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On my honour as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

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Abstract

The present study investigates the interrelation between the linkage politics model of James Rosenau and the crime-terrorism continuum of Tamara Makarenko, with Rosenau's theory being used to explain the motivations behind the shifts in the modalities of terrorist groups' participation in criminal activities. The study explores the penetrative, reactive and emulative linkages that the terrorist organisations display with regard to states, governments and other criminal and terrorist groups. In this regard, three case examples are analysed: Taliban's participation in drug cultivation and trafficking, the worldwide extortion networks of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the kidnapping activities of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

The findings of the study display a vast causative relationship between the Rosenau linkages and the positioning of the groups on the terror-crime continuum. In the analysed cases, penetrative and reactive linkages with the supporting states resulted in the enhanced participation of the group in criminal activities when such support ceased. Reactive linkages were additionally responsible for the change in the level of the convergency or in the intensity of a group's criminal activities within a single level of the continuum. In turn, emulative linkages were found to play either a boosting or a restraining role for the shift in the group's position on the continuum, depending on the emulated actor.

Zusammenfassung

In der vorliegenden Studie wird der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Verknüpfungsmodell von James Rosenau und dem Kontinuum von Kriminalität und Terrorismus von Tamara Makarenko untersucht. In den drei analysierten Fallstudien – die von der *Taliban*, den *Befreiungstigern von Tamil Eelam* und der *Abu Sayyaf-Gruppe* – wird Rosenaus Theorie verwendet, um die Modalitäten der Beteiligung terroristischer Gruppen an kriminellen Aktivitäten zu erklären. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen einen signifikanten ursächlichen Zusammenhang zwischen den zwei Theorien: es wurde festgestellt, dass die durchdringende, reaktive und emulative Verknüpfungen alle zu einer Änderung des Konvergenzniveaus oder der Intensität der kriminellen Aktivitäten innerhalb eines einzigen Niveaus führen können.

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

AFP - Armed Forces of the Philippines

AML - Anti-money laundering

ASG - Abu Sayyaf Group

AQ - al-Qaeda

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CFT - Countering the financing of terrorism

ENLF - Eelam National Liberation Front

EPRLF - Eelam's People Revolutionary Liberation Front

EROS - Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students

ETA - Basque Country and Freedom (Basque: *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*)

EU - European Union

FARC - The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish: *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*)

FTFs - Foreign terrorist fighters

HRW - Human Rights Watch

IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

IIRO - International Islamic Relief Organisation

IPKF - Indian Peace Keeping Force

IRA - Irish Republican Army

ISI - Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (Pakistan)

JI - Jemaah Islamiyah

JVP - People's Liberation Front (Sinhala/Tamil: *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna*)

KfR - Kidnapping for ransom

KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army

LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MNLF - Moro National Liberation Front

NGO - Non-governmental organisation

PKK - Kurdistan Workers Party

PLO - Palestine Liberation Organization

PLOTE - People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam

RAF - Red Army Faction

SIGAR - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SoM - Smuggling of migrants
TELA - Tamil Eelam Liberation Army
TELO - Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
TNT - Tamil New Tigers
TTP - Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan
TULF - Tamil United Liberation Front
UN - United Nations
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC / SC - United Nations Security Council / Security Council
UPFA - United People's Freedom Alliance
U.S. / USA - United States of America
USG - Under-Secretary General
WTCG - World Tamil Coordinating Committee

Introduction

In perpetrating terrorist activities, violent extremist and terrorist groups are largely driven by political and ideological goals that they seek to further. Some of such organisations have been born out of independence movements that adopted terrorism as a tactic, while others owe their existence to fringe ideologies and extremist narratives based on the perverse perception of religious canons. However, all terrorist operations, from small-scale assassination attempts to bombing attacks and all-out warfare, have one thing in common – they require money.

In the XX century, many of the groups proselytising violent ideologies and carrying out terrorist activities could replenish their resources through state sponsorship. One of the most prominent examples is the critical role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran in founding, training and supplying Hezbollah – an organisation labeled as terrorist by the United States Department of State¹, Israel², Gulf Cooperation Council³, and, partially, the EU⁴. According to Jeffrey Feltman, a former United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary General (USG) for political affairs and a former ambassador of the United States, as many as 1,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards were sent to Lebanon to create training camps, with Iran committing to the Lebanese Shia community "tens of millions of dollars annually to cover salaries and services that the Lebanese state neglected to extend"⁵, which largely contributed to creating a support base for Hezbollah by 1985, when the group issued its initial manifesto calling for the establishment, in Lebanon, of an Islamic republic *à la* Iran.

¹ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," *U.S. Department of State*. Accessed June 2, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>

² "The Hezbollah Terror Organization," *Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Accessed May 30, 2019, <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Hizbullah/Pages/default.aspx>

³ "Gulf Arab states label Hezbollah a terrorist organization," *Reuters*, March 2, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-hezbollah-idUSKCN0W40XF>

⁴ "Council decision (CFSP) 2015/1334 of 31 July 2015 updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/521," *Official Journal of the European Union*. Council of the European Union, 31 July 2015, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1334&qid=1440691334018&from=EN>

⁵ Jeffrey Feltman, "Hezbollah: Revolutionary Iran's most successful export," *The Brookings Institution*, January 17, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/>

Twenty years later, Hezbollah – described by Frederic Hof as "a state within a non-state"⁶ – continues to act, relying on a combination of its "genuine popularity among the majority of Lebanon's Shiites, its positions in Lebanon's parliament and cabinet, and its militia power"⁷, as a proxy actor for Iranian influence on the national, regional and international levels.

The period of the Cold War was also remarkable in this regard, with a plethora of armed groups and organisations using terrorist tactics having relied on the material or training support from one of the sides of the global standoff. During this period, many groups aimed at national liberation, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the National Liberation Army of Bolivia, the National Liberation Army of Colombia, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia, have allegedly benefited from assistance of the security services of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc countries⁸. East Germany's support for the Red Army Faction (RAF)⁹ and the USSR supplying arms to the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1972¹⁰ are yet other examples of a close alignment of militarised extremist groups with states that took sides in the Cold War. In turn, the U.S. was instrumental in funding and supplying arms to paramilitary groups in Nicaragua, Cuba and Colombia, as well as allegedly supporting right-wing paramilitary organisations such as *La Fenice*, *Avanguardia Nazionale* or *Ordine Nuovo* in Italy¹¹.

However, the situation largely changed at the turn of the centuries – in the late XX century, after the end of the Cold War, the need to finance paramilitary groups fighting proxy wars abroad has largely become obsolete, with the foreign financing for many of the violent extremist groups beginning to cease. The shift in the direction of self-financing was solidified after the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001 and the subsequent beginning of the War on Terror launched by the U.S. government in response to the bombings. While the

⁶ Frederic C. Hof, "It is no easy thing being Lebanon," *The Daily Star Lebanon*, January 30, 2007, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2007/Jan-30/113944-it-is-no-easy-thing-being-lebanon.ashx>

⁷ Feltman, "Hezbollah: Revolutionary Iran's most successful export"

⁸ Vasili Mitrokhin and Cristopher Andrew, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005)

⁹ "My Mother, the Terrorist," *Deutsche Welle*, March 14, 2006, <https://www.dw.com/en/my-mother-the-terrorist/a-1933629>

¹⁰ Vasili Mitrokhin and Cristopher Andrew, *Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB In Europe And The West* (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 502

¹¹ Philip Willan, "Terrorists 'helped by CIA' to stop rise of left in Italy," *The Guardian*, March 26, 2001, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/mar/26/terrorism>

military campaigns of this war were the subject of major publicity, an important component of the post-9/11 global anti-terrorism campaign was an increased focus on countering money laundering by non-state actors and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT activities), which largely led to the attrition of the financial flows to terrorist groups.

As a result of the two aforementioned factors, such organisations had to explore other sources of financing, with many of them turning to criminal activities to support the existence of the group. The forms of such linkages continue to vary to a great degree: while some terrorist groups develop in-house criminal capabilities (such as FARC drug and arms trafficking and Al Qaeda's money laundering and gunrunning¹² operatives), others create a quasi-symbiotic relationship with the groups controlling criminal activities in the area.

An interesting example of the latter was the cooperation between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the so-called "Albanian mafia"¹³ that mainly drew revenue from drug trafficking, causing several Balkan cities (such as Veliki Trnovac, Vratnica or Shkodër) to be dubbed "new Medellins of the Balkans"¹⁴. The now-defunct KLA presents a unique case study of an organisation that, having been formed, as was usual for the era, with state involvement, became one of the few violent extremist organisations that have developed self-supporting financial capacity before the turn of the centuries. While, according to many sources, at the beginning of its existence, the KLA received funding¹⁵, arms¹⁶ and training¹⁷ from the operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), it has increasingly grown independent of its early financiers, forging a symbiotic alliance with the organised criminal groups of ethnic Albanians in Albania and Kosovo who controlled the major parts of the Balkan drug routes. By 2000, it was estimated that around 80% of

¹² Rachel Ehrenfeld, *Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It* (Chicago and Los Angeles: Bonus Books, 2003)

¹³ "The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties? From 'Terrorists' to 'Partners'," *U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee presentation to the U.S. Senate*, 31 March 1999. Accessed 26 April 2019 through web archive, <https://web.archive.org/web/20000816165402/https://www.senate.gov/~rpc/releases/1999/fr033199.htm>

¹⁴ *Balkan - Albania - Kosovo - Heroin - Jihad: Research Analysis* (Toronto: The Center for Peace in the Balkans, 2000)

¹⁵ Richard H. Immerman, *The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 65

¹⁶ James Bisset, "We created a monster," *Toronto Star*, July 31, 2001. Accessed March 18, 2019 through web archive, <https://web.archive.org/web/20080510052014/http://www.deltax.net/bissett/a-monster.htm>

¹⁷ Paul F. J. Aranas, *Smokescreen: The US, NATO and the Illegitimate Use of Force* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2012), 126

Europe's heroin supply was trafficked through the routes controlled by Kosovar Albanians¹⁸, with over 250 million U.S. dollars of annual revenue ending up in the KLA-affiliated structures¹⁹.

Such a wide variety of possible types of nexuses presents a new threat to the stability of the international security architecture: crystallisation of these alliances in the shadow sectors of the economy can negatively impact national safety and security, undermine good governance and restrain economic and social development. In this regard, countering this new scourge increasingly becomes an important challenge for national authorities and the international community at large.

In this regard, this study aims to highlight, map and analyse the changeable nature of the crime-terrorism nexus in different cases around the globe. Among the applicable variables are the geographic region, the scope and size of organisation, its main goals, and the level of integration of its criminal and terrorist activities. Nevertheless, the main focus variable is the way in which a terrorist organisation interacts with other political and social actors – namely, governments, ethnic diasporas or other criminal or terrorist organisations. The study places the terrorist organisations in the wider concept of linkage politics created by James N. Rosenau, exploring the ways in which various linkages terrorist groups display can impact the modalities of their involvement in criminal activities. The main research objectives, therefore, are as follows:

- 1) Study the modalities and map the scope of the groups' criminal activities, analysing the impact of the crimes the groups commit upon their operational capabilities;
- 2) Explore the types of linkages that prevail in the case-specific nexuses between crime and terrorism; study the evolution of such and characterise them in accordance with the methodological tools;
- 3) Examine the degree of causation between the linkage-based reactions of the group to external stimuli and the positioning of the terrorist group on the crime-terrorism convergence continuum

The research focuses on the activities of three different terrorist organisations – the Taliban, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) –

¹⁸ Peter Klebnikov, "Heroin Heroes," *Mother Jones*, January–February 2000: 64, <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/01/heroin-heroes/>

¹⁹ Gary T. Dempsey and Roger Fontaine, *Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2001), 138

that differ in scope and goals, but all use crime to fund their operations and the commission of terrorist offences. Due to the temporal difference in the peaks of terrorist and criminal activity of the aforementioned organisations, the timeline of the study focuses on the period from the last decade of the XX century until nowadays.

The research question, in this regard, is formulated as follows:

What is the role of linkage politics in determining the degree of involvement of terrorist organisations in the nexus between crime and terrorism around the globe?

This research question is particularly relevant in the light of the changes that the landscape of the terrorism threat is currently undergoing: the financial inflows to terrorist organisations stemming from illicit activities have grown significantly in comparison to pre-9/11 times, enabling said organisations to increase their operational capacity and challenge the security and safety of civilians all around the world. The reorganisation of IS that suffered massive military losses in Syria and Iraq, along with the shift in the nature of ASG's activities that become more and more closely aligned with the IS position this study in a unique context of a crucial point at the international counter-terrorism efforts. The threat analysed in the present dissertation is likely to become even more pressing, as more and more foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), especially from the former IS territory, join the ranks of returnees and relocators, leading to further internationalisation of financing and operational networks of large terrorist organisations.

While the topic of linkages between crime and terrorism has been assuming relevance in the scientific discourse, with many researchers studying this "nexus of evil", such studies mostly focus on the singular case studies on the matter. Therefore, while one could find many papers on the trade in oil and antiquities ISIS is involved in or FARC's gunrunning in Latin America, the conclusions they make are difficult to extrapolate since they are mostly rooted in organisation-specific features such as scope, operational conditions or ideology of organisation, which may render inductive conclusions based on a specific case invalid. Conversely, comparative studies with a focus upon the motivation driving the modus of the group's operation largely lack from the scientific discourse on the matter. A notable exception with regard to the comparative approach are the works of Tamara Makarenko, an author of the crime-terrorism continuum theory that would be extensively used in the present study. Nevertheless, Makarenko's studies are mostly concerned with mapping the current state of the terrorism-crime linkages in the multitude

of cases, rather than examining the triggers that made terrorist organisations move along the continuum or choose a modality of interaction with the criminal world when such interaction first happened.

This study, therefore, will seek to fill the aforementioned research gap by combining an introspective politico-sociological model of linkages created by James Rosenau with the deeply practice-based terror-crime continuum model created by Tamara Makarenko in order to perform a comparative analysis of the way in which the terror-crime nexus forms and shifts, depending not only on the structure of organisation, its supporter base or its scope but foremost – centrally to Rosenau’s model – the way it responds to external stimuli.

Theoretical framework

Linkage theory of James N. Rosenau.

One of the theoretical foundations of the study is presented by the linkages theory put forward by James N. Rosenau. Although the theory, formulated by Rosenau in "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy"²⁰ and further explored in "Linkage politics: essays on the convergence of national and international systems"²¹, originally was used by political scientists to analyse the way national and international politics interplay, the author argues that the same method could be applied to analysing any polity, without regard to which are the political or societal views it professes or which tactics it uses to further them.

Therefore, in the present study Rosenau's linkage politics theory is used to compare the types of nexuses existing between crime and terrorism with regard to the differences in their input (namely, was the terrorist organisation reacting to an external change or was the trigger of the nexus found within the organisational structure) and output (did the structure of organisation itself change or did the terrorist group have an effect upon the organisation of a criminal entity) of such. The three major types of linkages considered, as per Rosenau's theory, are the penetrative, the reactive and the emulative.

The penetrative linkage is characteristic of a situation in which members of one polity serve as participants in the processes of another and share the authority of allocating value. The definition of a penetrative linkage is further reflected upon by Andrew M. Scott in his work "The revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration", where he describes the concept of informal penetration – a situation in which agents of one polity (in Scott's example – of a state) interact directly with the objects or processes pertaining to another polity (the people governed or the processes of governance, but not the government itself)²². In the framework of this study, two scenarios of a penetrative linkage seem most likely – a formal penetrative linkage may be manifested as a factual takeover of a criminal organisation by a terrorist one (or vice-versa) in order to broaden the scope of actions available to the penetrating polity, while the informal penetrative linkage will most likely be represented by a terrorist organisation utilising the processes or the resources

²⁰ James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*, edited by R. Barry Farrell. (Evanston: NorthWestern University Press, 1966)

²¹ James N. Rosenau (ed.) and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, "Linkage politics: essays on the convergence of national and international systems" (New York: Free Press, 1969)

²² Andrew M. Scott, "The revolution in statecraft : informal penetration" (New York: Random House, 1967)

pertaining to a criminal group – i.e. trafficking routes, sources of funding or modalities of criminal activities. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, most likely, none of the described interactions will completely satisfy the stiff Rosenauian criteria of a penetrative linkage, which include the acceptance of the nonmembers' actions by the polity's government and its citizenry (that is, in our case, the leadership of a criminal group and everybody involved in its functioning), which results in the nonmembers' decisions getting authority and legitimacy. Therefore, the criteria of penetrative linkage set for the purpose of this study are based on a set of looser definitions by Andrew M. Scott, Wolfram F. Hanreider and Clair Karl Blong. Based on Hanreider's works, the author includes in the concept of a penetrative linkage the situations triggered by external events and trends that "take place without the direct and authoritative participation of nonmembers of the affected society"²³. Additionally, the definition employed by the author includes the expanded areas of penetration proposed by C. Blong – not just the allocation of society's values and mobilisation of support on behalf of its goals, as was originally noted by Rosenau, but also "selection of goals, allocation of costs, mobilisation of resources and integration of the polity"²⁴.

The reactive and emulative linkages that have not been subject to a semantics debate as the one described above are much easier to define. The reactive linkage is caused by boundary-crossing reactions without direct foreign participation in the decisions made within the unit. The margins of this phenomenon, with regard to this study, are the broadest of the three: a reactive linkage can be manifested, for example, by a reaction to an external Hanreiderian event (such as the challenges posed to the group's existence and its financial inflows by law enforcement) in a setting where the decision-making part of the affected terrorist or criminal group retains its capacity to formulate tactics (as compared to the penetrative linkage). However, it could also show the internalised reaction of one polity (such as the change in tactics employed to finance itself) to the shifts in another polity's strategies (such as the discovery of entirely new financing methods).

Finally, emulative linkage is similar to a reactive one, although it carries an additional value of the response taking essentially the same form as the action that triggered it. One can theorise that this will probably be the type of linkage most common in

²³ Wolfram F. Hanreider, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," in *The American Political Science Review*, 61, December 1967, 971-982

²⁴ Clair Karl Blong, *External Penetration and Foreign Policy Behavior*, PhD diss. (University of Maryland, 1975); as cited in Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977): XIV

the actions of terrorist organisations with relation to the crime-terror nexus, manifesting itself in a special case of the second type of reactive linkage described – that is, the method of functioning of terrorist organisations in the criminal landscape emulating the tactics, means and strategies the criminal syndicates use. Additionally, a fine line in this case needs to be drawn between emulative and penetrative linkages in case a funding source is finite – if there is a certain power-sharing tactic adopted among the criminal and terrorist organisations using the same source of funding, it would, most likely, present a type of an emulative linkage; whereas if a terrorist organisation seeks to take over the funding flows and routes of a criminal one (or vice-versa), we could speak of a special case of a penetrative linkage.

Finally, an important limitation to note is that not all cases discussed might fit in the Rosenau's theory for two reasons. Firstly, terrorist and criminal organisations can present in itself a highly disorganised polity that can have multiple centres of power, which may impede the researchers from using Rosenau's system that was originally sculpted to describe states or state-level organised actors, rather than loose internationalised networks of non-state groups. Secondly, and building upon the first argument, due to the a looser nature of the polities, some of the stimuli may be purely internal in a larger organisation, which may be described as a conglomerate of actors, and lead to an internalised output. However, with the interaction landscape for the chosen terrorist groups presenting a plethora of other actors (such as the law enforcement, allies in the terrorist environment and rivalling criminal groups), the author theorises that most of the cases researched will provide grounds for a Rosenauian analysis.

In addition to Rosenau's linkages, from the theoretic viewpoint the study may touch upon the concepts of correlation and causation to explore the ways in which criminal and terrorist activities of a group complement one another and whether this interplay is driven by a rational choice of financing techniques for terrorism activities or by an implicit desire to profit from crime, rather than solely continuing to fight for the professed ideology.

Exploring the crime-terror continuum theory

Another important concept for this study is the crime-terror continuum, a model of convergence between crime and terrorism presented by Tamara Makarenko in “The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism”. The continuum (see Figure 1 below) maps the evolution of the crime-terror nexus in terms of the changes in organisational dynamics and the operational nature of a terrorist or a criminal group.

In this continuum, a single group can move up and down the scale, depending on the environment in which it operates, thus passing through multiple interoperability points between crime and terrorism. According to Makarenko, since terrorist and criminal organisations exist on the same plane, it is almost impossible to affirm that a group that is profit-based or ideology-based will stay as such throughout its existence²⁵. Therefore, she argues, the process of blurring of the border between violence motivated by ideology and that motivated by financial gain presents a nascent challenge to law enforcement efforts in countering both terrorism and organised crime.




Figure 1. Crime-terrorism continuum

Adapted from: Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” *Global Crime* 6, no. 1 (September 8, 2010): 131 and subsequent works of Tamara Makarenko

²⁵ Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” *Global Crime* 6, no. 1 (September 8, 2010), <https://www.iracm.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/makarenko-global-crime-5399.pdf> : 130

The continuum is broken down into seven categories classifying various types of relationships in a nexus that can be divided into four general groups: alliances (1), operational motivations (2), convergence (3) and the fulcrum of the terrorism-crime nexus, the „Black hole“.

In the alliance phase – the first of the levels of cooperation – criminals and terrorists collaborate, to their mutual benefit, in order to exchange the skills, know-how, materials and support critical to the functioning of both groups without, however, resorting to the operational tactics of their ‘counterparts’²⁶. Should they do so, thus employing the skills they may have acquired in the first phase of cooperation, their interoperability would move to the second point of the crime-terror continuum. In the ‘operational motivations’ phase, a criminal or terrorist group starts to use both criminal and terrorist tactics²⁷– however, Makarenko notes, at this stage the group may tend to lean back towards the original operational structure to avoid possible security challenges related to alliance-style cooperation with their terrorist/criminal counterparts²⁸. At this stage criminal groups start using tactics inherent to terrorism against the government or against rival groups to strengthen their standing in the criminal world, whereas terrorists resort to organised crime to finance its operations and ensure the protracted existence of the group. An example of such linkage on the criminal side of the spectrum is the Italian Mafia in the end of the XX century that resorted to car-bomb attacks to force the government to negotiate with them. At the same time, many organisations using terrorist tactics started exploring possible ways of self-financing through crime – among the well-known cases is the drug trade of the FARC and *Sendero Luminoso*, extortion, robberies and arms trafficking of the *Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), drug trafficking and money laundering of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

It is interesting to note that while Makarenko notes that the "absence of foreign support"²⁹ can be one of the factors that pushes a terrorist group into the second phase, she, surprisingly, does not reference the 'War on Terror' as the primary CFT-related drive – however, she rightly suggests that many of such organisations lost their state-related funding as the result of the end of the Cold War. In this regard, it should be noted that the international counter-terrorism efforts of the early 2000s (mainly, in the immediate

²⁶ Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 130–132.

²⁷ Ibid., 133–134.

²⁸ Ibid., 135.

²⁹ Ibid.

aftermath of 9/11) have acted as a trigger for many groups – that might have previously received money from, or through the concerted negligence of, state governments – to bypass the first stage of the continuum and go straight to adopting criminal tactics, which were deemed critical for the survival of many organisations.

The interconnected convergence points present the third phase of the continuum. At this level, argues Makarenko, "hybrid groups" emerge. According to her, this represents the point of major instability in the group's aims and means – extensively employing both criminal and terrorist tactics, groups can shift affiliation, form and organisation, possibly crossing over to the other part of the spectrum. In this case, both political and criminal groups have departed from their original nature. While noting the similarity of the developments on both sides of the spectrum, Makarenko still characterises them as "commercial terrorism" and "political crime". In the first case, the group that operationally is now focused on mostly criminal deeds masks and justifies its activities with ideologically-loaded rhetoric to ensure the popular support of the base for their actions. Additionally, the group chooses not to abandon terrorism altogether in order to have an operational edge over other criminal groups and with an aim to ensure that the state perceives these attacks as ideologically-based and does not focus, in countering the challenge presented by this group, on its funding modalities.³⁰ This was the trend that was noticeable in the later development of some parts and splinters of the FARC, as well as in such organisations as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the ASG, which will form one of the case studies for the present dissertation. At the other end of the convergence spectrum described by Makarenko are the organised crime groups that seek political objectives while retaining their original financial motivation³¹. This includes both criminal organisations that use terrorist tactics to attempt and take over certain economic sectors and those that try to undermine the political or judicial processes in the country to ensure impunity for their actions and create a more fertile soil for their future criminal rent-seeking activities. Some of the interactions between the KLA and the "Albanian Mafia" that were discussed in the introduction amounted to political crime: the Mafia supplied the KLA with arms and military equipment, buying them with drug money – not just because they were operational partners, but because the "Albanian Mafia" itself was deeply linked to the Pan-Albanian ideas and politics KLA professed. An indicator of such was also the growing trend towards

³⁰ Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum," 178.

³¹ Ibid., 136-138.

dual membership in the groups, since the support and recruitment base was largely the same.

Makarenko further argues that when unabated, the convergence scenario can develop into the ultimate "nexus of evil" – the situation that she describes as the "black hole"³². This is most common in weak or failed states, when the conditions of impunity coupled with a prospect of vast economic gains lead to the hybrid criminal-terrorist organisations gaining control over sectors of economy, parts of government or territory, or the entire country's apparatus. With the popular support now swayed against the government, the situation, according to Makarenko, can result in two scenarios – an anarchic state in parts of the country due to political instability, such as in the case of Afghanistan, or the creation of a "criminal state" in which the representatives of such organisations made its way into the political mainstream and now use terror tactics to keep their tenure intact – which, in turn, allows them to maximise their profits from illegal activities and launder them.

This study will focus on the terrorism spectrum of Makarenko's continuum model to examine the ways in which terrorist organisations interacted with their criminal counterparts or engaged in criminal activities. Mapping the causation between the organisational reactions to external stimuli (that is, the type of Rosenau linkages their interaction with external actors represents) and the organisation's placement on and shifts along Makarenko's continuum, the author seeks to extrapolate a certain pattern of nexuses between the introspective system of Rosenau and the practice-based continuum of Makarenko. It is therefore hoped that the combination of the continuum model with the linkages theory will provide insight into the motivations of different crime groups choosing to partake in criminal activities, as well as into the question of how the scope and means of such participation are determined initially and change a posteriori. Should such model of a nexus between the two theories hold in practice, it may be used to predict the possible shifts of an organisation along Makarenko's continuum based on the types of linkages such organisation tends towards.

³² Ibid., 138-139.

State of the art of research on terror-crime linkages

In the scientific discourse on the linkages between crime and terrorism, Makarenko's continuum model continues to be a cornerstone concept used, supplemented and modified by the majority of researchers working in the field. While the conditions for the creation of the 'black hole' – arguably, one of the less studied levels of convergence in Makarenko's works – are still often critically discussed, the premise of the multilevelled cooperation on a singular continuum is widely accepted – as evidenced by the work of Helena Carrapico, Daniela Irrena, and Bill Tupman, who argue that Makarenko's continuum is the model that can best represent the fluid nature of the nexus³³. While many of the researchers may not directly reference the continuum model created by Makarenko, the premise that organised crime and terrorism can be found on the same plane is still permeating their works: for instance, McKenzie O'Brien's case study of the ASG showcases the historical fluctuations of the group throughout the spectrum of the intersecting terrorist and criminal activities³⁴, thus presenting a picture very akin to Makarenko's continuum.

Other researchers use Makarenko's model as a basis for the perception of the nexus, supplementing it with other theories to present a broader, political science-based analysis of the continuum. Such is the case of John Picarelli, who leans on the postinternationalist paradigm of James Rosenau to contextualise the crime-terror continuum³⁵. Picarelli argues that the compartmentalised view of terrorist and criminal groups as actors pursuing situational alliances but largely prone to acting outside of the nexus does not stand the test of the modern-day international relations, where the cooperation of non-state actors – as laid out by the concept of postinternationalism – assumes prime importance. For yet another group of researchers, Makarenko's model became a starting point for the creation of a more complicated axis systems characterising the 'nexus of evil': for example, Santiago Ballina and Sam Mullins, in their respective works, both propose a three-dimensional model to analyse the modalities of the linkages. For Ballina, whose research is largely driven by the idea that the main triggers for the terrorist organisation's interaction with crime lie in the social and cultural environment, the

³³ Helena Carrapico, Daniela Irrena, and Bill Tupman, "Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Different Peas, Same Pod?" *Global Crime* 15, no. 3–4, 2014: 213–215

³⁴ McKenzie O'Brien, "Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyaf's Kidnapping Activities," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 2, 2012: 332

³⁵ John T. Picarelli, "The Turbulent Nexus Of Transnational Organised Crime And Terrorism: A Theory of Malevolent International Relations," *Global Crime*, 7 no. 1, 2007, 1-24

three key characteristics are ideology, profit and social or cultural dimensions³⁶. Mullins, in turn, mirrors Makarenko in noting that organised crime and terrorism display methodological similarities and proposes a system based on methods, motives and profiles to further study the convergence points of crime and terrorism³⁷.

Nevertheless, yet another strand of thought on the crime-terror linkages argues that Makarenko's model largely disregards certain limitations that may prevent the nexus developing further than a simple situational alliance. This is the argument made by Steven Hutchinson and Pat O'Malley, who believe that the inherently different ideological characteristics of the terrorist and organised criminal groups make it improbable for them to "foster a symbiotic cooperation"³⁸. Hutchinson and O'Malley further cite the desire for individual operational security of both types of actors, the political or ideological motivations of terrorists and their resulting willingness to increase publicity of their action as several of the reasons that are likely to impede the formation of strong convergence (therefore, effectively contradicting the vast majority of Makarenko's continuum-based projections). A less defined version of a similar argument is also presented by Harmonie Toros and Luca Mavelli who make the case for the dichotomy between terrorism – acceding to them, a strictly political phenomenon – and rent-seeking organised crime³⁹. In their example, while certain level of alliances is not implausible, close-knit long-term convergence between the two actors is unlikely to happen due to a perceived difference in motivation. It is important to note, however, that while narratives similar to those presented by Hutchinson/O'Malley or Toros/Mavelli exist in the discourse on the topic, the vast majority of researchers accept Makarenko's paradigm of crime and terrorism essentially being two sides of the same coin. To criticise the compartmentalisation of these two increasingly interwoven issues that one could notice in Hutchinson/O'Malley's or Toros/Mavelli's works, Picarelli's postinternationalist argument – or a plethora of case studies showing the high proneness of the nexus towards further developing in its modalities – are often quoted.

³⁶ Santiago Ballina, "The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for the Study of Hybrid Criminal Organisations," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 6, no. 2, October 2011: 129–131

³⁷ Sam Mullins, "Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism: A Social Psychological Perspective," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, no. 9, August 27, 2009: 816

³⁸ Steven Hutchinson and Pat O'Malley, "A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality," *Studies in Conflict Terrorism*, 30(12), 2007, 1096

³⁹ Harmonie Toros and Luca Mavelli, "Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Biopolitics of Violence," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6, no. 1, April 5, 2013: 73–74

Methodology. Presenting the case studies.

The study will largely be based on the inductive method of reasoning, with the three case studies forming the backbone of the research and the conclusions stemming largely from the differences and similarities of the interplay between characteristics of the behaviour of terrorist groups pertaining to Rosenau's linkages and to Makarenko's continuum theory. Each case will be analysed according to the same structure to identify common trends that may be used to predict the possible position of a group on the continuum from examining its Rosenauian reactions.

The research will mostly extract data from the documents available publicly or stemming from UNODC's material holdings, such as the reports of different states and international organisations on specific crime types, as well as the crime-terror nexus at large. Scientific articles, publications and monographs will be used to conceptualise the case studies, and news articles will provide the context and the background for the analysis of each of the terrorist organisations.

The three cases that were chosen for analysis in this dissertation present quite a diverse scene – the organisations stem from different parts of the world, proclaim different aims and use different means to reach these. Nevertheless, all of them show, in one degree or another, signs of involvement in the criminal world. The cases all reflect the certain specifics of terrorist action and the nexus in the region in an attempt to broadly characterise the types of this nascent threat around the world. Therefore, the organisations chosen that would be discussed in more detail later are as follows:

- 1) The Taliban, active in Afghanistan and Pakistan;
- 2) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, mostly active in Sri Lanka;
- 3) The Abu Sayyaf Group, focusing its actions on the Philippines.

Taliban

The linkage between terrorist activities of the Taliban and its participation in drug cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan is, perhaps, one of the most famous examples of the 'nexus of evil'. Having used drug trafficking as a way to offset the costs of a full-fledged warfare the group has been waging against the government of Afghanistan and the allied forces in the region, Taliban has even developed a drug proto-policy on the area it

controlled⁴⁰. Severely punishing individual drug consumption, the Taliban, at the same time, taxed the laboratories, farms, routes and convoys by which opiates moved through their territories. The rationalisation of this was put in the framework of the extremist ideology the Taliban professed: the opium and heroin that were trafficked were mostly bound for Europe and the US, thus serving as a weapon against the 'infidels'. Annual estimates of the Taliban's profits from drug trade lie between 75 and 100 million US dollars.⁴¹

This study will use the Taliban's example to explore how a terrorist organisation with a solid support base on the ground existing in conditions of quasi-impunity due to its physical control of the territory uses crime as one of the main sources of financing its own activities. The case of the Taliban, having received major attention from many researchers, will serve as an anchor point of comparison for the other cases that present more peculiar types of linkages than the classic Taliban example.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a violent extremist group with a separatist agenda, fought the government forces and terrorised the population of Sri Lanka for over 30 years in an effort to gain independence for the northern and eastern territories of the island in order to create a new state for the Tamil people. One of the main factors that allowed them to exist for such a long period, surviving several massive offensive operations, was their sophisticated support network. To support the military, intelligence and political apparatus, Tamil Tigers used a vast array of financing techniques – from legitimate fundraising activities that the World Tamil Coordinating Committee (WTCC), LTTE's front organisation, carried out across the world, to participation in a multitude of criminal activities. Among the confirmed cases of such linkages were the instances of sea

⁴⁰ Alain Labrousse, "The FARC and the Taliban's Connection to Drugs," *Journal of Drug Issues* 35(1), 2005, 169–184

⁴¹ Hutchinson and O'Malley, "A Crime–Terror Nexus?": 1095–1107

piracy⁴², human smuggling⁴³, drug trade⁴⁴, gunrunning⁴⁵, credit card fraud⁴⁶, cyber attacks⁴⁷ and passport forgery⁴⁸. However, the financing operation of the LTTE that had a truly global reach was focused mainly on their compatriots – when some members of the Tamil diaspora chose not to surrender portions of their earnings to LTTE's affiliates voluntarily, the Tamil Tigers used a variety of extortion techniques against them to make sure that they receive more funds to hand over to the main forces in Sri Lanka.

This study will map the unique linkage of the Tamil Tigers – who, due to their decades-long tenure and deeply entrenched governance structures, could be characterised as an organized-enduring terrorist group (as opposed to ephemeral-sporadic ones) – and their affiliates all over the world that repeatedly extorted money from the members of the diaspora to finance the liberation struggle led by the Tamil Tigers. The global span of their activities coupled with the precise targeting of diaspora elements allowed the Tamil Tigers to operate criminally superior, in terms of revenue, to many crime groups for several decades. Having established cells in thirty-eight countries in Europe, North America, and the Middle-East rooted upon the Tamil diaspora in these countries⁴⁹, the LTTE succeeded in creating a financing network that could not be controlled by the Sri-Lankan government, thus enabling their prolonged existence and a source of continued funding.

While briefly describing other criminal activities of the LTTE that formed an inherent part of the crime-terror linkage in this case, the present study will focus on the interrelations between the operational wing of the Tamil Tigers and their worldwide

⁴² Peter Lehr, *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 26–27

⁴³ Angel Rabasa and others, *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), 101–108

⁴⁴ Walter Jayawardhana, "Jane's intelligence review says LTTE controls a portion of Montreal's USD 1b drug trade," *Ministry of Defense and Urban Development of Sri Lanka*, December 12, 2010, Accessed through web archive March 10, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20120923173136/http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20070823_05

⁴⁵ John Thompson, "Other people's wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism in Canada," *The Mackenzie Institute*, June 2003: 46, Accessed through web archive April 8, 2019: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140203022234/http://pdf.edocr.com/3396e330692c0396edad12ebff090e8bc6b63d37.pdf>

⁴⁶ Asif Fuard, "Tiger paw in the credit card scam," *The Sunday Times*, March 30, 2008, sundaytimes.lk/080330/News/news0021.html

⁴⁷ Kenneth Einar Himma, *Internet security: hacking, counterhacking, and society* (Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2007): 129

⁴⁸ "Sri Lanka: Alien Smuggling," *Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada*, 1 May 1996, www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8660.html

⁴⁹ Hutchinson and O'Malley, "A Crime–Terror Nexus?"

extortion networks to examine this peculiar linkage from the standpoints of Rosenau's and Makarenko's theories.

Abu Sayyaf Group

Kidnapping for ransom has been one of the first criminal activities terrorists started using in the XX century to finance terrorist activities of their organisations. By late 2010s, the majority of large-scale terrorist groups focused on other, often more profitable types of crime and almost abandoned this practice – however, in some regions of the world it is still largely intact. An example of its protracted use is the Abu Sayyaf Group – a violent extremist organisation previously linked to Al Qaeda that became aligned with the Islamic State in 2014. Having started with kidnappings of tourists and aid workers in southern Philippines⁵⁰, the organisation quickly racked up the numbers and started acting as a criminal quasi-syndicate using kidnapping for ransom as a way not just to finance its terrorist activities, but also to enrich its leadership. It has been estimated that in 2000 alone, kidnapping deals garnered Abu Sayyaf \$20 million⁵¹.

The original political aim pursued by ASG was the establishment of an independent Islamic republic in the territory currently comprising Mindanao, surrounding islands, and the Sulu Archipelago. While at certain moments in the group's history it seemed as if there was little indication of the group's adherence to this goal, with criminal activities overshadowing the original politically charged operations they were supposed to finance, after 2014 the organisation leaned back upon its radical Islamist agenda – not giving up, however, the rent-seeking kidnapping.

ASG presents an extremely interesting case study of an organisation that, throughout its history, has fluctuated between crime and politically motivated terrorism, basing its choices upon the changing situation on the ground and the sentiment inside the organisation. With a rich history of such shifts in the behaviour of ASG, it is expected that this case will significantly contribute to the understanding of the interplay between Rosenau's linkages and the crime-terror continuum – however, it is important to make a reservation by noting that some of the triggers for the shifts in the continuum in ASG's case might bear non-Rosenauian nature.

⁵⁰ Terry Anderson, "Painful Lessons: Hostage-Taking and US Foreign Policy," *Harvard International Review* 20(4) (1998): 62–66.

⁵¹ Brian Joyce, "Terrorist financing in Southeast Asia," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 14, no. 11 (November 2002)

Case Study I: Taliban's drug trade in Afghanistan

Historical background of the Taliban

The Taliban, one of the world's most notorious Islamic fundamentalist movements currently recognised as a terrorist organisation in Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Russia and the UAE, are the umbrella group for multiple militarised groups forming the Afghan insurgency who, at the height of their power, controlled almost 3/4 of the entire territory of Afghanistan. Aside from the main entity, the Taliban itself, and multiple smaller affiliates, the group is closely aligned with and semi-encompasses the violent Haqqani network that draws on its own fundraising efforts, but advances Taliban's objectives⁵², and the splinter Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) group that focuses on overthrowing the Pakistani government. The core of the Taliban, according to a 2014 estimation, included over 60,000 fighters⁵³, allowing the organisation to effectively attack the positions of the central government in an effort to seize control of more territory. In the last few years, the group was rapidly gaining ground, having controlled or contested, in 2017, up to 45% of the Afghan territory⁵⁴. According to the report of the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), in 2018 the Taliban controlled the largest percentage of Afghan territory since the wake of the 2001 intervention⁵⁵. It was estimated that since 2015, the government has lost grip on over 15% of the territory it controlled, sliding from 72% to 55,5%⁵⁶. This subchapter will discuss the historical context of Taliban's presence in Afghanistan, setting the stage for the analysis of their criminal activities on and beyond the territories that are referred to, by Taliban, as the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" (IEA).

⁵² Eric Schmitt, "Taliban Fighters Appear Blunted in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, December 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/world/asia/27policy.html?_r=0.

⁵³ "Despite Massive Taliban Death Toll, No Drop in Insurgency," *Voice of America*, March 6, 2014, <http://www.voanews.com/content/despite-massive-taliban-death-toll-no-drop-in-insurgency/1866009.html>.

⁵⁴ Bill Roggio and Alexandra Gutowski, "LWJ Map Assessment: Taliban controls or contests 45% of Afghan districts," *Long War Journal*, September 26, 2017, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/09/lwj-map-assessment-taliban-controls-or-contests-45-of-afghan-districts.php>.

⁵⁵ Kara Fox, "Taliban control more territory in Afghanistan than at any point since 2001, US inspector says," *CNN*, November 1, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/01/middleeast/afghanistan-report-taliban-gains-control-intl/index.html>.

⁵⁶ "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," *Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction*, October 30, 2018, <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-10-30qr.pdf>;

The name of the movement, stemming from the Pashto word "students", reflects the primary composition of the organisation when it was first created in 1994. The militant organisation's initial aim was the establishment, in Afghanistan, of a state ruled according to Deobandi Islam principles. The core of the organisation was made of students coming from religious schools or *madrassas*, with many of them, including the creator of the group Mullah Mohammad Omar, having received prior training as *mujahideen* during the Soviet intervention from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI)⁵⁷. According to professor Carole Hillenbrand, the Taliban was largely the result of the support of the U.S., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for the anti-Soviet *mujahideen*: according to her, "The West helped the Taliban to fight the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan"⁵⁸. The involvement of the ISI sought to create a new regime in Afghanistan, which would be more favourable towards Pakistan. Nevertheless, the nature and degree of interlinkages between Pakistan and Taliban is sometimes contested: some of the researchers, such as Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, experts on the history of the Taliban, note that already on the early stages the movement showed signs of increasing independence from ISI and Pakistan's scheming: "the connection [between Pakistan and Taliban] was fragile and statements from both the Pakistani ISI and the Taliban early on demonstrated the uneasy nature of the relationship. The ISI and Pakistan aimed to exert control, while the Taliban leadership manoeuvred between keeping its independence and sustaining support."⁵⁹ However, even if it could be argued that Taliban was trying to pursue its own political agenda, it is impossible to deny that many of its military successes stemmed from Pakistan's involvement: according to Larry Goodson, "Pakistani support for the Taliban included direct and indirect military involvement [and] logistical support"⁶⁰.

By early 1995, Taliban has already conquered 12 Afghan provinces, with little to no resistance and even with popular support – at these stages, it was due to the fact that the Taliban professed that they would counter corruption, curb lawlessness and make citizens safer.⁶¹ With the Taliban taking over the majority of Afghanistan's territory, Omar's forces

⁵⁷ Brenda Shaffer, *The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006): 267

⁵⁸ Carole Hillenbrand, *Islam: A New Historical Introduction* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2015): 284

⁵⁹ Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, *An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 121-122

⁶⁰ Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002): 111

⁶¹ "Mapping Militant Organizations: The Taliban," *Stanford University*, upd. 15 July 2016, Accessed June 1, 2019, web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/367

focused on capturing Kabul. After a year-long standoff with the interim government's forces, the Taliban entered Kabul in September 1996, proclaiming the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and moving the capital of the newly-founded IEA to Kandahar. This started the period of "talibanisation" of Afghanistan.

By 1998, the Taliban already controlled 90% of the Afghan territory, enforcing on it a strict Deobandi interpretation of Sharia law. The conditions on the ground during their rule were becoming increasingly dire: at the time Taliban took reins in 1996, the economy and infrastructure were devastated by two decades of continuous wars, the socioeconomic safety net provided by the clan structure was decaying, and basic amenities like water and electricity supply, housing and energy were largely lacking. The radical islamisation efforts undertaken by the Taliban, coupled with the ongoing civil war that provoked a stream of refugees from the Mazar, Herat and Shomali regions further hardened the living conditions.

The country's population was largely dependent upon the aid provided by international charitable and development organisations operating in the region – including the United Nations, the largest purveyor of development aid at the time. However, the Taliban's sentiment towards such development aid and its providers was highly suspicious, if not outright hostile. This was due to several reasons: the Taliban was indignant that it was not being recognised by the UN as a legitimate government of Afghanistan – but more importantly, they saw the UN and other NGOs as proxies for Western values largely incompatible with the Deobandi ideology the Taliban professed. In a 1997 interview, Maulvi Jalil-ullah Maulvizada, the Attorney General of the Taliban characterised the involvement of the United Nations in Afghanistan as follows:

Let us state what sort of education the UN wants. This is a big infidel policy which gives such obscene freedom to women which would lead to adultery and herald the destruction of Islam. In any Islamic country where adultery becomes common, that country is destroyed and enters the domination of the infidels because their men become like women and women cannot defend themselves. Anyone who talks to us should do so within Islam's framework. The Holy Koran cannot adjust itself to other people's requirements, people should adjust themselves to the requirements of the Holy Koran.⁶²

⁶² Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000): 111–112.

This statement is largely demonstrative of the sentiment that reigned among Taliban's decision-makers. In that spirit, the Taliban government has started creating severe hindrances to the work of foreign aid providers: in 1997, Mullah Omar demanded that the non-Muslim UN staff working in Afghanistan were swapped for Muslims, and when the UN increased the number of female Muslim staff accordingly, the Taliban then demanded that all Muslim women working for the UN were accompanied by a blood relative chaperon. After a September 1997 incident, when a female UNHCR staff was forced to conceal herself behind the curtain while speaking, heads of three UN agencies based in Kandahar voiced their protest to this practice and were subsequently expelled from the country⁶³. An even harsher crackdown followed in 1998: in July, after NGOs refused to move offices to a severely damaged building of the former Polytechnic college, the Taliban closed all NGO offices in the controlled territory, and the UN offices followed the feat in a month. Nevertheless, Taliban's officials kept claiming that abandoning Afghanistan was the organisations' own choice: "If the foreign NGOs leave then it is their decision. We have not expelled them,"⁶⁴ – stated Taliban's Planning Minister Qari Din Mohammed.

Marred by human rights abuses and the cooperation with al-Qaeda (the Taliban regime sheltered Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda operatives, as well as provided training for many of AQ's fighters), Afghanistan's Taliban government was increasingly becoming a pariah in international relations. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the only three countries that recognised the Taliban government, with the majority of the international community supporting the main political opposition – the militarised Northern Alliance front led by Ahmed Shah Massoud that was fighting against the Taliban in the civil war. However, the Western countries had not provided large-scale material or military support to Massoud until 1998, when the U.S. launched air strikes targeting sites allegedly connected with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as a response to the terrorist acts in the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania perpetrated by al-Qaeda affiliates. The anti-Taliban drive was soon joined by the United Nations, with the Security Council adopting the resolution 1333(2000) which imposed wide sanctions on the Taliban government.

The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks became a turning point in the Afghan history: after the Taliban again refused to extradite Osama Bin Laden to the U.S., the United States-led coalition forces with the support of the Northern Alliance have launched a military offensive

⁶³ Ibid., 65

⁶⁴ "Taliban reject warnings of aid pull-out," *Agence France-Presse*, July 16, 1998

that succeeded in retaking control of Kabul. Mullah Omar, along with the bulk of Taliban's leadership, escaped to safe houses in southern Afghanistan and Quetta, Pakistan. At a UN-facilitated Bonn conference, Afghanistan's transitional government was elected, headed by Hamid Karzai. After the ratification of the new constitution in December 2003, elections for the presidential post were held, with Karzai reconfirming his mandate.

However, the threat of Taliban did not disappear – it just changed the vector. After several years of regrouping, Taliban reemerged as an insurgent movement and used the slowing momentum of U.S. military action – which was due to relocation of large amounts of troops to the now full-fledged war in Iraq – to launch a series of attacks, which included guerrilla warfare and many suicide bombings – a modality that Taliban rarely used before. The results of the U.S. response – a massive surge in the military contingent in Afghanistan – brought mixed results: while several provinces and the city of Kandahar were cleared from Taliban fighters, the group still remained highly functional from the operational viewpoint, and the situation in the provinces adjacent to Pakistan stayed almost unchanged.

Since that moment until nowadays, the Taliban and the central government have been engaged in on-and-off warfare. The security situation continues to deteriorate, with the only short intermissions in the warfare relating to the peace process and the negotiations on political settlement. Such talks started largely after 2012, when Taliban opened a political office in Doha – however, the first round fell apart after two month. After that, several efforts were made to restart the process, none of them to much avail. Mullah Mansoor, who became Omar's successor in 2015, was believed to be the most viable settlement partner – however, its fallout with the political bureau of the Taliban over the modalities of the peace process (Mansoor advocated for the Pakistan-backed talks, whereas the bureau believed that only the Doha office should be allowed to negotiate on behalf of the organisation) and his subsequent death from a U.S. drone strike derailed the negotiations. Meanwhile, the security on the ground continues to deteriorate, with recorded civilian casualties in 2015 surpassing the numbers of any of the post-intervention years.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ David Jolly, "Afghanistan Had Record Civilian Casualties in 2015, U.N. Says," *The New York Times*, February 14, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/15/world/asia/afghanistan-record-civilian-casualties-2015-united-nations.html>

Modalities of functioning of the crime-terrorism linkage

As was discussed in the previous subchapter, one of the principal actors in the creation of the Taliban was Pakistan's intelligence service - the ISI. The connection between Pakistan and the militant group continued long after its formation – according to Pakistani expert on Afghanistan Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban⁶⁶". These numbers included both regular Pakistani military, many of whom were sent to fight alongside the Taliban by the then Army Chief of Staff Pervez Musharraf, and volunteers proselytised in Pakistani *madrassas*. A document released by the US State Department in 1998 stated that "20 to 40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani".⁶⁷ The report also stressed that many of these Pakistanis stemmed from the Frontier Corps and from the regular Pakistani army.

Human Rights Watch, in its 2000 report on Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan, wrote:

Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting [in Afghanistan], Pakistan is distinguished both by the sweep of its objectives and the scale of its efforts, which include soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and [...] directly providing combat support.⁶⁸

Military support of the ISI did not only target the Taliban, but also went to al-Qaeda operatives in the Taliban-controlled territory. According to the reports of the British Intelligence, ISI-created camps trained many al-Qaeda cadres that went on to fight with

⁶⁶ William Maley, *The Afghanistan wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 288

⁶⁷ Barbara Elias, "Pakistan: 'The Taliban's Godfather? Documents Detail Years of Pakistani Support for Taliban, Extremists,'" *National Security Archive, George Washington University*, August 14, 2007 www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm#17

⁶⁸ "Pakistan's support of the Taliban," *Human Rights Watch*, Accessed March 8, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm>

the Taliban against the United Alliance⁶⁹. For providing military support and material aid to the Taliban, Pakistan was repeatedly criticised by the U.S.⁷⁰, Russia⁷¹, Iran⁷² and other countries; while imposing an arms embargo on the Taliban territory via Security Council resolution S/RES/1333(2000), UN officials specifically singled out Pakistan. However, seemingly nothing could reverse this trend – until the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Taliban, ostracised by the international community for the refusal to hand over Bin Laden, became a toxic asset, and Pakistan ceased much of the military and economic cooperation with the Taliban it used to have. While it was still involved in certain military operations – such as their help to the retreating Taliban forces⁷³ – including the notorious Kanduz airlift, in which the operatives of Taliban, Al Qaeda and the ISI were evacuated to Pakistani air bases on Pakistan Army aircraft⁷⁴ – Pakistan largely ceased to be financially involved in dealings with the Taliban⁷⁵.

It is important to note that pre-2001 Pakistani aid to the Taliban was not limited to just the military component: a significant part of the group's daily operations was made possible due to direct financing coming from Pakistan. In 1997 alone, after the Taliban took over Kabul, Pakistan transmitted to the Taliban government \$30 million in financial aid and a further \$10 million to cover the government wages⁷⁶. After 2001, when the financial flows from Pakistan were largely ceased, the Taliban found itself left to its own devices.

During the times when the Taliban controlled a major part of Afghanistan's territory, especially up to 1996, the Taliban government chose to finance its operations with large taxes – any company operating in the country was subject to a 50% revenue tax, and a

⁶⁹ Robert Litwak, *Regime change: U.S. strategy through the prism of 9/11* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007): 309.

⁷⁰ Mark Kukis and Eli J. Lake, "U.S. presses for bin Laden's ejection," *The Washington Times*, July 2, 2001

⁷¹ "Pak involved in Taliban offensive – Russia," *Express India*, August 12, 1998, Accessed through web archive April 20, 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20050128030041/http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19980812/22450054.html>

⁷² Pamela Constable, "Afghanistan: Arena for a New Rivalry," *The Washington Post*, September 16, 1998

⁷³ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007): 49

⁷⁴ Seymour M. Hersh, "The Getaway," *The New Yorker*, January 28, 2002, www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/020128fa_FACT

⁷⁵ One could theorise that such a shift has been a result of the resolve of the U.S. on the issue, with Richard Armitage, the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, allegedly proclaiming that if Pakistan were not to cease their financial support for the Taliban, it would be "bombed back to the stone age" – quoted according to Pervez Musharraf, *In the line of fire: a memoir* (New York: The Free Press, 2006): 201

⁷⁶ Daniel Byman, *Deadly connections: states that sponsor terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 195.

6% tax on anything brought into Afghanistan was established.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Transit treaty that was established between Afghanistan and Pakistan provided an influx of revenue to the Taliban: it was estimated that the Taliban received between \$100 and \$130 million from smuggling activities along the route. In addition to that, the Afghan Transit Trade (in its official channel) was characterised as "the largest official source of revenue for the Taliban"⁷⁸.

However, already in the end of the XX century, the Taliban has started interacting with the poppy agriculture that was a major source of revenue for the population. Reversing its opinion on the previously condoned trade in narcotics emanating from poppy, between 1996 and 1999, Mullah Omar has created a drug quasi-policy on the area the Taliban controlled. While individual drug consumption was still severely punished, the laboratories, farms where the poppy was harvested and opium was produced, as well as routes and convoys by which opiates moved through their territories, were heavily taxed.⁷⁹ With Taliban, at the height of its power, controlling 96% of Afghanistan's poppy fields, opiates have become the largest source of its taxation revenue, with the Helmand province converting into the organisation's war chest. This enrichment was conveniently covered with an ideological pretence: since the trafficked opium and heroin were mostly bound for Europe and the US, the Taliban claimed that the drugs presented yet another weapon in the war against the *kafirs*. The profits made from taxing opium farmers, as well as those from controlling the production and outflows of illicit drugs, quickly became the main part of Taliban's economy, funding "the weapons, ammunition and fuel for the war"⁸⁰. By the end of the XX century, according to Wahidullah Sabawoon, the United Front's Finance Minister, the Taliban was mainly reliant upon three sources of funding: "poppy, the Pakistanis and bin Laden"⁸¹. While the influence of the latter upon the financial inflows is largely disputed⁸², and the Pakistani flow of funding was largely depleted post 9/11, the Taliban redoubled its efforts to gain money from the drug trade.

⁷⁷ Michael C. Pugh and Neil Cooper Jonathan Goodhand, *War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004): 48.

⁷⁸ Neamatollah Nojum, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Region* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2002): 186.

⁷⁹ Labrousse, "The FARC and the Taliban's Connection to Drugs": 169–184.

⁸⁰ Nojum, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*: 186.

⁸¹ Labrousse, "The FARC and the Taliban's Connection to Drugs" : 169–184.

⁸² Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006): 222–223

It is interesting to note that at the turn of the centuries the Taliban sought to operationalise its linkages to the drug trafficking routes as a medium of influence upon its international relations and its stance on the international arena, rather than merely as a means of financing. According to the experts' estimates, by 2000, Afghanistan, accounting for 75% of the world's opium supply, produced an estimated 3276 metric tonnes of opium⁸³. In this situation, faced with already large existing stockpiles (1999 had yielded a record crop), Mullah Omar issued a decree prohibiting the further cultivation of opium, which was a twofold move: firstly, it was meant to bolster Taliban's bid for legitimacy on the international arena and international recognition; secondly, it was projected that, with Afghanistan being a major player in the world's drug trafficking routes, the ban would raise opium prices, bringing extra revenue for the sale of existing stockpiles. Continuing the selling throughout 2000 and 2001, Taliban was unable to reach its political goal, instead authorising the peasants, shortly before 9/11, to harvest opium again.

The beginning of the allied intervention did not significantly change the scenario: in late 2001, poppy seed agriculture and related trade in opium and heroin funded over 60% of the Taliban's activities⁸⁴. As the hostilities continued, this number gradually dropped, – mostly due to military successes of the allied forces in the Helmand and neighbouring provinces – reaching 40% in 2008⁸⁵. Nevertheless, the linkages continued to be vast: a 2008 UNODC report noted that in 2007 Afghanistan became "practically the exclusive supplier of the world's deadliest drug"⁸⁶, taking up 93% of the global market of opiates. The revenue from these sales in the same year surpassed half of the country's licit GDP, and the value of the narcotics continued increasing along the trafficking chain, reaching retail prices of up to ten times of the wholesale price, which, itself, increased tenfold in the end markets when compared to Afghanistan⁸⁷. The report concludes: "leaving aside 19th

⁸³ Labrousse, Ibid.

⁸⁴ "Mapping Militant Organizations: The Taliban," *Stanford University*

⁸⁵ "Taliban set to double opium profits this year?" *CBSNews*, May 5, 2015, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghanistan-taliban-double-opium-income-new-strain-high-yield-poppy-seed/>

⁸⁶ "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007," *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* (Kabul: UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan, 2008), <https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan-Opium-Survey-2007.pdf>, :iii

⁸⁷ According to the report, "The wholesale price of a gram of heroin is, on average, \$2.50 in Afghanistan, \$3.50 in Pakistan and Iran, \$8 in Turkey, \$12 in Albania, \$18 in Slovenia or Slovakia, \$22 in Germany, \$30 in the United Kingdom, and \$33 in Russia. Retail prices can be up to ten times as high as wholesale prices, also because of "cutting" that mixes the drug with other substances." Ibid.

century China that had a population at that time 15 times larger than today's Afghanistan, no other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale"⁸⁸.

Influenced mostly by military outcomes, as well as by weather conditions, the Taliban's yield of poppy and narcotics produced thereof largely fluctuated in the following decade, culminating in 2017⁸⁹. According to the 2018 UNODC report, the poppy agriculture became firmly integrated into the stream of financial activities of the Taliban, "fuelling insecurity, violence and insurgency"⁹⁰. This illicit part of the economy also became a crucial component of the daily lives of the population, firmly permeating many rural communities. The report notes that poppy was cultivated in more than a third villages in Western and Northern Afghanistan, over a half of villages in the East and almost 85% of those in the Southern provinces, with "opium poppy weeding and harvesting provid[ing] the equivalent of up to 354,000 full time jobs to rural areas"⁹¹.

One of the best insights into the modalities of the functioning of the crime-terrorism nexus with relation to Taliban's involvement in drug production and trafficking is presented by the 2015 Security Council report on the specific cases of cooperation between organised crime syndicates and individuals/entities listed or eligible for listing under the Security Council resolution 2160 (2014) sanctions list. The report notes that "while the Taliban have cooperated with criminal networks in Afghanistan since the 1990s, [...] the scale and depth of this cooperation is new"⁹². According to the report, in some cases, the Taliban generated resources by acting as a criminal syndicate, while in other occasions, cooperation with criminal networks was used to profit off illicit activities such as drug trafficking.

Report further notes that the Taliban's involvement with drug trafficking can be split into two large groups: cooperation with drug cartels that provide money laundering

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace and Security," *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* (Vienna: UNODC, 2018), <https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Opium-survey-peace-security-web.pdf>: 7

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ "Last year's record opium production in Afghanistan threatens sustainable development, latest survey reveals," *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*, May 21, 2018, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2018/May/last-years-record-opium-production-in-afghanistan-threatens-sustainable-development--latest-survey-reveals.html>

⁹² "Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on specific cases of cooperation between organized crime syndicates and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2160 (2014)," *United Nations Security Council / United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan*, February 2, 2015, <https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/20150209%202160-I-p-special-report.pdf>: 3

services and finance the movement; and direct participation of the organisation in the production and trafficking activities. With regard to the first facet, the report references the pre-2001 operations of the Noorzai tribe narcotics cartels (headed by Hajji Bashar Noorzai, Hajji Birgit and Hafizullah Khan⁹³) as a prominent example of drug lords who funnelled money to the movement and even participated, albeit at an advisory level, in decision-making. Although after the invasion some of the drug traffickers initially seemed reluctant to put their support behind Taliban – or even attempted to cooperate with ISAF, as Hajji Bashar Noorzai (who was subsequently arrested in the U.S. and convicted on heroin trafficking charges⁹⁴), the majority of the drug kingpins rekindled their support for the movement post-2002 (when the targeting by the allied forces of a narcotics lord Hajji Berget drove Hajji Bashar and Hajji Baghcho back to supporting the Taliban). The report further lists Abdul Habib Alizai and his Etehad Beverage Company Ltd., as well as Lahore Jan, and his *hawala*-style Lahore Jan Shanwari Exchange, as examples of persons who laundered money for the Taliban, while Hajji Juma Khan, his Hajji Juma Khan Organization and the linked New Ansari Money Exchange are quoted as examples of direct financing of the Taliban by drug-related actors. Another interesting case is that of the Ishaqzay syndicate, the close relatives of the members of which were fighting with the Taliban – a fact that allegedly led Hajji Fatah Ishaqzay, the head of the syndicate, to offer financial help to the Taliban and provide in-kind donation by treating the Taliban fighters free of charge in the hospital run by the syndicate.

However, this modality of cooperation is not the most profitable activity in which the Taliban engages. Multiple reports⁹⁵ also note that the Taliban had a long-established practice of collecting *ushr* - a 10% tax on the proceeds from opium cultivation - both in Helmand province⁹⁶ and beyond it⁹⁷. Tax is also levied in "poppy-free" provinces, such as

⁹³ Carlotta Gall, *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014)

⁹⁴ Benjamin Weiser, "Afghan linked to Taliban sentenced to life in drug trafficking case", *The New York Times*, May 1, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/nyregion/01sentence.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=44865B81740B18B2F9C1D5F9C7E3AD49&gwt=pay>

⁹⁵ "Fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2082 (2012) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan," *United Nations Security Council*, June 10, 2014, <https://undocs.org/S/2014/402>

⁹⁶ "First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities," *United Nations Security Council*, September 5, 2012, <https://undocs.org/S/2012/683>

⁹⁷ Gretchen Peters, *How Opium Profits the Taliban*, Peaceworks no.62 (August 2009), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf

Paktia, where farmers may participate in growing marijuana⁹⁸. Furthermore, the Taliban also exerts influence over the process of production and export of narcotics. It has been often noted that Taliban training camps, especially in poppy-rich provinces such as Helmand or Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan, were sometimes located near heroin laboratories⁹⁹. The abundance of such laboratories was further cited to be the reason for the Taliban's forces perseverance in capturing or defending certain districts¹⁰⁰. With regard to export, the UNSC report notes the closest alignment of the interests of terrorist and criminal groups in Afghanistan, citing the case of one of the already mentioned heads of the Noorzai clans, Hajji Kotwal Noorzai. In exchange for weapons and logistical support Noorzai provided to the Taliban, the terrorist group agreed not to disturb the crops and the farmers controlled by the kingpin and facilitated the export route for the narcotics produced by the syndicate. The alliance was finally cemented with the appointing of Hajji Kotwal as a tax collector and overseer of other narcotics traffickers in the Girdi Jangle region. This appointment, sealed by the Quetta Shura, Taliban's ruling organ, is the most vivid demonstration of the closest degree of relations between the Taliban and the drug trafficking syndicates in Afghanistan¹⁰¹.

Applying Rosenau and Makarenko's models to the Taliban case

While analysing the Taliban case from the perspective of Rosenau's model, it is important to note that in the decades of Taliban's development, change in form and shifts in policy, the organisation has experienced a multitude of push and pull factors – to some of them, Rosenauian characteristics can be attributed, while others solely bear an internal character. In Rosenauian linkages, the Taliban has manifested itself both as a subject of a linkage, being on a receiving end of an impulse, and as an independent actor that created stimuli that other polities reacted to. With regard to Makarenko's model, the Taliban, being

⁹⁸ "Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on specific cases of cooperation between organized crime syndicates and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2160 (2014)" : 9

⁹⁹ David Mansfield, *'From bad they made it worse': the concentration of opium poppy in areas of conflict in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar* (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014)

¹⁰⁰ "Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on specific cases of cooperation between organized crime syndicates and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2160 (2014)" : 5-6

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

a conglomerate of national and international-level actors, have also displayed multiple convergence points in its relations with the organised crime, engaging with the syndicates on operational level, but also employing the tactics frequently used by criminal organisations to fund its actions. This subchapter will explore the potential takeaways of the Taliban case with regard to the convergence between the Rosenauian system of linkages and Makarenko's crime-terrorism continuum.

The first touching point between the two systems can be found in the relationship between the Taliban and the Government of Pakistan/ISI. As has been described in the previous subchapters, the ISI's material, financial and in-kind assistance was far from being gratuitous, with Pakistan seeking to use the Taliban's military advances as a proxy for projecting Pakistani influence in the region. The participation of the Pakistani military and intelligence services in the civil war in Afghanistan was described, by Ahmad Shah Massoud and many international observers, as a "creeping invasion"¹⁰². Such relationship warranted a formation of a penetrative linkage of the formal character (described by Rosenau, as opposed to Andrew M. Scott's "informal penetrative linkage"). While one might argue that some of the characteristics of the Rosenauian linkage were not fulfilled (i.e., it is hard to argue that the ISI fully succeeded in mobilising the Taliban's fighters' support for Pakistan's own goals), this linkage would most certainly fit the expansive definition proposed by C. Blong, since the selection of goals, mobilisation of resources and - at least militarily - integration of the polities was, up to 2001, to an extent guided by ISI and the Pakistani Government.

With regard to the Makarenko's continuum, the Taliban's operations at the time were mostly reserved to the first level of convergence: the alliance between terrorist and criminal organisations. The indicators of this was the relatively peaceful coexistence of the opiate syndicates and the Taliban: while the criminal organisations and clans supplied the Taliban with arms and lent money laundering services and financial support, including through the *ushr*¹⁰³, the Taliban acted as a "protector" of their illicit businesses and provided ideological legitimisation of their activities through the narratives about drugs as a weapon in the war against the *kafirs*. However, at the turn of the centuries the nature of this nexus started changing – after the regime's bid for international legitimacy in 2000-2001 failed, Taliban doubled down on the financing coming from its linkages to the trafficking in opiates. Taliban's troops fought back in Helmand, Kandahar and the

¹⁰² Maley, *The Afghanistan wars*: 288

¹⁰³ Which, it could be argued, was the first precursor of the Taliban's possible aspirations to assume further criminal tactics for self-financing.

southeastern provinces to recapture control of the poppy fields and drug laboratories, and the Taliban has started gathering an additional 20% tax on truckloads of opium from poppy producers and traffickers that they called *zakat* (after the Islamic charity system that was traditionally limited to 2,5% of the payers' disposable income). Simultaneously, the ban on gathering poppy was lifted, leading to the amount of opiates produced skyrocketing. This was largely caused by the shift in the "poppy, Pakistan and bin Laden" formula of financing that was prevalent in the 1990s – after 9/11, Pakistan's departure from the close cooperation with Taliban meant that the penetrative linkage was broken, which, in itself, presented a strong impulse for Taliban to look for new ways of self-financing. This, in turn, prompted a shift from the first level of Makarenko's continuum onto the second (use of criminal activities for operational purposes) and, arguably, towards or onto the third and fourth convergence points.

While it could be argued that the main linkage in this case was of a reactive character, with the Taliban's increased participation in criminal activities merely being a reaction to the failure of its legitimization bid, it should be noted that, according to many sources, the main motivation behind the 2000-2001 poppy cultivation ban was not political, but financial. The report "How Opium Profits the Taliban" produced by the United States Institute of Peace notes that "some Western and Afghan officials have concluded that the poppy ban was the ultimate insider-trading act; [as] more than a half-dozen well-placed tribal sources and Afghan officials interviewed for this project said senior Taliban leaders and Haji Bashar Noorzai purchased massive amounts of opium just before the ban"¹⁰⁴. This theory is further substantiated by the fact that neither did Taliban stop collecting tax at refineries – which brought them large additional revenue due to an increase in the price of opiates – nor did it make any effort to seize drug stocks or arrest traffickers.

The *kushr* and *zakat* extortion rackets, as well as a closer alignment with the Noorzai and Ishaqzai narcotics cartels, resulting in a certain cross-pollination and cross-membership in the organisations (the Ishaqzai case, discussed in the previous subchapter, is the most vivid example of such alignment), are demonstrative of the new character the Taliban assumed post-2001 – that of a terrorist organisation largely relying upon criminal means to secure sources of financing. However, many researchers note that the evolution of the nexus continued further, with the Taliban progressing onto the third level and becoming a "hybrid organisation" that organically combines terrorist and criminal characteristics. The 2015 SC report notes that "[...] the Taliban have developed a complex,

¹⁰⁴ Peters, *How Opium Profits the Taliban*: 11

robust and multifaceted system for the generation of assets in Afghanistan and the region, [...] increasingly acting more like “godfathers” than a “government in waiting”¹⁰⁵.

Another popular argument claims that the Taliban post-2001 has evolved into the 'black hole' phase of the continuum – a situation in which a hybrid group engaging both in crime and terrorism profits from its virtual impunity due to its functioning in the conditions of a 'failed state'. Indeed, Makarenko herself presents an argument of Afghanistan being a classic example of a 'black hole state', claiming that "in the absence of any central authority capable of establishing widespread stability and order [...] Afghanistan became an important safe haven, congregation, and training point for a number of terrorist groups and transnational criminal organisations"¹⁰⁶. However, it is important to note that the description of a state as a 'black hole state' merely underscores the features of its failed governance and the existence of hybrid organisations on its soil, but does not necessarily imply that all terrorist and/or criminal organisations active in the region bear a hybrid character. Even in 2004, when the article was written, Makarenko's description of the conditions relevant to the 'black hole syndrome' does not fully apply to the Afghanistan of the times:

To begin with, conflict that besets the 'black hole' syndrome has no clear military objective and lacks political purpose. Instead, military units constitute little more than marauding bands acting quite independently of any order and showing no discipline whatsoever in the actions they were committing. Furthermore, where political motivations do follow the criminal activities of belligerents in violent conflicts, it is evident that the perpetuation of conflict, as opposed to victory, becomes a priority in order to create ideal conditions for transnational criminal activities to flourish.

While this argument may stand with regard to the actions of some parts of the Taliban, it seems overly simplistic to assume that the motivations of the entire movement became as fluid as in the classic example of a third- and fourth-level convergence as described by Makarenko. Instead, in the view of the author, at this level internal disagreements within the Taliban should be considered, as its heterogeneous nature gains

¹⁰⁵ "Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on specific cases of cooperation between organized crime syndicates and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2160 (2014)" : 4

¹⁰⁶ Tamara Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum": 139

additional significance. The fallout between the Quetta Shura and Mullah Mansoor over the peace negotiations is a telling demonstration of the two strands of sentiment that are most relevant to this argument – while the Quetta Shura insisted on the Doha office leading the negotiations, knowing that this would result in the protraction of the warfare, Mullah Mansoor wanted to reach a peace deal that would ensure the legitimization of the regime, thus reaching one of its main political objectives.

Therefore, one may argue that the transition, alleged or real, of the Taliban towards the third and fourth convergence points only took effect on the level of sub-organisational actors, with the motivation of some actors changing towards a purely criminal goal with the ideological façade. The political and financial interests of the mainstream wing of the Taliban, led by the Quetta Shura, became intertwined, with the UN noting that the trend of interconnectedness between the drug trafficking networks and the Taliban "encourages those within the Taliban movement who have the greatest economic incentives to oppose any meaningful process of reconciliation with the new Government"¹⁰⁷.

However, one may argue that the transition of the portions of the Taliban towards a 'hybrid' or a 'black hole' arrangement presents less scientific interest for the present study, since this move was not triggered to any significant extent by external stimuli and was a product of an intraorganisational split between the highly ideological actors, such as Mullah Mansoor, and those gravitating towards the financial motivation and, consequently, the 'hybridisation' of the organisation's character. In the described case of transition towards a 'hybrid' or a 'black hole' organisation, the researchers are confronted with the two limitations of the study mentioned before: firstly, due to the large scale and heterogeneity of the organisation, it is no longer possible to mark it as a singular actor on the crime-terrorism continuum, since the multiple actors comprising it are involved in criminal activities in ways characteristic of various convergence points on the continuum; secondly, the stimuli that led to a change in character and shift along the continuum from stage two to stage three and further were largely internal to the multitude of the actors comprising the organisation and, therefore, do not fit in the Rosenauian narratives.

¹⁰⁷ "Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on specific cases of cooperation between organized crime syndicates and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2160 (2014)" : 3

Case Study II: Financing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam through extortion rackets in the Tamil diaspora

LTTE: historical background of the organisation

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a violent extremist group with a separatist agenda that has been dubbed by the South Asia Terrorism Portal and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada as "arguably the most lethal and well organised terrorist group in the world"¹⁰⁸, was functional in Sri Lanka, with affiliates all over the world, for over 30 years until 2009. Since 1983, the group – that was accused multiple times of violating human rights due to their deliberate policy of recruiting women and children and the criminal networks all over the world they used to procure finance flows – has led an armed struggle against the Sri Lankan government in an effort to gain independence for the northern and eastern territories of the island, where they planned to create a new state for the Tamil people - the so-called Tamil Eelam.

The roots of the movement lie in the historical grievances in the inter-communal relations between the Sinhalese and Tamil population. After the end of the British rule, during which the Tamils – a minority – were in a largely favourable condition¹⁰⁹, the Sri Lankan government, in an attempt to rectify the position of the Sinhalese, adopted multiple discriminatory policies, including the act that proclaimed Sinhala to be the only official language of the country. These policies led to a backlash in the form of a non-violent political movement among the Tamils that sought the establishment of an independent Tamil state – a goal which was later used as a justification for LTTE's activities¹¹⁰. The forming of a coalition of young Tamil students led to the creation, in the early 1970s, of the Tamil Students League – an organisation that advocated for the fair enrolment of Tamils in the wake of the standardisation policy that was destined to increase the number of

¹⁰⁸ "Sri Lanka: The recruitment and extortion of Tamils in Colombo by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); the profile of those recruited and extorted (January 2003 - November 2004)," *Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada*, December 3, 2004, Accessed May 2, 2019, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/42df61253e.html>

¹⁰⁹ Jake Sherman, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003): 198.

¹¹⁰ Robert Picciotto and Rachel Weaving, *Security And Development: Investing In Peace And Prosperity* (London: Routledge, 2006): 171.

Sinhalese students. After a process of intra-group radicalisation, in which the failed 1971 People's Liberation Front (JVP) insurrection played a big role, the first militant Tamil organisation, the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) was created, with the Velupillai Prabhakaran and Chetti Thenabalasingam at the helm. In the next decade, multiple insurgent groups structured after TNT's example entered the arena, including the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam's People Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA).

Nevertheless, the TNT continued to be in the front rows of the resistance, and, having carried out several resonant attacks, the organisation, in 1976, rebranded itself as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, with Uma Maheswaran becoming the leader¹¹¹, and Prabhakaran the military commander thereof. According to terrorism researcher Rohan Gunaratna, the goal of the creation of the LTTE, which bore the form of a limited-scale, well-trained commando-like units, was to "refashion the old TNT/new LTTE into an elite, ruthlessly efficient, and highly professional fighting force"¹¹². The organisation managed to stand out among the other above-mentioned resistance movements by receiving the support of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) - the main political force in the national parliament advocating for the political autonomy of the Tamils. Although this support was largely clandestine, it helped the LTTE assume the leading position in the field of the Tamil armed insurgency movements. However, the alignment with TULF was short-lived – after the government mandated the TULF-requested devolution of power to the Tamil political leaders through the District Development Councils, the LTTE (that rejected any political compromise and sought the formation of an independent Tamil state) called for the boycott of 1983 local government elections that were critical for TULF's positions. As a result of this, voter turnout dropped to 10%, which indicates that by the time the LTTE and other insurgent movements have largely become the bearers of the Tamil political opinions, as the TULF lost popular support.

In July 1983, the LTTE carried out their first major attack, ambushing and killing a Sri Lankan military patrol. In response, a wave of anti-Tamil pogroms known as 'Black July' happened across the state, marking the beginning of the Sri Lanka civil war. The war that resulted from the LTTE's decision to continue the armed struggle rather than negotiate a political solution on the Tamil political autonomy went on, with intermissions, up until 2009.

¹¹¹ Maheswaran left the organisation over the disagreement with Prabhakaran in 1980 and created the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam.

¹¹² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006): 139.

The conflict was divided into four principal periods, dubbed Eelam Wars I, II, III and IV respectively. In the first Eelam War (1983-1987), the LTTE were fighting a guerrilla warfare while receiving broad support from India in the form of arms, training and monetary support. Initially forming a part of the broad Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) also encompassing the EROS, the TELO, the PLOTE and the EPRLF, the LTTE later attacked the TELO and the EPRLF (whom the Tamil Tigers considered to be overly supportive of the India's perspective on a conflict) and absorbed the majority of small-scale insurgency groups, thus becoming the primary actor in the resistance.

The signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987 marked the beginning of the new stage of the conflict. According to this agreement, the Sri Lankan government amended the Constitution to devolve power to the provinces and restore the status of Tamil as an official language. The EPRLF was to control the newly-created regional council, and the accord provided for the disarmament of all the Tamil militias. To oversee the disarmament and the functioning of the power-sharing, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) – a contingent of the Indian Army – was deployed on the island. The Tamil insurgent organisations were not parties to the talks – however, all of them but LTTE accepted the compromise, with LTTE opposing the EPRLF candidate for the Northeastern provinces minister. In 1987, LTTE forces attacked the IPKF that, subsequently, launched a counterassault. The LTTE forces at the time started clandestinely receiving arms and monetary support from the new Sri Lanka government who also sought the expulsion of the IPKF¹¹³. Following the request of the new Sri Lankan Prime Minister, the IPKF started evacuating its forces from the island, and with the assassination of the former Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi by LTTE cadres in 1990, India became uninvolved in the conflict, assuming the position of an external observer.

The 1990-2000 decade saw the continuation of hostilities in Eelam Wars II (1990-1995) and III (1995-2002), with a ceasefire period in 1995 – as the new peace process led by the People's Alliance party was underway – and brief ceasefires throughout the conflicts. In February 2002, the most comprehensive effort at reaching a peace agreement was started, as LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, now led by the pro-peace United National Front, signed the Memorandum of Understanding and launched negotiations, with Norway as a mediator. As the sides agreed to a federal solution, and the LTTE dropped the long-held demand for a completely independent Tamil Eelam, it seemed as if the talks would become a breakthrough. However, after six rounds of negotiations, the

¹¹³ T.D.S.A. Dissanayake, *War or Peace in Sri Lanka, Volume II* (Swastika (Pvt.) Ltd, 1998): 332

LTTE suspended the talks and issued its proposal of an Interim Self Governing Authority in the north and east, to be controlled by the Tamil Tigers. Many of the hard-line politicians in Sri Lankan government (mostly pertaining to the newly formed United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA)) opposed this proposal, and with the UPFA candidate winning in the 2006 presidential elections, the LTTE leader Prabhakaran announced that the Tamil Tigers were pulling out of the negotiations. Over the next 5 years, multiple ceasefire violations were registered by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission on both sides¹¹⁴ – however, the number of these attributed to the LTTE was ten times higher than that of the security forces (3,830 versus 351 respectively). In 2008, the Sri Lankan government officially abrogated the ceasefire and started a massive offensive on several fronts that ended in May 2009, with the elimination of Prabhakaran and the LTTE admitting defeat.

Modalities of functioning of the crime-terrorism linkage

Slightly reminiscent of the Taliban case, the LTTE, in its early years, received material and financial support from another state – in this case, India. Nevertheless, the linkage between the organisation and the state was short-lived and, due to the ideological and political disagreements with India and other Tamil organisations aligned with India over the Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord, the LTTE quickly became an enemy of the Indian state, rather than its ally, and even wilfully accepted armaments and financial aid from the Sri Lankan government that was destined to help the Tamil Tigers drive out the IPKF. Therefore, the organisation needed to develop a sophisticated financial support network early on in its existence to be able to lead protracted warfare in the air, sea and land military theatres that was characteristic of Eelam Wars II, III and IV. This system included many elemental links to organised crime. For example, the Sea Tigers, the LTTE's navy wing, was reported to have hijacked multiple vessels, kidnapping the crew or killing the seamen and ransacking the ship. Among the ships that fell prey to the Tamil Tigers, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence reports the *Irish Mona* (in 1995), *Princess Wave* (in 1996), *Athena*, *Misen*, *Morong Bong*, *MV Cordiality* (all in 1997), *Princess Kash* (in 1998), *MV Sik*

¹¹⁴ "Humanitarian Operation – Factual Analysis, July 2006 – May 2009," *Ministry of Defence of Sri Lanka*, August 1, 2011, Accessed through web archive April 12, 2019: https://web.archive.org/web/20160304055103/http://www.defence.lk/news/20110801_Conf.pdf

Yang (in 1999) and *MV Farah III* (in 2007)¹¹⁵. Some of the ships, including the 2,818-ton cargo *MV Sik Yang*, have still not been located, with reports suggesting that it has been used by the LTTE as a 'phantom vessel'.

Human smuggling has also been a considerable source of criminal income for the LTTE – a RAND Corporation report notes that "the group [was] playing a pivotal role in smuggling illegal migrants and refugees out of Sri Lanka and India to the West, charging anywhere between \$18,000 and \$32,000 per transaction"¹¹⁶, further citing a case of an LTTE smuggling ring uncovered by the Sri Lankan Government that helped smuggle 600-700 Tamil illegal migrants into the EU using forged Schengen visas. Furthermore, the aforementioned Ministry of Defence report notes that the LTTE also employed a practice of extorting 'exit visa fees' from people leaving Sri Lanka through Tamil-controlled territories.¹¹⁷ Human smuggling was closely connected to the document forging industry, with LTTE-related schemes providing fake passports both for smuggled Tamils¹¹⁸ and for other terrorist organisations, including the stack of forged Norwegian passports for al-Qaeda, one of which ended up in the hands of Ramzi Yousef, a perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, as well as the 1994 bombing of the Philippine Airlines flight 434.¹¹⁹

Circumstantial evidence also points at the fact that the LTTE was largely involved in drug trafficking operations. A Mackenzie Institute report notes that the main source of profit in this case was the cooperation with the drug producers in Afghanistan and Pakistan who sought to export the narcotics through India and Sri Lanka when the routes through Afghanistan and Iran were put in danger due to, respectively, Soviet military operation in Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran¹²⁰. However, in the majority of cases, the direct linkage of the Tamil-run drug networks to the LTTE could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. However, as indicated in the RAND corporation report, many experts

¹¹⁵ "The LTTE in brief," *Ministry of Defence of Sri Lanka / The Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at Geneva*, Accessed May 2, 2019, <http://www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf>: 7

¹¹⁶ Angel Rabasa and others, *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*: 103

¹¹⁷ "The LTTE in brief," *Ministry of Defence of Sri Lanka*: 7

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 3

¹¹⁹ Shlomi Yass, "Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers: Conflict and Legitimacy", *Military and Strategic Affairs* 6 (no.2, August 2014), <https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/ShlomiYass.pdf>: 68

¹²⁰ "Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Their Criminal Activities in Canada and Western Europe," *The Mackenzie Institute*, December 26, 1995, <https://mackenzieinstitute.com/1995/12/funding-terror-the-liberation-tigers-of-tamil-eelam-and-their-criminal-activities-in-canada-and-the-western-world/>

claim that this is most likely due to the "tightly organized and compartmentalized nature of LTTE trafficking networks in general, which [...] has effectively insulated the group and its senior membership from prosecution"¹²¹. It is further noted that in some cases of Tamils arrested on drug-related charges, the LTTE has assumed the legal costs and provided sustenance payments to the families of the arrested.

Finally, the LTTE was to the highest degree involved in international arms trafficking, even having created a special branch to deal with fundraising through arms sales. The branch, nicknamed the 'KP Branch' after its leader, Kumaran Padmanathan, mostly used noncombatants without a criminal record to ensure the secrecy of their operation. A multitude of ships under flags of convenience and with changing callsigns were used to transport weapons procured in Southeast and Southwest Asia to terrorist and criminal groups all around the world through the main shipping base the LTTE created on the island of Phuket in Thailand.¹²²

However, the estimated majority of the LTTE's budget was not a result of one of the aforementioned criminal activities, but was seemingly legal – through the actions of the World Tamil Coordinating Committee, as well as with the help of operatives abroad, the LTTE have established vast links with the Tamil diaspora overseas that allowed them to fundraise for their terrorist operations on a never-before-seen scale. The diaspora, that was formed by several migration waves since Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 (with the largest exodus having taken place due to the civil war), is roughly estimated to include up to one million people (1/4 of the entire Sri Lanka Tamil population)¹²³ mostly living in Canada, India, the EU and Switzerland. Over the three decades of the hostilities between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka, the diaspora played a critical role in the Tamil Tigers' financing activities, since it "provided money for weapons [and] provided the political advocacy in Western countries in support of the struggle for an independent

¹²¹ Angel Rabasa and others, *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*: 105

¹²² Daniel Byman and others, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001): 119

¹²³ "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE," International Crisis Group, *Asia Report N°186*, February 23, 2010, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/186-the-sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-the-ltte.pdf>: 1

state of Tamil Eelam"¹²⁴¹²⁵. According to the report of the International Crisis Group, at the height of the conflict the diaspora contributed as much as \$200 million a year for the LTTE¹²⁶. Money that was being collected in Europe and North America was used to procure weapons, explosives and double-use technology in Asian countries, to be shipped to Sri Lanka via Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and India. Funds were collected by personal networks, as well as through contributions channeled through temples, cultural and political community events.

It is important to note, however, that many of these donations did not bear a voluntary character – as more and more states designated the LTTE a terrorist organisation, as was done by the U.S. in 1997, the UK in 2001, the EU and Canada in 2006, the fundraising flows started to cease. With many Tamils fearing that a donation to the LTTE would put them under the risk of an arrest on terrorism-related charges, the ‘fundraiser wing’ of the Tigers began to employ increasingly aggressive tactics to extort money. In a report on the extortion in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) writes: "while many members of the Tamil diaspora willingly and actively support the LTTE, others have been subject to intimidation, extortion, and physical violence as the LTTE seeks to suppress criticism of its human rights abuses and to ensure a steady flow of income"¹²⁷.

Even before the crackdown on the financial sources, the LTTE has explored the non-voluntary financing methods in the form of ‘taxes’, with the minimum ‘tax’ varying from country to country and depending on individual income – starting at roughly \$30 in Canada or the U.S., the number went up to thousands and tens of thousands of dollars for the wealthy U.S.-based Tamils, whose aggregate contributions were estimated by the U.S.

¹²⁴ "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE," *International Crisis Group*: 1

¹²⁵ It is important to note, however, that the perception of the diaspora as a monolithic entity can be erroneous. While the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils living abroad conform, to some extent, to the political strand of Tamil Eelam independence, not all of them were implicated in financing schemes (and, out of those who did, many were implicated against their will), not everyone supported the Tamil Tigers’ means and goals, and many people count amongst the victims of the Tigers’ actions. Therefore, while acknowledging that Tamils abroad were one of the main funding bases of LTTE’s activities, it is important to underscore the heterogeneity of the diaspora with regard to their political views, relation to the LTTE and the willingness to be associated with the Tigers’ funding schemes.

See *Ibid.*, 2-5

¹²⁶ "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE," *International Crisis Group*: 1

¹²⁷ "Funding the ‘Final War’: LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil diaspora," *Human Rights Watch*, March 14, 2006, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/03/14/funding-final-war/ltte-intimidation-and-extortion-tamil-diaspora>

officials at 10-20 million dollars a year¹²⁸. However, after many of the voluntary contributions ceased, the LTTE doubled down on the 'taxes': HRW reports that in 2005-2006, the LTTE "launched a massive fundraising drive in Canada and parts of Europe, pressuring individuals and business owners in the Tamil diaspora to give money for the 'final war' [through fundraisers who] went from house to house, and approached businesses and professionals, demanding significant sums of money for their cause"¹²⁹. The numbers were significantly higher than the 'tax' that was extorted earlier – this time, the LTTE cadres demanded, in Canada, up to Cdn\$5000 per family and up to Cdn\$100,000 per business, threatening those who refused to pay with negative consequences for them or their families, both in Sri Lanka and abroad. The connections that Tamil emigrants had in Sri Lanka were weaponised against them. One of the Tamils interviewed by the HRW stated:

They target a person who has obviously some considerable money and is not in need. If they have many children or close relatives living abroad, they abduct them, and then the relatives here raise a lot of money and send it back home. And of course such stories then have a huge impact here, and those who feel vulnerable give money without much questioning. This has happened many times over the years, and I personally know of people to whom this has happened.¹³⁰

Furthermore, Tamils coming to visit families in north and east Sri Lanka were detained by the Tigers, and large sums of money (counted on the basis of the length of time the person lived abroad) were extorted so that they could leave safely. In the UK, Canada and elsewhere, computer databases of the givers and the amounts received were kept, so that the LTTE 'volunteers' could keep receiving the money from the paying persons and could threaten the non-payers. It is interesting to note that the 'volunteers' themselves were often Tamil migrants smuggled into the country by the LTTE who, upon arrival, took up a low-paying menial job arranged by the Tamil Tigers and effectively served as their henchmen and debt collectors¹³¹.

¹²⁸ "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE," *International Crisis Group*: 6

¹²⁹ "Funding the 'Final War'," *Human Rights Watch*

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Angel Rabasa and others, *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*: 104

Additionally, LTTE's sphere influence extended to many Hindu temples in the Western world. The temples, some of which could even be 'taken over' by the Tigers (as, according to HRW's report, had already happened in some of the temples in Toronto and Perth), can sell LTTE insignia or collect money directly for LTTE operations.

The global span of the extortion activities coupled with the precise targeting of diaspora elements allowed the Tamil Tigers to operate more efficiently than many criminal groups in terms of revenue. With cells in – according to different estimates – up to 35-44 countries, the LTTE succeeded in building a truly internationalised financial network spanning the diaspora around the globe. This network, based on fear of the emigrant Tamils for the lives and well-being of their relatives and immediate family, allowed the LTTE to cover a major part of the yearly military budgets, enabling their prolonged existence and a source of continued funding even after many licit financing sources were cut off by the CFT drive.

Applying Rosenau and Makarenko's models to the Tamil Tigers' case

From the point of view of Makarenko's model, the Tamil Tigers' operations present a classic case of a stage 2 linkage – that is, a terrorist organisation using criminal means and tactics for operational purposes. An important feature of the Tigers, however, is the stability of their position on the continuum – since the beginning of Eelam War II, the modality of LTTE's terrorism-crime interaction remained virtually unchanged, with the only slight modifications happening in the types of crime they chose to focus on in various periods. One could argue that to understand this distinctive feature, an analytical system considering the motivation of actors should be used – such as the Rosenau's linkages model.

From a Rosenauian perspective, many of the linkages in the case of the Tamil Tigers seem to bear a reactive character. The first one, playing a principal role in the LTTE's positioning on the Makarenko continuum, is found in the relations between the Tigers and the Indian government throughout Eelam Wars I and II. Although the modalities of Indian involvement with LTTE's activities were reminiscent of the classic case of a state support for a terrorist organisation – such as Pakistan's actions in the case of Taliban (i.e., creating special training camps, providing arms and monetary support) – India had almost no say in political decision-making of the LTTE apparatus. Besides, LTTE even initiated a

crackdown against TELO and EPRLF, who were politically aligned with India, accusing them of furthering the Indian interests in the conflicts – rather than those of Sri Lankan Tamils. Therefore, unlike in the Taliban case, the penetrative linkage between the state and the terrorist organisation was never formed, with LTTE's leadership opposing any political influence of India within the organisation's cadre.

Indeed, the active participation of the Tamil Tigers in organised criminal activities in general and in extortion in particular was largely a reaction both to New Delhi's decision to stop the financing of the organisation and India's active efforts, during the times of the LTTE-IPKF conflict (Eelam War II), to disrupt the delivery chains of arms and munitions that the group has established throughout the region during its guerrilla participation in the Eelam War I.¹³² The necessity to finance the creation of a new supply network that would not involve India and, more importantly, would be resistant to the Indian disruption efforts, placed LTTE straight onto the second level of Makarenko's terrorism-crime continuum, bypassing the stage of interaction with criminal groups. Therefore, building upon the examples presented by the Taliban and the LTTE, one may theorise that, from the point of view of the interaction between Rosenau's and Makarenko's systems, the nature of the linkage between the terrorist organisation and the supporting state (that is, penetrative or reactive) is largely secondary to the *ipso facto* existence of such a linkage. It seems that the cessation of a state's backing for a terrorist organisation, even if the state did not exercise political or ideological power over said organisation, almost inevitably leads to the group forming an interrelation with organised crime or elevating the level of it (if such relationship already existed). As practice shows, for the terrorist organisations it is most likely to result in a second-level Makarenko linkage – that is, the direct participation of the group in the criminal activities.

Furthermore, the reactive linkage also seems to be responsible for the intensification of a terrorist group's criminal activities within an assumed level of Makarenko's plane – that is, for example, a level-two group's drive to engage in crime more actively without giving up on the political ideology (which would be an important characteristic of a group transitioning to the third level of Makarenko's continuum). This is demonstrated by the two reactions displayed by the LTTE to the setbacks they suffered in the military and political environment. Firstly, after the recapture of Jaffna, an important LTTE outpost, by the Sri Lankan forces in 1995, the Tamil Tigers' leadership, according to multiple reports, ordered its cadres engaged in 'tax collection' and extortion abroad to

¹³² Angel Rabasa and others, *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*: 108-110

increase the amount of money gathered by 50%¹³³ – a goal that was hardly reachable without a drum-up in criminal extortion. The initial stage of the Eelam War IV provided a similar example: as many countries with significant Tamil diasporas listed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, the gathering of resources for the "final war" has started to become increasingly complex: the extortion became a lot more aggressive¹³⁴, and LTTE operatives increased their focus on larger targets, such as Hindu temples. The HRW report cites two significant cases, in which the Tigers attempted to extort money from Hindu communities by interacting directly with the temples: "In 2005, the LTTE detained two British Tamils for several weeks in Sri Lanka in order to gain control over a Hindu temple in London; [...] In late 2005, LTTE representatives approached [the] temple several times, asking for Cdn\$1 million as part of the recent LTTE fundraising drive."¹³⁵ Although the pretence that the agents presented for the demands was the promise of an imminent declaration of Tamil Eelam's independence, the situation on the ground at Sri Lanka showed that the money was used in an effort to prepare for the repelling of a massive offensive started by the Sri Lankan army in a renewed 'war for peace' effort.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that although the initial positioning of the LTTE on the Makarenko's continuum was, as discussed above, most likely due to the reactive linkages it exhibited, the permanence of the Tamil Tigers in a level-two position on the Makarenko continuum could be attributed to another type of linkage - emulative. As has been mentioned before, the LTTE was not progressing towards the third level on Makarenko's continuum due to their unwillingness to subject the ideology and political goals to wide-scale criminal operations that could be more profitable but could also bring negative publicity. Indeed, the argument frequently made by the experts is that in the organisation's relations with the people living on the land they controlled, as well as with Sri Lankan diaspora, the LTTE largely emulating the functioning of a legitimate state¹³⁶ – with the exception that they considered the diaspora to be an integral part of that 'state' as well.

A similar argument is made by the RAND Corporation to justify why LTTE did not get involved with organised crime beyond the operational needs:

¹³³ "The LTTE in brief," *Ministry of Defence of Sri Lanka*: 6

¹³⁴ "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE," *International Crisis Group*: 7

¹³⁵ "Funding the 'Final War'," *Human Rights Watch*

¹³⁶ Such as, for example, introducing the illicit 'taxes' or 'exit visas' and creating a complex political governance apparatus.

A considerable component of the group's overseas publicity and propaganda effort entails portraying the Tigers as a bona fide organization engaged in a fully justified and legitimate war of national liberation. [The LTTE seek to] impress on the international community that, should the organization succeed in winning control of a separate state, it would exercise its duties in a responsible manner consistent with democratic norms of civilized behavior. Obviously, any overt attachment to organized criminality [...] would run counter to this objective.¹³⁷

The fact that the Tamil Tigers sought to legitimise their struggle by emulating the functioning of a legitimate government predisposed that LTTE used criminal activities principally for funding the military effort, rather than for self-enrichment, as is common with criminal groups. This also prompted the Tigers to exercise highest measures of secrecy when engaging in criminal activities, which explains both the use of sophisticated tactics, such as 'phantom ships' and specialised agents for arms smuggling – and the inability of the Western security services to establish a definitive link between some of Tamil criminal operations and the LTTE.

Furthermore, the last argument – that of a necessity for secrecy – would largely explain why the LTTE, when choosing the *modus operandi* of the crime-terrorism linkage, did not opt for a lesser stage of involvement – an alliance with a criminal group. One could theorise that in the eyes of the Tamil Tigers' leadership, such an alliance could reduce the secrecy of the Tigers' operations and create unique security challenges due to the fact the LTTE would outsource criminal activities that could be potentially traced back to them¹³⁸, which would most likely reduce their reputability and undermine their claims for legitimacy. Indeed, even Makarenko herself noted that by creating in-house capabilities, criminals and terrorists tried to avoid the internet problems arising from an alliance: "differences over priorities and strategies, distrust, the danger of defections, and the threat that alliances could create competitors"¹³⁹. In this case, however, the LTTE, a 'quasi-state', had an ultimate concern that the aforementioned problems may reduce the legitimacy of its claims to governing an independent Tamil Eelam.

¹³⁷ Angel Rabasa and others, *Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*: 110

¹³⁸ This could happen in a multitude of situations, including a case of the security of the criminal organisation's network being compromised or a potential conflict between LTTE and the allied criminal organisation over sources of funding

¹³⁹ Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum,": 133

Case Study III: The involvement of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the kidnapping for ransom activities in the Philippines

Historical background of the ASG

The organisation that later came to be known as the Abu Sayyaf Group was born at the crossing between the violent Wahhabi ideology professed by groups such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and the independence drive in the Muslim Mindanao – a part of the Mindanao island group in the Philippines. The splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that, at the time, was the main separatist organisation fighting for an independent Mandanao, the ASG was first created under the alias Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah ('Islamic Movement') by Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani. Janjalani, who had studied in Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia, subsequently fought as a *mujahid* in Afghanistan in 1980s, where he reportedly met Osama Bin Laden who has helped him procure \$6 million for the formation of a group of a more pronouncedly Islamist character from a part of the MNLF's cadre¹⁴⁰.

In the late 1980s, MNLF began the drift towards the political solution, agreeing to negotiations with the Philippine government, that led, in 1989, to the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (which allowed for a certain degree of self-administration by the Muslim population) and finally, in 1996, to a comprehensive peace agreement between the Front and the government. Such policies provided a fertile soil for ASG's proselytising aimed at the cadres of MNLF who believed that negotiations leading to a political settlement will not be able to rid the Filipino Muslims of the social oppression, economic marginalisation and all the injustices they endured¹⁴¹. In 1991, Janjalani proclaimed the formation of the Abu Sayyaf Group that immediately proceeded to organising terrorist acts against the government and Western/Christian-connected targets.

¹⁴⁰ Zachary Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah," The National Bureau of Asian Research, *NBR Analysis*. 14 (no. 5, December 2003), Accessed through web archive June 1, 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20060927184541/http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol14no5.pdf>

¹⁴¹ Zack Fellman, "Abu Sayyaf Group," Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies, *AQAM Futures Case Studies Series, Case study no. 5* (November 2011), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111128_Fellman_ASQ_AQAMCaseStudy5.pdf: 2.

Among their first acts were a grenade attack in Zamboanga City and a bombing of the ship M/V Doulos used as a floating bookshop by a German charity and missionary group.

Under Abdurajik Janjalani's leadership, the group has mostly shown signs of a traditional Islamist terrorist group – the attacks were mostly deadly and included bombings, mass killings, kidnappings – albeit on a much smaller scale than in the ensuing years¹⁴² – and even a massive guerrilla attack on a town of Ipil in 1995 that led to 53 deaths. On 1998, when Abdurajik was killed in a shoot-out with the Filipino police, the group experienced severe turmoil as it broke up into several factions.

However, after a short period of infighting, Khadaffy Janjalani, the younger brother of Abdurajik assumed the leadership of the organisation that was now re-united – with the only exception of the Sulu archipelago faction led by Ghalib Andang who, while aligning strategically with the ASG, retained operational authority over the cadres of the group in the Sulu islands. The character of ASG's activities under Khadaffy took an important turn – having decided that the kidnappings first undertaken by the group around 1993-1995 (when the ASG abducted an American missionary and 11 Filipino tourists) carried a prospect of a great financial gain for the group, he started reorienting the organisation to focus on the kidnapping practices. The "bold and publicity-driven attacks"¹⁴³ of Abdurajik's time in power ceded way to a "period of banditry"¹⁴⁴. Kidnapping for ransom (KfR) became a widely-used tactic, with the ASG committing almost twice as many kidnappings as terrorist attacks and capturing over 2,000 hostages¹⁴⁵ in the period up to 2000.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. began a broad co-operation with the Philippine government in the framework of the 'War on Terror', advising and training the armed forces, as well as listing the ASG as a foreign terrorist organisation. The joint efforts succeeded in eliminating some of the major commanders of the factions, including Ghalib Andang and, subsequently, in significantly reducing the membership numbers of the ASG. In the period between 2000 and 2005, the membership dropped from over 1,250 fighters to roughly 250. Largely as a response, Khadaffy began to reorient the ASG again, modelling the initial aims of his late brother – creation of an independent state in the south of Philippines for the Filipino Muslim population. This period saw the continuation of bombing operations. with three of the largest ASG bomb attacks happening in 2003-2005:

¹⁴² Luke M. Gerdes, Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin, "Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group's Strategic and Learning Capacities," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 37, no. 3 (2014): 268

¹⁴³ Garret Atkinson, "ASG: The Father of the Swordsman," *American Security Project*, March 2012: 6

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

the Davao International Airport Bombing on 5 March 2003, the Superferry 14 bombing on 24 February 2004 and the Valentine's Day bombings on 14 February 2005 in Makati City, Davao City and General Santos City. Eventually, Khadaffy was also killed in a firefight with the Philippine forces in 2006, which left the group in yet another power vacuum situation. Multiple splinter groups were formed along the clan lines, with many of them returning to KfR as a monetary incentive for their existence and for attracting new recruits. It is important to note that while some experts describe ASG as a resilient extremist group of a hybrid character¹⁴⁶, many have noted that the group increasingly bears characteristics of a criminal syndicate motivated by greed, rather than a politically-motivated operation reminiscent of the group's early period in existence.

However, in 2014, through a video published on the Internet, senior Abu Sayyaf leader Isnilon Hapilon pledged ASG's allegiance to the Islamic State and to Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. Nevertheless, many experts believe that this announcement was largely motivated by the group's desire for increased publicity: for example, Michael Buehler noted that "groups in Southeast Asia like Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf have used the publicity they can get from ISIS to further their own agendas, not necessarily the Islamic State's. [...] Whenever the international focus shifts on an extremist group, they pledge allegiance and use the publicity for their own agenda"¹⁴⁷. In a comment to a Filipino news website, the commander of the Philippine's military's Western Mindanao Command stated that "[the ASG] are taking advantage of the international attention ISIS is getting so that the ransom would increase. [...] [Abu Sayyaf] is still a local group with a local agenda ... This is not a sign of Abu Sayyaf becoming an international group [like ISIS]".¹⁴⁸

The subsequent events, however, have shown that the Abu Sayyaf did not entirely transform into a criminal enterprise: in May 2017, as the Philippine government launched an operation in Marawi to capture Hapilon, the Abu Sayyaf, teaming up with the Maute militants, provided serious armed resistance, provoking what became the longest urban guerrilla battle in the Philippines' modern history. It was reported that the aims of the Islamists, who occupied some buildings and set other on fire, was declaring a *wilayat* – an

¹⁴⁶ Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Sources of Abu Sayyaf's Resilience in the Southern Philippines," *CTC Sentinel* 3, no. 5 (May 2010)

¹⁴⁷ Michelle FlorCruz, "Philippine Terror Group Abu Sayyaf May Be Using ISIS Link For Own Agenda," *International Business Times*, September 25, 2014, www.ibtimes.com/philippine-terror-group-abu-sayyaf-may-be-using-isis-link-own-agenda-1695156

¹⁴⁸ Carmela Fonbuena, "Abu Sayyaf taking advantage of int'l attention on ISIS," *Rappler*, September 25, 2014, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/70165-abu-sayyaf-isis-german-captives>

ISIL province – in Lanao del Sur by raising an ISIL Flag at the Provincial Capitol¹⁴⁹. Nevertheless, the massive offensive of the Philippine Army proved to be successful, and the battle ended with the ASG and Maute's defeat and the elimination of both Hapilon and Maute's leader Omar Maute.

Modalities of functioning of the crime-terrorism linkage

The ASG, created as an Islamist separatist faction, from the outset had vast links with other terrorist organisations, the most significant of which were al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. The original funding sources for the group's operation were quite diverse: as was mentioned above, the initial funding for the formation of the group was provided by al-Qaeda through bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. Khalifa continued monetary and in-kind support for ASG in late 1980s and early 1990s through the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), the Philippine branch of which he headed. According to an ASG defector, the IIRO, which operated under the guise of providing relief for construction of mosques, buildings and the operation of livelihood projects, allocated "only 10 to 30% of the foreign funding [...] to the legitimate relief and livelihood projects [with] the rest go[ing] to terrorist operations"¹⁵⁰.

Despite the provision of funding by the IIRO, the organisation did not have a steady and large enough external income stream which could allow it to operate seamlessly, and the first kidnapping for ransom activities started occurring in the mid-1990s. According to the terrorism expert James Forest, terrorist organisations resort to KfR "to achieve two kinds of goals: political or financial"¹⁵¹. The ASG presents an interesting case in this regard, since, while kidnappings remained one of the primary tactics of the group's attacks, the motivation behind them largely changed throughout the existence of the organisation. During Abdurajik's leadership, the series of kidnappings was largely motivated by ASG's desire to 'put itself on a map', projecting an image of a dedicatedly Islamic separatist movement in order to gain the attention of international terrorist

¹⁴⁹ "Maute plans to raise ISIS flags at Lanao capitol, Marawi city hall to declare 'wilayat'," *GMA Network*, May 27, 2017, www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/612374/maute-plans-to-raise-isis-flags-at-lanao-capitol-marawi-city-hall-to-declare-wilayat/story/

¹⁵⁰ Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia": 176.

¹⁵¹ James Forest, "Global Trends in Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 24, no.3, (October 2012): 322.

organisations and create beneficial alliances¹⁵². However, the situation started to change with Khadaffy's coming to power: the financially-motivated kidnappings took off, reaching a peak in 2000-2001 (see Figure 2 below). It is interesting to note that discussions on using KfR as a source of internalised funding were held in the ASG leadership since 1995, when IIRO's Khalifa was barred from re-entering the country by the Philippine government¹⁵³. One of the most active advocates of using kidnappings to create public resonance and ensure the steady flow of money was Ghalib Andang of the Sulu archipelago ASG faction.




Figure 2. Number of large ASG-related KfR incidents

Adapted from: "Global Terrorism Database," University of Maryland, Accessed March 2, 2019; <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>
(Please note that data for 1996 and 2005 is unavailable)

After 2001, when the 'War on Terror' efforts of the U.S reached the Philippines, resulting in the desecration of membership in the group, the ASG reoriented its resources to the bombings operations and re-ideologisation of ASG's activities. This largely led to the reduction in the number of kidnappings, since the resources of the group at the time were extremely limited.

With the elimination of Andang in 2005, and Khaddafy in 2006, the ASG began the process of splintering, with multiple smaller groups continuing the practice of KfR –

¹⁵² Banlaoi, "The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf's Resilience in the Southern Philippines"

¹⁵³ Fellman, "Abu Sayyaf Group" : 2-6

however, now they were largely guided by financial considerations. It is important to note that, while the organisation has undergone multiple shifts within the interrelation between ideology and financially-motivated actions, the majority of controversy over the tactics and the goals was reserved to its leadership. In contrast, the regular fighters were mostly driven by either political goals (stemming from the perceived social and economic injustices against Mindanao Muslims) or by rent-seeking psyche. According to Martin and Gracia Burnham, two of the kidnapping victims, the ASG fighters were largely unfamiliar with the Qur'an, with their notion of Islam described as a "sketchy [...] set of behavioural rules, to be violated when it suited them"¹⁵⁴. The only firm belief, according to the Burnhams, was that as "holy warriors, they were justified in kidnapping, killing and stealing"¹⁵⁵. Besides, according to several governmental reports, some of the ASG members are users of a 'shabu' drug, similar to met-amphetamine¹⁵⁶. One may argue that the fact, substantiated by the multiple military discoveries of drug packages in the abandoned ASG compounds, explains the strict adherence of at least some of the fighters to the continuation of criminal activities bringing large profits.

As the fragmentation of the ASG progressed, in mid-2010s so many groups operated under the umbrella term of the ASG that Abu Rami, the group's spokesman, appeared to lack knowledge on many members' activities¹⁵⁷. As mentioned in the previous subchapter, 2014 was also marked by the ASG's Hapilon pledging allegiance to the Islamic State, which was characterised by a military expert as a way to increase attention to the group to raise potential ransoms. Indeed, since the 2014 pledge, the ASG, operating under the pretence of a 'just jihad', significantly ramped up the kidnappings. Among the most profitable operations for the group were the 2014 kidnapping of a German couple of sailors, the 2015 Samal island kidnappings, the 2015 Dipolog city kidnapping of an Italian citizen, and the 2016 maritime kidnapping spree, when Indonesian, Filipino, Malaysian and Vietnamese sailors and fishermen were taken hostage. The overall amount of revenue from the ransoms is hard to estimate, due to the fact that many countries do not publicise information about the fact of paying the ransom or about the sums paid to not provide

¹⁵⁴ Mark Bowden, "Jihadists in Paradise," *The Atlantic*, March 1, 2007, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/03/jihadists-in-paradise/305613/>

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ryan Pickrell, "Meet 'Shabu,' The Drug Fueling Islamic Extremism," *The Daily Caller*, September 30, 2016, <http://www.dailycaller.com/2016/09/30/meet-shabu-the-drug-fueling-islamic-extremism/>

¹⁵⁷ Philip Golingai, "A peek into the mind of Abu Sayyaf man," *The Star*, October 1, 2016, www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/one-mans-meat/2016/10/01/a-peek-into-the-mind-of-abu-sayyaf-man-daily-chats-with-a-terrorist-provide-a-chilling-insight-into/

additional incentives for repeated kidnappings. However, the estimate just for the aforementioned kidnappings (not including the maritime kidnappings) stands at over \$7 million, with the 2016 kidnapping spree of mostly maritime acts brought the groups operating under the ASG umbrella name an additional \$7.3 million¹⁵⁸ just in the first half of the year.

In 2017, a rapid drop in the number of kidnappings is registered, as many fighters die in the Marawi offensive, and others break the alignment with the ASG trying to evade persecution. According to the experts' estimates, in the second half of 2018 no more than 150 ASG fighters were at large¹⁵⁹, with an estimated 100 troops hiding in Jolo and about 35 in Basilan. However, it is important to note that since kidnappings mostly do not require a large number of fighters, the threat of repeated acts is still present.

Applying Rosenau and Makarenko's models to the case of the ASG

Since mid-1990s and until nowadays, the activities of the Abu Sayyaf Group have presented a notable example of the third-level of the Makarenko's continuum – the closer-than-ever linkage between political crime and commercial terrorism. The organisation quickly progressed through the continuum, starting its relationship with crime in early 1990s, when it first operationalised kidnapping for ransom as a technique to both raise visibility of their ideology and earn additional financial resources for the functioning of the organisation. It has made its way into the realm of commercial terrorism in the late 1990s, after Abdurajik Janjalani's death and since then has fluctuated in the continuum between rent-seeking terrorism and political crime, at certain periods acting as a criminal syndicate rather than as an ideologically-driven terrorist organisation.

Throughout these shifts in the terrorism-crime continuum, the ASG was subject to a number of Rosenauian linkages that may help researchers explain the oscillation in the third-level crime-terrorism confluence situation. To begin with, much like the LTTE, the ASG displayed a reactive linkage to the governmental military crackdown against the organisation, which, in the Abu Sayyaf's case, was the escalation of the conflict related to

¹⁵⁸ Jim Gomez, "Abu Sayyaf got \$7 million from kidnappings," *Business Insider*, October 27, 2016, <https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-apnewsbreak-abu-sayyaf-got-7-million-from-kidnappings-2016-10?IR=T>

¹⁵⁹ Francis Wakefield, "Government troops still chasing 150 Abu Sayyaf terrorists — Lorenzana," *Manila Bulletin News*, August 28, 2018, Accessed through web archive May 15, 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190109020600/https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/08/28/government-troops-still-chasing-150-abu-sayyaf-terrorists-lorenzana/>

the U.S. cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the framework of the 'War on Terror' – however, the nature of this linkage and the shift it led to is diametrically opposite to the LTTE case. As the U.S.-supported AFP reached significant successes in countering many aspects of ASG's operation, the number of kidnappings went down, reflecting two important results of the AFP offensive. Firstly, many key personalities of the ASG were arrested or killed, with others escaping and 'laying low' in hideouts in central Mindanao. Secondly – and, perhaps, more importantly, the ASG's resources, both financial and human, began to deplete. In this situation, ASG started to look for support from other large terrorist organisations, seeking to reestablish connections with the AQ or the JI – who, as the ASG leaders assumed, could provide a stream of financial aid that would help elevate ASG's profile on the national arena and continue its operations despite the mounting pressure of the AFP. However, to do so, the ASG needed to reestablish the profile of an ideologically driven Islamist group – in an attempt to do this, the ASG focused on the bombing operations, temporarily foregoing the kidnappings. On the plane of Makarenko's continuum, it led to the return of the group from the rent-seeking 'political crime' spectrum back to 'commercial terrorism'.

Therefore, in the ASG's example, we have seen the opposite vector of movement along the Makarenko's terrorism-crime continuum (to that of the LTTE) in response to a largely similar reactive linkage. A possible explanation for this is the increased fluidity in the organisation's positioning on the third level of the continuum that was underscored in the works of Makarenko.¹⁶⁰ Such nature of the third-level linkage predisposes the possibility for easily-provoked and easily-effectuated shifts inside this stage, which also makes the vector of movement within the level quite unpredictable. Indeed, one possible reaction to the depletion of the financial flows as a result of the 'War on Terror' that the ASG could alternatively display was an increase, rather than a reduction, in kidnappings to receive an ad-hoc influx of money, which would shift the group even more towards the organised crime part of the continuum. However, the ASG's leadership decided to pursue an alternative strategy, possibly considering it a more sustainable way to receive sustained financial support from larger organisations.

Another Rosenauian linkage existing in the ASG's case is the emulative relationship between the group and larger terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and the Islamic State. The shifts from the more common state of 'political crime' towards 'commercial terrorism' for ASG were largely due to the fact that the group, seeking

¹⁶⁰ Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum": 130

financial and operational support from larger organisation such as the AQ or the IS, emulated their tactics and means of functioning. In an effort to present itself as an ideologically-driven Islamist organisation, in this periods the ASG resorted to purely terrorist activities, such as bombings or assassinations. Since throughout the group's history, due to resource limitations, the balance between terrorist acts and rent-seeking activities (such as kidnapping for ransom) was largely a zero-sum game, such behaviour contributed to ASG's temporary shift towards commercial terrorism.

Finally, an interesting issue arising with regard to ASG's positioning on the Makarenko's continuum is the spread of the splinter groups along the spectrum of the continuum's third level – that is, in the space between 'political crime' and 'commercial terrorism'. While some of the splinter groups began acting as criminal syndicates (for example, the groups that engaged in maritime kidnapping in early 2016), others still carried on the ideologically-driven terrorist activities, such as the Dawao city bombing in 2016 or the ASG's involvement in the 2017 Marawi crisis. In this regard, the question was posed by many experts as to what prompted a certain splinter group to assume the position on the spectrum it occupies. However, in the author's opinion, this question cannot be resolved with the use of the framework applied in the present study, since it is largely contingent upon intra-group dynamics. The splinter group's position on the third level of the continuum, therefore, is not determined by the Rosenauian linkages involving external actors, but rather by the internalised motivation of the splinter group's cadres that caused the split in the first place – much like the ASG's own split from the MNLF was triggered by the Janjalani brothers' postulation that MNLF's goals and means have become counterproductive to the cause of the Muslim Mindanao independence.

Key Takeaways. Conclusion.

As the analysed cases demonstrated, a broad interrelation exists between the largely theoretical model of linkage politics proposed by James Rosenau and the practice-based terrorism-crime continuum created by Tamara Makarenko. Many – yet not all – of the shifts that terrorist groups effectuate on the continuum's plane are intrinsically linked to, or even caused by a linkage existing between said organisation and another actor on the international or national arena, including other states, governments and organisations. In this linkages, terrorist organisations can both be an actor producing the stimuli and a subject of linkage, although the former is a more common relationship.

In this study, all three types of linkages were analysed – the expansive definition of a penetrative linkage by Rosenau, Andrew Scott, Wolfram Hanreider and Clair Blong, as well as Rosenauian reactive and emulative linkages. With regard to the Makarenko's continuum, all four levels of convergence were explored, with both leftward (that is, an increase in criminal behaviour) and rightward (that is, an intensification of terrorist activities) shifts considered. The key takeaways of the study are as follows:

- 1) A breakup of the penetrative linkage between a state and a terrorist organisation is likely to lead to the terrorist organisation actively searching an influx of financial support, which, in turn, may lead to the organisation increasing its level of terrorism-crime convergence – or, if there was no relationship with criminal activities, assuming a first- or second-level position on the terrorism-crime continuum. However, it has been demonstrated that if monetary support was provided by a state without the existence of a penetrative linkage, the cessation of such support is likely to provoke a similar result that would bear a reactive character, as it happened in the case of the Tamil Tigers. Therefore, one could theorise that the nature of the linkage between the terrorist organisation and the supporting state is largely secondary to the fact itself of the existence of such a linkage. It seems that the cessation of a state's backing for a terrorist organisation, even if the state did not exercise political or ideological power over said organisation, almost inevitably leads to the leftward shift of the organisation's position on the terrorism-crime continuum.

- 2) As demonstrated by the Tamil Tigers' and the ASG's cases, a reactive linkage can also be a reason for the change in the level of the continuum or in the intensity of a group's criminal activities within a single level of such. When confronted by massive military offensives of the governmental forces coupled with the attrition of the financial flows, the terrorist organisations tend to change the modality of their activities so as to ensure continued operation. Furthermore, it can be theorised that when a reactive linkage is activated by an intensification of government's resistance to the terrorist group's activities, the vector of the group's shift on the continuum depends on the place it occupied before the stimulus: for groups on the first and second level of convergence, the increase in the level is most likely, whereas for the groups on the third and fourth level the shift may occur in either direction depending mostly on non-Rosenauian factors such as the group's prevailing internal motivations.
- 3) While the emulative linkage, as predicted, is often observed in the interrelations between terrorism and crime, its modalities differ from the ones projected in the introduction: none of the organisations have displayed an emulative linkage with regard to a rivalling terrorist or criminal group. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that the organisations can emulate the functioning of a state system or of an ally terrorist group. In the former case, this is most often being done to align itself, from the ideologic viewpoint, with said organisation in order to receive material, financial or political support from it. In the latter case, the organisation tries to emulate certain government institutions and practices to support its claim for legitimacy (a feature that is mostly observed in insurgent or separatist groups). Additionally, the emulative linkage with a state can serve as a retention mechanism with regard to the group's possible shifts on the terrorism-crime continuum – in case a shift to a lower or higher level of convergence may lead to the legitimacy claim being undermined, the emulative linkage may prevent such transition from happening.
- 4) With regard to the third- and fourth-level convergence of crime and terrorism, intra-group motivations and organisational factors play a large role on its positioning on the crime-terrorism continuum. Since these levels are characterised by an elevated fluidity of the group's positions, the differences in opinions of sub-organisational actors assume greater importance when the overall position on the continuum is assumed. Consequently, it is in this modality that intraorganisational conflicts (such as the one

between Taliban's Quetta Shura and Mullah Mansoor) or even the formation of splinter groups (as it happened in the ASG's case) is most likely to occur.

Taking into account the aforementioned considerations, the author believes that the interrelation between Rosenau's linkages and Makarenko's terrorism-crime continuum presents a largely understudied issue that, upon the further exploration thereof, may provide valuable insights into the ways in which the interaction of terrorist organisations with external actors may influence the modalities of their nexus with organised crime. It has been shown that linkages have played a crucial role in the ways the nexus developed and changed in nature – therefore, they may further be used to examine how and why terrorist organisations move along the continuum, gradually acquiring some of the characteristics of a criminal syndicate. Finally, the accumulation of the body of research on the issue can result in the creation of a certain 'nexus roadmap' that may even allow to predict whether a terrorist organisation is likely to exhibit links to organised crime in some form (or what form this nexus may take), thus significantly improving the threat assessment and risk management techniques employed by states, international organisations, the private sector and the civil society.

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