



universität
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MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Who gets represented?

Patterns of Unequal Representation in Austria“

verfasst von / submitted by

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angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2019 / Vienna 2019

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme code as it appears on
the student record sheet:

UA 066 824

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:

Masterstudium Politikwissenschaft

Betreut von / Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Sylvia Kritzinger

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my supervisor Prof. Sylvia Kritzinger for her expertise, feedback and patience – her input not only created the idea for this thesis, but also enriched my writing in many ways. I would also like to thank Wolfgang C. Müller, Thomas Meyer, Marcelo Jenny, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Martin Haselmayer and Anita Bodlos, who gave me the amazing opportunity to gain research experience as student assistant at the Department of Government at the University of Vienna. It is your credit that I recognized that working with data is fun. This experience influenced my further educational decisions in a sustainable way. Many thanks also to my wonderful colleagues at the Department of Government – it was a joyful, enriching time and a huge pleasure for me to be part of this team.

I would also like to say a big thank you to my family, in particular my parents, my brother and my in-laws for their amazing support during my years of study. Many thanks to my fellow students and friends for their sympathetic ears and motivating words, whenever I needed them. Moreover, a special thank you is reserved for Lena, the best flatmate in the world. Finally, I would like to thank Andi for his incredible patience, support and love. I am deeply grateful for everything you have done for me.

Teresa Haudum

Abstract

This thesis examines patterns of unequal representation in Austria in a comprehensive and over-time perspective. Based on the normative principle that democratic systems should be responsive to their citizens and represent their opinions in an equal way, the research question asks how substantive representation in Austria is structured alongside the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension and how these patterns can possibly be explained. Taking advantage of mass survey data and content analyses provided by the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) for 2008, 2013 and 2017, the concept of substantive representation is operationalized as issue congruence between citizens and parties (and the government, respectively) at the aggregate and individual level. Importantly, the thesis takes citizens' preferences – and not their voting decisions – as starting point. The results show that the overall level of substantive representation in Austria is very high, especially in 2013. More particular, substantive representation is highly structured by (1) differences on the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension, (2) the individual issue position within the political space and (3) to a weaker extent by the net household income and educational background. On the other hand, gender, occupation or age cannot explain representational differences in a meaningful way. The most important explanation for changing levels of representation is the volatility of the political system: New parties and changing governments both tend to increase substantive representation significantly.

Abstract

Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit ungleicher Repräsentation in Österreich in einer umfassenden und zeitlichen Perspektive. Die theoretische Ausgangslage bildet dabei das normative Argument, wonach demokratische Systeme die Meinungen aller Bürgerinnen und Bürger in gleicher Art und Weise berücksichtigen sollen. Die Forschungsfrage beleuchtet dementsprechend die inhaltliche Repräsentation entlang der sozioökonomischen und soziokulturellen Dimension und fragt nach deren Struktur sowie nach möglichen erklärenden Faktoren. Basierend auf Umfragedaten und Inhaltsanalysen der Österreichischen Wahlstudie (AUTNES) aus den Jahren 2008, 2013 und 2017 wird das Konzept der inhaltlichen Repräsentation als Themenkongruenz zwischen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern und Parteien (sowie den entsprechenden Regierungen) operationalisiert. Die Messung erfolgt dabei sowohl auf der aggregierten als auch auf der individuellen Ebene. Wichtig ist dabei, dass die Meinungen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger – und nicht deren Wahlentscheidungen – als Startpunkt der Analyse herangezogen werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen im Allgemeinen ein sehr hohes Niveau an inhaltlicher Repräsentation in Österreich, insbesondere für 2013. Inhaltliche Repräsentation ist dabei durch drei wesentliche Faktoren strukturiert: (1) Differenzen entlang der sozioökonomischen und soziokulturellen Dimension, (2) die individuelle Position im zweidimensionalen politischen Raum und (3) in geringerem Ausmaß auch durch das Netto-Haushaltseinkommen und dem formalen Bildungsabschluss. Andere soziodemographische Merkmale wie Geschlecht, Berufsgruppe und Alter tragen jedoch nicht zur Erklärung von inhaltlicher Repräsentation bei. Veränderungen werden im Wesentlichen durch die Volatilität des politischen Systems hervorgerufen: Neue Parteien und wechselnde Regierungen tragen signifikant zu einer Steigerung der inhaltlichen Repräsentation bei.

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List of Abbreviations

AUTNES	Austrian National Election Study
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
FPTP	First-Past-The-Post Electoral System
MAN 2017	Content Analyses of Party Manifestos 2017
MAN 2013	Content Analyses of Party Manifestos 2013
MAN 2008	Content Analyses of Party Manifestos 2008
MMP 2017	Multi-Mode Panel Study 2017
MP	Member of Parliament
OPS 2013	Online Panel Study 2013
OTS 2017	Content Analysis of Party Press Releases 2017
PPES 2009	AUTNES Post Post Election Survey 2009
PR	Proportional Electoral System
SEM	Structural Equation Model

Chapter 1

Introduction

“Democratic representation means that the actions of [...] policy makers are supposed to be responsive to the wishes of the people.”

(Powell 2004, p. 273)

“One of the bedrock principles in a democracy is the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all citizens.”

(Verba 2003, p. 663)

Political representation is inherent to each political system as we know it today. It is an indispensable prerequisite that keeps national states capable of acting and decision-making. However, the term “representation” itself implies a whole range of manifestations, reaching from dictatorial and autocratic systems at one extreme to direct democracies on the opposite side. Dictators, kings, queens, presidents and chancellors all represent the citizenry of their territory in a formal sense (Pitkin 1967, chap. 3). Clearly, the practice of representation could not be more diverse in all of these cases. It is therefore sensible and necessary to specify this term more precisely and according to the research interest of the thesis at hand.

In the context of this thesis, political representation is always defined as “democratic representation”. There is a vast number of elements that distinguishes democratic representation from all other types, but the most important one has already been stated in the first quote at the very top of this chapter: *Responsiveness* to the people’s interests (Powell 2004, p. 273). Only if politics and policies adapt according to the citizenry’s opinions, full democratic representation exists. This requires a permanent and stable relationship between policy makers and citizens, secured by institutional arrangements:

Free and competitive national elections and universal suffrage are the most crucial of these institutions (Powell 2004, p. 273f.). The voting act defines the core mechanism of the connection between citizens and policy makers, which is control. The better citizens are able to exercise control of their representatives, the stronger is the “democratic diffusion of power” (Achen 1978, p. 479). Conversely, the degree of responsiveness of policy makers – i.e. their representativeness – is a measure of citizens’ democratic control over their elected officials (Achen 1978, p. 479).

Thus, democratic representation lies at heart of every free and well-functioning democracy. The concept itself has been defined and operationalized in many ways (e.g. Andeweg and Thomassen 2005; Mansbridge 2003; Pitkin 1967; Saward 2006, 2008). One of the most famous and influential of them is the model by Hanna Pitkin (1967), who separated representation into four distinct sub-types, namely formalistic, descriptive, symbolic and substantive representation. For the purpose of the present thesis, it is exclusively the substantive representation that is of interest – this term refers to the citizens’ issue preferences and policies that are represented by political elites (Powell 2004, p. 274). Before getting further into detail, the following Section outlines the overall research problem, whereas Section 1.2 describes the selected case. Section 1.3 discusses the particular research interest and question of the thesis at hand.

1.1 The Research Problem: An Overview

The central research problem of this thesis refers to the second introductory quote: The “*equal consideration of preferences and interests of all citizens*” (Verba 2003, p. 663 (emphasis TH)). *Equality*, as will be outlined below in greater detail (see Section 2.1), is a normative principle for democratic systems that has triggered political theorists already centuries ago. In terms of representation, equality implies the equal right of every citizen to have her voice and opinion heard:

“If some citizens’ views get unequally expressed, or if the preferences and wishes of certain subgroups are systematically neglected by political elites, this means that representative democracy in Europe does not live up to its ideal” (Lefkofridi et al. 2012, p. 1).

The normative goal is set unambiguously, but political reality often displays a different picture with (systematic) inequalities, as recent empirical research found out (see Section 2.1.3 for an overview). The first and most important aim of the present thesis is therefore to enhance current knowledge and to achieve a better understanding of the mechanisms and reasons of

unequal representation by conducting an in-depth case study. Among others, the added value of the thesis' empirical research is generated by the focus on time: This study evaluates one case over a timespan of ten years, which offers the opportunity to gain improved insights into the *process* of political responsiveness as well as to take various elections and their impacts on representation into account. The dynamic of representation in particular has been a "black box" in many empirical studies so far (Praprotnik 2017, p. 29). As a result, unequal representation of specific societal groups is expected to be better identifiable with this extended research design.

Second, the present thesis aims to examine substantive representation empirically from a preference-, not vote-based point of view. It will not follow the so-called "Standard Theory of Vote-Seat Representation" that defines the proportionality between citizen votes and legislative seats as "the standard of desirable representation" (Powell 2004, p. 279). Although it is acknowledged that this widely used approach offers great advantages in terms of comparability, it nevertheless does not measure the kind of representation that is of main interest for the thesis at hand. Vote-based approaches cannot ignore phenomena such as incorrect, strategic or non-voting; nor are they able to acknowledge the fact that the same party might have different interpretations and meanings to all voters in a country (Powell 2004, p. 281). Moreover, there are manifold options to calculate how votes are translated into legislative seats. In short, there is a lot of "noise" going on during the transition of voting decisions to the final distribution of legislative seats.

Fortunately, Powell (2004, p. 282) suggests a very useful alternative approach utilizing citizens' preferences as the starting point. The idea is to compare opinions of *all citizens* (not only *voters*) with the issue positions of their elected policy makers and to calculate their *issue congruence*. This enables a "purer" measurement of representation considering the voting process as a "black box in between". Of course, this approach suppresses a significant part of political reality. However, this study is not interested in the complex process happening inside the black box. It moreover argues that democratic representation is not just a privilege of voters, but includes the states' entire citizenry *equally*.

Measuring political preferences is a complex issue by itself. The most common and straightforward approach to do so is by utilizing the broadly known "left-right scale" and to ask citizens to declare their position on this dimension. However, there are severe methodological shortcomings such as inaccurate self-assessments due to guessing or a lack of knowledge (Powell 1989, p. 290) at the individual level, and the need for more dimensions to describe the political space in its full complexity (see e.g. Benoit and Laver 2012; Dalton 2017b). As will be outlined in Section 2.2, the distinction of at least two dimensions – a socio-economic and a socio-cultural one – is reasonable for West European democracies (Kriesi et al. 2008;

Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). This assumption will be tested at a later stage of the present thesis as well (see Section 3.2.1).

To sum up, the thesis at hand attempts to tackle two distinct research problems: First, the aim is to deepen the understanding of unequal representation by examining the status quo and the causing mechanisms in a well-established Western European democracy. The second target refers to methodological advancements, mainly by developing a more elaborated research design to measure citizens' and representatives' policy positions and to compare both in a meaningful way. However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to produce generalizable results that are valid for a larger sets of countries. Instead, the case study realized in this paper aims to open up new research frontiers and ways to push forward towards a better understanding of substantive representation.

1.2 Studying Substantive Representation in Austria

The present thesis conducts an in-depth study on substantive representation in Austria. This case is particular suitable and interesting due to various reasons: First, Austria's electoral system of proportional representation usually leads to a very high congruence between votes and seats in the legislative (Dolezal 2008, p. 112). A relatively low electoral threshold of four percent, multi-member constituencies and proportional calculating methods for allocating mandates (based on population numbers at the two lower tiers and the application of the D'Hondt method at the highest tier) result in a very balanced seat allocation with a slight benefit for larger parties. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect a (very) high level of substantive representation in general. Any form of systematic inequality can therefore be seen as an indicator of deeper, underlying difficulties that highly developed and well established democracies still have to deal with.

Second, the political circumstances in Austria offer many favorable ingredients for a study on representation. Regarding the dimensionality of the political space, it has been shown that the two assumed ideological dimensions – socio-economic and socio-cultural – have both been salient in the recent past, although to varying degrees (Dolezal 2008; Dolezal et al. 2013; Lefkofridi et al. 2014; Wagner and Kritzinger 2012). In addition, the party system became more dynamic due to a more volatile voting behaviour and declining ties to the two traditionally dominating parties (Bischof and Plasser 2008; Mair et al. 2004). This development is also underpinned by the changes of government: 2017 has just been the third time in the history of the Second Republic (since World War II) that the government was not formed exclusively by the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and/or the Social Democrats (SPÖ). The recent

two cases took place in the years 2000 to 2006 and 2017 to 2019. Both times, a coalition was formed including the ÖVP and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Given these circumstances, it is of particular interest to examine the impact of such rare governmental changes on substantive representation: Did they happen because of the parties' responsiveness to the changing peoples' preferences? This is reasonable to expect under the premise of a high level of representation.

Finally, according to the best of the author's knowledge, there exists no in-depth and over-time study on the Austrian case yet. Of course, previous studies have already gathered knowledge about representation in Austria (see Section 2.1.3 and Section 2.2.2 for an overview), but a research project as proposed in the paper at hand has not been conducted yet.

All of these ingredients make Austria to an interesting and promising country to study representation in. The empirical analysis will completely rely on data gathered by the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) that was established in 2008. For this reason, the present study will cover three National Elections in Austria – 2008, 2013 and 2017.

1.3 Research Question

Summarizing what has been said so far, the core research interest of this thesis is to examine substantive representation in Austria between 2008 and 2017 with a special focus on the identification and explanation of structural inequalities of socio-demographic groups. This will be realized applying a more sophisticated research design with the assumption of a two-dimensional political space that structures citizens' and politicians' issue positions similarly. The research question therefore reads as follows:

How is substantive representation in Austria structured alongside the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension and what explains this pattern?

It is the overarching goal of the thesis at hand to answer this question as comprehensive as possible. In order to do so, the following Chapter provides the theoretical foundation by discussing the most important historic and recent concepts of democratic representation (Section 2.1) and the dimensionality of the political space (Section 2.2). Based on this, the Hypotheses (Section 2.3) will be tested empirically in Chapter 3. After the presentation of the data in use (Section 3.1), the subsequent Section (3.2) discusses the applied method and operationalization in detail. Chapter 4 shows and interprets the results according to the specific measuring approaches (Section 4.1 and 4.2). Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the most important findings and discusses further research problems that can be derived from this thesis' findings.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Approach and Literature Review

2.1 Democratic Representation

The concept of democratic representation, as we understand it nowadays, has its roots in the British, American and French Revolutions in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. People claimed for representation as a fundamental right, famously manifested in the cry that “taxation without representation is tyranny” (Pitkin 1967, p. 3). Influenced by political philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu, the three countries established the first representative governments as counter models to the direct democracy practiced in ancient Greece (Praprotnik 2017, p. 24).

However, the term “democratic representation” itself combines two originally different and even contradictory concepts: “Democracy” can be understood as “government of the people, by the people, and for the people”, as famously stated by the former US president Abraham Lincoln (1943). It is a form of “popular self-government” (Pitkin 2004, p. 337) with citizens holding decision-making power exclusively. “Representation”, on the other hand, means the delegation of exactly this power to another entity: “A representative is someone who has been authorized to act” (Pitkin 1967, p. 39). This authorization can, but does not have to be a democratic process. In fact, representation existed long before any democratic election and was already exercised by feudal or monarchist regimes, for instance (Pitkin 2004, p. 337).

The compatibility of democracy and representation was also questioned by advocates of democracies since the very beginning. Most prominently, Jean-Jaques Rousseau (2002) postu-

lated that each citizen should express her opinion by herself to ensure her individual freedom. In his concept of radical direct democracy, professional “representatives” are not part of the political system. On the contrary, Rousseau argued that “any system of representatives in the sovereign (or legislative) body is illegitimate and inimical to the liberty of the people” (Douglass 2013, p. 735). Moreover, Rousseau worried that with the existence of representative sovereignty in a political system,

“two further principles associated with the legitimacy of modern democratic states [may be contravened]: the sovereignty of the people and the moral equality of the citizens” (Douglass 2013, p. 744).

Rousseau’s call for direct democracy as the only legitimate form of democracy is completely impractical in nowadays representative democracies for many reasons. However, his emphasis on public sovereignty and individuals’ equality can be seen as a normative benchmark for our current discussion on the (e)quality of representation.

Related to this, the combination of democracy and representation unavoidably leads to debates on the relationship between citizens and representatives. First, representation has been “democratized” insofar that citizens received the possibility to choose their representatives in the course of periodic elections that eventually came with universal and equal suffrage in the twentieth century. Over the decades, representation finally became a natural element of democracies and was implicitly assumed in influential definitions of this term, as for instance by Schattschneider (1960, p. 141):

“Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process.”

In this standard definition, the citizens are meant to *participate* in policy decisions, which is linguistically and conceptually a lot weaker than equipping the public with the full decision-making power.

This notion also refers to the necessary, but confusing division of power between citizens and their representatives. In other words, what is the preferred role that elected deputies should play – delegate or trustee (Eulau et al. 1959; Pitkin 1967; Wahlke 1962)? The balancing act between these two concepts – also known as the independent and mandate theory of representation – has been called “the ‘central normative problem’ of democracy” (Rehfeld 2009, p. 214).

As delegates, representatives directly depend on instructions and subordinate their own opinion to what is considered a superior authority (Eulau et al. 1959, p. 750). In early days, this

option was originally favored by US Anti-Federalists who were concerned that representatives might deviate too far from the citizens' interests (Praprotnik 2017, p. 25f.). However, their argument did not assert: Since the eighteenth century, no representative democracy has ever established the possibility for voters to give their elected deputies legally binding instructions (Manin 1997, p. 163).

In contrast, beginning in the eighteenth-century England, the idea started to spread that Members of Parliament should represent the whole nation rather than their particular voters or constituency (Manin 1997, p. 163). Most prominently, Edmund Burke stated that Parliament

“is not a *congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a *deliberative* assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole” (Burke 1774, cited from Eulau et al. 1959, p. 744 (emphasis in original)).

In this interpretation, the “Burkean trustee” acts according to the constituency’s and public *interest*, but not its *will* (Miller and Stokes 1963, p. 45). Policy decisions are based on representatives’ own judgements including their moral or rational considerations (Eulau et al. 1959, p. 749). The electoral process is the only and decisive link that connects citizens and public officials, holding the latter accountable for their actions (Manin 1997, p. 167).

However, reality is hardly ever black or white. This is why Eulau et al. (1959, p. 750) treat representation “as a continuum, with the Trustee and Delegate orientations as poles”. In between are the so-called “Politicos”, who adapt their role definition depending on political circumstances. Similarly, Hannah Pitkin (1967, chap. 7) found a way to unravel the contradictory nature of the trustee – delegate dichotomy by distinguishing two necessary prerequisites for representation: (1) Independent actions of representatives (*trustee*) that are (2) ordinarily free of conflicts with the interest of the represented (*delegate*). The framework developed by Eulau et al. and Pitkin has been applied by many scholars in the subsequent decades (see e.g. Converse and Pierce 1986; Judge 1999; Katz 1997; Méndez-Lago and Martínez 2002; Saalfeld and Müller 1997).

2.1.1 How to think about Representation?

Models and Typologies


The Roots: Pitkin's Theory and the Issue-Congruence Paradigm

At this point, it is useful to disentangle the very general concept of “democratic representation” and to continue with more concrete and clear-cut types of representation. Again, Hannah Pitkin (1967) is the most appropriate starting point for this. She distinguishes four specific kinds of representation: (1) *Formalistic representation* describes the formal act of authorizing someone else to act on behalf of one's own. (2) *Descriptive representation* “denotes the correspondence between the characteristics of the representatives and the represented” (Celis et al. 2008, p. 100) and can be thought of as a “mirror” (Pitkin 1967, p. 11). (3) *Symbolic representation* refers to the attitudes and beliefs that representatives are “standing for” (Pitkin 1967, pp. 92ff.). Finally, (4) *Substantive representation* focuses on the *congruence* between citizens and representatives regarding their ideology and policy positions (Lefkofridi et al. 2012, p. 2). Pitkin argues that the first three types are not sufficient for full representation by themselves. Rather, the fourth type is needed – the “acting in the interest of the represented” in a responsive way (Pitkin 1967, p. 209).

Pitkin's seminal typology has induced a massive amount of research, in particular regarding descriptive and substantive representation. Starting in the 1960s, the very first empirical studies examined the relationship between individual legislators and their constituency in the United States (Miller 1964; Miller and Stokes 1963). The major concern was to identify prerequisites to assure “constituency control and influence”, which directly refers to the trustee-delegate debate (Miller and Stokes 1963, pp. 50ff.). As result of their research, Miller and Stokes (1963) identified two distinct paths to exercise influence on public officials: (1) Choosing a representative that shares the constituency's views (AB-path in Figure 2.1), or (2) incentivizing the legislators to follow their “perceptions of district attitude in order to win re-election” (Miller and Stokes 1963, p. 50) (AC-path in Figure 2.1).

Miller and Stokes found empirical evidence for their theoretical assumptions, especially for the ACD-path in Figure 2.1 (Miller and Stokes 1963, pp. 51ff.). This early conceptualization has later been labelled as the “paradigmatic Miller-Stokes diamond” and influenced the study of political representation in a sustainable way by determining the so-called “Issue-Congruence Paradigm” (Powell 2004, p. 282ff.).

However, the criticism is almost as old as the approach itself. Christopher Achen (1978, p. 477) complained about the “drastic simplifications” that had been accepted by previous studies: They would all follow an implicit normative standard in which constituents' pref-



Source: Pierce 1999, p. 12; based on Miller and Stokes 1963, p. 50

Figure 2.1: The Miller-Stokes Diamond

erences are considered as fixed and the legislators' views are exclusively compared to their constituents. Moreover, representativeness would have been considered issue by issue and in no coherent way. He therefore argued for a more sophisticated approach, including various congruence measures and a tighter link to theory. Similarly, Robert Weissberg (1978) suggested to start thinking about representation *collectively*, i.e. considering the whole nation at once. Contrary to the "dyadic representation" assessed by Miller and Stokes, collective representation can balance misrepresentation in one constituency in another electoral district.

Despite these propositions, empirical research generally stuck with Pitkin's typology for the subsequent decades. The most important assumptions that have been taken for granted were (1) the dominance of elections in representative democracy, (2) the strong focus on the representatives' roles while taking the interests of the represented as given, and (3) the definition of representation as one-to-one relationship within constituencies (as reflected in the Miller-Stokes Diamond) (Saward 2008, pp. 1001f.). Reconsideration, adaptation and expansion of these longstanding assumptions started at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Once more, it was Hannah Pitkin (2004) who felt disillusioned by the concept's development since her famous publication in 1967 and criticized the status quo heavily:

"Despite repeated efforts to democratize the representative system, the predom-

inant result has been that representation has supplanted democracy instead of serving it. [...] The representatives act not as agents of the people but simply instead of them” (Pitkin 2004, p. 339).

This devastating verdict was echoed in political science with the massive claim to perform better, theoretically and practically. The innovation process was, inter alia, triggered by theoretical progress achieved by economic scientists: The principal-agent framework is originally rooted in the study of economic relationships and has been transferred into the political sphere (Bendor et al. 2001; Weingast 1989). In this context, political representation is considered as

“a delegation of power from a constituency or group of voters (the principal) to a particular party or MP (the agent), and the central question is how, and to what extent, the principal can prevent the agent from acting in a way contrary to the demands or interests of the principal” (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, p. 510).

The theory includes two control mechanisms to prevent undesirable behaviour of agents (also known as *agency loss*): (1) Ex ante controls such as screening in order to select the most competent and capable candidates (to obviate *adverse selection*); and (2) ex post controls such as monitoring and reporting to minimize opportunistic behaviour (*moral hazard*). Possible sanctions of these controls are the non-selection of potential agents (1) or the discontinuation of the existing relationship (2). In practice, the principal-agent relationship suffers from asymmetric information that strengthens the agents’ position and weakens the principals’ capacity to control properly (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, pp. 510ff.; Besley 2007, Chap. 3; Lane 2009, pp. 371f.).

The formalistic view of the principal-agent relationship opened up new ways of thinking about representative democracy. However, it did not solve the major problem in representational research, which is the static and unidirectional operationalisation of a relationship that began to be thought as dynamic and two-sided by several authors. Pitkin’s (1967) analysis mainly occupied the representatives’ perspective and thus failed to cover the manifold and continuing relationship between citizens and elected officials. Similarly, the principal-agent theory assumes clear and stable voter preferences as given input for their agents. These approaches enable the examination of representation at static and fixed points in time, but neglect the vital and manifold deliberations that characterize representational relationships significantly (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, p. 510; Mansbridge 2003; Praprotnik 2017, p. 29; Saward 2006, pp. 300ff.).

These insights lead to various new approaches. The three most important ones (in the context of this thesis) will be presented and discussed in the upcoming subsection.

Democratic Representation, Freshly Thought

The first approach that is presented here originates from Andeweg and Thomassen (2005). The authors are particularly interested in the interactions between voters and representatives and create a two-dimensional model that captures four different interaction modes. As a starting point, they use the control mechanisms (ex ante and ex post) from the principal-agent framework as first dimension of their typology. The relationship aspect is emphasized by a perspective lent from Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996): They distinguish a bottom-up and a top-down perspective, depending whether citizens' interests are translated into government policy (as already suggested in the principal-agent approach), or whether representatives enter the political process and ask citizens for their approval (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, p. 511). The combination of these two models creates four distinct modes of political representation, as shown in Figure 2.2.

	Control Mechanism	
	Ex Ante	Ex Post
Direction		
From Above	Authorization	Accountability
From Below	Delegation	Responsiveness

Source: Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, p. 512

Figure 2.2: Four Modes of Political Representation

Delegation can be seen as the ideal-type of representative democracy, since potential agents are controlled ex ante and from below, i.e. from their voters. However, this mode requires stable voter preferences and a predictable political agenda, which are demanding assumptions. *Responsiveness* omits the assumption of predictability and rather relies on ex post control. *Authorization* implies that voters are able to choose between two or more competing representatives, which again requires predictability. Moreover, voters need preferences – either exogenous (already existent) or endogenous (developed during electoral campaigns). Finally,

accountability only needs the plain existence of electoral choice and clearance about political responsibility to operate successfully (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, pp. 512ff.). The thesis at hand is largely driven by the assumption that representatives enter the political system and ask voters for their initial *authorization* or their confirmation for re-election (*accountability*). This assumption belongs to the responsible party government model, also known as mandate theory, and will be discussed below (Section 2.1.2).

A better known and also more influential approach was advanced by Jane Mansbridge (2003), who proposed four ideal types of representation. According to Mansbridge, *promissory representation* is the traditional model that follows the principal-agent model. Citizens influence policies by transmitting their interests to elected officials, which are in turn responsible to keep their electoral pledges and to stay accountable to their political actions. In this form, the power relation is a linear one, running from the voter at Time 1 (the election) to the representative at Time 2 (the governing period).

Anticipatory representation is directed in the opposite way, assuming that citizens vote retrospectively. The representative orientates her decisions during Time 2 (the governing period) towards future voters at Time 3 (the next election). The power relation therefore runs “backwards”, from the future to the present. This type of representation goes beyond the traditional principal-agent framework in the sense that “purely prudential incentives have replaced a combined moral and prudential imperative” (Mansbridge 2003, p. 518). Establishing a continuous relationship with citizens is the most important one of the new moral imperative. Normative criteria for anticipatory representation are therefore the quality of deliberation and information that citizens can receive, including the absence of manipulation.

The third type is called *gyroscopic representation* and deviates significantly from the previous two: Representatives are only accountable to their own principles and beliefs, voters have no direct power relation to their representatives. Instead, they exercise power over the system by choosing the representatives that eventually become part of that system. From a normative point of view, this requires a good quality of deliberation at Time 1 (the authorization), since voters are assumed to choose representatives based on commonalities such as shared values (Mansbridge (2003, p. 520) calls it a “common sense”) or similar descriptive characteristics. Research suggests that this type is most prevalent in the US senate and presidency elections (Stimson et al. 1995).

Mansbridge’s fourth type, *surrogate representation*, originates from an early reviewer of the Miller-Stokes theory: Robert Weissberg (1978) acknowledged the possibility that citizens can be represented by politicians outside their own constituencies and called this “collective representation”. Mansbridge defines surrogate representation in the very same way: There exists

no power relation between constituents and representatives. Indeed, elected officials can define their responsibility towards groups that are not geographically defined, such as women, youth, or minorities belonging to a certain skin color, origin or sexual orientation. What are normative criteria for this kind of representation? According to Mansbridge (2003, p. 524), the most obvious one is that “the legislature as a whole should represent the interests and perspectives of the citizenry roughly in proportion to their numbers in population.” Moreover, representatives should only focus on key decisions and encourage deliberation that enables “the force of the better argument” (Mansbridge 2003, p. 524).

Mansbridge developed types of representation that differ significantly from the mainstream approaches before. Neither anticipatory, gyroscopic nor surrogate representation meet the previous criterion of accountability, which is why new criteria have been necessary (see column four in Table 2.1). However, she emphasizes that none of the new criteria replace the existing criterion of constituent-representative congruence, they rather add to it (Mansbridge 2003, p. 526). With regard to the congruence paradigm, Mansbridge nevertheless criticizes certain aspects of it, such as the Burkean trustee who would be too hierarchical and too much concerned about the peoples’ capacities. Instead, she seeks to consolidate a “selection model” including a strong emphasis on ex ante deliberation that ultimately leads to the nomination of a public official. This model has been derived from the Miller-Stokes diamond (the ABD-Bond in Figure 2.1) and therefore puts special emphasis on the citizens’ preferences (Mansbridge 2009, 2011). For the purpose of this thesis, surrogate representation is the type that is of greatest interest for the following operationalization and analysis.

Table 2.1: Four Types of Representation (Mansbridge 2003)

Type	Focus	Power Relationship	Normative Criteria
Promissory Representation	Authorizing election	$V_{T1} \Rightarrow R_{T2}$	Keeping promises
Anticipatory Representation	Reelection and preceding term	$R_{T2} \Leftarrow V_{T3}$	Quality of deliberation during term
Gyroscopic Representation	Authorizing election and intrinsic motivation	$V_{T1} \Rightarrow SYSTEM_{T2}$	Quality of deliberation during authorizing election
Surrogate Representation	Composition of legislature and common interests	$V_{T1} \Rightarrow 0$	Representation of conflicting interests proportional to population and of key issues

The third approach discussed here is probably the most progressive one: Saward (2006, 2008) argues that representation is not exclusively tied to the electoral process and legislative institutions (as previously taken for granted in Schumpeterian (2018) democracies). Rather, he defines representation as an ongoing “process of making *claims*”, whereas a claim needs a Maker, a Subject (what the claim is about), an Object (who the claim stands for) and an Audience (Saward 2008, p. 1003; emphasis in original).

This perspective overcomes Pitkin’s static typology and interprets representation as a two-way street that occurs in an open society continuously and on a deliberative basis. Therefore, representation is not the opposite of direct democracy, but an inherent and necessary part of it. Similar to Mansbridge’s surrogate representation, Saward (2008, p. 1003; see also Saward 2009) considers non-elective representation as a possible extension of democratic representation:

“Representation does indeed happen in more contexts than electoral ones; representatives can speak and act for groups they are not chosen by and are not directly or formally accountable to.”

Of course, citizens’ votes still occupy a special status as formal authorizers in the principal-agent relationship (Powell 2004, p. 281) and therefore must be included in representational studies. However, following Mansbridge’s surrogate representation and the arguments put forward by Michael Saward, it is very reasonable to consider *all citizens* – and not just voters – in studies on representation and in the thesis at hand. This is also sensible from the perspective of voting behaviour, since vote-based approaches always have to handle phenomena such as incorrect, strategic or non-voting that might lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding the quality of representation. For instance, Dalton (2017a, p. 191) concluded that up to 50 percent of all voters do not choose the party closest to them. Moreover and importantly, issue preferences are formed exogenously and therefore independently, whereas voting preferences are heavily influenced by the available party policy alternatives (Budge et al. 2012, p. 19).

Choosing all citizens’ *preferences* as a starting point thus avoids these manifold conceptual shortcomings. In addition, the ubiquitous character of representation (Saward 2008) is reflected in the thesis’ over-time approach. Following the “dynamic-mandate theory” put forward by Budge et al. (2012, pp. 11ff.), it is no democratic duty that every election produces a result close to the average voters’ preferences (most often measured as median voter). One further aspect is whether legislative and government intentions over time correspond to average popular preferences, i.e. whether they are neutral and without any bias in the long run.

To sum up, the present thesis considers the seminal approaches by Pitkin (1967), Miller and

Stokes (1963) and Eulau et al. (1959) as the general framework, extended by more recent typologies by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005) (authorization and accountability), Mansbridge (2003) (surrogate representation), Saward (2008) (taking all citizens into account) and Budge et al. (2012) (dynamic perspective). What does this all mean for representatives and citizens in concrete terms? The following two sections aim to clarify this question.

2.1.2 Who represents? Taking Parties into Account

Up to now, not much attention has been paid to the term “representation” itself. The purpose of this section is to develop some clarifications and distinctions on who is (not) considered as a representative in the thesis at hand and why.

As already has been pointed out above, the first studies applying the issue-congruence paradigm considered single legislators and their corresponding constituency. This is perfectly reasonable in democracies as in the United States, since first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral systems with single-member districts encourage a direct relationship between citizens and representatives. Theoretically, this form of representation is mirrored in the so called constituency-centered model of representation (Pierce 1999, p. 10).

The picture gets more complicated in proportional (PR) electoral systems with multi-member districts, which are more common in EU countries: Here, the personal bond between the two levels is a lot weaker and the focus on individual legislators is therefore less telling. However, FPTP and PR systems share the fact that *political parties* are the main institutions that shape the system of democracy and representation (Dalton et al. 2011, pp. 5ff.). With this in mind, political scientists developed another, more comprehensive model for PR systems (but also applicable to FPTP, of course): The responsible party model, also discussed as mandate theory (Pierce 1999; Powell 2004; Praprotnik 2017; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999a).

In this approach, political parties are considered as “agents of representation” (Dalton 2017b, p. 609) or as “transmission belts” (Pierce 1999, p. 9) which are “responsible for expressing the ideological preferences of citizens and converting them into public policy” (Ezrow 2010, p. 4). They offer concrete policies (e.g. in the form of electoral manifestos) and ask voters for their order, the *mandate*, to implement these offerings. In turn, voters are the main actors who decide between the offered options according to their own preferences (Praprotnik 2017, p. 33). “The policy agreement between voters and their preferred party thus is a central measure of the functioning of representative democracy” (Dalton 2017b, p. 610). Put differently, political parties occupy an intermediary role in the democratic chain of delegation by shaping the relationship between citizens and the legislative on the one hand and between the legislators

and the government on the other (Bergman et al. 2003).

From a theoretical point of view, some basic properties are indispensable for the operability of the responsible party model (Pierce 1999, p. 9; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999a, pp. 113ff.):

1. Voters have a choice, i.e. there are at least two competing parties in the political system.
2. Political parties are able to implement their policies by ensuring a sufficient level of internal cohesion.
3. Voters have policy preferences and different issue positions.
4. Voters are aware of the differences between political parties and compare their own issue positions to those offered.
5. Voters vote according to their policy preferences and choose the party closest to their own position.

These assumptions highlight the top-down focus of the model, since political parties occupy the initiating role to generate and ensure representation. Voters are “only” left with the option to choose between different offerings, whereas scholars continue emphasizing the importance and decisiveness of this role (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999b, pp. 186f.). This notion refers to the top-down modes of political representation, as discussed above in Section 2.1.1.

The empirical study of this thesis relies on the framework provided by the responsible party model insofar that political parties as *collective actors* are considered as “representatives” in this context. Individual legislators are not of interest here. Furthermore, only parties carrying legislative responsibility are taken into account, since they have the possibility to influence public policies effectively. This decision is also reflected by the standard theory of vote-seat representation, which compares the congruence between citizens’ votes and legislative actors by various measures of proportionality (Powell 2004, pp. 279f.). The higher this congruence, the closer is the desired level of representation.

Citizen-legislative relationships are for sure the most intuitive and straightforward research objects when it comes to political representation. However, legislatures by themselves hardly ever play a dominant role in policy making: Initiating and negotiating new laws in PR systems is often determined by the executive in the political day-to-day business. This is why several scholars have acknowledged the importance of citizen-government relationships to generate a more comprehensive picture of representation (Golder and Stramski 2010, pp. 99f.; Powell 2000; Powell 2004, p. 280; Taylor and Lijphart 1985). Governments in PR systems typically consist of at least two parties forming a coalition that holds the majority in the legislative.

This brings the large and successful parties in the political system a decisive advantage in the government formation process and ultimately in the ability to implement new policies. Following this argument, it can be expected that there is a high level of congruence between citizens and their governments in PR systems (Golder and Stramski 2010, p. 100). Governments are defined as one collective body, since the coalition forming parties must negotiate and compromise on their policy positions in order to be capable of acting.

Political Parties and their Impact on Substantive Representation

The nature of the party system itself has a considerable impact on substantive representation and issue congruence. One decisive factor is the number and ideological position of parties: A legislative with several parties covering the full ideological range – including parties at the ideological extremes – will presumably produce a higher level of issue congruence than parliaments with less diversity (Dalton 2017b, pp. 616f.). This is especially the case in PR systems, which likely display a multi-party system (see Duverger's (1963) theory). An increased number of parties leads to more competition, which in turn strengthens the incentives for parties to disperse throughout the policy space to create their own niche electorates (Cox 1990). Taking all of these arguments together, citizens under the PR electoral rule have a larger range of electoral options and should therefore display a higher congruence with their legislative representatives compared to FPTP systems (Golder and Stramski 2010, pp. 99f.). This expectation is in line with various previous research results (Budge and McDonald 2007; Huber and Powell 1994; McDonald et al. 2004; Powell Jr and Vanberg 2000, but also see Powell 2018, 2009 for diverging results). A volatile party system can therefore be seen as a supporting factor for substantive representation. If new parties emerge in the legislative, it is plausible that they had been successful because they occupied a so-far unfilled ideological gap in the electorate.

However, it is reasonable to expect a ceiling effect at some point, since parties require time and stability to implement their policy programs. In addition, the track record of established parties produces a bond between policy makers and citizens that develops and strengthens over time. Well-known and long existing parties have competitive advantages such as name recognition and clear party positions, which can facilitate party support and thus issue congruence as well (Dalton 2017b, p. 616). Moreover, parties must be responsive to their electorate's preferences if they want to stay successful and keep their position. A second assumption therefore can be that voters and parties get closer the longer a party exists in a political system.

Regarding issue congruence between citizens and coalition governments, it is usually the case that the governing parties hold the majority in parliament and are therefore supported by

a majority of the electorate, which has authorized the new executive. If a national election causes a government change, this is a sign of accountability, since the previous government has not been authorized another time (see the model by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005) above). Consequently, it can be expected that any change in government leads to an improved issue congruence between citizens and the new government, compared to the previous one.

To conclude, this thesis considers political parties as collective representatives. In particular, two distinct relationships between citizens and parties are taken into account: (1) many-to-many relationships between citizens and the parties in the legislative, and (2) many-to-one relationships between citizens and the government position (Golder and Stramski 2010). The theoretical expectations have been brought into the form of empirically testable hypotheses and can be found in Section 2.3 below.

2.1.3 Who gets represented? The Citizens' Perspective

Voters versus Citizens

This section pays close attention to the demand side of the representation relationship. To start with, the thesis at hand emphasizes the importance to consider *all citizens* of a nation as basic population, not only voters. From a theoretical point of view, this is reflected in Mansbridge's (2009; 2011) concept of surrogate representation – which asks for representation proportionally to the population numbers – as well as to Saward's (2006; 2008) idea to go beyond elections for generating representation (see Section 2.1.1 above).

Empirically, the decisive role of elections for generating representation can be seen by the fact that measures of vote-seat disproportionality (i.e. how accurately votes are translated into legislative seats) were the standard and mainstream operationalizations for a good amount of time (Golder and Stramski 2010). To extend this approach, Golder and Stramski (2010, p. 104) argue that

“countries where the electoral system accurately translates votes into legislative seats will also be characterized by a more accurate translation of citizen preferences into legislative seats”.

This conclusion highlights the connection between citizens' votes and preferences, which in turn makes it reasonable to consider the latter for representational studies as well. Plain vote-seat ratios not only leave behind citizens' preferences, but are also not able to explain well-researched voting behaviour such as strategic, incorrect or non-voting. Moreover, they are not able to cope with the circumstance that not every voter has the same understanding of

what a certain party stands for (Powell 2004, pp. 281f.). In short, citizens' preferences and votes can deviate from each other significantly.

Because of this criticism on the vote-seat paradigm, the thesis at hand applies a different set of representational measures based on citizens' policy preferences. Specifically, the empirical analysis will mainly rely on Golder and Stramski's (2010) operationalizations of many-to-many and many-to-one relationships, whereas the first "many" refers to all citizens of a political system. The concrete calculation of issue congruence between citizens' preferences and party positions will be discussed in Section 3.2.3 below.

Representation and Socio-Demographic Groups

A special focus of the thesis at hand is to examine (systematic) representational inequalities regarding specific subgroups of the overall society. The normative ideal that interests are considered equally and proportionally to the citizenry (Lefkofridi et al. 2012; Mansbridge 2009) is usually not reached in modern democracies. This is very well documented by an increasing branch of research, as will be presented and discussed in this section.

To begin with, one of the best researched questions in this context is whether men and women are represented differently (see e.g. Beckwith 2007; Bernauer et al. 2015; Celis 2006; Celis and Childs 2012; Celis et al. 2008; Childs 2006; Childs and Krook 2009; Dingler et al. 2019; Evans 2012; Steininger 2000). Basically all of these studies conclude that there are not enough female legislators and office holders to ensure equal descriptive representation. In terms of substantive representation, however, the results are less clear-cut: While some studies find that women are disadvantaged to some extent (Bernauer et al. 2015; Evans 2012), others find no difference or even conclude that women's preferences are represented more accurately than men's (Dingler et al. 2019). These results suggest that there is no straightforward connection between descriptive and substantive representation in terms of gender (Celis 2006; Childs 2006). Notwithstanding the massive research efforts in this field, no clear proposition on whether men and women differ significantly can be derived so far.

For the Austrian case in particular, Steininger (2000) found that descriptive representation of women has always been too low regarding parliamentary candidates, member of parliament and government officials in the Second Republic. Despite various gender quotas implemented by the majority of Austrian parties (see Gresch and Sauer 2015), this situation basically remains true until today. According to previous research results, this does not necessarily mean that women's interests are less represented as well. This open question will be considered in the empirical section below.

A second well-researched issue is the difference between rich and poor citizens (see e.g. Bernauer et al. 2015; Ellis 2012; Giger et al. 2012; Gilens 2005; Griffin and Newman 2007; Rigby and Wright 2013). Contrary to gender, the results show that more affluent citizens are better represented than poorer ones in general. In a significant number of studies, income is among the strongest predictors – if not the strongest – for the quality of issue representation (Bernauer et al. (2015); Ellis (2012); but also see Soroka and Wlezien (2008) for slightly different results). Related to that, the categorization into social classes (operationalized as occupational group or as combination of income and education) displays the very same pattern, with citizens in the middle or higher class being better represented than those in the lower class (Lehmann et al. 2015; Walczak and Van der Brug 2012). However, the unequal effect of income seems to be somewhat smaller in countries under the PR system (Bernauer et al. 2015). It is nonetheless reasonable to expect a similar situation in Austria's democracy, namely that the preferences of citizens with high incomes are considered more accurate than those of the poor. In addition, the thesis at hand will also consider potential differences between occupational groups, assuming that blue-collar workers are less represented than white-collar workers or self-employed as a general tendency (see Walczak and Van der Brug (2012) and Evans (2000) for a more detailed discussion on how social classes can be measured using occupational groups).

The third group considered in this thesis is education. There are almost no studies focusing explicitly on educational groups. For most authors, the formal educational status is a control variable and not of particular interest. Those studies discussing education more explicitly generally conclude that citizens with a higher formal educational status tend to be represented better than those who are poorly educated (Dalton 2017a; Dolný and Baboš 2015; Walczak and Van der Brug 2012). This result can probably be explained by the observation that education and income are usually correlated significantly (Walczak and Van der Brug 2012). It can thus be expected that this pattern also holds true in Austria.

Finally, the representation of different age groups will be part of this thesis as well. Previous studies on this issue are rare and found rather counter-intuitive results: Younger age groups are slightly better represented substantively than older ones, although the descriptive representation is everything else but equal (Kissau et al. 2012). However, this effect is not a linear one, and PR systems tend to generate a more equal descriptive representation (Joshi 2013). Age is nevertheless a very interesting variable to research, given existing knowledge about different policy preferences between younger and older citizens (e.g. Busemeyer et al. 2009; Kissau et al. 2012; Svallfors 2008) and varying political behaviour (Goerres 2009; Rubenson et al. 2004), all combined with the existing fundamental demographic change towards ageing societies. Acknowledging the inconclusive research results found so far, it is nevertheless hypothesized that younger citizens are better represented than older ones preliminary.

For the sake of completeness, it is mentioned that the societal subgroups considered in this studies are not exhaustive at all: One could also examine the situation of minorities (see e.g. Griffin and Newman 2007), differences regarding political knowledge and interest (Walczak and Van der Brug 2012) or voters versus non-voters (Dolný and Baboš 2015; Griffin and Newman 2007), just to name a few. Another set of studies has also focused on representation in the European Parliament as supranational institution (Casado-Asensio and Lefkofridi 2011; Costello et al. 2012; Dalton 2017a; Walczak and Van der Brug 2012). The present thesis is nevertheless limited to the most important socio-demographic characteristics, which are assumed to have the strongest explanatory power. The hypotheses derived here can be found summarized in Section 2.3.

2.2 The Dimensionality of the Political Space

At this stage of the thesis, the actors determining the representational relationship have been defined and described in detail: Political parties on the supply side, citizens on the demand side. One decisive aspect is still missing yet, which is to take a closer look on *issue preferences* as *subjects* of the citizen-party relationships (Saward 2008, p. 1003). Political opinions and interests do not simply exist; they are moreover developed and, most importantly, are assumed to follow specific patterns that can be structured methodologically. The most prominent way to structure issue positions is the classical Left-Right dimension (Dalton 2017a), originally described in Anthony Downs' economic theory of democracy (Downs 1957). More recently, scholars argued for a more complex operationalization of the political space with two or even more dimensions (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2012; Budge et al. 2012; Dalton 2017b; Dolezal et al. 2013). These theoretical and methodological progress will be described step by step in the subsequent Sections.

Before getting further into detail, it is worth to highlight the function and necessity of ideological dimensions at all. First and foremost, they structure the political space in a meaningful way and therefore help to deal with the complexity that naturally comes with a vast number of political issues and opinions. In other words, ideological dimensions serve as cognitive shortcuts by solving "important problems of uncertainty, credibility, imperfect and incomplete information" (Hix 1999, p. 71). Reducing complexity and enabling individuals to act is one of the main reasons – together with path dependence and rational choice theory (assuming that new dimensions would be too costly for the actors involved) – why these dimensions tend to be stable over a longer period of time (Marks and Steenbergen 2002, pp. 881f.). Especially the Left-Right dimension is widely understood among scientists, politicians and citizens and therefore enables the political discourse based on a common ground.

By nature, however, concepts like political dimensionality “are not only unobservable but also remain metaphorical, not physical, spatial objects” (Benoit and Laver 2012, p. 196). They always include a great amount of simplifications, which is why they constitute an approximation to the real world at best. Even the most sophisticated operationalization is not able to verify whether the characterization of the political space and its actors has been “correct” (Benoit and Laver 2012, p. 196). This notion is important to be kept in mind for the following discussion, since political dimensions ultimately are only one simplified and structured way to think about a complex and manifold reality.

2.2.1 The Base: The Socio-Economic Dimension

The discussion on political dimensions can be traced back to Anthony Downs’ (Downs 1957) economic theory of democracy, which assumes that electoral competition is structured along one Left-Right dimension: Political parties are arrayed on this dimension and voters select the party that is closest to their own positions (Dalton 2017a, p. 189). In order to maximize their electoral success, political parties will move towards the median voter and eventually converge at the equilibrium point displaying the minimum distance between voters and parties. However, full convergence is not realistic in any case, since political parties also need to keep their distinctiveness to stay attractive for their own electorate and to avoid electoral loss towards their opponents (Budge et al. 2012, pp. 20f.).

This basic assumption of party convergence provided by Downs’ spatial model is very much inspired by two-party FPTP-systems such as in the US. However, multi-party systems display a different picture that the model is not able to explain, i.e. the existence of ideological extreme or niche parties. Especially in the European context, Lipset and Rokkan’s (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) seminal work on cleavage structures offers a potential answer: In their view, the political space is divided along certain conflict lines such as class, religion, and the center-periphery conflict. Although many of Lipset and Rokkan’s assumptions (e.g. the stability of these cleavages) have been confuted in the meantime, the debate about basic ideological conflicts and the content of the Left-Right dimension remains until today.

From the supply side’s point of view, a dimension can be defined as the reduction of parties’ positions across a variety of issues to a single point on that axis (Gabel and Hix 2002, p. 935). This implies that if once the relationship between certain issues and the underlying ideological position is uncovered, “one can infer parties’ positions on the ideological dimension from their positions on the specific policies” (Gabel and Huber 2000, p. 95). Which issues are part of this Left-Right ideology has been a main subject of discussions in the scientific discourse (e.g. Inglehart 1990; Sani and Sartori 1983). Given the fundamental differences between

democracies and societies all over the world, the answer to this question is never final and heavily depends on the cultural context of a particular region or country (Gabel and Huber 2000, p. 95).

For Western Europe, the Left-Right dimension becomes more comprehensible when considering the citizens' perspective (i.e. the demand side) in its historical context: The main source of societal conflict in the 19th century refers to the extent of "intervention in individual *social and political* relations for a collective good" (Hix 1999, p. 73; emphasis in original). This debate derives from the democratic revolution and includes normative values such as "freedom of association, opinion, speech and decision; versus restrictive, hierarchical, and traditional practices" (Hix 1999, p. 73). With the growing economic scarcity in the context of the industrial revolution and the First and Second World War, attention was shifted towards the desired level of "intervention in individual economic relations for a collective good", including the main issues "redistribution, employment, public ownership, and welfare versus *laissez-faire* practices" (Hix 1999, p. 73; emphasis in original).

All of these issues can be subsumed beneath the Left-Right axis, depending on their structure and salience within the particular political system. Within this framework, scholars examined exhaustively whether party and voter positions match on this dimension in different political systems and time periods – and found a strong issue congruence predominantly (Dalton 2017a; Klingemann 1995; McDonald et al. 2004; Powell 2000, 1982; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999). In this context, it is important to emphasize the difference between representational measurements at the individual and the aggregate level: While the Left-Right dimension works very well at the aggregate level and "produces" a satisfying level of issue congruence for the overall society, results are considerably different at the individual level: For reasons that have been already pointed out in Section 2.1.1, it is risky to compare individual voting decisions with party positions to examine substantive representation. These arguments are also the reason why the thesis at hand uses individual preferences as the central starting point for the measurement of issue congruence and substantive representation.

However, there exists an still ongoing discussion on whether citizens' attitudes can be even structured to one coherent dimension: In his seminal study, Converse (1964) found that only a minority (11.5 percent) of the US citizens in the 1950s could be considered as "ideologues" or "near-ideologues", operationalized as groups that exhibit an (at least a rough) understanding of what ideological dimensions are and what they could mean (Converse 1964, p. 17). This result is supported by the studies of the Michigan Group (Campbell et al. 1964), who also found only rarely linked issue positions among the electorate. Although several follow-up studies, also in the European context, have been more optimistic (Knutsen 1998; Pomper 1972), the prevalent finding is still in line with these very early studies (Dolezal et al. 2013;

Kuklinski and Peyton 2007).

One might argue that this result might be caused by measurement problems and is therefore rather a research artifact than a real observation. Indeed, a common point of criticism is exactly that the unidimensional approach would be too simple to cover the complexity of the political system. For this reason, scholars challenged the previous approach and argued for two – or even more – political dimensions (e.g. Achen 1978; Benoit and Laver 2012; Dalton 2017b; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Hix and Lord 1997; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Thomassen 2012). This will be discussed in the following Section.

2.2.2 The Socio-Cultural Dimension

Since the 1960s, new post-material issues such as environmentalism and women's rights became more salient, shifting societal conflict lines from class-based to value-based polarization. This is a result of the diminishing economic scarcity in the post-war era in the first place, which made problems of economic redistribution less salient and allowed room for new issues (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). The rise of postmaterialist values is therefore deeply rooted in the economic and physical security in which a new generation of citizens grew up. While the polarization on the owner-worker cleavage decreased, citizens divided along materialist and postmaterialist values to a larger extent (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, pp. 1296ff.)

As a result, many scholars argued for “a new axis of politics” (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, p. 1302) in Western political systems and debated on its labelling and content. Two frequent terms in this discussion are “libertarian” versus “authoritarian” values: For Inglehart and Flanagan (1987), the liberal side refers to the new post-materialist dimension, including

“an emphasis on personal and political freedom, participation [...], equality, tolerance of minorities and those holding different opinions, openness to new ideas and new life styles, environmental protection and concern over quality-of-life issues, self-indulgence, and self-actualization” (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, p. 1304).

On the other hand, authoritarian values are connected with

“respect for authority, loyalty and dutifulness, obedience and resignation to one's inherited station in life, order and social control, and patriotism and seeking security through national military height [as well as] traditional customs and beliefs” (Flanagan and Lee 2003, p. 238).


This interpretation has a strong focus on the individual level, especially on personality, cognitive and intellectual factors as well as emotions (Flanagan and Lee 2003, p. 238). Taking a macro-perspective into account, Kitschelt (1994) interpreted the second dimension as an opposition between libertarians and authoritarians in a similar manner, but traced its roots back to a societal conflict between secular and religious (or traditional) values. Somewhat differently, Franklin (1992) distinguished a New Politics and an Old Politics dimension. The European Union offered a starting point for new theories such as Kriesi et al. (2008), who defined the second dimension as a cultural dimension in the sense of a structural contrast between integration and demarcation (i.e. more open or closed nation states) (Dolezal et al. 2013, p. 426). Similarly, Hix (1999) and Marks and Steenbergen (2002) identified integration and independence as the two opposing poles on the second axis.

All of these manifold interpretations are valid for themselves and also empirically proven, at least to some extent. Despite their great variance, two big commonalities indeed do exist: First, they point on social, cultural and moral issues that are not necessarily (if not at all) economically related. This is why several authors have chosen to speak of a socio-economic dimension, which is similar to the traditional Left-Right axis and covers issues “related to the economic organisation of society, such as free markets, privatisation, redistribution and taxation”, and a *socio-cultural dimension*, with “issues and opinions related to law and order, human rights, national and religious identity, immigration and integration” (Wagner and Kritzinger 2012, p. 286; see also Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008 and Lefkofridi et al. 2014). If one would only consider the socio-economic dimension, all other issues would be minimized in their importance for the measurement of representation and would therefore lead to considerable measurement defects (Dalton 2017b, p. 611). For the purpose of this thesis, the author has decided to apply this nomenclature for the overall definition of the political space, since it provides a rather general label for the second axis, ready for adaptation according to the particular cases studied.

The second common feature is the notion that citizens and parties on the left side of the socio-economic dimension tend to identify themselves with the issues on the libertarian side of the socio-cultural axis and vice versa (a socio-economic right position is related with a authoritarian position the socio-cultural axis) (Flanagan and Lee 2003, pp. 249f.; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, p. 1297). Especially in the West European context, “most parties connect liberal market values with traditional, conservative ‘freedoms and rights’ values and ‘left’ economic values with liberal ‘freedom and rights’” (Busch 2016, p. 164). Fittingly, Hooghe et al. (2002) defined the two poles of the socio-cultural axis as “GAL” (Green/alternative/libertarian) and “TAN” (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist). These labels combine the libertarian/authoritarian debate as briefly described above with the party system features in many Western democra-

cies. Together with its openness regarding the composition of issues, the GALTAN framework is considered as useful and reasonable for the deployment in the thesis at hand.

The combination of the first and second axis creates a two-dimensional political space (based on the assumption that the dimensions are orthogonal) as shown in Figure 2.3. The four quadrants display the general and basic classification of voters' and parties' attitudes that lies at the heart of the following empirical analysis: Left-authoritarian, right-authoritarian, left-liberal and right-liberal (see also Lefkofridi et al. 2014, pp. 69f.).



Source: Lefkofridi et al. 2014, p. 68

Figure 2.3: The Dimensionality of the Political Space

For Western European democracies and Austria in particular, previous research has provided evidence for both an one-dimensional (Jenny 2006) as well as a two-dimensional configuration (Benoit and Laver 2012; Dalton 2017b; Dolezal 2008; Dolezal et al. 2013; Kriesi et al. 2006; Lefkofridi and Casado-Asensio 2013; Müller and Jenny 2000), whereby patterns are more clear for parties than for voters in general. Dolezal et al. (2013) analyzed the Austrian

political space for 2008 and found clear proof for the meaningfulness of a second dimension at the elite level. This is also in line with previous results by Dolezal (2008), who found two significant dimensions since 1975, although they were structured differently than theoretically expected. Moreover, the two dimensions seem to be correlated (and therefore not orthogonal) and without a clear pattern regarding the demand side (Dolezal et al. 2013, pp. 430ff.).

A vast number of authors studied issue congruence in a two-dimensional political space, applying a wide range of measurement methods. Very general, Dalton (2017b, pp. 613ff.) analyzed the data from the 2009 European Election Study and found that there is high congruence on the socio-economic dimension in Europe, while the socio-cultural axis displays considerable more variance for both citizens and party elites. In addition, congruence is higher when measured on dimensions than considering single issue positions, which indicates that the aggregate level compensates for various kinds of misrepresentation at the individual level (Esaiasson 1999, p. 132; Pierce 1999, p. 23).

However, Lefkofridi et al. (2014) identified structural inequalities alongside the two identified dimensions and argued that there is a significant lack of representation for left-authoritarian citizens. This is a result of a severe mismatch between demand and supply: The number of citizens in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 2.3 is considerable in Western Europe – between seven and 36 percent of all citizens belong to the left-authoritarian group, depending on the country (Lefkofridi et al. 2014, p. 71). On the other hand, there is not enough supply (i.e. parties) in this quadrant of the political space. Because of this insight, it is reasonable to expect a lack of issue congruence for left-authoritarian citizens in Austria as well. The accompanying hypothesis will be formulated below in Section 2.3.

Turning to more specific results for the Austrian case, the country is close to the European average in terms of issue congruence on the socio-economic dimension (Dolný and Baboš 2015). Several authors nevertheless described an “end-of-consensus in Austrian politics” (Dolezal 2008, p. 120; see also Müller 2006, p. 303; Plasser and Ulram 2002) for both voters and parties. In his comparative study of parties’ issue positions over time (1975-2002), Dolezal (2008, p. 128) concluded that

“one can see that the system’s polarization has risen. A renewed importance of the socio-economic conflict has recently produced more difference between the two main parties as well as their voters, but, in general, it is the small parties’ positions that structure the space. [...] Austria, therefore, is an example where both an increased polarization between the major parties and a transformation of an established party are the development’s driving forces.“

According to this study, Green and FPÖ supporters are the voters who polarize most and

therefore form the opposite poles of both dimensions (Dolezal 2008, p. 121). It is particularly interesting to what extent these two non-centrist parties are able to contribute to Austria's substantive representation in total. Additionally, three new parties – Alliance for Austria's Future (BZÖ), Team Stronach and the Party for a New Austria (NEOS) – entered the political system. According to the theoretical expectations formulated in Section 2.1.2, it can be expected that Austria's substantive representation increased due to these new participants in the electoral competition.

Besides the increased salience of the socio-economic dimension, Dolezal (2008, p. 124) moreover found that the socio-cultural dimension is in a transformation process, “as new issues are being ‘embedded’ in the existing structure and change their meaning”. This relates first and foremost to the conflict on immigration, which creates a sharp contrast to previous libertarian issue positions (Dolezal 2008, p. 124). Although in conflict as well, the issue structure of the socio-economic axis is expected to be more stable over time due to its historical dimension (see Section 2.2.1 above). In combination with the research result by Dalton (2017b) which shows higher congruence on the socio-economic dimension, it is reasonable to expect that citizens and parties in Austria are closer in socio-economic questions compared to socio-cultural ones. This conjecture will be formulated in Section 2.3 in form of a hypothesis as well.

An interesting pattern can be identified regarding the issue congruence between citizens and governing parties: As Kritzinger et al. (2010) have shown, the ÖVP-FPÖ government in 2004 produced an increased level of issue congruence, while it declined again in 2009 (grand coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP). Conversely, another study by Casado-Asensio and Lefkofridi (2011, p. 171) analyzed data from 2004 as well and concluded that the FPÖ was the party with the weakest issue congruence on a single left–right dimension, while the Social Democrats (at this time a party in opposition) were closest. While the general expectation would be that governmental changes lead to higher issue congruence (see Section 2.1.2), this result for Austria is non-conclusive. Thus, special attention will be paid to the new ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in 2017 and its impact on issue congruence in the empirical analysis.

2.3 Hypotheses

All theoretical concepts discussed so far provide a firm base to derive literature-based expectations that can be operationalized and tested in the following empirical part of this thesis.

In general, the main variable of interest is substantive representation, defined in this context as issue congruence between citizens and political parties in the legislative or in government. In PR systems like Austria, one can assume that there is a high level of issue congruence due

to the mechanisms that are inherent to this type of electoral system (see discussion in Section 2.1.2). Additionally to this baseline expectation, there are various theoretical expectations on how parties can influence issue congruence. They have been discussed in Section 2.1.2 and are now summarized in the following three hypotheses:

H 1.1: Issue congruence increases if new parties enter the political system and make it more volatile.

H 1.2: Issue congruence increases if the governing parties change.

In Section 2.1.3, several propositions have been formulated regarding the demand side of substantive representation. These theoretical claims can be phrased in the following set of hypotheses:

H 2.1: The issue congruence between men and women does not differ significantly.

H 2.2: Citizens with higher incomes display higher issue congruence than citizens with lower incomes.

H 2.3: White-collar workers and self-employed citizens display higher issue congruence than blue-collar workers.

H 2.4: Citizens with a higher formal education status display higher issue congruence than citizens with a lower one.

H 2.5: Younger citizens display higher issue congruence than older citizens.

Finally, Section 2.2 discussed the distinction between a socio-economic and a socio-cultural dimension. Based on the existing literature in this field, one can formulate the following propositions:

H 3.1: Issue congruence is higher on the socio-economic dimension compared to the socio-cultural dimension.

H 3.2: Citizens holding left-authoritarian preferences are weaker represented than citizens in other quadrants of the political space.

Chapter 3

Empirical Approach

In this chapter, the theoretical assumptions will be examined empirically. First, Section 3.1 presents the data that is in use for the subsequent analyses. The demand side data (Section 3.1.1) relies on surveys conducted by the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES), while the supply side data (Section 3.1.2) takes advantage of various content analyses and text codings, also provided by AUTNES. In Section 3.2, the theoretical concept of substantive representation will be operationalized in three steps: After an analysis of citizens' issue positions (Section 3.2.1) as well as the parties' positioning within the same political space (Section 3.2.2), the measurement of issue congruence will be discussed in Section 3.2.3 in further detail.

3.1 Data

This section describes the data in use for the subsequent empirical section. In general, the target is to place citizens (= demand side) as well as political parties (= supply side) within the same two-dimensional political space. Therefore, two kinds of data are utilized: The demand side takes advantage of mass surveys, whereas the supply side consists of manually coded content analyses of party manifestos and press releases. The utilization of different information sources ensures an independent measure of citizen and party positions and therefore avoids the potential problem that congruence is found because of circular measurement and not due to empirical existence (Blais and Bodet 2006, p. 1248). All empirical analyses as described below were conducted in Stata 15.

3.1.1 Demand Side Data

Surrounding the Austrian National Elections in 2008, 2013 and 2017, several large mass surveys have been conducted as part of the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES). These studies cover a wide range of aspects related to the voting decision and have the great advantage that the questionnaire has been kept very similar or sometimes even constant in all relevant issues.

AUTNES Multi-Mode Panel Study 2017

The AUTNES Multi-Mode Panel Study 2017 (MMP 2017) (Kritzinger et al. 2018a,b) surveyed in total 3.908 eligible voters in three waves. The decisive criteria for the ability to participate had been Austrian citizenship and a minimum age of 16 years. The first two waves took place prior to the elections on October 15th (Wave 1: June – July 2017, Wave 2: September – October 2017), the third wave was conducted afterwards (October – December 2017). For the purpose of this thesis, only Wave 1 has been taken into account, since the majority of respondents ($n = 3.846$) participated in this wave.

The MMP 2017 combined two different contacting strategies – a telephone and an online mode. Both strategies based on random samples and can therefore be considered as representative for the Austrian population in general. The study design nevertheless slightly influenced the regional distribution in the telephone mode by excluding some regions when the number of cases was large enough, but without violating random sample assumptions (Kritzinger et al. 2018a, p. 4). In the online mode, quotas for gender, age and education as well as special invitations for certain age groups had been applied partially. In order to adjust to population distributions, weights have been used for the factor analysis (see chapter 3.2.1). In particular, the IFES demographic and design weights have been chosen because of they increase the comparability with previous AUTNES Studies (Kritzinger et al. 2018a, p. 9).

AUTNES Online Panel Study 2013

The first Wave of the AUTNES Online Panel Study 2013 (OPS 2013) (Kritzinger et al. 2016a,b) was conducted from 16 to 28 August 2013, approximately a month previous to the Austrian National Election held on 29 September 2013. Similar to above, only the first Wave has been used in this thesis, since all respondents ($n = 3.084$) participated in this Wave. Austrian citizenship and a minimum age of 16 years on Election Day had been necessary

preconditions for suffrage and for participation in the survey as well. Respondents gave their answers online using CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviews) exclusively. The sampling procedure made use of quotas on key demographics (age, gender, region, household size), but participants were nevertheless selected randomly within these categories. As a result, the sample structure closely represents the Austrian population (Kritzinger et al. 2016b, p. 9), which makes any demographic weight dispensable.

AUTNES Post Post Election Survey 2009

The AUTNES Post Post Election Survey 2009 (PPES 2009) (Kritzinger et al. 2014, 2013) was conducted in the aftermath of the Austrian National Elections held on 28 September 2008. The sample included 1.165 enfranchised citizens with Austrian citizenship and older than 18 years.¹ The participants were surveyed once between 6 May and 2 July 2009 using CAPI (Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing). In principal, the sample was drawn randomly, although geographical balance had been ensured by “using multiple stratification with a clustered address random procedure” (Kritzinger et al. 2013, p. 6). This means that the Austrian population had been divided into geographical units (provinces, administrative districts, town sizes, communities) proportionally. The respondents had been selected randomly within these communities, i.e. the smallest geographical units. Moreover, a demographic sample weight was created by the researchers and has been applied in the factor analysis of this thesis (see chapter 3.2.1).

Contrary to the MMP 2017 and OPS 2013 datasets, the PPES 2009 did not survey citizens during the electoral campaign: The only Wave was conducted after the National Elections and with a good amount of time in between. Of course, this is not the perfect initial situation for a comparative study. However, given the lack of alternative datasets and the fact that questions on issue positions are very similar to the two younger datasets, it is still reasonable to include this election for the sake of an enhanced time comparison.

3.1.2 Supply Side Data

The data basis for the supply side is more multifaceted: For all three National Elections considered, AUTNES offers in-depth content analyses of party manifestos and press releases

¹In 2007, the Austrian government lowered the voting age from 18 to 16. The National Elections on 28 September 2008 were the first elections where 16- and 17-year-olds could vote. However, the PPES 2009 did not include this new group. Studies on young voters in Austria are available for more recent elections though (Wagner et al. 2012; Wagner and Kritzinger 2012).

published several weeks ahead of the election day.

AUTNES Content Analyses of Party Manifestos, 2008-2017

The party manifestos were coded following the same procedure for all three elections: Using the so-called core-sentences approach (Helbling and Tresch 2011, pp. 177f.) as starting point, AUTNES developed its own, unique coding scheme. Each full sentence in a parties' manifesto was manually transformed into one or more standardized sentences, consisting of a subject (which is usually the party itself), an issue (e.g. taxes) and a predicate (support, neutral or rejection). One standardized sentence includes only *one* issue, which is why one original sentence could result in several standardized sentences. Support was coded numerically +1, rejection -1 and neutral 0. Two in-between positions were possible as well, indicating support with reservations (+0.5) and rejection with reservations (-0.5). This procedure enables the researcher to deduce party positions and issue salience at the same time (Helbling and Tresch 2011, p. 177).

In case of the 2017 manifesto coding (MAN 2017), five parties have been taken into account: The Social Democrats (SPÖ), the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Green Party and the Party for a New Austria (NEOS). A member of parliament and former candidate of the Green Party, Peter Pilz (PILZ), also succeeded in getting into Parliament with his newly established party, but had to be omitted because of a too small number of cases on both (demand and supply) sides.²

The AUTNES Content Analysis of Party Manifestos 2013 (MAN 2013) (Müller et al. 2017c,d) includes seven parties: SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, the Green Party, NEOS, the Alliance for Austria's Future (BZÖ) and Team Stronach, a party list newly founded by the Austrian entrepreneur and millionaire Frank Stronach. Six of these seven parties finally got into parliament, only the BZÖ did not pass the threshold of four percent. This and the fact that the party got politically irrelevant are reasons for excluding the party from the subsequent analysis.³

Finally, the AUTNES Content Analysis of Party Manifestos 2008 (MAN 2008) (Müller et al. 2017a,b) covered six parties: SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, the Green Party, BZÖ and the liberal party LIF, which has also been excluded from the following analysis due to its dissolution.⁴

Table 3.1 provides an overview of the number of standardized sentences per manifesto and

²There were only 181 standardized sentences for the manifesto of PILZ and 39 party press releases.

³For the sake of completeness, the BZÖ had 806 standardized sentences in their manifesto and published 128 party press releases during the 2013 electoral campaign.

⁴The LIF's 2008 party manifesto covered 575 standardized sentences and the party produced 92 party press releases.

year. The length of party manifestos jumped up during the analyzed time span, culminating in the SPÖ’s extensive manifesto of 2017 with 9.957 standardized sentences.

Table 3.1: Number of Standardized Sentences in Party Manifestos

Party	2008	2013	2017
SPÖ	2.219	2.951	9.957
ÖVP	1.086	3.944	8.978
FPÖ	792	344	1.524
Greens	1.285	8.502	3.912
BZÖ	672	-	-
Team Stronach	-	481	-
NEOS	-	3.853	383
Sum	6.054	20.881	24.754

AUTNES Content Analysis of Party Press Releases, 2008 - 2017

All press releases that were published during six weeks in front of the elections via APA-OTS (*Originaltextservice* of the Austrian Press Agency) are part of the AUTNES datasets. The coding scheme is very similar to the party manifestos as described above: Again, subjects (mainly parties), objects (issues or actors) and predicates were coded manually. Title and subtitle of the press release were coded separately. Each of them could include up to three different issues or actors and their respective predicates, measured on the same scale as before (-1 to +1 with three intermediate positions).

Including party press releases to the measurement of party positions is reasonable because they are a very flexible communication instrument which enables parties to react promptly on new issues that emerge during the campaign. For this reason, it can be argued that they serve as a meaningful extension of the well-designed and long-time printed party manifestos. This is why both data sources were combined in order to obtain a more “realistic” picture of the parties’ positions.

Table 3.2 presents the number of party press releases that have been coded during the last three electoral campaigns. The analyzed parties remain the same as above. The datasets in use are the AUTNES Coding of Party Press Releases 2017 (Müller et al. 2019a,b), the AUTNES Coding of Party Press Releases 2013 (Müller et al. 2016b, 2017f) and the AUTNES Coding of Party Press Releases 2008 (Müller et al. 2016a, 2017e). Contrary to the party manifestos, the number of party press releases diminished drastically: In 2017, the SPÖ published

less than a half and the ÖVP only a fifth compared to 2008. It is likely that this trend was fueled by social media, which relocated significant parts of the campaign communication to these new possibilities.⁵

Table 3.2: Number of Party Press Releases

Party	2008	2013	2017
SPÖ	835	503	357
ÖVP	694	457	142
FPÖ	397	533	267
Greens	223	171	143
BZÖ	303	-	-
Team Stronach	-	130	-
NEOS	-	30	125
Sum	2.452	1.952	1.034

3.2 Method and Operationalization

This chapter discusses and presents the measurement of substantive representation and issue congruence. In general, there are manifold possibilities how to link citizens and political parties: The number of dimensions, the scaling, the method for calculating the distance – all these aspects are open questions and haven’t been answered in a conclusive way in the scientific literature so far. For sure, the one “correct” answer cannot exist, although it is possible and necessary to optimize the operationalization according to the research question (Golder and Stramski 2010). In the following three parts of this section, it will be pointed out how (1) citizens and (2) parties were placed within the political space and (3) which method was used to connect these two areas.

3.2.1 Demand Side: Citizens’ Issue Positions

In section 2.2.2, it has been argued that it is theoretically reasonable to expect a two-dimensional policy space in Austria. The assumption that there are two meaningful, distinguishable axes that are orthogonal and thus not strongly correlated is the kick-off point for the following

⁵The author acknowledges the increasing importance of social media for the analysis of parties’ issue positions. However, although the corresponding datasets do exist, it has been decided to exclude social media channels from this analysis due to limited time resources that comes with necessary simplifications.

analysis. The first dimension is expected to be formed out of socio-economic issues, the second one should include socio-cultural topics – these two factors have been salient in Austria in recent years (Dolezal 2008; Wagner and Kritzinger 2012). Based on this presumptions, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test the issue structure and salience of both dimensions.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Results

2017. Starting with the MMP 2017, this dataset offers a good amount of items in which respondents were asked to declare their opinion about various issues that are potentially related to the assumed dimensions. Each item was originally answered within a five-point Likert scale, reaching from 1 (completely agree) to 5 (completely disagree). Some of them had been recoded in the first place so that all items operate in the same direction. Lower scores indicate a “left” position on the socio-economic dimension and a “GAL” (Green-Alternative-Libertarian) position on the socio-cultural dimension. Vice versa, high scores indicate that a person stands “right” on the socio-economic dimension and is closer to the “TAN” (Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) edge of the socio-cultural dimension.

In sum, 17 items were part of a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) operated within a structural equation model (SEM). This approach was chosen not only because there are enough theoretical expectations to use confirmatory instead of explanatory factor analysis, but the latter one had also not produced satisfactory and empirically reasonable results. One reason for this might be the already mentioned insight by Converse (1964) that only a fractional part of the citizenry relies

“in some active way on a relatively abstract and far-reaching conceptional dimension as a yardstick against which political objects and their shifting policy significance over time [are] evaluated” (Converse 1964, p. 14).

In other words, very few citizens actively use political dimensions such as liberal/conservative or left/right as guidelines for their opinions and can therefore be labeled as “ideologues” (Converse 1964, p. 14). However, this does not imply that such political dimensions have no importance for citizens: According to Converse (1964, p. 21), the majority of people is indeed aware of their existence and is also able to associate them with the correct meaning and party. But, and this is the decisive part of Converse’s theory, only few people *actively* transfer this knowledge to their own opinion-making process (also see Section 2.2 for further discussion).

With this in mind, it becomes better understandable why the data itself does not cluster to

two (or more) reasonable dimensions when conducting the explanatory factor analysis. On the other hand, if theoretically derived and a priori-defined dimensions are applied utilizing confirmatory factor analysis, the data reveals the implicit existence of the socio-economic and the socio-cultural dimension.

In the SEM model (in which the confirmatory factor analysis operated), each item was allocated manually as an indicator to one of the two latent variables that the process aimed to discover. After the first iteration, all items that did not reach statistical significance at the 0.05-level or whose standardized coefficient was below 0.4 (with one exception) were excluded from the model. It has been decided to keep the following item in the model despite it had a rather low standardized coefficient of 0.23: “Politics should keep out of economy.” There are two justifications for this way of proceeding: First, the item is arguably of substantial importance for the formation of the socio-economic axis, and second, the reliability test (Cronbach’s Alpha) did only change marginal (0.01) when the item was excluded from the model. As a result of this process, Table 3.3 presents the indicators that constitute the two latent variables of interest. The overall R-squared of this model is 0.84. However, the correlation between both dimensions is 0.43, which indicates that they are not orthogonal. Instead, the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension are related to a moderate extent in 2017.

Table 3.3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Result for 2017

Latent Variable	Item	Cronbach’s Alpha
Socio-Economic Dimension	Welfare state makes people idle and lazy	0.56
	Politics should keep out of economy	
	Immigrants are good for the Austrian economy	
	Immigrants take away Austrian jobs	
Socio-Cultural Dimension	Police authorities should be extended	0.81
	Immigration to Austria only in exceptional cases	
	Immigrants should adapt to Austrian customs	
	Crime rates increase in Austria because of immigrants	
	Immigrants pay more into the social security system	

Two interesting aspects can be noticed in Table 3.3: First, six out of nine items are directly related to immigration issues, which is exactly in line with the overarching topic of the parties’ electoral campaign. Fitting to that, the socio-cultural dimension focuses very much on security and restrictions for immigrants.

Based on the result of the factor analysis, the four or five items were merged to two indices by

simply calculating the mean from the answers given. The number of observations diminishes from 3,846 to 3,018 because only respondents without any missing answer on both dimensions have been considered. With these indices each respondent can be placed at one distinct point within the two-dimensional political space. Figure 3.1 displays the relative number of respondents per quadrant. The majority of citizens holds political opinions that are clearly distinguishable from zero, whereas most of them can be found in the upper right quadrant (36.0%) with a right position on the socio-economic dimension and an authoritarian position on the socio-cultural axis. On the opposite, 20.8 percent of all respondents display left and liberal positions in the lower left quadrant.

Interestingly, the second largest group (23.9%) are respondents in the upper left quadrant: They can be located on the left side of the socio-economic scale, but nevertheless hold authoritarian opinions in terms of the socio-cultural axis. In Austria 2017, the median voter (marked with x) is also situated in this area. These “left-authoritarian” voters are often faced with electoral cross-pressure, since only few parties in Europe can be located within the same area (Lefkofridi et al. 2014). As will be discussed in section 3.2.3 below, the situation for left-authoritarians in Austria has somehow changed in 2017. Right-liberals would be another cross-pressed group, but they constitute a minority within the Austrian political space (1.5%). The percentages “in between” the four quadrants include citizens whose issue attitudes are zero and thus indifferent on one or both dimensions.

2013. The very same analysis has been repeated utilizing the OPS 2013 dataset: This survey includes a very similar, mostly identical battery of questions regarding issue positions than the MMP 2017. The 19 items (five-point Likert scale) were analyzed with the CFA approach again. Contrary to the 2017 dataset, the explanatory and the confirmatory factor analysis have lead to the same conclusions anyway. After several iterations, the SEM model left thirteen items that have been combined to a socio-economic and a socio-cultural dimension (see Table 3.4), since the analysis clearly indicated the meaningfulness of two distinct issue dimensions. Interestingly, the same item as above – “Politics should keep out of economy” – displayed a standard coefficient of only 0.05 and a statistical significance of 0.08, which is not sufficient under normal circumstances. It was nevertheless decided to keep this item as part of the socio-economic dimension to enhance its comparability with the other datasets.

Unfortunately, this choice induced a loss of reliability on the socio-economic axis (Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.30 instead of 0.50). The socio-cultural dimension, on the contrary, is very robust (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.92) and includes a larger number of items. In general, the model displays a very high overall R-squared (0.97). The correlation between the two axes is -0.19, which fulfills the assumption of orthogonality. During the whole process, the number of re-




Figure 3.1: Citizens' Issue Positions (MMP 2017)

spondents diminished from 3,084 in total to 2,426, since missing answers had to be excluded from the analysis.

Table 3.4 shows that the socio-economic dimension is not related to immigration issues that strong as it is the case in 2017. On the contrary, the socio-cultural axis displays a heavy focus on muslims, which is likely a result of the general issue salience at this time (in particular the refugee situation in 2015 and the terrorism acts in Western Europe).

In Figure 3.2, the percentages of respondents per quadrant are displayed: The majority (44.7%) are left-authoritarians located in the upper left area, which is a remarkable and considerable shift compared to 2017. The median voter can also be found in this quadrant. The second largest group (15.2%) is on the socio-economic left as well, combined with socio-cultural liberal positions. Right-authoritarians – the largest group of 2017 – are only the third largest group in 2013 (12.8%), leaving right-liberals as the smallest segment of respondents (8.2%). Compared to 2017, citizens in 2013 seemed to be more cross-pressured, but at the same time also more indifferent regarding their issue positions (with almost a fifth being placed in the middle on one or both axes).

Table 3.4: Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Result for 2013

Latent Variable	Item	Cronbach's Alpha
Socio-Economic Dimension	Politics should keep out of economy	0.30
	Balance difference between large and small incomes	
	Fight unemployment	
Socio-Cultural Dimension	Feeling like a stranger due to the many muslims	0.92
	European and muslim lifestyles are compatible	
	Muslims should assimilate	
	Muslims got more than they deserve	
	Muslims are responsible for racial tension	
	Feel uncomfortable if children married a muslim	
	Crack down harder on criminals	
	Young people should pay more attention to traditions and values	
	Immigration enriches the Austrian cultural life	
	Immigration to Austria must be stopped	

2008. The PPES 2009 dataset included 26 items in total, which were put into the CFA approach similar as above. Before this analysis, the items had to be recoded from a 11-point to a 5-point scale to ensure comparability with the 2013 and 2017 datasets ⁶. The final model based on the confirmatory factor analysis left twelve items, dividing equally on the socio-economic and the socio-cultural dimension. Two of these items did not pass the standard coefficient threshold of 0.4 narrowly: ‘It is more important to fight unemployment than to fight inflation’ (standard coefficient = 0.39) and ‘Foreign labour is good for Austria’s economy’ (0.40). They have nevertheless been kept in the model because of its very high explanatory power (R-squared = 0.96) and the fact that Cronbach’s Alpha would not change significantly (socio-economic dimension: 0.61; socio-cultural dimension: 0.81).

As in 2013, the explanatory and the confirmatory factor analysis lead to similar results. Moreover, the two dimensions fulfill the assumption of orthogonality (correlation = -0.14) as well. The number of respondents decreased from 1,165 to 942 due to the computation process.

The socio-economic dimension in 2008 can be interpreted in the context of the financial crisis and the concerns related to it – state regulation, unemployment, welfare state. Interestingly,

⁶Two categories of the original scale were transformed to one new category. The only exception is the middle one (3), which combines three original categories

Table 3.5: Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Result for 2008

Latent Variable	Item	Cronbach's Alpha
Socio-Economic Dimension	A market economy can only function with strong state regulations in place Maintaining current level of social policies It is more important to fight unemployment than to fight inflation Greater effort should be made to even out income inequality Maintaining current level of medical care The financial crisis shows that a market economy does not work	0.61
Socio-Cultural Dimension	Immigrants should be obliged to adapt/assimilate to Austrian culture Criminal offenders should be punished more severely Foreign labour is good for Austria's economy Immigration to Austria should be significantly curbed Austrians should be given preference when jobs are few The state should be tougher toward asylum seekers	0.81




Figure 3.2: Citizens' Issue Positions (OPS 2013)

the socio-cultural axis again displays mainly issues regarding immigration and asylum, as it is also the case in 2017. Other issues like environmental protection, human rights or nationalization did not relate to the second axis in any of the surveys in use.

Figure 3.3 provides an overview of the voters' issue positions in 2008. The vast majority of all respondents (77.7 %) can be placed in the upper-left quadrant, which is an even stronger result than it is in 2013. As a result, the median voter is also placed in the left-authoritarian area of the political space. The second largest group (9.4 %) is also on the socio-economic left side, combined with liberal positions on the socio-cultural axis. Right-authoritarians (5.4 %) and right-liberals (1.5 %) are only a minority in 2008. At the same time, there are almost no respondents with no clear political position – this is a remarkable result for itself as well.

To sum up the voters' issue positions as they have been calculated in this section, they have moved from a rather left to a more right position on the socio-economic scale generally speaking. On the contrary, authoritarian opinions regarding socio-cultural issues have been dominating from 2008 throughout 2017. The next section focuses on the parties' issue positions in greater detail, which is the final step before the calculation of issue congruence.




Figure 3.3: Citizens' Issue Positions (PES 2008)

3.2.2 Supply Side: Parties' Issue Positions

Party Manifestos

There exist various approaches for calculating parties' issue positions based on manifesto data (see for instance Helbling and Tresch 2011; Klingemann et al. 2006; McDonald and Mendes 2001). For the purpose of this thesis, the distance measure as put forward by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Klingemann et al. 2006, p. 5) produces the most useful results:

“The scale is made by adding percentage references to categories grouped as Left and Right, [...] and subtracting the sum of the left percentages from the sum of the right percentages. This gives a score for each party-in-an-election, based on its official programme, indicating where it was in Left-Right terms.”

Extending the CMP-Method, the same calculations were also applied to the GAL and TAN categories, so that the political space is determined by the same two dimensions as for the demand side.

2017. The MAN 2017 dataset includes 541 distinct issues that had been assigned to 24,935 standardized sentences in total. 96 of these issues were coded by hand as socio-economic left issues (includes 4,011 standardized sentences), and 69 were defined as socio-economic right issues (including 3,164 standardized sentences). In the same manner, 19 issues were coded as indicators for the "GAL"-side of the socio-cultural axis (423 standardized sentences) and 29 as "TAN" (982 standardized sentences). The decisive criterion for the coding decision was whether the issue matches with at least one item of the MMP 2017 factor analysis (see Table 3.3 above). This strategy follows the target that both parties and voters should be measured on the same dimensions that are constituted by almost the same combination of subjects.

For reasons of simplification, it was not checked whether the manifesto-issue fits one single survey item in Table 3.3, but the latter have been condensed into five broader categories (second column in Table 3.6): Economy, Equality, "Ecoimmigrant" (Immigrant issues referring to economy), Crime and Immigrant. If an issue matched one of these topics, it was then decided whether it fits the Left, Right, GAL or TAN ideology (see fourth column in Table 3.6 for examples). If the direction was unclear, the issue was coded as belonging to one of the issue categories, but without further specification. Every issue that had been coded (Left, Right, GAL, TAN *and* neutral) was part of the subsequent analysis; all other parts of the party manifestos were considered as irrelevant for this paper. A full list with all coded issues can be found in Appendix A.1.

2013. In the MAN 2013 dataset, 550 distinct issues were used to code 20,881 standardized sentences in total. 95 distinct issues (with 3,876 standardized sentences) were defined as socio-economic left issues, 74 issues (including 1,935 standardized sentences) were labelled as socio-economic right. On the second axis, 20 distinct issues (including 663 standardized sentences) were coded as "GAL", 33 distinct issues with 538 standardized sentences as the "TAN"-side of the socio-cultural dimension.

As for 2017, the issues were coded according to the result of the OPS 2013 factor analysis in Table 3.4. Moreover, the issues have been grouped to four issue categories (Economy, Equality, Crime and Immigrant), whose composition of distinct issues is slightly different than 2017. These differences exist because of the changing issue salience over the years. The issue category "Ecoimmigrant" was not salient in 2013 and therefore excluded for this year. Besides this variation, the coding procedure remained exactly the same as above. The full list with all coded issues has been attached in Appendix A.2.

2008. For 2008, the information base is somewhat smaller than in the years afterwards: The MAN 2008 dataset includes 464 distinct issues with 6,629 standardized sentences in

Table 3.6: Issue Categories 2017

Dimension	Issue Category	Ideology	Description
Socio-Economic Dimension	Economy	Left	Rights for employees, protectionism, more taxes
		Right	Economic growth, privatization, liberalization, deregulation
	Equality	Left	Extension of the welfare state, social equality
		Right	Social insurance fees, self-responsibility, misuse of the welfare system
	Ecoimmigrant	Left	Access to job market for immigrants, economic migrants
		Right	Temporary work permits, priority of domestic employees
Socio-Cultural Dimension	Crime	GAL	Rehabilitation of criminals, drug liberalization
		TAN	Competence of police and intelligence service, video surveillance
	Immigrant	GAL	Multiculturalism, rights for immigrants, integration
		TAN	Controlled migration, human traffickers, parallel society

Table 3.7: Issue Categories 2013

Dimension	Issue Category	Ideology	Description
Socio-Economic Dimension	Economy	Left	Rights for employees, protectionism redistribution of assets
		Right	Economic growth, privatization, liberalization, deregulation
	Equality	Left	Extension of the welfare state, social equality
		Right	Social insurance fees, self-responsibility, misuse of the welfare system
Socio-Cultural Dimension	Crime	GAL	Rehabilitation of criminals, drug liberalization
		TAN	Competence of police and intelligence service, video surveillance
	Immigrant	GAL	Multiculturalism, rights for immigrants, integration (supportive)
		TAN	Controlled migration, parallel society, integration (compulsory)

total. 86 issues (and 1,313 standardized sentences) constitute the socio-economic left, 55 issues (including 695 standardized sentences) the socio-economic right side of the first axis. The socio-cultural axis consists of 17 left issues with 180 standardized sentences and 28 issues with 398 standardized sentences.

In the same manner as above, the issues were selected based on the voters' results (Table 3.5) and grouped to five categories: Economy, Equality, "Ecoimmigrant", Crime and Immigration. The overall structure of these categories remains the same as in 2017 (see Table 3.6 above), with one important distinction: "Ecoimmigrant" is not a socio-economic label as in 2017, but a socio-cultural one. The distinction between Immigrant and Ecoimmigrant is therefore expendable to some extent, but has nevertheless been kept for better comparability. In Appendix A.3, the detailed issue list with all diverging distinct issues can be looked up.

Calculating issue positions. After the coding process, the issue positions were computed by subtracting the sum of left percentages from the right percentages per party and the sum of TAN percentages from the GAL percentages, respectively. The percentages were calculated relative to all coded standardized sentences per party, including the "neutral" ones (without a direction). This process has been repeated for each issue category (second column in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7) separately as well as pooled for the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension.

This operationalization comes with the particular advantage that the measure is straightforward and intuitive. If, for instance, a party makes 50% of its statements about left issues and 20% about right items, then it receives a score of -30 ($20 - 50 = -30$) (Klingemann et al. 2006, pp. 6f.). The theoretical range of this measurement reaches from -100 to +100, whereas scores smaller than 0 indicate a left or GAL position, scores larger than 0 indicate a right or TAN position. In order to match with the voters' positions, the score was rescaled to a range from -2 to +2. An analysis based on percentages is moreover reasonable since party manifestos are carefully written and revised documents: "[E]ach part is checked in relation to the others and the balance of the whole finely calibrated" (Klingemann et al. 2006, p. 7).

The results of the calculations can be looked up in Appendix A.4 for all years. As robustness check, a second approach has been applied as well: McDonald and Mendes (2001) recommend a ratio measure if the research interest "is to locate the party along the left-right dimension as such" (McDonald and Mendes 2001, p. 97). They do not calculate the difference of left and right issues like the CMP approach, but instead "count the left and right statements of a party as a percentage of *all* left and right statements made by that party" (McDonald and

Mendes 2001, p. 97; emphasis TH). The baseline for this calculation is therefore slightly different, excluding the “neutral” issues. However, as can be seen in Appendix A.4, the results between both approaches only differ marginally for 2008, 2013 and 2017, which increases the reliability of the measurement.

Party Press Releases

2017. The OTS 2017 dataset was collected and coded independently from the MAN 2017 dataset and thus provides an additional source to extend the measurement of party positions. The issues have been coded similar as above, with the same categories as in the second column of Table 3.6 and the same issues as in Appendix A.1. In sum, 460 press releases with 748 titles and subtitles fitted into one of the five issue categories. 598 titles and subtitles (in 362 press releases) constituted the socio-economic dimension, whereas 150 titles and subtitles (in 98 press releases) were allocated to the socio-cultural dimension.

2013. In 2013, 755 press releases with 1,208 titles and subtitles were coded from the OTS 2013 dataset, based on the issue categories in Table 3.7 and the issue list in Appendix A.2. 1,007 of these titles and subtitles (in 627 press releases) were assigned to the socio-economic dimension, the remaining 201 titles and subtitles (in 128 press releases) formed the socio-cultural axis.

2008. The OTS 2013 dataset included 1,748 titles and subtitles (in 1,148 press releases) that could be coded according to the issue list in Appendix A.3, which is a very good number to compensate the rather thin data in the MAN 2008 dataset. The socio-economic consists of 1,439 coded titles and subtitles (in 948 press releases), the socio-cultural axis includes 309 titles and subtitles (in 200 press releases).

Calculating issue positions. The calculation of party positions follows the approach by Helbling and Tresch (2011, p. 177): The direction of the relationship between the coded actor (which is normally the party) and the issue was quantified by an issue predicate, ranging from -1 to +1. For example, one observation in the OTS 2017 dataset displays a supportive position (issue predicate = +1) in the relationship between the actor “SPÖ” and the issue “social equality”, which means that the Social Democratic Party is in favor of this issue. Another example would be the rejecting relationship (issue predicate = -1) between the actor “ÖVP” and the issue “budget deficit/national debts”.

The issue predicate is thus the main variable of interest: A party position is thus computed by averaging all issue predicates per party and issue or dimension. For this purpose, all issues that had previously been defined as Left or GAL were recoded so that all issue predicates run in the same direction, with higher scores always indicating a position on the Right or TAN side of the political spectrum. In case of the examples above, the issue “social equality” was recoded, the issue “budget deficit/national debts” not. “Neutral” issues without clear ideological connections are not relevant for this analysis. Finally, the scale was again rescaled to a range from -2 to +2 to match with the other measurements.

The results of this analyses have been added in Appendix A.5 for all years. Not surprisingly, the party placements differ to some extent compared to the manifesto datasets, but in most cases the parties nevertheless remain in the same quadrants. Only the results for 2008 display larger deviations: While the parties are generally more authoritarian on the socio-cultural axis in the MAN 2008 dataset, they are rather liberal on the same axis in the OTS 2008 dataset. Intuitively, the “real” party position is most probably somewhere in the middle. This is why the results from the manifesto and press release codings were combined in order to generate the final party placements.

Combining both Datasets

2017. The combination of the manifesto and the press release datasets is not only reasonable because of intuition, but also because of “hard facts” in previous research results: In their comparative of various measurement approaches, Helbling and Tresch (2011, p. 179) concluded that “there is no strong method effect”. In general, they found high and significant correlations between all methods compared (media data, expert surveys, mass data, manifesto data) and thus provided evidence for the validity of these instruments.

Moreover, the correlation coefficients between the MAN 2017 and the OTS 2017 datasets display a high correlation of 0.87 between the two socio-cultural dimensions and a moderate correlation of 0.54 for the socio-economic dimensions. This is enough to argue that the combination of both approaches is reasonable, but it nevertheless points at the already-mentioned difficulties with the structure and stability of voter’s issue preferences once again (Converse 1964; Dolezal et al. 2013).

The final party placements were computed by averaging the issue positions of both measurements and are shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. Starting with Figure 3.4, the allocation of parties within the political space can be described as balanced: There is at least one party in each quadrant, with three parties (SPÖ, FPÖ and ÖVP) in the proximity of the median voter (see Figure 3.1 above). The ÖVP is the rightmost party at the socio-economic dimension with a




Figure 3.4: Party Positions 2017

score of 0.39, the SPÖ on the leftmost displays a position of -0.79. In socio-economic terms, the political space is moderate and rather left-leaning. On the contrary, the range of the socio-cultural axis reaches from 0.94 (FPÖ) to -1.24 (NEOS), which is a full unit larger than on the socio-economic scale. Moreover, three of five parties (SPÖ, FPÖ and ÖVP) are situated on the “TAN”-side of the axis.

It is interesting and also surprising that the Social Democratic Party exhibits consistently higher scores on the socio-cultural axis than the Christian Democratic Party, independently of the measurement. This is mostly due to the party’s position on crime, not on immigrants (see Figure 3.5). Another noteworthy insight is the fact that although the FPÖ is the party that is closest to the TAN pole on the socio-cultural axis (which is in line with previous expectations), it is in sum the most centrist party regarding socio-economic issues. This finding is in line with previous research by Aichholzer et al. (2014), who showed that FPÖ support is most strongly related to new political conflicts such as immigration and the EU, while socio-economic issues are not decisive at the same time. Previously, the party has taken up liberal economic positions on the one hand and more interventionist or populist positions on the other – sometimes at the same time and in a very contradictory way (Aichholzer et al. 2014, p. 119). This is why the FPÖ’s socio-economic position is not very pronounced and therefore rather centrist.

The 2017 findings illustrate the usefulness of two-dimensional political space, since an unidimensional approach would have failed to measure these fine-grained details. The correlation between the two axes is very weak ($r = -0.09$), which underpins their orthogonality and distinctiveness.




Figure 3.5: Party Issue Positions 2017

In Figure 3.5, the party positions are displayed separated per issue. Here, the average positions per issue (calculated as means) are shown, *independently* of their salience. This is an important annotation, since the party positions in Figure 3.4 above were computed with the particular issue positions *and* their salience, measured either as absolute number of mentions or as percentages (see above).

The results in Figure 3.5 are as expected in large parts: The SPÖ exhibits moderate left positions, except the already mentioned position on crime. ÖVP and FPÖ are mainly placed on the right side, although the FPÖ holds left opinions in terms of the welfare state/equality issue, which results in the middle-left placement on the socio-economic dimension. The Greens display the most leftist positions regarding the equality and immigrant issues. However, the NEOS are also very clear about their “GAL” position on immigrants, but they combine this with a right position in economic terms.

The “ecoimmigrant” issue had to be omitted for three parties (SPÖ, Greens and NEOS)

because of a too small number of cases. This is remarkable, since immigrants and their impact on the Austrian economy were important issues in the 2017 electoral campaign and also highly salient for voters, as shown above. However, three out of five parties did not mention anything or not too much on these issues, which indicates that the substantive representation is not existent in this regard. On the other hand, the later governing parties ÖVP and FPÖ emphasized this topic, which could explain their electoral success to some extent (the ÖVP occupied a centrist position, which is why there is no bar visible in Figure 3.5).

In sum, voters in 2017 faced a party system in which all four quadrants are covered with at least one party. This not only suggests that parties were on search of their distinct gap during the electoral campaign, but it also indicates new, probably previous not existent possibilities for cross-pressured voters. To what extent this well-balanced supply side translated into political representation is part of the following Section 3.2.3.

2013. The socio-economic dimensions between the MAN 13 and the OTS 13 datasets display a correlation coefficient of 0.61; the socio-cultural dimensions correlate almost perfectly (correlation coefficient = 0.96). As in 2017, the average of these two dimensions constitutes the final party positions. The final socio-economic axis and the final socio-cultural axis do not correlate at all (correlation coefficient = -0.01) and therefore fulfill the assumption of orthogonality.

Figure 3.6 presents the party positions in the two-dimensional political space. As already in 2017, the distribution of parties can be described as balanced, with at least one party per quadrant. The range of positions on the socio-economic axis is 1.96, with the SPÖ (-1.09) the most left and the NEOS (0.87) as the rightmost party. The socio-cultural dimension is even more diverse: The issues are dispersed on a range of 2.61 units, whereas the Team Stronach (1.72) reaches the highest score on the authoritarian half of the axis and the NEOS (-0.89) display the lowest score on the liberal half. Both parties competed for the first time in the 2013 elections, which is why they probably have used these distinct positions on muslims and immigrants as part of their electoral strategies.

The other parties are located in between these corners: The most centrist party is the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), with a score of -0.13 on the socio-economic and a score of 0.04 on the socio-cultural axis. This means that the ÖVP was clearly the party closest to the median voter on both dimensions in 2013. Its later coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), is far more left in economic terms, but very close regarding socio-cultural issues (0.27). The Greens cover the left-liberal quadrant with a score of -0.75 on the socio-economic and -0.74 on the socio-cultural axis. Finally, the FPÖ is not surprisingly rather authoritarian on the




Figure 3.6: Party Positions 2013

socio-cultural axis (0.93). Contrary to 2017, the party exhibits a well-defined left position on socio-economic issues (-0.55). This is also a pattern that Aichholzer et al. (2014, pp. 119f.) argued as plausible for right-wing parties such as the FPÖ due to their populist positions that favor the welfare state, if only for native citizens.

Splitting the result into the four issue categories, Figure 3.7 reveals that the SPÖ's slightly authoritarian position on the socio-cultural axis is because of the pronounced crime issue, but not because of the immigrant category. In fact, the Social Democrats were way more liberal regarding immigrants in 2013 than in 2017. This is also true for the ÖVP, who displays the most liberal immigration position of all parties. On the other hand, Greens and NEOS turned more liberal between the two elections, which could be a reaction to the migration situation in 2015 and afterwards. However, the FPÖ (and also the Team Stronach) was already very restrictive regarding immigration and even got more in 2017 – the party positions drifted apart in the time perspective. Another noticeable insight of Figure 3.7 is the FPÖ's high left score on the equality issue, which underlines the parties' focus on the blue-collar voter segment and the welfare state. Moreover, the NEOS display an extreme liberal position regarding crime – this is partly expected, but for sure also a form of measurement shortcoming due to a small number of cases.




Figure 3.7: Party Issue Positions 2013

Probably the most remarkable insight from the 2013 party positions is that the often-cited shift to the right between 2013 and 2017 is empirically not that clearly visible as one might have expected: While the SPÖ, ÖVP and FPÖ all moved to the right at the socio-economic axis, there was hardly any change at the socio-cultural dimension. Rather, the result already indicates a good level of issue congruence between citizens and parties, since their allocation in the political space is very similar.

2008. In 2008, the manifesto and OTS codings have a correlation coefficient of 0.76 (socio-economic dimension) and 0.74 (socio-cultural dimension), which is sufficient enough to combine them to one scale by averaging their values per party. The final two dimensions are shown in Figure 3.8 and exhibit a moderate negative correlation (-0.51), which violates the orthogonality assumption. Nevertheless, it has been decided to continue with the dimensions as calculated and described above, since the factor analysis of voter's positions was very robust in 2008 (see Section 3.2.1) and a consistent approach clearly increases comparability over time.

The first striking recognition in Figure 3.8 is the fact that all parties are located in the middle-left area of the socio-economic axis: The range is only 0.45, whereas the BZÖ is the most left (-0.73) and the ÖVP the most right (-0.28) party, relatively speaking. Because of this, two




Figure 3.8: Party Positions 2008

of four quadrants are not covered at all, which is a completely different pattern compared to 2013 or 2017. The socio-cultural axis is a bit more diverse and covers a range of 1.6 units: The BZÖ is the most authoritarian (1.04), the Greens the most liberal (-0.56) party.

Interestingly, the BZÖ is the party closest to the median voter on both dimensions: As shown in Figure 3.3, more than three fourths of all respondents were left-authoritarians. Given this circumstance, it becomes clear that a rather one-sided supply side must not necessarily lead to weaker results in terms of issue congruence.

Taking the long-term perspective into account, it is interesting to see that the two “major” parties changed their political positions significantly between 2008 and 2013: The SPÖ turned from a left-liberal party to a left-authoritarian position, while the ÖVP moved from left-authoritarian to right-authoritarian. It is clearly visible that the two former governing partner got more distant over the years, particularly regarding their economic positions.

Figure 3.9 presents the parties’ issue positions in the five coded categories. The only party that is consistent on one side are the Greens (although the “ecoimmigrant” issue had to be omitted due of a too small number of cases), all other parties display left and right issues. The SPÖ’s most obvious difference between the 2008 and the 2017 issue positions is the immigrant issue, which got significant less liberal. The very same is true for the ÖVP concerning equality and




Figure 3.9: Party Issue Positions 2008

immigration. On the contrary, the FPÖ has always been anti-immigrant and sharpened this position especially regarding the “ecoimmigrant” category.

Taken together, the 2008 party positions are generally more left and liberal than they are in 2017, which is most likely because of the immigration issue. However, there are again several parties located in the same quadrant as the median voter – this raises optimistic presumptions regarding issue congruence.

Government Position

Besides the study of representation by political parties, it is also interesting to ask to what extent citizens are represented by the government itself (Blais and Bodet see e.g. 2006; Golder and Stramski see e.g. 2010; McDonald et al. see e.g. 2004; Warwick see e.g. 2010; see also the theoretical discussion in Section 2.1.2). Golder and Stramski (2010, p. 96) introduce a very straightforward approach to calculate the government’s position:

“The location of the government is calculated as the weighted average of the positions of the parties in the cabinet, in which the weights are the parties’ share of legislative seats controlled by the government.”

2017. In 2017, the ÖVP-FPÖ government held in sum 113 out of 183 legislative seats, whereas 55% (62 seats) were controlled by the ÖVP and 45% (51 seats) by the FPÖ.⁷ These weights were used to compute the average government positions on both dimensions as well as for all issues. Figure 3.10 displays the government position added to the already-known policy space. Naturally, the government's position is located in between the two governing parties, slightly closer to the ÖVP. This placement depicts the current ÖVP-FPÖ government as a middle-right one, with almost centrist views in socio-economic terms and a moderate (but clearly not extreme) orientation towards the traditional/authoritarian/nationalist side of the socio-cultural axis.





Figure 3.10: Government Positions 2017

Figure 3.11 shows the government's issue positions. The middle-right positioning is visible here as well, but with two notable exceptions: First, the government exhibits a moderate left ideology towards welfare state and equality issues. Second, the positioning on the immigrant issue is remarkably pronounced with a score of 1.44 and thus strongly loaded with negative migrant and integration views. This insight is not recognizable in Figure 3.10 with this clarity and is striking given the moderate positioning on the socio-cultural axis there. The government's rather centrist view on the crime issue explains this pattern, since the score in Figure 3.10 displays the average between the crime and the immigration issue (which is 0.79).

⁷Source: <https://wahl17.bmi.gv.at> (last accessed on 12.02.2019)



Note: Bars represent average positions based on OTS & MAN datasets; Government positions weighted by legislative seat share

Figure 3.11: Government Issue Positions 2017

2013. For 2013, the government position was calculated in the same way as in 2017. The SPÖ-ÖVP government held 99 out of 183 legislative seats – 53% (52 seats) were SPÖ mandates and 47% (also 47 seats) were ÖVP mandates.⁸ Compared to 2017, the government’s position is located in a different quadrant due to the completely different position on socio-economic issues: A score of -0.64 indicates a clear left position, while the 2017 government displays a center-right position. The governing parties are one half of the explanation for this, the other is the ÖVP’s changing position during the two points of time. Regarding the socio-cultural axis, the government is slightly more centrist than its successor, but nevertheless on the “TAN” side of the axis again.

The socio-cultural dimension is particularly interesting if one considers the issues as presented in Figure 3.13: While the coalition adopts a clear authoritarian position on crime (1.04), its liberal view on immigration is very pronounced on the other hand (-1.26). This strong contrast of 2.3 units within one dimension is unique in the whole analysis. Additionally, the change on the immigration issue between 2013 and 2017 amounts 2.7 units, which highlights the change of paradigm between the two elections in an impressive way. It is important to highlight that this massive shift is not visible if one would only consider the socio-cultural axis in its completeness.

⁸Source: <https://wahl13.bmi.gv.at> (last accessed on 20.10.2019)





Figure 3.12: Government Positions 2013



Note: Bars represent average positions based on OTS & MAN datasets; Government positions weighted by legislative seat share

Figure 3.13: Government Issue Positions 2013

The economy and equality issues changed in a rather foreseeable way between 2013 and 2017: The first one turned from a center-left to a center-right position, the second one got less pronounced, but also still on the left side. This is exactly what one would anticipate from a ÖVP-FPÖ coalition compared to a grand coalition.





Figure 3.14: Government Positions 2008

2008. In 2008, the calculation method, the government and even the weighting remained the same as in 2013: The government's majority consists of 108 out of 183 legislative seats, split on 57 SPÖ seats (53%) and 51 ÖVP mandates (47%).⁹ As a result, the government position in the two-dimensional space is almost constant as well (see Figure 3.14: The middle-left economic position (-0.49) is in the same area as in 2017, the socio-cultural axis got even more centrist because of the SPÖ's liberal position.

Finally, Figure 3.15 displays the parties' issue positions. As in 2013, the strong left position on welfare state topics is clearly visible. An interesting insight from this Figure is moreover that both dimensions are split up and thus cover the full range of all four quadrants. The immigration issue is liberal, but less extreme than in 2013.

Up to now, both sides – voters and parties as well as governments – have been placed and

⁹Source: <https://wahl08.bmi.gv.at> (last accessed on 20.10.2019)



Note: Bars represent average positions based on OTS & MAN datasets; Government positions weighted by legislative seat share

Figure 3.15: Government Issue Positions 2008

described in the same two-dimensional political space. This is the prerequisite for the next step, which is the calculation of issue congruence between citizens and political parties or governments. The subsequent Section first describes the method and then presents some first insights resulting from the matching process between citizens and parties. The final results of these calculations will be presented and interpreted in Chapter 4.

3.2.3 Measuring Issue Congruence

Congruence between citizens and representatives can be measured in various ways. In general, one can distinguish one-to-one, many-to-one and many-to-many relationships (Golder and Stramski 2010, pp. 92ff): One-to-one refers to a highly individualized relationship between one citizen and one representative, while many-to-one considers the citizenry as a whole (either at an individual or an aggregated level) in relation to one representative (e.g., the government). Finally, many-to-many focuses on the citizenry and all representatives within a system (either individuals, parties, or governments; see also Section 2.1.2 for the theoretical discussion on this).

Within many-to-one relationships, Golder and Stramski (2010, pp. 92ff) moreover distinguish three sub-types, namely (1) absolute median citizen congruence, (2) absolute citizen

congruence and (3) relative citizen congruence. The predominant approach in many studies on political representation is the one that Golder and Stramski call absolute median citizen congruence:

$$= |MC - G| \quad (3.1)$$

MC stands for the ideological position of the median citizen and G is the ideological position of the government (Golder and Stramski 2010, p. 96). This approach “minimizes the sum of absolute distances between all citizens” and the representative body of interest (Golder and Stramski 2010, p. 92). Such a measurement condenses a lot of information through aggregation, which is clearly helpful for a first and general view. Because of this, it was incorporated in this thesis as well, although slightly modified:

$$= |MC - P_j| \quad (3.2)$$

MC again stands for the location of the median citizen, but calculated for each dimension and issue separately. P_j refers to the position of the j^{th} party that was included in the analysis, whereas this variable changes for each year considered:

$P_j(2017) : P_j \in \{SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Greens, NEOS\}$

$P_j(2013) : P_j \in \{SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Greens, TeamStronach, NEOS\}$

$P_j(2008) : P_j \in \{SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Greens, BZÖ\}$

The formulae 3.1 and 3.2 give information on how far the government and each party is away from the median voter on each dimension and issue, respectively.

However, due to the fact that citizens' positions are aggregated to one median citizen position, a lot of information at the individual level – especially regarding the distribution of citizen preferences – gets lost. This is why Golder and Stramski (2010, p. 93) conceptualize many-to-one congruence in a second way, namely

“as the average absolute distance between all citizens and the representative.
[...] [T]his conceptualization takes account of the ideological positions of all
citizens rather than just that of the median citizen.”

This absolute citizen congruence is operationalized as follows (Golder and Stramski 2010, p. 96):

$$= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N |C_i - G| \quad (3.3)$$

N stands for the number of citizens and C_i is “the ideal point of the i^{th} citizen” (Golder and Stramski 2010, p. 96). This formula starts at the individual level and takes the distance between each citizen and – in this case – the government into account. By summing up these

distances while controlling for the number of observations at the same time, it is again possible to make inferences about the issue congruence within the system as a whole. This is why the absolute citizen congruence is the main and most important measurement applied in this thesis. Just as formula 3.2 above, it has been slightly adopted as well:

$$= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N |C_i - P_c| \quad (3.4)$$

P_c refers to the party that is *closest* to the i^{th} citizen. This means that P_c is a flexible parameter which changes according to the preferences of the individual citizen. As written in formula 3.5, P_c is computed by minimizing the absolute distance between citizen C_i and the j^{th} party.

$$P_c = \min |C_i - P_j| \quad (3.5)$$

For each citizen, there is *one* party closest to her on the socio-economic dimension and *one* party closest to her on the socio-cultural dimension. This can, but does not have to be the same party; cross-pressure between the two dimensions is allowed. However, in order to avoid too complex calculations, formula 3.5 was not computed for each issue separately. Instead, citizens that are closest to party X on the socio-economic dimension are assumed to be closest to party X regarding the economic, equality and ecoimmigrant issues as well. Similarly, citizens closest to party Y on the socio-cultural dimension are assumed to be closest to party Y regarding the crime and immigrant issues. This clearly produces some form of mistake, which nevertheless was accepted for the sake of clear and intuitive results in the end. Moreover, the calculation of party positions includes salience (at least for the manifesto codings) and the single issues do not – it is thus reasonable to match citizens and parties in consideration of their most relevant issues.

With this method, each citizen is matched twice with the party system, one time each per dimension. Table 3.8 gives an overview about all citizen-party dyads that are expressed with P_c for all years.

In 2017, the vast majority of all respondents (almost 82%) have different party preferences on the two dimensions. Only 18% display consistent preferences, whereas approximately two thirds within this group are closest to the FPÖ on both axes. This means that eight out of ten citizens probably have a hard time when it comes to their voting decision, since they are cross-pressured in the sense that their preferences fit to more than one party, depending on the issue dimension. Previous research has shown that these voters primarily decide according to the issues that are most important and salient to them (Lefkofridi et al. 2014). In case of left-authoritarian voters – as there are many in Austria as well –, Lefkofridi et al. (2014) show that economic concerns usually dominate in Western Europe countries.

As Table 3.8 shows, the most common combination (23% of all respondents) is being closest to the ÖVP on the socio-economic dimension and closest to the FPÖ in socio-cultural terms. The second largest group is the already mentioned segment of citizens closest to the FPÖ on both axes (11% of all respondents). Summing up all citizen-party dyads for ÖVP and FPÖ, 43% of all respondents are closest to either one party on both dimensions or to both parties on one axis each. This is also reflected in the 2017 electoral results and therefore not only confirms the research result by Lefkofridi et al. (2014), but also indicates a high issue congruence between the two governing parties and the citizens.

On the other hand, approximately 10% of the respondents are closest to the SPÖ on the socio-economic dimension and at the same time closest to the Greens regarding the socio-cultural axis. This is the third-largest group of citizen-party dyads. SPÖ-SPÖ, Greens-Greens and SPÖ-Greens combinations cover 16% of all dyads, which is much smaller compared to ÖVP and FPÖ. Finally, it is also very interesting that no single respondent was closest to the NEOS on both dimensions. The party therefore has cross-pressured citizens exclusively, whereas most of them feel closest to the NEOS in economic terms and closest to the FPÖ when it comes to the socio-cultural dimension (6.56%).

Turning to the column for 2013 in Table 3.8, 87% of all respondents are cross-pressured and therefore show different party preferences for socio-economic and socio-cultural issues. A half of the other respondents with equal preferences on both dimensions are in favor of the ÖVP (6.47% of all respondents in total). The largest group of cross pressured voters is rather surprising: 9.23% of all respondents prefer the SPÖ on the socio-economic dimension and the Team Stronach in terms of socio-cultural issues. The Team Stronach occupies a very pronounced authoritarian position (a score of 1.72 out of 2) regarding the second axis. Approximately two third of all respondents are located at the authoritarians side of the socio-cultural dimension as well. The Team Stronach therefore “catches” all respondents with a similar distinct position on these topics.

The second-largest dyad also includes the SPÖ on the socio-economic scale, but this time in combination with the FPÖ at the socio-cultural axis (7.42% of all respondents). This results from the same circumstance as before with the dyad SPÖ-Team Stronach, but with more moderate citizens on the authoritarian side of the socio-cultural axis. Finally, 8.99% of the respondents favor the ÖVP-FPÖ dyad, which has been by far the largest combination in 2017. Based on this finding, one might argue that there has already been a voter segment in 2013 who preferred the party combination that got into government power about four years later. Interestingly, there is no single respondent who favors the two parties the other way round, which means no citizen is closest to the FPÖ regarding socio-economic issues.

The results for 2008 are differ fundamentally from the previous two years: The three largest dyads all include the BZÖ, which lost its political impact in the following years. The by far largest group of respondents favor the BZÖ on both axes (38.00%). This is also the reason why only 43,62% of the respondents are cross-pressured and therefore somehow in conflict when it comes to their voting decision. The other two most common combinations are BZÖ-FPÖ (11.78%) and ÖVP-BZÖ (10.62%). Looking at the voter distribution in Figure 3.3 in Section 3.2.1 above enlightens this unusual and surprising pattern: The vast majority of citizens (77.7%) are left-authoritarians. At the same time, the BZÖ is the most left party in socio-economic terms (a score of -0.73) and the most authoritarian ones regarding socio-cultural issues (score: 1.04). Thus, all citizens further on the left or further on the authoritarian side are automatically allocated to the BZÖ, since there is no other party closer to them.

Table 3.8: Citizen-Party Dyads (P_c)

Citizen closest to...		2017		2013		2008	
Socio-Economic Dimension	Socio-Cultural Dimension	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SPÖ	SPÖ	63	2.09	50	2.06	4	0.42
ÖVP	ÖVP	68	2.25	157	6.47	26	2.76
FPÖ	FPÖ	341	11.30	0	0.00	23	2.44
Greens	Greens	78	2.58	39	1.61	0	0.00
NEOS	NEOS	0	0.00	37	1.53	-	-
Stronach	Stronach	-	-	34	1.40	-	-
BZÖ	BZÖ	-	-	-	-	358	38.00
SPÖ	ÖVP	193	6.39	63	2.60	7	0.74
SPÖ	FPÖ	89	2.95	180	7.42	14	1.49
SPÖ	Greens	302	10.01	46	1.90	10	1.06
SPÖ	NEOS	96	3.18	48	1.98	-	-
SPÖ	Stronach	-	-	224	9.23	-	-
SPÖ	BZÖ	-	-	-	-	47	4.99
ÖVP	SPÖ	87	2.88	120	4.95	21	2.23
ÖVP	FPÖ	685	22.70	218	8.99	41	4.35
ÖVP	Greens	11	0.36	109	4.49	23	2.44
ÖVP	NEOS	0	0.00	88	3.63	-	-
ÖVP	Stronach	-	-	144	5.94	-	-
ÖVP	BZÖ	-	-	-	-	100	10.62
FPÖ	SPÖ	144	4.77	0	0.00	4	0.42
FPÖ	ÖVP	215	7.12	0	0.00	6	0.64
FPÖ	Greens	61	2.02	0	0.00	6	0.64
FPÖ	NEOS	7	0.23	0	0.00	-	-
FPÖ	Stronach	-	-	0	0.00	-	-
FPÖ	BZÖ	-	-	-	-	44	4.67

Table 3.8: Citizen-Party Dyads (P_c)

Citizen closest to...		2017		2013		2008	
Socio-Economic Dimension	Socio-Cultural Dimension	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Greens	SPÖ	54	1.79	67	2.76	0	0.00
Greens	ÖVP	131	4.34	44	1.81	0	0.00
Greens	FPÖ	88	2.92	142	5.85	0	0.00
Greens	NEOS	2	0.07	47	1.94	-	-
Greens	Stronach	-	-	110	4.53	-	-
Greens	BZÖ	-	-	-	-	0	0.00
NEOS	SPÖ	47	1.56	31	1.28	-	-
NEOS	ÖVP	44	1.46	46	1.90	-	-
NEOS	FPÖ	198	6.56	75	3.09	-	-
NEOS	Greens	14	0.46	37	1.53	-	-
NEOS	Stronach	-	-	48	1.98	-	-
Stronach	SPÖ	-	-	38	1.57	-	-
Stronach	ÖVP	-	-	43	1.77	-	-
Stronach	FPÖ	-	-	69	2.84	-	-
Stronach	Greens	-	-	35	1.44	-	-
Stronach	NEOS	-	-	37	1.53	-	-
BZÖ	SPÖ	-	-	-	-	24	2.55
BZÖ	ÖVP	-	-	-	-	36	3.82
BZÖ	FPÖ	-	-	-	-	111	11.78
BZÖ	Greens	-	-	-	-	37	3.93
Total		3,018	100.00	2,426	100.00	942	100.00

Once P_c has been defined as presented in Table 3.8, the absolute citizen congruence is then operationalized as *the sum of absolute distances between each citizen and the party closest to her on the socio-economic and the socio-cultural dimension* (see formula 3.4 above). In other words, the closer the parties and citizens match on both dimensions, the smaller is the estimated absolute citizen congruence and the higher is the issue congruence between these two levels. The results of this calculations will be presented in the subsequent section 4.2. However, the following chapter starts with the more general concept of the absolute median citizen congruence, as defined in formula 3.2 above.

Chapter 4

Results

This chapter presents the results of the analyses on issue congruence as previously described. Section 4.1 discusses the absolute median citizen congruence as a first indicator. In a second step, Section 4.2 takes the absolute citizen congruence at the individual level into account, which enables a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of substantive representation in Austria. Moreover, Section 4.2 distinguishes the measurement by issues and by various socio-demographic groups. At the end of each Sub-Section, the related Hypotheses will be answered.

4.1 Absolute Median Citizen Congruence

2017. Figure 4.1 displays the absolute median citizen congruence for 2017, computed with formulae 3.1 and 3.2 (see page 63). The dots represent the absolute distance between each party and the median voter; x represents the distance between the government and the median voter. In 2017, the median voter is located at -0.25 on the socio-economic dimension and at +0.67 at the socio-cultural dimension, whereas the scale ranges from -2 to +2 on both axes. The smaller the absolute median citizen congruence, the better a party matches with the median citizen position.

It can be seen in Figure 4.1 that the FPÖ is located closest to the median citizen in socio-economic terms (absolute median citizen distance = 0.08). Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, the middle-right position of the chancellor's party – the ÖVP – is the most distant one regarding this dimension (0.64). However, the three parties that got in opposition after the 2017 elections are not much closer neither (SPÖ: 0.54, Greens: 0.34, NEOS: 0.58). With a score of 0.39, the government's position is located in the same area. However, this axis




Figure 4.1: Absolute Median Citizen Congruence 2017

should be interpreted in light of the methodological difficulties as described in Section 3.2.1 above: The dimension is not perfectly consistent and does not fulfill all theoretical assumptions, which leads to a rather thin data base.

Turning to the socio-cultural dimension, the picture is more diverse: While three parties are close or very close to the median citizen (SPÖ: 0.08, ÖVP: 0.27, FPÖ: 0.27), the remaining two – the Greens (1.56) and NEOS (1.90) – are situated completely off the point. According to this measure, green, alternative and liberal ideologies were not strongly demanded by the citizens in 2017. It is remarkable that although ÖVP and FPÖ are almost equally distant to the median citizen, their weighted average position (see page 57) – which is equal to the government's position – matches virtually perfect to it (0.02). This indicates that the coalition between these two parties corresponds exactly to the citizens' demand and results in almost perfect issue congruence between citizens and the government.

In sum, if one takes both dimensions together, the FPÖ – the new junior partner in the Austrian government – is the party that is closest to the median voter. On the socio-economic axis, the results for all parties are quite homogeneous and not too far away from the median citizen position, contrary to wide-spread results on the socio-cultural scale. Based on this first and superficial analysis, one could conclude that representation in Austria is mixed at the

parliamentary level, with the two smallest opposition parties diverging significantly from the median citizen location. Indeed, the connection between government and median voter is a very close one, therefore suggesting a very high level of issue representation. However, as the subsequent and more detailed results in the next chapter will demonstrate, these conclusions change if one digs deeper.




Figure 4.2: Absolute Median Citizen Congruence 2013

2013. The same calculations as in 2017 have been applied to the 2013 data as well and can be seen in Figure 4.2. In this year, the median citizen is located very similar as in 2017, with a score of -0.33 at the socio-economic and +0.60 at the socio-cultural dimension. The most striking insight of this analysis is that the FPÖ is the closest party on both dimensions, but shares its position with another party on each axis: On the socio-economic dimension, the ÖVP and the FPÖ are the two closest parties to the median citizen (absolute median citizen distance ÖVP= 0.20; FPÖ = 0.21). On the socio-cultural axis, the FPÖ is equally distant than the SPÖ (both 0.33). As it will be pointed out in Figure 4.5 in the subsequent Section, the result differs a lot if one considers the absolute citizen congruence based on the individual respondent, not on the median.

Since both government parties – ÖVP and SPÖ – are closest to the median citizen on one dimension, it is a logical consequence that the government’s position is rather close to the

median citizen on both scales as well (socio-economic dimension: 0.30, socio-cultural dimension: 0.44). Particularly in terms of the second axis, the government is more distant to the median voter compared to 2017. This is possible a result of its very liberal position regarding immigrants (a score of -1.26), which is only shared by a small segment of citizens (29.3% of all respondents are located at the liberal side of the socio-cultural axis).

The other three parties in Figure 4.2 are further away from the median citizen on one or both dimensions: The Greens diverge 1.34 units in terms of socio-cultural issues. Similarly, the Team Stronach (1.12) and the NEOS (1.49) are more than one unit away on the second axis. The NEOS are the only party located in the right-liberal quadrant in Figure 3.6, which is why they are economically very far away from the median citizen as well (1.20).

Taken together, the dispersion of the data points is 2013 larger than in 2017, in particularly regarding the socio-economic dimension. At least two parties are located rather close to the median citizen on each axis, but they are nevertheless more distant than in 2017 in all cases. The same is true for the government's position, especially on the socio-cultural axis.




Figure 4.3: Absolute Median Citizen Congruence 2008

2008. Figure 4.3 displays the results of the 2008 calculations. In this year, the median citizen is placed at -1.00 at the socio-economic dimension and at +1.17 at the socio-cultural axis.

More than three quarters of the respondents (77.7%) are located in the left-authoritarian quadrant of the political space. In light of the fact that the BZÖ is the party with the most pronounced positions (see Figure 3.8), it is not surprising that the party is closest to the median citizen as well (absolute median citizen congruence at the socio-economic axis = 0.27; socio-cultural axis = 0.13). The greens are almost as close as the BZÖ on the first dimension (0.28).

Contrary to the years afterwards, the two government parties are further away from the median citizen, with a score of 0.34 (SPÖ) and 0.72 (ÖVP) at the socio-economic and a score of 1.39 (SPÖ) and 0.89 (ÖVP) at the socio-cultural axis. As a result, the government's position is rather distant as well, with a difference of 0.51 units at the first and 1.16 units at the second axis. This gap is created by the SPÖ's pronounced liberal position on immigrants in particular (see Figure 3.9 above).

The FPÖ is also not as close to the median citizen as in the years afterwards, with a distance of 0.50 in socio-economic and of 0.48 in socio-cultural terms. However, the party occupies a rather authoritarian position regarding immigrants and crime comparable to its spin-off, the BZÖ (see also Figure 3.9). Thus, if one would leave out the BZÖ (which lost its political importance in the years after 2008), it is again the FPÖ that is closest to the median citizen.

To sum up, the two governing parties as well as the government's position are more distant to the median voter in 2008 compared to the subsequent years. Moreover, there is a large variance visible at the socio-cultural dimension, which indicates lower levels of issue congruence than at other points of time.

This Section has provided a first and rather general overview of issue congruence in Austria due to its focus on the median citizen. It has shown that there are parties located (very) close to the median citizen, which therefore indicates a high to very high issue congruence. The constant that connects all three years is the closeness of economic liberal and social authoritarian parties – in particular the FPÖ – to the median citizen. The following Section takes this analysis one decisive step forward, since it focuses on the congruence between parties and the *individual* citizens. With the knowledge presented in the next Section and its Sub-Sections, it will be possible to answer the hypotheses and ultimately the research question of this thesis.

4.2 Absolute Citizen Congruence

The concept of absolute citizen congruence starts at the individual level and sums up the absolute distance between each citizen and the government or the party closest to her, always relative to the number of respondents (see formulae 3.3 and 3.4 on page 63). According to this approach, “[c]ongruence is high when the average absolute distance between the citizens and the representative is small” (Golder and Stramski 2010, p. 93).




Figure 4.4: Absolute Citizen Congruence 2017

2017. Figure 4.4 displays the absolute citizen congruence in 2017 for parties and the government at the same time (the latter is marked with x).

This operationalization reveals a completely different pattern compared to the absolute *median* citizen congruence: In general, all parties are quite close to those citizens that have previously been assigned to them (see formula 3.5 on page 64). Although this might appear as a quite obvious result, it nevertheless confirms that the parties in parliament represent the Austrian citizenry to a satisfactory extent. For this analysis, it is of major interest whether an individual citizen is represented ideologically by *any* political party, *independently* of the fact whether she has voted for that party or not. The voting process is considered as a “black box” that is simply given in this context. The central question is rather whether the democratic process

of matching voters and representatives leads to a compilation of parties in parliament (and in government) that represents the *whole* citizenry, excluding the in-between “noise” of incorrect, strategic or non-voting (see Section 2.1.3 for further theoretical discussion).

The overall absolute citizen congruence (computed across all parties, marked with a small circle (o) in Figure 4.4) is 0.28 on the socio-economic and 0.35 on the socio-cultural dimension. This is the average absolute distance that each citizen is away from the party closest to her.

Contrary to the absolute median citizen congruence, NEOS are the party that is in sum closest to its supporters (0.08 on the socio-economic and 0.17 on the socio-cultural scale). The greens, which have also been very far away from the median citizen in socio-cultural terms, now also display a higher level of issue congruence to their partisans (0.14/0.31). The former governing and now oppositional party, the SPÖ, is more distant regarding economic issues, but is the closest party to its supporters in terms of the socio-cultural axis (0.35/0.08). Turning to the two governing parties ÖVP and FPÖ, their scores are almost mirror-inverted: While the ÖVP is the most distant party on the socio-economic scale, the FPÖ is quite close to “its” citizens. Vice versa, the FPÖ is far away on the socio-cultural dimension relatively speaking, whereas the ÖVP displays a higher level of issue congruence here (ÖVP: 0.49/0.30; FPÖ: 0.13/0.47). One possible reason for the rather large and unusual distance between the FPÖ and its supporters on the socio-cultural axis might be the electoral campaign, in which the party had to present itself as a potential government party.

The absolute citizen congruence towards the government (marked with x in Figure 4.4) was computed with all respondents in the dataset, independent of their closest party. This is a tough measure, since there are arguably diverging opinions on whom a government should actually represent – only its own voters or the citizenry in general? The measure applied here takes up the second perspective and shows that the government is more distant to the citizenry than the parties (0.69/0.73). This result is as expected given that the whole citizenry has been taken into account, but it nevertheless shows that each citizen is not even three quarters of a point (on a four-points scale) distant from the government.

In sum, the results presented in Figure 4.4 demonstrate the importance of examining representation one step beyond the widely used absolute median citizen congruence: If one would have stopped with the first analysis, the conclusions would have been very different compared to those in this chapter, where individual respondents were taken into account. All parties are closer than 0.5 units to their supporters on a four-point scale on both dimensions, which indicates a very high level of issue congruence for 2017. While the governing parties ÖVP and FPÖ are rather close to their supporters on at least one dimension, the overall government

position – measured independently from party supporters – is more distant to the individual compared to the median citizen.




Figure 4.5: Absolute Citizen Congruence 2013

2013. Figure 4.5 presents the absolute citizen congruence 2013, calculated identically as in 2017. The graph is very similar to 2017, although the data points are even more concentrated: The overall absolute citizen congruence across all parties (marked with “o”) is 0.18 on the socio-economic and 0.21 on the socio-cultural axis. Both scores are lower than in 2017, which indicates a higher level of issue congruence in general. Moreover, the maximum distance between parties and their supporters is 0.30 on the socio-economic and 0.35 on the socio-cultural dimension.

Getting more into detail of this minute range, it is the new Team Stronach that is closest to its endorsers on both dimensions: The party displays almost perfect issue congruence in socio-economic terms (0.03) and is not much further away regarding socio-cultural issues (0.17). Similarly, the Greens are very close to their supporters as well (0.08/0.18). This is a particularly interesting result, since both parties have been rather far away to the median citizen (see Figure 4.2 above). Each party for itself is therefore able to represent its “own” citizen segment at more peripher areas of the political space.

The NEOS have been most distant to the median citizen and are also far away from their partisans (0.25/0.34), relatively speaking. 2013 has been the first national election for the party, which makes it even more remarkable that they have turned from the most distant to most closest party to its supporters in 2017. The party's position got more centrist in socio-economic issues and simultaneously more liberal on the socio-cultural dimension, which can be interpreted as a move closer to its target group. During one electoral period, the party has been able to find its place in the political space and to meet its supporters' demands almost perfectly.

The fourth and last opposition party, the FPÖ, is a remarkable case as well: Although the party is closest to the median citizen in Figure 4.2, it is not visible in the current Figure 4.5. The reason for this circumstance is that there is no citizen-party dyad that includes the FPÖ as the closest party at the socio-economic dimension. This means that no respondent is closest to the FPÖ on the first dimension in 2013. The left side of the socio-economic axis is crowded with three other parties (SPÖ, the Greens and ÖVP) as well, which take away the potential FPÖ supporters. Regarding socio-cultural issues, however, the party has a score of 0.20.

Turning to the governing parties, the ÖVP is very close to its partisans on both dimensions (0.17/0.14), which is a higher level of issue congruence than in 2017. The SPÖ is more distant in economic terms (0.30), but very close to its supporters with respect to socio-cultural issues (0.12) – these are approximately the same results as in 2017. As a result, the issue congruence between the governing parties and its endorsers displays a very high level.

Finally, the overall distance between each respondent and the government's position (marked with x in Figure 4.5) is 0.61 on the socio-economic and 0.83 at the socio-cultural axis. This means that the issue congruence is slightly higher for the first dimension and slightly weaker for the second dimension than in 2017, but nevertheless again at a very high level.

2008. In 2008, the results are clearly different from the years afterwards: The overall absolute citizen congruence (the circle ("o") in Figure 4.6) is 0.43 on the socio-economic and 0.33 on the socio-cultural axis – the highest score of all three years under consideration.

Taking a look at the parties' distances to their supporters, several aspects are remarkable: First, the BZÖ has been closest to the median voter (see Figure 4.3 above) is here the party that is by far the most distant to its partisans – the distance is 0.59 units regarding socio-economic and 0.44 units regarding socio-cultural issues. This result seems to be contradictory in the first place, but moreover reveals a special feature of the measurement applied in this thesis. As pointed out earlier in Section 3.2.3, the majority of citizen-party dyads in 2008 included the BZÖ, since more than a quarter of all respondents are left-authoritarians and the BZÖ is the




Figure 4.6: Absolute Citizen Congruence 2008

party with the most pronounced left-authoritarian position. As a result, the party absorbed a very large segment of citizens, including a wide range of opinions. For instance, a respondent with a calculated position of 1.0 on the socio-cultural axis is closest to the BZÖ (socio-cultural position = 1.04), and so is a respondent with a score of 1.45, 1.73 or 2.0 as well. The party system in 2008 offers no party that would be closer to the last three example respondents, which explains their large distance to their nearest party.

Second, the same reason leads to the opposite effect for SPÖ (0.01/0.15), FPÖ (0.003/0.12) and ÖVP (0.31/0.08) – the three parties are very close to their party supporters, but they cover only a small segment of respondents on the other hand. Especially in socio-economic terms, SPÖ, FPÖ and ÖVP do not differ a lot and therefore compete for a rather similar group of citizens (see Figure 3.8). Although still on the left side of the socio-economic axis, the ÖVP is the rightmost party – all respondents that are located at the right side of the axis are automatically assigned as being closest to the ÖVP. Because of this, the ÖVP's score of 0.31 corresponds to the expected result (a higher distance).

Moreover, there is no respondent closest to the Greens on the socio-economic axis, because they all have been assigned to the BZÖ (BZÖ and Greens differ only 0.01 units on this dimension). Due to this reason, the Greens are not displayed in Figure 4.6. However, they are

very distant to their supporters when it comes to socio-cultural issues (0.44), since there is no party with a more liberal position in this year.

What becomes very clear here is that a rather concentrated (or centrist) party system leads to a higher distance between the citizens and their closest party, and therefore to less substantive representation. A special illustration for this phenomenon is the distance between the government and all respondents independently of their party preference (marked with x in Figure 4.6): The SPÖ-ÖVP coalition displays an overall distance of 0.62 to the respondents on the socio-economic axis, and is more than one unit (1.11) away when it comes to socio-cultural issues. This is in line with the two following years regarding the socio-economic dimension, but the socio-cultural position is by far the most distant of all years.


The subsequent two Sections briefly present the absolute citizen congruence separated per issue and per (socio-demographic) groups. With these results, it is finally possible to answer the hypothesis and the research question as formulated at the outset of this thesis.

4.2.1 Absolute Citizen Congruence per Issue

For each year, the absolute citizen congruence between citizens and parties as well as citizens and the government was calculated for each issue separately as an additional analysis. The most important and remarkable results are discussed in the following, in order to refine the already presented results and to enable a more comprehensive answer of the research question. As a general rule, the citizen-party congruence always refers to the congruence between parties and their party supporters, whereas the citizen-government includes all citizens independently of their party preference (same approach as above).

The details of the issue coding process were described in Section 3.2.2 above. For a correct interpretation of the following results, it is nevertheless important to highlight one aspect in particular: The coding applied the assumption that a respondent closest to party X on one dimension is also closest to party X on all issues that are part of this dimension. This produces some form of incorrectness in the results, because the information whether the respondent actually preferred party X on issue i or not gets lost. In “real”, it is also possible that the respondent is closest to party X regarding *socio-economic issue 1*, but closest to party Y regarding *socio-economic issue 2*. It is exactly this form of inconsistency that was accepted for theoretical reasons outlined earlier. In case of the results presented in this Section, however, this “mistake” becomes more visible: In most cases, the absolute citizen – party congruence per issue is higher than per dimension for exactly this reason.


Absolute Citizen - Party Congruence per Issue (2017)



Data used: MMP 2017, OTS 2017, MAN 2017

Figure 4.7: Absolute Citizen - Party Congruence per Issue (2017)

Absolute Citizen - Government Congruence 2017



Data used: MMP 2017, OTS 2017, MAN 2017

Figure 4.8: Absolute Citizen - Government Congruence per Issue (2017)

2017. Starting with the 2017 citizen-party congruence as displayed in Figure 4.7, several insights are noteworthy. First, the “ecoimmigrant” issue is at an outstanding high level regarding the FPÖ: On average, a respondent that is closest to the FPÖ on the socio-economic scale is 1.59 points distant to her most preferred party with respect to this issue. This rather high distance indicates a low level of issue congruence between the party and the citizens closest to it. The FPÖ is also quite distant regarding crime issues (1.23), but keep in mind that these results have been calculated in relation to a different population (respondents closest to the FPÖ on the *socio-cultural dimension*). Interestingly, the FPÖ displays a high issue congruence on immigrant issues without an economic connotation (0.37).

On the contrary, the ÖVP is very distant regarding the immigrant issue (1.29). It is also quite far away from its supporters regarding crime (0.82), economy (0.86) and ecoimmigrant (0.81). The largest amount of issue congruence exists regarding equality and welfare state issues (0.57). One reason for this rather high distance probably was the circumstance that the ÖVP was looking for new voters (especially from the FPÖ in socio-cultural terms) in the 2017 campaign and therefore slightly moved away from its own supporters.


The three parties in opposition tend to produce higher levels of issue congruence regarding socio-economic issues and perform poorer regarding crime and immigration. The only exception is the high congruence between NEOS and its supporters regarding immigration (0.22), which is the lowest average distance of all parties and issues. All in all, the patterns mirror the results found above in Figure 4.4, with more congruence regarding socio-economic issues and larger distances when it comes to socio-cultural concerns.

Figure 4.8 displays the average absolute distance between the government’s position (which is a combination of the two governing parties, ÖVP and FPÖ) and *all* respondents in 2017. The distances have increased compared to the Figure 4.4 above as well and now range between 0.59 (equality) and 1.19 (crime).

2013. In 2013, most distances are smaller than in 2017, which indicates a higher issue congruence, generally speaking. In detail, all parties are closer to their supporters in economic concerns and differ not more than a half unit compared to 2017. On the other hand, some of them are more distant regarding equality and the welfare state (SPÖ, ÖVP, NEOS). Especially the NEOS are rather far away from their supporters in 2013 (1.15 units). The new party in 2013, the Team Stronach, is again remarkably close to its supporters, as already pointed out in Figure 4.5 above.

Regarding the socio-cultural dimension, it is noteworthy that the two governing parties SPÖ and ÖVP could improve their issue congruence at least partially, while the new coalition


Absolute Citizen - Party Congruence per Issue (2013)



Data used: OPS 2013, OTS 2013, MAN 2013

Figure 4.9: Absolute Citizen - Party Congruence per Issue (2013)

Absolute Citizen - Government Congruence 2013



Data used: OPS 2013, OTS 2013, MAN 2013

Figure 4.10: Absolute Citizen - Government Congruence per Issue (2013)

party in 2017, the FPÖ, got more distant when it comes to crime and immigration. This indicates that although the overall citizen-government congruence slightly increased between 2013 and 2017 on the socio-cultural axis, the FPÖ actually moved into the opposite direction and decreased issue congruence. This detail is an interesting insight, especially if one keeps the result in mind that the 2017 government has been closest to the median citizen of all three years when it comes to socio-cultural issues (see Figure 4.1).


Taking Figure 4.10 into account, it is clearly visible that the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition was very far away from all respondents regarding immigration issues (1.75 units). Compared to the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition four years later, this is a difference of 0.8 units. On the other hand, the 2013 government displayed a higher congruence regarding the crime issue (1.19 in 2017 versus 0.79 in 2013). As a result, the improved representation on the socio-cultural dimension in 2017 is largely triggered by the immigration issue.

Finally, the comparison of the two issues that generate the socio-economic dimension reveals that the issue congruence decreased between 2013 and 2017 in terms of the economic issue (0.65 in 2013 versus 0.96 in 2017). Equality and welfare state concerns behave exactly the other way round, with an improvement of 0.38 units between the two time points (0.97 in 2013 versus 0.59 in 2017).

2008. In 2008, the distances on the socio-economic dimension are comparable or slightly lower than in 2013 (Figure 4.11). This is particularly remarkable, given the circumstance that the overall absolute citizen congruence decreased between 2008 and 2013 (0.43 in 2008 versus 0.18 in 2013). In other words, if one considers the issues economy and equality separately, 2008 is the year with the (slightly) higher issue congruence, but if the overall dimensions are taken into account, 2013 is the year with better substantive representation. However, a comparison is only possible for the two governing parties SPÖ and ÖVP, since there is no data available neither for the FPÖ nor the BZÖ in 2013 for both years and dimensions. Regarding the BZÖ, it is interesting that the party is the most distant to its supporters on the whole dimension (0.44 units, see Figure 4.6 above), but its congruence on the economic and equality issue itself is comparable to all other parties.

The second column in Figure 4.11 shows mixed results: Regarding crime, SPÖ and ÖVP are most distant in 2008 compared to the two other time points. In terms of immigration, however, the ÖVP continuously got more distant to its supporters (0.63 in 2008 versus 1.29 in 2017), while its coalition partner SPÖ got closer (1.24 in 2008 versus 0.97 in 2017). The FPÖ managed to keep its distance at almost the same level between 2008 and 2017. The BZÖ displays one noteworthy outlier: The party is 2.98 units distant to its supporters on the

Absolute Citizen - Party Congruence per Issue (2008)



Data used: PES 2008, OTS 2008, MAN 2008

Figure 4.11: Absolute Citizen - Party Congruence per Issue (2008)

Absolute Citizen - Government Congruence 2008




Figure 4.12: Absolute Citizen - Government Congruence per Issue (2008)

“ecoimmigrant” issue, which indicates that the party represents a different opinion than most of the party’s supporters would actually be in favor of.

Finally, Figure 4.12 displays the absolute congruence between citizens and the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition. While the congruence on the socio-economic dimension stayed almost exactly the same between 2008 and 2013, the government got more distant from all respondents regarding equality and welfare state concerns (0.48 in 2008 versus 0.97 in 2013). The socio-cultural axis shows a consistent pattern: The representation increased from 2008 to 2013 on the overall dimension as well as with respect to the crime and immigration issues belonging to it. The immigration issue for itself is particularly telling insofar that the government’s and the citizens’ opinions constantly got closer over the years: Starting with a distance of 2.00 units in 2008, it reduced to 1.75 in 2013 and finally melted to 0.95 units under the new ÖVP-FPÖ government in 2017.

Answering the First Set of Hypotheses

The results presented so far – absolute median citizen congruence, overall absolute citizen congruence and absolute citizen congruence per issue – provide a solid base to answer the first set of Hypotheses as formulated in Section 2.3 above.

Hypothesis 1.1. Starting the discussion with Hypothesis 1.1, the assumption originally was that issue congruence increases (i.e. substantive representation improves) if new parties enter the political system. A party is “new” if it came into parliament for the first or second time between 2008 and 2017. Three parties fulfill this criterion: the BZÖ (in: 2006, out: 2013), the Team Stronach (in: 2013, out: 2017) and the NEOS (in: 2013, still in parliament). The 2008 national election was the second time that the BZÖ got into the National Council. In this year, the party was closest to the median citizen on both dimensions. However, if one considers the distance between the BZÖ and its individual supporters (= absolute citizen congruence), the data shows that the party is the most distant of all parties one on both dimensions and also regarding three out of five issues (economy, ecoimmigrant, crime). Despite the fact that the party was very close to the median citizen, this had no big impact on the representation of individuals: In fact, 2008 was the year with the highest absolute distance between parties and their supporters, compared to 2013 and 2017.

In 2013, two new parties made their way into parliament: First, the Team Stronach was closer to its supporters on three out of four issues (economy, equality, crime) than the other parties in this year. The party is also most closest to its endorsers on the two dimensions. This is an impressive result, since the party was completely new in the Austrian political system and only

managed to keep in parliament for one legislative period. The second new party, the NEOS, show a different picture: The party is rather distant to its supporters on both dimensions and also on two issues (equality, crime). Nevertheless, 2013 was the year with the lowest overall absolute citizen congruence on both axes, which means that the parties were closer to their supporters than in 2008 and 2017 on average. The two new parties covered new areas and quadrants of the political space and therefore most likely contributed to this result.

In 2017, the NEOS improved their position and turned to the party that is closest to its supporters on the socio-economic and on the socio-cultural dimension. Additionally, it is the party that has the highest issue congruence regarding the immigration issue. It is remarkable that all new parties managed to be closest to the median citizen (BZÖ) or to their supporters (Team Stronach, NEOS) at their second or even at their first election. This is a strong signal that new parties are voter-centered and sensitive regarding their supporter's demands. Hypothesis 1.1 can therefore be accepted preliminary.

Hypothesis 1.2. The second presumption was that issue congruence increases if the parties in government change. During the investigation period of this thesis, one governmental change occurred: The 2008 and 2013 election resulted in a great coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP, while the 2017 election brought a new coalition between ÖVP and FPÖ.

Table 4.1: Citizen – Government Congruence Over Time

Measurement	Dimension/Issue	2017	2013	2008
Absolute Median Citizen Congruence	Socio-Economic Dimension	0.39	0.30	0.51
	Socio-Cultural Dimension	0.02	0.44	1.16
Absolute Citizen Congruence	Socio-Economic Dimension	0.69	0.61	0.62
	Socio-Cultural Dimension	0.73	0.83	1.11
	Economy	0.96	0.65	0.62
	Equality	0.59	0.97	0.48
	Crime	1.19	0.79	0.84
	Immigrant	0.95	1.75	2.00

Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the various measurements over time in a condensed way. This information has been already presented in different graphs above and is therefore not new per se. Taking a look at the first measurement method, the absolute median citizen congruence, it is discernible that the government got slightly more distant from the median voter regarding socio-economic issues (0.39 in 2017 vs. 0.30 in 2013). However, there is almost perfect congruence on the socio-cultural axis (0.02 units distance), which clearly shows

that the ÖVP-FPÖ government improved substantive representation in this respect. The pattern stays the same if one considers the absolute citizen congruence, which is the distance between the government position and each individual citizen. The issues offer an explanation for the results on the overall dimensions: The distances regarding the economy and equality issue switched between 2013 and 2017 – as a result, there is only a slight adjustment visible on the socio-economic axis. Regarding crime, the government got more distant in 2017. The most striking result in Table 4.1 is the last row: The FPÖ-ÖVP government is 0.8 units closer to all citizens on the immigration issue compared to 2013.

With respect to the socio-cultural dimension and to the immigration issue in particular, Hypothesis 2.1 can be accepted. This result shows that the highly salient immigration and refugee theme during this time is mirrored in the new government's position and therefore increased the substantive representation of all citizens in a considerable way. In other words, the supply side of the political process was responsive enough to adapt itself according to citizens' opinions. From a normative-democratic perspective, this is a desirable and positive result.

Hypothesis 3.1. Another assumption formulated in Section 2.3 was that issue congruence is higher on the socio-economic dimension compared to the socio-cultural one. For all three years taken into consideration, parties are on average closer to the median citizen on the socio-economic axis than on the socio-cultural axis: Taking 2017 as an example, the five parties are on average 0.44 units distant from the median citizen on the first and 0.82 units distant on the second axis.

Regarding the overall absolute citizen congruence, the distance between parties and their supporters is smaller on the socio-economic axis in 2017 and in 2013 as well, but not in 2008. In 2017, supporters are on average 0.28 units away from their preferred party on the first dimension and 0.35 units away on the second dimension. For the other two years, the distances are 0.18 versus 0.21 (2013) and 0.43 versus 0.33 (2008).

The government is also less distant to the median citizen and to all citizens on the socio-economic axis compared to the socio-cultural axis, besides one already discussed exception (socio-cultural dimension in 2017). Since these exceptions are a minority in the analyzed data, Hypothesis 3.1 can be accepted preliminary here.

4.2.2 Absolute Citizen Congruence within (Socio-Demographic) Groups

Up to now, the results referred to *all* respondents, independently of their socio-demographic characteristics. This section takes a closer look at the results among specific groups in society, specifically on differences regarding gender, income, occupation, educational background and age. Before doing this, it is crucial to examine whether the named groups differ in their opinions to a significant extent at all – if not, an analysis of group differences would be pointless (Lefkofridi et al. 2012, p. 7f.).

Do socio-demographic groups differ significantly regarding their issue positions?

The significance of group differences was computed applying an one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), whereas the decisive (= dependent) variable was the citizen's positioning on the socio-economic and the socio-cultural dimension. As a starting point, six necessary assumptions have been checked and tested: (1) dependent variable is continuous, (2) independent variable consists of categorical groups, (3) independence of observations, (4) no significant outliers, (5) normal distribution (calculated by the Shapiro-Wilk W test), and (6) homogeneity of variances (calculated using Levene's test). The decisive criterion is whether the groups differ significantly in their means (at the 0.05-level) – if this is the case, one can conclude that the socio-demographic groups differ significantly regarding their issue positions.

The results show in 2017 that all five socio-demographic groups violate the assumption of a normal distribution, unfortunately. However, all other assumptions are met (except Levene's test for gender on the socio-cultural axis failed), which is why the results can be interpreted accepting these limitations. The ANOVA clearly shows differing means within four groups (all except of gender) in all or almost all categories of socio-demographic characteristics.

In 2013, the Shapiro-Wilk W test as well as Levene's test fail for several groups, which is why only two groups (education and age) are found as significant differences. A different mean within the four income groups is only significant on the socio-economic axis. Gender and occupation cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way.

The 2008 data is even less significant when it comes to the two tests of normal distribution and homogeneity of variances. Only age groups differ significantly; education and income display significant distinctions on the socio-cultural axis exclusively. Neither gender nor occupation fulfill the assumptions or show significant results.¹

¹The results of the ANOVA have been presented very briefly here due to limited space; the complete docu-

With these insights, the following Section presents the absolute citizen congruence between parties and their supporters, separated by socio-demographic characteristics. The figures show the overall absolute citizen congruence per year and group, but they do not distinguish per party – this detailed analysis can be found in Appendix A.6 for all years and groups. In case there is any interesting and noteworthy result there, the subsequent Section refers to these figures and explains the results verbally. As in all analyses above as well, a higher score represents a larger distance between parties and party supporters, which in turn means less issue congruence and substantive representation.

Absolute Citizen Congruence and Socio-Demographics




Figure 4.13: Absolute Citizen Congruence and Gender

Gender. Figure 4.13 displays the overall (= mean) absolute citizen congruence between citizens and the parties closest to them by gender and year. Given the fact that the ANOVA was not significant for any dataset, it is not surprising that the graph does not show considerable differences either. The very same is true if one considers the distinction between parties (see Appendix A.6): Men and women do not differ significantly when it comes to the issue congruence between citizens and their most supported party. In other words, gender has no

mentation of the analysis is of course available on request in the Author's documentation.

explanatory power for any form of unequal representation in Austria. This insight is exactly what has been expected in Hypothesis 2.1 (see Section 2.3), which means that this assumption can be confirmed for 2017, 2013 and 2008.




Figure 4.14: Absolute Citizen Congruence and Household Income

Household Income. The second socio-demographic characteristic taken into consideration is household income: Figure 4.14 presents the overall absolute citizen congruence of four groups, constituted by their net household income per month. The four groups differ significantly in 2017 and also partially in the years before (2013: socio-economic axis, 2008: socio-cultural axis).

In 2017, citizens with a higher net household income (2.100 € and more) tend to be slightly better represented than lower income groups. However, the difference from the highest to the lowest income group is a very small one (0.05 units on the socio-economic and 0.02 units on the socio-cultural dimension). This tendency is in accordance with the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 2.2. If one considers the data separated by party, the result gets further support: The SPÖ produces higher issue congruence for higher income groups in economic terms (0.43 in the lowest vs. 0.34 in the highest group). A similar pattern is recognizable for the ÖVP (0.54 in the lowest vs. 0.49 in the highest groups), whereas the second highest income group is even better represented (0.46). Regarding the socio-cultural scale, the FPÖ is

particularly distant from low-income groups (0.53 in the lowest vs. 0.47 in the highest group). On the other hand, ÖVP, Greens and NEOS are closer to their lower-income supporters than to their higher-income supporters on the socio-cultural axis.

The 2013 socio-economic axis displays significant group differences, whereas the lowest income group is represented weaker than the others (0.06 units distance between the lowest and the highest income group). This is in particular driven by the SPÖ's distance from low-income households (absolute issue congruence = 0.35), since all other parties remain basically constant throughout all groups. It is rather surprising that a socio-democratic party is more distant to low-income than to high-income citizens, but this is what can be derived from the 2013 and 2017 data. Nevertheless, 2013 is the year with the highest issue congruence in all groups, which becomes clearly visible in Figure 4.14.

The 2008 data can only be interpreted for the socio-cultural axis in a meaningful way, since the differences on the socio-economic axis have not been significant. This result is by itself already noteworthy, since it indicates that there are no measurable representational differences among income groups regarding economic issues. In other words, income does not induce differences in substantive representation in 2008. Taking the socio-cultural axis into account, the pattern in 2008 is different compared to 2013 and 2017: Citizens with a middle-high net household income (2.100 € – 3.000 €) are on average 0.37 units distant from their closest party on the socio-cultural dimension. Citizens in the lowest and the highest income group are both 0.31 units away and thus represented equally. It is remarkable that in this year, the SPÖ is only 0.11 units away from its supporters within the lowest income group – in absolute terms, this is more than 0.2 units closer than in the years afterwards.

To sum up, the 2013 and 2017 data shows a tendency that confirms Hypothesis 2.2, which stated that a citizens with a higher income display a higher issue congruence than citizens with lower incomes. However, these tendencies are rather weak and there are als contradictory patterns: Taking the 2017 governing parties as an example, the ÖVP's issue congruence on the socio-cultural axis runs in the opposite direction, and so does the SPÖ in 2013 as well. Hypothesis 2.2. therefore cannot be verified in a satisfactory way, which in turn means that it cannot be confirmed in this study.

Occupation. Hypothesis 2.3 stated that white-collar workers (i.e. employees and civil servants) and self-employed are better represented than other occupational groups. This assumption can be answered by comparing these groups with blue-collar workers. It is not very meaningful to use farmers as another comparative group, since there has been a too small number of observations in the data.




Figure 4.15: Absolute Citizen Congruence and Occupation

Starting with 2017, the ANOVA showed that blue-collar workers and employees are the only two groups that differ significantly regarding their absolute distance between themselves and their favorite party. On the socio-economic dimension as shown in Figure 4.15, blue-collar workers display an absolute distance of 0.33 units, while employees are 0.06 units closer (absolute citizen congruence = 0.27). If one takes the parties into account (see Appendix A.6), it is clearly visible that the ÖVP comes with a similar, even more pronounced result: On average, employees are 0.1 unit closer to their preferred party than blue-collar workers (0.44 vs. 0.54). The socio-cultural dimension displays the same pattern, but even weaker (only 0.04 units difference between blue-collar workers and employees). Here, the ÖVP presents blue-collar workers better than employees, although to a very small extent of 0.04 units. Based on these results, one can speak of patterns that indicate a better representation of white-collar workers than blue-collar workers, but only to a rather weak extent.

In 2013, blue-collar workers and employees differ significantly on both dimensions as well. However, the differences are even smaller on both dimensions. The only exception on the socio-economic dimension is the SPÖ with an absolute citizen congruence of 0.25 for employees and civil servants, compared to 0.33 for blue-collar workers. This is in line with Hypothesis 2.3, but one more time counterintuitive for a social democratic party. On the socio-cultural axis, self-employed and civil servants differ significantly and display a distance of 0.08 units

among each other. It is astounding that the ÖVP is more distant to self-employed citizens (0.26 units) than to civil servants (0.22 units). However, the group of self-employed is very diverse and includes all sorts of professions – it has therefore limited explanatory power with respect to Hypothesis 2.3.

Just as it has already been the case above when household income was discussed, there is no significant difference between occupational groups in 2008 on the socio-economic dimension. If one considers the absolute citizen congruence per party, one pattern is apparent though: The ÖVP is very distant from self-employed (0.51), employees (0.35) and civil servants (0.31), but rather close to blue-collar workers (0.18). In addition, there are some significant patterns on the socio-cultural scale: Civil servants and employees are both significantly better represented than blue-collar workers (although the difference between the groups is again a very small one, with 0.03 and 0.05 units).

Taken together, the second socio-demographic group that is related to economic issues (besides household income) does not display an unambiguous pattern either. There are several indicators that Hypothesis 2.3 might be correct and significant, but the differences found are extremely small (but more or less similar over all years, however). As a consequence, Hypothesis 2.3 cannot be answered in a conclusive way.




Figure 4.16: Absolute Citizen Congruence and Education

Educational Background. Another very interesting socio-demographic group is education, since it is well-known that citizens with a higher formal education have a higher level of descriptive representation than less educated citizens (see Section 2.1.3 for further discussion). Figure 4.16 provides an answer whether this pattern holds true for substantive representation as well. This assumption has been formulated in Hypothesis 2.4 above.

The 2017 ANOVA displayed significant differences between almost all groups on both dimensions, except the two lowest (compulsory school vs. vocational training) and the two highest (academic low and academic high) groups. Regarding socio-economic issues, citizens with a low academic degree are on average 0.06 units closer to their favorite party than citizens who visited compulsory school or completed a vocational training. The patterns are rather constant among all parties as well, with one exception: The ÖVP is closest to citizens with a low academic degree (absolute citizen congruence = 0.38 units) and most distant to citizens with a vocational training (0.51). Turning to the socio-cultural axis, it can be seen that citizens with vocational training display the weakest issue congruence, while party supporters with a low academic degree are represented the best – the two groups differ to an extent of 0.1 units. On this dimension, it is the second governing party – the FPÖ – that is rather close to citizens who finished a low university degree (0.37 units distance) and rather distant to citizens with vocational trainings (0.50 units). At least for this one year, the two governing parties display a clear and significant pattern as it has been expected in Hypothesis 2.4.

In 2013, one of the few groups that differ significantly on the first dimension is the most closest (diploma; 0.15 units) to the most distant (compulsory school; 0.22 units) educational group. Citizens with an academic degree are slightly less represented again, which means that the best absolute issue congruence is located in the middle category. At the party level, the SPÖ displays a good amount of variance: Citizens who finished compulsory school (or have even less formal education) are 0.35 units distant to their closest party, while holders of a lower academic degrees are much more closer (0.21 units distance). Nevertheless, graduates within the highest educational groups have a distance of 0.33 units again, which is comparable to the lowest group. The socio-cultural dimension in Figure 4.16 shows the exact opposite trend as initially expected. Due to the very small steps from group to group, though, two neighbored categories do not differ significantly (compulsory school vs. vocational training and diploma vs. academic low). It is again the SPÖ who mirrors the overall trend at the party level: The party is closest to the lowest educational category (0.15 units) and most distant to the highest (0.22 units) on the second axis. All in all, the 2013 data is not as straightforward as 2017 with regard to Hypothesis 2.4.

Finally, the 2008 ANOVA left almost no groups that can be distinguished at a significant level on the socio-economic axis: Only compulsory school (0.35) versus diploma (0.26) is

interpretable in a meaningful way. As already in 2013, the middle educational group is closest to its respective parties. Contrary to the other years, the ÖVP displays unequivocal results: Compulsory school leavers are on average 0.24 units away from their most preferred party, while academics are 0.47 (academic low) or 0.44 (academic high) units away. The socio-cultural dimension shows the same pattern as the first axis. Here, compulsory school and diploma differs 0.09 units. At the party level, the two governing parties remain more or less constant among all groups, while the differences are mainly driven by the parties in opposition, in particular Greens and BZÖ.

With respect to Hypothesis 2.4, the results in Figure 4.16 and in Appendix A.6 indicate that citizens with a diploma (i.e. high school leavers) are the best represented educational group in terms of issue congruence on both dimensions. The pattern slightly changes in 2017, where holders of a lower academic degree are the best represented group. One possible explanation for this might be the increasing number of university graduates and the overall growing importance of education in society, which likely leads party to a reorientation towards this continually growing group. Hypothesis 2.4 can therefore be accepted in 2017, but not in 2013 and 2008.




Figure 4.17: Absolute Citizen Congruence and Age

Age. The final socio-demographic group taken into consideration in the course of the present thesis is age. As stated in Hypothesis 2.5, the general expectation is that younger citizens are better represented substantively than older ones (which is counterintuitive in the first place and also contradicts descriptive representation; see Section 2.1.3 for the full discussion).

Starting again with 2017, almost all groups differ significantly on both dimensions (except the second and third group on the socio-economic axis). While the differences are minimal with respect to socio-economic issues, the pattern is slightly more clear on the right side of the Graph: Citizens younger than 30 years are on average 0.31 units away from their most preferred party, while citizens older than 50 years are 0.36 units distant averagely. At the party level, the results are particularly interesting in this case: The two governing parties correspond to the a-priori expectations on one dimension each (ÖVP for socio-economic and FPÖ for socio-cultural issues). However, the ÖVP displays the exact opposite pattern on the socio-cultural axis and is slightly closer to older than to younger citizens. It is remarkable that despite the unintuitive nature of Hypothesis 2.5, the data nevertheless show several patterns that are in accordance with this assumption in 2017.

Turning to 2013, the youngest age group again differs significantly from the two other groups on the socio-economic axis, although the differences are minimal at the overall and at the party level. On the socio-cultural scale, all groups differ significantly from each other, but the distances differ also at a very small level. However, it is worthwhile to notice one result at the party level: The ÖVP is on average 0.25 units distant from its supporters younger than 30 years, while it is closer to the two older groups (0.20 for 30- to 50-year-olds and 0.21 for 50 years and older). In this year, the socio-economic axis therefore displays a weak result that is in line with Hypothesis 2.5, while at the same time the socio-cultural axis shows a result that contradicts this assumption.

The 2008 data clearly shows that citizens with an age of 50 years and older are significantly less represented than the younger age groups on the socio-economic axis. The distance between the youngest and oldest group is 0.09 units and therefore larger than in most other results presented already in this Section. At the party level, it is interesting that the ÖVP is most distant to the middle group (30 – 49 years; 0.34 units) and closest to the youngest age group (0.27). Regarding the socio-cultural scale, only the youngest and oldest age group differs significantly. Here, the pattern contradicts Hypothesis 2.5 at the overall level as well as for the opposition parties FPÖ, Greens and BZÖ.

In sum, there are constant but weak signs that Hypothesis 2.5 can be accepted for the socio-economic dimension over all years and for the socio-cultural scale in 2017. In the time perspective, the age differences evened out between 2008 and 2017 regarding socio-economic

issues and even turned around with respect to socio-cultural aspects. However, the SPÖ and the ÖVP – two traditional parties with an older target group, generally speaking – contradict Hypothesis 2.5 in several cases and therefore stick to their original clientele.

Absolute Citizen Congruence and Left-Authoritarians

This section aims to present the absolute citizen congruence from a different point of view, namely distinguished between left-authoritarians and all other respondents. The theoretical background has been discussed in Section 2.2.2 above and was formulated in Hypothesis 3.2 (Section 2.3). Generally speaking, the assumption has been that left-authoritarians are less represented substantively, compared to other citizen's segments.




Figure 4.18: Absolute Citizen Congruence and Left-Authoritarians

The empirical analysis started again with an ANOVA, which clearly showed that left-authoritarians differ significantly from all other groups in all years.² Thus, the results in Figure 4.18 can be interpreted entirely.

The 2017 results speak an unmistakable language: Left-authoritarians are on average 0.14 units away from their closest party on the socio-economic axis, while all others are 0.32 units

²As already mentioned in the previous Section, the documentation of the ANOVA is not presented here in full detail. The author is nevertheless very happy to share the details if requested.

distant averagely. The same pattern exists on the socio-cultural dimension (0.20 units distance for left-authoritarians versus 0.39 for others). Taking the citizens' and parties' positions into account, it has been shown earlier that 24 percent of all citizens and two out of five parties (SPÖ and FPÖ) are located in the left-authoritarian quadrant of the political space. The three remaining parties in parliament are located in one of the other three quadrants each. As a result, left-authoritarians have two reasonable choices, which is twice as much as in other quadrants. The large distance between all other citizens and their closest parties is heavily driven by the upper-right (i.e. right-authoritarian) quadrant, since all economic right orientated citizens have the ÖVP as their closest party (the ÖVP has a score of 0.39 at the socio-economic axis).

In 2013, left-authoritarians are slightly better represented regarding socio-cultural issues, but further away from their most preferred party with respect to economic topics. This pattern can be explained if one remembers the 2013 party positions: The Team Stronach offered an opportunity for more extreme or radical authoritarian citizens, but there was no such an alternative on the left side of the socio-economic axis (here, the SPÖ was the most leftist party). The second part of the explanation is the citizens' distribution: In 2013, 44 percent of all citizens were left-authoritarians, and not all of them were as economically moderate as the parties in the system.

The 2008 data displays slightly better represented left-authoritarians on the socio-economic axis and almost equal represented citizens on the socio-cultural scale. Given the fact that 78 percent of all citizens were left-authoritarians in 2008, it is interesting that the difference between left-authoritarians and non-left-authoritarians is not a bigger one. Three of five parties were placed in the left-authoritarian quadrant as well, but they were nonetheless quite distant to their supporters, since the citizens' distribution has a strong bias towards more pronounced left-authoritarian positions in 2008.

Taken together, Figure 4.18 contradicts Hypothesis 3.2 in the majority of cases: Left-authoritarian citizens were the largest group in 2008 and 2013 and the second-largest group in 2017. Simultaneously, three (2008, 2013) and two (2017) parties were located in this quadrant as well – this clustering makes the good representation of left-authoritarians reasonable. Besides one exception (that is the 2013 socio-economic scale), all results indicate that left-authoritarians are actually and significantly better represented than other groups of the citizenry. Hypothesis 3.2 therefore can be falsified.

Multivariate Analysis

As one additional and final analysis, a multivariate regression analysis has been computed for all years. The analysis included all (socio-demographic) groups as discussed in this Section. These groups constituted the set of independent variables and were treated as categorical variables in the model. Based on the formulation of Hypotheses 2.1 – 2.5 and 3.2, it has been assumed that there are linear relationships all the way through. In other words, the presumption was that the dependent variable, overall issue congruence (not separated by party), in- or decreases equally from one group to the next. The analysis was conducted using the `regress-comand` in Stata 16. This section discusses the results verbally; the full models can be seen in Appendix A.7.

Generally speaking, very few results turned out to be statistically significant, which might be because of the rather small group differences of less than 0.1 units in many cases or a too limited number of observations (this is especially relevant for 2008). Besides these restrictions, a few results can be reported anyway: In the 2017 model, left-authoritarians are 0.19 (socio-economic dimension) and 0.18 (socio-cultural dimension) units closer to their preferred party than other groups, keeping all other variables constant. This result is significant at the 0.05-level and therefore confirms the results in Figure 4.18 as well. Another noteworthy result is that higher income groups display a significant higher absolute citizen congruence compared to the lowest income group, keeping everything else constant: Citizens with a net household income between 1.050 and 2.100 € are 0.12 units, those between 2.100 and 3.000 € are 0.14 units and those with a net household income higher than 3.000 € are 0.13 units closer than citizens in the lowest income group. This pattern has been identified in Figure 4.14 as well, but it is more pronounced in this analysis.

Turning to the 2013 model, left-authoritarians are significantly, but only marginally distinguishable (0.04 units less represented than others on the socio-economic axis and 0.02 units better represented on the socio-cultural axis). However, the result is in line with what has already been reported in Figure 4.18 above. Another significant, but also very small difference can be found with respect to income groups (higher income groups are slightly better represented than lower ones on the socio-economic axis). This is in accordance to Hypothesis 2.2. Finally, 2008 produced no significant result, most probably due to a too small number of cases.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The major objective of this thesis was to examine patterns of unequal representation in Austria in a comprehensive and over-time perspective. The driving force behind this research topic was the normative principle that democratic systems should be responsive to their citizens and represent their opinions in an equal way (Lefkofridi et al. 2012; Powell 2004; Verba 2003). In accordance to this notion, the research question asked how substantive representation in Austria is structured alongside the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension and how this pattern can possibly be explained.

The thesis started with the discussion whether the democratic and the representational principle are even compatible in a feasible way: Who should represent whom and how? Many political theorists and scientists attempted to answer this highly complex question; one of the most prominent models in this context is Hannah Pitkin's (1967) typology of representation. In her diction, *substantive representation* – i.e. representing citizens' opinions – is unavoidable for all democratic systems. Taking this as the starting point, Pitkin's model was extended by various authors (e.g. the four modes of representation by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005) or Jane Mansbridge's (2003) famous four types of representation).

One important theoretical point of this thesis is to consider all citizens of a nation as basic population when studying representation, not only voters. Plain vote-seat ratios – as they have been used quite frequently in previous research – not only leave behind citizens' preferences, but are also not able to explain well-researched voting behaviour such as strategic, incorrect or non-voting. In short, these approaches assume that the voting decision equals political preferences. The thesis made a clear point against this argument and instead argues to include all citizens and their preferences in the study, since preferences and voting decisions are not always interchangeable.

The theoretical concept of substantive representation was operationalized within a two-dimensional political space. A factor analysis showed that the differentiation between a socio-economic (left/right) and a socio-cultural (GAL/TAN) axis is meaningful in most cases, which is why the concept was applied for the purpose of this thesis. Based on mass surveys and content analyses provided by AUTNES, citizen, party and government positions were calculated within the same political space for three elections (2008, 2013, 2017).

This was the point of departure for the measurement of substantive representation, operationalized as issue congruence. Following Golder and Stramski (2010), the congruence between parties and the median citizen (= absolute median citizen congruence) was calculated as a first step (similarly, the distance between the government and the median citizen was computed as well). However, the main part was the measurement of issue congruence on the individual level: Issue congruence was calculated as the absolute distance between each citizen and the party closest to her on the socio-economic and the socio-cultural dimension. The *absolute citizen congruence*, which is the sum of these individual distances per party, constituted the major measurement instrument for this thesis. This operationalization has been specified further by distinguishing absolute citizen congruence by various issues (economy, equality, “ecoimmigrant”, crime and immigration) and socio-demographic groups.

Table 5.1 provides an overview of the nine Hypotheses that were examined previously and also shows whether they have been preliminary accepted or rejected.

The first set of Hypotheses (H 1.1, H 1.2) dealt with the over-time perspective. The most important insight in this context was that new parties tend to increase substantive representation, since they manage to meet their supporters’ demands very well. Similarly, a government change results in a higher level of substantive representation as well: In particular, the ÖVP-FPÖ government in 2017 was significantly closer to the citizens regarding socio-cultural and immigration issues than the grand coalition before. These two results show that a vivid political system is an effective (and necessary) tool to keep representatives and represented in a close relationship. As a consequence, a strong electoral competition and volatile voters fulfill an important task in order to keep the democratic system alive and healthy. Moreover, Hypothesis 1.2 indicates that the political system is responsive enough to react according to citizens’ demands – this has been identified as one essential characteristic for a representative democracy in the theory section.

Another interpretation of these results is that representation is not always related to voting results: The two parties BZÖ and Team Stronach demonstrate that the discrepancy between electoral success and issue congruence can be quite profound. While both parties were moderately successful at elections (BZÖ: 10,7 % of all votes in 2008; Team Stronach: 5,73 % in

Table 5.1: Overview of Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Answer
H 1.1: Issue congruence increases if new parties enter the political system and make it more volatile	accepted
H 1.2: Issue congruence increases if the governing parties change	accepted
H 2.1: The issue congruence between men and women does not differ significantly	accepted
H 2.2: Citizens with higher incomes display higher issue congruence than citizens with lower incomes	accepted only in 2017
H 2.3: White-collar workers and self-employed citizens display higher issue congruence than blue-collar workers	rejected (not conclusive)
H 2.4: Citizens with a higher formal education status display higher issue congruence than citizens with a lower one	accepted only in 2017
H 2.5: Younger citizens display higher issue congruence than older citizens	rejected (too weak results)
H 3.1: Issue congruence is higher on the socio-economic dimension compared to the socio-cultural dimension	accepted
H 3.2: Citizens holding left-authoritarian preferences are weaker represented than citizens in other quadrants of the political space	rejected

2013), they were closest to the median citizen (BZÖ in 2008) or closest to their party supporters (Team Stronach in 2013), compared to their political competitors.

The second set of Hypotheses (H 2.1 – H 2.5) analyzed the impact of various socio-demographic groups on issue congruence. Previous research showed that not all citizens are represented equally by the political system. In fact, there are various (systematic) representation inequalities visible in many studies – this was the theoretical starting point for the formulation of these Hypotheses. Gender, age and occupation showed no or not significant enough results, which means that these socio-demographic groups did not differ in their issue congruence on a measurable level. They can therefore be assumed to be equally represented by the parties and the government in Austria. Based on previous research results, this was expectable for gender, but not for occupational and age groups.

A more interesting distinction was the net household income: In accordance to previous expectations, higher income groups were slightly better represented in 2017 on both dimensions, whereas this is particularly the case for SPÖ and ÖVP on the socio-economic and for the FPÖ on the socio-cultural scale. The differences from the highest to the lowest income group were rather small, but nevertheless significant. In 2013, the pattern was mainly driven by the SPÖ, since the party was particularly distant from its low-income supporters. All other parties remained more or less constant, however. The 2008 data displays no measurable unequal representation of income groups regarding economic issues. Thus, contrary to other studies in which income has been among the strongest predictors of unequal representation, this pattern could not be reproduced in the thesis at hand in two out of three cases.

As a result, the two economy-related indicators – net household income and occupational group – do not display large differences for the most part and are therefore no suitable variables to explain unequal representation in Austria. This is particularly noteworthy, since economic issues are usually highly salient in electoral competitions and in the political process in general. The result of this study rather indicates that supply and demand fit together very well in this context. A possible reason for this might be that socio-economic issues are less polarized than socio-cultural ones among citizens and parties for all years (see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2): The differences between citizens and parties therefore cannot be as large as on the socio-cultural axis due to this limited range of positions. Moreover, another argument could be that socio-cultural issues (in particular immigration) became more salient over the past decade and therefore induced more polarization and unequal representation.

Taking issue salience into account would be an interesting and important extension of the results presented here: From a theoretical point of view, it is a decisive difference whether there is unequal representation *and* citizens care about it or not (because other issues are more im-

portant to them). In the second case, one would argue that a lack of issue congruence has not as wide-ranging democratic implications as in the first case. Empirically, it would probably be very rewarding to continue the research design developed here with the current 2019 data in Austria: While the dominating issues in the past have been economy and immigration (especially in 2017), the public awareness shifted to climate change and environmental protection, particularly among younger citizens. Thus, analyzing whether parties and the new government are responsive enough to deal with this quick shift in issue salience, would be a very good indicator for the quality of democratic representation in Austria.

Turning back to the research results here, educational background was the final socio-demographic group analyzed in the context of this thesis: It has been shown that holders of a lower academic degree are represented best in 2017 on both dimensions, while citizens who finished a vocational training are most distant on the socio-cultural axis. For 2013 and 2008, the inter-group differences are rather not significant or not big enough to be interpreted in a meaningful way.

The final set of Hypothesis (H 3.1 and H 3.2) dealt with two specialities in order to explain the patterns of substantive representation furthermore: The first assumption was that issue congruence is higher on the socio-economic dimension compared to the socio-cultural one. This can clearly be confirmed for all cases taken into account. Again, the arguments of a less polarized socio-economic axis and an increasing issue salience on the socio-cultural axis are most probably valid points in this context as well. Finally, contrary to previous expectations and research results, left-authoritarian citizens are unambiguously better represented than citizens in other quadrants of the political space. The study has shown that these “cross-pressured” citizens and voters find themselves not necessarily in an inner conflict, since there are at least two political options available that combine exactly this issue structure.

With respect to the research question stated at the very outset of this thesis, one can answer that substantive representation in Austria is highly structured by (1) differences on the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension, (2) the individual location within the political space (in particular left-authoritarian citizens versus all other groups) and (3) to a weaker extent by the net household income and educational background. On the other hand, gender, occupation or age cannot explain representational differences in a meaningful way. The most important explanation for changing levels of representation has been the volatility of the political system: New parties and changing governments both tend to increase issue salience and substantive representation significantly.

What does this mean in the big picture of representational research? From a methodological point of view, the thesis has demonstrated the importance to “dig deeper” by taking the indi-

vidual citizen as main starting point. Issue congruence depends heavily on the perspective – it has happened several times that the results between the absolute median citizen congruence and the absolute (individual) citizen congruence led to completely different or even contradictory conclusions. Moreover, the higher granularity reveals remarkable patterns: For instance, the ÖVP represented blue-collar workers significantly better than self-employed in 2008, or the SPÖ displayed a particular high distance to low-income households regarding economic issues in 2013 and 2017. This is exactly the opposite as one would expect from two parties that historically claim to represent entrepreneurs (ÖVP) and the workforce (SPÖ). It would be a very interesting follow-up research question how these differences can be explained – do they exist because of electoral strategies? Or do voters vote against their own interests?

In addition, another important aspect that has only been discussed sparsely in this thesis is the question whether parties follow citizens or citizens follow parties in their political opinions. Existing research argues that mainstream parties tend to follow the mean voter, while niche parties follow their supporters (Ezrow 2010, p. 95). Based on this argument, one could examine whether mainstream and niche parties differ in their issue congruence depending on the measurement at the aggregate or individual level.

Finally, it has been theoretically argued that a high level of substantive representation – as it has been proved for Austria – is desirable for a democracy from a normative point of view. However, it would be rewarding to measure the concrete impacts of substantive representation on other variables such as the perceived legitimacy and responsiveness of political parties and the government, satisfaction, political participation, self-efficacy or trust (see also (Golder and Stramski 2010, p. 95)). Such a research design would link substantive representation with other “quality measures” of democratic systems and could therefore contribute to the overall improvement of democratic systems.

Chapter 6

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Chapter 7

Appendix

Appendix A.1: Full Issue List 2017

Socio-Economic Dimension

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: allgemein
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Jugendliche
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Frauen
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Ältere Arbeitnehmer
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Behinderte/chronisch Kranke
Economy	Left	Recht auf Arbeit
Economy	Left	Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Economy	Left	Soziale Marktwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Ökosoziale Marktwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Rolle des Staates in Wirtschaft (allgem.)
Economy	Left	staatliche Preiskontrolle (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Konjunkturprogramm/öffentliche Investitionen
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung von Banken (spezif.)
Economy	Left	soziales/fares/gerechtes Welthandelssystem
Economy	Left	Schutz nationaler Märkte/Protektionismus
Economy	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung von Banken (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Economy	Left	staatlicher Rettungsschirm/Bad Bank
Economy	Left	Besteuerung von Spekulationsgewinnen/Aktien
Economy	Left	Bankensteuer
Economy	Left	Finanzmarktaufsicht/Kontrolle der Finanzmärkte
Economy	Left	Strafsteuer bei hohen Unternehmensgewinnen (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Kontrolle von Unternehmen (Lohndumping etc.)
Economy	Left	Schutz von Arbeitnehmern (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Arbeitsrecht (striktes)/gegen flexible Arbeitswelt
Economy	Left	geringfügig/atypisch/teilzeit-Beschäftigte
		(Personengruppe)
Economy	Left	geringfügige/atypische/teilzeit
		Beschäftigung (Arbeitsverhältnis)
Economy	Left	Kündigungsschutz (starker)
Economy	Left	Kollektivvertrag/Tarifvertrag
Economy	Left	Mindestlöhne/Mindestlohn
Economy	Left	Abfertigungen
Economy	Left	Gewerkschaft

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Left	Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz
Economy	Left	Streik
Economy	Left	Gleichstellung Arbeiter-Angestellte
Economy	Left	Urlaub
Economy	Left	Gesunder Arbeitsplatz (Lärm/Chemikalien)
Economy	Left	Konkurrenzklauseln
Economy	Left	staatliche Preiskontrolle (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Konsumentenschutz (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Benzinpreiskontrolle/Öffnung amtlicher Tankstellen (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Kontrolle von Mietpreisen/Mieterschutz
Economy	Left	sozialer, gemeinnütziger Wohnungsbau/ Wohnbeihilfe
Economy	Left	Amnestie für private Schuldner/ Privatkonkurs/Privatinsolvenz
Economy	Left	Offenlegung von Agrarsubventionen
Economy	Left	ökologische Landwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Einsatz von Gentechnik in Landwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Kennzeichnungspflicht Gentechnik
Economy	Left	Agrartreibstoffe/Biodiesel/Agrosprit
Economy	Left	Pestizide/Bienensterben
Economy	Right	Wirtschaftswachstum
Economy	Right	außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht/ ausgeglichene Zahlungsbilanz
Economy	Right	Bekämpfung Inflation/Teuerung; Sicherung Kaufkraft/Preisstabilität
Economy	Right	Kapitalismus/Marktwirtschaft/ Unternehmer/Eigentum (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Schienenverkehr/Bahn
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Luftverkehr (inkl. AUA)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Telekommunikation/Post
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Wasserversorgung
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Energieversorgung
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung/Wettbewerb im Gesundheitssektor
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Ladenöffnungszeiten (generell)
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Ladenöffnungszeiten (nicht am Sonntag)
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Gewerbeordnung
Economy	Right	Wettbewerbskontrolle/Bekämpfung Kartelle, Monopole, Preisabsprachen
Economy	Right	Globalisierung/Abbau Zölle/Öffnung Weltmärkte
Economy	Right	Wettbewerbsfähigkeit/Standortqualität Österreichs
Economy	Right	Investitionen österreichischer Betriebe im Ausland
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung des internationalen Kapitalverkehrs
Economy	Right	Bekämpfung Weltwirtschaftskrise/Bankenkrise
Economy	Right	Hohe Gehälter/Sonderzahlungen/Bonus/Boni
Economy	Right	Spekulation/Finanzgeschäfte/Börse
Economy	Right	Basel II-Richtlinien
Economy	Right	Förderungen/Maßnahmen für Unternehmen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Förderungen/Maßnahmen für kleine und mittlere Unternehmungen (KMU)
Economy	Right	Förderungen einzelner Unternehmen bei Notfällen (bail out etc.)
Economy	Right	private Investitionen im Inland fördern/Risikokapital
Economy	Right	Förderung des Fremdenverkehrs
Economy	Right	Förderung Selbständigkeit/Selbstständigkeit/

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Right	Unternehmensgründungen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	neue Selbstständige/Selbständige (spezif.)
Economy	Right	hohe Gehälter/Abfindungen von Managern (Privatwirtschaft)
Economy	Right	Kurzarbeit
Economy	Right	Kombilohn/Kombilöhne
Economy	Right	Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit (generell)
Economy	Right	Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit (außer Sonntag)
Economy	Right	Mitarbeiterbeteiligung (Aktien)
Economy	Right	privater Wohnbau/Wohnbauförderung
Economy	Right	Agrarförderungen/Subventionen/Direktzahlungen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Förderung von kleinen/mittleren landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben
Economy	Right	Förderung von Bergbauern
Economy	Right	Agrarkonzerne/Großbauern
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung/Wettbewerb im Gesundheitssektor
Economy	Right	Mehrwertsteuer (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Mehrwertsteuer (spezifische Produkte)
Economy	Right	Lohnsteuer/Einkommensteuer
Economy	Right	Steuersenkung Spitzeneinkommen
Economy	Right	Flat-Tax
Economy	Right	Besteuerung Urlaubs-/Weihnachtsgeld
Economy	Right	Besteuerung Überstunden/Nacht-, Sonn-, Feiertagsarbeit
Economy	Right	Grundsteuer
Economy	Right	Kirchensteuer
Economy	Right	Reduktion Unternehmensteuern
Economy	Right	Steuerliche Entlastung KMU (Mittelstand)
Economy	Right	Gewerbesteuer
Economy	Right	Umsatzsteuer
Economy	Right	Einheitliche Unternehmensbesteuerung
Equality	Left	Sozialpolitik/Wohlfahrtsstaat (allgem.)
Equality	Left	soziale Gerechtigkeit/Gleichheit/Chancengleichheit (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Umverteilung (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Grundeinkommen/Mindestsicherung/Grundsicherung
Equality	Left	Armut (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Zahlungen an Arme/Sozialhilfe/Notstandshilfe/Teuerungsausgleich
Equality	Left	Unterstützung von Arbeitslosen/Arbeitslosengeld
Equality	Left	Ausbau der Arbeitslosenversicherung
Equality	Left	Beschleunigung/Verbesserung der Arbeitslosenvermittlung
Equality	Left	Gesundheitssystem (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Versorgung verbessern/sichern (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Leistungen für Krankenversicherte
Equality	Left	(Teil-)Finanzierung durch Staat/Steuern/Budget/Subventionen
Equality	Left	Zweiklassen-Medizin
Equality	Left	Patientenrechte individuell (Patientenverfügungen)
Equality	Left	Patientenrechte kollektiv (Mitbestimmung bei Krankenkassen)
Equality	Left	Nichtraucherschutz/Rauchverbote (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Organspenden
Equality	Left	Lohnfortzahlung bei Krankheit
Equality	Left	Pflege alter Menschen (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Pflegegeld
Equality	Left	Ausbau der Altenbetreuung (Heime/Residenzen)
Equality	Left	private/häusliche Pflege (z.B. finanzielle Besserstellung)
Equality	Left	private/häusliche Pflege durch (illegale) Ausländer

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Equality	Left	Integration/Hilfe für Behinderte
Equality	Left	Pflege: Finanzierung über Sozialabgaben/ Pflegeversicherung
Equality	Left	Hospiz/Sterbebegleitung/Palliativmedizin
Equality	Left	Pensionisten/Senioren (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Einheitliches Pensionssystem
Equality	Left	Altersteilzeit
Equality	Left	Frühpensionen/Vorruhestand
Equality	Left	Hacklerregelung
Equality	Left	Pensionserhöhung (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Pensionserhöhung für kleine Pensionen/Witwen
Equality	Left	Pensionsfinanzierung I: Versicherungsbeiträge
Equality	Left	Pensionsfinanzierung II: Budget/Steuern
Equality	Left	Betriebspensionen (zweite Säule)
Equality	Left	Anrechnung von Erziehungs-/Pflegezeiten für Pension; Mütterpension
Equality	Left	Pensionssystem: Umlageverfahren/Generationenvertrag
Equality	Left	Familien (als soziale Gruppe, allgem.)
Equality	Left	Förderung von Familien/Zahlungen an Familien/ Familienbeihilfe
Equality	Left	Müttergehalt
Equality	Left	Steuerabzug für Familien mit Kindern/Familiensplitting
Equality	Left	Karenzgeld/Kinderbetreuungsgeld/Karenzzeit (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Papamonat/Väter in Karenz (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Hilfe für AlleinerzieherInnen (z.B. erhöhtes Karenzgeld)
Equality	Left	Recht auf Teilzeitarbeit für Eltern
Equality	Left	Steuerabzug für Familien mit Kindern/Familiensplitting
Equality	Left	Steuerbefreiung Kleinverdiener
Equality	Left	Steuersenkung kleine und mittlere Einkommen
Equality	Left	Steuererhöhung Spitzeneinkommen
Equality	Left	Progressive Einkommensteuer
Equality	Left	Kapitalertragssteuer/Besteuerung Zinsen
Equality	Left	Vermögenssteuer/Luxussteuer
Equality	Left	Steuerabsetzbarkeit haushaltsnaher Dienstleistungen
Equality	Left	Erbschaftssteuer
Equality	Left	Schenkungssteuer
Equality	Left	Mineralölsteuer/Heizölsteuer
Equality	Left	Absetzbarkeit von Spenden
Equality	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Equality	Left	Erhöhung Unternehmensteuern
Equality	Left	Körperschaftssteuer
Equality	Right	Treffericherheit/Kritik an Gießkanne
Equality	Right	Wahlmöglichkeiten/Eigenverantwortung/ Leistung (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten für Unternehmer
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten für Arbeitnehmer
Equality	Right	Sozialmissbrauch (allgem. bzw. Inländer)
Equality	Right	Reform/Zusammenlegung/Einsparung bei Sozialversicherungen
Equality	Right	Privatisierung der Arbeitslosenvermittlung
Equality	Right	weniger Geld bei Ablehnung von Arbeit
Equality	Right	Pflicht zur gemeinnützigen Arbeit für Arbeitslose
Equality	Right	Reform des Gesundheitssystems (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Ausgaben Gesundheitssystem
Equality	Right	Zusammenlegung Krankenkassen/Einsparung Verwaltung
Equality	Right	Selbstbehalte/Ambulanzgebühr/Rezeptgebühr
Equality	Right	Krankenversicherungsbeiträge
Equality	Right	private Krankenversicherung
Equality	Right	Kontrolle/Qualitätssicherung im Gesundheitswesen
Equality	Right	Kundennähe im Gesundheitswesen (z.B.

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Equality	Right	Öffnungszeiten, Wartezeiten)
Equality	Right	Vernetzung Gesundheitsdaten (ELGA, E-Card)
Equality	Right	Vorsorge/Eigenverantwortung/gesunder Lebenswandel (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Vermögensgrenze bei Pflegegeld/Beteiligung von Angehörigen/Regress
Equality	Right	Sachwalterschaft/Entmündigung/gesetzliche Betreuung
Equality	Right	Pflege: Finanzierung über Steuern/Privatisierungserlöse
Equality	Right	Verlängerung Lebensarbeitszeit/Erhöhung Pensionseintrittsalter
Equality	Right	private Pensionsvorsorge (dritte Säule)
Equality	Right	Pensionssystem: Drei-Säulen-Modell
Equality	Right	Einkommensabhängiges Karenzgeld/ Kinderbetreuungsgeld (spezif.)
Equality	Right	Zuverdienstgrenzen bei Karenzgeld/ Kinderbetreuungsgeld (spezif.)
Ecoimmigrant	Left	Aufnahme Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge
Ecoimmigrant	Left	Beschäftigungserlaubnis für Asylwerber
Ecoimmigrant	Left	(illegales) ausländisches Pflegepersonal (spezif.)
Ecoimmigrant	Left	Arbeitserlaubnis für legale Ausländer
Ecoimmigrant	Right	Vorrang für inländische Arbeitnehmer
Ecoimmigrant	Right	befristete Beschäftigungsbewilligung (Gastarbeiter, Saisonier, Erntehelfer)

Socio-Cultural Dimension

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Crime	Left	Kontrolle von Geheimdiensten
Crime	Left	Datenschutz
Crime	Left	Prävention (allgem.)
Crime	Left	Prävention durch Bildung/Soziales
Crime	Left	Resozialisierung
Crime	Left	Liberalisierung von Drogen
Crime	Left	Hilfe für Drogenabhängige
Crime	Right	Kriminalität (allgem.)
Crime	Right	organisierte Kriminalität
Crime	Right	Mafiaparagraf §278a StGB
Crime	Right	Jugendkriminalität
Crime	Right	Übertretungen/Missbrauch durch Polizei/ Nebentätigkeiten von Polizisten
Crime	Right	Polizei (allgem.)
Crime	Right	Online-Kriminalität/Cyber-Kriminalität (spezif.)
Crime	Right	Strukturreform Polizei/Zusammenlegung mit Gendarmerie
Crime	Right	Mittel für Polizei (Geld, Posten)
Crime	Right	Polizeirechte/-befugnisse
Crime	Right	internationale Zusammenarbeit der Polizei
Crime	Right	Befugnisse für Geheimdienste
Crime	Right	Videoüberwachung
Crime	Right	Sicherungsverwahrung/Auflagen nach Haftentlassung
Crime	Right	privater Waffenbesitz
Crime	Right	private, gesellschaftliche Verbrechensbekämpfung (Bürgerwehren, Stadtwachen)
Crime	Right	kommerzielle Verbrechensbekämpfung (Wachdienste)
Immigrant	Left	Familiennachzug/Familienzusammenführung
Immigrant	Left	Bleiberecht für Asylwerber
Immigrant	Left	Asylmissbrauch/Asyl-Missbrauch
Immigrant	Left	Beschleunigung/Verbesserung des Asylverfahrens (= keine Verschärfung)
Immigrant	Left	Maßnahmen zur Integration (Unterstützung)
Immigrant	Left	Wahlrecht für Ausländer (allgem.)

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Immigrant	Left	Ausweitung des Wahlrechts für EU-Ausländer
Immigrant	Left	(kommunales) Wahlrecht für Nicht-EU-Ausländer
Immigrant	Left	Immigranten/Zweite Generation als Kandidaten/Wähler
Immigrant	Left	Multikulturalismus/Dialog/Anerkennung von Differenz/Pluralismus
Immigrant	Left	Ausbau Sprachförderung (Unterstützung)
Immigrant	Left	Unterricht in Muttersprache
Immigrant	Right	Einwanderung/Ausländer (allgem.)
Immigrant	Right	Beschränkung Anzahl Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Kriterien für Einwanderung (Green Card, Punktesystem, Schlüsselarbeitskräfte)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung illegaler Ausländer/Asylwerber aus Drittstaaten
Immigrant	Right	Maßnahmen zur Integration (Zwang/Anpassung)
Immigrant	Right	Parallelgesellschaft
Immigrant	Right	Ausländerkriminalität (allgem.)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung ausländischer Straftäter (individuell)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung der Angehörigen ausländischer Straftäter (Kollektivstrafe)
Immigrant	Right	Kriminaltourismus
Immigrant	Right	Schlepperunwesen/Menschenhandel
Immigrant	Right	Sozialhilfe/Sozialleistungen nur für Österreicher
Immigrant	Right	Eigenes Sozialsystem für Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Sozialmissbrauch durch Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung arbeitsloser Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Verpflichtende Deutschkenntnisse vor Schuleintritt
Immigrant	Right	maximaler Ausländeranteil in Schulklassen
Immigrant	Right	eigene Schulklassen für Ausländer

Appendix A.2: Full Issue List 2013

Socio-Economic Dimension

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: allgemein
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Jugendliche
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Frauen
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Ältere Arbeitnehmer
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Behinderte/chronisch Kranke
Economy	Left	Recht auf Arbeit
Economy	Left	Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Economy	Left	Soziale Marktwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Ökosoziale Marktwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Rolle des Staates in Wirtschaft (allgem.)
Economy	Left	staatliche Preiskontrolle (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Konjunkturprogramm/öffentliche Investitionen
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung von Banken (spezif.)
Economy	Left	soziales/fares/gerechtes Welthandelssystem
Economy	Left	Schutz nationaler Märkte/Protektionismus
Economy	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung von Banken (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Economy	Left	staatlicher Rettungsschirm/Bad Bank
Economy	Left	Besteuerung von Spekulationsgewinnen/Aktien
Economy	Left	Bankensteuer

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Left	Finanzmarktaufsicht/Kontrolle der Finanzmärkte
Economy	Left	Strafsteuer bei hohen Unternehmensgewinnen (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Kontrolle von Unternehmen (Lohndumping etc.)
Economy	Left	Schutz von Arbeitnehmern (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Arbeitsrecht (striktes)/gegen flexible Arbeitswelt
Economy	Left	geringfügig/atypisch/teilzeit-Beschäftigte (Personengruppe)
Economy	Left	geringfügige/atypische/teilzeit Beschäftigung (Arbeitsverhältnis)
Economy	Left	Kündigungsschutz (starker)
Economy	Left	Kollektivvertrag/Tarifvertrag
Economy	Left	Mindestlöhne/Mindestlohn
Economy	Left	Abfertigungen
Economy	Left	Gewerkschaft
Economy	Left	Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz
Economy	Left	Streik
Economy	Left	Gleichstellung Arbeiter-Angestellte
Economy	Left	Urlaub
Economy	Left	Gesunder Arbeitsplatz (Lärm/Chemikalien)
Economy	Left	Konkurrenzklauseln
Economy	Left	staatliche Preiskontrolle (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Konsumentenschutz (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Benzinpreiskontrolle/Öffnung amtlicher Tankstellen (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Kontrolle von Mietpreisen/Mieterschutz
Economy	Left	sozialer, gemeinnütziger Wohnungsbau/ Wohnbeihilfe
Economy	Left	Amnestie für private Schuldner/Privatkonkurs/ Privatin solvenz
Economy	Left	Offenlegung von Agrarsubventionen
Economy	Left	ökologische Landwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Einsatz von Gentechnik in Landwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Kennzeichnungspflicht Gentechnik
Economy	Left	Agrartreibstoffe/Biodiesel/Agrosprit
Economy	Left	Pestizide/Bienensterben
Economy	Left	Steuerabzug für Familien mit Kindern/ Familiensplitting
Economy	Left	Steuerbefreiung Kleinverdiener
Economy	Left	Steuersenkung kleine und mittlere Einkommen
Economy	Left	Steuererhöhung Spitzeneinkommen
Economy	Left	Progressive Einkommensteuer
Economy	Left	Kapitalertragssteuer/Besteuerung Zinsen
Economy	Left	Vermögenssteuer/Luxussteuer
Economy	Left	Steuerabsetzbarkeit haushaltsnaher Dienstleistungen
Economy	Left	Erbschaftssteuer
Economy	Left	Schenkungssteuer
Economy	Left	Mineralölsteuer/Heizölsteuer
Economy	Left	Absetzbarkeit von Spenden
Economy	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Economy	Left	Erhöhung Unternehmensteuern
Economy	Left	Körperschaftssteuer
Economy	Right	Wirtschaftswachstum
Economy	Right	außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht/ausgeglichene Zahlungsbilanz
Economy	Right	Bekämpfung Inflation/Teuerung; Sicherung Kaufkraft/Preisstabilität
Economy	Right	Kapitalismus/Marktwirtschaft/Unternehmer/ Eigentum (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Right	(allgem.) Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Schienenverkehr/Bahn
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Luftverkehr (inkl. AUA)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Telekommunikation/Post
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Wasserversorgung
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Energieversorgung
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung/Wettbewerb im Gesundheitssektor
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Ladenöffnungszeiten (generell)
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Ladenöffnungszeiten (nicht am Sonntag)
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Gewerbeordnung
Economy	Right	Wettbewerbskontrolle/Bekämpfung Kartelle, Monopole, Preisabsprachen
Economy	Right	Globalisierung/Abbau Zölle/Öffnung Weltmärkte
Economy	Right	Wettbewerbsfähigkeit/Standortqualität Österreichs
Economy	Right	Investitionen österreichischer Betriebe im Ausland
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung des internationalen Kapitalverkehrs
Economy	Right	Bekämpfung Weltwirtschaftskrise/Bankenkrise
Economy	Right	Hohe Gehälter/Sonderzahlungen/Bonus/Boni
Economy	Right	Spekulation/Finanzgeschäfte/Börse
Economy	Right	Basel II-Richtlinien
Economy	Right	Förderungen/Maßnahmen für Unternehmen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Förderungen/Maßnahmen für kleine und mittlere Unternehmungen (KMU)
Economy	Right	Förderungen einzelner Unternehmen bei Notfällen (bail out etc.)
Economy	Right	private Investitionen im Inland fördern/Risikokapital
Economy	Right	Förderung des Fremdenverkehrs
Economy	Right	Förderung Selbständigkeit/Selbstständigkeit/ Unternehmensgründungen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	neue Selbstständige/Selbständige (spezif.)
Economy	Right	hohe Gehälter/Abfindungen von Managern (Privatwirtschaft)
Economy	Right	Kurzarbeit
Economy	Right	Kombilohn/Kombilöhne
Economy	Right	Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit (generell)
Economy	Right	Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit (außer Sonntag)
Economy	Right	Mitarbeiterbeteiligung (Aktien)
Economy	Right	privater Wohnbau/Wohnbauförderung
Economy	Right	Agrarförderungen/Subventionen/Direktzahlungen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Förderung von kleinen/mittleren landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben
Economy	Right	Förderung von Bergbauern
Economy	Right	Agrarkonzerne/Großbauern
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung/Wettbewerb im Gesundheitssektor
Economy	Right	Mehrwertsteuer (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Mehrwertsteuer (spezifische Produkte)
Economy	Right	Lohnsteuer/Einkommensteuer
Economy	Right	Steuersenkung Spitzeneinkommen
Economy	Right	Flat-Tax
Economy	Right	Besteuerung Urlaubs-/Weihnachtsgeld
Economy	Right	Besteuerung Überstunden/Nacht-, Sonn-, Feiertagsarbeit
Economy	Right	Grundsteuer
Economy	Right	Kirchensteuer
Economy	Right	Reduktion Unternehmensteuern

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Right	Steuerliche Entlastung KMU (Mittelstand)
Economy	Right	Gewerbesteuer
Economy	Right	Umsatzsteuer
Economy	Right	Einheitliche Unternehmensbesteuerung
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung
		Luftverkehr (inkl. AUA)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung
		Energieversorgung
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung
		Telekommunikation/Post
Equality	Left	Sozialpolitik/Wohlfahrtsstaat (allgem.)
Equality	Left	soziale Gerechtigkeit/Gleichheit/ Chancengleichheit (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Umverteilung (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Grundeinkommen/Mindestsicherung/ Grundsicherung
Equality	Left	Armut (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Zahlungen an Arme/Sozialhilfe/Notstandshilfe/ Teuerungsausgleich
Equality	Left	Unterstützung von Arbeitslosen/Arbeitslosengeld
Equality	Left	Ausbau der Arbeitslosenversicherung
Equality	Left	Beschleunigung/Verbesserung der Arbeitslosenvermittlung
Equality	Left	Gesundheitssystem (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Versorgung verbessern/sichern (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Leistungen für Krankenversicherte
Equality	Left	(Teil-)Finanzierung durch Staat/Steuern/ Budget/Subventionen
Equality	Left	Zweiklassen-Medizin
Equality	Left	Patientenrechte individuell (Patientenverfügungen)
Equality	Left	Patientenrechte kollektiv (Mitbestimmung bei Krankenkassen)
Equality	Left	Nichtraucherschutz/Rauchverbote (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Organspenden
Equality	Left	Lohnfortzahlung bei Krankheit
Equality	Left	Pflege alter Menschen (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Pflegegeld
Equality	Left	Ausbau der Altenbetreuung (Heime/Residenzen)
Equality	Left	private/häusliche Pflege (z.B. finanzielle Besserstellung)
Equality	Left	private/häusliche Pflege durch (illegale) Ausländer
Equality	Left	Integration/Hilfe für Behinderte
Equality	Left	Pflege: Finanzierung über Sozialabgaben/ Pflegeversicherung
Equality	Left	Hospiz/Sterbebegleitung/Palliativmedizin
Equality	Left	Pensionisten/Senioren (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Einheitliches Pensionssystem
Equality	Left	Altersteilzeit
Equality	Left	Frühpensionen/Vorruhestand
Equality	Left	Hacklerregelung
Equality	Left	Pensionserhöhung (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Pensionserhöhung für kleine Pensionen/Witwen
Equality	Left	Pensionsfinanzierung I: Versicherungsbeiträge
Equality	Left	Pensionsfinanzierung II: Budget/Steuern
Equality	Left	Betriebspensionen (zweite Säule)
Equality	Left	Anrechnung von Erziehungs-/Pflegezeiten für Pension; Mütterpension
Equality	Left	Pensionssystem: Umlageverfahren/ Generationenvertrag
Equality	Left	Familien (als soziale Gruppe, allgem.)
Equality	Left	Förderung von Familien/Zahlungen an Familien/ Familienbeihilfe

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Equality	Left	Müttergehalt
Equality	Left	Karenzgeld/Kinderbetreuungsgeld/Karenzzeit (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Papamonat/Väter in Karenz (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Hilfe für AlleinerzieherInnen (z.B. erhöhtes Karenzgeld)
Equality	Left	Recht auf Teilzeitarbeit für Eltern
Equality	Left	Steuerabzug für Familien mit Kindern/Familiensplitting
Equality	Right	Treffericherheit/Kritik an Gießkanne
Equality	Right	Wahlmöglichkeiten/Eigenverantwortung/ Leistung (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten für Unternehmer
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten für Arbeitnehmer
Equality	Right	Sozialmissbrauch (allgem. bzw. Inländer)
Equality	Right	Reform/Zusammenlegung/Einsparung bei Sozialversicherungen
Equality	Right	Privatisierung der Arbeitslosenvermittlung
Equality	Right	weniger Geld bei Ablehnung von Arbeit
Equality	Right	Pflicht zur gemeinnützigen Arbeit für Arbeitslose
Equality	Right	Refom des Gesundheitssystems (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Ausgaben Gesundheitssystem
Equality	Right	Zusammenlegung Krankenkassen/ Einsparung Verwaltung
Equality	Right	Selbstbehalte/Ambulanzgebühr/Rezeptgebühr
Equality	Right	Krankenversicherungsbeiträge
Equality	Right	private Krankenversicherung
Equality	Right	Kontrolle/Qualitätssicherung im Gesundheitswesen
Equality	Right	Kundennähe im Gesundheitswesen (z.B. Öffnungszeiten, Wartezeiten)
Equality	Right	Vernetzung Gesundheitsdaten (ELGA, E-Card)
Equality	Right	Vorsorge/Eigenverantwortung/gesunder Lebenswandel (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Vermögensgrenze bei Pflegegeld/Beteiligung von Angehörigen/Regress
Equality	Right	Sachwalterschaft/Entmündigung/ gesetzliche Betreuung
Equality	Right	Pflege: Finanzierung über Steuern/ Privatisierungserlöse
Equality	Right	Verlängerung Lebensarbeitszeit/ Erhöhung Pensionseintrittsalter
Equality	Right	private Pensionsvorsorge (dritte Säule)
Equality	Right	Pensionssystem: Drei-Säulen-Modell
Equality	Right	Einkommensabhängiges Karenzgeld/ Kinderbetreuungsgeld (spezif.)
Equality	Right	Zuverdienstgrenzen bei Karenzgeld/ Kinderbetreuungsgeld (spezif.)

Socio-Cultural Dimension

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Crime	Left	Kontrolle von Geheimdiensten
Crime	Left	Datenschutz
Crime	Left	Prävention (allgem.)
Crime	Left	Prävention durch Bildung/Soziales
Crime	Left	Resozialisierung
Crime	Left	Liberalisierung von Drogen
Crime	Left	Hilfe für Drogenabhängige
Crime	Right	Kriminalität (allgem.)
Crime	Right	organisierte Kriminalität
Crime	Right	Mafiaparagraf §278a StGB
Crime	Right	Jugendkriminalität
Crime	Right	Übertretungen/Missbrauch durch Polizei/

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Crime	Right	Nebentätigkeiten von Polizisten
Crime	Right	Polizei (allgem.)
Crime	Right	Online-Kriminalität/Cyber-Kriminalität (spezif.)
Crime	Right	Strukturreform Polizei/Zusammenlegung mit Gendarmerie
Crime	Right	Mittel für Polizei (Geld, Posten)
Crime	Right	Polizeirechte/-befugnisse
Crime	Right	internationale Zusammenarbeit der Polizei
Crime	Right	Befugnisse für Geheimdienste
Crime	Right	Videoüberwachung
Crime	Right	Sicherungsverwahrung/Auflagen nach Haftentlassung
Crime	Right	privater Waffenbesitz
Crime	Right	private, gesellschaftliche Verbrechensbekämpfung (Bürgerwehren, Stadtwachen)
Crime	Right	kommerzielle Verbrechensbekämpfung (Wachdienste)
Immigrant	Left	Familiennachzug/Familienzusammenführung
Immigrant	Left	Bleiberecht für Asylwerber
Immigrant	Left	Asylmissbrauch/Asyl-Missbrauch
Immigrant	Left	Beschleunigung/Verbesserung des Asylverfahrens (= keine Verschärfung)
Immigrant	Left	Maßnahmen zur Integration (Unterstützung)
Immigrant	Left	Wahlrecht für Ausländer (allgem.)
Immigrant	Left	Ausweitung des Wahlrechts für EU-Ausländer
Immigrant	Left	(kommunales) Wahlrecht für Nicht-EU-Ausländer
Immigrant	Left	Immigranten/Zweite Generation als Kandidaten/Wähler
Immigrant	Left	Multikulturalismus/Dialog/Anerkennung von Differenz/Pluralismus
Immigrant	Left	Ausbau Sprachförderung (Unterstützung)
Immigrant	Left	Unterricht in Muttersprache
Immigrant	Right	Einwanderung/Ausländer (allgem.)
Immigrant	Right	Beschränkung Anzahl Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Kriterien für Einwanderung (Green Card, Punktesystem, Schlüsselarbeitskräfte)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung illegaler Ausländer/Asylwerber aus Drittstaaten
Immigrant	Right	Maßnahmen zur Integration (Zwang/Anpassung)
Immigrant	Right	Parallelgesellschaft
Immigrant	Right	Ausländerkriminalität (allgem.)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung ausländischer Straftäter (individuell)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung der Angehörigen ausländischer Straftäter (Kollektivstrafe)
Immigrant	Right	Kriminaltourismus
Immigrant	Right	Schlepperunwesen/Menschenhandel
Immigrant	Right	Sozialhilfe/Sozialleistungen nur für Österreicher
Immigrant	Right	Eigenes Sozialsystem für Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Sozialmissbrauch durch Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung arbeitsloser Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Verpflichtende Deutschkenntnisse vor Schuleintritt
Immigrant	Right	maximaler Ausländeranteil in Schulklassen
Immigrant	Right	eigene Schulklassen für Ausländer
Tradition	Right	Patriotismus/Nationalismus/Heimat (allgem.)
Tradition	Right	österreichische Leitkultur/kulturelle Identität
Tradition	Right	Nationalhymne (bestehende)

Appendix A.3: Full Issue List 2008

Socio-Economic Dimension

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: allgemein
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Jugendliche
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Frauen
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Ältere Arbeitnehmer
Economy	Left	Arbeitslosigkeit: Behinderte/chronisch Kranke
Economy	Left	Recht auf Arbeit
Economy	Left	Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Economy	Left	Soziale Marktwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Ökosoziale Marktwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Rolle des Staates in Wirtschaft (allgem.)
Economy	Left	staatliche Preiskontrolle (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Konjunkturprogramm/öffentliche Investitionen
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung von Banken (spezif.)
Economy	Left	soziales/fares/gerechtes Welthandelssystem
Economy	Left	Schutz nationaler Märkte/Protektionismus
Economy	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Economy	Left	(Re-)Verstaatlichung von Banken (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Economy	Left	staatlicher Rettungsschirm/Bad Bank
Economy	Left	Besteuerung von Spekulationsgewinnen/Aktien
Economy	Left	Bankensteuer
Economy	Left	Finanzmarktaufsicht/Kontrolle der Finanzmärkte
Economy	Left	Strafsteuer bei hohen Unternehmensgewinnen (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Kontrolle von Unternehmen (Lohndumping etc.)
Economy	Left	Schutz von Arbeitnehmern (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Arbeitsrecht (strikt)/gegen flexible Arbeitswelt
Economy	Left	geringfügig/atypisch/teilzeit-Beschäftigte (Personengruppe)
Economy	Left	geringfügige/atypische/teilzeit Beschäftigung (Arbeitsverhältnis)
Economy	Left	Kündigungsschutz (starker)
Economy	Left	Kollektivvertrag/Tarifvertrag
Economy	Left	Mindestlöhne/Mindestlohn
Economy	Left	Abfertigungen
Economy	Left	Gewerkschaft
Economy	Left	Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz
Economy	Left	Streik
Economy	Left	Gleichstellung Arbeiter-Angestellte
Economy	Left	Urlaub
Economy	Left	Gesunder Arbeitsplatz (Lärm/Chemikalien)
Economy	Left	Konkurrenzklauseln
Economy	Left	staatliche Preiskontrolle (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Konsumentenschutz (allgem.)
Economy	Left	Benzinpreiskontrolle/Öffnung amtlicher Tankstellen (spezif.)
Economy	Left	Kontrolle von Mietpreisen/Mieterschutz
Economy	Left	sozialer, gemeinnütziger Wohnungsbau/Wohnbeihilfe
Economy	Left	Amnestie für private Schuldner/Privatkonkurs/Privatinsolvenz
Economy	Left	Offenlegung von Agrarsubventionen
Economy	Left	ökologische Landwirtschaft
Economy	Left	Einsatz von Gentechnik in Landwirtschaft

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Left	Kennzeichnungspflicht Gentechnik
Economy	Left	Agrartreibstoffe/Biodiesel/Agrosprit
Economy	Left	Pestizide/Bienensterben
Economy	Left	Steuerabzug für Familien mit Kindern/ Familiensplitting
Economy	Left	Kapitalertragssteuer/Besteuerung Zinsen
Economy	Left	Vermögenssteuer/Luxussteuer
Economy	Left	Steuerabsetzbarkeit haushaltsnaher Dienstleistungen
Economy	Left	Erbschaftssteuer
Economy	Left	Schenkungssteuer
Economy	Left	Mineralölsteuer/Heizölsteuer
Economy	Left	Absetzbarkeit von Spenden
Economy	Left	Tobin-Steuer/Besteuerung internationaler Finanzströme
Economy	Left	Erhöhung Unternehmensteuern
Economy	Left	Körperschaftssteuer
Economy	Right	Wirtschaftswachstum
Economy	Right	außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht/ ausgeglichene Zahlungsbilanz
Economy	Right	Bekämpfung Inflation/Teuerung; Sicherung Kaufkraft/Preisstabilität
Economy	Right	Kapitalismus/Marktwirtschaft/Unternehmer/ Eigentum (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Schienenverkehr/Bahn
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Luftverkehr (inkl. AUA)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Telekommunikation/Post
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Wasserversorgung
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung Energieversorgung
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung/Wettbewerb im Gesundheitssektor
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Ladenöffnungszeiten (generell)
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Ladenöffnungszeiten (nicht am Sonntag)
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung der Gewerbeordnung
Economy	Right	Wettbewerbskontrolle/Bekämpfung Kartelle, Monopole, Preisabsprachen
Economy	Right	Globalisierung/Abbau Zölle/Öffnung Weltmärkte
Economy	Right	Wettbewerbsfähigkeit/Standortqualität Österreichs
Economy	Right	Investitionen österreichischer Betriebe im Ausland
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung des internationalen Kapitalverkehrs
Economy	Right	Bekämpfung Weltwirtschaftskrise/Bankenkrise
Economy	Right	Hohe Gehälter/Sonderzahlungen/Bonus/Boni
Economy	Right	Spekulation/Finanzgeschäfte/Börse
Economy	Right	Basel II-Richtlinien
Economy	Right	Förderungen/Maßnahmen für Unternehmen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Förderungen/Maßnahmen für kleine und mittlere Unternehmungen (KMU)
Economy	Right	Förderungen einzelner Unternehmen bei Notfällen (bail out etc.)
Economy	Right	private Investitionen im Inland fördern/Risikokapital
Economy	Right	Förderung des Fremdenverkehrs
Economy	Right	Förderung Selbständigkeit/Selbstständigkeit/ Unternehmensgründungen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	neue Selbstständige/Selbständige (spezif.)

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Economy	Right	hohe Gehälter/Abfindungen von Managern (Privatwirtschaft)
Economy	Right	Kurzarbeit
Economy	Right	Kombilohn/Kombilöhne
Economy	Right	Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit (generell)
Economy	Right	Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit (außer Sonntag)
Economy	Right	Mitarbeiterbeteiligung (Aktien)
Economy	Right	privater Wohnbau/Wohnbauförderung
Economy	Right	Agrarförderungen/Subventionen/Direktzahlungen (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Förderung von kleinen/mittleren landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben
Economy	Right	Förderung von Bergbauern
Economy	Right	Agrarkonzerne/Großbauern
Economy	Right	Liberalisierung/Wettbewerb im Gesundheitssektor
Economy	Right	Mehrwertsteuer (allgem.)
Economy	Right	Mehrwertsteuer (spezifische Produkte)
Economy	Right	Lohnsteuer/Einkommensteuer
Economy	Right	Steuersenkung Spitzeneinkommen
Economy	Right	Flat-Tax
Economy	Right	Besteuerung Urlaubs-/Weihnachtsgeld
Economy	Right	Besteuerung Überstunden/Nacht-, Sonn-, Feiertagsarbeit
Economy	Right	Grundsteuer
Economy	Right	Kirchensteuer
Economy	Right	Reduktion Unternehmensteuern
Economy	Right	Steuerliche Entlastung KMU (Mittelstand)
Economy	Right	Gewerbsteuer
Economy	Right	Umsatzsteuer
Economy	Right	Einheitliche Unternehmensbesteuerung
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung
Economy	Right	Luftverkehr (inkl. AUA)
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung
Economy	Right	Energieversorgung
Economy	Right	Privatisierung/Liberalisierung/Deregulierung
Economy	Right	Telekommunikation/Post
Equality	Left	Sozialpolitik/Wohlfahrtsstaat (allgem.)
Equality	Left	soziale Gerechtigkeit/Gleichheit/Chancengleichheit (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Umverteilung (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Grundeinkommen/Mindestsicherung/Grundsicherung
Equality	Left	Armut (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Zahlungen an Arme/Sozialhilfe/Notstandshilfe/Teuerungsausgleich
Equality	Left	Unterstützung von Arbeitslosen/Arbeitslosengeld
Equality	Left	Ausbau der Arbeitslosenversicherung
Equality	Left	Beschleunigung/Verbesserung der Arbeitslosenvermittlung
Equality	Left	Gesundheitssystem (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Versorgung verbessern/sichern (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Leistungen für Krankenversicherte
Equality	Left	(Teil-)Finanzierung durch Staat/Steuern/Budget/Subventionen
Equality	Left	Zweiklassen-Medizin
Equality	Left	Patientenrechte individuell (Patientenverfügungen)
Equality	Left	Patientenrechte kollektiv (Mitbestimmung bei Krankenkassen)
Equality	Left	Nichtraucherschutz/Rauchverbote (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Organspenden
Equality	Left	Lohnfortzahlung bei Krankheit
Equality	Left	Pflege alter Menschen (allgem.)

Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Equality	Left	Pflegegeld
Equality	Left	Ausbau der Altenbetreuung (Heime/Residenzen)
Equality	Left	private/häusliche Pflege (z.B. finanzielle Besserstellung)
Equality	Left	private/häusliche Pflege durch (illegale) Ausländer
Equality	Left	Integration/Hilfe für Behinderte
Equality	Left	Pflege: Finanzierung über Sozialabgaben/Pflegeversicherung
Equality	Left	Hospiz/Sterbebegleitung/Palliativmedizin
Equality	Left	Pensionisten/Senioren (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Einheitliches Pensionssystem
Equality	Left	Altersteilzeit
Equality	Left	Frühpensionen/Vorruhestand
Equality	Left	Hacklerregelung
Equality	Left	Pensionserhöhung (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Pensionserhöhung für kleine Pensionen/Witwen
Equality	Left	Pensionsfinanzierung I: Versicherungsbeiträge
Equality	Left	Pensionsfinanzierung II: Budget/Steuern
Equality	Left	Betriebspensionen (zweite Säule)
Equality	Left	Anrechnung von Erziehungs-/Pflegezeiten für Pension; Mütterpension
Equality	Left	Pensionssystem: Umlageverfahren/Generationenvertrag
Equality	Left	Familien (als soziale Gruppe, allgem.)
Equality	Left	Förderung von Familien/Zahlungen an Familien/Familienbeihilfe
Equality	Left	Müttergehalt
Equality	Left	Steuerabzug für Familien mit Kindern/Familiensplitting
Equality	Left	Karenzgeld/Kinderbetreuungsgeld/Karenzzeit (allgem.)
Equality	Left	Papamonat/Väter in Karenz (spezif.)
Equality	Left	Hilfe für AlleinerzieherInnen (z.B. erhöhtes Karenzgeld)
Equality	Left	Recht auf Teilzeitarbeit für Eltern
Equality	Right	Treffsicherheit/Kritik an Gießkanne
Equality	Right	Wahlmöglichkeiten/Eigenverantwortung/Leistung (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten für Unternehmer
Equality	Right	Sozialbeiträge/Lohnnebenkosten für Arbeitnehmer
Equality	Right	Sozialmissbrauch (allgem. bzw. Inländer)
Equality	Right	Reform/Zusammenlegung/Einsparung bei Sozialversicherungen
Equality	Right	Privatisierung der Arbeitslosenvermittlung
Equality	Right	weniger Geld bei Ablehnung von Arbeit
Equality	Right	Pflicht zur gemeinnützigen Arbeit für Arbeitslose
Equality	Right	Refom des Gesundheitssystems (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Ausgaben Gesundheitssystem
Equality	Right	Zusammenlegung Krankenkassen/Einsparung Verwaltung
Equality	Right	Selbstbehalte/Ambulanzgebühr/Rezeptgebühr
Equality	Right	Krankenversicherungsbeiträge
Equality	Right	private Krankenversicherung
Equality	Right	Kontrolle/Qualitätssicherung im Gesundheitswesen
Equality	Right	Kundennähe im Gesundheitswesen (z.B. Öffnungszeiten, Wartezeiten)
Equality	Right	Vernetzung Gesundheitsdaten (ELGA, E-Card)
Equality	Right	Vorsorge/Eigenverantwortung/gesunder Lebenswandel (allgem.)
Equality	Right	Vermögensgrenze bei Pflegegeld/Beteiligung von Angehörigen/Regress



Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Equality	Right	Sachwalterschaft/Entmündigung/gesetzliche Betreuung
Equality	Right	Pflege: Finanzierung über Steuern/ Privatisierungserlöse
Equality	Right	Verlängerung Lebensarbeitszeit/Erhöhung Pensionseintrittsalter
Equality	Right	private Pensionsvorsorge (dritte Säule)
Equality	Right	Pensionssystem: Drei-Säulen-Modell
Equality	Right	Einkommensabhängiges Karenzgeld/ Kinderbetreuungsgeld (spezif.)
Equality	Right	Zuverdienstgrenzen bei Karenzgeld/ Kinderbetreuungsgeld (spezif.)



Socio-Cultural Dimension



Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Ecoimmigrant	Left	Aufnahme Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge
Ecoimmigrant	Left	Beschäftigungserlaubnis für Asylwerber
Ecoimmigrant	Left	(illegales) ausländisches Pflegepersonal (spezif.)
Ecoimmigrant	Left	Arbeitserlaubnis für legale Ausländer
Ecoimmigrant	Right	Vorrang für inländische Arbeitnehmer
Ecoimmigrant	Right	befristete Beschäftigungsbewilligung (Gastarbeiter, Saisonier, Erntehelfer)
Crime	Left	Kontrolle von Geheimdiensten
Crime	Left	Datenschutz
Crime	Left	Prävention (allgem.)
Crime	Left	Prävention durch Bildung/Soziales
Crime	Left	Resozialisierung
Crime	Left	Liberalisierung von Drogen
Crime	Left	Hilfe für Drogenabhängige
Crime	Right	Kriminalität (allgem.)
Crime	Right	organisierte Kriminalität
Crime	Right	Mafiaparagraf §278a StGB
Crime	Right	Jugendkriminalität
Crime	Right	Übertretungen/Missbrauch durch Polizei/ Nebentätigkeiten von Polizisten
Crime	Right	Polizei (allgem.)
Crime	Right	Online-Kriminalität/Cyber-Kriminalität (spezif.)
Crime	Right	Strukturreform Polizei/Zusammenlegung mit Gendarmerie
Crime	Right	Mittel für Polizei (Geld, Posten)
Crime	Right	Polizeirechte/-befugnisse
Crime	Right	internationale Zusammenarbeit der Polizei
Crime	Right	Befugnisse für Geheimdienste
Crime	Right	Videoüberwachung
Crime	Right	Sicherungsverwahrung/Auflagen nach Haftentlassung
Crime	Right	privater Waffenbesitz
Crime	Right	private, gesellschaftliche Verbrechensbekämpfung (Bürgerwehren, Stadtwachen)
Crime	Right	kommerzielle Verbrechensbekämpfung (Wachdienste)
Immigrant	Left	Familiennachzug/Familienzusammenführung
Immigrant	Left	Bleiberecht für Asylwerber
Immigrant	Left	Asylmissbrauch/Asyl-Missbrauch
Immigrant	Left	Beschleunigung/Verbesserung des Asylverfahrens (= keine Verschärfung)
Immigrant	Left	Maßnahmen zur Integration (Unterstützung)
Immigrant	Left	Wahlrecht für Ausländer (allgem.)
Immigrant	Left	Ausweitung des Wahlrechts für EU-Ausländer



Issue Category	Ideology	Original Issue
Immigrant	Left	(kommunales) Wahlrecht für Nicht-EU-Ausländer
Immigrant	Left	Immigranten/Zweite Generation als Kandidaten/Wähler
Immigrant	Left	Multikulturalismus/Dialog/Anerkennung von Differenz/Pluralismus
Immigrant	Left	Ausbau Sprachförderung (Unterstützung)
Immigrant	Left	Unterricht in Muttersprache
Immigrant	Right	Einwanderung/Ausländer (allgem.)
Immigrant	Right	Beschränkung Anzahl Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Kriterien für Einwanderung (Green Card, Punktesystem, Schlüsselarbeitskräfte)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung illegaler Ausländer/Asylwerber aus Drittstaaten
Immigrant	Right	Maßnahmen zur Integration (Zwang/Anpassung)
Immigrant	Right	Parallelgesellschaft
Immigrant	Right	Ausländerkriminalität (allgem.)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung ausländischer Straftäter (individuell)
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung der Angehörigen ausländischer Straftäter (Kollektivstrafe)
Immigrant	Right	Kriminaltourismus
Immigrant	Right	Schlepperunwesen/Menschenhandel
Immigrant	Right	Sozialhilfe/Sozialleistungen nur für Österreicher
Immigrant	Right	Eigenes Sozialsystem für Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Sozialmissbrauch durch Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Abschiebung arbeitsloser Ausländer
Immigrant	Right	Verpflichtende Deutschkenntnisse vor Schuleintritt
Immigrant	Right	maximaler Ausländeranteil in Schulklassen
Immigrant	Right	eigene Schulklassen für Ausländer



Appendix A.4: Party Positions – Manifesto Codings






















Appendix A.5: Party Positions – Party Press Releases











Appendix A.6: Absolute Citizen Congruence and Socio-Demographics




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Gender) – 2017




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Age) – 2017





Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Education) – 2017





Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Occupation) – 2017




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Household Income) – 2017




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Gender) – 2013




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Age) – 2013




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Education) – 2013




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Occupation) – 2013




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Household Income) – 2013




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Gender) – 2008




Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Age) – 2008



Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Education) – 2008



Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Occupation) – 2008



Absolute Citizen Congruence per Party (Household Income) – 2008

Appendix A.7: Multivariate Regression Model

	Socio-Economic Dimension	Socio-Cultural Dimension
other	0 (.)	0 (.)
left-authoritarian	-0.186*** (-10.28)	-0.176*** (-9.94)
Male	0 (.)	0 (.)
Female	0.00888 (0.58)	0.0237 (1.59)
under 30	0 (.)	0 (.)
30 - 49	-0.00408 (-0.20)	-0.00690 (-0.34)
50 and older	0.00325 (0.14)	-0.0216 (-0.97)
Compulsory school	0 (.)	0 (.)
Vocational training	0.00479 (0.13)	0.0298 (0.85)
Diploma	-0.0524 (-1.37)	-0.0388 (-1.04)
Academic (Low)	-0.0315 (-0.74)	-0.0621 (-1.50)
Academic (High)	0.00306 (0.08)	-0.0645 (-1.66)
Employee	0 (.)	0 (.)
Blue-collar worker	0.0397 (1.65)	0.00877 (0.37)
Civil servant	0.0161 (0.70)	-0.0000795 (-0.00)
Self-employed	-0.00413 (-0.18)	-0.0143 (-0.64)
Farmer	-0.0409 (-0.59)	-0.0791 (-1.17)
< 1.050 €	0 (.)	0 (.)
1.050 - 2.100 €	-0.117* (-2.28)	-0.0627 (-1.25)
2.100 - 3.000 €	-0.138** (-2.70)	-0.0604 (-1.21)
> 3.000	-0.130** (-2.59)	-0.0521 (-1.07)
Constant	0.444*** (7.58)	0.453*** (7.90)
Observations	1517	1517

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Socio-Economic Dimension	Socio-Cultural Dimension
other	0 (.)	0 (.)
left-authoritarian	0.0365*** (3.52)	-0.0243* (-2.53)
male	0 (.)	0 (.)
female	0.0132 (1.35)	0.00338 (0.37)
under 30	0 (.)	0 (.)
30 - 49	-0.0102 (-0.79)	0.00234 (0.19)
50 and older	0.0126 (0.83)	-0.0105 (-0.74)
Compulsory school	0 (.)	0 (.)
Vocational training	0.0167 (0.64)	0.00278 (0.12)
Diploma	0.00781 (0.29)	0.00519 (0.21)
Academic (Low)	-0.00721 (-0.24)	0.00911 (0.33)
Academic (High)	0.0211 (0.75)	0.0367 (1.40)
Employee	0 (.)	0 (.)
Blue-collar worker	0.0302 (1.82)	0.00547 (0.36)
Civil servant	-0.00242 (-0.16)	0.000522 (0.04)
Self-employed	0.0295 (1.78)	0.0504** (3.27)
Farmer	0.0955 (1.04)	-0.0621 (-0.73)
< 1.050 €	0 (.)	0 (.)
1.050 - 2.100 €	-0.0602* (-2.39)	0.0218 (0.93)
2.100 - 3.000 €	-0.0580* (-2.29)	0.0129 (0.55)
> 3.000	-0.0550* (-2.20)	0.0226 (0.97)
Constant	0.186*** (5.55)	0.164*** (5.28)
Observations	1087	1087

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Multivariate Regression Model (2013)

	Socio-Economic Dimension	Socio-Cultural Dimension
other	0 (.)	0 (.)
left-authoritarian	-0.0637 (-1.34)	-0.0443 (-1.14)
male	0 (.)	0 (.)
female	-0.0140 (-0.33)	0.0174 (0.51)
under 30	0 (.)	0 (.)
30 - 49	0.0134 (0.22)	-0.0589 (-1.22)
50 and older	0.0312 (0.47)	-0.0802 (-1.48)
Compulsory school	0 (.)	0 (.)
Vocational training	0.0239 (0.34)	0.0797 (1.38)
Diploma	-0.0397 (-0.46)	-0.0166 (-0.24)
Academic (Low)	0.201 (1.82)	0.100 (1.12)
Academic (High)	-0.0100 (-0.10)	0.0141 (0.18)
Employee	0 (.)	0 (.)
Blue-collar worker	-0.0118 (-0.21)	0.0277 (0.60)
Civil servant	0.0335 (0.44)	-0.0523 (-0.84)
Self-employed	0.0564 (0.93)	0.0234 (0.47)
Farmer	-0.0105 (-0.09)	0.0469 (0.50)
< 1.050 €	0 (.)	0 (.)
1.050 - 2.100 €	-0.0327 (-0.33)	0.0197 (0.24)
2.100 - 3.000 €	-0.0711 (-0.71)	0.108 (1.32)
> 3.000	-0.00685 (-0.07)	0.0501 (0.62)
Constant	0.482*** (3.43)	0.308** (2.70)
Observations	385	385

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Multivariate Regression Model (2008)