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## **ABSTRACT**

The subject of research of this paper is the impact of the ideology of Arab socialism on the economic development of Arabic countries – Syria and Egypt. Arab socialism refers to the countries of the Middle East and had a great influence on the economic development of this region. The aim of the research is reflected in the presentation of Arab socialism, the influence of Arab socialism on the economy, and the influence of Arab socialism on the observed economic indicators. Taking into account the specifics that characterize the studied subject of research, during the preparation of the master's thesis, different methods will be applied in order to meet the basic methodological requirements (objectivity, reliability, generality, and systematicity). Research of scientific and theoretical knowledge and relevant literature will be performed by applying the following methods: general scientific methods – statistical method (statistical data on economic indicators in Syria and Egypt), comparative-historical method (taking into account the concept of historical time and space and the systematic use of historical facts) and hypothetical-deductive method; special scientific methods – analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction, specification and generalization; individual (empirical) methods – observation, examination and content analysis. In this master's thesis, the following research question is asked, on the basis of which further independent research related to the defined topic is conducted: What is the impact of the ideology of Arab socialism on the economic development of Arab countries – specifically the analysis of economic indicators of Syria and Egypt? In accordance with the research question, the analysis is focused on the regime of Arab socialism and its impact on economic development through the implementation of this political ideology. This is an extremely complex topic, in line with the fact that Arab socialism is not identical in all Arab countries. There is a difference between the countries of this region. With variations based on existing resources, the countries of this region differed when it comes to the level of economic development. Economic indicators such as gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP growth, exports of goods and services imports of goods and services, merchandise trade are observed will be analyzed in this thesis. Based on the collected information and economic indicators, the research strategy is focused on a comparative analysis of two Arab countries – Syria and Egypt. Based on the results presented in the research, it is concluded that the ideology of Arab socialism had an impact on economic development, primarily in terms of improving the observed economic

indicators: gross domestic product, GDP growth, exports of goods, imports of goods and services, and merchandise trade.

***Keywords:*** *arab socialism, Baas party, Syria, Egypt, economic indicators*

## **ABSTRAKT**

Der Forschungsgegenstand dieser Arbeit ist der Einfluss der Ideologie des arabischen Sozialismus auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der arabischen Länder – Syrien und Ägypten. Der arabische Sozialismus bezieht sich auf die Länder des Nahen Ostens und hatte großen Einfluss auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung dieser Region. Das Ziel der Forschung spiegelt sich in der Darstellung des arabischen Sozialismus, des Einflusses des arabischen Sozialismus auf die Wirtschaft und des Einflusses des arabischen Sozialismus auf die beobachteten Wirtschaftsindikatoren wider. Unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten, die den untersuchten Forschungsgegenstand charakterisieren, werden bei der Erstellung der Masterarbeit unterschiedliche Methoden angewandt, um den methodischen Grundanforderungen (Objektivität, Zuverlässigkeit, Allgemeingültigkeit und Systematik) gerecht zu werden. Die Recherche von wissenschaftlichem und theoretischem Wissen und relevanter Literatur wird unter Anwendung der folgenden Methoden durchgeführt: allgemeine wissenschaftliche Methoden – statistische Methode (statistische Daten zu Wirtschaftsindikatoren in Syrien und Ägypten), vergleichend-historische Methode (unter Berücksichtigung des Konzepts der historischen Zeit und Raum und die systematische Verwendung historischer Fakten) und hypothetisch-deduktive Methode; spezielle wissenschaftliche Methoden – Analyse, Synthese, Induktion, Deduktion, Abstraktion, Spezifizierung und Verallgemeinerung; individuelle (empirische) Methoden – Beobachtung, Untersuchung und Inhaltsanalyse. In dieser Masterarbeit wird folgende Forschungsfrage gestellt, auf deren Grundlage weitere eigenständige Forschungen zum definierten Thema durchgeführt werden: Welchen Einfluss hat die Ideologie des arabischen Sozialismus auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung arabischer Länder – konkret die Analyse von Wirtschaftsindikatoren Syriens und Ägyptens? Entsprechend der Forschungsfrage konzentriert sich die Analyse auf das Regime des arabischen Sozialismus und seine Auswirkungen auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung durch die Umsetzung dieser politischen Ideologie. Dies ist ein äußerst komplexes Thema, da der arabische Sozialismus nicht in allen arabischen Ländern identisch ist. Es gibt einen Unterschied zwischen den Ländern dieser Region. Die Länder dieser Region unterscheiden sich je nach vorhandenen Ressourcen hinsichtlich des wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsstands. Wirtschaftsindikatoren wie Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP), BIP-Wachstum, Exporte von Waren und Dienstleistungen, Importe von Waren und Dienstleistungen, Warenhandel werden in dieser Arbeit analysiert.

Basierend auf den gesammelten Informationen und Wirtschaftsindikatoren konzentriert sich die Forschungsstrategie auf eine vergleichende Analyse zweier arabischer Länder – Syrien und Ägypten. Basierend auf den in der Forschung präsentierten Ergebnissen wird der Schluss gezogen, dass die Ideologie des arabischen Sozialismus einen Einfluss auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung hatte, vor allem im Hinblick auf die Verbesserung der beobachteten Wirtschaftsindikatoren: Bruttoinlandsprodukt, BIP-Wachstum, Warenexporte, Warenimporte und Dienstleistungen und Warenhandel.

***Schlüsselwörter:*** Arabischer Sozialismus, Baas-Partei, Syrien, Ägypten, Wirtschaftsindikatoren

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

The semi-theocratic monarchies in the Middle East, created by France and England, put Arab societies that wanted to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire in a more difficult situation of facing Western imperialism under the mandate. In Arab societies, which were confronted with monarchical governments created under the mandate, revolutionary ideas began to develop whose focus of loyalty was the nation, as in the case of the West and Turkey, instead of loyalty to religion and dynasty that arose before and during World War I. Arab socialism and pan-Arab ideologies were the ones that found the most answers to these ideas in society. The foundations of these ideas were laid by Sunni Muslims Salah Bitar and Nusayri Zeki Arsuzi under the leadership of Greek Orthodox Michel Aflak, who was educated in the West. All three encountered socialist ideas while studying at the University of Paris and believed that socialism would be the salvation of Arab societies (Bardakcı, 2011).

The three friends, who returned to their home countries after studying abroad, began to spread their ideas in society through the thought clubs they founded. In this process, Michel Aflak, who came to the fore with his identity as a thinker around him and who would later be known as a theorist of Arab socialism, began to accept himself as a leader. When Michel Aflak and his friends began to turn into a mass ideology with their work, they asked permission from the French Mandate Administration to establish a political party in Syria at that time in order to organize themselves politically and transfer their ideas from political to power. The Syrian elites, who had power during the Ottoman period, had the same power by cooperating in the French mandate administration. These elites, as a minority with economic and political power, naturally saw the sharing and anti-bourgeois socialist ideas of Michel Aflak and his friends as a threat to their economic and social power and took a stand against it. Given the dangers of the revolutionary nationalist socialist political movement, the French mandate administration did not allow Aflak and his friends to form a political party. When Aflak could not obtain the necessary permission to form a party, he founded the Arab Revival Movement in 1940 with Selahaddin Bitar. The name of the movement was changed to the Arab Baas movement in 1942, and when Zeki Arsuzi joined the duo Aflak and Bitar in 1947, the movement was transformed into a party and held its first congresses. At the end of the congress, Michel Aflak was elected the party's spiritual

leader and mentor, and Selahaddin Bitar was elected secretary general. The name of the movement became the party and became the Baas party. Thus began a political movement in Syria aimed at uniting all Arabs as a single nation, with Arab nationalist, socialist, secular and anti-imperialist elements and slogans „Unity, Freedom, Resurrection“ (Gundogdu, 2020).

The master thesis consists of an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion. The introduction serves for a brief interpretation of the topic to be analyzed, and for explaining the main concepts in the paper where, in addition, the theoretical and methodological starting points of the paper are presented. The introductory part (first chapter) will explain the subject and goal of the paper, research instruments and work structure. The scientific justification and potential social usefulness of the work are stated, the research question is asked and the work hypothesis is formulated.

The second chapter deals with Arab socialism, and it will define nationalism in the Middle East, Arab socialism, and social power and development.

The third chapter deals with Arab socialism in retrospect and will discuss Arab socialism in retrospect through the Suez Crisis and the Birth of Arab Egypt, the triumph of unification policy and the first signs of a crisis, the third Arab-Israeli war, and the withdrawal of Arab nationalism.

The fourth chapter deals with the influence of Arab socialism on the economic indicators of Syria and Egypt. This part of the paper will present a comparative presentation of the impact of Arab socialism on the gross domestic product, GDP growth, exports of goods and services, trade in Syria and Egypt.

The fourth chapter deals with concluding remarks. After that, the literature, lists of figures and tables are presented.

## **1.1. Subject and goal of research**

Arab socialism refers to the countries of the Middle East. Culcasi (2010) points out that defining the location of the Middle East can be considered an uncertain undertaking. The Middle East, the political-geographical name for the area of Northeast Africa and Southwest Asia. The Middle East includes Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and all the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait,

Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Sometimes the Middle East zone also includes Iran and Afghanistan.

According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Arab socialism is defined as state-sponsored economic development, as manifested in Nasserism and Ba'athism as the state ideologies of Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s and Syria and Iraq in 1960s until mid 1980s. Its appearance came after the Second World War when there was a consensus among the educated middle class and the unofficial opposition that independence and economic development were the most urgent national needs. The state is understood as a natural tool intended for the implementation of transformations. Strict land reforms and the nationalization of banking, insurance, foreign trade, large industry, and large private and foreign companies were introduced. At the same time, the economic program was accompanied by the expansion of social, educational, and health services (Esposito, 2003).

During the 1950s and 1960s, the main characteristic of economic development in the Middle East was the fact that the growth rate of gross domestic product was the highest in the world. Another characteristic of the region's economic development is reflected in the prominent role played by oil production. Other natural resources of the region were not worthy of attention. The region was characterized by productive rivers, such as the Nile, the Litany, the Tigris, and the Euphrates. However, more than half of the entire region was covered by desert, while in some countries less than half of the country was cultivated. In regions where agriculture relied on rainfall, it was often seasonal, and in some cases scarce and unreliable. Apart from oil, mineral wealth was limited to several regions. The third characteristic of the economic development of the Middle East was the so-called heavy industry syndrome. In Egypt, this resulted in undoubtedly rational ironworks and steelworks Helwan (Ellis, 1970).

## **1.2. Research method**

Taking into account the specifics that characterize the studied subject of research, during the preparation of the master's thesis, different methods will be applied in order to meet the basic methodological requirements (objectivity, reliability, generality, and systematicity). Research of scientific and theoretical knowledge and relevant literature will be performed by applying the following methods:

- general scientific methods – statistical method (statistical data on economic indicators in Syria and Egypt), comparative-historical method (taking into account the concept of historical time and space and the systematic use of historical facts) and hypothetical-deductive method;
- special scientific methods – analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction, specification and generalization;
- individual (empirical) methods – observation, examination and content analysis.

### 1.3. Hypotheses

*Hypotheses:*

- *H1: Arab socialism has influenced the state to be understood as a natural tool intended for the implementation of transformations.*
- *H2: Arab socialism has led to an increase in the growth rate of gross domestic product.*
- *H3: Arab socialism has influenced the production of oil to play a role in economic development.*

### 1.4. Research question

In this master's thesis, the following research question is asked, on the basis of which further independent research related to the defined topic is conducted:

- *What is the impact of the ideology of Arab socialism on the economic development of Arab countries – specifically the analysis of economic indicators of Syria and Egypt?*

In accordance with the research question, the analysis is focused on the regime of Arab socialism and its impact on economic development through the implementation of this political ideology. This is an extremely complex topic, in line with the fact that Arab socialism is not identical in all Arab countries. There is a difference between the countries of this region. With variations based on existing resources, the countries of this region differed when it comes to the level of economic development. Economic indicators such as

gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP growth, exports of goods and services imports of goods and services, merchandise trade are observed will be analyzed in this thesis. Based on the collected information and economic indicators, the research strategy is focused on a comparative analysis of two Arab countries – Syria and Egypt.

### **1.5. Scientific and social justification**

The scientific justification of the research is reflected in the fact that the influence of Arab socialism on the economic development of Egypt in Syria is not a topic that has been studied so far. The results obtained by this research will enrich the existing literature related to Arab socialism and its influences in the Middle East.

When it comes to social justification, this research can serve as a basis for some further research on this topic. For example, the impact of Arab socialism on the economic development of other Middle Eastern countries could be investigated, or the impact of Arab socialism on the economic development of Egypt and Syria could be analyzed using some other indicators of economic development.

### **1.6. Theoretical approach**

A large number of researches have studied Arab socialism (Kerr, 1962; Kerr, 1968; Manfred, 1963; Reid, 1974; Kadri, 2012; Kadri, 2013; Kadri, 2016; Mrduljaš, 2016). They show the positive and negative aspects of this ideology, its supporters and ways of governing.

„With the cessation of British and French rule, independent Arab states appeared on the international stage, which could already fit into the modern context according to the declared forms of government. After its independence, Egypt (formally independent in 1922, and actually in 1945), Jordan (formally independent in 1923, and actually in 1946), Iraq (formally independent in 1932, and actually in 1945), Libya (1951), Morocco 1956) and Tunisia (1956) were constitutional monarchies, and Lebanon (formally independent in 1943 and actually 1944), Syria (formally independent in 1941 and actually 1946), Sudan (separated from Egypt in 1956), Algeria (1962) and South Yemen (1967) republic” (Mrduljaš, 2016, 59-60).

Early in the years after gaining independence, the socialist Arab states, mostly Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, took significant land reform measures, nationalized major industry and financial institutions, and halted the cycle of resource usurpation. The goal of Arab socialism was reflected in self-sufficiency in production, supporting industrialization that would replace imports, and making a public investment in heavy industry during periods when capacity needed to be raised. There is an opinion that the Arab socialist model surpassed the neoliberal phase of development, which preceded the Arab Spring. Among the Arab countries, the Arab socialist regimes primarily surpassed the others in terms of the results of land reform and, on average, higher growth of real income per capita. At the same time, the development of socialized health and education must not be neglected. In particular, the impact of the state development model in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq has shown a dynamic impact on economic and social measures. After the period of Arab socialism, a period of neoliberalism took place in this area, which led to the deprivation of the working population of previous social gains and a simultaneous increase in the dose of repression (Kadri, 2012).

## 2. ARAB SOCIALISM

In this thesis, we also use the term „Arab world”, which can leave the impression of abstraction and deprivation of a particular representative. Historically, the Arabs as a unique and relevant political entity, and in its existing recognizable form, emerged in the early Middle Ages with the emergence of Islam and the expansion of the Islamic, then Arab state. However, it fragmented relatively quickly, which was accompanied by a significant reduction in Arab political influence in the works that succeeded it. A new, almost complete gathering of Arabs within one state took place during the 16th century under Ottoman rule, although in the Ottoman Empire the Turkish class retained leading positions until the collapse of the Empire in the early 20th century. Modern Arab states, although connected to the Arab League, are still crucially determined by the uniqueness of their development, unwillingness to more significant forms of integration, and even mutual opposition. Thus, in both historical and contemporary contexts, it is difficult to highlight an adequate representation of the Arab „world”. But what we mean by this term has indeed existed for a very long time as a continuous and relevant phenomenon. Namely, as much as it could be deprived of political capacity appropriate to its spatial and demographic strength, the Arab entity has never lost essential elements of ethnic and cultural unity and global significance primarily manifested through maintaining a leading role within Islamic civilization. From this point of view, there was and still is a sufficient level of uniqueness among the Arabs that, in this case towards a civilizationally different Europe and at the level of the basic definition of relations with it, they can be viewed uniformly (Lewis, 1956).

Within the civilization determined by Islam, states whose legal systems are to a greater or lesser extent determined by Islamic legislation, ie. sharia. However, given the overall content of their legal systems, it is most often not about theocracy, even when they point out that their sharia is the basis of legislation (Khan, 2013). But there are those, even in the Arab world, within which it is essentially functional. These states, which are particularly significant for severely sanctioning what they define as apostasy, atheism, or blasphemy, are considered theocracies (Goitom, 2014).

Finally, political forces that advocate the maintenance or establishment of a theocracy should be called theocratic. We hold that confusing and inappropriate names are commonly used for members of theocratic, conditionally speaking subversive movements

called moderate, radical, militant, etc. Islamists. These are Islamic theocrats who, by the totality of their demands, are necessarily in confrontation with their opponents. Opportunities determine whether they are moderate. If they advocate that within the order they prefer, there is a possibility of choosing between different promoters of that order, then, not without profaning the notion of democracy, they could only be called democratic theocrats (de Gaay Fortman, 2008).

Islamic theocracy in Arab societies lasted until the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century when the majority of them came under British, French, and in the case of Libya Italian (1912–1943) administration. Although theocratic models within Islamic, and therefore Arab, environments have gone through a historical process of adaptation to the different demands of political power, this has not created a legal framework superior to Islamic legislation. Although practical and political reasons required special solutions, they were expected to be in line with the requirements of Islam (Karčić, 2011). In any case, the modernization of Arab societies, even in the political, legal, ideological sense, encouraged by the party, ie. European administration, it was sudden and started late. In addition, the significance and scope of change were not the same everywhere. The differences stemmed primarily from differences in the degree and duration of foreign administration over individual Arab countries and from different social circumstances within them.

The presence of European powers in the Arab world, as elsewhere, was motivated by their interests, to which the content of modernization introduced into Arab environments was fundamentally subordinated. Despite the fact that modernization was primarily in the service of foreign administration, one could not ignore those its features that were conducive to the strengthening of Arab societies. Therefore, most of them were dominated by circles that, in the interest of progress, with the necessary adaptation to Arab conditions and traditions, were ready to accept solutions and concepts that proved functional in the West (Matić, 2011). As emphasized, in this way, with the cessation of French and British rule on the international scene, independent Arab states emerged that, in accordance with their declared forms of government, could fit into the modern context.

Within most of these states, during the initial phase of independence, there was indeed a space suitable for the (further) affirmation of liberal democracy. But there was also a framework suitable for articulating opposing tendencies. Namely, from the first attempts

at the political and legal adaptation of Arab societies to modern trends, a strong intention to preserve certain traditional features characteristic of theocracy was evident. This tendency, which was encouraged by the legacy and the desire to avoid „Westernization”, found its most far-reaching expression in the application of a kind of „constitutional Islamization” (Dawood & Gouda, 2015). Thus, the constitutions of, conditionally speaking, modernist-oriented Arab states provided Islam with a special, realistically privileged role. Its significance varied from country to country, but most often Islam was proclaimed the state religion, it was determined that the head of the executive branch must be a Muslim, to a greater or lesser extent Islamic law was retained. Neither Britain nor France basically hindered such development. In addition, the initial level of „constitutional Islamization” did not call into question the modernist features of independent states. But the fact is that, like Turkey, they have not permanently distanced themselves from the theocratic heritage and explicitly accepted secular and even liberal-democratic values. Instead, hybrid, realistically vague political-legal systems have functioned in them. Although according to their fundamentally declared characteristics, they could be considered semi-democratic, they favored various development directions, including those, as can be seen from subsequent and even modern development, which enable a return to theocracy.

Most importantly, these far-reaching changes have bypassed most of the Arabian Peninsula. The Ottoman government, and later the „Western” government, was only peripherally interested in its isolated, once extremely poor central parts (Najd). Thus, during the agonies of the Ottoman Empire, they became independent and expanded into neighboring regions, including Hijaz with the holiest places of Islam, Mecca, and Medina, forming a vast monarchy, Saudi Arabia (formally independent in 1902, and really in 1932). Within it, the Ottoman theocratic model is relatively flexible, „replaced” by a spontaneous model based on the Wahhabi, in other words, Puritan interpretation of (Sunni) Islam (Shalakany, 2008). Theocracy also took place in mostly Shiite North Yemen, whose autonomous position served as the basis for gaining state independence immediately after the collapse of the Ottoman state in 1918), Kuwait (1961), Bahrain (1971), Qatar (1971), and the United Arab Emirates (1971), in which similar social conditions prevailed, and which, according to Britain, were more in a relationship of a partnership than subordination, they retained, with the exception of more flexible Kuwait, their traditional systems. Thus, practically at the source of the Arab world, theocracy was permanently maintained.

All in all, during the 20th century, semi-democratic constitutive monarchies and republics emerged in the Arab world, but also the dominant theocratic absolute monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula. From the point of view of that time, it could be assumed that stability, development, and progress, and thus exemplary, would be characteristic of the former. But the opposite happened. In semi-democratic states, a period of erosion of their democratic features followed, most often by coups and the introduction of authoritarian, basically one-party systems. As this process was almost certainly accompanied by the abolition of monarchies (in Egypt in 1953, Tunisia in 1957, in Iraq in 1958, Yemen in 1962, and Libya in 1969), it affected the „preventive” reduction of the democratic potential of the countries in which they held, i.e. in Morocco and Jordan. As part of this development, the subsequently independent states, such as Algeria and South Yemen, and to some extent Tunisia, did not pass the semi-democratic phase in the initial phase of state independence, but their liberation movements imposed absolute power immediately after independence. In this sense, a kind of „democratic desert” soon prevailed in the Arab world after gaining independence (Pollack, 2011).

In a number of countries with authoritarian regimes, strong anti-Western sentiment prevailed, produced not only by the experience of the former British and French administrations, but also by new forms of Western domination and the experience of Israel, which was unjustifiably perceived as Western. Although these sentiments influenced the departure from liberal democracy, the new elites, mostly from army circles, did not seek to return to the old (Matić, 2008). Basically, they continued the tradition of ideological hybridity. Within the orders they created, the special position of Islam was retained, but the democratic contents were replaced by Arab nationalism and certain features of the then current socialism. Although Islam has retained a prominent place in this ideological combinatorics, it has been given crucial importance by two other components, also of European and contemporary origin – nationalism and socialism.

Therefore, these regimes were perceived, also not entirely justified, as secular. Beneath them, a significant set of values immanent to secularism has been preserved. In the changed circumstances, these values could be a good basis for the development of liberal democracy. But these were states that not only experimented ideologically, but also economically, but were politically unstable, mostly separated from the main centers of power, and economically underdeveloped. In that atmosphere, even those among them who, through oil exploitation, were given the opportunity to remedy unfavorable internal

conditions, most often did not adequately use that opportunity (Kulenović, 2008). Overall, among the Arab states that embarked on independence as semi-democratic, and within which authoritarian, predominantly secular regimes were subsequently established, there was none that could set a model in the Arab world.

In contrast, the Gulf monarchies arose from a historically conducted and foreign-influenced largely undisturbed internal „balance of power”. At the same time, they were compatible with their own social environment and retained the values on which it was based for centuries. Because during the imperialist period they were more in partnership than independence on Britain, they were not burdened with the kind of animosity that would prevent continuity of cooperation with the West after they grew into oil superpowers, and in Cold, War circumstances protect them from internal and external pressures. All this created the preconditions for the enrichment and the creation of relatively favorable existential conditions. Accordingly, the Gulf monarchies, led by Saudi Arabia, have maintained stability and gained not only wealth but also the opportunity to become role models within their own civilizational framework. In doing so, they could only benefit from being the “cradle” of Islam, but also of the Arab world (Khan, 2013).

Given the indicated circumstances, it could be assumed that within each of the Arab states there is a significant suppressed national energy that strives for change. The real question is in which direction that energy will be articulated if it comes to the fore. In countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, the importance of Arab nationalism and socialism was exhausted over time, especially after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. Nevertheless, ideological components that could be affirmative of liberal democracy with their focus on modernization continued to „survive” within them. However, the practice of political "reliance" of the ruling structures on Islam also persisted. Moreover, they often shifted the focus to his additional ideologization (Matić & Bilandžić, 2010). Thus, in Libya, the Arab-socialist-Islamic ideological construction began to be based on the Islamic segment in the late 1970s. Sudan's ruling party passed from its own version of socialism after 1983 into a kind of theocracy. Again, in Algeria, the regime's readiness for change has led to the expansion of not only Islamic-democratic but also theocratic tendencies.

This was followed by a long civil war, from 1991 to 2002, which ended in favor of the previous government. On the other hand, within absolute monarchies, one could expect movements that would be directed towards democratization, but also those that, by pointing

out the insufficient loyalty of these monarchies to Islam, strive for their own versions of theocracy. In accordance with prevailing global trends, and in some ways the laws of political evolution, it could be expected that the „suppressed” energy in the Arab world will primarily seek to expand the range of freedoms, especially in somewhat secularized Arab countries facing economic difficulties. But according to very specific indications, these calculations, at least in the medium term, had to be taken with considerable reserve.

## **2.1. Nationalism in the Middle East**

The basis of both rebellions is the goal of independence and religious demands. Sherif Hussein declared the Ottoman Empire an imperialist state that exploited Arab geography and society. He claimed that it was his natural right to be king of the Arabs, claiming that he came from the Prophet. Abdulaziz bin Saud, on the other hand, declared the Ottoman Empire imperialist, like Sherif Hussein, and claimed that the Ottomans had retreated according to the Takfir belief of the Wahhabi sect to which he belonged. Allied forces supported the rebellion movement that created both. One of the common features of these Arab uprisings is the understanding of nationalism created by the tribal system (Soy, 2014). During World War I, the British used the environment created to their advantage by the Gallipoli Campaign and the Channel I Campaign and instructed Abdulaziz bin Saud to remain neutral and the Emir of Hijaz, Sherif Hussein, to rebel. Thomas Edward Lawrence, a well-known British agent known as Lawrence of Arabia, was given the task of organizing the riots (Gundogdu, 2020).

The leaders of the Arab rebels in the Middle East saw the success of their struggle for independence in the atmosphere of the First World War in joint action with the allies. But the results of the First World War did not bring the independence they had dreamed of to the rebellious Arabs. The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, which divided the Middle East, revealed the main reason for supporting the Arab revolts against the Ottomans, allied forces that were their allies during the war. According to the concluded agreements, the governments of England and France created kingdoms within the borders that they withdrew in the regions and brought in rulers who could serve the policy of exploitation. In Iraq, Faisal, the son of the Emir of Mecca, Sharif Hussein, was brought to the Kingdom of Iraq. In Jordan, under the auspices of England, the second son of the Emir of Mecca, Sharif Hussein, was proclaimed king. With the declaration it issued, Britain

supported the dream of the Jewish diaspora to establish a state in Palestine and laid the foundations of the Palestinian problem that has survived to this day. In Egypt, they supported King Fuad I by allowing the establishment of a semi-independent kingdom to end the struggle of Arab nationalism for full independence (Gundogdu, 2020).

## **2.2. Defining Arab socialism**

In the years after World War II, Arab nationalism no longer called only for the independence of Arab countries but also for a political and social revolution that was to bring unity, power, and prosperity to a divided, militarily inferior, and economically underdeveloped Arab world.

This meant the fight against the domination of the imperialist forces, but also land reforms, nationalization, and the abolition of the institutions of parliamentary democracy imposed by the West. The notion that the unity of the „Arab nation” can only be achieved through radical sociopolitical transformation is at the heart of the idea of Arab socialism articulated by Michel Aflaq, co-founder and main ideologue of the BAAS.

Founded in 1947 in Damascus, the BAAS (Socialist Party of the Arab Revival) party was the main promoter of Aflaq's vision of secular Arab nationalism and socialism in the first decades of its existence. The Iraqi BAAS was founded in 1952, and two years later the Iraqi branch became independent, adopted a separate party statute, established a „regional command” and elected its own regional secretary. Seale (1965) and Batat (2004). But this socialism is specific and has nothing to do with the Marxist concept of class struggles within the framework of the nation-state. The Marxist interpretive scheme was considered inadequate for the Arab world because the Arab nation as a whole finds itself in a position of the oppressed class and as such participates in the struggle against the exploitation of external capitalist forces. Furthermore, the adjective „Arab” should have emphasized that it is a specific type of socialism that represents an authentic expression of the egalitarian Arab spirit and its aspirations for social justice. Just as Islam reformed the social and economic institutions of Arabia in the 7th century, so socialism needed to transform modern Arab society and provide the preconditions for the unity and freedom of the Arab nation. Aflaq summed up his nationalist philosophy in words that would become the slogan of the Baas party: „One Nation with Eternal Mission” (Dawisha, 2005, 195).

In Aflaq's conception of the nation as an organic community, just as in Sati al-Husri's, there is no place for the individual. He is only one of the limbs of the national organism and his existence is inconceivable without the nation. Therefore, an individual can assert his freedom only within the limits allowed by the nation, ie its conscious part, which is the only one authorized to speak on its behalf. Translated into BAAS political practice, this view led to an authoritarian form of political power in which the party, equated with the state, acted as a guarantor and protector of individual freedom, but at the same time severely punished any attempt at independent political action. This can be read from Article 41 of the BAAS Statute, which explicitly states that „the state will be responsible for protecting freedom of speech, publishing, assembly... within the limits of the sublime interests of the Arab nation” (Batatu, 2004, 736).

The idea of a revolutionary avant-garde promoted by Aflaq and which became an integral part of the worldview of Arab nationalists after World War II was in fundamental opposition to the idea and practice of parliamentary democracy. They opposed the so-called multi-party democracy of the Western type. People's democracy, is presented as a model of political power suitable for developing countries. It was to affirm the freedom and sovereignty of the Arab nation, ensure the equitable distribution of social wealth, and work toward the political unification of the Arab countries. As it will be shown, the central place in the implementation of this policy will belong to the army. Ultimately, Arab nationalism, as formulated by Aflaq, will become an instrument of ideological legitimization of military dictatorships in the Middle East.

The rise of Arab nationalism took place in the context of the dramatic political and socio-economic changes that engulfed the Middle East region in the years after World War II. The inability of Arab governments to ensure the full independence of their states and the defeat in the First Arab-Israeli War demonstrated the political and military inferiority of the Arab world, weakened the ruling upper classes, and discredited the European model of representative democracy. The shock caused by the creation of the State of Israel caused the radicalization of a growing new middle class that would reject regionalism, Europhilia, and liberalism of the wealthy and recognizes in ideological Arab nationalism an ideological structure compatible with its political aspirations. Modernly educated and located in the state administration, media, educational institutions, and the army, this class was preoccupied with issues of identity, socio-economic development, and its own social promotion, which made it particularly receptive to the call of revolutionary politics. Viewed

from this perspective, Arab nationalism also functioned as a powerful tool of class politics. He offered a positive vision of the Arab future, but at the same time, by delegitimizing traditional ruling elites, he enabled the middle class to take leading positions in the state and society and eventually take key levers of power.

During the years when Arab nationalism was at the zenith of its power, the Arab world became a stronghold of authoritarian politics. Although the pre-war parliamentary regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq deviated in many ways from the then standards of European democracy, they were far more open, plural and free than the regimes institutionalized by the post-war nationalist generation. The struggle for liberation from colonial rule was transformed in the 1950s and 1960s into a revolt against the imperialist West and its political ideas and institutions. This anti-Western mood led to the rejection of democracy as a desirable model of government and contributed to the establishment of the popular but fundamentally autocratic regimes of Nasser and the BAAS party. However, the slippage into authoritarianism was not a mere consequence of hostility to the West but largely stemmed from the essentially illiberal nature of pan-Arab ideology.

Unlike the first generation of Arab nationalists, who embraced the values of Western liberalism and advocated multipartyism and the separation of powers, followers of the pan-Arab movement favored the notion of political power developed by the extreme European right and the Bolshevik left. For Sati al Husri, „the fascist system is the one to which we should direct our hopes and to which we should aspire” (Kramer, 1993, 184). This view of power should be based on the domination of a conscious political elite, it has become an integral element of the post-war nationalist worldview and a fundamental principle of the organization of power in radical nationalist regimes.

The authoritarian nature of post-war Arab nationalism was also reflected in the understanding of the Arab nation as an organic community that did not know the idea of individual autonomy. The focus on the problem of political disunity in the Arab world and its dependence on external forces has resulted in a lack of interest in government, institution-building, and the protection of individual rights and freedoms, as Sati al-Husri stressed, „public attention should be focused on unification and duty. It is for every Arab to support a leader who is capable of achieving Arab unity” (Dawisha, 2005, 299). This nationalist doctrine rejected the political competition embodied in the institute of multipartyism because it was assumed that all nationally conscious Arabs shared the same

political goals and social priorities. Political parties are therefore not only considered unnecessary but also dangerous: they sow the seeds of discord, disrupt the unity of the national movement, and function as the fifth column of imperialist powers. Furthermore, the leading ideologues of pan-Arabism glorified revolutionary violence and declared it the only guarantee of achieving nationalist goals. Thus, for Aflaq, cruelty in confrontation with political dissidents was not only a necessary means of social transformation but also the ultimate expression of a nationalist's love for his people, because „when we are cruel to others we do so in order to return them to their true selves which remained unknown to them” (Makiya, 1998: 206). Nasser and the BAAS party translated this ideology into a political practice in which there was no room for individual freedom and democratic confrontation of different political options. Their rule was based on a zealous faith in their historical mission and a tremendous amount of repression.

The voluntarism of nationalist politics and the emphasis on extra-institutional methods of political struggle had catastrophic consequences for the stability of the Arab states. Declaring violence an integral element of progress, Arab nationalists encouraged internal conflicts and contributed to the spread of a toxic political culture in which tolerating opposition was interpreted as a sign of weakness and accepting the use of physical violence as normal and even necessary.

Finally, the most subtle destabilizing legacy of Arab nationalism concerns the ideological delegitimization of state borders. As Walid Khalidi will say, the Arab state system is first and foremost a „pan system”, based on a single Arab nation that, despite its political fragmentation, exists as an empirical reality. Viewed from this perspective, „individual Arab states are deviant and transitory entities, their borders illusory, and their rulers only temporary guardians or obstacles to be removed... and their legitimacy irrelevant to the super legitimacy of the pan-Arab unification project” (Khalidi, 1978, 695). Constantly undermining the legitimacy of existing states, Arab nationalism has played a significant role in escalating tensions in inter-Arab relations and bringing the region into a state of permanent political crisis. Most Arab governments since World War II have faced the problem of maintaining power and the fear, often well-founded, that citizens or neighboring countries hold their power illegitimate. This lack of legitimacy has contributed to the political instability of the entire region, but also to a huge expansion in the size and influence of the state apparatus and its security and police forces. In conditions of disputed legitimacy, repression became the basis for the survival of the regime, and behind the

rhetoric of Arab unity and solidarity often hid, as in the case of Syria and Iraq, the irredentist and hegemonic policies of Arab rulers.

Over time, the idea of a single Arab nation ceased to function as a more significant landmark of individual and collective action. Arab nationalism has disappeared from the Middle Eastern political scene, but it has left behind autocratic regimes determined to stay in power at all costs and by all means. These repressive regimes, in constant „war” with their own citizens and with hegemonic pretensions towards neighboring countries, are the political legacy of Arab nationalism on which rests much of the responsibility for the violence that accompanied the collapse of the Arab Spring and the ensuing sea of Middle Eastern reality.

### **2.3. Arab socialism based on the BAAS party**

Arab socialism is a political movement that emerged in the Arab world during the accelerated independence movement after World War II and had a significant impact on the political history of the Middle East at the time. On the other hand, articulating Arab nationalism with socialism, took on a different form from classical Marxism. Characteristic forms of Arab socialism are mainly based on tribal life and the basic moral principles of Islam (Heywood, 2011). The main starting point of this movement is the goal of uniting the Arab world under the roof of a socialist, but the more nationalist state.

Arab socialism and its rhetoric reached their peak, especially around the person of Jamal Abdul Nasser, and Arab societies accepted it. In fact, the only way for the Arab states, which gained their freedom from the colonial states through the independence movement, to overcome their relative backwardness and social inequality integrated into society by the colonial system, is a socialist state adorned with nationalist elements. According to the statist understanding of Arab socialism, the state will have most of the production channels, but, unlike communism, the principles of private property and inheritance rights will be preserved. Moreover, ignoring the materialist dimension of classical Marxism, Arab socialism did not fail to emphasize the secular state by relying on the traditional promises and basic teachings of Islam. Interstate coordination was ensured by the Baathist parties founded in Arab countries, and the dream of a single state reached its highest point with the short-lived United Arab Republic, which was established by the

unification of Egypt and Syria in 1958. In the part that follows, the formation of the Baath Party, its intellectual roots and intellectual infrastructure, as well as the basic building blocks on which it was built, will be discussed in more detail. Arab socialism, which is one of the basic building blocks, will be examined by comparison with classical Marxism.

### **2.3.1. The Baas party and its ideological origins**

The Baas Party was founded in 1943 by a group of intellectuals, almost all of whom had a Western education, as the Arab Resurrection Party (Ozkoc, 2008). The most important role in founding the party was played by the Orthodox Michel Eflak and Selahadim Bitar. Although Eflak and Bitar tried to create their own doctrines, they were influenced by Western values and the period of Western enlightenment with the influence of the Renaissance, so they thought it appropriate to name the Baas, the resurrection of the Arab nation, a party. In fact, Baas, who continued his activities in an intellectual movement until 1946, owes his name to Zeki Arsuzi. In fact, Arsuzi was the first person to use the name Al-Baas Al-Arabi (Resurrection of the Arabs) (Senturk, 2003).

The group led by Eflak and Bitar later merged with the Arsuzi-led Arab Awakening Party. The movement formed around Arsuzi's thoughts followed a line based on anti-colonialism and an emphasis on Arabic. With the articulation of the movement with the Baas party, discourses on Arab nationalism intensified more radically than any of them. In fact, the most basic intellectual infrastructure in the formation of the Baas party was Arab nationalism, which gained more and more supporters in the Arab world. This style of nationalism is not of national origin but is based on a goal that includes different Arab cultures and adopts the ideal of gathering all Arab societies under one roof. Because, unlike the political parties that emerged in the Arab world after World War II, the Baas Party was the only party defined by the ideal of a united Arab state (Ozkoc, 2008).

Although the dominant ideology in the founding of the Baas Party was Arab nationalism, as has been repeatedly pointed out, conditions of the period, such as the Cold War and the influence of Arabs from the Soviet experience, made the Arab version of socialism at least as effective as nationalism. Although the party's merger with Ekrem Hurani's Arab Socialist Party in 1953 is pragmatic, it is important to add the word socialist to the party's name after the merger (Ozkoc, 2008).

The Baas ideology has been shaped by some changes both in the region and internationally. The moves of Western-educated intellectuals to displace traditional elites and the growing role of the middle class and minorities whose class positions and ethnic identity are ignored in society are among the most important changes. On the other hand, the idea that Arab societies, which began to gradually gain independence despite Western exploitation, were re-entering the nation-building process, and especially the idea of joint action against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, were the main reasons for accelerating Arab nationalism. In addition, socialism, as a Soviet conception of a non-capitalist social and economic order, was another factor that brought Arab countries closer to socialism. In addition, Halpern tried to explain the source of the power of socialism in the Arab world in words; "Marxism is attractive because it offers more modern answers to fundamental questions than Islam" (Senturk, 2003, 79).

The Baas Party was the bearer of Arab socialism in the region. The concept of socialism used by the party was adopted to correct the backwardness of the Arab world, help the industrial development of the region, and give its people equal opportunities in the economic field. Economic democracy, mentioned in the language of the party, is implemented in order to strengthen the people economically, militarily, socially, politically, and culturally. Thus, the Arab states will be named in the same way as the great nations of the world, and the eternal mission of the Arabs on the path of civilization will be fulfilled.

The Baas Party was built on political movements that began to mobilize in geography and especially on the ideas of Arab nationalism and socialism that emerged during the term. While the ultimate goal of the Baas, whose founders were Western-educated intellectuals, was to establish a single Arab state based on Arab nationalism, socialism was seen as a means of ensuring social justice in the process.

### **2.2.2. Michel Eflak's ideas and thoughts**

When assessing the sociological effects of Michel Eflak's Western intellectual thought in Syria; the idea of independence that prevailed in Syria until the mid-1930s is a traditional understanding of nationalism that includes Islamic elements. From the mid-1930s, conflicts began between groups that wanted to regulate the class structure of society and the economy with Western socialist ideas and the traditional nationalists mentioned until then.

With the disappearance of the French mandate, thanks to the environment brought by the Second World War, socialist ideas that appealed to the middle classes found an opportunity to take more places in the country's politics. This movement, made up of educated Arabs, gathered around it young people who came to the cities for schooling. The land reform advocated by Michel Eflak and his friends supported Arab socialism among rural workers, who were not landowners and were mostly of different ethnic identities. Ekrem Havrani, who made significant contributions to the movement's nationalist and populist policies, also influenced his military and bureaucratic environment and Sunni peasants (Ozkoc, 2008).

Eflakov published a newspaper called Al-Baas, which was controlled by the Baas party, in order to publish his ideas to the general public. In this way, his statements and newspaper articles in opposition to the government reached the broad masses and left a great impression on the Arab world. In addition, Michel Eflak shared Arab socialism and pan-Arab ideas, in which he combined Western values with Arab values, in the Al-Baas newspaper, the organ of the party. In his interviews and articles published in the newspaper Al-Baas, he states:

„By advocating freedom and independence, we are not tied to anything theoretical that has nothing to do with reality. Freedom lets people know where their daily bread goes and how their wealth is spent, the fruits of their labor and production, how rulers do not fulfill their official duties and why it bothers their conscience. Because they keep the state by force, they prevent any progress, and freedom, they impose the continuation of moral corruption and material bankruptcy. Because Freedom enables people to realize the external dangers that threaten it with the height they have reached to achieve their independence, the shortcomings of independence. In our people's government, they will know the Palestinian cause and the reasons for external hegemony. They will be aware of the penetration of foreign companies into our country, their swallowing of our money and wealth, the oppression of our employees, and their conspiracies against us in some way“ (Eflak, 1946, 1).

With this statement, Eflak openly criticized the Syrian state administration and emphasized the level of corruption, sanctity of labor and production, and emphasized the

concept of „freedom” by taking an anti-imperialist stance against the exploitation of national capital:

„If the problem of our nation truly and sincerely concerns us, we must be brave. If we do not act bravely and stubbornly; if we do not deal with the outdated mentality that deceives the people and wants to seduce them like a human herd by killing their brains, and if we do not do so suddenly and violently, the danger we face is the danger of foreign attacks, because people who lack identity and freedom they cannot defend their country. The second danger, which can be more serious than the first, is the danger of staying like this and not being able to create any social construction or social creativity” (Eflak, 1948, 1).

In this statement, Eflak emphasized the importance of social construction by making sociological determinations and expressing the need to change the current government in revolutionary language:

„The only way to liberate and unite the Arab homeland is to enable the masses of people to take over the country and take over their business. Only the masses have the will, interest, ability, and potential for the Arabs to gain independence, unite their countries and revitalize their societies“ (Eflak, 1956, 1).

In this opening, Eflak spoke about the people's revolution and the sense of independence, desire, and potential of the Arab peoples to unite under a single state:

„The significance of Islam in this historical and important age and in this crucial phase of development is that all efforts should be aimed at empowering and awakening the Arabs and that these efforts should be within the framework of Arab nationalism“ (Eflak, 1943, 1).

In this statement, Eflak argued that Islam is the value and revolution of the Arabs, giving priority to its nationalist, socialist and revolutionary characteristics.

### **2.3.3. The political life of Michel Aflak**

While the Germans, who led the policies of the French government of Vichy, which signed a surrender agreement with Germany in World War II, tried to occupy Syria, British and Free French forces organized a joint military operation and took control of Syria and declared independence. However, in the elections held in 1943, the nationalist front government that united against France won the elections and Shukra al Kuvali was elected president of Syria. First, the Soviet Union, then the United States, and Britain recognized Syria as an independent state, and they wanted France to leave the country by recognizing Syria's independence. After negotiations at the United Nations level, British and French forces agreed to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon. France withdrew from Syrian territory on April 17, 1946. This ended the 25-year French mandate in Syria (Yazıcı, 2012). Michel Eflak and his friends turned into a mass movement that formed the ideological infrastructure and intellectual accumulation of the Arab Baas movement until 1946. Eflak and his friends actively began political work to come to power after the withdrawal of French troops and the end of the mandate administration in 1946. Michel Eflak, who was elected head of the Baas party, which was founded in 1947 at the first congress, found an opportunity to implement his ideas and entered a difficult political struggle (Britannica, 2020). After the loss of the Arab coalition in the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the Arab people blamed the current administration, and growing reactions further increased support for Arab socialism. In addition, from 1949 to 1963, until the Baas party took power, a period called coups began to take place. In 1949, Sunni General Huzun Zaim staged a military coup against Syria's first elected president since independence, Shukra Al-Keuli. After the coup, he declared himself president. Four months later, General Sami Hinavi counterattacked and executed Huzun Zaim. The British supported the Sami Hinavi administration and Hinavi's idea of uniting Iraq and Syria, and in that way, they wanted to take Syria under their control through Iraq, where they were active. But on December 19, 1949, Colonel Oedipus Cicek accused Sami Hinavi of treason for his policy of unification with Iraq and staged a coup. Oedipus Cicek declared himself head of state. During the reign of Oedipus Cicek, Eflak fled to Lebanon with Selahaddin Bitar due to increasing pressure. He tried to cooperate with all opposition parties in order to end the rule of Oedipus Cicek in Lebanon. In 1953, they merged with Ekrem Havrani's Arab Socialist Party and founded the Baathist Arab Socialist Party. The Eflaki Bitar returned to Syria after Cicek was overthrown by Colonel Faisal El-Atasi in 1954, and a coalition of national and people's parties came to power according to

the results of the next elections. The Baas party remained in opposition, winning 22 seats in parliament (Gundogdu, 2020). The Baas party, which remained in opposition, staged street protests against the newly established government to seize power in the country and allow them to step down. They also penetrated the army, playing an important role in the protests and the resignation of the Chief of the General Staff (Yazıcı, 2012).

In Syria, the Baas party gained significant power by penetrating the army and resigning the government with protests it organized. As the Baas party gradually began to strengthen in Syria and regional politics, on the other hand, it began to support the Egyptian administration in 1955, when Egyptian President Jamal Abdunasir took a stand against the Baghdad Pact, which was established to prevent the development of socialism in the Middle East. With the development of relations between Abdunasir and Eflak in Egypt, after 1956, the Baas party began to engage in politics and organize street demonstrations for the unification of Syria and Egypt as a reflection of pan-Arab thought. On the other hand, the attacks of England and France on Egypt after the crisis in the Suez Canal in 1956 also increased the anti-Western mood in the Middle East and further increased sympathy for pan-Arab and anti-imperialist socialist ideas. (Armaoglu, 2017).

#### **2.3.4. Egypt and Jamal Abdunnasir**

Born in 1918, Jamal Abdunasir, an important actor in twentieth-century Middle East politics, joined groups working to get the British to leave Egypt in the 1930s with nationalist sentiments. Although he enrolled in law school, he left military school and graduated there. In the early stages of his military life, he developed relationships with anti-monarchist soldiers such as Enver Sedat Zekerriia Muhyiddin and Abdulhakim Amir. The British occupation of all airports and seaports based on the 1936 agreement with Egypt played an important role in the development of nationalist movements and anti-imperialist sentiments in Egypt. Jamal Abdunasir and his friends founded the Free Officers Movement in 1942 to fight British domination of the country (Kuzgun, 2015). The Free Officers Movement overthrew the Egyptian monarchy on July 18, 1953, instead declaring a republic and bringing General Mohammed Najib to the presidency. Nasser became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. Nasser succeeded in becoming the head of Egypt and created an autocratic regime by establishing dominance in Egypt by removing General Nejib from the members of the Revolutionary Council, most of whom were appointed

ministers, from the presidency in March 1954. (Duman, 2018). As for the Eflak and Syrian Baathists, this change in Egypt was seen as an important leap in the politics of pan-Arabism. Egypt's potential to influence the entire Arab world has also come to the fore as a leading actor in undermining other monarchies in the Middle East and securing the Arab revolution. Namely, negotiations on the establishment of a united Arab and socialist state between Nasser and the Hashemites began, which resulted in a positive outcome in a short time. On February 1, 1958, the United Arab Republic was proclaimed with the participation of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. However, soon after the unification, Egypt's intervention in the internal affairs of Syria and the replacement of the administrator of Syrian origin with the Egyptian administrators caused serious disturbances on the Syrian side. The implemented socialist economic policy has disturbed the middle class of Syrian society (Gundogdu, 2020). In addition, Eflak's dissolution of his party on the basis of the conditions set by Nasser as a condition for unification, without consultation with his companions, the authorized committees of the Baas party, and without making relevant decisions, led to a split in his party. In addition, the administration of the Syrian Baas party saw Abdunaser's appointment of Egyptian officials to critical cadres of the United Socialist Arab State as a liquidation movement. Although Eflak showed a moderate stance during this process, the fact that his friends took the position of Syrian nationalists provoked discussions about Eflak's political position. Abdunaser's launch of a movement he called Nasserism showed that he had individual goals instead of being an actor in a collective project in the ultimate goal. Some party members and administrators have blamed Eflak for the crisis. Baathist soldiers such as Salah Cedid and Hafez Assad set up military committees on the grounds that Syrian Baas party activities were suspended in 1958 to ensure the movement continued (Seale, 1990). In addition, Nasser supporters in Syria have resisted the continuation of the United Arab Republic. Due to political instability, on September 27, 1961, a coup d'etat was carried out in Syria under the leadership of Abdul Karim al-Nahlavi, which would result in secession from the United Arab States. With the support and approval of Michel Eflak, the Baas party came to power in Syria after a counter-coup called the March Eighth Revolution of 1963. However, this coup or revolution was seen as the rule of the Syrian Baas party's military, not civilians. In Iraq, the Iraqi branch of Baas staged a coup, a month before the coup in Syria, against General Abdulkarim Qasim, who had Marxist ideas and did not adopt the Baathist idea, which ended the monarchy in a 1958 coup. In this way, the military branch of the Baas party came to power in both Syria and Iraq in 1963. At that time, the Baathist military committee in Syria rejected the moderate

social and economic policy envisaged by Eflak. Considering that Elak is old and incompetent, the committee started working to take over his leadership. Eflak lost the party congress held in 1965, and Munif Recaz was elected in his place. Then the National Committee appointed a new administration. During this period, military and civilian conflicts within the party began, and military Baathists fired those close to civilian Baathists, and civilian Baathists fired those close to military Baathists. As the military-civil conflict continued, in 1966, when Baathist officers led by Hafez Assad and Salah Cedit staged a coup, many civilian party leaders fled the country. Eflak and his supporters were detained, however, with the help of some of his trusted friends in the army, Eflak first fled to Beirut, and after some time left Beirut for Brazil. After the coup in Syria by Hafez Assad and Salah Cedit, the Baas party split into two, the Iraqi and the Syrian Baas party. After the fall of Eflak, Salah Chedid was brought to the helm of the Syrian Baas party, it was accepted that Zeki Arsuzi was the leader of the movement, and Eflak and Bitar were completely eliminated. After Eflak and Bitar, the new leaders of Syria became Salah Cedit and Hafez Assad. However, the defeat in the 6-day war and the admission of some members of the Black September Organization to Syria caused a rift between Salah Cedit and Hafez Assad. On November 13, 1970, Hafez Assad staged a coup against Salah Jadid and took the lead, and then, when he became the country's sole ruler, he decided to die in the absence of Eflak (Gundogdu, 2020).

Following this decision, Michel Eflak lost all influence in Syria. However, the Iraqi Baathist administration invited Michel Aflak to Iraq and gave him citizenship, and appointed him party leader. King Hussein of Jordan was angry that Iraq did not take a stand against the military operation it launched against Palestinian guerrillas and did not support the Palestinians, and Eflak left Iraq in 1970 and settled in Lebanon. In 1974, Eflak returned to Iraq and was re-appointed head of the party. He later played a major role in Saddam Hussein's takeover of Iraq in 1979 but had no say in the administration until his death. He lived in Iraq until 1989 and died in Paris. In addition, we learn from a letter written by Michel Eflak to his wife on July 29, 1961, which appeared in 2017, exactly 28 years after his death in 1989, reflecting his inner world and the thoughts he shared with his family, except from his official ideas:

„I wondered: what will happen to him if I don't live long? This is a question that has often been asked me lately. Who will take care of you and our children, who will provide for you after you lose your highest profession,

medical, because of me? Who will take care of you when you are a shy and slender girl? Despite the blows I have suffered in these two years due to the fact that many of my friends and comrades have turned their backs on me before your eyes, I have not lost faith in people. On the contrary, my belief that human behavior is good is much greater now, and that is why I believe that you, my people, whom I love and to whom I remain loyal, will not forget and will see the loyalty and respect of the Arabs. I say this not because I am proud of myself, but because I believe that the people of which I am a member will appreciate it; These people know I gave him everything I had. How can we not trust people, even though you have seen several examples of people who have shown their true love for us and reached the highest level in their generosity, closeness, and manners, without hesitation, during this time and in these difficult conditions we have gone through, oh dear mine?" (Gundogdu, 2020).

### **2.3.5. Arab socialism and classical Marxism**

Although the understanding of Baas Party socialism is very different from classical Marxism and communism, it emerged as a local movement independent of international movements. Arab socialism, which rejects Western democracy and Marxism, does not contain the belief that none of them is capable of solving the social and economic problems of the Arabs. Trying to create an understanding of socialism unique to Arab society, Michel Aflak sharply criticized Marxism, saying: „Marxism rejects what nations and spiritual values give. Communism is destructive because it comes with the promise of creating a paradise on earth. However, this paradise will come after the existing society is destroyed. Another destructive aspect comes from the desire to tie the Arab destiny to the Soviet Union" (Senturk, 2003, 102-103).

The socialism that Aflak wanted to synthesize with nationalism was, as he pointed out, a special kind of socialism. This kind of Arab socialism had nothing in common with classical Marxism. First, Arab intellectuals argued that Arab socialism was different, in order to break with the West and liquidate the remnants of cooperation with the colonialists there. The socialist system they advocated would stem from the economic and social conditions in a region independent of the West. In addition, Baas socialism, unlike classical

Marxism, was limited to the economic organization in the form of the distribution of wealth in the Arab nation on the basis of economic equality and justice among the citizens (Ozkoc, 2008).

Because the neglect of classical Marxism towards nationalism and its analysis of the economy was incompatible with the ideology of the Baas party. Another difference between Arab socialism and classical Marxism is the emphasis of Baas socialism on cooperation between individuals against exploitation and the concept of justice that will be provided later. In fact, this structure of Arab socialism is incompatible with classical Marxism, which is based on class conflicts. This type of socialism is undoubtedly different from the Western product of Marxism because it envisages class cooperation, not class war.

Finally, Arab socialism opposes the materialist philosophy of classical Marxism and does not accept that it attributes the development of society only to economic factors. The weight of spiritual values in Arab culture has found its place in Arab socialism, and it is stated that classical Marxism should be understood in its spirituality in order to achieve social and economic transformations, and not in its purely materialistic basis (Senturk, 2003).

Likewise, the Baathist intellectuals believed that Arab socialism would respond to the need for moral and just order in society. As can be seen, Arab socialism differs from classical Marxism in many respects, including its philosophical foundations. There is no doubt that Arab intellectuals were educated in the West, especially Michel Aflac, and the conditions of the mentioned period are the most important factors for the emergence of this type of socialism.

The Baas Party's view of Arab socialism as an indispensable element of party ideology is closely linked to the colonial past of Arab societies. The convenience of using Baath-specific Arab socialism in regional and international systems has been an important factor in both enabling greater movement and attracting the masses. Changes in the international arena have affected the spread of ideas based on Arab socialism, such as state control of resources for the benefit of society, state ownership, directing the production, and providing social services within the welfare state and their promise by the Baasists.

There are great differences between Arab socialism, shaped by the Baathist intellectuals, and classical Marxism. Among these two types of socialism, which have

different assumptions from ontological assumptions to the method they use, Arab socialism has taken on a new form by setting spirituality and national values based on history and life, as opposed to the materialism of classical Marxism. In addition, Arab socialism rejects class conflicts and relies on class cooperation to transform society.

Methodologically, Arab socialism envisages the transition of societies to a socialist just order through persuasion. In classical Marxism, on the other hand, there is an assumption that society will gradually move to a socialist order.

## **2.4. Social Power and Development in the Middle East: a transnational perspective**

A large number of observers and activists hope that recent events in the Middle East will trigger processes that will, in a fundamental way, change the existing structure, allow a greater degree of freedom, and form governments that have the ability and will to transform living conditions for most of their populations. In contrast, for some observers and activists, such hopes have been abandoned or have never been nurtured. The reason for that is reflected in the fact that economic structures and social structures have mostly remained untouched during coups, revolutions, and other types of political changes that have taken place in the region over the past seven decades (Halperin, 2014).

Within this part of the thesis, the anatomy of social power in the Middle East region and the structures that provided the opportunity to withstand the pressures of change will be considered. Primarily, the focus is on the regional structure of social power, which is reflected in dualistic economies, which are controlled by a narrow elite and which are deeply rooted within global networks. In the beginning, a brief overview of the evolution of global networks within which the creation and incorporation of a modern Middle Eastern state system took place will be highlighted. The section after that will provide a brief overview of the structure of social power in the region. In the very end, conditions will be considered in other parts of the world during recent history, which, by changing the balance of social power, have ensured the undermining of similar structures, while paving the way for transformative change (Halperin, 2014).

#### **2.4.1. Trans-local/Cross-Regional Structures: a horizontal perspective**

It seems that an increasing number of world experts and historians for non-Western regions are closer to the belief that all parts of the world have been closely interconnected for a long time and that Eurocentric perspectives tend to obscure this world while misrepresenting its history. The work of these experts and historians provides ample evidence of cross-similarities in the processes and outcomes of growth in world history, which, when combined, make conventional differences between developing and developed, non-Western and Western worlds increasingly unsustainable. At the same time, there is the possibility of noticing that this accumulated evidence of striking similarities in what is usually treated in the form of sharply different regional contexts as if easily combined to produce a gestalt shift, one that shifts our analytical focus from entire regions or nations to an essentially transnational set of processes, relationships, and connections (Halperin, 2014).

„Shifting our vision to a world divided ‘horizontally’ by supra-local networks of elite exchange, rather than ‘vertically’ by interactions among whole nation-states or regions, makes visible features of global development that conventions tend to obscure. From this angle of vision capitalism appears to have emerged, not from uniquely European developments, but from a changed domain of global interaction; to have developed, from the start, across international frontiers rather than within them, and based on interactions and connections, not of whole societies, but of interdependent centres of elite accumulation across the world” (Halperin, 2014, 1). It seems as if capitalist expansion for most of its history has been based on urban export centers, city-states, and cities, not nation-states. In this regard, it is important to point out that the emergence of nation-states and nation-states occurred only after the Second World War and only in a few countries for a short time. At the same time, it seems that the processes of capitalist expansion are characterized by interdependent and synchronous growth of the place of accumulation of the elite, and not by the burning of the periphery and the global core (Halperin, 2014).

Understanding the structures within which capitalism developed requires a revision of our view of the industrial revolution. What people call the Industrial Revolution was essentially a reorganization of production that included the deregulation of capital and markets, the deindustrialization of rural areas/the concentration of production in urban areas, and the introduction of new forms of domination and lower classes. It is a

reorganization of economic life that has given Europeans the opportunity to launch a brutal expansion of output production that is becoming a model for ruling groups and elites around the world. The industrial revolution is the aforementioned separation of local economies and the expansion of production intended for export (Halperin, 2014).

Industrial production has enabled the search for huge profits, which has faced elites everywhere with the dilemma of how they can realize the value of a growing mountain of goods without leading to the democratization of consumption at home. Enabling the masses to be able to consume what they have produced would lead to the destruction of the income, land, and class structures and social equalization on which the existing structures of social power were based. The ubiquity of this concern around the world is evidenced by public statements, records of elite complaints, official documents, and lavish laws related to over-consumption. (Halperin, 2014).

The dilemma was solved by producing goods and services of the predominantly ruling group, the network elite, governments, and settlers in other countries. In this way, the need to develop mass purchasing power at home was eliminated „and, focused efforts, instead on developing it among foreign groups and ruling bodies through the creation of public debt, and investment in infrastructure, railroads and armaments. The result was an expansion of production that, both within and outside Europe, involved, not whole societies, but the advanced sectors of dualistic economies in interaction with others in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere” (Halperin, 2014, 2). In the area of almost all regions, similar structures appeared in the form of foreign-oriented enclaves and export platforms, which was a consequence of the trans-local relations and similarities and interdependencies that were created. As a consequence, there has been a global social order constructed with the help of horizontal solidarity within elite groups in different parts of the world (Halperin, 2014).

This regime of accumulation consolidated the imperial order from the 19th century, which is considered to have had greater cooperation and to have distributed its benefits significantly wider than a large number of scientists admit. The wealth and power of what was wrongly characterized in the form of the periphery were never destroyed or displaced. On the contrary, they continued to grow, while local elites made progress. For this order, the financial center was considered London. London, as an advanced sector of the dependent third world economy, was focused on forming strong ties between foreign

economies on the one hand and British export industries on the other, instead of integrating different parts of the domestic economy. Accordingly, while growing blocks of territory around the world were covered by British railway networks built and financed by Britain, supplied by its steamships, and defended by its warships, Britain itself represented until the early twentieth century, as Warner described „the equivalent of an underdeveloped country in such a critical condition that the relief agencies of the world would be mounting huge campaigns to work there“ (Warner, 1979, 17). On the other hand, Joad (1951) described Great Britain before the First World War as a small island of ostentation and luxury surrounded by a sea of mass misery and poverty.

In the form of the results of the First and Second World Wars and the Great Depression, there was a change in the balance of class power in those countries that became better known in the form of the First World. In that area, welfare reforms and regulation of industry and markets have ensured that production and investments serve for the expansion and integration of national markets. In the area of European countries that have become part of the other world, identical structural changes have taken place. Despite the fact that their autocratic power structures remained, these are the changes that ultimately enabled them to realize the political changes that took place in the first world in the 1980s through the "velvet revolution". However, cooperation among elites around the world has prevented the mentioned changes from happening in most of the rest of the world, ie in the area called the third world. In this vast world, due to the world wars and the Great Depression, the existing structures were reduced through corporate arrangements and national development projects that reduced dualism and other features of capitalist development that all these worlds had before the end of World War II. As a consequence, there has been a rapid divergence between what is known in the form of advanced industrial countries (first and second world) and the developing world (third world) (Halperin, 2014).

#### **2.4.2. The Structure of Social Power in the Contemporary Middle East**

In the Middle East, as in other regions, for centuries social structures have been characterized by a landowning elite that is narrow and powerful. As in Europe and other regions, the power of landowners in the Middle East has been strengthened as additional land has been cultivated to export crops. In the same way that during the 18th and 19th centuries, landowners who were common property were closed by English landowners,

during the 19th century in the Middle East, landowners expelled small owners whose titles were based solely on custom. At the same time, as in England during the 19th century, mechanization accelerated the process, giving large landowners an advantage over small breeders (Halperin, 2014).

As elsewhere, in the Middle East, landowning elites sought to profit from the expansion of cultivated land. At the same time, they preserved the structures on which their privileges were based. However, during the 19th century, the Ottoman government introduced policies and reforms aimed at expanding the capitalist middle class (tanzimat); despite the emergence of a separate capitalist middle class that began to emerge to exercise political power, its expansion has jeopardized traditional social class structures, and above all, the privileges and powers of those at its top - predominantly Arab Muslim Muslim landowners and clerical elites. Due to the opposition of the Arab landowners and clerical elites to the reforms of the Tanzamites, nationalist movements of the 19th century eventually emerged, which were translated into traditional knowledge in Iraq and Syria and elsewhere. However, most Arab nationalists were not focused on establishing separate states. They only sought to restore Arab autonomy within the Empire, but also the expected defeat and defeat of the Ottomans (Halperin, 2014).

During the First World War, these aspirations were transformed by the empire into movements for national independence. The Arab glories that led them demanded, not the overthrow of the traditional order, but the return of the autonomy and local power that had previously enjoyed Ottoman society (Hourani, 1968).

When the Ottoman Empire entered Europe on the side of the Central Powers in 1914, support was shifted by the French and British governments to dissatisfied Arab glories (from the Ottoman Sultan). In this way, the Arab elites were given the opportunity to survive the coups and power struggles that accompanied the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the restoration of autonomy and power that they began to lose due to the introduction of tanzimat reforms (Halperin, 2014).

The Arab allies of France and Britain, under the United Nations mandate system, were given regimes and monarchies in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. On the other hand, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait (which were developed in the form of rival domains of allied British families), and Oman remained under British protection until the 1970s. Al-Saud was protected by the United States and Great Britain from his previous

rule and local opponents. Due to the mentioned connections, the construction of a modern state system in the Middle East has led to a change in the exclusively political structure of the region. Namely, the social structure remained intact during the period of transition from the empire to the modern state system (Halperin, 2014).

For Arab elites, after outgrowing the ruling classes of the independent successor states, the first project was to eliminate the middle class that had grown up with the help of tanzimat reforms. Primarily, members of minority groups and foreigners who were allowed to perform the functions of the entrepreneurial bourgeois class in industry, finance, and trade and, to a large extent, professions were eliminated. Then came the subjugation of the indigenous industrial and entrepreneurial middle class. The expansion of the mentioned class was not only a consequence of tanzimat, but it was also a consequence of the expanded industrial production that occurred during the First and Second World Wars. The growth of this group came to a halt during the 1950s when in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, states and their bureaucracies prevented producer groups from having sufficient autonomy to form institutions that could lead to expanding their economic base (Issawi, 1982). Instead, the industrial and commercial elements were subordinated to urban welfare and traditional land ownership and absorbed into state bureaucracies that were inefficient and overblown (Halperin, 2014).

In line with the above, it is concluded that, despite everything written about the rise of the new middle class in the Middle East, no economy class had enough strength to oppose the power of urban significance and traditional landowner classes. Egypt's economic development, after the end of the First World War, was translated into an older property class that grew into an industrialist (Davis, 1983). In Syria, in the area of the cities of Hami and Homs and their surrounding villages, economic power has remained with the old landlord aristocracy and traditional urban significance (Petran, 1972). There was a mass of government and bureaucratic officials in Jordan who had no independent economic and political power other than that given to them by the Crown. A small governing elite has developed in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bakhtin, and the United Arab Emirates). It was characterized by close connection and dependence on the ruling king, emir, or sultan (Halperin, 2014).

Despite the fact that the revolution of North Yemen in 1962 led to a change in the formal political structure, the economic life of the country was left under the control of

tribal leaders and other traditional leaders. In Lebanon, the real middle class existed before the civil wars. However, much of the middle class fled the country during the 1970s and 1980s (Halperin, 2014).

Taken as a whole, the strong traditional elite of landowners and urban dignitaries that grew into the ruling class of independent Arab states proved successful when it came to adapting, absorbing, and curbing various industrial and commercial elements that emerged during the 19th and early 20th centuries. During the middle of the 20th century, the ruling elite of the party, bureaucratic and military personnel took control of the state in a number of Arab states. However, this is an elite that did not differ significantly from the Ottoman petty-bourgeois and military ruling elites. Elites, under the Ottoman Empire, had a local government, while after the revolutions in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, they continued to do so under petty-bourgeois regimes. At the same time, despite the fact that they did not directly control the military and political apparatus of the state, their constant control of traditional local bases of power gave them the opportunity to block far-reaching reforms within social and economic structures (Halperin, 2014).

#### ***2.4.2.1. The Arab Cold War***

After the First World War, one of the most important features of the Middle East is considered to be the rise of communist, socialist, and other left-wing political organizations on the one hand and the intense social conflicts that were generated and followed. Similar struggles have taken place in Europe and many other parts of the world. These are fights that took place in different regions in different ways. At the same time, after the Second World War, their development was strongly influenced by the reasons why the conflicts occurred and the way in which they occurred. After the Second World War in the Middle East, there were parties and movements of the left in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iran, and others in the region. They were suppressed by local security forces with the help of France and Britain. Nevertheless, after World War II with the revival of these groups, regional elites who wanted to monopolize access to new sources and means of wealth production, foreign powers determined to make the world safe for investors and capitalist producers, were shut down. ranks within the campaign for eradication, not only for communists and socialists but for any element that calls for land reform and democracy, including center-left, liberal, and other reformist movements and groups (Halperin, 2014).

It is a campaign whose goal was allegedly to curb Soviet expansionism. Her prosecution was often carried out through imprisonment, expulsions, bloody police actions, and violent conflicts. Nevertheless, when it comes to the political and socio-economic development of the region, probably the most far-reaching consequences were two violent means that were less open. The first of the violent means were institutions and policies, which together produced and maintained a dualistic economy reminiscent of enclaves in Arab states. The elites, with the help of maintaining the aforementioned overall pattern of development, had the opportunity to expand production and increase their wealth. At the same time, they restricted access to resources and blocked the growth of new classes. Accordingly, while elites in the Middle East gained significant wealth and enjoyed the standard and lifestyle that was characteristic of elites in the United States and Western Europe, the living standards of the mass population continued to be close to subsistence levels. Another violent tool used during the campaign against reformism and the left was represented by actively helping and supporting the growth of the religious far-right, which functioned against the left as a bulwark. „As a result, today there is no left, center or even moderate right organized enough to compete successfully in open elections with the religious far-right” (Halperin, 2014, 6).

„Historically, the emergence of democracy has been associated with the disintegration of traditional class structures, an increase in the power of the working class over other classes, relatively more nationally ingrained capitalism, the development of purchasing power among the mass labor force, and the expansion and integration of domestic markets” (Halperin, 2014, 6). However, in the Middle East, after World War II, there was the Cold War Crusade, which banned traditional class structures while limiting the power of the working class on the one hand and encouraging the rise of anti-democratic, ultra-right groups on the other. In this way, the development of the very conditions that were related to democracy in Europe and other parts of the world was prevented (Halperin, 2014).

#### ***2.4.2.2. Nationalist Politics and the Reproduction of Traditional Socio Economic Structures***

During nationalist revolutions and coups in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt in the 1950s, bureaucratic and military elites came to power. Nevertheless, in these countries, revolutions

have never aimed at transforming traditional social structures. The free officers who overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 did not represent class interests that were fundamentally different from the interests of Egypt's traditional ruling class. It is important to point out that they were a substitute within the established structure, not enemies of the ruling class (Hussein, 1973). Accordingly, the British government issued an order to its occupying army to intervene in the name of the king. She, in cooperation with the Americans and the French, negotiated with the new regime, making concessions that helped them consolidate their power (Halperin, 2014).

During the period between July 1952 and the end of 1954, in the first years of their rule, the new regime severely repressed all trade union and political organizations associated with the petty bourgeoisie or the industrial proletariat. Free officers, like the political leaders and kings they replaced, were persistent anti-communists. In that way, in the area of Egypt, despite the rhetoric of the social revolution, they immediately started suppressing communism and other leftist elements. The nationalist movement then supported militancy in the form of contributions to the fight against foreign economic influence. However, the new regime suppressed all trade union and political organizations, as well as strikes and other manifestations of the working class. There was an institutionalization of „corporate, ethnic and religious, and selectively anti-imperialist, nationalist policies that brought the organization of labor under state control, targeted minorities and foreign elements that were instrumental in the development of communist parties and labor movements in the region and ensured wealth was created. the exploitation of national resources by Western business interests be limited in its distribution, locally, only to a narrow elite” (Halperin, 2014, 7).

The Iraqi Baas party, like Egypt's free officers, has been very anti-communist since its inception. During 1958, a coup against King Faisal II led by Colonel Abdul-Salem Aref and Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim led to the overthrow of the monarchy and the proclamation of a republic. After 1958, the Iraqi Communist Party grew rapidly, while building support in Kurdistan, southern Iraq, and Baghdad and gaining control of professional, youth, women's, and student unions, as well as newspapers and broadcasting facilities. At the same time, Iraqi communists have managed to hire a large part of their supporters for strategic jobs in the government. In this way, for example, they ensured almost complete control of the Ministry of Education and Information. During February 1963, a coup against the Kasim regime was carried out by a coalition of the Muslim

Brotherhood, Baathist army officers and anti-communist civilian members of the Baas party. On that occasion, Colonel Aref was appointed president, Kasim was executed, while the government and the army were cleansed of all communists and their sympathizers. About 10,000 people were killed during the coup and the anti-communist chase that followed. There is a general view that the United States was significantly involved in these events. At the same time, it is believed that the United States was involved in strengthening the rule of Saddam Hussein, who was the leader of the Baas party faction that took power in a coup in July 1968. In 1972, Bath called on the Iraqi Communist Party to participate in the government of the National Progressive Front. The Baathist National Front was used to expand control over mass organizations formerly dominated by the Iraqi Communist Party, creating joint lists of Baathist candidates for organizational functions. However, after Baas Kurdish policy was criticized by the Iraqi Communist Party in 1975, Baas began repression of the party. The Iraqi Communist Party left the Front in March 1979, formally dissolving the National Progressive Front (Halperin, 2014).

As already pointed out, the governments of the Iraqi Batista and Nasser called themselves Arab socialists. The removal of the Baathist movement has led to the formation of the term Arab socialism, with the aim of clearly emphasizing that it is not about macro-socialism, but primarily about an ideology that is different and in most respects opposed (Ismael, 1976). However, within the real practice and its doctrines, Arab socialism resembled what was called National Socialism in Europe. When it comes to Arab socialism, it, like National Socialism, represents a corporatist ideology and primarily, like corporate ideologies in Europe in the early twentieth century, deals with copying and restraining workers' movements and independent bourgeoisie (Halperin, 2014).

#### ***2.4.2.3. The Religious Right***

As in Europe in the past, in the Middle East, the religious establishment was associated with an urban respectable elite and a dominant traditional landowning elite. He shared with them a common interest in preserving the structures of traditional life. These are elites who oppose land reform and other democratic and liberal reforms, such as education and legal reform, religious tolerance, the rights of national minorities, women's rights, and the expansion of labor rights. The religious right called for the expulsion of the Christian population and other infidels from the Middle East and attacks on governments

trying to introduce reforms. In the area of Lebanon and Syria, the emergence of Islamic radicalism occurred during the 60s and 70s of the XX century. He was at odds with land reform and other socialist policies that threatened the traditional system of patronage. In Jordan and Egypt during the 1980s, the policy of economic liberalization led to a revival of religious opposition to the state. In whatever country the reform measures were introduced, they were unable to withstand anti-reform pressure from both the right-wing religious and traditional establishment and newer Islamist groups. Accordingly, in no country in the region have significant political and economic reforms been implemented by governments (Halperin, 2014).

In 1928, the Egyptian teacher Hasan al-Banna, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, founded the first religious-political organization to enter the political arena. During 1396, she began political activity, after taking over the action of the Palestinian Arabs against Zionism. There has been an association of Egyptian landowners and industrialists with the Muslim Brotherhood and Palestinian dignitaries, over concerns that contacts with the West, technical knowledge and Jewish capital would deprive it of the Middle East markets it hopes for. The goal of the association was to oppose further immigration of Jews, and to preserve Palestine as an Arab country. The Brotherhood has taken the lead in mobilizing mass support for the Palestinian Arabs. At the same time, she organized attacks on Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Catholic churches (Davis, 1983). Until December 1948, his political activities in Egypt led to the deterioration of his relations with the government, as a result of which it was banned. After that, she formed close ties with members of the free officers who took power in Egypt in 1952. All political parties were dissolved by the new government. The exception was the Brotherhood. Nasser was abandoned by the organization when it attacked him due to attempts to abolish sharia courts and nationalize religious endowments. However, reform attempts continued to be thwarted by anti-reform pressure exerted by the traditional and religious establishment (al-Nowaihi, 1979). Anwar al-Sadat, Nasser's successor, originally also had attempted to use the Muslim Brotherhood as a counterweight to the left. However, he, like Nasser, clashed with the organization in the end (Halperin, 2014).

Important branches of the Muslim Brotherhood have been developed in Jordan and Syria. Thus, in the 1950s, in the area of Jordan, all political parties were suppressed by the government, except the Muslim Brotherhood. Jordan before 1967 and Israel after 1967 allowed Islamic groups to act in the West Bank as a counterweight to left-wing, secular

nationalist forces. Finally, as is the case with Egypt, there was a direct conflict between these groups and all these countries. After that, they started to organize against them. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood launched a campaign against the Baas government in the 1970s. The campaign was followed by strikes, violent demonstrations, killings, and attacks. During the two years, 1980 and 1991, thousands of people lost their lives in violent clashes with reprisals and government troops and bomb blasts. The Islamic Front (which also includes the Muslim Brotherhood) launched a comprehensive offensive in Hama in 1982 against security forces and Baas party activists. The government used commando units and heavy artillery and tank convoys in response. In the two weeks that followed, a minimum of 25,000 people died. They were all slaughtered (Halperin, 2014).

With the consent of the Saudi government, during the 1990s, Islamist movements received hundreds of millions of dollars from wealthy Saudis. In the territory of Saudi Arabia, the government's great support is directed towards the maintenance and protection of Muslim religious places on the one hand, and the implementation of strict respect for the social norms of Islam on the other hand. The religious establishment, however, strongly opposed the government's attempts to introduce modest reforms. These reforms included strictly separate participation of women in higher education, expanded autonomy for provincial authorities, the creation of a written corpus of laws and a consultative council. Through mosques and religious societies, she launched a coordinated attack. This included recording and distributing hundreds of thousands of cassettes, lecturing at religious universities and public speeches in mosques. The monarchy was constantly forced to step down, fearing further antagonism with an extremely organized, potentially dangerous and politically powerful religious establishment (Halperin, 2014).

„With Islamist groups threatening right-wing regimes, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia found a way to keep them busy fighting an anti-communist jihad in Afghanistan. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. no longer required their services and stopped funding them. This triggered an Islamist war against the U.S. and its allies, beginning in 1991” (Halperin, 2014, 9-10). Al Qaeda, an Islamist network organization, opposes US support for right-wing governments such as Saudi Arabia. Namely, according to al-Qaeda, these governments do not represent the right-wing enough. Islamists, thanks to the Cold War crusade against the left, form the most powerful, richest and most organized political movement in the Middle East (Halperin, 2014).

### 2.4.3. Comparative Reflections

It is possible to say that from the very beginning, capitalist development had a transnational nature, in line with the fact that it included exclusively regions or sectors within nationally connected societies and not societies as a whole. The transnational nature continues along with the networks that connect the export sectors with each other, and not through the expansion and integration of economies and national societies. Almost everywhere and always, there was a dualistic development of capitalism. Namely, capitalism was characterized by a poorly integrated and limited domestic economy, in which there are strong links between foreign economies and sectors in expansion (Halperin, 2014).

Europeans developed a model of dualistic development at home. At the same time, they helped or encouraged its development abroad. Until the First and Second World Wars, as a result, in the area of Europe and the modern development world, political development and socio-economic development were not essentially different (Halperin, 2014).

Until the First and Second World Wars, the predominantly traditional landlord elites were those who formed the basis of Europe's capitalist classes. At the same time, they led capitalist development, dominating the state apparatus. There was a geographical and sectoral limitation of industrialization. It was conducted by a low-skilled, low-paid, and automated workforce. The production was intended for export to governments, elites, and ruling groups in other territories and countries, and not for local mass consumption. At the same time, industrialization was characterized by a poorly integrated and limited domestic market (Halperin, 2014).

The design of political institutions was such as to maintain the power of traditional forces over the lower classes. It can be said that political institutions have generally succeeded in achieving that goal. The working class has not been increased due to mobilization for large-scale industrial production, as is commonly assumed. Namely, it was done due to mass mobilizations for world wars. In this way, it is possible to achieve full, stable democracy in Europe (Halperin, 2014).

After the war, the order in Europe was based on social democratic reforms, which Europe had previously resisted strongly and often violently. As Schumpert noted, mass capitulation before social democratic reforms was forced in the form of the results of

decisive changes in the balance of class power that took place throughout Europe in the form the results of the Second World War. The mentioned author pointed out that in this way not only the transformation that took place in this area was explained, but also what represented its permanence. In this regard, he states:

„[t]he business class has accepted ‘gadgets of regulation’ and ‘new fiscal burdens, a mere fraction of which it would have felt to be unbearable fifty years ago.... And it does not matter whether the business class accepts this new situation or not. The power of labor is almost strong enough in itself and amply so in alliance with the other groups that have in fact, if not in words, renounced allegiance to the scheme of values of the private-profit economy to prevent any reversal which goes beyond an occasional scaling off of rough edges” (Schumpeter, 1976, 419-420).

As Schumpeter observed, the change in the balance of power meant that the changes that took place after the Second World War would not be annulled. Previous regional fires have been accompanied by restorations. The revolutions of 1789, 1820, 1830, and 1848 took place in Europe, which led to a stronger position of bankers and industrialists on the one hand, and a weakening of the influence of landowners on the other. In some places, these revolutions have led to the replacement of political personnel. However, they failed to provoke fundamental transformations of social structures (Halperin, 2014).

After 1917, in the territory of Europe (except Russia), the traditional social structure was essentially intact until the end of the Second World War. There has been an expansion of suffrage, and reform of local governments and legislatures. At the same time, social and economic structures have remained essentially the same. However, after 1945, changes in the balance of social power and consequent changes within the class structure led to the impossibility of restoration and the possibility of thorough reconstruction in accordance with the policy of redistribution which, before the war, was effectively blocked (Halperin, 2014).

„Between 1914 and 1945, the mobilization of mass armies to fight two extremely destructive wars in Europe, and the enormous industrial expansion undertaken by governments to support them, launched a social revolution that transformed social structures and placed economies on fundamentally different foundations. As a result of these events, in some parts of the world -

in Europe, in several Asian countries where similar changes have been imposed, and in new settlement areas (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) - living conditions have begun to differ rapidly from those which exist everywhere in the world” (Halperin, 2014, 11).

It soon became common to characterize the world in such a way that it is viewed divided into developed and developing countries. In the West, it is a division that was not attributed to revolutionary and recent transformations but was attributed to the further evolution of processes that supposedly defined the separation of the West from the rest of the world, which began in the 16th century (Halperin, 2014).

However, it was only after the end of the Second World War that a set of conditions emerged that defined developed countries. Namely, developed countries are those countries 1) in which their traditional social structures have collapsed through land reforms and other reforms and in the form of war results or external agents (South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the whole of Europe); 2) who have previously experienced a significant decline in the power of landowners in the form of the results of one of the bloodiest wars in history (USA 1860s) or 3) in which there has never been an elite rooted in the land (New Zealand, Canada, Australia) (Halperin, 2014).

During the early 1950s, the binary of developing and developed countries was replaced by a tripartite division of the world. According to this division, the capitalist countries belong to the first world, while the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union belong to the second world. The third developing world was considered to be the rest of the world made up of 2/3 of the planet's surface and ¾ world population (Mason, 1997). In the form of the results of coordinated, sustainable, and mass-funded global efforts in this area, pre-war social structures have been preserved for more than 50 years and are largely intact today (Halperin, 2014).

However, the existence of the three worlds did not last long. Namely, until the 70s and 80s of the XX century, the countries that belonged to the first and second world quickly began to return to the patterns and structures that existed before the war. The period that followed the Second World War could be viewed as an interregnum. Namely, it is about two to three decades during which, in several areas of the world, due to social-revolutionary changes, the work of patterns of capitalist social reproduction, which were considered historically normal, was suspended (Halperin, 2014).

Viewed from a historical angle, the emergence of democracy is associated with 1) the disintegration of traditional class structures, 2) an increase in the power of the working class compared to other classes, 3) relatively more nationally polished capitalism, 4) the development of purchasing power in mass labor. strength of the domestic population and 5) expansion and integration of domestic markets. At the same time, democracy was linked to state policies. In this regard, government policies ensured an increase in wages with a profit, so that labor increased labor productivity, which provided the possibility of higher mass consumption for new mass consumer industries. It is important to emphasize that none of the mentioned changes in the quantitative and qualitative literature related to the research of the needs of democracy has been highlighted. At the same time, their results are neither conceived nor promoted through the efforts of non-governmental and international organizations and Western governments in promoting democracy (Halperin, 2014).

Structural adjustment programs have been established to open the economy wider to foreign trade and foreign capital. These are programs that are promoted in the form inextricably linked to the expansion of civil society and democracy. Evidence of the persistence of structural adjustment programs can be seen in the fact that measures prescribed by these programs at the same time, with almost unchanged regularity, are at the heart of a number of other programs and initiatives, such as democratization programs, stabilization measures, good governance proposals. civil society initiatives, post-reconstruction after disasters and wars, shock therapies, rapid transitions from socialist systems. However, these are measures that are directly opposite to the changes associated with achieving democracy in the West, including the restoration of regulatory and social functions by states that were renounced during the nineteenth century, and the conduct of policies designed to expand domestic markets, producing a fairer distribution of resources and increasing domestic investment. It is important that this history be corrected. Misconceptions about the way democracy has been achieved in the past do not work exclusively in academic research and writing. At the same time, democracy is shaping expectations in the third world, democratization and development initiatives promoted by Western agencies, and our understanding of globalization itself and the relationship between globalization and democratic struggles around the world (Halperin, 2014).

### 3. ARAB SOCIALISM IN RETROSPECT

The first two important elements of Baas's ideology were nationalism and freedom, while the third and most important element in Baas's ideology was Arab socialism. The idea of socialism first began to appear in the writings of Christian Arab thinkers, who expressed their efforts to find solutions to economic and social problems in Arab geography at the end of the 19th century. The socialist thought of the Baas party was completely different from the content and ideals of European socialism and communism. This region-specific approach had nothing to do with the idea of socialism expressed in the international system. The idea that the socialist and Marxist communist views of the West were not suitable for solving the economic and social problems of Arab geography was the basic understanding of the founders of the Baathists.

Due to the lack of industrialization, a mass working-class and a conscious peasant society have not yet appeared in Syria. Baas approached socialism not only as an economic ideology but also as a set of values that would participate in social movements and bring individual prestige, using the power of the new middle class for wages. The Baas party has always seen socialism as a means, not an end (Sen, 2010).

The idea of socialism idealized by the Baas party, at the same time as early Arab socialism, had different meanings than Marxist theory. The socialism that Eflak wanted to synthesize with nationalism, as he underlined, was a special kind of socialism. This kind of Arab socialism had nothing to do with Marxist ideology (Ozkoc, 2008).

The Baas party had reason to bring a new understanding of Arab socialism to socialism, unlike the socialist discourse in the West. The first reason was the severance of ties with the West, which is known in the Arab world as a colonialist. Another issue was the liquidation of those who collaborated with the colonialists. Arab intellectuals spread the idea that Arab socialism was different and made people believe that the socialist system would emerge from the economic and e-social conditions of Arab geography without copying from the West.

Contrary to the ideas of the socialist system, the socialism constructed by the Baathists were limited to the realization of economic restructuring that would serve to achieve equality and justice among citizens and create a rapid and radical change in the

system of production. Prema Baathistima, marksizam je bio daleko od odgovora na arapsko nacionalno pitanje, ali ideja socijalizma nemarksističkog stila mogla bi zadovoljiti želje arapskog sveta. (Ozkoc, 2008). The distance of Orthodox Marxism from nationalism and its analysis of the economic structure did not affect the new vision of the state and society of the Baas Party. According to the Baathists, Marxism, which accepted the economic and social structure of the Western world as data and analyzed it, did not have access to solving the national problem related to the war for independence and the system of exploitation in the Arab world. According to them, socialism would save the individual from destruction, prevent exploitation, create an adequate standard of living, remove obstacles to individual development and ensure the mission of the Arab natio (Sen, 2010).

The idea of socialism defended by the Baas party was based primarily on the fight against exploitation and cooperation among individuals and on the concept of justice that would be provided later. This ideology, which was associated with Arab nationalism, could not then be based on class struggle, which is the main argument of Marxist thought. While advocating for the unity of the Arab world that the West has artificially created and fragmented, it would not be functional for the Baas because it would increase the fragmentation created for the Baas to affirm the existence of class struggle and develop its policies accordingly. For the Baathists, socialism was supposed to carry the ideal of class cooperation, not the idea of class struggle. This approach had a different setting from the socialist thought discussed or practiced in the West.

Arab socialism, built by the Baas party, also rejected the universalist characteristics of Western-style socialism. At the origin of this idea, the idea that the Soviet Union could replace Western domination had a special share. After the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, new initiatives by the Soviet Union regarding communism brought more freedom of action to communist and socialist parties in Arab geography. This paved the way for the socialist parties to cooperate with the nationalist parties.

Michel Eflak closely followed the model that Tito applied in Yugoslavia. Tito's model was known as the first socialist country to advocate principles that favored nationalism over communist internationalism. The first idea that the Baas party wanted to move away from the Yugoslav model was the practice of worker participation in factory management. The Baas party also saw socialism as a functional role to bring together Syria's highly divided social structure under one roof. As a mosaic country, Syria consisted

of different beliefs, different ethnic structures, and different tribal structures. Baathist thinkers believed that by creating a sense of equality, socialism would alleviate hostilities between these groups and prevent one of the groups from establishing political dominance. Simply put, socialism had the function of preventing differences in the social sphere between Muslim Arabs, Christians, Druze, Kurds, and others. This idea would not require cultural assimilation as long as economic inequalities have been eliminated (Sen, 2010).

Baathist socialism opposed the Marxist idea of economic determinism. Baas claimed that any attempt to explain history only in terms of economy (infrastructure) would undermine the spiritual values that the Arabs love. While socialism in Marxist thought was the inevitable result of dialectical materialism, Batista thought argued that socialism could be accepted by persuading the majority of society, in which case socialism would respond to the demand for spirituality and a just system among people (Jaber, 1970).

It should not be forgotten that Arab socialism, although in the years when nationalism progressed, especially in the 1950s, was a turn to the left with the Arab Socialist Party, was less important, but with the beginning of the neo-Baathist government, the struggle began to change. Unity was necessary before we came to socialism. Bitar emphasized that without the unification of the Arab countries, they cannot achieve real economic and social development individually. When the practice of unity with Egypt collapsed in the early 1960s, the radical wing of the Baas Party began to emphasize the need to build an economic and social order with a socialist structure in all Arab states before unity (Jaber, 1970).

### **3.1. The Suez Crisis and the Birth of Arab Egypt**

Developments in two Arab countries, Syria and Egypt, are key to understanding the dynamics of development and the political impact of the ideology of Arab nationalism. While Syria is his spiritual homeland, in Egypt until the 1950s the sense of belonging to the wider Arab community was subordinated to the idea of a distinctive Egyptian nation, articulated within territorially defined Egyptian nationalism<sup>1</sup> unity in its ideological fabric

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<sup>1</sup> Although the first historical manifestation of Egyptian nationalism was the uprising of 1879-1882, led by Urabi Pasha, under the slogan „Egypt for the Egyptians”, against the keditiv Tefik and the growing British influence in the country, the person most responsible for its articulation was Mustafa Kamil, a modernly educated jurist who emerged at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries as the leader of the first nationalist liberation movement from British rule. At the heart of his nationalist agitation was the image of Egypt as a

will decisively influence the consolidation of Arab nationalism as the most politically potent ideology in the region, but also the establishment of the Middle East as a zone of enduring tensions and conflicts in which regional rivalry will be closely intertwined with world powers.

The „Arabization” of Egyptian national consciousness did not, of course, take place in a sociopolitical vacuum. Immediately after World War II, Anglo-Egyptian relations entered a new phase of tension, generated by Britain's refusal to revise the 1936 agreement that limited Egyptian sovereignty and evacuated its troops from Suez. The government's failure to secure Egypt's full sovereignty and defeat in the Arab-Israeli war has discredited the large landowner class that has dominated the Egyptian parliament since 1923, King Farouk's frivolous extravagance and corruption scandals involving members of the ruling Wafd Party. are also the last remnants of the regime's legitimacy. The Egyptian masses, deeply dissatisfied with the general situation in the country, were ready for a revolution. When on the night of July 22-23, 1952, military units loyal to the Free Officer's secret organization occupied, almost without any resistance, all key points in Cairo, a new era in the modern history of Egypt and the Middle East began.

The July Revolution was the child of Egyptian nationalists still immune to the seductive call of the idea of pan-Arab unity. Their focus was not on inter-Arab relations but on the sociopolitical corruption of Egyptian society and the unresolved issue of the British military presence. As Nasser himself will once admit, in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 to 1949, he and his Egyptian comrades-in-arms fought for Palestine, but their dreams were in Egypt. „Our bullets”, he recalled his days on the Palestinian battlefield, „targeted enemies hidden in the trenches, but our hearts were with our homeland, which was like prey left to the wolves that ravaged it” (Dawisha, 2005, 135). Britain and Israel, in an effort to

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coherent and unique nation with roots in the ancient pharaonic past, shaped by specific geographical, climatic, and historical circumstances and whose distinctive history is reflected in the distinctive genius of its people (Salem, 1994). After World War I, the Wafd Party took over the leadership of the nationalist movement, and one of its founders, Ahmad Lufti al-Sajjid, became the chief architect of a liberal nationalist ideology that advocated the Egyptian people's right to self-determination and promoted Egypt's vision. in which Muslims and Copts are united by sacred ties of national solidarity, in which religion is separated from politics, the government is democratically established, and the individual rights of citizens are respected. Like Mustafa Kamil, Lufti believed that the Egyptian nation, as a distinctive political community, was shaped by bonds of communion, formed throughout history and within a specific geographical environment. For him, it was not an artificial creation of modernity, but a living organism that was born in the ancient times of Pharaonic Egypt and which, despite all the changes and adversities, has survived to this day. Numerous migrations and shifts of invaders have contributed to the ethnic, racial, and religious diversity of the Egyptian population, but thanks to the continuity of Egyptian history they have all been absorbed into one unique Egyptian nation. He considered Arab nationalism, especially its pan-Arab version, to be fundamentally contrary to the interests of the Egyptian nation (Wendell, 1972).

overthrow President Gamal Abdel Nasser, launched an invasion of Egyptian positions in the Sinai and Suez Canal zones. Under pressure from the United States and the international community, the occupying forces accepted a truce and in December 1956 evacuated their troops from Egyptian territory. Although defeated militarily, Nasser emerged from the war as a political victor. The Arab masses got their hero, the modern Saladin, who defeated the imperialist crusaders, and the Arab nationalists got their political leader, a statesman who was supposed to turn their dream of a united Arab state into a political reality.

### **3.2. The triumph of the unification policy and the first signs of a crisis**

Nasser's charisma, strengthened by the perceived victory in the Suez Crisis, but also by Egypt's absolute dominance over the Arab radio space, contributed to the mighty rise of Arab nationalism. The term „A single Arab nation from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea” has become commonplace in political speeches and newspaper articles, as well as in the everyday conversations of Arab citizens (Dawisha, 2005, 185). And as the number of those who believed in the indivisibility of the „Arab nation” grew, so did the faith of Arab nationalists in the imminent realization of their dream of a single Arab state. When the Egyptian-Syrian Union agreement was signed in Cairo on February 1, 1958, at the instigation of the BAAS party, and the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) was proclaimed, the Arab masses were in euphoria. Across the Arab world, people spontaneously gathered to celebrate what they considered to be the greatest Arab victory since the 12th century and the Saladin days. The referendum held in Syria and Egypt registered absolute support for unification – 99.25% in Syria and 99.8% in Egypt. Despite indications that these figures were inflated, there is no doubt that the UAR had broad voter support, especially in Syria (Dawisha, 2005).

Iraq at the time was still a stronghold of anti-Nasserist forces in the region. But the pan-Arab idea has already attracted a large number of supporters among members of the new middle class and, as will prove crucial, the Iraqi military. On July 14, 1958, troops led by nationalist officers occupied Baghdad, overthrew the monarchy, and proclaimed a republic. The Prime Minister, the young King Faisal II, was killed in a bloody campaign, and almost all members of the royal family. General Abdul Karim Kasem took power, announced close cooperation between the Republican government and Egypt, and recognized the UAR. A few days after the military coup, Colonel Aref, one of the new

regime's leading men, met with Nasser in Damascus and expressed hope for Iraq's imminent accession to the Egyptian-Syrian union. Nasser was at the height of his power, and Arab nationalism was constituted as the leading ideology of the Arab world. However, cracks in the magnificent building of his Arab unification project soon surfaced. For a number of geographical and political reasons, Nasser was not in a position to take on the role of the Arab Bismarck. The political societies of the Arab states were so different that neither the common culture nor the emotional euphoria of Arab nationalism was enough to unite them.

The fate of the Iraqi monarchy has caused concern among Arab rulers, who have recognized a direct threat to the survival of their regimes in Nasser's policy of exporting the revolution and pretending to impose itself as the leader of the Arab world. The interests of Saudi Arabia, which had acted as an important ally of Nasser until the Suez Crisis, were at odds with the goals of revolutionary Arab nationalism. While acknowledging the existence of specific ties between Arab countries, the conservative Saudi monarchy believed that the unity of the Arab world should be based on Islam and not on secularly conceived Arabism (Dawisha, 2005). In Lebanon, Nasser's pressure to sever diplomatic relations with the West sparked a crisis in relations between Sunnis and Maronite Christians, prompting Lebanese President Camille Chamoun to seek Washington's help and approve the deployment of US troops in the country. In Jordan, pro-Egyptian elements in the army tried to overthrow King Hussein and declare Jordan a republic.

Convinced, not without reason, that Nasser was behind the failed military coups, the king declared a state of emergency, accepted American military and economic aid, and launched an action to arrest domestic Nasserists. This marked the beginning of a period of new divisions and tensions in inter-Arab relations that were equally the result of the Cold War policy of the great powers and the diametrically different interests of the Arab states (Kerr, 1971). In the coming years, these divisions will be led by the so-called Arab Cold War – a conflict between revolutionary Arab regimes of pro-Soviet orientation and conservative, pro-Western monarchies led by Saudi Arabia.

Nasser's problem, however, was not just Lebanon and conservative Arab monarchies. The events in Iraq will warn of the existence of serious divisions within the nationalist movement and be the first indication of the intrinsic weakness of the idea of Arab unity. The very possibility of Iraq joining the UAR has revived old sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites who perceived the idea of Arab unity as a Sunni project

designed to subjugate the Shiite community. The clashes escalated in March 1959 when a group of Nasserist officers, with significant UAR support, attempted to overthrow General Kasim. The unity of the revolutionary movement was shattered, and Nasser and Qasim found themselves on opposite sides – the former on the side of pan-Arab nationalism and the latter on the side of Arab nationalism based on state sovereignty (Batatu, 2004).

Nasser's main problem, however, was the UAR government. The leadership of the BAAS party that initiated the unification realized that Nasser was unwilling to share power with them in the common state. Instead of the expected equality, Syria was reduced to the position of a younger partner, and its administrative, legal and military system was gradually absorbed into the Egyptian one (Mansfield, 2003). In late 1959, the Baathists withdrew from the government and became the fiercest critic of Nasser's rule in Syria. On September 28, 1961, the army took action and declared Syria's withdrawal from the common state. After the original intention to intervene and prevent the disintegration of the UAR, Nasser changed his mind and announced that he accepted Syria's decision.

Arab cities welcomed the news of the disintegration of the UAR in gloomy, agonizing silence. The seemingly impenetrable armor of Arab unity shot through the seams, but the emotions were still strong. The faith of Arab nationalists in the power of their ideology to overcome all divisions and particularist tendencies within the Arab world revived in 1963 when military coups in Iraq and Syria brought the Baas party to power and new regimes announced their support for a federation of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. However, mistrust between Nasser and the Syrian BAAS soon surfaced. An agreement to establish a tripartite federation was reached in April, but unification remained a dead letter. Clashes within the Iraqi BAAS and the purge of Nasserist officers in Syria alienated Nasser, who concluded that Arab political unification is not possible at the moment.

Despite the failure of the unification policy, Nasser continued to believe that the policy of interfering in the internal affairs of other states in the name of the revolutionary goals of Arab nationalism was justified and necessary. This belief will lead him to support pro-Egyptian Yemeni army officers who rebelled against Imam Muhammad al-Badr in September 1962, occupied cities and proclaimed a republic. The imam managed to escape to the hard-to-reach mountainous areas of Yemen where he gathered northern tribes and sought the support of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Convinced that the military intervention would be short-lived and of limited scope, Nasser sent a contingent of the Egyptian army to

the Yemeni capital Sana'a. It was, as Nasser himself would later admit, one of his worst political decisions. Egypt is embroiled in a protracted civil war, the so-called „Egyptian Vietnam”, which will exhaust it militarily and financially (Mansfield, 2003; Ferris, 2013). Launched in the name of Arab unity and solidarity, this intervention will further deepen divisions and mistrust among Arab states, signal a decline in Egyptian influence in the region and be one of the reasons for the catastrophic defeat of the Egyptian army in the Third Arab-Israeli War.

### **3.3. The third Arab-Israeli war and the withdrawal of Arab nationalism**

If the collapse of the UAR and the failed negotiations on a tripartite federation ushered in the aura of Arab nationalism, the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war will play a crucial role in its collapse. In the spring of that year, tensions between the revolutionary government in Damascus and Israel escalated with a sharp Israeli warning to Syria, to which Nasser, convinced that Israel was preparing a comprehensive attack on Syria, sent Egyptian troops to Sinai and banned Israeli ships from passing through Tirana strait. In May 1967, Soviet intelligence informed Syria and Egypt that Israel was preparing a major military action against Syria for its support of Palestinian guerrilla actions. The intelligence was false, but Nasser believed it was correct at the time (Oren, 2002). Under pressure from their citizens, enthusiastic about the Egyptian demonstration of force against Israel, the governments of the Arab countries declared their support for Egypt. The streets of Arabia were ablaze with enthusiasm for what seemed to be the imminent destruction of Israel, that „foreign body” in the very heart of the Arab world.

Driven by the general mood, the Arab nationalists were convinced not only that victory was inevitable, but also that it would give new strength to their movement. But what followed was not an expected triumph but a military and political catastrophe. On June 5, Israel attacked Egyptian air bases, destroyed all planes landed there, and on June 9, its ground troops reached the Suez Canal. After destroying elite units of the Egyptian army, Israel was free to deal with Jordan and Syria. After only six days, the Third Arab-Israeli War ended in total Arab defeat.

Israel's victory, but also the ease with which its forces defeated the Arab armies, inflicting enormous losses in equipment and manpower, had far-reaching consequences for

the internal dynamics of the Arab world. With the occupation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, Israel established control over the remaining 21% of the mandated Palestinian territory that has been under Jordanian control since 1949, and 200,000 Palestinians have fled to the East Bank. Egypt lost Sinai and Gaza, and Syria lost the strategically important Golan Heights. The territorial map of the Middle East has been changed again in favor of Israel. Important changes in inter-Arab relations followed. The catastrophic performance of the Egyptian army has seriously damaged the reputation of Egypt and its president. Egypt's defeat has strengthened the position of Saudi King Faisal, leader of conservative, pro-Western monarchies and a longtime opponent of Nasser's pan-Arab policies. In August, at an Arab League meeting in Khartoum, Nasser made an alliance with Faisal and agreed to withdraw his troops from Yemen in exchange for financial assistance to the depleted Egyptian economy. Providing support to the so-called progressive forces and the export of the revolution were now a luxury that Egypt and Nasser could no longer afford. His death in 1970 was the final blow to Arab nationalism which, as will soon be shown, was unable to survive the death of its political leader (Tessler, 1994).

One of the most important consequences of the June War was the „rebellion” of the Palestinian Arabs against the monolithic doctrine of Arab nationalism. Until 1967, politically aware elements of the Palestinian people defined their struggle for the liberation of Palestine in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. After 1967, their struggle against Israeli occupation will take place mostly under the banner of Palestinian national interests. At the same time, a revolutionary movement intensified among the Palestinians, reflecting a change in the attitude of radical Arab intellectuals toward the ideology and practice of the pan-Arab movement. In search of new political truths and concrete solutions to the Arab woes, they turned to the ideas of the European student movement and the so-called anti-imperialist ideology. Third world. While Palestinian nationalism has rejected the claims of other Arab states to decide on the future of the Palestinian people in the name of Arab unity, revolutionary groups have given up on pan-Arabism in the name of social revolution. The slogan of Arab nationalism - „We are all Arabs” – was an empty phrase for them, and he himself a petty-bourgeois ideology incapable of freeing the Arab world from the shackles of tradition, real socioeconomic change, and contributing to the collapse of imperialism and the capitalist world order (Ajami, 1992).

Another indicator of the collapse of the edifice of Arab nationalism was the end of the BAAS as a party committed to its original mission of Arab unity and socialism. The military officers who took power in Baghdad in 1968 and Damascus in 1970 still nominally represented the Baas, but their policies no longer had anything to do with the ideology of the Aflaq-founded party. This policy rested on completely different foundations: on bare physical force, a primitive cult of personality, and an understanding of the state as the private laziness of the new Iraqi and Syrian rulers. Empty of its original ideological content, Arab nationalism will soon become a mere means of legitimizing the brutal regimes of Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad.

In the years between 1956 and 1961, pan-Arab nationalism was at the height of its power. Impressed by Nasser's diplomatic victory in the Suez War and the establishment of the UAR, the Arab masses sincerely believed they were witnessing the birth of a new Arab order and the imminent realization of the nationalist dream of political unification. Following the collapse of the Syrian-Egyptian Union and the collapse of tripartite reunification talks in 1963, Arab nationalism entered a phase of stagnation, only to be dealt a final, deadly blow by the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The June War was, in the words of Fouad „Waterloo of Pan-Arabism” (Arami, 1978, 317), a military and political defeat that demonstrated the dysfunctionality and bankruptcy of the existing Arab order.

Just as the defeat in the 1948 and 1949 wars discredited the old regimes of the landed and urban aristocracy, so the 1967 defeat tarnished the reputation of the nationalist regimes. The regimes survived, but the champions of the unification movement were humiliated, and their ideology lost its magical appeal. The ability of Arab nationalism to produce feelings of positive identity, self-esteem, and power has been shattered, and its authority to manage socioeconomic and cultural change is severely impaired.

This by no means means that the collapse of Arab nationalism represented the end of Arabism as a cultural identity. The June War did not destroy the sense of belonging to common cultural space – the Arab world, but neither the Arab citizens nor their ruling elites „believed anymore in the possibility of organic political unity” (Dawisha, 2005: 253). An era of Arab politics is over. After 1967, political relations in the Middle East will be determined by state interest, not the idea of Arab unity. At the same time, at the level of society, a process of ideological change was taking place that would open space for the penetration of a new protest ideology shaped in terms of Islam. That as early as the mid-

1970s, especially among young people, Arab nationalism was a politically worn-out idea can be seen from the results of a 1977 survey of Kuwaiti University students from almost all Arab countries. Based on examining their views on pan-Arabism, family life, the state, and religion, the researchers came up with important information that pointed to the strengthening of Islamic sentiments and patriotism related to their countries of origin (Ajami, 1992). In other words, the ideological vacuum that emerged after the withdrawal of Arab nationalism was filled, on the one hand, by religious sentiments and, on the other, loyalty to the state. In the coming decades, political Islam will become the dominant ideology of the Arab world, and rebellion against the prevailing patterns of socioeconomic and political life in the region, as well as against the existing system of unequal distribution of power in international relations, will take place under the banner of Islam.

## **4. INFLUENCE OF ARAB SOCIALISM ON THE ECONOMY OF SYRIA AND EGYPT**

### **4.1. Economic and social structure during the formation of the Baas party**

When Syria gained independence in 1946, it was seen to have a heterogeneous structure in terms of ethnic and religious identity. In order to stop the rise of Arab nationalism during the French mandate, a divide and rule policy was implemented and efforts were made to make the division of Syria permanent. This French policy has encouraged Syrians to identify with their regional, religious or ethnic community instead of believing in the Syrian nation as a whole. After independence, people remained loyal to their communities, despite being members of national institutions such as the armed forces or the civil service (Cleveland, 2008). Syria, under the French mandate, was divided into five administrative units: the Jebel-Durz region, where the Druze make up the majority; the Aleppo region; Syria including Damascus, Homs, and Hama; Hataj Sandzak. The structural weakness of each administrative unit provided opportunities to facilitate the exercise of the sovereignty planned by France. France was seen trying to prevent a merger that could happen against its own sovereignty by supporting minorities.

During the Tanzimat period, large landowners and urban nobility were in a dominant position in Syria during the French mandate. The mentioned landowners and the city nobility got acquainted with Arab nationalism after the First World War. Their understanding of nationalism differed from the understanding of nationalism defined by the Baas party. Their understanding of nationalism was planned to create a balance between the French administration and the traditional elite and was aimed at preserving their existing gains. The traditional elite, mostly Sunni Muslims, began to be perceived as a French agents rather than a ruler of the country during the interwar period (Ozkoc, The traditional elite did not face serious local opposition until the outbreak of World War II. After Syria gained independence, the traditional elite began to lose its social base. Since the mid-1930s, however, there has been a conflict between local nationalism, which has been dominated by traditionalists, and Arab nationalism, which has focused on restructuring the social and economic order of the growing middle class educated in the West. With the end of the French mandate after the Second World War, with the contribution of development in the

Middle East, the path of nationalism representing the middle classes began to take place in Syrian political life.

This movement, which managed to guide teachers, students and the new generation with Western education, also played an important role in the formation of the Baas party. As party secular nationalism created a new alternative to conservatism in Syrian politics, it influenced young people who came to the cities for education and minorities who were just beginning to adjust to society. After finishing school in France and returning to Syria, Eflak began to teach, with the advantage of his profession, influencing his students and minorities whose class positions overlapped with their ethnic identities, the rhetoric of the Baas party's land reform policy. Despite opposition and the nationalist rise that began to emerge after independence in Syria, landowners and the Ottoman bureaucracy took power and were able to maintain their dominant order until the late 1950s. The strongest opposition to this class, which tried to maintain its power with a chain of coups that began in 1949, came from the Baas party. Prior to the formation of the Syrian-Egyptian Union in 1958, the Syrian economy was an entrepreneurial economy in which the private sector also operated. The state was mostly concerned with infrastructure services and unprofitable sectors. The structure in agriculture was similar to the feudal system, and the distribution of land was extremely unequal. From independence to unification with Egypt, Syria has been home to a powerful bourgeoisie, mostly Sunni Muslim landowners and urban merchants. Until unification with Egypt, executive governments promoted an economic model that gave priority to private companies. After the unification was achieved in 1958, land reform was carried out and partial nationalizations were carried out. All these practices were important steps toward weakening the influence of the Syrian traditional elite. During this period, the Baas regime undermined the interests and power of these groups through the nationalization of the economy and land reform. While the Baas party has taken away some sections, it has severely limited the business and trade opportunities of some sections. These interventions did not take place in the industrial zone, but in the land system where there was an unequal distribution of land (Ozkoc, 2008).

After gaining independence, in Syria, as in almost all Arab countries, most of the society lived in rural areas. The class that had the greatest influence on the people who lived in rural areas were large landowners, including the Ottoman Empire. Since the cadres of the new government were from rural areas, Baas further increased the antagonism with the urban classes by promoting the interests of the peasants. As expected, the ideological

approach and rhetoric of the Baas party brought some social strata closer to the Party, while some forced them to distance themselves. Given the divisions in Syria's social structure during its term, the participation of groups likely to have benefited from the social transformation advocated by the Baas party was undoubtedly an understandable development. Although early Batista thought did not believe that class struggle was necessary, the Party became the bearer of class struggle in the country as it was filled with members from rural areas (Ozkoc, 2008). At this stage, the Baas party government saw the liquidation of the nobility and the demands of the middle class, peasants, and working-class as its guide, especially after the secession from Egypt and especially after the 1963 coup. The economic policies pursued during that period, on the other hand, would change with the application of liberal policies in the region after 1970. On the other hand, the fact that Islamic ideas became politicized and had the potential to mobilize the masses and generally influence the Sunni Muslim segment required the Baas party to make some structural changes. The ideology of the Baas Party naturally attracted the attention of the poor peasants and the working class. Traditional dignitaries, who have dominated Syrian economic life since Tanzimat, have approached the Party cautiously because of the Baas Party's emphasis on secularism and socialism. Members of other minorities coming from rural areas, on the other hand, viewed the Batista ideology positively in order to correct their existing negative situation. The promise of land reform in the party's Statute is for peasants who do not have land; members related to the labor law and positive statements about the trade union organization of workers were attractive to locals and workers. The socialist ideas Baas synthesized with Arab nationalism facilitated the organization of the Party in the countryside and in poor areas, rather than in large cities, where local dignitaries, feudal landowners, and merchants dominated politics and economics.

Albert Hourani argued that the Baas party posed a challenge to the dominance of Syrian political life by a small number of large urban families and parties that had expressed their interests. Considered disadvantaged groups, the Alevis, Druze, and Christians dreamed of reaching the position held by the majority of the Sunni Muslim community by taking advantage of the rapid development of education (Hourani, 1994).

The Baas party was organized especially among students from rural areas who came to city centers for educational purposes. The students from the village functioned as a bridge between the town and the village. Baas mostly worked on organizing among high school and college students. Baas, who managed to organize the youth to be employed in

the army in the future, also formed the basis of rapprochement between him and the army. Therefore, given that Arabic-speaking religious minorities are concentrated in rural areas and Sunni Muslims are concentrated in large cities, it seems natural that minority groups predominate in the Baas party's organizational structure (Van Dam, 2000).

Undoubtedly, the starting point of the Baas party was not a minority party. Baas's ideology attracted minorities from the poor, especially the Alevis and Druze. As these minorities came to important positions both within the Baas and in the military, they played an important role in the struggle for power in the 1960s. The Baas party set out with the desire to establish a united Arab state based on the socialist system. Therefore, he did not accept structures such as sectarianism, regionalism, and tribalism, which he described as negative remnants of the previous order. The party sees them as obstacles to nationalism and socialism and accepts that they have no role in its formation and the process of coming to power (Van Dam, 2000).

There is no doubt that after the independence of Syria, some ties of social affiliation weakened, and they were replaced by national and class loyalty. Despite this determination; relations between the sect, tribes, and the region continued during the Baas party and became one of the basic elements of its power. The important thing here was the fact that the ethnic and religious identities and class positions of those who felt ties of belonging overlapped. Minorities living in the countryside and having no influence in the political life of Syria have benefited the most from economic and social transformation with the realization of Arab socialism. As economic and social changes integrate minorities into the political system, tribal, regional, and sectarian ties are seen to be being used, especially since the 1960s. This was key to establishing a regime based on the relations of tribes, regions, sects and patrons. While Baas's ideology rejects social divisions; Tribal, regional and sectarian ties are a decisive factor in Syrian politics, and the process of coming to power has been shaped by these elements, as the military is seen as a leader in modernization in an underdeveloped country like Syria. The structuring of elements, whose class positions and ethnic identities overlap, both within the Party and in the military, using regional, tribal, and sectarian ties, and the process of coming to power in this way, have profoundly influenced Syrian politics.

## **4.2. Oil industry**

Oil became the world's main source of energy in the 20th century, especially after the second half of the century. The high growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s were achieved with this cheap energy source. The geography of the Middle East, which was first occupied by the great powers in the period after the First World War and then divided among many countries, taking into account oil reserves, is still the focus of crises, wars, and conflicts due to its energy source. As the strategic and economic value of oil increases, the turn of powerful nations to oil fields in the Middle East to reach and control oil reserves has brought the region into serious chaos and it seems that it will continue to do so. Because the absence of large oil reserves in any part of the world, as in the Middle East, has made the countries of the region vital for world politics. Oil, which is one of the important factors in shaping modern Middle East policy, led to a severe oil crisis in the world economy after the jump in oil prices in 1973-1974 and 1979-80 as a consequence of the growing dependence of countries.

### **4.2.1. The effects of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war on the oil industry**

The third Arab-Israeli war began on June 4, 1967, when Israel invaded Egypt. Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain) gathered under the roof of the Arab League in Baghdad on June 5, under the leadership of Iraq, immediately after Egyptian President Nasser said that Israel was supported by the United States and Britain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Lebanon, and Syria) have decided to impose an oil embargo on Western countries that directly or indirectly help Israel (Pala, 2007).

According to the decision, while Iraq and Libya immediately suspended all oil exports; Kuwait and Algeria have suspended supplies only to countries believed to support Israel. On June 6, Syria announced that it had closed all oil pipelines starting from Iraq and Saudi Arabia and passing through Syrian territory. On the same day, Lebanon announced that it had stopped loading Saudi and Iraqi oil into tankers from its terminals. Saudi Arabia announced on June 7 this time that it was forbidden to ship to tankers belonging to countries that support Israel and to export oil (Pala, 2007).

However, the Arab oil embargo, which is one of the rare moments in their history, including the Crusades, excited the Arabs and tightened them together; some close OPEC members, such as Iran and Venezuela, took advantage of the oil shortage in the market due to the embargo and rapidly increased their production and exports, thus gradually moving away from activities. The need for oil on the market due to the embargo has given Iran the opportunity to increase oil sales in the UK and West Germany; Venezuela has seriously expanded its market share in Europe. Meanwhile, the continued export of some Arab countries that were themselves part of the boycott (for example, Libya exported more oil to West Germany than before the embargo) made the embargo a meaningless act. Also, during this period, oil prices experienced a temporary rise and, as the transport crisis erupted, tanker transport prices tripled (Gurel, 1979).

It seems that the weapons of the embargo have failed and that the producer countries have been seriously injured. As such, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait, which suffered heavy revenue losses during the embargo, have put on their agenda the easing of the embargo and its gradual lifting within weeks. Moreover, when hypocritical oil delivered from non-Arab sources was added to emergency oil, which was transported by the Cape of Good Hope route due to the closure of the Suez Canal due to the war, the main target of the USA and Western Europe got rid of this weak embargo only with light scratches. Under these conditions, the Arab summit, which met in Khartoum between August 29 and September 1 1967, decided that the oil embargo, which was far from active, should be lifted immediately (Pala. 2007).

All the producers who took part in the action realized that they were negatively affected by the embargo in relation to the target western countries. Some of the damage was not limited to this: according to another decision made at the summit, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya were supposed to provide financial aid worth 135 million dollars a year to Egypt and Jordan, two heroic countries that are fighting against Israel. These three countries suffered the most from the embargo due to the loss of revenue the embargo and the voluntary but rather large compensations they had to pay (Gurel, 1979).

Far from OPEC support during the embargo, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait, which had the memorable role of some of their members, gathered in Beirut in January 1968; they founded the Organization of the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, or

OAPEC, to prevent other Arab states from interfering in their national oil policies (Pala, 2007).

The most critical condition for membership in this new organization, which originally stated that it was not a political organization (undoubtedly, the Arab was the first condition), was that oil was the main export item of the member state. This special situation has eliminated Egypt and Algeria, as well as other members of the Arab League. However, as a result of intense pressure from Libya, which took a more radical stance with the Gaddafi revolution that erupted in September 1969, all Arab oil-exporting countries were admitted to OAPEC, regardless of the location of the oil industry in their economy (Pala, 2007).

New Libya, led by Gaddafi, saw the use of oil as a political weapon as its primary goal. He, therefore, put a lot of pressure on OAPEC to open its organization to new members and change its goals. The process began in 1970 in Algeria, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar. This resulted in the accession of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt in 1972. Under pressure from the new Libyan administration, OAPEC has suddenly become the antithesis of its original purpose of establishment. It has been turned into an Arab political tool that aims to use oil as a weapon. The place and importance of OAPEC in the market, which oil companies did not take seriously, was well understood in the great crisis of 1973 (Pala, 2007).

#### **4.2.2. Initiative attention of Arab producers to the oil industry after the 1967 war**

During the Khartoum Conference, which discussed the oil embargo, Arab countries saw the embargo as unsuccessful, both economically and politically. Lack of coordination and economic inadequacy among Arab countries were important factors in the failure of the embargo. The fact that non-Arab countries such as OPEC members Iran and Venezuela increased oil production during the embargo process also negatively affected Arab producers. As the embargo proved unsuccessful, some Arab countries proposed the establishment of an independent Arab organization of oil producers separate from OPEC. Namely, at the summit in Khartoum, where the embargo was lifted within the framework of this proposal, the Arab countries also decided to pursue their oil policy in a coordinated manner. Efforts to establish a common Arab oil policy, led by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, continued until the end of 1967. Continued efforts in this direction resulted in the

establishment of the Organization of the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in January 1968. OAPEC, which was decided to be based in Kuwait, was the product of the growing political and economic power of Arab oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya after the 1967 war. Arab manufacturers went into such a formation to minimize the factors that played a role in the failure of the 1967 war. According to some authors, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, which gained significant profits from the experience of the war in 1967, founded OAPEC to successfully implement another possible embargo decision. There was an integration of Arab economies. The establishment of the Arab tanker fleet, the design of shipyards, and the establishment of a joint oil company were also on the agenda of the Arab countries within OAPEC (Gurun, 1974).

In the period after the 1967 war and the establishment of OAPEC, the main goal of the growing anti-Western opposition throughout the Middle East was the direct nationalization of the oil industry. Saudi Arabia's Oil Minister Zeki Yamani, who delivered a speech at the American University in Beirut in 1968, drew attention to the rise in anti-Western sentiment in the region after the 1967 war, saying it had become difficult for foreign oil companies to continue their activities. region (Gurun, 1974). In this context, the prominent desire in the attempts of producer countries, which increased their doses after the 1967 war, to have a greater say in the oil industry was partial ownership or, if possible, full ownership of oil resources (Kobrin, 1985).

With the 1967 war, Algeria not only nationalized 13 American companies that were looking for oil on its territory but also seized the licenses of British and Dutch companies. In August, the government nationalized the processing and marketing companies Ekkon and Mobil, along with Ekkon's research firm. In September 1969, when a group of soldiers ended the pro-American regime of King Idris, talks began about the future of foreign oil companies operating in Libya. In this context, Colonel Gaddafi, who first closed US and British bases, then took action to establish effective control over the oil industry (Ari, 2004). On May 23, 1970, the governments of Libya, Iraq, and Algeria stated in a joint statement that they had decided to form a joint front against foreign oil companies and that they would produce and process their oil through joint ventures (Gurun, 1974). In 1970, the Libyan government led by Colonel Gaddafi successfully forced many companies, including New Jersey, to reconcile with him in terms of production and price (Yergin, 2009). In December 1971, the Gaddafi administration nationalized the British oil company BP on the grounds that Britain had not prevented Iran from occupying Abu Musa, the Big Tumbs and

the Little Tumbs. Libyan nationalization of BP was the first time that an Arab country nationalized a British oil company in response to political development outside the Arab-Israeli conflict and about 3,000 kilometers outside its borders. After American companies, Libya turned to the nationalization of French oil companies. At a time when Libya was trying to nationalize all foreign companies, the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to start negotiations with the companies in order to reach an agreement on participation. The Minister of Oil of Saudi Arabia openly stated that they raised the issue of participation after the anti-Westernism in the Arab world and the nationalizations that followed in recent years. The government of Saudi Arabia, Yamania, said that participation in companies according to the share should be seen as suppressing growing nationalist feelings in Arab countries and stopping the path to nationalization. While accession talks, initiated by Saudi Arabia, resumed in January 1972, the Baathit regime in Iraq, backed by the Soviet Union, announced on June 1 that IPC oil production had been halved and that the company's privileges in northern Iraq have been expropriated. Syria has also nationalized gas pipelines passing through the IPC country, citing political reasons (Ari, 2004).

While Libya and Kuwait have announced their support for Iraq and financial assistance, the French government has said it accepts a compromise proposal proposed by the Iraqi government over its stake in IPC (Ari, 2004). Following the nationalization of Iraq in October 1972, participation agreements between Iran and OPEC Gulf countries, excluding Iraq and companies, resulted in an agreement. Companies have recognized 25% of the rights to participate in Gulf companies. In addition, the parties agreed to increase this rate to 51% by 1983. However, the agreement did not have the expected effect and soon led to criticism from other OPEC countries. The Kuwaiti parliament did not accept and rejected the agreement (Gurun, 1974). The Libyan government has also said it will not accept a turnout of less than 51 percent. On the other hand, the agreement was published in the Iranian press: „Arabs are buying their own oil. They help companies increase their cash while paying fewer taxes and fewer privileges” (Ayhan, 2006, 267).

Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Saudi Arabia, which signed a 25% participation agreement with privileged companies in the shadow of nationalization, said they did not have enough penetration of 25%, and that a 51% participation was insufficient in the summer of 1973. years. Thus, the effect of accelerated political change from accession to nationalization in the Middle East also affected the moderate Gulf countries. Now it was very difficult for the companies to stop this process (Ayhan, 2006).

The process of association and nationalization after the 1967 war changed the balance of power between oil companies and producer countries in favor of producer countries. Because, in the Middle East and elsewhere, with the exception of Mexico, oil companies had complete control over all phases from determining the price of oil to the level of production. In this context, the 1967 war played a vital role in strengthening oil-producing countries. As a result, nationalization and association agreements, which effectively came to the fore after the 1967 war, were developments that reduced companies' influence in the oil industry. The nationalization initiative led by Algeria and Libya soon resulted in the Iraqi nationalization of the IPC, while Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar took action in the summer of 1973 to modify the accession agreements they had previously signed with the concession company. However, the joint war between Syria and Egypt with the sudden attack on Israel on October 6 to liberate the occupied countries began a process that would annul all nationalization and association agreements that were concluded or agreed upon.

#### **4.2.3. Post-war Arab oil policy - the effects of embargoes and price increases**

With the start of the October War, Kuwait took the initiative and invited Arab oil-producing countries to Kuwait for a meeting to discuss how Arab oil would help the war for Arab freedom. The day before the meeting, at the meeting of OPEC members in Kuwait, on October 16, the price of crude oil was increased by seventy percent. The new price has been increased from \$ 3 to \$ 5.11. The oil ministers of the Arab member states of OAPEC (Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) met in Kuwait on October 17. The main item on the meeting's agenda was the use of oil to help Arab forces in the war with Israel. The proposal presented by the Iraqi government during the meeting led to an increase in tensions between Arabs. The Iraqi government has proposed the nationalization of all American companies, the cessation of oil exports to all countries that support Israel, and the withdrawal of Arab funds from American banks. At the beginning of the war, the Iraqi government announced that it had nationalized the shares of British, American, and Dutch companies in Basra Oil. The Iraqi delegate based his proposal on the Conference on the following grounds:

„Nationalize all American interests, especially oil companies operating in Arab countries. Looking at the first six months of 1973, these companies

control 63% of the crude oil produced in Arab countries. Moreover, they control all production in the main Arab oil-producing countries. If all Arab funds are withdrawn from America, the American balance of payments will be deeply shaken. Terminate all diplomatic relations with the United States” (Smart, 1977, 20-21).

The Iraqi delegate left the meeting after the Gulf countries rejected it as quite radical. Iraq, Libya, and Algeria have argued that American foreign policy will change with the nationalization of American interests in the Arab region. The Kuwaiti National Assembly, on the other hand, passed a resolution immediately after the start of the war, recommending the king withdraw Kuwaiti funds from American banks and reconsider its policy of oil exports to the United States. Saudi Arabia's position was that it was too early to withdraw funds from American banks, resort to embargoes or nationalization as an element of political pressure, and instead, limiting Arab oil production with the active participation of all Arab countries is the most effective method. Despite the opposition of the radicals, the proposal of Saudi Arabia to reduce production was accepted by the Conference. With the policy of limiting production, Arab producers expected that the great powers would intervene in the war within the framework of Arab theses (Alnasrawi, 1991).

#### ***4.2.3.1. The decision to reduce oil production and the embargo of Arab countries***

Ignoring Saudi Arabia's efforts to change US policy, President Nixon offered Congress \$ 2.2 billion in aid to Israel on October 19. The decision left Saudi Arabia and other moderate producers, who opposed the embargo, facing Arab pressure to use oil as a foreign policy tool, with no alternative. In that context, the Arab oil producers perceived the decision to help as an insult to themselves and immediately imposed a ban on the export of oil to all ships going to the United States. Arab countries have decided to impose an embargo on the Netherlands as well as the United States. Thus, on October 20, in addition to the embargo, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Qatar decided to reduce oil production by 10% instead of 5%. Although Iraq announced that it would participate in the decision on the embargo without any cuts in production, it had to make a mandatory reduction because the Syrian line was damaged by the war, and they decided to reduce September production by an additional 25%. It was also decided at this meeting to continue the embargo against the USA and the Netherlands. The resolution underlined that the necessary measures will be

taken to prevent friendly countries from being affected by the interruption, but that no privileges will be applied to neutral countries. On the other hand, it was claimed that the decision on the embargo was made against the Netherlands, which has the largest oil refinery in Europe and was originally made to put pressure on all European countries. West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and the United Kingdom received a significant part of refined oil exported from the Netherlands. According to this claim, the Arab countries did not want to spoil their relations with other Western countries by targeting only the Netherlands (Ayhan, 2006).

The meeting in Kuwait was followed by a meeting of oil ministers of nine OAPEC member countries, which was held in Vienna on November 18. It was decided at the meeting that the necessary measures should be taken to prevent the nine EEC member states from being affected by the 5% reduction, which has been in force since 1 December 1973. The main reason for this decision was explained as support for the Arab theses in the Middle East crisis by these countries. Indeed, in mid-November, the member states of the Community made a decision that supported the Arab theses. The meeting in Vienna was followed by a conference of the Arab Summit held in Algeria from 26-28. November 1973. The Summit, which was not attended by Iraq and Libya, decided to continue the policy of reducing production and impose embargoes on Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, which support Israel (Itayim, 1974). The Arab member states of OAPEC once again decided at a meeting in Algeria that the suspension and embargo should continue until all Israeli soldiers withdraw from the Arab countries occupied during the 1967 war and until the legitimate rights of the Palestinians are established. The conference also decided to take the necessary measures to prevent Japan and the Philippines, which have shown political support for the Arabs, from being hit by a 5% oil cut from 1 December (Alnasrawi, 1991).

However, at a meeting of Arab oil ministers held in Kuwait on December 8, a decision was made to analyze the political situation of the Arabs. An addendum to the 1967 meeting said: „The lifting of restrictions on oil production if an agreement is reached, withdrawal and other practices guaranteed by the United States, milk will be accepted by all Arabs admitted to Israel, and the embargo imposed on the United States will also end“ (Itayim, 1974, 93). With this decision made on December 8, the decision to continue until all Israeli soldiers withdraw from the Arab countries occupied during the war in Algeria in 1967. 26-28. November 1973 and until the legitimate rights of the Palestinians were established. The revision of Arab theses was brought to a more visible dimension at the

meeting of Arab oil ministers held in Kuwait on 24-25. December. At this meeting, it was decided to stop oil cutting and increase production by 10%, in force since January 1, 1974. Because, at the meeting, it was decided that the production limit would be a maximum of 15% based on the production from September 1973. Just in the days when the United States began to play an active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab producers took a step back in their theses. In the days when the United States intensified its efforts in this direction, the Arab oil-producing countries intensified their attempts to lift the embargo. In mid-February 1974, King Faisal, who met with Hafez Assad, Anwar Sadat and the Algerian president in Algeria, told them that the embargo was no longer useful and that the embargo could be lifted as long as the Americans continued to make constructive efforts on a separation agreement. Israel and Syria (Yergin, 2009).

On March 13, 1974, at a meeting attended by nine OAPEC member countries (Iraq was not present), it was decided to continue the oil embargo against the Netherlands and Denmark. At the same meeting, the proposal to lift the embargo against the United States was accepted, despite the opposition of Syria and Libya. So, until July, the general prospects for the OAPEC embargo were as follows: all member states continue to impose embargoes on Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia; Libya and Syria continue to impose an embargo on the United States; all member states, except Algeria, which lifted the oil embargo on the Netherlands and Denmark since early June, continued to impose an embargo on the two countries. At the second meeting held in Cairo on July 10, 1974, the Arab oil embargo came to an end with the lifting of the embargo imposed on the Netherlands. In December, the Libyan government lifted a ban on oil exports to the United States without any official announcement (Gurel, 1979).

#### ***4.2.3.2. The impact of the crisis on oil prices***

The increase in oil prices, which affected the whole world after the October War, was one of the most important consequences of the Arab oil embargo. So, unlike the oil crisis of 1956 or 1967, the oil crisis of 1973 differed from the other two in that it was far-reaching and affected the entire market. In fact, OPEC was the first to raise the price of oil from \$ 3 to \$ 5.11 at a meeting on October 16 in Kuwait. This decision was followed by the decision of the Arab oil producers to reduce production and the embargo (Alnosrawi, 1991). The decision of Arab oil producers to reduce production and the embargo made it difficult

for oil-consuming countries to react to the increase in the price of OPEC oil by 70%. These developments were accompanied by heavy supply pressures due to the significant withdrawal of Arab oil from the international market in October and November. The fact that consumer countries have had problems finding oil for reasons related to production in the market has also spurred price increases. At a meeting in Tehran on 23-24. In December 1973, six OPEC member states in the Persian Gulf decided to raise prices (Gurel, 1979). Thus, oil prices, which were \$ 1.80 in 1970, \$ 2.18 in 1971, \$ 2.90 in mid-1973, and \$ 5.11 on October 16, 1973, rose to more than \$ 15 in January 1974 (Yergin, 2009). The impossibility of new oil entering the market was the trigger for rising prices. Since the oil embargo imposed by Arab oil producers during the 1967 war did not have the desired effect, apart from the United States, oil-producing countries such as Venezuela and Iran increased their oil production, and oil companies played an important role in distributing oil produced according to needs of countries. However, the policy of reducing oil production, which was implemented with the embargo in the crisis of 1973, directly affected the supply of oil on the market. Because, as a result of OPEC's policy of reducing oil supply, which began before the war, 700 thousand barrels of oil per day have already been withdrawn from the market (Ayhan, 2006).

At the beginning of the war, the daily production of oil in the world amounted to about 20.8 million barrels. The amount of oil produced in December, when the embargo and cut was introduced, was about 15.8 million barrels. This meant that about five million barrels of oil a day were withdrawn from the market. The break caused by the Middle East has put on the agenda an increase in oil production in other regions. However, the closure of the Suez Canal, Soviet pressure on Iran, the Nigerian civil war, and the peak of American oil production in 1970 were factors that prevented this goal from being achieved (Smart, 1977).

### **4.3. Arab economies were growing**

The so-called Arab countries in transition (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen) experienced growth rates that were signed between 1991 and 2010. The largest increase was recorded at the beginning of the 21st century. As the data in Table 1 show, Egypt's average GDP growth rates between 2000 and 2010 were between 4 and 6%. Thus,

the average GDP growth rate between 1991 and 1994 was 2.4%, between 1995 and 1999 5.8%, between 2000 and 2004 3.9%, and between 2005 and 2010 5.9% (Ghanem, 2016).

The question arises as to how these growth rates are compared to those in the rest of the world and have the income levels of the Arab countries in transition approached? The answer has two sides. On the one hand, the data indicate that income levels were approaching until the late 1990s, but very slowly. On the other hand, compared to India and especially China, this is a significant deviation (Ghanem, 2016).

*Table. Average GDP growth rates in Arab countries in transition between 1991 and 2010  
(Ghanem, 2016, 40)*

| Country | 1991-1994 | 1995-1999 | 2000-2004 | 2005-2010 |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Egypt   | 2,4       | 5,8       | 3,9       | 5,9       |
| Jordan  | 6,4       | 3,6       | 5,6       | 6,6       |
| Morocco | 3,1       | 2,3       | 4,7       | 4,6       |
| Tunisia | 4,6       | 5,2       | 4,5       | 4,4       |
| Yemen   | 6,3       | 5,1       | 4,3       | 4,6       |

Data on the ratio of GDP per capita in the purchasing power trend in the Arab countries in transition and GDP per capita in the purchasing power trend in the United States and three of the four economies known as BRICs (Brazil, China and India) show that during the 1980s and 1990s, there was divergence in most countries, including Arab countries in transition. „The ratio for Brazil fell from 37% in 1980 to 28% in 1990 and to 24% in 2000. India remained stagnant in the 1980s at 5% of U.S. GDP. During the 1980s, per capita GDP in Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia fell relative to the United States, while Egypt's per capita remained more or less unchanged in relative terms, moving from 17 to 18% of U.S. level. China is a clear exception to this trend, as the ratio of Chinese to U.S. per capita GDP doubled, from 2 to 4% in the 1980s and doubled again in the 1990s to 8%” (Ghanem, 2016, 40).

During the 1990s, the situation began to change, and they were very noticeable during the first years of the 21st century „as most emerging and developing economies including the Arab countries in transition started converging toward income levels of OECD countries. Egypt's and Jordan's GDP per capita which were 18% of US GDP in 1990, rose to 22 and 23%, respectively by 2010. During the same period Morocco moved from 11 to 13

percent of US GDP, and Tunisia from 15 to 21. However, the growth rate of convergence are very slow. At those rates Jordan would catch up with the United States somewhere around 2060, Tunisia would catch up around 2070, Morocco around 2080, and Egypt around 2090” (Ghanem, 2016, 41). In the case of Yemen, there is practically no convergence. In addition, after 2010, the political movement caused a slowdown in the economy of the Arab states in transition. This meant general stagnation, but also a direct return to divergence in Yemen, Jordan and Egypt (Ghanem, 2016).

Table 2. Ratio per capita GDP to U.S. per capita GDP, in TPPP Dollars, Arab countries and transition and BRICs 1980-2013 (Ghanem, 2016, 41)

| Country | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2013 |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Brazil  | 37   | 28   | 24   | 28   | 28   |
| China   | 2    | 4    | 8    | 19   | 22   |
| India   | 5    | 5    | 6    | 9    | 10   |
| Egypt   | 17   | 18   | 18   | 22   | 21   |
| Jordan  | 29   | 18   | 17   | 23   | 22   |
| Morocco | 12   | 11   | 10   | 13   | 14   |
| Tunisia | 17   | 15   | 16   | 21   | 21   |
| Yemen   | n.a. | 9    | 8    | 9    | 7    |

„Emerging economies, especially India and China, have been growing at much faster rates and therefore converging much faster to OECD levels. This also means that Arab countries in transition are rapidly losing ground compared with those economies. In 1980 Jordan’s GDP per capita was 647 percent that of India, and Tunisia’s was 347 percent; by 2013 those ratios had fallen to 2014 percent and 2020 percent, respectively. At this rate, India’s per capita GDP will surpass that of nearly all Arab countries in transition before the end of century” (Ghanem, 2016, 41).

The comparison with China is even more dramatic. Egypt's GDP per capita was seven times higher than China's in 1980, while in 2016 it was ten times lower in terms of purchasing power parity. At the same time, Yemen's GDP per capita in 1990 was twice as high as China's, while in 2016 it was three times lower (Ghanem, 2016).


Arab countries, with the exception of Yemen, have been sufficient in transitional growth rates to contribute to a significant reduction in extreme poverty. Poverty was almost eliminated in Jordan, reduced by half in Egypt and a quarter in Tunisia by 2010. A strange case is Morocco, where there was a large increase in poverty during the 1990s, followed by a huge decline between 2000 and 2010 (Ghanem, 2016).

## 4.4. Economic indicators

This part of the paper will present the state of economic indicators in Syria and Egypt during the period from 1960 to 2010: gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP growth, exports of goods and services, imports of goods and services, and merchandise trade.

### 4.4.1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)


When it comes to GDP in Syria, from 1960 to 1987 there was a slight increase, from 857,704,413 to 35.54 trillion, followed by a decline in 1988 to 16.57 trillion, which was followed by a sharp increase from 1989 to 2010 from 16.57 trillion to 252.2 trillion (The world bank, 2022a).



*Graph 1. GDP (current US\$) - Syrian Arab Republic (The world bank, 2022a)*

When it comes to GDP in Egypt, from 1965 to 1986, there was a slight increase, from 4.95 trillion to 41.25 trillion. Then over the next two years, there was a slight decline


to 34.8 trillion in 1988, followed by a slight increase to 42.98 trillion in 1990. During 1991 there was a slight decline to 37.89 trillion, followed by an increase between 1992 and 2000, to 2000 GDP of 99.84 trillion. Then in the period from 2001 to 2004, there was a decline in GDP, so that in 2004 it amounted to 78.78 trillion, which was followed by an increase from 2004 to 2010, to 218.98 trillion in 2010 (The world bank, 2022b).



*Graph 2. GDP (current US\$) - Egypt, Arab Rep. (The world bank, 2022b)*


#### 4.4.2. GDP growth

When it comes to the annual growth of GDP in Syria in the period from 1965 to 2010, there are ups and downs. Thus, in 1962, GDP growth was 24.5%, and the following year it dropped to -8.7%. The highest GDP growth rates were recorded in Syria in 1972 when it was 25.7%, and in 1974, when it was 25.8%. The variation in GDP growth is supported by the fact that, for example, in 1980 the GDP growth rate was 14.5%, followed by a decline to -7.6% in 1984 and an increase to 18% in 1988 (The world bank, 2022c).



*Graph 3. GDP growth (annual %) - Syrian Arab Republic (The world bank, 2022c)*


When it comes to the annual growth of GDP in Egypt in the period from 1961 to 2010, there are ups and downs. Thus, in 1961 a rate of 5.2% was recorded, in 1964 a rate of 11.5%, in 1968 a rate of -1.6%, in 1970 a rate of 5.6%, in 1974 a rate of 1.6%, and in 1976 a rate of 13.3% (which is also the highest rate). Then the period from 1977 to 1984 was characterized by sharp declines and jumps, while from 1984 from 9.7% there was a marked decline to 3.8% in 1987. During the period that followed, there was a slight increase to 5.7% in 1990, followed by a decline to 1.1% in 1991. During 1992 it increased to 4.5%, and in 1993 it decreased to 2.9%. From 1994 to 2000, there was an increase, so that the 2000 rate was 6.4%. The two years that followed were followed by a decline to 3.5% and 2.4%, respectively. From 2003 to 2008 there was an increase so that in 2008 the rate was 7.2%. 2009 was characterized by a decline to 4.7, and 2010 a slight increase to 5.1% (The world bank, 2022d).



Graph 4. GDP growth (annual %) - Egypt, Arab Rep. (The world bank, 2022d)


#### 4.4.3. Exports of goods and services

When it comes to the annual growth rate of exports of goods and services in Syria in the period from 1971 to 2010, there are jumps and falls. For example, in 1971 the annual growth rate of exports of goods and services was -4.9%, compared to 28.7% in 1975, -12.2% in 1976, 19.6% in 1979, -3.4% in 1980, 9.5% in 1985, 1986 -8.8%, 1987 was 19.4%, 1990 was 22.5%, 1992 was -1.6%, 1994 was 23.3%, 2003 -16.6%, 2004 was 23.9%, 2009 was -19% and 2010 was 11.2% (The world bank, 2022e).



Graph 5. Exports of goods and services (annual % growth) - Syrian Arab Republic (The world bank, 2022e)


When it comes to the annual growth rate of exports of goods and services in Egypt, the period from 1961 to 2010 is characterized by ups and downs. Thus in 1961 the rate was -6.7%, in 1963 it was 23%, in 1965 it was 0.1%, and in 1967 it was 6.8%. The largest decline was recorded in 1968 and amounted to -34.6%, and was followed by a sharp increase to 15.3% in 1969 and a decline to -1.8% in 1972. The period from 1972 to 1977 was characterized by an increase so that the rate in 1977 was 40.6% (which is at the same time the highest rate). The following year, 1978, saw a drop in the rate to 2.7%. In 1979, there was an increase to 29.7, which in 1982 was followed by a decrease to -10.4%. During the period from 1982 to 2001, there were constant smaller jumps and falls in the growth rate, and from 2001 there was a constant increase until 2004 when it reached 25.3%, and in 2005 there was a slight decrease to 20.2%, which was followed by a smaller increase in 28.8% in 2008. In 2009 there was a sharp drop in the rate and it amounted to -14.5%, and the following year there was an increase to -3% (The world bank, 2022f).



*Graph 6. Exports of goods and services (annual % growth) - Egypt, Arab Rep. (The world bank, 2022f)*

When it comes to exports of goods and services as a% of GDP, in the period from 1971 to 1974 Syria recorded growth from 12.8% to 18.1%, followed by a decline to 17.2% in 1975 to an increase to 20.4% in 1980. This was followed by a decline to 18% in 1983 and 16.7% in 1986, which was then followed by an increase to 19.9% in 1992, after which a decline to 19% was recorded in 1993. From 1994 there was an increase until 1997 to 22.1%, a decrease to 21.9% in 1999, an increase to 23.6% in 2000, a decrease to 23% in 2001 and a

constant increase to 31% in 2008, followed by a decrease to 26.4% in 2009 and an increase to 28.8% 2010 (The world bank, 2022g).



*Graph 7. Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) - Syrian Arab Republic (The world bank, 2022g)*


When it comes to exports of goods and services as a% of GDP in Egypt in the period from 1960 to 2010, they were characterized by high jumps and falls. Thus 1960 was 19.9%, 1962 was 15.1%, 1964 was 18.4%, 1966 was 16.3%, 1967 was 16.8%, and in 1968 there was a sharp decline to 11.8%. This was followed by an increase to 13.6% in 1970, followed by a small decrease to 12.7% in 1972, and a sharp increase to 20.4% in 1974. In 1976 there was a decrease to 17.2%, then in 1977, there was an increase to 21.6% and in 1978 a decrease to 19.9%. High rates of 30% and 31%, respectively, were recorded in 1980 and 1981, followed by a sharp decline until 1987, when the rate was 12.6%. This decline in the following years was followed by an increase until 1992 when the rate was 28.4%. From 1992 to 1999 there was a decline to 15.1% 1999. This was followed by a period of rate growth so that in 2005 it was 30.3%, and in the next two years, there was a slight decline to 29.9% in 2006 and 30.2% in 2007. 2008 the highest rate of 33% was recorded, while in 2009 there was a decline to 25% and in 2010 to 21.3% (The world bank, 2022h).



Graph 8. Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) - Egypt, Arab Rep. (The world bank, 2022h)


#### 4.4.4. Imports of goods and services

When it comes to the annual growth rate of imports of goods and services in Syria in the period from 1961 to 2010, there are jumps and falls. Thus 1971 amounted to 8%, 1974 amounted to 50.8%, 1976 amounted to -4.3%, 1977 amounted to 39.9%, 1978 amounted to -13.8%, 1979 amounted to 13.1%, 1982 amounted to -15.5%, 1985 amounted to 38.7, 1993 amounted to -0.5%. Then, in the period from 1994 to 2003, there were smaller jumps and falls, and from 2.4% in 2003 there was a jump to 40.2% in 2004, which was followed by a drop to -12.7% in 2006. In 2007 there was a jump to 7.6%, with a drop of -23% in 2009, while a jump of 15.1% in 2010 (The world bank, 2022i).




*Graph 9. Imports of goods and services (annual % growth) - Syrian Arab Republic (The world bank, 2022i)*

When it comes to the annual growth rate of imports of goods and services in Egypt in the period from 1961 to 2010, there are jumps and falls. Thus, in 1961 the rate was -1.8%, in 1963 it was 19.7%, in 1965 it was -8.9%, in 1966 it was 6.1%, in 1968 it was -6.6%, in 1970 it was 14.3%, in 1970 it was 14.3%, in 1972 it was 1.1%, in 1973 it was 8.9%, and in 1974 it was 6.4%, 1975 was 20.7%. 1976 saw a sharp decline to -13.5%, which in 1977 was followed by a sharp increase to 18.1%. During the period between 1977 and 1981, it fell to 0% in 1978, and then to a jump to 21.6% in 1981. The following year, 1982, it fell to -13.2%, while in 1984 it rose to 18.6%. In the years that followed, a sharp decline was recorded until 1987, when the rate was -8.2%. From 1987 to 2003, there were minor ups and downs, followed by an increase until 2005. The rate was 23.8% in 2005, 21.8% in 2006, and 28.8% in 2007 (which is also the highest rate). In the years that followed, there was a decline, so the rate in 2008 was 26.3%, and in 2009 it was -17.9% (which is also the lowest rate). 2010 rate was -3.2% (The world bank, 2022j).




*Graph 10. Imports of goods and services (annual % growth) - Egypt, Arab Rep. (The world bank, 2022j)*

When it comes to imports of goods and services as% of GDP in Syria in the period from 1960 to 1965, Syria recorded a decline from 27.8% to 17%, then in 1966, there was an increase to 26%, which in 1967 was followed by a decline to 19.2%. Thereafter, it increased from 21.1% in 1970 to 40.7% in 1970, before declining to 31.2% in 1978, followed by an increase to 36% in 1979. The period between 1980 and 1990 was marked by declines and jumps, and an increase from 1990 to 1990. until 1994, from 28% to 45.4% (which is also the highest rate). In 2000 there was a decrease to 29.2%, and in 2004 there was an increase of 37.7%; In 2009 it was 30.9% and in 2010 it was 31.8% (The world bank, 2022k).



*Graph 11. Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) - Syrian Arab Republic (The world bank, 2022k)*


When it comes to imports of goods and services as a% of GDP in Egypt in the period from 1960 to 1962 there was a decline from 21.8% to 19.5%, followed by growth to 24.9% in 1964. 1965 there was a decline to 20.1%, followed by a slight increase of 20.5% in 1966, followed by a period of decline until 1969 when the rate was 16.5%. This was followed by a period of growth from 1972 to 1975, and the 1975 rate was 35.5%. Then, in 1976, there was a decline to 27.9%, followed by an increase to 43% in 1979 and 43.5% in 1981 (which is also the highest rate). During the period from 1981 to 1986, there was a sharp decline, and the rate in 1986 was 22.2%. This was followed by an increase, so the 1988 rate was 35.2. The decline occurred in 1989 to 32.3%, followed by an increase to 35.4% in 1991. After 1991, there was a decline until 1997, when the rate was 24.9%. The decline was briefly halted in 1988, when the rate was 25.7%, to continue until 2001 when the rate was 22.3%. In the years from 2001 to 2005, there was a sharp increase, and in 2005 it amounted to 32.6%. In 2006 there was a small decrease to 31.6%, while in 2007 and 2008 there was an increase to 34.8% and 38.6%, respectively. Since 2008 there has been a decline in the rate, from 2009 to 31.6% and from 2010 to 26.6% (The world bank, 2022l).



Graph 12. Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) - Egypt, Arab Rep. (The world bank, 2022l)

#### 4.4.5. Merchandise trade


When it comes to trade in goods (% of GDP) in Syria from 1960 to 1974 there was an increase from 16.6% to 28.9%. Then in 1975, there was a decline to 27%, which was followed by growth in 1980 was 33.9%. Between 1981 and 1993 there were slight falls and jumps. The largest decline was recorded in 1986 and amounted to 26.8%. From 1993 to 1997 there was an increase from 29.3% to 34.9%, then there was a slight decline over the next two years, which in 2000 was followed by an increase to 38.8%. During 2001, there was a slight decline to 37.6% followed by a sharp increase until 2008 when it was 51.1%. 2009 recorded a sharp decline to 41.7% followed by a sharp rise in 2010 to 50% (The world bank, 2022m).



Graph 13. Merchandise trade (% of GDP) - Syrian Arab Republic (The world bank, 2022m)

When it comes to trade in goods (% of GDP) in Egypt from 1965 to 1966 there was an increase from 31.1% to 31.8%, followed by a decline to 24.2% in 1967, 19.3% in 1970, 18.5% in 1972. This period was followed by is a sharp increase, which in 1974 was 41.9%, in 1975 it was 45.9%. The period between 1976 and 1988 was marked by sharp falls and jumps, so in 1976 it was 40%, in 1979 it was 31.5%, in 1981 it was 54.3%, in 1986 it was 35%, and in 1988 it was 82.9% (which is also the highest rate). Then in the next two years, there was a sharp decline, so that in 1990 the rate was 27.5%. In the period from 1990 to 2001, smaller growths were recorded, followed by larger declines, so that in 2001 the rate

was 18.8%. From 2001 to 2008 there was a constant growth, from 18.8% to 45.8%. In 2009, a rate of 36% was recorded, and in 2010 it was 36.2% (The world bank, 2022n).



Graph 14. Merchandise trade (% of GDP) - Egypt, Arab Rep. (The world bank, 2022n)

## 5. CONCLUSION

Imagine a system that is neither socialist nor Islamic traditionalist, but continues to claim to have all this. Arab socialism can be considered an example from which many lessons can be learned in terms of its results. Arab socialism is not classical socialism, except that it is on the side of private property, while being an statist also aims to reveal the Arab national bourgeoisie. Like many newly independent nation-states, it is corporatist (in this respect, its resemblance to countries that emphasize solidarity corporatism is interesting). This does not affect feudalism, the workers have no share in the administration. Although called socialism, no model of Arab socialism involves large-scale land reform. Arab socialism cannot satisfy the needs of the people by applying the primitive model of state capitalism. In addition, the fact that Baathists, like Michel Aflak, do not say anything other than „Islam is important for Arab culture” in the context of emphasizing religion, pushes the people, troubled by economic problems, to stricter conservatism. The result is known, the bill is paid to socialism.

At the very beginning of the paper, three hypotheses were set. The first hypothesis that read: Arab socialism has influenced the state to be understood as a natural tool intended for the implementation of transformations, has been proven. Namely, in the Middle East, Arab socialism was used in order to implement transformation in many fields. Another hypothesis that read: Arab socialism has led to an increase in the growth rate of the gross domestic product has been proven. Namely, in the observed countries - Syria and Egypt, Arab socialism has led to a significant increase in gross domestic product. The third hypothesis, which read: Arab socialism has influenced the production of oil to play a role in economic development, has been proven. Arab socialism led to an increase in oil production, which contributed to the economic development of the Middle East.

The research question asked at the beginning of this paper was: *What is the impact of the ideology of Arab socialism on the economic development of Arab countries – specifically the analysis of economic indicators of Syria and Egypt?* Based on the results presented in the research, it is concluded that the ideology of Arab socialism had an impact on economic development, primarily in terms of improving the observed economic indicators: gross domestic product, GDP growth, exports of goods, imports of goods and services, and merchandise trade.

This paper is characterized by certain limitations. The reason for these limitations is the lack of accessibility of information, resources, and experience of researchers, as well as the literature used in this paper. The first restriction includes limited access to documents and information that reflect the impact of Arab socialism on the economies of Syria and Egypt, as only publicly available documents and information can be considered. The scope of the research is limited exclusively to concentrating on the analysis of Syria and Egypt, without analyzing the influence of Arab socialism on other countries in the Middle East. Last but not least, another limitation is the researcher himself. Namely, there is a possibility of certain limitations in the form of impartiality and neutrality of the expressed views and interpretations presented in this paper. For this reason, the potential existence of knowledge bias and access to knowledge should be recognized as a potential limitation of this paper. These limitations should in no way diminish the value and results of this work. It should be recognized and recognized in the form of factors that did not affect the research itself and the conclusions reached in the paper.

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