



MASTER THESIS

Titel der Master Thesis / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Navigating Maritime Security Challenges: A Comparative Study of EU and US Naval Capabilities and Maritime Security Strategies“

verfasst von / submitted by

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angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S.)

Wien 2023 / Vienna 2023

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt
Postgraduate programme code as it appears on the
student record sheet:

A 992 940

Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt
Postgraduate programme as it appears on the
student record sheet:

Internationale Studien / International Studies

Betreut von / Supervisor:

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Pledge of honesty

On my honor as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

Ema Odra Raščan, MAIS-2

8 June 2023

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my parents for their unwavering support throughout my academic journey, and my siblings, Pavel and Pija, for reminding me to take study breaks.

I would also like to extend my heartfelt appreciation to my friends in Vienna who made my time at the DA fly by and made Vienna a second home. Hvala tudi vsem prijateljem v Ljubljani, zaradi vas bo Ljubljana vedno dom.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all the professors, mentors, and the team at the Permanent Representation of Slovenia to the EU who introduced me to the topic of maritime security and guided me throughout this research. Their expertise, guidance, and constructive feedback have been invaluable in shaping the outcome of this thesis.

To all those mentioned above, I offer my deepest thanks for their contributions to my academic and personal growth.

Abstract (English)

This master thesis provides a comparative analysis of military capabilities and defense competencies in the context of maritime security, focusing on the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). The research investigates the acquisition of military capabilities, defense strategies, naval presence, and maritime security strategies of both entities. The thesis examines the complex interplay between geopolitical events, security concerns, economic factors, and national defense spending decisions, shedding light on the significant increase in global military expenditure and varying levels of defense spending among EU member states.

The analysis reveals that the EU lacks a fully integrated defense system, with defense competencies primarily resting with individual member states. In contrast, the US possesses a centralized defense structure under the Department of Defense, allowing for unified decision-making and significant investments in military technologies. Furthermore, the research evaluates the naval presence of the EU and the US, demonstrating contrasting characteristics and approaches. The thesis also examines the maritime security strategies of the EU and the US, identifying common goals of ensuring maritime security and protecting respective interests. Both strategies recognize the importance of international collaboration in addressing maritime security challenges.

The findings suggest that the EU has made progress in developing its defense capabilities, although limitations and complexities remain. The US, as a nation-state with extensive military capabilities, maintains a higher level of competency in assuming defense competencies related to maritime security strategies and naval presence. Additionally, the securitization of maritime security issues within the EU and the US positively influences their resource allocation and acquisition of military capabilities and defense competencies.

Understanding the military capabilities and defense competencies of the EU and the US in the context of maritime security is crucial for identifying common challenges, promoting effective cooperation, and ensuring secure maritime routes. This analysis contributes to the broader discussions on global security, international relations, and the evolving dynamics of maritime power.

Abstract (German)

Diese Masterarbeit befasst sich mit einer vergleichenden Analyse der militärischen Fähigkeiten und Verteidigungskompetenzen im Kontext der maritimen Sicherheit, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der Europäischen Union (EU) und den Vereinigten Staaten (USA) liegt. Untersucht werden der Erwerb militärischer Kapazitäten, die Verteidigungsstrategien, die Marinepräsenz und die maritimen Sicherheitsstrategien der beiden Staaten. Die Arbeit untersucht das komplexe Zusammenspiel zwischen geopolitischen Ereignissen, Sicherheitsbedenken, wirtschaftlichen Faktoren und nationalen Entscheidungen über Verteidigungsausgaben und beleuchtet den erheblichen Anstieg der weltweiten Militärausgaben und die unterschiedlichen Höhen der Verteidigungsausgaben in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten.

Die Analyse zeigt, dass die EU über kein vollständig integriertes Verteidigungssystem verfügt, da die Verteidigungskompetenzen in erster Linie bei den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten liegen. Im Gegensatz dazu verfügen die USA über eine zentralisierte Verteidigungsstruktur unter der Leitung des Verteidigungsministeriums, welche eine einheitliche Entscheidungsfindung und erhebliche Investitionen in Militärtechnologien ermöglicht. Darüber hinaus wird die Marinepräsenz der EU und der USA untersucht, wobei die unterschiedlichen Merkmale und Ansätze aufgezeigt werden. In der Arbeit werden auch die maritimen Sicherheitsstrategien der EU und der USA untersucht, wobei die gemeinsamen Ziele der Gewährleistung der maritimen Sicherheit und des Schutzes der jeweiligen Interessen herausgestellt werden. Beide Strategien erkennen die Bedeutung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit bei der Bewältigung von Herausforderungen im Bereich der maritimen Sicherheit an.

Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die EU bei der Entwicklung ihrer Verteidigungskapazitäten Fortschritte gemacht hat, auch wenn es nach wie vor Einschränkungen und Schwierigkeiten gibt. Die USA als Nationalstaat mit umfangreichen militärischen Fähigkeiten verfügen über ein höheres Maß an Kompetenz bei der Übernahme von Verteidigungskompetenzen im Zusammenhang mit maritimen Sicherheitsstrategien und Marinepräsenz. Darüber hinaus wirkt sich die Verankerung von Fragen der maritimen Sicherheit in der EU und den USA positiv auf die Ressourcenzuweisung und den Erwerb von militärischen Fähigkeiten und Verteidigungskompetenzen aus.

Das Verständnis der militärischen Fähigkeiten und Verteidigungskompetenzen der EU und der USA im Kontext der maritimen Sicherheit ist entscheidend für die Identifizierung gemeinsamer Herausforderungen, die Förderung einer effektiven Zusammenarbeit und die Gewährleistung sicherer Seewege. Diese Analyse leistet einen Beitrag zu den breiteren Diskussionen über globale Sicherheit, internationale Beziehungen und die verändernde Dynamik der Seemacht.

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Introduction

Maritime security is a critical issue that affects the economic, political, and social well-being of nations. With the international shipping industry facilitating around 90% of global trade, the significance of effective maritime security measures cannot be overstated.¹ Within economic regions such as the European Union (EU), maritime transportation accounts for approximately 80% of the aggregate volume of exports and imports, encompassing nearly 50% of its total value.² Recent events, including China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, have further emphasized the urgency of addressing regional security challenges and ensuring robust maritime security measures.³

As globalization progresses and oceans emerge as crucial for the transportation of goods and people, a scholarly discourse has emerged regarding the legislative and evolving role of common-property resources, often referred to as the 'commons.'⁴ These debates revolve around the governance of natural resources to prevent their depletion and the determination of rights to utilize such resources. Given the breadth of legal and political approaches to sea governance, this thesis will focus specifically on the concept of maritime security.

The primary objective of this master thesis is to explore the extent to which the EU and the United States (US) develop military capabilities and defense competencies, with particular emphasis on military security strategies and naval presence, within the framework of maritime security. To achieve this goal, the following research question will be addressed:

Research Question: To what extent do the EU and US acquire military capabilities and defense competencies, with a focus on military security strategies and naval presence, in the context of maritime security?

¹ "Explaining Shipping," International Chamber of Shipping, accessed June 6, 2023, <https://www.ics-shipping.org/explaining/>.

² "Shipping and World Trade: Driving Prosperity," International Chamber of Shipping, accessed June 2, 2023, <https://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-fact/shipping-and-world-trade-driving-prosperity/>.

³ More in Aljazeera, "China Warns against Taiwan Independence as It Ends Military Drill," April 10, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/10/china-to-stage-live-fire-drills-around-taiwan-for-third-day>; Bonny Lin et al., "Tracking the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis," May 8, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis>.

⁴ More in Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162, no. 3859 (1968): 1243–48; Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763>.

To guide the investigation, the following hypotheses are proposed:

Hypothesis 1: The EU has made progress in developing its military capabilities, enabling it to assume a greater level of defense competencies traditionally associated with nation-states.

Hypothesis 2: The US, as a nation-state with extensive military capabilities, maintains a higher level of competency in assuming defense competencies related to maritime security strategies and naval presence compared to the EU.

Hypothesis 3: The securitization of maritime security issues within the EU and the US positively influences their resource allocation and acquisition of military capabilities and defense competences, particularly in the context of naval presence and maritime security strategies.

These hypotheses serve as the foundation for examining and comparing the military capabilities, defense competences, maritime security strategies, and naval presence of the EU and US. By exploring these aspects through the lens of maritime security and utilizing the theoretical approach of securitization, this master thesis aims to deepen our understanding of how these two actors navigate the complex security landscape and contribute to the broader discourse on regional and global security dynamics.

The thesis is structured as follows. The first section presents the literature review, which delves into key concepts and approaches to maritime security, governance structures, the role of navies, and the specific contexts of the EU and the US within the maritime domain. Furthermore, the literature review examines the transatlantic partnership and the process of securitization within the maritime security discourse.

Following the literature review, the methodology section outlines the research design employed in this study. It describes the data collection process, data analysis techniques, and the adoption of a case study approach to examine the maritime security strategies and defense competencies of the EU and the US. The section also acknowledges the limitations of the research.

The subsequent sections present detailed case studies on the EU and the US, respectively. In the case study on the EU, an overview of defense integration is provided, followed by an examination of the EU's security and defense competences, the Common Security and Defense Policy, its missions and operations, and its naval military missions. Additionally, the case study

explores the EU's security and defense bodies, including the European Defense Agency and post-2016 initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund. The EU's maritime security strategy is also analyzed in detail.

Similarly, the case study on the US begins with an exploration of its federalism structure, followed by an examination of its security and defense framework, including the National Security Act and the National Security Council. The case study further investigates US national security objectives, the 2022 National Security Strategy, the US maritime security strategy, and the role of the US Navy in maritime security.

Building upon the insights gained from the case studies, the thesis conducts a comparative analysis of the EU and the US in terms of military spending, defense competencies, naval presence, and maritime security strategies. This analysis aims to identify similarities, differences, strengths, and weaknesses in their respective approaches to maritime security.

Finally, the findings and discussion section presents the outcomes of the research, addressing the research question and evaluating the hypotheses formulated. Based on the analysis conducted, the conclusion synthesizes the key findings and highlights the implications of the research.

Through this comprehensive examination, the master thesis seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on maritime security, while enhancing understanding of the EU and the US as influential actors in this domain. By identifying areas of convergence and divergence, the study offers valuable insights into the strategies and competencies necessary to address contemporary maritime security challenges effectively.

Literature Review

Maritime Security: Concepts and Approaches

The concept of maritime security does not have a universal definition and requires a comprehensive approach involving collaboration between different national and international authorities, as well as a combination of long experience, common exercise, and a common set of rules. Klein defines maritime security from different perspectives and contexts. From a defense standpoint, maritime security goes beyond traditional seapower and includes protecting the maritime domain from various threats, such as nation-state threats, terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. For the shipping industry, maritime security primarily focuses on ensuring the safe arrival of cargo without interference or criminal activities. It involves measures taken by owners, operators, and administrators of vessels, ports, offshore installations, and marine organizations to protect against seizure, sabotage, piracy, pilferage, annoyance, or surprise.⁵


While there is no clear-cut definition of maritime security in international law, references can be drawn from the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which identifies activities inconsistent with the right of innocent passage and prejudicial to the coastal state's peace, good order, and security. Discussions surrounding maritime security often focus on identifying concrete maritime threats, such as terrorist attacks, movement of terrorists, and financing through shipping, weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, people smuggling, piracy, and armed robbery at sea.⁶

Feldt et al. introduce maritime security as a combination of preventive and responsive measures, both civilian and military, aimed at protecting the maritime domain from intentional unlawful acts and threats, including transnational forces and irregular challenges.⁷

⁵ Natalie Klein, "Two Fundamental Concepts," in *Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 8–9.

⁶ Natalie Klein, "Two Fundamental Concepts," 9–10.

⁷ Lutz Feldt, Peter Roell, and Ralph D. Thiele, "Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach," No. 222 (ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, Institut für Strategie- Politik-Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung: ISPSW, 2013), 1–25, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162756/222_feldt_roell_thiele.pdf.



Picture 1: Bueger's maritime security matrix.⁸

Bueger presents a maritime security matrix, to try to sum up the various themes that fall under maritime security as a concept (Picture 1). Illegal and intentional activities which authors often point out are piracy, illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, transnational criminal activity, especially arms and drug smuggling and human trafficking, as well as deliberate (marine) pollution.

Maritime Security Governance

Sperling defines maritime security governance as the management of security in regions where the state has emerged or is emerging, specifically concerning maritime spaces and oceans. It encompasses the establishment and implementation of measures to address threats and challenges in the maritime domain. The existing global system of maritime security governance is deemed weak and underdeveloped, suggesting that a regional approach may be more effective in constructing a comprehensive global framework for maritime security governance.⁹

Aarstad presents a historical perspective on maritime security governance, highlighting the evolving relationship between public and private actors. The increasing presence of private actors in performing functions traditionally associated with the state is seen because of societal transformations. The power dynamics and roles of public and private actors in security

⁸ Christian Bueger, "What Is Maritime Security?," *Marine Policy* 53 (2015): 161, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.005>.

⁹ James Sperling, "Global Maritime Security Governance," in *Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security*, ed. Ruxandra-Laura Boşilcă, Susana Ferreira, and Barry J. Ryan (London and New York: Routledge, 2022), 73–75, DOI: 10.4324/9781003001324-3.

governance structures are contested, requiring empirical assessment rather than theoretical assumptions. The effectiveness of private security in preventing hijackings remains a topic of debate.¹⁰

The securing of maritime spaces is necessary due to conflicts that may emerge in the form of maritime claims. Maritime claims involve explicit disputes between states over access or usage of maritime areas, ranging from diplomatic quarrels to militarized conflicts. Economic, strategic, and symbolic motivations drive states to initiate maritime claims. The abundance of resources, strategic advantages, and symbolic attachments to territory contribute to these disputes. Understanding these motivations is essential for managing maritime claims effectively. Existing research focuses on institutionalization and privatization as solutions, but the role of a central authority in resolving these conflicts remains understudied.¹¹

Main issue		Example
Sovereignty	· Ownership of islands	The Falkland War (Argentina vs the UK, 1982)
	· Definition of rocks and islands	Spratly and Paracel Islands case (six neighboring states, the 1970s–)
Boundaries (Territorial Waters, EEZs)	· Overlapping maritime Boundaries	The Gulf of Maine case (Canada vs the US, 1976–1984)
	· Unilateral extensions of Boundaries	The Cod Wars (Iceland vs the UK, the 1950s–1970s)
Resources (Fisheries, Oil, Etc.)	· Illegal fishing over other state's claimed EEZs	The Turbot War (Canada vs Spain, 1994–1995)
	· Presence of natural resources	Ambalat case (Indonesia vs Malaysia, 1979–)
Pollution	· Pollution risks caused by neighboring states' land-based pollution or facilities, such as nuclear reprocessing facility	The MOX Plant case (Iceland vs the UK, 2001–)
Navigational Rights	· Passage of warships in other states' territorial waters and international straits	The Corfu Channel case (Albania vs the UK, 1947–1949)

Picture 2: Main Issues and Examples of Maritime Claims as presented by Han.¹²

Recent studies emphasize that regions face maritime threats in the form of improving, intensifying, and emerging categories. For example, Bradford and Edwards examined the situation in Southeast Asia and concluded that improving threats are those that have been mitigated, such as piracy and armed robbery. Intensifying threats for Southeast Asia include interstate disputes, maritime refugees, illicit drug trafficking, environmental crime, and climate-induced disasters. Lastly, emerging threats include cyber-attacks, unmanned

¹⁰ Åsne Kalland Aarstad, “Maritime Security and Transformations in Global Governance,” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 67, no. 3 (April 2017): 313–31, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9656-0>.

¹¹ Jonghwan Han, “Selective Engagement of US Naval Power in Maritime Conflicts: The Guardian of Freedom of Navigation,” *Pacific Focus* 36, no. 3 (December 2021): 380–404, <https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12192>.

¹² Han, “Selective Engagement of US Naval Power in Maritime Conflicts,” 383.

underwater vehicles, and the rise of China as a maritime power. Despite efforts to reduce risks, the maritime environment remains dynamic, and changes in variables can quickly reverse progress, highlighting the need for constant vigilance.¹³

State actorness

Having established the concept of maritime security governance as a comprehensive framework for safeguarding maritime activities and resources, it is crucial to examine the role of state actors in this context. Feldt et al. state that maritime security operations are a governmental responsibility, but the authority to act on behalf of a state is a sovereign decision with different options. UNCLOS offers a foundation for good governance at sea, and compliance with this globally accepted document is necessary to ensure maritime security. In the EU framework, member states (MS) retain sovereignty over their territorial waters and have the primary responsibility for maritime security within their jurisdiction. However, the EU has developed mechanisms, such as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), that include provisions for cooperative action and coordination among MS in the realm of security and defense, including maritime security.¹⁴ The competences of the EU and CSDP will be subject to further analysis in subsequent sections of this thesis.

Ryan argues that from a historical point of view, maritime politics have always been state-centric, resulting in a chronicle of interstate interactions. This had been challenged after the redefinition of non-traditional security threats with the establishing of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. A big step forward was especially with the signing of the UNCLOS which pursued to establish the UN as the High Seas' custodian. However, although an international organization became the platform to address maritime problems, the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones added additional state actors to the mix of international maritime affairs in the early 1980s and whereas UNCLOS was a driver for change, it was also a completely state-centric claim to maritime law.¹⁵

UNCLOS delineates the obligations of states, both on a global and regional scale, in multiple domains, which are to be fulfilled either directly or by proficient international organizations. While the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is only referenced once in UNCLOS, it

¹³ John Bradford and Scott Edwards, "The Evolving Nature of Southeast Asia's Maritime Security Threats," November 16, 2022.

¹⁴ Feldt, Roell, and Thiele, "Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach," 2.

¹⁵ Barry J. Ryan, "Maritime Security in a Critical Context," in *Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security*, ed. Ruxandra-Laura Boşilcă, Susana Ferreira, and Barry J. Ryan (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2022), 28–29.

is widely acknowledged as the foremost competent organization responsible for overseeing international shipping and navigation regulations. Furthermore, additional organizations such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are also recognized as competent entities in matters of the maritime sphere.¹⁶

The policies of maritime protection, prevention, and assurance are mainly national security goods, but some policies constitute collective goods that minimize criminal organizations' and terrorist groups' opportunities to exploit maritime commerce. For Sperling, quasi-institutionalized multilateral maritime hubs and international institutions have improved information sharing and have undisputed jurisdiction in the resolution of maritime disputes. An effective system of maritime security governance institutionalizing would enhance the prospect of providing an optimal supply of systemic maritime security and meeting the challenges attending the technologies of public goods production.¹⁷

When considering the regulatory bodies or organizations, it is evident that their membership exclusively consists of nation-states. UNCLOS was adopted by the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and opened for signature, together with the Final Act of the Conference, on 10 December 1982.¹⁸ There are currently 157 countries that have signed and 168 countries that are parties to UNCLOS.

UNCTAD currently has 195 countries that are members.¹⁹ UNCITRAL is formed of seventy MS elected by the General Assembly.²⁰ ILO membership is dependent on the state being a member of the UN.²¹ Also, IMO membership is based on states. At the moment, there are 175 MS, whereas 66 intergovernmental organizations have observer status, and 88 international non-governmental organizations have consultative status with IMO.²²

¹⁶ Aldo Chircop, "The International Maritime Organization," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea*, ed. Donald R Rothwell et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 416–17.

¹⁷ Sperling, "Global Maritime Security Governance," 76–77.

¹⁸ UN. UNCLOS, December 10, 1982. Accessed June 3, 2023. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=en#1.

¹⁹ UNCTAD. "Membership." Accessed June 3, 2023. <https://unctad.org/about/membership>.

²⁰ UNCITRAL. "FAQ - Mandate & Composition." Accessed June 3, 2023. https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/faq/mandate_composition.

²¹ ILO. "Frequently Asked Questions: Membership." Accessed June 3, 2023. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---jur/documents/genericdocument/wcms_441858.pdf.

²² IMO. "Membership." Accessed June 3, 2023. <https://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/default.aspx>.

In conclusion, the analysis reveals that full membership in the aforementioned regulatory bodies or organizations is exclusively limited to nation-states. This indicates that maritime security governance, in regulatory terms, is primarily driven and influenced by states. UNCLOS serves as a significant example, with a considerable number of countries signing and becoming parties to the treaty. Similarly, organizations such as UNCTAD, UNCITRAL, ILO, and IMO have memberships consisting of states. This state-centric approach to membership underscores the central role of nation-states in shaping and implementing maritime security governance initiatives and regulations. While intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations may have observer or consultative status, the decision-making power ultimately lies with state actors. Therefore, in regulatory terms, the involvement and participation of states remain crucial in shaping the framework and mechanisms of maritime security governance.

However, the changing nature of maritime power and the rise of new players in global politics has the potential to lead to conflict and competition for resources.²³ Non-state actors such as pirates and terrorists pose a threat to maritime security, while the use of private maritime security companies adds to the complexity of the situation.

The Role of Navies

Booth explores the question of why we need a navy by examining the purposes and functions of navies in foreign policy. Navies serve three main roles: military, diplomatic, and policing. They are essential for controlling the use of the sea, ensuring the passage of goods, projecting military force, and exploiting resources. The military role is fundamental, giving meaning to the navy's other actions. The diplomatic role involves managing foreign policy without resorting to force, while the policing role focuses on maintaining sovereignty over maritime frontiers. It is important to consider the context, differences between countries, and empirical evidence when analyzing naval functions.²⁴

²³ Girish Gujar, P.K. Ghosh and Hong Yan. "A strategy for Securing the Maritime Commons." In *Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region*, edited by David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, 2014. <https://www.stimson.org/2015/sea-change-evolving-maritime-geopolitics-indo-pacific-region-0/>.

²⁴ Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (London : New York: Croom Helm ; Crane, Russak, 1977), 15–25.



Picture 3: The functions of navies as introduced by Booth.²⁵

In his research, Stöhs examined the dynamic transformations in the roles assumed by the US and the EU navies. As the international security environment becomes increasingly competitive, major powers such as Russia and China are capable of challenging the US, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and their partners in a symmetrical manner. Within this context, naval power assumes significant importance due to the presence of advanced weapons systems, sophisticated sensors, and potentially disruptive technologies that pose numerous challenges to Western naval forces. Recognizing these challenges, the US is undergoing reorganization efforts within its armed forces to effectively deter and defeat potential adversaries in high-end scenarios. On the other hand, the EU seeks to achieve greater strategic autonomy and aims to develop capabilities that would enable independent conduct of foreign and security policy, including naval operations, without reliance on the US. Nevertheless, it is important to note that even when the naval power of all European states is aggregated, it still falls considerably short in comparison to the highly integrated naval forces of the US.²⁶

Recent studies conclude that despite a greater understanding of the need for navies and coastguards to deal with emerging non-traditional threats at sea, the general increase in the level of great power competition and the extent to which realist thinking can permeate the institutions and conduct of maritime security operations suggest that the traditional realist

²⁵ Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, 16.

²⁶ Jeremy Stöhs, "European Small(Er) Navies: Failure and Success in Doing More with Less," in *Europe, Small Navies and Maritime Security: Balancing Traditional Roles and Emergent Threats in the 21st Century*, ed. Robert McCabe, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller, 1st ed. (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2019), 71–80, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429286636>.

approach will continue to dominate the maritime scene. Till concludes that it is probable that maritime security operations will still take place in an area defined by conventional naval concerns.²⁷

Brewster observes a shift in naval power in the Indian Ocean, highlighting China's growing presence. Despite strategic disadvantages and limited security relationships, China is unlikely to fully mitigate its vulnerabilities in the region. The balance of power is changing due to the perceived decline of the US Navy's predominance, with China and India engaged in strategic competition. While China may deploy its navy for signaling, committing substantial defense resources to the region may not be strategically advantageous.²⁸

The emergence of new powers and evolving dynamics in maritime security are indicative of an emerging global order. The US and Europe will continue to wield significant influence, but the international maritime order will undergo fundamental changes as emerging powers gain economic and naval strength. Forecasts indicate that by 2030, China alone will possess a quarter of the world's merchant fleet, while other Asian nations such as Japan, South Korea, India, and Vietnam will expand their maritime presence. However, the precise contours of this order remain uncertain, leading to growing divisions on the international stage. This division poses challenges in effectively addressing global issues such as counterterrorism, resource competition, mercantilist policies, and climate change. The rise of new powers has sparked deliberations on its implications for maritime security and regional stability. While conflict is not an inevitable outcome, risks escalate when selective acceptance of norms and aggressive maritime strategies are pursued.²⁹

Geographical factors have a significant impact on a country's maritime security policies. Countries with longer coastlines, difficult-to-monitor coasts, or those with direct access to the high seas have greater challenges in controlling illegal activities in their maritime domain, such as drug smuggling and illegal immigration. However, non-geographical factors such as the

²⁷ Geoffrey Till, "Maritime Security: 'Good Navies' and Realism Re-Imagined," in *Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security*, ed. Ruxandra-Laura Boşilcă, Susana Ferreira, and Barry J. Ryan (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2022), 46-47.

²⁸ David Brewster, "The Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean: Prospects for a Significant Chinese Naval Presence." In *Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region*, edited by David Michel and Ricky Passarelli, 2014.

²⁹ Brahma Chellaney, "Major Maritime Powers and Their Changing Relationship: The United States, Europe, China, India and Others," in *Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security*, ed. Joachim Krause and Sebastian Bruns, Routledge Handbooks (London ; New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 338, <https://doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.4324/9781315732572>.

government's capabilities will also play a role in a country's maritime security. Since maritime threats have a transnational nature, countries not directly affected can contribute to policing efforts.³⁰

EU and the maritime domain

EU maritime foreign and security policies are shaped by external events, such as crises and geopolitical factors, which lead MS to seek common solutions through common policies. Additionally, Riddervold suggests that social factors, informal cooperation, and the ability to present convincing arguments all have integrative consequences in policymaking. EU institutions, including the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission (also Commission), play an important role in the development of these policies, particularly in terms of the scope and content of common policies. The Commission can exert influence through informal channels, expertise, and cooperation with MS, which can result in new policies cutting across policy fields and the pillar divide. The organizational structuring of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is also important, as the lack of a pre-established structure allowed the Commission and the EEAS to develop their own administrative system in the domain, leading to policies that are eventually agreed to and adopted by the MS.³¹

Van Leeuwen and Kern specify the internal and external dimensions of the EU's marine policy. As per internal governance, the EU MS are responsible for creating and executing the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the Integrated Maritime Policy. The external aspect of this policy extends beyond the borders of the EU, including connections between the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and Regional Sea Conventions such as the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment – OSPAR Convention (North-East Atlantic), the Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea), and the Barcelona Convention (Mediterranean Sea).³²

The EU developed its own shipping legislation in response to the IMO's perceived inadequacy in regulating commercial shipping for the past 20 years. The EU's regulatory efforts aimed to

³⁰ Basil Germond, "The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security," *Marine Policy* 54 (2015), 138–392. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.013>.

³¹ Marianne Riddervold, "EU Maritime Foreign and Security Policy Integration: Explaining the EU Maritime Security Strategy," in *The Maritime Turn in EU Foreign and Security Policies: Aims, Actors and Mechanisms of Integration* (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 143–64, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66598-6>.

³² Judith van Leeuwen and Kristine Kern, "The External Dimension of European Union Marine Governance: Institutional Interplay between the EU and the International Maritime Organization," *Global Environmental Politics* 13, no. 1 (2013): 69.

safeguard its seas against substandard shipping that did not comply with the IMO's safety and environmental standards. EU shipping policies have proved successful in impacting not only ships registered in the EU but also those that transport goods to and from the EU. As a result, the EU has become a leading force in the decision-making and implementation of IMO conventions, highlighting the efficacy of regional institutions in strengthening global institutions.³³

One of the objectives as pointed out by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, is that the EU constitutes the second largest exporter and third largest importer worldwide, its dependency on maritime transport and infrastructure is significant, and ensuring secure maritime routes is crucial for the global public good as a substantial portion of global goods are at risk of not reaching their intended recipients due to increasing challenges related to geo-strategic rivalries, piracy, and organized crime, requiring international cooperation.³⁴

EU's maritime foreign and security policies are shaped by external events, social factors, and institutional mechanisms, driving MS to seek common solutions through policies. The Commission and EEAS utilize informal channels and cooperation with MS to develop policies, extending the EU's marine policy beyond its borders. EU's regulatory efforts in shipping safeguard its seas and influence global institutions, highlighting its commitment to maritime security and global maritime influence.

US and the maritime domain

The US has played a crucial role in maintaining stability and order in the world's oceans since World War II. The US navy's ability to project power across the seas has deterred aggressive behavior in disputed maritime areas. However, due to resource constraints, the US prioritizes certain maritime claims based on their significance to US interests, with a focus on claims related to freedom of navigation.³⁵

The US Navy's strategy has evolved, shaped by historical and political factors. Its emergence as a global power after the Spanish-American War and the maritime nature of World War I and II influenced its strategic thinking. The advent of nuclear weapons and missile technology led

³³ van Leeuwen and Kern, "The External Dimension of European Union Marine Governance," 69-70.

³⁴ Josep Borrell, "Why the EU Needs to Be a Global Maritime Security Provider," EEAS, January 27, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-eu-needs-be-global-maritime-security-provider_en.

³⁵ Han, "Selective Engagement of US Naval Power in Maritime Conflicts," 386-93.

to the development of a sea-based deterrent. The Vietnam War and Soviet naval power expanded the Navy's mission. The Maritime Strategy implemented during the Reagan administration addressed growing Soviet confidence. Budget reductions and geopolitical shifts after the Cold War refocused the Navy on regional scenarios and counterterrorism. Despite challenges, the Navy's adaptability and contributions to US sea power remain vital, requiring comprehensive understanding and support from political and public spheres.³⁶

To understand the current status of American naval power and its interactions, it is crucial to consider several key principles. Firstly, the US Navy operates within the boundaries of American law, with the President serving as its Commander in Chief. Secondly, the Navy has historically played a crucial role in national security, diplomacy, and economic policy, performing various tasks. It operates as part of a joint military system overseen by civilian and military leaders under the President and Secretary of Defense. Collaboration with allies and partners enhances the Navy's operations, which extend globally, both during peacetime and war, adapting to strategic priorities established by the President. The Navy possesses specialized assets and is a versatile force capable of diverse missions. Moreover, the US has a history of technical expertise and a strong naval industrial base. Lastly, the Navy maintains operational readiness through continuous training and engagement with foreign armed forces, demonstrating a steadfast commitment to preparedness throughout its history.³⁷

The Transatlantic Partnership and the maritime domain

An important platform for shaping the US-Europe partnership is NATO. This master thesis looks separately at the defense and security competencies of the EU and the US, yet, under NATO the two share a common military approach. This section will briefly acknowledge the transatlantic partnership; however, this thesis will not analyze the actorship of European countries or the US within NATO.

NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance between 31 MS. Out of the twelve founding countries of NATO, eight were EU MS.³⁸ EU and NATO have shared values and interests, but

³⁶ Sebastian Bruns, "Conclusion," in *US Naval Strategy and National Security: The Evolution of American Maritime Power*, 1st ed. (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, [2018] | Series: Cass series: naval policy and history 1366-9478: Routledge, 2017), 249–56, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315624679>.

³⁷ Peter M. Swartz, "American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans, and Operations in the Second Decade of the Twenty-First Century," in *Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security*, ed. Joachim Krause and Sebastian Bruns, Routledge Handbooks (London ; New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 229–67.

³⁸ NATO. "Member Countries," NATO, accessed June 5, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm.

differences in responsibilities have led to misunderstandings and potential overlaps. While NATO focuses on external security, the EU has secondary tasks related to security and defense. The lack of a formal EU-NATO communication framework has resulted in a competitive cooperation dynamic. Both organizations require each other's capabilities to address diverse threats, and a rivalry would harm their competitiveness. Political support exists for intensifying EU-NATO cooperation, and joint declarations have aimed to enhance complementarity. However, the development of a common strategic culture relies on political will and the recognition of security and defense as fields of national sovereignty.³⁹

Country	NATO membership (year)	EU membership (year) ⁴⁰
Austria	not a member	1995
Belgium	1949	1957
Bulgaria	2004	2007
Croatia	2009	2013
The Czech Republic	1999	2004
Denmark	1949	1973
Estonia	2004	2004
Finland	2023	1995
France	1949	1957
Germany	1955	1957
Greece	1952	1981
Hungary	1999	2004
Italy	1949	1957
Ireland	not a member	1973
Latvia	2004	2004
Lithuania	2004	2004
Luxembourg	1949	1957
Netherlands	1949	1957
Malta	not a member	2004
Poland	1999	2004
Portugal	1949	1986
Romania	2004	2007
Slovakia	2004	2004
Slovenia	2004	2004
Spain	1982	1986
Sweden	candidacy status	1995
United Kingdom	1949	1973; left in 2020

Table 1: EU MS and years when they joined NATO and the EU.

³⁹ Alexandra Monica Nunweiller Bălănescu, "The International Liberal Order Prospects for the Transatlantic Partnership Under Biden's Administration," *EUROPOLITY* 15, no. 2 (2021): 133–37.

⁴⁰ European Commission, "From 6 to 27 Members," May 29, 2019, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/6-27-members_en.

Many candidate countries join NATO before becoming full-pledged EU MS. There is no written rule on this, and the decision to join either organization is independent and based on the individual country's foreign policy objectives and strategic considerations. While there may be cases where countries join NATO before the EU, it is not a prerequisite or a predetermined sequence.

The decision to join NATO or the EU depends on various factors, including a country's security concerns, geopolitical considerations, historical alliances, and national interests. NATO is a military alliance focused on collective defense and security cooperation, whereas the EU is primarily an economic and political union aimed at fostering integration and cooperation among MS.

Some countries may prioritize their security concerns and choose to join NATO as a means to enhance their defense capabilities and benefit from the collective security guarantee provided by the alliance. On the other hand, joining the EU may be driven by economic considerations, access to the single market, political integration, or a desire to contribute to European integration.

It is important to note that both organizations have distinct membership criteria and requirements. While there are some overlaps in terms of shared values and principles, the decision to join NATO or the EU ultimately depends on the specific circumstances and strategic priorities of each country.

Securitization and Maritime Security

The post-Cold War era witnessed a significant shift in the security dynamics of the naval domain. With the decline of communism and the changing geopolitical landscape in central and eastern Europe, security became uncertain. While military expenditures decreased after the Cold War, the world saw the emergence of various armed conflicts, regional rivalries, terrorism, transnational crime, nationalism, and ethnic and religious conflicts. This led to a reevaluation of the role of military forces, as they were increasingly employed for purposes other than war. Naval diplomacy played a crucial role in managing risks and competing for influence in the former Eastern bloc, exemplified by operations in the Adriatic and Black Sea regions. These operations demonstrated coalition building, showcased Western power, and had

both practical and symbolic impacts on the changing world order. However, they also strained relations with Russia, the dominant naval power in the region.⁴¹

Securitization theory, developed by the Copenhagen School, offers a non-traditional approach to security that challenges the narrow focus on the security of the state. Wæver observed one strategy of the post-1980s broadening of the security agenda as a shift of attention away from a narrow emphasis on the security of the state (national security) and toward a larger or alternative emphasis on the security of people, either as individuals or as a global or international collectivity. Multiple factors can impact an individual's sense of security, such as economic well-being, environmental difficulties, cultural identity, and political rights are more frequently relevant than military ones.⁴²

Buzan develops a definition along the logic that the traditional-political view of security explains what qualifies as an international security concern, whereas security refers to the ability to survive. Yet, threats and vulnerabilities can occur in a wide range of military and non-military contexts, but to qualify as security challenges, they must adhere to a set of precise criteria that set them apart from the ordinary course of the purely political, while being “staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generated endorsement for emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind.” Thereby, when leaders start discussing problems in terms of current dangers against some important referent object, issues start to become securitized; according to the securitizing formula, such risks must be dealt with using extraordinary measures and/or immediate action. In this sense, securitization can “be seen as a more extreme version of politicization”.⁴³

According to Balzacq, securitization involves a complex set of practices in which various tools, such as metaphors, policy instruments, images, analogies, stereotypes, and emotions, are strategically employed by an actor seeking to securitize a particular issue. The actor aims to elicit specific feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions in the audience, framing a target

⁴¹ Kevin Rowlands, *Naval Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Model for the Post-Cold War Global Order*, Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series (London ; New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2019): 59-68.

⁴² Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46-47.

⁴³ Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” *Cooperations and Conflict* 32, no. 1 (1997): 13–14, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836797032001001>.

object as critically vulnerable and necessitating immediate action to prevent its threatening development.⁴⁴

Balzacq's perspective on securitization is primarily sociological, distinguishing it from the philosophical view based on three key aspects. Firstly, the sociological view recognizes securitization as a strategic process influenced by contextual factors, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and power dynamics. Secondly, performatives are contextualized actions shaped by agents' habits, and the discourse of securitization represents a unique form of agency. Lastly, the sociological perspective highlights the reciprocal relationship between securitizing actors and audiences, acknowledging the audience as an empirically significant category. Balzacq argues that these differences provide a novel framework for understanding securitization as a practice that constructs shared understandings through habitus inherited from different social domains.⁴⁵

Hansen argues that the dependence of Buzan and Wæver on speech act theory for epistemology assumes the presence of circumstances where communication through speech is feasible. The Copenhagen School claims to have thoroughly explored the widening security agenda, yet Hansen in her critique claims that important security issues have been excluded from their gaze. One notable absence is the concept of gendered security, which is often included in post-structuralist and critical security studies. The article aims to critically discuss the Copenhagen School's lack of consideration for gender-based insecurity and identify the barriers to including gender in their security theory. The author argues that the 'security as silence' and 'subsuming security' problems prevent the inclusion of gender, as gendered security issues often involve an intimate interlinkage between the subject's gendered identity and other aspects of their identity. The article concludes that a more thorough investigation of the speech act is required to understand gender-based security problems and that security as a practice, rather than a concept, can facilitate a political analysis of how security discourses gain authority to define threats and strategies to counter them.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Therry Balzacq, "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants," in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. Therry Balzacq (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 1-3.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma: The Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000), 285-306, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020501>.

One of the shortcomings of securitization is the question of where to draw the line when using the term ‘security,’ if it can become synonymous for what is politically advantageous or desirable.⁴⁷ Securitization refers to the process of framing an issue or policy concern as a matter of security, thereby justifying extraordinary measures or responses that would not typically be employed. By invoking the language of security, policymakers seek to elevate certain issues to a higher priority level and gain public and political support for decisive action.

Securitization is a crucial concept within the theoretical framework of this thesis, particularly when examining maritime security. It refers to the process by which an issue is transformed into a security concern that requires extraordinary measures and exceptional responses. In the context of maritime security, securitization involves perceiving certain threats or challenges, such as piracy, terrorism, or illegal trafficking, as existential risks that demand immediate action and prioritization. Through securitization, maritime security issues are elevated above routine policy concerns, enabling the deployment of specialized security measures and the allocation of significant resources. Understanding the dynamics of securitization within the maritime domain is essential for comprehending the policy responses, institutional arrangements, and decision-making processes aimed at safeguarding maritime activities and resources.

⁴⁷ Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 47.

Methodology

This master thesis employs a mixed-methods research approach to investigate the military capabilities, defense competencies, and maritime security strategies of the EU and the US in the context of maritime security. The research methodology consists of both qualitative and quantitative elements, aiming to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research question and hypotheses.

Data Collection

Primary data for this study will be obtained from various sources, including academic literature, official documents, policy reports, and relevant databases. These sources will be selected based on their relevance to the research objectives and the availability of accurate and up-to-date information. When it comes to defense and security competencies and maritime security strategies, primary documents will be studied to ensure a legal framework that will be strengthened by some additional information from secondary sources. The comparative analysis of military spending will be done based on the data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Data Analysis

The collected data will be analyzed through a thematic analysis approach, which involves identifying recurring themes, patterns, and concepts within the data. The analysis will be conducted systematically and rigorously to ensure the reliability and validity of the findings. The qualitative data will be categorized to identify key themes and patterns.

The quantitative data, such as military spending figures and naval capabilities, will be subjected to contextual analysis to identify trends and patterns. The information will be provided in graphs, whereas the data retrieved from SIPRI is part of the appendix.

Case Study Approach

The research will employ a case study approach to examine the EU and the US as distinct cases, allowing for an in-depth analysis of their military capabilities, defense competencies, and maritime security strategies. The case study design enables a comprehensive exploration of each actor's policies, initiatives, and operational activities in the context of maritime security.

The analysis will be guided by the research question and hypotheses formulated in the introduction.

Limitations

It is important to acknowledge certain limitations that may affect the research findings. Firstly, the availability and quality of data may vary between the EU and the US, which could potentially impact the comparative analysis. Additionally, the research is focused separately on the EU and the US, limiting the understanding of their security cooperation under NATO. Lastly, the study's reliance on secondary data may introduce biases or limitations in terms of data completeness or objectivity.

Overall, the chosen methodology aims to provide a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the military capabilities, defense competencies, and maritime security strategies of the EU and the US. By utilizing a mixed-methods approach and employing a case study design, this thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of maritime security dynamics and their implications on regional and global security.

Case Study: The European Union

This section provides a comprehensive analysis of the EU's security and defense competences, focusing on its CSDP and related missions and operations. It also examines the EU's maritime security strategy and the key bodies involved in EU security and defense, including the European Defense Agency (EDA) and post-2016 initiatives. By delving into these aspects, this case study sheds light on the EU's historical integration, its evolving role in security and defense, and its efforts to ensure maritime security in the global context.

Overview of (Defense) Integration

Since its beginning, the EU has gone through notable treaty changes. The table below is a summary of all European treaties and their biggest amendments, highlighting the evolution of security competencies. Where relevant, articles from the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) will be provided to show how the legislative framework has developed in the sphere of security and defense competencies. The information is gathered from the official EU website on Treaty changes and amendments.

Treaty of Paris or the Treaty establishing the ESCS	Signed: 18 April 1951 Entered into force: 23 July 1952 Expired: 23 July 2002	Established the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) and created a common market for coal and steel products between six founding members: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
Treaties of Rome or EEC and Euratom Treaties	Signed: 25 March 1957 Entered into force: 1 January 1958	Established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and introduced the principle of the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people within the community.
Merger Treaty or Brussels Treaty	Signed: 8 April 1965	Modernizing the European institutions, which involved creating a single Commission and a single Council to serve the then three

	Entered into force: 1 July 1967	European Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC).
Single European Act	Signed: 17 February 1986 (Luxembourg) / 28 February 1986 (The Hague) Entered into force: 1 July 1987	Created a single market in the EU by removing trade barriers and harmonizing laws and introduced new powers for the European Parliament.
Maastricht Treaty	Signed: 7 February 1992 Entered into force: 1 November 1993	Renamed the EEC as the EU established the European Citizenship and the European Central Bank, created CFSP and the Justice and Home Affairs policies, and introduced the concept of the European Monetary Union and the euro as a single currency. The treaty introduced the concept of CSDP aiming to develop the EU's capacity for autonomous action in managing crises and recognized the right of EU MS to conduct individual or collective defense, and affirmed the principle of mutual defense (Article 42 (7) TEU).
Amsterdam Treaty	Signed: 2 October 1997 Entered into force: 1 May 1999	Enhanced the powers of the European Parliament, established the HR/VP, and created new provisions on employment policy, social policy, and civil rights. In terms of security competencies, it integrated the CFSP into the framework of the EU's supranational institutions, expanded the range of actions covered by CSDP to include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and conflict prevention, and enabled the EU to

		use civilian and military means to carry out CSDP missions.
Nice treaty	Signed: 26 February 2001 Entered into force: 1 February 2003	Reformed the EU's institutional structure to prepare for the enlargement of the EU, by increasing the power of the European Parliament, changing the voting system in the Council of Ministers, and establishing a new role for the European Court of Justice. The treaty oversaw the establishment of the EDA to support MS in improving defense capabilities and coordinating defense procurement.
Treaty of Lisbon	Signed: 13 December 2007 Entered into force: 01 December 2009	Replaced the previous constitutional treaty with new provisions to increase the democratic legitimacy and efficiency of the EU, by introducing the European Council President, a stronger role for the European Parliament, a new voting system in the Council of Ministers, and the possibility for EU citizens to request new legislation. The Treaty brought many changes to EU defense and security competences, as it replaced the pillar structure with a single legal personality for the EU (Article 47 TEU), introduced the role of the HR/VP, who assumes the position of Vice-President of the European Commission (Article 17(4) TEU) and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (Article (18) TEU). To facilitate the implementation of EU foreign policy, the Treaty created the EEAS, which serves as a supportive entity for the High Representative in conducting EU foreign

		policy endeavors (Article 27 TEU). Additionally, enhanced cooperation among MS in defense matters is promoted through the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation framework (Article 46 TEU).
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Table 2: Overview of the EU's Treaty Provisions, focusing on the development of security and defense capabilities.⁴⁸

Based on the overview of treaty provisions, it is important to note that while the EU has taken steps to strengthen its defense and security competences, the primary responsibility for defense and security still lies with individual MS. The EU's involvement in defense affairs is designed to complement, rather than replace, the role of NATO. Additionally, not all MS participate equally in all defense initiatives, as participation is based on willingness and individual national priorities.

EU's Security and Defense Competences

The Common Security and Defense Policy

In 1999, the European Council agreed on intending "to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense."⁴⁹ The objective was to establish a robust crisis management framework led by the EU that enables the full and equal participation of NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied EU members, in EU operations. This idea was fully manifested in its current form with the Treaty of Lisbon.

CSDP is defined in the TEU under Articles 42 to 46 and is part of the Chapter on CFSP. CSDP aims to provide the EU with operational capabilities using civilian and military assets to promote peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and international security, as aligned with the principles of the UN Charter.⁵⁰ The CSDP also aims to establish a common defense policy that may lead to a common defense when the European Council unanimously decides, while respecting the specific security and defense policies of certain MS. MS are required to make

⁴⁸ EU, "Founding Agreements," accessed April 26, 2023, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/founding-agreements_en.

⁴⁹ Cologne European Council, "Annex III: Conclusions of the Presidency," June 3-4, 1999, accessed June 4, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm#an3.

⁵⁰ TEU, Article 42.

their civilian and military capabilities available to the EU and progressively improve their military capabilities to support the objectives defined by the Council, as well as participate in identifying and implementing measures to enhance the defense sector.

CSDP was a contested matter, especially in Denmark for which rules under Article 5 of Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the EU treaties applied. Yet, on June 1, 2022, the Danes voted 67% in favor and 33% against a referendum for removing the opt-out of the CSDP. The move signifies a growing trend among Nordic countries to deepen defense ties in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and sends a signal to allies in NATO and Europe while viewed positively in Brussels.⁵¹

When it comes to criticism of the EU's external action, Cusumano believes that the conflicting preferences within EU external relations present challenges due to the intergovernmental decision-making process, where the approval of MS is crucial for mission inception and continuation, leading to potential mission terminations or resource shortages. Additionally, EU external policies carry normative expectations of protecting human rights and upholding international law, but the EU has been criticized for inconsistencies and failures to adhere to its normative commitments, leading to accusations of hypocrisy.⁵²

CSDP Missions and Operations

According to the latest Factsheet, published in May 2023, there are currently nine ongoing military operations and thirteen ongoing civilian missions.⁵³ The factsheet also emphasizes that during the conduct phase, the Political and Security Committee assumes political control and strategic direction for both civilian and military missions and operations, with the authority of the Council and the HR/VP. A single and identifiable chain of command is established for each mission and operation, which may involve the provision of an operational headquarters by a MS for military operations (e.g., EUNAVFOR Med IRINI) or the utilization of NATO command structures under the Berlin-Plus agreements (e.g., EUFOR Althea). Additionally, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability based in Brussels commands the military training

⁵¹ Reuters, "Denmark to Join EU Defence Policy after Historic Vote," *Reuters*, accessed June 8, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/denmark-looks-set-join-eus-defence-policy-exit-poll-by-public-broadcaster-dr-2022-06-01/>.

⁵² Eugenio Cusumano, "Migrant Rescue as Organized Hypocrisy: EU Maritime Missions Offshore Libya between Humanitarianism and Border Control," *Cooperation and Conflict* 54, no. 1 (March 2019): 6–7, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718780175>.

⁵³ EEAS, "EU Missions and Operations," n.d., https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/EU-mission-and-operation_2023_2_0.pdf.

missions in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia, and Mozambique, while the EU Civilian Operations Commander, supported by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability of the EEAS, commands all civilian missions and operations.

The financing of civilian missions is allocated from the CFSP budget, while the EU budget does not cover the common costs of military operations, which are instead funded by MS through the European Peace Facility (EPF).

The table below lists 23 operations, and summarizes their objectives, alongside information on the year of establishment, supposed end of mandate, and whether the mission is a civilian mission or a military operation. Although there are 22 operations, there is an additional Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell with headquarters in Nouakchott, Mauritania, which is part of a CSDP mission, but with a specific task and therefore understood as a separate entity within EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia. Out of the 23 listed operations and missions, 13 are focused on the African continent. Five missions concentrate on European neighbors, three operations deal with issues in the Middle East, and an additional two with Central Asia.

The name of each mission is complemented by a footnote that includes the primary source where data was gathered; some information needed an additional source, which is why an additional footnote is added.

Name	Established	Mandate	Type of mission	Objectives as per the Council Decisions
EU Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM Iraq) ⁵⁴	2017	amended and extended until 30 April 2024	Civilian mission	EUAM Iraq provides strategic advice and expertise to Iraqi authorities regarding civilian aspects of Security Sector Reforms, analyzing opportunities for EU engagement at various levels to support civilian Security Sector Reform needs, and collaborating with the EU Delegation to inform and

⁵⁴ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/635 of 13 April 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/1869 on the EU Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq) (OJ L 117, 19.4.2022, p. 32–33). <https://www.euam-iraq.eu/uploads/2022/07/05/euam62c429e2e701f.pdf>.

				facilitate planning and implementation support from the EU and its MS, ensuring coherence in their actions related to civilian Security Sector Reform.
EU Advisory Mission in Central African Republic (EUAM RCA)⁵⁵	2019	extended until 9 August 2024	Civilian mission	EUAM RCA supports the development of rule-based governance and management capacities within the Ministry for Interior and Public Security of the Central African Republic, facilitating the sustainable transformation and operational effectiveness of the Internal Security Forces, coordinating efforts, and establishing a comprehensive situational picture through analytical capacity, and promoting EU values, actions, and exposing human rights (HR) violations and abuses in the Central African Republic by foreign forces through strategic communication efforts.
EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)⁵⁶	2014	until October 2024	Civilian mission	EUMAM Ukraine supports the enhancement of the military capabilities of Ukraine's Armed Forces to effectively regenerate and conduct operations by supplying military equipment under the EPF. This objective

⁵⁵ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1333 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 on the EU CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA) ST/9385/2022/INIT (OJ L 201, 1.8.2022, p. 25–26). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022D1333>.

⁵⁶ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 85–91). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D1968>.

				aims to enable Ukraine to safeguard its territorial integrity, exercise sovereignty, and ensure the protection of civilians within its internationally recognized borders.
EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)⁵⁷	2013	extended until 30 June 2023 ⁵⁸	Civilian mission	EUBAM Libya facilitates the short-term augmentation of Libyan authorities' capabilities in bolstering the security of their land, sea, and air borders, while concurrently formulating a comprehensive long-term strategy for Integrated Border Management.
EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah)⁵⁹	2007	extended until 30 June 2023 ⁶⁰	Civilian mission	EUBAM Rafah establishes a Third Party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point to facilitate the opening of the crossing point, enhance confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and fulfill its responsibilities outlined in the Agreements concerning the management of the Rafah Crossing Point without assuming substitution tasks.

⁵⁷ Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013 on the EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) (OJ L 138, 24.5.2013, p. 15–18). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013D0233>.

⁵⁸ Political And Security Committee Decision extending the mandate of the Head of Mission of the EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) (EUBAM Libya/1/2022) (8368, p. 1–4). https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVII/EU/100055/imfname_11149972.pdf

⁵⁹ Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on establishing a EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) (OJ L 327, 14.12.2005, p. 28–32). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32005E0889>.

⁶⁰ Political and Security Committee Decision (CFSP) 2022/1045 of 28 June 2022 extending the mandate of the Head of Mission of the EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) (EU BAM Rafah/1/2022) (OJ L 173, 30.6.2022, p. 75). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022D1045>.

EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) ⁶¹	2012	extended until 31 January 2025	Civilian mission	EUCAP Sahel Mali aims to help the Malian authorities restore constitutional order, lasting peace, and state authority throughout the country. It will assist the internal security forces (ISF) in implementing security reforms, enhancing their effectiveness, hierarchical structure, and oversight by judicial and administrative authorities. The mission also includes facilitating the redeployment of ISF and promoting strategic communication to uphold EU values and expose HR violations.
EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) ⁶²	2012	extended until 30 September 2024 ⁶³	Civilian mission	EUCAP Sahel Niger, in line with the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, aims to assist Nigerien authorities in implementing their own security strategy. It focuses on improving regional coordination, developing integrated approaches, strengthening the rule of law, enhancing security forces' sustainability, and supporting

⁶¹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/96 of 10 January 2023 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) (OJ L 8, 11.1.2023, p.2–3). <https://tbt.sist.org.cn/csml/omfgk3/202301/P020230112363344671351.pdf>; Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on the EU CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) (OJ L 113, 16.4.2014, p. 21–26). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014D0219>.

⁶² Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the EU CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 48–51). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012D0392>.

⁶³ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1505 of 9 September 2022 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the EU CDSP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) (OJ L 235, 12.9.2022, p. 28–29). https://www.stradalex.eu/en/se_src_publ_leg_eur_jo/toc/leg_eur_jo_3_20220912_235/doc/ojeu_2022.235.01.00_28.01.

				project implementation. The mission does not involve executive functions.
EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia)⁶⁴	2016	extended until 31 December 2024 ⁶⁵	Civilian mission	Primarily launched in 2012 as the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR), was renamed EUCAP Somalia in 2016. The objectives of the mission are to enhance maritime security, counter-piracy efforts, and maritime governance in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean States. It supports the organization of maritime security agencies, provides training, assists in developing coastal police capabilities, addresses equipment gaps, strengthens legislation, promotes regional cooperation, and offers strategic advice. The mission does not involve executive functions.
EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR,	2004	November 2023 ⁶⁷	Military Mission	Operation Althea aims to deter conflict, ensure compliance with the peace agreement, and contribute to a safe environment. It operates under the CSDP and

⁶⁴ Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 40–43). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32012D0389>.

⁶⁵ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2445 of 12 December 2022 amending Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) (OJ L 319, 13.12.2022, p. 91-92). [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D2445#:~:text=\(3\)%20On%2010%20December%202020,Somalia%20until%2031%20December%202022](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D2445#:~:text=(3)%20On%2010%20December%202020,Somalia%20until%2031%20December%202022).

⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2658 (2022), S/RES/2658 (2022), 2 November 2022, accessed June 5, 2023, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/671/43/PDF/N2267143.pdf?OpenElement>.

Operation ALTHEA)⁶⁶				utilizes NATO assets and capabilities by agreed terms. The mission follows a Council-approved concept for the deployed forces.
EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)⁶⁸	2008	until 14 June 2023 ⁶⁹	Civilian mission	EULEX Kosovo aims to monitor, mentor, and advise Kosovo institutions on rule of law matters while retaining certain executive responsibilities. It ensures the independence of rule of law services, investigates and prosecutes serious crimes, strengthens cooperation in the judicial process, fights corruption and financial crimes, and upholds HR and gender mainstreaming.
EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA)⁷⁰	2023	until January 2025	Civilian mission	EUMA strives for a decrease in incidents in conflict-affected areas in Armenia, reducing risks for the population and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan. It promotes confidence-building through patrolling, reporting, and gathering information on the security situation, contributing to human security and building trust between populations and

⁶⁶ Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OJ L 252, 28.7.2004, p. 10–14). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004E0570>.

⁶⁸ Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO (OJ L 42, 16.2.2008, p. 92–98). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008E0124>.

⁶⁹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/904 of 3 June 2021 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO) (OJ L 197, 4.6.2021, p. 114). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2021.197.01.0114.01.ENG.

⁷⁰ Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162 of 23 January 2023 on a EU mission in Armenia (EUMA) ST/16342/2022/INIT OJ L 22, 24.1.2023, p. 29–35. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32023D0162>.

				authorities. It integrates humanitarian law, HR, gender equality, and the protection of civilians into its planning and activities.
EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) ⁷¹	2022	until October 2025	Civilian mission	EUMAM Ukraine seeks to enhance the military capabilities of Ukraine's Armed Forces, enabling the defense of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and protection of civilians. It provides individual and collective training, coordination of support activities, and integration of international humanitarian law, HR, and protection agendas.
EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) ⁷²	2008	shall expire on 14 December 2024 ⁷³	Civilian mission	EUMM Georgia targets to provide civilian monitoring, ensure compliance with agreements, and support stability, normalization, and confidence-building in Georgia. Its tasks include monitoring and reporting on the stabilization and normalization processes, promoting confidence-building measures, and informing European policy for a durable political solution in Georgia.

⁷¹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on an EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D1968#:~:text=\(5\)%20On%2010%20October%202022,years%20after%20it%20is%20launched](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D1968#:~:text=(5)%20On%2010%20October%202022,years%20after%20it%20is%20launched).

⁷² Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia OJ L 248, 17.9.2008, p. 26–31. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008E0736>.

⁷³ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2318 of 25 November 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia ST/12484/2022/INIT (OJ L 307, 28.11.2022, p. 133–134). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022D2318>.

EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger)⁷⁴	2022	December 2025	Military Operation	EUMPM Niger supports Niger in its fight against terrorist armed groups while respecting HR and international humanitarian law. This includes capacity building of the Niger Armed Forces, establishment of a training center, development of specialized capacities, and integration of humanitarian principles and gender equality. EUMPM Niger also facilitates assistance from the EPF for training and equipment provision.
EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI)⁷⁵	2020	31 March 2025 ⁷⁶	Military Operation	EUNAVFOR Med Irini was launched with the aim to contribute to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya, monitor and gather information on arms trafficking, monitor illicit petroleum exports from Libya, assist in the development and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and support the detection and monitoring of human smuggling and trafficking networks. Information collected may be shared with relevant partners and agencies, and personal data may

⁷⁴ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2444 of 12 December 2022 on a EU military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) ST/14820/2022/INIT (OJ L 319, 13.12.2022, p. 86–90). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022D2444>.

⁷⁵ Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 of 31 March 2020 on a EU military operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) ST/6414/2020/INIT (OJ L 101, 1.4.2020, p. 4–10). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32020D0472#ntr2-L_2020101EN.01000401-E0002.

⁷⁶ Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/653 of 20 March 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 on the EU military operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) ST/5858/2023/INIT (OJ L 81, 21.3.2023, p. 27–28). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023D0653>.

				be collected and transmitted to law enforcement authorities.
EU Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR Somalia, Operation ATALANTA) ⁷⁷	2008	extended until 31 December 2024 ⁷⁸	Military Operation	EUNAVFOR Somalia provides protection to World Food Programme-chartered vessels, offers case-by-case protection to merchant vessels in its deployment areas, monitors maritime activities off the Somali coast, intervenes and prevents acts of piracy and armed robbery, arrests and transfers suspected pirates, seizes pirate vessels and goods, and collaborates with other organizations and states combating piracy in the region.
EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) ⁷⁹	2006	extended until 30 June 2023 ⁸⁰	Civilian mission	EUPOL COPPS supports the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements in Palestine, aligned with international standards. This includes advising and mentoring the Palestinian Civil Police, coordinating and facilitating assistance, providing advice on criminal justice elements, and implementing projects in

⁷⁷ Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (OJ L 301, 12.11.2008, p. 33–37). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008E0851>.

⁷⁸ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2441 of 12 December 2022 amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (OJ L 319, 13.12.2022, p. 80–82). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D2441>.

⁷⁹ Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (OJ L 300, 17.11.2005, p.65). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/joint_action/2005/797/2009-12-15.

⁸⁰ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1018 of 27 June 2022 amending Decision 2013/354/CFSP on the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) ST/9356/2022/INIT (OJ L 170, 28.6.2022, p. 76–77). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022D1018>.

				coordination with MS and third States.
EU's Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel (EU RACC Sahel) ⁸¹	2019	amended and extended until 31 January 2025 ⁸²	Civilian mission	RACC was established within EUCAP Sahel Mali and enhances cooperation and coordination between G5 Sahel structures and countries, improves regional cooperation and operational capabilities in defense and security, reinforces national capacities, supports the regionalization of CSDP action, facilitates information gathering and sharing among partners in the G5 Sahel.
EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) ⁸³	2013	amended and extended until 18 May 2024	Military Mission	EUTM Mali assists the Malian Armed Forces (MAF) in restoring their military capacity, supports the G5 Sahel Joint Force and national armed forces in the G5 Sahel countries, provides military advice, training, and mentoring, and coordinates with other actors involved in supporting the MAF.
EU Training Mission in Mozambique	2021	July 2023	Military Mission	EUTM Mozambique supports the Mozambican armed forces in responding to the crisis in Cabo Delgado, builds the capacity of selected units for a Quick

⁸¹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/14 of 7 January 2021 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the EU CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) (OJ L 5, 8.1.2021, p. 16–17). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AL%3A2021%3A005%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2021.005.01.0016.01.EN.G.

⁸² Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/96 of 10 January 2023 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the EU CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) ST/12727/2022/INIT (OJ L 8, 11.1.2023, p. 2–3). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023D0096>.

⁸³ Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/434 of 23 March 2020 amending Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a EU military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) ST/6343/2020/INIT (OJ L 89, 24.3.2020, p. 1–3). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020D0434>.

(EUTM Mozambique)⁸⁴				Reaction Force, provides military training and education on HR and international humanitarian law, establishes command and control structures, contributes to situational awareness, and coordinates with other stakeholders for gender and HR policies.
EU Training Mission in Central African Republic (EUTM RCA)⁸⁵	2016	amended and extended until 20 September 2023	Military Mission	EUTM-RCA provides strategic advice to the Central African Republic's Ministry of Defence and FACA General Staff for the creation of capable and democratically controlled security forces that respect HR, international humanitarian law, and gender issues. It also aims to provide education in non-operational domains, support training if conditions are met, and assist in strategic communication efforts to promote EU values and expose violations of HR.
EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia)⁸⁶	2010	amended and extended until 31 December 2024	Military Mission	EUTM Somalia aims to strengthen the Somali Transitional Federal Government by providing military training and support to the Somali security

⁸⁴ Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a EU Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) ST/10013/2021/INIT (OJ L 247, 13.7.2021, p. 93–98). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2021.247.01.0093.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2021%3A247%3ATO_C.

⁸⁵ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1334 of 28 July 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 on a EU CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA). [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D1334#:~:text=\(1\)%20On%2019%20April%202016,RCA%20reach%20full%20operational%20capability](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D1334#:~:text=(1)%20On%2019%20April%202016,RCA%20reach%20full%20operational%20capability).

⁸⁶ Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010 on a EU military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (OJ L 44, 19.2.2010, p. 16–19). [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/96\(1\)/oj](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/96(1)/oj) AND.

				forces. The mission aims to contribute to the development of a comprehensive and sustainable security sector in Somalia through specific training programs and mentorship. It also seeks to coordinate and cooperate with international actors, (UN, African Union, US), while supporting the Somali-owned Training System and facilitating assistance provided by other EU actors and the EPF.
EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova)⁸⁷	April 2023	until April 2025	Civilian Operation	EUPM Moldova seeks to enhance the resilience of the Republic of Moldova's security sector in the areas of crisis management and hybrid threats, including cybersecurity and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). This is achieved through strengthening crisis management structures, providing strategic advice on countering hybrid threats and FIMI, enhancing cybersecurity, and protecting classified information. The mission also integrates international humanitarian law, human rights, gender equality, and the

Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2443 of 12 December 2022 amending Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a EU military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D2443#:~:text=\(1\)%20On%2015%20February%202010,security%20forces%20\(EUTM%20Somalia\).](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D2443#:~:text=(1)%20On%2015%20February%202010,security%20forces%20(EUTM%20Somalia).)

⁸⁷ Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/855 of 24 April 2023 on a EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) ST/7418/2023/INIT (OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 30–36). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32023D0855>.

				protection of civilians in its planning, activities, and reporting.
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Table 3: An overview of the ongoing CSDP Missions.

CSDP Naval Military Missions

Out of the 23 listed CSDP Mission, two are naval military operations, namely EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, and EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta. The subsequent section will undertake an analysis of the composition of each operation to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the extent to which MS contribute to naval operations.

EUNAVFOR MED IRINI

EUNAVFOR MED IRINI was established as the successor to Operation Sophia, which aimed to combat human smuggling and trafficking in the Southern Central Mediterranean. The mission received its name from an incident on the German frigate Schleswig-Holstein, where a Somali woman rescued at sea gave birth to a baby girl. The frigate was named after Princess Sophia of Schleswig-Holstein, thus inspiring the mission's name.⁸⁸

Operation Sophia was an EU military initiative that involved a series of coordinated phases to disrupt the activities of smugglers and traffickers. These phases encompassed gathering intelligence, conducting patrols, boarding and seizing vessels, and implementing appropriate measures against them. Whenever necessary, relevant law enforcement authorities were provided with collected personal data during the operation.⁸⁹

After the conclusion of Operation Sophia, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI took on the responsibility of continuing efforts to maintain security and stability in the region, albeit with a modified focus and approach. Operation IRINI was launched in March 2020, with 23 contributing MS. The Chain of Command is made up of Operation Commander Stefano Turchetto (Italian Navy), Deputy Operation commander Jean J. de Muizon (French Navy), Chief of Staff Konstantinos Bakalakos (Greek Navy), and Force Commander Valentino Rinaldi (Italian Navy).⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Operation Sophia. "About Us." Accessed June 5, 2023. <https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/>.

⁸⁹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) (OJ L 122, 19.5.2015, p. 31–35). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015D0778>.

⁹⁰ EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI. "About Us." Accessed June 5, 2023. <https://www.operationirini.eu/about-us/>.

Type of asset	Name and further identification of asset	Contributing state
surface vessel	HS Nikiforos Fokas; 10 th and last 'S' class frigate	Greece
surface vessel	ITS LIBECCIO; anti-submarine missile launcher frigate of the "Maestrale" class	Italy
surface vessel	FGS Bonn; multi-functional ship	Germany
Surface vessel	ROG Regele Ferdinand; ship with a combat system	Romania
Air asset	FALCON 50	France
Air asset	Erieye EMB-145H AEW&C	Greece
Air asset	An-28B1R BRYZA	Poland
Air asset, fighter plane	P-3C Orion	Germany
Air asset	MQ-9A Predator B	Italy

Table 4: Deployed assets of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI.⁹¹

Six EU MS have deployed vessels to EUNAVFOR MED IRINI (Table 4). The participation of Greece, Italy, Germany, Romania, France, and Poland in the EUNAVFOR MED IRINI mission can be understood by analyzing their foreign policy objectives and geostrategic ambitions in the region. Each country's interests contribute to its decision to contribute assets and personnel to the mission. Taking into account the respective contributions made by the participating states, I present the following potential scenarios outlining the involvement of these states.

Greece has a vested interest in the region due to its proximity to the Southern Central Mediterranean. It seeks to address the challenges of human smuggling and trafficking networks that operate in the area. Greece's involvement in the mission aligns with its foreign policy

⁹¹ EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI. "Assets." Accessed June 5, 2023. https://www.operationirini.eu/media_category/assets/?deployment=deployed&tax=media_category&categories=&nation=&search_archive=filter.

objectives within the EU of providing resources to secure EU borders and bring the topics of migration and maritime transport to the forefront.⁹²

Italy, being geographically close to the Mediterranean, also has significant interests in the region. It has been a major entry point for migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean and thus aims to combat human smuggling and trafficking networks. Italy's participation in the mission reflects its commitment to addressing migration challenges and promoting development aid mechanisms for North Africa.⁹³

Germany, as a prominent EU MS, has an interest in supporting EU-led initiatives for security and stability. Its participation in the operation demonstrates its commitment to combating illegal migration and addressing the root causes of instability in the Southern Central Mediterranean. Additionally, Germany's involvement aligns with its aim to contribute to the discourse on forced displacement and migration by advocating for fair distribution of responsibility between countries of origin, transit, and destination. This entails broader foreign policy objectives of international security and multilateral cooperation.⁹⁴

Romania, although not geographically adjacent to the Mediterranean, recognizes the impact of instability and illicit activities in the region on European security. Its participation in the mission indicates its commitment to EU security efforts and willingness to contribute to stability in the Mediterranean. Romania seeks to enhance its foreign policy by adapting to emerging challenges and maintaining a strong presence within the EU, and NATO, and as a dependable strategic partner for the US. The country is deeply committed to multilateralism and aims to promote freedom, democracy, and adherence to international law, which serve as the fundamental pillars for national security and prosperity. Romania's active foreign policy endeavors to advance national objectives and interests, fostering respect and a firm alignment with Western democratic values to directly benefit its citizens and ensure their security and well-being.⁹⁵

⁹² "Greece's Course in the EU - Greece in the EU," accessed June 6, 2023, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/greece-in-the-eu/greeces-course-in-the-eu.html>.

⁹³ Nathalie Tocci, "Italian Foreign Policy: A Message in the Bottle to the Next Italian Government," Italian Foreign Policy, 2018.

⁹⁴ "Federal Government of Germany Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace," September 2017, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/1214246/057f794cd3593763ea556897972574fd/preventing-crises-data.pdf>.

⁹⁵ "Foreign Policy," President of Romania, accessed June 6, 2023, <https://www.presidency.ro/en/commitments/foreign-policy>.

France has historically had significant interests in the Mediterranean region, given its colonial past and geopolitical influence. It seeks to address security challenges, especially counterterrorism, illegal migration, and combat the activities of smuggling and trafficking networks. France's participation in the mission reflects its ambition to strengthen European defense and to enhance CSDP to create common doctrines and capabilities for joining EU interventions.⁹⁶

Poland's participation in the mission highlights its commitment to EU security and defense initiatives. Although not a Mediterranean country, Poland recognizes "the growing threats and unpredictability in the EU's southern neighborhood," which creates a challenge to security with terrorism and uncontrolled migration flows. Their foreign policy strategy recognizes that traditional divisions of the internal and external dimensions of security have started to lose their distinctiveness.⁹⁷

EUNAVFOR Somalia - Operation Atalanta

The subsequent section will examine the activities and operations of EUNAVFOR Somalia - Operation Atalanta, relying exclusively on information obtained from the official website of the mission. Firstly, Operation Atalanta receives contributions through various means, including the deployment of navy vessels such as surface combat vessels and auxiliary ships, which may also carry embarked helicopters. In addition, Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems are utilized. Operation Atalanta following its new mandate, encompasses the Gulf of Aden and its neighboring countries, which extend to include the port and city of Muscat in Oman, the Somali Basin, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, and the Gulf of Aqaba (Picture 4).⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Republic of France, "Strategic Review of Defense and National Security: 2017 Key Points" n.d., https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/strategic_review_of_defense_and_national_security_2017_-_key_points_cle0d61fa.pdf.

⁹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, "Polish Foreign Policy Strategy: 2017-2021," n.d., <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/869184c0-bd6f-4a20-b8af-a5c8190350a1>.

⁹⁸ EUNAVFOR, "Mission," accessed June 7, 2023, <https://eunavfor.eu/mission>.



Picture 4: EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Area of Operations.⁹⁹

Contributing states bear the financial responsibility for providing military assets and personnel, covering associated running and personnel costs. Additionally, a common budget, overseen by EPF, is allocated annually to cover supplementary expenses related to the operation, amounting to €5.1 million for the common costs in 2023.

It is difficult to find information on the composition of the operation due to regular fluctuations attributable to the frequent rotation of units which is influenced by the varying monsoon seasons in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, its typical configuration consists of around 600 personnel, accompanied by 1-3 Surface Combat Vessels, and 1-2 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts. As of the latest available information, two states have deployed assets to the operation (Table 5).¹⁰⁰

Type of asset	Name and further identification of asset	Contributing state
Surface vessel	ESPS Reina Sofia F-84; Flagship	Spain
MPRA	CASA/IPTN CN-235 Vigma; maritime patrol and tactical transport turboprop aircraft	Spain
UAS	UAS – ScanEagle; remotely piloted air system with a two-stroke engine and a propeller	Spain

⁹⁹ EUNAVFOR, “Mission,” accessed June 7, 2023, <https://eunavfor.eu/mission>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

Rotary Aircrafts	Wings	Agusta Bell 212; multi-purpose helicopter	Spain
AVPD		MV ZEHRAH1; ship	Lithuania

Table 5: Deployed Assets to Operation Atalanta.¹⁰¹

Previously, there had been a German and British presence in operation Atalanta. The former withdrew its P-3C Orion maritime patrol craft due to assessing a justifiable decline in piracy incidents in Somalia and its surrounding water since 2013.¹⁰² The latter suspended its contributions due to membership withdrawal from the EU. The British naval forces leaving, made room for Spain to assert itself as a key player in the operation, and in the region. Media outlets published numerous articles on Spain seeking a bigger military role in post-Brexit Europe.¹⁰³

Spain's foreign policy strategy outlines that "Spain's security and stability are affected by security and stability in the Mediterranean and, more specifically, in the Maghreb." Within its framework, Spain promotes maritime security and stability, combating piracy, and ensuring the safety of commercial shipping routes. Spain's geographic proximity to the region, particularly the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin, further emphasizes its strategic interest in ensuring the safety of maritime activities in the area.¹⁰⁴

One of the primary objectives of Lithuanian foreign policy is to proactively reduce the illegal number of migrants entering the country, especially due to their experience with Minsk's orchestrated influx of migrants which they recognize as an act of hybrid aggression rather than a continuation of the 2015 refugee crisis. Due to this foreign policy objective, Lithuania with its participation contributes to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the operation and strengthens the EU's role in maritime security. Contributing to Operation Atalanta allows Lithuania to enhance its defense capabilities and gain valuable experience in international military

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² PVI, "Germany Leaves Operation ATALANTA as Piracy Threat in the Horn of Africa Declines," March 29, 2021, <https://www.pvild.com/germany-leaves-operation-atalanta-as-piracy-threat-in-the-horn-of-africa-declines/>.

¹⁰³ "Spain to Take over UK-Led EU Mission after Brexit: Diplomats," Reuters, June 22, 2018, sec. World News, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-Defense-idUSKBN1J11DA>; Julian E. Barnes, "Spain Puts On a Show to Win Post-Brexit Military Role," Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/spain-puts-on-a-show-to-win-post-brexit-military-role-1524512363>.

¹⁰⁴ Gobierno de Espana, "2021-2024 Foreign Action Strategy," n.d., https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/resumenes/Documents/2021/270421-foreign_action_strategy_2021-2024.pdf.

operations. Participation in multinational missions provides an opportunity for Lithuanian military personnel to train and operate alongside forces from other countries, fostering interoperability and improving their professional skills.¹⁰⁵

EU NAVFOR's participation extends beyond EU MS. Non-EU countries, including Norway, which was the first non-MS to contribute to the mission with their contribution of a warship in 2009. Alongside, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine, have contributed staff officers to the Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters to the Operation, with Ukraine also contributing a warship in 2014. Furthermore, the area also witnesses the presence of international military maritime forces from countries like China, India, Japan, Korea, and Russia, as well as the Combined Maritime Forces, each with distinct mandates and mission objectives focused on maritime security.¹⁰⁶

In conclusion, an examination of two naval military operations, namely EUNAVFOR MED IRINI and EUNAVFOR Somalia - Operation Atalanta, reveals the predominance of a state-centered approach within the EU's naval missions. This approach entails that information regarding each vessel and officer is contingent upon the MS from which they are deployed. Consequently, a unified EU approach is absent, common EU vessels, or EU military personnel, as all deployments originate from specific MS. The detailed tracking of contributions in terms of personnel and infrastructure implies that these military operations focus solely on the contributing states and lack a distinct EU identity. The existing structure suggests that a MS is responsible for deploying its personnel or vessels to EU missions. However, the question remains as to when this framework will evolve to encompass a military mission consisting of EU personnel and vessels in which MS identity will not be crucial.

Moreover, the absence of participation of all EU MS in every mission prevents the establishment of a collective EU identity. Each military operation only involves a limited number of MS. Additionally, non-EU countries such as Norway, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine, as well as international military maritime forces from China, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the Combined Maritime Forces, also contribute to enhancing maritime security. However, this further delays the formation of a cohesive EU military identity.

¹⁰⁵ Dizaino Kryptis, "A Year of Unprecedented Challenges," accessed June 6, 2023, <https://jp.mfa.lt/default/en/news/geopolitical-future-and-lithuanias-foreign-policy>.

¹⁰⁶ EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, "Mission," accessed June 6, 2023, <https://eunavfor.eu/mission>.

EU's Security and Defense Bodies

European Defense Agency

Article 43 TEU defines the EDA, which serves to identify military capability objectives and evaluate compliance with commitments made by MS, promote harmonization of operational needs and procurement methods, propose multilateral projects, support defense technology research, and strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defense sector. Membership is open to all EU MS, and a qualified majority decision by the Council defines the Agency's statute, seat, and operational rules, taking into account effective participation. The Agency collaborates with the Commission as needed to carry out its tasks.

Post-2016 initiatives

In 2016, the EU introduced various security and defense initiatives such as PESCO, Military Planning and Conduct Capability, Military Mobility, and the European Defense Fund (EDF). While these initiatives are mostly intergovernmental, the EDF and Military Mobility project have transformed the role of the European Commission in European security and defense cooperation. The creation of a new Directorate-General for Defense Industry and Space was established to implement the EDF and Action Plan on Military Mobility. Håkansson concludes that some MS were reluctant to give up power to the Commission, while others saw new Commission and EU competences as a threat to their bilateral relations with the US and the United Kingdom (UK) and a possible threat to NATO.¹⁰⁷

Deneckere analyzed the increasing ambition of European external policy, particularly in military cooperation, which had been evident by institutional reforms and innovations. This significant development, based on the 2019 discussion paper, stemmed from several contributing factors, such as heightened conflicts in neighboring regions, increased irregular migration to Europe, a more assertive Russia, doubts about the transatlantic partnership and multilateral norms during the Trump presidency, and the UK's planned exit from the EU. Consequently, the EU was pursuing greater strategic autonomy and exploring new initiatives

¹⁰⁷ Calle Håkansson, "The European Commission's New Role in EU Security and Defense Cooperation: The Case of the European Defense Fund," *European Security* 30, no. 4 (October 2, 2021): 589–608, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.1906229>.

to establish a global role beyond its traditional emphasis on civilian ‘soft power’ before fully agreeing on mechanisms such as the EPF.¹⁰⁸

Permanent Structured Cooperation

The cooperation among EU MS on defense, exemplified by joint training, acquisition, and development of military equipment, has evolved into PESCO. PESCO aims to deepen defense collaboration by transitioning from isolated projects to planned activities, focusing on delivering necessary capabilities for demanding missions and enhancing the security of EU citizens. PESCO projects undergo a thorough assessment by the PESCO secretariat to ensure support for capability development and operational effectiveness. PESCO is complemented by the EDF and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense initiatives, which contribute to a coherent European capability landscape aligned with EU Capability Development Priorities.¹⁰⁹

PESCO was established with a Council Decision in 2017.¹¹⁰ As per Article 2 of the Council Decision, all current EU MS, but Austria are a part of PESCO. The Annex titled, “List of ambitious and more binding common commitments undertaken by participating MS in the five areas set out by Article 2 of Protocol 10,” highlights that participating MS have made ambitious commitments in various areas of defense cooperation. These commitments include increasing defense budgets, investing in joint defense projects, enhancing interoperability, improving the availability and deployability of forces, contributing to EU battlegroups, supporting common funding for military operations, addressing capability shortcomings, and participating in major joint equipment programs. The aim is to strengthen European capabilities, promote strategic autonomy, and foster competitiveness in the European defense industry. These commitments are part of the broader efforts to achieve a more cohesive European defense landscape.

European Defense Fund

In June 2017, the European Commission proposed the establishment of the EDF, an EU funding initiative aimed at supporting defense research, development, and acquisition of capabilities. The primary objectives of the EDF are to foster cooperation among MS, enhance efficiency in defense spending, stimulate innovation, and strengthen the competitiveness of

¹⁰⁸ Matthias Deneckere, "The Uncharted Path towards a EPF." *Discussion Paper* No. 248, March 2019. Accessed June 5, 2023. <https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/the-uncharted-path-towards-a-european-peace-facility.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ PESCO, “About,” accessed June 5, 2023, <https://www.pesco.europa.eu/about/>.

¹¹⁰ Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing PESCO and determining the list of participating MS (OJ L 331/57), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D2315&from=EN>.

European defense industries, with a specific focus on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises. To initiate this effort, two programs were launched as pilot initiatives: the Preparatory Action on Defense Research and the EU Defense Industrial Development Program, which were operational from 2017 to 2020 and had budgets of €90 million and €500 million, respectively.¹¹¹

Under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, a substantial amount of €8 billion has been allocated to the EDF. Of this allocation, €2.7 billion has been earmarked to support collaborative defense research, while an additional €5.3 billion has been designated for collaborative capability development projects that complement the individual contributions of MS.¹¹²

Scholars perceive the EDF as a transformative initiative. Ianakiev emphasizes the significance of the EDF in the European defense industry, as it introduces dedicated funding for collaborative defense projects and incentivizes increased efficiency and cooperation. Consequently, this has the potential to bring about a significant shift in the industry and market dynamics. However, the realization of the EDF's goals relies on effective implementation, active participation from the defense industry and MS, and overcoming potential barriers to collaboration beyond financial incentives.¹¹³

Strategic Compass

The Strategic Compass represents an ambitious plan to enhance the EU's security and defense agenda. It aims to provide a shared understanding of the strategic environment, increase coherence in security and defense actions, improve collective defense capabilities, and establish measurable targets. The plan encompasses actions that include reinforcing missions and operations, developing rapid deployment capacity, strengthening command and control structures, enhancing intelligence capacities, creating a toolbox to address hybrid threats, investing in capabilities and innovative technologies, and fostering partnerships with NATO, the UN, and other regional partners.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Sabatino, "EDF," 140.

¹¹² European Commission, "EDF," accessed June 8, 2023, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en.

¹¹³ Gueorgui Ianakiev, "A Game Changer for European Defence Industrial Collaboration," Armament Industry European Research Group, 2019, 1–24. <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ARES-48.pdf>.

¹¹⁴ EEAS. "Strategic Compass: EU's Framework for Security and Defense." Accessed June 5, 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf.

The EU's focus on crisis response involves reinforcing civilian and military missions, granting flexible mandates and decision-making processes, promoting cooperation with ad hoc missions, and establishing a rapid deployment capacity. To anticipate threats and ensure security, the EU plans to enhance intelligence capacities, address hybrid threats, improve cyber defense, and strengthen security in strategic domains. In terms of investment, the EU aims to increase defense investment, improve capability development, seek common solutions, utilize PESCO and EDF, and establish a Defense Innovation Hub.¹¹⁵

By cooperating with like-minded partners in addressing common threats and challenges, the EU plans to strengthen cooperation by reinforcing strategic partnerships with organizations such as NATO and the UN, increasing cooperation with regional partners, establishing tailored partnerships in specific regions, and developing an EU Security and Defense Partnership Forum to enhance collaboration with partners and effectively tackle shared challenges. The Strategic Compass acknowledges the need for a stronger and more capable EU in the face of evolving geopolitical challenges and advocates for a joint commitment to action.¹¹⁶

European Peace Facility

Before the establishment of the EPF, the EU relied on two funding mechanisms, namely the Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility (APF), for military and defense activities. These mechanisms were operated outside the EU budget due to the prevailing belief that the EU treaties prohibited the allocation of funds from the budget for military or defense purposes. The Athena mechanism facilitated cost-sharing among MS for military operations under the CSDP, while the APF provided financial support for peace and security initiatives in Africa.¹¹⁷

In March 2021, the Council of the EU created the EPF as an off-budget instrument dedicated to preserving peace, preventing conflicts, and strengthening international security. The EPF replaced and incorporated the Athena mechanism and APF. It covers the financing of common costs for EU military operations and assistance measures aimed at enhancing the military capacities of third states and regional/international organizations. The EPF has a financial ceiling of €5,692,000,000 for the period 2021-2027. Based on the Council Decision, the EPF's priorities and strategic orientation are determined by the European Council and the Council, while the Political and Security Committee provides strategic guidance. The EPF emphasizes

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Matthias Deneckere. "The Uncharted Path towards a European Peace Facility", 1 -2.

consistency with other EU external actions, and a risk and safeguards methodology is established for assistance measures.¹¹⁸ Currently, the EPF funds nine EU military operations, such as EUFOR ALTHEA and Operation ATALANTA, across different regions.¹¹⁹

EU's Maritime Security Strategy

Riddervold's analysis outlines three phases in the development of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). The first phase involved initiating discussions on maritime security, driven by military interests and changing geopolitical factors. However, resistance from MS led to a compromise text proposing a Security Strategy for the global maritime domain. In the second phase, despite initial opposition, the Commission and the EEAS played a crucial role in advancing the policy, leading to the adoption of the EUMSS in 2014. This phase involved a complex interplay between military, supranational, and civilian-military elements, reducing MS control. The final phase was prompted by emerging threats in the EU's neighborhood, with Greece, Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal strongly supporting the EUMSS. However, debates arose regarding references to NATO, the development of common capabilities, key definitions, and the potential for supranational regulation in the domain.¹²⁰

EUMSS was adopted by the General Affairs Council on 24 June 2014 to ensure effective ocean governance, protect oceans and seabeds, and unlock the potential of a sustainable blue economy. The EU has the largest combined exclusive economic zone in the world and depends heavily on safe and secure oceans for its economy. The EU plays an increasingly important role in global maritime security by conducting its naval operations and implementing the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept. The updated EUMSS aims to respond to new challenges, promote international peace and security, adhere to the principle of sustainability, and protect biodiversity. The EU faces evolving and growing threats to maritime security, including territorial and maritime disputes, competition for natural resources, and threats to freedom of navigation and innocent passage.¹²¹

An updated version of EUMSS was published in March 2023, called "An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats." The document is an answer to the

¹¹⁸ Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing EPF, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528, ST/5212/2021/INIT (OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14–62), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D0509>.

¹¹⁹ "EPF," May 10, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/>.

¹²⁰ Riddervold, "EU Maritime Foreign and Security Policy Integration," 151-159.

¹²¹ European Commission, "Maritime Security: EU Updates Strategy," accessed June 6, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1483.

changed landscape since 2014 and emphasizes that the EU has assumed an increasingly significant role as a global provider of maritime security. It does so by conducting its own naval operations, such as Atalanta and Irini, implementing the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept, and fostering maritime situational awareness through collaboration with numerous external partners. Furthermore, the European Maritime Safety Agency and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) have implemented operational systems for maritime and border surveillance, namely Copernicus, which utilizes space-based observations in conjunction with the navigation services provided by Galileo satellites.¹²²

The EU's maritime security interests encompass various objectives to address evolving threats. These interests include safeguarding the EU, its MS, and citizens, maintaining global peace, upholding international law (such as UNCLOS) and sound ocean governance, protecting the marine environment and natural resources, ensuring critical maritime infrastructure resilience, combating illegal activities, securing economic activities at sea, and addressing migration and unauthorized drilling. The EU's response involves increased action at sea, cooperation with partners, leadership in maritime domain awareness, risk management, capability enhancement, and education and training. Key actions include naval exercises, reinforcing operations, combating illicit activities, and promoting coast guard cooperation.¹²³

The EU also engages in international cooperation through regional architectures, bilateral dialogues, and support measures for maritime security. It emphasizes cooperation with NATO, partners in strategically important areas, and international fora to enhance maritime security globally.¹²⁴

¹²² Joint Communication To The European Parliament And The Council on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan "An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats," JOIN(2023) 8 final, https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/join-2023-8_en.pdf.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

Case Study: The United States of America

The case study on the US provides background information on its defense structure, highlighting the key elements of its military capabilities and defense competences. It explores the US' strategic approach to maritime security, including its naval presence and maritime security strategies.

US Federalism

The framers of the US Constitution created a federal arrangement in which the national government and states share power. This arrangement was intended to create a strong central government while still avoiding the tyranny of the majority. The constitution was designed with a 'compound system' that combined elements of both federal and national forms of government and created a system that allowed the people to assign their power to whichever level they believed was best for promoting the common good.¹²⁵

The US Constitution establishes a distribution of political power between the federal government and the states, utilizing checks and balances to prevent dominance by any one group. The balance between centralization and decentralization in national security policymaking has an impact on individual liberty. The level of centralization within the government remains an ongoing question. The Constitution's core principle of power distribution has been fundamental to American governance, ensuring no entity dominates the political landscape. Achieving the right balance between centralization and decentralization in national security policymaking is a constant challenge for decision-makers, with implications for individual freedom. This balance has evolved over time, influenced by various factors and dynamics in defense and other policy areas. The Constitution serves as a guide, reminding the US of the importance of maintaining an equilibrium that upholds both the common good and the rights of citizens.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Ralph. A. Rossum, "Constitutional Structure, Federalism, and the Securing of Liberty," in *Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment: The Irony of Constitutional Democracy*, 2001:78-82, <https://search-ebscohost-com.uaccess.univie.ac.at/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=632175&site=ehost-live>.

¹²⁶ Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz, and Caitlin Talmadge, "President and the National Security Council," in *US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy*, Fourth edition (London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2021), 216–32.

US Security and Defense

Considering the US Constitution, “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.”¹²⁷ The president’s formal authority over the use of force in international affairs brings both credit and blame. Consequently, presidents tend to centralize national security decision-making to retain control and avoid blame. The Department of Defense’s centralized hierarchies have yielded influence on the president’s White House staff, potentially leading to clashes between political advisors and defense policy experts. Despite a growing White House staff, presidents must adapt to crises and unforeseen opportunities, as campaigns focus more on general attributes than detailed strategy and plans.¹²⁸

The National Security Act

The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 established key institutions within the executive branch, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Chiefs of Staff, and National Security Council (NSC), to enable presidents to safeguard expanding US interests. With the emergence of the US as a global superpower post-World War II and the ensuing Cold War with the Soviet Union, the imperative for centralized information gathering, analysis, and cohesive military decision-making became apparent. This legislation aimed to provide presidents with the requisite intelligence and military capabilities to effectively shape national security policy.¹²⁹

Jablonsky et al. provided a comprehensive summary of lectures commemorating the 50th anniversary of the NSA, focusing on the evolving concept of US national security in the post-Cold War era. The authors highlight the need for a deeper understanding of national security, considering technological advancements, global interdependence, and the emergence of transnational actors. New threats, such as long-range ballistic missiles and cyber warfare, challenge the physical security of the nation. Additionally, economic prosperity and the promotion of values are integral to national security. Selective engagement, recognizing the significance of great power relations and cooperative security coalitions, is necessary. However, determining the extent of global engagement, the means employed, and the level of

¹²⁷ National Archives. “The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription,” Article 2, Section 3, November 4, 2015. <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript>.

¹²⁸ Sapolsky, Gholz, and Talmadge, “President and the National Security Council”: 216-217.

¹²⁹ Meena Bose, “What Have We Learned about How Presidents Organize for National Security Decision Making, 1947-2017?,” in *US National Security Reform: Reassessing the NSA of 1947*, ed. Heidi Brockmann Demarest and Erica D. Borghard, First edition, Routledge Global Security Studies (London ; New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 92.

autonomy poses challenges. The domestic dimension of national security, encompassing economic competitiveness and social problems, should also be addressed. Adaptability and a comprehensive grand strategy are vital to sustain public support and effectively address emerging threats in the changing political landscape.¹³⁰

Over seven decades since its enactment, the legislation of 1947 has profoundly influenced the process of making national security decisions, yielding substantial and occasionally unforeseen consequences. On the other hand, scholars see the Act as “well past normal retirement age but like many other baby boomers are still working full-time.”¹³¹

Betts argues that despite the 1947 Act’s intention to consolidate functions within the US government, limited consolidation was achieved, resulting in persistent duplication and overlaps. The effectiveness of the system is contingent upon external factors such as power dynamics, information availability, and individual judgments. While the Act’s reforms enhanced national security policy during the Cold War, subsequent expansions were made without significant structural adjustments. The failures in Vietnam and Iraq cannot be solely attributed to the institutional framework established by the Act; the decision-making and judgment of individual policymakers also played substantial roles. Betts suggests evolutionary changes to the current national security policy system, advocating for sensible proposals that consider tradeoffs between efficiency, centralization, and checks and balances. He warns against striving for a perfect system and emphasizes the necessity for continuous adaptation and flexibility.¹³²

The National Security Council

In its initial form, the NSC comprised a limited number of designated individuals, such as the secretary of state and secretary of defense, was under the leadership of the president, and lacked an autonomous support staff.¹³³ Throughout the Eisenhower Administration NSC emerged as an executive branch mechanism of the federal government.¹³⁴ Under Eisenhower’s leadership, the NSC was restructured, and important subordinate bodies, including the NSC Planning

¹³⁰ David Jablonsky et al., “US National Security: Beyond the Cold War,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 26, 1997, 1–92.

¹³¹ Richard K. Betts, “The Durable National Security Act,” in *US National Security Reform: Reassessing the NSA of 1947*, ed. Heidi Brockmann Demarest and Erica D. Borghard, First edition, Routledge Global Security Studies (London ; New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2019):8.

¹³² Betts, “The Durable NSA,” 15-19.

¹³³ *ibid*

¹³⁴ Robert Cutler, “The Development of the National Security Council,” *Foreign Affairs* 34, no. 3 (1956): 441, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20031176>.

Board and the Operations Coordinating Board, were created to facilitate the effective implementation of national security policy.¹³⁵

Beginning with the John F. Kennedy administration, the individual in this position assumed both managerial responsibilities and a role in advocating policies, leading to their designation as the national security advisor. Presently, the national security advisor serves as the chief presidential aide for policy matters, overseeing a sizable NSC staff, and is accountable for conducting NSC and ‘Principals’ meetings, excluding the president. Depending on the president, either the national security advisor or the secretary of state takes on the primary role of spokesperson in foreign policy, potentially causing tensions between the State Department, NSC, and the White House.¹³⁶ In the executive branch, the President unmistakably wields ultimate decision-making power. Nevertheless, over time, the NSC personnel have evolved into a significant determinant in shaping and occasionally executing national security policy. Similarly, the National Security Adviser, as the leader of the NSC staff, has assumed significant and occasionally conspicuous roles in the policy formation process.¹³⁷

However, critics of the NSC alleged that its procedures had become overly bureaucratic, and some scholars have suggested that many key decisions were made in the Oval Office with only a few advisers present.¹³⁸ The NSC is a vital decision-making forum for the President, comprising senior national security advisors and cabinet officials, and serves as the primary coordinating body for national security policies across federal agencies. In recognition of contemporary challenges that require a comprehensive understanding of national security, the Biden-Harris NSC has expanded its purview to include domestic and foreign policy and address issues such as economic, health, and environmental security. The NSC is led by the President and attended by the Vice President, senior cabinet officials, military, and intelligence advisors, with other officials invited as necessary to tackle critical cross-cutting national security issues.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Richard A Best Jr, “National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment,” *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 8, 2009), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA501333.pdf>.

¹³⁶ Bose, “What Have We Learned about How Presidents Organize for National Security Decision Making, 1947-2017?,” 92.

¹³⁷ Richard A Best Jr, “The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment,” *Congressional Research Service*, December 28, 2011, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL30840.pdf>.

¹³⁸ Best Jr, “National Security Council,” 10.

¹³⁹ White House, “National Security Council,” The White House, accessed May 7, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/>.

US National Security Objectives

Sarkesian et al. define US national security as “the ability of national institutions to prevent adversaries from using force to harm Americans or their national interests and the confidence of Americans in this capability.”¹⁴⁰ Beyond the ability to engage in international warfare, national security encompasses a broader scope in the context of the contemporary international landscape, where unconventional challenges such as international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological warfare, and information warfare have gained increasing significance alongside the continued importance of deterring nuclear war and conducting conventional conflicts in the pursuit of US national security objectives.¹⁴¹

In the analysis of national security, it is crucial to consider foreign policy, which refers to a nation’s official relations with other countries and encompasses a range of policies aimed at promoting favorable conditions for US national interests and mitigating those that are detrimental, primarily through diplomatic, political, psychological, and economic means.¹⁴² US foreign policy is characterized by extensive commitments in Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East. These commitments are interconnected and pose challenges due to limited military resources. The interdependence of commitments affects the ability to project force, increases the costs of protection, and risks overstretching. Treating different adversaries with similar operational concepts can have both efficiency and effectiveness implications. Prioritizing denial strategies against major powers may undermine denial against minor powers. Force planning patterns shape resource allocation and responses to structural pressures.¹⁴³

Since World War II, international relations have exhibited consistent patterns despite claims of radical change with the Soviet-American relationship playing a central role and driving the foreign and defense policies of both superpowers. Attempts by recent American administrations to break from the past have been met with challenges, with events casting doubt on the primacy of the Soviet-American relationship. The Carter administration’s belief in the obsolescence of the relationship was undermined by the resurgence of the Soviet-American

¹⁴⁰ Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, “National Interests and National Security,” in *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*, 5th ed (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013):2.

¹⁴¹ Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, “National Interests and National Security”:4.

¹⁴² Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, “National Interests and National Security”:2.

¹⁴³ Evan Braden Montgomery, “Primacy and Punishment: US Grand Strategy, Maritime Power, and Military Options to Manage Decline,” *Security Studies* 29, no. 4 (August 7, 2020): 769–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1811463>.

rivalry, while the Reagan administration's attempts at a new approach ultimately led to an accommodation with established forces.¹⁴⁴

During the Cold War, the US had a clear grand strategy based on containment and deterrence.¹⁴⁵ The strategy prevented Soviet expansion, aimed to avoid a nuclear war, and promoted economic prosperity in the West. The collapse of state socialism marked the triumph of capitalism after the Cold War, with liberal capitalism being promoted as the ideal model for global success.¹⁴⁶ However, the vision of widespread adoption of liberal capitalism and democracy faced challenges as some states pursued their own paths, including combining capitalism with authoritarianism, and the credibility of the Western capitalist model declined due to the 2008 financial crisis, leading to reduced support for military interventions and economic assistance.¹⁴⁷

Sapolsky et al. believe that in the post-Cold War era, American leaders struggled to find a new grand strategy due to the lack of a clear enemy like the Soviet Union, and efforts to create an organizing principle around small threats such as 'rogue states' and terrorism were unsuccessful.¹⁴⁸ After the turn of the 21st century, Eland forecasted that the primary threats to US national security would include the potential for a nuclear attack from Russia or China, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states. While the risk of a large-scale invasion is low due to geographic barriers, both Russia and China possess significant nuclear arsenals that could pose a threat. Russia's nuclear arsenal remains comparable to the US, and there are concerns about the stability of its command-and-control system. China's nuclear capabilities are more limited but still pose a minimal deterrent. Proliferation to rogue states, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea, is also a significant concern. Efforts to prevent proliferation have been only partially successful, and these states continue to pursue nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technologies.

¹⁴⁴ John J. Weltman, "The Setting for American National Security in the 1990s," in *Challenges to American National Security in the 1990s*, ed. John J. Weltman, Michael Nacht, and George H. Quester (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1991), 1–4.

¹⁴⁵ Sapolsky, Gholz, and Talmadge, "President and the National Security Council", 15–18.

¹⁴⁶ Lawrence Freedman, "The Counterrevolution in Strategic Affairs," in *The Modern American Military*, ed. David M. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 16, [DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199895946.001.0001](https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199895946.001.0001).

¹⁴⁷ Freedman, "The Counterrevolution in Strategic Affairs", 16–17

¹⁴⁸ Sapolsky, Gholz, and Talmadge, "President and the National Security Council," 15–18.

Managing proliferation and mediating regional disputes are important strategies to mitigate these threats.¹⁴⁹

An event that changed US National Security drastically was the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 (also 9/11). The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in Manhattan rapidly and significantly altered the global landscape, disrupting the established post-Cold War equilibrium and forever preventing its restoration. On the day of the attacks, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were already being identified as the likely perpetrators, and President Bush, in his address to the nation, indicated his knowledge of the upcoming events and set the stage for future actions, emphasizing the intention to bring the responsible parties to justice without distinguishing between the terrorists and their supporters. The urgency of the crisis resulted in swift government decision-making, with Secretary of State Colin Powell securing over-flight permission and a declaration of war against Afghanistan becoming imminent, while options for military intervention were exclusively considered during a significant meeting at Camp David, where Vice President Dick Cheney acknowledged the simplicity of the choice between the United States and the ‘bad guys.’¹⁵⁰

In 2007, Lebovic believed that the lessons from the Cold War remain relevant as many aspects of the world have not significantly changed since the end of the Soviet threat. The US in the mid-2000s possessed greater capabilities to impose costly consequences on offending states, both conventionally and through nonconventional means, while also limiting risks to itself and its allies. The reduced costs of intervention have strengthened deterrence by enhancing the credibility of US threats to respond to attacks, even if adversaries may doubt the certainty of US action. Ironically, the interest in deterrence and deterrence theory has decreased as strategic challenges to mainstream US policy have diminished in the post-Cold War era.¹⁵¹

Looking at the current state of affairs, there are five primary goals as per the Joint Strategic plan framework 2022-2026, firstly, to reestablish US leadership and build alliances to address global challenges that significantly impact the security and well-being of Americans. Next, to

¹⁴⁹ Ivan Eland, “Threats to U.S. Vital Interests,” in *Putting ‘Defense’ Back into US Defense Policy: Rethinking U.S. Security in the Post-Cold War World* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001), 37–82.

¹⁵⁰ James F. D. Fiddes, “Afghanistan: Clarity in Crisis,” in *Post Cold-War Anglo-American Military Intervention: A Study of the Dynamics of Legality and Legitimacy*, Modern Security Studies (London; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 100–101.

¹⁵¹ James H. Lebovic, “Introduction: Deterrence in a Changing World,” in *Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11*, Contemporary Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2007), 6–8.

focus on advancing global prosperity and shaping a favorable international landscape that allows the US to prosper and aims to enhance democratic institutions, uphold universal values, and promote human dignity. The fourth goal focuses on revitalizing the diplomatic and development workforce and institutions and lastly, dedication to serving US citizens worldwide and facilitating safe international travel. These five goals were written as foreign policy objectives by the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) which are pivotal institutions responsible for addressing global challenges, impacting the lives and well-being of Americans and people worldwide. The Department of State is a leading US foreign affairs and diplomacy efforts organization, while USAID serves as the primary US government agency for international development, health, and humanitarian assistance, working in collaboration with various stakeholders to improve global conditions.¹⁵²

2022 National Security Strategy

The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines the overarching principles and priorities of the US' approach to safeguarding its national security interests. This strategic document, issued by the Biden-Harris Administration, provides a comprehensive framework that addresses key challenges and outlines the desired outcomes and strategies to achieve them. The following section will analyze the NSS.¹⁵³

The NSS recognizes that the US faces a complex and evolving security landscape characterized by a range of interconnected threats. It emphasizes the importance of multilateralism, alliance-building, and diplomacy to promote stability, prosperity, and the protection of American values and interests. The strategy highlights the need for cooperation with international partners to address global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and economic disparities. In terms of military strength, the NSS underscores the importance of maintaining a strong, agile, and technologically advanced military capable of defending the US and its allies. It emphasizes the integration of traditional military capabilities with emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities, to enhance national security.

When it comes to concrete global priorities, the strategy focuses on two countries, namely China and Russia. In the context of China, the NSS recognizes its economic and military rise

¹⁵² US Department of State, "Joint Strategic Plan," accessed June 6, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/joint-strategic-plan/>, 7-9.

¹⁵³ The White House, "Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy" (October 2022), accessed June 7, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>.

as a challenge to US interests. It underscores the importance of fair and reciprocal economic practices, safeguarding critical technologies, and investing in research and development to maintain a competitive edge. The strategy aims to counter China's influence by deepening partnerships with like-minded countries and supporting the development of a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

Regarding Russia, the NSS acknowledges its aggressive behavior and attempts to undermine Western democracies. It emphasizes the need to deter Russian aggression through a combination of military readiness, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and cyber defenses. The strategy also highlights the importance of engaging with European allies to strengthen collective defense and counter Russian malign activities.

Overall, the NSS in 2022 adopts a comprehensive approach that combines economic, military, and diplomatic elements to address the challenges posed by China and Russia. By out-competing China and constraining Russia, the US seeks to safeguard its national security interests, promote stability in key regions, and uphold democratic values on the global stage.

US Maritime Security Strategy

The National Strategy for Maritime Security, published in September 2005, comprises four main sections and a concluding remarks section.¹⁵⁴ Section I serves as an introduction, highlighting the importance of maritime security for the US and its allies. It emphasizes the need to prevent terrorists and rogue states from utilizing weapons of mass destruction and engaging in attacks. Furthermore, it recognizes the significance of the world's oceans in terms of global trade, resources, and transportation. The section acknowledges the vulnerabilities of shipping routes, and trading hubs, and the challenges posed by illegal activities and competition over marine resources. It concludes by stressing the significance of global cooperation and collective responsibility in maintaining maritime security.

Section II focuses on the importance of secure oceans for the safety and economic security of the US. It underscores the global significance of the oceans as a network of sea-lanes that facilitate trade and commerce among nations. However, the section acknowledges existing vulnerabilities, particularly in megaports and strategic chokepoints, where international commerce is at risk. The maritime domain's infrastructure and systems are potential targets for

¹⁵⁴ Department of Homeland Security, "National Strategy for Maritime Security," accessed June 7, 2023, https://www.maritime-cybersecurity.com/National_Strategy_for_Maritime_Security.html.

illicit activities, and the oceans face threats from the illegal exploitation of marine resources. Countering these threats requires a joint global effort to ensure maritime security and protect against the use of weapons of mass destruction. This effort necessitates a common understanding and shared responsibility among nations to safeguard the oceans. The section concludes by emphasizing the connection between a strong world economy and national security, advocating for economic growth and freedom through free markets and trade.

Section III underscores the US' national interest in maritime security, with a focus on preventing threats such as terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. It also discusses the significance of the world's oceans in terms of trade, resources, and recreation, as well as the vulnerability of shipping and major trading hubs to attacks. Illicit activities increasingly target the maritime domain's private sector-owned infrastructure and systems. The section emphasizes the need for a global understanding and joint effort to counter threats and maintain maritime security, as it is crucial for economic prosperity and freedom. Additionally, the section defines weapons of mass destruction and highlights their potential threat to maritime security.

Section IV addresses the importance of maritime security for the US and the world. It underscores the role of the oceans in global trade and highlights the vulnerability of shipping routes and trading hubs to attacks. The section emphasizes the necessity of international cooperation to counter threats to maritime security, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. The US commits to improving its existing systems and developing new capabilities and procedures to identify and monitor maritime threats and illegal activities. This includes expanding and enhancing vessel detection and monitoring capabilities, implementing regulations and agreements to enhance information on vessel movements and cargo, promoting international arrangements for better visibility into the maritime supply chain, utilizing sensor technology and human intelligence to monitor the maritime domain, forming international coalitions to share situational awareness, establishing a global maritime intelligence and integration enterprise, disseminating information to users at all levels, employing automated tools for data fusion and analysis, and investing in research and development programs to enhance threat detection capabilities.

The strategy also emphasizes the importance of a close partnership between the government and the private sector. To reduce vulnerabilities and facilitate commerce, security measures must be integrated into commercial practices. Private owners and operators are encouraged to

take the lead in improving facility security and implementing scalable security measures to protect against terrorist attacks and criminal acts. The partnership between the government and the private sector is crucial for identifying and addressing vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and key resources. Through intelligence-based strategies and coordination with federal agencies like Customs and Border Protection, efforts are made to inspect and target potentially threatening cargo containers before they reach US ports. Vulnerability assessments should be conducted by both the government and the private sector, using a risk management approach to invest in protective measures.

US Navy

There are eleven ongoing US naval operations, as reported by the US Naval Institute (USNI). According to available Navy and public data as of June 1, 2023, the approximate locations of the deployed carrier strike groups (CSGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) of the US Navy are summed up in the following picture (Picture 5). It is important to note that in situations where a CSG or ARG is engaged in disaggregated operations, the provided information pertains to the position of the main or capital ship within the group.



Picture 5: Ongoing US naval operations on a map as presented by USNI.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ USNI. "USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker: June 1, 2023." *USNI News*, June 1, 2023. <https://news.usni.org/2023/06/01/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-june-1-2023>.

The US naval forces have been engaged in several significant operations across different regions. Within the naval vessel register, there are two ways to classify naval crafts. First, there are the commissioned vessel and crafts, namely the United States Ship (USS). Civilian-manned vessels, under the command of the Military Sealift Command or other relevant commands, that hold the designation of being in ‘active status, in service’ are referred to as United States Naval Ship (USNS).¹⁵⁶

The size of the US navy matters, because, as Captain Sam J. Tangredi put it, “Bigger Fleets Win.”¹⁵⁷ According to the latest information provided by USNI, the total battle force consists of 297 vessels. Out of these, 239 are USS vessels and 58 are USNS vessels. Currently, 106 vessels are deployed, including 73 USS vessels and 33 USNS vessels. Furthermore, 89 vessels are underway, with 56 deployed and 33 in local operations. The fleet deployment of ships is as follows: The 2nd Fleet has deployed 3 ships, the 3rd Fleet has deployed 5 ships, the 4th Fleet has deployed 2 ships, the 5th Fleet has deployed 11 ships, the 6th Fleet has deployed 20 ships, and the 7th Fleet has deployed 65 ships. In total, there are 106 ships deployed across these fleets.¹⁵⁸

Following a record-breaking \$31.5 billion shipbuilding budget allocated by Congress for the US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday urged ship construction yards to increase their productivity. He emphasized the need for the industry to prove its capacity to meet the Navy’s shipbuilding goals. Gilday highlighted specific shipyards and their ongoing projects, expressing concerns about the gap between the Navy’s annual procurement and the industry’s delivery rates. Incentives provided through defense and spending bills, including funding for three destroyers, were seen as motivating factors for shipyards to meet production targets.¹⁵⁹

The US Commander of Naval Surface Forces published a strategy in late December 2022 in which the way to ensure competitiveness at sea is outlined. In the context of global competition with China and tensions with Russia, the US Navy recognizes the need to strengthen its Surface

¹⁵⁶ Department of the Navy, “United States Navy Regulations,” Article 0406. Accessed June 6, 2023. <https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/United%20States%20Navy%20Regulations.pdf>.

¹⁵⁷ Sam J. Tangredi, “Bigger Fleets Win,” USNI, January 1, 2023, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/january/bigger-fleets-win>.

¹⁵⁸ USNI, “USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker: June 1, 2023.”

¹⁵⁹ Megan Eckstein, “To Shipbuilders Who Think They Can Build More, CNO Says: ‘Prove It,’” *Defense News*, January 11, 2023, <https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/01/11/to-shipbuilders-who-think-they-can-build-more-cno-says-prove-it/>.

Force to maintain stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region. The Navy aims to integrate new platforms and capabilities into its existing force, emphasizing the importance of closer alignment across various aspects of the force and broader enterprise. Moreover, the Navy acknowledges the challenges posed by an aging fleet and plans to apply lessons from past shipbuilding programs to improve execution and reduce risk. Infrastructure upgrades and strategic planning for future locations and facilities are also highlighted, along with the establishment of land-based engineering sites to support research and development. The Navy aims to enhance readiness, improve training availability, and ensure the effectiveness of its fleet in the face of a complex and challenging future.¹⁶⁰

The information provided regarding the US Navy's ongoing operations and fleet deployment has significant implications for the US as a naval power. With a total battle force of 297 vessels, the US Navy showcases its substantial maritime capabilities. Currently, 106 vessels are deployed, demonstrating the Navy's active presence across different regions.

To further reinforce its naval power, the US Navy has allocated a substantial amount to the shipbuilding budget. This emphasizes the government's recognition of the importance of expanding and modernizing the fleet as the US recognizes the challenges posed by global competition, particularly from China and tensions with Russia and those implications on the US Navy's strategy focuses on strengthening its Surface Force. By addressing the aging fleet, applying lessons from past shipbuilding programs, and investing in infrastructure upgrades and strategic planning, the Navy aims to enhance its readiness and maintain stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

The notion that 'Bigger Fleets Win,' highlights the importance of the size and capability of the US Navy. With its ongoing operations, extensive fleet deployment, and future-oriented strategies, the US continues to assert itself as a formidable naval power, ensuring its ability to project influence and protect its national interests across the world's oceans.

¹⁶⁰ US Navy, "Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge." Accessed June 5, 2023. <https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/Portals/54/Documents/CNSP/SNA/SNA-2022/Competitive-Edge-Paper-Approved-Dec-20th.pdf>.

Comparative Analysis: EU and US in Maritime Security

Comparative Analysis of Military Spending

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military expenditure reached a new record high of \$2.24 trillion in 2022, up 3.7% from 2021. The increase in spending was mainly driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, resulting in a 13% increase in military expenditure in Europe, and a substantial increase in Russian and Ukrainian spending.¹⁶¹


Based on data gathered from the SIPRI,¹⁶² in the year 2022, the US exhibited a substantial allocation of financial resources surpassing the combined expenditures of the following ten highest spenders, as demonstrated in the accompanying graph. The US dedicated approximately \$877 billion towards its financial investment, while the aggregate contributions of the subsequent ten countries amounted to \$849 billion (Graph 1). Notably, China, as the second largest spender, exhibited a spending level nearly two-thirds lower than that of the US. Among the top eleven biggest spenders are also two EU MS, notably Germany, and France.

At the moment, Ukraine is allocating the biggest portion of its GDP to military expenditure due to the ongoing Russian invasion (Graph 2). Other than that, proportionally looking, Saudi Arabia allocates the largest part of its GDP to military expenditure.


Overall, in 2022, the US accounted for 39% of the world military spending, whereas China was at 13%, followed by Russia (3.9%), India (3.6%), Saudi Arabia (3.3%), and the UK (3.1%) (Graph 3). The remaining countries individually represent less than 3% of the world's military spending. Given the significant proportion of the US military investment relative to the global share, EU MS opt to join NATO to ensure security assurances from allied nations, while also seeking economic benefits through EU membership. Although this thesis does not specifically assess military expenditure under the NATO framework, it is noteworthy that having the US as an ally enables countries to rely on their military support during times of crisis. Considering that the military budgets of most nations are considerably smaller than that of the US, smaller NATO contributors can obtain external security guarantees.

¹⁶¹ Nan Tian et al., "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2022" (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 24, 2023), 1-5, <https://doi.org/10.55163/PNVP2622>.


¹⁶² SIPRI, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database," accessed June 7, 2023, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.



Graph 1: Comparison of Expenditures: US vs. Next Top Ten Spenders in 2022 in billions of US\$.



Graph 2: Spending as a Share of GDP in 2022 in percent for the top eleven spenders.




Graph 3: World Share in 2022 in percent for the top eleven spenders.


United States' Military Expenditure

Starting from 1990, the US military expenditure stood at \$325 billion and experienced fluctuations over the years (Graph 4). Despite minor decreases in the early 1990s, the expenditure gradually increased until the early 2000s. From 2001 onwards, it experienced significant growth, peaking at \$877 billion dollars in 2022. The presented data showcases the substantial and consistent commitment of the US toward military spending. This trend is further exemplified by the progressive growth in military expenditure, reaching its peak in 2022.

The data indicates the proportion of the US GDP dedicated to military spending, demonstrating fluctuations and trends throughout the examined timeframe (Graph 5). In 1990, military expenditure accounted for 5.61% of the GDP, gradually decreasing to 3.20% by 1998. This downward trend continued until 2000, with a slight increase in 2001. Subsequently, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP remained relatively stable, hovering between 3% and 4% from 2001 to 2014. However, from 2015 onwards, there was a slight decline in the percentage, reaching 3.45% in 2022.



Graph 4: US Military expenditure, in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 1990-2022.



Graph 5: US Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-2022.

The trends observed in the US' military expenditure can be contextualized by several significant events and global developments during the period under examination.

The early 1990s witnessed minor fluctuations in military spending, which can be attributed to the post-Cold War era and the subsequent shift in global geopolitical dynamics. However, a significant turning point occurred in 2001 with the terrorist attacks. The 9/11 attacks had a

profound impact on US foreign and defense policies, prompting a heightened focus on national security and counterterrorism efforts. Following the 9/11 attacks, the US initiated military interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The global recession of 2008 also impacted military spending trends worldwide, including that of the US. Economic downturns often lead to budgetary constraints, but it is important to note that military spending tends to be relatively resilient, with governments prioritizing defense capabilities even during challenging economic times. Another significant event that may have influenced military expenditure trends is the war in Ukraine, which erupted in 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea. While the direct impact on US military spending might not be as pronounced, geopolitical tensions and regional instability can have indirect effects on defense budgets, as countries reevaluate their defense strategies and reassess potential threats.

The combination of these factors, including the aftermath of 9/11, the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the global recession, and regional conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, contributed to the fluctuations and significant growth observed in the US' military expenditure during the examined period. These events underscore the complex interplay between geopolitical events, security concerns, and economic factors that shape a nation's defense spending decisions.

European Union's Military Expenditure

Regarding the EU, it should be noted that there is no consolidated EU budget specifically allocated for EU military expenditure. The examination of the military spending within the EU will be conducted in a two-fold manner. Initially, the individual military expenditures of each EU MS will be compared, aiming to analyze which MS make the greatest contributions to military capabilities within their own national frameworks. Subsequently, the budget allocated to the EDA will be studied to determine how EU MS invest in collective EU defense projects. To enhance readability, the presentation of data will be organized into groups of three graphs. This approach allows for a clearer representation of the military expenditure information, as assimilating data from all 28 MS into a single graph can be challenging and may hinder information interpretation.

The UK is included in the information provided until 2020 when they left the EU and were no longer members. However, it is important to keep the UK in the study, to analyze the situation until Brexit, and to try to draw future trends for post-Brexit EU military expenditures.

There are six graphs; Graphs 6, 8, and 10 represent the military expenditures in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, whereas Graphs 7, 9, and 11 present military expenditure in terms of percentage of GDP. Graphs 6 and 7 present the seven biggest EU MS spenders in terms of US\$, Graphs 8 and 9 sum up the nine medium-sized spenders, and graphs 10 and 11 show the twelve smallest military spenders. The data provided by SIPRI showcases the changing patterns of military spending over the years. It is worth noting that some countries lack information in the early 1990s due to the countries not yet existing as sovereign states during that period.

There is a notable difference between the peaks in graphs in US\$ and in GDP. The seven biggest spenders in terms of US\$ never contributed more than 3% of GDP apart from the UK in the early 90s. On the other hand, the graph with the twelve smallest spenders in terms of US\$ would contribute more than 3% of its GDP to the military in the 90s, however after the mid-2000s the proportion was rarely higher than 2%.

There are notable peaks in 1990-2000. For instance, in the mid-90s, Croatia allocated more than 10% of its GDP towards the military. However, by 2022, this percentage had significantly decreased to 2.17%. The reason behind this notable decline can be attributed to the Balkan wars that occurred in the 1990s, which directly impacted Croatia as they were happening at its borders (Graph 11). These conflicts demanded a higher military budget during that time. As the situation stabilized and the wars concluded, Croatia's military expenditure as a percentage of GDP gradually decreased over the years.


Additionally, during the 90s, Cyprus allocated a larger portion of its GDP toward the military compared to the post-2000s period (Graph 11). One of the reasons for this disparity can be attributed to the issues between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, which have been ongoing for decades. The tensions between these two communities and the geopolitical situation in Cyprus likely contributed to the higher military spending in the 90s. However, as the situation evolved and diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the conflict progressed, the need for extensive military spending reduced, leading to a decline in the allocation of GDP towards the military post-2000s.

Romania's military expenditure as a percentage of GDP peaked in the early 90s (Graph 9). This peak aligns with the time of the Romanian Revolution, which occurred in 1989, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Romanian Revolution marked a significant turning point


in the country's history, leading to the overthrow of the communist regime. The aftermath of the revolution and the subsequent political and social changes likely contributed to the need for increased military spending during that period. The uncertainties surrounding the political transition and the potential for regional instability may have prompted Romania to allocate a higher percentage of its GDP toward the military.

In summary, the provided elaboration emphasizes the importance of examining peaks in graphs representing military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. The examples of Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania demonstrate how historical events, such as wars, conflicts, and political transitions, can significantly influence a country's military budget allocations. These peaks reflect the impact of specific events or periods on a nation's security priorities and highlight the dynamic nature of military spending in response to changing geopolitical circumstances.


It is important to highlight that this analysis focuses on military expenditures alone and does not consider the specific contexts, strategic considerations, or geopolitical factors that may influence a country's defense budget. Further analysis would be necessary to gain a comprehensive understanding of the determinants and implications of military expenditure in each country.




Graph 6: Military expenditure of seven biggest EU MS spenders, in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 1990-2022.




Graph 7: Military expenditure of seven biggest EU MS spenders, as percentage of GDP, 1990-2022.




Graph 8: Military expenditure of nine medium-sized spenders, in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 1990-2022.



Graph 9: Military expenditure of nine medium-sized spenders, as percentage of GDP, 1990-2022.



Graph 10: Military expenditure of twelve smallest EU MS spenders, in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 1990-2022.



Graph 11: Military expenditure of twelve smallest EU MS spenders, as percentage of GDP, 1990-2022.

Analysis of the EDA Budget

Analyzing the EDA budget and the contributions of participating MS at the EU level is crucial for understanding the commitment to defense capabilities and collective security. It allows for assessing resource allocation and identifying areas for improvement. Additionally, studying the budget sheds light on collaboration dynamics, political relations, and integration in defense matters. This master thesis aims to comprehensively analyze the EDA budget and contribute to enhancing the EU's defense capabilities through policy recommendations based on the findings.

The provided information presents an analysis of annual contributions and the contributions of participating MS of the EDA. These contributions are computed based on the proportionate share of each country's Gross National Income (GNI) in relation to the total GNI aggregate of the EU budget. The data covers the years from 2006 to 2020.

Each year, the contributions of all participating MS sum up to 100%, indicating that each individual contribution represents the percentage of the MS' contribution relative to the entire budget. This proportional allocation ensures that each country's financial commitment aligns with its economic capacity.

The first available information found online is from 2006, which is why that is the first year considered. The final information available online was from 2020. Although there is an Annual Report from 2021, the report does not offer an insight into the contributions of participating MS; it only summarizes EDA's spending and doesn't offer an insight into how MS contributions have changed post-Brexit. Another interesting detail that I'm unable to analyze, is the contribution of Denmark, as there is no information available.

Due to the Danish opt-out, there were 24 participating MS in 2006. The number rose by two following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. The highest number of participating MS was in 2013 as Croatia acceded and the UK was still a MS. The source for each year is the yearly Annual Reports posted in June of the following year on EDA's official website. Each year in Table 5 will have an Annual Report cited; these citations are also relevant for data retrieved for Graphs 13-15.

Year	Annual Contribution (in €)
2006 ¹⁶³	18,809,534
2007 ¹⁶⁴	21,497,687
2008 ¹⁶⁵	26,197,095
2009 ¹⁶⁶	28,110,000
2010 ¹⁶⁷	30,639,000
2011 ¹⁶⁸	30,159,000
2012 ¹⁶⁹	30,406,000
2013 ¹⁷⁰	29,683,000

¹⁶³ EDA, "2006 Financial Report," June 2007, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/finance-documents/2006-financial-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0>.

¹⁶⁴ EDA, "2007 Financial Report," June 2008, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/finance-documents/2007-financial-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0>.

¹⁶⁵ EDA, "2008 Financial Report," June 2009, https://eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/Final_Signed_version_-_EDA_2008_Financial_Report.

¹⁶⁶ EDA, "2009 Financial Report," June 2010, https://eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/EDA_2009_Financial_Report.

¹⁶⁷ EDA, "2010 Financial Report," May 2011, https://eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/EDA_2010_Financial_Report_-_AUDITED_lv.

¹⁶⁸ EDA, "2011 Financial Report," June 2012, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/finance-documents/2011-financial-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0>.


¹⁶⁹ EDA, "2012 Financial Report," June 2013, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/2012-financial-report.pdf>.

¹⁷⁰ EDA, "2013 Financial Report," June 13, 2014, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/2013-financial-report-audited.pdf>.

2014 ¹⁷¹	30,733,000
2015 ¹⁷²	30,093,000
2016 ¹⁷³	30,517,000
2017 ¹⁷⁴	31,140,000
2018 ¹⁷⁵	32,994,000
2019 ¹⁷⁶	34,768,000
2020 ¹⁷⁷	37,029,000
2021 ¹⁷⁸	36,842,000

Table 5: Annual Contributions to the EDA Budget in €, 2006-2021.

Changes in EU-28 GDP, public debt, and defense expenditures (2005–2019)



Sources: SIPRI, Eurostat, and the World Bank. Chart generated by the author.

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Graph 12: Changes in EU-28 GDP, public debt, and defense expenditures, 2005-2019.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷¹ EDA, “2014 Financial Report,” June 30, 2015, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2014-financial-report-audited.pdf>.

¹⁷² EDA, “2015 Financial Report,” June 20, 2016, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2015-financial-report---signed.pdf>.

¹⁷³ EDA, “2016 Annual Accounts,” June 20, 2017, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2016-annual-accounts.pdf>.

¹⁷⁴ EDA, “2017 Annual Accounts,” June 2018, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/2017-annual-accounts-signed.pdf>.

¹⁷⁵ EDA, “2018 Annual Accounts,” June 2019, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2018-final-annual-accounts.pdf>.

¹⁷⁶ EDA, “2019 Annual Accounts,” June 2020, <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-2019-annual-accounts.pdf>.

¹⁷⁷ EDA, “2020 Annual Accounts,” June 30, 2021, https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-general-annual-accounts-2020_final.pdf.

¹⁷⁸ EDA, “2021 Annual Accounts,” June 30, 2022, https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/finance-documents/eda-general-audited-annual-accounts-2021_final.pdf.

¹⁷⁹ Pierre Morcos, “Toward a New ‘Lost Decade’? Covid-19 and Defense Spending in Europe,” October 15, 2020, CSIS, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/toward-new-lost-decade-covid-19-and-defense-spending-europe>.

Looking at the annual contributions from 2006 to 2010, there is a notable growth from €18.8 million to €30 million (Table 5). From 2010 to 2016, the number stays around €30 million. Graph 12 shows that these are also the years of significant public debt, which followed the events of the Eurozone crisis of 2008. Since 2015 there has been a constant yearly increase in annual contributions. The graph also shows that since 2014 public debt has been decreasing, and defense spending increasing, with also an increase in EU-28 GDP post-2015.

There are other reasons, alongside the economic, which have influenced the defense spending of MS. Firstly, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 presented a large threat to Europe, especially those EU MS who share a border with Russia.¹⁸⁰ However, Garder emphasizes that there was a division in the perception of threat among different MS; Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states, expressed greater concern due to Russia's military capabilities, proximity, and historical occupation, while Germany, along with some NATO allies, had been more reluctant to support the stationing of rotating or permanent forces in Eastern Europe.¹⁸¹

Subsequently, the migration crisis emerged as a term encapsulating the heightened influx of refugees and individuals seeking unauthorized entry into Europe, predominantly from the Middle East and North Africa during the period spanning from 2015 to 2016.¹⁸² Estevens concludes that securitization of migration is based on socioeconomic factors, securitarian concerns over control and borders, identitarian tensions, political discourses, impacts on state sovereignty, power dynamics, conflicts, urban clusters, entry control, ethnic/religious composition, and integration challenges.¹⁸³

In the same time frame, multiple terrorist attacks shook Europe, especially the assassinations of Charlie Hebdo offices, and orchestrated multisite terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, and the Brussels and Nice attacks in 2016. The occurrence of terrorist attacks between 2015 and 2016

¹⁸⁰ Michal Natonski and Karolina Pomorska, "Trust and Decision-Making in Times of Crisis: The EU's Response to the Events in Ukraine: Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 55, no. 1 (January 2017): 54–70, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12445>.

¹⁸¹ Hall Gardner, "The Russian Annexation of Crimea: Regional and Global Ramifications," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (October 1, 2016): 495, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1154190>.

¹⁸² More in Victoria Metcalfe-Hough, "A Migration Crisis? Facts, Challenges and Possible Solutions," *ODI: Think change*, October 20, 2015, <https://odi.org/en/publications/a-migration-crisis-facts-challenges-and-possible-solutions/>.

¹⁸³ João Estevens, "Migration Crisis in the EU: Developing a Framework for Analysis of National Security and Defence Strategies," *Comparative Migration Studies* 6, no. 1 (December 2018): 28, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-018-0093-3>.


has served as significant turning points that have spurred the progress of counter-terrorism strategies and shed light on the notion of European borders.

Lastly, the Russian aggression on Ukraine has greatly changed the perception of Europeans on defense and security. The EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 can be categorized into three main approaches: strategic reorientation, defensive weaponization, and industrial rehabilitation. These include the adoption of the Strategic Compass, enhanced delivery of lethal equipment through the EPF, and investment in military equipment manufacturing to support Ukraine's armed forces.¹⁸⁴


The largest part of the EDA budget is contributed by Germany (Graph 13). Germany's contribution has presented a larger part of the budget, in 2007 Germany's contribution made up 20% of EDA, and in 2020 it was 22.3%. The next larger portion of the budget is allocated by France and the UK. France's share has always been between 15 and 16%, whereas the UK's slice in the initial years, 2006-2008, was 17% and by the time they had decided to leave the EU, their contributed part was 14.5%.

Due to not having information on the proportional contributions of participating MS for the years 2021 and 2022, the impact of Brexit cannot be analyzed. Considering that the UK was the third biggest contributor to the EDA budget, their withdrawal, especially for CSDP and the military capacities of individual MS, has left a wound in Europe's strength.


¹⁸⁴ Daniel Fiott, "In Every Crisis an Opportunity? European Union Integration in Defence and the War on Ukraine," *Journal of European Integration* 45, no. 3 (April 3, 2023): 449, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2183395>.



Graph 13: Six largest contributors to the EDA budget in proportion to the entire budget in percent, 2006-2020.



Graph 14: Twelve medium contributors to the EDA budget in proportion to the entire budget in percent, 2006-2020.



Graph 15: Nine smallest contributors to the EDA budget in proportion to the entire budget in percent, 2006-2020.

Conclusion

The comparative military expenditure analysis reveals the complex interplay between geopolitical events, security concerns, economic factors, and national defense spending decisions. It shows the significant increase in global military expenditure, with the US as the highest spender and varying levels of spending among EU MS. The analysis of the EDA budget provides insights into defense cooperation dynamics within the EU and MS priorities.

It indicates the willingness of MS to collaborate and pool resources for common defense projects, fostering cohesion and coordination. It also sheds light on broader political dynamics, such as power relations and policy priorities. Despite growing commitment to defense cooperation and integration, challenges remain due to the UK's withdrawal and varying contributions among MS.

Addressing the budget gap left by the UK and ensuring fair distribution of contributions is crucial for strengthening EU defense competences and integration. Enhanced coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among MS are necessary to address evolving security challenges effectively. A strategic approach to resource allocation and utilization will maximize the impact of the EDA budget and improve the EU's defense capabilities.

Comparative Assessment of Defense Competences

The defense competencies of the EU and the US differ significantly due to variations in their institutional frameworks and historical contexts. The EU lacks a fully integrated defense system, with defense competencies primarily resting with individual MS. Decisions require consensus among MS, and coordinating roles are played by the EEAS, European Commission, and EDA. However, these bodies lack the authority to command an army or possess their own military forces, preventing the establishment of a unified EU army.

In contrast, the US has a centralized defense structure under the DoD. The President, as the Commander in Chief, holds ultimate decision-making authority, with the DoD responsible for defense policy formulation and execution. The NSC advises the President on defense matters. The US boasts the world's most powerful military, investing heavily in research, development, and procurement of advanced military technologies. It maintains a global military presence through forward-deployed forces and numerous bases worldwide.

While the EU has made progress through initiatives like the CSDP, PESCO, EDF, Strategic Compass, and EPF, achieving full military integration remains a complex and ongoing process. These initiatives aim to enhance defense collaboration, capability development, investment, innovation, partnerships, and contribute to global security.

In summary, the EU and the US differ in their defense competencies due to institutional structures, military capabilities, defense spending, and approaches to collective defense. The EU strives to enhance defense cooperation and capabilities, relying on MS for military forces. Meanwhile, the US possesses a centralized structure, significant military capabilities, and maintains extensive global military engagements.

Comparative Evaluation of Naval Presence

The evaluation of naval presence highlights the contrasting characteristics and approaches of the EU and the US in terms of their defense competencies. The EU's CSDP Naval Military Missions, such as ENVAFOR MED IRINI and EUNAVFOR Somalia, demonstrate that MS' involvement aligns with their foreign policy objectives and regional interests. These missions aim to address challenges like illegal migration, human smuggling, trafficking, and promote stability in the Mediterranean and the EU. The participation involves several countries, each deploying assets according to their priorities.

In contrast, the US Navy has numerous ongoing operations worldwide, with a significant focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The US Navy maintains a large fleet of 297 vessels, including commissioned and civilian-manned ships. Fleet deployment is organized into different fleets, with the 7th Fleet having the highest number of deployed ships. The US has allocated a substantial budget for shipbuilding, emphasizing the goal of increasing fleet size and capabilities. Strengthening the Surface Force is a priority for the US Navy to ensure stability and security, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.

In summary, the EU's naval presence is driven by the specific interests and contributions of MS, primarily focusing on addressing migration, smuggling, trafficking, and piracy challenges. These EU missions lack a unified approach and do not establish a distinct EU military identity. On the other hand, the US Navy possesses a large and active fleet, engaged in various operations globally. They prioritize reinforcing the Surface Force and expanding capabilities to maintain stability and security, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

Comparative analysis of the Maritime Security Strategies

EUMSS and the US Maritime Security Strategy share common goals of ensuring maritime security and protecting their respective interests. However, they differ in their approaches and emphases. The EUMSS prioritizes effective ocean governance and sustainable development of the blue economy. It recognizes the EU's role as a global provider of maritime security, highlighting naval operations like Atalanta and Irini. The strategy aims to enhance situational awareness through collaboration with external partners, utilizing surveillance systems like Copernicus and space-based observations. It addresses evolving threats such as territorial disputes, resource competition, and freedom of navigation while promoting peace, security, and biodiversity protection.

In contrast, the US Maritime Security Strategy emphasizes maritime security for the US and its allies. It acknowledges the vulnerability of shipping routes, trading hubs, and strategic chokepoints, highlighting risks from illicit activities and competition over marine resources. The strategy stresses global cooperation and collective responsibility in maintaining maritime security, particularly to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist attacks. It also underscores the connection between maritime security, economic security, and global trade, advocating for economic growth and freedom through free markets and trade.

Both strategies recognize the importance of international cooperation in addressing maritime security challenges. The EU strategy emphasizes cooperation with NATO, strategic partners, and international fora, while the US strategy highlights joint global efforts and shared responsibility among nations. The US strategy also emphasizes the partnership between the government and the private sector, integrating security measures into commercial practices and encouraging private owners and operators to improve facility security.

In summary, while the EU and the US maritime security strategies share common objectives, the EU strategy emphasizes ocean governance, sustainable development, and its role as a global provider of maritime security. The US strategy focuses on national interest, the link between maritime security and economic prosperity, and the partnership between the government and the private sector to enhance security measures.

Findings and discussion

The present master thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of military capabilities and defense competencies in the context of maritime security, focusing on the EU and US. Analyzing the two as maritime powers is of great importance due to their significant roles in shaping the international maritime order.

Research Question

Research Question: To what extent do the EU and US acquire military capabilities and defense competencies, with a focus on military security strategies and naval presence, in the context of maritime security?

EU and the US prioritize maritime security and have formulated strategies to address the challenges in the maritime domain. The EU has developed its maritime security strategy with a focus on effective ocean governance, the protection of oceans and seabeds, and the promotion of a sustainable blue economy. Influenced by external events, social factors, and institutional mechanisms, the EU seeks common solutions through policies and has played a leading role in regulating shipping and influencing global institutions in this field.

The US, with a strong naval presence, has a longstanding history of maintaining stability and order in the world's oceans. The US Navy's strategy has evolved, shaped by historical and political factors. The US prioritizes specific maritime claims, particularly freedom of navigation, based on their significance to US interests. The US Navy operates as part of a joint military system overseen by civilian and military leaders, and collaboration with allies and partners enhances its operations.

The transatlantic partnership, particularly through NATO, serves as an important platform for shaping the military approach of both the EU and the US. While NATO focuses on external security, the EU has secondary tasks related to security and defense. Although a formal communication framework between the EU and NATO is lacking, there is political support for intensifying cooperation, as both organizations require each other's capabilities to address diverse threats.

Maritime security has been securitized by both the EU and the US, viewing certain threats as existential risks requiring immediate action. EUMSS and the US National Strategy for Maritime Security outline objectives to address evolving threats such as terrorism, illegal

activities, and resource competition. Both entities emphasize the importance of global cooperation, engagement with partners, and international fora to enhance maritime security worldwide.

However, the EU's naval forces still lag behind the integrated forces of the US. Analyzing evolving maritime security dynamics is crucial, as it impacts global challenges like counterterrorism, resource competition, mercantilist policies, and climate change. The rise of new powers, particularly China, in the maritime domain introduces uncertainty to the international order. Understanding the maritime policies of the EU and the US helps identify common challenges and opportunities, facilitates effective cooperation, and supports the development of strategies to ensure secure maritime routes and maintain stability and order in the world's oceans.

In conclusion, both the EU and the US have acquired military capabilities and defense competencies in the context of maritime security. The EU has developed its maritime security strategy and influenced global shipping regulations, while the US maintains a strong naval presence and prioritizes freedom of navigation. The transatlantic partnership, primarily through NATO, plays a crucial role in shaping their military approaches. Both entities securitize maritime security and emphasize global cooperation to address evolving threats.

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1: The EU has made progress in developing its military capabilities, enabling it to assume a greater level of defense competencies traditionally associated with nation-states.

The analysis based on the literature review and the case study supports the hypothesis that the EU has made progress in developing its military capabilities, enabling it to assume a greater level of defense competencies traditionally associated with nation-states.

The examination of the CSDP reveals significant advancements in the EU's military capabilities. The CSDP, outlined in the TEU, aims to provide the EU with operational capabilities utilizing both civilian and military assets for peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and international security. MS are obligated to make their capabilities available to the EU and continually improve their military capabilities to support the Council's objectives. Ongoing military operations and civilian missions conducted by the CSDP demonstrate the EU's commitment to addressing security challenges and safeguarding its interests.

However, it is important to note that the primary responsibility for defense and security still rests with individual MS. The EU's involvement in defense affairs is intended to complement, rather than replace, the role of NATO. The evaluation emphasizes that participation in defense initiatives varies among MS, depending on willingness and individual national priorities.

In naval operations, participating MS choose the extent to which they contribute, usually aligning their participation with their national foreign policy objectives and the specific context of the military operation. These contributions include air and surface vessels, as well as military personnel, with each contribution displaying the national flag to emphasize its identity. The analysis of two naval military missions, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI and Operation Atalanta, reveals the absence of a unified EU approach, common EU vessels, or EU military personnel in these missions.

In conclusion, although the EU has made efforts to enhance its defense capabilities and participate in security and defense initiatives, such as EPF and PESCO, challenges and criticisms persist. Overall, the EU's endeavors demonstrate its commitment to assuming a greater level of defense competencies traditionally associated with nation-states, but limitations and complexities remain.

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2: The US, as a nation-state with extensive military capabilities, maintains a higher level of competency in assuming defense competencies related to maritime security strategies and naval presence compared to the EU.

Considering the presented information, it can be inferred that the hypothesis positing the US, as a nation-state possessing formidable military capabilities, to exhibit greater competence in assuming defense competencies associated with maritime security strategies and naval presence compared to the EU finds support. The analysis reveals several notable disparities concerning defense competencies and naval presence between the EU and the US.

Concerning defense competencies, the EU lacks a fully integrated defense system, as defense competencies predominantly reside with individual MS. Decisions necessitate consensus among MS, and coordination is undertaken by the EEAS, European Commission, and EDA. However, these entities lack the authority to command an army or possess independent military forces, precluding the establishment of a unified EU army. In contrast, the US boasts a

centralized defense structure under the DoD, wherein the President wields ultimate decision-making authority. The US invests significantly in research, development, and procurement of advanced military technologies while sustaining a global military presence through forward-deployed forces and a multitude of bases worldwide.

Regarding naval presence, the EU's naval missions primarily concentrate on addressing migration, smuggling, trafficking, and fostering stability in specific regions, such as the Mediterranean. These missions involve several countries deploying assets based on their respective priorities. Conversely, the US Navy is actively engaged in numerous ongoing operations globally, with a pronounced focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The US Navy possesses a substantial fleet of ships and has allocated a considerable budget for shipbuilding, aimed at expanding fleet size and capabilities. The US prioritizes reinforcing the Surface Force and augmenting capabilities to ensure stability and security, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.

Based on these disparities, one can contend that the US, with its centralized defense structure, extensive military capabilities, and global military involvements, demonstrates a higher level of competence in assuming defense competencies associated with maritime security strategies and naval presence when compared to the EU. The EU's defense competencies and naval presence exhibit greater fragmentation and rely on the participation and priorities of individual MS.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3: The securitization of maritime security issues within the EU and the US positively influences their resource allocation and acquisition of military capabilities and defense competencies, particularly in the context of naval presence and maritime security strategies.

Based on the information provided, the hypothesis states that the securitization of maritime security issues within the EU and the US positively influences their resource allocation and acquisition of military capabilities and defense competencies, particularly in the context of naval presence and maritime security strategies.

The conclusion drawn from the analysis is that maritime security is a multifaceted concept encompassing various threats and challenges, including piracy, illegal fishing, transnational

crime, and maritime pollution. These issues require a comprehensive approach involving collaboration between different national and international authorities. UNCLOS outlines global and regional cooperation duties for states in maritime matters.

Maritime security governance refers to the management of security in maritime domains, and a regional approach may be more effective in constructing a comprehensive global framework for maritime security governance. The roles and responsibilities of various actors, including state actors, coast guards, naval forces, shipping companies, and international organizations, are crucial in establishing robust regulations, rules, and mechanisms to foster a secure and stable maritime environment.

State actors play a significant role in maritime security governance, as demonstrated by their involvement in international organizations such as the IMO. While intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations may have observer or consultative status, the decision-making power ultimately lies with state actors. Membership in regulatory bodies or organizations related to maritime security is exclusively limited to nation-states, underscoring the central role of nation-states in shaping and implementing maritime security governance initiatives and regulations.

However, the changing nature of maritime power and the rise of new players in global politics, including non-state actors such as pirates and terrorists, add complexity to the maritime security landscape. The use of private maritime security companies further contributes to the challenges faced in ensuring maritime security.

In summary, the hypothesis suggests that securitizing maritime security issues positively influence resource allocation and the acquisition of military capabilities and defense competencies by the EU and the US. However, it is important to consider the evolving nature of maritime threats, the involvement of non-state actors, and the changing dynamics of maritime power to effectively address the complex challenges in maritime security.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this master thesis has provided a comprehensive analysis of military capabilities and defense competencies in the context of maritime security, focusing on the EU and the US. The research has shed light on the complex interplay between geopolitical events, security concerns, economic factors, and national defense spending decisions.

The analysis of comparative military expenditure has revealed a significant increase in global military spending, with the US being the highest spender and varying levels of spending among EU MS. It has also highlighted the willingness of EU MS to collaborate and pool resources for common defense projects, fostering cohesion and coordination. However, challenges remain due to the UK's withdrawal and varying contributions among MS, necessitating addressing the budget gap and ensuring fair distribution of contributions.

The examination of defense competencies has underscored the differences between the EU and the US in terms of institutional frameworks and historical contexts. The EU lacks a fully integrated defense system, while the US has a centralized defense structure under the DoD. Despite progress made by the EU through initiatives CSDP, challenges remain in achieving full military integration.

The evaluation of naval presence has highlighted the contrasting characteristics and approaches of the EU and the US. The EU's naval presence is driven by MS' specific interests and contributions, focusing on addressing migration, smuggling, trafficking, and piracy challenges. In contrast, the US Navy maintains a large and active fleet engaged in various operations worldwide, with a significant focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

The comparative analysis of maritime security strategies has demonstrated that both the EU and the US share common goals of ensuring maritime security and protecting their interests. However, they differ in their approaches and emphases. The EU's strategy prioritizes effective ocean governance and sustainable development of the blue economy, while the US strategy emphasizes maritime security for the US and its allies.

In conclusion, the EU and the US have acquired military capabilities and defense competencies in the context of maritime security, but with notable differences. The EU has made progress in developing its defense capabilities and participating in security and defense initiatives. However, limitations and complexities persist due to the absence of a fully integrated defense

system and varying contributions among MS. On the other hand, the US, as a nation-state with extensive military capabilities, maintains a higher level of competency in assuming defense competencies related to maritime security strategies and naval presence.

The securitization of maritime security issues within the EU and the US has positively influenced their resource allocation and acquisition of military capabilities and defense competencies. The recognition of maritime security as a critical concern has led to the formulation of strategies, initiatives, and collaborations to address evolving threats and challenges. However, ongoing analysis and adaptation to changing dynamics, such as the rise of new powers, remain essential to ensure secure maritime routes and maintain stability and order in the world's oceans.

The future of maritime security will likely witness heightened tensions due to China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, as it poses a significant challenge to regional stability. In response, the EU and the US are expected to play crucial roles in maintaining peace and safeguarding the freedom of navigation in the region. Through diplomatic channels, multilateral cooperation, and potential military presence, both entities will strive to deter potential conflicts and ensure the security of vital sea lanes, while also supporting the sovereignty and interests of Taiwan and its allies.

Overall, this research contributes to a better understanding of the complexities and dynamics of maritime security and provides insights into the implications for the EU and its MS. It underscores the importance of continued cooperation, coordination, and resource allocation to enhance defense capabilities, strengthen integration, and effectively address evolving security challenges in the maritime domain.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Data for Graphs 1, 2, 3

Graph 1: “Comparison of Expenditures: US vs. Next Top Ten Spenders in 2022 in billions of US\$.”

Graph 2: “Spending as a Share of GDP in 2022 in percent for the top eleven spenders.”

Graph 3: “World Share in 2022 in percent for the top eleven spenders.”

	In billions of US\$	in percent of GDP	in percent of World share
US	876,9	3,5	39
Next 10	848,9	1,6	13
China	292,0	4,1	3,9
Russia	86,4	2,4	3,6
India	81,4	7,4	3,3
Saudi Arabia	75,0	2,2	3,1
United Kingdom	68,5	1,4	2,5
Germany	55,8	1,9	2,4
France	53,6	2,7	2,1
South Korea	46,4	1,1	2,1
Japan	46,0	34	2
Ukraine	44,0	3,5	39

Appendix B: Data for Graphs 4, 5

Graph 4: “US Military expenditure, in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 1990-2022.”

Graph 5: “US Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-2022.”

Year	in billions of US\$	as a Percentage of GDP
1990	325,1	5,61%
1991	299,4	4,88%
1992	325,0	4,97%
1993	316,7	4,60%
1994	308,1	4,22%
1995	295,9	3,86%
1996	288,0	3,55%
1997	293,2	3,41%
1998	291,0	3,20%
1999	298,1	3,09%
2000	320,1	3,11%
2001	331,8	3,12%
2002	378,5	3,45%
2003	440,5	3,83%
2004	493,0	4,02%
2005	533,2	4,09%
2006	558,3	4,04%
2007	589,6	4,07%
2008	656,8	4,45%
2009	705,9	4,88%
2010	738,0	4,90%
2011	752,3	4,82%
2012	725,2	4,46%
2013	679,2	4,03%
2014	647,8	3,69%
2015	633,8	3,48%
2016	639,9	3,42%
2017	646,8	3,32%
2018	682,5	3,32%
2019	734,3	3,43%
2020	778,4	3,70%
2021	806,2	3,46%
2022	876,9	3,45%

Appendix C: Data for Graphs 6, 8, 10

Graph 6: “Military expenditure of seven biggest EU MS spenders, in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 1990-2022.”

Graph 8: “Military expenditure of nine medium-sized spenders, in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 1990-2022.”

Graph 10: “Military expenditure of twelve smallest EU MS spenders, in billions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 1990-2022.”

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Austria	1,972701682	1,994055546	2,139925322	2,115115267	2,22756055	2,557834494	2,457903049	2,164802343	2,159796003
Belgium	4,644324241	4,624500746	4,131298112	3,746042851	3,944101813	4,449014835	4,241865968	3,684095389	3,664288413
Bulgaria	0,794520548	0,232176387	0,255770912	0,282674243	0,241993435	0,311147106	0,213616356	0,244369396	0,320389011
Croatia			0,782003661	1,168936759	1,625222365	2,06038893	1,938698897	1,797184681	1,427264827
Cyprus	0,411409063	0,418387369	0,630127106	0,268277272	0,298469127	0,298833386	0,448075909	0,534141189	0,483748645
Czech Republic				0,815585467	0,938252777	1,065352459	1,123923831	0,988324332	1,166099773
Denmark	2,649889473	2,671946671	2,837745377	2,682011246	2,718790042	3,117966146	3,086224945	2,804317083	2,846065338
Estonia			0	0,01314656	0,025135735	0,036343488	0,041436608	0,053031652	0,059919847
Finland	2,141300984	2,200991549	2,075955555	1,615424809	1,756338984	1,908986807	2,021797095	1,94700259	1,959708814
France	35,77443032	35,86912092	37,90226982	35,77527329	37,28860606	40,12402414	38,9777341	34,6979041	33,63356128
Germany	39,83466688	37,19672973	39,50245227	35,03053759	34,19770564	38,7426991	36,70118977	31,2677104	31,20076808
Greece	3,193376484	3,146899035	3,623052915	3,36441333	3,587244914	4,179913247	4,613167577	4,573516492	4,824257169
Hungary	0,847389247	0,722549153	0,812017967	0,735860386	0,757131989	0,612184817	0,585271902	0,695972461	0,61846438
Ireland	0,59400601	0,624932658	0,674035044	0,597723766	0,633699379	0,702039703	0,750987246	0,765305513	0,742402153
Italy	20,73462558	21,58570677	22,17709039	18,2420139	18,06245908	17,185853	20,79312883	20,15610226	20,82512535
Latvia			0,009864491	0,017691508	0,033900348	0,043560331	0,038154935	0,037988313	0,042180167
Lithuania			0,012851642	0,020769764	0,021062271	0,030453613	0,04226	0,075611	0,138175
Luxembourg	0,087355712	0,097334052	0,111320676	0,09765307	0,113834573	0,128521764	0,127833884	0,121130606	0,129319441
Malta	0,021152028	0,021744818	0,026692691	0,024637706	0,027870262	0,03114486	0,033296175	0,031142215	0,029081268
Netherlands	7,420849636	7,246192325	7,904561273	7,054868962	7,137373801	8,011539559	7,829004728	6,839136799	6,836084823
Poland	1,540736842	1,721995821	1,881935067	2,123378416	2,251923178	2,719362634	3,083416787	3,192276377	3,491022616
Portugal	1,41608317	1,597556799	1,91267951	1,655575219	1,641548411	2,01649972	1,964184856	1,803958424	1,76386384
Romania	1,739025771	1,377194085	0,83162041	0,72245152	0,936686223	0,983140541	0,874451239	1,074785782	1,254227893
Slovakia				0,266899037	0,299993419	0,629622683	0,641559871	0,499529507	0,397592216
Slovenia			0,281422738	0,230303672	0,237949504	0,334655023	0,329972648	0,290785272	0,301139822
Spain	11,69503864	11,68026375	12,25019543	10,04151135	10,09267126	11,43990627	11,29431685	9,865892241	10,33341723
Sweden	6,16950424	6,219460369	6,418628291	5,01115832	5,15450423	5,729770498	6,203436943	5,203218383	5,035805617
United Kingdom	43,54509484	47,04545733	45,59259182	38,11320679	38,5690135	38,29428308	38,56613465	39,88994745	41,22212583

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Austria	2,124379546	1,925557398	1,788798311	1,881746741	2,381962769	2,679282065	2,686166244	2,640185362	3,499817967
Belgium	3,59844752	3,190805233	3,036035472	3,147146017	3,875697772	4,262663513	4,228224643	4,307895341	5,163979974
Bulgaria	0,35722454	0,351343205	0,406003543	0,455950467	0,569054077	0,620909016	0,667670396	0,715719535	0,990168294
Croatia	1,035949008	0,659775033	0,629464104	0,733680739	0,709399147	0,730867005	0,799160901	0,849431035	0,978853732
Cyprus	0,289970367	0,281160374	0,32762716	0,242483491	0,288427606	0,338474566	0,380875029	0,387703672	0,405176368
Czech Republic	1,20593187	1,157294085	1,182519922	1,494390397	1,885706689	2,042085931	2,439538514	2,44996371	2,707677752
Denmark	2,784881254	2,392510831	2,525225825	2,694082493	3,199158428	3,57883246	3,46845292	3,896730668	4,175652589
Estonia	0,073800541	0,078313309	0,09381854	0,122069531	0,171411924	0,20496818	0,204517021	0,236324449	0,371974547
Finland	1,653905119	1,55813525	1,479270879	1,611406522	2,475059743	2,892938124	2,999391049	3,128517474	3,29655775
France	32,67271428	28,40313895	27,95156638	30,57839893	38,56911581	44,52457961	44,44205052	45,79214842	50,68446738
Germany	30,69015843	26,49759316	25,81540196	27,61135567	32,99736302	35,77657389	30,32496518	35,88365797	40,11085928
Greece	5,012285642	4,564522446	4,428103552	4,734177215	5,035585542	6,267468787	7,028428593	7,607186182	8,533090258
Hungary	0,702942491	0,715857665	0,845055674	1,079154824	1,401561253	1,532612234	1,596087843	1,410071771	1,776464117
Ireland	0,741508608	0,694674774	0,767778364	0,811255941	0,965199981	1,101860647	1,144978361	1,190379117	1,37222537
Italy	21,01645691	19,87872093	19,51938148	21,61005976	26,82421329	30,26107665	29,73764239	29,63302226	31,98243179
Latvia	0,056568626	0,069990683	0,086966741	0,14722484	0,189144251	0,229353323	0,272551116	0,36782549	0,481492627
Lithuania	0,10645	0,1404	0,166875	0,181481441	0,210822413	0,2708418	0,303819006	0,351605789	0,442004493
Luxembourg	0,127052872	0,115698727	0,144712222	0,138593169	0,179459262	0,212017959	0,220210897	0,223272213	0,258432797
Malta	0,027986621	0,025353948	0,027119323	0,028403691	0,034125502	0,040526469	0,052498963	0,044434426	0,049263377
Netherlands	7,02643329	5,971807629	6,200391943	6,728153969	8,35633847	9,377114724	9,566980053	10,21776574	11,48037742
Poland	3,226555351	3,146106713	3,630645595	3,776173214	4,150261759	4,778627749	5,896404861	6,619413759	8,589136364
Portugal	1,817405621	1,664674243	1,755718395	1,965227762	2,363340459	2,847156258	3,142565786	3,153770788	3,30943641
Romania	0,955337577	0,93556961	0,985657656	1,056136062	1,250327559	1,530183904	1,975975151	2,251493425	2,607689942
Slovakia	0,327169171	0,342322769	0,393996598	0,440059286	0,624508455	0,711290428	0,823313455	0,911370627	1,139194488
Slovenia	0,274841828	0,222391557	0,27148879	0,326959523	0,416906754	0,493153893	0,514172799	0,608833753	0,692654913
Spain	11,11372249	10,27377925	10,22207408	10,27083902	12,8805328	15,26245864	15,99772422	17,25221761	20,06566863
Sweden	5,148727432	4,789440137	4,128046006	4,354573015	5,305640404	5,514710385	5,518466926	5,577203266	6,386221162
United Kingdom	40,76040067	39,34371127	39,51257994	44,245266	52,34312228	60,25078254	61,65363504	64,21761953	73,44803201

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Austria	3,746731607	3,33475494	3,218351	3,409721	3,187227	3,229066	3,305159	2,66541	2,885947	3,153119	3,387982
Belgium	6,295821584	5,620670063	5,244721	5,499371	5,168998	5,263165	5,191507	4,202063	4,25549	4,432808	4,840126
Bulgaria	1,161451478	0,904961292	0,832549	0,757931	0,722052	0,811634	0,747533	0,63251	0,670593	0,720038	0,961297
Croatia	1,295957074	1,129098496				0,956953	1,06347	0,883163	0,836685	0,920837	0,966359
Cyprus	0,453803054	0,471352781	0,477587	0,479735	0,414496	0,384925	0,357807	0,327892	0,295355	0,359062	0,450409
Czech Republic	2,918695853	2,718559513	2,497903	2,474313	2,22061	2,148784	2,022883	1,779887	1,954935	2,077722	2,710018
Denmark	4,788030121	4,33735569	4,503492	4,51859	4,422458	4,216648	4,056862	3,364048	3,592728	3,764033	4,55869
Estonia	0,429662699	0,353366577	0,33218	0,389238	0,436853	0,479314	0,512119	0,463569	0,497653	0,53744	0,614945
Finland	3,958118334	3,940584835	3,717181	4,099506	3,94324	4,16114	3,985508	3,399135	3,415008	3,43109	3,754588
France	55,36596584	56,4414554	52,04406	54,12087	50,21651	52,00146	53,13475	45,64747	47,37059	49,19566	51,40981
Germany	45,09895631	44,52892784	43,02592	45,16321	43,79823	44,24265	44,66283	38,17002	39,90968	42,28111	46,49768
Greece	10,5741385	10,64134818	8,163619	7,128608	5,914988	5,655183	5,531286	4,818121	4,963484	5,088179	5,757114
Hungary	1,867877499	1,475818169	1,35082	1,47207	1,322278	1,280051	1,209802	1,132476	1,288676	1,702636	1,615619
Ireland	1,582890834	1,415725373	1,274229	1,300332	1,157532	1,195763	1,192734	0,997006	1,00161	1,025063	1,107137
Italy	36,83998975	34,05448132	32,02082	33,8288	29,78101	29,95745	27,70103	22,18085	25,03303	26,44789	28,4201
Latvia	0,581752273	0,363809251	0,259672	0,296835	0,25574	0,283569	0,295729	0,282688	0,404552	0,482462	0,709371
Lithuania	0,541390195	0,404826029	0,326321	0,344605	0,328632	0,354862	0,426914	0,471221	0,635448	0,812107	1,056384
Luxembourg	0,213864577	0,201432812	0,247667	0,232152	0,214572	0,233682	0,252079	0,249529	0,235556	0,323138	0,355275
Malta	0,056032519	0,059110112	0,058729	0,055893	0,049922	0,053789	0,056515	0,051797	0,059673	0,064236	0,066869
Netherlands	12,37484894	12,13181208	11,22052	11,64793	10,36472	10,22626	10,3326	8,66785	9,115241	9,580685	11,11493
Poland	9,349421394	7,903812008	8,79017	9,455423	8,986839	9,275712	10,34515	10,21279	9,164191	9,870681	12,04067
Portugal	3,714798403	3,73831516	3,540186	3,651883	3,039982	3,262259	3,002399	2,643895	3,178346	2,719739	3,245872
Romania	3,000404945	2,22514454	2,08622	2,379871	2,102886	2,452513	2,69147	2,580594	2,64416	3,622068	4,359021
Slovakia	1,411710285	1,350294439	1,137681	1,064843	1,02018	0,967923	0,997704	0,985915	1,003048	1,049074	1,295988
Slovenia	0,829384407	0,798868642	0,772085	0,66568	0,543496	0,506743	0,486195	0,400772	0,449178	0,473797	0,529496
Spain	22,22772183	20,17827498	19,71079	19,69544	18,86062	17,24296	17,17855	15,18717	14,01444	16,04353	17,82327
Sweden	6,024791006	5,062962024	5,885936	6,324747	6,243672	6,528737	6,555518	5,386942	5,427549	5,526593	5,732823
United Kingdom	72,91540767	64,01050667	63,97911	66,56955	65,45249	63,83772	66,99547	59,99021	53,32737	52,07501	55,83292

	2019	2020	2021	2022
Austria	3,336543	3,840078	4,196429	3,625565
Belgium	4,761196	5,317451	6,239357	6,867022
Bulgaria	2,158558	1,119012	1,275245	1,335963
Croatia	1,001812	0,980798	1,361238	1,308521
Cyprus	0,463614	0,483415	0,541805	0,494238
Czech Republic	2,910252	3,252505	3,935631	4,005428
Denmark	4,487779	4,887156	5,273696	5,467947
Estonia	0,637035	0,718112	0,748581	0,810917
Finland	3,635244	3,868688	3,752365	4,822903
France	50,11893	52,74706	56,647	53,63875
Germany	49,07944	53,31871	56,51313	55,75975
Greece	5,383117	5,773282	8,299905	8,104853
Hungary	2,190629	2,768373	3,060137	2,572246
Ireland	1,112741	1,14442	1,267739	1,164312
Italy	26,38067	32,92909	36,24928	33,48971
Latvia	0,691894	0,742049	0,823084	0,84878
Lithuania	1,09382	1,174057	1,306764	1,732269
Luxembourg	0,381773	0,425168	0,403264	0,564625
Malta	0,080268	0,086287	0,087951	0,086973
Netherlands	12,00067	13,08572	13,94158	15,60662
Poland	11,78615	13,36839	15,11249	16,57313
Portugal	3,299373	3,267981	3,896641	3,500299
Romania	4,61304	5,052321	5,300048	5,186685
Slovakia	1,802508	2,04719	2,064806	1,994161
Slovenia	0,572884	0,567651	0,762772	0,735189
Spain	17,18932	17,43178	19,54447	20,30657
Sweden	5,839556	6,271286	7,582556	7,722479
United Kingdom	56,5676			

Appendix D: Data for Graphs 7, 9, 11

Graph 7: “Military expenditure of seven biggest EU MS spenders, as percentage of GDP, 1990-2022.”

Graph 9: “Military expenditure of nine medium-sized spenders, as percentage of GDP, 1990-2022.”

Graph 11: “Military expenditure of twelve smallest EU MS spenders, as percentage of GDP, 1990-2022”

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Austria	1,20%	1,15%	1,10%	1,12%	1,09%	1,07%	1,05%	1,05%	1,02%	0,98%	0,98%
Belgium	2,36%	2,29%	1,83%	1,74%	1,68%	1,57%	1,54%	1,48%	1,46%	1,39%	1,34%
Bulgaria	3,83%	3,04%	2,97%	2,61%	2,49%	2,37%	2,40%	2,43%	2,45%	2,65%	2,65%
Croatia	xxx	xxx	7,61%	10,73%	11,15%	9,18%	8,16%	7,52%	5,60%	4,42%	3,02%
Cyprus	7,37%	7,26%	9,13%	4,07%	4,02%	3,04%	4,52%	5,57%	4,68%	2,73%	2,82%
Czechia	xxx	xxx	xxx	2,33%	2,28%	1,84%	1,73%	1,66%	1,83%	1,86%	1,88%
Denmark	1,95%	1,95%	1,89%	1,91%	1,77%	1,69%	1,64%	1,62%	1,61%	1,56%	1,46%
Estonia	xxx	xxx	...	0,76%	1,04%	0,96%	0,87%	1,05%	1,07%	1,29%	1,38%
Finland	1,56%	1,78%	1,91%	1,87%	1,76%	1,42%	1,53%	1,54%	1,46%	1,22%	1,24%
France	2,81%	2,81%	2,69%	2,69%	2,66%	2,49%	2,41%	2,38%	2,23%	2,18%	2,09%
Germany	2,52%	2,00%	1,86%	1,69%	1,55%	1,50%	1,47%	1,41%	1,39%	1,40%	1,36%
Greece	3,80%	3,48%	3,63%	3,60%	3,58%	3,17%	3,31%	3,37%	3,53%	3,36%	3,47%
Hungary	2,56%	2,16%	2,18%	1,91%	1,82%	1,32%	1,26%	1,48%	1,27%	1,43%	1,51%
Ireland	1,20%	1,25%	1,20%	1,14%	1,11%	1,01%	0,99%	0,92%	0,82%	0,75%	0,70%
Italy	1,88%	1,86%	1,75%	1,79%	1,71%	1,47%	1,59%	1,63%	1,64%	1,68%	1,74%
Latvia	xxx	xxx	0,65%	0,74%	0,84%	0,81%	0,64%	0,58%	0,59%	0,75%	0,88%
Lithuania	xxx	xxx	...	0,81%	0,49%	0,45%	0,50%	0,75%	1,23%	0,97%	1,22%
Luxembourg	0,79%	0,81%	0,83%	0,71%	0,74%	0,60%	0,59%	0,61%	0,64%	0,57%	0,54%
Malta	0,91%	0,87%	0,97%	1,00%	1,02%	0,84%	0,87%	0,82%	0,73%	0,68%	0,63%
Netherlands	2,37%	2,25%	2,21%	2,03%	1,91%	1,79%	1,76%	1,66%	1,58%	1,59%	1,43%
Poland	2,61%	2,25%	2,23%	2,47%	2,27%	1,96%	1,97%	2,03%	2,02%	1,90%	1,83%
Portugal	1,84%	1,83%	1,81%	1,79%	1,68%	1,71%	1,60%	1,54%	1,42%	1,43%	1,41%
Romania	4,55%	4,77%	4,25%	2,74%	3,11%	2,61%	2,37%	3,02%	3,00%	2,64%	2,50%
Slovakia	xxx	xxx	xxx	2,00%	1,94%	3,15%	2,97%	2,28%	1,74%	1,57%	1,66%
Slovenia	xxx	xxx	2,25%	1,82%	1,65%	1,57%	1,54%	1,40%	1,36%	1,21%	1,09%
Spain	2,29%	2,13%	2,04%	2,01%	2,00%	1,92%	1,81%	1,72%	1,76%	1,76%	1,73%
Sweden	2,57%	2,45%	2,44%	2,39%	2,28%	2,16%	2,14%	1,95%	1,87%	1,89%	1,83%
United Kingdom	3,98%	4,12%	3,86%	3,59%	3,38%	2,85%	2,72%	2,56%	2,50%	2,42%	2,37%

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Austria	0,91%	0,88%	0,91%	0,89%	0,85%	0,79%	0,90%	0,87%	0,83%	0,82%	0,79%
Belgium	1,28%	1,22%	1,21%	1,15%	1,10%	1,06%	1,10%	1,22%	1,17%	1,09%	1,05%
Bulgaria	2,86%	2,78%	2,69%	2,37%	2,24%	2,08%	2,23%	2,13%	1,74%	1,31%	1,33%
Croatia	2,70%	2,71%	2,03%	1,74%	1,75%	1,67%	1,62%	1,83%	1,79%		
Cyprus	3,15%	2,13%	1,99%	1,96%	2,04%	1,90%	1,68%	1,63%	1,82%	1,85%	1,74%
Czechia	1,75%	1,82%	1,89%	1,71%	1,78%	1,57%	1,42%	1,23%	1,31%	1,19%	1,08%
Denmark	1,53%	1,51%	1,47%	1,42%	1,31%	1,38%	1,31%	1,36%	1,35%	1,40%	1,31%
Estonia	1,50%	1,67%	1,74%	1,70%	1,45%	1,39%	1,66%	1,77%	1,80%	1,70%	1,68%
Finland	1,14%	1,15%	1,45%	1,47%	1,46%	1,44%	1,29%	1,39%	1,56%	1,49%	1,49%
France	2,03%	2,05%	2,10%	2,10%	2,02%	1,98%	1,91%	1,90%	2,10%	1,97%	1,89%
Germany	1,32%	1,33%	1,32%	1,27%	1,07%	1,20%	1,17%	1,21%	1,31%	1,27%	1,21%
Greece	3,25%	3,08%	2,49%	2,61%	2,84%	2,78%	2,68%	2,98%	3,22%	2,75%	2,52%
Hungary	1,57%	1,59%	1,64%	1,47%	1,41%	1,22%	1,27%	1,18%	1,13%	1,02%	1,04%
Ireland	0,70%	0,63%	0,59%	0,57%	0,54%	0,51%	0,51%	0,58%	0,60%	0,57%	0,54%
Italy	1,68%	1,71%	1,71%	1,68%	1,60%	1,52%	1,45%	1,54%	1,55%	1,50%	1,48%
Latvia	1,04%	1,54%	1,61%	1,60%	1,61%	1,71%	1,55%	1,62%	1,38%	1,08%	1,07%
Lithuania	1,36%	1,27%	1,12%	1,20%	1,16%	1,17%	1,11%	1,13%	1,08%	0,88%	0,79%
Luxembourg	0,68%	0,59%	0,61%	0,61%	0,58%	0,52%	0,50%	0,36%	0,37%	0,44%	0,38%
Malta	0,67%	0,64%	0,63%	0,67%	0,82%	0,65%	0,62%	0,62%	0,68%	0,65%	0,58%
Netherlands	1,44%	1,43%	1,44%	1,43%	1,40%	1,39%	1,35%	1,31%	1,40%	1,33%	1,29%
Poland	1,91%	1,90%	1,91%	1,87%	1,93%	1,92%	2,00%	1,75%	1,80%	1,85%	1,80%
Portugal	1,44%	1,46%	1,43%	1,50%	1,59%	1,51%	1,38%	1,42%	1,53%	1,49%	1,49%
Romania	2,42%	2,29%	2,09%	2,01%	2,01%	1,85%	1,49%	1,40%	1,28%	1,23%	1,24%
Slovakia	1,84%	1,78%	1,84%	1,65%	1,68%	1,59%	1,48%	1,46%	1,52%	1,25%	1,07%
Slovenia	1,30%	1,39%	1,40%	1,43%	1,42%	1,54%	1,44%	1,49%	1,59%	1,60%	1,29%
Spain	1,63%	1,46%	1,42%	1,43%	1,39%	1,37%	1,36%	1,37%	1,36%	1,39%	1,33%
Sweden	1,71%	1,64%	1,60%	1,44%	1,41%	1,32%	1,30%	1,16%	1,16%	1,19%	1,10%
United Kingdom	2,41%	2,49%	2,55%	2,50%	2,42%	2,37%	2,37%	2,49%	2,65%	2,57%	2,50%

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Austria	0,78%	0,75%	0,75%	0,70%	0,73%	0,76%	0,75%	0,75%	0,88%	0,87%	0,77%
Belgium	1,04%	1,01%	0,97%	0,91%	0,89%	0,88%	0,89%	0,89%	1,01%	1,05%	1,18%
Bulgaria	1,45%	1,31%	1,25%	1,24%	1,22%	1,45%	3,13%	1,59%	1,52%	1,51%	
Croatia		1,63%	1,82%	1,76%	1,60%	1,64%	1,55%	1,61%	1,71%	2,01%	2,17%
Cyprus	1,65%	1,61%	1,54%	1,65%	1,40%	1,57%	1,76%	1,79%	1,94%	1,91%	1,81%
Czechia	1,06%	1,02%	0,97%	0,95%	1,00%	0,96%	1,09%	1,15%	1,32%	1,40%	1,36%
Denmark	1,35%	1,23%	1,15%	1,11%	1,15%	1,14%	1,28%	1,30%	1,38%	1,32%	1,42%
Estonia	1,90%	1,91%	1,93%	2,03%	2,07%	2,01%	2,01%	2,05%	2,29%	2,01%	2,09%
Finland	1,53%	1,53%	1,45%	1,45%	1,42%	1,35%	1,36%	1,35%	1,43%	1,26%	1,72%
France	1,87%	1,85%	1,86%	1,87%	1,92%	1,91%	1,84%	1,84%	2,00%	1,92%	1,94%
Germany	1,24%	1,19%	1,15%	1,14%	1,15%	1,15%	1,17%	1,26%	1,37%	1,33%	1,39%
Greece	2,44%	2,37%	2,35%	2,46%	2,57%	2,56%	2,72%	2,62%	3,06%	3,86%	3,69%
Hungary	1,03%	0,94%	0,86%	0,90%	1,00%	1,19%	1,01%	1,34%	1,76%	1,68%	1,53%
Ireland	0,51%	0,50%	0,46%	0,34%	0,34%	0,31%	0,29%	0,28%	0,27%	0,25%	0,23%
Italy	1,43%	1,40%	1,28%	1,21%	1,33%	1,36%	1,36%	1,31%	1,74%	1,72%	1,68%
Latvia	0,91%	0,94%	0,94%	1,04%	1,45%	1,59%	2,06%	2,01%	2,15%	2,07%	2,05%
Lithuania	0,77%	0,76%	0,88%	1,14%	1,48%	1,71%	1,97%	2,00%	2,07%	1,97%	2,52%
Luxembourg	0,36%	0,36%	0,37%	0,42%	0,38%	0,50%	0,50%	0,55%	0,58%	0,47%	0,70%
Malta	0,53%	0,51%	0,49%	0,47%	0,51%	0,48%	0,44%	0,51%	0,58%	0,50%	0,50%
Netherlands	1,24%	1,17%	1,16%	1,13%	1,16%	1,16%	1,22%	1,32%	1,44%	1,38%	1,58%
Poland	1,81%	1,80%	1,92%	2,14%	1,95%	1,90%	2,04%	1,98%	2,23%	2,22%	2,39%
Portugal	1,41%	1,44%	1,31%	1,33%	1,54%	1,24%	1,34%	1,37%	1,43%	1,54%	1,35%
Romania	1,17%	1,29%	1,35%	1,45%	1,43%	1,73%	1,79%	1,84%	2,01%	1,86%	1,73%
Slovakia	1,08%	0,98%	0,98%	1,11%	1,12%	1,10%	1,22%	1,70%	1,92%	1,77%	1,76%
Slovenia	1,17%	1,05%	0,97%	0,93%	1,00%	0,98%	0,98%	1,05%	1,06%	1,24%	1,19%
Spain	1,42%	1,27%	1,25%	1,27%	1,14%	1,23%	1,25%	1,23%	1,37%	1,37%	1,47%
Sweden	1,13%	1,11%	1,13%	1,07%	1,05%	1,02%	1,03%	1,09%	1,15%	1,19%	1,31%
United Kingdom	2,42%	2,29%	2,18%	2,04%	1,98%	1,95%	1,94%	1,98%	2,16%		

Appendix D: Data for Graphs 13, 14, 15

Graph 13: “Six largest contributors to the EDA budget in present, 2006-2020.”

Graph 14: “12 medium contributors to the EDA budget in percent, 2006-2020.”

Graph 15: “9 smallest contributors to the EDA budget in percent, 2006-2020.”

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Austria	2,2801	2,2884	2,216	2,2893	2,3621
Belgium	2,8769	2,8375	3	2,8188	2,9346
Bulgaria		0,2186	0,245	0,2875	0,2952
Croatia					
Cyprus	0,1249	0,129	0,1274	0,136	0,1521
Czech Republic	0,9147	0,9606	0,9874	1,1764	1,1049
Denmark					
Estonia	0,0906	0,1088	0,134	0,1407	0,1152
Finland	1,4836	1,4722	1,481	1,5596	1,5501
France	16,1937	16,0781	15,5715	15,8975	16,8329
Germany	20,9727	20,1846	20,0164	20,2439	20,7954
Greece	1,7414	1,7724	1,7619	1,9952	2,0905
Hungary	0,8335	0,7657	0,8063	0,8239	0,727
Ireland	1,3026	1,3632	1,3927	1,3369	1,1652
Italy	13,29	12,7991	12,7185	12,641	13,0429
Latvia	0,1195	0,1453	0,1771	0,1979	0,1559
Lithuania	0,1932	0,2132	0,2319	0,2685	0,228
Luxembourg	0,2358	0,2268	0,2622	0,2456	0,2473
Malta	0,0421	0,042	0,0431	0,0454	0,0501
Netherlands	4,4732	4,6622	4,6511	4,7831	5,0112
Poland	2,2051	2,3013	2,5283	2,9723	2,4737
Portugal	1,3139	1,3467	1,2949	1,3052	1,3382
Romania		0,8969	1,0666	1,1309	1,1227
Slovakia	0,3623	0,396	0,4567	0,5175	0,5971
Slovenia	0,2693	0,2659	0,2713	0,2976	0,3125
Spain	8,278	8,7882	8,7631	8,6931	8,8855
Sweden	2,8306	2,7211	2,7986	2,83	2,5391
United Kingdom	17,5723	17,0165	17,2277	15,3664	13,8706

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Austria	2,3442	2,3624	2,4703	2,4909	2,4334
Belgium	2,9413	2,9965	3,008	3,0186	2,9576
Bulgaria	0,2831	0,3058	0,3088	0,3133	0,3028
Croatia			0,1665	0,3316	0,3141
Cyprus	0,1414	0,1447	0,1238	0,1169	0,1155
Czech Republic	1,1373	1,1733	1,1066	1,079	1,0255
Denmark					
Estonia	0,1119	0,1205	0,1336	0,1392	0,1451
Finland	1,4889	1,5741	1,5495	1,5616	1,487
France	16,6453	16,4255	16,2866	16,3221	16,0885
Germany	20,7354	20,9938	21,3443	21,4881	21,9366
Greece	1,8917	1,7129	1,4139	1,370507	1,3467
Hungary	0,8046	0,8519	0,7369	0,7382	0,7254
Ireland	1,0812	1,0009	1,0394	1,0463	1,0882
Italy	12,8508	12,6171	12,1031	12,1042	11,7952
Latvia	0,1391	0,1519	0,1825	0,1884	0,1919
Lithuania	0,2215	0,2431	0,2575	0,2667	0,2715
Luxembourg	0,2375	0,2602	0,2551	0,2576	0,2432
Malta	0,0469	0,0494	0,0508	0,0515	0,0539
Netherlands	4,9069	4,9436	4,7406	4,7407	4,6737
Poland	2,9953	3,0968	2,9928	2,9761	2,9903
Portugal	1,3283	1,2679	1,2378	1,2209	1,2341
Romania	1,0411	1,0948	1,0757	1,1394	1,1223
Slovakia	0,5596	0,5704	0,5624	0,574	0,5523
Slovenia	0,2896	0,2928	0,2688	0,2642	0,2607
Spain	8,5639	8,4322	8,0188	7,945	7,6903
Sweden	2,8508	3,1968	3,3803	3,4371	3,2904
United Kingdom	14,3622	14,1208	15,185	14,8179	15,6636

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Austria	2,2883	2,3646	2,409	2,4926	2,5104
Belgium	2,8749	2,8866	2,8821	2,9009	2,934
Bulgaria	0,2922	0,2984	0,3262	0,3475	0,3762
Croatia	0,2963	0,3038	0,3129	0,3247	0,3349
Cyprus	0,1141	0,1171	0,1202	0,129	0,1334
Czech Republic	1,0434	1,0885	1,1607	1,2802	1,311
Denmark					
Estonia	0,1435	0,1452	0,1494	0,1593	0,1705
Finland	1,4184	1,4359	1,4689	1,5136	1,5112
France	15,4273	15,4022	15,464	15,4119	15,4254
Germany	21,5601	21,8666	22,0141	22,3067	22,3448
Greece	1,2659	1,2052	1,2189	1,181	1,1992
Hungary	0,7759	0,7647	0,8026	0,8356	0,8736
Ireland	1,1663	1,3553	1,5745	1,6585	1,692
Italy	11,2491	11,3242	11,3327	11,3166	11,1439
Latvia	0,1791	0,1813	0,1811	0,1878	0,1998
Lithuania	0,2664	0,2617	0,2667	0,2776	0,2939
Luxembourg	0,2216	0,2404	0,2556	0,255	0,269
Malta	0,0581	0,064	0,0677	0,075	0,0807
Netherlands	4,7129	4,7898	4,7625	4,9757	5,0445
Poland	3,0629	2,8641	3,0314	3,1195	3,2556
Portugal	1,2247	1,2418	1,2522	1,2603	1,2796
Romania	1,122	1,1699	1,2136	1,3168	1,3769
Slovakia	0,5361	0,5383	0,5607	0,5891	0,6073
Slovenia	0,261	0,2677	0,278	0,3003	0,3085
Spain	7,7061	7,6754	7,7729	7,8012	7,8856
Sweden	3,1331	3,3901	3,2668	2,9821	2,9701
United Kingdom	17,6005	16,7573	15,8544	15,0013	14,4681