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Zusammenfassung

Unter den Institutionen der Europäischen Union hat sich das Europäische Parlament als Befürworter der Geschlechtergleichstellung etabliert. Aktuelle Forschung zeichnet jedoch ein differenzierteres Bild des Europäischen Parlaments als geschlechtspolitischer Akteur und weist auf die Umstrittenheit von Geschlechtergleichstellung innerhalb der Institution hin. Viele Dimensionen dessen bleiben dabei in der Literatur nach wie vor unbeleuchtet. Diese Arbeit wählt mit dem Konzept des Femonationalismus von Sara Farris (2017) einen innovativen theoretischen Anknüpfungspunkt, um bestimmte Facetten der Opposition zu Geschlechtergleichstellung im Parlament näher zu untersuchen. Das Konzept hilft konkret dabei, die potenzielle Konvergenz feministischer Kräfte im Europäischen Parlament mit nationalistischen und neoliberalen Agenden in den Blick zu nehmen. Die Arbeit identifiziert femonationalistische Argumentationsstrukturen im Europäischen Parlament mithilfe einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse von 486 Redebeiträgen in 18 Plenardebatten von Abgeordneten zu relevanten Politikbereichen. In der Gesamtschau erweisen sich femonationalistische Argumentationsmuster nicht als zentral in den Debattenbeiträgen. Sie charakterisieren – in Form von Anti-Islam und Anti-Migrations-Kampagnen – ausschließlich die geschlechtspolitischen Positionen von denjenigen Fraktionen, die sich auf der mittig rechten bis radikal rechten Seite des politischen Spektrums bewegen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen somit auf, dass das Europäische Parlament trotz seines supranationalen Charakters als eine Arena für femonationalistische Politik von primär nationalistischen Akteuren genutzt wird.

Abstract

The European Parliament has established itself as a promoter of gender equality among European Union (EU) institutions. Yet, recent research has drawn a more nuanced picture of the European Parliament pointing to the struggle around gender equality between different actors in the institution. Still, many facets of this struggle remain unexplored. Further examining the contestation of gender equality in the European Parliament, this thesis takes the concept of femonationalism by Sara Farris (2017) as an innovative theoretical starting point. The analytical tools provided by femonationalism help to elucidate the potential convergence of gender equality promotion in the European Parliament with nationalist and neoliberal agendas. The qualitative content analysis of 486 speeches by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) delivered in 18 plenary debates on relevant policy areas reveals how different actors engage in femonationalism. It shows that femonationalist arguments – in form of anti-Islam and anti-migration campaigns – characterise the position on gender equality by centre-right and radical right political groups, although not very prevalent in the overall picture. The findings establish the European Parliament as a playing field for femonationalist politics by nationalist actors, its supranational character notwithstanding.

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List of Abbreviations

ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformers
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
ENF	Europe of Nations and Freedom
EPP	European Peoples Party
EU	European Union
FEMM Committee	Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality
GAL-TAN	Greens, Alternatives, Libertarians – Traditionalists, Authoritarians, Nationalists
Greens/EFA	Greens/European Free Alliance
GUE/NGL	Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
ID	Identity & Democracy
MEP	Members of the European Parliament
S&D	Socialists & Democrats
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFEU	Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union

1. Introduction

The European Union's (EU) goal of advancing gender equality is enshrined in numerous legal provisions in EU primary law. Fundamentally, Art. 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), constituting the EU as a community of values, formulates equality between women and men as a central value of European societies (European Union, 2012a). Guiding EU policymaking in practice, Art. 19 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) defines the objective of so-called gender mainstreaming, i.e., of integrating a gender perspective into all EU policies (European Union, 2012b). These provisions are only two examples of an extensive legislative framework institutionalising the EU's promotion of gender equality. Among EU institutions, it is the European Parliament, in particular, which has presented itself as a promoter of gender equality (see van der Vleuten, 2019). This reputation builds not least on the high numerical representation of women in the European Parliament (see, e.g., Fortin-Rittberger & Rittberger, 2014, p. 498) and the establishment of institutions for feminist governance such as the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM Committee) (Ahrens, 2016; Ahrens, 2019; Elomäki & Kantola, 2023).

Consequently, the promotion of gender equality by the European Parliament and the gendered nature of the institution itself have increasingly attracted scholarly attention. Still, scholars have sought to draw a more nuanced picture. For example, Kantola (2022) shows that the European Parliament's political groups strongly diverge on the issue of gender equality. Kantola & Lombardo (2021) specifically highlight the opposition to gender equality voiced by radical right populist parties. Concrete policy debates on sexual health and reproductive rights or the Istanbul Convention demonstrate that anti-gender mobilisations – a phenomenon that emerged across Europe over a decade ago (see, e.g., Kuhar & Paternotte, 2018) – also shape European Parliament politics (see, e.g., Santos & Geva, 2022; Berthet, 2022b). Against this background, Kantola & Lombardo's (2023) characterisation of the European Parliament as a “contradictory forerunner” (ibid.) aptly describes the contestation of gender equality in the institution.

This thesis joins these studies' attempts to provide a more differentiated view of the European Parliament as a gender equality actor. Analysing the contestation of gender equality in the European Parliament, it adopts a novel theoretical approach. It introduces the concept of femonationalism developed by sociologist Sara Farris (2017) in her widely cited book “In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism”. The concept enriches the scientific debate by theorising the entanglement of feminism with nationalism and neoliberalism and allows to better understand the promotion of gender equality by non-feminist forces. Its

political-economic approach, furthermore, offers a conceptual perspective largely missing in debate on the European Parliament and gender (for an exception, see Elomäki, 2023). In broader terms, the concept grasps the convergence of feminism with neoliberal and nationalist agendas undermining the emancipatory force at the heart of feminist movements (see Farris, 2017). Farris (2017) roots the emergence of femonationalism in the neoliberal organisation of Western European economies. Femonationalism denotes

“both [] the exploitation of feminist themes by nationalists and neoliberals in anti-Islam (but [...] also anti-immigration) campaigns and [] the participation of certain feminists and femocrats in the stigmatization of Muslim men under the banner of gender equality” (ibid., p. 4).

In this thesis, I argue that femonationalism can be considered as a form of contestation of gender equality which complements other forms of opposition. I raise the following research question: How do actors in the European Parliament engage in femonationalism?

Having reviewed the literature on the European Parliament, gender and femonationalism, the aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it seeks to contribute to a more differentiated understanding of the European Parliament from a gender perspective. Introducing a concept from political sociology to the study of EU institutions, it specifically adds to the literature on the European Parliament and gender. Second, it contributes to the literature on femonationalism, which has so far focused on different Western European national contexts (see, e.g., Bauer et al., 2024; Rahbari, 2021; Colella, 2021; Calderaro, 2022; Bader & Mottier, 2020) while empirical applications to the supranational level are rare (for an exception, see Greiwe, 2024). Also, in Farris’ (2017) conceptual elaborations, it is mainly the European Commission’s role that is addressed. Studying the European Parliament and single actors within the institution, hence, serves to further conceptualise the role of supranational EU institutions in the femonationalist convergence.

To study the engagement in femonationalism empirically, I analyse speeches by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in European Parliament plenary debates in three policy areas: gender equality, migration and integration as well as employment and social policy. I focus on three different femonationalist themes which are developed in the analytical framework: 1) *the sexualisation of racism*, 2) *the racialisation of sexism*, 3) *the gendered racialisation of reproductive work*. Identifying the main femonationalist actors, I turn to the level of political groups, national affiliations and individual MEPs. I conduct a Qualitative Content Analysis of

plenary debates following Mayring's (2022) procedure of deductive category assignment as it enables a strongly theory-based approach. Additionally, I draw on Kuckartz's (2018) steps of qualitative and quantitative evaluation to make assessments of the prevalence of the different femonationalist themes on the one hand, and the actors invoking these themes, on the other. The software MAXQDA is used to assist in the coding process.

The relevance of researching the European Parliament under the lens of femonationalism arises from the rise of anti-gender politics in Europe (see, e.g. Kuhar & Paternotte, 2018; Kováts, 2018) but also worldwide (see Piscopo & Walsh, 2020 and the whole symposium on *Backlash and the Future of Feminism* they are introducing). The recent success of right-wing parties in the European Parliament elections suggest that this trend will continue, if not intensify, in the upcoming years. The concept of femonationalism provides an analysis of one facet of this development. It reveals how the convergence of feminism with neoliberalism and nationalism has reinforced the discrimination against a particularly marginalised group in Europe, that of Muslim and non-Western migrant women. In this context, analyses adopting a femonationalist perspective can contribute to preserve feminism's emancipatory potential. As Krause & Schwenken (2021) encourage:

“How to save existing spaces as well as develop emancipatory policies – that also tackle structural issues and thus go beyond the individualism of anti-discriminatory policies – and support structures for all migrant women in light of strengthened anti-immigration and anti-gender-equality forces will be a major issue for the years to come, for feminist activists as well as scholars” (ibid., p. 348)

Contributing to this endeavour is a core motivation of this thesis. It proceeds as follows. The first chapter provides an overview of the existing literature on the European Parliament and gender. Building on this, the following chapter introduces the concept of femonationalism. In addition to defining the theoretical core notions of the concept, it conceptualises femonationalism as a contestation of gender equality. Moreover, the theoretical chapter discusses the role of the EU in femonationalism's constitution revealing that academic engagements with the European Parliament from a femonationalist perspective are still missing. The subsequent chapter outlines the analytical framework followed by a presentation of the findings. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the empirical and theoretical implications of its findings.

2. State of the Art: The European Parliament and gender

Overarchingly, this thesis adds to two bodies of literature. Firstly, it contributes to the literature on the European Parliament and gender by providing a novel political-economic perspective. Moreover, it elucidates femonationalist dynamics in the European Parliament as an empirical case that has not received scholarly attention in the literature on femonationalism. This section initially outlines how femonationalism can deepen the understanding of the European Parliament from a gender perspective.

At the beginning, the term 'gender' needs some clarification. While originally describing a linguistic category (Hawkesworth, 1997, p. 650), the meaning and use of the term 'gender' has become very variable (see Scott, 2013). Historically, the notion of 'gender' instead of 'woman' was invoked by feminists to de-essentialise the experience of what it means to be a woman and embed women's experiences in more structural gender relations (see *ibid.*, Scott 1986).¹ In a widely recognised definition, Scott (1986) points to two dimensions of gender as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and [...] a primary way of signifying relationships of power” (*ibid.*, p. 1067). In feminist scholarship, gender poses a core theoretical and analytical concept constituting the transformative and critical approach of its academic work (*ibid.*, p. 1054). Crucial for this paper's research agenda is the conception of gender as an analytical tool (see Scott, 1986; Hawkesworth, 1997). As an analytical tool, gender “identifies puzzles or problems in need of exploration or clarification and provides concepts, definitions, and hypotheses to guide research” (Hawkesworth, 1997, p. 655).

Authors studying the European Parliament have deployed gender as an analytical tool to shed light on different aspects. Several books such as “Gender and the European Union” (Kantola, 2010) or “The Routledge handbook of gender and EU politics” (Abels et al., 2021) adopt a gender perspective in EU academia. The number of academic pieces specifically about the European Parliament has been rising significantly in recent years. The results of a literature search on March 5, 2024 in the databases Web of Science and Scopus as well as the online library catalogue of the University of Vienna using the keywords “European Parliament” and “gender” show that the large share of journal articles and book sections researching the relation between the European Parliament and the concept of gender has been published within the last five years. The so far only comprehensive study of the European Parliament from a gender

¹ Scott (2013, p. 6) remarks that the notion of 'gender' has nevertheless mainly referred to the experience of women in policies and academic work.

perspective is provided by Ahrens & Rolandsen Agustín (2019) in their edited book “Gendering the European Parliament: Structures, Policies and Practices”. The individual contributions establish the European Parliament as a relevant actor for studying the EU from a gender perspective because it “enjoys a strong reputation as a promoter of gender equality” (van der Vleuten, 2019, p. 35). The promotion of ‘gender equality’, albeit an inherently contested concept (Lombardo et al., 2009), has consequently been a central focal point in literature on the European Parliament and gender, as will become clear in this section (see also Ahrens & Rolandsen Agustín, 2021, p. 108). Moreover, the gendered nature of the institution itself has attracted scholarly attention (see, *ibid.*).

Early work mainly turned to women’s descriptive representation in the European Parliament (see, e.g., Stockemer, 2008; Fortin-Rittberger & Rittberger, 2014; Fortin-Rittberger & Rittberger, 2015; Lühiste & Kenny, 2016; Abels, 2020; Aldrich & Daniel, 2020). These studies jointly highlight the relatively high descriptive representation of women in the European Parliament compared to its national counterparts (Stockemer, 2008, p. 468; Fortin-Rittberger & Rittberger, 2014, p. 498), other EU institutions (Kantola, 2010, p. 60) and parliaments worldwide (Aldrich and Daniel 2020, p. 740). The share of female Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the European Parliament has been growing from 16,6% in 1979 to 39,9% in 2024, constantly being higher than the average share of female parliamentarians in national parliaments which amounted to 31,6% in March 2024 (Zamfir, 2024, p. 2). Scholars point to several factors accounting for the high descriptive representation of women in the European Parliament. Kantola (2010, p. 60) identifies four institutional factors frequently discussed in the literature: the electoral system, the second-order character of European Parliament elections, the style of politics in the European Parliament and the novelty of the institution (see also Stockemer, 2008, pp. 477-479). However, scholarly consensus has yet to be established. Fortin-Rittberger & Rittberger (2014), for example, reject the widely held assumption that the electoral system is a crucial factor in explaining the higher representation of women in the European Parliament. Moreover, women’s representation in the European Parliament varies strongly between national affiliation, political groups and committees (see Kantola, 2010, pp. 50-75; Abels, 2020), warranting a more differentiated perspective. Crucially, Lühiste & Kenny (2016) identify party ideologies as the determining factor, with the level of women’s representation being higher in left-wing than in right-wing parties.

Recent scholarly work attempts to provide more differentiated insights into the gendered dynamics of European Parliament politics. They zoom in on single actors within the European

Parliament, i.e., focus their analyses on the meso-level (see Ahrens et al., 2023). Overall, these studies respond to Ahrens & Rolandsen Agustín (2019, p. 1) who point out the lack of engagement with European Parliament internal struggles on gender equality. These contributions have, furthermore, examined different facets of gender equality beyond descriptive representation.² For example, scholars have turned to the role of gender in processes of political group formation (Ahrens & Kantola, 2023), practices for promoting gender equality within political groups (Kantola, 2022), the perception of gender equality in political groups by MEPs and political staff (Kantola & Rolandsen Agustín, 2019), or female party group chairs (Müller & Pansardi, 2023). Moreover, the fight against sexual harassment within the European Parliament kicked off by the parliament-internal movement #MeTooEP has been studied in the literature (see Berthet, 2022a; Berthet & Kantola, 2021).

Similarly, the FEMM Committee has turned into a centre of scholarly attention as a crucial actor in the promotion of gender equality by the European Parliament (Ahrens, 2016, p. 778; Warasin, 2019, p. 187; Ahrens & Rolandsen Agustín, 2021, p. 114). Scholars have identified several institutional constraints the FEMM Committee faces in influencing policymaking, for example, its status as a neutralised committee³ (see, e.g., Ahrens, 2016; Kantola & Lombardo, 2023, pp. 300f.). Still, Ahrens (2016) posits that the FEMM Committee has been able to overcome these institutional constraints and defend its role as an advocate for gender equality in the European Parliament. Similarly, Elomäki & Kantola's (2023) analysis shows that the FEMM Committee succeeded in promoting a feminist approach to the EU's crisis response during the Covid-19 pandemic. Nugent (2019), however, demonstrates that within the FEMM Committee female MEPs are more actively involved than their male colleagues, so gender equality is still primarily promoted by female MEPs.

In addition to focusing on individual actors, scholars have also examined the European Parliament's promotion of gender equality in EU policies. Providing a historical outline of the European Parliament's role as a gender equality actor, van der Vleuten (2019) finds that the European Parliament has broadened its policy agenda from the integration of women into the labour market to other aspects of gender equality. Recent initiatives discussed in the literature include the European Parliament's support for the EU's ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence

² See Childs & Krook (2006) for a critique of the assumptions guiding the general research agenda on women's representation.

³ In a neutralised committee, membership is voluntary and additional to membership in a compulsory committee (see Ahrens, 2016).

(‘Istanbul Convention’) (Berthet, 2022b) or the liberalisation of abortion rights (Berthet, 2022c). Moreover, the promotion of gender equality has developed into a cross-cutting issue for all policy areas, known as gender mainstreaming⁴. The European Parliament is one of the few parliaments worldwide which has officially adopted a gender mainstreaming approach to its parliamentary activities since 2003 (Elomäki & Ahrens, 2022, p. 325, Ahrens, 2016 p. 782; see also Ahrens, 2019). Its progress is monitored by the FEMM Committee as gender mainstreaming is yet to be fully implemented (Elomäki & Ahrens, 2022, p. 325). For example, Elomäki (2023) shows that a gender perspective is still often silenced in economic governance.

In sum, these studies draw a more differentiated picture challenging the prevailing notion of the European Parliament as a unified actor in the promotion of gender equality. Taking a closer look, actors within the European Parliament are far from being united in their promotion of gender equality. On the contrary, gender equality tends to polarise opinions among MEPs and may form the basis of a new political cleavage dividing political groups (see, e.g., Ahrens & Kantola, 2023; Ahrens et al., 2022). Traditionally, the party system in the European Parliament has been characterised by two dimensions, the left-right cleavage and the integration-sovereignty cleavage (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 23-27). Moreover, socio-cultural policy issues, growing in relevance, have split parties across Europe along the GAL (Greens, Alternatives, Libertarians) vs. TAN (Traditionalists, Authoritarians, Nationalists) axis (Hooghe et al., 2002), which is also reflected in the European Parliament’s party system (see, e.g., Börzel & Hartlapp, 2022). Political groups’ position on gender equality is closely intertwined with these structuring dimensions of European Parliament politics, particularly, the GAL-TAN axis (see e.g., Ahrens & Kantola, 2023, p. 825; Ahrens et al., 2022, p. 808, 810). Studies of the 8th and 9th parliamentary term reveal the following patterns.

Based on insights from Ahrens & Kantola (2023), Elomäki & Ahrens (2022), Kantola (2022), Kantola & Rolandsen Agustín (2019), four political groups can broadly be considered as supporters of gender equality. The *Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left* (GUE/NGL) and the *Greens/European Free Alliance* (Greens/EFA) appear as the strongest promoters. According to Ahrens & Kantola (2023, p. 825), they demonstrate the highest level of gender equality in the process of forming political groups, as also reflected in female group members' perceptions of gender equality (Kantola & Rolandsen Agustín, 2019, p. 775) and

⁴ The gender mainstreaming approach took centre stage for the first time in the United Nations Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 1995 (see United Nations, 1996; for a scholarly discussion see Cavaghan, 2017). In the following, it began to increasingly shape European Union politics, mainly promoted by the European Commission (Pollack & Hafner-Burton, 2000, pp. 435-437).

through the emphasis on gender equality as a core principle in their political group activities (Kantola, 2022, pp. 227-230). Moreover, Elomäki & Ahrens (2022, pp. 329f.) establish both political groups as the most ambitious in promoting gender mainstreaming. Regarding the *Socialists & Democrats* (S&D) and the *Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe* (ALDE) (8th term)/Renew Europe (9th term), these authors show that they share a similar position, but that their support for gender equality is less consistent. For example, Ahrens & Kantola (2023) reveal that, in group formation processes, gender equality is “appl[ied] [] pragmatically” (ibid., p. 825). Kantola (2022) argues that gender equality is treated as a “flexible” (ibid., p. 230) group-internal norm in these political groups (ibid., pp. 230-233). If compared to GUE/NGL and Greens/EFA, Elomäki & Ahrens (2022, p. 330) demonstrate that their support for gender mainstreaming is not as extensive.

The opposition to gender equality, according to these studies, is formed by the *European Peoples Party* (EPP), the *European Conservatives and Reformists* (ECR) group as well as the *Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy* (EFDD) (8th term) and *Europe of Nations and Freedom* (ENF) (8th term)/*Identity and Democracy* (ID) group (9th term). Ahrens & Kantola, (2023, p. 825) assess that gender equality is no guiding principle in the group formation process of any of these political groups. Nonetheless, the EPP emerges as the most heterogeneous political group as members are split on the issue (see Elomäki & Ahrens, 2022, pp. 330f.). Still, Kantola (2022, p. 234) underlines that the EPP’s overall reluctance to promote gender equality as the biggest political group in the European Parliament has hampered the progress on implementing gender equality in policymaking. According to her findings, practices to promote gender equality within the EPP are, likewise, characterised as “contradictory” (see ibid.). The case of the EPP shows that gender equality is not only a contested issue *between* but also *within* political groups (Kantola & Lombardo, 2021, p. 575, see also Warasin, 2019, pp. 193f.; Kantola, 2022, p. 238), dependent also on the national party affiliation of MEPs (see Berthet, 2022b, pp. 693f. on the ‘Istanbul Convention’).

Similar to the EPP, Kantola (2022, pp. 234-238) highlights that the EFDD and the ECR show contradictory practices promoting gender equality group internally. Beyond group internal politics, Elomäki & Ahrens (2022, p. 331) point out that the ECR opposes gender mainstreaming more generally. Exploring the relationship between conservatism and gender equality, Gaweda et al. (2023, p. 838) reveal that the ECR group’s opposition often does not appear in the form of outright rejection but of indirect strategies, bending and stretching the meaning of the concept. Still, research has established radical right political groups as the

forefront of opposing gender equality. Elomäki & Ahrens (2022, p. 331) point out that the ID joins the ECR in its opposition to gender mainstreaming. Kantola (2022) stresses that ENF and ID consider the concept of gender “irrelevant” if not “dangerous” (ibid., p. 238). This assessment is supported by Kantola & Lombardo's (2021) analysis, showing that radical right populist parties in the European Parliament use the concept of ‘gender ideology’ as a direct form for objecting to gender equality (ibid., pp. 572f.).

These analyses suggest that gender equality’s contestation among conservative and radical right parties can be embedded in the rise of anti-gender politics in Europe more generally (see also Kantola & Lombardo, 2021; Berthet, 2022b; Santos & Geva, 2022). Across Europe, Kuhar & Paternotte (2018, pp. 8-10) observe that different actors unite in denouncing the concept of ‘gender’ as a leftist political ideology. According to populist rhetoric, the EU takes part in spreading a so-called ‘gender ideology’ in a colonial manner (Korolczuk & Graff, 2018). Anti-gender mobilisations have emerged across Europe especially since 2010 (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2018, p. 8). Depending on the country, the Catholic Church or right-wing populists act as key drivers for mobilising against policy reforms such as the introduction of same-sex marriage or the liberalisation of reproductive rights (ibid., pp. 8-10). While the phenomenon of transnational anti-gender politics is very heterogenous and embedded in concrete national contexts, it has also entered the supranational sphere of European Parliament politics and increasingly shaped its gender equality policymaking (see, e.g., Kantola & Lombardo, 2021; Berthet, 2022b; Santos & Geva, 2022).

Summarising, the literature on the European Parliament from a gender perspective has concentrated on a variety of different aspects. Considering that the meaning of ‘gender equality’ is constantly subject to contestation within and beyond research (see Lombardo et al., 2009), the field is highly dynamic. Nonetheless, a key tendency can be observed in existing literature. Rather than a united actor, the European Parliament appears as a “contradictory forerunner” (Kantola & Lombardo, 2023) in promoting gender equality. These contradictions serve as a starting point also for this thesis. Joining the attempt to provide a differentiated picture, it introduces the concept of femonationalism developed by Sara Farris (2017) to the scholarly debate. Rooted in political sociology, the concept has not yet entered EU studies. It provides a promising lens to further shed light on the European Parliament from a gender analytical perspective. In its empirical manifestation, femonationalism can be considered a contestation of gender equality (see Chapter 3.2.).

Femonationalism offers political economic arguments only rarely taken into account in the literature on gender and the European Parliament so far. Most existing studies on the European Parliament and gender depart from the theoretical assumptions of feminist institutionalism which posits that institutions, formal and informal, are inherently gendered (Ahrens & Kantola, 2023; Kantola & Rolandsen Agustín, 2019; Ahrens, 2016; Berthet, 2022a; Elomäki & Ahrens, 2022; Berthet & Kantola, 2021). An exception is presented by Elomäki (2023) who demonstrates that the European Parliament's approach to gender equality in EU economic policy is still dominated by "strategic silence" (ibid.). Her observations resonate well with one of Farris' (2017) core arguments.

Moreover, the femonationalist perspective allows to take an intersectional approach which has been identified as an important avenue for future research in the study of European Parliament from a gender perspective (see Ahrens & Rolandsen Agustín, 2021). Femonationalism provides exactly the conceptual tools to capture the intersectional discrimination facing Muslim and non-Western migrant women.⁵ Gender is thus taken seriously as an analytical category that is closely linked to other categories such as race and class (Scott, 1986, p. 1054). This is crucial for the emancipatory approach of gender analysis (see Hawkesworth 1997, p. 680).

Finally, femonationalism helps to further elucidate different aspects of the contestation of gender equality in the European Parliament already researched. For example, while earlier studies assess radical right-wing parties' promotion of gender equality as a strategic instrumentalisation (see, e.g., Kantola & Lombardo, 2021; Ahrens et al., 2022; Gaweda et al., 2023), femonationalism points to the central role of women in nationalist ideologies to make sense of this development. Hence, it offers insights that can deepen the understanding of this dynamic. Femonationalism's theoretical claims are presented in the following.

3. Theoretical framework: The concept of femonationalism

The concept of femonationalism was introduced by sociologist Sara R. Farris (see Farris, 2011).⁶ It became well known following the publication of Farris' (2017) widely cited book "In the name of women's rights: The rise of femonationalism". The following chapter defines femonationalism and presents its key theoretical arguments. Laying down the conceptual

⁵ Note that Möser (2022) understands intersectionality as an analytical tool distinct from femonationalism.

⁶ Please note that I have already applied the concept of femonationalism in a seminar paper (see Greiwe, 2024). The content of this chapter – but not the formulation – is therefore similar to certain sections of this seminar paper.

foundations for the empirical analysis, it argues that femonationalism can be understood as a contestation of gender equality which may also become manifest in the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament's nor any other EU institutions' role in shaping femonationalism has been thoroughly investigated beyond remarks on the European Commission's migrant integration policies by Farris (2017) herself (for an exception, see Greiwe, 2024). This is the second research gap, that this thesis intends to address.

According to Farris (2017), femonationalism can be considered "one of the most puzzling and powerful ideological formations of our times" (ibid., p. 180). But what does femonationalism refer to? The term as such is an abbreviation for "feminist and femocratic nationalism" (ibid., p. 4). It seeks to grasp an inherently contradictory phenomenon, namely, the merging of emancipatory and non-emancipatory agendas in the encounter between nationalists, feminists and neoliberals (see, e.g., ibid., p. 9, p. 17). In more concrete terms, Farris (2017) defines femonationalism as

"both [...] the exploitation of feminist themes by nationalists and neoliberals in anti-Islam (but [...] also anti-immigration) campaigns and [...] the participation of certain feminists and femocrats in the stigmatization of Muslim men under the banner of gender equality" (ibid., p. 4).

Based on findings from a comparative case study of the Netherlands, France and Italy, Farris (2017) conceptualises three different dimensions of femonationalism at the theoretical level: as convergence, as ideological formation, and as political economy.

3.1. The theoretical dimensions of femonationalism

Firstly, the concept of femonationalism captures the *convergence* between nationalist, neoliberal and feminist actors (Farris, 2017, pp. 6-10). The term *convergence* refers to

"the encounter between different actors and movements [...] without them losing their relative autonomy, and without the encounter itself (necessarily) producing identity or homogeneity" (ibid., p. 6).

Farris (2017) highlights the concept of *convergence* to emphasise the diverse range of agendas that shape femonationalism. Nationalists, neoliberals and feminists unite in their common assumption of Western supremacy which is coupled with anti-Islam rhetoric (ibid., pp. 10-13). However, these groups pursue independent political projects (ibid.). According to Farris (2017, pp. 9f., p. 42) it is the participation of feminist intellectuals, politicians or bureaucrats, in

particular, which reinforces and ultimately legitimises the Islam's stigmatisation by non-feminist actors.

Femonationalism, secondly, is conceptualised as an *ideological formation* to capture both the substantial claims put forward as well as its discursive and material mode of operation (Farris (2017, pp. 10-13). Building on Benedict Anderson's concept of modularity – pointing to both the universality and particularity of the nation – Farris (2017, p. 11) shows that the femonationalist ideology reveals recurring patterns across Europe. The ideological foundation of the convergence, as mentioned before, is the common assumption of Western supremacy (ibid., pp. 10f.). Accordingly, femonationalist discourses and practices portray the religion and culture of Islam as inherently misogynistic Other⁷ (ibid., p. 8, p. 109). Muslim men are depicted as oppressors while Muslim women are considered as the primary victims to be emancipated from patriarchal oppression (see, e.g., ibid., pp. 73f.). Regardless of the particular national context, femonationalism, thus, draws on the Western, colonial topos of “white men [] saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak, 1988, p. 296, see Farris, 2017, p. 11, p. 22). According to Farris (2017, p. 11), the non-Western – ‘brown’- woman that this topos describes is today homogenously represented by the Muslim woman.

Importantly, the concept of femonationalism highlights that the invocation of feminist themes by nationalists must be understood not as a mere instrumentalisation of these themes but as connected to the central role of women in the nation's imaginary (ibid., p. 69). Nationalism is deeply gendered inasmuch as women – or, rather, the female body – have taken on a central role as “biological reproducers of the [...] nation” (ibid., p. 72) in nationalist ideologies (ibid., pp. 68-70). In the modern nation-state, picturing women as symbols of the nation has served to naturalise the socially constructed idea of the nation (ibid., p. 69). In substantive terms, this does not only imply the protection of ‘national’ women from the misogynist male Other (ibid., p. 73). It also translates into viewing Muslim and non-Western migrant women primarily as the “embodiment of the *other* nation” (ibid., p. 103, emphasis added) as Farris' (2017, pp. 93-103) analysis of national migrant integration programmes shows.

Thirdly, the core argument of femonationalism is that these ideological beliefs are not only reproduced discursively but also grounded in specific material conditions (ibid., p. 12). The concrete materiality of femonationalist ideology is grasped by the theoretical dimension, which describes femonationalism as a *political economy*. To understand the femonationalist

⁷ The term ‘Other’ is capitalised to signal that it is a particular other culture, nation, religion, etc. that serves as the main reference point of identity constructions.

convergence, it is crucial to turn to the political-economic logic guiding the gendered imaginary of Muslim and non-Western migrant men and women. The rescue of victimised Muslim and non-Western migrant women and exclusion of Muslim and non-Western migrant men from Europe is linked to the gendered integration of non-Western migrants into Western European economies (see Farris, 2017, Chapter 5). While non-Western migrant men are predominantly finding occupations in the productive sphere, non-Western migrant women are systematically deployed as labour force in the reproductive sphere (*ibid.*, pp. 124-131).

The separation of the economy into a productive and reproductive sphere is a key moment of the emergence of capitalist societies. As the subsistence economy was superseded by market-oriented production, “the reproduction of the worker began to be considered as valueless from an economic viewpoint and even ceased to be considered as work” (Federici, 2004, pp. 74f., see also Farris, 2017, pp. 131-134). Women’s performance of reproductive work provided – and continues to provide – an essential condition for capitalist accumulation (Federici, 2004, pp. 74f.). The notion of ‘reproduction’ has often been broadened to ‘social reproduction’ in feminist scholarship. Social reproduction is defined as “the social processes and human relations associated with the creation and maintenance of the communities upon which all production and exchange rest” (Bakker, 2003, p. 67). In more concrete terms, social reproduction involves the biological reproduction of the species, the reproduction of the labour force and the reproduction of provisioning and caring needs (Bakker & Gill, 2003, p. 32, for another definition see Hoskyns & Rai, 2007, p. 300). Recent scholarship has attempted to make visible and provide a tool for measuring the costs associated with the performance of socially reproductive work not economically recognised (see Rai et al., 2014).

Central to Farris’ (2017) argument is the recent change the organisation of social reproduction has undergone in Europe. Following Western feminism’s struggle for emancipation, the male bread-winner model has been increasingly abolished and the number of women working in the productive sphere has been rising (*ibid.*, pp. 136f., pp. 173f.). This has created a gap in the provision of reproductive work formerly carried out by these women (*ibid.*). At the same time, neoliberal policies, such as the privatisation and partial commodification of care and domestic work, have reduced the provision of public services in this sector (*ibid.*, p. 137, see also Dowling, 2021, pp. 39f. on the ‘triple privatisation’ of care). Outside the private household and public services, reproductive work turned into waged work that, however, “continues to be socially stigmatized, very poorly paid, and undesired by most western European women” (Farris, 2017, p. 137). At the same time, the need for labour force persists, as reproductive work

can neither be fully automatised nor outsourced (ibid., p. 175). The need for labour force is filled by non-Western migrant women (ibid., p. 137, p. 138) performing feminised care work in private households, in hospitals, residential care as well as home care and cleaning (Farris, 2017, p. 157). This constitutes the logic of the femonationalist political economy.

Overarchingly, Farris (2017) thus shows how the economic and societal development, linked to the neoliberalisation of western European economies, has formed a labour force in the reproductive sector which is still gendered but also getting more and more racialised (ibid., p. 143). Farris (2017) argues that non-western migrant women's employment in the care and domestic sector can be best captured by the notion of a "regular army of labour", leaning on Marx's notion of the "reserve army of labour" (ibid., p. 177). Drawing on Marx's concept, Farris (2017, p. 117) intends to underline that non-Western migrant women are welcomed in Europe as a workforce that European economies desperately need – in contrast to non-Western migrant men who are depicted as threats in social terms but also as a competing labour force on the labour market (ibid.). Following Farris' (2017) argument, the goal of emancipating non-Western migrant and Muslim women as an 'act of saviour' is, thus, intertwined with the economic necessity of filling the care gap in Western European countries (ibid., p. 16). Farris (2017, pp. 124-128) finds in her empirical analysis of migrant integration programmes in the Netherlands, France and partly Italy a particularly illustrative manifestation of this femonationalist convergence. These policies, while encouraging non-Western migrant women to work, have de facto channelled these women into the reproductive sphere (ibid.). More broadly, Farris' (2017) observation resonates with concepts such as global care chains (Yeates, 2009) or care extractivism (Wichterich, 2019) capturing the increasing globalisation and transnational organisation of reproductive work.

3.2. Femonationalism as a contestation of gender equality

Having outlined Farris' (2017) core arguments, the following section establishes femonationalism as a contestation of gender equality. In a broader sense, the concept of femonationalism addresses an issue widely discussed as the co-optation of feminism (see, e.g., de Jong & Kimm, 2017). These debates show that Farris' (2017) empirical observations are not entirely new. Still, the concept of femonationalism adds a novel perspective to this literature by focusing on the political-economic logic underpinning these developments. Although the notion of 'co-optation' still lacks a consistent conceptualisation, the core argument informing the debate is that feminist ideas have increasingly been adopted by non-feminist actors for non-feminist ends (de Jong & Kimm, 2017, p. 186), sometimes even with the support of feminist

actors (*ibid.*, p. 188). Primarily, the concept of co-optation is drawn upon to describe the increasing absorption of feminism by neoliberalism (see, e.g., Eschle & Maiguashca, 2018; Fraser, 2013). It has also been used to characterise how the EU's gender equality policy goal of family-work balance has been increasingly dominated by economic concerns about employment (see Stratigaki, 2004).

Although not linked to the literature on co-optation explicitly, scholars have made a related argument with regards to feminism and racism. The mobilisation of feminist themes for racist agendas is captured by concepts such as “gendered Islamophobia” (Zine, 2006) or “enlightened fundamentalism” (Fekete, 2006). Much of this work roots the linkage between Islamophobia and feminism in the imperialist discourses accompanying the ‘war on terror’ post 9/11 (see *ibid.*). Nonetheless, scholars acknowledge that feminism has always been a heterogeneous concept subject of contestation (de Jong & Kimm, 2017, p. 189). There is hence no unanimous agreement on the definitional core of feminism. This consideration is also relevant for the subsequent discussion that links femonationalism to gender equality.

Gender equality is a core concept in the definition of femonationalism (see introduction to Chapter 3) which, *inter alia*, concerns the “deployment of gender equality within xenophobic campaigns” (Farris, 2017, p. 5). Still, the exact meaning of the concept is not clarified. Lombardo et al. (2009, p. 7) argue that gender equality is constructed discursively and, thus, inherently contested. This thesis suggests that femonationalism, in its discursive mode of operation (see Farris, 2017, p. 12), can be understood as part of the discursive politics around gender equality. Lombardo et al. (2009) define four ways – fixing, shrinking, stretching and bending – in which the meaning of gender equality is constantly being changed (see *ibid.*, pp. 3f.). Following their conceptualisation, femonationalism could be best considered as a form of bending which is defined as “shap[ing] meaning at the expense of the goal of gender equality” (*ibid.*, p. 5).

While I follow Lombardo et al. 's (2009) assumptions on gender equality, I use the term ‘contestation’ instead of ‘bending’ to define the relationship between femonationalism and gender equality. Doing so, I seek to underline that femonationalism, due to the non-emancipatory forces at its core, should not be understood as one interpretation of gender equality among many, but as a contestation of its emancipatory agenda. As outlined in the previous section, the transformation of feminist themes for non-emancipatory agendas turns femonationalism into an ideological formation inherently contradicting the emancipatory core of gender equality. Choosing the notion of contestation, moreover, reinforces femonationalism

as an ideological formation rather than a discursive strategy (see Farris, 2017, p. 54), whereas the concept of bending has been conceptualised as a strategic tool in the literature (see Kantola & Lombardo, 2021).

Given the frequent linkages to the literature on anti-gender politics, it is important to consider how the concept of femonationalism relates to the debate on 'gender'. As discussed in the literature review, it is the notion of 'gender' - although filled with various meanings – which is particularly contested among opponents of the concept of gender equality, also in the European Parliament. Different to other forms of opposition to gender equality, femonationalism does not concern the notion of 'gender' as such. Still, empirically these two forms of opposition may go hand in hand.⁸ For example, MEPs might oppose the notion of 'gender' and, at the same time, advance anti-Islam campaigns “in the name of women’s rights” (Farris, 2017). In her conceptual elaborations, Farris (2017) refers to both 'gender equality' and 'women’s rights' as potential reference points for femonationalist claims. The analysis will, hence, take both into account. Nonetheless, the essentialist conception of womanhood in nationalism, outlined earlier, suggests that 'women’s rights' might be more frequently invoked than 'gender equality' in femonationalist discourses. Nonetheless, femonationalist actors and anti-gender actors should not be conflated.⁹

Recently, feminist scholars themselves have questioned the analytical value of gender. For example, Scott (2013) argues that it has lost much of its critical momentum given that its meaning has become increasingly vague. A similar argument is made in the literature on co-optation. Nonetheless, Scott (2013, pp. 74f.) pleads for the continuing value of gender to examine politics of gender and gendered politics as dynamic societal and cultural processes. Farris' (2017) concept has neither escaped scholarly criticism. Most prominently, Möser's (2022) discussion of Farris' (2017) methodological approach and theoretical claims raises a number of concerns. Möser's (2022) critique centres the depiction of Western feminism in the concept. She claims that Farris (2017) argument on the participation of Western feminists in xenophobic campaigns has a weak empirical basis and, thus, over-generalises feminisms' entanglement with racism (ibid., p. 1546). According to Möser (2022 p. 1551), Farris' (2017) focus on convergence neglects the difference between the political projects and engages into an oversimplified categorisation of people and agendas. In a similar vein, Möser (2022, pp. 1556f.)

⁸ See also Colella's (2021) analysis of the convergence between femonationalism and the anti-gender backlash.

⁹ Note that Farris (2017) builds on Jasbir Puar's (2007) concept of homonationalism which has highlighted the mobilisation of LGBTIQ+ rights by nationalists in the United States in the course of the war on terror. LGBTIQ+ rights have been a traditional target of anti-gender campaigns (see Kuhar & Paternotte, 2018).

argues that Western feminism is juxtaposed to Muslim and migrant women without justification depriving Muslim and non-western women of their (feminist) agency. Möser (2022, p. 1557) proposes intersectionality – a concept developed by Crenshaw (1989) – to capture the discrimination non-Western migrant women, as individuals rather than as a group, are facing.

Möser's (2022) critique of the concept raises important points to consider. Nonetheless, I regard Farris' (2017) political-economic considerations as an important perspective adding to the debate on the promotion of gender equality by the European Parliament (see above). Overall, her assessment encourages rather than discourages further empirical investigation. The concept's empirical shortcomings can only be addressed by further empirical analysis, as provided by this thesis. The EU is a promising case for such an endeavour. Möser (2017, p. 1555) rightly points out that the EU's complex relation to gender equality is not taken into account in Farris' (2017) discussion. Taking a closer look at the role of the EU, in particular, the European Parliament in the constitution of femonationalism, I intend to provide crucial insights for such a discussion.

3.3. The European Union and femonationalism

This elaboration of femonationalism's three theoretical dimensions shows that the main focus of the concept lies in understanding the empirical manifestations of femonationalism in different Western European national settings. In Farris' (2017) own words, femonationalism serves as a tool to “analyz[e] similar phenomena in different national settings across western Europe in particular and in the West more generally” (ibid., p. 17). After all, it is a concept that is concerned with nationalism as a core ideological notion. This is also reflected in existing empirical analyses of femonationalism. Next to the case studies of the Netherlands, France and Italy provided by Farris (2017), other authors have examined civic integration programmes in Sweden (Bauer et al., 2024), gender activism in Belgian right-wing politics (Rahbari, 2021), anti-gender politics in the discourse of the Fratelli d'Italia in Italy (Colella, 2021), the Muslim face-veil ban in France (Calderaro, 2022) and the ban of female genital mutilation and populist politics in Switzerland (Bader and Mottier, 2020) under the lens of femonationalism. The role of supranational actors in the constitution of femonationalism, however, is not yet empirically explored. Considering the crucial role of the EU and, in particular, the European Parliament, in advancing gender equality in Europe (see above), the question arises of what role different EU actors play in shaping femonationalism.

Farris' (2017) own remarks suggest that supranational EU actors have significantly shaped the conditions for the femonationalist convergence. “In the name of women's rights: The rise of

femonationalism” includes several references to the EU, in particular, the European Commission and its migrant integration policies.¹⁰ As will be shown in this section, the Commission’s migrant integration policies are a crucial contribution of EU actors to creating femonationalism. Farris (2017) reveals that it is primarily the neoliberal approach to migrant integration policies that defines the European Commission’s role in constituting femonationalism.

Farris (2017, p. 83) argues that the European Commission’s promotion of gender equality in migrant integration policies was initially confined to single references to the integration of migrant women into the labour market. However, she assesses that national migrant integration policies shifted the focus to the private sphere and the family diverging from the Commission’s original approach (*ibid.*, p. 110). This can be observed in all three national settings analysed by Farris (2017). Farris (2017) points out that this shared focus on the private sphere reveals strong nationalist components (*ibid.*, p. 92). Hence, it must be understood as an expression of the modularity of nationalism rather than as an instance of Europeanisation or a post-national turn (*ibid.*, p. 92, 110). In general, Farris (2017, pp. 111f.) suggests that decision-making at the EU level is strongly informed by national agendas, questioning the assumption of post-sovereignty in the relation between the EU and its member states (*ibid.*, p. 112).

Farris (2017, p. 84) contends that gender then turned into a more prominent policy concern in the EU’s approach to migrant integration. Migrant women are defined as an explicit target group in the Commission’s 2011 policy documents on migrant integration (*ibid.*, p. 84). The Commission continues to promote a focus on employment as the main area of migrant integration but applies more selective criteria for admitting migrants based on European economies’ needs (*ibid.*, pp. 119f.). According to Farris (2017, p. 121, 123), this can be viewed in line with the EU’s neoliberal workfare strategy, which was aimed at increasing employment rates in its broader economic and social policy agenda. At the heart of this strategy stood the linking of welfare state benefits with the condition of employment (*ibid.*). As Farris (2017, p. 120) argues the policy goal of closing employment gaps between migrant men and women followed the same rationale. Still, the neoliberal economic agenda converged with Western feminists’ emphasis on work as the primary realm of integration – and emancipation – as gender

¹⁰ Chapter 3 and 4 are devoted to a discussion of three concrete documents issued by the European Commission on integration: the 2005 Communication “A Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union”, the 2011 Communication “European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals” and the accompanying Commission Staff Working Paper “EU initiatives supporting the integration of third-country nationals”.

equality agencies in the European Commission joined the call for more labour market participation by migrant women (Farris, 2017, pp. 122f.).

In contrast to the European Commission, and despite its strong reputation as a promoter of gender equality, the European Parliament and its role in shaping femonationalism is barely mentioned in Farris' (2017) conceptual discussion. Farris (2017) solely points to nationalist right-wing parties' contradictory promotion of gender equality in the European Parliament election campaigns in 2014:

“[O]ne of the striking features that distinguishes contemporary European nationalist parties from their older counterparts [fascism, author's note] is the invocation of gender equality (and occasionally LGBT rights) within an otherwise xenophobic rhetoric”
(Farris, 2017, p. 1)

Her observation suggests that the European Parliament, its supranational character notwithstanding, may serve as a platform for nationalists to advance femonationalist claims (see also Greiwe, 2024). Still, the European Parliament consists of several political groups with different ideological backgrounds. Yet their relation to femonationalism is neither conceptualised nor empirically investigated. This thesis begins its scientific inquiry from this point.

The European Parliament promises to be a particularly interesting case for analysing femonationalism's theoretical claims. This is not only because of its supranational character and prominent role in the promotion of gender equality but also given the involvement of MEPs from Eastern European member states in European Parliament politics. In Farris' (2017) conceptual elaborations, only Western European national contexts are addressed while considerations on femonationalism in Eastern Europe are missing. Exploring the role of Eastern European MEPs in shaping femonationalist discourses and practices promises to be particularly insightful considering that the reproductive sector in many Western European countries heavily relies on Eastern European women's labour force (see, e.g., Wichterich, 2019 on 24-hour services in Germany; Maier, 2022 on 24-hour services in Austria). The European Parliament might thus constitute a platform for actors from different national settings and political ideological backgrounds to take part in the femonationalist convergence. Against this background, I intend to explore the European Parliament politics more in depth with view to manifestations of femonationalism.

4. Research design

The following section outlines the analytical framework guiding the empirical analysis. It presents the research question and expectations that follow from the theoretical considerations. Subsequently, three femonationalist themes are introduced operationalising the concept's key notions. Methodologically, this thesis relies on a Qualitative Content Analysis in the tradition of Mayring (2022) and Kuckartz (2018). Methodical challenges and limitations of the framework are reflected upon in the end.

4.1. Research question and expectations

Femonationalism describes an empirical phenomenon and provides an analytical toolbox. Conceptualising empirical manifestations of femonationalism as a contestation of gender equality, this thesis joins existing approaches studying the support for and opposition to gender equality in the European Parliament. It seeks to yield first insights into femonationalism's operation in the European Parliament. Specifically, I raise the question:

How do different actors in the European Parliament engage in femonationalism?

The research question addresses two dimensions. First, it requires an analysis of femonationalist arguments put forward, i.e., the *1) main femonationalist themes*. Second, it raises the question of who engages in femonationalism, i.e., the *2) main femonationalist actors*.

Based on findings of existing research on the European Parliament and gender, some expectations of how femonationalism becomes manifest in the European Parliament can be formulated. As stated earlier, several scholars have already pointed to the appropriation of feminist themes by non-feminist actors in the European Parliament. Kantola and Lombardo (2021, p. 574), for example, note that the protection of European women and children from non-Western migrants has been framed as a feminist stance. Similarly, Ahrens et al. (2022, p. 811) observe that Islam has been frequently represented as the ultimate Other to Christian Europe. Elomäki (2023, p. 413), on the other hand, shows how gender equality has been silenced in EU economic governance involving the ignorance of reproductive work. Although these studies have not adopted a femonationalist perspective themselves, they suggest that in terms of *femonationalist themes*, the mobilisation of gender equality for anti-migration and anti-Islam campaigns may be more prominent in European Parliament debates than the policy issue of reproductive work.

In terms of actors, existing research has focused on political group affiliation as a key structuring dimension for understanding positions on gender equality in the European

Parliament (see above). Political group affiliation, thus, emerges as an important factor to take into consideration when analysing the *main femonationalist actors*. Following the analyses of Ahrens & Kantola (2023), Elomäki & Ahrens (2022), Kantola (2022) and Kantola & Rolandsen Agustín (2019), opposition to gender equality mainly characterises conservative and radical right parties. This also applies to the bending of gender equality (see Kantola & Lombardo, 2021). Farris (2017), in turn, points to the convergence of nationalist, neoliberal and feminist actors in the constitution of femonationalism. pursuing independent political projects otherwise. Diverging from other ways of contesting gender equality, this justifies the expectation that the promotion of femonationalism can be found across the political spectrum.

Moreover, scholars have identified the national affiliation of MEPs as a factor to take into consideration (see Berthet, 2022b, Kantola & Lombardo, 2021, p. 573). As nationalism is part of its ideological core, also the concept of femonationalism encourages a closer look at MEPs' nationality to determine the *main femonationalist actors*. This is particularly interesting in the case of the European Parliament. MEPs also come from Central and Eastern European member states while femonationalism has been conceptualised for and empirically applied to Western European nationalisms (see Farris, 2017; Calderaro, 2022; Bader and Mottier, 2020; Rahbari, 2021; Colella, 2021; Bauer et al., 2023). Also, the political economic logic of femonationalism can be applied first and foremost to Western European economies. In fact, Eastern European women themselves play a crucial role in providing care in the Western European reproductive sphere (see above). This suggests a different positionality of Eastern European MEPs and informs the expectation that the promotion of femonationalism is stronger among MEPs with Western European national affiliation.¹¹

4.2. Operationalisation

As I study the *engagement* in femonationalism by different actors in the European Parliament, the notion of 'engagement' needs to be discussed in more detail. Revising a first version of the research question I chose to use this term rather than 'support' or 'promotion' to capture the relation between European Parliament actors and the ideology of femonationalism. Femonationalism is not a political project or strategy and is neither regarded as such by political

¹¹ Importantly, this expectation is not supposed to imply that femonationalism's argument on the non-Western migrant woman can simply be transferred to the Eastern European context. Femonationalism builds on the Western colonial topos of "white men [...] saving brown women from brown men" (Spivak, 1988, p. 296, see Farris, 2017, p. 11, p. 22). Similarly, scholars from critical race studies cited by Farris (2017) centre the exploitation and control of Black people (see, e.g., Braxton, 1973; see Farris 2017, pp. 74f.). Hence, it is not my intention to equate the experience of non-Western migrant women with that of Eastern European migrant women employed in the Western European reproductive economy.

actors. Instead, femonationalism can be understood as a phenomenon emerging from different, independent political projects. The notion of 'engagement' conceptualises the contribution of actors to femonationalism as a rather unconscious, unintended process – as a product of their individual agendas that converge with other actors' individual agendas.

In my analytical approach, I seek to capture the substantive expressions of the femonationalism including the political economic logic driving it. Doing so, I develop three femonationalist themes based on Farris' (2017) conceptualisation: the *sexualisation of racism*, the *racialisation of sexism* and the *gendered racialisation of reproductive work*. These themes are intertwined and represent femonationalism as an ideology and a political economy resulting from the convergence of feminism, nationalism and neoliberalism. I refrain from categorising the position of actors in the European Parliament in the convergence, i.e., whether they may have a feminist, nationalist or neoliberal motivation, as this cannot be determined in a text analysis. Instead, I intend to identify which femonationalist themes prevail in the European Parliament and which actors invoke these themes.

In terms of actors, the analysis focuses on speeches by MEPs, examining the prevalence of femonationalist themes in MEPs' discourses across political groups and national affiliations as well as at the individual level. Analysing the political group level has two reasons. First, political groups have served as a level of analysis in the majority of existing studies on the contestation of gender equality in the European Parliament. Moreover, femonationalism highlights the diversity of different ideological backgrounds of the actors shaping femonationalism. This is best captured at the political group level. Turning to the national affiliation as the second actor-variable serves two purposes. First, it accounts for the heterogeneity within political groups that has been established in research before. Second, focusing on the national background of the MEPs results from the centrality of nationalist arguments in femonationalism. Finally, the focus moves back to the individual level as MEPs should be considered as actors with individual agency and not only bound to their political group and national affiliation.

Political groups have been described as the "life blood" (Westlake, 1994, p. 191) of the European Parliament. According to the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure, members of a political group can be assumed to share a political ideology at least to some extent as political groups are formed "according to [] political affinities" (Rule 33, see European Parliament, 2019). Nonetheless, as group membership entails more resources and a more influential position in parliamentary politics (see Ripoll Servent, 2017, pp. 39f.), also other motives might de facto

influence the formation of political groups. Despite their supranational character, political groups are formed by national party delegations which “serve [...] as a direct link between the EP [European Parliament, author’s note] and national politics” (Ripoll Servent, 2017, p. 198; see also *ibid.*, p. 193-200). Still, research has shown that the cohesion in voting behaviour within political groups has been relatively high (see, Ripoll Servent, 2017, p. 188; Raunio, 2014, p. 251; Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 181).

Specifically, the analysis turns to the 9th parliamentary legislature (2019-2024) as it is the current parliamentary formation at the time of the first analytical steps taken. Focusing on the 9th legislature serves to provide a recent picture of femonationalism in the European Parliament. Moreover, the findings complement existing scholarship which assessments almost exclusively concern the 8th and 9th term. The 9th European Parliament was formed by a total of 703 MEPs from 27 member states organised in seven political groups, The Left (37 seats), S&D (138 seats), Greens/EFA (70 seats), Renew Europe (98 seats), EPP (179 seats), ECR (69 seats), ID (49 seats), plus non-attached members (63 seats) (European Parliament, n.d.b). The numbers describe the outgoing parliament as of June 2024 and thus the configuration of the European Parliament relevant for the examined period¹², as will be further explained below. The 27 different national affiliations can be further divided in Western European and Eastern European national affiliations. For the present analysis, this division follows EU membership. That means, member states that joined the EU in the course of the Eastern enlargement – including Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia – are considered to be Eastern European, while the rest is considered to be Western European.

Femonationalism is operationalised in a tripartite analytical framework. Femonationalist discourses may be expressed in 1) *the sexualisation of racism* and/or 2) *the racialisation of sexism*. The political-economic rationale informing femonationalism, in turn, may become manifest in 3) *the gendered racialisation of reproductive work* which is analysed at the discursive level as well. The analytical framework and terminology here crucially build on Farris’ (2017) elaborations on critical race theory (*ibid.*, p. 73-77), neoliberal workfare ideology and Western feminism’s productivist ethics (*ibid.*, Chapter 4).

¹² During the parliamentary term, the total number of MEPs was reduced from 751 to 703 due to the Brexit in 2020. The distribution of seats changed according to proportionality rules. Moreover, group affiliations may have changed over time, for example, the Finns party left the ID group in 2023 to join the ECR (Camut, 2023). Note, in particular, that members of the German AfD were expelled from the ID group in May 2024. That means, in the plenary debates analysed, they were still attached to the ID group (van Petzold et al., 2024).

Building on Anderson's (1991) conception of nations, Farris (2017) argues that the nation is always defined in relation to Others. The two notions of the *sexualisation of racism* and the *racialisation of sexism* refer to nationalist Othering processes that are deeply intertwined with sexism and racism. In femonationalism, they govern the relations between the Western, European, Christian "Us" and the non-western, non-European, Muslim "Them" (Farris, 2017, p. 8). This shows that the Other is characterised according to different social categories. Farris (2017, p. 68) unveils that in nationalist representations the nation is considered homogeneous in terms of religion and culture but also race. While Islam is targeted as a religion and culture (ibid., p. 4), nationalist Othering affects not only to Muslim men and women as religious or cultural subjects but also, in racial or ethnic terms, the non-Western men and women (ibid., p. 73). Racism – referring to "both the process of categorization of certain groups of people as inferior according to phenotypical and/or cultural markers, and as the practice of their exclusion" (ibid.) – can, hence, be considered a driving force in the nationalist constitution of the Other (ibid.).

Accordingly, the *sexualisation of racism* captures the depiction of the Other. Non-Western and Muslim men are portrayed as "oppressors and sexual threats" (ibid. pp. 73f.) whereas non-Western and Muslim women are portrayed as "victims and sexual objects/property" (ibid., p. 74). Second, the *racialisation of sexism* grasps the relation between the Self and the Other. It involves the representation of sexism and patriarchy as the "exclusive domains of the (non-Western and Muslim) Other" (ibid.) rather than the acknowledgement of their persistence also in Western European societies and cultures. In substantive terms, this ideology manifests in the exclusion of the non-western migrant and Muslim man and the inclusion of the non-Western migrant and Muslim woman presented as an act of saviour (ibid., p. 73). As an important caveat, Farris (2017, p. 5) stresses that her argument is not supposed to deny the actual oppressive patriarchal structures that non-Western and Muslim women are confronted with. Analysing femonationalism, it is, hence, important to not understand every critique of patriarchal oppression in Muslim or non-Western countries as a femonationalist claim. The pivotal question is whether the portrayal is biased, in that sense that it stigmatises Muslim and non-Western men and women or links patriarchal oppression to non-Western societies or Muslim culture and religion exclusively.

The *gendered racialisation of reproductive work* defines the channelling of migrant women into the care and domestic sector as a third femonationalist theme. As Farris' (2017) argument on the political-economic logic of femonationalism has shown, the proclaimed mission of rescuing

and emancipating non-Western migrant women and, in particular, Muslim women, in nationalist and feminist discourses meets the economic rationale of filling the care gap in western European economies. According to Farris (2017, pp. 164-166), the care gap results from the privatisation of welfare services in combination with demographic change and the increasing employment of Western women in the productive sphere. The integration of Muslim/non-Western migrant women is primarily oriented towards meeting these economic needs in the reproductive sector.

These three themes together operationalise femonationalism (see Table 1). While analytically separated, in practice, the three aspects are in a mutually dependent relationship. The *sexualisation of racism* and the *racialisation of sexism* as racist and sexist imaginaries form the basis of the *gendered racialisation of reproductive work*. At the same time, it is the economic pressure captured by the third theme that reinforces racist and sexist beliefs. Hence, these themes cover different substantive expressions of the femonationalist convergence.

FEMONATIONALISM					
No.	Categories	Definition		Indicator	Example
A	Sexualisation of racism	the stigmatisation of non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim men <i>and/or</i> women in the context of gender equality	A1	Statements connecting non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim men to the oppression of women predominantly	Muslim men are the main perpetrators responsible for sexualised violence against women
			A2	Statements portraying non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim women as the primary victims of patriarchal oppression predominantly	
B	Racialisation of sexism	the representation of sexism and patriarchy as the exclusive domain of the non-Western Other <i>and/or</i> of gender equality as the exclusive domain of the European Self	B1	Statements connecting the oppression of women to non-Western societies, cultures, or religions exclusively	Europe, as a civilisation in which the equality of women is realised, needs to be protected against Islam
			B2	Statements connecting the realisation of women's emancipation to European societies, cultures or religions exclusively	

FEMONATIONALISM				
No.	Categories	Definition	Indicator	Example
C	Gendered racialisation of reproductive work	the support of non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim women's integration through reproductive work	C1 Statements encouraging non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim women to work in the sphere of social reproduction	Employment in the care sector offers a promising possibility for the integration of Muslim women

Table 1. Own operationalisation based on Farris (2017, pp. 73-77, pp. 124-131)

4.3. Methods

To study the promotion of femonationalism in the European Parliament empirically, I conduct a Qualitative Content Analysis of European Parliament plenary debate contributions by Members of the European Parliament building on Mayring (2022) and Kuckartz (2018). The analysis examines contributions to nine plenary debates held in 2024 (see List of plenary debates in the Annex). Plenary debates pose a promising arena for the study of femonationalist politics given that a wide array of actors with different political backgrounds take part in them. Although concrete policies are drafted and discussed in the committees, the plenary functions as “the ultimate decision-making body” (Ripoll Servent, 2017, p. 28, see also Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, p. 185). MEPs can still influence decision-making if they do not agree with the committee proposal (Ripoll Servent, 2017, p. 232). Importantly, it also serves as a platform for MEPs to engage with the wider public and address also an external audience (Ripoll Servent, 2017, p. 237). Ripoll Servent (2017) argues that “MEPs use this forum to offer justifications and to signal their position to national parties, constituents or interest groups” (ibid., p. 236). This turns the plenary into a crucial site for femonationalist politics. Similarly, existing research on gender equality in the European Parliament has recurred to plenary debates as an important arena in which the discourse on gender equality is defined (Kantola & Lombardo, 2021, p. 568, Berthet & Kantola, 2021 for studies of plenary debates on specific issues, see also Berthet 2022c).

I employ a Qualitative Content Analysis of the nine plenary debates largely following Mayring's (2022) procedure of structuring, specifically, deductive category assignment. The extraction of data material from a larger data set, a central feature of Qualitative Content Analysis (Gläser & Laudel, 2010, p. 200), seems well-suited to detect single femonationalist statements in larger numbers of European Parliament plenary debate speeches. Speeches in plenary debates cover a wider range of different aspects. Thus, the reduction of the data material

to relevant passages is a crucial step of the analysis. Moreover, deductive category assignment in line with Mayring (2022, pp. 90-93) allows for a strongly theory-based approach to qualitative text analysis in contrast to methods with more open category development such as coding (see, e.g., Schreier, 2013). It is hence an adequate method for building the analysis on the categories of femonationalism defined above.

Similar reasons turn Mayring's (2022) approach into the best suited among other variants of Qualitative Content Analysis which strongly rely on the data-driven development of categories (see, e.g., Schreier, 2013, p. 176) and emphasise the openness of the category system during the research process (see, e.g., Gläser & Laudel, 2010, p. 205). The methodological framework additionally draws on Kuckartz's (2018) conceptualisation of an evaluative Qualitative Content Analysis. Beyond Mayring's (2022) focus on category-centred analysis, Kuckartz (2018) argues for the added value of case-centred analysis. Moreover, he outlines several ways to interpret results both qualitatively and quantitatively ranging from simple category-based evaluation of the analysed material to more complex analyses (ibid., pp. 134-140). For the present case, a combination of both analytical foci enables an assessment of differences in the prevalence of femonationalist themes, on the one hand, and a comparison between different actors promoting femonationalist themes, on the other hand.

The analysis includes 18 plenary debates (see Appendix A) List of debates) with a total of 486 speeches. The sampling of plenary debates followed theoretical considerations concentrating on the policy areas of gender equality, migration and integration as well as employment and social policy. I consider these three policy fields as important sites for potential femonationalist argumentation given the centrality of feminist themes, migrant integration policies, and political economic considerations in Farris' (2017) conception of femonationalism. In terms of data selection, verbatim reports were searched in the document register of the European Parliament. All verbatim reports including the keyword "debate" in their title and published between 1 January and 30 April 2024 were scanned. Covering the latest parliamentary sittings of the 9th legislature, the analysis seeks to provide a recent picture of femonationalism in the European Parliament. Plenary debates on gender equality, migration and integration as well as employment and social policy were then filtered out and added to a preliminary list of plenary debates. The categorisation into policy areas proceeded based on the title. Debates covering related issues such as human rights or budget policies were scanned and sorted out if only single references to relevant policy areas were made. Some of these debates deal with more than one of the three policy areas and were categorised correspondingly. Debates whose relevance could

not be determined based on the title were recorded in a separate list. In a second round, this list was again filtered by reviewing the content of the debate contributions. A major challenge arose from the fact that the verbatim reports are not fully translated into English and a majority of speeches are thus only available in the MEPs' native language. Hence, only debate contributions in English, German, Italian, Dutch, Danish and Spanish were skimmed to determine the relevancy of the plenary debate. The final compilation of relevant plenary debates consists of 33 debates.

In a second step, the amount of material was reduced to nine plenary debates by selecting three debates per policy area, i.e., gender equality, migration and integration, as well as social and employment policy. Starting the analysis with nine debates seeks to balance feasibility with the need to account for possible variations in the empirical phenomenon (see Mayring, 2022, pp. 128-130 for considerations on sampling size). Femonationalism as a very heterogeneous phenomenon calls for a larger sampling size. The aim of detecting the potential invocation of femonationalist themes by a broad range of actors requires including several speeches by each political group and national affiliation in all three policy areas. Nine plenary debates are a suitable compromise to meet this concern while, at the same time, ensuring feasibility. The three debates selected from each policy area address broader issues within the respective policy area rather than covering single legal regulations, events or groups. The (preliminary) findings may encourage the inclusion of further debates in the analysis, for example, if only few speeches fall into the categories of femonationalism not allowing for the establishment of patterns.

This was indeed the case so that more debates were added to the material to ensure empirical saturation in a third step.¹³ Extending the final number of plenary debates to 18, the selection of additional debates was based on the assumed relevance of the debate topics for femonationalism. The debates included cover different policy issues, often relevant to more than one of the three policy areas. As gender equality, migration and integration as well as social and employment affairs are cross-cutting issues, it is not possible to ensure that each policy area is covered to the exact same extent. The debates also vary a lot in their length, i.e., in their number of speeches ranging from nine speeches ("Major interpellation on migration and

¹³ The notion of theoretical saturation has been developed in grounded theory and refers to "the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and then decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 61). Although I do not seek to inductively develop a new theory in line with the grounded theory approach, the notion of theoretical saturation can be helpful to determine if an expansion of the data material is fruitful for the analysis. With view to the contestations and critique of the concept of saturation, Nelson (2017) may provide a useful guide for the assessment.

asylum”) to 64 speeches (“Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred”). Nonetheless, all policy areas are represented with a range of different policy issues in the analysis. Crucially, extending the data material allowed to establish patterns of femonationalism within policy areas by including a broader range of policy issues. It also served to validate and better contextualise the preliminary findings.

Varieties in the number of speeches by political group or national affiliation did not serve as selection criteria beforehand but are taken into account in the analysis. The allocation of speaking time, and hence, number of debate contributions, is specified in Rule 171 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. According to Rule 171, speaking time is divided among political groups partly equally and partly proportional to their size (European Parliament, 2019). The rest of the speaking time is allocated by the European Parliament President to MEPs in the catch-the-eye procedure while ensuring that different political views and member states are represented (*ibid.*). These regulations are important for the analysis as they turn the plenary into a discursive space in which MEPs from different political backgrounds and with different national affiliations can voice their opinions. Still, the occurrence of femonationalist statements in debate contributions needs to be examined in relative terms as the number of debate contributions diverges between political groups and national affiliation.

The coding process proceeds as follows. First, speeches in languages other than English are translated using DeepL.com (Free and Advanced version)¹⁴ or transcribed based on the English simultaneous interpretation of the speeches by European Parliament translators. Speeches by the President of the European Parliament, Committee rapporteurs or Commission representatives usually introducing and concluding a plenary debate are not included. Contributions to the debates made in writing, on the other hand, are taken into account¹⁵ as well as blue-card questions and responses¹⁶. To avoid potential biases, the filename of each speech was encrypted, only indicating the debate name and sequence of speeches.¹⁷

¹⁴ The DeepL translator can be accessed here: <https://www.deepl.com/de/translator> (accessed 14 October 2024).

¹⁵ The only exception is one speech in Croatian, submitted to the debate on “Gender aspects of the rising cost of living and the impact of the energy crisis” in writing. It could neither be translated as Croatian is not available on DeepL.com, nor transcribed as there is no video of the speech.

¹⁶ According to Rule 171 of the Rules of Procedure, blue-card questions can be raised by MEPs during a speech if the speaker agrees and must relate to the content of that speech (see European Parliament, 2019).

¹⁷ Still, as the first contributions to a debate are made in order of political group size, it was not possible to completely exclude information on political group affiliation.

The single speech by an MEP serves as the recording unit. Within each speech, the analysis turns to single statements as the coding unit, i.e., as the smallest unit that can be assigned to a category (see Mayring, 2022, p. 64). Assigning a category to a statement, the whole speech may be taken into account to determine a statement's meaning. If the speech as such does not suffice as a source of information, the whole debate may provide additional contextual insights. If a femonationalist theme can be detected in a statement, the respective statement plus the speech is coded correspondingly. Both the speech and the statement are recorded. A speech is thus considered femonationalist if it contains at least one femonationalist statement.¹⁸ The number of femonationalist statements is recorded to recognise and make visible differences between the speeches. The statements also form the basis of the verbal-interpretative analysis. If several femonationalist themes are found, more than one category may be applied to one statement. This is noted separately. After a trial run based on six debates, the final definition of the categories and the coding guideline was developed. The coding guideline can be found in the Appendix. For reasons of transparency, particularly important for qualitative research, potentially controversial coding decisions are discussed in the subsequent section. To ensure reliability, the analysis is carried out in two runs. The software MAXQDA is used to assist in the coding process.

Following the coding process, the analysis engages in a simple numerical and verbal-interpretative evaluation of the prevalence of the three different femonationalist themes and the actors invoking them. I first discuss the *main femonationalist themes* in terms of the prevalence of the three themes just defined. Moreover, the analysis identifies prevailing patterns of argumentation and engages in a detailed description of how these themes take concrete shape. It investigates the use of femonationalist themes by political groups, national affiliation and individual MEP. Here, variations in the engagements in femonationalism by different actors are measured in terms of degree, i.e., how often actors invoke femonationalist themes, and type of femonationalist themes.

4.4. Methodical challenges and analytical limitations

Without anticipating too much of the results, I want to draw attention to analytical limitations and methodical challenges that emerged during the coding process. The discussion of these challenges and limitations serves as a helpful guide for assessing the findings in the subsequent chapter. The first part of this section makes transparent potentially controversial coding

¹⁸ For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these speeches as 'femonationalist speeches', although they might not only contain femonationalist statements.

decisions and provides justification for the decisions made. The second part turns to analytical limitations rooted in the research design.

The first challenge that had to be overcome is the representation of the people subject of stigmatisation. According to the definition of the *sexualisation of racism*, the category concerns people that are non-Western or Muslim. However, this background is only rarely made explicit in the speeches. For example, if sexual assaults are linked to “foreigners” (CVAWAD_06, Pos. 16, CVAWAD_14, Pos. 11), it is not clear whether these ‘foreigners’ are from non-Western countries. The same applies for the *racialisation of sexism*, i.e. the attribution of gender inequalities to non-Western or Muslim societies, cultures or religions, for example, if the safety of women in Europe is claimed to be threatened by “multiculturalism” (CDIMST_17, Pos. 4). I decided to count such claims as femonationalist statements, if the context of the speeches implied that they concern non-Western or Muslim people, societies, cultures or religions. As indicators served, for example, if another statement in the speech specified a non-Western or Muslim background. For transparency reasons, I applied an additional code for such cases to distinguish them from other femonationalist statements.

The second challenge concerned the exact interpretation of the term ‘predominantly’ as an indicator for the *sexualisation of racism* to identify a stigmatisation of Muslim/non-Western migrant men and women. If dynamics of repression are linked to these people, what turns these references into forms of stigmatisation? I decided to code statements as stigmatisation, if, for example, a whole speech discusses the repression of Muslim women in an unproportionate manner. Similarly, statements attributing the majority of cases of sexual violence to non-Western migrant men fall into the category.¹⁹ Other cases proved to be more difficult to categorise. If only a single statement in a speech addresses the repression of Muslim women, I assigned a code, if that statement refers to Muslim women as the primary group of women in Europe suffering from repression. Additionally, I included statements that present Muslim women as repressed because of their religion without making any qualifications to that claim. In a similar vein, I assigned a code if a statement singles out non-Western migrant men as the primary group responsible for the repression of women in Europe.

¹⁹ See Colella’s (2021) remarks on the problems associated with neglecting violence against women as a structural phenomenon: “[...] the depiction of the perpetrator of GBV [gender-based violence; author’s note] as the othered man diverts the attention from the real root causes of GBV. Attention is shifted from the dynamics of power and control that trigger it [...] to an alleged external threat with potential consequences for the fight against GBV that risks being addressed as a matter of integration/assimilation and security instead of social and cultural change” (ibid., p. 281).

These decisions were made on the basis of the following considerations. The context of the debates implies that these statements centre Muslim/non-Western migrant women and men in Europe. Hence, such statements externalise gender inequalities in Europe to the group of non-Western and Muslim people while, at the same time, generalising and homogenising their experience of or responsibility for repression.²⁰ This also applies to statements advancing what could be overarchingly termed the “blind eye” (SOFRIT_26, Pos. 10) argument. In frequent cases, MEPs argue that other political actors do not acknowledge these dynamics of repression. I still decided to count such argumentation as a femonationalist statement, as they tend to follow similar patterns of generalisation and singling out groups of people. Still, I applied an additional code for such cases to record them separately. Above all, the concept of femonationalism does not deny the repressive structures Muslim and non-Western women are confronted with, but rather specifically seeks to analyse the “*representations and conceptualizations* [of these women] in the western European cultural imagery” (Farris, 2017, p. 5, emphasis in the original).

The interpretation of the term ‘exclusively’ to identify statements engaging in the *racialisation of sexism* posed the third major methodical challenge. Statements explicitly attributing gender inequalities to non-Western societies, cultures, or religions only are rare. Prevailing modes of argumentation rather present Islam as a threat to women’s rights in Europe. Alternatively, rising gender inequalities in Europe are linked to immigration. Here, I also decided to code such claims as femonationalist as they externalise gender inequalities as something foreign to Europe. Moreover, they identify tackling gender inequalities attributed to the non-Western Other as the most pressing issue on the gender equality agenda in Europe.

Beyond these methodical challenges, the analysis faces several limitations. The first limitation concerns the notion of ‘engagement’ as the analytical framework mainly allows to capture and compare engagement in femonationalism in terms of the frequency of femonationalist statements raised. Still, the qualitative analysis of the promotion of femonationalism enriches a purely numerical description with more in-depth insights into the argumentation of different actors. Potential contestations of femonationalism, on the other hand, are not taken into account. The dimension of contestation in an initial draft version of the research design was discarded after viewing the data material for the first time. Due to the heterogeneity of femonationalism as an empirical phenomenon and the procedural rules of European Parliament plenary debates, conceptualising contestations of femonationalism turned out to be a complex task. Single

²⁰ See, for example, Hasan’s (2012, p. 59) critique of tendencies in Western feminism to make universalist, homogenising assumptions about Muslim women and Islam.

contributions to plenary debates usually do not make reference to previous utterances, with the exception of so-called blue-card questions. Hence, contestation in form of 'outright rejection' could rarely be found. Then again, analysing contestations in form of 'arguing otherwise' opened a spectrum of positions contesting femonationalism too broad to maintain the concept's validity. In the end, it was decided to only analyse actors' engagement in femonationalism in positive terms, similar to other studies focusing on the opposition to gender equality in the European Parliament only.

The second challenge pertains to the focus on plenary debate speeches as the unit of analysis. Although the plenary promises to be a fruitful arena of European Parliament politics to analyse femonationalism (see above), building the entire analysis on speeches has its limitations. In the European Parliament, the plenary is not the primary platform for discussing substantive policy choices. Policies are primarily negotiated in the committees (Ripoll Servent, 2017, p. 28f.; Roger & Winzen, 2014, p. 391) which are considered the "legislative backbone" (Westlake, 1994, p. 191) of the institution. Hence, manifestations of femonationalism in substantive policies promoted by actors within the European Parliament elsewhere except the plenary cannot be detected. Instead, the analysis is confined to broader debates on policy issues.

This might impact the analysis of the political-economic dimension of femonationalism, in particular. Following Farris' (2017) analysis, the political-economic rationale of channelling Muslim and non-western migrant women into the reproductive sector becomes manifest in migrant integration policies and their implementation rather than being openly discussed. The analysis tries to meet this difficulty by conceptualising the *gendered racialisation of reproductive work* as a femonationalist theme. Nonetheless, an analysis of plenary debate speeches might not fully capture the political-economic dimension of femonationalism as expressed in policies. This limitation, in turn, also affects the actor-dimension as actors promoting respective policies can potentially not be identified.

Finally, coding plenary debate speeches does not allow for a fine-grained analysis of how femonationalist arguments are presented or embedded in the broader policy debate. Nevertheless, the analytical approach reflects the main purpose of the thesis. This is identifying and mapping what actors in the European Parliament engage in femonationalist argumentation. Future research may build on these insights and turn to the question of how femonationalist statements are transported discursively in a next step.

5. Femonationalism in the European Parliament – main themes

Turning to the presentation of the findings, this chapter introduces the main femonationalist themes emerging from the analysis. The first section provides a brief overview of *Femonationalism across policy areas*, i.e., summarising the policy issues discussed in the debates and highlighting the debates in which femonationalist statements can be found. The subsequent two sections *Sexism and racism* and *Political economy* engage more in depth with femonationalist statements clustering them into category-based themes. Recalling the expectations about the prevalence of the different femonationalist themes, the findings reveal that the *sexualisation of racism* and *racialisation of sexism* are not only more prominent in European Parliament debates but exclusively inform the analysed femonationalist statements. In turn, the *gendered racialisation of reproductive work* could not be found in any speech. As a consequence, the section on *sexism and racism* is more extensive and develops further subthemes, while the section on *political economy* is limited to empirically contextualise and provide an understanding of the lack of findings.

The sections are based on both quantitative and qualitative interpretations of the findings. The quantitative interpretations should be taken with the caveat that the sample of plenary debates is rather small. The figures, hence, only provide first indications of the frequency of femonationalist speeches in plenary debates. They are complemented by a verbal-interpretative analysis of the femonationalist statements, presenting the most prominent femonationalist arguments and motifs. For illustrative purposes, I provide examples of concrete manifestations of femonationalism.

5.1. Femonationalism across policy areas

Looking at the bigger picture, femonationalist statements do not feature evenly in the examined debates and policy areas. The debates cover a wide range of issues relevant to the policy areas of gender equality, migration and integration as well as social and employment policies (see Appendix A for the List of plenary debates). Subjects of debate vary, ranging from concrete policy measures and policy reports to more abstract topics. However, only six of the 18 debates include femonationalist statements. Following an overview of the debate topics, these six debates will be discussed in more detail.

In the policy area of gender equality, issues raised include violence against women²¹, workplace harassment, sexual health and reproductive rights, women's poverty, human trafficking for sexual exploitation, and LGBTIQ+ rights. Concrete policy instruments and initiatives discussed in this context are, for example, the EU Directive 2024/1385 Regulating Violence Against Women And Domestic Violence, the ratification of the Violence and Harassment Convention of the International Labour Organisation, the inclusion of the right to abortion in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU Directive 2024/1712 On Preventing And Combating Trafficking In Human Beings And Protecting Its Victims, or the implementation report on the European Commission's LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025. Regarding more abstract topics, MEPs negotiate the priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. Similarly, they emphasise gender equality in debates about the rising cost of living and the gendered impact of the energy crisis, which also extend into social and employment policy. Debates in this policy area touch upon issues of poverty, living and working conditions, quality jobs, workplace harassment, social and cohesion policy as well as forced labour. Next to the above-mentioned debates, they discuss the European Year of Skills, the La Hulpe declaration on the future of a social Europe and broader issues such as the deterioration of living conditions in the EU. Some debates deal with migrant labour specifically such as the debate on the Single Permit Directive 2024/1233 On Work And Residence Permits For Third-country Nationals, or, in terms of forced labour, on the above-mentioned EU Directive 2024/1712 On Preventing And Combating Trafficking In Human Beings And Protecting Its Victims. Debates on migration and integration further deal with broader reforms of EU asylum policy, crucially the Migration and Asylum Package, but also societal challenges such as increasing antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred. Finally, debates on fundamental rights in the EU and rising inequalities in the world go beyond individual policy areas.

This brief summary provides the basis for classifying the policy areas in which femonationalist statements can be found. Overall, the analysis reveals that femonationalist statements are no widespread phenomenon. Out of 486 speeches, only 14 speeches included femonationalist statements. This amounts to about 3% of all speeches. In these speeches, I coded 21 statements as femonationalist but assigned 24 times a category as 3 statements fit into two categories.²² As stated, femonationalist speeches and statements are not evenly distributed among the debates.

²¹ Note that the term 'gender-based violence' is broader than 'violence against women' and goes beyond a binary gender order (see Council of Europe, n.d.). The European Parliament uses the latter in its debate title, while a few MEPs also use the term 'gender-based violence'.

²² In quantitative comparisons, these three statements are only counted once.

Quite the contrary, most debates do not contain any speech with a femonationalist statement while only six debates do. Table 2 lists all plenary debates containing femonationalist speeches under their official debate title. It specifies the total number of speeches per debate, the number of femonationalist speeches and the respective relative frequencies of femonationalist speeches. The last column shows the number of femonationalist statements per debate.

Femonationalist speeches and statements per debate				
Debate title	Total number of speeches	Femonat. speeches	Relative frequency	Femonat. statements
<i>“Combating violence against women and domestic violence”</i>	34	4	11,76%	7
<i>“Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred”</i>	64	4	6,25%	4
<i>“Situation of fundamental rights in the EU in 2022 and 2023”</i>	27	2	7,41%	2
<i>“The EU priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women”</i>	34	2	5,88%	6
<i>“A single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State”</i>	13	1	7,69%	1
<i>“Council decision inviting Member States to ratify the Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190) of the International Labour Organization”</i>	23	1	4,35%	1

Table 2. Femonationalist speeches and statements per debate

The debate “Combating violence against women and domestic violence”, preceding the adoption of EU Directive 2024/1385, contains the most femonationalist speeches both in absolute and relative terms. Four out of 34 speeches include femonationalist statements, i.e., almost 12%. Four femonationalist speeches can also be found in the debate on the “Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred”. With a total number of 64 speeches, these four femonationalist speeches, however, make up only 6% of all speeches in that debate. If zooming in on the speeches, they also differ in the number of femonationalist statements. While it is difficult to compare the relative number of statements, the debates “Combating violence against women and domestic violence” and “The EU priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women” stand out with seven and six femonationalist statements. Together, they make up 13 out of 21 femonationalist statements. The high number of femonationalist statements reveals that the femonationalist speeches in these debates tend to contain more than one femonationalist statement. In turn, speeches in the other debates often only feature a single femonationalist statement.

These figures give a first impression of the contexts in which femonationalist speeches and statements are articulated. They are most frequent in debates dealing with gender equality issues. Still, femonationalist claims cannot be anchored in any gender equality debate. Femonationalist statements concentrate in debates on gender-based violence and broader gender equality issues, whereas they are absent in debates on other, more specific gender equality issues such as the right to abortion or LGBTIQ-rights. Femonationalist statements also form part of debates about migration and integration, although to a lesser extent. Here, it is especially in the context of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred that femonationalist statements are articulated. This debate is most concerned with the aspect of migrant integration, highlighted as the primary arena of femonationalism by Farris (2017), while other debates primarily engage with questions of migration. Nonetheless, the kind of femonationalist statement raised also varies depending on the context. The following section further explores this providing concrete examples to illustrate the numbers just presented.

5.2. Sexism and racism

All femonationalist statements could be assigned either to the category *sexualisation of racism* or *racialisation of sexism*. Both categories appear with an approximately similar frequency, as I found ten manifestations of the *sexualisation of racism* and 14 manifestations of the *racialisation of sexism*. Moreover, a separation between both categories proves to be difficult. Although capturing different dynamics, they are closely intertwined. The *racialisation of sexism*

concerns the representation of a European Self vis-à-vis a non-Western/Muslim Other with gender equality serving as the dividing boundary. The *sexualisation of racism* concerns only the representation of the Other by gendering the Other in male oppressors and female victims. Hence, when Muslim culture is portrayed as a culture in which women are particularly oppressed, the line between both category is sometimes blurry.²³ This is reflected in the data. Some statements were assigned to both categories which often occurred when a statement consists of more than one sentence. As a general rule, a longer statement coded as the *racialisation of sexism*, i.e., representing a Self-Other relation, also included the *sexualisation of racism*, i.e., a gendered stigmatisation of the Other. Due to this connection between both categories, it makes sense to present and discuss the results for both categories in a common chapter. This also allows to better embed the statements in the speeches and debates they were derived from. Nonetheless, distinct argumentation structures for both categories will be highlighted.

The argumentative structures of the statements crystallise into two subthemes: the mobilisation of gender equality for anti-Islam campaigns and the mobilisation of gender equality for anti-immigration campaigns. This distinction between anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns is also reflected in Farris' (2017, p. 4) definition of femonationalism. The two subthemes are informed by both the *sexualisation of racism* and the *racialisation of sexism* but are based on distinct manifestations of the categories. In the matrix of the *sexualisation of racism* (Muslim/non-Western migrant and man/woman), Muslim women and non-Western migrant men emerge as the primary groups affected by stigmatisation in femonationalist speeches. Their stigmatisation is embedded in argumentation patterns shaped by the *racialisation of sexism* rejecting Islam or immigration as a source of patriarchal oppression and sexism in a gender equal Europe. In few cases, both subthemes resonate in one statement.

Another crucial argumentative structure that recurred in the speeches in combination with anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns is the critique of other political actors in the EU and their role in politics on Islam and immigration. Albeit not captured by the categories directly, it is closely intertwined with their dynamics of Othering and turned out to be a crucial argumentative structure of the femonationalist statements found. In the following, I first discuss

²³ See also Rahbari (2021) who argues that “[i]t is not possible to see Islam and Muslims as completely separate entities, neither in terms of diverse public perceptions of Islam as a religion and Muslims as diverse populations, nor regarding the consequences of ‘othering’ one or the other” (ibid., p. 50).

the structure of anti-Islam campaigns, before turning to anti-immigration campaigns and, finally, the role of other EU actors in these configurations.

5.2.1. Anti-Islam campaigns

Anti-Islam campaigns feature in four debates which discuss “Combating violence against women and domestic violence”, “The EU priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women”, the “Situation of fundamental rights in the EU in 2022 and 2023” and the “Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred”. Although it is difficult to establish patterns considering the limited number of statements, this section attempts to show how different variations of the *racialisation of sexism* and the *sexualisation of racism* develop anti-Islam campaigns. Broadly, they contain two components. First, the depiction of Islam as a misogynist religion or culture vis-à-vis a European culture, tradition or identity that is based on gender equality as its core principle. In some cases, the latter is connected to Europe’s Christian values. The second crucial element is the portrayal of the Muslim woman as the primary victim of patriarchal oppression and, to a lesser extent, of the Muslim man as the primary oppressor.

The *racialisation of sexism* in the speeches takes different shapes. It takes the form of direct comparisons between Islam and Europe regarding respect for gender equality. Moreover, it manifests in the attribution of rising gender inequality in Europe to the growing influence of Islam. It also informs the exclusionary dynamic of statements rejecting Muslimness in Europe to protect achievements of the struggle for gender equality. These representations of Self-Other relations are already pervaded by stigmatisation dynamics. They represent the Muslim woman as generally oppressed, connecting Muslim women’s oppression with their Muslimness. These implicit forms of stigmatisation are reinforced by mechanisms of the *sexualisation of racism*. They work by singling out Muslim women as a group of women particularly affected by sexism and patriarchal oppression in Europe. This involves a generalisation and homogenisation of Muslim women’s experience. Both the *racialisation of sexism* and the *sexualisation of racism* tend to go hand in hand with a critique of the European Parliament’s or European Commission’s approach to gender equality. This is illustrated in the following.

For example, in the debate on the EU Directive Regulating Violence Against Women And Domestic Violence, designed to be the first EU legislative instrument on gender-based violence²⁴, the French ID group member Mathilde Androuët uses a direct juxtaposition of

²⁴ For the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2024/1385, see European Union (2024b).

Europe and Islam to question the effectiveness of the Directive in reducing violence against women and domestic violence:

“The European Commission should not forget that it is treading on a continent where women have been scientists, queens, saints, warlords, astronauts, empresses and writers, and that this heritage obliges it. Obligated to do what? At the very least, to avoid importing or kowtowing to ideologies where women are simply a womb to be filled, a body to be veiled or subjugated, or a mind to be silenced. Europe has established the principle that women are man's greatest treasure. Make this principle your dogma, protect her, but really protect her.” (CVAWAD_14, Pos. 17-24)

Mathilde Androuët presents Islam as an “ideology” in which women are not considered as thinking individuals but are repressed and mainly perceived in their reproductive function. This is set in contrast to the many opportunities women are offered in Europe – and have had also historically as part of Europe’s “heritage”. By rejecting the Directive, inter alia, on the basis of this juxtaposition, the statements implies that effective measures to reduce gender-based violence in Europe should target Muslim traditions and values. Hence, it attributes persisting gender inequalities in Europe to the growing influence of Islam.

A similar argument can also be found in other debates, such as the debate on the EU’s priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. The session took place in March 2024 under the priority theme “Accelerating the achievement of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls by addressing poverty and strengthening institutions and financing with a gender perspective” (UN Women, n.d.). In her contribution to the debate, the Italian ID group member Isabella Tovaglieri claims:

“Europe wants more rights and equality for all women, but does not realise that the real battle today is to defend women's conquests that we can no longer take for granted in the face of the progressive Islamisation of our cities.” (TEUPFT_06, Pos. 1-5)

Echoing the first claim, Isabella Tovaglieri argues that achievements of the struggle for gender equality in Europe, i.e., “women’s conquests” are threatened by Islam. The statement calls for a European approach to gender equality that takes this particular threat seriously. Both statements use language for drawing boundaries between the Self and the Other that is dominated by the use of vocabulary such as “importing”, “defending” or “protecting”. They imply that gender inequalities are something foreign and not part of European culture or

societies. This externalisation of gender inequalities is combined with a rejection of Muslimness in Europe which is regarded as a threat to gender equality. In turn, gender equality is depicted as central to Europe's self-perception.

A second femonationalist statement made by Isabella Tovaglieri in the same speech illustrates how her above-cited claim translates into concrete policy measures: ending financial support of Muslim organisations that promote the practice of veiling in Europe (see TEUPFT_06, Pos. 18-21). The practice of veiling, that is referred to here, is central to the representation of Muslim women's repression. It is addressed in almost half of the statements. The practice of veiling is generally regarded as a symbol of Muslim women's lack of freedom. An exemplary claim is made by the Italian ID group member Silvia Sardone. She rejects the implementation report on the "Situation of fundamental rights in the EU in 2022 and 2023"²⁵ as dominated by left political thought. Inter alia, she criticises the depiction of women's rights in the report:

"Earlier you spoke of restrictions on women's rights, but you say nothing about Islamic women being deprived of their freedom and forced to wear the veil." (SOFRIT_06, Pos. 17-19)

As the debate concerns the situation of fundamental rights *in Europe*, the statement can be assumed to target Muslim women living in Europe. It links Muslim women's lack of freedom not to, for example, an autocratic Islamic regime or to persisting gender inequalities in Europe, but to their religious practices. Silvia Sardone reinforces her position in the debate on the EU Directive Regulating Violence Against Women And Domestic Violence, in which she describes the veil as a "prison for women" (CVAWAD_28, Pos. 11) and reiterates her claims:

"[...] [Y]ou rightly speak of the horror of violence against women that must be combated, but you do nothing to counter the plight of millions of women oppressed by the Islamic veil. A veil that is too often worn even by girls who have not even developed yet." (CVAWAD_28, Pos. 1-4)

Like her colleague, Silvia Sardone criticises that the repression of Muslim women is a form of violence against women that is not acted upon and should be targeted by anti-veiling legislation. According to her, this repression requires an immediate ban of the veil from schools:

"That is why I have submitted a resolution to Parliament urging the Commission to call on the Member States to ban the Islamic veil in schools. In Europe this means of

²⁵ For the European Parliament resolution on the report of 18 January 2024, see European Parliament (2024).

subjugation must be opposed, not promoted in a positive way, as you do. It is our duty to wage a cultural battle to defend our values, our freedom, to guarantee the rights of women and girls, defending them from shameful impositions.” (see CVAWAD_28, Pos. 5-10)

These examples illustrate how Muslim women are portrayed as a primary group of women in Europe that is subject to oppression in different debate contexts, i.e., the *sexualisation of racism*. The repression of Muslim women is not linked to being a woman per se but to be *Muslim* woman. They imply that a woman cannot be free from oppression as long as she is Muslim. These findings revert to the *racialisation of sexism*, in that persisting patriarchal oppression of women in Europe is externalised to the figure of the culturally foreign woman. In the same vein, measures proposed for the fight against gender inequality address Muslim women only. The inclusion and emancipation of Muslim women is sought to be achieved through policy measures targeting the practice of veiling.

Different to the Muslim woman, the Muslim *man* is less frequent turned into a subject of stigmatisation. The only explicit reference to Muslim men as responsible for the repression of Muslim women, can be found in the following comment by Italian ID group member Susanna Ceccardi. She denounces the implementation report on the “Situation of fundamental rights in the EU in 2022 and 2023” as hypocritical, echoing the views expressed in the above-cited statements:

“You talk about women's rights in Europe, but turn a blind eye to the many Islamic women who are treated like animals by their husbands in Europe.” (SOFRIT_26, Pos. 10-12)

In connection with the previous statements, Susanna Ceccardi’s remark demonstrates that MEPs articulating these statements primarily localise oppressive structures of gender inequalities in Muslim families. Still, apart from her remark, responsibility for Muslim women’s repression remains abstract and linked to Islam more generally rather than to Muslim men, as illustrated earlier in this section.

Individual statements link sexual violence in Europe committed against women in general – not only against Muslim women – to Muslim men. However, these statements make no clear distinction between Muslim and non-Western men. This is demonstrated in the following statement by the German ID-group member Bernhard Zimniok in the debate on the “Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred”:

“The EU and the German government are thus forcing the Islamisation of our continent. As a result, democratic values such as freedom of opinion and equal rights will be abolished as soon as Sharia law takes hold. The dramatic rise in sexual offences - 7,000 women have been raped by asylum seekers in Germany alone since 2015 - is just a foretaste of what we will then face.” (NTFTIO_26, Pos. 9-13)

The statement is overall aimed at rejecting the existence of anti-Muslim hatred, as the context of the speech reveals, and targets Islam as such, but also refers to “asylum seekers” representing non-Western men, more generally. Hence, the statement is not confined to anti-Islam claims. However, as the next section shows, the figure of the non-Western migrant man is much more prevalent than the figure of the Muslim man when it comes to identifying perpetrators of sexual violence against women in Europe. This is further explored in the following. In turn, the role of the Muslim man as the oppressor, is more strongly associated with the oppression of women in his own family although rarely made explicit.

Summing up, this section has demonstrated how MEPs draw boundaries between a gender equal European Self and a gender unequal Muslim Other. The statements do not necessarily deny the persistence of sexism and patriarchal oppression in Western European societies and cultures. Nonetheless, they neglect the importance of tackling gender inequalities by turning the fight against Islam into a priority for gender equality action in Europe. The repressed Muslim woman is invoked as a central figure in this fight. It is striking that, compared to Muslim men, Muslim women are much more frequently addressed in the construction of the oppressor-victim binary (see Farris, 2017, p. 5). Yet, not addressing the Muslim men explicitly contributes to generalise the experience of Muslim women as a result of their cultural and religious practice and detaching this experience from oppressive actions or behaviour of individual men.

Overall, these representations are informed by discriminatory dynamics. Hasan (2012, pp. 58f.) argues that the image of the veiled and oppressed women emanates from a stereotypical portrayal of the Muslim woman in the Western gaze. Zine (2006, p. 10) and Fekete (2006, p. 18) point out how veil bans should be understood as another way of subjecting Muslim women’s bodies to body politics and takes away their agency. Anyhow, considering the crucial role of Muslim women in the femonationalist statements highlighted, it seems important to recall Farris’ (2017) admonitory words:

“[...] [The] critique of the western European portrayal of Muslim women as the quintessential victims of non-western patriarchy does not in any way imply a denial of

the inequality or repression to which these women, like women from any other cultural/social/national background, may potentially (and often factually) be subject within their societies.” (ibid., p. 5)

Hence, also the findings presented here should not hide the fact that there are oppressive patriarchal structures that Muslim women – as all other women – are subjected to. From a conceptual perspective it is still crucial to engage with the *representations* of this oppression and to turn attention to and consider “the ways in which such representations and conceptualizations are informed by (and in turn inform) deeply rooted racist stereotypes as well as economic interests and practices” (ibid.).

5.2.2 Anti-immigration campaigns

The second subtheme that emerges from the analysis is the mobilisation of gender equality for anti-immigration campaigns. It can be found in a broader range of debates: “Combating violence against women and domestic violence”, “The EU priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women”, the “Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred”, “A single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State” and the “Council decision inviting Member States to ratify the Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190) of the International Labour Organization”. In this subtheme, the *racialisation of sexism* and *sexualisation of racism* follow different patterns. It builds on the representation of patriarchy and sexism as the exclusive domain of a more general non-Western Other, typically embodied by the non-Western migrant man. Both categories are intertwined even more closely here.

The *racialisation of sexism* works as follows. Immigration, symbolising the non-Western Other in Europe, is related to the increasing insecurity of women in Europe. It is hence linked to one specific aspect of gender inequality, namely, women’s safety or security. Resembling the externalisation strategies identified above, Europe is represented as a place, where that safety or security is guaranteed. These claims translate into mechanisms of exclusion, in the form of calls for stricter immigration control. Again, these anti-immigration stances entail an implicit stigmatisation of the non-Western migrant man as the primary threat to women’s safety. The *sexualisation of racism* appears in the central figure of the non-Western migrant man who is stigmatised as the primary perpetrator of violence against women in Europe. Mechanisms of stigmatisation work either through generalising and homogenising assumptions about the non-Western migrant man or through attributing the majority of (sexual) assaults to this group of

men. Importantly, it is not the Muslim or non-Western migrant woman who is represented as the main victim of this form of oppression, but rather women in general. Again, the statements advance critiques of other EU actor's approach to gender equality or immigration.

A typical statement illustrating anti-immigration campaigns following femonationalist patterns is the following remark by the Spanish ECR member Margarita de la Pisa Carrión in the debate on the EU Directive Regulating Violence Against Women And Domestic Violence. She is critical of the EU Directive and turns attention to how the subject of immigration gets addressed in this context:

“However, we see that women's safety is increasingly threatened by uncontrolled immigration. Fear already conditions our freedom and the way we act. We must reflect on the way it is being tackled and even if it is not part of the problem, because it is turning its back on the principles that underpin our culture and protect us, giving way to those who do not respect it.” (CVAWAD_05, Pos. 5-9)

In this statement “uncontrolled immigration” is identified as a threat to women's safety that is not adequately approached in the EU Directive. It implies that an effective European approach to violence against women and domestic violence should involve a reform of immigration policies. While Margarita de la Pisa Carrión refers to “women's safety” more generally, the most prominent form of oppression associated with non-Western migrant men is sexual violence, in particular, rape. An association, which is often underscored with statistics. This argumentation structure is exemplified in the following statement by the French ID group member Mathilde Androuët, in another critique of the EU Directive Regulating Violence Against Women And Domestic Violence:

“The objective of intersectionality, which is made explicit in the text, mixes up the defence of women with, for example, the defence of immigrants, who nonetheless bear some of the brunt of sexual violence. Recent figures show that in Paris, 77% of rapes cleared up are committed by foreigners.” (CVAWAD_14, Pos. 8-11)

Similar claims can also be found in debates on migration and integration. For example, in the debate on the Single Permit Directive²⁶, the Bulgarian MEP Angel Dzhambazki, member of the ECR group, criticises the newly adopted Pact on Migration and Asylum²⁷ with the following words:

²⁶ For the final legislative act, EU Directive 2024/1233, see European Union (2024a).

²⁷ For more information on the Pact on Migration and Asylum, see European Commission (2024).

“And that is a problem, because you are trying, you are making, you are costing, you are spinning, you are bitching, you are trying to make illegal migration legal again. There is no way that this thing is going to happen. And right now in Sofia, right now there is a protest against illegal migration. Today you celebrated the 8th of March, these days there have been several attacks, fights committed by illegal migrants against girls in Sofia. Illegal migration is not of people who will bring prosperity to our society or become doctors, engineers and so on. These people are not coming to fit in, these people have other motives and reasons. Separate things.” (ASAPFA_05, Pos. 6-14)

In this statement, Angel Dzhambazki points to incidents of violence against girls committed by “illegal migrants” in Bulgaria. In the following, he generalises the intentions of non-Western migrant men, coming to Europe via irregular migration routes, as “not coming to fit in”. The willing lack of integration insinuated is clearly put in the context of gender equality. Referring to the celebration of Women’s Day on March 8, Angel Dzhambazki portrays the promotion of gender equality as irreconcilable with the legalisation of immigration. While no concrete measures are formulated, this statement, as others, suggests that a more restrictive approach to immigration is necessary to guarantee gender equality, in particular, women’s security, in Europe.

All in all, the findings show similar but slightly different patterns compared to the anti-Islam campaigns. The central figure, that is subject of stigmatisation, is the non-Western migrant man who is represented as the main responsible for gender inequalities in Europe. The stigmatisation of the non-Western migrant men is embedded in the rejection of immigration to Europe as a priority concern for protecting gender equality, in particular, women’s safety and security, in Europe. According to Farris (2017, pp. 67-73), the need for protecting the “native” women, resonating here, is strongly informed by nationalist motives. Concretely, it arises from women’s role in reproducing the nation. In the statements, women who are represented as victims of (sexual) violence by non-Western migrant men are not further characterised, neither it is clarified whether they stand in a specific relation to the non-Western migrant men. Still, the statements suggest that the repression of women by the non-Western migrant man transcends the family and reaches into the public sphere, i.e., also affecting Western women. The non-Western migrant woman, in turn, is not addressed at all in the femonationalist statements found and, hence, not subject of victimisation as the Muslim women. This reinforces that the repression of Muslim women is very specifically linked to their Muslim religion and culture, rather than a non-Western culture more generally.

Nonetheless, these representations entail discriminatory dynamics for all women, as insights from the literature on femonationalism emphasise. Identifying the “‘the black’ as rapist” (ibid., p. 278-280) narrative in the discourse by the Italian party Fratelli d’Italia, Colella (2021, p. 281) warns of the consequences of such representations. Relying on this narrative in the fight against gender-based violence, risks neglecting structural, societal roots of gender-based violence (ibid.). Similarly, this argumentation structure represents European women as in need of protection, rather than autonomous beings (see ibid.) – although these women are not explicitly included in the categories of femonationalism.

The analysis reveals that the role of other political actors in the EU is another important component of femonationalist statements shaped by racism and sexism. As reflected in the quotations, both in the context of anti-Islam and of anti-immigration campaigns, femonationalist statements often address other EU actors and their approach to gender equality. MEPs engaging in femonationalism are, in general, very critical of other EU actors’ approach to gender equality. This critique is integrated into their femonationalist arguments. Due to the dominance of this argumentation pattern, it is further explored in the following section, although not genuinely a (sub-)theme of femonationalism.

5.2.3 The role of other EU actors

Almost all the statements explicitly criticise other political actors, in particular, left-wing MEPs, the European Parliament as a whole, and the European Commission.²⁸ That means, it is mainly supranational EU actors that are addressed. Rather than building on the *sexualisation of racism* or the *racialisation of sexism* itself, this theme concerns the representation of other EU actors’ relationship with the concepts of Islam, immigration and Europe as well as to Muslim/non-Western migrant men and women. The representation of these relationships defines how other political actors’ position on gender equality is represented. In both anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns, the representation of other EU actors follows similar patterns.

The most frequent critique is that of hypocrisy, i.e., the claim that whereas women’s rights are important to other EU actors, they ignore the repression experienced by Muslim women and the sexual violence exerted by non-Western migrant men. This critique already resonates in many of the above-cited statements. It concerns both the rhetorical level and the level of actions. The following example, a statement made by the Italian MEP Isabella Tovaglieri, member of

²⁸ Often the personal pronoun “you” is used, leaving open whether it is only other MEPs or also the European Commission who are addressed as the Commissioner responsible also attends the European Parliament’s plenary debates.

the ID group, in the debate on the “EU’s priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women”, demonstrates this mode of argumentation:

“Dear left-wingers, do not delude yourselves. To defend equality, it is not enough to change the name of the Chamber of Deputies by adding the word deputate. It is not enough to be feminists only against Italian rapists, but to turn away when it is immigrants who rape. It is much more useful to fight together the radical Islamist ideology that threatens the safety and freedom of our women.” (TEUPFT_06, Pos. 13-17)

The statement argues that violence against women perpetrated by non-Western migrant men are not taken seriously by MEPs from left political groups. In other statements, different variations following the tenet of this statement can be found, using vocabulary such as “turn[ing] a blind eye to” (SOFRIT_26, Pos. 10), “turn[ing] away” (TEUPFT_06, Pos. 15) or “do[ing] nothing” (CVAWAD_28, Pos. 2).

Another way of expressing criticism is to accuse other political actors of acting as accomplice. This argument is particularly prominent in the context of anti-Islam campaigns. Concretely, MEPs argue that the European Parliament or the European Commission actively take part in the repression of Muslim women by not rejecting – or even promoting – the practice of veiling. This is exemplified by the following statement by the Greek MEP Emmanouil Frangos, member of the ECR group, in the debate on the “Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred”. He criticises the inclusion of anti-Muslim hatred as a debate topic and insinuates that the European Parliament supports the increasing influence of Islam in Europe, at the cost of Christian identity and culture:

“[...] [T]he theory of so-called Islamophobia is promoted by certain centres, Turkey, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood. In other words, the same people who are funding the illegal invasion, the replacement of our population in Europe, the guilt of being Christians. Unfortunately, they are finding fertile ground. This Parliament has refused to condemn the use of the headscarf, even in European Commission campaigns.” (NTFTIO_44, Pos. 1-6)

In the same debate, also the Italian member of the ID group, Silvia Sardone depicts a dramatic future for Europe in light of the rising influence of Islam, that is, according to her, supported by other EU actors:

“[...] We are facing the suicide of the West, the surrender of Europe, the one that promotes the Islamic veil in its communications and erases our festivals. You are betraying the values of the European Union to lead us to a dramatic future of an Islamised Europe.” (NTFTIO_37, Pos. 16-19)

Overall, the relationship between other EU actors and the non-Western, Muslim Other is thus characterised as supportive, indirectly due to non-action but also proactively pursued. This representation translates into a critical position also towards the way other EU actors promote gender equality. Their actions are portrayed as doing gender equality ‘the wrong way’ or even contributing to gender inequalities.

Returning to this chapter’s broader theme, the entanglement of sexism and racism, the three sections have demonstrated how this aspect of femonationalism becomes manifest in European Parliament debates. The femonationalist statements reveal argumentation structures that resemble parts of the Western colonial topos of “white men [...] saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak, 1988, p. 296, see Farris, 2017, p. 11, p. 22). Muslim women are portrayed as “victims” (ibid., p. 74) while Muslim men are, to a lesser extent, portrayed as “oppressors” (ibid. pp. 73). Still, the emphasis lies on the oppressive character of Islam as such rather than of Muslim men. Statements calling for more attention to be paid to Muslim women in the context of women’s rights debates can be understood as a saviour motif directed towards these women. A similar, but more implicit saviour motif also resonates in the rejection of Muslimness in Europe. In the context of anti-immigration campaigns, the protection of women in general is focused upon. Here, the sexual component of the victim-oppressor dichotomy is more visible. The non-Western migrant man is considered a “sexual threat[]” (Farris, 2017, p. 74.). Overall, these stigmatisations are embedded in representations of the Self-Other relation informed by the shared assumption of Western supremacy (see ibid., pp. 10f.). Other political actors in the EU, however, are portrayed as neglecting or even supporting these sources of gender inequality and forms of repression.

According to Farris’ (2017) conception, the *sexualisation of racism* and the *racialisation of sexism* also feed into an economic rationale. The vision of emancipating the repressed Muslim woman – or non-Western migrant woman which is, however, not referred to in the statements – meets the economic need for labour force in the reproductive sector. The following chapter *Political economy*, thus, delves deeper into the question of whether and how this intersection between racism and sexism also informs MEPs’ approach to labour shortages in the reproductive sector and Muslim/non-Western migrant women’s integration.

5.3. Political economy

The *gendered racialisation of reproductive work* captures the channelling of non-Western migrant women into the care and domestic sector. However, in contrast to the *sexualisation of racism* and the *racialisation of sexism*, the analysis revealed no statements engaging in the *gendered racialisation of reproductive work*. There is no call for non-Western women to work in the reproductive sector, neither as a mode of integration nor as a source of labour for European economies. To better understand and contextualise this result, it is insightful to break down the category into its individual elements and look at whether and how these aspects get addressed in the debates. For example, do MEPs acknowledge the demand for labour force in the reproductive sector? Do they address non-Western migrant women as workforce? Zooming in on these aspects, this section tries to provide first indications for future, more in-depth research of this dimension of femonationalism. The following considerations are not the result of a systematic analysis but are based on anecdotic evidence gathered during the initial work with the debates.

Taking an overarching look at the debates, no debate that was included in the analysis has labour shortages in the reproductive sector or the integration of non-Western migrant women as its main subject. A few MEPs, nonetheless, raise related matters in their individual speeches. However, these aspects are not combined into a femonationalist argument. Issues taken up include the need for migrant workforce in European economies due to a general labour shortage in Europe, the exploitation of migrant workforce, the care gap and women's role in providing care in general.

There is a range of speeches emphasising the importance of migrant workforce to fill labour shortages in certain sectors of European economies. Deviating from the *gendered racialisation of reproductive work*, they neither mention the reproductive sector explicitly nor refer to non-Western migrant women as a group suitable to work in this sector. The following statement by the Slovakian non-attached MEP Katarína Roth Neved'alová supporting the recast of the Single Permit Directive comes close to such a position:

“For example, we need a lot of drivers, chauffeurs, people who know how to operate, for example, cash registers in retail stores, we need technicians and all sorts of other people, not only highly educated people, but also people who perhaps have lower qualifications for jobs that have been vacant for a long time and that perhaps the Europeans no longer want to fill or cannot fill anymore.” (ASAPFA_12, Pos. 6-11)

However, it remains too vague to count as a femonationalist statement. In particular, it does not explicitly mention non-Western migrant women as a target group.

If turning away from debates centring migration, to debates on social and employment policy, it is also possible to find statements highlighting the need for workforce in the reproductive sector. This is exemplified in the following statement by the Slovakian EPP member Miriam Lexmann in the debate on “Addressing urgent skills shortages and finding the right talents to boost job creation (European Year of Skills)”:

“The shortage of skilled labour is a phenomenon that affects all Member States. Specific sectors, such as healthcare, the care sector, but also the construction and information sectors, are the worst affected.” (AUSSAF_01, Pos. 2-4)

While acknowledging the care gap, these statements do not refer to non-Western migrant women as a potential workforce. Hence, they neither qualify as femonationalist statements.

Migrant workers are also addressed in the context of exploitation and forced labour. This perspective is often taken on in the debate on “Amending Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims”. Individual speeches make the exploitative conditions in the reproductive sector subject of discussion. The Portuguese member of the Left group, Anabela Rodrigues explicitly warns of the high number of workers, inter alia, exploited in the domestic sector:

“Of the 24.9 million people mentioned by the ILO who are trapped in forced labour, 16 million are exploited in the private sector, such as domestic work, construction or agriculture.” (ADOPAC_06, Pos. 12-14)

In the same debate, these exploitative dynamics are vividly illustrated by the Jana Toom, Estonian member of the Renew group. She tells the story of a migrant woman working in the care sector:

“[...] [I]n January, when we were already heavily negotiating on the directive, an article was published in the local Brussels newspaper. It was the story of Ernestine, an undocumented migrant who left her home country to flee from domestic violence. Ernestine was offered a place to stay in exchange for childcare without any proper pay.” (ADOPAC_03, Pos. 1-5)

Pointing to the exploitative working conditions in the reproductive sectors, often affecting migrant workers, these examples could be read as contestations of the political-economic logic

of femonationalism. Still, the debate in question deals with the conditions of irregular migrant workers rather than that of non-Western migrant women as part of the regular workforce, centred by femonationalism.

Overall, this anecdotic evidence shows that the debates do discuss aspects relevant to the political economic logic of femonationalism in the broader sense. Still, they show that non-Western migrant women are not addressed as workforce, only migrants more generally. The need for workforce, especially, in the reproductive sector is mentioned occasionally. However, it does not translate into calls for non-Western, migrant women to perform this work. Hence, the political-economic logic of femonationalism, and migrant women's function as a "regular army of labour" (see Farris, 2017, pp. 173-180), does not find its expression in the statements of MEPs. Processes of racialisation and sexualisation are not overtly related to the economic necessity of filling the care gap in Western European countries (see Farris, 2017, p. 16) in the European Parliament.

As discussed in the theoretical chapters, Farris (2017, pp. 124-128) herself identifies dynamics of what I termed the *gendered racialisation of reproductive work* in national migrant integration programmes. The lack of findings in the analysis suggests that the political economic logic underpinning these integration programmes is not circulating in the form of ideas in the European Parliament. Alternatively, it could indicate that the political economic logic of femonationalism only manifests itself at the level of actions and not at the declaratory level. Additionally, the analysis did not cover the constituting forces of the political economic logic discussed by Farris (2017). In this respect, Farris (2017, pp. 119-124) points to the convergence of neoliberal and feminist agendas in the European Commission's approach to migrant integration. For the evaluation of the analysis' findings, this means that actors in the European Parliament may still support economic policies, such as privatisation or the dismantling of the welfare state, first justifying the need for non-Western migrant women's workforce this sector (see Farris, 2017, Chapter 5). Similarly, such dynamics may result as an unintended consequence of what Farris (2017) considers the "'westocentric' feminist notion of emancipation through work" (ibid., p. 8), potentially also shared by MEPs in the European Parliament.

6. Femonationalism in the European Parliament – main actors

Having discussed the major femonationalist themes becoming manifest in European Parliament debates, this chapter turns to the actors engaging in femonationalism. Doing so, it looks at the

distribution of femonationalist speeches and statements among political groups and national affiliations. Following on from this, it zooms in individual MEPs who emerged as particularly salient actors in the analysis, leading to a final section on the role of gender in the engagement in femonationalism. The role of gender was initially not included in the research design but was incorporated later on the basis of the empirical findings. Generally, this chapter connects the actors discussed to the specific femonationalist themes they engage with. Again, I should remind that the figures provided can only serve as first indications of the engagement in femonationalism.

6.1. Engagement in femonationalism across political groups

The 9th European Parliament consisted of seven political groups, The Left, S&D, Greens/EFA, Renew Europe, EPP, ECR and ID, plus non-attached members. As discussed earlier, political groups in the European Parliament form around a common ideological orientation. Diverging from the initial expectation, engagement in femonationalism cannot be found across the political spectrum but concentrates in two political groups. All actors making femonationalist statements are members of either the ECR or ID group.

Table 3 shows the distribution of femonationalist speeches among political groups, with the absolute and relative frequencies indicated as well as the number of femonationalist statements. The ID group stands out as particularly engaged in femonationalism. Out of 14 femonationalist speeches, ten speeches are given by members of the ID group while the four remaining speeches can be attributed to members of the ECR group. Looking at the relative frequency, femonationalist speeches are even more prevalent in the ID group. The share of femonationalist speeches in the total number of speeches by ID group members amounts to 26,32% and is more than three times higher than in the ECR group. Hence, while femonationalist speeches are not a widespread phenomenon in the overall picture, this is different in terms of the ID group. The group's political position in relevant policy areas is strongly informed by femonationalist dynamics. Taking into consideration the level of statements, this distribution gets confirmed. Out of 21 femonationalist statements, 17 statements can be assigned to ID group members and four statements to ECR members. These numbers furthermore reveal that femonationalist speeches by ECR members only include single femonationalist statements, while femonationalist speeches by ID members tend to contain more than one femonationalist statement.

Femonationalist speeches and statements per political group				
Political group	Total number of speeches	Femonationalist speeches	Relative frequency	Femonationalist statements
ID	38	10	26,32%	17
ECR	49	4	8,16%	4
EPP	89	0	-	0
S&D	108	0	-	0
Renew	65	0	-	0
Greens/EFA	50	0	-	0
Left	53	0	-	0
Non-attached	34	0	-	0

Table 3. Femonationalist speeches and statements per political group

Connecting actors to the subthemes outlined in Chapter 5, it becomes clear that femonationalist statements by the ID group and the ECR group show a different thematic focus. The statements by ECR group members convey anti-Islam and anti-immigration messages approximately to the same extent. ECR group members advance two femonationalist statements including anti-Islam claims in the debate on the “Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred”, one femonationalist statement including anti-immigration claims in the debate on the Single Permit Directive and another in the debate on “Combatting violence against women and domestic violence”. Hence, anti-Islam campaigns with references to gender equality only feature in one debate which is genuinely related to Islam. In contrast, there is no femonationalist statement containing anti-Islam messages in ECR group members’ contribution to debates on gender equality. The only femonationalist statement made by an ECR group member in the context of gender equality debates is a more general anti-immigration claim. Zooming in on the categories, i.e., the *racialisation of sexism* and the *sexualisation of racism*, only one statement engages in the stigmatisation of the non-Western migrant man, whereas the remaining statements focus on linking gender inequalities to Islam and immigration. Crucially, this means that the central figure of the oppressed Muslim woman, identified earlier, only appears implicitly in the statements of ECR group members.

Turning to the ID group, the figure of the oppressed Muslim woman is much more prominent. About half of the 17 statements by ID group members address the repression of the Muslim woman directly through the *sexualisation of racism* or indirectly through the *racialisation of sexism*. ID group members put a slightly stronger focus on conveying anti-Islam messages than

ECR group members. About two thirds of the femonationalist statements by ID group members can be considered part of anti-Islam campaigns. The remaining third of the femonationalist statements by the ID group focus on the non-Western migrant man as the subject of stigmatisation. What is particularly striking is that, with the exception of one statement, the high number of femonationalist statements in the debates on gender equality, i.e. “Combating violence against women and domestic violence” and “The EU priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women” can be attributed to ID group members. This implies that femonationalism informs their general position on gender equality. In fact, all contributions to these two debates by ID group members, in total five, included femonationalist statements. Still, this is different in debates touching upon other issues of gender equality.

Opposite to the ID and ECR group, the other political groups do not appear as actors engaged in femonationalism. Not a single statement coded as femonationalist can be attributed to the EPP, S&D, Renew, Greens/EFA, the Left or non-attached MEPs. This distribution of femonationalist statements across political groups suggests that femonationalism links to the ideological orientations of MEPs. The ECR group describes itself as a “a centre-right political group” (ECR, n.d.) and the literature on gender equality and the European Parliament observed the “increasingly radical stance of the ECR and their reactionary construction of conservatism” (Gaweda et al., 2022, p. 838). The website of the ID group has been inactive since the dissolution of the group following the European elections of 2024, but it is described as a radical-right populist group in the literature (see, e.g., Kantola, 2022). As femonationalist statements could only be found in the speeches of these two political groups, the ideological orientation of MEPs seems to influence whether they engage in the *sexualisation of racism* and *racialisation of sexism* or not. Political groups at the conservative, centre-right and, particularly, radical right side of the political spectrum are engaged in femonationalism, whereas those at the liberal, centre-left or left side are not. Interestingly, the latter group includes the EPP which neither engages in femonationalism. This is insofar surprising as parts of the group have been identified as standing in opposition to gender equality in the literature on the European Parliament and gender (see Chapter 2). It implies that femonationalism as a contestation of gender equality also divides the opposition to gender equality in the European Parliament, established in the literature.

6.2. Engagement in femonationalism across national affiliations

Similar to the political group affiliation, the engagement in femonationalism differs across MEPs’ national affiliations. Whereas 27 different nationalities are represented in the European

Parliament, MEPs expressing femonationalist views come from seven countries only: Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Greece, Poland and Bulgaria. Confirming the initial expectation, the results of the analysis show that MEPs with Western European national affiliation engage in femonationalism more strongly than their colleagues from Eastern Europe. The findings also give rise to considerations as to whether the national affiliation of MEPs explains heterogeneity in terms of femonationalism within the political groups.

The distribution of femonationalist speeches among national affiliations is summarised in Table 4, excluding the national affiliations that do not engage in femonationalism. Among the seven countries, Italy and France stand out in terms of the absolute frequency of femonationalist speeches with five and four femonationalist speeches. Together, they account for approximately two thirds of all femonationalist speeches. The remaining third is equally divided between Spain, Germany, Greece, Poland and Bulgaria, with one femonationalist speech per country. Possibly, femonationalist speeches are only isolated cases here. Still, the picture is more balanced when looking at the relative frequency of femonationalist speeches. Italy again achieves the highest figures. 11,63% of all speeches by Italian MEPs are coded as femonationalist. France remains second with 9,76% but is closely followed by Bulgaria with 9,10%. Greek ranks fourth with 7,14%. In turn, femonationalist speeches play only a marginal role in speeches by Poland, German and Spanish MEPs with the relative frequency being below 5%. Still, further speeches need to be analysed in order to confirm these tendencies.

Femonationalist speeches and statements per national affiliation				
National affiliation	Total number of speeches	Femonationalist speeches	Relative frequency	Femonationalist statements
Italy	43	5	11,63%	10
France	41	4	9,76%	6
Spain	59	1	1,70%	1
Germany	47	1	2,13%	1
Greece	14	1	7,14%	1
Poland	23	1	4,35%	1
Bulgaria	11	1	9,10%	1

Table 4. Femonationalist speeches and statements per national affiliation

A look at the level of statements reinforces the dominant role of French and Italian MEPs engaging in femonationalism. MEPs from Spain, Germany, Greece, Bulgaria and Poland only make one femonationalist statement each, i.e., one per femonationalist speech. In contrast, in

five femonationalist speeches, Italian MEPs advance ten femonationalist claims. French MEPs make six femonationalist claims in four femonationalist speeches. Again, thematic priorities set by the MEPs vary per national affiliation. Patterns established per political group reoccur in terms of national affiliations as French, Italian and German MEPs are members from of the ID group, while Spanish, Greek, Polish and Bulgarian MEPs are members of the ECR group. Especially, the large number of femonationalist contributions by French and Italian MEPs campaign against Islam, focusing on the figure of the oppressed Muslim woman.

Turning to the expected West-East divide, these numbers reveal that MEPs from Western Europe take centre stage in the engagement in femonationalism. In absolute terms, Western European MEPs give twelve femonationalist speeches and Eastern European MEPs two femonationalist speeches. This difference is less pronounced but still existent in terms of the relative frequency of femonationalist speeches. They account for 3,29% of all speeches by Western European MEPs and for 1,65% of all speeches by Eastern European MEPs. The analysis leaves open whether this East-West divide can be linked to the different political-economic positionality of Eastern European MEPs as suggested earlier, given that it could not find any empirical manifestations of the *gendered racialisation of reproductive work*. Moreover, the findings reveal that femonationalism is not a phenomenon *exclusively* characterising Western European settings. Femonationalist dynamics, in particular, the convergence between nationalism and feminism as captured by the *sexualisation of racism* and the *racialisation of sexism*, also inform discourses by Eastern European MEPs.

Analysing MEPs' national affiliation also serves to identify potential heterogeneities within political groups. Here, the findings encourage to take a closer look at the national party affiliation of ID group members. ID group members engaged in femonationalism are exclusively affiliated with the Lega (Italy), the Rassemblement National (France) and the Alternative für Deutschland (Germany). This suggests, at first, that within the ID group only members of these national parties engage in femonationalism. However, if looking at the configuration of the ID group, it mainly consisted of French and Italian MEPs. They accounted for 40 of the group's 49 seats in the Outgoing Parliament (European Parliament, n.d.a). Counting in the eleven German MEPs that were excluded from the ID group shortly before the elections, in May 2024, these MEPs still form a big majority within the ID group. As a consequence, the findings cannot provide a clear picture of whether MEPs with other national party affiliations do not share the femonationalist views of their colleagues. Alternatively, it is due to their minimal size that they do not appear as actors engaged in femonationalism in the

plenary debates. The same applies to the ECR group. Here, the low number of femonationalist statements does not allow to make any systematic assessments. In the ECR group, members of the Polish PiS party and of the Italian Fratelli d'Italia hold the most seats (European Parliament, n.d.a) which is not reflected in the findings as femonationalist statements are made by Spanish, Greek, Polish and Bulgarian MEPs.

Eventually, the findings need to be put into perspective. Taking into account the MEPs' ideological background reveals that it is only Italian and French MEPs with a radical right political orientation that engage in femonationalist discourses, rather than MEPs with that national affiliation per se. Any assessment must therefore consider that MEPs' national affiliation and political group affiliations are not completely independent of each other. Depending on the election results, the MEPs of national affiliations are distributed across the political spectrum. If a country has a higher number of conservative, centre-right or right-wing oriented MEPs that may translate into a higher number of femonationalist statements. Furthermore, the following section shows that individual MEPs are particularly engaged in femonationalism highlighting individual politicians' role in femonationalism.

6.3. Engagement in femonationalism by MEPs

For the analysis of individual MEPs and their engagement in femonationalism, no expectation was formulated beforehand. The findings affirm that the individual level play an important role for the investigation of the engagement in femonationalism. While the total number of 21 femonationalist statements is divided among ten different MEPs (for an overview see Appendix C) Codebook), some MEPs are more salient in terms of their engagement in femonationalism than others. The following section presents the three most prominent cases based on the number of femonationalist speeches and statements.

The first MEP who emerges as an active promoter of femonationalist claims from the analysis, is the French MEP Annika Bruna who is member of the ID group in the European Parliament and of the Rassemblement National at the national level. In the 18 debates analysed, Annika Bruna gives three speeches in different debates on gender equality, all of which include femonationalist statements. In total, she makes four femonationalist statements. Her femonationalist statements mainly reflect anti-immigration stances based on the *racialisation of sexism* combined with the *sexualisation of racism* stigmatising non-Western and Muslim men by linking them to sexual violence against women. In turn, her statements do not contain any explicit reference to Muslim women.

The Italian ID group member Silvia Sardone is another prominent advocate of femonationalist positions in the European Parliament. She is a party member of the Lega at the national level. Three of her four speeches include femonationalist statements, contributing to debates on gender equality, migration and integration as well as fundamental rights as a cross-cutting issue. One of her speeches, delivered in the debate on “Combating violence against women and domestic violence” consists of femonationalist statements only. Different to her colleague, Silvia Sardone’s statements focus primarily on anti-Islam claims informed by both the *sexualisation of racism* and the *racialisation of sexism*. In the debates analysed, Silvia Sardone presents herself at the forefront of the opposition to the practice of veiling. Consequently, her statements centre the Muslim woman as the primary victim of sexist and patriarchal oppression.

Isabella Tovaglieri is the second Italian member of the ID group in the European Parliament – and the Lega at the national level – standing out with femonationalist statements. In the debates analysed, Isabella Tovaglieri only gives one speech in a debate on gender equality, so it is difficult to establish patterns as with the previous two cases. Still, this one speech contains four femonationalist statements. In terms of content, her statements do not reveal a clear focus, as in the other two cases. Building both on the *sexualisation of racism* and the *racialisation of sexism*, she links sexual violence against women to immigrants but also represents Islam as a particularly misogynist religion and promotes anti-veiling positions.

These examples demonstrate that engagement in femonationalism strongly depends on individual MEPs. Still, these individual MEPs show similarities. Right-wing, (assumably) female MEPs from Western European member states appear as the main actors engaged in femonationalism in the European Parliament. This assessment can be confirmed if we again broaden the picture a little. Other MEPs articulating femonationalist statements, albeit to a lesser extent, include the French ID group member Mathilde Androuët and the Italian ID group member Susanna Ceccardi. Adding their results, female ID group members from Western Europe account for 16 of 21 femonationalist statements. It is insightful to compare these numbers to the case of the Spanish MEP Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, the only (assumably) female ECR group member. Margarita de la Pisa Carrión makes a femonationalist statement opposing immigration in one of her speeches. Still, this speech is only one of a total number of ten speeches she gave in the debates analysed. That does not mean Margarita de la Pisa Carrión is a stronger supporter of gender equality, just that femonationalism is not a very prominent theme in her political position. Focusing on individual cases, hence, also helps to differentiate between the two political groups engaged in femonationalism.

Looking at these three actors, (assumably) female, ID group members from Western Europe form the primary group of MEPs engaged in femonationalism. The strong presence of women among the actors engaged in femonationalism is striking. It encourages to not only analyse femonationalism as a contestation of gender equality but also turn attention to how the engagement in femonationalism itself is gendered. The subsequent section, thus, takes a closer look at the role of gender for the engagement in femonationalism.

6.4. Engagement in femonationalism by gender

Initially, gender was not an analytical dimension incorporated in the research design. Insights from the analysis, nonetheless, suggest that it is worth to devote a separate section to the role of gender in the engagement in femonationalism. This is also in line with this thesis' approach, outlined in the theoretical chapters, to consider gender as an analytical tool.

As the figures presented in the previous section indicate, the numbers of femonationalist statements per female MEPs is higher than among their male colleagues. Of the 14 femonationalist speeches, ten are given by female MEPs and four by male MEPs. This distribution is even more pronounced at the level of statements, as 17 of 21 femonationalist statements are articulated by female MEPs. However, it must be taken into account that these numbers are only absolute frequencies based on the assumed gender of the MEPs. For a more systematic analysis of the influence of gender on the engagement in femonationalism, data on the gender of all MEPs participating in the debates would need to be collected.

If linking the MEPs to femonationalist statements per gender, interesting pattern emerge. Male MEPs only engage in femonationalism in debates on migration and integration, but not in debates on gender equality. Looking at their speeches more in depth, they reveal that references to gender equality are embedded in more general claims against immigration and Islam going beyond gender equality aspects. On the other hand, female MEPs advance femonationalist claims mainly – but not only – in debates on gender equality. This implies that femonationalism characterises their general position on gender equality, while it is only one additional point made by male MEPs rejecting immigration to Europe and the influence of Islam on the continent. Moreover, while both female and male MEPs engage in anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns, only female MEPs explicitly stigmatise Muslim women by the *sexualisation of racism*. Male MEPs' anti-Islam campaigns address gender inequalities in Islam as a *racialisation of sexism* and, thus, only implicitly target the Muslim woman. In turn, the stigmatisation of non-Western migrant men as a perpetrator of (sexual) violence in anti-immigration campaigns is more gender balanced.

In the logic of femonationalism, the stigmatisation of the Muslim women by female MEPs defines a particular relationship between these two groups of women. While Muslim women are represented as the primary victims of patriarchal and sexist oppression, female MEPs conveying these representations can be understood as contrasting figures. As Colella (2021) finds in her analysis of femonationalism in the Italian party Fratelli d'Italia, the party's discourses build on the "display of an emancipated and powerful woman image" (ibid., p. 276) of white women. In their engagement in femonationalism, female MEPs themselves can be considered to act as "models of western womanhood" (Farris, 2017, p. 77) that Muslim women are sought to follow. The figures and thematic priorities identified suggest that gender is an important factor to consider in the analysis of femonationalism in the European Parliament. Overall, the engagement in femonationalism in the European Parliament is a gendered process itself and relies strongly on single female actors.

7. What have we learned?

The discussion in this chapter takes us back to the literature on the European Parliament and gender, as well as femonationalism's theoretical considerations. Firstly, I relate the empirical findings to the state of research on the European Parliament and gender discussing what they reveal both about the European Parliament as a gender equality actor but also as a gendered institution. Secondly, I explore their theoretical implications for the concept of femonationalism, inter alia, turning to the role of the EU in constituting femonationalism. The chapter closes with some final methodological reflections.

The first overarching aim of this thesis was to provide a more nuanced picture of the European Parliament as a gender equality actor. As argued, femonationalism can be understood as one particular form of contesting gender equality. Findings are consistent with findings from previous studies on gender equality discourses in the European Parliament in the 9th legislative term. These studies have argued that the opposition to gender equality can mainly be found among conservative, centre-right and, in particular, radical right parties, i.e., among MEPs on the TAN side of the GAL-TAN axis (see, Ahrens & Kantola, 2023; Elomäki & Ahrens, 2022; Kantola, 2022; Kantola & Rolandsen Agustín, 2019). This thesis finds similar patterns regarding political groups' engagement in femonationalism: the ID group appears as the political group that is most strongly engaged in femonationalism. The ECR group is the second political group that engages in femonationalism, yet to a lesser extent. Linking the findings to existing literature, they suggest that the contestation of gender equality in the form of

femonationalism is combined with other forms of opposition to gender equality, such as anti-gender politics.²⁹

The analysis of femonationalist themes, developing anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns as subthemes, reinforces assessments by Kantola & Lombardo (2021, p. 574) who found that protecting European women's children against non-Western immigrants and Islam characterises radical right populist's opposition to gender equality in the European Parliament. Similarly, it underlines Ahrens et al. (2022, p. 811) findings that Islam is subject of Othering processes by the ECR group and the ENF (8th term)/ID (9th term) group.³⁰ Like this thesis, Ahrens et al. (2022, p. 810) highlight that these Othering processes are combined with anti-EU stances. However, both Kantola & Lombardo (2021) and Ahrens et al. (2022) conceptualise the connection of gender equality discourses to anti-migration and anti-Islam discourses as the strategy of bending (see also Lombardo et al., 2009, p. 5). Similarly, Gaweda et al. (2023, p. 838) define the ECR group's opposition to gender equality as bending and stretching the meaning of the concept. Following Farris' (2017) conceptual considerations, opposition to gender equality informed by femonationalism could also be rooted in parties' nationalist ideology.

The analysis did not find any femonationalist statements by EPP members, although previous studies established that some parts of the EPP oppose gender equality (see Elomäki & Ahrens, 2022, pp. 330f.; Kantola, 2022, p. 234). While parts of the EPP may oppose the concept of gender equality as shown in the literature, this suggests that their opposition to gender equality is not characterised by sexist-racist dynamics. This marks a clear dividing line between the ideology and conception of gender equality between the EPP, on the one side, and the ECR and ID group, on the other. Femonationalism, hence, further nuances differences in the opposition to gender equality in the European Parliament.

The analysis could not finally establish whether national affiliation can account for heterogeneities in the engagement in femonationalism within political groups, as argued for political groups' position on gender equality more generally in other studies (Berthet, 2022b, pp. 693f.). However, it shows that femonationalist arguments more strongly inform positions on gender equality of Western European MEPs than of Eastern European MEPs, especially in the case of anti-Islam campaigns. The prominent role of Western European MEPs in

²⁹ This linkage has already been analysed by Colella (2021) in the case of Italy who illustrates how femonationalism and the anti-gender backlash reinforce each other.

³⁰ Ahrens et al. (2022) identify "homonationalist" (ibid., p. 811) arguments building on Puar's (2007) concept of homonationalism, but do not refer to Farris' (2017) concept of femonationalism.

femonationalism identified in the analysis underscores the findings of previous studies that emphasise the femonationalist convergence as a dynamic to be observed in Western European countries (see Farris, 2017; Calderaro, 2022; Bader and Mottier, 2020; Rahbari, 2021; Colella, 2021; Bauer et al., 2023). Still, it is up to future research to investigate whether this East-West divide can be linked to the political-economic logic of femonationalism, specifically characterising Western European economies. The engagement of individual MEPs from Eastern European member states in femonationalism still warrants more in-depth research on femonationalist dynamics in Eastern European countries.

In the literature on the European Parliament and gender, to my knowledge, no contribution analyses other dimensions of gender equality with view to a potential East-West divide. Valuable insights can be drawn from the broader literature on the EU's promotion of gender equality. In an analysis of EU identity construction, for example, Sloomaeckers (2020) shows how LGBT equality served as an arena for normative Othering processes in the Eastern enlargement process. Hence, Eastern European member states as well have been subject of Othering processes in the context of gender equality. However, these Othering processes follow different dynamics than in femonationalism. They still provide a potential explanation why MEPs from Eastern Europe are less engaged in femonationalist Othering processes. Yet more comprehensive research is needed to establish this connection.

Furthermore, femonationalism appears as a highly gendered phenomenon, denoting that female MEPs are more prone to promote (see Nugent, 2019) but also to contest gender equality. In her analysis of the FEMM Committee, Nugent (2019) points to the “[g]endered [d]ivisions of [l]abour” (ibid.) characterising the Committee's promotion of gender equality. Paradoxically, the findings of this thesis suggest that the contestation of gender quality can be gendered as well. In the context of femonationalism, it is not male MEPs that primarily contest the promotion of gender equality by female MEPs, but other female MEPs. This can be related to the fact that femonationalist statements – albeit considered a contestation of gender equality in this thesis – are presented as a stance in favour of gender equality. It emphasises that the high descriptive representation of women in the European Parliament (Zamfir, 2024, p. 2) does not necessarily translate into more support for gender equality positions. This feeds into the critique of the general assumption, that a high number of female parliamentarians leads to a higher substantive representation of women in policies, as essentialist (see Childs & Krook, 2006, p. 22).

Although the analysis focused on plenary debates, the findings also provide insights into potential consequences for EU policies in the area of gender equality. The policy proposals in femonationalist statements primarily emphasise the importance of anti-veiling legislation. Anti-veiling measures at the EU level itself are confined to financial tools and soft policy instruments, as EU competences in the area of integration and, hence, the role of the European Parliament, are limited.³¹ As envisioned in the proposals, measures at the EU could target the funding of Muslim organisations and the representation of veiling in EU gender equality campaigns. They also call for the Commission to support legislative veil bans in schools as a policy instrument at the national level. Still, while outlining a concrete vision for changes in EU gender equality policies, femonationalist positions are far from being shared by a majority of MEPs in the time period analysed. Moreover, the measures would need to be supported by the European Commission whose engagement in anti-Islam campaigns has not yet been analysed. It is thus questionable, to what extent femonationalist positions directly inform EU gender equality policies. Still, policy implications of anti-immigration campaigns and their calls for stricter immigration control may be more far-reaching as, following Art. 79 TFEU, the EU shares competences with its member states on regulating migration (see European Union, 2012b).

Overall, these findings strengthen the European Parliament's conception as a "contradictory forerunner" (Kantola & Lombardo, 2023) in promoting gender equality and challenge the prevailing notion of the European Parliament as a unified actor. Femonationalism is another form of how gender equality is subject to contestation in the European Parliament. As only MEPs from centre-right and right-wing political groups engage in femonationalism, femonationalist positions are likely to contribute to a further "[p]olarisation [a]round [g]ender" (see Kantola 2022). Considering that femonationalism builds on an affirmative position towards gender equality, it contributed to gender equality as a contested discursive terrain. Although their impact on policies is so far rather limited, femonationalist statements fuel the discursive struggle around the meaning of gender equality (see Lombardo et al., 2009).

The findings also empirically enrich the literature of femonationalism shedding light on femonationalist dynamics in supranational settings. As one core notion of femonationalism, Farris (2017) identifies a convergence of nationalist, neoliberal and feminist actors in the constitution of femonationalism. The analysis itself does not allow to define the underlying

³¹ According to Art. 79(4) TFEU, the European Parliament and the Council are only allowed to take legislative measures supporting Member States' action, "excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States" (European Union, 2012b).

motives of femonationalist statements, i.e., whether MEPs pursue a nationalist, feminist or neoliberal political agenda. Nonetheless, insights from the literature on femonationalism prove to be useful to better understand their political projects. The national parties to which the ID group members are affiliated have been analysed as nationalist right-wing actors in Farris' case studies of Italy and France (see Farris, 2017, p. 4).³² This suggests that the MEPs identified in the analysis belong to the nationalist part of the femonationalist convergence, also reinforced by the EU critical positions reflected in their statements. Still, the political projects of nationalism – and conservatism – cannot be fully separated from that of neoliberalism, as argued by Farris (2017). Similarly, Elomäki & Kantola (2018) emphasise the close relationship between nationalism, conservatism and neoliberalism arguing that they should be understood as “three distinct, yet partly overlapping and interconnected projects” (p. 340). Analysing the case of Finland, they find that conservative and right populist actors have pursued privatisation policies informed by a neoliberal agenda (ibid.). Hence, the political projects of the ID group and the ECR group, while rooted in nationalism and conservatism, may also be informed by neoliberalism.

Eventually, it is also worth discussing the role of feminism in this characterisation. The analysis reveals the prominent role of female conservative and right-wing MEPs engaging in femonationalism. Interestingly, discussing insights from her case studies, Farris (2017) considers female right-wing politicians as part of “the feminist side” (ibid., p. 55). She elaborates that

“[f]rom the right to the left [...] women within the femonationalist field have become particularly vocal in reinforcing the notion of sexism and misogyny as problems that primarily affect Muslim communities.” (ibid.)

According to this interpretation, female conservative and right-wing MEPs can also be understood as feminist actors in the femonationalist convergence.³³ However, Farris (2017, p. 4, 55) also emphasises that feminist actors only engage in anti-Islam campaigns and refrain from expressing anti-immigration opinions. The finding that female MEPs also advance anti-immigration claims, hence, suggests that their political projects are more rooted in nationalism than in feminism.

³² To be precise, Farris (2017) analyses the Front National and Lega Nord, which have since been renamed ‘Rassemblement National’ or, in the case of the Lega Nord, newly founded as a nationwide party called ‘Lega’.

³³ Female ID group members may also consider themselves feminists. See, for example, the invitation to an event hosted by the German ID group member Christiane Anderson and titled “Feminismus von Rechts” (Anderson, 2022).

The concept of femonationalism could still benefit from a clearer definition of feminist actors and movements in the femonationalist convergence. This links back to Möser's (2022) critique of the concept. Möser (2022, p. 1546) questions feminism's entanglement with racism as a structural phenomenon going beyond individual cases.³⁴ Particularly, it needs to be reflected upon whether women in the femonationalist field should automatically be considered feminist. As elaborated in the conceptual considerations, there is a difference between non-feminist actors advancing feminist themes and feminist actors engaging in anti-emancipatory politics. These two groups should not be conflated. To this end, Eschle and Maiguashca (2018) suggest differentiating between co-optation and appropriation. Co-optation involves the conversion of feminist actors' agendas whereas appropriation captures the adoption of feminist themes by non-feminist actors (ibid., p. 232). Similarly, different to Farris' (2017, p. 55) findings cited above, this thesis did not find any evidence of engagement in femonationalism across the political spectrum, i.e., also no women from left, green, liberal or centre political groups engaged in femonationalism.

Overarchingly, the analysis' findings on the role of women in femonationalism still resonate well with findings of previous studies. For example, in her analysis of the Italian party Fratelli d'Italia, Colella (2021) highlights the crucial role of Georgia Meloni as an emancipated, white female figure in the party's femonationalist positions. The female MEPs engaging in femonationalism, all white and from Western European member states, fit into this schema and may take on a similar role in their party's femonationalist politics. Other contributions highlight the role of individual Muslim women, taking on the role of an "insider" (Rahbari, 2021, p. 51) to legitimise right-wing parties' anti-Islam claims.³⁵ Such modes of argumentation could not be found in the European Parliament in the context of gender equality.

Beyond providing a better understanding of the European Parliament as a gender equality actor, this thesis' findings also help to conceptualise the complex role of supranational EU institutions in the femonationalist convergence. By doing so, they speak to Möser's (2017) critique of a lack of such a discussion in Farris' (2017) conceptualisation. The EU's role in femonationalism is primarily addressed by Farris (2017) regarding the European Commission's neoliberal approach to integration policies, supported by its gender equality agencies. The findings complement this picture. They confirm Farris' (2017, p. 1) observations of the election campaigns for the European Parliament in 2014: The surprising mobilisation of gender equality

³⁴ Still, Calderaro (2022) has further substantiated Farris' (2017) claims in her analysis of feminists' engagement in and feminist discourses surrounding the legislative process on a veil ban in France.

³⁵ See also Farris' (2017, pp. 43f.) discussion of the case of Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands.

themes by far right – but also centre-right – MEPs. As this thesis reveals, this mobilisation of gender equality is usually accompanied by arguments building on the intersection between racism and sexism. Despite its supranational character, nationalist dynamics seem to prevail in the European Parliament's role in femonationalism (see Greiwe, 2024, p. 14 for similar findings). MEPs from Western Europe, in particular, France and Italy, emerged as the main actors engaged in femonationalism. Both countries have served as subjects of analysis in the literature on femonationalism (see Farris, 2017; Calderaro, 2022; Colella, 2021). Femonationalist dynamics highlighted in these studies in the respective national settings have also found their way into European Parliament politics via national representatives.

Different to the European Commission (see Farris, 2017, pp. 119-130), actors in the European Parliament do not actively foster the political-economic logic of femonationalism. The racist-sexist arguments found in MEPs' statements still feed into this political-economic logic. It is the underlying assumption of Western supremacy and the victimisation of Muslim women, representing the non-Western woman more generally, that inform economic policies channelling non-Western migrant women into the reproductive sector. However, the question whether and how such policies are designed at EU level requires more in-depth analyses. Overall, the EU can thus be conceptualised as an interface between different actors of the femonationalist convergence. Neoliberal and feminist forces in the European Commission, highlighted by Farris (2017), meet nationalist forces in the European Parliament. The critique of other EU actors in the femonationalist statements underlines that these actors otherwise pursue diverging political agendas (see also Greiwe, 2024, p. 14).

Notwithstanding, the findings are subject to some methodological limitations. These limitations raise the question of whether the analysis can definitively settle that the role of the European Parliament in femonationalism is limited to the mobilisation of gender equality by nationalist actors. First, due to the small number of femonationalist statements and speeches found, this thesis can only provide a first assessment of femonationalist dynamics in the European Parliament. The patterns established need to be confirmed in future, more comprehensive research. Even more important, the methodological approach chosen is limited to the detection of actors and discourses actively mobilising the discriminatory force of femonationalism. However, Farris (2017) understands femonationalism not as an intentional political project, but as a convergence. Femonationalism may unfold its discriminatory potential only if political agendas by different actors converge, without this convergence necessarily being reflected in one single actor. Femonationalist dynamics can also result from a range of negligent acts or

arise as an unintended consequence. That means that even MEPs who are not outright discriminatory in their statements may still contribute to femonationalism. The concept of femonationalism crucially points out how discriminatory discourses by nationalists, such as detected in this thesis, converge with a neoliberal agenda in Western European economies and the struggle for feminist emancipation in Western Europe. These dynamics could not be captured in the analysis and define research agendas for the future.

8. Concluding remarks

As the introduction to this thesis outlined, gender equality is a central principle in the EU's self-conception, defined in various regulations in EU primary law. At the same time, the EU is constituted by many different players, reaching from larger EU institutions to individuals, all of whom have their own understanding of and relation to this principle. The ambivalent relation between the principle of gender equality and different EU actors, in particular, actors within the European Parliament, have been at the centre of this thesis. The concept of femonationalism by Farris (2017) provided a lens through which to look at these ambivalences more closely and make sense of them.

Despite representing itself as a vanguard in the promotion of gender equality (see van der Vleuten, 2019), this thesis has once more highlighted that the European Parliament's relation to gender equality is highly contentious. Complementing other forms of opposition to gender equality, femonationalism constitutes one way how gender equality is contested within the institution. In more concrete terms, engagement in femonationalism contests gender equality by externalising persisting gender inequalities in Europe which are linked to the presence of a Muslim or non-Western Other. This Muslim or non-Western Other is either portrayed abstractly as Muslim religious practices, culture and traditions or is concretised in the figure of the non-Western migrant man. Moreover, it crucially builds on the stigmatisation of Muslim women as primarily affected by the persisting repressive structures in Europe. Doing so, it denies the inextricable link between gender and race as structural dimensions of society (see, e.g., Scott, 1986, p. 1054) and reinforces the marginalisation of this group of women. That contradicts the emancipatory agenda behind gender equality.

Still, this thesis underlines the importance of understanding the European Parliament as a heterogeneous institution whose approach to gender equality is shaped by many different political actors. While not a widespread phenomenon in the overall view of European Parliament plenary debates, engagement in femonationalism primarily characterises the

approach to gender equality by the centre-right and right-wing and is, hence, dependent on the ideological orientation of MEPs. With view to the electoral success of right-wing parties in the European Parliament elections of 2024, the struggle around gender equality is likely to get even fiercer in the future. As majorities in the European Parliament are shifting to the centre-right and radical right, femonationalist positions may gain stronger influence also in terms of EU gender equality policy. Not least, the thesis encourages to turn to the individual level for better grasping a larger institution's relation to femonationalism and gender equality, more generally. While aggregating numbers for political groups proved to be insightful, it is individual MEPs who act as driving forces in spreading femonationalist ideas. This particularly applies to female MEPs from the radical right encouraging a general reflection upon the representation of women's interests in the European Parliament.

From the conceptual perspective of femonationalism, the European Parliament emerges as a site of femonationalist politics by nationalist actors, despite the supranational character of the institution. Combining this finding with Farris' (2017) remarks on the European Commission, the role of supranational EU institutions in femonationalism appears complex, yet significant. Actors and movements from all three political projects, neoliberalism, feminism and nationalism, take part in EU politics, turning the EU into an important arena for the femonationalist convergence.

Overall, the concept of femonationalism has provided a useful analytical tool to examine the contestation of gender equality in the European Parliament. Moreover, the study of the European Parliament has offered valuable insights into the role of the EU in femonationalism highlighting the EU as an important area of focus for scientific analyses of femonationalism. The findings still give rise to numerous avenues for future research on the European Parliament and femonationalism. In particular, more comprehensive analyses of plenary debates are necessary to substantiate the patterns found. A discourse analysis seems useful for such an endeavour. Additionally, including the level of substantive policies could provide further insights into femonationalist dynamics in the European Parliament. To this end, future research could focus on the committee work in which policies are formulated. The FEMM Committee, but also the Committees on Employment and Social Affairs, on Economic and Monetary Affairs or on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs seem suitable for this purpose.

Future academic work could also extend the focus to how femonationalist dynamics themselves are contested in the European Parliament. The initial work with the debates during the analysis yielded promising evidence in this regard. While this thesis concentrates on statements

contesting gender equality through femonationalism, other statements – directly or indirectly – challenge the underlying assumptions of these statements. This suggests that the struggle around the emancipatory core of feminism in the European Parliament is ongoing.

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APPENDIX

- A) List of plenary debates
- B) Coding guideline based on Mayring (2022)
- C) Codebook
- D) Case-Category Matrices
- E) List of all speeches

A) List of plenary debates

Identifier	Reference	Policy area	Number of speeches
TEUPFT	European Parliament (2024). The EU priorities for the 68th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (debate). 7 February 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)02-07(15). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-02-07-ITM-015_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	gender equality	34
CVAWAD	European Parliament (2024). Combating violence against women and domestic violence (debate). 23 April 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)04-23(7). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-04-23-ITM-007_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	gender equality	34
IROTEL	European Parliament (2024). Implementation report on the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (debate). 7 February 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)02-07(16). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-02-07-ITM-016_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025). European Parliament (2024). Implementation report on the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (continuation of debate). 7 February 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)02-07(18). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-02-07-ITM-018_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	gender equality	34
ASAPFA	European Parliament (2024). A single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State (recast) (debate). 12 March 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)03-12(16). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-03-12-ITM-016_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	migration and integration, social and employment	13
SOTCNA	European Parliament (2024). Screening of third country nationals at the external borders - European Criminal Records Information System - Third Country Nationals - Common procedure for international protection in the Union -	migration and integration	51

Identifier	Reference	Policy area	Number of speeches
	Establishing a return border procedure, and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 - Asylum and migration management - Addressing situations of crisis and force majeure - Establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast) - Union Resettlement Framework - Standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection - Standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) (joint debate - Migration and Asylum package). 10 April 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)04-10(16). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-04-10-ITM-017_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).		
NTFTIO	European Parliament (2024). Need to fight the increase of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred (debate). 7 February 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)02-07(13). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-02-07-ITM-013_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	migration and integration	64
CDIMST	European Parliament (2024). Council decision inviting Member States to ratify the Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190) of the International Labour Organization (debate)', 12 March 2024, P9_CRE-PROV(2024)03-12(5). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-03-12-ITM-005_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	social and employment, gender equality	23
FASFTE	European Parliament (2024). Forging a sustainable future together: economic, social and territorial challenges for a competitive, cohesive and inclusive Europe (debate). 24 April 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)04-24(18), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-04-24-ITM-018_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	social and employment	17

Identifier	Reference	Policy area	Number of speeches
LHDOTF	European Parliament (2024). La Hulpe declaration on the future of social Europe (debate). 24 April 2024, P9_CRE-PROV(2024)04-24(17). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-04-24-ITM-017_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	social and employment	25
ADOPAC	European Parliament (2024). Amending Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (debate). 22 April 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)04-22(20). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-04-22-ITM-020_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	migration and integration, social and employment, gender equality	18
IOTRTA	European Parliament (2024). Inclusion of the right to abortion in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (debate). 14 March 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)03-14(3). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-03-14-ITM-003_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	gender equality	32
DOLCIT	European Parliament (2024). Deterioration of living conditions in the EU (debate). 14 March 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)03-14(6). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-03-14-ITM-006_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	social and employment	13
MAJINT	European Parliament (2024). Major interpellations (debate). 29 February 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)02-29(10). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-02-29-ITM-010_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	migration and integration	9
RIITWO	European Parliament (2024). Rising inequalities in the world (debate). 27 April 2024. P9_CRE-PROV(2024)02-27(20). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-02-27-ITM-020_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	migration and integration, social and employment, gender equality	21

Identifier	Reference	Policy area	Number of speeches
QJIACF	European Parliament (2024). Quality jobs in a competitive future-oriented social market economy (topical debate). 17 January 2024. P9_CRE-REV(2024)01-17(11). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-01-17-ITM-011_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	social and employment	28
SOFRIT	European Parliament (2024). Situation of fundamental rights in the EU in 2022 and 2023 (debate). 17 January 2024. P9_CRE-REV(2024)01-17(15). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-01-17-ITM-015_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	migration and integration, social and employment, gender equality	27
GAOTRC	European Parliament (2024). Gender aspects of the rising cost of living and the impact of the energy crisis (debate). 17 January 2024. P9_CRE-REV(2024)01-17(19). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-01-17-ITM-019_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	social and employment, gender equality	21 (* 1 not included)
AUSSAF	European Parliament (2024). Addressing urgent skills shortages and finding the right talents to boost job creation (European Year of Skills) (debate). 17 January 2024. P9_CRE-REV(2024)01-17(20). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-01-17-ITM-020_EN.html . (accessed 11 February 2025).	social and employment	23

B) Coding guideline based on Mayring (2022)

Category	Definition	Indicators	Anchor example	Coding rules
Sexualisation of racism	the stigmatisation of non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim men <i>and/or</i> women in the context of gender equality	Statements connecting non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim men to the oppression of women predominantly	"You talk about women's rights in Europe, but turn a blind eye to the many Islamic women who are treated like animals by their husbands in Europe." (SOFRIT_26, Pos. 10-11)	The category is applied if a statement, in context of a speech on gender-based violence, refers to the oppression of Muslim women by Islam (Islamic veil, Muslim men etc.) in Europe and the speech mentions no other forms of gender-based violence The category is applied if a statement claims that Muslim women are repressed by Islam (including the veil) or Muslim men in Europe without qualifying this claim The category is applied if a statement accuses other MEPs of ignoring the repression of Muslim women by Islam or Muslim men in Europe specifically → subcode: blind-eye argument The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement refers to the repression of non-Western or Muslim women in non-European countries linked to autocratic or radical Islamist regimes
		Statements portraying non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim women as the primary victims of patriarchal oppression predominantly	“And that is a problem, because you are trying, you are making, you are costing, you are spinning, you are bitching, you are trying to make illegal migration legal again. There is no way that this thing is going to happen. And right now in Sofia, right now there is a protest against illegal migration.	The category is applied if a statement links the repression of women in Europe primarily to Muslim/non-Western men The category is applied if a statement portrays Muslim/non-Western men as perpetrators of violence against women in Europe, without any qualification The category is applied if a statement invokes numbers indicating that non-Western migrant men are the main perpetrators of (sexual) violence against women in Europe

Category	Definition	Indicators	Anchor example	Coding rules
			Today you celebrated the 8th of March, these days there have been several attacks, fights committed by illegal migrants against girls in Sofia. Illegal migration is not of people who will bring prosperity to our society or become doctors, engineers and so on. These people are not coming to fit in, these people have other motives and reasons. Separate things.” (ASAPFA_05, Pos. 6-14)	The category is applied even if a statement does not specify the gender of the perpetrators of (sexual) violence against women The category is applied even if it is not explicitly stated that immigrants/foreigners made responsible for (sexual) violence against women or increasing insecurity of women in Europe come from Muslim/non-Western countries but the context of the speech/debate suggests so → subcode: general immigrant argument The category is applied if a statement accuses other MEPs of ignoring gender-based violence perpetrated by non-Western migrant or Muslim men specifically → subcode: blind-eye argument The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement portrays non-Western migrants as being violent or as a threat in general without an explicit reference to concerns about gender equality The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement depicts Muslim men as being particularly antisemitic or as main responsables for the persecution of Christians
Racialisation of sexism	the representation of sexism and patriarchy as the exclusive domain of the non-Western Other <i>and/or</i> of	Statements connecting the oppression of women to non-Western societies, cultures, or	"Europe wants more rights and equality for all women, but does not realise that the real battle today is to defend women's conquests that we can no longer take for granted in the face of the progressive	The category is applied if a statement makes an explicit reference to gender equality as part of European culture/identity/society or Christian religion that is threatened or needs to be defended against a non-Western/Muslim Other The category is applied if a statement presents the rise of sexism/the increase in gender inequality as a consequence of the "Islamisation" of Europe

Category	Definition	Indicators	Anchor example	Coding rules
	gender equality as the exclusive domain of the European Self	religions exclusively Statements connecting the realisation of women's emancipation to European societies, cultures or religions exclusively	Islamisation of our cities." (TEUPFT_06, Pos. 1-4) "However, we see that women's safety is increasingly threatened by uncontrolled immigration. Fear already conditions our freedom and the way we act. We must reflect on the way it is being tackled and even if it is not part of the problem, because it is turning its back on the principles that underpin our culture and protect us, giving way to those who do not respect it." (CVAWAD_05, Pos. 5-9)	The category is applied if a statement claims that gender equality in Europe needs to be defended against a Muslim/non-Western Other The category is applied if a statement asks a rhetorical question comparing women's rights in European/Christian countries and non-Western/Muslim countries, even if it does not explicitly state that it is in the latter, in which women have less rights The category is even applied if a statement does not specify countries of origin as non-Western/Muslim when it links immigration to increasing insecurity of women in Europe/the increase in sexism and gender inequalities-→ subcode: general immigration argument The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement expresses concern about "Islamisation" without specifying increasing gender inequality as a consequence of "Islamisation" The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement presents immigration as a threat to European identity/culture/society or Christian religion but does not explicitly refer gender equality as part of that identity/culture/society or religion The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement characterises Europe/European countries as places where gender reality is realised but also lists limitations to that realisation The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement advocates the promotion of gender equality outside the EU in its external

Category	Definition	Indicators	Anchor example	Coding rules
				actions other statements in the speech acknowledges persisting inequalities in Europe The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement refers to gender inequalities in non-Western countries and, at the same, time other statements in the speech acknowledge persisting inequalities in Europe The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement links persisting gender inequalities in non-Western European countries to other reasons than Islam as a religion per se The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement calls for the EU to "lead by example" in advancing gender equality The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement formulates the aim of turning Europe into the first continent where gender equality is realised The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement represents antisemitism as the exclusive domain of the Muslim Other
Gendered racialisation of reproductive work	the support of non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim women's integration through reproductive work	Statements encouraging non-Western <i>and/or</i> Muslim women to work in the sphere of social reproduction	-	The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement emphasises the positive economic contribution of immigrants to European economies in general, without specific reference to non-Western migrant/Muslim women The category is <u>not</u> applied if a statement identifies the need for workforce in low-skilled sectors in the context of legal migration, but does not call upon non-Western migrant/Muslim women to perform these jobs

C) Codebook

Debate/Speech	MEP	Political Group	National affiliation	Statement	Category
TEUPFT_06	Isabella Tovaglieri	ID	Italy	"Europe wants more rights and equality for all women, but does not realise that the real battle today is to defend women's conquests that we can no longer take for granted in the face of the progressive Islamisation of our cities."	Racialisation of sexism
TEUPFT_06	Isabella Tovaglieri	ID	Italy	“A few days ago, in Italy, a 13-year-old girl was abused by a pack of young Egyptians. This was a chilling episode, but not an isolated one, as confirmed by incontrovertible yet chilling data, which a certain political party is happy not to see, which tell us that in Italy 40 % of sexual crimes are committed by foreigners. Crimes that have matured in a cultural context that considers women inferior and submissive to men, condemned to undergo the imposition of the veil, early marriages, female genital mutilation, phenomena that are worryingly on the increase right here in Europe.”	Sexualisation of racism Racialisation of sexism
TEUPFT_06	Isabella Tovaglieri	ID	Italy	"As the League, we have tabled a motion to prevent any European funding for associations that promote the wearing of the veil in Europe. Leftists, will you support us or, once again, in the name of short-sighted goodness, will you continue to subsidise those	Racialisation of sexism

Debate/Speech	MEP	Political Group	National affiliation	Statement	Category
				who are truly enemies of women's rights and dignity."	
TEUPFT_06	Isabella Tovaglieri	ID	Italy	"Dear left-wingers, do not delude yourselves. To defend equality, it is not enough to change the name of the Chamber of Deputies by adding the word deputate. It is not enough to be feminists only against Italian rapists, but to turn away when it is immigrants who rape."	Sexualisation of racism Racialisation of sexism
TEUPFT_13	Annika Bruna	ID	France	"This resolution includes the need to tackle harmful traditional practices such as child marriages, forced marriages and genital mutilation, which, I would remind you, are imported into our country."	Racialisation of sexism
TEUPFT_13	Annika Bruna	ID	France	"On the other hand, these resolutions proposed by the European Parliament systematically miss the real priorities for women's rights. Not a word about the increase in insecurity throughout Europe, mass and uncontrolled immigration, radical Islam and their serious repercussions on women, who are the first victims."	Racialisation of sexism
CVAWAD_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	"However, we see that women's safety is increasingly threatened by uncontrolled immigration. Fear already conditions our freedom and the way we act. We must reflect on the way it is being tackled and even if it is	Racialisation of sexism

Debate/Speech	MEP	Political Group	National affiliation	Statement	Category
				not part of the problem, because it is turning its back on the principles that underpin our culture and protect us, giving way to those who do not respect it."	
CVAWAD_06	Annika Bruna	ID	France	“However, I regret the lack of measures to stop the arrival of massive, illegal and unassimilated immigration on European soil, which poses a serious threat to the safety of our fellow citizens. Take, for example, the figures compiled by the Paris Prefecture of Police, which, whatever our detractors may say, are a sad and harsh reality. In fact, 77% of known rapes committed in the streets of Paris are perpetrated by foreigners.”	Sexualisation of racism
CVAWAD_14	Mathilde Androuët	ID	France	“The objective of intersectionality, which is made explicit in the text, mixes up the defence of women with, for example, the defence of immigrants, who nonetheless bear some of the brunt of sexual violence. Recent figures show that in Paris, 77% of rapes cleared up are committed by foreigners.”	Sexualisation of racism
CVAWAD_14	Mathilde Androuët	ID	France	“The European Commission should not forget that it is treading on a continent where women have been scientists, queens, saints, warlords, astronauts, empresses and writers, and that this heritage obliges it. Obligated to do what? At the very least, to avoid importing or	Racialisation of sexism

Debate/Speech	MEP	Political Group	National affiliation	Statement	Category
				kowtowing to ideologies where women are simply a womb to be filled, a body to be veiled or subjugated, or a mind to be silenced.”	
CVAWAD_28	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	“you rightly speak of the horror of violence against women that must be combated, but you do nothing to counter the plight of millions of women oppressed by the Islamic veil. A veil that is too often worn even by girls who have not even developed yet.”	Sexualisation of racism
CVAWAD_28	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	"That is why I have submitted a resolution to Parliament urging the Commission to call on the Member States to ban the Islamic veil in schools. In Europe this means of subjugation must be opposed, not promoted in a positive way, as you do. It is our duty to wage a cultural battle to defend our values, our freedom, to guarantee the rights of women and girls, defending them from shameful impositions. (...) We need a change in Europe. We must not submit. Let us ban the Islamic veil in schools."	Racialisation of sexism
CVAWAD_28	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	“I reiterate it strongly: the Islamic veil is a prison for women and those who deny it slap in the face the many women who cannot remove that veil, cannot live freely by dressing as they wish.”	Sexualisation of racism

Debate/Speech	MEP	Political Group	National affiliation	Statement	Category
ASAPFA_05	Angel Dzhambazki	ECR	Bulgaria	“And that is a problem, because you are trying, you are making, you are costing, you are spinning, you are bitching, you are trying to make illegal migration legal again. There is no way that this thing is going to happen. And right now in Sofia, right now there is a protest against illegal migration. Today you celebrated the 8th of March, these days there have been several attacks, fights committed by illegal migrants against girls in Sofia. Illegal migration is not of people who will bring prosperity to our society or become doctors, engineers and so on. These people are not coming to fit in, these people have other motives and reasons. Separate things.”	Sexualisation of racism
NTFTIO_25	Patryk Jaki	ECR	Poland	"The key question is this: why, then, do you care more about the militant Sharia religion than about your own religion of love, which has created the strength and uniqueness of this continent? You talk a lot about women's rights. Compare women's rights in Islam and women's rights in civilisations founded on the Christian religion. Compare these rights."	Racialisation of sexism
NTFTIO_26	Bernhard Zimniok	ID	Germany	“The EU and the German government are thus forcing the Islamisation of our continent. As a result, democratic values such as freedom of opinion and equal rights will be abolished as soon as Sharia law takes hold. The dramatic rise in sexual offences - 7,000	Racialisation of sexism Sexualisation of racism

Debate/Speech	MEP	Political Group	National affiliation	Statement	Category
				women have been raped by asylum seekers in Germany alone since 2015 - is just a foretaste of what we will then face."	
NTFTIO_37	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	"But what Islamophobia are you talking about? In the world, rather, persecution of Christians is on the rise and in Europe there is a serious retreat on freedoms, with teachers and headmasters being killed or threatened. I myself am under escort in Italy because I dared to express my opinion on the Islamic veil, the condition of women and Islamisation on our continent. Out of fear or interest you are doing everything to erase our traditions, our history and our identity. We are facing the suicide of the West, the surrender of Europe, the one that promotes the Islamic veil in its communications and erases our festivals. You are betraying the values of the European Union to lead us to a dramatic future of an Islamised Europe."	Racialisation of sexism
NTFTIO_44	Emmanouil Fragkos	ECR	Greece	"the theory of so-called Islamophobia is promoted by certain centres, Turkey, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood. In other words, the same people who are funding the illegal invasion, the replacement of our population in Europe, the guilt of being Christians. Unfortunately, they are finding fertile ground. This Parliament has refused to condemn the	Racialisation of sexism

Debate/Speech	MEP	Political Group	National affiliation	Statement	Category
				use of the headscarf, even in European Commission campaigns."	
CDIMST_17	Annika Bruna	ID	France	"I am delighted that we are able to vote on a text that is genuinely in favour of women's rights in this institution, which is often out of touch with the issues facing women, such as the growing insecurity linked to the expansion of multiculturalism throughout Europe."	Racialisation of sexism
SOFRIT_06	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	"Obviously no mention of Islamic terrorism. Earlier you spoke of restrictions on women's rights, but you say nothing about Islamic women being deprived of their freedom and forced to wear the veil."	Sexualisation of racism
SOFRIT_26	Susanna Ceccardi	ID	Italy	"You talk about women's rights in Europe, but turn a blind eye to the many Islamic women who are treated like animals by their husbands in Europe."	Sexualisation of racism

D) Case-Category-Matrices

1. Political Groups

Political Group	Sexualisation of racism	Racialisation of sexism	Gendered racialisation of reproductive work	Total
EPP	0	0	0	0
SD	0	0	0	0
Renew	0	0	0	0
Greens/EFA	0	0	0	0
ECR	1	3	0	4
ID	9	11	0	20 (17)*
Left	0	0	0	0
NI	0	0	0	0

*Total number of femonationalist statements if subtracting the number of statements fitting into both categories

2. National Affiliation

National affiliation	Sexualisation of racism	Racialisation of sexism	Gendered racialisation of reproductive work	Total
France	2	4	0	6
Spain	0	1	0	1
Portugal	0	0	0	0
Italy	6	6	0	12 (10)*
Netherlands	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0
Germany	1	1	0	2 (1)*
Austria	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	1	0	1
Lithuania	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	1	0	1
Czechia	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	1	0	0	1
Romania	0	0	0	0

*Total number of femonationalist statements if subtracting the number of statements fitting into both categories

E) List of all speeches

No.	file name	MEP	political group	national affiliation	A	B	C	total	complete speech
1	TEUPFT_01	Maria da Graca Carvalho	EPP	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
2	TEUPFT_02	Evelyn Regner	SD	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
3	TEUPFT_03	Samira Rafaela	Renew	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
4	TEUPFT_04	Monika Vana	Greens/EFA	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
5	TEUPFT_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
6	TEUPFT_06	Isabella Tovaglieri	ID	Italy	2	4	0	6 (4)*	1
7	TEUPFT_07	Eugenia Rodríguez Palop	Left	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
8	TEUPFT_08	Laura Ferrara	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
9	TEUPFT_09	Rosa Estaràs Ferragut	EPP	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
10	TEUPFT_10	Heléne Fritzon	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
11	TEUPFT_11	Guy Lavocat	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
12	TEUPFT_12	Pierrette Herberger-Fofana	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
13	TEUPFT_13	Annika Bruna	ID	France	0	2	0	2	1
14	TEUPFT_14	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
15	TEUPFT_15	Lina Gálvez Munow	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
16	TEUPFT_16	Grace O'Sullivan	Greens/EFA	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
17	TEUPFT_17	Malin Björk	Left	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
18	TEUPFT_18	Mario Furore	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
19	TEUPFT_19	Arba Kokalari	EPP	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
20	TEUPFT_20	Vera Tax	SD	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
21	TEUPFT_21	Ελένη Σταύρου	EPP	Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0
22	TEUPFT_22	Radka Maxová	SD	Czechia	0	0	0	0	0
23	TEUPFT_23	Henna Virkkunen	EPP	Finland	0	0	0	0	0

24	TEUPFT_24	Pina Picierno	SD	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
25	TEUPFT_25	Sunčana Glavak	EPP	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
26	TEUPFT_26	Juan Fernando López Aguilar	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
27	TEUPFT_27	Stanislav Polčák	EPP	Czechia	0	0	0	0	0
28	TEUPFT_28	Carina Ohlsson	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
29	TEUPFT_29	Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
30	TEUPFT_30	Laura Ballarín Cereza	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
31	TEUPFT_31	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
32	TEUPFT_32	Laura Ballarín Cereza	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
33	TEUPFT_33	Sirpa Pietikäinen	EPP	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
34	TEUPFT_34	Έλενα Κουντουρά	Left	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
35	CVAWAD_01	Nathalie Colin-Oesterlé	EPP	France	0	0	0	0	0
36	CVAWAD_02	Pina Picierno	SD	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
37	CVAWAD_03	María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos	Renew	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
38	CVAWAD_04	Diana Riba i Giner	Greens/EFA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
39	CVAWAD_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	1	0	1	1
40	CVAWAD_06	Annika Bruna	ID	France	1	0	0	1	1
41	CVAWAD_07	Malin Björk	Left	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
42	CVAWAD_08	Laura Ferrara	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
43	CVAWAD_09	Arba Kokalari	EPP	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
44	CVAWAD_10	Juan Fernando López Aguilar	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
45	CVAWAD_11	Martin Hojsík	Renew	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
46	CVAWAD_12	Sylwia Spurek	Greens/EFA	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
47	CVAWAD_13	Assita Kanko	ECR	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0

48	CVAWAD_14	Mathilde Androuët	ID	France	2	1	0	3	1
49	CVAWAD_15	Eugenia Rodríguez Palop	Left	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
50	CVAWAD_16	Mario Furore	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
51	CVAWAD_17	Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska	EPP	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
52	CVAWAD_18	Evelyn Regner	SD	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
53	CVAWAD_19	Alice Kuhnke	Greens/EFA	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
54	CVAWAD_20	Cristian Terheş	ECR	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
55	CVAWAD_21	Karen Melchior	Renew	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
56	CVAWAD_22	Cristian Terheş	ECR	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
57	CVAWAD_23	Łukasz Kohut	SD	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
58	CVAWAD_24	Chinnici Caterina	EPP	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
59	CVAWAD_25	Radka Maxová	SD	Czechia	0	0	0	0	0
60	CVAWAD_26	Barry Andrews	Renew	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
61	CVAWAD_27	Ana Miranda	Greens/EFA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
62	CVAWAD_28	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	2	1	0	3	1
63	CVAWAD_29	Έλενα Κουντουρά	Left	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
64	CVAWAD_30	Nicolae Ştefănuţă	Greens/EFA	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
65	CVAWAD_31	Marc Angel	SD	Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
66	CVAWAD_32	Lívía Járóka	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
67	CVAWAD_33	Romana Jerković	SD	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
68	CVAWAD_34	Ελισσάβετ Βόζεμπεργκ-Βρυωνίδη	EPP	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
69	IROTEL_01	Maria Walsh	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
70	IROTEL_02	Isabel Santos	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
71	IROTEL_03	Moritz Körner	Renew	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
72	IROTEL_04	Dina Riba i Giner	Greens/EFA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
73	IROTEL_05	Beata Kempa	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
74	IROTEL_06	Danilo Oscar Lancini	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0

75	IROTEL_07	Malin Björk	Left	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
76	IROTEL_08	Mario Furore	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
77	IROTEL_09	Sirpa Pietikäinen	EPP	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
78	IROTEL_10	Cyrus Engerer	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
79	IROTEL_11	Pierre Karleskind	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
80	IROTEL_12	Kim Van Sparrentak	Greens/EFA	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
81	IROTEL_13	Emmanouil Fragkos	ECR	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
82	IROTEL_14	Κωνσταντίνος Αρβανίτης	Left	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
83	IROTEL_15	Antoni Comin i Oliveres	NI	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
84	IROTEL_16	Rosa Estaràs Ferragut	EPP	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
85	IROTEL_17	Robert Biedroń	SD	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
86	IROTEL_18	Karen Melchior	Renew	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
87	IROTEL_19	Rasmus Andresen	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
88	IROTEL_20	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
89	IROTEL_21	Fabio Massimo Castaldo	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
90	IROTEL_22	Theresa Bielowski	SD	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
91	IROTEL_23	Michael Kauch	Renew	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
92	IROTEL_24	Alice Kuhnke	Greens/EFA	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
93	IROTEL_25	Marc Angel	SD	Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
94	IROTEL_26	Martin Hojsík	Renew	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
95	IROTEL_27	Rosa D'Amato	Greens/EFA	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
96	IROTEL_28	Evin Incir	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
97	IROTEL_29	Asger Christensen	Renew	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
98	IROTEL_30	Seán Kelly	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
99	IROTEL_31	Maria Manuel Leitão- Marques	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
100	IROTEL_32	Mick Wallace	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0

101	IROTEL_33	Juan Fernando López Aguilar	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
102	IROTEL_34	Sara Cerdas	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
103	ASAPFA_01	Lena Düpont	EPP	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
104	ASAPFA_02	Gabriele Bischoff	SD	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
105	ASAPFA_03	Jan-Christoph Oetjen	Renew	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
106	ASAPFA_04	Trineke Strik	Greens/EFA	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
107	ASAPFA_05	Angel Dzhambazki	ECR	Bulgaria	1	0	0	1	1
108	ASAPFA_06	Annalisa Tardino	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
109	ASAPFA_07	Κωνσταντίνος Αρβανίτης	Left	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
110	ASAPFA_08	Λευτέρης Νικολάου-Αλαβάνος	NI	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
111	ASAPFA_09	Tomáš Zdechovský	EPP	Czechia	0	0	0	0	0
112	ASAPFA_10	Juan Fernando López Aguilar	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
113	ASAPFA_11	Fabienne Keller	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
114	ASAPFA_12	Katarína Roth Neved'alová	NI	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
115	ASAPFA_13	Cyrus Engerer	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
116	SOTCNA_01	Jeroen Lenaers	EPP	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
117	SOTCNA_02	Gabriele Bischoff	SD	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
118	SOTCNA_03	Malik Azmani	Renew	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
119	SOTCNA_04	Saskia Bricmont	Greens/EFA	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
120	SOTCNA_05	Nicola Procaccini	ECR	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
121	SOTCNA_06	Jordan Bardella	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0
122	SOTCNA_07	Martin Schirdewan	Left	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
123	SOTCNA_08	Laura Ferrara	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
124	SOTCNA_09	Lena Düpont	EPP	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
125	SOTCNA_10	Pietro Bartolo	SD	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
126	SOTCNA_11	Jan-Christoph Oetjen	Renew	Germany	0	0	0	0	0

127	SOTCNA_12	Erik Marquardt	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
128	SOTCNA_13	Özlem Demirel	Left	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
129	SOTCNA_14	Erik Marquardt	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
130	SOTCNA_15	Beata Szydło	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
131	SOTCNA_16	Annalisa Tardino	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
132	SOTCNA_17	Cornelia Ernst	Left	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
133	SOTCNA_18	Κώστας Παπαδάκης	NI	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
134	SOTCNA_19	Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez	EPP	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
135	SOTCNA_20	Sylvie Guillaume	SD	France	0	0	0	0	0
136	SOTCNA_21	Hilde Vautmans	Renew	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
137	SOTCNA_22	Tineke Strik	Greens/EFA	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
138	SOTCNA_23	Patryk Jaki	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
139	SOTCNA_24	Tom Vandendriessche	ID	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
140	SOTCNA_25	Sophia in 't Veld	Renew	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
141	SOTCNA_26	Tom Vandendriessche	ID	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
142	SOTCNA_27	Sophia in 't Veld	Renew	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
143	SOTCNA_28	Κωνσταντίνος Αρβανίτης	Left	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
144	SOTCNA_29	Balázs Hidvéghi	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
145	SOTCNA_30	Ελισσάβετ Βόζεμπεργκ- Βρυωνίδα	EPP	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
146	SOTCNA_31	Isabel Santos	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
147	SOTCNA_32	Abir Al-Sahlani	Renew	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
148	SOTCNA_33	Damien Carême	Greens/EFA	France	0	0	0	0	0
149	SOTCNA_34	Assita Kanko	ECR	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
150	SOTCNA_35	Gunnar Beck	ID	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
151	SOTCNA_36	Kinga Gál	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
152	SOTCNA_37	Karlo Ressler	EPP	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
153	SOTCNA_38	Elena Yoncheva	SD	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0

154	SOTCNA_39	Charlie Weimers	ECR	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
155	SOTCNA_40	Lukas Mandl	EPP	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
156	SOTCNA_41	Pedro Marques	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
157	SOTCNA_42	Tomislav Sokol	EPP	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
158	SOTCNA_43	Maria Arena	SD	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
159	SOTCNA_44	Ana Miranda	Greens/EFA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
160	SOTCNA_45	Angel Dzhambazki	ECR	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
161	SOTCNA_46	Anabela Rodrigues	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
162	SOTCNA_47	Seán Kelly	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
163	SOTCNA_48	Joachim Stanisław Brudziński	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
164	SOTCNA_49	Miapetra Kumpula- Natri	SD	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
165	SOTCNA_50	Емил Радев	EPP	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
166	SOTCNA_51	Henna Virkkunen	EPP	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
167	NTFTIO_01	Lukas Mandl	EPP	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
168	NTFTIO_02	Evin Incir	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
169	NTFTIO_03	Илхан Кючюк	Renew	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
170	NTFTIO_04	Alice Kuhnke	Greens/EFA	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
171	NTFTIO_05	Assita Kanko	ECR	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
172	NTFTIO_06	Susanna Ceccardi	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
173	NTFTIO_07	Miguel Urbán Crespo	Left	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
174	NTFTIO_08	Livia Járóka	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
175	NTFTIO_09	Peter Pollák	EPP	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
176	NTFTIO_10	Juan Fernando López Aguilar	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
177	NTFTIO_11	Nathalie Lioseau	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
178	NTFTIO_12	Mounir Satouri	Greens/EFA	France	0	0	0	0	0
179	NTFTIO_13	Charlie Weimers	ECR	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
180	NTFTIO_14	Evin Incir	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
181	NTFTIO_15	Charlie Weimers	ECR	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0

182	NTFTIO_16	Mathilde Androuët	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0
183	NTFTIO_17	Sergey Lagodinsky	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
184	NTFTIO_18	Mathilde Androuët	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0
185	NTFTIO_19	Martina Michels	Left	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
186	NTFTIO_20	Jörg Meuthen	NI	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
187	NTFTIO_21	Sirpa Pietikäinen	EPP	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
188	NTFTIO_22	Елена Йончева	SD	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
189	NTFTIO_23	Abir Al-Sahlan	Renew	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
190	NTFTIO_24	Sergey Lagodinsky	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
191	NTFTIO_25	Patryk Jaki	ECR	Poland	0	1	0	1	1
192	NTFTIO_26	Bernhard Zimniok	ID	Germany	1	1	0	2 (1)*	1
193	NTFTIO_27	Sergey Lagodinsky	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
194	NTFTIO_28	Bernhard Zimniok	ID	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
195	NTFTIO_29	Sergey Lagodinsky	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
196	NTFTIO_30	Bernhard Zimniok	ID	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
197	NTFTIO_31	Emmanuel Maurel	Left	France	0	0	0	0	0
198	NTFTIO_32	Tomislav Sokol	EPP	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
199	NTFTIO_33	Milan Brglez	SD	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
200	NTFTIO_34	José Ramón Bauzá Díaz	Renew	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
201	NTFTIO_35	Pierrette Herzberger-Fofana	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
202	NTFTIO_36	Teuvo Hakkarainen	ECR	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
203	NTFTIO_37	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	0	1	0	1	1
204	NTFTIO_38	Karen Melchior	Renew	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
205	NTFTIO_39	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
206	NTFTIO_40	Νιαζί Κιζιλγιουρέκ	Left	Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0
207	NTFTIO_41	Stanislav Polčák	EPP	Czechia	0	0	0	0	0
208	NTFTIO_42	Leszek Miller	SD	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
209	NTFTIO_43	Irena Joveva	Renew	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0

210	NTFTIO_44	Emmanouil Fragkos	ECR	Greece	0	1	0	1	1
211	NTFTIO_45	Mick Wallace	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
212	NTFTIO_46	Liudas Mažylis	EPP	Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0
213	NTFTIO_47	Carmen Avram	SD	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
214	NTFTIO_48	Karen Melchior	Renew	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
215	NTFTIO_49	Beata Kempa	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
216	NTFTIO_50	Janina Ochojska	EPP	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
217	NTFTIO_51	Alessandra Moretti	SD	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
218	NTFTIO_52	Salima Yenbou	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
219	NTFTIO_53	Hermann Tertsch	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
220	NTFTIO_54	Antonio López-Istúriz White	EPP	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
221	NTFTIO_55	Pedro Silva Pereira	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
222	NTFTIO_56	Bert-Jan Ruissen	ECR	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
223	NTFTIO_57	Cyrus Engerer	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
224	NTFTIO_58	Domènec Ruiz Devesa	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
225	NTFTIO_59	Łukasz Kohut	SD	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
226	NTFTIO_60	Carina Ohlsson	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
227	NTFTIO_61	Matthias Ecke	SD	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
228	NTFTIO_62	Željana Zovko	EPP	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
229	NTFTIO_63	Clare Daly	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
230	NTFTIO_64	Seán Kelly	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
231	CDIMST_01	Frances Fitzgerald	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
232	CDIMST_02	Marc Angel	SD	Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
233	CDIMST_03	María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos	Renew	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
234	CDIMST_04	Diana Riba i Giner	Greens/EFA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
235	CDIMST_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
236	CDIMST_06	Elena Lizzi	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0

237	CDIMST_07	Eugenia Rodríguez Palo	Left	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
238	CDIMST_08	Mario Furore	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
239	CDIMST_09	Rosa Estaràs Ferragut	EPP	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
240	CDIMST_10	Carina Ohlsson	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
241	CDIMST_11	Sylvie Brunet	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
242	CDIMST_12	Alice Kuhnke	Greens/EFA	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
243	CDIMST_13	Guido Reil	ID	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
244	CDIMST_14	Maria da Graça Carvalho	EPP	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
245	CDIMST_15	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė	SD	Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0
246	CDIMST_16	Katrin Langensiepen	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
247	CDIMST_17	Annika Bruna	ID	France	0	1	0	1	1
248	CDIMST_18	Salvatore De Meo	EPP	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
249	CDIMST_19	Lina Gálvez Muñoz	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
250	CDIMST_20	Maria Grapini	SD	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
251	CDIMST_21	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
252	CDIMST_22	Caterina Chinnici	EPP	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
253	CDIMST_23	Lívía Járóka	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
254	FASFTE_01	Dan-Ştefan Motreanu	EPP	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
255	FASFTE_02	Marcos Ros Sempere	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
256	FASFTE_03	Vlad-Marius Botoş	Renew	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
257	FASFTE_04	Niklas Nienau	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
258	FASFTE_05	Gianna Gancia	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
259	FASFTE_06	Younous Omarjee	Left	France	0	0	0	0	0
260	FASFTE_07	Clara Ponsatí Obiols	NI	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
261	FASFTE_08	Franc Bogovič	EPP	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
262	FASFTE_09	Margarida Marques	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
263	FASFTE_10	Mauri Pekkarinen	Renew	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
264	FASFTE_11	Dominique Bilde	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0

265	FASFTE_12	Maria Angela Danzi	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
266	FASFTE_13	Wolfram Pirchner	EPP	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
267	FASFTE_14	Matthias Ecke	SD	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
268	FASFTE_15	Daniel Buda	EPP	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
269	FASFTE_16	Niels Geuking	EPP	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
270	FASFTE_17	Ana Miranda	Greens/EFA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
271	LHDOTF_01	Dennis Radtke	EPP	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
272	LHDOTF_02	Agnes Jongerius	SD	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
273	LHDOTF_03	Dragoș Pîslaru	Renew	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
274	LHDOTF_04	Sara Matthieu	Greens/EFA	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
275	LHDOTF_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
276	LHDOTF_06	Guido Reil	ID	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
277	LHDOTF_07	Nikolaj Villumsen	Left	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
278	LHDOTF_08	Ádám Kósa	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
279	LHDOTF_09	Στέλιος Κυμπουρόπουλος	EPP	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
280	LHDOTF_10	Gabriele Bischoff	SD	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
281	LHDOTF_11	Sylvie Brunet	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
282	LHDOTF_12	Tilly Metz	Greens/EFA	Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
283	LHDOTF_13	Dominique Bilde	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0
284	LHDOTF_14	Leila Chaibi	Left	France	0	0	0	0	0
285	LHDOTF_15	Katarína Roth Neved'alová	NI	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
286	LHDOTF_16	Peter Pollák	EPP	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
287	LHDOTF_17	Milan Brglez	SD	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
288	LHDOTF_18	Kim Van Sparrentak	Greens/EFA	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
289	LHDOTF_19	Isabella Tovaglieri	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
290	LHDOTF_20	Marc Botenga	Left	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
291	LHDOTF_21	Maria Angela Danzi	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
292	LHDOTF_22	Katrin Langensiepen	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0

293	LHDOTF_23	Niels Geuking	EPP	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
294	LHDOTF_24	Mick Wallace	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
295	LHDOTF_25	Clare Daly	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
296	ADOPAC_01	Lena Düpont	EPP	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
297	ADOPAC_02	Juan Fernando López Aguilar	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
298	ADOPAC_03	Jana Toom	Renew	Estonia	0	0	0	0	0
299	ADOPAC_04	Alice Kuhnke	Greens/EFA	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
300	ADOPAC_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
301	ADOPAC_06	Anabela Rodrigues	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
302	ADOPAC_07	Frances Fitzgerald	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
303	ADOPAC_08	Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
304	ADOPAC_09	Abir Al-Sahlani	Renew	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
305	ADOPAC_10	Beata Kempa	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
306	ADOPAC_11	Cyrus Engerer	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
307	ADOPAC_12	Dorien Rookmaker	ECR	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
308	ADOPAC_13	Maria Noichl	SD	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
309	ADOPAC_14	Bert-Jan Ruissen	ECR	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
310	ADOPAC_15	Έλενα Κουντουρά	Left	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
311	ADOPAC_16	Clare Daly	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
312	ADOPAC_17	Mick Wallace	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
313	ADOPAC_18	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
314	IOTRTA_01	Nathalie Colin-Oesterlé	EPP	France	0	0	0	0	0
315	IOTRTA_02	Robert Biedroń	SD	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
316	IOTRTA_03	Karen Melchior	Renew	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
317	IOTRTA_04	Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield	Greens/EFA	France	0	0	0	0	0

318	IOTRTA_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
319	IOTRTA_06	Eugenia Rodríguez Palop	Left	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
320	IOTRTA_07	Isabel Benjumea Benjumea	EPP	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
321	IOTRTA_08	Hilde Vautmans	Renew	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
322	IOTRTA_09	Isabel Benjumea Benjumea	EPP	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
323	IOTRTA_10	Predrag Fred Matić	SD	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
324	IOTRTA_11	Bert-Jan Ruissen	ECR	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
325	IOTRTA_12	Predrag Fred Matić	SD	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
326	IOTRTA_13	Marie-Pierre Vedrenne	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
327	IOTRTA_14	Diana Riba i Giner	Greens/EFA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
328	IOTRTA_15	Izabela-Helena Kloc	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
329	IOTRTA_16	Marina Mesure	Left	France	0	0	0	0	0
330	IOTRTA_17	Arba Kokalari	EPP	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
331	IOTRTA_18	Cyrus Engerer	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
332	IOTRTA_19	Abir Al-Sahlani	Renew	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
333	IOTRTA_20	Alice Kuhnke	Greens/EFA	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
334	IOTRTA_21	Miriam Lexmann	EPP	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
335	IOTRTA_22	Hilde Vautmans	Renew	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
336	IOTRTA_23	Michaela Šojdrová	EPP	Czechia	0	0	0	0	0
337	IOTRTA_24	Maria—Manuel Leitão-Marques	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
338	IOTRTA_25	Ana Miranda Paz	Greens/EFA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
339	IOTRTA_26	Ladislav Ilčić	ECR	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
340	IOTRTA_27	Clare Daly	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
341	IOTRTA_28	Tomislav Sokol	EPP	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
342	IOTRTA_29	Sara Cerdas	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
343	IOTRTA_30	Bert-Jan Ruissen	ECR	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0

344	IOTRTA_31	Hilde Vautmans	Renew	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
345	IOTRTA_32	Ladislav Ilčić	ECR	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
346	DOLCIT_01	Markus Ferber	EPP	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
347	DOLCIT_02	Agnes Jongerius	SD	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
348	DOLCIT_03	Klemen Grošelj	Renew	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
349	DOLCIT_04	Sara Matthieu	Greens/EFA	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
350	DOLCIT_05	Elżbieta Rafalska	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
351	DOLCIT_06	Mathilde Androuët	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0
352	DOLCIT_07	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
353	DOLCIT_08	José Manuel Fernandes	EPP	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
354	DOLCIT_09	Robert Roos	ECR	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
355	DOLCIT_10	Seán Kelly	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
356	DOLCIT_11	Iuliu Winkler	EPP	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
357	DOLCIT_12	Dominique Bilde	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0
358	DOLCIT_13	Cindy Franssen	EPP	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
359	MAJINT_01	Tomislav Sokol	EPP	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
360	MAJINT_02	Pietro Bartolo	SD	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
361	MAJINT_03	Fabienne Keller	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
362	MAJINT_04	Tineke Strik	Greens/EFA	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
363	MAJINT_05	Angel Dzhambazki	ECR	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
364	MAJINT_06	Elena Lizzi	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
365	MAJINT_07	Ryszard Czarnecki	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
366	MAJINT_08	Mick Wallace	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
367	MAJINT_09	Clare Daly	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
368	RIITWO_01	Sirpa Pietikäinen	EPP	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
369	RIITWO_02	Carlos Zorrinho	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
370	RIITWO_03	Max Orville	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
371	RIITWO_04	Francisco Guerreiro	Greens/EFA	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
372	RIITWO_05	Younous Omarjee	Left	France	0	0	0	0	0

373	RIITWO_06	Mercedes Bresso	SD	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
374	RIITWO_07	Атидже Алиева-Бели	Renew	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
375	RIITWO_08	Malte Gallée	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
376	RIITWO_09	Alex Agius Saliba	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
377	RIITWO_10	Irena Joveva	Renew	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
378	RIITWO_11	Sara Cerdas	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
379	RIITWO_12	Monica Semedo	Renew	Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
380	RIITWO_13	Hannes Heide	SD	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
381	RIITWO_14	Mónica Silvana González	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
382	RIITWO_15	Cyrus Engerer	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
383	RIITWO_16	Evin Incir	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
384	RIITWO_17	Seán Kelly	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
385	RIITWO_18	Juan Fernando López Aguilar	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
386	RIITWO_19	Clare Daly	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
387	RIITWO_20	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
388	RIITWO_21	Mick Wallace	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
389	QJIACF_01	Maria Walsh	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
390	QJIACF_02	Agnes Jongerius	SD	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
391	QJIACF_03	Marie-Pierre Vedrenne	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
392	QJIACF_04	Michael Bloss	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
393	QJIACF_05	Elżbieta Rafalska	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
394	QJIACF_06	Dominique Bilde	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0
395	QJIACF_07	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
396	QJIACF_08	Ádám Kósa	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
397	QJIACF_09	Radan Kanev	EPP	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
398	QJIACF_10	Alex Agius Saliba	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
399	QJIACF_11	Атидже Алиева-Бели	Renew	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
400	QJIACF_12	Katrin Langensiepen	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0

401	QJIACF_13	Michiel Hoogeveen	ECR	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
402	QJIACF_14	Katarína Roth Neved'alová	NI	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
403	QJIACF_15	Lídia Pereira	EPP	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
404	QJIACF_16	Alicia Homs Ginel	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
405	QJIACF_17	Max Orville	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
406	QJIACF_18	Monika Beňová	NI	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
407	QJIACF_19	Isabel Benjumea Benjumea	EPP	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
408	QJIACF_20	Estrella Durá Ferrandis	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
409	QJIACF_21	Vlad-Marius Botoș	Renew	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
410	QJIACF_22	Milan Brglez	SD	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
411	QJIACF_23	Izaskun Bilbao Barandica	Renew	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
412	QJIACF_24	Daniela Rondinelli	SD	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
413	QJIACF_25	Engin Eroglu	Renew	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
414	QJIACF_26	Evelyn Regner	SD	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
415	QJIACF_27	Monica Semedo	Renew	Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
416	QJIACF_28	Valter Flego	Renew	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
417	SOFRIT_01	Lukas Mandl	EPP	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
418	SOFRIT_02	Juan Fernando López Aguilar	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
419	SOFRIT_03	Jana Toom	Renew	Estonia	0	0	0	0	0
420	SOFRIT_04	Daniel Freund	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
421	SOFRIT_05	Jorge Buxadé Villalba	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
422	SOFRIT_06	Silvia Sardone	ID	Italy	1	0	0	1	1
423	SOFRIT_07	Balázs Hidvéghi	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
424	SOFRIT_08	Jiří Pospíšil	EPP	Czechia	0	0	0	0	0
425	SOFRIT_09	Sylvie Guillaume	SD	France	0	0	0	0	0
426	SOFRIT_10	Max Orville	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0

427	SOFRIT_11	Beata Kempa	ECR	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
428	SOFRIT_12	Jean-Lin Lacapelle	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0
429	SOFRIT_13	Sabrina Pignedoli	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
430	SOFRIT_14	Witold Pahl	EPP	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
431	SOFRIT_15	Cyrus Engerer	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0
432	SOFRIT_16	Vlad Gheorghe	Renew	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
433	SOFRIT_17	Tatjana Ždanoka	NI	Latvia	0	0	0	0	0
434	SOFRIT_18	Sirpa Pietikäinen	EPP	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
435	SOFRIT_19	Łukasz Kohut	SD	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
436	SOFRIT_20	Katarína Roth Neved'alová	NI	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
437	SOFRIT_21	Miriam Lexmann	EPP	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
438	SOFRIT_22	Carina Ohlsson	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
439	SOFRIT_23	Matjaž Nemec	SD	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
440	SOFRIT_24	Costas Mavrides	SD	Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0
441	SOFRIT_25	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
442	SOFRIT_26	Susanna Ceccardi	ID	Italy	1	0	0	1	1
443	SOFRIT_27	Mick Wallace	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
444	GAOTRC_01	Isabella Adinolfi	EPP	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
445	GAOTRC_02	Lina Gálvez Muñoz	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
446	GAOTRC_03	Barry Andrews	Renew	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
447	GAOTRC_04	Ciarán Cuffe	Greens/EFA	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
448	GAOTRC_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
449	GAOTRC_06	Maria Veronica Rossi	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
450	GAOTRC_07	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
451	GAOTRC_08	Lívia Járóka	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
452	GAOTRC_09	Maria Walsh	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
453	GAOTRC_10	Heléne Fritzon	SD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
454	GAOTRC_11	Annika Bruna	ID	France	0	0	0	0	0

455	GAOTRC_12	Chris MacManus	Left	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
456	GAOTRC_13	Mario Furore	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
457	GAOTRC_14	Marc Angel	SD	Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
458	GAOTRC_15	Gianna Gancia	ID	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
459	GAOTRC_16	Silvia Modig	Left	Finland	0	0	0	0	0
460	GAOTRC_17	Radka Maxová	SD	Czechia	0	0	0	0	0
461	GAOTRC_18	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė	SD	Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0
462	GAOTRC_19	Ladislav Ilčić	ECR	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
463	GAOTRC_20	Έλενα Κουντουρά	Left	Greece	0	0	0	0	0
464	AUSSAF_01	Miriam Lexmann	EPP	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
465	AUSSAF_02	João Albuquerque	SD	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
466	AUSSAF_03	Marie-Pierre Vedrenne	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
467	AUSSAF_04	Katrin Langensiepen	Greens/EFA	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
468	AUSSAF_05	Margarita de la Pisa Carrión	ECR	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
469	AUSSAF_06	Sandra Pereira	Left	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
470	AUSSAF_07	Maria Angela Danzi	NI	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
471	AUSSAF_08	Lukas Mandl	EPP	Austria	0	0	0	0	0
472	AUSSAF_09	Gabriele Bischoff	SD	Germany	0	0	0	0	0
473	AUSSAF_10	Dragoș Pîslaru	Renew	Romania	0	0	0	0	0
474	AUSSAF_11	Peter Pollák	EPP	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
475	AUSSAF_12	Alicia Homs Ginel	SD	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
476	AUSSAF_13	Атидже Алиева-Бели	Renew	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
477	AUSSAF_14	Maria Walsh	EPP	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
478	AUSSAF_15	Vilija Blinkevičiūtė	SD	Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0
479	AUSSAF_16	Pernille Weiss	EPP	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
480	AUSSAF_17	Laurence Farreng	Renew	France	0	0	0	0	0
481	AUSSAF_18	Eva Maria Poptcheva	Renew	Spain	0	0	0	0	0
482	AUSSAF_19	Francesca Peppucci	EPP	Italy	0	0	0	0	0
483	AUSSAF_20	Josianne Cutajar	SD	Malta	0	0	0	0	0

484	AUSSAF_21	Jarosław Duda	EPP	Poland	0	0	0	0	0
485	AUSSAF_22	Λουκάς Φουρλάς	EPP	Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0
486	AUSSAF_23	Ádám Kósa	NI	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0

*Total number of femonationalist statements if subtracting the number of statements fitting into both categories