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Pledge of Honesty

On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

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Abstract

China's investment in Africa is embraced by African governments due to the unattached conditionalities and the non-interference foreign policy of their investment compared to western investments. Africa is still lagging behind the rest of the world in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or Agenda 2030. This study seeks to add to the existing literature on Chinese investment and sustainable development in Africa. The study focused on the reviewing SDGs in Africa and Chinese investment in four selected countries: Kenya, Zambia, Mozambique, and Ghana. The study further analysed whether Chinese investment aid or derails the case study countries in achieving their SDGs or not. A structured focused comparison method was used in the study to answer the research question and test the study's hypothesis. Factors such as "environmental", "economic", and "well-being" were enumerated in the research as the key factors hindering sustainable development goals in the case study countries. Findings from the study revealed that Chinese investment hinders achieving sustainable development goals in the study countries.

Kurzbeschreibung

Chinas Investment in Afrika wird von afrikanischen Regierungen angenommen da keine Konditionalitäten daran geknüpft sind und die chinesische Nichteinmischungs-Politik einen willkommenen Gegensatz zu westlichen Investitionen darstellt. Afrika hinkt bei der Erreichung der Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) oder Agenda 30 noch immer hinter dem Rest der Welt hinterher. Diese Studie strebt danach, bereits existierende Literatur zu chinesischen Investments und nachhaltiger Entwicklung in Afrika zu ergänzen. In diesem Sinne, liegt der Fokus auf der Prüfung der Einhaltung von den SDGs bei chinesischen Investments in den vier ausgewählten Ländern Kenia, Sambia, Mosambik und Ghana. In einem weiteren Schritt analysiert diese Studie, ob chinesische Investitionen in den ausgewählten Ländern bei der Erreichung der SDGs hilft oder schadet. Eine strukturierte, fokussierte Vergleichsmethode wurde bei der Beantwortung der Forschungsfragen und dem Testen der Hypothese angewendet. Ökologische, wirtschaftliche und Wohlbefindens-Faktoren wurden bei der Recherche als Schlüsselfaktoren aufgezählt, wenn es um das Fördern oder Behindern nachhaltiger Entwicklung

geht. Die Erkenntnisse der Studie haben gezeigt, dass chinesische Investitionen in den untersuchten Ländern das Erreichen der Sustainable Development Goals verhindern.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

Research Question 3

Hypothesis 4

Methodology 4

Case Selection 5

Source 6

Significance of the Study 6

Organization of the Study 7

CHAPTER ONE 8

EVOLUTION OF AFRICA-CHINA RELATIONS 8

Sino-Africa Economic Relations 10

Sino-Africa Trade Relations 11

Sino-Africa Relations on Governance and Human Rights 12

CHAPTER TWO 14

LITERATURE REVIEW 14

One Side Benefit of China-Africa Relations 15

Mutual Benefits of China-Africa Relations 18

Theoretical Framework 21

CHAPTER THREE 24

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SDGs IN AFRICA AND CASE STUDIES 24

Review of the SDGs in Africa 25

Brief Overview of the SDGs 26

Case Studies 33

A: Kenya 33

B: Zambia 40

C: Mozambique 47

D: Ghana 53

CHAPTER 4 60

ANALYSIS 60

Conclusion 66

BIBILIOGRAPHY 67

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Review of SDGs trend in Africa (2019 SDG index and dashboard and trends) 32

Table 2: List of registered Chinese investment projects in Kenya 38

Table 3: List of registered Chinese investment projects in Zambia... 45

Table 4: List of registered Chinese investment projects in Mozambique..................................... 51

Table 5: List of registered Chinese investment projects in Ghana 57

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Registered Chinese investment projects in Kenya 2019 38

Figure 2: Registered Chinese investment projects in Zambia 2019 46

Figure 3: Registered Chinese investment projects in Mozambique 2019.................................... 52

Figure 4: Registered Chinese investment projects in Ghana 2019 58

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AGOA	African Growth & Opportunity
AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil Russia India China South Africa
COREMO	Comitè Revolucionário de Mozambique
ECI	Economic Consumer Index
ECZ	Electoral Commission of Zambia
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Mozambique
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICC	International Criminal Court
IECB	Independent Electoral Commission Boundary
KADA	Kenya Africa Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya Africa National Union
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

NPP	New Patriotic Party
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PF	Patriotic Front Party
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SDGSN	Sustainable Development Solution Network
SFC	Structured Focus Comparison
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UN SDG	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals

INTRODUCTION

The growing literature on contemporary China-Africa relations that continue to enrich our knowledge of Chinese objectives and strategies in Africa.[1] China's involvement in Africa is multidimensional ranging from aid, trade, debt cancellations, development finance through to investment among several others. According to Shaun (2013), Chinese economic relations is unattached with 'liberalization' or 'good governance'. This argument puts Chinese capital in Africa into a bad spotlight. Most literature interrogates the rationale behind Chinese engagement in Africa and its attendant ramifications on governance and economic growth in Africa. Two broad answers thus far, suffice. On the one hand, Chinese economic relations with Africa is perceived through the lenses of imperialism which seeks to exploit Africa. The other proffers that, Chinese investments are possibly a new form of development that employs the developmental role of the state. China is seen to offer an alternative developmental future that differs from the neo-liberal policies of Western multilateral institutions, particularly Bretton woods institutions.

The burgeoning of Chinese economic presence in Africa based on trade, aid, and investment surpassed the United States, as Africa's largest trading partner in 2009, with trade skyrocketing from $200 million to $200 billion between 2000 and 2014 (Albert, 2017). Moreover, there is a long tradition of Africa-China relations.[2]

The first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in October 2000 with 44 African States served as a cooperation mechanism that helped to strengthen China-Africa relations through political and economic means. The forum emphasized on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence including non-aggression, non-interference, sustainable development, equality, and cooperation for mutual benefit (Power and Mohan 2012). The FOCAC became the engine of implementing Chinese political and economic policies aimed at Africa states and falls within the

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[1] The theme, "China in Africa" is well documented and has been widely covered especially western news media, online publications, academic journals, business publications, and scholarly books. Books are being published every year after the 3rd Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held in Beijing in 2006. The growing list of publications has led to the creation of several online blogs that help to track the publications on this subject matter. A typical example is Deborah Brautigam's 'the Real Story': http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/.

[2] For a comprehensive analysis of China-Africa relations, see for example, Jinyuan, Gao. "China and Africa: The Development of Relations over Many Centuries." (1984)

south-south cooperation. With a collective multilateral consultative mechanism between China and Africa, Africa now speaks with one voice which has enhanced the diplomatic interactions among African states (He 2007).

The desire for African countries to independently seek for a new relationship with non-Western allies has become a challenging issue that affects its development. Factors such as IMF Structural Adjustment, colonialism, resource exploitation by the West as well as Apartheid, just to mention but a few, drive African nations to find different partners. This has led to an increasing Chinese economic and political ascendency in Africa as an alternative for governments (Robinson 2009). Aside from political and economic engagement with sub-Saharan Africa, serious questions and concerns have been raised on the issues of environmental sustainability, and its effects on the environment regarding Chinese investment.

Chinese investment is heavily centred on many sectors of sub-Saharan economies such as mining, energy, fishing among others. The environmental practices by these Chinese firms on the continent in areas mentioned have been criticized widely by environmental advocates, western governments, and several international organizations. The Sinohydro barter trade deal worth $2 billion signed between China and Ghana recently has raised concerns about its impact on the environment.[3] Chinese investors have been alleged to do little to promote environmental sustainability, a sphere which helps advance growth stability in the long-term run.

Despite the pervasive adoption of the progress towards the SDGs globally, Africa still lags behind the rest of the world in terms of socio-economic development. A lot has been written about the 'resources curse' of Africa but less has been said about how the continent's natural capital remains crucial to the working of the global capitalist economy. A critical example is how coltan from the Democratic Republic of the Congo plays a vital role in the mobile phone industry globally (Wakenge, Dijkezeul and Vlassenroot 2018). This has raised questions about the context

[3] Many have argued that the mining of bauxites will taint the water body which serves as a drinking water for about 5 million people in various communities within the region. Evidence found from the mining of bauxite in Guinea had destroyed several farmlands, polluting waterbodies, homes, and crops with air pollution See, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/mining-ghanas-bauxite-would-bring-in-billions-from-china-but-it-could-also-taint-the-water-for-5-million-people/2019/10/25/e4726518-e3a7-11e9-b0a6-3d03721b85ef_story.html on

at which SDGs can help support the global vision of sustainable development to present a new opportunity for reshaping the political economy of natural resources on the Africa continent.

On the issues of sustainability, their actions demonstrate they only have the interest in the exploitation of natural resources from the continent whilst ignoring environmental pollution. Sub-Saharan countries have different approaches relating to issues of environmental protection, Chinese and other investors, however, are able to manipulate these processes owning to weak institutions of many African countries with less punitive repercussions. Consequently, Africa's political and economic landscape is increasingly experiencing China's emerging footprint as part of South-South cooperation. As described by Lyman, "China returns to Africa in the 21st century with not only a need for economic resources but with the cash to play the game dramatically and competitively" (Lyman 2005). Sino-African relations are most centred on unattached conditionalities and non-interference of Chinese foreign policy (Taylor 2006, Besada, Wang and Whalley 2008, Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009).

Currently, Africa is yet to have a strategy for China as China already has an African strategy. A Chinese strategy by Africa will help balance the asymmetry in economic relations. However, Chinese engagement with Africa, have increased tremendously since the mid-1950s (Bautigam et al. 2010). These engagements transcend several sectors of economies with natural resources extraction and the manufacturing sector leading China's involvement in several African countries (Brookes and Shin 2006).

It can be confirmed that the implications of China's presence in Africa is not as black and white; China's engagement also has a multifaceted consequence. The literature clearly highlights the virtues and vices of China's presence in Africa. This study will shed more light on how states can mitigate the effects of China's investment in their various countries and capitalize on the opportunity to seek for a win-win relation.

Research Question

- Does Chinese investment in Africa help or hinder sustainable development?

According to Langan (2017), African elites are being swayed by the Chinese on certain policies through their lucrative aid and trade to help advance their interests. This can be viewed as a form of neo-colonialism. Moreover, China's investment in Africa is considered to be an opportunistic exploitation of weaker states in their quest for natural resources, leveraging it through their economic empowerment for their economic might for their parochial interests while considering the less the needs of Africa. Many African leaders and the educated youth have raised serious doubts concerning Chinese investment and their various activities in Africa. On the contrary, other scholars see China's presences in Africa as a significant opportunity which can open doors for Africa's development. Most are concerned with the ability of Africa to comparatively use this advantage to avoid being exploited by China through their economic baits which comes in the form of investments. Billions are pumped by China into Africa through trade and investments but whether it helps in enhancing sustainable development raises doubt.

Hypothesis

- The presence of Chinese investment in Africa enhances the Sustainable Development Goals.
- Chinese investment in Africa has a significant impact on the environment

Methodology

This thesis will provide in-depth analysis of Chinese investment in Africa in relation to sustainable development. In this research, data on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or Agenda 2030 regarding the three dimensions of SDGs namely, economic, social, environmental, and possibly governance will be accessed to determine if Chinese investment has helped or hindered the achievement of the SDGs in the selected case study countries.

Structured Focused Comparison (SFC) will be used to analyse Chinese investment in the four selected African countries. To this end, four sub- Saharan African countries will be selected for a multiple case studies; Kenya, Zambia, Mozambique, and Ghana. The study will compare if Chinese investments in the selected countries aids or derails sustainable development or not. For instance, if Chinese investment in the case study countries is aiding them in their progress towards achieving the SDGs or not. The study will, therefore, discuss if these countries are performing well or not vis á vis Chinese investment in the chosen areas of analysis. The SFC method will help analyse the selected case studies in a way that permits equal comparison. From a “structured" perspective, the research objectives set are guided with standardized data collection that helps in achieving the desired results and the focused aspect deals with the historical aspect of the case to be investigated (George and Bennett 2005). Therefore, this method will help in asking the same questions for the selected cases with a clear focus of the research on Chinese investment and sustainable development.

Case Selection

The four countries selected are all democratic and peaceful. Ghana is endowed with rich resources, such as gold, manganese, bauxite, and several other minerals. Gold and cocoa forms the biggest part of Ghana’s export. China became the third destination country Ghana exported most of its resources to in 2016 with crude oil as the leading exported commodity to China. The recent assertion of the senior minister regarding the issue of the ‘Galamsay’, illegal mining, and the arrest of Chinese illegal miners had an implication on Chinese relations with Ghana.

Similarly, Zambia was selected for this study because it is rich in resources such as copper, nickel, and cobalt. Additionally, about 70-75% of infrastructure contracts in Zambia were obtained by Chinese companies. Michael Sata with campaign message on ‘China question’ during the 2006 general elections promised to deport all Chinese traders from Zambia if elected. Kenya on the other hand is one of the leading importers of Chinese goods in Africa. Kenya also possesses an abundance resources such as limestone, zinc, diatomite, oil, and gas. Additionally, most of Kenya’s rural telecommunications projects and equipment are either financed or tied to Chinese companies. China was heavily criticized for its involvement in Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence[4], as they supplied the Kenyan government with weapons during the turmoil. Mozambique attained independence through a guerrilla warfare. As one of the 10 poorest countries in the world, Mozambique is endowed with a large amount of valuable resources such as coal and gas, timber, tantalite, gold, bauxite, marble, graphite, bentonite and limestone (Index of Economic Freedom 2020).

4 The Global and Mail, “China says Kenya violence proof Western democracy unsuitable” (2008).

Source

Data to be used for this study is largely derived from Sustainable Development Reports, UNDP publications, United Nations reports, and internet sources mainly journals and official publications, and books, as well as relevant publications and researches conducted on the subject matter by individuals and institutions. The study will focus on the SDGs, Africa, and Chinese investment.

The limitation of selecting 4 out of 54 African countries gave the study a narrow scope as this helped to provide a comprehensive analysis than a shallow overview of all Africa. Inadequate time and resources did not research did not allow for field research to assess the current state of affairs of the selected countries for the thesis.

Significance of the Study

The Sustainable Development Goals launched in 2015 coincidentally promulgate the Agenda 2063 of the African Union which tends to offer a significant opportunity for Africans and international partners similarly to consider the best possible ways of achieving the set up developmental objectives for the continent. China's engagement with Africa has galvanized a greater involvement on broader economic, trade, political, and investment issues on the continent in recent years. The importance of this study is to provide new perspectives on how African countries can effectively engage China whiles advancing the SDGs. However, Africa achieving the SDGs are impossible without assessing the investment impact of their major trading partners on the continent. Hence, this study aims at contributing to the existing literature that seeks to improve the formulation of policies and the delivery of SDGs in Africa through a credible development index whiles engaging with China. A detailed insight of Sino-Africa relations on the progress of achieving the SDGs, the challenges, and lessons learnt about this relationship can serve as a guiding principle for achieving the Agenda 2063 set by the Africa Union.

Organization of the Study

The study is organized into four main chapters. Chapter one focuses on the evolution of Sino-Africa relations, its economic and trade relations. Chapter two focuses on the review and discussion of literature on the study done by other researchers including the motivation of China in Africa as in either a one-way benefit or a mutual benefit. It also discusses the various approaches that have been used on the subject. Chapter three outlines the research methodology employed including the review of SDGs and the case studies. Finally, chapter four presents the findings of the study and gives an in-depth analysis and discussion of the findings and draws conclusions and makes recommendations.

CHAPTER ONE

EVOLUTION OF AFRICA-CHINA RELATIONS

China-Africa's relationship cannot be described as a recent one and has taken various forms over the years. China's foremost known and documented contact with Africa can be traced to the Ming Dynasty (Filesi 1972). Despite China's initial contact with Africa during the Ming Dynasty, there existed no diplomatic or formal relations until 1949 when the People's Republic of China was formed (Rich & Recker 2013). This charted the path which will lead to the close contact between Africa and China today. The foundation of this relationship was hinged on two major goals.

In the first place, China needed Africa's backing in its diplomatic scuffles with Taiwan. China and Taiwan's diplomatic battle was aimed at gaining global recognition which will consequently open the gateway to the United Nations. (Krasner 2009). Gaining recognition around the globe meant for them total sovereignty which was the goal of political elites and leaders. Surprisingly, the diplomatic scuffle between China and Taiwan was concurrently happening with the heavy wind of political independence blowing across the African continent. African countries had increasingly formed a relatively large part of UN membership. According to (Rich & Recker 2013), African nations formed approximately one-third of the total membership of the United Nations by the mid-1960s. China, therefore, saw Africa's numerical strength at the UN as a catalyst to advance their agenda of gaining recognition and consequently becoming a representative at the UN.

Despite China's efforts to gain grounds and acknowledgment in Africa, very few African countries had recognized them between 1960 and 1963. Thirteen (13) out of twenty-three (23) African states acknowledged Taiwan whilst China had the recognition of five (5) African countries. (Brauitgam 2009) accounts that China did not relent on their quest of gaining ground in Africa but continually engaged African countries and went ahead to commit $120 million dollars to some African countries in the form of aid (Brauitgam 2009). By 1965, nations in Africa were almost equally divided between Taiwan and China in terms of recognition. At the end of 1970, the tables had completely turned around in favor of China as they gained a seat at the United Nations Security Council (Rich & Recker 2013).

By this period, forty-four (44) African countries had rallied behind and recognized them as opposed to five countries in Africa recognizing Taiwan (Taylor 2002).
Secondly, the growing China-Africa relations could be accounted to the Sino-Soviet conflict. At the Bandung Conference in 1958, China made a strong appeal and justification to become an influencer and contributor to the third world. Leveraging their already established relationship and recognition in Africa, China supported various liberation struggles and movements in some parts of Africa. Notably, Algeria, Cape Verde, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and other African nations received China's support for their struggle for liberation. China’s support for Africa’s independence and liberation movements was aimed to associate Africa’s independence with communist mutiny going on at the time to register Chinese interests on the continent of Africa (Yu 1988).

Leaders in Africa saw China’s version of communism friendlier, and this fuelled Chinese interests. Chinese used Africa as a decoy to advance the Cold war between them and the Soviet Union. Chinese supported movements in Africa that were anti-Soviet. For instance, China used its relations with Tanzania to respond to the Soviet Union’s naval base close (Copper 1976).
It was evidently clear that China’s relationship with Africa from the beginning of the 1950s to the 1960s was fundamentally based on ideologies. However, the end of the cold war brought China to refocus and turn from the ideological wars (Rich & Recker 2013). China turned to focus attention and siphoning resources into becoming a global political and economic giant.

The legitimacy and recognition success achieved by China during the cold war served as a fertile ground to plant the seed of global dominance. The fertile grounds provided opportunities for access to global markets and resources. Coincidentally, many African countries were struggling with their developmental goals and objectives. The struggles of the newly independent African Nations were the lack of external reserves despite the abundance of local natural resources.
As part of the efforts of African countries to solve their challenges and liberate themselves from their economic struggles, relationships with China were strengthened with the aim of creating a market for their exports. Rich & Recker (2013) argued that China excessively focuses on the economic gains in Africa but ignores systematic challenges such as political instability, human

rights violations, and environmental pollution that plague the continent. Other scholars also argue that this relationship has the tendency to rapidly bear mutual benefits in the very near future. As to which of these two schools of thought reflects the reality on the ground, subsequent discussions in this research critically explore the intricacies of the actual impacts of Africa-China relations.

Sino-Africa Economic Relations

Economics form a major pillar in Sino-Africa policy and no complete analysis can be undertaken without major regard for economics. Modern Sino-Africa relations reap substantial economic gains that influence development. The economic relations unlike political relations between Africa and China can be described as a recent one (Busse et al 2014). This economic relation saw an extensive rise in the early 2000s. Economic relations with Africa became very relevant to China in the 1990s when China was on the path to experiencing significant growth. To sustain the growth momentum, policy advisors saw the need to secure a reliable source and supply of natural resources. China, therefore, leveraged on the already existing political relationships to create new economic relations with Africa.

According to Li (2014), the African continent is undoubtedly a major player in the affairs of many nations across the world. Africa plays a central role in the growth of the world due to its wide and diverse geographical span, the status of the origin of human civilization, and the array of natural resources. Li, therefore, opined four principles that should guide the growth of Sino-Africa relations. From the outset, every nation that deals with Africa must see that both are equal partners with no hidden intention and no strings attached. Secondly, all policies and agreements must be in the best interest of both parties with mutual benefits, trust, and regard. In the third place, there should be a transparent platform to exchange knowledge, skills, and technology. Lastly, Li argued that the Sino-Africa relationship should thrive beyond resources and energy and explore opportunities such as eradication of poverty, environmental sustainability, culture exchanges whiles promoting peace and security in Africa and China. The foreign policy and relations between China-Africa reached a remarkable stage when the FOCAC was instituted in the year 2000. FOCAC brings together respective ministries together every three years to formulate and implement specific economic policies that will benefit both China and Africa.

According to (UNCTAD 2007), the "Going Global" policy that was rolled out by China in 2001 played a pivotal role in raising and strengthening the Sino-Africa affairs. This policy made Chinese globally competitive by providing them with soft loans, tax waivers, import and export rate exemption, etc. This policy was directly beneficial to Chinese companies, but it provided a blueprint for China to identify important areas for China's foreign direct investment.

Sino-Africa economic relations rest on three main pillars that are Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Aid.

Sino-Africa Trade Relations

Since the adoption of the FOCAC framework in 2000, China-Africa trade has grown relatively small yearly. The seed of this unprecedented surge in China-Africa trade as China demands for raw material inputs and an export market for its products that were planted in the Chinese economy in the 1980s and 1990s thrived since the adoption of FOCAC. Hence, Chinese exporters have expanded rapidly to access African markets and purchases of the increasing supplies of critical raw material from Africa. China continues to create powerful economies of scale to attract capital and large pools of skilled and unskilled labour. African markets are heavily flooded with cheap and counterfeit Chinese products including textiles and electronics.

Wang (2007) revealed that "strong growth of the Chinese and African economies, together with the complementary trade pattern, China imports fuel and other commodities, Africa purchases investment and manufactured products from China, largely explains their surging trade in recent years".

Until the year 2000, trade between China and Africa remained minimal. The new millennium brought an exponential growth of trade between these two regions as trade rose to $166 billion in 2012. In total, African exports to China (7.8 percent of GDP) surpassed its imports (4.8 percent of GDP) in 2012. This, therefore, created a surplus of some $ 39 billion. Currently, China is Africa's largest trading partner accounting for approximately 15 percent of African trade. On the flip side, Africa accounts for approximately 5 percent of Chinese trade. Most of the exports from China to Africa are basically consumer, electrical and mechanical goods. Exports from Africa are predominantly raw materials and natural resources. Geographically, the Sino-Africa trade is concentrated on relatively few regions. In 2012 for instance, major imports of natural resources to China were from South Africa, Angola, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia. A critical observation of the pattern of Sino-Africa trade, Africa heavily imports non-resources from China whilst China heavily imports mainly resources.

Sino-Africa Relations on Governance and Human Rights

The renewal of Chinese interest in Africa occurred with the rising interest of the West in advancing democracy and human rights in Africa. The third wave of democracy that swept across Africa during the post-Cold War received huge support from the West. Snow (1995) revealed that China and African bureaucrats took a stance based on their previous experiences with imperialism and neo-imperialism. Not surprisingly, African governments' support for China has raised serious questions about democracy in Africa as China refuses to attach political conditions with its investment in Africa. In support with this argument, former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi asserted that "it is wrong for the people of the West to assume they can only provide aid and investment by good governance in Africa and good governance can only come from inside; it cannot be imposed from outside". "China has helped in exposing this illusion as their investment does not jeopardize the reforms of good governance and democracy in Africa because only those that were home-grown ever had the chance of success".[5]

China has tapped into this suspicion as Taylor (2006) argued that human rights such as 'economic rights' and 'rights of subsistence' are the main priority of developing nations with the prior interest of the West over personal, individual rights. Chinese investment and aid are new options for dictators who were previously dependent on the West with their insistence on progressive human rights (The Human Rights Watch 2007). Chinese engagement with Zimbabwe under the late Robert Mugabe is pivotal to this belief. Until the ousting of the late president Mugabe, opposition parties were brutally met with gun violence; also kidnapping and torturing of human rights activists became a norm. When sanctions were imposed by the West on his government, late president Mugabe brushed it off by insisting that "We have turned to the

[5] William Wallis, "Ethiopia Looks East to Slip Reins of Western Orthodoxy", Financial Times, February 6, 2007. The report highlighted that the United States provides about $600 million in aid annually to Ethiopia despite its questionable record on governance.

East, where the sun rises and given our back to the West, where the sun sets".[6] Others also point to countries like Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan, Sudan, and Angola. Conversely, with the help of the Chinese ambassador to Sierra Leone and other foreign ambassadors, they persuaded the incumbent president of Sierra Leone to step down peacefully after his defeat in the 2007 elections. The 2007 post-election violence in Kenya was evidence of China's political activities to the persistence of the country's democratic system with its constant supply of weapons to the Kenyan government during the turmoil.[7]

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[6] President Mugabe made a strong speech during the celebration of the 25th independence celebration by attacking the West and defending his land grab and redistribution of farmlands policy. See, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/19/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum

[7] Editorial comment in People's Daily revealed the "Western-style democratic theory simply isn't suited to African conditions, but rather carries with it the root of disaster. See, Human Rights Watch report on Kenya Violence Proof That Western Democracy Unsuitable," See, https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets/organized-political-violence-and-kenyas-crisis-governance

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is no one specific definition for sustainable development. According to Brundtland (1991) “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”. And sustainable development can be categorized into three namely: environmental, economic, and social well-being. Many scholars have argued that is long overdue for African states for not being able to unlock their developmental potential. An African country such as Botswana has, however, impressively developed through the governance of its natural resources (Centeno, et al. 2017; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). An intense competition on natural resources has become a challenge in Africa consequently due to the use of resources in achieving the SDGs. Investment and trade patterns show the rivalry between traditional Western and other emerging countries interested in the natural resources of Africa.

The launching of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) coincidentally happened at a time FOCAC was launched. FOCAC serves as a platform for dialogue between China and the African continent at policy, ministerial and other levels. In the FOCAC plan of action compliments the MDGs. The shifting of development beyond 2015 (SDGs) became clear that the FOCAC has a role to play in Sino–Africa relations especially, in the aspects of economic development, infrastructure, and well-being citizens. (Marafa et al. 2020). Several concerns have been raised on Chinese industries in Africa for not upholding good environmental standards because of China’ s poor environmental record at home. The scramble over Africa’s natural resources highlights the geopolitical role African resources play in the world. This competition has significant effects on achieving SDGs in Africa. The SDGs have been suggested by many scholars to serve as a guide to advance economic and development policy in Africa, as a platform for promoting African agency, and as a pathway for African development (Besada, Xu, et al. 2017).

Regardless of the comprehensive acknowledgment of China’s resource related objectives, there is a little agreement about the importance and, in a broader sense, what all this suggests about Chinese aspirations or intentions in Africa in the long term. Among Africanists, the emergence of China in Africa as an economic partner and political partner has become connected with the robust development, ignites the debate between the “Washington Consensus” and the "Beijing Consensus.” Questions are being raised about if China’s model of illiberalism, authoritative capitalism which can be transferred to African countries and how suitable is this model is conducive to Africa as compared to the free-market, and liberal democracy? These questions keep up appearing in Africanist discussions about China, however, the ongoing debate among Sinologist is about their strategic intentions that has spilled over Sino-Africa literature. Does China in Africa have anything to do with recolonization and if it is a rogue donor? This has elicited the debate between Africanists and Sinologists about the strategic involvement of China and its influence on Africa development. The contemporary literature on Sino-Africa relations is argued within the framework of the optimistic (mutual benefit) view and the pessimistic view (one sided benefit).

One Side Benefit of China-Africa Relations

Most literature on Sino-Africa relations focuses on the negative narrative, as many scholars believe the negative impacts outweigh the positives Chinese aid is heavily criticized due to lack of political conditionalities as argued by scholars that such aid will increase debt and affect governance in Africa (Chiduase 2007; Schoeman 2007). China’s engagement with Africa is seen as resource extraction that seeks to benefit China than enhancing the economic and political sustainability of Africa as it is viewed as a potential market to tap into (Hananer and Moris 2014). In support of this argument, Taylor (2010) elucidated that China’s expansion into Africa was propelled by the hungry needs for raw materials and energy to feed its growing industries for economic growth and creating new markets for Chinese producers and traders to export their products.

Moreover, studies have linked the Western development assistance with liberalism and depict Chinese investment in Africa as part of a zero-sum game that challenges liberal values and the dominance of the West. Scholars argued that Chinese support for political and economic repression in Africa counters the liberalizing influences of Africa’s traditional European and American partners (Sautman and Hairong 2007; Jing 2010). Other studies argue that “through a wide array of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, the Chinese government has begun to build an alternative international structure anchored by illiberal norms" and that, "nowhere is this trend more evident than in Africa." (Shinn and Eisennan 2014). They have a strong assertion that "Chinese illiberalism highlights the real long-term geopolitical challenge: It is easily exportable, and it is dangerously appealing to a disaffected world." Furthermore, linking Chinese political illiberalism with its economic relations confirms that China leverages its "mercantilist strength in the international system" to accomplish its national interest (Naazneen and Ratner 2006)

It is therefore evident that China's buoyant investments in Sub-Saharan African countries may have inevitable implications for the diplomatic relations of these Sub-Saharan African countries. However, many of the studies conducted on China and Sub-Saharan Africa's engagement focused on China as the new development partner for Africa, the rationale for China's renewed interest in the region and the history of China-Africa engagements (Alden 2005, Brookes and Shin 2006, (Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris 2007, Large 2008). Researchers particularly devoted to studying the implications of the recent China's engagements with the region, on the traditional diplomatic relations these countries already hold, have not received much attention. Zhang (2016) argued that Sino-Africa relations started earlier and on a stronger background than Sino-Latin America relations. However, the two bilateral relations revealed asymmetrical features although China's policies toward the two continents are identical, today China-Latin American relations are catching up very fast and are becoming more robust and substantial than those with African countries, leading to a new asymmetry. Similarly, Alden (2006) observed that Sino-African relations are asymmetric and have raised several concerns from the West on issues of humanitarian intervention, and as Breslin and Taylor (2008) also asserted that Sino-African relations may lead to the exportation of human rights violations from China to Africa.

Moreover, Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) used disaggregated data to confirm that Chinese trade is crowding out hence putting the local industries in Africa at risk. Power (2008) argues that the Sino-Africa relations negatively affect industrial growth in Africa as Chinese investments challenge the established industrialization which is the key component of African countries' development strategies. However, it can also be argued that the recent experiences indicate that clothing exports to the US under AGOA (African Growth & Opportunity Act) has significantly hurt or retarded industrial growth in Africa. And the sustainability of these harmful effects will be deepened if the policies of Washington Consensus prevails.

Furthermore, Villoria (2009) studies compared the demand for Chinese agriculture import to agricultural exports from Southern African countries. The studies suggested that the agriculture exports from the Southern Africa region is negatively affected China's growth. Elu and Price (2010) argue that the growing openness of trade to China in Africa does not guarantee improved living standards in Africa in the long-term run. Some concerns have also been raised about the unpleasant ramifications of this Sino-Africa increasing diplomatic relations. One issue highlighted has been the displacement of indigenous companies particularly in the textiles industry by the influx of Chinese textiles on the continent. Others fear that the Sino-African relations will neither aid local employment creation nor benefit the continent's long-term economic development.

Moreover, Brooks (2010) observed that there is substantial discontent in labour relations between China and the textile industry in Zambia as lower wages are being paid to the locals by textile firms run by the Chinese. This does not help to benefit from the modern livelihood expected by the Zambians (Kaplinsky et. al 2007, Zafar 2007). Tull and Taylor (2006) suggested that political illiberalism has been a component of Sino-Africa relations. They were unsure to impute this to China's indifference or its design. They agreed that: "There is virtually no way around the conclusion that China's massive return to Africa presents a negative political development that certainly does not contribute to the promotion of peace, prosperity, and democracy on the continent". Alden (2006) revealed that China's demand for African resource commodities instinctively increases the tendency to do business with illiberal regimes. Kiss and Kate Zhou (2010) made a concluding remark that the Chinese are acquiescence in corrupt and brutal neo-patrimonial regimes will be increasingly pitted against an emerging narrative of resistance in Africa. Ndjio (2009) argued that Chinese prostitutes are perceived as cheap and junk as the Chinese commodities at large.[8] Huliaras and Magliveras (2008) asserted that negative perception and increasing suspicions by the United States and Europe regarding the rapid growth of China-Africa relations is because they want to find a strategical way of

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[8] The "Shanghai beauty" as they are affectionately called by the Cameroonians in their reference to Chinese prostitutes reflects the perception for sourced good from China.

increasing their own presence in Africa.[9] Likewise, Askouri (2007) argued that Chinese investments in Sudan are destroying local communities as China and the government of Sudan join hands to displace locals from their lands in the exploitation of natural resources.

Mutual Benefits of China-Africa Relations

Without any doubt, Africa is seen to be also economically benefiting from its engagement with China. Sino-Africa relations serve as a partnership that is rightfully needed to mitigate the imbalances of the international economic system which has marginalized the development of Africa (Gadzala and Hanusch 2010). According to Munemo (2013), the reliance of Africa on capital goods from China has led to economic growth most importantly through the transfer of technology. Findings from Munemo's work confirms that growth strategies greatly rely on efficient human resources, the increasing openness of Africa to trade, political stability, and the checks and balance of expenditure of government consumption.

Buckley (2013) "*From the Senegalese experience*", revealed that the grabbing of land by China will seem beneficial and efficient to local people if their views are considered during contract agreements. Moreover, Africa trading with China helps to diversify the economy and mitigates the implications of natural resource specialization on economic growth (Diaw and Lessoua 2013). Similarly, Jenkins and Edwards (2006) confirmed that positive or negative relationships of trade mostly depend on countries. They argued that the effects of Chinese investments in the various African countries differ significantly from each other as Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria are shown to be vital exporters. Conversely, Africa countries that mainly import from Asia face unfair competition from China in their export markets. McCormick (2008,) also asserted that Chinese aid to Africa has an implication on development, yet the impact varies depending on the characteristics of the structures and institutions of the recipient country. According to Friedman (2009), Africa is being transformed by China through the exports of entrepreneurial

[9] Hitherto this burgeoning Sino-Africa involvement, America and its European Allies especially previous colonial masters still had diplomatic grips over the African continent. Part of their mission is to contribute to a prosperous Africa, ruled by democracies that have uttermost respect for the rule of law, human rights and embrace a free market system (Brookes and Shin 2006). Therefore, the current escalating presence of China in Sub-Saharan African countries, is seen to be challenging this vision of the traditional diplomatic relations between these African countries and their Anglo-French development allies.

talents and economic dynamism. Bodomo made an assertion in his paper that the argument of the asymmetric relationship between China and Africa is exaggerated. This is due to the fact that China, a huge country with a population of 1.3 billion and its relations with 54 African countries can be seen as imperative and logical asymmetry (Bodomo 2009).

The impact of Chinese investment in Africa through trade and aid has enhanced development in non-resource countries like Mauritius as Ancharaz (2009) asserted that the economic rise of China has significantly benefited Mauritius notwithstanding the locals losing jobs in the clothing industry.[10] According to Mohan and Lampert (2010), African agency is pivotal in shaping Sino-African relations. They argued that several analyses made to renew the engagement with Africa by treating China as the driving force, there given a minute acknowledgement of the role of African agency, primarily exceeding the level of state elites. Kuo (2012) suggested that the Beijing model should be engaged rather than being criticized. Instead of Sino-pessimistic criticisms of Beijing for "free security riding non-cooperation in their liberal peaceful African projects hence, they should engage with Beijing in the perspective of seeing African security and its rationale for non-interference in Africa's domestic affairs.

More studies are recommended by Mohan (2013) encompassing Sino-Africa relations to prove the myths of Chinese importing their own labour into African countries. Mohan depicted that the Chinese work through enclaved investments to secure the resources of low-income economies, despite the fact that Chinese are not different from other foreign investors. Power and Mohan (2010) argued that in the pursuit of Chinese interest, they have developed strategic partnerships with Africa, thus increasing the economic, political, and diplomatic activities on the continent. Goldstein et. al (2006) suggested that the rising price of natural resources greatly benefits Africa, although there are some dramatic and unexpected consequences attached to it.

Africa still lags behind other continents in terms of poverty eradication. However, lessons can be drawn from how China mitigated the poverty in their country to help advance Sino-Africa relations. Several studies argued that Chinese investment offers the possibilities of eradicating

[10] The inception of Chinas in Mauritius cannot be accused for the drastic jobs lost in their clothing industry. However, this industry has proven to be resilient as exports confirmed a remarkable increasing trend.
Based on this, china has strategically used this peculiar achievement in Mauritius to infiltrate Africa market through their investments

poverty hence, enhancing south-south cooperation, accelerating economic growth and the investment has both economic and political tone (Carmody 2009, Wu and Cheng 2010, Zafar 2007, Brautigam, Farole and Xiaoyang 2010, Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris 2007, Tull 2006).

Reviewing the arguments from both sides, it can clearly be stipulated that China's engagement in the continent is polarized. In the words of Ademola et. al (2009), trade has both positive and negative effects, albeit, the negative effects offset the positives regarding Sino-Africa trade relations. However, it is up to African policymakers in their own wisdom in African to work towards advancing the interest of Africa to mitigate the negative trading effect with China. And through diversification of the economic and trade structures in the various Africa countries will enhance the significant contributions of trade to the industrial development of Africa. This study hence sets out specifically to thoroughly investigate if Chinese investment is helping or hindering Africa to move towards sustainable development.

Theoretical Framework

The impact of Chinese investment in Africa has become the focal point of discussion in international relations and political economy. There is a huge divergence of views on analysing China's contemporary engagement in Africa. These views are however seemed to be guided emphatically by China than the various African states. China-Africa investment relations are emphasized within the theoretical framework of geo-economics. This theory is deemed appropriate for this thesis as it is based on the analysis of politics and emphasizes the relevance of economic power and development. Geo-economics was coined by Luttwark (1990). He argued that "military means of power had become redundant and were being replaced by economic means that states now apply in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives" (Luttwark 1990). Geo-economics strongly lay emphasizes on "building an international partnership that promotes harmonization, efficiency, economic leverage, and growth that opposes the threat of political radicalism, anachronism, and anarchy" (Spark and Lawson 2007). During Africa's struggle for independence between the 1960s and 1970s, the ideology of China for African states was backed up with measures of economic aid, which emphasized building pertinent infrastructure developmental projects for the newly attained independence of Africa states. Chinese engagement in Africa ranges on a broader economic endeavour but with a specific focus on securing resources from Africa to feed its hungry economy. China's ambition to become a world super, it is imperative for it not to allow its geo-economic interest for resources to override Africa's quest for good governance, human rights, and sustainable development.

Recently, the Sino-Africa trade has increased with resources playing a vital role as the medium of exchange although infrastructure development and rehabilitation still remain another significant component of their relationship. China's resource expansionism into Africa has specifically been focused on securing oil concessions as the growing needs of petroleum hence becoming the second largest consumer of petroleum behind the US after overtaking Japan in 2003.[11] The fragmentation of the BRICS and other emerging countries (Malaysia, Thailand,

[11] China oil demands for over for the last four years accounts for 40 percent of the global oil demands. See, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4587374.stm.

Mexico, and the Philippines) in Africa threatens the long-established world order (Cooper et.al 2007). Africa is being projected by China as a strategic partner in its quest to become a world superpower and an economic might. From a geo-economic perspective, China investment activities in Africa aimed at taking a strategic advantage over its big regional economic competitors (Japan and India), and other BRICS countries that have shown a serious interest in cultivating a strong tie with Africa. However, this relationship tends to be complicated, multifaceted, and ambitious and with the assumptions of not enduring in the future if the relationship is solely based on ideological principles, unless those principles are beneficial enough to help advance sustainable development in Africa.

The geo-economic tune of Chinese resource expansion in the oil sector in Africa has become a threat to the interest of the US in Africa as a source for diversifying its oil imports. This has helped China to deal with the issues of its energy security and securing a reliable source for its energy dependency. China's expansionism in Africa is best captured by the wide range of its transactions on the continent especially a flurry of bilateral trade accompanied by high ranked Chinese leaders state visit, including President Xi Jinping. Albeit with the ongoing chaos and international opprobrium for its conduct in Darfur, Sudan still enjoys strong support from China to develop its oil sector. As several Western countries have retreated from Sudan over human rights abuse of protested citizens and terrorism concerns, China has been the principal beneficiary of Sudan's oil sector through its expanded economic engagement. This created a mutual benefit that enhances the relationship between the two countries. On one hand, Sudan was shielded by China from being criticized by the international community through their veto power in the UN Security Council, while on the other hand, China got a leverage over Sudanese government by convincing them to allow the deployment of UN-Africa peacekeeping forces in Darfur (Mensah 2010).

During the Bandung era, China propagated the idea of giving assistance to developing countries in their quest of promoting development of the Third World movement. In pursuant of its geo-economic interest, China will go beyond any means to over aggressively protect the Third World government in exchange for resources especially oil despite international criticism of human rights abuse by these governments. It is noteworthy that some Chinese investments fall within the concept of mutual benefit principle and South-South cooperation. For instance, the Sino-hydro barter deal signed between China and Ghana was an exchange for bauxite for the construction of roads, building of schools, and other infrastructural development. With its geo-economic stands, Africa presents a golden opportunity for China to meet the resource needs of its extractive industries. According to Nolan (2004), China has limited resources of oil and gas which accounts for only 2.3 and 0.9 percentages respectively. Chinese forays in search of resources can be found in their expression and agreements for oil development with other African countries, including an agreement signed between Kenya and China which allows Chinese oil firms to search for oil in Kenya. With a predominant focus on natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, Sino-Africa relations tend to promote Africa's dependence on natural resources and commodity exports in an increasingly globalized economy.

China's quest to establish a new international and economic order has advanced its interest in important discourses that seek to protect the legitimacy and rights of developing countries. China's FOCAC VI compliments Agenda 2065 of the African Union (AU) and UN's SDG Agenda 2030. Hence, geo-economics theoretical framework will be used to answer the question of whether Chinese investment in Africa help or hinder sustainable development.

CHAPTER THREE

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SDGs IN AFRICA AND CASE STUDIES

The MDGs launched in September 2000 became the ground-breaking for development. The eight goals of the MDGs set to specifically targeted at improving the social sector was fully supported by the Western donors who complained about suffering from "donor fatigue" for over decades of donating to Africa. And despite the recent benefits from China and India's engagement in promoting Africa to achieve the MDGs, there was a genuine restricted development with the sectors targeted by the MDGs to be achieved by Africa.[12] Botswana and Equatorial Guinea were the only two countries in Africa to have met the MDG target of reducing poverty in their various economies by half in over 15 years (Alden 2017).

The success stories of the MDGs helped in building the SDGs which has added new areas such as climate change, economic equality, innovation, sustainable consumption, peace, and justice among several other priorities. The 17 SDGs along and with its 169 targets were adopted in September 2015 during a special UN summit on sustainable development with the slogan "leave no one behind." This called for an immediate attempt that seeks to address inequality in all countries, reinforcing the belief of an NGO that "the goals are relevant to everyone, whether in the UK, Brazil or Kenya".[13]

The SDGs are very comprehensive than the MDGs as the 17 SDGs span across a multitude of sectors which are not limited to only low- and middle-income countries. It represents a universal call for ending poverty, protecting our planet, guaranteeing a better life, ensuring peace and prosperity for all the people on our planet. The significant aspect of the SDGs that differentiate it from the MDGs is the inherent synergies between all the goals which interconnect them; hence addressing one issue will indirectly also tackle other goals. Aligning the SDGs with the Africa Union Agenda 2063 gives Africa a very big opportunity to capitalize on MDGs' benefit over the decades and build on its policies and practices to advance a long-term development in Africa. Albeit, there are disparities presented in the SDG. However, the Agenda 2063 of the Africa

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[12] For a comprehensive review of the MDGs in Africa See, AfDB, "Annual Development Effectiveness Review 2013: Towards Sustainable Growth for Africa." (2013).

[13] See, https://www.christianaid.org.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/august_2015/sustainable-development-goals-deal-creates-new-momentum-towards-a-better-world.aspx.

Union share a similar focus as the SDGs in its own sets of 10 years sequenced strategy for the transformation of Africa.[14] With the commitments showed by Africa, its subregion, and regional organizations to achieve the SDGs, it has become imperative for all parties including the international to work effectively together to transform these ideas (SDGs) into reality.

African traditional partners (European Union, the United States, and Japan) have designed their development assistance programs to be in line with the SDGs and the AU agenda 2063 to help advance the progress of sustainable development across Africa. However, the new emerging partners present a non-Western, especially the BRICS excluding Russia (developing country of the South), have a similar historical relationship with Africa with an engagement through South–South Development Cooperation recently. China's role as an emerging partner with its financial prowess, trade standing, institutional capabilities and development records distinguishes it from other emerging partners such as India and Brazil. This has drawn specific attention to China from the West in their quest to Africa.

Review of the SDGs in Africa

Recently, Africa has been experiencing a sustainable and significant economic growth. Averagely, a quarter of African countries grew about 7 percent and of which some are among the forecasted fastest-growing economies in the world. However, this growth needs to be refocused to provide a strong ground on achieving sustainable development in Africa. These impressive growth rates need to be transformed into jobs that seek to improve the wellbeing of Africans.

Africa has made significant progress in social development. There has been an impressive decrease in poverty in several countries. Quality education and health are seeing some remarkable changes as government spending on it is steadily increasing. For instance, many states have achieved universal primary education enrolment and gender parity. Little progress has been made in areas such as health, and women empowerment, albeit with a considerable

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14 Although the SDGs and Agenda 2060 complement each other, however, a close assessment of the two approaches divulge some difference in the subtitles of both agendas. As the Agenda 2060 has a subtitle "The Africa We Want" clearly meant to mimic the subtitle of Rio+20's conference "The World We Want". This simultaneously pronounce a specific concerns and interest in Africa within the global. See, https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/new-actors-new-models-new-outcomes-african-countries-engagement-with-china-and-620319.

challenge still remaining. Other areas including poverty, gender inequality, and extreme hunger remain a difficult challenge for Africa in achieving Agenda 2030. Social development challenges such as youth employment, inadequate social protection, lack of quality education, fundamental access to infrastructural service also needs critical attention and investment.

Sustainable development in Africa heavily relies on goods and services obtained from the environment and extraction of natural resources. These natural resources are central to Africa's quest to eradicate poverty is entangled with an interconnection to social dimensions including food security, health, and gender. Moreover, livelihood and food security directly rely on a functioning ecosystem. Africa's socioeconomic development depends on mineral resources, forest, land, water, and marine ecosystem primarily forms the basis of productions.

According to SDSN (2013), consumption and production trends are based on resources which on the other hand controls the rate of sustainable development.[15]

Brief Overview of the SDGs

SDG 1: "No poverty"

This goal aims at "ending poverty in all its forms everywhere" **(**Guterres 2019). However, data on poverty is obsolete in several countries (Beegel et al 2016). And only 6 out of 54 countries in Africa have an up-to -date data for 2016-2017 with current data traced back as far as 2011 (UN SDG 2019). Long term progress has been made in moderate terms as the number of poverties keeps on rising. According to UNSDG (2019), only two African countries (Algeria and Mauritius have been able to achieve a single digit poverty rate with 14 other countries having a 50 percent rate above and three countries (Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and South Sudan) have a rate of 70 percent. Based on data available, only North African countries are likely to meet the 2030 target for poverty on the continent.

SDG 2: "Zero hunger"

The target of this goal is to end "all forms of hunger and malnutrition by 2030" whiles "securing sufficient and nutritious food yearly for everyone" **(**Guterres 2019). Africa has an overwhelming

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[15] Ibid.

challenge in malnutrition. The challenge is quite significant in Central Africa which has 32.3 percent acute food insecurity and 32.3 percent among East African countries. A quarter of both West Africa and Southern Africa populations are severely food insecure. The Central Africa Republic has the highest food insecurity in Africa at a rate of 58.6 percent with Rwanda, Madagascar, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Liberia are equally at a rate above 40 percent. Egypt, Mali, and Tunisia have the lowest food insecurity rate at 4.5 percent and 3.5 percent respectively. On the whole, excluding North Africa, food insecurity in Africa exceeds a 25 percent rate. North Africa is the only subregion in Africa to have decreased malnutrition rates to below 7.5 percent by 2030.

SDG 3: "Good Health and well-being"

This goal calls for "ensuring health and promote well-being at all ages for everyone". There is a high possibility of mortality between birth and age five (under-five-mortality) in Africa. This far surpasses the average of 39 per 1000 live births globally. As of 2015, North Africa has already achieved the target of decreasing the under-five mortality rate to below 25 deaths per 1000. Countries in Africa with the highest rates of death include Somalia, Chad, and the Central Africa Republic at a rate of 132.5, 127.3, and 123.6 per 1000 live birth respectively. However, West Africa having the highest death needs to put an intensive effort to reduce under-five mortality at least by half to achieve the 2030 target.

SDG 4: "Quality education"

The target of this SDG goal calls for "universal primary and secondary education for all by 2030" **(**Guterres 2019). Africa is yet to achieve a universal free primary education, although a huge progress has been towards achieving this goal. Over 50 percent of Africa countries have 90 percent enrolment in primary education and these countries have a high possibility of achieving 100 percent enrolment of primary education by 2030. Conversely, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Niger have primary enrolment below 90 percent at a rate of 41.7 percent, 51.4 percent, and 61.8 percent respectively.

SDG 5: “Gender equality”

This goal is to ensure “full effective participation and equal opportunities for all women in all leadership positions in political economy decision making and public life” **(**Guterres 2019). By measuring gender equality in terms of parliamentary seat proportion, Africa leads the world by appointing female legislators with an average of 24.2 percent above the world average of 23.6 percent. Rwanda leads as the country with the highest representatives of female legislators at a rate of 61.3 percent while countries like Senegal and Mozambique have a rate above 40 percent. Nigeria, Central African Republic and Congo have less than 10 percent women legislators in their respective parliaments. Despite the decreasing trends of people in vulnerable employment, women in Africa are still likely and vulnerably employed than men.

SDG 6: “Clean Water and sanitation”

The target of this goal is to “ensure a universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking to all by 2030” **(**Guterres 2019). A substantial percentage of Africans still lack access to basic drinking water. Africa’s access to improved drinking water within 30 minutes round trip is far below the global average. Six (6) out of the 54 countries in Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritius, Egypt, Libya, Seychelles) are above the 30 minutes threshold round trip for drinking water. About 19.3 percent of Eritreans have access to basic water services and Uganda and Ethiopia at a rate of 39 percent and 40 percent rate respectively. A considerable investment is required in several Africa states before it can reach the 2030 target on clean water and sanitation; however Official Development Assistance to Africa on issues of water and sanitation has progressively decreasing before the launching of the SDG in 2015.

SDG 7: “Affordable and clean energy”

This goal calls for a “universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy service to all by 2030” **(**Guterres 2019). Accessibility to electricity in Africa remains a critical challenge. North Africa and the Island countries are the only nine countries in Africa to have electrification above the 89 percent threshold. These countries are in progress of achieving 100 percent electrification by 2030, and East Africa is also on the path of achieving universal electrification. About less than half of the population of about 70 percent in several African countries have access to electricity.

SDG 8: "Decent work and economic growth"

This goal has a target of achieving a "full and productive employment and decent work….and equal pay for a work of equal value for all by 2030" **(**Guterres 2019). Africa has the highest unemployment rates in the world (Kuhn et al 2018). This is a severe challenge that undermines wealth creation in Africa. More than 40 countries in Africa have an unemployment rate above 5 percent. Countries including South Africa, Lesotho, Eswatini, Namibia, and the Gambia have more than a quarter of their population unemployed.

SDG 9: "Industry, innovation and infrastructure"

This goal calls for " a significant increase to the access to information and communication technology, and a universal and affordable or cheap access to the internet by 2030" **(**Guterres 2019). This remains a challenge as internet usage in Africa at a lower rate compared to the rest of the world on average. Only South Africa, Mauritius, Djibouti, Cape Verde, Seychelles, Morocco, and Tunisia have internet usage above 50 percent of their citizens. One-fifth population of 24 countries in Africa has access to the internet and nations including Central Africa Republic, Guinea Bissau, Chad, and Somalia have below 5 percent internet usage in their respective countries. Although Morocco has the highest internet usage in Africa, it is still below the world average. About half of the countries in Africa have less than 20 percent access to the internet.

SDG 10: "Reducing inequality within and among countries"

This goal has a target of ensuring the "basic needs and rights of all people are met by 2030" **(**Guterres 2019). With no existing SDG data to help to assess this indicator clearly shows that Africa is one of the world's most unequal regions.

SDG 11: "Sustainable cities and communities"

This goal calls for "Making cities and human settlement inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable for all by 2030" **(**Guterres 2019). According to Africa SDGs Centre (2019), Africa is the least urbanized region than the rest of the world. However, there is no reliable data to analyse the trend although 13 countries have formulated, and 21 states are still on the path of the implementation of national urban policies.

SDG 12: "Sustainable consumption"

The target of this goal is to "ensure sustainable consumption and production by 2030" **(**Guterres 2019). There is a lack of data for any of the indicators.

SDG 13: "Climate change"

This goal calls for "taking and urgent action to combat climate change and its implication" **(**Guterres 2019). Africa stands tall among all the regions in the world in terms of CO_2 emissions. Only South Africa is among the top 20 top emitters of CO_2 in the world. It emits 467.7 metric tonnes of CO_2 annually. Egypt and Algeria are considered among the worst offenders of CO_2 emission as well.

SDG 14: "Life below water"

The target is to ensure "the conservation and sustainability uses of the oceans, seas, marine resources for sustainable development" **(**Guterres 2019). This goal lacks data to help in assessing its progress through countries with maritime borders do deem it necessary to protect areas for marine life.

SDG 15: "Life on land"

The target of this goal is to "ensure the conservation, restoration, and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems" **(**Guterres 2019). Africa performs quite well in terms of protecting lands to support biodiversity. Europe and North America are the only two regions with the largest protected biodiversity site than Africa with 46.1 percent. The continent could achieve the targeted goal as it has already been done by 44 percent of its countries if Africa focused on policy intervention programs.

SDG 16: "Peace, justice and strong institution"

This goal calls for a "significant reduction of all forms of violence and related death rate everywhere by 2030" **(**Guterres 2019). Africa has a huge number of deaths caused by conflict or terrorism. Most of the alarming countries include Sudan, Libya, and Somalia at a rate of 6.5 percent, 28.5 percent, and 30.3 percent respectively. North Africa has the least number of deaths although it is significantly above the average of the world. About 91 percent of countries in Africa have less than 1.9 deaths per 1000,000 people due to conflict or terrorism.

SDG 17: "Partnership for the goal"

The target of this goal is to "strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development" **(**Guterres 2019). According to 2015 data, over half of African countries have their national statistics plan fully funded and implemented. The continent requires a significant effort to achieve the 2030 target by all the regions.

Table 1: Review of SDGs trend in Africa (2019 SDG index and dashboard and trends)

COUNTRY	INDEX SCORE	RANKINGS	SDG 1	SDG 2	SDG 3	SDG 4	SDG 5	SDG 6	SDG 7	SDG 8	SDG 9	SDG 10	SDG 11	SDG 12	SDG 13	SDG 14	SDG 15	SDG 16	SDG 17
Mauritius	66.19	1	↑	↗	↗	↗	↗	↑	↗	↗	↗	↗	↗	↗	↓	→	↓	↗	↗
Tunisia	66.12	2	↑	↗	↗	→	→	→	↗	-	↗	-	-	-	↑	→	↗	→	↗
Algeria	65.77	3	↑	→	↗	↗	↗	↗	↗	→	↑	-	→	-	↓	↓	↗	→	→
Morocco	64.37	4	↑	↗	↗	↗	↗	↑	↗	-	↗	-	→	-	↑	↗	↓	→	↗
Cabo Verde	64.08	5	↗	↗	↗	→	↗	↗	↗	-	↗	-	-	-	↑	↗	→	↗	↗
Egypt, Arab Rep.	63.78	6	↑	↗	↗	↑	↗	↑	↗	→	↗	-	→	-	↑	↗	↗	→	→
Sao Tome and Princi	61.84	7	→	↗	→	→	→	↗	↓	-	→	-	-	-	↑	↗	→	-	→
Botswana	61.63	8	→	→	↗	→	↗	→	→	→	↗	-	↗	-	↓	-	↗	↗	→
Ghana	61.19	9	↗	→	→	↓	↗	→	→	→	↗	-	→	-	↑	↗	→	→	→
South Africa	60.43	10	→	↗	↗	→	↗	↗	↗	→	↗	-	→	-	→	→	→	→	↗
Gabon	53.22	11	→	→	→	→	↗	↗	↑	↗	↗	-	→	-	↑	→	↑	→	↓
Rwanda	57.9	12	→	→	↗	→	↗	→	↗	↗	↗	-	-	-	↑	-	→	→	↗
Namibia	57.09	13	↓	↗	↗	↗	↑	→	→	-	↗	-	-	-	↑	↗	↑	→	→
Senegal	56.96	14	↗	↗	↗	→	↗	↗	→	→	-	-	-	↑	↗	↗	↗	↗	↑
Kenya	56.55	15	→	→	↗	→	↗	→	→	↗	↗	-	→	-	↑	↗	↓	→	→
Tanzania	55.95	16	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	↗	→	→	→
Cote d'Ivoire	55.59	17	↗	↗	↗	↗	→	→	→	-	↗	-	→	-	↑	-	↗	↗	→
Uganda	54.88	18	→	→	↗	→	→	→	→	↑	↗	-	↓	-	↑	-	→	→	→
Zimbabwe	54.81	19	→	→	↗	→	↗	↓	→	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	-	→	→	↑
Burkina Faso	53.48	20	↗	↗	↗	↗	→	→	→	↗	↗	-	→	-	↑	-	↑	↗	↗
Ethiopia	53.21	21	↑	↗	↗	→	→	→	→	-	→	-	→	-	↑	-	→	→	↓
Zambia	53.05	22	→	→	↗	→	↗	→	→	↗	↗	-	→	-	↑	-	→	→	↗
Togo	52.69	23	→	→	→	→	→	→	↗	↑	→	-	↓	-	↑	-	↗	→	↑
Eswatini	52.36	24	↓	→	↗	↓	→	→	↗	-	→	-	-	-	↑	-	→	-	↗
Malawi	52.32	25	→	→	↗	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	-	→	→	↗
The Gambia	51.91	26	→	→	→	↗	→	→	→	-	→	-	-	-	↑	↗	↗	-	→
Mali	51.75	27	→	↗	→	→	→	↗	→	↗	↗	-	↗	-	↑	-	↗	↓	→
Cameroon	51.57	28	→	→	→	↗	→	→	↗	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	-	↓	↓	↓
Benin	51.52	29	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	-	↑	↗	→
Mozambique	51.42	30	→	→	→	→	↗	→	→	-	↗	-	-	-	↑	↗	↓	→	↗
Mauritania	51.29	31	→	↓	→	→	→	↗	→	→	→	-	→	-	↑	↗	↗	→	↗
Lesotho	50.91	32	→	→	→	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	-	↗	→	↗
Niger	50.33	33	→	→	↗	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	-	↗	-	↑	-	↗	→	↗
Burundi	50.25	34	↓	↗	↗	→	→	→	→	-	→	-	-	-	↑	-	↑	→	→
Sierra Leone	49.75	35	→	↗	→	↗	→	→	→	→	→	-	→	-	↑	→	↑	→	→
Djibouti	49.67	36	↗	→	→	→	↑	→	↓	-	→	-	-	-	↑	-	↓	-	↗
Guinea	49.35	37	↗	→	→	→	→	→	→	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	↗	↗	→	↓
Angola	49.26	38	↓	↗	→	→	→	→	→	-	→	-	-	-	↑	→	↗	-	→
Congo, Rep.	48.66	39	↓	→	→	→	↗	→	↗	↗	↗	-	↑	-	↑	-	↑	↓	→
Liberia	48.03	40	↓	↗	→	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	-	↓	-	↑	↗	→	→	↗
Comoros	47.57	41	→	-	↗	↓	→	→	→	-	→	-	-	-	↑	→	↓	-	→
Sudan	47.4	42	→	→	→	→	→	→	→	-	→	-	-	-	↑	↗	↗	-	→
Nigeria	47.07	43	↓	→	→	→	→	→	→	-	→	-	→	-	↑	→	↗	→	↗
Madagascar	45.57	44	→	→	→	→	↗	→	↓	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	↗	↓	→	→
Guinea-Bissau	45.48	45	→	↗	→	→	→	→	-	↓	-	-	-	↑	↗	→	↑	-	→
Equatorial Guinea	43.39	46	-	-	→	→	→	↓	→	-	→	-	-	-	-	→	→	-	→
Eritrea	43.33	47	-	→	↗	↓	→	→	→	-	→	-	-	-	-	→	↗	-	-
Dem.Rep. Congo	41.62	48	→	→	→	→	↗	→	→	↗	→	-	→	-	↑	-	→	→	↗
Somalia	40.12	49	-	-	→	-	↗	→	→	-	→	-	-	-	↑	→	↗	-	-
Chad	38.73	50	↓	→	↗	→	↗	→	→	→	→	-	→	-	↑	-	↑	→	→
Central African Repu	36.7	51	→	→	→	→	→	→	→	↓	→	-	→	-	↑	-	↑	→	↓
South Sudan	29.195	52	↓	-	→	→	→	→	-	-	-	-	↓	-	↑	-	↗	→	-
Seychelles	-	-	↑	-	-	↗	-	↑	↗	-	↗	-	-	-	↓	↗	↓	↑	↑
Libya	-	-	-	↓	↗	→	→	↑	-	-	→	-	-	-	↓	→	↗	-	↓

Source: *SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2019 and by the author. According to the SDG dashboard report (2019), the green colour represents achieved the SDG. The red colour represents a major challenge of achieving SDG, colour brown illustrates a significant challenge, colour yellow shows the challenge remains. These three colours show a surging distance from achieving the SDGs. The grey colour represents unavailable data. (↑) shows the country is on the path or maintaining SDG achievement, (↓) shows a decreasing distance away from achieving SDG, (↗) indicates that the SDG is moderately improved, (→) shows there is a stagnation of achieving SDG, and (-) shows there is unavailable information.*

Case Studies

A: Kenya

Introduction

Kenya is a country located in East Africa at the 'Horn of Africa'. It gained an internal rule from British colonial rule on June 1, 1963. The British allowed Kenya to form an internal government under Jomo Kenyetta as their first president. Kenya gained official independence on December 12, 1963 and became a Republic a year later on December 12, 1964. Kenya is endowed with many natural resources such as tea, coffee, titanium ore, and petrol. According to the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) (2017), Kenya's largest export includes tea, coffee, refined petrol, titanium ore, and cut flowers.

Political System of Kenya

With violence from the Mau Mau rebellions, civil interest, and diplomatic means through the petitioning of the UN's petition against British Colonial rule led to Kenya's independence in December 1963. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) led by Jomo Kenyatta won the first election against Kenya Africa Democratic Union (KADU). Jomo Kenyatta became the first Prime Minister with the Queen of England as the Head of State (Hodder Williams 1980). The KANU after winning the general election in 1963, changed the constitution from the Westminster model to the Presidential model (Muigai 2004).

However, the presidential system of governance has been used in Kenya until the general election dispute in 2007 (Francois et al 2015). Daniel Moi became the next president after the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 till 2002. Under Daniel Moi's presidency, he managed to strengthen the office of the president's office by amending the constitution, the presidential decrees, and declaration (Nepstad 2011; Wolf 2006). This gave the president full control over the judiciary and the parliament. The president had the powers to appoint the high court judges, the Commissioner of the Judicial Services, and suspends parliament (Branch and Cheeseman 2009). Kenya was transformed into a one-party state system and it was President Moi who restored multiparty politics during the 1992 general election. In 1997, President Moi won another election with Uhuru Kenyatta (the son of the former president late Jomo Kenyatta) as his vice president. During the 2002 election, President Moi stood down to allow Uhuru Kenyatta to run for the president on the ticket of KANU. Unfortunately, Uhuru Kenyatta led the KANU to its first defeat to a coalition party, National Rainbow Coalition Party (NARC) led by Mwai Kibaki. The coalition government formed by Mwai Kibaki fell apart after his government renounced the strong creation of a Prime Minister position instead of creating a weak one during the 2003 Constitutional Review proposal. This led to a fracture in the NARC, which resulted in the dismissal of Odinga and his support from Kibaki's government. The 2007 election was won by President Kibaki (Party of National Unity) with support from Uhuru Kenyatta against the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Odinga. This election saw 1300 people killed and over 600,000 people including women and children displaced. The violence that erupted in the 2007 elections led to the indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate, Williams Ruto to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2011 for inciting ethnic violence against Odinga's supporters.

Due to the ICC's lack of evidence, charges against Uhuru Kenyatta and Williams Ruto were dropped in 2014 and 2016 respectively. The post-election violence of 2007 led to the creation of the 2008 National Accord and Reconciliation Act. And with the mediation of the former UN Secretary General, late Kofi Annan and Jakaya Kikwete, President of Tanzania and Africa Union chairman helped broker an agreement between Kibaki and Odinga to form a coalition between the PNU and the ODM with Odinga swearing-in as a Prime Minister on April 17, 2008, for the first time since 1964. The 2010 new constitution of Kenya was seen as a big achievement towards democracy in Kenya (Barkan and Mutua 2010). With contributions and opinions from academicians, professional organizations, media, citizens, civil society, religious groups, and people with special interests.[16] The new constitution helped address the issues including the power vested in the president to appoint public officers without vetting by the parliament and

[16] 68.7 percent of the vote casted during the referendum were in favor of the new constitution and 31.3 percent were against it. See, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-referendum/kenya-votes-yes-to-new-constitution-idUSTRE6743G720100805

problems with electoral justice that the previous constitution failed to give proper mechanisms. It also provided fair means of resolving disputes that will arise from elections.[17]

Uhuru Kenyatta became the next president after defeating Raila Odinga ODM party in 2013 elections though Odinga's party won the majority seats at the National Assembly. The 2017 election was won again by Uhuru Kenyatta won his second term in office against Odinga who ran unsuccessfully in 1997, 2007, and 2013 elections. Odinga challenged the results in the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court annulled the results of the presidential elections after citing irregularities. Re-election was conducted by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IECB) on October 26, 2017 following Supreme Court rulings. Uhuru Kenya won the re-elections after the withdrawal of Odinga in his quest for reforms of the IEBC.

Economy of Kenya

Kenya has positioned itself as the economic, financial and, logistics hub in East Africa. The rebased GDP of $58.1 Billion in 2014 per the World Bank threshold elevated Kenya into a Lower-Middle-Income country. Kenya's economy remains one of the strongest economies in Africa with a GDP of $99.25 billion which grew at 5.6 percent in 2019. Agriculture is the backbone of Kenya's economy and it contributes 24.9 percent to its GDP. The leading export of Kenya in 2017 includes were tea and horticulture with an export value of $1.5billion and $1.1billion respectively. Africa remains the leading destination of Kenya's exports followed by Asia and Europe (KNBS 2018). Tourism also plays a vital role in Kenya's economy. It contributed about 20 percent to the economy in 2017 despite the country's political tumour of the country during the second half of 2017. Kenya, however, contributes 40 percent to the regional GDP of East Africa Community. The discovery of oil and gas recently at Turkana will help strengthen Kenya's economic growth. Trade between China and Kenya is not balanced as Chinese exports to exceed imports from Kenya thus creating a balance of trade deficit for Kenya.

[17] Petitions were lodged by the opposition parties against the IEBC to the Supreme Court about fairness of 2013 and 2017 elections. See , https://www.africanews.com/2017/10/25/a-look-at-kenya-s-elections-history-since-independence-in-1964//

China-Kenya Relations

China nurtured a prominent Kenyan politician, Oginga Odinga three years before the independence of Kenya was attained. Odinga represented the radical wing of the KANU. He made his first visit to China in 1960 and eventually became the vice president after Kenya's independence in 1963 (Shinn and Eisenman 2012). Nevertheless, Kenya had a trade relationship with China before independence and recognized China afterward. In 1964, China gave grant cash of $3 million and $18 million long term credit as their recognition of Kenya as an important regional player to China. Oginga Odinga still receiving financial support from China became a threat to Jomo Kenyatta. This led to the expulsion of Xinhua correspondent in 1965 by President Kenyatta as the pamphlet "Revolution in Africa" attributed to China called for the overthrow of the Kenyatta government circulated in East Africa.

The interception of Chinese arms to Uganda from Tanzania by the Kenyan police got President Kenyatta furious. This led to the declaration of Chinese chargé d'affaires as a persona non grata in 1967 making it the fourth Chinese official to be expelled from Kenya in two years. China retaliated by ordering the chargé d'affaires of Kenya out of their country. Chinese support for Odinga and their actions in Kenya was miscalculated and were not inconsistent with policy at the time (Bruce Larkin 1974). These issues set back China-Kenya relations for several years although it did not result in a formal break (Chege 2008). China-Kenya relations started improving after 1978 when Daniel Moi accused China of plotting revolution in Kenya in the 1960s became the president after the death of Jomo Kenyatta. The Sino-Kenyan relationship has shifted from political interference to cooperation that seeks to advance the interests of the two countries through technology, health, education, and many others.

Chinese Investment, Trade, and Aid in Kenya

China is the largest importer of goods to Kenya's economy as Chinese exports to Kenya increased significantly from $3 billion in 2015 to 3.42 billion in 2018. Kenya export metals, plastics, vegetable textile fibres, and leather rawhide skin to China and the European Union (Hansen et al 2015). China's exports to Kenya include rubber and plastics products. This clearly suggest an overspecialization in the manufacturing industries hence affecting the domestic consumption and services in Kenya. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

(KNBS, 2020), Kenya exports to China in 2018 worth $109 million and Chinese export to Kenya as of 2018 was $3.5 billion. Aid from China to Kenya is entirely in the form of loans and only a fraction of Chinese Official Development flows as an aid to Kenya. Most of China's loans in 2015 went to Kenyan energy and petroleum ministry. Chinese loans in Africa primarily focus on the extraction of resources and infrastructure. In 2000, Chinese investment was totally absent in Kenya. However, Chinese FDI inflows substantially increased in 2013 after the 2012 presidential elections due to the predicted political stability. Chinese FDI in 2015 at $1.1billion was 22 times higher than 2006 placing it as 12th country in Africa for Chinese FDI.[18] The One-Belt-One-Road policy highlighted Kenya as the gateway to Africa. Kenya was among the countries which were used as a pilot for One-Belt-One-Road policy for China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation due to its strategic location between the East countries and the Indian Ocean.[19] However, Chinese loans to the Kenyan communication and technology sector complement its investments in the communication sector as it uses Kenya as a strategy in accessing the East Africa regional market.

Kenya mineral sector (metals) received a significant part of Chinese investment in 2003-2015 with an amount of $179 million. The Communication sector had a fair of $151 million and the automotive original equipment manufacturing attracted $66 million of China's investment. Investment in metals fits with Kenya's upsurge exports of minerals to China such as titanium ores and copper. Companies from China invest heavily in the Kenyan manufacturing sector as their investment in 2003-2015 account for $ 296.2 million represent 64 percent of the total Chinese firms' investment (Sanghi and Johnson 2016). However, Chinese FDI was missed from major sectors such as constructions, internet infrastructure, transportation, electricity, and ICT. Bräutigam (2011) revealed that China's official finance to African countries is at a competitive commercial rate with 12 to 15 years maturity and 2-5 years grace period. In 2015, Kenya awarded Huawei with a $60 million contract to build a national fibre optic network. The

[18] "Bilateral relations between China and Kenya," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. Available at, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn//gxh/cgb/zcgmzysx/ fz/1206_25/1206x1/t6589.htm, Accessed on July 15, 2020.

[19]"One-Belt-One-Road Initiative and Construction of Port in Kenya," Retrieved from http://www.sohu.com/a/230354876_100116571 on 14 July 2020.

deal was financed by China EXIM Bank (ICT Authority Kenya 2015). Chinese banks also offer cheap loans to State Owned-Enterprises to bid for big infrastructure in Africa. In contrast to oil-exporting countries, Chinese firms in Kenya are interested in coffee production and manufacturing firms due to the high returns on it compared to the oil exploitations. Kenya's automotive equipment manufacturing (OEM) and communication sectors have received a significant amount of Chinese investments.[20]

Table 2: List of registered Chinese investment projects in Kenya

SECTOR	Registered Chinese Investment Projects
Agriculture	6
Mineral Processing	20
Manufacturing	27
Services	18

Source: China Ministry of Commerce 2019



Figure 1: Registered Chinese investment projects in Kenya 2019

20 Sangi and Johnson "Deal or No Deal" Strictly Business for China in Kenya? 2016. Available at, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/801581468195561492/pdf/WPS7614.pdf

Impact

Kenya's exports to its neighbouring countries (Uganda and Tanzania) have decreased significantly in recent years due to the influx of Chinese goods. Exports from Kenya to Uganda and Tanzania are relatively similar to Chinese products to those countries as compared to Kenya and Chinese exports to the US and the UK. These overlaps in East Africa trade indicates that Kenya exports to these neighbouring countries are highly likely to be replaced by the cheap Chinese goods. Chinese imports to Kenya have led to deindustrialization as the number of industries in Kenya keeps declining due to the decrease in manufacturing growth from 5.6 percent in 2013 to 3.4 percent in 2017.[21] Moreover, Chinese finished products and intermediate goods are less expensive hence benefiting Kenya's economy as competition from Chinese firms force less competitive firms out of the market. This helps eliminate deadweight loss from Kenya's domestic market and improves the efficiency and the upgrading of local firms' standards to supply the inputs needed by Chinese companies for their productions. A typical example was the ongoing Standard Gauge Railway construction and Thika road construction (a first-class multi-lane highway to connect Nairobi and Thai). local cement producers were trained to meet the international standards of producing cement and parts needed the construction of roads and railways. This created employment thereby decreasing unemployment rates in Kenya. (KAM 2020).

Conversely, inputs from China have hurt the textiles and clothing industries in Kenya. The clothing enterprises in Kenya especially employ women; a weak sector will, however, worsen gender equality as stipulated in the SDG 5 (Sanghi and Johnson 2016). Similarly, Chinese companies in Kenya employ a relatively small number of women's workforces. A survey done by the World Bank in 2017, women represent only 3 percent of employees in Chinese firms in Kenya with 15 percent of the women working in private companies and 2 percent in the Chinese State-Owned-Enterprises. The hiring of more women in Kenya's workforce has a significant

[21] The World Bank has warned Kenya that cheap imports from Chinese may significantly hurt the economy as it bids to become a member of the industrialized nations which is clearly projected in Kenya's Vision 2030 economic prototype. See, http://www.idpublications.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Full-Paper-FACILITATING-TRADE-OF-IMPORT-AND-EXPORT-BETWEEN-KENYA-AND-CHINA.pdf

impact on poverty eradication as women spend more on education and household durables. Household savings increase when women work hence solving hunger and malnutrition in many households (Lawson and Gilman 2009). Without increasing women employees in Chinese firms will worsen or upsurge poverty in Kenya.

B***: Zambia***

Introduction

In Southern Africa, Zambia attained its independence from British Colonial rule on October 24, 1964, under Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda by an election won by the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Zambia is endowed with natural resources such as cobalt, silver, gold, and copper as the basis of their prosperity in the first decade of their independence.

Political System

There have three Republics since Zambia's independence. Zambia started as a multiparty-politics that ensured full participation of opposition parties until it adopted the one-party system. Zambia returned to multi-party politics in 1991 after two decades of a one-party system (Ihonvbere 1996). The election held in 1991 was won by a newly formed Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by former union leader Frederick Chiluba which was seen as a shining example for several African countries by the international communities and governments. The 1991 general election was characterized as violent and complex development, accusations by opposition parties, manipulation of state and resources by the government to appeal the masses to solicit for votes (Joseph 1992). Frederick Chiluba became the second president of Zambia and got re-elected in 1996. The smooth transition from an authoritative one-party system of 27 years rule under Kenneth Kaunda to a liberal multiparty democracy did not only advance Zambia but also accelerate its economic growth and recovery.

Since 1991, Zambia has held numerous general elections which have been praised as enhancing democracy in Zambia. However, the 1996 and 2001 elections were seen as fraudulent. Many local and international observers accused the government and the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) failing to conduct credible free and fair elections. The opposition parties challenge the results, but the court later ruled in favour of President Levy Mwanawasa.

Then, after all elections held have gone under closed scrutiny to prevent rigging of votes as Zambia strives to build confidence in the results of the recently held elections including 2006, 2008, and 2011. Vice President Rupiah Banda became the president after President Mwanawasa's death in 2008 through a by-election held. President Banda secured 40.09 percent of the votes cast to complete the presidential term. Another election held in 2011 was won by the Patriotic Front (PF) led by Michael Chilufya Sata against MMD led by President Banda. Michael Data became the 5th president of Zambia. The death of Michael Sata on October 28, 2014 paved the way for Guy Scott to serve as the interim president until new elections were held on January 20, 2015. Edgar Lungu became the sixth president of Zambia after winning the 2015 general elections.

Economy of Zambia

Zambia is the second largest producer of copper in Africa and the country achieved a middle-income status during an impressive economic growth run at a rate of 7.4 percent for a decade (2004-2014).[22] The GDP of Zambia in 2019 was worth $13 billion at a negative growth rate of 8.6 percent. However, only a small fraction of its urban population has enjoyed this significant growth which has limited the impact of eradicating poverty in Zambia. The country is ranked among the countries with the highest level of inequalities globally. The World Bank (2020) revealed that about 58 percent of Zambians earned less than $1.90 per day as suggested by the international poverty line. About three quarters of its poor population lives in rural areas. The country's economy grew by 3.7 percent in 2018 from 3.5 percent in 2017. This growth increase was observed in the strong performance in the service sector specifically the wholesale and retails, information and communication, and pension. Agriculture and mining activities combined accounts for 21 percent of the country's GDP. Manufacturing and construction sector make up to 25 percent of the GDP whiles the services sector, including financial services, tourism, retailing, and transports represent 46 percent of Zambia's GDP.

Agriculture employs about 85 percent of the Zambian population, 8 percent are into the formal labour force and 6 percent are into the services sector. The performance of agriculture in 2018

[22] See, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview

was negative due to poor harvest. Zambia's current account deficit increased to 2.8 percent of the GDP in 2018 from 1.7 percent in 2017. The debt to GDP quadrupled from 20.5 percent in 2011 to 78.1 percent in 2018. The external and domestic debt accumulations drive this. The country's sovereign debt of the country is expected to increase to 96 percent of the GDP in 2020 as public guaranteed debt service obligations between 2019 and 2021 are expected to reach $4.6 billion. A debt sustainability analysis done by the World Bank and the IMF confirmed that Zambia's public debt under the current policies is leading to an unsustainable road due to high external debt distress.

Sino-Zambia Relations

Prior to the independence of Zambia, only a few exchanges have been made between Zambia and China although China gave a grant of $500,000 to Zambia (Kopinski and Polus 2011). China recognized Zambia's significance as a strategic location in Southern Africa and through the influence of Kenneth Kaunda, the first President of Zambia. China made an effort to cultivate this mineral rich country. China established diplomatic relations with Zambia immediately when it gained independence. Through the persuasions of Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda started to develop a special interest in China although he was wary of China's communism. A cultural agreement between Zambia and China was signed in 1966. China offered a $7 million loan in 1967 followed by a $17 million interest-free loan during President Kenneth Kaunda's visit to China. Tanzania, Zambia, and China agreed to build a Chinese aid project, the Tanzania-Zambia railway. Subsequently, the two countries signed protocols for road constructions and a short-wave radio transmitting station criticism of the quality of the equipment (Shinn and Eisenman 2012).

Kenneth Kaunda visited China in 1974 and helped to secure a loan of $20 million for road construction and agricultural projects and went to the extent of convincing China to support for liberation groups in Angola (Mwanawina 2008). China started admitting students from Zambia on scholarship and sending medical teams to Zambia to assist in delivering quality health services to Zambians. In 1979, the vice premier of China visited Zambia, and this made it possible by extending $230 million grants to Zambia compared to the $15 million grant they got from the Soviet Union. This made Kenneth Kaunda's affection for China stronger than the Soviet Union, therefore, making a third visit to China in 1980. A new agreement on culture, media, health, and sports was signed between China and Zambia under President Kaunda followed by a military delegation that led to a close military cooperation. Kenneth Kaunda's last visit to China was in 1988 after Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Zambia in 1983 (Taylor 2010).

The defeat of President Kaunda in 1991 election by Frederick Chiluba did not drive China away from Zambia. It still gave them a new opportunity in building a close relationship with the newly formed government as China began sending teachers to the University of Zambia in 1992 and the city of Luzhou in Sichuan Province established a sister city connection with Kwabe. Zambia reaffirmed its desire for a good relationship with China and supported China on human rights issues at the UN. The first Chinese State-Owned Bank branch in Sub-Saharan Africa was established in Zambia in 1997. It became a strategic investment that helped in mitigating risk in banking challenges faced by Chinese investors in Zambia (Van Dijk 2009). The Chinese ambassador in Lusaka, Li Baodong causes a political misstep by finding himself meandering deep in Zambian presidential elections in 2006. This issue received a severe bashing from the leading opposition leader of the PF party, Michael Sata criticizing Chinese business practices in Zambia and openly contacted Taiwanese officials. Ambassador Li Baodong threatened to withdraw China's assistance to Zambia if Sata won. This utterance from Li Baodong led to his transfer to Geneva although Sata lost the elections.[23] The relationship between these two countries can be concluded as an exchange of resources for investment and aid from China.

Chinese Investment, Trade, and, Aid in Zambia

Zambia is the second largest trading partner with China, which is defined mainly on Chinese demand for copper from the country. Zambia has a balance of trade surplus with China. The bilateral trade between the two countries exceeded $2.52 billion in 2018, over $4 billion is an export from Zambia to China and $800 million represented an import from China. However, Zambia imports from China increased to $1.02 billion in 2019 as Chinese imports from Zambia decreased to $1.5 billion in 2019. Over a decade, China has invested relatively quite a huge amount in mining especially copper, as its export to China increased significantly from $157,363 in 1995 to $1.3 billion in 2018. The major Chinese investment in Zambia started in 1998 when

[23] See, https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20060925/281663955493983

China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Company bought the Chambishi copper mine at a $20 million fee. A lot of safety and complaints about labor issues were made against the mining company. China investment in Zambia increased after the mine explosion that killed 49 people in Chambishi as the problem left an ill legacy to the Chinese. The largest textile mill was created in Zambia as part of a joint venture between the two countries. The company had a short life span due to stiff competition from China and other Asian countries (Muna Ndulo 2008). The Ministry of Finance in 2018 reveals that FDI inflow to the mining sector accounts for 65.7 percent, manufacturing represents 24.3 percent of FDI, wholesale and retail trade at 6.7 percent, and deposit taking corporation accounts for 6.6 percent.

President Mwanawasa's representation at the 2006 FOCAC resulted in China's cancelation of $211 million debt including the Tanzania-Zambia railway loan. A $220 million agreement for the construction of a copper smelter was signed. However, the complaints from unhappy workers on issues relating to their safety and working conditions forced Hu Jintao to be cancelling his stop to Chambishi during his visit to Zambia. China experienced a periodic backlash from opposition political parties, civil societies, and labour unions. It still recognizes Zambia's vital role for its political collaboration and access to its resources such as copper, cobalt, and nickel.
The construction of a new hydroelectric dam in South Zambia at a cost of $1.2 billion financed with China Africa Development Fund was signed in 2010.[24] Chinese FDI in 2011 reached an estimate of $2 billion mostly in natural resources, agriculture, and the extractive industries, and in total over 200 Chinese companies had already been established in Zambia. Chinese firms were winning about 70-75 percent of infrastructure contracts in Zambia hence Chinese FDI increased at a faster rate in the country than any other country in Africa. In 2010, exports from Zambia to China saw some steady growth reaching $2.5 billion, mostly from cobalt, copper, and tobacco.

Zambia's energy sector has received a significant amount of Chinese FDI. The energy projects that China has invested in Zambia include hydro, and coal power and the current energy project is the EMCO thermal plant at the cost of $690 million. When completed, the project is expected to generate 600 Mega Watts of electricity to help minimize energy shortfalls in Zambia. China's

[24] Lydia Polgreen and Howard W. French, "China's trade in Africa carries a price tag" New York Times 2007. See, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/world/africa/21zambia.html

investment in Zambia regarding road infrastructure has been unprecedented. The Accelerated National Roads Constructions project initiated by President Sata to link 8000 Zambian roads received a remarkable welcome from China. Sixteen (16) out of the 23 contracts of the projects were awarded to Chinese companies and financed by China EXIM Bank.[25]

The Zambian Road Development Agency (RDA) awarded the construction of the Mansa to Luwingu at the cost of $207 million to China Henan International Corporation. The development of roads in Zambia will help advance trading by having affordable access to transports and easy accessibility to markets in all regions of Zambia. This will help to attract a significant inflow of FDI from other countries to Zambia. Zambia's Agriculture sector has also received a lot of Chinese investment. As of 2015, there were only 2 Chinese State-Owned farms and about 30 Chinese private farms in Zambia (Chatelard, 2014). China has helped to train about 200 farmers and students through the establishment of Centre for Agriculture Training and Technology Demonstration Centre at Jilin University.[26]

Table 3: List of registered Chinese investment projects in Zambia

SECTOR	Registered Chinese Investment Projects
Agriculture	20
Mineral Processing	81
Manufacturing	40
Services	18

Source: China Ministry of Commerce 2019

25 See, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/09/20/president-sata-launches-link-zambia-declares-rda-contracts/

26 This has helped in training of farmers and students on programs such as mushrooms, maize, wheat, and vegetables and operating of advanced agriculture machines and computers (Chileshe 2010).



Figure 2: Registered Chinese investment projects in Zambia 2019

Impact

Chinese mining companies in Zambia heavily rely on the hiring of plant and equipment instead of purchasing new ones (Mathobela-Nhalapo 2018). This prevents the transfer of technology to the locals since the hired plants and equipment are not the assets of the mining company, hence there is a minimal level of training or building the capacities of the locals' to be abreast of new technologies using the equipment. This has a significant effect on achieving the SDG 9. Additionally, a huge number of Chinese registered companies in Zambia are service related compared to a decade ago when Chinese firms were particularly into investments. Recent Chinese service-related firms in Zambia serve as providing local inputs to their investors thus creating an unhealthy competition between the local input supply companies and the Chinese service firms. This has further led to weakening the connection between Chinese investors and local companies as the Chinese service firms are highly favoured by their investors thereby collapsing the local companies (This has an impact on achieving SDG 8).

Moreover, the increasing production and sales of copper in Zambia has not positively improved the standard of living of Zambians due to tax haven enjoyed by mining companies. Fraser and Miles (2010) observed that the returns or profits on mining activities leave Zambia without any significant impact on the country's economy. These profits are transferred and invested in foreign countries rather than investing and helping to build a resilient economy in Zambia. And the tax incentives enjoyed by the mining firms undermined the positive impact the mining companies can have on the Zambian economy as mining contributions to tax revenues in the country is extremely low (World Bank 2016). Human Rights Watch (2011) reports confirmed a comprehensive labor abuse, union-busting, and poor wages paid to locals by mining companies and their subsidiaries State Owned-Enterprises (SOE) in Zambia. However, the report revealed that Chinese firms prevent Zambians from joining trade unions due to the poor working conditions of the locals such as no paid holidays, no retirement benefits, and long working hours without breaks. This has a huge effect on achieving the SDG 6.

C: ***Mozambique***

Introduction

Unlike many African countries, Mozambique, a Southern African nation gained its independence through guerrilla warfare on June 25, 1975. President Samora Moises Machel became the first president of Mozambique. As one of the ten poorest countries globally, Mozambique has a large number of valuable resources such as coal and gas, timber, tantalite, gold, bauxite, marble, graphite, bentonite and limestone (Index of Economic Freedom 2020).[27] The recent discovery of gas fields has characterized Mozambique as the 'Qatar of Africa' (The Economist 2020).

Political System

After attaining independence in 1975, President Machel established the one-party system with Frente de Libertação de Mozambique (FRELIMO) as the only legitimate party in Mozambique. The independence of the country followed by 16 years of civil war against the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) rebels, was heavily supported by Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa as they deliberately adopted a policy of destabilization to refute the Mozambican regime.[28] Joaquin Chissano became the second president of Mozambique in 1992 after President Machel's death caused by a plane crash. FRELIMO in 1989 under President Chissano adopted a

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27 "2020 Index of Economic Freedom". Available at , https://www.heritage.org/index/country/mozambique

28 Freedom House, "Freed Freedom in the world-Mozambique 2001".
Available at , https://www.refworld.org/docid/5278c93914.html

democratic socialism and free market economy whiles renouncing the Marxism-Leninism rule under President Machel. The government amended the constitution in 1990 to allow for a multiparty political system for the first time in the country. The 1992 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhaklama in Rome quite stabilized the country due to RENAMO rebels accepting to run as an opposition party hence recognizing the legitimacy of the incumbent government.[29]

The first multiparty election in Mozambique was held in 1994. The international community applauded them for their successful democratic held elections. The RENAMO nearly boycotted the election after they accused the FRELIMO of election fraud. However, RENAMO was pressurized by its international financiers to repeal their decision and participate in the elections. President Chissano won the 1994 elections. Armando Guebuza became the third president to succeed President Chissano after defeating Alfonso Dhlakama in 2005 presidential polls. The boycott of the 2013 municipal election by RENAMO sparked another conflict between them and the government aid displaced thousands of people from their homes. FRELIMO party led by Filipe Nyusi won the general elections in October 2014 against the RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhaklama (Manning (2015). Another ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the RENAMO ending the ongoing conflict in 2017. The recent insurgency in northern Mozambique has killed many civilians including aid workers and has forced more than 100,000 to flee from their homes.[30] President Nyusi and his FRELIMO party have been re-elected again during the presidential, legislative, and provincial elections held in October 2019 making it the sixth successive multiparty election since 1994.[31]

Economy of Mozambique

Mozambique is among the world's poorest countries with about 70 percent out of 30 million people living on less than $1.96 per day. Agriculture employs about four-fifths of the country's workforce despite the fact that it accounts for one-fifth of the GDP of Mozambique. In 2015,

[29] "Mozambique profile-timeline" 2019. Available at, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13890720

[30] See, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/02/jihadists-threaten-mozambiques-new-gasfields

[31] "The World Bank in Mozambique" 2020. Available at, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview

Mozambique grew averagely between 6-8 percent per year making it one of the strongest economies in Africa until the Tropical Cyclone (TC) Idai hit the central region of the country and TC Kenneth heavily hit Cabo Delgado. These cyclones have rendered thousands homeless as a result of destroying several homes, schools, and, hospitals. The agriculture sector of Mozambique accounts for 26 percent of the GDP with about 8 percent growth rate per annum, the services sector contributes 41 percent of the GDP Mozambique with an annual growth rate of 5 percent, and 24 percent at a growth rate of 5 percent came from industry (Plecher 2020). Mozambique has the largest power generation from its untapped coal, hydroelectric, gas, wind, and solar resources. Energy exports make up the largest share of the total exchange earnings of Mozambique. The Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam located in the Tete Province supplies power to South Africa and Zimbabwe. Recently, the discovery of oil and gas in the Northern part of Mozambique gives higher hopes for a better or prosperous economy as it is accounted to be among the top 10 largest producers of coal and natural gas in the world (Hofmann 2013).[32] The construction of onshore Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) led by the Exxon Mobile and Anadarko is valued at $20 billion and $25 billion respectively. These exploration activities provide great opportunities in the oil and gas industry.

Sino-Mozambique Relations

According to Chichava (2008), The Sino-Mozambican relations are traced as far back to the struggle of Mozambique's independence from the Portuguese colonial rule. The Chinese provided guerrilla training, military equipment, and financial assistance to the FRELIMO although they highly favoured Comitè Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO). The Soviets had total control in Mozambique due to the significant aid they gave to President Machel. China developed with Mozambique's strong diplomatic relations immediately after the country attained its independence in 1975, and their relationship continued flourished during the civil war between 1977-1992 and were deepen after the signing of the peace accord in 1992 (Janssen and Kiala 2009). China provided about $60 million in credit by 1978, making it one of the largest

[32] The gas reserve in Rovuma would become the fourth reserve in the world estimated at 70 million cubic feet when exploitation starts. Hofmann, Katharina. Economic Transformation in Mozambique: Implications for Human Security. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Africa Department, 2013. See, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10201.pdf

donations to Mozambique although there was set back after Mozambique criticized China for its border dispute with Vietnam (Shinn and Eisenman 2012). However, Mozambique refused to criticize China after its Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 as China increased its assistance program to Mozambique (Taylor 2007).

Many agreements were reached between the two countries on economic, cultural, and technical assistance in the 1980s. The cooperation agreement signed between FRELIMO and the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1988 led to China agreeing on building the Mozambique Parliament house. China became a 'natural partner' for Mozambique after the collapse of the Soviet Union, increasing its economic assistance and trade and investment in the 90s. President Chissano's subsequent high visit to China between 1993 and 2004 led to several trade agreements through scientific cooperation on medical plants and information technology. The Mozambique government has begun to translate the country's labor law into Chinese for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Maputo and several other Chinese firms doing business in Mozambique (Shinn and Eisenman 2012). The relationship between the two countries is an exchange of resources from Mozambique for aid and investment from China.

China Investment, Aid, and Trade in Mozambique

China has contributed significantly to the Mozambican economy in sectors including agriculture, infrastructure and energy, communication, transport, and, human capital development. China is the third largest trading partner of Mozambique after South Africa and Portugal.[33] Sino-Mozambique trading has reached $32 billion in the first quarter of 2020. Mozambique has a balance trade surplus with China with an export of $23 billion goods to China whiles imported good from China accounts for $9 billion. China since 1975, has been providing assistance to Mozambique with textile mills, shoe, and clothing factories. Hundreds of Mozambicans have been awarded with Scholarships to study in China and the Mandarin language has been taught in Mozambique universities since 2011.

[33] Nordea, "Country Profile Mozambique" 2020. See, https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-market/mozambique/trade-profile.

Mozambique is the first 'lusophone' country to enjoy Startimes Satellite television broadcast to 20,000 households in 1000 villages in Cabo Delgado Province hence creating about 2000 jobs for the Mozambican youth (Xinhuanet 2020). The Universidade Pedagógica and Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd of China has set up a Huawei Information and Communication Technology Academy at the university to help train the youth in ICT. Chinese registered timber companies in Mozambique are merchants that buy and export timber to China from local and foreign timber operators. China has invested heavily in hydroelectric dams to help generate electricity to all provinces of Mozambique. The completed Mphanda Nkuwa dam financed by EXIM Bank at the cost of $2.3 billion is said to generate 1350 Mega Watts of electricity to Maputo province.

However, civil society and NGOs have argued that the project will have a severe socioeconomic effect of displacing thousands from their homes and livelihoods. And the high cost involved in extending the transmission grid will not significantly contribute to rural electrification as proposed. Conversely, the government elucidated that the project would help control flooding and drought periods in several parts of the country. The China Export-Import Bank has invested over $125 million on building the Beira fishing port to suit international standards and added value to seafood exported to Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Americas. China became the biggest source of external funding to Mozambique in 2018, at the cost of $2 billion, representing 39 percent of its country's external debt. And Mozambique public external debt as of 2018 stood at $12.1 billion.

Table 4: List of registered Chinese investment projects in Mozambique

SECTOR	Registered Chinese Investment Projects
Agriculture	15
Mineral Processing	20
Manufacturing	4
Services	6

Source: China Ministry of Commence, 2019



Figure 3: Registered Chinese investment projects in Mozambique 2019

Impact

Sino-Mozambique relations have experienced serious challenges recently. China is the leading importers of timber from Mozambique. Numerous illegal timber exported to China is in the form of unprocessed logs. This strategy is pursued with the help of locals.[34] These logs are transported to the ports by the locals to avoid suspicions by the Mozambique Authorities as their Chinese partners wait to transport the merchandise on international waters. The United Nations International Trade Statistics (2018) revealed that Mozambique timber exported was officially reported as 280,796 cubic metres. However, records of imported timber from Mozambique in 2018 published by Chinese port show that about 601,919 cubic metres of timber were exported.[35] The differences in the export figures can be accounted for as illegally timber.

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34 The locals and Chinese timber firms form a strong partnership by acquiring license form the Mozambique nationals that give them the authority to logging a demarcated area. The cost of these licenses are however paid by their China counterparts.

35 "Timber and Fishing in Africa: Countering illicit operations in Mozambique." 2019. Available at, https://www.clbrief.com/chinese-timber-and-fishing-in-africa/

This clearly indicates the complexity of Chinese relations with Africa as Legon and Pibeiro (2006) asserted that “China timber buyers are colluding with Mozambicans and members of the government for their illegal lumbering activities”. Moreover, several concerns have been raised about the involvement of China in illegal fishing activities on Mozambique water bodies as several Chinese vessels have been confiscated on Mozambican waters. Illegal fishing cost the country over $60 million in 2018.[36] Mozambique authorities have accused of using high speed fishing boats, gill nets and, longliners that are detrimental to the coastal areas to capture fish, sharks and, turtles.

D: Ghana

Introduction

Ghana, located on the West Coast of Africa, was the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from British colonial rule on March 6, 1957. It became a Republic on July 1, 1960. The country has abundant natural resources such as gold, bauxite, diamond, manganese, cocoa, oil, and, other resources.

Political System

Ghana known as the beacon of hope for democracy in Africa attained its independence under Kwame Nkrumah as the first Prime Minister. However, the post-independence history of Ghana has been depicted by a long military rule marked with human rights abuses. The country, from 1957 has adopted a succession of four constitutions, which are commonly referred to as the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Republican Constitution by Ghanaians.[37] Ghana became a one-party state during the First Republic under Kwame Nkrumah in 1964, which was subsequently followed by military and authoritarian regimes in both the Second and Third Republic (Brierley, 2012). After a decade of military regime, Ghana returned to a multiparty democracy and unicameral legislature in 1992 under the Fourth Republic led Ft.Lt. Jerry John Rawlings and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) thanks to the pressure from international communities, civil societies, and civilians. After 19 years in power, the constitution barred President Rawlings from seeking another term in office in 2000. The general elections, (Presidential and

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[36] Ibid

[37] For a comprehensive analysis of the constitutions of Ghana, See, Abdulai, Political Context Study-Ghana (2009).

Parliamentary) held in 2000 were won by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by John Agyekum Kuffour and it was the first time in the history of Ghana that there has been a democratic transfer of power. President Kuffour of NPP won the 2004 election for his second term after defeating the NDC led by John Evans Atta Mills. After the two terms of President Kuffour has ended, John Evans Atta Mills won the closely contested election in 2008 that went on a run-off was won by John Atta Mills after defeating the NPP led by Nana Akuffo Addo. Subsequently, Vice President John Dramani Mahama was sworn in as the next president in accordance with the constitution after President Mills' sudden death on July 24, 2012.

President Mahama of the NDC went on to win the 2012 general election against the Nana Addo Danquah and the NPP. However, the 2012 presidential election result was challenged in the court by NPP for the rigging of election results. The Supreme Court rejected the petition of the NPP. It went on to declare President Mahama and the NDC as the winners of the 2012 election after the NPP failed to produce reliable evidence of election malpractices. The last general election held on December 7, 2016, was won by Nana Addo Danquah of the NPP against NDC led by President Mahama. Since 1992, six successful multiparty elections have been held in Ghana and with the next presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled to be on December 7, 2020.

Economy of Ghana

The economy of Ghana continued to expand in 2019 with a real GDP growth rate of 7.1 percent. The continuous economic growth since 2017 has significantly placed Ghana as one of the ten fastest growing economies in Africa. The Bank projected Ghana as the third fastest growing economy in 42 sub-Saharan African countries at a growth rate of 6.8 percent after Rwanda and Cote d'Ivoire. The diversity of the economy of Ghana is driven by Agriculture, services, and, industry sectors. According to AfDB (2020), agriculture remains the second fastest growing sector in Ghana's economy although the financial sector cleans up that began in 2017 has decreased the growth of services. Similarly, the Ghana Statistical Service (2019) revealed that Agriculture accounts for 18.3 percent of the GDP and employs 34 percent of the total workforce; the industry presents 31.5 percent of the GDP, and services, the largest component of the economy accounts for 43 percent of the GDP and employs 48 percent of Ghana's workforce. The discovery of oil in 2010 and the establishment of oil and industry have attracted a lot of foreign investment. Since the discovery of oil, several concerns have been raised over the direction of the country's economic development as many fears the economy will become an oil dependent. According to the Bank of Ghana, the exports of crude oil increased from $3.1 billion in 2018 to $4.6 billion in 2019 as oil became the second largest export commodity besides gold. The Ghana Statistical Service figures revealed that Ghana depends heavily on oil for its economic growth following the downward trending of growth in the non-oil sector from 6.5 percent in 2018 to 5.8 percent in 2019 at as compared to the oil sector growth rate of 10.4 percent in the third quarter of 2019. The OCE (2018) reveals that Ghana's top imported product is refined oil at the cost of $738 million. Ghana exports of raw materials and subsequent import of primarily consumer goods is evidence for the call of industrialization in Ghana as the government seeks to diversify the economy for long term economic prosperity.

Sino-Ghana Relations

Ghana and China established a formal relation in 1960 under President Kwame Nkrumah three years after independence. Nkrumah had a good relationship with the Soviet Union due to his strong socialist views; however, he did not want to become embroiled in the dispute between China and the Soviets. Nkrumah's visit to China in 1961 paid off as China gave him an interest free loan worth $20 million and repayable in Ghanaian exports. Nkrumah returned the favour by supporting China in a border dispute with India in 1962. A friendship treaty and an economic and cultural agreement was signed between Ghana and China which led to the inclusion of Ghana in the Zhou Enlai famous Africa trip in 1963-1964 where he promised a $22 million loan to Ghana (Chau 2007). The Sino-Ghana relations became frosty in 1966 after the military disposed of Nkrumah while he was being feted in China. The new government accused China of interfering in Ghana's internal affairs by supporting Nkrumah's effort to return to power. This led to the suspension of diplomatic ties between the two countries as all Chinese withdrew its aid and diplomatic staffers from Ghana in 1966 (Idun 2008). However, the relation got better after Ghana backed China in the 1971 UN voting to recognize The People's Republic of China as the only representative of China at the UN and as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The $3 billion commercial rate loan divided into two trenches signed in 2011 between China Development Bank and the Government of Ghana to financed projects including roads, railways, ports and industrial zones in Ghana received serious criticism from the opposition party (NPP) for using revenues as collateral for the loan.[38] Consequently, the second tranche of the loan was cancelled by the cabinet after revealing the country's external debt situation. Similarly, the arrest and deportation of hundreds of Chinese illegal gold miners in Ghana received serious international attention. Many Chinese investors in Ghana were troubled by the anti-Chinese sentiments and further expressed their sympathy for the arrested illegal miners.[39] The relationship between these two countries was at first seen as political support in exchange for aid and investment. However, the recent relationship has shifted from ideology as the two countries seek to advance their cooperation through science and technology, trade, health, agriculture, and many others.

Chinese Investment, Trade, and Aid in Ghana

Presently, there is a strong bilateral and economic relationship between the two countries. China is one of Ghana's largest trade partners as trade upsurge from $4.22 billion in 2018 to 7.6 billion in 2019 (GIPC 2020). However, Ghana has a balance trade deficit with China, with Ghana exports to China in 2019 accounts for $2.56 billion whiles imports from China represent $4.9 billion. Using the number of registered projects in Ghana, China is the largest investor in Ghana with 37 projects in 2019. Concerning investment, the Netherlands emerged as having the largest amount of investment in Ghana worth $1.9 billion and an FDI amount of $1.89 billion followed by India with an investment value of $549.1 billion of projects and an FDI worth $510.72 million. This clearly highlights the vital role played by other invested countries in the economic development of Ghana than solely dependence on China as Hess and Aidoo (2015) asserted that the country does not strongly felt by the value of Chinese investment in Ghana. Chinese aid has helped in infrastructure projects in Ghana.[40] Raw materials are Ghana's main exported goods to

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[38] See, https://china.aiddata.org/projects/2034

[39] See, http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/131119/filename/131330.pdf

[40] China promised to give $15 billion to Ghana to finance the country's massive economic transformation agenda and they have also agreed to finance the construction of 90 bridges across Ghana and the 'Point 7' interchange in Tamale.

China whiles manufactured goods are primarily manufactured goods. Ghana's balance of trade deficit between China has received serious criticism as the local economy is at a disadvantage at the expense of a huge influx of cheap Chinese manufactured products. The influx of Chinese textiles into the local market has had serious repercussions on Ghana textile industries through displacement and the losses of jobs regardless of the benefits low-income consumers, retailers and wholesalers procuring the cheap manufactured imports from China. This will hurt the manufacturing sector which in return harms the economy in general.

Table 5: List of registered Chinese investment projects in Ghana

SECTOR	Registered Chinese Investment Projects
Agriculture	15
Mineral Processing	30
Manufacturing	21
Services	14

Source: China Ministry of Commence, 2019

"Going to China, we were well aware of Ghana's economic situation. We needed what really amounts to a big bang approach and a marshal plan for Ghana… and the kind of needs we have in the areas of water, energy, railways, sanitation, road etc, are so massive that we needed a sort of marshal plan to be able to lay the foundation for the strategy of agricultural transformation as well as industrialisation"…..and "Ghana would leverage on a minute fraction of its untapped and proven mineral resources to fund its marshal plan of development and all capital intensive projects". Available at, https://www.gipcghana.com/press-and-media/538-ghana-secures-15-billion-chinese-funding-for-transformation-agenda.html



Figure 4: Registered Chinese investment projects in Ghana 2019

Impact

Chinese engagement with Ghana is centred mostly in the extractive industry (mining industry). The recent tension sparked between the two countries relating to the pervasive illegal mining aided by the Chinese companies in Ghana. The unbridled increase of illegal mining activities in Ghana has a serious effect on the environmental degradation, pollution of water bodies, destruction of the forest, and a negative social effect in the country such as eliciting violence and the killing of locals by Chinese miners as they see mining in Ghana as their entitlement rights hence they seek to recoup their investment after bribing authorities. The arrest of illegal Chinese miners in Ghana has created a diplomatic tension between the two countries with the fear that the Chinese might threaten to withdraw its loans and investment activities in Ghana.[41] The minister of lands and natural resources revealed that an estimated amount of $2.3 billion was lost in 2016 due to undetected exports of illegal gold from Ghana's shores. This is a huge loss for a middle-low income country as revenue from gold was $3.2 billion in 2015. Moreover, the textile industries in Ghana have fallen prey to the inundation of cheap Chinese textiles. A sector which gave livelihood to about 25,000 locals in the between 1970 and 1980 currently employs only

[41] https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/transcript-what-osafo-maafo-said-about-deportation-of galamsey-queen.amp.html.

3000 workers nationwide. The victims of this rampant trade liberalization that has hit the textile sector include the Freedom Textiles Ltd., Tema Textile, Akosombo Textiles, and lately Juapong Textile. The government's recent decision sounds like a quietus to the textile industry that was previously against competition from foreigners. This has increased the loss of jobs in Ghana as Chinese clothing industries benefit.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The analysis of Chinese investments in Africa in the light of sustainable development can be categorized into three, that is, environmental, economic, and social well-being. From an environmental perspective, as it can clearly be seen in table 1 that all the four countries selected for the study have a serious challenge of achieving sustainable development (SDG 15). Chinese investments in the various countries are specifically focused on the mineral sector. Ghana was ranked 9th out of 52 African countries on the 2019 Africa SDG index based 97 indicators across 17 goals. Ghana performed well in SDG 1 and 13. Conversely, the country faces a major challenge in achieving SDG 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, and 15. Looking at table 5, it can clearly be seen that Chinese investment in Ghana is primarily focused on the processing sector (oil and gas, gold, bauxite, manganese), manufacturing, agriculture, and services sector, respectively. This, however, proves that Chinese investment in Ghana is distinctly centred on natural resource extraction. The involvement of Chinese investment in the alluvial small-scale gold mining has led to a transformation of the small-scale mining sector in Ghana. The Chinese investment introduced new technologies and machinery compared to the hitherto used pickaxe, shovel, and pans by the local people.

More particularly, the Chinese investors introduced the now-widespread use of excavators, wash plants, and crushing machines to the industry. In addition, they initiated the water platforms and suction equipment for dredging the rivers as well as considerable amounts of capital (Crawford et al. 2014). With the combination of these technologies and capital that the Chinese businessmen brought along, alluvial small-scale mining was intensified and areas of land that previously took years to mine using traditional methods are now being mined in weeks (Crawford et al. 2016). An interview conducted by Crawford et al. (2016) revealed that a small-scale concession holder confesses said that “area half the size of a football pitch would now take him two to three weeks to mine using excavators and a wash plant, compared with four to five years using traditional methods”. Admittedly, this transformation will yield higher returns even for the Ghanaian local small-scale miners who jump on the technological transformation. The practice remains illegal and environmentally degrading. Through the activities of small scale miners with the majority being Chinese nationals, farmlands have been destroyed, rivers and streams have been diverted for mining purposes, and surface and groundwater pollution has been drastically enhanced due to the hazardous chemicals, notably cyanide and mercury used in the processing of gold. Major water bodies in the eastern and western regions of Ghana specifically have been degraded. The degradation and pollution of the water bodies are extreme to the extent that water processing plants of the Ghana water company could not process the water for safe drinking anymore and hence, hindering Ghana in achieving SDG 6 (Crawford et al. (2016).

The destruction of water bodies has been catastrophic in the wake of the intensification of small-scale mining in Ghana.[42] Riverbeds are now being dredged and the materials processed for gold. This has resulted in heavy pollution of the major water bodies in Ghana. Both the land and water environments have been extremely polluted. Cocoa farms (plantation crops) and food crop farms have all been victims of illegal alluvial gold mining activities from Chinese immigrants and their investors in Ghana. This situation has impacted negatively on food security and shortage of potable water in the immediate communities, which resulted in hindering Ghana from achieving SDG 2. Ghana's overarching goal in ensuring sustainable development is to improve the quality of life of all its citizens and build a prosperous nation, safeguard its natural environment and ensure a resilient built environment (VNRR 2019). In this regard, the activities of the Chinese nationals in the alluvial small-scale mining sector of Ghana have brought retrogressive consequences on the country's development agenda. Sino-African relations have been touted to seek to bring development and mutual benefits to both China and Africa. However, the illegal activities of the Chinese citizens, particularly in the extractive sector in Ghana has defeated the mutual benefits that Sino-African relations could yield to sustainably develop the African continent. Consequently, Chinese investment in the mining sector of Ghana mostly hinders sustainable development.

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[42] For a detailed report on the deportation of Chinese illegal miners in Ghana, see, See, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/50-000-Chinese-are-engaged-in-illegal-mining-in-Ghana-FORIG-CSIR-792395

Similarly, Mozambique was ranked 30th out of 52 countries on Africa SDG index. The country performed well on SDG 17. The country faces a significant challenge in achieving sustainable development on SDG 1, 2,3,4,5,6,7,9, 14, 15, and 16. Chinese investment in Mozambique is concentrated on the mineral processing sector followed by agriculture, services, and the manufacturing sector. China is known as the largest importer of forest products in the world. And for the last two decades, forest products imported by China tripled.[43] The ban placed on Chinese domestic logging in 1998 forced the country to import a high percentage of their total wood consumption. Although Africa's timber exports to China represent a small percentage of the total timber imported. China is the primary destination for about 90 percent of timber from Africa (Sun 2014). Mozambique is the largest exporter of hardwood in China. It accounts for 90 percent of the total imported hardwood to China in recent times. According to Mozambique's customs statistics, illegal export logging from the country is estimated at 80 percent. The illegal nature of their business enables traders to escape the obligations of paying appropriate logging taxes and more importantly reforesting trees that have been cut.

The weak system of forest governance and law enforcement has led to the surge of illegal logging of timber, loss of biodiversity hence abusing the rights of forest communities and possibly advanced by Chinese increasing demand.[44] And instead of investing in sustainable forest management and processing, Chinese firms with their rapid high demand for profits end up purchasing timber through local concessions. The Chinese businessmen pay some local residents or help them secure equipment like chainsaw machines to illegally cut down economic trees from Mozambique's tropical forests (Dijkstra 2015). The practice of illegal logging by Chinese businessmen in Mozambique is fast depleting the country's forest reserves to the extent

[43] Environmental Investigation Agency, "First Class Criss": "China's Criminal and Unsustainable intervention in Mozambique Miombo forest" 2014. Available at, https://eia-international.org/report/first-class-crisis-chinas-criminal-and-unsustainable-intervention-in-mozambiques-miombo-forests/

[44] To control these practices and regulate the Mozambican forests sector for more sustainable development, an initiative like the legislative instrument including Law No 7/2010, Decree No 30/2012, Ministerial Diploma No 293/2012 and Decree No 73/2011 which all seeks to regulate timber processing taxation, requirements for timber harvesting using license regimes, timber taxes and fines and sanctions for breaching the forest legislations respectfully (Macqueen, 2018). These efforts seek to monitor the sustainable harvesting of forest resources. However, their efforts have been bedevilled with bribery and corruption and have resulted in a weak frontier in the fight against forest loss specifically in Mozambique.

that analysts predict the forest may disappear within a few years if the practice is left unchecked (Dijkstra 2015).

This has a critical effect on the sustainability of forests in Mozambique, for which the Chinese operators are not concerned. These practices derail not only Mozambique but Africa and the entire world's attempt to strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters (sustainable Goal 13). These illegal logging practices rather increase the world's vulnerability to climate-related hazards. The resulting reduction in the amount of rainfall owing to deforestation also portends negative impacts on agricultural development and hence, further entrenches poverty and hunger in these poor African countries. The call to take sustainable actions to address the Climate Change (sustainable Goal 13) is directly impacted by actions such as illegal logging and deforestation, in the absence of reforestation initiative to replace the lost trees, carried out by Chinese businessmen in Africa.

With the same vein, Zambia was ranked 22nd among the 52 countries in the Africa SDG index. The country's highest SDG performance was SDG 13. However, the country grapples with formidable challenges in achieving sustainable development in SDG 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 16. China is the largest consumer of copper in the world. Chinese investment in Zambia's mining sector accounts for 88 percent of Chinese total investment as confirmed in table 3. Copper mining in Zambia has a serious implication on the environment such as water, air and, pollutions, destroying the wildlife habitat, and displacing indigenous communities without substantial compensation for their damages. The acid and rock residues during the concentration process enter into watercourses. This causes sedimentation and siltation which, in turn, poses a serious health-related problem. (Locals complain about their water supply being turned into "rivers of acid").

Similarly, sulphur dioxides that are unleashed into the air through the copper smelting process cause water pollution, causing respiratory diseases and deteriorating the inhabitants with cardiovascular diseases. These challenges draw Zambia back from achieving SDGs 3 and 11. An investigation done by Better Environment NGO in Zambia confirmed that two Chinese Copper mining companies (Nonferrous China Africa (NFCA) and Chambish Copper Smelters (CCS)) failed to conform to the environmental regulations in the Copperbelt province, particularly the failure to timely submission of their periodic reports on emissions and environmental impacts of their activities. In other words, the Chinese companies in this sector fail to conduct the necessary environmental impact assessment (EIA). Chinese companies have a negligible incentive of abiding with regulators in Zambia as the Chinese government and their banks do not have a framework of monitoring the adherence of their companies with the host county's regulations (Haglund 2010). Moreover, Chinese managers are prone to issuing bribes to Zambia regulators as the Chinese managers threaten regulators of shutting down their mines[45] to dominate Zambia officials into turning a blind spot to their deleterious environmental practices. Bribery and corruption activities by Chinese firms and Zambian officials have a detrimental effect on building strong institutions and it hinders the achievement of SDG 16.

From an economic and wellbeing perspective of sustainable development, Kenya was ranked 15th on the African SDG index using table 1. Kenya performed exceptionally well on achieving SDG 13. On the other hand, it has a significant challenge in achieving SDG 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 16. Table 2 shows that Chinese investment in Kenya is focused on the manufacturing sector, mineral processing, services, and, agriculture. China is the largest exporter of goods (manufacturing goods) in Kenya. The influx of cheap and counterfeited Chinese goods into Kenya's local market has a huge effect on the local companies such as retrenching local workers due to loss of market shares and revenues. Conversely, indigenous companies benefit from the cheap imported Chinese goods. Chinese manufacturing companies in Kenya employs a significant number of workers from these areas. Even though this increases employment opportunities, it changes rural-urban income and population disparities which might have an adverse effect on technological improvement; thus, ending up with unskilled workers losing their jobs. Several Chinese manufacturing goods in Kenya are fake.

The Kenya Association of Manufacturers revealed that Chinese counterfeit products to Kenya causes a net loss of $368 million per annum. The impact of fake Chinese goods is felt by the indigenous manufacturing companies through unhealthy competition, brand erosion, plummeted

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[45] shutdown of Chinese mining companies will cause job losses in Zambia. See, https://www.thechinastory.org/yearbooks/yearbook-2016/forum-diasporic-dilemmas/chinas-environmental-footprint-the-zambian-example/

sales, and loss of market shares. Kenyan government loses a huge amount of taxes yearly as a cost of counterfeit goods and tracking of these fakes involves significant inputs resources which incurs additional cost. The clothing sector of Kenya which employs a large number of women rendered a weak industry because of unfair competition from Chinese firms that exacerbate gender inequality (SDG 5). Chinese firms in Kenya hire the lowest number of women in Kenya. This may have a detrimental effect on achieving SDG1 and SDG2. A survey done by the World Bank elucidated that hiring women will have a positive impact on eradicating poverty, decreasing malnutrition, and increasing girl child education in Africa. This is because women spent more on education and household durables. Hence, Chinese investment in Kenya manufacturing sector hinders sustainable development especially SDG 1, 2, 5, 8, and 10.

Similarly, the local textile industries in both Ghana and Zambia have not been spared from the flooding of Chinese cheap garments as it creates an unfair competition with the local textiles. Several textile industries have been shut down in Zambia leaving hundreds of locals jobless especially women. Chinese traders taking over local markets in Zambia is seen as a threat to Zambians' livelihood as a result of the cheap Chinese goods offered by their traders, is attracting local customers. The reliance of Chinese mining companies on renting of plants and equipment limits the transfer of technology to the locals. This restricts the training of natives in using advanced equipment and as such hinders Zambia from achieving SDG 5, 8, and 10. Moreover, Chinese fishing vessels seen on the shores of Africa's coast have worsening food security in several countries including Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and among others as they targeted small species such as Mackerel which serve as primary source food of and livelihood for African small-scale fishermen. Chinese illegal fishing in Africa has derailed several African countries including Ghana and Mozambique from achieving SDG 1,2,10, and 14.

Conclusion

This study set out to probe into whether Chinese investment in Africa helps or hinders sustainable development. From the findings, it is evident that China is focused on the extraction of resources with no political interference in the four countries studied in this research. However, Chinese investment hinders sustainable development and it has a detrimental effect on environmental sustainability (Air, water, and land pollution), in Ghana, Zambia, and Mozambique due to their exclusive interest in resource extraction. In Kenya, Chinese investment is centred on the manufacturing sector and this has an effect on economic growth and the wellbeing of the locals due to their high influx of cheap and counterfeit goods that create an unfair competition, leaving several local workers jobless mostly women.

As a way forward, this paper suggests that African governments should consider a policy dimension in dealing with China to ensure a win-win strategy for Sino-Africa relations. Moreover, conducting a Voluntary National Review (VNR) of the SDGs in all African countries and stakeholders and public engagement by the governments will help them improve the progressive reports of SDGs performance in various African countries. Inadequate data on Chinese investment in Africa impedes empirical analysis to support policymaking. Therefore, credible and reliable improvement data on Chinese investment is highly recommended to help advance policymakers' knowledge and contributions to a better policy discourse.

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