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**The 'rebalance' to Asia; US (re)engagement with South East Asia:  
How have the US's security and economic relationships with South  
East Asia evolved since 2009, with a particular focus on the case  
studies of the Philippines and Indonesia, in response to the  
declared 'rebalance' to Asia?**

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***Abstract in English and German***

This paper examines the central foreign policy priority of the Obama Administration, 'the pivot' or 'rebalance' to Asia. It examines the evolution since 2009 through the Presidencies of Obama, Trump and now Biden of the strategic, diplomatic, security, military, economic and trade relationships between the United States and two case study countries in South East Asia: The Philippines and Indonesia. In doing so, it seeks to fill a tentatively identified knowledge gap concerning the implications of this flagship US foreign policy in practice for the countries it is ostensibly aimed at. The paper combines discourse analysis of US, Philippine and Indonesian political leaders with additional empirical analysis of security, military, economic and trade trends. Overall, the paper concludes that the rebalance sits squarely within the established parameters of US foreign policy as set out in International Relations and Foreign Policy theory, and in practice has meant a 'security first' deepening of relationships between the US and partners in South East Asia.

Diese Arbeit untersucht die zentrale außenpolitische Priorität der Obama-Regierung, „the pivot“ oder „rebalance“ nach Asien. Sie untersucht die Entwicklung der strategischen, diplomatischen, sicherheitspolitischen, militärischen, wirtschaftlichen und handelspolitischen Beziehungen zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und zwei Fallstudienländern in Südostasien, den Philippinen und Indonesien, im Zeitraum von 2009 bis 2022, beginnend mit der Präsidentschaft Obamas, über die Regierung Trumps, bis hin zur jetzigen Regierung Bidens. Auf diese Weise versucht sie, eine vorläufig identifizierte Wissenslücke zu schließen, nämlich über die praktischen Auswirkungen dieser Vorzeige-US-Außenpolitik auf die Länder, auf die sie angeblich abzielt. Die Arbeit kombiniert eine Diskursanalyse zu US-, philippinischen und indonesischen politischen Führungspersonen mit einer zusätzlichen empirischen Analyse von Sicherheits-, Militär-, Wirtschafts- und Handelstrends. Insgesamt kommt die Arbeit zu dem Schluss, dass die Neuausrichtung exakt innerhalb der etablierten Parameter der US-Außenpolitik liegt, wie sie in der Theorie der Internationalen Beziehungen und der Außenpolitik festgelegt sind, was in der Praxis eine Vertiefung der Beziehungen zwischen den USA und ihren Partnern in Südostasien unter dem Motto „Sicherheit zuerst“ bedeutet.

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## **Topic: The ‘rebalance’ to Asia; US (re)engagement with South East Asia.**

**Research Question: How have the US’s security and economic relationships with South East Asia evolved since 2009, with a particular focus on the case studies of the Philippines and Indonesia, in response to the declared ‘rebalance’ to Asia?**

“...the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation...”

President Barack Obama, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia

November 17<sup>th</sup> 2011

### **Section A: Theoretical**

#### **A1 Introduction**

This paper examines how the US’s security and economic relationships with South East Asia have evolved since 2009 in response to the declared ‘rebalance’ to Asia. In November 2011 while on a visit to Australia the then President of the United States of America (USA), Barack Obama, announced to the Australian Parliament in Canberra a major shift in foreign policy that came to be known as the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ to Asia. He however did not use either term in his speech; instead, the President spoke of a ‘deliberate and strategic decision’ to ‘play a larger and long-term role in shaping’ the Asia-Pacific.<sup>1</sup> In November 2014 at the University of Queensland, on a return visit to Australia, he reiterated his commitment to the US’s ‘rebalance’ – that had become his preferred term (and the one that will be used as the default term in this paper).<sup>2</sup> During Barack Obama’s terms in office, whatever the preferred choice of terminology, this refocusing of US attention and effort towards the Asia-Pacific became his Administration’s defining foreign policy<sup>3</sup> - and settled strategy vis-à-vis Asia.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Press Release November 17<sup>th</sup> 2011: Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament*, Obama White House Archives (2011):

[www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov](http://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov), accessed 7<sup>th</sup> June 2022: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>

<sup>2</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Press Release November 15<sup>th</sup> 2014: Remarks by President Obama at the University of Queensland*, Obama White House Archives (2014):

[www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov](http://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov), accessed 7<sup>th</sup> June 2022: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarks-president-obama-university-queensland>

<sup>3</sup> Liow, J., *Ambivalent Engagement: The United States and Regional Security in Southeast Asia After the Cold War*, Brookings Institution Press (2017), page 142.

<sup>4</sup> Zhang, F., ‘US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific’, *US Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press (2018), page 249.

What factors were identified as driving the decision to ‘rebalance’? First, it was explicitly presented as a counterpoint to the drawing down of the US’s commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>5</sup> Implicitly – and for some explicitly – it was a repudiation of the policies of Obama’s predecessor, President George W. Bush and the interventionism of the neo-conservatives that had led in the early 2000s to the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. For Obama and many others in the US foreign policy community these interventions in the Middle East and West Asia had absorbed too much of the US’s diplomatic, political, economic and military capital in return for limited gains. Meanwhile, its attention had been diverted as the world’s economic centre of gravity – and by extension the cockpit of its politics – shifted east to the Asia-Pacific.<sup>6</sup>

Secondly, underpinning this shift and generating additional reasons to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific was the rise of China. Between 2000 and 2010 China’s GDP as a proportion of global GDP had nearly tripled, increasing from 3.6% to just over 10%.<sup>7</sup> Over the same period East Asia and the Pacific’s share of global GDP had increased from 24.7% to 25.6%.<sup>8</sup> This underlined the importance of the region to the global economy but also just how important – and impressive – China’s economic growth rate was. This growing economic power in turn had led, from the perspective of the US and many of its friends and allies, to increasing Chinese political and diplomatic assertiveness; manifesting itself in the South China Sea, in trading relationships and vis-à-vis relationships with other key powers in the region such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.<sup>9</sup> All of these countries were, and are, to one extent or another US allies. Obama was at pains to reiterate his support for China’s peaceful rise; however, he and other foreign policy commentators were also equally clear that the rebalance was at least in part designed to respond to the challenge represented to the ‘rules-based’ – and American-led – status quo in the region, by China’s rise.<sup>10</sup>

What is the rebalance supposed to entail according to its architects? First and foremost, it is clearly a political and diplomatic push to increase US engagement in the region. Underneath this umbrella three broad themes or priorities became

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<sup>5</sup> Lieberthal, K., *Article: The American Pivot to Asia*, The Brookings Institution (2011): [www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu), accessed 7<sup>th</sup> June 2022: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/>

<sup>6</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet November 16<sup>th</sup> 2015: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific*, Obama White House Archives (2015): [www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov](http://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov), accessed 7<sup>th</sup> June 2022: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific>

<sup>7</sup> World Bank database, *GDP (current US\$) - East Asia & Pacific, World*, The World Bank (2022), [www.data.worldbank.org](http://www.data.worldbank.org), accessed June 7<sup>th</sup> 2022: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=1W-CN>

<sup>8</sup> World Bank database, *Data: GDP (current US\$) - World, China*, The World Bank (2022), [www.data.worldbank.org](http://www.data.worldbank.org), accessed June 7<sup>th</sup> 2022: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=Z4-1W>

<sup>9</sup> Birgbauer, P., *The US Pivot to Asia Was Dead on Arrival*, The Diplomat (2022): [www.thediplomat.com](http://www.thediplomat.com), accessed 7<sup>th</sup> June 2022: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/the-us-pivot-to-asia-was-dead-on-arrival/>

<sup>10</sup> Manyin, M., et al, *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia*, Congressional Research Service, via the Project on Government Secrecy of the Federation of American Scientists (2012): [www.sgp.fas.org](http://www.sgp.fas.org), accessed 7<sup>th</sup> June 2022: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf>

apparent as the idea was further defined.<sup>11</sup> First, is what has been termed a 'modernisation' of the US's security relationships in the region. Second was a deepening or expansion of economic and trading relationships. And third was greater support for democratic or 'good' governance and the protection and promotion of human rights. These three themes were all present in early pronouncements from the Obama Administration as to the substance of the policy, and their content was built up further over time. Importantly, as the flagship foreign policy initiative of the Administration it was supposedly comprehensive and far-reaching; a significant shift in the US's stance cutting across vast swathes of foreign, defence, economic and development policy. It was presented as a long-term shift that would be implemented over the course of many years.

Since the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and then Joe Biden in 2020 the rebalance, despite the detractors who criticised it as an unfulfilled promise,<sup>12</sup> on the surface at least appears to have become a mainstay of US foreign policy; an established and integrated part of US foreign policy assumptions and perhaps a rare example of bipartisan consensus. Although the rhetoric differed and the particulars varied in terms of prioritising different aspects (as will be explored further later in this paper), Trump in no way repudiated the central tenets of the policy.<sup>13</sup> Unsurprisingly, given he was Obama's Vice President, Joe Biden is viewed by some as pursuing the rebalance with a gusto that perhaps its original proponent lacked.<sup>14</sup> It is also worth noting here that where the US has led, inevitably its friends and allies have followed: France, the European Union (EU), Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) as well as a number of other countries and institutions have also announced their versions of 'pivots' or 'rebalances' to the Asia-Pacific or the variation thereon, the Indo-Pacific, in the past few years.

The rebalance was not uncontroversial however in the region that it was directed towards. Whereas for some it provided assurance that the US was not resiling from its commitments to the region as part of a general reduction in military and defence expenditure from the heights of the Bush years – a point that President Obama was at pains to personally reinforce in 2011. For others it was viewed as provocative, particularly its stated objective of countering supposed threats to the 'rules-based order', explicitly or implicitly identified as emanating from China. Some in Beijing concluded that the US was seeking to contain or encircle China, or was otherwise

<sup>11</sup> Snyder, S., *Obama's Rebalance to Asia In His Own Words: Where Does it Stand?*, Council on Foreign Relations (2014): [www.cfr.org](http://www.cfr.org), accessed June 7<sup>th</sup> 2022: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-rebalance-asia-his-own-words-where-does-it-stand>

<sup>12</sup> Ford, L., *The Trump Administration and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific*, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press (2020), accessed 7<sup>th</sup> June 2022:

[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/fp\\_20200505\\_free\\_open\\_indo\\_pacific.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/fp_20200505_free_open_indo_pacific.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Townshend, A., *America First: US Asia Policy Under President Trump*, The United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney (2017): [www.ussc.edu.au](http://www.ussc.edu.au), accessed June 7<sup>th</sup> 2022: <https://united-states-studies-centre.s3.amazonaws.com/attache/8d/e5/5a/4a/8f/f6/a4/73/a1/e6/cb/b0/e5/98/7e/11/America-first-US-Asia-policy-under-President-Trump.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Myre, G, *Radio Programme and Article 6<sup>th</sup> October 2021: Long promised and often delayed, the 'pivot to Asia' takes shape under Biden*, National Public Radio (2021): [www.npr.org](http://www.npr.org), accessed June 7<sup>th</sup> 2022: <https://www.npr.org/2021/10/06/1043329242/long-promised-and-often-delayed-the-pivot-to-asia-takes-shape-under-biden>

hostile to it, despite the attempts by Obama and his Administration to sound emollient.<sup>15</sup> Reactions from other countries in the region, particularly in South East Asia were mixed, ranging from support to caution.<sup>16</sup> Few countries though, with the exception of China and rather unsurprisingly given its longstanding hostile relations with the US, North Korea, rejected out of hand the idea of greater American engagement with the region.

As well as the discussion over the rationale and objectives of the pivot or rebalance – for example to what extent is it aimed at countering China – there has also been much debate and criticism about the substance of the policy in practice. How much of a strategic shift is it? How much has it changed existing US policies and approaches? How consequential has it been? What has actually happened as a result of it? It is this set of questions that form the basis of this paper. More than ten years on from the advent of the rebalance, there should be ample evidence available enabling us to look at what has actually happened and to draw some tentative conclusions in response to these questions.

### **A1.1 Research Question**

This paper will pick up on the questions in the previous paragraph, focusing on what the rebalance has proved to mean in practice, what has changed as a result of it, and what the consequences of it are for the countries in the region it is aimed at, at the heart of the Asia-Pacific. The research question of this paper is therefore:

How have the US's security and economic relationships with South East Asia evolved since 2009, with a particular focus on the case studies of the Philippines and Indonesia, in response to the declared 'rebalance' to Asia?

The period from 2009 to the present has been selected as 2009 is when the substance of the rebalance was first articulated by President Obama, even if the terminology used to describe it did not settle down until a few years later. South East Asia has been selected as the region of focus partly because it is a region of interest to the author (see below) but mainly because it represents a more distinct, coherent and identifiable geographical, political, economic and social unit of analysis. This is especially so compared to the extremely expansive, very unwieldy and sometimes contested constructs used by the US and other countries and also present in the literature, such as 'Asia', 'East Asia', 'the Asia-Pacific', and 'the Indo-Pacific' (this issue is also explored in more detail later as part of the Literature Review). For the purposes of this paper, the commonly used definition for South East Asia meaning ASEAN members plus East Timor, is used throughout.

Furthermore, the countries in the region also have a variety of different relationships with the US. These are generally, not as close as those countries commonly regarded as the US's principal allies in the broader East Asian region, namely Japan,

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<sup>15</sup> Ford, J., *The Pivot to Asia Was Obama's Biggest Mistake*, The Diplomat (2017): [www.thediplomat.com](http://www.thediplomat.com), accessed June 7<sup>th</sup> 2022: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-pivot-to-asia-was-obamas-biggest-mistake/>

<sup>16</sup> Emmerson, D., *Challenging ASEAN: The US Pivot Through Southeast Asia's Eyes*, Global Asia (2012): [www.globalasia.com](http://www.globalasia.com), accessed June 7<sup>th</sup> 2022: [https://globalasia.org/v7no4/cover/challenging-asean-the-us-pivot-through-southeast-asias-eyes\\_donald-k-emmerson](https://globalasia.org/v7no4/cover/challenging-asean-the-us-pivot-through-southeast-asias-eyes_donald-k-emmerson)

South Korea, and Taiwan. They range from the newly resurgent military dictatorship of Myanmar, now again isolated and sanctioned by the US, to the city state of Singapore and the kingdom of Thailand; both imperfect democracies and firm friends of the US. The region also contains countries, such as Cambodia and Laos, that are often seen as more vulnerable, or perhaps more open and more welcoming, to overtures from China.

As noted in the research question, two countries have been selected as the case studies for this paper. First, the Philippines, because it has what many consider to be the strongest relationship with the US in the region. For most of the period from 1898 to 1946 the US ruled the country as a formal or *de facto* colony and the two countries have shared a formal defence treaty since 1951. The Philippines is an example of a country that already has a strong political, security and economic ties with the United States and is considered to be firm friend and ally. Some have even suggested that a 'special relationship' exists between the two countries. What has the rebalance meant for that relationship?

Secondly, Indonesia has been selected because it does not have so 'special' a relationship with the US. It is an extremely important regional and potentially global power. It has the fourth largest population in the world, the highest GDP of the Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) countries, is a highly diverse and functioning, if flawed democracy and is a member of the G20. It does not however, have the same history of strong, formal political, security and economic ties to the US as the Philippines does. Indonesia is an example of a country that has a positive, but also a more distant relationship with the US, that perhaps has the potential to be strengthened. What has the rebalance meant for that relationship?

As noted above, there are countries in the region such as Myanmar or Laos that have relatively limited or even negative or unfriendly relationships with the US. These countries were also considered as potential case studies, and indeed alongside the 'special relationship' of the Philippines and the friendly but potentially stronger relationship of Indonesia, examining a country with a more problematic relationship with the US in the context of the rebalance would indeed have value. Due to the constraints of this paper and the breadth of the analysis involved however, such a third case study has not been included.

The US's security and economic relationships with the two case study countries will be examined in relation to the evolution of its overall strategic, political and diplomatic relationship with them; providing and analysing the general context within which shifts in the more specific fields of defence, security, trade and investment do or do not occur. The rationale for examining these three elements of the rebalance together is explained in further detail in the Theoretical Section's Literature Review.

Although at core highly descriptive, answering the research question will also allow this paper to site and analyse the rebalance more deeply, taking into account and reflecting on existing Foreign Policy and International Relations theory that seeks to explain US foreign policy vis-à-vis East and South East Asia. This theory is summarised in the Theoretical Section's Literature Review and reflected on, in light of the findings of the Empirical Section, in the Analytical Section.

## A1.2 Relevance

First, the subject of this paper is highly relevant to the author, as a professional diplomat and development worker who lived and worked in South East Asia, in Myanmar, from 2009 to 2011 and in the broader Indo-Pacific region, in India, from 2017 to 2020. The author has a keen interest in understanding better how and in what ways this overarching policy rubric or stated strategic intent was and is being implemented in practice. As a practitioner, along with others in the field, the author has a strong interest in how and in what ways policy and strategy can be turned into real action or change on the ground – or perhaps fail to do so.

Secondly, this paper will help fill a tentatively identified research ‘knowledge gap’, regarding the practical outcomes and effects of the rebalance, specifically as they relate to South East Asia and the US’s relationships with key South East Asian countries. In discourse and literature so far encountered on this topic there seems to be a significant focus on the genesis and motivations of this particular aspect of US foreign policy viewed from the US’s perspective and through the prism of China’s growing economic and political power. In so far as there is research and analysis of what the outcomes of the policy have been, it again appears to focus overwhelmingly on the implications for the US-China relationship. There appears to have been very little knowledge generated regarding what the rebalance means in practice for countries in South East Asia; a group of actors that the policy is supposedly to a greater extent designed to influence. The existence and nature of this hypothesised knowledge gap is subject to exploration and validation through the full Literature Review.

Thirdly, the architects of the rebalance in the US and policy makers generally who are also seeking to refocus their institutions’ efforts and resources will want to understand and assess whether, how, and in what ways policy commitments are being implemented and making a difference on the ground. As referenced above, other countries and institutions continue to follow the US lead. In September 2021 at the launch of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy Josep Borrell Fontelles, the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy stated that: ‘The Indo-Pacific is a very important part of the world for us. It is the future, where the world’s centre of gravity is moving, both in geo-economic and geo-political terms...’. And publicly committed to action: ‘On this Indo-Pacific Strategy, we have identified seven priority areas, with a set of concrete steps that are mentioned in the [strategy]’.<sup>17</sup> Policy makers and practitioners, in the US and elsewhere, have a strong interest in learning from the experience of others that have sought to implement strategy and policy shifts in the real world of politics, diplomacy, and economic and trading relations.

Fourthly, the analysis in this paper will also be highly relevant for policy makers in the Asia-Pacific region. As noted above the announcement of the rebalance was not uncontroversial. This is true both in terms of big strategic choices and for day-to-day

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<sup>17</sup> Borrell, J., *Indo-Pacific: Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President at the press conference on the Joint Communication*, European External Action Service (2021): <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/en>, accessed March 13<sup>th</sup> 2023: [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/indo-pacific-remarks-high-representativevice-president-press-conference-joint-communication\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/indo-pacific-remarks-high-representativevice-president-press-conference-joint-communication_en)

engagement: Southeast Asian countries in particular have been reported as perturbed by the potentially invidious choices the rebalance imposes on them, perhaps forcing them to choose between China and the US. Policy makers and practitioners will want to know what this policy change means for their engagement and relationships with the US and others.

Finally, this paper will be relevant for legislators, commentators and citizens in all relevant countries seeking to hold policy makers and/or governments to account for the decisions they've made and whether they are being implemented. The US Congress for example, continues to convene sessions especially on the rebalance, to hold US policy makers to account for progress. The UK Parliament's Foreign Affairs Select Committee also announced an inquiry into the UK Government's Integrated Review and 'Indo-Pacific tilt' in July 2021; with one set of questions specifically look at how the strategy can and is being implemented. Whatever you call it – rebalance or tilt, the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific – the interest in and appetite for information about these strategic shifts and how they are being implemented remains very high in the countries that have proposed them.

### **A1.3 Structure of this paper**

This paper first includes in this **theoretical section, a literature review** of the general theoretical and empirical literature relating to US foreign policy and Asia or the Asia-Pacific and South East Asia specifically; placing the rebalance in its theoretical and also historical, empirical context after World War Two and prior to 2011. Theories from the realist and constructivist schools of International Relations that seek to explain the evolution – the *why* – of the US's relationships with the region are compared and contrasted in order to identify a wide range of different structural factors that may or may not have changed, and influenced the announcement and formulation of the rebalance since 2009.

The first section of the literature review seeks to answer the questions:

- What are the characteristics of the US's relationship(s) with the region and the countries it includes?
- How do they compare with the US's relationships with countries outside the region?
- What are the similarities and differences between them? If they are different, why so?
- How have they evolved over time?
- What factors influence, shape or constrain these relationships?

Following this, the literature review then examines the strategic evolution of the rebalance since 2009 with a particular focus on US policy and the security and economic dimensions of the US's relationships with South East Asia, to assess how they may or may not fit within any general theoretical framework(s) or be influenced by structural factors identified. The outcome of these reviews then enables the paper to draw some conclusions regarding what a rebalance might realistically mean for the US's relationships with the region and with the two case study countries.

On the basis of these conclusions an **analytical framework** is developed including a set of qualitative and quantitative criteria based on the above conclusions as to what a rebalance might realistically mean for their relationships with the US that will be applied to the two cases studies.

Then in the **empirical section** this framework is applied to the two case study countries, Indonesia and the Philippines, in order to systematically assess how the US's strategic, security and economic relationships have evolved since 2009. For each case study country this section has three main components:

First, an account of the country's relationship with the US from the perspective of the case study country itself; its historical context and key attributes prior to the announcement of the rebalance in 2009.

Secondly, an account of how since 2009 the ways in which the two countries describe, frame, shape and the nature of their discourse regarding their strategic, security and economic relationships have evolved, based on a discourse analysis of the two countries' political leaderships.

Finally, this section sets out, framed by the above context, how the relationships have evolved practically at the strategic political and diplomatic level and in the security and economic fields since 2009 (or 2010 depending on data availability), drawing on a range of qualitative and quantitative data sources.

Finally, in the **analytical section**, conclusions based on an analysis of the systematic assessment in the empirical section are set out.

## **A2 Literature Review**

### **A2.1 The rebalance in context: Theory and practice of US and Asia-Pacific foreign policy**

#### *The US, Asia and the 'Open Door'*

The United States of America has not always been a Pacific nation. It was only in 1848 with the seizure of California from Mexico that the US gained a foothold on the Pacific seaboard. The discovery of gold in the region, at around the same time, drove a wave of migration and commercial energy from the US's heartlands on the eastern Atlantic seaboard to the far west.<sup>18</sup> It has been argued that very quickly the area became integrated into the Pacific regional economy, stretching as far as Australia, based on the trade in two key commodities: Gold and grain.<sup>19</sup> From the 1840s and 1850s onwards the US's economic and soon social, cultural, and political centre of gravity shifted irreversibly westward.

A few years later, Commodore Matthew Perry – a veteran of the conquest of California – and his 'black ships' arrived off the coast of Japan. He demanded 'friendship', defined as the right to create coaling stations and the opening of commercial relations; threatening the possibility of war if the Japanese did not agree to these terms. This 'friendly' approach was not uncontroversial in the US, nevertheless the overriding objective remained to 'open up' Japan both to secure commercial relationships with it, but more importantly due to the role it could play in giving the US an advantage in the pursuit of the bigger prize: Trade with China.<sup>20</sup>

Although the US is not viewed by some as playing a leading role in exerting pressure on the declining Qing dynasty of China, it did seek to secure its interests and extract similar concessions as were made to the other, mainly European powers, such as through the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia.<sup>21</sup> Intense commercial interaction between the US and Qing dynasty China predated that treaty by almost a half century however; an alternative view is that the US engaged heavily in the opium trade and was quite happy to enjoy the benefits of British leadership in forcing concessions on China.<sup>22</sup> China was also a major target for US Christian missionary society activities. The reaction to them and the resulting atrocities against missionaries and other US and foreign nationals would draw the US into further entanglement in Chinese affairs, culminating in the multinational intervention to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.<sup>23</sup>

Following the Boxer Rebellion, the US, recognising the limits of its power in the Far East as the European powers and Japan carved out ever more expansive spheres of

<sup>18</sup> Flynn, D., Frost, L., and Latham, A., *Pacific Centuries: Pacific and Pacific Rim Economic History Since the 16th Century*, Routledge (1999), page 125.

<sup>19</sup> Flynn, D., Frost, L., and Latham, A., *Pacific Centuries*, page 147.

<sup>20</sup> Unoki, K., *International Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War*, Palgrave Macmillan (2016), page 32.

<sup>21</sup> Wang, E., 'US-China relations: Returning to the past or forging the future?—Editor's introduction', *Chinese Studies in History* 54:1 (2021), pages 1-4.

<sup>22</sup> Goldstein, L., *Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry*, Washington DC, Georgetown University Press (2015), pages 28-29.

<sup>23</sup> Goldstein, L., *Meeting China Halfway*, page 32.

influence in the region, set out and formalised what came to be known as the 'Open Door' policy. This had two parts: The first called for equal opportunity for commerce in China for all nations, while accepting the presence of spheres of influence. The second stated that the US stood for the maintenance of China's territorial integrity. In practice, the US's limited ability to enforce the policies' provisions and lack of public support for greater interventionism meant that, provided the US was able to continue its trade with China and as long as a balance was maintained between the other foreign powers with no one dominating, the US was content with the status quo.<sup>24</sup>

Bearing in mind this historical context and the centrality of trade and commercial relationships, particularly with China, US policy towards East Asia more broadly has since at least the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century been underpinned by two related objectives: First, to ensure that the region remains open to US trade, commerce and other forms of exchange. And secondly, following on from the first, to prevent the emergence in the region of a rival power that would threaten that openness, and cut the US off from the region's vast potential markets, resources and friends and allies.<sup>25</sup> At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century these potential rivals were the European colonial powers who seemed intent on carving out of China proprietorial territories that in a similar way to their other imperial possessions would exclude the US; by the middle of the century, it was Japan. These objectives, grounded in the tenants of the original 'Open Door' policy have in essence remained unchanged for more than a century.<sup>26</sup>

### *Bilateralism vs. multilateralism*

For the US, the experiences of the Great Depression and World War Two further underlined the need to avoid protectionism and reinforced the objective to ensure openness in the region.<sup>27</sup> In the immediate aftermath of World War Two however, with the latest such threat to these objectives, Japan, vanquished and confident in its naval and air supremacy,<sup>28</sup> the US initially resisted making binding political and security commitments in Asia.<sup>29</sup>

The evolving confrontation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the declaration of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the perceived need to confront the threat of advancing communism – 'domino theory' – led to a revaluation however; over time a patchwork of agreements, commitments and alliances emerged. These arrangements were and are dynamic, occupying various points on

<sup>24</sup> Moore, G., *Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy: Theodore Roosevelt and China, 1901–1909*, Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books (2015), page 13.

<sup>25</sup> Zhang, F., 'US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific', *US Foreign Policy*, page 241.

<sup>26</sup> Singh, D., 'Frontmatter', in *How Will Shifts in American Foreign Policy Affect Southeast Asia?*, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute (2019), page 2.

<sup>27</sup> Zhang, F., 'US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific', *US Foreign Policy*, page 244.

<sup>28</sup> Zhang, F., 'US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific', *US Foreign Policy*, page 239.

<sup>29</sup> Ikenberry, J., and Mastanduno, M., *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. New York: Columbia University Press (2003), page 7.

the spectrum between a full alliance, with security guarantees, and looser forms of alignment that are a longstanding feature of international relations.<sup>30</sup>

At their most developed it has been argued that the US and Japan in particular enjoy the benefits of a full 'security community' based on shared democratic norms.<sup>31</sup>

Interestingly however, it is a community of two: Japan and the US. A key distinguishing feature of the US's approach in the Asia-Pacific when compared with its approach in the other key theatre in which it was engaged in confrontation with the USSR – Europe – is its overwhelmingly bilateral and not multilateral nature. This difference had emerged as soon as the early 1950s, with NATO's foundation in 1949 binding most Western European and North American countries into a relatively coherent, well-structured and centralised multilateral alliance that has continued to expand in terms of members and deepen levels of cooperation since its founding.<sup>32</sup> In contrast, various attempts to create multilateral organisations or systems of alliance in Asia, floundered. Even when attempts were made, such as through the creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955, they did not include key countries, had weak institutions and did not involve significant security guarantees or military integration.<sup>33</sup>

In the place of a formal and effective multilateral system, the US has forged a set of bilateral security agreements in what has come to be known as the 'hub and spokes' system,<sup>34</sup> part of the wider 'San Francisco System' underpinning security in the broader Pacific.<sup>35</sup> At the core of this system are formal security treaty relationships with Australia (technically the regional power in Oceania), Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea. These alliances have had their challenges; for example, New Zealand was originally included in the 'ANZUS' trilateral defence pact along with Australia and the US but is no longer due to its opposition to nuclear weapons. However overall, this system has exhibited a high level of endurance, now over several decades, with the US and regional partners unable or unwilling to identify and pursue alternative options that would give them the same benefits.<sup>36</sup>

Bilateralism in the security sphere has been mirrored by bilateralism in the spheres of economics and trade. Trade in the region was skewed largely in the direction of the central hub – the US – rather than intra-regionally<sup>37</sup>. The US refused to

<sup>30</sup> Wilins, T., 'Alignment', not 'alliance' – the shifting paradigm of international security cooperation: Toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment', *Review of International Studies* 38(1) (2012), pages 55 and 76.

<sup>31</sup> Nau, H., 'Identity and the balance of power in Asia', in, Ikenberry, J., and Mastanduno, M., (Eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York, Columbia University Press (2003), page 228.

<sup>32</sup> Duffield, J., 'Asia-Pacific security institutions in comparative perspective', in, Ikenberry, J., and Mastanduno, M., (Eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York, Columbia University Press (2003), page 246.

<sup>33</sup> Duffield, J., 'Asia-Pacific security institutions in comparative perspective', in, Ikenberry, J., and Mastanduno, M., (Eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, page 247.

<sup>34</sup> Zhang, F., 'US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific', *US Foreign Policy*, page 243.

<sup>35</sup> Calder, K., 'Securing security through prosperity: the San Francisco System in comparative perspective', *The Pacific Review* 17:1 (2004), pages 138-139.

<sup>36</sup> Vaughn, B., 2007. *U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (2007), pages 15-16.

<sup>37</sup> Cha, V., 'American Alliances and Asia's Regional Architecture', in, Pekkanen, S., Ravenhill J., and Foot, R., (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, Oxford University Press (2014), page 739.

countenance including any significant economic provisions during earlier attempts at multilateralism such as the creation of SEATO.<sup>38</sup> Instead, a series of agreements have been made on a country-by-country basis. According to the Office of the US Trade Representative, as of 2022 the US has Free Trade Agreements with Australia and South Korea, and Trade and Investment Framework Agreements with Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam and the regional grouping ASEAN. No formal overarching treaty governs US-Japan economic and trade relationships. Instead, since the 1950s, a series of bilateral agreements and frameworks that were often sector specific and driven by the US's desire to access Japan's market or limit Japan's exports to the US have been used to manage their government-to-government economic relations.<sup>39</sup>

### *Realist thesis*

Why has the US's engagement in the Asia region relied so heavily on bilateral rather than multilateral relationships? Realist theorists of international relations and foreign policy point to the realities of geography, security and power in the post-World War Two era. The power disparity between the US and potential partners in Asia was so great that they could not offer any meaningful economic and/or military support to the US.<sup>40</sup> In Europe the US faced a predominantly land-based rival in the USSR and its friends and allies could make a significant economic contribution and a meaningful, if still small contribution to collective security and defence. In contrast, in Asia, the US's overwhelming economic power and naval and air power relative to the very limited capabilities of the predominantly littoral and archipelago or island partner countries in the region meant that the US could defend them or its vital interests largely independently without creating more sophisticated alliance or burden-sharing structures. Conversely, countries in the region were and, in many cases, continue to be content to rely on the security gains that US power provided and had little incentive to invest in collective security.<sup>41</sup>

For the US, the system provided ample access to bases that enabled it to support the containment of communism.<sup>42</sup> A system of bilateral arrangements may also have been attractive as it inherently maximised – and still maximises – the US's level of control over a set of 'potential rogue allies' in the region,<sup>43</sup> and its own flexibility and freedom of action.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>38</sup> He K., and Feng H., 'Why is there no NATO in Asia?' revisited: Prospect theory, balance of threat, and US alliance strategies', *European Journal of International Relations* 18(2) (2012), page 244.

<sup>39</sup> Cooper, W., *U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options*, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (2014), page 16.

<sup>40</sup> He K., and Feng H., 'Why is there no NATO in Asia?', page 229.

<sup>41</sup> Duffield, J., 'Asia-Pacific security institutions in comparative perspective', in, Ikenberry, J., and Mastanduno, M., (Eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York, Columbia University Press (2003), page 253.

<sup>42</sup> Zhang, F., 'US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific', *US Foreign Policy*, page 243.

<sup>43</sup> Cha, V., 'Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia', *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2009), page 193.

<sup>44</sup> Wohlforth, W., Mastanduno, M., and Ikenberry, G., *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*. Cambridge University Press (2011), pages 137-138.

Economic and trading relationships followed a similar pattern. Faced with a rival in the USSR, that sought to propagate an alternative political and economic ideology, and enjoying the benefits of highly asymmetric economic relations, the US employed economic means to advance its political goals; tailoring its trade strategies to cultivate political influence with the smaller states in the region. Partner countries in the region enjoyed significant advantages as the US made (overly) generous, but given its economic preponderance from its perspective still relatively insignificant concessions, alongside security guarantees, to secure their cooperation and friendship.<sup>45</sup> In Japan's case, this deal became known as the Yoshida doctrine; trading some autonomy in the political and security fields in order to better focus on economic development and enjoy access to the US's vast, wealthy market.<sup>46</sup> To various extents, a number of other countries in the region could be said to have followed similar approaches.

The US's willingness to absorb Asian countries' goods and run chronic trade deficits was central to many of their export growth led development strategies, and certainly during periods of sustained economic growth in the US, potential criticism of those deficits had little domestic political resonance there.<sup>47</sup> There have been periods of heightened tension, particularly during periods of economic stress in the US, with Japan,<sup>48</sup> and South Korea,<sup>49</sup> in the 1980s for example coming under pressure to weaken mercantilist policies that were viewed as harmful to US commercial and industrial interests. Neither set of parties however had or have much incentive to radically change or dismantle these arrangements. The rise of China has provided countries in the region with an alternative partner with which to engage in trade and investment; but many of their economies also remain to varying degrees integrated with that of the US.

### *Constructivist thesis*

Constructivist theorists provide a different set of explanations for the difference in relationship structures in Asia, based on norms and identities. They posit that the US viewed countries in Europe as part of a shared historical and cultural (perhaps even ethnic) community in a way that did and still does not apply to countries in Asia.<sup>50</sup> Conversely, many countries in Asia that had been recently liberated from colonial rule guarded their new-found independence jealously, and in some cases were formally committed to non-alignment. They were therefore suspicious of new security arrangements proposed by a potential new hegemon, the US.<sup>51</sup> These suspicions

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<sup>45</sup> Kirshner, J., 'States, markets, and great power relations in the pacific Some Realist Expectations', in Ikenberry, J., and Michael Mastanduno, M., (Eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York Columbia University Press (2003), page 278.

<sup>46</sup> Campbell, J., 'US foreign policy towards northeast asia', *Perceptions* 17(4):3-26 (2012), page 6.

<sup>47</sup> Ikenberry, J., and Michael Mastanduno, M., *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, page 431.

<sup>48</sup> Campbell, J., 'US foreign policy towards northeast asia', page 6.

<sup>49</sup> Campbell, J., 'US foreign policy towards northeast asia', page 12.

<sup>50</sup> He K., and Feng H., 'Why is there no NATO in Asia?', page 231.

<sup>51</sup> Duffield, J., 'Asia-pacific security institutions in comparative perspective', in, Ikenberry, J., and Mastanduno, M., (Eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, page 255.

continue to resonate today; with many countries remaining nervous that US moves to create new security structures are attempts at 'entrapment'.<sup>52</sup>

A particular issue in Asia was and is the anomalous situation of Japan. Whereas in Europe the integration of the defeated Axis powers, principally Germany and Italy, into multilateral security and economic constructs had created a virtuous cycle of trust- and confidence- building and eventual reconciliation on the basis of shared democratic political and free market economic values and interests, this process was stunted in Asia. Following its rapid recovery after World War Two to become a major, advanced economy, suspicion of Japanese intentions and anti-Japanese sentiment in a number of neighbouring countries remained strong despite the US-authored pacifist provisions of its constitution. South Korea for example did not normalise its relations with Japan until 1965.<sup>53</sup> Some have argued that the US-Japan alliance, balanced by similar security commitments to some of its neighbours, has helped to allay suspicions and encourage the normalisation of relationships with Japan.<sup>54</sup> Whereas others argue that the prioritisation of relationships with the US has reduced the incentives for any country, particularly Japan, to seek genuine reconciliation.<sup>55</sup>

### *Comment on theory*

The realist and constructivist theses summarised above, do not on the face of it contradict each other. Indeed, they may actually complement each other; assessing and analysing as they do different factors that have together interacted to underpin what has been identified as a distinctively *bilateral* set of relationships between the US and its friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific. A number of factors have combined to make the creation of ambitious, expansive new multilateral frameworks in both security and economic fields, unlikely. For the purposes of this paper the salient points are as follows: First, that there are structural and systemic drivers (whether they be based on power, rational choice, culture or values) that have helped shape and define this outcome. Secondly, that although China's economic rise in particular does have implications for the US and other countries in the region, that many of these fundamental drivers likely remain broadly the same.

## **A 2.2: The rebalance in its own terms: Strategy, policy and practice under Obama, Trump and Biden**

When examined in light of the theoretical and historical context summarised above, the rebalance has been regarded as representing more continuity rather than radical change by international relations theorists and foreign policy analysts. The Obama Administration was clear that the US had never 'left' the region, but was merely

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<sup>52</sup> Ford, L., 'The U.S. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Concept - Continuity and Change', in Stromseth, J., *Rivalry and Response : Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia*, Washington DC Brookings Institution Press (2021), page 35.

<sup>53</sup> Duffield, J., 'Asia-Pacific security institutions in comparative perspective', in, Ikenberry, J., and Mastanduno, M., (Eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, page 255.

<sup>54</sup> Ikenberry, J., and Michael Mastanduno, M., *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, page 432.

<sup>55</sup> Cha, V., 'American Alliances and Asia's Regional Architecture', in, Pekkanen, S., Ravenhill J., and Foot, R., (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, page 739.

reprioritising it as the period of intensive interventions elsewhere drew to a close.<sup>56</sup> The rebalance did not therefore herald a correction or radical redrawing of relationships with a part of the world that the US had somehow forgotten. The US's stated objectives remained and do remain broadly the same. Many of the structural influences and constraints that had steered the US and its partners towards the 'hub and spoke' model, primarily based on bilateral relationships, in the post-World War Two era remained and remain the same. These include the region's geography, the US's overwhelming preponderance in naval and air power, the more heterogeneous cultures and values in the region particularly relating to democratic governance, and the lack of genuine, meaningful reconciliation between Japan and a number of its neighbours.

### *Three elements*

As noted earlier, the rebalance is commonly held to encompass three elements: Diplomatic, economic and military or security. In the diplomatic field the rebalance was construed as meaning greater levels of proactive, US diplomatic engagement with the region to signal the importance it attached to key relationships. This encompassed more and higher-level bilateral visits both to the region by US officials and to the US by counterparts from Asia. As well as becoming the first recent US President to visit the region more than once per year, President Obama also personally attended the East Asia Summit, signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and supported hosting G20 summit meetings in South Korea.<sup>57</sup> Although these engagements were sometimes criticised for lacking substance, they had a high diplomatic and symbolic importance. The essence of diplomacy is to meet, talk, exchange views and demonstrate the importance that an actor attaches to a relationship; the significance of these meetings is therefore that they happened at all.<sup>58</sup>

In the economic field, the Obama Administration continued a movement that had actually begun prior to the formal announcement of the rebalance. From the 1990's onwards the US had started to complement its traditional bilateral approach to economic and trade relationships with more multilateral approaches: The US supported ASEAN in part as a way to shore up the South East Asia region's economic success and also the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, providing a new mechanism to push for the integration of regional economies.<sup>59</sup> Under Obama these foundations were built upon and resulted in the US's championing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) proposal. This would have been an important new multilateral economic institution and a key building block for an

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<sup>56</sup> Liow, J., 'Ambivalent Engagement : The United States and Regional Security in Southeast Asia After the Cold War', *Geopolitics in the 21st Century*, page 143.

<sup>57</sup> Cha, V., 'American Alliances and Asia's Regional Architecture', in, Pekkanen, S., Ravenhill J., and Foot, R., (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, page 740.

<sup>58</sup> Liow, J., 'Ambivalent Engagement : The United States and Regional Security in Southeast Asia After the Cold War', *Geopolitics in the 21st Century*, page 145.

<sup>59</sup> Overholt, W., *Asia, America and the Transformation of Geopolitics*, Cambridge University Press (2008), pages 171-177.

eventual regional free trade area<sup>60</sup>. Despite Obama's failure to push agreement and ratification of TPP quickly enough, meaning that after his two terms the proposal fell prey to a new President with a very different, zero-sum approach to international trade deals (as explored in a later section), his Administration at least recognised the huge importance of the US exercising leadership on – and having a vision for – trade and the regional economy.<sup>61</sup>

As part of the rebalance the US also linked elements of its foreign assistance programmes to diplomatic and economic priorities. The Obama Administration trumpeted new schemes to support maritime capacity building, with an eye on disputes in the South China Sea, and capacity building linked to the creation and implementation of the TPP and the strengthening of APEC.<sup>62</sup> The rebalance did not however result in a significant increase in foreign assistance to the region. Budget allocations actually fell for a period after the announcement of the rebalance, albeit less than for some other regions.<sup>63</sup> Post 2011 in the latter years of Obama's first term and during his second, the level of resources allocated to the region stayed relatively stable as a very small proportion of global US foreign assistance,<sup>64</sup> despite the stated objective to increase it.<sup>65</sup> Certainly, under the Obama Administration no new far-reaching 'Marshall Plan' of economic or financial assistance designed to undergird US reengagement or counter the perceived attractions of Chinese finance was attempted. Instead, a moderate shift in resources and thematic focuses was in evidence.

In both the diplomatic and economic fields, a key shift is discernible from the 'bilateral first' approach that characterised the US's relationships with the region for most of the post-World War Two period. The US became much more open to more multilateral and what's termed 'mini-lateral' – that is involving a more select group of countries – institutions and ways of cooperating in what could be termed 'bilateral plus'.<sup>66</sup> On the US's side, this was in part driven by the desire to see regional partners work together, share burdens more effectively, break down barriers between 'spokes', while maintaining the primacy of the relationship with the 'hub',

<sup>60</sup> Cha, V., 'American Alliances and Asia's Regional Architecture', in, Pekkanen, S., Ravenhill J., and Foot, R., (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, page 748.

<sup>61</sup> Singh, D., 'Frontmatter', in *How Will Shifts in American Foreign Policy Affect Southeast Asia?*, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute (2019), page 18

<sup>62</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Factsheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific*, The White House Obama Archive (2015): [www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov](http://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov), accessed 13<sup>th</sup> May 2022: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific>

<sup>63</sup> Manyin, M., et al, (2021), *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia*, Congressional Research Service (2021), [www.crsreports.congress.gov](http://www.crsreports.congress.gov), accessed 13<sup>th</sup> May 2022 (from the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy): <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf>

<sup>64</sup> US China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2016 Annual Report to Congress*, US China Economic and Security Review Commission (2016), [www.uscc.gov](http://www.uscc.gov), accessed 13<sup>th</sup> May 2022: [https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual\\_reports/2016%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2016%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf)

<sup>65</sup> Sutter, R., Brown, M., and Adamson, T., *Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability*, George Washington University (2013): [www.gwu.edu](http://www.gwu.edu), accessed 13<sup>th</sup> May 2022: [https://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs\\_Compiled1.pdf](https://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf)

<sup>66</sup> Ikenberry, J., and Michael Mastanduno, M., *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, page 436.

and allow the US's leadership role to become less overt.<sup>67</sup> For countries in the region, it reflected the growing economic reality both of their own economic success – and therefore the gains to be achieved from greater levels of integration – and the diminution of the US's economic preponderance and shifting patterns of trade and investment as China's economy continued to grow rapidly. Many countries in the region wanted and needed productive economic ties with China and were positive about the source of finance and investment that it offered.<sup>68</sup> Multilateral or mini-lateral approaches provided an option that might 'square the circle' of the need to cultivate good relations with both Beijing and Washington DC.

In the military or security field however, the approach followed by the US and its regional partners continues to be based overwhelmingly on bilateral relationships, agreements and treaties. The rebalance prioritised continuing defence diplomacy led by the Department of Defence with the militaries of key Southeast Asian countries involving capacity building, shared military exercises, the sale of equipment and provision of training and improving the US military's access to the region by agreeing or expanding access to bases or facilities.<sup>69</sup> The US also sought in parallel to invigorate the 'Quad' along with Australia, Japan and India; however, the championing of this 'mini-lateral' grouping has not been followed by any more ambitious or comprehensive proposals for new multilateral institutions in the security sphere.

Particularly in South East Asia such proposals are viewed as problematic, given concerns over their potential to 'provoke' China and undermine productive relationships with it. Many countries in the region have long welcomed the US's security guarantees and military presence as providing an effective counterbalance to China; but they also do not completely trust the US and do not want to be identified as US allies in a constellation or grouping that is directed *against* China.<sup>70</sup> Conversely, US championing of multilateral security arrangements is viewed by some as a potential diminution of its commitments, prompting fears that it may be resiling from the region.<sup>71</sup> Countries in the region therefore find themselves caught between the twin fears of 'entrapment' or 'abandonment'.<sup>72</sup> The US for its part is stuck with the perennial 'Goldilocks' problem; how much US leadership is too much, too little, or just enough? For many policy makers in the region, leading the creation of a new multilateral security architecture would be a provocation to China and definitely 'too much'.

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<sup>67</sup> Liow, J., 'Ambivalent Engagement : The United States and Regional Security in Southeast Asia After the Cold War', *Geopolitics in the 21st Century*, pages 143 and 147.

<sup>68</sup> Ford, L., 'The U.S. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Concept - Continuity and Change', in Stromseth, J., *Rivalry and Response : Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia*, page 32.

<sup>69</sup> Singh, D., 'Frontmatter', in *How Will Shifts in American Foreign Policy Affect Southeast Asia?*, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute (2019), page 18.

<sup>70</sup> Overholt, W., *Asia, America and the Transformation of Geopolitics*, page 181

<sup>71</sup> Cha, V., 'American Alliances and Asia's Regional Architecture', in Pekkanen, S., Ravenhill J., and Foot, R., (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, page 740.

<sup>72</sup> Ford, L., 'The U.S. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Concept - Continuity and Change', in Stromseth, J., *Rivalry and Response : Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia*, page 35.

### *'Free and Open Indo-Pacific'*

The election of President Donald Trump in 2016 was initially thought to herald a radical shift from the Obama Administration's approach given the candidate's bombastic and iconoclastic rhetoric; it soon became clear however that in substance, there were high degrees of continuity, particularly in the security field.<sup>73</sup> The overall rubric changed, from rebalance to Asia to 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific', however underneath this the policy substance was largely conventional and in line with the US's longstanding objectives in the region: Building collective security through a network of allies and partners, promoting economic prosperity, and encouraging good governance.<sup>74</sup> The Trump Administration continued to expand and develop bilateral and 'mini-lateral' partnerships in South East and South East Asia, with a particular focus on the Mekong region, Sri Lanka and the Pacific islands.<sup>75</sup> However, there was again no attempt to radically alter the existing pattern of US engagement and security relationships in the region, and unsurprisingly, given the approach of the Trump Administration, no major multilateral proposals were forthcoming.

What the election of Donald Trump did herald was a cooling of diplomatic relations with many partners and a significant shift in rhetoric. The impacts of this should not be overstated however. As noted earlier, there have been previous examples of Trump's 'America First' rhetoric, focus on self-reliance and isolationism, and denigration of relationships with external partners, particularly during periods of economic stress in the US.<sup>76</sup> Trump also resiled from the personal diplomatic engagement with leaders from the region (with some notable exceptions, for example Kim Jong Un) that had marked out the approach of Barak Obama and many of his senior officials.

A key difference perhaps more in substance, as opposed to style, was the Trump Administration's more robust approach to China; identifying it explicitly as a strategic competitor and framing the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' concept much more explicitly as a response to China's growing power and influence.<sup>77</sup> This view was not shared at the highest levels of the Obama Administration, even at the end of his second term; the policy to sustain a cooperative relationship with China, manage differences and avoid tensions remained.<sup>78</sup> Trump's more bellicose approach – at least in terms of rhetoric – heightened the concerns amongst regional partners, as explained earlier, that being 'forced to choose' might have implications for their relationships with Beijing or Washington and so strengthened the attraction of

<sup>73</sup> Cullen, P., 'The Rebalance to Asia Under Trump', *The RUSI Journal* 162:2, 8-15 (2017), page 13.

<sup>74</sup> Ford, L., 'The U.S. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Concept - Continuity and Change', in Stromseth, J., *Rivalry and Response : Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia*, page 30.

<sup>75</sup> Ford, L., 'The U.S. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Concept - Continuity and Change', in Stromseth, J., *Rivalry and Response : Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia*, page 31.

<sup>76</sup> Singh, D., 'Frontmatter', in *How Will Shifts in American Foreign Policy Affect Southeast Asia?*, page 2.

<sup>77</sup> Ford, L., 'The U.S. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Concept - Continuity and Change', in Stromseth, J., *Rivalry and Response : Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia*, page 30.

<sup>78</sup> Singh, D., 'Frontmatter', in *How Will Shifts in American Foreign Policy Affect Southeast Asia?*, page 4.

'hedging' strategies.<sup>79</sup> It did not however lead to any significant or structural rupture in relationships with either the PRC or the US.

The advent of the Trump era did mark a more significant divergence from the priorities of previous administrations in the fields of economics and trade, with the repudiation of the nascent more multilateral approach. Acting in line with his 'America First' rhetoric and zero-sum view of international trade, where trade deals always have a 'winner' and a 'loser', on his first day in office Trump withdrew the US from the TPP agreement; declaring an end to multilateral trade agreements and stating the US would instead seek bilateral arrangements with partners.<sup>80</sup> Building on its domestic economic agenda and seeking to draw a contrast with China's state-led development model, the Trump Administration emphasised private sector business-to-business links and pursued limited bilateral deals with established regional partners such as Japan and South Korea. But even this switch back to what could be considered a more traditional, 'bilateral first' approach was augmented by attempts to create new, 'mini-lateral' partnerships; for example, with Australia and Japan on regional energy security, and with ASEAN on digital connectivity in South East Asia.<sup>81</sup> The Trump Administration could not escape the reality that after several decades – with huge strides in economic growth and development in the region and much higher levels of integration – a strictly bilateral approach would yield little of additional value.

#### *President Biden – Back to rebalance?*

Joe Biden was inaugurated as US president in January 2021 and most of his first 18 to 24 months in office were overshadowed by the continuing COVID19 pandemic and then after February 2022, Russia's aggressive and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Despite this, it is possible to discern the beginnings of a distinctive approach to the rebalance that combines the diplomatic smoothness and push on multilateralism in the economic field that characterised the Obama Administration, with a more muscular and explicit approach to the perceived threat posed by China.<sup>82</sup> Relationships with key friends and allies have improved, becoming less transactional, and the Biden Administration has sought to strengthen new 'mini-lateral' groups such as the Quad.<sup>83</sup> The US continues to augment its bilateral security relationships with 'mini-lateral' arrangements, such as the 'AUKUS' agreement on nuclear submarines agreed with Australia and the UK in September 2021; sending a clear message to Beijing that any military build-up on its part will be

<sup>79</sup> Southgate, L., 'Explaining the United States' Foreign Policy Failure in Southeast Asia since 2008', *Asia Policy* 16.4 (2021), page 215.

<sup>80</sup> Mireya Solís, M., *Trump withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership*, Brookings Institution (2017): [www.brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/03/24/trump-withdrawing-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/), accessed 13<sup>th</sup> May 2022: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/03/24/trump-withdrawing-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/>

<sup>81</sup> Ford, L., 'The U.S. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Concept - Continuity and Change', in Stromseth, J., *Rivalry and Response : Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia*, pages 33-34.

<sup>82</sup> Southgate, L., 'Explaining the United States' Foreign Policy Failure in Southeast Asia since 2008', *Asia Policy*, page 211.

<sup>83</sup> Grabowski, M., 'Joe Biden's Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Change or Continuity. A Comparative Analysis', *Polish Political Science* 50.4 (2021), pages 9-10.

balanced by the US and its allies in the medium- to long- term.<sup>84</sup> The Biden Administration has also announced that it is designing a new multilateral 'Indo-Pacific economic framework' as part of its approach to the regional economy and trade,<sup>85</sup> although what that will actually entail in practice is unclear at present. As some had argued in the early years of the rebalance, the costs of investing in relationships were low and the returns were high, and thinking in terms of rebalancing had become routine.<sup>86</sup> Overall, unsurprisingly, US policy under Biden does not represent a radical departure from the previous two Administrations but a continued evolution of the 'bilateral plus' approach to the rebalance.

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<sup>84</sup> Mori Satoru, M., 'The Biden Administration's First Year in the Indo-Pacific: Balancing, Order-Building and Managing Competition with China', *Asia-Pacific Review*, 28:2, 77-106 (2021), page 93.

<sup>85</sup> The White House, *Fact Sheet: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States*, The White House Press Office (2022): [www.whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov), accessed on March 15<sup>th</sup> 2023: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states/>

<sup>86</sup> Harold, S., 'Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America's Strategic 'Rebalance'', *The Washington Quarterly*, 37:4, 85-99 (2014), page 98.

### A3 Analytical Framework

#### *Literature Review: Implications for Analytical Framework*

As a result of the the findings of the Literature Review, the Analytical Framework has been designed on the basis of the following principles:

- Assessing changes in **bilateral relationships**; the foundation of the US's engagement with and presence in the region.
- Analysing **what is said about the relationship** between the two countries, by their political leadership and **what happens in practice**.
- Analysing a range of **qualitative and quantitative sources and combining discourse and additional empirical analysis**; to provide a rounded analysis of any changes.
- As well as assessing the evolution of **overall strategic, political and diplomatic relationships**, focusing thematically on the two areas of **security and economics and trade**; the areas where substantive changes are likely to have occurred despite any ups and downs in the political or diplomatic spheres.
- Being **realistic** about the extent and/or significance of the changes that have happened and can be measured as a result of the rebalance; it is not a radical approach.
- Recognising that any changes are likely to be **incremental**; building upon and expanding existing relationships.

#### *Methodology – discourse analysis*

Discourse analysis has been chosen as it provides a useful, general framework to organise and carry out problem-orientated social research,<sup>87</sup> in this case the problem of determining the consequences and impacts of the US's rebalance to Asia. The definition of discourse used is a broad one, encompassing records of speech that are more commonly included in the definition, as well as longer 'texts' that are often categorised differently.<sup>88</sup> The analysis therefore includes all substantive public statements, whether oral or written, that are available from the identified source archives and websites.

The first step in conducting the discourse analysis is the identification of online sources for the discourse, namely the White House and State Department archived (for Obama and Trump) and current (for Biden) websites. These sources have been

<sup>87</sup> Wodak, R., and Krzyzanowski, M., *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Palgrave Macmillan (2008), page 2.

<sup>88</sup> Wodak, R., and Krzyzanowski, M., *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, pages 6-7.

selected as they are judged as likely to include the most substantive, formal and official contributions to the discourse about the countries' relationships.

| Strategic political relationship                                                                                                                                                                                                             |             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evolution of how the US and partner countries characterise, describe and explain their relationship in overall terms and with a focus on security and economic aspects of the relationship</li> </ul> | Qualitative | <p>Discourse analysis based on database of all relevant public statements by US and country leaders, using the following sources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Obama White House Archive: <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/</a></li> <li>Obama State Department Archive: <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/index.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/index.htm</a></li> <li>Trump White House Archive: <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/</a></li> <li>Trump State Department Archive: <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/index.html</a></li> <li>Biden White House: <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/</a></li> <li>Biden State Department: <a href="https://www.state.gov/">https://www.state.gov/</a></li> </ul> |

Then a long list of potential documents was created using the websites' existing free text word search functions. The search terms used were 'Indonesia' and 'Philippines' in order to capture all potentially relevant documents.

These long lists were then sifted to produce a short list of documents where there are substantive contributions to the discourse; documents where Indonesian, Philippine or US interlocutors talk substantively about the relationship between their countries. Most of these documents constitute speeches, call or meeting read outs, press conferences, formal statements and fact sheets. Despite the online sources being US Government websites, a significant proportion of the documents, around 25% for each country, contain or record contributions to the discourse from Indonesian or Philippine interlocutors, or are stated to be 'joint'. Documents where the two countries are mentioned in passing, or in the context of discussion about a different subject, or that otherwise did not represent a substantive contribution to the discourse were sifted out.

The remaining short-listed documents are recorded in an EXCEL database with the following key makers recorded:

| Date published | Relevant country – Indonesia or the Philippines | Title | US Gov. Website Source | URL | US Leader | Indonesian Leader | Philippines Leader | Whether the document is joint |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|------------------------|-----|-----------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
|                |                                                 |       |                        |     |           |                   |                    |                               |

The full text of these documents was also copied and pasted into a Word document for ease of reading, searching and interrogating.

Each short-listed document was then read and analysed. First, using a colour code system to identify sections of the text that contain discourse on the 'strategic/political/diplomatic', 'security/military', or 'economic/trade' attributes of the countries' relationships.

Secondly, more closely and with notes taken using the proforma below based on a simple, generic approach to discourse analysis,<sup>89</sup> to help structure the analysis of the discourse and the writing up of findings.

|                                                      | Strategic/Political/<br>Diplomatic | Security/Military | Economic/Trade |
|------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Overall Narrative                                    |                                    |                   |                |
| Key Vocabulary/<br>Lexicon                           |                                    |                   |                |
| Emphasised/<br>Included                              |                                    |                   |                |
| Deemphasised/<br>Not Included                        |                                    |                   |                |
| Positive/ Negative                                   |                                    |                   |                |
| Grammar, Active/<br>Passive; Modal,<br>Should/ Could |                                    |                   |                |
| Metaphor/ Simile                                     |                                    |                   |                |
| Evidence, Facts/<br>Factuality                       |                                    |                   |                |

For each set of documents, a key word check was also conducted using a basic, freely available online tool at: <https://checkserp.com/keyword-density-checker/>

#### *Methodology – further empirical analysis*

The discourse analysis is then supplemented with further empirical analysis of the evolution of the security and economic relationships between the US and each case study country. This is structured around the questions and data sources summarised below.

| Criterion                              | Unit                              | Data source                                                                                                                                                             |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Country Case Study (X2)                |                                   |                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Security relationship                  |                                   |                                                                                                                                                                         |
| • Formal treaty or agreement           | Yes/no and qualitative assessment | US State Department Office of Treaty Affairs: <a href="https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/treaty-affairs/">https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/treaty-affairs/</a> |
| • Strengthening of treaty or agreement | Qualitative assessment            | US State Department Office of Treaty Affairs: <a href="https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/treaty-affairs/">https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/treaty-affairs/</a> |
| • Levels of foreign                    | Quantitative funding levels       | US Foreign Assistance database: <a href="https://foreignassistance.gov/cd">https://foreignassistance.gov/cd</a>                                                         |

<sup>89</sup> Luo, A., *Critical Discourse Analysis Definition, Guide & Examples*, [www.scribbr.com](http://www.scribbr.com) (2022), accessed March 16<sup>th</sup> 2023: <https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/discourse-analysis/>

|                                                                                                            |                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| assistance for military/security purposes                                                                  |                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Levels of arms exports from the US</li> </ul>                       | Quantitative exports              | Stockholm Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database:<br><a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers">https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Content of arms exports from the US</li> </ul>                      | Qualitative assessment            | Stockholm Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database:<br><a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers">https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| <b>Trade/Economic relationship</b>                                                                         |                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formal treaty or agreement</li> </ul>                               | Yes/no and qualitative assessment | US State Department Office of Treaty Affairs:<br><a href="https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/treaty-affairs/">https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/treaty-affairs/</a><br><br>Plus the Office of the US Trade Representative: <a href="https://ustr.gov/">https://ustr.gov/</a>                                                                                                               |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening of treaty or agreement</li> </ul>                     | Qualitative assessment            | US State Department Office of Treaty Affairs:<br><a href="https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/treaty-affairs/">https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/treaty-affairs/</a><br><br>Plus, the Office of the US Trade Representative: <a href="https://ustr.gov/">https://ustr.gov/</a>                                                                                                              |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>US-country levels of trade, imports, exports, investment</li> </ul> | Quantitative levels               | World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution Database:<br><a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en">https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en</a><br><br>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Database<br><a href="https://www.oecd.org/investment/statistics.htm">https://www.oecd.org/investment/statistics.htm</a> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Levels of foreign assistance for economic purposes</li> </ul>       | Quantitative funding levels       | US Foreign Assistance database:<br><a href="https://foreignassistance.gov/cd">https://foreignassistance.gov/cd</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |

## **Section B: Empirical**

### **B1 Case Study One: The Philippines**

#### **B1.1. The rebalance in context: Philippines perspectives**

From the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Philippines was a Spanish colony. Following the Spanish-American War, in 1898, the territory was ceded to the US. US interest in the territory was in part driven by the broader more strategic concerns regarding the carving out of spheres of influence in Asia by European powers and Japan, from which the US might be excluded; and so, in the relentless logic of imperialism, it needed to secure a sphere of its own. US policy, particularly under President William McKinley, was deliberately and avowedly expansionist.<sup>90</sup> It was also driven partly by a sense of national 'destiny' and 'duty'; to bring liberty to a people newly freed from the imperialism of Spain.<sup>91</sup> These competing narratives were contested at the time both in the US itself and in the Philippines, and remain so to this day.

Despite its protestation of liberal ideals, US refusal to countenance actual independence for the Philippines under the leadership of its indigenous nationalist forces led to further armed conflict with them and a guerrilla war that lasted until 1902. 20,000 direct combatants died and between 200,000 and 1 million, out of a population of 7 to 8 million, died as a result of the hunger, disease and dislocation caused by the war. This experience provides the foundation for a more critical nationalist perspective that still exists in the Philippines today and views the relationship with the US as neo-colonial in nature.<sup>92</sup>

From the beginning of its rule over the Philippines the US had promised eventual independence.<sup>93</sup> After a number of abortive attempts however, formal independence was not granted until 1946, after World War Two and liberation from Japanese occupation. In the interim, the US sought to reconcile colonialism with liberalism by granting the Philippines the trappings of sovereignty without ever actually ceding genuine control to the people of the country.<sup>94</sup> The US actively sought to cultivate the elite of Philippines society; drawing them into a political process under its tutelage and offering a pathway to reform, modernisation and nation building.<sup>95</sup> This continued in the immediate post-independence period: The country's new leaders, with the strong support of elite land owners, sought a close relationship with the US

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<sup>90</sup> Cotterell, A., *A History of Southeast Asia*, Marshall Cavendish (2014), page 266.

<sup>91</sup> Hunt, M., and Levine, S., *Arc of Empire: America's Wars in Asia From the Philippines to Vietnam*, Chapel Hill The University of North Carolina Press (2012), pages 15-18.

<sup>92</sup> Hunt, M., and Levine, S., *Arc of Empire: America's Wars in Asia From the Philippines to Vietnam*, page 58.

<sup>93</sup> Immerwahr, D., 'Philippine Independence in U.S. History: A Car, Not a Train', *Pacific Historical Review* 91 (2): 220–248 (2022), page 245.

<sup>94</sup> Castañeda Anastacio, L., Conclusion. In *The Foundations of the Modern Philippine State: Imperial Rule and the American Constitutional Tradition in the Philippine Islands, 1898–1935* (Cambridge Historical Studies in American Law and Society). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2016), pages 259-266.

<sup>95</sup> Stanley, P., *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899–1921*, Cambridge, MA and London, England, Harvard University Press (2013), page 268.

based on a free trade agreement and the provision of significant amounts of aid, particularly to the army.<sup>96</sup>

As the only part of the Asia Pacific to be directly ruled by the US for a period of almost 50 years, and with a political and economic elite and system built in its image, some in its neighbouring countries have characterised the Philippines as 'insufficiently Asian'.<sup>97</sup> Given this long history and the deep ties with the United States, Filipinos view relations with the US very favourably, tinged with a degree of nationalistic wariness.<sup>98</sup> This has led to a close political relationship and military alliance: A 'Military Bases Agreement' was signed in 1947 and relations became closer after the signing of the 1951 'Mutual Defense Treaty'. However, it has not been without its problems; in 1991, the Philippine Senate voted not to extend the US's military presence in part fuelled by concerns about sovereignty and overweening US influence, resulting in American military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992.

Since the early 2000's a key factor pushing the Philippines towards greater engagement with the US, particularly on defence and security, has been growing concern about China's activities in the South China Sea.<sup>99</sup> The Philippines views these as clear threats to its territory and resources and has caused concern amongst other ASEAN members through its robust, and sometimes unilateral, defence of what it perceives to be its rights.<sup>100</sup> For its part, the US has remained cautious about backing the Philippines too strongly and is officially neutral regarding the territorial disputes so as to avoid encouraging any escalation of any confrontations with China; nevertheless even prior to the announcement of the rebalance the US's treaty commitment already extended to 'public vessels' belonging to the Philippines in the Pacific.<sup>101</sup> Building on the existing relationships, the Philippines has been assessed as the 'closest and keenest' of all the countries in South East Asia with regard to its openness to greater engagement with the US and the potential to strengthen its relationship with the US as part of the rebalance.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Cotterell, A., *A History of Southeast Asia*, pages 373-375.

<sup>97</sup> Overholt, W., *Asia, America and the Transformation of Geopolitics*, page 181.

<sup>98</sup> Chua, D., 'United States' Pivot and South East Asia', in Ganguly, S., Scobell, A., Chinyong Liow, J., (Eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, Routledge (2017).

<sup>99</sup> Tow, W., 'US-South East Asia Relations in the Age of Rebalance', *Southeast Asian Affairs* 35-53 (2016), page 5.

<sup>100</sup> Graham E., 'Southeast asia in the US rebalance: Perceptions from a divided region', *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 35(3) (2013), page 315.

<sup>101</sup> Graham E., 'Southeast asia in the US rebalance: Perceptions from a divided region', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, page 314.

<sup>102</sup> Graham E., 'Southeast asia in the US rebalance: Perceptions from a divided region', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, page 313.

## B1.2 The Philippines and the US rebalance: Discourse Analysis

### B.1.2.1 The Obama Administration 2009-2017

*Strategic, political/diplomatic discourse*

*Overall narrative*

First, throughout the period of the two Obama Administrations, both US and Philippine interlocutors present and promote the idea of a ‘deep’, and ‘historic’ alliance between their countries. This is grounded in a narrative that repeatedly stresses shared values, in particular those of democracy. Both sets of actors seek to draw a link between their countries’ claimed status as democracies and the durability of their alliance. The core claim is that as two democracies, the Philippines and the US are natural partners with a shared vision; working together to strengthen their bilateral alliance, advance their mutual interests and contributing to security, peace and stability in their region over the course of some sixty to seventy years.

Secondly, a major theme in the narrative are the shared, historical ties between the two countries (although there are limits to the extent this is drawn upon in the narrative, see the section below on what is deemphasised). Interlocutors from both countries repeatedly cite the shared experience of fighting Japanese aggression during World War Two as a formative experience for and continuing basis for their alliance. In more recent times, the presence of a significant diaspora from the Philippines in the US and similar ‘people-to-people’ ties are cited as a strong basis for the alliance. As an alliance, the relationship between the two countries constitutes a number of strategic partnerships across a broad range of areas. It is described as comprehensive, encompassing collaboration on security and defence, economics and trade and a broad range of other issues.

Thirdly, both countries explicitly cite the pivot or rebalance in explicit terms, and the growing economic and political importance of the region, as justifying greater levels of engagement. Interlocutors from the Philippines are very positive about this shift. The US states explicitly that they are an Asia Pacific nation and notes the Philippine’s status as one of the world’s fastest growing economies. Repeated references are made to the need to reinvigorate and expand the two countries’ alliance so that they are better able to respond to twenty-first century challenges.

The way in which both countries characterise their relationship is perhaps best exemplified by the following extract, from the text of a joint statement issued in April 2012 titled ‘The U.S.-Philippines Alliance: Charting a Course Forward’:

“The U.S.-Philippines alliance is stronger than ever, reflecting the deep and abiding ties linking our two nations and forged through a history of shared sacrifice and common purpose. Seventy years ago this month, thousands of U.S. and Filipino troops served together in defense of our last strongholds at Corregidor and Bataan. Later, when we signed our Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, we united against the spread of communism. Today, Americans and Filipinos are inextricably bound by common values and shared aspirations,

including a commitment to democracy and the rule of law, building a robust economic partnership, and deepening people-to-people ties.

Our alliance remains an anchor for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. With this in mind, our Ministers meet today in Washington to reaffirm the Manila Declaration signed by our governments on November 16, 2011 and to ensure that our alliance remains robust, agile, and responsive in order to meet changing global and regional dynamics. Our consultations seek to address common strategic and security objectives, promote economic cooperation, advance people-to-people ties, and enshrine principles of good governance and the rule of law.

The Ministers reaffirm our shared obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty and our mutual commitment to the peace and security of the region.”<sup>103</sup>

Finally, it is also worth noting that in the latter part of this period the shared narrative does shift in response to the election of President Duterte in June 2016. Philippines interlocutors had noted as part of their contributions to the discourse that mutual confidence and respect were an important part of the alliance. US interlocutors also, in response to reported comments from President Duterte, explicitly accentuate that the alliance is based on an equal partnership and mutual respect, as in this example from October 2016:

“And a big part of the message that Secretary conveyed and I conveyed is that there is a deep wellspring of respect and affection between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. Our roots run deep.

My belief is that those deep roots between the American and Filipino people will ensure stability in our relationship over the long term.

For our part, the U.S. remains a steady and trusted partner, and strong ally. We stand by our commitments, we stand by international law, and we stand by the Philippines.

The U.S. respects the Philippines’ sovereignty and independence. In fact, U.S. training, capacity building, equipment, these are all crucial to protecting the autonomy and promoting the self-reliance of the Republic of the Philippines.

Now, President Duterte already walked back and explained that comment about “separation” with the United States. He described it as a reference to maintaining an “independent” foreign policy.

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<sup>103</sup> US Department of State, *Joint Statement of the United States-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (April 30, 2012), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188977.htm>

Well, if "separation" means that the government in Manila makes its own foreign policy decisions based on its own assessment of the Filipino national interests then there is no need for a change.

If it is the policy of the Philippines to honor its constitution and to make its own decision on the basis of autonomy, independence and self-reliance that's consistent with the way the U.S. and the Philippines have partnered as allies today."<sup>104</sup>

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

A top 10 ranking of words from the key word density analysis of the full texts of the discourse is summarised below. Extraneous words or particles such as names of the two countries, job titles, etc. have been excluded based on a judgement by the author.

| <b>Single words</b> | <b>Two-word linkages</b> | <b>Three-word linkages</b>    |
|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| People              | Asia Pacific             | South China Sea               |
| Partnership         | International Law        | Defense Cooperation Agreement |
| Security            | Partnership Growth       | Mutual Defense Treaty         |
| Defense             | Economic Growth          | Bilateral Strategic Dialogue  |
| Government          | Look Forward             | Asia Pacific Region           |
| China               | China Sea                | Enhanced Defense Cooperation  |
| Region              | South China              | Unimpeded Lawful Commerce     |
| Growth              | Mutual Defense           | Armed Forces Philippines      |
| Economic            | Defense Cooperation      | Maritime Domain Awareness     |
| Cooperation         | Defense Treaty           | East Asia Summit              |

Given the nature and content of the overarching narrative, and that the foundation of the two countries' relationship is a military alliance, it is not surprising that the terms

<sup>104</sup> US Department of State, *Remarks at Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (October 24, 2016), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2016/10/263465.htm>

'partnership', 'people', 'cooperation', 'security' and 'defence' figure highly in the shared vocabulary of the Philippines and the US. Economic growth also figures highly in the words and concepts, reflecting the priority that both countries ascribe to it. References to China, the South China Sea and related issues such as international law and 'unimpeded lawful commerce' also figure highly, reflecting both countries' view about the importance of these issues as a driver for their increased collaboration, particularly in the security field. References to regional and multilateral issues and institutions are also present.

The Philippines and the US also create and then draw upon a shared lexicon relating to the institutions and priority subject matter of their comprehensive partnership. Key concepts and institutions include the Mutual Defense Treaty, Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and a series of official bilateral dialogues. The creation, functioning and outcomes from these institutions provides a locus and content for the two countries' discourse regarding their relationship.

### *Emphasised/included*

Throughout the discourse the claims that the US and the Philippines share a common commitment to 'values' such as tolerance and pluralism, and a set of shared experiences especially relating to the practice of democracy, are emphasised. Shared interests, challenges and a commitment to tackle them together and contribute to a set of shared normative 'goods' in the region such as peace, stability, security and prosperity are also emphasised. The shared historical experience, particularly during World War Two is also repeatedly drawn upon to emphasise the two countries' shared sacrifice; fighting for the cause of freedom against imperialism.

The explicit references to the pivot and the rebalance also serve to emphasise the idea that changes in the US's approach to the Philippines specifically or the South East Asia or East Asia regions more generally are driven by a grander US strategy, approach or foreign policy design that the Philippines is supportive of and keen to be part of.

The two countries' commitment to a rules-based order in international affairs is also repeatedly noted and contrasted explicitly with China's actions in the South China Sea that constitute a joint cause for concern about the threat posed to that order. The Philippines is explicit regarding its territorial dispute with China whereas the US is repeatedly clear that it takes no formal position on the issue. This emphasises the idea that rather than working together to advance the Philippine's interests in this area, the two countries are working together to support a rules-based order in international relations; they repeatedly stress that they are not trying to exclude or counter China but merely defending the right of countries to make their own decisions without coercion and the norm that disputes are resolved peacefully. This position is summarised by the then US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, in April 2012:

"We also discussed the evolving regional security situation. We both share deep concerns about the developments on the Korean Peninsula and events

in the South China Sea, including recent tensions surrounding the Scarborough Shoal. In this context, the United States has been clear and consistent. While we do not take sides on the competing sovereignty claims to land features in the South China Sea, as a Pacific power we have a national interest in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, and the unimpeded, lawful commerce across our sea lanes. The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all those involved for resolving the various disputes that they encounter. We oppose the threat or use of force by any party to advance its claims. And we will remain in close contact with our ally, the Philippines. I look forward to continuing to work closely with the foreign secretary as we approach the ASEAN Regional Forum in July.”<sup>105</sup>

### *Deemphasised/not included*

Throughout the discourse there is an absence of language, narrative and discourse relating to power or the power differential between the US and the Philippines. The two countries are referred to as equal actors pursuing mutual benefit through a partnership based on mutual respect. This deemphasises the idea that the US as the leading partner or driving force behind the alliance. And concomitantly, deemphasises the idea that the Philippines is a junior partner, following the US's lead or seeking gains or favours from a much more powerful actor.

There is no mention at all throughout the discourse of the Philippines past status as a colony of the US. References to the colonial past and imperialism seem to refer only to Japan, with the interlocutors' version of history beginning only in December 1941. In a similar vein, throughout the discourse there is little in the way of deeper or more meaningful exposition on what democracy is or how and in what ways the US or Philippines experiences of it may be similar or different despite the Philippines having suffered under periods of dictatorship since its independence from the US. Mostly, any challenges around the two countries historical relationship or about defining or being a democracy are deemphasised, therefore deemphasising any potential differences between the Philippines and the US. Both are characterised without much qualification as functioning democracies and this forms one of the main foundations for their alliance.

### *Security/military discourse*

#### *Narrative*

It is noticeable throughout the discourse that there is significant narrative content on security, military and defence matters that places details on these issues within the overall context of the alliance between the US and the Philippines. Both countries underline repeatedly their commitment to the alliance, with the US in particular using such terms as 'unwavering', 'shoulder-to-shoulder', 'ironclad' and 'rock solid' to

<sup>105</sup> US Department of State, *Remarks With Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (April 30, 2012), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188982.htm>

describe their support for the Philippines under the terms of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. Building on a point from the analysis of the overall strategic and political narrative, both countries also claim repeatedly that their alliance, and its longevity, represents a cornerstone not just of their own security and defence, but also of security, stability and prosperity in the broader South East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions. Their alliance helps deliver these public goods not just for each other, but for other countries too. Then US Defence Secretary, Ash Carter, provides just one example of this claim being made, also in support of the idea of the rebalance, explicitly, in January 2016:

“The rebalance, so-called, to the Asia Pacific is, as the Secretary of State has noted, not a purely military concept. It is an economic and political one as well. However, it has a very important security dimension, and that can be captured very succinctly by looking past over the many decades of peace and stability in the region and the role that the United States and Philippines have played together in keeping peace in the Asia Pacific region.”<sup>106</sup>

Another significant aspect of the overall narrative is that both countries explicitly compare and contrast their contributions to regional stability and security with China’s actions, particularly in the South China Sea that are characterised negatively, often as ‘destabilising’. This is done both proactively and in response to journalists’ questions. Here, both sets of interlocutors deploy a narrative that focuses on the importance of freedom of navigation and trade, respect for international rules and the need for negotiated and peaceful settlements of disputes. Their cooperation is legitimised by being presented as designed to support and defend these desirable norms (conversely China’s actions are delegitimised). President Obama makes many of these points during remarks to the press in November 2015:

“We discussed the impact of China’s land reclamation and construction activities on regional stability. We agree on the need for bold steps to lower tensions, including pledging to halt further reclamation, new construction, and militarization of disputed areas in the South China Sea. As President Aquino indicated, disputes need to be resolved peacefully. That’s why the United States supports the Philippines’ decision to use arbitration under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to peacefully and lawfully address differences.”<sup>107</sup>

The role of regional organisations such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, and the leading role of the Philippines and/or the US within them is also referred to

<sup>106</sup> US Department of State, *Remarks With Secretary of Defense Ash Carter with Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario and Secretary of Defense Voltaire Gazmin*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (January 12, 2016), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/01/251126.htm>

<sup>107</sup> The White House, *Remarks by President Obama and President Aquino of the Republic of the Philippines after Bilateral Meeting*, Obama White House Archive (November 17, 2015), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/remarks-president-obama-and-president-aquino-republic-philippines-after>

frequently, centrally, in the narrative, as exemplifying the kind of rules-based diplomatic and dispute resolution mechanisms that the two countries support.

The final major element of the narrative relates to the richness of the US-Philippines relationship on defence and security matters. Both countries repeatedly highlight the high levels of cooperation they enjoy particularly in the areas of counter terrorism or extremism, counter proliferation, maritime security and maritime 'domain awareness' and the provision of humanitarian assistance and support following natural disasters. The provision of training, equipment and other forms of capacity building by the US and the conducting of joint visits and exercises are cited often in the narrative as examples of the practical manifestation, and benefits, of the two countries' alliance.

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

As in other areas, the Philippines and the US create and draw on a shared vocabulary on security issues reflective of the longstanding and 'institutionalised' nature of their relationship. Formal agreements referred to include the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1998, the Agreement Relating to Military Assistance of 1947, the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement of 2007 and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement agreed during this period in 2014, all of which provide much of the foundation for the cooperation between the two countries. As the relevant parts of the architecture created by the two countries, there are multiple references to the 'Bilateral Strategic Dialogue', its 'Defense Working Group' and the US's Global Security Contingency Fund, through which much of the US support for the modernisation of the Philippine's armed forces is channelled; these institution's, discussions, activities and conclusions are also drawn upon to provide content for the discourse.

The US and the Philippines also share a common language regarding the subject matter included in their cooperation on security: Counter terrorism, counter extremism, counter proliferation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping and modernisation – meaning US support for the modernisation of the Philippines's armed forces. The term 'minimum credible defence' is also used to describe the level of military and security capability that the Philippines is aiming to reach, and that US support is helping to achieve; although that it is, is not defined explicitly at any point during the discourse.

In discourse on the South China Sea repeated reference is made to the 'Code of Conduct', referring to the proposed Code of Conduct for the South China Sea between ASEAN and China. Since 2002, ASEAN has sought to obtain China's consent to this binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, with formal consultations between ASEAN and China commencing in 2013. It is intended that the Code of Conduct will set out a set of principles to help manage tensions and potential flashpoints in the South China Sea, build confidence and facilitate a negotiated settlement to territorial disputes.<sup>108</sup> Interlocutors from both countries refer repeatedly to the Code in support of and as part of their assertion of ASEAN's

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<sup>108</sup> Thayer, C., 'ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea', *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33 (2013), page 76.

importance in the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Although as of 2022 no Code of Conduct has been agreed.

### *Emphasised/included*

Both parties make repeated assertions that the ‘modernisation’ or intensification of their defence and security cooperation is designed to deliver mutual benefits and respond to new challenges (as well as contribute to regional benefits). As noted above, US interlocutors have a tendency to stress their commitment to the Philippines and the benefits that it receives from the alliance, also underlining repeatedly that it is founded upon mutual respect and mutual interest. US interlocutors also repeatedly stress that the presence of US forces in the Philippines under the terms of the Visiting Forces Agreement and other agreements has been hugely beneficial in allowing them to be deployed quickly to assist the Philippines in responding to natural disasters and delivering humanitarian aid, as then US Secretary of State John Kerry does in this example from July 2016:

“In addition, the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, which Jun referred to, has been a cornerstone of security in the region for decades, and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the EDCA, is exactly what the foreign secretary has defined it as. It not only helps us to coordinate our efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region, but it also allows the United States to provide rapid assistance to the Philippines in the event of an emergency because it enables us to be able to preposition humanitarian relief supplies. I personally saw first-hand the importance of this disaster response when I visited Tacloban very soon after the devastation of Typhoon Haiyan.”<sup>109</sup>

The role of US forces in strengthening efforts to tackle criminality, drug smuggling, and counter terrorism and counter extremism efforts in a non-fighting capacity in the southern Philippines is also drawn upon to emphasise how the US contributes to the country’s security in multiple ways, not limited to enhancing the formal war fighting capability of the armed forces. US interlocutors are explicit that they are not seeking to recover or recreate permanent bases in the Philippines. Philippine interlocutors are also explicit that US forces are in the country to ‘assist, advise and train’, only. This further emphasises that they are there at the invitation of the Philippine government so assist with the delivery of its objectives.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

Throughout the discourse, US interlocutors repeatedly stress that they are not a party to territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. They continually deemphasise the idea that they are a direct party to the conflict, while supporting the Philippine’s diplomatic attempts to resolve it including through international arbitration and by supporting a resolution founded on the basis of the principles set out in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), thus

<sup>109</sup> US Department of State, *Remarks With Philippines Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (July 27, 2016), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260541.htm>

mirroring the Philippine's position. Although both the Philippines and the US talk in general terms about Chinese actions that undermine peace, security or stability in the region, no link is drawn between them and the specific activities undertaken as part of the US and the Philippine's growing defence and security cooperation. That is presented always as contributing to each countries' security and regional public goods. The idea that it is undertaken in direct response to Chinese actions or that China has any cause to be concerned by the strengthening of the Philippine's armed forces is repeatedly deemphasised in, as in this example from the discourse of the then President of the Philippines Aquino in April 2014:

"First of all, I think China shouldn't be concerned about this agreement, especially if you look at what is being contemplated -- for instance, training for emergency disaster relief operations.

I'll give you a perfect example. The Americans have the V-22 Osprey aircraft, which is quite a significant upgrade in capabilities in terms of reaching out to very remote areas. We don't have a comparable aircraft. We have smaller helicopters. And we had 44 of our provinces devastated by Typhoon Haiyan. Now, the training will not just train our people on how to operate this particular aircraft, but more importantly, even help the Office of Civil Defense, for instance, manage this resource in case a storm or another natural disaster of the scale that transpired does happen."<sup>110</sup>

### *Economic/trade discourse*

#### *Narrative*

Throughout the discourse both parties present a strong narrative on economic and trade related issues, referring to themselves as 'economic partners', although these references are usually secondary in prominence and importance to security issues. Much of the shared, overarching narrative is centred on the 'Partnership for Growth', an agreement between the two countries to work together on anti-corruption, strengthening the rule of law, improving regulatory quality and generating *inclusive* economic growth. Making the Philippines more 'competitive' is also commonly identified as an overarching goal. A link is regularly made between issues of governance and transparency and the progress of development. Delivering these objectives is presented as a shared, common endeavour between the two countries. The partnership is often framed in terms of development cooperation, with US foreign assistance funding channelled via USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation being identified for key priorities.

A second narrative theme is a shared focus on bilateral trade and investment between the US and the Philippines. Interlocutors from both countries repeatedly state their objective is to 'expand', 'broaden' or 'increase' trade and investment between the two countries. Increased trade and the reforms that drive it are

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<sup>110</sup> The White House, *Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference*, Obama White House Archive (April 28, 2014), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi>

presented as generating benefits for both countries, as the then US Secretary of State Kerry does here, in December 2013:

“The United States is also one of the Philippines largest trading partners in Asia. Last year, \$22 billion crossed between us in two-way trade. So we look forward to working with the Philippines to further deepen our trade relationship, understanding that this benefits both of us, that it creates jobs in America, in the Philippines – puts people to work, it raises the standard of living, but it also raises the standard of doing business, and that works for everybody.”<sup>111</sup>

Specific areas identified are few; aviation and key agricultural products such as rice are mentioned. The importance of remittances and foreign direct investment from the US to the Philippines are also highlighted.

#### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

As in the field of security, the Philippines and the US create and draw on a shared vocabulary on economic and trade issues. As the foundation for their economic and trading relationship agreed by the two countries, there are multiple references to the 1989 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and the Trade and Customs Facilitation Agreement agreed during this period in 2011; as for the security equivalents, the two countries more regular meetings, discussions and conclusions centred on the existing institutional architecture are referred to.

#### *Emphasised/included*

As noted above, particularly earlier in the discourse there are repeated references to the need for reforms on the part of the Philippines. US interlocutors have a tendency to praise the commitment of the Philippines and its progress in delivering reforms so far, but the agreement on the Partnership for Growth and the continued return to the theme of reform throughout the narrative, suggest that more needs to be done on the part of the Philippines. As noted, the emphasis is placed on reform in the Philippines being necessary to unlock ‘inclusive’ growth in the Philippines. One US interlocutor even explicitly states, that one of the purposes of securing more inclusive economic growth is to reduce emigration (it is left implicit, but presumably, referring to emigration from the Philippines to the US). Despite claims of an equal partnership and that the reform agenda is owned by both countries and not driven by the US, this plus the heavy emphasis on the support provided by the US through its foreign assistance, does tend to emphasise the ‘donor-recipient’ nature of the relationship between the two countries.

#### *Deemphasised/not included*

It is noticeable that beyond the references to increasing bilateral trade and investment and delivering inclusive growth in the Philippines, very few concrete outcomes are identified throughout the discourse. No quantifiable targets are set.

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<sup>111</sup> US Department of State, *Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (December 17, 2013), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218835.htm>

Dollar values are only provided for US foreign assistance funding in identified sectoral areas or when referring retrospectively to overall trade and investment volumes, or to commercial deals that have been completed by private sector partners. No sense is provided as to what targets the two countries are aiming for. For the Philippines, no further detail is provided as to what benefits it can expect, beyond the provision of US foreign assistance. Overall, this serves to deemphasise any sense that the economic relationship between the two countries is transactional in nature. It also makes it more difficult to determine whether the cooperation between the two countries is delivering the results it is expected to on trade and economic development, deemphasising any scope for disagreement or disappointment.

It should also be noted that there is very little focus on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). It is mentioned by both Philippine and US interlocutors but is not a major topic of the discourse. Both countries register the Philippines' interest in joining, however the response from US interlocutors is guarded; limited to 'noting' their interest and later in this period, inviting a team to the US to engage in technical consultations regarding potential involvement by the Philippines. This serves to deemphasise this multilateral trade agreement as an option for advancing the two countries' economic interests and the scope for disagreement or disappointment regarding the US's lack of support for participation by the Philippines.

Throughout the discourse there are a number of references to progress in the economic and trade relationship between the two countries being subject to oversight, discussion and perhaps disagreement in the domestic politics of both. And more specifically a subject of controversy in the US Congress. The then President of the Philippines, Aquino, refers to this in November 2015:

“With regards to trade, we have a political system that is very similar to that that exists in the United States of America. We are both facing elections come next year. We recognize the pressure to make populous statements at this point in time. At the end of the election period, there will be sobriety, and the argument that not opening ourselves up to a bigger market and freer access to that bigger market cannot be made. Therefore, we think that once elections are over, that current voice will die down and there will be new champions of increased free trade amongst all countries.”<sup>112</sup>

The references remain however, relatively nuanced and oblique; both actors are aware of the domestic constraints on their relationship in these areas, but choose, at least in their public narratives, to deemphasise them.

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<sup>112</sup> The White House, *Remarks by President Obama and President Aquino of the Republic of the Philippines after Bilateral Meeting*, Obama White House Archive (November 17, 2015), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/remarks-president-obama-and-president-aquino-republic-philippines-after>

### B.1.2.2 The Trump Administration 2017-2021

#### *Strategic, political/diplomatic discourse*

##### *Overall narrative*

Much of the overall narrative deployed by the US and the Philippines during the Trump Administration is familiar from the previous Obama era. Both countries continue to accentuate their shared history, practice of democracy and respect for the rule of law. Interlocutors from both countries continue to draw upon their shared experience from WW2, the longevity of their alliance and ‘people-to-people’ links to provide context for their current relationship. Both parties continue to claim that their alliance has contributed to broader, regional stability, security and prosperity, as well as their own. These are repeatedly stated as mutual goals. One key shift from the Obama period is the introduction of the concept of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’. Both countries use this term. US interlocutors in particular cite their relationship and deeper engagement with the Philippines as part of their efforts to support and advance the concept.

The Mutual Defense Treaty and military alliance is repeatedly stressed at the forefront of the two countries’ relationship. Security issues directly relevant to the Philippines, such as its relationship with China and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, as well as regional security challenges – principal among them North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme – dominate the discourse. President Trump, in his own inimitable style, trumpets claimed progress in the relationship compared to the previous administration and is blunt about why it may focus on security, during remarks to the press in November 2017:

“I mean, the Philippines, we just could not have been treated nicer. And as you know, we were having a lot of problems with the Philippines. The relationship with the past administration was horrible, to use a nice word. I would say “horrible” is putting it mildly. You know what happened. Many of you were there, and you never got to land. The plane came close but it didn’t land.

And now we have a very, very strong relationship with the Philippines, which is really important — less so for trade, in this case, than for military purposes. It is a strategic location — the most strategic location. And, if you look at it, it’s called the most prime piece of real estate from a military standpoint.

So it’s very important that we get along with the Philippines, and we really do. We have a very good relationship. I would actually say probably better than ever before.”<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> The White House, *Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle After 12th East Asia Summit | Manila, Philippines*, Trump White House Archive (November 14, 2017), <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-gaggle-12th-east-asia-summit-manila-philippines/>

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

A top 10 ranking of words from the key word density analysis of the full texts of the discourse is summarised below. Extraneous words or particles such as names of the two countries, job titles, etc. have been excluded based on a judgement by the author.

| <b>Single words</b> | <b>Two-word linkages</b> | <b>Three-word linkages</b>   |
|---------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| Security            | North Korea              | South China Sea              |
| China               | China Sea                | Mutual Defense Treaty        |
| Sea                 | South China              | Online Sexual Exploitation   |
| Region              | Two Countries            | Free Open Indo-Pacific       |
| Korea               | Mutual Defense           | Bilateral Strategic Dialogue |
| Countries           | Freedom Navigation       | Sexual Exploitation Children |
| Defense             | Foreign Affairs          | Security Council Resolutions |
| ASEAN               | Make Sure                | ASEAN Regional Forum         |
| Cooperation         | Free Open                | Monitor Combat trafficking   |
| Trade               | Security Council         | Combat Trafficking Persons   |

Given the nature and content of the overarching narrative it is not surprising that the terms 'defense', 'mutual defense', 'South China Sea' and 'cooperation' continue to figure highly in the shared vocabulary of the Philippines and the US. The diminution of the economic agenda during this period in the two countries' relationship is marked with only the single word 'trade' figuring highly in the discourse. New vocabulary relating to people trafficking and child abuse enter the discourse, reflecting the prominence of new cooperation between the two countries of tackling these crimes in the Philippines.

Regional references are strong, with the introduction and use of the term and concept of the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' and related terms such as 'freedom of navigation', alongside continued regular references to China, the South China Sea and regional security challenges such as North Korea. ASEAN-related terms are

also used regularly, reflecting both parties' reference to the organisation in the context of the South China Sea disputes. Overall, the shared vocabulary reflects the tighter focus in the discourse on a smaller number of key security issues: Principal among these is the Philippine's territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea.

### *Emphasised/included*

Both countries continue to emphasise the mutual nature of their relationship, as a partnership of equals and mutually important allies. Throughout the discourse the claims that the US and the Philippines share a common commitment to democracy and the rule of law both in domestic and international affairs, are again emphasised. A shared commitment to tackle challenges together and contribute to peace, stability, security and prosperity are also emphasised. Trump era officials tie together their commitment to the Philippines, the broader region and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific as an organising or motivating factor behind their engagement, as here in a factsheet regarding the relationship published in January 2020:

“The U.S. government’s goals in the Philippines are to strengthen democratic governance and support Philippine government efforts to promote inclusive development and contribute to security and development cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. assistance to the Philippines fosters broad-based economic growth; improves the health and education of Filipinos; promotes peace and security; advances democratic values, good governance, and human rights; and strengthens regional and global partnerships Department of State, Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao aim to create a sustainable foundation for peace and stability in areas at risk from terrorism and violent extremism. U.S. assistance seeks to intensify cooperation through a whole-of-government approach that supports a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”<sup>114</sup>

### *Deemphasised/not included*

The terms ‘pivot’ and ‘rebalance’ are not mentioned once by any US or Philippines interlocutor. This is perhaps not surprising given their strong association with the foreign policy of the previous US Administration. This serves to deemphasise the idea that changes in the US’s approach to Indonesia specifically or the South East Asia or East Asia regions more generally are driven by a grander US strategy, approach or foreign policy design.

There continues to be an absence of language, narrative and discourse relating to power or the power differential between the US and the Philippines. Throughout the two countries are referred to as equal actors pursuing mutual benefit through their alliance. This reinforces the idea that the US is not the leading partner or driving

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<sup>114</sup> US Department of State, *U.S. Relations With the Philippines*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (January 21, 2020), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-philippines/index.html>

force behind the comprehensive partnership and that the Philippines is not a junior partner.

And again, throughout the discourse there is little in the way of deeper or more meaningful exposition on what democracy is or how and in what ways the US or the Philippines experiences of it may be similar or different, therefore again deemphasising any potential differences between the Philippines and the US. Both are characterised without much qualification as functioning democracies that respect the rule of law – and this forms a key foundation for their alliance.

### *Security/military discourse*

#### *Narrative*

The overall narrative regarding security, military and defence issues remains very prominent in both scope and content throughout the discourse. Both parties place their alliance and their cooperation on security issues to the front and centre of their relationship. This cooperation is stated to be aimed at increasing each countries' security, countering 'terrorism', and at supporting regional and global security. US interlocutors in particular draw a strong narrative link between this cooperation and support for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept and the values-based partnership that the Philippines and the US claim to have.

The Philippines' territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea is a major topic covered in the two countries' discourse on security. It is often the first or most prominent topic covered in any communication from either country, whether issued individually or jointly. During this period, the US issues annual, formal, official statements, setting out its view that the findings of the 2016 UNCLOS arbitration ruling are binding. The US also explicitly recognises the threat that China represents to the territorial integrity of the Philippines as well as the wider possibility of it denying freedom of navigation in international waters and airspace to other countries. During a visit to the Philippines in March 2019, then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announces an explicit shift in US policy, providing more clarity on its interpretation of the terms of the Mutual Defence Treaty that had hitherto been left opaque:

“As an island nation, the Philippines depends on free and unobstructed access to the seas. China's island-building and military activities in the South China Sea threaten your sovereignty, security, and therefore economic livelihood, as well as that of the United States. As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> US Department of State, *Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr. at a Press Availability*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (March 1, 2019), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html>

Discourse on the South China Sea dispute is often grouped together alongside that on other regional security challenges, principal among them being North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. US interlocutors in particular describe the Philippines as being a strong supporter of the US's campaign to put pressure on North Korea. The Philippines is explicitly praised by the US for supporting and meeting the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions on the issue.

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

As noted above, this period sees the introduction of the concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This term is not defined explicitly or in detail however, anywhere in the discourse. Most of the meaning of this term is implied: free and open transportation, overflight, trade and commerce in the region generally. And specifically in the South China Sea, in opposition to perceived attempts by China to control or restrict access to it based on its claimed sovereignty.

The US and the Philippines continue to share a common language regarding the subject matter included in their cooperation on security drawing on terms such as maritime security, counter terrorism, counter proliferation, and modernisation.

### *Emphasised/included*

As well as its direct contribution to the security of the Philippines through the alliance, the role of US forces in strengthening efforts to tackle criminality and drug smuggling, disaster preparedness and response and counter terrorism and counter extremism efforts continues to be drawn upon to emphasise how the US contributes to the country's security in other ways. US interlocutors also highlight their support for and cooperation with the Philippines on non-traditional security challenges such as people trafficking and child abuse. Repeated reference is made to the US's support for counter terrorism operations and to rebuilding and supporting communities after territory has been recovered from extremist groups by the Philippine's forces. Significant detail is provided on the US's support for increasing the Philippine's maritime security and surveillance capabilities both in terms of funding and activities. This assistance is explicitly welcomed in Philippine discourse, as here by then Foreign Secretary Locsin in March 2019:

“We discussed the vital support of the United States for the AFP's modernization program, and hopefully to our campaign against all forms of criminality, especially terrorism and its tight connection with the illegal drug trade. Indeed, any mutual defense should cover a partner's back as well as its front.

Secretary Pompeo and I agreed that it was in both our countries' interest to ensure the alliance effectively addressed other nontraditional security issues such as, in addition, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and above all the fight against human trafficking. I acknowledged the continued support of the United States in the Philippine Government's counterterrorism efforts,

especially its vital role during the Marawi siege. We appreciate the assistance of the U.S. in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Marawi City.”<sup>116</sup>

This further emphasises that US forces are present at the invitation of the Philippine government so assist with the delivering of its objectives and draws attention to the strengthening of Philippines capability in these areas.

Despite the interlocutors from both countries explicitly and repeatedly citing China and its behaviour as both a threat to their interest and to broader regional stability and security, both parties continue to try and insist that their actions in response pose no threat to it. They continue to emphasise that their actions are designed to uphold international norms and regional public goods.

#### *Deemphasised/not included*

As noted, the US-Philippine discourse on security during this period is substantive and positive. Discussion of areas of disagreement or tension, such as around the presence and status of US forces in the country, is notably absent and therefore deemphasised.

#### *Economic/trade discourse*

##### *Narrative*

The discourse in this area has the most marked changes from that of the Obama Administration period. Trade and investment do not figure highly as subject matter. There are references to the objective that they should be increased, that the relationship should be ‘deepened’ and that the two countries should cooperate in a number of thematic areas, but in a way that secures a ‘win-win’ for both parties. This is led mainly by the US’s narrative, calling for there to be a ‘level playing field’, that trade should be ‘fair’ and that there should be gains for both parties. President Trump states explicitly that the United States has ‘been taken advantage of’ under previous Administrations. Similar points are repeated throughout the US contributions to the discourse.

Both parties recognise the importance of the work of the existing mechanisms created under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, but there is little sense of it being prioritised or resulting in significant progress. Reference is also made to a potential bilateral free trade agreement between the two countries, however there is again little sense of there being urgency or prioritisation attached to it, as set out here in a joint statement from December 2017:

“The U.S. and Philippine delegations reaffirmed their commitment to deepening the extensive economic relationship between the two countries. Both sides noted the substantive discussions on cooperating in areas such as science & technology, agriculture and fisheries, and health and environment.

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<sup>116</sup> US Department of State, *Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr. at a Press Availability*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (March 1, 2019), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html>

They welcomed the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) discussions held on November 29, and look forward to more robust discussions on ways to expand free, fair and reciprocal bilateral trade, including through exploring a potential Free Trade Agreement.”<sup>117</sup>

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

As noted, the two countries draw upon references to the existing agreements between them, such as the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement when discussing economic and trade related issues.

### *Emphasised/included*

Interlocutors from both countries make repeated reference to and emphasise the existing state of their economic and trading relationships, often drawing a link with their ‘people-to-people’ relationships and the Philippine diaspora in the US. Both countries emphasise their commitment to build on these, with a number of different sectors, prominently energy, being identified as potential areas for greater collaboration. However, very little detail is provided on what the objectives of this collaboration might be beyond contributing to mutual prosperity, neither is more detail provided on its substance.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

There are no references to the Partnership for Growth agreed during the Obama Administration period, and only limited references to the previously stated goal of delivering inclusive economic growth in the Philippines. References to the provision of US foreign assistance to support reform and economic development are also limited, serving to deemphasise that these issues are important in the two countries’ relationship.

## **B.1.2.3 The Biden Administration 2017-2021-present**

### *Strategic, political/diplomatic discourse*

#### *Overall narrative*

In the Biden Administration period the overall narrative of the discourse remains anchored in the longevity and durability of the alliance between the US and the Philippines. The two countries draw on their shared commitment to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, their shared history and their people-to-people links when discussing the foundations of their relationship – in one example it is described as a ‘special relationship’. The US is commonly characterised as ‘supporting’ democracy in the Philippines, with explicit recognition that strengthening it is a work in progress and that the two countries are partners in doing so.

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<sup>117</sup> US Department of State, *Joint Press Statement: U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue 2017*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (December 1, 2017), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-press-statement-u-s-philippines-bilateral-strategic-dialogue-2017/index.html>

Security and defence issues continue to feature more prominently in the discourse. A key point introduced during the Trump Administration period is maintained: Support for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific from both countries. The alliance between the two countries is again presented as being part of and as reinforcing the concept; contributing not just to their own security and prosperity but also that of the wider region and supporting regional and global public goods and international norms.

Overall, however, in this period the discourse is much more balanced between security and economic issues; US interlocutors in particular talk much more substantively about economic cooperation with the Philippines, largely under the rubric of foreign assistance. A new and explicit link is also made between the US's support for the security of the Philippines and its positive impacts in terms of protecting the livelihoods of its people.

#### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

A top 10 ranking of words from the key word density analysis of the full texts of the discourse is summarised below. Extraneous words or particles such as names of the two countries, job titles, etc. have been excluded based on a judgement by the author.

| <b>Single words</b> | <b>Two-word linkages</b> | <b>Three-word linkages</b>          |
|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Security            | China Sea                | South China Sea                     |
| Energy              | South China              | Mutual Defense Treaty               |
| China               | Clean Energy             | International Rules Norms           |
| Cooperation         | Human Rights             | Law Sea Convention                  |
| Sea                 | Mutual Defense           | Respect Human Rights                |
| International       | Defense Treaty           | Upholding Rules-based International |
| Region              | International Law        | Trade Development Agency            |
| Defense             | Foreign Affairs          | Philippine Coast Guard              |
| Economic            | Climate Crisis           | Enhanced Defense Cooperation        |

| Support | Law Sea | Defense<br>Cooperation<br>Agreement |
|---------|---------|-------------------------------------|
|---------|---------|-------------------------------------|

Terminology relating to defence, security, the US-Philippine alliance and specifically China and the South China Sea figures very highly in the shared lexicon and vocabulary during this period. This is alongside multiple references to partnership, cooperation and working together to address shared challenges such as the demand for clean energy and deliver regional and global public goods, in a style reminiscent of the Obama Administration period. Climate change returns to the high-profile lexicon, and the list of shared concerns and subject matter of discussion, having been absent during the Trump Administration period. Human rights also have a higher profile in the lexicon, reflecting in particular repeated US assertions of their prioritisation of the subject in discussion with Philippine partners.

Interestingly the key vocabulary of the narrative does not reflect current events during the course of 2020 to 2022, principally the COVID19 pandemic, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although references to these issues are present in the discourse, they are not particularly prevalent.

#### *Emphasised/included*

US interlocutors continue to reference the Philippines's status as a democracy, historical ally and a supporter of a rules-based international order as the foundation for their enhanced relationship. Again, emphasising these values, where shared, as being the foundation for the alliance. People-to-people links, specifically the Philippine diaspora in the US, are repeatedly emphasising as providing a foundation for and strengthening their relationship. Both countries continue to emphasise their shared objectives for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific; a region where free and open societies are able to make their own choices, without coercion.

#### *Deemphasised/not included*

The terms 'pivot' and 'rebalance' are not mentioned once by any Philippine or US interlocutor. This is perhaps surprising, given President Biden was President Obama's Vice President. Although concern about and criticism of China and its activities in the South China Sea are repeatedly expressed, this is in terms of their threats to the territorial integrity of the Philippines and regional and international norms, thus legitimising the strengthening of the relationship. The US's position vis-à-vis the region is not presented as the driving factor. This again serves to deemphasise the idea that changes in the US's or the Philippines' approach are driven by a grander US strategy, approach or foreign policy design.

There continues to be an absence of language, narrative and discourse relating to power or the power differential between the US and the Philippines. As noted above, the two parties continue to deploy a narrative regarding shared values and shared challenges that they are working together to address. This reinforces strongly the

idea that the US is not the leading partner or driving force behind the comprehensive partnership and that the Philippines is not a junior partner.

And again, throughout the discourse there is little in the way of deeper or more meaningful exposition on what democracy, the rule of law, pluralism, or respect for human rights means, or how and in what ways the US or Philippine experiences of them may be similar or different. Differences and challenges in the relationship continue to be deemphasised.

### *Security/military discourse*

#### *Narrative*

During this period there remains very significant explicit, high-level narrative relating to security issues centred again on the issue of the South China Sea. Chinese activities in the area are harshly criticised, described by both parties using such terms as ‘intimidation’, ‘coercion’, ‘harassment’, ‘unlawful’ and ‘provocative’. These activities are presented as a threat to the Philippines and to the livelihoods and economic opportunities (particularly fishermen) of communities in the Philippines, also other countries in the region and international norms. These norms continue to be summarised under the rubric of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, encompassing freedom of navigation and commerce and a peaceful and rules-based approach to the settlement of disputes. US interlocutors in particular cite the strategic, economic importance of the region as justifying their defence of these norms.

The US continues to release annual statements on the anniversary of the UNCLOS arbitration decision, explicitly rejecting Chinese claims in the South China Sea that are incompatible with international law. This point, as well as explicit reiteration of the US’s previous shift in policy on its interpretation of the applicability of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines are also repeatedly made, including in response to particular Chinese activities that are perceived to threaten the Philippines. This is best exemplified in this example from November 2021:

“Two days ago, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Coast Guard blocked and used water cannons against Philippine resupply ships en route to Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.

The United States stands with our ally, the Philippines, in the face of this escalation that directly threatens regional peace and stability, escalates regional tensions, infringes upon freedom of navigation in the South China Sea as guaranteed under international law, and undermines the rules-based international order.

On July 12, 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, delivered a unanimous and enduring decision firmly rejecting the PRC’s claims to Second Thomas Shoal and to waters determined to be part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. The PRC and the Philippines, pursuant to their treaty obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention, are legally bound to comply with this decision. The PRC should

not interfere with lawful Philippine activities in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.

The United States stands with our Philippine allies in upholding the rules-based international maritime order and reaffirms that an armed attack on Philippine public vessels in the South China Sea would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments under Article IV of the 1951 U.S. Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

The United States strongly believes that PRC actions asserting its expansive and unlawful South China Sea maritime claims undermine peace and security in the region."<sup>118</sup>

### *Emphasised/included*

Both parties continue to focus on the practical nature of their security engagement, in particular under the Enhanced Cooperation Defence Agreement. It is announced that new locations have been identified where the US will invest in security infrastructure, emphasising the two partners' commitment to and progress on strengthening the defence of the Philippines. Both parties also emphasise their commitment to ensuring their alliance can respond to new threats, listing multiple areas that they are working on together: Maritime security, border security, counter proliferation, counterterrorism, maritime security, maritime domain awareness, peacekeeping operations, trafficking, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The provision of training and capacity building alongside arms and equipment by the US is repeatedly noted and again, as per in previous periods, the positive impact that is having on the ability of the Philippines to respond to a variety of security challenges is emphasised.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

A key comparison with the Trump Administration period is that there are far fewer references to regional issues, such as North Korea's nuclear programme, in the shared discourse. This serves to deemphasise that there is a link between the two countries' positions on these issues and, for example, the South China Sea.

### *Economic/trade discourse*

#### *Narrative*

During this period, both countries continue to set out their shared objective to expand or strengthen their economic relationship, or otherwise increase bilateral trade and investment. There are repeated references to this being delivered by the private sector, or through public-private partnerships. Several areas for collaboration are identified, including COVID vaccine provision by the US and the development of domestic COVID vaccine production facilities in the Philippines. Energy, particularly 'clean' energy with a focus on nuclear, wind and geothermal is cited as a priority. As

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<sup>118</sup> US Department of State, *On the Situation in the South China Sea*, US Department of State Website (November 19, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/on-the-situation-in-the-south-china-sea/>

is rare earths production in the Philippines and investment in infrastructure. As noted above, a link is made between the US's support for the security of the Philippines and its support for livelihoods and food security, particularly in the fishing sector.

US interlocutors often link references to their economic relationship with the Philippines to their approach to the broader region, and the concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the US-led 'Economic Framework' that it is linked to, as US Secretary of State Blinken does here, during a speech in August 2022:

"In my conversations today with President Marcos and Secretary Manalo, we spoke about deepening our economic relationship. The United States remains a top three trading partner and investor in the Philippines. American firms are among the largest employers, the biggest taxpayers, and highest value exporters here.

We want to expand those ties – through private sector investment, public-private partnerships, and by working together to address leading challenges of the 21st century economy, like shaping emerging technologies, strengthening our supply chains, accelerating the transition to a green economy. These are all pillars of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which the Philippines joined this spring and which reflects our shared vision of a region that's free, open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient."<sup>119</sup>

### *Emphasised/included*

During this period there is a noticeable shift back to narrative that presents the US relationship with the Philippines explicitly and implicitly as one of a partnership. A significant amount of detail is provided on the US's foreign assistance programmes, providing the foundation for many of the areas of cooperation identified. This emphasises the role of the US as a donor, despite attempts to present assistance as delivering the priorities of the Philippines, as is done here from a factsheet published in March 2022:

"The U.S. government's goals in the Philippines are to strengthen democratic governance and support Philippine government efforts to promote inclusive development and contribute to security and development cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. assistance to the Philippines helps expand inclusive, market-driven growth; foster strong democratic systems and good economic, health, and education governance; promote responsible natural resource management; and enhance resilience for communities and the environment."<sup>120</sup>

<sup>119</sup> US Department of State, *Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a U.S. Trade and Development Agency Offshore Wind Grant Signing*, US Department of State Website (August 6, 2022), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-u-s-trade-and-development-agency-offshore-wind-grant-signing/>

<sup>120</sup> US Department of State, *U.S. Relations With the Philippines*, US Department of State Website (February 23, 2023), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-philippines/>

### *Deemphasised/not included*

Factual information is provided on current levels of trade and investment between the US and the Philippines, but no information is provided on outcomes, targets, or expectations for bilateral trade and investment between the two countries in the future. References to a potential bilateral free trade agreements from the Trump Administration period are absent. As are Trump period references to the 'unfairness' of trade and the prioritisation of the need for trade deals to be 'win-win' for both parties. No detail or explanation is also provided regarding the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework; what it is, what it will entail and who will benefit. Taken together these absences serve to deemphasise the idea that formal government-to-government trade or investment deals are being prioritised in the relationship.

## **B1.3 Evolution of the Philippines-US Security Relationship since 2009: Further Empirical Analysis**

### **B1.3.1 Is there a/are there formal treaty(ies) or agreement(s) that underpin the security relationship?**

#### *The Mutual Defense Treaty*

Yes. The Philippines and the US already have a formal treaty-based security relationship. This is founded primarily on the 'Mutual Defense Treaty' of 1951. (The Military Bases Agreement of 1947 is not covered in this section as it expired in 1992.) At the core of the 1951 treaty, setting out the mutual security commitments that the Philippines and the US have made to each other, are Articles IV and V:

#### **'ARTICLE IV**

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

#### **ARTICLE V**

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.<sup>121</sup>

It should be noted that the language used by the treaty and the precise definitions of 'territory' and 'territories' have long been the subject of controversy and dispute. The

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<sup>121</sup> The Avalon Project, *Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; August 30, 1951*, Yale Law School (2008), <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/phil001.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp)

Philippines argues that the security guarantee applies to all territories including those that it claims and are disputed, such as those in the South China Sea contested with the PRC. The US has never agreed to this; with many policy makers arguing for a more conservative interpretation that covers only those territories universally recognised as belonging to the Philippines.<sup>122</sup>

It is also important to note that the treaty does not define how the parties should ‘act’ nor what ‘measures’ would be taken in the event of an armed attack. This can be compared and contrasted for example, with Article 5 of the 1949 ‘North Atlantic Treaty’ that created NATO. This article, at the core of NATO members’ mutual commitments to collective security and defence is much clearer and more forceful regarding the consequences of an armed attack, with explicit reference to the use of armed force in response:

#### ‘Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. [my emphasis added]<sup>123</sup>

#### Visiting Forces Agreement

The 1951 treaty is supplemented by the 1998 ‘Visiting Forces Agreement’;<sup>124</sup> that governs the legal status of US forces visiting the Philippines for training and other purposes. The 1998 agreement allows troops, vessels and aircraft to enter the Philippine’s territory subject to agreement from the government and establishes that

<sup>122</sup> Albert, E., *The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance*, Council on Foreign Relations (2016), <https://www.cfr.org/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-philippines-defense-alliance>

<sup>123</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Website (2019), <https://www.nato.int/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm)

<sup>124</sup> US Department of State, *DEFENSE Status of Forces Agreement Between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the PHILIPPINES Signed at Manila February 10, 1998 and Agreement Between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the PHILIPPINES Signed at Manila October 9, 1998*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (1998), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/107852.pdf>

criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel is exercised primarily by the US, in most circumstances.<sup>125</sup>

### *Further supplementary agreements*

The State Department Office of Treaty Affairs lists an additional 15 defence-related bilateral agreements agreed between the two countries between 1952 and 2010 covering such diverse issues as ‘the establishment of a Mutual Defense Board’, to ‘mapping, charting and geodesy cooperation’.<sup>126</sup>

### **B1.3.2 Have any treaties or agreements that underpin the security relationship been revised or supplemented, or have any new treaties or agreements been negotiated, since 2009?**

The Mutual Defense Treaty and Visiting Forces Agreement have not been revised since 2009.

None of the additional 15 agreements have been revised since 2009.

### *Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement*

In April 2014 the Philippines and the US signed an ‘Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement’. The agreement is considered to be an ‘executive agreement’ between the two government and not a formal treaty requiring both countries’ Senates to agree it.<sup>127</sup> The stated objectives of the 2014 agreement are to:

- Increase the levels of interoperability between Philippine and US forces
- Build capacity and modernise the armed forces of the Philippines
- Strengthen the ability of the armed forces of the Philippines to defend the country against external threats
- Increase levels of maritime control and security
- Provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response<sup>128</sup>

The agreement does not allow the US to (re-)create permanent bases in the Philippines. Article 3 however, grants the US operational control over ‘agreed locations’, where the US can construct facilities necessary to deliver the objectives of the agreement. Article 4 grants the US permission to store defence material at the locations, excluding nuclear weapons.<sup>129</sup> In effect the agreement grants the US a

<sup>125</sup> Congressional Research Service, *The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service Reports Website (2022), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47055>, page 13

<sup>126</sup> US Department of State, *A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020*, US Department of State Website (2020), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf>, pages 363-365.

<sup>127</sup> Thayer, C., *Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement*, The Diplomat (2014), <https://thediplomat.com/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/>

<sup>128</sup> Government of the Philippines, *Q&A on the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement*, Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines (2014), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2014/04/28/qna-on-the-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/>

<sup>129</sup> Government of the Philippines, *Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation*, Official Gazette of the

more strategic presence in the Philippines and the most extensive access to Philippine military facilities it has enjoyed since the expiration of the Military Bases Agreement in 1992.<sup>130</sup>

#### *Additional agreements*

The State Department Office of Treaty Affairs also lists an additional 4 defence-related agreements that have been signed between the US and the Philippines (and in some cases amended) since 2009.

| Name                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Agreement details                                                                                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Aviation Leadership Program agreement                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Signed at Washington and Pasay November 12, 2015 and August 5, 2016. Entered into force August 5, 2016.                                        |
| Agreement regarding the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or successor legislation, including the Global Peace Operations Initiative; the Arms Export Control Act; the Global Security Contingency Fund; 10 U.S.C. § 2282, 10 U.S.C. § 333, and other Department of Defense authorities; and the furnishing of defense articles, related training, and other defense services from the United States of America to the Philippines under such authorities | Exchange of notes at Manila and Pasay City July 28 and September 15, 2017. Entered into force September 15, 2017.                              |
| Mutual logistics support agreement, with annexes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Signed at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, and Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, October 12 and 23, 2017. Entered into force July 12, 2018. |
| Special security agreement concerning security measures for the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II, with appendix                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Signed at Washington and Manila September 17, 2018 and April 15, 2019. Entered into force April 15, 2019.                                      |

Republic of the Philippines (2014), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2014/04apr/20140428-EDCA.pdf>

<sup>130</sup> Castro, R., 'The 21st Century Philippine-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA): The Philippines' Policy in Facilitating the Obama Administration's Strategic Pivot to Asia', *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 26 (2014), page 428.


### B1.3.3 Have US levels of foreign assistance provided to the Philippines for military purposes increased or decreased?

*Foreign Assistance for military purposes in relation to total assistance*

Figure 1: Philippines-US Foreign Assistance Total and with Military (M) Objective: Total Obligations by US Fiscal Year 2010-2020 (\$million)

|       | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| M     | 42   | 45   | 57   | 51   | 70   | 120  | 160  | 80   | 130  | 220  | 170  |
| Total | 232  | 705  | 257  | 251  | 400  | 290  | 310  | 177  | 370  | 430  | 390  |

Source: US Government Foreign Assistance database




The levels of US foreign assistance provided to the Philippines where the primary objective is military have increased significantly in the period 2010 to 2020, exhibiting a clear trend. The overall level of foreign assistance provided has however remained broadly stable during the same period, perhaps even showing a slight reduction. As a result, the proportion of total US foreign assistance to the Philippines where the primary objective is military has increased dramatically from 18% in 2010 to 44% in 2020.

*Foreign Assistance for military purposes in regional context*

Figure 2: Philippines vs South East Asia - US Foreign Assistance with Military Objective: Total Obligations by US Fiscal Year 2010-2020 (\$million)

|                 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Philippines     | 42   | 45   | 57   | 51   | 70   | 120  | 160  | 80   | 130  | 220  | 170  |
| South East Asia | 88   | 91   | 97   | 98   | 130  | 180  | 250  | 160  | 250  | 520  | 300  |

Source: US Government Foreign Assistance database



The levels of US foreign assistance provided to the South East Asia region as a whole where the primary objective is military have increased significantly in the period 2010 to 2020, driven in part by the increase provided to the Philippines and exhibiting a clear trend. In this regional context, the proportion allocated to the Philippines has increased slightly from 48% in 2010 to 57% in 2020.

#### **B1.3.4 Has the level of US arms sales or transfers to the Philippines increased or decreased?**


##### *Financial value of arms sales*

Figure 3: Direct Commercial Sales Deliveries of arms exports from the US to the Philippines: 2010-2019 (\$m)

| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 22.5 | *    | 15.8 | 17.4 | 32.7 | 72.4 | 7    | 15.7 | 24.3 | 31.6 |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, based on US Department of Defense annual reports to Congress

\*figures not available for 2011




### *Capability of arms provided*

**Figure 4: Arms Exports from the US to the Philippines: Trend Indicator Values (TIVs)\* 2010-2021 (million)**

| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 0    | 60   | 6    | 55   | 12   | 46   | 82   | 23   | 3    | 11   | 60   | 91   |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

\* Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) are a measure the volume of deliveries of major conventional weapons, providing a measure of military capability rather than the financial value of arms transfers.




On the basis of both metrics available, the level of capability provided by US arms exports to the Philippines does exhibit an increasing trend in the period 2010 to 2021. Given the volatility in the figures however, it is difficult to draw too firm a conclusion on this metric.

#### *Capability of arms provided in regional context*

| Figure 5: Arms Exports from the US to the Philippines vs South East Asia: Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) 2010-2021 (million) |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                                                                                                             | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Philippines                                                                                                                 | 0    | 60   | 6    | 55   | 12   | 46   | 82   | 23   | 3    | 11   | 60   | 91   |
| South East Asia Total                                                                                                       | 702  | 570  | 496  | 847  | 266  | 289  | 795  | 527  | 231  | 103  | 214  | 349  |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute




The capability levels of US arms exports to the South East Asia region as a whole have declined significantly in the period 2010 to 2020, exhibiting a clear trend despite also being subject to significant volatility. In this regional context, the capability exported to the Philippines has increased significantly from 11% in 2011 (according to these SPIRI figures there were no exports in 2010) to 26% in 2021.

#### *Importance of the US as an arms provider*

Figure 6: Arms Exports from the US to the Philippines vs. total to the Philippines: Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) 2010-2021 (million)

|       | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| US    | 0    | 60   | 6    | 55   | 12   | 46   | 82   | 23   | 3    | 11   | 60   | 91   |
| Total | 3    | 63   | 16   | 78   | 12   | 153  | 227  | 276  | 18   | 187  | 349  | 349  |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute



For the period 2010-2015 the US was the single largest source of arms exports to the Philippines, accounting for 55%. For the period 2016-2021 the US was the second largest source of arms exports to the Philippines, accounting for 19%, behind South Korea at 47%.

### *Nature of US arms provided*

Figure 7: Philippines weapons orders from the US, 2010-2021

| Year | Description                           | Value \$million (if information available) |
|------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| 2011 | Hamilton Class offshore patrol vessel | 27                                         |
|      | Bombs/missiles                        |                                            |
|      | Radar system                          |                                            |
| 2012 | Hamilton Class offshore patrol vessel | 16                                         |
|      | Armoured personnel carriers           |                                            |
| 2013 | Bombs/missiles                        |                                            |
|      | Helicopters                           |                                            |
|      | Armoured patrol vehicles              |                                            |
| 2014 | Helicopters                           | 105                                        |
|      | Transport aircraft                    | 56                                         |
|      | Aircraft parts                        |                                            |
| 2015 | Hamilton Class offshore patrol vessel |                                            |
| 2016 | Transport aircraft                    |                                            |
|      | Aircraft parts                        |                                            |
|      | Vehicle parts                         |                                            |
| 2017 | Sonar system                          |                                            |
|      | Drones                                | 14                                         |
| 2019 | Drones                                | 15                                         |
|      | Anti-tank missiles                    |                                            |
|      | Helicopters                           | 241                                        |
| 2020 | Anti-tank missiles                    |                                            |
|      | Transport aircraft                    | 70                                         |
| 2021 | Transport aircraft                    |                                            |
|      | Aircraft                              | 2                                          |
|      | Helicopters                           | 624                                        |
|      | Helicopter parts                      |                                            |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

## **B1.4 Evolution of the Philippines-US Economic Relationship since 2009: Further Empirical Analysis**

### **B1.4.1 Is there a/are there formal treaty(ies) or agreement(s) that underpin the economic relationship?**

Yes. The US and the Philippines signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 1989. This agreement created a process of annual, formal

consultations on trade and investment issues with the overall objective being to 'expand trade and investment flows'.<sup>131</sup>

The US and the Philippines have not agreed a full bilateral Free Trade Agreement.

The State Department Office of Treaty Affairs lists an additional 3 trade and investment-related bilateral agreements agreed between the two countries between 1965 and 2009 concerning:

- 'Free-entry privileges to dependents of United States Government employees newly assigned to South Viet-Nam who elect to reside in the Philippines'
- 'Customs regulations governing cargo consigned to United States military authorities or armed forces personnel'
- 'Cooperation in trade in textile and apparel goods'<sup>132</sup>

The Philippines has benefited from the US's Generalized System of Preferences, allowing tariff free imports on a wide variety of products, since before 2011.<sup>133</sup>

**B1.4.2 Have any treaties or agreements that underpin the economic relationship been revised or supplemented, or have any new treaties or agreements been negotiated, since 2009?**

Yes. In November 2011 the US and the Philippines agreed a protocol to the 1989 agreement 'Concerning Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation'. The stated objective of the protocol is to 'expedite the movement, release, and clearance of goods in order to facilitate trade'. The protocol sets out a number of practical steps that both parties agree to undertake in order to achieve this objective.<sup>134</sup>

None of the additional 3 agreements have been revised since 2011.

<sup>131</sup> Office of the US Trade Representative, *Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning a Framework of Principles and Procedures and the Establishment of a Consultative Mechanism for the Expansion of trade and Investment Flows Between the Two Countries*, Office of the US Trade Representative Website (1989), <https://ustr.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US-Philippines%20TIFA.pdf>

<sup>132</sup> US Department of State, *A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020*, US Department of State Website (2020), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf>, page 368.

<sup>133</sup> Office of the US Trade Representative, *Countries Eligible for GSP*, Office of the US Trade Representative Website (2020), <https://ustr.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/gsp/countrieseligible.pdf>

<sup>134</sup> Office of the US Trade Representative, *PROTOCOL TO THE 1989 TRADE AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES CONCERNING CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION AND TRADE FACILITATION*, Office of the US Trade Representative Website (2011), <https://ustr.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Countries%20Regions/africa/agreements/tifa/11212011%20Philippines%20Protocol%20--%20Final%20US%20Version%20as%20Signed.pdf>

### B1.4.3 Have levels of trade and investment between the US and the Philippines increased or decreased since 2009?

#### *US importance as trade partner to the Philippines*

| Figure 8: Philippines Trade Partner United States Share in percentage 2011-2020 |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                                                                                 | 2010  | 2011  | 2012  | 2013  | 2014  | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  | 2018  | 2019  | 2020  |
| Exports                                                                         | 14.70 | 14.79 | 14.24 | 14.71 | 14.13 | 15.02 | 15.40 | 14.07 | 15.63 | 16.32 | 15.37 |
| Imports                                                                         | 10.82 | 10.91 | 11.61 | 11.29 | 8.86  | 10.88 | 8.94  | 8.16  | 7.21  | 7.30  | 7.79  |

Source: World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution Database




The position of the US as a major destination for exports from the Philippines has remained broadly stable during this period. Over the same time frame, the importance of the US as a source of imports for the Philippines has declined significantly.

#### *Philippines importance as trade partner to the US*

| Figure 9: United States Trade Partner Philippines Share in percentage 2011-2020 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                                                                 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
| Exports                                                                         | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.56 | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.54 |
| Imports                                                                         | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.41 | 0.44 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.48 |

Source: World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution Database




The position of the Philippines as a minor destination for exports from the Philippines has remained broadly stable during this period. Over the same time frame, the importance of the Philippines as a source of imports for the US has increased slightly, mirroring the figures above.

#### *US-Philippines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows*

Figure 10: United States Foreign Direct Investment with the Philippines Outward and Inward, total financial flows \$ millions, 2011-2020

|         | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Outward | -    | 228  | -    | -111 | 643  | 75   | 756  | 562  | 238  | 174  | 228  |
| Inward  | -    | 11   | 100  | -    | 768  | 145  | -435 | -87  | -329 | 116  | -13  |

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Database




Based on these figures it is difficult to discern any overall trend in FDI flows between the two countries. It should be noted that for some years figures are not available and a value of zero is given.

#### **B1.4.4 Have US levels of foreign assistance provided to the Philippines for economic purposes increased or decreased?**

*Foreign Assistance for economic purposes in relation to total assistance*

| Figure 11: Philippines-US Foreign Assistance Total and with Economic (E) Objective: Total Obligations by US Fiscal Year 2010-2020 (\$million) |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                                                                                                                               | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
| E                                                                                                                                             | 190  | 660  | 200  | 200  | 330  | 170  | 150  | 97   | 240  | 210  | 220  |
| Total                                                                                                                                         | 232  | 705  | 257  | 251  | 400  | 290  | 310  | 177  | 370  | 430  | 390  |

Source: US Foreign Assistance Database




The levels of US foreign assistance provided to the Philippines where the primary objective is economic have decreased significantly in the period 2010 to 2020, exhibiting a clear trend. As noted previously, the overall level of foreign assistance provided has however remained broadly stable during the same period, perhaps even showing a slight reduction. As a result, the proportion of total US foreign assistance to the Philippines where the primary objective is economic has decreased significantly from 82% in 2010 to 66% in 2020.

#### *Foreign Assistance for economic purposes in regional context*

| Figure 12: Philippines vs South East Asia - US Foreign Assistance with Economic Objective: Total Obligations by US Fiscal Year 2010-2020 (\$million) |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                                                                                                                                      | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
| Philippines                                                                                                                                          | 190  | 660  | 200  | 200  | 330  | 170  | 150  | 97   | 240  | 210  | 220  |
| South East Asia                                                                                                                                      | 800  | 1100 | 850  | 1400 | 1000 | 780  | 910  | 820  | 920  | 1100 | 1200 |

Source: US Foreign Assistance Database



The levels of US foreign assistance provided to the South East Asia region as a whole where the primary objective is economic have increased moderately in the period 2010 to 2020. In this regional context, the proportion allocated to the Philippines has decreased from 24% in 2010 to 18% in 2020.

## B2 Case Study Two: Indonesia

### B2.1 The rebalance in context: Indonesian perspectives

From the late 16<sup>th</sup> century and early 17<sup>th</sup> century onwards, accelerating in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Dutch carved out of what came to be known as Indonesia the colony of the Dutch East Indies. No pre-colonial state had ever come close to exercising this degree of control over the archipelago.<sup>135</sup> It was achieved through a mixture of diplomacy and brutal atrocity; in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century however US concerns about the latter were outweighed by its concerns that an expansionist Japan would absorb the territory, concerns that eventually came to pass.<sup>136</sup> Following the defeat of Japan and the end of its occupation of the archipelago in 1945, attempts by the Dutch with support from the British, to reassert imperial control were repulsed by the strength of Indonesian nationalism.<sup>137</sup> Initially more pro-Dutch and in favour of a peaceful resolution than supportive of the imperial power, the US eventually become a strong supporter of Indonesian independence, that was finally recognised in 1949.<sup>138</sup>

Under its independence leader and new President, Sukarno, Indonesia became a leading proponent of African and Asian cooperation and ultimately a leading member of the non-aligned movement. For Indonesia's newly independent leaders a non-aligned approach allowed the new nation more strategic space and the ability to pursue its own interests; being 'aligned' with the US or the Eastern bloc under the leadership of the USSR inevitably meant servicing those of another power.<sup>139</sup> Indonesia had no interest in joining the US-led SEATO and pursued a foreign policy based on confrontation against colonialism and the presence of military forces from outside powers in the region.<sup>140</sup> Despite this overarching strategic outlook however, Sukarno and the US developed a closer relationship driven by a shared fear of the expansion of communism and with links between the two countries' armed forces playing a key role.<sup>141</sup>

From 1967 onwards under the leadership of Sukarno's successor, Suharto, Indonesia shifted to an even closer relationship with the US, justified by a need to secure political stability and focus on economic growth, particularly in the face of domestic communist opposition.<sup>142</sup> This can be summarised perhaps as Indonesia's own version of the 'Yoshida doctrine'. This did not lead to any formal alliance between the two countries however, and the country remained ostensibly a leading member of the non-aligned movement. This period of warmer relations and

<sup>135</sup> Cotterell, A., *A History of Southeast Asia*, page 368.

<sup>136</sup> Cotterell, A., *A History of Southeast Asia*, page 258.

<sup>137</sup> Cotterell, A., *A History of Southeast Asia*, page 359.

<sup>138</sup> Gouda, F., and Brocades Zaalberg, T., *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism 1920–1949*, Amsterdam University (2002), pages 22–23.

<sup>139</sup> Shekhar, V., *Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an Indo-Pacific Power*, Routledge (2018), page 3.

<sup>140</sup> Duffield, J., 'Asia-Pacific security institutions in comparative perspective', in, Ikenberry, J., and Mastanduno, M., (Eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, page 255.

<sup>141</sup> Cotterell, A., *A History of Southeast Asia*, page 361.

<sup>142</sup> Shekhar, V., *Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an Indo-Pacific Power*, page 4.

particularly closer military-to-military ties was brought to an end as the degree of Indonesian abuses in East Timor became increasingly apparent and the collapse of the Soviet Union rendered a united front against Communism redundant, during the late 1980s and 1990s.<sup>143</sup> With the resolution of the East Timor conflict, Indonesia-US relations warmed during the early 2000s, with the country viewed by the US as an important partner in counter-terrorism efforts in South East Asia; economic and military assistance and arms sales followed.<sup>144</sup>

For Indonesian policy makers in the first decades of the 2000's, the country's approach to the US (and China) is driven by a need to maintain what is termed a 'dynamic equilibrium' based on cooperation, consultation, the forging of consensus positions centred on ASEAN and without identifying 'adversaries'.<sup>145</sup> Based on its colonial and post-independence experiences, placing a high value on sovereignty and independence and mindful of its status as the potential regional power in South East Asia, Indonesia continues with its long-standing opposition to the presence of foreign military forces in the region.<sup>146</sup> Nevertheless, although it itself has no territorial disputes with China, the latter's greater level of assertiveness in the South China Sea has led the Indonesian government and particularly its armed forces, to reassess its approach to and ultimately tolerate the presence of the US, as a valuable 'hedge' against Chinese power.<sup>147</sup> In conclusion, Indonesia is not 'closest and keenest' as the Philippines has been described, but it also has reasons to respond more positively to any offers of higher levels of US engagement driven by the rebalance.

## **B2.2 Indonesia and the US rebalance: Discourse Analysis**

### **B2.2.1 The Obama Administration 2009-2017**

*Strategic, political/diplomatic discourse*

*Overall narrative*

First, throughout the period of the two Obama Administrations, both US and Indonesian interlocutors present and promote the idea of a 'strategic', or more commonly 'comprehensive' partnership between their countries. This is grounded in a narrative that repeatedly stresses shared values, in particular those of democracy. US actors in particular seek to draw a link between their country's claimed status as 'the world's oldest functioning democracy' and Indonesia's status as a vibrant and relatively new one. The core claim is that as two major democracies, Indonesia and

<sup>143</sup> Cotterell, A., *A History of Southeast Asia*, Marshall Cavendish (2014), page 370.

<sup>144</sup> Chua, D., 'United States' Pivot and South East Asia', in Ganguly, S., Scobell, A., Chinyong Liow, J., (Eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, Routledge (2017).

<sup>145</sup> Graham E., 'Southeast asia in the US rebalance: Perceptions from a divided region', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, page 321.

<sup>146</sup> Liow, J., 'Ambivalent Engagement : The United States and Regional Security in Southeast Asia After the Cold War', *Geopolitics in the 21st Century*, pages 149-150.

<sup>147</sup> Graham E., 'Southeast asia in the US rebalance: Perceptions from a divided region', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, pages 321-322.

the US are natural partners with a shared vision; working together to strengthen their bilateral relationship and contribute to solving regional and global problems.

These core tenets of the argument and narrative are best summed up in the opening paragraphs of the November 9<sup>th</sup> 2010 'Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia', in a public statement of what the comprehensive partnership is, agreed by both countries:

"The spirit behind this new partnership is a shared desire to increase consultation and cooperation, reflecting warmer ties, significant shared interests, and a belief that partnership is critical not only to the bilateral relationship, but to addressing key regional and global challenges. The partnership is founded on the shared values of freedom, pluralism, tolerance, democracy and respect for human rights."<sup>148</sup>

Secondly, in earlier iterations of the discourse the US and Indonesian narratives also focus on Indonesia's status as a predominantly Muslim nation. For both, Indonesia is presented as an example of a country where Islam, democracy, modernity and the rights of women are able to coexist and advance together. For US interlocutors in particular, Indonesia's claimed success in these areas and greater US engagement with the government and people of the country are presented as part of efforts to reach out to and change the nature of the US's relationships with 'the Muslim world'.

In remarks to the press on February 18<sup>th</sup> 2009 both the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda and US Secretary of State Clinton pick up and amplify this narrative theme:

"FOREIGN MINISTER WIRAJUDA:

.....

I share the view of Secretary Clinton that there exists (inaudible) ground for cooperation as we both pluralistic and tolerant society. And on its own, Indonesia is not only country with largest Muslim populations, but as we have proven here, democracy, Islam and modernity can go hand in hand. And as an active promoter of dialogue among civilizations, religions and cultures, Indonesia will be a good partner of United States in reaching out to the Muslim world.

.....

SECRETARY CLINTON:

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<sup>148</sup> The White House, *Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (November 09, 2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/joint-declaration-comprehensive-partnership-between-united-states-america>

.....

We believe that there are opportunities for us to engage with nations that have similar values and visions of the kind of future that we need to share. United States and Asia have a common future. The question is: How will we share it together and how do we make it more prosperous and peaceful for all of our people? And certainly, Indonesia being the largest Muslim nation in the world, the third largest democracy, will play a leading role in the promotion of that shared future. So we are looking forward to deepening our cooperation on a number of issues.”<sup>149</sup>

In later iterations of the narrative however, references to the Muslim nature of Indonesia are less prevalent, perhaps reflecting the diminishing salience of the Bush era and the need for the US to accentuate positive relationships with Muslim nations.

Thirdly, over this period the narrative also evolves from focusing on shared values and the strengthening of the bilateral relationship to having a much stronger emphasis on the role both countries play in advancing their shared objectives in multilateral contexts and institutions. US interlocutors repeatedly and explicitly praise Indonesia’s perceived ‘leadership’ in these institutions, while Indonesian interlocutors express support for the US’s increased engagement with South East Asian and East Asian institutions and groupings. This point is also made explicitly and substantively in the 2010 Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership:

“President Yudhoyono welcomed President Obama’s decision to join the East Asia Summit, which further integrates the United States into the evolving institutional architecture of the Asia-Pacific region and opens a new channel for expanding multilateral cooperation. They agreed to energetically harness the new Partnership so that it will contribute to the continued progress and prosperity of both countries, while also serving as an important pillar for growing U.S. – ASEAN cooperation, and for advancing regional peace and prosperity. They also agreed to continue to work closely together in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum to strengthen and deepen regional economic integration by addressing barriers to trade and investment.”<sup>150</sup>

Finally, it is also worth noting that President Obama’s personal links with Indonesia, having spent part of his upbringing there, are also mentioned frequently by the President himself throughout his contributions to the discourse. Although they are not dwelt on as providing any basis for the substantial – or strengthened – relationship between the United States and Indonesia, the President’s personal

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<sup>149</sup> US Department of State, *Developing a Comprehensive Partnership With Indonesia*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (February 18, 2009), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119424.htm>

<sup>150</sup> The White House, *Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (November 09, 2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/joint-declaration-comprehensive-partnership-between-united-states-america>

reminiscences are used as a framing device for certain parts of the narrative and as a source of example and metaphor.

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

A top 10 ranking of words from the key word density analysis of the full texts of the discourse is summarised below. Extraneous words or particles such as names of the two countries, job titles, etc. have been excluded based on a judgement by the author.

| <b>Single words</b> | <b>Two-word linkages</b>  | <b>Three-word linkages</b>       |
|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Cooperation         | Comprehensive Partnership | East Asia Summit                 |
| People              | Climate Change            | Joint Commission Meeting         |
| Partnership         | Trade Investment          | South China Sea                  |
| Energy              | Joint Commission          | Millennium Challenge Corporation |
| Working             | Human Rights              | Democracy Civil Society          |
| Development         | Civil Society             | Democracy Human Rights           |
| World               | East Asia                 | Regional Global Issues           |
| Security            | Higher Education          | Bali Democracy Forum             |
| Bilateral           | Science Technology        | Greenhouse Gas Emissions         |
| Trade               | Asia Pacific              | Respect Human Rights             |

Given the nature and content of the overarching narrative it is not surprising that the terms ‘cooperation’, ‘partnership’ and ‘people’ figure highly in the shared vocabulary of Indonesia and the US. Democracy, human rights and civil society also figure highly as words and concepts, largely reflecting both countries’ view that shared values regarding and approaches to these subjects underpin their strategic relationship and the comprehensive partnership developed to underpin it. References to regional and multilateral issues and institutions are also strong. In both cases however, these references do not just reflect the content of the proactive narrative set out by Indonesia and the US, but also reflect their discourse around

challenges and reactive responses to live issues (explored in later sections, particularly on security).

Indonesia and the US also create and then draw upon a shared lexicon relating to the institutions and priority subject matter of their comprehensive partnership. Key institutions created include a joint, ministerial level commission and a series of working groups. The creation, functioning and outcomes from these institutions increasingly provide a locus and content for the two countries' discourse regarding their relationship. Energy, Climate Change and Higher Education figure highly, particularly in the US discourse earlier in this period, reflecting the US's stated priorities for the partnership. Over time however the vocabulary shifts to include other issues such as security and trade (as will be explored in the later sections on security and economic issues).

### *Emphasised/included*

Throughout the discourse the claims that the US and Indonesia share a common commitment to 'values' such as tolerance and pluralism, and a set of shared experiences especially relating to the practice of democracy, are emphasised. Shared challenges and a commitment to tackle them together and contribute to a set of shared normative 'goods' such as peace, stability, security and prosperity are also emphasised. As is the claim that the partnership is not aimed 'against' any other actor. For the US, especially earlier in the discourse, the challenges of climate change, energy, the development of an effective civil society and higher education are explicitly spelt out and therefore emphasised.

For both countries the mutual nature of the challenges, interests and benefits of their relationship are also emphasised. This is best expressed by Barack Obama during 'Remarks by the President at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta' on November 10<sup>th</sup> 2010:

"So today, I return to Indonesia as a friend, but also as a President who seeks a deep and enduring partnership between our two countries.

(Applause.) Because as vast and diverse countries; as neighbors on either side of the Pacific; and above all as democracies -- the United States and Indonesia are bound together by shared interests and shared values.

Yesterday, President Yudhoyono and I announced a new Comprehensive Partnership between the United States and Indonesia. We are increasing ties between our governments in many different areas, and -- just as importantly -- we are increasing ties among our people. This is a partnership of equals, grounded in mutual interests and mutual respect."<sup>151</sup>

In contrast, again especially in the earlier stages of the discourse, Indonesian interlocutors have a tendency to emphasise two things: The first is the need for the

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<sup>151</sup> The White House, *Remarks by the President at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (November 10, 2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/10/remarks-president-university-indonesia-jakarta-indonesia>

partnership to focus on economic issues, growth, trade and prosperity as well as the shared commitment to democracy. The second is to broaden the narrative to emphasise the role of Indonesia and the US in the wider, regional and multilateral system. For the Indonesians the bilateral relationship is often given equal emphasis with the multilateral when framing the overall narrative, as in this example from President Yudhoyono during 'Remarks by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of the Republic of Indonesia Before Bilateral Breakfast Meeting' on June 17<sup>th</sup> 2010:

"Thank you. Good morning. I am very pleased to meet again once again Barack Obama this morning to discuss issues of common interest, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Indonesia and America are entering and developing a comprehensive partnership which is elevating and transforming our relations based on the equal partnership and aim to meet the challenges of the 21st century -- promoting peace, reforming the world economy, addressing climate change, as well as promoting harmony among civilizations. A stable, dynamic, and strong relations between Indonesia and the U.S. is good for our region and for our world.

I appreciate the leadership of President Barack Obama and I thank to him for his friendship and goodwill toward Indonesia."<sup>152</sup>

### *Deemphasised/not included*

First and most interestingly, the terms 'pivot' and 'rebalance' are not mentioned once verbally by President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton or any Indonesian interlocutor in the entire discourse. The terms are only used sparingly by the then US Secretary of State Kerry in remarks to the press in 2013 and then only in response to journalists where the terms are explicitly used in the framing of questions. The term 'pivot' does not appear in any written communication, whether produced by the US, Indonesia, or both jointly. The only appearance of the term 'rebalance' in an official written communication is the following in the 'Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia' published on October 26<sup>th</sup> 2015:

"Both Presidents welcomed the Indonesian Government's maritime vision to become a global maritime fulcrum, as well as Indonesia's leadership in regional and global fora, and the United States' Rebalance policy to the Asia Pacific aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, stability and security in the Asia-Pacific Region."<sup>153</sup>

<sup>152</sup> The White House, *Remarks by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of the Republic of Indonesia Before Bilateral Breakfast Meeting, Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (June 27, 2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-republic-indonesia-bilateral-breakf>

<sup>153</sup> The White House, *Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (October 26, 2015), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023:

This absence serves to deemphasise the idea that changes in the US's approach to Indonesia specifically or the South East Asia or East Asia regions more generally are driven by a grander US strategy, approach or foreign policy design. This is surprising given, as explored earlier in this paper, the 'pivot' or 'rebalance' to Asia is considered the defining foreign policy of the Obama Administration and the organising lens through which its successes or failures are assessed. This would be well known to informed policy makers in the region.

Linked to this is an absence of language, narrative and discourse relating to power or the power differential between the US and Indonesia. The US was and is a global superpower with a total GDP almost twenty times that of Indonesia. Throughout this discourse however, the US and Indonesia are referred to as equal actors pursuing mutual benefit through a partnership based on mutual respect. This further deemphasises the idea that the US as the leading partner or driving force behind the comprehensive partnership. And concomitantly, deemphasises the idea that Indonesia is a junior partner, following the US's lead or seeking gains or favours from a much more powerful actor.

Throughout the discourse there is little in the way of deeper or more meaningful exposition on what democracy is or how and in what ways the US or Indonesian experiences of it may be similar or different. In one example, Secretary of State Clinton does allude to the difficulties of characterising a republic that allowed ownership of slaves (until 1865) and denied the franchise to half its population, (women, on equal terms to men, until 1928) as 'the world's oldest functioning democracy'. Some of the challenges Indonesia has faced since its transition to democracy, such as a lack of respect for basic human rights, are also referenced. However mostly, the challenges around defining or being a democracy are deemphasised, therefore deemphasising any potential differences between Indonesia and the US. Both are characterised without much qualification as functioning democracies and this forms the foundation for their enhanced relationship.

The discourse is also notable for its lack of significant detail on the outcomes that the strengthened partnership between the two countries is intended to produce, with only a limited explanation of the concrete commitments that the two countries are making to each other. As noted above, the purposes of the partnership are painted in very broad-brush terms, largely by way of contributions to regional or global public 'goods' or 'increased' security or prosperity. Beyond this, no overarching rubric is presented through which the success of the partnership could be assessed, either strategically overall or specifically in the areas of the two countries' security and economic or trading relationships. Quantitative measures are limited largely to the US's announcements of foreign assistance packages, for example for higher education or for security assistance, and figures relating to existing trade and investment levels that the two countries wish to increase. These absences serve to further

deemphasise the transactional or mercantile nature of the relationship, in favour of the declared focus on values.

Perhaps surprisingly given the perception that the announcement of the rebalance was driven by concerns about China's growing economic and political influence in the region, China does not figure very much at all in either countries' interlocutors' explanations for the reasons for the strengthened partnership or its focus and contents. China, and its increased role in the region, is certainly not presented as an overall driver of increased engagement between Indonesia and the US. For the US, in the earlier stages of the discourse, the closest it gets to recognising something like this is Secretary Clinton's acceptance that there may be a perception that the US has prioritised engagement with China to the exclusion of other partners, during remarks to the press in Jakarta in February 2009:

"SECRETARY CLINTON: ..... I decided that I wanted to come to Asia on my first trip because we concluded that in the last several years, we hadn't paid enough attention to many parts of Asia, and certainly to the ASEAN countries. And I think it's important that Asia know that the United States is paying attention that we consider ourselves both a transpacific and a transatlantic power – we don't just look one way – and that our interests are not just focused on China. China is very important. We know China will assume more and more of a presence in not just Asia, but the world. But that we have long relationships with many countries, and I wanted to demonstrate that."<sup>154</sup>

As noted above, unless prompted by questions from journalists, both Indonesian and US interlocutors barely mention China, serving to deemphasise its importance in the framing of the rebalance and the enhanced partnership between the two countries. It is noticeable that China does not figure as one of the top key single words in the density analysis, and only at all as part of the three-word term 'South China Sea'.

Finally, it is also worth noting that although there are specific elements of the discourse that focus on security issues (explored in more detail in the section below), the overall strategic narrative contains very little about security, the two countries' defence relationship, military matters or arms sales. No specific security threat is identified by either party to justify a more intensive security relationship between the two countries. This serves to deemphasise the role of security as a driver for the enhanced partnership in favour of the values-driven narrative that Indonesia and the US prefer to promote.

### *Security/military discourse*

#### *Narrative*

It is noticeable in the discourse that there is very little narrative content on security, military or defence matters that places details on these issues in some kind of overall context. This is in stark contrast to the lengthy discourses regarding values and

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<sup>154</sup> US Department of State, *Expanding the U.S.-Indonesian Dialogue*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (February 19, 2009), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119423.htm>

democracy that are used to frame the overall relationship. Earlier in the Obama Administration period there are scattered references in the discourse to ‘security cooperation’, ‘regional security’, ‘counter terrorism’ and ‘communicable diseases’, but these are not drawn together proactively into a coherent attempt to communicate Indonesia’s or the US’s intentions in these areas or explain why they seek to enhance their cooperation in them. Beyond this, the most substantive references to security issues in the earlier parts of the discourse relate to the Middle East; with US interlocutors providing assurance to their Indonesian counterparts that they are actively pursuing a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This point is though entirely separate from discussion of the US-Indonesia security relationship.

In the early stages of the discourse, it is stated as a fact without much explanation that the two countries have a strong security relationship and that ‘security cooperation’ will be part of the Comprehensive Partnership. The areas included under that rubric are listed, as confirmed in this statement from the ‘U.S.-Indonesia Joint Commission and Bilateral Meeting’ in September 2010:

#### “Working Group on Security

The co-chairs of the Working Group on Security reported to Secretary Clinton and Minister Natalegawa on the result of the last meeting of Indonesia – United States Security Dialogue (IUSSD) in Washington, D.C., on May 25-26, 2010. They reaffirmed the strong security relationship the two countries share, and pledged to continue close cooperation on programs related to maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping, and defense reform and professionalization. The chairs also reported on the recent signing of the Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defense, and highlighted the annual Indonesia-United States Security Dialogue as the pre-eminent forum for the two countries to discuss security issues. The Indonesian delegation shared information on TNI [Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Indonesia’s armed forces] reform toward professionalization, modernization, and respect for human rights.”<sup>155</sup>

Later in this period, the narrative on why Indonesia and the US cooperate in these fields and what it is expected it will deliver has developed slightly; although it still remains a relatively vague list of activities that could apply almost to any country or set of countries. This text is from a joint statement from the two countries’ Presidents in October 2015:

#### “Defense Cooperation

The two Presidents affirmed their commitment to further strengthen their bilateral defense cooperation, and welcomed the growth in bilateral military engagements, which now stand at more than 200 activities annually. The Presidents welcomed the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation of October 26, 2015, between the Indonesian Ministry of Defense

<sup>155</sup> US Department of State, *U.S.-Indonesia Joint Commission and Bilateral Meeting*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (September 17, 2010), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147309.htm>

and the U.S. Department of Defense. The two Presidents underscored their commitment to deepen collaboration on areas such as: maritime cooperation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, defense joint research and development, countering transnational threats, and military professionalization. The two Presidents also affirmed their interest in exploring and consulting on new activities to advance cooperation in the areas of co-development and co-production of defense equipment, cooperative logistics, and maritime security.”<sup>156</sup>

Insofar as further, consistent narrative is discernible it largely relates to the issue of regional security and specifically the South China Sea. Here, both sets of interlocutors deploy a narrative that focuses on the importance of freedom of navigation and trade, respect for international rules and norms the need for negotiated settlements of disputes and the role that cooperation between the two countries plays in supporting such regional public goods as ‘security’ and ‘stability’. Building on a point from the analysis of the overall strategic and political narrative, Indonesia’s leadership, both bilaterally and regionally is accentuated. The role of regional organisations such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit is also referred to frequently, centrally, in the narrative. The US’s joining of the latter group is welcomed explicitly.

Finally, it is also worth noting a limited number of references to ‘Papua’ throughout the discourse. Papua in this context refers to the part of Indonesia that occupies the western part of New Guinea. Indonesian rule over the region has been subject to sustained criticism over decades regarding human rights abuses related to ongoing conflict between the government and separatist groups, including in the US State Department’s own regular human rights reports<sup>157</sup>. This issue is not raised proactively by either party, but in most cases through questions directed by journalists to US interlocutors. In responding, they stick very closely to a narrative formulation that supports the territorial integrity of Indonesia, encourages dialogue and the addressing of grievances, but otherwise avoids any criticism of Indonesia and respects the issue as an internal matter for the country. No explicit link, either positive or negative, is made between the issue and the deepening of engagement between Indonesia and the US on security issues.

Overall, however, as noted earlier the existence of substantive proactive narrative discourse on security, defence or military matters is noticeable by its relative absence during this period in Indonesian-US relations.

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<sup>156</sup> The White House, *Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (October 26, 2015), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia>

<sup>157</sup> US Department of State, *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia*, US Department of State Website (2021), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/indonesia/>

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

As in other areas, Indonesia and the US create and draw on a shared vocabulary on security issues. However, in keeping with the relatively low level of proactive discourse regarding security, military or defence issues this does not figure significantly in the overall discourse as shown in the word density analysis. 'Security' is identified as one of the top single words along with 'South China Sea' as a three-word linkage; but these are the only words with an obvious link to security subject matter.

As the relevant part of the architecture created by the two countries, there are multiple references to the 'Working Group on Security'; its meetings, discussions and conclusions. The US and Indonesia share a common language regarding the subject matter included in their cooperation on security: Counter terrorism, counter proliferation (of WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction), humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping and modernisation – meaning US support for the modernisation of Indonesia's armed forces.

### *Emphasised/included*

Throughout this period a large proportion of the security-, military- or defence-related elements of the discourse are devoted to reports on joint activities between the military forces of Indonesia and the United States. The reporting is passive, largely retroactive and factual in nature, serving to accentuate the practical, day-to-day nature of the cooperation between the two countries. This information also includes details of the supply of US equipment and training to the armed forces of Indonesia. As an example, early in the period in 2011 an entire factsheet is published devoted entirely to a 'DoD[Department of Defense]-funded Integrated Maritime Surveillance System' that has been provided to Indonesia. Over the course of this period the details provided evolve to include reports on the provision of US arms to the country, including fighter jets, helicopters and missiles.

The US in particular also repeatedly counts and reports on 'military-to-military engagements' seemingly as a marker of the increased intensity and utility of the two countries' security cooperation. What a 'military-to-military engagement' is, is never defined, but the term appears to encompass any kind of joint activity, exercise or even meeting between the security, defence or military establishments of the two countries.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

Throughout the discourse, as already noted, very little further information is provided as to why the US and Indonesia are deepening their engagement in these areas or what the objectives of it are, beyond the relatively vague references to regional public goods. The two partners state that they are working together to counter terrorism and weapons proliferation, but do not define who the terrorists or the proliferators are. They are working together on peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, but do not provide any further information on where, or in what ways these activities are taking place nor who the beneficiaries are. Maritime security is repeatedly stressed as a priority, but beyond confirming that the object of the

engagement is to strengthen Indonesia's and perhaps the region's maritime security, again very little information is provided on what if anything their security is being strengthened against or in response to. This further serves to deemphasise the idea that the strengthening of the relationship and the specific activities are directed against any particular actor.

When the two interlocutors discuss the South China Sea, there are also very obviously limited explicit references to or criticisms of the actions of China. Both Indonesia and the US prefer to talk in general terms about actions that undermine peace, security or stability with specifically naming China as the source of those actions. This approach is exemplified in the following extract from the 2015 'Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia' where the two Heads of State talk in some length about the South China Sea and their concerns about recent developments in the region, without actually mentioning 'China' itself once:

"The two Presidents expressed their shared concern about recent developments in the South China Sea that have increased tensions, eroded trust, and threatened to undermine peace, security, and the economic well-being of the region. Both countries believe it is vital for all parties to refrain from actions that raise tensions in the South China Sea. Both Presidents affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and upholding internationally recognized freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Both countries support the peaceful resolution of disputes in conformity with international law, including as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS), and recognize the importance of full and effective implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China, as well as efforts to quickly conclude the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea."<sup>158</sup>

This serves again, to deemphasise the idea that China and its policies and activities in the region are an important driver of US or Indonesian policy or of the strengthening of their relationship, in favour of the idea that the two countries are seeking to uphold shared values and public goods.

### *Economic/trade discourse*

#### *Narrative*

In the earlier stages of the discourse, the US narrative regarding economic and trade issues is limited, again reflecting the overriding focus on values and democracy. Where references are made, they are expressed in terms of thematic priorities for foreign assistance or other bilateral cooperation between the US and Indonesia. It is Indonesian interlocutors that introduce broader issues regarding economic growth, prosperity and development into the narrative, including by placing collaboration on

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<sup>158</sup> The White House, *Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (October 26, 2015), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia>

these issues in the context of then extant 2008-2009 financial crisis. In one case the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Wirajuda, politely but quite clearly contradicts – or at least, heavily modifies – the US narrative and its strong focus on values and specifically democracy during remarks to the press in February 2009:

“We agreed to expand and deepen our bilateral cooperation within a comprehensive partnership, having concrete agendas (inaudible) economy, trade, investment, education, health, climate change, security cooperation (inaudible), and enhanced people to people contacts, including exchanges of youths and students.

We agreed that the cooperation to promote prosperity and welfare of the people is as equally important as promoting democracy; hence, democracy and prosperity are mutually reinforcing. We will be working closely to promote development cooperation to help Indonesia attain the Millennium Development Goals in line with the (inaudible) the primacy of development that Obama’s Administration wishes to promote around the world.”<sup>159</sup>

The issues of economic and development cooperation are included in the initial shared statements and announcements relating to the Comprehensive Partnership. Further detail is provided in the Partnership’s ‘Plan of Action’ that lists 27 areas for collaboration. In the initial stages of the discourse however, beyond limited references to promoting economic growth, stabilising the global economy and a shared commitment to ‘open markets’ little narrative context is provided to explain why the US-Indonesian economic or trading relationship is important and a priority for the Comprehensive Partnership and/or what it is intended to achieve.

Later in the period, President Obama himself during a visit to Indonesia in 2010, sets out a justification for economic cooperation with Indonesia that seems designed to appeal to US audiences rather than Indonesian ones; emphasising as it does that growing Indonesian prosperity means the country will become a bigger export market for the US:

“America has a stake in Indonesia growing and developing, with prosperity that is broadly shared among the Indonesian people -- because a rising middle class here in Indonesia means new markets for our goods, just as America is a market for goods coming from Indonesia. So we are investing more in Indonesia, and our exports have grown by nearly 50 percent, and we are opening doors for Americans and Indonesians to do business with one another.”<sup>160</sup>

<sup>159</sup> US Department of State, *Developing a Comprehensive Partnership With Indonesia*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (February 18, 2009), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119424.htm>

<sup>160</sup> The White House, *Remarks by the President at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (November 10, 2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/10/remarks-president-university-indonesia-jakarta-indonesia>

The overarching theme of the narrative for the remainder of this period is a shared focus on increasing bilateral trade and investment between the US and Indonesia. A comparison is made between trade and investment levels between the US and other countries in the region, and lower levels with Indonesia; and the ambition expressed to match or exceed those levels. The shared narrative between both countries continues to list initiatives, meetings, visits, events, commercial deals and priorities for US foreign assistance, alongside key trade and investment metrics. It is implied that there is a link between the two.

Near the end of Obama's term in 2015, the section of the two countries' statement headed 'Economic Growth and Development' provides a key example of this narrative approach. It sets out standard commitments to open markets and the facilitation of private sector investment. It notes a dollar figure relating to commercial deals, but provides no context or point of reference to enable the reader to judge how significant it is. It further notes discussions and agreements under the pre-existing US-Indonesia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and that both countries are committed to ratify or implement two multilateral agreements. It sets out a vague commitment to cooperate more on science, technology. And finally notes the discussions of an aviation working group and the commitments of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation.<sup>161</sup>

#### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

Particularly in the Comprehensive Partnership's Plan of Action there is a distinctive use of more active verbs to describe the US and Indonesia's shared commitments in the economic and trade fields: 'increase', 'enhance', 'promote' and 'work together' are used much more commonly when compared with similar texts relating to the security or defence relationship.

As in other areas, Indonesia and the US create and draw on a shared vocabulary on economic and trade issues. As the relevant part of the architecture created by the two countries, there are multiple references to the 'Working Group on Trade and Investment'; and, as for the security equivalent, its meetings, discussions and conclusions.

Repeated reference is also made to the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), originally agreed by the two countries in 1996. US and Indonesian representatives already met regularly under the terms of the TIFA through a 'Trade and Investment Council'.<sup>162</sup> In addition, a 'Commercial Dialogue' is also referenced, under the direction of the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs and with a strong focus on the

<sup>161</sup> The White House, *Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (October 26, 2015), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia>

<sup>162</sup> Office of the United States Trade Representative, Indonesia country Profile, Office of the United States Trade Representative Website (2023), <https://ustr.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/indonesia>

private sector.<sup>163</sup> The precise relationships between the Working Group, the Council and the Dialogue are never spelt out in the narrative, however the workings and decisions of all are drawn upon to provide content for it.

### *Emphasised/included*

The shared commitment to increasing bilateral trade and investment is strongly emphasised throughout the narrative, particularly by Indonesia. Economy, trade and investment are subjects prioritised before others, for example by the then President of Indonesia, Yudhoyono, during a press conference with President Obama in 2010:

“First of all is in the area of trade and investment. At this time, the United States is the trade partner number three for Indonesia, with \$21 billion in 2008, and also investor number three for Indonesia. We hope that -- and I personally expect that -- once again, the investment and trade between our two countries can be increased significantly in the future, bearing in mind that the magnitude of the economies of the United States and also the economic growth that is occurring in Indonesia right now.”<sup>164</sup>

As noted above, Indonesian interlocutors are also keen to assert that democracy and prosperity are linked, a theme that is also picked up later by US counterparts. This serves to emphasise the more concrete economic gains that Indonesia in particular can hope to gain from a stronger relationship with the US.

The US also emphasises that both countries are members of the G20 and can and do both contribute to global economic stability. This theme is repeated later in the narrative and echoed by Indonesian interlocutors. The commitment to strengthening the bilateral relationship is included alongside commitments to increase cooperation in and with multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and APEC. This serves to emphasise that US and Indonesian cooperation supports the delivery of regional and global public goods, as well as gains for both countries individually.

For the US there is also significant emphasis on foreign assistance and sectoral areas for funding and cooperation, repeatedly referring to climate change, energy and education. The US also emphasises the provision of Export-Import Bank credit lines and the export of US clean energy technologies to Indonesia, emphasising its ‘offer’ and the potential benefits to Indonesia, but also the potential benefits to the US of higher levels of bilateral trade.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

Mirroring Indonesia’s relatively high prioritisation of economic and trade issues, for the US particularly earlier in the narrative they appear further down the list or stated

<sup>163</sup> United States Department of Commerce, *United States-Indonesia Commercial Dialogue*, International Trade Administration Website Archive, <https://2016.export.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2016.export.gov/indonesia/commercialdialogue/index.asp>

<sup>164</sup> The White House, *Press Conference by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (November 9, 2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-indonesia-jakar>

priorities. They usually appear behind values such as democracy and priorities such as tackling climate change as in this example from the then Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, in 2009, where discussion of economic growth and development is framed through the lens of US foreign assistance and comes third after points on the Peace Corps and Fulbright scholarships:

“Third, we talked about the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact for Indonesia. Indonesia has earned the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact eligibility status because of its impressive reform agenda and results. And I’m pleased to announce that a Millennium Challenge Corporation team will visit this spring to begin another exciting new partnership to work with Indonesia on its goals of reducing poverty and promoting economic growth. This remained an important point. Democracy and prosperity must advance together. And that is a goal that we share as well.”<sup>165</sup>

Beyond the references to increasing bilateral trade and investment and contributing to regional or global prosperity, very few concrete outcomes are identified throughout the discourse. No quantifiable targets are set. For example, for the 27 areas listed in the Comprehensive Partnership’s Plan of Action, none have a numerical target or financial figure attached. Dollar values are only provided for US foreign assistance funding in identified sectoral areas or when referring to commercial deals that have been completed by private sector partners. Overall, this serves to deemphasise any sense that the economic relationship between the two countries is transactional in nature. It also of course makes it more difficult to determine whether the comprehensive partnership is delivering the results it is expected to on trade and economic development, deemphasising any scope for disagreement or disappointment.

Finally, it should be noted that there is very little emphasis on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). It is not mentioned by Indonesian interlocutors at all, and only briefly by US leaders later in this period. This is perhaps not surprising, given Indonesia was not a signatory of the agreement. But the lack of much reference to it, or public US lobbying for it, serves to deemphasise any difference of opinion or disagreement between the two countries about it.

## **B2.2.2 The Trump Administration 2017-2021**

*Strategic, political/diplomatic discourse*

*Overall narrative*

Much of the overall narrative deployed by the US and Indonesia during the Trump Administration is familiar from the previous Obama era. Both countries continue to accentuate their shared ‘values’. Principal among these is democracy, with interlocutors from both countries citing this as a shared basis for their relationship, being as they are the second and third largest democracies in the world. This point is

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<sup>165</sup> US Department of State, *Developing a Comprehensive Partnership With Indonesia*, US Department of State Archive 2009-2017 (February 18, 2009), <https://2009-2017.state.gov>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119424.htm>

repeated throughout this period. A shared commitment to the rule of law applied domestically and to international matters (see below) is also cited. As this period also coincides with the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the two countries establishing diplomatic relations, this fact is also drawn upon as evidence to bolster claims regarding the longevity and nature of the relationship.

The fact of Indonesia's status as a Muslim nation is also repeatedly inserted into the discourse. Both by the US and Indonesia, the country's 'tolerance', 'pluralism' and 'inclusiveness' are presented as facts and positive ones; attributes that the two countries again share in common and are a source of mutual admiration. The US Vice President, Mike Pence, also expands this point to one about 'faith' being a shared, positive value.

Both countries continue to profess their commitment to the strategic partnership. A US interlocutor uses the term 'alliance', once, however in all other cases representatives of both countries stick to the same partnership rubric used during the Obama Administration. US interlocutors have a tendency to assert that their commitment to and the strengthening of the relationship with Indonesia is an expression of their commitment to the Asia Pacific as a whole, given Indonesia's centrality and strategic position within it. Both countries continue to assert that their relationship is an important one not just for delivering bilateral advantages for each other, but also in delivering peace and prosperity in the region and globally.

The US summarises the relationship in the following way in a factsheet published in January 2020:

"Indonesia is a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific Region and U.S.-Indonesia relations have taken on increasing importance. Indonesia is the world's third largest democracy, largest Muslim-majority country, the seventh-largest economy by purchasing power, and a leader in ASEAN. It possesses the world's greatest marine biodiversity and its second greatest terrestrial biodiversity. Indonesia also borders the South China Sea, which has the world's busiest sea lanes — over \$5 trillion in cargo and as much as 50 percent of the world's oil tankers pass through the South China Sea every year. The United States was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia in 1949, following its independence from the Netherlands. Indonesia's democratization and reform process since 1998 has increased its stability and security, and resulted in strengthened U.S.-Indonesia relations. The United States and Indonesia initiated in 2010 a Comprehensive Partnership to foster consistent high-level engagement on democracy and civil society, education, security, resilience and mitigation, maritime, energy, and trade issues, among others. Based on its success, in 2015, the two countries upgraded the relationship to the U.S.-Indonesia

Strategic Partnership, extending cooperation to issues of regional and global significance.”<sup>166</sup>

One key shift from the Obama period is the introduction of the concept of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, placing the countries’ bilateral relationship within a broader strategic construct. Both countries use this term in joint statements and it is expressed in terms of a shared value, rather than a shared interest or interests. Very little explanation is provided as to what it means, beyond the link to the two countries’ common commitment to the rule of law. These statements are regularly linked more to events, disputes and tensions in the South China particularly by US interlocutors when compared to the previous administration. This remains however often by implication, rather than explicitly.

Both countries’ public remarks continue to be cordial, friendly and diplomatic towards each other and fully supportive of the strategic partnership. It is noticeable however that the Indonesian interlocutors occasionally insert a marker into the discourse concerning respect for differences and its independent foreign policy, as here in remarks to the press by Indonesia’s then Foreign Minister Marsudi in October 2020:

“My meeting with Secretary Pompeo went very well and productive in a very transparent and cordial environment. I reiterated the principle of free and independent foreign policy of Indonesia. I re-emphasized the need to pursue inclusive cooperation amidst this challenging time, and I underlined the need for every country to be part of the solution in the collective contribution toward world peace, stability, and prosperity.

On bilateral side, we agreed to enhance our strategic partnership by amplifying our shares values and interests while respecting our differences.”<sup>167</sup>

The Foreign Minister also goes on to underline Indonesia’s concerns regarding Palestine and the Middle East and its strong support for a two-state solution.

### ***Key vocabulary and lexicon***

A top 10 ranking of words from the key word density analysis of the full texts of the discourse is summarised below. Extraneous words or particles such as names of the two countries, job titles, etc. have been excluded based on a judgement by the author.

<sup>166</sup> US Department of State, *U.S. Relations With Indonesia*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (January 21, 2020), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/index.html>

<sup>167</sup> US Department of State, *Secretary Michael R. Pompeo And Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (October 29, 2020), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi/index.html>

| Single words | Two-word linkages     | Three-word linkages              |
|--------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Partnership  | Strategic Partnership | South China Sea                  |
| Today        | Southeast Asia        | Foreign Policy Issued            |
| Security     | South China           | Free Open Indo-pacific           |
| Thank        | Look Forward          | U S Businesses                   |
| Cooperation  | Foreign Policy        | Bilateral Trade Investment       |
| Economic     | Two Countries         | Issues Regional Global           |
| World        | China Sea             | Agreed Strengthen Cooperation    |
| Foreign      | Maritime Security     | Peaceful Prosperous Indo-pacific |
| Strategic    | Indo-pacific Region   | 70 Years Bilateral               |
| People       | Policy Issued         | Shared Democratic Values         |

Given the nature and content of the overarching narrative it is not surprising that the terms 'cooperation' and 'partnership' continue to figure highly in the shared vocabulary of Indonesia and the US. In a marked shift from the Obama Administration period however, references to democracy, human rights, education, climate change and civil society do not figure highly as words and concepts. These are replaced by terms such as 'security', 'economic', 'maritime security' and 'bilateral trade investment', reflecting the greater preponderance of those terms particularly in US interlocutors' contributions to the discourse.

Regional references remain strong, with the introduction and use of the term and concept of the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' alongside continued regular references to the South China Sea. Overall, the shared vocabulary reflects the tighter focus in the discourse on a smaller number of key issues: The strategic bilateral relationship between the US and Indonesia, trade, investment and economic relations and security issues.

#### *Emphasised/included*

Both countries continue to emphasise the mutual nature of their relationship, as a partnership of equals. Throughout the discourse the claims that the US and

Indonesia share a common commitment to 'values' such as tolerance and pluralism, and a set of shared experiences especially relating to the practice of democracy, are again emphasised. A shared commitment to tackle challenges together and contribute to peace, stability, security and prosperity are also emphasised.

Both countries also emphasise that their partnership must focus on economic issues, growth, trade and prosperity as well as the shared commitment to democracy, in a way that is distinctive from the Obama period discourse. For US interlocutors in particular, the narrative in these areas is much more substantive and up front.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

The terms 'pivot' and 'rebalance' are not mentioned once by any Indonesian or US interlocutor. This is perhaps not surprising given their strong association with the foreign policy of the previous US Administration. Instead, Trump era officials refer to their commitment to the Indonesia, the broader region and to an extent the Free and Open Indo-Pacific as an organising or motivating factor behind their engagement. This serves again to deemphasise the idea that changes in the US's approach to Indonesia specifically or the South East Asia or East Asia regions more generally are driven by a grander US strategy, approach or foreign policy design.

There continues to be an absence of language, narrative and discourse relating to power or the power differential between the US and Indonesia. Throughout the US and Indonesia are referred to as equal actors pursuing mutual benefit through a partnership based on mutual respect. This reinforces the idea that the US is not the leading partner or driving force behind the comprehensive partnership and that Indonesia is not a junior partner.

And again, throughout the discourse there is little in the way of deeper or more meaningful exposition on what democracy is or how and in what ways the US or Indonesian experiences of it may be similar or different, therefore again deemphasising any potential differences between Indonesia and the US. Both are characterised without much qualification as functioning democracies, as tolerant, pluralistic countries that respect the rule of law – and this forms the foundation for their enhanced relationship.

The purposes of the partnership continue to be painted in very broad-brush terms, with no overarching rubric presented through which the success of the partnership could be assessed or significant detail on the outcomes that the strengthened partnership between the two countries is intended to produce. Although China and the South China Sea and concerns about them are mentioned more prominently, a link is not drawn between a specific security threat identified by either party to justify a more intensive security relationship between the two countries. These absences serve to further deemphasise the transactional or mercantile nature of the relationship. And continue to deemphasise the role of security as a driver for the enhanced partnership in favour of the values-driven narrative.

## *Security/military discourse*

### *Narrative*

The overall narrative regarding security, military and defence issues remains limited in scope and content. Both parties, particularly the US, stick closely to the rubric of 'defence cooperation'. This cooperation is stated to be aimed at increasing each countries' security, and more specifically at countering 'terrorism', and at supporting regional and global security.

US interlocutors in particular draw a strong narrative link between this cooperation and support for the rules-based system, specifically that it helps support freedom of navigation, commerce, etc. in the South China Sea. There are repeated attempts to place security cooperation within a narrative context that accentuates mutual support for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept and the values-based partnership that Indonesia and the US claim to have, as in this example published by the US State Department before a visit by then Secretary of State Pompeo to Indonesia, in October 2020:

“THE UNITED STATES AND INDONESIA SHARE A VISION OF A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC REGION

The United States and Indonesia share a vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region, including a commitment to freedom of navigation and overflight. Indonesia is a leader within ASEAN and an anchor of the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. The United States remains deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific, and we and our partners believe the best way to prevent conflict is to reinforce our shared values.

Security cooperation is a key pillar of our strategic partnership. The United States is proud to be Indonesia's largest defense partner in terms of the number of annual exercises and events in which we participate together. Our cooperation in counterterrorism and in countering violent extremism is also an important component of our joint efforts to build a safer world. We respect Indonesia's strong efforts to safeguard its maritime rights and stand up to PRC aggression in the South China Sea, including in its Exclusive Economic Zone around the Natuna Islands.”<sup>168</sup>

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

As noted above, this period sees the introduction of the concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This term is not defined explicitly or in detail however, anywhere in the discourse. Most of the meaning of this term is implied: free and open transportation, overflight, trade and commerce in the region generally. And

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<sup>168</sup> US Department of State, *Secretary Michael R. Pompeo Travels to Indonesia To Underscore Shared Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (October 28, 2020), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-travels-to-indonesia-to-underscore-shared-vision-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-region/index.html>

specifically in the South China Sea, in opposition to perceived attempts by China to control or restrict access to it based on its claimed sovereignty.

The US and Indonesia continue to share a common language regarding the subject matter included in their cooperation on security drawing on terms such as maritime security, counter terrorism, counter proliferation, peacekeeping and modernisation.

### *Emphasised/included*

Indonesian interlocutors continue to include and emphasise ASEAN, when talking about the rules-based regional, multilateral system and managing and resolving disputes and tensions in the South China Sea. This serves to emphasise multilateral diplomatic approaches and the country's important role at the heart of them in South East Asia.

China, and its behaviour, particularly in the South China Sea, is more likely to be identified as the source of tensions and disputes, undermining the rules-based order and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Although not presented as a direct threat to the US or Indonesia, this serves to emphasise Chinese behaviour as a driver of greater bilateral cooperation, particularly in the security field.

Both countries also insert into the narrative and seek the others support for other foreign policy priorities: For Indonesia there are references to Palestine and the Middle East conflict, Afghanistan, and the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The US inserts repeated references to North Korea and its missile tests with claimed Indonesia support for its position. These references are almost transactional, serving to emphasise that perhaps the bilateral relationship is based more on quid pro quo than it is values-driven.

Both countries also include increased references to Indonesian arms procurement from the US and other aspects of military or security engagement. This serves to emphasise the growing relationship between the two countries, with the inference that Indonesian capabilities are being enhanced through training, support and equipment provision from the US. The then Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marsudi, makes this point during remarks to the press in October 2020:

“On defense cooperation, our minister – Indonesian Minister of Defense has visited the U.S. this month and met with various U.S. counterpart, including the U.S. Secretary of Defense. In the meeting, they agreed to enhance defense cooperation, including by strengthening defense capabilities and military procurement to achieve minimum essential force, training and exercises, intelligence sharings, and maritime security cooperation in the region.”<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> US Department of State, *Secretary Michael R. Pompeo And Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (October 29, 2020), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi/index.html>

*Deemphasised/not included*

Beyond the references to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and China's activities in the South China Sea, very little further information is provided as to why the US and Indonesia are deepening their engagement in these areas or what the objectives of it are. The two partners state that they are working together to counter terrorism but again do not define who the terrorists are. Terrorism is defined as an abstract 'evil'. This further serves to deemphasise the idea that the strengthening of the relationship and the specific activities in these areas are directed against any particular actor.

There are few or no references to the 'Working Group on Security' created under the Obama Administration; its meetings, discussions and conclusions. This deemphasises that institution's importance.

*Economic/trade discourse**Narrative*

The discourse in this area has the most marked changes from that of the Obama Administration period. Trade and investment figure highly as subject matter with the objective declared that they should be increased but in a way that secures a 'win-win' for both parties. This is led mainly by the US's narrative, calling for there to be a 'level playing field', that trade should be 'fair' and that there should be gains for both parties. US interlocutors call explicitly for the breaking down of barriers to the Indonesian market, making the point that Indonesia has enjoyed privileged access to the US's. These points are repeated throughout the US contributions to the discourse. Indonesian interlocutors echo the general points about mutual benefit although are not drawn on the specific points about 'opening' their market.

*Key vocabulary and lexicon*

The rubric of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is also drawn upon in these parts of the discourse. US contributions to the discourse seek to draw a link between US growth contributing to for global growth, being good for the region and therefore being good for Indonesia

*Emphasised/included*

US interlocutors in particular emphasise the history of private sector investment in Indonesia and the region, drawing on figures that relate to ASEAN. They note that US exports (it seems from the text generally) have fallen and both countries set out the ambition to increase trade and investment. US contributions also link this point back to the US domestic reform agenda, presented as being all about securing growth. They emphasise that growth for the US brings benefits for everyone, including Indonesia.

US contributions to the discourse also repeatedly refer to 'Indonesia's reform agenda'. An implicit link is made between the need to break down perceived barriers to US trade with and investment in Indonesia if such market access is to be reciprocated by the US. US engagement with Indonesia is presented as being

concerned with securing the necessary reforms, as in this State Department factsheet from January 2020:

“The United States continues to engage with Indonesia to advance economic reform priorities, such as strengthening the investment climate and reducing barriers to trade, such as protectionist laws, limited infrastructure, and an unevenly applied legal structure.”<sup>170</sup>

This serves to emphasize that the US is seeking to extract gains for itself from its engagement with Indonesia, and suggests again a further shift to a more transactional kind of relationship.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

There are few or no references to the various groups and bodies created under the Obama Administration and in previous years; their meetings, discussions and conclusions. This deemphasises those institutions' importance.

## **B2.2.3 The Biden Administration 2017-2021-present**

### *Strategic, political/diplomatic discourse*

#### *Overall narrative*

In the Biden Administration period the overall narrative is anchored in two of the key points that have already been introduced into the discourse. The first is support for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, something that both countries claim to share. The concept is presented as a 'good' encompassing a wide variety of positive attributes, as exemplified here by the US Secretary of State, Blinken, during a press conference in December 2021:

“I spoke this morning at greater length about our commitment to a free and open, interconnected, prosperous, resilient, and secure Indo-Pacific, because we believe these attributes are key to a region where the benefits of economic growth are broadly shared, crises are addressed effectively, people are empowered to chart their own futures, countries work together on the basis of mutual respect, and we preserve the rules-based order that we've built and maintained together for so many years

And what I want to emphasize is this is not only an American vision. It's one that people and countries across the Indo-Pacific hold, including the Indonesian people, who have worked hard over the decades to strengthen their own democracy, to grow their economy, to play a greater role in regional and global affairs.”<sup>171</sup>

<sup>170</sup> US Department of State, *U.S. Relations With Indonesia*, US Department of State Archive 2017-2021 (January 21, 2020), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/index.html>

<sup>171</sup> US Department of State, *Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability*, US Department of State Website (December 14, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-8/>

The second is support for the Strategic Partnership between Indonesia and the US. This is presented as being part of and as reinforcing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Indonesia is again portrayed as a pluralistic democracy that upholds the rule of law and international order and respects human rights. It is these shared attributes that make it a strong partner for the US, working together to deliver peace, stability and prosperity.

### *Key vocabulary and lexicon*

A top 10 ranking of words from the key word density analysis of the full texts of the discourse is summarised below. Extraneous words or particles such as names of the two countries, job titles, etc. have been excluded based on a judgement by the author.

| <b>Single words</b>  | <b>Two-word linkages</b> | <b>Three-word linkages</b>                 |
|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Indo-Pacific         | Strategic Partnership    | Free Open Indo-Pacific                     |
| Security Partnership | Make Sure Climate Crisis | South China Sea ASEAN Outlook Indo-Pacific |
| Cooperation          | Free Open                | Indo-Pacific Economic Framework            |
| Foreign              | Around World             | Global Health Security                     |
| Global               | Global Health            | Aggression Against Ukraine                 |
| World                | Work Together            | Strengthen Global Health                   |
| Think                | Let Me                   | We're Working Together                     |
| Together             | Open Indo-Pacific        | G20 Next Year                              |
| G20                  | Working Together         | Rules-Based International Order            |

The Indo-Pacific rubric figures very highly in the shared lexicon and vocabulary during this period. This is alongside multiple references to partnership, cooperation and working together to address shared challenges and deliver regional and global public goods, in a style reminiscent of the Obama Administration period. Climate change returns to the high-profile lexicon, and the list of shared concerns, having been absent during the Trump Administration period.

Two new concepts are introduced. The first is the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, a statement published in 2020 that sets out ASEAN's shared policy position on the region<sup>172</sup>. The second is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, launched by the US in May 2022, that seeks to create a 'stronger, fairer, more resilient economy' in the region<sup>173</sup>.

The key vocabulary of the narrative also reflects current events during the course of 2020 to 2022 where Indonesian and US interlocutors have commented publicly usually in response to press questions. This includes multiple references to health, driven by the COVID19 pandemic, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

### *Emphasised/included*

US interlocutors continue to reference Indonesia's status as a democracy, fast growing economy, majority Muslim nation, and a supporter of a rules-based international order as the foundation for their enhanced relationship. Again, emphasising these values, where shared, as being the foundation for the strategic partnership.

The US in particular repeatedly associates support for and engagement with Indonesia with its support for ASEAN 'centrality' and the organisation's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The Outlook is presented as being very similar to the US's own position, emphasising the parties' similar views and approaches. Indonesian interlocutors make repeated references to their, and ASEAN's, conception of the region being open, inclusive and not excluding any party. Both countries continue to emphasise their shared objectives for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific; a region where free and open societies are able to make their own choices, without coercion.

The US continually praises Indonesian leadership, both in the South East Asian region and globally, looking forward to Indonesia's chairing of the G20 in 2022, thus emphasising Indonesia's leadership role and regional and global prominence.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

The terms 'pivot' and 'rebalance' are not mentioned once by any Indonesian or US interlocutor. This is perhaps surprising, given President Biden was President Obama's Vice President, but again serves to deemphasise the idea that changes in the US's approach are driven by a grander US strategy, approach or foreign policy design. US interlocutors also state explicitly that their approach to Indonesia and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is not driven by concerns about China nor is it designed to exclude that country, despite multiple references to concerns about China's behaviour, particularly in the South China Sea.

<sup>172</sup> Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Association of South East Asian Nations Website (2020), <https://asean.org/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: [https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific\\_FINAL\\_22062019.pdf](https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf)

<sup>173</sup> The White House, *FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity*, The White House Press Office (May 23 2022): [www.whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov), accessed on March 15<sup>th</sup> 2023: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pacific-partners-launch-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/>

There continues to be an absence of language, narrative and discourse relating to power or the power differential between the US and Indonesia. As noted above, the two parties revert to a narrative regarding shared challenges that they are working together to address. This reinforces strongly the idea that the US is not the leading partner or driving force behind the comprehensive partnership and that Indonesia is not a junior partner.

And again, throughout the discourse there is little in the way of deeper or more meaningful exposition on what democracy, the rule of law, pluralism, or respect for human rights means, or how and in what ways the US or Indonesian experiences of them may be similar or different. Differences and challenges in the relationship continue to be deemphasised.

### *Security/military discourse*

#### *Narrative*

During this period there is very little explicit, high-level narrative relating to security issues. Both countries refer to their shared objectives of upholding international law and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea under the rubric and as part of their efforts to support the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Engagement between the two countries is characterised as focusing on counter terrorism, counter extremism and contributing to safer world. The discourse also contains references to health security, relating to the COVID19 pandemic; collaboration on which forms part of the strategic partnership.

#### *Emphasised/included*

Both parties focus on the practical nature of their security engagement, listing multiple areas that they are working on together: Maritime security, border security, counter proliferation, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, maritime security, maritime domain awareness, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The provision of training and capacity building alongside arms and equipment by the US is emphasised.

#### *Deemphasised/not included*

Beyond the vague references to increasing security, again no detail is provided as to what objectives this activity is designed to achieve, or who it is aimed at.

### *Economic/trade discourse*

#### *Narrative*

Overall, there is very little explicit narrative about the bilateral trade and investment relationship during this period. There are a few references to prosperity and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the objective of increasing trade and economic ties in the region, on the part of the US. There is a marked difference to the narrative during the Trump Administration period, with the references to securing gains for the US and the implication that Indonesia needs to reform in order to secure greater market access, absent. In their limited contributions to the discourse in this area the

Indonesians raise the issue of bilateral trade and investment and their hopes that levels will be increased. However, this is not the focus of the narrative.

Instead, the focus shifts back to US foreign assistance, not least for that provided to help Indonesia deal with the COVID pandemic. A factsheet about the relationship with Indonesia published by the US in November 2022 for example, has nothing in it on trade and investment. Instead, there is a lengthy description of US foreign assistance-funded work on climate, infrastructure, food security, plus many more areas.

### *Emphasised/included*

As mentioned above, the role of the US as a donor, supporting Indonesia is emphasised, with significant detail provided on foreign assistance programmes. Aspirations for regional and global property are also emphasised, particularly on the US's part through the references to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

### *Deemphasised/not included*

Little or no information is provided on outcomes, targets, or expectations for bilateral trade and investment between the US and Indonesia. No detail or explanation is also provided regarding the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, what it is, what it will entail and who will benefit. The narrative is very vague on what is in it for Indonesia, as exemplified by this exchange between Secretary of State Blinken and an Indonesian journalist in December 2021, where he is unable to articulate what a new global infrastructure initiative is going to mean for the country:

“QUESTION: And our president said that there will some kind of promise of investment from United States to Indonesia. Could you tell us what kind of investment that – which will be invested to our country?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, first, President Jokowi and President Biden had a very productive meeting in Glasgow during the climate talks, the COP26. In fact, it went on twice as long as it was scheduled for because they had so much to talk about.

One of the things they talked about was investment, including investment in infrastructure. And we have a program that we developed through the G7 countries, the largest economies in the world, called Build Back Better World, where we're working closely with partner countries like Indonesia to identify really good projects for new infrastructure investment in health infrastructure, in digital infrastructure, in hard infrastructure, green infrastructure. So we're very actively looking at all that in partnership with Indonesia.

QUESTION: Is it already – there is a number of investments which will be coming to Indonesia?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, I can't give you a number, but we expect overall, working with our private sector, which is where most of the investment comes from, to mobilize overall hundreds of billions of dollars for investment

infrastructure. There's a huge need around the world and, of course, here in Indonesia."<sup>174</sup>

## **B2.3 Evolution of the Indonesia-US Security Relationship since 2009: Further Empirical Analysis**

### **B2.3.1 Is there a/are there formal treaty(ies) or agreement(s) that underpin the security relationship?**

No formal treaty underpins the security relationship. In 2010 the US and Indonesia agreed a 'Comprehensive Partnership' and shortly before that a 'Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defense'.

The 'Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia' released by President Obama and President Yudhoyono mentions 'security' as an area to advance cooperation, but is otherwise silent on what that might entail.<sup>175</sup>

Prior to 2011 there was therefore no security relationship based on mutual defence guarantees, analogous to the Philippines-US Mutual Defense Treaty, between Indonesia and the US.

The State Department Office of Treaty Affairs does however list an additional 10 defence-related bilateral agreements agreed between the two countries between 1950 and 2010, mostly from the 1950s, '60s and '70s, and largely relating to the provision, purchasing and disposal of US-provided equipment.<sup>176</sup>

### **B2.3.2 Have any treaties or agreements that underpin the security relationship been revised or supplemented, or have any new treaties or agreements been negotiated, since 2009?**

No new formal treaties in the field of security have been negotiated since 2009.

After 2009 therefore, no new security relationship based on mutual guarantees between Indonesia and the US has been created.

<sup>174</sup> US Department of State, *Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Santi Dewi of IDN Times*, US Department of State Website (December 14, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023:

<https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-santi-dewi-of-idn-times/>

<sup>175</sup> The White House, *Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia*, Obama White House Archive (November 9, 2010),

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023:

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/joint-declaration-comprehensive-partnership-between-united-states-america>

<sup>176</sup> US Department of State, *A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020*, US Department of State Website (2020), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf> Page 206

The State Department Office of Treaty Affairs lists one additional agreement relating to an 'Aviation Leadership Program' that was signed and entered into force in 2015.<sup>177</sup>

In 2021 the US State Department also announced that Indonesia had concluded a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). According to the US government: 'These foundational agreements establish the framework for enhanced partnership, information sharing, and defense cooperation between the United States and Indonesia.'<sup>178</sup>


### B2.3.3 Have US levels of foreign assistance provided to Indonesia for military purposes increased or decreased?

*Foreign Assistance for military purposes in relation to total assistance*

Figure 13: Indonesia-US Foreign Assistance Total and with Military (M) Objective: Total Obligations by US Fiscal Year 2010-2020 (\$million)

|       | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| M     | 32   | 28   | 21   | 18   | 18   | 23   | 39   | 18   | 19   | 87   | 24   |
| Total | 362  | 288  | 321  | 868  | 218  | 243  | 239  | 228  | 95   | 267  | 174  |

Source: US Government Foreign Assistance database



<sup>177</sup> US Department of State, *A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2020*, US Department of State Website (2020), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf> Page 207

<sup>178</sup> US Department of State, *U.S. Security Cooperation With Indonesia*, US Department of State Website (March 23, 2021), <https://www.state.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-indonesia/>


The levels of US foreign assistance provided to Indonesia where the primary objective is military have not changed significantly in the period 2010 to 2020. No clear trend is exhibited. The overall level of foreign assistance provided has however shown a declining trend during the same period. As a result, the proportion of total US foreign assistance to Indonesia where the primary objective is military has increased slightly from 9% in 2010 to 14% in 2020.

#### Foreign assistance for military purposes in regional context

**Figure 14: Indonesia vs South East Asia - US Foreign Assistance with Military Objective: Total Obligations by US Fiscal Year 2010-2020 (\$million)**

|                 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Indonesia       | 32   | 28   | 21   | 18   | 18   | 23   | 39   | 18   | 19   | 87   | 24   |
| South East Asia | 88   | 91   | 97   | 98   | 130  | 180  | 250  | 160  | 250  | 520  | 300  |

Source: US Government Foreign Assistance database



As noted previously, the levels of US foreign assistance provided to the South East Asia region as a whole where the primary objective is military have increased significantly in the period 2010 to 2020, exhibiting a clear trend. In this regional context, the proportion allocated to Indonesia has decreased significantly from 36% in 2010 to 8% in 2020.

### Financial value of arms sales


#### B2.3.4 Has the level of US arms sales or transfers to Indonesia increased or decreased?

Figure 15: Direct Commercial Sales Deliveries of arms exports from the US to Indonesia: 2010-2019 (\$m)

| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 5.2  | *    | 26.8 | 21.3 | 20.4 | 7.5  | 30   | 39.3 | 35.3 | 7.8  |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, based on US Department of Defense annual reports to Congress

\*figures not available for 2011



### Capability of arms provided

Figure 16: Arms Exports from the US to Indonesia: Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) 2010-2021 (million)

| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 0    | 0    | 35   | 84   | 150  | 83   | 94   | 246  | 90   | 21   | 88   | 91   |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute




On the basis of both metrics available, the levels of US arms exports in both financial value and capability terms to Indonesia do exhibit an increasing trend in the period 2010 to 2021. Given the volatility in the figures however, it is again difficult to draw too firm a conclusion on this metric.

#### *Capability of arms provided in regional context*

Figure 17: Arms Exports from the US to Indonesia vs South East Asia: Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) 2010-2021 (million)

|                       | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Indonesia             | 0    | 0    | 35   | 84   | 150  | 83   | 94   | 246  | 90   | 21   | 88   | 91   |
| South East Asia Total | 702  | 570  | 496  | 847  | 266  | 289  | 795  | 527  | 231  | 103  | 214  | 349  |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute




As noted previously, the levels of US arms exports to the South East Asia region as a whole have declined significantly in the period 2010 to 2020, exhibiting a clear trend despite also being subject to significant volatility. In this regional context, the proportion exported to Indonesia has increased significantly from 7% in 2012 (according to these SPIRI figures there were no exports in 2010 or 2011) to 26% in 2021.

#### *Importance of the US as an arms provider*

Figure 18: Arms Exports from the US to Indonesia vs. total to Indonesia: Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) 2010-2021 (million)

|       | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| US    | 0    | 0    | 35   | 84   | 150  | 83   | 94   | 246  | 90   | 21   | 88   | 91   |
| Total | 225  | 249  | 212  | 823  | 1190 | 438  | 380  | 1169 | 339  | 212  | 269  | 328  |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute



For the period 2010-2015 Russia was the single largest source of arms exports to Indonesia, accounting for 22%. The US accounted for 11%. For the period 2016-

2021 the US was the largest source of arms exports to Indonesia, accounting for 24%.

#### *Nature of US arms provided*

| Figure 19: Indonesian weapons orders from the US, 2010-2021 |                    |                                            |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Year                                                        | Description        | Value \$million (if information available) |
| 2011                                                        | Aircraft parts     |                                            |
| 2012                                                        | Helicopters        |                                            |
|                                                             | Helicopter parts   |                                            |
|                                                             | Aircraft           | 670-750                                    |
| 2013                                                        | Aircraft radar     |                                            |
|                                                             | Anti-tank missiles |                                            |
|                                                             | Vehicles parts     |                                            |
|                                                             | Aircraft           |                                            |
| 2014                                                        | Anti-tank missiles |                                            |
|                                                             | Helicopters        | 500                                        |
|                                                             | Aircraft           |                                            |
|                                                             | Sonar systems      |                                            |
| 2016                                                        | Aircraft parts     |                                            |
|                                                             | Vehicle parts      |                                            |
|                                                             | Aircraft           |                                            |
| 2017                                                        | Vehicle parts      |                                            |
|                                                             | Missiles           |                                            |
|                                                             | Aircraft parts     |                                            |
| 2018                                                        | Helicopters        | 183                                        |
|                                                             | Drones             |                                            |
| 2019                                                        | Transport aircraft |                                            |
|                                                             | Vehicle parts      |                                            |
|                                                             | Aircraft           |                                            |
|                                                             | Drones             |                                            |
| 2020                                                        | Helicopters        |                                            |
| 2021                                                        | Aircraft parts     |                                            |

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

## **B2.4 Evolution of the Indonesia-US Economic Relationship since 2009: Further Empirical Analysis**

### **B2.4.1 Is there a/are there formal treaty(ies) or agreement(s) that underpin the economic relationship?**

Yes. The US and Indonesia signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 1996. This agreement created a 'Council on Trade and Investment' charged with

'monitoring trade and investment' relations and providing a forum for consultations and the negotiation of further agreements.<sup>179</sup>

The US and Indonesia have not agreed a full bilateral Free Trade Agreement.

The State Department Office of Treaty Affairs lists an additional trade and investment-related bilateral agreement agreed between the two countries in 2006 concerning the illegal logging trade.

Indonesia has benefited from the US's Generalized System of Preferences, allowing tariff free imports on a wide variety of products, since before 2009.<sup>180</sup>

#### **B2.4.2 Have any treaties or agreements that underpin the economic relationship been revised or supplemented, or have any new treaties or agreements been negotiated, since 2009?**

No. Neither the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement nor the additional agreement on logging has not been revised since 2009.

No new treaties or agreements have been negotiated.

#### **B2.4.3 Have levels of trade and investment between the US and Indonesia increased or decreased since 2022?**

*US importance as trade partner to Indonesia*


| Figure 20: Indonesia Trade Partner United States Share in percentage 2011-2020 |      |      |      |      |      |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                                                                                | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015  | 2016  | 2017  | 2018  | 2019  | 2020  |
| Exports                                                                        | 9.06 | 8.11 | 7.85 | 8.62 | 9.41 | 10.82 | 11.19 | 10.55 | 10.25 | 10.66 | 11.44 |
| Imports                                                                        | 6.94 | 6.11 | 6.06 | 4.87 | 4.60 | 5.34  | 5.40  | 5.19  | 5.41  | 5.44  | 6.10  |

Source: World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution Database

<sup>179</sup> Office of the US Trade Representative, *Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning the Establishment of the Council on Trade and Investment*, Office of the US Trade Representative Website (1996), <https://ustr.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023:

[https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset\\_upload\\_file10\\_10199.pdf](https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file10_10199.pdf)

<sup>180</sup> Office of the US Trade Representative, *Countries Eligible for GSP*, Office of the US Trade Representative Website (2020), <https://ustr.gov/>, accessed 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/gsp/countrieligiblegsp.pdf>



The position of the US as a major destination for exports from Indonesia has increased during this period. Over the same time frame, the importance of the US as a source of imports for Indonesia has declined slightly.

*Indonesian importance as trade partner to the US*

| Figure 21: United States Trade Partner Indonesia Share in percentage 2011-2020 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                                                                | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
| Exports                                                                        | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.58 | 0.51 | 0.47 | 0.42 | 0.44 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.52 |
| Imports                                                                        | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.79 | 0.83 | 0.84 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.88 | 0.84 | 0.83 | 0.89 |

Source: World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution Database




The position of Indonesia as a minor destination for exports from the US and as a source of imports has remained broadly stable during this period.

#### *US-Indonesia Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows*

**Figure 22: United States Foreign Direct Investment with Indonesia Outward and Inward, total financial flows \$ millions, 2011-2020**

|         | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016  | 2017 | 2018  | 2019 | 2020  |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| Outward | -    | 1926 | 2301 | 440  | 3443 | 176  | -729  | -861 | -2978 | 902  | -1017 |
| Inward  | -    | 125  | -117 | 1170 | 339  | 173  | -1059 | -233 | 32    | 70   | 51    |

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Database




Outward levels of FDI from the US to Indonesia rose to a peak in 2014. Following which there have been a number of years with negative flows. Inward flows from Indonesia to the US have remained broadly stable throughout the period from 2010 to 2020. It should be noted that for 2010 figures are not available and a value of zero is given.

#### **B2.4.4 Have US levels of foreign assistance provided to Indonesia for economic purposes increased or decreased?**

*Foreign Assistance for economic purposes in relation to total assistance*

| Figure 23: Indonesia-US Foreign Assistance Total and with Economic (E) Objective: Total Obligations by US Fiscal Year 2010-2020 (\$million) |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                                                                                                                             | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
| E                                                                                                                                           | 332  | 260  | 300  | 850  | 200  | 220  | 200  | 210  | 76   | 180  | 150  |
| Total                                                                                                                                       | 362  | 288  | 321  | 868  | 218  | 243  | 239  | 228  | 95   | 267  | 174  |

Source: US Foreign Assistance Database




The levels of US foreign assistance provided to Indonesia where the primary objective is economic and the overall level of foreign assistance provided has shown a declining trend during the 2010 to 2020 period. As a result, the proportion of total US foreign assistance to Indonesia where the primary objective is economic has decreased slightly from 92% in 2010 to 86% in 2020.

#### *Foreign Assistance for economic purposes in regional context*

| Figure 24: Indonesia vs South East Asia - US Foreign Assistance with Economic Objective: Total Obligations by US Fiscal Year 2010-2020 (\$million) |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                                                                                                                                    | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
| Indonesia                                                                                                                                          | 332  | 260  | 300  | 850  | 200  | 220  | 200  | 210  | 76   | 180  | 150  |
| South East Asia                                                                                                                                    | 800  | 1100 | 850  | 1400 | 100  | 780  | 910  | 820  | 920  | 1100 | 1200 |

Source: US Foreign Assistance Database



As noted previously, the levels of US foreign assistance provided to the South East Asia region as a whole where the primary objective is economic have increased slightly in the period 2010 to 2020, exhibiting a clear trend. In this regional context, the proportion allocated to Indonesia has decreased significantly from 42% in 2010 to 13% in 2020.

## C. Analytical Section

### C1. The Rebalance and the Philippines: Reflections

In reviewing the empirical evidence of the Philippines' experience of the rebalance, particularly in comparison with Indonesia, it is striking how much the country's historically close security relationship with the US still dominates and yet constrains discourse and practice. Although both parties tend to cloak discussion of their relationship in terms of a values driven partnership and a joint contribution to regional public goods, in reality the alliance and associated security considerations remain the cornerstone of the relationship, almost to the exclusion of other issues. The Philippines' domestic political controversy about potential or feared dominance by the US constrains the relationship, at least in terms of how it can be presented publicly both in the security field and in terms of delivering economic 'reforms' that are perceived as driven by US interests. In parallel, the US accentuates its practical support for democracy and human rights, but offers no direct criticism of the Philippines and deemphasises differences or problems, so as to maintain the idea of a values driven partnership of equals.

It is also clear that concerns about China and territorial disputes in the South China Sea are expressed much more explicitly and centrally in its discourse by the Philippines. Any moderation by the US of the Philippines' approach to these issues happens in private, with any concerns about the Philippines' rhetoric or behaviour not expressed in public. There is a noticeable hardening of the US position vis-à-vis China in the South China Sea and in support of the Philippines' position over the course of the period examined and particularly under President Trump. This includes the important clarification of US policy concerning the applicability of security guarantees to Philippines's vessels in the South China Sea. The reiteration of this position under the Biden Presidency shows that it now enjoys bipartisan support in the US. It is an interesting question whether or to what degree the Philippines traded support for Trump's ultimately largely ephemeral diplomatic initiatives (e.g., peace with North Korea) for this firmer, and seemingly now permanent, security commitment.

In the defence and security field, in practical terms, there has been a noticeable evolution during the period since 2009. At the heart of this, the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is important as it appears to effectively recreate de facto US bases in the Philippines. In parallel there is evidence, through amendment and updating of formal government-to-government agreements, of a deepening of defence and security cooperation in other areas. There is a noticeable uptick in the provision of US foreign assistance for military purposes, although this represents a shift in priorities rather than an overall increase in foreign assistance. Trends in the supply of arms from the US to the Philippines show a mixed picture, with potentially greater capability being provided but no discernible large-scale increases; however, the US remains one of the country's most important partners in this area. These developments should not be overstated, as they have occurred within and do not change the existing parameters of the alliance. There has been no radical recasting of it, but incremental progress in deepening day-to-day cooperation and capacity

building. That this is being driven in no small part by concerns about China is a reasonable conclusion, even if this link is not often made publicly or explicitly.

In the economic and trade field the picture is much less compelling. Despite enjoying a full military alliance, multiple government-to-government contacts at the highest level, and repeated commitments to 'expand trade and investment flows' or otherwise enhance their economic relationship, over the course of over a decade only one very limited agreement on customs checks was agreed between the two countries. There has been no progress in negotiating a full bilateral trade agreement. Levels of foreign assistance provided by the US for economic development have fallen as that provided for military purposes has increased. Given the lack of any radical change in the terms of trade, there are no discernible or significant shifts in trade and investment levels between the two countries, beyond, from the US's perspective, a further deterioration of its trade balance with the Philippines. For the US, domestic political constraints have prevented any meaningful shift in the economic 'offer' that it can provide. This is perhaps true also to a lesser extent with the Philippines. Even the incremental evolution seen in the security field is absent.

## **C.2 The Rebalance and Indonesia: Reflections**

In comparing and contrasting the Indonesian experience of the rebalance with that of the Philippines there are a number of similarities and differences. One key difference is of course the very different history of the two countries' relationship and the lack of an existing, substantive, treaty-based alliance. In its absence, both countries seek to frame a 'new' strategic partnership by claiming shared values such as democracy, pluralism and human rights. These claims are only partially convincing, particularly given Indonesia's post-independence history of authoritarian rule and serious human rights abuses, not least in East Timor. Mutual criticism is however deliberately muted, and both countries are at pains to deemphasise differences or problems as they seek to identify the basis for a closer relationship. Both countries also seek to build up each other's' legitimacy as leading Asia-Pacific powers, particularly in regional and multilateral forums.

Another key difference compared to the evolution of the discourse with the Philippines is that both Indonesia and the US are even more circumspect in the earlier stages in mentioning China, or concerns about its behaviour, as a driver of their new, enhanced partnership. This does evolve over the period in question, with both parties increasingly prepared to be explicit in identifying Chinese actions, particularly in the South China Sea as undermining regional stability and international norms. In contrast to the Philippines, the US's role is more encouraging of a more robust approach rather than moderating the stance of a potentially reckless ally. The US's discourse is clearly modulated however, in deference to Indonesia's objective to maintain a 'dynamic equilibrium' and the shared discourse is less dominated by (maritime) security issues due to the lack of actual territorial disputes with China.

In the defence and security field, in practical terms, there has been a noticeable evolution during the period since 2009 albeit of course from a different starting point to that of the Philippines. Both countries are increasing security cooperation within

the limits that the lack of a formal treaty-based relationship and domestic constraints, particularly in Indonesia, confer. It is note-worthy that despite the lack of live territorial disputes in the South China Sea that cooperation prioritises maritime security, surveillance and control. Some limited progress has been made in formalising government-to-government agreements to codify and underpin the security relationship. Although there has been no significant increase in US foreign assistance provided for military purposes, there is some evidence that the value and capability of arms supplied by the US to Indonesia has increased relative to a noticeable decline in supply to the South East Asia region. Again, in a similar way to the Philippines, the US and Indonesia have not radically recast their security relationship, but have engaged in a process of incrementally deepening day-to-day cooperation and capacity building.

In the economic and trade field the picture is very similar to the Philippines. The US and Indonesia already have a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, however since 2009 there has been no progress in amending, expanding or complementing this and there has again been no progress in negotiating a full bilateral trade agreement. Levels of foreign assistance provided by the US for economic development have demonstrated a declining trend, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of funding provided to the South East Asia region. Again, given the lack of any radical change in the terms of trade, there are no discernible or significant shifts in trade and investment levels between the two countries. Domestic political constraints have again prevented any significant government-to-government action. From the US's perspective there has been no new money to expand or enhance foreign assistance, and the two countries have not been able to negotiate a substantive agreement in the economic field for more than ten years.

### **C.3.The Rebalance: General Reflections**

It is clear, both for the two case study countries and more broadly, that the rebalance has not, since 2009, resulted in any fundamental changes in the overall political, or security and economic relationships established between the US and key countries in the Asia Pacific. Despite the ups and downs of relationships and the sometimes very striking political rhetoric, e.g., from Donald Trump, the bilaterally driven, hub and spokes model of the US's foreign policy in the region is alive and well. The US and its partners have demonstrated zero appetite or interest in creating any meaningful multilateral security architecture, with one exception: Encouraging ASEAN's role in management of disputes in the South China Sea. Other groups have been created and encouraged to provide forums for discussion. But these initiatives have not entailed any *actual* security commitments on the part of the US or others.

Similarly, there has been a marked failure or a lack of substance (because substance will fail) in the creation of any multilateral economic constructs. This is principally due to domestic resistance in the US as it cycles through one of its more protectionist periods. The same is true for bilateral economic and trade relationships. There have not even been marginal shifts in terms of formal trade or investment agreements. There have been no significant changes in tariffs or other non-tariff trade barriers. It is difficult to discern any meaningful shift in economic, trade or

investment relationships. The private sector of course, conducts the vast majority of this business. However, governments can set or change its terms. They have not done so in this period. This level of stasis is remarkable given the degree of economic preponderance the US still has, the mutual importance of the US and Asia Pacific markets to each other, and the repeated political commitment to 'move the dial' on trade and investment in the region.

For the US's part, despite the announcement of the rebalance there has been no *rebalance* of its official resources to back up its political rhetoric; those under the control or influence of successive Administrations. It seems that there has been no significant increase in foreign assistance, either for the region or individual countries. Congress, the ultimate controller of spending in the US system has not authorised any new resources nor any significant reallocation with the existing budget envelope. This is surprising, given this is a tool the US can use, under its direct control, and there seems to be bilateral consensus on the need to rebalance or pivot resources to the Asia Pacific.

The US rebalance has by default therefore been diplomatically and most substantively defence or security driven – a 'security first' rebalance. There has been a de facto shift of foreign assistance towards security or military objectives, both at regional level and for both country case studies. There is some evidence of an uptick in arms sales/ or provision. And there is a strong sectoral focus on maritime surveillance and security capability and capacity building. These are the tools that successive US Administrations have been able to deploy to affect change in their relationship with key partners. And there is clearly demand from partners to enhance their security relationship with the US by drawing upon its expertise and resources. But again, there has not been agreement on any *actual* new bilateral security commitments. Neither party has needed them during this period to secure their interests.

#### **C.4 The Rebalance and Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory: Reflections**

From this paper's empirical analysis, reflected on in light of the theory examined in the Literature Review, it is clear that on the US side, structural factors detailed in theory and that have shaped policy and practice over many decades (power, threat, identity, etc.) remain fundamentally the same; suggesting that a radical change in policy or approach to the Asia Pacific and South East Asia was not and remains unlikely. There has been no change to the US's core objectives vis-à-vis the region: Securing its continued 'openness' to US commerce, influence and to varying degrees vice versa; while maintaining the maximum flexibility and freedom of action and minimising the 'costs' of maintaining that 'openness'.

Whether and to what extent China represents a challenge to that 'openness' is still debated in the US and in the rest of the region. It is clear that so far, the increase in China's economic influence has not caused a radical upending of the regional order. At worst, from a US perspective, it is just the latest in a series of *potentially* hostile powers (Europeans, Japan, the Soviet Union and international Communism) that might 'close' the region or parts of it to the US and that needs to be countered.

However, there are many in the US, including the chief progenitor of the rebalance – Barack Obama – who continue to resist viewing China in such adversarial terms.

It is also clear that for countries in the region many of the structural factors that have influenced their policies and behaviours have also remained fundamentally the same. Private gains from close bilateral relationships with the US, in both the security and economic spheres, remain extremely valuable for those countries that can and are prepared to make the necessary compromises to secure them. The anomalous situation of Japan – a regional economic superpower that is politically, both due to its domestic constitutional constraints and lingering mistrust in many of its neighbours unable to play a fuller role in regional security – remains.

Key relationships continue to ‘run through Washington DC’: There has been no change that would render any alternative, such as a multilateral security arrangement, attractive to countries in the region (or indeed the US). Particularly in South East Asia, the US presence is wanted and needed as a ‘balance’ to China, but with the exception of those that already have to some extent, countries do not want to commit wholeheartedly to a ‘US alliance’ for fear of upsetting Beijing and threatening lucrative trade and investment ties. Many South East Asian countries remain suspicious of moves to strengthen multilateral cooperation particularly in the security sphere, fearing they will be used by the US to weaken bilateral commitments and/or will provoke China.

But, ambivalence towards US hegemony in the region and closer relationships with it are not new phenomena. Although their experiences and situations prior to the announcement of the rebalance are different, both the Philippines and Indonesia have and continue to seek to find a balance between ‘entrapment’ and ‘abandonment’ in their relationships with the US and their responses to the rebalance, based on concerns regarding sovereignty and independence.

It is clear that the overall commitment to and many practical aspects of the implementation of the rebalance have remained consistent despite the changes in US Administrations. The extent to which the Trump Presidency caused any radical rethink of the rebalance beyond the rhetoric is limited. The ‘America First’ discussion about – and intermittent diplomatic fall out from – how to extract more value for the US from the relationships with Asian countries regarding burden sharing, market access, etc., is actually a longstanding feature of US policy making. Key differences with Trump were the extreme change in diplomatic tone from the Obama era, more robust and overt rhetoric vis-à-vis the challenge posed by China and the de-prioritisation of new multilateral economic and trade initiatives. To a greater extent however, the latter were relatively recent innovations in the US approach to the region; in reverting to a prioritisation of bilateral relationships, Trump reverted to a longstanding US policy approach.

In practice then, the rebalance has turned out primarily to be a reinforcement or reenergising of the existing ‘hub and spoke’ model of US-regional country relationships explained in Foreign Policy and International Relations theory. This means the focus remains on bilateral security alliances or more limited versions thereof and largely bilateral trade and economic agreements. Any moves by the US

to create or strengthen multilateral approaches or organisations have and will therefore be complementary to the bilateral approach and are likely to focus on economic and trade issues. However, the difficulties in making substantive progress on these are evidenced by the fate of the TPP.

### **C.5 Limitations and Concluding Remarks**

This paper has been limited in scope in two key respects: First, in limiting itself to two case study countries, albeit grounded in some broader theoretical and empirical reviews, the conclusions necessarily extrapolate from the findings regarding the Philippines and Indonesia and the limited fields of enquiry identified in diplomacy, security and economics. In future there will be value in further research, examining and comparing and contrasting how the US's rebalance has impacted on other countries, using a wider range of data and information sources.

Secondly, by definition, as the rebalance is a declared US policy shift, this paper takes as its starting point the US's conception of the policy and relies heavily on US sources for its discourse and additional empirical analysis. Although a significant proportion of the sources, particularly in the discourse analysis are joint, the analysis presented here is necessarily US-centric. Further research, taking the starting premises and views of countries in the Asia Pacific fully into account could also provide very different insights and conclusions.

This paper has however, allowed us to provide a credible answer to the original research question:

How have the US's security and economic relationships with South East Asia evolved since 2009, in response to the declared 'rebalance' to Asia?

The short answer is, not very much. And certainly not as much as the nature of political rhetoric and commentary around the rebalance might have led a reasonable observer to expect. The fundamental, structural imperatives that determine both the US's policy towards the region and the policies of partner countries towards the US remain the same. There has been no 'Ukraine moment', or 'Zeitenwende' in the region that might upend the existing economic and security order as has happened in Europe with, for example, the decoupling of the European energy market from Russia and the applications of Finland and Sweden to join NATO. In the Asia Pacific, key countries continue to balance China and the US and hedge their bets. Domestic politics also prevent significant shifts in economic and trading relationships, with no fundamental change in the US's 'offer' or partners countries' views of it.

Within these constraints however, the US has been playing a long game, entirely consistent with the venerable 'Open Door' policy: Consistently, incrementally increasing cooperation, thickening relationships, building capabilities, and strengthening longer term partnerships, primarily in the security field, with the objective of countering any attempt by China to 'close' the region to its influence. The Biden Administration shows early signs of continuing these efforts and perhaps even augmenting them, with new energy, resources and perhaps an enhanced economic offer. The region will remain the cockpit of global economics and politics for many decades to come.

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## Appendix 1

### Discourse Analysis Sources: The Philippines

| Reference | Date       | Country     | Title                                                                    | Source                         | URL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | US Leader | Philippines Leader | Joint? |
|-----------|------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|--------------------|--------|
| 001       | 06/02/2009 | Philippines | The Philippines: A Close and Important U.S. Ally                         | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/116224.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/116224.htm</a>                                                                       | Obama     | Aquino             | Y      |
| 002       | 12/11/2009 | Philippines | Remarks With Philippines Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo                | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/11/131831.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/11/131831.htm</a>                                                                       | Obama     | Aquino             | Y      |
| 003       | 13/11/2009 | Philippines | Remarks With Manila Radio Host Mo Twister                                | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/11/131926.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/11/131926.htm</a>                                                                       | Obama     | Aquino             |        |
| 004       | 09/06/2010 | Philippines | Readout of the President's Call with President Aquino of the Philippines | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/readout-presidents-call-with-president-aquino-philippines">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/readout-presidents-call-with-president-aquino-philippines</a> | Obama     | Aquino             |        |
| 005       | 09/06/2010 | Philippines | Congratulations to President-Elect Aquino of the Philippines             | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/06/142921.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/06/142921.htm</a>                                                                         | Obama     | Aquino             |        |
| 006       | 10/06/2010 | Philippines | Philippines Independence Day                                             | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/06/142825.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/06/142825.htm</a>                                                                         | Obama     | Aquino             |        |
| 007       | 20/06/2010 | Philippines | Press Availability Following Meeting With President Aquino               | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/144866.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/144866.htm</a>                                                                                                                         | Obama     | Aquino             |        |

|     |            |             |                                                                                                           |                                |                                                                                                                                                                       |       |        |   |
|-----|------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------|---|
| 008 | 16/08/2010 | Philippines | U.S. Provides Material Assistance to the Maritime Police of the Philippines                               | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2010/08/145987.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2010/08/145987.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 009 | 23/09/2010 | Philippines | Remarks With Philippine President Benigno Aquino III At Millennium Challenge Corporation Signing Ceremony | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/09/147833.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/09/147833.htm</a> | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 010 | 09/06/2011 | Philippines | The Philippines' National Day                                                                             | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/06/165385.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/06/165385.htm</a> | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 011 | 30/08/2011 | Philippines | 60th Anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty                                            | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/08/171282.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/08/171282.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 012 | 14/11/2011 | Philippines | Background Briefing with Senior Administration Officials                                                  | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/11/177158.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/11/177158.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 013 | 16/11/2011 | Philippines | United States-Philippines Partnership for Growth                                                          | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/11/177225.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/11/177225.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 014 | 16/11/2011 | Philippines | U.S.-Philippines Partnership for Growth Joint Statement of Principles                                     | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/11/177227.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/11/177227.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 015 | 16/11/2011 | Philippines | Signing of the Manila Declaration On Board the USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay, Manila, Philippines          | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/11/177226.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2011/11/177226.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 016 | 16/11/2011 | Philippines | Remarks At A Luncheon Hosted by President Benigno Aquino                                                  | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177229.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177229.htm</a> | Obama | Aquino | Y |

|     |            |             |                                                                                                                                                                         |                                |                                                                                                                                                                       |       |        |   |
|-----|------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------|---|
| 017 | 16/11/2011 | Philippines | Remarks Aboard USS Fitzgerald Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty                                                          | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177228.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177228.htm</a> | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 018 | 16/11/2011 | Philippines | Presentation of the Order of Lakandula, Signing of the Partnership for Growth and Joint Press Availability with Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario        | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177234.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177234.htm</a> | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 019 | 26/01/2012 | Philippines | Remarks to the Media Before the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue                                                                                                            | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2012/01/182649.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2012/01/182649.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 020 | 27/01/2012 | Philippines | Toward a Deeper Alliance: United States-Philippines Bilateral Cooperation                                                                                               | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2012/01/182689.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2012/01/182689.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 021 | 27/01/2012 | Philippines | Joint Statement of the United States-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue                                                                                           | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2012/01/182688.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2012/01/182688.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 022 | 30/04/2012 | Philippines | The U.S.-Philippines Partnership                                                                                                                                        | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2012/04/188978.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2012/04/188978.htm</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 023 | 30/04/2012 | Philippines | Remarks With Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188982.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188982.htm</a> | Obama | Aquino | Y |

|     |            |             |                                                                                                                                   |                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |        |   |
|-----|------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------|---|
| 024 | 30/04/2012 | Philippines | Joint Statement of the United States-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue                                                             | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2012/04/188977.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2012/04/188977.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                             | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 025 | 08/06/2012 | Philippines | Statement on the President's Meeting with President Aquino of the Philippines                                                     | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/08/statement-president-s-meeting-president-aquino-philippines">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/08/statement-president-s-meeting-president-aquino-philippines</a>                             | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 026 | 08/06/2012 | Philippines | Hosts a Lunch for President of the Republic of the Philippines Benigno S. Aquino III                                              | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/192004.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/192004.htm</a>                                                                                                                             | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 027 | 11/06/2012 | Philippines | Philippines Independence Day                                                                                                      | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/192064.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/192064.htm</a>                                                                                                                             | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 028 | 15/10/2012 | Philippines | Statement by the Press Secretary on the Agreement Between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/10/15/statement-press-secretary-agreement-between-government-philippines-and-m">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/10/15/statement-press-secretary-agreement-between-government-philippines-and-m</a> | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 029 | 02/04/2013 | Philippines | Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario Before Their Meeting                                                 | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/206821.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/206821.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 030 | 10/06/2013 | Philippines | Philippines Independence Day                                                                                                      | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/06/210440.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/06/210440.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 031 | 02/10/2013 | Philippines | Readout of the President's call to President Aquino of the Philippines                                                            | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/02/readout-president-s-call-">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/02/readout-president-s-call-</a>                                                                                               | Obama | Aquino |   |

|     |            |             |                                                                                               |                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |        |   |
|-----|------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------|---|
|     |            |             |                                                                                               |                                | <a href="#">president-aquino-philippines</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |        |   |
| 032 | 10/10/2013 | Philippines | Remarks With Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario at Their Meeting     | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/10/215266.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/10/215266.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 033 | 12/11/2013 | Philippines | Readout of the President's call to President Aquino of the Philippines                        | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/12/readout-president-s-call-president-aquino-philippines">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/12/readout-president-s-call-president-aquino-philippines</a>                                       | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 034 | 13/11/2013 | Philippines | Statement by the President Encouraging Americans to Support Relief Efforts in the Philippines | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/13/statement-president-encouraging-americans-support-relief-efforts-philipp">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/13/statement-president-encouraging-americans-support-relief-efforts-philipp</a> | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 035 | 21/11/2013 | Philippines | Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony for Philip Goldberg as U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/217855.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/217855.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 036 | 17/12/2013 | Philippines | Remarks at American Chamber of Commerce Business Community Event                              | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218819.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218819.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 037 | 17/12/2013 | Philippines | Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario                                  | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218835.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218835.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 038 | 17/12/2013 | Philippines | Global Security Contingency Fund Program for the Philippines                                  | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218823.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218823.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                                     | Obama | Aquino |   |

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| 039 | 18/12/2013 | Philippines | Remarks at USAID Tacloban                                                                                | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218869.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218869.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 040 | 07/03/2014 | Philippines | Fourth Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue                                            | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2014/03/223151.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2014/03/223151.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                             | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 041 | 28/04/2014 | Philippines | Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi</a> | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 042 | 28/04/2014 | Philippines | FACT SHEET: United States-Philippines Bilateral Relations                                                | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/fact-sheet-united-states-philippines-bilateral-relations">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/fact-sheet-united-states-philippines-bilateral-relations</a>                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 043 | 28/04/2014 | Philippines | Remarks by President Obama and President Aquino III of the Philippines at State Dinner                   | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-aquino-iii-philippines-state-dinne">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-aquino-iii-philippines-state-dinne</a> | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 044 | 28/04/2014 | Philippines | FACT SHEET: U.S.-Philippines Partnership for Growth                                                      | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/fact-sheet-us-philippines-partnership-growth">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/fact-sheet-us-philippines-partnership-growth</a>                                                         | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 045 | 11/06/2014 | Philippines | Republic of the Philippines Independence Day                                                             | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/06/227471.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/06/227471.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 046 | 20/10/2014 | Philippines | Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary del                                                            | Obama State                    | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Obama | Aquino | Y |

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|     |            |             | Rosario Before Their Meeting                                                                                                                        | Department Archive             | <a href="/remarks/2014/10/233148.htm">/remarks/2014/10/233148.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |       |        |   |
| 047 | 19/01/2015 | Philippines | Remarks at the Mangrove Forum of the Philippine Foreign Service Institute                                                                           | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/01/236249.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/01/236249.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                           | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 048 | 21/01/2015 | Philippines | U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Security Dialogue Press Conference                                                                                       | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/prs/2015/236246.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/prs/2015/236246.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 049 | 11/06/2015 | Philippines | Republic of the Philippines Independence Day                                                                                                        | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/243684.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/243684.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                 | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 050 | 16/11/2015 | Philippines | Remarks at National Center for APEC Luncheon                                                                                                        | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/2015/249519.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/2015/249519.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Aquino |   |
| 051 | 17/11/2015 | Philippines | Remarks by President Obama and President Aquino of the Republic of the Philippines after Bilateral Meeting                                          | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/remarks-president-obama-and-president-aquino-republic-philippines-after">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/remarks-president-obama-and-president-aquino-republic-philippines-after</a> | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 052 | 12/01/2016 | Philippines | Remarks With Secretary of Defense Ash Carter with Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario and Secretary of Defense Voltaire Gazmin | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/01/251126.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/01/251126.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                 | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 053 | 12/01/2016 | Philippines | 2016 Joint Statement of the United States-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue                                                                          | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/01/251503.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/01/251503.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                             | Obama | Aquino | Y |
| 054 | 12/05/2016 | Philippines | Philippine Elections                                                                                                                                | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/05/257143.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/05/257143.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                             | Obama | Aquino |   |

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| 055 | 10/06/2016 | Philippines | Republic of the Philippines Independence Day                                                    | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/06/258377.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/06/258377.htm</a>                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Aquino  |   |
| 056 | 27/07/2016 | Philippines | Secretary Kerry's Meeting with Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte                            | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2016/07/260546.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2016/07/260546.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                         | Obama | Duterte |   |
| 057 | 27/07/2016 | Philippines | Remarks With Philippines Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay                                       | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260541.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260541.htm</a>                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Duterte | Y |
| 058 | 27/07/2016 | Philippines | Remarks Philippines Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay Before Their Meeting                       | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260543.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260543.htm</a>                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Duterte | Y |
| 059 | 24/10/2016 | Philippines | Remarks at Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs                                            | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2016/10/263465.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2016/10/263465.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                         | Obama | Duterte |   |
| 060 | 03/11/2016 | Philippines | Remarks at Swearing-In Ceremony for U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines Sung Kim | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/11/264079.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/11/264079.htm</a>                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Duterte |   |
| 061 | 07/11/2016 | Philippines | Secretary Kerry's Meeting With Philippine Foreign Minister Yasay                                | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2016/11/264415.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/p/s/2016/11/264415.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                         | Obama | Duterte |   |
| 062 | 29/04/2017 | Philippines | Readout of President Donald J. Trump's Call with President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines   | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-president-donald-j-trumps-call-president-rodrigo-duterte-philippines/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-president-donald-j-trumps-call-president-rodrigo-duterte-philippines/</a> | Trump | Duterte |   |

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| 063 | 15/05/2017 | Philippines | Statement from the Press Secretary on the United States' Solidarity with the Philippines                           | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-united-states-solidarity-philippines/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-united-states-solidarity-philippines/</a> | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 064 | 11/06/2017 | Philippines | Republic of the Philippines Independence Day                                                                       | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/republic-of-the-philippines-independence-day-2/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/republic-of-the-philippines-independence-day-2/index.html</a>                                                                         | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 065 | 02/08/2017 | Philippines | Briefing on Secretary Tillerson's Travel to the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia                                | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/briefing-on-secretary-tillersons-travel-to-the-philippines-thailand-and-malaysia/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/briefing-on-secretary-tillersons-travel-to-the-philippines-thailand-and-malaysia/index.html</a>     | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 066 | 07/08/2017 | Philippines | Press Availability in Manila, Philippines                                                                          | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/press-availability-in-manila-philippines/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/press-availability-in-manila-philippines/index.html</a>                                                                                     | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 067 | 28/09/2017 | Philippines | Secretary Tillerson's Meeting With Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Cayetano                                | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-tillersons-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-cayetano/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-tillersons-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-cayetano/index.html</a> | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 068 | 19/10/2017 | Philippines | U.S.-Philippines CPC Partnership Activities Commence in Manila and Cebu                                            | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-philippines-cpc-partnership-activities-commence-in-manila-and-cebu/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-philippines-cpc-partnership-activities-commence-in-manila-and-cebu/index.html</a>                         | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 069 | 13/11/2017 | Philippines | Remarks by President Trump and President Duterte of the Philippines Before Bilateral Meeting   Manila, Philippines | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-duterte-">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-duterte-</a>                                           | Trump | Duterte | Y |

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|     |            |             |                                                                                          |                                | <a href="#">philippines-bilateral-meeting-manila-philippines/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |       |         |   |
| 070 | 13/11/2017 | Philippines | Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-america-republic-philippines/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-america-republic-philippines/</a>                                       | Trump | Duterte | Y |
| 071 | 14/11/2017 | Philippines | President Donald J. Trump's Trip to the Philippines                                      | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-trip-philippines/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-trip-philippines/</a>                                                                       | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 072 | 14/11/2017 | Philippines | Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle After 12th East Asia Summit                   | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-gaggle-12th-east-asia-summit-manila-philippines/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-gaggle-12th-east-asia-summit-manila-philippines/</a> | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 073 | 01/12/2017 | Philippines | Joint Press Statement: U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue 2017                | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-press-statement-u-s-philippines-bilateral-strategic-dialogue-2017/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-press-statement-u-s-philippines-bilateral-strategic-dialogue-2017/index.html</a>                                                     | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 074 | 28/12/2017 | Philippines | The Secretary's Phone Call With Philippines Foreign Secretary                            | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-secretarys-phone-call-with-philippines-foreign-secretary/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-secretarys-phone-call-with-philippines-foreign-secretary/index.html</a>                                                                           | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 075 | 06/06/2018 | Philippines | U.S.-Philippines Join Efforts to Fight Human Trafficking                                 | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-philippines-join-efforts-to-fight-human-trafficking/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-philippines-join-efforts-to-fight-human-trafficking/index.html</a>                                                                                     | Trump | Duterte |   |

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| 076 | 11/06/2018 | Philippines | Republic of the Philippines Independence Day                                         | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/republic-of-the-philippines-independence-day/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/republic-of-the-philippines-independence-day/index.html</a>                                                                             | Trump | Duterte |  |
| 077 | 21/06/2018 | Philippines | Secretary Pompeo's Meeting With Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Cayetano     | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-cayetano/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-cayetano/index.html</a>       | Trump | Duterte |  |
| 078 | 19/09/2018 | Philippines | Secretary Pompeo's Meeting With Philippine Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana   | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-national-defense-lorenzana/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-national-defense-lorenzana/index.html</a>   | Trump | Duterte |  |
| 079 | 25/10/2018 | Philippines | Secretary Pompeo's Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs                 | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs/index.html</a>                               | Trump | Duterte |  |
| 080 | 01/11/2018 | Philippines | Telephonic Press Briefing with Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/telephonic-press-briefing-with-admiral-john-m-richardson-chief-of-naval-operations/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/telephonic-press-briefing-with-admiral-john-m-richardson-chief-of-naval-operations/index.html</a> | Trump | Duterte |  |
| 081 | 15/11/2018 | Philippines | U.S.-Philippines High-Level Dialogue Marks Progress in Combating Child Trafficking   | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-philippines-high-level-dialogue-marks-progress-in-combating-child-trafficking/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-philippines-high-level-dialogue-marks-progress-in-combating-child-trafficking/index.html</a>   | Trump | Duterte |  |

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| 082 | 20/12/2018 | Philippines | Secretary Pompeo's Meeting With Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro Locsin, Jr.  | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html</a>     | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 083 | 28/02/2019 | Philippines | Secretary Pompeo's Meeting With Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte                         | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-philippine-president-rodrigo-duterte/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-philippine-president-rodrigo-duterte/index.html</a>                                               | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 084 | 28/02/2019 | Philippines | Remarks With Traveling Press                                                                 | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-traveling-press-4/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-traveling-press-4/index.html</a>                                                                                                                         | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 085 | 01/03/2019 | Philippines | The U.S.-Philippines Alliance: An Enduring Bond Based on Shared History and Common Interests | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-u-s-philippines-alliance-an-enduring-bond-based-on-shared-history-and-common-interests/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-u-s-philippines-alliance-an-enduring-bond-based-on-shared-history-and-common-interests/index.html</a> | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 086 | 01/03/2019 | Philippines | Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr. at a Press Availability        | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html</a>                                                               | Trump | Duterte | Y |
| 087 | 01/03/2019 | Philippines | Interview With Buena Bernal of Channel News Asia                                             | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/interview-with-buena-bernal-of-channel-news-asia/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/interview-with-buena-bernal-of-channel-news-asia/index.html</a>                                                                                     | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 088 | 01/03/2019 | Philippines | Interview With Karmina Constantino of ABS-CBN                                                | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/interview-with-karmina-constantino-of-abs-cbn/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/interview-with-karmina-constantino-of-abs-cbn/index.html</a>                                                                                           | Trump | Duterte |   |

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| 089 | 27/03/2019 | Philippines | Global Security Contingency Fund Assistance Helps Philippines Bolster Maritime Security                                                                          | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/global-security-contingency-fund-assistance-helps-philippines-bolster-maritime-security/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/global-security-contingency-fund-assistance-helps-philippines-bolster-maritime-security/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                 | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 090 | 16/07/2019 | Philippines | Telephonic Press Briefing with General David L. Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force; and General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., Commander, Pacific Air Forces | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/telephonic-press-briefing-with-general-david-l-goldfein-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-air-force-and-general-charles-q-brown-jr-commander-pacific-air-forces/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/telephonic-press-briefing-with-general-david-l-goldfein-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-air-force-and-general-charles-q-brown-jr-commander-pacific-air-forces/index.html</a> | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 091 | 17/07/2019 | Philippines | Joint Statement From the 8th Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (BSD)                                                                        | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-statement-from-the-8th-philippines-united-states-bilateral-strategic-dialogue-bsd/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-statement-from-the-8th-philippines-united-states-bilateral-strategic-dialogue-bsd/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                 | Trump | Duterte | Y |
| 092 | 21/01/2020 | Philippines | U.S. Relations With the Philippines                                                                                                                              | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-philippines/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-philippines/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 093 | 30/01/2020 | Philippines | Deputy Secretary Biegun's Meeting with Philippine Foreign Secretary Locsin                                                                                       | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/deputy-secretary-bieguns-meeting-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-locsin/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/deputy-secretary-bieguns-meeting-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-locsin/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                             | Trump | Duterte |   |
| 094 | 10/07/2020 | Philippines | Philippines Independence Day                                                                                                                                     | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/philippines-independence-day/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/philippines-independence-day/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Trump | Duterte |   |

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| 095 | 06/08/2020 | Philippines | Secretary Pompeo's Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin                                                                                                            | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Trump | Duterte |  |
| 096 | 18/12/2020 | Philippines | Secretary Pompeo's Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin                                                                                                            | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin-2/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin-2/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Trump | Duterte |  |
| 097 | 27/01/2021 | Philippines | Secretary Blinken's Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin                                                                                                           | Biden State Department         | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Biden | Duterte |  |
| 098 | 17/02/2021 | Philippines | Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan Call with National Security Advisor Hermogenes Esperon of the Philippines                         | Biden White House              | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/17/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-call-with-national-security-advisor-hermogenes-esperon-of-the-philippines/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/17/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-call-with-national-security-advisor-hermogenes-esperon-of-the-philippines/</a> | Biden | Duterte |  |
| 099 | 31/03/2021 | Philippines | Statement by National Security Council Spokesperson Emily Horne on National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's Call with National Security Advisor Hermogenes Esperon of the Philippines | Biden White House              | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/statement-by-national-security-council-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-call-with-">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/statement-by-national-security-council-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-call-with-</a>                                                                                   | Biden | Duterte |  |

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|     |            |             |                                                                                                  |                        | <a href="#">national-security-advisor-hermogenes-esperon-of-the-philippines/</a>                                                                                                                                                                            |       |         |   |
| 100 | 08/04/2021 | Philippines | Secretary Blinken's Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin                     | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin-2/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin-2/</a>                                     | Biden | Duterte |   |
| 101 | 11/06/2021 | Philippines | Philippines National Day                                                                         | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/philippines-national-day/">https://www.state.gov/philippines-national-day/</a>                                                                                                                                               | Biden | Duterte |   |
| 102 | 11/07/2021 | Philippines | Fifth Anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling on the South China Sea                         | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/">https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/</a>                                               | Biden | Duterte |   |
| 103 | 09/09/2021 | Philippines | Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Before Their Meeting | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-before-their-meeting/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-before-their-meeting/</a> | Biden | Duterte | Y |
| 104 | 09/09/2021 | Philippines | Secretary Blinken's Meeting with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin                  | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/</a>                                   | Biden | Duterte |   |
| 105 | 16/11/2021 | Philippines | 9th U.S-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue                                                 | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/9th-u-s-philippines-bilateral-strategic-dialogue/">https://www.state.gov/9th-u-s-philippines-bilateral-strategic-dialogue/</a>                                                                                               | Biden | Duterte | Y |
| 106 | 16/11/2021 | Philippines | Joint Vision for a 21st Century United States-Philippines Partnership                            | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-vision-for-a-21st-century-united-states-philippines-partnership/">https://www.state.gov/joint-vision-for-a-21st-century-united-states-philippines-partnership/</a>                                                     | Biden | Duterte | Y |
| 107 | 19/11/2021 | Philippines | On the Situation in the South China Sea                                                          | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/on-the-situation-in-the-south-china-sea/">https://www.state.gov/on-the-situation-in-the-south-china-sea/</a>                                                                                                                 | Biden | Duterte |   |

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| 108 | 03/03/2022 | Philippines | U.S. Relations With the Philippines                                                                                                                | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-philippines/">https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-philippines/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Biden | Duterte |  |
| 109 | 10/03/2022 | Philippines | The United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines Sign a Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-the-philippines-sign-a-memorandum-of-understanding-concerning-strategic-civil-nuclear-cooperation/">https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-the-philippines-sign-a-memorandum-of-understanding-concerning-strategic-civil-nuclear-cooperation/</a> | Biden | Duterte |  |
| 110 | 11/05/2022 | Philippines | Readout of President Biden's Call with Philippine President-Elect Ferdinand Marcos Jr.                                                             | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/11/readout-of-president-bidens-call-with-philippine-president-elect-ferdinand-marcos-jr/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/11/readout-of-president-bidens-call-with-philippine-president-elect-ferdinand-marcos-jr/</a>                         | Biden | Marcos  |  |
| 111 | 11/05/2022 | Philippines | The Philippine Presidential Election                                                                                                               | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-philippine-presidential-election/">https://www.state.gov/the-philippine-presidential-election/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Biden | Duterte |  |
| 112 | 09/06/2022 | Philippines | Deputy Secretary Sherman's Meeting with Philippine President-Elect Marcos, Jr.                                                                     | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-meeting-with-philippine-president-elect-marcos-jr/">https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-meeting-with-philippine-president-elect-marcos-jr/</a>                                                                                                                                               | Biden | Marcos  |  |
| 113 | 09/06/2022 | Philippines | Deputy Secretary Sherman's Meeting with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin                                                             | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/">https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-meeting-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/</a>                                                                                                                           | Biden | Duterte |  |
| 114 | 10/06/2022 | Philippines | Philippines National Day                                                                                                                           | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/philippines-national-day-2/">https://www.state.gov/philippines-national-day-2/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Biden | Marcos  |  |
| 115 | 17/06/2022 | Philippines | U.S. Support for the Philippines in the South China Sea                                                                                            | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-">https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Biden | Marcos  |  |

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|     |            |             |                                                                                                                        |                        | <a href="#">philippines-in-the-south-china-sea/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |       |        |   |
| 116 | 09/07/2022 | Philippines | Secretary Blinken's Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Manalo                                           | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-manalo/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-manalo/</a>                                                                                     | Biden | Marcos |   |
| 117 | 11/07/2022 | Philippines | Sixth Anniversary of the Philippines-China South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Ruling                                    | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/sixth-anniversary-of-the-philippines-china-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-ruling/">https://www.state.gov/sixth-anniversary-of-the-philippines-china-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-ruling/</a>                                                                     | Biden | Marcos |   |
| 118 | 05/08/2022 | Philippines | The United States-Philippines Relationship                                                                             | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-philippines-relationship/">https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-philippines-relationship/</a>                                                                                                                                                       | Biden | Marcos |   |
| 119 | 06/08/2022 | Philippines | Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo Before Their Virtual Meeting    | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-enrique-manalo-before-their-virtual-meeting/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-enrique-manalo-before-their-virtual-meeting/</a>       | Biden | Marcos | Y |
| 120 | 06/08/2022 | Philippines | Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Philippine President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. Before Their Meeting               | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-philippine-president-ferdinand-romualdez-marcos-jr-before-their-meeting/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-philippine-president-ferdinand-romualdez-marcos-jr-before-their-meeting/</a>                               | Biden | Marcos | Y |
| 121 | 06/08/2022 | Philippines | Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo At a Virtual Press Availability | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-enrique-manalo-at-a-virtual-press-availability/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-enrique-manalo-at-a-virtual-press-availability/</a> | Biden | Marcos | Y |
| 122 | 06/08/2022 | Philippines | Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a U.S. Trade and Development Agency Offshore Wind Grant Signing                         | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-u-s-trade-and-development-agency-offshore-wind-grant-signing/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-u-s-trade-and-development-agency-offshore-wind-grant-signing/</a>                                                   | Biden | Marcos |   |

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| 123 | 06/08/2022 | Philippines | Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Karen Davila of ABS-CBN                                                                         | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-karen-davila-of-abs-cbn/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-karen-davila-of-abs-cbn/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Biden | Marcos |  |
| 124 | 02/09/2022 | Philippines | Remarks by President Biden and President Marcos of the Republic of the Philippines Before Bilateral Meeting                      | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/22/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-marcos-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-before-bilateral-meeting/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/22/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-marcos-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-before-bilateral-meeting/</a>                                     | Biden | Marcos |  |
| 125 | 22/09/2022 | Philippines | Readout of President Biden's Meeting with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.                                              | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/22/readout-of-president-bidens-meeting-with-philippine-president-ferdinand-marcos-jr/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/22/readout-of-president-bidens-meeting-with-philippine-president-ferdinand-marcos-jr/</a>                                                                                   | Biden | Marcos |  |
| 126 | 07/10/2022 | Philippines | U.S. Security Cooperation with the Philippines                                                                                   | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-the-philippines/">https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-the-philippines/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Biden | Marcos |  |
| 127 | 15/11/2022 | Philippines | Background Press Call By Senior Administration Officials Previewing Vice President Harris's Trip To Thailand and the Philippines | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/11/15/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-previewing-vice-president-harris-trip-to-thailand-and-the-philippines/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/11/15/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-previewing-vice-president-harris-trip-to-thailand-and-the-philippines/</a> | Biden | Marcos |  |
| 128 | 20/11/2022 | Philippines | FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Launches New Initiatives to Strengthen U.S.-Philippines Alliance                               | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/20/fact-sheet-vice-president-">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/20/fact-sheet-vice-president-</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Biden | Marcos |  |

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|     |            |             |                                                                                                                 |                   | <a href="#">harris-launches-new-initiatives-to-strengthen-u-s-philippines-alliance/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |       |        |  |
| 129 | 20/11/2022 | Philippines | Background Press Call By Senior Administration Officials On the Vice President's Engagements in the Philippines | Biden White House | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/11/20/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-the-vice-presidents-engagements-in-the-philippines/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/11/20/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-the-vice-presidents-engagements-in-the-philippines/</a> | Biden | Marcos |  |
| 130 | 21/11/2022 | Philippines | Vice President Harris's Meeting With Filipina Civil Society Leaders And Human Rights Defenders                  | Biden White House | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/21/vice-president-harris-meeting-with-filipina-civil-society-leaders-and-human-rights-defenders/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/21/vice-president-harris-meeting-with-filipina-civil-society-leaders-and-human-rights-defenders/</a>                             | Biden | Marcos |  |
| 131 | 21/11/2022 | Philippines | Readout of Vice President Harris's Meeting with President Marcos of the Philippines                             | Biden White House | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/21/readout-of-vice-president-harris-meeting-with-president-marcos-of-the-philippines/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/21/readout-of-vice-president-harris-meeting-with-president-marcos-of-the-philippines/</a>                                                   | Biden | Marcos |  |
| 132 | 21/11/2022 | Philippines | Readout of Vice President Harris's Meeting with Vice President Duterte of the Philippines                       | Biden White House | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/21/readout-of-vice-president-harris-meeting-with-vice-president-duterte-of-the-philippines/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/21/readout-of-vice-president-harris-meeting-with-vice-president-duterte-of-the-philippines/</a>                                       | Biden | Marcos |  |

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| 133 | 21/11/2022 | Philippines | Remarks by Vice President Harris And President Marcos of the Republic of the Philippines Before Bilateral Meeting | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/21/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-and-president-marcos-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-before-bilateral-meeting/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/21/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-and-president-marcos-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-before-bilateral-meeting/</a> | Biden | Marcos | Y |
| 134 | 21/11/2022 | Philippines | FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Launches Initiatives to Support U.S.-Philippines Maritime Cooperation           | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/21/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-launches-initiatives-to-support-u-s-philippines-maritime-cooperation/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/21/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-launches-initiatives-to-support-u-s-philippines-maritime-cooperation/</a>                   | Biden | Marcos |   |
| 135 | 22/11/2022 | Philippines | Remarks by Vice President Harris Aboard the Philippine Coast Guard Ship Teresa Magbanua                           | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/22/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-aboard-the-philippine-coast-guard-ship-teresa-magbanua/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/22/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-aboard-the-philippine-coast-guard-ship-teresa-magbanua/</a>                                                     | Biden | Marcos |   |
| 136 | 22/11/2022 | Philippines | Press Gaggle by Vice President Harris Aboard the Philippine Coast Guard Ship Teresa Magbanua                      | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/22/press-gaggle-by-vice-president-harris-aboard-the-philippine-coast-guard-ship-teresa-magbanua/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/22/press-gaggle-by-vice-president-harris-aboard-the-philippine-coast-guard-ship-teresa-magbanua/</a>                                           | Biden | Marcos |   |
| 137 | 19/12/2022 | Philippines | U.S. Support for the Philippines in the South China Sea                                                           | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-">https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-the-</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Biden | Marcos |   |

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| 001       | 18/02/2009 | Indonesia | The Role of Civil Society in Building a Stronger, More Peaceful World                                              | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119425.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119425.htm</a>                                                                                                                           | Obama     | Yudhoyono        |        |
| 002       | 18/02/2009 | Indonesia | Developing a Comprehensive Partnership With Indonesia                                                              | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119424.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119424.htm</a>                                                                                                                           | Obama     | Yudhoyono        | Y      |
| 003       | 19/02/2009 | Indonesia | Expanding the U.S.- Indonesian Dialogue                                                                            | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119423.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119423.htm</a>                                                                                                                           | Obama     | Yudhoyono        |        |
| 004       | 13/03/2009 | Indonesia | Readout of the President's telephone call to President Yudhoyono of Indonesia                                      | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/readout-presidents-telephone-call-president-yudhoyono-indonesia">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/readout-presidents-telephone-call-president-yudhoyono-indonesia</a>                                         | Obama     | Yudhoyono        |        |
| 005       | 08/06/2009 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Noer Hassan Wirajuda After Their Meeting                                  | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/06/124461.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/06/124461.htm</a>                                                                                                                           | Obama     | Yudhoyono        | Y      |
| 006       | 14/07/2009 | Indonesia | Statement by President Obama Following the Re-election of Indonesian President Yudhoyono                           | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-obama-following-re-election-indonesian-president-yudhoyono">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-obama-following-re-election-indonesian-president-yudhoyono</a>           | Obama     | Yudhoyono        |        |
| 007       | 15/11/2009 | Indonesia | Remarks by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of Indonesia after Bilateral Meeting                            | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-indonesia-after-bilateral-meeting">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-indonesia-after-bilateral-meeting</a>     | Obama     | Yudhoyono        | Y      |
| 008       | 17/06/2010 | Indonesia | Remarks by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of the Republic of Indonesia Before Bilateral Breakfast Meeting | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-republic-indonesia-bilateral-breakf">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-republic-indonesia-bilateral-breakf</a> | Obama     | Yudhoyono        | Y      |

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| 009 | 27/06/2010 | Indonesia | The U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership                                                      | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-indonesia-comprehensive-partnership">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-indonesia-comprehensive-partnership</a>                                                                                           | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 010 | 15/08/2010 | Indonesia | Republic of Indonesia's National Day                                                              | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/08/145981.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/08/145981.htm</a>                                                                                                                             | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 011 | 17/09/2010 | Indonesia | Plan of Action to Implement the Indonesia-U.S. Comprehensive Partnership                          | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/2010/147287.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/2010/147287.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 012 | 17/09/2010 | Indonesia | U.S.-Indonesian Joint Commission Meeting With Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa        | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/09/147304.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/09/147304.htm</a>                                                                                                                             | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 013 | 17/09/2010 | Indonesia | U.S.-Indonesia Joint Commission and Bilateral Meeting                                             | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147309.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147309.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 014 | 17/09/2010 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa After Their Meeting                     | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/09/147322.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/09/147322.htm</a>                                                                                                                             | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 015 | 09/11/2010 | Indonesia | Press Conference by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia    | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-indonesia-jakar">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-indonesia-jakar</a> | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 016 | 09/11/2010 | Indonesia | Remarks by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of Indonesia Before Expanded Bilateral Meeting | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/remarks-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-indonesia-expanded-bilat">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/remarks-president-obama-and-president-yudhoyono-indonesia-expanded-bilat</a> | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 017 | 09/11/2010 | Indonesia | Remarks by the President in a Toast at the State                                                  | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/remarks-">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/remarks-</a>                                                                                                                                 | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |

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|     |            |           | Dinner in Jakarta, Indonesia                                                                                                                  |                                | <a href="#">president-a-toast-state-dinner-jakarta-indonesia</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |       |           |   |
| 018 | 09/11/2010 | Indonesia | Fact Sheets: The United States and Indonesia - Building a 21st Century Partnership                                                            | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/fact-sheets-united-states-and-indonesia-building-a-21st-century-partners">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/fact-sheets-united-states-and-indonesia-building-a-21st-century-partners</a>   | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 019 | 09/11/2010 | Indonesia | Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia                         | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/joint-declaration-comprehensive-partnership-between-united-states-america">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/joint-declaration-comprehensive-partnership-between-united-states-america</a> | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 020 | 10/11/2010 | Indonesia | Remarks by the President at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia                                                                 | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/10/remarks-president-university-indonesia-jakarta-indonesia">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/10/remarks-president-university-indonesia-jakarta-indonesia</a>                                   | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 021 | 18/11/2010 | Indonesia | Joint Statement by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of The Republic of Indonesia and President Barack Obama of The United States of America | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/joint-statement-president-susilo-bambang-yudhoyono-republic-indonesia-0">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/joint-statement-president-susilo-bambang-yudhoyono-republic-indonesia-0</a>     | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 022 | 24/07/2011 | Indonesia | United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership                                                                                             | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169001.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169001.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                                 | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 023 | 24/07/2011 | Indonesia | The United States and Indonesia - Strengthening our 21st Century Partnership                                                                  | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169000.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169000.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                                 | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 024 | 24/07/2011 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa After Their Meeting                                                                 | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168997.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168997.htm</a>                                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |

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| 025 | 26/07/2011 | Indonesia | Joint Statement of the Second Indonesia-U.S. Joint Commission Meeting Bali, Indonesia      | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169104.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169104.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 026 | 18/11/2011 | Indonesia | Statement by President Obama after Bilateral Meeting with President Yudhoyono of Indonesia | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/statement-president-obama-after-bilateral-meeting-president-yudhoyono-in">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/statement-president-obama-after-bilateral-meeting-president-yudhoyono-in</a> | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 027 | 18/11/2011 | Indonesia | Fact Sheet: Expansion of the Peace Corps Indonesia Program                                 | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/fact-sheet-expansion-peace-corps-indonesia-program">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/fact-sheet-expansion-peace-corps-indonesia-program</a>                                             | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 028 | 18/11/2011 | Indonesia | Fact Sheet United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership                               | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/fact-sheet-united-states-indonesia-comprehensive-partnership">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/fact-sheet-united-states-indonesia-comprehensive-partnership</a>                         | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 029 | 18/11/2011 | Indonesia | Fact Sheet: U.S.-Indonesia Education Partnership                                           | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/fact-sheet-us-indonesia-education-partnership">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/18/fact-sheet-us-indonesia-education-partnership</a>                                                       | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 030 | 18/11/2011 | Indonesia | U.S.-Indonesia Trade and Investment Relationship                                           | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177383.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177383.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 031 | 18/11/2011 | Indonesia | DoD-funded Integrated Maritime Surveillance System                                         | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177382.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177382.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 032 | 19/11/2011 | Indonesia | Remarks at Millennium Challenge Corporation Signing Ceremony                               | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177396.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177396.htm</a>                                                                                                                             | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 033 | 15/08/2012 | Indonesia | Republic of Indonesia's National Day                                                       | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/196528.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/196528.htm</a>                                                                                                                             | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 034 | 03/09/2012 | Indonesia | United States-Indonesia Relations                                                          | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197277.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197277.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |

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| 035 | 03/09/2012 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa                                                           | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197279.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197279.htm</a>                                                                                         | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 036 | 20/09/2012 | Indonesia | Remarks at the Third Annual U.S.-Indonesian Joint Commission Meeting                                                                       | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197977.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197977.htm</a>                                                                                         | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 037 | 20/09/2012 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa After Their Meeting                                       | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197993.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197993.htm</a>                                                                                         | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 038 | 20/09/2012 | Indonesia | Joint Statement of the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia on the Occasion of the Third Annual Joint Commission Meeting | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198004.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198004.htm</a>                                                                                                                           | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 039 | 20/09/2012 | Indonesia | Indonesia-U.S. Third Joint Commission Meeting (Updated)                                                                                    | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197980.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197980.htm</a>                                                                                                                           | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 040 | 16/05/2013 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa Before Their Meeting                                                             | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209509.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209509.htm</a>                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 041 | 15/08/2013 | Indonesia | Republic of Indonesia's National Day                                                                                                       | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213151.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213151.htm</a>                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 042 | 03/10/2013 | Indonesia | Readout of the President's call to President Yudhoyono of Indonesia                                                                        | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/03/readout-president-s-call-president-yudhoyono-indonesia">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/03/readout-president-s-call-president-yudhoyono-indonesia</a> | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 043 | 05/10/2013 | Indonesia | Remarks at a Press Availability With United States Trade                                                                                   | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/10/215148.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/10/215148.htm</a>                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |

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|     |            |           | Representative Ambassador Froman                                                      |                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |           |   |
| 044 | 08/10/2013 | Indonesia | United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership                                     | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215196.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215196.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 045 | 17/02/2014 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa      | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221711.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221711.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Yudhoyono | Y |
| 046 | 17/02/2014 | Indonesia | U.S.-Indonesia Fourth Joint Commission Meeting                                        | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/02/221714.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/02/221714.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 047 | 22/07/2014 | Indonesia | Indonesia's Presidential Election                                                     | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/07/229629.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/07/229629.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Yudhoyono |   |
| 048 | 23/07/2014 | Indonesia | Readout of the President's Call with Indonesian President-Elect Widodo                | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/23/readout-presidents-call-indonesian-president-elect-widodo">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/23/readout-presidents-call-indonesian-president-elect-widodo</a>                               | Obama | Widodo    |   |
| 049 | 15/08/2014 | Indonesia | Indonesia's Independence Day                                                          | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230643.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230643.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Widodo    |   |
| 050 | 10/11/2014 | Indonesia | Remarks by President Obama and President Widodo of Indonesia before Bilateral Meeting | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/10/remarks-president-obama-and-president-widodo-indonesia-bilateral-meeting">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/10/remarks-president-obama-and-president-widodo-indonesia-bilateral-meeting</a> | Obama | Widodo    | Y |
| 051 | 21/09/2015 | Indonesia | Statement by the Press Secretary on the Visit of President Joko Widodo of Indonesia   | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/21/statement-press-secretary-visit-president-joko-widodo-indonesia">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/21/statement-press-secretary-visit-president-joko-widodo-indonesia</a>                   | Obama | Widodo    |   |
| 052 | 21/09/2015 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi                                | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/09/247114.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/09/247114.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                   | Obama | Widodo    | Y |

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| 053 | 26/10/2015 | Indonesia | FACT SHEET: U.S.-Indonesia Energy Cooperation                                                            | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/fact-sheet-us-indonesia-energy-cooperation">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/fact-sheet-us-indonesia-energy-cooperation</a>                                                                               | Obama | Widodo |   |
| 054 | 26/10/2015 | Indonesia | FACT SHEET: U.S.-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation                                                          | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/fact-sheet-us-indonesia-maritime-cooperation">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/fact-sheet-us-indonesia-maritime-cooperation</a>                                                                           | Obama | Widodo |   |
| 055 | 26/10/2015 | Indonesia | FACT SHEET: U.S.-Indonesia Climate Cooperation                                                           | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/fact-sheet-us-indonesia-climate-cooperation">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/fact-sheet-us-indonesia-climate-cooperation</a>                                                                             | Obama | Widodo |   |
| 056 | 26/10/2015 | Indonesia | Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia                            | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/26/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-indonesia</a>                                           | Obama | Widodo | Y |
| 057 | 27/10/2015 | Indonesia | Readout of Vice President Biden's Meeting with Indonesian President Widodo                               | Obama White House Archive      | <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/27/readout-vice-president-bidens-meeting-indonesian-president-widodo">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/27/readout-vice-president-bidens-meeting-indonesian-president-widodo</a>                                 | Obama | Widodo |   |
| 058 | 22/04/2016 | Indonesia | Press Roundtable in Jakarta                                                                              | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/2016d/256554.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/2016d/256554.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Obama | Widodo |   |
| 059 | 15/08/2016 | Indonesia | Republic of Indonesia Independence Day                                                                   | Obama State Department Archive | <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/08/261065.htm">https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/08/261065.htm</a>                                                                                                                                                                     | Obama | Widodo |   |
| 060 | 20/04/2017 | Indonesia | Remarks by the Vice President and Indonesian President Widodo to the Press                               | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-indonesian-president-widodo-press/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-indonesian-president-widodo-press/</a>                                                               | Trump | Widodo | Y |
| 061 | 20/04/2017 | Indonesia | Readout of the Vice President's Meeting with Vice President Jusuf Kalla and Indonesian Cabinet Ministers | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-vice-presidents-meeting-vice-president-jusuf-kalla-indonesian-cabinet-ministers/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-vice-presidents-meeting-vice-president-jusuf-kalla-indonesian-cabinet-ministers/</a> | Trump | Widodo |   |

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| 062 | 25/04/2017 | Indonesia | Remarks by the Vice President at a Meeting with US and Indonesian Business Leaders      | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-meeting-us-indonesian-business-leaders/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-meeting-us-indonesian-business-leaders/</a>                         | Trump | Widodo |  |
| 063 | 16/08/2017 | Indonesia | Indonesia National Day                                                                  | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/indonesia-national-day/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/indonesia-national-day/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                               | Trump | Widodo |  |
| 064 | 26/03/2018 | Indonesia | Deputy Secretary Sullivan's Meeting With Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno L.P. Marsudi | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/deputy-secretary-sullivans-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-l-p-marsudi/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/deputy-secretary-sullivans-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-l-p-marsudi/index.html</a>                 | Trump | Widodo |  |
| 065 | 05/06/2018 | Indonesia | Secretary Pompeo's Meeting With Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno L.P. Marsudi          | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-l-p-marsudi/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-l-p-marsudi/index.html</a>                                   | Trump | Widodo |  |
| 066 | 08/07/2018 | Indonesia | Readout of President Donald J. Trump's Meeting with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia  | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-president-donald-j-trumps-meeting-president-joko-widodo-indonesia/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-president-donald-j-trumps-meeting-president-joko-widodo-indonesia/</a> | Trump | Widodo |  |
| 067 | 04/08/2018 | Indonesia | Secretary Pompeo's Meeting With Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno L.P. Marsudi          | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-l-p-marsudi-2/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-l-p-marsudi-2/index.html</a>                               | Trump | Widodo |  |
| 068 | 05/08/2018 | Indonesia | Remarks With Indonesian President Joko Widodo Before Their Meeting                      | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-indonesian-president-joko-widodo-before-their-meeting/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-indonesian-president-joko-widodo-before-their-meeting/index.html</a>                                                       | Trump | Widodo |  |
| 069 | 06/08/2018 | Indonesia | Secretary Pompeo Reinforces U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Dialogue                           | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeo-reinforces-u-s-indonesia-strategic-dialogue/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeo-reinforces-u-s-indonesia-strategic-dialogue/index.html</a>                                                                   | Trump | Widodo |  |

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| 070 | 25/09/2018 | Indonesia | Readout of the Vice President's Meeting with Republic of Indonesia Vice President Jusuf Kalla                       | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-vice-presidents-meeting-republic-indonesia-vice-president-jusuf-kalla/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-vice-presidents-meeting-republic-indonesia-vice-president-jusuf-kalla/</a>                                   | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 071 | 25/09/2018 | Indonesia | Remarks by Vice President Pence and Vice President Kalla of the Republic of Indonesia Before Bilateral Meeting      | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-vice-president-kalla-republic-indonesia-bilateral-meeting/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-vice-president-kalla-republic-indonesia-bilateral-meeting/</a>                 | Trump | Widodo | Y |
| 072 | 14/11/2018 | Indonesia | Readout of the Vice President's Meeting with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia                                     | Trump White House Archive      | <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-vice-presidents-meeting-president-joko-widodo-indonesia/">https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-vice-presidents-meeting-president-joko-widodo-indonesia/</a>                                                               | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 073 | 15/08/2019 | Indonesia | Indonesia National Day                                                                                              | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/indonesias-national-day/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/indonesias-national-day/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                       | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 074 | 15/08/2019 | Indonesia | Indonesia National Day                                                                                              | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/republic-of-indonesia-national-day/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/republic-of-indonesia-national-day/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                 | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 075 | 21/01/2020 | Indonesia | Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations With Indonesia                                                                           | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                             | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 076 | 03/08/2020 | Indonesia | Secretary Pompeo's Call with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marsudi                                                    | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-marsudi/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-marsudi/index.html</a>                                                                                                       | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 077 | 14/08/2020 | Indonesia | Indonesia National Day                                                                                              | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/indonesia-national-day-2/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/indonesia-national-day-2/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                     | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 078 | 28/10/2020 | Indonesia | Secretary Michael R. Pompeo Travels to Indonesia To Underscore Shared Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-travels-to-indonesia-to-underscore-shared-vision-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-region/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-travels-to-indonesia-to-underscore-shared-vision-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-region/index.html</a> | Trump | Widodo |   |

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| 079 | 29/10/2020 | Indonesia | Secretary Pompeo's Meeting with Indonesian President Joko Widodo                                                                                | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-indonesian-president-joko-widodo/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-indonesian-president-joko-widodo/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 080 | 29/10/2020 | Indonesia | Secretary Michael R. Pompeo And Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi                                                                       | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Trump | Widodo | Y |
| 081 | 30/11/2020 | Indonesia | Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Cooperation With Indonesia                                                                                            | Trump State Department Archive | <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-indonesia/index.html">https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-indonesia/index.html</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Trump | Widodo |   |
| 082 | 16/02/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Blinken's Call with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marsudi                                                                               | Biden State Department         | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-marsudi/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-marsudi/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 083 | 23/04/2021 | Indonesia | Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's Call with Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi of Indonesia    | Biden White House              | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/23/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-s-call-with-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-of-indonesia/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/23/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-s-call-with-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-of-indonesia/</a>       | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 084 | 02/08/2021 | Indonesia | Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's Meeting with Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi of Indonesia | Biden White House              | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/02/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-s-meeting-with-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-of-indonesia/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/02/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-s-meeting-with-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-of-indonesia/</a> | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 085 | 03/08/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Blinken's Meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi                                                                      | Biden State Department         | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 086 | 03/08/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno                                                                               | Biden State Department         | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Biden | Widodo | Y |

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|     |            |           | Marsudi Before Their Meeting                                                                                                      |                        | <a href="#">foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-before-their-meeting/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |       |        |  |
| 087 | 16/08/2021 | Indonesia | Indonesia National Day                                                                                                            | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/indonesia-national-day/">https://www.state.gov/indonesia-national-day/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Biden | Widodo |  |
| 088 | 18/10/2021 | Indonesia | Statement by NSC Spokesperson Emily Horne on National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's Meeting with Luhut Pandjaitan of Indonesia | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/18/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-meeting-with-luhut-pandjaitan-of-indonesia/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/18/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-meeting-with-luhut-pandjaitan-of-indonesia/</a> | Biden | Widodo |  |
| 089 | 01/11/2021 | Indonesia | Remarks by President Biden and President Widodo of the Republic of Indonesia Before Bilateral Meeting                             | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/11/01/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-widodo-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-before-bilateral-meeting/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/11/01/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-widodo-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-before-bilateral-meeting/</a>                                                           | Biden | Widodo |  |
| 090 | 01/11/2021 | Indonesia | Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.'s Meeting with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia                                       | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/01/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-s-meeting-with-president-joko-widodo-of-indonesia/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/01/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-s-meeting-with-president-joko-widodo-of-indonesia/</a>                                                                               | Biden | Widodo |  |
| 091 | 12/12/2021 | Indonesia | The United States-Indonesia Relationship                                                                                          | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-indonesia-relationship/">https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-indonesia-relationship/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Biden | Widodo |  |
| 092 | 13/12/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Blinken's Remarks on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific                                                                       | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/">https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Biden | Widodo |  |
| 093 | 13/12/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Blinken's Meeting with Indonesian President Joko Widodo                                                                 | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-indonesian-president-joko-widodo/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-indonesian-president-joko-widodo/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Biden | Widodo |  |
| 094 | 14/12/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Santi Dewi of IDN Times                                                                          | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-santi-dewi-of-idn-times/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-santi-dewi-of-idn-times/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Biden | Widodo |  |

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| 095 | 14/12/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Frisca Clarissa of Kompas TV                                                                                | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-frisca-clarissa-of-kompas-tv/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-frisca-clarissa-of-kompas-tv/</a>                                                                                                                                                               | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 096 | 14/12/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Blinken's Meeting with Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Maritime and Investment Affairs Pandjaitan and Minister of Trade Lutfi | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-indonesian-coordinating-minister-for-maritime-and-investment-affairs-pandjaitan-and-minister-of-trade-lutfi/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-indonesian-coordinating-minister-for-maritime-and-investment-affairs-pandjaitan-and-minister-of-trade-lutfi/</a> | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 097 | 14/12/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability                                                                                          | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-8/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-8/</a>                                                                                                                                                                               | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 098 | 14/12/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi at Memorandum of Understanding Signing Ceremony                    | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-at-memorandum-of-understanding-signing-ceremony/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-at-memorandum-of-understanding-signing-ceremony/</a>                                       | Biden | Widodo | Y |
| 099 | 14/12/2021 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi Before Their Meeting                                               | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-before-their-meeting-2/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-before-their-meeting-2/</a>                                                                                         | Biden | Widodo | Y |
| 100 | 02/03/2022 | Indonesia | Deputy Secretary Sherman's Call with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marsudi                                                                     | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-call-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-marsudi/">https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-call-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-marsudi/</a>                                                                                                                                         | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 101 | 19/04/2022 | Indonesia | U.S. Relations With Indonesia                                                                                                                | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/">https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 102 | 13/05/2022 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi Before Their Meeting                                               | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-before-their-meeting-3/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-before-their-meeting-3/</a>                                                                                         | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 103 | 15/05/2022 | Indonesia | Secretary Blinken's Meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno                                                                           | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno/</a>                                                                                                                                                     | Biden | Widodo |   |

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| 104 | 09/07/2022 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability                                                                                                  | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-21/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-21/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 105 | 04/08/2022 | Indonesia | Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi Before The ASEAN-U.S. Ministerial Meeting                                  | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-before-the-asean-u-s-ministerial-meeting/">https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-before-the-asean-u-s-ministerial-meeting/</a>                                                                                                                                                                         | Biden | Widodo | Y |
| 106 | 16/08/2022 | Indonesia | Indonesia Independence Day                                                                                                                           | Biden State Department | <a href="https://www.state.gov/indonesia-independence-day/">https://www.state.gov/indonesia-independence-day/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 107 | 22/08/2022 | Indonesia | Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's Call with Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Pandjaitan | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/22/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-call-with-indonesian-coordinating-minister-for-maritime-affairs-and-investment-luhut-pandjaitan/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/22/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-call-with-indonesian-coordinating-minister-for-maritime-affairs-and-investment-luhut-pandjaitan/</a> | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 108 | 13/11/2022 | Indonesia | FACT SHEET: Strengthening the U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership                                                                                   | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/fact-sheet-strengthening-the-u-s-indonesia-strategic-partnership/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/fact-sheet-strengthening-the-u-s-indonesia-strategic-partnership/</a>                                                                                                                                                                       | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 109 | 14/11/2022 | Indonesia | Readout of President Joe Biden's Meeting with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia                                                                     | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-joko-widodo-of-indonesia/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-joko-widodo-of-indonesia/</a>                                                                                                                                         | Biden | Widodo |   |
| 110 | 14/11/2022 | Indonesia | Remarks by President Biden and President Joko Widodo of Indonesia Before Bilateral Meeting                                                           | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-joko-widodo-of-indonesia-before-bilateral-meeting/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-joko-widodo-of-indonesia-before-bilateral-meeting/</a>                                                                                                                         | Biden | Widodo | Y |
| 111 | 14/11/2022 | Indonesia | Remarks by President Biden in a Press                                                                                                                | Biden White House      | <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-press/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-press/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Biden | Widodo |   |

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|  |  |  | Conference   Bali,<br>Indonesia |  | <a href="#">remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-press-conference-bali-indonesia/</a> |  |  |  |
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