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“RUSSIAN CORPORATE LOBBYING IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: TECHNOLOGIES AND PROSPECTS

(In the examples of Hungary, Germany, Austria and Italy)”

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On my honor as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

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ABSTRACT FOR MASTER'S THESIS WORK

The research is devoted to the analysis of lobbying activities of Russian corporations in the EU countries. The member states differ in their level of economic development, therefore, in order to identify the specifics of Russian lobbying in the EU, it was necessary to consider both the most economically developed states and countries with a lower level of economic development. Among them there are Germany and Austria, Italy and Hungary.

The analysis of the sphere of corporate lobbying in Europe testifies to the uniformity of the nature of the lobbying influence of Russian corporate structures from other states operating in the European Union and realizing their economic interests through lobbying activities. The study demonstrates that in both cases lobbying influence is carried out through politicians and public figures or public associations. However, the activities of corporate lobbyists from Russia are fundamentally different to similar activities in other countries. There are two reasons for this. Due to the structure of the European industry, Europe's needs for trade with Russia consist mainly of energy supplies (oil, gas, as well as uranium). Other industrial goods from Russia are not of particular interest to the European Union at the moment. Their quality and cost make them uncompetitive in the EU markets. However, the same specifics of the economic development of the EU countries have predetermined a significant need for energy carriers and a number of other raw materials. And Russia can fulfill these requirements since it is a universal supplier of natural gas. It provides relatively low transportation costs for the transportation of natural gas to the European Union. It is possible to replace Russia as an energy supplier, but this involves significant costs for the restructuring of transport infrastructure and logistics. Thus, this creates a situation of relative dependence of the European Union on Russian energy suppliers.

In addition, due to the specific nature of the relationship between the Russian authorities and corporate structures in the country, its energy corporations are actually turning into representatives of Russia's political interests in the European Union. Their main goal was the geopolitical subordination of European countries by economic methods.

The study revealed that Russian corporations made the greatest efforts to lobby in the developed countries, as this allowed them to control not only the energy sector, but also the high-tech industries of the European industry which were dependent on it. At the same time, politicians in Germany and Austria were willing to contact Russian corporations, defending the interests of their countries and their economies. In Italy and Hungary, the lobbying efforts of Russian corporations were less pronounced due to the lesser importance of the economies of these countries.

The beginning of Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine demonstrated not only the predominantly militaristic nature of Russian corporate lobbying, but also the limited potential of the EU's capabilities in countering it.

ABSTRACT DER MASTERARBEIT

Die Masterarbeit widmet sich der Identifizierung der Besonderheiten der Lobbying-Aktivitäten russischer Unternehmensstrukturen in den EU-Ländern. Deutschland und Österreich werden als die wirtschaftlich am weitesten entwickelten Staaten, Italien und Ungarn als Länder mit weniger entwickelter Wirtschaft in die Analyse aufgenommen.

Die Studie ergab, dass russische Konzerne im Bereich Corporate Lobbying die gleichen Methoden anwenden wie Konzerne aus anderen Ländern, die ihre wirtschaftlichen Interessen in der Europäischen Union verfolgen. Art und Ziele ihrer Lobbyarbeit sind jedoch grundlegend verschieden. Eng mit dem russischen Staat verbunden und faktisch dessen Wirtschaftsakteure, betrieben russische Unternehmensstrukturen im 21. Jahrhundert immer weniger „klassisches“ Lobbying und führten immer mehr einen Wirtschaftskrieg mit dem Ziel, europäische Länder dem geopolitischen Einfluss Russlands zu unterwerfen.

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1. Introduction

The complex of issues concerning various aspects of corporate lobbying in developed countries continues to be of great relevance for researchers today, generally fitting into the mainstream of a fairly broad problem of lobbying as a social phenomenon affecting the sphere of politics and economics and widely represented in the modern world¹. The development of this problem in the context of globalization is of even greater interest due to the fundamentally unchanged nature of the emerging differences in the interests of social groups and individual subjects of economic activity on the one hand, and states and their governing bodies on the other. The emerging opportunities to harmonize the interests of the parties, resolve emerging contradictions and problems, as well as the desire to extract additional profit within the framework of the rules established by national and supranational legislations (for example, the European Union) generate interest in an increasing number of aspects of the legal regulation of corporate lobbyists, the search for tools, channels and ways of economic impact on the corporate lobby to overcome its negative impact on state and political institutions, etc. At the same time, all the attention of the Western (and Russian) scientific community on corporate lobbying fits well into the mainstream of the already traditional research paradigm, within which both the territorial framework of research (mainly Western countries) and the established institutional approaches to problems remain fundamentally unchanged. At the same time, of course, all the "innovations" of development taking place in the field of corporate lobbying in the European Union, the United States, Great Britain and similar countries from an economic point of view are carefully studied, comprehended and analyzed². However, due to the increasingly active inclusion of the former Eastern bloc countries in the sphere of the international division of labor and international trade, and then and the former republics of the USSR that have now become independent states, it is necessary to see and closely study the qualitative changes that are becoming more and more clearly manifested in this area. And the problem in this case is that the coordinate system itself, in which corporate lobbying is considered, begins to change qualitatively – and these qualitative changes are

¹ Almond G., Powell G. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston, 1966; Almond G. Pluralism, Corporatism and Professional Memory // World Politics. – 1983. – Vol. 35. - №. 2;

² Cawson A. Public Policies and Private Interests: the role of business interests in determining Europe's future television system. Greenwood, 1995.

by no means identical to a simple increase in the number of lobbying interactions due to an increase in the number of corporate entities involved in cross-country relations.

If we try to formulate this problem in the most general form, then it lies in the variability of the nature of corporate lobbying in relation to each specific state in the new conditions. This can be both a completely "classic" corporate lobbying of the European model, and something different from it – with the same designation of the relevant actions. Everything in this situation "rests" on the economic capabilities of corporate business entities within the framework of their interaction with the state (states) and its bodies in a market economy. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that corporate entities of relatively small states of Eastern and Central Europe, even if they were previously in the sphere of Soviet influence, as a rule, cannot fundamentally differ in their lobbying capabilities from other similar ones among Western European countries. The reason lies in the fact that since their products and services are not exclusive, they cannot accumulate significant resources. In addition, it is simply dangerous for them to grossly violate the requirements of corporate and other legislation, since in this case the consequences for them will be very unfavorable.

Approximately the same situation will arise with the lobbying potentials of Russian corporate entities that are unable to provide exclusive services to the world and produce unique goods³. However, Russian corporations whose services (products) are consumed on the world market in almost all spheres and sectors of the economy undoubtedly find themselves in a qualitatively different position compared to the first ones. At the same time, it should be understood that the products of these Russian corporations are not unique in themselves; in terms of their physical properties, similar ones are produced in many other regions of the globe, and they can also be delivered to any place on the planet. However, this product differs from any other in that it is the basis of everything and without it the production process of any other goods and services is impossible. Moreover, even the very life activity of a person is impossible without it, and therefore the one in whose hands the production of these products and its delivery to places of consumption turns out to be, receives exceptional advantages over any other economic entities. It is impossible to replace such a corporate entity in the foreseeable future without serious consequences, and even more so to eliminate it from the economic and social life of the European states at one

³ Greenwood J. Interest Representation in the European Union. – Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 310 p.; Peterson J., Bomberg E. Decision-Making in the European Union. – N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1999. 352 p.

time, or even just quickly enough. But at the same time, this entity itself, due to its financial capabilities, can influence others to a very significant extent, including in the field of lobbying. As it is not difficult to understand, in this case, all of the above is most directly related to Russian energy-producing corporations.

The objectively privileged position of such corporate structures today is further enhanced by the fact that in the conditions of the rejection of "obsolete" types of energy carriers (coal and brown coal, firewood and nuclear energy) declared in Western Europe, the need for oil and – especially – gas has objectively increased, and the prospects for its reduction are not yet visible. For this reason, corporations like Gazprom, which is regarded as the "national treasure of Russia", get maximum opportunities to protect their interests anywhere, including in the West. And, of course, lobbying is becoming one of the most traditional forms of protecting such interests. At the same time, due to financial opportunities in this case, quantity turns into quality – lobbying by a super-rich corporation objectively creates conditions which not only solve individual economic problems, but also influence political processes in some countries as a whole⁴.

However, with all the severity and importance of the above problem, this is only part of it, and far from the most important one. The main thing here is something else – it is the systemically anti-Western nature of the current Russian state, which controls large corporations, and which is quite often referred to in political science as a failed state. With all the costs of this definition, the "features and qualities" of such a state are undoubtedly present in Russian reality. Their set includes an authoritarian political regime, which has been evaluating with increasing speed in the direction of neo-totalitarian, very specific and obviously with little concern for market relations between the authorities and owners of businesses, as well as a clearly visible disparity in the distribution of economic activity results between the ruling group and the general population. In this regard, the nature of relations with the "own" state of corporations, such as the Russian Gazprom, differs in principle from that of any Western corporation with "its" state⁵. For example, the Norwegian oil and gas corporation, similar to Gazprom in basic parameters, is in this respect quite an ordinary, "classic" corporate structure, while the Russian Gazprom is

⁴ Butova T.V. Features of corporate governance in domestic companies with state participation / T.V. Butova, H.P. Kharchilova // Collection of scientific articles in 3 parts. Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. – M., 2015. – pp. 60-74.

⁵ Butrin D. Miller's Cocktail // Kommersant. – 2006. – January 10. No. 1 (3332); Grozovsky B., Dokuchaev D. European shutters: What awaits Gazprom in the Old World // The New Times. – 2012. April 2. - No. 12 (240).

increasingly becoming an instrument for economic and political pressure on the countries that consume Russian gas. Under certain conditions, this pressure can turn into a clear political one, as evidenced by the "gas wars" that took place in the recent past⁶. And the reason for this is that the relations between business and the state in the Russian Federation are completely different in the West, but radically different from those due to the above-mentioned nature of the Russian state. At the same time, the nature of corporate lobbying in each case will be significantly different, despite the fact that both Russian and foreign corporations can carry out lobbying of their interests, and are identical in their main parameters.

Taking into account all the above, our research on the topic: "Russian corporate lobbying in the member States of the European Union: technologies and prospects" cannot be anything but relevant within the framework of a broader scientific agenda. Such research has many scientific facets. But since we are primarily interested in technologies for achieving results through the functioning of lobbying structures and the prospects for such activities of Russian corporations in the European Union, we formulate the hypothesis of our study as follows – corporate lobbying in Russia as an economic institution exists and is used by Russian corporations to solve their own economic problems in order to increase profits. However, as the scale of economic activity of these corporations increases, due to the specifics of their relationship with the Russian state, it varies in nature from the "classic" way of optimizing corporate costs to turning it into a tool for a contactless war, not only carried out in modern conditions by Russia against Western countries as a whole and/or one, a single country of the European Union, and in principle, against the West as a phenomenon systemically alien to Russia. The level of "militarization" of corporate lobbying is not a constant and varies from a rather "soft", almost classical, Western type of lobbying influence on countries whose economic potential is relatively small, to extremely tough, implemented in order to correct or even change the foreign policy of a sufficiently "important" country in the direction desired by Russia – in relation to those countries whose economic potential is significant.

At the same time, the first option will mainly use specific methods of lobbying influence to finance public associations and non-governmental organizations with the goals they need for themselves, while the second option will mainly integrate high-ranking officials from among top managers or politicians of these countries into the management

⁶ Panchenko Yu. Ukraine invited the IMF to meet // Kommersant Ukraine. 2012. October 11. № 160 (1650).

structures of Russian corporations in order to use their personal connections, previously acquired, to promote Russian interests at the national level of such countries and at the expense of Russian corporate structures.

In order to confirm the hypothesis put forward, we will formulate the purpose, objectives, object and subject of our research – i.e., we will move on to the complex of research issues to be solved.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the functioning of the mechanism of lobbying corporate interests of the Russian Federation in the EU states in the example of a group of countries – Germany, Austria, Italy and Hungary – i.e., as their economic potential decreases. Based on the analysis carried out, it is planned to develop recommendations for further improving the regulation of corporate lobbying in general and the development of specific measures to neutralize the consequences of the negative impact of corporate lobbying by Russian corporate structures on this group of countries and the European Union as a whole.

Thus, the object of our research is the sphere of corporate lobbying in the EU states, within which the interests of corporate structures as special groups of influence on the socio-economic life of states and their economies are realized.

The subject of our research is the impact of Russian corporate structures on the economic situation of the EU states and their political state.

This goal involves identifying the specifics of Russian corporate lobbying and identifying its differences from lobbying carried out by corporations in other countries. To do this, it is necessary to reflect all aspects of this issue, which allows us to identify the relationship between the level of economic development of a particular EU state and the methods of influencing its economy applied by Russian corporate structures.

Corporate lobbying seems to be a relatively little-studied topic. Such issues are often resolved behind the scenes, without public disclosure. In this regard, the main research issue is to identify the impact of corporate lobbying on Russia's relations with the countries of the European Union.

The formation of Russia's special relations with some countries of the European Union also actualizes the question of the role of corporate lobbying.

Germany, Italy, Austria and Hungary were chosen as cases of the analysis. The most attention devoted to the issues of Russian corporate lobbying is in Germany. This is due to the size and weight of the German economy as the locomotive of the entire EU and the scale of relations with Russia. Positions of all four countries often differ from the general

position of Brussels. They often try to develop ties with Moscow despite opposition from many others states in the EU. The influence of Russian lobbying structures, the possibilities and limitations of their influence form the main research question.

2. Literature review

The problem of promoting private interests in the development and implementation of political decisions has attracted the attention of scholars since the early twentieth century. The first scientific developments of lobbying were closely related to the theory of interest groups.

To date, the state of research in lobbying is represented by a significant number of works, including monographs, articles, analytical notes of experts, and a number of dissertations. An analysis of the literature shows that lobbyists meet the criteria for almost the whole range of issues related to the study of this phenomenon. Our analysis of the authors' work shows that the study of lobbying is developing in the context of global trends that characterize its study. As in foreign literature, it reflects a variety of theoretical and methodological concepts that define approaches to the study of such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, which is the phenomenon of lobbying. A significant amount of scientific work on this topic requires systematization, which is based on the problem principle. According to this, work on this problem can be divided into the following groups.

The first group of works is represented by research related to the analysis of theoretical and methodological aspects of lobbying. This applies to such issues as the development of the categorical-conceptual apparatus of lobbying, the development of conceptual approaches to its study.

The classic works of this group are the works of foreign researchers related to interest group theory. Key works among them are that of A. Bentley "Management process. The Study of Social Pressures" of 1908, in which the political process acts as a struggle and competition between different groups in society, as well as the work of D. Truman, "The Government Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion" 1951⁷. Theoretical principles of lobbying were further developed in the works of M. Olson "The Logic of Collective

⁷ Bentley A. The Process of government. A study of social pressures. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1908. 534 p.

Truman D, B. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1981, 544 p.

Action" (1965)⁸ and R. Salisbury "Exchange Theory of Interest Groups", 1969⁹. These works became fundamental in the study of the influence of nongovernmental actors on the political process, and also laid the foundations for further study of the phenomenon of lobbying.

Among the studies of foreign scholars, a significant contribution to the analysis of lobbying as a political institution was made by the French researcher F. Famell in "Lobbying: Strategies and Techniques of Intervention" in 1994¹⁰, British researcher L. Zetter in "Lobbying: The Art of Political Persuasion" in 2008¹¹, German researcher K. Juice in "Lobbying in the new Europe" in 2011¹². These researchers devoted themselves to defining the essence of lobbying, highlighting its main functions in the political system. They considered the history of the emergence and development of this phenomenon, the main tools and technologies to promote private interests in the political process, ethical aspects of lobbying and more.

After the collapse of the USSR and the increasing relevance of work on the problems of democracy, scientists began to turn to the study of problems in the post-Soviet space. Lobbying and its positive functions in the process of democratic transformation have been the subject of scientific research by a number of Russian scholars, including the works of V. Lepekhin's "Lobbying" (1995)¹³, M. Zyablyuk's "Lobbying in the United States as a political institution" (1995)¹⁴, O. Lyubimov's "History of Lobbying in Russia" (2005)¹⁵, A. Avtonomov's "Alphabet of Lobbying" (2004)¹⁶, etc. Their works determine the conceptual apparatus of lobbying, the historical stages of lobbying, consider the peculiarities of the functioning of lobbying in the political systems of post-Soviet countries, study the foreign experience of the formation and development of lobbying.

⁸ Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press.

⁹ Salisbury R.I. An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups // Midwest Journal of Political Science. – 1969. – Vol. 13, №1. P. 1-31.

¹⁰ Famel F. Zh. Lobbying: strategies and intervention techniques. Les Editions d'Organisation, 1994. 118 p.

¹¹ Zetter L. Lobbying. The Art of Political Persuasion. Great Britain: I Uniman House LTD, 2008. 454 p

¹² Juice K. Lobbying in the new Europe. Weinheim; Wiley-VCH, 2011. 244 p.

¹³ Лепехин В. А. Лоббизм. — М.: Фонд IQ, 1995. 116 с. / Lepekhin V. A. Lobbyism. — М.: Фонд IQ, 1995. 116 с. / Lepekhin V. A. Lobbying. Moscow: Res. legal ed. house, 1995. 116 p

¹⁴ Zyablyuk N. G. Lobbying in the USA as a political institution. USA. Economy. Politics. Ideology. 1995. No. 1. p. 51-56

¹⁵ Любимов А.П. История лоббизма в России. — М.: Фонд «Либеральная миссия», 2005. — 208 с. / Lyubimov A.P. Istoriya lobbizma v Rossii. — М.: Фонд «Liberal'naya missiya», 2005. — 208 с. / Lyubimov A.P. History of lobbying in Russia. Moscow: Liberal mission, 2005. 208 p

¹⁶ Автономов А.С. Алфавит лоббирования. М.: Права человека, 2004. 109 с. / Avtonomov A.S. Azbuka lobbirovaniya. М.: Prava cheloveka, 2004. 109 с. / Avtonomov A, S. The ABC of Lobbying, Moscow: Human Rights, 2004, 109 p.

The trends that characterize the study of lobbying today indicate the complexity of its study, the desire to consider it in the context of new theories and approaches, in the framework of communication technologies and communication management. Examples of this approach are the work of Yu. Ganzhurova's "Parliamentary Lobbying in the Context of Political Communication"¹⁷, and E. Tikhomirova's article "Lobbying as a component of international PR"¹⁸. In the latter, the author, through the analysis of international PR, approaches the disclosure of global, regional and national levels of international lobbying, which is considered as a specific form of communication. This author owns a number of other works, where lobbying is seen as a specific form of communication with society.

The second group is represented by works that study the foreign experience of the formation, institutionalization and functioning of the institution of lobbying. This group is mostly represented by foreign researchers. A. Pross *Lobbying: Models for Regulation*¹⁹ conducted a comparative analysis of the two main models of lobbying regulation, and highlighted the main features of the American and European models.

Peculiarities of lobbying in the United States are considered in the works of American researchers, including S. Holman's "Origins, Evolution and Structure of the Lobbying Disclosure Act" and W. Luneburg's "The Evolution of the Federal Lobbying Regulation Where We Are Now and Where We Should Be Going"²⁰:

Among the works that consider the development of lobbying and its regulation in European countries, it is worth noting the works of J. Murphy's "Lobbying regulation in Ireland"²¹, and R. Speth's "Lobbying in Germany"²².

In the context of the study of foreign experience, the work of E. Tikhomirova's "Technology of relations with the government: the international experience of lobbying" is of interest²³. Based on foreign experience, the author reveals the potential of lobbying in the fight against corruption, but for this it must be introduced into the legal field, otherwise she concludes that "the process of mutation will go towards crime."

¹⁷ Gaikulmrov Yu. Parliamentary lobbying in the context of political communication. Political management. 2005. No. 4. p. 50-62.

¹⁸ Tikhomirova E.V. Lobbyism as a specific form of communication with the public. Bulletin of Moscow' University. Series 18, Sociology and Political Science. 2002. No. 3. p. 113-127.

¹⁹ Pross A. Lobbying: Models for Regulation. Paris, 2007. 53 p.

²⁰ Luneburg W. V. The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where We Are now and Where We Should Be Going. McGeorge Law Review. 2009. Vol. 41. No 1. pp. 85-130.

²¹ Murphy G. Lobbying regulation in Ireland: Fool's errand or finest hour? Journal of the Institute of Public Administration of Ireland. 2017. Vol. 65. no. 2. pp. 127-144.

²² Speth R. Lobbying in Germany / Transparency International Deutschland e.V. October 2014. 43 p.

²³ Tikhomirova E. Technology of communication with power: international opinion of lobbying. Bulletin of Lviv University. Series: international blues. 2001. VIP. 6. S. 235-244.

The work of this group provides an opportunity to trace the evolution of lobbying, to identify the most effective tools for its regulation, and to identify the most effective technologies for promoting interests. In addition, they prove the positive effect of lobbying as a political institution in a democratic society under a clearly defined legal framework for its operation.

The analysis of the state of research on the problem of lobbying allows us to draw the following conclusions. The authors generally conduct lobbying research in the context of the concepts that characterize the study of this phenomenon in the world today. The problem of lobbying is most actively studied in the framework of legal and political science approaches, but in practice this topic remains outside the interest of economists. At the same time, the authors are taking steps to understand lobbying in the context of communication technologies and communication management. An analysis of the literature also shows that there are no unambiguous assessments among researchers in the interpretation of the issue of lobbying technology, or its characteristics, in the relationship between lobbying and corruption

3. Research question

The main research question is how the influence of corporate lobbying of Russia's interests manifests itself in Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary. Other research tasks are related to this issue, in particular:

- how corporate lobbying influences political decision-making,
- what is the impact of corporate lobbying,
- to what extent does corporate lobbying influence relations between Russia, on the one hand, and the countries selected as examples, on the other.

4. Theory of international relations

The task before us to "fit" the problems of corporate lobbying into the system of international relations within the framework of this study involves an appeal to already formed theories of international relations, with the subsequent choice of one of them as the most appropriate, philosophical and theoretical basis for this work. Unfortunately, it is impossible to do this, because there are a number of significant limitations. Firstly, there is not a single theory that adequately reflects the realities of today – the world has been

changing so dynamically in recent years that all theoretical constructions simply do not have time to refine themselves after these changes, no matter how their authors and/or their followers strive to do so. More precisely, the existing theories of international relations are just as susceptible to moral aging as any other theories in any other field of scientific knowledge. Secondly, almost any theoretical construction at the moment of its appearance already presupposes the inevitable abstraction from very significant "details"; therefore, even at the beginning of its scientific evolution, it cannot quite accurately explain the processes for which it was created to comprehend.

It follows from this that, since at the moment of its appearance any theory already carries the prerequisites for a crisis of cognition of the phenomena for which it was created, not only are the theories themselves subject to continuous improvement, but this improvement itself should lead to the emergence of a new synthetic knowledge in the corresponding theoretical field.

It is possible to point out at least a few more objective limitations that will clearly demonstrate the impossibility of creating some kind of ideal theory of international relations (like any other). However, within the framework of this study, we will not need them. Let us try to synthesize the most suitable theory of international relations for us – suitable from the point of view of the possibility to explain the situation of corporate lobbying in the EU countries and the role of Russia most accurately.

Since we have to analyze international relations, i.e., relations between ethnic groups that have already become nations, we will proceed from the fact that at the moment the most common form of their organization is the state. With this in mind, it is possible to apply any theory created for the analysis of interstate relations. But after all, one state is different from another state – and they can differ from each other according to a variety of criteria. At the same time, there is something that makes all states the same – and indeed, they are all created as a means of realizing the interests of the dominant social group, or, using the terminology of Marxism, class. In this connection, a quite natural question arises: is, perhaps, the Marxist theory applicable to our situation? If this is the case, it turns out that the relationship of states is primarily the relationship of ruling social groups, which is largely true, but it does not explain many other problems. Among them, the most important is that the relations of formally equal states can look and develop in time and space in completely different ways. And Marxism does not give an exact and unambiguous answer to the reasons for this situation.

In addition, if we analyze in detail the level of development of each state, it turns out that there is not one among them that is absolutely identical to any other. At the same time, all states, from the point of view of Marxist theory, strive exclusively for a forceful solution to issues of their interest. However, this will be a frankly inadequate assessment of the current situation. Consequently, Marxism, with its theory of imperialism, claiming that states strive to create empires and then behave imperialistically, is unacceptable for this study as a basic theory of the development of international relations.

At the same time, as it seems to us, there is still a rational link in Marxism - it brings to the fore the problem of interest within the framework of economic determinism with the general primacy of the material basis of being. The evolution of classical Marxism has created, as it seems to us, a very interesting theoretical construction - the concept of ultra-imperialism. We deliberately do not call it a theory, since there are some controversial points in it, but in this case, it is not critical. Without going into details, we note that at the moment ultra-imperialism is the most optimal way to explain the relationship between the EU countries and explain the reasons for its creation. The fact is that tense interstate relations, which generated previously unsolvable contradictions, were quite successfully resolved at the end of the twentieth century; today these relations demonstrate the correctness of this theoretical concept quite well.

If you look at the way in which the concept of ultra-imperialism proposes to resolve contradictions between states - there is no interstate violence in the European Union. And if there are contradictions, then they are resolved quite peacefully. It was exactly this which was "warned" by the concept of ultra-imperialism. The cooperation of states in international organizations is present, and the European Union itself is a clear confirmation of this. But this is also evidenced by the concept of ultra-imperialism. Strengthening international trade instead of protectionism - and the rightness of the concept of ultra-imperialism is again confirmed. As a matter of fact, K. Kautsky wrote about such issues back in 1914, when he pointed out that there would come a "stage at which competition between states would be turned off by cartel relations"²⁴ between them. Such provisions confirm its applicability for our study.

Yes, indeed, individual developed states and their alliances still play a huge role in modern world politics. However, they are not alone, as it shows the very fact of the phenomenon of corporate lobbying in the context of increasingly active processes of

²⁴ Kautsky K. The National state, the imperialist state and the Union of States. - M., 1917. - p. 17.

globalization in the world. As expected, under ultra-imperialism, transnational corporations and various non-governmental organizations will play an increasingly important role in the world, and states themselves will become even less prone to interstate violence.

As it is easy to see, the above information is quite sufficient to demonstrate the applicability of ultra-imperialism as a basic theory of international relations within the framework of our study, but only for the states of the European Union and the wider West as a whole. But there is an objective limitation that will require us to involve for our research (in addition to the theory of ultra-imperialism) another theoretical concept. The problem lies in the fact that ultra-imperialism, as has been repeatedly pointed out by K. Kautsky, is characteristic only of highly developed and advanced (from the point of view of the stage of their development) states of the capitalist world²⁵. The states of the European periphery do not and cannot relate to them (because they are lagging in their development, and sometimes very thoroughly). Consequently, their relationship with the "world of the European Union" will be built completely differently. What is the best theoretical basis for describing the relationship between the EU and, for example, Russia?

Looking ahead a little, let us explain that the theory of so-called "offensive realism" is, in our opinion, the most adequate way to describe the policy pursued by the Russian Federation towards the West in general and the European Union in particular, but – and this is very significant – with the inclusion of elements of ultra-imperialism policy beneficial to Russia (more precisely, its corrupt leadership). The synthesis of these two theoretical constructions will create a truly scientific basis for identifying the specifics of Russian corporate lobbying in the European Union.

As before, without going into the description of the above theory itself, we will note only its essential features that allow us to "impose" the policy pursued by Russia on an adequate theoretical basis. As a matter of fact, considering the policy of the modern Russian Federation carried out by its leadership towards the West with Ukraine as its tool, one can say with a sufficient degree of confidence that J. Mearsheimer's theory in the brightest way is embodied in the politics of modern Russia and Russian politics is so similar to the declared principles of Realpolitik from the "Tragedy of the Politics of the Great Powers". However, it seems that the Russian leadership has learned only one thesis from this work: "The stronger they are compared to their rivals, the higher their chances of survival"²⁶.

For more information, see: Kautsky K. Imperialism // K. Kautsky. Democracy and socialism. Fragments of works from different years – M., 1991.

²⁶ Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. – WW Norton & Company, 2001.

We argue this with the following examples. What is included in the set of interrelated system elements in the concept of "offensive realism"? The survival of the state is the main task of foreign policy – the need for statesmen to pursue an aggressive foreign policy - hence threats or even the use of force. In other words, here is the rationale for Russian hybrid, or rather contactless war against the West today.

What does today's Russian foreign policy look like? "Getting up from your knees"; enemies are all around; the demand for guarantees of non-expansion of NATO to the east - man-made Ukrainian crisis created by Russia.

According to the theory of J. Mearsheimer, the existence of a state is possible only with its global hegemony – but this is impossible in principle - therefore it is necessary to achieve hegemony at least in its own region. And once again, Russia is demanding "zones of influence" for itself.

This can be continued for quite a long time, and we only note that the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Federation in such a situation seems to be the only rational one, and the limit of aggressiveness is only the absence of nuclear hegemony in Russia. But in any case, Russia should strive for regional hegemony, and Europe plays the role of this very region. Therefore, Russia must control the whole of Europe.

This leads to another conclusion that is not very pleasant for the European Union. If there is another regional hegemony in the region, in accordance with the doctrine under consideration and its implementation by Russia, it must be eliminated so that Russia can become a regional hegemon. Therefore, the ultimate goal of the Russian leadership is more than clearly visible: the destruction of the European Union. But there is one nuance: this regional hegemony should not interfere with the Russian leadership's profit-making from international relations - through corporate lobbying and a number of other tools. Therefore, the threat of the use of force in such circumstances is an indispensable attribute of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, which, however, creates a threat of the actual use of military force due to the increasing likelihood of an unintended escalation of the existing conflict.

As a result, the theoretical basis for this study will be simple: This is a synthesis of the theory of "offensive realism" and ultra-imperialism. Actually, this country will conduct a foreign policy that does not "directly" affect the interests of the ruling group of leaders in Russia from the positions of "offensive realism", and where their private interests will be viewed from the positions of ultra-imperialism.

5. Methodology

As a general methodological basis of this study, the dialectical method of cognition will be applied in relation to corporate lobbying, which implies the focus of the study on identifying the prerequisites and considering the circumstances of the formation of lobbying processes, their study in dynamics, interrelation with other economic processes and within the framework of foreign economic activity, taking into account the constant development and specifics of Russia. As a result, it is possible to move from individual cases of lobbying to understanding the regularity of the entire process of influence on the EU countries by Russia through its corporate structures.

Reducing the theoretical concepts outlined above to the level of direct methodological tools, we apply structural and functional analysis used with the application of a systematic approach. To identify the most optimal structure of the studied phenomena with their inherent functions, we will apply the theory of systems, assuming that each lower level contains not only primary system elements, but also individual subsystems considered as such.

This approach will make it possible to most accurately and adequately determine the role and value of lobbying for modern Russia when it is applied by Russian corporate structures in the European Union.

The set of special scientific methods used is standard for such research. These are sociological, logical, historical–economic, comparative and other methods in studying the current stage of lobbying for Russia's corporate interests in individual EU countries, which ultimately allows us to determine the state and dynamics of the development of this institution, to consider the general and specific in lobbying for Russia's corporate interests in Germany, Austria, Italy and Hungary and the European Union as a whole.

In addition, the analysis of factors affecting the specifics of lobbying of corporate interests of Russia in Germany, Austria, Italy and Hungary, allows us to identify problems characteristic of corporate lobbying in Russia itself.

6. Discussion of the topic

Lobbying of Russian corporations in modern Europe is qualitatively different from corporate lobbying with any other territorial affiliation. There are good reasons for this. Due to a complex of historical, political, geographical and economic reasons, the circumstances have developed so that the countries of Europe can produce almost everything they need for themselves. To do this, there is an advanced scientific and technological base and a powerful industrial potential. However, there are not enough raw materials and energy in Europe. There are various ways to eliminate this deficit, but it is desirable to do so with minimal cost. Otherwise, there is a risk that the competitiveness of European products on the world market will be insufficient.

The second important aspect of this problem is that, ideally, energy and raw materials should be represented by a single carrier. In this case, being delivered by the same transport system to Europe, it can be used both as an energy source and as a basis for the production of many products. To date, only natural gas fully satisfies such conditions – within the framework of the third energy transition that has taken place in the world, it perfectly acts both as an energy carrier and as a raw material for chemical and other industries. Oil has a similar versatility, after all, to a somewhat lesser extent. Therefore, it is in the supply of natural gas from abroad that Europe is still very interested, despite the planned transition to the use of renewable energy sources in the near future.

The natural "counterparty" of Europe in the supply of raw materials and energy within the borders of the Eurasian continent is Russia. Again, due to geographical and economic reasons, and partly historical and political reasons, it can only supply raw materials and energy to the European Union today. It does not follow from what has been said that the range of Russian goods for export to Europe is fundamentally limited only to the goods of these two groups, but they are mainly of interest to Europe. Everything else from Russia, as a rule, is either worse in quality, or more expensive than a similar European one, or both worse and more expensive at the same time. In other words, almost everything else from Russia in the European market is uncompetitive. There are few exceptions. Therefore, all the necessary prerequisites for the formation of a completely rational Eurasian economic system have been in place for a long time. It looks like a complex of Russian economic entities exporting raw materials and energy to Europe, and European enterprises producing goods with high added value here on the basis of Russian raw materials and using Russian energy carriers. In the absence of "external" adverse

influences, such a system functions very effectively, and involves exactly the goods that each of them needs go in both directions. Europe, as already noted, receives energy and raw materials, and Russia receives industrial goods and other products of industrial processing that it needs. Raw materials and energy from other countries are also present on the European market, but the efficiency of their use in the European economy is usually lower due to more complex delivery conditions to Europe.

Within the framework of the functioning of this system, there is only one fundamental "defect" – Russia tends to inadequately assess its role in all of this. And if such an assessment was manifested only in declarations, then there would be no big trouble in this. But unfortunately, the Russian leadership has demonstrated its political inadequacy in practice. Europe and the world saw this quite clearly and vividly on February 24, 2022. The reason for this "inadequacy" was a number of domestic political factors, but also the misinterpreted dependence of Europe on Russian energy supplies by the country's leadership. The logic of the President of Russia is easily seen in this: we supply oil and gas to Europe on very favorable terms. Additionally, we have in every way interested a number of European leaders in these supplies, therefore, they will be our lobbyists in the European Union, so they will not be able to and will not oppose the expansion of our spheres of influence. And no matter what Russia does, there will be no sanctions from the European Union.

The dependence of Europe on Russian energy resources seen by the Russian leadership was, of course, not absolute in nature – their import from Russia, without making up 100% of the structure of European energy consumption, can certainly be replaced by its import from other countries. However, there is still a relative dependence on Russia in Europe. The problem is that it is impossible to replace gas and oil from Russia with alternative sources quickly and without additional investments, since this requires a thorough reconfiguration and/or reconstruction of the existing transport (pipeline) infrastructure. Today's disputes in the European Union over sanctions under the "sixth energy package" and Hungary's specific position on this issue demonstrate this quite clearly – the consequences of Russian lobbying in the field of energy supplies to Europe are obvious today.

Since Russia supplied all energy carriers to Europe through its corporate structures, an interesting situation arose here. In fact, with the help of its corporations, Russia lobbied in every possible way for Europe's energy dependence, seeking to subordinate it to its geopolitical influence. At least, this statement has been true for the last 20 years, when

energy prices began to rise rapidly. Until that time, at the end of the last century, Russian corporate lobbying in the European Union did not differ fundamentally from similar lobbying activities of competitors, but in the third millennium the situation changed radically. Lobbying, instead of a way to defend Russia's corporate interests in the European Union, has turned into a way for Russia to wage a "hybrid" war against the West. The actual economic background of lobbying in Russian corporations has gone far into the background. In fact, they were increasingly waging a real war with Europe by economic methods – long before 2022, while making significant profits.

6.1. Germany: political and economic practices of Russian lobby

Germany has been building a special relationship with the Soviet Union/Russia since the late 1960s. The policy of Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, who came to power in 1969, was aimed at improving relations with the USSR, considering the de facto balance of power in Europe at the height of the Cold War. Willy Brandt believed that the former policy of non-recognition and confrontation was bringing more and more shortcomings to the Federal Republic of Germany. In particular, West Germany limited itself in foreign policy opportunities. Establishing ties with the Eastern Bloc led by the USSR was supposed to help achieve the following goals. First, the reality was that the Eastern Bloc was strong enough at that time, and the FRG needed to recognize the socialist countries and at least de facto recognize the GDR. Second, the previous policy did not bring closer the unification of Germany. Third, the German economy was growing rapidly and needed new markets. Fourth, Germany's European neighbors were already establishing economic ties with the Eastern Bloc, and Germany remained isolated. Fifth, the new Ostpolitik was supposed to bring the two Germanys closer together, tie the GDR closer and create an asymmetric dependency in the long term. This could bring unification closer. Sixth, closer economic ties could lead to political changes in the Eastern Bloc countries themselves, led by the USSR. These countries could gradually follow the example of their western neighbors. Thus, the FRG with economic incentives for the new Ostpolitik would bring the end of the Cold War closer. The new Ostpolitik of the FRG was also reflected in the later periods of German-Russian relations and, in a sense, at the present time²⁷.

²⁷ Филитов А.М. СССР и «Новая восточная политика» ФРГ. Вестник МГИМО-Университета. 2017. 3(54). С. 123-140. <https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/703/687> / Filitov A.M. SSSR i «Novaya vostochnaya politika» FRG Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta. 2017. 3(54). S. 123-140.

Currently, relations are characterized by the presence of common interests in the field of energy.

In the energy sector, there were the largest number of "points of contact" between Russian and German economic interests. Therefore, Germany was a supporter of the Nord Stream 2 project. It invested both in the construction of the gas pipeline and in the prospective income from the participation of its gas companies in this construction. At the same time, it provided itself with cheaper gas after the pipeline was put into operation. The economic logic was extremely simple: Germany wanted to get rid of the "extra costs" for payments to transit countries and thereby gain access to cheaper energy carriers. The return on investment was supposed to be fast. The undoubted benefits would be received by the German corporations "E.ON", "BASF", "Wintershall" and "Uniper".

The situation with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 in our time was very similar to the situation with the already existing Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod gas pipeline. By introducing a new gas pipeline, additional opportunities would arise for a more dynamic development of the German economy. Therefore, German business again actively lobbied for its energy interests, as in the days of the late USSR.

The construction of a new gas pipeline also gave political dividends to the then German Chancellor A. Merkel, although she had previously called it a "diabolical project of Moscow." However, the "pre-election fear" forced Merkel to change her previously negative opinion about Putin, although even then many of Germany's European partners were offended by how unceremoniously Berlin "openly promotes Vladimir Putin's business." In other words, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project was directly and unambiguously linked to the personal interest of the Russian President in its construction. But not just him. Significant political benefits were also seen in this project personally for the Federal Chancellor, who retained the influence of his party in the Bundestag. At the same time, Germany's neighbors accused A. Merkel "of unceremoniously pursuing their interests." However, the expected political dividends from the implementation of the "diabolical project" were so great that A. Merkel was ready to challenge the entire US foreign policy in the European direction, implementing the principles of the notorious "real policy".

<https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/703/687> / Filitov A.M. The USSR and FRG's "New Ostpolitik". MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2017. (3(54)) P. 123-140.
<https://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/703/687>

Of course, this deal with Moscow eliminated some political risks for A. Merkel – the Chancellor could not but know what a failure in the elections in a similar situation in the late 60s ended the objections of the CDU-CSU bloc against the construction of a gas pipeline from the USSR. At that time, German industrialists were very upset by the loss of contracts for several tens of millions of marks, especially since the subsequent coming to power of the Social Democrats immediately led to the signing of the necessary agreement with the USSR. This was the reason A. Merkel changed her stance on the construction of the new pipeline and the objections disappeared. However, they also disappeared, apparently, because Nord Stream 2, a joint venture of the Russian corporation Gazprom and the German companies BASF and Uniper, was supposed to be engaged in the construction of Nord Stream 2, and also, perhaps, because the ex-Chancellor of Germany, G. Schroeder, was the head of the board of Directors of Nord Stream 2. During the construction of the Nord Stream 2, as before, at the turn of the 1960s and 70s, Germany had little choice but to defend its interests. At the same time, after the completion of the construction of the new pipeline, 70% of Russian gas for the European Union would flow to Germany, bypassing the territory of Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states. This situation split Europe, but for Germany it provided serious economic advantages. And this was the most important thing for A. Merkel.

However, from a foreign policy point of view, when in the new conditions the aggressiveness of the Russian President on the world stage was increasing, it was difficult for the Federal Chancellor. The Crimea's incorporation into Russia and the war in Donbass, which took place while A. Merkel was Chancellor, did not contribute to increasing her authority. It was undoubtedly easier for the former German leadership with the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. Brezhnev. The domestic political dividends received thus led to foreign policy failures. However, the sanctions imposed by the United States after the Crimean case were quite mild – and although they created difficulties during the construction of the gas pipeline, they did not cause a significant deterioration of the situation for Germany.

The indignation of the leaders of the countries concerned did not play a special role either. Even then, the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, pointed out the serious danger of the new gas pipeline for the whole of Europe, not just for Ukraine. He described Nord Stream 2 as an instrument of Russia's "energy aggression" and warned that the purpose of the construction of this gas pipeline is to "destroy Europe." In an article for the German edition of *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, P. Poroshenko actually spoke even more sharply,

pointing to the President of Russia, V. Putin, personally: "The construction of Nord Stream 2 is a purely geopolitical project of the Kremlin, which has nothing to do with economic and private interests, but only seeks to undermine the unity of Europe in order, in the end, to destroy it. This has always been the ideology of the Kremlin's energy policy." Further, P. Poroshenko predicted the prospect of an "even tougher offensive" by Russia on European values. Summing up his concerns a little later, he pointed out: "Investments in Nord Stream 2 are an investment in the decomposition of Europe. Europe now has two choices: to support those who want to unite with Europe, or to build a completely unnecessary pipeline that will connect it with a country that openly despises it."²⁸

Developing the views of his boss, the then head of the Ukrainian Naftogaz, A. Kobolev appealed to US lawmakers to "immediately extend the anti-Russian sanctions to all companies directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project." At the same time, he pointed out the negative consequences of the commissioning of the gas pipeline: in case of completion of construction, Gazprom's ability to "abuse its dominant position in the European gas market" with all the ensuing consequences will expand.

The next President of Ukraine, V. Zelensky, also called the project unacceptable because it contains "a threat to the whole of Europe." The Parliament of Ukraine issued an appeal to all countries of the world urging them to prevent the construction of the gas pipeline: "The intention to implement Nord Stream 2, it said, will approve the absolute monopoly of the Russian Federation on the European gas market. In this case, Gazprom will gain control over the volume and price of the entire continental European gas market, as well as the physical ability to refuse gas supplies to Central European countries altogether."²⁹

Even if we assume that all the negative reviews about the project from Ukraine were not completely objective, as they were an attempt to save their income from pumping Russian gas, subsequent events confirmed the correctness of the concerns expressed. Of

²⁸ Порошенко назвал целью «Северного потока – 2» «уничтожение Европы». Ведомости, 2018.

<https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2018/05/20/770060-poroshenko-unichtozhenie-evropi> / Poroshenko nazval tsel'yu «Severnogo potoka – 2» «unichtozheniye Yevropy». Vedomosti, 2018.

<https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2018/05/20/770060-poroshenko-unichtozhenie-evropi> / Poroshenko called the goal of Nord Stream 2 "the destruction of Europe." Vedomosti, 2018.

<https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2018/05/20/770060-poroshenko-unichtozhenie-evropi>

²⁹ Nord Stream 2: How does the pipeline fit into the Ukraine-Russia crisis? BBC, 02.22.2022.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60131520>

course, Russian representatives assessed the role of Nord Stream 2 in a completely different way.

A. Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Board, pointed out that Nord Stream 2 would be the shortest way to connect Gazprom's new resource base (Yamal) and the main gas consumption center – the north-west of Europe. In addition, the new gas pipeline was also hailed as the most environmentally friendly version of the pipeline. Russian President Vladimir Putin went even further, directly criticizing potential American competitors who offered supplies of liquefied natural gas to Europe from the United States. He argued that Nord Stream 2 is beneficial for the economy of Europe in general and Germany in particular. Because the other option involved buying a more expensive primary energy carrier — American liquefied natural gas — "at a price 20% higher than our pipe gas — what does this mean? The decline in the competitiveness of the German economy and the increase in prices for households. This corresponds to the national interests of Europe and Germany."³⁰

Behind the Russian president's insincere and touching concern for the interests of "German households" and "the national interests of Europe and Germany", of course, his desire to remove Ukraine from the path of transporting Russian gas to Europe, i.e., to solve the political task of weakening Ukraine, was not visible, although he certainly had such a desire, as all subsequent events showed. But the position of the Europeans themselves is also important here, as they were only interested in profit from cheap energy in the near future, and did not expect an economic war against themselves. Moreover, it was assumed that all the conflict situations between Russia and Ukraine, in the early 2000s, which twice caused serious problems with gas supplies to Europe in the midst of winter and the heating season, were in the past. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has already been mentioned, promptly "changed the front" and stated: "We consider this project to be economic. We are in favor of diversification. The project does not pose a threat to the diversification of "energy supplies"³¹.

Nevertheless, during the construction of the Nord Stream 2, the emphasis on the diversification of energy suppliers was still made, as required by the European Union in its

³⁰ США пытаются перевести Европу на дорогой американский СПГ, заявил Путин. РИА Новости, 31.03.2022. <https://ria.ru/20220331/ssha-1781118682.html> / SSHA pytayutsya perevesti Yevropu na dorogoy amerikanskiy SPG, zayavil Putin. RIA Novosti, 31.03.2022. <https://ria.ru/20220331/ssha-1781118682.html> / The US is trying to switch Europe to expensive American LNG, Putin said. RIA Novosti, 03/31/2022. <https://ria.ru/20220331/ssha-1781118682.html>

³¹ Nord Stream 2 more opponents. Warsaw Institute, 2018. <https://warsawinstitute.org/nord-stream-2-opponents/>

Third Energy Package to ensure Europe's energy security. At the same time, A. Merkel's opinion was the most neutral in the general chorus of benevolent statements. But she at least mentioned the problem of European energy security, while other representatives of politics and business did not touch on it at all. Obviously, they were only interested in profit. Thus, the Minister of Economy and Energy of Germany, P. Altmaier, stated that Nord Stream 2 gas was "significantly cheaper" than American liquefied gas, which was quite fair. However, as if apologizing to the Americans, he noted that the Europeans, following the United States, also prioritize their own economic interests.

The opinion of the residents of Germany was evidence of complacency: 73% of German citizens in January 2019, according to the results of a sociological survey conducted by the Forsa Institute, were in favor of the construction of the Nord Stream 2. At the same time, 67% of Germans did not see any threat to their country's dependence on gas supplies from Russia, which was mentioned by US President D. Trump. Moreover, 90% of respondents in Germany were sure that the US president "just wants to sell American liquefied gas" to Germany, and is not at all concerned about Europe's energy security³².

Unfortunately, in 2022, the events in Ukraine more than demonstrated the extent of the delusion of European politicians and German philistines. Only the United States, during the construction of the Nord Stream 2, expressed corresponding concerns, which turned out to be by no means groundless. Therefore, back in early 2018, 39 US senators demanded that two relevant ministries – the US Treasury Department and the State Department – block the implementation of this project. The reason was clearly stated: if it is implemented, then "American allies and partners in Europe will be under even greater malicious influence from Moscow," and, in addition, Nord Stream 2 will undermine the economy of Ukraine and other Central European countries through whose territory gas transit is carried out.

At the same time, not wanting an obvious aggravation of relations with the EU countries, the US acted quite gently, only "reminding" the Europeans of the risks they face in the energy sector. And only on December 12, 2018, the House of Representatives of the US Congress adopted a resolution calling on the EU countries to abandon the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. The congressmen also spoke in favor of imposing sanctions against this project in accordance with the already mentioned CAATSA law.

³² Forsa: less and less confidence in the U.S. Forsa Institute, 2019.
<https://wintershalidea.com/en/newsroom/forsa-less-and-less-confidence-us>

With a serious interest in energy resources, German, as well as European companies in general, actively cooperated in the field of transportation and distribution of natural gas with Gazprom, while their interests spread much further. They paid attention to projects for the production of liquefied natural gas and its application in Europe. From this point of view, the cooperation of European business with the Russian company Novatek, owned by L. Mikhelson, is of interest for our research. It is also noteworthy that 23% of Novatek's shares belong to the "oligarch" G. Timchenko, who is close to V. Putin. This company is actively developing LNG projects, and it was already subject to sanctions by the United States, Canada and the European Union until 2022. Nevertheless, cooperation with Germany in the field of liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies was still being carried out, although European businesses had to take into account the sanctions and restrictions from the United States. As noted in the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* at the end of 2021³³, Novatek was the first Russian energy company that was ready to export hydrogen to Europe in industrial volumes in 2022, taking into account modern environmental requirements. The company plant on the Yamal Peninsula was built using advanced European technologies for gas liquefaction and processing and was supposed to pump up to 1.2 million tons of "blue" (eco-friendly) ammonia to Europe, from which a German company would process hydrogen in Germany. *Kommersant* explained that eco-friendly "blue" ammonia was used as a carrier of hydrogen, which made the process of transporting the latter safe, and the cost of obtaining the finished energy carrier was quite competitive. This deal was quite satisfactory to both sides, although the technology of pumping gas did not suit the "greens". They expressed their concerns about Novatek's production activity in the field of liquefied gas production even before the conclusion of the contract for the construction of a gas plant in Yamal on May 20, 2020 in messages to senior leaders of a number of European countries. In them, members of the European Parliament from the "Greens" called on France, Germany and Italy, in principle, to refuse any participation in Novatek's projects for the extraction and transportation of liquefied natural gas – as the process did not ensure the environmental safety of Europe during the transportation of liquefied gas.

Russian energy companies sought to put under their control more than just oil and gas supplies to Europe. Rosatom, shortly before the start of the Russian "special operation" in Ukraine, planned to purchase part of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in the German city

³³ НОВАТЭК поставит газ в Европу. Коммерсант, 22.12.2021. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5142548> / NOVATEK postavit gaz v Yevropu. Kommersant, 22.12.2021. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5142548> / NOVATEK will supply gas to Europe. Kommersant, 12/22/2021. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5142548>

of Lingen. The corresponding application was submitted to the Ministry of Energy of the Federal Republic of Germany, as it was important that Rosatom showed its intention to create a Russian-French company for the production of fuel for nuclear power plants in this Lower Saxon city.

The desire of Russia and its companies to gain maximum control over the European energy sector through energy supplies to Germany also made it possible to manage the European industrial potential. At the same time, Russia sought to start controlling the production cycles of advanced and strategically important materials, such as aluminum and alloys based on it. This metal is extremely important for automobile and aircraft construction, as well as for a number of other industries producing other high-tech products. Naturally, the Russian company Rusal, owned by Fr. Deripaska, showed interest in the German company for the production of aluminum products "Aluminum Rheinfelden". It seems that Rusal's desire to take control of this German company was not just a manifestation of interest in the German localization of production, but even more so a desire to "lend a helping hand" to an enterprise that found itself in a difficult economic situation. The "exits" of Aluminum Rheinfelden to the enterprises of the German automotive industry, its considerable experience in the field of innovations in the aluminum industry and the production of aluminum car parts, and finally, possession of more than seven dozen patents, allowed Rusal to become one of the largest suppliers of parts for the entire global automotive industry, i.e., to become a global player in this market. In addition, of course, the Russian company would gain control over the most important companies in the automotive industry in Germany and in Europe. A side effect of such a transaction was the possibility of transferring Aluminum Rheinfelden technologies to Russia – in this case, in addition to obtaining a more dynamic process of modernization of the Russian automotive industry, there would also be a relative decrease in the share of imports of aluminum parts from Europe and the opportunity to compete with it in the markets of third countries in the production of aluminum products for the automotive industry. Taking into account Rusal's desire to intensify development work and research and development in the production of products for the automotive industry, a very favorable situation would be obtained for Russia: it would not only strengthen its own "aluminum sector" of industry, but it would

also place the automotive industry of Germany and Europe under its control, as well as a number of other high-tech industrial sectors in this country³⁴.

Thus, lobbying of Russian corporations in Germany seems to be not so much a way of teaching some economic preferences, but rather a form of direct or indirect control over key sectors of the economy and strategic directions of industrial development by the state behind these companies. At the same time, the economic interests of private companies, of course, could and even should have been present so that it would not arouse suspicion in Germany and in Europe, but they did not become more and more important over time. Even in cases of questionable economic efficiency of individual commercial transactions, such transactions could be carried out if Russia's interest in them was seen from the point of view of the possibility of subsequent dominance over Europe.

From the point of view of the forms and methods of influence of Russian corporations on German businessmen and politicians, corporate lobbying in Germany seems to us quite simple in relation to Germany: there are no special efforts on the part of Russian business, Russian public organizations (such as the German-Russian Friendship Society), industry business associations, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russia. It was enough only to be informed by their interested parties about the possible receipt by German companies of very significant competitive advantages within the framework of the proposed cooperation in the field of energy supply and/or transportation of energy carriers, so that representatives of German business and even politicians showed the liveliest interest in them.

At the same time, both private businesses and German politicians were interested in business contacts with Russian companies. The reason for this was the provision of exceptional and very significant economic advantages for companies in Germany, which otherwise would not have received such advantages. This was followed by good opportunities for the development of what in Germany was called a "social market economy". At the same time, it cannot be argued that the growing dependence of Germany on energy supplies from Russia was not obvious in Germany itself, but the conditions for obtaining energy carriers were very favorable, on which the competitiveness of the German

³⁴ 2021: «Русал» купил Aluminium Rheinfelden. Tadviser, 2022.

https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F:Aluminium_Rheinfelden/ 2021: «Rusal» kupil Aluminium Rheinfelden. Tadviser, 2022.

https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F:Aluminium_Rheinfelden/ 2021: Rusal bought Aluminum Rheinfelden. Tadviser, 2022.

https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F:Aluminium_Rheinfelden/

economy was based to a large extent. It is worth mentioning that the ex-Chancellor of Germany, G. Schroeder, was a member of the Gazprom board of directors until the introduction of sanctions against Russia in 2022. He spoke in the sense that none of the German politicians and businessmen were against receiving relatively cheap energy from Russia, although the possible risks associated with this were always obvious to them earlier. The subtext of this statement is very simple: German society should not try to blame him alone for cooperation with Russia. It is obvious that Germany saw the ongoing military strengthening of Russia and the militarization of life in Russia with the growth of extreme right-wing sentiments in it under V. Putin since the middle of the "zero" years of the XXI century; but to assume that the country that defeated Hitlerism will recreate its analogue – this was obviously not suspected in Germany.

However, after the start of the "special operation" in Ukraine, a lot has changed in Germany with regard to Russia, although it is hardly possible to say that the potential of the Russian lobby has been completely reset. It should be understood here that the events that have occurred require a thoughtful analysis, since a systematic approach assumes the interdependence of the subject and object of sanctions policy.

6.2. Impact of the EU restrictive measures as a consequence of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in the example of Germany

As it was noted in the previous chapter, cooperation between Russia and Germany in the field of energy supply to Europe was actively developing and had every chance to successfully develop further. In 2020, Germany received almost a third (29.7%) of the oil it consumed from Russia, exceeding the level of imports in the European Union as a whole, which was 24.9%. Russian corporations lobbied for energy cooperation and German businesses and German politicians easily and actively "responded" to it, promoting Russian interests in Europe. The result was the intensive development of the technical components of the sphere of transportation of energy resources to Germany and Europe, as well as the effective development of economic projects in the energy field between Russian and German partners.

Everything changed quite dramatically and almost instantly with the beginning of the "special operation for the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine." At the same time, Russia, as a largely European country and as a fairly important trading partner, is important for Germany. To fully "exclude" Russia from the "world economic space", as some

politicians suggest and some political scientists predict, most likely will not work, and it is impractical. For the same reason, it is also of interest how Germany, along with other countries in Europe and the West as a whole, can guide it "on the right path." It should be noted here that lobbying, as it seems to us, is a process that can have not only different directions, but also different forms. The sanctions imposed by the European Union – and at the moment they are already preparing the seventh "package" and soon, despite Hungary's opposition, it is likely to be adopted – are a kind of negative or reverse lobbying directed at Russian corporate structures because they "slow down" its economy and they deprive it of prospects for strategic development. In any case, that is how they can be viewed. Let us look at it unconventionally.

Any of the six sanction "packages"³⁵ already imposed against the Russian Federation reduces Russia's ability to develop in one or even several sectors of the economy. It is possible to list specific restrictions from each package of measures, although there is no particular need for this – their consequences are already obvious: in the future, Russia will lag behind European countries more and more. At the same time, it is safe to say that sanctions will be imposed further, therefore, the economic prospects for the country will become more and more illusory. The effect that all these sanctions will have on the Russian economy can be assessed only after some time. Only one thing is obvious: that sanctions will not immediately slow down the economic development of the Russian Federation. In this sense, the sanctions tool can only work as a promising one – its use can under no circumstances have an instant effect, and an excessively strong use can even harm the very objective of the sanctions' impact.

However, the impact of sanctions on the fundamental possibilities of lobbying the interests of Russian corporations in the European Union is already quite easy to assess. In general, it should be borne in mind that any sanctions – regardless of which European state they are imposed by – change and replace the object of lobbying, its subject and the entity that carries out lobbying activities. At the same time, its character also changes. Accordingly, if the lobbying entity has the ability to adequately respond to all of the above components, it will be able to continue to effectively carry out its lobbying activities. If there is no such possibility, the importance of lobbying first decreases and it becomes less and less effective, then it is impossible and/or, finally, it completely loses its meaning.

³⁵ EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine (since 2014). Council of European Union, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>

Next, we will demonstrate that this is also quite visible in our situation – there is a direct, albeit time-limited, relationship between sanctions – as a form of negative lobbying by the West of its interests in Europe and Germany in particular - and the power of the economies of individual European countries. But at the same time, the same is true in the current situation and in relation to Russian companies – one should not think that their lobbying potential and opportunities in relation to European states and European companies and politicians disappeared immediately with the beginning of the sanctions period.

It is noteworthy that after the beginning of the "special operation" against Ukraine, on February 26, 2022, a number of persons directly related to the elites of Germany and Austria were nominated to the board of directors of Rosneft as independent directors. These are the former Federal Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder and the executive director of Nord Stream 2 (Nord Stream 2 AG) Matthias Warnig. The list of independent directors of Rosneft from Austria included the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first government of S. Kurz in Austria, Karin Kneissl, known for her personal acquaintance with Russian President Vladimir Putin. All these appointments allow us to assert that these high-ranking – in the recent past - persons were introduced into the composition of PJSC Rosneft for certain purposes. It is obvious that their lobbying potential, from the point of view of the Russian side, is far from being exhausted in their countries. However, on May 23, 2022, they had to leave Rosneft.

At the same time, the refusal to accredit Nord Stream 2 AG in Germany almost immediately after the start of the "special operation" became one of the first facts of a kind of "negative lobbying" by Germany and other Western countries (Europe and the USA and Canada, as well as other Anglo-Saxon countries), i.e., sanctions applied to Russian companies, and through them, to Russia itself. In total, six "packages" of sanctions have already been introduced at the moment, affecting both corporate structures of Russia and state and public figures of the country. At the same time, it is obvious that the sanctions pressure on Russia will not end either on the sixth or even on the seventh "package" of sanctions.

Nevertheless, from an economic point of view, sanctions cannot be perceived as an effective weapon against Russia. The six sanctions "packages" of the European Union and the total number of sanctions, taking into account the sanctions of other countries, exceeding in size all previously imposed sanctions against any of the countries of the world, showed that sanctions cannot give an immediate end to "special military operation". This is what some economists wrote about, in particular, Vladislav Inozemtsev from Russia,

who claimed that due to the "isolation" of the Russian economy, Russian President Vladimir Putin can conduct a "special military operation" for a long time, since neither the outflow nor even the cessation of the flow of foreign currency resources to Russia from abroad can affect the financing of the costs of conducting "special military operation". Even the complete refusal of the West to purchase energy carriers in Russia will not change the situation in this regard; only significant losses of manpower in Ukraine can force the termination of V. Putin's "special military operation".

As for the effect of "negative lobbying", the opinions of some analysts differ. For instance, V. Inozemtsev believes that the West as a whole will be able to adapt to the economic losses inevitable due to sanctions and will introduce them further as soon as individual European countries are ready for their consequences. In the first scenario, they would lead to an increased and very high inflation, while in the second – in the event of a complete rejection of the import of Russian hydrocarbons – Germany will experience double-digit inflation rates, and the German economy will collapse³⁶.

In addition, six packages of sanctions brought the sanctions pressure to the maximum. The head of the European Commission, J. Borel, was forced to admit this fact. At the same time, German Chancellor O. Scholz said that German sanctions from the sixth package against Russia will be accepted, even if the European Union refuses to do so. The decision of the Chancellor is of particular importance because of the severity of the sanctions pressure on Russia has cost his party to lose seats in the election, due to the deterioration of socio-economic indicators in Germany.

In general, it seems to us that with all the negative consequences of the refusal to import Russian oil and then gas, the "collapse" of the German economy will not and cannot happen – at least because these energy carriers will be replaced by alternative energy sources and gas and oil from other countries. The economic costs of sanctions against Russia in Germany, of course, will be significant. However, due to the power of its economy, they will be overcome relatively easily and quickly. Germany will, in principle, completely abandon the import of Russian oil and gas in the future. As for Russia's

³⁶ Россия не распадется. Владислав Иноземцев — о том, почему прогнозы о дезинтеграции РФ вряд ли сбудутся. Republic, 2022. <https://republic.ru/posts/103751> / Rossiya ne raspadetsya. Vladislav Inozemtsev — o tom, pochemu prognozy o dezintegratsii RF vryad li sbudutsya. Republic, 2022. <https://republic.ru/posts/103751> / Russia will not fall apart. Vladislav Inozemtsev - about why the forecasts about the disintegration of the Russian Federation are unlikely to come true. Republic, 2022. <https://republic.ru/posts/103751/>

economic losses, its energy exports will continue, albeit with serious discounts, but the recipients, of course, will change and energy flows will go in the eastern direction.

In the long term, Russia's losses from sanctions will become quite serious. Let us turn to the German sanctions against the Russian companies Gazprom and Novatek as an example. The first example in this case is of interest in the connection with the Nord Stream 2, which was actually closed by Germany immediately after the introduction of sanctions and Russia lost all expected preferences, incurring losses. Gazprom's attempt to enter the liquefied gas market is of interest – and here the situation is really difficult for Russia. Novatek is in a similar situation.

Let us recall that thanks to cooperation with European partners, the first stage of the liquefied natural gas plant on the Yamal Peninsula was 98% ready by the time of the start of Russia's "special operation", i.e., almost completely completed. The construction of the plant was carried out by Novatek. However, the 2% of the infrastructure that remained unfinished changed the situation qualitatively – in technical terms, they were the most important elements of the gas liquefaction production cycle. Russia is currently unable to independently produce either cryogenic plants, or hydrocarbon separation plants for the production of LNG, or gas transfer pumps, which eventually accounted for this 2%, so contracts for their supply were concluded with European enterprises and had to be fulfilled by the time the construction of all other necessary infrastructure were completed. Obviously, all this equipment would have been delivered to Yamal on time if it were not for the sanctions imposed by Europe – but it is the sanctions that do not allow this to be done. At the same time, Russia does not have the ability to quickly replace these elements of equipment with products from other manufacturers. The reason is trivial: such devices are produced by a very limited number of machine-building enterprises in Germany and in Europe, and they are all known throughout the world; none of them will agree to a violation of the sanctions' regime. Russia's own technical and technological level of development also does not allow the production of such equipment. Consequently, the almost finished plant cannot function either now or in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the relevant Novatek projects have been left hanging – and Novatek is not alone. Gazprom's similar Arctic-LNG project also has no chance of being implemented in the near future for the same reasons. As a result, today Russia does not have the ability to produce liquefied natural gas and, accordingly, its plans to become one of the world's largest producers of this product can be shelved. Thus, the technological lag in the presence of huge reserves of energy carriers will not allow the "great energy power" to sell them for currency, the

receipts of which Russia still needs and the deficit of which will soon begin to be felt more and more clearly. At the same time, it is impossible to correct the situation without lifting sanctions promptly, and the chances of this are almost zero. Further, as we approach the so-called "green transition", i.e., to gradually minimize the consumption of oil and gas, Russian energy carriers will not be particularly needed because of the high cost of their production, and, accordingly, their price uncompetitiveness. There is another scenario – the demand for oil and gas will, in principle, become so small that even selling them at sufficiently high prices will not be able to ensure the inflow of currency into a country that has lost modern technologies in the amount required for its development.

At the same time, sanctions are imposed in almost all sectors of the economy in which cooperation with Russia was carried out. The nature of such sanctions can be different – they are personal, against individual owners of companies, and "production" sanctions (for example, a ban on the supply of uranium from Russia, etc.), but their negative effect is the same. All of them deprive the country of the opportunity to develop.

In general, sanctions on the supply of dual-use goods and high-tech products to Russia will most likely not be lifted at all. As US Defense Minister L. A. Austin quite frankly stated, this is done so that Russia in the future will never be capable of aggressive actions similar to those it carried out in Ukraine. Such sanctions will be implemented against Russia by all Western countries, including Germany.

Such are the prospects for "negative lobbying" in the form of Western sanctions restrictions against Russia in terms of the impact of its consequences on the latter. As for the "traditional" lobbying of Russian companies in today's conditions, it will continue, but its capabilities are sharply reduced, despite attempts to involve characters like G. Schroeder and similar high-ranking persons in the past in this process.

6.3. Austria: political and economic practices of Russian lobby

Having traditionally close ties with Germany, the Republic of Austria in modern conditions quite often takes positions similar to Germany on many economic issues. This is facilitated by almost the same level of their technical and economic development. This is most evident in the sphere of energy imports and subsequent production of chemical products, where the positions of the Austrian petrochemical industry are very strong. It is not surprising that, due to similar conditions, Austria is to some extent a "copy" of Germany in terms of its interests in the field of energy supplies to the country from Russia.

Just like Germany, dependent on gas supplies from abroad, Austria, represented by its leadership, acted as a lobbyist in the Nord Stream 2 project, which we have already considered in relation to Germany, from which a section of the gas pipeline to the gas hub in Baumgarten was extended to Austria. Even at the stage of preparation for the approval of this project, and then during the construction of the gas pipeline, this support was provided by a distinctly pro-Russian coalition formed after the 2017 elections from the People's Party and the far-right Freedom Party. Both of these parties were quite loyal to Russian politics in general, and the future Chancellor of Austria and at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, together with the then Chancellor of Austria K. Kern and together with his German counterpart Z. Gabriel, sent a rather sharp letter to the American Congress. In fact, it contained accusations of lobbying the United States for its economic interests in the supply of liquefied natural gas to Europe and denied the accusations made by American politicians of Russia creating threats to its energy security for Europe, for which sanctions were imposed. Of course, behind this demarche was the desire to strengthen the position of the Austrian chemical industry as a whole and, first of all, OMV. Technically, it was possible to do this: by building a branch from the Nord Stream 2, Austria received the best opportunities for the distribution of gas flows both within the country and in a number of neighboring states. These included Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which did not have direct access to the Nord Stream 2. In this case, Austria also received additional financial preferences as a gas transit country.

In addition, Austria, by participating in the construction of the gas pipeline, thereby improved relations with Russia, whose leadership, represented by President V. Putin, was close in its political views to the leaders of the Austrian government coalition – but all this, of course, before the start of the "special operation".

Prior to the events under consideration, due to the high level of development of the Austrian chemical industry and fairly close ties with Russia, cooperation in the field of oil refining was very effective, since a significant number of products of the Austrian chemical industry were exported to Russia. The capacity of the Russian market of Austrian industrial and household products based on various polymers was significant; in fact, the final operation for the production of a whole range of products based on the petrochemical cycle was carried out in Austria. Taking into account the constant improvement of the product range and the development of new, including qualitatively new products, polymer production volumes tended to continuously increase. Therefore, the prospects for cooperation between Austrian and Russian corporations within the framework of

cooperation between Gazprom and the Austrian company OMV looked promising: it is significant that the existing contract for the supply of natural gas from Russia, which ended in 2028, was extended ahead of schedule. It was assumed that this agreement would be valid until 2040. At the same time, OMV, along with Akfel, Kibar and Bosphorus, became the owners of the longest contract with Gazprom. The head of OMV, R. Zele, noted that by "2030, the European Union will need to import natural gas in excess of 80% of total demand. The expansion of this gas supply agreement allows us to provide Austria and other European countries with natural gas, despite the growing demand."³⁷ OMV was one of Gazprom's partners in the Nord Stream 2 project. According to the agreement between the parties, the volume of gas supplied per year was 6.9 billion cubic meters. In practice, however, significantly more gas was supplied to Austria – more than 9.1 billion cubic meters of natural gas, which indicates the possible significant prospects for such cooperation.

The cooperation of Russian companies with OMV in the production of various products in the field of high technologies was quite large-scale - this Austrian company is also very highly developed in the field of scientific and technological developments. The strategy of its development assumes the transition in the production of various types of products to a new, higher level of environmental safety and minimization of energy costs for their production. In essence, it is supposed to create a qualitatively new technological basis for a wide range of goods produced up to today. A number of other Austrian companies working in the field of mechanical engineering, machine tool construction, automotive industry, transport, energy and equipment for public utilities and environmental protection have similar goals. That is why Russia has shown considerable interest in the activities of Austrian enterprises from various fields – in particular, meetings of the Russian-Austrian Business Council (RABS) were held regularly, which was attended by representatives of up to 200 companies from Russia and Austria. At the last meetings, the question was raised about the involvement of Austrian firms in the implementation of projects of a comprehensive plan for the modernization and expansion of the backbone infrastructure of the Russian Federation until 2024, as well as projects for the implementation of industrial digitalization. As cooperation projects between Russia and Austria were developing dynamically, lobbying interest in the activities of a number of

³⁷ OMV und Gazprom vereinbaren Erdgaslieferungen bis 2040. Salzburger Nachrichten, 2022.
<https://www.sn.at/wirtschaft/oesterreich/omv-und-gazprom-vereinbaren-erdgaslieferungen-bis-2040-28832263>

chemical, electronic, fiber-optic and other industries was clearly manifested among Russian organizations. The Trade Representation of Russia in Austria, whose business mission was primarily to find potential partners from both sides, demonstrated a special interest in attracting cooperation with Russian companies.

The Joint Russian-Austrian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation also played a significant role in the development of economic relations between the two countries. The role of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was somewhat smaller in Austria.

As a result of the activities of Russian lobbying organizations, the implementation of 5-7 investment projects of Austria in Russia began annually. Unfortunately, today all these activities have been curtailed, and the prospects for innovative and technological development in Russia due to the use of new Austrian technologies have significantly decreased.

6.4. Impact of the EU restrictive measures as a consequence of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in the example of Austria

Everything that was positive in the cooperation between Austrian and Russian companies changed after February 24, 2022. Austria, as a member of the European Union, joined large-scale sanctions against Russia. There will certainly be economic costs for Austria, but the negative effect of sanctions on Russia will be more significant. The reason for this is quite simple: Austria received raw materials and energy carriers from Russia, i.e., raw materials products came in, while high-tech products went in the opposite direction – cars, quantum computers, chemical products, industrial electronics and electrical engineering, as well as technologies based on which joint ventures or independent productions were created in Russia as branches of the respective companies.

As part of the first six packages of EU sanctions, Austria joined all sanctions aimed at minimizing cooperation with Russia. It is also obvious that the same thing will happen with the next packages of sanctions that are currently being planned (at least the seventh) – Austria will follow the EU policy. It should also be noted that Austria complied with the EU sanctions imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of events in the Donbass region in 2014. However, unlike Germany, Austria, with the general uniformity of the situation with sanctions restrictions against Russia, acts less dynamically and less radically than, for example, the United States and Great Britain. The problem lies

in a lower level of readiness for the consequences of sanctions than Germany, although it is not as active in sanctions restrictions as, for example, the Anglo-Saxons, which is a consequence of the Austria's lack of access to the seas. Therefore, technologically, in such a situation, it is more difficult for Austria to prepare the country for receiving liquefied gas if natural gas is rejected from Russia, as well as after the embargo on oil imports from Russia is imposed, which is assumed under the sixth package of sanctions. That is why it cannot afford to abruptly cut off economic ties with Russia. At the same time, it cannot be said that Austria and its leadership do not show solidarity with the European Union on the issue of anti-Russian sanctions due to Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine. Moreover, the Austrian leadership cannot be suspected of sabotaging these decisions. As noted by the previously quoted K. Kneissl, the understanding of the need to be independent from gas suppliers (in principle, including Russia and Gazprom) in Austria "has always been there," but "it is impossible to do it in a few months." It is impossible precisely because of the complexity of the infrastructure for transporting energy carriers via alternative routes and the duration of the production cycle for the construction of facilities and technical devices for receiving oil and liquefied gas. If we add to this that gas prices in Europe surged from April 2021 to the beginning of 2022 by 400%, the sanctions pressure on Russia should be carried out more than carefully. It is for this reason that, from the point of view of the Austrian Foreign Minister, the previous US and EU sanctions against Russia "deliberately did not concern oil and gas." Unfortunately, as part of the sixth package of sanctions, Russian energy carriers are expected to fall under sanctions in Austria. This applies not only to oil and natural gas, but also to Russian-made liquefied natural gas and coal from Russia, even as part of their supplies from third countries. The embargo on coal supplies has been imposed since August 2022. A ban is being imposed on the import of Russian-made mineral fertilizers and timber from Russia to Austria at any stage of processing. It will not be possible to replace these products with products from other manufacturers promptly, and the shortage of mineral fertilizers on the world market will not allow this to be done in principle. However, for Austria, with its minimal share of the agricultural sector in the structure of the national economy, the damage will be minimal.

Of course, all the above restrictions will work against Austria, causing some damage to its economy by raising prices for finished industrial products and through an increase in inflation. However, Russia will still be more affected by sanctions. Everything related to high-tech products and their supplies to Russia from Austria, as well as technologies for the production of such products, is already being implemented in practice. As part of the

strategy of minimizing trade and economic relations with Russia and focusing on restrictions on the supply of high-tech products, the fifth package of sanctions prohibits the supply (including those already paid for) of all dual-use goods. Starting from April 5, 2022, high-tech semiconductor elements are not supplied, including those from Austria, and the sixth package of sanctions includes a ban on the supply of quantum computers manufactured in Austria by the company AQT. It is impossible to import into Russia from Austria, as well as from the Austrian branches of the German company XeedQ, software for the use of quantum computers, printed circuit boards for organic light-emitting diodes OLED and other similar products. A branch of the German company Infineon, which produces high-tech semiconductors, located in Austria, can also no longer supply its products to Russia.

In the previous paragraph, we pointed out the established and expanding cooperation of Russian companies with the Austrian company OMV, which had a clear interest in cooperation with many Russian enterprises. We regret to note that Russia is excluded from the priority areas of activity for the company. This means that all the innovative developments of the Austrian company are also becoming inaccessible to Russia and its companies, which also will not contribute to innovation in those areas where OMV's positions were very strong. Consequently, a wide range of innovative products of various industrial and household purposes has become unavailable in Russia.

Against the background of these restrictions, all the others turn out to be "trifles" – Austrian enterprises and organizations will no longer provide consulting assistance in Russia.

The final prospects for lobbying Russian corporations in Austria in current conditions, as well as the effect of "negative lobbying" in the form of sanctions against Russia by Austria, will be identical to the German version.

6.5. Italy: political and economic practices of Russian lobby

If the previous states we considered were among the most industrially developed countries in the EU, then Italy can be classified as such with certain assumptions. This leaves its mark on the lobbying by Russia and its companies of interests in Italy. Two circumstances are important to take into account here – firstly, Italy looks very uneven from the point of view of industrial development, which reflects the process of its development before unification - there is a highly developed industrial North of the country and a still

underdeveloped agrarian South. Of course, Italy's entry into the European Union presupposed the provision of financial assistance to "equalize" the levels of development of different regions, but it is still impossible to eliminate such differences quickly. In this circumstance lies a good opportunity for Russian companies to lobby their interests by investing in individual projects for which the Italian government and the European Union had insufficient resources. In all other respects, the Italian Republic and its economy represent a typical state of Southern Europe with traditional problems for it and its economy, with one of the most serious being the lack of investment capital. As a result, the economic crisis of 2008 had a stronger negative impact on the country than on any of the Central European states, which, taking into account the influx of African refugees to Europe, complicated the already difficult situation in the country's economy.

If we consider the period up to February 24, 2022, it can be stated that there were quite good trade and economic relations between Russia and Italy. They were, among other things, a kind of projection of the good personal relations of the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin and the then Prime Minister of Italy S. Berlusconi, based on some similarity of the political regimes of the two countries. M. Salvini's opposition League party was also loyal to the Russian Federation. M. Draghi, who became Prime Minister of Italy after that, also treats Russia well and stimulated business to cooperate with it.

Effective trade and economic ties led to quite fruitful cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Italian Republic in various sectors of the economy. As for Italy, the role of the energy sector in its economy was less significant than in Germany and in Austria. The oil and gas company Eni has seen Russia as one of the areas of its activities, conducting offshore drilling in the Black and Barents Seas. At the same time, a significant share of the products of the light, textile, and food industries, as well as Italian agriculture, were exported to Russia. Italian businesses actively invested in Russia – the volume of such investments in Russian assets amounted to more than 800 million euros. Prior to the start of the "special operation", the Italian Republic maintained a dialogue with the Russian Federation on a wide range of issues of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The spheres of activity of Italian companies in the Russian market were electric power, agro-industrial complex, steel, aviation, space industry, helicopter construction, high technology, transport and energy infrastructure, oil production and oil refining, and production of modern industrial equipment. In the regions of Russia, Italy also took part in some innovative projects. For example, in the Republic of Tatarstan, it was the Innopolis center. The Italian businesses in Russia were represented by the

following companies: Enel (electric and thermal power engineering), Eni (oil and gas sector), Menarini (pharmaceutical production), Cremonini (meat production), Danieli (metallurgical equipment production), Codest (construction of buildings and structures, construction of high-tech facilities).

Cooperation with Italy in terms of stimulating the interest of Italian businessmen was conducted by Russia through the implementation of joint projects with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). This fund actively involved the Italian Strategic Fund (FSI) in cooperation, then directing cooperation between them into a joint investment fund, which turned out to be very effective for various economic projects in the field of energy conversion, transportation of energy carriers and improving the energy efficiency of production processes. The main factor of cooperation was the possibility of obtaining state financial guarantees for successful economic activity. The most significant investment project of the Russian Federation in Italy with a budget of more than 100 million euros, which was implemented by RUSAL, was the modernization of the aluminum production enterprise "EurAllumina", located in Portskuso in Sardinia.

The Russian-Italian Council for Economic, Industrial, Monetary and Financial Cooperation played an important role in the search for new areas of cooperation, including in the conditions of economic sanctions imposed by the European Union until 2022. Within the framework of the Council's functioning, a regular Russian-Italian business forum was held. It was attended by up to 150 representatives of Russian and Italian businesses, development institutions and government organizations. The participants were most interested in urbanism and high-tech issues.

To strengthen the dialogue between entrepreneurs of both countries, the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was active, organizing various exhibitions with the participation of Italian and Russian entrepreneurs and various enterprises and organizations at the international level.

In general, Russian companies have achieved good results in cooperation with Italian business, actively promoting their interests in Italy. This development was true until February 24, 2022.

6.6. Impact of the EU restrictive measures as a consequence of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in the example of Italy

After the start of the "special operation", the situation in all sectors of cooperation between Russia and Italy deteriorated sharply; trade and economic ties were curtailed and at present there are no prospects for their significant improvement at least until the lifting of sanctions from Russia by the European Union. Italy follows all these sanctions and will obviously continue to be guided by them in the future. Such a conclusion can be made even without analyzing the current situation from the point of view of today's relations between Russia and Ukraine. The reason for this lies in the immutability of the EU's positions towards Russia after the annexation of Crimea, when sanctions were first imposed against the Russian Federation. Therefore, as noted in the Report of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs "Russian-Italian relations: yesterday, today, tomorrow", made back in 2019, the obvious should be recognized: Italy will not violate the principles of solidarity of the European Union. This means that it will follow the sanctions imposed on Russia, and relations between our two countries, even in the best case, cannot exceed a level higher than the "best among the worst". However, the question of the reason for Italy's negative attitude towards Russia after the start of the "special operation" still arises. After all, before that, even when Crimea was annexed, and then the war in the Donbass began, Italy reacted to these events much milder manner.

Indeed, after the Crimean events, many Italian politicians sought to maintain the best possible relations with Russia. The report already mentioned states that within the framework of Euro-Atlantic solidarity, and the government under the leadership of Matteo Renzi in the fall of 2016 tried in every possible way to prevent the introduction of even tougher sanctions. Neither the Syrian nor the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 destroyed Italy's good attitude towards Russia – the Italian Foreign Minister in 2017, when the country presided over the "Big Seven", even offered to return Russia to the "eight". We should take into consideration that Russia was "asked" to leave this format after the annexation of the Crimea.

Additionally, it was not only Prime Minister M. Renzi, and before that, S. Berlusconi – a "great friend" of V. Putin – but also lower-level politicians on the ground (in the regions of Veneto, Liguria, Lombardy) who advocated the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions by the European Union and even recognition of Crimea as Russian. Later, Deputy Prime Minister M. Salvini (the League party) generally described the EU sanctions against Russia over Crimea as "social, cultural and economic absurdity." In other words, the attitude towards Russia in the Italian establishment was more than benevolent. However, the "special operation" has radically changed it due to the scale of the Russian influence on Ukraine.

There is no need to find out the reasons for the negative turn that occurred in the minds of Italian politicians after February 24, 2022 – they are more than obvious. However, it is necessary to find out the reasons for the "warm" attitude towards Russia until this moment. Without doubting the pragmatism of Italian politicians, we can assume that Russia lobbied its interests so effectively that the Italians were quite satisfied. And the relations between the two countries remained a partnership and quite friendly.

Let's start with the energy sector. Italy is a country for which the role of the energy sector in its economy is still less significant than in Germany and Austria. This country is neither an oil nor gas hub – neither for Europe nor for a group of European countries. It receives gas only for domestic use. At the same time, Eni is drilling wells and producing natural gas in 69 countries around the world. At one time the company cooperated with Russia, developing deposits in the Barents and Black Seas – however, it did not conduct particularly active activities there. Eni also receives hydrocarbons from Russia. Today, Eni finds itself in a difficult situation – EU sanctions prohibit the payment of energy imported from Russia in any currency other than the euro, and President Putin demands that it be made exclusively in Russian currency. There is a dilemma – either to refuse to import the gas Italy needs, or to violate the sanctions regime. At the same time, explanations about specific actions in this situation on the part of the European Union were not given. The company's reaction was extremely simple, however, as well as a number of other importers who found themselves in a similar situation – it was decided to transfer payments for gas in euro currency to an account in the Russian Gazprombank, and already he was transferring euros converted into rubles to Gazprom's account. At the same time, the moment of payment is considered to be the deposit of the amount in euros to the account, and the company is not interested in the time of conversion into Russian currency. Such a palliative measure is, of course, a compromise, but it allows both the EU sanctions to be met and the requirements of Russian President Vladimir Putin on payments to be fulfilled. It is obvious that such a compromise model of payment for Russian natural gas, in principle, suits all parties. At the same time, however, we should not forget that Italy, along with other EU countries, is striving to completely abandon the import of Russian energy carriers in the near future.

Italy, having joined the European sanctions packages imposed against Russia after February 24, 2022, could not do otherwise. It was not stopped even by the fact that a significant share of its light, textile, food industry and agriculture products were exported to Russia. Nevertheless, in Italy, Russian assets worth about 800 million euros were frozen,

which significantly affected interstate relations. But that's not all. Italian entrepreneurs have actively invested in the Russian economy before – now they are all determined to withdraw their funds from it, which was extremely unfavorably perceived in our country against the background of previously traditionally good relations with Italy.

The Italian Republic maintained a steady dialogue with the Russian Federation on a wide range of issues of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, then on February 24, 2022, this dialogue ended. The activities of the Council and the business forum have been discontinued. It is not yet known whether it will be resumed and when.

To strengthen the dialogue between entrepreneurs of both countries, the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has previously been active. It organized various exhibitions and presentations with the participation of Italian and Russian entrepreneurs, and also introduced the activities of joint Italian-Russian enterprises and organizations at the international level. Now Italian entrepreneurs do not want to have any contacts with the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

These are the consequences of the introduction of EU sanctions against Russia by a country that was friendly enough to it earlier. It should be noted that Italy "without enthusiasm" obeyed the EU sanctions requirements against Russia, but, nevertheless, strictly complies with them and will not try to circumvent them in any way in the future. This is due, on the one hand, to the relative weakness of the Italian economy against the background of the leading European countries, as a result of which the negative effect of sanctions is more sensitive for Italy in comparison. On the other hand, Italy's sanctions against Russia in the field of high technologies will not allow Russian enterprises to develop to the extent they expected when starting cooperation with Italian partners. Negative lobbying from Italy will have its effect.

6.7. Hungary: political and economic practices of Russian lobby

Today, the Republic of Hungary is one of the most economically weak states of the European Union. This country has neither a powerful production potential nor a rich resource base. Nevertheless, Hungary is developing successfully – as successfully as possible in modern conditions for this state. The Hungarian government, under the leadership of V. Orban from the Hungarian Civil Union, is doing everything to minimize costs and get maximum income. In solving this task of optimizing the economic parameters of the state, the emphasis is placed on effective cooperation with Russia, which has become

a source of investments, a supplier of hydrocarbons for Hungary and a major consumer of many types of products of Hungarian industry and agriculture.

At the same time, Russia shows considerable interest in Hungary, directly and indirectly investing in this country. However, Russian investments are not only, and perhaps not so much, of an economic nature. In fact, through investments in Hungary, Russia lobbies its interests in the European Union, and quite effectively. As an EU member state, Hungary can block EU decisions, which is extremely important for Russia, especially in the current situation - after February 24, 2022.

Hungary and Russia are characterized by a certain commonality of interests in the economy and a significant commonality in approaches to the socio-political situation in the world. The right-wing populist political regimes in Russia and Hungary also give their leaders a good basis for mutual understanding so far – between V. Orban and V. Putin, they both have found a good common language in solving many problems of common interest for both countries. At the same time, V. Orban, representing Hungary in the European Union, is for Russia a kind of "our man" and a Russian "foreign agent" in the European Union, despite the fact that formally Hungary fulfills all the requirements for EU membership. However, Hungary blocking the sixth package of sanctions against Russia and the requesting the European Union compensate Hungary for the costs of the negative sanctions effect to the amount of 17 billion US dollars cause undoubted irritation among a number of EU members who support sanctions against Russia.

Russia and Hungary have the greatest interest in three priority areas of trade and economic cooperation for them: these are nuclear power, energy supplies and pharmaceuticals, a sector which plays a very important role in light of today's fight against the ongoing coronavirus epidemic. In the future, Hungary plans to fully provide itself with vaccines against this disease in this regard.

Currently, a major energy project is being implemented in Hungary – with the help of Russia, two new power units of the Paks nuclear power plant are being built.

Russia also supplies Hungary with 55% of the oil it needs and 80% of natural gas. At the same time, the price of natural gas for Hungary is five times lower than for all other consumers in Europe. Gazprom has two long-term contracts for the supply of natural gas from Russia to Hungary until 2036. It is obvious that such favorable conditions for natural gas supplies from Russia are a consequence of President Vladimir Putin's special disposition towards the Hungarian Prime Minister, since it is impossible to explain this state of affairs by any other reasons.

In the pharmaceutical industry, Russia and Hungary cooperate in the joint production of the COVID-19 coronavirus vaccine – first, more than two million doses of this Russian-made vaccine were delivered to Hungary from Russia, then the Sputnik vaccine was registered in Hungary in the Sputnik Lite version. Later, the issue of technology transfer and the start of production of this vaccine directly in Hungary began to be worked out. At the same time, Hungary became the first country in the European Union to approve the use of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine and then wanted to establish its production on its territory. As a matter of fact, there are no other candidates for the role of a foreign manufacturer of Sputnik in Europe yet. At the same time, Russia is very supportive of Hungary's desire to produce the vaccine and is ready to assist it in every possible way in establishing production on Hungarian territory. A practical example of this is the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). It is that which plays a significant role in the beginning of vaccine production, as well as providing state guarantees for financing this business project. Thus, the best possible conditions have been created for Hungary.

The Hungarian-Russian Economic Business Forum is regularly held in order to promptly solve problems arising in the course of interstate cooperation and within the framework of the development of cooperation between Hungary and Russia. Organizational control over this event is carried out by the Ministry of External Economic Relations and Foreign Affairs of Hungary. On the Russian side, this event is supervised by the Russian Embassy in Hungary and the Trade Mission of the Russian Federation in this country. The results of the Forum are summed up regularly – and this form of interstate contacts seems to be the most effective in today's conditions. As a result of the Forum, cooperation agreements are concluded, contracts are concluded, personal and business ties are established between participants from both sides. The Forum demonstrates a rather striking situation: despite the current sanctions and belonging to economic associations of different nature, Hungarian and Russian business representatives are ready and able to find new directions for trade and economic cooperation at regional and national levels.

Other platforms for promoting mutual interests include the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which holds various events with the participation of business representatives from both sides.

6.8. Impact of the EU restrictive measures as a consequence of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine on the example of Hungary

Taking into account the situations discussed above in relation to Germany, Austria and Italy with the reaction from the point of view of lobbying the interests of Russian corporations after February 24, 2022, there is no need to analyze Hungary's position in detail. But there are still specifics in the behavior of this country. The fundamental difference between Hungary and all other EU countries in terms of sanctions pressure on Russia is Hungary's permanent and current refusal to impose "tough" sanctions against Russia. Hungary stubbornly strives to "withdraw" Russia from the most severe European sanctions pressure. Both Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Foreign Minister P. Szijjarto persistently claim that sanctions cause more harm to the European Union than to Russia, and therefore it is better not to apply the toughest sanctions. A clear example of this approach was the blocking of the sixth package of anti-Russian sanctions of the European Union - of course, on the initiative of Hungary. And although European Commissioner P. Gentiloni is quite optimistic about overcoming Hungary's veto, there are reasons to believe that this veto is not the last one on her part, and in general Hungary's position will not fundamentally change. It is obvious, however, that by actually opposing the position of the European Union, Hungary is not doing this for any principled reasons stemming from friendship with Russia. The reason here lies solely in considerations of protecting its economy, therefore Hungary wants to receive "energy compensation" from the European Union in the amount of approximately 17 billion euros. However, even in this case, Hungary may try to find some kind of "loophole" in the decision-making procedure in the EU. Despite the measures to refuse imports of Russian oil, an exception is made for Hungary, since it belongs to "those EU member states that, due to their geographic situation, suffer from a specific dependence on Russian supplies and have no viable alternative options"³⁸. Hungary is quite carefully maneuvering between the interests of the European Union and Russia, finding for itself the most effective option to minimize the harmful economic consequences of sanctions pressure. This has been happening for quite a long time, since Russia's annexation of Crimea. This position allows it to receive undoubted economic advantages, which is extremely important for a country that, in principle, cannot pay for energy at a higher price, as many EU countries are already doing now. The consequence of such a policy is, however, suspicion on the part of a number of

³⁸ Russia's aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts sixth package of sanctions. Press Release. Council of Europe, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions/pdf>

EU countries of V. Orban's opportunism, which, however, is still quite tolerable by some other EU countries.

Let's summarize. The Hungarian position regarding the corporate lobby on the part of Russia can be summarized as follows: the obvious lobbying of Russia's interests in this country is quite favorably accepted despite the difficulties in relations between the USSR and Hungary in the past and pressure from the European Union in the present. The reason lies in Russia's large-scale investments in the Hungarian economy, the rejection of which can have an extremely unfavorable impact on the economic development indicators of this country.

"Negative lobbying" against Russia is presented here in the mildest version among all EU countries, since Hungary does not belong to the leading and most powerful of its participants. At the same time, Hungary cannot fundamentally change the situation with sanctions, since it is forced to comply with general requirements, but its actions can somewhat mitigate and slow down the imposition of sanctions against Russia. Hungary itself, due to its "opportunistic" position, was able to obtain more favorable conditions from the European Union when joining the pan-European sanctions, thereby minimizing the negative effect of the sanctions imposed. At the same time, it has maintained the warmest relations with Russia, which allows it to purchase Russian energy carriers at minimal prices, thereby creating the most comfortable conditions for its economy.

The overall negative effect for Russia from the sanctions imposed by Hungary in Russia is negligible, since the sanctions do not depend on the position of this country – unless it vetoes the decision of the entire European Union.

7. Summary

1. Lobbying is represented in all EU countries. At the same time, corporate lobbying has turned into an independent branch of government.

2. Russia, which has its own economic and political interests in all EU countries, is one of the largest lobbyists, but the purpose of its lobbying structures differs from that of the corporate structures of the EU countries themselves.

3. Lobbying of their interests by individual EU countries increases their political significance for Russia along with the economic effect they undoubtedly achieve.

4. Russia's interest in lobbying its interests in the European Union, carried out through the involvement of its corporate structures for this, pursues not so much economic

as political goals – and primarily the economic and political weakening of Western European countries. During the twenty-first century, this trend is only increasing.

5. Russia's lobbying of its interests is carried out by methods that do not formally violate the legislation of the European Union, but objectively have a negative impact on the countries included in it.

6. All legal means and instruments can be used as lobbyists of Russian interests in the European Union – politicians and formally independent public organizations that are actually affiliated with the Russian government and realize its interests, thus posing a threat to the economic and political security of the European Union.

8. Conclusion and policy recommendations

The study of the problems of Russian corporate lobbying within the framework of this study revealed the specifics of lobbying activities of Russian corporations in the EU countries. It is established that Russian corporate lobbying during the twenty-first century has increasingly evolved into an instrument of economic warfare and geopolitical subordination of European countries to Russian influence. At the same time, Russian corporations and the Russian state controlling them received significant profits, in turn negatively affecting the economies of European countries.

9. Practical significance of the study

The results of the research can be used in the practical activities of higher education teachers, as well as in expert and scientific analytical work. Also, the results of the study can be used in the development of special legislation regulating lobbying in public authorities. This will prevent the growth of the influence of Russian corporate structures in the European Union and the negative impact they have on its member states.

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
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https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F:Aluminium_Rheinfelden

11. Appendix

11.1 EU Gaz Infrastructure, 2017³⁹

³⁹ Gas imports: new rules for pipelines from non-EU countries. European Parliament official 2019.
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/economy/20190328STO33742/gas-imports-new-rules-for-pipelines-from-non-eu-countries>




11.2 Main Russia-EU Gaz Pipelines⁴⁰

⁴⁰ The quest for natural gas pipelines. European Parliament official site, 2016.
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/586626/EPRS_STU\(2016\)586626_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/586626/EPRS_STU(2016)586626_EN.pdf)




11.3. Natural gas supplies via Gazprom Export to the countries of Europe and Turkey in 2020, bcm ⁴¹

Natural gas supplies via Gazprom Export to the countries of Western Europe and Turkey in 2020, bcm



Natural gas supplies via Gazprom Export to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe in 2020, bcm

⁴¹ Gas supplies to Europe. Gazprom Export official site, 2021. <https://gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/>



11.4. Russian Gaz and Oil export⁴²


⁴² Экспорт нефти из России. Tadviser, 2022.

https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F:%D0%AD%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B8_%D0%B8%D0%B7_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8#2019:_.D0.A0.D0.BE.D1.81.D1.81.D0.B8.D1.8F_-_/ Экспорт нефти из России. Tadviser, 2022.

https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F:%D0%AD%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B8_%D0%B8%D0%B7_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8#2019:_.D0.A0.D0.BE.D1.81.D1.81.D0.B8.D1.8F_-_/ Export of oil from Russia, Tadviser, accessed May 15, 2022,


[https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F:%D0%AD%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B8_%D0%B8%D0%B7_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8#2019:_.D0.A0.D0.BE.D1.81.D1.81.D0.B8.D1.8F_-_.](https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F:%D0%AD%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B8_%D0%B8%D0%B7_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8#2019:_.D0.A0.D0.BE.D1.81.D1.81.D0.B8.D1.8F_-_/)

Figure 1: Russian gas exports (billions of cubic metres)



Source: Bruegel based on BP *Statistical Review of World Energy* 2009 and 2019 editions, and Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Note: LNG = liquefied natural gas.

Figure 2: Russian oil exports in millions of tonnes



Sources: Bruegel based on Eurostat, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, <https://oec.world/en/> and BP *Statistical Review of World Energy* 2018.