



universität
wien

DISSERTATION / DOCTORAL THESIS

Titel der Dissertation /Title of the Doctoral Thesis

Middle Class in Iran; a sociological perspective on
class structure in Iran

Verfasst von / submitted by

Sina Ansari Eshlaghi

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doktor der Philosophie (Dr.phil.)

Wien, 2023 / Vienna 2023

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme code as it appears
on the student record sheet:

UA 784 122

Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt /
field of study as it appears on the
student record sheet:

Soziologie

Betreut von / Supervisor:

ao. Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Christoph Reinprecht

Abstract

In this dissertation, I studied the development of Iranian middle class in a period from 1984 till 2013. The main aim is to demonstrate *class structure* of Iran and how different classes stand together in the Iranian society and to describe the probable impact of global capitalism on these classes, especially on the middle class. For this reason, three main data sources have been studied: the annual Household Expenditure Income Survey (HEIS) conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI), *Values and Attitudes of Iranians* and *Cultural Behaviors of Iranians* investigated by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG) in 2003. The main results include the inequality schema of the Iranian society from 1984 to 2013 with detailed percentages of upper, middle- and lower-classes. Besides, with the help of correspondence analysis I analyzed the main groupings of the society regarding education, occupation, consumption and assets for the same period. These findings were compared with the results of MCIG's investigation and completed with a round of expert interviews to verify the findings of the dissertation; especially the general consumption patterns (with focus on cultural goods and leisure time) of Iranians. The evidence from the study suggested that there is a weak correlation between education, occupation and cultural consumption of a household, but generally the cultural consumption behavior of Iranians cannot be modeled with conventional socio-economic factors; which means Iranians consume cultural goods due to their tendencies apart from occupation, education, income or wealth. Indeed, the most striking result emerged from the study is that fact that Iranians desire for cultural goods is not dependent upon their economic condition.

Zusammenfassung

Das Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation eine Untersuchung der Entwicklung der iranischen Mittelschicht in den letzten 40 Jahren. Das Hauptziel ist es zu zeigen, wie die verschiedenen Milieus in der iranischen Gesellschaft positioniert sind und welche Auswirkungen der globale Kapitalismus auf diese Klassen, insbesondere auf die Mittelschicht, hat. Aus diesem Grund wurden drei Hauptdatenquellen untersucht: die jährliche Umfrage über die Haushalts-Ausgaben und Einkünfte (HEIS) des Statistischen Zentrums Irans (SCI) sowie die vom Ministerium für Kultur und islamische Führung untersuchten *Werte und Attitüden der Iraner* und *das kulturelle Verhalten der Iraner* im Jahr 2003. Die Hauptergebnisse umfassen das gesamte Ungleichheitsschema der iranischen Gesellschaft von 1984 bis 2013 mit einer detaillierten Quote der Ober-, Mittel- und Unterschicht. Außerdem wurden mit Hilfe der Korrespondenzanalyse die Hauptgruppen der Gesellschaft in Bezug auf Bildung, Beruf, Konsum und Vermögen für den gleichen Zeitraum aufgezeigt. Der Vergleich dieser Ergebnisse und Ergebnisse der MCIG-Untersuchung mitsamt einer Runde reflexiver Expert*innen-Interviews zeigt die allgemeinen Konsummuster (mit Schwerpunkt auf Kulturgütern und Freizeit) der Iraner*innen. Obwohl die Ergebnisse der Studie darauf hindeuten, dass eine Korrelation zwischen Bildung, Beruf und kulturellem Konsum eines Haushalts besteht, zeigt die geringe Ausprägung des R-Quadrats für lineare und nichtlineare Modelle, dass das kulturelle Konsumverhalten von Iraner*innen nicht mit den konventionellen sozioökonomischen Faktoren modelliert werden kann; d.h., dass die Neigung der Iraner*innen nach Kulturgütern nicht von ihrem wirtschaftlichen Zustand abhängt.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my supervisor, Prof. Christoph Reinprecht. His support, guidance and overall insights in this field have made this an inspiring experience for me. He has not only been a patient supervisor, but his kind manner also helped to overcome the burdens of immigration and lack of financial sources, in order to find the concentration and peace needed for writing such a work.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Prof. Roland Verwiebe for his useful feedbacks at the beginning of this dissertation and for his meticulous comments at the last phase of the work. I must also thank Prof. Sighard Neckel, who supported me at the first phase of this work. His support, advice and comments has been a great help. I would like to thank Prof. Bernhard Kittel for his feedback in the last phase of my work. My wife, Shaya, deserves my warmest thanks for her unfailing support, niceness and encouragement during the dissertation's development as well as our living together. She stood beside me in the darkest days of my life and helped me to confront the problems of life. Without her support, I would never get the courage to finish writing my dissertation. I would like to dedicate this work to my daughter Hanna. You have made me stronger, better and more fulfilled than I could have ever imagined.

I am extremely grateful to my sister, Parisa for her wise counsel and sympathetic ear. She has always been there for me. Without her encouragement and support, I could have never finished my studies.

I am deeply indebted to Jadi Mirmirani – my good friend, who helped me with some technical requirements of the project. His support for converting the Access DB to SQL was professional, friendly and unprecedented. I am extremely grateful to him. I'd also like to extend my gratitude to Gerhard Paulinger for his constructive advice and valuable suggestions and Ariane Sadjed for her generous manner in lending me some of her interviews done for her dissertation. I also thank Irina Kachapova for proofreading the dissertation. I would like to thank Azita Piran – my cousin who tried hard for admission at the University of Vienna. I would like to thank Dr. Shirin Ahmadnia for all her support.

Finally, there are my friends, who were of great support in deliberating over our problems and findings, as well as providing happy distraction to rest my mind outside of my research.

Table of Contents

1	INTRODUCTION.....	1
2	CLASS	8
2.1	MARX AND MARXISTS	11
2.1.1	Marx	11
2.1.2	Ralf Dahrendorf.....	13
2.1.3	Nicos Poulantzas	15
2.1.4	Erik Olin Wright	16
2.1.5	John Roemer	18
2.1.6	Gaetano Mosca.....	20
2.1.7	Frank Parkin.....	21
2.1.8	Immanuel Wallerstein.....	22
2.1.9	C. Wright Mills – <i>The Power Elite</i>	22
2.2	WEBER AND POST-WEBERIANS.....	23
2.2.1	Class mobility and Class conflict in Weberian terminology.....	26
2.2.2	Anthony Giddens - <i>Elite and Power</i>	27
2.3	DURKHEIM AND POST-DURKHEIMIANS	30
2.3.1	Alexis de Tocqueville	31
2.3.2	David Grusky and Jesper Sørensen	31
2.3.3	Daniel Bell	32
2.4	JAN PAKULSKI AND MALCOLM WATERS – DEATH OF THE CLASS.....	33
2.5	GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN – SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES	33
2.6	WEBER AND MARX ON CLASS: CONVERGENCES.....	34
2.7	CLASS IN THE SECOND HALF OF 20TH CENTURY	36
2.8	CLASS IN A BOURDIEUSIAN MODEL	40
2.8.1	Class habitus	44
2.9	ERIKSON AND GOLDTHORPE CLASS SCHEMA	47
2.10	DANIEL OESCH AND OESCH MODEL	49
3	MIDDLE CLASS AS A TERM	52
3.1	MARXISM AND MIDDLE CLASS	54
3.2	MIDDLE CLASS AND BOURDIEU	55
3.3	CLASS AS IDENTITY	57
3.4	CLASS: SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE.....	58
3.5	MIDDLE CLASS OR MIDDLE STRATUM OR MIDDLE STATUS.....	60
4	FORMATION OF MIDDLE CLASS IN ENGLAND, INDIA, CHINA AND IRAN.....	73
4.1	ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS	74
4.2	INDIAN MIDDLE CLASS	77
4.3	CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS	82
4.4	MIDDLE CLASS IN MIDDLE EAST	85
4.5	RISE OF IRANIAN MIDDLE-CLASS	87
4.5.1	<i>The Role of State in development of Iranian Middle-Class</i>	98
5	CONSUMPTION AS A BASIS FOR CLASS.....	103
5.1	MIDDLE CLASS AND CONSUMPTION	104
5.2	CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION AND MIDDLE CLASS	108
5.3	MIDDLE CLASS LIFESTYLE	110
5.4	MIDDLE CLASS AND CULTURAL CONSUMPTION	114
5.4.1	<i>Middle Class cultural consumption in non-Western world</i>	118
5.5	GLOBALIZATION AND NEW GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASS.....	119
5.6	MIDDLE CLASS AS A GLOBAL CLASS	124
5.7	IRANIAN MIDDLE CLASS; THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	126
6	METHODOLOGY	134

6.1	OPERATIONALIZING CLASS STRUCTURE	134
6.2	CLASSES REGARDING JOBS	137
6.3	OPERATIONALIZATION OF MIDDLE CLASS	140
6.4	STANDARDIZATION OF INCOME	144
6.5	CULTURAL CONSUMPTION PATTERNS	145
6.6	EDUCATION AND INEQUALITY.....	145
7	DATA OF RESEARCH	147
7.1	INCOME-EXPENDITURE SURVEY (STATISTICAL CENTRE OF IRAN).....	147
7.1.1	<i>Correspondence Analysis</i>	150
7.2	VALUES AND ATTITUDES OF IRANIAN AND CULTURAL BEHAVIOR OF IRANIANS (MCIG 2003) 150	
8	RESULTS; SOCIAL MILIEUS, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION	152
8.1	SOCIAL MILIEUS IN IRAN	152
8.2	DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS	154
8.3	INCOME DISTRIBUTION	162
9	ECONOMIC FACTORS OF IRAN.....	171
9.1	POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN	171
9.2	RESEARCHES ABOUT INEQUALITY AND MIDDLE CLASS IN IRAN	172
10	RESULTS; CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS	178
10.1	YEAR: 1984 AND 1986	178
10.2	YEAR: 1988.....	179
10.3	YEAR: 1990.....	181
10.4	YEAR: 1992.....	182
10.5	YEAR: 1994.....	183
10.6	YEAR: 1996.....	184
10.7	YEAR: 1998-2004	185
10.8	YEARS: 2005 - 2010	186
10.9	YEARS: 2011 - 2013	189
10.10	INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCORDING TO CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS.....	190
11	VALUES AND ATTITUDES OF IRANIANS ACCORDING MINISTERIUM'S SURVEY 197	
11.1	LEISURE TIME ACTIVITIES	197
11.2	TRAVELING	200
11.3	WATCHING TV AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS, LISTENING TO RADIO AND READING BOOKS, MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS	203
11.4	SOCIAL CAPITAL.....	207
11.5	CLASS IDENTITY (SUBJECTIVE).....	208
11.6	CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND CONSUMPTION.....	209
12	CALCULATIONS AND CORRELATIONS.....	212
12.1	CULTURAL CONSUMPTION.....	220
13	REFLECTIONS OF EXPERTS ON RESULTS	226
13.1	WESTERN HYPER-CULTURE	228
13.2	CONSUMPTION AND MIDDLE CLASS	229
13.3	OCCUPATION AND CLASS SCHEME.....	231
13.4	HISTORY OF MIDDLE CLASS	232
13.5	MIDDLE CLASS PERCENTAGE AND FUTURE.....	235
13.6	CONCLUSION.....	236
14	CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION.....	240
15	BIBLIOGRAPHY	248
15.1	ENGLISH AND GERMAN REFERENCES.....	248

15.2	PERSIAN	270
15.3	PERSIAN MAGAZINES	272
15.4	DATA SET	272
16	FIGURES AND TABLES	273
17	ABBREVIATIONS	276
18	APPENDIXES.....	277
18.1	APPENDIX 1 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS	277
18.2	APPENDIX 2 – TABLES SHOWING CULTURAL CONSUMPTION	288
18.3	APPENDIX 3 – GUIDELINE FOR EXPERT-INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE	289

1 Introduction

In 2009, I decided to continue my studies at the University of Vienna. At that time, many Iranians protested against the presidential election results and one could observe the protests on the streets, as well as the people who attended demonstrations with their motto “where is my vote”. The government referred to these people as delinquent and followers of anti-freedom exile groups. Interestingly, both sides of this debate; namely the government on one side and the protesters on the other side asserted that they fought for liberty, freedom, justice and equity.

A question could be posed in this respect; namely how do both sides of this debate define liberty and freedom? For me – trying to observe as a sociologist free from value judgements –, it was also a question of perception. Indeed, I wanted to know if application of these abstract concepts is an endogenous need which is originated in everyday life or people just repeated them without being familiar with the historical development and definition of these concepts.

The first hypothesis that came to mind, was the global conceptualization of political thoughts by a dominant global culture. This dominant culture (roughly called Western here) generate a pattern of beliefs which becomes global and non-Western countries would be just a consumer of thoughts without having the idea of the origin and background of the concept. It is important to emphasize that I do not discuss if freedom is good or bad, the question arises the desire for freedom was an endogenous development of Iranians or a consequence of living in a consumption society with all its characteristics. In this regard, an example of consuming material goods might help for a better understanding. We can suppose people drive in one country, and in another one, the people are not familiar with cars. Then, they hear about the cars and want to have them in the society without knowing what a car is and which regulations one needs for driving. That is the same about thoughts and ideas; if someone is not familiar with a way of thinking, he/she would become a pure consumer and the debate between two laypersons about an idea would end in nothing.

A historical remark could help us to figure out the situation in this regard. Reckwitz (2019) described how the mainstream theories of the last decades have supposed there is a hegemony of cultural and political domination of an idea or country which has become the proceeding force of the 21st century, but the rise of other Isms (such as Islamic Fundamentalism) worldwide was a proof that there are other cultural and

political views which coexist with Western modernization and can affect the lives of people. In Iran, one can ask if the role of this global Western culture is more important than culture elements propagated by the government.

Therefore, the point of departure of this dissertation is to find out how the globalized Western culture has influenced Iranians' way of thinking and consumption. The main problem in this respect is the wide nature of such researches and generality of investigation, which makes it impossible to perform a complete study with the limited budget of a self-financed dissertation. As a result, I decided to limit the study to the consumption patterns of Iranians.

The point here is the protesters that called for freedom and justice were assumed to belong to middle class, because typically, groups that historically are classified under middle class conduct protests for civil and political rights, in contrast to lower classes whose demands are more in the field of economic needs. With these presuppositions, I decided to find out, how we can define and dispose middle class in the Iranian society and besides, how we can study the consumption patterns of the Iranian middle class as one of the main characteristics of middle class. At the time, I started the dissertation, the structural inequality of the Iranian society was barely analyzed and the classification of Abrahamian (2000) was the main source of scientific researches. He had categorized the Iranian middle class into traditional (mostly businesspersons in Bazar) and modern (mostly educated civil servants) in the era of Revolution in 1979. The other analyses of the 20th century were polemic debates of different political parties who wanted to project beliefs in a political situation and were rarely based on scientific assessments. After two decades of scientific stagnation in the field of middle-class studies, we can see that there are attempts in order to find out the characteristic of the middle class in Iran during the 2000s and 2010s. Sadjed (2012) in her dissertation (which was later published as a book) analyzed middle-class consumption as a sign of resistance. Indeed, she assumes that the middle class in Iran consumes in order to show its protest and objection to the government. Salehi-Isfahani et al (2009; 2015) tried to monitor the poverty and inequality in Iran and their effect on populist politics in Iran. Farzanegan and his colleagues (2015; 2016; 2017; 2019) investigated the condition of Iran after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and sanctions in 2011. In most of these studies, the focus was economic aspects of equality and not the sociological and cultural lifestyle.

The main shortcoming of all these studies is the disability to picture and map the middle class in Iran. Indeed, the economic analysis enables us to understand if the financial

crisis or sanctions have changed the total expenditure of a household, but the information about patterns of consumption; especially cultural consumption is unstudied. More importantly, the desire for cultural consumption as a characteristic of the middle class can be seen as a decisive factor in inequality research. The point of departure for Sadjed (2012) was the fact that consumption can be seen as a resistance and protest medium for middle class against the governmental suppression and the role of modernization in consume preferences in the micro-level, but general research at the macro-level is needed to depict the middle class in comparison to other classes.

In sum, this dissertation is an attempt to find out the structural characteristics of the Iranian middle class regarding consumption with focus on cultural consumption. The dissertation is divided in 14 chapters. At first, the main theories of class and middle class will be discussed. Class is a multidimensional concept with a wide range of approaches used by thinkers. The concept of class introduced by Marx has different implications than the Weberian one. Dahrendorf, Poulantzas, Wright or Parkin tried to develop the concept of class in a Marxian framework. On the other side, Weberian and Structuralists emphasized other aspects of the class (such as lifestyle) and applied the concept in their own approach. The sociologist who conceptualized class in a highly influential way is Bourdieu. The way he applied the concept of capital and later introduced an inequality system based on different kinds of capitals integrated most of former theories. Another goal of this dissertation is depicting the characteristics of Iranian middle class by applying fundamentals of Bourdieu's system of inequality based on socio-economic and cultural differences.

The third chapter reviews "Middle Class" as a sociological term. The complexity of finding a definition for middle class lies on the multi-dimensionality of *class* on one side and the *middle* in inequality on the other side. How can one find the "middle" in an inequality system and what does that mean? Is it solely a question of income or are other aspects of inequality (more) decisive in defining the middle (e.g. consumption or cultural preferences)? These debates are discussed in the third chapter for a better understanding of middle class.

The concept of middle class is indeed a construct that ascribed its meaning in a historical context. Without the evolution of capitalism and altering the formations in capitalism, defining a "middle" was not possible. That is why; chapter 4 is a historical study of the establishment of middle class in England and Asian countries. The rise of middle class in Iran is also a part of this chapter, which shows how the Iranian middle

class came to existence and which characteristic distinguish the Iranian system of inequality from other societies. Furthermore, the different approaches to operationalize middle class will be discussed in this part. A complex concept like middle class cannot be defined easily without considering historical, economic and social structures of a society. That is why; in the 4th chapter, the main attempt is finding a way to define an appropriate method to represent the middle class in a scientific study without leaving the accepted framework of a dissertation. For this reason, the main focus of the 5th chapter lies on the definition of middle class associated with consumption patterns.

In this point, one of the main debates regarding middle class in sociology can be discussed. In sociology, there are concepts like *middle class*, *middle stratum*, *middle milieu* and seldom *petite bourgeoisie*, which have been used as alternating terms by different scholars in different historical and geographical contexts. Middle class seems to be a term, which has a wider practice in social sciences. Middle class is a term which shows the middle of the society and in this respect, middle class could refer to occupations with a middle a middle-rate income or the people who expend a moderate amount of money. The lifestyle becomes also decisive, because due to lifestyle one can estimate the expenditure of a household. Middle can also have normative components in cases one talks about the “normal” in a society or as median statistics. Besides, cultural preferences and lifestyle of a household are related. Veblen (1899), who suggested the idea of a leisure class that has a certain way of living, first indicated such a relation. After his study, the idea of analyzing lifestyles became highly relevant for studying inequalities.

Therefore, the middle class in this dissertation is defined regarding consumption patterns, income and expenditure, education and cultural preferences of a household. Indeed, the dissertation is an attempt to find out a way for a reciprocal analysis of the Iranian middle class, which on one side applies the classic definitions of middle class and on the other side, aims to find the *Middle* in the contemporary Iranian society. For this reason, at the end of chapter 5, the rise of middle class and related studies about it in the global scale will be discussed.

In fact, the focal point of this study lies on the fact that there is a globalized lifestyle followed by middle class in different countries, which is called the New Class by Gursky (2008). (See also Milanović, 2016; Beck, 2011; Grusky, 2008; Patnaik, 2002). According to this idea, the New Class has the same value system and way of thinking worldwide. That is why; in the demonstrations of the year 2009 we see that the

requisitions and demands of protesters are mainly related to human rights and the separation of state and religion. This point provoked the guiding question of this study for me; namely, how can we percept the Iranian middle class in the global scale? And more importantly, how does this middle class consume?

Indeed, in this dissertation we assume that the similarities in new global middle class (in different countries) is a historical development of capitalism which seeks new markets worldwide and this similarity results in a common demand of consumption. The difference here lies on the availability and cultural backgrounds. The Iranian middle class is restricted for variety of reasons. Firstly, due to international sanctions the popular international brands do not have the possibility to sell their commodities in Iran. Therefore, Iranians cannot buy the same goods as easily as (for example) Americans. Secondly, the Iranian government has restricted many cultural activities, which are normal and popular in Western countries. For example, many pop and rock music bands are not allowed to give a concert and therefore are active as underground. Such restrictions have changed the possibilities for Iranians; especially for the Iranian middle class because the higher classes can consume whatever they want by means of wealth which increases their chances; for instance, they can easily travel abroad to provide their clothing from famous and premium and top-rated brands.

One of the main portrayals of middle class consumption can be seen in public and street ceremonies since 2000s. Two interesting examples investigated by Shiva (2008; 2006) are Mourning of Muharram (a set of commemoration held by Shia Muslims for Imam Hussein - third Imam of Shiites) and Valentine day¹. In the photos taken by Shiva, one sees how the young generation tends to consume and how shopping is a means to fulfill their needs. Interestingly, both of these events happen in a country in which the consumption of Western commodities was a taboo for a long time. I remember an era in my childhood that we were discouraged to wear jeans and it was not allowed to wear short sleeved t-shirts. Indeed, in 2000s one could observe new consumption patterns which were suppressed for a long time. Therefore, for me the similarity of consumption tendency in a religious event like Moharram and a Western event like Valentine was disputable and interesting which could be a result of a new worldwide value system.

¹ I also participated in data gathering and photo shooting of this project and observed the ceremonies and behavior of the public.

At this point, one can pose the question, what is the exact role of globalized capitalism on the Iranian middle class and besides, can this effect be measured or precisely investigated? To find an answer, one would need a very detailed survey about the consumption history of Iranian households and individuals. This data is not available at this point and would require high spending on data gathering that exceed the author's resources. That is why; chapter 5 is an anecdotal report of the relation between the Iranian middle class and a global *New Class*. After that, I have tried to depict the consumption patterns of Iranians based on this historical development of this new class. Indeed, the dissertation is a descriptive study of different milieus in Iranian society with a focus on middle classes, which is an important step for analyzing social relations, because such studies have been rarely conducted about inequality in Iran. Hence, another aim of my research is an explanatory investigation of the socio-economic situation of different milieus by their consumption.

Chapter 6 declares the methodology of the research with focus on the operationalization of the middle class for the research, which is based on income, consumption, education and occupation. The data will be discussed in chapter 7. The main point about the methodology lies on the fact that due to theoretical framework a function of occupation, income, consumption (especially cultural consumption) determines the socio-economic position of a household as middle class. For this reason, the Iranian income-expenditure survey is applied as the main data source that is in the household's level. In order to portray a more precise image of the Iranian middle class, a time period of 30 years has been investigated. A long-time observation of changes assures reliability by considering most aspects of consumption behavior of Iranians and overcoming shortages of dataset. A historical and careful consideration of data will decrease the possibility of bugs in a system.

The second data set, which is reviewed just as a verifying source, is a survey conducted by the MCIG: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in two waves. In this survey, we can deduct the cultural behavior of Iranians and find out the main interests of different income groups in the society. Since the raw data of these studies are not available, only a secondary analysis is possible.

The results of the study are presented in chapters 8 to 13. Firstly, by means of descriptive data from SCI, a structure of different socio-economic groups of Iran is depicted and after that, a classification of Iranian milieus is suggested. For a graphical classification of Iranian society, a set of correspondence analyses from different years

is conducted in order to follow the changes of different occupation groupings from 1984 to 2014. Besides, by using these data an analysis is done in order to find out if variables like occupation, education and cultural consumption are correlated. At the end, an analysis of cultural consumption by means of the survey conducted by Ministry of Culture will be executed. The importance of these data lies on detailed information about consumption preferences, which is not available by the other datasets. The last chapter is a round of expert interviews with scholars who have investigated socio-economic structure of Iran or are experts in the field of social inequality. The main aim of the chapter is to fill the research gaps that could not be investigated by dataset (such as the impact of Western culture on Iranian middle class). Besides, the expert interviews provide a basis for validity check of findings und putting the results up for discussion. Indeed, the expert interview in this dissertation is the means of validity and supplementary test of results as well as covering up the shortages of research findings.

2 Class

Although social class is one of the fundamental concepts of sociology and has been applied by many sociologists and economists from the beginning of the social sciences, it is not possible to find a common definition accepted by all scientists. That is why; we can see that the historical development of social class in theories is dependent on scholars and their point of view. We can observe different definitions of class in the 20th century. For example, class was defined as uniting force into group of people (Marshall, 1977). It was also seen as a part of ego and feeling of a person for identifying himself / herself (Centers, 1949). For MacIver (1937), social status and class were associated. Social classes were also defined due to similar conditions, status and values (Corner, 1954). Due to Warner & Lunt (1941), orders of people ranked in socially superior and inferior positions make classes and class was seen as a combination of occupation and income, property and the type of relations in the system of labor (Nemchinov, 1956).

In contrast to social scientists, political discourse applies this term in a common sense. For example, one can see that class is used to answer question like: “Why do people vote for specific political parties?” or “What does explain variations across people in consumption patterns, tastes, and lifestyles?”

In short, there is a significant difference between class defined in common sense and in social sciences. For this reason, the definition of class in social sciences needs a long historical study of this term. Besides, class has different aspects and dimensions including social, psychological, economic and even political aspects. Hence, the view on class is highly influenced by the scientist's discipline. Among the most frequently discussed alternatives to class analysis are the ‘multidimensional’ Weberian analysis of stratification, Durkheimian analysis of occupational differentiation, Tocquevillian approach focusing on civil society and studies of power stratification (e.g. Marxian theories of class) and elite formation will be discussed later. In recent years, the way the new American researchers define class in order to categorize different classes in the society is totally different than the definition used by Bourdieusian theory. One can define class as a pure economic term and also it is possible to see class – and especially middle-class – as a culture-based term.

Pakulski and Waters (1996) tried to summarize these theories in order to find a concept, which can be accepted by a majority of sociologists. For them, in the analytic

vocabulary of contemporary sociology, *Class* refers to a specific social location and causality, a specific pattern of groupness, and a specific form of identification. Indeed, they point to the broad consensus that class is primarily about economic-productive location and determination; which means, it is based on property or market relations. For them, people participate in class as producers or organizational position-holders. What they suggest, is in my opinion far from the explanatory power of class in Marxist and Weberian approaches. That is why; the first step for a comparison of class theories is a comparison between Marx and Weber - the prominent figures of inequality studies. Another point is about the difference of “Class” and “Stratum” and “Social Environment (social milieu)” which are used confusingly and mistakably. It is maintained by Dahrendorf (1969) that class is associated with purposes and social conflicts, which means it is related to structure of a society, and in this regard, distinguishes itself from stratum, which is a construction limited to a definite time period and mirrors the ranks of a society. Indeed, class is a scientific construct to declare the social structure of societies in a longer period and wider geographical region; in contrast to strata which is limited in terms of place and time. Regarding this definition, I concentrate on class and try to argue different theories on class in general.

For the reason of this wide definition of class and its ties to the structure of societies, one can hardly find a common terminology of class among social scientists. Maybe, it is the only consensus between sociologists that class has more or less an analytical function, although the idea of class, historically, was used as a category. The meaning of stratum and social environment would be discussed later.

Historically, class was used at first by Romans who divided the population into tax groups named *classis*. The classification consisted of *assidui* with the highest income on one end and *proletarii* on the other end, whereas the *lumpenproletariat* was lower than proletarii. The first appearances of *class* and *rank* in the social sciences are the works of Ferguson (1767) and Millar (1787) in the eighteenth century who tried to rank people by observing how wealthy someone is.

As the nineteenth century is the beginning of social sciences, we can find the first indications of social inequality in writings of scholars like Adam Smith, Ricardo, Saint-Simon and Fourier who spoke of *poor* and *laboring class*. The most famous scholars of this period whose names are linked with the concept of class are Engels and Marx who observed the modern society as a *class society*. Indeed, they explained the position of classes in the modern societies and their role in structural changes. The important point

stated by them is the change in function of property and wealth which firstly were symbols of rank and then became also instruments of power in the capitalistic society. In the history of sociology, *Class* is best known by the works of Marx and Engels. Their analysis of historical changes is based on class formation. The main interest of Marx and Engels was to analyze the power relations in the capitalist society and especially the condition of the working class in these societies. Engels (1845) tried to find out how the working class in England developed and described how the history of working class in England began with the last half of the eighteenth century after the invention of the steam engine and the machines for manufacturing cotton. Then, Marx asserted in his numerous writings about a model of classes in capitalist society which consisted of capitalists and labor force. As suggested by Satgar & Williams (2017), the strength of Marx' model is its ability to explain the formation of the capitalist society and different aspects of relations within; namely the relations of working class with capital, itself, machines and nature.

The main point here is the role of the industrial revolution whereas the rise of working class resulted in changes in social order, and for this reason, new concepts were necessary for a scientific analysis of the society. The first step in this regard was to make it possible to categorize different groups in the society. Social classes function as a facilitator to analyze the industrial society.

Beside Marx, Weber is another prominent sociologist whose ideas influenced next generations of social scholars who researched inequality. For Weber (1947), the status position has a similar denotation as class position. Interestingly, it seems that the German language has played a role in this difference (of course beside the scientific views of Weber). In conversational German, the word "Stand" was used as equivalent to class to show the rank; for example, *Mittelstand* means someone with a middle rank. Therefore, the German word *Stand*, is a substitute of class in showing inequality and is similar to "status" in English. This aspect of inequality described by Weber resulted in confusion by scholars but indeed, it completed the theory of Marx.

Durkheim (2019) saw division of labor as the main characteristic of the modern society and in this respect, the role of "working classes" could be interpreted as a mechanical-ideological cohesion (solidarity) of the modern society, i.e., the working class is just a part of society doing its task. In this respect, Durkheim was not a class theorist per se, especially because of his obsessive emphasis on social order, but as discussed by Grusky & Galescu (2005), his influence on next generations of scholars who stressed

occupation as the main element of difference in the society makes it necessary to review his theory of labor division.

Pakulski (2005) is one of the scholars who tried to summarize the evolution of class society by means of theories of Marx, Weber and Durkheim in three stages. The first years of industrializing societies (also called liberal capitalism), class divisions overlapped with estate divisions; social and political powers were extreme on both ends of power spectrum. Indeed, this era can be seen as a transition from estate to class divisions. In the second phase, class divisions became stronger, and the political situation was apparent in parties, movements, ideologies, etc. The period resulted in modern industrial societies (organized capitalism), where occupation and class divisions were linked together. In the recent era of postmodern, postindustrial societies (disorganized capitalism) industrial classes are decomposed. The main phenomena of this era are collapsing corporatist deals, globalization, intense social differentiation and progressive individualism, that prompt further (ideological and political) class decomposition and de-stratification. It can be concluded that in recent capitalism, the concept of class and especially the inequality related to classes is changing and it might be seen as a transition from hybrid stratification to complex (classless) inequality.

As a matter of fact, the concept of class has been defined and applied by scholars regarding their viewpoints, paradigms, fields of study, era and location; therefore, it is not strange that class is still a very confusing construct in the sociology. For a good start in defining *Class*, it would be meaningful to review the main theories about class, strata and social environment. Since Marx was the prominent thinker in the field of class, we can begin with his and other Marxists' theories about capitalist society.

2.1 Marx and Marxists

2.1.1 Marx

Marx and Engels were the first scientists who put class in the middle of their analysis. Maybe we can claim that contemporary class theorists are grandchildren of Marxism. Marx's idea rooted in early British political economists, the French "utopian" socialists and Hegel's dialectics. Indeed, Marx tried to provide a link between sociological investigation, economic analysis and philosophical speculation with the help of theory of class.

Due to Marx (1920), classes are defined by the relations of property and power and their functions as political forces in the society. The main factor here is the social relation which forms action of man/woman. Besides, these social relations themselves rest on the conflict of classes (Marx, 1847). That is why; class's nature is antagonistic and results in changes in a society; because every class wants to dominate the other classes and through this conflict, the formation of society changes and leads to a new era. In this regard, the society can be identified by social conflicts which is presented by class conflicts (Geiger, 1949).

Marx distinguishes two main classes: Workers and Bourgeoisie. The working class is the exploited one; because it gains insufficiently from the benefits it generates and through the years it turns to a cheaper commodity in comparison to the goods it produces.

Another point that was emphasized by Marx is the fact that the workers find their product as an alien being. As noted by Grusky (2008), the product is the objectification of labor and the work of workers has been embodied in a thing which is alien to the worker. Especially in the 19th century that the workers were not familiar with the whole process of production and for this reason, the final product was totally alien for them. In a vicious circle, by engaging the workers in the production, they produce more, but the object would become more powerful and at the end, the worker becomes poorer and more alien to the world.

The point mentioned by Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* is the fact that in capitalism – in contrast to earlier modes of production – the instruments of production have been revolutionized steadily and there are rapid changes. What Marx and Engels also stated is the fact that these changes affect all nations and that is why; the nature of capitalism is global. Indeed, capitalism “creates a world after its own image” (Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 108-119). Another important characteristic of the bourgeoisie is its tendency to globalize markets. The national markets are limited. For technological progresses and in order to generate more profit, the bourgeoisie needs accumulation, that is hardly attainable with limited national markets. Hence, the bourgeoisie has given through its exploitation of the world-market a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.

Class awareness and *class consciousness* are the hearts of Marx's theory regarding social change. The changes occur, if the classes become aware of their existence as well as social relations. Without this consciousness, classes would exist without doing

anything in the society. The characteristic of social awareness is its effect on making the alignment of lifestyles of a class.

It is important to note that the definition of class had been developed by Marx through the years and was not exactly the same in all of his writings. Marshall et al. (1993) argued that in later works of Marx, he maintained an analytical distinction between ownership and social division of labor. The former defines the social class and the latter shapes the structure of classes. With this terminology, one can apply the theory of Marx for finding the stratification structure of the society.

One can argue that Marx was the first sociologist that considered class as an analytical sociological concept. For this reason, any sociologist interested in social inequality tried to find a middle way; Ralf Dahrendorf is one of these sociologists.

2.1.2 Ralf Dahrendorf

For Dahrendorf (1969), there are two meta-theories regarding classes in contemporary sociology. The *integration theory of society* considers the social structure as an integrated system with components that are in an equilibrium. The *coercion theory of society*, views social structure as a system, which should be bound together by forces; however, changes are inevitable in such systems. In contrast to Marx who assumed that class conflict groups are generated by social structure, Dahrendorf used the term “class” in the sense of conflict groups generated by organizational distribution of *authority*. For him, classes are conflict groups on the basis of authority relations in a hierarchical form of super- and subordination. These positions are structured in a way that the super-ordinate controls the behavior of the sub-ordinate. He pointed out that these relations become legitimate in the society and after a period, both sides accept the legitimate authority (ibid.).

In this point, Dahrendorf differs from Marx by considering power as the main source of inequality in all societies. We can imagine a society, where differences of *income* and *prestige* are leveled (it can be called *stratumless*), but the legitimate *power* makes the society unequal anyway. Therefore, for Dahrendorf, there has been no equal society in the history.

Another important consideration of Dahrendorf is *Subjection*. Subjection (not mistaken by subjective) is the exclusion from the authority hierarchy of the society. Actors that have a social position are obliged to follow a pattern of behaviors - sometimes without being conscious that this behavior could oppose their own interests (therefore, *latent*

interests). Based on this idea, Dahrendorf suggested the concept of *Quasi-group* which means “any collectivity of individuals sharing positions with identical latent interests without having organized themselves as such” (Dahrendorf, 1969, p. 237-8). *Manifest interests* are in contrast behavior patterns that are conscious to actors or better to say, are interests which are known by actors. At this moment, the actors become aware of social conflict and form *Interest groups*. An interest group is any organized collectivity of individuals sharing manifest interests. In this sense, *social class* can be understood as group of people with similar manifest or latent interests. The interests are defined regarding authority structure; therefore, the idea of Dahrendorf makes it possible to define classes in every society regarding the legitimate power, which means, we are restricted to two main classes. In practice, one can distinguish with this terminology white-collar work from manual work or wage work or other working class categories. In this structure, it is possible to define different working classes regarding their skill and position. The skilled workers are engineers and white-collar employees; the semiskilled workers own specific industrial experience; and unskilled laborers are newcomers to industry (beginners, former agricultural laborers, immigrants) or semi-unemployables. In this, the concept of middle class would be easier to understand, which would refer to people standing between the working class (with no authority) and the managers (who own the power).

Another advantage of Dahrendorf’s theory is its ability to analyze former Communist governments, which was applied by Djilas. According to Djilas (1962), the bureaucratic ruling class of Communist societies, which has not grown spontaneously like other classes in history, has created aristocracy. Djilas argued that *collective ownership* is a façade behind which the ruling class exercises its control and its *monopolistic ownership* which resulted in a *totalitarian authority*. This class extended its power over all spheres of life. It also tried to legitimize its rule by an ideology – just like the previous classes. He declared that *power* was the mean and goal of the communist party in order to maintain their privileges and ownership. That is why; they were not able to change the social formations. With Dahrendorf’s approach, one can also extend power relations from a property-based approach to an authority-based approach.

The importance of Dahrendorf’s theory for my research lies on the fact that the Iranian political system shows similarity with the political structure of former communist countries where the authority and political power were concentrated in the hands of a special group. In this respect, I want to conduct a similar analysis of Iranian middle

class with the help of Dahrendorf and his emphasis on authority. The governmental authorities possess power and through the social power they benefit from economic rents; on the other side, there is a group of people that does not own economic and political sources and can be seen as subordinate. In the middle, we can find the Iranians who are neither super- nor subordinate.

2.1.3 Nicos Poulantzas

The main focus and interest of Poulantzas were social and political structures. He tried to apply the historical analysis of Marx in a systematic structural analysis of the society. In this way, Poulantzas (1978) distinguished three control layers in the relation of capital and labor: (1) control over the physical means of production, (2) control over labor power, (3) control over investments and resource allocation, which means, beside the means of production ownership, the control process plays a significant role in the inequality of the society. In addition, ownership can also be economic or legal, which forms class interests, economic interests and political interests. In this respect, the key factor in the social formation of classes is *interest*. In this formation, the role of the *petty bourgeoisie* becomes more important (in comparison to Class Theory of Marx); because the petty bourgeoisie owns means of production, but has no control over labor power. Therefore, Poulantzas (1975) categorized many occupations as new petty bourgeoisie, which can be seen as middle class. Indeed, this formation helps us to extend Marx's theory, in order to apply the concept of middle class in modern society. It is important to note, for Marx, the productive labor is associated with surplus-value creation of material goods. Poulantzas insisted on the definition of productive labor as proletariat and argued that unproductive wage-earners must be excluded from the proletariat, because the exploitation relation of capitalistic society does not apply to them. The condition of supervisory labor in commodity production is also remarkable: because their position is the same as manual labor; but the difference is their power in dominating the working class. Indeed, they do not own the means of production, but they have the power to control the workers.

In sum, the formation suggested by Poulantzas helps us to distinguish the working class (who does not own the means of production and control) with the supervisory labor and petty bourgeoisie who stand between workers and bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact, although the terminology of Poulantzas regarding productive and unproductive labor is very helpful for understanding the formation of modern society, it is very difficult to

distinguish productive and unproductive labor; because it seems that productivity would be defined subjectively and every scholar might interpret the concept on her / his own. Besides, Poulantzas model is very complicated when it comes to interests. How can we define interests and what are special interests of middle class? Therefore, we can conclude that this model is very useful for finding out a rough image of inequality structure of a society, but we definitely need a more precise terminology in practical investigations.

2.1.4 Erik Olin Wright

Erik Olin Wright is another prominent sociologist in the field of class studies during the last decades of 20th century. The main characteristic of Wright's work was his consideration and discussion of the position of the middle class and democracy in a Marxist paradigm; in this way, Wright can be considered as Neo-Marxist. He argued that many neo-Marxist scholars try to shift the analysis of class relations from exploitation to *domination*. That is why; many neo-Marxist theorists cannot easily locate managers in the system. They are simultaneously dominators and dominated. The concept of domination does not imply any specific interest of actors; for example, parents dominate and control small children, but this does not mean that they are against the interests of their children.

Besides, Wright's comparative study (1985) on class consciousness is an attempt to show the importance of democracy in the analysis. His study showed that the degree of polarization in the USA and Sweden is somewhat different due to working-class consciousness in these countries. The Swedish Social Democratic Party and associated Swedish labor movement are completely different in comparison the Democratic Party and trade unions in America.

In this point, Wright (1989) – in contrast to other Marxists - suggested that socialism is not the only possible way to overcome capitalism. According to Wright, in socialism, the means of production are democratically controlled, hence capital and asset cannot be the source of exploitation. It means that the struggle for socialism and democracy are the same per se. Indeed, not only the means of production should be redistributed, the process of control and management must be democratized; i.e., the power of all actors would be equal and only in such a structure, exploitation will alleviate. The point was later asserted by Marshall et al. (2005) who believed without democracy, the

elimination of private ownership of capital assets would result in the replacement of the bourgeoisie with an exploiting class of bureaucrats and managers.

To attain radical democracy considered by Wright as the revolutionary transforming society, he argued that the different classes under capitalism would make an alliance in a process which he named *proletarianization of the working conditions of white-collar labor*. For Wright (1978), a majority of white-collar employees and small businesses have autonomy, but do not control the whole process and for this reason, they can be considered as working class. For example, the owner of fast-food and gas station franchises or professors with large research grants, can hire assistants, secretaries, etc., but they are not equal with owners of large businesses and high-ranked managers.

In order to explain social relations and to clarify the behavior of social actors, Wright (1978) suggested two kinds of interests: *immediate interests* are interests within a given structure of social relations and *fundamental interests* which can be deemed as the main intention underlying human action. Hence, regarding fundamental interests many actors behave and are treated the same in a social field. In this sense, an unproductive worker and a private servant have the same interests, as they are treated similarly in the capitalist society; therefore, both can be considered as the same class if revolutionary changes happen.

Table 2-1 - locations within class relations

Process underlying class relations			
	Control over investments and the accumulation process	Control over physical means of production	Control over the labor power of others
Bourgeoisie	+	+	+
Proletariat	-	-	-
Petty Bourgeoisie	+	+	-

Note. Adapted from “Class boundaries in advanced capitalist societies,” by E. O. Wright, 1976. *New Left Review*, 98, 3-41, p. 14.

One of the most important contributions of Wright to Class Theory is his emphasis on controlling the means of production. Table 2-1 is a summary of his idea on class relations. The bourgeoisie owns and controls means of production. The petite bourgeoisie owns means of production and also has control over physical means of

production, but in contrast to bourgeoisie cannot control the labor power of others. The proletariat neither owns means of production nor controls any means of production. With this model, it is easier to position *petty bourgeoisie* which has always been a debate between sociologists. As stated in model, the difference between bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie lies in the point that the bourgeoisie has the power to control labor power of others. The significant point is not only the economic ownership, but also the control over labor power.

2.1.5 John Roemer

John Roemer (1982a) argued that Classical Marxism could not precisely predict the future of capitalism on one hand and on the other hand, the suggested class structure within capitalism; namely, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, is not appropriate to analyze post-capitalist societies. Besides, he believed that Marxism has problems in clarifying the reasons for which workers are exploited in the second half of 20th century. Marx insisted on *unpaid* working hours as the source of exploitation; but if the workers are paid properly, then there is no reason to talk about exploitation. For Roemer, the concept of exploitation should be generalized in a way that it is applicable for any given society. For this reason, he suggested a basis for the reconstruction of an exploitation-centered concept of class.

One can observe inequalities in the distribution of incomes or the real consumption. The concept of exploitation is a particular way of analyzing inequalities, because the economic inequality does not necessarily result in exploitation. For this reason, scholars like Grusky (2008) distinguish between oppression and exploitation. For Grusky, unemployed workers are economically oppressed but not exploited. Exploitation implies economic oppression and taking the advantage of surplus by the oppressor at the same time.

In this sense, Roemer (1982b) defined exploitation as an interrelationship between different sources of income. The organization of production can be seen as a game, where some players benefit if they leave the game. In this way, a group of players prefer (or at least theoretically benefit from) changing the organization for better conditions – this is what Roemer called exploitation. Due to this viewpoint, three kinds of exploitation are distinguishable: *feudal exploitation*, *capitalist exploitation*, and what is referred to as *socialist exploitation*. In capitalism, workers own no physical assets and means of production and sell their labor power to capitalists for a wage. Now, we can

suppose if the coalition of all wage-earners were to leave game of capitalism, then they would be better off than staying in capitalism and the capitalists would be worse off in this case.

It is remarkable that the material basis of exploitation is inequalities in distribution of productive assets. In this case, the differences in benefiting from the surplus value and exploitation result in inequalities. Therefore, Roemer (1982b) defined classes as positions within the social relations of production derived from these relations to exploitation. The advantage of Roemer's analysis lies in the fact that he could show the relation of distribution and exploitation, where different kinds of assets and exploitation work together and form patterns of exploitation. Roemer distinguished two kinds of assets: physical assets (*alienable assets* in his terminology) and skill assets (*inalienable assets*). Physical assets determine the distinction between exploitation in feudalism and exploitation in capitalism. For example, labor power is a productive asset. Hence, in capitalist societies everyone owns one unit of asset, namely himself/herself.

From this point of view, Roemer discussed the idea of *Status Exploitation*, which means exploitation exercised by bureaucrats. Given some positions need special skills, then one gains more by being employed in this job, but if the employee is remunerated more because of his/her position (and not because of his/her skills), then it can be seen as status exploitation. Although Roemer criticized that status exploitation had no necessary relationship to production, but by adding organization assets to the list of Roemer's analysis, a new terminology was presented by Grusky (Table 2-2).

For preparing the theoretical framework of this study, the idea of status exploitation also plays a role. Corrupted and rentier states and meritocracy are mostly two sides of a coin and having proper skills does not necessarily result in being a governmental manager. In this respect, one can observe rise of a group of managers in the public sector that owns the authority without having proper education or experience or capabilities in the field they manage. Therefore, the disposition of this group is very difficult in countries like Iran; because their economic position and authority make them a part of middle class without having other factors of middle class like education and consuming cultural goods. In this way, status exploitation is a key concept for analyzing their function in the society.

Table 2-2 - Assets, Exploitation and Classes

Type of class Structure	Principal asset that is unequally distributed	Mechanism of Exploitation	Classes	Central task of revolutionary transformation
Feudalism	Labor Power	Coercive extraction of surplus labor	Lords and Serfs	Individual liberty
Capitalism	Means of production	Market exchanges of labor power and commodities	Capitalists and workers	Socializing means of production
State bureaucratic socialism	Organizations	Planned appropriation and distribution of surplus based on hierarchy	Managers / bureaucrats and non-management	Democratization of organizational control
Socialism	Skills	Negotiated redistribution of surplus from workers to experts	Experts and workers	Substantive equality

Note. Adapted from *A General Theory of Exploitation and Class*, by J. Roemer, 1982, Copyright 1982 by Harvard University Press; *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, by D. Grusky, 2019, p. 106. Copyright by 2019 Westview Press.

2.1.6 Gaetano Mosca

Due to Mosca (1939), in all societies two classes of people appear: a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is normally smaller, but owns the significant positions, monopolizes power and uses the privileges that power brings, whereas the other class is controlled by the first one arbitrarily or violently, and supplies the first. In such systems, one person or a group of persons is at the position of a supreme leader. As a matter of fact, Mosca applied the main idea of Marx, which says there are two antagonistic classes and extended that to the political field. The essence of this idea can be seen also in the works of scholars who developed and amplified Darwin's theories and contended that upper classes represent a higher level in social evolution and are therefore superior to lower classes by organic structure.

The significant role of Mosca in extending Marx idea is remarkable. Indeed, his idea makes it possible to consider the opposing forces of a society in a way which a group rules and the other obeys. It might remind us also of the role of political power in the 20th century, where extremist views like fascism played a significant role in

constructing structures. A similar consideration must be paid to the situation of Iran in this regard, where the political power is the main element in allocation of resources.

2.1.7 Frank Parkin

Frank Parkin is famous for his book *Marxism and Class theory, a Bourgeois Critique*. Parkin – like Dahrendorf – tried to find a new approach to analyze the capitalist society, which is not based on property. He argued there has been a change in capitalist society, namely that the centerpiece of capitalist society has become managerial authority, hence private ownership does not play the main role. Indeed, the role of managerial positions in capitalist and socialist societies regarding authority is the same. In this regard, Parkin (1974) was inspired by Weber's idea of social closure, which means the process that a group tries to maximize the gains of its members by limiting access of others to resources. Therefore, one can see a certain social or physical attribute as a basis of exclusion. Weber suggested thus that any group attribute such as race, language, social origin or religion might monopolize the economic opportunities. That means the social closure can result in having (or not having) power.

As an example, one can consider modern capitalism, whereby firstly the ownership of property, and secondly academic or professional qualifications and credentials caused this closure and the owners and educated individuals are privileged. Each of these attributes represents a set of arrangements for restricting access to rewards and privileges: property is a kind of closure designed to prevent general access to means of production and its fruits; education is a form of closure designed to control and monitor entry to key positions in the division of labor. Parkin (1974) also argued how formal qualifications can be an instrument for ensuring the people with higher cultural capital to provide best chances for their children in getting best professional status. In this sense, closure is not only an individualistic privilege, but also it results in inequality in the social level.

Interestingly, Grusky (2019) believed that the closure model is the intersection point of liberal and Marxist theories, whereas in liberal theories of class, mutual interests and harmony are essential factors, Marxists assume that there is an irresolvable antagonism in the system. The Closure model provides a common base for the analysis of inequality, namely the similarity of a class by disclosing itself as in the liberal approach and highlighting the differences as in Marxism. This model is very useful for discussing

the role of Iranian middle class in a society which is a result of growing rate of population with higher educations.

2.1.8 Immanuel Wallerstein

What makes the capitalistic mode of production unique is its ability to benefit from exchange of production. Before capitalism, the aim of production was use-value, but in capitalism, the maximization of surplus value is the ultimate goal. The rewards and penalties in this system are mediated through a structure called the market. The point, on which Wallerstein (1979) insisted, is that the market is a structure, but not an institution. Indeed, it is a structure modeled by many institutions (political, economic, social, even cultural), and it is the principal arena of economic struggle. Wallerstein believed that the market plays the most important role in the formation and stabilization of capitalism and is a vital element for capitalism to live on. Indeed, the main goal of capitalism is accumulation and if accumulation does not happen, it loses out fast. The market has the duty to help accumulation and circulation of products and money. In this respect, the bourgeoisie is not a profession anymore, it is a collectivity that obtains benefit from investing and not from working. The point is, that the bourgeoisie invests a part of surplus again in capital goods.

The important contribution of Wallerstein is the model he suggested. He generalized the model of capitalism and the structured market for an international system. For him, socio-economic relations are global, and power relations should be seen in a global scale. That is why; Wallerstein's world-system theory makes it possible for us to see social relations as a worldwide system with a possibility to distinguish global classes (e.g. the *New Class*). Thus, not only economy and socio-economic relations are global, but also classes are international; in contrast to classic economics which analyzes the national economy as a closed system.

2.1.9 C. Wright Mills – The Power Elite

For Mills (1956), the power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to change the social conditions of others. They make decisions that can have major consequences for the society. They manage large enterprises, military establishments, and the governmental administration; indeed, they decide as the highest hierarchy of social structure. They own effective instruments of power. That means a quite small group, namely the elite, makes decisions for the whole population.

The work of Mills is important, because the economic growth of America was different from the historical development of capitalism in Europe. Grusky (2018) believed that American society has never passed through a feudal epoch and its effect is observable on the American elite, as well as the American society as a whole. Indeed, in contrast to Europe, where an aristocratic power hegemony ruled before capitalism, the American society did not experience such a transformation and as a consequence, we see that in the American society, the bourgeoisie owns the wealth, status and power at the same time. Somehow, we can say that the American elite has emerged from an existing middle class that has increased their wealth. For this reason, the American bourgeoisie did not confront any opposing force and became the superior class in the modern time. This new superior class is less visible because of its origins and novelty. Having no military neighbors, they easily occupied an isolated continent stocked with natural resources and were immensely inviting to a willing labor force.

The point, which can be compared to the Iranian bourgeoisie is the fact that Iranian society did not experience the same process as West-Europe regarding modes of production; namely, transition from a feudalistic society to capitalism. For this reason, the Iranian elite groups also have the wealth and status and power at the same time, which will be discussed in section 4.5.

2.2 Weber and post-Weberians

The main difference between Marx and Weber regarding classes, is the vital role of class in Marx' theory and its rather peripheral role in Weber's work. For Weber (1922), class is the way that economic power is distributed, but it is not a central concept for explaining the social relations. Class, for Weber, was just one element of inequality and scholars should consider other sources of inequality as well, namely, social status and party. In fact, Weber tried to understand inequality in different social fields and find out how prestige and power are distributed in a society. However, the concept of class was applied by him differently in his works.

Wright (2002) distinguished three different approaches to class in works of Weber. In *Economy and Society*, the concept of class did not play the main role in the analysis and is a factor together with other social factors resulting in inequality. In contrast, in his early works like studies on East-Elbian agricultural workers and research on the agrarian sociology of ancient civilizations, Weber was involved with class analysis. The third, more prominent approach, is that Weber tried to analyze the capitalist society as

a social order; therefore, his point of view is concentrated on the condition of capitalism and as a consequence, the issue of social class is not central (in contrast to Marx).

In the terminology of Weber, there are two decisive factors regarding stratification. The *sphere* or *order* within which social interaction occurs (economic, communal or political) determines the category in which individuals within the distribution of power can be classified. The second factor emphasized by Weber is the subjective perception of affiliation to a class or party. Indeed, Weber (1922) assumed that a person can be economically in a class situation; but without generating a class identity and participation in collective action, it is not complete.

Classes are related to the economic sphere, then the status groups function in the sphere of communal interaction (or ‘social order’ in Weber’s terminology) and can be associated with honor. In this respect, subjective perception of status also plays an important role, because status group and belonging to a status group are interconnected with society’s definition of honor and prestige. Table 2-3 shows a summary of Weber’s ideas about class, status and party, which are associated with the economic, communal and political sphere of social interaction.

Table 2-3 - Weber theory on Spheres of Social Interaction and Distribution of Power

Sphere of Social Interaction	Category	Objective Properties	Subjective Identity	Collective Action
Economic Order	Class	Yes	No	No
Social Order / Honor	Status group	Yes	Yes	No
Sphere of Power	Party	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Adapted from *Economy and Society*, By M. Weber, 1922.

The three-dimension model of Weber is associated with the fruits in every field of social action, namely social honor, material resources, and authority. Class designates highly rationalized social relations that govern the way people get access to and use material resources (Weber, 1922).

For Weber (1978), members of a class become a status group when they become conscious of sharing a common identity and they become a party when they organize on the basis of that identity. The way class and status produce inequality is different; class is associated with the assets people exchange in the market and in this regard have an effect on well-being. In contrast, the effect of status on material well-being is indirect.

The importance of Weber's theory is due to his alternative vision of social stratification. Weber formulated the relation between power and life chances with market endowments, established cultural conventions of honor, and organizational power; especially within the state. With this model, one can perform a multidimensional analysis of inequality. Each dimension results in differences in economic, communal or political field. Indeed, Weber found out how the dimensions of social life; namely, economic, social and political aspects are associated with *class*, *status* and *party*. These three sources due to principle of distribution produce complex gradations of societal power and life chances which generate the inequality.

Weber (2021) tried to define a multi-aspect model of class which is based on ownership and properties. One can own a property or gain the property; the former class is called *ownership classes* (Besitzklassen) and the latter *acquisition classes* (Erwerbsklassen). Ownership can result in different kinds of returns; for example, the ownership of a dwelling is totally different from having a store or mine. Weber (2021) defines classes regarding market interests. The advantage of the market is that it is not an individual being and is by nature social and independent from the persons. For this reason, classes are meaningful in relation to markets where social action occurs; individuals have their economic interests and are represented due to the situation of market. In this way, Weber could suggest an objective way of representing class in his terminology, which was based on class interests, life chances and class situation. Besides, an individual belongs to a class, if the objective factors of class are similar and the individual is conscious about them.

In contrast to class, *status groups* are subjective and dependent on society. The important point here is that status is not related to market interests; therefore, its nature is subjective and any individual can choose that by herself/himself. In this way, one can distinguish *production* and *consumption*. The market interest determines which commodities would be produced; but the person decides which commodity will be bought and consumed which forms his/her *style of life*. Certainly, class and status are interconnected. A person with higher income has better life chances, namely the ability to choose what (s)he consumes; which means, that status group is related to lifestyle and consumption.

Another advantage of Weber's theory is the possibility to describe social mobility. For Weber, two economic classes ('Besitzklassen' and 'Erwerbsklassen') are distinguishable. Besides, Weber identifies a matrix with the axes *class situation* and

market position. With the aid of these concepts, we can retrace the common mobility chances, either within the career of individuals or across generations. In capitalism, Weber distinguishes four main social class groupings: the *manual working class*; the *petty bourgeoisie*; *propertyless white-collar workers*: e.g. technicians, various kinds of white-collar employees, civil servants; and those *privileged through property and education* (Weber, 1968). Similarly, status groups form the matrix of lifestyle and consumption patterns.

Weber demonstrated the importance of political power in social inequalities like other elite theorists (i.e. Pareto, Mosca and Michels). Power is not only control of the means of production and market endowments, but also the control of the means of political domination. Table 2-4 shows the location of class in Weberian analysis.

Table 2-4 - The Theoretical Location of “Class” in Weber’s Analysis of Rationalization

Sources of Social Power	Degree of Rationalization of Social Relations	
	<i>Rationalized Social Relations</i>	<i>Nonrationalized Social Relations</i>
Social Honor	Meritocratic prestige	Ascriptive status groups
Material conditions of life	Class: capital, labor	Ascriptively based consumption groups
Authority	Rational-legal domination: bureaucracy	Patrimonial administration

Note. Reprinted from “The Shadow of Exploitation in Weber’s Class Analysis,” by E. O. Wright, 2002, *American Sociological Review*, 832-853, p. 836

2.2.1 Class mobility and Class conflict in Weberian terminology

It is important to notice that class for Weber had a descriptive function to show the life chances and material condition of people. Since for Weber rationalization played the most important role, he maintained that the actors try to maximize their life chances and improve their material condition. The other forms of inequality are social honor (prestige) and political power. That is why; for post-Weberians like Pakulski and Grusky, classes are instruments to describe social inequality in the capitalistic society from the beginning of the industrial revolution until the emergence of the post-industrial (or postmodern) era. In this viewpoint, not only economic inequality must be seen in structures of inequality, but social honor is also another aspect of inequality.

For Weber and Weberians, in a rationalized society social honor results in a meritocracy; but what these sociologists did not answer is the complex problem of non-rationalized societies. In non-industrialized societies, class cannot be analyzed as in industrialized societies, where class is associated with production and capital. That is why; we have to rely on other aspects of inequality which are observable in such societies; for example, consumption is a point where different dimensions of inequality intersect. It shows economic ability and cultural interests.

With these points, we can come to one of the advantages of Weber's theory which lies in the ability of declaring class mobility. Unlike Marx's theory, classes are not tight social positions that cannot change. In Weber's model, workers can change their situation by advancing from a simple worker to a semi-skilled or skilled worker. Also, the members of middle class can rise into the privileged class by certain opportunities like bank credits or higher salaries. The same is true about power relations in the society. Indeed, a change in lifestyle or market interest can result in changes in social position.

2.2.2 Anthony Giddens - Elite and Power

Anthony Giddens as a Weberian sociologist has a holistic view of society. By combining the class theories of Marx and Weber, he suggests a new understanding of modern capitalism. Indeed, Giddens' point of departure is the idea of political domination of the ruling class. For Marx, in capitalism the realm of the *political* is subordinated to that of the *economic*. The unclear point in Marx analysis is the impact of these realms on each other on one side, and the mechanism of this dependency on the other side. For Marx, it was clear that economic power results in political power, but the question regarding the mechanism is unclear.

Giddens (1973) concluded that Marx had treated 'class' as a purely economic phenomenon and for this reason, class conflicts are always in the material realm, the problem here is the fact that material interests create classes, but classes are not necessarily the same as statuses. Status is subjective and must be seen as a subjective perception in a society. However, class and status are interrelated in many cases; therefore, for a better understanding of inequality there must be a third dimension. For Giddens, this third dimension is power, which for Marx, was a dependent factor of economic interests and for Weber, was an independent variable. In this way, Giddens

criticizes the Marxian viewpoint of class and found it better to follow and develop Weber's insights in this respect.

Giddens implied that the idea of propertylessness is another weak point of Marxism. He argued that if we suppose wage-laborer as *propertyless* regarding means of production, their capacity in the labor market is something precious, which is possessed by them (Giddens, 1973). Therefore, the *property* of the wage-laborer is the labor-power which (s)he brings for sale in the market. The point is that the wage-laborer owns a capacity needed by the capital owner; namely the labor power. This makes it necessary that the capital owner pays some minimal attention to the demands of the labor power. In this case, the working class has a possibility for bargaining, which can be interpreted as power or property. Besides, Marx put a lot of emphasis is on the productive labor and for this reason, he could not see the importance of *skills* (e.g. educational qualifications) in the market (which was described by Weber). Indeed, the workers and markets develop together and influence each other and power relations.

Another important aspect of Giddens' work is the idea of class system by applying theory of Schumpeter. For Schumpeter (1942; 1953), classes are like conveyances, which carry different people, but the shape is always the same. Therefore, Giddens suggested a class system that is constant in form, but with the possibility of social mobility, and consisted of *upper*, *middle* and *lower* or *working classes*. This connotation was used in many later researches about classes.

Here, we can analyze the structuration theory of Giddens regarding classes by means of an example. In a factory, there are manual and non-manual workers, whose conditions are entirely different. The administrative workers are responsible in framing and conducting the production process. In this sense, they try to distinguish themselves from manual workers who are subject to those commands. In fact, the non-manual workers are the layer between workers and factory owner. Grusky (2019) explained how the same system functions as a whole in the society. The upper class wants to rule, and administrates the working class through the middle class without any direct confrontation.

Another important aspect of Giddens' work, which is related to this study, is his belief that structuration of class originates in the sphere of consumption rather than production. According to the traditional interpretations of class structure (i.e. Marx and Weber) class is a phenomenon of production. Therefore, they supposed that relationships established in consumption are secondary to productive activity. Giddens

(1979) emphasized that it is still possible to regard consumption patterns as a major influence upon *class structuration*. The remarkable point maintained by Weber was that *status* and *status groups* make it possible to find groupings with non-economic characteristics based on *honor* and *prestige*. Although status and class can coincide, but they are not the same. In this respect, one can distinguish production from consumption. Besides, one can also distinguish status and status group; the former is dependent upon attitudes towards specific consumption patterns and the latter is the application of them by a group of people (Giddens, 1973). Classes can result in common patterns of social behavior and attitude and lifestyle as well. Therefore, class and status (or belonging to a class and status group) determine our behavior, attitude and lifestyle.

Power has also a role in the multi-dimension model of Giddens. The effective power forms the elite groups regarding two factors: if the power is restricted in the hand of a group and if the power strength is higher for special positions in the society. Then, it is possible to establish a classification to see how the elites exercise power. Table 2-5 shows these possibilities.

Table 2-5 - Power schemes by Giddens

	Broad	Restricted
Consolidated power	Autocratic	Oligarchic
Diffused power	Hegemonic	Democratic

Note. Adapted from *Die Klassenstruktur fortgeschrittener Gesellschaften*, by A. Giddens, 1979

Grusky (2008) suggested an overall typology of elite formations and power within the class structure based on Giddens' theory to clarify four concepts: *ruling class*, *governing class*, *power elite* and *leadership groups*. In this terminology, the ruling class is the strongest if the power is restricted to a special group; the weakest is where an established elite group holds oligarchic power (Table 2-6).

Giddens (1979) also assumed that the class difference is going to vanish in modern societies. In modern capitalist societies, one can see that socialism values have been conducted and developed, whereas the way which countries with a state economy have chosen is far beyond socialism. Indeed, one can assume that there is a convergence in countries toward a similar class structure.

Table 2-6 - Power and Elite formation in the theory of Giddens

	Elite formation	Power-holding
Ruling class	Uniform/established elite	Autocratic/oligarchic
Governing class	Uniform/established elite	Hegemonic/democratic
Power elite	Solidary elite	Autocratic/oligarchic
Leadership groups	Abstract elite	Hegemonic/democratic

Note. Reprinted from “Elites in the British class structure,” by A. Giddens, 1972, *The Sociological Review*, 20(3), 345-372, p. 352

An important conclusion of Giddens’s class system is that due to the possibility of social mobility in the 20th century, the concept of class must be reconsidered. Now, social inequality is not a definite social construction like before, and many new aspects are involved in inequality. Indeed, Giddens argued that we are going toward more equal societies. For example, it is not possible to categorize labor in the service sector as working class anymore. Besides, there are too many new jobs in IT with characteristics of both working class and bourgeoisie. For instance, a software developer who works for a company cannot be counted as a bourgeois in classic way; because he/she does not own the company and at the same does not belong to working class: because he/she is not dependent on means of production as the classic working class does. Indeed, we have to suggest new mixed theories which do not see classes as solid social facts, but as historically changing constructions.

2.3 Durkheim and post-Durkheimians

Marx, Weber and Durkheim are the trio classic sociologists at the beginning era of social sciences. In the last sections, I have investigated Marx and Weber theory of class. In this section, the idea of Durkheim will be asserted. Durkheim (2019) supposed property as sacred and ownership as a privilege. That is why; social inequalities related to uneven distribution of property were seen by Durkheim as legitimate. As formulated by Pakulski (2005), Durkheim interconnected property rights with taboos and rituals, and by means of his terminology, Durkheim described inequality as a global and historical phenomenon, which has been present in all the societies. In this way, he formed the theoretical foundation of the social anthropology of inequality, which was later used by Pierre Bourdieu.

One of Durkheim’s major contributions to sociology of inequality concerns the form and the evolution of occupational hierarchies. Social differentiation (division of labor)

lied at the heart of Durkheim's theory in investigating the modern society. That is why; in his works, one can repeatedly see the analysis of occupational groups. Occupational groups become central elements of the new stratification system because they confer identity, status, and material awards. Besides, Durkheim (2014) believed that the occupational associations would become a conciliator between the state and the individual, in order to prevent conflicts.

Although the role of Durkheim in the sociology of inequality has often been neglected by scholars, I believe that Durkheim's legacy has its most impressive manifestations in defining strata in the society. Especially, occupation groups are key factors in later analysis of structural inequality.

2.3.1 Alexis de Tocqueville

Alexis de Tocqueville's (1945 [1862]) vision of social inequalities and their modern dynamics mirrors in many ways the Marxist class vision. For Marx, the society would be polarized due to presence of classes, but in contrast, for de Tocqueville, the modern society would become equal due to democratic practices. According to Tocqueville, modern democracy will result in an equal world in which humankind will live in passion and freedom. This equalization is a result of Christian values, industrialization and commercialization, well-being, civil society and democratization of culture.

Marxist and Tocquevillian visions are similar in their prognoses in regard of an equal society, but what they see and the process that they suggest are entirely different. For Tocqueville, democracy connects the social gaps created by industrialization and for Marx, the social relations and formations have changed because of industrialization. That is why; for Tocqueville and his followers, class division is not important, and the main focus is on the civic society.

2.3.2 David Grusky and Jesper Sørensen

David Grusky described *occupation* as main factor of modern social hierarchy (Grusky, 2001). Grusky – just like Durkheim – claimed that the society is similar to an organic entity; therefore, differentiation, organic social clustering for the modern society and occupation groupings form the social identities. They result in common lifestyles, tastes and consumption patterns. Grusky also suggested that occupations should be considered as *real classes*.

Indeed, occupation and differentiation lie in the heart of Grusky and Sørensen's (1998) analysis about social inequality. Their theory is a base for many practical researches in the field of inequality, where occupations would be considered as the main factor in distinguishing classes and strata. In contrast to Bourdieu who emphasized the cultural implications and lifestyle in inequality studies, they considered occupational closure as the decisive factor in this regard.

2.3.3 Daniel Bell

Bell (1974) supposed that classes show the horizontal inequality and *statuses* vertical inequality. Then, he used the word *situses* instead of statuses to emphasize the fact that in daily life, there are conflict interests between organizations to which men belong, and not between class or status identities. The important point for Bell was the difference between the capitalist and post-industrial society. In the former, the property owner is in the company or corporation and for this reason, status and situs are identical, but in the latter, the estates are distributed among many different situses. His idea was that the post-industrial society did not arise from the old system, it became to existence outside that.

The arising post-industrial society in the twentieth century is a result of scientific progresses, in contrast to the bourgeois society of the nineteenth century, which was made up by free professionals whose property was their skills or their willingness to take risks. For this reason, the initial logic of the post-industrial society is meritocracy. Differential status and differential income are based on technical skills and higher education (Bell, 1974). Without these qualities, one cannot integrate in the new developing labor market, which is a characteristic of post-industrial society. We can imagine that in such a society, four years investment of studying in a university would result in higher education and higher income. In this process, the university as a symbol of status system, has resulted in an increase of economic income, which means it has an impact on class position.

The main question after the emergence of a new kind of society is the distribution of wealth, power, and status. For Bell (1974), classes are created in a society regarding two factors: *property* and *knowledge*, which, together with the political system, determine the elites of the society. In this point, Bell believed that in the post-industrial society, managers can be the ruling class – in contrast to Dahrendorf who believed that the authority would be distributed regardless of classes, i.e., a worker can become a

parliament member and obtain authority. The theory of Bell helped us to go beyond the classical view, which remarked property class as the ruling class. Besides, Bell showed the importance of education in the stratification system.

2.4 Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters – Death of the Class

Pakulski and Waters (1996) assumed that classes are dissolving in advanced societies. Therefore, class identities, class ideologies and class organizations are not the characteristics of Western societies anymore. For them, the most important developments that resulted in the new society include the reallocation of wealth and properties, the importance of education and skills in labor market, the globalization of markets and the significance of consumption patterns and lifestyles.

As a result of this theory, class analysis would lose its importance in investigating inequality and factors like gender and racial inequality would become significant. Besides, the character of authority, which was neglected by class analysis, would be emphasized.

Indeed, this radical emphasis makes their theory important, because they consider a turning point in the social sciences. The point of departure in classic theories of sociology has been inequality and most importantly, the concept of class. Now, the significance of class loses its weight in the studies.

2.5 Gøsta Esping-Andersen – Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies

The most famous theorist of the postindustrial society was Daniel Bell. For him, societies are in the position that they benefit from the *democratic class struggle*, because it pushes the improvements by a fair competition between actors. Bell (2000) believed that in the post-industrial society, occupations determine inequality and therefore, the main conflict is between statuses and not classes. The main function of the social safety net in Western countries was to overcome the social and economic inequalities. Besides, during the Golden Age capitalism, many low-skilled workers were employed in mass-production. This vanished in the new society and instead of these jobs in the production line, the jobs in service sector increased.

In this constellation, developing countries take the responsibility of manufacturing simple goods and thereby, fuel the process of urbanization and industrialization. At the same time, developed countries eliminate most unpleasant jobs and substitute them with

better-paid jobs (Bell, 2000). Esping-Andersen (1999) suggested that in this system, the structure of occupation hierarchies would change in post-industrial countries and skilled service workers would have better opportunities in the labor market. As a consequence, the occupational hierarchy changes in postindustrial societies. If in the industrial society, the managers and executives were at the top of the pyramid, now professionals have the power and are key actors of the society (Table 2-7).

Table 2-7 - Industrial and Postindustrial Occupational Hierarchies

The Industrial Hierarchy	The Service Hierarchy
Managers and executives	Professionals
Administrators, supervisors	Semi-professionals, technicians
Skilled manuals	Skilled service
Unskilled manuals	Unskilled service

Note. Adapted from *Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economics* by G. Esping-Andersen, 1999. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Grusky (2008) argued that as a result, the number of manual workers declines; besides, the typical middle class occupations of the after war era (like managers, clerical, and sales jobs) would lose their importance, and professionals and semi-professionals would dominate the labor market. Accordingly, the chances of class mobility in such a society are correlated with the growth of professionals and experts. The point is that the new economy is a professionally dominated service economy. For my research, it is visible in the rise of new occupations in the IT-Sector with high-income payments and flexibility. Understanding this change is essential for analyzing the new era of inequality worldwide.

2.6 Weber and Marx on Class: Convergences

In order to have a better overview of ‘class’, we have to compare basic ideas of Marx and Weber about class. Their theories of class are the basis for other theories in this field. Interestingly, there are many similarities between these two. Weber’s point of departure was somehow the theory of Marx. Weber, indeed, applied the main theoretical ideas of Marx about class, but at the end was skeptical about the prognosis of Marx. For Weber, class was the means of analysis instead of means of emancipation. The similarities of Marx and Weber can be listed as follows:

1. Both Marx and Weber considered classes as *qualitative relational concepts* in the social field, which means that classes are meaningful if groups in the society are compared with each other.
2. Property, wealth and *economic factors* are decisive in defining classes.
3. For Marx and Weber, there is a difference between classes as a socially defined group and collectively defined concept regarding collective behavior and the condition of social actors. For this reason, Weber used the concept of *class situation* and Marx used the expression *class-in-itself / class-for-itself* (and the contemporary Marxists have used the expressions like *class location* or *class position* or *class structure*).
4. For both, material interests are the center point where class locations influence social action. Indeed, class location defines the material interests and even social behavior.


Due to Wright (2002), the difference between Weber and Marx is in their understanding of the causal mechanisms linked to property relational classes. For Weber, the main issue was the relation of classes and life chances in the rationalized economic markets and for Marx, the central issue was to understand the influence of class on life chances and exploitation.

Class struggle is without doubt the main difference between Marx and Weber. For Weber, the problem of material deprivation is not important. Therefore, his point of view and his point of departure are not the same as Marx's. Marx and Weber both believed that ownership is decisive in class membership as well as in life chances, besides the exchange has its own rules and is rationalized. For Marx however, these are a part of the analysis and it was important for him to examine the exploitation relations and mechanism in the capitalist society. Marx believed that exploitation is the source of profits in capitalism and with this assumption, one can understand the conflict between classes in capitalism.

Figure 2-1 shows the basic structure of Marx's and Weber's analysis. Both believed that economic assets play the main role in class structure; then, Weber tried to define classes regarding the market, which for him is instrumentally rational regulated and with this constellation, the market defines income and life chances. Marx was interested in production relations and relations of domination/subordination which result in exploitation and the domination of the ruling class over the working class. Therefore,

the focus of Weber was life chances and of Marx was the relation in production field. In this respect, Marx maintained that socialism is the natural end of capitalism with public ownership of means of production, but Weber asserted that socialism would only intensify the oppression and is not an alternative to capitalism. Besides, Weber had a multidimensional idea of class, that is not only defined by property. For this reason, capitalism (or any era) would not inevitably end in revolution and change. For example, one can see that slave-owners as a privileged property class coexisted with peasants, that are not a privileged class.

Figure 2-1 - Core Elements in Weber's and Marx's Analysis of Class



Note. Own figure based on *Understanding class*, by E. O. Wright, 2015.

2.7 Class in the second half of 20th century

Marx and Weber did not investigate all aspects of social inequalities and that is why; after them, the sociologists tried to analyze other kinds of social inequalities such as gender inequalities and race discriminations, too. In classic theories of class, ownership and economic wealth played the main role for social scientists in their studies of structures. Besides, class conflict and class struggle were in focus of Marx and Marxists; but as said above, biological and racial inequalities were seldomly discussed. For this reason, we see that in the second half of 20th century, classic class theories were revised and new theories were suggested.

Pakulski (2005) tried to overcome these shortcomings of classic sociology by turning the theories to a more comprehensive and plural instrument of analysis. He suggested to apply class theories solely for societies of the industrial era and rejected idea of class for advanced societies, considering them as classless. Due to Pakulski, the role and definition of class in the contemporary society is related to different factors like the objective location of people regarding material ownership, subjective perception of

people from their position in the class structure, life chances, social cleavages of the society, historical variation of inequality, and emancipation. By considering these factors, one can have a better understanding what class means, and it is possible to analyze other kinds of inequality in the society.

Grusky (2008) suggested a multi aspect view of classes regarding different dimensions of inequality such as economy, politics, gender etc. which is summarized in Table 2-8. As we can see, the idea of economic class is converted into conventional status. That means, for theorists like Grusky there is a wider level of analysis, namely the global world, and structure is formed with status and not class.

Table 2-8 - Registration of Stratification Orders through System Levels

Axial principle	World	Society	Politics	Economy	Community	Domesticity	Gender	Individual
Economic Class	Colonialism	Laissez-faire state	Plutocratic / revolutionary parties	Owner capitalism	Property order	Reproduction state	Patriarchy	Worker
Organized Class	Imperialism	Corporatism	Mass parties	Fordism	Occupational order	Consumer sphere	Reorganized Patriarchy	Citizenship
Conventional Status	Globalization	Nation	Niche parties	Flexible specialization	Value order	Significant lifeworld	Hyper-differentiation	Human

Note. Reprinted from *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, by D. Grusky, 2019, p. 1027. Copyright 2019 by Westview Press.

Due to Grusky (2019), the analysis of inequality has begun with the concept of economy class and then developed to organized class and in late capitalism, we can see that in conventional statuses. At the world level, we experience changes like globalization and our level of analysis would be the nation. The important point here is this development in comparison to the industrialization era, where the individuals were workers who counted as the main actors in class analysis and now, the human is the main actor.

If we consider the history of class theories, we conclude that Marxists' concept of class is stamped with ideal ideas like social emancipation and historical variation, whereas issues like individual life chances are neglected. That is why; neo-Marxists try to systematically engage the problem of life chances by incorporating Weberian ideas into class analysis. In order to have an overview of different theories, we can summarize the differences between theorists of class in a table regarding anchor questions of every thinker (Table 2-9).

For Weber (and Weberians), class is an instrument for analyzing inequality with a focus on life chances. Besides, class and status for them are both important in this analysis; therefore, these concepts are applied in different epochs. Interestingly, the historical variation of inequality has been a central point of Weber's ideas, which has not been a focus point for new-Weberians like Goldthorpe.

Another development in class theories is related to Schumpeter (1942) who argued that many problems regarding classes are neglected, for instance, it has not been researched how and why classes are linked together. Also, the question of how classes originate has not been answered. He assumed that empirical studies are needed to answer these questions and he was particularly interested in class formation.

In sum, we see that the concept of class has been applied widely in the last decades of 20th century, because there was an increase in the economic and social gap worldwide on one side and on the other side, the classic theories could not explain the condition and class formation. Besides, another important change in the structure of Western societies in 20th century was the possibility of *social mobility*, which was not feasible due to the solid structure of capitalist societies in the 19th century.

The other modification regarding property is related to its control. Since the second half of the 20th century, property and wealth are not controlled by owners but by the managers. The new structure has changed the social and legal relations and has also resulted in new kinds of properties. Previously, property was limited to visible valuable goods like land, but recently, we can see that claims, grants and patent count as property. These new properties have also changed the relation of individuals and the state, because we can imagine that subsidies to farmers and grants to universities have impact on the existence of these entities and institutions and affect inequality in a holistic view.

Beside legal properties, the new society experiences the rise of a new group, which was called by Grusky (2008) *knowledge class*. This class is not an economic interest class or a political power class and its relations with the society are based on corporate identity. Bell (2000) defines *professional class* in the same way, which plays the main role in the post-industrial society, where science, technology, administration and culture are main criteria for distinguishing occupation groups. For instance, technologists are engineers or physicians who apply the knowledge produced by scientists. In the same way, the managers are the occupation group which has the duty

of controlling the new society. The cultural occupations are involved with the expressive symbolism of forms and meanings.

Table 2-9 - Importance of anchor questions for theorists of class

Approaches to Class Analysis	Anchoring Questions					
	<i>Distributional location</i>	<i>Subjectively salient groups</i>	<i>Life chances</i>	<i>Antagonistic conflicts</i>	<i>Historical variation</i>	<i>Emancipation</i>
Popular usage	***	*	**	*		
David Grusky (neo-Durkheimian)	**	***	**	*	*	
Jan Pakulski	**	***	**	**	**	
Pierre Bourdieu	**	**	***	*		
J. Goldthorpe (neo-Weberian)	**	*	***	*		
Sorensen	**	*	**	***		
Max Weber	*	*	**	*	***	
Eric Olin Wright (neo-Marxian)	*	*	**	**	**	***

Note. Reprinted from *Approaches to Class Analysis*, by E. O. Wright, 2005, p. 182. Copyright 2005 by Cambridge University Press.

The main point stated by these scholars is that in the post-industrial society, the position of property has changed and new distinguishing factors like skill and occupation have become more important. Grusky summarized these changes regarding property, position and skill in the society (Table 2-10).

Table 2-10 - Changes in the concept of social position due to changes in social mobility

Base of Power:	Property	Political Position	Skill
Mode of Access:	Inheritance / Entrepreneurial Ability	Machine Membership / Co-optation	Education
Social Unit:	Family	Group / Party	Individual

Note. Reprinted from *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, by D. Grusky, 2019, p. 971. Copyright 2019 by Westview Press.

If we observe these changes historically, we can see that social position has become a factor of property, political position and skills. Indeed, the position and the route of access to these qualities determine the position of an individual or an entity in the

society. Interestingly, by means of this matrix, Grusky also positioned the social unit in the social field. Therefore, we can analyze the situation of families, political parties and an individual.

2.8 Class in a Bourdieusian Model

Bourdieu can be seen as one of the influential social scientists of recent decades who could overcome some of dualities in the classic sociology; namely, the duality of structure-agent, duality of economy-culture and the interpretation of social action (Wacquant, 2019). He could find a way to link the class theory of Weber and Marx, by taking the idea of capital from Marx and the notion of different social fields from Weber and formulating a new theory of inequality based on different measures of capital in social field. Besides, he could suggest a theory in order to interpret and understand the social action of individuals by considering their *habitus* and the structure of a society. Indeed, Bourdieu opposed the debate of pure subjectivism and objectivism and concentrated on *structural constructivism*, which made it possible not only to interpret and analyze social actions, but also to suggest a way to observe the reason of actions, which root in the past, culture and social environment (Lamont & Fournier, 1992).

Another duality discussed by Bourdieu was the separation of theory and research; he considered the theory as an outcome of empirical research and vice versa, the empirical analysis is meaningful in combination with theories. Besides, Bourdieu considered both quantitative and qualitative methods significant and believed that none of them should be seen as the main technique for gathering data.

This wide understanding of the social field and human behavior helped him to investigate in different spheres of social activities, phenomena, and realms. Bourdieu and his team could research about literature, fashion, photography, sport, art, taste, domination, academia, and poverty and interpret the facts with the conceptual tool suggested by Bourdieu. Bourdieu found out that in the field of social life there is a principle, that distinguishes social behavior of actors; namely, the tendency to be different from others; that means, the actors prefer to consume in a way that shows they are different from others. For Bourdieu (1984), this pattern of social action is inevitable and actors cannot escape from that.

The main concern of Bourdieu was the meaning of collective life and as a consequence, the forms of domination in history. For Bourdieu (1987), domination formations can be

clarified by class relations; therefore, he investigated the concept of privilege historically and the idea of class and social formation in his works.

In this point, Bourdieu differs from Marx. Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* described the French peasantry as a “sack of potatoes”; because they did not have the means to organize themselves as a class to take part in revolutionary changes. Marx believed that the main problem in the case of peasants is lack of effective communication and disability to organize and mobilize, but Bourdieu supposed that the communication or interaction are not the decisive factors and class identity plays the main role, which means that the actors would need to recognize themselves as a class.

Weininger (2005) declared how in Bourdieu’s theory social actors are positioned in a class with a probability of belonging to a class. Due to a lifestyle or an organizational membership, one can be categorized in a definite position *with a definite probability*. On the other hand, there is a subjective feeling of membership in a special class, which determines if an individual recognizes himself/herself as a member of a class. Therefore, there are two dimensions of class affiliation: *subjective*, which is related to the feeling of an individual to feel himself or herself as a member of class, and *objective*, which is related to lifestyle that makes a class affiliation more probable. For Bourdieu (1985; 1987), social class can be formed, when the *objective probabilities resulting from the structure of social space* and the *subjective “belief” in the existence of classes* conjoin. In this respect, Bourdieu (1989) also considered the position of power and class struggle. It is possible for social actors to impose their classification and that is the symbol of power in the society, because they can manipulate the classification and objective and subjective aspects of class affiliation.

For Bourdieu (1984), there are structured products and structuring structures. One can find in all products and practices a cohesive force which is called *habitus*. The habitus is a structuring structure, which means, the reason for behavior similarity of social actors is the similar habitus. It functions as a framework that forces people to do something, and it is formable in interaction of actors.

The main distinguishing factor regarding lifestyles is *taste*. Taste functions as a mirror of preferences of a class and is manifested in the symbols generated by a group in the social field. Besides, taste is present in every aspect of social life and plays a distinguishing role. One can observe taste in all choices of an individual, e.g. in choosing clothing and furniture as well as kind of sports and language.

Although Bourdieu tried to explain the interaction of class and status in his first works, he later cared more about the cultural aspects of inequality in comparison to economic dimensions and especially emphasized the role of occupation groups in forming tastes (Weininger, 2005). However, the analysis of symbolic systems in his class theory remained important and are his main interest.

We can see that Bourdieu extended Weber's idea of class and status into a new field of material and symbolic capital. Whereas Weber believed that class is related to the economic sphere of social life and status is related to the communal sphere, for Bourdieu (1985), class and status are analytical instruments to clarify how stratification influences the material life of people and which symbols of distinction are produced by social system. Indeed, Bourdieu could overcome the shortcoming regarding the reductionism of economic class analysis and at the same time, could explore a deeper layer of symbols in the social life.

The remarkable point about class theory of Bourdieu is its focus on culture and cultural goods. Bourdieu (1984) maintained that an artistic work has meaning for people with cultural competence and those who are interested in such works have a taste for *high culture*. This can also be seen as a point of distinction between social classes – as mentioned by Halle (1992; 1993), because the capacity to understand the meaning and codes of a high culture artistic work is different among social classes. In this respect, higher education plays a significant role and for this reason, the working class that comes from poor families is not interested in the so-called high culture, because they had not the same chances in the educational system as others. For Bourdieu (1984), here is the cut-off point, where the dominant class prefers the high culture and dominated class has a taste for popular culture.

Besides, Bourdieu (1977; 1984) could overcome the debate of subjectivism and objectivism by suggesting the concept of *social space*. Every individual can be positioned in the social space regarding volume and composition of capitals. Therefore, social class is a system of objective determinants and subjective lifestyles in the social space. With this positioning, every individual can be located in the space and compared with other actors. The benefit of subjectivism lies in the ability to change structures into objective, calculable variables. Indeed, the concept of social space makes it possible to combine the objective and subjective elements of theories about classes and depict them.

One of the ageless debates of class theory is the idea of class conflict and seeing that as the *motor of history*. Wright (2005) declared that for Bourdieu, the class struggle is not the only conflict that we have to consider in the stratification processes. Bourdieu – in *The Weight of the World* – showed that there are many antagonistic relations among the working class worldwide, which are related to ethnicity or immigration etc. They produce new identities that result in conflict.

In this point, we can compare class theories of Marx, Weber and Bourdieu, in order to find out which elements were used by Bourdieu in his assumptions. Table 2-11 is a brief comparison between Marx, Weber and Bourdieu in this regard. As we can see in the table, between these three, Bourdieu is the only one who sees cultural capital as a resource that shapes life chances. For Bourdieu, life chances must be in the center of class analysis. In contrast to Marx and Weber, for Bourdieu questions about emancipation and historical variation are insignificant. In Bourdieu's class analysis, life chances play the central role and interestingly, life chances are dependent on material properties, skills, occupation, and cultural capital. Although Bourdieu is not concerned about emancipation – like Marx –, Weininger (2005) believed that for Bourdieu, the intellectuals are the force against the exploitation and subordination, because of their high accumulation of cultural capital that can result in symbolic power. Therefore, the intellectuals are powerful in this sense and have impact in the social relations and formations.

Bourdieu extended the concept of life chances from an economic factor related to material aspects of daily life to a variable, which is related to symbolic rewards of the society; therefore, one can see that social class and social status are integrated in class theory of Bourdieu, which is wider than Weber's and Marx'. For Marx, economic capital was more important, and Weber tried to show the importance of skills and their role in market capacities. Neo-Weberians, like Breen (2005) and Chan & Goldthorpe (2005), added occupation-related characteristics to the market capacity maintained by Weber. In sum, Bourdieu argued that class is not just an economic matter but has a cultural and social dimension as well (McKinnon, 2017).

The remarkable point is the fact that division of labor and many other factors locate an individual's position in social space. The decisive factors here are the volume of every type of capital each individual owns. Capital is defined as a set of resources and powers, which can be used, and Bourdieu believed that there are too many kinds of capitals; therefore, it is not possible to categorize all of them under a single kind. That is why;

the social space model for class structure suggested by Bourdieu has three orthogonal axes for economic and cultural capital indicating the volume of each capital owned by an individual in combination with occupation groups in order to show the position of person in the chart.

Table 2-11 - Life chances question in Marx, Weber, and Bourdieu

	Salient resources that shape life chances			Relative centrality of three class analysis questions		
	<i>Capital and labor</i>	<i>Human capital</i>	<i>Cultural capital</i>	<i>Life chances</i>	<i>Historical variation</i>	<i>Emancipation</i>
Marx	*			3	2	1
Weber	*	*		2	1	
Bourdieu	*	*	*	1		

Note. Adapted from *Approaches to Class Analysis*, by E. O. Wright, 2005, Cambridge University Press.

Due to this setting, it is possible to distinguish dominant and dominated classes. Bourdieu (1984) in his famous study of French society concluded that occupations like industrialists, private sector executives, and professors are at the upper end of the axis; which means they are at the same position regarding class system. For Bourdieu, these groups are the *dominant class*. At the other end of the axes, one can find manual workers and farm laborers who do not possess capitals and they are the typical *working class*. Due to this class system, all occupations can be positioned, and their relation would be clear. For example, office workers have a low qualification and a middle income; and the skilled or semi-skilled workers have lower incomes and often lower cultural capital. The most important advantage of Bourdieu's class theory is the possibility to analyze the modern society and categorizing different occupations. Besides, the concept of middle class, which has always been controversial would become meaningful for study and research.

2.8.1 Class habitus

In order to explain the relation between the position of individuals in the social field and their action, Bourdieu (1977) suggested the concept of habitus, which became characteristic of his theory and was widely applied. Indeed, Bourdieu tried to show the mechanism that determines class location, namely the objective position (regarding volume of capitals) and subjective affiliation of a person (due to class identity), which

result in taste, behavior and lifestyle of an individual. Interestingly, habitus is a social construction which has impact on people and would be impacted. That is why; it is called the structuring structures and also the structured structure (Bourdieu, 1984). The relation of social actors and habitus is mutual and interchangeable. Besides, habitus steers the actions, because it is internalized and for this reason, habitus has impact on all aspects of life.

Another concept suggested by Bourdieu (1977) is *class condition*, which consists of a set of life chances and is directly related to the location in social space. The dispositions have impact on thoughts, actions and perceptions (Bourdieu, 1990). For Bourdieu, habitus is formed regarding the position in the social space, whereas Weininger (2005) also added the *experience of material necessity* as a factor related to forming the habitus.

Habitus is the center point of Bourdieu's theory, which produces and influences the individual's taste and lifestyle. Taste and lifestyle create a sign system that generates the differences. Social actors behave and consume due to their taste and lifestyle and distinguish themselves from *others*; therefore, study of habitus is the recognition of differences and qualifications generated by habitus. By means of habitus and its dialectic relation with class conditions, Bourdieu could explain the power relation, domination and sign system of a society in relation with different kinds of capitals including symbolic and cultural capitals. Symbolic capital is also the key aspect in the distinction aimed by social actors and functions as a distinguishing dimension of social life.

Grusky (2019) explained that how taste functions as a transformation instrument of habits in life practice of actors. Indeed, class condition determines the practice, and then the symbolic expression of class position is created. The dialectic relation of practice and position results in the classification system. Therefore, for Bourdieu (1984) this classificatory system is the product of the internalization of the structure of social space. Although the class system is internalized, there are choices in daily life of social actors, hence the practices are not totally determined and these choices make the differences between the actors in the similar positions. That is why; we can see that different lifestyles and although individuals are classified regarding their position in the social space, they are also classifiers regarding their role in the establishment of lifestyles.

Bourdieu's study about French society showed that lifestyle distinguishes different classes by consumption; for instance, one class is interested in reading poetry,

philosophical and political works, *Le Monde*, and the leftish literary or artistic magazines; and another class prefers hunting or betting, reading *France-Soir* or *Auto-Journal*; that is the same about the taste for art; one class is interested in theater and classical music, and the other class prefers to attend a boulevard theater and a music-hall and watches variety shows on TV (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 283). Due to these characteristics, Bourdieu distinguishes the dominant and working classes by their taste; the former possesses tastes of luxury and the latter tastes of necessity. The consumption patterns of the dominant class mostly manifest in three fields: food, culture and presentation (clothing, beauty care, toiletries etc.). The patterns of consumption for every occupational group are different because of capital volumes. For example, the consumption pattern of teachers is totally different from industrial and commercial employers; teachers spend less than average on food and presentation and in contrast, their expenses on culture (e.g. books and magazines) are higher than average (Bourdieu, 1984). In this way, it is emphasized that lifestyle corresponds to the actors' capital volume and locates them in social space. For Bourdieu, the most important capital in expressing social class are consumer preferences in cultural field. Therefore, cultural consumption is the best way to recognize social class and lifestyle of an individual or rather the household.

The class theory of Bourdieu has been widely used by different scholars; especially it inspired many sociologists to perform investigations in the field of art and literature by applying the idea of habitus and measuring cultural capital (cf. Rutz & Balkan, 2009; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007, Peterson & Kern, 1996; Peterson & Simkus, 1992; Weininger, 2005; Wacquant, 2019). As a matter of fact, this idea helped to analyze complex patterns of stratification using different forms of capital.

In sum, we can conclude that for Bourdieu, consumption forms the social collectives (Wright, 2005), which means that lifestyle and consumption patterns are the main sources of investigation in analyzing stratification. Among preferences of consumption, cultural commodities (like music, literature, art, theater etc.) can give us more information about the class condition of an individual or a household. It should be noted, that cultural goods have a wider meaning and can include food, leisure time activities and clothing too. Especially, in countries like Iran, where some artistic activities are restricted, food and clothing can substitute the canonized cultural goods in providing the distinction for dominant and working classes.

The method used by Bourdieu for analyzing data was correspondence analysis; by means of this method, Bourdieu was able to demonstrate indicators of presentation in the social space – with his words, it was possible to find out “preferences and practices cluster in different sectors of social space” (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 4-6).

The last but not the least it is not possible to *observe* the habitus (just like structure or culture), because it is related to internalized preferences and environment and needs to be interpreted and operationalized. That is why; in most parts of *Distinction*, Bourdieu tried to study and describe the preferences and practices of social space. Then, Weininger (2005) declared, one can identify similarities in lifestyle due to expenditures of economic and cultural capital. Therefore, the dominant class is to distinguish through its lifestyle. The working class is unified through a lifestyle which is associated with a taste, which is named “taste for necessity” by Bourdieu. These two lifestyles are totally different and function as tools of distinction.

The class theory of Bourdieu paved the way to have a better understanding of middle class; besides, it helped to recognize the importance of cultural consumption in studying stratification in a society. In addition, Bourdieu’s theory resulted in a new vision in inequality by creating a new concept; namely, social milieus (social environment), which is now widely known and applied in researches. In the next chapter, we will have a short review about the middle class and its history.

2.9 Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema

Another model which has been widely used is Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero’s (1979) class schema. The model was originally developed in order to depict occupation classification of the last decades of the 20th century and also in order to function as a means for analyzing (intergenerational) social mobility. Their main attempt was to overcome the complications of occupational mobilities which are not possible to describe with classic models (for instance in Marx theory). For instance, mobility from agricultural to non-agricultural sector is not easy to comprehend and besides, the individual’s position in a hierarchical classification model needs essential knowledge about the social dimensions of these occupations. The main point of difference between them and Bourdieu is their critique concerning habitus and their gradationally scaled model (in contrast to Bourdieu’s relational approach). The Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero class schema (EGP) consists of nine classes and is classified from higher classes to lower classes. Class I are “Higher-grade professionals, administrators and

officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors” and the 9th class, marking the end of the scale, are “Agricultural workers”.

This schema was widely used in many different countries and was adopted by different researchers worldwide. Later, Goldthorpe (1987) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993) revised the model and suggested a more complete schema with 11 classes (Table 2-12). The advantage of this schema is its integrity and totality. That is why; it can be adopted for any given country and situation. Besides, the model is very practical and can comprehend all kinds of occupational mobilities in the society (even a change from the agricultural sector to the industrial or service sector).

Table 2-12 - Goldthorpe’s class categories

Class		
Services	I	Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; in large establishments; large proprietors
	II	Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; higher-grade technicians; managers in small business and industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees
Intermediate	IIIa	Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce
	IIIb	Personal service workers
	IVa	Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with employees
	IVb	Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees
	IVc	Farmers and smallholders; self-employed fishermen
	V	Lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers
Working	VI	Skilled manual workers
	VIIa	Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture)
	VIIb	Agricultural workers

Note. Adapted from *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*, by J. H. Goldthorpe, 1987, Clarendon Press; and *The Constant Flux: a Study of Class mobility in Industrial Societies*, by R. Erikson, & J. H. Goldthorpe, 1993, Clarendon Press.

The main critique of this model is its economic nature and its emphasis on occupational division of labor, that is why; the schema was also known as the “employment aggregate” approach (Tittenbrun, 2014). Indeed, the model defines class in terms of economic position in the labor market and neglects cultural or political aspects of class. In this regard, EGP-Model is a schema based on theories of Weber and Durkheim. Despite this shortcoming, this model is one of the most complete comparative studies

in the field of class analysis. For this reason, many scholars applied the model in their studies (see also Connelly et al., 2016b). Besides, it became a remarkable point of departure for later theorists like Oesch in developing their own models.

2.10 Daniel Oesch and Oesch Model

Daniel Oesch is regarded as one of the most influential sociologists of the last decades whose model refers to a complete and considerate mapping of occupations in social field. Although his point of departure was the EGP-model (Oesch, 2003; 2007), his experience and deliberation made it complete and multi-dimensional. Indeed, he reviewed the main occupation-based class theories and criticized them in order to develop a more reliable model for analyzing the contemporary societies.

Oesch (2006) declares that Wright's neo-Marxists class schema is based on exploitation and rooted in domination, but the main shortcoming of his model lies on its non-pragmatic nature. In empirical studies, one has to distinguish between skilled, semi and unskilled workers (white- or blue-collar), which is not possible by means on Wright's class schema. For Wright (1984), resources like skills play a role in social stratification. In this regard, Bourdieu (1984) asserted capitals (i.e. resources) are the main determinants of stratification. Oesch (2006) praised Bourdieu for finding a way to converge status and class by introducing symbolic and economic capital, but at the same time criticized Bourdieu; because *habitus* (as a main concept in Bourdieu's model) is not observable which makes the operationalization of cultural capital difficult and arbitrary. As a matter of fact, Bourdieu introduced occupation as an indicator which is associated with class and status, but because of the complexity of *habitus* it is very difficult to apply Bourdieu's model in empirical studies.

For these reasons, Oesch preferred Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema as an empirical instrument for analytical analysis. Besides being pragmatic, the model of Erikson and Goldthorpe is its ability to distinguish different groups within the working class. Unlike other schemata, EGP-model distinguishes between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the service and industry sectors.

Oesch observed global changes and tried to develop a detailed class schema (Table 2-13), in order to analyze the new inequality structures. The strength of his model lies on the fact that he added self-employed labor force to his schema. The other point which can be observed is the classification due to skill level of employees. The fact that Oesch paid attention to work logic made his model very innovative. Indeed, the experience of

Oesch in conducting comparable studies in European countries resulted in the explicit knowledge of classifying employees regarding their work logic. Work logic can be technical (e.g. engineers), organizational (e.g. administrators) or socio-cultural (e.g. teachers). The shortage of previous schemes was the difficulty to distinguish occupations with minor distinctions but totally different positions. For instance, school teachers and engineers might be in a similar income level, but they are not logically the same.

Table 2-13 – The Oesch detailed 17-class schema (and collapsed 8-class)

Self-employed		Employees			Marketable skills:
Independent work logic		Technical work logic	Organizational work logic	Interpersonal service work logic	
1. Large employers (>9) <i>Firm owners, Hotel owners, Salesmen</i>	2. Self-employed professionals <i>Lawyers, Accountants, Medical doctors</i>	5. Technical experts <i>Mechanical engineers, Computing professionals, Architects</i>	10. Higher-grade managers <i>Business administrators, Financial managers, Marketing managers</i>	14. Socio-cultural professionals <i>University teachers, Medical doctors, Journalists</i>	Professional managerial /
3. Small proprietors, artisans, with employees (<9) <i>Restaurant owners, Farmers, Garage owners</i>		6. Technicians <i>Electrical technicians, Computer equipment operators, Safety inspectors</i>	11. Associate managers <i>Managers in small firms, Tax officials, Bookkeepers</i>	15. Socio-cultural semi-professionals <i>Primary school teachers, Registered nurses, Social workers</i>	Associate professional managerial /
4. Small proprietors, artisans, without employees <i>Shopkeepers, Hairdressers, Lorry drivers</i>		7. Skilled crafts <i>Machinery mechanics, Toolmakers, Electricians</i>	12. Skilled office <i>Secretaries, Bank tellers, Stock clerks</i>	16. Skilled service <i>Children's nurses, Cooks, Policemen</i>	Generally vocationally skilled /
NOTE: Continuous lines indicate how classes are to be collapsed into the 8-class version		8. Routine operatives <i>Assemblers, Machine operators, Freight handlers</i>	9. Routine agriculture <i>Farm hands, Loggers, Gardeners</i>	13. Routine office <i>Mail sorting clerks, Call center employees, Messengers</i>	Low / unskilled
				17. Routine service <i>Shop assistants, Home helpers, Waiters</i>	

Note. Reprinted from *Redrawing the class map: Stratification and institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland*, by D. Oesch, 2006. Copyright by D. Oesch.

Another advantage of Oesch class schema is the position of the working class in his model. In this class schema, one can distinguish different layers of working class which is a very significant step in analyzing stratification in modern societies. This model let Oesch to investigate polarization theory in European countries (cf. Oesch & Piccitto, 2019; Murphy & Oesch, 2018). By means of this model, Oesch and Vigna (2022) tried to find out if the social status of the working class has declined. Their findings show a neglected fact about the concept of class in the 21st century. They declared that the resources are concentrating in some particular cities and for this reason, the importance

of place is becoming highly significant. Indeed, residents of peripheral towns and rural areas have the feeling that they are marginalized. As a consequence, the role of place has become more meaningful than something like class.

Oesch's class schema can position the middle class in investigations. Besides, positioning different service sector occupations is a necessary step to map milieus in modern societies. The service sector forms the main labor force of European countries with more than 70 per cent of the employed population. Iran also experiences a significant growth in the tertiary or service sector. According to the statistic of Markaz Amar Iran (2016), more than 50 per cent of employed Iranians were active in the service sector, which means, a reconsideration of classic models of class is needed in order to find inequality structure of countries like Iran.

3 Middle Class as a term

As discussed before, *Class* is one of the most controversial concepts in the history of sociology. It is not possible to find a comprised definition of class by different theorists. We can argue that *Middle Class* is more controversial, because it is not only related to class, also needs to be interpreted regarding the position of a middle. All debates on class are valid for middle class, too. Besides, we can consider new questions regarding middle class. For instance, we can pose the question if the middle class is a new phenomenon in modern societies or if it existed from the beginning of capitalism? Can one distinguish a “new” middle class from an “old” one? Can middle class be divided into categories like upper-middle class and lower-middle class?

The giants of classical sociology – namely Marx, Weber and Durkheim –, did not consider individuals of the *middle class* as the main societal actors. After them, other scholars tried to find this concept in their main works. For example, the ‘petite bourgeoisie’ in the works of Marx was interpreted to be the same as middle class. Or in a Weberian point of view, there are various types of middle classes which stand between the ‘positively privileged’ classes (the propertied) and the ‘negatively privileged’ classes (those possess neither property nor marketable skills).

The reason for these struggles is the importance of middle class discussed in the 20th century. In the 18th and 19th century, namely after the Industrial Revolution, the roles of working class and bourgeoisie were the dominant debate of sociology, but the political events of twentieth century affected social scientists’ perception. From the early years of the twentieth century, classes, nation-states and parties became intimately linked. Indeed, classes substituted the older local communities because of the political structure in nation-states. That is why; we see that many class parties and trade unions were established at that time. The main characteristic of these new classes was their origin in political relations of the society – in contrast to older ones, which were more heterogenous (especially occupationally). Besides, many of these classes were local and national and were different to the idea of global working class. These new classes are similar regarding their interests.

Pakulski (2005) summarized the historical trend of class development in three periods, whereas during the first period, the realm of economic is the most important one and for this reason, interest groups conflict over the economic interests. That is why; he called it *Economic-class society*. The class theory of Marx emerged in an era, when the

bourgeoisie (the owners of material goods) and the working class were the main actors. The dominant class controls the state and culture consists of dominant and subordinate ideologies and hence is divided into high and low cultures. The second type of society called the *Organized-class Society* in which just a group of people rules (e.g. a bureaucratic elite). *Status-conventional Society* is the third one discussed by Pakulski where the cultural domain plays the main role in inequality. In this society, we can distinguish different lifestyles, consumption patterns, sign systems, taste and other diversities in the cultural sphere. In this case, power of the state is weakened due to importance of symbolic values.

In this regard, sociologists like Pakulski have tried to find an answer to the question of the political structure of advanced industrial societies and its class basis. Some approaches refocused on the bureaucratic characteristic of the (new) middle class due to its connection to public administration. As we will discuss in regard of the Iranian society, the role of authority is decisive in stratification and structure of the society.

A similar approach was suggested by Giddens (1973) who considered the role of property as a fundamental factor for ruling a system (for example a company or factory) and then there is a position that belongs to people who manage the system. For him, this is the difference between upper and middle class. Giddens (1979) also believed that the role of the middle class in society is as important as the role of the bourgeoisie and working class, because it is a class that has no property, but does not count as the working class. For Giddens, this new class is a social group between capitalists and landowners. The bureaucratic labor force and experts make up the middle class. Indeed, technical skills caused the growth and development of late capitalism and their role in this regard was decisive and that is why; for Giddens the middle class is the key actor. Actually, Giddens supported the idea of C. Wright Mills (1951) who categorized occupations like lawyers and medical doctors as middle class. These occupations are key positions in the capitalism of the second half of the 20th century. Interestingly, some Marxists like Maurice Bouvier-Ajam and Gilbert Mury called this group the *new working class*. They believed that although these occupations earn money in the society, they do not own means of production. Hence, they would join the working class in order to change capitalist social relations (see Bouvier-Ajam & Mury, 1963).

3.1 Marxism and middle class

Due to Grusky, the phenomenon of the middle class can be marked as the *embarrassment* for Marxists (Grusky, 2008, p. 98), because Marx has neglected the *Middle Class*. In contrast to this argument, Marx did apply the idea of middle class in his writings. For example, one can see in *The Communist Manifesto* that Marx and Engels have identified some occupations such as small tradespeople, shopkeepers, handicraftsmen and peasants as middle class who cannot compete with capitalists and at the end, they will join the proletariat (Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 108-119). Indeed, for Marx and Engels the middle class was a group between two antagonistic classes and their position was not as important as others, because at the end, they would become a part of the other classes. In *Capital*, Marx argued that there are three main classes in the capitalist society: labor-power, capitalists, and landowners, in other words, wage-laborers, capitalists and landowners, but this stratification is not pure and there are groups of people between the main three classes.

Since the role of middle class in capitalist societies in the 20th century became more important, Marxists after Marx tried to find a solution for the neglected middle class. Due to Wright (2005), four different approaches were followed by Marxists regarding middle class. The first group believed that middle class is an illusion and in fact, the capitalist society consists of two antagonistic classes. The middle class does not exist and is not real. For the second group, the middle class exists, but it should be considered as a part of other main classes. Indeed, the middle class is not independent; for instance, concepts like *new petty bourgeoisie* or *new working class* can be added to the terminology of social sciences in order to define the new occupations in the capitalist society. The third group considered the middle class as a separate and independent class in the capitalist society that has its own characteristics. The fourth group has the idea that the new debated occupations are located between main classes and are the overlaps in this system. For example, a manager belongs to working class, because a manager sells his labor power and is a part of bourgeoisie, because a manager has a dominating position. Anyway, the common point of all Marxists is the view that the society consists of two polarized classes and the middle class can be neglected or has a position between classes or is a segment of these classes.

It can be argued that there were differences between the capitalist society of the 19th and the 20th century. In the time that Marx developed his theory, the majority of the

industrial society consisted of the working class, but in the second half of the 20th century the formation of the capitalist society changed completely. The United States is a good example for the growth of the middle class. As asserted by Grusky (2019), the American society has never passed through a feudal epoch. It means that the society did not experience the noble families or aristocracy as the European countries; and then the United States entered the era of capitalism. For this reason, the bourgeoisie in the North America does not only possess capital and properties, but also prestige and power are in their hands. A part of this dominant class was previously the middle class and due to possibilities of upward mobility became superior. Such a structure is interesting for our research, because the Iranian society has also a historical background, which is different from European countries and Iran did not enter the capitalistic era due to an endogenous development.

3.2 Middle Class and Bourdieu

The importance of Bourdieu's theory is due its multi-dimensionality. With this theory, one can define the middle class with all its different and diverse social and economic aspects. In this respect, middle class can be seen as a group of people with a certain amount of capital and also with a similar lifestyle and taste. The three-dimensional definition enables us to analyze the behavior and characteristics of the middle class in any society. That is why; Bourdieu's theory is applied by different scholars worldwide. For Bourdieu, classes can be defined due to the overall volume of economic and cultural capital they own. Then, one can distinguish *class fractions* within classes whereas the ratio of economic to cultural capital plays the role. With this model, Bourdieu (1984) could depict the structure of France regarding classes and class fractions. Class fractions are not only identified by means of economic and cultural capital, preferences and taste of individuals and families about art, literature, politics and leisure time are also important. Bourdieu emphasized there also the taste or distaste for *highbrow* art forms (painting, music, literature, drama, etc.). His analysis showed that the class and class fraction have very similar taste, consumption patterns and also a similar combination of cultural and economic capital. In this respect, Bourdieu extended the meaning of social status and prestige in the society (social honor in terminology of Weber). Bourdieu applied this social construction as *symbolic capital*, which determines the signs produced in a society and influences the taste of people (especially the dominant

class) and generates codes for consumption in order to be distinguished from other classes and class fractions.

In this point, we can pose the fundamental question of sociology again: how does the dominant class reproduce the social relations? Bourdieu (1984) came to his brilliant conclusion in the capitalist society with the argument that this question cannot be answered just by considering the economic capital, and one must necessarily consider the cultural capital as the decisive factor in reproduction of power relations. The dominant class uses cultural capital to endorse and legitimate its power and hegemony in the society. Indeed, the middle class prefers to show its similarity to the *higher* classes and distinguish itself from the *lower* classes and it is done through the process that the middle class tries to consume similar cultural commodities as the upper class. For Bourdieu, the mapping of social space was an important achievement to identify the class structure. The main characteristic of the social space is its multi-dimensionality, which is reflected in the image depicted by Bourdieu. In *Distinction*, he declared that how consumption is the arena in which the economic and cultural capital can be showed as distinguishing factors. Through the process of consumption, symbolic capital is produced and with these elements the membership in classes (and fractions), as well as the behavior of actors can be explained.

According to Bourdieu, the middle class tries to show its status by deploying capitals in four primary fields: “(1) the media and public sphere, (2) the labor market, (3) urban neighborhoods, (4) democratic politics” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 53). Middle class lifestyle is also shaped by media, income, cultural capital and identity. Income shows the level of economic capital and cultural capital influences the artistic views of individuals which are associated with taste and also have impact on purchase choices.

As a consequence, consumption patterns of middle class are a function of income, media images and interaction of subjective and objective dimensions of class identity. Therefore, we can conclude that social structure is not deterministic for Bourdieu, but the historical and environmental conditions play significant role. For instance, if an individual is born in Iran, the meaning and sign system of actions are different from an individual in Austria, which results in different symbolic capital for two persons and different behavior in similar situations.

After Bourdieu, other scholars tried to define middle class by means of his theory of class and by concentrating on the volume of different capitals an individual possess. For example, Rutz and Balkan (2009) analysed the impact of education on upper-

middle-class in Turkey. They argued that Istanbul middle-class parents prefer to choose private expensive middle schools for their children with the hope that in the future, the children can make a fortune with the help of their education. Indeed, Rutz and Balkan emphasized the fact that in such conditions, the belief system of parents regarding higher education and accumulation of cultural and symbolic capitals results in a behavior pattern. The advantage of Bourdieu's theory lies on the fact that the researchers could define middle class regarding capitals and more importantly, they could explain the behavior and belief system of actors applying this theory.

The Bourdieu's theory was applied by scholars examine the social structure of Eastern Bloc countries too, which shows the flexibility of the model for adapting to different structures and systems. Peterson and Kern (1996) analyzed the stratification system in Eastern Bloc and concluded that in countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, one can observe a type of *capitalism without capitalists*. In this system, cultural capital stands as the most important basis of power and privilege. For Peterson, cultural capital has always played the main role in determination of the stratification systems and for this reason, the study of cultural taste is the key to investigating the stratification system (cf. Peterson & Kern, 1996; Peterson & Simkus, 1992).

3.3 Class as Identity

The subjective dimension of class is interconnected with identity. Indeed, a sense of belonging is essential to count oneself as a member of a class. For scholars like Marshall, this relation is mutual. Due to Marshall and associates (1993), class is still the most common source of social identity and retains its salience as such. It is important to notice that class identity and class consciousness are different in this point. In a survey done by Marshall et al. (1993), the function of social class as a source of identity was investigated. The results showed that people's affiliation to social classes was still very strong in Britain at that time and as a result, it could be suggested that the subjective dimension of social class is also important in researches, because it has impact on decisions and behavior of people in the society. Therefore, the behavior and choices of social actors are not only dependent to objective affiliation to a class, but can also be determined by the subjective perception of an individual as a class member.

The social identity intended here is different from class consciousness, which was repeatedly used by Marxists previously. One of the first scholars that maintained the importance of class identity in his studies was Mann (1970) who considered class

identity as a factor of class consciousness. For him, a mature class consciousness consists of four elements:

- Class identity (a feeling of class)
- Class opposition (to class enemies)
- Class totality (the ability to analyze situations in class terms)
- Class alternatives (a conception of a better society)

Mann found that these elements exist in different degrees and differing mixtures among working classes in the industrial west. Due to him, an individual can be disposed in a class by considering these elements. Indeed, his idea helped sociologists to combine the idea of a subjective class identity with an objective one. As a result, class can be considered as a phenomenon related to income, occupation, and education; or to occupation and lifestyle; and so on.

Recently, Miao (2017) suggested a consideration of factors, in order to distinguish identity and class consciousness; namely,

- subjective class identification
- the perception of persisting and gross class inequalities
- general emphasis on cultural and symbolic factors, such as education
- consideration of lifestyle and consumption
- traditional economic indicators clearly played a role in their identity formation

With these factors, Miao showed the importance of consumption in the identity of the middle class. Indeed, Miao emphasized the role of non-economic factors in the perception of middle class.

3.4 Class: Subjective or Objective

Usually, objective and subjective definitions of class are distinguished. By subjective theories of class, most classifiers mean conceptions according to which a person feels as a class member. Due to this perception or feeling the individual would be assigned to a class and internalize class values. Objective theories try to determine class exclusively by ‘objective’ data, i.e.; by data which are given in the environment, the conditions of existence, etc., of the members of classes; such theories represent class as automatically determined by definite criteria, especially wealth and occupation (cf.

Marshall, 1950; Corner, 1954; Pfautz, 1953; Giddens, 1973; Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero, 1979; Oesch, 2007; Kharas, 2010; Goodman & Chen, 2013; Sosnaud et al., 2013).

Class can be defined by definite characteristics in the society. these characteristics can be objective and measurable as well as subjective. For example, one can suppose that all households that earn the same as the mean income of the society are middle class. Economist and American sociologist traditionally apply an objective definition of class. In this case, class is often the answer to the question *how much an individual (or a household) earns?* or *how much property and assets an individual (or a household) owns?* The most common indexes are material terms like income and wealth.

In contrast, class can be the answer to the question *which class do you belong to?* Classes – as a possible answer to this question – are social categories that are related to identities used by people to locate themselves within a system of inequality. In this case, class is in a narrow relation with experiences, which are turned to identities. Due to Giddens (1973) and Piketty (2014), the classical theory of Marx is more subjectively oriented and lacks an objective perspective.

Therefore, one of the debates about definition of class is related to subjectivity and objectivity. Bourdieu's model of inequality solved this shortcoming by combining objectivity and subjectivity. *Taste* in Bourdieu's theory plays a central role. Taste reflects what people *want* to consume on one side and on the other side, shows what people *can* consume. Indeed, taste in itself reflects needs and capabilities, so that it can be seen as intersection of objectivity (e.g. capability of spending money due to high income) and subjectivity (e.g. the need to consume certain commodities due to subjective affiliation to a group).

Here, we can emphasize the main critique on Bourdieu's idea of Habitus as well. Oesch (2003; 2006) declared that habitus in Bourdieu's terminology does not have a precise definition and for this reason, its operationalization is arbitrary. Indeed, Bourdieu solved that problem of duality between subjectivity and objectivity, but on the other side, his theory confronts the problem of uncertainty regarding practical application of habitus.

3.5 Middle Class or Middle Stratum or Middle Status

One of the widest concepts in sociology is the *Class*. Class has been defined so many times that finding a common definition is not simple. Not only there are many definitions for class, its functionality for scientists was also varying; it has been used as a substructure or as a statistical category, or as an analytical concept for explaining social relations. Also, the number of classes, the extent of polarization, the borders between classes and conflict logic between classes might vary among different theories. If the inequality structure of the society is based on classes, we have a class society, but is important to distinguish between *class* and *stratum*. Class is mostly used as a nominal concept regarding material assets owning or earning, whereas stratum has been used as a factor for showing hierarchy or as a factor related to status groups of the society.

In order to sketch the historical development of these two concepts, we can review the theories from the 1950s. In the 1950s, the concept of strata and class were mixed. For example, Renner (1953) developed a ‘theory of delegation’. For him, in the post-capitalist society the number of white-collar workers increases, and can be categorized in highest, high and lower rank. Indeed, Renner wanted to mix the concepts of class and stratum and eventually, he suggested the term “service class” for this stratum. He did not use “middle class”, maybe for the reason that middle class was not widely used until the 1950s.

The point about middle class is the difficulty to define it; firstly, middle class as a sociological construct was not used widely until the 20th century, although before that the concept of class was very common. Secondly, the middle class must indicate the middle of *something* and the main challenge here to suggest a proper indication of this *something*. It can be either economic and material property or social status; alternatively, it can be defined regarding skills, or the middle class can be designated (as Jaffrelot & van der Veer (2008, p. 11) suggest) as those “who have some education, who have some property and some character to preserve”.

For MacInnes (2006), all groupings in a society are just categories and constructed. Among these constructs, one can find concepts, which are easier to accept and applied by scholars. These are called *etic* by MacInnes. The *emic* – in contrast – is not widely accepted and depends on the interpretation of the beholder; therefore, it needs more explanation. Class is an *emic*, which must be defined, if it is used in a research. A

concept like middle class is more complicated in this respect and needs more explanation.

For these reasons, a scholar like Thorsten Veblen was interested in ‘Leisure Class’ and not in ‘Middle Class’. The Leisure Class was present in all history of civilization, but in contrast, middle class is related to the era of capitalism. Wahrman (1995) believed that the middle class is the product of industrialization and urbanization and then, in the capitalism of 20th century became more significant.

Thus, it is no wonder that since the last decades of 20th century one can see too many interpretations and operationalizations of middle class. Some theorists applied the term for describing a definite group of households with middle income in the society - similar to *middle stratum* (cf. Al-Mokadem, 2020; Atkinson & Brandolini, 2013; Engbersen et al., 2018). Some other theorists tried to describe middle class as a special lifestyle (Belbağ et al., 2019; Butler, 1997; Elfick, 2008). Theorists who wanted to develop political views about the society, used middle class as a way of thinking and acting.

Due to Dahrendorf (1969), the middle class is located between two classes, but then one should ask, between which classes. If one assumes that the salaried employees are middle class because they belong to an upper stratum regarding their earnings, and they are working class due to their position in the mode of production. Here, we can also see that a scholar like Dahrendorf had to mix the concepts of class and stratum to find a way to define middle class, which he operationalized as the salaried employees.

In order to overcome this problem, Geiger (1949, p. 35) suggested that one can distinguish *social stratum* as a general category from *class* as a “special case of social stratum”. For him, class is a definition determined by the relations of production and stratum is the general concept. In this terminology, the *old middle stratum* consists of craftsmen and tradesmen who are in conflict with large-scale companies and are ideologically distant from the proletariat. The bureaucrats and experts as *new middle stratum* also have to struggle with dominant companies of technology and due to their ideologies cannot be counted as proletariat. Therefore, we can see for Marxists of the 20th century the problem of middle class was discussed with the help of class and stratum.

In this point, we can follow Geiger who posed a question, if class is a *real phenomenon* (Realphänomen) or a *theoretical phenomenon* (Ordnungsphänomen). Geiger (1949) argued that class has both characteristics of real and theoretical phenomena. If the people are classified on the basis of certain characteristics or sets of characteristics, it

is the former. Class as the concept of a social entity, which involves a specific goal and intention, is the concept of a specific totality and therefore is a real phenomenon. Before Geiger, Schumpeter (1953) introduced a similar distinction between class as a particular social creature (real phenomenon) and class in the sense of orders of pluralities according to certain characteristics. The latter meaning is an analytical instrument for the scientist and counts as a theoretical phenomenon.

According to Schumpeter's famous example (1942), classes may be seen as conveyances, which constantly carry different 'passengers' without in any way changing their shape. Giddens (1979) suggested that class power is derived from three primary sources: ownership of property, educational qualifications, and the ability to perform physical labor. These factors lead to the creation of a three-tiered class system, with a dominant upper class based on property ownership, an intermediate middle class based on educational credentials, and a working lower class based on the ability to perform physical labor. Grusky (2008) believed that Marx tended to use the notion of *division of labor* very broadly, to refer both to market relationships and to the allocation of occupational tasks within the productive organization.

The technology plays an important role here; because the industrial progresses have created the main difference between labor conditions of manual and non-manual workers. As a side effect, the authority of different workers in workplaces has changed; because their capabilities in the production system are differentiated due to new technologies. In this regard, inequality is not only based on income but also on different kinds of authority. Indeed, owners and managers and skilled workers have the command in the enterprise and thus, the upper and middle within a class can be determined by means of authority.

In recent decades, theorists like Goldthorpe (1996) and later Erikson & Goldthorpe (2007) tried to suggest new models for classes. Indeed, one of the most significant quantitative class groupings was used by Erikson & Goldthorpe, which was applied by some other scholars as well (cf. Svallfors, 2006; Kulin & Svallfors, 2013). The main distinction in Erikson & Goldthorpe (2007) class model lies between two major groups of employees – the *working class* and the *service class* (the salariat) – that differ with regard to their employment relations in the labor market or production units. Kulin and Svallfors (2013), for example, used a version of this schema that divides the two original classes into six categories: Service Class I and II, routine non-manuals, skilled manual worker, unskilled manual worker, and self-employed.

If we go back to Weber, for him, class situation can be defined by the material resources and skills an individual brings to the market. Hence, according to Jaffrelot & van der Veer (2008), the middle classes in the West consist of entrepreneurs and traders (ranging from the small shopkeepers to middle merchants) who can control the labor, on the one hand, and salaried people ranging from managers to journalists, on the other. For Weber (2021), there is a difference between acquisition and ascribed classes, therefore, categorizing individuals due to their occupation is an analytical method for identifying acquisition class or achieved status. The new middle class is also normally based on the idea that class mobility is possible and thus, achievements of individuals would result in changes in class position; but at the same time, the probability of social mobility is not equal for all occupational groups; for instance, traditional middle class like independent peasants and craftsmen has less chances for mobility than technicians and experts. In this respect, we have to distinguish between different types of middle class. Thus, this category includes officials, some freelance occupations, and some skilled workers, too. With these assumptions, Grusky (2019, p. 144) suggested this typology of social classes: “(a) the ‘working’ class as a whole; (b) the petty bourgeoisie; (c) the ‘intelligentsia’ without independent property and individuals whose social position is primarily dependent on technical training such as engineers, commercial and other officials, and civil servants; (d) the classes occupying a privileged position through property and education”. Although this definition by Weber (and also Grusky) is declaratory, it is still difficult to find a definition for middle class because of the difference made by Weber between *class* and *status*. According to Weber (2021), status groups are normally communities (in contrast to classes). Besides, the *class situation* is just related to economic factors, but the *status situation* is related to more aspects of life including honor, lifestyle and prestige. Class situation and status situation are not linked and should be distinguished. With these assumptions, it would be more complicated to determine middle class due to class theory of Weber; especially if we consider middle class as a multi-dimensional construct where economy is just one dimension.

Neo-Weberians have always tried to emphasize the distinction between class situation and status situation. As a matter of fact, in a Weberian view, status and possessions are inseparable for the middle class. Therefore, for James (2006), the middle class has definite preferences; for instance, its members prefer to move to suburbs (because of their children) or to have higher education. As a consequence, there has been a tendency to define middle class as a function of lifestyle, income and consumption. This

phenomenon is observable from the rise of capitalism. For example, James (2006, p. 160-1) quoted a middle class servant who emphasized honesty and hard working as characteristics of being middle class which are the main values in England of Victorian era. That is why; James considered the rise of middle class in England as a result of Victorian policies and a phenomenon of the late-Victorian age and called that era as “the triumph of the middle class”.

In the USA, the process of industrialization and then bureaucratization of the States resulted in a new middle class; namely, the white collar, which was studied by C. Wright Mills (1951) after World War II. In his classic formulation, Mills (1951) defined the new middle class in the United States as salaried white-collar professionals with a distinctive lifestyle. This group came to existence along with the growth of the third sector; namely, the service sector. The characteristic of the service occupations is their diversity. Given the service sector as a class, the stratification of service class is too complicated. That is why; Jaffrelot & van der Veer (2008) suggested that one can qualify this category as comprising an upper layer, the upper middle class and the lower middle class. The classification was based on socio-economic criteria such as occupation and the standard of living. Then, other parameters such as patterns of consumption were considered. And nowadays middle class has a rather homogenous consumption pattern.

However, the specific conditions of late-developing countries clarify the position of the new middle class in significant ways. For instance, Wietzke & Sumner (2014) maintained that the new middle class in these countries is smaller (the proportion to the national population is less in comparison to developed countries), does not have proper access to infrastructure (such as roads and electricity), and is not yet a stable socioeconomic group. In some late-developing nations like Iran, the new middle class is still in an emerging relationship with traditional segments of the middle class that are still largely dependent on state employment. Although we can observe this significant difference between the Western and non-Western middle class, in consumption they have a similar trend. As discussed by Sheth (1999), in China and India, membership of today's middle class is associated with new lifestyles (modern consumption patterns), ownership of certain economic assets and the self-consciousness of belonging to the middle class.

Interestingly, scholars like Glassman (1997) suggested a new political middle class pursuable in countries like Iran which is a perfect example of a national movement with

a special cultural coherence. He supposed that the middle class did not act politically per se, because it is a cultural and socio-economic category. Therefore, if a movement or action of middle class is supposed to be political, it is related to cultural needs in nature. For example, 'My Stealthy Freedom' is an online movement and started from a Facebook page where women from Iran post their photos without scarf, which is a form of resistance against Islamic laws in Iran. An Iranian woman has to cover her hair in public according to local Islamic dress code. Although this movement seems to act against the laws, but indeed it is a lifestyle movement which seeks freedom and new dress coding. The change is not only political, but also cultural.

One can see that the emergence of middle class and consumerism are mutual. Due to Consumerism – as a result of lifestyle changes - one can observe the growth of the urban middle class and more shops means more shopkeepers. In many countries, the process of economic reorganization can be seen in the spatial reorganization of neighborhoods within cities and small towns. The middle class develops new suburban aesthetic identities and lifestyles that seek to displace visual signs of poverty from public spaces.

Glassman (1997) asserted that the new upper class emerges as an upper class through three sets of skills: technologic, managerial, and 'Byzantic' political skills. Technology is produced in the developed countries; the new managerial skills are developed in Western countries and new politics are normally global in recent years or at least are influenced by developed countries.

As stated by Fernandes (2006) about Indian middle class, the new middle class is marked by a set of interests that are identified with India's embrace of a free-market-oriented approach to development. Indeed, the new middle class in developing countries is a natural development of late capitalism which needs to be globalized. One of the most salient social phenomena of our times is the rise of global cities and the associated remaking of national middle classes into global new middle classes as a consequence of economic globalization through global corporations that are restructuring welfare states and transforming them into neoliberal states.

In this regard, we can consider the aspects that scholars like Bourdieu and Elias have defined for the middle class, namely a certain ethos that constitutes a guideline for behaviors and actions. Individuals who desire to belong to this group have to respect this framework by respecting signs of distinction (Bourdieu, 1979; Elias, 1983). In brief, middle class is not only an objective concept regarding income, status, and

consumption; it features a certain way of thinking and living too. Rocca (2008) asserted this as the imaginary nature of middle class, which is more measurable than other classes for two reasons. Firstly, the scholars who suggested and investigated the middle class, are part of the middle class themselves and besides, they are the main symbols of the middle stratum (Rocca prefers to use the term 'stratum' in this case). Indeed, they are reproducing their own status and identity through the media and research. Secondly, the middle class is not a homogenous group of people and consists of different people with different economic, social and cultural capitals.

Beside theoretical discussions about the middle class, the concept has been operationalized by many researchers. For example, Pinches (1999, p. 25) identified the growth of the new middle class in terms of "highly-educated salaried professionals, technical specialists, managers and administrators who assume powerful positions in the running of large corporations and state agencies". It is this occupational grouping that is fundamentally linked to the rise of consumer cultures in cross-national contexts. For this reason, the lifestyle of the middle class appears as an important factor of economic growth. They consume a lot and mainly sophisticated products: house, cars etc. (Rocca, 2008).

There is an important point about the difference between the middle class in non-Western countries and Western ones. In countries like Iran and China, the middle class is closely linked to power structure. As a comparison, we can observe in developed countries, i.e. the so-called post-industrial, middle class accounts for 80 per cent of the population (hence referred to as 'the masses') and the social structure is olive-shaped, but in present day China, the middle class constitutes less than 20 per cent of the whole population. Indeed, the upper 'capital class' and a friction of the middle class in Chinese society are both derived from the former power center. Besides, the expansion of China's middle class is related to the unsolved problem of demand and pressure that the large rural population has on industrialization (Zhou, 2008).

Grusky (2019) summarized three waves of theorists regarding *New Middle Class*: (1) the first one was the idea of *intellectual class*, which was asserted mainly by anarchists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They believed that the new class consisted mostly of office workers; (2) the second wave considered *bureaucratic technocratic class* as the new class. They believed that the new class has the function to fill the gap created by the decline of the family and importance of individual private property, (3) the third wave of new class theories are called *the knowledge class*

theories. The argument here was the fact that after 1960s, knowledge became more important in production and scientists began replacing property owners as the dominant group in advanced Western societies. Then, in the 21st century changes in the global economy resulted in a new global class. The structural politics of the new middle class have been both intensified and globalized through the effects of the international division labour on white-collar employment. A good example of such changes are companies like Nokia in Iran. They have established local affiliates in countries like Iran and hired local engineers. They can benefit from cheap labor and, lower tax rates. These engineers are the new middle class who earn more than average income and tend to consume like Western middle class.

Interestingly, scholars like Goody believe that in fact the new class is the dominant one. For Goody (2000), the growth of nation-state has led to the emergence of an elite involved in administrative, professional, political and military activities, an elite that constitutes a 'New Class'. Although this class is spoken of as the bourgeoisie or middle class, it is in fact the ruling class. As a matter of fact, the new class controls the power and Goody's idea in this sense is similar to the elite theory of C. Wright Mills.

For Marxists, middle class as a scientific term has always been controversial. Orthodox Marxists like Nemchinov (1956) criticized the idea of middle class, because they believed that middle class is a solution of 'bourgeois sociologists' to homogenize the society. In this respect, the function of the middle was to establish a new order in capitalism all over the world. For him, the middle class functions as a pillow between two antagonistic classes; namely, the Bourgeoisie and the Working class. It is also assumed by these Marxists that middle class is a solution for Capitalism to disarm working class from its revolutionary ideas.

In another way, Dahrendorf (1969) assumed that middle class is not truly a class, because the middle class was born decomposed – in contrast to class at the era of Marx. In other words, for him middle class is a result of tension in the structure and culture in capitalistic society; whereas for him, the authority plays the main role in class formation.

In sum, we can see that Marx was criticized for two reasons. Firstly, Marx could not locate the middle class in a society. Secondly, explaining social mobility is not possible in Marx's Theory. The other critique mentioned by Giddens (1979) refers to the Marxist application of the theory. In fact, for Marx class was an exploratory term, whereas for

Marxists it was a descriptive term. These Marxists wanted to categorize the actors of a society without explaining the social phenomena.

In order to have a Marxist Theory of middle class, Wright (1989, pp. 7-9) suggested a model. Two different kinds of non-polarized class locations can be defined in the logic of this framework. For him, “there are class locations that are neither exploiter nor exploited, that is, people who have precisely the per capita level of relevant asset”. For instance, the role of self-employed producers in the society is neither exploiter nor exploited within capitalist relations. Besides, it cannot be claimed that a society has just a certain mode of production and normally, the societies have more than one mode of production at the same time. Therefore, each society can be characterized by different exploitation relations. Interestingly, one relation can be characterized as exploiting from one direction and as exploited along another. The occupations in the middle of organizational hierarchy are good examples for such positions. They are exploited by their managers, and they exploit their employees.

In Table 3-1, one can see a scheme of different classes in capitalistic countries with a comparison between Sweden and USA. One can locate professions regarding exploitation, ownership of means of production and ownership of assets. Thus, the scheme shows how the new structure of the capitalistic society works. For example, an expert manager is a non-owner of means of production who owns assets and is in the position that exploits.

We can observe that middle class are like workers in being excluded from ownership of the means of production, but at the same time, they have interests opposed to workers because of their effective control of organization and skill assets. This contradiction makes the location of middle class too complicated. These principal contradictory locations are presented in Table 3-2.

The point here is the co-existence of different classes in a society, that means, in the feudalistic society, there is also the bourgeoisie that changes the structure of the society and conducts it toward capitalism. Similarly, managers and state bureaucrats can be the next progressive forces to lead the society toward post-capitalism, which means we can constitute the central contradictory location within exploitation relations. In contrast to a dualistic view of dividing the society to only two classes, one can find the middle class between. For example, the owners of fast-food and gas station franchises could be seen as occupying a contradictory location between the petty bourgeoisie or small

employers and managers. Professors with large research grants are able to hire associates and staffs.

Table 3-1 - Basic Typology of Exploitation and Class; Assets in the means of production

Owners (%)	Non-owners (Wage Laborers) (%)			
1 Bourgeoisie US (1.8) Sweden (0.7)	4 Expert Manager US (3.9) Sweden (4.4)	7 Semi-credentialed managers US (6.2) Sweden (4.0)	10 Uncredentialed manager US (2.3) Sweden (2.5)	+
2 Small employers US (6.0) Sweden (4.8)	5 Expert supervisors US (3.7) Sweden (3.8)	8 Semi-credentialed supervisors US (6.8) Sweden (3.2)	11 Uncredentialed supervisor US (6.9) Sweden (3.1)	> 0 Organization assets
3 Petty bourgeoisie US (6.9) Sweden (5.4)	6 Expert non-managers US (3.4) Sweden (6.8)	9 Semi-credentialed workers US (12.2) Sweden (17.8)	12 Proletarian US (39.9) Sweden (43.5)	-
	+	> 0 Skill assets	-	

Note. Reprinted from “The Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness: An Overview.” By E. O. Wright, 1989, *Acta Sociologica*, 32(1), 3–22, p. 9.

a) The numbers between the parentheses show the percentage of every class in that country.

In a similar way, Savage et al. (1992) suggested three different approaches regarding middle class theories. The first is analytical which holds the middle class between the capitalist and working class (e.g. Wright); the second is empirical which demonstrates middle class by factors like work, culture, and lifestyles; the third sees middle classes as an independent social class.

Table 3-2 - Basic Classes and Contradictory Locations in Successive Modes of Production

Mode of Production	Basic classes	Principal contradictory location
Feudalism	Lords and serfs	Bourgeoisie
Capitalism	Bourgeoisie and proletariat	Managers / bureaucrats
State bureaucratic socialism	Bureaucrats and workers	Intelligentsia / experts

Note. Own adaption from “The Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness: An Overview.” By E. O. Wright, 1989, *Acta Sociologica*, 32(1), 3–22.

Wright (2015) suggested two instructive definitions, which are very useful in understanding his point of view: class structure and class formation. Class structure is related to class interests and shows the structure of social relations; class formation refers to the formation of organized collectivities within class structure. Class structure is shaped by relations between classes whereas class formation is based on relations within classes. Therefore, in class analysis one has to consider class formation, class relations and mode of production. In this respect, Wright maintained that Marx concentrated only on class structure within the capitalist mode of production, without considering other existing social formations.

Indeed, Wright tried to expand Marx's Class Theory by distinguishing two different kinds of class interests in the society: (1) *Immediate class interests* are interests within a given structure of social relations, and (2) *fundamental interests* center on interests that exist regardless of social relations and the actors involved (Wright, 1978). Fundamental interests are related to every actor of a social field. For example, simple workers have the same condition as servants of superrich who are hired for the immediate use value of the labor rather than their exchange value. By this reasoning, both of them can be considered as the same class in revolutionary changes. By this solution, one can categorize different occupations, which are similar regarding interests in either a class structure or a class formation. Indeed, the confusing part of categorization regarding occupations like managers (who have no property but own power) or servants (who are not workers but are treated similarly) is clear by this definition.

Beside scholars like Wright who tried to develop class theory on the basis of *Class*, scientists like Geißler (2014) tried to find a way to explain the differences between middle class, middle stratum and middle situation, in order to explain stratification and inequality by means of diverse concepts. For him, the middle class and stratum consist of people with similar socio-economic positions with similar life experiences and similar characteristics (psychological dispositions, attitudes and values, needs and interests, mentality, habitus and lifestyles) and also similar life chances and risks. Maybe the most important point about the middle class / stratum is the emphasis on the priority of economic capital and assets in comparison to social and cultural characteristics. That is why; since the last decades of the 20th century, the idea of social milieu has become more popular in inequality researches. The best examples are

Bourdieu's study about French society and Sinus's classification about Germany (cf. Bourdieu, 1984; Sinus-Institut, 2015).

We can deploy Bourdieu's class theory, which combined different approaches and came to a certain conclusion about middle class. For him, middle class was formed through historical processes by a dynamic set of symbolic and material boundaries, which is manifest in behavior and culture (Wacquant, 1991). In this view, we can conclude that as the modern society became more complicated, our point of view about classes changed from focusing on economic aspects/dimensions to cultural ones.

As a conclusion about middle class and middle stratum, we can quote Wahrman who believed that in middle class, the middle is emphasized and not the class. Indeed, the concept of middle class was developed from non-class terminologies like 'middle rank', 'middle station' or 'middling orders' and is not related to class (Wahrman, 1995). Thus, in the 20th century the terms middle class and middle strata have been used in a similar way and for that reason, we have to define carefully what we mean by middle class and middle stratum. Maybe if we want to be very precise, we can distinguish middle class as a meta-structure in a society and middle stratum as some smaller groupings (or formations in Wright's terminology). Power (2000) concluded that middle class is a nominal grouping of people in social investigations and one cannot compare that with the concept as was applied by sociologists like Marx.

In summary, we have to emphasize that middle class has been a means for social analysis and at the same time, it has been employed as a category of social practice (cf. Harris, 2021; 2020). Indeed, the middle class can be seen as a coherent class between the bourgeoisie and working class whereas for some scholars, it can be a category of different people which are divided into groups with a specific education-level or definite occupation. For example, Reckwitz (2019; 2021) suggested an analytical model on the macro-level for investigating the society as a whole. In his model, middle class is divided to old and new middle class. In contrast, scholars like Chan and Goldthorpe (2007) have seen middle class more or less as a practical division of occupations for categorizing and representing their findings. In this study, I will try to employ theories which have tried to see middle class as an analytical tool as well as practical method of classification. The most important models are class theories of Bourdieu (1984), Wright (1984; 1989) and recently Oesch (2006), although these theories are different in conceptual substances (which have been discussed in chapter 2). Therefore, the middle class – in this study – would be an empirical means for analyzing class structure and it

is a nominal (and not ordinal) concept for analytical reasons, which help us to find out a way to demonstrate differences and to investigate the models of consumption and patterns of distinction in a society like Iran; a society that is not in the post-industrial or post-capitalist era and at the same time, confronts the waves of globalization. In this respect, the middle class would be also close to the newer concept of social milieu, which is related to lifestyle and habitus in the society. That is why; the concepts like consumption and consumption patterns, ownership and cultural commodities lie in the middle of investigations in this research.

4 Formation of Middle Class in England, India, China and Iran

This chapter deals with the formation of middle class and related theories in different regions of the world. The first part illustrates the history of English middle class from the viewpoint of scholars like James (2006) and Gunn (2004) who investigated the modification of English society since 19th century with the emphasis on middle class. The importance of English middle class lies on the fact that the industrial revolution began there, and it is supposed that capitalism emerged from England, therefore, one can suppose that the concept of middle class has its roots in 19th century England. Another remarkable point is the role of trade in forming new small businesses in England which can be seen as driving force for the establishment of the *petite bourgeoisies*. Among Asian countries, India is famous for its economic growth in the field of IT, which resulted in establishment of New Class. Therefore, this chapter tries to explain the formation of English middle class at first, because England is the pioneer of industrial revolution and formation of classes in capitalistic era and will be followed by explaining the formation of middle class in India which is well-known for its New Middle Class. In fact, in contrast to the English middle class, the new Indian middle class has formed recently and is a consequence of structural changes and technological evolution worldwide which resulted in emergence of IT-companies and start-ups in India (cf. Jaffrelot & van der Veer, 2008; Fernandes, 2006). For this reason, there is a tendency to indicate this middle class in India as the *New Class* (Upadhyay, 2008). We can conclude that two main factors would affect emergence of middle class which are *trade* and *new technologies*.

China is an interesting example where the emergence of the middle class is dependent on both sectors of trade and new technologies. Indeed, due to economic reforms and political interests of Chinese government, we can observe a structural change in Chinese class formation. Therefore, China is a typical example of the emergence of the new middle class with state led policies in trade and technology sectors, which is similar to the role of Iranian government in forming middle class. Therefore, the significant role of government in this development and also the co-existence of trade- and technology-based new middle class make China a remarkable case for middle class studies. Due to Kharas (2010), China will experience the fastest growth of middle class

worldwide until 2030 – in contrast to Western countries in which the rate of middle class is stagnated.

The position of Iran in Middle East and recent developments in economic and political structure in the global and national level makes it necessary to investigate rise of middle class and its history in Middle East. Among the middle eastern countries, there are researches about Turkish middle class (cf. Rutz and Balkan, 2009), whereas structural changes in other countries are neglected.

The main part of this chapter is dedicated to the formation of Iranian middle class. Indeed, the main factors in the rise of Iranian middle class will be discussed as the theoretical framework and perspective of this dissertation. It is necessary to find out how the middle class in Iran was formed and which factors had an impact on that. Since the history of Iranian middle class has not been studied and this theoretical framework would help for further studies.

In sum, the main aim of this chapter is to find out the history of middle class in different parts of the world, emphasizing the historical and structural differences and similarities of Iranian middle class with investigated countries – especially regions and countries that are important in middle class studies or rather countries that can be compared with Iran regarding the emergence of middle class in the era of globalization.

4.1 English Middle Class

England is the country in which industrial revolution began. Therefore, it is not a big surprise that the first studies about middle class were about England. Besides, scholars like Thompson (1963) provided a new humanistic view about classes in England by his historical investigation of English Working Class formation. Hobsbawm (1995) maintained that *middle class* as a concept was born in England between 1790 and 1830, whereby at first, it was employed in the meaning of middling people, middle sorts and middle ranks. Then, due to the growth and establishment of middle class(es) the concept of middle class became more solid, changing its meaning into the one employed nowadays. James (2006) also argued that the eighteenth and early nineteenth century middle class spent all possible economic and time resources. Indeed, this middle class was based on consumption. Gunn (2004) maintained that after this time, the position of a person in the society depended on the money one spent – which was not the case before – and the position in the society was dependent upon income or expenditure.

Indeed, the possibility to earn more and consume more led into a new lifestyle in England, which was called middle class by James (2006).

This point was also mentioned by Young (2002) who described how the use of practices such as self-control, consumption, and performance identified the characteristics of the middle class. Indeed, the consumption was an important characteristic of English middle class. The taste of middle class became more important because of its role in mass consumption, especially in consumption of cultural goods. The producers tried to absorb more money from the newly arising class. James (2006) described how the theatrical programs aimed to attract middle class by considering people's preferences and taste. It seemed that the middle class needed and wanted new cultural goods and preferred to watch new cultural products. For this reason, the playhouses tried to motivate this huge group of people to attend their plays by a variety of innovations and advertisements. The middle class was now richer – due to overseas trade – and could spend more money on the comforts, entertainments and commodities that took their fancy. That is why; not only cultural goods had a better market, many new shops opened in order to provide commodities that this new group would like to consume.

In this regard, consumerism increased the number of the urban middle class; more shops meant more shopkeepers. With a wide selection of goods available, shopping became a popular entertainment for the middle class. Window shopping had arrived with its delights of imagining what one could buy if one had the money. Behavior was regulated, at least for the middle and upper ranks of society (cf. Young, 2003; James; 2006). Knowledge was another characteristic of uprising middle class. They could afford to buy books and journals. The publication of new newspapers, magazines and journals meant that middle class wanted to know more about the society and widen its horizons.

By the increase of number of middle class households, the political leaders were interested to collect their votes. Due to James, a third of a million largely middle-class voters were added to the electoral roll, roughly 14 percent of the adult male population. Since the middle class was increasing in size (between 1824 and 1833 the number of general practitioners, for instance, rose from 5200 to 8100), the electorate grew. By 1859, it totaled 1.2 million, just over a quarter of the adult male population (James, 2006, p. 149).

Religion also played an important role in the development of the British (and European) middle class. Methodism and Anglican Evangelicalism believed that submission and

salvation are inseparable; therefore, the religious poor who visited the church learnt that they could mobilize their resources and advance economically. That is why; we see a change in the social structure of England in the 18th century, where some poor people earned money and changed their situation. Besides, due to these changes, middle class wanted to distinguish itself from the working class and tried to assimilate to the upper rich class. Therefore, the rise of consumerism has its roots in this era. Another change in the structure of society is related to politics. The middle class wanted to obtain power and have the right to decide for the cities. For this reason, the parties became more important and more powerful. The parties' power meant the power of the political leaders who obtained the opportunity to bargain with the authorities.

Gunn (2004) declared that the early English middle class can be characterized by two phenomena: *Shopping* and *Urbanism*. Indeed, commerce and urbanism were the bases of middle-class emergence. This importance was also reflected in laws enacted in the 19th century. The Poor Law Act was one of the most famous steps, which aimed to enable the poor to join the labor market. Also, the new condition of the middle class resulted in new job opportunities in the market; for instance, the rising middle class tended to employ servants at home; a luxurious lifestyle, which was just a characteristic of upper class. Due to James (2006, p. 344), most middle-class families employed servants. In 1891, around 10 percent of London households (roughly equivalent to the city's middle class) had resident services, which was remarkable for the time.

The other turning point regarding middle class rise is the systematic sexual education for the young. For a long time, it was taboo to talk about relationships and the main source of information for children were other children's knowledge or servants. According to statistics, in 1910 it was estimated that 15 per cent of middle class couples intended to prevent pregnancy, which changed rapidly, which resulted in a decline in middle class birth rate. The average size of a family fell from 6.1 in the 1860s to 2.4 by 1915 and analysts agreed the decline was most pronounced among the middle classes (James, 2006). The phenomenon was linked to a new opinion about women body and rights and to changes in the labor market, which absorbed more women.

Another turning point regarding middle class can be seen in 1950s, as Britons were becoming richer. The consumer boom of the 1950s resulted in a richer working class in Britain. This trend continued until the late 1980s. Due to Frank (2007), houses became bigger for all strata of the society. Indeed, income and consumption growth were balanced across income categories during the three decades following World War II.

The pattern began to change at some point during the 1970s. Income gains for rich families grew, at the same time, the earnings of other classes declined. The later period, it was observed that inequality increased and at the same time, economic expansion stopped. The statistic showed that the poorest 40 percent experienced a decline in income and the richest 1 percent accumulated 40 percent more wealth (Frank, 2007). Generally, education was one of the areas that affected and was affected by the rise of the middle class. Education let middle class families have better opportunities for jobs and they could be distinguished from working class who did not have the same opportunities for education. Besides, the quality and the environment of schools became more important. Parents expected an equipped school with an appropriate atmosphere where their children could learn better and improve their skills. The achievements of children became more important in comparison to previous period of time. Success and achievement were seen together, and achievement was the sign of success; for that reason, the middle class needed the achievement to state their status. That is what made middle-class different from previous classes: the importance of achievements. Social mobility became important for the new middle class, they wanted to be (and seem) better, which resulted in struggles to accumulate and consume. Education was a way to improve their living conditions; therefore, many families invested on education.

Housing was another example of changes in middle class lifestyle. The middle class home is a museum of the owner's taste, imagination, income, and status. It shows the economic status and prestige of the owner. Given income and expenditure are correlated, consumption – the commodities a person buys – can show the economic material of this person and for this reason, observable consumption has become a characteristic of middle class. It can be concluded that the home of a middle class family is the façade that reflects the status of the family.

In sum, many factors caused existence of English and then also European middle class: religion, consumerism, the school system, new ethics and viewpoints about sexual relations, art, and cultural goods.

4.2 *Indian Middle class*

India has a very complicated social structure. Especially, it is not possible to distinguish class and caste easily because both categories are closely connected. That is why;

Beteille (2002) explained that analyzing the Indian middle class without considering the historical differences on the basis of language, religion and caste is not possible. The caste system influenced the middle class characteristic in India in different ways. For example, Jaffrelot & van der Veer (2008) assumed the urban upper caste is not interested in elections, because it rejects the model of current democracy in India. This phenomenon has a direct impact on the Indian middle class that benefits from the democratic structure as they could share the power through democratic elections. Besides, Fernandes (2006) explained that in India, the identity of the new middle class continued to compete with other national political forces such as the rise of caste-based movements and politics. In this respect, not only the existing caste system can be seen as an obstacle, the religious belief system and values also reject some democratic values.

Beside social structure and political interests, the Indian economy has created niches for middle class entrepreneurs from the British era. India is the first non-European country that experienced the emergence of middle class. The main turning point here was the import of technologies and modernization in the middle of the 20th century, which resulted in new production trends in the Indian economy and the activity of social actors that established the new middle classes. Jaffrelot et al. (2008) believed that the policies of the national state also played an important role in the rise of the middle class by the protection of domestic production. For instance, there was a law that banned the import of manufactured consumer goods in the post-colonial era. This protection resulted in growth of small and medium businesses, which are the typical middle class members.

Religious identity also played a complex role in the formation of the colonial middle class. The formation of the upper tiers of this class was often marked by the exclusion of Muslims, in part because the Hindu elites invested in business sooner than Muslim elites (Sangari, 2001) and because fewer Muslim recruits were employed in Indian Civil Service.

Marxist scholars like Dutt (1940) and Kosambi (1964) assumed that the petty bourgeoisie, the ruling bourgeoisie and foreign trade also influenced the rise of middle class by developing national and international economic markets. The market is related to production and consumption at the same time, and as discussed before, the rise of middle class is dependent upon consumption patterns in the society. Although the import of many goods was prohibited, Jaffrelot and van der Veer (2008) believed that

new Western goods were imported with the aim of appealing to new consumption habits and tastes of the middle class. That is why; the new middle class in India is also known as a consuming class and scholars have paid most attention to consumption and media. Besides, consumption has become an important aspect of the contemporary middle class identity.

In this point, we can distinguish two fractions in the Indian middle class: the *traditional middle class* and the *new middle class*. As discussed earlier, the former rose due to business and market development, depends directly on the market situation and is identified with wealth and consumption.

The new middle class is related to the political economy of colonialism. British control resulted in industrialization that would have led to the expansion of an industrial middle class. The emerging colonial middle class was directed toward the limited opportunities available through colonial educational policy. Besides, most members belonged to the service and literary classes (Fernandes, 2006). The educational policy of the colonial era was geographically limited to Calcutta and Bombay, which intensified the power of the middle class in these towns. The rising new middle class had connections with the traditional middle class and elites, but they could distinguish themselves by their education and language. Indeed, a new class was born, based on education and language distinction, that are the typical examples of cultural capital. In sum, we can see that the traditional middle class owned wealth (economic capital) and the new middle class had a higher education (cultural capital).

As a matter of fact, social relations in India have been deeply affected by colonialism. Indeed, the social formation is a mix-up of historical formation and new social structures. That is why; the new middle class has values and attitudes of previous generations, but also new thoughts and belief system. Appadurai (1988) explained that the role of colonialism was very important in the rise of the middle class in India. Before the colonial era, the Indian economy was *proto-capitalist* and colonial India experienced a time period when markets started to link and join; in opposition to previous markets, which were local without wide relations. At the same time, Fernandes (2006) pointed out the insecure situation of the middle class in the era of colonialism. They were totally dependent upon the colonial state and because of this uncertain condition could not establish a political identity, but nevertheless, they played a role in social reforms and in the emergence of new lifestyles.

One can conclude that the new Indian middle class (or the post-Independence middle class) had its roots not only in colonial era but also in the Nehruvian development regime, which, through the rapid expansion of the higher education system, created a large number of professional, managerial and technical experts as well as a bureaucratic staff to run the state apparatus and public sector enterprises (Deshpande, 2003). It is implied that in the post-colonial era, the state had a high impact on the emergence of the new middle class. The Nehruvian socialist measures addressed the poor, but simultaneously, developmental practices and policies resulted in a modernist outlook in middle class visions and desires for rapid technological and industrial growth.

The early decades of economic policy in post-independence India were focused on the development of large-scale industrial units; the emphasis of economic development was on production in heavy industries rather than on the production of consumer-oriented commodities. Meanwhile, these icons of modern industrial development were linked to a political culture that was constituted by public discourses on the need for the advancement of the rural poor (cf. Khilnani, 2004; Tuvikene et al., 2019). Later during Rajiv Gandhi's reign, changes in economic policies and a limited phase of liberalization accompanied with these cultural desires resulted in significant changes in middle class consumption trends. This period witnessed sharp rises in the middle class's demand for consumer durable goods such as televisions, VCRs, and washing machines. These changes in consumption were consolidated into more permanent lifestyle changes for the middle class as such commodities increasingly are perceived as necessary components of their lifestyle.

This pattern can be followed in many non-Western countries where the rise of the new middle class found its roots in the development of the state apparatus and therefore new job positions. The simultaneous economic development and liberalization in India (and also many developing countries) from the late 1980s is represented by the influx of foreign branded consumer goods and new forms of media. The opening up of the economy not only produced a growing public culture of consumption within the middle classes, but also reconstructed the middle class itself as a consuming class.

As a consequence, there has always been a mutual dependency between the state and the new middle class; especially in those developing countries, where development and growth were led by the state. In India, the intersecting relationship between the state, political economy and the middle class was strengthened by the public industries and enterprises in the Nehruvian policy measurements. Due to Potter (1996), this model of

development based on planning and expansion of the public sector resulted in a rapid increase of public sector employment, from 4.1 million in 1953 to an estimated 16.2 million in 1983. Besides, the state had another function regarding the middle class; it attempted to manage the relationship of middle class to other social groups by regulations in favor of middle class and consumption.

As a sign of a growing market of consumer-based commodities, one could observe the rise of advertising in India. Due to Fernandes (2006), a measure of the increasing significance of the advertisement industry could be seen in figures of the industry in the early period of liberalization in the 1990s, which ranged from a 49.5 percent increase in 1994-95 to a 22.4 increase in 1996-97.

To sum up, we can conclude that the middle class in India could be characterized by education, consumption, and economic factors. Besides, the struggle of the new middle class to resemble the Western lifestyle resulted in a change of traditional lifestyles. The fact that the middle class as well as the state preferred to integrate into the global economy, showed its consequences on consumption tendencies and lifestyles which became very similar to Western lifestyle. Therefore, we can conclude that this class is economically a consuming class that tends to simulate the lifestyle of Western countries by consumption. Upadhyaya (2008) named this class as *New Class*, which plays the significant role in delivering goods, production and consumption.

In addition, the new Indian middle class is an urban phenomenon per se. As a matter of fact, the new middle class is an urban class that aims to progress and the central agent in contemporary India. That is why; the process of economic reorganization in India can be seen in spatial reorganization of neighborhoods within cities and small towns. The middle class develops new suburban aesthetic identities and lifestyles in order to exclude visual signs of poverty from public spaces (Ghertner, 2011). The consumption image is standard and repeating: automobiles and cellular phones are the main signs of middle class existence.

The other characteristic of Indian middle class is its reciprocal relation with the phenomenon of globalization. Indeed, the new Indian middle class, which was originally dependent on state and public sector, became globalized in the 1990s and reinforced its relations to the global market. As mentioned by Fernandes (2006), the new class was successful to reconsider and to change its lifestyle regarding the Indian culture and ideology of globalization. These include notions of 'tradition' and 'modernity', ideologies of the family, discourses about nationality and Indian culture,

that are now complemented by discussions about IT and India's new place on the world stage. Fernandes also focused on shifts that made the Indian market interesting for foreign investment.

Suter et al. (2020) asserted that the middle class is tied to the success of economic reforms in India; India is attractive for international investors because of its size and possibility to win a market with many potential consumers. Furthermore, supporters of these reforms have adopted consumer-based understandings of the middle class and have argued that the middle class has benefited from economic reforms through the availability of new commodities and increasing opportunities for consumer choice (Fernandes, 2006). The central argument here is the fact that the new middle class has benefited from liberalization and vice versa, the global market could find a new market for their commodities in India, which means that the rise of new class and globalization intensified each other.

In this respect, the concept *New Class* has been applied not because the class is new, because the social and political identity of this class has changed and now, it is representative of globalization and liberalization in India. At a structural level, this group largely encompasses English-speaking urban white-collar segments of the middle class that are benefiting from new employment opportunities (particularly in private-sector employment). However, the heart of the construction of this social group rests on the assumption that other segments of the middle class and upwardly mobile working class can potentially join it. For example, the privileged lifestyle and patterns of consumption depicted in media images are associated with individuals that can afford English-based higher education and credentials such as MBAs.

4.3 Chinese Middle class

For a better understanding of China's middle class, we have to go back to the second half of the 19th century, where a class of traders developed brokerage between the imperial powers and the Qing imperial system. This class has been considered as middle class due to their position in China. The other part of middle class was a group of bureaucratic officials that emerged from educated families. The structure of the middle class consisting of merchants and entrepreneurs and officials is still present in today's China. The middle class's connection to the West still lasts upon the present day as well (Jaffrelot & van der Veer, 2008).

Historically, the first half of the 20th century was the rise of metropolis cities in China and in fact, the rise of Chinese trade centers. In the 1910s and 1920s, Shanghai became emerging center of the urban middle class with greater consumption needs. Lee (2000) maintained that Shanghai became the center of the production of new culture, with an emphasis on novelty. That new middle class culture could be found in advertisements of newspapers and magazines and it showed significant changes in gender relations in the domestic sphere and in leisure activities. It is important to note that this new class was not a national effective force (e.g. national bourgeoisie) and was only comprised of separated groups in metropolises of China with a common lifestyle and interests.

Very similar to other non-Western countries, trade played the main role in the rise of middle class in China. Like India, we can observe that after bureaucratic reforms in the beginning of the 20th century, a ‘new middle class’ came to existence which could be characterized by its similarities to Western middle class and their tendency to imitate Western culture. Interestingly, China experienced an era of socialistic development after the first phase of their confrontation with Western culture through trade; just like India where Nehru carried out social reforms. Then, in the last decades of 20th century, liberalization of economy resulted in social and cultural changes in China.

Naturally, there was an obvious difference between Western countries and China regarding this new modern middle class. In western countries, the so-called post-industrial (or middle class) societies, middle class people account for 80 per cent of the population (hence referred to as ‘the masses’) and the social structure is olive-shaped. As Zhou (2008) stated, in China, however, the middle class constitutes less than 20 per cent of the whole population.

The obstacles of Chinese middle class growth were rapid growth of economy and the relation of upper ‘capital class’ and a part of middle class with former power centers. Besides, the population of China was (and is) mostly rural whereas the new middle class is mostly an urban population (Jacques, 2012; Ferreira et al., 2012). Therefore, we notice that there is an economic gap in China because of the rapid economic growth and a rural/urban gap due to geographic specification of China (like being large), which has affected the development of the Chinese middle class.

Social and economic reforms played an important role, since there is a large urban population that influences and is influenced by reforms. They are the target group of reforms in China. In the early years of the reform process, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly referred to consumption as the ‘motor of production’. Indeed, the urban population has

similar consumption patterns to the Western middle class. Since the beginning of the reform period, the Chinese middle class has adopted a transnational consumer culture. Due to Elfick (2008), dining at foreign fast-food restaurants such as McDonalds and KFC is very popular in China. Many people prefer Hollywood to domestically produced films. Foreign goods are generally viewed as reliable, well-designed and innovative, and foreign media content is seen as exciting and untainted by state censorship. Croll (2006) argued that rapid economic growth and booming private enterprise have led to spending habits that are totally new in China.

Milanović (2003) declared although the Chinese middle class has grown in the last years of the 20th century, China had 200 million middle income consumers who could afford to buy cars and housing and spend money on leisure travel in the first decade of the 21st century. It suggested that the country's middle class was still small in number amounting to only 15 per cent of the population compared with 60 per cent in America. Another consequence of the economic growth is an increase in inequality. The Gini coefficient in China was 0.28 in the early 1980s, 0.38 in 1995 and 0.458 in the late 1990s.

The economic reforms did not only change China's economic structure but also affected its social structure, especially regarding young women. In the 2000's, about 90 million young single women started to work in offices, factories, business and the professions in the public private and joint-venture sectors, they lived at home and they had the economic means and the time to pursue the latest consumer trends (Croll, 2006, p. 216). One can observe new lifestyles and tastes for these skilled working women who now read premium fashion magazines like *Vogue*, *Elle*, *Cosmopolitan* and *Marie Claire*, and would like to have the *best body figure* which propagated in social media; therefore, there was an increase in the consumption of cosmetics and other body-products. Croll (2006) reported that the number of registered factories producing cosmetics doubled from 700 to 1500 between 1986 and 1992 and International companies established joint-ventures in China and sold their products in city stores.

In order to encourage consumption and affect the growth of domestic demand, China's government has introduced measures such as extending holiday shopping-days or succession of interest-rate: reduced interest rates to 2.75 per cent in 2001 while a new tax on interest income was also designed to make saving less attractive (Asia Trade Hub, 2013). Indeed, for the government, consumption was the engine of economic growth. That is why; China experienced a structural change and as stated by Croll

(2006) is now “a mosaic made up of consumption hot spots”, which resulted in an extreme inequality, where there are super-rich with a super luxury lifestyle, poor people with a limited access to facilities and middle class with a special lifestyles, homes, cars and leisure activities. Indeed, different lifestyles are observable in material signs like cars and consumer goods. Leisure activities are also another sign related to economic level of a household.

With a similar geopolitical situation in Asia, Japan had a different developing phase in comparison to China. Glassman (1997) argued that development of capitalism in Japan is more like in Germany, and totally different from other Western countries like England and the USA. In Britain and the USA, the economic and political system developed in a way that the businessmen were ‘god’s stewards on earth’, giving every worker wage and practise a godlike behaviour in their businesses. In contrast, we can see another kind of development which is called ‘Capitalism and Bureaucracy’ in Germany and Japan, where capitalism was a result of reforms in bureaucratic organizations. Indeed, in Japan and Germany bureaucracy played the main role. In Germany and later in Japan, the government was one of the main actors with their planned development measures. That is why; middle class formation was dependent on state regulations and foreign trade.

4.4 Middle Class in Middle East


For Bill (1972), there are traditionally the following classes in the Middle East:

- The ruling class
- The bureaucratic middle class
- The bourgeois middle class
- The cleric middle class
- The traditional working class
- The peasant (class)
- The nomadic class

Besides, he found two new classes:

- The professional middle class
- The industrial working class

Figure 4-1 – The Classes in Middle East



Note. Reprinted from “Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East” by J. Bill, 1972, *Int. J. Middle East Stud*, 3 (1972), 417-434, p. 428.

He proposed that the traditional ruling class can be broken down into six major components: (i) the ruler (Sultan, Shah, or Shaykh); (2) the ruling families; (3) tribal nobility; (4) native landlords; (5) system-supporting high 'ulama (clerics); and (6) military elite (Figure 4-1). Interestingly, we can see that for Bill also the traditional middle class consisted of the bureaucratic administration and cleric, which was discussed before. Indeed, in middle Eastern societies, the power of cleric and public service employees has always been important in the power structure and they have played a decisive role in ruling the countries. Thus, the concept of middle here indicates their position in the middle of a power structure, with a ruler above and ordinary people beneath. Since they have established the power relations from the beginning of the

modern era, they are named traditional, the professional middle class, which is newer and also different in origin and taste, is called the modern middle class. Indeed, these are the occupations that we call experts now and the technological or economic development of the state apparatus or capitalism is dependent on them. Interestingly, this structure is observable in many Middle Eastern countries like Iran.

4.5 Rise of Iranian middle-class

As discussed before, the history of middle class in Western and non-Western countries is different. In the former, middle class emerged as a phase of capitalistic evolution whereas in the latter, the middle class came to existence within a global relation with Western countries or as a growing class developed due to national bureaucratic reforms. For instance, a historical study of Iranian middle class emergence in the 20th century shows that they are consisted of intellectuals who studied abroad and came back to Iran and white-collar workers and officers in the government who had a fixed job and salary; therefore, they had the opportunity to onsume luxury (or at least modern) commodities. Indeed, the first step of the establishment of the modern middle class in Iran were global relationships with Western countries and reforms in the bureaucratic organization of the nation-state.

For a better understanding of classes in Iran, we have to review the discussions about the mode of production in Iran. One can find three main scientific approaches regarding the pre-capitalism era in Iran. The first approach discusses that the mode of production in Iran is not comparable with Western countries; therefore, the researchers have to find their own terminology about the Iranian system. The second approach compares the Iranian agrarian system with Serfdom, concluding that serfs in European Serfdom have more freedom (than their Iranian counterparts). The last approach tries to apply the idea of Marx and Engels regarding the Asiatic mode of production (AMP) (cf. Abrahamian, 2010; 2009; Ghasemi et al., 2013; Katouzian, 2005; Moaddel, 2003; Pirooz, 1992).

Before one can determine which approach is suitable in this case, one has to consider the geopolitical position of Iran between Europe and Asia. Due to this geographical position, trade was always very significant in Iranian economy, since Iran was the bridge between Europe and Asia. That is why; tradesmen were always important social and economic actors in Iranian history.

The first known delegates of European kings to Iran go back to the era of mercantilism in the 16th and 17th century (Shirley brothers). With the expansion of capitalism in the

18th and 19th century, trade routes began to emerge in West Europe and naturally the process of accumulation had an effect on Iranian economy. As a matter of fact, capitalists have always tried to find new markets and for their expansion; for this reason, they started to send troops and messengers to all continents. We can see that in this era, there were many envoys that visited Iran to extend new markets for the products. That is why; the first ministers of European countries who came to Iran had the intention to begin trade with Iran. After beginning of the trade, a part of Iranian tradesmen profited from these relations. Although the role of trading was always important in the history of Iran, by that time, relations with the Western countries grew; indeed, the global relations resulted in a new wave of import-export in Iran.

Therefore, from a historical viewpoint, the impact of Western countries on Iran began in the era of mercantilism. The European countries had to find new markets in order to overcome the overproduction crisis. Hence, they had to trade with countries like Iran to export their goods. On the other side, the importance of new technologies made it inevitable for non-Western countries to import new innovative products. For example, the Iranian army had to learn how to use canons and other weapons in wars after they lost to their sword enemies – Ottoman Dynasty in 16th and 17th centuries. At the time, weaponries were imported and many experts (for training Iranian army) and tradesmen (for marketing) entered Iran. One can suggest that these were the first steps of dependency on Western commodities. After that, we can see that the Iranian market became more attractive for Western goods and that the import of processed commodities versus the export of raw materials became the most important activity in Iranian economy. This trend continued until now and Iran can be seen as a destination for foreign experts who have stayed in Iran for a while and influenced Iranian culture. Javadi Yeganeh et al. (2014) have investigated the changes in consumption and income patterns during the last years of Qajar dynasty due to the activities of tradesmen.

Another important aspect of Iranian modernization were the trips of kings to European countries. We can follow the changes in the Era of Qajar dynasty (1785-1906), when the Shah (King in Persian) decided to discover the world and travelled to Europe. During the trips, the kings became acquainted with progress in Western countries. As a consequence, they brought new technologies such as cinematography to Iran. Another reason for the kings' interest on new technology was war defeat against Russia. At that time, it was understood there is a need to get connected to the modern world in order to use innovations and knowledge. That is why; Iranian kings employed army officers,

financial consultants and scientists from European countries. The officers modernized the Iranian army; financial consultants suggested new bureaucratic organizations; and scientists began to tutor Iranians in modern schools like Dar-ul-Funun. The attendance of foreign scientists did not only cause a scientific revolution, but also impacted Iranian culture.

Therefore, the interest in knowing and learning scientific achievements and trade were the reasons for Iranians to become acquainted with European culture and language. Indeed, from the middle of the 19th century many Iranian students left Iran for their education, furthermore many Iranians travelled to European countries for trade. These students and tradesmen learned the language and got to know the culture. They also got familiar with concepts like democracy, republic, liberalism, justice and etc. When they came back to Iran, they spread these ideas by publishing newspapers and magazines.

Another job opportunity for them the government. They were the educated group in a country and held influential positions in the new government during the beginning of Iran's modernization. Since the bureaucratic system had to be reformed, these educated people could get high-rank positions in the government, which brought them money and power.

Abrahamian (2000) categorized tradesmen and students as middle class. For him, the former is *traditional* due to their relation to religion and regarding their beliefs. Abrahamian discussed that there is another middle class, which can be named *modern* middle class due the belief system and lifestyle. For him, The Iranian modern middle class was established after Iranian high-status families decided to send their children abroad in order to study at the end of 19th century. These students experienced a new lifestyle in Europe and came back with their experiences and lifestyles. Regarding their lifestyles, they had new needs and demands. Hence, at the beginning of the 20th century the Iranian Bourgeoisie and middle class consisted of two groups: *traditional* and *modern middle class*.

The tradesmen's earnings came from trade and therefore were not related to production. This capital was not invested in production either. As a matter of fact, export and import of goods were always the main occupation of this group. Especially after the exploration of oil in Iran, the Iranian state became the most important and affluent trade organization. According to statistics of the Central Bank of Iran, over 75 percent of Iranian export was oil and oil products from 1930 to 2009 (Salehi Esfahani & Pesaran,

2011). Therefore, Iran's economy was and is entirely dependent on international trade and naturally the traditional middle class is dependent on international relations.

The modern middle class is characterized by its lifestyle and consumption. Indeed, the Iranian modern middle class came to existence due to cultural relations of Iran and Western countries. One can see two groups of Iranians had the opportunity to leave Iran and live abroad. The first group were children of noble families who had the opportunity to live abroad with family support. The second group were governmental dependents who had the rent to get governmental support and live abroad.

These people had the opportunity to study at European universities. After they came back to the country, they started to work in non-labor jobs and civil services. Indeed, the government needed these labor forces, because reforms became more important at the beginning of the 20th century. A state could not sustain with a traditional administration system and only the new educated youth could work as new public officials or university professors; because they were competent and capable of doing these jobs – due to their knowledge. Besides, these educated people had an impact on spreading new philosophical thoughts. Scholars like Abrahamian, Katouzian and Moaddel mentioned the role of these students and scholars on the constitutional revolution of 1905 (cf. Abrahamian, 2010; 1997; 2000; Moaddel, 2003; Katouzian, 2005). Due to their role in state, the bureaucratic and civic servants could accumulate money and consume Western goods.

It is important to state that the modern class is defined by its mode of consumption and its position in the production. Therefore, we can use this aspect in our researches, namely the cultural aspect of modern middle class in Iran. Another aspect is that the modern class is related to Western culture per se. Naturally, when Iranian middle class is defined to its position and relation to Western culture, it is not surprising, if consumption patterns of the Iranian middle class in Iran would be very similar to the Western way of consuming goods.

Another turning point regarding the emergence of the middle class is World War II and the governance of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, at the time the illiteracy rate decreased from 74 to 58 per cent. Besides, the economic and cultural condition of new middle class changed. Tabrayi (2013) estimated that in 1950s the Iranian *modern* middle class amounted to approximately 10 per cent of the population and consisted of government administrators and university graduates. The *traditional* middle class, that consisted of shopkeepers and traders on the bazar, was made up of 13 per cent of the population.

Besides, the number of intellectuals and industrial workers increased four times during that decade.

The main discussion in that era was the unequal distribution of income due modernization and the following *white revolution of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi*. The aim of the white revolution was a fair distribution of land in Iran, but due to several structural obstacles (for instance, corrupted politicians and economic stagflation), Iran became one of the most unequal countries of the world instead. The distribution of income was so unfair that 20 per cent of the population owned 63 per cent of the resources. On the contrary, the poorest 10 percent earned just 1.3 percent of income (Ashraf & Banuazizi, 1985). There are hypotheses that the 1979 revolution was a result of this inequality (Abrahamian, 2010; Ashraf & Banuazizi, 1985). Therefore, the middle class and poor rebelled. The main goals of the revolution were independence and freedom which are generally middle-class values and equality as the main aim of poor.

A turning point regarding inequality in Iran was the revolution in 1979, which changed the power relations and power sources in Iran, and its impact on social structure is still debatable. Then, just two years after the revolution a war between Iran and Iraq began. At that time, economic resources were mostly invested in the war, therefore, it is not possible to analyze the consumption patterns of the middle class. The main changes in consumption patterns began after the end of Iran-Iraq war.

After the Iran-Iraq war, an era of heavy investment in construction and automobile industries began. A main characteristic of this period is the importance of technocrats in Iran; because they could conduct new policies aiming growth of industries. Here, one could observe a conflict between uprising technocrats and the traditional part of the government who wanted to control and govern due to their beliefs as before. In the era of President Hashemi, although the oil price decreased and economic crisis began, the modern middle class became more powerful. On the other side, Iranian economy experienced a huge increase of inequality of inflation (see 9.1). President Khatami continued the policies of Hashemi. Besides, the production and consumption rate of cultural goods increased (Markaz Amar Iran, 2006); at this period, the modern middle class attended theaters, cinemas, and concerts. It seems that a new modern class were established whose characteristics was consuming Western goods and having tendencies to choose Western values. In this point, we can consider that the New Class is becoming global concept.

In the era of globalization, two important factors had an impact on the way the Iranian middle class consumes. Firstly, globalization made the world a global village, hence the Iranian middle class got informed about consumption patterns in Western countries through internet and satellite. Secondly, the new markets are a remedy of capitalism to overcome the/its over-production crisis

We have to mention common problems studying middle class in Iran. The first problem is the lack of an accepted and practical definition of middle class, and secondly, of reliable statistics on Iranian households. That is why; economists and sociologists tried to define middle class in their own way. For example, Tabrayi (2013) defined middle class as the households who are between the 4th and 8th income deciles. Although this definition is very practical, but it is reductionist. To see middle class solely as an economic concept and as an income group results in a definition that ignores cultural and social characteristics of middle class.

Besides, there is another important aspect concerning the traditional middle class; namely, the role of religion. Interestingly, James (2006) explained how the middle class of Victorian time was related to religion which shaped the traditional middle class. The modern middle class, on the other hand, criticized religion. In the Iranian society, one should consider the role of religion in defining traditional and modern middle class. Originally, Tabrayi (2013) tried to find a way to define middle class regarding education, job skills, health, consumption patterns, and income, but eventually, his main focus was *income / expenditure*. He categorized households that consume between 730000 and 1400000 Tomans (350 to 700 dollars) monthly as middle class. Indeed, Tabrayi emphasized the role of middle class in the social space of Iran (instead of defining middle class due to social variables). For instance, he maintained that middle class played an important role in the field of gender inequality by paying attention to women in labor market.

Another characteristic of the Iranian middle class which is similar to the Indian middle class but distinguishes itself from Western middle class is its relation to technology. Mishra (1961) characterized the emergence of middle class by changes in the law system and public administration, in contrast to Western countries, where the middle class emerged due to economic and technological change. In India, education is traditionally praised; this specification combined with Britain's rule and its imperialist economy resulted in emergence of the modern Indian middle classes. That was very similar to Iran: the Iranian Shahs in the 20th century promoted literacy and education.

As a result, Iranian students had the opportunity to rise to Europe and learn about new scientific progresses. The consequence was initiation of modern technology. At the same time, these students tried to change their lifestyle in a way to be alike Western Bourgeoisie. Therefore, we can follow the influences of Iranian first abroad students in life style changes in Iran. It is important to notice, that Kalecki (1972) hypothesized the development of the Indian middle class as an uncomplete process at that time, because the rising middle class in India could not reach the aims of capitalism. In recent years, Samir Amin (2011) also discussed the role of this dependent middle class in the contemporary global economy. Indeed, the existence of Iranian bourgeoisie is dependent on global trade and namely the export of oil and import of other kinds of productions. Middle class identity in countries like Iran is dependent on the complex social structure of the country composed of subaltern groups and vernacular elites. In sum, we can argue that emergence of Iranian middle class is a result of following events in Iran (Table 4-1).

Table 4-1 – Chronological Table of Middle Class Formation in Iran

Timeline	Events	Effect on Middle-Class emergence
1501–1729 (<i>Safavid era</i>) <i>European Mercantilism</i>	• Iran's trade routes • International trade (Silk production in Iran) • first envoys from England to Iran: Anthony Jenkinson, Arthur Edwards, Robert Shirley and Anthony Shirley	• Iran (Persia) became a geostrategic and important region in the Silk Road between Europe and Eastern Civilizations of East • Iran became a growing market for European goods
1796-1925 (<i>Qajar dynasty</i>)	• First Iranian who left country to study abroad • First modern school / University • First modern Iranian monarch to formally visit Europe	• Iranians became aware of progresses in Europe (knowledge, Technology and Humanities) • Iranian Kings (especially Naser al-Din Shah) became interested in Western technology and governance

		• First railway and modernization of cities • First newspapers and intellectuals • Constitution law • Discovery of oil in Iran (Formation of APOC: Anglo-Persian Oil Company)	• The political consciousness grew due to communication with Europe and activities of intellectual and also inequality and injustice which resulted in Constitution Revolution • Iran became a single-export economy dependent on revenues of oil
<i>Pahlavi Dynasty</i>	Reza Pahlavi (1925-1941)	• Modernization of the bureaucratic system of Iran • Emergence the idea of nation-state (centralized governance and replacement of Persia with Iran) • Changes in foreign affairs (Struggles to balance the power between England, Russia and later Germany in Iran)	• Due to bureaucratic reforms, we see that the number of public servants and officials grew and a new lifestyle came to existence • Due to centralization, the central government became more powerful, important and influential
	Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979)	• Oil nationalization and the 1953 coup – Influence of US in Iran • First development plan in Iran • Economic boom in 1970s (Oil prices increased 470 per cent over a 12-month period) • Reforms (e.g. White Revolution including land reform, sale of some state-	• Due to development plan, the government hand influence on the economic situation of Iranians • The land reforms resulted in changes in social relations of strata in Iran • The economic boom which was a result of the sudden increase of oil price came, led to more consumption in special groups of the

		owned factories to finance the land reform, construction of an expanded road, rail, and air network) • Formation of secret police (SAVAK)	society and simultaneously to more inequality in the country • The suppression from the ruling class resulted in a segmented society; on one side the monarch family and the rich and secret police and on the other side the intellectual, revolutionary and middle class and poor
<i>Islamic Republic</i>	First Phase (1979-89)	• Political conflicts and instability • Iran-Iraq war • Public controlled economy • Establishment of power of one group inside the government by eliminating other groups • Job opportunities in favor of a part of society which are related directly or indirectly to government	• Reduction of inequality due to state-based ownership and rationing policies during the war • Suppression of opposition and cultural revolution resulted in a pronounced reduction of cultural consumption (possibilities) • Retreat of intellectual and opposition due to suppression
	President Hashemi	• Neoliberal policies and structural adjustment under the so-called <i>Construction Era</i> • International debt • Continued suppression policies in the field of cultural goods • The first steps toward economic liberalization and foreign investment	• Increase of inequality, poverty and unemployment because of neoliberal policies and structural adjustment • The first urban rebels after revolution resulted in death of protesters • Continued retreat of intellectual because of suppression policies

		• The first Satellite TVs (although they were banned, the people used dishes privately)	• Contact of economic middle class with global new class through satellite • Entrance of international companies due to liberalization and import of luxury commodities due to effective national demand • Paradox of liberalization of economy and cultural/political suppression • High inflation rate (at the last years of President Hashemi, Iran experienced more than 50 per cent inflation)
	President Khatami	• Continued neoliberal economic policies (especially the labor law was changed in favor of employers) • A short period of liberation in producing cultural goods such as books, films and music • High volume of foreign investment in comparison to previous periods of Islamic Republic • Lenient policies regarding foreign affairs • Brain drain became a concern due to high rate of immigration	• Increase of economic inequality due to continued neoliberal policies • The entrance of multi- and international companies like Nokia resulted in emergence of a new group of experts which can be seen as modern middle class • Emergence of a group of semi-governmental companies in order to buy the privatized public companies; which resulted in emergence of an affluent class which is religious and consumerist

			• Embezzlement and financial fraud as well as capital flight became a serious problem • The international brands enter Iran's market directly and indirectly and, in this respect, one can experience new consumption possibilities in Iran
	President Ahmadinejad	• Beginning of populist economic policies • New social welfare benefit policies including eliminating energy subsidies and starting direct cash payments instead • Public Housing policies • Tension policies regarding foreign affairs • More international sanctions against Iran • Conflict between two governmental political groups: Reformists and Conservatives • Iranian embezzlement scandal (with approximately US\$943.5 million, it is a record in the history of Iran) • Reduction of Gini-Index • Management and Planning Organization of Iran (MPOI) was dissolved	• After a long era of neoliberal policies, the new government tried to revise the economic distribution policies • Due to sanctions, the foreign investment reduced and as a consequence, many experts were unemployed • The import-export process became more difficult after the sanctions and consequently consumption possibilities reduced; that can be seen as a cause for a new wave of immigration • Government tried to execute new equity policies which were unsuccessful due to lack of scientific planning, and liquidation of MPOI and welfare organization

	President Rouhani	• Return of liberal economic policies • Continued sanctions against Iran (more restrictions after President Trump) • The idea of resistive economy (which aims to reduce public deficit by making the state smaller) • Reducing the liquidity • Subsidy reform plan • Support of Start-ups and SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) • Investment (public and foreign)	• Due to international sanctions and restrictions, the consumption possibilities became less and less • Due to conflict of economic policies (on one side small businesses and high-tech enterprises planned to be supported, whereas the government tried to possess and govern all sectors in economy), not only the middle class shrank, but the poor also became poorer • Due to political suppression and socio-economic inequalities, Iran experienced violent riots and protests that resulted in deaths and casualties
--	-------------------	--	--

Note. Own creation

4.5.1 The Role of State in development of Iranian Middle-Class

As discussed before, the rise of middle class in Iran cannot be analysed without considering the role of state, which had an impact on formation of middle class from different aspects. Firstly, the modern middle class is a result of bureaucratic reforms led by the government. Secondly, the government is the main employer in Iranian economy, because the oil industry as the main source of income belongs to the government. Thirdly, the Iranian governments (both before and after revolution) needed legitimization. One way to attain legitimization is mutual dependency on people. As a matter of fact, the middle class is dependent on government; because it owns the resources, and the government is dependent on people because it needs legitimization. Fourthly, it is discussed by Harris (2020; 2021) that middle class is one of the most common concepts that has been employed to explain the zigzag trajectory of Islamic

republic. Finally, in countries like Iran, China and India, trade and relationship with Western countries resulted in two significant consequences. The first consequence was the import of foreign commodities and hence consumption of new goods which resulted in new lifestyles. The most obvious change in this respect was clothing. From the 19th century, a part of Iranian society tended to wear traditional clothes whereas some people preferred to have Western clothes. The second effect is the changes of values and attitudes of new middle class, which is in accordance with Western middle class. Therefore, there has been always debates about this co-existence with the Western culture.

A part of Iranian intellectuals believed that Iranians had to assimilate to Western countries with the goal of reaching the same condition of European countries (Shayegan, 1992). Another group argued that Iran had to find its own way to be considered as a developed country (Pirooz, 1992). The idea became more controversial as Iran started to design development plans in the 1950s.

Although both groups were opposite in this regard, they followed a consumption-based development. Therefore, the plans were based on consumption. That is why; there is a mutual dependency of the state system and the modern class. The middle class is the main actor in designing development strategies which are consumption based and the middle class is dependent on the state system, because the plans are executed by the state.

Interestingly, Iran is not the only country with a mutual dependency of the state and consuming middle class. Potter (1996) argued that the dependency between the state and middle class in India is a result of state-led development. We could also find the same tendency in Iranian development plans. The employees of state agencies were doubled in the 1950s (Abrahamian, 2000). In fact, a new middle class was born which was highly dependent on the government. Interestingly, the government was also dependent on this middle class because of its services.

Besides, the state plays the role of a balance-maker in the public sphere. Therefore, the state safeguards the existence of the middle class in a traditional society (Fernandes, 2006). An interesting example of the traditional way of life in Iran can be seen in the era of Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi. In that time, the state tended to imitate Western way of life. Social scientists like Abrahamian (1997; 2000; 2010) and Katouzian (2004; 2005) pointed out that the traditional middle class rejected and protested the Western

lifestyle and preferred to go back to Islamic values and consequently, these protests triggered the revolution.

In fact, the relation of middle class and state is mutual. Not only the policies have changed the taste of middle class, middle class has also strongly influenced the policies. We can experience this convergence also in Indian new middle class as discussed by Fernandes (2006). As she explained, the cities have excluded beggars and dwellers from public space due to the request of the middle class; indeed, the local state is the main actor regarding the production of a purified middle class civic space with the goal of representing the globalizing Indian nation. At another level, the state actively participates in attempting to produce a middle class-based vision of a beautified and globalizing city in which signs of poverty can be neglected in both spatial and political terms. The similarity of such programs in Iran and India is astonishing. The programs to eliminate beggars and labor children from streets or beautifying cities were practiced in Iran, too.

After the revolution, there has been a conflict between modern and traditional political forces in different fields. For instance, there has been a conflict about economic policies of development, about freedom of speech or even about clothing in public space. Interestingly, the conflict between modern and traditional middle class has always become apparent during president elections in Iran. The liberal candidates represent the modern middle class in a way and the traditional middle class is generally a supporter of conservative candidates. The modern middle class benefits from relations with the global economy and the traditional one seeks a gain in prestige through hostility with the United States. Indeed, the new middle class shows its tendency to practice consumption patterns similar to the ones of the new global class.

The common point about the situation in Iran and India and many developing countries is the simultaneous process of globalization and effects of liberalization policies in these countries, which have produced a restructuring of the relationship between the middle class and the state. While there are convergences between the state and the new middle class, this does not imply that the state has been captured by the middle class, which is in contrast to class theory of Marx. For Marx, the mode of production defines the social formation, but this was reconsidered later by Marxists and the importance of consumption was emphasized. Besides, it was stressed that the mode of production is not always decisive regarding classes; for example, Poulantzas (1973) considered

Imperialism as a reproduction of capitalism regarding social formations and not the mode of production which can be the case in Iran, India or other similar countries.

Although the modern class tends to distinguish itself from being a state supported class, the state has played an important role in the rise of Iranian middle class through development plans. Essentially, development plans caused aggregate demands, which are effective in economic growth. Demands and consumption are mutually related. As asserted by Wright (1978), the middle class's consumption is highly effective and the aim of development plans in countries like Iran is demand aggregation. Hence, the target group of development plans is the middle class. In this way, the state affects the existence of middle class in developing countries.

We can remark two important factors in last decades that changed the lifestyle of the middle class. Firstly, the process of globalizing the economy which brought new high-income jobs, new commodities and new lifestyles to Iran. Secondly, in a country like Iran with a rentier state, obviously a part of the government authorities benefits from international trade. For these reasons, there is a tendency to consume foreign goods, Iran is a part of international market and consumption patterns would be similar to other countries. As a matter of fact, in developing countries the state designs and executes development plans. For Keynesian states, a duty of the state is to consume and to increase effective consumption in the society. Indeed, development plans affect aggregate demand and the target group for consumption is the middle class. Grusky (2008) argued the condition of core states. Historically, core states have arranged that world-wide and over time, money and goods have flowed more freely than labor. For this reason, one can see that the middle class has easily access to luxurious goods.

The main point here is the difference in dynamic changes between Western countries and Iran. The rise of industrial capitalism in the West has resulted in producing newer and cheaper commodities and has also resulted in more employment. The growth of middle class was a consequence of this process. On one hand, there were more jobs and as a result more earnings (for consumption) and on the other hand, there were more and cheaper commodities to buy (and to consume). Indeed, industrialization and the rise of the middle class in developed countries went hand in hand. In contrast to Western countries, in rentier economies like Iran, industrialization resulted in a phenomenon which was called *state class* by Farzanegan et al. (2021). In this case, the existence of the class is dependent on the state and after a time, state and the middle class learned to co-existence together.

In sum, the remarkable point here is the fact that in countries like Iran we can observe a middle class which is similar to new global middle class culturally and economically, and that is entirely/highly dependent on the state.

5 Consumption as a basis for class

Although the familiar classic definition of class roots in production (as in Marx's Theory) or income (as in Weber's Theory), there are some characteristics of consumption which make it a good basis for analysis of inequality and classes. For example, Frank (2007) asserted that consumption patterns have the advantage of not being sensitive to context like other variables; therefore, they are good candidates for studying social inequality. Fernandes (2006) maintained also that middle class identity is connected with public discourses and public space. This connection has produced new urban aesthetics and certain tastes regarding the design of urban space, associated with consumption and lifestyle. Indeed, the middle class is managed through the reproduction of socio-spatial distance from the urban poor and working class and the new way of consumption serves as a significant aspect of the production of a new middle-class identity.

Consumption can be seen as a set of socio-symbolic status markers that help researchers to classify different classes, strata and milieus in the society. Another advantage of studying consumption behavior is its accuracy and flexibility. For individuals, it is not very easy to estimate all their earnings (especially talking about households), whereas one can easily estimate the spending of an individual or a household. At the same time, consumption can show us the taste of a group during the years, which is not possible in case the income is investigated. By the investigation of income or production in a society, we ignore the changes in the lives of the middle class. Hence, it seems that studying class through consumption can result in more complete findings. Besides, it seems that age is a very important factor in categorizing the middle class, because the lifestyle of one generation might be entirely different from another one. Therefore, for a better understanding of taste and lifestyle, it is better to apply consumption-based research.

Sweet (2011) indicated that global inequality has resulted in patterns of consumption, which both reflect and maintain inequalities. In this respect, we have to stress there is a difference between consumerism and consumption. The Iranian middle class is economically too fragile to engage in consumerism, but consumption is a common habit in middle class. As a matter of fact, consumption plays a critical role in both the maintenance and the expression of social and economic inequalities.

5.1 Middle Class and Consumption

Horkheimer and Adorno (2002 [1947]) discussed consumption from a highly critical perspective. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, they explained the mechanism by which the labor force was alienated in the capitalist society, resulting in the establishment of a mass consumer society to ensure the continuation of capital accumulation. Through this process, the individualistic society based on creativity would vanish and as a consequence, the society moves toward homogenization and mass deception. Galbraith (1958) took this criticism further and emphasized the importance of advertising in capitalism and the middle class is the aim of advertisements. For this reason, middle class and consumption are two inseparable phenomena of the capitalist society.

The first analysis of mass consumption and inequality appears in Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class*. Introducing the idea of conspicuous consumption, Veblen argued that after accumulation of wealth, inequality grows and at this point, consumption is a symbol for social distinction. In Veblen's theory, material goods, consumption and leisure time are the most significant factors for upper class to show off. Lower economic classes in society also intend to represent symbolic markers of status, but in an imperfect and a descending manner (Veblen, 1899). Veblen also reasoned that material consumption is becoming more important in urban contexts where consumption produces more symbolic meaning as well as offering more and diverse opportunities. His most important conclusion was that in modern society, interactions are primarily guided by symbolically displayed social status. Grusky (2008) summarized this idea by this argument that wealth has become the symbol of honor and invidious distinction, and nothing can show the accumulation of wealth and status as well as consumption of goods.

Distinction – Bourdieu's study of French consumer culture – showed that even within the economic classes, consumer tastes are not the same and differ due to cultural capital and social norms. For Bourdieu (1984), there is a mutual relation between taste and cultural capital, which ensures the reproduction and maintenance of social hierarchies, since economic distinctions are connected/linked to cultural values and norms. Bourdieu thus introduced the idea that economic, material, and symbolic forms of capital intersect with each other in complex ways in modern society, and that culture, in the anthropological sense, is critical to understanding these relationships.

In the current political–economic context of the postmodern era, or what Jameson (1991) refers to as the *cultural logic of late capitalism*, social and economic patterns of consumption have become even more complex. We can now observe that production has risen and for this reason, capitalism demands more consumption in order to overcome the overproduction crisis. New technologies and innovations in the market have resulted in global distribution and international consumption, which enabled flexible accumulation. For Jameson, the neoliberal ideology created a global ideology of mass consumption and consumer culture based on new electronic media.

In the most advanced societies, social distinction is related to consumption. With the increase of wealth, working time would be reduced and thus, the time spent consuming increases. This would result in conspicuous consumption regarding socioeconomic hierarchy. Moreover, as pointed out by Jean Baudrillard (1988), consumption has become more and more symbolic, and it is implicated in the processes of social ordering. The consequence can be observed in formation of groups due to consumption patterns and detachment of groupings from production/employment relations, material needs and interests. It means that consumption functions as autonomous social-structuring system (Katz-Gerro, 2002; 2004). That is why; Fernandes (2006) suggested the new concept of consumer-citizen in the first decade of the 21st century. In India, the icon of the consumer-citizen was exhibited as a sign for liberalization, which means, the citizens are defined through consumption. We can extend his idea to a global level. Due to these changes, Croll (2006) suggested three phases of consumer revolution: possibilities of self-definition, social aspiration and political legitimation. Indeed, the consumption revolution began with the possibility to consume and extended itself to the political sphere. Sadjed (2012) showed in her book *Shopping for Freedom* how Iranian middle class consumes and experiences feelings of freedom due being able to choose. She proposed that consumption now has a wider meaning that extends beyond the private sphere, it can be interpreted politically and hence revolutionize the political sphere.

It is important to notice consumption is now central to the cultural as well as material reproduction of social lives and relationships (Saltık et al., 2013). Slater (1997) argued that *Consumer Culture* is the most significant characteristic of the modern West which determines occupation and lifestyle there. Zhou (2008) also investigated how middle class families tend to assimilate to the global urban model of consumption and lifestyle. He asserted that since the beginning of the 1990s, the increase in middle income

consumers of China has changed the economic, social and political structure of China. Remarkably, consumption – in this sense - is everyday life and more than shopping and spending. Shopping and spending are just a part of everyday life and cannot be seen as *consumption*. As argued by Croll (2006), the events of 1980s were effective in rise of the new consumer society: Rise of income and shift in emphasis from production, work and worker – comrade to consumption, lifestyle and the consumer.

Naturally, some scientists consider consumption in the same way as at production. Indeed, all assumptions regarding production and society are true for consumption and social formation now. For example, Miller (1987) believed that consumption is the same as production regarding alienation. For him, consumption constructs social identities for consumers and produces a network of social relations and in this regard, consumption has an impact on cultural reproduction, moral and social values. For this reason, consumption has become the single most important form of expressing social identity. Interestingly, scholars like Elfick (2008) maintained that the shift of social identities in China has resulted in class consciousness. Leisure time activities are becoming particularly significant as expression of status and wealth. Indeed, consumption is the way that classes (especially new middle class and upper class) distinguish themselves from others.

A good example of consumption, which is common in all societies (industrialized or developing) is food. As maintained by Goody (2000), food is *symbolic* of social relationships; indeed, we can see the relation of social structure and symbols there. Food consumed by individuals in a society, clarifies the culture, taste and social relations. As a matter of fact, eating habits are a part of culture. In such a system, food becomes not only a cultural representation regarding the value system of Simmel. For Simmel (1978), the value of economic objects is determined through the person's desire and enjoyment of its consumption.

Hence, in every society including Iran consuming food is a necessary and common habit and the distinction depends on what and how the food is consumed. The popularity of foreign or global food (or for example karaoke amongst Chinese consumers) shows that consumption plays an integral part in creating new identities as well as sustaining old ones. It is a symbol of being *global* and *modern*. As explained by Zhou (2008), by consuming global food and karaoke, individual Chinese consumers have been transformed into global middle class and modern citizens. Croll (2006) described that one of the most growing markets in post-revolutionary China was in cosmetics and

body-products. The number of registered factories producing cosmetics doubled from 700 to 1500 between 1986 and 1992. Besides, many international companies established joint-ventures in China. The same changes occurred in the lifestyle of Iranian middle class (Ansari Eshlaghi, 2013) whereupon consuming cosmetic products has increased enormously in the recent years. Another activity that is more popular nowadays is music. In the last ten years, many new Iranian pop singers began to work legally or underground. Interestingly, we can observe that in China as well.

In sum, we can see that the values regarding consumption have changed in these years. As a consequence, the non-Western countries follow the same pattern like the West. Indeed, mass consumption is a need of post-industrial capitalism and started in West and then extended to non-Western countries. One of the factors related to mass consumption and the tendency towards mass consumption is inequality. The middle class tends to assimilate to the higher class on a national and international level. The symbol of being rich is consuming high culture. In this respect, each cultural form (music, literature, film, food and etc.) can be investigated in a study of inequality. The classification ranges from the highbrow (e.g. classical music and opera) to the middlebrow (e.g. Broadway show tunes) and the lowbrow (e.g. country music and rock).

Sombart (1969) described that approximately from 1300 to 1800 was the epoch of expansion of trade, industry, and finance in Europe which resulted in an increase for demanding luxury goods. Given owning is the basis and moving vehicle of capitalism, then this epoch was the emergence of capitalism. As a consequence, to own more corresponds to higher social status in capitalism. Appadurai (1988) formulated that the demand functions as a stimulus for ending a lifestyle and beginning a new one. As a matter of fact, it is now more important to own something new and different. Fashion functions as a marker of distinction between the people who can afford something and the people who cannot. Besides, the exchange function of economies tends to commoditize and homogenize every aspect of life and for Appadurai, culture is the counter-force, which maintains the individuals against singularization and homogenization; because due to culture, the individuals can be different and this difference prevents the person from changes in the direction of homogenization.

In this sense, consumption can be seen as a form of symbolic action. Gell (1986) believed that consumption of any goods and commodities are more than mere packets of neutral *utility*. They build the symbolic system and function as the symbols shaping

the culture. Douglas and Isherwood (2005) have devoted an interesting monograph to this subject, stressing the central importance of “consumption rituals” in the mediation of social life. Indeed, they see consumption as a ritual, that dictates the behavior of the actors.

5.2 Conspicuous Consumption and Middle Class

Veblen (1899) in *The Theory of the Leisure Class* described the role of conspicuous consumption in the society and the importance of consumption for the middle class. He argued that at first, one could see the distinction between the honorable superior class, namely the men at that time and inferior class of laboring women. That is why; at that time there were some taboos regarding culture, even some foods were taboo for women and children. Many taboos changed during the centuries. As property was accumulated, the leisure class changed in function and structure and that resulted in a differentiation within the class and the establishment of a new system of rank and grades. In brief, Veblen explained how the consumption dynamic functioned and how in the 19th century, the leisure class emerged with new patterns of consumption.

It is important to note, that the various consumption patterns of the middle and lower classes do not represent the leisure-class lifestyle; because these households do not count as leisure class. By applying the idea of Veblen, Grusky (2019) declared that the difference of taste between classes in the society is visible in consuming goods such as furniture, houses, parks, and gardens, which show distinguishable views and norms. To take an example, food taste can be seen as an interesting symbol of difference. Tastes in food are very personal, but the ways of treating food, of serving, presenting and offering it can be formed by the class and environment.

As well as outlining the ways in which the leisure class expressed their status, Veblen (1970) clarified the two major means by which such strategies were extended into society in general. The first of these was through control over matters of taste. Good taste was defined as a taste, that is distanced from the world of work, the practical or the natural world, and was termed *refined* or *cultivated*, and if the taste was not cultivated, it was called *cheap*. This became apparent through the process of emulation, by which lower groups in the hierarchy sought to copy the higher groups, which was for Veblen the foundation for the concept of private property. Interestingly, Veblen investigated leisure time, which is distanced from work. Indeed, he showed that there is a phenomenon hardly related to work which distinguishes the people.

Simmel just like Veblen paid attention to consumption. Simmel (1978) – in *The Philosophy of Money* stressed the relationship between people, products of industrialization and the monetary economy not only in terms of production, but also of consumption. Simmel (1957) also recognized the necessity of culture for the development of the society and saw the massive increase in material culture. He considered that the relationship of individuals with consumer goods is a determinant for the individual's development. Therefore, consumer objects become decisive factors of life in the capitalist society.

Another modern twist to the Marxist critique of the commodity has emerged with the application of semiotics. Although often associated with structuralism, semiotic analysis is involved in the details of representation and signification. In this view, objects can be supposed as alternative to words, or as signs whose meaning and perception can be seen in a deeper layer of social relations. Barthes (1973) began to criticize the commodity and the bourgeois culture with the help of semiotic analysis. Objects are analyzed as myths, which provide artificial resolutions to real contradictions in society. In this respect, the signification in all day life functions similarly to myths; namely, it shifts the connotation of objects to another level. Indeed, one can understand how the value of objects changes in the capitalist society and owning a property can produce new meaning and connotation. The work of Douglas and Isherwood (2005, p. 59) is related to that Durkheimian pre-structuralist tradition which sees objects as aiding in the creation of a cognitive order based upon social divisions. They argued that goods are used to make “visible and stable the categories of culture”. Indeed, a commodity can denote more; it is a symbol to show one's status. Consumption is not only the ordinary usage of a commodity, it is also a symbol. The middle class consumes in a way to distinguish it from lower classes.

In the same tradition of French sociology, Bourdieu (1991; 1984) established his theory on structures and taste, which is directly derived from consumption. For Bourdieu, the *habitus* is that structured set of classificatory patterns which is inculcated in the child as its sense of cultural propriety and normative order. The emphasis on taste is common by Veblen and Bourdieu which is for them the key dimension controlling the significance of ordinary goods, and their common location of the source of taste in distance from work. Bourdieu provided an array of domains divided according to the criteria of taste. An obvious case is that of food, which may be graded according to the social position of the consumer. For example, working people might prefer a complete

dish full of red meat and bread; the quantity is also important. Middle class preferences are based on moral interest in food as wholesome, healthy, and sustaining. For higher classes, scarcity of the food and being luxurious is decisive. They might prefer rich sauces and desserts, and the food, which shows their economic capital. The taste for food has become more and more about locating oneself in the social field. By taste and food consumption, one shows to which class one belongs. The same logic also is valid for consuming other goods in the society.

Indeed, we can claim that all goods to some extent emanate messages about rank. That is why; Douglas and Isherwood (2005) believed that consumption patterns are just as important to track as prices on stock exchange, if a sociologist tries to find class structure in the late capitalism. In this sense, the consumer is not only a buyer, he or she is as actor who follows certain behavior patterns, which can be investigated. Therefore, we can conclude that middle class is a construct based on consumption and not on production. Indeed, in contrast to classic Marxism, which was only interested on production, we have to investigate the consumption patterns. In this sense, the lifestyle is very important, because consumption is reflected in lifestyle of households. It is important to notice that we have to distinguish between practices of consumption and the phenomenon of consumerism, in order to avoid confusion. Scholars like Sadjed (2016) have analysed consumption and consumerism in Iran from a view of political economy. Here, we would like to investigate the consumption patterns as a means for analysing the middle class.

5.3 Middle Class Lifestyle

In a society dominated by market relations and based on mass consumption, goods represent culture. In such a system, the affluent lifestyle is a sign for status, which guides us to the class theory of Weber. Class, in Weber's terminology, always refers to market interests, which exist independently of whether men are aware of them. Thus, class is an objective characteristic influencing the life-chances of people, but only under certain circumstances become conscious of, and act upon, their mutual economic interests. Weber, by defining status groups (Stände) as contrasted to classes, distinguishes between subjective and objective aspects of differentiation. The importance of status groups derives from the fact that they are built upon criteria of grouping other than those stemming from market interests.

The contrast between classes and status groups is sometimes portrayed as one between the objective and the subjective; but is also one between production and consumption. Whereas class expresses relationships involved in production, status groups express those involved in consumption, in the form of specific *styles of life*. Giddens (1973) extended the idea of Weber regarding class relations. For Giddens, class would become manifest, if common patterns of behavior and attitude are formed. Besides, classes tend to manifest in common styles of life. Naturally, in many cases classes and status groups tend to be closely linked, for instance, possession of property is both determinant of class situation and also provides the basis for following a definite *style of life*. By this view, we can suppose that consumption and lifestyle are the main characteristics of middle class; hence, we can consider that middle class members see lifestyle as the main attribute of themselves in order to distinguish themselves from the lower class. Indeed, by this theory someone can suppose him/herself as middle class if his/her consumption pattern is similar to others.

The system of differences becomes clearer when one looks more closely at the patterns of spending on food. In this respect, middle class differs from workers or the affluent class. The professionals also consume differently. For examples, Bourdieu (1984) showed the teachers spend more than all other fractions on bread, milk products, sugar, fruit preserves and non-alcoholic drinks, less on wine and spirits and distinctly less than the professionals on expensive products such as meat – especially the most expensive meats, such as mutton and lamb – and fresh fruit and vegetables. The members of the professionals are mainly distinguished by the high proportion of their spending which goes on expensive products, particularly meat (18.3 percent of their food budget), and especially the most expensive meat (veal, lamb, mutton), fresh fruit and vegetables, fish and shellfish, cheese and aperitifs.

Fernandes (2006) noted the changes in the kinds of food associated with emerging status distinctions. For example, new middle class lifestyles were creating a demand for *luxury foods* such as mushrooms, broccoli, and kiwi. Along with changes in taste, consumption, and status, new middle-class lifestyle shifts have also incorporated practices such as participation in gym cultures, domestic and international travel, and changes in areas such as fashion and children entertainment.

Food is not the only distinction between classes in a society. Due to Douglas and Isherwood (2005), a change in lifestyles ought to be recognizable by a change in the pattern of periodicities in house. James (2006) considered holidays as therapy for

middle class men and women. Fresh air, sea bathing and exercise recovers the muscles and organs of the urban man. He reported that at the end of 19th century fun trips and travelling for fun became a part of middle class life. Remarkably, the latest consumer revolution made luxuries affordable for middle class. Cars, clothes, and food became the signs of affluency and in the 1960s and 1970s, one could see many advertisements focused on food and lifestyle as symbols of status. Mankekar (1999) demonstrated that middle class lifestyle was promoted by media and market as a fantastic way of life. By means of media and advertisement, a kind consumer habits as middle class-ness was introduced, which was imitated by a large part of the middle class (and the people who felt themselves as middle class).

James (2006) argued how gradually new habits of middle class changed from pure pleasure to the combination of pleasure, leisure time activities and health. His famous example is the famous slogan of the 1950s 'Have a Capstan and Make Friends'. At the time that offering a cigarette was a gesture of friendship and an invitation to familiarity, but later in the second half of the 20th century, middle class-ness became associated with exercising for the purpose of having a healthy body and soul. Besides, attention to body shape, beauty and health were signs of belonging to a higher class. The importance of shape and health has continued to be a focal point for showing off.

Jaffrelot & van der Veer (2008) declared that the new consumer culture is connected to the development of American hegemony in the world. Indeed, after the World War II American society experienced production boom. Since the US was not destroyed during the war, many factories were built in America. These products had to be consumed and the era of consumption begun at the time. Non-Western countries were also influenced by the new consumer society. Their ideal was a country like US and they followed the same consumption pattern as the United States. Even countries like China, which resisted at first, had to follow the same way. The new generation and especially children were the target group of global products. Croll (2006) implied that the main aim of marketing companies (domestic and foreign) are Chinese children. If children begin to consume, the parents have to consume, too. Another symbol of consumer society is the urban shopping-malls which have been built, in order to facilitate consumption.

In India, the situation is a bit different to China. The lifestyle of the new middle class is in many ways the most visible symbolic representation of globalization. This middle class is not simply a new socioeconomic group; it embodies a changing set of socio-cultural norms for the Indian nation (Robinson and Goodman, 1996; Fadaee, 2014). It

seems that consumption behavior is also related to occupation in India. Upadhya (2008) maintained differences in consumption patterns and preferences employed by IT professionals to distinguish themselves from other segments of the *consuming classes*. For instance, they consciously attempt to differentiate themselves from the young center employees. He noted that the identity of transnational Indian IT professionals is produced more through consumption of ideologies of the family and nation, and of the idea of Indian culture, than through consumption of new consumer goods and lifestyles. Indeed, the culture and the symbols were modified and concepts like nation, middle class-ness and family were rewritten, because the context has changed. The new middle class had to think globally and more importantly consume globally.

Fernandes (2006) described the new lifestyle of the new Indian middle class as a shift from old ideology to a new consumer culture. It is visible that a new middle class-based culture of consumption has emerged and substituted the older ideologies of a state-managed economy. Therefore, the national symbols of progress and development were cell phones, washing machines, and colour televisions. While earlier state socialist ideologies tended to depict workers or rural villagers as objects of development, such ideologies changed now in favour of urban middle-class consumers. The new cultural coding of economic reforms is the emergence of consumption patterns and lifestyles associated with *newly valuable commodities*.

Gerke (2000) supposed that in Indonesia, members of the middle class have deployed a form of virtual consumption, a set of strategies designed to display standards of living that then in fact could not necessarily afford. Indeed, the middle class tried to distinguish itself from the other groups in the society in two directions: firstly, in a national level and secondly in an international level. The fact that the Indonesian new middle class tends to consume in a way, which is called virtual consumption, shows that not only the consumption is important for the middle class also the act of showing off is a part of being middle class. Indeed, consumption reflects the lifestyle and distinction in a society. Grusky (2008) argued how honor is a symbol, which is associated closely to lifestyle and consumption. Indeed, the way to represent status is the associated lifestyle, which would be practiced by all people who prefer to be a part of that. Therefore, it is not surprising that middle class women – who are almost as dissatisfied with their bodies as working class women – devote such great investments to improve their appearance and are such unconditional believers in all forms of plastic surgery.

In a consumer society where the quantity of consumption is obviously high for all classes, the quality of goods and the consumed goods become more significant. Indeed, exaggerated consumption is not a symbol of being *rich*, but by buying expensive goods and also consuming goods that are not consumed by other classes, the middle class draws a line between itself and lower classes. In this respect, cultural consumption plays the most important role, because the middle class pays more attention to cultural consumption in comparison to other classes.

5.4 Middle Class and Cultural Consumption

Bourdieu (1984) interpreted power relations between groups due to their relations with culture. Culture with its symbolic nature is the pivot of the new society to elucidate power relations. The mirror of cultural relations is cultural consumption. With cultural consumption, people can show their tastes and consequently their belonging to a class. The idea can be seen in the idea of high-culture in Frankfurt School. The people who consume high-culture goods do have a higher status and rank in the society. For this reason, studying cultural consumption patterns is a part of distinguishing middle class. For me, in this dissertation, the way cultural goods are consumed, is the key to interpret the impact of Western culture on Iranian cultural and economic structures. Given that class is defined by consumption of a household, then cultural consumption is a very useful tool to see the interests of the middle class and their possibilities to consume. In this respect, the preferences (the taste) and the capability (the economic condition) are important. Indeed, cultural consumption gives us a pattern for determining how middle class distinguishes itself from other classes.

Especially when we are talking about Iranian middle class, the role of Western commodities becomes more and more important. The cultural interest of a class is the key to their taste. Indeed, cultural interest is the subjective part of class belonging for a group, because the way people consume is limited to their social and economic conditions, but on the hand, interests reflect wants and wishes. For example, one might like to have a very expensive car, but due to his/her economic income, he/she cannot afford one. Hence, the interest is subjective, whereas the consumption pattern is objective. This way of analyzing cultural interests is a phenomenon of the last decades of the 20th century.

Poststructuralists have shown the influence of power relations on identity; in this way, they could analyze cultural codes and signs by means of cultural politics. This

relationship was neglected before this era and the impact of cultural politics on identity making was studied by scholars (Lamont & Fournier, 1992). I assume that the Iranian middle class is influenced by the Western middle class through global power relations which results in an interest in consuming in a way to assimilate to the global middle class. A middle class member feels free, rich and joyful if it can consume in the same way as every other middle class member on a global level.

It is important to note that British social historians and Birmingham School sociologists have considered how the working class defines its identity in opposition to those of other classes (Cannadine, 2000). Indeed, they believe that there is a mutual exclusion between the middle class and the working class. The middle class tends to be distinguished by consuming specific cultural goods. Paul DiMaggio (1986) showed that boundaries between *popular culture* and *elite/high culture* are the products of social history. Remarkably, he showed that how the differences became systematic in the field of visual arts and music through a *high culture model* in the United States.

DiMaggio (1992) in another article pointed out that although it seems cultural values change and modify in a natural way (and are not manipulated), but the great interest on opera, theater, and the dance as *high cultural* status show that the values and tastes can be selected and changed due to social factors. These art fields became the boundaries, that distinguish high cultural status and popular forms. In order to establish their position as remarkable art forms, they had to be developed at the universities as well. That is why; one can see new ties of theater, dance, modern painting, photography, and film to the universities as dominant centers of cultural authority in the United States. These artistic activities needed also another step for their establishment; namely, they had to tie themselves to the market. James (2006) described how art has been a part of middle-class lifestyle in the last century. Art for the middle class meant also spending money. The high-income middle class commissioned architects to build their houses and bought paintings and sculpture to fill them, and those with less to spend purchased reproductions and mass-produce furniture and ceramics. Like art, literature was another cultural commodity, which was marketed for middle class consumption.

Due to James, snobbery was a great theme of the 19th century which continued to exist in the 20th century in middle class encounters. Snobbery is a part of a wider suburban stereotype. In this respect, owning meant success; members of the middle class had to possess a car, garden and household gadgets (James, 2006). Snobbery is closely related to the concept of objectivism and subjectivism in middle class models; because snobs

try to distinguish themselves. Naturally, different theorists discuss the different aspects of subjectivism and objectivism, not only on a practical and social level, but also theoretically. For example, Miller (1987) suggested that the potential for a balance between objectivism and subjectivism in social theory has been demonstrated by a number of recent models (e.g. Bourdieu, Giddens). The problem is then how to translate this balance from more general issues of social theory to the particular context of mass consumption.

Some theories and studies tried to make a bridge between subjectivism and objectivism by investigating cultural consumption. Bourdieu's *Distinction* was one of them. Another prominent approach is the formulation of Chan and Goldthorpe (2005). They suggested that consumers can be categorized under omnivore and univore due to their interests. It must be noted that the omnivore-univore argument was initially developed in reference to musical consumption by Peterson (Peterson & Simkus, 1992). Chan and Goldthorpe (2005) tried to test this assumption on other aspects of cultural consumption in Britain. Data used in their research was from the *Arts in England* survey which was carried out by the Office for National Statistics on behalf of Art Council England. The respondents were 6042 individuals aged over 16 who lived in private households and were chosen randomly.

The important variables for Chan and Goldthorpe were theatre and cinema attendance, which were investigated by means of six questions. Respondents were asked whether or not, in the last 12 months, they had attended a performance of a play/drama, a musical, a pantomime, a ballet, some other form of dance (including contemporary dance, African People's dance and South Asian dance), or had seen a film at a cinema (or another venue rather than at home) (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2005). The results of their research can be found in Table 5-1.

Their model proposed two latent classes: Latent class 1 (which accounts for almost two-thirds of the sample) comprised *individuals* who have a very low probability of having attended a theatre in the last twelve months. Latent class 2 consisted *individuals* who had a relatively high probability of having attended a theatre, any kind of performance and having been to the cinema as well.

Chan and Goldthorpe analyzed the distribution of univores (latent class 1) and omnivores (latent class 2) within the seven classes (which is suggested by NS-SEC: The National Statistics Socio-economic classification). It is evident that omnivores are most common in the professional and managerial classes, 1 and 2, where they are in

fact in a slight majority, while univores dominate in Classes 5, 6 and 7, those of lower superiority and technical, semi-routine and routine workers (Grusky, 2008). Then, it was found that there are three types of musical consumers: univores whose consumption is largely restricted to pop and rock, and then two kinds of omnivores – *true omnivores* and omnivore listeners. The former tends to attend musical events as well as to listen all genres of music, whereas the latter prefers only to listen to recorded music and broadcast.

Table 5-1- Estimated size of the latent Classes and Conditional Probabilities of Attendance under Chan-Goldthorpe Model

Latent Class	1	2
Relative Size	64.2 %	35.8 %
Probabilities of Attendance (%)		
Ballet	0.1	5.0
Other dances	5.6	24.6
Pantomime	6.7	27.9
Musical	6.9	56.2
Play/drama	6.1	67.1
Cinema	48.0	87.1

Note. Adapted from “The social stratification of theatre, dance and cinema attendance.” By T. W. Chan, and J. H. Goldthorpe, 2005, *Cultural Trends*, 14(3), 193–212.

Results show that a two-way, or bivariate analysis is not sufficient for understanding cultural consumption behavior and we have to move to a multivariable kind of analysis. It is necessary to relate the chances of an individual being an omnivore rather than a univore to the full range of stratification variables referred to earlier and also to the socio-demographic variable of sex, age, marital status, family composition and region of residence (Table 5-2).

Due to this research, women are more likely to be theater goers than men; or, women are more likely to be theater and cinema omnivores rather than simply cinema-only omnivores (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2005). They concluded that there is a correlation between income and being omnivore; besides, including class and status in the analysis would help to find out better results.

Table 5-2- Distribution of Univores (U) and Omnivores (O) within NS Social Classes

Social Classes	U (%)	O (%)	N
1 Higher managerial and professional occupations	43.9	56.2	488
2 Lower managerial and professional occupations	49.4	50.6	1023
3 Intermediate occupations	63.2	36.8	574
4 Small employers and own-account workers	72.7	27.3	275
5 Lower supervisory and technical occupations	77.7	22.3	359
6 Semi-routine occupations	77.1	22.9	620
7 Routine occupations	85.8	14.2	480
	64.2	35.8	3819

Note. Reprinted from “The social stratification of theatre, dance and cinema attendance.” By T. W. Chan, and J. H. Goldthorpe, 2005, *Cultural Trends*, 14(3), 193–212, p. 201

Although middle class and cultural consumption has been a theme of discussion, there are rather few theories on that except for approaches of Bourdieu and Chan & Goldthorpe. Indeed, Bourdieu’s approach is more about the interests and reasons of cultural consumption, whereat Chan & Goldthorpe try to categorize different groups of consumers.

It is important to notice that a main difference in defining classes in the recent years is the fact that the focus lies on the cultural characteristic of classes. This change can be seen as the main difference between classic theories and theories put into practice in the post-industrial era. For this reason, culture and cultural consumption are central for present inequality studies.

5.4.1 Middle Class cultural consumption in non-Western world

Middle class studies started in Western countries. Hence, Western lifestyle has been investigated mostly. Recently, due to the lack of research on the middle class in developing countries, some surveys have been conducted in countries like China, India and Turkey. The theoretical framework of these survey roots in researches in Western countries. The researches tended to investigate how people consume regarding categories, which were found in Western countries. An interesting example for cultural studies is Turkey. Turkey is an Islamic country with a traditional background. Now, it wants to join European Union and therefore, many reforms are planned. The changes

in socio-economic structure of Turkey can be studied for a better understanding of dynamics and impacts of cultural consumption.

Besides, since Turkey tends to play a more important role in Middle East and Europe, economic growth is also a significant concern of the state. Consumption is a way to grow economically which can be seen in the emergence of new lifestyles in Turkey. Therefore, we have a population, which is modernized, but still traditional and wants to consume. The market was blooming for Turkish products, which are promoted by the government. Remarkably, the growing industry is dependent on an urban university-educated upper middle class who are employed in different services in the cities.

Rutz and Balkan (2009) employed Bourdieu's approach of distinction in their research about the Turkish middle class. They concluded that the middle class in Turkey consisted of wage earners who held the means of production. Besides, the new generation tends to distinguish itself by cultural capital, especially education. For example, Istanbul middle class parents believed that elite private middle schools constituted the main path to the best universities; because by graduating from these schools, one has better chances in the labor market. Another advantage of elite schools for families is the prestigious higher education degree that adds value to the accumulation of a family's symbolic and economic capital. In this case, we have a redefinition of symbols and prestige. Good education and consuming cultural goods have become a symbol of being new middle class.

We can summarize that in sociological analyses of cultural consumption, income and education are often taken as substitutes for more direct measures of class or status in the study. Indeed, consumption and income and education are different parts of a triangle that define the class status of a household. We can discuss here that class is a factor of both consumption and income, although they are interrelated.

5.5 Globalization and New Global Middle Class

Milanović (2016) discussed that from the last decades of the 20th century, we observe a global middle class, which affects and is affected on a global level. The economic growth worldwide affects life and condition of this middle class in every country. For this reason, the dynamics of structural changes must be discussed globally. Grusky (2019) argued a global New Class in this respect. He maintained that the New Class in Western countries is related to the emergence of the public sphere. A synoptic inventory

of some episodes decisive in the formation of the new class can be summarized as following:

1. A *process of secularization* in which most intelligentsia are not educated and supervised by a churchly organization. Therefore, they are now connected to everyday life of society.
2. The corresponding *decline of Latin* as the language of intellectuals, and especially of their scholarly production. Therefore, there are more languages in the science world.
3. The *breakdown of the feudal and old regime system* of personalized patronage relations between the old hegemonic elites and individual members of the New Class as cultural producers.
4. A corresponding growth of an *anonymous market* for the products and services of the New Class.
5. The character and development of the emerging New Class also depended highly on the *multinational structure of European policies*.
6. The emergence of the *nuclear family and change of gender roles*. As middle-class women become educated and emancipated, they increasingly challenge paternal authority and side with their children in resisting it.
7. A new structurally *differentiated educational system* which was insulated from the family system (and also religion), becoming an important source of values among students divergent from those of their families. While growing public education limits family influences on education, it also increases the influence of the state on education.
8. The *new school system* became a major setting for the intensive linguistic conversion of students from casual to reflexive speech, or from restricted linguistic codes to elaborated linguistic codes, to a culture of discourse in which claims and assertions may not be justified by reference to the speaker's social status.
9. This *new culture of discourse* often diverged from assumptions fundamental to everyday life, tending to put them into question even when they are linked to the upper classes.
10. With the *spread of public schools* and the reduction of illiteracy, intellectuals lose their importance, and therefore, the high culture they represent lost its position.

11. Finally, there has been a shift from of the revolutionary thinking to *instrumental rationality* among the modern intelligentsia.

This main process in emergence of new class can be followed in many countries. Indeed, the tendency toward secularization and then education made the New Class something global, which has too many similarities although it might emerge in different countries and cultures.

The theory of new class is not new and we can see that at the last decades of the 20th century; for instance, Gouldner (1979) investigated the new class as a global phenomenon. For him, the socioeconomic order is decisive in this respect. All countries that become a part of the global order have a new class consisting of intellectuals and technical intelligentsia and they enter into contention with the groups already in control of the society's economy, businessmen or party leaders. Indeed, managers, politicians and experts are the new class that is present in every modern society. They do not own material property as discussed in classic Marxism, but they have knowledge or are able to gain power. We see a group of people, that has no material property, but owns political and economic power. They have a new way of life, which is global.

Patnaik (2002) tried to find the mechanism that resulted in the homogeneity of this New Class worldwide. Due to his approach, neoliberal policies have motivated the countries to open the borders to capital in order to experience larger capital inflows and thereby raise the pace of development beyond what its own internal savings would permit. Indeed, the New Class is dependent on technology, industry and capital-in-finance (in contrast to capital-in-production). The presumption here is that the capital-in-production has become highly mobile, in contrast to what had been the case historically. Grusky (2008) named the new class *cultural bourgeoisie*. For him, the New Class and the old class are at first the same; indeed, the new class is based on property privileges sponsored by old class. Besides, the new class of intellectuals and intelligentsia are more educated than the old moneyed class. In comparison, the new class possesses knowledge and technology, and the old class has economic capital. It seems that in this point, we can use Robertson's idea of homogenization. For Robertson, cultural globalization resulted in cultural homogenization (Robertson, 1995). The global New Class is becoming culturally similar in many ways.

Historically seen, the New Class is closely related to the rise of post-industrial society. Daniel Bell discussed in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* the characteristics of

the post-industrial society. He summarized the characteristics of the post-industrial society as following (Bell, 1974, pp. 43-57):

- *The centrality of theoretical knowledge.* Every society has always existed on the basis of knowledge, but in the last decades of the 20th century, material science became the basis of innovations in technology.
- *The creation of a new intellectual technology* through mathematical and economic techniques – based on the computer linear programming.
- *The spread of a knowledge class.* The fastest growing group in society is the technical and professional class.
- *The change from goods to services.* In the United States more than 65 out of every 100 persons are engaged in services.
- *A change in the character of work.* In a pre-industrial world, life is a game against nature. In an industrial society, work is a game against fabricated nature. But in the post-industrial society, work is primarily a game between persons (bureaucrat and client, doctor and patient, teacher and student, or within research groups).
- *The role of women.* Work in the industrial sector (e.g. the factory) has largely been men's work. Work in the post-industrial sector provides expanded employment opportunities for women emancipation and erosion of traditional gender roles.
- *Situes as political units.* In the classic sociology, the focus was on class, strata and other horizontal levels of inequality. For the post-industrial society, Bell suggested a new concept of situses (from the Latin *situ*, location), a set of vertical orders. Bell's argument is that the major interest conflicts will be between situses groups.
- *Meritocracy.* A post-industrial society, being in fact a technical society, awards place less on the basis of inheritance or property than on education and skill.
- *The end of scarcity.* Most socialist and utopian theories of the nineteenth century ascribed almost all the ills of society to the scarcity of goods and the competition of men for these scarce goods. Socialists and liberals had talked of scarcities of goods, but in the post-industrial society there will scarcities of information and time.

In the post-industrial society, technical knowledge and education play the significant role in access to power. The changes of post-industrial society can be seen in power relations and stratification. Grusky (2019) summarizes the stratification and power relations in different historical epochs – as in Table 5-3.

In sum, the main resource in post-industrial society is knowledge and therefore, the base of class would be technical skills. Interestingly, these skills are bound to people and move when they migrate. Hence, we experience an era in which everything is global, even the labor power. In this case, from one side the expert labor power can move easily and on the other side, the interests of these experts would assimilate, because they make a new global class.

Table 5-3- Stratification and Power in different epochs

	Pre-Industrial	Industrial	Post-Industrial
Resource	Land	Machinery	Knowledge
Social locus	Farm / Plantation	Business farm	University / research Institute
Dominant figures	Landowner / Military	Businessmen	Scientists / researchers
Means of power	Direct control of force	Indirect influence on politics	Balance of technical-political forces / Franchises and rights
Class base	Property / Military force	Property / Political organization / Technical skill	Technical skill / Political organization
Access	Inheritance / Seizure by armies	Inheritance / Patronage / Education	Education / Mobilization / Co-optation


Note. Adapted from *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society; A Venture in Social Forecasting*, by D. Bell, 2000, Heinemann; *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, by D. Grusky, 2019, Westview Press, p. 969

Reckwitz (2019; 2020; 2021) is the other sociologist who suggested a class model with a focus on post-industrial society. For him, the New Middle Class is the most important change in the structure of inequality from 1970s. The New Middle Class is the product of the crossing point of three momentous processes; namely, post-industrialization of the society due to expansion of knowledge, educational opportunities and value

changes. In this respect, the New Middle Class is the product of changes and at the same time, it is motor of changes.

The main characteristic of this New Class can be summarized in four elements: Firstly, *individualism* lies in the center of new class's life. It emphasizes values like "self-fulfillment", "good life" and other post-material values. Secondly, this class possesses a much higher *cultural capital* in comparison to other classes. Thirdly, the new class plays a dominant role in the field of culture and influences in this way *politics*, media and art. At the end, it can be seen that the new middle class is *international* (Reckwitz, 2021). For this reason, Reckwitz (2019) suggested the concept of *hyper-culture*, which means, there is an international accepted culture that almost all members the new class maintain. Reckwitz completed the previous class model with adding the new class to that. Figure 5-1 shows his model.

Figure 5-1 – Three-Plus-One Class Model of Reckwitz



Note. Adapted from *Das hybride Subjekt: eine Theorie der Subjektkulturen von der bürgerlichen Moderne zur Postmoderne*, by A. Reckwitz, 2020. Copyright 2020 by Suhrkamp Verlag.

Reckwitz (2021) maintained that the new middle class has been considered by other sociologists of the last trimester of the 20th century; for instance, Bell named the *knowledge worker* as a group which came to existence in the post-industrial era or Bourdieu showed the importance of *Petite Bourgeoisie* among French classes. The main contribution of Reckwitz in this respect is developing a simple schema to show the position and importance of new middle class in the end-stage capitalism.

5.6 Middle Class as a global class

Beck (2011) described that risks in *risk society* enforce a global civility, because the risks are global and for this reason the world population share the same destiny. This

means that in a world of global crises and of dangers produced by civilization, the old dualisms of internal and external, national and international, and us and them lose their validity, and the imagined community of cosmopolitanism becomes essential and vital. In this sense, cosmopolitanism is not dichotomous other of nationalism. Indeed, there are the nation-states but the relations in the global level differ.

At this point, we can ask what constitutes class in the global civility. To answer this question, we can go back to Marx' *Capital* and review his reply Marx (1983) believed that wage-laborers, capitalist and landlords are the main social classes of the capitalist society, who live on wages, profit and ground-rent respectively. Since every group earns their living in relation to other groups and owns a resource in the production,, the class formation and relation continue to exist. For Marx, there is a ruling class, which controls the material production and intellectual force. Therefore, we can conclude in the global level, one has to find global relations regarding global middle class. The new era of capitalism has different names due to different viewpoint of the scholars, but a common idea is the global nature and monopoly of this capitalism. Nederveen Pieterse (2004) maintained that a unique characteristic of this monopoly is inequality. This global inequality has caused the *second great transformation*, the transformation from national capitalism to global capitalism. This is the era in which the divide between rich and poor is now amplified on a world scale. For Amin (1997), the ascent and decline are largely determined in our age by the following five monopolies:

- 1) The monopoly of technology, supported by military expenditures of the dominant nations
- 2) The monopoly of control over global finances and a strong position in the hierarchy of current account balances
- 3) The monopoly of access to natural resources
- 4) The monopoly over international communication and the media
- 5) The monopoly of the military means of mass destruction

Amin as a thinker of Dependency and World System Theory theorizes the inequality between the center and periphery. In his model, there are four main characteristics of the peripheral formation:

- The predominance of agrarian capitalism in the 'national' sector

- The formation of a local bourgeoisie, which is dependent of foreign capital, especially in the trading sector
- The tendency of bureaucratization
- Specific and incomplete forms of proletarianization of the labor force

For Amin and other World System theorists, after the establishment of capitalism, due to rapid urbanization and insufficient local production of food, changes in income distribution to the benefit of the local elites (demonstration effects), lack of industrial infrastructure, and reliance on foreign assistance, the peripheries have a new role in the World System as importers of goods. Indeed, not only goods, but also finances are imported in an unfair trade system. Due to Patnaik (2002), in this global system the metropolitan banks give loans to countries all over the world – developed and developing countries; that is why: the era is called *bankerization of capital* or *debt imperialism*. A monitor, in the form of Bretton woods twins (the IMF and the World Bank), supervising the third world countries, holds the money under unfair *conditionalities* in favor of banks and first world countries. At the end, the multinational banks and other creditors are the winners and the developing countries lose their investments.

Beside theories about the global nature of classes in capitalism, the new class is especially associated with international and global convergences. As discussed before (see 5.5 and 5.3), the new middle class is the product of changes in cultural values which affect the value system, media and lifestyles worldwide. Therefore, the new middle class is a global class per se and there are not only numerous theoretical publications about them (e.g. Reckwitz, 2020; Milanović, 2016), it has been investigated empirically (see Fernandes, 2006; Kharas, 2017; 2010). At the end, I have to add scholars like Therborn (2020) criticize the idea that propagates the expansion of middle class worldwide; because they assume that in the *North*, the middle class is shrinking in favor of the rich.

5.7 Iranian Middle Class; Theoretical Framework

As many theorists of globalization and post-modernity have pointed out, signs, commodities, images, ideas and cultural meanings are now global and communication technology is widely and rapidly available for public and private consumption. From this point of view, one can see that the emergence of new middle class is closely tied to

globalization regarding cultural, economic and demographic changes such as wider availability and accessibility of new items of consumption (material and non-material), highly visible immigrants (Non-Resident and Resident) and the hegemony of Western Lifestyle.

Historically, the emergence of new Iranian middle class goes back to the time that Iranians left Iran in order to study in Europe and then, they were acquainted with the European lifestyle. The impact of this acquaintance can be seen later on Iranian culture and middle class. Indeed, the majority of Iranian middle class tried to assimilate Western middle class.

After the 1979 revolution, it became more difficult to imitate Western lifestyle due to governmental regulations. For example, the women had to wear headscarves and hide their hair; or for a period of time, it was forbidden for men to wear jeans and short sleeved shirts. One decade after the revolution, these regulations partly disappeared and it became easier to imitate Western lifestyle. The reason for this change was, on one side, the new liberal policies of the government in 1990s and also its obligation for liberalization of the country after a period of repression; and on the other side, the global changes in 1990s which made it necessary for the late capitalism to find global markets. Due to Farzanegan et al. (2021), in this period the quota of the middle class in the population was the highest.

The main point here was the political situation in Iran. At that time, the political atmosphere was so repressed that without giving minimum freedom, the government could not survive anymore. That is why; one could observe that some obstacles were lifted in the benefit of social freedom. At the same time, there was a shift in economic policies of the state. In the first decade of revolution, politicians believed in state economy and tried to control the economy completely; but after a decade, with the election of President Hashemi, Iran started to practice neo-liberalism which is bound to consumption and international relations. For this reason, the effect of globalization can be seen as a facilitator of consumption in Iran.

The point here is that, globalization is a necessity for the survival of capitalism. Without a global market, capitalism could not continue to exchange commodity and money in a way that system survives. The changes in policies of multi-national companies and innovations in technology are some effects. Also, the emergence of the new middle class in countries such as India, China and Singapore is a sign for globalization. Naturally, as discussed before, the emergence of the Iranian middle class started long

before, but due to these changes and global politics, it became more obvious and gained global attention.

For conducting a conspicuous lifestyle, there were hindrances. For instance, in Islam being rich is disapproved of and there are many anecdotes about religious leaders who have lived in poverty and endowed all their properties. In this sense, it was always publicized in Islamic instructions that endowment and living a simple life are honorable. Secondly, Iran has always been a country which was attacked and had been occupied. According to Pirooz (1992) and his *Geostrategic Theory*, Iran lies in the middle of different civilizations and due to its geostrategic position; therefore, the neighboring countries always attacked Iran and it was occupied often. Thus, this condition resulted in a sort of mental insecurity among Iranians. That is why; they prefer to appear poor. Indeed, it is a kind of defense mechanism between Iranians. They have always feared of being attacked and looted. Iranians do not like to seem rich; because historically the country was always under attack and the people preferred to hide their property and wealth in such an insecure land. That is why; normally in the traditional Persian architecture, houses consisted of an *Andaruni* (inside) and *Biruni* (outside). *Andaruni* as the inside part of the house was always nicely furnished and *Biruni* did not show the wealth and asset of the owner.

Therefore, in the second half of the 1990s, one could observe a paradoxical behavior in Iran. On one hand, it was propagated by the government and society to live a poor life with no luxury commodities and on the other hand, the people had to consume for an economic growth in the neo-liberal system.

In this sense, the differences between traditional and new middle class became obvious. The traditional part of upper- and middle-class started to organize splendid religious ceremonies and trips to holy cities. In contrast, the new middle class started to visit cinemas, theaters, and music concerts. For this reason, cultural consumption had a key value; because consumption shows interests, cultural background, income and also taste. What we consume is correlated to how we think, what we earn, and which interests we have. Due to Bourdieu (1984), the most important reason for consumption is to show distinction. The way people consume positions them in the social sphere. In this respect, cultural consumption is the most obvious and significant way to show difference. Cultural consumption is interrelated with social values, intellectual ideas, economic capital and income.

Historically, consuming cultural capital is mostly related to the class which was called leisure class by Veblen. One is *distinguished* due to consumption of cultural commodities. That is why; I put my emphasis on cultural consumption goods in this study. Besides, obviously one can consume cultural goods only, just when basic needs like food and shelter are satisfied. Besides, scholars like Schayegh (2002) considered the increase of oil price as the turning point in the history of Iran. The similarity of Iranian middle class with European middle class is consumption and especially leisure time activities like sport. That is why; it is important to investigate Iranian consumption patterns regarding inequality.

One of the practical classifications of consuming cultural goods (and somehow the most famous one) has been suggested by Chan and Goldthorpe (2007). They suggested three main lines of argument regarding the relationship between inequality and patterns of cultural taste and consumption:

1. *The homology argument*: here it is supposed that inequality and cultural consumption differences are correlated. Households and individuals in higher social strata also prefer to consume *high* or *elite* cultural goods, and lower social strata prefer *popular* or *mass* culture. From a Bordieuan perspective, it is argued that the dominant class demonstrates its superiority by *distinction* in cultural taste and processes of *aesthetic distancing*
2. *The individualization argument*: it is argued that in modern societies everything is marketed and therefore, we cannot find sharp differences in cultural taste. In fact, social stratification is not the determinant factor of cultural differentiation anymore. Scholars like Baumann (1988) or Featherstone (1987) maintain that the individuals have the freedom to choose and form their own distinctive identities and lifestyles and more importantly patterns of cultural consumption.
3. *The omnivore-univore argument*: it challenges the homology and individualization arguments. In this respect, cultural and social stratification are related; but not as being 'elite-to-mass'. Indeed, differences in cultural consumption patterns are associated with the wider range of possibilities for higher strata. Therefore, there is 'high-brow' culture, but also more 'middle-brow' and 'low-brow' culture. The consumption of individuals in lower social strata is restricted to more popular cultural forms.

As discussed before, due to the historical and cultural background, Iranians do not want to show off and seem rich, but it seems that in the recent years, the values have changed; especially because of the global communications. Consumption has become a value; a sign of richness and a symbol of success. Naturally, the way of consumption is different between groups of the Iranian society. We can see these changes in advertisements of magazines (cf. Ansari Eshlaghi, 2013; Sadjed, 2012) and in addition, consumption can be interpreted as a sign of resistance against the suppressing culture (Sadjed, 2012; 2016). Factors like wealth, income, religion, culture and global relations play significant roles in the consumption preferences of people. For example, religious people prefer to show their wealth by organizing religious ceremonies. That is why; one can see very luxury ceremonies in Muharram. Muharram is the first month of the Islamic calendar and one of the four sacred months of the year. The tenth day of Muharram is Ashura, which is for Shi'a Muslims part of the *Mourning of Muharram*. Originally, the ceremony consisted of mourning and some theater performances called *Ta'zieh*. Since 1990s, obviously there has been many changes in the ways which ceremonies were organized, especially in the rich districts of Tehran. One could see that many chic people came to the streets and also very expensive foods were served. These were the signs that rich religious people wanted to show their wealth.

Non-religious people also show their wealth through organizing very expensive and luxurious parties and wedding ceremonies. Indeed, rich families try to find a way out to show how rich they are, for example by a very expensive ceremony in a garden full of entertainment program, expensive foods and clothing. Now, many middle-class families try to do the same. Interestingly, this kind of consumption is against the instructions of Islamic role models. For example, students have always learned that the prophet and Imams lived a very simple life with no luxury. That is why; we see that the consumption patterns are becoming paradoxical and dual. The middle class prefers to consume as a part of global consumer society and simultaneously has to avoid showing off because of religious and historical background.

The reasoning for consumption of the Iranian middle class studied by Godazgar (2007) and Sadjed (2012; 2016). They suggested that the consumption is a form of resistance of the Iranian middle class in an Islamic country where the consumption is restricted due to governmental regulations. In this point, I have to add indeed it can be a motivation of the *New Middle Class* to consume as a sign of resistance. The *traditional* middle class (or at least a part of that) has no opposition with the government and that

is why; their consumption should be interpreted in another way, namely in relation to identity. According to John (2006), people show their identity by showing consumption patterns, which he calls *consumption-identities* in a globalized culture. Therefore, it can be argued that consumption determines identity and identity determines consumption patterns. The part of middle class which associates itself with the global new class tries to consume in a similar way to the global class and the part of middle class which is line with the government, would consume according to the Islamic and governmental guidelines. Under these circumstances, cultural consumption is the main difference between those two groups. Cultural consumption shows the tendencies and preferences of each group and the lifestyle of middle class.

It has to be mentioned that there are other factors which affect consumption. For instance, even geographical situation would play a role. Due to Alam Ol Hoda (2014), there are 247 cinemas in Iran, but 106 of them are located in Tehran, the capital, which means, 43 per cent of cinemas are in a city, whereas 1081 cities do not have a cinema. In this case, people who do not live in Tehran have lower chances to visit cinema (or theater or music concerts).

In summary, the point of departure of my dissertation is a social structure analysis of Iranian society, because social structure analysis is the central point of social theories. Therefore, it is necessary to have a wholistic structural analysis of the current Iranian society in order to develop an impactful social theory about contemporary Iran. In the recent years, most of the researchers tried to investigate a limited period or concentrated on economic or social aspects of life in Iran. This study intends to expand the point of view to a longer period of time and different aspects of life.

For structural analysis of contemporary societies, it is proper to go beyond the classic theories of social inequalities, because those theories and models are based on a duality of classes who own property (or mean of production) and the labor force. In the postindustrial era, the importance of skills and management has changed the power relations in the capitalist society and as a consequence the meaning and perception of income inequality. For instance, Ranaldi and Milanović (2022) suggested to investigate compositional income inequality, because it is important to distinguish the earnings from properties and labor done by labor force. The results show that the income inequality from these two sources vary between different countries. The point here is the importance of new sources of economic and social power in late capitalism.

Another reason to review social theories about Iran are the changes in economic sectors of current Iranian society. Due to the last census (Markaz Amar Iran, 2016), for the first time, employees in the service sector make up more than 50 per cent of the whole job holders in Iran. This proportion is higher for the urban areas. Therefore, it is necessary to find out the structural changes in this respect.

When we talk about skill and service class, the first point which comes to mind is the new middle class which consists of skilled labor force and experts. Indeed, the dynamic of changes related to this group of people in the society has mostly been neglected in the literature. That is why; the dissertation aims to depict the social structure of contemporary Iran regarding these changes.

Middle class (and especially new middle class) is linked to cultural capital and consumption per se, therefore cultural consumption is a central concept in my research. The questions like *what do people in their leisure time? How much do they spend on cultural goods? What are the main activities of people when they hang around* etc. are the main aspects of cultural consumption of individuals.

Although there are many scholars who defined middle class regarding income (e.g. Kharas 2017; Kharas und Gertz, 2010; Banerjee & Duflo, 2008; Easterly, 2001)², occupation is the intersection point of class definition (and especially middle class) by sociologists like Oesch (2003; 2006; 2007) and Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero (1979) and Erikson & Goldthorpe (1993). The advantage of occupation is its validity as a multi-aspect indicator of economic class and social status. Occupation shows normally the income of a person and also his/her prestige in the society. Therefore, by means of occupations one can depict the inequality structure due to occupation groups. In this dissertation, although the focus lies on the social and multi aspect definition of class, I will apply the economic definition of class and present the economic structure as well for a better understanding of economic condition of Iran. The economic definitions function as a medium for understanding the economic structure and economic inequality in Iran.

An example might help to declare the notion. In Iran, many young people live with their families before their marriage. Such a cultural characteristic has consequences. Economically, they do not pay rent or they can use the family car or they eat at home; therefore, they reduce their expenditure in many ways. At the same time, their earning

² For reading critical views on economic definition of global middle class see Jayadev et al., 2018

will increase the household's income at all. Thus, there is a difference between a one-person household comprising one engineer and another household, where the household representative is an engineer and two other members are medical doctors. The economic analysis will help us to have a better insight of structure. For these reasons, although the main interest of the research are occupational differences and their effect on Iranian society, the income inequality analysis will function as a complement for the analysis of occupation rates.

Another point which has to be mentioned here is the difference between *class structure* and *class analysis*. Wright (2019) declared that the concept of class structure is an element among different elements of class analysis. Class analysis also consists of class formation, class struggle and class consciousness. Wright has always tried to find out a way to overcome the shortages of Marxist class theories (like middle class position) by providing a more complicated class structure. For him, it is the class structure that determines the possibilities of class formation. Besides, the phenomenon of middle class is the key factor in understanding modern capitalist society.

This dissertation is the first step to depict the class structure of today's Iran. For this reason, the dissertation is more or less a descriptive analysis of the socio-economic structure of the society based on middle class dynamic in the last three decades. Occupation and income are the main economic indicators and cultural consumption and lifestyles are the main social and cultural characteristics of middle class in determining class structure of Iran.

In the past chapters, the theory of middle class and history of Iranian middle class were discussed, in the following chapters I will try to operationalize middle class in Iran and propose a model for the class structure of today's Iran. Besides, I will try to describe/depict class formation due to local and international changes which affected this structure.

6 Methodology

The main goal of this study is to investigate the characteristics of the Iranian middle class, consumption patterns and class structure. As discussed in the previous chapters, the definition of the middle class in this study is based on occupation, income and cultural consumption; because these indicators are representative for life style, education and other characteristic of classes.

The applied methods in the dissertation are correspondence analysis for a graphical overview of class dynamics in Iran, descriptive statistics of the socio-economic structure of the Iranian society and a round of reflexive expert-interviews about the results of analysis.

Correspondence analysis was first used in sociology by Bourdieu in 1979. It is primarily a technique for representing the rows and columns of a two-way contingency table in a joint plot. Indeed, this analysis helps the researcher to visualize the similarities and differences in a population. The advantage of this method for my dissertation is the ability to show the changes in cultural consumption patterns and prosperity of different occupation groups in different diagrams. Besides, correspondence analyses of different years make it possible to have an overview about the dynamic of changes. Indeed, the data and analysis are multi-dimensional and for this reason, diagrams are more suitable for depicting changes; especially, in the case of correspondence analysis it is possible to find out the position of occupation in the social field. In this respect, this analysis was chosen mainly for presenting the changes. The main challenge in presenting descriptive finding is the definition of middle class here. Therefore, in the first step I will try to operationalize the concept of middle class.

6.1 *Operationalizing Class Structure*

The most important point about middle class research is a proper operationalization, because middle class has a variety of meanings in social sciences. In this part, I try to review operationalizations of middle class in prominent researches and then find a way to suggest a definition.

Historically, the criteria used for identifying the middle class have changed through the years. For a long time, its definition was based on occupation, revenues or education. Now, it is emphasized that ‘social class’ is an objective fact and a subjective reality (cf. Bourdieu, 1979; Elias, 1983; and Castoriadis, 1987). As a result, there are often obvious

discrepancies between self-perceptions and objective indices like income and occupation (Jaffrelot & van der Veer, 2008). Especially after Bourdieu, we can see that in social class their objective and subjective dimension are both very important. That is why; we tend to define middle class as a lifestyle. In this point, we can go back to Weber who applied ascription and acquisition classes and then conclude that people try to position themselves in a higher class. It can be concluded that in secondary data analysis as my study, consumption is an indicator which functions as a subjective demonstrator of class. Indeed, actors consume cultural commodities due to their class affiliation.

To begin, we can study approaches to middle-class operationalization. In general, middle class can be seen as a factor of income, consumption, education, occupation, political view or as a combination of them. For example, a central trend can be seen in some studies which adopted a consumption-based definition of the New Class (see Chua, 2002). Another approach is to define middle class by means of occupation and dividing them to white-collar and professional-managerial workers (see Pinches, 1999). One of the most famous surveys about middle class in Middle East is ‘Istanbul Socioeconomic Household Survey’ conducted by Rutz and Balkan (2009). In the questionnaire, the researchers tried to investigate various aspects of households’ lives including:

- General Characteristics of Space and Location (7 questions)
 - District / reasons for living in that district / time of residence in Istanbul
- Household Characteristics
 - Household head / type of apartment / size and bedrooms of apartment
- Individual Characteristics
 - Households’ level of education / occupation and ...
- Food (21 questions)
- Credit and Insurance
 - Do they use credit cards / do they possess gold, foreign currency / do they own stocks?
- Vacation and Entertainment
 - Do they own a summer house / place of holidays / do they travel outside of Turkey?

They developed their own code for assigning households to social class by using a combination of education and occupation. Education was coded as a combination of attained level, school type, and presence or absence of foreign-language instruction. Occupation was coded by using a classification that distinguished professional / managerial categories from shopkeepers / clerks and skilled / unskilled labor categories (Rutz & Balkan, 2009). The applied method had some advantages like being multi-level and multi-aspect, general and deep. The disadvantages of this method are that it is expensive and complicated.

Another practical method for defining middle class is the idea of Bourdieu which categorizes middle class regarding vocation (Bourdieu, 1984):

- Teachers (higher and secondary)
- Senior executives
- Professions
- Engineers
- Industrial
- Commercial employers.

Another interesting approach is Fernandes' investigation on middle class in India. He combined three different methods: (1) Quantitative study of income and occupations in India; (2) Qualitative interviews in Bombay; (3) Historical study. She / he could figure out employment patterns of middle class by interviewing different occupations ranging from secretarial workers to upper-level management representatives (Fernandes, 2006). The fieldwork showed that the market is tight and too much effort is needed to enter the labor market and obtain a decent job. The importance of Fernandes' research lies on his focus on consumption. Indeed, the notion was that behavior and patterns of consumption of various social groups including the middle *consuming class* could be measured purely by changing income levels.

Another measure which was used by NCAER (National Council of Applied Economic Research) showed the size of Indian middle class on the base of the distribution of households by occupation of the head of household (Meyer & Birdsall, 2012). The NCAER data suggested that a substantial proportion of the middle classes are classified as salaries earners (monthly and yearly salary earners) and professionals which shows an increase in the last decade of 20th century (Shukla, 2004). Table 6-1 shows the

proportion of different classes in association of occupation. As we can see, the proportion of middle class is higher among salary earners and professionals.

Table 6-1 - Distribution of households in class segments by household head's occupation in India, 1999-2000 (in percentage)

Head of household's occupation	Lower	Lower middle	Middle	Upper middle	High
Housewife	29,99	35,88	19,62	9,08	5,42
Cultivator	38,31	36,48	13,32	6,19	5,69
Wage earner	56,25	33,81	8,41	1,08	0,46
Salary earner	14,91	33,29	24,12	13,22	14,47
Professional	6,23	16,72	23,62	25,32	28,11
Artisan	32,51	39,56	20,87	10,11	9,64
Petty shopkeeper	23,50	36,00	20,74	10,11	9,64
Businessperson	0,42	4,48	23,35	33,07	38,68
Others	26,41	30,59	21,39	11,99	9,63

Note. Adapted from *India's New Middle Class*, by L. Fernandes, 2006. Copyright 2006 by University of Minnesota Press.

In another research conducted by Wright (2000), the middle class in Sweden and USA were compared. Wright categorized different occupations in society regarding the ownership of skills and assets. For example, the bourgeoisie is a class with high organization assets. In comparison, expert managers are a group with high organization assets and also high skills. The proletariat is a group in a society who has low organizational assets and low skills as well. In this definition, the middle class can be seen as the groups of the society who own average of skills and organization assets. In sum, we can distinguish the main idea of middle-class operationalization is based on occupation and income which finds its roots in class theory of Weber.

6.2 Classes regarding Jobs

For Weber (1968), ownership, production and struggle are the main dimensions of defining social class, but as discussed by Marshall and associates (1993), the market is the central pillar of class for Weber. In this respect, the primary distinguishing feature

between Marx' and Weber's social class analysis would seem to be the theory of surplus value.

The terminology of Weber helps us to categorize classes easily regarding their market position. For example, Carr-Hill and Pritchard (1992) assumed that society is a graded hierarchy of occupations ranked according to skill. Class categories included:

- Professional
- Intermediate occupations
- Skilled occupations, non-manual
- Skilled occupations, manual
- Partly skilled occupations
- Unskilled occupations
- Armed forces

This strategy has been widely criticized in sociology on both practical and theoretical grounds. The main shortage here would be the difficulty of coding every single occupation and the dependency of answers (in a survey) on how the people refer their job. For instance, given a sales person in high-tech shop. This person can refer to his job as "shop assistant" or "sales person" as well as "service specialist" because of his / her expertise about high-tech products. The interviewee would hesitate, if this job must be considered as unskilled or as intermediate. The same applies to coding protocols. For example, being a medical doctor would be accepted as a high-prestige job, but if for coding, one considers income, there would be a great difference between doctors who work in a hospital or the one who owns a clinic. In this regard, comparing a doctor who works for someone else with a tradesman who possesses chain stores is very difficult, because working as a doctor is very prestigious, whereas the income of businessman is very higher in this case. Therefore, some sociologists like Erikson & Goldthorpe have sought to develop plausible measures of social class definition. The schemata developed by Erikson & Goldthorpe (1993) was originally a classification for investigating social mobility in industrial countries.

Erikson and Goldthorpe's classification attempted to combine occupational categories in terms of their levels of income, job security, possible mobility, systems of authority and control over the process of production, and decision-making possibilities in performing work objectives. For Goldthorpe (1987) and Erikson & Goldthorpe (1993),

specific historical forms of the division of labor have resulted in a definite structure of positions – typically those of employer, self-employed worker, domestic laborer, and employee – with the last of these differentiated into a complex hierarchy according to varying conditions of employment. Goldthorpe divided classes to 7 categories (Table 2-12).

A remarkable is the role of service sector in late capitalism. In the 18th and 19th century – the rise of capitalism –, the service sector was a small, peripheric and unimportant part of the society, but now this sector has the most employees in the developed countries. Therefore, changes in capitalism made occupations more complicated and diverse. We can name many of these changes; such as decline of traditional proletarian occupations and communities, the expansion of working-class ‘affluence’, the growth of service sector and white-collar employment, the professionalization of certain non-manual occupations and routinization or deskilling of others and the increasing participation of women in paid employment. That is why; sociologists had to suggest a more diverse class structure for the late capitalism. For example, Rutz and Balkan (2009) investigated occupations of 258 upper middle-class household-heads and their spouses categorized as managers, business-men/women, engineers, academics, professionals and service providers. The most important finding was that 63 per cent of wives had no occupation even though many of them had high education credentials. We can conclude that in such cases, classifying the society regarding occupation needs to be at household’s level and individual ranking is not practical.

The main criticism in such classifications is the latent exploitation of women in the society. For Pakulski (2005), women cannot work because there are many obstacles against women’s labor; therefore, the structure of inequality is more complicated than a pure consideration of occupations and education levels. One has to find out a way to observe this kind of inequality at the household level. Indeed; investigating in household level is a solution to overcome gender inequality biases.

Wright (1987) suggested that classes must be defined by social relations of production; namely, by ownership and non-ownership of productive means, and the relation of domination (supervision, decision-making, and autonomy) in the workplace (in contrast to Goldthorpe who defined classes regarding market situations and work situations). For Wright, original classes consist of Small Employers (SE), Petit Bourgeoisie (PB), Managers and Supervisors (MS), Semi-autonomous employees (SAE), and W (Workers). Marshall (1993) suggested a new revised version of Wright’s categories

which consists of Bourgeoisie (B), Small Employers (SE), Petit Bourgeoisie (PB), Expert Manager (EM), Expert Supervisors (ES), Expert non-Managers (ENM), Semi-credentialed Managers (SCM), Semi-credentialed Supervisors (SCS), Semi-credentialed Workers (SCW), Uncredentialed Managers (UM), Uncredentialed Supervisors (US), and Proletarians (P).

In sum, we can conclude that the attention of contemporary stratification sociologists focuses on *occupational classes*; which means, vertical clusters of positions forming on the matrix of technical divisions of labor, as well as property and employment relations. For this reason, one aspect of class structure in this study are occupational groups in Iranian society.

6.3 Operationalization of Middle class

As discussed before, one cannot find a particular and certain definition for middle class. Therefore, the researcher has to find the best suitable way to define and operationalize middle class. For instance, Rocco et al. (2016) had the idea to define the middle class with some new criteria such as *economic empowerment* and *life chances*. In this way, they proposed 4 different groupings which are *elite*, *middle class*, *vulnerable class* and *poor*. Surprisingly, they categorize 13,5 per cent of the population as middle class, which is a small rate. Similarly, Whelan et al. (2017) defined middle class regarding *income*, *material deprivation* and *economic stress*.

In this research, I apply many aspects of Bourdieu's idea of class and social space. For him, consumption and especially, cultural consumption patterns were central to classification; but more important – as described by Veal (2016) – Bourdieu proposed that each occupational group establishes its own distinctive tastes and values. Indeed, occupation is a determining variable in inequality studies, because occupation is an omni-dimensional factor in this respect. Income, consumption, wealth, taste and education are correlated with occupation (see also Anghel et al., 2018; Veal, 2016; Engbersen et al., 2018; Marginson, 2018; Atkinson & Brandolini, 2013; Bourdieu, 1984).

For economic inequality, I have used the data on income and consumption with a focus on cultural consumption. Indeed, cultural consumption plays an important role in developed countries, because the basic needs of people in these countries are normally satisfied and, on a next level, cultural consumption shows the taste and possibilities of individuals. The differences in cultural consumption are associated with the position of

a household or a person in social space (Torche & Lopez-Calva, 2013; Katz-Gerro & Sullivan, 2010; Chan, 2010; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007; Alderson et al., 2007; Zukin & Maguire, 2004; Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, income, consumption and cultural consumption, education and occupation were chosen as the main factors to locate the Iranian middle class.

In Iran, most researchers attempt a multi-aspect definition of middle class. For instance, Abrahamian (1997; 2000; 2010) is among the first Iranian sociologists who considered the main role of the middle class in social changes in Iran; but due to lack of interest in field studies, he never conducted a survey. His theoretical framework in socio-political analysis is the most important work in modern Iran's history. Indeed, in classic Iranian sociology, we cannot find much research on the Iranian middle class. In the 2010s, one can observe an increase of studies on the Iranian middle class, but these studies solely investigate its economic characteristics, neglecting other aspects and are mostly conducted by economists, these studies. Salehi Esfahani and Pesaran (2011) are economists who defined middle class due to household's income and consumption.

In 2012, Sadjed wrote her dissertation about Iranian middle class which was published under the name of *Shopping for Freedom*. As a sociologist, she tried to find out if the Iranian middle class resists against governmental restraints. For her, expense, cultural consumption, and leisure time activities are important factors. Especially the differences between religious and non-religious people were one central point. At the end however, she categorized middle class regarding household's income (Sadjed, 2012). The merit of her research is the attention she brought on other factors like education, occupation and to some extent age and gender. Although Sadjed's goal was to investigate conformism and resistance of the middle class against the government, one can deduct some significant characteristics of the middle class from her study. For example, she categorizes a group called 'Bohemians' that are the individuals who have low income, but access to facilities and money they want (Sadjed, 2012, p. 184). The best example of Bohemians in this study is the children of rich families who do not work but can profit of a good lifestyle due to their parents' money.

The difficulty of defining middle class is not restricted to the Iranian middle class. As discussed by Wright (2000), it is not easy to operationalize a concept like class; especially because of its wide usage in social sciences and the duality of subjectivity and objectivity. The dimensions Wright suggested consist of different aspects of inequality, i.e., the property dimension, the authority dimension and the skill

dimension. Historically and traditionally, self-employment is a prestigious status among Americans. That is why; Wright paid significant attention to self-employment which was considered as authority by him (Figure 6-1).

Figure 6-1- Class categories used in the analysis of permeability of class boundaries

Owner		Employees			Relationship to scarce skills
With employees	Without employees				-----
		Expert managers		Professionals	Professional credentials
				Skilled employees	Skilled
Employers	Petty bourgeoisie	Managers	Supervisors	Workers	Nonskilled
Managers-supervisors	No authority	Managers	Supervisors	No authority	
Relationship to authority for owners		Relationship to authority for employers			

Note. Reprinted from *Class Counts (Studies in Marxism and Social Theory)*, by E. O. Wright, 2000, Cambridge University Press, p. 155


Figure 6-2- Basic class typology

Relation to means of production				
	Owner	Employees		
Hires labor	Capitalist	Expert managers	Nonskilled managers	Has authority
Does not hire labor	Petty bourgeoisie	Experts	Workers	No authority
		Possess scarce skills	Nonskilled	
		Relation to scarce skills		

Note. Reprinted from *Class Counts (Studies in Marxism and Social Theory)*, by E. O. Wright, 2000, Cambridge University Press, p. 24

If we analyze the class structure in Capitalism just regarding the ownership of the means of production, we are restricted to three classes: the capitalists, working class and the petty bourgeoisie (they own the means of production without hiring workers). Wright criticized this one-dimensional analysis; because in this way, we have to categorize 80-90 per cent in a single class. For this reason, he suggested a three-dimensional analysis of class structure, although he has a Marxist approach. Wright – by considering the authority hierarchies and possession of scarce skills and expertise – generated a map of class structure, which is useful for investigating the middle class (Figure 6-1). By means of these assumptions, one can find the middle class between capitalists and workers. Indeed, the terminology of Wright helps us to crystallize the middle class by considering authority, type of employment and skills in the society (cf. Figure 6-2). As discussed before (see section 3.5), Sinus-Institut in Germany also classified different milieus in Germany regarding social status and basic values people respect. This classification was named “class-based milieu analysis” by Geißler (2014). Indeed, the differentiation based on class theory of Bourdieu has inspired many researchers worldwide. The social space of positions and space of lifestyles in *Distinction* can be seen as a complete and total mapping of social inequality (Bourdieu, 1984). Figure 6-3 shows the social status and basic orientation of the milieus in the Germany.

Figure 6-3 - Social Status and Basic Orientation




Note. „Sinus-Milieus 2015“[Digital Report], by Sinus-Institut, 2015, <https://www.sinus-institut.de/veroeffentlichungen/downloads/download/sinus-meta-milieusR/download-file/1110/download-a/download/download-c/Category>, p. 14

The advantage of this mapping is the ability to depict a multi-dimensional and multi-aspect analysis which is proper for showing inequality and also classification. That is why; I will try to depict Iranian classes by means of mapping.

6.4 Standardization of Income

The most objective and simple way of defining middle class is income level. Many researches were conducted by defining classes due to income. One approach is understanding middle class as the households whose income is between 80 and 200 per cent of the median income of the society (Riederer et al., 2018; Atkinson & Brandolini, 2013). By this definition, we can naturally categorize middle class due to the position in this spectrum. For instance, the high middle-class can be defined as the households who earn 140-200 per cent of the median income. Another definition by Atkinson et al. (2013) supposed that the middle 60 per cent of income distribution are middle class. Engbersen et al. (2018) maintained that being middle class has four aspects: middle income (60% - 200% of the median income), intermediate education, intermediate education and attitudes towards politics and society. For Torche and Lopez-Calva (2013), middle class can be defined regarding income distribution, rank of households in the society and ownership of standard durable goods.

Figure 6-4 – Inflation Rate in Iran in comparison to European Community from 1980 to 2016



Note. Own calculation based on Data gathered from *Iranian National Bank* in different years

The point in this regard, is the value or purchasing power of currency. Due to inflation and social transfers, the value of a money-unit changes during a long period of time. Especially, in countries like Iran with a high rate of inflation (Figure 6-4), we have to find a way to standardize income due to inflation through the years, which is very common in researches. We can see that in researches such as Milanović (2002), Verwiebe et al. (2019), Farzanegan et al. (2017) etc. That is why; in this study the equalized income regarding inflation and household-size will be calculated and deployed.

6.5 Cultural consumption patterns

Consumption and especially cultural consumption (and in this regard cultural capital) lies in the heart of middle-class studies and can be found in many researches and theories (s. Power, 2000; Scott, 2002; Zukin et al., 2004). The idea to investigate social status and cultural consumption is also very common the scientific researches (e.g. Chan, 2010; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007). Studies on cultural consumption such as reading books and leisure time activities (Kraaykamp & Dijkstra, 1999; Alderson et al., 2007; Torche, 2007; 2010) are some typical examples.

Bourdieu's *Distinction* is also based on cultural consumption and variables like reading newspapers, theater / cinema / museum visit and leisure time activities are considered as cultural goods by Bourdieu (1984). In this dissertation, I will also focus on the cultural consumption regarding the available data.

6.6 Education and inequality

Another variable, that is central in inequality researches is education (e.g. in Marginson, 2018). Education can be seen as a factor that is correlated with income and lifestyle. Thus, it is no wonder that it has been used in many researches as a decisive variable by defining inequality.

Another often investigated factor is the correlation of gender and social status (e.g. Katz-Gerro & Sullivan, 2010; Bihagen & Katz-Gerro, 2000). In countries like Iran, it is important to investigate the situation of women. Women are discriminated in the labor market and they have a lower income than men, which results in a lower socio-economic situation.

In summary, I discussed the main variables applied for operationalization of class in recent years. For a better presentation of class structure, *income*, *education*, *occupation* and *(cultural) consumption* will be considered in the empiric studies of this dissertation.

7 Data of Research

7.1 *Income-Expenditure Survey (Statistical Centre of Iran)*

The main source of my study is the annual Household Expenditure Income Survey (HEIS), which is conducted yearly by the ‘Statistical Centre of Iran’. Every household completes an 81-page questionnaire with detailed data about expenditure and income. The sample is selected randomly from households of different provinces in Iran that are sorted in clusters. Therefore, this cluster sampling method has helped the SCI to choose the households in a scientific way. The questionnaires are filled face-to-face by interviewers of SCI (Statistical Center of Iran). Then, these data are entered in a MS-Access file and researchers can buy the raw data. Recently, it has been possible to download many of these raw data free of cost. Since MS-Access was not an appropriate data-software for my study, I had to convert the Access-database to a SQL-database and then with the queries of this dataset, it was possible to enter data in SPSS for different analyses of the study.

There is an important point about the data, which is the problem of reliability. Many data gathered in Iran, cannot be trusted easily due to intentional and unintentional biases during the gathering and entering. For instance, I compared the reports from SCI and National Bank of Iran for given years regarding average income and consumption. The comparison showed a deviation of about 40 per cent with each other (cf. CSI, 2016; 2017; CBI, 2016; 2017). That is why; my intention in this study was to simulate a longitudinal study consisted of data gathered in different year. By this strategy, it is possible to minimize the manipulation and bias effects and besides, we can depict the longitudinal changes during the years. The years I selected begin from 1984 with intervals of one year till 2003 and from that year I have coded the data yearly. In Table 7-1, we can see how many questionnaires were filled in given years in urban areas. It is very important to maintain that the sample analyzed here is just the urban population; since we investigate the middle class in Iran and middle class is an urban phenomenon per se. Therefore, all the calculations and modeling in this dissertation are done due to this sample and thus are related to urban households.

The questions do not alter every year; hence researchers can follow annual changes regarding income and expenditure. The designers of the questionnaire have tried to keep the questions up to date by adding new technologies which are relevant to researches.

For example, in recent years some new fields were added to investigate if the household has access to internet or if the household receives subsidies. The biggest disadvantage of the database regarding programming and longitudinal research are changes in variable names. For this reason, I had to adjust the interface program for every year which was very time-consuming.

Table 7-1 – The sample frequency of the data used for this research

Year	Sample Frequency
1984	14728
1986	2745
1988	3987
1990	9095
1992	9250
1994	12116
1996	10977
1998	8285
2000	12320
2002	15114
2003	10959
2004	11619
2005	12925
2006	14175
2007	15018
2008	19381
2009	18665
2010	18701
2011	18727
2012	18535
2013	18880
2014	19756
2015	19758
2016	19764
2017	18701
Total	354181

Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

The questionnaire is divided into four sections, which are divided in subsections. The first section is dedicated to general information of the household (e.g. gender, education etc.). The second one is about housing and information is gathered regarding surface, rooms, ownership and properties of the house. In section three and four, we can find information on expenditure and income respectively. In detail, one can calculate this information from these two sections:

- Earnings (self-employment income, salaries, or any other income of the household)
- Expenditure on nutrition and smoking
- Expenditure on clothing
- Expenditure on housing
- Expenditure on furniture and facility
- Expenditure on health
- Expenditure on health
- Expenditure on leisure time and culture
- Miscellaneous
- Investment
- Properties of the household (car, apartments, estate, TV, internet etc.)

Besides, the questionnaire offers precise information about the households' size, activities, income, occupation, age and gender. With this information, one can estimate consumption patterns of the household with some assumptions. The estimation is not as precise as Bourdieu's work, because the attendance of theaters, cinemas or concerts is not included; neither are the names or types of publications or newspapers which are bought by the household: we just can calculate how much the household spends on books or some other cultural goods. By an analysis of family expenditure on cultural commodities, we have a distinction between different households. Indeed, the cultural capital is an interesting point of departure in class and milieu studies; because the lower class does not have enough economic resources for cultural activities (e.g. concerts or theaters) and the higher class has its motivations (like show-off) by expending on cultural goods, but the behavior of middle class is interesting in this case.

The middle-class situation is bound to choices. Due to Veblen effect, they want to consume just like the elite class, but lack of resources obliges them to choose. These

choices clarify the patterns of middle class in Iran and make it possible to see if it is similar to global new class and the Western middle class.

7.1.1 Correspondence Analysis

Correspondence analysis (CA) is an explorative method in order to depict a graphical and numerical analysis of a database with variables and records. One of the first and most famous correspondence analyses were Bourdieu's researches about the state of culture in France (*Distinction* and then *Homo Academicus*). The advantage of CA lies on the ability to depict the similarity of attributes in a visual map, which makes the analysis simple. If two attributes are closer on the map and their angle to the axes of coordinates is alike, they are more similar to each other (Greenacre, 2017; Blasius & Greenacre, 2014).

As discussed before, the main attributes of a household in this study are education, income / expenditure, cultural goods consumption, occupation and properties (ownership). Education levels (of the head of the household) are ordered in 10 different groups from illiterate to post graduate university degrees, different professions are coded due to ISCO-standard from 1 (managers) to 9 (workers), ownership is represented by having properties like car, cellular phone or other valuable commodities as economic capital. The other variables like total expenditure of a household and the expenditure on the cultural commodity will be categorized in 10 and 3 groups respectively. The resulting diagrams are shown in the 'Results' chapter.

The shortcomings of this database are unreliability of data gathering, lack of data on frequency of theater/cinema/concert attendance, and analysis level of survey (the data about cultural consumption is not gathered at the individual level). Indeed, the inquiries in Iran are not always trustworthy for many reasons such as the lack of expert teams and governmental manipulation. I bought the data in three different trips to Iran and every time different coding was handed out. That means, every year they change the codes and methods.

7.2 Values and Attitudes of Iranian and Cultural Behavior of Iranians (MCIG 2003)

Additionally, as a second source of investigation and to verify my findings I will use two detailed and complete inquiries of Vezarat Ershad (MCIG: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance) which began in 2001 and were published in 2003. The main focuses

of researches, which were conducted on a national level, were values, attitudes and cultural behavior of Iranians. They were published separately for every province.

The questions were about control of parents on children, the values in marriage, economic situation and attitudes, social participation, leisure time activities, vacation, TV / video recorder usage, radio / TV / video recorder possession.

The weakness of the survey is its lack of information on the methods of data gathering and sampling. Besides, the methods and variable selection was not described. For instance, it was not specified why there were no data on theater attendance, whereby cinema attendance was asked; or we can find information about religious ceremonies which are categorized as cultural activities, but there is nothing about other kinds of ceremonies.

This data is used as double-check for the findings from raw database of Statistic Center of Iran. Also, some descriptive statistics are embedded in the research for a better understanding of Iranians cultural behaviors. Especially, it is interesting to know if Iranians trust satellite or internet news as an alternative to governmental sources of information.

8 Results; Social Milieus, Descriptive Statistics and Income Distribution

8.1 Social Milieus in Iran

My focus and interest in this study is to find a way to map Iranian class structure with a focus on middle class. Middle class is a class with a specific level of economic and cultural capital in the social space. In order to operationalize the concept of middle class, I use a multi-aspect definition by means of income-expense database; namely the occupation of head of household, income, expenses, education and properties of households. For Bourdieu, “class can be defined by neither one characteristic, nor sum of characteristics, nor a chain of characteristics. A social class should be defined by structure of relations between relevant characters which result in the praxis forms in the social field” (Bourdieu, 1987a, p. 182). That is why; I try to combine different variables in order to define middle class.

In the database, we can distinguish nine different occupation groups consisted of

1. Managers
2. Professionals (e.g. Engineers or Developers)
3. Technicians and Associate Professionals
4. Clerical Support Workers
5. Services and Sales Workers
6. Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers
7. Craft and Related Trades Workers
8. Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers (e. g. drivers)
9. Elementary Occupations

The advantage of the database is the standard coding of ISCO-2008. Therefore, we know the exact job of household’s head. If we apply the exact profession, which is a four-digit number, the sample would not be representative for jobs, since there are too many professions. For this reason, I decided to separate the first digit, which shows the major profession group and is ordered regarding supposed ranking of job status. It is supposed that the managers and professions (rank 1 and 2) have higher socio-economic status in comparison to elementary jobs (rank 9). Therefore, we can assume that the first left digit of ISCO-code is a good representative for the rank of an occupation.

At the next step, one can categorize occupations in rough groupings like working class, middle class and higher class. For example, the last two major groups (8 and 9) belong to working class. The first group (managers) can be seen as high-status households. Professions and experts (major group 2) are the elite class and the new middle class. These new groupings are useful for the interpretation of CA as well as regression. Total income of the household and also the total expenditure of a household were also calculated for this study. For these calculations, the earnings of each household's member were added together. The same was done for total expenditure. It is important to notice, the expenditure and tendency for consumption are not necessarily the same in Iran. Firstly, without enough income, a family does not have the opportunity to consume. Secondly, one can note *freedom of consumption* has another meaning in Iran and one has to change the point of view by investigating Iran (just like Bourdieu's early studies in Algeria). A very common example is consuming alcoholic beverages, which is prohibited in public places in Iran (and generally among the Muslims). Such differences have to be considered in a comparative study like this. Indeed, it is emphasized that there are differences between opportunity, tendency and potential for consumption.

Since it is not possible to apply the scale variable in correspondence analysis, the incomes would be classified in 10 different groups. The resource of this categorization is the studies of the Statistical Center of Iran in this respect, where the incomes were classified in 10 groups.

For consumption, two variables were chosen: firstly, the total consumption of a household in year and secondly, the cultural consumption of a household in a year. Clearly, there is a correlation between the total consumption of a household and cultural consumption. The focus here is on the preferences of households with a similar average income. The main variables for the calculation of cultural consumption consisted of expenditure on books, music and cinema. As mentioned before, the shortcoming of this database is the lack of information about frequencies of cultural events attendances; we only have information about the total amount expensed on films and movies or books and other cultural activities. For comparison, it is important to know if a household prefers to consume food in luxury restaurants or spend money on books. In this way, we can distinguish different milieus.

In order to distinguish different cultural consumption groups, I had to find a way for a better representation of consuming cultural goods groups. Inspired by Chan and


Goldthorpe (2007), and DiMaggio (2004), cultural goods consumption was reduced to households' expenditure on books (schoolbooks excluded), music, and theater/cinema. The challenge here is that regarding the data many households don't spend any money on these cultural goods, which makes it impossible to compare different groups. Therefore, the total cultural consumption was categorized in quartiles. In this way, we have three major groups regarding cultural goods, consisting of people who don't spend anything on cultural goods, people who invest a little and people who buy books and visit cinema and theater.

8.2 Descriptive Statistics

In order to investigate the affluence of a household, I decided to choose the possession of cars as a decisive variable. Having a car is not a symbol of wealth per se, indeed the brand of car is also important which is not possible to find out due to information of this database. The advantage of this variable is its availability over the years of research (in contrast to internet-access or owing a cellular phone). Due to information from the Census of 2011 (and also due to our sample), in the year 2011, about 40 per cent of Iranian households owned a car (Markaz Amar Iran, 2012). Besides, during the years of our research (1984-2008), on average one fourth of the households owned a car. Therefore, the possession of a car can be seen as a variable, which separates households into two major groups. Table 8-1 and Figure 8-1 show the changing dynamic of owning a car during the years.

Obviously, the rate of owning a car is increasing. It is a consequence of industrial policies of Iranian government and global changes. During the recent years, the government tended to invest on automobile industries with the idea of applying "import substitute industrialization" development strategies (First Iranian Development Plan). We can see that the rate of owning a private car has grown extremely through the years and has become more than 53 per cent in 2017 in comparison to about 15 percent 1984. In this point, I decided to assume car possession as a variable showing asset ownership of a household for two reasons. Firstly, about 50 percent of the households owned a car in the last decade which is a good line to divide the population to two groups and secondly, the dynamic of owning a car can show the dynamic of changes in general economic condition of a family during the years of investigation in this study. Thirdly, as discussed in section 5.3, having a car became a sign of middle class lifestyle in countries like England (see also Belbağ et al., 2019).

Figure 8-1 – Percentage of households in Iranian urban areas who own at least a car



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

In this point, we can sketch an overview of the characteristics of Iranian households due to our sample. In Table 8-2, we can see the gender of household's heads. Unsurprisingly, women are the head of household in only 10 per cent of the Iranian households. In Iran – just like many other traditional countries, men are seen as the breadwinners and that is why; in many cases, even if the woman is the main earner, the man is named as head of household.

Figure 8-2 and Table 8-3 show the education status of the households' heads in Iran. The main characteristic of the Iranian society is a change in the illiteracy rate. Due to censuses 1986, 1996, 2006 and 2016, the literacy rates are 61%, 79,2%, 84,7% and 87,5% respectively which is why we can assume that the average could be approximately 80%. The results show that the sample can be representative in this respect. The advantage is that we can sort the education level ordinally from illiterate to university post-graduates. There is a point about *seminary education* (Divinity School) which results in a misapprehension; because the system of divinity school in Iran is not comparable and associated with ordinary schools. Besides, the clergy in Iran have some special rents which make it more difficult to integrate them in another group.

Table 8-1 - The answers to the question: “Does the household own a car?”

Year	Yes	No
1984	14,6%	85,4%
1986	19,6%	80,4%
1988	17,6%	82,4%
1990	13,9%	86,1%
1992	13,7%	86,3%
1994	17,2%	82,8%
1996	16,8%	83,2%
1998	17,5%	82,5%
2000	16,6%	83,4%
2002	18,8%	81,2%
2003	21,2%	78,8%
2004	23,7%	76,3%
2005	25,2%	74,8%
2006	28,2%	71,8%
2007	29,9%	70,1%
2008	31,7%	68,3%
2009	31,4%	68,6%
2010	36,9%	63,1%
2011	38,9%	61,1%
2012	40,3%	59,7%
2013	41,9%	59,1%
2014	44,8%	55,2%
2015	47,3%	52,7%
2016	50,6%	49,4%
2017	53,2%	46,8%

Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 8-3 shows the percentage of primary, secondary and tertiary educated people among core middle-class in chosen European countries, which will be discussed later in detail. We can observe a high variety of proportion regarding education among the middle classes in European countries.

Table 8-2 – Gender of Iranian household's heads from 1984 to 2017

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	cumulative percentage
Valid	Male	314495	88,8	89,5	89,5
	Female	36973	10,4	10,5	100,0
	Gesamt	351468	99,2	100,0	

Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI


One can see in Portugal 45 per cent of employees only have a minimum of education, whereas in comparison, in countries like Austria, Denmark and Slovakia the middle class is better educated. Such a diversity makes the education level a decisive factor in middle-class studies. Indeed, being educated per se does not mean someone belongs to the middle class, but it is the combination of a diversity of characteristics would determine affiliation to middle class. That is why; in this study variables like education, income, occupation and consumption are mostly considered.

Table 8-3- Average Education of Household's Head for data from 1984 till 2017

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Analphabet	70676	20,0	21,4	21,4
	Literacy Organization	10339	2,9	3,1	24,5
	Primary School	81791	23,1	24,8	49,3
	Middle School	54668	15,4	16,6	65,9
	High-School	64782	18,3	19,6	85,5
	Associate Degree	23448	6,6	7,1	92,6
	Bachelor	17200	4,9	5,2	97,8
	Master Degree and Doctor med.	5507	1,6	1,7	99,5
	PhD and higher	692	,2	,2	99,7
	Seminary (Divinity School)	1080	,3	,3	100,0
	Total	330183	93,2	100,0	


Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 8-2- Average Education of Household's Head for data from 1984 until 2017



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 8-3- Proportion of employees with primary, secondary and tertiary education, among core middle-class, European countries, 2011 (percentage)



Note. Reprinted from *Europe's Disappearing Middle Class?* by D. Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016, Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 38

Occupation is the central variable in my analysis, since it reflects/is an indicator for the socio-economic status of an individual and the household. Indeed, occupation is

correlated with earnings, consumption and lifestyle of a family. Table 8-4 and Figure 8-4 show the descriptive statistics of occupations in our sample.

Occupation plays a key role in the life of individuals; because finding a job is dependent on education level, skills, and environment on one side and occupation is correlated with income and consumption; therefore, we can assume many socio-economic factors of an individual by knowing occupation. For this research, I tried to adopt the query of database for 15 groupings regarding occupation. First, the population can be divided into individuals that are employed and not employed. Employees can be categorized into the nine categories of the ISCO-08 standard, whereas the latter group can be divided into students, housekeepers and unemployed. Such a classification helps us to have a detailed view on a wider range of groups in the labor market.


Table 8-4- Occupation of Household's Head in 15 Categories

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Managers and Government Admins	8516	2,4	3,2	3,2
	Professionals	16939	4,8	6,3	9,5
	Technicians and Associate Professionals	12570	3,5	4,7	14,1
	Clerical Support and Office Workers	14369	4,1	5,3	19,5
	Services and Sales Workers	18795	5,3	7,0	26,5
	Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers	6853	1,9	2,5	29,0
	Craft and Related Trade Workers	28336	8,0	10,5	39,6
	Drivers and Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers	24812	7,0	9,2	48,8
	Elementary Occupations	45561	12,9	16,9	65,7
	Unemployed (No Job)	4945	1,4	1,8	67,6
	Income without Job	75602	21,3	28,1	95,7
	Student	1198	,3	,4	96,1
	Housekeeper	5173	1,5	1,9	98,0
	Army Officials	5248	1,5	2,0	100,0
	Total	268917	75,9	100,0	

Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

An interesting group regarding income source are people that earn their living without having a job. These people – almost one fifth of the sample – are people that let property, the young that are dependent on allowances from the family and retirees. Therefore, we can see that a large group of people is dependent on earnings other than their income from jobs, which influences their lifestyle. As we can see in Table 8-4, the households who earn money without job (28,11%) makes up the biggest group. There are many households, that earn their living by renting their properties. There are also many rich families, whose children do not work and that are dependent on wealth and assets of the parents. There are also people that live by gaining money from their investment and savings in banks. Due to high interest rates (about 20%), this also makes a profitable source of income.

Figure 8-4- Pie Chart of the Occupation and Income Resource in 15 Categories




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Another striking point is the low percentage of skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, which is a consequence of choosing the urban population for this investigation. Indeed, in Iran, the main economic activity of rural population in the North and South is fishing and agriculture.

I have used this unusual and novel classification of occupation in Iran to have a better overview on labor force structure in Iran, we can consult the last report on employment of the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) which showed that less than half of Iranians above the age of 15 years can be considered as *active*. Among the active population, the *unemployment rate* is 10,6 per cent and interestingly, just half of the employed work full-time (Figure 8-5).

The labor market statistics shows that the situation in Iran is not comparable with European countries. For example, the labor force participation in the European Union was at about 80% in 2019 (OECD, 2020).

Figure 8-5- Labor Force Structure of Iran in 2019




Note. Adapted from *Labor Force Survey – a Summary [Report]*, by SCI, 2019. Copyright 2019 by Statistic Center of Iran.

Therefore, for a better understanding of the relation between occupation and consumption, it would be useful to distinguish between different professions in the labor market. For this reason, Figure 8-6 shows the occupations rates of the Iranian urban employed population. With a rough estimate, we can assume that the first and a part of the second group (managers and professional) are the high-income group, and middle class would be the other part of second group in addition to groups three, four and five, which are technicians, clerical support workers and services / sales workers. Since we are investigating the urban population, the proportion of skilled agricultural,

forestry and fishery workers is too low, compared to the whole country. The working class consists of the last three groups (cf. Xie et al., 2016; Goos et al., 2009; 2014). The armed forces jobholders are also controversial in this setting, since there is no further differentiation in ranks. Therefore, we have to keep in mind that consumption and lifestyle of army officials could diverge because of this situation.

Figure 8-6- Pie Charts of the Occupations for Employed Heads of Households (ISCO-08)



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

8.3 Income Distribution

As discussed before, income has always been the easiest and in a certain regard also most objective way of defining inequality in a society. The following tables show the income distribution in Iran between 1988 and 2013. This time period is chosen, because in 1988 the Iran-Iraq war ended and a new era of execution of neoliberal policies began. After President Hashemi (1989-1997) and President Khatami (1997-2005), who are known for liberalization and privatization of the economy, president Ahmadinejad won the presidential election in 2005 and came to power. His government is known for his populist economic policies and the implementation of some equitable social policies

like paying subsidies. The year 2013 is the last year that president Ahmadinejad controlled the government. After that the new president Rouhani began a new era of right-wing governance in Iran. Since the presidential period of Rouhani ended in 2021, I preferred to limit the study to the years before he took the office.

Beside changes in economic policies of government, we have to take the effects of the sanctions on Iranian economy into consideration as well. These effects have been discussed by other scholars (cf. Ghodsi & Karamelikli, 2020; Farzanegan & Hayo, 2019; Farzanegan et al., 2015). The sanctions had an impact on the GDP and consumption opportunities of Iranians. The answer to the question, if these sanctions affected income equality, must be discussed in another study.

The following tables show statistics of the Iranian upper-, middle- and lower class during these years. The thresholds for these categories are defined as follows: the lower class consists of people whose income is lower than 80 per cent of median income. The percentages for middle and upper classes are 80-140 and more than 140 per cent respectively (Suter et al., 2020). The growth of middle class percentage through these years is very similar to the findings of Farzanegan et al. (2021) and Kharas (2017), who showed a steady increase of the middle class.

Table 8-5 shows the classes regarding the income level of households. The incomes are equalized regarding the inflation rate in Iran and are adjusted by households' size. In this way, the incomes are comparable in different years.

Table 8-6 shows different classes regarding occupations and categorized regarding adjusted disposable income. The results can be compared with Western middle-class studies from different sources. There are many recent sources that calculated the ratio of middle class in the population recently. One way is to define the middle of income distribution, i.e., in deciles 3 to 8. The German Institute for Economic Research defines the middle class as households with an equivalized disposable net income of between 70 and 150 per cent of the median income (cf. Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016; Kochhar et al., 2017; Pew Research Center, 2017).

Vaughan-Whitehead (2016) - in his study as a member of the International Labor Organization research team - proposed 60 per cent of median income as the threshold below which to place the bottom income group (in order to match the low pay threshold used by the European Union fixed at two-thirds of median income by the Council of Europe). The higher income group would consist of individuals/household with an income higher than 200 per cent of median income. Therefore, the middle class is

comprised of individuals whose income ranges between 60 and 200 per cent of median income. He distinguished three categories within the middle incomes: the lower middle class (60–80 per cent of median income), the core middle class (80–120 per cent) and the upper middle class (120–200 per cent of median income). The top of the distribution begins at 200 per cent of median income, which corresponds to approximately the top 5 per cent wealthiest households (ibid). Figure 8-7 shows the results of his study about classes in European countries.

Table 8-5- Upper-, Middle- and Lower Class in Iran from 1988 to 2013 due to income level

	1988	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Upper Classes											
Greater than 200% of Median Income	15,0	17,0	16,3	16,5	16,5	14,8	17,2	13,0	10,6	10,0	10,6
Upper Middle Class: Between 140% and 200% of Median Income	15,1	14,2	14,2	13,7	14,5	14,3	14,6	15,5	15,3	14,9	14,8
Middle Class											
Between 120% and 140% of Median Income	8,7	8,3	8,5	8,2	8,4	9,0	8,3	9,2	10,2	10,2	10,1
Core Middle Class: Between 80% and 120% of Median Income	25,2	24,4	24,9	25,6	24,8	25,6	21,4	25,7	31,0	33,2	32,8
Lower Classes											
Between 60% and 80% of Median Income	14,1	14,1	13,7	15,0	13,9	14,4	12,3	13,3	14,9	15,1	15,5
Less than 60% of Median Income	21,9	22,0	22,4	21,0	21,9	22,0	26,1	23,3	18,0	16,6	16,1

Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

a) The numbers show the percentages of every class for every year

If we compare Figure 8-7 and Table 8-5, we see that the core middle class in Iran has grown during the years from 1988 to 2013. At first, the percentage of core middle class was similar to countries like Romania, Greece and Bulgaria. Then, in the first years of 2010s, it has become near to countries like Cyprus, France and Belgium. Interestingly, the percentage of upper middle-class is very similar among European countries and ranges from 25 to 30 per cent. The upper middle-class has not changed during the years of research as well. We can see that it has been at around 23 and 24 percent these years. The obvious reduction of the proportion of the lower-class could be a consequence of

subsidies and cash transfers that began in the second half of 2000s, which is investigated by many scholars (e.g. Karami et al., 2012; Guillaume et al., 2011; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2015). The upper income in Iran has formed more than 10 per cent of the population. In this respect, Iran can be compared with European countries such as Latvia, Greece, Romania and UK.

Table 8-6- Upper-, Middle- and Lower Class in Iran from 1988 to 2013 regarding occupation


	1988	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Upper Classes											
Manager and Governmental Admins	2,9	3,2	2,8	3,0	2,8	2,3	2,2	2,2	2,3	2,1	2,1
Experts and Professionals	8,9	9,0	9,2	9,9	8,3	8,2	6,9	6,7	6,3	6,5	7,4
Middle Classes											
Technicians and Assistant Professionals	4,7	5,4	4,6	5,2	4,7	4,4	3,5	3,6	3,4	3,4	3,5
Office Employees	7,3	6,6	5,8	6,2	5,8	5,4	4,6	4,6	4,5	4,0	4,2
Service Employees and Clerks	6,4	6,2	4,7	5,6	5,0	4,5	4,7	4,9	4,6	4,7	4,8
Expert Workers	1,1	1,0	0,9	0,8	1,0	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,6
Lower Classes											
Craft and Related Trades Workers	13,1	13,7	13,1	12,8	11,0	10,7	10,3	9,1	8,9	8,8	10,7
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers (e. g. drivers)	9,5	10,1	9,7	9,5	8,7	8,6	8,5	7,9	7,4	6,9	7,6
Elementary Occupations	16,6	16,4	16,7	16,1	17,2	17,2	18,6	17,5	16,6	16,6	18,1
M (Unemployed, Student, Income without Job, Housekeepers)											
	29,6	28,4	32,4	30,9	35,6	38,0	40,1	42,8	45,3	46,6	41,1

Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

a) The numbers show the percentages of every class for every year

Kochhar et al. (2017) in their research by the Pew Research Center have applied a similar definition for middle income. Middle-income households are those families whose income is two-thirds to double that of country's median disposable household income.

Figure 8-7- Size of income classes, Europe, 2006 (percentage)



Note. Reprinted from *Europe's Disappearing Middle Class?* by D. Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016, Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 13

Figure 8-8 - Percentage of adult population in lower-, middle- and upper-income households

Note. Reprinted from *Middle Class Fortunes in Western Europe*, R. Kochhar, 2017, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), p. 14





Figure 8-8 shows the percentage of middle class in different European countries. The results show that Scandinavian countries have always tried to improve the situation by increasing middle income share in the national level. The comparison of Iran and European countries and U.S. (Table 8-5, Table 8-6 and Figure 8-8) show that Iran cannot be considered as an equal country, in fact its situation is very similar to United States.

Another way to analyze inequality is occupation polarization (Xie et al., 2016; Goos et al., 2009; 2014) which helps us to categorize classes with help of occupations. Table 8-6 shows the grouping of Iranian employees regarding occupations. We can assume that the managers and a part of professionals (e.g. medical doctors) belong to the upper

class. The elementary occupations are certainly the lower class. With this grouping, we can see that among the employed population, 16-18 per cent are lower classes and 2-3 per cent are managers and thus the upper class. Most likely, the second major group; namely professionals (6-10 per cent) are also upper class and we can assume that their socio-economic status is also high. From the whole population, approximately 45% can be seen as middle status occupations; especially the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th major groups are middle class and 7th and 8th group are either lower middle class or lower class. The disadvantage of this categorization is its inability to obtain information about the condition of the not-working population consisting of unemployed, students, housekeepers and earners without job. However, this approach helps us to have an overview about inequality between the employed.

For a better understanding of different occupation groups regarding their income, we can follow the changes in earnings of these groups through the years of research.

Figure 8-9 – Average income of different occupation groups from 1984 to 2013 (income is equalized due to inflation and household's size)




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

In Figure 8-9, we can see the average income of every group from 1984 to 2013. The earnings are equalized due to inflation and size of household, otherwise that does not make sense to calculate the mean value. Due to a high rate of inflation in Iran, the earnings of families are in 2013 10 times higher than 1980s. Therefore, the calculations

are done with the equalized income. The main observation here is the high income-level of two occupation groups of managers and professionals, as we have discussed before. Besides, army officials have higher earnings than other groups. The main reason for that could be the importance of the army in contemporary Iran. Surely, a general's salary is much higher than many other occupations.

Figure 8-10 – Income of middle level occupations from 1986 to 2013




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 8-10 and Figure 8-11 show the income trajectories for middle-income and higher-income occupations from 1986 to 2013, respectively. Figure 8-11 is an interesting mirror of economic developments in Iran. In 1986, Iranian economy was experiencing the last years of the Iran-Iraq war and that is why; army officials earn almost as much as experts. The striking point here is the low income of managers and governmental administration in comparison to other groups in 1986.

After the Iran-Iraq war, President Hashemi came to power, leading an era called *construction period*, in which many neo-liberal plans were executed (such as structural adjustment, privatization and price deregulation). One key effect was employing the experts for conducting these plans. That is why; the earnings of experts rose rapidly in this era. This trend continued in the 1990s and then we can see another phenomenon; namely, an increase in the earnings of governmental managers in the mid-90s. The

reason for that is a governmental policy to attract successful managers of the private sector for changes in economic structure. Gholamhossein Karbaschi – mayor of Tehran in 1990s and a reformist politician near to president Hashemi mentioned a particular example repeatedly. The idea was to reform the economics with the help of capable managers who were successful. Given that these successful men and women would not leave their positions without a good reason, they received good salaries in the public sector, which is shown in Figure 8-11. The paradox at that time the main idea of neo-liberalism was to reduce government spending and in contrast, the government employed managers with high salaries. The gradual increase of managers' income continued in the 2000s.

Figure 8-11 - Income of high-level occupations from 1986 to 2013



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

The income trajectories of middle-income occupations are depicted in Figure 8-10. Generally, the economic situation of these groups seems to be more stable. The nature of these jobs is their indispensability in any political condition. The striking point about these occupation groups is the steady increase in earnings of office workers at the time of president Ahmadinejad. The main reason for that is the initiation subsidies and government incentives. Although these subsidies were not very high, they played an important role in the lives of the poor.

In sum, the economic analysis of Iranian society shows a constant increase of middle class through the years of this study. This result is very similar to the findings of Farzanegan et al. (2021) who calculated middle class due to absolute income thresholds. Indeed, we can conclude that the international relation after Iran-Iraq war and neo-liberal policies of government resulted in growth of economic middle class.

The size of the middle class regarding occupation also shows a slight increase. The main difference here is the high rate of students, people without a job (with income) and housekeepers. Interestingly, a group of Iranians that can be categorized as *jobless with income* is among the high-income groups of Iranians. They are the people who either have properties, or very high savings in the bank and live from these earnings. We can see that this group (and students) percentages in the population have grown, which means, there is a part of population that has the time and opportunity to consume more than others without working.

The economic and occupation analyses are the base for defining and identifying middle class, the next step would be describing the country's economic situation in general, followed by an investigation of consumption patterns and lifestyles of Iranians for a better understanding of social structure.


9 Economic Factors of Iran

9.1 *Political and Economic Development of Iran*

Researchers on political economy of Iran emphasized some characteristic, that affect the accumulation process and consumption patterns of Iranians. For instance, Katouzian (2004) referred to the Iranian economy as short-term in comparison with Western economy which is considered as long-term. The concept used by Katouzian is pick-axe building (*sakhteman-e kolangi*) which describes buildings not older than 30 years, but that will be destructed, in order to construct new ones. This concept represents the absence of stability on one side and inviolable legal framework in Iranian economy on the other side. This situation makes it difficult to accumulate and certainly to consume as a consequence. There are many reasons for this insecurity in the economic history of Iran. Keddie, Ashraf, Abrahamian and Moaddel proposed different assumptions in this regard such as obstacles for the emergence of national bourgeoisie, precarious ownership relationships and oriental despotism (cf. Ashraf, 1969; Abrahamian, 1974; Moaddel, 1992; Keddie, 1978; 1972).

Historically, a turning point in the political economy of Iran was the discovery of oil on 26, May 1908, which led to formation of the London-based Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1909. After that, the economy of Iran became entirely dependent on oil revenue. Since that time, Iran belongs to single-commodity export economies. There are many researches which show the impact of oil revenue on the Iranian economy (cf. Farzanegan et al., 2021; Salehi Esfahani & Pesaran, 2009; Katouzian, 2004; Keddie, 1972). Besides, Nademi (2018) showed that there is a correlation between inequality and dependence of the government on oil income. It means that Iranian economy is a dependent and inequal economy, which affects the consumption tendencies and preferences. The main indicator for investigating inequality is the Gini-Index. Figure 9-1 shows the changes of Gini-Index in Iran from 1980 until 2017.

Figure 9-1- Gini coefficient of Iran 1980 - 2017



Note. Adapted from *Iran - GINI index (World Bank estimate)*, by Indexmundi, 2019, <https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/iran/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.

Inequality and economic condition have a significant effect on other aspects of welfare and social life. For instance, Amini Rarani et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between health condition and households' economic condition. In addition, due to Shadi et al. (2018), economic inequality and education are correlated with social capital. Therefore, we have to investigate and consider the role of inequality in consumption pattern of Iranian milieus.

9.2 Researches about inequality and middle class in Iran

Although at the time I decided to write my dissertation, the Iranian middle class was a little-noticed theme, nowadays, one can find more studies conducted in this field based on the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). Therefore, I would like to review some of the most important researches.

Salehi-Isfahani (2009) investigated the relation between poverty, inequality and populist politics in Iran. He employed the HIES-data from 1984 until 2004. The main investigated variable was PCE (Per Capita Expenditure) as an indicator of individual welfare. His research showed that inequality in Iran has not changed, in contrast to poverty, which reduced due to statistics.

One of the main scholars that has conducted numerous studies about inequality in Iran is Mohammad-Reza Farzanegan – a professor at the University of Marburg. His main focus lies in the economic dynamic of the Iranian society with regard to national and


international changes. For instance, Farzanegan and colleagues (2015) investigated the effects of sanctions on welfare in Iran with CGE model. The same method was used by Karami et al. (2012). Another interest of Farzanegan and colleagues is the effect of subsidies and sanctions on the Iranian economy (see Farzanegan et al., 2017; Farzanegan & Hayo, 2019). The main data used by these teams are HIES indicators. The same is true about Guillaume et al. (2011), Enami et al. (2016), Enami et al. (2019) and Enami & Lustig (2016). In Enami et al. (2016) and (2019). The main research goals of these studies were defining the role of social transfers and subsidies on inequality in Iran. Interestingly, the main data source was HIES 2011 and the results showed that the subsidies and transfers could be successful in reducing poverty; especially in rural areas. The research executed by Soltani and colleagues (2012) was conducted in a rural part of Iran with a sample of 75 households, in order to examine the livelihood strategies of households. Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2015) used also the HIES data of 2010 in order to investigate the effects of subsidies on Iranian households. Interestingly, their research showed that more than 60 per cent of Iranian households receive subsidies through cash transfers which seems to be a high rate.

Ghasemi and Zarezade (2013) defined Iranian new middle-class regarding education, middle income, occupation in non-manual jobs and urban lifestyle. They argued that the emergence of this new middle class goes back to 1970s, at the time which Iran experienced an economic boom due to sudden increase of oil price. Due to Ghasemi and Zarezade (2013), the governmental white collars increased from 662000 (9,6 per cent of the labor force) to 1673000 (19 per cent of the labor force) in the time period from 1966 to 1976. Shahbaz et al. (2015) believe that the main cause of inequality in Iran lies in the way that oil revenues were spent at that time. Indeed, most of the money was invested in urban areas and rural parts were neglected and remained deprived.

Ghiasvand and research team (2015) tried to examine the inequality of Iranian households regarding food and health care payments with the help of HIES from 1998 to 2012. Majbourni and Fesharaki (2019) analyzed the diversity of Iranian population and its effect on social and economic indicators like poverty and inequality. The data used for the research were the HIES from 1990 through 2012. The conclusion showed that poverty and inequality are generally decreasing, and the public goods are increasing. Farzanegan and associates (2021) showed that the size of Iranian middle class is correlated with the flow of oil-income. Indeed, the middle class size is sensitive to shocks and earnings related to international oil trade.

Inequality can affect different aspects of socio-economic life, such as health care and nutrition. It would be remarkable to know if inequality and cultural consumption are related. That is why; I calculated the Gini Index for years between 1984 and 2013 and the cultural consumption (written media) share in total expenditure for the same time period (Figure 9-2).

Figure 9-2- Gini Index (before social transfers) and Cultural Consumption in Iran from 1984 to 2013




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Interestingly, the curves are very similar; which shows that statistically Gini-coefficient and cultural consumption might be related, but to assume any hypothesis for this relationship, further and more precise studies are needed. One point here that inequality in Iran is rather high without social transfers.

For a better understanding of the inequality structure in Iran, it is necessary to investigate the economic situation regarding growth and inequality. Figure 9-3 shows the growth of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in billion dollars from 1990 to 2016.

Figure 9-3- GDP from 1990 to 2016




Note. Adapted from *World Development Indicators*, by World Bank, 2019. Copyright 2019 by World Bank

a) The amounts are in billion dollars

The inflation rate of Iran is rather high (Figure 9-4) and that is why; the income has to be standardized for any scientific comparison. We can observe that although the GDP of Iran has a steady rise through the years, the rate of cultural consumption is unaltered. This phenomenon is pursuable with the justified equalized total income of Iranian households (Figure 9-5).

Figure 9-4- Inflation Rate and Cultural Consumption in Iran from 1984 to 2013



Note. Own calculation

The justified income stayed constant after a slight increase during the Iran-Iraq war. Interestingly, the fluctuation of cultural consumption is very similar to changes of GINI-Index of Iran before social transfers. That is why; later this factor will be studied in details later.

Figure 9-5- Adjusted equalized income of Iranian Households from 1984 to 2013



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

The macro-economic variables help us to provide a single snapshot of a country's socio-economic. In sum, by analyzing these factors we conclude that Iranian economy is a low-growing economy with a rather high Gini coefficient. The main characteristic of the Iranian economy is its high rate of inflation (Figure 9-4) whereas the adjusted equalized income level has increased for a period after the Iran-Iraq war and then declined and reached the amounts of the mid-1980s.

The main aim of this chapter was to highlight the studies related to middle class or conducted by means of the HIES data set and the main findings of these researches. The main conclusions concern the role of oil-revenue on Iranian economy and the middle class. Besides, we could see that health care and education in Iran is also correlated with inequality. Indeed, the GDP (which is dependent on oil income of Iran) and inequality are two main indicators that have an impact on other aspects of Iranian socio-economic conditions. For this reason, I tried to introduce these indicators in this chapter.

The results show that, if we define middle class by economic indicators, namely income, the size of Iranian middle class has increased. These changes were stressed by Farzanegan et al. (2021), Kharas (2017) and reinforced by calculations conducted by me. Besides, we see that there is an increase in service sector employment in the labor market. That means the Iranian economy like many developing and industrial countries is experiencing tertiarization of the economy which affects class structure. This phenomenon has been asserted in the last census and also examined by me in this dissertation. Therefore, we can observe two main phenomena in the Iranian economy: firstly, the increase of middle class and secondly the tertiarization of the economy.

10 Results; Correspondence Analysis

The focus of this dissertation is to portray Iranian class structure and the main method for this purpose is Correspondence Analysis (CA). In the following, we can see the results of correspondence analysis for the years of research. As discussed before, the main variables for correspondence analysis are income, total expenditure, yearly expenditure on cultural goods (or leisure activities or books), education, occupation and assets (represented by owning a car).


10.1 Year: 1984 and 1986

The first year that I have chosen for CA research is 1984. Five years after the revolution and in the middle of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian government could eliminate political active opposition in Iran and establish a system of monocracy. Indeed, one can see this period as the era of establishment; although on the other side, there are many problems and shortages because of the war. Besides, it seems that the revolutionary and egalitarian values were still the mainstream motto of the government. Under these circumstances, the main aim of the government was to find a fair system of distribution through rationing.

We can assume that the consumption patterns of different groups were similar, because the possibilities for consumption were limited and dependent on the economic condition and international trade. The most obvious fact here is accordance of total income and total expenditure, which is a sign that the CA plot is reliable. Since we have tried to find the relations regarding occupation and education, we can find out the similarities due to plots.

According to CA, we can see at the right side that the professionals and experts and also army officials are the richest group who own a car and spend more than others in sum and also on cultural goods. Very close to this group are managers and government administrators whose education is mostly at the high- and middle school level. It is important to notice that after the revolution, there was a tendency to employ royal young forces in the government, royalty to Islamic revolution was more important than education. That is why; we see that the managers and governmental authorities are not highly educated.

Figure 10-1 – Correspondence Analysis; Year 1984



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI


The poorest group in this analysis are machine operators and assemblers and also elementary occupations (simple workers) who do not earn much and practically have no expenditure on leisure time. Between the rich and poor groups, we can see clerical support and services workers who have an average income and expenditure. The analysis shows very similar results to the year 1986 (in Appendix). Experts and army officials earn and expend on average more than other groups. Workers gain less than others and also expend less.

10.2 Year: 1988

This year is important for two reasons. Firstly, the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988 and the *Era of Reconstruction* began. Secondly, the new government started neo-liberal policies. These policies consisted of privatization, deregulation, free trade and economic liberalization. Therefore, we can assume that there would be a change in consumption behavior of Iranians in the following years.

As revealed by CA plot, the relation of education and occupation and income / expenditure groups is not clear. The plot demonstrates that bachelor degree is separated from other groupings and master degree holders are very near to simple workers, which can be true due to results from other diagrams of 1980s and 1990s.

Figure 10-2 – Correspondence Analysis; year 1988



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI


One important point at the beginning of this era is the close relation of income, expenditure and leisure time expenditure which seems to be clear because of economic reasons. Besides, we see that the different groups are close together which means similarity. As a matter of fact, the compact cluster of different groupings shows that the Iranians are very similar at the end of the war; they earn and spend irrespective of their education, occupation and maybe even their desires. That is a sign of limited opportunities and an equal society at that time.

10.3 Year: 1990

At the beginning of 1990s, we see that the Iranian society was going to experience a new era of inequality. The impact of neo-liberal policies and change of attitudes, which valued wealth instead of fairness, resulted in a more unequal society with a higher inequality, which is visible in the analysis of 1990.

The position of students and people who have an income without job is very interesting in this plot. We can see that these groups in fact have lowest income and expenditure therefore a similar condition (regarding expenditure).

Figure 10-3 – Correspondence Analysis; year 1990



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI


Interestingly, the analysis shows that the experts and army officials have spent the most compared to other groups. The groups with the second biggest earnings are managers and government administrators. The similarity of housekeepers, unemployed and illiterates is another point, which is a consequence of their economic status. Just like in

previous plots, we can see that the workers (simple and skilled) are on the same level and have similar situation regarding income and expenditure.

10.4 Year: 1992

In the analysis of this year, we see that the professionals have the highest income and expenditure. The interesting point is the gradual change of the position of army officials. In the 1980s, army officials had a position near the professionals (experts), but during the years, their rank changed. Also, the position of the post-graduate educated people at the end of our spectrum was a point that they gain and expend the most among all occupational groups.

Figure 10-4 – Correspondence Analysis; year 1992



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Indeed, we observe that a shift is happening in the social field and labor market, where professionals become more important in comparison to the war period which was characterized by the significance of army related occupations.

10.5 Year: 1994

We can see that there are some very similar groups regarding income and expenses:


- Experts and Army officials
- Managers and Governmental administrators
- Technicians and Office employees
- Simple, Expert and Industrial Workers
- Housekeepers and Students

Indeed, the similarity between these groups is not surprising, since the income level is alike. The important point here is the position of major group 1 (managers) in comparison to major group 2 (professionals and experts) and 0 (army officials). It is normally assumed that managers might have a higher income level than professionals and army officials. The reason for that could be the higher income of medical specialists in Iran, which belong to the major group 2. Secondly, the magisterial and authoritative structure of Iran is complicated; because the government has always spun between being small and large. Therefore, the employment of new authorities was not permitted for a long time. Besides, the first years of implementation neo-liberal policies resulted in a vast structural adjustment and many competent managers quit working for the government. In sum, one can assume that after the revolution and due to inappropriate regulations (like mandatory hijab), many educated and expert managers were either dismissed or resigned. For this reason, managers and governmental authorities are not the groups with the highest earnings in Iran.

The high position of army officials in Iran shows their importance for the Islamic Republic. It is remarkable that in Iran, one can distinguish two different armed forces: The Army and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The former are the normal armed forces, that exist in every country, but the latter is a loyal force to the supreme leader that has become powerful through the years and has been also very engaged with political and economic activities. For instance, during the ministry of President Ahmadinejad at least ten ministers of the cabinet were members of the Revolutionary

Guard. In the Middle East, power position was closely related to occupational function. Years before revolution, Bill (1972) has analyzed the power structure in Middle East as follows: “The military, cleric, and bureaucratic occupations, for example, have proved to be especially effective arenas for these kinds of power relationships in Islamic society” (Bill, 1972: 425).

Figure 10-5 – Correspondence Analysis; Year 1994




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

10.6 Year: 1996

It seems that the position of managers and government administrators and experts is gradually changing, i.e., managers and government administrators are located at the highest position. Interestingly, in this year Mohammad Khatami began his presidential campaign and later in 1997 became the president with mottos like “*Iranian for Iranians*” and *Meritocracy*. That is why; we see that some experts outside Iran tended to come back to Iran. This trend has started at the beginning of the 1990s. If we observe

the net migration of Iran during the 1990s, we realize that the net migration has decreased from -898.423 in 1992 to -218,350 in 1997 and then later the net migration decreased to -48.444 in 2002 (Fred, 2019). Therefore, since this year the plot reveals a similarity between major group 1 and 2 regarding income, expenditure and most interestingly regarding education. As demonstrated in CA plot, the education level of managers and professionals is becoming university graduates.

Figure 10-6 – Correspondence Analysis; year 1996




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

10.7 Year: 1998-2004

The years of 1990s till the mid-2000s have very similar characteristics, mostly because of the unchanging economic policies. Indeed, President Hashemi and President Khatami follow the same neo-liberal model of development and for this reason, in the economic field has stayed the same. The trend, that managers and governmental administrators are becoming richer and spend the most, continues. The position of

housekeepers and students with the minimum income and expenditure is not a surprise. It is very interesting that army officials have a new disposition in comparison to first half of 1990s, which continues in the CA plot of this period (Figure 10-7 and CA plots in appendix 1).

Figure 10-7- Correspondence Analysis; year 1998




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

10.8 Years: 2005 - 2010

The CA plots of years 2005 to 2010 (Figure 10-8 and CA plots in appendix 1) show the same patterns which can be a sign of stability in Iranian economy and social structure. These years indicate a stability of economy on one side, on the other side the Press Freedom Index increased, which means that the freedom of the press has declined (Figure 10-9). The same is true about transparency and corruption in Iran. According

to Figure 10-10, one can see that in these years, the situation of transparency worsened, and the country experienced more corruption than before.

Figure 10-8- Correspondence Analysis; year 2005




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Interestingly, we can follow the changes in the social field of Iranian society. The CA plots show evidences that education and income are in a correlation and the order of occupations become in accordance with what we have assumed. Managers, administrators, and experts are PhD and master degree owners who earn and consume the most. On the other side of the spectrum, we can see students and housekeepers, which earn and consume the least. Therefore, the hierarchy of occupation is very similar to the order of ISCO-2008. It seems that the situation in Iran established and after the turbulences of war period, there is an economic recovery.

In this point, we can explore two indices, which might influence cultural consumption (e.g. book and magazine reading) and also economic structure: Press Freedom Index and Corruption Index. The former shows the degree of freedom that journalists and

news agencies have in a country and the latter is an index for transparency and corruption in a country.

Figure 10-9- Press Freedom Index in Iran from 2002 to 2014 (Rank and Score)




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI and RSF, 2019

Figure 10-9 shows that the press freedom index in Iran has never been in a good situation for journalists. The best rank reported for Iran is 120 in 2002. Indeed, the situation for journalists became worse and worse, which means that Iran experienced an economic stability without freedom in the field of publications.

Another point is the fact that Iranian economy is perceived as corrupt. Due to Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in Figure 10-10, the corruption index has risen in the end of 2000s and has improved since 2010. Nevertheless, Iran is a corrupted country and it affects the economic situation discussed later.

Figure 10-10- Corruption Index in Iran from 2003 to 2014




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI and Transparency International, 2018

10.9 Years: 2011 - 2013

From 2011 to the middle of the 2010s, we can observe a stable pattern again. Indeed, due to the correspondence analysis, the consumption characteristics of the Iranian society shows an accordance with the assumption that the occupation is the decisive factor in consumption and income of a household. The stability of the pattern regarding occupations allows us to categorize different groups due to their occupation and explore the characteristics of each grouping which will be presented in the next section.

Further investigations of correlations between factors and modeling a pattern of consumption will be discussed in another chapter. There, I will examine each factor's relation with other factors and also check the possibility of a model.

Figure 10-11- Correspondence Analysis; year 2013



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

10.10 Income and Expenditure according to Correspondence Analysis

Table 10-1 provides the results from correspondence analysis plots presented above. Here, we can find out characteristics of occupation groups regarding *Income*, *Expenditure*, *Cultural Consumption*, *Education* and *Assets*. Since an exact estimation in this respect is not possible, an ordinal categorization with the dimensions *High*, *Medium* and (*Very*) *Low* was applied.

In this point I tried to summarize the findings of the correspondence analyses in order to distinguish between social groups. The table provides details about the capital level and consumption patterns of every occupation-group. As we could assume, *managers* and *technicians* have a high level of cultural consumption because of their high income-level. Interestingly, *professionals* and *students* have the highest level of cultural consumption as a result of their high level of cultural capital. The remarkable point here

is the high cultural consumption of students despite their very low-income level. *Army officials, clerical support workers, services and sales workers and skilled agricultural workers*³ consume cultural goods at a medium level.

Table 10-1- The results of the Correspondence Analysis

Occupation (group)	Income	Total Expenditure	Cultural Expenditure	Education	Assets
<i>Managers</i>	High	High	High	University	High
<i>Professionals</i>	High	High	(Very) High	University	High
<i>Technicians</i>	Middle	Middle	High	High School	High
<i>Clerical support workers</i>	Middle	Middle	Medium	High School	High
<i>Services and sales workers</i>	Middle	Middle	Medium	High School	Middle
<i>Skilled agricultural workers</i>	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Middle
<i>Craft and related trades workers</i>	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
<i>Machine operators / assemblers</i>	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
<i>Elementary occupations</i>	Low	Very Low	Low	Low	Low
<i>Army officials</i>	High / Middle	Medium	Medium	High School/ University	Medium
<i>Unemployed</i>	Very low	Low	Low	Low	Low
<i>Income without job</i>	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Medium
<i>Students</i>	Very low	Low	High	-	-
<i>Housekeeper</i>	Very low	Low	Low	Very Low	Low

Note. Own depiction based on results of the study


A main conclusion here is the fact that income plays the most important role in cultural consumption which could be assumed before the study. On the top of the table, we can find the managers and professionals who earn the most and also consume more than other groups. Their cultural consumption is also higher than other groups except for students. Students are among the lowest income levels, but their cultural consumption

³ It is important to notice that the sample is consisted of urban population; therefore, the ratio of agricultural (skilled) workers is very low and it consists of a special group of agricultural workers that live in cities.

is very high. Although self-employed persons (as a part of the income without job group) have middle or even higher earnings than other groups, their cultural consumption is rather low. The fact that their education level is not very high could be a reason. Another assumption could be, that the traditional middle class, which consists mostly of self-employed shopkeepers and *bazari* people, does not consume as many cultural goods as the new middle class.

The main focus of study is on the cultural consumption of a family. Figure 10-12 show the level of education and the cultural consumption of households. The advantage of Figure 10-12 is the possibility to compare the education of different groups and their spending on books, magazines and newspapers. Obviously, managers (Group 1) and experts (Group 2) are highly educated and spend more on publications. The figure also shows that the workers (expert, industrial and simple workers as well as drivers) buy the least books and magazines.

Figure 10-12- Education Level of Households' Heads




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 10-13 confirms these findings. The interesting point here is the fact that although the students earn very little, they spend almost as much as managers and governmental administrative on books and magazines. Disregarding students, we see that high-level occupations spend more on books and magazines. In fact, experts regarding their work

have to spend more on publications and according to the graphic, they pay almost twice as much as the managers for books.

Figure 10-13- Average Expenditure of different Occupation Groups on Books, Magazines and Newspapers



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

The consumption models of different occupation groupings are very similar to what we expected. Occupations with higher income consume more and invest more on cultural goods. Interestingly, the results reinforce the idea of Bourdieu (1984) regarding capitals. He showed that teachers have high expenditure on cultural goods, whereas they spend less than average on food and presentation (see 2.8.1). The results are similar to Bourdieu's findings. These correlations between variables will be discussed in chapter 12.

In Table 10-2 s we can find information on the amount that every household spends for a specific goal by occupation of the head of the household. Remarkable points can be concluded from the table:

Firstly, the main leisure activity seems to be eating food in restaurants. The expenditure on food is the highest compared to other activities. A comparison between expenditure

on books and on eating foods in restaurants shows that some groups spend more than 30 times on food than on books. Interestingly, this leisure time activity is also income oriented. Low-income jobs (like elementary occupations) and housekeepers spend the least on eating food in restaurants. Obviously, the fact that housekeepers cook at home, plays a role too.

Secondly, traveling is a leisure activity for the richest. On average, the professionals spend 18 times more than elementary occupations on travel. At the same time, we can see that visiting museums and historical places is related to traveling. Indeed, people visit museums and historical places during their trip to other cities. Besides, visiting museums might be an expensive activity for low-income families. The fact that the group of self-employed does not travel much is in the nature of these activities; because they have to be present at their firm normally and therefore, do not have many opportunities to go on a trip.

Thirdly, expenditure on hairstyle and make-up services provides important insights into taste preferences. The difference between groups, when it comes to make-up services and cosmetic tools, is not as big compared to other expenditure. For instance, we notice that the amount that housekeepers spend on cosmetics is about a quarter of the amount that professionals spend.

Fourthly, the summary statistics for expenditure on publications show that (as expected) high-income groups; i.e. managers and professionals and students; spend the most on books because of their high level of cultural capital. However, the high expenditure of middle-income groups like clerical and sales workers on newspapers and magazines is also noteworthy. For instance, the average amount that clerical and sales workers pay for newspapers is more than the amount that students spend for newspapers. Indeed, it seems that newspapers and magazines are very popular among Iranians. That is why; we can see that there are many advertisements in these publications to influence the taste and attitude of middle class. This assumption was investigated by Ansari Eshlaghi (2013) and one can find many related and biased advertisements that try to show the relation of consumption and success by photos and commercial ads.

Fifthly, the interest of Iranians in going to cinema and theater is also an important aspect of cultural lifestyle of Iranians. Almost all the high and middle-income groups spend on cinema and theater. As expected, professionals (highest economic capital) and students (highest cultural capital) spent the most on cinema and theater. Interestingly, associate professionals and clerical workers spend almost half as much as students

spend on cinema; which means, middle class occupations are interested in this kind of cultural activities.

An important point here is the cultural behavior of students regarding concerts and buying CDs. The amount that students spend on concerts is rather low, but they spend a lot on buying CDs. It seems that the music is a great concern of Iranians, but due to economic conditions, they prefer to listen to music instead of attending live events. In this regard, the high-income groups spend the most on concert tickets.

In summary, the results show that consuming food in restaurants is the main leisure time activity of Iranians. The main cultural activity is cinema/theater attendance on which they spend almost the same amount of money. Interestingly, all Iranians households spend on make-up services and cosmetics.

Regarding cultural goods, we observe that buying books and CDs is an activity which is related to high economic or cultural capital. The group which earns the most (professionals) and the groups with the highest cultural capital (students) buy more books and CDs than others. Magazines and newspapers are very popular between both high- and middle- income families. All of these groups spend similarly on publications. In the next chapter, these finding will be compared partly with the national survey of values and attitudes of Iranians.

Table 10-2 – detailed consumption patterns of occupation groups in Iran (in Rial and equalized regarding inflation – base year is 1984)

Expenditure on												
	Food in Restaurants and Hotels	Travel (generally)	Hairstyle and Make-up services	Cosmetic Tools	non-educational Books	Magazines	Newspapers	Books	Tickets for Museums and Historical Places	Tickets of Theater and Cinema	buying CDs	Opera, Music Concert Tickets
Managers and Government Admins	606263	19797	346236	28130	9178	21075	36627	24602	2198	7072	3113	2408
	842328	36453	503691	36061	10804	35340	57979	53546	5923	13258	5335	4592
Technicians and Associate Professionals	435254	12827	314565	23835	4483	15912	27798	17373	1758	5475	2431	471
Clerical Support and Office Workers	466013	5120	323062	18829	3032	16361	25395	16964	692	5903	3276	0
Services and Sales Workers	400089	3648	314213	13772	1867	10547	16221	12364	733	2583	1867	324
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers	73346	905	105649	6503	810	2551	2477	2453	60	521	381	0
Craft and Related Trade Workers	343982	7966	338387	17522	1253	8074	11519	11766	991	2267	1492	105
Drivers and Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers	372757	3268	342542	19267	1339	9367	12267	9115	665	2340	1779	440
Elementary Occupations	221197	2057	288347	8864	698	5437	6519	5948	211	1179	1093	35
Unemployed (No Job)	394142	8523	322060	13591	2217	8362	17550	18651	136	4944	1353	276
Income without Job	519810	2891	395066	9757	1999	16002	27280	19016	798	4370	1322	749
Student	550106	3221	177918	19257	7970	19279	20532	23998	92	12027	6011	92
Housekeeper	178576	5378	169801	10869	1633	6125	8224	4811	27	2118	694	0
Army Officials	433314	14846	296216	19889	2722	14858	23584	15044	1372	4505	2625	0

11 Values and Attitudes of Iranians according Ministerium's Survey

One of the main sources for studies about cultural consumption in Iran are national surveys conducted by Ershad Ministerial (MCIG: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance): *The Cultural Behavior of Iranians* and *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*. These two studies were planned to be done every two years or at least in logical intervals, but due of managerial problems, they were conducted in three waves until now (1996, 2004 and 2017). The most recent available publication for me were the results of researches in 2004⁴.

A detailed application of these surveys is not possible, because in contrast to SCI, the MCIG does not release the raw data for researchers. For this reason, many analyses are impossible to conduct here. Another shortcoming is the representation of social concepts in the study. For instance, there are no precise definition regarding classes. Although the term “middle class” is applied in the study, one cannot find a discussion of the meaning of “middle”. The data collected by MCIG was categorized by provinces. For this study, I integrated the data in a table for a better comparison at the national level. Some data were also gathered in the main cities of Iran. For this reason, I chose some main metropolises in Iran for representing the data.

Although there are so many disadvantages, one can compare these findings with my results as a verifying study in order to depict a fuller picture of cultural consumption in Iran. Following, we can see different tables about consumption in Iran. The data on leisure time activities (e.g. frequencies, quality and etc.), cultural goods consumption (visiting cinema, theater and etc.) and expenditure on cultural goods were ascertained from two national surveys.

11.1 Leisure time activities

Leisure time activities are one of the main interests talking about higher and middle classes. The feeling of relief caused by having a high-income job beside the fact that they own more financial resources cause the opportunity for the rich to have different activities in comparison to low-income groups. Another point is the study of Veblen (1899) about leisure activities, which indicated the importance of leisure time as a

⁴ The last survey has been published in 2020. Since the focus of dissertation were the years between 1984 and 2013, I preferred not to consider the data for this research.

distinguishing factor between classes. Table 11-1 demonstrates the time Iranians spend weekly for leisure time. From this table, it can be calculated that about 40 per cent of Iranians have less than 10 hours per week for leisure activities. To compare, we can see that the time per day spent on leisure activities in Finland is 361 minutes per day (42 Hours per week). The mean value for Iran is 20 hours per week (Statista, 2020).

Table 11-1- Hours of leisure time in a week

Time	Per cent
Less than 5 hours	22,2
5-10	17,8
10,1-15	12,4
15,1-20	8,9
20,1-25	11,8
25,1-30	8,9
30,1-40	7,2
40,1-50	6
More than 50,1 hours	4,8
<i>Mean</i>	<i>19,7</i>

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 353. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

Table 11-2 shows the main activities of Iranian households in their leisure time. Interestingly, reading is the main leisure time activity of Iranians, although the average time for reading is very low in comparison to most countries around the world. Iranians read in average about 13 minutes per day (Donyaye Eghtesad, 2018: 3). Indeed, Iranians read one tenth of world average, but reading is the main activity. The second most common activity of Iranians are multi-media related activities (i.e. watching TV and films). About one fifth of Iranians spend their leisure time with these activities. According to a study conducted by OECD (2009), watching television is the preferred leisure activity across all surveyed OECD countries. These statistics can reinforce our findings in chapter 10 that reading is main leisure time activity of Iranian households. Another variable about leisure time is the social network. Table 11-3 show that 68 per cent of the Iranians prefer to spend their leisure time with their family. As a matter of fact, the social network of Iranians is based on familial relations.

Table 11-2- Activities of the Leisure Time

Activity	Per cent
Reading	21,7
Rest and Relaxing	17
Sport Activities	5,7
Multi-Media	19,4
Excursion	9
Private Activities	9,4
Artistic Activities	5,8
Religious Activities	4,1
Social Networking (Party, Family gathering, ...)	6,4

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 354. Copyright 2004 by Vezeerat Ershad.

Table 11-3- Social Network of Leisure Activities

	Per cent
Family	68,3
Relatives	7,4
Friends	16,3
Colleagues	0,9
Neighbors	2
Alone	4,2

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 355. Copyright 2004 by Vezeerat Ershad.

The leisure time activities and network of Iranians seem to be different from Europeans (cf. Eurostat 2018; 2004). Iranians prefer to spend time with their family and their average weekly leisure time is under the average of Europeans. One can also find a difference between men and women. Table 11-4 contains the main leisure time activities of Iranians regarding gender, age, education, occupation and marital status.

Table 11-4- Leisure Time Activities ordered by Age, Gender, Occupation and Marital Status (%)

	Gender		Age			Education					Occupation					Marital Status	
	M	F	15-29	30-49	50<	Illiterate	1-5	5-10	High School	University	Employed	Unemployed	Housewife	Student	Retired	S	M
Reading	19,4	24,2	22,7	21,2	19,5	-	7,6	17,4	25,9	42,7	21,3	21,1	19,1	25,4	22,7	23,3	20,7
Rest and Relaxing	21,9	11,8	15,7	17,5	20	30,8	20,6	17,4	15,2	10,8	21,4	22,1	12,5	12,9	20,2	15,1	18,1
Sport Activities	9,6	1,7	8,7	3,1	1,2	0,4	2,3	8,5	5,9	5,5	5,5	8,5	1,6	11,5	1,7	10,8	2,6
Multi-Media	16,6	22,3	23,5	16,1	13	17,6	16,8	21,7	20,8	15,9	14,5	19,5	18,4	30,5	12,7	25,5	15,7
Excursion	11,5	6,3	11	7,2	6	5,5	6,9	11,5	9,3	7,1	10,5	13,1	5,7	9,5	6,4	11	7,7
Private Activities	8,8	10,2	5,7	12,5	15,4	16,5	14,3	7,8	8,2	7,6	11,9	4,9	12,4	2,8	11,6	4,1	12,8
Artistic Activities	1,6	10,1	6,6	6	1,9	2,6	8,2	5,6	6,8	3,3	1,9	4,9	12,8	3,5	1,2	5,1	6,2
Religious Activities	1,5	6,8	1,4	5	12,3	11,4	11	2,8	2,2	1,2	1,9	0,9	9,6	0,9	7,5	1,1	6
Social Networking (Party, Family gathering, ...)	8	4,6	3,7	9,5	8,1	13,2	10,2	5,7	4,6	4,6	9,7	4,2	5,6	2,6	7,5	3,6	8,1

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 357. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

The image of leisure time activities can be interpreted in many different ways, i.e., we see that less educated people spend more their time with religious activities. Another point is the difference between genders regarding sport activities. While men spend 9,6% of their leisure doing sports, women spend only 1,7% of theirs. Also, men spend twice as much time relaxing as women. Men have more time for social networking and parties. Therefore, the gender variable plays an important role in studies about leisure time.

11.2 Traveling

Travels can give us an image about the leisure time behavior of a household. To go on a trip is normally an expensive activity in comparison to many other leisure time activities. Indeed, it shows the fortune and wealth of a household. Besides, it is a sign that the household has more opportunities. Table 11-5 shows the frequency of trips in

a year. 67 per cent of Iranians go on a trip one or two times in a year. Indeed, just one third of Iranians go on a trip more than two times in a year, which is not too much.

Table 11-5- Trips during a year

Numbers	Per cent
1-2 times	67,7
3-4 times	21,2
More than 4 times	11,1

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 356. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

The following tables show the economic condition of households and weekend activities, vacation plan and hindrances for planning respectively. Statistics regarding travel are only available for the main cities of every province. For this reason, I chose the four largest cities for comparison.

When we consider different possible activities, we see that going on a walk in the parks and attending educational courses are more popular than reading and visiting the cinema. In this respect, we see that the families with a better economic condition go to the cinema more than other strata.

Due to a different questionnaire, the results of the survey are not comparable between different cities; but we see clearly that the low-income households tend to visit cities mostly for religious purposes.

Table 11-6- Economic condition and weekend activities (four largest cities after Tehran)

	MASHHAD			TABRIZ			ESFAHAN			SHIRAZ		
	Economic condition			Economic condition			Economic condition			Economic condition		
	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High
Educational courses	20,5	29,8	21,7	6,8	4,1	0	9,4	6,3	-	-	-	-
Excursion in Parks	22,3	19,2	21,7	30,1	24,5	33,3	18,8	21,5	-	8	3,5	5,9
Artistic activities	15,8	18,3	17,4	-	-	-	12,8	11,4	-	-	-	-
Cinema	11,6	3,8	17,4	-	-	-	10,7	5,1	-	2,6	9,4	11,8
Party	10,7	6,7	26,1	12	14,3	33,3	18,2	11,4	-	11,9	20	23,5
Reading	8,6	10,6	26,1	6,8	8,2	0	-	-	-	8,4	12,9	11,8
Sport activities	5,1	11,5	13	7,8	4,1	0	22,1	27,8	-	4,8	2,4	0
Pilgrim travels	-	-	-	18	16,3	0	-	-	-	7,7	-	-
Travelling (for fun)	-	-	-	30,8	32,7	33,3	18	21,5		31,5	45,9	41,2

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004b, pp. (Shiraz: 244); (Esfahan: 257); (Mashhad: 248); (Tabriz: 264). Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

Table 11-7- Economic condition and yearly vacation plan (four largest cities after Tehran)

	MASHHAD			TABRIZ			ESFAHAN			SHIRAZ		
	Economic condition			Economic condition			Economic condition			Economic condition		
	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High
Traveling (for fun)	9,5	3,8	0	57,6	61,2	66,7	57,8	68,4	-	55,9	61,2	52,9
Pilgrim travels	31	18,3	8,7	49,6	28,6	33,3	33,1	22,8	-	25,1	14,1	11,8
Sport activities	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	16,5	-	-	-	-
Artistic activities	3,6	2,9	0	-	-	-	10,4	7,6	-	4,2	1,2	5,9
Excursion in Parks	47,9	45,2	78,3	11,3	2	0	5,5	2,5	-	-	-	-
Travel to visit relatives	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,6	5,1	-	-	-	-
Party	-	-	-	4,5	2	0	3,1	7,6	-	-	-	-
Educational courses	10,4	21,2	21,7	4,5	8,2	0	3,4	3,8	-	-	-	-
Reading	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,1	3,8	-	-	-	-
Traveling abroad	-	-	-	2,8	4,1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004b, pp. (Mashhad: 248); (Tabriz: 264); (Esfahan: 258); (Shiraz: 246). Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

a) The numbers show the percentage.

Table 11-8 indicates the hindrances of vacation planning which completely depend on the economic situation. Lack of money seems to be a hinderance for most of low-income families. In contrast, lack of mood plays an important role for the rich not to travel. In Table 11-9, we can find information about weekend activities of households regarding their job prestige.

Table 11-8- Economic condition and hindrances for yearly vacation planning (four large cities after Tehran)

	MASHHAD			TABRIZ			ESFAHAN			SHIRAZ		
	Economic condition			Economic condition			Economic condition			Economic condition		
	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High
Lack of money	87,8	62,5	52,2	100	71,4	0	100	100	-	71,4	50,6	23,5
Lack of mood	5,7	6,7	21,7	12	18,4	0	12,8	6,3	-	14,5	15,3	23,5
Lack of means	36	29,8	34,8	54,6	53,1	100	56	46,8	-	30,9	24,7	17,6
Lack of facilities in the society	9,5	19,2	34,8	18,5	12,2	0	16,7	22,8	-	11,9	11,8	17,6

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004b, pp. (Mashhad: 248); (Tabriz: 264); (Esfahan: 258); (Shiraz: 246). Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

a) The numbers show the percentage.

Interestingly, the kind of leisure time activity is related to job prestige. For example, the high prestige occupations in Mashhad prefer not to go on an excursion in parks,

which is a popular activity among low prestige jobs and also low-income households. Another common leisure time activity is reading, that is done in all cities. Besides, going to parties seems to be one of the most common activities of Iranians, that is rather similar between different groups.

Table 11-9- Job prestige and weekend activities (four largest cities after Tehran)

	MASHHAD			TABRIZ			ESFAHAN			SHIRAZ		
	Job Prestige			Job Prestige			Job Prestige			Job Prestige		
	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High
Educational courses	23,6	6,9	55,6	7,2	4,2	0	30,3	36,9	33,4	-	-	-
Excursion in Parks	22,2	31	0	30,1	29,2	11,1	18,2	16,7	20,8	4,5	5,6	0
Artistic activities	18,6	13,8	22,2	-	-	-	11,8	14,3	8,3	-	-	-
Cinema	11,1	3,4	0	-	-	-	10,4	8,3	16,7	3,9	2,8	5,3
Party	11,1	13,8	11,1	13,5	8,3	22,2	16,1	15,5	12,5	13,2	11,1	31,6
Reading	9,2	13,8	11,1	6	8,3	33,3	12,5	7,1	7,4	7,4	11,1	15,8
Sport activities	6,1	13,8	11,1	6,9	10,4	11,1	-	-	-	4,5	11,1	5,3
Pilgrim travels	-	-	-	16,6	16,7	0	-	-	-	5,5	2,8	0
Travelling (for fun)	-	-	-	11,1	29,2	31	16,8	25	29,2	5,3	22,2	17,4

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004b, pp. (Mashhad: 249); (Tabriz: 265); (Esfahan: 259); (Shiraz: 247). Copyright 2004 by Vezeerat Ershad.

a) The numbers show the percentage.

Travelling behavior of this survey shows very similar results to our findings in chapter 10, especially in regard of the relation between travelling behavior and occupation. In three main cities, job prestige is decisive in travelling activities.

11.3 Watching TV and satellite programs, listening to radio and reading books, magazines and newspapers

Table 11-10 shows the results to the question: “How many hours a day do you watch TV?”. Table 11-11 and Table 11-12 pose the same question regarding radio and satellite. Interestingly, listening to the radio is not a popular activity; in contrast to watching satellite programs where more than two third of the population watch half an hour to two hours satellite programs per day on average.

According to statistics, more than 90 per cent of Iranians own a TV-set in the 2000s; therefore, we can assume that the percentage of people who watch television must be high. Table 11-11 proves the hypothesis; more than 50 per cent of Iranians watch at least 2 hours television per day. In contrast, radio is not popular in the recent years.

Table 11-12 shows that in 2002, 82 per cent of Iranians spend less than one hour listening to the radio. We can justify this tendency due to changes in the technology and the attractiveness of the television in comparison to the radio. The older generation has been born as the TV-sets were not widespread and people had mostly listened to radio, but the new generation has the opportunity to have television at home. Indeed, we can assume that there is an intergenerational difference whereas radio is an entertainment for the older generation and television is popular for all people.

Table 11-10- How many hours do you watch TV in a day?

	Sex		Age			Education					Occupation					Marital Status	
	M	F	15-29	30-49	50<	Illiterate	1-5	5-10	High School	University	Employed	Unemployed	Housewife	Student	Retired	S	M
Less than one hour	18,6	13,1	13,9	15,9	23,5	30,6	17	11,7	13,6	20,6	20,6	11	12,7	14,4	17,1	15	16,5
1,1 – 2 hours	26,2	19,4	20,5	24	28,4	27	22,8	19,9	21,7	28,4	29,4	17,1	17,8	21,1	25,4	20,5	24,3
2,1 – 3 hours	22,4	21,3	21,8	22,5	20,4	15,3	23,8	22,5	21,5	22,2	23	19,1	19,5	24,5	22,7	23,6	20,8
3,1 – 4 hours	13,5	15,5	15,8	14,3	9,7	9,1	13,1	15	15,9	14,2	12,9	14	15	16,7	13,8	15,8	13,6
4,1 – 5 hours	9,2	13,1	11,6	10,6	10,5	9,8	9,8	12,6	12,6	7,5	7,7	14	15	16,7	13,8	15,8	13,6
5,1 – 6 hours	4,5	6,7	6,6	5	3,2	2,6	4,8	7,7	5,9	3,1	3	9,5	8	5,2	3,9	5,3	5,8
6,1 – 7 hours	1,7	2,7	2,6	1,8	1,8	1	2,5	2,9	2,3	0,9	0,8	3,4	3,4	2	3,3	2,2	2,2
7,1 – 8 hours	2,2	3,2	3,1	2,7	1,1	1,6	2,5	3,7	2,7	1,3	1,2	5,6	3,6	3	1,7	3	2,5
8,1 – 9 hours	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	-	-	0,1	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,1	-	0,1	0,2
9,1 – 10 hours	1,1	2,5	2,2	1,4	1	1	2,2	2,1	1,9	0,9	0,8	3,4	2,7	1,3	1,7	1,6	1,9
More than 10 hours	0,6	2,3	1,7	1,5	0,3	2	1,4	1,5	1,6	0,9	0,4	2,7	2,9	0,8	-	1,5	1,4

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 359. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

a) The numbers show the percentage.

Table 11-11- How many hours do you listen to the radio?

Hours	Per cent
Less than one hour	82,1
1 - 2	8,5
2,1 – 3	3,4
3,1 – 4	1,7
4,1 – 5	1,4
More than 5 hours	2,9

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 364. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

It is important to notice that it is forbidden to have a satellite receiver in Iran and the police is allowed to confiscate the equipment related to satellite receivers. Nevertheless, there are many Iranians who prefer to take the risk and watch satellite programs. Due to Table 11-12, 35 per cent of Iranians spend at least two hours per day watching satellite programs.

Table 11-12- How many hours do you watch satellite programs?

Hours	Per cent
Less than half an hour	12,2
0,5 – 1	25,5
1,1 – 2	26,7
2,1 – 3	16,5
3,1 – 4	7,8
4,1 – 5	4,6
More than 5 hours	6,7

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 364. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

The following tables provide information about reading magazines, newspapers and books. The statistics related to reading newspapers, magazines and books show that about 40 per cent of people do not read magazines and newspapers at all and 24 per cent do not read any books in a week.

Reading books, magazines and newspapers counts normally as a distinguishing difference between groups and especially stands in the heart of this study as a decisive point regarding cultural consumption. Table 11-14 shows the daily hours of reading books; clearly, more educated people read more, which seems to be obvious.

Table 11-15 shows the relation of economic condition and reading and owning books. The results have a very particular point; although groups with a high economic condition own and buy more books, the average number of books read by every group is almost the same; which means that the high-income people tend to accumulate their cultural capital, but the consumption is similar between different income groups.

Table 11-13- How many hours a day do you read newspapers and magazines?

	Sex		Age			Education				Occupation					Marital Status	
	M	F	15-29	30-49	50<	1-5 years	5-10 years	High School	University	Employed	Unemployed	Housewife	Student	Retired	S	M
0	35,8	41,4	32,5	39,5	58,2	65,6	36,1	25,8	17,3	34,7	36,5	50,6	26,5	47,5	31	43
Less than half an hour	26,8	22,5	28,1	24,1	13,8	16,7	27,9	27,9	30,4	25,3	24,8	19,2	33,4	16,6	29,4	21,9
0,5-1	23,5	22,4	24,6	22,7	17,7	11,9	22,9	29,3	31,4	25,6	23,4	18,8	25,3	18,2	23,8	22,5
1,1 – 2	9,9	8,5	9,5	9,4	7,6	3,9	8,4	11,9	14,6	10,1	9,2	7	10,2	13,3	10,5	8,5
2,1 – 3	2,6	3,4	3,4	2,9	1,5	1,1	2,7	9,3	4,6	2,9	3,6	5,7	3,4	1,7	3,6	2,6
3,1 – 4	0,7	1	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,4	1,2	0,7	1,3	0,8	1,1	0,9	0,6	1,7	0,8	0,9
More than 4 hours	0,8	0,7	1,1	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,8	1,2	0,4	0,6	1,4	0,7	0,5	1,1	1	0,6

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 371. Copyright 2004 by Vezerat Ershad.

Table 11-14- How many hours in a week do you read books that are not related to your studies?

	Sex		Age			Education				Occupation					Marital Status	
	M	F	15-29	30-49	50<	1-5 years	5-10 years	High School	University	Employed	Unemployed	Housewife	Student	Retired	S	M
0,1 – 1	23,4	24,9	7,23	24,9	23,8	36,3	26,5	22,5	18,6	23,3	16,8	28,5	24,7	14,3	23,6	24,6
1,1 – 3	38	39,5	40,1	36,5	38,1	39,7	39,8	39	36,5	36,6	36,9	39,5	42,1	34,5	38,9	38,6
3,1 – 5	18,9	16,4	17	18,5	18,7	14,1	17,3	17,7	19,5	19,8	20,1	15,1	16,1	19	17,7	17,6
5,1 – 7	6,8	7,7	6,8	8,4	6	5	7,3	7,3	8,1	6,9	7,7	7,7	6,7	10,7	6,8	7,6
7,1 – 9	1,4	1,8	1,3	2,2	1,2	-	1,5	2,2	1,5	2	1,8	1,8	0,9	-	1,2	1,9
9,1 – 11	4,6	3,3	4,4	3,1	4,4	2,3	2,8	3,9	6,2	4,7	2,1	2,1	3,6	3,7	5	3,1
More than 11 hours	7	6,4	6,7	6,5	7,9	2,7	4,9	7,5	9,6	6,5	5,3	5,3	6	14,3	6,7	6,7

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 374. Copyright 2004 by Vezerat Ershad.

Table 11-15- Economic condition and Reading books in one year (four large cities after Tehran)

	MASHHAD			TABRIZ			ESFAHAN			SHIRAZ		
	Economic condition			Economic condition			Economic condition			Economic condition		
	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	High
Percent of people reading books	85,3	91,1	95,5	83,9	88,9	100	90,7	92,2	100	63,2	65	75
Number of books owned by person	38,8	65,6	111,9	36,3	168	123,3	68,1	136,3	83,3	56	73,5	86,8
Number of books bought by person	2,9	5,9	7	2,1	6	7	5,7	6,9	9,3	4,2	5,9	6,4
Average number of books read	1,7	1,7	1,5	1,6	1,89	1,65	1,8	1,9	2,4	1,8	1,9	1,7

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004b, pp. (Mashhad: 42); (Tabriz: 42); (Esfahan: 42); (Shiraz: 42). Copyright 2004 by Vezerat Ershad.

11.4 Social capital

Social capital is also a concept investigated by Bourdieu. Trust and reliability are central to social capital. Table 11-16 and Table 11-17 hold information about the perceived reliability of people and different occupation groups. Teachers and academics are two groups whom people mostly trust.

The studies measuring social capital in Iran prove that the level of social capital is low (cf. Nedjat et al., 2013; Shiani et al., 2009; Abdollahi et al., 2007). In Table 11-16, we can see that the majority of the people considers the reliability of others in a medium level. Indeed, as reported in Table 11-17, Iranians spend more than 70 per cent of their leisure time with family members and relatives, which confirms that social network of Iranians is mostly based on blood relationship and relatedness.

Table 11-16- How reliable are people?

	Sex		Age			Education					Occupation					Marital Status	
	M	F	15-29	30-49	50<	Illiterate	1-5	5-10	High School	University	Employed	Unemployed	Housewife	Student	Retired	S	M
Low	24,5	33,2	31,3	26,5	25,2	29,9	29	31,8	29,2	21,1	22,2	37,5	33,3	31,3	20,6	30,7	27,6
Middle	57,7	56,1	57,9	56,8	53,2	49	52,9	57,9	58,2	59,5	58,2	53,6	54,7	59,4	57,1	58,9	55,7
High	17,8	10,7	10,7	16,6	21,6	21,1	18,1	10,3	12,6	18,6	19,6	8,9	12	9,5	22,3	10,4	16,7

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 263. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

Table 11-17 compares the reliability of different occupation groups from Iranians point of view. Notably, the Iranians trust teachers and academics more than other groups. After these two groups, sportspersons are considered as most trustworthy. It is no wonder, in many historical natural catastrophes in Iran there were famous sportsperson who collected the donations. For example, we can name Takhti in 1960s and recently Ali Daei who gathered the charitable contributions for two earthquakes which destructed many houses and killed many people. In some way, these sportspersons are more reliable than governmental administrative. On the other side, we can see that Iranians do not trust real estates and car dealers. Generally, it seems that the people who are in business and trading (like bazaris, dealers and shopkeepers) have only minimum trust.

The interesting point here is the high reliability of occupations with higher cultural capital in comparison to occupations with high economic capital. For instance, we can compare that people trust teachers, students and doctors and in contrast, they do not trust governmental administrators (even judges), shop keepers and dealers.

Due to our finding in chapter 10, the army officials are economically and culturally similar to the middle class. Interestingly, workers are in the middle of the trust spectrum, where they were found very reliable in the survey.

Table 11-17- How reliable is each of these occupations?

	Low	Middle	High
<i>Workers</i>	15,2	35,5	49,3
<i>Real estates and car dealers</i>	74,2	21,6	4,2
<i>Taxi drivers</i>	33,2	45,9	20,9
<i>Doctors</i>	11,6	32,4	56
<i>Judges</i>	28,7	36	35,3
<i>Shopkeepers</i>	39,3	43,9	16,8
<i>Police</i>	19,8	27,2	53
<i>Traffic police</i>	17,2	27,7	55,1
<i>Bazaris and Tradesmen</i>	52,5	37	10,5
<i>Army officials</i>	13,3	30,7	56
<i>Governmental administrators</i>	34,1	44,3	21,6
<i>Teachers</i>	5	17,7	77,3
<i>Journalists</i>	24,2	43	32,8
<i>Academics</i>	6,4	23,1	70,5
<i>Sportspersons</i>	8,2	29,7	62,1
<i>Clergies</i>	28,3	30,8	40,8
<i>Artists</i>	13,1	39,2	47,7
<i>Students</i>	10,5	36,6	52,9

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 267. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

a) The numbers show the percentage for each occupation.

11.5 Class Identity (Subjective)

A typical example in social sciences is the bias in the question, which asks “which class do you belong to?” and the typical answer is *middle class*; because the people mostly compare themselves with friends and relatives and since they feel their situation similar

to others, believe that they belong to middle class. Table 11-18 shows the subjective belonging to middle class. The people have answered that they belong to middle class. The most interesting group are the *students* whereas 80% believe that they belong to middle class. Interestingly, the percentage of Iranians who count themselves as higher class is noticeably *low*. Two reasons can be mentioned as the reason for that. Firstly, the upper class feels that the income (and earning) is not high enough to be count themselves as upper class. Secondly, as discussed before conducting a simple life is a virtue in Iran and the people are not ready to mention that they have a lavish lifestyle.

Table 11-18- Which class do you belong to?

	Sex		Age			Education					Occupation					Marital Status	
	M	F	15-29	30-49	50<	Illiterate	1-5	5-10	High School	University	Employed	Unemployed	Housewife	Student	Retired	S	M
Higher	1,2	1,6	1,9	1	0,5	0,3	1,2	1,3	0,9	2,9	1,1	1,4	1	2,7	-	2,1	0,9
Middle	63,6	80	77	67,7	62,2	45,4	58,5	72,1	79,8	78,9	65,2	58	76,3	85,2	57,2	77,1	68,4
Lower	35,2	18,5	21,1	31,3	37,3	54,2	40,2	26,6	19,3	18,2	33,7	40,6	22,6	12,1	42,8	20,8	30,7

Note. Adapted from *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*, by Ershad – MCIG, 2004, p. 287. Copyright 2004 by Vezarat Ershad.

11.6 Cultural Activities and Consumption

In the recent years, the third wave of the national survey “Consumption of Cultural Goods” was conducted and some findings were published. The sample size was 15500 individuals older than 15 in rural and urban areas of 31 provinces. Some findings are presented in Figure 11-1.

Figure 11-1 presents in details how Iranians consume cultural commodities in 21st century. 93% of Iranians watch TV, 22% go to cinema, 30% listen to radio, 72% listen to music, 47% read books and 28% newspapers. This information helped us to have an image about the cultural consumption in Iran, which will be used by finding correlations and regression models. Indeed, the surveys of MCIG resulted in verification of analysis and facilitates to have some assumptions regarding different variables. The main point here is accordance of these statistics with the data used for this study. One point here is the obvious decrease of cinema attendance in comparison to last decades.


Due to Toepler and Zimmer (2002), there are three approaches regarding cultural policy: The Bureaucratic Top-Down Approach to Cultural Policy (like France), The

Corporatist Approach to Cultural Policy (Sweden) and Dominance of the Private Sector in Cultural Policy Initiatives (United States). In the first approach, the government plays a dominant role particularly in the production of high-culture, resulting in high levels of public spending for the arts and culture. Therefore, we can see that the Iranian government follows this approach to control the cultural taste of Iranians, which is very decisive in cultural consumption of households.


In chapter 11, the main findings of the 2nd wave of values and attitudes were described in order to present a better overview of cultural consumption in Iran. The main points are the coverage of television in Iranian society and a high rate of musical product consumption. This statistic in line with the fact that the government tries to control cultural taste of the Iranian society is a key to understand high amount of investigation in cultural fields by the government.

Figure 11-1- Cultural Consumption in Iran


Reading Newspaper




Reading Books




Travel




Watching TV




Listening to Radio



Going to Cinema



Listening to Music



Note. Adapted from *Infographic of Iranians' cultural consumption*, by Asr-Iran, 2020.

- a) The numbers show the percentage of the population who does this cultural activity.

12 Calculations and Correlations

The findings until now show that there are relations between education, occupation, income and expenditure on cultural goods. Besides, we have the opportunity to investigate the changes in consumption patterns of different groupings during the past decades. Figure 12-1 and Figure 12-2 show that the expenses on cultural goods and publications are lower than in European countries (cf. Statista, 2020; Eurostat, 2018; 2004). Notably, the professionals (experts) spend more than other occupations on buying books, magazines and newspapers. In Figure 12-3, the changes of expenses for books, magazines and newspapers are depicted for middle- and high-income occupations (major occupation groups 1 to 6).

Figure 12-1- Cultural goods and leisure time expenses in total expenses

Multiple Line Mean of Cultural Goods and Leisure Time Expenditure Rate in Total Exp. by Year in Gergorian Calender by Occupation in 10 Groups



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 12-1 pinpoints the changes in percentage of leisure time expenditure in the whole expenditure for nine ISCO occupation groups. In general, we can see that the rate has increased through the years. Interestingly, in the first years of our investigation, managers have spent a greater share of their expenditure for leisure time, followed by experts. Since 2007, we can follow the trend that workers (simple, expert and industrial)


spend less on cultural goods and leisure time activities. A reason for that can be the implementation of neo-liberal policies and the weakening of social security. One can also observe the increase in equality based on the change in Gini Coefficient before social transfers in Figure 9-2.

In contrast, the major group 1 (managers and governmental administrative) who had spent smaller share of their income on cultural goods, has started to spend more on cultural goods and leisure time activities.

As discussed in chapter 5, DiMaggio (1992) and Chan & Goldthorpe (2007) have considered the cultural consumption as buying and reading books and written media. For this reason, I investigate the expenses of a household on written media in detail. It must be mentioned that the advantage of analyzing written media (in comparison to digital media) is that they exist from the beginning of the investigating period and for this reason, it is possible to compare consumption for a longer period of time.

Figure 12-2- Expenses on books, magazines and newspapers in all expenses for all occupations

Multiple Line Mean of The consumption of books, magazines and newspapers divided by total consumption by Year in Gergorian Calender by Occupation in 10 Groups




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 12-2 reports the average expenditure of every occupation group on books, magazines and newspapers. One can observe a convergent pattern for different groups and since 2010, all groups spend similar amounts on written media. The findings here is also in accordance with the survey conducted by MCIG presented in Table 11-14 and

Table 11-15. For a detailed observation of middle- and high-income occupations, a graph of five major groups is depicted in appendix 2.

For a better understanding of cultural consumption of the Iranian middle class, we can concentrate on the higher income occupations (middle and upper classes). Figure 12-3 represents the share of household's expenditure on cultural goods. Curiously, the maximum is 1,5 % which means that a family in Iran spends a very low amount of money for cultural commodities. In this respect, office employees and service employees (typical middle class) have spent more in 2010s. A main reason for that can be the interest of high-income families in investing in housing market or in luxurious style of life (e.g. expensive trips to Europe or other parts of the world – see table 10-2). The important note here is that in 2016, households in European Union devoted 1,1% share of their total expenditure to books, newspapers and stationery (Eurostat, 2017) which is very similar to Iranians middle occupation groups.

Figure 12-3- Percentage of Cultural Expenditure in Total Expenses by Occupation




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Another important point about Iranians is the limitation of cultural activities due to religious and governmental obstacles. For example, there are many theater pieces and cinema films, that are banned or many music bands that are not allowed to perform on stage. These obstacles have resulted in a lower tendency of the public to go cinemas or concerts in the last years of investigation.

In Figure 12-4, we can observe firstly the difference between the amount of money each group spends for make-up services with the expenses of cultural goods including books or theater tickets and secondly the average amount spent by each occupation groups for make-up services and cultural goods. By comparing Figure 12-3 and Figure 12-4, we note that although the share of expenses on cultural goods in all expenses for the middle-income occupations higher than for other groups, the amount of money spent by experts and professionals is the highest (see also table 10-2 for more details). Besides, the results show that Iranians spend three times more on make-up than on other cultural goods.


Figure 12-4– Bar Charts of different Expenditure of Households to compare with Cultural Goods



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 12-5 makes it clear that Iranians prefer to buy newspapers more than other published media. Besides, the percentage of expenditure on educational books is remarkable. For example, the expenditure of the first two major groups on non-educational books is almost the same as expenses on educational books. Students, in contrast, spend less money on educational books and prefer to buy non-educational books. We can assume that there is a tendency to borrow books for study instead of buying them, which can also justify the reason for low amount of print run in scientific fields.

Figure 12-5- Expenditure of Households on different written media by Occupations




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 12-6 illustrates the expenditure of families on hotels and restaurants, hairstyle and make-up, and books, magazines and newspapers. Referring to these figures, we see that the expenditure on restaurants and hotels is much higher than expenditure on written media. The expenditure on hairstyling and make-up is in the middle. As we can see, the main leisure activity of Iranians is consuming foods in restaurants. Interestingly, workers and housekeepers spend a bigger share (of their costs) on hair-styling and make-up. The remarkable point here is that the mean amount spent on make-up and styling is very similar among different groups, but the expenditure on leisure time and cultural activities varies strongly. In my opinion, it is a very interesting finding that for Iranians, the appearance is the most important demand.

Figure 12-7 summarizes the household's spending on buying music bands' products (e.g. CDs and tapes), galleries, visiting historical places and museum entrances, library membership and opera/concert tickets. Obviously, expenditure on these cultural activities is different between occupations. For example, the high- and middle-income groups (except the professionals and experts) spend the most on products related to

music; namely, they buy CDs and cassettes. The experts are the only group, that prefer to spend more money on entrances to museums and historical places. It is no wonder that students have to allocate more money for library membership. We have discussed that the students prefer to borrow books instead of buying them. Opera and concert visits are activities of high-income groups. As we can see in Figure 12-7, the first two groups – managers and experts spent the most on tickets for opera and music concerts. One reason for that are the high prices of these tickets in comparison to cinema tickets; therefore, the main cultural activity which is common would be going to cinema.


Figure 12-6- Expenditure on Food in Restaurants, on Make-up and on Written Media by Occupations (Rials – adjusted with the year 1984)



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

The figures in this section are a comparison between different occupational groups in different fields of consumption. In this way, we have found out which field of consumption is more popular among groups. For example, the professionals and experts spend the most on *written media*. Interestingly, the popular media among written ones is the newspaper and the expenditure on (non-educational) books is low.

Figure 12-7- Expenditure on Music Events, on Gallery Entrances, on Library Membership, on Concerts and on Tickets for Museums by Occupations



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

The results help us to portray the consumption patterns of groups. For instance, students eat a lot in the restaurants and borrow books. In contrast, the households whose head is a housekeeper eat less in restaurants and spend more money on make-up. The very low proportion of expenditure on tickets for museums and entrance of historical places is another characteristic of Iranians.

Now, we can check the correlations between consumption and investigating variables. Formerly, we assumed that cultural consumption could be a function of income, occupation, education, age, gender and household's size. Table 12-1 shows correlations between these variables.

Table 12-1- Correlation Table (cultural consumption is related to income, occupation, education, age, gender and household's size)

		Expenditure on Cultural Goods and Leisure Time	Cultural Goods and Leisure Time Expenditure Rate in Total Exp.
Expenditure on Cultural Goods and Leisure Time	Pearson Correlation	1	,589**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000
	N	276202	265243
Cultural Goods and Leisure Time Expenditure Rate in Total Exp.	Pearson Correlation	,589**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	
	N	265243	265243
Cultural Costs (Percent)	Pearson Correlation	,505**	,877**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
	N	276202	265243
Total Expenditure	Pearson Correlation	,093**	,017**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
	N	276202	265243
Year	Pearson Correlation	,082**	,089**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
	N	276202	265243
Adjusted Equalized Income Categories in 3	Pearson Correlation	,083**	,109**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
	N	250497	250497
Log of Equalized Income	Pearson Correlation	,080**	,107**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
	N	247996	247996
equalized income of a household regarding inflation and Household's size ("OECD- modified" scale) with no minus value	Pearson Correlation	,050**	,049**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
	N	250497	250497
Food Costs (Percent)	Pearson Correlation	,016**	,042**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
	N	276202	265243
Occupation of Household's Head in 15 Groups	Pearson Correlation	-,003	-,037**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,193	,000
	N	194631	187243
Head of Household's Education in 10 Groups	Pearson Correlation	,055**	,106**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
	N	254918	244224
Head of Household's Gender	Pearson Correlation	-,012**	-,038**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000

	N	276202	265243
Head of Household's Age	Pearson Correlation	,004	-,065**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,059	,000
	N	276202	265243
Household's Size	Pearson Correlation	-,013**	,006**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,001
	N	276202	265243

There is significant correlation between cultural expenditure and almost all the investigated variables, although many of them show weak Pearson coefficients; for instance, the correlation with household's size is too weak, even though it is significant. In this respect, it seems that the correlation with income and education is stronger than other correlations. The point here is that the large sample has resulted in a situation that the correlation result is significant.

12.1 Cultural consumption

Since the main focus of this study are middle classes, in this point, I try to find out the probable patterns of cultural consumption among this group. As described before, two main factors distinguish the middle class: income and occupation. Middle income would be considered as the people who earn between 80% and 200% of the median income. The comparison of Table 12-2 and Table 12-3 points out an interesting point regarding cultural goods consumption.

Table 12-2- Mean Value of Cultural Consumption of different Income Groups (in Rials)

Income Group	Cultural Goods Consumption (Expenditure on books; magazines; newspapers; music; gallery, library, cinema and theater museum, opera entrances; and cultural services) – Rials
Low-Income	126371,3374
Middle-Income	368761,4414
High-Income	710595,3684
Total	331323,3697

Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Obviously, the high-income group spend the most on cultural goods (consisting of expenditure on books; magazines; newspapers; music; gallery, library, cinema, theater, museum and opera entrances; and cultural services). Observing the occupations' major groups, the two higher groups (namely, managers and professionals) spend the most on

cultural goods. Interestingly, we can see that students' expenditure on cultural goods is at the level of middle-income Iranians, although they earn almost nothing. One reason for the very weak correlation between income and expenditure on cultural goods could be the role of students.


Table 12-3- Mean Value of Cultural Consumption of different Occupations (in Rials)

Occupation of Household's Head	Cultural Goods Consumption
Managers, senior officials and legislators	537929,1518
Professionals	675308,6046
Technicians and associate professionals	381804,1475
Clerical Support and Office Workers	437967,6498
Services and Sales Workers	275335,6911
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers	125270,9453
Craft and Related Trade Workers	275388,2425
Drivers and Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers	277688,3067
Elementary Occupations	223371,4399
Unemployed (No Job)	280868,2457
Income without Job	304619,6146
Student	350288,6140
Housekeeper	120330,2590
Army Officials	359617,5770
Total	323215,3421

Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 12-8 shows that Iranians with a middle income (with middle- and high-level occupations) spend between 1,5 and 6 per cent of their expenditure on cultural goods and services. In comparison, according to findings of Eurostat (2019), in 2015 3 % of consumption expenditure by EU households was devoted to culture-related goods and services. An interesting point here is the strong decrease of cultural expenditure in 2004; mainly because of the high inflation rate.

Figure 12-8- The percentage that middle income and occupation spend on cultural goods in total expenditure (per cent)



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

For a better understanding, we can further differentiate these findings. Table 12-4 shows the proportion of cultural consumption in total consumption for Iranian households between 1988 and 2013 regarding three income levels. As one can assume, higher income households spend more on cultural goods and services. Interestingly, this proportion is similar to the ratio Europeans spend on cultural goods and services.

Table 12-4- Proportion of Iranians' households' cultural goods and services expenditure in all expenditure of the household separated by income levels
Report

Mean		Cultural
Adjusted Equalized Income		Expenditure Rate
Year in Gergorian Calender	Categories in 3	in Total Exp.
1988	Low-Income	,0163
	Middle-Income	,0290
	High-Income	,0478
	Total	,0210
1990	Low-Income	,0109
	Middle-Income	,0185
	High-Income	,0229
	Total	,0137
1992	Low-Income	,0112
	Middle-Income	,0187
	High-Income	,0235
	Total	,0178
1994	Low-Income	,0176

	Middle-Income	,0345
	High-Income	,0384
	Total	,0258
1996	Low-Income	,0211
	Middle-Income	,0347
	High-Income	,0443
	Total	,0272
1998	Low-Income	,0229
	Middle-Income	,0383
	High-Income	,0550
	Total	,0317
2000	Low-Income	,0260
	Middle-Income	,0422
	High-Income	,0442
	Total	,0340
2002	Low-Income	,0276
	Middle-Income	,0434
	High-Income	,0463
	Total	,0375
2004	Low-Income	,0065
	Middle-Income	,0119
	High-Income	,0122
	Total	,0102
2005	Low-Income	,0498
	Middle-Income	,0523
	High-Income	,0521
	Total	,0515
2006	Low-Income	,0403
	Middle-Income	,0422
	High-Income	,0519
	Total	,0437
2007	Low-Income	,0319
	Middle-Income	,0378
	High-Income	,0387
	Total	,0364
2008	Low-Income	,0308
	Middle-Income	,0315
	High-Income	,0349
	Total	,0318
2009	Low-Income	,0288
	Middle-Income	,0424
	High-Income	,0530
	Total	,0415
2010	Low-Income	,0291
	Middle-Income	,0330
	High-Income	,0393
	Total	,0328

2011	Low-Income	,0236
	Middle-Income	,0320
	High-Income	,0374
	Total	,0311
2012	Low-Income	,0295
	Middle-Income	,0350
	High-Income	,0386
	Total	,0344
2013	Low-Income	,0327
	Middle-Income	,0386
	High-Income	,0426
	Total	,0373
Total	Low-Income	,0245
	Middle-Income	,0351
	High-Income	,0410
	Total	,0321

In sum, the results suggest a model for cultural consumption of Iranians which explains cultural consumption category (low, middle, high) regarding total income of the households and factors including age, gender, education and occupation of the household's head⁵. In this model, I tried to find out the probable correlation of each variable on cultural consumption of Iranians. The relation of variables like income and consumption is predictable, the point here is to find out the percentage of cultural consumption in total expenditure for a means for positioning different classes in social space. It is remarkable that the proportion of cultural consumption in total consumption is low, but the trend can help us to find fluctuations caused by external occurrences. For instance, the cultural consumption of middle income groups shows also a steady rise after the Iran-Iraq war until 2005 and fluctuates after that. The main reason could be changes in lifestyle and liberalization of the country after the war. On the other side, the main goal of President Ahmadinejad (President from 2005 to 2013) was to reduce the inequality and to redistribute the wealth in benefit of the poor, which resulted in changes regarding consumption. These changes can be followed in Table 12-4 which shows that the percentage of cultural consumption among poor families has risen and became comparable with middle- and high-income households after 2005.

⁵ The disadvantage of this model is the low R-Squared, which means that just a small part of the population can be explained by this model. Two main reasons can be mentioned for this shortcoming. Firstly, the database used for this analysis has been managed by public organizations in Iran which makes the outputs doubtful in some cases. This issue will be discussed in chapter 14. Secondly, we investigate cultural consumption behavior of a population with diverse tastes and interests.

In sum, we can name the notable characteristic of consumption in Iran. Firstly, as supposed, there is a correlation between cultural consumption and occupation, education, age, gender and household's size. Although the correlation with gender and household's size is very low, it is significant. Secondly, we can see that the main leisure activity of Iranians is consuming foods in restaurants. Thirdly, the mean amount spent on make-up and styling is very similar among different groups, it seems that Iranian prefer to invest on the appearance more than other aspects of life. Fourthly, the expenditure on leisure time and cultural activities varies strongly between occupational groups; which means that leisure activities and cultural consumption is dependent on occupation and status (and income). Activities like visiting historical places and museums are only a prominent part of the first major occupation groups' lifestyles (namely administrators and professionals), the other groups visit historical places only seldomly. Fifthly, the most popular written media is the newspaper in Iran; which is obviously related to its functionality for different groups. For example, all people can follow the news by reading newspapers.

An important point about the data in Iran is the reliability, there have always been debates about reliability of data gathered by Iranian administrative. In some cases, the difference between results presented by two organizations is an evidence for such a claim. For instance, Central Bank of Iran and Statistic Center of Iran measured and published results of their surveys about income and expenditure in Iran; the results had more than 25 % difference in items like average income or average expenditure of Iranian households (cf. CBI, 2016; 2017 & SCI 2016; 2017). Such differences are reasons to be cautious when analyzing these data. I tried to reduce these kinds of errors in this dissertation by expanding the investigation period in order to minimize measurement and observational errors. It is more probable to have inaccurate data for one year, but if we analyze data of a period of 30 years, the errors might be less.

The second solution in this regard is to discuss the results by experts of the field. The experts can help to review the findings of the research and also fill research gaps that could not be investigated due to lack of resources (e.g. the role of Western culture on Iranian new class or plausibility of statistics). For this purpose, a group of 50 experts in different disciplines of social sciences were invited to reflect their critical opinions about results and assumptions of this dissertation. These reflective expressions aim to validate the results on one side and on the other side, opens new horizons for future studies in this field.

13 Reflections of Experts on Results

As discussed by von Soest (2022), experts are the mechanics and observers in social sciences who can describe interactions and causal mechanisms in a system. That is why; “this method is widely used in analysis of complex social systems and understanding institutional behavior and aims at exploring or collecting data about a specific field of interest” (Döringer, 2021, p. 265). The main advantage of expert interviews, in this regard, is the possibility to promote cumulative knowledge in a field of study which is not reachable with quantitative methods. Another advantage of experts’ knowledge is the possibility to build up a bridge between macro- and micro level of analyses, a link that is difficult to set without background knowledge and a deep social analysis of a phenomena.

As mentioned by Tansey (2009), expert interviews function as affirmation for results of a research. The experts can confirm or disprove the conclusions due to their expertise, background knowledge, information, and evidence. Their function can be seen as a validity and reliability instrument for the reconsideration and reexamination of findings.

In this study, the *historicity* of Iranian class structure was investigated historically in the first five chapters and depicted with the help of quantitative statistical methods in chapter 8 to 12, and then, it is tried to complete with qualitative expert interviews in this chapter. The findings of quantitative investigation needed to be revalidated through the background knowledge of experts in order to overcome the shortages of the database (as well as shortages of the study). By choosing this mixed methods approach, it is possible to cover different aspects of Iranian class structure. Under these considerations, at the last phase of the dissertation, a round of reflexive critical expert interviews was planned in order to affirm the findings of the empirical part. These interviews serve as a re-confirmation or disaffirmation the results which has been discussed in the previous chapters. For this reason, expert interviews have been conducted in the last part of the dissertation for validating of hitherto figured results. Another function of expert-interviews is the support for better interpretation of statistics in this dissertation.

Since choosing the experts is a selective process, the researcher must carefully inquire in a way that gaps of the research are found and the reliability of results discussed. Representativity is not obtained by random sampling, but by a thorough selection of interview-partners, that aims at covering all research gaps. Therefore, I selected 50

scholars from different disciplines of social sciences, whose research fields are related to inequality structure, to Iranian social structure or middle class studies of developing countries. Since some of them requested that they prefer I do not mention their names in the dissertation, I list the main major fields here as 3 (social) anthropologists, 1 demographer, 2 political scientists, 3 social history researchers, 20 sociologists and 21 economists. Apart from the focus in the diversity of the scientists' major fields, I tried to include the main approaches in social sciences; for instance, some of the scholars follow the Marxist approaches, some other structuralist or some conduct researches due to rational choice theory. For this reason, the received answers concluded a variety of viewpoints with different approaches. At the end, 19 answers were received; 15 were written letters, 2 were sent via WhatsApp and 2 interviews were conducted via Zoom. The last four interviews were transcribed later. The method to give reflexive feedback (face-to-face or written) was chosen by the interview-partner and I did not force any scholar for any of these methods. To send voice messages via WhatsApp was the idea of two sociologists in Iran and I just transcribed the answers. Indeed, I tried to have the least influence on these interviews, in order to make them as comparable as possible with the written letters. Since it was possible to choose in which language one can respond, the texts are in English, German and Persian. All documents were coded and analyzed in MAXQDA software.

The main issues for the questionnaire were the role of culture in the establishment of middle class in Iran, the reliability of an occupation-based structure analysis of a society like Iran, the existence of a Western-oriented cultural consumption pattern worldwide (probability of seeing a dominating hyper-culture), the impression of experts about middle class proportion in Iran (and developing countries), the possibility of seeing culture as motor of changes in late capitalism (and not the economic aspects of life), and the future of middle class in Iran. The detailed letter can be seen in Appendix 3 – Guideline for Expert-Interview Questionnaire.

Also, it was asked if we can separate classes due to occupational groups and the influence of a Western hyper-culture on lifestyle of Iranian middle class and the impact of government and governmental regulation on existence of middle class. The result of analysis was a considerably wide range of ideas and critical feedbacks different aspects of the research theme. Consequently, the main findings of the interviews are discussed.

13.1 Western hyper-culture

As discussed in chapter 4 and 5, the Iranian middle class's existence is directly related to international relations with Western countries. Therefore, it could be assumed that the contemporary Iranian middle class is also influenced by Western culture. In addition, it is supposed that there exists a new global middle class (chapter 5.5) worldwide, which is characterized by its similar consumption patterns and preferences. For this reason, we can suppose that in many countries the new middle class tries to imitate a specific Western lifestyle and also holds the same values as the middle class (or the upper class) in the North. This assumption was the first statement for reflexive feedback of scholars in the conveyed questionnaire.

More than half of the respondents believe that there is a dominating culture which has become global. The impact can be seen in the lifestyle of the middle class where the consumed commodities are becoming very similar worldwide. One of the respondents named a very interesting example in this regard. He meant that he can see a young person in Canada carrying a "Deuter" rucksack and at the same time, many young Iranians would also have the desire to possess the same rucksack. Indeed, for him this is a sign that consumption among the middle class is becoming global. Besides, "it seems that thinking is also becoming similar and the young generation in Iran thinks in the same way as the young middle class worldwide".

Interestingly, there was also a very radical criticism about the influence of a "Western Culture". One anthropologist believed that the idea of a dominant culture is *outdated* and belongs to the 1980s and 1990s, the time that globalization was a topic of discussion. Indeed, the concept of *Western Lifestyle* is widely generalized and it is not clear what is actually included, e.g. whether it is people and/brands. Besides, "there is no simple overtake of *Western* styles in Iran. Rather, specific elements are integrated, and become something of their own in the process of integration into a new cultural framework". Besides, one economist mentioned a critical point regarding the concept of *Western* in the questionnaire. In fiscal policies, the distribution of taxes and transfers in Western countries are not similar in terms of how much they reduce inequality. "Scandinavian countries have fiscal systems (i.e., taxes and transfers) that are highly equalizing, while the fiscal system in the U.S. is much less equalizing. So, I don't believe there is such thing as one homogenous set of Western countries to compare Iran to". As a matter of fact, these experts suggest that one should distinguish countries

regarding their systems and it is not possible to see all developed countries as a whole and classify them as *West*. This critic is meaningful on one side, but at the same time, it should be emphasized that the problematic of this study is to find out if the changes in class structure of Iran can be seen as an endogenous or it is more exogenous and based on external impacts. In this regard, an argument of one respondent is very helpful. For him, it is obvious that we talk about Western culture when it comes to consumption. Many products which we utilize these days (he named computer as an example) are invented in developed countries; therefore, their usage have impact on lives and culture of people on other parts of the world.

Another sociologist saw the impact of Western culture something between an overtake and total rejection. For him, the process of glocalization lets people to choose the elements of globalization they want and localize them due to their culture and needs. Interestingly, he took the “home mini bars” as an example. His friends who visit Iran have indicated that there are many fancy well-stocked mini bars in Iranians’ middle-class houses. One can find different kinds of alcoholic drinks in these mini bars, which is not very common in Sweden – his country of residence. He concluded that this is the overtake of a culture with localizing.

In this regard, the most remarkable comment was an example of a cultural anthropologist. “If the metaphor of language is apt here, the outcome is a shared ‘language’ through which the middle class throughout the world can communicate with, but at the same the ‘accents’ of this language is culturally specific”. Indeed, he sees the dominant culture as the core and then, there is variation in local manifestations of the dominant culture. There is of a *global* culture, but at the same time the subjectivity and creativity of local cultures have impact on that.

In sum, it can be seen that the most of scholars believe in the existence and influence of a dominant culture which functions as an assimilation force in the field of consumption. The main point here is the transmission of this dominant culture with local values and attitudes. Indeed, one can assume the existence of a hyper-culture in the macro level, that is adopted by individuals on the micro level.

13.2 Consumption and Middle class

One main assumption in this dissertation is the significant role of consumption patterns in the analysis of inequality structure in a society. In this regard, consumption can be seen as motor of changes in recent capitalism, which means, consumption has taken the

role that production has played in the early era of capitalism. In the 19th century, at the time that capitalism began to grow, production gained the interest of social scientists, because production was decisive in analyzing and determining the development of a society and showed the class situation. In the second half of the 20th century, due to complicated division of labor and the need for revising classic views of class analysis, new class schemes were suggested in order to depict class situation in modern societies. As discussed in chapter 2, lifestyle and occupation became the pivotal factors in defining class situation. Indeed, we can see the influence of Weber in theories that consider lifestyle and consumption as significant in this regard and the legacy of Durkheim in theories that see class situation represented by occupation.

Under these circumstances the findings of chapter 2 were discussed by scholars. The main idea was to find out how they classify the role of cultural consumption and occupation in defining class situation. Indeed, the importance of lifestyle and occupation in class disposition lies in the focus of this study. For this reason, the theoretical framework of class scheme we discussed in chapter 2 and 3 and the empirical results of Iranian class structure were presented in chapter 8.

In this section, the arguments will be analyzed which the experts maintained regarding the role of cultural consumption in class analysis and the assumption that cultural impacts can be seen as motor of changes in recent capitalism.

The idea of considering culture as the dominant factor of changes was debated and a variety of answers were received. A part of respondents believed that the dominant role of culture (and cultural consumption) must be considered as an element in addition to other decisive factors. For instance, technology has changed many aspects of our lives and power relations. Also, welfare state and new forms of employment have changed the societies; therefore, cultural consumption cannot be seen as the only cause of changes. Indeed, culture is one factor among a series of factors.

Especially, the interviewed experts whose major field economy was were more assured that technology and market mechanism were more significant factors in changes than cultural impacts. Interestingly, one economist viewed the role of technology more important than cultural values in the upgrowth of the middle class, because the new technologies made commodities cheaper and more accessible for the public. He named the new technological products like cellular phones or color TVs which were not available or were too expensive for middle and lower classes, but now, due to progresses in technology, many people can buy these products; therefore, the increase

in middle class rate is a result of technological changes. Besides, the increase of GDP and the facilitation of production and trade between countries reinforced consumption worldwide. The growth of middle class consumption in Iran is predictable too.

For me, this example implies the role of culture in depicting the class structure. Indeed, having mobile phones is a sign of consumption, although technological progress facilitates the process, but the tendency of having these products is related to cultural preferences. As a matter of fact, new cultural values – resulting by the development of social media and technological development – are signs and causes of changes at the same time. Indeed, it is not easy to separate cultural, economic and technological changes. For this reason, consumption patterns can be a controlling and leading variable in depicting class scheme. The idea of new middle class is based on the idea of consumption and other non-economic factors.

In this regard, it was also mentioned by two sociologists that education has played a very central role in the establishment of new middle class. For them, consciousness and knowledge could convince the people to change their lifestyle which resulted in the birth of middle class. For this reason, they maintained that the role of education must be taken into greater account than other factors. As a matter of fact, education is a confounding variable in inequality researches. Education has impact on economic income on one side and the other side, changes the lifestyle. Therefore, education can be seen as a significant defining factor in analyzing class structure.

13.3 Occupation and Class Scheme

As discussed in the previous sector (13.2), occupation has played the main role in many class schemes suggested by scholars (cf. Oesch, 2003; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1993). The next topic in the questionnaire was about the plausibility of a class structure based on occupation groups; since I have also applied occupation groups for picturing class structure and social milieus in Iran. Therefore, the validity of this structure must be revised with critical feedbacks of social scientists.

There is a common consent that occupation is a reliable variable in defining classes in Iran. On the other side, it was also argued by two interview-partners that occupation per se is not the best variable, because worldwide occupation groups function as an indicator of income (economic power) and political power (like in labor unions) and cultural preferences (lifestyle), but in Iran, we cannot observe the same pattern. The

main arguments for this difference included emigration (brain drain), oligarchic structure of Iran's economy and high rate of inflation.

Brain drain has resulted in emigration of high-quality educated labor forces in the last five decades and for this reason, the experts, entrepreneurs and creative young people do not enter the labor market. They prefer to find their fortune in developed countries. This phenomenon, therefore, results in a gap in occupational structure of Iranian society. Especially, IT-sector where the competent personnel must be employed on one side and the other side can create new job opportunities, is not dynamic. Besides, high-level jobs in the IT-sector are typical new middle class occupations and with emigration of these experts, the expected ratio of new middle class would be reduced.

The second point here is the closed market of Iran among a small elite who benefit from their relation to the government. Indeed, high-income job opportunities are controlled by an oligarch that is not competent, and this process results in a deviation from the hierarchical pyramids of occupation and income. Besides, the oligarchical system has caused corruption which reinforces the inefficiency of Iranian job and labor market.

The third fact is the unstable economic condition of Iran and the high rate of inflation. From an economic point of view, one can consider occupations that earn around the medium national income as the middle class. In Iran, due to high rate of inflation it can be assumed that for many (supposed) middle class occupations, the income is not sufficient for a decent living; which means, a middle class job in Iran does not necessarily guarantee a place within the economic middle class.

In sum, we can conclude that the interviewed experts consider occupation groups an appropriate variable in depicting class structure with the regard that occupation groups are not definitely a good compass alone and must be carefully analyzed with another variable like income or education. The main reason is the fact that Iranian occupational system is not the same as the structure we observe in developed countries due to emigration, oligarchical monopolies and inflation.

13.4 History of Middle class

One of the main goals of the dissertation was depicting the class structure of Iran and characteristics of the middle class (especially after the revolution). In section 5.7., it was studied how middle class has formed in Iran. The results of this section were discussed by the experts to evaluate the reliability of this investigation. Apart from that, these experts also discussed whether the middle class established before the revolution

and after the revolution differ, and, in general, how the middle class has developed during this era.

One scholar explained that the middle class before the revolution can be compared to the Western middle class regarding lifestyle and consumption patterns, because they were born in a Western-oriented process caused by Mohammad Reza Shah's policies. This middle class shrank during the Iran-Iraq war due to emigration, sanctions, changes in power relations and economic condition. The revival of middle class goes back to the era of President Hashemi – aka. Reconstruction Period. Although the period is also marked with privatization and neo-liberal policies, Iran experienced a period of middle class growth. Another characteristic of this period is conspicuous consumption. Import of commodities resulted in a new era where competition in consuming was obvious. Interestingly, these new values were in contrast to previous values of revolution which were modesty and simple life.

Although this middle class was pro-Western culture regarding values like democracy and reforms and civil society, its establishment was not a consequence of the relation to Western countries. Indeed, the middle class of 1990s came to existence from the bureaucratic system. Besides, after the revolution (and also in this era) the traditional bazaar merchants and a part of lower classes became more powerful. Therefore, this growing middle class is more traditional in comparison to the previous middle class.

This assumption is in some aspects similar to the explanation of Harris (2020), who was also interviewed in this dissertation. He argued the policies of Iranian government after the revolution as making and unmaking of middle class and divides this period to three main processes of middle class establishment. In the first phase in 1980s, we see the establishment of a state building intelligentsia, and then in 1990s/2000s the hegemonic professionals evolved, and then an urban service-providing class was born by upward mobility of a part of rural and urban people.

This assumption is very similar to the finding in chapter 10, in which I discussed that in the second half of the 1980s, the professionals became more important in economic structure of Iran; they earn more and also spend more. The importance of Harris theory is considering establishment of service sector in the 2000s. As discussed before, since 2016 more than half of the labor force is employed in the service sector. The investment in the service sector and its growth is one of the characteristics of Iranian economy.

Both of these two sociologists asserted that the *2009 Green Movement* can be seen as a consequence of the growth of the middle class in the 1990s and 2000s which resulted

in rising public demands and a conflict between “fractions of these new middle classes and their latent nationalist visions for a modern Iran”. After the harsh reactions by the state against this movement, one respondent believed, the middle class became very cautious. All protests in 2010s have started from lower classes.

In this regard, it was said in the reflections that the government has learnt to co-exist with the middle class, although the government’s behavior with the middle class is hypocritical. On one hand, the values of new middle class are totally different from the government’s; and on the other hand, the government is dependent on middle class because of their knowledge and legalization. Indeed, through the years middle class and government have learnt to live together, although some governmental restrictions confront the values and expectations of the middle class. These obstacles caused by governmental regulations and their effects on consumption have been discussed in chapter 12.

In sum, we can see that there is a similar point in experts’ considerations about the history of middle class in Iran. The class that is known as middle class now, was established about 120 years ago after cultural and scientific relations with Western countries at the time. This newly born middle class was pro-Western and tended to consume new modern products and to choose a Western lifestyle. For this reason, it has been named modern middle class by Abrahamian (2000). On the other side, there existed a group of national traders who could be seen as the traditional bourgeoisie who were more religious and culturally preferred the traditional way of life, that is why; they were called traditional middle class by Abrahamian. The conflict between these two groups can be seen in the history of modern Iran (for instance in Persian Constitutional Revolution, cf. Ajoudani, 1997; Lampton, 2015; Abrahamian, 1979). The Iranian middle class after the Revolution in 1979 experienced different periods. At first, one can observe the gradual establishment of an endogenous middle class in 1980s and 1990s due to growth in the governmental bureaucratic system and then in 2000s, we can see that a pro-Western middle class became more powerful because of liberalization in the era of President Khatami and also international trade opportunities at that time which made the consumption of Western products possible. The 2010s is the period that we can witness the rise of service sector more than before that forms the lower middle class in Iran.

13.5 Middle class percentage and future

In section 8.3, it was tried to find out the percentage of middle class in Iran by means of income distribution. Due to the calculations, about 40 per cent of the Iranians can be considered as middle class, if middle class is defined by economic income. Interestingly, it seems that middle class percentage is constant during these years, although there are many up and down conditions in Iranian economy (like war, sanctions and economic crisis). Therefore, it would be a valuable discussion with scholars to know if they agree with these statistics and how would they see the future of Iranian middle class. Such prognoses are common in the mini-Delphi method (Boberg, & Morris-Khoo, 1992), in which the future will be discussed with experts in order to find out which possibilities are imaginable for a phenomenon imaginable. Such forecasts show us the probability and likeliness in social field and will help us to plan (in applied researches) or understand the possible scenarios (in pure researches).

Interestingly, the respondents (mostly economists) found that the given statistic is plausible and they can assume that about 40 per cent of Iranian society are middle class. Even, one of the respondents mentioned that the calculations of Kharas (2010) are good evidence for that. In contrast, five scholars (mostly sociologists) did not agree with a pure economic definition of middle class. For them, factors like education, human capital, social relations and culture play more significant roles in defining middle class. Especially culture functions as a generator of behavior codes which is necessary in distinguishing middle class. Due to this view, the points of distinction in locating the middle class are the culture and signifiers of middle class (like education and lifestyle). Therefore, middle class cannot be defined by income without considering other factors. In this respect, it was mentioned that the middle class cannot be seen as a coherent population, because middle class is very diverse in nature. Therefore, classifying a section of population as middle class by economic income does not match with the concept of middle class which is multifaceted and multi-aspect. By this point of view, two respondents believe that the middle class rate in Iran is much lower than 40 per cent and it is shrinking. For example, one sociologist asserted that about 90 per cent of Iranian population have never travelled abroad and 60 per cent did not have the opportunity to travel inside Iran. For her, these statistics show that the middle class should be less than 40 per cent.

The future of the Iranian middle class is highly debated. Most of interviewed scholars believe that the global (and Iranian) middle class has grown in the last decades. Indeed, the new opportunities of consumption, trade and an increase in earnings have resulted in the increase of the middle class rate worldwide. From an economical point of view, the average GDP has increased gradually, and international trade had made it possible to consume new commodities. Therefore, these scholars assume that middle class also grows. Besides, technological progress is a catalyzer for reducing product costs; which means that the average income has increased and the same time the prices have declined. As a result, the live-standard became higher and middle class grew

By contrast, some respondents consider the situation differently. They argue that the Iranian middle class has not grown, mostly because of international sanctions and governmental restrictions. Due to this analysis, the trend seems to continue and the Iranian middle class would decrease in the future.

13.6 Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to examine the findings of database analysis in chapter 8 to 12; especially it was important to investigate research gaps which could not be answered properly by means of quantitative methods. In this regard, 19 interviews with experts in the field of inequality structure and Iranian history were conducted and then analyzed.

Firstly, we can conclude that the responses of scholars are dependent on their scientific discipline, approach and analysis levels. For instance, the way that an anthropologist sees a concept like *Western dominant Culture* is different from viewpoint of an economist. Economists analyze the phenomena quantitatively and by means of large datasets, whereas the anthropologists are interested in micro level and individual interactions. Therefore, debating on Western culture and its impact with these scientists can clarify different aspects of the phenomenon on one side and on the other side can uncover strong disagreements. As discussed before (section 13.1), the concept of Western was entirely off the mark for an anthropologist, because people take elements of a culture and act as they want; indeed, the actors select due to their preferences and values. On the other side, an economist mentioned that finding a *Western* culture is not possible, because all policies are becoming similar worldwide. Indeed, different scientific disciplines have come to these conclusions. For instance, in micro level analysis, it is not plausible to mention a *Western* culture; because one can immediately

ask what Western here means. At the same time, we cannot also talk about an Iranian culture; because there are many ethnic diversities in Iran and in the micro-level, we can observe many different cultural values and attitudes. The struggle in this dissertation is to depict the class structure and for this reason, the analysis must be wholistic and in macro-level. An analysis in the macro level is reductionist, because many facts of the micro-level are neglected, but for a structural analysis, it is inevitable to pay more attention to the variables of the macro-level. Under these circumstances, Western culture (or Western dominant culture) is meaningful and interesting, almost half of the interviewed scholars (especially the sociologists) mentioned that there exists a dominant culture which has impact on behavior codes and consumption patterns in the countries of the *South* (or developing countries).

The other debate among the respondents was about considering occupation as a main variable in defining Iranian class structure. It was argued by a few scholars that an occupation-based model is not appropriate for the Iranian society for two reasons. Firstly, there is no relation between education and income in Iran, which means that unlike in many other countries, higher education does not result in higher income. Indeed, the hierarchical structure of classes does not match the education level in Iran regarding the point that education is an important sign of being middle class. Therefore, it is not possible to define Iranian middle class regarding occupations. Secondly, in Iran the labor market is open only for a small elite who have narrow relations with government. A correlation test between education and income was conducted and the result showed that the correlation is very weak for Iran. Therefore, the first argument is not definitely true; because education and income correlate, but it reinforces the second argument. Indeed, the labor market is based on relations and not on competence. Interestingly, recently Iranian administrative workers have the opportunity to study after starting the job. Therefore, some governmental managers obtain higher degrees after having high-status jobs which can be seen in correspondence analyses of chapter 10. Another point is the fact that middle class jobs are still occupied by ordinary people. Indeed, the labor market might be closed if one considers higher governmental occupations, but professionals and middle-status jobs need still education and skill. For this reason, if we investigate the whole job structure, we can still find a correlation of occupation and income.

Another point argued by scholars are the statistics about Iranian middle class and the plausibility of findings of the dissertation (namely the 40 per cent). In this regard, there

are two entirely different opinions (beside the scholars who preferred not to assert these statistics). The first group including economists and some non-Iranian sociologists found the statistics plausible and probable; in contrast, a few Iranian sociologists believed that the economic definition of middle class is unsuitable and the Iranian middle class must be defined due to *human capital* and *social capital*. In this regard, we can refer to international surveys (cf. Kharas, 2010) with similar percentages to the calculations of this dissertation (Table 8-5). Interestingly, if we define middle class due to occupation (as an indicator of income and status), we have a lower percentage of middle class (Table 8-6). Indeed, it seems that a one-dimensional definition of middle class (e.g. by income) might be incomplete and more complicated models based on occupation depict the class structure better.

The future of Iranian middle class was also investigated with the help of this questionnaire. Half of the interview-partners believed that the Iranian middle class continue to grow like the global middle class. The main argument is the fact that due to technological progress, the increase in GDP and global social media, consumption has become easier, and this process continues worldwide. The other group assumed that due to the inequal allocation of resources, corruption and the high rate of inflation the middle class will shrink.

The findings of expert interviews can be summarized in following points:

- The domination of a global hyper-culture that impacts lifestyle and consumption patterns is very challenging. If we observe the population as a whole, in the macro-level we can assume that there exists such a dominating culture with its influence on behavioral codes and cultural values of Iranian classes (and especially the new middle class). In contrast, in the micro level of analysis the individuals choose their own values and implying a concept like “Western Culture” is inappropriate.
- Considering occupations as the main variable in depicting class scheme is plausible and widely accepted, but in regard of the Iranian society, it must be applied with more attention. Due to emigration of high-educated and high-skilled labor force, a closed labor market among elites with relation to government and high rate of inflation, the classic theories of class scheme are not completely applicable for Iranian society.

- The history of Iranian middle class begins with a pro-Western group of educated and bureaucratic labor force at the beginning of Constitutional Revolution (1905) which continues until the revolution of 1979. In this period, we observe two main groups of traditional and modern middle class. After the revolution, the middle class shrinks for a decade and then, a state building intelligentsia is established in the second half of the 1980s. In the 1990s/2000s hegemonic professionals emerged, and then, in 2010s an urban service-providing class was born by upward mobility of a part of rural and urban people.
- It was emphasized by the scholars that there are internal and external obstacles for the growth of middle class in Iran. The main external hindrances are the sanctions against Iran which make trade and business very hard. Because of these sanctions, many commodities are not available for Iranians to consume (e.g. international brands like Adidas, Nike etc.). The main internal obstacle is the governmental laws which regulate the lifestyle of Iranians. Interestingly, now as I revise my dissertation there are bloody protests in Iran against one of these obstacles, namely the *hijab*.

14 Conclusion and Discussion

The main aim of this dissertation was to depict the *class structure* of Iran with a focus on middle class. Besides, I tried to explore the patterns of consumption in order to investigate the social structure in Iran with the help of assumptions regarding the new middle class. The social structure was portrayed due to occupation, education, cultural consumption and ownership of cars. The correspondence analysis helped me to present an image of different milieus of Iranian society and their dynamics through the last years and at last, expert interviews functioned as a checking instrument of my findings. A core problem of studies about non-Western countries is the focus on the present condition of these societies without considering the history behind changes on one side and by neglecting the fact that one has to observe these societies with the eyes of a native scientist for a better understanding of the actual condition on the other side. Without this background knowledge, any study would be a comparison of incommensurables. Until now, most research in European universities is based on the image created by Western scientific institutionalizations with definite presuppositions. My main assumption is based on the fact that in the last decades capitalism has been globalized and for this reason, we cannot see countries as isolated islands, but they are interconnected. The flow of commodities and financial and human capital has changed the face of the world. Therefore, the cultures are changing and as a consequence, lifestyles are becoming more and more similar. Consumption is the main mirror, that represents these new lifestyles. In sum, I claim that studies about the inequality have to consider the fact that consumption has become global.

In order to conduct a *class analysis* of Iranian society, it is necessary to have a reliable and plausible *class structure* with a precise description of economic and social structure first; therefore, I have tried to depict a complete image of socio-economic structure dynamics in contemporary Iran. The main dynamics of changes is around the middle class in Iran; because these changes are decisive in arranging social structure of Iran after the revolution in 1979. In this respect, the category of the middle class is both a category of analysis – long debated within social theory – as well as a category of practice – routinely deployed in political behavior and social distinction. The middle class is a point of debate in many aspects when we are talking about Iran's class structure and that is why; it is a key point in the analysis and needs a historical and chronological study. A historical study regarding the establishment of the middle class

suggests, that the Iranian middle class (especially the modern middle class) is a phenomenon that came to existence in relation with other cultures and is a result of relationships with *Western* countries. Given that the middle class of Iran consisted of tradesmen travelling and importing goods, then obviously trade and international relationships played a significant role in establishment of Iranian middle class.

The Iranian middle class is also a phenomenon related to reforms in the bureaucratic system of the government in the 20th century, whereas the main actors were students and educated Iranians who studied abroad and then came back. In both cases, the effect of other cultures and especially the Western culture seems to be significant. In Table 4-1, I summarized the developments related to the Iranian middle class in the contemporary period. This summary shows how the establishment of middle class is dependent upon the international relations at the time.

The recent term of *New Class* (by Grusky, 2008) which is conceptualized as globalized lifestyle followed by middle class in different countries, stands in the middle of this research and complements the main idea of this research. It is assumed that there exists a global middle class, that is impacted by global consumption values and patterns (cf. Milanović, 2016; Beck, 2011; Grusky, 2008; Patnaik, 2002). This idea was studied in India by Fernandes (2006) and Upadhyay (2008), in China by Croll (2006) and in other Asian countries by Chua (2002). Indeed, all these theories assume that there is a new global (middle) class, which is characterized by its consumption behavior and cultural values.

In this point, one can assume the existence of a New Middle Class in non-Western countries. Indeed, we can observe a global new middle class, which is defined by its consumption specifications (especially cultural consumption), and cultural values and indeed its habitus (cf. Oliveira-Cruz et al., 2016; Al-Mokadem, 2020; Martínez et al., 2019; Klein et al., 2018). Belbağ et al. (2019) investigated consumerism values of the new middle class in Turkey and found that this middle class has developed its own values and consumption patterns. The role of religion and consumerism values and the correlation between owning an automobile and consumerism values are remarkable findings of the study.

The new middle class can be identified and studied by using a sociocultural perspective considering lifestyles and consumption patterns. The overall argument that the Chinese new middle class is best defined through cultural markers, and that it is economically progressive but politically conservative, is original, important, and interesting.

Remarkably, the new middle class can cause social changes and historical transformation in favor of its class interests and lifestyles (Tsang, 2014). Besides, Fernandes (2006) showed that occupations like IT-experts are forming this middle class in India, which means that the professionals play a significant in this regard.

The main point now would be the cultural diversities of Iranians with people living in Western countries as well as socio-economic structural differences of Iran. The Iranian economy has a higher Gini coefficient than European countries and is comparable with the US. The inflation rate is much higher than Western and developed countries (Figure 9-4). National revenues are highly dependent on oil import and the GDP is low compared to European countries and average in comparison to other Asian countries (Figure 9-3- GDP from 1990 to 2016). Iran is badly off in the World Press Freedom Index with a rank higher than 100 (Figure 10-9) and more importantly, the country is rather corrupted (Figure 10-10). We know that Iran has experienced different sanctions since 1980, which has limited the import of many commodities to the country. Besides, the religious beliefs and power of fundamentalists have restricted the people's way of life and possible lifestyles. For instance, it was not allowed for a long time to wear jeans at school, because it was seen as a symbol of Western culture.

Under these circumstances, there is a tendency to consume in confrontation with restrictions. In this point, we can follow the conclusion of Campbell (1994) who distinguishes between *modern consumerism* and *traditional consumerism*. Modern consumerism is viewed as a source of "the worst" of human motives: envy, avarice, pride and extreme materialism" and in contrast, traditional consumerism is characterized by "fixed needs, rather than endless wants, consumption of the same products repeatedly as and when these needs arise and, more importantly, these needs are dictated by traditional ways of life" (Campbell, 1994, p. 507). Therefore, we can argue that these obstacles have resulted in a kind of consumerism in Iran which can be called traditional consumption in the words of Campbell. As a matter of fact, if we investigate the Iranian society due to income level, the quota of the middle class in Iran is comparable with some European countries (Figure 8-7 and Table 8-5) which is also plausible due to consumption statistics (Table 11-15 and Figure 12-8); which means, in every country a middle-income group is distinguishable. The point here is that a middle-income population in Iran consume; in contrast to theories who assume that Iranian middle class disappears. The difference between countries might be the lifestyle and

cultural preferences. Indeed, the lifestyle and preferences are dependent on socio-economic conditions in that time period.

The middle class in Iran in the time period from 1980 to 2020 (after the Islamic revolution) is different to the middle class established in 1970s. A part of middle class which came to existence in this period, has endogenous characteristics and was a consequence of economic policies of that decade. In the first phase in the 1980s, we see the establishment of a state building intelligentsia, and then in the 1990s, a middle class appeared that was a result of liberal economic policies of President Hashemi. In the same period and after that, an urban service-providing class was born which tends to be alike global middle class.

Due to Ahmad (1992), Turner (2000; 1994) and Sadjed (2012), the lifestyle of the middle classes with its emphasis on leisure, gratification, and hedonism has now become a global normative standard. From this viewpoint, modern consumption is associated with hedonism and pleasure-seeking, whereupon the traditional one is oriented towards satisfaction-seeking, which originates in utilitarianism and seems to be compatible with religious faith. This characterization of modern consumerism is analogous to what Adorno (1984) and Marcuse (1964) (and in general, in the critical mood of the Frankfurt School) say about hedonism.

This terminology helps to explain Iranian's hedonistic consumption. The obstacles for cultural activities and limitation of leisure time have resulted in a tendency to spend more money in fast-food restaurants and inns (Figure 12-6). Indeed, the desire to consume exists, but it is pushed towards eating in restaurants; therefore, an important result of the study is the importance of restaurants in Iranian leisure time.

The striking point regarding cultural goods is the high percentage of expenditure on written media. The share of expenditure on written media among Iranians is very similar to the average of Europeans (Figure 10-13). In this respect, we see that although students do not earn too much money, their expenditure on cultural goods is at the level of middle-income Iranians. This result is in accordance with Sadjed (2012) who assumes that the main owner of cultural capital (better to say, the consumers of cultural goods) are students and Bohemians.

Another significant point here is the high rank of experts and professionals in spending on cultural goods and especially on books and magazines. The historical trend shows that this group has always been a good consumer of cultural goods. Besides, the importance of education is an obvious point in this group. If we observe the

correspondence analysis plot of year 1984, we see that the experts and professionals are the most educated occupation group in our classification. Indeed, the first years after revolution the faith to Islamic revolution was a decisive factor to obtain a managerial level occupation in the government. In fact, the famous motto of “faith is more important than expertise” belonged to that era. Therefore, we see that in the first years after revolution – until 1990s – experts and professionals are more educated in comparisons to managers.

Through the years, we can follow a change in this pattern, which started in the first years after the Iran-Iraq war. The decade after the war (which is called *Construction Era*) under the presidentship of Hashemi, there was a tendency to absorb the educated capable managers from the private sector. After the President Hashemi and at the beginning period of President Khatami’s ministry, we can see a comeback of asylum seekers and high-educated scientists to Iran, after a long period of brain drain, that had been a challenge for Iranian government and a threat to Iranian economy. Another change is related to the facilities for managers to attend graduate and postgraduate course at the universities and get higher university degrees, which has resulted in the improvement of the education level of governmental managers (Figure 10-8).

These phenomena have resulted in a change of income and disbursements of high-level occupations; namely, managers and experts (Figure 8-11). Indeed, from the middle of the 1990s, there is a steady rise of income for managerial occupations, exceeding the income of professionals at that time. The obvious point regarding army officials is the steadiness of their income. Although they have earned almost as much as professionals at the end of the war (year 1986), Figure 8-11 shows that their income has not increased as much compared to other high-income occupations. There are two main reasons for that; firstly, these jobs have lost their importance after the war and secondly, there is the phenomenon that military officials (especially Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps⁶) have entered the politics and gained power through managerial positions in the government. For instance, at least 10 ministers in the Cabinet of President Ahmadinejad were members (or formerly members) of *The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps*, which means the military officials became engaged in politics and economy and this

⁶ The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepâh-e Pâsdârân-e Enghelâb-e Eslâmi in Persian) is a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces, founded after the Iranian Revolution. Whereas the Iranian Army defends Iranian borders and maintains internal order, according to the Iranian constitution, the Revolutionary Guard is responsible to protect the country’s Islamic republic political system.

also resulted in a change in income level of these people. As a consequence, we see that the income of army officials stayed constant, whereas the income of managers increased.

From the Correspondence Analysis plots can be concluded that since 2000, there has been a structural change in income and expenditure patterns. We see that managers and governmental administrative earn more than before, ranking first regarding income. Besides, they obtained higher education levels in comparison to the first decade after the revolution. This shows that the government employed more educated managers and many managers used opportunities, such as educational leave for further study, as well. In contrast to higher occupation groups, the average standardized income of other groups did not change too much through the years. Figure 8-10 shows the average income of typical middle class occupations from 1986 to 2013. Generally, it seems that their economic condition is stable. The main point here is the relation of per capita GDP of Iran, Crude Oil Price and the yearly Income of Iranians. In years with a rising oil price, we find an increase in the capita GDP as well as the individual income. That is why; we see a steady rise of average income from the 1980s to the 2010s and a decline later. If we follow the changes of crude oil price and then the GDP of Iran, we can see that Iranian economy is directly dependent on oil price, therefore there is relation between per capita GDP and average income of different occupations (cf. Farzanegan & Markwardt, 2009; Farzanegan, 2011; Farzanegan et al., 2021).

Since I also discussed the middle class in Iran by means of cultural capital, beside economic situation, I tried to find out interrelations of cultural consumption and other socio-economic factors. The results of the study show that there is a weak correlation between cultural consumption of an Iranian household and total income, education, occupation and age of the head of the household. Head of the household's gender does not play any role in a household's amount of cultural consumption. Therefore, we can conclude that the cultural taste of Iranians is influenced by their income, occupation, education, age and gender.

By analyzing consumption patterns, one can also assume that the Iranian are omnivores in consuming cultural goods; i.e., the Iranians consume regardless of their income, education, gender or occupation. The idea of omnivoreness of cultural consumption argued by Peterson & Simkus (1992) and Chan & Goldthorpe (2005), assumes that people consume whatever they want regardless of their *class affiliation*; in contrast to the past paradigms which maintained that rich people tend to consume high-culture

whereas lower classes prefer pop-culture. The other aspect of this result would be the possibility which strengthens our hypothesis that the Western way of life has an impact on the decisions of Iranians in consumption. Indeed, Iranians prefer to simulate consumption patterns regardless of their income. As a matter of fact, due to multidimensional nature of social life and factors influencing decisions of the people, it cannot be claimed that these consumption patterns are only determined by a Western dominant culture, but it strengthens the hypotheses asserted in this dissertation. The expert interviews showed also similar findings regarding a dominant culture. Naturally, here we need more data and other surveys for a better investigation. Statistics in Iran are not reliable, because sometimes the governmental resources are not entirely neutral regarding data gathering and there has always been gossips about data manipulation and fabrication. One reason for my longitudinal analysis of thirty years is the unreliability of data. With a long-time analysis, one can reduce this unreliability, but in modeling, any manipulated data can affect the model and its representativeness. The evidences from formal sources of data prove that we have to be careful with data. For instance, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) has also published a yearly report of households' budget since 2001 (whose raw data is not available for researchers). A comparison of results of these reports with the reports of Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) shows more than 25 % difference in items like average income of expenditure of Iranian households which is too high for such cases (cf. CBI, 2016; 2017 & SCI 2016; 2017). In this point, we can discuss one of the most important shortcomings of the analyzed database. By interpreting this database, we can find out how much Iranian households spend on different commodities or identify the detailed income sources of a family, but other qualities of consumption are not investigated. For instance, we know how much a family spends on books and magazines, but it is not mentioned what kinds of books and magazines are bought. Similarly, it has been asked how much a family spent for cinema, but the frequency of visit and the preferred genre remain unknown. The survey conducted by Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has more details in this field, but there are many disadvantages of this inquiry. Firstly, the raw data of this survey is not available for researchers and only the results are published. Secondly, one cannot find enough information about the sampling in this survey which makes it difficult to accept the reliability of the study. Another shortcoming of the survey is its subjectivity regarding middle class. The results about middle class (and also higher and lower classes) are based on a subjective definition of class, namely, the interviewer has

asked the interviewee, if (s)he considers himself / herself as middle class. In this respect, the results are based on subjective perception of respondents and not on an objective definition.

A common shortcoming of both databases is their observation level. Both are in the household's level and it is impossible to obtain information about individuals. In such studies, it is important to investigate individual consumption patterns and preferences, which is not possible in these cases.

At the end, it should be stated that this work clearly has some limitations. Nevertheless, I believe this work could be the basis and a starting point for further researches in the field of cultural consumption. The most important limitation lies in the fact that the analyzed data in this dissertation lacks some detailed aspects of cultural lifestyles of individuals. Future studies should target and address these aspects of cultural life. Indeed, these researches need financial resources to conduct wide surveys with a large sample which is representative for the whole population. Normally, these resources are available for public entities and universities.

15 Bibliography

15.1 English and German References

- Abrahamian, E. (1974). Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5(1), 3–31. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800032761>.
- Abrahamian, E. (1979). The causes of the constitutional revolution in Iran. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10(3), 381–414.
- Ahmed, A. S. (1991). Postmodernist Perceptions of Islam: Observing the Observer. *Asian Survey*, 31(3): 213–231.
- Ahmed, A. S. (1992). *Postmodernism and Islam*. Routledge
- Alderson, A. S., Junisbai, A., & Heacock, I. (2007). Social status and cultural consumption in the United States. *Poetics*, 35(2–3), 191–212.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2007.03.005>.
- Althanns, L. (2009). *McLenin: Die Konsumrevolution in Russland*. Transcript Verlag
- Al-Mokadem, M. (2020). The matrimonial culture in Cairo's upper middle class: Capital, collective and consumption. [Master's Thesis, American University in Cairo]
- Amin, S. (2011). *Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure*. Pambazuka Press
- Amini Rarani, M., Rashidian, A., Khosravi, A., Arab, M., Abbasian, E., & Khedmati Morasae, E. (2016). Changes in Socio-Economic Inequality in Neonatal Mortality in Iran Between 1995-2000 and 2005-2010: An Oaxaca Decomposition Analysis. *International Journal of Health Policy and Management*, 6(4), 219–218.
<https://doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2016.127>.
- Anghel, B., Basso, H., Bover, O., Casado, J. M., Hospido, L., Izquierdo, M., Kataryniuk, I. A., Lacuesta, A., Montero, J. M., & Vozmediano, E. (2018). Income, consumption and wealth inequality in Spain. *SERIEs*, 9(4), 351–387.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-018-0185-1>.
- Ansari Eshlaghi, S. (2013). The Impact of Globalization on Iranian Middle Class Consumption Attitudes. In P. Strobl & M. Kohler (Eds.), *The Phenomenon of Globalization* (pp. 193–212). Peter Lang GmbH
- Appadurai, A. (1988). *The Social Life of Things; commodities in cultural perspective*. Cambridge University Press
- Appadurai, A. (1997). *Modernity at large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Oxford University Press

- Ashraf, A. (1969). Historical obstacles to the development of a bourgeoisie in Iran. *Iranian Studies*, 2(2–3), 54–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00210866908701378>.
- Ashraf, A., & Banuazizi, A. (1985). The state, classes and modes of mobilization in the Iranian revolution. *State, Culture, and Society*, 1(3), 3-40.
- Asia Trade Hub (2013, Jan 2014). *Overview of China's Current Tax System*.
<http://www.asiatradehub.com/china/tax.asp>
- Atkinson, A. B., & Brandolini, A. (2013). On the identification of the middle class. *Income inequality: Economic disparities and the middle class in affluent countries*, 77-100.
- Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2008). What is middle class about the middle classes around the world? *Journal of economic perspectives*, 22(2), 3-28.
- Barthes, R. (1973). *Mythologies*. Paladin
- Barthes, R. (1977). *Image-Music-Text*. Fontana
- Baudrillard, J. (1988). The system of objects. *Art Monthly* (Archive: 1976-2005), (115), 5.
- Baumann, Z. (1982). *Memories of Class: The Pre-history and After-life of Class*.
Routledge & Keagan Paul
- Baumann, Z. (1988). *Freedom*. Open University Press
- Beck, U. (2011). Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 55, 1346-1361
- Belbağ, A. G., Üner, M. M., Cavusgil, E., & Cavusgil, S. T. (2019). The new middle class in emerging markets: How values and demographics influence discretionary consumption. *Thunderbird International Business Review*, 61(2), 325-337.
- Bell, D. (2000 [1974]). *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society; A Venture in Social Forecasting*. Heinemann
- Bennett, T., Savage, M., Silva, E., Warde, A., Gayo-Cal, M., & Wright, D. (2009). *Class, Culture, Distinction*. Routledge
- Beteille, A. (2002). *Sociology; Essays on Approach and Method*. Oxford University Press
- Bihagen, E., & Katz-Gerro, T. (2000). Culture consumption in Sweden: The stability of gender differences. *Poetics*, 27(5–6), 327–349. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-422X\(00\)00004-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-422X(00)00004-8).
- Bill, J. (1972). Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East. *Int. J. Middle East Stud*, 3 (1972), 417-434
- Blasius, J. & Greencare, M. (2014). *Visualization and verbalization of data*. Chapman & Hall/CRC.

- Blasius, J., & Winkler, J. (1989). Gibt es die feinen Unterschiede? Eine empirische Überprüfung der Bourdieuschen Theorie. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 41, 72-9
- Boberg, A. L., & Morris-Khoo, S. A. (1992). The Delphi method: A review of methodology and an application in the evaluation of a higher education program. *The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation*, 7(1), 27-39.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. (Richard Nice). Cambridge University Press
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction; a Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*. (Richard Nice). Harvard University Press
- Bourdieu, P. (1985). The social space and the genesis of groups. *Theory and society*, 14(6), 723-744.
- Bourdieu, P. (1987). What makes a Social Class? *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 32, 1-17
- Bourdieu, P. (1989). Social Space and Symbolic Power. *Sociological Theory*, 7 (1), 14-25
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. (Richard Nice). Stanford University Press
- Bourdieu, P. (1998). *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*. Stanford University Press
- Bourdieu, P. (2000). *Pascalian Meditations*. Polity Press
- Bourdieu, P. (2001). *Masculine Domination*. (Richard Nice). Stanford University Press
- Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. The University of Chicago Press
- Bouvier-Ajam, M., & Mury, G. (1963). *Les classes sociales en france*. Editions sociales
- Braudel, F. (1981). *The Structures of Everyday Life*. Collins
- Breen, R. (2005). Foundations of a neo-Weberian class analysis. In E. O. Wright (Ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis* (pp. 31-50). Cambridge University Press
- Breen, R., Karlson, K. B., & Holm, A. (2020). A Note on a Reformulation of the KHB Method. *Sociological Methods & Research*.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124118789717>.
- Butler, M. (1997). *Gentrification and the middle classes*. Ashgate.
- Campbell, C. (1983). Romanticism and the Consumer Ethic: Intimations of a Weber-Style Thesis. *Sociological Analysis*, 44(4), 279–296.
- Campbell, C. (1987). *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism*. Basil Blackwell
- Campbell, C. (1994). Consuming Goods and the Good of Consuming. *Critical Review*, 8(4), 503–520.

- Campbell, C. (1997). Shopping, Pleasure and the Sex War. In P. Falk & C. Campbell (Eds.) *The Shopping Experience* (pp. 166–176). Sage.
- Campbell, C. (2004). I Shop Therefore I Know that I Am: The Metaphysical Basis of Modern Consumerism. In K. M. Ekstrom & H. Brembeck (Eds.), *Elusive Consumption* (pp. 27–44). Berg.
- Cannadine, D. (2000). *Class in Britain*. Penguin UK.
- Carr-Hill, R. A., & Pritchard, C. W. (1992). The registrar-general's social class scheme: The Stevenson Version. In *Women's social standing* (pp. 10-24). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Castoriadis, C. (1987). *The Imaginary Institution of Society*. Polity Press
- Cattaneo, M. D., Idrobo, N., & Titiunik, R. (2019). *A Practical Introduction to Regression Discontinuity Designs: Foundations*. Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108684606>.
- Cederberg, M. (2012). Migrant networks and beyond: Exploring the value of the notion of social capital for making sense of ethnic inequalities. *Acta Sociologica*, 55(1), 59-72.
- Centers, R. (1949). *The Psychology of Social Classes*. Princeton University Press
- Chan, T. (Ed.) (2010). *Social Status and Cultural Consumption*. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511712036.
- Chan, T. W., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (2005). The social stratification of theatre, dance and cinema attendance. *Cultural Trends*, 14(3), 193–212.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09548960500436774>
- Chan, T. W., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (2007a). Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: Music in England. *European Sociological Review*, 23,1-29
- Chan, T. W., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (2007b). Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: The Visual Arts in England. *Poetics*, 35, 168-90.
- Chan, W. T., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (2007). The Social Stratification of Cultural Consumption: Some Policy Implications of a Research Project. *Cultural Trends*, 16(4), 373–384. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09548960701692787>.
- Chua, B. (2002), *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*. Routledge.
- Chunling, L. (Ed.). (2012). *Rising Middle Classes in China*. Paths International Ltd.
- Connelly, R., Gayle, V., & Lambert, P. S. (2016a). Statistical modelling of key variables in social survey data analysis. *Methodological Innovations*, 9.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2059799116638002>.

- Connelly, R., Gayle, V., & Lambert, P. S. (2016b). A review of occupation-based social classifications for social survey research. *Methodological Innovations*, 9, 2059799116638003.
- Cook, R. D., & Weisberg, S. (1999). *Applied regression including computing and graphics*. Wiley.
- Corner, F. (1954). *Die Angestellten in der modernen Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt/Wien
- Croll, E. (2006). *China's New Consumers: Social Development and Domestic Demand*. Routledge
- Dahrendorf, R. (1969). *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*.: Routledge & Kegan Paul
- Deshpande, S. (2003). *Contemporary India: A Sociological View*. Viking
- DeVroey, M. (1975). The separation of Ownership and Control in Large Corporations. *The Review of Radical Political Economics*, 7(2), 1-10
- DiMaggio, P. (1986). Cultural Entrepreneurship in nineteenth-Century Boston: The Creation of an Organizational Base for High Culture in America. In R. Collins, J. Curran, N. Graham, P. Scannell, P. Schlesinger & C. Sparks, *Media, Culture and Society*. Sage Publications
- DiMaggio, P. (1992). Cultural Boundaries and Structural Change: The Extension of the High Culture Model to Theater, Opera and the Dance, 1900-1940. In M. Lamont, & M. Fournier (Eds.), *Cultivating Differences; Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality*. The University of Chicago Press
- DiMaggio, P. (1994). Lifestyle and Social Cognition. In D. B. Grusky, *Social Stratification, Class, Race and Gender in Sociological Perspective* (pp. 542-52.). Westview Press.
- DiMaggio, P., & Mukhtar, T. (2004). Arts participation as cultural capital in the United States, 1982–2002: Signs of decline? *Poetics*, 32(2), 169-194.
- Djilas, M. (1962). *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. Praeger Publishers.
- Döringer, S. (2021). 'The problem-centred expert interview'. Combining qualitative interviewing approaches for investigating implicit expert knowledge. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 24(3), 265-278.
- Douglas, M., & Isherwood, B. (2005). *The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption*. Routledge.

- Durkheim, E. (2019). The division of labor in society. In *Social stratification* (pp. 178-183). Routledge.
- Dutt, R. P. (1940). *India Today*. Read Country Book
- Easterly, W. (2001). The middle class consensus and economic development. *Journal of economic growth*, 6(4), 317-335.
- Elfick, J. (2008). Televisiosn, Sex and Middle Class Identity in China. In C. Jaffrelot, & P. van der Veer, *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China* (pp. 207-229). Sage.
- Elias, N. (1983). *The Court Society*. Blackwell.
- Enami, A., & Lustig, N. (2016a). Fiscal Policy, Inequality and Poverty in Iran: Assessing the Impact and Effectiveness of Taxes and Transfers the Poor in the Developing World. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2893762>.
- Enami, A., Lustig, N., & Taqdiri, A. (2016). *The Role of Fiscal Policy in Fighting Poverty and Reducing Inequality in Iran: An Application of the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Framework*. [Working Paper].
- Enami, A., Lustig, N., & Taqdiri, A. (2019). Fiscal policy, inequality, and poverty in Iran: Assessing the impact and effectiveness of taxes and transfers. *Middle East Development Journal*, 11(1), 49–74. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17938120.2019.1583510>.
- Engbersen, G., Snel, E., & Kremer, M. (2018). *The Fall of the Middle Class: Stability and Vulnerability in the Middle Segment of Society*. WRR Publication.
- Erel, U. (2010). Migrating cultural capital: Bourdieu in migration studies. *Sociology*, 44(4), 642-660.
- Erikson, R., Goldthorpe, J. H., & Portocarero, L. (1979). Intergenerational class mobility in three Western European societies: England, France and Sweden. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 30(4), 415-441.
- Erikson, R., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (1993). *The Constant Flux: a Study of Class mobility in Industrial Societies*. Clarendon Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). *Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economics*. Oxford University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (2019). Social foundations of postindustrial economies. In *Social Stratification* (pp. 830-845). Routledge.
- Eurostat (2004). *How Europeans spend their time Everyday life of women and men*. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3930297/5953614/KS-58-04-998-EN.PDF/c789a2ce-ed5b-4a0c-bcbf-693e699db7d7?version=1.0>.

- Eurostat (2017). *World Book Day*. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20180423-1>.
- Eurostat (2018). Archive: Quality of life in Europe - facts and views - leisure and social relations. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Quality_of_life_in_Europe_-_facts_and_views_-_leisure_and_social_relations&oldid=400083.
- Eurostat (2019). Culture statistics - household expenditure on culture. [Online Report]. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Culture_statistics_-_household_expenditure_on_culture#Household_cultural_expenditure.
- Fadaee, S. (2014). India's New Middle Class and the Critical Activist Milieu. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 30(4), 441–457. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X14545583>.
- Farzanegan, M. R., & Habibpour, M. M. (2017). Resource rents distribution, income inequality and poverty in Iran. *Energy Economics*, 66, 35–42. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2017.05.029>.
- Farzanegan, M. R., & Hayo, B. (2019). Sanctions and the shadow economy: Empirical evidence from Iranian provinces. *Applied Economics Letters*, 26(6), 501–505. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1486981>.
- Farzanegan, M., Mohammadikhabbazan, M., & Sadeghi, H. (2015). Effect of oil sanctions on the macroeconomic and household welfare in Iran: New evidence from a CGE model. [Working Paper]. <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109685>.
- Farzanegan, M. R., & Alā'-ad-Dīnī, P. (2016). *Economic Welfare and Inequality in Iran: Developments since the Revolution*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Farzanegan, M. R. (2011). Oil revenue shocks and government spending behavior in Iran. *Energy Economics*, 33(6), 1055-1069.
- Farzanegan, M. R., & Markwardt, G. (2009). The effects of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy. *Energy Economics*, 31(1), 134-151.
- Farzanegan, M. R., Alaedini, P., Azizimehr, K., & Habibpour, M. M. (2021). Effect of oil revenues on size and income of Iranian middle class. *Middle East Development Journal*, 13(1), 27-58.
- Featherstone, M. (1987). Life style and consumer culture. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 4(1), 55-70.
- Featherstone, M. (2007). *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*. Sage Publications.
- Fedoseyev, P. N. (1957). *Laws of Social Changes in the Twentieth Century. Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. VIII. London.
- Ferguson, A. (1767). *Essays on the History of Civil Society*. London.

- Fernandes, L. (2006). *India's New Middle Class*. University of Minnesota Press
- Ferreira, F. H., Messina, J., Rigolini, J., López-Calva, L. F., Lugo, M. A., Vakis, R., & Ló, L. F. (2012). *Economic mobility and the rise of the Latin American middle class*. World Bank Publications.
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and Punish*. Vintage Books.
- Fowler, B. (Ed.) (2000). *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture*. Blackwell Publishers
- Frank, R. H. (2007). *Falling Behind; How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Class*. University of California Press.
- Fred (2019). *Net migration for the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SMPOPNETMIRN>.
- Galbraith, J. (1958). *The Affluent Society*. Houghton Mifflin.
- Galescu, G. (2005). Foundations of a neo-Durkheimian class analysis. In E. O. Wright (Ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis*. Cambridge University Press.
- Geiger, T. (1949). *Die Klassengesellschaft im Schmelztiegel*. Cologne and Hagen.
- Geißler, R. (2014). *Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands*. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19151-5>.
- Gell, A. (1986). Newcomers to the world of goods: consumption among the Muria Gonds. In A. Appadurai, *The Social Life of Things; commodities in cultural perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gerke, S. (2000). Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: The new Indonesian Middle Class. In B. Chua (Ed.), *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities* (pp. 135-58). Routledge.
- Ghertner, D. A. (2011). Gentrifying the state, gentrifying participation: Elite governance programs in Delhi. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(3), 504-532.
- Ghiasvand, H., Naghdi, S., Abolhassani, N., & Moghri, J. (2015). Iranian Households' Payments on Food and Health Out-of- Pocket Expenditures: Evidence of Inequality. *Iran J Public Health*, 44(11).
- Ghodsi, M., & Karamelikli, H. (2020). *The Impact of Sanctions Imposed by the European Union against Iran on their Bilateral Trade: General versus Targeted Sanctions*. 36.
- Giddens, A. (1972). Elites in the British class structure. *The Sociological Review*, 20(3), 345-372.
- Giddens, A. (1973). *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. Hutchinson.

- Giddens, A. (1979). *Die Klassenstruktur fortgeschrittener Gesellschaften*. (Cora Stephan). Suhrkamp.
- Glassman, R. M. (1997). *The new Middle Class and Democracy in global Perspective*. Macmillan.
- Godazgar, H. (2007). Islam Versus Consumerism and Postmodernism in the Context of Iran. *Social Compass*, 54(3), 389–418. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768607080835>.
- Goldthorpe, J. H. (1987). *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*. Clarendon Press.
- Goldthorpe, J. H. (1996). Class analysis and the reorientation of class theory: the case of persisting differentials in educational attainment. *British journal of Sociology*, 481-505.
- Goodman, D. S. G., & Chen, M. (2013). *Middle class China: Identity and behavior*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Goodman, D., & Redclift, M. (2010). *Consuming Space; Placing Consumption in Perspective*. Ashgate.
- Goody, J. (2000). *Cooking, Cuisine and Class; A Study in Comparative Sociology*. Cambridge University Press.
- Goos, M., Manning, A., & Salomons, A. (2009). Job Polarization in Europe. *American Economic Review*, 99(2), 58–63. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.58>.
- Goos, M., Manning, A., & Salomons, A. (2014). Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring. *American Economic Review*, 104(8), 2509–2526. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.8.2509>.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1979). *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*. Continuum Publishing Service.
- Greenacre, M. (2017). *Correspondence Analysis in Practice*. Chapman & Hall/CRC Interdisciplinary Statistics.
- Grusky, D., & Sørensen, J. (1998). Can Class Analysis be salvaged? *American Journal of Sociology*, 103, 1187-1234.
- Grusky, D. (Ed.) (2019 [2008]). *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*. Westview Press.
- Grusky, D. (2018). *The inequality reader: Contemporary and foundational readings in race, class, and gender*. Routledge.
- Grusky, D. B., & Galescu, G. (2005). Is Durkheim a class analyst? *The Cambridge companion to Durkheim*, 322-359.

- Guillaume, D. M., Zyteck, R., & Farzin, M. (2011). Iran: The Chronicles of the Subsidy Reform. *IMF Working Papers*, 11(167), 1-12.
<https://doi.org/10.5089/9781462303212.001>.
- Gunn, S. (2004). Class, identity and the urban: The middle class in England, 1790–1950. *Urban History*, 31(1), 29–47. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963926804001774>.
- Gurucharan, D. (2000). *India unbound. From Independence to the Global Information age*. Penguin Books.
- Halle, D. (1992). The Audience for Abstract Art: Class, Culture, and Power. In M. Lamont, & M. Fournier (Eds.), *Cultivating Differences; Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Halle, D. (1993). *Inside Culture: Art and Class in the American Home*. University of Chicago Press.
- Harris, K. (2020). Unraveling the Middle Classes in Postrevolutionary Iran. In *Rethinking Class and Social Difference*. Emerald Publishing Limited.
- Harris, K. (2021). Myths of Middle- Class Political Behavior in the Islamic Republic. In J. L. Gelvin, (Ed.), *The Contemporary Middle East in an Age of Upheaval*. (pp. 75-88). Stanford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (1990). *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Blackwell
- Hobsbawm, E. (1995). Die englische middle class 1780-1920. S. 85-112 in *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Band I: Einheit und Vielfalt Europas*, hrsg. von Kocka, J.
- Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. W. (2002). *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Stanford University Press.
- Indexamundi (2019). *Iran - GINI index (World Bank estimate)*.
<https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/iran/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.
- Jacques, M. (2012). *When China rules the world: The rise of the middle kingdom and the end of the western world* [Greatly updated and expanded]. Penguin UK.
- Jaffrelot, C., & van der Veer, P. (2008). *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China*. Sage Publications.
- James, L. (2006). *Middle Class: a history*. Abacus.
- Jameson, F. (1991). *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Duke University Press.
- Jayadev, A., Lahoti, R., & Reddy, S. (2018). 3. The Middle Muddle: Conceptualizing and Measuring the Global Middle Class. In *Toward a Just Society* (pp. 63-92). Columbia University Press.

- John, R. (2006). Globalized Culture, Consumption and Identity. In Ernst, C., & Csiba, L. (Eds.). (2006). *Bastard: Choose my identity*. Actar.
- Kalecki, M. (1972). Social and Economic Aspects of Intermediate Regimes. In M. Kalecki, *Selected Essays on the Economic Growth of the Socialist and Mixed Economy*. Cambridge University Press
- Karami, A., Esmaeili, A., & Najafi, B. (2012). Assessing effects of alternative food subsidy reform in Iran. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 34(5), 788–799.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.08.002>.
- Katouzian, H. (2004). The short-term society: A study in the problems of long-term political and economic development in Iran. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40(1), 1–22.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200412331301867>.
- Katz-Gerro, T. (2002). Highbrow Cultural Consumption and Class Distinction in Italy, Israel, West Germany, Sweden, and the United States. *Social Forces*, 81(1), 207-29
- Katz-Gerro, T. (2004). Cultural consumption research: review of methodology, theory, and consequence. *International Review of Sociology*, 14(1), 11-29.
- Katz-Gerro, T., & Sullivan, O. (2010). Voracious Cultural Consumption: The intertwining of gender and social status. *Time & Society*, 19(2), 193–219.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X09354422>.
- Keddie, N. R. (1972). The economic history of Iran, 1800–1914, and its political impact an overview. *Iranian Studies*, 5(2–3), 58–78.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00210867208701424>.
- Keddie, N. R. (1978). Class structure and political power in Iran since 1796. *Iranian Studies*, 11(1–4), 305–330. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00210867808701547>.
- Kharas, H. (2010). *The emerging middle class in developing countries*. OECD Development Center Working Paper.
- Kharas, H. (2017). *The unprecedented expansion of the global middle class: An update*. The Brooking Institution.
- Kharas, H., & Gertz, G. (2010). The new global middle class: A cross-over from West to East. *Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings*, 1-14.
- Khilnani, S. (2004). *The idea of India*. Penguin Books India.
- Klein, C. H., Mitchell, S. T., & Junge, B. (2018). Naming Brazil's previously poor: “New middle class” as an economic, political, and experiential category. *Economic Anthropology*, 5(1), 83-95.

- Kochhar, R. (2017). Middle Class Fortunes in Western Europe, LIS. [Working Paper Series, No. 702]. Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
<http://hdl.handle.net/10419/169262>.
- Kopytoff, I. (1986). The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process. In A. Appadurai, *The Social Life of Things; commodities in cultural perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kosambi, D. (1964). *The Culture and Civilisation of ancient India in Historical Outline*. [Reprint]. Vikas Publishing House.
- Kraaykamp, G., & Dijkstra, K. (1999). Preferences in leisure time book reading: A study on the social differentiation in book reading for the Netherlands. *Poetics*, 26(4), 203–234. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-422X\(99\)00002-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-422X(99)00002-9).
- Kulin, J., & Svallfors, S. (2013). Class, Values, and Attitudes Towards Redistribution: A European Comparison. *European Sociological Review*, 29(2), 155-167.
- Lamont, M., & Fournier, M. (Eds.) (1992). *Cultivating Differences; Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Lambton, A. K. (2015). The Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–6. In *Revolution in the Middle East* (pp. 173-182). Routledge.
- Lee, L. O. F. (2000). The cultural construction of modernity in urban Shanghai: Some preliminary explorations. In W. H. Yeh (ed.), *Becoming Chinese: Passages to modernity and beyond* (pp. 31-61). University of California Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (1991). *Critique of Everyday Life*. (John Moore). Verso.
- Lengfeld, H., & Ordemann, J. (2017). Der Fall der Abstiegsangst, oder: Die mittlere Mittelschicht als sensibles Zentrum der Gesellschaft. Eine Trendanalyse 1984–2014. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 46(3), 167–184. <https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-2017-1010>.
- Lipset, S. M. (1963). *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Anchor.
- MacInnes, J. (2006). Category and comparison across what kind of frontier? In *International Workshop on Comparative Survey Design and Implementation [CSDI Workshop Report]* (Vol. 12, pp. 101-114). DEU.
- MacIver, R. (1937). *Society*. Atherton Press.
- Majbouri, M., & Fesharaki, S. (2019). Iran's Multi-ethnic Mosaic: A 23-Year Perspective. *Social Indicators Research*, 145(3), 831–859. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-017-1800-4>.
- Mankekar, P. (1999). *Screening Culture, Viewing Politics: Television, Womanhood and Nation in Modern India*. Oxford University Press.

- Marginson, S. (2018). Higher education, economic inequality and social mobility: Implications for emerging East Asia. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 63, 4–11. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2017.03.002>.
- Marshall, G., Rose, D., Newby, H., & Vogler, C. (1993 [2005]). *Social Class in Modern Britain*. Routledge.
- Marshall, T. H. (1977). *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*. The University of Chicago Press.
- Marshall, T. H. (1950). *Citizenship and social class*. New York, NY: Cambridge.
- Martínez, L., Short, J. R., & Zafra, M. I. (2019). A fragile hold on consumption: Consumption and the new middle class in Colombia. *Rev. Eur. Stud.*, 11, 73.
- Marx, K. (1847). *Das Elend der Philosophie*. Stuttgart.
- Marx, K. (1909). *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. International Publishers
- Marx, K. (1920). Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritische Moral. In F. Mehring (Ed.), *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels*. Stuttgart.
- Marx, K. (1983). *Capital; A Critique of Political Economy*. Lawrence & Wishart
- McKinnon, A. (2017). Religion and Social Class: Theory and Method after Bourdieu. *Sociological Research Online*, 22 (1), 161-173.
- McNall, S. G., Levine, R. F., & Fantasia, R. (Ed.). (2019). *Bringing class back in: Contemporary and historical perspectives*. Routledge.
- Meyer, C., & Birdsall, N. (2012). New estimates of India's middle class. *CGD Note, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC*.
- Meuser, M., & Nagel, U. (2009). The expert interview and changes in knowledge production. In *Interviewing experts* (pp. 17-42). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Miao, Y. (2017). Middle Class Identity in China: Subjectivity and Stratification. *Asian Studies Review*, 41(4), 629–646. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2017.1372360>.
- Milanović, B. (2002). True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone. *The Economic Journal*, 112(476), 51–92. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.0j673>.
- Milanović, B. (2003). The two faces of globalization: against globalization as we know it. *World development*, 31(4), 667-683.
- Milanović, B. (2012). Global inequality recalculated and updated: The effect of new PPP estimates on global inequality and 2005 estimates. *The Journal of Economic Inequality*, 10(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-010-9155-y>.

- Milanović, B. (2014). The Return of “Patrimonial Capitalism”: A Review of Thomas Piketty’s *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 52(2), 519–534. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.2.519>.
- Milanović, B. (2016). *Global inequality: a new approach for the age of globalization*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Milanović, B., & Roemer, J. E. (2016). Interaction of Global and National Income Inequalities. *Journal of Globalization and Development*, 7(1). <https://doi.org/10.1515/jgd-2016-0023>.
- Millar, J. (1787). *An Historical View of the English Government*. London.
- Miller, D. (1987). *Material Culture and Mass Consumption*. Basil Blackwell.
- Mills, C. W. (1951). *White Collar: The American Middle Classes*. Oxford University Press.
- Mills, C. W. (1956). *The Power Elite*. Oxford University Press.
- Mishra, B. B. (1961). *The Indian Middle Classes: Their growth in Modern Times*. Oxford University Press.
- Moaddel, M. (1992). Shi’i political discourse and class mobilization in the tobacco movement of 1890–1892. *Sociological Forum*, 7(3), 447–468. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01117556>.
- Mosca, G. (1939). *The Ruling Class*. (Hannah D. Kahn). McGraw Hill.
- Murphy, E. C., & Oesch, D. (2018). Is employment polarisation inevitable? Occupational change in Ireland and Switzerland, 1970–2010. *Work, employment and society*, 32(6), 1099–1117.
- Nademi, Y. (2018). The resource curse and income inequality in Iran. *Quality & Quantity*, 52(3), 1159–1172. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-017-0510-y>.
- Neckel, S. (2008). *Flucht nach vorn; Die Erfolgskultur der Marktgesellschaft*. Campus Verlag
- Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2004). *Globalization or Empire?* Routledge.
- Nedjat, S., Majdzadeh, R., Kheiltash, A., Jamshidi, E., & Yazdani, S. (2013). Social capital in association with socioeconomic variables in Iran. *Social indicators research*, 113(3), 1153–1170.
- Nemchinov, V. S. (1956). Changes in the Class Structure of the population of the Soviet Union. *Mimeographed for the Third World Congress of Sociology*.
- OECD (2020). *Labour force participation rate*. <https://data.oecd.org/emp/labour-force-participation-rate.htm>.

- OECD. (2009). Special Focus: Measuring Leisure in OECD Countries. In OECD, *Society at a Glance 2009* (pp. 19–49). OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/soc_glance-2008-3-en.
- Oesch, D. (2003). Labour market trends and the Goldthorpe class schema: A conceptual reassessment. *Swiss Journal of Sociology*, 29(2), 241-262.
- Oesch, D. (2006). *Redrawing the class map: Stratification and institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland*. Springer.
- Oesch, D. (2007). Soziale Schichtung in der Schweiz und in Deutschland. *Widerspruch*, 52(07), 59-74.
- Oesch, D., & Piccitto, G. (2019). The polarization myth: Occupational upgrading in Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, 1992–2015. *Work and Occupations*, 46(4), 441-469.
- Oesch, D., & Vigna, N. (2022). A decline in the social status of the working class? Conflicting evidence for 8 Western countries, 1987–2017. *Comparative Political Studies*, 55(7), 1130-1157.
- Oliver, C., & O'Reilly, K. (2010). A Bourdieusian analysis of class and migration: Habitus and the individualizing process. *Sociology*, 44(1), 49-66.
- Oliveira-Cruz, M.C., & Ronsini, V. (2016). The media discourse and the 'new middle class': articulations of a social experience in process. *Intercom: Revista Brasileira de Ciências da Comunicação*, 39(1), 21-37.
- Ozturk, A. (2016). Examining the economic growth and the middle-income trap from the perspective of the middle class. *International Business Review*, 25(3), 726–738. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2015.03.008>.
- Pakulski, J. (2005). Foundations of post-class analysis. In E. O. Wright (Ed.). *Approaches to Class Analysis*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pakulski, J., & Waters, M. (1996). *The Death of Class*. Sage Publications.
- Parkin, F. (Ed.) (1974). *The Social Analysis of Class Structure*. Tavistock Publications.
- Patnaik, P. (2002). Globalization and the Emerging Global Politics. *Social Scientist*, 30, 3-16.
- Peterson, R. A., & Kern, R. (1996). Changing highbrow taste: from Snob to Omnivore. *American Sociological Review*, 61, 900-909.
- Peterson, R. A., & Simkus, A. (1992). How musical tastes mark occupational status groups. In M. Lamont & M. Fournier (Eds). *Cultivating Differences*. Chicago University Press.

- Pew Research Center (2017). Middle Class Fortunes in Western Europe. [Report].
<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/04/24/middle-class-fortunes-in-western-europe>.
- Pfautz, H. W. (1953). The current literature on social stratification: critique and bibliography. *American Journal of Sociology*, 58(4), 391-418.
- Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the twenty-first century*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Pinches, M. (Ed.) (1999). *Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia*. Routledge.
- Potter, D. C. (1996). *India's Political Administration: From ICS to IAS*. Oxford University Press.
- Poulantzas, N. (1973). On Social Classes. *New Left Review*, 78.
- Poulantzas, N. (1975a). *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. New Left Books.
- Poulantzas, N. (1975b). *Politische Macht und gesellschaftliche Klassen*. (Günter Seib und Erika Hültenschmidt). Athenäum Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Power, S. (2000). Educational Pathways into the Middle Class(es). *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 21(2), 133–145. <https://doi.org/10.1080/713655348>.
- Ranaldi, M., & Milanović, B. (2022). Capitalist systems and income inequality. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 50(1), 20-32.
- Reckwitz, A. (2019). *Das Ende der Illusionen: Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur in der Spätmoderne*. Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Reckwitz, A. (2020). *Das hybride Subjekt: eine Theorie der Subjektkulturen von der bürgerlichen Moderne zur Postmoderne*. Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Reckwitz, A. (2021). Auf der Suche nach der neuen Mittelklasse–Replik auf Nils Kumkar und Uwe Schimank. *Leviathan*, 49(1), 33-61.
- Renfrew, C. (1986). Varna and the emergence of wealth in prehistoric Europe. In A. Appadurai, *The Social Life of Things; commodities in cultural perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Renner, K. (1953). *Wandlungen der modernen Gesellschaft: zwei Abhandlungen über die Probleme der Nachkriegszeit*. Vienna.
- Riederer, B., Seewann, L., & Verwiebe, R. (2018). Warum schrumpft die migrantische Mittelschicht in der Stadt? Zur Dynamik der Schichtung am Beispiel Wiens zwischen 2003 und 2013. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 70(4), 539–564. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-018-0577-z>.

- Riederer, B., Verwiebe, R., & Seewann, L. (2019). Changing social stratification in Vienna: Why are migrants declining from the middle of society? Declining migrant middle class in Vienna. *Population, Space and Place*, 25(2), e2215. <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2215>.
- Robertson, R. (1995). Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. In M. Featherstone, S. Lash, & R. Robertson, *Global Modernities* (pp. 25-44). Sage.
- Robinson, R., & Goodman, D. (1996). *The new Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle Class Revolution*. Routledge.
- Rocca, J. (2008). Power of Knowledge: The Imaginary Formation of the Chinese Middle Stratum in an Era of Growth and Stability. In C. Jaffrelot & P. van der Veer, *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China*. Sage.
- Rocco Z., Schotte, S., Leibbrandt, M & Ranchhod, V. (2016). Vulnerability and the Middle Class in South Africa. *Southern African Labor and Development Research Unit (SALDRU)*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2013.831060>.
- Roemer, J. E. (1982a). Exploitation, alternatives and socialism. *The Economic Journal*, 92(365), 87-107.
- Roemer, J. (1982b). *A General Theory of Exploitation and Class*. Harvard University Press.
- Rössel, J. (2008). Conditions for the Explanatory Power of Life Styles. *European Sociological Review*, 24(2), 231-241.
- Rössel, J. (2011). Cultural capital and the variety of modes of cultural consumption in the opera audience. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 52(1), 83-103.
- RSF (2019). *The World Press Freedom Index*. Reporters without borders. <https://rsf.org/en/ranking?#>
- Rutz, H. J., & Balkan, E. M. (2009). *Reproducing Class: Education, Neoliberalism, and the Rise of the New Middle Class in Istanbul*. Berghahn Books.
- Sadjed, A. (2012). *Shopping for Freedom. der Islamischen Republik: Widerstand und Konformismus im Konsumverhalten der iranischen Mittelschicht*. Transcript Verlag.
- Sadjed, A. (2016). Consumer Culture and the Design of a Modern Self in Iran: The Cultivation of Mind and Body in Iranian Lifestyle Magazines. *Review of Social Studies*, 3(1), 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.21586/ross0000027>.
- Salehi Esfahani, H., & Pesaran, M. H. (2009). The Iranian Economy in the Twentieth Century: A Global Perspective. *Iranian Studies*, 42(2), 177–211. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00210860902764896>.

- Salehi-Isfahani, D. (2009). Poverty, inequality, and populist politics in Iran. *The Journal of Economic Inequality*, 7(1), 5–28. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-007-9071-y>.
- Salehi-Isfahani, D., Wilson Stucki, B., & Deutschmann, J. (2015). The Reform of Energy Subsidies in Iran: The Role of Cash Transfers. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 51(6), 1144–1162. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2015.1080512>.
- Saltık, I. A., Firat, A., Kutucuoğlu, K., & Tuncel, O. (2013). Consumption, consumer culture and consumer society. *Journal of Community Positive Practices*, 13, 182–203.
- Sangari, K. (2001). *Politics of the Possible: Essays on Gender, History, Narratives, Colonial English*. Anthem Press.
- Savage, M., Barlow, J., Dickens, P., & Fielding, T. (1992). *Property, Bureaucracy and Culture*. Routledge.
- Schayegh, C. (2002). Sport, health, and the Iranian middle class in the 1920s and 1930s. *Iranian Studies*, 35(4), 341–369. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00210860208702024>.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. Routledge.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1953 [1927]). Die sozialen Klassen im ethnisch homogenen Milieu. In S. Mohr, *Aufsätze zur Soziologie* (147–213). Tübingen.
- Schwager, J. (2017). Introduction to Regression Analysis. In J. D. Schwager & M. Etzkorn, *A Complete Guide to the Futures Market* (pp. 589–595). John Wiley & Sons, Inc. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119209713.app1>.
- Scott, J. (2002). Social Class and Stratification in Late Modernity. *Acta Sociologica*, 45(1), 23–35.
- Shadi, Y., Lotfi, M. H., Nedjat, S., Amini Rarani, M., & Khedmati Morasae, E. (2018). Explaining Unequal Levels of Social Capital in Tehran. *Social Indicators Research*, 140(1), 243–265. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-017-1773-3>.
- Shahbaz, M., Loganathan, N., Tiwari, A. K., & Sherafatian-Jahromi, R. (2015). Financial Development and Income Inequality: Is There Any Financial Kuznets Curve in Iran? *Social Indicators Research*, 124(2), 357–382. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-014-0801-9>.
- Sharabi, H. (1998). *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*. Oxford University Press.
- Sheth, D. L. (1999). Secularization of Caste and the Making of the New Middle Class. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34(34).
- Shiva, Amirpouyan (2008). *The Sorrowful Carnivals of Moharram: Transgression and the Bloody Rituals of Lamentation*. Retrieved from <https://www.pouyan.ws/en/photo->

essays/the-sorrowful-carnivals-of-muharram-transgression-and-the-bloody-rituals-of-lamentation.

- Shukla, R. (2004). The great Indian middle class. *Business Standard Limited*.
- Simmel, G. (1957). Fashion. *American Journal of Sociology*, 62(6), 541-58.
- Simmel, G. (1978). *The Philosophy of Money*. Routledge.
- Sinus-Institut (2015). *Sinus-Milieus 2015* [Digital Report]. <https://www.sinus-institut.de/veroeffentlichungen/downloads/download/sinus-meta-milieusR/download-file/1110/download-a/download/download-c/Category/>
- Slater, D. (1997). *Consumer Culture and Modernity*. Polity Press.
- Soltani, A., Angelsen, A., Eid, T., Naieni, M. S. N., & Shamekhi, T. (2012). Poverty, sustainability, and household livelihood strategies in Zagros, Iran. *Ecological Economics*, 79, 60–70. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.04.019>.
- Sombart, W. (1969). *Der moderne Kapitalismus; historisch-systematische Darstellung des gesamteuropäischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. dtv.
- Sosnaud, B., Brady, D., & Frenk, S. M. (2013). Class in Name Only: Subjective Class Identity, Objective Class Position, and Vote Choice in American Presidential Elections. *Social Problems*, 60(1), 81–99. <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2013.60.1.81>.
- Satgar, V., & Williams, M. (2017). Marxism and Class. In K. Korgen (Ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Sociology: Specialty and Interdisciplinary Studies* (pp. 41-50). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316418369.006
- Statista (2020). *Average minutes per day spent on leisure activities in OECD countries plus China, India and South Africa by gender, as of 2016*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/521992/time-spent-leisure-countries/>
- Suter, C., Madheswaran, S., & Vani, B. P. (Eds.). (2020). *The middle class in world society: negotiations, diversities and lived experiences*. Taylor & Francis.
- Svallfors, S. (1997). Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to redistribution: a comparison of eight Western nations. *European Sociological review*, 13(3), 283-304.
- Svallfors, S. (2006). *The Moral Economy of Class: Class and Attitudes in Comparative Perspective*. Stanford University Press.
- Sweet, E. (2011). Symbolic Capital, Consumption, and Health Inequality. *The American Journal of Public Health*, 101(2), 260–264. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2010.193896>.
- Szelenyi, I., & Martin, B. (1988). The three waves of New Class theories. *Theory and Society*, 17(5), 645–667. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00162614>.

- Tansey, O. (2009). Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability sampling. In *Methoden der vergleichenden Politik-und Sozialwissenschaft* (pp. 481-496). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Ter Bogt, T. F., Delsing, M. J., Van Zalk, M., Christenson, P. G., & Meeus, W. H. (2011). Intergenerational continuity of taste: Parental and adolescent music preferences. *Social forces*, 90(1), 297-319.
- Thompson, E. P. (1963). *The making of the English working class*. Vintage Books.
- Therborn, G. (2020). Dreams and nightmares of the world's middle classes. *New Left Review*, (124). <https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii124/articles/goran-therborn-dreams-and-nightmares-of-the-world-s-middle-classes>
- Tittenbrun, J. (2014). The EGP class scheme: in search of a theory. *International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences*, 44, 29-44.
- Toepler, S., & Zimmer, A. (2002). Subsidizing the Arts; Government and the Arts in Western Europe and the United States. In D. Crane, N. Kawashoma, & K. Kawasaki, *Global Culture; Media, Arts, Policy and Globalization*. Routledge.
- Torche, F. (2007). Social status and cultural consumption: The case of reading in Chile. *Poetics*, 35(2-3), 70-92. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2007.03.004>.
- Torche, F. (2010). Social status and public cultural consumption: Chile in comparative perspective. In T. W. Chan (Ed.), *Social Status and Cultural Consumption* (pp. 109-138). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511712036.005>.
- Torche, F., & Lopez-Calva, L. F. (2013). Stability and Vulnerability of the Latin American Middle Class. *Oxford Development Studies*, 41(4), 409-435.
- Tsang, E. Y. H. (2014). Conclusion: A China in the Making with a New Middle Class?. In *The New Middle Class in China* (pp. 174-182). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Transparency International (2018). *Corruption Perceptions Index*. <https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi>.
- Turner, B. S. (1991). Politics and Culture in Islamic Globalism. In R. Robertson, & W.R. Garrett (Eds.), *Religion and Global Order* (pp. 161-182). Paragon House.
- Turner, B. S. (1994). *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*. Routledge.
- Turner, B. S. (2000). Islam and Consumerism. In J. Beynon, & D. Dunkerley (Eds.), *Globalisation: The Reader* (pp. 145-147). Athlone.
- Tuvikene, T., Sgibnev, W., & Neugebauer, C. S. (Eds.) (2019). *Post-Socialist Urban Infrastructures*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351190350>.

- Upadhyaya, C. (2008). Rewriting the Code: Software Professionals and the Reconstitution of Indian Middle Class Identity. In C. Jaffrelot, & P. van der Veer, *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China*. Sage Publications.
- Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (2016). *Europe's Disappearing Middle Class?* Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786430601>.
- Veal, A. J. (2016). Leisure, income inequality and the Veblen effect: Cross-national analysis of leisure time and sport and cultural activity. *Leisure Studies*, 35(2), 215–240. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02614367.2015.1036104>.
- Veblen, T. (1899 [1970]). *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. Penguin Books.
- Vester, M., von Oertzen, P., Geiling, H., Hermann, T., Müller, D. (1993). *Soziale Milieus im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel*. Bund Verlag.
- Virtanen, T. (2005, July). Dimensions of Taste for Cultural Consumption—A Cross-cultural Study on Young Europeans. In *Proceedings of the 8th AIMAC Conference* (pp. 3-6).
- Virtanen, T. (2007). Across and beyond the bounds of taste. On cultural consumption patterns in the European Union. *Turku School of Economics*, [Series A-11].
- von Soest, C. (2022). Why Do We Speak to Experts? Reviving the Strength of the Expert Interview Method. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1-11.
- Wacquant, L. J. (2019). Making class: the middle class (es) in social theory and social structure. In McNall, S. G. (Ed.), *Bringing class back In* (pp. 39-64). Routledge.
- Wahrman, D. (1995). *Imagining the Middle Class: the political representation of class in Britain*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1979). *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Warner, W. L., & Lunt, P. S. (1941). *The Social life in a Modern Community*. Yale University Press.
- Weber, M. (1896) [1988]. The Social Causes of the Decline in of Ancient Socialization. In *Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* (pp. 387-411). (R. I. Frank).
- Weber, M. (1922) [1968]. *Economy and Society*. University of California Press.
- Weber, M. (1947). *The theory of social and economic organization*. (Talcott Parsons). The Free Press.
- Weber, M. (2021). Class, Status, and Party. In *Essays in Economic Sociology* (pp. 83-96). Princeton University Press.
- Weininger, E. B. (2005). Foundations of Pierre Bourdieu's class analysis. In E. O. Wright (Ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis*. Cambridge University Press.

- Whelan, C. T., Nolan, B., & Maitre, B. (2017). Polarization or “Squeezed Middle” in the Great Recession? A Comparative European Analysis of the Distribution of Economic Stress. *Social Indicators Research*, 133(1), 163–184. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1350-1>.
- Wietzke, B., & Sumner, A. (2014). *The Political and Social Implications of the ‘New Middle Classes’ in Developing Countries: A Literature Review and Avenues for Future Research* (Digital). EADI, Bonn. http://www.gc2014.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/GC2014_Background-Paper.pdf.
- World Bank (2019). *World Development Indicators*. <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD&country=IRN#>
- Wright, D. (2016). Cultural Consumption and Cultural Omnivorousness. In D. Inglis & A.-M. Almila, *The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Sociology* (pp. 567–577). Sage Publications. 10.4135/9781473957886.n41.
- Wright, E. O. (1976). Class boundaries in advanced capitalist societies. *New Left Review*, 98, 3-41.
- Wright, E. O. (1978). *Class, Crisis and the State*. Western Printing Services.
- Wright, E. O. (1984). A General Framework for the Analysis of Class Structure. *Politics and Society*, 13.
- Wright, E. O. (1989). The Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness: An Overview. *Acta Sociologica*, 32(1), 3–22. 10.1177/000169938903200101.
- Wright, E. O. (2000). *Class Counts (Studies in Marxism and Social Theory)*. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511488917.
- Wright, E. O. (2002). The Shadow of Exploitation in Weber’s Class Analysis. *American Sociological Review*, 832-853.
- Wright, E. O. (2005). *Approaches to Class Analysis*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wright, E. O. (2015). *Understanding class*. Verso Books.
- Wright, E. O. (2019). The conceptual status of class structure in class analysis. In *Bringing Class Back In* (pp. 17-37). Routledge.
- Xie, Y., Killewald, A., & Near, C. (2016). Between- and Within-Occupation Inequality: The Case of High-Status Professions. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 663(1), 53–79. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716215596958>.

- Young, L. (2002). *Middle class culture in the nineteenth century: America, Australia and Britain*. Springer.
- Zhou, X. (2008). Chinese Middle Class: Reality or Illusion? In C. Jaffrelot, & P. van der Veer, *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China* (pp. 110-126). Sage.
- Zhou, X. (2008). Eat, Drink and Sing, and be Modern and Global: Food, Karaoke and 'Middle Class' Consumers in China. In C. Jaffrelot, & P. van der Veer, *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China* (pp. 157-169). Sage.
- Zizzamia, R., Schotte, S., Leibbrandt, M., & Ranchhod, V. (2016). Vulnerability and the middle class in South Africa.
- Zukin, S., & Maguire, J. S. (2004). Consumers and Consumption. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30(1), 173–197. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110553>.

15.2 Persian

- Abdollahi, M., & Moosavi, M. (2007). Social Capital in Iran. *Social Welfare*, 6 (25). 195-233.
- Abrahamian, E. (1997). *Articles on Iranian Political Sociology*. Shiraze.
- Abrahamian, E. (2000). *Iran between two Revolutions*. Ney.
- Abrahamian, E. (2010). *A history of Modern Iran*. Ney.
- Ajoudani, M. (1997). *The Iranian Constitution (Movement)*. Akhtaran
- Alam Ol Hoda, A. H. (2014). Statistics of Iranians Cinema. *Mehr News Agency*
- Asr-Iran (2020). *Infographic of Iranians' cultural consumption*.
<https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/714021/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%81-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%DB%8C%DA%A9>
- CBI (2016). *Households' Budget in Urban areas of Iran*. Central Bank of Iran. [Report].
<https://www.cbi.ir/page/16734.aspx>.
- CBI (2017). *Households' Budget in Urban areas of Iran*. Central Bank of Iran. [Report].
<https://www.cbi.ir/page/18453.aspx>.
- Donyay-e-Eghtesad (2018). Iran's rank in reading. *Donyaye Eghtesad*, 429.
- Ershad – MCIG (2004). *Values and Attitudes of Iranians*. Vezarat Ershad.

- Ershad – MCIG (2004b). *Iranian Cultural Behaviors*. Vezarat Ershad (28 Volumes; One Volume for every Province).
- Ghasemi, S., & Zarezade, R. (2013). Payamadhaye Zohore Tabaghe Motavaset Jadid dar Iran (the consequences of new middle-class emergence in Iran). *Afagh Amniat*, 18.
- Javadi Yeganeh, M. R., Motavaseli, M., & Tohidlou, S. (2014). Consumption and Income Patterns during the Constitutional Era. *The Journal of Planning and Budgeting*, 18(4), 129-160.
- Katouzian, M. (2005). *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*. Markaz.
- Markaz Amar Iran (2006). *Census 2002*. Statistical Centre of Iran.
- Markaz Amar Iran (2012). *Census 2012*. Statistical Centre of Iran.
- Markez Amar Iran (2016). *Salnameh Amari Keshvar*. Statistical Centre of Iran.
https://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/0/Files/fulltext/1395/n_ank_95-2.pdf
- Moaddel, M. (2003). *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution*. Baz.
- Pirooz, P. (1992). Development's obstacles in Iran; historical factors. *Etela'at Siasi-Ehtesadi*, 59 & 60
- Salehi Esfahani, H., & Pesaran, H. (2011). The Iranian Economy in the Twentieth Century: A Global Perspective. *Iranian Studies*, 42
- SCI (2016). *Households' Consumption in Urban areas of Iran*. Statistic Center of Iran. [Report].
https://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/0/PropertyAgent/461/Files/9312/hazineh_khoraki_nakhales_shahri-cpc_95.xls
- SCI (2017). *Households' Consumption in Urban areas of Iran*. Statistic Center of Iran. [Report].
<https://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/0/PropertyAgent/461/Files/9837/2801z111411397.xls>
- SCI (2019). *Labor Force Survey – a Summary*. Statistic Center of Iran. [Report].
<https://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/0/News/1398/bikari98-32.pdf>
- Shayegan, D. (1992). *Asia against the West*. Aineh Publication, Bagh, Tehran.
- Shiani, M., Moosavi, M., & Madani, S. (2009). Social Capital of the Youth in Iran. *Iranian Sociological Magazine*, 10 (3). 57-84.
- Shiva, Amir-Pouyan (2006, February 14). Valentine's Day in Gha'em Shopping Center [Blog post]. <http://www.pouyan.ws/archives/001320.php#more>.
- Tabrayi, H. (2013, Jan 12). An economic investigation of relation between Iranian middle class and government. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/persian/viewpoints/2013/02/post-461.html>.

15.3 Persian Magazines

Movafaghiat (Success). Volumes 199-211. Years 2010-2014.

Zendegi Ideal (Ideal Life). Volumes 87-110. Years 2010-2014.

15.4 Data Set

SCI (1984-2013). Urban and Rural Household Income and Expenditure Survey. [Data set].

16 Figures and Tables

TABLE 2-1 - UNAMBIGUOUS LOCATIONS WITHIN CLASS RELATIONS.....	17
TABLE 2-2 - ASSETS, EXPLOITATION AND CLASSES.....	20
TABLE 2-3 - SUMMARY OF WEBER THEORY ON SPHERES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION AND ALSO DISTRIBUTION OF POWER...	24
TABLE 2-4 - THE THEORETICAL LOCATION OF "CLASS" IN WEBER'S ANALYSIS OF RATIONALIZATION	26
TABLE 2-5 - POWER SCHEMES BY GIDDENS	29
TABLE 2-6 - POWER AND ELITE FORMATION IN THE THEORY OF GIDDENS	30
TABLE 2-7 - INDUSTRIAL AND POSTINDUSTRIAL OCCUPATIONAL HIERARCHIES	34
TABLE 2-8 - REGISTRATION OF STRATIFICATION ORDERS THROUGH SYSTEM LEVELS	37
TABLE 2-9 - IMPORTANCE OF ANCHOR QUESTIONS FOR THEORISTS OF CLASS	39
TABLE 2-10 - CHANGES IN THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL POSITION DUE TO CHANGES IN SOCIAL MOBILITY	39
TABLE 2-11 - LIFE CHANCES QUESTION IN MARX, WEBER, AND BOURDIEU.....	44
TABLE 2-12 - GOLDTHORPE'S CLASS CATEGORIES	48
TABLE 2-13 - THE OESCH DETAILED 17-CLASS SCHEMA (AND COLLAPSED 8-CLASS)	50
TABLE 3-1 - BASIC TYPOLOGY OF EXPLOITATION AND CLASS; ASSETS IN THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION	69
TABLE 3-2 - BASIC CLASSES AND CONTRADICTION LOCATIONS IN SUCCESSIVE MODES OF PRODUCTION	69
TABLE 4-1 - CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF MIDDLE CLASS FORMATION IN IRAN.....	93
TABLE 5-1- ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE LATENT CLASSES AND CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF ATTENDANCE UNDER CHAN- GOLDTHORPE MODEL.....	117
TABLE 5-2- DISTRIBUTION OF UNIVORES (U) AND OMNIVORES (O) WITHIN NS SOCIAL CLASSES	118
TABLE 5-3- STRATIFICATION AND POWER IN DIFFERENT EPOCHS	123
TABLE 6-1 - DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS IN CLASS SEGMENTS BY HOUSEHOLD HEAD'S OCCUPATION IN INDIA, 1999- 2000 (IN PERCENTAGE)	137
TABLE 7-1 - THE SAMPLE FREQUENCY OF THE DATA USED FOR THIS RESEARCH	148
TABLE 8-1 - THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION: "DOES THE HOUSEHOLD OWN A CAR?"	156
TABLE 8-2 - GENDER OF IRANIAN HOUSEHOLD'S HEADS FROM 1984 TO 2017.....	157
TABLE 8-3- AVERAGE EDUCATION OF HOUSEHOLD'S HEAD FOR DATA FROM 1984 TILL 2017	157
TABLE 8-4- OCCUPATION OF HOUSEHOLD'S HEAD IN 15 CATEGORIES.....	159
TABLE 8-5- UPPER-, MIDDLE- AND LOWER CLASS IN IRAN FROM 1988 TO 2013 DUE TO INCOME LEVEL	164
TABLE 8-6- UPPER-, MIDDLE- AND LOWER CLASS IN IRAN FROM 1988 TO 2013 REGARDING OCCUPATION	165
TABLE 10-1- THE RESULTS OF THE CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS.....	191
TABLE 10-2 - DETAILED CONSUMPTION PATTERNS OF OCCUPATION GROUPS IN IRAN (IN RIAL AND EQUALIZED REGARDING INFLATION - BASE YEAR IS 1984)	196
TABLE 11-1- HOURS OF LEISURE TIME IN A WEEK.....	198
TABLE 11-2- ACTIVITIES OF THE LEISURE TIME	199
TABLE 11-3- SOCIAL NETWORK OF LEISURE ACTIVITIES	199
TABLE 11-4- LEISURE TIME ACTIVITIES ORDERED BY AGE, GENDER, OCCUPATION AND MARITAL STATUS (%).....	200
TABLE 11-5- TRIPS DURING A YEAR.....	201
TABLE 11-6- ECONOMIC CONDITION AND WEEKEND ACTIVITIES (FOUR LARGE CITIES AFTER TEHRAN)	201
TABLE 11-7- ECONOMIC CONDITION AND YEARLY VACATION PLAN (FOUR LARGE CITIES AFTER TEHRAN)	202
TABLE 11-8- ECONOMIC CONDITION AND HINDRANCES FOR YEARLY VACATION PLANNING (FOUR LARGE CITIES AFTER TEHRAN)	202
TABLE 11-9- JOB PRESTIGE AND WEEKEND ACTIVITIES (FOUR LARGE CITIES AFTER TEHRAN).....	203
TABLE 11-10- HOW MANY HOURS DO YOU WATCH TV IN A DAY?.....	204
TABLE 11-11- HOW MANY HOURS DO YOU LISTEN TO THE RADIO?	204
TABLE 11-12- HOW MANY HOURS DO YOU WATCH SATELLITE PROGRAMS?	205
TABLE 11-13- HOW MANY HOURS A DAY DO YOU READ NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES?	206
TABLE 11-14- HOW MANY HOURS IN A WEEK DO YOU READ BOOKS THAT ARE NOT RELATED TO YOUR STUDIES?	206
TABLE 11-15- ECONOMIC CONDITION AND READING BOOKS IN ONE YEAR (FOUR LARGE CITIES AFTER TEHRAN)	206
TABLE 11-16- HOW RELIABLE ARE PEOPLE?	207
TABLE 11-17- HOW RELIABLE ARE EVERY OCCUPATION?	208
TABLE 11-18- WHICH CLASS DO YOU BELONG TO?	209
TABLE 12-1- CORRELATION TABLE (CULTURAL CONSUMPTION IS RELATED TO INCOME, OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, AGE, GENDER AND HOUSEHOLD'S SIZE)	219
TABLE 12-2- MEAN VALUE OF CULTURAL CONSUMPTION OF DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS (IN RIALS)	220

TABLE 12-3- MEAN VALUE OF CULTURAL CONSUMPTION OF DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONS (IN RIALS)	221
TABLE 12-4- PROPORTION OF IRANIANS' HOUSEHOLDS' CULTURAL GOODS AND SERVICES EXPENDITURE IN ALL EXPENDITURE OF THE HOUSEHOLD SEPARATED BY INCOME LEVELS.....	222
FIGURE 2-1 - CORE ELEMENTS IN WEBER'S AND MARX'S ANALYSIS OF CLASS	36
FIGURE 4-1 – THE CLASSES IN MIDDLE EAST	86
FIGURE 5-1 – THREE-PLUS-ONE CLASS MODEL OF RECKWITZ.....	124
FIGURE 6-1- CLASS CATEGORIES USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF PERMEABILITY OF CLASS BOUNDARIES	142
FIGURE 6-2- BASIC CLASS TYPOLOGY	142
FIGURE 6-3 - SOCIAL STATUS AND BASIC ORIENTATION	143
FIGURE 6-4 – INFLATION RATE IN IRAN IN COMPARISON TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FROM 1980 TO 2016	144
FIGURE 8-1 – PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS IN IRANIAN URBAN AREAS WHO OWN AT LEAST A CAR.....	155
FIGURE 8-2- AVERAGE EDUCATION OF HOUSEHOLD'S HEAD FOR DATA FROM 1984 TILL 2017.....	158
FIGURE 8-3- PROPORTION OF EMPLOYEES WITH PRIMARY, SECONDARY AND TERTIARY EDUCATION, AMONG CORE MIDDLE- CLASS, EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 2011 (PERCENTAGE)	158
FIGURE 8-4- PIE CHART OF THE OCCUPATION AND INCOME RESOURCE IN 15 CATEGORIES	160
FIGURE 8-5- LABOR FORCE STRUCTURE OF IRAN IN 2019	161
FIGURE 8-6- PIE CHARTS OF THE OCCUPATIONS FOR EMPLOYED HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS (ISCO-08)	162
FIGURE 8-7- SIZE OF INCOME CLASSES, EUROPE, 2006 (PERCENTAGE)	166
FIGURE 8-8 - PERCENTAGE OF ADULT POPULATION IN LOWER-, MIDDLE- AND UPPER-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS	166
FIGURE 8-9 – AVERAGE INCOME OF DIFFERENT OCCUPATION GROUPS FROM 1984 TO 2013 (INCOME IS EQUALIZED DUE TO INFLATION AND HOUSEHOLD'S SIZE).....	167
FIGURE 8-10 – INCOME OF MIDDLE LEVEL OCCUPATIONS FROM 1986 TO 2013.....	168
FIGURE 8-11 - INCOME OF HIGH-LEVEL OCCUPATIONS FROM 1986 TO 2013	169
FIGURE 9-1- GINI COEFFICIENT OF IRAN 1980 - 2017	172
FIGURE 9-2- GINI INDEX (BEFORE SOCIAL TRANSFERS) AND CULTURAL CONSUMPTION IN IRAN FROM 1984 TO 2013 ..	174
FIGURE 9-3- GDP FROM 1990 TO 2016	175
FIGURE 9-4- INFLATION RATE AND CULTURAL CONSUMPTION IN IRAN FROM 1984 TO 2013	175
FIGURE 9-5- ADJUSTED EQUALIZED INCOME OF IRANIAN HOUSEHOLDS FROM 1984 TO 2013	176
FIGURE 10-1 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 1984	179
FIGURE 10-2 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 1988.....	180
FIGURE 10-3 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 1990.....	181
FIGURE 10-4 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 1992.....	182
FIGURE 10-5 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 1994	184
FIGURE 10-6 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 1996.....	185
FIGURE 10-7- CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 1998	186
FIGURE 10-8- CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2005	187
FIGURE 10-9- PRESS FREEDOM INDEX IN IRAN FROM 2002 TO 2014 (RANK AND SCORE)	188
FIGURE 10-10- CORRUPTION INDEX IN IRAN FROM 2003 TO 2014.....	189
FIGURE 10-11- CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2013	190
FIGURE 10-12- EDUCATION LEVEL OF HOUSEHOLDS' HEADS.....	192
FIGURE 10-13- AVERAGE EXPENDITURE OF DIFFERENT OCCUPATION GROUPS ON BOOKS, MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS	193
FIGURE 11-1- CULTURAL CONSUMPTION IN IRAN.....	210
FIGURE 12-1- CULTURAL GOODS AND LEISURE TIME EXPENSES IN TOTAL EXPENSES.....	212
FIGURE 12-2- EXPENSES ON BOOKS, MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS IN ALL EXPENSES FOR ALL OCCUPATIONS	213
FIGURE 12-3- PERCENTAGE OF CULTURAL EXPENDITURE IN TOTAL EXPENSES BY OCCUPATION.....	214
FIGURE 12-4– BAR CHARTS OF DIFFERENT EXPENDITURE OF HOUSEHOLDS TO COMPARE WITH CULTURAL GOODS.....	215
FIGURE 12-5- EXPENDITURE OF HOUSEHOLDS ON DIFFERENT WRITTEN MEDIA BY OCCUPATIONS.....	216
FIGURE 12-6- EXPENDITURE ON FOOD IN RESTAURANTS, ON MAKE-UP AND ON WRITTEN MEDIA BY OCCUPATIONS (RIALS – ADJUSTED WITH THE YEAR 1984)	217
FIGURE 12-7- EXPENDITURE ON MUSIC EVENTS, ON GALLERY ENTRANCES, ON LIBRARY MEMBERSHIP, ON CONCERTS AND ON TICKETS FOR MUSEUMS BY OCCUPATIONS	218
FIGURE 12-8- THE PERCENTAGE THAT MIDDLE INCOME AND OCCUPATION SPEND ON CULTURAL GOODS IN TOTAL EXPENDITURE (PER CENT).....	222
FIGURE 18-1 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 1986.....	277

FIGURE 18-2 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2000.....	278
FIGURE 18-3 - CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2002	279
FIGURE 18-4 – CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2004.....	280
FIGURE 18-5 - CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2006	281
FIGURE 18-6 - CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2007	282
FIGURE 18-7 - CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2008	283
FIGURE 18-8 - CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2009	284
FIGURE 18-9 - CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2010	285
FIGURE 18-10 - CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2011	286
FIGURE 18-11 - CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS; YEAR 2012	287
FIGURE 18-12 - EXPENSES ON BOOKS, MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS IN ALL EXPENSES FOR MIDDLE- AND HIGHER OCCUPATIONS.....	288

17 Abbreviations

CBI: Central Bank of Iran

MCIG: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance

NCAER: National Council of Applied Economic Research


NS-SEC: The National Statistics Socio-economic classification

SCI: Statistical Center of Iran

18 Appendixes


18.1 Appendix 1 – Correspondence Analysis

Figure 18-1 – Correspondence Analysis; year 1986




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-2 – Correspondence Analysis; year 2000




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-3 - Correspondence Analysis; year 2002




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-4 – Correspondence Analysis; year 2004




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-5 - Correspondence Analysis; year 2006




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-6 - Correspondence Analysis; year 2007




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-7 - Correspondence Analysis; year 2008




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-8 - Correspondence Analysis; year 2009




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-9 - Correspondence Analysis; year 2010




Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

Figure 18-10 - Correspondence Analysis; year 2011



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI


Figure 18-11 - Correspondence Analysis; year 2012



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

18.2 Appendix 2 – Tables showing cultural consumption

Figure 18-12 - Expenses on books, magazines and newspapers in all expenses for Middle- and Higher Occupations



Note. Own calculation based on raw data of SCI

18.3 Appendix 3 – Guideline for Expert-Interview Questionnaire

Dear colleague,

I am Sina Ansari and PhD candidate at the University of Vienna. I write my dissertation about the rise of New Middle Class in Iran and the impact of globalized capitalism on that. During my research, I developed some statements regarding establishment of middle class in Iran (especially the New Class). As you are an expert in the field of structural inequality, I would like to ask you for your critical reflective opinion about these results. It is a great help for me and I am very grateful for your help.

Naturally, it is not obligatory to answer all the questions. Indeed, it is a matter of expertise and if you do not like to mention any points about the statement, please feel free to pass the item unanswered. Besides, your name will be mentioned at the end of dissertation as respondent and I might refer to your statements within the text. Therefore, if you prefer that your name **unmentioned**, please cross the box at the end of questionnaire. It is possible to answer the questions in *English, German or Persian* regarding your preferences.

Statement 1:

The establishment of new middle class in non-Western Countries was a result of socio-economic changes in the global level regarding consumption, which means the cultural changes played the significant role regarding establishment of new middle class. What do think in this respect? Do we experience a new era of capitalism that cultural consumption is becoming the motor of changes in the global level?

Statement 2:

The occupation plays the most important role in establishment of the new middle class; the new middle class is a result of possible social mobilities due the changes in labor market that absorbs expert labor with a better economic earning (in comparison to other occupations) in the society and for this reason, these experts can improve their economic condition. A good example of this hypothesis is Indian New Class which is consisted of IT-experts who earn more than average. Do you also see the same dynamic in developing countries?

Statement 3:

Following statement 3, we can mention another finding; namely, cultural consumption is becoming western oriented in non-Western countries. Do you also believe that there is a phenomenon of westernization in the global level? Besides, can we claim that cultural consumption works as a unifying factor in homogenization of New Class worldwide?

Statement 4:

Although it has been discussed by scholars (cf. Tabrayi 2013; Ghasemi et al. 2013; Shiani et al. 2009) that a significant difference between countries like Iran and European countries is the percentage of (economic) middle class, the economic middle class in Iran consist a main part of Iranian society. For example, due to Verwiebe et al. (2019) the percentage of middle class in Vienna is about 40% in 2016 (calculated as the income of 80 to 140 per cent of national median income) which is regarding my researches is about 42% for urban Iranian society. What is your impression about the middle class percentage in Iran (or any other similar country)?

Statement 5:

The culture has always played the determinant role in showing the diversity of societies. It seems that we experience a new era which consumption patterns are becoming similar. Can we maintain that there is a new paradigm of cultural consumption viewable as a consequence of changes in social structure?

Statement 6:

A main difference between Iranian New class and middle class in Western countries is not the economic situation, it is related to opportunities the society provided by the society and state. Indeed, the prohibitions executed by the government can prevent consumption tendencies of New Class in countries like Iran. Some examples about Iran is

pop music concerts or dressing codes. Do you agree that it results in a cleavage between the growing New Class and the government? And if there is such a gap, what can be conflict line in everyday life and socio-economic formation of the society?

Statement 7:

How would you predict the situation in the future? Will the New Class (in Iran and other countries) grow or in your opinion, it will decline? What will be the role of this class in social and political changes in countries like Iran? Does the New Class change the consumption culture in non-Western countries? And does it have impact on political turning points in countries like Iran?

Personal Information of the respondent

Name:

Occupation:

Institute:

I prefer that my name is not mentioned in the dissertation •

Thank you very much again for your cooperation. I am very grateful.

Sina Ansari