



universität
wien

MASTERARBEIT

Titel der Masterarbeit

Kemalism, the EU, and the Turkish Welfare State:
Legacy and Development

Verfasserin

Ayşe Kocakulah, BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad

Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, August 2012

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 066 824

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Politikwissenschaft

Betreuerin / Betreuer: Prof. Dr. Peter Gerlich

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	6
ABBREVIATIONS	7
INTRODUCTION	8
METHODOLOGY	11
KEMALISM: THE MAN, THE MYTH, THE PHILOSOPHY	14
THE MAN AND THE MYTH	14
THE PHILOSOPHY: THE SIX ARROWS	17
REPUBLICANISM	18
NATIONALISM	19
POPULISM	21
ÉTATISM:	23
SECULARISM (LAICISM)	25
DEVIRIMCILIK (REFORMISM-REVOLUTIONISM)	27
A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE REPUBLIC: KEMALISM IN (NON-) ACTION	29
EDUCATION	38
POLITICAL ISSUES—SECULARIZATION AND THE ALPHABET	40
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION	44
TERTIARY EDUCATION	50
ADULT EDUCATION	55
WOMEN AND EDUCATION	58
OVERALL IMPLICATIONS IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM	60
HEALTHCARE	61
INSURANCE	63
FAMILY PLANNING	65
FUTURE PLANS	69
HEALTHCARE AND KEMALISM:	70
THE EU—A FORCE FOR CHANGE	72
ACCESSION AGREEMENT	74
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS	74
WOMEN’S RIGHTS	76
SOCIAL POLICY AND EMPLOYMENT	78
EDUCATION AND CULTURE	79
CONSUMER AND HEALTH PROTECTION	82
OVERALL EU KEMALIST IMPLICATIONS	83
CONCLUSION—KEMALISM IN (IN)ACTION	84

<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	<u>90</u>
<u>ABSTRACT</u>	<u>96</u>
<u>CURRICULUM VITAE:</u>	<u>97</u>

Acknowledgements

This work could not have been undertaken without the help of both friends and family, specifically Mehmet Kocakulah, Hüssein Kocakulah, and Kamil Erker. I give thanks for their support with their own histories and their knowledge of the Turkish language, without which this study could not have been undertaken. Also, many thanks, particularly to Johanna Hubweber and Mathias Dorner for their accommodation and support during my studies. Further thanks and appreciation to Prof. Dr. Peter Gerlich for his help and advice during the writing of this thesis and my studies at the University of Vienna.

Abbreviations

CHP-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/Republican People's Party

DP-Demokrat Partisi/Democratic Party

EU-European Union

GERF-Government Employees Retirement Fund

MoH-Ministry of Health

RP-Refah Party/Welfare Party

SSK-State Insurance Organization

TUSİAD-Turkish Industry and Business Association

Introduction

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the hero of the Turkish War of Independence and first president of the modern Republic of Turkey, formed his own political philosophy: Kemalism. This political philosophy was the foundation of the modern Turkish state and has continued to be a guiding principle in governance. This philosophy changed not only the Turkish political system, but also Turkish social, educational, and policy norms and standards. Because both Atatürk and the philosophy that bears his name have been so influential in the Turkish state, it could be assumed that the Turkish welfare state model, as a part of the government, would be shaped by this philosophy. While Turkey, as a state, is a well-researched subject, it is only recently that it has become a subject of research in social policy studies. The frequent political upheavals and occasional military coup d'états have changed the constitution and the Turkish social and governmental structure frequently. Many of these upheavals were in support of Kemalism when it appeared to be threatened, such as in the administration of Adnan Menderes and the resultant military putsch in 1960. However, the military has not executed a full, militarized coup since 1980 and participated only in the soft removal of Necmettin Erbakan and his Welfare Party from power in 1997. This has allowed for a longer period of welfare state development on solely political and democratic terms in parliament, rather than by military junta. However, this has still been a period often overwhelmed by security and cultural concerns—primarily concerning the Kurdish minority and issues relating to the headscarf in public buildings, universities, and other issues of political Islam.

However, the Turkish state is currently undergoing many changes in pursuit of European Union (EU) membership. The EU defines social policy as a somewhat important factor in accession and has mandated that Turkey strengthen its social safety net and further equal opportunities. This has had a significant effect in recent reforms of Turkish social

policy and adds a new dimension to Turkey's governing philosophy in this area. This paper seeks to explore if there is a relationship between the foundational philosophy of Kemalism and the welfare state of the Republic of Turkey and how this relationship has contributed to Turkish welfare state formation and policy, specifically in the areas of education, healthcare, and women's equality. Furthermore, as Turkey takes steps to join the EU, it is important to note whether the Turkish welfare state is changing as a result of the accession process and if those changes are in line with Kemalist doctrine. The EU is a new actor in Turkish policy decisions and while it does not generally play a strong role in social policy, its various mandates can either directly or indirectly lead to or force changes.

This paper will seek to fill a seeming gap in the literature. There is existing literature regarding the Turkish welfare state and current reforms. There has also been research into the effect that the EU accession process is having on Turkish policy, as well as Kemalism and its effect on the Turkish state. However, these strands have not been combined to construct a theory of legacy politics regarding Turkey's westward turn intertwined with Turkey's further involvement in Europe. This case is unique as it is separate from the legacy politics and entry of former Warsaw Pact states into the EU, as there has not been a radical system change in Turkey—despite two hard coups (1960 and 1980) and two soft coups (1971 and 1997) in the short existence of the republic—meaning that development has a strand of continuity since the establishment of the republic—and Turkey's accession process to the EU has been far more fraught with complications than those of the former Warsaw Pact states due to their different political legacies, culture, and their pace of modernization.

Also, the history of modern Turkey is unique in that it followed a bloody war of independence against the Great Powers of the time with the country being reconstructed without significant foreign aid after the First World War. It also saw the rapid industrialization of a country that had previously been woefully underdeveloped and largely

disconnected from the West, unlike Warsaw Pact states that had previously belonged to the various empires of Western Europe and had a relatively high level of exposure to so-called “Western ideals.” This necessitates a further examination of the conditions of the state when it was founded and its history, in order to fully understand the country’s development within Kemalist principles.

Also unique is the continued reverence, some would say cult of personality, that continues to this day in Turkey, revolving around Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the republic. He, as a figure, looms large, with his name being invoked for various changes to and defenses of the state. This is also in contrast to Warsaw Pact states where the history of subjugation to empires and the leadership during the communist period has been largely disavowed. An examination of Kemalism must also include the man who gave the philosophy its name and his statements and stated aims in terms of modernization of the country and the types of services it should provide and what it represents to the Turkish people.

This study will first give a brief history of Atatürk as a modern leader and the way in which his own history shaped the principles that bear his name and look at some elements of his life as examples of Kemalist principles. Following will be an examination of Kemalism and how the principles can be interpreted through the lens of social policy and welfare state structure. A brief history of Turkish development, in line with these principles, will be given as development of a state and the way in which it occurred is instructive in the system of social policy that then evolved. Following that, three case studies will be presented: education, healthcare, and family/women’s benefits will be presented as analyzed through Kemalist principles. The final section will seek to elucidate how involvement with the EU has changed Turkish policy and if these changes are in line with Turkish founding philosophy.

The results of this study are expected to be mixed, finding varying degrees of influence between the EU and Kemalism in Turkish healthcare, educational, and women's policies; however it is expected that reforms demanded by the EU and the Kemalist philosophy will not conflict in theory regarding welfare state policies, but rather in areas where Turkey has strayed from Kemalist philosophy and failed to modernize. Also, due to financial constraints and policy half-measures, it is expected to find a gap between intention and practice in terms of social policy.

Methodology

The methods of this paper are qualitative. The text of the principles of Kemalism used in this paper are those stated in the party manifesto of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party/CHP), which have remained relatively unchanged since the time of the party's founding.¹ The original principles, or Six Arrows² as they are called also bear further analysis as they are to be interpreted in their original form as they relate to social policy, but still also using evolving interpretations by political parties, particularly the CHP, the modern arbiters of Atatürk's legacy, in terms of modernization, as the Six Arrows are treated as eternal on their own, but their interpretation is changing (Ciddi 2009) (Kili 1980). The Six Arrows, while revolutionary in the realm of Turkish governance, hold the principle of 'revolutionism,' meaning that the interpretations themselves change as the state evolves, thus the current CHP definitions will also be used to illuminate this concept.

Developments in social policy will be examined on their own merits, looking at laws, application, and disbursement. The ultimate passing of a law, however, does not equal practice. Intention and practice will be judged separately but equally as they are both indicative of social policy, as there is both policy and practice inherent in the subject. This

¹ These principles have been translated, with the thanks of this author, by Kamil Erker.

² Republicanism, Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Étatism, and Devrimcilik (reformism-revolutionism)

examination will be done using governmental statistics as well as those released by international organizations, such as the World Bank.

Also, interviews with Turkish citizens will be used as they are instructive regarding not only practice, but also their understanding of Kemalism, their perceptions of how it has been practiced, and how it has influenced their lives in their interactions with the Turkish welfare state. These interviewees have been chosen for their range of ages, with the elderly, middle aged and young adults being represented. This will also include observations by the author, having been on site and observed the workings of the welfare state first hand.

Furthermore, the areas of education, healthcare, and women's issues—largely relating to family benefits—have been chosen for their direct relation to Kemalism and the modernization process. Education provides a view into both modernization and the principles of Kemalism as it was revolutionized following the establishment of the republic in the elementary, secondary, and tertiary levels. In its development as a policy area, it has also undergone several changes since the early days of the republic, often for reasons relating to politics (Hale 1981). It also provides an excellent case in which to examine universality vs. elitism as well as secularism—one of the Six Arrows.

Healthcare is also an excellent case as it is demonstrative of the way in which the welfare state has developed as healthcare offers an example of universality vs. corporatism two of the Six Arrows—étatisme and populism. Also, healthcare, much like education, have been widely developed in the republican period. In this situation, it was the actual establishment of healthcare within Turkish borders, subsequent modernization, and issues of access, which are largely decided by the state.

Women's issues and family benefits provide a more social example of the Turkish welfare state as women's issues/family benefits are often indicative of the status of women in

society, often based on culture or religion. Family benefits can also be indicative of women's equality in terms of citizenship and bears a relation to several of the Six Arrows, but namely secularism and devrimcilik (reformism-revolutionism).

Policy changes enacted and new policies introduced during Turkey's quest to become, first, an official EU candidate and, second, to begin accession talks with the EU, and third, during the accession process will be examined through the mandates set by the EU and general EU policy in these areas. Also, whether these policies are in conflict or accordance with the Six Arrows of Kemalism will be assessed.

The terminology used to describe welfare state models will be drawn from Gøsta Esping-Andersen's classic *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Esping-Andersen 1990). The term: "(de)commodification," refers to the dependency of a person/worker on the labor market for survival. If there is a high level of commodification, a worker is highly dependent on the labor market for survival, meaning that there is a lack of availability of benefits outside of the market itself. A high level of decommodification implies the inverse. "Universalism" is used to denote, as would be expected, the universality of benefits. This universalism is based on the citizenship model, meaning that qualifying for benefits is based on citizenship in a society rather than economic standing or profession. Benefits are obtainable by all, meaning that there is a low level of commodification. "Corporatist" refers to a benefits structure that is largely dependent on profession, meaning that the system relies on labor unions and other occupation based organizations to negotiate benefit levels. This reliance on employer/employee organizations does represent a slight privileging of groups over the citizen-whole; however it does provide a safety net through the organizations to which workers/employees belong. This denotes a middling level of commodification. "Means- testing" refers to an extremely restrictive method of benefit disbursement from the state. This method sets an income or living standard threshold above which no benefits are

disbursed. If one were to fall below this threshold, one would then be able to claim benefits from the state. This makes workers/employees extremely dependent on the labor market as one must fall far to qualify to be caught by the social safety net, meaning a high level of commodification. These terms will be used while discussing the welfare state and social policy within Turkey, especially, as regards which method should be used as directed by Kemalist principles.

Kemalism: The Man, the Myth, the Philosophy

In order to address the Kemalist philosophy and its effect on continuing Turkish politics, one must also examine the man who was responsible for their formulation. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938). His life and exploits have been widely recorded and widely mythologized. However, his life was instrumental in the formulation of the principles that would later bear his name.

The Man and the Myth

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born in Thessaloniki—then part of the Ottoman Empire, now part of Greece—the son of a customs officer. As related by Atatürk, his father was in favor of him attending a school based on new methods of learning (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963). He later entered the Thessaloniki high school for civil service, continuing his modern education. This was then followed by attending military school in Monastir, where, according to some, he began to develop his political consciousness during the absolutist rule of Abdülhamid II (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963, 10). He went on to form his first revolutionary committee, named Fatherland and Freedom,³ in 1906 while stationed in Damascus, Syria (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963, 13). During this time, Atatürk and others were exposed to and read such Western works as Rousseau's *The Social Contract* and Montesquieu's *The*

³ "Vatan ve Hürriyet"

Spirit of the Laws, thus possibly adding to his later drive for ‘westernization’ (Dumont 1984). His convictions during this time were largely in line with the Young Turks movement and the writings of Ziya Gökalp, a reformist sociologist, which were often also heavily influenced by western Enlightenment writings and the solidarist principles of Émile Durkheim. He continued to be involved in political activity while being promoted through the ranks of the Ottoman military.

The most mythologized exploit of his activities in the Ottoman period before the War of Independence came during the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, where he led Ottoman troops to an unlikely victory against better equipped troops from Australia and New Zealand. His legend began to loom large with an exchange he later related between him and his troops:

“One does not flee before their enemy.’

They answered: ‘We have no more ammunition.’

I replied: ‘When you don’t have any ammunition, you still have a bayonet.’
(Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963, 24).⁴

After the war, disgusted by the occupation of Turkey by various Allied powers and subsequent atrocities committed in western Turkey by Greek forces with the complicity of the Allied powers, Atatürk, with like-minded others, managed to form a reasonably organized coalition of troops cobbled together of guerilla fighters, ex-Ottoman military soldiers, and other elements to fight the occupation and regain control of all of Anatolia and Thrace (Edib 1930). During this time a Grand National Assembly was also constituted with Atatürk’s proclamation, issued in both public and private, that “Istanbul no longer rules Anatolia” (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963, 64). This was followed by the declaration on March 16, 1920 that the Sultanate in Istanbul was “null and void,” due both to the belief among Atatürk and his cohort that not only was the Sultan corrupt, but also an

⁴ “Man flieht nicht vor dem Feind.’ Sie antworteten: ‚Wir haben keine Munition mehr.’ Ich sagte darauf: „Wenn ihr keine Munition habt, so habt ihr doch Bajonette.“

effective prisoner of the Allied powers, thus becoming the puppet of Western powers rather than a representative of the Turkish people. This was key in Atatürk's formulation of the Six Arrows. The government must be one that is for and by the Turkish people.

A new government and the formation of the republic were ultimately declared on October 29, 1923 after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24th of the same year (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963). Atatürk assumed the presidency of the Republic in a one-party state run by the CHP. The one-party state era came into place with Edib writing, during the one-party period, that in "1925 a violent change took place, and what the outside world calls a dictatorship came into existence" (Edib 1930, 214). She continues, however, to speak in favor of one-party rule as necessary to the development of the nation, noting that Turkey lagged far behind other Western states and that one-party rule that accelerated and furthered reform and modernization was far preferable to a multi-party system that fought and dithered while Turkey slipped farther behind. Also, she notes that Atatürk's hegemonial rule was still pursued under legal auspices, noting that under Atatürk, the National Assembly "stubbornly preserved the constitutional and democratic form, even when it became in spirit a personal dictatorship" (Edib 1930, 203).

While there were other leaders in the early Turkish republic, none were as visible as Atatürk or as heralded. Markus Dreßler notes that Kemalism, even mixed with other elements, has remained the "civil religion" of modern Turkey, in many ways due to the near canonization of Atatürk, noting that Atatürk's 'way' became almost holy with a 1938 school book stating:

"As our enemies trod over us, Atatürk stepped to the fore. An eternal sun has risen. It has throttled the darkness. He lit and led us on along the correct path⁵⁵" (Dreßler 1999, 69).

⁵⁵ „Als die Feinde uns zertraten, trat Atatürk an unsere Spitze. Eine unauslöschliche Sonne ist aufgegangen. Sie hat die Dunkelheiten erdrosselt. Er leuchtet uns und führt uns auf den richtigen Weg.“

The religious overtones in this passage are hard to ignore. Because of this elevation to holy status, the Six Arrows of Kemalism have taken on their own mythical status. They are not untouchable in interpretation, as many have reinterpreted them; however they are unchanged in essentials and still form the basis of the republican system. They were codified over a number of years, often changing, which in some ways conforms to the sixth arrow (devrimcilik). It has been noted that the principles themselves are not new in the world in that they do stem from the ideas of others and have their roots in the first and second constitutional periods of the Ottoman Empire, however, their revolutionary and radical implementation in practice during the early republic and their continuing guidance coupled with the cult of personality surrounding Atatürk can be considered unique (Dumont 1984).

The Philosophy: The Six Arrows

The elevation of Atatürk is central to the Six Arrows because they have become sacrosanct in the Turkish “civil religion” (Dreßler 1999). Because these principles, at least in their headings, remain stationary, they remain in the image of Atatürk. Regardless of the policies of successive governments, they have continued to evoke Kemalism in their policies and rhetoric, going so far as to enter the Six Arrows into the constitution in 1937 (T.C. Anayasa Mahkemesi 2010). They were removed in the new constitution of 1961, but reference to Atatürk, his reforms, and his philosophy are still mentioned in the preamble of the most recent constitution, which was amended in October of 2001 (Office of the Prime Minister-Directorate General of Press and Information Turkey 2012). This passage reads as follows:

“The recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics; the acknowledgement that it is the birthright of every Turkish citizen to lead an honourable life and to develop his or her material and

spiritual assets under the aegis of national culture, civilization and the rule of law, through the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms set forth in this Constitution in conformity with the requirements of equality and social justice...” (Office of the Prime Minister-Directorate General of Press and Information Turkey 2012)

While the above passage does not specifically mention the Six Arrows, it still recalls the reforms of Atatürk and declares them unassailable and unchangeable, as well as making clear their adherence to at least three of the Six Arrows (nationalism, secularism, and devrimcilik). The Six Arrows, again, are as follows: republicanism, nationalism, populism, étatism, secularism, and devrimcilik (reformism-revolutionism). Each of these principles, their origins and their implications for the Turkish welfare state, will be examined.

Republicanism

Republicanism is, as defined by the CHP:

“The republic is the most fundamental transformation in Turkish history. It is the approach to governance that finds the source of sovereignty within the nation and represents the collapse of the concept of monarchy with the emergence of statehood based on the will of the nation. The latter encompasses the entire nation to include both the party in power and the opposition. CHP is a republicanist party advocating the founding of the Republic of Turkey on the unity of principles and ideals of all fellow citizens. The republic derives its power from the tenet of equal rights for and integrity of all people forming this unity. Republicanism replaces the subject with the fellow countryman” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2010).”

The original usage of “republicanism,” was largely related to the form of government that was desired by Atatürk and his compatriots. This was expressed by Atatürk himself saying: “...this government [the Grand National Assembly] works for the people who do not wish to be slaves, to bind their hands and give themselves over to the enemy⁶” (Atatürk, 1981, p. 128). He also stated in reference to the republican form of government: “The foundational principle of this type of government is the theory of unity of force⁷” (Atatürk, 1981, p. 6).

Thus the tenet of republicanism refers to the sovereignty of the people to govern themselves

⁶ “...diese Regierung, sage ich, arbeitet daran, dem Volk, das nicht zu Sklaven werden will, selbst die Hände zu binden und es den Feinden zu überliefern.“

⁷ “Das bei der Organisation einer derartiger Regierung grundlegende Prinzip ist die Theorie der Einheit die Gewalten.”

in a system that fully represents them. It is also through this type of government that the people can find unity among themselves instead of through a symbolic figure like a sultan or a caliph. This is generally taken to be the original intention of the principle of republicanism, however, Kemalists and the CHP have also reinterpreted this principle to relate to concerns of the welfare of the people as being a principle of unity and equality (Ciddi 2009) (Kili 1980). Also, Atatürk and other founders of the republic were very heavily influenced by French Enlightenment thought, meaning that although it may not have been explicitly mentioned, republicanism was a way of binding the country to the West as well as pulling the country into a more modern orbit (Dumont 1984).

The CHP did, in the 1970s, readjust itself to be a social democratic party (Ciddi 2009), however to interpret the idea of republicanism in terms of social policy is simultaneously complex and simple. Both the CHP's current definition and Atatürk's original statements regarding the unity of the people, "replacing the subject with the fellow countryman," reveal a principle of universality to the system. A republic is taken to represent the interests of all as well as equality. This would imply that, as a republic, the Turkish welfare state would not choose a corporatist model of benefits, but rather one that is fully universal—social democratic—or one that is means-tested, which still implies unity with a minimal amount of wealth redistribution and communal support for the least well off in the republic. The state could either subscribe to a low or high level of commodification, both of which would be acceptable under this principle as it is not specific regarding the level of commodification of labor within the republic. To privilege a group within the republic or to organize parallel systems for parallel groups could be seen as anathema to the republican principle of collective sovereignty and ultimate solidarity.

Nationalism

The CHP's current definition of nationalism is as follows:

“CHP acknowledges the Atatürk nationalism: the Turkish Republic has been established on a foundation of political awareness and unity of ideals, not religious, linguistic, racial or ethnic origin elements. Nationalism represents the nation’s moving forward beyond the concepts of race, religion, sect, regionalism and tribe or ethnic group. Turkey has never been and will never be a state governed based on race, blood or ancestry principles. Our approach to solving the nation’s problems is not centered on race, but rather on fellow citizenship. CHP resolutely rejects any and all contemplations leading to the disintegration and fragmentation of Turkey. The party also rebuffs any attempts by an economically and politically powerful social class or caste to dominate classes that do not enjoy similar powers.

Our nationalism acknowledges the concept of pluralism and respects all ethnic and cultural identities. This is about all fellow citizens being equal under law regardless of their origin, language or faith and about all Turkish nationals being the collective owners of the country. Different ethnic origins cannot be assessed as a criterion for preferential treatment or discrimination. Nationalism encompasses all ethnic and faith differences, acknowledges these differences as a treasure within the framework of Turkey’s national unity, protects individual rights and their contemporary interpretation, allows for freedom of democratic differentiation and embraces integration despite differences, thus defining the ideal of unity aiming to safeguard the national union.

The state cannot have a race. It stands at equal distance from all ethnic identities and espouses the principle that it should secure cultural pluralism. It also advocates the requirement for resolving problems facing citizens of different ethnic origins within the nation’s unity and through a contemporary approach. It defends the tenet of respect for individual cultural rights. The national state supports the unconditional protection of the unity and security of all fellow citizens constituting the Turkish Republic and the independence and sovereignty of the country as well as the absolute integrity of its territory and people” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2010).

This definition speaks broadly to further unity within the party. As can be seen in the first paragraph, Kemalist nationalism rejects class differences and historically did not recognize class at all (Atatürk, 1981) (Kili 1980) (Aydın 2005). Nationalism, in its rejection of race or ethnicity, is also what E.J. Hobsbawm would state was ‘civic nationalism,’ referring to nationalism being based on a civic framework or concept of citizenship, rather than ethnic or more abstract ties, such as ‘blood’ or ‘soul’ (Hobsbawm 1990). This concept of nationalism, which in the 1930 CHP party platform was described as such: “A nation is a social and political formation comprising citizens linked together by the community of language,

culture, and ideal” (Dumont 1984, 29). However, former Prime Minister Recep Peker went further to say that ethnic particularism was no longer a modern possibility, seeking to unify all under the civic banner of ‘Turkishness’ (Dumont 1984). This was to assuage any ethnic tensions and create a heterogeneous national group that not only lived but owned the state together. Nationalism, in this sense, can be transferred to the idea of citizenship, especially with the mention of all citizens being the “collective owners” of the state.

Citizenship based rights without recognition or privileging of socio-economic classes would, again, speak to a universalistic benefit structure and would decry both corporatism and clientelism as antithetical to the nationalist principle as they would disrupt unity. Also, to not recognize class at all would be to reject means-tested benefits as they would be recognition of an economic underclass. This would lead to a low level of commodification of labor as one is not valued solely by their labor but by their citizenship. As nationalism and collective ownership is universalistic in principle, it would then go to support universal benefits as are typified in a social democratic welfare state model.

Populism

The principle of populism is as follows:

“CHP is a populist party. CHP’s populist understanding acknowledges that the basis of its political legitimacy is the will of the people. Populism manifests itself through the abolition of the economic and political privileges of certain classes and coteries, the protection of the unaffiliated and by finding solutions for the people in association with the people” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2010).

The principle of populism is related to the principle of ‘nationalism’ as it specifically follows the nationalist principle of equality and the rejection of privileges for certain groups. What is further illuminating in this principle is the “protection of the unaffiliated,” being explicitly mentioned. This inclusion may have more to do with later Turkish development, but the principle of populism stands on being inclusionary. It is a further bulwark against division

between the people of the republic as well as an imperative for all of the people of the republic to develop and progress together.

Atatürk himself remarked in 1920: “I believe the essential reason of our [the Grand National Assembly] existence now has proven the general tendency of our nation, and it is populism and people’s government. It is the taking over of the government by the people” (Kili 1980, 389). The rejection of class defines “the people” as all of the people or, all Turks. Furthermore, following the definition of a Turk in the principle of nationalism, that is a broadly inclusive category. Ultimately, development and security were invested in all citizens and their state, with the unity principle pulling them together to share any benefits. This was then further supported during the course of the republic by Article 2 of the 1961 constitution:

“The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble” (Balkan, Uysal and Karpat trans. n.d.).

The state being envisaged as a ‘social state’ can be seen as a feint towards the principle of populism as it is a state that exists solely because of unity and not because of the efforts of individuals. The naming of this as social is more of a vocabulary shift rather than a shift in meaning. This is supported by an address by Atatürk to the Grand National Assembly where he said: “Surely, the nation, the community, forms the foundation for all and embodies that will in the Assembly” (Atatürk, 1981, p. 199). In this way, the people are inseparable from the state and the state is inseparable from the people.

Populism, much like nationalism, is universalistic. It implies unity, but also decries privileges. Without taking on a Marxist character, as Kemalism cannot due to its rejection of the notions of class and class struggle, the populist principle denies particularism, which is a facet of corporatism and as it rejects class, it again must reject means-testing for any type of social safety net. However, to invert the principle that means-testing would imply a privilege

granted by the state to the very poor is also possible, meaning that means-testing is granting a privilege to the few not enjoyed by the many, leading Kemalism, especially in view of the populist principle, to reject it. Again, this Arrow points to a universalistic, social democratic welfare state.

Étatism:

The principle of étatism is as follows:

“CHP is an étatist party. CHP’s étatism promotes the structuring of the government with the purpose of serving the people. It embraces participatory governance and supports a democratic state respecting the rule of law. Our perception of étatism is the implementing of an understanding promoting a government existing for the people, not the people for the government. Moreover, it requires that all economic, social and political objectives of the state focus on people. Étatism is a security to be brought to establish a viable balance between individual benefits and communal gains.

Nonetheless, CHP’s étatism does not oppose an organized and social market economy. Based on the fact that markets may evolve against the people’s benefit, the party acknowledges the significance of the requirement for government regulation and supervision. Consequently, it opposes the markets’ overriding the people’s will by attempting to shape government policy” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2010).

Étatism can be ultimately summed up as ‘the state works for the people.’ This principle has, however, not been one of strict theory like the three previous principles, but has truly been one seen in economic practice. This will be discussed later, but the theoretical aspects of étatism and how they translate to social policy are fairly clear. Dreßler sums up the principle of étatism as giving the state the right to enact measures to influence the economy in the interest of the people (Dreßler 1999, 59). This is ultimately supported by quotations from Atatürk himself on 1 March, 1922 to the Grand National Assembly:

“We [the people and government] soon will connect all the important centers in the country with railways. Important resources will be developed. The foundation of this plan, the conversion of the destroyed face of our land to bountiful land, will enchant eyes everywhere.⁸” (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963, 259)

⁸ „Alle wichtigen Zentren des Landes werden wir in kurzer Zeit durch Eisenbahnen miteinander verbinden. Wichtige Bodenschätze werden erschlossen werden. Die Grundsteine des Planes, das zerstörte Gesicht unseres Landes von Anfang bis Ende in ein wohlbebautes Land zu verwandeln, wird alle[o]rts die Augen verzaubern.“

“Soon, there will be more opportunities on a wider basis for secure jobs for all of the people that work and would like to. It will not be long until the faces of our merchants are smiling⁹” (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963, 259).

And in 1937:

“...In the machine of political existence, that invests in a nation an independent character and independent worth, the mechanisms of state, ideals, and economic life are interconnected and work together, so much so that when this apparatus is not aligned and does not work together in the same rhythm, the driving force of the government apparatus is wasted. Because of this, the expected results cannot be achieved. But the cultural level of a nation is judged by its results and successes in three fields, namely the fields of the state, the mind, and the economy¹⁰” (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963, 262).

And also:

“Étatism, as applied by us, while giving priority to individual work and effort, consists in the intervention of the state in all spheres, whenever the general interests of the nation are involved, and this with the aim of leading the country with the least delay to prosperity and welfare” (Dumont 1984).

Taken together, the quotations from 1922, before the formal establishment of the republic, speak of political existence and the need for the state to be responsible for the development of the country in both the cultural and economic realms. All the activities of the state are fully focused on the nation, meaning that the state is fully in service to the people—all the people.

This again implies a universalistic approach as étatism regards the entire population and not any specific groups as would be found in corporatism. Also, means-testing of benefits move only to the survival of the less fortunate and not the betterment of the nation as a whole. This again points to a universalistic approach as the economy, culture, and the state are seen as intertwined and must be instilled in all people. While people have independent values and the population as a whole has an independent worth from the state, the state

⁹ „Für unser ganzes Volk, das arbeiten und glücklich sein möchte, und für die Arbeiter wrden sich bald Angebote auf breiter Basis für sichere Arbeitsplätze auftun. Es wird nicht mehr lange dauern, dann werden die Gischter unserer Kaufleute lachen.“

¹⁰ „...In der Maschine des politischen Daseins, die einer Nation eine unabhängige Gestalt und einen unabhängigen Wert verleiht, hängen die Mechanismen des staatlichen, ideellen und ökonomischen Lebens voneinander ab und miteinander zusammen, so sehr, dass, wenn diese Apparate sich nicht einander anpassen und im gleichen Rhythmus arbeiten, die motorischen Kräfte der Regierungsmaschine vergeudet werden. Aus diesem Grunde kann man das erwartete vollkommene Ergebnis nicht erzielen. Aus diesem Grud bemisst man das kulturelle Niveau einer Nation nach den erzielten Ergebnissen und den Erfolgen auf drei Gebieten, nämlich den Gebieten des Staates, des Geistes und der Ökonomie.“

cannot move against the interests of the people and, as the modern CHP states, cannot allow the market to supersede the interests of the people. This is, again, the people as a whole.

Secularism (Laicism)

The current definition and understanding of secularism is as follows:

“Secularism is the separation of religion from the state’s civil affairs. The basic tenet of freedom of faith and conscience is a prerequisite for and the assurance of the peaceful coexistence of different faiths in the community. This also represents a fundamental value for the republic and democracy as well as the national unity and domestic peace.

That the state and its institutions, the population, law and education are to be secular is our unconditional fundamental rule. The basic aim of the secularism principle is the emancipation of the mind. For CHP, secularism is the cornerstone of national unity and domestic peace as well as the foundation of the belief in modernity and science. This understanding of the party firmly opposes the abuse of religion by politicians. It accepts neither the politicization of religion nor religious motives’ overwhelming politics.

The state is at equal distance from all religions and faiths. It cannot affiliate with any religion. Religion is not a fact of public sphere; it is a matter of private domain. Secularism is the cornerstone of the republic, democracy, domestic peace, human rights and national unity. It is the assurance of human rights, gender equality, modernity and modernization. Consequently, secularism is the indispensable and inexorable provision of the Turkish constitution” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2010).

Secularism, at its base, is the separation of religion from the state apparatus in governing, the absence of a state religion, and the free practice of all religions within the republic. It can also be seen to have an underlying motive—that of promoting the nationalist principle as this was a way to “generate a Turkish nation of people who would feel first and foremost Turkish” (Aydın 2005, 185). This is in some ways similar to the French concept of *laïcité* and the moving of religion out of the public space (Bowen 2007). However, the refusal to recognize and the opposition to the politicization of religion by politicians are of particular significance to the republic. These principles within secularism are both matters of principle, but also motivated by history.

The most recent incidence of this was the removal from office in a soft coup d’état of Necmettin Erbakan in 1997 and the outlawing of his Refah Partisi (RP/Welfare Party).

Erbakan and the RP—not to impugn their self-proclaimed devout adherence to Islam—were militant in their claims and also reportedly underhanded in their dealings (Aydın 2005). They attempted to gain the support of the urban and rural poor with religious rhetoric and promises of social aid because of religious devotion; however these promises, due to their removal from the government, were never fully put to the test. Their electoral strategy was seen as craven by Kemalists—this author has often heard rumors that young women were paid to follow religious dress codes as a way to further and make more visible the religious cause of the RP—which ultimately led to their downfall, as the secular principles of Kemalism and the current version of the constitution were violated—Article 24 of both the 1980 and currently amended version of the constitution (Office of the Prime Minister-Directorate General of Press and Information Turkey 2012) (Erhan Yasar n.d.). There was also an earlier instance of the usage of religion and religious rhetoric for political gain by Adnan Menderes, described by former Prime Minister Recep Peker in 1946 as a ‘psychopath,’ and his Demokrat Parti (DP/Democrat Party) (Mango 2004, 43). They were removed from office in a hard coup in 1960, in part for their totalitarian policies, Menderes’s apparent mental instability, violation of the constitution, and their attacks on secularism.

Article 24 of the most recent constitution has remained in place because, as has been demonstrated by the above recounted history, it is considered central to the republic. Furthermore, it has a central place in the founding of the republic, which involved not only the abolishment of the monarchy, but also the caliphate. These actions were taken simultaneously because of the fact that the sultan was also the caliph, meaning that religion and government were fully bound together. Atatürk proclaimed that the end of this combined institution was necessary for total freedom (Atatürk, 1981, p. 117) saying:

“When one says the word caliphate, the sultanate is included...Considering these thoughts, there was an opposing thought that was not clear. One couldn’t openly say that the sovereignty is invested in the nation; there is no longer a monarchy. The

caliphate also means the sultanate and no longer has any right to exist¹¹” (Atatürk, 1981, p. 118).

And as regards the preservation of religion in the state:

“I have no doubt that in the opposing case, the Turkish nation and also the entire Muslim world, would be sentenced to slavery and degradation¹²” (Atatürk, 1981, p. 141).

The principle of secularism, rather ironically, can be described as sacrosanct as the lack of secularism in religious government foments not only inequality, but also the humiliation of the people. In terms of the welfare state, this means that ideals, in regards to gender and access to services, must be separated from those of the church. Also, religious institutions can no longer be the primary means of charity and support for adherents and must be replaced by the state in order to move religion fully into the private sphere. The state must provide for the needs of the people outside of religion, thus providing for a universalistic conception of the welfare state as there can be no divisions on religious lines or in terms of class. This also has important bearing on the roles of women in society as the principle of secularism ultimately moves to decry religious patriarchalism and religious motivations for legislation, such as dress codes and family planning. In this way, secularism is again universalistic in nature as it removes gender as a privileging instrument and breaks down barriers for the involvement of women in society.

Devrimcilik (Reformism-Revolutionism)

The current definition of devrimcilik is as follows:

“CHP is a revolutionist party in that it pursues the process of radical change aiming contemporary civilization, sharing the age and investing for the future spearheaded in the republican era by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the party’s founder. CHP maintains its revolutionist approach through a strict adherence to democratic state rules and peaceful means, in concert with, supported and as authorized by the people.

¹¹ „Man setzte nur das Wort ‚Kalifat,‘ denn es schließt das, Sultanat in sich...Was den Gedanken anbetrifft, den man diesem entgegestellte, so war es nicht klar. Man konnte nicht offen sagen, die Souveränität ist an die Nation übergegangen; es gibt keine Monarchie mehr; das Kalifat bedeutet auch das Sultanat und hat folglich ebenfalls keine Daseinsberechtigung mehr.“

¹² „Im entgegengesetzten Fall unterliegt es für mich keinem Zweifel, daß die türkische Nation und damit zugleich die ganze mohammedanische Welt zu Knechtschaft und Erniedrigung verurteilt sein werden.“

The CHP revolutionism adopts an approach open to innovation by embracing contemporary thinking and transforming it into a continuous way of life and management. This is about questioning the rules and the self with a view to pave the way towards the better and the just, and within this framework carve out the methods and means of development. In essence, this is about converting the energy and dynamism of the youth into a driving force for transformation to instill their vision of continuing change and reform to the entire population” (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2010).

Devrimcilik is what it purports to be. As Suna Kili states:

“[t]he principle of *devrimcilik* went beyond the recognition of the reforms which were made. Kemalism is not an ideology of the status quo, but a radical liberal ideology capable of growth with the times. Its principle of *devrimcilik* is what gives it the needed flexibility and power of growth without sacrificing basic tenets” (Kili 1980, 392).

It is the tenet of *devrimcilik* that makes it possible to interpret the Six Arrows in the context of social policy and the welfare state as they do indeed have the necessary flexibility and broadness to be accommodated to a number of areas.

Devrimcilik in terms of the Turkish welfare state refers to, firstly, whether the welfare state is in itself revolutionary, meaning if it, at the beginning, moved or sought to move beyond what was existent at the present time of the founding of the republic. Furthermore, it refers to whether the system has adapted and changed in meaningful ways to move with the times, present conditions, and changing social mores. Were policies to move backwards in modernity or to become outmoded and unworkable, the principle of *devrimcilik* would be betrayed. Devrimcilik is not so much a motive as an imperative.

During the War of Independence, Atatürk, referring to the outdated policies and general antiquated nature of the Ottoman state, stated: “In this manner, every century, every day, and every hour, Turkey sinks and is denigrated further because men gave themselves up to be lead by false ideas of this kind¹³” (Atatürk, 1981, p. 181). Edib, as a contemporary observer, also noted, regarding the government of the new republic, that “[t]he deep-lying

¹³ „Auf diese Weise ist die Türkei in jedem Jahrhundert, an jedem Tage, in jeder Stunde ein wenig gesunken und denigiert, weil es Männer gab die sich vor falschen Ideen dieser Art leiten ließen.“

cause of its strength, the swift way in which it established itself in the place of a government which had lasted seven centuries, was in a sense the outcome of a long process of change” (Edib 1930, 187). It seems that the idea of change and constant revolution was embedded within the CHP ideology itself, as it was recognized that change was necessary not only to remain relevant, but to be at the service of the people. However, it is important to note that while revolution is a principle in Kemalist ideology, it does not subscribe to the ‘vanguard’ approach often seen in Marxist-Leninism. Kemalist devrimcilik is about constant evolution, betterment, and development instead of constant militancy.

One can observe whether this principle is at work or not in the Turkish welfare state relatively clearly, however this principle comes most strongly into play, in the context of this study, in regards to Turkey’s modernizing processes in relation to international organizations in which Turkey desires membership. Devrimcilik does not necessarily imply a type of welfare state, but rather a characteristic within the welfare state that encourages and, indeed, demands constant evolution.

It is all of these principles combined that constitute the broad outlines of Kemalism, as well as their applications within this study to the Turkish welfare state. As discussed here, they are all universalistic in nature, lending themselves to a universalistic welfare state construction.

A Brief History of Development in the Republic: Kemalism in (Non-) Action

When discussing the Turkish welfare state, it is also important to note the conditions under which it developed. Welfare state development does not occur in a vacuum, making a short history of economic and industrial conditions and development necessary. It is a fact that Turkish economic development, as related below, has been erratic and, in many ways,

underwhelming. It is also important to note that Turkey has been subject to significant political upheaval since the founding of the republic with new constitutions being written in 1961 and 1980 by military juntas and their appointed constituent assemblies. These conditions have inevitably influenced policy, but when assessing whether the Turkish social policy is in line with the founding Kemalist philosophy, one can look at the intention of the policy and how close a policy was or is to reaching the Kemalist ideal in the context of economic and political conditions.

The Turkish republic has a history that is somewhat rare in the modern world. While the state was formed in the ashes of empires after the First World War, it found itself on a completely different trajectory than the states of Western and Central Europe. While Germany found itself in the Weimar Republic and Austria in the First Republic, Turkey also began its life as the first—and so far only—republic. However, Germany and Austria were left with defined borders, relatively little occupation, and were already industrial centers that were capable of existing in the modern, mechanized world. Turkey, on the other hand, was left occupied on all sides by Great Britain, France, Italy, and invaded by Greece with Western complicity. Turkey also was very lightly industrialized with most of the country working in rural agriculture, with the urban population in Turkey comprising only 16.6% of the whole in 1935 (Hale 1981, 26). Also, Turkey had essentially gone through two wars instead of one, considering the War of Independence separately from World War I.

At the point of the founding of the republic, Turkey's transportation infrastructure was severely lacking, the banking and finance sectors were largely under foreign control, mining was possible but the industry was underdeveloped, and a skilled class of non-Muslim artisans and merchants had left the country due to the loss of privileges granted them under Ottoman rule. The textile industry was at least somewhat developed, however it was localized

in the west, with hardly any developed industry existing in eastern or central Anatolia (Aydın 2005) (Hale 1981).

The principle of étatism comes into play here in its earliest form as the state sought to build industry within the country in order to make Turkey as self-sufficient as possible, while also inviting foreign capital and foreign investment. The *Ziraat Bankası* (Agricultural Bank) was formed in order to aid the agricultural sector in order to aid development, with other banks—*Sümerbank* (factories) and *Etibank* (mining)—being established for other sectors of the economy. Also, the tax and tariff systems were reformed (Hale 1981).

At this point, Turkey developed its ‘third-way’ capitalism with a market system existing, but the state providing and directing most industry. This was due both to the étatist principle, but also to the fact that there wasn’t any other domestic entity with the capital or ability to undertake industrialization and that the world was soon gripped by the Great Depression, leaving little for other more developed nations to invest in Turkey. The state thus began to establish and/or support the existing textile industry while working to establish paper, glass, cement, chemical, and mining industries (Aydın 2005) (Hale 1981).

While these plants were often set up in less developed areas in order to spur regional development, the infrastructure problems remained. Also, because these industries were state controlled, they were subject to corruption and patronage, which would ultimately turn into forms of clientelism with Edib noting in 1930:

“The trading class has also changed its complexion. Commerce and trade have gradually begun to require political backing. The place of the non-party, conservative trader of some standing is taken by adherents of the ruling party... The traders are obliged either to back the policy of the ruling party or at least be neutral” (Edib 1930, 217)

This observation would prove prophetic in terms of later economic and political development. However, it was also during the 1930s that some of these enterprises were

made 'joint-stock' companies, thus allowing for the return of private capital to the system, but the endpoint of this development will be eternally unknown because of the new policies necessitated by the outbreak of the Second World War. Where the state had passed and implemented the first of two five year plans, the second was interrupted and replaced by the National Defense Law, which gave the government almost total control of the economy (Hale 1981, 59). Agricultural policy followed on largely the same lines as industrial policy with the agricultural bank supporting producers and the Office of Soil Products purchasing the products. Land was also re-distributed from large landholders and religious institutions to landless peasants and smaller producers in an effort to promote productivity and subsistence. But the end of the Second World War saw the CHP—at the time the only political party—retreat from the policy of state intervention as well as the entrance of the DP into politics (Aydın 2005) (Hale 1981) (Mango 2004). Despite all of these efforts, Turkey remained largely unindustrialized with the massive disparities between the east and the west remaining.

The DP purported to favor private enterprise, but their actions were contradictory. Very little changed in terms of the state owned industries and factories, though some foreign investment did arrive in the country. Investment in private firms did increase and these firms did finally begin to hold a higher market share and employ a larger number of workers by the late 1950s, but state support was still used as a stop-gap measure when private investment could not meet the country's needs. However, the DP became more entrenched in the system of patronage and clientelism that was formed by their predecessors, putting plants and factories in places where they were not needed, an example being the selling of cement at a loss on the foreign market due to a cement factory being placed in an area that was politically vital for the DP, which ultimately did not need cement. Agricultural policy was also mixed in this period with state support being given to agriculture with more avenues for private capital to be invested. Tractors were introduced for the first time but other advancements were

absent, though agricultural villagers were in a better position than they had been before (Aydın 2005) (Hale 1981) (Mango 2004).

The DP was removed from power, as aforementioned, by a military coup d'état. This was prompted by the continuing authoritarianism of the DP and the plainly visible mental instability of Adnan Menderes, then prime minister and head of the DP. The putsch was spurred on by student movements, academics, intellectuals, and the military. This will be further discussed in the section regarding education. But this military junta did produce what is widely recognized as the most liberal constitution in Turkish history and the first explicit definition of Turkey as a 'social state' (Balkan, Uysal and Karpat trans. n.d.).

State planning came back into vogue through the idea that the state could better distribute resources than the private sector. There were three five-year plans (1963-1967, 1968-1972, 1973-1977), first instituted by the military, that saw the country grow considerably, however the state continued as it had during the 1950s as a support measure when the private sector could not meet demand. Industrialization continued, but protectionism also flourished. Due to the lack of competition, some industrialists were seen to lose their drive for innovation, making productivity levels sink. The GNP did rise 7% between 1960 and 1970; however this was also related to income from another source. The state could rely on family remittances coming from Western Europe to underpin families themselves after the Federal German Republic and other Western European and Scandinavian countries began their guest worker programs in the early 1960s (Mango 2004, 65). Furthermore, income inequalities remained stubbornly in place.

Turkey was in need of help from the International Monetary Fund in 1973, but the rate of industrial growth between 1963 and 1976 was around 10% (Aydın 2005). However, Turkey was hit by global economic recession and economic inequalities intensified with the

extreme political uncertainty of the time. In 1971, then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel voluntarily left office after he refused to comply with reforms demanded by the military. Unrest continued, often making concerted government action haphazard with parts of the country being put under martial law and the rate of politically motivated murders and kidnappings rising, as well as purges in the military to root out officers planning further coups (Mango 2004). By 1973, the military felt able to leave politics to the politicians.

But 1974 was to put another drain on the Turkish economy in the form of Northern Cyprus. Turkey's invasion of Cyprus during inter-ethnic conflict on the island is well-known. But Northern Cyprus, not being recognized by the international community at large, was and has been largely supported by the Republic of Turkey since that time, providing for a civil service, infrastructure improvements, and defense, among other things. This has proved costly as well as reducing Turkey's political capital in economic matters during that period of time with support of Northern Cyprus still being a factor in Turkish finances (Aydın 2005) (Mango 2004).

The government was again taken over by the military in 1980, which saw the introduction of a neo-liberal approach with the privatization of state industries. This intervention occurred after years of political and social unrest as battles between leftists and rightists had spread to the streets. Martial law was declared again in 1978 with Mango putting the figure for politically motivated murders from January to September of 1980 at 3,000 (Mango 2004). These movements were also seen across the educational spectrum in secondary and tertiary education, thus somewhat marring the independence of universities and any type of education received during this period (Mango 2004) (Jacoby 2004). To add to this, the economic policies of governments during this period of time were misguided, to say the least, with inflation running rampant and finance collapsing. This saw huge rises in income inequality and massive jumps in unemployment, with much of the country

impoverished. Foreign aid dried up for both political and economic reasons and shortages of basic necessities became routine (Aydın 2005) (Mango 2004). It was at this point that the government began to introduce neo-liberal measures and weakening government support for industry and further opening the Turkish economy to the world.

The social consequences of the 1980 coup d'état were wide reaching with society “depoliticized,” which included universities, which had previously been hotbeds of political activity (Mango 2004) (Jacoby 2004). The stabilization program directed by the IMF also reduced the growth of the Turkish economy, brought down the GNP, and resulted in the unemployment of 1.5 million people (Aydın 2005) (Mango 2004).

The economy was saved by “the revitalization of the unused capacity in existing industries rather than further industrialization” (Aydın 2005, 46). Also, exports increased and infrastructure was improved in the mid-1980s, leading to better economic conditions and the reduction of social unrest. But wage earners, like teachers, saw their wages reduced with the example, given by Mango, of “schoolteachers who supplemented their income by working as cab drivers after hours” (Mango 2004, 85-86). Also, innovation and diversification into newer high tech industries was largely forgotten and is still not a large component of the Turkish economy in 2012. Corruption has been steadily on the rise. This tide has not been stemmed, leading to a large shadow economy that does not contribute to the state (Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010) (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). Whether corruption-based or not, the government has been generally sloppy in its accounting, leading to an unreliability of figures due to either carelessness or intentional manipulation. The economy still rests, in 2012, on labor-intensive manufacturing and small farmers rather than in a more technically advanced service economy, with much of the manufacturing as part of joint ventures with foreign companies providing the technology. While it is open to foreign competition, the state sector is still supporting private enterprise, much as it has done throughout Turkish history, putting a

further strain on finances. Added to this was the significant loss of trade with Iraq during and after Desert Storm in 1991 (Mango 2004). Overspending continued and the country was again in crisis in 1994, needing help from the IMF. In a social advancement, this occurred under the premiership of Tansu Çiller, Turkey's first and so far only female prime minister. In 1996 a customs union agreement was reached with the EU, which brought benefits in advancement of Turkish industry but also drawbacks in areas of compliance with EU regulations.

This was then followed by the election to parliament of the RP whose leader, Necmettin Erbakan, sought to make deals with other Muslim countries based on the idea of Muslim fellowship. This quest failed spectacularly. He was then quietly removed from government. The economy continued in its normal fashion of moderate crises and short bouts of health until it completely collapsed on 19 February, 2001. The IMF was again asked for help and a radical austerity package for public spending was enacted. Many banks had already failed and continued to fail thus increasing public debt as these failures were absorbed by the government. The GNP of the country went into a downward spiral and 2.5 million jobs were lost from November of 2000 to February of 2001 (Mango 2004). However, the IMF program ultimately did help the Turkish economy recover. Unemployment though, continued to remain high with the employment ratio in 2003 at 35% (Mango 2004).

The Turkish economy has improved, however it has seen miscalculations, controversial privatizations, and has suffered through a world financial crisis, with overall GDP increasing by 4.7% in 2007, .07% in 2008, contracting by 4.8% in 2009, and then exploding to an increase of 9.0%. However, in US dollars, the GDP per capita is slightly lower in 2010 at \$10,094 than it was in 2008 (\$10,298). Unemployment also remains high in the latter half of the new century's first decade with unemployment in 2007 before the financial crisis at 10.3% rising to 14% in 2009, with female and male unemployment rates

hovering around the same level. Also, there are new concerns regarding the fact that while public debt in 2011 was at 40% and GDP growth was near 8%, the current-account deficit was over 10% of the GDP. There are serious concerns that the economy is overheating (The Economist 2012) with economics professor Dani Rodrik stating that “the economy is poised for a painful hard landing as soon as confidence turns south... Governments that engineer growth accelerations on the back of unsustainable foreign borrowing booms like to repeat the mantra ‘this time it is different.’ Unfortunately, few current account deficits as large as Turkey’s end well” (Rodrik, Dani Rodrik's weblog: The Turkish economy after the global financial crisis 2012). However, it is still unknown what effects these new economic developments will have on the Turkish population or the Turkish economy.

Turkey is also beset by the existence of a large informal economy. This is not necessarily a black market in the conventional sense of the term, but rather a system of unofficial, unreported labor. This is a significant challenge in a welfare state that for many benefits relies on employment related programs for benefit disbursal. These informal laborers present a further challenge in regards to their living conditions, many of whom live in *gecekondu*—illegally built housing settlements in urban areas. This has been a side effect of rapid urbanization occurring over the second half of the twentieth century (Kisa, Younis and Kisa 2007). While many of these settlements have been recognized, more, still, have not; this has ultimately created a further problem of people living ‘off the grid’ so to speak and has thus complicated their efforts to obtain and receive benefits.

These economic factors are important to remember as the backdrop to all of the developments that will be examined in this study. The development of the welfare state is largely dependent on the state’s ability to function and support itself while supporting its citizens. Also, in some ways there has been the understanding on the part of the government that the nation (i.e. the populace) serves the state and not the other way around. Despite this

being counter to the étatist principle, it is a feeling that some feel has been institutionalized (Sozen and Shaw 2003). This was in some ways demonstrated by a quote from Necmettin Erbakan who stated that if his party were in power, Turkey would no longer be a ‘guardian state’ but that the state would instead be a ‘waiter state’ (Müftüler-Bac 1998, 249).

While the Turkish welfare state should follow a Kemalist universalistic welfare state model based on the idea of citizenship, economic conditions and the state of development are mitigating factors while discussing the welfare state as regards education, healthcare, and benefits for women. While practice is, in this context, important, intent is also a determining factor.

Education

Education within Turkey has developed greatly since the founding of the republic. The new republican government, using previous census data, estimated that in 1927, 98% of villages had no educational facilities whatsoever during the War of Independence (Başgöz and Wilson 1968). Assessments made by foreign observers were not complimentary of the state of the Turkish educational system with the Kemerrer Report, written by American experts in 1933, stating that “there is great illiteracy and a strong tradition originating from ignorance...” (Başgöz and Wilson 1968, 71). In 1927, the literacy rate of the total population was assessed at 10%: 17% men, 9% women (Hale 1981). Radical changes and improvements were necessary to the educational system that had been in place if the republic was to prosper and if the educational system were to be remade to fit Kemalist ideals.

Education in Turkey is part of social policy and the Turkish welfare state as it has been presented by the early reformers as a service to the public and a significant part of the ‘social state.’ Education was to be the engine through which the country developed and the people were lifted out of ignorance and poverty. In this way, it contributes to the welfare of

the people and finds its place with the construct of the welfare state. Atatürk himself remarked:

“Around the world, for material and ideals, for life and for success, knowledge and science are the truest (spiritually and morally) leaders. A leader without knowledge and science is synonymous with thoughtlessness, ignorance, and error¹⁴” (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963).

Education at the end of the Ottoman period was a privilege extended only to the upper and upper middle classes of men and the upper classes of women. Furthermore, while Atatürk and many of his cohorts were secularly educated with Western methods and Westernized curriculums, this was not the case for most Turks. The prevailing system of education was found in medreses, or religious schools, that were, as argued by Kemalists, completely antithetical to both the Kemalist program (secularism) and western modernization as there was a total absence of the arts and sciences in the curriculum. Also, the Turkish language as spoken by Turks was not at all standardized with Ottoman Turkish being the academic and administrative language of the area and unknown to the general populace.

Ottoman Turkish itself was an extremely complicated language, sometimes referred to as a prestige language, composed of not only words of Turkish origin, but also words of Arabic and Persian origin that were unfamiliar to the vast majority of the population, and written in a modified Arabic script that was wholly unsuited to the Turkish language and ultimately contributed to illiteracy. All of these things, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, were to be swept away in new reforms with an educational system rebuilt in the image of the new republic. The political developments in education, such as the secularization of education and the latinization of the alphabet will be covered in their own section. A survey

¹⁴ “Auf der Welt sind für alles, für das Materielle und Ideale, für das Leben und für den Erfolg die Wissenschaft und die Technik die wahrsten (geistigen und moralischen) Führer. Einen solchen Führer ausserhalb der Wissenschaft mit Gedankenlosigkeit, Unwissenheit, und Irrtum.“

of developments and the current state of primary, secondary, tertiary, and adult education will follow. All of these will be analyzed in a Kemalist context.

Political Issues—Secularization and the Alphabet

The secularization of education was a point held dear by Atatürk. Without secularization, in his view, the revolution would have been for naught, as the country would not advance. His view can be summed up in this quote:

“It is my opinion that the teaching and educational methods used up until now have contributed to the historic decline of our nation. Therefore when I speak of a national education program, I mean the building of a new culture that is consistent with our national character and our history that is far removed from the religious fables of earlier times, from foreign ideas that have absolutely no relationship with our natural character, and from all influence from the East or the West¹⁵” (Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO 1963, 209).

During the Ottoman period, there was a ministry known as Evkaf. This ministry dealt with religious or ‘pious’ foundations, which included schools (medreses). This was a particular problem for the new republic as it was not only a relic of the old regime, but anathema in their quest for westernization and secularization. Also, even after the War of Independence, the Evkaf ministry remained independent of the Ministry of Education, which was formed during the war. This created a parallel system that proved to be unworkable as Evkaf sought to, in the Kemalist view, keep the population subservient through religious means even after the abolition or demolition of the caliphate.

But it was in 1924 that Evkaf was dissolved and all educational institutions were placed under the new Ministry of Education. When this occurred, 479 medreses were closed, which at that point had an enrollment of 18,000 students (Başgöz and Wilson 1968, 77).

Between the years of 1925 and 1928, all religion was removed from the curriculum in public

¹⁵ “Ich bin der Ansicht, dass die bis jetzt verfolgten Unterrichts- und Erziehungsmethoden ein sehr wichtiges Moment für den allmählichen historischen Verfall unserer Nation sind. Wenn ich deshalb von einem nationalen Erziehungsprogramm spreche, so meine ich hiermit den Aufbau einer Kultur, die unserem nationalen Charakter und unserer Geschichte entspricht, die weit entfernt sind von den religiösen Fabeln früherer Zeiten, von fremden Ideen, die überhaupt keine Beziehungen zu unseren natürlichen Eigenschaften haben, und von allem Einflüssen aus dem Osten oder dem Westen.“

schools. Even earlier, in 1924, all forms of “religious instruction and propaganda” were forbidden in foreign operated schools. This actually led to the closure of many foreign schools, as many were missionary based. However, these actions were not due to any sort of xenophobia, but rather to the absolute adherence to the principle of secularism, which had been added to the constitution in 1928. Religion was to be completely removed from education as this was viewed, regardless of faith, as proselytization, which had no place in education. This view is well summarized by a 1933 article in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*

“Our views concerning the foreign schools are very plain. We do not object to the existence of foreign schools in the country, or to the opening of new ones. However, we want them to conform to the secularistic principles of the Republic... We are not against the opening of a secular school to carry out instructions in French. In fact, we would regard this as a service to the country... However, it has been reported that in some of these schools religious instruction is being given or contemplated. Our new regime believes in secularism as a modern principle, and we cannot tolerate any act that may destroy this principle. There are two choices left for these schools. They may either stop religious instructions, or close” (Başgöz and Wilson 1968).

The views of *Cumhuriyet* were then confirmed as being those of the government as the CHP, at their fourth general congress in 1935, adopted this as their stance:

“The most important problem at every level of education is to educate the Turkish citizen to be a strong nationalist, republican, secularist, progressive and populist” (Başgöz and Wilson 1968).

All education in Turkey for the first 15 years of the republic and a few years beyond was strictly “positivist, secularist and nationalist” (Mango 2004, 158). Though there are some claims that religious education was only fully dropped from both primary and secondary education in 1932 (Winter 1984).

However, the secularization of education was pushed backwards in the late 1940s when religious education was reintroduced in public schools, albeit as an elective course and not mandatory in middle and high schools. However, this instruction was still done under strict parameters requiring the use of Turkish texts in the reformed Latin alphabet as well as a

full ban on religious propaganda or the promotion of any kind of political interest or goal. But in the late 1940s, it was the prerogative of the parents to sign their children up for these classes. Since 1950, it has been the prerogative of the parents to request that their children *not* receive religious instruction, as it then became part of the curriculum by default. This was then changed again after the military coup of 1980. Classes regarding ‘religious culture’ were made mandatory; however these classes were meant to be more about morals, history, and ethics than theological instruction.

Religious schools were again allowed after the election of the DP in 1950, with nearly 200,000 religious high schools in operation in 1998. These schools were still subject to government oversight and private, but they did run counter to the Kemalist principle of secularism as education should be totally free of religious/unscientific influences. The influence and prevalence of religious schools was, however, severely reduced in 1997 after the soft coup that removed Erbakan and the RP from power. It was at this point that all religious middle schools were closed and enrolment in religious high schools was limited. Compulsory education was also extended to 8 years—the middle school level—in order to keep students out of any kind of religious middle school, which were usually unlicensed. It is important to note that state supported religious schools of any kind are in clear violation of the secularist principle. Also, a number of current politicians were educated in these religious high schools, meaning that those without scientific and modern educations are in power of the state apparatus, further violating the Kemalist ethos of logic and knowledge. These schools still exist and religious culture education is still compulsory in schools. It is claimed that these classes exist as a preventative mechanism against communism (Mango 2004), but the clear violation of the secular principle can in no way be ignored.

The latinization of the alphabet was a measure undertaken to express ‘Turkishness,’ giving a unique alphabet to the language as well as fulfilling pan-Turkist goals while

improving literacy. As previously noted, Turkish was written in a modified Arabic script during the Ottoman period despite the fact that the Arabic alphabet was ill-suited for the Turkish language and the difficulty associated with learning to read and write it was prohibitive. It was also at odds with other Turkic languages that were at that point already using Latin script. The literacy rate at the founding of the republic and in 1928 with the introduction of the Latin script was extremely low. The introduction of this alphabet was meant to rectify this. But to attribute the latinization of the alphabet solely to a drive for greater literacy would be in error. Although this was part of the modernization of education and the modernization of the language, it was also about both secularism and nationalism. The primary argument for the alphabet remaining Arabic was, naturally, not because so many people were familiar with it, but rather because it was the script of the Qu'ran and the holy language. By changing the alphabet, the connection between text and religion was severed, leaving no religious undertones in everyday literature.

Furthermore, the Arabic script provided a link between various Muslim nationalities and cultures but other Turkic speaking communities were reforming their alphabets and also adopting Latin script, much like Azerbaijanis and other Turkic nationalities in the Soviet Union did in 1926 (Başgöz and Wilson 1968). While pan-Turkism was not a motivation in Kemalism, it did further distance Turkey from the religious world as the larger community was no longer religious, but rather ethnic and, by extension, nationalist. The Kuhne Report on education, written in 1926, put it thusly:

“We are aware that it takes longer to read and write in Turkey. This is not only a problem of the alphabet, but it is a cultural and Westernization problem as well. If the Turks accept a transcription system similar to that of Hungarian and Finnish, languages which are related to Turkish, it will serve to bring them closer to Western civilization” (Başgöz and Wilson 1968).

Also, by latinizing the alphabet, Turkey expressed solidarity with the Western world as well as embracing the principle of devrimcilik with constant reform and revolution. The top-down

regulation of language and education was highly centralized with government direction extending beyond the alphabet into all realms of education policy.

Primary and Secondary Education

Primary and secondary education, as they now exist in Turkey, are not overly divergent from their early formulations at the beginning of the republic. The system was formed by a five-year primary school, a three year middle school, and a three year high school before progressing on to university. High school was lengthened to four years in 1949, but this year was later dropped in 1954. Borrowing from Western models, the system was most heavily influenced by the French with the word for high school even being *lise* (lycée). For many years, only primary education was mandatory (5 years), however this was changed following the military government of 1980 to 8 years, thus covering both elementary and middle school. This was done for a number of reasons, one of which was, naturally, to increase the educational level of the population at large, however it was also done to eradicate the influence of religious schools (available only as a high school) and to further homogenize education. This has done much to further literacy with the rate rising from a total of 10% of the population in 1927 and 20.9% in 1930, to an 89% literacy rate in 2007 and 91% in 2009 (The World Bank 2012). However, controversy has been reignited with a recent change in legislation that changed the entrance age to religious training schools from 15 to 11, meaning the religious middle schools are again fully acceptable and legal (BBC News 2012).

But the development of these programs in terms of their social implications has been widely varied. While large urban areas have generally been well equipped with schools throughout the republican period, the villages have not. The 1935 census records 26,187 villages with populations under 400. The establishment of schools in these villages was not economically feasible in the cash-strapped early republic. Also, due to the educational deficiencies of the Ottoman system, there was not only a lack of teachers willing to teach in

rural districts, there was a lack of qualified teachers in general. This led to a lower rate of school attendance in the villages, simply due to the lack of accessible schools and unavailable teachers. There was also a wide divergence between east and west. Even by 1940, it was found that 95% children from villages near Hakkari, Siirt, Van, Bitlis, Muş, Bingöl, Diyarbakır, and Mardin—all eastern cities—had never attended elementary school. The figure for comparable villages near western cities was 39.6%. This inequality extended, also, into the cities with children in Bitlis, Van, Urfa, Siirt, Hakkari, Diyarbakır, and Mardin in the east having a non-attendance rate of 56.8%. This is paltry in comparison to the 21% rate seen in Ankara, Istanbul, Muğla, İzmir, and Bursa in the west (Başgöz and Wilson 1968, 128).

Regional inequalities were due not simply to a lack of development on the part of the republican government, but also to the fact that the eastern side of the Anatolian peninsula was less developed and less educated under the Ottoman period as well, leaving the financially insecure republic unable to make up for previous shortfalls. But despite these regional inequalities in provision, education was provided by the state free of charge to all children. This was true at all levels of school, but did not alleviate the problem of school attendance completely even when schools were available due to the need for village children to work and for the lack of educational opportunities beyond the most basic elementary education. By 1950, enrollment in middle schools was only at 67,400 children and 255,000 in 1960 (Hale 1981). To give an example of the difficulty of attending middle school, the village of Zeytindağ, less than 100 kilometers from İzmir, a large western city, provides a decent example. Zeytindağ, a village estimated to have more than 400 inhabitants in the 1960s, did not have a middle school in 1960. If a child was to attend middle school, they were required to board in Bergama, the county seat, or another town, where a middle school was located. Though Bergama was the county seat, it did not have a high school at that time either, thus requiring a child from Zeytindağ or Bergama to then board and attend high school

in Izmir, which was both costly and difficult for rural, agricultural families (M. Kocakulah 2012). Even by 1975, there were still 3,116 villages without schools (Hale 1981, 225).

Secondary education has seen further and more recent developments in structure and entrance requirements. Secondary schools are still three-year programs, but students now wishing to enter secondary schools are subject to intense exams in order to qualify for high school. But the growth of secondary education and students in high school has been extensive. In 1927, enrolment in high schools was only 11,200 students. By 1950, following the new education initiatives, enrolment had reached 39,100 students (Hale 1981, 67). By 1960, this figure had risen to only 62,000 (Hale 1981, 101). By 1970, only 2.2% of the population had completed secondary education (Hale 1981, 225). By 2009, net secondary school enrolment had increased to 74%, but this is part of a downward trend from 2007 when net enrolment was 78% (The World Bank 2012).

Technical schools were also established in the early republican period focusing on trades and agriculture. Following a report made by John Dewey, vocational education took on a new importance with experimental programs and vocational schools being set up. These schools were part of the drive for modern agriculture and industrialization, but they were dependent on reforms and further industrialization to provide practical training. Funding was also an issue as the educational system in the early republic was struggling with funding as a whole. Despite this, enrolment in these schools went from 1,089 in 1927 to 2,975 in 1939. Commercial high schools also saw their enrolment rise to 1,447 by 1939. While these early gains are commendable, they can hardly be called significant (Başgöz and Wilson 1968, 175). By 1972 15% of total secondary education enrolment was to be found for technical schools and 8% in the commercial high schools (Winter 1984, 191). Technical education is also reported to be lacking in prestige, leading to the bulk of students attending the academic high schools creating a large amount of academics and few technical specialists.

Academic high schools continue in existence in their three-year form. Education in public schools is still state funded and thus ostensibly open to all, but the existence of high school entrance exams and lack of resources hobbles the ability of students to receive a quality education at the secondary level. To quote Mango:

“University admission departments complained that the 2,600 general *lycées* which functioned in the public sector in 2000 were less successful. They were starved of resources; teachers were often demoralized; there were reports of drugs and alcohol abuse among the pupils” (Mango 2004, 161).

Between 1995 and 1997, only 22% of the educational budget was spent on secondary education, which is part of both underfunding and the smaller amount of students progressing to this level of education. This has been ameliorated in some ways by the system of *Anadolu liseleri*, which are public schools that accept private contributions, and teach several subjects in English and accept only students with high scores on the high school entrance exam. In a conversation with an alumnus of an *Anadolu lise* in Istanbul, it was remarked that she was required to go to tutoring sessions for the exams in order to get a score good enough to enter this high school. The tutoring was private, thus requiring parental contribution, and required giving up extra-curricular activities in order to prepare for the test adequately (Cihan 2012). And this tuition is generally continued before a student then goes on to take the university exam. However, tutoring and other preparation for these exams can also preclude students from undertaking outside activities, such as playing a musical instrument or participation in sports, arguably lessening opportunities for extra-curricular education (Cihan 2012).

Wealthier parents also often send their children to private schools, which in 1999 had an enrolment of around 60,000 students (Mango 2004, 161). These schools of course are better funded through student fees, have smaller class sizes, and are often taught in foreign languages—English, French, German, etc. These schools are generally available to only the middle and upper classes, effectively creating a two tiered system of secondary education

where the higher classes benefit from their wealth while public schools remain underfunded. Also, these foreign schools are hampered by state administration in terms of curriculum with one administrator, quoted by Robert Maynard as reproduced by Andreas Kazamias: “It is difficult to imagine a system in which less opportunity is given for individual schools and teachers to exercise initiative, and in which all changes and adjustments must come from a place as remote from the real school situation” (Kazamias 1966, 121).

There have been recent developments in the area of minority rights and education with Kurdish language now being offered as an elective course in schools (BBC News 2012). A primary issue in debates regarding minority rights had been the issue of language. While Turkish is still the primary language of instruction, Kurdish and other minority languages had not been in any way permitted in schools, making this a step forward in education for minorities as well as the simple addition of new subjects to the curriculum. This step is important but Kurdish and another minority languages are still not permitted as languages of instruction. The inclusion of Kurdish as only an elective subject does move education policy forward in terms of embracing the linguistic culture of all Turkish citizens, but it can also be interpreted as more of a salutary effort than a concrete step towards reform.

This system of primary and secondary education is possibly, in spirit, adhering to Kemalism, but it is failing in practice. The principles of nationalism, étatism, and populism provides that all are equal regardless of ethnic group or class, but they are not in this system as wealth ultimately provides better education. The principle of nationalism is violated due to the persistent inequality in education between east and west, thus violating national unity. The inclusion of Kurdish as an elective course is a further step towards national unity, as it is an implicit recognition that the language not only exists, but is also a subject that is desired at the primary and secondary levels of education. Differing interpretations of nationalism could point to this as being either agreement with the principle of national unity being strengthened

by the ability of minorities to express themselves and be educated in their own language, others would say that it hinders national unity by emphasizing differences. However, Turkish citizenship is ultimately the basis for inclusion, meaning that the inclusion of Kurdish in the curriculum is a step towards full recognition of the cultural mores of all Turkish citizens rather than only those who are primarily Turkish speaking.

Furthermore, étatism and populism are violated as the current government cannot meet the needs of the population. In 2004, Turkey spent 3.1% of GDP on education with UNICEF reporting that Turkey is “under-spending, relative to its economic capacity, on its primary school pupils, whereas secondary school students are getting a fairer slice of the cake” (UNICEF 2007). An article in the Turkish newspaper ‘Today’s Zaman,’ the English language version of the Turkish newspaper ‘Zaman,’ in an interview with the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mehmet Sağlam, the amount given for education between 2002 to 2011 has tripled, but this figure is given for the years in which his political party, the AKP, have been in power and what percentage of this figure is given to religious schools and whether this figure is accurate or not is unspecified. The AKP is a religious party and ‘Today’s Zaman’ is considered by some observers to be the mouthpiece of the AKP and the religious Gülenist movement—rumored to have ties to and a controlling stake in the current government—thus statements made in and to that publication must be treated with at least a mild amount of skepticism (Tosun 2011) (Rodrik, A Moscow Show Trial on the Bosphorus - NYTimes.com 2012). But despite any increase in spending, the budget is still not adequate to serve all students and the country at large, especially students without significant financial means. Furthermore, there are concerns regarding the secular nature of education with the recent changes in the age at which one can enter a religious school. While many of these schools are not explicitly state funded, state regulations regarding education should be Kemalist in

character, thus rendering the possible substitution of scientific education with religious education at a younger age is a violation of secularism.

Tertiary Education

Tertiary education in Turkey has developed greatly over the course of the republican period, as a system of public universities operating steadily for many years and a recent addition of private universities has complemented the system adequately. Universities were not common during the Ottoman period, there being only one well-established university located in Istanbul. This university was viewed by many as un-modern, though it did have a section for women, established in 1914, giving it a progressive edge over several Western universities—Harvard College only granted ‘Harvard’ degrees to graduates of their women’s section, Radcliffe, in 1963, which was also the same year in which women were first accepted into the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (Harvard College 2012). However, there were several professional schools in the French *grande école* style. Several ‘institutes’ were also in existence that, despite not being called universities, were effective institutions of higher education.

Several institutes were established throughout the country starting in 1924 due to the CHP’s perception of the lack of educational infrastructure within the country, but also in order to bolster the necessary intellectual capital to develop industry as many of these institutes were for training teachers or focusing on mining, agriculture or civil service (Barblan 2008). Some of these were located in Ankara and other parts of the country, thus widening the availability of higher education to those not living in and around Istanbul. However it was only in 1931 that a study was commissioned to evaluate the current higher educational infrastructure, which was done by Albert Malche of Geneva University. This report was highly valued and many of the suggestions implemented involving changes ranging from instructional style to academic independence. Atatürk himself was deeply

involved in this process, being called the “intellectual source for the reform” (Barblan 2008, 30).

It was following this reform that the existing university in Istanbul was officially chartered as Istanbul University in 1933. Foreign faculty were also allowed to be employed, thus many Jewish and non-Jewish professors fleeing Nazism found employment and refuge in Turkey, being viewed as a major source of modernization (Barblan 2008) (Başgöz and Wilson 1968). More universities were established in diverse geographical areas in the 1950s with the process continuing until the present day. The first private university in Turkey was established in 1983 with more private universities being established after as well as the establishment of independent technical schools (Barblan 2008). Some Turkish universities have been able to acquire international prestige with Middle East Technical University (METU), a public university, being placed in the 91-100 group in the *Times Higher Education* international university rankings by reputation (Times Higher Education 2012) and Bilkent University, a private university, being placed in the 201-225 ranked group in overall rankings by *Times Higher Education* and METU, Istanbul Technical University (public) being ranked in the 276-300 group among others. (Times Higher Education 2012), though Turkish universities do not appear on every ranking list. Turkey did join the Bologna Process in 2001 with various directions and regulations being issued and committees being formed for quality control, thus ensuring that minimum standards are met in Turkish universities and that they are at least minimally on par with Western, Central, and Eastern European universities.

Institutions of tertiary education have become more widespread with Turkey growing to become a large system of national tertiary education. But despite the system’s growth, it lags behind other OECD countries in most averages with only 10% of the population between the ages of 25 and 64 having attained tertiary education compared with the OECD average of

26% in 2005 (Barblan 2008, 76). This number in 2009 was at 12.7% (OECD 2011). This can be due to a lack of funding with \$3,400 being spent per student in Turkey, which is well under the OECD average of \$10,650 in 2002 (Barblan 2008, 124).

But the lag in tertiary education is also due to the dearth of available places in institutions, which some attribute to a lack of funding for expansion of existing higher education institutions and the founding of new ones. The number of applicants to full time courses in the year 2007 was 1,641,403 for 413,147 open places, meaning there was space for approximately 25% of applicants. This could be considered either a large or marginal improvement from the 16% place availability for applicants in 1974 (229,994 applicants for 37,271 places) (Barblan 2008, 70), though the newspaper *Today's Zaman* stated in 2008 that around 1.5 million students take the exam with only 1/3 receiving a place in a university (Today's Zaman 2008). Private university admission is also based on this test.

A further problem with this system is that students with greater economic means are able to better their chances on the exam through private tutoring, special schools, and/or dershanes (Crawford 2011) (Visakorpi, Stankovic, Perosa, & Rozsnyai, 2008). *Hürriyet Daily News* writer Melissa J.L. Crawford writes that “[p]reparatory courses and private tutors are common ways of increasing Turkish students’ chances of scoring well on the exam and to enter the top universities in Istanbul and Ankara. Parents will hire private tutors for their children as young as 9 years old in areas such as math, science, and English” (Crawford 2011). Tutoring is also advantageous as the university exam now takes into account a student’s cumulative grade point average, thus leading to better performance in schools as well as on the exam itself. These private tutors are not state funded and thus disadvantage those with more modest economic means. Also, the test determines which department a student can enter, meaning that students are further restricted in their choices by the exam. Also, the exam, in many ways, tests only a student’s ability to do well on this particular

exam, meaning that students “fail to develop either social or problem-solving skills,” thus somewhat devaluing their later education through the failure to instill important skills before a student enters university (Visakorpi, et al. 2008).

If a student is unable to earn a place in a university, they have the option to either try the exam again at a later date or, if they possess adequate private means, they can go abroad, often to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Including students in the TRNC, Mango claims that the Turkish authorities in the year 2000 “knew of 19,000 Turkish students (14,000 undergraduate and 5,000 postgraduate) in foreign universities...” (Mango 2004, 162), though Barblan cites this figure in 2002 as being at 47,382 without including students in the TRNC (Barblan 2008, 117). The GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) in 2011 US dollars comes to an estimated \$14,600 (CIA 2012) with the average annual disposable income of households being 9,735 TL or approximately \$5,440 USD (Turkish Statistical Institute 2011). With tuition fees in the United States running upwards of \$20,000 per year and paying the higher cost of living in the United States and Western Europe, sending a child abroad is not an option for most families with low disposable income, especially in southeastern Anatolia where annual household disposable income is only 5,144 TL or approximately \$2,875 USD (Turkish Statistical Institute 2011). Thus sending students abroad is reserved for the more financially privileged classes in a national system that already favors the financially privileged.

Thus in tertiary education we find the same issues with Kemalism that we do with primary and secondary education. The tertiary education system in Turkey is still growing; however in its current state it is highly deficient when viewed through a Kemalist lens. The intention of the system is equality through qualification through a test of knowledge and critical reasoning, intending to be a meritocracy that privileges no ethnic group and no socio-economic class. But the reality lies in stark contrast to this. Students who receive private

tutoring, according to one study, increase their chances of earning a place at a university by 9% (Tansel and Bircan 2005, 9). There's also a significant correlation as to the education level of parents and the likelihood of children receiving private tutoring, meaning that tertiary education is passed from generation to generation and not necessarily to those whose families did not receive tertiary education or advanced graduate studies (Tansel and Bircan 2005). However, while 55% of students who received private tutoring were able to gain university places, 45% did not, however this cannot lead to the inference that natural ability of those economically disadvantaged who did not receive private tutoring overcame this disadvantage, but it is also possible that in a highly exclusive system, there are still not enough places in universities to accommodate all students who receive private tutoring. The conclusion to draw from these results remains unclear, but it still speaks to the high exclusivity of Turkish tertiary education.

Tertiary education, in terms of Kemalism, provides a conundrum in terms of the gap between intention and actual practice. While an exam mixed with weighting of cumulative grade point average can seem to be the most egalitarian and merit based system for university entrance, the system of tutoring and the necessary economic privilege to receive tutoring belie the system's egalitarian nature.

The principle of nationalism, in the current CHP formulation, is the equality of all Turks and that Kemalism stands against economic classes attempting to dominate each other. The principle of populism reflects the desire for ultimate equality and non-differentiation between economic classes in its entirety. Tertiary education opens certain doors of opportunity that are closed to the lesser educated. While the intention of the university exam is good, the actual current practice and system of preparation violates the nationalist and populist principles because it does allow advantages for economic privilege and can also lead to the domination of the lower classes in terms of industry and the entire economic sphere.

The principle of étatism is also violated due to the state's current inability to provide for the need of the Turkish people in the area of tertiary education as the infrastructure of the tertiary education system cannot offer enough places to applicants. The principle of devrimcilik is also not observed as the system of entrance has remained largely unchanged for years. While certain changes with the weighting of certain factors in consideration of admission have changed slightly over the course of the republican period, there have been no radical reforms or revolutions, if you will, to remedy the current inequalities in the system and to bring the system of tertiary education in line with the founding principles of Turkish republican governance.

Adult Education

There have been several efforts in regards to what could be termed 'adult education' through the republican period. This follows the basic principles of Atatürk, in that education is what lifts the nation and what would ultimately bring Turkey out of its underdeveloped state and move it into the modern, Western world.

The first of these efforts was known as the People's Houses. The general idea for this effort was presented in 1927 by Atatürk at the CHP Congress stating that: "Our program includes the opening of classes for those citizens who have not had any elementary schooling, and the creation of vocational courses designed to increase the productive ability of citizens engaged in various sectors of our economy" (Başgöz and Wilson 1968, 150). This idea was re-introduced at the 1931 Congress of the CHP in the form of community centers with "materials and installations for general education, such as cinemas and libraries" (Başgöz and Wilson 1968, 151).

The first of these centers was opened in Ankara in 1932 with several more being opened in the next decade. In 1945 there were 437 People's Houses and 2,688 People's Rooms—a smaller version of the People's Houses. They continued their focus on general

education, vocational education, and literacy—especially as concerned the changeover from the modified Arabic to the Latin script. Beyond that, they also promoted cultural activities with libraries, theatrical productions, cinemas, etc. These organizations did not discriminate based on ethnic group or religion and were, by most accounts, open to all citizens. There are criticisms relating to this program as many saw these centers as organs for the CHP and CHP propaganda, sometimes with slightly sinister undertones, and that these centers were to prevent people from joining rival political parties, even though these parties did not exist until 1946 with the beginning of the multi-party period (Turan 1984). While these centers actively promoted republican values, such as secularism and the Kemalist principle of nationalism, they were not overtly political in nature. These charges generally came from the DP who saw the People's Houses as a challenge to their more conservative and, despite their claims, anti-Kemalist program.

These programs were discontinued and largely replaced by another called the Village Institutes. The People's Houses/Rooms program was replaced because, while the People's Houses and Rooms had good intentions, they were not overly successful, especially in the area of village aid. Furthermore, while they did contribute to vocational and general education, there was still a shortage of teachers in the countryside, a problem the Village Institutes sought to remedy. But as can be easily seen, the People's Houses were intended by the CHP to be populist, nationalistic, and republican in nature, trying to lift the nation through widespread education (populism) while spreading the western values, represented in Kemalist principles such as secularism, republicanism, and non-exclusionary Turkish nationalism. This is not to say that they were organs of propaganda, but rather they were attempting to achieve the modernization and solidification of the revolution in Turkey, which was considered a greater good as well as the CHP's party program.

Before the establishment of the Village Institutes, there was effectively no vocational education in the villages. The attempts to remedy this were the Village Educator's Law, passed in 1937, and the Village Institute Law, passed in 1940. These laws established teacher training centers in rural areas, generally teaching ex-soldiers and others who had completed elementary education: "from among young men who have successfully fulfilled their army service, who know how to read and write and whose families are farmers or peasants" (Başgöz and Wilson 1968, 148). The Village Institutes were then assimilated into the previous program in 1940, eventually assigning 8,000 teachers to various posts between 1937 and 1946 (Başgöz and Wilson 1968, 148). In conjunction with this program, Girls' Institutes were also set up for vocational education. An attendee of one of these Village Institutes who was assigned a teaching position in western Turkey received qualifications as both a music teacher and an English teacher, saying that the Institute was a rare opportunity for him to learn and gave him a successful career as a teacher (H. Kocakulah 2011). Despite the success of these institutes, they were shut down by the DP government, which accused the Institutes of teaching subversive anti-government propaganda, in 1954. It is true that these institutes were Kemalist and did teach the values of secularism, but there is no widespread or clear evidence that the Institutes were working or plotting against the government.

After the People's Houses/Rooms and Village Institutes were closed, adult education was still offered with state assistance. Between 1985 and 1986, there were 35,061 courses offered with a total of 291,782 people participating (Dogramaci 2000). Vocational and training courses are also offered. These courses are widely valued with the largest percentage of people participating having only completed primary school (327,802 participants) according to the State Institute of Statistics in 1990 (Dogramaci 2000). Many of these participate in vocational and general knowledge courses with sewing also a popular subject. These courses are important as they allow adults who, at the time of primary school

completion, were unable to continue their education for various reasons, thus giving the chance to both men and women to be not only better educated but also more successful economically.

Women and Education

Education for women has long been existent within the Turkish republic. Atatürk frequently spoke of the value of equal education for women as well as the need for women to fully participate in Turkish society. He also viewed this as a means of social and economic advancement. While women have been present in schools since the early republican period, there continue to be inequalities in terms of female education. Women were first admitted to universities in 1923, with coeducation in primary and secondary schools occurring after the passage of the new civil code in 1926, guaranteeing full equality. This was necessary due to the small number of schools available to women outside of major metropolitan areas. The need for teachers also prompted this move as women were similarly admitted to teacher training colleges. But even in the modern university system, women still do not function on an equal playing field.

These inequalities tend to reside in the social sector rather than through the actual policies of the government, though they have been permitted to persist. There are no rules or regulations that hinder educational achievement of females; however, social conditions often prevent women from attaining equal education. In a study published in 2006 using data from 1988, Rankin and Aytaç found that several factors account for the continuing lower educational and literacy level of women in Turkey. It was found that girls were 3.2 times more likely to have no schooling and that this number increased when accounting for those that had finished middle school (Rankin and Aytaç 2006). It was found that in farming families, both boys and girls were less likely to continue on to secondary and tertiary education, though it was significantly less across the board for girls whose mothers were

employed. This is due to several factors, but one of which is the continuing belief that domestic work, such as care of children, lacking comprehensive systems of affordable childcare, falls on daughters, meaning that they are less likely to continue school if they are felt to be needed within the home. This duty is particularly onerous for the eldest daughter who is less likely than her younger sisters to attend school (Rankin and Aytaç 2006). It was also found that girls were less likely to attend school if they had parents, more specifically a father, that believed in gender segregation and the tradition of ‘bride price’ (dowry paid by a suitor for a daughter before marriage). These more traditional attitudes tended to correlate to a lack of schooling for daughters as schools were possibly seen as being counter to traditional values. These issues have not been tackled through further government action, such as instituting subsidized child care to free up daughters from domestic duties.

Beyond this, inequalities have also been found at the tertiary level. Due to the lesser likelihood of women progressing to secondary education, more men than women matriculate to universities every year. However, in a study performed using the Middle Eastern Technical Institute (METU), it was found that while female students almost uniformly had higher grade point averages, they entered university with lower university exam scores and were generally segregated to more ‘traditional’ areas of study. At this elite university, only 37.4% of the student body in 2003 was female. However, women are overrepresented in certain departments with 59% of students in the education faculty being women, despite their relatively low share of the student population as a whole. Also marked is the low proportion of women in the engineering faculty, representing only 21% of students enrolled (Dayioğlu and Türüt-Aşık 2007, Roy 2004, Dorronsoro n.d.). This may be due to a social bias in ideas as to what ‘feminine’ occupations should be, or it could be a result of women achieving generally lower scores on the university entrance exam, with the engineering faculty accepting only students with the highest scores. Regardless of which factor is the underlying

cause of this disparity, women tend to enter faculties with lower entry requirements than men. But, despite this, women, on average, have much higher grade point averages than their male counterparts on the whole; possibly pointing to inequalities in preparation for the exam, though no absolute correlation for this has been established.

Overall Implications in the Education System

The educational system in its present form is meant and intended to be egalitarian, not recognizing economic class, offering at least some public schools that are of excellent academic caliber alongside private schools at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. But intention is, unfortunately, not practice and practice in the current system blatantly violates Kemalist principles. Economic privilege has provided a significant unfair advantage to some students, in violation of both the nationalist and populist principles, while religious teaching and the recognition of religious schools as legitimate are in direct and flagrant violation of the secularist principles of not only Kemalism but the Turkish state and all Turkish constitutions. Furthermore, while reform was vigorous and widespread in the early republican period, reform has dried up with the system remaining largely unchanged for decades outside of the founding of private universities and the recent lowering of entry age for religious middle schools, which ultimately goes against Kemalist principles, primarily secularism. Furthermore, the state has not provided an adequate amount of facilities, especially at the tertiary level, meaning that the state is ultimately not adequately serving the citizenry, thus violating the principle of étatism.

But these violations of Kemalism are not due to the machinations of any single political party as the lack of reform has occurred under numerous political parties and coalitions, all of which allowed the effects of privilege to flourish and some, including the military administration following the 1980 coup d'état, though not all endorsing religious

instruction and eventually succeeding with it being included in the standard school curriculum.

In the case of education, intentions have proven to be good, as it has been universally recognized by Atatürk and subsequent administrations that education is a way of advancing the country both civilly and industrially. But as UNICEF noted, it is underfunded and infrastructure is inadequate, thus negating intention and forcing the conclusion that current education in Turkey, due to the actions of past and current governments, is not in accordance with Kemalist principles and has not been so for an extended period of time.

Healthcare

The Turkish healthcare system has developed rapidly through the republican period. The Ottoman period saw wide disparities in healthcare availability between urban and rural areas, much like in education, as well as problems of affordability of services for the rural and urban poor. The history of Turkish healthcare is one of generally good intentions, but riven with inadequacy, underfunding, and clientelism due to political concerns.

The Ministry of Health was established by Law No. 3 on 3 May, 1920, meaning that it was one of the first ministries created in the Grand National Assembly before the formal declaration of the republic three years later. In 1923, health services were provided by the central government and municipalities with, according to the Turkish Ministry of Health: “86 inpatient clinics, 6,437 hospital beds, 554 physicians, 69 pharmacists, 4 nurses, 560 health officers and 196 midwives” (The Ministry of Health of Turkey 2010, 15). The reported orientation of the ministry during these years was creating and effectively running the healthcare system centrally, creating separate arenas for preventative and curative medicine, bettering medical education, and focusing on the prevention and control of communicable diseases, e.g. malaria.

The first ten-year national health plan was proposed in 1946 but then withdrawn. Consequently, a ‘National Health Plan’ was proposed but was also not made into law. Despite the failure of these efforts, there was a separate effort to open clinics in villages, envisaged as 10 bed clinics with each clinic serving forty villages. The development of these was slow with only eight in existence in 1945 and still only 283 in 1960 (The Ministry of Health of Turkey 2010, 17). Further medical faculties and universities were opened and the number of vaccinations and hospital beds increased. What is notable in the report from the current Turkish Ministry of Health is the notation that the National Health Plan and National Program wanted to provide insurance for a fee or a premium with a “health bank” to cover those who were uninsured. The first citizens insured were those who were part of the Workers’ Insurance Administration (SSK), established in 1946, though care was first available six years later in 1952. This plan bears an eerie similarity to a current plan to be described later.

In the 1950s, hospitals were erected on the order of the Ministry of Health but actual care was generally privately provided. The Basic Health Services Movement culminated in the Socialization Act of 1961, which sought to bring equality in healthcare to all sectors of the population regardless of location (Tatar and Tatar 1997, 226). Also, the Socialization of Health Services (Law 224) passed in 1961 after the 1960 coup d’état demonstrated the “statist and universal orientation of the 1961 intervention” (Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010, 753).

The Socialization law of 1961, though only effectively introduced in 1963, created, through the Ministry of Health, several ‘health houses’ and ‘health centers’ to deal with primary care needs as well as district hospitals. However, these clinics have frequently suffered personnel and equipment shortages (Tatar and Tatar 1997). It is also noted in the Ministry of Health’s own report that this system did not become widespread until 1983—22 years after the law was passed. Also, despite the fact that draft laws for universal healthcare

were presented to the Grand National Assembly in both 1971 and 1974, neither were passed (The Ministry of Health of Turkey 2010).

Public healthcare has been generally underfunded throughout the republican period, leading to issues of quality and availability, which has ultimately led to the creation of a tiered system of healthcare as a private industry with varying levels of quality depending on the economic and employment status of the patient. Also at issue is quality of care in urban and rural areas. This author can relate a personal anecdote having experienced the fairly routine medical procedure of nose cauterization in both rural and urban environments, with the rural environment (Bergama) involving a metal rod and a cigarette lighter and an urban environment (Izmir) involving chemical cauterization and anesthetic administered in a sterile environment without the aid of metal rods or cigarette lighters. This divergence of modernity of care occurred within around 100km of distance, and while not indicative of an east/west divide, it is in some ways instructive of the level of care provided to those in differing areas of economic development and the urban/rural divide.

Insurance

Turkey did not have a comprehensive national healthcare plan before the 1990s. The issue was, in fact, a non-issue politically and did not gain importance until accession negotiations with the EU began. Health insurance was entirely tied to employment status and often privately paid coverage (Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010). This led to mass inequalities in availability of healthcare to all. Further complicating the tying of employment to health insurance is the problem of the informal economy in Turkey and people working in the large agricultural sector who are often ‘self-employed.’ There are five major groups of those that are covered by employment based insurance as explained by Tatar and Tatar:

“1) civil servants and their dependants, who enjoy free health services mainly from the MoH [Ministry of Health] and university facilities. Their expenses are paid from

their department's budgetary allowance for this purpose. Since 1983, civil servants must pay 20% of the prescription charge.

2) members of the State Insurance Organization [SSK], who use health services provided by the organization's facilities and financed by their own contributions.

3) retired civil servants and their dependants, who are covered by the Government Employees Retirement Fund (GERF) which contracts out services to the MoH facilities and university hospitals. The Fund is financed by the contributions of the active civil servants and the State.

4) people covered by the latest fund established to provide social security to the self-employed. Bağ-Kur, as it is named in Turkish, was established in 1972 and in theory any person who is not covered by the aforementioned schemes, including housewives, can join the scheme. As in GERF, the organization buys health care services from other public sector organizations.

5) a relatively small group of people, mainly working for banks and insurance companies, whose expenditures are covered by private funds. These usually purchase medical care from the private sector or university hospitals.”

As can be seen, healthcare is in no way universal, but is instead highly corporatist in nature.

A significant amount of people are also unable to participate in the aforementioned schemes because of their employment status. The majority of hospital beds are supplied by the Ministry of Health; however other insurance schemes provide their own hospitals. This system is massively skewed towards those who are officially/formally employed or have sufficient funds to pay into the Bağ-Kur fund. This presents a problem due to the issue of massive informal employment in Turkey, calculated as being possibly above 50% (Buğra & Keyder, 2006, p. 217). For these people, there has been no specific scheme to insure them, until one was developed in 1992. This system was called the Green Card.

The Green Card system was formulated in order to insure those who were both extremely low income and not covered by any established insurance scheme. The program was introduced in limited form in 1992 until it eventually expanded to cover the whole country. In 2006, the number of people issued and using Green Cards we estimated to be between 10 and 11 million people, but the amount of the totally uninsured is not entirely clear. Buğra and Keyder place the totally uninsured population at more than one-third, but

Kısa and Younis place this figure at 87% of the population (Buğra & Keyder, 2006) (Kısa and Younis 2006, 765). Both estimates, though widely disparate, suggest that a large amount of people remain outside the health care system due to employment status or income level. Furthermore, it is widely noted that many who would qualify for a Green Card do not have one because of the difficulty of proving that their income is below a certain threshold due to a lack of documentation and the poor assessment infrastructure of the government and the fact that those who would qualify are often ill-informed and do not recognize that either such a scheme exists or that they would, in fact, qualify. In 2006, it was found that somewhere between 13% and 15% of the population were using the Green Card scheme and there have been no new programs since the Green Card program's introduction. What is also problematic in this system is that the card does not give access to preventative care, meaning that preventable or normally non-severe conditions often become severe as Green Card holders wait until they will be admitted to hospital for treatment in order to avoid spending money they are not likely to have. Also, despite it being illegal to do so, Kısa and Younis found many public university hospitals rejecting Green Card holders due to the government's seeming bureaucratic inability to reimburse hospitals in a timely fashion. Also, prescriptions, until recently, were generally not covered under this scheme, meaning that the already poor had to spend money in order to treat their various conditions. However, according to a report released by the Ministry of Health, as part of the Health Transformation Program, instituted in 2003, medications and outpatient services are now covered under the Green Card Program.

Family Planning

Family planning services, generally considered a women's issue, is also an area of development within the Turkish health care system. This area is vital as it has indirect effects on possibilities for women to participate in both education and the labor market. This

program can fall under the rubric of preventative medicine, but will be taken as its own area for the purposes of this study.

Family planning is a fairly recent development within the relatively young republic. Due to the decline in population following WWI and the War of Independence, the policies of the government were decidedly pro-natalist, going so far as to pass a law banning “birth control propaganda” that was still in effect in 1965 (Stycos 1965). Only following the 1960 coup, which produced a far more liberal government and constitution, did family planning become a national issue. In a study undertaken and subsequently published in 1965, it was found that there was a low knowledge of family planning methods in all of Turkey, with information most absent in smaller communities. However, family planning information was generally desired by rural inhabitants, both male and female. It was found that the use of local notables, particularly political leaders, would be useful in making this issue a public issue rather than a private one, thus facilitating the flow of information by changing local attitudes. One particularly important finding in this study, however, were the non-egalitarian family attitudes held by male heads of household, thus necessitating village leaders to promote changes in attitude as male attitudes were generally seen as holding more weight in family decisions than female attitudes (Stycos 1965).

This approach or idea was found to still exist in another study published in 1982. In a survey of the rural Etimesgut district, males responded that their opinion either held equal or more weight than that of their wife, while also holding a less favorable attitude concerning family planning. Furthermore, this patriarchy was reinforced by “large numbers of females” saying “they would defer to their husband’s opinions” (Carpenter-Yaman 1982, 156). This attitude was still found at a significant level in another study, published in 1995, of low-income women in Istanbul (Bulut and Turan 1995). It was found in both studies, rural and urban, that family planning education remained low with, most disturbingly, information

regarding family planning in a survey given to healthcare providers being found to be “sometimes inaccurate” (Carpenter-Yaman 1982, 96).

Overall, in the 1980s and 1990s, these studies both found that information was difficult to come by, often being provided in a disjointed manner and also subject to economic concerns, even going so far as to note that low income women in Istanbul opting for home birth due to financial reasons being less likely to receive information because of lack of contact with healthcare providers (Carpenter-Yaman 1982). Contraception use has increased within this time period, as well as development in awareness of family size issues and people of both sexes having a pre-conceived desired family size, thus family planning policies do seem to have had an effect, but as more recent studies have shown, these efforts continue to be piecemeal and somewhat ineffective in practice.

The country is currently also running the Turkish Sexual and Reproductive Health Program in cooperation with the EU, with a reported 3,260,000 couples receiving “sexual and reproductive healthcare services from MoH institutions in 2002, with the number increasing to 7,730,420 in 2010 (The Ministry of Health of Turkey 2010, 86). However, statistics for single women or men seeking information regarding family planning information is not given. Whether or not this points to a preference of restricting services to couples is up for discussion, however, pregnancy outside of marriage is seen, societally, to be undesirable (Today's Zaman 2012).

The SSK does provide family planning services to women covered by their scheme, however that is a limited amount of women. This largely began in 1992 when the United States Agency for International Development gave assistance in funding a comprehensive family planning program. By 1994, this program was reported to have created a more friendly and effective environment for family planning services with services being provided in both

hospitals and clinics with both contraception and counseling being provided. Within two years, this program was able to reach approximately 91,000 patients, however, this is still only within one insurance scheme (Cakir and Stephen J. Fabrican 1996). Furthermore, the SSK has provided maternity-leave payments to working women as well as compensation to their employers, affording women participating in the SSK the ability to retain employment while having a family. This program proved successful financially for the SSK, however it is not widespread and not available to women covered by a Green Card and programs are not as comprehensive in other health insurance schemes, giving women short-shrift.

There is now further debate regarding women's health services as the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared that abortion was 'murder' and brought this topic of conversation back into the national discussion (Ahmadi 2012). Abortion has been legal in Turkey through the 10th week of pregnancy since 1983 with exceptions allowing for later terminations in cases of rape and when the mental and physical health of the mother is in danger. To legally have a late-term abortion, a woman must receive permission from a court, which recently approved an abortion at 20 weeks for a 14-year old girl who had been raped (Today's Zaman 2012). However, a new bill will be presented to parliament in October regarding abortion. Despite the prime minister's rhetoric regarding abortion bans, the bill will not change the current structure related to the availability of abortions, but prison terms for women who have been found to have had an abortion after ten weeks will be subject to stiffer penalties with the one-year prison term penalty being increased to three years (Today's Zaman 2012). A four-day waiting period will also be introduced. The policy of jailing women who have abortions after 10 weeks is aided by the monitoring of women who have tested positive for pregnancy in medical facilities, GELBİZ, which has been in effect since 2008 (Today's Zaman 2012). This policy has effectively made these pregnancies the business of the state, rather than allowing for privacy in the health and medical status of women. Also at

issue in the new bill is the fact that abortions will no longer be allowed in general medical facilities, but will be required to be performed by gynecologists in hospitals, thus restricting access due to the lack of hospitals in many small villages (Today's Zaman 2012). This can be seen in the amount of hospitals, as of 2008, existing in Turkey by region with the number of Ministry of Health hospital beds in the developed Aegean region at 18.7 per 10,000 in population and 11.7 beds per 10,000 in the less developed southeastern region (The Ministry of Health of Turkey 2010). However, this bill does have the added effect of increasing state maternity leave from 4 to 6 months. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan has also made comments regarding caesarean section births and seeking to limit the practice, thus speaking to a further intrusion in the medical care of women during pregnancy by the government for no real medical purpose.

Future Plans

The current system of healthcare is funded by taxes, insurance premiums, and out-of-pocket payments. Despite these three funding sources, health care costs are rising and coverage rates are not demonstrably improving. To combat this, ideas for reform have been circulated. There are proposals regarding universal coverage, but how this will be achieved is somewhat unclear. Furthermore, the current government implies that this universal coverage will be provided while hospitals are privatized and the practice of healthcare workers being employed by the state will be totally eliminated. This vision is essentially the near-full privatization of healthcare with the state providing minimal services, much as they do now for Green Card holders. There is also concern that the once temporary Green Card program will become a permanent fixture as private insurance will have to be purchased or citizens must join one of the established social funds in order to receive anything above the most basic care.

Şeref Hoşgör and Aysıt Tansel, in a report for the Turkish Industry and Business Association and United Nations Population Fund, point to current problems in the accuracy of healthcare records and patient files as being a problem in the current healthcare system with providers being lax with accuracy and general norms of record keeping. They suggest that this is standing in the way of a healthy future for Turkey, but plans to fix this problem have not seemed to materialize (Hoşgör & Tansel, 2011). This can lead to problems in not only treatment but on the mobility of patients from doctor to doctor in the event of relocation as their records are not under any norm and can hinder future treatment. Hoşgör and Tansel also point to the need for a renewed emphasis on preventative care as well as the making available of such care to Turkey's aging population, which is expected to increase to 17.32% by 2050.

Healthcare and Kemalism:

Healthcare within a Kemalist framework provides another example of the state wishing to follow Kemalist principles, but failing fairly spectacularly in implementation due either to bureaucratic incompetence or governing financial conditions.

While it is true that the Turkish republic has had to deal with difficult economic conditions, their policies seem to have been dictated, since the emergence of various social insurance schemes tied to employment, by a corporatist approach. This approach is not in line with Kemalist principles, which dictate that there can be no special classes within the republic. The nationalist and populist principles are rigidly against any sort of fragmentation within the citizenry. While the original language refers to blood, ancestry, class, etc., the division and classification of certain citizens into differing schemes ultimately runs against these principles by creating de facto economic and sometimes social classes in terms of healthcare coverage and provision. It has created differing rights and benefits based on profession and employment, which is not only related to personal choice, but also to class and

educational opportunities, thus creating societal and class cleavages. This can also take on an ethnic scope due to regional economic disparities with the majority of the Kurdish minority found in the less developed and ultimately poorer east. This author's own experience speaks to the rural/urban divide in the standard of care, with both being privately paid as this author, despite being a Turkish citizen, is not covered by any insurance scheme.

The principle of *étatisme* is also disregarded within this set-up as the state is not effectively providing for the populace. While the Green Card system is there to provide for those who are economically disadvantaged, this scheme falls short in the basic provision of care in the area of preventative medicine. The disadvantaged, through this system, are placed into a scheme where their healthcare has been reduced to emergency care, meaning that general health is not exactly the objective of the system. The state has also failed in the *étatiste* principle by failing to make clear to the populace the availability of the Green Card scheme, meaning that the state has failed in its duty to its citizens. Also, the private schemes, inherent in their existence, do not follow the *étatiste* principle as they do not necessarily relate to the state caring and providing for the citizenry, but instead have shunted this responsibility to other funds. To be clear, this is not the fault of a particular government or political party, but rather a continuing failure of the state over many governments to provide healthcare for the citizenry.

The principle of *devrimcilik* has been, in some ways, honored with continuing attempts at improvement, but the subpar quality of care for the greater part of the populace must bring into question the will to reform or where exactly healthcare ranks on the agenda. There has been a sustained effort to improve and to do good, but it has, as of yet, fallen short of Kemalist principles and general adequacy. Also problematic in this regard is the relative crystallization of attitudes regarding choice for women as the opinion of the husband is still often weighted more than that of the wife. Also, the recent statements by the current prime

minister in regards to abortion and caesarean sections belie any outward appearance toward progressiveness. The current government expresses a desire to move backwards, in clear violation of the principle of devrimcilik. However, the current ‘transformation’ program provides hope in this principle as the system is not remaining static, but is instead improving, often in cooperation with the EU, towards a more universalistic principle as well as in improvement of services and modernization in terms of record keeping, recommended in the TUSİAD report. These efforts cannot be discounted and do represent a continuing effort by the Turkish republic to continue to reform, even if these reforms are sometimes piecemeal and not always entirely effective. It remains to be seen whether the state of Turkish healthcare can be brought fully into line with Kemalist principles.

The EU—a force for change

Turkey has a long history with the European Union and ‘Europe’ in general. The program of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, and other early republican leaders was a program of westernization, which many would term as Europeanization. Ultimately, the goal was to bring Turkey into the realm of Europe both governmentally and culturally. The place of Turkey in Europe is still one questioned by some, but even the Ottoman Empire was recognized as being European in nature, the so-called ‘sick man of Europe.’ However, Turkey still has struggled and continues to struggle to fully exhibit ‘European-ness,’ as defined by what is considered recognized Europe—the European Union.

Turkey has been part of NATO, primarily a defense organization, since 1952, occupying a strategically important role. While this is an implicit recognition of Westernness, it was during the time of the Cold War, putting Turkey in the camp standing against communist/Soviet expansion rather than recognition of belonging to the European club. However, admission to NATO and resistance against communism does place Turkey in the

camp of democracies, with a recognition that it did not subscribe to the Soviet model of totalitarianism, thus putting it in the sphere of Europe.

Turkey's first attempt to join a fully European organization occurred in 1959, when Turkey applied to join the European Economic Community, but efforts did not end there (Pan 2005). The Ankara Association Agreement of 1963 was an effort to set up a customs union between Turkey and the EU, however this did not actually occur until 1995 (European Commission 2012). But Turkey's efforts to join Europe took a specific turn towards EU membership in 1987, when Turkey formally applied for membership. The EU refused candidate status at that point, considered by some to have been a slap in the face. It would take a further 10 years for Turkey to be declared 'eligible for candidate status' (European Commission 2012). Accession negotiations were slow to start, only beginning in 2005—9 years after Turkey was declared eligible. Negotiations have been bumpy with an additional protocol of the Ankara agreement regarding Cyprus being a large stumbling block. But negotiations are ongoing.

The period of accession talks can be viewed as when the EU is in a position of power to either dictate or encourage policy changes in terms of modernization or conformity with EU norms. These fall within the areas of social policy and include policy recommendations or demands by the EU in progress reports issued yearly to track Turkey's progression towards EU membership. As of 2010, 12 of 35 chapters are open for negotiation. Negotiations have taken place under only one government—that of the AKP—meaning that there have been no significant political upheavals in Turkey, as would normally occur with a change in government. Negotiations are ongoing, but the EU progress reports show a number of problems in Turkey's welfare state as well as prescriptions to move it forward.

Accession Agreement

The accession agreement in place for Turkey is not markedly different from others. It is, of course, tailored to the Turkish situation, however it is designed, like all others, to move Turkey into meeting the demands of the Copenhagen Criteria regarding the works of the state, judiciary, social policy, and civic life. The salient points of the accession agreement for the purposes of this paper are:

- Civil and Political Rights
- Women's Rights
- Social Policy and Employment
- Education and Culture
- Consumer and Health Protection

Each of these will be examined individually.

Civil and Political Rights

Under the heading of Democracy and Rule of Law, there is a clause regarding civil society organizations. These refer to groups lobbying the state as well as their ability to affect change in terms of social policy. This is in reference to the ability of the people to have input in the actions of the state, rather than having the state run roughshod over the people. The original agreement requires that Turkey:

- “-strengthen domestic development and involvement in public policy
- facilitate open communication in all sectors of Turkish civil society and European partners” (The Council of the European Union 2008, 5).

The progress reports stress that these criteria has not truly been fulfilled as it urges civil society to be more involved in constitutional reform process (European Parliament 2011).

This is related to a further section regarding the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria, which “urges the Government to uphold rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of association

enshrined in Articles 33 and 34 of the Turkish Constitution; deplores and condemns, in this context, the violent police crackdown on student demonstrations at Ankara University in December 2010” (European Parliament 2011, C 199 E/99). In this area, Turkey has still shown their unwillingness to change and allow civil society to participate in the process of social policy, even more so when these demonstrations occur on university campuses, thus showing the lack of autonomy of universities. The 2011 progress report does commend civil society participation in elections as well as has reports regarding civil society participation in the formulation of the conclusions in the EU progress report, however, it also mentions the suppression of opinions and prosecution of organizations under suspect pretenses (European Commission 2011). But the situation does continue to improve with the 2012 report stating: “Support to **civil society** [bold original] continues with the implementation of previously programmed EU financial assistance for civil society capacity building and civil society dialogue between Turkey and the EU, both under the national programme and the Civil Society Facility” (European Commission 2012, 6). What is disturbing, though, is the further restriction of civil society organizations in other areas with many that will still be restricted to fines, being unable to assemble, etc. Civil society organizations are still not fully free in society and, as such, their ability to affect policy and participate in the political process is stymied.

Civil society is gaining weight and strength within Turkey, which speaks to a growth in the arrow of populism with the state working with the people in order to work for the people. This is important in Turkey’s development and an improvement in adherence to Kemalism, done so with the prodding and aid of the EU. It is also encouraging that the EU continues to critique Turkey on the restrictions placed on civil society, which is a way of prodding change and further development in social policy.

Women's Rights

The EU accession agreement points to two main areas in women's rights; however only one pertains to social policy. This is the aim to

“further increase the awareness of the general public, and of men in particular, concerning gender issues, and promote the role of women in society, including through ensuring equal access to education and participation in the labour market and in political and social life; support the development of women's organisations to fulfill these goals (The Council of the European Union 2008, L51/9).”

This clause pertains to both healthcare and education, which the European Union considers necessary for the advancement of the society as a whole, which follows the ideals of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Kemalism in general, which decreed that all Turkish citizens were equal regardless of gender. Ensuring equal opportunity is part of this, meaning that the EU is reinforcing a Kemalist ideal.

The progress report of 2010 is less optimistic, however, with their findings showing a backward trend in women's rights in Turkey. The 2010 report:

“welcomes the strengthening of the legal framework guaranteeing women's rights and gender equality through the constitutional package; is concerned about falling rates of labour force participation even among highly educated women; urges the Government, businesses, and civil society to take comprehensive measures—such as fighting female illiteracy, providing childcare facilities—to tackle poverty among women and increase women's social inclusion and participation in the labour market; furthermore, encourages the introduction of a system of reserved quotas in order to ensure a meaningful presence of women at all levels in business, the public sector and politics; calls, in particular, on the political parties to use the opportunity of the forthcoming elections to strengthen women's active engagement in politics (European Parliament 2011, C 199 E/102).”

The 2011 progress report is slightly more optimistic noting that women's labor force participation did increase to 29.8% from 26.6%, however it was noted that the working environment was not necessarily friendly for women and noted a need to improve access to affordable childcare, which often hinders women from seeking or keeping gainful employment (European Commission 2011). But the 2012 report again found areas of concern. The EU has prodded the Ministry of Families and Social Policies to adopt a new

National Action Plan to Combat Violence Against Women, which encompasses issues like policing, education, awareness, healthcare, employment, etc., however it is slow in implementation. A quota—one woman, minimum—on every publicly traded corporate board was instituted through an agreement with the Capital Markets Board, but that is, again, still in the process of implementation.

Furthermore, the EU finds particular problems with social attitudes for women, even in the highest level of government saying in regards to a law regarding caesarean sections: “in the debate that preceded this law and a similar debate on abortion, government statements neglected the overall need for increased respect for women’s rights in practical terms” (European Commission 2012, 26). The EU also noted that a male-dominated media and discourse hurts the advancement of women, coupled with a still low labor market participation rate and the lack of both childcare facilities and a comprehensive plan regarding maternal leave. The EU finds a myriad of problems in this area in Turkey but does hold out hope for the future.

It is important to note that the European Union does not ask for anything that is incompatible with Kemalism. Equality for women was a key issue in the early republican period with the wife of Atatürk, Latife, traveling around the country proclaiming equality and extolling the virtues of equal rights. The EU’s positions on these issues are fundamentally to ensure equality of all citizens, women in this case, as relates to the principle of nationalism and the equality of all citizens. Furthermore, the EU recommends and, indeed, commends efforts by the government to entrench these principles in law and enshrine their safe-keeping as a function of the state, thus encouraging étatism in this area. The state is viewed as the primary mover in changing discourse in the media and the labor market. In this area, the EU seeks not to change the governing philosophy of Turkey, but rather to align current Turkish

policy with constitutionally enshrined Turkish governing philosophy.

Social Policy and Employment

The EU accession agreement for Turkey contains the following two relevant clauses regarding social policy and employment:

“-Establish conditions for an effective social dialogue at all levels, inter alia, by adopting new legislation eliminating restrictive provisions in trade union activities and ensuring full trade union rights

-provide an analysis of undeclared work in Turkey and draw up a plan to tackle this problem in the context of an overall action plan for the enforcement of the acquis for the benefit of the entire workforce” (The Council of the European Union 2008, L51/13).

These clauses are relevant as they refer to building of civil society through trade unions, which also function as social safety nets and can negotiate benefits packages for members with the government. The strengthening and lifting of restrictions on trade unions gives workers the ability to provide their own social organizations as well as formulate their own social benefits in an already corporatist system. The second point is relevant due to the prevalence of unofficial employment in Turkey, which ultimately separates people from social benefits, such as health care, pensions, etc. By providing a mechanism for unofficial labor to become official, citizens have the opportunity to claim benefits that are available as well as have the ability to show financial means in means-tested schemes like the Green Card program. Also, by declaring their work, they will be able to join already existing social service administrations, thus expanding the pool of beneficiaries. Also, a medium term priority is to “ensure the sustainability of public finance” (The Council of the European Union 2008, L51/15). This goes further into the area of undeclared work as they currently pay no contributions into social insurance schemes, thus the contribution base will be greater if work is declared.

The 2010 progress report notes positive development in the area of trade unions, but still finds that it falls short of international standards. Also, official unemployment is still high, meaning that full recognition of unofficial labor is still an issue (European Parliament 2011). The 2011 report is also not encouraging. The EU recommends that unofficial labor be ended through an Action Plan for Combating Informal Economy, however no such plan was announced (European Commission 2011). The 2012 progress report is largely the same with the EU stating that Turkey has not adequately combated problems in undeclared work and continues to have a large unofficial economy. Furthermore, it notes that any gains anywhere have been modest, including the area of social dialogue, which is the government working with unions and other organizations, that are ultimately the providers of the social safety net (European Commission 2012).

The EU seeks to ensure a labor market where people can receive benefits commensurate to their labor, which they cannot currently do if they are working unofficially. The ability to partake of social services, even if they are on offer to the general public, is seriously hampered by this issue. In this area, the EU is recommending a return to étatisme with the state ultimately providing for the people and providing the umbrella under which labor organizations can function, however the state has so far failed to achieve this. The EU is ultimately advocating a return to Kemalist principles, but the state has so far failed to comply.

Education and Culture

Education and culture is another area touched on by the EU in their accession agreement. The short-term goal is fairly simple: “Enhance the administrative capacity of the Lifelong Learning and Youth in Action National Agency in order to be able to deal with the increased workload” (The Council of the European Union 2008, L 51/14). The 2010 progress report is largely silent on the issue of education other than in the aforementioned area of women’s rights, encouraging more opportunities for women in education. The 2011 progress

report was far more complimentary noting that: “Turkey continues to align with the EU acquis and standards in the area of education, training and youth” (European Commission 2011, 98). It continues though by reporting that Turkey still lags behind other EU nations in terms of early education drop-outs and adult education participation. This is a large problem as the problem of primary school drop-outs contributes to the problem of an educated workforce and affects social mobility. Pre-school is now compulsory in 57 provinces with enrolment going from 39% to 43%, however it was not compulsory nationwide until the 2012-2013 school year. There continues to be a gender gap in primary school enrolment though it is narrowing with 98.22% of girls enrolled and 98.59% of boys. However, the gap in secondary school enrolment remains considerable with boys entering at a rate of 72.35% and girls at only 66.14%. University development expanded with eight new private universities, but they vary in quality, staff, and infrastructure. There remains a need for an independent Quality Assurance and Accreditation agency to ensure quality in tertiary education (Visakorpi, Stankovic, Perosa, & Rozsnyai, 2008). Also, interest and participation in Lifelong Learning and Youth in Action programs increased (European Commission 2011).

The 2012 report touches on more controversial subjects, such as the reconstituting of the Turkish educational system from an 8+4 plan (8 years of primary school, four years of secondary school), to a 4+4+4 plan, making it possible for students to enter religious schools at an earlier age. The EU remarks that this caused controversy in Turkey, but does not comment further, despite the fact that this is in strict violation of the principle of secularism. Compulsory pre-school education has been dropped for the future, though pre-school enrolment did see a slight uptick. Adult education continues to develop along EU lines. Universities continue to expand with six new universities that opened in 2012, but the concerns regarding quality remain. Also, a quality control and accreditation organization remains to be established. Turkey is deemed to be at an advanced state of Bologna process

implementation, but this is still hampered by a lack of verification due to the lack of any kind of independent accrediting body.

Turkey is also a signatory of the ‘Bologna Declaration’ meaning that some changes have been provisionally made in the system. The universities still give credits based on ‘contact hours,’ rather than student workload, meaning that the calculation of ECTS points is not uniform with many other EU universities. However, it can also be noted that the requirements of Turkish universities are often higher than other universities in the European Higher Education Area (Visakorpi, et al. 2008). Some universities also take part in the ERASMUS programs, thus giving students more access to EU universities and increasing students’ exposure to EU cultures, however, there are still roadblocks in this area due to the fact that foreign language knowledge is not necessarily high enough to facilitate wide involvement over a variety of countries in the ERASMUS scheme, meaning that there tend to be clusters from certain universities that take advantage of this program, with more left out of the scheme altogether (Visakorpi, et al. 2008).

The educational system is improving and is reaching its intention of educating all citizens, but the EU still notices that more needs to be done to narrow the gender gap. Where the EU fails in their recommendations is to see the dangers of religious education in Turkey. This is part of a larger problem of women’s rights and anti-intellectualism as a religious education is not a substitute for a scientific education, as per the observations of Atatürk. The EU and Turkey’s commitment to adult education is important as it fills the gap left to many adults during the period of only compulsory elementary education, but while the EU affects change in a populist manner of providing for all, it does not comment or seem to care in terms of backward steps in secularism.

Consumer and Health Protection

The general accession agreement in this area recommends that Turkey progress to a high health coverage rate as well as improvements in quality of care and, particularly, in the area of mental health. (The Council of the European Union 2008). In the area of public health, the EU found in 2011 that Turkey had achieved universal coverage in 2010 in terms of family benefits, but this is debatable considering other scholarly literature. Health expenditure also rose to 5.6%, which is around average EU levels. Communicable diseases, like HIV/AIDS are still a large issue due to the lack of a national plan to combat and monitor the disease. There have been improvements in mental health, but they are still modest in nature. There is also no national cancer institute, meaning research and treatment options have yet to advance (European Commission 2011). The progress report of 2012 saw, due to EU urging, the establishment of a National Public Health Institute, but the effects that this institution will have remain to be seen. The EU concludes that administrative structures have been greatly improved and developments seem to be on track (European Commission 2012).

The EU has been a significant force for development in the area of healthcare. Public health is still a major area of concern with scholarship reporting far less in terms of the development of primary care facilities—going so far as to say that many hospital admissions are due to illnesses that could have been prevented with adequate primary care—but it is doubtful whether these reforms would have ever taken place if the EU were not a prime mover. By focusing healthcare as an issue of ‘public health,’ the EU has renewed focus on healthcare as a populist enterprise in Turkey as well as a nationalist one as it provides for all and does not discriminate due to any affiliations, national or otherwise (Kisa, Younis and Kisa 2007). Furthermore, Turkey’s ‘Health Transformation Program’ was influenced not only by the World Health Organization, but also by various conditions of their accession agreement with the EU. The EU has, in this way, succeeded in moving Turkey back towards Kemalism

in the area of healthcare, particularly in the state providing more in terms of facilities to the citizenry, but also by the expansion of access through the corresponding expansion of the Green Card program.

Overall EU Kemalist Implications

The overall implications of the EU's effects on Turkish social policy and welfare state development have been generally positive and Kemalist in nature. The EU has focused on several areas in which Turkey has already noted to have been in violation or falling short of Kemalism. The goals of Kemalism, such as universal coverage in healthcare and equal and full opportunity in education through the populist, nationalist, and étatist principles, are the same goals as the EU. In essence, the achievement of EU goals and policy prescriptions in these areas is the achievement of a more Kemalist welfare state. It seems to be the policy prescription of the EU, especially as regards the growth of civil society, to reverse the trend of the people serving the state and having the state serve the needs of the people. The EU is, in this regard, fully moving towards the harmonization of state and society that was envisaged by Kemalism.

However, where the EU falls woefully short is in the area of secularism. The current government has passed legislation in these policy areas that move the country away from secularism and they have passed without significant comment. The EU cannot legitimately comment in regards to abortion as it is a practice outlawed in some EU member states (Poland, Ireland), but it also does not decry the often patriarchal rhetoric through which this has been reached. The EU does not concern itself with the problems or the 'arrow' of secularism because it could possibly be, for them, a matter of religious freedom. However the religious education of children in Turkey is not subject to an evaluation process, making sure that these students are receiving a fully scientific education. The weight of the university exam score for vocational high school students is being adjusted to weigh less, however it is

not spelled out whether that will also include religious schools. If religious schools are included in that category, students with an inferior and non-scientific education could obtain admission to university, thus creating a double standard for students whose test scores are more heavily weighted and ultimately allow unqualified applicants to enter universities. The EU's silence on secularism is interesting and somewhat confusing that they have not taken issue with many of these initiatives as they are the overt acts of growing political Islam.

Overall, the EU is a supporter of the Kemalist principle of *devrimcilik* as it is prodding Turkey to reform, however it is not seeing the kind of revolutions in existing systems that would ultimately bring it fully in line with the principles of Kemalism. While it prods the state closer to that ideal, it allows for a certain amount of backsliding and obfuscation of constitutional principles in the name of 'progress,' though what the EU means by progress is not necessarily progress indeed.

Conclusion—Kemalism in (In)action

The Turkish welfare state has been shown to have gone through, in its relatively short history, periods of intense reform and stultifying stagnation. The republican project, beginning after WWI, has been one that has gone through the heady days of triumph following the War of Independence to the low points of various coups and economic depressions. The road to the present state of affairs has in no way been easy or without peril.

While recognizing the inherent difficulties in remaking a state in an image not previously conceived of by either the nation or many of that nation's elites, the republic itself continues to endure and to change, though whether those changes are progressive or regressive is a matter of opinion for observers. The welfare state of Turkey in the areas of education, health care, and the specific situation of women within these policy areas have gone through massive changes, but it is important to observe and clarify whether these policy

areas have been progressing in a manner that is coherent to the governing ideology of the state, especially with the advent of EU accession talks being introduced to the mix.

In the area of education, the state has had to start from a barely-existing system and attempt to move it towards a fully functioning nation-wide model. As previously noted, there have been notable successes in this area with primary school completion becoming more the norm than the exception, the further expansion of tertiary education, and the successful inclusion of women in all levels of education. However, in order to fully subscribe to the Kemalist model, economic and cultural barriers do need to be removed from the system. While removing economic inequalities from the educational system may seem a pipedream, the problems in this area could be eased even if they cannot be fully eradicated. The Kemalist dream of an educated society, able to harness physical science, humanities, and social science to reach its full potential is still a work in progress. However, as has been previously pointed out, there continue to be issues in the areas of funding, particularly in tertiary education, as well as issues of access favoring the wealthy over the working class. Also, the culture of education has not done enough to propel more women into education, with cultural barriers being the primary cause of school non-completion. The further inclusion of religion in curriculum and the rise of religious schools may exacerbate this problem, but that is something that remains to be seen. Also, the class cleavages that have occurred in education in regards to private tutoring for high school and university exams as well as the ability of some to send their children to private foreign-language high schools give some students advantages on a socio-economic basis, violating the principles of nationalism and populism. The Kemalist dream in this area does continue to breathe, but it is continually threatened by the inclusion of religious materials, socio-economic privilege, and inadequate funding. The principles of étatism, nationalism, populism, and secularism are no longer met, though it is

possible that further association with the EU will help to staunch the inadequacies of the current system.

Healthcare continues to be improved as well mostly within the Kemalist model. Universal coverage has become a concrete goal and a process that has been enacted. But problems do remain in terms of regional disparities and inadequate facilities. The woeful state of healthcare at the beginning of the republican period has become one of hope and continued advancement with modernization as a driving factor. Kemalism has been a driving force in the idea of a universal healthcare system as well as the idea that this system exists for the benefit of the nation. The danger in this area is that further privatization brings in the idea of profit-motive whether than national well-being. While privatization may bring further benefits, it could also work to exacerbate the existing inequalities in the system and promote larger class cleavages in direct opposition to Kemalist principles. Furthermore, the continued existence of corporatist schemes like the SSK and Bağ-Kur remain in place despite their actual creation of further class cleavages. The EU has been helpful in this regard and has been pushing the system towards a universalistic solution, thus making the state the instrument at the service of the people rather than the people serving the state. But whether this solution rests on universal coverage through government provided insurance or a continued reliance and expansion of employment-based schemes is a current unknown.

The situation of women in both of these policy areas is fraught with difficulties. While primary school attendance is mandatory, it is still not absolute for women with secondary school attendance being even more unlikely. In healthcare, family planning services are still woefully inadequate. This issue is intertwined with education as family planning, especially with the absence of adequate childcare, is related to school attendance and the level of schooling a woman can complete. Kemalism demands total equality of opportunity for all citizens, for women this means increased concern and action by the state

in order to alleviate the household/childcare duties that are culturally assigned to women. So far, the state has struggled to do so, meaning that women continue to underachieve in society due to institutional and social constraints. This remains a clear violation of the principles of nationalism, populism, étatism, secularism, and devrimcilik as women are not provided for adequately by the state, they are not given the means by the state to function equally in society, they do not share the same opportunities as men because of various socio-economic realities, and many times their roles are religiously prescribed with the state not acting as a bulwark against the religious oppression of women. The fact that these issues still exist in Turkey to the extent that they do is in itself a betrayal of the principle of devrimcilik.

The EU has done much to continue progress in the Kemalist vein of devrimcilik as reform is constantly demanded. However, the nature of these reforms is often at odds with Kemalist principles as they frequently demand privatization—counter to étatism—as well as encouraging corporatism, which is a feature often found in EU welfare states. The EU has largely been a force for good and a force for progress in the Kemalist vein as equal access is prized as well as the expansion of services and rights to those that were previously denied. However, the EU itself is not interested in Kemalist goals, nor should it necessarily be. Despite this, the EU has not been at all present on issues of creeping Islamicization, preferring to focus more on policy prescriptions. While this is the general purview of the EU, it is neither to their benefit nor to Turkey's benefit to ignore covert or overt religious politics.

What has also been shown, is that the Turkish welfare state is not guided by party affiliations, but rather by the state of affairs both economically and socially within the republic, making any failings not the result of political alignment, but of both circumstance and a resistance to change on the parts of political and military leaders. While not deeply explored in this paper, political suppression as well as the suppression of civil society could have had an effect in the slowing of reform and the development of the systems in question as

power has been concentrated in the hands of ruling elites and the military throughout most of the republican period (Grigoriadis 2009). The EU has pushed for more participation from various groups, however political suppression remains a factor in Turkey that cannot be ignored. This political suppression is also instrumental in the welfare state as the state cannot serve the needs of the populace if the state is blind and deaf to those needs as expressed by the citizenry. The state, as per the principle of étatism, exists for the people, but if the people are suppressed, their needs cannot be made known and thus cannot be met.

Despite political turmoil and changing geopolitical alliances, the Turkish welfare state has had a fairly continuous line of progress, making the best of situations as they were presented. It is hoped that this line of progress continues, but that this line also goes further in the direction of a Kemalist welfare state. Religious influences must be removed from education and healthcare, and thusly the position of women, in both of these policy areas, in order for the potential of these two sectors to be fully realized. Also, the privileging of the interests of some economic sectors must be removed in order for the betterment of welfare state function as a whole. The cleavages between economic sectors has provided a patchwork of policies across the board that has produced a welfare state that does not necessarily work for the nation as a whole, but rather for certain sectors, with those left out being left behind. This is counter to the principles of republicanism and nationalism, as society should not be cordoned into sectors, but rather seen as a whole. In order for the welfare state to conform fully to the governing ideology, these sectors must be joined under a universalistic system.

The welfare state concept is Kemalist in nature as the state must provide for the welfare of the people. While the welfare state continues to strive to meet this goal, it must still undergo significant reforms. The efforts of the Turkish state are commendable, but these efforts have not been enough and have frequently been misguided. Furthermore, the welfare state cannot be used as a pawn in order to gain political power. A comprehensive plan must

be developed, which is an area in which the EU can be of aid. However, the EU must concern itself more with the welfare state in order for significant reforms to be enacted, as stagnation has been a factor in the past. The gap between intention and reality as well as between government and culture must be closed in order for the Turkish welfare state to be fully Kemalist in nature. This requires both aid and political will. It remains to be seen whether it is aid the EU is willing to provide and if the political will exists to enact real reforms. If not, the Kemalist welfare state ideals will remain unrealized.

Bibliography

- Ahmadi, Arash. *Turkey PM Erdogan sparks row over abortion*. June 1, 2012.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18297760> (accessed September 22, 2012).
- Amiraux, Valerie. "Turkey and the European Union: From Migration to Integration?" In *Turkey Today: A European Country?*, by Olivier Roy, (ed)., 67-78. London: Anthem Press, 2004.
- Ataürk, Mustafa Kemal. *Der Weg zur Freiheit*. Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981.
- Atasoy, Yildiz. *Turkey, Islamists and Democracy: Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.
- Aybars, Ayse Idil, and Dimitris Tsarouhas. "Straddling Two Continents: Social Policy and Welfare Politics in Turkey." *Social Policy & Administration*, 2010: 746-763.
- Aydın, Zülküf. *The Political Economy of Turkey*. London: Pluto Press, 2005.
- Başgöz, İlhan, and Howard E. Wilson. *Educational Problems in Turkey 1920-1940*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Publications, 1968.
- Balkan, Sadik, Ahmet E. Uysal, and Kemal. H. Karpat trans. *1961 constitution-text.pdf*.
<http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf> (accessed 2012, 14-January).
- Barblan, Andris. *Case Studies: Higher Education in Turkey: Institutional autonomy and Responsibility in a modernising society: Policy Recommendations in a Historical Perspective*. Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2008.
- BBC News. *Anger at religious school admission age reform in Turkey*. April 2, 2012.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17590866> (accessed January 14, 2013).
- . *Kurdish can be taught in Turkey's schools, Erdogan says*. June 12, 2012.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18410596> (accessed January 15, 2013).
- Berker, Ali. "Labor-Market Consequences of Internal Migration in Turkey." *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 2011: 197-239.
- Bowen, John R. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Bugra, Ayse, and Çağlar Keyder. "The Turkish welfare regime in transformation." *Journal of European Social Policy*, 2006: 211-228.
- Bulut, Aysen, and Janet Molzan Turan. "Postpartum Family Planning and Health Needs of Women of Low Income in Istanbul." *Studies in Family Planning*, 1995: 88-100.
- Cakir, H. Volkan, and F. Nilgun Kircalioglu Stephen J. Fabrican. "Comparative Costs of Family Planning Services and Hospital-based Maternity Care in Turkey." *Studies in Family Planning*, 1996: 269-276.
- Carpenter-Yaman, Carol E. "Sources of Family Size Attitudes and Family Planning Knowledge among Rural Turkish Youth." *Studies in Family Planning*, 1982: 149-158.

- CIA. *CIA - The World Factbook*. 2012. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html#top> (accessed 2012, 19-April).
- Ciddi, Sinan. *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, secularism and nationalism*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Cihan, Özlem, interview by Ayse Kocakulah. *High School and Universities in the 2000s* (2012, 18-February).
- Cizre-Sakallioğlu, Ümit. "Labour and State in Turkey: 1960-80." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1992: 712-728.
- Crawford, Melissa J.L. "TURKEY - Turkish university exams get low good grade from foreign students." *Hürriyet Daily News*. 2011, 7-June.
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=foreign-students-eye-turkish-university-exams-2011-06-07> (accessed 2012, 19-April).
- Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. *chpprogram.pdf*. 2010. <http://www.chp.org.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/chpprogram.pdf> (accessed 2012 7-March).
- Dayioğlu, Meltem, and Serap Türüt-Aşık. "Gender Differences in Academic Performance in a Large Public University in Turkey." *Higher Education*, 2007: 255-277.
- Dogramaci, Emel. *Women in Turkey and the New Millenium*. Ankara: AKDTYK Atatürk Arastirma Merkezi, 2000.
- Dorronsoro, Gilles. "Turkey-A Democracy Under Control?" In *Turkey Today: A European Country?*, by Olivier Roy, (ed)., 27-38. London: Anthem Press.
- Dreßler, Markus. *Die civil religion der Türkei*. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 1999.
- Dumont, Paul. "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology." In *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, by Jacob M. Landau (ed)., 25-44. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984.
- Earle, Edward Mead. "The New Constitution of Turkey." *Political Science Quarterly*, 1925: 73-100.
- Edib, Halide. *Turkey Faces West: A Turkish View of Recent Changes and their Origin*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.
- Erhan Yasar, trans. *1982constitution-1995-1.pdf*. <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982constitution-1995-1.pdf> (accessed 2012, 13-January).
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990.
- European Commission. *EU-Enlargement-Turkey*. October 10, 2012.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm (accessed October 12, 2012).
- European Commission. *Turkey 2011 Progress Report*. Progress Report, Brussels: European Commission, 2011.
- European Commission. *Turkey 2012 Progress Report*. Progress, European Commission, 2012.

- European Parliament. *European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2011 on Turkey's 2010 progress report*. Progress, Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2011.
- Fendall, N.R.E. "A Comparison of Family Planning Programs in Iran and Turkey." *HSMHA Health Reports*, 1971: 1011-1024.
- Gültekin, Burcu. "The Turkish Economy Between Neo-Liberalism and the Weight of Statism." In *Turkey Today: A European Country?*, by Olivier Roy (ed.), 39-52. London: Anthem Press, 2004.
- Gal, John. "Is there an extended family of Mediterranean welfare states?" *Journal of European Social Policy*, 2010: 283-300.
- Gartmann, Helene. *Zur Situation der Frau im Gecekondu: Eine Untersuchung über die Lebensverhältnisse von Frauen in einem durch Zuwanderung aus dem Landesinnern entstandenen Stadtrandgebiet von Ankara*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1981.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. *Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Hale, William. *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*. London: Coom Helm Ltd., 1981.
- Harvard College. *History of Harvard College*. 2012.
<http://www.college.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k61161&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup85886>
 (accessed September 23, 2012).
- Hobsbawm, E.J. *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Hosgor, Seref, and Aysit Tansel. *Demography and Management Towards 2050: Repercussions on Education, Labor, Health and Social Security Systems*. Translated by Can Simek. Ankara: TUSIAD and UNFPA, 2011.
- Jacoby, Tim. *Social Power and the Turkish State*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004.
- Kısa, Adnan, and Mustafa Z. Younis. "Financing Health Care for the Poor in Turkey: Is a Temporary Solution Becoming a Permanent Scheme?" *Public Health Reports*, 2006: 764-768.
- Kalaycioglu, Ersin. *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Karaomerlioglu, M. Asim. "The Village Institutes Experience in Turkey." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1998: 47-73.
- Kazamias, Andreas M. *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- Kili, Suna. "Kemalism in Contermporary Turkey." *International Political Science Review*, 1980: 381-404.
- Kisa, Adnan, Mustafa Z. Younis, and Sezer Kisa. "A Comparative Analysis of the European Union's and Turkey's Health Status: How Health-Care Services Might Affect Turkey's Accession to the EU." *Public Health Reports*, 2007: 693-701.

- Kocakulah, Hussein, interview by Ayse Kocakulah. *Interview Regarding Turkish Village Institutes* (2011, 30-July).
- Kocakulah, Mehmet, interview by Ayse Kocakulah. *Rural School Experiences in Turkey 1955-1970* (2012, 4-February).
- Kramer, Heinz. *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
- Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. "The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1998: 240-258.
- Mango, Andrew. *The Turks Today*. London: John Murray (Publishers), 2004.
- Massicard, Elise. "Islam in Turkey: A 'Secular Muslim' State." In *Turkey Today: A European Country?*, by Olivier Roy (ed.), 55-66. London: Anthem Press, 2004.
- OECD. "Country statistical profile: Turkey." In *Country statistical profiles: Key tables from OECD*, doi: 10.1787/csp-tur-table-2011-1-en. 2011.
- Office of the Prime Minister-Directorate General of Press and Information Turkey. *Başbakanlık Basın - Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü*. 2012. <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/Content.aspx?s=tcotrot> (accessed 2012, 7-March).
- Pan, Esther. *Turkey's EU Bid*. September 30, 2005. <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkeys-eu-bid/p8939> (accessed October 12, 2012).
- Rankin, Bruce H., and Işık A. Aytaç. "Gender Inequality in Schooling: The Case of Turkey." *Sociology of Education*, 2006: 25-43.
- Reisman, Arnold. *Turkey's Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk's Vision*. Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2006.
- Rodrik, Dani. *A Moscow Show Trial on the Bosphorus* - *NYTimes.com*. 2012 yıl 12-March. <http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/a-moscow-show-trial-on-the-bosphorus/> (accessed 2012, 14-March).
- . *Dani Rodrik's weblog: The Turkish economy after the global financial crisis*. 2012 yıl 3-February. http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2012/02/the-turkish-economy-after-the-global-financial-crisis.html (accessed 2012, 13-February).
- Roy, Olivier. "Turkey-A World Apart, or Europe's New Frontier?" In *Turkey Today: A European Country?*, by Olivier Roy (ed.), 11-25. London: Anthem Press, 2004.
- Saktanber, Ayse. *Living Islam: Women, Religion and the Politicization of Culture in Turkey*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2002.
- Sozen, Süleyman, and Ian Shaw. "Turkey and the European Union: Modernizing a Traditional State." *Social Policy and Administration*, 2003: 108-120.
- Stycos, J. Mayonne. "The Potential Role of Turkish Village Opinion Leaders in a Program of Family Planning." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1965: 120-130.

- T.C. Anayasa Mahkemesi. *T.C. Anayasa Mahkemesi*. 2010 йил February.
<http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=20&lang=0&hlkey=1937> (accessed 2012, 7-March).
- Türkische Nationale Kommission für UNESCO. *Atatürk*. Istanbul: Nurgök, 1963.
- Tansel, Aysit, and Fatma Bircan. "Effect of Private Tutoring on University Entrance Examination Performance in Turkey." *ERC Working Papers in Economics 05/04*, 2005.
- Tatar, Mehtap, and Fahreddin Tatar. "Primary health care in Turkey: a passing fashion?" *Health Policy and Planning*, 1997: 224-233.
- The Council of the European Union. *COUNCIL DECISION of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/EC*. Decision, Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2008.
- The Economist. *Turkey's political in-fighting: Erogan at bay*. 2012 йил 25-February.
<http://www.economist.com/node/21548261> (accessed 2012, 1-March).
- The Ministry of Health of Turkey. *Health Statistics Yearbook 2008*. Ankara: Refik Saydam Hygiene Center Presidency School of Public Health, 2010.
- The Ministry of Health of Turkey. *Health Transformation Program in Turkey: Progress Report*. Progress Report, Ankara: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Health Publication, 2010.
- The World Bank. *Indicators / Data*. 2012.
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/TR?display=default> (accessed 2012, 14-February).
- Times Higher Education. *Top 400 (201 to 225) - The Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2011-2012*. 2012. <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2011-2012/201-225.html> (accessed 2012, 19-April).
- . *Top Universities by Reputation 2012*. 2012. <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2011-2012/reputation-rankings.html> (accessed 2012, 19-April).
- Today's Zaman. *ÖSYM announces university exam registration date*. 2008, 1-March.
http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionId=EF98BEA1B89FE977F04F9B99FE213560?newsId=135233 (accessed 2012, 19-April).
- . *Bill introduces longer jail time for late-term abortions*. July 18, 2012.
<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-286904-bill-introduces-longer-jail-time-for-late-term-abortions.html> (accessed September 22, 2012).
- . *Court approves abortion for 14-year-old rape victim*. September 12, 2012.
<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-292220--court-approves-abortion-for-14-year-old-rape-victim.html> (accessed September 22, 2012).
- . *Ministry adopts privacy policy in monitoring pregnancies*. June 22, 2012.
<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-284393-ministry-adopts-privacy-policy-in-monitoring-pregnancy.html> (accessed September 22, 2012).

—. *No ban on abortion or change to legal abortion time limit*. June 22, 2012. <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-284332-no-ban-on-abortion-or-change-to-legal-abortion-time-limit.html> (accessed September 22, 2012).

Tosun, Ayşe. *Turkey's education budget tripled between 2002 and 2011*. 2011 йил 27-November. <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-264010-turkeys-education-budget-tripled-between-2002-and-2011.html> (accessed 2012, 2-March).

Turan, Ilter. "Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After." In *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, by Jacob M. ed. Landau, 99-121. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

Turkish Statistical Institute. "Income and Living Conditions Survey, 2010." Ankara, 2011 йил 19-December.

UNICEF. *UNICEF Turkey/ Say Yes / Autumn 2007 / Educational spending: still room for improvement*. 2007. <http://www.unicef.org/turkey/sy22/ge78.html> (accessed 2012, 3-March).

Visakorpi, Jarmo, Fuada Stankovic, Julio Perosa, and Christina Rozsnyai. *Higher Education in Turkey: Trends, Challenges, Opportunities*. Commissioned Report, Istanbul: Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, 2008.

Winter, Michael. "The Modernization of Education in Kemalist Turkey." In *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, by Jacob M. Landau (ed.), 183-194. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984.

Abstract

The Turkish Republic is a well studied subject; however the Turkish welfare state is a relatively new topic of study. This paper seeks to address the fundamental composition of the Turkish welfare state as regards how benefits are disbursed, levels of benefits, and the general welfare state type. Furthermore, this paper seeks to determine whether the existing welfare state, both currently and historically, conform to the founding and continuing governing ideology of Kemalism, factoring in historical economic and political conditions, culminating in the EU accession process. An examination of certain policy areas, namely education and healthcare, with women's issues examined specifically in both, is undertaken with a resulting analysis of whether the Turkish welfare state is ultimately Kemalist or not.

Während die türkische Republik ein gut erforschtes Gebiet ist, ist das Forschungsthema des türkischen Wohlfahrtsstaates ein relativ neues. Die vorliegende Arbeit soll den grundlegenden Aufbau des türkischen Wohlfahrtsstaates hinsichtlich der Auszahlung von Sozialleistungen, des Umfanges der Leistungen und der generellen Form des Wohlfahrtsstaates darlegen. Des Weiteren soll in dieser Arbeit, unter Berücksichtigung der jeweiligen politischen und ökonomischen Gegebenheiten bis hin zum EU-Eintrittsprozess, festgestellt werden, inwiefern der tatsächliche Wohlfahrtsstaat - sowohl gegenwärtig als auch in der Vergangenheit - der grundsätzlichen und der in weiterer Folge herrschenden Ideologie des Kemalismus entspricht. Eine Untersuchung bestimmter Bereiche wie der Bildungs- und Gesundheitspolitik – jeweils unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Frauenpolitischen Aspekten – bildet die Grundlage für die abschließende Analyse, in welchem Ausmaß der türkische Wohlfahrtsstaat letztlich Kemalistisch ist oder nicht.

Curriculum Vitae:

Name: Ayse Kocakulah

Birth Place: Terre Haute, Indiana USA

Birth date: 10 June, 1985

Nationality: USA/Turkish

Email: aysedeniz.k@gmail.com

Education: University of Chicago, BA Slavic Languages and Literatures, 2006

Indiana Academy for Science, Mathematics, and Humanities, Academic Honors Diploma, 2003

Career History:

MODUL Career and Alumni Relations, Modul University Vienna, April 2013-Present

- Formulated strategic development plan for establishment of an Alumni Relations office
- Creating alumni database
- Event organization and management
- Creating international alumni network/regional chapters

Assistant Librarian, Modul University Vienna, May 2010-March 2013

- Cataloging, organizing and shelving of books
- Ordering books and handling faculty requests
- Assisting students in use of library facilities
- Managing faculty publications on website
- Serving as substitute receptionist when they are unavailable.

Assistant Director West Coast Regional Office, University of Chicago Office of Alumni Relations and Development, December 2008-August 2009 (Palo Alto, CA)

- Managed fundraising and alumni relations in Southern California and Arizona.
- Spearheaded a campaign for Chicago Society (gifts of \$2500 or more) donations
- Managed Chicago Society Volunteer Solicitation Committee of Los Angeles
- Organizing and overseeing Alumni events in Southern California and Arizona
- Liaising with various corporations and business concerns regarding internships for University of Chicago students

Sales Administrator, Edline, LLC, June 2008-December 2008 (Chicago, IL)

- Aiding in the release of new materials
- Maintaining files and inventory
- Aiding in the administrative execution of marketing campaigns
- Fielding customer service calls regarding renewals, technical issues, and sales

Account Executive SingleHop, Inc., October 2007-May 2008 (Chicago, IL)

- Creating and overseeing billing policies
- Maintaining and managing customer relations
- Maintaining customer loyalty

- Managing personal customer portfolio
- Created and lead “Energy Efficient, Eco-Friendly” marketing campaign
- Creating international customer base

Billing Representative, midPhase Services/SingleHop, Inc., July 2007-October 2007
(Chicago, IL)

- Creating and maintaining customer relations via telephone and email
- Aiding customers in cancellations, issuing refunds, collection of past due payments
- Analyzing fraud risk in processing new orders

Fundraiser, University of Chicago Office of Development and Alumni Relations, September 2005-June 2006 (Chicago, IL).

- Contacted alumni for university development and improvement purposes
- Achieved record success rate in fundraising for Court Theater
- Participated in mail fundraising campaign

Volunteer Experience:

Intern, Weinzapfel for Mayor, May 2003 (Evansville, IN)

- Directed and assembled all mailings
- Compiled and maintained financial records and database of donors
- Edited and reviewed press releases

Membership Intern, WNIN (Local affiliate of the Public Broadcasting System and National Public Radio), June 2002-August 2002 (Evansville, IN).

- Maintained membership and contribution records
- Planned and organized logistics of annual picnic
- Maintained inventory of music
- Managed and assembled mailings in the interest of strengthening donor relations

Additional Education and Awards:

- Recipient of Foreign Language Acquisition Grant, University of Chicago, 2005
- Studied Advanced Serbian at Azbukum Language School, Belgrade, Serbia, 2005
- Studied Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian at Indiana University Summer Workshop in Slavic, East European, and Central Asian Languages, 2003
- Studied German language and Central European history and literature in Vienna, Austria, 2006
- Studied German Language at the Vorstudienlehrgang Wiener Universitäten (C1)

Computer Competency: Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, Powerpoint, etc.), Ubersmith, Aleph

Typing speed: 95 WPM

Languages: High proficiency (C1) in German, proficiency in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, competency in Russian, competency in Turkish, reading knowledge of French.

