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Delicate Thoughts: Towards A Phenomenology Of Food Cravings.

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Prologue

This thesis was conducted under the supervision of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Urban Kordeš, head of the cognitive science department at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, who encouraged me to follow up on my unusual and quite ambitious research plan.

It is the particular theme of food that intrigued me with most certainty throughout my life. And in spite the seeming distance to the study of cognitive sciences it was the remembrance of things past that disclosed the multifariousness of connections as they crossed my mind. The rich connections to the very first experiences with concepts of fear, fragility and existentiality during my childhood and years of adolescence were demanding and luckily outweighed by feelings of ease, safety and self-realization in latter years. By a fortunate turn of events I grew up to see food as something very precious and formative. Especially during this previous year of my Master's studies I learned to consciously share and cherish those experiences and their impact on my life.

Subsequently, I wanted to set a first milestone for my personal quest to get a big picture on *how* people experience food with this thesis, which is propelled by a certainty that adjoining the investigation of the *structure*, instead of solely looking at the *content* of experience, can add vital perspectives to our understanding of our cognitive integration of food. In other words, I assume that the *qualia* of our experience exceed the range of the sensory and suggest hereby that we are able to experientially understand propositions in sense of a *cognitive phenomenology* (cf. Strawson, 2011).

This work required me to immerse in an overwhelming amount of phenomenal data and venture far leaps in the literature due to the scarcely researched grounds I walked on. Nevertheless, the times of uncertainty have been outweighed by far by the joy of working with my co-researchers whose experiences compose the heart of this case study; the candid feedback from my supervisor and colleagues; the intriguing discussions with international researchers as well as the support of my dearest friends. I cannot stress hard enough how grateful I am for all the hours of discussions; the forthright puzzled but yet encouraging reactions; and moreover how smitten I am with the insight I was given into very personal stories and experiences.

From a methodological perspective I strive to pay tribute to Phenomenology following Merleau-Ponty's denotation as the study of essences (i.e. of perception and consciousness), thus trying to put those »essences back into existence«. Consequently, the direct descriptions in this thesis shall offer an account of space, time and the world as they are lived by my co-researchers.

I have lived through years of refusal to release food as a (former) private resort into my public life *out there*. My thoughts on eating and drinking, my planning and cooking, all of it has been a safe-place. Now, by finally expanding it to be part of my academic studies I hope to not only share an extraordinary approach to empirical phenomenal data, but rather some of my attitude and belief as well. That is to say, that I am confident about the significance of our very own cognition, of how we integrate our experiences as well as the importance of readopting the individual as originating point of research; way prior to investigating groups or cultures as we are often used to in science.

Moving in the realms of scientific research may allure to operationalize, generalize and explain things (instead of problematizing an issue in order to reach a better understanding); often misremembering the »things themselves« in the run, as Husserl (1936/1970) asserted when demanding to return to matters of describing rather than analysing. In a sense, it was and is a far reaching struggle to resist the scholastic temptations of the »new Scholastic [who] criticizes the criticisms with which some other Scholastic has criticized other criticisms« (Dewey, 1891–1892). Instead, I want to clear the ground for new perspectives and take this (counterintuitive) step back of investigating the subjective individual so as to conjure what we are actually looking at when we »do science«.¹

Accordingly, this research enabled me to take a halt and rethink my understanding of the essence of consciousness after the intense engagement during the study of cognitive science. In an environment where I often felt lost in translation between definitions and value-laden concepts that differ from discipline to discipline I think the thought of »wonder« introduced by Fink in order to relate to reduction in Husserl's work and adopted by Merleau-Ponty describes best how my research shall encourage reflection. »Wonder« is thus a process of *stepping back* to »watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire« (Merleau-Ponty, 2002:xv). This simple movement widened the angles and literally captured me with wonder. Hence, my uttermost hopes remain that my fascination for this research will spark off further exploration, subsequent consolidation and initiate interdisciplinary collaborations.

¹ For a rare perspective on a more »humble« picture of a philosopher you may read Callebaut (1993). *Taking the naturalistic turn, or how real philosophy of science is done*. He argues in line with the poignant assertion made by Locke, that »[t]he commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but everyone must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambitious enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge.« (Locke, [1690], 1959: 14)

The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty. (2002: ix)

1 | Introduction

In spirit with Maurice Merleau-Ponty as he wrote in his preface to his book *Phenomenology of Perception* »we must reawaken the basic experience of the world« (Merleau-Ponty, 2002), simultaneously introducing the argument that science and in particular analytical reflection, starts from experience. Departing from this perspective this interdisciplinary master thesis connects two dimensions. On the one hand a specific method is drawn from the cognitive sciences by using the study of *phenomenology* as vehicle of investigation². And on the other hand *food studies* are used as a concrete platform for discussion.

In the course of this thesis I will point out the significance of the phenomenological method chosen to access experiences and question the construction of concepts in science. Foremost, this underpinning originates the title »Delicate Thoughts«, which not only hints at the common description of food as being *delicate*, but moreover it points at the *sensitivity* and *complexity* of the subject matter of experience that stands at the core of this research. By subsequently introducing the selected figurehead of »food cravings«, likewise part of the thesis title, a typical example for the manifold of poorly understood phenomena is offered where obtaining reliable data seems to disregard experiential data for the sake of focusing on science-based measurements. To oppose to this seemingly preference for numbers and measures that are statistically processed, an empirical enquiry will outline how concepts such as *hunger* or *food cravings* are actually experienced. Therefore, this research investigates *whether* and *how* individuals experience varying structures to food-related thoughts and contrast specific concepts such as *food cravings* in a further step. This comparison affords to disclose significances for individuals and commonalities between the collaborating co-researchers; in a sense that a *food craving* may be experienced as being aware of the cognitive state of liking and subsequent wanting of a specific food in a very effortlessly manner for *person A*, while *person B* may describe a complex experience of an irresolute struggle that arises as mental images and bodily sensations accompanied by inner speech. By investigating their fundamentally diverging structure of experience the notion of *cognitive flavours* is introduced, which denotes cognitive *styles* for food-related thought and opens up the field for gaining *phenomenal* insight into how other people experience food.

To facilitate an anchor for both approximating the connections between the discussed propositions and chapters before reading (or respectively redrawing them after reading) a schematic overview of the thesis composition is illustrated in *Figure 1* (see page 5). It shows the main components of argument with their corresponding chapters as discussed.

² Importantly, it is no specific phenomenological school that dictates this work, but rather the phenomenological thought that facilitates as starting framework for this research.

The thesis will open with a brief overview of relevant concepts and selected theories, of both the state of the art in food studies (Chapter 2.1) as well as the study of phenomenology (Chapter 2.2) to set a common ground before focusing on the empirical part of the thesis.




Figure 1: Schematic Overview of the Thesis Structure

While this research is constructing against the grain it delimits itself from prior hypothesis. Instead of spotting gaps in existent theories it intends to problematize the account of food in science. This *problematization*, as advocated by Freire (1970), sets the general methodological proposal of posing questions to challenge assumptions and deconstruct the phenomena.

The specific method implemented was drawn from the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) by Russell Hurlburt (2006), a method for investigating random samples of inner experience in participants' natural environments. Consequently, the core driving-force of this thesis is covered by the empirical research conducted (Chapter 3).

The vital asset of the phenomenological approach lies in illuminating the *structure* rather than only the *content* of lived experience. The decisive difference between these two classes is the usual focus on the *content* that questions *what* was experienced, resulting in interpretations, psychological origins or causal explanations, whereas asking *how* aims at the *structure* and therefore direct descriptions of lived experience.

After elaborating on the validity and reliability of the data (Chapter 4) a close up view of the methodology and research design (Chapter 5) is provided.

Continuing to the core of this multiple case study unfolds the discussion of the phenomenal data that was acquired within in-depth interviews for a selection of five collaborating co-researchers who were trained to give their experiential reports following DES. Being dedicated to this *idiographic* approach (i.e. within-person as introduced by Allport, 1970) will result in the presentation of the phenomenal data in form of a verbal report on the derived themes and concepts as well as a schematic visualization of categories for each case (i.e. co-researcher) that was involved in the research (Chapter 6).

In the discussion of the results (Chapter 7) a direct line-up of the diverging experience of two selected concepts of *hunger* and *food-cravings* is given. This overview of significant and distinct characteristics of the several co-researchers shall open a data-driven discourse that reflects on the concrete challenges of an attempt to assess, structure and analyse phenomenal data related to food.

The final discussion of the thesis (Chapter 8) summarizes the cases and key assertions from the research and illuminates them in the light of the core notion of *cognitive flavours* and prepares for the final conclusion and positioning of the thesis (Chapter 9).

A future outlook (Chapter 10) shall close the attempt to problematize the construction of food-related concepts by embedding the investigations of this case study into a selection of theories that propose future lines of research.

Considering that both the methodology adopted from my background in the *cognitive sciences* and the platform of *food studies* are working with highly interdependent and multidisciplinary phenomena. I therefore advocate to *deconstruct* human experience instead of setting it aside

due to its complexity. In the end, it is at the forefront of what we *see, hear, feel, think, know* and thus, research and science is just a »second-order expression« as Merleau-Ponty asserted. Recalling this calls to attention that we should not discard the step of grounding our research in what human experience discloses to be important, in order to accelerate the process by starting with pre-defined concepts, popular constructs of operationalization found in the literature. Crucially, this could lead to a circular movement that only re-evaluates what a majority of theories already advocate and prevent us from discovering novel nuances to them.

2 | Finding Common Ground

Following, I will provide a brief overview of relevant concepts and selected theories on the state of the art research regarding food studies, as well as an introduction into the study of phenomenology as considered for this thesis. The line of argument in this section of the thesis is an extended version of the authors' publication on *Flavours of Thought: Towards a Phenomenological Approach of Food-Related Experiences* (Tan, 2013).

2.1. The Platform: Human Experience and Food Studies

Food and Academia

Contrary to common belief the study of food emerges to be of high importance throughout human history. Contemplations about production, consumption of food, as well as the overall theme of eating and drinking is subject to the studies of a number of famous Philosophers. Unfortunately, much of it remains disguised behind drawn curtains. In ancient Greece, Plato evolved his dietary ideas of Pythagoras in Book II of *Republic* (Williams, 1883) and Epicurus acknowledged the desires of good food and fine wine as natural, although defining them as unnecessary for human happiness. Further remains to the unexpected are the manuscript of the wine enthusiast John Locke (Locke & Sandby, 1766), or the fact that the only goods Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1754) recognized in the universe are *food*, a female, and sleep, while the only evils he feared were pain and hunger. Likewise Karl Marx offered the view that »by producing food, man indirectly produces his material life itself« in his early work on *The German Ideology*.

Evidently *food* intrigues. However, despite the deep rootedness into the thinking and creations of great minds that shaped the history of Western Philosophy, we look back at meagre fields when searching for research in the realm of *food studies*. This is often explained due to the domain of food being identified as secondary or lower senses; since touch, smell and taste are classified as ephemeral stimuli (Diaconu, 2013).

What Food Studies is all about ³

Before we can discuss how to use Food Studies as a discourse platform, we first have to consider what it is, and respectively, what it is not. Miller & Deutsch introduced it in their book *Food Studies* as following: »There are many fields that study food itself - its production (agricultural sciences, meat and poultry science, aquaculture); its chemical, physical or

³ This Chapter *The Platform: Human Experience in Food Studies* is taken from the authors' publication on *Flavours of Thought: Towards A Phenomenology of Food-Related Experiences* (Tan, 2013).

biological properties (food science, biochemistry); its physiology when consumed (nutrition); and its preparation (culinary arts). [...] Food study, then, is not the study of food itself but rather the study of the relationships between food and the human experience« (Miller & Deutsch, 2010:1).

Accordingly, contemporary research that is dealing with the phenomena of food paints a thousands pictures, but mostly about food itself [ibidem]. What locks into your gaze most probable will be the frequent motif depicting a love for erroneous detail, i.e. when identifying obesogens that denote environmental chemicals that are linked to obesity (Janesick & Blumberg, 2012) or connecting the body mass index to the energy balance model in nutritional science (Kuczmarski et al., 1994; Flegal, 2010). As Belasco points out, »[w]e can't live without food, but food also kills us«. This notion is reflected by the vast amount of research investigating the negative nature of i.e. pathologies of malnutrition and hunger. »But when it comes to analysing the more positive and intimate features of what, how, and why we eat, academics have been considerably more reticent« (Belasco, 2008:2).

Phenomena related to food seem to be a topic of increasing attention, descending from simple intake covered by nutrition knowledge (Wardle et al., 2000), to food safety (Ziegler et al., 2011) up to public health policies (Nestle, 2000). Food as a figurehead of culture and heritage is likewise nothing new, thus studies on the topic of food are abound.

Now, reviewing the core of approaches adopted causes a feeling of being in between two minds. On the one hand we encounter a growing appetite for qualitative research in studies of obesity (Morland & Evenson, 2009; Newbold et al. 2008; Wang & Beydoun, 2007; White, 2007) and eating disorders (Waters & Waller, 2001) as dominant public health issue. But on the other hand, attempts to include qualitative aspects in a descriptive manner and which might contrast positive, intimate features of food remain on the periphery. Subsequently, this thesis proposes to fill this gap and attempts to provide an empirical qualitative enquiry on the human experience of food.

Investigating Food in its Maladaptive Nature

Now, as we shift to the study of the relationships between food and the human experience we are confronted with exemplary phenomena such as *food-cravings*. Clearly, these are normative everyday experiences (Gendall et al., 1997; Hill, 1994) and again food-related experiences are predominantly investigated in their potential maladaptive nature (Lafay et al. 2001). Tiggeman and Kemps likewise criticised this negative construction of *food-cravings*, »For example, food cravings have been associated with binge eating (Gendall, Joyce, Sullivan, & Bulik, 1998; McManus & Waller, 1995), which in turn contributes to both obesity (Wurtman & Wurtman, 1995) and eating disorders (Gendall et al., 1998; Waters, Hill, & Waller, 2000). Food cravings are also associated with guilt (Macdiarmid & Heatherington,

1995) and depression (Gendall et al., 1998), and have been shown to impair cognitive performance (Green, 2001)« (Tiggemann & Kemps, 2005:305).

Consequently, in order to stop highlighting the potential maladaptive nature it is suggested that there is a strong need to suspend the abundance of preconceptions. Instead, food studies should centrally attempt to understand »what it is in fact for us«, following the words of Merleau-Ponty (2002:xvii). In this sense, it is proposed that *how* we experience food can give a vibrant insight to our cognitive integration of sensations, perceptions, thoughts and feelings, and such.

On Cultural Dependence & Linguistic Examination

Belasco advocates the message, that »[s]haring food makes us wiser, better people. This belief is also expressed in the Latin-based words ‘company’ and ‘companions’: the people with whom one shares bread. But despite this general principle, an even rudimentary understanding of cultural anthropology or history suggests that many of the practices that we take to be timeless and universal are in fact highly variable and only recently ‘constructed’« (Belasco, 2008:19)

This cultural aspect and construction is far-reaching and constitutes the fundament of the studies of anthropologists, geographers, historians and sociologists on food. On the one hand we are thus faced with a patronage of cultural studies that explains the complexity of the human experience on food by investigating typical core interests such as collective models of perception, socialization of habits and its meaning to a culture, or the overall group specific identification of values and norms (Diaconu, 2013).

And on the other hand our descriptions might be cultural dependent starting from their very basic buildings blocks. On that, »[i]ntercultural studies have suggested that the four basic taste nodes: sweet, sour, bitter and salty, might be a cultural construction« (Diaconu, 2006), which leaves us with an inevitable encounter of linguistic examination.

Memory, Identity & Food

One final assertion to demonstrate the relevance of food to the study of human experience and its the deep rootedness (but often hidden dimension) in regards to memory and identity, will be depicted by a short excerpt of the most famous example of involuntary memory elicited by food, taken from Proust’s episode of the madeleine in *Remembrance Of Things Past*.

»And suddenly the memory revealed itself. The taste was that of the little piece of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray (because on those mornings I did not go out before mass), when I went to say good morning to her in her bedroom, my aunt Léonie used to give me, dipping it first in her own cup of tea or tisane. The sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing to my mind before I tasted it; perhaps because I had so often

seen such things in the meantime, without tasting them, on the trays in pastry-cooks' windows, that their image had dissociated itself from those Combray days to take its place among others more recent; perhaps because of those memories, so long abandoned and put out of mind, nothing now survived, everything was scattered; the shapes of things, including that of the little scallop-shell of pastry, so richly sensual under its severe, religious folds, were either obliterated or had been so long dormant as to have lost the power of expansion which would have allowed them to resume their place in my consciousness. But when from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the things are broken and scattered, taste and smell alone, more fragile but more enduring, more unsubstantial, more persistent, more faithful, remain poised a long time, like souls, remembering, waiting, hoping, amid the ruins of all the rest; and bear unflinchingly, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection.

And as soon as I had recognized the taste of the piece of madeleine soaked in her decoction of lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me (although I did not yet know and must long postpone the discovery of why this memory made me so happy) immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose up like a stage set to attach itself to the little pavilion opening on to the garden which had been built out behind it for my parents (the isolated segment which until that moment had been all that I could see); and with the house the town, from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I used to be sent before lunch, the streets along which I used to run errands, the country roads we took when it was fine. And as in the game wherein the Japanese amuse themselves by filling a porcelain bowl with water and steeping in it little pieces of paper which until then are without character or form, but, the moment they become wet, stretch and twist and take on colour and distinctive shape, become flowers or houses or people, solid and recognizable, so in that moment all the flowers in our garden and in M. Swann's park, and the water-lilies on the Vivonne and the good folk of the village and their little dwellings and the parish church and the whole of Combray and its surroundings, taking shape and solidity, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea.» (Proust, 1917-1923)

What Proust's exuberant writing does, is skilfully relating description of food directly to memory. His experience of food clearly exceeded the sole signal integration of smell, taste and texture to a *flavour*. Rather it triggered a vivid and nearly overwhelmingly detailed recollection of visual impressions and emotions. Successively, it illustrates how memory is at the core of what we take to be essential for understanding the distinctive capacities of the human mind and cognition. His episode showed how one »creates the memory at the moment one needs it, rather than merely pulling it out an intact item, image, or story« (Engel, 1999:6). Hereby reminding that memories are experience-dependent internal representations (Dudai & Fitzpatrick, 2007) that do not exist separately from the various *acts* of recall (Moscovitch, 2007). Such acts are, in fact, the ones we try to capture by means of

phenomenological methods (even if not in such an elegant literal manner). After all, »our best knowledge of our ‘inner states’ are by way of memory, attending to experiences we previously had«, as James posed (Overgaard, 2006: 629).

The enormous significance of food is thus evident. It »is for nourishing, for fueling the body, for building bones, teeth and muscle« (Lupton, 1996), but there is more to it than just nutrition. The French father of gastronomic prose Brillat-Savarin once said, »Tell me what you eat and I will tell you what you are« (Brillat-Savarin, 1825/1949/2009). This popular proverb sounds familiar, intuitive and catchy enough to not spend too much thought on it. By virtue of this, it illustrates the important core idea of adopting food as vital for the notion of *being* and having a concept of *self*. Thus, asking how eating influences us leads us to the discussion of *identity* and *memory* and food as a medium for personal recollection and collective identity. Yet, talking about recalling our very own fragments of memories and looking through this lens of nostalgia might cause some discomfort. Isn’t it too harsh to rashly say *we are what we eat*? Some might be displeased about overrating these so-called tastes of the past. After all, we »eat so many different foods! Which ones signify deep identity and which simply fill us up? Culinaricians like to draw deep distinctions between human ‘dining’, which is full of deep cultural significance, and animal ‘feeding’, a purely biological act, but not everything we eat has a lot of meaning. Sometimes we just ‘feed’« (Belasco, 2008:32).

2.2. The Vehicle: Phenomenology As The Study Of Subjective Experience

The Myth and Fashion of Husserl

Phenomenology, in its basic understanding, can be seen as the philosophical study of subjective experience and consciousness. Importantly, phenomenology achieves a higher level of knowledge through »eidetic reduction« (from *eidos* meaning essence) in contrast to inductive methods where commonalities are generalised step by step (Diaconu, 2013:10). This direct leap towards the essence of consciousness points at Husserl's long tradition and first directive to »return to the things themselves« as the essential matter of describing, rather than explaining or analysing (Husserl, 1936/1970). However, due to the empirical character of this research and the superior aspiration to problematize the concrete account of food in science I restrain from intense application and reflection of the long tradition of following Husserl's work at this point. Those who are familiar to the diverging schools of Phenomenology will be aware of the rich and competing philosophies regarding the *world, consciousness, reduction, perception, truth* and such, but an attempt to give a full review of the field would clearly exceed the scope and in fact purpose of this thesis. The warily suspension of the elaboration and analysis of the thick theoretical studies of the diverging schools of phenomenology at this point intends to allow a perspective that is foremost grounded in the empirical data obtained. This approach is in line with Glaser's (1967) attempt to generate »uncontaminated« constructs, relationships and theories. In the end, an initial literature review of the topic (rather than on the theory) did provide the early structure to this work.

A Look Within: Introspection vs. Phenomenology

As one approaches phenomenology explanations referring to introspection are often met since this does recourse to a more intuitive notion of reflecting and observing oneself. But as the past shows even famous researchers as Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Titchener who managed to establish experimental applications in areas of (cognitive) psychology strongly differed in their understanding of introspection. I.e. whereas Titchener focused on the qualitative analysis of consciousness in its parts, Wundt's viewpoint approaches conscious experience quantitatively and as a whole (Schultz & Schultz, 2012:88-100).

Subsequently, it is a common misconception that introspection equalizes phenomenology. A long tradition of studies on introspection focuses on the self-examination of one's own conscious thoughts and feelings (Schultz & Schultz, 2012:67-77). Conversely, this is a misleading equalization in the author's opinion. One such argument that supports this stance, was made by Gallagher & Zahavi, in their book *The Phenomenological Mind*.

»We are aware of what we experience without using introspection precisely because we have an implicit, non-objectifying, pre-reflective awareness of our own experience as we live it through. At the same time that I see the light, I'm aware that I see the light. The awareness in question is not based on reflectively or introspectively turning our attention to our own experience. It is, rather, built into our experience as an essential part of it, and it is precisely this which defines our experience as conscious experience« (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008:15).

They continued arguing in sense of »my« and »other« people's consciousness of the world, which often surrounds the question on whether we understand the concepts and use of other people's words. Introspection, in this sense, is an important approach for phenomenology, but has no exclusive character for an access to our mind.

Phenomenological Approach as Attitude & Access to Truth

Drawing from Merleau-Ponty's assertion of a responsible philosopher I act in place »that phenomenology can be practised and identified as a manner or style of thinking, that it existed as a movement before arriving at complete awareness of itself as a philosophy« (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: viii).

This »style of thinking« depicts the vital string of thought considered for the phenomenological practice in this research and is best illustrated by contrasting his thought on »Wortbedeutungen« taken from the preface to his book *Phenomenology of Perception* (with emphasis added):

»Seeking the essence of consciousness will therefore *not consist in developing the Wortbedeutung* of consciousness and escaping from existence into the universe of things said; it will consist in rediscovering my actual presence to myself, the fact of my consciousness which is in the last resort what the word and the concept of consciousness mean. Looking for the world's essence is not looking for what it is as an idea once it has been reduced to a theme of discourse; it is looking for *what it is as a fact for us, before any thematization.*« (Merleau-Ponty, 2002:xvii)

In fact, whenever we assess experience we ask for the *content* and consequently get interpretations and explanations of *what* was experienced. Indisputably, our dependence on »Wortbedeutung« and thus »things said« in verbalized language is crucial to every method of access. Linguistic examination and ideas reduced to themes of discourse are therefore inevitable to a certain degree, likewise this holds for the interviews that will serve as the core empirical data to this thesis. But rather than rendering this work redundant we shall keep this ultimate dependence on »Wortbedeutungen« as a vital figurehead in mind, which posits the thought that scientific research is built as second-order expression upon the original world of experience, by nature.

By and large, this does not excuse withdrawing from the challenge to strive for »what it is in fact for us« and only strengthens the need to suspend »thematization«. In line with the succeeding argument that a purely linguistic examination of texts only reveals what we put into them, originates the decision to engage in a dialogical mode of in-depth interviews for the empirical phenomenological enquiry.

This research design is thus responding to this previous contemplation by looking at the pristine inner experience not by the means of *thematized content* by asking *what* is experienced, but rather revealing subjective constructs of the *process* through asking *how* something was experienced. The decisive difference between those two classes of reports lies in the first one resulting in interpretations, psychological origins or causal explanations, whereas asking *how* aims at direct descriptions as they are lived. Ultimately, observations show that preconceptions on the detailed structure and *process* of experience are rarely available and thus facilitate a pristine investigation that limits the issues aforementioned.

Problematization As General Methodological Proposal

Overall, this research is constructing against the grain and delimiting itself from prior hypothesis. Instead of spotting gaps in existent theories it intends to *problematize* the account of food in science. This *problematization*, as advocated by Paulo Freire, sets the general methodological proposal of posing questions to challenge assumptions and deconstruct phenomena. Freire's major work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* originally focused on philosophy of education. This deconstruction was aimed at fostering a pedagogical practice of challenging »truths« that are taken-for-granted in a system by posing them as »problems« and thus developing a more critical consciousness (cf. Freire, 1972:132). The aspect of *truth* emerges as evidently reoccurring theme when discussing consciousness and is vital for understanding the considerations regarding the design of this phenomenological study.

Let us therefore highlight this from a methodological view. Opposing the two typical philosophical research paradigms of the *positivistic* versus the *naturalistic* approach, we are aware of the contrasting use of either quantitative methods with pre-established hypotheses and research designs in comparison to qualitative methods such as ethnographies allowing an emergent research design. Interestingly enough, qualitative research provides us with an established way of developing an interpretive understanding of e.g. a culture. Yet, as soon as we observe how this is done in practice I advance the view that those interpretations have too much weighing; they become the sole qualities considered and make *qualia*⁴ vanish in oblivion. That is to say, that for the case of consciousness, it is likely to automatically think about qualities such as contents, interpretation, and reports of meaning and subsequently disregard (even if not necessarily warily) the *access* to those qualities of experience that make

⁴ Derived from Latin, meaning »what kind« for different instances of subjective experience, such as the perception of *redness* of a glass of wine.

great part of *qualia* in the authors opinion. I want to accentuate that this subtlety of *access* is the crucial stressor that I would like to illustrate by leaning on what Husserl wrote about the »experience of truth« (Husserl, 1975:190) in his work *Das Erlebnis der Wahrheit (Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik)*. For him the world *is* what we perceive and perception is thus not truth in itself but the *access to truth*. In this sense, I would see the reports in qualitative research referring to the *what*, the *content* of experiences, the interpretations and explanations, as the rash equalization to *truth*. Consequently, this poses the challenge to take one step back and refocus on the actual *access* to truth; which I interpret as demand to readjust the lens to including the *how*, and therefore the *structure* of experience.

Important to recognize here is the differentiation of *problematization* as a general methodological proposal and the specific phenomenological method used as the *access to experience of truth*. Revisiting Freire, he also asserted that one can know only to the extent that one *problematizes* the natural, cultural and historical reality in which she or he is immersed (Freire, 1994).

3 | Interdisciplinary Research Interest

The previous chapter already suggested vital parts of the larger research interest. This chapter will now give an elaborate view of the central notions that depart from *cultural dependence* and questions regarding the *scientific construction of concepts*. These lines of thought originated the idea to problematize the specific account of food by means of phenomenological enquiry and point at the final aspiration to highlight so-called *cognitive flavours* that question the existence of cognitive styles of food-related thought. Lastly, setting boundaries to the research interest will conclude this chapter.

Cultural Dependence & Linguistic Examination

The inevitable encounter of cultural dependence and linguistic examination was discussed in chapter 2.1. And although not being able to circumvent either of them it is aspired to at least suspend some of the linguistic preconceptions by adjoining the *structure* of experience (also denoted as the *process* or *modalities* of experience in the course of this thesis) through asking *how* a food-related incident is experienced. This shall facilitate suspension of pre-conceptions, since it is assumed that prejudgements usually constrain to content prejudices. That is to say, reporting on the meaning or explanation might be confabulated, but observations show that it is unlikely to recourse to biases during interviews when asked *how* something was experienced. For instance, reporting the thought of rain might carry biases of liking or disliking it, but whether it arises as a mental image of newly bought rain boots; the comforting sound of raindrops trickling on the windowpane; or the imagination of the discomfoting feeling of cold feet will not be subject to any preconceptions most likely if reported. With hope to deconstruct food-related experiences in their whole *gestalt*, as *Gesamtkunstwerk* that largely tries to delimit itself from prior bias regarding the content. By and large this can be seen as the prime asset of this thesis and to my knowledge there has not been any similar research done on the topic so far.

Vital to mark at this point is that this thesis is not an attempt to offer a unified definition of *food cravings* to comfort the reader. In fact, it wants to highlight the multiplicity of personal stories of lived experience in order to fuel debates on how our presuppositions are milled into these phenomena and influence important areas such as disease construction, operationalization in scientific research or the individual experience of disorders and disturbances related to food.

Contrasting the Scientific Construction of Concepts

In order to contrast the scientific construction of concepts in contemporary research the particular phenomenological method used to access human experience related to food is a

methodology drawn from the cognitive sciences, which specifically investigates the relationship of food and human experience in this project. The interdisciplinary character of this thesis is therefore given in two dimensions, namely the specific research design at hand aiming at illuminating the field of *food studies*, as well as the further implications on human experience that grasp onto many other areas of research.

By way of example, we can take a look at neuroscientific findings as a benchmark in cognitive sciences that despite, or by virtue of its popularity, needs to be treated with caution. As Cacioppo et al. (2003) put it very poignant, *Just Because You're Imaging the Brain Doesn't Mean You Can Stop Using Your Head* in their same titled paper. They argued in line with the fundamental premise to social psychology, that social cognition, emotion and behaviour emanate from the brain, dating back to James (1890/1950) and Spencer (1895). »When one first reads an article in which fMRI measurements are reported, one is likely to be impressed by the apparent ability of this new technology to image the inner workings of the normal human brain« (Cacioppo et al, 2003:651). The assumption crystalizes that brain imaging can show us what is going on inside our heads, but this is a clear make-believe and we should remain critical on *how* we do research. Gallagher & Zahavi (2008) likewise referred to the current progress in brain imaging techniques such as fMRI and PET, and remind us that it is »certainly not just a matter of taking a snapshot of what is going on inside the head« (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008:5).

Ultimately, we arrive at one problematic aspect of contemporary research: the way we hypothesize studies and interpret and explain our results. This is likewise the overarching idea for this thesis when consulting studies such as *Food and drug cues activate similar brain regions: A meta-analysis of functional MRI studies* by Tang et al. (2013). Their exemplary conclusion states that food and smoking cues activate comparable brain networks. The introduction (emphasis added) reads as follows:

»In healthy individuals, food cues can trigger *hunger* and feeding behavior. Likewise, smoking cues can trigger *craving* and relapse in smokers. Brain imaging studies report that structures involved in appetitive behaviors and *reward*, notably the insula, striatum, amygdala and orbital frontal cortex, tend to be activated by both *visual food and smoking cues*. « (Tang et al, 2013:317)

Without going into technical details on this particular study, it illustrates central questions that sparked my initial curiosity in the early stages of this thesis. What do they denote when referring to concepts of *hunger* or *craving*? Is it enough to identify them as phenomena present or absent during an fMRI measurement without accounting for the qualia and what the experience it is for us? Even if we assume that *hunger* is mainly experienced *bodily*, is it really satisfying to look at *visual* activation?

By now, most researchers in the field are very aware of these constraints of their methodological designs. Nevertheless, it seems to remain as a popular blind spot. In this sense, we need to remind ourselves that phenomena such as *food cravings* or *hunger* are hypothetical constructs, which are neither directly observable nor measurable. Finally, these first-person reports are no plain add-ons to empirical studies but at the very core heart of our findings. After all, without the insight into a persons experience we would have no data to correlate our most advanced technological data with. To recall Merleau-Ponty's assertion, mentioned in the very beginning, »we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression« (Merleau-Ponty, 2002:xi).

Cognitive Flavours

Eventually, the idea of *cognitive flavours* emerged with the intention of questioning the existence of cognitive styles for food-related thought. Specifically, it is assumed that not everyone is constantly accompanied by inner speech (as known from movies), but moreover each individual has particular structures to his food-related experiences that may denote a person's *cognitive flavours*. This research therefore vitally grounds its results in empirical data and questions *how* food-related experiences arise and *whether* there are certain stabilities in significances or commonalities for particular individuals or concepts.

For matters of clarification, this notion sets out with the descriptor *flavour* that centrally adopts the common equalization of *taste* and *flavour*. Accordingly, one is often challenged to describe how something does *taste*, although the desired report aims at a holistic evaluation of the *flavour*. This is a clear misconception since the sensation of *taste* is just one vital component to the integrated experience of *flavour* in the brain. The incorporation of various segregated information from the gustatory receptors (taste), olfactory receptors (smell), thermal nociceptors (temperature), photoreceptors (vision) and hair cells in the ear (sound), is thus combined into one single perceived stimuli we call *flavour* (Shepherd, 2012).



Figure 2: There is more to Flavour Than Taste.

Even more so, this neurogastronomical definition of *flavour* inspires an allegorical use, so as to claim that food-related experiences consist of more than just plain signal processing. We

know from experience that percepts such as smells, sounds are directly intertwined with emotion and cognition. But these signals do not access an intact item of experience by executing specific routines of symbol manipulation. Most of the time they only initiate the retrieval of prior knowledge or memories (cf. Chapter 2.1.) and captivate us in the unfolding of experiential convolutions; such as dictating our preferences or animosities.

At large, one might synonymously say, that it takes much more than just to look at the *content* of reports to make sense of the *gestalt* of experience (cf. Figure 3). Resorting to the example of rain (cf. page 17) one may confidently report the content of thought, however, losing sight of *how* it is experienced. This may exemplarily arise as paying attention to the sound on the windowpane, as recollecting a memory of a lost umbrella, as the mental imagery of newly bought boots, a bodily sensation of cold feet, a conversation in inner speech or a abstract thought without symbols of any kind. In other words, the *contents* cover interpretations, explanations and meanings that are reported and simply fall short on giving an accurate description that necessarily involve the *structure* or *process* of experience as well⁵.

This central idea is thus the core driving force of the research design and stresses the benefit of the particular methodology chosen. The consequent main goal of this research therefore lies in finding prominent significances, commonalities and patterns in the phenomenal data that may guide the idea of *cognitive flavours* in future research.




Figure 3: There is more to Gestalt than Content.

Setting Boundaries

Admittedly this research explores to see the bigger picture, but as this undertaking warily faces the fact that food-related thought is more than just the sum of its parts, more than the reduction to neural mechanisms or the adding up of sensory signals, we shouldn't get discouraged by only seeing parts of picture. As Rezende wrote: »Phenomenology is not a philosophy of evidence but of truth in all of its manifestations. As a matter of fact, truth not

⁵ Which does not deny that the content of thought has a direct and vital impact on conscious thought. Positions as such may therefore denote that the »phenomenology of thought is constitutive of its content« (Pitt, 2004:2).

only manifests but also hides itself, and its hiding is still one of its forms of manifestations. The unveiling [...] consists of discovering [...] that truth never reveals itself entirely« (Rezende, 1990:29). The movement of hiding and discovering is thus a natural driving force that adds spice to the challenge of finding the *manifestations of truth* even if we need to stay sceptical and careful on this journey.

At large, it is necessary to clarify the *idiographic* analysis of depicting a within-person investigation as the major legitimate aim. Any general and normative description towards a truly *nomothetic* approach (in sense of a quantitative between person approach that facilitates general laws) is attended as supplementary discussion, and only constructed as pointer for future research.

4 | Participation, Validity & Reliability

On the Influence of the Investigator

Assuming that I have been able to bracket out prior hypothesis and biases to a great extent I am confident to have analyzed the data to reveal structures without distorting the pristine lived experience of my co-researchers. Specifically regarding this critical aspect of »bracketing« in pure phenomenology I have to mark that I do not claim to have started from a perspective that was completely free from hypotheses or preconceptions according to Husserl (1970). Rather, I worked with the central notion to suspend and challenge normative and structural assumptions. As of my being investigator I acknowledge to have been a vital part of the research; as an interested actor engaging into the process with my co-researchers, rather than being just a detached observer (cf. Plummer, 1983; Stanley & Wise, 2002).

On Subjectivity

Investigating mental imagery, inner speech or reports on emotions and feelings echoes with a voice of discontent. Indeed, the demand to investigate subjective constructs is uttermost complex. When doing research on human experience we necessarily need to come to the awareness that we often get caught in misconceptions of what is more *real* or *objective*. Keep in mind that reports on e.g. *sensations* are things that are simply experienced and therefore neither *true* nor *false* (Wiesing, 2009:73). Furthermore, as Diaconu asserted, consciousness does not *have* objects, but rather it *constitutes* them (my translation; Diaconu, 2013: 41ff). This constituting and detaching from objects renders the aspect of *objectivity* redundant in a sense.

Exemplary, thinking of sensory hierarchies will curl up the fact that they are indisputable rooted into our thinking. Simply considering the superiority of the sense of vision and audition reflect this clear preference of investigating external stimuli that are elicited, over sensations that arise in mind. And exactly this privilege of stimuli of vision and audition over reported feelings and mental images (that are so easily second-guessed) are exceptional, in that to my opinion this distinction poses a fundamental issue, since all modalities should be seen as *content* of consciousness (cf. Sartre, 1971). Whether perception, inner speech or mental imagery, all of them are *acts* of consciousness that promote *how* we relate to objects; and every report should be taken into account independently of the ascribed measurability or rank in a sensory hierarchies.

Documentation

Following measures pay tribute to secure transparency regarding the research process:

- 1) Any wording that may bias the co-researcher (such as *food cravings*) was explicitly avoided prior and during data acquisition and the concrete thematic idea and purpose of the research only revealed after the revision of the enquiry.
- 2) All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed before the actual data analysis.
- 3) For purposes of full transparency a notation was introduced that allows retracing all codes used for grouping into concept and categories to their according samples. (For details see *Specification and Notation* in the upcoming chapter 5)
- 4) After the data enquiry each participant was contacted for subsequent revision of the interviews to clarify aspects such as proper wording of the transcriptions as well as to confirm the correct basic understanding of concepts and relations in the data. A consensual validation of the overall interpretation and identified themes and concepts applied in all cases.

Ecological & Consensual Validity

The term validity denotes the extent to which the used tool of measurement corresponds to the actual measure of what it claims to measure.

Accordingly, one great asset of the phenomenological methodology in use is its access to lived experience that subsequently claims an accurate sampling of phenomenal data from participant's actual natural environments. It is vital to note that the research design excluded any construction of particular concepts such as *food cravings* or *hunger* by explicitly asking or eliciting them. The phenomenological enquiry solely served to investigate naturally occurring experiences. From the perspective of ecological validity this work thus aspires to approximate the real world experienced in a most authentic manner possible and contrasts the collection of data within specific tasks performances or other fixed settings.

To reassure the accuracy of the data, additional follow-up interviews with all co-researchers validated the idiographic maps and verbal descriptions of the cases in order to check aspects such as correct wording, right contextualisation and an overall evaluation of the soundness of the structures drawn from the phenomenal data. A co-researchers confirmation of the genuineness of his or her case description was therefore taken as the major benchmark for evaluating the content-related validity of the data in a consensual manner.

Reliability

The term reliability denotes the consistency of the measures, i.e. in how far the obtained empirical data is stable to an extent that e.g. other researchers might reproduce them.

Reviewing the literature challenges the view that there might be as many kinds of Phenomenology as there exists phenomenologists. Looking into the work of the abundance

of phenomenological researchers reveals that they were »extraordinarily diverse in their interests, in their interpretation of the central issues of phenomenology, in their application of what they understood to be the phenomenological method, and in their development of what they took to be the phenomenological programme for the future of philosophy« as posed by Moran (2000:3).

Nevertheless, I am confident about the reliability of the phenomenal data and the reproducibility of this research. Since the empirical data is collected in natural environments the samples are certainly highly dependent of e.g. the current routine or tasks in daily life within the samplings periods. Anyhow, it is assumed that the structures of experience would stay stable to a high degree, in so far that i.e. a person who consistently reports about emotional aspects when thinking of food will unlikely give strongly diverging reports as long as the external circumstances remain comparable. This is supposed even when repeating the same phenomenological enquiry with a different investigator.

5 | Methodology & Research Design

5.1. Outline of the Research Design ⁶

As aforementioned, this research is constructing against the grain and delimits itself from prior hypothesis. Instead of spotting gaps in existent theories it intends to problematize the account of food in science. This problematization, as advocated by Freire (1970), sets the general methodological proposal of posing questions to challenge assumptions and deconstruct the phenomena. The phenomenological enquiry done for the purposes of this case study benefits from an empirical approach, in that it suspends a purist view where the only interpretation permissible demands self-reflection by the researcher (cf. Husserl 1960). We therefore move away from the limited consideration of first-person reports and dare to attempt a second order construction that places itself closer to heterophenomenology (cf. Dennett, 2003). According to Aspers' empirical phenomenology proceeds from the assumption »that scientific explanation must be grounded in the first-order construction of the actors; that is, in their own meanings. These constructions are then related to the second-order constructions of the scientist« (Aspers, 2009:1).

The specific method implemented was drawn from the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) by Russell Hurlburt (2006), a method for investigating random samples of inner experience in participants' natural environments. The overall research design followed a procedure⁷ of several steps (see Figure 4: Research Design Outline) and the according descriptions are elaborated in more detail in separate sections of this chapter:

Introduction for Selected Co-Researchers. The multiple case study investigated five collaborating co-researchers (cf. page 27 for further details on the selection process). An introduction into the philosophical perspectives and attitudes behind the approach was given and especially the concept of studying *how* people experience a phenomenon was thoroughly explained to the co-researcher.

DES: Training Sampling. The co-researcher was trained to collect and give descriptive reports according to DES and prior to the actual data acquisition. The explicatory interviews of this training sampling served to clarify uncertainties about the method on concrete examples from the everyday lived experience. (Note that these interviews were excluded from the later data analysis.)

⁶ This section of the Research Design is an extended version of the paragraph *The Vehicle: A Phenomenological Method To Access Experience* taken from the authors publication *Flavours of Thought: Towards a Phenomenology of Food-Related Experiences*. (Tan, 2013)

⁷ For similar research designs consult an overview of traditions of qualitative inquiries and research designs proposed by Creswell (1998)

DES: Data Acquisition. The actual data acquisition integrated an a priori focus, which is a vital variation to the former randomly triggered training sampling. Here the co-researcher was asked to jot down notes whenever an onset of a food-related experience was noticed. The sampling period was set to 24 hours prior to the scheduled explicatory interview, in which the samples were discussed for a maximum duration of 90 minutes (due to reasons of concentration and accuracy of reports).

Data Analysis. The collected phenomenal data was then analysed and coded by the investigator and processed into visual illustrations and verbal case descriptions.

Selection of Co-Researchers

*that covers a broad as possible range in
self-reported and observed attitude towards food*



Facial Expressions taken from Flores, V.C. (2005). Artnatomy (www.artnatomia.net)

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Descriptive Experience Sampling

used for training & data acquisition



Data Analysis

using open coding in grounded theory

results are given in verbal reports & visual illustrations




Figure 4: Research Design Outline

5.2. Selection of Co-Researchers

The fundamental difference in qualitative phenomenological approaches is that we disregard the aspect of representativeness (common to quantitative approaches) for the selection process until a general knowledge of a phenomenon is available. In all, the empirical study included 5 co-researchers without any diagnosed disorders related to food (due to the assumed proneness of patients with food-related disorders to report on their problematic relation to food). The process of recruiting subjects for participation in the multiple case study initially addressed the interest of study colleagues that were familiar with the method. Here, an overwhelming number of students declared their curiosity and willingness to participate. And in addition to the simultaneously positive reception of non-study related individuals this led to the expansion of the selection array. A new focus was set on a broad as possible range in the self-reported and observed attitude towards food with an additional orientation on dissimilar demographics. Most of the participants were therefore explicitly approached for the reason that significant food-related statements or behaviours have come to my attention (i.e. repeating the same meal over a long period of time or the high curiosity to try out new foods). The main selection criteria were therefore the distinctive feature of food, as well as a balance in gender (3 female, 2 male) and a broad as possible range in age (24 to 35 years).

Following outline shall give an overview on some of the main characteristics that were either reported or attributed during or before the first sample interviews for this study. Therefor, the labels that were chosen from the investigator solely reflect the diverging attitudes towards food and originate from reports and observations.



Figure 5: The »Anti-Foodie« - Facial Expression taken from Flores (2005)

The Anti-Foodie. »Food is just fuel. I don't care about food at all.«

According to his self-reported mindset the co-researcher is known for a quite passive stance towards a clearly functional attribution of food. Food-related thoughts would only occur on very rare occasion and mostly out of bodily necessity as claimed before starting with the actual data acquisition. Personal reports include the common iteration of a regular menu that would persist over a longer period of time, i.e. eating the same or similar meal every day for several months.



Figure 6: The »Food-Lover« - Facial Expression taken from Flores (2005)

The Food-Lover. »I constantly think about food.«

As reported from this co-researcher food-related thoughts would take up a great deal of daily thoughts and experiences, sometimes with a emphasis and self-reflection of having an »unhealthy« relation to food as well as a perception of being perceived by close persons as someone who is thinking too much about food. Food-related thoughts were characterized as being very vivid and elaborated before starting the data acquisition. Her overall mindset was described as being predominantly very positive and in line with reports of actively enjoying thinking about food.



Figure 7: The »Neutral« - Facial Expression taken from Flores (2005)

The Neutral. »Food is food.«

This co-researcher was selected as of a neutral handling and stance towards food. Food was attributed with an average range of characteristics, such as being potentially enjoyable, as well as reported presence of preferences (such as vegetables) and changing daily routines of eating or forgetting to eat. Compared to the previous researchers food is not connected to any strict valuation. Only more detailed discussions before the first sample interviews revealed the co-researcher being a vegetarian, which notably does not root in strict animal welfare, in that she e.g. supports the reasonable use of animals for purposes of research. This again strengthened the opinion of her neutral stance due to her casual handling of this preference of certain foods. Her interest in participating in this study was announced during informal food-related conversations prior to the actual data acquisition.




Figure 8: The »Conscious« -

The Conscious. »There is a value to every food.«

A conscious dealing with food and high awareness of food-related thought was both observed and reported from this co-researcher before the in-depth interviews. Her attribution of food showed a clear preference for healthy, fresh, and »good« food and her overall integration and relation to food-related

Facial Expression taken from
Flores (2005)



Figure 9: The »Unconscious«
- Facial Expression taken
from Flores (2005)

thought was described as being warily elaborated. Attitudes included positive and enjoyable food-related thoughts, but also negative reports according to the self-attributed emotional valence. Ingredients and composition of food are of high importance.

The Unconscious. »I love food.« vs. »I don't think about food.«

This co-researcher was selected due to the ambiguity between reports on attitudes towards food and food-related thought. On being approached for participation he reported that food-related thought only occurs on rare to non-existent occasion. This was perceived as remarkable in opposition to very detailed and vivid discussions about and descriptions of food prior to this recruitment as well as his renowned love for eating and drinking. Reports emphasized the very positive attitude and high interest in food (i.e. trying out new things and exploring food in different cultures) and discussions included strong reports about particular characteristics of certain dishes (e.g. preference for certain textures). This led to the assumption that a more unconscious mindset towards food could underlie this ambivalent self-reflection regarding food-related thought.

5.3. Descriptive Experience Sampling Method

Being interested in subjective thoughts, feelings and sensations makes it essential to find a suitable phenomenological method to access human experiences. The methodology used for phenomenal enquiry in this case study is based on Russell Hurlburt's **Descriptive Experience Sampling** method (**DES**), which investigates pristine inner experience and is implemented as follows:

»DES subjects carry a random beeper in natural environments; when the beep sounds, they capture their inner experience, jot down notes about it, and report it to an investigator in a subsequent expositional interview. DES is a fundamentally idiographic method, describing faithfully the pristine inner experiences of persons. Subsequently, DES can be used in a nomothetic way to describe the characteristics of groups of people who share some common characteristic« (Hurlburt & Akhter (2006:271).

DES was designed as method to sample *pristine* experiences, which should not denote »clean« or »pure« descriptions, but actual phenomena that have been lived and experienced by actual people in their natural environments and thus without interference by the investigator. It allows »high fidelity« answers to the differing experiences of thoughts, feelings, sensations, seeing's, hearings, and such, existent with each individual. The best way to describe the attempts of DES is by referring to Akhter's & Hurlburt's original delineation of the method:

»Pristine experiences are fundamental data of consciousness studies in particular and psychology in general—pristine experience is the way real people experience real things in their real lives. I as a person am who I am in large part because of the things I experience and the way I experience them; I differ from you not merely because you and I have different histories and different physicalities, but because you and I have different experiences and different ways of experiencing them. In any given moment of any real person's existence, there is a welter of potential experience, some external (a myriad of surrounding objects and people, features of the environment such as temperature, wind, brightness, sounds, tastes, smells, etc.), some interoceptive, proprioceptive, kinesthetic events (pressures, pains, hunger pangs, limb/joint positions, tickles, itches, etc.), some inner created events (thoughts, images, feelings, etc.). At every moment, a person selects/creates some very small number (often just one) of those potential experiences to form that moment's actual pristine experience. Different people do that in different ways: one consistently creates visual images that are quite unrelated to the immediate environment; another, in exactly the same environment, consistently attends to emotional experience; a third, also in the same environment, consistently pays attention to the sensory features of that external environment. Those three people are likely to be very different from each other—or maybe not. Science needs to figure that out; to do so depends on methods that apprehend adequately pristine experience with an adequate degree of accuracy« (Akhter & Hurlburt, 2006:273).

Training Sampling: On the importance of natural environments

All participants were trained to give their experiential reports according to the Descriptive Experience Sampling method. The in-depth interview discussed random beeps that were collected within 24 hours prior to the scheduled appointment and lasted max. 90 minutes. This training interview served the purpose to give a proper introduction and feeling for the style and content of reports and descriptions vital to this method. Due to the critical characteristic of asking *how* a moment was experienced instead of exclusively focusing on the typical *what* and therefore content of experience, it is best advised to explain the typicality's of this phenomenological method by discussing concrete random beeps.

Practical application shows that examples taken out of co-researchers lived experiences

illustrate the particularities of the method most effective and allows immediate clarification and fast comprehension of the extraordinary style of reporting. Hence, this training sampling is meant to focus on the illustrative advantage of giving examples based on freshly collected experiences out of a co-researchers daily life. This appliance in a natural environment plays a vital role in assessing human experience and agrees with other research done in realms of ethnography or human-computer-interaction. As Gibson asserted, the complementary characteristic of organism and environment demands that studies on an organism needs to be conducted in its natural environment rather than in artificial and isolated settings⁸. Thus, one of the most prominent assets of this methodology is its access to pristine lived experiences.

Overall, this training sampling showed to be a highly effective and necessary acquaintance with the methodology and, which is however not included in the later data analysis. All co-researchers were offered to continue the training sampling until they reached a level of comfort that allows a confident focus on food-related thoughts and experiences instead of sampling random beeps.

Data Acquisition: Modification to a priori focus

One vital modification was necessary to allow the directed sampling of food-related experiences. Instead of capturing random moments triggered by a beeper, all co-researchers were instructed to document the onset of their experiences involving food. Since the main aim of this phenomenological study is facilitating access to essences of perception and consciousness of a concrete phenomenon, random sampling was rendered as inadequate. This variation was only applied after a co-researcher was trained to give their experiential reports according to the original setting of DES. The overall sampling period of 24 hours was followed by in-depth interviews of max. 90 minutes and this procedure was repeated three times for every co-researcher, thus resulting in up to 4 ½ hours of recorded audio footage covering 3 days of sampling per case.

Critics may remark that this modification falls short of the aim to avoid artificial interference. Thereupon, precautions measurements were taken by explicitly instructing the co-researchers to immediately noting down food-related experiences as they arise, which naturally disrupts artificial elaboration. Throughout the interviews this confidently demonstrated to divert conscious attempts to tune up the experiences. In any case, deliberate confabulation would immediately result in easily detectable inconsistencies during reporting. As of my own experience with this method (as both investigator and investigated), there is a rather low

⁸ His original assertion promotes the concept of *affordances*, which argues that the inherent *values* and *meanings* of surrounding things can be directly perceived and thus the information of *how* connected to action potentialities. This meaning that thus derives possibilities from environment can be illustrated by its application in Human-Computer-Interaction, where things are to be designed as such, that the user can easily infer what these things *afford*.

threat of overly contemplating the samples. After all, the samples mostly disrupt daily routines or specific tasks; calling a food-related experience into consciousness for a split moment. But as long as they are immediately discarded after taking notes confabulation may be granted minimal impact. Communicating that this research explicitly excludes to handle those samples as chores with good or bad performance it is advised to resume at the point of disruption soon after short notes have been documented. Though agreeing to run the risk that subjects may create or exaggerate aspects while they might overlook or minimize others (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006:278) I am confident that a conscious selection bears the same potential to reveal the underlying constructs of experience as random beeps.

Additionally, it was clarified to all co-researchers that the main aim of this research is to get an authentic and pristine insight into lived experience, thus emphasizing the importance of a least possible influence to their usual thinking and elaboration. To eliminate possible biasing of the co-researcher it was taken into careful consideration to avoid any wording indicating value-laden concepts such as *cravings* or *urges* that may lead to an increased possibility of undesired manipulation by the interviewee. Since this *onset* is not predefined in means of any timely limit or similar criteria, the resulting reports will naturally vary depending on the different co-researchers and samples of experience⁹. What is considered as relevant fragment to a food-related experience is a vital part to understanding the nature of an individual lived experience and thus necessarily a judgment entrusted to the co-researcher.

5.4. Data Analysis: Open Coding

The transcriptions of the interviews were analysed using open coding from Glaser & Strauss' (1967) **grounded theory method**. This qualitative analysis is an iterative, open process that was done for one co-researcher at a time. The implementation is sketched in Figure 10 and detailed in the subsequent paragraphs.




Figure 10: Data Analysis Step-by-Step

⁹ Regarding the temporal structure of samples see chapter 8.2 on *Linearity and Time* or consult Appendix B on *Reviewing Data Assessment and Analysis*.

Extracting Codes

A series of statements (ranging from single words up to whole sentences) are extracted from the experiential reports and then structured into common codes, i.e. »warm«, »cold«, »fresh«, »hot« may be considered as a range of descriptions referring to the code of »temperature«. The extraction of both statements and codes uses *descriptive coding* that »summarizes the primary topic of excerpts« (Saldaña, 2012:3). This step is often referred to as *initial* or *first cycle coding* in the literature and vitally captures »first impression phrases« (Saldaña, 2012:4) in an open-ended process.

Construction of Categories

The further construction of categories is strongly dependent on the narrative and often drawn from evident connections of similar codes. At first, those connections are documented as sole potentialities in the data (i.e. noting down all the modalities to be able to identify typical patterns in particular situations at a later point) and mostly they display patterns of similarity, frequency or correspondence. A typical composition taken as a potential pattern may be for example visualizing a scene and simultaneously commenting it verbally in mind, based on a frequent correspondence of those two modes of experience. Essentially this categorizing (also referred to as *codifying* in the literature) facilitates that data gets »segregated, grouped, regrouped and relinked in order to consolidate meaning and explanation« (Grbich, 2012:17). This construction of categories gets processed further in two cycles: in a visual manner to form detailed *idiographic maps* (cf. step 3 in Figure 10) and as a refinement that condenses the data to reoccurring themes in a textual manner in form of a *codebook* (cf. step 4 in Figure 10).

Idiographic Concept Maps & Codebook

The categorization process is manually illustrated as visual map then digitalized for purposes of graphic refinement and documentation and consists of:

- original statements and annotations of the samples they occurred in,
- grouped to codes (e.g. cold and warm grouped as *temperature*) and
- clustered into categories (e.g. mouth feel and pain clustered as category *hunger*).

Using intuitive color-coding embedded additional information. Each sample¹⁰ was visualized as one single map and every subsequent sample was constructed to overlay with the preceding sample-maps, thus forming a sample-by-sample overview for each case (see Appendix C for the »Conscious«). The manual and visual grouping of codes and categories is thus elaborated in an iterative manner that allowed for highest flexibility during categorization.

¹⁰ A *sample* corresponds to one 'incident', as usually referred to in the literature.

Departing from this detailed analysis of the data another refinement of this initial coding was aspired in form of a codebook. This condensation and restructuring of the data concludes in a list of open codes including paraphrases and a clustering into reoccurring categories.

Discussion

The available idiographic illustration and codebook provide as a basis for the final discussion of the subject's construction of food-related experiences. It gives an advanced interpretation of the structures of experience in form of *themes* and *concepts*. To get a detailed insight into the individual themes & content categories, as well as the individual categories, please consult the first case of Ima G. (the »Conscious «) and Appendix C.

6 | An Idiographic View

For purposes of transparency this thesis guides through a more detailed process of analysis for one of the five co-researchers, including 1) the full *idiographic map* that visualizes statements and codes during immersion in the phenomenal data and 2) the *codebook* that consists of open codes, descriptions and grouping in categories. A short *discussion and integration* concludes the case and gives a feeling on how food is experienced by this co-researcher.

To retain the readability it is refrained from exposing the full coding process for every single case, thus only portraying the rest of cases in a reduced form, which includes a *case description* (giving short demographic info), a *schematic idiographic map* as well as the *case discussion and integration*. However, additional details and the full idiographic maps (as shown for the first co-researcher) can be found in Appendix C.

Specification and Notation

In order to assure anonymity, all names were changed to aliases and the personal data was reduced to a concise demographic description that corresponds to the time of data acquisition. A specific sampling notation is introduced that allows the allocation of statements (i.e. codes used for grouping of concepts and categories) to their originating sample. All samples are numbered in consecutive order for each co-researcher. The notation follows the form of the sample number(s) preceded by the letter *s*, for *sample(s)*, written in superscript. An example for »feeling cold«, which was reported in the particular sample number 09 would thus appear as »feeling cold^{s09}« in the text flow. In case of statements reoccurring in several samples, further sample numbers are added with the delimiter symbol •, i.e. »feeling cold^{s09•10•11}«.

Instructions for Reading the Verbalised Case Descriptions

For additional orientation, following icons mark the main characteristics of experiences. The colour coding indicates the relative frequency, i.e. light grey shading indicates a low relevance of this particular classification characteristic.

low	medium	high	FREQUENCY of the particular class of characteristic
			SENSATION&PERCEPTION bodily sensations and external perceptions
			EMOTION feelings such as moods, valences or concrete emotions and affect
			COGNITION abstract concepts and qualities of experience, such as imagining

Figure 11: Legend for Verbalised Case Descriptions.

Legend for Schematic Idiographic Maps ¹¹

The schematic idiographic map gives an overview of categories according to their rough characteristics classification for one specific case-alias, which is indicated at the right bottom and includes a rough outline of the typical classifications next to it (the circle colours correspond to the three areas of main classification).

All *content* categories are indicated in *regular* font style, whereas categories that predominantly summarize the *structure* or *modality* of experience are written in *italic* style, both with notes in [square brackets]. These are situated in the according coloured circles that mark the three areas of main classification: 1) sensation & perception, 2) emotion and 3) cognition. An additional percentage number indicated after the category name informs about the relative occurrence for one particular co-researcher¹².




Figure 12: Legend for Schematic Idiographic Map

¹¹ Note: The classification in use does not capture the quality of experience. Particularly, keep in mind that the *frequency* of e.g. an emotional report does not inform about the *intensity* of the actual experience. I.e. this schematic map does not illustrate the vital qualitative difference between a co-researcher who had average perceptions of things from the surrounding mentioned in 90% of the samples, in comparison to someone who describes very vivid and strong external impressions in only 45% of the samples.

¹² I.e. if there were 10 food-related experiences sampled in sum, 60% would mean that this category was mentioned in 6 out of 10 samples. Note: the occurrences are approximations that depend on the interpretation of the investigator and all numbers were rounded.

6.1. Mapping the »Conscious« (Full Analysis Process)

Following categories were derived from the data acquisition of the first co-researcher Ima G. She is a 31-year-old female PhD student at the time of the interviews. Due to her focus on her studies at the time of sampling without fixed hours at any working place or lab, the sampling periods covered time spend for both leisure activities as well as study-related working tasks. In sum the interviews covered descriptions of 16 samples that were reported as being perceived as each one food-related experience or thought. One sample s09 was excluded due to the report of not being able to recall the experience properly during the in-depth interview.

Coding Process


The idiographic coding process involved following steps:

- 1) Listen to audio records and read transcriptions of all samples for one co-researcher.
- 2) Complete coding for all samples and record topics that come up frequently.
- 3) Keep all codes and review the structure of the data (*cf. section idiographic visualizations*).
- 4) Review the analysis and note which codes remain constant across samples. List these open codes with according paraphrases and group them into categories. The resulting codebook (*cf. section codebook*) provides key definitions of the proposed categories.

Idiographic Map

The first step of data analysis included the 1) extraction of single codes from the transcription of all samples and 2) structuring into themes and topics. This was done in a visual manner, which allowed high flexibility in identifying potential structures. The resulting idiographic map illustrates the broadest set of codes and provides as basis for further refinement. See Figure 13: Full Idiographic Visualization for Ima G. (the »Conscious«).

Figure 13: Full Idiographic Visualization for Ima G. (the »Conscious«).



Codebook

OPEN CODE (DESCRIPTIVE)	PARAPHRASES (DESCRIPTIVE EXCERPTS)	CATEGORY
bodily hunger	s01: I felt in my mouth that I should eat something s02: specific plexus area, saliva in my mouth s07: I felt my stomach, empty, sound, contractions s11: hunger was getting strong; stinging in plexus, stomach, cramping; limbs are heavy, I feel overloaded and exhausted; it felt nervous and annoying s13: tired, burning eyes, heavy, blurry; from the stomach and plexus; when I tried to focus where it really comes from, where exactly, it disappeared. s14: mouth full of saliva; it felt timeless, a torturing feeling, I felt annoyed and cannot push it away, really nervous and kind of tension going through my body; mad at myself that I cannot push thoughts away; a tension in head that went through my body	HUNGER: A content description of a bodily state that can arise as bodily sensation or cognitive indicator
knowing states & feelings	s05: feeling of something is missing s08: I know there is something good around (everything is bright,...) s15: mind and body agree	KNOWING: Awareness of concrete meaning without symbols of any kind.
motivational desire	s13: expectations that it would »lift me up«	FOOD CRAVING: A particular mindset that describes the need and thought for food and arises in several modalities.
bodily urge	s01: annoying and itchy	
want	s10: want the sensation you expect from food	
intense want/desire/urge	s05: I miss something, I want to repair this tiredness and fullness s06: I don't need it at all, but I would love to have something sweet; its an effort to do things; lack of energy; my brain being super slow s13: desire for food but too tired, trying to push the thoughts of food away s14: I was really mad at myself that I cannot push this hunger away, it made me angry, it was pushing me and I feel like crying, annoyed and impatient; the body was uncomfortable and nervous and my head	

	felt like torture; struggle to drop it; felt unhealthy	
flash & switch	s01: sudden urge: a foggy, lazy mood that jumped to a more anxious one s02: sudden bodily attention to stomach/mouth/tongue, pulsing sensation s03: smell opened everything up, I got my body back again, feel awake s04: every sip of sweet tea caused a switch between happy & heavy mood s05: I felt like missing something (quick picture from lunch popped up) s08: I realized that I'm in a totally different mood, really calm and peaceful, this switch came when I was in my space and only then it popped up s11: the flash that I function and it's kind of weird but good	EMOTION: Awareness of emotional states that are detected as experiential assessment.
blankness	s08: I couldn't go into the feeling, I sensed the food and the picture was very clear, I can recall the people that I met but I had no feelings (the picture did not stop, the mind didn't stop to focus on something)	
mind vs. mind	s12: evaluating options, but like I wasn't there with my body and I has the stronger feeling of the head and the thoughts in my head s15: conversation in my head: I tested the picture in my head and whether I get a positive response.	CHECK & MATCH: A seemingly cognitive strategy that involves at least two contrasted elements of experience.
mind vs. perception	s16: when I looked at the picture I felt jealous and checked if I could add something into my stomach; it elicited a kind conversation in my head - visual thoughts and then I paid attention to my body, like evaluating and commenting how good it would be when I was seeing the picture (kind of putting association into the picture)	
mind vs. sensation	s11: focus on the picture in mind; testing image of food and my response; like matching the right picture to the right response (check picture and what would go down my throat)	
sensing/awareness	s03: sensing something; smell alerts the body; I felt excited and more awake; I sensed with all the skin and all my senses are	SELF/OTHERS: The perception of self and others

	more receiving s08: I couldn't detect how I was feeling, but suddenly I felt calm and peaceful and bright like good vibrations, and I know something good happened. s11: sensing what is outside: sounds are bright and loud, the neighbour playing piano, mom asking something; the light is really present, the smell of fresh summer air, temperature, moisture s13: fluid boundaries between what is sensed and perceived; everything felt all bold, the air smelled good, the light and colours were just the perfect and I liked my overall mood..	implicitly expressed in relations of inclusion and exclusion that mostly differentiate in spatial terms of private space and public surrounding.
extended/connected	s04: I sensed the music, the colour of fabric and everything would fit s08: the picture in my head were like flooding through me; I felt like blending into another environment; although I felt dizzy and up in my head, bodily soft and I am present with everything and moving with the environment s13: I would say I have flashes of total awareness of everything, like the environment, colour, my skin, the air going through my nose.. s15: standing on one place but I'm floating around; I was not so much aware of the surroundings, I know I was in the street and people around, maybe how the light was but I was kind of closed in; more in myself, in my space and not sure where to go ahead.	
cognitive self	s10: I was talking to myself, like a conversation on my head of what is reasonable and what I feel like s11: I quit all the talking to myself and trying to focus more on the picture in my mind (what would be suited) s11: I'm in myself: half dark, half asleep, everything is heavy s12: talking to myself whether it would be senseful to have something or not; I also talked to the pictures (evaluating them); but it doesn't feel like it is deep talk or my talk, it was like watching what is going on	

	s14: head felt like torture	
	s15: really in my head, floating all over	
bodily self	s10: I felt tired, stinging feeling in plexus area; inconvenient, empty, compressing, dry mouth and strong taste of saliva; more awake and bright; annoying and exhausting; picturing myself already outside of the city	
	s14: I wouldn't say I was really mad of myself; annoyed that I cannot put it away, kind of being weak; body is really uncomfortable and nervous	
visual imagery	s08: series of pictures, but in the back of my head	MENTAL IMAGERY: Mental imagery of perceptual qualities or sensational qualities.
	s10: already pictured myself outside of the city	
	s12: I got a really visual picture of a smoothie in the glass, exactly how it would taste and look like with all the pieces inside, like the yogurt does not blend all together and it's a kind of grainy picture of the liquid	
	s15: a good vision of the perfect coffee	
gustatory imagery	s12: exactly how it would taste	
	s15: imagining how the perfect taste would be	

Figure 14: Codebook for Ima G. (the »Unconscious«)

From Codes to Categories

Codes and Categories are two different components in the data analysis. The descriptive open *codes* capture essential elements of the data of the personal stories and when clustered to patterns of similarity or regularity they reveal connections that allow *categorization*. (cf. Saldaña, 2012). Following section will discuss the categories in a narrative form including paraphrases and grounded in the idiographic illustrations.

Discussion of Categories

Flash • Switch • Emotion • Pop Out (s01•02•04•06•08•10•13•14)



A common report occurring in 8 out of 16 (50%) of the samples involved a (more or less sudden) *switch in mood*. The reports ranged from positive descriptions of comfort, satisfaction, warm, relief, easy to passive or negative emotions and valences of emptiness, anxious, anger, torture, discomfort, sadness, impatience and much more. This clearly emotional category was

mostly accompanied by *bodily* sensations^{s01•02•04•06•10•13•14} that were only partly described as *hunger*^{s02•13•14} (please see category *hunger* for definition).

An exemplary illustration occurred while drinking a tea she reported to »feel the weight, that I'm going down with my feelings and when I have a sip it just goes up again«^{s04}. Her heavy, tired state shifted every time she took a sip, she described it to make her satisfied and her taste buds felt »like jumping from heaven«^{s04}. The overall situation was experienced as a clear blend of feelings and perceptions as her descriptions were very abstract, yet vivid and colourful. »Yea, I felt exactly like that pattern of fabric, as if everything would fit super to the music, a little bit romantic, fragile but at the end deep blue, deep colours«^{s04}.

These emotional *switches* were usually also described as something that »pops out or up«^{s01•03•08} and described an additional shift of attention and focus directed towards something. Bodily descriptions involved a feeling of being annoyed and with a mouth sensation^{s01}; the detection of a smell that caused sudden attention and active sniffing^{s03}; or a state of tiredness that changed when a visual »popped out and stayed in mind«^{s08}. This category often characterized the onset of a food related thought, therefore giving the nudge to alert the co-researcher about a food-related experience.

Hunger (s02•07•11•13•14)



Bodily sensations were only partly described as *hunger* (in 5 out of 16 samples, thus 31% of the cases). Typically they involved overall descriptions of a predominant body or head feeling or more concrete locative reports on stomach (feeling empty, pulsing or making sounds) or a strong mouth feeling (and sensations of tongue, saliva) up to reporting about heavy limbs, nervous hands, tension throughout the body and much more. Thus, the occurrence of most of these bodily sensations alone is not a sufficient condition to define or identify the perceived concept of *hunger*.

Check • Match (s10•11•12•13•15•16)



This category occurred in several described manifestations in 6 out of 16 samples (38%). The descriptions involved *emotional* reports (e.g. confusion, exhaust, nervousness), reports including the *perception* of self (e.g. picturing oneself, talking to oneself but not perceived as own talk, feeling of being closed in, moving in one's own space) and concepts and modalities of thinking (e.g. talking to oneself, commenting or evaluating pictures that were visualized in mind). Central about this category was the connection between those several fragments of experience, such as visualizing things in mind but commenting on them via talking to oneself or *checking* the emotional response or mood. The descriptions of the category seemed to differ in the underlying motivation, while *checking* was characterized as open questioning of a particular e.g. bodily need for food^{s16} or a feeling of indecisiveness »between what I want and what I'm supposed to do«^{s12}. Whereas *matching* occurred when e.g. imagining pictures were

connected to according bodily feelings^{s10•11}. A frequent modality involved in these processes were visual evaluations, i.e. checking for emotional, bodily or cognitive responses for mental images of food items ^{s11•12}.

Desire • Urge (s01•06•03•13•14)



The concrete concept of *desire* regarding food-related thought occurred in 34% of the samples and expressed abstract concepts and perceptions of self that imply a conceptualization of a certain mindset. Reports described neutral to negative feelings ranging from: the urge for food but not being happy with it^{s03}, wanting to »stuff myself«^{s06}, wanting to push away thoughts^{s13•14}, struggling to drop it^{s14} or thoughts feeling unhealthy^{s14}. Furthermore, perceptions of self included the *desire* or expectation to »lift me up« ^{s06}, the feeling of being stuck ^{s14}, the sentiment »as if the desire is not my desire«^{s13} or the notion of missing something^{s08}. With a high interdependence of all classes of characteristics her basic emotional assessment seemed to overrule both bodily and cognitive integration.

Sensing • Awareness • Extended • Connected (s03•04•08•11•13•15)



Special cases of emotional and bodily *sensing* and *awareness*^{s03•11•13} were grouped in this category and occurred in 20% of the cases. *Awareness* shows perceptions of self and bodily and seems to have fluid boundaries between *internal* sensations and *external* perceptions. Emotional descriptions ranged from feeling of being awake, lightning up, excitement to being annoyed, nervous or confused. These were accompanied by perceptive bodily dimensions that described to »get the body back«^{s03} and involved increased awareness and sensations regarding smell, sound, light, skin, temperature, moisture, colours and similar. Overall these reports had an extraordinary perception of either environment or self in common.

Even more specific and amplified cases of *sensing* and *awareness* seemed to have more concrete features described as a feeling of *extendedness* and *connectedness*^{s04•08•11•13•15}, attributed to 31% of the samples, involving very strong compositions of emotional & bodily perceptions regarding the environment and self. Thus, bodily perceptions were experienced close to emotional fragments and included aspects of the environment to result in a blended experience with multifarious modalities. This combination occurred for example in a situation of high *awareness* of her physical presence of standing at one spot and »being more present in her own space«^{s15}, but with decreased *awareness* of her surrounding and a according feeling of »being stuck«^{s15} and not knowing where to go ahead, which resulted in the spatial description of »half-dreaming«^{s15} and »floating around«^{s15}.

In other samples the co-researcher reported to »open up« ^{s03•04•13}, »blend« into the environment ^{s08}, be »present with everything«^{s08} or »sensing what is outside«^{s11}. External

impressions such as colours or music composited with strong reports of a feeling of »deep blue«^{s04}; feelings of romantic and fragile^{s04}; or as if something resolves^{s08}.

Samples showed a clear relevance of the *awareness* of the surrounding for overall experiences, i.e. when she reported: »I was looking to the sky, because it was just before the storm and I thought it's beautiful but I have to hurry. It felt kind of all bold, [...] the air smelled good, the light was perfect, just the perfect colours and I liked my overall mood«^{s13}. This high appreciation of the perceived environment was likewise very strongly articulated in the further discussion. »If I look back at it, I would say I have flashes of total awareness of everything, like the environment, colour, my skin, the air going through my nose«^{s13}.

Imagining (s05•07•10•11•12•15•16)



Imagining as modality occurred in 47% of food-related samples and usually accompanied the category of *checking & matching*. It ranged from visualizing concrete colours, surfaces, textures and tastes in particular, but also included abstract forms of food or places and overall sensations. Besides the content of *imagination* also emotions reflected further characteristics of the process such as the intensity, quality or handling of the visualization, i.e. how it visually »popped out«^{s08} or »stayed in my mind«^{s10} and thereby caught attention of whether it felt easy to drop this imagination^{s07}. Her *imagining* was mainly visual, i.e. when she reported on the experience to include bodily aspects and questioning herself »What would be good to do?«^{s10}, which was experienced as having pictures in mind of what she would like to eat. »I kind of felt like the thoughts are running around, kind of annoying and exhausting to think about. Only the picture of what I would like to eat was kind of making me more awake for a second and it feels bright, tasty and sweet«^{s10}.

Another similar combination of visual thoughts and conversation in her mind occurred when she perceived an actual external picture and tried to evaluate and comment how good it would be^{s16}. An incident where she checked the emotional response included envisioning the perfect coffee in visual detail, and *imagining* the best possible taste^{s15}. Thus, imagination was mainly described as mental visuals accompanied by other modalities of experience such as emotional and bodily sensations or cognitive responses such as actively commenting mental *imagery*.

Knowing (s05•07•08•15)



This category covers fragments of experiences that have an evident meaning to the co-researcher, but with absence of concrete modalities in 25% of the cases. The co-researcher stated to *know* »something is missing«^{s05}, »something good is around«^{s08} or that she feels »overloaded, [...] it was too much«^{s15}. Typical for this category was the lack of perceived

necessity to give further descriptions expressed as kind of clarity of *knowing* and high confidence of these reports. Without being connected to other fragments of the discussed experiences (such as visualizing, talking in mind, etc.) she communicated those meanings as clear and stand-alone content.

These fragments of *knowing* were interpreted as *unsymbolized thinking*. An illustration can be given by reports of sample 15, where she tried to describe how she experienced a moment of food-related overload. She reported, »It comes from I don't know where, I would say from my pre-knowing. I just KNOW it's too much, my body and mind are agreeing with each other«^{s15}. This synchrony of mind and body not only illustrates the confidence about the meaning but also goes in line with the overall high connectedness between multifarious modalities of experience.

Inner Speech (s10•11•12•13•15•16)



Inner speech occurred in 40% of the samples and was usually a conversation in mind, and had several styles of e.g. commenting and evaluation of visual imagery^{s10•11•16}. Brief conversations were mentioned in 3 samples^{s10•13•15}. Usually it was perceived as her own active talking directed towards herself. Interestingly one sample included *inner speech* that was not perceived as own talk but rather like »perceiving it«^{s12}. Here she was talking to herself whether it was reasonable or not to have a smoothie that she imagined visually. This *inner speech* occurred in close connection to the visual mental images, »as if you would be watching TV«^{s12}. A decreased feeling of control is assumed.

Classification

During coding and categorization of the data a classification was introduced, which consists of the three classes of *cognition*, *emotion* and *perception & sensation*. It was the ambiguity between the implicit meaning and linguistic conception that necessitated such classification in order to capture the fundamental nature of statements. That is to say, the peculiarity of describing to »feel« or »think« strongly promotes prejudiced interpretation during both assessment and analysis, in such manner that it is important to consider the distinctive difference whether a »feeling« describes an emotion, a bodily sensation or an abstract cognitive concept. These hidden characteristics of statements, codes and categories reflect a salient feature for both individual analysis and subsequent between-person comparison.

Classes. The concrete classes were defined in following manner: *cognition* as the meaning of reports, *emotions* as feelings that express an underlying emotional assessment and *perception & sensation* as bodily units of describing external percepts or internal bodily sensations.

Visualization. Drawing clear boundaries between these three classes is a challenge for most of the categories that may be experienced as a mixture of statements rooted in several of them. This overlapping nature of the data is featured in the visualization of the data and exposed important assertions for the between-person comparison.

Following schematic idiographic map gives an outline of the structure of food-related experience for Ima G. For a more detailed description of these individual themes and categories drawn from the empirical data please consult Appendix C.




Figure 15: Schematic Idiographic Map for the »Conscious«

Discussion and Integration of Themes & Concepts

Contrasting to usual procedures in qualitative research the idiographic level focuses on the abstraction of key assertions such as themes & concepts as follows, rather than a full formal theory. Departing from the list of open codes grouped into categories and classified in a

visual manner, the data was strained for patterns characterized mainly as forms¹³ of: similarity (things happen the same way), difference (they happen in predictably different ways), frequency (they happen often or seldom) and correspondence (they happen in relation to other activities or events) (cf. Saldana 2011). Following from these patterns, an integration of themes and concepts traces how food is experienced in daily life based and sketches them in a narrative manner that chooses to discuss the qualitative analysis close to the original paraphrases and excerpts.

For purposes of highlighting the research story this first co-researcher includes additional *pattern-related annotations* that explicitly explain the process of grounding *themes & concepts* in the aforementioned *patterns*.

Emotional Access to Food



To grasp the co-researcher's attitude one very important characteristic is the positive value of food with a clear emotional access. One main category described emotional *switches*, often reported as something that »pops out or up«^{s01•03•08} and denoting a shift of attention and focus. One typical switch in mood was reported as, »Everything is really bright, like good vibrations, something good happens but I couldn't touch it and it has no form and I just know there is something good around«^{s08}. This emotional category characterized the majority of onsets, therefore emotions seem to nudge and alert the co-researcher about a food-related experience. Contrastingly, cases where the reported feelings were not consciously lucid and clear to her it caused confusion and intense pondering.

The extensiveness of her emotional and cognitive blend experienced is evident when you look at the elaborations of s08 regarding the moment of realization that food-related thoughts occurred already all day: »When I came there I was really calm, I was really in my space [...] I was just sitting there and watching them how they were communicating and doing stuff and then it just popped out, the whole day I was thinking about food and now I just realized it. It felt like I was blending into another environment«^{s08}.

Hence, close observation of these structures of experience during the interviews revealed that Ima G. identified a food-related thought only in cases of emotional access. By way of example, perceiving food-related items without corresponding emotion are characterized as »blank [...] full of experience but I cannot get how I feel, as if looking on a blank page. For me it was really strange, and it felt like 'wow, what happened?'«^{s08}.

Bodily Tension and Negative Integration



¹³ This selection of traits is a reduced list that Saldana (2011: p6) provided in his book *The coding manual for qualitative researchers*. For similar forms of patterns cf. Hatch (2002).

Bodily components were mostly of accompanying nature and occurred mainly in cases of negative emotional situations. A solid case is illustrated in s13 where she described the thoughts in her head being really tense, her brain feeling like one muscle struggling to drop the hunger and the thoughts of food. »The tension went through my whole body. [...] I wanted to push the thoughts of food away, because I was too tired to actually deal with it«^{s13}. Another situation likewise consisted of strong bodily sensations, »It actually felt like torture. When this feeling came I was so annoyed by it, that I cannot push it away«^{s14}. This bodily manifestation of wanting to push away^{s13*14} the discomforting thoughts of food seemed to be very present. In comparison to this, positive food-related experiences showed emotional fragments as more superior, thus bodily sensations being of less importance.

Light Demarcation between Sensation and Perception



Ima G. accumulated reports that show a light demarcation between inner bodily sensations and external perceptions, indicated by the experience of fluid boundaries of emotional and bodily states that would blend with the perceived environment. Such examples did describe compositions that *connected* and *extended* her bodily conception of self: »If I look back at it, I would say I have flashes of total awareness of everything, like the environment, colour, my skin, the air going through my nose« ^{s13}.

Reports included descriptions of »half-dreaming«^{s15} and »floating around«^{s15}, the feeling to »open up«^{s03*04*13}, »blend« into the environment^{s08}, be »present with everything«^{s08} or »sensing what is outside«^{s11}. External impressions such as colours or music composited with strong reports of a feeling of »deep blue«^{s04}, feelings of romantic and fragile ^{s04} or as if something resolves ^{s08}. The impact of this theme seems as strong as its articulation strongly articulated in the further discussion.

Cognitive Integration of Food



After analysis of the interviews a high relevance of expected consequences of food is assumed. This is probably best illustrated by following statement given by the co-researcher in s08: »I was constantly wishing for something, but not a greedy wishing but maybe again just to fix things, because I'm tired and I want to have a fix«. In this sense food seems to be constructed as a means to an end, namely the consequence of improving bodily or mental states of being, as I would ascribe to the reference to »having a fix«. Yet, the overall attitude in line with the description of a non-greedy wishing hints at a very value-laden opinion about food causing the co-researcher to engage in thorough elaboration of a range of aspects, such as what could fit, what she should eat and what are the things she would want to eat, rather than a search for an easy fix.

Besides the emotional awareness and bodily manifestations (overbalanced in negative connotations of food related experiences) the cognitive integration is attributed as subject-

driven. The co-researcher was often nudged to experience food-related thoughts by her own cognition, rather than triggered by external precepts. I.e. only in three samples ^{s03•04•16} external sensations, such as detecting a smell, drinking tea or looking at a food picture, were identified. All other 80% of the samples included thinking and elaborating on food-related thoughts that were initiated by the co-researcher without any evident external percept. Consequently, the accompanying emotional valences varied, thus resulting in experiences ranging from intrusive thoughts to comforting elaborations.

[Pattern-related Annotation for Ima G.]

Difference in Flash & Switch: Emotional switches predicted the temporal (sudden) shift in mood and indicated a food-related experience. This shift results in *emotional* states that are nevertheless predictably different and describe a pattern throughout several samples. (Relevant for Themes: Emotional Access)

Frequency and Correspondence in both Sensing & Awareness and Extended & Connected: These two categories are both characterized by a light demarcation between reports on internal sensations (often corresponding to a concept of self) and the perception of the immediate external surrounding. The particular correspondence between reports of what is sensed and perceived appeared frequently and was thus identified as strong pattern for Ima G. (Relevant for Theme: Emotional Access)

Similarity and Correspondence in Urge: This category is interpreted as cognizing of an urge with a high similarity in reported statements. It showed an implicit intensity to its way of reporting and was usually experienced in correspondence with emotional and bodily feelings. (Relevant for Theme: Emotional Access)

Similarity and Correspondence in Imagery: The mental imagery of sensations & perceptions were quite consistently experienced in a similar manner, such as visually and/or inner speech accompanied by emotional evaluation. (Relevant for Themes: Emotional Access, Bodily Tension and Cognitive Integration)

Similarity and Frequency in Hunger: These category of reports frequently reported very similar descriptions of clear *bodily* sensations, such as reports on the stomach, plexus, mouth, etc. (Relevant for Theme: Bodily Tension)

Difference and Correspondence in Check & Match: The correspondence of checking different aspects of experience involved combinations of checking or matching mental impressions with sensations or perceptions. (Relevant for Theme: Bodily Tension, Cognitive Integration)

Similarity in Knowing: This category consistently describes the awareness of concrete meaning without symbols of any kind. (Relevant for Theme: Cognitive Integration)

6.2. Mapping »The Anti-Foodie«

Following categories were derived from the data acquisition of the second co-researcher Jake C. At the time of data acquisition the 35-year old male was currently finishing his master thesis along with working full-time at a research centre. The sampling periods covered both time at the research lab and leisure time due to our sampling on a weekend and a public holiday. In sum the interviews covered descriptions of 15 samples that were reported as being perceived as each one food-related experience or thought.

Classification of Categories

Following schematic idiographic map gives an outline of the structure of food-related experience for Jake C. For a detailed description of individual themes and concepts drawn from the empirical data please consult Appendix C.




Figure 16: Schematic Idiographic Map for the »Anti-Foodie«

Discussion and Integration of Themes & Concepts

Superiority of Perception Over Sensation



Most of the samples included external vision that is similar to common definitions: with a very detailed centre of perception, whereas the awareness of the periphery gradually tapers off to indistinctness (cf. Hurlburt, 1993). The empirical data moreover revealed distinct variations in his sense of vision. Overall, perceptions were clearly prioritized while bodily sensations were reported to be of less importance for the experience¹⁴.

Weak Emotional Assessment



Although there were reports on weak emotions and valences occurring, they mostly covered a very basic level of positive or negative valences.

Informed Knowing



Overall characteristics of the Jakes lived experiences showed that samples reported as one food-related experience mostly involved situations of concrete food-related decisions, tasks and routines that are perceived as chore or labour with a rather negative connotation.¹⁵

One specifically interesting concept was *informed knowing*, which describes certain routines by means of a consolidation of prior experience combined with frequent repetition. This structure of experiences seems to underlie reports of automatic behaviour where the actual experience does not seem to have any symbols to it. By way of example, reports of *knowing* described brief moments that e.g. »by looking at it briefly I immediately know what it tastes like. So, there is no real simulation or imagining, but I just knew«. This *informed knowing* does not necessarily mean that there were no other modalities or impressions included in the original thought process. However, this *informed knowing* is important to understand food-related experiences of Jake, since it seems to diminish his cognizing them.

Unconscious Thought for Food

Surprisingly, descriptions supported the co-researchers' openness to passionate descriptions of food and his capability to elaborate confidently about preferences in a very proficient

¹⁴ This might be an artifact due to the better accessibility to concepts of visual perceptions that could be subject to more articulate elaboration due to more common terminology. After all, visual perception is an accepted modality of cognition in comparison to his other concepts such as blankness or motor simulation.

¹⁵ Contrastingly, if no action was taken, a food-related thought was more likely not perceived as such. This is subsumed as of reports about already planning to buy particular food items for a couple of weeks (s11) or already having made up his mind on what to eat some time before reporting an actual food-related thought (s07) or already knowing what to buy in the supermarket before actually going shopping (s08) indicate that those may be not taken in account as food-related thoughts since they are not directly associated with immediate actions taken. Nevertheless, this assumption is subject to discussion since these samples were not specifically included.

manner: »And in these days I really like the duck, because how they cook the duck, it's the way I like, it's kind of crispy outside and inside it's not that crispy but midi, a little bit of fat and that's how I like it«^{s13}.

One special incident even revealed a novel insight for the co-researcher, summed up in his statement: »I reaaally like sweet stuff, I don't know how I didn't get that, yet«. As he detailed on thinking about a pie in his bag, he started with a passive description of his pie and coffee that subsequently shifted towards positive notions of »excitement«, »reward«, »energizing«.

Reports as these are a strong contrast to his mindset on food; attributed as having no importance for the co-researchers daily life. However, these exceptions do not render his attribution redundant. Although food-related thought does occur with a higher amount of detail and pleasure than assumed, the integration seems to be excelled by cognitive tasks that need not be disrupted by emotional or bodily desires all the same. Thus, his overall mindset is probably best illustrated in s13 with the statement on how it is experienced to want something particular, something spicy: »I don't think about it. There is no feeling about that feeling. I want to eat that, so just eat it. I don't really question about this food«. It is this diminished engagement in questioning his thoughts for food; the extraordinary ease to push away food-related thoughts and his casual attitude to simply act upon wishes without further cognizing it, that are distinct for understanding the construction of food for Jake C.

6.3. Mapping »The Neutral«

Following categories were derived from the data acquisition of the third co-researcher Giulia P., age 25 who was currently focusing on voluntary work and projects while in the process of finding a topic for her master's thesis. The sampling periods fell into a busy time with tight daily schedules, often attending several meetings a day. In sum the interviews covered descriptions of only 5 samples that were reported as being perceived as each one food-related experience or thought during a sampling frame of three days of each approximately 24hrs. Interestingly only 1-2 notes have been taken per sampling day, compared to 5-10 samples that were average with the other co-researchers.

Classification of Categories

Following schematic idiographic map gives an outline of the structure of food-related experience for Giulia. For a detailed description of her individual themes and concepts drawn from the empirical data please consult Appendix C.




Figure 17: Schematic Idiographic Map for the »Neutral«

Discussion and Integration of Themes & Concepts

Superiority of Bodily Feelings



The interviews with Giulia P. showed a large amount of experiences involving *feelings*. However, these *feelings* clearly denote *physical senses* and *bodily sensations*, rather than emotional states such as rare affects of happiness^{s02} or disappointment^{s03}.

This linguistic peculiarity covers both emotional as well as physical feelings (or rather sensations). Contrasting to the abundance of reports on bodily sensations and external perceptions, there was an overall low occurrence of emotions in the reports.

Taste & Integration as Entity



The co-researcher showed an interesting combination of being aware of aspects of *taste* in their basic descriptions such as sweet, salty, bitter, as well as a clear perception of mouth feeling, as shown in concrete focus on chewing, texture, tongue, teeth, palatine or throat.

By and large, her samples showed a use of the concept of *taste* as a kind of *entity* than can be manipulated. Above that, a correlation between the level of perceived *taste* and *quality* was reported. »I thought I have to consume it, so I use salt as an accessory to the food to make it better; something to change the notion of the food being gross. Because when you over-salt it, the taste is not so full [...] salt just makes it functional«^{s04}. Another depiction given included the taste of sweet: »also with cocoa, when you put more sugar in it the taste of cocoa is not so distinct anymore. And if the cocoa is great, it's just 'oh, f_ck the sugar'«^{s04}. Yet, despite this extensive awareness and attention of *taste*, *texture* and such, the reports accumulated the attitude of low importance of food itself.

Integration of Food: Body vs. Head



Giulia's *bodily consciousness* regarding food is best illustrated by two according reports depicting her head-attributed and body-attributed experience of food. Thus, a bodily superiority in s01 described feeling »primitive; when I felt like my body is taking over my cognitive processes [...] even though you are having fun while eating and waiting for the food. It was the body taking over«^{s01}. Illuminating this from the inverse perspective, the absence of need for food is reported as: »I don't have to worry about that and think about other stuff and I can think and do some proper cognitive processes without having to satisfy my bodily needs. Feeling of freedom, it's very light [...] You feel like nothing is standing in front of you and your thoughts and it's oh, great, awesome«^{s02}.

Thus, the bodily superiority of food-related thought seems to be opposing to the cognitive expression in absence of a perceived bodily expression of food.

Social Eating and Demarcation of Inside/Outside



As Giulia's lived experience rarely focused on food itself, but rather on the overall experience, her reports showed a tendency to highlight the social aspect of eating in the very vivid descriptions involving a separation of inside and outside. A notion of »we« or »us« in sense of an in-group awareness or the perception of a *bubble* as an inside realm (e.g. of two friends^{s04}) always delimited itself from the outside environment (e.g. the waiter they were talking to and other guests^{s04}). In social settings, this environment immediately loses importance, i.e. »I stop seeing the environment and just focus on the talking«^{s04}.

A strong illustration of the »we« feeling is following. »We were really nagging, 'Where is the pizza?!' *laughing [...] Yah, it *made* this experience of being hungry and food. If you do something like this together, you still enjoy and being hungry is more fun, because you know you all have the same goal and you are not the only one who is fighting to get this«^{s01}.

The primary construction of food as a social engagement is therefore very distinct for the co-researcher.

6.4. Mapping the »Food-Lover«

Following categories were derived from the data acquisition of the fourth co-researcher Eve M. who is 24 years old and doing her master's degree at the time of data acquisition. The sampling periods covered days of leisure time and work as a waitress. In sum the interviews covered descriptions of 13 samples that were reported as being perceived as each one food-related experience or thought.

Classification of Categories

Following schematic idiographic map gives an outline of the structure of food-related experience for Eve. For a detailed description of her individual themes and concepts drawn from the empirical data please consult Appendix C.




Figure 18: Schematic Idiographic Map for the »Food-Lover«

Discussion and Integration of Themes & Concepts

Self-Evaluation



Analysing the reports of Eve M. showed high awareness regarding her perception of self as well as other people's perception towards her. A strong integration of others into her considerations and thoughts was evident active imagery of other people's feedback^{s01•05•07}. Very strong reports included assertions that seemed to influence her decision-making and actions such as in s01 where she reported »I knew there was no point in making that pie because my boyfriend will say 'Why, let's go out for a walk or something, it will only take time and it doesn't really matter'«^{s01}.

A self-evaluating attitude came to light in experiential reports that showed that her talking to herself included commenting on her own thoughts or experiences in a reoccurring manner with contents such as »You are overdoing it again«^{s05}. A moment of anger was experienced when she realized she had unconsciously eaten several sweet mini pastries, commenting this in a sense of »Why are you doing this«^{s12}? At that particular moment, she was still chewing and this anger, dissatisfaction and disappointment was directed at her resulting full stomach and expressed by the report: »What did you do to yourself, how many of those have you eaten«^{s12}? She experienced this as sequence of mental images, where she recalled visuals of herself with a chocolate snack in her hand as she eats every single one.

Food-related experiences and thoughts have a very personal character and are warily not shared with others. This was derived from reports such as »I always keep thoughts like this to myself, I didn't tell him I want to make a cheese cake, just to probably hear 'nobody will care if you make it or not'«^{s01}. This dissonance of a positive experience of food itself (i.e. thinking of cheese cake) to her inclusion of the mental imagination of negative feedback coming from friends is assumed to be of main importance for the self-reported problematic relation to food-related experiences.

Self & Environment



Overall, the food-related thoughts were primarily kept in private thought rather than shared with others or followed by actions, no matter if the actual situation is experienced being on her own or in presence of others. For example in s04, when she reported »I didn't share my thinking with anyone. While I was talking to his mother I completely went away from that situation into my situation with everything, completely introspective, completely in my own space. [...] I went out of the situation, erased everybody around me and concentrated on my self and the bowl of ice cream and cheesecake. So for me there was nobody else in the room«^{s04}. Also on other occasion she clearly focused on the experience and report to be deprived of input from her surrounding to an extent where she was not aware of what

happened around her^{s13}. In s13 she even described a positive experience as if thinking about another world: »I wanted to prolong the feeling, I didn't have any work so I just enjoyed the thinking. And while I was making coffees at that time I was just doing them. I didn't thought about coffees but when I was boiling the milk I was thinking about warm food and everything. I was doing things simultaneously and I didn't think at all about the things I'm doing, but about another world...«

Contextualisation: Room & Surrounding



Experiences that involved the awareness and imagery of location and surrounding were very rich. In s03 she added at some point »Now I see. The rooms I am in really influence the thinking about food. Because in that room I never think about food a lot because I constantly do different things and whenever I step outside that room, it goes directly to the kitchen and as soon as I open the door I start thinking about the possibilities happening in the kitchen«^{s03}. She vividly imagined situations in their several characteristics, even if she imagined a particular food item such as a cheesecake^{s01} she did not solely focus on this one concrete aspect but a further elaborated in sense of other people's reaction or feedback and in particular, the process of making it in a certain kitchen, as well as the ingredients available and their locative whereabouts.

Trying to illustrate the complexity and richness following reports should suffice as example of the crispness of how she experienced the aspect of her imagined surrounding in this food-related thought in s13: »The Cafeteria was only one big picture from far behind and no exact details such as people, food, or anything. Just a big picture of cafeteria and a big feeling. But if I would have to choose: the feelings of cafeteria were bigger than the picture; really complex and rich. Everything, the textures of the food, I could imagine the noises, not hear them but imagine them comforting«^{s13}. Thus, the surrounding matters of great deal for Eve's food-related experiences, enriching the experience by proper contextualisation.

High Degree of Elaboration



Looking at both the single experiences and at the holistic picture of samples discussed the co-researcher showed a high degree of elaboration for food-related experiences. Interestingly, as she recounted about the concept of *wish* the food-related reports themselves were consistently very vivid, detailed and included strong descriptions with a very positive energy, which I attributed due to her way of reporting. Yet, the observed integration stood very opposite to my topic-related assumptions of being perceived as something positively vivid, since the self-reports showed her dissatisfaction connected to the presence or frequency of those thoughts illustrated by reports such as »Because I know, the longer I think about it, the bigger the wish gets and the worse I feel«^{s04}.

Reported experiences rarely focused on only one aspect but rather combined several percepts and modalities, such as perceived input, which triggered a taste and memory and was accompanied by emotional and bodily sensations, such as feeling happy, warm and comfortable that is then embedded into the imagery of a concrete surrounding or location. This complexity occurred for example in s11 when she reported: »I smelled the coffee and remembered the taste of it in my mouth. And I felt happy when I thought about coffee, so I knew I would make it myself, so I knew it's exactly the way I want it to be and it will be warm and make me warm, give me 5 minutes of time«^{s11}. It was described as accompanied by anticipation, not in a bodily way, but as a psychological way of looking forward to something.

The active engagement in *imagination* is interpreted as a vital act of creating extensive thought processes that are distinct for the participant's way of experiencing daily life and reflects the overall high degree of elaboration.

Positive Experience and Negative Integration



Ultimately, her detailed elaborations are predominantly not experienced as executed in deliberate act, which corresponds to the high frequency of food-related thoughts being perceived as problematic. The integration often takes a leap to the negative, such as when assuming negative feedback from people in her close surrounding. Although exceptions do occur, e.g. when she wanted to prolong the positive feeling by elaborating^{s13}. Overall, food-related experiences seem to be consciously lived and show a positive connotation and detailed elaboration, but with a critical integration and cognitive reflection.

6.5. Mapping the »Unconscious«

Following categories were derived from the data acquisition of the fifth co-researcher Dre D. The male student works at a medical research lab for purposes of research connected to his master's degree. At the time of data acquisition he is 27 years old and is involved in some working projects on a freelancer basis along with his studies. The sampling periods covered working times (at the lab and home), as well as leisure time due to sampling on a public holiday. In sum, the interviews covered descriptions of 12 samples that were reported as being perceived as each one food-related experience or thought.

Classification of Categories

Following schematic idiographic map gives an outline of the structure of food-related experience for Dre D. For a detailed description of his individual themes and concepts please consult Appendix C.




Figure 19: Schematic Map for the »Unconscious«

Discussion and Integration of Themes & Concepts

Emotions & Valences



The co-researcher showed a consistently low level of emotional assessment; mostly only reporting about weak variations of moods or valences. On this, Dre annotated that concrete emotions such as happy^{s12}, mad⁰⁷, regret^{s10}, disappointment^{s08•09} and fear^{s02} would be »exaggeration« already, subsequently suspending any priority of emotions and affect. Thus, it seems that emotional concepts stayed on a valence level; a mood that would mainly differ between a positive, negative or neutral emotional baseline. According to this, emotional terms were solely used to describe very slight tendencies, without actually experiencing the full scope and intensity of them. This is connected to the content category *anticipation*, where the cognitive elaboration of options and consequences seem to be accompanying by a weak emotional baseline (i.e. the value-laden wording of *want*, *should*, *avoid*, and such were indicative and not explicitly reported as lived *emotions*).

Perceptive Access & Time



Short into the in-depth interviews the reports revealed that his experiences were mainly triggered by external cues (75%) and rarely started as self-standing internal thoughts (25%). Interestingly, all samples arising out of internal thought were described as signified by the state of being *hungry* (see category *hunger*) and awareness of *bodily sensations*, whereas the externally triggered thoughts were mainly connected to the aspect of *time* (see category *Time*).

Hunger-Detection Threshold



After analysis of the data it crystallized that the researcher detects hunger before it arises with bodily indicators, thus leading to the assumption of a low *hunger-detection-threshold*. Foremost, it was suspected that the co-researcher has a lack in ability to describe his feeling of *hunger* and that he might be prone to fill the explanatory gap by reporting *hunger* in every case that involved thinking about food. But due to his consistent confidence of reporting *hunger* I quickly discarded the second assumption and came to belief that he has a very low detection threshold for *hunger* that is very similar to basic human senses such as olfaction, where we are able to detect a odour long before we can actually identify it¹⁶. This would also align to the low detail in specific descriptors for his concept of *hunger*, as well as the founding in s10 where he described a very severe case of *hunger*, where he already felt the discomfoting »pulling«^{s10} in his stomach region. The co-researcher's integration of *bodily sensations* suggests a high level of severity of *hunger* with an alerting effect. Reports such as »oh

¹⁶ For more information on odor detection and recognition thresholds cf. PM 1963c. The Science of Smell Part 3: Odor detection and measurement. Iowa State University: Department of Animal Science.

crap, I really have to eat something«^{s10} and »you should f_cking eat now«^{s10} strengthen this assumption. The early detection of *hunger* as discussed also shows high connection to the content-category of *Anticipation* (see Appendix for details on category *anticipation*).

Hunger-Prevention or Time to Eat



A competing or even complementary concept to the low hunger-detection-threshold is *hunger-prevention*. It is signified by timely aspects in cases of directly reporting about the fear or anticipation of hunger^{s02•09•10}, the active prevention of what would follow if he didn't eat^{s05}, or situation were he made sure to get food in time^{s02•04•11•12}. Evidently time is either indirectly addressed in sense of cognized future scenarios, consequences or as concrete factor i.e. when checking the actual time. The frequency of this reoccurring theme showed to be a vital motif for the lived experiences and in line with half of the samples being triggered by time cues. In one incident he decided to order food before his train arrived in Maribor and gave following reports that support my assumption: »It was not out of hunger [...] I just noticed that it's about time. [...] I wasn't extremely hungry, so I figured I could wait a bit, but because we're getting close I figured I should order it now before it's too late«^{s11}. Thus, thinking about food seems to coincide with the inclusion of *time* (see category *time*, for details on notions of »too early«, »too late«, and such) and concomitant to negative *valences* associated with the undesired state of *hunger*. Hence, avoiding the state of severe *hunger* that comes with *bodily* indicators seems to be a strong source of motivation to daily food-related experiences. A conscious or unconscious avoidance of *bodily experiences* of *hunger* suggests itself and is clearly experienced as an undesired state.

Cognitive Integration of Food Experiences



Overall, Dre's discussed samples showed the relevance of abstract cognitive concepts such as *hunger*, *time* and *anticipation*, whereas typical modalities and process categories were *mental imagery* with a focus on *simulating* visual and spatial characteristics (of situations) and *knowing*. His attention to the environment did not show any significance and there were no indicators for any special delimitation between a concept of *self* and *others* or the *environment*. Only a few fragments of experience were described with high detail and when asked for further elaboration the co-researcher would often halt in contemplation and express that the aspects of experience simply didn't consist in further detail than already described.

Unsymbolized Thinking



After thorough observation I came to the conclusion that the simplicity of reports do not originate in the co-researchers lack of ability to access and communicate his experiences properly, but rather as of the clear and nonspecific characteristic of his reports. Further explicatory interviews and discussion after the data acquisition consequently cleared his

discontent of potentially disappointing me when reporting about emotions. This ambiguity regarding the capability of accessing experiences needs to be considered in clear differentiation between the actual access and quality of this access. A low presence or depth of descriptions is not a sufficient indicator for a lack in ability to retrospect on lived experiences. This holds the case for Dre, especially due to the fact of some reports being very vivid and specific in both modality and detail. Eventually, one explanation suggested is the majority of *unsymbolized thinking* (or as the co-researcher would prefer *abstract thinking*) to his reoccurring content concepts. The co-researcher seems to predominantly *cognize* food-related thoughts, with a weak but present *emotional* baseline in form of valences and very rare *bodily* sensations.

7 | Towards A Comparative View

Coding was done once per participant to allow an independent idiographic analysis at first. After all idiographic coding's have been completed, a second run implemented a between-person comparison of the data with a specific consideration of the initial concepts of interest, namely *hunger* and *food cravings*. In a sense, the resulting comparison will offer ideas on these two themes that may inspire further development of nomothetic laws in later study.

Examining the five cases reveal elementary differences in the categories of lived food-related experiences.¹⁷ To illuminate the prime interest of how categories such as *food craving* and *hunger* are constructed it is now reviewed *whether* and *how* the five co-researchers experienced these according concepts. This chapter will therefore summarize the codebook (chapter 7.1) for the two specific concepts and subsequently discuss a direct line-up (chapter 7.2 and 7.3) and conclude with major observations (chapter 7.4).

7.1. Codebooks for Hunger and Food Cravings ¹⁸

SAMPLE	PARAPHRASE	OPEN CODE
CR01s02	hungry but in the plexus area	bodily hunger
CR01s07	I had this feeling in my stomach, it was a little bit empty, cause it made a sound and it was kind of contracting...I got the notion I could eat (<i>and a picture of the food and the fridge and kitchen</i>).	bodily hunger
CR01s11	So I was getting really hungry and the hunger was getting me strong, I felt in my body that the stinging in my plexus gets increased and I really felt my stomach strong, the juices flowing and cramping and the pain was going more up.	bodily hunger
CR01s13	heavy...like I would put some weight on it. And this kind of stinging pain that I felt the plexus going up;	bodily hunger

¹⁷ Further differences in the distribution of categories in the three classes (Δ perception; ⌘ emotion; © cognition) and the overall density of concepts and categories reported, were likewise identified but an intense discussion would exceed the scope of this thesis.

¹⁸ Legend for Table: CR01 (Ima G alias the »Conscious«), CR02 (Jack C. alias the »Anti-Foodie«), CR03 (Giulia P. alias the »Neutral«), CR04 (Eve M. Alias the »Foodie«), CR05 (Dre D. alias the »Unconscious«)

	blurry; stomach	
CR01s14	the mouth was full with saliva..	bodily hunger
CR02s09	tired; anticipation that it would really energize	bodily tiredness
CR02s10	stomach feeling, empty, heaviness	bodily emptiness
CR02s12	emptiness feeling	bodily emptiness
CR03s01	I was so hungry that even when I was chewing the food I noticed that I don't really care about the texture or taste; as long as it is warm and salty; physically and mentally weak; hole in my stomach, like something was bothering me; didn't have any power; it was too light, too empty	bodily hunger; mental weakness
CR03s03	feeling hungry after the lunch and felt exhausted with all the digestion going on and I felt like I had this big bulk in my stomach. But on the other hand I couldn't really stop thinking about eating and I felt as if I was hungry again although I knew I wasn't.	bodily & cognitive hunger
CR03s05	I was just hungry so I didn't have any experience; I'm not feeling that powerful	hunger & power
CR05s01	I didn't sleep much; tired/slow/passive; thinking that I'm hungry	cognitive hunger (unsymbolized; other visual thoughts)
CR05s02	time to eat	cognitive hunger (time, visual imagery)
CR05s03	checking the time	cognitive hunger (time, visual imagery and simulation)
CR05s04	I will be hungry in a little while again	anticipating hunger (time, visual imagery)
CR05s05	tired/slow; I figured I'm kind of hungry and thought »damn it, I have to go to the bakery«; I wouldn't say I was starving but it was more like a prevention of what would follow if I didn't.	hunger prevention, bodily & cognitive hunger

CR05s08	I was disappointed 5 times in a row and I was like, 'this is not going to happen' because I just feel hungry.	unsymbolized hunger (visual imagery)
CR05s10	fighting the temptation to just get something at Westbahnhof earlier; I'm hungry now and I realized that I have to eat something at home and it sucks; sudden and severe hunger, I did feel something in my stomach; head, unconscious, feeling of guilt, regret	severe bodily hunger (visual imagery)
CR05s11	time; it was a reminder that I will need to eat something soon and seeing that kind of made me hungry.	cognitive hunger (time, visual perception)

Figure 20: Code List for the Diverging Experience of Hunger

SAMPLE	PARAPHRASE	OPEN CODE
CR01s01	this urge like something is screaming inside of you »I need it, I need it«, kind of almost crying; It was like a body craving; it pops out and this annoyed, nervous, anxious feeling that you have to do it, it was more in the mouth, not like a full mouth but I would love to put something and taste something; mouth- and tongue feeling	body craving (emotional shift)
CR01s03	I don't like it, but »I wanna eat«, so when I felt the urge for the food... I was more like an 'ouh' (disappointing sound); it's the smell and I wanna eat, but in the middle more like »how could it be, it doesn't smell good«?	urge (feeling of ambiguity)
CR01s06	I don't need it at all, I would just stuff my mouth full of sugar, with cookies and candies and not being hungry at all... I had this desire to just stuff myself; I felt greedy; like I was drooling; I'm heavy, lack of energy	bodily desire
CR01s14	torturing feeling, it was coming up and it felt so...it actually felt like torture. When this feeling came I was so annoyed by it that I cannot push it away; it was pushing me; mad at myself; annoyed by this thing; all the body is uncomfortable and nervous; I did have the	bodily & cognitive struggle

	flashes 'I want to eat'; mouth full of saliva and then again the burning thing around the plexus	
CR03s01	powerless; we are stuck on this waiting part, so actually no constructive environment; we are together in some trouble, we were all hungry and in the same sh_t; it's very primitive; It's this feeling of urge, this instinct and first reaction, more like a reflex; your body just takes over	cognitive powerless (social construction) & bodily overruling
CR03s03	I had the urge that I have to get to the refrigerator or anything else in the kitchen and I had to open, I had to eat; I really wanted something that is f_cking strong; I noticed it had a different texture, different structure... but it was not happy eating; stomach feels like the world...being annoyed by my full stomach; felt like I have no control of what to put in my mouth; really concentrated on texture and taste; really like some force was driving me into it; but somehow I can't cognitively grasp it; I was talking to myself »Come on stop it« and it is also a surprising feeling; I only feel me and not really the food or things that are around me. I'm very well aware about my body and my self and it is very communicative in myself; chewing slower and really getting into the mouthy feeling and the process of chewing	intensity & ambiguity between bodily sensation and cognitive want; awareness of self and feeling of mouth, texture, taste, chewing
CR04s01	I could feel the saliva in my mouth. I really had this strong feeling of texture, it's really moist the cottage cheese pie and it was a wish of me, making something that day. I wanted to make that pie, it was an instant wish; It was in the chest, a strong feeling. A wish; getting used to this feeling of pushing away; It's stressful for me; the bigger the wish gets and the worse I feel.	instant wish (temporal; abundance of details; positive experience and negative integration)
CR04s02	the biggest wish was to get the freshness of the cold cheese cake in my mouth.	repetitive wish (sensory & visual imagery)

CR04s03	the wish of seeing everything I did the opposite, not so pleasant thing for me but as I said all this time I was anticipating; Yes, again I pushed myself from thinking too much; unpleasant feeling, when I push myself away; angry, weird, ashamed, unnatural, negative	detailed wish with subsequent negative integration
CR04s05	Again, you are overdoing it again	negative integration
CR04s11	I didn't feel any hunger, I didn't feel like eating; I should eat something. Just this feeling of regret that I have muesli; didn't enjoy it; strange; missed the feeling of being alone for 5 seconds; definitely in my head, the regret, and I was really angry with myself; missing the feeling of warm fullness in the stomach, missing the feeling of hunger; physical discomfort	regret & missing (inner conversation)

Figure 21: Code List for Diverging Experience of Food Cravings

7.2. The Diverging Experience of »Hunger«




Figure 22: Comparison of the Experience of Hunger¹⁹

Ima G. (*the Conscious*) experienced *hunger* in 31% of her samples and described bodily sensations with concrete locative reports of head, stomach or mouth feeling. Also Jake C. (*the Anti-Foodie*) gave bodily descriptions in 34% of the samples where he reported on his concept of *hunger* & *energizing*, but in a more abstract manner of perceptions of emptiness, heaviness, fatigue and feeling weak or tired. Comparing those two we might differentiate between first-order bodily sensations from locative parts of the body for Ima, whereas Jake gave perceptual interpretations of his overall bodily state.

Giulia's (*the Neutral*) description of *hunger*, *urge* & *craving* in 60% of the samples referred to a physical or mental weakness, i.e. the bodily sensation of throat or stomach, the perception of being powerless, too light or empty. Both Jake C. and Giulia P. had coinciding reports of *hunger* with other concepts of *energizing*, *urge* and *craving*.

The most frequent reports on *hunger* were evident in Dre D. (*the Unconscious*), since he described the presence of *hunger* in 75% of his samples. Distinct to the others, he refers to a cognizing concept that has a clear meaning without awareness of any other symbols, sensations or perceptions (except one severe case of hunger that involved a bodily sensation). Merely Eve M. (*the Food-Lover*) did not report on any incidents of *hunger* at all. Even more so, she described the confident absence of hunger^{s01•06•10•11} or the explicit experience of actually missing the feeling of hunger^{s12}.

¹⁹ The direct line-up includes the main class of characteristic (perception; emotion; cognition) and rough estimates for the occurrence in percent of all samples.

7.3. The Diverging Experience of »Food Cravings«




Figure 23: Comparison of the Experience of Food Cravings

Ima reported on a so-called *desire & urge* in 34% of her samples. Her discontent^{s03} and struggle^{s14} with food-related thoughts showed high involvement of all three classes, although the emotional assessment seems to overrule bodily and cognizing descriptions.

Giulia's reports of *hunger* coincided with the *bodily need* and kind of *instinct, reflex or urge* in 60% of her samples. Her subsequent experience of *craving* is experienced as a bodily superiority of the cognitive control of a situation.

Eve's emotional *desire* or *want* occurs in 39% of her samples and described the bodily *missing* of particular emotional satisfaction that she usually gets from food and involve the simple checking of mouth^{s09} or missing the warm fullness in her stomach^{s11}.

Lastly, Jake and Dre did not report on any concepts that seemed of particular relevance for the concept of *craving*.

7.4. Key Assertions for A Comparative View

Complementing Structures and Hunger

	Detail of Experience	Occurrence Of <i>Hunger</i>
Ima G. (<i>the Conscious</i>)	↑↑↑	↓↓
Jake C. (<i>the Anti-Foodie</i>)	↑	↓
Giulia P. (<i>the Neutral</i>)	↓↓	↑↑↑
* Eve M. (<i>the Food-Lover</i>)	↑↑↑	-
* Dre D. (<i>the Unconscious</i>)	↓↓↓	↑↑↑

Figure 24: Overview of Complementing Structures and Hunger

Lining up the diverging experience of *hunger* posed two specifically interesting observations for Eve M. and Dre D. (marked with * in Figure 24). Here, Eve's complete absence of *hunger* in all of her 13 samples seemed remarkable since it contrasts to her self-reported constant thinking about food. This extreme was reversed in the case of Dre, whose high frequency of *cognizing hunger* contrasts to his prior self-report to never think about food. Furthermore, his definition of *hunger* differed substantially since his clear knowing of the meaning is in very contrast to the majority of *bodily descriptors* that were intuitively expected.

This spectrum of reports compared the detail and range of the reported descriptions and departing from these two incidents it seems that the overall detail for food-related reports complement the occurrence of the concept of *hunger* in a somewhat negative correlation. That is to say, that with an increase of reported details on the experiential structure, an accompanying decrease in the experience of *hunger* (or vice versa) is likely.

Competing Modalities and Food Cravings

	Modalities Involved	Integration
Ima G. (<i>the Conscious</i>)	emotion overrules body & cognizing ↑	↓ discontent & struggle
Jake C. (<i>the Anti-Foodie</i>)	clear, intuitive knowing ↓	↑ immediate execution
Giulia P. (<i>the Neutral</i>)	bodily superiority over cognizing ↑	↓ loss of cognitive control
Eve M. (<i>the Food-Lover</i>)	bodily & emotional assessment ↑	↓ negative instinct, reflex, urge
Dre D. (<i>the Unconscious</i>)	-	-

Figure 25: Competing Modalities

Another assertion was drawn from the analysis of codes and categories that were grouped as experiences that fit to the concept of *food cravings*. Here, it seems that a common characteristic of competing modalities crystallized correlates with the integration of food-related thought. It is assumed that with an increase of co-occurring modalities involved within the description of one sample, the more likely a decrease of positive integration (and vice versa). Co-occurring modalities hereby denote cases where one single sample included reports of two or more relevant modalities of experience, such as mental imagery, perceptions, emotional assessment, inner speech, etc.

Single Classification & Sound Integration.

Jake C. (the *Anti-Foodie*), Giulia P. (the *Neutral*) and Dre D. (the *Unconscious*) reported either low importance or complete absence of emotional reports. One potentially connected commonality lied in their reports being easily assignable to one single classification (either sensation & perception, emotion or abstract cognitive concept). A contingent assumption might be therefore that the correspondence of categories to one single class of characteristic correlates with the effortless (or sound) integration and lower awareness of food-related thought.

Combined Classifications & Complex Integration.

Contrastingly, the occurrence of mixed reports or combined classifications indicates a more complex integration by means of experienced modalities. That is to say, in cases where a category is classified to involve more than one class of characteristic (such as e.g. mental imagery that is classified as *cognition* that is simultaneously reported with evaluation classified as *emotion*). These converging classes of lived experience might indicate a more effortful integration and higher awareness of food-related thought. A correlation to the judgmental attitude towards food for Ima G. (the *Conscious*) and Eve M. (the *Food-Lover*) is possible but limited to those two cases.

Vividness of Emotional Reports & Complex Integration.

One quite intuitive finding was the intensity and density of reports in the class of *emotions* that might be linked to the overall integration of food. A clear positive or negative trend is not shown since emotional reports with a initially positive character even changed due to sceptic integration and often merged to be perceived or reflected as a negative experience. Accordingly, the richer the emotional reports the more complex seems its integration. In the specific cases of Ima and Eve this may be associated to their judgemental reflection.

8 | Cognitive Flavours: Savouring the Idiographic

This chapter comprehends the final discussion of this thesis and summarizes all cases and recourses to exploring the introduced notion of *cognitive flavours* in light of the key assertions identified during the data analysis.

The aim of this thesis was to provide the wider audience with a first glimpse on the immense potential of a phenomenology of food-related experiences; revealing characteristics of inner experience that would supposable remain hidden with the current methodologies adopted in the field of food studies. This underpinning originated the idea of *cognitive flavours*, which centrally adopts the common misconception that equalizes *taste* and *flavour* and highlights that it takes much more than *taste* to make sense of the experience of *flavour*. Subsequently, the metaphorical claim states that it takes much more than just to look at the *content* of reports to make sense of the *gestalt* of experience, wherefore the assessment of experience was shifted from mere *content* to an aware inclusion of the *structure & process* of experience.




Figure 26: From Content to Process: Questioning the Stability of Phenomenal Data

Ultimately, *cognitive flavours* denote the assumption, that individuals possess certain cognitive styles that are more or less stable to their food-related experience. The elicitation, major modalities of thinking or overall integration of a thought for food would therefore arise in individual themes and concepts that consists of basic building blocks, such as inner speech, mental imagery or bodily sensations. Amplifying this projection envisions great applications for the future.

Cogitating about the investigations done for the purposes of this thesis constructed a tasting menu that initiated the immersion into the lived food-related experience of five co-researchers that fundamentally differed in their attitudes towards drinking and eating. It explored the chief ingredients for each single case; their properties, meanings, relationships and correspondences, amongst others. This all boiled down to an overwhelming selection of significances and differences, narrated as personal stories and releasing a vast range in foretastes of how *others* experience food.

8.1. Discussing the Cases

The Conscious personified that there is a *value* to every food, appreciating healthy, fresh, and good food. Her self-attribution of a warily elaboration of food prior to the interviews are supported by the core themes identified for Ima G. The initial assumption of visual aspects being of uttermost importance partly originate from her interest and current study in the realm of fine arts. However, the phenomenological enquiry revealed other features of experience as more salient and the identification of themes and concepts clearly gained in depth from her extensive experience with the particular method of investigation. Foremost, a strong *emotional access* to food is evident, often marking the onset of a food-related experience. In this sense, her integration of her thoughts for drinking and eating showed to be highly dependant on her emotional assessment of an experience and opposing incidents including food without any emotional indicator were not consciously attended to. This *emotional* integration renders her *cognition* less dependant on external percepts and rather emphasises the importance of *bodily sensations*. Ima's experience reveals an inseparable blend of affective, bodily, cognitive qualities that tightly intertwine in most of her thought for food; and headed by her light demarcation between sensed self and perceived surrounding as detailed in her most salient concepts of *sensing & awareness* and *extended & connected*. After immersion into the available food-related samples, one close assumption is therefore a weak detachment between the several faculties of her experience that may result in her proneness and/or dependency on complexity of food-related experience in order to consciously perceive it as such. This catching up on complex experiences therefore sheds a new light on her initial labelling as the »Conscious« in which her (food-related) experiences may be characterised by a high threshold of conscious detection (i.e. her only consciously detecting and attending to food-related experience when it reaches a certain complexity or intensity). It is assumed that this might in turn constitute her indecisive opinion of food because the only food-related thoughts that are consciously perceived are the ones with a more significant complexity.

The Anti-Foodie considers food as »fuel« and is known for a quite passive stance with a clear functional attribution of food. His attitude towards food and infrequency of food-related thought was very determined and merely left the occurrence out of bodily necessity as point of connection following his self-reports prior to the interviews. Surprisingly, bodily aspects of experience showed to be of lower importance and disclosed other structures of experience as more salient. Jake's experience of food hereby illustrated a strong superiority of *perception* with a specific focus on the sense of vision in several manifestations. Throughout the reports his encountering of food were mainly of *perceptive* and *cognitive* nature with *bodily sensations* and *emotional assessment* taking a consequent back seat. One most surprising finding (both to the investigator as well as the co-researcher) revealed a positive attitude towards

food that exhibits in proficient elaborations of food preferences, which challenges the initially reported insignificance of eating and drinking. That is to say, that Jake's elaborations on food were of much more detail and clarity regarding colour, texture, taste and such, than expected. A possible argument on this hitherto undetected care for food lies in the clear excel of cognizing thought that need not be disrupted by emotional or bodily factors. In a way, thought for food showed to be phenomenally conscious when recalling and describing the experience, but were not warily attended to during the process. Overall, this may be supported by his concise descriptive reports that hint at a low complexity of experience. His experience renders to be mostly illustrated in themes that involve distinct classes of characteristics (such as only perception) rather than a more complex combination of several modalities (e.g. bodily and emotional sensations combined with inner speech). At last, this simple structure of food-related experience is concomitant to the thought for food being rarely phenomenally conscious and the subsequent integration with such ease.

The Neutral simply considers »food as food« and enacts an indifferent mindset towards food as reported prior to the data acquisition. Short into the in-depth interviews a superiority of *feelings* manifested that places bodily sensations over emotional assessment. This likewise reflects the integration of food as a bodily conscious experience in which the body takes over cognitive processes in reported incidents of *hunger* or *cravings*. Despite a high awareness of tastes and textures when describing actual thoughts for food these qualities accumulated to be of low importance. In fact, food is foremost experienced as social activity, determining the experience of an inside *bubble* (referring to herself, two people or a group of people as centre of attention) and separating it from the outside environment. This shift to the realm of the social was an extraordinary finding since it detached the experience of food from food itself and actively substituted the topic focus to the more narrow activity of eating and drinking. Such restriction to a contemplation of social eating was especially interesting in the light of the warily attended aspects of taste and texture of the food that demonstrate a certain sensitivity to gustatory details that supposedly have no impact on the perceived importance of food.

The Food-Lover problematizes to »constantly think about food«, expressing a »unhealthy« relation to food according to her self-reflection prior to the research. Her curiosity and passion for food therefore advised the factually detailed elaboration, although the sampled experiences fall short of the number of incidents that she initially expected. Soon into the in-depth interviews this self-evaluation of her »unhealthy« relationship to food appeared to be strongly connected to her experience of considering other people's feedback. However, the incidents did not include any actual critical feedback but were rather valuations that anticipated a reaction in mental imagery or simulation. This fragment of experience mostly characterized a negative integration and connected with her inner commentary that typically expressed her discontent in inner speech, which may be a vital factor for her resulting

behaviour of keeping her food-related thoughts to herself. This manner of self-evaluation showed a high dominance during the interviews. But more importantly, these investigations exposed her initial positive experience that is often contextualised and elaborated in high detail or assembled as complex composite of several modalities. On that account, she mainly experienced food independent of external triggers or the presence of *hunger*. And despite the seemingly fundamental experience of food being positive, an originally pleasurable experience often turned out to be described with a negative connotation through emotional and bodily discomfort or negative commentaries in mind. Therefore, the degree of complexity of food-related experience seems to be constitutive for the difficult integration.

The Unconscious is signified by the ambiguity of reports between his love for food, which is contrasted by his rare to non-existent thought for food. Remarkably, the analysis disclosed the predominance of cognitive themes. For example, a *low hunger-detection-threshold* seemed to dictate most of Dre's collected samples where he detected or anticipated his hunger in a very early stage before uncomfortable bodily indicators ascend. The connected notion of *hunger-prevention* thematized the motivation to avoid this bodily discomfort and both themes are essentially associated to an aware inclusion of *time*. Dre's overall experience seemed to chiefly occur in an *unsymbolized* fashion or in *visual imagery*, as well as triggered by external cues rather than standalone thoughts arising internally. Merely, the state of *hunger* risen as internal thought in that *bodily sensations* signal the urgent need for food. However, both bodily sensations and emotional assessments are far from relevant to cognizing thoughts for food, and account for strikingly little. Consequently, all identified themes and concepts displayed a rather simple structure and low complexity, rarely involving several modalities at a time. Likewise the depth of elaboration featured little; concurring with the assumption of unsymbolized thinking. Lastly, his love for food gleamed out rarely and only in small fragments, i.e. describing the details of a particular food that he experienced in visual imagery. The ambiguity between the structure of experience and self-reported attitude towards food therefore remains striking and attracts to the hidden nature of unsymbolized thought.

8.2. Exploring Cognitive Flavours as Framework

Considering the given insights into the lived experience of food, a full menu was served that hopefully tuned the desire for more; remaining as an appetizer on the broad scale.

Clearly, there is the need for further engagement in both collecting experiential data and finding novel approaches to analyse the data. On that account, it is of uttermost importance to review the research process with according focus on the assessment and analysis of phenomenal data. Naturally, any comparison of data, both within-person and between-

person, necessitate a thorough systematic acquisition, representation and analysis of data to account for aspects; such as the consideration of time and space for descriptive fragments, i.e. linearity and temporal sequences of descriptions, as well as the evaluation and weighting of fragments in respect to each other, to only name the most critical aspects.

Following dimensions shortly address the key lessons learned from this research process that may inform and challenge a systematic way of assessing as well as analysing food-related experiences in the future.

Linearity and Time

Reports exemplary painted the picture of a visual image arising in mind with a detailed list of traits followed by an emotional sensation. However, these temporal structures are mostly misleading and follow from the peculiarity of linguistic linearity. Therefore, as a thought arises »it is far from obvious that such occurrences lack a temporal structure« (Bayne & Montague, 2011:26) and it is often held that they arrive »all at once« (cf. Tye & Wright 2011, Wittgenstein 1953). This circumstance poses a great issue for both assessment and analysis of phenomenal data. For further elaboration of concrete implications see Appendix B on *Reviewing Data Assessment and Analysis*.

Data Classification

Another challenge lies in identifying the nature of fragments of experiences with the help of classes such as sensory, perceptual, emotional or cognitive nature. By way of example, we may consider emotions, that describe a clear affect or valence but which are experienced as a bodily unit of physiological arousal. Here the classifications of *emotion* and *sensation* evidently overlap. Similarly a thought can be known to cognize a specific thing, such as simulating to peel an orange in mind. It is clearly a process happening in *mental imagery* and somehow experienced as *bodily sensation* at the same time. Assigning reports to classes is thus subject to rough estimation and identification of slight tendencies in their experiential disposition.

In all fairness, this classification needs to be taken into account as data-wise differentiation in order to address weighing and processing during the analysis of lived experience; which does not oppose to the fact that cognitive, affective and bodily mechanisms are inseparable (cf. research on human embodied cognition).

Level of Investigation

This research explored so-called *cognitive flavours* that are grounded in original phenomenal data and exposing those *flavours* proved to show its most fruitful results on the idiographic level of analysis. As evident, the main objective of this research lied in description rather than prediction and it would be misguided to attempt any generalisation and nomothetic

laws before an adequate investigation of the individual demonstrate a sufficient set of data. The complementary nature of *idiographic* and *nomothetic* was thus adopted to attend to the vision of representing a within person perspective that will serve as a source of ideas for future research. Comparisons between the individuals have been conducted, though without the intention to formulate predictive laws of generalisation. A focus on this idiographic level of analysis therefore remains a recommendation for subsequent research in the field of food studies.

Structure of Concepts and Integration

Drawn from the analysis of specific concepts such as *hunger* and *food craving* it was assessed that there are predominant patterns of experience identifiable for a single individual (cf. chapter 7.4 for details). Although there seem to be no clear consistencies of specific structures between individuals, following two patterns are proposed as potentially relevant.

Complementing Structures and Hunger

This finding suggested that the details of food-related reports complement the occurrence of the concept of *hunger* in a somewhat negative correlation. Meaning, that with an increase of modalities and details involved in reporting about a food-related thought there is an assumed decrease in the occurrence of *hunger*.




Figure 27: Complementing Structures and Hunger

Competing Modalities and Food Cravings

Throughout the reports on food-cravings it seems that competing modalities (i.e. the co-occurrence of several modalities such as inner speech, visual imagery, bodily sensations and such for one incident) are a common characteristic with a negative correlation towards the integration of food-related thought. This applies that with an increase of co-occurring modalities involved for one food-related experience the more likely a decrease in positive integration.



Figure 28: Competing Modalities and Food Cravings

Patterns of Integration

Furthermore some observations emerged independent of specific concepts and suggest following cognitive flavours for further exploration (see chapter 7.4 for details):

Single Classification & Sound Integration




Figure 29: Single Classification & Sound Integration

This observation suggests that the clearness of classifying concepts to single classes of characteristics accompanies a sound integration of food-related thought. In other words, it seems that in cases where concepts are easily assigned to a one class of characteristic (sensation & perception, emotion or cognition) a sound integration and lower awareness of food-related thought is more probable.

Combined Classification & Complex Integration

The complementary observation suggests that combined classifications indicate a more complex integration by means of experienced modalities. By way of example, mental imagery that is simultaneously accompanied by emotional evaluation (and therefore classified to combine cognition and emotion) did result in a more effortful integration and higher awareness of food-related thought.




Figure 30: Combined Classification & Complex Integration

Emotional Reports & Integration

This finding suggests that the richer the emotional reports, the more complex its overall integration.




Figure 31: Emotional Reports & Integration

9 | Conclusion and Positioning of this Thesis

This thesis investigated the relationship between human experience and food by adopting a phenomenological approach and applying it to a novel platform of discourse.

Considering the young field of food studies it was a great surprise how far the struggle seems to reach that separates food and academia. Despite the deep rootedness of the topic in works of renowned minds of Western Philosophy, starting from Epicurus in Ancient Greece to Locke, Rousseau and Marx (cf. Chapter 2.1), food is considered as basic need that echoes with underwhelming low priority. Now, especially by virtue of the fact that food has been so little appreciated in academia, I felt challenged to promote the importance of the study of human experience on the example food as phenomena every single one of us can relate to.

Although the study of food itself is a well-established field implementing approaches of nutritional, anthropological, sociological nature and the like, there have been only few attempts on a philosophy of food. In spite of the small selection of literature, of all the more exquisite scope and quality, there has been no study done to my knowledge that attempts an empirical approach implementing a phenomenological investigation of the human experience of food.

Positioning this thesis thus places this research close to works on philosophy of food (cf. Korsmeyer 2002, Kaplan 2012, Allhoff & Monroe 2007) regarding their scope, as well as phenomenological case studies of any kind and even sensory approaches to ethnography (cf. Pink, 2009) from a methodological point of view. Above all that, the thinking and contemplations of this work sparked specific interest in the study of food in relation to *art*, *embodied cognition* and most of all the current debate on the existence of a *cognitive phenomenology* (in opposition to the classical sensory and perceptual approaches).

This empirical engagement with phenomenal data allowed to describe and, at least partially, understand the experience of my co-researchers; sketching an emotional conscious Ima G. who often senses her world as extension of her self; a perceptive Jack C. cognizing the world with a predominant independence of bodily sensations and emotions; a bodily Giulia P. whose companionable nature constructs food as something fundamentally social; a versatile Eve M. who immerses into her rich and positive experience of food (although ending up cognize a negative turn most of the time); and an anticipating Dre D. whose unsymbolized thoughts dictate time and other abstract cognates.

Linguistic peculiarities of linearity and time have left their mark, guiding us through a colourful range of codes and categories, as well as endless potentialities for classification and patterns of integration.

At last, one statement that I can give with both sorrow and uttermost delight is that I will and want to remain immersed in the topic, the methodology and empirical data. This research has opened Pandora's box for me. Once unsealed, it released a topic that seemed peculiar but yet small and harmless in the very beginning. However, it grew to an alluring, overwhelming complex and daunting project that, now as it has seen the face of (my) earth, will remain with me and hopefully turn out to have *severe* and *far-reaching consequences* (to abide with the classical sense in Greek mythology) for research and science.

10 | Future Outlook: Longing for the Nomothetic

In order to provide a concluding response to the aspiration of *problematizing* the topic of food in science I will finish with some interesting observations and questions that ascend from this research.

Cognitive Flavours Applied

Any nomothetic approach that claim to pose predictive generalisations remain a aspiration for the future since it necessitates to acquire a sufficient phenomenal data set that may provide a large enough quantity of data to derive statistically significant results first. However, the fruits of this work do not depend on general laws that are derived from quantitative data and strikes with the asset of achieving higher levels of knowledge through »eidetic reduction« when engaging into methods of phenomenology (Diaconu, 2013: 10).

The movement between experience, reflection and abstraction poses a very intriguing idea of being able to identify certain cognitive flavours that designate (individual's) spectrums of experience. To name just one potential example of application, attempting to identify a more general description that defines the *nature* of *hunger* from a data-driven point of view, as initiated in this work, may serve to inform the work with e.g. patients suffering of food-related disturbances and subsequently assessing frequent patterns of experience common to certain clinical diagnoses.

Applications as such might be able to influence large target groups and inform the discourse on disease construction. Up to this point this research had an impressive impact on the lives of the few individuals involved in the research. In facing the underlying structures of food-related experience it afforded a novel way of reflection and integration. This accomplishment, together with the positive feedback of my co-researchers, encourages me in my belief of the rich possibilities for future application.

From Perceptual to Cognitive

Phenomenological enquiry results in a jungle of features; features that are critical to grasp in their nature. Distinct ways of experiencing *hunger* may seem like fiddling details to some, but when aspiring to understand human experience these subtleties might sketch new paths to investigating whether and how much the *way* and *structure* of our experience influences the overall integration of food-related experiences. One central finding amongst the manifold of reports is embodied by the classical approaches of phenomenology that are constructed as fundamentally sensory or perceptual (cf. Diaconu, 2013 or Merleau-Ponty, 2002). Sensory hierarchies are historically ingrained and favour the *higher* senses of vision and audition as superior to *lower* senses of touch, smell and gustation (cf. Diaconu, 2006 or Korsmeyer,

2005). Considerations as such marble the field of research like an exquisite cut of meat; often biasing our reports of experience as being of foremost perceptual and sensory nature. This challenges a shift from perceptual or sensory phenomenology to *cognitive phenomenology*²⁰ and herewith adopting an upcoming dispute that problematizes the assumption that e.g. qualia may reach beyond a range of the sensory and supposing that one can experientially understand propositions (cf. Strawson, 2011).

Food History: A Cloud of Concepts

Clearly, our empirical data confronts us with a cloud of concepts that touch certain phenomena such as *food craving*. And all of a sudden we move in realms of instincts, urges, desires; all of them concepts without clear definition or boundaries. Now, to navigate through this conglomerate we need to decide what is of interest for us. A potential guidance is offered by considering how concepts as such have been constructed in the past. That is to ask: when did certain concepts arise; in what historical context; and is there any precursor to what we call e.g. a *food craving* nowadays?

Such schemes of potential relevance for *food cravings* might be found in Sartre who denoted *appetite* as »*desire*« in sense of a longing or craving for something (Sartre, 1982: 141/149); or in another illustration dating way dating back to the philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who declares »*desire*« as a fundamental motivation of all human action:

»Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not only by his Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal Pleasure.«
(Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1651, Pt. I, Chapter 6.)

In a sense, the term *desire* carries similar structures that we could compare with our phenomenal reports. To that effect we could interpret *curiosity* as reports of missing something, subsume the *pleasures of the sense* as descriptions of mouth and stomach and contrast the *lust of the mind* to a struggle to drop the vivid mental images.

However, it is not at all clear whether there are certain stabilities available for phenomena such as food cravings, neither in the present nor past. Ultimately, it seems that there is an unexpressed but mutual understanding as we talk about food-cravings, which might be important to investigate in the light of historical aspects.

²⁰ For an exquisite introduction consult Bayne and Montague's (2011) book *Cognitive Phenomenology*.

The Linguistic Peculiarity of Knowing

There is a colloquial habit of expressing the certainty of *meaning* by saying that we *know* something and it is assumed that every individual features a certain application range of what is understood as *knowledge* and what not. Now, although inevitably confronted with fuzzy boundaries and semantic peculiarities this suggests a prominent aspect for future research in analysing the subjective structure of *knowing*.

For attempting an analysis on the structure of *knowing* one could include already available distinctions from the literature. On this, Bertrand Russell advocated the difference between »*knowledge by acquaintance*« and »*knowledge by description*« in the 1905 paper *On Denoting*. His strong critique regarded the common equation of the two very distinct kinds of knowledge. He asserted that people can only get acquainted with ones own sense of self, thoughts, feelings and ideas. In line with the proverb *cogito ergo sum* this acquaintance is achieved through direct causal interaction with things we have »presentations of« (Russell, 1905:479). Although his original work draws a strong delimitation that one can never truly know a physical object or get acquainted with another person's mind, I claim that an experience-based approach suggests itself. This could reveal interesting nuances regarding e.g. immediate sensations reported as knowing and the inference of knowledge.

Does all experience involve self-consciousness?

When contemplating on the concept of »self« it will elicit a chain of associations. It follows that we have to pay close attention if we want to start any investigations involving the concept of self. Naturally, we have a head start by assessing subjective constructions as they are lived and experienced. But as we re-evaluate the empirical data we face inconsistencies and the overall difficulty to identify the concept of »self« in phenomenal reports. One argument in favour of relating to the peculiarity of language was brought forth by David Schear (2009) who pointed at the critical aspect of semantic reduction, asserting that our natural way to express a »mineness« of experience (i.e. *I was doing this or that*) does not necessarily state that there is any particular notion of »I« or »me« present.

Following line of argument illustrates the intrinsic complexity of *self*, a phenomenon that is often interpreted as illusion in developmental psychology (cf. Hood, 2012). The concept of »self« often entails »consciousness«, hinting at the common equalization of the joint term »self-consciousness«. That is to say, that the notion of »me« and »I« are intrinsic to our way of reporting and most of the time we will stress on what arises *consciously*. In line with this complexity of the empirical findings, Schear (2009) problematized the interpretive gap between experience and self-consciousness by contrasting Dan Zahavi's claim that »all experience involves self-consciousness« with Sartre's opposing view on the structure of consciousness. In case of following Zahavi this would mean that our contemplating e.g. a

portrait always involves some awareness of *my* seeing the portrait (Scheer, 2009). Intuitively, this sounds correct, but let's take a step back to the »pre-reflective cogito« introduced in §3 of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, that contrasts »when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. [...] I am then plunged into the world of objects; [...] but me, I have disappeared [...] There is no place for me on this level.« (Sartre, 1957: 49)? Evidently, the main critique is thus grounded in the notion of self-relatedness and I agree with Scheer on the *thin* and *minimal* sense of Zahavi's self-consciousness that should not be confused with first personal knowledge.

To sum things up, this *Gedankenexperiment* is indeed thought provoking and illustrates its strong line of argument by way of example. The existence and construction of »self« is a huge discourse on itself and I need to delimit myself from any attempt to elaborate an accurate overview of present theories.²¹ However, to me this supports the importance of grounding research in experience and poses the crucial question how to actually interpret reports on first-person knowledge of our mental lives, if linguistic examination allures us into rash assumptions of a »self«?

Remaining Immersed in the Data

Finally, I need to emphasize the strong explorative character of this research. Intentions to draw clear conclusions from the empirical phenomenal data require further research, but I hope to have provided an extensive and critical enough insight to understanding how other people experience and conceptualize food. Facing the need and great potential of interdisciplinary work, I see promising collaborations with researchers coming from anthropology, epistemology, ecology, gestaltism or aesthetics, to only name a very few, and I remain with the uttermost hope for much more research to come.

²¹ For an interesting (non-academic) introduction into this topic you might consider Bruce Hood's *The Self Illusion: How the Social Brain Creates Identity*, which gives one extensive perspective from developmental psychology.

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Appendix A

German Abstract | Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Diese Master-thesis untersucht die Beziehung zwischen menschlicher Erfahrung und Essen und implementierte einen empirisch phänomenologischen Ansatz in Anwendung auf Essen als Diskursplattform. Hierbei unterstreicht der Titel *Delicate Thoughts* viel mehr als nur Delikatessen und betont die filigrane, delikate als gleich auch empfindliche Natur menschlicher Erfahrung, welche letztendlich den Versuch an einer Phänomenologie des Essens (im Sinne des Subtitels *Towards a Phenomenology of Food Cravings*) durchwächst.

Wie Merleau-Ponty in seinem Werk *Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung* erläuterte, ist Phänomenologie eine »Besinnung auf Raum, Zeit und Welt des „Lebens“. Sie ist ein Versuch der direkten Beschreibung aller Erfahrung, so wie sie ist« (Merleau-Ponty, 1976: 3). So zeigt sich die Kerncharakteristik dieser multiplen Fallstudie genau in dieser Betrachtung der »Erfahrung, so wie sie ist« und zielt auf eine *Problematisierung* von Konzepten wie *Hunger* oder *Food Cravings* abseits von üblichen Operationalisierungen und Quantifizierungen des Wissenschaftsbetriebes. Anstatt kurzgreifend *Food Cravings* auf messbare Größen zu reduzieren, wird ein starker Kontrast adaptiert welcher auf den Verlust des erlebenden Individuums aufmerksam machen soll.

Dementsprechend befasst sich diese These im weiteren Sinne mit der Konstruktion von Begrifflichkeiten und deren Stellenwert in der Wissenschaft, beziehungsweise agiert in der Gegenbewegung als Dekonstruktion essensbezogener Begrifflichkeiten durch Blick auf die grundlegende Erlebenswelt. Letztendlich, verkörpern Konzepte wie *Hunger* und *Food Cravings* subjektive Phänomene als hypothetische Konstrukte welche weder direkt operationalisierbar noch klar messbar sind. Und so allgemeingültig wie diese auch klingen mögen gilt es einen Schritt zurück zu treten um eventuell festgetretene Perspektiven umdenken zu können. Denn das »Universum der Wissenschaft gründet als Ganzes auf dem Boden der Lebenswelt, und wollen wir die Wissenschaft selbst in Strenge denken, ihren Sinn und ihre Tragweite genau ermessen, so gilt es allem voran, auf jene Welterfahrung zurückzugreifen, deren bloßer sekundärer Ausdruck die Wissenschaft bleibt« (Merleau-Ponty, 1976: 4).

Zentral strebt diese Fallstudie somit nach einer essensbezogenen Wesensschau und skizziert signifikante Konzepte und Leit motive für fünf untersuchte Individuen. Methodisch bediente sich diese Thesis hierbei einer Modifizierung der *Descriptive Experience Sampling Method* von Russell Hurlburt (2006) zur Erhebung von phänomenalen Beschreibungen. Im weiteren

Zuge wurde die Analyse in einem Open Coding Verfahren (Grounded Theory Method nach Glaser & Strauss, 1967) durchgeführt. Eine rein textuelle Verarbeitung und Elaboration der gefundenen Konzepte und Leitmotive entspricht dem üblichen Verfahren dieser qualitativen Methodik und wurde in diesem spezifischen Forschungsdesign durch eine grafische Visualisierung und Repräsentation ergänzt.

In grober Annäherung kristallisierten sich Beschreibungen einer emotional bewussten Ima G. deren Welterfahrung oftmals in Verbindung oder als Erweiterung ihrer Selbst wahrgenommen wird; eines visuell und kognitiv geleiteten Jack C. der Essen überwiegend unabhängig von körperlichen Empfindungen und Emotionen erfährt; eine körperlich empfindende Giulia P. deren gesellige Natur Nahrung als etwas grundlegend Soziales konstruiert; eine zwiespältige Eva M. welche in ihrem Denken an Essen durch Detail und Tiefe geprägt ist, jedoch positive Erfahrung oftmals negativ integriert; sowie eines hungrigen Dre D. welcher Essen in starkem Bezug zu abstrakten Konzepten wie Zeit und Antizipation erlebt. Diese Formationen der Erfahrung in Bezug auf Essen folgen der zentralen Idee der *Cognitive Flavours*, in der Annahme, dass sich Individuen eines mehr oder weniger stabilen Sets an kognitiven Strukturen (den sogenannten »Flavours«) bedienen, welche es in dieser Leitstudie zu erheben galt.

In weiterer Folge erlaubte diese idiographische Erfassung einzelner Individuen die vergleichende Diskussion konkreter Konzepte in deren Gemeinsamkeiten und Divergenzen und sogleich eine Analyse der zugrunde liegenden Strukturen des Erlebens. Nach Betrachtung der zwei Konzepte *Hunger* und *Food Craving* in den unterschiedlichen Ausprägungen für verschiedene Individuen erfolgte die Elaboration von potentiellen Korrelationen und Kernstrukturen. Formuliert als datengetriebene Annahmen, bieten eine Reihe an Kernbeobachtungen als weitere Orientierung und Empfehlung für künftige Forschungsarbeiten. Diese befassen sich primär mit der Klassifikation phänomenaler Daten in Relation zur kognitiven Integration, mit *Komplementären Strukturen* in *Hunger* (je höher der Anteil an Detail und Tiefe von essensbezogenen Erfahrung, umso geringer ist das Vorkommen von *Hunger*) oder mit *Konkurrierenden Strukturen* in *Food Cravings* (bei facettenreicher Beschreibung von involvierten bzw. konkurrierenden Modalitäten sinkt die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer positiven Integration).

Letztlich reflektiert diese Arbeit den Forschungsprozess und identifiziert Kernproblematiken bei der Erhebung und Analyse phänomenaler Daten, wie beispielsweise sprachliche Eigenheiten der Zeit und Linearität oder die unerschöpfliche Breite an möglichen Interpretationen. Final wird im Sinne der Problematisierung des Themenfeldes *Food* eine Positionierung der vorliegenden Arbeit abgesteckt und ein konkreter Blick auf anschlussfähige Theorien als Ausblick für folgende Forschungsvorhaben geworfen.

English Abstract | Englische Zusammenfassung

This thesis investigated the relationship between human experience and food by adopting a phenomenological approach and applying it to a novel platform of discourse. Foremost, this underpinning originates the title »Delicate Thoughts«, which not only hints at the common description of food as being *delicate*, but moreover points at the *sensitivity* and *complexity* of the subject matter of experience that stands at the core of this research.

In spirit with Maurice Merleau-Ponty as he wrote in his preface to his book *Phenomenology of Perception* »we must reawaken the basic experience of the world« (Merleau-Ponty, 2002), simultaneously introducing the argument that science and in particular analytical reflection, starts from experience. It is exactly this returning to the »basic experience« that affords to *problematize* the construction of concepts such as *food cravings* and *hunger* in science and oppose the seemingly preference for numbers and measures with the ultimate goal to call attention to the experiencing individual.

Moving in the realms of scientific research may allure to operationalize, generalize and explain things; often misremembering the »things themselves« as Husserl (1936/1970) asserted when demanding to return to matters of describing rather than analysing. In this sense, we need to remind ourselves that phenomena such as *food cravings* or *hunger* are hypothetical constructs, which are neither directly observable nor measurable. Finally, these first-person reports are no plain add-ons to empirical studies but at the very core heart of our findings. After all, without the insight into a persons experience we would have no data to correlate our most advanced technological data with.

This multiple case study therefore investigated the diverging structure of food-related experience for five collaborating co-researchers. The specific method implemented was drawn from the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) by Russell Hurlburt (2006), a method for investigating random samples of inner experience in participants' natural environments. The data analysis followed an open coding process (grounded theory method, Glaser & Strauss 1967) and explored central themes and concepts for each individual as well as significances and commonalities in a further comparison between the co-researchers. Besides the common linguistic examination of the transcribed in-depth interviews, additional visualizations and graphical processing were used to enrich the workflow during analysis.

By and large, this empirical engagement with phenomenal data allowed to describe and, at least partially, understand the experience of my co-researchers; sketching an emotional conscious Ima G. who often senses her world as extension of her self; a perceptive Jack C. cognizing the world with a predominant independence of bodily sensations and emotions; a bodily Giulia P. whose companionable nature constructs food as something fundamentally social; a versatile Eve M. who immerses into her rich and positive experience of food

(although ending up cognize a negative turn most of the time); and an anticipating Dre D. whose unsymbolized thoughts dictate time and other abstract cognates.

Extending these idiographic perspectives, an additional comparison provided further insight into potential stabilities between individuals and providing a range of observations regarding the structure of concepts (i.e. complementing structures in *hunger* and competing structures in *food cravings*) as well as the classification of phenomenal data in relation to patterns of integration (i.e. consistent indicators that were involved in a easy to critical integration of food-related thought). These data-driven key assertions mainly facilitate as guidance and recommendation for future research by means of classification and structuring of phenomenal data in relation to their characteristics, occurrence, integration and such.

At last, reflecting the research process enables to identify core issues of the enquiry as well as analysis of phenomenal data, such as linguistic peculiarities of linearity and time that reliably leave their marks throughout descriptive reports; the colourful range of codes and categories; as well as endless potentialities for classification and patterns of integration. Ultimately, returning to the problematization of concepts related to *food* concludes with a positioning of the thesis and facilitates a concrete outlook for specific lines of future research.

Curriculum Vitae

[legend]

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 21st century«

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02/2013-04/2013



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Publications	
10/2013	Tan, F. (2013). <i>Flavours of Thought: Towards A Phenomenology of Food-Related Experiences</i> . Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 11 (4), p. 400-414. http://dx.doi.org/10.7906/indexs.11.4.5
10/2013	Tan, F. (2013). <i>Delicate Food-Waves: A Phenomenological Approach to Food-Related Experiences</i> . Proceedings of the 16th International Multiconference Information Society – IS 2013, Volume A, p. 378-382
06/2013	Tan, F. (2013). <i>Delicate Thoughts. A Phenomenology Of Food Cravings</i> . Proceedings of the MEi:CogSci Conference 2013. Comenius University in Bratislava.
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Foreign Language	English – fluent in spoken and written
Stipends & Scholarships	Interdisciplinary College Günne 2013 Performance Scholarships in 2010/2011/2013 (Studienförderungsgesetz der Universität Wien)
Interests	culinary art, food design, food morphology, ethnography, photography, graphic design

Appendix B

Reviewing Data Assessment and Analysis

Assessment: When Does A Food-Related Experience Start And Stop?

Considering the assessment, the data clearly showed the challenge of reporting one food-related experience as an event with clear boundaries. I.e. as a visual percept occurs it may be accompanied by a bodily state (such as being in pain) or certain mindset (of being relaxed or happy) that is relevant for this particular situation. However, it did not arise at this particular moment, but remains as being present at that time and of clear relevance for the overall *gestalt* of this experience. Reports as these can be extensive and judgements on what is relevant or not; or on when a food-related experience started and stopped, show the greatest challenges for assessment.

Analysis: The Issue Of Representation.

Asserted temporalities between certain fragments of experience may hold in some cases, but deriving relationships and significances from them will be misleading. After all, statements regarding timely aspects are mostly approximations and therefore cannot be considered as major guidance for neither assessment nor analysis. Accordingly, temporal features were discarded and the data representation reduced to samples²² as unit of interest. Regarding future implementation this seems to be a necessity beyond escape, in that temporal aspects may be only interpolated in later comparison of several sets of samples. In other words, one sample is taken as an event that is happening all at once, rather than as a process. This handling is in line with discussions on the temporality and ontology of experience, which opposes the differentiation of thought and consciousness, where a thought (or sample) exists without temporal structure and accumulates into the process stream of consciousness (Bayne & Montague, 2011:26).

²² All reports that are identified as being relevant to one food-related experience are considered as one sample.

Appendix C

A full elaboration of the research process (cf. Chapter 6 |) is provided for the case of Ima G. (alias the »Conscious«) and the remaining cases were outlined in a reduced discussion of their central themes and concepts. This Appendix C provides the sample-by-sample maps for Ima G., as well as the full idiographic illustrations and overview of categories for the remaining four co-researchers.

The appendix illuminates two levels of perspective (content and process). Keep in mind that although *content* and *process* are separated in terminology, these levels do not exist in isolation since both are inseparable when talking about experience. Therefore calling attention that this separation is the investigators attempt to give two perspectives onto the same data, which are nonetheless not conforming to any particular standardized attributions.

- 1) **Content-Categories:** Every case starts with an elaboration of individual themes that are mainly content-categories. These themes mainly draw from case based stories and illustrate the core themes of content. They give a feeling for re-occurring concepts and thus identify potential content patterns.
- 2) **Process-Categories:** The second section elaborates modality-specific descriptions and focuses on process-categories. These process-categories give a very different perspective on the *how* of experience and offer an overview of re-occurring to typical modalities. Some of these process-categories might or might not be closely connected to particular content-categories.

Appendix for the »Conscious«

Following maps give an illustration of statements and codes on a sample-by-sample basis. Superposing all sample-by-sample maps does result in the full idiographic illustration as provided in Figure 13: Full Idiographic Visualization for Ima G. (the »Conscious«).

(See page 38)




Figure 32: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 01




Figure 33: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 02




Figure 34: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 03




Figure 35: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 04



Figure 36: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 05



Figure 37: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 06




Figure 38: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 07




Figure 39: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 09




Figure 40: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 10




Figure 41: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 11

Delicate Thoughts: Towards A Phenomenology Of Food Cravings.




Figure 42: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 12



Figure 43: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 13




Figure 44: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 14





Figure 45: Ima G. (the »Conscious«) - Sample Illustration 15

Appendix for the »Anti-Foodie«

Figure 48: Full Idiographic Illustration for Jack C. (the »Anti-Foodie«)



Content Categories

Blankness & Concentration (s01•02•05•07•09•10)



The co-researcher showed a high integration of aspects of perception in the reported experiences. Perceived visuals (e.g. food stores^{s02} or snacks on the desk^{s10}) have a distinct character in situations, therefore integrating external vision as main focus. Extreme cases of this perceptive entity were reported as *blankness* ^{s01•07•09} in 40% of the samples. He reported, »blank means not the blank of information of what I'm doing but the blankness of everything else. It's more like concentration [...] With some exaggeration [...] even if there is a dog in my fridge I would not notice«^{s01}. This mode of *concentration* strongly includes descriptions of vision, ranging from a rectangle of clear vision to more unclear impressions, i.e. »I don't see very clear [...] Everything is just some colours, blobs here and there but I don't recognize it. I don't, I really don't know what was there«^{s01}. When directing a goal, path or entity a clear focus was evident in this state of *blankness* where the rest of the environment or situation was clearly of no importance or awareness.

Browsing | Soft-Eye | Decision (s01•03•05•06•11•13)



Strategies of *browsing* or *soft-eye* were common in processes of *decision-making* and mainly occurred in a visual manner in 40% of the samples. This visual browsing was applied until something pops up, out or in to the co-researchers attention, such as in s05, where the yellow colour of a sandwich did immediately catch his attention as he was *browsing* the options. He described the *soft-eye* as kind of strategy of seeing »the whole picture as a picture, you don't focus on anything basically and all of a sudden something pops up. [...] Again, this breaks the whole flow and this breaking moment is easily spottable«^{s05}. Yet, it was not clearly identified whether this *soft-eye* is a more active and engaged in activity and strategy, thus the two concepts of *browsing* and *soft-eye* seem to have no straight delimitation and can be seen synonymously.

This category was consistently connected to a more complex process of *decision making* - illustrated for example in s01, including the weighing of *bodily states* (i.e. state of stomach), *emotions* such as *moods* (i.e. how do I feel, more of orange, cherry tomato or apple), consideration of external *visual information* (i.e. the bad state of cherry tomatoes) and the final mental weighing of options as described by calculating (in an unsymbolized manner). The importance of visual perceptions was further consolidated in reports stating »once I decide, I reach the goal, and everything else becomes blurry and I don't care about other things anymore so it becomes blurry very quickly«^{s05}.

Pop in/out/up (s02•05•07•08•11•13)



A very common report was identified as things that **pop out or pop in** to the co-researchers visual attention and perception (occurring in 40% of the samples). This characteristic of visual perception can be a significant moment, occurring in the (active) process of *browsing* or *deciding*, or when a (passive) spontaneous event draws attention^{s08}. This category was often reported in form of visual cues being vital to it, i.e. when a visual percept triggered attention (e.g. symbolized thinking of »ah, food« as food stores are approached^{s02}), but also differences in a visual scene that immediately draw attention^{s08•11•13}. One rather detailed food-related thought centred on the description of choosing a dish. »In the ramen section I found the duck, that word. It popped up. The duck really popped up«^{s13}. He described it as clear visual cue on a language level where the word »duck« pops up. Thus, this concept seems to be closely connected to prior elaborated concepts of perception and demarcate the way of how things draw the co-researchers attention in a sudden and distinct visual manner.

Stressed | The Cube (s07•09)



A conspicuous concept involved in food-related experiences occurred in 13% of the samples, described as a feeling of being in a *cube*. He characterized this feeling as happening in the head region and further elaborated, »It's kind of a solid space, which is composed of only problems. And I have to solve, this, that, this,... that first, and then after sorting everything I feel really great. And then I can breathe again and I can feel other stuff again. I feel like that, automatically in this cube, this space that is only about the problems I'm facing, so everything else is just out of consideration«^{s07}. This happened when deciding for lunch, as he described an immediate and determined reaction of »I already talked to myself 'No.'«^{s07}. He was clearly aware of the people surrounding him, and the general mindset and situation was outlined as being busy, with too many things on the schedule and work-related thoughts being stressful. Interestingly enough he also reported that in contrary »food-related thought is not that stressful«. Thus, showing food-related thought being perceived as segregated and delimitable part of an experience, as embedded in an overall situation.

Throughout the reports this feeling of being *stressed* turned out to be the consideration of the current state of *mind*, *body* and *situation* that would also influence his *decision-making* processes (i.e. not wanting to think about anything else when being too stressed). Similarly to experiences involving *knowing* the co-researcher described that this situation happens quite often, where a »couple of really important things come up all together. In that situation I feel like I'm filled with that thinking, so I'm already full«^{s07}.

This feeling of a *cube* reoccurred in other samples, where he again described: »This cube is a feeling in my head and then it excludes everything else and immediately 'boom, I have to do this'. Then I look into this detail and nothing else comes in, I just forget about coffee and whatever else at once, immediately I forget it, it just goes out of my head«^{s09}.

Hungry • Energizing (s09•10•12•13)



Samples caused by an actual feeling of *hunger* occurred in 34% of the samples. A bodily and cognitive description of hunger manifested in several reports, such as a clear stomach feeling of »being empty and heavy«^{s10}, as *hunger* stretching over time (initially experienced as being weak and tired and continuing as a feeling of emptiness that vanishes at some point after holding back^{s12}) or described by tiredness and feeling of fatigue^{s13} (which was later identified to be only similar but not actually concept of *hunger*).

One extraordinary report on *hunger* was again described as feeling tired, but revealed an additional vital component of what I would describe as *appeal* or *desire*. It arose in s09 as the co-researcher reported the notion »Ah, I should eat the pie that I already bought« because of being *hungry*. Hunger was described as tired feeling and the experience explained by »I wanted to eat something and for that kind of moment and time I like sweet and it really energizes me«. Going deeper into this description of energizing, we discovered a reassuring feeling that illustrates one of the most surprising founding in all of the samples of Jake R. as he continued his elaboration. His *knowing* about having a pie available in his bag caused a reaction that is best described in his own words. »Yes, even thinking about it [...] this 'ahh, I have a pie to eat' makes me feel... OK. Good. I have something. [...] But I think it's really deep from my instinct that sweet ...« and after a short halting break followed »I reaaally like sweet stuff, I don't know how I didn't get that, yet«. After this sudden shift of interpretation and to my opinion very intense moment, he continued his elaboration with the quite interesting statement, »I really love that sweet stuff, so just thinking about it or thinking about eating it with the coffee, the sweet coffee again, makes me feel, maybe a little excited [...] it's like reward, energizing [...] I would say the most positive food«^{s09}. Thus, drawing from this report, *hunger* was rather experienced as a kind of unconscious *desire* for something energizing and sweet. A motivational outlook that only revealed itself during the interview extended the bodily feeling of tiredness.

Doubtful Thinking (s06•11)



An exceptional form or *knowing* occurred in 13% of the samples when the usually brief and clear content of an experience was accompanied by *doubt*. In s06 the co-researcher described a state of tiredness, not being fully awake as the food-related thought came about. Although *knowing* there was nothing in the fridge he still kept on going through his routine of checking the fridge in the morning, feeling both stupid but positive at the same time. His *doubts* expressed by a feeling described as the notion to *check* anyway. This whole experience of checking slowed the situation down in comparison to the usual routine because of the process of visually searching, confirming and assessment. The assessment included emotional feedback, although reported with the description of »Ah, right, there's still carrot,

I should throw it out«^{s06} it was not actually verbalized in any manner but rather expressed by a feeling of frustration.

In s11 a similar situation occurred, where the co-researcher described choosing to buy a new brand of coffee although knowing from experience that his perception of a nicer package will not make a difference, because drawn from experience he was sure that they don't do anything internally on the product, and yet he thought »logically, I don't know how it tastes like, so I should try.« ^{s11}

This doubtful thinking was not described in a vivid manner and perceived as disruption of flow, but with a positive attitude when following through with acting upon these doubts.

Constant Noise (s12)



One further interesting concept regarding his usual thinking was described as *noise*. Although this elaboration occurred only in one sample, he identified this *noise* as being present in most of the samples. When asked whether anything else is part of his experience he elaborated as follows, »Hm, a lot, but not really. A lot means noise, so I don't count it as my real thoughts. That's always like that, not only in this moment, but all the moments I'm thinking always a couple of things at the same time but it is considered as noise, so it's ignored. At the moment I can identify. It's like a dream, as you dream you can identify the dream of course but after that you forget about this. So it's the same thing, it's like a daydream, it constantly flows but I don't really care«^{s12}.

Knowing An Urge (s13)



The concept of *urge* was described as something intuitively *known* and identified by its meaning as follows. »Sometimes I like to have some spicy stuff but I don't know where it is coming from. It's not really about the food...it's just...urge to eat some...I don't know where it is coming. It's just a feeling, it's not really a bodily feeling, it's not taste, it's not...it's somewhere in the brain I guess, I don't know where. It just pops up, and I just feel like I want to eat something sweet, something salty or spicy but I cannot tell where, what sense. There is no...it's not really anything. [...] It's not thought either. I guess it's very similar to *gut feeling*. It's kind of bodily feeling but you cannot localize where or I cannot localize...it's not on my tongue, not in my stomach, not on my other sensory organs, somewhere in the body but no specific place«^{s13}.

Modalities & Process Categories

Knowing | Wanting | Detecting (s01•02•05•06•08•10•11•12•13)



Most of the samples (60%) included the concept of *knowing* with a strong content-related confidence towards given statements. This *knowing* usually occurs with external entities but

instead of being perceived by the co-researcher they are already *known* independent of an actual percept, e.g. knowing that he thinks about a sandwich^{s02} or coffee^{s04}, knowing an exact taste^{s05} or the want of having something spicy to eat^{s13}. This concept is strongly connected to *decisions*, i.e. what to buy^{s08} or direct factual states of the environment, such as what there is or is not available to eat^{s01•06•10} or states of current being, such as knowing that he has to eat something^{s12} or knowing the state of the stomach that sets a mood for making a decision on what and how much food to take^{s01}. Although one might assume that this information may occur in combination with *perceptual* or *bodily* cues, the reports consistently showed an absence of concrete modalities of thought process. Hence, pointing to *unsymbolized thinking* as usually defined as thinking with clear meaning but without symbols of any kind (cf. imageless thought in 1990 introspectionist school or unsymbolized thinking in sensationalist's approaches).

Visual Detection (s05)



One very distinct fragment of experience involved the decision of choosing a pie^{s05}, where the co-researcher paid attention to food items to recognize what he likes. Thus the co-researcher can effortlessly derive a taste from visual information. »I was looking for those kind of features, I like crusty surface, but inside it's kind of moist, that kind of thing and somewhat sweet, but not too sweet«^{s05}. The colour seemed to be of high importance as supported by further elaboration, »but they didn't have any particularly attractive pie so I chose some brownish colour with white icing«^{s05}.

Spatial Orientation (s13)



In s13 a logical strategy of *decision-making* was described, including a spatial map with a perceived list like inclusion of paths and least distances from their position and according weighing of convenience or inconvenience but also a checking of the current bodily state and »what he felt like«^{s13}.

Motor Simulation (s07•08)



A quite rare but distinct type of sample (occurred in 13% of the cases and) includes the active thought and *motor simulation* involved in food-related experiences. In s07 the co-researcher reported about the feeling of thirst as wanting to taste a kind of freshness that he compared to eating fruit like oranges or tomatoes that are watery inside. His decision what to buy for lunch was thus elaborated on in a kind of *tactile* manner of simulating the mouth feeling of a past experience of the wrap. As he described it was a »motoric simulation of having one bite, the feeling of wrap (this feeling is not that great, it's an okay feeling), but right after that it's as if I bite into the freshness from the lettuce and there is sauce in it«^{s07}.

Another excerpt of a whole situation occurred in s08 when choosing which fruits to buy. This included the pondering on whether to buy oranges. This happened as a mental simulation and his distinct decision not to buy it was experienced as follows. »I imagined the whole scene that I am trying to peel off the orange. And then I just gave up. [...] It's too much.« We were able to identify this feeling in more detail, described as a »cutting off feeling« that he tried to illustrate with a metaphor where it resembles a TV that just powers out. Thus his simulation of peeling an orange represented the thought of buying it, and the decision being distinct due to the »termination of the simulation. [...] A sudden stop«.

Emotion (s02•03•04•06•07•08•11•12)



Emotions occurred in 54% of the cases but showed to be usually of very weak character and rarely of distinctness for the experience. One special incident in s12 showed a brief emotional response towards a food-related thought that had major importance for a fragment of experience and how it was lived. When the co-researcher described choosing snacks and being interrupted in his decision by his girlfriend, her insertion to take the other snack caused him to react with a »Why?!« that was verbalized but without directing it to her. This assertion meant something like »I don't want to, I'm hungry« as he elaborated. The response was clearly characterized as emotional and described as a feeling of rejection. This very brief feeling of frustration was disregarded by an immediate process of saying »It doesn't matter«, although here it was not surely perceived whether it was actual said out loud or just a talking to himself.

Other typical showcases covered rather slight emotions. For example in s08 where the situation of implicitly *knowing* how things are arranged in a supermarket involved the awareness of entities being different to the expected scene. This visually *popped up* and the absence of a concrete item, namely mandarin oranges triggered a slight emotion of disappointment. Or s07 in a kind of motor simulation of a bite of wrap drawn from past experience that showed a very vivid and fluent description of how he experienced this moment of being thirsty and his »looking for that fresh and juicy kind of feeling« that he missed. But other than expected he stated that this situation was not emotional whatsoever, although positive somehow. Overall, *emotions* don't seem to be perceived as significant fragments of experience but rather as very weak incidents interspersed.

Bodily (s02•03•04•06•07•08•09•12•13)



Bodily sensations were reported in 60% of the samples and included feeling chilly, stiff, tense, weak, slow, tired and much more. To give one example with a strong bodily impact to the experience I will outline s04. In this situation he was feeling the cold and discomfort while sitting in a classroom, he described the surrounding of the »damn concrete building« that was giving him chilliness. He was able to report on the resilient bodily coldness, deep

frustration caused by it and that this frustration was taking over the whole body, without imagining or language being involved. Further description of the frustration centred on the metaphorical description of feeling stuck and lead to the actual food-related content of the experience, namely of having the (repeating) wish to get coffee but not being able to do so because of the environmental reason of sitting in class.

Verbalization



Most report given by the co-researcher gave explanations in sentences regarding the mood or feeling in a particular situation, although these reports often turned out to be mere descriptions since they mostly did not include any verbalization whatsoever.

Appendix for the »Neutral«

Figure 49: Full Idiographic Illustration for Giulia P. (the »Neutral«)



Content Categories

Self • Bubble • Spatial Awareness (s02•03•04•05)



80% of the reports (in 4 out of 5 samples) showed a rather high awareness and differentiation between her *surrounding* and a concept of *self*, which she denotes as so-called »bubble«^{s02}. The co-researcher elaborated on the »spatial feeling, when you are not concentrated on your body [...] your bubble is bigger in a way, but it's like you are more open to the environment and not so concentrated on yourself«. This awareness about her so-called *bubble* in respect to the environment occurred also in other samples, as being »very observant about what was around me and what is going on«^{s02}, delimited as »not the physical awareness of moving but awareness of me being somewhere«^{s03}, as a constellation where a »friend and me are inside a bubble«^{s04} and the »waiter and everything else it outside«^{s04}, or also as not caring^{s01} or being aware^{s02•05} of the environment. This indicates a characterization of *self* that was metaphorically expressed as »space of comfort« and easiness.

Self • Power • Energy & Control (s01•02•03•05)



Close to aspects of *awareness*, further reports (80%) were grouped to a more specific representation, likewise involving a potential concept of *self*, but which seemed to be closely connected to her perception of power and energy. Classified as a bodily manifestation it is based on reports such as »the whole me is not moving fast enough«^{s01}, a feeling of being frozen in time, feeling really small or further elaborations such as being »focused on myself and my inability to focus on food«^{s01} and a feeling of her »body is taking over the cognitive process«^{s01} came hand in hand with reports of having no power, feeling too light and too empty^{s01}. Other reports included also positive reports on having the feeling of time and energy to do things^{s02} or the account of the current state of feeling less powerful but expecting to get energized by something to eat^{s05}.

Other than this aforementioned aspect of *energy* & *power*, I identified similar characteristics to the aspect of *control* regarding reports such as »I felt like I have no control of what I put in my mouth«^{s03}. As we compare for example s01 where the influence on a situation or behaviour in a particular situation was described in the wording of power the use seemed very close to the concept of *control*. Concrete experiential reports involving a potential concept of self included »I only feel me, not the food or things around me«, »I'm well aware about my body and my self«^{s03} or »I focused on myself and my inability to focus on food«^{s02}. Thus, a strong relevance of body ownership seems to be the case in the construction of *self*.

Hunger, Urge & Craving (s01•03•05)



A specific illustration of *hunger* was given in three reports (60% of the samples) and included sensations of physical and/or mental weakness^{s01}, being powerless^{s01•05}, feeling the

stomach^{s01•03} or throat^{s04}, feeling too light or empty^{s01} and the overall absence or presence of a bodily need of food^{s01•02•04•05}. The samples included the want of something strong^{s01•03} or the feeling of being greedy as so-called *urge*, need, instinct or reflex^{s01}. This is best illustrated in the experienced samples by the report, »some things you know you could process cognitively but in the situation you really need it, your body takes over«^{s01}. This very physical category also includes the co-researchers illustration of craving as »somewhere inside of me I know what I want but somehow I cannot cognitively grasp it«^{s01}, »it is physical explorative, it knows what to do and it drives you«^{s01}. A very distinct description of *need* was identified with confidence. »It was as if I don't care about eating as long as it is warm, salty and fulfils the hole in my stomach. Because I was also kind of drunk and it's really a need«^{s01}. Consequently, a definition of *craving* was mainly broaching the issue of bodily superiority in comparison to the cognitive processing and control of the experienced situation.

Exploration, Search & Check (s03)



This again very physical coined sample was described with the notion of *physical exploration*. Although it only occurred in one sample it was interpreted to be of relevance due to the vivid and strong descriptions. In this sample her body *searched* for something particular, but *not known* yet. This searching started as a feeling coming from the head and was accompanied by a voice in the back, inserting things such as »Come on, stop it!«^{s03} and finally migrating to the stomach where she *checked* whether it's full. This bodily overruling of the stomach was driving this *craving* and comments expressed by the verbalization in mind were very distinct for this bodily *urge* (see previous category).

Fullness & Freedom (s02)



The feeling of *fullness* was identified as feeling in the upper part of the mouth, namely the palatine in sample 02 and was concretely elaborated in reports such as the mouth being 'too busy' and the palatine feeling numb and hard. She reported that »coffee is all I need and I must not put anything else in me, because otherwise I would feel like I have an intruder in me«^{s02}. Although the sample occurred once and thus not allowing any comparison in discussion I included it due to the emphasized report of this being her »favourite feeling about food«. This fullness was accompanied by positive emotional feelings (i.e. being happy not to be hungry) and reports on the feeling of *self* and her *awareness* of the surrounding. The sample s02 also included a feeling described as *freedom* in the same course that occurred as a sensation of lightness, explained as a great and awesome feeling of »nothing standing in front of you and your thoughts«. This was accompanied by an overall mindset of *spatial awareness* (see category *Self & Spatial Awareness*).

Modalities & Process Categories

Taste & Mouth Feeling (s01•02•03•04•05)



All of the 5 discussed samples (100%) included bodily reports on food-related experiences. Mainly taste and mouth feelings were described as relevant parts of the experiences. Reports about the taste were mostly not detailed and strongly connected to accompanied feelings. Descriptions varied from basic salty, sweet or bitter to more valued reports on fried & greasy^{s04}, burnt^{s05}, or a simply unfitting^{s04} or disappointing^{s03} taste. Other strong indicators involved were a mouth feeling of texture^{s01•03•04•05}, the particular act of chewing^{s01•03•04}, a feeling of parts such as the tongue & teeth^{s04}, palatine^{s02} or throat^{s01}. Other bodily reports regarded the stomach^{s01•02•03} or overall bodily states such as exhaustion^{s03} or tiredness^{s03•05}. Three more concrete concepts using bodily descriptors were identified as a feeling of fullness, search & check as well as hunger but are discussed separately. Thus, bodily sensations seem to be vital for the awareness of a food-related experience arising.

Bodily • Simulation • Knowing (s01•02•03•04•05)



As evident in the selection of categories mostly all of the concepts showed a strong *bodily* manifestation of food-related experiences in all samples (100%). Since all food-related samples discussed only covered actual consumption or outlook to consumption accompanied by bodily sensation it is hinting at the importance of this aspect to the conscious percept of a food-related thought arising.

In particular moments of *deciding*, she reported on the *physical exploration*^{s03} (cf. category *Exploration, Search & Check*) that resembles a kind of bodily simulation. A concrete report on this occurred when she contemplated about what to buy before going to the bakery, »I do simulate the taste in my mouth when I eat, and the feeling in my stomach afterwards«^{s05}. Only after deciding, »what would suit my body«^{s05} she would buy it.

Also her concept of *knowing* regarded bodily states of knowing one should drink^{s03} or eat^{s04•05}, reflected in reports such as »I couldn't really stop thinking about eating and I felt as if I was hungry again although I knew I wasn't«^{s03}.


Emotion (s01•02•03•04•05)



Interestingly the co-researcher gave the self-report that she mostly does not think in pictures but in feelings^{s05}. Yet it seems that, emotional reports such as light and happy^{s02} or disappointed^{s03} are rare. Due to fact of English being a foreign language for the co-researcher, a lot of the concrete emotional descriptors had a negating form, such as a »not positive feeling« or not enjoying^{s01} and not happy/pleasant/active^{s03}. Nevertheless, consulting the previous concepts should have illustrated the rich share of valences (rather than concrete affects) being important to the co-researchers experience.

Appendix for the »Food-Lover«

Figure 50: Full Idiographic Illustration for Eve M. (the »Food Lover«).



Individual Themes & Content Categories

Trigger (s01•02•03•04•05•06•07•08•09•10•11•12•13)



All reported food-related thoughts were identified as being either triggered by a specific internal thought or an external percept. 54% of food related experiences were initiated by external input and were either of visual nature^{s01•07•08•11}, an olfactory trigger^{s03•11} or actual food intake involved at the onset^{s04•05}. Food-related experiences arising in thought and without any external aspect reported to be of importance, occurred in 46% of the samples^{s02•06•09•10•12•13}.

Check & Decide (s05•08•09•13)



The concept of *checking* involved several types of modalities in 30% of the samples discussed and were either of *bodily* or *emotional* nature but always experienced in correspondence to a mental image. Pictures of this kind were for example thinking about how creative the co-researcher could get with some bread she just got. She did this by picturing her room in mind and checked what ingredients she could combine to make something good for dinner^{s05}. In another report she elaborated on choosing a meal from a menu by mental imagery as well, »I checked only the three I knew I could pick. [...] It was a picture. Maybe I would have picked the steak if it weren't for the picture of that greasy, brown sauce. Really not nice, so that's why I turned away to something else. This desert is nice to look at, the white and brown breadcrumbs and red of sour cherry. It was a nice feeling«^{s09}.

A *bodily checking* was vital to her choosing, i.e. »I again try to decide, to see for myself, what the thing is I want the most that day. To see whether it's salty or crunchy. I will decide on what I want the most. So I was lying in bed and I was quite focused on what I miss in my mouth and my stomach?«^{s09}.

This category thus describes some kind of active decision making and planning that involves imagery, i.e. when starting to think about lunch, in concrete about when, where, with whom and what she will eat by e.g. having a picture of herself in the kitchen in mind and paying attention to the upcoming emotional and bodily responses^{s13}.

Missing • Desire • Want (s08•09•11•12•13)



This category occurred in 39% of the samples and was described in *bodily* modalities. The concrete concepts are described as *missing* (the absence of a particular state) or the abstract emotional *desire* or *want* (as the knowledge of a desired state or object). Concrete samples occurred as she did not get the satisfaction that she usually gets from food^{s08} or in a situation where she was lying in bed and focused on what is currently missing in her mouth and

stomach^{s09}, but also when she misses the simple feeling of being alone 5 seconds^{s11} or the complex feeling of a perfect lunch^{s13}.

To illustrate her elaborations some reports taken out of s11 will give a nice illustration how she perceives the experience of *missing* something. Initially her experience started as follows. »Coffee and cookies would make me satisfied because the cookie was fresh and coffee was warm. Because I missed the feeling of something warm. But then when I did have this coffee and cookies I didn't enjoy it at all. That's not it, that's not what I wanted«^{s11}. This experience was described as reoccurring thought. »It was a feeling of something missing with the food. I was missing the feeling of warm fullness in the stomach like when you eat something really good and how it makes you feel. [...] I missed it. I missed the feeling of being really hungry, when you really wish to eat something and I missed the feeling«^{s11}. Distinct about this notion of *missing* is the concrete content and meaning attributed to this concept as it is experienced.

Wish (s01•04•08•12)



A *wish* occurred in 30% of the samples and was described as the co-researchers strong feeling of *wanting* something. It was mostly located in the chest area and thus a bodily category. It may be interpreted as a more specific and complex version of *missing*, with a stable entity that is *wished* for, persistent over time, and with additional aspects of cognizing it. In s01 she reported about the great wish and strong chest feeling of making a cheesecake, her vivid and detailed elaboration involved specific traits of her wish that she imagined in mind, such as »the smell in the kitchen, the texture, it's crunchy and after a day it's moisturized [...] A wish to make the cake, but I think because of the feeling I knew somewhere in my mind, I won't make it. It made the wish even bigger. I had a small fantasy«.

The timely re-occurrence shows itself with the aforementioned *wish* in s01 that was picked up by the co-researcher at a later point »Oh, the ice cream. And I was wishing for a cheesecake. I was thinking it would be much better substitute for desert than an ice cream [...] It was a chest feeling. Now it was not so much about the flavour, but me being sad and angry that I didn't make it. It would be much better to put this on the table, it would be homemade and it would be fresh«^{s04}.

The persistency of the experience is not only attributed due to the reoccurrence of thoughts that were characteristic for a wish but foremost supported by the fact that those *wishes* were initiated by the co-researcher rather than triggered by concrete food-related external precepts' as typical in most of the collected samples. »But even when I was reading the newspaper, the feeling of wishing for something and not being able to do it was still there«^{s01}.

Besides, *wishes* are mostly reported to be phenomena that are planned or imagined but not implemented or executed as a consequence.

Push Away & Distraction (s01•03)



A reoccurring description given by the co-researcher was the controlled disruption of negative food-related thoughts by engaging in so-called *pushing away*, reported in 2 of the 13 samples (15%). This active distraction was described as following. »The point where it was like 'Oh, it won't be good' I stopped thinking about it until I came to the kitchen and saw the whole thing. When the negative thoughts came I started doing something. I went on the Internet or something to distract my thoughts«^{s03}. In order to do so she had to actively engage in avoiding the kitchen that offered the smell that triggered her food-related experience to make it easier to stop thinking about it since the feelings were less strong in a different room. This act was described as »pushing herself away« from thinking too much about food and was characterized as an unpleasant feeling and is interpreted as a cognizing category.

This rather negative attitude towards her food-related experiences is best illustrated by giving an excerpt of her reports. »I really think too much about food and I know it's too much and that's why I deliberately push things away. [...] I'm angry, it's weird to me that I'm thinking too much about food. Sometimes I think, am I the only person that thinks so much about food? I'm quite ashamed to talk with people how much I think or imagine food, such as different varieties. So I started pushing away things. It's unnatural to do this. It's not something I want to do. I feel I would fit in better, so I put the feeling about food aside, and it's making me...tense in a negative way. It's not so strong, you feel for a minute and then it goes away... I just want to live it, do it, eat everything, get fat, whatever«. Evidently, she considers her relation to food as something problematic.

A similar feeling of discomfort seemed to occur in s08, out of her explained fear to choose a wrong meal, i.e. when something that is expected to be really good turns out to be something lousy. Her report was following, »I was split between the room and the cafeteria and I was split between the choices I had. It became that unpleasant that I just closed the explorer window of that cafeteria. And I said I will decide when I will get there, when I see somebody carrying the food on the tray and see how it looks like. I didn't wanted to think about it anymore, I knew I won't decide, it's just all in my head and doing this to myself. [...] I intentionally stopped and didn't want to think about it anymore«^{s08}. Interesting to note here is that it seems to be of small effort to actually *push away* those thoughts.

Modalities & Process Categories

Informed Knowing (s01•02•03•06•07•08•09•10•11•13)



The concept of *knowing* had a broad meaning and use. Thus, *knowing* described (in 77% of the cases) the derivation of information from current percepts^{s03•13}, from memory^{s02•06•07•11},

from former experiences^{s01•10•11}, as anticipation of someone else's reaction^{s01•02} or one's own behaviour^{s02•07•08•09•13} and most of them in close use of the process of imagining and thus involving other modalities such as visualizing or talking in mind. She for example *knew* what her mother in law was cooking by deriving the ingredients used from their smell and the specific use of the oven by the warmth when she entered the house^{s03}. Another concrete modality used to her *knowing* was visualization, where she pictured in mind where she had all the ingredients for breakfast^{s10}. This knowing illustrates the familiarity to a feeling or sensation that the co-researcher could easily imagine which led to a more informed use of the concept of *knowing* that crystallized. Thus, the co-researcher used information from the (past and current) perceived surrounding to form her knowledge basis, e.g. strongly using the integration of memory in the process of imagining as in s13: »I knew if I cook alone I won't feel really happy, because I will be alone in the kitchen, cooking things and it was like somewhere back in my mind I had the picture of the kitchen in the dormitory in my mind. It looks like Hiroshima.« Her high amount of elaboration allowed to use the concept of *knowing* for any future situation, such as in s13, where her ability to simulate potential lines of actions gave the vivid report: »I knew when I will go home [...] how comforting it will be to come to the warm cafeteria«^{s13}.

In s11 she described her critical thoughts at work about the decision she made in the morning on what to bring for breakfast. She stated that it was clearly not a conversation but a thought of »Why?«. Further elaboration explained her notion of knowing. »I knew it, I didn't have to question anything. I thought 'Why are you stupid, why don't you listen to yourself, why do you always do something...'«^{s11}. The clear meaning of dissatisfaction about her choice of breakfast in the morning was coupled with the frustration that she did not listen to herself. Although verbalized in a clear manner during the reports, this fragment of experience was described as a thought without concrete modality but yet with clear meaning.

Some reports also reflected a clear attitude towards food, »More than enjoying the flavours, I enjoy looking at people eating my food and loving the food [...] I know how many positive feelings I can get out of it«^{s05}.

Thus, her use of the concept of *knowing* often involved imagery and notions of planning and decision-making and integrates a prior informed knowledge base.

Unsymbolized Knowing (s01•07•09•11)



Only in few cases (31%) *knowing* was reported as a complex feeling with a clear meaning, but without any other perceptions. This occurred for example as Eve described, »I knew it was good and why I want to make it«^{s01} or »I knew from the instant I saw cottage cheese it would be so great to make it, but I knew I won't make it«^{s01} or when she reported »I knew I was in the cafeteria«^{s09}. In clear delimitation from *Informed Knowing* she excluded any other modalities

by reporting, »it was not a conversation. I knew it. I didn't have to question anything«^{s11}. This unsymbolized thinking involved in *knowing* resides in an evident meaning assigned, but was hard to describe as her hesitation and discomfort showed when asked to report how this meaning is known. In s07 the confusion was big when she reported on the childhood memory of sharing milk rice with her sister. »It was not physical; I didn't picture home or my sister. Somehow I knew. It's hard to describe. The memory is just in you and I can always connect it with home, back in my mind...it's hard to describe...«^{s07}.

Emotions (s01•02•03•04•05•06•07•08•09•10•11•12•13)



Emotional feelings were part of all experiential samples (100%) and covered the overall mood of a situation (e.g. lazy in s06, relaxed in s08 or happy in s06•07•11•13), immanent *emotions* of the food-related experience itself (e.g. excited^{s07•09}, comforting^{s04•11}) as well as the emotional attitude towards food-related experience in a more self-reflective manner (e.g. discomfort^{s03•06•10•11}, ashamed^{s03} or stupid^{s12}). Incisive for the co-researchers emotional spectrum was clearly the accumulation of a rather negative mindset regarding her food-related experiences. The re-occurring reflection and assumption of critical to derogative feedback of other's seemed to be very vivid and of high relevance for her. This kind of evaluating feedback was either expressed as assuming how particular people would react, or as emotional comments to her own thoughts and actions.

To give an insight to this self-evaluating attitude (see further in category *Self*) emotions included a negative connotation such as in s03 where she reported to feel unpleasant, angry and weird when she deliberately pushed things away (because of her opinion to think too much about food). »I'm angry. It's weird to me that I'm thinking too much about food. Sometimes I think, am I the only person that thinks so much about food? I'm quite ashamed to talk with people how much I think or imagine food, the different varieties«^{s03}.

Thus *emotions* seem to have a positive immediate character within the experience, but tend to shift to a more critical integration during cognitive self-reflection of those food-related experiences.

Imagining a Situation (s01•02•03•04•05•06•07•08•09•10•11•12•13)



Interestingly, all the experiential reports included the description and wording of *imagining*. In case of *imagining* a situation or location a quite complex construct was involved as of the emotional concepts of feeling like at home, nice, familiar and safe^{s05•08}, peaceful^{s12•13} or unpleasant^{s06} but also the imagination of concrete percepts such as the warmth^{s09•12•13}, sounds^{s08} or colours^{s07•08•09} and lights^{s09} of a place. This concept was thoroughly observed during the interviews and was identified to be quite active instances of mental processing.

Hence, her way to experience mental imagery often illustrated a certain *contextualization*, i.e. when she contextualized the imagination of cheesecake with some coffee for breakfast or as a present for the upcoming day^{s01}.

Simulating • Imagine Mouth Sensation (s01•02•03•04•06•07•08•09•11•13) ©

Very concrete descriptions surrounding mouth sensations were given in 77% of the samples and reflected active mental imagery and simulation of specific mouth sensations. These included particular bodily sensations of temperature, i.e. the cold, fresh, warm or hot sensation of imagining food^{s01•02•07•09•11}, the smell^{s01•07•11}, the texture^{s01•03•04•06•07•08•09•11•13}, the taste^{s03•04•06•07•08•09•11} or the sensation of saliva^{s01•07} in her mouth. Likewise more complex concepts such as the fullness of flavour^{s13} or the particular sensation of a piece of cake in her mouth signified by the sensation of freshness^{s02}, occurred.

Evidently, a high amount of experiential reports included *simulation* as part of mental imagery, such as simulating the sensation of flavours by identifying for example the texture and taste as she reported, »I didn't picture cumin on the potatoes but I could picture the feeling in my mouth how it would combine. [...] I had in my mind, how you crunch the spice with your teeth and it is really strong. [...] I had the taste that I was mainly focusing on«^{s03}.

Recalling a Memory • Visual Imagery (s01•02•03•04•05•06•07•10•12•13) ©

Thinking of particular contents in a food-related experience also included the *imagination* of a fragment of experience (in 77% of the cases) by imagining a picture in mind, such as the want to bake a cheesecake and the concrete envisioning of »taking this pie out of the oven and it is slightly brown and baked on the top«^{s01}. These pictures in mind weren't entities that exist on their own but rather with the co-researcher being part of this visualization. They were either pure *imagination* or an extracted part of a memory. A manifold of content and types of recalled or imagined entities occurred, including visualizations of ingredients^{s02•03•05•06•10} were incidents involved very concrete items. I.e. in s03 where the co-researcher described »I had the picture of Cumin in my mind, the package of Cumin in my mind, all the time«, but also tangible kind of pictures as the reports elaborate about a spatial image: »Actually, I went with my mind through the fridge, not the store or something, but what I could do with the ingredients that are in the fridge right now. I have eggs, I have sour cream [...] it was not a list, it was more a picture of ingredients in front of me in the fridge«^{s01}. In other samples she pictured her room in mind with the explanation »what are the ingredients I can combine to make something good for dinner«^{s05} or pictured where the ingredients^{s10} are but also described »I definitely pictured the kitchen [...] I imagined the desk filled up with bottles and empty glasses and spilled drinks«^{s06}.


Recalling a memory was usually described as mixture of imagined feelings and other known qualities of a past experience. Most of the experiences were accompanied by a visualized picture in mind such as the memory of Cumin where she »went back to the picture of these cookies that were not good«^{s03}.

In another situation ice cream triggered the memory of her previous working place serving the exact same ice cream. This thought did arise as a picture in my mind. It was »the ice cream counter and I was picturing myself on one side of the refrigerator. Then are the ice creams and on the other side you have another waiter. And I was telling my co-worker what flavours I need to take out. I didn't imagine the conversation, but I pictured this situation, me on one side, ice creams, and somebody behind the counter. In the picture I was focused on where the flavour Stracciatella was«^{s04}. Again, the spatial features indicate the inclusion of self into this *visual imagery* that also seems to be in line with mentioning herself being part of this picture.

Overall, *visual imagery* shows to be a distinct modality to the co-researchers experience.

Appendix for the »Unconscious«

Figure 51: Full Idiographic Illustration for Dre D. (the »Unconscious«).



Individual Themes & Content Categories

External Trigger (s02•03•06•07•08•09•10•11•12)



75% of the reported food-related thoughts were identified as being triggered by external percepts, the remaining 25% did arise out of internal thought and without any identified cues. For the external cues there was mainly visual cues (25%) or awareness of time (33%) involved at the onset of the reported samples. The remaining three incidents (17%) were related to actual food, an action related to food and a bodily sensation. Interestingly, all samples arising out of internal thought were described as signified by the state of being *hungry* (see category *hunger*) and awareness of *bodily sensations*, whereas the externally triggered thoughts were mainly connected to the aspect of *time* (see category *Time*).

Hunger (s01•02•03•04•05•08•09•10•11)



The concept of *hunger* was reported for 9 of the samples (75%). His confident report about the presence of this feeling was consistent throughout the interviews, but only in very few cases he was able to identify further traits or descriptions for the underlying concept. Only one very severe case of *hunger* (i.e. in s10) was accompanied by a concrete *bodily sensation* of a »pulling« in the stomach region. Questions that addressed further elaboration of this concept caused the co-researcher to react with confusion and slight reconsideration of his initial statement about a feeling *hungry* in 3 out of the 9 samples. This insecurity about the actual presence of hunger was mostly described in bodily manners and generalized as the phenomena happening in a state of sleepiness where he is *sort of hungry* but showed to be open to the option that it might not be *actual hunger*. Although this retrospective reconsideration might cause to question the co-researcher's accuracy in reporting, I want to highlight this as openness to erroneous awareness, which in the same turn presses his confidence about the other incidents where he reported *hunger*. Throughout the reports meaning was consistently evident in the lived experience, but without the accessibility to report on further processes involved. Thus, Dre shows a clear *cognitive* and *unsymbolized* concept of *hunger* that seems to be closely connected to his way of anticipating everyday experiences (see category *Anticipation*).

Time (s02•03•08•09•11•12)



Most of the externally triggered experiences (50% and therefore 6 out of 12 samples in sum) involved the co-researchers' awareness of time. Reports included the active or coincidental checking of time, assessments such as not being able to wait longer without starving, getting late to buy food or being too early for dinner. Following reports taken from s12 might suit best to illustrate his attitude towards food. The sample involved the initiation of ordering food and this kind of *decision* was reported as follows: »It was not out of hunger [...] I just

noticed that it's about time to order«^{s12}. This fragment of experience was furthermore closely connected to the reoccurring theme of *anticipating* things, depicted by the report »I should order it now before it's too late«^{s12}. Explicitly, he would express that this case was a forced decision, a situation where he had to buy food on the train to avoid the negative outcome: »If I don't get it now, I won't get something a really long time«^{s12}. Hence, the co-researcher has an evident awareness of *time* connected to food-related experiences. Most of the discussed samples (5 out of 6) in this category showed to be accompanied by reports of *anticipation* (see further elaboration in *anticipation*). From this point of view the aspect of *time* shows a clear characteristic as a driving force in his daily experiences.

Anticipation (s02•04•05•06•08•09•10•11•12)



As this category already implies, it denotes the feeling or knowledge of something that would happen, in sense of anticipating options or consequences (in 75% of the samples). The main characteristic of these kinds of reports is the use of the descriptors such as could for rather positive options of action^{s09}; want, will for particular consequences^{s04•11} and need, want or should for potentially desirable or undesirable states^{s04•08•09•10}. A concrete content aspect of this anticipation is the consistent report of *making sure* to get food^{s04•12}, *preventing* what would happen if he didn't get something to eat^{s05} and thus actively *avoiding* a undesired consequence^{s09•12}. The descriptions grouped in this category of anticipation were regularly connected to a timing aspect (i.e. managing something in time or setting time frames and goals). As reported by the co-researcher this can also be seen as a pushing and motivating aspect of experience^{s09}. This category is a clear content-related construction and the frequency of elaborating options and consequences speaks for a prevalence of cognizing experiences. Nevertheless, *feelings* and *knowledge* in sense of a weak emotional baseline of valences were reported as well and need to be considered as intertwined with this cognitive category (see further in the discussion on *Emotion & Valence*).

Modalities and Content Categories

Visual Imagery • Spatial Imagery (s01•02•03•04•08•10•11)



In 58% of the samples we discussed fragments of mental imagery, mostly of visualizing character. Depending on the distinctness of inner pictures the reports covered *kind of visual imagery* for items such as a cup of yoghurt (s01), where he described to have visualized the colour, shape and maybe pattern, but rather consolidated this as *knowing* how it looks like standing in the fridge. *Certain visual imagery* was reported with more confidence and detail, such as in s02, where the inner visual of a Mango Lassi and its distinct colour was the underlying experience of thinking about Indian food. In another incident in he experienced the displeasing mental visualization of yesterday's leftovers, how they lie on a plate, covered

with cling film in the fridge^{s10}. Also more active and directed mental imagery occurred in several samples. In s11 he was matching the voice heard to the heads of people he knows, this happened visually in mind in order to identify the origin of the heard accent. On two occasions, the visual imagery was extended by spatial components^{s03•08}, such as going through a list of restaurants in mind and knowing that none of the considered options was desired since none of the visual-spatial impressions remained. Vital to mark here, is that though the rather frequent involvement of this *imagery*, the discussed fragments also included other contents and modalities of experience, thus *imagery* never being the main process of lived experience.

Simulation (s02•03•11)



A more specific version of imagery is separately discussed as *simulation*. This subcategory of *mental imagery* occurred in 3 samples (25%). This can range from more abstract simulations^{s02} to concrete situations^{s03} and more complex constructs^{s11}. The *abstract simulation* occurred when he was simulating that could happen between several reference time points. Once he was imagining the negative outcome of getting lunch extremely late and described this situation as something that »you don't really want to have that experience«, thus his action taken intended to make sure this simulated consequence does not happen. It is denoted as abstract since the reference time points and possible outcomes were confidently reported to be experienced, but without any specific content or modality. Delimitation to s03 is clear, where he was able to report how he pictured himself in the very situation of navigating through a known area, looking left and right so as to imagine how the delivery guy is lost and does not find the entrance. The more complex version thus included concrete steps of simulating states of being, i.e. imagining foods and the state of hunger for different reference time points. To give an example how all these categories occur in lived experience, you may note that this *simulation* occurred as a process category to the previously illustrated content category of *anticipation*.

Informed Knowing (s01•02•03•04•07•09•11)



This co-researchers category of *knowing* resembles *unsymbolized thinking* as of its occurrence (in 58% of the samples) with clear meaning but seemingly without symbols of any kind. Since most of the discussed samples were clearly grounded in prior experience it is denoted as *informed knowing*. This *knowing* ranged from simple knowing of content (e.g. what is in the fridge ^{s01}), about a feeling (e.g. how much a situation »sucks« ^{s02}), a nonspecific thought (e.g. of a snack ^{s09}) or a quality (e.g. feeling sure the food won't be bad ^{s11}).

Attention & Environment (s02•03•04•08•09•10•11•12)



The co-researchers attention was commented in 66% of the samples (8 out of 12). His focus was mainly directed towards a concrete working task in 3 samples and the food related thought was rather happening in the background ^{s08•09•10}. Essential to mention here is that the sampling periods superposed working hours with working tasks presently pending. Subsequently, food-related thoughts were also interrupting a workflow or stream of thought on some occasions^{s02•04•03•12}. This includes for example the situation of repeatedly thinking about motivating the colleagues to finally order food but as he reported »I myself have to get back to this stream of thought«^{s03}. Another thought occurring with interruption was his realizing to have passed Graz by train, which reminded him to finally order food as he already decided earlier^{s12}. Awareness of items or people from the direct surrounding were only reported rarely and involved a running TV^{s08}, a food menu^{s11}, colleagues^{s03}, a patient^{s02•03} and an annoying couple on the train^{s11}. Thus the reported attention of the co-researcher seems to only occasionally include selected things from the direct environment and clearly without any specific modality that might be significant for *attention*. (Note here, that during the debriefing interviews we identified that although the samples discussed did not include a specific modality he would assume that a stronger impact of visual perception could be a common part of food-related experiences.)

Bodily Sensations & Food (s01•05•06•07•10)



Interestingly, *bodily sensations* only occurred in the discussion of samples that solely focused on food, without any distractors (such as working tasks or colleagues) present in the experience. Coincidentally, the analysis showed that 4 samples (34%) that had no reports about the co-researchers awareness about his attention on things other than food thoughts superimpose with the presence of bodily sensations. This also holds for s10, although being aware of the environment while looking out of the window, he didn't pay attention to anything in his surrounding and was being more with himself. The concrete bodily sensations reported were states such as tiredness^{s01•05•06}, sleepiness ^{s01•07}, having no energy^{s07}, stomach pulling^{s10} and the feeling of being slow or things around being faster^{s01•05•07}. These and other bodily sensations accompanied the sole focus on thinking of food or (planning on) getting something to eat. Consequently, the discussed samples show the exclusive occasion of *bodily sensations* and food as centre of attention.