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For Calvin and Peter

When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.

Acholi Proverb

Preface

Since I first started to read about the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army conflict and the massive human rights violations that have taken place, I was enticed by the question of how people manage to come to terms with the past and gradually begin to live together as a community after such traumatic events. Soon I realized that it is not an easy path. I decided to research these issues and learn from them. I wanted to identify strategies used, if possible find positive examples that can influence further planning for peace building and wished to travel to Uganda in order to see for myself, how the aftermath of the conflict is being dealt with.

First of all I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Alfred Gerstl for supporting me throughout all the stages of my paper. I would like to thank the Federal Ministry for Science and Research of Austria¹ for supporting my research project and providing me with a research grant, as well as my professor Dr. Margret Steixner who introduced me to qualitative methods and helped me with my research proposal. I would like to give my sincere thanks to Wilson Bwambale, Ochen Peter Emmanuel, Despina Namwembe, Sr. Fernanda Pellizzer, Godfrey G. Mukalazi, Canon Joseph Oneka, Archbishop John Baptist Odama, Rt. Bishop Macleord Baker Ochola II, Francis Lokwiya, Benard Okot, Mwaka Emmanuel Lutukumoi, Christopher Ouma, Joyce Bongomin and all the others who gave me an insight into their work and experiences and provided me with valuable information. I would also like to thank Patricia Helen McLoughlin for proof-reading my paper. A special thanks to you Calvin my love, for always backing my ideas and plans, for the endless discussions and unconditional support you gave me. Without you this paper would not be what it is today.

¹ Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Forschung, Österreich

Abbreviation

AFCSO	Alliance for Community Support Organization
ARLPI	Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative
CAR	Central African Republic
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRT	Amnesty Commission Demobilisation and Resettlement Team
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoU	Government of Uganda
HDI	Human Development Index
HSN	Human Security Network
HSU	Human Security Unit
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JLOS	Justice Law and Order Sector
KAR	King's African Rifles
KKA	Ker Kwaro Acholi
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NRA	National Resistance Army
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPHI	Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
PEAP	Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UJCC	Uganda Joint Christian Council
UDN	Uganda Debt Network
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNTFHS	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
UNLA	Uganda National Liberation Army
UPDA	Uganda People's Democratic Army
UYAP	United Youth Action for Progress
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WPF	World Food Programme
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army



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1. Introduction

1.1 Starting Point and Research Question

From 2006 to 2008, peace talks were held in Juba, the capital of Sudan, between the Government of Uganda (GoU) headed by long-term President Yoweri Museveni and a rebel movement called the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) founded by its leader Joseph Kony whose name is well known around the world. The LRA emerged in 1987 following the violent overthrow of Tito Okello's regime in 1986 by Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA). With Museveni's seizure of power, members of the old leadership as well as a large number of the former Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers retreated back to their origins or went into exile to Southern Sudan taking arms and ammunitions with them. Men from northern Uganda historically comprised a large part of the national army. During an attempt to pacify the northern region, some elements of the Museveni's NRA took revenge for crimes allegedly committed by the UNLA soldiers during the Luwero triangle war that lasted from 1981-1985. Therefore some NRA soldiers were committing human rights abuses against the population, including killings, torture and rape, especially in the Acholi sub-region.³ The new army was looting, people were arrested and put in detention centres without trial and in particular younger boys and men were at risk of being associated with rebel activities and being shot randomly. At the same time, the former UNLA soldiers were facing hardship in Southern Sudan and regrouped under the name Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) that launched an attack on the NRA.

The existing power vacuum in northern Uganda, combined with the practice of terrorizing the local population, resulted in a strong afflux of people joining the UPDA that was now a rebel force. Later on, the GoU successfully reached an agreement with the UPDA whereby members were integrated into the army or the Government. The rebels that refused to lay down their arms, in part because it was hard to trust a Government that had committed the aforementioned atrocities, joined the new emerging rebel movements instead. At the time of the negotiations in 1989 the LRA was born. The aggression of the LRA was not exclusively targeted towards the GoU but, following the organization of a local militia in 1991 and the turning of the affected communities towards a peace agreement, directed against the civilian

³ UGJCC 2007: 1.

population itself who they accused of betrayal. Large-scale killings and maiming of civilians, such as the cutting off of lips, noses, ears or limbs with symbolic effect, became common practice. The tactic of the LRA relied on the abduction of children and adolescents for the purpose of recruiting new members, as well as in the spread of terror and violence.⁴ It is estimated, that during the years of paramilitary struggle against the GoU more than 100.000 people died⁵ and approximately 60.000 children were abducted by the LRA and forced to become child soldiers.⁶ The extent of this estimation needs to be seen in relation to the actual time the child spent in the military, which could range from a few days to a few years. Similarly, the term 'soldier' in the case of recruited children cannot automatically be equated with an active participation in hostilities. Rather children in the LRA were serving for diverse activities such as spying, surveillance services and support functions, and everyday tasks such as the procurement of food from looting, cooking meals, or serving as sex slaves, which is usually the bitter fate of female recruits.

Museveni's Government and his military strategy towards the LRA received equally scarce support from the population. To protect the northern Ugandan population from LRA attacks and abductions, people were forced by the GoU to resettle and live in camps. Instead of being protected properly by the Ugandan army, people found themselves even more vulnerable, living conditions deteriorated, economic self-reliance was reduced and with it the dignity of the people.

After years of conflict, the start of the Juba peace talks in 2006 was the first real chance to put an end to the conflict. Although the peace talks were a complicated series of negotiations, an agreement including all the important issues was reached. Unfortunately, Kony did not sign the final agreement. He may have feared the International Criminal Court's (ICC) indictments, issued against him and his top rebel leaders, or maybe he never wanted to sign it in the first place and buy time instead. The speculations are numerous, but the true reason remains unclear. Nevertheless, the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 2006 and the subsequent negotiations in Juba brought relative peace to Uganda. The LRA is now scattered in different parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and Southern Sudan where they are continuing to spread violence and fear.

⁴ According to the UN Convention on the Rights of a Child every person under the age of 18 is considered as a child. This definition is applied in the course of this work, even if it must be clear that conceptions of childhood around the world are never bound to this universal norm.

⁵ United Nations Report Nr. S/2013/297.

⁶ SWAY Report 2007.

The majority of the 1.8 million internally displaced people (IDPs) who lived in camps at the height of the crisis have returned to their areas of origin or resettled in new locations,⁷ as did the majority of the formerly abducted children. But what comes next? After having suffered through decades of conflict, people cannot simply go back to normal and act as if nothing has happened. Security and peace are more than the mere absence of conflict. There is a pressing need for reconstruction and rehabilitation at all levels: economic, political, social and cultural.

With the growing attention of the international community since 2003, numerous international development organizations and NGOs have tried to help the affected communities. At the same time, did the GoU come up with a Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) from 2007-2010. Apart from international and political efforts and various initiatives, subsumed under the term ‘civil society’, which not only advocated for peace but also came up with approaches and solutions during and “after“ the conflict to support the peace process. This thesis will focus on different aspects of the peace process in northern Uganda that were set in motion within the context of the conflict with the LRA, with a special focus on establishing a peaceful coexistence and everyday living in the Acholi communities.

Therefore I will identify in a first step the major human security challenges the population is dealing with and then describe the various peace and confidence-building strategies that are used at national and local level to transform social structures that have been negatively affected by the conflict. The centrepiece and the main research question is which of these activities built on the efforts and capacities of those who are directly affected by insecurities? To properly identify the adequacy of bottom-up, grass root or indigenous approaches, with regard to the needs of the affected communities and individuals within them and their emancipatory force, I will apply a human security perspective. It is not about romanticizing local approaches, but about asking the question: what works best, and discussing the complementarities to top-down initiatives.

1.2 Field Research

In order to identify relevant approaches to peace building and to get a hold of the necessary information from “the ground“, thereby including the views of those directly affected by insecurity, I opted to combine my literature analysis with a field research in Uganda. A two-

⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012: 4.

month field stay in Uganda was made possible thanks to a research grant (Förderstipendium) which is awarded for the application of yet incomplete scientific work (dissertation) from the Federal Ministry for Science and Research of Austria (Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Forschung, Österreich).

After researching NGO's and civil society organizations that are active in the field of peace building in Uganda related to the LRA conflict, I managed to establish contact via e-mail.⁸ While many never responded, I received about 20 answers from representatives of the respective organizations that were potentially willing to help a young student by providing insight into their work and views on the conflict resolution. Before my departure, I began to re-contact those that had promised their support and willingness to cooperate to inform them about my period of stay from the beginning of August to the end of September 2013, and to make arrangements for meetings. I spent the first days of the expedition in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, during which I met with five representatives of different NGO's as well as a political representative whom I always met in their local offices where an interview was recorded. The interviews were a variation of expert interviews where my partners talked on behalf of their organization, as well as problem-centered interviews that revolved around a specific topic. Some of them proved to be particularly helpful and enabled me to establish contact with new informants through their network.

After completing research in Kampala, I travelled to Gulu in northern Uganda, the region around which my thesis primarily revolves. There I continued the practice of visiting informants for interviews. Overall, ten further interviews and one group discussion were recorded. Among the representatives were not only NGO employees, but also high-ranking religious leaders who have played and still play an important role in the peace process. I have always experienced the interviewees as open-minded, reflective, critical and happy about somebody showing an interest in the situation in northern Uganda. My questionnaire was expanded in the course of research, adapted to interview partners and situations, and thus was applied very flexible. Four NGOs made it possible for me to experience the implementation of peace-building measures such as peace training, training programmes and the resolution of land conflicts. Further NGOs that are active in research towards the conflict resolution provided me with additional scientific papers, literature, brochures and quantitative data.

⁸ Insight Conflict. <http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/uganda/peace-building-organizations/> and Uganda Directory. <http://www.ugandangodirectory.org/> Accessed 09.02.2012

For the data analysis I chose the approach of the grounded theory supported by Atlas.ti, a computer-assisted workbench for qualitative analysis. Due to the rainy season in Gulu it was not always easy to comply with the arranged meetings, and regular power blackouts often left me without a battery for the transcription and evaluation of the data. Nevertheless I was lucky to be able to live together with a family who patiently answered all of my questions and provided me with background information about the Acholi culture, traditions, the political situation, as well as many informal talks about their experiences during and after the time of conflict.

1.3 Structure

In chapter two the concept of human security, its origins and development within the UN is discussed. The focus lies on the development of the human security approach within the UN, because proponents within the organization have contributed extensively to its design. Further the UN conceptions function as a reference point for the discussion about the extent to which the analysed initiatives can contribute to human security. Even if human security has not yet found its final place within the organization, whether as a result of conceptual confusion, difficulty of operationalization or institutional constraints, influential impetus has come from the UN. Additionally, to the UN's approach, a few selected discussions on the current scientific discourse concerning human security will be presented in order to give a small overview. Further, I will explain the added value of the concept for my particular research question. On the basis of human security and other relevant concepts such as peace building, transitional justice and constructivism, I will select theoretical aspects and research criteria that are reviewed methodically based on the case study. Subsequently, in chapter three research indicators are specified and methods to pursue the issue raised by the research question with special regard to the field research of this study are introduced. Chapter four gives a shortened representation of the causes of conflict, information about the political problems or relevant historical developments that the reader will need to understand the further investigation. Chapter five covers the empirical findings. In a first step, the main challenges that people are dealing with after having gone through a long period of conflict and the connections between the different dimensions are analysed. The initiatives of the GoU and local initiatives by religious and cultural leaders, as well as NGOs are discussed. Chapter six ends with a conclusion that sums up the most relevant findings in relation to the research question.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Origins of Human Security

“In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons - it is a concern with human life and dignity.”⁹

Theoretical schools emerge in a particular historical context that determines their strengths and weaknesses and reflects the experiences of a particular period. This also applies to human security. The changing international landscape following the end of the Cold War, created space for new emerging concepts concerning international relations that challenged, redefined or broadened the existing dominant way of thinking. After 1989 the international community experienced a transition (mainly within the UN) from state security, with its main determinants sovereignty and territorial integrity, to wider concepts such as comprehensive and human security. Reasons for this transition can be found in the decline of inter-state conflicts and the simultaneous rise of armed intrastate conflicts, newly (perceived) transnational and non-traditional threats such as terrorism or climate change, the economic rise of some regions and the simultaneously enlarging distances to other countries, growing inequalities, as well as globalization trends that required alternative views on international politics regarding decision-making.

The Human Development Report "New Dimensions of Human Security" published in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme (hereafter the report), is generally considered a milestone of human security. It states that it moves away from nuclear security thinking thereby challenging exclusive territorial security and illusive security attained through weapons to an integrative concept of human security. Therefore the report names four essential characteristics of human security. First, human security is a universal concern since there are sources of uncertainty in daily life, which can affect all people in this world, no matter where they live. Furthermore, the different components that comprise human security can be seen as interdependent.¹⁰ This does not mean an intertwining between the different

⁹ Human Development Report 1994: 22.

¹⁰ Human Development Report 1994: 22.

dimensions of human security, but instead describes how uncertainties in one region can affect another and, respectively, the entire globe. In the case under discussion one can think about the consequences following the displacement of civilians or the LRA rebels into South Sudan, the DRC or the CAR. The problems that arise from such movements show that events cannot be treated in isolation within the borders of a nation state. A move in this direction is the annual Global Risk Report of the World Economic Forum that was first published in 2007. It aims to improve the understanding of the interdependencies of global risks and causes in an integrated "risk management approach" through the identification of key risks and the measurement of costs and probabilities based on quantitative data.¹¹ This example illustrates how trade-offs are analysed along different dimensions of human security. The third characteristic of the UNDP report emphasises that human security is easier to ensure through early prevention. Finally, it is important that human security is centred along the human dimension: the freedoms that people enjoy individual fulfilment, the array of decision-making possibilities and many more. All of this relates to human security.¹²

The report offers two main aspects of human security for clarification and as an explicit definition: *"(...), first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities."*¹³ Thus, the report introduces a temporal dimension of human security. In addition, the relationship between human security and the development discourse of the UN is addressed. Despite the clear link of human security to human development, they cannot be treated as similar. Human development is defined as a broader concept, which is about enhancing the scope for decision-making of humans while human security deals with humans that can exercise their decisions freely, safely and in a stable environment.¹⁴ Two major components, namely *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*, are being introduced as distinct categories to form a framework for the conceptualization of threats. This concept is somewhat responsible for the *broad* and *narrow* dichotomy introduced in the concept around which much of the scientific discussion turns. The first term generally attributed to the *narrow* school refers mainly to war, violence and their related direct effects on civilians, such as landmine casualties or child soldier recruitment. The political implications are relatively clear: reduction of civilian casualties

¹¹ Howell, Lee, Global Risk Report 2013.

¹² Human Development Report 1994: 22-23.

¹³ Human Development Report 1994: 23.

¹⁴ Human Development Report 1994: 23.

and of direct war or conflict-related burdens on the affected population. The *broad* school generally related to *freedom from want* includes a wide range of non-military threats, complex conflict-related issues as well as non-traditional threats for humans such as environmental degradation or the spread of HIV/AIDS. In this regard, the report states that for most people feelings of insecurity arise mainly from worries of daily life.¹⁵ The report further introduces seven main categories of human security, namely: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; and political security threats. The report thus defines what constitutes human security, which areas are affected by insecurity, pointing to global trends and divides them into non-political and non-military and political or conflictive dimensions. Although the categories can be treated as separate there are various links between them.

Human security was a way to face alterations within the UN that were already underway due to changing international structures and to encounter them on a conceptual basis and frame them accordingly. For Keith Krause, the UN human security discourse was a lens, a way of describing or framing what they were doing that allowed a number of disparate policy initiatives to be linked, and to be given greater coherence.¹⁶ Krause defines human security as a point of view and as a possibility to integrate multidisciplinary perspectives on different aspects of security. But the real achievement of human security should lie in the fact that the envisaged change of perspective manifests itself and brings about tangible improvements to the people. The report thus defines human security as a goal and hence contains political instructions and ways to actively address issues of global insecurity. The real novelty was that individuals and groups of individuals are not only the central referent of security, but also key to attain international security.

2.2 Development of the Concept and Discourse within the UN

In 1999 the Human Security Network (HSN) was formed. The group is composed of foreign ministers coming from 13 countries. The network seeks to promote and mainstream the concept of human security in national and international policies. HSN members include Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Slovenia,

¹⁵ Human Development Report 1994: 22.

¹⁶ Keith Krause 1994: 43-46.

Switzerland and Thailand, with South Africa as an observer.¹⁷ 1999 was also the year of the established UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) with an original contribution of an estimated \$5 million. Funds under the UNTFHS are entitled to the entire globe, but activities are primarily concerned with the global South, or speaking generally, developing countries. The last of the four projects for Uganda was for example the “Northern Uganda early recovery project” which started in 2009 and ended in 2012 with a budget of \$3,914,193.80. Under the implementing agencies, namely UNDP, WFP and WHO, the project aimed to support the rapid and self-sustainable recovery of the conflict-affected, returning the population to their respective communities through integrated service delivery and community-based recovery in four districts in the Lango Sub-region.¹⁸

In the course of the Millennium Summit a report entitled “We the peoples. The role of the United Nations in the 21st century”, reflecting on the role of the UN, was published in 2001 by the then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan. The report maintains the differentiation between the two thematic blocks *Freedom from want* and *Freedom from fear* without analysing the relationship between the two spheres. The text keeps referring to the importance of a new security perspective and a ‘people-centred’ approach, but there is no single explicit reference to human security as a strategic narrative. Human security is specifically mentioned only once in the *Freedom from fear* paragraph with reference to the human security principle of prevention.¹⁹

In response to the World Summit Outcome and the call to implement *Freedom from want* and *Freedom from fear*, the Commission on Human Security (CHS) was founded in 2001 on the initiative of the Japanese Government.²⁰ The Commission consists of twelve prominent figures, including Sadako Ogata (Scholar-in-Residence, the Ford Foundation, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Professor Amartya Sen (Master, Trinity College, Cambridge, Nobel Prize winner in 1998) and Lakhdar Brahimi (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan and UN Under-Secretary General). On May 2003, the

¹⁷ OCHA 2009.

<https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/HumanSecurityUnit/Outreach/Uganda/067/Beneficiary%20story%20-%20067-Uganda.pdf> Accessed 09.02.2014.

¹⁸ OCHA 2009.

<https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/HumanSecurityUnit/Outreach/Uganda/067/Beneficiary%20story%20-%20067-Uganda.pdf> Accessed 09.02.2014.

¹⁹ Annan K. 2000: 46.

²⁰ OCHA. <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/about-human-security/human-security-un>. Accessed 09.02.2014.

Commission presented its final report "Human Security Now" (hereafter the Commission's report), which introduced a new and much quoted definition:

“(T)o protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”²¹

The importance and extent of the term ‘vital core’ is a much-discussed topic within the human security discourse. The Commission refers to a set of fundamental rights and freedoms that people enjoy. What is central, the essence of life and particularly important differs between individuals and societies.²² Sabina Alkire, director of the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) proposes a working definition of human security: *the objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment*. Safeguard refers to the protection of people, as they are threatened by events beyond their control. The international community must ensure that their actions do not, even if unintentionally, threaten the safety of the people.²³ For her the ‘vital core’ is not meant to be precise either. It indicates a minimal or basic or fundamental set of functions related to survival, livelihood and dignity that can be informed by medical or psychological research, as well as by consensus and awareness of threats. The term ‘vital core’ is an advantage for human security that aims to connect a number of concepts, because it is not yet claimed by any other approach. Human security gains coherence when the realms that are to be protect are identified and specified, based on the affected peoples conceptions. The identification of what constitutes the vital core promotes effective human security responses. It is the ‘vital core’ that must be protected. Institutions that are there to protect human security will not be able to promote every aspect of human well-being, but at least they need to protect this core of people's lives.²⁴

The Commission's report re-clarifies the complementary relationship of human security and

²¹ Commission on Human Security 2003: 4.

²² Commission on Human Security 2003: 5.

²³ Alkire 2003: 2-3.

²⁴ Alkire 2003: 24-26.

state security, human development and human rights, as well as the connection of the dimensions *freedom from want*, *freedom from fear* und *freedom to take action on one's own behalf*. Additionally the link between protection and empowerment is further elaborated. The empowerment component reminds us of Amartya Sen's own work such as his capability approach. Also new are the "downside risks", namely long-term costs of endemic human insecurity. Because the report and its implication are of particular importance, it will be analysed further in relation to the research subject.

In 2004 the Human Security Unit (HSU) was established under the United Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The aim was to mainstream human security in UN activities. The network engages and cooperates with different stakeholders. Together they seek to demonstrate the added value of the human security concept throughout the UNTFHS and other related activities.²⁵ In the same year, the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility" was published. However, the focus of this report is on the term "Comprehensive Collective Security". Human security is used in subchapters only. Kofi Annan's terminal proposal in 2005 for reform of the UN, published in the report entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all", uses the three components *freedom from fear*, *freedom from want*, and *freedom to live in dignity* as the main thematic principles, without specific reference to the concept of human security.²⁶ However, under item 143 of the draft resolution that was adopted by the General Assembly, there is one paragraph devoted to human security that reaffirms the basic freedoms with a commitment to further discuss and define the notion of human security in the General Assembly.²⁷

The first report (A/64/701) of the Secretary-General as the follow-up, and in accordance with paragraph 143 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome that was published in March 2010, marks an important step forward for human security. A few important remarks about its content should be mentioned. A government's main role is to ensure the survival, livelihood and dignity of its citizens. Human security is a valuable tool, or a means to help Governments to identify properly and systematically critical and widespread threats that threaten the well-being of its citizens and thus, through adequate response policies, simultaneously strengthen the stability of their own sovereignty. For the UN, a human security perspective improves

²⁵ OCHA. <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/about-human-security/human-security-un> Accessed 09.02.2014

²⁶ OCHA. <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/about-human-security/human-security-un> Accessed 09.02.2014

²⁷ General Assembly (A/RES/60/1) 2005.

programmes and policies in such a way that emerging threats can be countered with the right actions by setting priorities and by identification of the most urgent problems. If the causes of the problems are identified appropriately, the relevance of formulated policies response can be increased. Human security can help to ensure that resources are used more effectively by developing appropriate strategies.²⁸ Finding the right policy answer to uncertainties and threats should in turn, improve the partnership between a government and its citizens. This perspective involves strengthening the government by tapping into local capacities and thereby improving its own worth and therefore national security. In this regard, human security acts as a perfect partner for governments. In addition to governments, a wide range of actors from across the United Nations system, as well as the private and public sectors at the local, national, regional and international levels, should be included and participate in human security activities in a way that synergies and partnerships can be established.

As far as the relationship between human security and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is concerned, the follow-up report states, that the principles are separate from each other. The use of violence is not being considered in the application of the human security concept. Human security focuses on Governments, local capacity and strengthening these. R2P focuses on the protection of people, in specific cases, such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The international community is urged to avoid the escalation of such cases and contain them. In contrast, principles and approaches of human security are about the entire width of threats and about understanding how particular constellations of threats to individuals and communities result in domestic and inter-state security gaps.²⁹ Interestingly both concepts share the principle of prevention. To keep these principles separate clearly relates to the narrow definition of R2P that was adopted by the General Assembly that focuses on the *Responsibility to React* and does not share the wider concept of R2P developed by the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS) that includes a strong focus on a *Responsibility to Prevent* and a *Responsibility to Rebuild*. If the UN adopted a wider definition of R2P there would be a clear relationship with human security.

Despite that fact there is a lively discussion about human security and humanitarian interventions within the scientific debate. The most important aspects thereby concern human security and issues regarding the use of force, the hierarchy of humanitarian objectives,

²⁸ Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/701) 2010: 1.

²⁹ Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/701) 2010: 6-8.

international norms, sovereignty and the principle of ‘non-intervention’. The discussion revolves around when an intervention is legitimate, at what civil cost, and what kind of collateral damage is compatible with the principles of human security. If human security imperatives deal with humanitarian interventions, normative concerns do occur. Fen Osler Hampson locates the profound implications of emerging human security standards in such ethical discussions. According to Hampson, the investigation of tensions between different conceptions and priorities of the human security agenda, structures the field in itself.³⁰

While the year 2011 is characterized by informal debates and a panel discussion on human security, the second report of the Secretary-General on Human Security (A/66/763) was published in April 2012. The main thrust of the report is that the embedding of a human security definition in a legal framework is considered to be counter-productive since the term is applied operational as well as a political framework. The Member States perceive the human security approach, in addition to post-conflict peace building and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), as particularly relevant in the discussion about the impact and associated uncertainties of climate change.³¹

2012 was also the year in which the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 66/290 entitled "Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome". The document marks an important step forward, since Member States agreed on a common understanding of human security for the first time, which is equivalent to the previous reports of the Secretary-General. This consensus strengthens the hope that it gives a push to formally applying human security within the efforts of the UN. The year 2013 has brought about numerous meetings on human security. For example, in May 2013, ‘World leaders’ met in the Economic and Social Council of the UN in New York for a high-level event *“to reflect on the added value and the learning process of the implementation of the human security approach, as well as to consider the future of the integration of human security into the work of the UN.”*³²

³⁰ Hampson 2008: 235.

³¹ Report of the Secretary-General: (A/66/763) 2012: 4-11.

³² OCHA. <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/about-human-security/human-security-un> Accessed 09.02.2014

2.3 The Analytical Framework - Theoretical Integration and Research Criteria

The report of the Human Security Commission “Human Security Now” functions as the main theoretical background underlying this thesis, because it borrows heavily from its understanding of human security in theory and in practice. It structures the theoretical assumptions and investigation criteria developed. Nevertheless adaptations are made in several instances. The Commission’s report selects a few topics to explore human security. I will focus on Chapter one “Human Security Now” and Chapter four “Recovering from Violent Conflict”. My particular field study shall serve as an input to the call for responses, adaption of institutions and answers for situations, where people recover from conflict as envisaged by the Commission’s report. In Uganda it is difficult to define a clear starting point for the post-conflict phase, especially the recovery, because rebel leader Joseph Kony ultimately did not sign the negotiated peace agreement. Nevertheless, fighting stopped around the year 2006 and an unstable peace came into existence. Although a formal peace was established between the warring parties the community was barely at peace, facing multidimensional challenges.

While states maintain their role as main providers of security, the Commission’s report acknowledges that states can fail in fulfilling their security obligations. Because national security is not sufficient to guarantee people’s freedoms and rights it needs to be complemented by human security. The two aspects can be seen as mutually dependent. Human security is the goal while state security is instrumental in achieving this goal and vice versa.³³

The relationship between human development and human security is further elaborated. Human security requires a focus on what is called “downturns with security”. Ghobarah, Huth and Russett give an example in their research of what “downturns with security” imply. They combine the long-term health effects of civil war with transnational WHO statistics. The immediate, direct damages are known, but Ghobarah and his colleagues show the delayed effects and their mechanisms of civil war on health issues.³⁴ With regard to the Ugandan situation under discussion, it means that human security focuses on what needs to be done before development can take off and does not focus on what human development calls “expansion with equity“ which is concerned primarily with progress and augmentation. In

³³ Commission on Human Security: 2003: 2-6

³⁴ Ghobarah/ Huth/ Russett 2003: 189-202.

contrasting to development, which generally targets a larger group of people under the same umbrella, adopting a focus on the individual level can point for example to discriminatory practices within a society, community or a household that would otherwise be ignored.³⁵ This distinction seems clear on t paper, but in reality the two spheres are sometimes blurred and in a positive way they are mutually reinforcing.

International assistance is crucial for conflict recovery. If residual conflicts at the individual or community level are not tackled, there will be no stable peace at regional or national level. The Commission's report identifies several gaps in the post-conflict phase, but not all of them are being addressed here. With regard to governance gaps, it is criticised that peace building is seen as a "top-down" process that is commonly led and imposed by outside actors rather than as a process to be owned by national institutions and people. It states that only little attention goes to building national, local civil society and communities, drawing on their capacities and expertise. Likewise reconciliation efforts pay too little attention to the coexistence of divided communities and the building of trust.³⁶

Edward Newman, who introduces a human security peace building agenda, offers a similar critic. The fact that the liberal peace paradigm, which is currently structuring practice-oriented peace building measures by the international community displays a certain conformity with the neoliberal paradigm, has several problematic aspects. It is state-centred in a sense that the building of institutions and state structures is enhanced. This rests upon the liberal institutionalist perception that the major problem of unstable countries or regions is that there are no regulating and effective institutions in place. The political sphere is thereby characterised by the discourse on democracy and good governance and economic development is guided by market-oriented reforms.³⁷ The problems associated with ill-timed elections or market liberalizations in instable countries following a conflict are well-known and documented. That is not to say that aspects of state building, democracy promotion or open market reforms cannot contribute to stability and development, but they should not be the sole benchmark and primary goal of peace building efforts. Apart from questioning the appropriateness of current state-building, democracy and marked oriented approaches, Newman calls into question the sustainability of peace building projects due to the absence of 'local ownership', 'bottom-up' strategies and the existing focus on reconstruction and stability

³⁵ Commission on Human Security 2003: 8-10.

³⁶ Commission on Human Security 2003: 59.

³⁷ Newman 2010: 1742-1743.

without addressing root causes.³⁸ To avoid a peace building approach that fails to take the welfare needs of the local population as well as indigenous traditional institutions into account Newman describes why and how a human security perspective can provide a remedy.³⁹ A human security approach does not look at peace building as "securitization". This means that weak or failing states are not seen as a threat to international security only, but primarily as a threat to the affected people. From a human security perspective, the primary target of public policy should be improving the personal safety, welfare and dignity of individuals and communities. Individuals and vulnerable populations form the central reference point for the analysis and local dimensions of the conflict are in the foreground instead of international and institutional approaches. A human security approach does not rely on preconceived, institutional structures (government, democracy, market) as ultimate goals, but as a means to protect the public. This repositioning has far-reaching implications for the assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation of post-conflict initiatives.⁴⁰ A peace building approach with regard to local needs and conditions provides power to act for individuals, since they are not only referents of security, but ultimately providers of security. Besides providing for security and material goods, the importance of social integration, trust building, reconciliation and coexistence are areas where individuals and communities can take up an important and more active part in peace building. These processes are identified as important, but unfortunately neglected parts of peace building are of special interest to me. The examples addressed in this paper will help to fill the gaps identified by the Commission's report and criticism of top-down peace building.

Returning back to the Commission's report, five key human security clusters that should follow violent conflict, namely: public safety, humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, reconciliation and coexistence as well as governance and empowerment, can be identified.⁴¹ The areas of interest for the Ugandan post-conflict phase in this study are therefore first and foremost reconciliation, coexistence and empowerment but also elements of public safety as well as certain aspects of rehabilitation and reconstruction as envisaged by the Commission. Under the headline reconciliation and coexistence the Commission subsumes justice mechanisms such as setting up tribunals, the involvement of traditional

³⁸ The term 'root causes' is always a problematic expression because their assessment can vary greatly depending on who is identifying them. A neutral assessment of root cause is indeed a difficult task to undertake and requires the consultation of a great range of people. Although I will address some historic events to point out causes for the LRA conflict and the post-conflict situation it must be clear that this is only a selection.

³⁹ Newman 2010: 1747-1748.

⁴⁰ Newman 2010: 1751.

⁴¹ Commission on Human Security 2003: 59-60.

justice processes, truth commissions as well as the promotion of forgiveness and the restoration of dignity for victims. It calls for amnesties, including immunity from prosecution for lesser crimes, reparation for victims, and in the social sphere, the promotion of coexistence and the encouragement of community-based initiatives in the long term, thereby rebuilding social capital.⁴²

In the wake of the conflict about 1.8 million people have been internally displaced and put in camps and about 60.000 children have been abducted. With regard to public safety the focus therefore lies on a smooth reintegration of people that are returning to the community as well as on disarmament and demobilization of combatants. Public safety can be threatened by smaller inter-personal conflicts that occur in the aftermath of a bigger conflict. For people to move freely and secure the removal of small arms, light weapons and landmines from conflict areas is another critical step.⁴³ In the area of rehabilitation and reconstruction it is the integration of conflict-affected people that is primarily of interest.

Going back to the seven dimensions identified by the HDR report, we are mainly dealing with aspects of personal security, community security, health security, as well as community security. Personal security thereby deals with security from physical violence at all levels. In Uganda we deal with a variety of violent threats from armed rebel groups, the state, or threats directed against women and children based on their vulnerability and dependence. Equally, threats to oneself that occur when people are hopeless can also play a role. In this section the focus is on threats against women and children due to their vulnerability. With respect to community security the report states: that “...most people derive security from their membership in a group - a family, a community, an organization, a racial or ethnic group that can provide a cultural identity and a reassuring set of values.” The problem of ethnic tensions in Uganda exists on a national scale, but looking at the post-conflict situation and especially at the Acholi society that is at the centre of the study, we are basically dealing with war-related disruption of the social fabric, cultural norms and systems that guide society. In northern Uganda there are several interesting initiatives that deal with these issues. Health security focuses in particular on conflict related issues, such as landmine victims or mental health issues. Economic security is about basic income, usually from productive and remunerative work, or as a last resort from some publicly financed safety net.⁴⁴

⁴² Commission on Human Security 2003: 60.

⁴³ Commission on Human Security 2003: 61-62.

⁴⁴ Human Development Report 1994: 25-32.

Human security always requires a comprehensive and context-specific approach.⁴⁵ For us to understand why certain aspects related to violent conflict are given priority in this study the major threats and their interconnectedness will first have to be identified. As we understand the many challenges the population at risk are dealing with, and the relationship between them, it becomes clearer why I have selected the discussed subset of answers. These answers will in turn focus on initiatives and policy responses that follow the imperative of the Commission's report to empower people in a way that enhances their capabilities so that they can act on their own behalf and contribute to development as an integral part. Empowerment is associated with the ability of people to act on their own behalf and on behalf of others.⁴⁶ In the scientific literature the empowerment framework entails many spheres that need to be addressed for empowerment to occur. Because human security is policy-oriented strengthening people's ability to act as individuals or as part of a community with common goals is a key component. According to the vision of the Commission, empowerment cannot occur in the absence of governance. People's participation in decision-making from the local to the national level through efficient and transparent institutions is critical.⁴⁷ But political reforms, the establishment of a public space, as well as democratic institutions that uphold the rule of law, is neither the focus of the GoU nor of this paper. Instead the question as to when does empowerment occur is directed solely to peace and confidence-building strategies that are not directly related to governance issues and focus mainly on empowerment that occurs through the work of the civil society, participation, accountability, access to information and capacity-building.⁴⁸

Looking at the research questions that guide this study, they are not only about identifying peace and confidence-building strategies that contribute to human security, but ultimately about how these are built upon individual or community-based capacities and efforts. Those that are directly affected by insecurity must play their part in the recovering process through active participation. Not only because the ones dealing with problems know best how to address them, but also because human security starts from the recognition that people are the most active participants in determining their own wellbeing.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Human Security Unit 2009: 7-8.

⁴⁶ Commission on Human Security 2003: 11.

⁴⁷ Commission on Human Security 2003: 68.

⁴⁸ Commission on Human Security 2003: 60.

⁴⁹ Commission on Human Security 2003: 4.

“The primary question of every human security activity should not be: What can we do? It should be: How does this activity build on the efforts and capabilities of those directly affected?”⁵⁰

That is based on the underlying assumption that the tapping of local capacities and resources of the affected communities, including those that have contributed to address uncertainties in the past, can make an important contribution to a lasting peace. The strength of the approach consists of a dual policy framework, which is based on the mutually reinforcing pillars of protection and empowerment.⁵¹ It is important to complement top-down initiatives with a focus on bottom-up, thus creating synergies that strengthen at best the social contract between the government and its citizens. The active protection of people in connection with empowerment serves as conflict prevention.⁵² This has many reasons: the inclusion of formerly excluded parts of society, bringing diverse constituents together to rebuild their communities which can in itself solve security problems, people empowered can demand respect for their dignity when it is violated.⁵³ Therefore the local community must play an integral part, not only by identifying what is a source of insecurity and what needs to be done, but also be part of the implementation process. As this thesis will show, the local population or respectively the civil society is being very active in the post-conflict recovery. What now remains to be identified is when this bottom-up approach can complement top-down initiatives and enhance human security. Looking at examples from Uganda can contribute to the question when emancipation and empowerment occur.

2.4 Integration of Other Relevant Theoretical Approaches

2.4.1 Human Security and Constructivism

For individuals and communities to become an integral and active part in peace building, their views, norms and values related to history, experiences and the socio-cultural milieu have to be taken into account. To analyse these aspects, a constructivist approach can be useful. Constructivism, informed by sociological approaches and critical theory, holds that the world is constituted socially through inter-subjective interactions; that agents and structures are mutually constituted; and that ideational factors such as norms, identity and ideas generally

⁵⁰ Commission on Human Security 2003: 12

⁵¹ Human Security Unit 2009: 29-30.

⁵² Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/701) 2010: 8.

⁵³ Examples are drawn from the Commission on Human Security 2003: 5-11.

constitute what we consider reality. It is less a comprehensive theory, then a broader social theory that than informs how we might approach the subject e.g. the study of security.⁵⁴ Constructivists assume that the real place of our world is the consciousness of the actors. Structures are defined by the social behaviour of actors and normative rules that are in turn given to them by the actors, as well as by the discourses in which they communicate about contents and notions. Structures exist through the practice of actors. At the same time, behaviour is influenced by specific norms and values that arise in the context of the social and institutional conditions.⁵⁵

Relevant for a human security peace building agenda and especially the field of social reconstruction and reconciliation considered as a period of structural change, are questions of social and cultural identity formation and the importance of related collective norms and rules. As we assume that the social fabric of the Ugandan population has been crippled by conflict and insecurity, it becomes clear why the tapping of what some call “indigenous“ practices or aspects of religious peace building are so important. Not only does the involvement of the views of those affected inform peace building practices and gives them a meaningful dimension with respect to the local context, but also the inclusion of local wisdom serves as the empowerment that a human security approach requires. As mentioned earlier, the cultural fabric of the Acholi people has been disrupted due to a long period of civil war, but one must not forget that aspects of “modernization” also have their part to play in the changing cultural context that can give, for example, rise to individualism or the diminishing respect for elders. In order to foster peace building, it makes sense to include traditional and religious approaches to peace building that are vested in local norms and religious and cultural values. This in turn can help to include a large segment of the population and thereby strengthen collectively held norms and bonds between community members.

Consistent with human security, this means placing individual experiences at the forefront as well as understanding social structures, such as inequality, discrimination or under-development. The analysis starts from a broad conception of human security that takes into consideration the individual situated in broader social structures. It involves, as Earl Conteh-Morgan puts it, an attempt to understand human security/insecurity in terms of those who experience them. Conteh-Morgan, one of the very few authors who analyse the linkages between constructivism, human security and peace building in a post-war societies stresses

⁵⁴ Matt McDonald 2008: 59-60.

⁵⁵ Lemke 2000: 43.

that peace builders must delve into the normative, ideational, and intersubjective beliefs that constructed the interests and identities of key actors during the civil war in order to achieve sustained peace and human security following a brutal civil war.⁵⁶

Constructivist investigation criteria, such as values, norms or cultural aspects, also play an important role when looking into different perceptions of human security or issues of what constitutes a threat for a specific group of people. The 1994 UNDP report, as well as the Commission's report, reaffirm that not only does the individual matter, but equally important are individual conceptions about what security means to them. There is a common understanding of human security that includes a very broad definition, but this does not mean that threats to human security are equally perceived. Human security and constructivism shares basic questions in how far threats to human security are constructed or dependent on material and non-material values. Conceptions of who we are and what values encourage particular ways of thinking about where threats to those values might come from, what form they might take and how they might be dealt with are also important.⁵⁷ Starting from a constructivist perspective this means understanding cultural and social complexities so that one can grasp especially the non-material threats that threaten personal and community security. My research is not primarily concerned with how perceptions of human security/insecurity are constructed, but the interviews specifically asked what people perceive as the major challenge for the affected population, to make space for individual conceptions.

Research on human security will in the future increasingly investigate what role cultural aspects, and thus measures and strategies to change social behaviours that could be in the way of the realization of human security, play.⁵⁸ A step in this direction is the article "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Understanding Human Security" by Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris published in 2012, which deals with the far under-represented question "how ordinary people perceive risks". They used the data from the World Values Survey that was already available at the time of analysis and differentiates between national security, community security and personal security. They promote the thesis that those perceptions of human security entail important cultural implications.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Conteh-Morgan 2005:70-73.

⁵⁷ McDonald 2008: 64.

⁵⁸ Hampson 2008: 240.

⁵⁹ Inglehart/ Norris 2012: 73.

2.4.2 Transitional Justice: Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence

While reintegration and rehabilitation are assumed to be a little-researched and relatively theory-free field, reconciliation and coexistence efforts can be subsumed under the various instruments of transitional justice.⁶⁰ Transitional justice refers to a period of transition, from violent conflict to achieving a peaceful society without grievances, distrust and vengeance, often with a democracy-promotion context. Because deep-seated psychological wounds remain after the conflict formally ended, these issues need to be addressed so that a stable order can be reached and a relapse into conflict can be prevented. Therefore peace building, human security and transitional justice are intrinsically linked.⁶¹ To attain some sort of stability and peace that is more than the mere absence of war, transitional justice mechanisms include judicial and non-judicial measures. The former term can be associated with what is called retributive justice, which can be associated with proportionate punishment following established rules and norms as an appropriate response to crimes. In this sense, the perpetrator has to “pay” for his violation of the law. Restorative justice, conversely, is a process of active participation in which the wider community deliberates over past crimes, giving centre stage to both victim and perpetrator in a process that seeks to bestow dignity and empowerment upon the victim, with special emphasis placed upon contextual factors.⁶²

Transitional justice holds the premise that unaddressed legacies hamper the potential of a society to achieve development and security goals. Undergoing judicial procedures that deal with human rights abuses in turn can help to deal with the conflictive past, in a material as well as a non-material way. Nowadays most peace agreements, as well as post-conflict strategies include references to justice and reconciliation.⁶³ Transitional justice has many components that function best as a holistic approach. There exists a broad range of options regarding “coming to terms with the past” and building trust. Situations are unique and each society has different ways of achieving justice and reconciliation.⁶⁴ Therefore I will focus on

⁶⁰ That is not to say that there is no relationship between DDR programmes and transitional justice. Due to limitations, the relationship between them is not further addressed here. For further information see: Ana Patel published a chapter entitled “DDR and Transitional Justice” in the book *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War* (Routledge, 2008), and Pablo de Greiff published the chapter “DDR and Reparations: Establishing Links Between Peace and Justice” in *Building a Future on Peace and Justice* (Springer, 2009). Most recently, ICTJ worked with the UN DPKO to develop a module for the UN’s Integrated DDR Standards on transitional justice, which was published in 2009. Information form: <http://ictj.org/our-work/research/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration>. Accessed 09.02.2014.

⁶¹ Hutchison/Bleiker 2013: 81.

⁶² Dinnen 1997: 245-262.

⁶³ Commission on Human Security 2003: 65.

⁶⁴ Commission on Human Security 2003: 65.

the aspects, such as the ICC, the Amnesty Act, reparations, and different traditional and/or religious justice mechanisms that operate outside formal procedures. Focusing on establishing the truth of what has happened, securing justice for the victims, dealing with the perpetrators or reaching an agreement on the extent of reparations, all these are important aspects to enhance trust, confidence that lead to reconciliation and strengthen community security. Nevertheless, despite the positive view of transitional justice measures in contributing to a better future, each of the aspects under discussion are seen as critical. For example, many people see the ICC indictments and the following investigations rather as an obstacle than a means for peace. Equally, it is not wise to romanticize traditional or “indigenous” approaches to justice, but instead focus on when and where they can promote justice and thereby contribute to human security. The human security focus will help to examine not only large-scale improvements, but also gains and losses on an individual scale.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Indicators

The analysis of the described set of criteria representing the theoretical concept requires qualitative indicators. To measure the contributions of the selected peace building strategies that improves human security in a way that empowers people means first describing the status quo. Besides identifying challenges that people are facing in the aftermath of the conflict, whereby the focus lies on personal and community security threats, strategies that are targeting this threats need to be described before they can be analysed. What is being done by the GoU, the international community and most important the civil-society through local bottom-up approaches? Later improvements can be identified and compared to the desired state. It must be clear that most of the indicators mentioned below can never be measured in absolute terms and are partially informed by personal views that were expressed in the interviews conducted.

Now, what does this mean for reconciliation, justice and coexistence? Following the imperatives of the Commission, this means that the psychological wounds of people have been healed and the dignity of victims as well as communities has been restored.⁶⁵ People can live without vengeance because the right way of dealing with perpetrators has been found and implemented. Former child soldiers that perpetrated crimes are welcomed back into their families and are able to live a life without stigmatization in their respective communities. The community in turn accepts that they were forced into soldiering and learns not to fear, but to forgive them. People are able to resolve conflicts within their communities peacefully, especially when it comes to land conflicts. This process is undertaken and supported by adequate actors that help to create dialogue and understanding. A justice system is in place that is accepted by the communities based on their values and ideas of justice. Attitudes towards peace and social reconstruction are positive. Population-based surveys on these issues can help to identify some trends. Further, the Government has acknowledged its failures, asked for forgiveness and introduced appropriate ways to compensate people.

To measure public safety, meaning that people are able to move about freely, qualitative data

⁶⁵ Commission on Human Security 2003: 60.

can be more easily complemented by quantitative statistics, namely: how many people have been disarmed and demobilized and how many areas are declared land mine free. Public safety means that people can return home without fear, that they are not threatened by inter-personal conflicts and that they are able to cultivate their land without being harmed by war remnants. Former (child) soldiers were able to catch up on education and have found other ways to create an income. Employment opportunities are created so that people do not have to resort to crime or wish to join the rebel forces.⁶⁶

In the area of rehabilitation and reconstruction, the Commission's report puts the emphasis on the provision of key services, the rebuilding of infrastructure and the reintegration of returning refugees and demobilized combatants.⁶⁷ Not only was infrastructure mostly destroyed during the conflict, additionally the communities missed out on years of development. A sufficient coverage of health facilities that are well-equipped and able to treat prominent diseases and war related-injuries, public schools and universities that are affordable, or simply roads that do not turn into rivers with the next heavy rain, indicate that infrastructure is being rebuilt. It is important that people can see these changes and realize that something is being done for them. The change has to be visible to the individual. Indications of a successful rehabilitation can be found with people that have returned home safely and managed to rebuild their assets. Former child soldiers have received amnesty, gone through reception centres that supervised their reintegration back into the family, received reinsertion packages, performed traditional justice procedures, and are now active parts of the society. For a comprehensive reintegration nobody is left behind. The ones that need special care receive psychosocial support, counselling and follow-up care. Suicide rates as well as HIV/AIDS are low or at least declining. People with disabilities receive artificial limbs and material support. Vulnerable segments of the society like children or elders without a safety net are being supported by other means.

Through all of these stages people are being empowered. The question of how peace-building measures are designed and implemented can help to identify if empowerment occurs. Empowerment here focuses on measurements related to agency - the ability of people to act on their own behalf and on behalf of others.⁶⁸ Empowerment through participation in institutional settings is only relevant with regard to the selected areas of research and not

⁶⁶ Commission on Human Security 2003: 62.

⁶⁷ Commission on Human Security 2003: 64.

⁶⁸ Commission on Human Security 2003: 11.

related to aspects of large-scale political participation. When real freedoms that people enjoy are enhanced, so are their choices. People and communities are empowered when their environment is stable enough to make effective, informed choices, that is, to make choices and then to transform these choices into desired actions and outcomes.⁶⁹ Here empowerment is related to terms such as agency, control, autonomy, self-direction, self-determination, liberation, and self-confidence.⁷⁰ People can be empowered in the process of peace building not only through active protection and improvement of their livelihood by external actors, so that they can make effective choices. Instead they can participate in their own empowerment when they are part of the implementation process. The affected society forms an integral part in determining their well-being. That means that local wisdom and knowledge is included and respected, needs-assessments are being carried out and people are incorporated in project planning and implementation through inclusive approaches.

Returning refugees, internally displaced persons and former child soldiers have to be considered a resource. By emphasizing their economic potential and their role in reconstructing and reconciling, such an approach makes the reintegration in communities and societies as a whole more feasible.⁷¹ Here empowerment is related to terms such as participation, identification, inclusion, information and influence. The last strain of empowerment relates to mobilization. Here empowerment is used to *“characterize approaches based on social mobilization. A key element in most social mobilization approaches is helping poor and socially excluded individuals realize the power they gain from collective action. Often social mobilization approaches work “from below” to create voice and demand for change among diverse groups of poor and socially excluded persons.”*⁷²

3.2 Research Design

*“By reorienting the research focus to life as it is lived by the most insecure in any society (women, the poor, minorities, aboriginal communities), these methodologies can advance research and make for more productive human security policy.”*⁷³

⁶⁹ Alsop/ Heinsohn 2005: 10.

⁷⁰ Narayan-Parker 2005: 3.

⁷¹ Commission on Human Security 2003: 65.

⁷² Bennet 2002: 6.

⁷³ Hampson 2008: 242.

To pay respect to local perspectives and bottom-up elements of peace building, thereby applying a human security perspective, it makes sense to approach the topic by including an empirical research component. Therefore this study will be guided by a case study using existing literature complemented by empirical findings. The systematic processing of the various cases studied does not form the sole basis for writing, but receives a complementary and illustrative function in addition to existing material. Literature on the topic is widely available, although only very few works exist that focus on complementarities between human security and peace building. The starting point of the empirical work is the motivation to fill those gaps that are identified by the Commission on Human Security based on examples from Uganda and thereby makes an important contribution to a little-researched field.

The empirical research follows the “research perspective“ of the grounded theory. The label theory is somewhat misleading, as it is more about the manner of generating a theory and not a theory in itself. The goal is the formation or modification of a theory as close to reality as possible and the reduction of existing theory-practices gaps. Therefore it is necessary to undertake field research in the milieu of the researched subjects. It is a relatively creative, flexible and variable style of research and not a concrete set of methods. *Grounded* refers to the grounding of the developed or modified theory in the empirical data respectively the subject of interests. The systematic grounding of the generated theory-elements by constantly returning and tying them to the data is a special feature and a particular strength of this methodological approach.⁷⁴ The main reason for choosing the grounded theory approach is the flexibility and discovery orientation it brings with it, as well as the applicability of its methods to frame and structure research of “small social worlds“ as well as problems and perceptions of its members though interactive participation of the researcher.⁷⁵ Although a human security approach guides this study, only careful assumptions that structure the field are made in advance. The basic design of the empirical research follows a descriptive orientation only insofar as to illustrate certain concepts. The empirical data will help to identify the challenges people are dealing with after having gone through a long period of conflict, the interconnectivity between human security threats as well as ways in which people are trying to solve them. Bottom-up experimental elements of peace building are one of the least studied, yet crucially important aspects of the subject.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Breuer 2009: 53.

⁷⁵ Breuer 1996. Cited by Breuer 2009: 39.

⁷⁶ Mac Ginty 2013: 7.

In the elicitation and analysis phase, a triangulation of methods was used. Elicitation methods are problem-focused/centred interviews, which were levied on the basis of a flexible questionnaire, which is structured along thematic priorities.⁷⁷ Furthermore semi-open, but actively designed expert interviews were employed. These interview forms have both an explorative-systematizing, and a theory-generating function. Participant observation acted as the third survey method. The observation was largely unstructured (only rough main categories function as a framework) and always performed as an open, direct observation (explicit occurrence as a researcher). The observation was mainly used to identify the implementation procedure of peace-building measures while the interviews were aimed at identifying the strategies used and their contribution to society.

Data was collected during a five-week stay in Uganda from August to September 2013, mostly in Kampala and Gulu. Interviews were held with several local NGO representatives and employees, religious and cultural leaders, while the research was further informed by more informal talks. In accordance with the motto “all is data”⁷⁸ material beyond textbooks and scientific papers such as field notes, memos, literary genres, media, movies, photos and diaries influenced the research as well. The data analysis was carried out in parallel to the data collection informed by *theoretical sampling*. This means selecting new “material” according to the criterion where new insights can be suspected. New samples are added until a theoretical saturation is reached, which means that no more new information can be obtained.

The basis for this theoretical sampling is the conceptualization of the collected data, called *coding*. It is done in three different stages, namely: open coding or substantive coding, selective coding and theoretical coding, while each of these steps has different goals and reconstruction logics.⁷⁹ Coding means the process of searching adequate terms for the subject matter. Through a back and forth movement between data collection and data analysis, generalized terms (codes, categories) emerge that are further elaborated, put in relation to each other and are further condensed.⁸⁰ By making comparisons between phenomena and contexts, theoretical concepts emerge. The underlying assumption of the coding in the grounded theory is based on the so-called concept-indicator model. Everyday worldly phenomena in the form of empirical data are understood as indicators, as an indication of

⁷⁷ Lamnek 2005: 367.

⁷⁸ Glaser 2001: 145.

⁷⁹ Breuer 2009: 76.

⁸⁰ Breuer 2009: 52.

something more general, more fundamental. In this regard, phenomena or indicators are then the immediate and visible, the general concepts of what lies behind. The latter are included in the data to a certain extent; they are hidden and must be introduced by the methodical and creative activity of the researcher, his heuristic and hermeneutic efforts on the basis of theoretical sensitivity.⁸¹

⁸¹ Breuer 2009: 71.

4. Understanding the Conflict

4.1 Historical Background

Languages of Uganda ⁸²



Analyses of the conflict often start with the British colonial era. While industrial and cash crop production was introduced in the south of Uganda, cheap workers were recruited from the northern areas. With the anti-colonial uprisings around the year 1945 their main driving forces were elitist layers from the south of the country. The British colonial administrations strategy was to recruit soldiers for the army, the *King's African Rifles* (KAR), exclusively from the northern part, to balance power between the southern educated elite and a northern military elite. The institutionalization of the indirect rule

reinforced the sense of belonging of the inhabitants to an ethnic group insofar as the transitions between different "tribes" became less fluent and demarcations between them became stronger. In addition to the north-south division between the southern Bantu-speaking kingdoms and the Nilotic and Sudanese speaking people in the North, there were other subdivisions, such as between Acholi, Langi and the West Nilers. With independence in 1962, there were very different societies within the national territory, while ethnic divisions were continually perpetuated in the course of the struggle for state power. The first Head of State after independence was Milton Obote, from the Langi "tribe". He was the first in a long line who used the military to suspend the Constitution and overthrow the Government, in his case, the King of Buganda. In 1971, Obote was overthrown himself in a coup d'état that was led by his Muslim army commander Idi Amin who came from north-western Uganda. One of Amin's first acts was to murder numerous Langi and Acholi officers, which forced many soldiers into exile. The initial support from the South and his home region soon waned due to his incompetence and brutality. Estimates count up to 1 million citizens that died during his

⁸² Map: Wiki Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Languages_of_Uganda.png Accessed 09.02.2014

reign. In 1978, Amin was overthrown by the *Uganda National Liberation Front* (UNLF) with support from Tanzania. What followed was a short reign by Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa, while a military commission vested the real power in the state. Despite the allegations of massive election fraud, Obote seized power for a second time in 1980. Some, like Yuweri Museveni who had fought against the rule of Amin, were against the seizure of power by Obote. Museveni led a guerrilla campaign in the south and northwest of the country during the 80's. His *National Resistance Army* (NRA) could be sure of support from Museveni's home region in the southwest of the country and the central regions of Uganda, where antipathy against the perceived northern domination was widespread. Massacres were carried out by the mostly, but not exclusively, Acholi and Langi troops of Obote's *Uganda National Liberation Army* (UNLA). An estimated 300,000 people lost their lives during Operation Bonanza in the Luwero triangle from 1981-1985.

These tragic events have affected the efforts of north-south reconciliation until today. In 1985, Obote was overthrown for a second time, by the leading Acholi commanders of UNLA, namely General Olara Okello Bazilio and General Tito Okello Lutwa, with the latter becoming President for a short time. Not long afterwards, a peace agreement with the NRA was signed. Indiscriminate killing of UNLA soldiers, as well as different resentments of Okello allied troops against the peace agreement, resulted in the decision of Museveni and his NRA that only a complete upheaval could result in a chance for peace and he decided to overthrow the government. The invasion of the NRA in Kampala is still a source of deep-rooted resentment among the Acholi, who insist that President Museveni is not a man who can be trusted or has even sought a peaceful reconciliation in the country. With the takeover of the NRA, which was renamed, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), the military power shifted for the first time to the south of the country, much to the dissatisfaction of the Acholi population.⁸³

⁸³ The historical outline based on Doom und Vlassenroot (1999), International Crisis Group (2004), Allen and Vlassenroot (2010), Branch (2010) and my own research in Uganda 2013.

4.2 The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Districts affected by the LRA⁸⁴



Fearing revenge, many Acholi soldiers fled to northern Uganda and Southern Sudan to reorganize there. Museveni soon gained control of the northern territories where segments of his troops began with brutal persecutions and murder of civilians in order to avenge discriminative actions and killings of soldiers under Obote in the Luwero triangle. Together with a power vacuum in the area, this practice in turn created fertile grounds for guerrilla movements to develop. The greatest resistance came from the *Uganda People's Democratic*

Army (UPDA), which was largely composed of former UNLA soldiers. When the UPDA began launching attacks, the conflict spread quickly all over the northern region. It started in Acholi then spread to Lango, later to Teso and some eastern parts of Uganda. Although the UPDA was originally a secular power, spiritual practices began to gain in importance. The growing significance of religious-spiritual practices can partially be explained by the fact that motivation for the fight began to wane and that a new form of justification had to be found opposed to the seemingly senseless violence. The tendency of the religious and spiritually legitimated military power manifested itself for the first time noticeably in the form of Alice Auma Lakwena who founded the *Holy Spirit Movement* that emerged around that time. Alice, whose practice included healing rituals for soldiers or the expulsion of Zen (evil spirits of murdered people) claimed to be possessed by different ghosts or spirits. The relation between Alice and the Holy Spirit Movement to the Christian faith is unclear. In 1987, the insurgent group was defeated near Kampala by the Ugandan army. While the UPDA initially continued the struggle in the north, the majority of the members surrendered in the course of negotiations with the new GoU in 1989. Many former officers that were deposed from power negotiated successfully with the Government and became part of it or were included in the army. While the negotiations were certainly a success and many of the rebels came out of the

⁸⁴Map: Wiki Commons.

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ugandan_districts_affected_by_Lords_Resistance_Army.png
Accessed 09.02.2014

bush, those who were not ready or thought they were actually safer with the rebels ran over to other movements, especially the movement of the charismatic leader Joseph Kony who also claimed various spirits had taken possession of him. Kony had received training as an Awaki healer, a mix of Christian and local ideas, when he was still young. In the beginning he learned guerrilla tactics from the defected commander Odong Latek.

After his death Kony gave the movement its final name: the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Since 1990 the LRA, with its main base in Southern Sudan, is the only significant armed group that is still fighting in the Acholi homeland areas. The size of the LRA cannot clearly be established due to strong fluctuations. An estimate of the year 1997 assumed 3,000-4,000 fighters (other estimates are lower), of which never more than a few hundred were allegedly staying in northern Uganda as the LRA resorted primarily to guerrilla tactics, and fights with the Ugandan army were, apart from big military operations, relatively rare. While people were joining the ranks of the LRA in the very beginning, support soon began to drain as the fighting continued and people began to see them as a source that interfered with the security and peace of the area.⁸⁵

4.3 Political Efforts and Government Responses

Museveni's main tactic was to defeat the LRA by military force, whereby his strategy of deterrence continued to fail in the course of the years of conflict. In an attempt to defeat the LRA through Operation North in 1991, the GoU sent a lot of tanks and soldiers to northern Uganda and declared the entire region as a prohibited zone in a sense that nobody from the rest of Uganda was allowed to cross the river at Karuma. At the same time, people who lived there were allowed to leave the area. In this environment the people suffered tremendously. Both sides killed many people.

*"That was the saddest moment in the lives of our people here. Government soldiers would come to a place and group men and women to sit in another place. In the evening they would send army trucks to ferry the women and their daughters to the barracks where they would be raped the whole night. It was a terrible thing."*⁸⁶

⁸⁵The chapter is influenced by Doom und Vlassenroot (1999), International Crisis Group (2004), Allen and Vlassenroot (2010), Branch (2010) and my own research in Uganda 2013.

⁸⁶ Rt. Rev. Macleod Baker Ochola II, Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative (ARLPI). Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

The population bearing the cost of this war started to strive for peace. One of the Government's tactics was to support the formation of a local militia. Apart from the fact that this militia was poorly equipped compared to the LRA, the fact that this signalled dwindling support for the LRA made Kony furious. The LRA became brutal. Just like Alice once, Kony saw the need to cleanse the Acholi society through violence. He began to systematically torture civilians and resorted to the practice of abducting children into the LRA in order to survive and to create fear and discredit the GoU by showing its leaders that they were incapable of adequately protecting their own people.

With the LRA spreading fear, people were driven from their villages to the main centres seeking refuge. In order to protect citizens and to cut off the LRA support, the GoU actually further aggravated the displacement and ordered people to resettle in refugee camps where the UPDF should guard them. This practice proved to be a fatal decision. The conditions in the refugee camps were catastrophic and the guarding was never sufficient. People were still being attacked, children could be kidnapped from the camps with ease, and particularly women and girls were targeted. Operation North did not succeed mainly due to the difficulties of combating a guerrilla army in the bush with conventional warfare and was highly criticized by human rights organizations for its brutality and heavy-handedness.

In a reversal of strategy, the GoU through Betty Bigombe, an Acholi Minister in Charge of the North, embarked on negotiations with the LRA in 1994.⁸⁷ An unstable ceasefire came into existence, but none of the warring parties trusted each other. The GoU did not believe the rebels would actually come and the rebels did not believe that GoU was really honest. During this tentative progress of peace, Museveni played a visit to northern Uganda and issued an ultimatum to the rebels saying they should lay down their weapons and surrender to the Government's forces within seven days otherwise they would be forced out of the bush. The LRA responded that they did not need a whole week and that the fighting should start right away. Within three days, the LRA started with wanton killings, ambushes on all roads leading out of towns and abducted innocent children. After only three days, Museveni himself resumed the fighting. Instead of listening to Betty Bigombe, the GoU actually made the situation even worse. Because at that time nobody from the outside was allowed to stay in northern Uganda, all these events were almost unknown in the rest of the country.

⁸⁷ Khadiagala/ Lyons 2001: 1.

The LRA went to Sudan and kept returning every year until 1999. From December 1999 up to 2001 they did not come back, which meant relative calm and peace in the villages and even in the IDP camps. In 1998, the GoU adopted the first official Amnesty Law following the 1987 Amnesty Statute. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the LRA had been assigned with the label of ‘terrorists’ under the Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002. In the same year, the offensive ‘Operation Iron Fist’ started with the UPDF taking cross-border action against the LRA bases in southern Sudan. As a result, many soldiers were killed and the LRA returned to northern Uganda committing large-scale atrocities once again. Attempts to restart peace negotiations continued to fail.

In 2004, the GoU referred Kony and his senior officer’s case to the International Criminal Court and arrest warrants were issued. Around July 2006, the GoU started talking to the rebels and in August the GoU and the LRA signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that marked the beginning of the Juba peace talks. The LRA remnants that were still in Uganda were able to leave the country in broad daylight and in front of the eyes of the UPDF who even provided them with water, to go into Southern Sudan and DRC. The initiative for the talks came from Salvar Kirr and his Vice President Rieck Machar who appears to have convinced Museveni, probably because the LRA had become a thorn for them as much as it was for Uganda. The Juba Talks lasted from 2006 to 2008 and were mediated by Machar. At that time Southern Sudan was a self-governing, semi-autonomous, state that was not an ICC member.

When Kony did not sign the final agreement in 2008, the GoU launched ‘Operation Lightning Thunder’ in collaboration with the army of the DRC, South Sudan and support from the U.S. to wipe out the LRA leadership of the LRA once and for all. Kony and his senior commanders again managed to escape before ground troops arrived. The UPDF and its allies were not adequately equipped to defeat Kony and his well-adapted guerrilla force. Instead ‘Operation Lightning Thunder’ set the LRA loose against the people of DRC, CAR and Southern Sudan where they continue to cause atrocities. The fact that no government ever militarily defeated the LRA strengthens their spiritual claims. The GoU pursued a strategy of sticks and carrots, thereby constantly moving back and forth between negotiations and military operations. The latter is partially the result of embarrassment that the GoU felt for being able to defeat an army consisting of children that barely had any military skill. On the other hand, Museveni knows how to play the conflict down and exploit it politically while stalling the international

community. Resentment towards the "northerners" who are discredited, and in some cases, even classified as another category of people are constantly being fuelled. The victims are as always, innocent civilians.⁸⁸

⁸⁸The chapter is influenced by Doom und Vlassenroot (1999), International Crisis Group (2004), Allen and Vlassenroot (2010), Branch (2010) and my own research in Uganda 2013.

5. Empirical Findings

5.1 Major Threats and Challenges

The main challenges identified rely partly on my research in the course of which people were asked: What are the major challenges people are dealing with? The answers to this question are not the sole basis but instead the entire interview content was analysed in relation to human security threats. The biggest challenges with regard to the post-conflict situation are clearly related to community security, health security and to a lesser extent personal and economic security. The analysis shows a strong interconnection between the areas.

5.1.1 Community Security

The loss of cultural values is hard to grasp from an outside point of view but deeply hurts the community. Acholi culture used to be very strong, with many structured social interactions, which guided people's lives, but this has been significantly weakened. There is a lot of desire in the population to go back to everyday life as it was before the war, where there was trust and families were united. But between the past and the present there is a huge gap.

Now, most people are used to life in the camps over many years, sometimes even decades. There is a whole generation of children that grew up in a surrounding that made it nearly impossible for people to follow their traditional way of living. If a community, family or parents are deprived of their natural living conditions because they are forced to live in congested camps, they are not free to practice their culture or religion. That is problematic in a sense that it is them who usually pass on cultural values. This can be through teaching but also through setting an example in the way one lives. To illustrate this, it was common practice for families to build separate huts for men and women. Children who were born in the camps never experienced this form of privacy and when going back to the community and having a family of their own, they might not be able to pass on this tradition if it is unfamiliar to them. Another problem that was mentioned quite often regarded farming, which used to be the main economic activity of the Acholi people. The land in the Acholi region is for the most part very fertile, but when people moved to the camps they could not cultivate their land any more. With people relying on food aid, a dependency syndrome grew as a result.

“(...) and besides that people lived in the camps for so long. For over 20 years. Now living in the camps their hopes were reduced to mere rumbling of motor vehicle engines. BRRRRR. Oh food is coming. Therefore everything was free. So your hopes are based on what you eat the next day.”⁸⁹

In the words of many of my interviewees, the younger generation has failed to learn to use the hoe, they don't know how to dig. That means farming methods could not be passed on from generation to generation and as a result those people find it difficult to make a living according to traditional ways once they are back in the community. Apart from that there was not much to do in the camps and young people have learned redundancy instead of physical work. That results in a situation where people who are used to hard work are not content with the young people who reject hard physical work or who want to sell their land. This practice of getting quick money happens much to the disgust of many community members who have experienced strong ties to land at first hand.

The related problems of not being able to grow up in the community as usual also apply to the customary rules of using land. In northern Uganda, over 90% of land is owned under customary tenure, meaning land that is owned by a particular group of people (family, clan, tribe, community) and is managed according to the rules of the group. Usually elders, clan heads, or other agreed institutions oversee the land. Despite the recognition of customary tenure by Courts of Law it is usually not codified or documented but instead procedures are passed on from generation to generation. Only a very small part is considered as freehold (use of land for a particular time) and leasehold tenure (land that is owned with full power over its use). Customary tenure is defined in the Section 3 of the Land Act. Parcels of land can be recognized as subdivisions belonging to a person, family or a traditional institution; and which is owned perpetually.⁹⁰

As we acknowledge that many people have been in the camps for a long time, there is a generation that did not experience the rules of land use at first hand. Therefore, many are not familiar with traditions of land-related rules and procedures that can differ slightly between clans, families and communities. This is especially difficult when viewed in relation to the fact that many families were torn apart, or elders, who knew how to handle land issues, or

⁸⁹ Mwaka Emmanuel Lutukumoi, Founder and Programme Director at United Youth Action for Progress (UYAP). Field Research Kampala: August 2013.

⁹⁰ United Religious Initiative 2012: 8-9.

people who knew where the demarcations lay, which are often in the form of a physical aspect like a rock or a tree, have died. Nowadays people are claiming land and disputes arise as to whether this is appropriate or not. Land conflicts, especially over boundaries, are in many respects a major issue in the post-conflict situation. Pham and Vinck's survey indicates that one in five respondents (20%) indicated having experienced a conflict within the six months prior to the survey. Land was the most significant cause of clashes at the local level (63%), which were also least frequently resolved with less than half of the conflicts (48%), compared to 81% of the domestic disputes, and 76% of the disputes over minor thieveries.⁹¹ However their 2010 findings indicate that community relations are mostly good with a majority of respondents (87%) viewing their relationships with their family positively ("good" or "very good"), neighbours (87%), and the broader community (91%). Likewise, 76 % said they trusted people in their village "a lot" or "extremely."⁹²

Although views and values tend to diverge between generations in general, the fact that a whole generation was born and raised throughout the war has deepened differences. Still, it is not possible to attribute changes in lifestyle simply to the fact that children were brought up in the camps, or to separate them from phenomena such as "modernization" or what some might call "westernization" that gives rise to individualism. The lifestyle of the younger generation, their unwillingness to accept of the family as the main foundation of society and the wish of some younger people to live on their own, clearly disturbs the older generation. For some the culture has been weakened to the extent that children do not respect their parents any more and even lack respect for elders. The same problems apply to children who spend a long time in LRA captivity.

Still the family remains the major social safety net and studies show that a warm welcome by the family is especially helpful for children who escaped LRA captivity and returned home. The transition period from an identity as a soldier back to civilian life is a particularly painful one. The return to civilian life means losing their identity once again, once from civilian life to an identity as a soldier and back again. The skills learned in the LRA are sometimes unusable and acquired norms and values must be discarded again before new rules of coexistence can be learned.⁹³ The survey including nearly 1000 households and youths in the war zone, including nearly 500 former abductees of Blattman and Annan from the year 2008

⁹¹ Pham/Vinck 2010: 27-28.

⁹² Pham/Vinck 2010: 31.

⁹³ Mergelsberg 2010: 167.

shows that the acceptance by the family is remarkably high. Only 1% of young people stated that their family was unhappy about their return, or that they would have been unwelcomed. About 94% of children reported to have been accepted by their families without insults, accusations or physical aggression.⁹⁴ For those that lose their families and close relatives life becomes very hard. Especially vulnerable are the young and old people whose entire families have died because they have no one to support him or her. A study originally interested in post-traumatic stress conducted in 2004 with 301 former Ugandan child soldiers found that 30 of these children (10%) were orphans.⁹⁵ This gave rise to an increased number of street kids and prostitution, phenomena that were barely existent before the war. Sometimes you find child headed homes living miserable lives. People like elders or persons with disabilities that lost their social security net are not strong enough to defend themselves, which can in turn result in the fact that they are exploited or chased away from their land. While there are a lot of caring individuals I have been told that society is sometimes reluctant to take care of somebody who shows strange behaviour that can be attributed to the experiences he or she makes.

“So many people would look at it as someone’s behaviour, as if the war has made that person a mad person already. They are giving up on that person. “If he wants to commit suicide let him commit suicide. He is not the first person to die. We have seen many. I have buried many. I have not even seen my family member. If he wants to commit suicide, let him commit suicide.”⁹⁶

Another vulnerable group are so-called child mothers who gave birth to children with men when they were in captivity, or women and girls that got pregnant as a result of being raped. When they return to the community it is especially hard for them to be accepted. This can be partially explained by looking at the functions of Acholi traditions and rules. The Acholi have a clan system of about 54 clans, each one headed by a chief. People are supposed to marry somebody from another clan, whereby the male descendants usually remain with the clan they were born into. The daughters in turn become part of their husband’s clan. The problem is that most of the girls that produced children in captivity, escaped and are now coming back to the community, either do not know their husband’s real identity, where his respective clan comes from or if he is still alive. Spontaneous relations are generally forbidden in the LRA although

⁹⁴ Blattman/ Annan 2008: 14.

⁹⁵ Derluyn et. al 2004: 861.

⁹⁶ Benard Okot, Senior Research and Advocacy Officer, leading the psychosocial component of the Beyond Juba II Project at the Refugee Law Project. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

marriage is quite common. Pham et al. found that a majority of the 946 former abductees that they interviewed were in a committed relationship during their captivity, either married (71.8%) or in a partnership 3.6%.⁹⁷ Even if the identity is known, it is hard for formal rules to be applied because it is sometimes considered as an irregular marriage.

Despite the fact of formally belonging nowhere, the integration is made harder by rights on land use. Generally property rights of Uganda state that every person has the right to own property and every person has equal rights to land. According to the Acholi, the eldest son inherits the father's land. If the sons are too young his brother is the rightful heir. If both parents die, the land is divided between all children, irrespective of their gender and even whether the daughter is already married. Women are disregarded at this point, which is diverging from the provision on equal rights to land. Nevertheless, paragraph 3 of the Principles and Practices of the Customary Tenure in Acholi land allows all clan members, irrespective of their status, age or gender rights to their family and communal land.⁹⁸

As long as land was owned communally and land conflicts were rare, women were part of the arrangement. In marriage, a woman is automatically entitled to the husband's property, including land. If she becomes a widow she is entitled to 15% of the property, land included. If there is more than one woman the 15% are to be divided between them. In case of divorce the land is divided equally between the former partners. The major problem is section 30 of the Succession Act that states that if a wife or a husband of one dies without a legal will, he or she cannot profit from the deceased property if at the moment of death he or she was separated and as such, not a member of the same household.⁹⁹ The notion of "voluntarily abandoned spouse" is critical with respect to people that "abandoned" their partners because of escaping LRA captivity. This results in the unfortunate situation that the very system that was supposed to protect people, now works against them because it was not designed to counter such a situation of war-related disruptions.

The mothers who gave birth to girls sometimes found it easier to be accepted in their mother's home because nobody has to fear a boy who grows up and demand his share of land. But if they have boys, and the fathers who are responsible for passing on the land are unknown, absent, or dead, not only are the mothers marginalized but also so are their male children once

⁹⁷ Pham et al. 2009: 4.

⁹⁸ United Religious Initiative 2012: 12.

⁹⁹ United Religious Initiative 2012: 14.

they grow up because they are deprived of land. Some of them are lucky to be accepted while those who are not are in clear need of help. The safety net fails to deliver its promises. The results are marginalization, economic insecurity, homelessness, exploitation, hopelessness and even prostitution.

The elephant is the totem of the Acholi as something they identify with. Elephants are very social animals that live in families with strong bonds. As they move in their natural habitat, the small ones are in the middle while the big ones are on the outside protecting them. So they represent their lives through this figure. But they also say that the elephant does not forget, so trauma or feelings of revenge can be there, although the Acholi society is built on a culture of peace and forgiveness. Even if children were abducted by the rebels against their own will, unfortunately what they were forced to do can make people very angry with them. From the outside it is hard to tell that feelings of revenge are present, but a closer look at people's actions shows that they are acting in the spirit of revenge and this is only natural, calling into mind what happened.

For example, a boy was abducted and later he captures a girl whose family recognizes him. Again the clan or the family is considered responsible for someone's behaviour, because recognition of individual guilt is less common. Although forced abductions diminish the importance of collective guilt, the two families of the boy and the girl will most likely not be at peace. The same problem arises if the girl's brother, who was also captured, dies in his absence while his abductee escapes and returns to the community. The family whose child died will feel desperation, which in turn can result in actions of revenge against the abductee who managed to escape. Stigmatization is considered a major problem for former child soldiers. More than a quarter of the children in Blattman und Annan's study reported that other members of the community had offended, or have been afraid of them.¹⁰⁰ Another study from Pham et al. presented in 2009, finds that out of the 946 former abductees, 39% reported difficulties upon returning to their home communities. 68% of the former LRA abductees who spent six or more months with the rebels reported more problems after returning home than those who stayed for a shorter timeframe.¹⁰¹

While it may be easier to forgive the "small" soldiers, this becomes even harder when high-ranking members of the LRA return. Brigadier Bania Kenneth, a former LRA member

¹⁰⁰ Blattman/ Annan 2008: 14.

¹⁰¹ Pham et al. 2009:14.

surrendered to the GoU and was issued an amnesty certificate. As he tried to build up his life again and started to dig a foundation for his house, people from the community began to harass him, asking about their missing children. It must be harsh to see someone building up a life, which can be held responsible for destroying yours. In the end he had to leave the area. These kind of small-scale conflicts make it hard for the society to live peacefully with neighbours. The effects that the conflict left behind are adversely affecting people's lives with many people still living next to people who disrupted the balance, and with the war touching almost everybody it is very likely that your neighbour could be your former enemy. The major challenge is that these small-scale problems can easily turn into larger conflicts that affect the whole community. This issue has to be taken seriously with respect to peace. So the conflict moved from the sound of the guns to a very silent conflict that is happening in the community. Even land conflicts can grow because of these feelings of revenge.

The last challenges that can be identified in the field of community security are conflicts that are not within an ethnic group but are inter-ethnic conflicts on a larger scale. The LRA conflict itself has inflicted great harm on the good relations of the Acholi with neighbouring tribes. As the conflict spread to Lira, Langi and Teso, those communities developed grievances against the Acholi, because Kony and the members of the LRA were ethnically associated with an Acholi rebellion. It was their sons who allegedly came, killed, looted and abducted. This created bitter enmity between the Acholi and the Teso people. When the LRA moved to Teso and committed atrocities there, a statement was released that any Acholi girl or boy below 18 who was found in the Teso sub-region must be killed. That reflects the bitterness of the situation when the Teso people were afflicted for the first time. On the other hand, Acholi, Teso and Lango sub-regions share the experience of being attacked by the Karamojong who are pastoralist tribes, used to cattle rustle, who looted arms from the army barracks when Amin was ousted. They used to terrorize the tribes along the border and steal their animals during the years of LRA insurgency.

Tensions between ethnical groups are a serious issue in many societies around the globe. In Uganda, even on a national scale there is a lot of mistrust. Uganda has about 40 ethnical groups with a strong north-south divide resulting from a long history of politicians exploiting and instrumentalizing ethnicity to achieve political goals.

“Because when the north is in chaos, the south and the centre are at peace. When the centre is in chaos and the west and so on, the north is at peace. That has been the scenario since 1962. So people are dishonest, people are disunited, you know. Each one for himself, god for us all. You go to the job line, you have to speak a specific language. And you should, not even come from the same region, but you should speak a specific clan language. So everything functions according to ethnicity.”¹⁰²

Compared to the rest of the country, the north feels that they are losing out and are being neglected due to resentment against them. Because most of the country that was not affected by the LRA conflict knew almost nothing about the situation in the north, stereotypes persist. People from the north are being associated with rebel activities and sometimes classified as less worthy and backwards in development. Equally resentment against other ethnic tribes are persisting in the northern parts. There are many occasions in informal talks, where if you listen closely you will find that some stereotypes are deeply rooted in people’s perceptions, even if the person you are talking to seems to know better. A community is a source of passing on good values, but it can also be a source of passing on negative images.

5.1.2 Health Security

5.1.2.1 Physical Health Issues

This section is not about identifying the general health figures, but instead presents the health issues that are seen as a serious impediment to reintegration and reconciliation efforts, or are related to post-conflict peace building in general. The health of the people was generally poor when they were still in the camps because of the overall condition such as lack of clean water and missing health facilities, the high prevalence of infectious diseases and malnourishment due to the impossibility of farming and the dependency on food aid. Life expectancy and HIV/AIDS rates are much higher in the north than the rest of the country. Although nutrition got better when people could access their land again, there are people still living with untreated wounds, bullets in their body parts and mutilations that affect their physical as well as their psychological well-being and therefore reintegration efforts. 18.9% of 946 former abductees repeatedly mentioned physical concerns ("health" and "injury").¹⁰³ The facilities to

¹⁰² Mwaka Emmanuel Lutukumoi, Founder and Programme Director at United Youth Action for Progress (UYAP). Field Research Kampala: August 2013.

¹⁰³ Pham et al. 2009: 6.

treat them are insufficient and even if they are in place treatment is too expensive for most people.

Although Uganda has committed victim assistance through ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty and signing the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the public health system in the mine-affected areas of northern Uganda is ill equipped to handle landmine casualties. Facilities lack staff and are too small and too few to handle the people in need, which results in the fact that they are overcrowded. First aid and emergency facilities are similarly insufficient due to a lack of materials, trained workers. Victims often have to cover a long way to reach and adequate medical facilities. Between January 2004 and March 2005, the three ICRC-supported hospitals in Gulu treated 1,519 victims of landmines, gunshots, bomb blasts and other war-related injuries.¹⁰⁴ By the end of 2012, a total of 2,763 victims were formally recorded, whereby 2,234 people were injured and 529 died through the incident. Some accidents might have never been registered. Of these casualties, 1,814 happened in northern Uganda. In the recent years casualties are progressively declining. Unfortunately these good news result in the fact that availability and quality of physical rehabilitation services in Uganda are declining, because funding and support from international organizations has increasingly been withdrawn.¹⁰⁵ The GoU shows only slight signs of effort to improve the situation of land mine victims. Losing a limb or being amputated is a serious impediment to mobility, participation as well as reintegration.

5.1.2.2 Psychological Health Issues

Although the 1994 development report makes no specific reference to psychological health issues, mental health is equally as important as physical health issues. Besides that, the two spheres are mutually dependent. Because threats to psychological health are considered a major risk by nearly all of my interviewees it needs to be addressed further. It has to be mentioned that psychological problems are difficult to investigate and available studies can have quite different conclusions. The majority of scientific literature that attempts to measure violence and its direct effect on wellbeing comes from the field of psychology. Such studies survey youth exposed to war violence and test them for psychological disorders, especially

¹⁰⁴ Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. Country Profile Uganda 2005. <http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2005/uganda.html> Accessed 09.02.2014

¹⁰⁵ Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. Country Profile Uganda 2013. http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3120 Accessed 09.02.2014

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), aggression, and depression.¹⁰⁶ Difficulties relate to the adaption of “western“ norms such as PTSD that might not be universally applicable and can result in “transcultural“ errors, without contextualizing surveys to a situation of mass suffering as in northern Uganda. Studies also tend to neglect aspects such as economic status or educational issues. Studies about general patterns of mental health issues are not available for northern Uganda. The focus lies on child soldiers and their psychological traumas. LRA abduction was large-scale and indiscriminate, with estimates of over 60,000 youth abducted since 1996.¹⁰⁷ P.W. Singer mentions in his book "Children at War" serious effects on the psyche as a result of the extreme experiences in times when the children are still "growing up". The phenomena range from PTSD and other mental symptoms, such as weight loss, depression, nightmares and flashbacks to cognitive problems. These aspects impair, according to Singer, everyday life and the "functioning" of a person in a society.¹⁰⁸ In the context of northern Uganda these “extreme experiences“ are generally attributed to the experience of violence.

A study from Derluyn et. al. about posttraumatic stress in former Ugandan child soldiers from the year 2004 who interviewed 301 former child soldiers who had been abducted at a very young age (12.9 years) who stayed with the LRA for a mean period of more than 2 years, found that 233 children (77%) saw someone being killed during their abduction; 18 (6%) saw a close relative being killed; 118 children (39%) had to kill another person themselves; 7 (2%) killed their own father, brother, or another relative; 116 (39%) had to abduct other children; 195 (65%) were forced into military training and 193 (64%) had to actually fight; 156 (52%) were seriously beaten while 143 (48%) got injured; 189 (63%) had to loot properties and burn houses of civilians. Out of the few girls that participated in the study 21 (35%) were sexually abused (“given as wife”) and 11 (18%) gave birth to one or more children when they were with the LRA. Due to a small number of female respondents this is barely representative. Almost all the children experienced several traumatic events.¹⁰⁹

In another study from the year 2006, Blattman and Annan show the results of 462 male abductees out of 1,016 households, aged fourteen to thirty that participated in a large-scale survey in northern Uganda. While the experience of violence is reported almost universally,

¹⁰⁶ Blattman 2006: 7.

¹⁰⁷ Pham et al 2007: 642.

¹⁰⁸ Singer 2005: 195.

¹⁰⁹ Derluyn et. al 2004: 861–63.

only a minority of children report to having committed the worst acts of violence, such as rape or killing of family members. These results should not diminish the cruelty and the importance of realizing the severity of such experiences, but reveal that this practice, which is often portrayed in the media as very widespread, is much less frequently used. Approximately 24% had to kill, with those that spent over a year in the LRA showing higher rates at 49%; 22% reported that they were forced to abuse dead bodies; 14% said that they were forced to beat a person close to them, while 8% had to kill a family member or friend; 57% reported to have been severely beaten; 24% were attacked by someone with a weapon and 61% were being tied up or imprisoned.¹¹⁰

To that point the findings do not diverge greatly, which changes when looking at the results. The correlation between violence experienced and mental health issues is significantly less in the Blattman and Annan's study, whereby their study includes a control group and uses attrition and selection bias. Another study presented in 2002, from MacMullin and Loughry, that also uses a control group in turn found that abducted youth were more anxious, depressed, hostile, and socially inactive than the non-abducted.¹¹¹ The 2004 study from Derluyn et. al randomly selected a sample of 75 children from the 301 participants to complete the impact of event scale-revised IES-R a self-report scale, parallel to the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. The total score is 88 while a score of greater than 24 is considered to show clinically significant symptoms. Results from the IES-R showed very high rates of post-traumatic stress symptoms with 69 (97%) of the 71 children who actually finalised the assessment displaying a clinically significant score mainly related to intrusion, avoidance and hyperarousal. The mean total IES-R score was 53.5. Another interesting finding shows that the death of the mother significantly relates to higher scores for avoidance, but only for the female respondents, which could be an indicator that the availability of a parent is favourable for a healthy recovery. The age of the child, the period of abduction, and the timespan between escape and research did not affect PTSD and even children who escaped quite a long time ago still experienced post-traumatic stress related problems. Here the number of traumatic experiences and the kind of the trauma experienced seemed to have little influence on the post-trauma reactions.¹¹²

In an attempt to improve reintegration strategies, Blattman and Annan questioned 462 male

¹¹⁰ Blattman/ Annan 2010: 136-137.

¹¹¹ MacMullin/ Loughry 2002.

¹¹² Derluyn et. al 2004: 861-63.

abductees, including a control group. Adversely to the hitherto presented findings, they show that on average it appears that child soldiers were not significantly different in terms of their social integration than the non-abducted children. It turns out that a number of stress symptoms do exist, however they occur in a minority, namely those that have made the worst experiences of violence. They conclude that extreme war violence, not abduction, can account for the concentrated psychological distress in both child and mature ex-fighters. This affects about one sixth of the kidnapped children.¹¹³ Interestingly when the authors discuss the same data in a paper from 2010, they conclude that abducted youth are 11% more likely to be in the top quartile of the distress index, a 49% increase relative to the non-abducted. Nearly 37% of former abductees report re-experiencing traumatic events through nightmares versus 25% of non-abducted youth. Furthermore, 16% of abductees reported feeling “always sad” compared to 13% of their non-abducted peers.¹¹⁴ If the study is considered representative, and is being generalized, one has to ask if these figures really constitute a minority? When, 22% that reported that they were forced to abuse dead bodies are hypothetically applied to estimates that consider 60,000 abducted, this results in 13,200 people that have made that horrible experience. Combined with Blattman and Annan’s conclusion that psychological health is adversely affected by combat experiences, this would in turn represent a pressing need for treatment. Further trauma can be something that can suddenly affect people many years after their horrible experience. Trauma often appears years after the traumatic event and starts to haunt people when they finally start to face what has happened. This factor is not being addressed in any of the studies.

Another important aspect is asking the key question: Reintegration into what?¹¹⁵ The studies presented here were conducted in a time where reintegration meant to go back to the IDP camps. In a later study regarding reintegration of former child soldiers presented by Annan, she writes that “there is nothing to do” was a repeated testimony made by youth in the interviews.¹¹⁶ The context nowadays has changed and therefore an additional study related to mental health issues from the year 2009 by Pham et al. who questioned 946 former abductees, will be presented. Of those 946, 11% were held for about one to six months and 10% for more than six months. 13% of the respondents said they had spent time in a reception centre, while about half of those who spent a long time with the LRA have passed through one. The results

¹¹³ Blattman/ Annan 2008: 103–105.

¹¹⁴ Blattman/Annan 2010: 890.

¹¹⁵ Özerdem/Podder 2011: 313.

¹¹⁶ Annan/ Brier/ Aryemo, 2009: 647.

of this study show a high prevalence of mental health issues. 67% met the criteria for symptoms of PTSD and 40% met the criteria for symptoms of depression, compared to 51% and 25.9% respectively among those who were not abducted. Symptoms of PTSD were associated with gender, ethnicity, problems returning home, cumulative exposure as a witness, and cumulative exposure to forced acts of violence. Females were almost nine times more likely to report symptoms of PTSD. What is important with regard to community security is that most studies find that community acceptance and support are vital to psychosocial well-being of former LRA abductees, problems associated with returning home were found to be statistically associated with symptoms of PTSD and depression.¹¹⁷

Another study by Neuner et al. released in 2012 researches prevalence, predictors and outcomes of spirit possession experiences among 1113 former child soldiers and war-affected civilians in Northern Uganda called Cen.¹¹⁸ Cen ghost are believed to be evil spirits of people who were killed and are now haunting their murderers, or in some cases bystanders, thereby influencing their behaviour to an extent that it is considered abnormal. The study that was carried out between 2007 and 2008 included 474 youths formerly abducted aged between 12 and 25 years in war-affected regions of northern Uganda out of the total sample. The researchers concluded that a high prevalence of spirit possession exists with 8.2% of the total population and 14.3% of the abductees. That could be attributed to their exposure to the LRA belief system that builds upon a string belief system. Cen was related to extreme levels of traumatic events and Cen spirit possession scores significantly correlated with psychopathology, i.e. PTSD and depression symptoms. Relating to the social dynamics of Cen, the researchers found that the subjects affected by spirit possession felt more being discriminated against, although discrimination cannot be directly attribute to Cen.¹¹⁹

Do the studies differ greatly? First, all of them find a prevalence of health issues, while only Blattman and Annan interpret their results as a minority. On the contrary, Neuner et al. interpret their findings of 15% that are affected by Cen spirit possession as highly prevalent and a common phenomenon. This simply relates to a different interpretation of similar findings. Blattman and Annan simply wanted to influence reintegration designs and therefore conclude that the psychological health issues are not the major target area. The biggest differences can be found in Blattman and Annan's study when compared to Pham et. al. who

¹¹⁷ Pham et al. 2009: 9-23.

¹¹⁸ Neuner et al. 2012: 548.

¹¹⁹ Neuner et al. 2012: 548.

clearly find a bigger impact on the mental health of former abductees as well as differences in social integration. A common feature is that although former soldiers tend to show higher rates of problems associated with their violent experiences, psychological problems are by no means restricted to them.

5.1.3 Personal Security

While threats to personal security came from rebels, government soldiers and other ethnic communities during the time of conflict, the situation has changed with the post conflict. Threats are now more directed at specific groups, such as former children or women, or have to do with self-inflicting behaviours like alcoholism and drug abuse. Despite economic challenges, illness, trauma, distress, desperation and stigmatization aggravated addictions, especially alcoholism, during, but also in, the post-conflict situation. The same reason can be attributed to the phenomenon of Gender Based Violence (GBV) and suicide rates that are generally considered high in northern Uganda. Neuner et al. detect a relationship between suicidal ideation and a high suicide risk in combination with spirit possession states.¹²⁰ Threats to oneself are a serious issue in the post conflict.

Furthermore, threats directed against children or former soldiers: imagine a person who was abducted when he was ten years and who comes back into the community in his twenties. He has probably seen a lot of atrocities and as a result of spending a long time with the LRA most likely abducted, raped, killed or burned huts and looted. The adoption of values and norms in the LRA contributes to the transformation of identities. The internalization of social rules takes on different strengths. What is certain is that the parameters of what is considered normal behaviour change with a longer stay in the LRA. The effectiveness of the LRA transformed children and to give them a new identity as a soldier often proves an obstacle to a return to society. If a former abductee comes back and goes through a reception centre he will be treated well there but as soon as he comes back to the community things will get harder.

“So when they go into the communities they behave in a manner that makes the community intimidate them. With the stigmatization in the community, pointing fingers at them, some ran out of patience and began to fight. (...) It takes a lot of time and for that to happen it requires them to live in a very good a very social, friendly and lovely environment because the community forgets that they were forced into soldiering. The

¹²⁰ Neuner et al. 2012: 552.

community does not treat them like people with special needs. So it makes them fight back."¹²¹

This citations shows that attitudes of former soldiers that can be related to their experiences and time spent in the LRA, which can quickly lead to clashes within the community, where the community can start direct threats against them often as a result of their behaviour. At the same time, a receptive community is favourable for a good reintegration. Thereby a vicious circle can be created. This example shows how psychological issues, community issues and threats to personal security are interrelated. Although Blattman finds that social exclusion concerns only a minority,¹²² subliminal and direct threats from the community directed against children are familiar to all of my respondents who live in affected areas.

Education is not specifically attributed to any of the seven main categories in the 1994 UNDP report. It is instead discussed in relation to various aspects, for example under the headline personal security discussing the negligence of women or girls in the area of education. I therefore subsume educational issues within personal security with a special focus on the vulnerability of former child soldiers. While northern Uganda is lagging behind in developmental terms, Higgins, who uses data from the Ugandan Ministry of Education and Sports, finds that the conflict-affected Acholi sub-region does fare relatively well in terms of access to education, while the region struggles with regard to the quality and performance of education.¹²³ Nevertheless, this data has to be interpreted carefully as my interviewees suggest a more dire state, claiming that many children do not go to school because it is too expensive for the parents, especially if they have several children, or simply because facilities are not accessible. During their time in the IDP camps, children often had to travel long distances to access education because there were no schools in their area, or local facilities had been damaged or destroyed during disasters.¹²⁴ Additionally the content of school education has to be questioned, because children seem to learn a lot more about intangible content such as European history than about applicable knowledge such as farming methods.

With regard to former abductees, Blattman and Annan's study provides some important insights. They find that the main effects of abduction manifest themselves in a lack of

¹²¹ Francis Lokwiya. Programme Coordinator Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

¹²² Blattman 2006: 19.

¹²³ Higgins 2009: 3-4.

¹²⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2014: 7

education in addition to reduced productivity, increased poverty and inequality. The main factor for these effects is the absence, due to the time spent in the bush, and not psychological suffering. The average loss of school time is nine months.¹²⁵ Abducted male youth attain 0.75 fewer years of education, a 10% reduction relative to the average non-abducted youth's 7.6 years of education. The data shows a correspondence with the average length of abduction. They also find that abducted youth are 15 percentage points less likely to report being functionally literate (able to read a book or newspaper), because the majority missed grades six and seven where reading and writing is usually taught.¹²⁶

5.1.4 Economic Security

Blattman and Annan's findings lead directly to aspects of economic security. Youth complained of difficulties re-entering the school system, which in turn leads to an educational gap that limits their options in the labour market. This affects mainly the quality of work-lower skill and capital intensity rather than the quantity meaning the probability of having work. Abducted youth are five percentage points (43% of abductees) less likely to be employed in skilful jobs than non-abductees while the results also suggest that earnings are 33% lesser among abducted youth. The implications of their study suggest investing more in education rather than psychological areas.¹²⁷ Therefore it is important to tackle both aspects as mutually reinforcing: the psychosocial from the angle of creating economic opportunities, or the training of additional skills. A person with serious psychological issues will most probably not do well in the economic or educational sphere. If that person is counselled, or receives some form of therapy, it will force him at some point to look at other problems too. If a person is not able to make a living, it will be hard to move beyond one's problems. The two spheres have to be treated at the same time.

Blattman and Annan's findings are even more challenging regarding a 2010 assessment on durable solutions in northern Uganda. Around 80% of respondents said they were hardly able or unable to make a living from their present-day primary source of income.¹²⁸ Although Uganda has made some progress it remains one of the poorest countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0,456, ranking 161st worldwide.¹²⁹ The poverty decline in

¹²⁵ Blattman/ Annan 2008: 16.

¹²⁶ Blattman/ Annan 2010: 884.

¹²⁷ Blattman/ Annan 2010: 884-889.

¹²⁸ Higgins 2009: 2.

¹²⁹ UNDP <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/UGA>

Uganda has not been experienced uniformly across the country. In the northern region, for example, poverty decline has been modest at approximately 17% since 1992/93.¹³⁰ During the conflict, property and private as well as human capital were lost in large numbers, with infrastructure and houses being destroyed. The loss of large numbers of animals raided by government soldiers, rebels or Karamojong tribes are especially challenging because they were the main source of income next to agriculture.

“(…) because in the past the Acholi land was blessed with animals, with cattle, cows, bulls, goats and sheep. So when this war came we lost most of this, some families lost all. And this affected everything. Predominantly we used to depend on agriculture and on those animals for our livelihood, for taking our children to school. In the wake of the war we lost all our animals. Our neighbours from Karamoja also came and raided the animals. So we were left with our empty hands.”¹³¹

5.1.5 Interconnections and ‘Downturns with Security’

The conflict affected all dimensions of human security. In the post-conflict disagreements over land is in many respects a major impediment to economic security. When people fight over a piece of land, this results in the unfortunate situation that none of the warring parties can use it productively. These conflicts in turn affect the peaceful harmony of the community. A community that is not peaceful does not create the friendly and loving environment that favours reintegration, especially when former child soldiers are concerned. Under the headline community security it was clarified that many people lack skills with regard to agriculture as a business. In the absence of job opportunities this leads to low income. Low income in turn leads to poor health or to loss of education when parents cannot afford to send children to school. The impossibility to make a living can threaten public security, because people turn to other means of income such as crime. Psychological health and the ability to make a living are mutually dependent. If food security is imperilled in combination with psychological problems, this can lead to desperation and threats against oneself, such as alcoholism and drug abuse. Strange behaviour of former child soldiers can in turn lead to stigmatization from the community that aggravates the problems they already have. Some grievous environmental security issues in northern Uganda are brought about by the destruction during the conflict,

¹³⁰ Higgins 2009: 2.

¹³¹ Francis Lokwiya, Programme Coordinator Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

which contributed to serious droughts. Furthermore, people who returned cut down many of the remaining trees to build homes. This in turn leads to food insecurity, which affects people's economic security. The interconnections are numerous.

5.2 Post Conflict Peace Building

5.2.1 National Level

This section will discuss initiatives undertaken by the GoU that are specifically targeting the northern region, intended to tackle areas underdevelopment and conflict-related challenges. The overall development framework is Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) that started in 1997 and was revised in 2000. Although the focus is on the post-conflict area, many initiatives that are still in place today started in the hot conflict phase, which means that a clear assignment to the post-conflict can only be made in a few cases. A common feature of the presented initiatives at national level is that they target issues related to the LRA conflict. A strict separation between national, international and local level is rather difficult because various actors can be part of one initiative, like the Amnesty Act. The Amnesty Act will be discussed under this section, although the initiative clearly came from a local group of religious leaders and could therefore also be attributed to the local level. Nevertheless, it was the GoU that finally enacted the law that enabled the amnesty and its implementation. Similarly, projects that are internationally funded, but implemented by government agencies, will be assigned to the national level and not discussed with regard to international efforts. Although the GoU made the ICC referral of Kony and his five top rebel leaders, the ICC will be discussed in relation to traditional approaches to justice.

5.2.1.1 The Amnesty Act

In 1998, the GoU adopted the first official Amnesty Law following the 1987 Amnesty Statute. However some selectivity remained concerning the awarding of amnesty certificates. Certain top LRA commanders are not considered ineligible for amnesty. Apart from a few exceptions any Ugandan citizen, who was involved in an armed conflict or rebellion against the GoU since 26 January 1986, can gain an amnesty certificate. Amnesty includes all the rebellion, or riot-related offences against the GoU and signifies pardon, forgiveness, freedom from prosecution and any form of state punishment. The Amnesty Law provides the legal basis for

the Amnesty Commission and the Demobilisation and Resettlement Team (DRT), whose task is the institutionalized reintegration and demobilization. A person that seeks to be granted amnesty under the act needs to report upon return to the nearest army or police unit, a chief, a member of the executive committee of a local Government unit, a magistrate or a religious leader within the locality, who in turn hands the person over to the DRT. The person needs to renounce and abandon involvement in the war or armed rebellion. If he is carrying a weapon, it needs to be handed over.¹³² This is seldom the case, because if children ever had a gun, they usually get rid of it in the bush. Until now there is no need for large-scale demobilization, since the returnees usually come back alone or in small groups, even after amnesty was announced. The escape from the LRA is mostly described as a spontaneous moment of awakening, preceded by the slow realization that promises, such as a good job in the “new government” and monetary rewards, would not be fulfilled and that the rebel’s existence does not serve a noble higher purpose, usually preceded by an increasing war-weariness. Only a few are taken by the UPDF and integrated against their will into society.¹³³

The call for the initiative came from the local level, with civil and religious leaders listening to demands from the community, urging the GoU to enforce amnesty on a national level. The community’s war-weariness, in combination with the assumption that the formal justice system is not sufficient to handle an increasing number of cases, or to make the necessary distinction between legal and moral guilt, played an important role in the call for amnesty. Other interpretations of the reasons for the initiative vary from the assumption that a great willingness to reconcile and the desire for peace and stability prevailed over feelings of revenge among the Acholi and explanations that look at the simple necessity of the situation, in which a majority of the rebels has not voluntarily joined the LRA.¹³⁴ The Amnesty is seen as a way of drawing a line between the past and the present and as an instrument for peace that facilitates a normal coexistence. In 2000, a new Amnesty Act was adopted, where especially the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), whose draft laid the foundations of the current Amnesty Act, rejected a proposal of partial amnesty. The GoU was initially against amnesty, but eventually, due to a lot of pressure from the civil society, it was passed into law and recently reinstated. It can therefore be seen as a bottom-up approach.

¹³² Uganda Legal Information Institute. <http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/294>
Accessed 09.02.2014

¹³³ Mergelsberger 2010: 163

¹³⁴ Afako 2002: 64-66.

Since 2005, the Amnesty Commission hands out so-called “reintegration packages” in the form of cash (263.000 Ugandan Shillings / US\$ 120¹³⁵), and a few useful items (mattress, sheets, hoe, machete, cups, plates, corn and bean seeds). The Amnesty Act expired in May 2012, but was renewed for another twelve months, this time without Part II, which includes the issuance of the amnesty certificate. Since May 2012, this section of the act was reinstated and will remain in force for two years.¹³⁶ By 2012, a total of 26,288 rebels from 29 different rebel groups, including 12,971 ex-LRA fighters received amnesty.¹³⁷ With the financial and technical provisions from the WB and the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the Commission was able to help the majority of returnees by the end of 2006.¹³⁸ According to the website Humanitarian News and Analysis, a service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the reintegration program came to a standstill in recent years due to scarce funding. In particular, the closure of the WB financed US\$ 8.2 million Uganda Demobilization and Reintegration Program in 2012, contributed to the slowdown of the process.¹³⁹

The amnesty proved to be a useful incentive for some rebels to surrender to the GoU, but did not result in the expected end of the conflict. Kony supposedly rejected the Amnesty Act, on the grounds that he would favour a real dialogue with the GoU. Eventually, he also tried to withhold the information about the possibility of amnesty from his fighters. Another impediment could have been the lack of trust by the rebels towards a government that continues to pursue military strategies, while promising amnesty upon surrender. Additionally, a certain selectivity can be observed towards the granting of amnesty for higher ranking leaders. While Brigadier Sam Kolo Otto and Brigadier Kenneth Banya received amnesty, others have been indicted.

“But still, as much as there was amnesty a number of people who were not on the list of those who were supposed to undergo trial, were taken for trials and their cases are still pending. So they are very vulnerable.”¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ At the time of writing 263.000 Ugandan Schillings are equivalent to 106 US\$.

¹³⁶ Humanitarian News and Analysis Service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=95672> and <http://www.irinnews.org/report/98133/rebel-amnesty-reinstated-in-uganda> Accessed 09.02.2014

¹³⁷ Numbers provided by the Amnesty Commission. Cited by Agger 2012: 2.

¹³⁸ Blattman/Annan 2008: 9.

¹³⁹ Humanitarian News and Analysis Service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=95672>

¹⁴⁰ Benard Okot, Senior Research and Advocacy Officer, leading the psychosocial component of the Beyond Juba II Project at the Refugee Law Project. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

Even if amnesty protects former soldiers from legal consequences, it can help the community to accept their innocence only to some extent. The reintegration packages that are granted are highly desired but do not contribute to the strengthening of the community's cohesion because of their disproportionate aid for former soldiers. It rather has the opposite effect, as the rest of the population, who see themselves as the true victims of the conflict, hardly receive any support, although they have to bear the brunt of the war burden.¹⁴¹ The reintegration packages have caused quite a lot of trouble in the community.

Furthermore, the discourse on “innocent passive victims” deprives children of their role as an active player in the peace building process. Among the former child soldiers there is a certain ambiguity between the feeling to have been a good soldier, and the knowledge to have actually been abducted against their own will, meaning that they have been turned into something that did not originally suit their own ideas. During his in-depth field study Ben Mergelsberger, who got really close to former Ugandan child soldiers, was able to show that children could draw something positive out of fighting, especially if they were on the winning side. In the course of his qualitative study, he concludes that the children are active survivors that show a good sense of why they fought, how they survived and what they need the most in their current situation.¹⁴² Many still feel guilt, which means that a simple acknowledgment of their innocence as amnesty provides it, is not sufficient and must be complemented by other means of relieving them of their guilt. The Amnesty program has not undergone any evaluation until the present day. It proved to be a useful instrument, but it must be complemented by other means of justice.

5.2.1.2 The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund

“The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project aims to empower communities in Northern Uganda by enhancing their capacity to systematically identify, prioritize, and plan for their needs and implement sustainable development initiatives that improve socio-economic services and opportunities.”¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Blattman/ Annan 2008: 11.

¹⁴² Mergelsberger 2010: 162-175.

¹⁴³ World Bank

<http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=104231&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P002952> Accessed 09.02.2014

Between 1992 and 2006, the GoU implemented several plans for recovery in Northern Uganda. The first of its kind was the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP I) that was intended to tackle social and economic problems of the north.¹⁴⁴ The program, with a duration of six years, failed to deliver tangible improvements. Despite a budget of US\$ 600 million, only US\$ 93.6 million was spent. It was criticised for its top-down implementation and its negligence of areas such as peace building and psychosocial support for war affected communities.¹⁴⁵ In an effort to address “lessons learnt” from NURP I, the GoU came up with a strategy for NURP II in 1999, with the stated intention of incorporating a more bottom-up, demand-responsive approach.¹⁴⁶ Part of the program was the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), a loan given by the World Bank (WB) with an initial budget of US\$ 100 million that lasted from July 2002 until March 2009. The program includes eighteen districts and is not entirely restricted to LRA affected regions. The program had four different strands.

With regard to the *Community Development Initiative* (US\$ 53.04 million), the major sectors involved were health and social services (55%), primary education (20%), water, sanitation and flood protection (15%), and agriculture, fishing and forestry (10%). Besides contributing to strategies of vulnerable groups, civil society organizations, NGOs and private sector agencies (*Vulnerable Groups Support* US\$ 41.06 million), the *Institutional Component* (US\$ 7.80 million) aimed to support among others, capacity building and training for communities and local government staff and to provide information, education, and enhanced communication.¹⁴⁷

All the components emphasize a strong bottom-up approach in a sense that community-driven initiatives should be supported. The bottom-up component seeks to directly finance project proposals from community initiatives, while the community is supposed to take an active part in the implementation phase as well. Besides improving the socio-economic infrastructure, the project included a *Community Reconciliation and Conflict Management* component (US\$2.87 million) that targeted 800 communities, to support the implementation of traditional and non-traditional approaches to peace building, reconciliation and conflict management.¹⁴⁸ Initially this component seeks to encourage communities to identify reconciliation and conflict

¹⁴⁴The Government of Uganda, Discussion Paper 2003: 31.

¹⁴⁵ Office of the Prime Minister (1999): NURP II District Profile Study, Volume 1: 25. Cited by Beyond Juba 2008: 2.

¹⁴⁶ Beyond Juba Project 2008: 2.

¹⁴⁷ World Bank Report No ICR00001211 2009: 4-5.

¹⁴⁸ World Bank Report No ICR00001211 2009: 4-5.

management approaches, using traditional and non-traditional approaches that are based on indigenous knowledge and the way communities have managed injustice in the past.¹⁴⁹ The final implementation and results report found that reconciliation meetings and negotiations between clans or tribes were initiated, counselling and psychosocial support for ex-abductees, returnees and dropouts have been provided. In total the project trained 1,309 peace promoters, provided 458 returnees with reintegration support, implemented 652 structured events (including games, sports, and drama and peace meetings) and supported 3 institutions that promoted traditional reconciliation mechanisms.¹⁵⁰ Meanwhile, according to a report by the Beyond Juba Project 2008, the project start was delayed with the first projects financed in 2004, two years after its official beginning.¹⁵¹ Despite challenges resulting from the on-going conflict, NUSAF has funded a total of 9,307 out of 44,131 projects that the communities submitted.¹⁵² NUSAF agencies had to face accusations of corruption, with at least twenty people having been charged with corruption during the implementation phase of NUSAF projects.¹⁵³

However, the WB claims that participatory involvement of communities in sub-project management, public sharing of expenditures at the local level and follow-up on misuse of funds, resulted in improved accountability and transparency. Ratings from the World Bank were as follows: outcomes were satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was moderate, bank performance was satisfactory, and borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. The actual themes differed from the originally envisaged sector shares with general agriculture, fishing and forestry sector receiving 32% of total bank financing and primary education with 31% of total bank financing. The least targeted sector remained health with only 4%. Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction only rose from 20% to 21%.¹⁵⁴

This partly reflects how the community changed target areas, through prioritization. On the other hand, it could be due to privileges given by people in charge of approving projects. The

¹⁴⁹World Bank

<http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=104231&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P002952> Accessed 09.02.2014

¹⁵⁰ World Bank Report No ICR00001211 2009: 14.

¹⁵¹ Komakech/ Muyomba: A Critical Analysis of the Relief, Reconstruction and Development Programmes in Northern Uganda. ACODE Policy Research Paper: 22. Cited by Beyond Juba 2008: 2.

¹⁵² World Bank Report No ICR00001211 2009: 12.

¹⁵³ Daily Monitor on 23 April 2008 and 29 September 2008. Cited by Beyond Juba 2008: 2.

¹⁵⁴ World Bank Report No ICR00001211 2009: i-ii.

best way to reach out to the different communities was through locally popular radio stations. Awareness seemed to be high, but many people found that they did not benefit.¹⁵⁵

In May 2009, NUSAF II was approved for a five-year time span with a budget of US\$ 100 million. This time the project includes only three components focusing on better socio-economic services, economic aspects, like income generation and better earning opportunities, and an institutional development component, which alongside others, aims at improving accountability and transparency in the use of project resources.¹⁵⁶ The empowerment, bottom-up approach is still the core area of the projects, while the reconciliation and conflict component is no longer part of NUSAF II. A transparency, accountability and anti-corruption component is included in NUSAF II.

Because NUSAF II is still in place, evaluations criteria are drawn from the final report of NUSAF I. The WB evaluation report includes some lessons learnt, but substantial criticism is lacking overall. One of the challenges identified is the question of how to target nomadic tribes, which is barely relevant for the Acholi sub-region. The question that would be more relevant for the analysed context is how to target people living in IDP camps or very remote areas? The evaluation report acknowledges that NUSAF subprojects initially suffered from lapses in technical quality, due to shortcomings in desk and field appraisal, but that these problems could be addressed in the course of the project.¹⁵⁷

Contrary to these findings Basil Kandyomunda, Deputy Executive Director of the Uganda Debt Network (UDN), an advocacy and lobbying coalition of NGOs, institutions and individuals formed in 1996, finds harsh criticism in a 2004 presented report. First of all the coverage of the “greater north” with a population of more than 6.5 million, leads to an overstretch of the program. Second it fails to address structural problems, such as the long-lasting rebellion, or the lack of entrepreneurial skills. While an approach of decentralized development is favourable, in a context of patrimonialism and corruption, a full realization of ownership brings its own problems with it. People complained that projects were approved e.g. along political lines. Another criticism addresses the near total unawareness of NUSAF among the public. Beneficiaries seemed incapable to access the full potential of the funds available. Apart from a lack of information about NUSAF, this can be a result of the complex

¹⁵⁵ World Bank Report No ICR00001211 2009: 39.

¹⁵⁶ World Bank

<http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P111633/second-northern-uganda-social-action-fund-project-nusaf2?lang=en>
Accessed 09.02.2014

¹⁵⁷ World Bank Report No ICR00001211 2009: 11.

process of submitting a full project proposal without the necessary mentoring and support to overcome administrative barriers. Kandyomunda complains that out of the 125 employed NUSAF staff members, only 21 Justification Officers and District Officers are supposed to deal with the technical project applications, which is simply not enough. Furthermore it is mandatory for NUSAF that the community contributes 5% for *Vulnerable Group Support* and 20% for *Community Reconciliation and Conflict Management* projects which is, in his eyes, definitely too much for an already impoverished community.¹⁵⁸

If a real participatory approach is to be adopted by the most vulnerable segments of society, these groups need substantial support throughout the whole process, from articulating their needs to formulating an intervention, up to mentoring in the implementation phase. Otherwise some people, who are more knowledgeable and empowered in the first place, will dominate the process and a real participatory approach cannot take place. Kandyomunda concludes that, however the knowledgeable the community might be, they still need mentoring which was not available.¹⁵⁹

5.2.1.3 The Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda

“The overall goal of the PRDP is stabilization in order to regain and consolidate peace and lay the foundations for recovery and development in Northern Uganda.”¹⁶⁰

In 2007 the GoU launched the Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) in 2007, with the overarching goal to stabilize the north, within a three-year time span. The clear intention of the PRDP, whose projects run along NUREP and NUSAF, to stabilize the region and thereby contribute to the goals of the overall PEAP, is in line with a human security approach. The PEAP aims at becoming a middle-income country by addressing international targets such as the MDGs. The GoU acknowledges in the PRDP report that these goals may not yet be appropriate for northern Uganda. The region needs to be stabilized before the huge development gap between the “greater north” and the rest of the country can be closed. The GoU claims that previous interventions in the north had been de-linked, due to a lack of an overall strategic framework. Development efforts in the region were undertaken, based on the assumption that state authority is fully functioning, which is

¹⁵⁸ Kandyomunda 2004: 1-3.

¹⁵⁹ Kandyomunda 2004: 3.

¹⁶⁰ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 32.

not the case. Therefore interventions may not have been appropriate for the conflict setting.¹⁶¹

The PRDP includes the greater north, addressing the northwest (West Nile) region in accordance with the perceived post-conflict status, the north-central (Lango, Acholi and IDP hosting districts) where at the time of the establishment of the PRDP, the armed rebellion was perceived as on-going, and the northeast (Karamoja, Elgon and Teso) where lawlessness and underdevelopment are perceived as the major issues.¹⁶² The program is divided along four strategic objectives. Number one “*Consolidation of state authority*” was intended to ensure cessation of armed hostilities, to provide security, to re-establish the rule of law and to strengthen judicial and legal services, human rights and local governance through the rebuilding of state institutions. Strategic objective number two “*Rebuilding and empowering communities*” seeks to contribute to community recovery and to improve living conditions. Number three “*Revitalization of the economy*” is intended to promote productive sectors (production, marketing services, industry) and to rehabilitate the infrastructure. The last objective “*Peace building and reconciliation*” wanted to promote these aspects through better access to information, enhanced counselling services, mechanisms for communal and national conflict resolution, the strengthening of local governance as well as informal leadership structures and the reinforcement of the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants.¹⁶³

The original estimated cost was around US\$ 606 million.¹⁶⁴ It is stated that the process of developing was a participatory and consultative process with ministries, local governments and political leaders and MPs from northern Uganda.¹⁶⁵ One of the guiding principles was a decentralized approach, meaning that the focus was upon local and district governance structures and should involve needs-based programming that promotes participation. The PRDP was a rather overambitious program, although the GoU was aware of the fact that a three-year recovery program would not be sufficient to address all the causes and consequences of decades of conflict.¹⁶⁶

With regard to the research criteria, strategic objective number two “*Rebuilding and empowering communities*” and strategic objective number four “*Peace building and*

¹⁶¹ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 20-21.

¹⁶² Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: vii.

¹⁶³ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: vii-viii.

¹⁶⁴ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: ix.

¹⁶⁵ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 20.

¹⁶⁶ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 31-32.

reconciliation” are most relevant. The former focuses on emergency assistance, basic social services and livelihood support for war affected populations. Part of this section is the *Return and Resettlement of IDPs Program*. The program does mention concrete concessions for returning refugees, but mainly relies on information campaigns, like how to best establish new households, awareness-raising (e.g. land mines), or confidence-building strategies. 70% of the IDPs should be given return kits containing food and household items.

Objective two also included the *Community Empowerment and Development Programme*, which looked at the provision of basic services, such as health, education, where educational dropouts should be prevented or alternative training should be provided for those, who either do not want or cannot, continue education. Another relevant component is the *Livelihood Support and Social Protection Program* that was aimed at targeting vulnerable segments such as orphans, the widowed, elderly, persons with disabilities, IDPs and the poorest of the poor. The GoU acknowledged that the situation at that time has left a considerable number of persons vulnerable, as community structures were disrupted and family support systems destroyed. Furthermore, paid employment was considered almost non-existent in most parts of the north. The objective of the program was to provide support for vulnerable persons as a means of strengthening their capacity to sustain themselves. Therefore it aimed at promoting employment and labour productivity by targeting people in groups.¹⁶⁷ The sole focus on economic empowerment is not enough, considering that especially vulnerable segments, like children, the elderly or disabled are not in a position to economically become more productive through employment. Even if they are targeted from a group, why should certain segments of the group provide for others if they are not related? In turn, vulnerable segments would need adequate state aid, as well as retirement homes or orphanages.

Regarding the research criteria set out, objective four “*Peace building and reconciliation*” is of special interest as well. The GoU admits that latent conflicts exist between individuals, families, ethnic groups, civilians and government authorities and that particular programs are required to address these conflicts in order to build trust and reconciliation in the community. Unfortunately, the overall institutional approach towards peace building and reconciliation is reflected in the proclaimed connection between the accountable and transparent delivery of the rule of law and basic social services by local authorities, and the strengthening of conflict

¹⁶⁷ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 56-74.

management.¹⁶⁸ This is reflected in the budget of the program where about US\$ 16 million is intended for objective four, while the objective “*Consolidation of state authority*” has an estimated amount of US\$ 105 million at their disposal.¹⁶⁹

Nevertheless, the project envisaged programs aimed more directly at reconciliation, especially for the north central sub-region. The *Public Information, Education and Communication (IEC) and Counselling Program* aimed at increasing information on welfare and income opportunities, as well as land rights through radio or television. One is left to wonder what this information might have been like. Additionally it looked at enhancing provisions of psychosocial, trauma, and other counselling services, at building support mechanisms, assistance for ex-combatant’s reintegration, as well as to ensure that formal and non-formal accountability and justice mechanisms are in place. Besides that, informal leadership among men and women should be established, who in turn were supposed to engage local authorities and civilians.¹⁷⁰

Without specifically addressing any justice mechanisms, or special support to a specific institution apart from the Amnesty Commission, it is stated that local religious, civil, cultural and community leaders should be involved in the mediation of conflicts. The section speaks about harmonization of approaches for e.g. reconciliation, but there is no reference as to what mechanism should be included, apart from drama dances.

The programme in turn is very vague with lots of room for speculation, how formal and informal justice mechanisms, counselling and reconciliation strategies might look like. It is in turn questionable if a budget of about US\$ 85 million for a *Police Force Enhancement Programme* under the “*Consolidation of state authority*” objective, reflects an appropriate target setting compared to about US\$ 6 million for the *Public Information, Education and Communication (IEC) and Counselling Program*.¹⁷¹ It has to be said that these numbers are estimates by the GoU and do not necessarily reflect the reality of money ultimately invested in this areas. A state funded justice, peace or truth commission was not envisaged in the PRDP, although the report states that the Office of the Prime Minister is leading the process

¹⁶⁸ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 94.

¹⁶⁹ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: Statistics: 113-115. Because the translation into dollars show the wrong number in the official document, I translated the envisaged Shillings budget into dollars, which means that the amount of dollars might have been different in 2007 due to a relatively high inflation.

¹⁷⁰ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 94-99.

¹⁷¹ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: Statistics: 113-115

of preparing a Conflict Resolution and Peace building Policy, but there is no such document up to date. Only recently, in May 2013, has the GoU published a draft through the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) for a comprehensive Transitional Justice Policy. The document, which seeks to implement the provisions of the *Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation* of the Juba Peace Agreement, is considered a milestone Africa wide.¹⁷²

The *Demobilization and Re-integration of Ex-Combatants Programme* also belongs to objective four, although it could easily be attributed to objective two. It makes a special reference to the *Amnesty Reintegration Programme* that is implemented by the Amnesty Commission and their strategy of handing out resettlement packages, facilitation of reunifications, and access to existing service providers combined with information campaigns. Under the *Demobilization and Re-integration of Ex-Combatants Programme*, education should be provided for estimated 20% of reporters and skill training for about 50% of ex-combatants. Provisions of support for income generating activities should be given to 30% of the ex-combatants.¹⁷³ It is not clear how and at what point the beneficiaries should be selected: Do these numbers apply to the already returned soldiers, or are future-returning combatants included as well?

Strategic objective number one “*Consolidation of state authority*” includes e.g. the facilitation of peace agreement initiatives, the scaling up of the *Mine Action Program* that was launched in 2005 as well as the *Support for the Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme*. As mentioned earlier an additional objective was the strengthening the Ugandan Police Force including redeployment and training of personnel, the reduction of Auxiliary Forces, community based forces aimed at supporting the UPDF, plus a prison enhancement programme. It also included a *Judicial Service Enhancement Programme* aimed at targeting the problem that too few magistrates are in place, courts are inadequate or vandalized and in some places non-existent. It is not mentioned that Local Council Courts, formalized alternative courts that are much closer to the people, would be strengthened. Last but not least, the local government enhancement program seeks to strengthen local government capacities.¹⁷⁴

Objective two “*Rebuilding and empowering communities*” has the biggest budget with an

¹⁷² Bradfield 2013.

¹⁷³ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 100-102.

¹⁷⁴ Government of Uganda: PRDP 2007: 38-55.

originally estimated US\$ 209 million, while objective four “*Peace building and reconciliation*” has clearly the smallest share, with only US\$ 16 million. These figures relate to the original estimations in the PRDP report and do not reflect an up to date translation into dollars. A briefing note by the Beyond Juba Project from the year 2008 reveals that budgets were significantly cut after the first year of PRDP. Objective four, which already has a very small budget, saw a 9% overall decrease in funding from 2007/08 to 2008/09. The important project Public Information, Education and Communication (IEC) and Counselling Program, did not even have a budget line, in the 2008/09 PRDP budget.¹⁷⁵ In the end the focus was more on infrastructure, building of schools, or the refurbishment of hospitals. The beneficiaries are missing the human aspect in the project. The GoU clearly is involved in the reconciliation process from a non-material perspective. Although the GoU recognised that reintegration - the rebuilding and empowering of communities needs a lot of resources and commitment, it was approached in a short-term manner.

*“That is not reintegration that is re-inserting. You are re-inserting the people into their original homes without providing a way of living, to change their lifestyle and to change economically. So they have still done very little in terms of reintegration.”*¹⁷⁶

The report from the Beyond Juba Project reveals existing confusion at sector, district and community level as to when and how funding arrives, as well as how the implementation is supposed to proceed. Additionally the paper concludes that the envisaged stakeholder inclusion for the draft versions did not take place, while the first general planning discussion for the PRDP, among all stakeholders, was not held until February 2008. The paper states that according to a report by the Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), “*few, if any, consultations were held with the communities that are supposed to benefit from the program as consultations stopped at district level.*”¹⁷⁷ The fact that communities were not consulted resulted in the blockade of some projects, like in Amoro, where the GoU planned to invest in sugar production in order to create jobs. Until today the community has rejected the envisaged production plant on the grounds that this would have been land grabbing. This reflects the problem, that despite good intentions, a project can fail without consulting the community to agree on a common way of implementing a project.

¹⁷⁵ Beyond Juba Project 2008: 4-8.

¹⁷⁶ Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

¹⁷⁷ Beyond Juba Project 2008: 4-8.

Complementary to the Beyond Juba findings, throughout my research people only knew very little about PRDP, while some community members knew absolutely nothing about it. When people were asked about PRDP, they mentioned infrastructure programmes, police training and sometimes education. Education was stated more often in comparison to other aspects, although it came with a lot of criticism. The GoU provided for free primary education, but the exemption applies to school fees only, while the parents are still responsible to make for contributions, like paying for schoolbooks. Additionally the number is limited to four children that can make use of free primary education. Besides that, some schools were reportedly built but they lacked equipment or even teachers and are now in a state of decay. Other components that are envisaged by the PRDP report are either not in place or the community lacks information about which projects are financed by PRDP. Many are wondering if PRDP even exists. They clearly cannot grasp the impact or say that they have benefited from the program.

A common criticism is that the PRDP included too many diverse districts as to really have an impact on the region that was worst affected by the LRA rebellion. Initially eight districts should have been targeted, but the PRDP was stretched to forty districts, which is simply too much. Additionally corruption is mentioned in each and every conversation about PRDP. The fact that many ministries, as well as local government units were included, results in the unfortunate effect that substantial amounts of money is diverted from official resources. Furthermore, it seems that some regions and projects are favoured above others. Then, there is the issue of monitoring which is clearly lacking. There were few inspectors that came down to the ground and monitored the implementation process, outputs, the outcomes and the impact according to clear targets and indicators. Therefore no evaluation or recommendations exist.

“(...) so you find some cases, where people are coming for a monitoring visit and you will find people rushing, the officers rushing and convincing farmers, even bribing some farmers to pretend that this is their project. They will come and take pictures there. It is very bad. That means you don't monitor the process. They are taking them to someone's farm and showing him that this is the project. It is a big failure.”¹⁷⁸

The overall framework itself can be considered good, although it clearly fails to address the importance of land conflicts. At the time of planning this might not have been such a serious issue, but with a clear monitoring policy it should have been recognised. Additionally

¹⁷⁸ Benard Okot, Senior Research and Advocacy Officer, leading the psychosocial component of the Beyond Juba II Project at the Refugee Law Project. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

agriculture, probably the most important sector in Uganda, comes up short compared to the potential this sector has, especially in the Acholi sub-region. There is no such thing as a general rural agriculture strategy. Furthermore, some programme approaches are rather vague without a clear reference to the target group, or how projects are going to be implemented. The output is described in detail, but the activities to get there are laid out only in a very superficial manner. For example, PRDP suggested ensuring formal and non-formal accountability and justice mechanisms, but there was no clear vision how this might look like in practice. What can be considered positive is that, in theory, PRDP takes on a comprehensive approach that seeks e.g. to combine economic aspects with issues of reintegration. Unfortunately, planning is one thing, but the implementation phase is the most critical aspect and this is clearly where the PRDP comes up short. Corruption and mismanagement are the biggest impediments. The situation in northern Uganda is better nowadays, mostly because people managed to stand on their own feet again and not because government initiatives stabilised the situation.

5.2.2 Local Level

5.2.2.1 Religious Peace Building

The peace process in northern Uganda was and is strongly influenced by religious interfaith groups. The role of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) are examined in closer detail. The UJCC is an ecumenical organization that was established in 1963 in the wake of the conflict between and among faith communities after Uganda's independence. Its current membership comprises of the Church of Uganda, the Roman Catholic Church and the Uganda Orthodox Church, which together constitute about 78% of Uganda's population. The council acknowledges the need to work towards interfaith understanding and promoting togetherness in order to live in harmony.¹⁷⁹ ARLPI is an umbrella organization of the major religious denominations in northern Uganda, namely Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox, Pentecostal, Seventh Day Adventists and Muslim faith, that was formed in 1997 as a pro-active response to the on-going conflict and the mass suffering it caused.¹⁸⁰ The group has its roots in the Religious Peace Leaders Initiative, originally from Kitgum, who found that it would be important for the religious leaders to speak with one voice on behalf of the voiceless. One of the first moves by this group was a

¹⁷⁹ Uganda Joint Christian Council. <http://www.ujcc.co.ug/more2.htm> Accessed 09.02.2014

¹⁸⁰ Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative. <http://www.arlpi.org/about-us> Accessed 09.02.2014

joint prayer. In the beginning, the participation of the Muslims was rather hard to understand for the Christian majority, but the strong belief in unity, equality and communality, regardless of tribe, ethnicity, colour, nationality, even religion, is a principle that guides ARLPI until today. For them, religion is especially seen as a factor of unity, something that brings people together. Although the group's unusual diversity met challenges in the beginning, they forced people to look at things they have in common instead of factors that divide them. From the beginning on, the group publicly condemned the GoU's policy of military conflict resolution and establishment of protracted camps.¹⁸¹ As the rebellion spread from Acholi into Lango and into Teso, similar forums of leaders were formed in those sub-regions.

In order to understand ARLPI activities, it is important to look at their strong stance regarding a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Despite their ideal of coming together as a group, while each of the member denominations freely exercises their religion, they were very clear about the way forward to put an end to the conflict: Peace can only be achieved by peaceful means, reconciliation and forgiveness, negotiation, dialogue, mutual respect and a clear impartiality on their side. ARLPI came into existence because people were suffering and therefore they looked at themselves as people, who are active on behalf of the population in order to be accountable to the grassroots. Their clearly stated desire is to use their position as religious leaders to give a voice to the voiceless in an effort to affect change for the betterment of all.¹⁸² As laid out before, ARLPI worked very hard to campaign, especially for the Amnesty Act, stating that they were listening to calls from the community. The group managed to engage with the local communities through their faith rather than solely through humanist or secular values and methods regarding peace building.

Advocacy is one of the major activities of religious groups in general. Both UJCC and ARLPI started their engagement by advocating for issues that are of crucial importance to them. It was around the year 2000 as internally displacement intensified, when the council felt that it was not a matter to be left to the religious leaders in the north, already consisting of UJCC member churches, and that there was need to mobilize Ugandans on a much greater scale. This could only be achieved if the council was able to speak on conflict-related problems in northern Uganda with a united voice. When they came together, around 2005, and thought about ways the church can actually get involved into this matter with a view to seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict, they started a program with some funding from Christian

¹⁸¹ Kandyomunda 2004: 4.

¹⁸² Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative. <http://www.arlpi.org/about-us/advocay> Accessed 09.02.2014

Aid UK that aimed to collect data on the plight of the IDPs. A group of forty people was trained, who were deployed in different areas to monitor the situation of the internally displaced people in the camps. The aim was to collect data in order to design an appropriate advocacy intervention. The research resulted in a report that was presented at the general assembly of the UJCC to inform the broader church about the worrying conditions in the IDP camps.

“Worrying because it was like a death trap. There was extreme suffering characterized by shortage of food, water, and firewood. Sanitation was very poor. Social services were virtually paralyzed. At that time, so many people, especially children were dying because of these very horrible conditions. Things were extremely bad!”¹⁸³

As a result a task force comprised of the member churches led by the now retired bishop Zac Niringiye from the dioceses of Kampala was established to first of all get people in the rest of the country to know what was happening and to sensitize people about the plight in the camp. Secondly, they started to engage with various stakeholders to address the refugees’ humanitarian concerns. Apart from that, the council started to look at the broader issues of peace building and conflict resolution. For example the UJCC came up with an extensive Framework for Dialogue on Reconciliation and Peace in Northern Uganda, containing views on broader aspects resolving the conflict, promoting alternative means of justice, guided by a post-conflict transitional justice law as a basis for a Transitional Justice Commission. Meanwhile the task force started moving around and holding workshops in order to sensitize the people and eventually public opinion slowly started to change. It needs to be said, that at that time, large parts of the country knew almost nothing about the situation in northern Uganda.

“We also had a documentary depicting the situation in the camps. We would begin the workshop by showing the documentary. And, so many people were extremely shocked that things were that bad; a significant number confessed saying, ‘we can’t believe this because the official information we are getting from the government is not what we are seeing’.”¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ Canon Joseph Oneka, Head of Human Rights and Good Governance Department at Uganda Joint Christian Council. Field Research Kampala: August 2013.

¹⁸⁴ Canon Joseph Oneka, Head of Human Rights and Good Governance Department at Uganda Joint Christian Council. Field Research Kampala: August 2013.

Apart from the task force information campaign, they organized a trip for people from the member churches from south-western Uganda to visit the north so that they could see for themselves. Again people confessed that they could not believe what they have seen and some of them became ambassadors, who in turn started to share testimonies, talk to the people, and mobilize their respective communities. The UJCC raised awareness in the rest of the country, thereby reinforcing voices that could put pressure on the GoU. ARLPI similarly did a lot of advocacy at the initial stage, addressing different audiences to ensure that the conflict attracts more attention. They wrote pastoral letters urging the LRA to stop the killing but also pressuring the GoU and the international community to resort to a peaceful resolution, as well as to look at the socio-economic needs of the people. Whatever went wrong ALPRI spoke on it and condemned it strongly. Another way of advocacy for both groups were peace prayers.

During the conflict people, and especially children, used to come in large numbers from the villages at night to sleep in the towns, looking for safety. They would sleep in hospitals, schools or in bus parks. In order to draw attention to the phenomena of the so-called “night commuters” and to show solidarity, the ARLPI bishops slept alongside the children for one night, on a veranda. Archbishop John Baptist Odama opted not to carry a blanket with him, but instead wrapped his legs in a nylon sack just like most of the children would do in order to keep warm for the night.¹⁸⁵ The pictures of the bishops sleeping alongside children attracted the attention of international news. Reportedly it created a lot of attention and increased support, especially because the GoU used to play the conflict down, arguing that the LRA could easily be contained.

5.2.2.1.1 Addressing Broader Issues of Peace Building

Contradicting Mohammed Abu-Nimer's findings in his chapter about religion and peace building in the Routledge Handbook on Peace building, that religious actors tend to focus on advocacy while avoiding government confrontation or joining nonviolence resistance campaigns, religious actors in Uganda were the most active and prominent participants at the forefront of this particular area.¹⁸⁶ In 2002, eight years after Betty Bigombe initiated talks with the LRA, the rebels themselves approached ARLPI, asking them to talk to and mediate between them and the GoU. They approached the GoU who accepted the proposal if the group was really able to get the LRA to the negotiation table. So they went ahead and held

¹⁸⁵ Ogora 2012.

¹⁸⁶ Abu-Nimer 2013: 70-72.

several meetings with the LRA, who agreed that copies of the talks were made and handed over to the President. What happened next was a scenario that repeated itself several times.

The first time a meeting was about to be conducted, a commander wanted to talk with a priest. When a father went to the bush to talk with the commander, immediately an attack by the GoU was launched on their position. The commander managed to get away, but the level of trust was significantly reduced between the rebels, ARLPI and the GoU. The rebels accused ARLPI of using them as a bait for the GoU, but later on they realized that the religious leaders really were impartial and were themselves victim of the attack, because the father was arrested himself. When talks were scheduled for a second time in 2003, and the religious leaders, together with other representatives, went to witness the talks between the GoU and twenty-seven LRA commanders, again they were hindered in reaching Pajule, where the talks should have taken place, because of a military attack.

The peace process was delayed again and the LRA moved to eastern Uganda, committing atrocities there, which created bitter enmity between the Acholi and the Teso people. To counter this level of anger, the religious leaders went and talked to representatives from Teso and broadcast radio shows, sharing their own testimonies, to clarify that the Acholi people themselves were victims of this conflict. After that ARLPI once again approached the LRA, together with Betty Bigome and representatives from Sant'Egidio in Rome. For the first time, in 2004, the GoU and the rebel representatives met face to face. The GoU in an attempt to make the LRA sign a Memorandum of Understanding, a document they had not seen before, resulted in protests by the LRA. By December 2005, the GoU once again bombarded LRA positions. The UPDF and the LRA went on to lead offensives against each other. Throughout all these initiatives, the UJCC also tried to engage the GoU directly, pressuring them to talk with the rebels and explore ways of resolving this conflict peacefully. The GoU reportedly was very reluctant, discrediting the rebels as terrorist and killers. UJCC used of means available to them, from quiet diplomacy, to press conferences, to publishing papers.

After the peace process was delayed once again, South Sudan's President Salva Kiir and his Vice President Riek Machar took the initiative and convinced Museveni to agree to peace talks that would be hosted in Juba, with Machar as the main mediator. This was the beginning of the Juba Peace talks. Both the UJCC and ARLPI played their part during the peace talks. During the talks both groups functioned as peace observers and occasionally advised the LRA

delegation on various matters. At times when the LRA threatened to withdraw or actually withdrew from the talks the religious groups took advantage of their impartiality and mediated successfully to get the LRA back to the negotiating table. For example the UJCC held a four-day workshop with the LRA delegation on matters of the ICC because the rebels barely had any information about the functioning of the court. Apart from that, the UJCC organized an ecumenical service at the All Saints Cathedral in Juba that brought together the Government team and the LRA. They took it as an opportunity to convey a message to encourage both parties to work together. Apart from ARLPI and UJCC, many other NGOs and countries were involved in the Juba talks. Neither ARLPI nor UJCC prided themselves with their efforts, but acknowledged that it was the combined effort of different actors that made the peace process possible and both do feel very sorry that the Juba peace talks were not concluded.

What conclusion can be drawn from this narrative? Both groups emerged out of a sheer need and did engage very actively inside various institutional arrangements (ARPLI engaged e.g. with the UN and the ICC), as well as with the GoU and the rebels. They managed to get the warring parties together and to play a mediator role due to their credibility that built upon religious views. Both groups, but especially ARLPI, are deeply rooted in their communities with strong ties to the people. By most estimates, 90% of the Acholi belong to the religious faiths that are part of the group, furnishing the leadership with strategic institutional networks to mobilize for peace and reconciliation.¹⁸⁷

“ (...) because they didn't have a voice that could carry their wishes and desires far. It was more our group who could do it. We thought that was an advantage. And the group of the ARLPI, we always took ourselves as people who were active on behalf of the population, and that is why the two sides came to realize, we were really for the good of the people and not to be politicized or polarized to go for this group or that group.”¹⁸⁸

Both groups played a key factor in unlocking a deep-rooted conflict, despite the fact that it was not a conflict along religious lines. Their dialogue programs helped to break the negative images to humanize the perceived “other“ in form of the enemy advocated for justice and human rights and supported non-violent resistance.¹⁸⁹ They effectively managed to build trust and confidence. Besides advocacy and mediation, both groups developed frameworks for a

¹⁸⁷ Kandyomunda 2004: 4:3.

¹⁸⁸ Archbishop John Baptist Odama, Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative (ARLPI). Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

¹⁸⁹ Abu-Nimer 2013: 70-72.

further conflict resolution. Although this is a great example of religious interfaith groups engaged in peace building, it has to be mentioned that achievements are partly the result of a few very charismatic individuals strongly believing in humanity and peace.

“In a peace process, our role as a church is to remain available to both parties to the conflict so that we can mediate and help to resolve issues that sparked off the conflict in a peaceful manner. But also- as you may know- where there is conflict there are those who suffer and yet their voices are not heard. It is also our obligation to see that the voice of the voiceless that are caught up in a situation of war can be heard and their needs taken into account by the parties in conflict. I think these are the important roles we can play: mediation and advocacy for those who are unable to speak out for themselves.”¹⁹⁰

5.2.2.1.2 Peace Building and Development Initiatives

Despite the failure of the Juba talks, a relative peace came into existence in northern Uganda and ARLPI developed further to manage aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. Up until now, ARLPI's activities range from reconciliation and mediation efforts to classical development work. In the post-conflict, ARLPI could build upon its perception as a neutral actor to mediate arising conflicts at community level. ARLPI conducts mediations, peace trainings, and in conflict resolutions through peace committees set up with communities who in turn mediate in land disputes and other related conflicts within the communities, facilitate dialogue, and promote customary cultural dispute resolution of conflicts.¹⁹¹ Equipping people with conflict handling mechanisms strengthens them. If a serious conflict cannot be resolved through these committees, the religious leaders themselves get involved to handle the matter. Large parts of Uganda are very religious and therefore many people seek help from their respective churches, not only with regard to visible conflicts, but also for counselling purposes.

Neuner et. al found in their study about Cen that 70.2% of those who had ever sought help for spirit possession, looked for help from a church or a priest, contrary to 7.9% that conducted Mato Oput, a traditional reconciliation ritual.¹⁹² This can also be attributed to a larger

¹⁹⁰ Canon Joseph Oneka, Head of Human Rights and Good Governance Department at Uganda Joint Christian Council. Field Research Kampala: August 2013.

¹⁹¹ Insight Conflict. <http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/uganda/peace-building-organizations/arlpi/> Additional information about ARLPI resolving land conflicts: Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative <http://www.arlpi.org/land-conflict-1> Accessed 09.02.2014

¹⁹² Neuner et. al 2012: 551.

availability of churches and religious personnel, contrary to the cultural leaders who perform Mato Oput. Apart from that, external factors can result in the fact that not everybody is eligible to perform the ritual, while there are no restrictions for someone choosing the religious way of confessing and asking for forgiveness. Therefore, various religious leaders seek to facilitate people with their confessions, primarily in front of god, but also before the communities where atrocities were committed, who are then asked for forgiveness. Religious leaders then seek to talk with both sides and mediate between them, to encourage a successful reintegration. Nevertheless, it is rather difficult to trace the impact of such interventions. Although the Anglican Church was reluctant in the beginning, they supported and facilitated traditional justice mechanisms eventually.

Nowadays ARLPI mainly works to resolve land conflicts, issues of HIV/AIDS prevention and women empowerment. With the effect of the war in northern Uganda, women suffered a lot, therefore ARLPI tries to empower women through a multi-year program (2009-2013) funded by NORAD (Norway), with funds channelled through CARE Uganda, called 'Roco Kwo', Acholi for 'Transforming Lives'. The project seeks to raise women's participation in various areas, such as development, social and economic decision-making through training, provision of life skills, how to start a business or how to improve farming methods. The project also covers the Village Saving and Loan Skill programme (VSLs), where groups of about fifteen people come together and start saving small amounts on a weekly basis, outside formal bank procedures. If a person of the group has a problem, he or she can borrow the money and pay it back later without paying interest rates. Alternatively the micro credit program does not force people to encumber themselves with debts and the money circulates among the people.

This shows how ARLPI has successfully managed to transform their role. Despite their initial purpose of seeking a means to end the conflict, they developed institutionally and continue to be an active part of the civil society. Similarly, UJCC engages in development work, but not specifically directed at northern Uganda.

5.2.2.2 Acholi Approaches to Justice, Reconciliation and Reintegration

5.2.2.2.1 The Role of Traditional Leaders

Beginning in the mid-1990s and throughout on-going violence, Acholi religious, cultural, and local government leaders openly promoted tradition-based rituals to be applied for war-related justice, reconciliation and reintegration.¹⁹³ This section focuses on the role of traditional leaders, such as the cultural leaders and elders and their institution Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), with regard to traditional approaches to reconciliation and justice, particularly the process of Mato Oput, Acholi for ‘drinking the bitter root’. Furthermore, the relationship between the cultural and the religious leaders will be evaluated and challenges as well as added value of traditional justice approaches will be discussed. The adjective ‘traditional’ here refers to activities, a given society used in the past to restore broken relationships or to deal with interruptions in everyday life and that are passed on from generation to generation based on cultural values and believes.

Erin Baines, for example, prefers to use the notion ‘local’, because traditional is often understood to be the opposite of modern.¹⁹⁴ Here ‘local’ is another attribute for traditional approaches because the rituals presented can be attributed to a given area. In the Acholi sub-region, rituals are practiced locally in a sense that common characteristics of the rituals do not appear nationwide, but instead belong to an ethnicity and their ‘native’ region. Although there are specific characteristics of the rituals that can vary slightly in the region, the overall framework stays the same. The notion tradition is important, because the circumstances in which rituals are perceived as traditional in turn gives them their meaning. It is in fact the reason why, they are so important for many Acholi people, who continue to hold sophisticated cultural beliefs in the spiritual world, which greatly shape their perceptions of truth, justice, forgiveness and reconciliation.¹⁹⁵ As we will see, the fact that something is considered as traditional does not necessarily mean that it is stable and unchangeable, but instead traditional approaches are in turn influenced by the circumstances in a given time. They are in fact more fluid than most Acholi would like to acknowledge. Traditional mechanisms as part of culture can never be rigid, inflexible and enduring because culture in itself is always bound to change.

¹⁹³ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 4.

¹⁹⁴ Baines 2007: 69.

¹⁹⁵ Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. 2005: ii.

Instead the term ‘alternative justice’ is avoided because traditional approaches will be conceptualized as complementary to ‘formal’ mechanisms of justice.

KKA is the cultural institution of the Acholi comprising of 52 chiefs (Rwodi), historically the clan leaders, elders and the Paramount Chief (Lawirwodi). KKA dates its existence back to 1400 AD, arising from the migration of the Luo ethnic group. While the clan system, headed by a chief whose position is inherited patrilineally is clearly an old manifestation, the position of the Paramount Chief as head of the clan leaders was installed in 2000, five years after the recognition of the cultural institution of the Acholi people in the 1995 constitution of Uganda under Article 246.¹⁹⁶ The Paramount Chief, currently H.H. Rwot David Onen Acana II, is voted by the Rwodi and installed as a ‘king figure’ who presides over the cultural institution. This in turn is a good example of an adaption of tradition in order to function as an institution, tasked with the preservation and promotion of the culture and tradition of the Acholi people.¹⁹⁷ Traditionally the chiefs intervened before a fight between or within clans could escalate. Elders of a particular area, in turn, would generally be consulted for advice or resolution regarding smaller conflicts and everyday problems such as domestic violence, quarrels or the breaking of social taboos. Elders at the clan level address those quarrels that cannot be solved at the compound level, or which involve conflicts over land, food or water. Conflicts that involve more than one clan, including inter-clan killing or serious injuries involving compensation, are brought to the Council of Elders that serves the cultural chiefs.¹⁹⁸

The Acholi society has many processes concerning reconciliation and traditional cleansing. They will be described to the best knowledge of the author. When people are coming back from captivity a frequently practiced ritual is Nyono Tong Gweno, commonly translated as ‘stepping on the egg of a chicken’ or just ‘stepping on an egg’. The egg symbolizes the innocence and the stepping on it, the destruction of life. This should either remind you that you destroyed life or in turn can symbolize that you are now as innocent as the egg. Additionally the returnee has to step or jump over opobo, a slippery branch or a slice of bamboo or a certain tree that is usually put in a crossroad. After performing this ritual, the returnee can be welcomed home. The Acholi believe that once you have stepped on the egg, you are cleansed from your wrongdoings, but it is just the preliminary stage of accepting somebody home. After this first initiation with the family, some former soldiers seek

¹⁹⁶ Ker Kwaro Acholi. http://kerkwaroacholi.co.ug/about_us.html Accessed 09.02.2014

¹⁹⁷ Ker Kwaro Acholi. http://kerkwaroacholi.co.ug/about_us.html Accessed 09.02.2014

¹⁹⁸ Baines 2007: 103-104.

reconciliation on a greater scale with the relatives or the clan of the people that he has killed.

Traditionally the ritual of Mato Oput, which is a whole process, was performed between groups of people from different clans after a killing occurred. It can be either the victim's relatives, who identify somebody as the killer and report to the elders, who in turn become active or a perpetrator himself seeks help from the KKA or elders, to whom he has to admit his crimes. An important component is that Mato Oput is always voluntary. In the context of the LRA conflict, it is generally the perpetrator that approaches the cultural institution to facilitate the process of finding his victim's relatives. At this stage, the first challenge is identifying the group with which the perpetrator can perform Mato Oput, because he might have killed more than one person and the chances are high that he does not know their identity. The cultural leaders in turn decide if Mato Oput can take place, a process that is subjected much discussion between elders and KKA members. If it is agreed that the ritual can in theory take place, they begin the search for his victim's relatives.

Once they are identified, the perpetrator has to acknowledge all his wrongdoings and give details about what, how, where and why he did it in front of his victim's relatives. Telling the truth is vital. Thereby he has to accept his crimes, come out with the truth, repent and promise never to do it again. Then the process of negotiation over the compensation that should be paid begins. This is the next critical and most important stage of Mato Oput. The negotiations can take weeks or even years until agreement is reached between the perpetrator's family (or clan) and his victim's family (or clan). The compensation usually involves a certain amount of money or/and livestock, in the form of cows, goats, sheep or chicken, which has to be paid by the clan or family of the perpetrator.

By involving the whole clan, forgiveness takes place on a greater scale and not just one on one. It is ultimately participative and restorative because it seeks to repair the community as a whole (as discussed earlier, a person's crime usually extends to the whole family). At the last stage, a ritual of cleansing takes place, where usually both sides drink a brew consisting of a bitter herb to wash away the bitterness. Often an animal, a goat or a sheep is slaughtered and is divided between the two groups to symbolize exchange. The climax of the process is the sharing of a meal together. In some cases, when communities are fighting each other, Gomo Tong, Acholi for 'bending of the spear', takes place. The former 'warring' parties take up a spear and direct it against themselves, to symbolize that this spear will not be used against

your enemy, because when you were fighting the spear was facing your enemy and now the spear is facing you. This shows that no weapon will ever be used against each other.

A research study about community perspectives on Mato Oput, from the Mato Oput Project, where 513 people participated in 101 focus group discussions and 33 in-depth individual interviews, found that participants frequently declared the significance of elders and KKA in heading the negotiation or mediation processes. About 63% of participants directly mentioned the role of a mediator, and of those slightly more than 50% highlighted the primary role of KKA. Most frequently, participants noted the importance of their local elders (85%). KKA often executively officiates the ceremony, whereas elders almost always managed the mediation process between the two clans involved. Less than half noted the role of the local chief.¹⁹⁹ Trust and respect for elders and cultural leaders is generally high, but as outlined in the chapter in community security, the fact that people live in the camps significantly hindered cultural practices and diminished respect for elders. Especially youth, who are the main beneficiaries of traditional justice rituals, seem to know little about it. However, the majority of them seem to be confident about its function in promoting war-related reconciliation and justice.²⁰⁰ The renewal of traditional approaches can therefore be seen as an attempt to revive and restore the Acholi culture. Although that is not always the case, Erin Baines unfortunately found that elders could be driven by their own economic needs and a desire to earn money through supervising or performing traditional rituals. Their demands in turn can make the process unaffordable for some people.²⁰¹ They are not immune to corruption either. Neither is the cultural institution KKA that is dealing with a major corruption scandal at the moment involving the paramount chief, although institution members are undertaking measures to restore the credibility of KKA.

A study called 'Roco Wat I Acoli' on traditional justice and reintegration from the year 2005, including interviews with 120 cultural leaders and elders, 506 formerly abducted, 3 former LRA commanders, 80 displaced persons and an array of religious groups and NGOs, concluded that approaches are often commenced in an ad-hoc fashion, while lacking harmonization and synergies with other prevailing efforts, thereby reflecting an institutional weakness of KKA. It is stated that the organization must begin to define a unified, consensual vision of not only cultural contributions to the reintegration process, but also of how to adjust

¹⁹⁹ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 14.

²⁰⁰ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 13.

²⁰¹ Baines 2007: 111.

a traditional justice mechanism.²⁰² Tim Allen concludes in a critical publication called “The ‘invention’ of Acholi traditional justice” that the formalization of selected rituals may result in a pseudo-traditional system that loses its flexibility and that those who are promoting such an agenda are, in turn, those who might gain local political influence: notably the newly created council of traditional chiefs. He also finds that current debates about who should interpret traditional justice are part of a longer standing local contest about who should interpret the Acholi spirit world and traditional customs of social life, while discussions about ritual practices in scientific papers oversee these frictions, implying far greater consensus than is actually the case.²⁰³

Nevertheless, Acholi participants think very highly of their clan elders and KKA. They seek advice about how Mato Oput can be applied, as well as guidance for the education of youth and returnees about cultural practices. The fact that people appreciate and approach the institution suggests that it is critical for the local leadership to be available. The Mato Oput Project recommends fostering capacity-building and education with increased roles and responsibilities for clan and other community leaders if Mato Oput is to be applied to war offences, instead of codifying ritual practices.²⁰⁴ Strengthening local institutions makes sense because they are going to be present, even if NGO support is withdrawn, which is already the case in northern Uganda. Land conflicts, which are particularly prominent at the moment, could be diminished if awareness and sensitization are increased through community leaders, local leaders, traditional leaders and chiefs, because people tend to pay more attention to them than to government officials. So far the GoU is not paying adequate attention to skills and resources provision, which could resolve and mediate conflicts more effectively locally. Strengthening traditional leaders means strengthening their ability to act on behalf of others.

Regarding relations with the church, the acceptance of Mato Oput among the religious denominations is generally high, although especially the Anglican Church had their reservations in the beginning. It was only the Pentecostal and the Born Again Christians that completely rejected being involved on the grounds that practicing such rituals was associated with something unchristian or satanic. As Archbishop John Baptist Odama of the Catholic Church in Gulu told me, the Christians saw it in the context of Christian values: Accepting guilt, being open about the wrongdoing and asking for forgiveness. They appreciated the

²⁰² Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. 2005: ii-iii.

²⁰³ Allen 2010: 253-254.

²⁰⁴ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 36.

culture of the community and found that it would be favourable to work within it. While the Anglican Church was more reserved about it, proponents like the now retired Rt. Anglican Bishop Macleod Baker Ochola II of the dioceses of Kitgum facilitated and witnessed traditional rituals, especially in very difficult situations. Traditional and religious approaches to reconciliation or counselling coexist in northern Uganda. While they are clearly separate processes, individuals may seek help from both sides. The decision to seek help from a priest or to approach the cultural leaders is left to the individual as the following citations illustrate:

“As ALPRI we work with the cultural leaders. It depends on the choice of that person. If the person says I believe in prayers, so the religious leaders make a healing prayer for that person. But when he says, I think I am part of my tradition and the traditional reconciliation has to take place, we facilitate the traditional leaders to carry out traditional cleansing, then after that sometimes the actual reconciliation, we call it ‘Mato Oput’ takes place and then the people reconcile and then they gradually begin to live together.”²⁰⁵

“Well the choice has to be with the person involved. If he chooses the traditional way there are the people who can do it and as a priest I wouldn't stop him, because then you would be interfering with the recovery process. If he wants to do the traditional let him go, because at this stage it is still treatment. You don't want to interfere with the progress of somebody's treatment.”²⁰⁶

On the one hand the religious leaders who accepted the traditional approaches simply wanted to reduce the cost of fighting while rejection on the other hand would have meant to be left out of the process instead of looking for some kind of integration.

5.2.2.2.2 Challenges and Added Value

In addition to my findings, the Mato Oput Project found that most people reject the fact that the custom of Mato Oput can differ between clans although minor variations do exist. But, most importantly, the basic meaning of Mato Oput is unvarying. The process aims to achieve forgiveness, justice, and healing while ultimately reconciling parties and re-establishing relationships shattered due to a killing.²⁰⁷ The seemingly existing wish to preserve the pure traditional approaches to reconciliation is reflected in the discussion on the possibility of

²⁰⁵ Francis Lokwiya, Programme Coordinator Acholi Religious Peace Leaders Initiative. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

²⁰⁶ Interview. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

²⁰⁷ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 6.

making changes in the light of the post-conflict situation. Most people deny the fact that Mato Oput has to be used more flexible to successfully be applied. Interestingly, the Mato Oput Project finds, that the same people who deny modifications are making suggestions for changes, such as the possibility for NGOs or the GoU to pay compensation.²⁰⁸

Compensation is one of the most critical, but also on of the weakest points of Mato Oput, because in a state of widespread poverty and the significant reduction of livestock, it can be very hard to meet the demands. The Mato Oput Project found that 78% of participants believe that the underlying meaning of Mato Oput and compensation will stay the same if NGOs deliver the compensation instead of the perpetrator's clan or family. Out of these, 25% favoured the idea of the perpetrator coming up with parts of the compensation, with an NGO providing the remaining costs. The 20% of partakers who felt that NGO compensation funds would change the meaning, view that the struggle to come up with compensation is part of the responsibility and reflects the strong commitment to be reconciled and forgiven.²⁰⁹ Because Mato Oput involves the wider family of a person, somebody without a family to accompany and/or support the person will meet major challenges. Another big question involves child mothers and rape victims because there are practically no cultural initiatives that could facilitate their reintegration.

An already existing alteration of Mato Oput is that originally it was performed when the fighting was over, which is clearly not the case. Rituals were undertaken while the LRA was still active in northern Uganda. Even now the LRA continues their guerrilla fighting in other countries. The 'Roco Wat I Acoli' study, found that dozens of elders across Acholiland almost universally expressed the opinion that there was little sense in pursuing Mato Oput on a case-by-case basis as too many people had been killed and it was therefore difficult to trace who had killed whom and which clans to engage.²¹⁰ Therefore large-scale group Nyono Tong Gweno has already taken place, and the possibility for large-scale group Mato Oput is discussed. The Mato Oput project found that Mato Oput is seen as an option for offences such as massacres and or other crimes that might demand a large-scale ceremony, despite the fact that there are no precedents, at least at the time of their study in 2007. For them, this reflects a will on side of the population to think creatively. The persisting tension nowadays, between the efforts to realize peace by any means and opposing changes to culture at the same time, is

²⁰⁸ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 6.

²⁰⁹ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 27.

²¹⁰ Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. 2005. Cited by Baines 2007: 105.

a frequent theme in the report.²¹¹

Traditional rituals can be useful because they resemble and take upon the spiritual order and practice the LRA elite leaders established to tie children to the group as well as to sustain the cohesion of the group. The common view that the LRA is made up of a bunch of primitive religious fanatics, whose actions are influenced by irrational madness, is opposed to a very rational logic of the LRA ruling elite that can be identified on closer inspection. In general, little is known about the motivation and structure of the LRA and the rare knowledge that exists was reconstructed mostly from retrospective narratives of former members. Nevertheless, some practices of the LRA in dealing with abducted children can be identified and these clearly show the importance of rituals and spiritual beliefs. The experience of traditional rituals upon return can be helpful to cope with psychological issues, especially for soldiers who spend a long time inside the LRA structures. Erin Baines also has a very interesting approach towards the fact that Acholi people seek help in traditional approaches. She refers to Sverker Finnström book “Living with Bad Surroundings“ who argues that:

“With each attempt to preserve a cultural practice in the brutality of the conflict, or to embrace one to counterbalance the misfortunes that arise, people are exercising agency, seeking to cope with intolerable surroundings.”²¹²

She argues that it is critical to investigate cultural practices, despite existing challenges, because they can offer a view on how Acholi people reconcile themselves in the context of the conflict, thereby seeking to regain control over their lives.²¹³ Therefore traditional approaches can not only help to resolve deep rooted conflicts, thereby dealing with a person’s feelings of guilt, it can also be seen as a form of agency, were people become active on their own behalf in an attempt to restore their dignity. A genuine Mato Oput did not take place in northern Uganda, but probably this is not what is needed. What is important is that people who want to go this way find the necessary support.

²¹¹ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 22-36.

²¹² Sverker Finnström 2008.

²¹³ Baines 2007: 111-112.

5.2.2.2.3 Restorative and Retributive Justice

The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, signed in Juba in 2007, states that it is driven by the need for adopting an appropriate justice mechanism, including customary processes of accountability. Point 3.1 specifically mentions traditional justice mechanisms that shall be promoted as a central part of the framework for accountability and reconciliation.²¹⁴ Allan argues that codifying traditional justice mechanism is a difficult and a highly critical step due to questions of who is eligible to do this, especially when incorporating a traditional justice mechanism into Ugandan law. He questions if it is wise to leave the Acholi population with their ‘own traditional justice’ while the rest of the country resorts to formal justice mechanisms.²¹⁵

Nevertheless, most Ugandans, not only those in northern Uganda, more or less reject the formal court system on the basis that it is corrupted, politically biased and lacks impartiality due to widespread government influence. The formal courts are considered selective by favouring rich people. In that context, it is no wonder that people who are frustrated with the formal justice system favour resorting to a traditional justice mechanism. In the absence of formal justice processes in northern Uganda, and of a functioning democratic dispensation in that region, the Acholi people have coped with everyday life of violent conflict by relying on ‘culturally informed practices’.²¹⁶ The third large-scale population-based survey on attitudes about social reconstruction and justice in northern Uganda called “Transitioning to Peace” in 2010, that interviewed a total of 2,498 participants in 2010, found that nearly half of respondents (49%) said they had no understanding at all about Uganda’s formal justice structures, and another 29% understood “very little” about it. Similar surveys were conducted in 2005 and 2007.²¹⁷

While Allan concludes that evidence from his fieldwork in the region suggests that new modes of conflict resolution (or public welcoming ceremonies) are not significant, the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) report suggests that 64% of participants think that traditional and cultural ceremonies can contribute to peace through promoting unity, togetherness and

²¹⁴ Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the GoU and the LRA.

http://www.amicc.org/docs/Agreement_on_Accountability_and_Reconciliation.pdf Accessed on 09.02.14
Accessed 09.02.2014

²¹⁵ Allen 2010: 250-260.

²¹⁶ Baines 2007: 114.

²¹⁷ Pham/Vinck 2010: 40.

further cementing reconciliation.²¹⁸ The “Transitioning to Peace” study also finds that traditional justice mechanisms, such as ceremonies, have been advanced as a way to deal with LRA combatants. About half of respondents (53%) regarded such mechanisms as helpful for this purpose. A majority of respondents said such ceremonies aided the community to reconcile (39%) and pardon the wrongdoer (25%). However, one in three (31%) said it did not make change at all. Among all respondents, 47% further said they had taken part in such ceremonies at least once. They most frequently identified “Slaughtering of the Goat” (21%), “Stepping on the Egg” (14%), and Mato Oput (13%).

When respondents were asked about their favoured accountability mechanisms, the highest proportion favoured peace with amnesty (45%) over peace with a truth-seeking mechanism (32%), peace with trials (15%), or peace with traditional ceremonies (8%). When respondents were asked specifically about options for trying perpetrators, the highest proportion favoured trials in Uganda by Ugandan courts (35%) over trials abroad by an international court (28%), trials in Uganda by an international court (22%), or no trials at all (15%). Results on both questions are consistent with the 2007 findings.²¹⁹ This shows that people generally seek other means of peace and accountability than formal justice, but when asked specifically about what kind of trial they would prefer there is no agreed position on which trial is favoured.

The Mato Oput Project found with regard to trials and Mato Oput, that 66% of the participants favour Mato Oput as opposed to a court system, 23% argue for complementary systems while 11% state a preference for trials. A majority of participants, including some from the group who viewed Mato Oput and trial justice as sequential, criticized the retributive nature of trials. Both the ‘Roco Wat I Acoli’ as well as the Mato Oput Project Report conclude that the Acholi society, including cultural leaders, do not consider traditional justice as exceeding the law, but as a complementary measures of addressing crimes.²²⁰ The slightly different results with the “Transitioning to Peace” study can be attributed to the way the questions were asked. While the Mato Oput Project specifically asks about Mato Oput vs. the court system, the other study’s questions were more open, asking about the participant’s favoured accountability mechanisms, or more specifically when asking about how to deal with perpetrators.

When asked about the favoured means of accountability, trials were clearly favoured by a

²¹⁸ Justice Law and Order Sector 2007: 62.

²¹⁹ Pham/Vinck 2010: 40-41.

²²⁰ The Mato Oput Project 2009: 34.

minority as a first means to peace. When respondents in turn were given only the option of trying the perpetrators, 28% favoured a trial in an international court. Regarding the ICC, the study finds that by 2007, 70% of people responded that they were knowledgeable about the ICC, while the number shrunk in the recent survey to just 59 % of the Acholi population. Of those, 59% out of a majority of 66% described their knowledge of the ICC as being “bad” or “very bad”, and only 53 % knew that the ICC was not set up only to investigate serious crimes committed in northern Uganda. When asked about the impact of the ICC, most people cited that it had helped to chase the LRA away (38%) and contributed to physical security (30%). 7% said it had brought attention to the conflict, while 6% said it hampered the peace process. A follow-up question showed that less than half of respondents believed the ICC had helped the general situation in northern Uganda (43%). About the same proportion felt it had no effect (40%) and some believed that the court hindered the situation (10%).²²¹

Results from the authors field study suggest that there are perceived disadvantages of retributive justice (that are also associated with the ICC) such as that it can encourage injustice, because a person who is in fact guilty can hire a top lawyer, argue his case and probably win. In any case a trial creates a win-lose situation. In that way a conflict is formally resolved but the problem is still there. The ICC is valued as an institution that is in fact an advantageous instrument to hold perpetrators of serious crimes accountable, but with regard to the situation in northern Uganda the ICC was insisting on ‘justice’ at a time when there was already a lot of effort on the ground to resolve the conflict. My respondents acknowledged that the GoU made the ICC referral, but the way the ICC handled the situation, its failure to interact and listen to various, stakeholder’s and its mismanagement in regards of timing, is seen as a huge impediment to the peace process. This weakness is associated with the international community.

The GoU recently came up with a draft for a National Transitional Justice Policy through the JLOS that seeks to address the country’s legacy of past violations by providing accountability and reconciliation through a combination of justice mechanisms including formal criminal prosecutions, traditional justice, truth-telling and reconciliation, reparation and amnesty.²²² The formal aspect cites witness protection, while the GoU seeks to formally recognize traditional justice mechanisms. Despite a reparations programme for victims affected by

²²¹ Pham/Vinck 2010: 41-43.

²²² Ederu 2013.

conflict, the GoU shall establish and resource a national truth-telling process.²²³ This is indeed an important step, because the policy program is not specifically restricted to northern Uganda, but seems to be a more inclusive project without a specific timeframe. This would in turn be important, because Uganda clearly needs reconciliation at local but also at national level. As far as northern Uganda is concerned, an inclusive policy would be important to address UPDF crimes that are not yet covered by any formal or traditional approaches to justice.

5.2.2.3 NGOs Contribution - Best Practice

“The role of an NGO in the peace process is to be accepted in the community, to involve people, to understand the reality before acting. You can propose, but sometimes the proposition takes time for the people to understand. So don’t act before you have the people moving with you. Success comes when you are being able to move together. For us coming from a western country, we are very time conscious. We have a time frame and we want to implement it. And that sometimes is what brings challenges and sometimes failures to the achievement.”²²⁴

Driving through Gulu and its surroundings there exists hardly a road without a NGO sign. This is both good and bad. On the one hand, their work is very much appreciated in a context where the government does not live up to its responsibilities. They are in fact an important part of civilian life and their contribution is vital in many respects. On the other hand, by filling those gaps that should be addressed by the government, they are relieving it of its responsibilities. Nevertheless the GoU lacks capacities in many aspects. When people were still in the IDP camps, NGOs addressed the humanitarian issues for the most part. People are saying that if this responsibility had been left to the GoU alone, people would have died in even larger numbers. In the post-conflict, many of the humanitarian-oriented NGOs left, others adapted and transformed their support and new ones came in. Some NGOs can look back on a long history of engagement in peace building, while others have just started as a result of the conflict. Despite weaknesses and failures of NGOs, one of their major strengths is their close relationship with the community. A complete discussion of the contribution of NGOs in northern Uganda would exceed the claims of this paper. Therefore this chapter looks at their positive contributions and identifies best practices with regard to reconciliation,

²²³ Bradfield 2013-

²²⁴ Sr. Fernanda Pellizzer, Director of John Paul II Justice and Peace Centre (JPIJPC). Field Research Kampala: August 2013.

reintegration and peace building in northern Uganda, as well as criticisms that my interview partners expressed.

Some of the children who returned from captivity went through so-called reception centres, led by international as well as local NGOs. Out of the six initial reception centres, only the local Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO) and the World Vision Reception Center are still active in northern Uganda, though the latter is facing closure due to a lack of funding. The two reception centres have received and treated about 25,000 abductees and former fighters since 1994, while GUSCO does not handle adult returnees.²²⁵ The returnees often come back with various health problems (diseases, mutilations, minor and major injuries), as well as psychological problems that are addressed in the centres or by other NGO programs. Most children are sent home after a few weeks, or sometimes even months. The most important contribution of the NGOs, despite health care provisions, is tracing and locating the families, as well as the supervision of the reunification process. Before 2006, the reunification with the family in most cases meant the beginning of a new and yet old existence in an IDP camp, which was less favourable than the environment nowadays. Children whose families cannot be located, or whose families are either not capable or not willing to take them back, should be integrated in an area where they did not commit any offences. This practice has proven to be beneficial for the absorption into society.²²⁶ Follow-up visits are important, but unfortunately not very common. Blattman and Annan showed in their study that most of the former soldiers prove to be very resilient.²²⁷ This is confirmed by my qualitative research. In most cases the reintegration goes well and the former soldiers get on with their lives, start a small business, or continue with their education. But there are isolated cases where it is difficult for the people to reintegrate and return to normality. These people need specific targeting and help, because the overall reintegration framework does not consider their special needs. It is important not to apply a “one size fits” all approach based on fixed ideas about former child soldiers needs, but instead to consider their opinions and wishes. Some might already have a family and prefer to receive training instead of going back to school.

²²⁵ IRIN Humanitarian News and Analyses. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/97276/rehabilitation-centre-for-uganda-s-lra-returnees-to-close>. Accessed 09.02.2014

²²⁶ Singer 2005: 201.

²²⁷ Blattman/ Annan 2010: 883.

Together with child mothers, disabled people and refugees that still remain in the IDP camps, former child soldiers with serious psychological health issues form the most vulnerable parts of society. Regarding psychosocial support, many NGOs have already left or stopped with their programmes. Even if studies identify that “only” 20-30% of former child soldiers have psychological issues, combined with other people in the society who have made horrific experiences, that actually means a lot of people are in need of help. In the beginning there was coordinated cooperation in the field, such as psychosocial working groups, but nowadays organizations in the field are more or less working on their own. The few organizations that have remained can have very different approaches. There is a lack of cooperation and a lot of unprofessionalism that is going on in the field of psychosocial support. For those who are in real need, it is important that help is available unconditionally within the time frame that is needed to work on a problem. It is useless to come and counsel somebody a few times and then leave the person behind with no means of helping him or herself. Because the GoU is not taking care of psychosocial support, and the work of the civil society cannot meet all the demands, the Refugee Law Project, within the Beyond Juba II Project, resorted to establish support groups, comprising of people who are trained with some basic counselling skills, in reaction to the many suicides and the little support available.

“The Government does not seem to take care of the healing process. It doesn't and it is only the civil society that is trying to do something and of course the magnitude of the problem is so huge that even that what the civil society is doing is only a small bit. Only a few people are getting the services that are helping them. So the bulk of the communities are just there on their own, really.”²²⁸

When people are supported from a group, it is important for an NGO to oversee the developing group dynamics and to give guidance. To avoid stigmatisation or discrimination, groups should consist of mixed participants. Although groups can be helpful, it cannot replace individual counselling. One thing that was made clear throughout research is that psychological healing cannot take place in the absence of economic security on a personal level. Poverty and the struggle to survive is part of the problem. It is therefore crucial to equip people that are suffering with skills, education, and knowledge so that they can overcome some of their problems on their own and to make the recovery sustainable.

In order to get relevant information from the community it is critical to go to the villages and

²²⁸ Interview. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

not to gather people in a hotel, because if they are removed from their original location the unfamiliar environment can affect or even intimidate them. Therefore it is important to really get down to the grassroots level. The Refugee Law Project, under its psychosocial component works towards sensitizing the community concerning different issues. They visit the communities and hold community information sessions and dialogue meetings to create awareness on psychological health issues, and to make the community understand that abnormal behaviour can be the result of a psychological condition and is not related to some kind of taboo or bad spirits. They also discuss other matters with the community, whereby the community needs to address problems and identify key targets and stakeholders that can help to address their problems. Should well-known issues not come up in the course of these discussions, NGO workers make further inquiries, to raise awareness for matters such as domestic violence, as these are often not considered an issue although they are present within the communities. The organization in turn seeks to contact stakeholders and to present the community issues to them.

“So we make people acknowledge that things are there in their communities and that those are issues that need to be addressed. And their contribution towards their solution is critical. They have a big stake in addressing those issues. So we talk about those impacts and further we get them to discuss how to address it. Because we don't want to use classroom structures where you would just tell them what to do. No. We don't want to impose therapies on them. And when they are saying something, we build on what they are saying. We give strength. We reinforce their strength. That gives them more confidence because they see that even they are part of the solution.”²²⁹

To distribute information, the radio has proven to be a very important medium in northern Uganda. NGOs record community debates, where they invite experts and key stakeholders to comment and give advice and distribute them through the radio. People can also call and ask questions. For the Refugee Law Project or the John Paul II Peace and Justice Centre, these community debates additionally serve as an important assessment and research tool. There is also a radio station called Mega FM that runs a special program for returning child soldiers.

During my research I was told about projects aimed at increasing food security in the course of which the decision, what crops to plant, was left to the beneficiaries. One of the

²²⁹ Benard Okot, Senior Research and Advocacy Officer, leading the psychosocial component of the Beyond Juba II Project at the Refugee Law Project. Field Research Gulu: August 2013.

coordinators told me that as much as they know, they cannot assume to know everything and therefore they have to ask what the people want. Yet information and consultation of people at the grassroots level is key, but as much as an NGO cannot assume to know everything, they cannot assume that the people know everything in all matters concerned. To increase agricultural productivity while making the project sustainable, it is not enough to provide people with crops, even if they can decide on their own which ones to plant. For example, lectures on agricultural business can be a useful tool. Because land is a key issue in northern Uganda, it makes sense as an NGO to build the capacity of people who in turn can take over this responsibility, instead of simply mediating land conflicts in their own. As the saying goes: *Give a man a fish and you have fed him for today. Teach a man to fish and you have fed him for a lifetime.* But it is the combination of the provision of expertise, procedural mechanisms and resources on side of the NGO and the consultation and involvement of the beneficiaries on the other that makes a successful bottom-up strategy. No one knows everything, but if both sides manage to successfully combine their wisdom, chances for a successful project increase. But that is not all. An alternative saying goes as follows: *If you give me a fish, you have fed me for a day. If you teach me to fish, then you have fed me until the river is contaminated or the shoreline seized for development. But if you teach me how to organize, then whatever the challenge I can join together with my peers and we will fashion our own solution.* To train people, to provide people with skills and the capacity to manage problems on their own, so that in turn they can one day resolve them without external help, is what makes a project really sustainable and ultimately bottom-up.

The Refugee Law Project also targets people with physical disabilities such as amputations, because they have realized that untreated wounds or the lack of prostheses hinder people to think positively and creatively and that this is a major impediment to their participation in development. They help them to regain their mobility and take care of their psychological needs. They feel that by simply supporting them, people will on their own create a platform where they can raise their issues and develop advocacy strategies. During my research I have visited an organization comprised of land-mine victims. They were happy about the mutual support they can give each other and very active in the field of advocacy, but in the absence of external help, especially in the form of budgetary support, they were once again without a capacity to act.

I found a very positive example regarding self-help and cooperation within a group in the Alliance for Community Support Organization (AFCSO). It was founded by a formerly abducted child soldier, who reached out to his former abductor who was living under harsh conditions to join with other affected youth in order to support each other and seek a better life.²³⁰ At times the group included up to 80 members.

“So what our organization does basically, it brings the youth together to see how we can change our own lives, using the means that we have. You find that young people here can be very stressed because of the problems they have at home. So we try to come together to listen to one another’s problems. And then the person feels better, because he belongs to a group that listens and that shares his problems.”²³¹

The means available to the group are foremost ways of creatively addressing issues, such as the formation of drama groups, the organization of traditional dances, and the singing of songs or playing games. In a collaborative process they write scripts on issues that affect the community, such as land conflicts, where it is especially difficult for youth to intervene. The group believes that through participating in the writing and especially the acting, youth are able to incorporate their views and concerns. The challenge that remains for them is to perform the plays in front of an audience, which would be a very good approach of sensitising the community regarding young people’s opinions. AFSCO also organizes traditional Acholi dances in order to bring people together to have a good time. Besides dancing, playing soccer is used as a means of bringing people together. The organization is a wonderful example of a former child soldier who managed to get active and involve his peers, despite the little resources available. Additionally, community work as structured group activities, such as rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, schools or wells, and helping in the localization and clearance of landmines, can have a positive impact on the social life within the society. By involving former soldiers and other members, stigma towards them can be reduced and by making the experience to do something good for the whole society and successfully accomplishing something, the self-esteem of participants can be increased.

Another former child soldier, who against all the odds managed to escape his existence as a street kid and became a very active and concerned member of society, founded an NGO

²³⁰ Alliance for Community Support (AFSCO). <http://afco.wordpress.com/> Accessed 09.02.2014

²³¹ Ochen Peter Emmanuel, Founder of the Alliance for Community Support Organization (AFSCO). Field Research Kampala: August 2013.

called United Youth Action for Progress (UYAP), which was the first group to set up ‘night commuter centres’. The youth charity organization targets children and youth and strives to empower them, especially through education.²³² At times the organization’s volunteers went from door to door and offered their physical labour in order to collect money to support children to go to school. They seek to positively reinforce young people through inviting successful role models to schools. Their program “Glad I am 18” seeks to inspire young people to be active and to demonstrate to them their possibilities in life. Another program called “My mother and I” particularly targets young girls in schools, who are sometimes demoralized. Women with successful careers are invited to encourage young girls with their personal success stories. The John Paul II Peace and Justice Centre published a manual on civic education, promoting common values in culture and faith, thereby trying to embrace the community of Uganda as a whole in order to promote peace building. Peace Clubs are organized in schools to create a space where problems can be addressed. The Japanese funded Terra Renaissance Organization in Gulu organizes peace-building lectures about understanding conflict, approaches to resolve and prevent conflicts, and various peace building measures. Part of the curriculum is to learn how to deal with anger, how to respond to it, how to formulate fear and bitterness and how to use communication as a tool for peace building. These are some of the very positive and valuable examples of NGO participation and engagement regarding bottom-up peace building I could identify in the many different areas in the field of conflict resolution.

²³² United Youth Action for Progress (UYAP). <http://uyap.jakou.com/> Accessed 09.02.2014

6. Conclusion

Peace building is a complicated task. Once a minimum level of security is guaranteed, post-conflict peace building measures can commence. Despite its failure, the Juba Peace Agreement and the final withdrawal of the remaining LRA forces from Uganda to neighbouring countries guaranteed the minimum security for people to return from the IDP camps. However, a broad outlook on human security requires more than the absence of violent threats. Refugees, as well as returning soldiers, need to be able to build a life. The former soldiers, very often children, not only missed out on education, but equally important they missed out on growing up in the way the community used to live and interact. Trauma and stigma can further aggravate issues during the transition. People returning from the camps find their homes and land devastated or occupied. Land conflicts hinder people from cultivating and becoming productive and self-reliant again. To deal with these issues is an important part of achieving human security. They must be able to resume livelihood activities, especially with regard to land, find job opportunities to earn money, and learn to live together as a community again.²³³

The absence of violence in northern Uganda does not necessarily mean that people believe that this is a lasting and stable peace. Pham and Vick's population-based survey on attitudes about social reconstruction and justice in northern Uganda shows that while many respondents did believe that there is peace in northern Uganda (85%), less than half considered the state to be lasting (44%) and about 40% believed it to be only temporary. Those who stated that they did not believe peace existed currently, most frequently justified their answer by affirming that the LRA still exists (45%), and they fear the LRA may reappear (45%). The study shows that as security improves, people's needs with regard to their livelihoods, shift from *freedom of fear* (peace, security, and returning home) towards *freedom from want* (food (28%), agriculture, including access to land and seeds (19%), education (15%), and health services (13%)).²³⁴

While personal security has improved overall, the major challenges in the eyes of the affected population with regard to the post-conflict situation point to threats that can be attributed to the dimension of community security. The challenges in this area include land conflicts,

²³³ Pham/Vinck 2010: 17.

²³⁴ Pham/Vinck 2010: 17-18.

which are perceived to pose a big threat, and social problems such as the reintegration difficulties of some former child soldiers and especially child mothers, as well as the deterioration of culture and traditions, that are especially painful in the eyes of the older generation. Old people, disabled people, orphans and former child soldiers who suffer from psychological health issues, as well as child mothers, constitute the most vulnerable segments of the Acholi society. Without particularly intending to do so, the latter are discriminated against by the traditional structures of the clan system. While overall community security seems to be improving, subliminal feelings of guilt, revenge, frustration and anger exist at the individual level.

Health Security has been divided into physical and psychological health issues, such as trauma or PTSD. Although not mentioned in the 1994 UNDP report, psychological health issues are one of the long-term effects of the conflict that seem to affect a range of people, especially those who have had the most horrific violent experiences. Similarly, physiological health issues are a major impediment in order to regain a normal life.

An analysis of the dimension of economic security suggests that job and income opportunities are scarce in northern Uganda. This is especially problematic because a successful reintegration is difficult in the absence of economic security. Furthermore community security, meaning a friendly and social environment, favours child-soldier reintegration and their psychological wellbeing. It has been shown that not all former child soldiers have the same needs, and that reintegration strategies should display a certain flexibility to react to their needs ranging from education and skill training, to monetary support as well as psychosocial support. Answering questions as to what experiences have been made, how they relate to peace building projects, as well as when norms and respectively the behaviour of actors can change, are important for a successful reintegration. When looking at child-soldier reintegration it is necessary to analyse common experiences and the issue of what constitutes their identity in order to analyse whether reintegration efforts are suitable and meaningful within the specific context, as well as to deconstruct negative images.²³⁵ The same applies for child mothers, but as with old people and orphans, they also need social welfare payments that are currently not available. They more or less rely on caring individuals or NGO support.

After having identified the major challenges and their interconnections, the various peace and

²³⁵ Conteh-Morgan 2005: 73.

confidence-building strategies were identified with a focus on the question which of these activities built on the efforts and capacities of those directly affected by insecurities. These activities should take into consideration local conditions and accepted norms and values of the respective society thereby enabling emancipation.

At first government efforts were discussed. During the conflict the GoU has failed to protect its citizens. When Government troops were combating the LRA insurgency in northern Uganda the army became friend and foe of the affected population. Soldiers on both sides became a source of insecurity and threat. Attempts of the GoU to regain territorial security through military power failed and continuously reduced and threatened human security of the population. The UN human security approach states that a government can strengthen its relation with the population by setting the right priorities after identifying the most pressing human security needs.

In the Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation in 2007, the GoU and the LRA agreed to promote redress.²³⁶ Although transitional justice processes and mechanisms, including reparations, have been a part of the national dialogue since then, a report by the International Centre for Transitional Justice makes it clear that the GoU has embarked on several reconstruction, recovery, humanitarian, and development programs for the north and other conflict-affected parts of the country, but these programmes were explicitly motivated by stabilization, development, and poverty-reduction objectives, rather than justice and reparations goals.²³⁷ While transitional justice has many components that function best as a holistic approach, various aspects, such as establishing the rule of law, developing a human rights regime, strengthening the judicial system, truth commissions or security sector reform, have seen no substantial contribution or change following the LRA conflict.²³⁸ The envisaged comprehensive Transitional Justice Policy is an important step not only for northern Uganda, but for the whole country that clearly needs reconciliation at the national level.

While NUSAF I tried to embark on a bottom-up approach, many problems in the accessibility and allocation of funds, the lack of information and provision of assistance for community projects, corruption and the inclusion of a wide range of districts, diminished tangible results.

²³⁶ Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the GoU and the LRA.
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Agreement_on_Accountability_and_Reconciliation.pdf Accessed on 09.02.14
Accessed 09.02.2014

²³⁷ Carrington/Naughton 2012: 2012: 1.

²³⁸ Commission on Human Security 2003: 65.

It is a very noble idea to let people identify their needs so that they can design projects that are in fact accurate responses, but the project somehow assumed that it would be easy for people to come up with a project proposal and deal with the necessary bureaucracy. The project did not ensure that those who are already the weakest or most excluded parts of society get the necessary information and substantial support in designing and implementing their projects. As a result, people who were already knowledgeable and empowered in some way profited most from the funds. In a sense the GoU tried to address issues in northern Uganda, but people clearly cannot grasp improvements. The GoU installed the Amnesty Act and supports traditional justice, but this should not absolve the Government of its responsibility to strengthen the judicial system. The newly envisioned Truth Commission is a good start in the direction of strengthening the social cohesion of the whole country in order to make an effort to restore dignity. Despite the GoU's efforts to become more accountable, attempts at improving political security are overall lacking. Massive corruption, intimidation, election fraud and torture continue to alienate large parts of the population from the political process.

The civil society in Uganda proves to be very strong and active on behalf of the population. Especially religious and cultural leaders successfully managed to engage in a peaceful resolution of the conflict. They are both accountable to the population and knowledgeable of the situation at hand. Both have the backing of the community and see themselves as actors on behalf of their interests. The population particularly values the amnesty that the religious leaders proposed. The Pham and Vinck study suggests that the highest proportion of respondents saw the best way forward in peace with amnesty (45%) over peace with a truth-seeking mechanism (32%). The project of applying traditional justice has merits, but also disadvantages. As far as justice is concerned, traditional justice mechanisms are not well equipped to hold all perpetrators accountable, especially high-ranking LRA leaders and UPDF soldiers. Mato Oput was never an overarching framework that meant to include all segments of society, but it does not need to be. When posing the question of which form of justice is preferred, it becomes clear that traditional justice cannot be the way forward for each and every person. Some people might not believe in it, others such as rape victims or child mothers are entirely left out of the process. Cultural leaders are probably not representative to exert independent, accountable and legitimate justice for the society as a whole. Traditional approaches to justice cannot be a replacement for an all-encompassing justice framework and should therefore function as complementary to formal or other means of coming to terms with the past.

On the positive side, it is a voluntary process and that should give traditional approaches its strength: That those who value it and believe in its power to resolve conflicts can be empowered through their participation in the rituals. The biggest strength of traditional approaches is that it is vested in cultural beliefs and values, even if adaptations have to be made. It can offer a way of countering the perceived deterioration of culture and tradition and therefore can be seen as a local approach to cope with the situation and to build upon the capabilities of those who are directly affected. Traditional approaches can address the link between the experiences soldiers made during their time with the LRA and their reintegration, because both build upon Acholi practices. Perpetrators are given the possibility to apologize and be forgiven, which can help them to relieve their guilt and reclaim their own humanity.

Traditional mechanisms therefore need to be supported so that those who seek help in a traditional mechanism can find the necessary support and resources to perform rituals. Further research needs to address the concrete mechanisms of traditional approaches and their power to go beyond symbolic meaning and to address questions as to when norms and respectively the behaviour of actors can change. Traditional approaches aim to change the way people think. To trace such changes is especially challenging for social scientists.

As far as NGOs that were part of my research are concerned, their commitment to involving the grassroots people is overwhelming. They reaffirm that the grassroots people are the ones knowledgeable of the situation at hand, because they know the situational dynamics and can identify strategies to address problems themselves. Nevertheless, grassroots people will need substantial support. The NGO needs to bridge knowledge gaps and build capacities. A bottom-up approach does not mean that the NGO is solely giving budget support. Instead their role is to find the balance between decentralizing projects to the local people and providing the necessary assistance. A bottom-up approach means that the population is part of every stage of a project.

My field research provided me with the necessary insights to properly understand the situation, identify major challenges and responses to them. The identification of the specific dynamics of the functioning of bottom-up strategies could be further improved by a longer timeframe of research and extensive participant observation. Nevertheless, with regard to human security I was able to identify various practices at different levels that counter war-related effects and discuss their strengths and weaknesses in relation to those who should

benefit: individuals and communities. Therefore I focused on the ability of the GoU to find the right policy responses with respect to local needs and traditions. I revealed how local actors, namely religious and cultural leaders became active on behalf of the population, engaged in a peaceful resolution of the conflict and promoted strategies to cope with the situation on the ground. In regard to NGOs I presented positive illustrations of grassroots participation and discussed best practices for a successful bottom-up approach. I was able to identify positive examples in the context of the peace building and restoration process in northern Uganda, outside the conventional liberal peace paradigm.

Human security is relevant and attractive as a theoretical but also as a political concept. Therefore I hope that this framing can give greater attention to the question why my findings are relevant and where they can be included in future peace building or development work, especially in the African context where human security is most fragile.²³⁹

²³⁹ United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) 2005:6.
<http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Human%20Security%20in%20Africa%20FINAL.pdf>
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Appendix

I. List of Participants- Field Research

Organization	Participant
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)	Archbishop John Baptist Odama, Member ARLPI Governing Council Former Chairman
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)	Rt. Bishop Macleord Baker Ochola II Representative for the Retired Religious Leaders, Member ARLPI Governing Council Founding Member Former Vice-Chairperson
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)	Francis Lokwiya Programme Coordinator
United Religious Initiative (URI)- Great Lakes	Despina Namwembe Regional Coordinator
Alliance for Community Support Organization (AFSCO)	Ochen Peter Emmanuel Founder
United Youth Action for Progress (UYAP)	Mwaka Emmanuel Lutukumoi Founder, Programme Director at UYAP
Anti-Mines Network Rwenzori (AMNET-R)	Wilson Bwambale Founding Member Director
Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)	Godfrey G. Mukalazi Programme Officer
Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)	Canon Joseph Oneka Head of Human Rights and Good Governance Department Uganda Joint Christian Council Secretariat
Refugee Law Project (RLP)	Benard Okot, Senior Research and Advocacy Officer
John Paul II Justice and Peace Centre (JPIIJC)	Sr. Fernanda Pellizzer, Director
Terra Renaissance	Not specified

II. Sample Questionnaire- John Paul II Justice and Peace Centre (JPIIJC)

Questions about the organization and their work	
1. Can you give a brief overview of the core areas of work where JPIIJC is active in Uganda?	
1. Can you talk about the challenges societies and individuals are facing after having gone through a long period of armed conflict in northern Uganda. 2. Which of these negative impacts resulting from the LRA conflict did your organization identify (and primarily target)? 3. Can you describe the different initiatives and programmes that your organization conducted in the past until present in Northern Uganda (or respectively related to the LRA conflict)? 4. What worked best? 5. Did the focus of JPIIJC changed over time? And if yes how?	A study about mental health and human rights situation in northern Uganda will be conducted in four districts, namely: Gulu, Lira, Oyam and Amuru. All the necessary preparation is being done and data collection is to commence from 17 th April 2012. Results?
6. How do the programmes/initiatives relate to building a sustainable peace in the post-war situation?	Quotation "There is no peace without justice and there is no justice without forgiveness." (Johannes Paul) -How can your organization promote justice?
7. How do they relate to improving security?	
8. To which degree is the local population and/or civil society integrated in the work of your organization in Uganda?	Needs-assessments (systematic process for determining and addressing needs, or "gaps" between current conditions and desired conditions or "wants") Project design, Implementation Philosophy: Do grassroots people know best how to deal with the situation? Indigenous culture, authority and practices? Which element can they add?
9. How do you estimate the contribution of your organization to the community and the post- conflict situation in general?	Improvements? Dimensions of HS?

Questions about the post-conflict situation in general (Experts)	
10. What does the government do to deal with the post-conflict situation related to the LRA insurgency?	-Relationship with the government? -Issuance of arrest warrants
11. What does the International Community (UN, western donor countries) do with regard to peace building and dealing with the post-conflict situation?	-Emerging donors (Nordic countries and Canada) plus Ireland and Germany -Main backers UK, US/UN -Humanitarian and regional approach
12. Can you describe the impact the internationalization (intervention of international state and non-state external actors) had on the conflict resolution process in northern Uganda?	External aid- mainly budget support
13. What role does the civil society play in this process?	Related to research question: How can bottom-up approaches act complementary to top-down initiatives? Or: Which role do the Ugandan people assign to different aspects of peace building such as transitional justice? Amnesty Prosecution Reconciliation Compensation
14. How can bottom-up or grassroots initiatives act complementary to state-sponsored or internationally funded and undertaken projects?	
15. What are your views on the benefits, added value or weaknesses of bottom-up approaches?	
16. How are people that were abducted by rebels being dealt with?	Assessment of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes
Views and assessments	
17. What does it take for a sustainable peace at a regional and national level?	Problems faced?
18. What contribution can you, as an NGO, make? What can and should be the role of an NGO in a peace process?	
19. Define what security means for you in the context of the post-conflict?	
20. How can the security situation be improved?	
21. What is, in your eyes, really needed and what is in demand in northern Uganda?	

III. Sample Interview

1. A: I have had that many times already. #00:00:13.0#
2. Q: Also with students? #00:00:13.0#
3. A: With students and with those who call it, most of them are researchers. They are students, others are those who do research for PHD and so on, and others for general you know. Yes so... #00:00:33.5#
4. Q: If you please could give an introduction about yourself, the work you do and after that speak about your and ARLPIs engagement in the whole peace building process. #00:00:47.1#
5. A: Okay, well my name is John Baptist Odama. I am the Archbishop of Gulu, Gulu Archdiocese. I have been here already for 14 years. My installation as Archbishop was in 1999. When I came in, the situation was already bad. The war had more or less stayed here for more than seven years because I came 1999 but this war started 1986, and I found myself in a group of religious leaders, an inter-religious group where you had the Muslims, the Orthodox, the Catholics, then the Adventists. We were four. #00:02:24.4#
6. Q: Is it ARLPI? #00:02:27.2#
7. A: Yes we call it ARLPI - Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative- and although I was new, I was put to succeed my predecessor. You see the photos there: Bishop Martin. And he was the Vice Chairman of this group. I came and replaced him automatically as a Vice Chairman. I worked with the group for about two years and in the third year I was made the Chairman of this group. And there I began to see the trail of the things with a little bit more involvement and engagement.
8. The lucky thing was that the people, the population, trusted this group.
9. Then also in our adventure of trying to see that the conflicting parties should be talking more peace than fighting we began to engage them in conversations and meetings. We were meeting them; we were making a bold move to them. Yeah, to the side of the Government and to the side of the LRA. And especially from July 2002 we succeeded to get the both sides.

Something very interesting was this: nobody expected any organized group to reach the LRA. How did we succeed to get them? It was our consistent stand about the situation and our public statements about the situation that this war was not appropriate and it should not be promoted further because the population was suffering. And they were in the camps and they had been in the camps since 1996. So we said something must be done to alleviate this problem and bring kind of a stop to this.

10. Besides our movement to the LRA and the Government there was a prior move by the population who were advocating that the war should be stopped by granting amnesty and this amnesty should be blanket for all the rebel leaders, including those what you call, the abductees. So this blanket amnesty, it took long to process it. It had to be made into a law, before it could be implemented. And luckily the Members of Parliament from this area picked up this idea. We, the religious leaders, worked together and we had also our consultations with some lawyers. We drafted something and presented it to Members of Parliament to put it across to the Parliament and in the year 2000 this proposal was passed into a bill. Although it was not blanket amnesty because according to rules and the laws of the international groups, it could not be a blanket amnesty. But at least they said yes, this could be done and those who are willing to come out could be.

11. So we moved on with this for a while until ICC came in and they made the indictment in the year 2003, to arrest five top leaders including the chief that is Kony himself. Then those who were after him the vice, his vice, then the third man to him, the forth and the fifth. But we as religious leaders, in our group, who advised the ICC to postpone the indictment because there was already a lot of effort on the ground. We were already in contact with the LRA, with the government trying to, you know, advocate for dialogue, for peace talks. So we said this would interfere with that process and it could easily go against the whole system. But ICC insisted: no we are going to keep on. We are going to keep on. #00:09:15.2#

12. Q: What arguments were brought forward by the ICC? #00:09:21.8#

13. A: The argument was that these people had been committing crimes against humanity, so they must be arrested. They cannot be left to go on like this. But we said: you are tiny. But tiny is not correct because at the time you are trying to arrest him, it will not be easy. They were in the Sudan and they ordered the Sudanese Government to arrest them. And they were partially

also sometimes going to Congo. They ordered the people of Congo to arrest them. But we said: look here now. These are the countries where these people are staying. How will they arrest them? If they were staying there, how will they arrest them? It will not be easy. We insisted to them but then they said: no they will do it. Then I said: okay, go ahead. You can go ahead but we are trying the other way here.

14. So as we moved for advocacy to these two sides there came a time in 2006 that these two sides agreed to go and have a talk. And there was no easy country to accept such a commitment without being implicated by ICC, except Southern Sudan. By then it was self-governing and they were not under any authority and they were freer. And it was also a provisional moment for them. So they said why not. We are here semiautonomous and these people we have contacted them in the bush and they have accepted. We give them a chance. Yes we give them a chance. And eventually that meeting took place in Juba in 2006. From the 14th of July up to, it ended in 2008, on 28 of February 2008. #00:11:59.8#

15. The process of the discussions was quite long, with a lot of difficulties in the middle because there came a time when the LRA was not happy with the mediator any more. They thought he was siding with those who are on the side of the Government and he was doing them some injustice. Plus some other complaints they had as reasons. So they wanted to actually withdraw but our group luckily, the ARLPI plus the cultural leaders. I don't know if you will have a chance to talk with them. The Paramount Chief has come back already. Have you tried? #00:12:59.0#

16. A: No, not yet. #00:13:01.4#

17. A: But there will be some people there. Although recently they had some other arrangements which were going on. There could be some people there who could give you some insight also. #00:13:18.2#

18. Now with this group we made a move to talk to the leaders of the LRA delegation, they should not withdraw. And they should not postpone and neither should they change any country to go to, because them going elsewhere was not as safe as being here in Juba. And we gave them more explanations. That was also the time the UN Special Envoi came in. He was the former President, you know whom? #00:14:04.7#

19. Q: Mr. Egeland? #00:14:05.6#

20. A: No, Egeland came later. But Jan Egeland started earlier with us when we are doing the campaign for peace talk. He came in; he even reached up to here. He was with us here. Jan Egeland was with us. And I think it was his intervention that made the process of our going on successful. Yeah, I saw a very big advantage in his coming in, yes. #00:14:51.8#

21. The peace talk started in July but those who played a big role in the process were the cultural leaders. Some politicians also played a role. Then those of Jan Egeland, then we have former President of Mozambique, Chissano. There were also people in the background like those of Betty Bigombe. There is a photo here you can have a look. You can see that lady. Now she is a Minister. Then this one was a lawyer advising the Government during the peace talk. Now he is the Deputy Speaker of the National Parliament and this one he was the Spokesman of the LRA, whom we meet in the bush: Brigadier Banja. And this is the Minister; he was by then Minister of Internal Affairs, Rugunda. Now, he is a Minister of Health and he led also the delegation of the Government for the peace talk. And this was the Paramount Chief. We were in that place before this meeting. We went more or less and talked with the people. That was one. #00:17:09.1#

22. In the process of these efforts many other countries came in. The UN came in, African Union came in, and European Union also came in. Then there were other countries that also individually came in to support the process and to give some financial and other support. We have had, I could say, a lot of hurdles. It was not easy to get the Government to agree, neither the LRA. It took a long time to prepare this. Very long. And I must say we thank god but more so we thank the people of Sudan. Sudan Government, when they agreed and said yes you come. You can have this talk here. All the five topics that were identified for the peace talk, they were covered. About cession of hostilities, comprehensive solution to the problem, the question of reconciliation, then the question of a final peace agreement and then the last one was rehabilitation and reintegration of the population. The title was, I think you can best get them, when you go on Google you will find them. You will find those there and other information. #00:19:51.3#

23. The discussions generally, according to my own because I was in most of it, we were observing it. For me as far as my observations were, many of the points of discussion were

valid. They were good. It was only the final signing of the agreement, the final agreement was not signed. There were other factors that came inside. There was a fear in the heart of Kony that he could easily be arrested or he could be killed. There were also other people who did not want this process to reach a conclusion of that kind. Then also the fear that there was going to be a military option also. That affected also all this. What we were not comfortable about, just two weeks, because our group was the last to go to the bush to meet Kony with his group. Just fourteen days after there was a military attack on him and that sparked the spread of these people to other areas like Congo, CAR and so on. And the program of the LRA never stopped. It is going on. Even as I talk now, but in other countries. This, for us, was a bit sad. We didn't expect that to happen but anyways it has. #00:21:47.8#

24. Then at home here, many of those who had surrendered and who had benefitted by amnesty, many of them were integrated in the families. Although some met some difficulties. They could not come in. You may have heard about some things like Mato Oput. This process of Mato Oput in complete, I don't think it took place. There may have been some isolated cases of receiving people at home using the ritual of 'stepping on an egg'. You heard something about that. Yes, 'stepping on the egg'. That was just the preliminary stage of accepting somebody who had been from outside coming back to the home. That was to tell the one coming home, as you have been outside there, if you destroyed life this ritual should remind you about it because you should step on the egg. A fresh egg. There is a sign of destruction of life. Then you jump over a piece of bar, of this bamboo or a certain tree. You pass over to say: come back, we accept you despite your weakness and failures you made, we accept you. But you wait for us now to have the chance to link with those sides. With the people whose relatives you killed, or you have injured. We want now to find and see where to meet those people as a community and make the process of Mato Oput, which is the 'drinking of bitter herbs'.
25. That process in some cases did not materialize. Because normally you do really true Mato Oput when there is no more war. There is no more engagement in violence from either side. From the side of the perpetrator or from the side of the, what you call the victim. That should not be there. Then you can now start the process. But in the case of what happened that has never been reached. Because some people are still engaged in fighting. Because when you do that Mato Oput which is reconciliation, it should not be repeated. There should be no more violence. No more anything, or breaking the agreement of having accepted to live now in

peace. It should not be doubled now again.

26. Because in some cases there is a bending of what now, the spear. And that bending of the spear is to show, now from our side as victims, we have no more interest in straightening this spear to fight you. Then on the side of the perpetrator it is the same. They bend this, we have no more interest to go on perpetrating this. We vow not to do it and we accept our mistake. We are going to make compensation for the loss of lives. But most of that is done symbolically. Because you cannot compensate human life. Human life is too expensive. So that process will need to be carried on. #00:26:47.7#

27. I am not very sure now in the condition we are now, whether we shall have that kind of absolute Mato Oput reconciliation. Instead what we are advocating as religious leaders is let people have opportunity to settle their neighbouring conflicts. Those that are near. They need to settle and resolve to have reconciliation. But in the relation to the war itself fully it cannot be done immediately. No, it will take time. #00:27:40.2#

28. Q: So was this original Mato Oput process transformed in some way to use it after or let's say during the war? #00:27:49.6#

29. A: Yes it was supposed to be now, done after the war. But fully it was not done. Why, because some of the people who were fighting are still in the bush. A few are here. But the idea of say, let us reconcile in non-situations because these things also happened in villages, between one village and another, between one family and another. These some were done, but what we call a certain level to stop the fighting again within and among the people. You see this. The system of the Mato Oput is, I don't know if they talked to you about it, they did ha? That is okay. Then I don't need to repeat that one. #00:28:56.3#

30. Q: And who could perform these Mato Oput ceremonies? #00:29:00.2#

31. A: Generally there are the cultural leaders, the chiefs that preside over it. Generally, or some elders, they do that. For us the religious leaders we have our own ceremony, according to our (lough) tradition. Like for the Catholics they go for confession and so on. Those kinds of things. Then for the Muslims they have also their own. Then the Anglicans have also their own. Okay? So now for us as Christians, we have our own systems. We accept to do them.

But the traditional one, the power is more with the cultural leaders: the chiefs #00:29:53.9#

32. Q: Did the religious leaders accept this process? #00:29:58.9#

33. A: This process, especially when it was in the beginning with this system of 'stepping over eggs' and so on. In the beginning no, some did not. But we worried. For us as Catholics we didn't find it a problem. Because for us we saw it, it was a sign of accepting guilt and being open to say I am sorry and I would like to be reconciled with the people. We saw it in that context. In the beginning the Anglican group was a little bit reserved about it. They said no, this is now practicing rituals, which are more giving the idea more of 'devil washing' or something like this. We don't advocate this. In the beginning, but later when we discussed and accepted, we found it was okay. #00:31:08.4#

34. Q: Do you have the feeling that it was accepted by the community, that it meant something to them? #00:31:13.5#

35. A: *Oh yes*, the community saw no problem with it and they were happy about it. In fact they would like that it be done. Whenever there was a chance of doing it then they would come there to witness welcoming back this people stepping over the egg, raw egg, and jumping over this, you know. They were always there. #00:31:38.7#

36. Q: Do you have the feeling that it was a way of preserving cultural aspects that were eroded by the war? #00:31:45.1#

37. A: Yes, it was of course. Of course it gave another chance of having deeper reflections about it. And the practice of it. And I for one, if we had gone a little further and researched on this deeply, I would have said we should have a kind of integration of this with the Christian approach. We could have done that but at the moment it is left like this. #00:32:29.8#

38. Q: I have another question related to the Juba peace talks and records. Were there other NGOs or organizations that tried to establish contact with the LRA or seeking to mediate the peace talks? #00:32:46.8#

39. A: What I know personally, I tell you what I know of the other groups. We had the cultural

group, the chiefs and so on, they headed. Our group ARPLI, they came in. Then through this group of those of Betty. Then there was the group of some NGOs really not with prominent names, really. But there was what we call Uganda National NGO Forum. There were some leaders who were there. Then some individuals they were also there. Not really prominent group or NGOs like that. #00:34:03.3#

40. Q: I only heard of Pax Christi. #00:34:05.9#

41. A: Oh yes, Pax Christi, yes. Pax Christi they had something. Then we had also the San'Egidio the one in Rom. You know that one. Pax Christi yes. Then in the process of this we had also the people of Reconciliation Resource. They came in also. #00:34:35.5#

42. Q: So as I can see there were many groups. Did all of them communicate with each other or did they approach the LRA separate from each other? #00:34:46.6#

43. A: There were some who communicated with one and another. For example the group of Pax Christi, they were always in link with us. Then we had the group of San'Egidio. They were together with those of Betty Bigombe. It was more or less that time. Then there was the group of certain professor in Kenya. Was called professor Okumu. What was the other name William I think? And there was also effort by the South African Government. Yes. #00:35:42.8#

44. Q: You also said that you advocated for the Amnesty Act, but that the initial incentive came from the community. Can you tell me more about it? #00:35:52.2#

45. A: Right. We sensed it from the community, but they didn't have the time to articulate it. It was all with the political MPs to articulate this and formulate it into a proposal for discussion in the Parliament. #00:36:14.8#

46. Q: Would you say that the local population and the civil society are integrated in you work? #00:36:19.8#

47. A: Yes, yes most of the time. Yeah most of the times because they didn't have really a voice that could carry their wishes and desires far. It was more our group who could do it. You see.

So we thought that was an advantage. And the group of the Acholi Religious Peace Leaders, we always took ourselves as people who were active on behalf of the population, and that is why the two sides came to realize we were really for the good of the people. Not so much to be politicized or polarized to go for this group or that group. No. #00:37:14.4#

48. Q: Did the LRA at times seek your advice? #00:37:17.7#

49. A: In the sense, unless during the time of the peace talk. In the operations of rebels outside they never bothered about us. They were doing their own things. They were doing their own things. Always we told them: No, don't do it. No please no! But they never listened to us. #00:37:43.2#

50. Q: Can you talk about the challenges that the society or individuals are facing now after having gone through this long period of conflict? #00:37:52.0#

51. A: Yeah, yeah there are so many challenges (sigh). First in the area of education. The general standard of education here has been very, very much reduced by war because during the war people couldn't go to school. Except in the schools that were around the camps and those around and in the town, where people were in the towns in some centres. People could go but the standard was too poor. Next to this there was also promotion of this standard to secondary school or to university. There were few who went. So there is a generation gap in education here. #00:38:57.0#

52. Two: health. The health of people generally was poor because the amount of food they got was below the level of really maintaining good health and for growing, especially of children. Not only that, the pandemic HIV/AIDS took a big #store# of the people during that and even up to now the rate of HIV/AIDS infection is higher than nationwide. #00:39:40.9#

53. Then the challenge of eroding the culture. The culture was completely corroded. Because the custom, the customary way of passing traditional information and also home, what to call, home education was missing. For example in a family they may build huts as you saw, you may have seen. They would build a hut here for the parents another hut there for the children; both male and the girls would be in different huts. But in the time of camps all was cramped together, so virtually there was no privacy. #00:40:42.2#

54. Then another factor that was rather negative as a challenge to the people was the question of trauma. Trauma affected a large population of the people. And as a consequence many, many diversions were there: addictions, alcoholism, drug addictions and then a morality in general. Then you had also the question of suicide was very high. #00:41:48.4#
55. Then the problem of violence in the homes, what they call domestic violence. Sometimes men are very aggressive towards their women. Sometimes also the women are aggressive towards the man. You find they injure themselves or even kill themselves. All those were insight. #00:42:06.7#
56. Then on top of this the question of development as such retarded, was retarded. It was only in the centres like the town, where people could come. Some could come from elsewhere who were taking advantage of this opportunity to build houses, to build shops, to have trade and so on in the centres like this one. #00:42:38.3#
57. Then the question of neighbourliness with this other countries was a little bit tense. People were mostly suspicious of each other. Those were some challenges, which were there. #00:43:06.1#
58. What else was there? Well in religion, well many tried to practice their faith but there was lack. You see. They splayed down. A lot of syncretism's came in. Yes. These were some of the, we could say, challenges. #00:43:30.8#
59. Then the economical, of course. There wasn't much (lough) because people were redundant and they learned the redundancy instead of working. There is a generation who has failed to use the hoe. Especially the younger generations. Some don't even want to work, (little lough) this physical work. So low, low income, low income and the employment was not easy. In this kind of environment you cannot create opportunities and so for real employment. It was difficult and then income was so low. It made the people very poor. So generally there is a very low level of income of the population here. They are generally poor. You detect this in occasions when people have to give some gifts, offering something. Although now things are a little better in a sense that people can now dig some things and they get some crops and so on. Although with some bad weather also they lost some of the crops and so on. So these are some of the challenges and it gave a lot of excuses for Government to say: ah there is no

security in that area. We cannot do this and we cannot do that and so on. Yes. #00:45:10.7#

60. Q: And now, who is addressing all of this issues the most? #00:45:15.8#

61. A: These ones. Well some are being done like now on the issues of education. We are trying to encourage the people to go to school. Government gave opportunity for what they call primary, this free primary education. But then the population, they are limited. Is not totally free in the sense you do everything, you go and get everything, no. There is also, there are the parents who have to make some contributions. And then also the number is limited: You must have at least four. If you have seven children you cannot send them all in the same thing, no. Only four. That also has a limit. There is also university and secondary education, but that also has a limitation. So it is still a struggle. #00:46:35.5#

62. For economics there should have been, you know of course there was the Government to address this issue by PRDP. But unfortunately some of the money was not. I think you heard about that one. Which angered some of the countries to boycott giving aid to Uganda until this area is rectified. But we hope that they will do. We appreciate the interest of the, especially the countries like in the European Union, eh some of the countries. The US and so on. They gave some support, yes. Those were good enough. But the atmosphere fully for real recovery is not yet there. #00:47:51.2#

63. Q: What does it take, in your opinion, for a sustainable peace at a regional and at a national level? #00:48:01.5#

64. A: Right. I think I have one conviction. My conviction is this: if humanity is to survive (giggle) they must abandon war. You see as much as people were scared at a certain moment about nuclear war, where they thought it could have exterminated humanity. That fear should be brought also for other conflicts. So that we don't go for war. I think Europe has learned once for good. Europe has learned once for good, war is not good. Let us prevent it. Therefore we use our resources for promotion of humanity. And my conviction is strongly that people or the world let us put it like that, tend to spend more on war. The expenditure on war is more than the expenditure on peace. That disparity needs to be reversed. It needs to be reversed. Which will mean; we should have more people who voice strongly for peace and we should have governments who are convinced that peace is the way and dialogue. Encourage it. You

see. That is my little contribution. #00:50:12.7#

65. Q: Do you think that the international community or especially the UN must advocate stronger for regional conflicts, like the LRA conflict. #00:50:24.5#

66. A: Yes, although that part I didn't comment on. I put it in general. (Pause) You said your name was what? #00:50:47.0#

67. Q: Tanja. #00:50:47.0#

68. A: You see Tanja. The real, for me, the most fundamental thing is valuing the human being. No matter from whatever area. Like the declaration of UN. If that declaration of UN was really be implemented fully, we should have a different world now. That is what we need to work on. Whether on the national level, regional level or on international level. We need to implement that. Strongly. Strongly. We should spend money in propagating that declaration. Not the other way round. You know. I felt very sad Tanja to tell you this. When I saw UN having now its own war, war what you call it, war equipment's. Going for confrontation. Like in Congo. Like in parts of central Africa. I just, I got disappointed because now UN is seen not so much as peace worker. But is seen as, what you call it, warmonger. #00:52:43.0#

69. Q: A peace operation with weapons. #00:52:45.7#

70. A: Yes, with weapons. People can't see the difference now. People can't see the difference. You see. We have gone now to the level, were we must say: we must acquire peace with weapons. We must acquire peace by violence. It is not correct. You know. And they should have engaged the world in the Assembly, World Assembly, like the UN. Talk very strongly, like the first leaders of UN. They stood very firm about we cannot afford now going to war any more. We have all agreed. And you know this text is written on the wall of the UN. And I went there many times in that area. We went to the UN many times. And we reminded them about it. Said look here you people, this text of UN is written on the wall of UN. It is written on the wall here. It is so important. #00:53:53.2#

71. Isaiah Chapter two Verse four. Let me just read it. *He will judge between the nations and will settle disputes for many peoples. They will beat their swords into ploughshares, and their*

spears into pruning hooks: nations will not take up swords against nation, nor will they train for war any more.

72. And this is written on the wall of the UN (lough). Really, but I am happy that you are picking a topic of peace studies. We need more of this. And your publications should be sent over and over. Now with the modern approach of Internet and so on. Even with Facebook, what all this. #00:55:03.5#

73. Q: Social media. #00:55:03.9#

74. A: Yeah, social media. It must be constantly. We should bombard the media with this message. All the time, until people get exhausted. But it must be. And this is what I would wish, if I had the opportunity more and more to do. When World Vision International gave me a peace award, you may have read it on the Internet. When I was given my peace acceptance, accepting the peace award, I said something like this: I said look. I am receiving this peace award at a time when still human being is fighting human being. A human being is insulting human being. Human being is all those kind of things and I concluded. I said: With the many parts of my years I would wish to work to sensitize about humanity, about their dignity and value one another. That is my little contribution. Then I asked those apology, I asked forgiveness and I apologized to all those whom I may have injured either by my words or my actions. Yeah. And I knelt down, to show clearly that when I do something wrong I lower myself and I lowered the rest of humanity. Yeah. So in humility I had to do that. I pray and hope that with also this kind of research and so on. Some of our views and expressions can pass through also through your researches. So that is it. #00:57:48.5#

75. Q: Thank you very much for the talk. #00:58:05.5#

76. A: I am happy to see people like you, as young as you are, you can look far ahead. You can carry the mantle of peace longer and that is what I want to encourage you. And I surely wish success in your studies. Get a good grade and push on. #00:59:50.5#

IV. Abstract English Version

This thesis looks at peace building efforts in northern Uganda in the aftermath following decades of paramilitary struggle of the Lords Resistance Army against the Ugandan Government headed by Yoweri Museveni, with a special focus on issues of social transformation and bottom-up oriented solutions. The thesis is informed by a qualitative field research in Uganda that was undertaken from August until September 2013 in Kampala and Gulu, one of the most severely affected districts. The analysis of the process and strategies of reconstruction and transformation, as well as the attempt to prevent a relapse into violence by structural preventive measures in a post-conflict situation, would naturally require the application of peace building concepts and theory. The conventional liberal peace paradigm is not well equipped to focus on bottom-up elements of peace building or the consequences and gains for the Ugandan population at the local level. Therefore I will complement the liberal peace paradigm with a human security perspective, thereby reorienting the research focus to the individual level. The right time for peace building is controversially discussed in literature and in political practice. Especially in Uganda one cannot speak of a clear starting point for a post-conflict situation, because peace-building measures were undertaken simultaneously to peace talks and during the hot conflict phase. In this thesis the Juba Peace Talks from 2006-2008 constitute the starting point. Nevertheless some of the initiatives presented have their origins in the early years of the conflict. After analysing the major challenges the population at risk is dealing with, several counter measures at national and local level are discussed in relation to their adequacy and emancipatory force. Of particular interest are psychosocial aspects of peace building, such as support and reintegration of war-victims, child soldiers, refugees and displaced persons, projects for reconciliation and coping with the conflictive past, as well as aspects of transitional justice. In accordance with human security relevant research criteria, examples from the Acholi society in northern Uganda are identified.

V. Abstract German Version

In dieser Diplomarbeit werden Peacebuilding Maßnahmen mit einem speziellem Fokus auf Aspekte der sozialen Transformation und bottom-up orientierte Lösungen untersucht, die infolge des jahrzehntelangen paramilitärischen Kampfes der Lords Resistance Army, gegen die Ugandische Regierung unter Präsident Yoweri Museveni, unternommen wurden. Die Diplomarbeit basiert auf qualitativer Feldforschung, die von August bis September 2013 in Kampala und Gulu, einem der am schlimmsten betroffenen Bezirke durchgeführt wurde. Die Analyse der Prozesse und Strategien des Wiederaufbaus und der Transformation, sowie den Versuch durch strukturelle Präventivmaßnahmen einen Rückfall in die Gewalt zu verhindern, würden logischerweise die Anwendung von Konzepten und Theorien aus dem Peacebuilding Bereich voraussetzen. Das konventionelle Liberal Peace Paradigma ist nicht entsprechend ausgestattet um bottom-up Elemente des Peacebuildings zu diskutieren, oder um die Konsequenzen und Gewinne für die ugandische Bevölkerung auf lokaler Ebene zu diskutieren. Deshalb wird das Konzept Human Security herangezogen um den Fokus der Forschung auf die individuelle Ebene zu lenken. Der richtige Zeitpunkt für Peacebuilding Maßnahmen wird in der Literatur und der politischen Praxis kontrovers diskutiert. Speziell in Uganda lässt sich kaum ein klarer Ausgangspunkt für die Post-Konflikt Situation ausmachen, da Peacebuilding stets simultan zu Friedensverhandlungen und während der "heißen" Konfliktphase stattfand. In dieser Arbeit werden die Juba Friedensverhandlungen von 2006-2007 als Referenzpunkt herangezogen. Dennoch haben etliche der diskutierten Initiativen ihren Ausgangspunkt in den frühen Jahren des Konflikts. Nachdem die dringlichsten Risiken mit denen die ugandische Bevölkerung in folge der Konfliktes konfrontiert ist, gemäß einer Human Security Analyse aufgezeigt werden, werden ausgewählte Gegenmaßnahmen auf nationaler und lokaler Ebene, sowie deren Angemessenheit und emanzipatorische Kraft diskutiert. Von besonderem Interesse sind psychosoziale Aspekte des Peacebuildings: Betreuung und Reintegration von Kriegsopfern, Kindersoldaten, Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen, Projekte zur Versöhnung und zur Bewältigung der konfliktiven Vergangenheit, sowie die moralische und strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung, Aspekte die unter Transitional Justice subsumiert werden können.

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