



universität
wien

DISSERTATION

Titel der Dissertation

“Post-Remittances? On Transnational Ties and Migration
Between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden”

Verfasserin

Mag. Lisa Pelling

angestrebter akademischer Grad
Doktorin der Philosophie (Dr. phil.)

Wien, März 2013

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt:

A 092 300

Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt:

Politikwissenschaft

Betreuerin / Betreuer:

Univ. Prof. Dr. Hans-Georg Heinrich

Abstract

This dissertation studies the transnational ties between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden with a particular focus on how these ties affect migration. Further, it analyses how the transnational ties between Kurds in Sweden and their relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq have evolved during the past three decades. During this time, the Kurdistan region has moved from an extremely difficult situation with high levels of violence, close to economic collapse and grim outlooks, to a situation characterised by a booming economy, high levels of security, and optimism about the future. The dissertation looks at the importance of transnational practices for the creation, the direction and the perpetuation of migration with empiric evidence from the migration corridor between Iraq and Sweden and through a case study of the transnational ties forged between Kurdish immigrants in Uppsala and their families and relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

Support is found for a network effect on migration from Iraq to Sweden. The existence of a Kurdish population in Sweden and their transnational ties are indeed important in explaining asylum migration from Iraq to Sweden. Evidence is also presented that the social networks created by former asylum seekers influence more recent labour immigration from Iraq to Sweden. Moreover, it is concluded that transnational practices, including the sending of remittances, will continue to be carried out for many years to come, and the resulting transnational ties will facilitate and encourage migration between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden in the future.

Abstract (in German)

Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die transnationalen Beziehungen zwischen der Region Kurdistan im Irak und Schweden. Einem besonderen Fokus wird auf den aus diesen Beziehungen resultierendem Einfluss auf Migrationsbewegungen zwischen dem Irak und Schweden gelegt. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert, wie sich die transnationalen Beziehungen zwischen Kurden in Schweden und deren Angehörigen in der Region Kurdistan im Irak in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten verändert haben. Die Region Kurdistan im Irak hat sich in dieser Zeit aus einer extrem schwierigen Lage mit einem hohen Maß an Gewalt, einem wirtschaftlichen Kollaps und traurigen Zukunftsperspektiven befreit, und hat sich zu einer Region mit boomender Wirtschaft, hoher Sicherheit und allgemeinem Optimismus über die Zukunft entwickelt.

Die Dissertation befasst sich mit der Bedeutung der transnationalen Praktiken für das Zustandekommen, die Zielrichtung und die Fortdauer der Migration unter Verwendung empirischer Daten aus dem Migrationskorridor zwischen dem Irak und Schweden. Diese Daten werden ergänzt durch eine Fallstudie der transnationalen Beziehungen zwischen kurdischen Immigranten in Uppsala und ihren in der Region Kurdistan im Irak verbliebenen Familien und Verwandten.

Die Studie bestätigt Einflüsse der sozialen Netzwerke auf die Migration aus dem Irak nach Schweden. Die Existenz einer kurdischen Bevölkerung in Schweden und deren transnationale Beziehungen sind in der Tat ausschlaggebend für die Asylmigration aus dem Irak nach Schweden. Es gibt weiters auch deutliche Anzeichen dafür, dass die sozialen Netzwerke von ehemaligen Asylbewerbern für die Zuwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus dem Irak nach Schweden von besonderer Relevanz sind. Darüber hinaus wird der Schluss gezogen, dass diese transnationalen Praktiken, einschließlich der Transfer von *Remittances* von Schweden nach Kurdistan, noch für längere Zeit fortgeführt werden wird. Die daraus resultierenden länderübergreifenden Beziehungen zwischen der Region Kurdistan im Irak und Schweden werden auch in Zukunft die Migration weiter erleichtern und fördern.

Thanks

I would like to start by thanking Jan O Karlsson, who by recruiting me as his political advisor in 2002 introduced me to the fascinating world of migration issues. Through the years, you have stubbornly held on to an exaggerated assessment of my capacity, and I am fortunate to have you as my mentor. Thank you also for introducing me to Professor Susan Martin at Georgetown University who has functioned as an indispensable second supervisor, and who welcomed me to spend an inspiring time as a visiting scholar at the Institute for the Study of International Migration. Thanks to my parents, to Henke, Bitten and Sven-Erik who travelled with me to Washington D.C. and made sure I could focus on my thesis while my two then two-and-a-half year old girls had a great time in on the play grounds of Georgetown. (And thanks for all other countless occasions you have helped me). Thanks Adrienne Sörbom, who happened to be in D.C. at the same time with *her* twin girls, and who has helped me enormously by showing me how my incoherent thoughts on migration theory could be made into something that resembles a scientific argument.

I am grateful to all the Kurds who have enriched my life since I started working on this dissertation. I would like to thank all my survey respondents and informants for generously sharing their time, their knowledge and thoughts. Thank you Shores Rahem and Ranj Mohammed for being such great guides. Thanks to Ann-Catrine Emanuelsson and Bahar Baser for reviewing what I have written about the history and politics of Kurdistan. Any remaining misunderstandings or misinterpretations are entirely my responsibility. Thanks to Welat Zeydanlioglu and other Kurdistan scholars who have contributed with their expertise and knowledge, not least at the conference *Kurdish Migration and Diaspora* held at the University of Uppsala on April 12–13, 2012.

Thanks to Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels for your helpful Methods Workshop on Migration in 2009, and to the other PhD wannabies at that workshop who could confirm that Dr Klekowski was right in that the longest phase of any dissertation project is the Stage of Confusion and Distress. Maria Gunther-Axelsson was one of the baby-sitters I needed to attend the workshop. Maria later gave me helpful insights into the world of statistics, despite insisting that the kind of statistics she is familiar with as a nuclear physicist do not have much to do with the kind of methods I could use on my rather limited samples.

I would like to thank my fellow political scientist Annika Kropf, who helped me get out of some of my worst moments of confusion and distress. With your clarity of mind and logical thinking, you have helped sort my thoughts from the introduction to the summary, all while finishing your own

PhD-thesis. You also put me in touch with Peter Michelson, to whom I am grateful for proof-reading an earlier version of this dissertation. Any remaining errors and awkward "Swenglish" expressions are my own. Alexandra Miltner has also been a linguistic support, but has above all extended my productive hours enormously by picking up my oldest son from school several times a week. Thanks also to your mother and mother-in-law for their support! Thank you Barbara Götsch for introducing me to Alex, and into to the process of doing a PhD at the University of Vienna. You've been there all along.

Thank you Professor Heinrich at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Vienna for agreeing to be my supervisor. I am grateful to Professor Bo Malmberg and Charlotta Hedberg at the Department of Human Geography of Stockholm University with whom I processed some of the data I use for this thesis.

I would like to thank the University of Vienna for giving me the "*Forschungsstipendium 2011*", including a six months' grant. Most of the time, however, I have had to combine my PhD project with wage labour. I would like to thank the Stockholm based think tank Global Utmaning, my employer since 2009, with its president Kristina Persson and its Head of Office Per Lagerström for putting up with my transnational life style. In particular, I would like to thank my closest colleagues Elin Ewers and Veronica Nordlund. I could not wish for better work mates.

Thanks also to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign affairs, who has generously approved two applications for grants to gather and process data on remittances from Sweden.

For all the help with picking up from Kindergarten and for always, always being there: my parents-in-law Oma Sabine and late Opa Gerhard.

Malte, Alvin, Elin and Lava: You have had no choice but to cope with the absent-minded mother who has fallen on your lot. Thank you anyway. I know I have given your reason to doubt, but you are more important to me than anything else.

There are many more people I should thank, but all of them put together do not add up to what Gerin has meant for me and for this dissertation. You have supported me all through this amazing, agonising and exhausting adventure. Your argument for why I should try to become "Frau Doktor" has been as simple as convincing: "because you can". Thanks to you, Gerin, I could.

Vienna, March 2013

Table of Contents

1 Introduction	1
1.1 Research Questions 1 and 2.....	2
1.2 Research Question 3.....	5
1.3 Definitions.....	6
1.4 Theoretical Perspectives.....	6
1.5 Data and Methodology.....	8
1.6 Structure of the Study.....	9
2 Background	10
2.1 Sweden: A Country of Immigration	10
2.2 Immigration from Iraq to Sweden.....	12
2.3 What is Kurdistan?	18
2.4 Tracing the Immigration of Kurds to Sweden.....	27
2.5 Immigration from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq	31
2.6 The Diverse Origins of the Kurdish Population in Sweden.....	37
2.7 The Kurdish Community in Uppsala	39
2.8 Previous Research on Remittances from Sweden.....	44
3 A Transnationalist Perspective on Migration	48
3.1 Theories on the Causes of International Migration.....	48
3.1.1 Neo-classic Economic Theory.....	49
3.1.2 New Economics of Labour Migration.....	50
3.1.3 Labour Market Segmentation.....	51
3.1.4 World-Systems Theory.....	52
3.1.5 Network Theory.....	53
3.1.6 Migration Systems Theory.....	55
3.1.7 Cumulative Causation	56
3.2 Theories on Why People Do Not Migrate.....	56
3.3 International Migration and State Sovereignty: A Political Science Perspective.....	58
3.4 Transnationalism: A New Optic.....	63
3.5 Migrants' Transnational Practices and Migration Patterns	68
3.6 Transnationalism and Integration: On the Durability of Transnational Ties.....	71
4 A Transnationalist Perspective on How Remittances Shape Migration	75
4.1 Remittances as an Incentive to Migrate.....	76
4.2 Remittances as a Source of Funding Migration.....	78
4.3 Transnational Practices Over Time: A Life Course Perspective On Remittances.....	79
4.4 Cultural Convergence of Remittance Sending Practices?	85
4.5 Transnational Transfers and State Sovereignty: A Contentious Issue?.....	87
5 Methodology: Researching Transnational Ties.....	90
5.1 Methodological Implications of a Transnational Perspective	91
5.2 Methodological Challenges in Remittances Research	94
5.3 Ethical Considerations	97

5.4 The Official Survey HEK as a Source of Data on Remittances.....	97
5.5 Surveying Kurds in Uppsala: Constructing a Sample Frame.....	103
5.6 Postal Survey Among Kurds in Uppsala.....	105
5.7 Sampling Frame in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq	110
5.8 Intercept Survey in Suleymani.....	111
5.9 Key Informant Interviews.....	112
5.10 Semi-Structured Individual Interviews in Uppsala and Iraq.....	112
5.10.1 Interviews among Kurds in Uppsala.....	112
5.10.2 Interviews with Return Migrants and Migrant Relatives in the Kurdistan Region..	114
5.11 Group Interviews in Uppsala and Iraq.....	115
5.11.1 Conducting Interviews in a Foreign Language.....	115
5.12 Summary.....	116
6 Remitting Money from Sweden: Evidence from HEK 2007.....	117
6.1 Transnational Practices Over Time.....	119
6.2 Life-Course Determinants.....	121
6.3 Factors Related to Integration into the Host Society.....	123
6.4 Evidence from HEK 2007: Summary.....	125
7 The Transnational Capacity of Kurds in Sweden.....	127
7.1 The Swedish Citizenship Regime.....	130
7.2 The Swedish Integration Model.....	134
7.3 The Possibilities to Return from Sweden to Kurdistan.....	141
8 Evidence of Network Effects on Migration From Iraq to Sweden.....	144
8.1 Network of Iraqis.....	145
8.2 Network of Kurds.....	148
8.3 Evidence of a Network Effect on Recent Labour Immigration.....	150
9 Transnational Ties Between Kurds in Sweden and Iraq.....	166
9.1 Intensity.....	168
9.1.1 Gifts Made in Kind.....	172
9.1.2 Simultaneous Practices: Remittances and Other Transnational Practices.....	176
9.1.3 Intensity: Summary.....	177
9.2 Frequency.....	178
9.2.1 Collective Remittances.....	179
9.2.2 Aspects of Gender Differences	181
9.2.3 Education.....	183
9.2.4 Frequency in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.....	184
9.2.5 Frequency: Summary.....	186
9.2.6 How Transfer Methods Might Influence Intensity and Frequency.....	187
9.3 Implications For The Migration Between the Kurdistan Region and Sweden.....	191
9.3.1 Helping to Cover the Costs of Migration as an Alternative to Remittances.....	192
9.3.2 Lowering the Costs of Migration by Helping Newly Arrived.....	193
9.3.3 Impressions about Sweden and Motives to Migrate from to Sweden.....	195
10 Tracing Transnational Ties into the Future.....	198
10.1 What the Use of Remittances Toady Might Say about the Future.....	198
10.2 How Economic Growth Weakens the Need for Remittances.....	200
10.3 Remittances for Self-Support.....	202

10.4	Persisting Needs for Support from Abroad	203
10.5	Transnational Ties as an Insurance	204
10.6	Remaining Expectations.....	207
10.7	Transnational ties as a Career Resource.....	207
10.8	The Prospect of Return.....	208
10.9	Durability: Summary.....	211
11	Post-Remittances? Tracing the Transition of Transnational Ties.....	213
12	References	222

Index of Tables

Table 1: Top ten countries of origin of immigrants in Sweden.....	12
Table 2: Asylum Seekers From Iraq 2004–2011.....	16
Table 3: Immigration from Iraq to Sweden Based on Grounds for Residence 2004–2010.....	17
Table 4: Work permits granted 2009–2011.....	18
Table 5: Estimations of the number of Kurds in Europe.....	29
Table 6: The general tendency to remit from Sweden according to HEK 2007.....	87
Table 7: Principal worker remittance characteristics.....	96
Table 8: Different sources of data on workers' remittances from Sweden.....	100
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of data in HEK 2007.....	101
Table 10: Country of origin of Kurdish respondents.....	109
Table 11: Percentage of Iraqi households receiving assistance from households abroad.....	111
Table 12: Outward remittance flows 2000–2006, USD (millions).....	117
Table 13: Remittances per year and number of foreign born (USD)	117
Table 14: Propensity to remit on citizenship in HEK 2007.....	123
Table 15: Propensity to remit on income in HEK 2007.....	124
Table 16: Emigration from Sweden to Iraq 2000–2010.....	142
Table 17: Top ten countries of origin of immigrants in Sweden in 2011.....	147
Table 18: Place of Birth of Iraqi Immigrants 2007–2011.....	149
Table 19: Permanent and Temporary Labour Immigration to Sweden 2005–2010.....	153
Table 20: Immigration from Iraq to Sweden based on grounds for residence 2004-2011.....	155
Table 21: Work permits granted in Sweden 2009-2011.....	157
Table 22: Work permits granted on size of foreign born population.....	158
Table 23: Work permits 2008-12-15 to 2011-11-03 on occupational area.....	160
Table 24: Work permits granted between 2009 and 2011 on occupational area.....	160
Table 25: Work permits 2008-12-15 to 2011-12-14 on profession	163
Table 26: Work permits issued to former asylum seekers from Iraq 2009–2011.....	165
Table 27: Question 21. “When did you last send money to your country of origin?”.....	170
Table 28: Question 22: “How much money did you send when you last sent money?”.....	172
Table 29: Question 23: “How much money did you send during the past year?”.....	172
Table 30: Propensity to remit among Kurds and Persians.....	180
Table 31: Propensity to remit on age group.....	183
Table 32: Propensity to remit last year on age group.....	183
Table 33: Propensity to remit on level of education.....	184
Table 34: Question 26. “When you send money, what determines the amount you send?”...189	
Table 35: Transfer costs in the corridor Sweden–Iraq, October 2009.....	191
Table 36: Transfer costs in the corridor Sweden–Turkey, October 2009.....	191
Table 37: Question 14. “Why would you like to live in Sweden?”.....	197
Table 38: Question 27. “How is the money that you send used?”	200

Illustration Index

Figure 1: Emigration and Immigration Sweden 1851–2010.....	11
Figure 2: Immigration from Iraq 1990-2011 based on grounds for residence.....	13
Figure 3: Civilian Casualties in Iraq from May 2003 through September 2010.....	14
Figure 4: Map of Kurdish Areas.....	19
Figure 5: Age Structure of Iraqi Immigrants 2007–2011.....	37
Figure 6: Remittances and the 1991 Swedish Financial Crisis.....	46
Figure 7: Cultural Map of 82 Societies.....	86
Figure 8: Propensity to Remit on Time since Immigration.....	120
Figure 9: Propensity to Remit on Age.....	121
Figure 10: Propensity to Remit on Family Type.....	122
Figure 11: Propensity to Remit on Household Disposable Income.....	125
Figure 12: MIPEx 2011 Score Overview for Germany.....	137
Figure 13: MIPEx 2011 Score Overview for Sweden.....	138
Figure 14: Emigration from Sweden to Iraq 2000–2010.....	142
Figure 15: Labour Immigration From Iraq on Occupational Area 2011.....	161

Index of Appendices

Appendix 1: Details on Identification of Addresses.....	256
Appendix 2: Questionnaire and Covering Letter Used for Postal Survey in Uppsala.....	259
Appendix 3: Key Informants.....	264

1 Introduction

In 2007, at the height of the most recent Iraqi refugee crisis, Sweden received the largest amount of asylum applicants from Iraq registered in any country outside Iraq's neighbouring region (UNHCR 2010). Over eighteen thousand asylum seekers from Iraq arrived in Sweden in that year. The large number of asylum seekers from Iraq contributed to make Sweden the second most important country of destination for asylum seekers of the industrial countries in absolute numbers in 2007 (UNHCR 2011, 8). Almost every second application for asylum filed in Europe by asylum seekers from Iraq was made in Sweden (Swedish Migration Board 2010a). At one point, the small Swedish town of Södertälje received as many asylum seekers from Iraq as the US and Canada together, and the mayor of Södertälje was called to witness in the US Congress on how his municipality was coping with a dramatic situation (*Dagens Nyheter*, 22 November 2007 and 11 April, 2008).

In 2007, Iraq was a country at war. Sectarian forces fought each other and the US-led alliance. Month after month, thousands of civilians were killed by suicide attacks, by stray bullets and by bombs intended for 'terrorists'. People were killed trapped between sectarian groups whose ever-changing front-lines divided neighbourhoods and villages, or simply as 'collateral damage' in the allied forces' attempts to put down insurgents. To make things worse, the dramatic levels of unpredictable violence paralysed the Iraqi economy, which was already shattered after decades of mismanagement under the regime of Saddam Hussein and fifteen years of international economic blockade. In many places, power shortages, lack of medical supplies and difficulties to get even the most basic food stuffs was added to an already unbearable life situation. In short, in 2007 there were indeed many reasons to flee from Iraq.

However, while violence and deprivation in Iraq can explain why so many Iraqis left their country, these factors cannot explain why so many Iraqi applied for asylum in Sweden.

The relatively liberal Sweden asylum legislation was certainly an important factor (Brekke and Aarset 2009). However, the explanation favoured by the Swedish Migration Board was that asylum seekers from Iraq choose Sweden for historic reasons. According to the annual report of the Swedish Migration Board on the year 2007, the large inflow of Iraqi asylum seekers in that year could be explained by the fact that "there is already a relatively large group originating from Iraq living here" (Swedish Migration Board 2008a, 7). This view was shared by the UNHCR, who in its 2008 report on Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries wrote "It is believed that the

extensive Iraqi community and its strong social network in the country may have been driving forces behind the concentration of Iraqi asylum-seekers in Sweden” (UNHCR 2009, 8). Being the host of a large Iraqi community is a feature that Sweden shared with Germany, the largest receiver of asylum-seekers from Iraq after 2003. Already before 2007, Iraqis were the third largest group of foreign born in Germany after Turkey and Serbia and Montenegro (Eurostat 2008, quoted by Huddlestone et al 2011, 87).

Sweden also, just like Germany, hosts an important Kurdish community, whose transnational ties link Kurds in exile with their families, relatives and communities in Iraq. The Kurdish community in Sweden dates back to the 1950s, and the Swedish mode of immigrant integration has contributed to create a confident transnational Kurdish community in Sweden (Alakom 2007, Khayati 2008).

1.1 Research Questions 1 and 2

In this dissertation, I present the results of a case study of the transnational practices of Kurds in a city in Sweden and in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. How have these transnational ties been created, and what factors have shaped them? This is my first research question. In order to answer it, I have traced the immigration of Kurds to Sweden, and analysed how conditions in Sweden have shaped the transnational practices carried out by Kurds in Sweden. My second research question relates these transnational practices to the patterns of migration between Iraq and Sweden: Is it reasonable to believe that these transnational practices, and the transnational ties they create, shape migration from Iraq to Sweden? I have looked at what kind of transnational practices Kurds in this transnational space engage in, and at their character: could these transnational practices shape migration from Iraq to Sweden? In particular, I have looked at the transnational practice of sending remittances, that is, the transfer of support from households in Sweden to households in Iraq. Remittances merit particular attention in a study on the relationship between transnational ties and migration. The most important reasons for this is that the need to secure assistance from abroad is often a motivation for international migration, and remittances are often used to finance further migration.

A recent change in Swedish immigration legislation provides an interesting opportunity to study the effects of transnational networks on immigration to Sweden. In December 2008, Sweden introduced the most liberal labour immigration legislation among the OECD countries (OECD

2011a) opening up for demand-driven labour immigration from all countries outside the EU/EES without restrictions either in terms of numbers or required skills levels.¹

The first major group of Iraqi immigrants arrived in Sweden at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. This first wave of Iraqi immigration mainly consisted of Kurds who fled from ruthless persecution under the regime of Saddam Hussein (Emanuelsson 2007). They fled from the so-called *Anfal campaign*, an ethnic cleansing that was waged against the Kurds between 1987 and 1989. It is estimated that 182,000 Kurds—mainly civilians—were killed during the Anfal-campaign, which according to Human Rights Watch should be defined as a genocide directed against the Kurds in Iraq (Human Rights Watch 1993, 2006). During the Anfal-campaign, some 4,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed together with churches, hospitals, mosques and schools. In addition to the human suffering it caused, the Anfal campaign led to an almost total collapse of the local agriculture-dependent economy in the Kurdish region of Iraq. As a part of the campaign, large parts of the Kurdish country side were declared no-go areas, and hundreds of thousands of villagers found themselves stranded in the cities, cut off from their lands and their livelihoods. Emanuelsson and Salih describe how many families were forced to sell all they had—carpets, furniture, the TV—to support themselves. Many only just survived because they received money and medicine from relatives abroad (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 132–39).

It is impossible to talk about remittances to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq without talking about the years towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. These dark years was what my respondents spontaneously started to talk about when I asked about sending support to relatives in Kurdistan. It was repeated over and over again in the interviews I made: At the beginning of the 1990s, 100 dollars was enough to feed an entire family for a month. One hundred dollars, sent from a relative who had joined the Kurdish diaspora in Germany, Holland, the UK or Sweden: many, many families had nothing else to live on. Emanuelsson and Salih describe how after the Anfal campaign, the border with Turkey constituted a precarious life line with the outer world. As people where trying to reconstruct their houses from the rubble the Iraqi bulldozers had left behind, concrete and fuel was smuggled into the Kurdish cities over the Turkish border. Not least, it was over this border that refugees returned from exile in Europe bringing money to their desolate families (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 132).

The years of the Anfal campaign can be described as the darkest and the bloodiest in the history of the Kurdish people. At the same time, these years constitute a kind of turning point. The Anfal

¹ The requirements made in the legislation are only placed on the job offer that is the basis for the work permit. The job offer must include a salary and other conditions that correspond to the level in the collective agreement of the respective branch of the labour market, and on which the employee can earn a living in Sweden above the level of subsistence, that is above the level of monthly income that would entitle the employee to social assistance (*försörjningsstöd*). See chapter 8.

campaign was the beginning of the developments that some years later would lead to the formation of what is arguably the closest the Kurds have ever got to having their own, sovereign country: the *quasi*-independent Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

After the humiliating defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, Kurds in the north as well as Shia groups in the south of Iraq saw an opportunity to oust Saddam Hussein's regime and attempted an armed uprising. During the uprising, the Kurdish guerilla fighters—the *peshmerga*—managed to take control over the larger cities in Kurdistan. Tons of official Iraqi documents with details on the Anfal campaign fell into the hands of the Kurds when they opened the local offices of the Iraqi security forces. The *peshmerga* held the cities only a couple of weeks, but it was long enough for the entire Kurdish population to learn about the atrocities of the Anfal campaign, and about the continuously horrendous situation on the countryside and in the prisons (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 124). When the regime brutally cracked down on the uprising, an unprecedented and massive number of civilian Kurds fled towards the Turkish and Iranian borders. Almost 1.9 million civilians fled from the Kurdish governorates to neighbouring countries in the spring of 1991 (Council of Europe 1994). Turkey closed its border with Iraq, which forced hundreds of thousands of the refugees to seek shelter in the mountains (BBC 2011-10-29). In order to make it possible for the refugees to return, France, the UK and the US installed a “safe haven” over the Kurdish areas in April 1991.² The installation of a no-fly zone over the northern governorates enabled the *peshmerga* to seize control over large parts of Iraqi Kurdistan, and they have controlled the area ever since.

Today, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) rules over a *de facto* autonomous Kurdistan Region. It's a region where people feel safe: the Kurdistan Region has largely been spared from the sectarian violence that has been devastating the rest of Iraq during the past decade, and the former guerilla-fighters have been successfully integrated into civil security structures, which has contributed to low rates of criminality. Thanks to regular transfers from the national Iraqi budget, and because the Kurdish ‘capital’ Erbil has been able to establish itself as the ‘Gateway to Iraq’ for businessmen and investing foreign companies, the economy is booming. The skyline of Erbil is full with construction cranes and the newly inaugurated roundabouts are trafficked by brand new cars. The income per capita is higher here than in any other part of Iraq, unemployment is relatively low (IHSES 2009b, see also Associated Press 2009-05-20), and even though the economy suffers from a number of structural deficits (RTI International 2008, Heshmati 2007) there are reasons to be optimistic about future economic developments.

2 In August 1992, Shia populations in the south of Iraq received similar international protection when a ‘no-fly zone’ was set up south of a line following latitude 32 degrees north.

1.2 Research Question 3

Has the Kurdistan Region of Iraq now moved into a situation where support from households abroad is no longer relevant? Has the region entered a *post-remittances* situation, and what implications will this have for migration between Iraq and Sweden? This is my third research question. A combination of factors makes it particularly interesting to use the case of migration between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden to study how transnational ties influence migration. the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has undergone dramatic changes: from ethnic cleansing, almost total economic collapse and grim outlooks, to a situation with historically low levels of violence, a booming economy, and optimism about the future. Even though the improved situation in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has made it difficult for asylum seekers from this region to obtain a residence permit in Sweden, the new labour immigration legislation has opened a new door into Sweden which has enabled migration from Iraq to continue.

I argue that in the 1990s, the situation in Northern Iraq could be described as ‘ideal’ for remittances. The economy was in shatters and people were desperately poor. For many families, support sent home from relatives abroad constituted the thin difference between poverty and outright misery. At the same time, the Kurdish flag waved at the border, installing people with optimism: now is the time to build a new Kurdistan (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 133). Huge needs in combination with growing optimism is probably a close to optimal combination for attracting remittances. Relatives abroad could make a difference with the money they sent: people were in great need, and with the depreciation of the Iraqi currency, 100 USD could buy a family food for a month. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that optimism about the future also fuelled remittances sent for investment purposes: optimism can function as an incentive to send remittances to build a house, to buy a piece of land, to set up a business.

When I started to do interviews for this study, I was able to confirm what an important role remittances had played in the relation between Kurds in exile in Sweden, and their relatives and families in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. However, and more importantly, I also began to understand that this relationship had undergone fundamental changes over the past decades. In the 1980s and 1990s, I was told, ‘everyone’ sent money home to support family and relatives in Iraqi Kurdistan. When I asked what difference 100 dollars would make today, I was told “you go to the market in Erbil, and in one hour the money is gone”. Today, the relationship might even have been reversed. “Now they are richer than we are”, Kurds in Sweden told me. “They should send money to us!”.

I analyse the importance of transnational practices for the creation, the direction and the perpetuation of migration with empiric evidence from the migration corridor between Iraq and

Sweden and a case study of the transnational ties forged between Kurdish immigrants in Sweden and their families and relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. In the concluding chapter, I link my first two research questions on the importance of transnational practices for shaping migration between Iraq and Sweden to the third question on the characteristics of a post-remittances situation. I examine the transition of transnational ties between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden with a particular focus on how this transition affects migration. The concluding chapter takes the form of an outlook into the future: Sweden has been an important destination for migration from Iraq during the last decades, will this continue to be the case?

1.3 Definitions

I define transnational practices as social, economic, political and cultural practices that involve people in more than one country simultaneously (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). By focusing on transnational *practices* I look at the intended and unintended results and consequences of individual actions. The practices I look at are actions undertaken by individuals and individual families and households in their efforts to organise their family life and secure their livelihood in a transnational context. My focus is thus not on a transnational community as a collective, political actor. I have not looked at the political actions of diaspora organisations, nor at the actions of single public figures such as politicians or intellectuals who belong to the elite of the transnational community. The sending of remittances, i.e. the transfer of support between households in different countries, is an important transnational practice. Other transnational practices include visits and communication between the individuals in the host state and in the country of origin, and exchanges of information, advice and ideas in this transnational space.

1.4 Theoretical Perspectives

There is no single, widely accepted theory on the causes of international migration (Massey et al. 2002, Portes and DeWind 2004). However, a growing body of literature assigns an important role to migrants' networks in facilitating and encouraging migration (see for instance Collyer 2005, and Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith 2008). Network theory is an attempt to explain the often 'spatially clustered' nature of migratory flows (De Haas 2007). Migrants' networks fuel migration by lowering both costs and risks associated with cross-border movements. Through networks, the narrow paths carved by migrant pioneers can develop into broad migration corridors linking countries of origin with particular destination countries. Migrants' networks operate at all stages of the migration process: by providing prospective migrants with information on travel routes or with travel documents and at times with human smuggling, and by helping migrants to find shelter and

an income in the country of destination. By lowering the costs of migration, with time social networks render migration less selective: people who previously could not afford to migrate abroad can do so with the help of friends and relatives who have already made the journey. Migrants networks facilitate migration to the point of contributing to the perpetuation of migration over time (Massey et al. 2002).

A central question of this dissertation is to what extent the transnational networks of Kurds, and the transnational practices that build these networks, can explain migration between Iraq and Sweden. Moving beyond an analysis of the current origins of Iraqi immigration to Sweden, it looks at what conditions might lead to sustain this migration over time. What conditions help sustain migration over time when the original causes of migration have faded? In the situation of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, where economic misery and insecurity have been replaced by an economic boom and confidence about the future, what role do transnational ties forged by migrants play in a possible perpetuation of migration?

By definition, international migration occurs when people cross the international borders of states.³ The challenges and constraints faced by states in controlling their borders, and thereby upholding sovereignty over their territory is a central issue in international relations and political science (Betts 2011, Hollifield 2008). Control over the borders of the state, or the regulation of entry and exit into its territory is essential for state sovereignty. In this sense, cross-border movements of people in the form of international migration pose a challenge to state sovereignty (Castles 2004a, Hollifield 2004, Joppke 1998, Sassen 1996). Social networks can contribute to perpetuate migration also over (formally) closed borders, making it notoriously difficult for states to control migration (Massey et al. 1993, 448; Schoorl 1998).

In recent migration research, a transnationalist perspective has contributed to make migrants' agency visible in fuelling and shaping human cross-border movements. My analysis is based on a critical appraisal of the transnationalist perspective on migration. I understand the term transnational ties as the sum of migrant transnational practices—whether intensive and recurrent or sporadic and occasional—that tie Kurdish migrants in Sweden to their families, relatives and communities in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. A particular focus is placed on migrant remittances, the funds that migrants transfer to their countries of origin. Remittances are interpreted as a particularly important transnational practice. Remittances bind migrants and non-migrants together

3 The definition of an international migrant used by the United Nations is a person who “changes his or her country of usual residence”. Temporary travellers, like tourists or businessmen are not defined as migrants. The UN further defines a short term migrant as “a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year (12 months)” and a ‘long-term migrant as “A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence.” (UNDESA 1998, 17–18).

in a web of mutual obligations. A transnationalist perspective has mostly been applied by sociologists and anthropologists, but was long missing in political science (Castles 2004a).

I use a transnationalist perspective in an effort to analyse how the aspirations, practices and struggles of individual migrants shape migration. This has a bearing on the state's possibilities to control migration: I relate different aspects of transnational practices with a political science perspective on theories of international migration.

Analysing empiric material on what transnational ties look like and how they are forged between Sweden and Iraq can consequently shed light on a core issue of political science and migration: the implications of international migration on state sovereignty. A transnationalist perspective that renders migrant agency visible is needed to enhance understanding of what factors, in addition to structural and institutional factors, shape constraints on state sovereignty over immigration. By looking at how migration is shaped by migrants' transnational practices, this dissertation can contribute to shed light over the relationship between migrants' transnational practices and the constraints posed by international migration on states' sovereignty over its borders.

1.5 Data and Methodology

This study employs an actor centred approach, by looking at how ties forged by individual migrants in Sweden and their relatives and family members in Kurdistan shape patterns of migration. Its focus is not on migrant organisations, nor on organised diaspora interests. Instead, it looks at the potential impact of the sum of individual transnational practices.

In addition to a review of relevant literature, the findings of the study are based on empiric data gained from semi-structured individual and group interviews and surveys conducted among Kurds in the Swedish city Uppsala in several locations in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. Eleven key informant and expert interviews were made in Sweden, and 14 semi-structured individual and group interviews were made with a total of 36 respondents in Uppsala between 2009 and 2011. Further data was gathered during field work in the Kurdistan Region at two occasions (December 2009 and May 2010). Nine expert interviews and 36 individual and group interviews with a total of over 100 respondents were made. Data from an official Swedish household survey (HEK 2007) is used to analyse the economic ties between immigrants in Sweden and their families and relatives. Data from the Iraqi Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES 2007) further underpin the findings of the study.

Migration research is intrinsically interdisciplinary (Brettell and Hollifield 2007). This study draws on analyses made in other disciplines, particularly demography and sociology, but relates its findings mainly to concepts and theories developed within the field of political science.

1.6 Structure of the Study

This introduction is followed by a chapter that provides a background to current immigration from Iraq to Sweden (chapter 2). The background chapter also traces the origins and the development of the Kurdish population in Uppsala. In the following two chapters (chapters 3 and 4) I present the theoretical context of my research. Chapter 5 presents the methodologies used in gathering the empiric material, and discuss some methodological challenges. In the empiric chapters (chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10), the empiric data is presented and analysed. The empiric chapters are based on three different kinds of empiric data. Chapter 6 is based on statistical data taken from the national Household Economic Survey of Statistics Sweden (HEK 2007). The second empiric chapter, on the transnational capacity of Kurds in Sweden (chapter 7), is mainly based on secondary literature: other dissertations and studies on Kurds and the Kurdish community in Sweden. The third empiric chapter (chapter 8) is based on statistical data from Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Migration Board: it looks for evidence of network effects on recent immigration from Iraq to Sweden. The last two empiric chapters (chapters 9 and 10) are based on data I have gathered in the course of my field work, including surveys, expert interviews and semi-structured individual and group interviews with Kurdish informants in Uppsala and in four locations in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. The empiric chapters are followed by a concluding chapter (chapter 11).

2 Background

This chapter starts with a general overview of the history of immigration to Sweden. The next section focuses on immigration from Iraq to Sweden. Then I attempt to establish what can be said about Kurdish immigration to Sweden. This is a complicated issue, since there is no straightforward answer to the question ‘What is Kurdistan?’ I devote one section to a discussion about this question. The second last section further narrows the focus by looking at Kurdish immigration from Iraq. Finally, the last section describes the development of the Kurdish community in the city of Uppsala where I conducted my Swedish fieldwork.

2.1 Sweden: A Country of Immigration


The Swedish state started to keep statistics on emigration in the year 1851. During the course of the past 150 years, Sweden has been transformed from a country of emigration, to one of the countries in Europe with the highest number of immigrants (see Figure 1). After the Second World War, Sweden has received larger immigration than the European average (Malmberg and Hedberg 2008, 35). Today Sweden, with 14.4 percent of the population, has one of the highest shares of foreign born in Europe, and higher than the share of foreign born in the USA who had a share of 12.5 percent in 2009 (OECD 2011b).

The transformation from a country of emigration to an important country of immigration has been dramatic, indeed. According to Statistics Sweden, 1.5 million Swedes emigrate between 1850 and 1930, 1.2 million of them to North America. Stricter immigration legislation adopted in the US in the 1920s and the economic crisis starting in 1929 brought the emigration to North America to a halt at the end of the 1920s. Since the year 1930, with the exception of the years 1972 and 1973, immigration to Sweden has been larger than emigration. Sweden received some refugees after the Second World War, but large-scale immigration started in the 1950s, fuelled by booming Swedish industry and a policy of basically unrestricted labour immigration. During the 1950s and 60s, immigration was dominated by labour migrants from primarily from southern European countries such as Italy, Portugal and Greece. (Statistics Sweden 2010a).

The policy of unrestricted labour migration from non-Nordic countries was stopped at the end of the 1960s. The introduction of restrictions on labour immigration thereby largely coincide with the EU’s and its predecessor’s era of ‘zero immigration’ from 1973 (Hansen 2012). From the 1970s onward, non-Nordic immigration to Sweden consequently has consisted almost exclusively of

asylum-related immigration, with the largest number of people being family members of individuals that have been granted residence after arriving in Sweden as asylum applicants.

In 1980, the largest group of foreign born permanent residents originated in Finland (251,342 individuals) followed by Germany (38,696) and Yugoslavia (37,982). Between 1980 and 1990, the number of residents born in Iraq tripled to over 27,000, and in 1990 there were significant groups of residents born in Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and Turkey. (Westin 2006). Of the Turks, many were Kurds who had fled political persecution after the military coups in Turkey (Alakom 2007). After a major influx of refugees from the Western Balkans in the 1990, people born in Former Yugoslavia grew to become the second largest group after Finns with 130,000 people in the year 2000. In the year 2000, Iraq together with Iran had become important countries of origin for immigration to Sweden, with approximately 50,000 individuals from each country (Westin 2006).



The immigration from Iraq to Sweden had its first peak in 1992 and 1993. Again, this coincided with asylum immigration of Kurdish refugees. After Iraq was defeated in the Gulf War in 1991, Shias in the south and Kurds in the northern parts of Iraq revolted against Saddam Hussein's regime. The uprisings were brutally put down by the Iraqi elite troops in a very violent offensive, and it is estimated that 1.5 million Kurds in the northern Iraqi governorates fled the offensive of the Iraqi troops (BBC 2011-10-26, van Bruinessen 1999).

Some of these Kurdish refugees sought refuge in Sweden. Sweden granted asylum to 3,355 individuals from Iraq in 1992 and to 2,907 individuals in 1993. During the rest of the 1990s, around 2,000 asylum seekers from Iraq were granted asylum each year. The number of family-related immigrants was a little larger. Immigration from Iraq then grew slowly but steadily from the end of the 1990s. The yearly number of immigrants from Iraq did not drop until after the US-led

invasion in 2003. In total, 77,640 Iraqi citizens were granted residence permit in Sweden between 1990 and 2005 (Swedish Migration Board 2012a and 2012b). As is shown in Figure 2 below, the drop in the curve in 2004 and 2005 following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was only temporary.




Figure 2: Immigration from Iraq 1990-2011 based on grounds for residence

Source: Statistics Sweden 2012b.

Between 2005 and 2006, immigration from Iraq almost quadrupled: it increased from 2,035 individuals in 2004 and 2,448 in 2005 to almost ten thousand people in 2006. The large inflow of asylum seekers from Iraq contributed to historically high levels of immigration to Sweden: in 2006, immigration to Sweden reach an all-time-high with 82,929 immigrants. Every tenth, or 9,456 individuals, originated from Iraq.

During this peak of immigration from Iraq, Iraq experienced the highest level of violence against civilians since the US-led invasion in 2003. Sectarian violence and the Allied forces' attempts to put down 'insurgents' claimed an ever-growing number of civilian victims. The number of civilian casualties peaked between May 2006 and September 2007. The Iraq Body Count is an often cited source on the numbers of civilian deaths in Iraq after the invasion in 2003⁴. Between May 2006 and September 2007, the Iraq Body Count registered an average of over 2,600 civilian casualties per month (see Figure 3 below).

⁴ According to *The Guardian*, "Iraq Body Count compiles the world's most comprehensive set of casualty figures for deaths in Iraq since the invasion in 2003" (*The Guardian*, December 31, 2010).




Figure 3: Civilian Casualties in Iraq from May 2003 through September 2010

Source: Iraq Body Count 2010

All in all, over two million people fled from Iraq between 2003 and 2007, making refugees from Iraq one of the largest refugee populations in the world (UNHCR 2008). The overwhelming majority of them were received in Syria and Jordan (Weiss Fagen 2007).

The fact that most of the refugees from Iraq only crossed the border into one of Iraq's neighbour countries is consistent with what refugees typically do. In a study of 600,000 refugee movements registered by the UNHCR between 1965 and 1995, Moore and Shellman conclude that neighbouring countries generally absorb over 90% of those who flee a given country (More and Shellman 2007, 813). Refugees leave countries with high levels of violence, and countries with lower levels of wealth. Research also shows that the level of democracy also has a negative impact on the number of people who choose to flee from a given country (Moore and Shellman 2007, 816 quoting Apodaca 1998, Moore and Shellman 2004a and Neumayer 2005). In 2006 and 2007, Iraq suffered not only from high levels of violence. The lack of insecurity severely affected the economy, and the democratic institutions that the Alliance had promised to build were fragile at best. In sum, factors relating to the level of violence, to the economic crisis and to the lack of functioning democratic institutions combined to make Iraqis one of the largest refugee population in the world.

There are several reasons why a relatively large share of those that sought refuge in Europe went to Sweden. Malmberg and Hedberg point out that in comparison with other European countries, Sweden had a relatively generous policy of granting residence permits to asylum seekers from Iraq. In 2007, the rate of approval of asylum applications filed by Iraqis was 93 percent (Swedish Migration Board 2008a, 42). This high rate of approval in itself contributed to attract asylum seekers to Sweden, it created what the Swedish Minister of Migration Tobias Billström in February 2008 called a “signal effect” (Hansen 2009, 4).

This relatively generous policy was combined with the existence of social networks between earlier immigrants from Iraq from the 1980 and 1990s, that is, a ‘tradition’ of moving to Sweden that had existed for a long time (Malmberg and Hedberg 2008, 39). I return to this issue in chapter 8 below.

In addition to the high levels of violence and insecurity in Iraq, an important reason why immigration to Sweden was at record levels in 2006 was a temporary law introduced in connection with a major reform of the asylum process. The reform replaced the heavily criticised administrative ‘Aliens Appeals Board’ (*Utlänningsnämnden*) with three regional migration courts and one ‘Migration Court of Appeal’ (*Migrationsöverdomstolen*). As part of the introduction of the new legislation, opposition parties in the Swedish parliament (supported by a coalition of grassroots movements, religious communities and labour unions, see Hansen 2009, 4) negotiated a transitional period in the form of a temporary law. The temporary law that was introduced at the end of 2005 allowed for generous reconsiderations of previous negative decisions on applications for asylum, particularly for families with small children. 31,000 applications for asylum were re-filed under the temporary law, resulting in a total of 17,000 positive decisions on asylum. The largest groups of applicants granted asylum came from Iraq, Serbia and Somalia (Swedish Migration Board 2007a, 23). One intention with the temporary law was to grant asylum to applicants from countries to which it was difficult or impossible to execute forced return. These countries included Iraq. 96 percent of the individuals from such countries were granted permanent or temporary residence under the temporary law (Migration Board 2007a, 23).

The numbers themselves stirred a lot of attention, which might have reinforced the image of Sweden as a particularly ‘generous’ country and thereby contributed to ‘attract’ more asylum seekers. In July 2007, BBC News quoted an Iraqi refugee in Sweden saying “Everyone wants to go to Sweden, it has always been good to Iraqis. They respect human rights here. I wanted my children to grow up in a safe country, that’s why we chose Sweden” (BBC News 2007-07-06). Hansen (2009) argues that Sweden’s reputation as a “moral superpower” built during the Cold War has not completely faded. Hansen cites a number of quotes from international media, where Sweden in

2007 were hailed as a safe haven for asylum seekers from Iraq. CBC/Radio Canada applauded ‘generous Sweden’, and wrote: “No country outside the Middle East has been as welcoming to the refugees of this war.” (CBC/Radio Canada 2007-09-14). Another quote is from Der Spiegel (2007-04-18): “Life is so good in Sweden that families are encouraging their relatives and friends to follow their example and move there.” (Hansen 2009, 3).

Statistics Sweden registered a new immigration all-time-high in 2008, with 101,200 immigrants to Sweden in that year alone. Of them, 76,240 were non-Nordic immigrants (Statistics Sweden 2009a, 10). Immigrants from Iraq continued to be the largest group of immigrants: 12,677 residence permits were granted to Iraqi citizens in 2008 (Statistics Sweden 2011a). From 2005 to 2007, the number of asylum seekers from Iraq grew dramatically (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: Asylum Seekers From Iraq 2004–2011

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Men	1,005	1,541	6,356	14,136	4,370	1,506	1,248	968
Women	451	789	2,595	4,423	1,713	791	729	665
Total	1,456	2,330	8,951	18,559	6,083	2,297	1,977	1633

Sources: Swedish Migration Board 2006a, 2007a, 2008a, 2009, 2010a, 2011a and 2012c.

Possibly responding to the very high numbers of asylum seekers from Iraq, the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal in February 2007 decided that the situation in Iraq would no longer be considered an “armed conflict”⁵. This decision severely limited the possibilities for asylum seekers from Iraq to be granted asylum in Sweden, and the number of asylum applicants from Iraq subsequently dropped sharply (see Figure 2 and Table 2 above). Another reason why the number of asylum seekers from Iraq to Sweden decreased in 2008 was the Sweden signed a readmission agreement with the Iraqi authorities. Ensuring protection against being forcibly returned is crucial in determining what country of destination refugees choose (Moore and Shellman 2007, 816).⁶ Swedish authorities also took measures on the ground in the transit countries of Syria and Jordan to stop the spreading of false visas and passports used for entering Sweden. These measures contributed to a dramatic decrease in asylum seekers from Iraq to Sweden.⁷ Numbers plummeted from 1,500 applications per months in 2007 to 300 applicants in December 2008. “The decrease in Iraqis coming to Sweden was the major asylum event in Europe that year” write Brekke and Aarset (Brekke and Aarset 2009, 43). It seems in part Iraqi asylum seekers instead choose to go to

⁵ Case number UN23-06, 26 February 2007.

⁶ Moore and Shellman measure this variable as countries that are *nonrefoulement* treaty signatories. Obviously, the Swedish government has argued that the agreement on acceptance of forced returnees from Sweden to Iraq is compatible with Sweden’s commitments to respect the principle of *nonrefoulement*.

⁷ The measures targeted asylum seekers from Iraq specifically. While the number of asylum seekers from Iraq decreased dramatically, the total number of asylum seekers to Sweden remained more or less the same. (Brekke and Aarset 2009, 43).

neighbouring Norway (Brekke and Aarset 2009, 43) and to The Netherlands (Jenissen et al. 2009, quoted by Brekke and Aarset 2009, 43), two countries in Europe that received an increasing number of asylum seekers from Iraq in 2008 at the same time as the total number of asylum seekers from Iraq to the EU decreased by almost 30 percent.

However, also in 2009 Sweden received almost ten percent of all Iraqi asylum applications lodged in the industrialised countries⁸. In 2009, three industrialised countries together received half of all asylum applicants from Iraq: Germany (6,300), Turkey (3,800) and Sweden (2,300) (UNHCR 2010).

The large number of asylum immigrants from Iraq in 2006 and 2007 was followed by a peak in immigration based on family reunification in the years 2007 and 2008. In the years 2006 and 2007, immigration from Iraq based on other grounds for residence also peaked. (See Table 3 and Figure 2).

Table 3: Immigration from Iraq to Sweden Based on Grounds for Residence 2004–2010

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Asylum	453	1,278	8,140	9,779	4,439	2,273	1,353
Family ties	2,449	1,573	2,528	4,019	7,821	6,460	3,035
Work	9	10	25	16	14	129	297
Other grounds	66	51	123	1,454	403	245	168
Total	2,977	2,912	10,816	15,268	12,677	9,107	4853

Source: Statistics Sweden 2011b. Includes immigrants in the civil registry only. Immigrants who did not have a registered address in Sweden at the time of the surveys are not included.

During the last decade, Iraq has been the most important country of origin for immigration to Sweden, both in terms of the stock of immigrants (measured as the number of residents born in Iraq) and in terms of inflow (measured in the number of new residence permits issues per year).

Iraq has also become an increasingly important source country for labour immigration to Sweden. When it comes to labour immigration from countries outside the EU/EES, Iraq is the sixth most important country of origin since the introduction of the new, liberal legislation on labour immigration in December 2008 (see Table 4 below).

⁸ The UNHCR records the number of asylum seekers in 44 industrialised countries. These 44 countries include the 27 Member States of the European Union, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey, as well as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America (UNHCR 2010, 3).

Table 4: Work permits granted 2009–2011

	Citizenship	2009	2010	2011	Sum 2009–2011
1	Thailand	6,173	3,520	2,842	12,535
2	India	2,011	1,853	2,292	6,156
3	China	1,073	1,518	1,180	3,771
4	Ukraine	1,083	551	572	2,206
5	Turkey	336	744	758	1,838
6	Iraq	156	363	556	1,075
7	Syria	117	369	570	1,056
8	USA	293	325	363	981
9	Bangladesh	133	412	415	960
10	Iran	161	292	497	950
11	Vietnam	244	469	166	879
12	Pakistan	149	211	492	852
13	Russia	225	269	336	830
14	Serbia	208	172	250	630
15	Egypt	53	141	306	50

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2011b, 2011c, 2012d.

2.3 What is Kurdistan?

It is difficult to gain an exact picture of immigration from Kurdistan to Sweden. Since there is no independent Kurdish state that could issue birth certificates or passports, and since Sweden does not keep records on ethnicity, there is no statistics on the immigration of Kurds. Approximations can be made from statistics on immigration from the geographical areas that are considered the Kurdish heartlands in south-eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, north-western Iran and northern Syria, but these can never be exact. There are important Kurdish minority communities outside of the ‘traditional’ Kurdish areas, not least in large cities like Istanbul, Damascus and Baghdad. Moreover, the Kurds have a long history of displacement from the Kurdish heartlands. Evictions and forced displacements have led to the formation of Kurdish diasporas in several Caucasian countries of the former Soviet Union, in Lebanon and in the north-eastern province of Khorasan in Iran. There has been immigration of Kurds to Europe and Sweden from most of these locations (Alakom 2007).

There is no generally agreed geographical definition of Kurdistan. Over the course of history, different areas have carried the name of Kurdistan. In the 10th to 12th century AC, ‘Kurdistan’ was a large province in the empire of the Seljuq Turks, in the Ottoman empire it was a province around the city of Diyarbakir, and today there is a province in northern Iran called Kurdistan (Karlsson 2008). Generally, the term Kurdistan is used when referring to the areas in the Middle East where Kurds are in majority (see Figure 4). Important Kurdish communities also live as minorities in large cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Bagdad and Damascus (Karlsson 2008).



Figure 4: Map of Kurdish Areas

Source: Izady 1992.

Arguably, the closest the Kurds have ever got to get their own state was in connection with the dismantling of the Ottoman empire after its defeat in the World War I (McDowall 2004). The history of how a window of opportunity was opened for a Kurdish state, and the reasons why it was closed again, is according to some telling for later failures to realise the dream of an independent Kurdistan. The difficulty to create a Kurdish state is also relevant for the situation of Kurds around the world today. Kurds remain a people without an independent country of their own, usually at the mercy of mighty powers and so often forced to move and migrate.

In the spring of 1919, the Allies of World War I nurtured real plans of dividing eastern Anatolia into an Armenian state and a Kurdish state (McDowall 2004, 124). For the first time in Kurdish history, major powers had concrete plans for creating a Kurdish state, not entirely self-governed or sovereign, but still a state. One year later, the idea of creating a Kurdish state was incorporated into the Treaty of Sèvres, a treaty on the partition of the Ottoman Empire signed in 1920 by the Allies of World War I⁹ (Encyclopædia Britannica 2007a). The Treaty of Sèvres granted independence to the Democratic Republic of Armenia and the Kingdom of Hejaz¹⁰, and a number of new states were created out of the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire: Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, Lebanon and an enlarged Syria. In a system of mandates upheld by the League of Nations, Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine were entrusted to Britain, and Syria and Lebanon were made the responsibility of France.

⁹ The signatories of the treaty were France, the Russian Empire, the British Empire and Italy. The United States did not sign. (Encyclopædia Britannica 2007).

¹⁰ The Kingdom of Hejaz was a state that shortly existed in the Hejaz region of the Arabian Peninsula. It was annexed by Nejd and merged into Saudi Arabia in 1932.

These countries were so-called Class A mandates. The Class A mandates were lands that were to be prepared for independence (Encyclopædia Britannica 2007b).

As for the Kurds, the Treaty of Sèvres called for the drafting of “a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas” for a geographically defined zone. Paragraph 62 of the Treaty of Sèvres defines the Kurdish areas that are to be under a “scheme of local autonomy” as areas “lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3)” (Treaty of Sèvres 1920, article 62). More importantly, Article 64 included an agreement with Turkey to grant the population of predominantly Kurdish areas listed in the Treaty independence “if the Council [of the League of Nations] then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them” (Treaty of Sèvres 1920, Article 64). The treaty also dealt with the Kurds in the province of Mosul, now under British mandate, who were given the right to join an eventual independent state. The treaty of Sèvres has remained an important milestone in Kurdish history, as it gave the Kurds international support and recognised Kurdish aspirations (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 27).

The military successes of the new Turkish regime under the leadership by Mustafa Kemal made it impossible to implement the Treaty of Sèvres. In what became known in Turkish history as the ‘Independence War’, Turkey won back the Aegean islands from Greece, and forced the allied back to the negotiation table. The treaty of Sèvres never entered into force but was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 (Encyclopædia Britannica 2007a). As I will discuss below, there was no major Kurdish movement fighting for an independent Kurdistan at this time. Instead, many Kurds fought alongside the troops of Mustafa Kemal or ‘Ataturk’, on the promise that the Kurds would be given autonomy once the war against the foreign invaders had been won. However, these promises to the Kurds were not honoured and the wounds of this Turkish betrayal are still open. (Baser 2012).

The Treaty of Lausanne did not include such an opportunity for independence for the Kurds as the Treaty of Sèvres had done. In fact, when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the Allied Powers had dropped their demands for autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan altogether. As for the Mosul province, the treaty formalises its inclusion in the British mandate of Iraq. The Treaty of Lausanne was to be the final treaty concluding World War I (Encyclopædia Britannica 2007). The Kurdish window of opportunity opened by the defeat of the Ottoman Empire had been closed.

The partition of the Ottoman Empire was based on ideas around state sovereignty dominant after World War I. A crucial expression of these ideas was the “Fourteen Points for World Peace” formulated by the US president Woodrow Wilson in 1918. The content of Wilson’s Fourteen Points were to become important for the formulation of the Covenant of the League of Nations (Dodge

2003). Wilson's Fourteen Points had a particular importance for the Kurdish people, since in his declaration, Wilson also dealt with the future of the Ottoman Empire. Point 12 reads:

The Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty; but other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development. (Quoted by McDowall 2004, 115)

President Wilson's 14 points were a source of inspiration to peoples in the colonies, as well as in Eastern and Central Europe (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 26). Karlsson argues, however, that the intention of the Treaty of Sèvres was not to implement Wilson's ideas on popular sovereignty, but merely to divide the territories of the Ottoman empire. In addition, Karlsson points out that even if the "scheme of local autonomy" promised by the Treaty of Sèvres had become reality, the geographic area specified in the treaty would have covered only a third of the predominantly Kurdish areas in the Middle East, and the most fertile lands would have been excluded. It was, writes Karlsson, as such "a provocation against both Turks and Kurds" (Karlsson 2008, 58).

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the creation of an autonomous Kurdistan foreseen in the Treaty of Sèvres never came into force, the 'Sèvres Syndrome' is something of a 'chosen trauma' of the Turkish nation (Özcelik 2006, quoted by Baser 2012, 63), a societal trauma that is essential for the collective identity of the Turks, not least in the diaspora.

The average Turk's perception of social-political diversity is still affected by the so-called 'Sèvres syndrome,' which refers to the dominant ways in which Turks interpret how they lost their empire and came to the brink of colonization in early twentieth century. These interpretations attribute the Ottoman meltdown to the unbridled spiralling of hostile minority nationalisms that foreign powers fostered and liberal Ottoman-Turkish elites endorsed. (Somer 2007, quoted by Baser 2012, 63)

Surely, geo-political interests lay behind the fact that the Allies abandoned the idea of a Kurdish state. Influential states, such as Britain, were more concerned with creating a relatively stable region, and secure borders around its main interests in Iraq, than granting independence to the Kurdish people (Dodge 2003). McDowall (2004) points out that for Britain "the question of Kurdistan was bound to remain secondary to a political settlement for the main territories of interest, greater Syria and Mesopotamia." (McDowall 2004, 117). It could be argued that the fate of Kurdistan was entirely decided by the wish of Britain to create a buffer zone along the northern

border of Mesopotamia against Turkey, and ensure a satisfactory protection of the newly created Armenian state to the north of this buffer zone (McDowall 2004, 119–125).

Lack of sustainable support from the mighty states that have had the power to draw borders and create states in the Middle East has haunted Kurdish history. But, there are also other, complementary, reasons for the non-existence of a Kurdish state.

According to the “Theory of the Three Elements” of Georg Jellinek, presented in his influential *Allgemeine Staatslehre* from the year 1900, a state rests upon the fulfilment of three criteria: there has to be a specified territory (*Staatsgebiet*), populated by a defined people (*Staatsvolk*) who are subject to the power of the state (*Staatsgewalt*)¹¹. These three elements are dependent of one another. A territory without people cannot be a state, just as a people without a territory cannot be a state. In addition, a state requires an institution or organisation that can efficiently govern the territory and its people. According to Jellinek, the last element (that of *Staatsgewalt*) is defined by its relation to the other two. It is crucial that the monopoly of violence can be upheld with certain efficiency. The power over the territory of the state and its people must be upheld over time and be more or less uncontested. It should not be too much questioned either by people within the state or by other states (Heintzen 2002). Kurdistan could not fulfil any of Jellinek’s three criteria at the time of the Treaty of Sèvres, and it is difficult to see how Kurdistan do so now.

The first of Jellinek’s three elements, *Staatsgebiet*, indicates that a state supposes a certain, defined territory. It does not matter how big or small this geographical area is (which the existence of the Vatican is an example of). But an association of people who are not tied to a piece of land, or a group of nomads, cannot constitute a state (Heintzen 2002). Jellinek writes that the state, (*Staatliche Verbandseinheit*) must be defined as a *Verbandseinheit sesshafter Menschen* or a unity of settled people (Jellinek 1914, 179). Here the problems start for the Kurdish people. Even though the first mentioning of a Kurdish people dates two thousand years back, as has been mentioned above, there has never been a Kurdish state with a defined territory, nor something like a united autonomous area covering something close to the territories that are claimed to be Kurdish. Even at the time of the Ottoman Empire, when the Kurdish areas all belonged to the same entity, there was no single ‘Kurdish province’ (McDowall 2004).

If there is not a state, how can it be determined if a group of people could form a *Staatsvolk*, the second of Jellinek’s three elements? A common language would be one important criterion. The fact

11 Still in 1973, the German Foreign Ministry made explicit reference to the “Drei-Elementen-Lehre” and the theories of Georg Jellinek in the following declaration on criteria guiding the recognition of new states (quoted by Loudwin 1983, 45): “Die Anerkennung eines neuen Staates setzt voraus, dass sich ein Staat gebildet hat mit einem *Staatsvolk*, ein *Staatsgebiet* und einer *Staatsgewalt*, die durch eine effektive handlungsfähige Regierung verkörpert wird, die ihre Hoheitsgewalt über den größten Teil des Territoriums und die Mehrzahl der Einwohner effektiv ausübt und die sich mit Aufsicht auf Dauer behaupten kann.” (my italics).

that there are so many different Kurdish ‘dialects’ which are not mutually intelligible (see page 36) has led some linguists to argue that there are several different Kurdish languages rather than merely different dialects. This “implicitly cast doubt on the unity of the Kurdish people” (McDowall 2004, 3). In addition, Kurdish is written in three different scripts: Latin in Turkey, Cyrillic in the former Soviet Union and Persian in Iraq and Iran. Kurdish literature is also very recent phenomena. According to McDowall, the first texts in Kurdish languages were not published until in the 1920s. Until recently, due to the political oppression of Kurds in Turkey, the largest publication of literature in Kurmanji (the northern Kurdish language spoken mainly in Turkish areas of Kurdistan) happened in the former Soviet Union, a country where members of the Kurdish diaspora could enjoy relative cultural freedom during the 20th century (Lindberg 2007). From the 1970s onwards, a large number of titles in Kurdish was published in Sweden. In the mid-1990s, Nedim Dagdeviren, one of the founders of the Kurdish Library in Stockholm, claimed that Sweden was at the time the country where most books in Kurdish were published, and with around 70 members, the Swedish Writers’ Union (*Författarförbundet*) the largest Kurdish writers’ union in the world (*Svenska Dagbladet*, 5 March, 1996). The Kurdish Library in Stockholm prides itself of being the first public Kurdish library in the world (Kurdish Library in Stockholm 2012).

The third of Jellinek’s elements is *Staatsgewalt*. The state monopoly of violence consists of two parts: *Gebietshoheit* means that the state has power over all people within the borders of the state, and *Personalhoheit* means that the state has power over people who belong to the state as citizens or legal residents (Heintzen 2002).

Sassen (2006) defines the building blocks of a modern state as *territory*, *authority* and *rights*. In her book “Territory, Authority, Rights” (2006), Sassen identifies these three elements in the state-like entities that emerged during the Middle Ages. A defined *territory* is, as Jellinek pointed out in 1900, an indispensable prerequisite of a state. This territory has to be governed by an *authority*: be it a king, an emperor, a religious leader or a president. In addition to a territory and an authority, Sassen argue that a state needs a people that identifies with the state in that they expect the state to uphold or protect a certain number of *rights*.

Crucial capabilities for the formation of a modern state are thus, according to Sassen (2006), a centralised bureaucracy, an abstract form of authority, and a citizenry. The centralised bureaucracy is needed to collect revenue (taxes) to finance the state. The acceptance of an abstract form of authority is crucial for people to become tied to more than their family, clan or tribe: to the state or the nation and its ruler(s). Finally, a citizenry is necessary if a constitutional form of government is to be developed. Only a citizenry can demand and develop civil liberties, the very fundamentals of a secular, constitutional government.

According to Sassen, the concept of a state territory was preceded by the concept of *patria* or fatherland. That is, that people started to identify with a certain territory as their homeland (Sassen 2006, 20). Before the emergence of the modern state, Heintzen points out (Heintzen 2002, 4) people identified more with certain people (their clan, tribe, etc.) than with a specific territory. Today, some argue that Kurdish people identify more with kinship networks than with a geographical Kurdish homeland (cf. Karlsson 2008). Indeed, the term ‘Kurds’ was historically identical not with people inhabiting a particular area, but with ‘nomads’ (McDowall 2004, 12).

Sassen argues that the idea that an *authority* (be it a king, an emperor, a religious leader or a secular state), should rule over a certain piece of land developed during the Middle Ages. Sassen describes how—paradoxically—it was the popular acceptance of the idea that the French king had a divine authority (and not an authority derived from the Pope in Rome) that paved the way for the French revolution and the resulting secular state. (Sassen 2006, chapter 3). In Kurdish history, there has not been a single, unified leader who has been able to claim or uphold authority over all Kurds (Karlsson 2008). Instead, the Kurdish areas have been ruled by a patchwork of tribal leaders, whose areas of control and mutual relationship have fluctuated with time. In the decisive months following the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, the lack of a Kurdish leadership was a “fatal fact” (McDowall 2004, 189). In 1922, writes McDowall, “there was no credible Kurdish nation leadership with which the Ankara could negotiate even if it was so inclined” (McDowall 2004, 189). There were some self-proclaimed leaders, but they seldom had control over more than a restricted area; over their own clan but not over neighbouring clans. For a power wishing to create some kind of controlled self-government, the shifting loyalties of the Kurdish leaders was an obstacle (McDowall 2004, 123). The general insecurity that dominated the years following the fall of the Ottoman Empire contributed to the unpredictability of the Kurdish leaders. As McDowall describes it, in 1919 there were “three stands of political thinking among the Kurds: pro-Turkish, pro-Allies and finally, among the Dersim Kurds, a desire for complete independence from all outside interference”. To further complicate things, the same tribe or leader could hold several positions at a time: “Many Kurds, perplexed by the uncertainties involved, did not wish to commit themselves irretrievably to one course of action.” (McDowall 2004, 125).

Sassen devotes particular attention to the development of cities during the Middle Ages. Most cities at the time did not have armies of their own. Still, they were able to uphold a certain independence towards surrounding landlords and governing kings, as well as towards the Church. The cities negotiated rights towards other centres of power, and the inhabitants of the cities developed a system of citizen rights in relationship with one another. This system of rights,

according to Sassen, was a fundamental building block in the construction of the modern state (Sassen 2006, Chapter 3).

There are several large cities in Kurdistan. Cities like Diyarbakir (in present-day Turkey) and Erbil (in northern Iraq) are some of the oldest cities of the world. According to McDowall, it was indeed in the cities that Kurdish nationalism first developed. Paradoxically, some of the earliest Kurdish nationalist groups were established in the Ottoman capital itself: in the form of Kurdish clubs and societies in Istanbul (McDowall 2004, 93). Other nationalist associations were formed in Diyarbakir, and in Suleymani¹² in today's Iraq.

In a tribal society, it is the tribe or the clan that upholds the right of the individual. In a modern society, rights are being ensured by the institutions of the state. The Kurdish areas of Iraq were under British control from 1920 until the British mandate ended with the independence of Iraq in 1932.¹³ It can be argued that British rule reinforced the tribal aspects of organisation of Kurdish society. According to Dodge (2003), the British thought of Iraqi society as deeply split between the rural and the urban. And the British decided to side with the rurals:

For the British, the urban centres of Iraq were made up of *effendis*¹⁴, remnants of the Ottoman Empire, who were tainted by training and working with corrupt institutions. Juxtaposed against the contaminated cities was the Arab countryside. Here the 'true' Iraqis lived, unscathed by Ottoman influence and in need of protection from the grasping effendis. (Dodge 2003, 43–44).

Tribal leaders played a particularly important role for British policy in the Kurdish areas. Dodge quotes a report on Kirkuk written in 1919: "Political freedom cannot be attained except through a community. We must therefore look for some simple form of responsible community on which to base our system. The simplest form of community in the purely Kurdish area is the tribe" (Dodge 2003, 75). Romanticism about the balancing role played by feudal landlords in containing monarchist absolutism in the history of Great Britain also played a role in British attitudes towards rural, tribal chiefs in Iraq (Dodge 2003, 46 ff). The British devoted a great deal of time and effort at the construction of tribal lists. However, British attempts to build a stable government in Iraq by supporting "natural leaders" on the Iraqi countryside failed. According to Dodge, "the homogenous

12 There are many ways of spelling the name of the city and governorate of Suleymani. I have used the spelling that I most often have encountered. On the English version of the official site of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the name is spelled 'Suleimaniah', while the official site of the Iraqi government suggests the transcription into English should read 'As Sulaymaniyah'. The World Bank uses the spelling "Sulaimaniya" in its Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey.

13 Britain reoccupied Iraq during World War II (1939–1945).

14 *Effendi* is a derogatory term used for Ottoman officials (Dodge 2003, 43).

category of ‘tribe’ was violently superimposed over British ignorance and a complex and ambiguous social, political, religious and cultural reality” (Dodge 2003, 75).

In his *Allgemeine Staatslehre* Jellinek again and again argues against the idea that a state is something natural, something created by nature beyond the influence of human people. Instead, he defends the view that every state is a result of human efforts, just as is the case with other social institutions. Out of this idea, that states are created by human beings and their actions, springs the conclusion that states can also be re-created. States can, and must be put into question by every new generation: “*Wie immer die Institutionen entstanden sein mögen, sie müssen sich, um fortzubestehen, vor dem Bewußtsein einer jeden Generation als vernünftig rechtfertigen können.*” (Jellinek 1914, 184). The non-existence of a Kurdish state is not the work of nature, nor is the Kurdish people forever doomed to be state-less.

Karlsson (2008) provoked many Kurds in Sweden when he entitled his book *Kurdistan: landet som icke är* or “Kurdistan: The Country That Is Not” (Can 2008). By focusing on the non-existence of a Kurdish state, Karlsson was criticised for overseeing the strong sense of community and belonging that exists among Kurds, not least in the diaspora. Demirbag Sten, a well-known Swedish-Kurdish writer and journalist criticised Karlsson for being ignorant of Kurdish history and unwilling to credit Kurds with any attributes of statehood. “He dismisses everything that might make Kurds appear as a people with a right to lay claim on anything” (Demirbag Sten in *Expressen* 2008-08-13). A crucial part of Demirbag Sten’s critique of Karlsson’s book is that it deprives the Kurds of their vision of an independent country. “Many Kurds long for a Kurdistan where they do not have to live subdued under the supremacy of another country. An idea that to a large extent has been transmitted orally from generation to generation, and that has helped millions of Kurds to survive brutalities, persecution and mass murder. Karlsson’s book is in many ways a negation of this vision”, writes Demirbag Sten (in *Expressen* 2008-08-13). Demirbag Sten received support by some Kurdish personalities (for instance from Gulan Avci, a Kurdish member of the Swedish parliament¹⁵) but a number of Kurds instead defended Karlsson (like the journalist and writer Mustafa Can in *Dagens Nyheter*, 30 August, 2008).

Alinia (2004) describes the sense of belonging to a Kurdish community as a resource that Kurds in the diaspora can mobilise to endure the exclusion and feeling of otherness that living in exile entails. This sense of belonging, this ‘home’, Alinia argues, is not tied to a specific piece of geographical territory. Among her Kurdish respondents, Alinia did not find “any given homeland to which they all relate and with which they all identify” (Alinia 2004, V). Nevertheless, she did find

15 See for instance Avci’s blog entry on 2008-08-14 retrieved from <http://gulanavci.blogspot.com/2008/08/ingmar-karlssons-senaste-bok-om.html> on January 1st, 2012.

this strong sense of belonging to a community. In this sense, the community of Kurds might not be less strong than communities of people that share a common state of origin.

In their book entitled “The dream of Kurdistan” (*Drömmen om Kurdistan*) Emanuelsson and Salih set out to show that “the story of Kurdistan is not about ‘the country that is not’, nor that Kurdistan is always ‘in the shadow of history’ or that the Kurds are ‘a people without a land’.” Emanuelsson and Salih argue that while the dream of a free, independent Kurdistan is real, it should not be confused with a concrete political program.

Most Kurds imagine or dream about a free and unified Kurdistan. At the same time, many would agree that there is a decisive difference between dream and reality. The dream does not have to be a realistic political goal that shall be realised within a life time. (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 12–13)

The Treaty of Sèvres never entered into force, but it has remained an important inspiration to Kurdish aspirations over the century. From 1992, three Iraqi governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymani have been under Kurdish control. Emanuelsson and Salih describe how the two major parties in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, KDP and PUK, sought legitimacy from the Treaty of Sèvres in their efforts to construct a legitimate administrative platform for the governance of the three governorates. A major first step was the organisation of general elections in these governorates in May 1992. (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 128).

2.4 Tracing the Immigration of Kurds to Sweden

Immigration from Kurdistan to Sweden began in the 1960s and was part of a larger migratory movement of Kurds from Kurdistan to Europe that started with a small migration of students in the 1950s followed by larger numbers of labour immigrants in the 1960s (Alakom 2007). Many of the ‘Turkish’ labour immigrants that arrived in countries like Germany and Sweden in the 1960s were in fact Kurds. In the 1970s and 1980s, with increasing persecution of Kurds in both Turkey (under military regime from 1980) and in Iraq (under the regime of the Ba’ath party from 1968) an increasing number of Kurdish asylum seekers sought refuge in Europe. Asylum immigration was followed by family immigration in the 1980s and 1990s (Amman 2005).

This immigration has resulted in a large Kurdish community in Europe. It is, however, notoriously difficult to determine the exact number of Kurds. This is true for the number of Kurds in the countries with large Kurdish minorities in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria as well as for the size of the diaspora population. As Kurdish scholar Michael Gunter points out “most Kurds tend to exaggerate their number, although the states in which they live undercount them for political

reasons.” (Gunter 2004, 198). Generally, the number of Kurds in the Middle East is estimated to be between 25 and 30 million. This large number makes them one of the world’s largest “stateless nations” (Council of Europe 2006).

A fundamental problem is that the definition of ‘Kurds’ is not straightforward. Since there is no Kurdish state, and subsequently no Kurdish citizenship, being ‘Kurd’ can mean many different things. Most Kurds are Muslims, but Kurds share the Muslim religion with most of their Arab neighbours, and religion has not been a unifying force among Kurds (Alinia 2004, 42). Instead, Kurds are often defined on the basis of speaking a Kurdish language. Contrary to Turkish (a Turkic language) and Arabic (a Semitic language), the Kurdish language belongs to the Indo-European languages. The language of the Kurds is therefore distinctly different from the languages spoken by the Kurds’ Arab and Turk neighbours in the Middle East. Kurdish is part of the family of new Iranian languages, and is close to Persian (Sheyholislami 2009). However, to use the Kurdish language as a definition of the Kurds is problematic. Because of the repression of the Kurdish language in Turkey, for instance, there are individuals and communities that do not (or no longer) speak Kurdish, but who still consider themselves Kurds. At the foundation of the Turkish republic 1923, the use of the Kurdish language was forbidden altogether. It was allowed again in the 1960s, but after the military coup in 1980 a new ban on the Kurdish language was imposed. The Turkish military regime also forbid the use of the Kurdish letters that are not part of the Turkish alphabet (like q, x and w) (Karlsson 2008, 12). Østergaard-Nielsen has described how many labour immigrants from Turkey discovered their “Kurdishness” in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). There are also minorities in Turkey who speak Kurdish that do not consider themselves Kurds (Karlsson 2008).

The Institut kurde de Paris estimates that the total number of Kurds in Europe is 1.2 million, divided as follows (Table 5):

Table 5: Estimations of the number of Kurds in Europe

Country	Institute Kurde de Paris	NAVEND	Council of Europe*
Germany	600,000–650,000	700,000–800,000	700,000–800,000
France	130,000–150,000	100,000–120,000	120,000–150,000
The Netherlands	80,000–90,000	70,000–80,000	70,000–80,000
Switzerland	70,000–80,000	60,000–70,000	60,000–70,000
Belgium	50,000–60,000	50,000–60,000	10,000–15,000
Austria	60,000–70,000	50,000–60,000	50,000–60,000
Sweden	40,000–50,000	25,000–30,000	80,000–100,000
UK	30,000–40,000	20,000–25,000	80,000–100,000
Greece	20,000–25,000	20,000–25,000	20,000–25,000
Denmark	15,000–10,000	8,000–10,000	8,000–10,000
Norway	4,000–20,000	4,000–5,000	4,000–5,000
Italy	8,000–10,000	3,000–4,000	3,000–4,000
Finland	4,000–6,000	2,000–3,000	2,000–3,000

Sources: Institut kurde de Paris 2011, NAVEND 2011 and *)Russell-Johnston 2006.

However, the Institut Kurde de Paris cite figures from 1995. These numbers consequently do not contain the possibly very large numbers of Kurds that have come to Europe as asylum seekers from Syria, Iran and not least Iraq during the last more than fifteen years. Still, in 2002, the German Kurdish study centre NAVEND estimated the number of Kurds in Europe at 1.1 to 1.3 million people. (See Table 5 above).

A more recent estimation of the number of Kurds in Europe was published in a report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2006 (Russell-Johnston 2006, point 109). The rapporteur, Lord Russel-Johnston of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, notes that there is no “precise and reliable census”, but that “the most widely accepted estimates” would be that there are 1,3 million Kurds in Western Europe (again, see Table 5).

As has already been mentioned, Swedish authorities do not register residents according to their ethnicity. Kurds in Sweden are therefore registered according to their country of origin. The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden (*Kurdiska Riksförbundet*) claims that some fifty-to sixty thousand Kurds live in Sweden (*Federasyona Komleyn Kurdistanê Li Swêdê* 2011). Khalid

Khayati who has written a PhD thesis on the Kurdish communities in Sweden and France estimates the number of Kurds in Sweden at 55,000 (Khayati 2005). In 2005, Emanuelsson estimated that there are around 19,000 Kurds in Sweden from Iraq (Emanuelsson 2005, 83). Later, Emanuelsson (2007) has made an estimation of the number of Kurds from Iraq in Sweden based on the registered city of birth of immigrants from Iraq. The Kurdish population of Iraq is concentrated to the three northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymani, but there are also a number of villages and smaller towns outside of the area now under control of the Kurdistan Regional Government that are predominantly Kurdish. The largest 'Kurdish' town outside of the KRG area is Kirkuk with approximately 800,000 inhabitants (Anderson and Stansfield 2009). Emanuelsson (2007) acknowledges that there are estimations that put the total number of Kurds in Sweden at 25,000 (see the numbers from NAVEND in table 5 above, for instance). Such a low number, according to Emanuelsson "seems like a gross underestimation of the entire Kurdish population in Sweden" (Emanuelsson 2007, 262).¹⁶ In a book published in 2012, Emanuelsson and Salih estimate that there are around 70,000 Kurds in Sweden (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 21).

For her thesis entitled "Health, Migration and Quality of Life among Kurdish Men in Sweden", Taloyan (2008) used a list of individuals who had identified themselves as Kurds in the Swedish National Survey of Immigrants (INV-ULF) conducted by Statistics Sweden in 1996. However, INV-ULF was conducted only among individuals born in Chile, Poland, Iran and Turkey. Since many Kurds in Sweden originate from Iraq and Syria, it is not possible to use INV-ULF as an estimation of the total size of the Kurdish population in Sweden.

There is no official statistics on languages spoken in Sweden. Sweden has been criticised for not collecting data on linguistic identity by the Council of Europe (Vallius 2005, quoted by Parkvall 2009, 9). Parkvall (2009) argues that, given the absence of official statistics, the best way of estimating the number of speakers of a particular language in Sweden is to make a calculation based on the number of immigrants from the country or countries where the language is spoken, and combine this number with the number of school children that receive teaching in that language as their mother tongue. In Swedish compulsory school (the first nine years) pupils who speak another language than Swedish at home have the right to receive education in their mother tongue. This policy is based on the conviction that "the development of the mother tongue constitutes the base for the general language development and is a precondition for learning Swedish" (Swedish National Agency for Education 2010). In the school year 2007/08 more than 3,000 pupils received education in two of the Kurdish languages, making Kurdish the fifth largest mother tongue to be

¹⁶ Similar calculations of the number of Kurds in Sweden based on their cities and regions of birth in Turkey, Syria or Iran could possibly be made. However, to my knowledge, no such estimations have been made to date.

taught in Swedish schools (Swedish National Agency for Education 2009, 44). With this method, Parkvall estimates that there are approximately 66,000 people who speak Kurdish in Sweden, with the largest number of speakers in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Uppsala (Parkvall 2009, 91). With 66,000 speakers, Kurdish would be the fifth largest language in Sweden after Swedish, Finnish, Serbo-Croatian and Arabic (Parkvall 2009, 160).

The first Kurdish immigrants to Sweden were students who arrived in the 1950s, followed by labour immigrants predominantly from the Turkish parts of Kurdistan in the 1960s (Alakom 2005). The first Kurd to claim political asylum in Sweden was Jamal Alemdar who was born in Erbil in northern Iraq but who fled from Turkey where he had been a political activist while studying in Istanbul. Jamal Alemdar was granted political asylum in Sweden in 1965 (Alakom 2005, 48). As we have seen above, he was followed by larger numbers of political refugees from the Kurdish region in Iraq from 1975 and onwards. The first major group of immigrants from Iraq consisted of Kurdish political refugees who sought asylum in Sweden towards the end of the 1980s (Emanuelsson 2008). The Kurdish immigration from Iraq to Sweden started a little later than immigration of Kurds from Turkey. Kurds from Turkey dominated the Kurdish population in Sweden at least until the second wave of asylum seekers from Iraq arrived at the beginning of the 1990s.

2.5 Immigration from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq

In this section, I turn to look at the immigration of Kurds from Iraq. That is, I attempt to establish the Kurdish ‘factor’ in immigration from Iraq to Sweden. Kurds in Iraq are fairly concentrated to three governorates in northern Iraq. I have already described how the window of opportunity opened by the Treaty of Sèvres of a Kurdish state in the predominantly Kurdish areas “east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia (...), and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia” was closed. This Kurdish state would have been almost entirely located within the borders of present Turkey. However, in the aftermath of World War I, at least theoretically there could have been a Kurdish entity created within what was to become the British Mandate of Iraq. The very constitution of Ottoman Iraq itself provided an opening for this. When the Ottoman Empire incorporated what was to become present-day Iraq, it divided the “land between the rivers” (the original meaning of al-‘Iraq) into three provinces centred around the cities of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra respectively (Tripp 2002, 8). The Kurdish-speaking population was concentrated to one of these three provinces: the province of Mosul (Tripp 2002, 10).

In his book from 2003 “Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied” British political scientist Toby Dodge describes how British attempts to build a state in Iraq failed. Facing a very negative domestic public opinion, the financially strained British government was so

eager to get rid of their costly responsibility for Iraq that they, according to Dodge, decided to build a 'quasi-state'. That is, a state "which bore appearance of a *de jure* national polity but whose institutions were in fact a façade built in order to allow Britain to disengage" (Dodge 2003, 10). The Kurdish people in Iraq met the same fate as the Iraqi population as a whole: Britain's promises and commitments on state building in the former Ottoman Empire faded away with the withering finances of the Crown.

With formal British disengagement from Iraq in 1932, and the declaration of Iraqi independence, the Kurdish—theoretical—chance at an independent state was gone. And the Iraqi nation was fragile. The situation of the Kurdish population was just as unstable and unpredictable as the changing regimes in Baghdad. During the decades after World War II, regime after regime was ousted from power in Iraq in military coups: in 1958 the monarchy was overthrown, in 1963 first the government of Prime Minister Qasim was ousted, then the succeeding Baath-party was ousted as well. In 1968, the Baath party came back to power through yet another coup. It is not until 1979 and Saddam Hussein's accession to the presidency of Iraq that the power in Baghdad assumes some 'stability'. For the Kurds, however, the first decade under Saddam Hussein's rule would be the bloodiest in their history.

Under Baathist rule, any political activist belonging to the wrong side of the shifting alliances of the government in Baghdad risked violent persecution. A small number of Kurdish refugees fled from Iraq to Sweden in the 1970s. They fled from a brutal and violent regime. In the 1980s, however, the persecution of Kurds reached new, horrific levels. In 1987, the Iraqi military launched the Anfal campaign that would lead to the killing of 182,000 Kurds, and that, according to Human Rights Watch, amounted to genocide directed against the Kurds in Iraq (Human Rights Watch 1993, 2006¹⁷). In March 1987, Saddam Hussein's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, who later earned the infamous nick-name 'Chemical-Ali', was given 'special authorities'. That is, he was given the right to use the army as well as the security forces to strike against the Kurds. In June, Saddam Hussein's regime took the drastic decision to ban all human presence from areas controlled by Kurdish *peshmerga*. These areas included most of the countryside in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The idea was to cut off the *peshmerga* from all kinds of support from the civil population (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 110–111).

Human Rights Watch (2006) describes the Anfal campaign as the culmination of a long-term strategy of the Baathist regime to subdue the Kurds. It entailed forcing hundreds of thousands of Kurds to leave their homes for the "Kurdish Autonomous Region" that was created in 1974. The

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch bases its report from 1993 on interviews with survivors conducted in 1992 and 1993, forensic examinations of mass graves and Iraqi official documents from captured intelligence archives (Human Rights Watch 1993).

areas that the Kurds had to leave, such as the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, where then ‘Arabised’.

‘Arabisation’ was a systematic policy of encouraging non-Kurds to move into houses and areas that the Kurds had been forced to leave. Poor Arab families from southern Iraq were offered financial compensation for moving to Kurdish areas. In the beginning of the 1980s, the government began to seal off areas within the Kurdish Autonomous Region. These areas, that in the end stretched over most of the rural parts of the three northern governorates, were declared ‘off-limits’ and put under economic blockade. In 1987, the repression escalated with shelling and bombing of thousands of villages, and with systematic slaughtering of everyone who remained in the areas.

Human Rights Watch notes that very little was known about the extent of the massacres at the time they occurred. Human Rights Watch argues that it was only because they happened close to international borders that two of the most gruesome events became known: the gas attack on the city of Halabja in March 1988 (close to the Iranian border) and the mass exodus of between 65,000 to 80,000 Kurds from the mountains of the Badinan area in Iraq (close to the border with Turkey) at the end of August 1988. The Anfal campaign ended in September 1988, but Kurds were forbidden to return to the prohibited zones. This was fatal for the food production in the entire Kurdish region, and seriously harmed the local economy (Human Rights Watch 1993 and 2006).

The Anfal campaign was carried out in the shadows of the war between Iran and Iraq, and in the context of US attempts to win over Iraq from the Soviet block and to contain Islamist Iran. Despite the fact that the Anfal campaign was carried out in a systematic way, and that each step was meticulously documented by the bureaucrats of the Baath regime (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 120, Human Rights Watch 2006), it did not receive much international attention, and there were no international attempts to intervene in order to protect the Kurdish civilians. Emanuelsson and Salih sum up: “Besides some limited media reports in some countries, the Iraqi Kurds have to suffer in silence. The silence is deafening regardless if they are attacked with chemical weapons, are summoned in Iraqi prisons under horrific circumstances, are killed by death squads in southern Iraq or end up in refugee camps in the neighbouring countries.” (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 115–116).

The Kurdish refugees who arrived from Iraq to Sweden in the 1980s was a relatively small group. They consisted of relatively well educated young men who were politically active (Emanuelsson 2008, 6). Their possibilities to uphold transnational contacts were severely limited by the fact that until 1991, it was very difficult for political refugees to travel to Iraq, including to the northern Kurdistan province. Kurdish refugees from Iraq in Sweden could seldom visit their families and relatives in Iraq during these years, since they feared that the regime would persecute family members of exiled political opponents (Emanuelsson 2007, 262).

In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The invasion was condemned by the international community, and a massive US-led military campaign defeated Iraq and liberated Kuwait in what has become known as the Gulf War. Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait in February 1991. After the humiliating defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, Kurds in the north as well as Shia groups in the south of Iraq saw an opportunity to oust Saddam Hussein's regime. Encouraged by the president of the United States (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 123), they attempted an armed uprising. During the uprising, the peshmerga managed to take control over the large cities in Kurdistan. Tons of documents with details on the Anfal campaign fell into the hands of Kurds when they attacked the local offices of the Iraqi security forces. The liberty lasted only some twenty days, but it was enough for the entire Kurdish population to learn about the atrocities of the Anfal campaign, and about the continuously horrendous situation on the countryside and in the prisons (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 124). When the regime brutally cracked down on the uprising, an unprecedented and massive number of civilian Kurds fled towards the Turkish and Iranian borders. According to the UNHCR, it was one of the largest and fastest refugee movement in modern times, and the Pope speaks about "an exodus of Biblical proportions" (quoted by Emanuelsson and Sali 2012, 125). Turkey closed its border with Iraq, which forced hundreds of thousands of the estimated 1.5 million refugees to seek shelter in the mountains (BBC 2011-10-26). In order to make it possible for the refugees to return, France, the UK and the US installed a "safe haven" over the Kurdish areas in April 1991.¹⁸

The safe haven expanded the space for transnational practices dramatically. Even though it was still time consuming and expensive to travel to the Kurdish areas in Iraq, Emanuelsson writes, "there was always someone within the network in Europe who knew someone who would travel" (Emanuelsson 2007, 265), and who could bring letters and financial support to families and relatives in the Kurdish region. Many Kurdish refugees could now return for the first time. Some returned to take up functions with the *de facto* autonomous Kurdish authorities that were set up in the safe haven.¹⁹ Some returned to get married, and brought their Kurdish wives to Europe. The transnational practice by exiles to marry a woman seem to have been widespread also among Kurdish men in Sweden (Emanuelsson 2007, 263).

Emanuelsson (2007) writes that for many, the dream of permanent return to Kurdistan was shattered towards the end of the 1990s when increasing levels of violence in the Kurdish areas forced many to flee again. In 1994, hostilities between the two main political parties of the areas

¹⁸ In August 1992, Shia populations in the south of Iraq received similar international protection when a 'no-fly zone' was set up south of a line following latitude 32 degrees north.

¹⁹ Over the years, returnees from Sweden have played an important role in KRG politics. In 2010, three ministers of the Kurdistan Regional Government were Swedish citizens: the minister of interior, the minister for the municipalities and the communication minister. In a previous government, a total of six ministers were Swedish citizens (Key informant interview in Erbil 2010-05-25).

under Kurdish control in northern Iraq, PUK and KDP, spiralled into civil war. The civil war lasted until 1998 when Jalal Talabani of the PUK and Masoud Barzani of the KDP signed a peace agreement in Washington.

In many respects, the year 1998 is a turning point for the Kurdish region of Iraq. After several years of civil war like fighting between the main Kurdish rival political parties the KDP and the PUK had finally resolved to share the power over the Kurdistan region. Also in 1998, the oil-for-food programme of the UN began to function, granting the Kurdistan Regional Government control over 13 percent of Iraq's oil revenues. With money coming in, the two Kurdish parties could start to compete with each other with infrastructure projects, schools and hospitals instead of arms. When Saddam Hussein's regime fell in April 2003, a new era for the Kurdish people began. It was full of uncertainties, but the Kurds entered the negotiations about a new post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi constitution from a position of strength. They have been in control in the three governorates for 11 years, they had established institutions: a parliament, a judiciary system, laws, military forces. (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012).

The conditions for visits improved after the end of outright fighting between the two parties in 1998, but the difficult economic situation meant that very few Kurds in exile risked attempting to return. The number of emigrants from Sweden to Iraq did not start to grow until after the ousting of the Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. The number of emigrants from Sweden to Iraq doubled from 124 to 244 between 2003 and 2004 (Statistics Sweden 2011c, see table 16 on page 141).

As we have seen above, immigration from Sweden to Iraq peaked a first time in connection with the refugee crisis after the crackdown on the uprising after the Gulf War. It is likely that a majority of the around three thousand people from Iraq that were granted asylum in Sweden in 1992 and 1993 were Kurds. Also the following asylum immigration from Iraq in the 1990s (around two thousand people per year, see above) probably mainly consisted of Kurds. Not all of them were Kurds, however. Some of the refugees that fled from Iraq at this time were Christian Iraqi: Assyrians/Syrians²⁰. Together with other religious minorities such as Yezidi Kurds, the Christian minorities in the Kurdish governorates were also victims of persecution, discrimination and 'Arabisation' under Saddam Hussein's regime (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 119). Many of the Assyrian/Syrians settled in Södertälje, a city that has hosted several Syrian churches since the 1970s and is perceived by many Assyrians and Syrians as their international 'capital' (Röshammar 2009).

20 The name of this group is highly contentious. Even though Assyrians and Syrians generally agree they belong to the same ethnic group, some prefer to call themselves Assyrians, and other Syrians. According to Oscar Pripp, interviewed in *Fokus* 2009-06-12 (Röshammar 2009), a social anthropologist who wrote his dissertation about Assyrian/Syrian entrepreneurs in Södertälje, choosing the term 'Assyrian' reflects a "ethno-nationalistic" identity based on a vision of an Assyrian national state built on the Assyrian empire that once existed in ancient Mesopotamia. Syrians, on the other hand, build their identity on religion and their belonging to Syrian churches. The terms Chaldeans and Syriacs is also used for the group.

It is estimated that there are up to thirty to forty thousand Assyrians/Syrians in Sweden, of whom some 18,000 live in Södertälje (Rabo 2007, 206–207).

The second peak of Iraqi immigration to Sweden occurred in 2006 and 2007. As has been described above, immigration from Iraq almost quadrupled from 2005 to 2006, and increased with another 50 percent between 2006 and 2007. It is not certain how many of the individuals from Iraq who were granted asylum in Sweden during these years that were Kurds, but it is likely that they constituted a small share. I have made an attempt to calculate the share of Kurds in recent immigration from Iraq based on registered place of birth (see section *Tracing the Immigration of Kurds to Sweden* on page 26 above).

During the decade between 2000 and 2010, immigration from Iraq has been far larger than immigration from other countries housing Kurdish populations in the Middle East, like Iran, Syria and Turkey. As has been mentioned above, it is not possible to establish exactly how many of the immigrants from these countries that are actually Kurds. Still, it is likely that the large immigration from Iraq is changing the composition of the Kurdish population in Sweden. With a lot of new immigration, the share of newcomers in the community grows. As we have seen above, newcomers are more dependent on social subsidies and have lower levels of employment than immigrants that have spent more time in the host country (for a detailed analysis of the integration of the Iraqi cohort that arrived in Sweden between 1990 and 1995, see Hedberg and Malmberg 2010, quoted above). Newcomers are also generally younger. Newly arrived immigrants are also more likely to have small children. One reason for this is again that migrants tend to be young. Another reason is that many migrants postpone child bearing until after migration has taken place (Hedberg and Malmberg 2010, 46). The share of families with small children is particularly high among Iraqi immigrants to Sweden. In 2008, immigrants from Iraq and Somalia contained the largest share of under-aged children of all immigrant groups in Sweden (Statistics Sweden 2009a, 11).

In 2008, 80 percent of the immigrants to Sweden were under the age of 40 (Statistics Sweden 2009a, 10). Between 2007 and 2011, immigrants from Iraq showed a similar age structure, with 65 percent being between the age of 13 and 39 (Swedish Migration Board 2012e). See Figure 5.




Figure 5: Age Structure of Iraqi Immigrants 2007–2011

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2012e.

Often, demographic characteristics of an immigrant community, such as the share of newcomers or the share of families with small children, is not taken into account in analyses of how the community integrates into the host country. Hedberg and Malmberg warns against analysing the integration performance of a particular immigrant group without taking these aspects into account. “Differences that are related to the balance between newcomers and established migrants could then be perceived as related to for instance cultural differences based on [ethnic] origin” (Hedberg and Malmberg 2010, 45).

2.6 The Diverse Origins of the Kurdish Population in Sweden

Is it possible to speak of one, single, Kurdish community in Sweden? The Kurdish population in Sweden originates from all parts of Kurdistan: from Northern Kurdistan (in Turkey), as well as from Southern Kurdistan (in Iraq), and from Kurdish areas in Syria and Iran²¹. Some Kurds in Sweden originate from the Kurdish diaspora in Lebanon. Kurds from different parts of Kurdistan tend to organise in different associations. One important reason for this is that Kurds lack a single language that can easily be understood by all Kurds. Instead, the Kurdish language can be defined

²¹ In the course of my fieldwork, I have learned that my Kurdish informants preferred the terms ‘North Kurdistan’ and ‘South Kurdistan’ over ‘Turkish Kurdistan’ or ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’ respectively. Wahlbeck argues that while the terms ‘Kurds from Turkey’ or ‘Kurds from Iraq’ might be easier to understand for a reader that is not familiar with Kurdish issues, it is important to avoid the expressions ‘Turkish Kurd’ or ‘Iraqi Kurd’ since these expressions are contradictory and can be perceived as offensive (Wahlbeck 1999). However, the terms ‘South Kurdistan’ och ‘North Kurdistan’ are politically loaded terms. According to Eliassi, these terms are used by Kurds as “a strategy of resistance to subvert and dismantle the sovereignty of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria and describe their present political authority over Kurdish regions as illegitimate.” (Eliassi 2010, 111).

as a form ‘dialect continuum’. A dialect continuum is made up of different dialects that do not differ much between neighbouring areas, but gets more difficult to understand the larger the geographical distance so that speakers at the far ends of the continuum cannot understand each other. The speech varieties spoken in the eastern or Iranian parts and those spoken in the western or Turkish parts are “not mutually intelligible unless there has been considerable prior contact between their speakers” (Sheyholislami 2009, 4). Rather than a distinct Kurdish language, argues Sheyholislami, there is a “construct of such a language” (Sheyholislami 2009, 4). This ‘construct’ includes the languages of Kurmanji or Northern Kurdish, Sorani or Central Kurdish, and Gorani, Hawrami, and Zazaki or Southern Kurdish (Sheyholislami 2009). The largest language is Kurmanji. Different dialects of Kurmanji are spoken in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and the western parts of northern Iraq/South Kurdistan, as well as among Kurds in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Sorani is spoken in the southern parts of Iraqi Kurdistan, and on the Iranian side of the border. Zazaki is spoken in an area between the cities of Diyarbakir, Sivas and Erzurum in Turkey. (Karlsson 2008, 11–12).

It is important to note that the linguistic cleavages within the Kurdish community do not necessarily follow international borders. For instance, different varieties of the major dialect of Kurmanji is spoke on both sides of the border between Turkey and Iraq, as well as in Syria and among Kurds in Lebanon. The linguistic border between the northern variety of the Kurdish language, Kurmanji and the central variety of Sorani instead goes roughly between the governorates of Erbil and Suleymani in northern Iraq. Two of my informants in Uppsala had at the time they were interviewed just returned from visits to Kurdistan on which they had visited friends and relatives both in Syria and Turkey (group interview in Uppsala 2009-08-15), and Lebanon and Turkey (group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-27) respectively. The Kurdish political parties by necessity have had to adopt to their respective national contexts, but a party such as the PKK has supporters and followers in all parts of Kurdistan and bases in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

Despite the linguistic and political challenges, the largest network of Kurdish associations, the Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden (*Kurdiska Riksförbundet*) prides itself of being an organisation not only for all different Kurdish political currents, but also for all language varieties. The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden was founded already in 1981 and now gathers local Kurdish associations across the geographic and linguistic cleavages that tend to divide national federations of the Kurdish diaspora in other countries. It claims to be the only Kurdish organisation in the world that has achieved this (SIOS 2011). However, The Federation of Kurdish Associations has not been able to prevent the creation of two additional national federations for Kurdish organisations in Sweden: The Council of Kurdish Associations in Sweden (*Kurdiska Rådet i Sverige*) was founded in 1993 and in 2006, the Kurdish Union in Sweden (*Kurdiska Unionen i*

Sverige) was formally registered. The Council of Kurdish Associations in Sweden is pro-PKK, it is a member of the The Association of Kurdish Organisations in Europe (KON-KURD), which is the legal organisational cover for the Kurdistan Workers' Party PKK in Europe (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2007, 6). The Kurdish Union of Sweden is generally perceived to be more connected with the Kurdish Iranian party KDPI (Berruti et al 2002). Kurdiska Riksförbundet is more KDP oriented. There is also KOMKAr which is a Kurdish nationalist but anti-PKK group. The leader of KOMKAr Kemal Burkay just returned to Turkey after 30 years of exile in Sweden. He is strongly opposed among supporters of the PKK (Baser 2012).

2.7 The Kurdish Community in Uppsala

The town of Uppsala was the first destination of Kurdish immigration to Sweden. In the 1950s, the first Kurds arrived here to study at the internationally known University of Uppsala (Alakom 2007). The Kurdish students were followed by Kurdish political refugees from Turkey in the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s. Since 1991, Kurds from Iraq seem to have dominated Kurdish immigration to Uppsala (interview in Uppsala 2010-05-05). The city also hosts relatively many Kurds from Syria. In 2004, a national Swedish association for Kurds from Syria "The Council for Syrian Kurds in Sweden" (*Rådet för Syriska Kurder*) was founded in Uppsala (Rådet för Syriska Kurder i Sverige 2012).

Today Uppsala hosts a sizeable Kurdish population. For the reasons mentioned above, the exact number of Kurds in Uppsala is not known. Among my key informants, estimates of the size of the Kurdish population range between 2,000 and 7,000 individuals (key informant interviews in Uppsala 2009-08-15 and 2010-05-05). In Sweden as a whole, Kurds from Turkey probably constitute the largest group of Kurds (Khayati 2008, 203, quoting Berruti et al. 2002, 166). Judging from the responses to my postal questionnaire that was sent to 652 randomly chosen individuals, whose names had been identified as Kurdish, the largest group of Kurds in Uppsala originates in Iraq (53.3 percent of Kurdish respondents). Also according to the responses to the questionnaire, the second largest group are Kurds from Turkey (27.2 percent) followed by Kurds from Iran (8.7 percent) and Syria (1.1 percent).²²

In many ways, the Kurdish community in Uppsala has a paradoxical outlook. On the one hand, a number of Kurdish artists, politicians and intellectuals originate from the Kurdish community of

²² These numbers are based on responses to a questionnaire distributed to people identified as Kurds through their first name. It is possible that this method leads to a over-representation of Iraqi Kurds since it has been a lot more difficult to use Kurdish names in Turkey than in Iraq. Tigris estimates that 60 to 70 percent of Kurds in Turkey carry Kurdish names (Marouf and Tigris 2012). Turkish name-policy was also upheld abroad: the Turkish embassies kept lists of 'adequate' Turkish names that applicants for Turkish passports had to choose from (Marouf and Tigris 2012).

Uppsala. Uppsala is the home town of Dilsa Demirbag-Sten²³, today a prominent writer and journalist (cf. Demirbag-Sten 2010), and her sister Dilbahar ('Dilba') Demirbag, a successful pop singer. For many years, two of the world's most famous Kurdish musicians, Gülistan and Siwan Perwer, lived in the Uppsala suburb of Stenhagen (Uppsala Konsert and Kongress 2011). There are at least three Kurdish members of the local city council (2011). In Uppsala, Kurds run "Aydin" a chain of food retail stores with several outlets in and around Uppsala. Moreover, profiled Kurdish physicians work at the Uppsala Academic Hospital (like child psychiatrist Abdulbaghi Ahmad from Dohuk in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq). There are a number of Kurdish teachers and professors at Uppsala University, which is the only university in Sweden that offers courses in Kurdish (Verket för Högskoleservice 2012). Two relatively successful football clubs also contribute to shape the image of Kurds in Uppsala: Uppsala-Kurd FK (in Stenhagen) and KFF Kurdiska Fotbollsföreningen) in Nyby (laget.se 2013a, 2013b).

On the other hand, Uppsala is also the city where the young Kurdish woman Fadime Sahindal in 2002 was brutally murdered by her own father. The killing of Fadime Sahindal in the Uppsala neighbourhood Gränby sparked a nation-wide debate about honour-based violence that has stigmatised the entire Kurdish community in Sweden (see below). When I asked the president of one of Uppsala's Kurdish associations about the issue of honour-related violence, he told me he was so tired of these issues that he would not have answered my phone call. "If it had not been that the number was +43... then I would not have answered, then I would have said no." (Interview in Uppsala 2009-05-10).

It was also in Uppsala that an agent from PKK in 1984 shot and killed a PKK-defector, a 26-year old Kurd from Turkey . The shooting took place in front of many witnesses at Stora Torget, Uppsala's main square. The murderer was caught by the police. The agent confessed to the killing, arguing that it was the duty of the Kurdish people to kill the defector. By defending his actions he contributed to create an image of the PKK as a terrorist organisation who would not hesitate to use violence in Sweden to reach its goals. The agent was sentenced to life-long imprisonment and expulsion from Sweden (Alfvén 1996). The killing in Uppsala in 1984 was followed by another killing in Medborgarplatsen, a major square in Stockholm in 1985. As a result of the killings, the PKK was declared a terrorist organisation, and this was one of the reasons PKK was suspected of having ordered the murder of the Swedish prime minister Olof Palme in February 1986 (*Rapport* 2006-02-24). The so-called "PKK-track", with its implicit accusation of Kurds being the enemies of

23 Dilsa Demirbag-Sten has written about her upbringing in Uppsala in the 1970s in her autobiography *Fosterland* (Fatherland) published in 2010.

the respected prime minister tainted the image of the Kurdish community in Sweden for many years, even though it rapidly proved to be erroneous.

So while members of the Kurdish community in Uppsala might be proud over the many artists, intellectuals and politicians that the Kurdish community in Uppsala has hosted or produced, they are also victims of the stigmatisation that brutal honour-based or politically motivated killings has inflicted upon Kurds in Uppsala. Some have made it their mission to try to change the image of the community. In 2005, a young Kurdish man, Roujman Shahbazian, was awarded Uppsala's yearly equality prize "Man of the Future" for his voluntary work for the Uppsala-based association TRIS (*Tjejers Rätt i Samhället*, Young Women's Rights in Society). Roujman Shahbazian was awarded the prize as "a good representative of the young Kurdish man who does not tolerate humiliation, mistreatment and female oppression" (*Uppsala Nya Tidning*, 17 March, 2005).

To some extent, the multifaceted outlook of the Kurdish community in Uppsala is a reflection of the very diverse backgrounds of its members. As mentioned above, the first Kurdish refugees that arrived to Uppsala came from Turkey as well as from Iraq and Syria. In one of the first documentations of the Kurdish community in Uppsala, Alar Kuutmann, a civil servant at the Municipality of Uppsala, reports about his findings from interviews with newly arrived Kurdish refugees. Kuutmann writes that while most Kurdish refugees from Turkey came from the countryside and had very limited education, most of the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds came from larger cities and had studied at university (Kuutmann 1980²⁴, 39). According to Kuutmann, almost all of the women who arrived as relatives to refugees (and not on their own) to Uppsala at this time could be considered illiterate (Kuutmann 1980, 52).

Many of those that arrived with a university education had ambitions to study at university. However, despite the fact that many "attended course after course in Swedish and isolated themselves in their rooms with a cassette recorder and TV to try to learn Swedish as fast as possible" (Kuutmann 1980, 46), many did not manage to continue their university studies in Sweden. The language problem was exacerbated by the fact that few of them knew English, a language in which a lot of the literature taught at university was written. In the end, members of both categories of Kurdish immigrants, well-educated as well as illiterate, made their first experiences on the Swedish labour market as cleaners at the academic hospital of Uppsala 'Akis', one of Sweden's largest hospitals and one of Uppsala's largest employers. The parents of Dilsa and

24 There is no date on the the publication that was published by the International Committee of the Municipality of Uppsala. In the official records of the Royal Library of Sweden, the Kuutman's report is listed as published in 198n (National Library of Sweden 2012-01-19). I have been in contact with the author Alar Kuutmann (personal e-mail 2012-01-19) who writes he presented his report to the International Committee shortly after moving from Uppsala in autumn 1980. He writes it is possible that the publication was not published until after new year 1980/81, but the most likely date of publication is 1980.

Dilba Demirbag worked as cleaners at the university hospital, and so did the father of Mustafa Can (a Kurdish writer and journalist, see Can 2006). Kuutmann quotes one of his respondents:

In the beginning in Uppsala I was wondering a lot over the fact that all my Kurdish friends were studying a university. I was thinking that's where I will go, too. Then I understood that most of them actually should call themselves cleaners. They had problems with Swedish and did not manage their studies and had to start cleaning at 'Akis' instead because they did not get student grants. (Kuutmann 1980, 51)

Difficulties to cope with life in Sweden seem to have been most acute for the mostly uneducated women who came to join their husbands who had been granted political asylum in Sweden. They had been living under "practically medieval circumstances" (Kuutmann 1980, 54), and had to learn to cope with modern kitchen appliances and the modernities of a large apartment building. In Kurdistan, they had carried the full responsibility for the children and the household. They continued to carry this responsibility in Sweden, even though in Uppsala many of them had to start working outside of home, which increased their workload enormously. According to Kuutmann, most of them had been married to their husbands in arranged marriages. In these kinds of arrangements, the woman could always count on the support from her own family if her husband mistreated her. In Sweden, this support was far away (Kuutmann 1980, 53–54).

Frustrating experiences seem to have characterised the first months and years in Sweden for most Kurdish refugees that arrived in Uppsala during the 1970s. Some were given the advice to try to learn Swedish while working instead of attempting to study at university. Kuutmann quotes a woman who tried to follow this piece of advice:

I did not speak to anybody, and nobody spoke to me. All they said to me was 'You did not clean properly'. I was hurt and angry. I thought: why should you come here and be treated unworthily? I lost confidence in the Swedes there. (Kuutmann 1980, 49)

For many, political activism was an escape from the hardships of immigrant life. Being able to participate in the struggle for Kurdistan and the Kurds gave a sense of meaningfulness to their lives in exile. At the same time, the meeting with the comrades must have been social events that many Kurds who felt isolated and/or discriminated against longed for. The escape from the shores and difficulties of everyday life that was offered by political activism was less accessible to the Kurdish women in Kuutmann's study. Since, as mentioned above, the women had to take care of the children and of the household, they had not much free time—if any—to go to meetings or attend study

circles (Kuutmann 1980, 54). Kuutmann quotes one of his respondents talking about Kurdish men: “They can just leave the children and go to a disco but when their wives want too attend a women’s circle it’s a totally different matter.” (Kuutmann 1980, 54).

Returnee Kurds that have lived in Uppsala have reached important political positions in Turkey as well as in Iraq. One of them is Suleyman Anik, who in 2004 was elected major in the south eastern Turkish city of Dargecit (*Dagens Nyheter*, 31 March, 2004). Anik spent many years in Uppsala, and parts of his family were still living there when he was elected. In 2004, the local Uppsala newspaper UNT reported that Shakhwan Abbas, who had lived many years in Uppsala and whose family was still living in Uppsala was one of the victims of the large suicide bombing that killed up to 350 people in Erbil in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq on the 1st of February 2004. Shakhwan Abbas was described by the paper as a possible future minister in the Kurdistan Regional Government. A mourning ceremony was arranged the day after his death in the Uppsala suburb of Sävja (*Uppsala Nya Tidning*, February 2, 2004). In June 2012, the leadership of the main Syrian opposition group the Syrian National Council was taken over by a Kurd from Uppsala: Abdulbaset Sieda (*Dagens Nyheter*, 9 June, 2012).

The first major group of Kurdish immigrants to Uppsala experienced discrimination and difficulties to adopt to life in Sweden. On the other hand, they arrived to a country where they were not only allowed to express their Kurdish culture, but were often also encourage to do so. Swedish school authorities asked for teaching material in Kurdish so that Kurdish children could be given education in the maternal language just as immigrants from countries such as Finland and Chile already did. The librarian Mikos Gulyas (1978, 1982) identified the Kurdish children as the ‘children-without-books’, and libraries commissioned the recording of Kurdish children stories on cassettes. According to Kuutmann’s respondents, the Kurdish refugees had a general, positive image of Sweden as a “free, democratic and developed country” (Kuutmann 1980, 40).

It is likely that this image was somewhat shaken by the experiences of discrimination. Alinia has described how Kurdish immigrants met two faces of Sweden: on the one hand, democracy and “cultural freedom of choice”, on the other hand structural discrimination and everyday racism (Alinia 2004, 162–171). After the infamous PKK-killing in Uppsala in 1984 and the ensuing focus on PKK and Kurds in the investigation into the murder of prime minister Olof Palme, and after Kurds became almost synonymous with honour-related violence with the killing of Fadime Sahindal, Kurds would, in Alinia’s word, experience ‘otherness’ not only as immigrants, but also as Kurds. Alinia’s respondents report being asked if all Kurds are forced into arranged marriages, and encountering the view that “killing women” is part of Kurdish culture. She quotes one of her

respondents complaining “It does not matter if I am a communist, feminist, and atheist because there is already a conception of me.” (Alinia 2004, 187).

However valuable as a document of the first Kurdish immigration to Sweden, Kuutmann’s report rarely touches upon the transnational aspects of the lives of Kurdish refugees and their families in Uppsala. There is no mentioning at all of support sent from Uppsala to family members and relatives still in Kurdistan, nor of possible other transnational obligations or responsibilities. Kuutmann has gathered many accounts of how the newly arrived male refugees struggled to bring the immediate family to Sweden: their wife and children. But their relationships to their extended family, including siblings and parents, are invisible. No analysis is made of how the migration to Sweden was financed. Had the journey been paid by the refugees themselves? By their political organisations? By their families back home, or by credit?

When it comes to Kurds from Southern Kurdistan/the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, it is possible that financial assistance from Sweden was not so important in the 1970s as it would become during the last decade of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In the 1970s, Iraq experienced an oil-boom and even though the Kurdish areas did not get to share much of this wealth, the living conditions in the Kurdish region were better than during the 1980s.

2.8 Previous Research on Remittances from Sweden²⁵

The issue of remittances was the topic of studies published in Sweden at the beginning of last century. “The Emigration Inquest” (*Emigrationsutredningen*) worked from 1907 to 1913. The task of the inquest was to look for ways of limiting the massive emigration out of Sweden that took place at this time. It also analysed the issues of remittances, or “*remittenser*” as the Swedish term was then. At this time, however, the issue of remittances concerned remittances sent to Sweden from abroad, above all from the United States (Barton 1994, 133ff).

Wadensjö’s dissertation (1973) is probably one of the earliest studies of remittances sent from Sweden. Wadensjö analysed the remittance sending of labour immigrants in Sweden. Wadensjö compared frequency and size of remittances sent by labour immigrants from some of the most important countries of origin of labour immigration to Sweden at that time: West Germany, Italy and Greece. In this section, I give an overview of studies on remittances from Sweden that have been published during the past decade and are relevant for this study.


In 2007, two undergraduate students at the Institute for Economics at the University of Uppsala made an attempt to determine what variables influence the amount of remittances sent by immigrants in Sweden. Brinkberg and Engdahl (2007) based their analysis on statistics published by

²⁵ This section partly builds on a report written for the Swedish think tank “Global Utmaning” (Pelling 2009).

the World Bank in their annual “Global Development Finance” which contains balance of payment statistics. They conclude that the number of immigrants has a positive impact on the amount of remittances. This is consistent with other studies (e.g. Jimenez-Martín 2007 on remittances from the EU). Brinkberg and Engdahl also observe that the flow of remittances sent from Sweden seems to follow the trends of economic growth, with more remittances being sent during good times, and less money being remitted when the economy makes a down-turn. Brinkberg and Engdahl found some evidence that the share of married people in the immigrant population had a negative impact on the sending of remittances from Sweden. The finding that the presence of family members in the host country reduces the propensity to remit has been made elsewhere, see for instance Holst and Schrooten (2006). For instance, it has been used to explain the fact that unskilled migrants seem to be more prone to remit than skilled. Skilled migrant generally spend longer periods of time abroad, and are more likely to be able to unite with their family in the host country (Faini 2006; Niimi, Ozden and Schiff 2008).

In an attempt to forecast how the current (2009) financial crisis might affect incomes in African countries, Holmqvist of the Nordic Africa Institute (Holmqvist 2009) looks at the changes in the flow of remittances and official development assistance following a financial crisis in a number of developed countries. In the past, remittances have been known to be relatively resilient to economic downturns. Holmqvist shows that this is not true for countries experiencing a particularly severe crisis. Following a severe financial crisis, the remittances curve drops.

Sweden suffered its latest severe financial crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. What Reinhart and Rogoff 2008 (quoted by Holmqvist 2009) term as the ‘Sweden91’ crisis was one of the five largest experienced by developed countries since 1970 according to Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification. Using data from the World Bank “Global Development Finance”, Holmqvist concludes that remittances from Sweden fell fast and fell deeper than remittances from other countries experiencing a similarly severe financial crisis. Available data shows that remittances from Sweden fell by some 50 percent after the crisis in 1991 (Holmqvist 2009, 5). See Figure 6.



Sources: Aid from OECD/DAC and Remittances from World Bank/Global Development Finance, both flows reconverted to Swedish kronor from current USD. Unemployment and Public Sector deficit from Konjunkturinstitutet/Nyckeltal.

Figure 6: Remittances and the 1991 Swedish Financial Crisis

Source: Holmqvist 2009, 5.

In 2008, Engdahl published the results of an online survey on the sending of remittances among members of immigrant organizations in Sweden in his master thesis in economics. Unfortunately, Engdahl was able to gather data from only 91 individuals (of whom only 59 completed the entire survey). As Engdahl points out, this makes it difficult to draw any general conclusions from his study. Some of his results are interesting, nevertheless. The finding, for instance, that more than a third of the remittance senders in Engdahl's sample had used informal channels to transfer money, is an indication that Swedish statistics on remittances probably underestimate the real amount sent.

Among the participants of Engdahl's study, men showed a higher propensity to remit than women, and highly skilled more than low-skilled. Both of these findings contradict results made in other recent studies of remittances senders. Orozco, Lowell and Schneider (2006) have shown that while men tend to remit larger amount each time they remit, women remit more often and therefore arrive at larger yearly sums (Orozco, Lowell and Schneider 2006, quoted by Engdahl 2007, 14). This is confirmed in a recent study made by the Spanish remittances research centre remesas.org. Remesas.org base their results on an analysis of over 50,000 remittances sent through eleven money-transfer institutions in Spain during two days in 2006. Their study confirms that women

remit more. Despite the fact that the average remittance sent by a woman from Spain was smaller than that of a man, and that there are fewer potential women remittance senders in Spain, women accounted for approximately 60.3 percent of remittances sent from Spain in 2006 (Moré et al 2008). In Engdahl's study, highly educated individuals were more likely to remit than individuals with lower levels of education. As a part of a discussion on whether remittances can compensate for brain-drain of skilled migrants, Faini in 2007 published a study showing that skilled migrants had a lower propensity to send money home. This finding was confirmed by Niimi, Ozden and Schiff (2008), who found that remittances actually seem to decrease with the share of migrants with tertiary education. Because of Engdahl's limited and not representative sample, it is not possible to say whether these differences say something about the specificities of remittance-senders from Sweden.

In her master thesis in economics, Stryjan (2007) analyses the sending of remittances from people in Sweden originating in Somaliland, a part of Somalia. 96 people from Somaliland gathered at three different events participated in Stryjan's survey. Her results show a weak or negative correlation between income and amount remitted, that is: the amount remitted did not increase with the income of the remitter. At the same time, Stryjan's results indicate that people with a more stable living situation (in particular a full-time job, but also a stable housing situation) tended to remit higher amounts.

Stryjan also found that respondents with high education, income given, tended to remit larger amounts, contradicting the findings of Niimi, Ozden and Schiff (2008, see above). Similar to Engdahl, Stryjan also saw a tendency for the amount of remittances sent to the respondent's family to diminish with time spent in Sweden. Stryjan asked her respondents about their plans to return to the country of origin, and records a positive correlation between plans to return and the amounts remitted. People with close relatives in the country of origin also tended to remit more. These results have also been found in other studies. (See for instance Holst and Schrooten's study from 2006 of remittances from Germany, quoted by Stryjan 2007, 1).

3 A Transnationalist Perspective on Migration

In this dissertation, I analyse the relationship between transnational ties and migration patterns through a case study on the transnational ties between Kurds in Sweden and their families, relatives and communities in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

This chapter starts with an overview of theories on the causes of international migration. I briefly review theoretical developments in migration studies: from the focus on the individual benefits of migrating into areas with higher wages of neo-classical economics over the household perspective of the New Economics of Labour Migration to more recent theories on how migrant networks and migration systems shape migration. I also address the inability of most migration theories to explain why we do not see *more* migration in today's world. State policies are indeed decisive in limiting migration, and I devote one section to a discussion on the role of state policies in shaping migration.

From my overview of migration theories, I conclude that theories concerned with the role of social networks in shaping migration, supplemented with a transnationalist perspective on migration, are best suited to understand the role of networks of Kurds in shaping migration from Iraq to Sweden. I make a critical appraisal of the transnationalist 'turn' in migration studies in one section (Transnationalism: A New Optic). In the following section, I discuss how a transnationalist perspective can enrich the understanding of how migration networks shape migration. I conclude with a section concerned with how a transnationalist perspective can explain the durability of cross-border social networks and their impacts.

Among different transnational practices, the act of sending remittances merit particular attention, since remittance sending is crucial to understand the relationship between transnational ties and migration. The need to secure assistance from abroad in the form of remittances is an important incentive for migration, and remittances are often used to finance further migration. Remittances are the topic of a second theoretical chapter.

3.1 Theories on the Causes of International Migration

A large number of factors contribute to create, sustain and direct migration. Migration is a complex human process, and there is no single theory to explain why and how migration takes place. Indeed "no single cause is ever sufficient to explain why people decide to leave their country and settle in another" as Castles and Miller conclude in an overview of migration theories (Castles and Miller 2009, 30). In an often quoted analysis of migration theories, Massey et al. (2002)

conclude that there is at present no single, coherent theory of international migration. Instead, a number of different theories contribute to explain different aspects of the complex human phenomenon of migration. Different migration theories operate at different levels of analysis, and focus on different explanatory variables. In an article summarising the progress of research and theory in the study of international migration, Portes and DeWind argue that seeking for “a grand theory of migration” that covers all aspects of migration would be misguided. Such a theory would be a useless tool, since it would have to be formulated at a very high level of abstraction (Portes and DeWind 2004, 829).

3.1.1 Neo-classic Economic Theory

One of the earliest migration theories were formulated by the German-English geographer Ravenstein at the end of the 19th century. His “Laws of Migration” were published in 1885 and 1889. According to Ravenstein, people are pushed away from scarce resources in rural areas, and pulled to move towards “great centres of commerce or industry” (Ravenstein 1885, 199). Natives of towns are therefore less migratory than individuals from rural parts of the country. As individuals move, the gaps left behind are filled by others from more rural areas, with the result that migration to a greater city causes movement in many steps. Ravenstein predicted that migration would continue until the density of the population corresponded with the natural resources of the area (Ravenstein 1885).

Neo-classical economic theory reminds of Ravenstein’s theories of how labor supply and demand shape migration. In neo-classic economic theory, migration is a result of disequilibria between economically underdeveloped areas which have a surplus of labour, and more economically developed areas with demand for labour and therefore higher wages. People migrate from labour abundant and capital scarce regions or countries to labour scarce and capital rich regions or countries. Basically, people are pushed out of areas with few opportunities, and pulled into areas where they can earn higher wages. In an empirical investigation of the the determinants of bilateral immigration flows into fourteen OECD countries, Mayda (2008) find empiric evidence that pull factors, defined as improvements in the mean income opportunities in the destination country, increase emigration.

Mayda finds that “the emigration rate to a given destination is an increasing function of that country’s per worker GDP and a decreasing function of the average per worker GDP of all the other host countries in the sample.” (Mayda 2008, 3–4).

As a result of population movements, the demand for labour in developed areas will be met, and wages decrease. In the sending areas wages increase as the surplus of labour leaves for other areas.

When a new equilibrium of labour supply and demand has been reached, migration is expected to cease. That is, neo-classical economic theory predicts that migration will continue until wage differences are too small to cover the cost of migration. In neo-classic economic theory, the labour markets are the primary factors in migration. Policies to regulate migration therefore need to regulate labour market access.

On the individual level, neo-classical economic theory assumes that individuals are rational actors that seek their best interest. Their best interest is to maximise their income and their return on investment in human capital (for instance education). Migration decisions are assumed to be made at an individual level. Policies which aim at regulating migration therefore should focus on increasing or reducing the economic payoff of migration to individuals.

The push-pull theory of international migration remains influential even though the neo-classical theories of rational, individual actors have been challenged during the last decades. A main critique of neo-classical theory has been that it assumes that potential migrants have access to perfect information. That is, that migrants' decisions are based on full knowledge of factors such as wage levels, employment opportunities and living costs in the country of destination. "Instead", writes Castles and Miller (2009), "migrants have limited and sometimes contradictory information, and are subject to a range of constraints (especially lack of power in face of the employers and governments)." (Castles and Miller 2009, 23).

Another important critique is that the key determinants of individual migration models, that is expected wages (both in the country of origin and in the country of destination), migration costs (including risks) and the returns to investment in human capital (like education) are almost always different for men and women. However, the implications of these models have not been thoroughly examined through a "gendered lens" (Pfeiffer et al. 2007,6). It is often difficult to estimate the expected income gains from migration, and because women's incomes are more often non-monetary than men's incomes, it tends to be even more difficult to make these estimations for women.

3.1.2 New Economics of Labour Migration

Proponents of the "New Economics of Labour Migration" (NELM) argue that decisions about migration are taken not at an individual level, but at in larger social units, usually at the household level. In this view, migration is not primarily the result of an individual cost-benefit analysis, but a part of a household strategy. In the New Economics of Labour Migration, migration is assumed to be the result of a collective decision to send one member of the household to an urban area or abroad, and an important determinant of migration is the level of uncertainty of household income

(see Stark 1991, Lucas and Stark 1985). Migration is seen as a risk-diversification strategy. Migration to a different non-correlated labour market, in another area or abroad, can be a way of securing a stable income to the household. For households, migration can thus function as a kind of an insurance or safety net. If members of the household work on different labour markets (in different parts of the country or in different countries) the household is better protected against income-shocks than if all its members are dependent on incomes from the same area. In their work on remittance sending in Botswana, Lucas and Stark (1985) describe how farming households in the countryside used labour migration to urban areas as a strategy to protect the household from loss of income: in the case of a bad harvest, remittances from migrants can be used as a compensation. The New Economics of Labour Migration also models migration as a response to different kinds of market constraints, such as lack of access to affordable credit.

Summing up, the NELM models migration as a part of a household strategy to increase income, get access to funds for investments, and insure the income of the household against different kinds of risks (Taylor 1999, 64). Since migration in this view is not simply the result of labour market disequilibria or wage level differentials, policies with the aim of limiting migration need to focus on other issues, such as easing credit constraints or helping households to get access to more diversified sources of income.

Nowadays, there is an increasing consensus among researchers that individuals do not make decisions about migration independently from their household (Pfeiffer et al 2007). However, researchers departing from the idea that migration decisions are taken by the household have been criticised for assuming that it is a male head of household who takes the decisions, and for conceiving of households as single, unified actors. Instead, households should be seen as *sites of struggle*, in which the often diverging interests and strategies of its male and female members are negotiated (Gabbacia, et al., 2006, quoted by Pfeiffer et al 2007, 2).

3.1.3 Labour Market Segmentation

Different from the New Economics of Migration, Dual or Segmented Labour Market Theory explains migration primarily with forces in the receiving countries. According to this theory, it is the labour demand structure of modern industrial societies that causes migration. The labour demand structure is different in countries. The dual labour market theory identifies two main kinds of markets: a capital intensive primary market with high wages, and a labour intensive secondary market with greater labour needs and lower wages. At the bottom of this hierarchical structure are jobs that earn very little money and have low social status. These are jobs that members of the native workforce are reluctant to carry out. Because the native workforce is not available for these

jobs, they are taken up by immigrant workers. According to dual labour market theory, migration is essentially demand driven, and employers and governments play an important role in encouraging and shaping international migration (Massey et al 1998, 28–34). Policies which aim at regulating migration must therefore focus on the nature of the economy of the host country.

Related to this theory are theories that explain variations in immigration across countries with different socio-economic regimes or variations of capitalism. Devitt (2011) argues that the different capitalism models in Western Europe (EU15) can explain both quantitative and qualitative variations in labour immigration: that is, both the relative number and the skillset of labour immigrants. Devitt contrasts the “the Southern-Statist regime” of Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal and France with the Nordic regime in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. In Southern-Statist regimes, a relatively large agricultural sector, many small and medium sized firms and large informal economies generate a demand for low-skilled immigrant labour to fill positions that the (under-mobilised) native workforce is reluctant to carry out. In the Nordic countries Sweden, Denmark and Finland, a highly regulated labour market and a relatively high share of “high-quality production” in the economy makes it difficult for low-skilled labour migrants to find employment. Moreover, in the Nordic countries active labour market policies as well as extensive supplies of social services such as child and elderly care that encourage women’s (or rather, mothers’ and daughters’) participation in the labour market contribute to mobilise a large share of the domestic workforce and minimise the need for foreign labour.

3.1.4 World-Systems Theory

World-systems theory looks beyond the individual nation. World-systems theory, originally formulated by Wallerstein in the 1970s, distinguished between capitalist “core” nations, and “peripheral” nations outside the capitalist system (De Haas 2007, 15). In this view, migration is linked to the structure of the capitalist world economy. International migration is the consequence of dislocations created by the penetration of capitalist globalisation into peripheral areas of the world. Capitalist forces in search for new markets alter local conditions and create migration from the periphery to the centre. Dislocations created by neoliberal structural adjustment programmes are a case in point. According to world-systems theory, the international flow of people follows (in reverse) the international flow of goods and capital. The world-systems model predicts that migration will be particularly important between former colonies and their former colonial power, because of the strong cultural and structural links that exist between these countries. Since in this view migration is caused by capitalist economic globalisation, policies that aim at regulating migration would have to target multinational companies and other powerful economic interests.

Such policies are, as has been pointed out by Massey et al. (1993), “unlikely to be implemented because they are difficult to enforce, tend to incite international trade disputes, risk world economic recession, and antagonise multinational firms with substantial political resources that can be mobilized to block them.” (Massey et al. 1993, 448).

While the neo-classical approach has been criticised for accruing too much importance to the agency of individual actors acting to maximise their economic benefit, and downplay the role of the state and of politics in shaping migration, other approaches (such as world-systems theory) have been criticised for exaggerating the role of economic forces, for seeing “the interests of capital as all-determining” (Castles and Miller 2009, 27). Migration network theory and migration systems theory, that both also contribute to explain the perpetuation of migration, have sprung out of a critique on the focus on economic or structural factors.

3.1.5 Network Theory

As pointed out by De Haas (De Haas 2007, 16), neo-classical theories of migration cannot explain why migration flows tend to be “spatially clustered”: human migration does not simply follow wage differentials or employment prospects, but is often concentrated to specific countries of destination. Network theory is an attempt to understand this ‘clustering’ of migration.

According to network theory, migrant networks increase the likelihood of migration by lowering both the financial and the psychological costs of moving (Palloni et al 2001). A prospective migrant with a network of kin or friends in his or her chosen country of destination enjoy a number of advantages. Social networks provide social capital²⁶ in the form of contacts and know-how in the country of destination, which helps the migrant find a job, somewhere to stay, etc. Networks are also often instrumental in facilitating the actual move by giving advice on travel routes, helping the migrant to pass administrative hurdles to get work or residence permits, etc. The existence of social networks contributes to explain the concentration of migration movements from a given area of origin to a limited number of destination countries.

The social network approach was originally applied as a framework to study labour migration. Using the example of Iranian asylum seekers in the Netherlands, Koser (1997) argues that refugee movement are also to an important extent affected by social networks. Often, labour and refugee migrants move along the same paths. For instance, recent refugees from Afghanistan have been found to follow routes to Iran and Pakistan that were established by seasonal labour migrants some decades ago (UNDP 2009, 13).

26 According to a classical definition of Bourdieu and Wacquant, social capital is “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119, quoted by Palloni et al 2001, 1263).

The information that social networks can provide has an economic worth: the social capital that it entails to have a tie to someone who has migrated can be converted into for instance access to higher wages abroad. As networks expand, the cost of migration declines. This has two effects on migration. Firstly, migrants predominantly go to countries with an already established community of people from the same country of origin. Secondly, with time and with declining costs of migration, migration flows become less selective. Individuals and families that would not have been able to afford the costs the pioneer movers had to pay, can now, with the help of people in their network, afford to move. “Each act of migration creates social capital among people to whom the new migrant is related” writes Palloni et al, “thereby raising their own odds of out-migration” (Palloni et al 2001, 1264). In this way, personal relations between migrants and non-migrants, and the social capital these relations generate, contribute to facilitate, to perpetuate and to transform migration processes (De Haas 2007, 33).

Analysing recent migration to Sweden, Malmberg and Hedberg point out that migration generally happens in waves. These waves of migration tend to have a slow start, a clear peak, and be followed by a smaller migration after the peak (Hedberg and Malmberg 2010, 42). The fact that the peak is generally preceded by migration from the same country of origin is an indication, according to Hedberg and Malmberg, that “migrants who have already established themselves, so called pioneers, can play a role when it comes to spreading information to the country of origin about the host country as a possible destination” (Hedberg and Malmberg 2010, 42–43).

Social networks have been used to explain the geography of immigration to Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period of time, as predicted by the assumptions arising from network theory, “[e]ach destination country received new immigrants from the same range of countries of origin as its existing immigrant population” (Collyer 2005, 700–701). This has lately begun to change. Gosh (1992, quoted by Schoorl 1998, 7) predicts that the widening of the geographical scope of migration will accelerate further as globalisation creates new flows of trade and capital. Using the example of Algerian immigration to the UK, which according to Collyer’s field work seems to be made up almost entirely by immigrants who do not have any family or relatives in the UK, Collyer argues that stricter immigration policies have made it difficult for immigrants to make use of their social networks. This has in turn led to a diversification of migration destinations. When migrants are not able to rely on support from their social network in the form of relatives or family members in the country of destination, they might be forced to instead buy support from smugglers.

Network theory assigns an important role to the agency of migrants themselves. Migrants build and sustain the networks that make it cheaper and less risky to migrate, and they build institutions that facilitate border crossings. In broader interpretations of network theory, networks consist not

only of family members or relatives, but also of ‘weak ties’ such as to friends or acquaintances (Espinosa and Massey 1999, quoted by Collyer 2005, 713). Networks might also include non-governmental organisation and even smugglers. The higher the barriers to entry, the more important are the networks. Social networks can contribute to perpetuate migration also over (formally) closed borders, and they make it notoriously difficult for states to control migration. I will address the challenges that networks pose to policy makers trying to regulate migration in later sections of this chapter.

The effects of networks are almost certainly gender specific (Pfeiffer et al 2007). For instance, many studies have found that the gender composition of networks is an important variable shaping migration: if labour markets in destination countries are gender segregated, networks of male migrants will be of little value to female migrants, and vice versa. Also, it has been argued that women are dependent upon networks of female relatives and friends to overcome social norms that place restrictions on female mobility. It might be socially more accepted for a woman to migrate to join relatives abroad, than to move alone. (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994, quoted by Pfeiffer et al 2007, 21). Pfeiffer et al. (2007) point out that most studies consider networks as predetermined: little is therefore known about endogenous network formation. However, it is likely that households strategically invest in building the kind of gender-network that is most useful for the household.

3.1.6 Migration Systems Theory

Migration systems theory is an attempt to take both ends of the migration flow into account, by looking at the particular links and relationships that exists between a country of origin and a given country of destination (Castles and Miller 2009, 27). Already in 1966, Lee noted that “migration tends to take place largely within well defined streams” (Lee 1966, 53). Previous migrants overcome obstacles that clears the passage for later migrants who follow the same pathways, just as “elevated highways pass over the countryside” (Lee 1966, 54).

Empirically, migration flows acquire some stability and structure over time. Generally, flows are characterised by core destination countries (such as former colonial powers) and multiple source countries. According to migration system theory, migration flows are structured both by institutional factors (such as the functioning of the world economy and the legal structures and laws of both sending and receiving countries), and of micro factors (such as migrant networks). Migration systems theory is thus an attempt to merge the explanatory power of the economic forces of world economy with the importance of human practices and networks (De Haas 2007).

3.1.7 Cumulative Causation

Finally, theories on cumulative causation show how migration itself tends to make further migration more likely. Causation becomes cumulative when “each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely.” (Massey et al. 1993, 451). An example of cumulative causation is when migration causes relative deprivation by exacerbating income differences in source countries. When households with family members abroad become more wealthy, this creates a feeling among non-migrant households of relative deprivation, which can motivate migration (for a definition of relative deprivation, see Encyclopaedia Britannica Online 2007).

Massey et al. (1993) list six socio-economic factors that have been identified as likely to contribute to a cumulative causation of further migration: changes in the distribution of income (causing relative deprivation), changes in the the distribution of land (land bought with remittances or by returning migrants can make non-migrants landless), the organisation of agriculture (with more capital becoming available through migrants, non-migrant farmers face harsher competition than before), the emergence of a culture of migration (that makes migration natural and expected), changes in the regional distribution of human capital (so called brain-drain) and changes in the social meaning of work in countries of destination (creating a need for immigrants to fill jobs with low social status) (Massey et al. 1993, 451-453).

Work on social networks was originally intended to compensate for a lack of concern with the social elements of the migration process in theories which prioritised economic accounts of migration. However, just as economic aspects alone cannot explain migration, so is the existence of social networks insufficient in explaining why people move. According to De Haas, a major problem with network theory is that it does not specify the importance of networks in relation to other factors that shape migration. Governments might find it hard to control migration because of social networks, but legal and physical barriers to migration are not without effect. Also, there are internal forces that contribute to weaken networks over time. An established community of immigrants might have an interest in limiting further immigration (particularly if new immigrants compete for the same kind of jobs): bridgeheads are turned into gatekeepers (De Haas 2007, 32). In next section, I look at theories on why people *do not* migrate.

3.2 Theories on Why People Do Not Migrate

As has been mentioned above, no one theory can explain all aspects of migration. Newer theories have often been formulated in an attempt to address the deficiencies of theories that focus only on the economic reasons of migration. In reality, migrants’ motivations are often shaped

simultaneously by economic considerations, political constraints and social aspirations. This is highlighted in the case of refugee migration. As Collyer puts it “just as more voluntary forms of movement have a political component, so forced migrations frequently involve clear economic considerations. Indeed, the ability to secure a reasonable livelihood is an essential element of protection which refugees seek.” (Collyer 2005, 714). The motivations of migrants are mixed, and so are the determinants of migration flows.

If migration was exclusively determined by differences in expected wages, then people would primarily move from poor to rich countries, and there would be little migration between rich countries. In practice, the map of human cross-border movements shows a different picture. Less than half of the migration in the world goes from developing to developed countries (UNDP 2009). In fact, most migration takes place between countries with fairly similar levels of development, that is, from one rich country to another, or within a region of poor countries. For instance, migration within Asia explains almost 20 percent of all international migration, and is larger than the total migration to Europe (UNDP 2009, 21).

Moreover, migration theories generally fail to explain why most people do not migrate. The last available figures from the United Nations Population Division show that the percentage of international migrants among the world population merely reaches three percent (it was expected to reach 3.1 percent in 2010) (UNDESA 2009). That is, 97 percent of the world's people are not international migrants.

If migrants are motivated to leave their countries of origin by lack of economic opportunity why in a world of increasing economic inequalities do we not see more migration? Fischer and Malmberg (2001) explains this with the ‘sunken costs’ that people have invested in their home communities. It takes time and energy to build up social networks, local know-how, etc. in a new place. These are costs that enter into the cost/benefit analysis of the prospective migrant (or his or her household). The longer you stay in a community, the more investments you have made in social relationships, etc. in that particular community. This is a reason why the propensity to migrate sinks with older age: The longer you do not migrate the lower the likelihood that you will migrate (Fischer and Malmberg 2001). In a famous essay on migration theory, Lee calls this a ‘natural inertia’: “While migration may result from a comparison of factors at origin and destination, a simple calculus of +’s and -’s does not decide the act of migration. The balance in favour of the move must be enough to overcome the natural inertia which always exists.” (Lee 1966, 51).

According to von Koppenfels (2009), civic relationships seems to be a deterrent of migration. Measured by the development of local cooperatives, it seems that the stronger civic relationships

are in the sending countries, the less likely are people to migrate. People with more civic engagement seems to have lower emigration rates, independent of wage levels.

As has been shown in the overview above, few migration theories take the role of the state into account. In her review of migration theories, Morawska (2007) identifies what she terms a political economy model of international migration. According to Morawska, this model has been formulated in part as a reaction to the pessimistic view on the role of politics that results from the world-systems theory. Contrary to the world-systems theory that assumes that political decisions generally are a result of the dominating economic forces, the political economy model of international migration “views receiver- country or region (for example, the European Union as a supranational body) immigration policies, including regulations of entry, duration of sojourn, permission to work, the treatment of unauthorized immigrants, and of citizenship as directly shaping the volume and directions of international migration.” (Morawska 2007, 3). According to Morawska, however, proponents of a political economy model of international migration generally fail to determine the causal weight of political factors in relation to for instance economic determinants.

Mayda (2008) has looked at the relative importance of policy compared with other long-term determinants of international migration by analysing data collected by the OECD on immigration to fourteen OECD countries over a period of fifteen years. Mayda’s conclusion is that the state, or political factors matters hugely. According to Mayda, only political factors can explain why we do not see more migration in a world where there are high wage differentials across countries and transportation and communication costs decrease. Restrictive immigration policies help explain why migration flows are relatively small in scale compared with other dimensions of globalisation—such as trade and capital flows—and relative to the past. I will expand on the role of the state in shaping migration in the next section of this chapter.

3.3 International Migration and State Sovereignty: A Political Science Perspective

By definition, international migration occurs when people cross the international borders of states. The challenges and constraints faced by states in controlling their borders, and thereby upholding sovereignty over their territory is a central issue in international relations and political science (Betts 2011, Hollifield 2008). Control over the borders of the state, or authority over the regulation of entry and exit into its territory is essential for state sovereignty. In this sense, cross-border movements of people in the form of international migration pose a challenge to state sovereignty (Castles 2004a, Hollifield 2004, Joppke 1998, Sassen 1996).²⁷

²⁷ Bauböck (2009) presents an alternative view on the relation between state sovereignty and borders, by pointing out that while borders might be necessary for democratic reasons (namely as demarcations of the jurisdiction of political authorities), borders need not be used to stop or hinder cross-border movement of people. Indeed, there are many reasons—economic as well as humanitarian—why open borders might be favourable to states.

Sovereignty can be understood as “ultimate control over a bounded territory and populace” (Joppke 1998, 10). In the present international system, state sovereignty is the ‘constitutive norm’ (Betts 2011, 15). While migration has been an important part of human history (McNeill 1978), borders are a relatively recent historic phenomenon. It was only with the emergence of nation-states in the 16th century that populations began to be assigned to specific territories separated by borders. It was not until 200 years ago that the institutions of nationality and citizenship, which would become the “hallmarks of the modern nation-state”, developed fully (Hollifield 2008, 187). By creating the concept of an ‘exclusive political community’, it is this norm of state sovereignty that give legitimacy to the restrictions that almost all states put on human movement across their borders (Betts 2011, 15).

It is this norm of state sovereignty that creates the phenomena of international migration. In a world where borders between state are non-existent or unimportant, it would not be necessary to distinguish between international migration and internal mobility. The very definition of a state is based on the assumption that the state can control its borders. A state must be able to ensure that no other state can claim a monopoly of ‘the legitimate use of violence’ (Weber 1964) in the same territory at the same time. Since human movement in the form of international migration poses a challenge to a state’s ability to control entry and exit into the territory of the state, migration can be seen as a challenge to state sovereignty.

How the forces driving international migration constrain states’ possibilities to control their borders is the focus of a large and growing body of literature. Different theories give attention to different aspects, and departs from different sets of explanations or theories of why migration starts and why it continues over time.

Sassen (1996, 2006) can be seen as a representative of a world systems theory, which relates human migration to the way the present world system works. As has been mentioned above, in this view immigration is the result of how economic forces, often following colonial patterns, and supported by government actions, penetrate new markets in an accelerating economic globalisation. Migration follows the flow of goods, but in the opposite direction. An important assumption of this school of thought is that individual governments have little real possibility to influence migration movements. Migration flows are tied to global flows of capital and goods that government cannot or are not willing to regulate (Massey et al. 1993, 448).

In world systems theory, there is little room for the agency of the individual migrant. Even though “the individual is the site for accountability and enforcement” of immigration policy at the borders, in airports, or in consulates in sending countries, “international migrations are embedded in larger geopolitical and transnational economic dynamics” (Sassen 1998, 57). According to Sassen, it is

necessary to “suspend the proposition implicit in much immigration analysis, that immigration is the result of individual action.” (Sassen 1998, 57). In Hollifield’s view, ‘globalization theorists’ like Sassen “see the nation-state as essentially outmoded and incapable of keeping pace with changes in the world economy” (Hollifield 2008, 205). In the process of globalisation, states are losing control over immigration because of a process that Sassen terms “transnationalization of immigration policy” (Sassen 1998, 49). The effect of this process is “to constrain the sovereignty of the state and to undermine old notions about immigration control.” (Sassen 1998, 57). This transnationalisation consists of a number of components. One is the transfer of power and state authority over different aspects of immigration policy that has been made to supranational organisations such as the EU or the WTO. Other constraints originate in the obligations that states have to respect international human rights codes.

Hollifield (2004) points out that all cross-border movements—whether of goods, capital, or people—can be perceived as a threat or a challenge of the authority of the nation-state. What makes the cross-border movement of people or international migration particular is that migration flows are “composed of people who can, by their sustained presence, alter the very character of the receiving society.” (Portes and DeWind 2004, 831). The impact of immigration on the receiving society can be substantial. “The citizenry or the *demos* may be transformed in such a way as to violate the social contract and undermine the legitimacy of the government and the sovereignty of the state itself” (Hollifield 2004, 887).

Another particularity of human migration is that people, unlike goods or capital, are enshrined with rights which demand respect. The institutions that regulate human movement are not as developed as those that regulate the movement of goods and capital. There is no migration equivalent of the World Trade Organisation. But international migration does not take place in a “legal or institutional void” (Hollifield 2004, 901). Indeed, according to Hollifield one of the most important developments in the regulation of international migration after World War II has been the development of international human rights law. Through the development of human rights law, rights that were previously the privilege of citizens have been extended to all inhabitants of a territory. The extension of rights to non-citizens has contributed to blur the distinction between nationals and non-nationals. Though these rights are mostly social and civil rights, they include political rights such as the right for non-nationals to vote in local elections, contributing to the rise of “transnational citizenship” (Bauböck 2007).

Because immigrants have rights, the state cannot deal with them summarily. And supporters of immigrants, like church groups or ethnic organisations, can mobilise protection from the judiciary against the executive branch of the state. Hollifield argues that liberal states are trapped in a ‘liberal

paradox' (Hollifield 2004, 2008). This 'liberal paradox', summarises Portes and DeWind (2004), means that "the most powerful nations in the world are prevented by their own laws from effectively controlling or suppressing unwanted immigration." (Portes and DeWind 2004, 832).

Hollifield argues that the main driving force behind late twentieth century and early twenty-first century international migration is economic globalisation. However, while the logic of the globalised economy demands openness, the political and legal logic of the international system of nation-states is still that of closure (Hollifield 2004, 887). Just as the mercantile state had to risk to open itself to trade in the 18th century, writes Hollifield, nation-states of today have to open themselves to migration. Hollifield (2004) argues that the 'emerging migration state' needs to deal with the fact that cross-border trade and cross-border movement of people are intrinsically linked together, and cope with increasing international migration. The economic forces fuelling international migration are so strong that unilateral or bilateral policies will not be enough to regulate migration. Rather than perceiving the last decades' development of international human rights law as another constraint on national immigration policy, Hollifield argues that it is this kind of multi-lateral legal framework that can help states escape from the 'liberal paradox' (Hollifield 2004). The challenge is to change the very nature of the liberal nation state, to make sure there is no domestic, xenophobic backlash against liberal immigration policies. There is a need to make sure "openness is institutionalized and (constitutionally) protected from the 'majority of the moment'" (Hollifield 2004, 904).

According to Castles (2004a, 2004b), the reason why immigration policies fail to reach their declared objectives, or often have unintended consequences, is a combination of several factors. One important reason is that 'one-sided explanatory models' of international migration fail to grasp the complex and long-term social dynamics of migration processes. Migration cannot be "turned on or off like a tap" (Castles and Miller 2009, 33). People's motivations to move cannot be reduced to individual utility maximisation, and the resulting complexities will make it impossible to construct a perfect, administrative regulation of migration. (Castles 2004a, 858). According to Castles another important reason is connected to the political system of receiving states. Globalisation increases migration by creating both the global inequalities that exacerbate poverty and deprivation and incite people to leave, and the cultural capital and technical means to migrate. But states are not powerless. States do shape migration movements, but often in contradictory and incoherent ways, since states have to balance conflicting interests. (Castles 2004a).

The 'thesis of declining sovereignty' has been challenged by among others Freeman (Freeman 1995, 1998). According to Freeman, liberal democracies have equipped themselves with important capacities to manage and control immigration. Contrary to common perception, he argues, these

states' control over immigration is increasing rather than decreasing over time. "The sovereign powers of states to regulate their borders and the terms of membership in their societies remain substantial." (Freeman 1998, 101). Freeman argues that states are also able to substantially control asylum related immigration. During the first decades after the adoption of the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the number of asylum seekers was limited by the Cold War to a very small number. When the numbers of asylum seekers drastically increased with the fall of the Eastern Bloc and later with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this "overburdened an individual-centred process of determining genuine refugee status, attuned to the trickle of (politically convenient) refugee flows in the Cold War era" (Freeman 1998, 109). But Western states eventually managed to adapt to the new situation.

Rather than looking at exogenous factors, Freeman argues that increasing immigration can be explained by factors that are endogenous to the state. According to Freeman, important constraints on states' possibilities to control immigration have domestic origins. The existence of liberal immigration policies can be explained by the fact that the benefits of immigration are concentrated, whereas the costs are diffuse (Hollifield 2008, 192). When the benefits of immigration are concentrated to well-organised interests, such as employers in a particular sector of the economy, these interests can have a decisive influence on immigration policy. There is no reason why immigration policies should be more inefficient than other kinds of state policies. What is often overlooked is, according to Freeman, that "domestic forces, rather than constituting a powerful and uniform stimulus for restrictionism, is a much more complex force that actually undermines such efforts." (Freeman 1998, 87). Freeman gives primacy to politics and the domestic interplay of political interests. "Rather than a side-show in the larger story of socio-economic change, politics is itself a cause of weak sovereignty and ineffective immigration policy." (Freeman 1998, 103).

The result of this balancing of interest is often liberal immigration policies, despite strong restrictionist political pressures. Boswell (2007) argues that immigration policy should be interpreted as the result of the 'functional imperatives' of the state. In Boswell's account, the 'functional imperatives' of the state is to defend its legitimacy by satisfying people's expectations that the state must provide security (including border control), fairness (including equal treatment of all inhabitants), conditions for the accumulation of wealth (including possibly labour immigration) and institutional legitimacy (including predictability and the rule of law) (Boswell 2007, 88-92). By bringing these functional imperatives of the state into the analysis, Boswell formulates a 'third way' of explaining immigration policy between political economy (represented by Freeman), where the state is merely seen as neutral broker of interests, and neo-institutionalist (represented among others by Hollifield). According to Boswell, neo-institutionalist approaches fail to explain why the state

takes certain societal interests, domestic and international norms seriously: why is the state constrained by liberal institutions? Boswell argues that the powers of the interests that compete over immigration policy depend on how these interests relate to the functional imperatives of the state.

It is not possible to make a neat distinction between domestic and non-domestic forces that constrain migration policy. The forces of the global economy are—at least to some extent—shaped by domestic political decisions. The international human rights regime is implemented through and by domestic legal institutions, and it is often ultimately anchored in the national constitution. At the domestic level, the interests of business are embedded in the demands of the global economy. The confusion of the domestic and the non-domestic is particularly acute when it comes to the actor that is the focus of this study: migrants themselves.

While state regulation seem to have a decisive influence on migration, it has been suggested that states' main influence might not be on the number of migrants, but rather on the status of migrants (Castles 2004a, Guiraudon and Joppke 2001, Sassen 2006). If the demand for immigrant labour is strong enough, a strict limitation of immigration might only have as its consequence that those who immigrate do so under irregular conditions. Similarly, an open immigration policy might not lead to a very large inflow of immigrants. The structure of the labour market is often decisive, a fact that can be illustrated with the the experience of Sweden in connection with the EU-enlargement in 2004 (Devitt 2011). Even though Sweden just as the UK and Ireland refrained from imposing transitional limitations on the citizens of the new EU member states access to the labour market, the number of immigrants from the new EU member states was very limited (Tamas and Münz 2006).

3.4 Transnationalism: A New Optic

Our analytical lens must necessarily broaden and deepen because migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social fields, encompassing those who move and those who stay behind. As a result, basic assumptions about social institutions such as the family, citizenship, and nation-states need to be revisited. (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, 1003)

As mentioned above, in neo-classical economic analysis of migration, the individual is the unit of analysis, and a decision to migrate is assumed to be based on this individual's cost-benefit analysis of the possible gains from international migration (Massey et al. 1993, 434). In other words: it is the migrant's calculation of the costs and benefits of moving to areas with higher expected earnings that drives migration. As was mentioned above, "New Economics of Labour Migration" made an important contribution to migration theory by challenging the neo-classic assumption of the autonomous individual migrant. Instead, focus was shifted to a network of people, generally living together in a household and/or tied together by kinship ties (Taylor 1986, Stark 1991). In dual

labour market theory and world systems theory, migration is driven by powerful economic forces, that individual states, and let alone individual migrants, have little possibilities to influence.

It is an important sociological and anthropological insight that “migrants are not isolated individuals who react to market stimuli and bureaucratic rules” (Castles 2004a, 860). Rather, the notion of migrant agency helps to perceive migrants as social beings, who shape the immigration process in their struggle to pursue a better future for themselves and their families. Research on the causes of migration and the relationship between migration and development has been criticised for failing to simultaneously incorporate structural causes with migrant agency (see for instance De Haas 2010).

The agency of individual migrants is central to transnationalism. In this perspective focus is put on the links that migrants create between countries of origin and host countries and the transnational social spaces that are built in this process. The agency of the migrants themselves in forging and sustaining these transnational links is at the centre of attention (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994).

Transnationalism is a perspective in migration studies that has gained significant ground during the past two decades (for overviews and definitions, see e.g. Bauböck and Faist 2010, Castles and Miller 2009, 30-33, Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, Vertovec 2004). Transnationalism focuses on the cross-border ties that migrants keep while integrating in their new societies and that non-migrants keep with emigrants. Migrants’ aspirations, strategies and motivations depend on conditions in the host society, but are also shaped by their ties to their countries of origin. In order to analyse migrant agency, it is necessary to look for influencing factors in both countries of origin and host countries.

The International Organisation for Migration lists the emergence of transnational migration as a global trend that, by the shrinking of the gap between ‘geographical space’ and ‘migration space’ will have far-reaching consequences for international migration. According to the IOM, transnational migration is giving rise to a new kind of people-State relationship, which is “likely to influence the future course of human mobility” (IOM 2011). An early proponent of a ‘transnationalist perspective’ on migration studies is the American sociologist Levitt who in 2001 published a study on the transnational community created by migrants from the village of Miraflores in The Dominican Republic to Boston in the US. Levitt argues that this ‘transnational village’ is “emblematic of changes in contemporary migration patterns” (Levitt 2006, 23). Levitt predicts that more and more people in the future will “work, pray and express their political interests in several contexts rather than in a single nation state.” (Levitt 2006, 24).

Transnational perspectives on migration strive to overcome the ‘false dichotomy’ that in traditional migration theory tends to classify migrants either as immigrants or emigrants (Basch,

Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994). According their often used definition, transnational migration should be understood as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994, 6). In a transnational perspective, the nation state is no longer the starting point. Migrants have not either departed from or arrived in a given nation state, they live their lives between one or more states at a time. People that simultaneously interact and identify with more than on nation state and/or community contribute to the formation of transnational communities (Levitt 2001). De Haas writes that “clear- cut dichotomies of ‘origin’ or ‘destination’ and categories such as ‘permanent,’ ‘temporary,’ and ‘return’ migration are increasingly difficult to sustain in a world in which the lives of migrants are characterized by circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies or communities.” (De Haas 2010, 247).

When focus is placed on the transnational social fields that are created by migrants’ transnational practices, other groups of people are made visible: not only those who migrate, but also those who stay behind. Those who stay behind are influenced by migration in different ways. If someone in their household or family has migrated, they might receive remittances and other transfers (of values, knowledge, etc sometimes called social remittances.) from the destination country. But also those that do not have a direct connection to a migrant are influenced by the changes that migration brings to a society (Levitt 2001).

Political scientists have been concerned with analysing how migrants’ simultaneous memberships in two or more territorially separated and independent polities influence politics and political modes of action. Bauböck (2003) proposes a broad definition of political transnationalism in which not only migrants’ involvement in the domestic politics in their countries of origin is included, but also includes how migrant’s political transnationalism influences “collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both receiving and sending societies” (Bauböck 2003, 700). In Bauböck’s view, globalisation will not entail the replacement of national sovereignty and citizenship with deterritorialized or ‘postnational’ communities. Instead, he insists on the importance of the state in shaping the transnational social fields in which migrants live, for instance by naturalisation policies allowing for multiple citizenship (Bauböck 2003, 701).

Like any new perspective, attempts to apply a transnationalist view on migration has given raise to contentious debates. Critics of the transnationalist approach to migration studies have argued that transnationalism is nothing new; that definitions and delimitations are blurry and that the scope and consequences of transnationalism therefore have been exaggerated; and that a transnationalist perspective risks to reduce migrant experiences to an issue of ethnicity ignoring factors such as

class, race and gender. (For overviews of these debates, see Bommes 2003, Gran 2007, Joppke 1998, Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, Vertovec 2004).

New communication technologies and cheaper transportation has led to an intensification of transnational relations. But there seems to be a consensus that transnational practices as such are nothing new (Kraler and Parnreiter 2005, 341). Cohen (1997) traces cross-border and inter-cultural communities back to the first use of the term ‘diaspora’ in the Antique. In this sense, transnationalism is not the term for an entirely new social phenomena, but rather a new “analytical perspective” (Portes and DeWind 2004, 835). Bauböck argues that what is “fundamentally new and empirically significant” about migrant transnationalism are the “institutional responses to transnationalism that enable migrants to claim rights and membership in several polities” (Bauböck 2007, 2394). These ‘institutional responses’ include the introduction by an increasing number of states of external voting rights as well as an increased acceptance of dual citizenship. According to the democracy research institute IDEA, over 100 countries in the world now allow for citizens who reside abroad to vote in national elections (Bauböck 2007, 2393). The last decades have seen legal changes that have led to a proliferation of dual citizenships, particularly in Western Europe (Bauböck 2007, Howard 2009, Vink and de Groot 2010).

The concept of transnationalism has been criticised for being too broadly defined. The “surge in interest [in transnationalism] has been accompanied, however, by mounting theoretical ambiguity and analytical confusion in the use of the term.” (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003, 1212). Castles and Miller warn against the “inflationary use of such terms as ‘transnational communities’ and ‘transmigrants’” (Castles and Miller 2009, 32). In the beginning, researchers “tended to see transnational migration everywhere” (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 131). Not only scope, but also consequences tended to be exaggerated. Joppke criticises Jacobson (1996) for using ‘transnational ties’ as another word for the presence of immigrants. When Jacobson argues that transnational ties influence immigration policies, this is a circular argument, “saying that states accept immigrants because they accept immigrants.” (Joppke 1998, 14).

Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt has proposed that the concept of transnationalism should be delimited to “occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation” (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999, 219). Key to this narrowed definition is that transnational activities should be “a central part of a person’s life” (Castles and Miller 2009, 32). Or in another formulation by Portes (Portes 1999, 464, quoted by Castles and Miller 2009, 30) transnational practices are “those that take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time by participants.” With this definition, Guarnizo, Portes and Haller found that the number of immigrants

in three immigrant communities in the US who are actually involved in activities that could be termed transnational was fairly small (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003).

Portes et al.'s (2003) definition has been criticised for being too narrow. An important critique is that it tends to be an elite within an ethnic community that has time and resources to engage in transnationalist practices on a recurrent basis. This transnational elite consists of people like business men, political activists and/or community leaders. With a too narrow definition, migrants that engage in transnational practices only occasionally, for instance at certain stages of their life course (like marriage and burial) tend to remain invisible. (Gran 2007, 37, see also Koser and Ali 2002).

For the purpose of this study it is important to employ a perspective that renders visible not only the (recurrent or occasional) transnational practices of immigrants, but also sheds light on transnationalist practices of non-migrants in the sending country. Levitt and Glick-Schiller propose the optic of a transnational 'social field': "a set of multiple inter-locking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed" (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, 1009). A transnational social field encompasses migrants as well as non-migrants with and without migrant relatives. The idea of a transnational social field rests on the assumption that migration, and the ensuing transnational linkages, transform practices and norms also for those that are not migrants themselves (or members of migrant households).

Early scholarship on transnationalism, writes Levitt and Jaworsky in an overview (2007) tended to be "celebratory" (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 131). In this early scholarship, transnational ties were seen as a means to overcome a great number of problems confronting migrants. By doing this, the transnational perspective tended to essentialise migrant experiences based on ethnicity, and obscure obstacles that migrants encounter because of gender, race or class (Gran 2007).

The transnationalist perspective in migration studies has now somewhat matured, argue Levitt and Jaworsky: high-flying expectations of the scope and power of transnationalism have been pulled down to earth. Remaining is a new optic, that render visible migrants and non-migrants that are "simultaneously embedded in the multiple sites and layers of the transnational social fields in which they live." (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 130). Remaining is a perspective that focuses both on the agency of migrants and on the agency of non-migrants. It is a perspective that recognises that these transnational social fields extend beyond the duality of sending and receiving country, which demands a new thinking around concepts of belonging and identity and their transformations over time. (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 142).

3.5 Migrants' Transnational Practices and Migration Patterns

What does the transnational perspective add to the understanding of how the practices of individuals and households shape migration? As has been mentioned above, it has long been recognised that human networks play an important role in shaping migration. In this section, I highlight two aspects of the role of networks: firstly, the role of networks in explaining the direction of migration and secondly, the role of networks in the perpetuation of migration movements. I then describe what in my view are the two most important contributions of the transnationalist perspective to the understanding of how migration is shaped.

Network theory predates theories on transnationalism. Network theory assigns an important role to migrant networks in explaining and predicting migration. Networks lower the costs and risks associated with migration, and thereby increase the possible gains from migration (Massey et al. 1993, 448). Theories on migrant networks have raised two major assumptions about what causes international migration (Massey et al. 1993, 449-450). The first assumption concerns the direction of migration movements, and the second relates to the perpetuation of migration over time.

Migrants networks are thought to contribute to the concentration of migration to a limited number of receiving countries. The existence of networks makes it easier to walk the trodden path, to follow in the footsteps of others. This makes it attractive for a migrant to choose the same country of destination as other members of his or her network, which in turn concentrates migration to this country of destination. An important reason for the powerful effects of social networks is that the kind of information that social networks can provide has an economic worth. In order to understand why some people migrate while others don't, the 'social capital' that migrants can access through their network must be added into the equation together with migrants' material and human capital (such as particular skills or education). As networks expand, the cost of migration declines, and flows will predominantly go to countries with an already established community of people from the same country of origin.

There is ample empirical evidence of network effects. Social networks have been used to explain the geography of immigration to Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Collyer 2005, see above) and Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2008) have found strong network effects on immigration to OECD countries between 1990 and 2000, even though the effect of networks varies between countries with different welfare models and different kinds of immigration policy. A recent worldwide survey carried out by Gallup showed that networks play a crucial role at all stages of migration (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2011).

Summarising the results of the survey, Esipova, Ray and Pugliese write that "[t]he important role that transnational social networks play in migration is evident, regardless of whether people are

only dreaming of moving to another country or actually planning and preparing to go.” (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2011, 33). According to Gallup’s data, adults who report that they can count on assistance from family members or friends abroad are almost three times more likely to state that they would like to migrate than individuals who do not have access to such a network. Among the potential migrants, twice as many (14 percent) of those who can count on someone in another country say they are planning to move within the next 12 months as those who cannot count on someone in another country (6 percent) (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2011, 34).

An important reason for the crucial role played by social networks is the information that migrants obtain from members of their social network. According to the UNDP (2009, 102) the major cost for labour migrants is the cost related to the fact that they often have to receive a job offer from an employer abroad before migrating. Migrants who cannot obtain such a job offer through his or her social network has to rely on commercial agents or brokers. Not all of them are honest: many migrants are forced to pay exorbitant fees for obtaining information that is incomplete or incorrect, and some fall into the hands of smugglers who use risky, illegal migration channels.

The second assumption raised by network theory relates to the perpetuation of migration over time. Migration often starts for economic reasons. However, migration might continue and even increase despite deteriorated economic conditions like high unemployment in destination countries or higher costs of migration, for instance due to tightened admission policies (see for instance Schoorl 1998). Indeed, “the conditions that initiate international movement might be quite different from those that perpetuate it across space and time” (Massey et al. 1993, 448). Networks are assigned an important role in the perpetuation of migration. Networks are thought to help institutionalise migration, causing flows to continue even though the original cause of migration has faded or disappeared. Once migration has begun, a number of institutions emerge to cater for migrants’ needs. Some of these institutions operate on the ‘black market’ of immigration services, providing migrants with smugglers, false travel documents, etc. If the barriers to legal entry are high, and the expected benefits from migration are also high, this will be a lucrative business whose actors have an interest in keeping the business going. If governments try to impose restrictions on one form of migration, these actors might channel migration through other channels, such as the asylum system or undocumented entry (Castles 2004a, 859). Other institutions that contribute to the perpetuation of migration are voluntary organisations set up to defend the rights of labour migrants or asylum seekers by giving advice, organising shelter, etc. (Massey et al. 1993, 450-451).

Because networks contribute to the ‘geographical clustering’ of migration, networks can also contribute to perpetuate migration by the creation of a *culture of migration* (Massey et al 1993). Such a culture emerges when the number of migrants or migrant households reaches a certain

threshold in a given location. If a very large share of households in a community have relatives abroad, migration will be seen as a normal thing to do. In such communities, “migration becomes deeply engrained into the repertoire of people’s behaviours” (Massey et al. 1993, 452-53) and the community identifies itself as a community in which migration is part of its culture. This migration culture can be strengthened when migrants keep close contacts with non-migrants in their place of origin. Levitt has described how such a migration culture has emerged in the Dominican village of Villaflores, where more than a third of village residents lived abroad in the 1990s (Levitt 1999), and how the practice of migration is upheld by its ‘global villagers’ (Levitt 2001).

In my view, the transnationalist optic add two major aspects to the understanding of how people’s networks shape migration. Firstly, by identifying transnational social fields or spaces, a transnational perspective helps understand how cross-border social ties shape migration patterns not only for people in migrant’s immediate network, but for entire communities. Secondly, a transnationalist perspective highlights the long-term duration of cross-border ties. By conceptualising of migrants as individuals who live their lives between one or more states at a time, transnationalist scholars have shown that there is no contradiction between integrating in the host society and keeping strong social ties to the society of origin. Transnational social ties are not perceived as a temporary phenomena that will fade rapidly as migrants prolong their stay in the host country, but as lasting ties that will help shape migration patterns in the long run.

Transnational spaces

The concept of a transnational *space* or a transnational social field is central to understand how transnational practices influence migration patterns. Glick Schiller has defined transnational social fields as “networks of networks that link individuals directly or indirectly to institutions located in more than one nation-state” (Glick Schiller 2010, 112). Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) point out that even when only one member in a transnational social space maintain intensive contacts with the country of origin, the entire community comes in touch with the information, resources and identities that this person transmits. Other individuals in the transnational social space might not be actively engaged in transnational practices, but transnational modes of action are part of their ‘tool box’ and can be used if events or circumstances necessitates it. Levitt and Glick-Schiller write: “Recognizing that this individual is embedded in a transnational social field may be a better predictor of future transnational behaviour than if we simply locate him or her solely within a nationally delimited set of relations” (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004, 1009–1010). The concept of a transnational social space or field is thus essential for understanding how also non-migrants and non-migrant households can access ‘tools’ or resources to facilitate migration. The way in which the

transnationalist perspective helps understand the long-term duration of cross-border ties and their impacts is the topic of next section of this chapter.

3.6 Transnationalism and Integration: On the Durability of Transnational Ties

Migration has never been a one-way process of assimilation into a melting pot or a multicultural salad bowl but one in which migrants, to varying degrees, are simultaneously embedded in the multiple sites and layers of the transnational social fields in which they live. (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 130)

Transnationalism and assimilation are sometimes portrayed as opposites. In this line of argument, maintaining transnational ties are seen as an obstacle to assimilation into the host country. Instead of investing time and resources into activities that benefit integration into the new country (such as learning the language or engaging in local politics) migrants with strong transnational ties, the argument goes, spend too much time with their co-ethnics, and remit money ‘home’ instead of investing it in their country of residence.

Esser argues that immigrants have to strike a balance between the utility the immigrants and their children get from investing in ‘host country capital’, like learning the local language or getting a degree in the host country, as opposed to investing in ‘ethnic community capital’, like the conservation of language, networks and culture of the country of origin (Esser 2004). It can be argued that integration suffers when strong transnational ties influence how migrants balance between investing in ‘host country capital’ and ‘ethnic community capital’.

It seems that migrant experiences often tell a different story. Transnational practices and assimilation into the host country need not be binary opposites (Levitt and Sørensen 2004). Transnational practices are not necessarily an obstacle to integration. In a study of immigrant communities in the Netherlands, Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes (2006) found that “Migrant groups that are known as poorly integrated into Dutch society are not more involved in transnational activities and have no stronger identifications with the country of origin than other groups.” (Snel, Engbersen and Leerkes 2006, 285; also quoted in Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 137). On the contrary, many studies have found that those who engage in transnational practices are often relatively well assimilated. In a study of political practices among three Latin American immigrant groups in the US, Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003) found that “it is not the least educated, more marginal, or more recent arrivals who are most prone to retain ties with their home country politics.” (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003, 1229). Instead, transnational political activities were often carried out by people with relatively high social status. This is in line with a study on diaspora involvement in the development of countries of origin (De Haas 2006). De Haas argues that it is “actually incorrect to

automatically interpret migrants' commitment towards their countries of origin as a consequence of their inability or unwillingness to integrate." Rather, "it is in particular the relatively successful and 'integrated' migrants who have the time, know-how and resources to remit money, to become active in diaspora organisations and to remain involved in the social and economic development of countries of origin" (De Haas 2006, 96).

It is difficult to find out if the fact that many relatively resourceful migrants are involved in transnational practices is a result of self-selection. It might be that only better-off people can spend time and money on transnational activities. However, it might also be that transnational practices lead to higher social status. There are many ways in which transnational linkages can be beneficial for the migrant in the host-country. Businessmen who trade with their country of origin or who establish a business geared towards his or her ethnic community in the host country are some examples. There is empiric evidence that transnational practices might actually facilitate assimilation. In a study conducted among Greek immigrants in the US (Karpathakis 1999) it was found that the attempts of Greek migrants to influence American policy towards Greece eventually led to their incorporation into the political system (Karpathakis 1999; quoted by Gran 2007, 43). In summary, writes Levitt and Jaworsky, "[r]ecent scholarship suggests multiple memberships can enhance rather than compete with or contradict each other." (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 137).

Even though immigrants do indeed assimilate into their host society, transnational ties are still upheld. By engaging in transnational practices, 'assimilated' immigrants simultaneously keep ties with their country of origin. By doing business with people in the country of origin, by travelling there, or simply by keeping in touch by phone and online, these immigrants continue to be exposed to values, social practices and ideas from their country of origin. For transnational migrants, their country of origin and their country of destination are not separate spheres, "but part of the same social system within which ideas about morality, equality, and democracy are renegotiated" (Levitt 2006, 25). In her study of people in the transnational community of Miraflores in the Dominican Republic and Boston in the US, Levitt could record how political morality in the US (such as the public condemnation of Bill Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky) was changing the way people from Miraflores both in Boston and in the Dominican Republic looked upon the morals of Dominican politicians (Levitt 2006).

Increasing transnational practices have prompted state responses who can in themselves help sustain transnational ties over time. Institutional and political responses to transnational practices can be measured by the increased number of countries that recognise dual citizenship, extend voting rights to non-residents, and institutionalise relationships with their diasporas (Bauböck 2007). These

political and legal developments help institutionalise multiple allegiances over time and over generations.

Sending states are increasingly recognising the benefits of transnational ties, and try to harness these benefits in different ways. A case in point is policies to engage diasporas (Gamlen 2006). An important tool for keeping diasporas and co-ethnic communities abroad engaged in their country of origin has been the introduction of external voting rights. When the diaspora represent a small faction of the resident citizenship of a state, the introduction of external voting rights will have limited impact. Often, the voter turn-out is lower among external than among resident voters (Bauböck 2007). But for some countries the introduction of external voting rights could have dramatic consequences. Bauböck (2007) points at the example of Hungary, that has a population of 10 million and a diaspora of Hungarian citizens consisting of up to 3.5 million people. If these non-resident citizens could vote in elections in Hungary, their votes could have a decisive influence on the electoral outcome. This potential leverage might in itself motivate Hungarians abroad to make use of and defend their voting rights.

The reason why sending states attempt to mobilise their diasporas is because it is increasingly recognised that diasporas can play a positive role in promoting development in their country of origin (Gamlen 2006). But history also knows of diasporas that have helped fuel civil strife and conflict from abroad. A classic example is how support for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from nostalgic Irish-Americans in the US prolonged the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s. The Jewish diaspora in the US is often criticised for their uncompromising positions on Middle East politics. In his work “Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs” Shain (2008) adds the example of the Armenian diaspora (See also Shain and Barth 2003). Shain argues that the Armenian diaspora in France, in the US and elsewhere was “a crucial factor” in ousting the Armenian president Ter-Petrossian in 1998 and replacing his conciliatory policies towards Armenia’s neighbour Turkey with a “more militant anti-Turkish line” (Shain 2008, 152).

As have been shown above, it is important to acknowledge the agency of migrants in shaping migration patterns, without at the same time ignoring the role of the state in shaping the choices that migrants make (Hollifield 2004, 901). Also transnational communities are shaped by state policies. “(...) diaspora is not merely an object of policy, but also a function of it.” (Gamlen 2011, 267). Integration policies shape transnationalism (Boswell and Ciobanu 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005; Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes 2006). An important indication of this is that communities of people from the same country display different transnational practices in different host countries. Koopmans et al. (2005) have gathered empirical data on migrants’ political claims-making in five European countries. Koopmans et al. argue that cross-national differences in migrants’ political

claims-making are related to different integration regimes in migrant host countries rather than differences in migrant countries of origin. Their data, they write, “provide little support for the culturalist view of migrants as transnational communities and strong evidence for the continued relevance of national integration politics.” (Koopmans et al. 2005, 142). In chapter 7, I look at how the ‘Swedish model of integration’ has contributed to shape the transnational practices of Kurds in Sweden.

Even though there is no single theory that can explain all aspects of migration, there are a number of theories on international migration that contribute to explain what causes migration and what perpetuates migration over time. Some theories operate at an individual or household level, while others look at international migration from a macro perspective.

Neo-classical theory focuses on the individual, and his or her rational calculation of the costs of migration, generally by analysing the difference between possible wage gains in the prospective country of destination minus the costs of travelling there. Proponents of the New Economics of Labour Migration use the household as the unit of analysis, and add a number of factors—notably risk diversification—that influence the propensity to migrate.

Fundamentally, migrants are motivated by a search for better opportunities. Still, migration cannot be explained easily by comparing different opportunities in different countries: human migration is not a simple function of wage differentials or different levels of security. Political constraints also shape migrants’ choices and opportunities, and must be taken into account. While world system theory is pessimistic of the possibility of states to politically influence migration, there is empiric evidence that political factors are often indeed decisive for the size and direction of migration. However, network and migration system theory show how individual migrants, their networks and transnational ties can shape and transform migration movements, often undermining the efforts of states to control immigration. Next chapter focuses on how a central transnational migrant practice, that of sending money home, helps shape migration.

4 A Transnationalist Perspective on How Remittances Shape Migration

Remittances are funds that migrants transfer from host countries to individuals, households and associations in the country of origin. The ‘discovery’ of remittances in the 1970s led to an important reconsideration of migration theory. In neo-classical, individual-centred economic theory of migration there was no room for remittances (Taylor 1999). Neo-classical economic theory conceived of migrants as autonomous, utility maximizing individuals, and thus tended to have blind spot for migrants’ relations and ties to families, households and communities. A simplistic model of international migration in which migrants are supposed to leave areas with low wages and bad opportunities for areas or countries with higher wages and better opportunities, does not foresee that migrants would transfer the wage differential back to the area or country they have left. However, this is what millions of migrants across the world do, and the size of the flows created by the efforts of migrants to support families and relatives back home makes remittances the maybe most tangible of all transnational practices.

My point of departure here is that patterns of migration cannot be understood in isolation from remittances. Remittances and migration are intertwined and endogenous phenomena (McKenzie and Sasin 2007). Remittances are both an impact and a cause of migration (Taylor 1999). In order to find out what role the transnational ties between Kurds in Sweden and their relatives and communities in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq have played in making Sweden an important destination for immigration from Iraq, remittances merit particular attention. Remittances are a crucial part of the transnational ties that connect migrants in Sweden to individuals and communities in their countries of origin. In my case study, I analyse patterns of remittance sending (occurrence, frequency, use, etc.) in order to understand how the transnational practice of sending remittances contribute to shape migration between Iraq and Sweden.

It seems natural to look at the relationship between remittances and migration as a casual relationship where migration creates remittances. This relationship certainly exists. On the macroeconomic level, the global flows of remittances are determined by the stock of migrants in the remittance sending country (that is, the number of people who have migrated there), the migrants’ average wage level as well as their general economic situation in their host country. This is probably true also for Sweden. Analysing IMF balance of payment data, Brinkberg and Engdahl have found

that the number of individuals born abroad in the Swedish population is positively correlated with the amount of remittances sent from Sweden for the years 1970 through 2004 (Brinkberg and Engdahl, 2007). Brinkberg (2009) found indications that the change in migration patterns to Sweden, with an important increase of migrants coming from non-OECD countries, can help explain the increase of remittances from Sweden since the 1980s. Holmqvist (2009) have found a correlation between Swedish economic growth and the amount of remittances sent from Sweden. In times of severe economic crisis, like in the beginning of the 1990s, the curve of outflow remittances measured in the IMF balance of payment statistics drops (Holmqvist, 2009, 5). The general pattern is that flows of remittances grow with the number of migrants and with their income, even though this description of how migration influences the size of remittance flows is a simplification.

While it is clear that international migration generate flows of remittances from host countries to countries of origin, remittances also generate migration. Neo-classic economic theory focuses on possibilities for individuals to improve their income and life perspectives as incentives for migration. However, later theories acknowledge that migration is often motivated by a collective effort to secure the livelihood of an entire household. A household's need to secure assistance from abroad in the form of remittances can be an important incentive to encourage one or several of its members to migrate. Another reason is that remittances from abroad are often used to finance migration. In the following, I develop these two arguments for relating remittances to migration patterns. I find that a transnational perspective on migration helps understand the relationship between remittances and migration patterns.

4.1 Remittances as an Incentive to Migrate

That the need to secure remittances from abroad is an important incentive to migrate is a central tenant of the New Economics of Labour Migration (De Haas 2010, 243). The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) highlights the links between decisions about remittances and decisions about migration (Carling 2008a).

According to the New Economics of Labour Migration, remittances are often part of a contractual agreement between the migrant and his or her household in the country of origin (Taylor 1999). As described above, the New Economics of Labour Migration models migration as a risk-diversification strategy. To protect itself against income shocks (for instance due to crop failure or extreme weather such as hurricanes), the household supports one or several migrants to work in a non-correlated labor market abroad (or in a city in the context of rural-urban migration). The household invests in the migrant (for instance by covering migration costs or by supporting the

migrant while he or she is looking for a job) and the migrant compensates with remittances. This implicit co-insurance agreement reduces risks both for the household and the migrant.

Another form of contractual agreement is household investment in education of one or several of its members for the purposes of migration. With better education, a member of the household might be able to find a job abroad. Remittances sent to the original household are then a loan repayment, and should increase with the level of education of the migrant. This effect might be difficult to separate from altruism, since higher education tends to be associated with higher income. However, in an effort to measure the net effect of the so-called brain drain, Riccardo Faini (2006) has tried to determine if high-skilled emigration produce larger flows of remittances than emigration of low-skilled workers. Because high-skilled workers earn more, they have a larger capacity to remit than low-skilled workers. But, writes Faini, “[t]here is no evidence that skilled workers remit more.” (Faini 2006, 2). This can be explained by the fact that high-skilled workers tend to come from relatively wealthy families, who have less need for support in the form of remittances. It can also, according to Faini, be connected to the fact that skilled workers tend to spend longer periods of time abroad, which weakens their ties with their country of origin.

In an attempt to improve Faini’s model, Niimi, Ozden, and Schiff (2008) have processed data on migration levels, migrants’ education level, and source countries’ income, financial sector development and expected growth rate in 82 countries. Niimi, Ozden, and Schiff (2008) found that remittances do actually *decrease* with the share of migrants with tertiary education. However, in 2009 Bollard et al. published the results of analyses of micro-data from surveys in eleven migrant destination countries. Bollard et al. conclude that there is a strong positive relation between education and the amount remitted, given that the surveyed individual remitted at all. The most important reason why more educated remit more was, according to to Bollard et al, the higher income earned by migrants with higher education.

How do remittances influence the incentives to migrate? In a study using interview data from Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, Van Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema (2005) attempt to determine if members of migrant households (defined as households with a least one member of the household currently living abroad) that receive remittances differ in their intentions to migrate from members of households that do not receive remittances. Van Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema conclude that the receipt of remittances does have a positive effect on the intentions to migrate: individuals in households that receive remittances are more likely to have the intention to migrate than individuals in households who do not receive remittances from abroad. A reason why remittance trigger intentions to migrate can be that remittances convey a ‘message’ to members of the households that

have stayed behind. Remittances might signal that the household member who has migrated is successful, and that migration is profitable (Van Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema 2005).

Before I look at other aspects of how remittances shape migration patterns, it is important to acknowledge that important flows of remittances are sent by non-economic migrants. Should one expect refugees or asylum seekers to remit less money than labour migrants? This question is relevant for a study on remittances from Sweden, since migration to Sweden has been dominated by asylum migration during the last four decades (see chapter Background). Intuitively, one might assume that labor migrants have a higher propensity to remit than refugees. The very motivation for labour migration is often the possibility to send money home. However, in line with altruistic motives to remit, it might indeed be the needs of those at home that determine if and how much remittances are sent. In fact, refugees have been found to have similar propensities to remit as non-refugees (see for instance Akruet 2005, Lindley 2007). Indeed, there are many examples of important flows of remittances originating from refugee communities. Remittances sent by Bosnian refugees in Europe or by Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica have been indispensable for the survival of their worn-torn societies (UNDP 2009, 72).

4.2 Remittances as a Source of Funding Migration

That remittances are used to finance migration is nothing new. Around a quarter of the emigration from Europe to the United States at the beginning of the last century is believed to have been financed by remittances from those already in the US (Magee and Thompson 2006 and Baines 1985, quoted by UNDP 2009, 29). In a study based on interviews with migrant and non-migrant households in Morocco, Egypt and Turkey, Van Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema (2005) found that the emigration intentions of household members still living in the country of origin were positively influenced by the receipt of remittances.

These results were confirmed in a world-wide survey carried out by Gallup from 2005 until 2011. According to the Gallup data, individuals who receive help from family and friends in other countries are almost three times as likely to desire to migrate than individuals who do not receive that kind of assistance. According to Gallup's figures, 38 percent of people who live in households that receive money from abroad say that they would like to migrate, whereas only 12 percent of people living in households that do not receive remittances say they would like to move abroad (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2011, 34). Importantly, the act of receiving remittances not only increases the desire to migrate, it also increases the likelihood that potential migrants make plans to move in the near future or are actually making preparations to move (such as buying tickets or applying for visa). 21 percent of the potential migrants who belong to households that receive

remittances plan to move within the coming 12 months, whereas only 7 percent of potential migrants who do not receive remittances do actually plan to migrate in the coming year (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2011, 34). The transnational act of receiving remittances is thus an important indicator of desire and plans to migrate.

In 1985, Lukas and Stark published an often-quoted article based on their research on remittance sending in Botswana. Lucas and Stark hypothesised that the motivations to send remittances would be ‘pure altruism’, ‘pure self-interest’ or ‘tempered altruism’/‘enlightened self-interest’. Attempts to test the model developed by Lucas and Stark have been the focus of mainly economic studies of the motivations of remittance senders for the past two decades (see Rapoport and Docquier 2005 for an overview). If sending remittances is guided by altruism, remittances should be higher the lower the income of the receiver. A motivation guided by self-interest would for instance be that of assuring an inheritance, sometimes called the ‘bequest motive’. In this case, remittances would be larger the larger the (inheritable) resources of the receiving household. Lucas and Stark (1985) concluded that remittances in the cases they studies were guided by ‘tempered altruism’ or ‘enlightened self-interest’, implying that altruistic and self-interested or contractual motives are not necessarily exclusive.

With empirical evidence from different regions and immigrant groups, in fact both altruist and self-interested motives to remit have been confirmed. Orozco et al. (2005) argue that both motives may indeed operate simultaneously. Different motives might overlap and complement each other (Orozco, Lowell and Schneider 2006). Carling (2008a) argues that the hitherto prevailing focus on determining the balance between altruist and self-interested motives to remit has been unfortunate. With this narrow focus, argues Carling, researchers risk to overlook the complex context of migration and remittance decisions. The motivations to send money home are influenced by the context of migration, by variations in the nature of families and households as well as by normative settings (Carling 2008a, 584-585). Below, I devote one section to a life course perspective on remittances, and one section to a reflection on how changes in the normative settings in which remittances are sent might influence patterns of remittance sending.

4.3 Transnational Practices Over Time: A Life Course Perspective On Remittances

As has been shown above, flows of remittances can be explained by a number of different factors. Microeconomic determinants of remittances include age, education, gender, marital status, household size and length of stay in the host country as well as plans to return (see Carling 2008a, Hagen-Zanker and Siegel 2007 and Rapoport and Docquier 2005 for overviews). In this section, I show how many of these determinants of remittances can be related to different stages in the life

course of the studied individuals. I argue that a life course perspective on remittances can help understand how the transnational practice of sending remittances and its implications change over time.

Central to the life course perspective is the notion that earlier life events, or life history, has strong impacts on outcomes later in life (Mayer 2009). The life course perspective is not a coherent body of theory, but rather an interdisciplinary area of study. In life course research, focus is placed on the timing, sequence and structure of major life course events and how this structures population groups (Bailey 2008). Major life events include when the studies subject starts and finishes school or education, moves away from home, finds a partner, becomes a parent, starts working, retires, etc. Motives to migrate are strongly related to different stages in the life course (Lee 1966, Warnes 1992, Fischer and Malmberg 2001). In his classic text on migration theory, Lee writes:

There are clearly stages in the life cycle in which the positive elements at origin are overwhelmingly important in limiting migration, and there are times in which such bonds are slackened with catastrophic suddenness. Children are bound to the familial residence by the need for care and subsistence, but, as one grows older, ages are reached at which it is customary to cease one stage of development and begin another. Such times are the cessation of education, entrance into the labor force, or retirement from work. Marriage, too, constitutes such a change in the life cycle, as does the dissolution of marriage, either through divorce or the death of a spouse. (Lee 1966, 51–52)

As has been pointed out above, remittances are “intrinsically linked to the migration process” (Clark and Drinkwater 2006, 734). Since there are strong linkages between decisions to migrate and decisions to remit (see also Carling 2008a), motives to remit can also be expected to vary over the life course. One case in point is how motivations to migrate and to remit vary with age. It is reasonable to assume that the propensity to give gifts and economic support will differ by age. Young people who are still at school or newly arrived on the labour market have less ability to remit than older people. The assumption that the propensity to remit increases with increasing age has been confirmed in a number of studies. After a certain age, however, this propensity tends to decrease. One reason is probably that income decreases after retirement, but the fact that the propensity to send remittances tend to decrease with increasing age has also been linked to the tendency of ties to the country of origin to grow weaker over time (Holst, Schäfer and Schrooten 2008).

One aspect of how age determines remittance behaviour is age at the time of migration (Carling 2008b, Snel, Engbersen and Leerkes 2006). Migrants who left their country of origin in their childhood or youth might not have strong ties to family and relatives in that country. For migrants

who moved abroad as adults, and have spent a smaller share of their lives in another country, the incentives to return are stronger. Migrants who plan to return to their country of origin tend to have a higher propensity to remit, and to remit larger amounts (Ulku 2010; Carling 2008a; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006a; Merkle and Zimmermann 1992). An implication of this is that remittances can be expected to decline with increasing time spent in the country of destination, but not necessarily to decline with increasing age. Indeed, Snel, Engbersen and Leerkes (2006) found that among six immigrant groups in the Netherlands, higher age at the time of migration was connected with higher participation in transnational practices, including remittance sending.

An important conclusion of this conflicting empirical evidence on the effect of age on remittances is that it is necessary to take several factors into account simultaneously: the fact that remittance seem to increase with age might be because income (and thereby the capacity to remit) also does, and it might decrease with age since the propensity to remit tend to decrease with time since migration. To this, one must add a family perspective: young people's higher propensity to remit might be a reflection of the fact that their families have not yet joined them in the country of destination, and older people's lower propensity to remit might be a reflection of the fact that the original receivers of remittances are no longer alive.

In a review of micro determinants determinants of remittances (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011) we conclude that the conflicting effects of age on patterns of remittance sending highlights the relevance of looking at determinants linked to phases in the life course rather than age on its own.

Migration can be seen as a strategy to deal with transitions between different stages in the life course. The sending of remittances can be a means of transferring funds and resources between different stages of the life course. In countries with well-developed capital markets, young people can take a credit in order to finance their studies, to settle in their own first flat, etc. In countries where affordable credits are difficult to access, remittances might function as intra-family transfers over the life course. Analysing data from a Peruvian household survey, Cox, Eser and Jimenez (1998) found that remittances are sent to households in "low earning phases of the life-cycle" (Cox et al., 1998, 14, quoted by Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 7). Intra-family transfers in the form of remittances compensate for lack of opportunities to borrow from future income (for instance post-graduation incomes), and for difficulties to save towards retirement. These intra-family transfers are made in an informal setting. It is a kind of contractual agreement between the migrant and his or her household that must be self-reinforcing, which point to the importance of strong family ties to explain remittances: "the strength of family ties is likely to play a crucial role

in overcoming hurdles to the financing of lifetime consumption paths” writes Van Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema (2005, 377).

As has been shown above, both altruist and self-interest motives to remit imply that remittances are positively related to the income of the remitter. According to Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007), most studies [do indeed] find a positive effect of migrant’s income on remittances. But the relationship between the migrant’s level of income and the amount remitted is not linear. Surveying Salvadoran and Filipino remittance senders in the US, Menjivar et al. (1998) found that increased household income did not result in a linear increase of remittances: a 10 percent increase in income only led to a 4 percent increase in the remitted amount (quoted by DeSipio 2000). A life course perspective on remittances can help understand this result, by relating migrants’ behaviour to stages in the life course. A survey among immigrants from Somaliland in Sweden even showed a weak negative correlation between income and amount remitted, that is: the amount remitted did not increase with the income of the remitter (Stryjan 2007). However, those surveyed individuals with a more stable living situation (in particular a full-time job, but also a stable housing situation) tended to remit higher amounts. A Canadian survey among recent immigrants detected differences in the amounts remitted and the propensity to remit that were not related to current income, but were positively correlated with the place of residence. In regions with comparatively high unemployment, migrants tended to remit less. In regions whose economy performed better both the incidence of remitters and the remitted amounts were higher, possibly reflecting “positive expectations on future earnings” (Houle and Schellenberg 2008, 10).

Also, the income level of migrants in the host country may not be positively related with the *propensity* to remit (Faini 2006; Page and Plaza 2006). Faini explained this with the fact that skilled migrants more often have the possibility to live with their families abroad, and that skilled migrants tended to spend more time abroad leading to weaker ties to the original household in the country of origin (Faini, 2006).

Many empirical studies have been made in order to test what has been termed ‘the remittance decay hypothesis’. According to this hypothesis, the propensity to remit over time follows an inverted U-curve (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006a). As recent immigrants have not yet been able to establish themselves on the labour market, they have little possibility to send larger gifts or economic support to their relatives. But as the immigrants gain increasing foothold in their host country, the propensity to remit would increase as well. As more time passes, however, the ties to the country of origin get weaker.

The results of different efforts to empirically confirm or reject the remittance decay hypothesis have been “disparate” (Carling 2008a, 592). One reason as that most studies fail to take the life

course stages into account. The presence of family members in the country of origin seems to be an important factor for the development of remittance sending over time. As migrants move between different stages in the life course, they are reunited with family members, or form their own, new family in the country of destination. With time, old family members pass away (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006a, Carling 2008a). In a study of Mexican migrants to the US, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo found that while remittances initially increase, they start to decay after approximately 5.5 years of staying in the US. For individuals whose spouse was still in Mexico, remittance decay came three years later (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006a, 58).

According to a different formulation of the hypothesis, the remittance decay hypothesis relates remittances to the income of the remittance receiving household. According to this hypothesis, the migrant will send remittances until the household has reached a certain level of income. Beyond this income-threshold level, the migrant will reduce remittances primarily “in an effort to avoid destroying the work ethic of family members.” (Hunte 2004, 83). Already in the 1950s, Friedman argued that it is important to distinguish between remittances that are perceived as a transitory income, and remittances that are considered a permanent income (Friedman 1957, quoted in Hunte 2004, 86). If the receiving household thinks of remittances as a transitory income, it will try to save and or invest the additional, temporary income. If, on the other hand, remittances are taken for granted and considered a permanent income, they may, argued Friedman, destroy the work ethic of receiving family members. In order to avoid this, the remittance sender would set a target income, and reduce the transfer of remittances beyond this level. In this formulation of the remittance decay hypothesis, remittances should be expected to decay with increasing income of the receiving household. Using a crosscountry, panel-data for eighteen developing countries, Hunte (2004) confirms the remittance-decay hypothesis in which remittances decline when household income increases. Hunte finds that a one percent increase in household income results in a 0.8 percent decrease in remittances.

As has been mentioned above, several studies have shown that intentions to return have a positive impact on the propensity to remit (Carling 2008a, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006a, Merkle and Zimmermann 1992). Migrants who consider their stay abroad to be temporary and plan to return are both more likely to remit and more likely to remit larger amounts than migrants who consider their migration to be a permanent move (Carling 2008a, 593). Migrants’ investments and savings in their community of origin, sometimes described as saving for return, is an important reason why remittances prove quite resilient over time (Brown 1998, quoted in Cohen and Sirkeci 2012, 20).

Because different ethnic groups have different propensities to return, the impact of the duration of stay in the host country on remittance sending can be different for different ethnic groups (Clark

and Drinkwater 2007). In a similar way, visits to the country of origin also positively influence remittances (Carling 2008a, Ulku 2010).

Intentions to return are connected to the possibility to acquire citizenship in the host country. Vadean (2007) has found evidence in German micro data that citizenship status is an important determinant of remittances if the country of origin does not allow foreigners to own property. Migrants from such countries who gave up their citizenship to naturalise in Germany showed a lower propensity to remit and remitted lower amounts. Migrants who acquired dual citizenship, however, gained “the best capacity to act transnationally” (Vadean 2007, 23) and increased their probability to remit and the amounts sent. As have been described above, Sweden has one of the most liberal citizenship policies in Western Europe (Howard 2009), and traditionally high rates of naturalisation: that is, a high share of the foreign born acquire Swedish citizenship (Bauböck 2007). For the majority of Swedish foreign-born who have come to Sweden as asylum seekers or relatives to asylum seekers, possessing a Swedish passport might make it easier to travel to the country he or she has once fled from. Holding a Swedish citizenship entails an unlimited right to return to Sweden, in contrast to a permanent residency permit that expires after a certain time abroad. In this way, gaining citizenship in Sweden might also function as an insurance, and encourage visits and return to the country of origin.

Several selection problems arise when researchers try to study how remittance behaviour changes over time. It might be that those that have been successful enough in the host country to be able to send remittances are those that do actually stay in the host country, while those who are less successful return to the country of origin and are therefore not included in samples of immigrants in the host country. It might also be, however, that it is the most successful migrants who are able to realise the dream of return, while the less successful stay abroad. It is difficult to determine if people send remittances to their country of origin because they intend to return, or if they return because they have sent remittances. “Indeed”, writes Carling (2008a, 593), “the power of both failure and accomplishment as motivations for return make it difficult to generalize about selection mechanisms”.

Carling (2008a, 594) concludes that four elements related to migration patterns influence how remittances change over time. Firstly, propensity to remit and the amounts sent are often related to the movement of family members. For instance, family reunification in the migrant’s host country often leads to a decrease in remittances sent to the country of origin. Secondly, both capacity and willingness to send remittances contribute to the inverted U-shaped pattern of remittances often observed: the ability to remit increases over time as the migrant gains a better position on the labour market in the host country and has payed-off settlement costs, but later the willingness to remit

decreases (as a result of family reunification in the host country or because remittance receivers such as older parents are no longer alive). Thirdly, maintained transnational family ties can sustain flows of remittances for a very long time. Fourthly, intention to return affects how patterns of remittance sending are prolonged over time.

4.4 Cultural Convergence of Remittance Sending Practices?

It is increasingly recognised that remittances are part of social obligations that migrants have towards their families and relatives in their countries of origin, and vice versa (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 7). Indeed: “The nature of this social obligation is at the heart of remittance patterns and expenditure decisions” (Carling 2008c, 55). Human cultures define these social obligations, for instance how resources are expected to be shared within a household. When members of a household migrate, resources that would otherwise have been shared are transferred as remittances instead. Empirical studies have for instance confirmed that married migrants that are separated from their spouse remit more than couples who live in the same household (Carling 2008a; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006a).

The cultural norms that define sharing practices follow the migrant abroad, and different cultures of social obligations produce different patterns of remittance behaviour. With time, these cultural norms can be expected to be influenced by the experiences migrants make abroad. What would happen with remittance patterns of immigrants in Sweden if, with time, they were to converge with that of the Swedish majority population?

According to data from the World Values Survey, Sweden is one of the most secular and most individualistic countries in the world (Inglehart 2007, Pettersson and Yilmaz 2005). Data from World Values Survey has been used to compare different countries on scales comparing secular or rational vs. traditional values (on one scale) and survival vs. self-expressionist values (on the other scale). Sweden is placed in the upper right corner as one of the most secular and most individualistic countries in the world (see Figure 7). In contrast, a large share of the Swedish immigrants have their roots in developing countries that are at the other extreme on Inglehart's scales (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 7). Iraq is not on the map below, but it is likely that Iraq would be closer to other Middle Eastern and North African countries such as Algeria, Morocco and Jordan in the lower left corner of the map, than at the upper right hand corner with countries such as Sweden.²⁸

28 The figure is a “cultural map” of 82 societies, with economic zones based on the World Bank definitions of low-, middle- and high income countries from 2002. (Inglehart 2007, 27).




Figure 7: Cultural Map of 82 Societies

Source: Inglehart 2007, 27.

Sweden's position as an extremely individualistic country might seem contradictory, since Sweden is—at the same time—one of the countries of the world with the highest collective contributions. Berggren and Trägårdh write that what has made the Nordic countries the “least family-dependent and most individualized societies on the face of the earth” has been the “overarching ambition” that has characterised the Nordic countries during the twentieth century, which has been “to liberate the individual citizen from all forms of subordination and dependency within the family and in civil society: the poor from charity, the workers from their employers, wives from their husbands, children from parents—and vice versa when the parents become elderly.” (Berggren and Trägårdh 2010, 14).

Can individualistic inhabitants of a well-developed welfare state that has ‘liberated’ its citizens from dependency of the family, and caters for its citizens at all stages of life be expected to give gifts and economic support at all? The generous Swedish welfare state provides its inhabitants with universal childcare and generous old-age pensions. However, this does not seem to work as a disincentive for intergenerational transfers (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 7; see also chapter Remitting Money from Sweden: Evidence from HEK 2007). According to Swedish survey data from the 2004 Swedish Panel Study of Living Conditions of the Oldest Old (SWEOLD).

SWEOLD 2002 and the Level of Living Survey (LNU) conducted in 2000, money transfers between households nevertheless take place in Sweden (Lennartsson, Silverstein and Fritzell 2009). It seems old individuals in Sweden make transfers to younger generations in exchange for time (Lennartsson, Silverstein and Fritzell 2009). In our study of gift-giving and economic assistance among natives and foreign born based on data from the Swedish Household Economic Survey (HEK), we found that the propensity to give gifts or economic support was actually lower among immigrants from developing countries than among natives or immigrants from non-developing countries (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011).

Table 6: The general tendency to remit from Sweden according to HEK 2007

Origin	No. of surveyed individuals	Have remitted*	Have remitted %
Sweden	16,717	2,343	14.0%
Developing country	1,315	149	11.30%
Non-developing country	1,341	172	12.8%
Entire sample	19,373	2,664	13.8%

Source: Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 12.

*) Answer to the question “*Has the household during 2007 given family members/relatives economic support or gifts worth at least 5,000 SEK?*”

4.5 Transnational Transfers and State Sovereignty: A Contentious Issue?

As has been pointed out above, the issue of how states can secure their borders and uphold ‘state sovereignty’ is a central issue in political science (Betts 2011, Hollifield 2008). What is then the relationship between state sovereignty and remittances? Would states such as Sweden have an interest in regulating remittances? The answer to that question is relevant in order to understand if it should be expected that remittance sending from Sweden will be the object of major policy interventions in the near future.

Lindley argues that for migrant host states in the north, there are certainly “thornier” migration issues than remittances (Lindley 2011, 257). The reason is that the outflows of remittances are generally not big enough in economic terms to spur any interest from neither the finance minister nor the citizens. One can take the example of Spain, that at least before the outbreak of the current financial crisis used to be one of the major remittance sending countries of Europe. In 2009, according to the World Bank the outflow of remittances from Spain was 12,646 million USD. In the same year, Spain’s GNI was 1,419,200 million USD (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2011). The outflow of remittances represented merely around 0.8 percent of GNI. So when politicians focus on

reducing the transfer costs of remittances, this is hardly a controversial issue. Many new policies on the transfer costs of remittances have been developed and implemented since the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 2005 draw attention to the “scandalously high” transfer costs of sending remittances (GCIM 2005, 27). These policies are not controversial, on the contrary, argues Lindley, policies to lower transfer costs fit very well with “domestic goals of consumer protection, financial inclusion, and civil society promotion” (Lindley 2011, 257).

There are, however, more controversial aspects of remittances in relation to state sovereignty of migrant host states. There are at least three ways in which the sending of remittances can be seen as a challenge to state sovereignty. Firstly, the sending of remittances is an expression of the dependencies and commitments that exist between immigrants and their family members and relatives in their country of origin. The receivers of remittances have an interest in making sure that their relatives abroad keep their ties to their country of origin. This encourages communication and travel to the country of origin, and other ways of staying in touch. Keeping in touch with the country of origin, in turn, entails that immigrants sustain multiple allegiances, potentially conflicting with their loyalty to their country of residence.

Secondly, the sending of remittances can affect the way immigrants integrate into the host society. Integration can be described as a process through which the difference between the native and the immigrant population decreases in areas such as income and employment (Brubaker 2001; Bolt, Özüekren and Phillips 2010; Venturini 2011). Resources, in terms of money as well as time, which are devoted to meet the obligations to send money to relatives in the country of origin are resources that could otherwise have been invested in integration into the host society. Immigrants who have to send money home maybe chose to take up a job instead of investing in education that would be better for their long-term integration into the host society. In this way, sending remittances might slow down the pace of integration. In other words: the host country risks to loose when migrants have to strike a balance between investing in “host country capital” and “ethnic community capital” (Esser 2004). However, the need to devote resources to remittances might also encourage integration. The obligation to send remittances can be seen as a powerful incentive to get employment and an income, two steps that are essential to integration into the new society.

Thirdly, the sending of remittances can contribute to the growth of informal financial institutions that largely escape the control of state authorities. When there are no formal transfer mechanisms, or when the formal channels are not competitive enough, the sending of migrant remittances will fuel informal and sometimes illegal transfer systems.

Often, state actors have a conflicting approach to remittances. While some actors target the sending remittances as an obstacle to integration, other actors might attempt to instrumentalise

transnational ties in order to promote development in immigrants' countries of origin, including in attempts to ease immigration pressures. Consequently, as pointed out by Bauböck "ministries in charge of foreign relations and development pursue agendas that conflict with policies promoted by ministries of justice and home affairs." (Bauböck 2008, 8; quoted by Glick Schiller 2010, 112).

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of policies aimed at enhancing the development impact of remittances, to the point that remittances have become "the new development mantra" (Kapur 2004). There is a tension between the declared aim of promoting remittances' contribution to development, and the unwillingness of the same states to acknowledge that a coherent approach to remittances and development would entail allowing for more immigration from developing countries (Faist 2008). Lindley argues that states attempt to hide this tension by concentrating on uncontroversial issues such as reducing transfer costs or promoting the use of remittances for development projects (Lindley 2011, 257-258).

5 Methodology: Researching Transnational Ties

In this dissertation, I combine quantitative methods, including statistical analysis of large quantities of household survey data, with qualitative interviews with a more limited number of migrants and migrant families. This combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is associated with the methodological approach of *critical realism* (Hedberg 2005). *Critical realism* can be described as an attempt to offer a ‘third way’ between empiricism/positivism and idealism/postmodernism. Whereas positivists claim that the world can be explained by observed phenomena (Sayer 1992, 45, quoted by Hedberg, 41), in the post modern idealist view all objects are socially constructed (Sayer 1997, 454, quoted by Hedberg, 41).

My approach is a kind of methodological triangulation (Kropf 2012), which enables me to combine the benefits of quantitative and qualitative methods, while limiting the unavoidable drawbacks of each of the methods used.

The official household survey data (from the Swedish Economic Household Survey HEK 2007) that I have accessed for this study is a representative sample of the Swedish population. It enables a rich comparison between native and foreign-born residents when it comes to patterns of gift-giving. However, the sub-sample of my population of interest, that is, immigrants from Iraq or—preferably—Kurds from Iraq, was too small in HEK 2007 to allow for any useful analysis. Using Kurdish first names as a sampling method, I have been able to construct an alternative sampling frame that is better targeted at my population of interest. Data that I obtained through qualitative interviews with a strategic sample of informants proved indispensable for my analysis.

The next section of this chapter discusses the need for research into transnational ties to be multi-sited. I then devote one section to a general discussion of the particular challenges of researching one of the most important transnational practices: that of sending remittances. In the rest of the chapter, I describe and discuss each of the methods that I have used in turn: regression analysis of data from a national household survey; descriptive statistics of data obtained through a questionnaire to a sample generated on the basis of first names; qualitative analysis of data from expert, individual and group interviews in Uppsala and Stockholm and in four locations in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. In the section “Surveying Kurds: constructing a relevant sample frame” I discuss different methods that can be used to sample Kurds, a part of the population that is difficult to define and delimit, partly because in Sweden neither residents’ mother tongue nor ethnicity are included in official registers.

5.1 Methodological Implications of a Transnational Perspective

For the purpose of this study, I define transnational practices as social, economic, political and cultural practices that involve people in more than one country simultaneously (cf. Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004). By focusing on transnational *practices* I focus on actions taken by individuals, groups and networks. The focus is not, however, on formal collective actors, such as organised diaspora associations or transnational political parties. Instead of focusing on the actions of single public figures such as politicians or intellectuals who belong to the elite of the transnational community, I try to shed light on the practices of ‘ordinary’ citizens engaged in transnational practices.

Obviously, actors such as diaspora organisations can play an important role in facilitating migration, for instance by lobbying for less restrictive immigration policies. However, the practices under scrutiny here are practices undertaken by individuals and individual families and households in their efforts to organise their family life and secure their livelihood in a transnational context. These practices include the support of relatives and family members across borders, visits and communication between the host state and the country of origin, and exchanges of information, advice and ideas in this transnational social space.

To look at migration through a transnational lens requires a number of methodological shifts (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). One of these shifts includes conceiving of transnational social spaces as something that is beyond the duality of a sending and a receiving country. There is a need, argue Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2003), to move beyond ‘methodological nationalism’. Glick Schiller defines ‘methodological nationalism’ as an “ideological orientation that approaches the study of social and historical processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-states. Members of those states are assumed to share a common history and set of values, norms, social customs and institutions” (Glick-Schiller 2010, 110–111).

According to Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, ‘methodological nationalism’ has shaped social sciences—including migration studies during the past century. Often, the tendency to assume that countries are “the natural units for comparative studies” is a reflection of the fact that researchers themselves identify with their own nation-state (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003, 576). A consequence of ‘methodological nationalism’ is that migration and migrants as objects of study have been reduced to “antinomies of the orderly working of state and society” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003, 583). Immigrants are perceived as being outside the ‘deal’ that states strike with their citizens: shared loyalty towards the state is rewarded with the protection of the rights of the citizens by the state. In this light, studies of the political loyalty of immigrants have often been an expression of the need of the state to control and supervise the immigrant population.

Immigrants challenge nation-building projects, since their very existence is a manifestation of the fragility of any nation state that perceives itself as mono-cultural. Consequently, migration studies have been induced to “measure and scrutinize the cultural differences between immigrants and nationals and to describe pathways of assimilation into the national group” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003, 584). All post-war theories on immigrant integration, write Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, assume that the two entities that should be related to each other are the nation-state society on the one hand, and immigrants that are foreigners to this nation-state society on the other hand. This kind of methodological nationalism has led to immigrants often being lumped together and then compared to the average of the native population, for instance in quantitative studies on levels of unemployment and social welfare dependency, when it might have been more relevant to compare immigrants to other groups in society with similar levels of education, etc. Finally, the movement over international borders has been seen as an exception to the normative rule of sedentariness within a specific nation-state. Movements within states, as well as the in-migration of people characterised as ‘nationals’ (such as the German speaking ‘Aussiedlers’ who moved ‘back’ to Germany after the fall of the Soviet Union) have not received the same kind of negative attention. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller summarise: “Describing immigrants as political security risks, as culturally others, as socially marginal, and as an exception to the rule of territorial confinement, migration studies have faithfully mirrored the nationalist image of normal life.” (2003, 599). Wimmer and Glick-Schiller do not propose a new set of analytical tools. The challenge of escaping methodological nationalism and opening up new ways of analysing and understanding migration and migrant realities remains a challenge, they write.

A starting point is—as suggested by Levitt and Jaworsky—to attempt to understand the multi-sited reality of transnational spaces. This entails leaving the assumption that the nation-state is the logical starting point of research on migration and migrants. For many migrants leading transnational lives, borders are artificially dividing what they perceive as one, single space (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 142). Most data gathered on migrants are gathered on one side of the border only, making it very difficult to study and analyse the entire transnational social field. One way of addressing this problem is to analyse transnational social spaces using multi-sited ethnographical studies. Espen Gran’s study of Kurds in Norway and their relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq is an example of such an effort to use multi-sited ethnographies to gain a sense of people’s lives within a transnational social space (Gran 2007). Levitt and Jaworsky warns against studies that limit one or several countries in such a transnational social space to a source of background information only. The goal must be, they argue, to make a “a thick and empirically rich mapping of how global, macro-level processes interact with local lived experiences”. (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 143).

When I began my interviews among Kurds in Uppsala, I quickly discovered that their transnational social spaces spun over a multitude of countries. Some of the cross-country networks of Kurds are a result of the fact that what Kurds define as ‘Kurdistan’ stretches across several countries in the Middle East. Kurds from Syria whom I interviewed would visit relatives both in Syria and at the other side of the border in Turkey when they went ‘home’ to the Kurdish areas around the city of Qamishli in north-eastern Syria. Several of my informants from Lebanon had immigrated from Turkey to Lebanon, and maintained ties with relatives both in Beirut and in their ‘original’ village in Turkey. Other transnational ties among my informants had been created by migration to Europe. In the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, it was the rule rather than the exception that extended families would include members who had migrated to different countries: an uncle in the UK; a cousin in Germany, other family members in Sweden. The insight that families and individuals often have ‘mixed’ migration experiences made me question the conceptualisation of transnational ties as something that exists in a ‘corridor’ between two countries. In remittance research, it is common to talk of ‘remittance corridors’. This concept, which is used by among other the World Bank for analysing remittance flows from one country of origin to one specific country of destination (see for instance Hernandez-Coss et al 2007), is ill-suited to describe transnational ties. The image of a corridor signals that transnational ties are tied between two places only, and gives the impression that migrants and migrants’ communities of origin are influenced by transnational ties between two nation-states only. The same family, and the same household, might indeed maintain ties to individuals and societies in several other nation-states at the same time.

I was not able to conduct interviews in more than two countries for this study. However, it would be incorrect to characterise my study as dual-sited. In Sweden, I have concentrated my fieldwork and my interviews to one geographical location: the city of Uppsala. However, in Iraq my snow-ball sampling method took me to four different cities and towns in two different governorates in the areas administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government: the cities of Erbil/Hawler, Koya and Rania in the province of Erbil, and Suleymani, the main city of the province with the same name. I also interviewed a group of young men from Kirkuk. For security reasons, I could not travel to Kirkuk during my stay in Iraq, so I met these informants in Hawler.

At first, I planned to follow the transnational ties from Uppsala to Kurdistan. My idea was to interview Kurdish individuals and families in Uppsala, and then interview their relatives at the ‘other end’ of the transnational tie. I was planning to ask my informants in Uppsala for names and addresses of their relatives in Kurdistan. However, I quickly discovered that even though some of my informants generously provided me with phone numbers, many of the respondents were reluctant to put me in touch with their relatives. The Norwegian cultural geographer Espen Gran

made the same experiences when he tried to follow relations from Kurds in Norway to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (Gran 2007, 65–66), and more recently Carling, Bivand Erdal and Horst (2012) opted against trying to set up a matched sample for both ethical and feasibility reasons. I therefore decided to snow-ball my sample in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq instead.

Another methodological implication of the transnational perspective on migration is that non-migrants are given an important role. Transnational social spaces are inhabited by both migrants and non-migrants, argue Levitt and Jaworsky “because the flow of people, money, and ‘social remittances’ (ideas, norms, practices, and identities) within these spaces is so dense, thick, and widespread that nonmigrants’ lives are also transformed, even though they do not move” (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 132). Even in transnational studies, complain Orozco et al (2005), the relatives of the migrants who remain in the migrants’ home country are often overlooked. The migrant is often viewed as the agent and the driving force in the forging of transnational ties (Orozco et al. 2005, 31). This obscures the agency of members of migrant households in the country of origin. These individuals are just as much part of the transnational space created by migratory movements between Sweden and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, as are Kurds who live in Sweden.

A focus of this study is the transnational practice of remitting money. It is common in remittance research to assign an active role to the remittance sender only, that is, to the migrant who sends money home from abroad. Yet, as Orozco et al point out, those who receive remittances also help forge the transnational networks. Obviously, the receivers have an interest in the remittances being sent, and they have an interest in sustaining the transnational ties in order to ensure future transfers. Consequently, the receivers often have a say on how, when and why remittances are sent and spent (Orozco et al. 2005, 8).

5.2 Methodological Challenges in Remittances Research

Because remittances can not be separated from migration, it is essential to look at remittance sending as an integral part of migration practices. In a working paper written for the World Bank, senior remittance researchers McKenzie and Sasin argue that researchers who want to look at the impact of remittances on some measure of human ‘welfare’ (like poverty reduction, school attendance, health, etc.) should chose to formulate a broad research question, for instance “what is the impact of migration on poverty/human capital?”, instead of a more narrow question on the impact of remittances on a given variable (McKenzie and Sasin 2007, 2). In my case, I have broadened my very initial question about the patterns of remittance sending from Kurds in my home town, to a more comprehensive study of the transnational ties that link Kurds in Uppsala with their families, relatives and societies in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

A challenge common to almost all research on migration is that migrants tend to be a ‘rare event’ in any given population. As mentioned previously, according to the statistics of the UN, only three percent of the world’s population currently live in a country other than their country of birth (UNDESA 2009). In most countries of the world foreign-born are a minority of the population. In a study made for the World Bank, McKenzie and Mistiaen compare different ways of surveying immigrants. They surveyed the same migrant community—Brazilians of Japanese descent (‘Nikkei’) who constitute approximately 1.2 to 1.9 million people of Brazil’s 170 million inhabitants—using three different sampling methods (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2007).

The first sampling method used a stratified sample based on a recently conducted official census. First, the households were screened to see whether they had a migrant or not. The questionnaire was distributed to those households that were identified as being of interest (that is, containing a Nikkei) after a first round of doorstep interviews. The second sampling method was snowball sampling. Nikkei community groups were used to select the seeds (that is, the starting point of the snowballing), and all the interviewed households were asked to recommend other households with migrant members. The third sample method consisted of an intercept point survey. In this method, locations where the target population often meet (a neighbourhood, a church, a shopping centre) are identified, and individuals belonging to the target group are sampled at these spots. McKenzie and Mistiaen conclude that snowball sampling and intercept point sampling are no substitutes to census based sampling if the objective is to obtain a truly representative survey. However, if surveys based on snowball sampling and intercept point sampling are well designed, the results obtained using these two methods are not much different from results obtained with census-based methods, and are comparatively much cheaper and less time-consuming.

One of the conclusions of McKenzie and Mistiaen is that both intercept point and snowball surveys are likely to oversample individuals who are “more closely connected to the community” (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2007, 37). Since being closely connected to the community is often associated with engaging in transnational practices, these two survey methods risk to produce results that exaggerate the extent to which the targeted population engage in transnational practices.

A particular disadvantage with intercept point surveys is that stopping people on the street (or at an event) means that the interviewer generally has much less time to ask questions than an interviewer who meets the respondent at his or her home. Therefore, the questionnaires distributed with an intercept point method will have to be shorter and less detailed.

The surveys made by McKenzie and Mistiaen among the Nikkei concerned return migration to Japan. However, their results should be relevant for other kinds of surveys that target migrant households, in host countries as well as in countries of origin.

It is notoriously difficult to gather data on remittances. In the research guidelines made by Hernandez-Coss et al (2007) and issued by the Financial Market Integrity Unit of the World Bank for their work on Bilateral Remittances Corridor Analysis, the analysis of remittance corridors is broken down into three stages: the origination stage (decisions about amounts to be remitted and transfer mechanisms taking by migrants their host country), the intermediary stage (the actual transfer of the funds through different actors) and the "last mile" or distribution stage, when remittances arrive to their receivers. Difficulties arise at every stage. "Remittance data for most corridors are likely to be scarce and incomplete", they write (Hernandez-Coss et al 2007, 8). In order to gain a picture of the flow of remittances between a given pair of countries, data should be gathered from different sources: balance of payments data, data from central bank or other regulatory agencies, numbers reported by banks, other formal financial institutions or money transfer organizations. This data should be completed by data from surveys conducted by academic researchers and—when available—from community organisations. In their research guidelines, Hernandez-Coss et al list what characteristics of remittance senders they suggest should be measured: These are reproduced in table 7.

Table 7: Principal worker remittance characteristics

- * Frequency and average size, and their principal determinants (e.g., income of sender, size of his family in host and in home country, mortgage payments or other fixed obligations in home country);
- * The intended recipients (e.g., remitter's family, charitable organization in home country, savings or other account in remitter's own name);
- * Location of recipients (urban/rural, region of country);
- * The purposes for which remitter expects the remitted funds to be used (e.g., supplement family consumption, celebrate special occasion, investment in housing or small business, general community support); and
- * Other transfers, if any, remitters make to the home country (e.g., contributions to hometown associations).

Source: Hernandez-Coss et al 2007, 12.

Most of these characteristics were included in my questionnaire sent to a sample of Kurds in Uppsala (see below). The sum of remittances sent is also dependent upon the cost of transaction, which in turn depends on a number of factors, such as availability and regulation of remittance service providers, and fees. Government policies and laws such as taxes, exchange rate regimes or bilateral agreements between the sending and the receiving country can also have a decisive impact on the amounts sent as well as the channels that are used for the transaction.

5.3 Ethical Considerations

I have endeavoured to follow the ethical guidelines for research within humanities and social sciences of the Swedish Research Council *Vetenskapsrådet* (Vetenskapsrådet 2007). The guidelines are divided into four main principles or requirements: information, consent, confidentiality and use.

The information requirement stipulates that all respondents, informants and other participants in a research project must be informed about the conditions of their participation in the project, including information about the fact that their participation is voluntary and that they can choose to cancel their participation at any time. The principle of consent requires the researcher to ask for respondents and informants explicit consent to participate in the project.

In my case, information was given in a cover letter to the postal questionnaire. This letter also included my contact details, and information on how the information provided by the respondents was going to be used and published. I gave the same information orally at the beginning of each interview. I did not ask any individual under the age of 15 to participate in the project.

The confidentiality requirement entails making sure that ethically sensitive data that can be put in connection with identifiable individuals is stored safely. In order to ensure confidentiality of my respondents, I have stored the questionnaires in such a way that personal data cannot be put in connection with an individual questionnaire.

The principle of use of research data stipulates that data gathered for a research project shall not be used for other commercial or non-scientific purposes. It should also not be used as a basis for decisions or actions that directly influences the individual participants. The data that I have gathered for this project has been published in this thesis. Some quotes have been published reports for the Swedish independent think tank Global Utmaning, a non-profit organisation. I have made sure that these quotes cannot be traced to an identifiable individual.

This study partly draws on an analysis of data from the Household Economic Survey of Statistics Sweden for the year 2007. The results of this project, entitled *Transnationell migration och utveckling: remitteringar från Sverige* (Transnational Migration and Development: Remittances from Sweden), was published in 2011 (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011). The project was approved by the Stockholm Regional Ethical Review Board of the Swedish Central Ethical Review Board according to the requirements of the Swedish Ethical Review Act (2003:460).

5.4 The Official Survey HEK as a Source of Data on Remittances

In their comparisons of different methods of sampling migrants, McKenzie and Mistiaen (2007) conclude that census based sampling will generate the most representative sample of a migrant community. Generally, official household surveys are considered the most effective mechanism for

obtaining accurate data on remittances (Millis, Orozco and Raheem 2008, 13). This is also the method recommended by the Luxembourg Group on Remittances, a working group with representatives of the IMF, the OECD, EUROSTAT, the World Bank and experts from national statistical offices and central banks. Members of the Luxembourg Group on Remittances have produced the *International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users* (IMF 2009).

A main advantage of official household surveys is that they gather data from a random and representative sample of the population. Another advantage is that household surveys capture remittances regardless of the method of transaction. It is known that a large share of remittances are sent through informal channels, and these flows are not recorded by central banks or money transfer operators, who are both alternative sources of data on remittances. Because official household surveys gather a wide range of socio-economic data, they can be used to analyse the relation between sending or receiving remittances and a range of socio-economic indicators such as income, education and employment (Millis, Orozco and Raheem 2008).

For this study, I attempted to use data from the annual Household Income Survey (HEK) compiled by Statistics Sweden (SCB). Some of the results of this analysis have been published in a working paper for the Institute for Future Studies (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011). In chapter 6, our findings are related to issues relevant for this study.

To the best of my knowledge, our analysis of data from HEK (published in Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011), was the first attempt to study remittance flows from Sweden using data from an official household survey. Most of the limited number of recent studies on remittances from Sweden are based on data from the Balance of Payments Statistics Database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is also the main source of data on remittances in the often-quoted “Migration and Remittances Factbook” regularly published by the World Bank. The version quoted in this study—the Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011—was published towards the end of 2010 and includes data available up to the 1st of October 2010 (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2011b).

There are many problems with data obtained from balance of payment statistics compiled by the IMF. For a start, the quality of balance of payment statistics is known to be affected by problems relating to reporting, accuracy and reliability (Carson and Laliberté 2002). In addition, data on remittances might be even less reliable than many other items in the balance of payment accounts (IMF 2009). A survey of central banks made by Irving, Mohapatra, and Ratha in 2010 (quoted in Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2011b, xvii) revealed that central banks often publish data that is not up to date, or not correctly classified. According to the central bank survey, Central Banks do not

adequately capture remittances transferred through money transfer operators, post offices, and money transfers made with mobile phones.

Obviously, remittances transferred outside of official channels are not captured at all. In 2006, the World Bank estimated that true value of remittances might be 50 percent larger than the officially recorded sums (World Bank 2006, 85). Informal remittances might account for as much as 75 percent of the flows to developing countries (Freund and Spatafora 2005). According to a study made by Freund and Spatafora (2005) formal and informal remittance channels appear to be substitutes. That is, if it is expensive to transfer remittances through formal channels, migrants will chose to transfer through informal channels instead. Officially recorded flows of remittances will particularly underestimate the flows of remittances to countries where formal money transfer channels are expensive or unavailable (for instance because the financial sector is underdeveloped). Informal remittance transfers seem to be common in Sweden as well. In a survey sent to immigrant organisations in Sweden, Engdahl (2007) found that 37 percent had sent money through friends, relatives or other people travelling to the receiving country. In my survey of Kurds in Uppsala, over 70 percent of the respondents reported that they had used informal channels to transfer remittances (see chapter 9). A survey among immigrants from Somaliland found that many use the company Dahabshiil, a Hawala company to transfer remittances to Somaliland (Stryjan 2007, 21).

Unfortunately, the Swedish case could be used as an illustration of the poor quality of data that is included in the balance of payment statistics (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 8). The data available for Sweden is based on models from 2002 (see also Pelling 2009), and a review made by Statistics Sweden (Lindgren 2010-10-15) on the quality of statistics on remittances from Sweden conclude that these statistics are faulty, not least since they do not capture the “drastic” increase in remittances recorded globally during the last decade²⁹ (Lindgren 2010-10-15, 1).

According to the data published in the ”Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011”, the sum of workers remittances from Sweden was 7 million USD in 2009 or approximately 49 million SEK (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2011a). For the same year, the “Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011” records 1,156 million USD in workers remittances from Austria, a country whose economy and immigrant population is of similar size³⁰. Also, the inflow of worker’s remittances to Sweden is larger than the outward flow, even though the opposite should be expected (Lindgren 2010-10-15).

Table 8 compares different sources of data on remittances from Sweden.

29 According to Ratha, Mohapatra and Xu (2008), the size of recorded global flows of remittances doubled between 2002 and 2007.

30 According to the numbers included in the “Migration and Remittances Factbook” Austria had a stock of immigrants of 1,310.2 thousands individuals, while Sweden hosted 1,306.0 thousands (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2011). Sweden’s GNI (Gross National Income) was 413.1 US\$ billions in 2009, while Austria’s GNI was 383.0 US\$ billions.

Table 8: Different sources of data on workers' remittances from Sweden

	Formal transfers	Informal transfers	Information on the sender	Information on the receiver
Balance of Payment Statistics	Yes, estimations based on data from 2002	no	no	no
HEK	yes, self-reported	yes, self-reported	yes, self-reported and from official registers	no
Other household surveys without register data*	yes, self-reported	yes, self-reported	yes, self-reported, limited amount of variables	yes, receiving country and individual

Source: Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 10.

HEK contains data from interviews with a representative sample of all households and individuals registered as resident in Sweden some time during the surveyed year. The sample size in 2007 was approximately 17,000 households, representing 0.3 percent of all Swedish households (Forsgren 2009). Household surveys are either 'extended household surveys', that include data on all members of the household or 'head of household surveys', that only include data on one member of the household. The HEK is an extended household survey, including data on all members of the household of the interviewed respondent. The respondent is asked to provide information about other members of the household, and register data is compiled for all members of the household. The non-response rate to the HEK 2007 was 31.4 percent: 14.9 percent declined to participate, 13.3 percent could not be reached and 3.1 failed to participate. Social assistance recipients, individuals with very low income and migrants from non-Nordic countries were overrepresented in the drop-out (Forsgren 2009). After removing children (aged 0-19) we could use data from a total of 19,373 adult individuals (see Table 9 below). The share of foreign-born in the sample is 13.7 percent compared to 13.37 percent in the total population in the year 2007.

The data gathered in HEK is very detailed. A particular feature of the Swedish statistical system is that official household surveys can be combined with extensive data from administrative registers. This is facilitated by the fact that every Swedish inhabitant carries a unique personal identification number, which is used in almost all public administration registers (Vogel 2001). HEK combines data gathered through phone interviews with detailed register data on income, social

payments, social benefits and taxes from the central income and tax register and data on housing (including from the central register on real estate taxation) from all household members (Forsgren 2009).

Table 9: Descriptive statistics of data in HEK 2007

Country of origin	Men	Women	Total
Native-born	8,321	8,396	16,717
Developing country	616	699	1,315
Non-developing country	573	768	1,341
Total	9,510	9,863	19,373

Source: HEK 2007, Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 9.

In comparison with balance of payment statistics, and in addition to being able to capture a larger size of actual flows of remittances, data from household surveys also have the advantage of measuring the characteristics of remittance senders or receivers (Schachter 2008). We could use data from HEK to make estimations on how the determinants of remittances from Sweden vary with age, disposable income, levels of education, and family situation (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011). Since HEK is carried out among migrants as well as non-migrants we were also able to use data from HEK to compare patters of gift-giving between foreign born and native Swedish residents.

In our working paper, we argue that HEK data has two major drawbacks (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 10–12). The first one concerns the way the survey records remittances. HEK does not ask about remittances in the way they are defined by the world bank. Instead, we had to base our analysis on the question “*Has the household during 2007 given family members/relatives economic support or gifts worth at least 5,000 SEK?*”. A problem with this question is that respondents are not asked if the gift or the economic support is sent to a household in another country, a crucial part of the definition of remittances (see for instance IMF 2010).

The second problem is that the phrasing “worth at least 5,000 SEK” can be interpreted as meaning at least 5,000 SEK *at a time*. Other surveys show that while many migrant households transfer the equivalent of 5,000 SEK per year, each transfer tends to be smaller. Analysing what is arguably one of the largest and most detailed data sets of remittances made through private transfer institutions, Moré (2008) found that the average sum sent in 55,000 analysed transactions was 348 EUR (men) and 333 EUR (women). In 2007, Bendixen found that the average remittance sent by migrants in Spain was 270 EUR (Bendixen 2007). In the US, a survey among 5,000 randomly

selected Latin Americans recorded an average of 325 USD per transaction (Bendixen 2008). Among the Kurds that I surveyed in Uppsala in 2009, only 20.4 percent reported having sent 3,000 SEK or more last time they remitted. A general problem with data on money issues is that questions on money tend to be particularly sensitive, which affects the quality of data (Schachter 2008). While we conclude that while data contained in HEK might give a better picture of patterns of remittances from Sweden than balance of payment statistics, generalising from data contained in HEK should be undertaken with caution (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 10).

As has been mentioned above, the HEK is an extended household survey, including data on all members of the household even though only one member of the household is interviewed. The question of particular interest to this study were asked about the entire household, that is '*Has the household during 2007 given family members/relatives economic support or gifts worth at least 5,000 SEK?*'. In order to include all members of the household in the analysis, and to individualise the data, we transferred the value given to the interviewed individual to all adult individuals in the household. That is, if individual A and individual B both belong to the same household, only the interviewed individual A had a value on gift-giving in the original dataset. This value was transferred to individual B as well. This way, we got a much larger population: instead of just the interviewed individual, all members of the household could be analysed. This method also enabled us to analyse 'mixed' households, in which the interviewed individual and other members of the household belong to different country groups.

We used descriptive analysis to compare the probability of giving remittances among individuals belonging to three country groups (see chapter 6). Using cross-tables, we analysed differences with regard to income class, level of capital income, time since immigration to Sweden, age, family situation, citizenship, educational level and reception of social assistance (see chapter 6 for the results). However, we also wanted to find out if any factors had a particular effect on the propensity to remit. In order to analyse the significance of different factors on the propensity to give gifts/economic support we performed effect likelihood ratio tests. In these tests, the variables of age, education, family type, children under the age of 18, income class and capital income were included.

Effect likelihood ratio tests are a form of logistic regression used to determine if identified independent variables influence the dependent variable. The results of our likelihood ratio tests are presented in chapter 6.

5.5 Surveying Kurds in Uppsala: Constructing a Sample Frame

The Kurdish community of Uppsala was chosen as a case study for a number of reasons. Some of them were practical reasons: the Kurdish community in Sweden and particularly in my home-town Uppsala is a community that I know well, and where I have earned a name as person that takes an interest in Kurdish issues. This has facilitated my possibility to access and interview key informants. More importantly, it has been—according to some key informants—indispensable for my possibility to interview ordinary members of the community and get an acceptable response rate on a postal questionnaire sent to Kurds in Uppsala.

I found it relatively easy to get in touch with the Kurdish community in Uppsala. Over a number of years, I had been member of the board of a Swedish non-governmental organisation that conducts development projects in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. At the time I started conducting formal interviews in Uppsala, Qandil was the largest foreign NGO in the KRG area, and carried out projects for the UNHCR and other UN agencies. Qandil had its Swedish offices in Uppsala until the year 2010, and was a well-known and respected organisation among Kurds in Uppsala. I had also been a more or less profiled local politician in Uppsala. As such, I had participated in the formation of a national association for Kurds from Syria in Uppsala in 2004. In March 2008, I was invited to hold a short speech at the 30th annual commemoration of the massacre in Halabja.

I encountered few problems in contacting or convincing the chairpersons of the Kurdish associations to agree to be interviewed. For a while, I considered continuing to conduct interviews with members of the Kurdish associations of Uppsala only. This would have made it relatively easy to conduct a large number of interviews. Since Kurdish immigrants are not registered as Kurds in most host countries, surveys on Kurdish communities commonly consist of interviews with people being identified as Kurds through their membership in a Kurdish association (a case in point is Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a).

I was, however, concerned about the bias this would mean for my empiric material. There is empiric evidence that the kind of transnational practices people engage in differ between organised and non-organised migrants, between the organised ‘elites’ of a transnational community, and ordinary members. Migrants that are members of ethnic associations are more likely than others to engage in transnational practices (see for instance Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003).

I decided to try to construct a sampling frame that would include also those that have not chosen to be a member of a Kurdish association. My results confirmed that a sample framed based on membership of a Kurdish association would only have included a small minority of the Kurds in Uppsala. Only a little more than a fifth of the Kurdish respondents (22.8 percent) to my survey turned out to be members of a Kurdish association. That is, almost 80 percent of the respondents

would not have been included in a sample based on membership in an association. The finding that members of ethnic organisations are more likely to engage in transnational practices was also confirmed by my results. Of those that were members of such an ethnic association, 81 percent (or 17 out of 21 respondents) had remitted money. Of those that were not members of an ethnic association, half as many or 46.5 percent had remitted.

There is no official registration according to ethnicity in Sweden, so I could not rely on an official registry to make a sample of Kurds. Instead, I decided to use Kurdish first names as the basis for the list. The Kurdish languages³¹ are Indo-European languages. The Kurdish languages are therefore quite different from the two main languages spoken by the Kurds' neighbours: Arabic (a Semitic language) and Turkish (one of the Turkic languages).

The linguistic specificity of Kurds makes their names relatively easy to distinguish from Arabic or Turkish names. First names were consequently a target of the Kemalist assimilation policies that dominated in Turkey until the end of the 1980s. The Kurdish population of Turkey were seen as posing "the major challenge to the state's attempts at nation building through the homogenization of people's identities, loyalties, and language" (Somer 2005, 595), and giving children Kurdish names was forbidden along education in Kurdish and Kurdish broadcasting. According to Aslan (2009), Kurdish names have constituted "one of the main issues of cultural contestation between the authorities and the Kurds" (Aslan 2009, 2). From 1934 and onwards, 'tribal' surnames were forbidden and with the 1972 Civil Registry Law it became forbidden to give children names that did not "conform to national culture" (Aslan 2009, 4–5). It took until 2003 before the civil registry laws were amended to allow children to be given Kurdish names. However, even after the amendment of the civil registry laws, it remained forbidden to use the letters Q, W, and Y in names. All these letters are common in Kurdish names (Moustakis and Chaudhuri 2005, 87). Before 2003, Turkish Kurds in Sweden who wanted to apply for a Turkish passport were presented with lists of approved names (Marouf and Tigris 2012). In Syria, Kurdish names remain forbidden for individuals as well as companies (Council of Europe 2006, 12). For these reasons, the use of Kurdish names is most spread among Kurds in Southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan. Tigris estimates that 60 to 70 percent of Kurds in Turkey carry Kurdish names (Marouf and Tigris 2012).

A consequence of the oppression of the Kurdish culture and the Kurdish languages is that Kurds in exile take great pride in carrying Kurdish names (Mayi 2002, 6). Two major institutions for Kurdish culture, the Institute Kurd de Paris in France and the Kurdish Library in Stockholm, provide lists of Kurdish names and encourage Kurds to give their children traditional Kurdish names. The Kurdish Library in Stockholm even offered new-born babies who had been given a

31 For a discussion on Kurdish languages, see section 2.3 What is Kurdistan? .

Kurdish name “a little birthday gift” (Kurdish Library in Stockholm 2009). I combined the lists from the Institute Kurd de Paris in France and the Kurdish Library in Stockholm to identify Kurds in Uppsala.³² More details on how I arrived at a list of addresses are given in Appendix 1.

It would have been more difficult to use surnames as a sampling base. In southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq) there is no tradition of surnames, instead, people use their village or city of origin as their surname, or the name(s) of the father. In Turkey, all inhabitants were forced to carry Turkish surnames. (Marouf and Tigris 2012).

Telephone listings of names has previously been used as a method to generate a sample of remittance senders. Okonkwo Osili (2007) identified Nigerians of Igbo ethnicity in Chicago by their names (Okonkwo Osili 2007). Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any other study that has used Kurdish first names as a sampling basis.³³

Two studies of the Kurdish community in Uppsala have used alternative sampling frames. For a scientific study targeting Kurdish children in Uppsala, researchers constructed a sample frame using name lists from child-care centres and school health care units in Uppsala. However, they also used the address register of two Kurdish associations in Uppsala (Sundelin Wahlsten, Ahmad and von Knorring 2001, 565). Sundelin Wahlsten, Ahmad and von Knorring aimed to include all Kurdish children aged 6 to 18 in Uppsala in their sample. They were able to identified 170 eligible children in the ages 6-18, out of which 111 completed the interviews of the study. Mayi (2002, 2003) made a sample of Kurdish pupils and their parents in Uppsala and Stockholm through teachers in Kurdish as a maternal language in these two cities. In order to reach Kurdish youth aged 12 to 16 (grades 7 to 9) Mayi asked the teachers to distribute the questionnaire to their pupils. 50 questionnaires were distributed in this way, out of which 43 were completed (Mayi 2002, 9).

5.6 Postal Survey Among Kurds in Uppsala

Using the address list I had obtained through identification of Kurdish first names as described above, I sent out a questionnaire to 652 addresses in Uppsala on October 9, 2009³⁴. This section describes and discusses how the questionnaire was constructed, tested and distributed. For the final questionnaire, see Appendix 2.

32 I am indebted to Bo Malmberg, professor in human geography at the University of Stockholm for suggesting I should try this method, and to Newzad Hirori of the Kurdish Library in Stockholm for making it possible for me to use it.

33 I have sent a letter asking for references to such studies to the “Kurdish Studies Network” that includes more than 70 Kurdish scholars and students of Kurdish issues around the world (see <http://kurdishstudiesnetwork.wordpress.com/>) The letter was sent on March 4, 2010. Unfortunately, it has not generated any responses. I have also presented my method at an international academic conference on “Kurdish Migration and Diaspora” held at the University of Uppsala on April 12–13, 2012.

34 The distribution of the questionnaire was made in co-operation with the Stockholm based think tank Global Utmaning, and financed in the framework of a project supported by the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The results of this project have been published by Global Utmaning (Pelling 2010).

The wording of questions in a survey is essential for the resulting data. It is generally assumed that respondents process a question in several different stages (Schaeffer and Presse 2003). Schaeffer and Presse (2003) divides this process into three stages. First, the respondent forms his or her understanding of the question. Then the respondents retrieve information from his or her memory to construct an answer. The next step includes a judgement stage, where the respondent decides if the information retrieved is adequate, plausible, etc. The final stage includes reporting the answer in the format that is required (orally, or by filling in a form on paper or on a computer). The notion of a strict sequence of different stages has been criticised by among others Willis (2005) who argue that “the survey response process is subject to many social and contextual variables, and cannot be fully accounted for by a simple, serial processing model” (Willis 2005, 37).

There are possible sources of error in all parts of the process. The wording of the question might make it impossible for the respondent to understand the question. If the question is not unambiguous, it can be misunderstood. In the retrieving phase, there are a number of possible errors related to how people’s memory works. Referral errors, that is when respondents refer an event to an erroneous time-span, are common. The respondent might recall an event as closer in time than it actually is. So when asked of their behaviour in a given time period, say the last 12 months, respondents might include things they did more than a year ago. This causes an ‘intrusion’ error. Omission errors occur when events are wrongly dated as further back in time, when respondents miss events because they search in the ‘wrong’ part of memory or because events have been conflated with one another. (Schaeffer and Presse 2003, 69). These possible sources of error might have influenced the data that I have been able to gather with my two surveys, and should be kept in mind when interpreting the data.

In the 1980s and 1990s, cognitive psychologists and conversation analysts contributed to the work of research methodologists to develop what Schaeffer and Presse call “the science of asking questions” (Schaeffer and Presse 2003, 65). Notably, a method of testing questions called ‘cognitive interviewing’ was developed. ‘Cognitive interviewing’ is a qualitative technique primarily used to test quantitative survey questions, but it can also be used to test topic guides for qualitative interviews. Cognitive interviews are used to test how respondents understand and react to questions. In cognitive interviews, respondents are asked probing questions in connection with or after responding to a questionnaire. Respondents might also be encouraged to ‘think aloud’ while filling in the form or answering questions posed by an interviewer who observes and take notes of the respondents reactions, hesitations and behaviours (see for instance Willis 2005). Testing a questionnaire in this way can reveal problems of comprehension, difficulties for respondents to recall events (e.g. because they are asked of events that are far away in time or insignificant to the

respondent), sensitivity (which is likely to be a problem when asking about remittances, see below) and layout. Cognitive interviews will not, however, reveal all problems nor the extent of the problems that exist. Importantly, the fact that one question is problematic does not “necessarily allow us to say whether the new question is better than the old question” (d’Ardenne 2011, 5). I used techniques developed for cognitive interviewing, for instance by encouraging my respondents to think aloud when filling out a pilot version of my questionnaire.

In order to determine what questions to include in the survey, and how to phrase them, I interviewed the chairpersons of two of Uppsala’s Kurdish associations. In August of 2009, I travelled to Oslo to visit remittance scholar Jörgen Carling and his team at the Norwegian peace research institute PRIO. With Jörgen Carling, I discussed the specific questions I was planning to ask in my survey, and I also benefited from his decade long experience of the methodological challenges of remittance research. I did not, however, follow his—possibly most important—piece of advice: to refrain from making a postal survey, and instead focus on making personal interviews only. Carling warned me that I risked to get a very low rate of response on a questionnaire sent out by mail. Via e-mail, I was also in touch with Peggy Levitt, a scholar on transnationalism. I sent her a draft of my questionnaire and received some comments. I also discussed the questions with a Kurdish member of the city council of Uppsala. He helped me set up a meeting with three more persons to advise me on the design of the questionnaire. In total, I conducted 11 key-informant or expert interviews before I decided on the final design of the questionnaire. I also received helpful suggestions and inspiration from Miri Stryjan who has conducted a survey on remittance-sending among Somalis in Sweden (Stryjan 2007).

For the design of the content of the questionnaire, I consulted the research guidelines developed by the Financial Market Integrity unit of the World Bank for their work on Bilateral Remittances Corridor Analysis (World Bank 2007). The guidelines include a sample “Questionnaire on Remittance Senders” (World Bank 2007, 60–69). I used this as a starting point for a first draft of my questionnaire. I made two major revisions of this first draft. Firstly, I shortened the questionnaire so that it would better fit as a postal questionnaire. I aimed at a questionnaire that would take not more than 15 minutes to complete. The second revision was made after pilot testing and consultation with experts on remittance research. I also looked at questionnaires designed with aims similar to my own. In particular, I made use of some phrasings from a questionnaire designed by the World Bank for a survey among Nigerian immigrants in Belgium in 2005 (World Bank 2005). In order to allow comparison with previous research on remittance sending from Sweden, I also adopted my questions to those used in the two previous recent Swedish surveys of remittance senders that I

knew of at the time: those carried out by Stryjan (2007) and Engdahl (2008). I included both closed questions (with a limited number of response alternatives listed) and a few open questions.

A major disadvantage with postal surveys is that the drop-out ratio tends to be higher than with personal interviews. This is a reason why many official household surveys such as HEK are carried out through phone interviews instead of by post (Forsgren 2009). It is also difficult to find out why an individual chooses not to participate in the survey. There is a risk that reluctance to answer one specific question on the questionnaire means that the respondent chooses not to send back the questionnaire at all. The drop-out risk had important repercussions for the design of the questionnaire. In order to minimise drop-out, I tried to keep the questionnaire as short as possible. This meant many important aspects had to be left out. To mention some of the more important, I omitted questions about citizenship status, and I did not ask about the frequency of contacts with the respondents country of origin. Other questions were taken out of the questionnaire after pilot testing.

I made pilot tests of the questionnaire in between April and August 2009 among a small number of key informants (see above). Several pointed out to me that members of the Kurdish community would be reluctant to answer questions about their income. Questions about income were therefore excluded from the questionnaire. In particular, several of my Kurdish key informants were worried that people who receive social allowances would not want to answer the questionnaire: “Those who get social allowances will [with emphasis] never tell you that they send money. If the *socialen* [slang for social allowances office] knows that they can save money... they would be afraid to loose the money” (interview in Uppsala 2009-05-05). Another worry was that the questionnaire might be seen in light of increasing suspicion and hostility directed against Muslims. “When you send money, it is to family or relatives, or to some organisation. They might suspect that I am sending money to Islamists or so...” (interview in Uppsala 2009-05-05). I was also encouraged to keep the questionnaire short.

Considerable effort was made to keep the language of the questionnaire simple and straightforward. In a cover letter in Kurmanji, respondents were offered a possibility to answer the questions Kurmanji in an online-version of the questionnaire. However only one respondent made use of this opportunity.

In a letter accompanying the questionnaire, the addressees were informed that their answers would be treated anonymously, and that the results of the survey would be published at the internet site of Global Utmaning. Respondents were offered a symbolic reward (a gift-check worth 50 SEK or the equivalent of 5 USD at the Swedish supermarket chain ICA). My phone number and e-mail address were provided, and the addressees were encourage to get in touch if they needed more

information. (For the questionnaire and the accompanying letter, see Appendix 2). On the same date, I published an online version of the questionnaire at the site of the think tank Global Utmaning, and I encouraged respondents to make use of this opportunity to fill in the answers to the questionnaire. To my surprise, only 15 respondents made use of this opportunity.

Deadline for responding was set on the 31st of October, 2009. A reminder was sent on the 28th of October, 2009. In this reminder, the final date for responding was extended to the 7th of November, 2009.

91 questionnaires did not reach their destination but were returned by the post office. 168 individuals or 29.9 percent of those that received the questionnaire responded. Of those that responded, 92 individuals or 55 percent could be identified as Kurds.

Table 10: Country of origin of Kurdish respondents

Country of origin of Kurds	Total	Percent
Iraq	49	53.3 %
Iran	8	8.7 %
Lebanon	2	2.2 %
Syria	1	1.1 %
Turkey	25	27.2 %
Kurdistan	7	7.6 %
Total	92	100 %

Source: postal survey in Uppsala.

I had expected a higher turn-out of Kurds among the respondents. There are several explanations for the fact that only slightly more than half of the respondents chosen on the basis of their name being identified as Kurdish were actually Kurdish. The most obvious explanation is that the lists of the Kurdish Library in Stockholm and of the Institut Kurde de Paris are somewhat inflated: they include names that are common also among members of other ethnic groups. Another explanation is that first names that because of their Indo-European roots are considered distinctly Kurdish names in predominantly Turkish or Arab-speaking countries such as Turkey, Syria or Iraq are in fact (also) Persian names. As I mentioned above, unfortunately to date I have not been able to compare my results with results of other surveys based on Kurdish first names. If my questionnaire had been distributed among members of Kurdish associations in Uppsala, I would probably have been able to generate more responses.

I chose to send out the questionnaire per post, as opposed to hand it out in connection with a personal visit or making interviews over the phone. This choice was made because of time constraints and for financial reasons. The World Bank has carried out a number of surveys among remittance senders and receivers by personal visits.³⁵ This is also how the Black and Minority Ethnic Remittance Survey was carried out in the UK (Boon 2006). Other surveys have been carried out through telephone interviews (this is the case, for instance, with a number of Pew Hispanic Center surveys on remittance senders, for instance that authored by Lopez, Livingston and Kochhar in 2009). I did not have the funds to hire people to help me carry out interviews, and I did not have the time to conduct (possibly) hundreds of interviews on my own.

5.7 Sampling Frame in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq

I looked into different possibilities of doing a survey in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. Adams has discussed the pros and cons of using household surveys to study remittances to developing countries (Adams 2005). The team behind the latest Iraqi household survey, the Iraqi Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) notes that Iraq used to be “a leader in household expenditure and income surveys” with regular surveys carried up until the 1990s (IHSES 2009a, 13). Even though the three Kurdish governates were excluded from the latest population census in 1997, a sample frame had been constructed for the 2004 Iraqi Living Conditions Survey for the two governates of Dohuk and Erbil. When the Iraqi Household Socio-Economic Survey was carried out in 2007, this sample frame was completed with census data gathered from a compulsory education project (IHSES 2009a, 16). The fact that migrants tend to be a ‘rare event’ in almost all populations (see above) might not have been such a problem in the three governates in the Kurdish Region. According to the IHSES, the share of households receiving economic support from households abroad is larger in the Kurdish Region (the governorates of Suleymani, Erbil and Dohuk) than in other parts of Iraq. In the governate of Suleymani 17.8 percent of the households participating in the survey reported that they receive economic assistance from abroad, a strong indication that they are migrant households, from which at least one member has migrated abroad.

³⁵ See for instance a survey among Brazilians of Japanese decent (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2007), and the International Remittance Senders Household Survey carried out among Senegalese and Nigerian immigrants in Belgium in 2005 (World Bank 2005).

Table 11: Percentage of Iraqi households receiving assistance from other households abroad

Governorate	Assistance from households abroad
Sulaimaniya	17.8%
Erbil	8.7%
Duhouk	7.0%
Al-Muthanna	6.5%
Kirkuk	5.5%
Thi Qar	5.0%
Baghdad	4.8%
Al-Anbar	4.7%
Al-Najaf	3.9%
Basrah	3.6%
Salahuddin	3.1%
Babil	3.0%
Ninevah	2.8%
Wasit	2.6%
Al-Qadisiya	2.4%
Kerbela	1.7%
Diala	0.9%
Missan	0.80%

Source: IHSES 2009b, 659.

5.8 Intercept Survey in Suleymani

Not being able to use of the IHSES sample frame to distribute a survey, I opted for an intercept survey, that is, a survey made among people gathered at a particular place (see above). During one of my visits, a good opportunity to do so arose when I was invited to give a speech at a large, local conference in the second largest town of the Kurdish region Suleymani. The conference was funded by the Olof Palme International Center, based in Stockholm. The participants at the conference were local activists of the sister party of Swedish social democrats: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK, or *Yeketî Nîştîmanî Kurdistan* in Sorani)³⁶. The questionnaire was distributed on the 11 December 2009 among the 78 participants at the conference. 71 or 91 percent filled out the questionnaire. The language of the questionnaire was Sorani, the Kurdish language spoken in Suleymani. The majority of the participants of the conference were men, which is reflected in the answers to the questionnaire: 64.8 of respondents were male and 35.2 percent female.

³⁶ The participants at the conference cannot be considered to be entirely representative of the population in Suleymani. The PUK is a large party with a broad fellowship, but party cadres are a kind of elite in the Kurdish society (Kareem and Yardımcısı 2011).

5.9 Key Informant Interviews

I started doing research for this study in 2006. My first interviews were key-informant interviews with the President of The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden (*Kurdiska riksförbundet*), Aycan ermîn Bozarslan (key informant interviews in Stockholm 2007-04-10 and 2009-04-17), and with staff at the Nordic office of the Kurdistan Regional Government (key informant interviews in Stockholm 2007-04-11 and 2009-04-08). I made a second interview with the KRG office in April 2009 (key informant interview in Stockholm 2009-04-08). I also interviewed Tahir Ismail, the officer responsible for Iraq at the international institute of the Swedish labour movement, the Olof Palme International Center (key informant interview in Stockholm 2009-04-15) and Conny Fredriksson, chair of the Working Group on Kurdish Issues of the Socialist International (key informant interview in Stockholm 2007-01-08) as well as Anita Gradin, former EU-commissioner, who has a strong personal engagement with the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (key informant interview in Stockholm 2006-10-25). On April 17 to 18, 2009, I participated at a national level conference organised by the Swedish Migration Board on called “Dialogue with a focus on Iraq” that is organised within the Migration Board’s programme of voluntary return. At this conference, I was able to speak to a number of profiled Kurdish business men and heads of different Sweden-based Kurdish organisations and institutions, including the Kurdish library in Stockholm.

In Uppsala, the first interviews I conducted were with civil servants at the Child, Youth and Employment Office of the Municipality of Uppsala (key informant interview in Uppsala 2009-04-15). An important aim of these interviews was to try to establish the size of the Kurdish population in Uppsala. At my interview with the chairperson of the municipal committee on labour market and education, the Education and Employment Board, a committee made up of local part-time politicians, I discovered that my informant was in fact a Kurd from Lebanon (interview in Uppsala 2009-04-20). I also made key-informant interviews with the chairpersons of three of Uppsala’s Kurdish associations and with two local politicians of Kurdish decent.

In parallel with these interviews, I tried to deepen my knowledge about the history of the Kurdish community in Uppsala by reading biographies of Kurdish immigrants in Uppsala and searching the archives of the local newspaper Upsala Nya Tidning.

5.10 Semi-Structured Individual Interviews in Uppsala and Iraq

5.10.1 Interviews among Kurds in Uppsala

Qualitative interviews is a research method commonly used by sociologists and anthropologists. In remittance research, the introduction of methodologies developed within sociology and social

anthropology led to a questioning of neo-classical theory's 'methodological individualism'. By using methods such as qualitative interviews and household surveys inspired by those used by anthropologists, the researchers who developed the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) produced a shift of focus from profit-maximising individuals to households (Castles 2008, 5). Qualitative interviews are now widely used to research the motivations and preferences of remittance senders and to study other transnational practices.

I carried out 14 semi-structured individual and group interviews with a total of 36 Kurds in Uppsala in order to complement the data I had been able to gather through my postal survey and the questionnaire I distributed in Suleymani (see above). I tried to make use of the same sample frame that I used for the postal survey among Kurds in Uppsala (that is, a list of addresses based on Kurdish first names in the phone book) in order to get a random sample of respondents. I had hoped that I would be able to use this sample of Kurds in Uppsala to gather a reasonable number of individuals that I could interview, by generating snow-ball samples of respondents starting from individual respondents to the questionnaire who would volunteer to be interviewed. Unfortunately, only three respondents contacted me. One of the three respondents helped me arrange an interview with four Kurdish women from Lebanon (group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-27). I made an interview with the board of one of the largest associations, the Swedish-Kurdish association (group interview in Uppsala 2010-01-11) and two group interviews with members of the Kurdish Student and Academics' Association KSAF (group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31 and 2011-04-14). Two more formal interviews and a number of more informal exchanges were the results of personal contacts. The interviewees were offered 300 SEK (the equivalent of 30 USD) for their time and effort.

As mentioned above, in addition to these interviews I carried out interviews with eleven key informants or experts in Sweden, including with the chairpersons of three of the Kurdish associations in Uppsala and with two leading local politicians of Kurdish decent. All the interviewed individuals in Uppsala, (including participants in the group interviews) had sent money to family or relatives in their country of origin. Unfortunately, I have not been able to interview anybody who has not sent remittances to Kurdistan. In this sense, and judging from the results of the postal survey, the interviewed individuals are not a representative sample of Kurds in Uppsala. In particular, since remittance sending is generally considered to be a strong indication of an individual's transnational ties, the transnational practices of the interviewees probably differ from that of members of the Kurdish community in Uppsala who do not remit. A majority of those interviewed were also members of a Kurdish association, which is only the case of a small share of

the entire Kurdish community. Among the Kurdish respondents to the questionnaire, 22.8 percent reported that they were members of a Kurdish association.

5.10.2 Interviews with Return Migrants and Migrant Relatives in the Kurdistan Region

In December 2009 and in May 2010, I carried out fieldwork in the cities of Erbil/Hawler, Suleymani, Koya and Rania in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. As I have mentioned above, I had originally hoped that my informants in Uppsala would be able to provide me with names and addresses to their relatives so that I could follow the transnational ties from individuals/families/households in Uppsala to (potential) remittance receivers in Iraq. However, this strategy could not be employed. Instead of doing group interviews, I identified informants by doing a snow-ball sample starting from the individuals that I or my research assistant had identified.

Snowball sampling is a common method for sampling migrants when no sampling frame (such as census data or an official register) is available (Heckathorn 1997). Generally, migrants are a 'rare event' in a population, but, and this is a condition for the success of this method of sampling, they generally know each other (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2007, 6). Snowball sampling is a chain-referral method: every respondent is asked to refer to another member of the group (in my case, individuals with relatives in Sweden). The main source of bias in any chain-referral method is connected to the first sample, the 'seed'. As Heckathorn points out, "it generally has been assumed that however many waves the chain-referral sampling may contain, it necessarily must reflect the biases in the initial sample" (Heckathorn 1997, 176).

Heckathorn describes a method of "Respondent-Driven-Sampling" (RDS) that attempts to minimise this risk of bias. By giving the initial respondents incentives not only to participate in the study themselves (a 'primary award') but also 'secondary reward' for recruiting their peers into the study, and make sure that their referrals do actually participate in the study, Respondent-Driven-Sampling produces a sample that is "independent of the initial subjects from which sampling begins" (Heckathorn 1997, 176).

In my Iraqi sample, I included migrants who had returned from Sweden, as well as individuals with a family member or a relative currently in Sweden. I had three original seeds: members of the board of the association for returnees from Sweden "Tor", participants at a conference in Suleymani, and friends and family members of my guide (who was recommended to me by a Kurdish acquaintance in Sweden). In total, I conducted individual and group interviews with over 100 individuals. In addition, I made nine expert interviews. I interviewed leading staff (level of general director) at the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry for Sports, Youth and Culture, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research and at the Bureau of Migration and Displaced

of the Kurdistan Regional Government. I also interviewed the Dean at the College of Law and Politics of Salahaddin University, and the secretary generals of two foreign non-governmental organisations based in Erbil/Hawler: Swedish Qandil (At the time, the Secretary General of Qandil also served as Sweden's honorary consul in Erbil) and German AGEF (*Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Bereich der Migration und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*)³⁷.

When different kinds of strategic sampling are used to identify respondents for interviews, there is no universal rule as to how many interviews have to be carried out. Instead, interviews should continue until there is a "theoretical saturation", that is, when new interviews do not provide any new information of interest to the study (Behnke, Baur and Behnke 2010, 209). To Kvale (1997, quoted by Hedberg 2005, 56) ten to fifteen interviews is a reasonable number. I conducted 36 interviews at two different occasions (in December 2009 and in May 2010).

I conducted semi-structured interviews, which meant that I followed a guide with a number of questions rather than a strict script. The semi-structured approach has a number of advantages. It makes it possible to add questions during the interview, as well as changing the order of the questions if necessary. The guide I used contained a number of topics I wanted to raise with the informant, rather than pre-formulated questions.

5.11 Group Interviews in Uppsala and Iraq

Four group interviews were conducted in Uppsala: with the board of the Swedish-Kurdish association, with the board of the Kurdish Student and Academics Association in Uppsala, with a group of members of the Kurdish Student and Academics Association in Uppsala, and with a group of Kurdish women from Lebanon who were reached through one of the individual respondents. The interviewed individuals have received a transcript of the interviews per e-mail and were given the opportunity to correct misunderstandings, etc. The group interviews generally lasted one and a half hours.

5.11.1 Conducting Interviews in a Foreign Language

During my two field visits to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, I conducted single as well as group interviews in Swedish, English, German and Sorani. I am fluent in the first three languages. For interviews with informants who could not speak neither Swedish, English nor German, I was dependent upon an interpreter. I cannot rule out the possibility that language problems have affected my interview material. After several failed attempts to gain my informants' consent to record the interviews, I decided to only take notes. In most cases, I transcribed my notes in the evening the

³⁷ Between January 2007 and January 2009, the Swedish Migration Board gave support to returnees from Sweden through AGEF in Northern Iraq. (Migration Board 2009, 48).

same day the interview took place and discussed possible omissions and misinterpretations with my interpreter. When this was not possible, I endeavoured to transcribe as soon as possible.

5.12 Summary

For this study, I have combined quantitative data from an official household survey, from official migration statistics, and from a survey sent out to a sample of Kurds in one Sweden town, with qualitative data from individual and group interviews in Sweden and in four locations in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. All these sources, with the limitation I have described above, have added to my understanding of how transnational practices shape migration.

The census-based, national household survey data from a representative sample of Swedish residents enabled me to analyse patterns of gift-giving in the native as well as foreign born Swedish population. Using first names to sample Kurdish residents in the town of Uppsala, I was able to distribute a questionnaire that reached also those that are not members of a Kurdish association. According to my data, the group of non-organised constitutes around 80 percent of all Kurds in Uppsala. Data that I obtained through qualitative interviews with a strategic sample of informants proved indispensable for my analysis.

I also base my analysis on extensive reading of secondary sources, including in particular other studies of the Kurdish population in Sweden (Kuutmann 1980, Alinia 2004, Emanuelsson 2005 and 2007, Khayati 2005 and 2008, Alakom 2007, Eliassi 2010, Baser 2012), autobiographies, newspaper articles and other media reports.

An alternative way of analysing transnational ties is to make a comparative analysis of two or several transnational communities. A comparative perspective has many advantages. If the cases to be studied are chosen with care, different aspects that might influence the extent, scope and durability of transnational practices could be isolated. Interesting results have been achieved by comparing the strategies and focus of the same ethnic community in different nation-states (see Koopmans et al. 2005, and Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, for instance). A disadvantage with a study based on several cases is obviously the fact that each case could not be studied with the same depth.

This study focuses on the agency of individual migrants in shaping the transnational ties between Sweden with Iraq. There are other individual agents that could have been at the centre of analysis, for instance community leaders, or politicians and civil servants in the two countries. I hope that my focus on the agency of 'ordinary' members of the Kurdish population, in Uppsala as well as in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, can provide insights that a more traditional focus on leading figures would not be able to provide.

6 Remitting Money from Sweden: Evidence from HEK 2007

What are the general patterns of remittance sending from Sweden? What can patterns of remittance sending tell about the transition and possible transformation of these ties over time? In 2011, I published the results of an analysis of Swedish survey data collected by Statistics Sweden for their annual Swedish Economic Household Survey (HEK) together with Charlotta Hedberg and Bo Malmberg (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011). This chapter summarises the most important conclusions of our analysis and relates our findings to the issues relevant for this dissertation.

The main reason we decided to analyse data from HEK was the identified lack of up to date data on remittances from Sweden described in chapter 5. As described in chapter 5, no new data on remittances from Sweden was published from 2002 until this date (October 2012). Data reported to the IMF and published in their Balance of Payment statistics during these years are estimations built on data collected before 2002. This is probably the main reason why remittances from Sweden seem to be so low compared to flows from similar countries, both in absolute numbers and in relation to the size of Sweden's immigrant population (see table 12 and 13 below).

Table 12: Outward remittance flows 2000–2006, USD (millions)

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Austria	858	950	1,095	1,466	2,014	2,543	1,533
Denmark	662	745	860	1,029	1,226	1,480	1,792
Germany	7,761	7,609	9,572	11,190	11,977	12,282	12,345
The Netherlands	3,122	2,850	2,889	4,238	5,032	5,678	6,662
Norway	718	554	658	1,430	1,749	2,170	2,620
Spain	2,059	2,470	2,914	5,139	6,977	8,136	11,004
Sweden	545	589	590	600	646	532	589

Source: Ratha and Xu 2008.

Table 13: Remittances per year and number of foreign born (USD)

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Austria	1,018	1,063	1,254	1,588	1,902	2,311	1,331
Denmark	2,145	2,315	2,594	3,046	3,571	4,223	4,965
Germany	757	731	909	1,054	1,128	1,156	1,162
The Netherlands	1,933	1,702	1,685	2,447	2,898	3,273	3,846
Norway	2,354	1,758	1,971	4,118	4,843	5,705	6,467
Spain	1,046	952	882	1,391	1,589	1,682	2,096
Sweden	543	573	560	557	587	473	501

Source: OECD 2008a, Ratha and Xu 2008.

However, there might of course be other explanations for the relatively small flows of remittances sent from Sweden shown in tables 14 and 15 above. By analysing data from HEK, among other things we were interested to find out if remittance patterns from Sweden would be in any way different from patterns of remittance sending from other comparable countries. The propensity to remit from Sweden indeed turned out to be quite different from the propensity to remit observed in other countries: only 13.8 percent of all surveyed individuals in HEK 2007 belong to a remitting household, that is, to a household that reported giving gifts or economic support worth at least 5,000 SEK during the last year (see table 9, page 100). An other household interview survey carried out by Statistics Sweden in 2010 among foreign-born Swedish residents found a similar propensity to remit. According to preliminary results from the survey, among the 3,500 interviewed immigrants one in every ten regularly sent money to family and relatives in the country of origin (reported in Swedish Radio 2012-05-28).

In contrast, more than a third of immigrants in a survey carried out by Statistics Norway in 2007 reported helping their families in their countries of origin (Blom and Henriksen, eds. 2008), and in 2006 a survey commissioned by the British Department for International Development on ‘Black and Minority Ethnic’ households found that 26 percent of those surveyed had sent money to family and friends abroad during the last 12 months (Boon 2006). In Canada, data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada revealed that an average of 23 percent of the immigrants in Canada send money home 6 to 24 months after immigrating, and 29 percent 25 to 28 months after arrival in Canada (Houle and Schollenberg 2008, 6).

We concluded that one important explanation for this difference between propensity to remit among households surveyed in Sweden and households in other, similar countries might be related to two aspects of the question of the survey. We based the propensity to remit on answers to the question “*Has the household during 2007 given family members/relatives economic support or gifts worth at least 5000 SEK?*”. Firstly, this question only includes sums above 5,000 SEK (the equivalent of 760 USD or 540 EUR in 2007). Secondly, what is worse, (as described in section The Official Survey HEK as a Source of Data on Remittances above) the question could be interpreted as asking about gifts or transfers of support of a *one-time value* of 5,000 SEK. That is, the respondent might have interpreted the question as asking about large gifts worth more than 5,000 SEK, or about single transfers of more than 5,000 SEK. 5,000 SEK is a relatively large sum of money, exceeding the average amounts sent as remittances found in other surveys (notably Moré 2008). According to SOEP data from Germany (Holst, Schäfer and Schrooten 2008), the median remittance sent by migrants in 2006 was 500 EUR per year (women) and 1,000 EUR per year (men), indicating that

more than half of the remitting women and a substantial share of remitting men remitted less than 5,000 SEK.

Rather than offering data on remittances from Sweden that can be easily compared to data from other countries, we found that data from HEK could be used to compare patterns of gift-giving and economic support between different groups of immigrants in Sweden and native Swedes. We looked at three different groups: 1) natives³⁸, 2) individuals born in developing countries, and 3) individuals born in non-developing countries other than Sweden. We used the OECD categorisation of so-called DAC-countries as a definition of a developing country. DAC stands for Development Aid Committee, and DAC countries are eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA) according to OECD/DAC criteria (OECD 2008b). This was a pragmatic choice: there is no gulf separating ‘developed’ from ‘non-developed’ countries. Instead, if countries are placed on a scale from ‘poor’ to ‘rich’ the world is more of a continuum than two separate spheres as the division between ‘developed’ and non-developed’ signalises (gapminder 2012). DAC countries had a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita lower than 11,455 USD in 2007 (GNI per capita for Sweden was 47,940 USD in 2007).

6.1 Transnational Practices Over Time

Not surprisingly, we did indeed find evidence that transnational practices change over time. We also found evidence that remittance practices change differently for different groups of immigrants. We found evidence for a remittance decay (the remittance decay hypothesis is described in chapter 4 above). However, for immigrants from developing countries, the decay only started after more than 20 years in Sweden (see Figure 8 below).

38 Second generation immigrants were included in the group of native-born. Only individuals born outside Sweden were categorised as immigrants.




Figure 8: Propensity to Remit on Time since Immigration

Source: HEK 2007

The red line in Figure 8 above shows how the practice of giving gifts and economic support varied with time spent in Sweden for immigrants from non-developing countries. Interestingly, the decay of their propensity to remit happens earlier (after ten years in Sweden) for this group. On the other hand, after more than 20 years in Sweden, the propensity to give gifts/economic support increases again. This might be an indication that, over time, immigrants from non-developing countries adopt their gift-giving practices to those of the native-born: that is, they give more gifts and economic support as they grow older (see Figure 9 below below).

Another time-aspect of remittances sending is its relation to the age of the remitter. We found interesting differences between native Swedes and immigrants from non-developing countries on one hand, and immigrants from developing countries on the other hand. As Figure 9 below shows, among native Swedes as well as among immigrants born in non-developing countries the propensity to give gifts/economic support *increases* with increasing age. However, for immigrants born in developing countries, the opposite is true: the propensity to remit among individuals born in this country group *decreases* with increasing age. As immigrants from developing countries grow older, they tend to remit less. Of course, this tendency might not necessarily be related to age itself. Instead, it can be a consequence of the pattern shown in Figure 8 above, that is that the propensity to remit tends to decrease with time spent in Sweden.




Figure 9: Propensity to Remit on Age

Source: HEK 2007

There could be several reasons why the propensity to remit decreases with time spent in Sweden. It is possible to interpret it as a sign of integration: with time, the ties to the country of origin grow weaker, the host country becomes more important and relationships and obligations in the country of origin lose significance (cf Holst, Schäfer and Schrooten 2008). However, it does not seem that immigrants from developing countries integrated into Swedish society in the sense of adopting their gift-giving practices to those of the majority population of native Swedes.

The fact that the propensity to remit decays with time spent in the host country can also be, as has been pointed out by Carling (Carling 2008a), the result of a selection effect: since the propensity to remit tends to be related to plans to return, it might be that after twenty years, a significant share of those who remitted during their first years in Sweden have actually returned to their country of origin. Those that are still in Sweden and are included in the survey are those that—maybe from the beginning—were less prone to remit. Another, maybe more important explanation, is that those that used to *receive* the remittances sent by immigrants in Sweden are no longer alive, or do not need remittances any more. In chapter 9 below, I describe how my informants sent remittances with the explicit goal of making their relatives independent from support from abroad.

6.2 Life-Course Determinants

As I have argued in chapter 4 (from page 78), it is relevant to apply a life course perspective on patterns of remittance sending. That is, time factors alone (such as age and time spent abroad) are not enough to explain how practices of remittance sending change. Life course variables, such as




Figure 10: Propensity to Remit on Family Type

Source: HEK 2007

family situation, are also relevant. The HEK data includes data on the family constellation of the interviewee and his or her household. In Figure 10 above, families are grouped according to the age of the youngest child living in the household: children under the age of 18 are termed “small kids” and children over the age of 18 (but still living in the parental home) are termed “older kids”. The Figure shows some important differences between immigrants from developing countries and native Swedes. In two types of families, individuals from developing countries have a higher propensity to give gifts or economic support than native Swedes: families that consist of couples with small children, and single households without children.

The difference was larger the younger the children. Individuals from developing countries living in households whose youngest child was under the age of six, had a propensity to give gifts/economic support of 8.8 percent compared with only 3.7 percent among native-born individuals in the same situation. In households whose youngest child was under the age of 18, the propensity to remit was 10.3 percent for individuals from developing countries and 5.6 percent for native-born individuals.

It is surprising that individuals born in developing countries who live in a family with small children show a higher propensity to remit than couples who do not have children in their household. Having small children tends to be a phase in life when the financial situation is particularly strained: kids cost, and many parents have to cut down on their working hours in order to take care of their children and thus tend to earn less than couples without children. In our working paper, we argue that one reason why for immigrants from developing countries this particular family constellation displays a relatively high propensity to remit might be connected to the potential receivers of gifts and economic support (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 16). Potential receivers include adult siblings, who might also find themselves in a strained financial

situation because they have small children to take care of. At this stage in life, it is also likely that the parents of the interviewees are still alive and—potentially—in need of remittances. At this point in life, potential receivers thus include both siblings in the same phase of the life cycle and elderly parents.

Who the potential receivers of remittances are could also explain, we argue, why singles born in developing countries who do not have children in their household tend to remit more than their native-born peers. These singles without children in the household are possibly members of a transnational family, in which the spouse and the children still remain in the country of origin.

6.3 Factors Related to Integration into the Host Society

How does the practice of giving gifts and economic support change with integration into Swedish society? Citizenship is sometimes seen as a token of integration into the host society (see sectionThe Swedish Citizenship Regime below). Table 14 below shows that having acquired Swedish citizenship seems to have very little influence on the propensity to give gifts/economic support.

Table 14: Propensity to remit on citizenship in HEK 2007

	Developing	Non-developing
Not citizen	10.3%	10.2%
Citizen	11.7%	14.30%

Source: HEK 2007.

One reason why there is no major difference between the propensity to the remit between immigrants who have naturalised in Sweden and those who have not acquired a Swedish passport is that the Swedish citizenship does not seem to make much of a difference to its holder. I describe the Swedish citizenship regime in sectionThe Swedish Citizenship Regimebelow. According to current Swedish legislation, most rights and entitlements are tied to the status of permanent residence. For instance, a permanent residence permit entitles to a personal identification number (essential for opening a bank account or buying property) and permanent residents have the right to vote in local elections. Unlike some other European countries, Sweden does not discriminate between citizens and non-citizens in the provision of public funded housing.

Definitions of integration usually includes a measure of income-parity with the native born population (see Venturini 2012, for instance). What happens with the propensity to remit as the income of foreign born increases? Most studies find a positive effect of income on the propensity to remit (see Hagen-Zanker and Siegel 2007 for an overview), that is: the propensity to remit increases with increasing income. However, the effect of income on the amount remitted is not necessarily

linear (Houle and Schellenberg 2008, Faini 2006). Income was indeed an important determinant for the propensity to remit among respondents to HEK 2007 from all country groups. We divided the respondents into five different income groups. Table 15 below shows how the propensity to remit increases from 8.3 percent in the lowest income group (annual disposable household income of less than 135,000 SEK) to 24.1 percent in the highest income group (annual disposable household income of more than 285,000 SEK).

Table 15: Propensity to remit on income in HEK 2007

Income group (annual household disposable income)	Have remitted	
1 (<135,000 SEK)	Sweden	8.7 %
	developing country	6.2 %
	non-developing country	8.5 %
	Total	8.3 %
2 (135,001 – 175,000 SEK)	Sweden	8.6 %
	developing country	16.0 %
	non-developing country	11.2 %
	Total	9.4 %
3 (175,001 – 220,000 SEK)	Sweden	11.1 %
	developing country	9.4 %
	non-developing country	13.6 %
	Total	11.1 %
4 (220,001 - 285,000 SEK)	Sweden	15.1 %
	developing country	19.3 %
	non-developing country	14.7 %
	Total	15.3 %
5 (>285,000 SEK)	Sweden	24.6 %
	developing country	20.0 %
	non-developing country	17.3 %
	Total	24.1 %

Source: HEK 2007.




Figure 11: Propensity to Remit on Household Disposable Income

Source: HEK 2007.

Among native born and individuals born in non-developing countries, the propensity to remit increases with increasing income. However, individuals born in developing countries display a slightly diverging pattern: respondents belonging to income group 2 is actually have a *higher* propensity to remit than respondents in income group 3 (see Figure 11 above).

6.4 Evidence from HEK 2007: Summary

Despite its limitations, and given the lack of other up-to-date data, the Swedish Economic Household Survey HEK is a relevant source of data on the general patterns of remittance sending from Sweden. In particular, HEK can be used to compare patterns of gift-giving and economic support between native Swedes and immigrants from developing countries.

Data from HEK shows that the practice of giving gifts and economic support changes over time. Transnational practices change with age, but also with time spent in Sweden. There is evidence of remittance decay, but among immigrants from developing countries the decay starts only after 20 years in Sweden. For immigrants from non-developing countries, the propensity to give gifts and economic support decreases over time, but increases again after 20 years in Sweden. Age affects the

propensity to remit very differently in different groups: immigrants from developing countries are less prone to give gifts and economic support less as they grow older, whereas the opposite is true for native Swedes and immigrants from non-developing countries.

In our analysis of data from HEK 2007, we found that life course determinants are relevant for understanding the patterns of gift-giving and economic support. In particular, life course determinants are essential in explaining the differences in patterns of gift-giving and economic support between native Swedes and immigrants from developing countries. In comparison with native-born who give gifts and economic support, migrants from developing countries were younger, more often lived in a household with small children, and tended to have a lower disposable income. To us, this is an indication that individuals from developing countries give gifts and economic support when in vulnerable stages of the life course: when they are young, have small children, and relatively low income (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011, 20).

7 The Transnational Capacity of Kurds in Sweden

The transnational practices of Kurds in different countries relate to and are shaped by different country-specific institutional, cultural and historic contexts. In this chapter, I describe the environment that Kurds in Sweden live and operate in. I will argue that the conditions for cultivating what Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) have termed a ‘transnational social field’³⁹ (2004) are better in Sweden than in some other countries with large Kurdish exile communities.

Communities of Kurdish immigrants in Europe have been described as transnational communities (Faist 2000; Gran 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Wahlbeck 1998, 2002). The Kurdish diaspora in Sweden is often compared to the Kurdish diaspora in Germany (see for instance van Bruinessen 1999, Baser 2012). Germany hosts the largest Kurdish community outside the Middle East (McDowall 2004) with an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 members (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 61; Gunter 2004, 198). Kurdish organisations in Germany claim that the Kurdish population in Germany is even larger, comprising up to 900,000 members (Baser 2011, 8). The formation of the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden and Germany follow similar lines. The first major immigration of Kurds began with labour migration from Turkey in the 1960s, followed by family reunification in the 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, Kurdish immigration consisted mainly of asylum applicants. In the first decade of the 21st century, a significant number of Kurdish asylum applicants from Iraq arrived to both Germany and Sweden. (Amman 2005, Alakom 2007, Khayati 2008). Both in Sweden and in Germany, the Kurdish population is thus a mixture of former labour immigrants, asylum applicants, and their families and descendants.

However, van Bruinessen argues that because Swedish integration policies encouraged the use of immigrant mother tongues, “especially writers, journalists and other intellectuals chose Sweden as their place of exile” (van Bruinessen 1999, 9). Multilingualism is promoted through the Swedish educational system. The fact that many Kurdish intellectuals have been exiled in Sweden has had implications for the political outlook of the diaspora. Even though the PKK started attempts to recruit support in the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden already in the 1980s, it was not able to get much headway among the already quite politicised Kurds in Sweden. Many of them belonged to groups that were rivals of the PKK in Turkey such as Kawa and PSK (Baser 2012). The PKK found “more fertile field for recruitment”, writes van Bruinessen, among labour immigrants in Germany (van

³⁹ For a discussion about the term ‘transnational social field’ please refer to chapter 3, in particular the section Transnationalism: A New Optic.

Bruinessen 1999, 9). Many Kurds who are in exile in Sweden came before the PKK was founded, or they belonged to the movements which were in opposition to the PKK in Turkey. In Germany, in contrast, the PKK mobilized a previously apolitical population. Many Kurds became politically active after being subjected to the PKK propaganda in Germany in the 1990s (Baser 2012).

Say ‘Kurds in Germany’, and what might come to mind are pictures of angry PKK supporters in a mass rally. Say ‘Kurds in Sweden’, and chances are many Swedes associate to one of Sweden’s most popular pop stars Dilan, or with any of a large number of prominent Swedish-Kurdish writers, journalists, stand-up comedians and politicians.

Nevertheless, the current image of the Kurdish community in Sweden must be described as contradictory. On the one hand, the community is indeed known for its artists, writers, intellectuals and politicians.⁴⁰ For instance, in 2005, four Kurds were listed as some of the 100 most powerful Swedes in a ranking made by the weakly paper *Fokus*. The four Kurds were the Social Democratic politician Nalin Pekköl (on position 40), the journalist Evin Rubar (position 47), the journalist, writer and director Zanyar Adami (position 58), and the journalist and stand-up comedian Nisti Stêrk (position 68) (Swedish–Kurdish Friendship League 2012 quoting beyan.net 2005-12-29). On the other hand, Kurds in Sweden are often portrayed as marginalised and poorly integrated into society. The negative image of Kurds was to a large extent shaped by the fact that the investigation into the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme for a long time focused its attention on the ‘Kurdish track’. The investigation found no evidence that individual Kurds or Kurdish organisations were implicated in the murder. In the 1990s, several cases of honour killings involving Kurdish families have given Kurds a lot of negative attention, and rendered the Kurdish community a stigmatised image in the media (Khayati 2008).

The occurrence of honour-based violence in Sweden is strongly connected to the names of two young Kurdish women: Pela Atroshi and Fadime Sahindal. Pela Atroshi was a 19 year old woman that had grown up in the Stockholm suburb of Farsta. She was murdered when she was on vacation in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq in 1999. According to Pela’s sister Breen, who contacted the Swedish police and was herself a witness to the killing, Pela was murdered because she had refused to live according to the rules set up by her father, and thereby she had hurt the families honour. Even though Pela Atroshi was not a Swedish citizen, the Swedish police and judiciary took up her case and in January 2001, two of Pela Atroshi uncles were convicted of her murder in the first trial of honour-related violence in Sweden (Swedish Radio 2011-11-27). In 2002, Fadime Sahindal was a young Kurdish woman from Uppsala. She was politically active in the youth organisation of the

⁴⁰ Sweden is also the home of several artists and writers who are predominantly known to their Kurdish audience. One example is the musician Ciwan Haco, who lives an anonymous life in the Swedish city of Gävle, but gathers hundreds of thousands of listeners when he performs in Turkish Kurdistan (*SVT Gävleborg* 2011-03-21).

Social Democratic Party (SSU), and she had witnessed in Swedish media about the honour related threats and the violence she had had to endure from her father and brother. Fadime Sahindal refused an arranged marriage and choose a Swedish boyfriend. She was killed by her father as she was visiting her mother and sisters at their flat in Gränby, Uppsala in January 2002. Fadime Sahindal's funeral in the cathedral of Uppsala was attended by the Swedish Crown Princess, the president of the Swedish parliament, several government ministers and the Archbishop. Her murder spurred an intensive debate about honour-killings and honour-related violence particularly among Kurds (Wikan 2008). In his book "Starless nights" (*Stjärnlösa nätter*), Arkan Asaad, with roots in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, writes about male experiences of honour based oppression of the individual. Arkan Assad was forced to marry one of his cousins in Kurdistan and wrote a semi-autobiographic book about his struggles with his family's honour culture (Assad 2011).

Just as the image of the Kurdish community is contradictory, so is the experience of Kurds in Sweden. Alinia writes that the experiences of Sweden of the 22 Kurds in Gothenburg she interviewed for her dissertation "Spaces of Diasporas: Kurdish identities, experiences of otherness and politics of belonging" (Alinia 2004) were "associated on the one hand with democracy and political freedom, which give them social opportunities to pursue their activities, and on the other hand with everyday racism and exclusion." (Alinia 2004, V). The dissertation of Barzoo Eliassi "A stranger in my homeland" addresses the 'politics of belonging' among young people with Kurdish backgrounds in Sweden. Eliassi describes how Kurdish young people experience ethnic discrimination and stigmatisation on the labor market, through housing segregation, in the legal system, as well as in school. Eliassi's respondents also report that they are being discriminated by 'ordinary Swedes' and through the reproduction of stereotype images of Muslims and Kurds in the mass media. (Eliassi 2010). Eliassi's report that his respondents experience an "exclusive Swedishness", which limits young Kurds to being "Swedish on paper" as opposed to 'real' or "Swedish Swedish" (Eliassi 2010, 219). Eliassi concludes that in order for young Kurds to feel included in Swedish society, citizenship and belonging must be "detached from ethnicist notions of Swedishness" (Eliassi 2010, 223), it is necessary to "reformulate the basis of Swedish identity" (Eliassi 2010, 224) .

For Kurds, writes Eliassi, the fact that the Kurds lack their own state "in a world order permeated by nationstatism", can be a stigma in itself (Eliasssi 2010, 221). Eliassi's respondents compared themselves to Gypsies, who because they lack their own state are discriminated against everywhere. Eliassi highlights the agency of young Kurds in opposing discrimination. Interestingly, he argues that the life experiences in Sweden (including experiences of discrimination and racism), as well as quarrels with young people originating other parts of the Middle East had contributed to Kurds

in Sweden harbouring strong nationalist Kurdish feelings, sometimes expressed through active participation in transnational activities of support for the Kurdish struggle .

Difficulties to integrate into Swedish society, combined with often traumatic experiences of persecution made before the arrival to Sweden has affected the health of Kurdish immigrants. Taloyan (2008) has analysed the answers of respondents to the Swedish National Survey of Immigrants (INV-ULF) conducted in 1996. In the survey, the respondents were asked about their ethnicity. Taloyan looked at the answers given by self-identified Kurdish male respondents to the survey. She found that the prevalence of poor self-reported health among Kurdish men was 30.6 percent, twice as high as among Swedish men in the Swedish Level of Living Surveys (SALLS) conducted in the same year (Taloyan 2008, 28). According to Taloyan, the high prevalence of poor self-reported health could be explained both by factors relating to pre-migration experiences as well as post-migration, that is experiences made in Sweden. Taloyan looked specifically at mental health, and identified “creation and re-creation of Kurdish identity” as a protective factors for good mental health. That is, those men that felt that they were able to contribute to the strengthening of Kurdish culture reported that they were more healthy than individuals that did not make this experience. Among Taloyan’s respondents, “dissatisfaction with Swedish society” was a risk-factor for for poor mental health (Taloyan 2008, 44). She writes:

The image of Kurdish men as presented by the Swedish mass media during three specific incidents (the assassination of the prime minister and two so-called honour killings), produced a feeling of persecution (sic) without any basis. This in turn created a feeling of being uprightly discriminated against and judged by Swedish society. (Taloyan 2008, 44)

7.1 The Swedish Citizenship Regime

The Kurdish diaspora in Sweden has been influenced by the context to which its members have been integrated into Swedish society. One striking difference between Sweden and Germany is the citizenship regime that prevailed (and partly prevails) in the two countries. According to the Citizenship Policies Index developed by Howard (Howard 2009), Sweden belongs to one of the most liberal countries in Western Europe, whereas Germany is placed in the medium category. Both countries have made major changes to their citizenship policies since the 1980s. Germany made a large citizenship reform in the year 2000. Notably, Germany has made it easier for children born on Germany territory to non-German citizens to acquire German citizenship. It has also become possible for German citizens to hold dual citizenship (Howard 2009, 27-28). This reform moved

Germany from being classified as “restrictive” to the category “medium” in Howard’s index. In the same time span, however, Sweden has moved from “medium” to “liberal” (Howard 2009, 27-28). In other classifications of citizenship regimes, Germany is often the typical example of an “ethnic” or “exclusive” regime, whereas Sweden generally belongs to the group of “multicultural” or “pluralist” regimes. (Koopmans et al 2005, 8).

Sweden introduced dual citizenship in 2001. In the debate leading up to the passing of the dual citizenship bill in June 2001, government representatives stressed that Swedish citizenship should be seen as a tool for integration, and not as the final step. The Minister of Integration Ulrika Messing argued that “Dual citizenship and multiple identities are a natural consequence of the official Swedish policy of accepting ethnic and cultural diversity in order to enhance the process of integration” (Jørgensen 2008, 153). This, as pointed out by Jørgensen (2008), corresponds to the Swedish understanding of integration as a process.

The naturalisation rate is not a part of Howard’s index. However, the nationalisation rate in itself can be an important indicator of the actual possibilities for foreigners to acquire citizenship. According to the “The Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States” (NATAC) project, in the years between 2000 and 2003, NATAC found the highest rates of naturalisation in Sweden with 7.6 percent (Bauböck 2006). In the year 2000, the naturalisation rate in Germany was only 2.5 percent. (Koopmans et al 2005, 39).

It can be argued that Swedish citizenship policies facilitate transnational practices. In European countries, the difference of status between people with formal citizenship and those that are legal residents but not citizens has narrowed considerably during the second half of the twentieth century, but the remaining differences are important enough (Bauböck 2006). In addition to the right to vote (which non-citizens that are legal residents may be able to exercise only on the local level) and the right to diplomatic protection, citizens also enjoy an unconditional right of residence. Unlike legal residents, citizens are always guaranteed free entry to the territory of the state, they are protected against expulsion, and they have the right to return. This right to return can be a life insurance for migrants who want to return to unstable, conflict-ridden countries of origin. It could therefore be assumed that migrants that have the possibility of obtaining the citizenship of their receiving country, are more likely to engage in the transnational practices of return and travel to their country of origin. As Newland (2009) has pointed out:

The individuals who are best able to pursue transnational lives are those who have secure residential status in both country of origin and country of destination, so that they can travel back and forth

without fear of losing status in either country. Dual citizenship is the most secure guarantee of such capability, but other forms of secure legal residence may confer similar flexibility—such as that permitted within regional integration structures such as the European Union. (Newland 2009, 19)

In reference to debates on how to best encourage ‘circular migration’, Newland has described what she terms the ‘permanent paradox’. The more permanent the right of residence, the more likely that the immigrant will dare to make the stay in the country of destination temporary by returning to his or her country of origin (Newland 2009, see also Committee on Circular Migration and Development 2010, 40).

This insight was shared by the Swedish Citizenship Commission, who was charged with an inquiry into the possibilities of Sweden introducing dual citizenship leading up to the government bill passed in 2001 (see above). The Citizenship Commission argued that dual citizenship could be instrumental in encouraging return migration (Gustafson 2005, quoted by Jørgensen 2008, 153).

For the development and character of transnational ties, it is relevant how transnational communities focus their political engagement. Østergaard-Nielsen distinguishes five different types of political issues that migrants mobilise around. The types are immigrant politics, homeland politics, emigrant politics, diaspora politics and translocal politics. Whereas immigrant politics are political activities that aim at improving the situation of immigrants in their host country, homeland politics focuses on the domestic or foreign policy of the sending country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b, 762). It has been argued that the restrictive political opportunity structures existing in Germany, including low naturalisation rates, explains why Kurds in Germany have focused more on “homeland politics” than Kurds in for instance the Netherlands (Paul 2008, 10). It is easier for Kurds to acquire citizenship in the Netherlands than in Germany. This might encourage Kurds to plan for a more permanent stay in the Netherlands, and hence “immigrant politics” become more relevant. Brown has studied how the political opportunity structure in Australia affects migrants’ forms of political participation. He concludes: “the more inclusive the political system is, the more the activities are channelled into that system and shaped accordingly, rather than taking place outside the system in more confrontational or extra-legal forms.” (Brown 2004, 104, quoted by Baser 2012, 182).

When immigrants become citizens of the host country, do they stop their transnational activities directed towards the country of origin? “Within European-based scholarship it is stressed”, writes Østergaard-Nielsen, that “transnational loyalty and political incorporation in the receiving country are not mutually exclusive.” In the US, similar observations have been made by Guarnizo and Portes (2001), who conclude that transnational political engagement of immigrants in the US does

not depend on whether or not they have American citizenship (quoted by Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 20). Indeed, there is some evidence that well-integrated immigrants are more involved in transnational networks with the country of origin than less integrated migrants (De Haas 2006). Although not always for local elections, citizenship is a prerequisite for participation in national elections: it is necessary to be a citizen in order to vote and in order to be a candidate. If a country makes it relatively easy to acquire citizenship, immigrant groups can vote and members of the immigrant community can run for national office. This opens up possibilities for political action that are not available to immigrant groups that do not have the same possibility to acquire citizenship.

It has always been easier for Kurds in Sweden to acquire Swedish citizenship than for Kurds in for instance Germany to acquire German citizenship. Again, Howard's Citizenship Policies Index (CPI) can be used to illustrate the differences. In the 1980s, Germany scored 0 (zero) on all three of the main components of Howard's CPI. Germany at this time had no *jus soli* provisions for children born to foreign citizens on German territory⁴¹, required ten years of legal residence before naturalisation, and did not allow dual citizenship. Sweden equally scored zero on the *jus soli* and dual citizenship components, but could be categorised in the "medium" group by Howard thanks to relatively generous naturalisation requirements (score 1.72 of maximum 2.0 for this component) (Howard 2009, 20–27). Mainly thanks to the reforms of the citizenship legislation introduced in Germany in the year 2000, in the year 2008 Germany's score on CPI had climbed to the medium category with a combined score of 2.04 (of maximum 6.00). However, in 2008 Sweden had the second highest score of all measured countries (after Belgium) with 5.22 out of 6.00 and is decidedly in the group of the most liberal countries when it comes to citizenship policies (Howard 2009, 28).

For many decades, Kurds in Germany were barred from participation in elections, both as voters and candidates. As has been detailed above, naturalisation policies have historically been more liberal in Sweden. Sweden introduced local voting rights for immigrants already in 1976, making Sweden a European pioneer (Jørgensen 2008, 154).⁴² In addition to the more generous naturalisation policies, Sweden also generally granted labour immigrants with a permanent right of resident. This was important for the naturalisation rate of labour immigrants from Turkey to Sweden, who like in the German case included a share of Kurdish people. Even though the labour immigrants were also in Sweden thought of as 'guest workers' who would eventually return to their countries of origin, they were granted permanent residence permits with the objective of facilitating their (temporary)

41 That is, children born on German soil but to foreign parents could not acquire German citizenship, but had to carry the citizenship of its parents.

42 The right to vote in municipal (*kommun*) and regional (*landstingskommun*) elections extend to adult individuals who have held a legal residence permits for at least three years.

integration into Swedish society (Spång 2008). Because of this policy of permanent residence permits, Kurdish people who arrived as labour immigrants in Sweden in the 1960s and 70s were able to fulfil the requirements for naturalisation much earlier than their counterparts in Germany.

Formal citizenship entails voting rights. Obviously, if the immigrant community consists of potential voters, they have more leverage towards politicians and decision-makers than a group of people that do not have voting rights. Koopmans et al also argues it should be expected that “beyond formal rights, open citizenship also increases the legitimacy of immigrant demands”. (Koopmans et al, 20). When immigrants are also citizens, their demands for equal treatment has more legitimacy and demands of foreign citizens who could be defined as temporary guests. Increasing legitimacy of immigrant demand contributes to make immigrant politics more fruitful.

The influence of citizenship policies on the political focus of immigrant groups, such as Kurds in Sweden or Germany, can work in opposite directions. Lack of citizenship reduces both leverage and legitimacy of the claims made by the group (see reference to Koopmans et al above) which restricts their possibility to influence immigrant politics. This might lead to an increased focus on homeland politics. On the other hand, immigrants who are well integrated into their host society, including by being naturalised citizens of that country, might have access to more resources and better tools also in their homeland engagement. “After all,” writes De Haas (2006, 2), “successful and ‘integrated’ migrants generally also possess the attitudes, know-how, rights and financial capacity for setting up enterprises, participating in public debates and establishing development projects in their regions and countries of origin.”

Acquiring the nationality of the host state is generally seen as an important token of integration. In Sweden, where it is comparatively easy to naturalise (see the Migration and Integration Policy Index, Huddleston et al 2011 and above), acquiring a Swedish passport is not the same rite of passage into integration as in countries where immigrants have to pass compulsory language and cultural tests in order to naturalise. Still, it might be a large mental step to take. At the same time, acquiring Swedish nationality might—as has been discussed above—be an important prerequisite for return since nationality entails an unconditional right of return. For the Iraqi Kurdish informants of Emanuelsson (2007) who planned to return to Kurdistan, it was indeed important to make sure that they would be able to return to Sweden if things did not turn out well in Kurdistan (Emanuelsson 2007, 266).

7.2 The Swedish Integration Model

In addition to the citizenship regime, the prevailing country-specific immigration model influences the formation of a transnational community. The Kurds in Germany were according to

Østergaard-Nielsen, incorporated into one of the “most exclusive incorporation regimes in Europe” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 3). In his PhD thesis on the Kurdish communities in Sweden and France, Khayati contrasts “the inflexible nature of France’s mono-cultural national model” (Khayati 2008, 253) with Swedish “multicultural” policies for the integration of immigrants. Khayati describes how already in the 1960s, Swedish policy on the inclusion of immigrants in society started to shift from assimilation to a notion of multiculturalism (even though the term multiculturalism was not used to describe Sweden’s policy on minorities until the end of the 1980s, *cf* Khayati 2008, 185).

A corner stone of the Swedish model of immigrant policy is the immigrant and minorities policy that was adopted in 1975. The new policy adopted in 1975 was to be based on the principles of equality, freedom of choice, and partnership. To the policy makers, the principle of *equality* meant that legally resident immigrants as far as possible should enjoy the same rights as Swedish citizens, for instance in terms of being able to access the welfare system. The principle of *freedom of choice* meant that the policy makers made it a matter of choice for immigrants to assimilate or to maintain their, even though immigrants were expected to respect basic ‘Swedish’ values and norms. Finally, *partnership* meant that immigrants should be empowered to participate in decision making. Granting immigrants the right to vote in municipal and regional elections was part of this effort to ensure a partnership between the immigrants and the receiving Swedish society. (Jørgensen 2008, 147–148). The overriding aim of this policy was, Khayati summarises, that “immigrants should be given the necessary means to integrate while still having the chance to maintain their cultural heritage and their ethnic identity” (Khayati 2008, 186).

Comparing Danish and Swedish models of integration, Jørgensen (2008) highlights that a fundamental feature of Swedish integration policies is the notion of a pluralistic society. He quotes the government proposition 1997/1998:16, which according to Jørgensen represented an important policy shift from ‘multiculturalism’ to ‘diversity’ and from ‘immigrant policy’ to ‘integration policy’. Instead of a ‘multicultural’ society with a number of defined cultures living side by side, the policy makers now wanted to see a society characterised by a general ‘diversity’ within and across cultures. The follow quote from the government bill illustrates the argument on why ‘immigrant policy’ should be replaced by ‘integration policy’:

For the one who is a minority the strategy for coping with the majority can easily be to protect one’s own culture and lifestyle. Integration must therefore deal with the possibilities for being part of a greater whole without doing damage to one’s cultural and ethnic identity. Some sort of accommodation must always happen in the meeting between people. The process of integration is mutual in the sense that all people have to participate and have a responsibility for making

this happen. Integration is not just a question about and for immigrants [...] The cultural and ethnic diversity of the society should be the premise for the political development and should be established in all areas and levels of society (Proposition, 1997/1998:16, 22–23, quoted by Jørgensen 2008, 148–149)

According to Baser (2012) the Swedish multicultural integration policy has had four major consequences for the relation between the Kurdish and the Turkish communities in Sweden, and for the ‘import’ of the Kurdish conflict into their relation. Firstly, since the multicultural system puts migrants into ‘ethnic boxes’ (see also Schierup 1991), the policy helps sustain intra-group harmony. There are less rivalries based on political positions within the Kurdish community in Sweden, for instance between groups such as PKK and its main opponent KOMKAR, argues Baser. Instead, the main rivalries are expressed along ethnic lines, in this case between Kurds on the one hand and Turks on the other.

Secondly, the fact that immigrants are encouraged to organise along ethnic lines, encourages what Baser calls a ‘pan-ethnic policy’ (Baser 2012). That is, Kurds (particularly in the second generation) from Turkey are organised in the same organisations as Kurds from Iraq, Iran and Syria to a much larger extent than Kurds in Germany. Baser argues that the multicultural policy has benefited the Kurdish community in Sweden to a larger extent than the Turkish community. Whereas the Kurds in Sweden enjoy possibilities to express and cultivate their culture and language that they lack in Turkey, the Turkish community has significantly less leverage than they have in Germany. In Sweden, there are almost no Kurdish immigrants from Turkey affiliated to the ‘Turkish’ organisations, which makes them smaller than in Germany where Kurds are more often included in organisations for immigrants from Turkey.

Thirdly, the multicultural mode of integration helps to reinforce the distance to other ethnic groups. Baser has studied the relationship between second-generation Kurds and Turks in Sweden and Germany, and her results show that while animosity exists between the second generation Kurds and Turks in Germany (occasionally even resulting in violent clashes) they do cooperate on many issues. In contrast, in Sweden there is virtually no cooperation or communication between organisations of the two groups. It is important to underline that multiculturalist policies do not *create* the conflicts between the different ethnic groups. What it does, argues Baser, is that it helps maintain spaces in which these conflicts are kept alive and conserved over time.

Fourthly, Baser notes that Kurdish and Turkish organisations in Sweden have grown dependent upon state subsidies. This dependency largely shapes both their activities (most are running projects running on the situation of women, young people and integration as encouraged by state policies)

and their membership, which is as broad as possible in order to maximise funding that is given on the basis of the number of members affiliated with the organisation.

As has been described above, in official government policy, multiculturalism (*mångkultur*) has been gradually replaced by diversity (*mångfald*) during the last decade. Whereas the term multiculturalism can be seen as denoting an ideology of society, diversity is a characteristic of society. Instead of striving for a multicultural society that could incorporate well-defined different cultural groups, official policy now has the goal of a diverse society, with the protection of the rights of the *individual* at its core (Jørgensen 2008). Arguably, in the longer-term this policy shift should serve to liberate immigrants from the ‘ethnic boxes’ in which they were put as multiculturalism was the dominant idea in the field of integration.

Indeed, Swedish integration policies are arguably more ‘generous’ than those of other comparable countries. By analysing the integration policies of 31 countries in Europe and North America, the Migration Policy Group has constructed the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Since the index was first compiled in 2007, Sweden has obtained the largest number of scores of all countries. In the third Migrant Integration Policy Index published in February 2011 Sweden’s score was 83 (see Figure 13 below. The same year, Germany scored 57 (number 12 in the ranking, see Figure 12) and France scored 51 which placed it as number 15 in the ranking (Huddlestone et al. 2011).




Figure 12: MIPEX 2011 Score Overview for Germany

Source: Huddlestone et al. 2011, 86

As Figure 12 above shows, Germany’s scores are at European average when it comes to on education and family reunion policies. At the same time, according to the MIPEX index Germany lags far behind on equality policies and long-term residence conditions.




Figure 13: MIPEX 2011 Score Overview for Sweden

Source: Huddleston et al. 2011, 188.

It has to be noted, however, that the Migrant Integration Policy Index only captures the existence of policies, and not their implementation nor the results of the policies. Notably, Sweden lags behind most other European countries when it comes to labour market participation, with large gaps between the level of employment among native-born and immigrants (Wiesbrock 2011, Szylikin 2012).

Integration has been described as a process through which differences between majority and minority populations decrease, including differences in income and employment (Brubaker 2001, Bolt, Özüekren, and Phillips 2010). On the labour market, integration happens when migrants of the same age, similar education, skills and experience attain, over time, the same wage and the same probability of being employed as natives (Venturini 2011). Measured this way, Swedish integration policies have been far from successful. In 2006, the rate of employment among foreign-born women was only 61.1 percent while the rate of employment was 79.3 among native women. The difference in rate of employment is similarly large between men: the rate of employment among foreign-born men was 70.9 percent in 2006, and 83.9 percent among native men the same year (Integrationsverket 2007, 15). Since immigration to Sweden is dominated by immigration on asylum and family grounds, it seems natural that it must take some time before the newly arrived immigrants attain the same rate of employment as residents (foreign-born and natives) who have spent more time in the country. However, the lower probability for foreign-born men and women to be employed compared to natives remains regardless of how long the foreign-born individual has lived in Sweden (Integrationsverket 2007, 18).

It has been shown that the integration of immigrants largely depend on when they arrive in the host country: if the economic situation is favourable at the time of arrival, the newcomers will integrate faster than those that arrive at times with higher unemployment. In an analysis made for the annual report of the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (*Socialstyrelsen*) in 2010, Hedberg and Malmberg have analysed groups of immigrants from four countries of origin that arrived to Sweden during two different time periods.⁴³ Hedberg and Malmberg compare the Chileans and Iranians who arrived in Sweden between 1985 and 1989 on the one hand, and the Bosnians and Iraqis who arrived between 1990 and 1995. At the end of the 1980s, Sweden experiences an economic boom. During the 1990s, on the other hand, Sweden suffered from a recession resulting in historically high rates of unemployment. The differences in economic situation are mirrored in the fact Chileans and Iranians who arrived during the boom were less dependent upon financial assistance after five years in Sweden (57.7 percent of the Chileans and 60.1 percent of the Iranians) than the Iraqis (87.9 percent) and the Bosnians (89.5 percent).

Hedberg and Malmberg show that whereas most members of the four studied groups were dependent upon economic assistance shortly after their arrival in Sweden, the share of individuals dependent on financial assistance decreased rapidly during the first ten years in Sweden in all groups. However, of the four groups compared, the Iraqi group experienced most difficulties to integrate on the Swedish labour market. Ten years after the first measurement was made in 1996, only 57.4 percent of the men in the group of Iraqis that arrived between 1990 and 1995 were employed, and only 48.3 percent of the women. In comparison, in the group of Bosnians who arrived during the same time period (1990–1995), 79.4 percent of the men and 74.4 percent of the women had managed to find employment in 2006.

Hedberg and Malmberg argue that one explanation might be that it is more common that Arabic and African immigrants report that they experience discrimination on the labour market, than immigrants from former Yugoslavia. Hedberg and Malmberg also argue that differences in access to a social network might play a role. At the time of their arrival at the end of the 1980s or the beginning of the 1990s respectively, the Iraqi group was much smaller than the groups of Chileans, Iranians and people from former Yugoslavia. That is, the social network of co-ethnics potentially available to Iraqis was smaller than that available to Chileans, Iranians or Bosnians (Hedberg and Malmberg 2010, 46).

A comparison between the Kurdish communities in Sweden and France provides additional insights about the specificities of the integration context of the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden. During

⁴³ Hedberg and Malmberg base their analysis on data from the data base PLACE, a register based database that contains demographic and labour market data on all individuals residents in Sweden since 1990.

several years of fieldwork, Kurdish scholar Khalid Khayati has gathered material on Kurds in the Marseille region in France and Kurds in the Stockholm region in Sweden. Khayati argues at the ‘diasporic discourse’ of the two communities differ a lot, and that the two communities employ very different political practices or ‘modes of action’ (Khayati 2008, 256). Comparing the Kurdish communities in France and Sweden, Khayati (2008) argues that the “favourable Swedish political climate towards non-native ethno-cultural populations”, including state economic support of ethno-cultural associations, has been central to the development of the “highly profiled and transnationally active Kurdish diaspora” in Sweden (Khayati 2008, 253-255).

The differences between the Kurdish community of the Marseille region and that of the Stockholm region are partly due to the differing origins of its members. Whereas the Kurds in the Marseille region studied by Khayati mainly come from villages and towns in the Sarhad region in Turkey, the Kurdish community in Stockholm is much more diverse in terms of geographical and social origins. Khayati argues, however, that it is the “exclusionary French political environment” that has played a decisive role in shaping the transnational identity and practices of the Kurds in the Marseille region. Khayati describes the French “republican model of integration” as based on assimilationist and monoculturalist principles (Khayati 2008, 109 ff). He lists discriminatory housing policies and difficulties to enter the regular labour market (Khayati 2008, 142–175). An important part of the experience of the Kurds in the Marseille region is the complex and inaccessible French asylum system. Khayati describes how difficulties to gain asylum and permanent residence, let alone citizenship, has turned the Sarhadi Kurds into “eternal asylum applicants” (Khayati 2008, 158). In contrast, according to Khayati, Swedish Kurds have been able to develop what he terms “transborder citizenship”, associated with a number of political practices, largely thanks to a more favourable Swedish political environment (Khayati 2008, 256).

Khayati find that Kurds in France are much less visible in the country’s public spheres than are Kurds in Sweden, and that the Sarhadi Kurds in the Marseille region have been much more focused on ‘homeland politics’ than the Kurds in the region of Stockholm (Khayati 2008, 253). When the Sarhadi Kurds in Marseille were mobilised at all, it was notably to rally in support of the imprisoned leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan, rather than to participate in French political processes. Kurds in Sweden, in contrast, were during the same period, and again according to Khayati, much more visible. In the 2006 general election, Khayati counts no less than 33 Kurdish candidates for the Swedish Parliament, and more than 70 candidates in the municipal elections that took place at the same date (Khayati 2006).

State support for ethnic organisations is an important feature of Sweden’s integration model. The fact that the Swedish authorities have encouraged organisations along national or ethnic lines, rather

than neighbourhood or religious organisations. This has shaped the organisational life of immigrant organisations in Sweden. The policy of financial support of immigrant organisations has been described as an attempt of the Swedish state to incorporate immigrant organisations into a system of corporate bargaining and negotiations. Immigrant organisations are often asked to provide their opinion on government proposals as referral bodies, and are invited to participate in different kinds of advisory bodies, directly under the government or bodies that are formed by ministries and other authorities. However, it has been argued that the state has overlooked the fact that the immigrant organisations have often been more focused on providing cultural services to their members than to be partners of the state in decision-making procedures (Lindvall and Sebring 2005, 1067). Lindvall and Sebring also argue that the encouragement of organisations along ethnic lines has impeded the functioning of the migrant organisations as interest organisations (Lindvall and Sebring 2005, 1068).

7.3 The Possibilities to Return from Sweden to Kurdistan

Possibilities to return to the country of origin also helps shape transnational ties (for literature on return and onward migration from Sweden, see among others Klinthäll 2003, Nekby 2006 and Takenaka 2007).

When it comes to possibilities to return, the situation is very different for Kurds from different parts of Kurdistan. According to my informants, it is currently perceived as risky for Kurds from Iran to return to visit family and relatives in Iranian Kurdistan. At the time of writing, the situation in Syria is extremely difficult, with civil war-like confrontations between the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the opposition to this regime. Though still discriminated against, violence directed against Kurds in Turkey has diminished since the PKK ended their armed struggle with the capture of PKK leader Öcalan in February 1999. Most Kurds from Turkey have been able to travel back to visit. Kurds from Northern Iraq have had relatively good possibilities to visit and to return since 1992, since a US-led coalition had installed a 'safe haven' covering the northern Iraqi governorates of Erbil and Dohuk⁴⁴. The 'safe haven' was created after Saddam Hussein's regime had attempted to crush an uprising following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War. The brutality of the government onslaught against Kurds in the north and against uprising Shias in the south create massive flows of refugees towards Turkey and Iran, which according to a UN Security council resolution adopted on the 5 of April 1991 "threaten international peace and security in the region" (UN Security Council 1991:688). The safe haven was installed in order to make it possible for the refugees to return. The

⁴⁴ The 'safe haven' was a no-fly zone upheld by a UN coalition north of latitude 36 degrees north. The intention was to allow for Kurdish refugees to return safely. A few months later the no-fly-zone came into effect, Kurdish *peshmerga* managed to take control also over the Kurd-dominated province of Suleymani. From 1992 onwards, the three governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymani have been under Kurdish control (Emanuelsson and Salih, 125–128).

international protection of the ‘safe haven’ together with the military force of the *peshmerga* constituted an efficient protection of people in these three governorates against persecution by the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad. Though travelling through Baghdad has at times been impossible, refugees have been able to return to the autonomous Kurdish area by crossing the border directly into the Kurdish region from Syria or Turkey.

The fact that visits and return to this part of Kurdistan have been possible during the past two decades has contributed to the development of the transnational Kurdish community in Sweden. Many Kurds from southern Kurdistan now live their lives in both Sweden and Kurdistan. While some families regularly spend their holidays in Kurdistan, others have moved back more permanently.

To some extent, the possibilities to return to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq are reflected in Swedish migration statistics. The number of emigrants from Sweden to Iraq is very low compared to the yearly number of immigrants from Iraq, but emigration from Sweden to Iraq has increased steadily over the last decade (see Table 16).

Table 16: Emigration from Sweden to Iraq 2000–2010

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Men	32	26	32	68	142	215	233	203	236	271	403
Women	21	23	33	56	102	136	168	168	170	205	327
Total	53	49	65	124	244	351	401	371	406	476	73

Source: Statistics Sweden 2011c.

Source: Statistics Sweden 2011c.




Figure 14: Emigration from Sweden to Iraq 2000–2010

It is important to note that Statistics Sweden register the emigration of all legal residents. The number of emigrants therefore includes both Swedish citizens and non-citizens. Emigration to Iraq doubled between 2002 and the ousting of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. During the years 2005 to 2009, the size of emigration from Sweden to Iraq was fairly stable at around 400 individuals per year. Numbers almost doubled in 2010 (from 476 to 730). This made Iraq the 12th most important country of destination for emigrants from Sweden in 2010, just before Australia (where 723 Swedish residents emigrated). The changes in the emigration from Sweden to Iraq over the last decade are illustrated in Figure 14 above).

The real number of emigrants from Sweden to Iraq is probably higher, since officially emigrating from Sweden means losing certain welfare benefits (such as child allowance and housing subsidies) and might therefore not be reported.

8 Evidence of Network Effects on Migration From Iraq to Sweden

As I have described in chapter 2, immigration from Iraq to Sweden has happened in several different waves. The first major group of Iraqi immigrants arrived at the beginning of the 1990s. A second peak happened between 2000 and 2002. After the US invasion in 2003, migration from Iraq to Sweden dropped, but this drop was only temporary: the largest increase of immigration to Sweden from Iraq happened between 2006 and 2007.

In 2007, Sweden received the largest amount of asylum applicants from Iraq registered in any country outside Iraq's neighbouring region (UNHCR 2010). Over eighteen thousand asylum seekers from Iraq arrived in Sweden in that year. The large number of asylum seekers from Iraq contributed to make Sweden the second most important country of destination for asylum seekers of the industrial countries in absolute numbers (UNHCR 2011, 8). Almost every second application for asylum filed in Europe in 2007 by asylum seekers from Iraq was made in Sweden (Swedish Migration Board 2010b, 5).

The large flow of refugees from Iraq at this time was driven by the high levels of violence and deprivation in Iraq. However, these factors cannot explain why so many Iraqi applied for asylum in Sweden. It is likely that the fact that Sweden's asylum legislation and practice was relatively generous at the time played a role (Brekke and Aarset 2009). However, as has been mentioned in chapter Error: Reference source not found, the Swedish Migration Board argued that asylum seekers from Iraq choose Sweden predominantly because Sweden already hosted a large Iraqi population. This was also the explanation favoured by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2009).

As has been pointed out in the overview of theories on migration in chapter 3, network theory assigns an important role to migrant networks in explaining and predicting migration flows (Massey et al. 1998). Migrants networks are thought to contribute to the concentration of migration movements to a limited number of destination countries: flows will predominantly go to countries with an already established community of people from the same country of origin. Networks are also thought to contribute to the perpetuation of flows by institutionalising migration (Massey et al. 1993, 449–450, see chapter 3, section Network Theory). In the following section, I look at data on

immigration from Iraq to Sweden during the last decade. Is there evidence that a network effect is relevant in explaining migration from Iraq to Sweden?

8.1 Network of Iraqis

Hedberg and Malmberg have shown that a network effect is visible in recent immigration to Sweden (Hedberg and Malmberg 2010). Immigration flows often follow a wave pattern: a slow start is followed by a clear peak. After the peak, migration continues but at lower yearly numbers (see section Network Theory above). This wave pattern applies to immigration from the most important source countries for immigration to Sweden since the Second World War (Hedberg and Malmberg 2010, 42). One example is immigration from Greece. Migration to Sweden from Greece started slowly in the 1940s and 50s, and peaked in connection with the military coup in Greece in 1967. A similar pattern is visible for migration from Poland, which after a slow start grew larger during the 1960s and 1970s and had a clear peak after the military crack-down on the opposition in 1981. A second peak in immigration from Greece is visible after the enlargement of the EU and Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004. Immigration from Iran is dominated by a peak at the height of the Iran–Iraq war between 1980 and 1988.

Immigration from Iraq also started with very low numbers of immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s, but it has then peaked several times. The first peak of Iraqi immigration to Sweden happened in 1992. In that year, almost 4,000 Iraqi citizens were granted residence in Sweden. This inflow of immigrants from Iraq was predominantly made up of refugees, and followed the brutal crackdown on an uprising against Saddam Hussein's regime. The uprising, which lasted between mid March and early April 1991, and was an attempt by Kurds in the north of Iraq and Shia in the south to seize the opportunity to oust the Ba'ath regime created by Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War (see chapter Immigration from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq). Migration from Iraq to Sweden peaked a second time between 2000 and 2002. The third and hitherto highest peak was registered between 2006 and 2008 (See Figure 3 on page 13).

Even though the overwhelming majority of the over two million people who fled Iraq between 2003 and 2006 sought refuge in Syria and Jordan (Weiss Fagen 2007), a large number of Iraqi asylum seekers also found their way to Europe. As has been described above, in 2006 and 2007, Sweden experienced a dramatic increase of asylum seekers from Iraq, contributing to a record-high immigration rate in 2007. In 2007, Sweden was the second only to the US in the UNHCR's ranking of the top-ten most important receiving countries (UNHCR 2009, 7). In 2007, more than half (51 percent) of all the asylum seekers to Sweden came from Iraq. The increase of asylum seekers was dramatic, indeed, with 18,600 asylum seekers from Iraq submitting an application for asylum in

Sweden in 2007 (UNHCR 2010). Almost every second application for asylum filed in Europe by asylum seekers from Iraq was made in Sweden in that year (Swedish Migration Board 2010a).

Possibly reacting to this large inflow, the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal in February 2007 ruled that the situation in Iraq should not longer be considered an “armed internal conflict”. As has been mentioned in chapter 2, this decision of the Migration Court of Appeal had as an effect that the approval rate of asylum applications from Iraq dropped considerable. The falling approval rates were rapidly followed by a decrease in the number of asylum seekers. The share of asylum seekers from Iraq decreased from 51 percent of all applicants in Sweden in 2007 to 25 percent of all applicants in 2008 (Swedish Migration Board 2011d, 4).

Still, in 2009 the number of asylum seekers from Iraq received by Sweden represented almost ten percent of all Iraqi asylum applications lodged in the industrialised countries. In 2009, three countries received half of all asylum seekers from Iraq to industrialised countries: Germany (6,300), Turkey (3,800) and Sweden (2,300) (UNHCR 2010, 11).

The decrease in the number of asylum seekers from Iraq in Sweden in the year 2008 was consistent with an international trend of decreasing requests for asylum lodged by Iraqis. The total number of asylum applications lodged in the industrialised countries increased by 12 percent between 2007 and 2008. Partly, the decrease of the share of Iraqi asylum seekers was due to an increase of asylum seekers from Somalia and Afghanistan, which offset the decrease of asylum seekers from Iraq (UNHCR 2009, 3). The decrease in the number of Iraqi asylum seekers was probably largely a result of decreasing levels of violence in Iraq. As mentioned in chapter 2, the levels of deadly violence in Iraq peaked in 2006 and 2007 with around 2,500 civilian casualties per month from June 2006 through August 2007. The levels of violence then decreased to less than one thousand casualties per month towards the end of 2007 (see Figure 4 on page 18).

The downward trend of asylum applications lodged by Iraqis continued in 2009, when, for the first time since 2006, Iraq was not the most important country of origin of asylum seekers to the industrialised countries (UNHCR 2010, 10). The decrease continued from 2009 to 2010: The number of asylum applications lodged by Iraqis in the industrialised countries decreased by 18 percent from 24,673 in 2009 to 20,129 in 2010 (UNHCR 2011, 17). Instead, Afghanistan became the number one source country of asylum seekers among these countries. Despite the fall in numbers, Iraq continued to be one of the most important source countries for asylum seekers to the industrialised countries in 2009 and 2010. In 2010, Iraq was among the top five source countries together with Serbia, Afghanistan, China, and the Russian Federation (UNHCR 2011, 11). Notably, the concentration of Iraqi asylum seekers to a limited number of countries of destination including

Sweden remained. In 2010, Sweden was still the third after Germany (5,600 applicants) and Turkey (3,700) (UNHCR 2011, 13).

In 2006, people born in Iraq were already the second largest group of foreign born in Sweden with 82,827 individuals according to Statistics Sweden (Statistics Sweden 2012a). It remained the second largest group in 2010, but now with 121,761 individuals (see Table 17). In European perspective, the Iraqi population in Sweden is the second largest in absolute numbers after the Iraqi population in Germany. The Federal Statistical Office of Germany, *Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland*, does not publish statistics on foreign born. Instead, a distinction is made between German citizens and non-German citizens (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2010a). According to Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, there were 81 272 Iraqi citizens living in Germany in 2011 (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2010b, 42). For the reason mentioned above, this number should not be confused with the number of people born in Iraq living in Germany. The number of people born in Iraq is larger, since this number includes individuals born in Iraq who have acquired German citizenship. The UK hosts the third largest population of people born in Iraq. According to the Office of National Statistics, 66,000 people born in Iraq resided in the UK in 2010 (Reid and Miller 2011).

Table 17: Top ten countries of origin of immigrants in Sweden in 2011

Country of birth	Number of individuals
Finland	166,723
Iraq	125,499
Poland	72,865
Yugoslavia	70,050
Iran	63,828
Bosnia-Herzegovina	56,290
Germany	48,442
Denmark	44,951
Turkey	43,909
Norway	43,058

Source: Statistics Sweden 2012a.

8.2 Network of Kurds

In addition to hosting a large population of people of Iraqi decent, Sweden also hosts a large Kurdish community. As has been pointed out above, there is no official statistics on the immigration of Kurds to Sweden. Since the first Kurdish students arrived in Sweden in the 1950s, Sweden has received immigration from all parts of Kurdistan: from Turkey as well as from Iraq, Iran, Syria and Lebanon (Alakom 2007). In the 1950s and 1960s, labour immigrants came from Turkey alongside immigration from Italy, Spain, Portugal and Finland. As has been described above (see section What is Kurdistan?) the geographical areas in the Middle East claimed by Kurds to be Kurdistan are divided between four countries: Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Today, these countries are all among the top source countries of non-European immigration to Sweden. In 2011, Iraq was the most important non-EU/EES country of origin for immigrants in Sweden with 125,499 individuals born in Iraq living in Sweden. Iran is the third most important country of origin with 63,828 individuals, and Turkey the fifth most important (43,909 individuals) (Statistics Sweden 2012a). Just outside of the top ten, Syria is the 11th most important non-EU/EES country of origin.

It is problematic to assume that Kurdish immigrants from one part of Kurdistan would constitute a social network for potential migrants from other parts of Kurdistan. On the one hand, Kurds from different geographical areas share many common traits. On the other hand, the differences are also large. As has been described in section The Diverse Origins of the Kurdish Population in Sweden, Kurdish languages is a kind of dialect continuum. Variants of Kurdish spoken at different extremes of this dialect continuum are not mutually intelligible, that is, Kurdish speakers from Iran in the east cannot understand speakers from Turkey in the west. In Uppsala, I was told that one reason there are so many different Kurdish associations in Uppsala was that different associations catered for Kurds speaking different Kurdish dialects.

There have been several efforts to measure the Kurdish 'share' of immigration from Iraq. In 2005, Emanuelsson published a calculation of the number of Kurds from Iraq based on the registered places of birth of Iraqi immigrants to Sweden. According to Emanuelsson's calculations, there were around 19,000 Kurds in Sweden from Iraq at this time (Emanuelsson 2005, 83). This would represent 26 percent of the 72,553 individuals born in Iraq that were registered as resident in Sweden in 2005 (Statistics Sweden 2012a).

It is likely that the wave of immigration from Iraq to Sweden after 2005 contained more non-Kurds than previous immigration from Iraq. I have analysed statistics from the Swedish Migration Board on the place of birth of Iraqis granted residence permits from the 1st of January 2007 to end of November 2011. Judging from this statistic, the percentage might now be considerably lower than 25 percent. The Swedish Migration Board (Swedish Migration Board 2012e) registered 11,552

individual residence permit dossiers between January 2007 and November 2011. Of these, 2,875 (24.9 percent) were women and 8,677 (75.1 percent) were men. Children under the age of 13 were not included in the data. Place of birth has been registered in 6,499 cases. The regional distribution is shown in Table 20.⁴⁵

Table 18: Place of Birth of Iraqi Immigrants 2007–2011

Region	Number	Percentage
Baghdād	3,387	52.12%
Salāh ad-Dīn	24	0.37%
Diyālā	110	1.69%
Wāsīt	70	1.08%
Maysān	142	2.18%
Al-Basrah	410	6.31%
Dhī Qār	203	3.12%
Al-Muthannā	22	0.34%
Al-Qādisiyyah	65	1.00%
Bābil (Babylon)	117	1.80%
Karbalā'	44	0.68%
An-Najaf	27	0.42%
Al-Anbar	79	1.22%
Nīnawā (Nineveh)	839	12.91%
Duhok	147	2.26%
Arbīl	144	2.22%
Kirkuk	457	7.03%
As-Sulaymāniyyah	175	2.69%
Other	37	0.57%
Total	6,499	100.00%

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2012-02-16.

According to these statistics, only 7.17 percent of immigrants from Iraq were born in one of the three regions of the Kurdistan province Duhok, Arbīl/Erbil or As-Sulaymaniyyah/Suleymani. The Swedish Migration Board does not register ethnic or religious belonging. It is likely, however, that a large share of Iraqi immigration to Sweden during these years consisted of Christians. After the US invasion in 2003, many Christians found themselves squeezed between sectarian groups and the allied forces. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Christian population in Iraq might have decreased with as much as 50 percent since 2003 (CIA 2012). An important indication that a large share of the recent immigration from Iraq to Sweden consisted of Christian

⁴⁵ I am grateful to Veronica Nordlund for helping to process the file from the Swedish Migration Board.

Iraq is the concentration of the Iraqi immigration to the city of Södertälje, sometimes described as the Assyrian/Syrian ‘international capital’ (see chapter 2, section Immigration from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq).

To summarise: though difficult to measure, it is likely that an important share of immigration from Iraq as well as from Turkey, Syria and Lebanon has consisted of Kurds. However, their share of immigrants from these countries to Sweden most probably has decreased during the last few years, not least due to a large numbers of Christian asylum seekers and relatives from the region. Also, the relative stability and low levels of violence in the Kurdish region of Iraq has made it more difficult for asylum seekers from this part of Iraq to obtain asylum in Sweden compared to asylum seekers from the central region (above all from Baghdad).

8.3 Evidence of a Network Effect on Recent Labour Immigration

In the 1960s and 1970s, Sweden received a relatively large immigration of labour. These years have been described as entailing “virtually free entry of labor immigrants” (Westin 2006, 3). A few years earlier than other Western European countries, Sweden started to change its liberal labour immigration policy in 1968, and labour migration from non-Nordic countries officially ended in 1972 (Westin 2006). During the following decades, immigration to Sweden was dominated by asylum related immigration, and the immigration of family members of asylum immigrants.

After several years of intense discussions, the Swedish parliament passed what—according to the OECD (2011a) is the most liberal labour immigration policy in Europe in December 2008. The new legislation is based on Government Proposition 2007/08:174, which was developed by the right-wing coalition government that took office in 2006. It was passed with the support of the Green Party. The government proposition largely follows the recommendations made by a parliamentary inquiry (*Kommittén för arbetskraftsinvandring KAKI*) that presented its final report in October 2006 (Swedish Parliamentary Committee for Labour Immigration SOU 2006:87).

The new legislation is unique in that it allows employers to—while respecting the EU rule of community preference—recruit employees from outside the EU/EES countries and Switzerland regardless of the kind of skills the employer is looking for. In contrast to the current legislation at the EU level, which facilitates the entry of immigrants for “highly qualified employment” through its Blue Card-scheme (European Council 2009), the Swedish 2008 labour immigration legislation extends to all kinds of employment, including low-skilled. No requirements are made concerning the skills or educational level of the labour immigrant, instead it is the character of the job-offer that is decisive. The job-offer must fulfil two main requirements. One, the labour immigrant must be able to support him or herself with the remuneration of the job. He or she must be able to pay for

accommodation and cover other living costs above the level of subsistence. The level of subsistence is defined as above the level of income that entitles to social assistance (*försörjningsstöd*). Two, the employment conditions must include levels of income, insurance coverage and working conditions that “are not lower than the conditions that result from collective agreements or customs in the profession or industry” (Swedish Aliens Act *Utlänningslagen* 2005:716, Chapter 6, paragraph 2⁴⁶, see SFS 2009:1542).

The legislation makes labour immigration explicitly demand- and employer driven. In a presentation of the reform, the government writes, “[t]he point of departure is that the individual employer best knows the recruitment needs of his or her business. When processing cases involving residence and work permits, decisions are based on employers’ own assessment of their needs.” (Swedish Government Offices 2008, 2).

Normally, a work permit must be obtained before entering Sweden, but the possibilities to get a visa to attend a job interview have been widened under the new legislation. This is crucial for people who live in countries like Iraq that are important source countries for asylum seekers, and whose citizens consequently have difficulties to obtain a visa to enter Sweden.

Family members have the right to join, and work permits can also be issued to accompanying family members. The permits are temporary (for the duration of the employment or a maximum of two years) but they can be renewed several times up to a total duration of four years, and after that, a permanent residence permit can be granted. Should the employee become unemployed while having a valid work permit, he or she is given the opportunity to find a new job offer that qualifies for a work permit during a three months’ transition period.

Under the present legislation, what a given young man or woman who wants to live in Sweden for a while needs to do, is to find an employer who can offer a job that pays well enough to pay for accommodation and keep him or her above the level of subsistence and whose conditions are not worse than the current Swedish standard for such a job. It can be any job that satisfy those conditions: also unqualified employment as a cleaner, dish-washer or farm labourer qualify for a work permit and can eventually lead to a permanent residence permit.

The new legislation resulted in a 50 percent increase of labour immigration in 2009 compared to 2008, but the numbers did not continue to increase at that rate in 2010. Moreover, in terms of numbers, the new legislation did not result in any larger flows of labour immigrants. 21,584 individuals were granted a residence permit on the basis of work in 2010. This number constitutes 23 percent of the total number of people granted residence permits that year. The largest group of

46 “6 kap. 2 § Arbetstillstånd får ges till en utlänning som erbjudits en anställning, om 1. anställningen gör det möjligt för honom eller henne att försörja sig, och 2. lönen, försäkringsskyddet och övriga anställningsvillkor inte är sämre än de villkor som följer av svenska kollektivavtal eller praxis inom yrket eller branschen.”

immigrants (35 percent) continued to be people granted residence permits on family grounds, the overwhelming majority of this group being relatives to asylum immigrants. Eleven percent were granted residence permits on humanitarian grounds in 2010. (Swedish Migration Board 2011a).

So what we have is a very liberal legislation for labour immigration, and a large Iraqi population with—as has been argued above—relatively good conditions for engaging in transnational practices. Will the transnational practices of Iraqis in Sweden facilitate or even encourage labour immigration from Iraq? For a start, it is noticeably how small the number of labour immigrants from Iraq has been. There are more than 120,000 people born in Iraq living in Sweden, but only a couple of hundred labour immigrants from Iraq per year have joined their compatriots in Sweden. A part of the explanation is the the number of labour immigrants has not been very high in general (see above).

There are a number of reasons why it could be expected that labour immigration to Sweden would be limited also after the introduction of a liberal policy for labour immigration. Sweden has traditionally not been an attractive country for labour immigration: In comparison to other European countries, in particular the Mediterranean countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, the Swedish highly-regulated labour market and technic-intensive production has a relatively low demand for the kind of labour that immigrant workers generally offer, that is low-skilled labour that can be carried out by workers who have limited or no proficiency in the local language (Devitt 2011).

Sweden's experiences with labour immigration from the eight new EU members states following EU enlargement in 2004 are illustrative of the fact that Sweden is a relatively unattractive country for labour migrants. According to the Accession Treaty regulating the enlargement of the European Union with ten new member states in 2004, the old member states were given the right to restrict access to their labour markets for workers from eight of the new member states during a transitional period (European Commission 2006). Sweden, together with Ireland and the UK, and in contrast notably to Germany and Austria chose not to impose any transitional arrangements restricting the entry to the Swedish labour market for workers from the new EU member states. In an evaluation of the effects of the EU enlargement on labour immigration to Sweden, the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) conclude that even though the number of labour immigrants from the eight new member states increased (from approximately 2,300 individuals before enlargement to 4,200 in 2004 and 5,600 in 2005), labour immigration from the new members states remained limited in comparison with overall immigration to Sweden. The main reason for this was, according to SIEPS, that it was easier for labour immigrants from these countries to find employment in the UK and Ireland than in Sweden (SIEPS 2006, quoted by the Swedish Parliamentary Committee on

Labour Immigration SOU 2006:87, 110). In a comparison of labour immigration between two countries without transitional arrangements (Sweden and the UK) on the one side, and Austria and Germany on the other side (who imposed restrictions on the free movement of workers during the maximum length of the transitional period), Tamas and Münz (2006) draw a similar conclusion: low demand for the kind of labour that could be provided by labour immigrants from EU-10 in Sweden meant that very few workers from these countries chose Sweden as their destination.

Another possible explanation for why labour immigration to Sweden has been rather limited compared to other kinds of immigration after the introduction of the new legislation is that work permits under the new legislation are temporary. In contrast to resident permits issued to people granted asylum and their relative, which are generally permanent resident permits, labour immigrants and their relatives can only be granted temporary residence permits. Also under the old legislation, work permits were normally issued for a limited time period (paragraph 1, chapter 6 Swedish Aliens Act 2005:716, see SFS 2009:1542). However, permanent residence permits could be granted if the employee was offered a permanent position, and possessed “particular qualifications” that could not be found on the Swedish labour market or through recruitment within the EES (Swedish Government Proposal 2007/08:147, 6). The possibility to grant labour immigrants permanent residence from the beginning disappeared with the new legislation. Under the new legislation, permanent residence permits can only be granted to employees who “during the past five years have had a residence permit for employment for a total of four years” (Chapter 5, paragraph 5 of the Swedish Aliens Act 2005:716, see SFS 2009:1542). The temporary permits are limited to the length of the job-offer, or a maximum of two years. When a work permit expires, a new one can be issued in Sweden. However, the total amount of time on this kind of work permits cannot exceed four years.

As could be expected, the number of permanent residence permits granted for labour immigration has dwindled since the introduction of the new legislation. The number of permanent work permits decreased from 796 in 2008 to 81 in 2009 (see table 19).

Table 19: Permanent and Temporary Labour Immigration to Sweden 2005–2010

	Permanent	Temporary
2005	293	5,985
2006	349	6,257
2007	543	9,859
2008	796	14,513
2009	81	21,582
2010	99	21584

Sources: Statistics Sweden 2011b (permanent), Swedish Migration Board 2011e (temporary).

The first four year period will end in December 2013. That is, the first permanent residence permits issued to labour immigrants who have received their work permits under the new legislation will be issued at the earliest in January 2013. However, we know already now that a large majority of labour immigrants who have arrived since December 2008 will not receive permanent residence permits.

In November 2011, I asked the statistical office (*Statistikfunktionen*) of the Swedish Migration Board for data on how many of the temporary residence permits that were issued under the new labour immigration legislation that had been renewed. The Swedish Migration Board took a look at 12,951 individuals who in 2009 were granted work permits under the new legislation⁴⁷. Of these 12,951 individuals, only 1,984 had a Swedish residence permit in November 2011, and these permits were almost exclusively temporary: 1,967 out of 1,984. The 17 individuals in this group who had been granted permanent residence permits had obtained this status mostly on other grounds than work (e-mail from Jens Andersson, Swedish Migration Board 2011-11-14).

The difficulties to obtain permanent residence has been criticised by the parliamentary inquiry “Committee on Circular Migration and Development” (CIMU) which presented its report to the Swedish government in 2011. The parliamentary inquiry suggests that the period of time during which labour immigrants can earn an entitlement to apply for permanent residence should be extended from five to eight years (Committee on Circular Migration and Development 2011, 118).

In combination with the difficulties to obtain permanent residence permits on the basis of work, reports on abuse of labour immigrants in Sweden might work as a further disincentive for immigrants to choose to enter Sweden under the labour immigration legislation as opposed to the asylum legislation. As has been mentioned above, the new legislation requires job-offers to include a salary and other employment conditions that are not worse than those that are generally held by native workers in the same profession or have been set in collective agreements in the respective branch. However, in practice it has proven difficult to make sure that the conditions offered in the job-offer translate into decent conditions in practice. I return to this issue below.

The employer is required to give employee organisations an opportunity to voice their concerns over the terms of employment, and the Swedish Migration Board is instructed to take trade union concerns into account when deciding on an application for work permit, but the unions have no veto right. Since there is only a minimum of control of the job offer, once a prospective labour

⁴⁷ This number, according to Jens Andersson at the Swedish Migration Board, includes “only individuals who had just one reason for application, and only one code of classification” (Andersson 2011-11-14). The difference to the total number of immigration on the basis of work registered in 2009 (21,582) is, according to Andersson, that the smaller number does not include work permits granted to former asylum applicants, to trainees, au pairs or sportsmen (who have other application codes).

immigrant has received a job offer the process toward obtaining a work permit is speedy. In general, it takes just two weeks. It seems that non-serious employers have taken advantage of the government's concern that the process of granting work permits should be fast and 'efficient'. Media has reported on a number of cases of abuse, notably of berry pickers from Thailand and Vietnam, some of whom ended up working under miserable conditions and received very little salary. In November 2010, the president of the blue-collar workers' trade union confederation LO wrote "The threat of expulsion becomes an efficient means for unserious employers to subdue employees not to demand better working conditions or to ask for help. Daily, we see how this leads to unreasonably low salaries and employment conditions that nobody should have to accept in Sweden in 2010".

On the 17th of November 2011, the state television main evening news broadcast reported that the Swedish Migration Board had tightened controls of employers wishing to import labour in the cleaning sector, after reports of widespread abuse (see also Swedish Migration Board 2011-11-23). On the same date, the National Police Board (*Rikspolisstyrelsen*) reported they suspect that the new legislation has been abused for human smuggling, with "thousands" of work permits having been sold to desperate immigrants who have not been offered a job, but only an 'opportunity' to pay to gain entry into Sweden (Svt 2011-11-17). Among other changes to the regulation, the white collar union TCO has suggested that the job offer should be given a legally binding status and that the authorities should check that the employer has paid taxes and social fees corresponding to the wage offered in the job offer (Engblom 2011).

In 2011, most residence permits to Iraqi citizens continued to be granted on humanitarian grounds (asylum) (1,099) or family grounds (2,704), but the number of residence permits granted on the basis of work increased substantially (Statistics Sweden 2012b). See Table 20.

Table 20: Immigration from Iraq to Sweden based on grounds for residence 2004-2011

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Studies	1	1	4	6	23	18	31	17
Work	1	1	2	5	2	125	280	415
Family ties	2455	1571	2543	3960	7668	6290	2953	2704
Asylum	321	596	3751	9756	4096	1939	1159	1099
Temporary law	0	728	4456	4	2	1	0	6
Other grounds	46	45	94	1469	312	166	111	228
Total	2824	2942	10850	15200	12103	8539	4534	4469

Source: Statistics Sweden 2012b.

Statistics Sweden only registers immigrants who have registered a Swedish address in the Swedish civil registry (*Folkbokföringen*).⁴⁸ According to the Swedish Migration Board, only about half of the individuals granted residence permit on the grounds of work registered an address in the civil registry. However, most of the Iraqi labour immigrants have registered. If also those that did not register with the civil registry are included, the numbers increase from 125 labour immigrants from Iraq in 2009 to 156, and from 280 to 363 in 2010. In 2011, 556 work permits were issued to Iraqi citizens. In a detailed analysis of 545 work permits that were issued to Iraqi citizens during 2011, the Swedish Migration Board finds that only 53 individuals who were granted a work permit failed to register with the civil registry. In 30 of these cases, the Migration Board suspects that the individuals have not taken up a job in Sweden, but used the work permit as a means to enter Sweden or the Schengen area for other reasons (Jonsson 2012).

The fact that so few people from Iraq have made use of the possibility to immigrate to Sweden as labour immigrants worries the Swedish Migration Board, who is “proud to welcome people to Sweden” and who wants to “help the vision come true of a Sweden that with openness harness the possibilities of global migration” (Swedish Migration Board 2011f). In June 2011, the Swedish Migration Board applied for funds from the European Integration Fund for a project entitled “New way in”⁴⁹. The aim of the project is to facilitate immigration to Sweden on the grounds of work. The project wants to address the obstacles that hinders immigrants from choosing alternatives to the asylum route into Sweden. Lack of information and knowledge about the alternative route is singled out as a potential problem to be addressed. The project includes a case study on the migration from Iraq to Sweden.

However, the number of labour immigrants from Iraq has been increasing since the new legislation went into force at the end of 2008. As of June 2011, labour immigration from Iraq became a more important ground for residence in Sweden than asylum. Since the introduction of the new legislation, Iraq has been the sixth most important country of origin for labour immigration to Sweden after Thailand, India, China, Ukraine and Turkey. (See Table 21).

48 According to the Swedish Population Registration Act (SFS 1991:481), only residents that intend to stay in Sweden for more than a year are legally obliged to register their address in the civil registry.

49 The Stockholm-based think tank Global Utmaning ("Global Challenge") is, together with the Swedish Public Employment Service, a partner to the Swedish Migration board in the project "New Way In". As a program manager for migration at Global Utmaning, I currently work on this project.

Table 21: Work permits granted in Sweden 2009-2011⁵⁰

Citizenship	2009	2010	2011	Sum
1 Thailand	6,173	3,520	2,842	12,535
2 India	2,011	1,853	2,292	6,156
3 China	1,073	1,518	1,180	3,771
4 Ukraine	1,083	551	572	2,206
5 Turkey	336	744	758	1,838
6 Iraq	156	363	556	1,075
7 Syria	117	369	570	1,056
8 USA	293	325	363	981
9 Bangladesh	133	412	415	960
10 Iran	161	292	497	950
11 Vietnam	244	469	166	879
12 Pakistan	149	211	492	852
13 Russia	225	269	336	830
14 Serbia	208	172	250	630
15 Egypt	53	141	306	500

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2011b, 2011c, 2012d.

This table shows that the most important source countries for labour immigration to Sweden since the introduction of the new legislation has been Thailand, India and China. However, Iraq is the sixth most important source country. In order to see if there is some evidence for a network effect on labour immigration to Sweden, I have looked at labour immigration in relation to the size of the immigrant population from the respective country. Table 22 reveals that there is indeed a correlation between the size of the immigrant population from a particular country, and labour immigration from that country. With some exceptions, the countries of origin of Sweden's largest immigrant communities are also among the most important countries of origin for labour immigrants.

⁵⁰ The figures concern work permits granted in 2011 (published 2012-01-01), Work permits, granted in 2010 (published 2011-01-01) and work permits granted in 2009, (published 2011-03-03) and do not cover athletes, artists, au-pairs, trainees or holiday workers.

Table 22: Work permits granted on size of foreign born population

Citizenship		Work permits 2009	Work permits 2010	Work permits 2011	Sum of work permits 2009–2011	Share of total nb of work permits 2009–2011	Share of total foreign born population
1 (7)*	Thailand	6,173	3,520	2,842	12,535	29.28%	2,36%
2 (12)	India	2,011	1,853	2,292	6,156	14.38%	1,30%
3 (9)	China	1,073	1,518	1,180	3,771	8.81%	1,80%
4 (33)	Ukraine	1,083	551	572	2,206	5.15%	0,37%
5 (5)	Turkey	336	744	758	1,838	4.29%	3,08%
6 (1)	Iraq	156	363	556	1,075	2.51%	8.79%
7 (11)	Syria	117	369	570	1,056	2.47%	1,57%
8 (13)	USA	293	325	363	981	2.29%	1,24%
9 (26)	Bangladesh	133	412	415	960	2.24%	0,46%
10 (3)	Iran	161	292	497	950	2.22%	4.47%
11 (16)	Vietnam	244	469	166	879	2.05%	1,06%
12 (20)	Pakistan	149	211	492	852	1.99%	0,74%
13 (15)	Russia**	225	269	336	830	1.94%	1.15%
14 (27)	Serbia***	208	172	250	630	1.47%	0,45%
15 (35)	Egypt	53	141	306	500	1.17%	0,30%
Total number of work permits		14,481	13,612	14,722	42,815		

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2012d, 2011b, 2011c (number of work permits granted in), Statistics Sweden 2012c⁵¹ (foreign born population).

*) The figure within brackets indicates the relative size of the total population from each country. I.e Thailand is the number 1 country of origin for individuals who have been granted a work permit between 2009 and 2011, and the number 7 country of origin of foreign born in Sweden in 2011.

**) Individuals born in the former Soviet Union (6,119 in 2011) are not included.

***) Individuals born in former Yugoslavia (70,050 in 2011) are not included.

There is evidence of a network effect: Half of the top ten countries of origin of labour immigration are also among the top ten country of origin for immigrant population in general. Of the top 15 countries of origin of labour immigrants, nine are among the top 15 countries of origins of the foreign born population in general. However, some of the top ten countries of origin of the Swedish immigrant population have generated almost no labour immigration at all since the introduction of the new labour immigration legislation in 2008. Somalia is 6th most important country of origin of Sweden's foreign born population. Yet between 2009 and 2011 only two work permits were granted to applicants with Somali citizenship. During the same years, Somalia was the

⁵¹ The figures on work permits do not cover athletes, artists, au-pairs, trainees or holiday workers.

most important country of origin for asylum applicants in Sweden.

Ethnic recruitment

There are several indications that social networks or transnational ties between Iraqis in Sweden and Iraq play a role in facilitating labour immigration from Iraq to Sweden. Firstly, ‘ethnic recruitment’ is prevalent, that is, it is common that it is Iraqis who are already established in Sweden to recruit their co-ethnics to work in Sweden. Secondly, the fact that a majority of the work permits were issued for work in occupations where there is no excess demand on the Swedish labour market can be interpreted as an indication that the Iraqi labour immigrants have found their jobs through their social network. In the following section, I present detailed data on labour immigration to Sweden during the last years that illustrate these two indicators.

The Swedish Migration Board has made a detailed analysis of 545 work permits issued by the Migration Board to Iraqi citizens during 2011. The work permits were almost exclusively issued to individuals employed by small firms with between two and ten employees. Analysing the 58 employers who employed two or more Iraqi citizens (165 work permits in total), the Migration Board found that 50 out of 58 employers had a name ”indicating a Middle Eastern origin” which makes it plausible that most of these employers employ their own co-ethnics. The fact that almost all of the employers have made job offers only to Iraqi labour immigrants also suggests a large share of ‘ethnic recruitment’ (Jonsson 2012).

Clearly, most Iraqi labour immigrants who have obtained a work permit in Sweden since the introduction of the new legislation in December 2008 have received work permits for low-skilled jobs. The Swedish Migration Board has looked at data on 918 work permits issued to Iraqi citizens from December 2008 until November 2011. Of them, a third (303 permits) were issued for “Work that does not require particular professional skills”. Another of 24 percent of work permits (223 permits) were issued for “Craftwork within building and manufacture”. Only 21 permits were issued for “Work that requires high-level theoretic competence” (see table 23 below).

Table 23: Work permits 2008-12-15 to 2011-11-03 on occupational area

Occupational area	Number	Percentage
Work within agriculture, gardening/horticulture, forestry or fishing	5	0.5%
Work that requires shorter tertiary education or equivalent	42	4.6%
Work that requires high-level theoretic competence	21	2.3%
Work that does not require particular professional skills	303	33.00%
Craftwork within building and manufacture	223	24.30%
Office work and customer service	43	4.70%
Management	6	0.60%
Processing and machine operation, transport, etc.	35	3.80%
Service-, care and retail	239	26.00%
Other	1	0.10%
Total	918	100.0%

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2011e

The occupational profile of the work permits granted to Iraqi citizens differs from the average.

Table 26 below shows work permits granted to all nationalities between 2009 and 2011 on occupational area.

Table 24: Work permits granted between 2009 and 2011 on occupational area

Occupational area	Number	Percentage
Work within agriculture, gardening/horticulture, forestry or fishing	536	3.6%
Work that requires shorter tertiary education or equivalent	1,117	7.6%
Work that requires high-level theoretic competence	4,052	27.5%
Work that does not require particular professional skills	4,784	32.5%
Craftwork within building and manufacture	1,322	9.0%
Office work and customer service	244	1.7%
Management	375	2.5%
Military work	2	0.0%
Processing and machine operation, transport, etc.	253	1.7%
Service-, care and retail	2,037	13.8%
Total	14,722	100.0%

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2011f, 2011g, 2012c.⁵²

⁵² The figures on work permits do not cover athletes, artists, au-pairs, trainees or holiday workers.

Overall, about a third of labour immigrants have been issued work permits for jobs that require “high-level theoretic competence”. Among Iraqi labour immigrants, only two percent have these kinds of highly qualified jobs. Whereas jobs that require no qualifications or skills are more or less equally common among Iraqi and other labour immigrants (33.0 percent among Iraqis vs. 27.5 percent on average), Iraqis more often work with craftwork within building and manufacture as well as within service, care and retail. Figure 15 below compares the occupational area of labour immigrants from Iraq 2009–2011 with all labour immigrants to Sweden in 2011.




Figure 15: Labour Immigration From Iraq on Occupational Area 2011

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2012d (all labour migrants to Sweden in 2011) and Swedish Migration Board 2011-12-08 (work permits to Iraqi citizens).

An important aspect of labour immigration is its relation to the situation on the labour market of the host country. The main intention of the new legislation was to prevent negative consequences of labour shortages, that is problems to recruit that could not be solved by recruitment of labour in Sweden or in other countries in the EU/EES area (Swedish Government Proposition 2007/08:147). The Swedish Public Employment Service (*Arbetsförmedlingen*) annually grades occupations according to the estimated demand for labour within each occupation in one year’s time. Almost 200 occupations are included on the list. The occupations are grouped into three groups: occupations where there is a shortage of labour (shortage), occupations where the demand for labour is met (balance), and occupations where there is an excess supply of labour (surplus). One

way of measuring the success of the reform of the year 2008 would be to look at how labour immigration relates to the labour shortage list. Have the work permits issued under the new legislation primarily been issued for occupations where Swedish employers face difficulties recruiting, that is surplus professions (*bristyrken*)?

During the first three years of the new legislation on labour immigration introduced in December 2008, a comparison of the statistics of the Swedish Migration Board on the professions of labour immigrants from Iraq, and the Swedish Public Employment Service's list on the recruitment needs of employers, 40 percent of work permits issued to labour immigrants from Iraq were issued for occupations where supply exceeds demand (surplus professions/*bristyrken*)⁵³. These professions are often low-skilled: janitors, kitchen staff, gardeners, salespersons in retail, etc (Swedish Migration Board 2011-12-08). Table 27 shows the total number of work permits granted to Iraqi citizens between 2009 and 2011 on profession (*yrke*).

Table 25: Work permits 2008-12-15 to 2011-12-14 on profession

Occupation according to the Swedish Standard Classification of Occupations (SSYK)	Number of permits	Assessment of the Swedish Public Employment Service
Helpers in restaurants (<i>Köks- och restaurangbiträden</i>)	163	Surplus
Cleaners in offices, hotels and other establishments, etc. (<i>Hotell- och kontorsstädare m.fl.</i>)	118	Surplus
Bakers, pastry-cooks and confectionery makers (<i>Bagare och konditorer</i>)	102	Shortage
Cooks (<i>Kockar och kokerskor</i>)	99	Shortage
Motor vehicle mechanics and fitters (<i>Motorfordonsmekaniker och motorfordonsreparatörer</i>)	63	Shortage
Shop salespersons, food stores (<i>Försäljare, dagligvaror</i>)	56	Balance
Home-based personal care and related workers (<i>Vårdbiträden, personliga assistenter m.fl.</i>)	53	Surplus
Stores and transport clerks (<i>Lagerassistenter m.fl.</i>)	29	Surplus
Other sales and services elementary occupations (<i>Övriga servicearbetare</i>)	29	No assessment
Commercial sales representatives (<i>Företagssäljare</i>)	24	Shortage
Total number of work permits	1047	
Total number of work permits for professions assessed by the Swedish Public Employment Service	933	
Surplus professions, percentage	39%	

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2011-12-08.

53 The comparison between data from the Swedish Migration Board and the Swedish Public Employment Service has been made by Linda Pärlemo.

On the one hand, it should not be surprising that labour immigrants are concentrated in these sectors. In these sectors, newly arrived immigrants can find jobs that neither require knowledge of the Swedish language nor country-specific qualifications. Low-skilled jobs are ideal first-time jobs, be it for young people who make their first experiences on the labour market, or for newly arrived immigrants. Generally, labour migration is concentrated to the lowest and the highest segments of the labour market: professions in the middle segments often require country specific knowledge (such as knowing the local language) that neither low-skilled workers at the lower end nor highly specialised employees (who can often use English as their working language) at the upper end need (Wadensjö 2012).

On the other hand, it can be seen as remarkable that newly arrived immigrants manage to get employment in sectors where supply exceeds the demand for labour. Possibly, access to a social network in Sweden can facilitate access to the few jobs that are available in these sectors. This would give a role to social networks and transnational ties in explaining labour immigration to Sweden. If social networks are particularly important in explaining labour immigration to sectors of the economy with low demand for labour, labour immigration to these sectors should be more geographically concentrated, that is, the origin of labour immigrants should more often be from the same countries as already established immigrant groups in Sweden, than labour immigration to other sectors. Unfortunately, I have not been able to access country specific data on work permits issued within different occupations for other countries.

The new legislation on labour immigration includes two possibilities for labour immigrants to enter Sweden. As a rule, the application for a work permit should be submitted abroad, before entering Sweden. There is, however, a possibility for rejected asylum seekers to ‘change tracks’ and apply for a work permit while remaining in Sweden (Act amending the Aliens Act 2005:716, Chapter 5, 15 a §, see SFS 2009:1542). The rejected asylum seeker must apply for a work permit within two weeks after the rejection has gained legal force. Only rejected asylum seekers who have worked legally in Sweden for at least six months, and have a job offer for at least one year of employment from the date of application have the right to apply for a work permit. In practice, very few rejected asylum seekers manage to ‘change tracks’. According to the parliamentary inquiry Committee on Circular Migration and Development (CIMU), 1,262 applications were made in 2009, but only 387 (30 percent) were accepted. In 2010 the acceptance rate was 44 percent (478 of 1,080) (Committee on Circular Migration and Development 2011, 116). The Committee on Circular Migration and Development, which was charged with suggesting how Sweden can encourage circular migration, proposed that the time period required to be able to apply for a residence permit on the basis of work should be shortened from six to three months, and that also having two jobs

(consecutively or in parallel) should qualify for permanent residence (Committee on Circular Migration and Development 2011, 123).

Table 26 shows that the number of work permits issued to former asylum seekers from Iraq, that is to individuals who have ‘changed tracks’, has decreased during the last years (from 109 individuals in 2009 and 135 individuals in 2010 to only 26 individuals in 2011). However, according to a detailed analysis of work permits issued to Iraqis in 2011 made by the Swedish Migration Board, about half of all individuals who have been issued work permits in 2011 might have applied for asylum in Sweden (Jonsson 2012). The reason why these individuals do not appear as having “changed tracks” is that they have not applied for a work permit from within Sweden (probably because they could not fulfil the criteria to do so) but have applied from abroad.

Table 26: Work permits issued to former asylum seekers from Iraq 2009–2011

	2009	2010	2011	Total
Former asylum seekers	109	135	26	270
Others	47	230	528	805
Total number of permits	156	365	554	1075

Source: Swedish Migration Board 2012-01-12

Summary

I find evidence that a network effect is relevant in explaining migration from Iraq to Sweden during the last decade. Before the dramatic increase in asylum applications from Iraqis and immigration from Iraq during the years 2006 and 2007, people originating in Iraq already constituted one of the largest immigrant communities in Sweden. Moreover, the population of Iraqis was the second largest in Europe in absolute numbers: only Germany hosted a larger number of people born in Iraq at that time.

Another indication that social networks are relevant in explaining immigration from Iraq to Sweden is the composition of labour immigration to Sweden. In December 2008, Sweden introduced what according to the OECD is the most liberal system for labour immigration in the OECD, opening up a ‘new way in’ for immigrants from countries like Iraq. I find that there is a correlation between the size of the immigrant population from a particular country, and labour immigration from that country. Half of the top ten countries of origin of labour immigrants to Sweden are also among the top ten countries of origin of the total foreign-born population. There are several indications that the access to a social network has been particularly important for labour immigrants from Iraq: according to analyses made by the Swedish Migration Board Iraqi labour

immigrants are often employed by other Iraqis, and according to the Swedish Employment Service Agency, almost 40% of Iraqi labour immigrants have been issued work permits within occupations where there is a surplus of labour in Sweden, jobs that should be difficult to obtain without personal contacts or 'ethnic recruitment'. The fact that as many as half of labour immigrants from Iraq according to the Swedish Migration Board are former asylum seekers indicate that labour immigration is an alternative to the asylum door into Sweden.

It is difficult to know that what extent the social networks or transnational ties of Kurds in Sweden have influence migration from Iraq to Sweden. Estimations made before 2006 suggest that up to a quarter of the immigration from Iraq to Sweden might have consisted of Kurds. However, my and Veronica Nordlund's analysis of the place of birth of recent immigrants from Iraq (2007–2011) show that only 7.17 percent of immigrants from Iraq were born in one of the three Kurdish provinces (Pelling 2012). Judging from the statistics presented above, over half of the immigrants from Iraq to Sweden between 2007 and 2011 were born in Baghdad. It is not possible to know how many of the Iraqi immigrants born in Baghdad (which hosts a significant Kurdish population) were Kurds. In the next chapter, I look at the conditions for Kurds to build and nurture transnational ties between Sweden and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

9 Transnational Ties Between Kurds in Sweden and Iraq

In this dissertation, I focus on migrants' transnational practices and on how these help shape patterns of migration. A particular focus is on how migrants' transnational practices can be related to the perpetuation of migration over time. I base my analysis on a case study of transnational practices carried out by Kurdish immigrants in Sweden and their families and relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

This chapter presents and analyses empirical material drawn from my fieldwork among Kurds in Uppsala, and among relatives to migrants and returnees (all with a migration history involving Sweden) in four cities in the Kurdish region in Iraq. In Uppsala, I have raised data from two main sources: 1) responses to a questionnaire that was distributed to 652 individuals in Uppsala on the basis of their names having been identified as Kurdish, and 2) individual as well as group interviews conducted with Kurds living in Uppsala. In total, I interviewed 33 individuals at 11 occasions in Uppsala. In the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, I conducted a survey among the participants of a conference for members of the political party PUK, and 38 group and individual interviews. Further insight was collected through nine expert interviews in the capital city of the Kurdish region Hawler/Erbil. The methods used for data collection are described in Chapter 5. This chapter also includes an analysis of the methodological challenges I encountered while collecting the data.

Transnational practices are defined as social, economic, political and cultural practices that involve people in more than one country simultaneously (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Examples of transnational practices are the sending of remittances, staying in touch with relatives and friends in the country of origin (by phone, online as well as by travelling), engaging in trade with the country of origin, and the exchange of ideas, knowledge and values across borders.⁵⁴

In this chapter, I analyse and discuss the transnational practices by asking two questions to the empiric material. The first question concerns intensity. How intensive are the transnational practices? Questions related to intensity are questions about “how much” and “how often”. Are the transnational practices intensive enough to influence everyday life of my informants? Are the transnational practices intensive enough to shape migration?

⁵⁴ For an analysis of how transnational ties contribute to development, Orozco et al. (2005) have defined transnational practices as the “5 Ts”. The “5 Ts” stand for money transfers (remittances), tourism, transportation, telecommunications, and nostalgic trade. Orozco et al. describes how migrants promote economic development when they send money home, travel home as tourists, buy phone cards and make calls to keep in touch, and buy products from their country of origin.

The second question is about frequency. This is the question of ‘How many?’. How many individuals or what share of the Kurdish population in Uppsala are engaged in forging and maintaining transnational practices? Some members of the community might engage in very intensive transnational practices, but if they represent a small number of people, these practices might not sum up to be significant enough to have an impact on migration between Iraq and Sweden. It is also interesting to look at how many engage in transnational practices within different sub-sets of the studied population. Are transnational practices more common among individuals belonging to certain age groups? Among men or women? Recently arrived or more established immigrants? By studying the demography of an immigrant community, for instance in terms of what share of the community are first-, second-, or third-generation immigrants, it is possible to obtain an indication of the community’s transnational capacity (Carling 2008b). The frequency of people engaged in transnational practices might also vary according to stages in the life course. While at some points in life, people might be very intensively engaged in transnational practices, this might not be the case at other stages in life (Carling 2008b, see also Snel, Engbersen and Leerkes 2006). A life-course perspective on transnational practices can be used to analyse and predict the transnational practices of different cohorts of an immigrant group.

I present my empiric material from Sweden and Iraq in common chapters. My ambition has been to illustrate different aspects of how transnational practices are carried out, and how transnational ties are forged and maintained by looking simultaneously at individuals and households in both the country of origin and the country of destination. It is important to note, however, that the transnational space in which Kurdish migrants in Sweden and their family members in Iraq live, encompasses a much larger space than just Sweden and Iraq. My informants among Kurds in Uppsala came from different parts of Kurdistan: from Kurdish areas in Iraq as well as in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Lebanon. A majority of those that I interviewed in Iraq had transnational ties to individuals and households not only in Sweden but in one or several other countries as well, so their transnational social field would—in geographic terms—include many more countries than Sweden. Possibly, it is futile to try to delimit a transnational social field to a certain geographic area.

It would be tempting to divide my respondents into three categories: 1) leavers (migrants of first and possibly second generation in Sweden) 2) returnees and 3) stayers (non-migrants). The problem with any such categorisation is that people’s status and—even more so—identities are difficult to define. When is a migrant a return migrant and when should he or she rather be defined as a ‘visitor’? Maybe ‘international commuter’ would be a better term for those who regularly move back and forth? ‘Return migrants’ who have returned with the intention to stay “for good” might

still end up going back to Sweden again, or migrating to another country. When is a visit long enough for it to be considered a more permanent return?

Since my interest is to study how transnational practices shape migration between Iraq and Sweden, a decisive criteria is that all my informants would have a relationship to Sweden. That is also what all interviewed or surveyed individuals have in common: a relationship to Sweden. They were either currently residents in Sweden (in many cases also citizens, and several of the respondents to my postal survey were born in Sweden), had lived in Sweden in the past (but had returned to Iraq on a permanent or temporary basis) or had family members or relatives who were living in or had returned from Sweden. The common denominator of the transnational practices that I analyse is—consequently—that they all involve Sweden.

9.1 Intensity

This section looks into the intensity of transnational practices carried out by Kurdish individuals and households in Uppsala, as well as individuals who have returned from Sweden and/or have relatives in Sweden in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. Questions of intensity are questions of ‘how often’ and ‘how much’. The section starts with looking at different aspects of the transnational practice of sending remittances: how often do Kurds in Uppsala remit money? How much (in cash and in kind) do they remit? It adds the perspective from the (predominantly) receiving side by including responses to a small-scale survey in Suleymani and interviews with remittance receivers in Suleymani and other parts of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. The section concludes with some data on combinations of different transnational practices. It is more common, for example, for individuals who are members of a Kurdish association to remit money. The propensity to remit is also higher among individuals who regularly visit their country of origin. In sum, those individuals can be said to be more intensively transnationally engaged than individuals who carried out a smaller number of practices.

The intensity of sending remittances varied a great deal among my informants in Uppsala. Some of my informants reported that they send money on a regular basis. One informant told me “My brother died two years ago. He had five children. We are three brothers here in Sweden, now we send 1,000 krona per month to his family, regularly. There is no social welfare there” (group interview in Uppsala 2010-01-11). An other interviewee said: “It’s like a salary for them, every month a certain sum that they get”. (Interview in Uppsala 2010-01-14b). Responses like this give the impression that remittances are sent often and regularly.

The responses to the anonymous and randomly distributed questionnaire⁵⁵ give a different picture. 92 Kurds responded to the questionnaire. Of them, 91 responded to the question on whether they send remittances. 49 out of 91 respondents or 53.8 percent responded that they have “sent money to family or relatives in [their] country of origin⁵⁶” but only one respondent had sent money about a week ago, and just about one fourth of the respondents had sent money a month ago. In fact, the majority of respondents had sent money several months ago (15 respondents or 30 percent) or last year or earlier (22 respondents or 44 percent.) See table 27.

Table 27: Question 21. “When did you last send money to your country of origin?”

	Number	Percentage
About a week ago	1	2.0 %
About a month ago	12	24.0 %
Several months ago	15	30.0 %
Last year or earlier	22	44.0 %
Sum	50	100.0 %

Source: postal survey in Uppsala..

The survey that I conducted among participants at a conference in Suleymani confirm that it is not as common that relatives abroad send remittances today as it used to be. Half of those that had received money from relatives abroad had done so last year or earlier.

A 46 year old man (ID 22505) in Uppsala wrote in a comment to a question in the questionnaire about what determines how much money he sends: “It depends primarily on how much I can [send] and how much they need, that is both. But this is not a regular thing to do, but [something I do] only at single occasions”.

In Kurdistan, my respondents gave the impression that remittances were often received in connection with an event such as Ramadan or the Kurdish new year celebration Newroz. Talking about the timing of remittances, one informant (a 24 year old man from Kirkuk who has a sister and two brothers in Sweden) told me “they cannot fix it, it depends on life in Sweden. But if we have a financial problem, we phone them and they send money immediately.” According to the same informant, such a phone call was made primarily when someone needed medical treatment: “Health, that’s the most important reason. Then for Ramadan, for Newroz...”. (Group interview in Erbil 2009-12-with young men from Kirkuk).

⁵⁵ See chapter 5.

⁵⁶ Question 20: “Have you sent money to family or relatives in your country of origin?”

The intensity of contacts with relatives abroad seemed to follow the same pattern as remittance sending: contacts were made irregularly, and often on special occasions like in connection with Ramadan or the Kurdish new year Newroz. A 26-year old man with three cousins in Sweden said they call “every one or two months. They also call at festivities like Ramadan or Newroz, etc.” I did, however, also record many accounts of quite intensive contacts with relatives abroad. Contact was upheld mainly through phone calls, but also via Facebook as well as through e-mail or hotmail, yahoo and other internet chats. A 18-year old student who has a brother in Sweden and a brother and a sister in Norway: “I send them a text message to go online, and then we make a video chat with yahoo or with Skype.” (Group interview with youth of PUK in Suleymani 2009-12-11). A student boasted he had introduced his aunt in Sweden to Skype: “She calls me, and I talk to them on Skype. They did not know Skype, I told them about it. Most of the time I kiss my laptop because of Skype!” (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-10). One elderly mother whom I interviewed in the village of Koya, and who has three adult sons and a daughter in Sweden tapped with her fingers on her little Nokia cell phone and said “Whenever I miss them, I phone, and then they phone me back.” (Interview with family in Koya 2010-05-27).

Most of my interviewees in Uppsala seemed to have frequent contacts with people in Kurdistan. They phoned or sent text messages, kept in touch over Facebook and used MSN and Yahoo chat. “They had Facebook before I had it!” a 27-year old student told me about his cousins in Iranian Kurdistan (group interview in Uppsala 2011-04-14). Some use a web cam. “Yes, that’s very common!” said a 20 year old woman from Turkish Kurdistan (group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31). Most interviewees had phone cards for low-fee phone calls to Kurdistan.

Some seemed to take a very active part in the everyday life of their community of origin. One member of the Kurdish student association of Uppsala told me that a cheap phone card for calls from Sweden to Iran allowed him to be virtually present at the celebration of the Kurdish new year Newroz in his home village:

The 21st of March they celebrated Newroz in our home village. I phoned, and then my uncle put his mobile here [he taps at his breast pocket]. I participated in the whole party! My cousin phoned to tell me about the party... I said: I can tell *you* what happened. (Group interview in Uppsala 2011-04-14)

Another aspect of intensity is the question of ‘how much’. According to the responses to the postal questionnaire, the most common sum to remit in cash at a time was two to three thousand SEK (26.5 percent responded that they transferred this amount last time they remitted). Ten

respondents sent more than 3,000 SEK, two more than 10,000 SEK. See table 28. The yearly sums (see table 31) are not much higher: Half of the respondents sent less than 5,000 SEK per year.

Table 28: Question 22: “How much money did you send when you last sent money?”

	Number	Percentage
1-300 kr	3	6.1 %
301-500 kr	4	8.2 %
501-1,000 kr	6	12.2 %
1,001-2,000 kr	9	18.4 %
2,001-3,000 kr	13	26.5 %
3,001-5,000 kr	8	16.3 %
5,001-10,000 kr	4	8.2 %
More than 10,000 kr	2	4.1 %
Total number of respondents	49	100.0 %

Source: postal survey in Uppsala.

Table 29: Question 23: “How much money did you send during the past year?”

Remittances	Number	Percentage
1-1,000 kr	7	15.22 %
1,001-5,000 kr	16	34.78 %
5,001-10,000 kr	13	28.26 %
10,001-30,000 kr	5	10.87 %
10,001-30,000 kr	2	4.35 %
50,001-70,000 kr	2	4.35 %
70,001-100,000 kr	1	2.17 %
Total number of respondents	46	100 %

Source: postal survey in Uppsala.

In Suleymani, respondents to my questionnaire indicated that the most common sum received from relatives and family members abroad was 1,000 to 2,000 SEK each time. The most common annual amounts were 1,000 to 5,000 and 5,000 to 10,000 SEK per year. Three respondents indicated, however, that they had received more than 30,000 SEK during the last year.

The question in the Uppsala questionnaire explicitly asked about *sending* money: “20. Have you sent money to family members or relatives in your country of origin?”. The respondents might not have included money they bring in cash to family members and relatives in connection with a visit. According to my interviewees, to bring money when on visit is a very common practice. When I

asked about financial support to people in the country of origin, one 23 year old man from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq said his mother always brings cash: “Every family that needs it there, she gives a certain sum of money”. He added “When you come, it is like Santa Claus is coming”. A 20 year old woman from the Turkish part of Kurdistan added “Yes, every time someone travels there, they bring money with them.” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31).

9.1.1 Gifts Made in Kind

The transfer of money is only one type of support that Kurds in Uppsala give to their families and relatives in Kurdistan. During the course of my interviews with Kurds in Uppsala, I encountered many examples of support made in kind. Studying Greek immigrants in Germany and Australia, Glytsos (1997, quoted by Buch and Kuckulenz 2010) has observed that temporary migrants often feel obliged to remit, whereas the remittances of permanent migrants more often take the shape of gifts sent to their relatives in the country of origin. In the case of Pakistani immigrants in Norway, Carling, Erdal and Horst have observed that remittance practices change over time. With time, family obligations or responsibilities are replaced by remittances that are „practices related“ gifts, that is money sent in connection with for instance weddings or religious festivities. (Carling, Erdal and Horst 2012, 292).

Among my Kurdish informants in Uppsala, support made in kind was given in the form of gifts that were brought from Sweden to Kurdistan in connection with visits. Several of the interviewed had experiences of bringing large quantities of gifts. Talking about the costs of travelling to visit relatives in Kurdistan, one woman aged 52 from Turkey said “We chose the airline that allows us to take the most weight”. Still “sometimes we pay 1,000 SEK to bring an additional 20 kilo”, she said. A 23 year old man from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq said about his mother: “When we travel, you have to pity the person who gets to carry her bags. She always brings like two tons...”. Common things to bring were clothes and shoes, both new and used. One of my informants told me she would buy second hand clothes for her relatives in Turkey: “If it is a nice coat, for instance, at the Red Cross or the Salvation Army” (both these institutions run second hand shops in Uppsala). “Because we know that over there in Turkey or Lebanon, people cannot afford it.” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-27). Others mentioned bringing ironing boards, water boilers, duvets, telephones. “We sometimes bring microwaves (...) Sometimes we bring vacuum cleaners and stuff like that.” (20 year old woman from Turkish Kurdistan. (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31).

A woman (58) tells of what happens when she visits her relatives in Turkey: “Everybody comes to visit, all the neighbours... and you have to give something to everyone”. (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-27). A 27-year old man from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq told me “I have never

bought any gifts, it is my mother that do that. I have to take stuff out of my bag because my mother wants to bring gifts”.

Gifts are predominantly but not exclusively brought to relatives. My informants in Uppsala told me that they would bring gifts (primarily second hand clothes) to neighbours of their relatives, and to poor people that their relatives know. “(...) it happened that when you were there, your clothes kind of disappeared to the neighbours. [Quoting his mother:] ‘They are poor, they need clothes’.” (21 year old man, (group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31). Food is also distributed in this way, often as a part of religious practices, such as giving food to poor people in connection with Ramadan. One of my informants, a 22 year old woman born in Erbil/Hawler in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq told me this story:

My dad passed away in April... I do not know if you [Swedes] do it, but when someone dies, you try to do something good. (...) My mother dreamed that dad was craving for kebab. So we sent one hundred dollars to my uncle in Erbil. He bought kebab for twenty families. (...) My uncle in Erbil, he lives close to the citadel, and there, there is a neighbourhood where a lot of poor people live. There it is easy to find poor people. So he bought the meat and then he went there and distributed it. (Single interview in Uppsala 2010-01-16)

During the course of my interviews, I also learned of other forms of transnational support. Mohammad Hassan, a local politician in Uppsala and a Lebanese immigrant of Kurdish decent, told me that when Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006, his parents moved to another part of Beirut in order to escape the Israeli bombings. During the war, Hassan could not send them money to help them pay the rent for their temporary housing. Instead, he offered housing to a Lebanese person in Uppsala, whose relatives in Beirut returned his service by lending a flat to Hassan’s parents. (Interview in Uppsala 2009-04-20). This is a kind a transnational economic support that is transferred without money ever moving across borders.

Are the transnational practice of sending money or giving gifts intensive enough to influence daily life of remittance senders? According to my informants, it is not uncommon that the pressure to remit money leads to conflicts. In a written answer to one of the questions in the postal survey, a man aged 39 writes that he sends money “when there is a fight in the family and my wife exhorts and pressures me” (ID 22541). One informant from Lebanon regularly sends money to her parents in law. They often need help: “Yes, often, and it is always them, never us... You feel it sometimes... We cannot afford it, but we have to. That’s hard sometimes.” When I asked her if she feels she has to do sacrifices in order to be able to send money, she said “Yes, I think it makes a difference. (...) Above all, what has an impact is the fact that my husband has to give money to his parents every

month.” If she would not have to send money, she first says she would go on a holiday. Then she adds she “would like to save to have a bit bigger car, or to buy a flat, but it doesn’t work.” (Interview in Uppsala 2010-01-14b). A Kurdish woman from Turkey said her son says jokingly “We pay two taxes! We already pay taxes here, do we have to pay taxes over there, too?” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-27).

Sometimes, support for relatives in Kurdistan is given by offering a place to stay for newly arrived immigrants. To share a flat with one or several relatives obviously has a tangible impact on daily life. (See section Lowering the Costs of Migration by Helping Newly Arrived).

Does the obligation or pressure to send remittances influence the possibilities of Kurds to integrate into Swedish society? Emanuelsson has recorded many cases of how Kurds from Iraq in Sweden have had to choose between improving their situation in Sweden, and sending money to help above all their parents and siblings in Kurdistan. She describes how during the 1990s, ‘Evin’ and her husband worked to be able to send money to Kurdistan instead of completing their degrees (Emanuelsson 2007, 265). In 2009, staff at the KRG Nordic Office voiced concern that many of the newly arrived young Kurdish men from Iraq seemed to focus only on working and earning money for their return, instead of devoting time to learn Swedish and integrate into Swedish society (key informant interview in Stockholm 2009-04-08).

Mohamad Hassan, a Kurd from Lebanon that at the time of the interview was the chairperson of the municipal committee on labour market and education in Uppsala argued that it is possible that money that could have been spent on a membership in a sports association for the children, or an a visit to the theatre, are remitted instead. If this is the case, the practice of sending remittances could indeed be seen as an obstacle to integration. However, another informant in Uppsala objected to this view: “No, not free time activities. That’s not about money. It’s that is not the way you think (...) If you do not ice-skate or ski in Sweden... how much do you not miss out on then? But there are still [Kurds] who say: ‘it’s too cold today, you cannot go to school’. Maybe it is not so common anymore, but it happens.” (Interview in Uppsala 2010-01-14a).

It could be argued that transnational practices—perhaps paradoxically—can promote integration in the host society. To have a job is often seen as decisive for integration. Many transnational practices, such as supporting family members or relatives in the country of origin, and planning or preparing to return, is an incentive to get a job and to work hard. However, when migrants are expected to send money home from day one, this might be an obstacle to long-term integration. Newly arrived immigrants that do not know Swedish and want to start working immediately are often limited to low-skilled jobs on the informal labour market. These jobs generally pay a lot less than jobs on the formal labour market, and employees who are not formally registered cannot

qualify for social benefits such as unemployment insurance and pensions. If integration is defined as a process by which migrants over time achieve the same income as natives with comparable education, experience and skills (Venturini 2011), 'getting stuck' in the informal labour market is a long-term obstacle to integration for migrants. Investments in education are crucial for integration. Making sure that migrants acquire knowledge (particularly of the local language) and skills necessary to advance from low-skilled 'arrival jobs' to more qualified jobs on the labour market are an essential basis for advancement in the host society.

For those planning to return to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, investing in an education in Sweden, however, might not pay off. According to my informants, it seems that during the present phase in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, contacts count more than a formal education. When asked if the KRG has policies to encourage return, a business man who is a member of an association for Swedish returnees says "Yes, in theory, yet in practice, contacts count. They say it often and they like to say that people should return. But in practice it is having contacts that counts." (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-12). This makes it difficult for returnees to get a job according to their qualifications, and returnees might lack the contacts necessary to facilitate bureaucratic procedures with the administration. The business man again: "When you change cars in Sweden it takes a couple of minutes. Here, it takes two, three weeks." (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-12).

The economic development in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has probably made return seem a more realistic option for Kurds in Sweden than it used to be. In a longitudinal study of Swedish emigration data, Klinthäll (2006, 2003) has shown that economic growth in the country of origin is decisive for immigrant return. In the Kurdish region in Iraq, I encountered several examples of returnees who had been well integrated in Sweden, including professionally successful, but who had returned because it is now possible to earn more money in Kurdistan than in Sweden, and because their education and expertise was in demand. A returnee from the Swedish city of Göteborg who lost his job as an automation engineer in Sweden has now found a job with a firm supplying Erbil's parks and roadside trees with irrigation systems. He says "I am so happy with my new job. I want to earn money, too... There are lots and lots of big projects here. Everyone earns big money here, specially those with high education". (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-10).

Most of my informants in Iraq told me their relatives in Sweden came back to visit every couple of years. However, some came more often. A 24-year old civil servant at the Ministry for Education said his aunt who has been in Sweden for 16 years comes back "once a year, or more. If my grandmother is sick, she comes immediately." Visiting the KRG area has become much easier during the last years. Said a 30-year old with four sisters in Sweden: "Now it is also easier for them to come and visit, they can go directly. No need to go over Turkey or Iran." A few years back,

people had to travel over land from airports in Turkey or Iran. Said one of my informants in Uppsala who took a direct flight from Sweden to Suleymani for the first time in 2009: “It was amazing to land in the middle of Suli. Before it took three days: by plane to Istanbul, then a domestic flight to Diyarbakir, then by car” (interview in Uppsala 2010-01-19). There are now direct flights from several cities in Sweden to both Erbil and Suleymani. In September 2011, Aer Olympic (according to its site at www.aerolympic.se/destinations) offered direct flights from Gothenburg, Malmö and Stockholm to both Suleymani and Erbil. The fares varied between 400 and 700 Euro for a return flight.

A businessman who had returned to Iraq from Sweden without his family said his daughters who were still in Sweden came to visit on holidays. “My daughters, yes, they like to make holidays here. But ‘extra-holiday’. They want to have a ‘normal’ holiday first, in Sweden or in another country, but they also want to come here and visit.” He adds that he thinks that the KRG should do more to encourage young people to come and visit. (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-12).

Visits clearly seem to be the privileged way of transferring support to relatives in the KRG area. According to the responses to the survey I made among participants at a political conference in Suleymani, the most common way of receiving money from relatives abroad was to do so in cash from visiting migrants. Only a little more than 20 percent of the respondents had used the services of transfer companies such as Western Union. Hawala agents had been used by 20 percent of the respondents. Respondents in Uppsala as well as in the Kurdistan Region confirmed that gifts and support are given in connection with visits. A man who has travelled back to his town of birth Koya regularly since 1991 said his relatives expect him to bring gifts every time. However, my impression was that the gifts have more symbolic than economic value. Continued the visitor in Koya: “[This time] there was a huge sale at Dressman [a store for men’s clothes], ten ties for 100 krona! So I brought twenty ties”.

9.1.2 Simultaneous Practices: Remittances and Other Transnational Practices

There is a relationship between other transnational practices and the propensity to remit. The postal questionnaire that was sent to a sample of Kurds in Uppsala contained a number of questions on other kinds of transnational practices than remittances. The questionnaire included questions on visits to the country of origin and membership in an association for co-ethnics. The individuals in the sample were also asked about their plans to return. The results indicate that there is a strong relationship between these indicators of transnational practices and the propensity to remit. Very few respondents are “planning to move to my or my parents country of origin in the future” (question 10, see Appendix 2), most are planning to “stay permanently in Sweden”. But among

those that do plan to return, the propensity to remit is a lot higher than the average: nine out of ten respondents who plan to return send remittances.

Among those that have visited his or her country of origin (or his or her parent's /parents' country of origin) at least once during the last five years the share of remitters is 60.6 percent. Among those that indicate that they have not visited the country of origin at all during the past five years, only 33.3 percent indicate that they have sent money to family or relatives in that country. As Carling has pointed out (2008a), it is difficult to know how plans to return influence the propensity to remit. On the one hand, the desire to return might be a strong incentive to remit. On the other hand, migrants who have not been able to remit for some reason(s), might not like to return to confront possibly disappointed family members and relatives.

Only slightly more than one fifth of the respondents (22.8 percent) to the Uppsala survey indicate that they are members of an association for co-ethnics. Among the members of such associations, the propensity to remit is high: 81 percent or 17 out of 21 respondents say they have sent money home. This should be compared to 46.5 percent of those that are not members of a Kurdish association.

Of the transnational practices captured by the questionnaire I used for my Uppsala survey, most seem to concern only a minority of Kurds in Uppsala. Only a minority are members of an association. Only a third (28 out of 91 respondents, see table on page 186) have sent money home during the last year. The most common practice is that of visits to the country of origin: 77.2 percent of the respondents have visited his or her country of origin (or his or her parents' country of origin) at least once during the last five years.

9.1.3 Intensity: Summary

The intensity with which my informants engaged in transnational practices varied a lot. While some of my interviewees in Uppsala had to make hard-felt sacrifices in order to be able to send remittances often and regularly, the general picture was that the transnational practice of sending remittances was more intense in the past. At the time of my survey and my interviews, it was often carried out at specific occasions: if an emergency arose in the family in Kurdistan (often health related), in connection with religious holidays such as Ramadan, or when political events in Kurdistan led to the collection of collective support. Since it has become cheaper and easier to visit Kurdistan, people have made visits more often during the last years. However, the most intensive transnational practice was, without doubt, keeping in touch: speaking on the phone, sending text messages, chatting over the Internet, using Facebook and Skype. Intense contacts between people and communities across national borders is an important feature of a transnational social space, a

space whose inhabitants live their lives in more than one country at a time. Says Evin Cetin, a Kurdish local politician in Södertälje: “When a bomb explodes in a church in Iraq, it has repercussions in the schools of Södertälje ten minutes later” (Nilsson 2010).

Intense transnational practices can both be an obstacle and an incentive to integration. When migrants are expected to send money home to the country of origin from day one, they might take decide to postpone investments in education that are necessary for long-term integration, and risk getting stuck in low-paid segments of the labour market. On the other hand, the responsibility to cater for family members and relatives in the country of origin can be a powerful incentive to find a job and work hard in the host country.

9.2 Frequency

This section looks at the frequency or communality of transnational practices. Is it common that Kurds in Uppsala engage in transnational practices? Is it common among people in the Kurdish region in Iraq?

Is it common that Kurds in Uppsala send money home? Among my interviewees, the typical answer to this question was “It is something common, it is something everybody does”. Are Kurds, as an immigrant community, in this respect different from other immigrant communities in Sweden? That is, in comparison, do Kurds keep particularly strong transnational ties with their region and communities of origin? A comparison of the Kurdish respondents with non-Kurdish respondents to my postal survey in Uppsala can give an indication. In total, 150 individuals from seven countries in the Middle East responded to the questionnaire in October 2009. However, the number of respondents from some countries was very low, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions. Respondents from Syria displayed the highest propensity to remit: 66.7 percent indicated that they have sent money home. The lowest propensity to remit was found among respondents from Lebanon (25 percent had remitted) and Iran (25.6 percent). The largest difference in propensity to remit was found between the two largest ethnic groups among the respondents: Kurds and Persians. I could contrast Kurds (defined as people indicating having Kurdish as their mother tongue) from all countries on the one hand, and Persians (defined as non-Kurdish individuals from Iran) on the other hand. Whereas slightly more than half of the Kurdish respondents had sent money home (49 out of 91 respondents or 53.8 percent), only 20.0 percent of Persian respondents (7 out of 35) reported that they have remitted (see Table 30 below).

Table 30: Propensity to remit among Kurds and Persians

	Have remitted	Have not remitted	Number of respondents
Kurds	53.8 %	46.2 %	91
Persians (non-Kurds from Iran)	20.0 %	80.0 %	35
Total number of respondents			126

Source: postal survey in Uppsala.

The difference in the propensity to remit between Kurds and Persians might be connected to the respondents' intention to return. As I have already described, the propensity to remit is highest among individuals who intend to return. In the present survey, 81.8 percent of all respondents who intend to return have sent money home, whereas only 38.3 percent of respondents who do not intend to return have remitted. None of the non-Kurdish respondents from Iran indicated that they plan to return to their country of origin in the future. Among Kurds from Iran, the intention to return was also low: ten percent indicate that they plan to return. This is probably a result of the political situation in Iran.

However, one of my respondents interpreted this difference between Kurds and Persians as an indication of a cultural difference. This is what a 29-year old Kurd from Iran said when I asked him if he had experiences of helping family members and relatives: "It probably has to do with the culture of hospitality... that is still quite alive in Kurdistan. (...) Iranians: we use to call them greedy (laughs). [Among Kurds] there is a strong village culture, strong family ties...." (Group interview in Uppsala 2011-04-14).

9.2.1 *Collective Remittances*

So-called collective remittances, that is when a number of individuals and households gather money towards a common objective in the country or origin, is a transnational practice that might involve many immigrants at certain, punctual occasions. 13 out of 56 or 23 percent of the Kurdish respondents to the questionnaire reported having transferred money to charity or to an organisation in the country of origin. Again, the interviewees gave a different picture, describing it as if 'almost all' would contribute money for common purposes from time to time. During my interviews, I encountered several examples of collective remittances: money collected for a health clinic in Halabja in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, financial support sent to a Kurdish political party in Turkey, and collections of money for victims of political persecution in Syria.

I was told it is common that money is collected in connection with political events or troubles in different parts of Kurdistan. "If something happens, then we collect money, among all the Kurds

(...). When there are troubles... we also collect money for people who have got arrested, for their families.” The informants mentioned a concrete example: the political protests in the Kurdish areas around the city of Qamishli in Syria in 2004 when several Kurdish demonstrators were killed by Syrian security forces. The Swedish-Kurdish association of Uppsala collected money and organised support for the victims of violence and persecution by the Syrian regime in connection with the protests. “2004 in Qamishli... all, not all but almost all, most Kurds in Uppsala gave money to the families of those that were killed or arrested in the repression of the protests. You go to someone you know and ask for money in cash, and then you try to find someone who can go there, who can go there in a safe way.” Another occasion was in connection with troubles in March 2007. Syrian police shot at a group of young Kurds who were celebrating the Kurdish new year Newroz in March 2007. “Also then, you tried to send a little money” (interview in Uppsala 2009-08-16).

As mentioned above, many collective remittances are fund-raising efforts that are made at specific occasions. Other efforts to raise funds are of longer duration. At the end of the 1990s, Kurds in Uppsala collected money over several years in order to build a health clinic in the Iraqi town of Halabja. In March 1988, Halabja was the victim of a gas attack by Saddam Hussein’s regime. More than 5,000 people are estimated to have died from the cocktail of poisonous gas that was dropped over Halabja on March 16, 1988. In total, an association in Uppsala called “The Uppsala Committee for the Human Rights of the Kurds” collected around 35,000 SEK. A Swedish state supported non-governmental organisation working with development aid (Forum Syd) contributed an additional 135,000 SEK to the project. The health clinic was inaugurated in the year 2000, and according to my informants, people in Halabja still call it ‘The Uppsala Clinic’ (group interview in Uppsala 2010-01-10).

Some members of the Swedish-Kurdish Association of Uppsala regularly send financial support to a Kurdish political party in the town of Nusaybin in South Eastern Turkey. At the time of the interview, the president of the Swedish-Kurdish Association of Uppsala Huseyin Alpergin represented the Swedish Left Party in the municipal council of Uppsala. As a member of the municipal council, Alpergin had raised a motion demanding that Nusaybin and Uppsala should become twin cities. The motion did not pass, but the initiative received some attention in local media (*Uppsala Nya Tidning*, 29 October, 2007).

Even though my informants mentioned several examples of collective remittances, sending money to common projects is the exception rather than the rule. As mentioned earlier, among the respondents of the questionnaire, only 23 percent stated that they had sent money “to charity or an organisation in your country of origin”. A young Kurdish informant from Lebanon explained: “I think you want to get recognition for what you give, and know that it is used for something good. If

it disappears far away you do not want to give... If someone else gets the honour.” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-27).

9.2.2 *Aspects of Gender Differences*

Is there a difference in frequency between women and men when it comes to remitting money? The literature gives no clear indication on what to expect. When it comes to remittances, the empirical evidence on gender differences is contradictory (Orozco, Lowell and Schneider 2006, Martin 2007, Carling 2008a). Even though surveys often find that women remit lower amounts, there is evidence that women tend to remit a larger share of their income (UNDP 2009, 74). According to data from the German standard of living survey SOEP, male migrants in Germany remit substantially larger amounts than female migrants (Holst, Schäfer and Schrooten 2008). Holst, Schäfer and Schrooten argue that this is because female migrants prioritise their closest family (their children) who are often in Germany, while male migrants give more importance than women to give support to more distant relatives in the extended family. However, analysing data from formal remitters in Germany, the UK and the US originating from 18 different countries, Orozco, Lowell and Schneider (2006) found that women remit *more* to family members (such as siblings) while men's remittances were increased only when sending to their spouse. In an analysis of data on more than 50,000 transfers of remittances from Spain, the research institute Remesas.org found that the average sum sent by women was smaller than that sent by men. But because women were found to remit more often, according to the data gathered by Remesas.org, female migrants still sent 60 percent of remittances from Spain in 2006 (Moré et al 2008).

The female respondents to my survey in Uppsala had a higher propensity to remit than the male respondents. 57.5 percent of Kurdish women responded that they had sent money to family or friends in their country of origin, while 51.9 percent of the men responded that they had remitted.

Is the frequency of the transnational practice of remitting money different in different age groups? It is reasonable to assume that the propensity to remit will be different between individuals of different ages. Children and young people as well as old-age pensioners have smaller financial capacity to send remittances than other age groups. The hypothesis that the propensity to remit will increase with increasing age has been confirmed in a number of studies. After a certain age, the propensity to remit however tends to decrease again. This can be interpreted as an indication that links to the country of origin grow weaker over time (Holst, Schäfer and Schrooten 2008). Table 31 shows a similar tendency among Kurds in Uppsala: the proportion of remitters increases with increasing age. Among the 19 to 24 year olds, only a third respond that they have sent money to family or friends in their country of origin. Among respondents aged 55 to 64, over 70 percent

reported that they had sent money home. There was only one respondent aged over 65. This respondent had not sent money home.

Table 31: Propensity to remit on age group

Age group	Has not sent remittances	Has sent remittances	Number of respondents
19-24	72.7 %	27.3 %	11
25-34	48.1 %	51.9 %	27
35-44	43.5 %	56.5 %	23
45-54	38.5 %	61.5 %	13
55-64	28.6 %	71.4 %	14
65+	100.0 %	0.0 %	1
Total number of respondents			91

Source: postal survey in Uppsala.

This result is probably also influenced by the fact that it was more common for Kurds in Uppsala to send remittances a few years ago than at the time of the survey (autumn 2009). Among those that indicate that they have remitted during the last year, the age group with the highest propensity to remit is individuals aged 35 to 44.

Table 32: Propensity to remit last year on age group

Age	Remitted last year or earlier	Remitted in 2009 percentage	Remitted in 2009 number	Number of respondents
0-18	0.0 %	100.0 %	1	1
19-24	66.7 %	33.3 %	1	3
25-34	35.7 %	64.3 %	9	14
35-44	30.8 %	69.2 %	9	13
45-54	62.5 %	37.5 %	3	8
55-64	60.0 %	40.0 %	4	10
Total number of respondents			27	49

Source: postal survey in Uppsala.

9.2.3 Education

Is the practice of sending remittances more common among people with higher education? How does education influence the propensity to remit? There is no conclusive evidence in the literature (cf chapterA Transnationalist Perspective on How Remittances Shape Migration A Transnationalist Perspective on How Remittances Shape Migration). On the one hand, migrants with higher education generally earn more than low-skilled migrants, and therefore have a larger capacity to remit. On the other hand, migrants with higher levels of education tend to come from households with higher incomes, who might be less in need of remittances than other households. Also, highly skilled migrants are more often granted the possibility to stay abroad for longer periods of time (this is a general feature of immigration policy to the OECD countries, cf. Ruhs 2011), which means that their ties to their original household might be weaker than more temporary, low-skilled migrants.

The results of the survey in Uppsala give a mixed picture (see table 33). The propensity to remit seems to be equally high among those with least schooling (maximum six years) and among those with a university degree. But when all respondents that lack university education are taken together, there is a clear difference between those that have and those that do not have a university degree: 50.0 percent of respondents without university education remit, whereas 61.1 percent of those that have a university degree remit.

Table 33: Propensity to remit on level of education

Level of education	Do not remit	Remit	Number of respondents
No education	100,0 %	0,0 %	1
1–6 years of school	40,0 %	60,0 %	10
6–9 years of school	57,1 %	42,9 %	7
9–12 years of school	48,6 %	51,4 %	37
University degree	38,9 %	61,1 %	36
Total number of respondents			91

Source: postal survey in Uppsala.

The share of migrants who remit will also be different in different income groups. As has been mentioned in chapterA Transnationalist Perspective on How Remittances Shape Migration A Transnationalist Perspective on How Remittances Shape Migration , most studies find that the level of income positively influence remittances (see Hagen-Zanker and Siegel 2007 for an overview). But there is not necessarily a linear relationship between the migrant's level of income and amount

remitted, and the propensity to remit does not necessarily increase with increasing income (Faini 2006; Page and Plaza 2006).

When pilot-testing the questionnaire, I was told that direct questions about the income of the respondents would lower the response rate considerably. Therefore, the postal survey did not raise any data on the level of income among Kurds in Uppsala. However, employment status can be used as an indication of an individual's income. Among those that work full-time, 59.0 percent remit. Among those that work part-time or not at all, the share of remittance senders was slightly lower with 50.9 percent.

The practice to send remittances might be more frequent among religious people. Religious motives to send money were mentioned in several of the interviews I did in Uppsala. It seems money is often sent in connection with Ramadan and other religious holidays. A 22 year old woman from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq explained:

In my family... we help. It has to do with our faith. If you have, you should share. (...) They are my relatives, but it has to do with my faith, too. That's an important rule in Islam: if you can you should help others. (Interview in Uppsala 2010-01-16).

None of my respondents spoke of remittances as a religious *obligation*: it was referred to as an act of faith, but not something they had been encouraged to do by a religious leader. Another reason to send money is as a gesture of gratitude: when an exam has been passed, when the sender gets a job. "We have that tradition, if you are lucky you should be grateful, and then you should give some money to people who need it." A young woman law student in Uppsala said "It is like a tax on your success". (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-27).

9.2.4 Frequency in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq

How common are transnational practices in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq? There are at least two ways to look at this question. One way is to look at the entire population in the area. What share of the population are engaged in transnational practices? In the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, the sheer number of families who have relatives abroad might say something about how widespread transnational practice are. During my fieldwork I was told that in the KRG area it would be difficult to find a family who has *not* got relatives abroad. “There is no family in Kurdistan who do not have family in other countries.” (Group interview with students in Suleymani 2009-12-08). When I asked the male head of a large family in Rania if it is common in Rania to have sons and daughters abroad, he answered “A few families *do not* have relatives abroad” (group interview in Rania 2010-05-27).

There are reasons to believe that the governate of Suleymani in the Kurdistan Region is one of the regions of Iraq with the highest share of migrant households, that is households which have at least one member of the household abroad. According to the Iraqi Household Socio Economic Survey published in 2007, the highest share of households who receive money from abroad is found in the governate of Suleymani: 17.8 percent of the households in the Suleymani governate receive assistance from other households outside Iraq (IHSES 2009b, 659). The reason is not that Suleymani is a particularly poor part of Iraq, on the contrary, the governate of Suleymani belong to the wealthier parts of Iraq. According to the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) carried out in 2007, the nominal per capita income in Suleymani was the second highest in Iraq in 2007 after Erbil (IHSES 2009b, 674).

During one of my field trips to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (November 2009), I distributed at questionnaire among the participants of a conference organised by the Swedish Olof Palme International Center and hosted by by the local political party PUK in Suleymani. The results of this survey can be interpreted as an indication of the many connections that exist between the city of Suleymani and Sweden. 28 individuals, or 42.4 percent of the respondents said they have at least one relative in Sweden.

As has been mentioned in the theoretical overview above (see section Network Theory in particular), it is not unusual that emigration is concentrated to a limited number of destinations. Network theory explains why migration flows tend to be geographically clustered, with flows often being concentrated not only between particular countries, but also between regions or even villages/neighbourhoods in these countries. Writes De Haas, “[i]n emigration countries, we often see that particular regions, villages, or ethnic (sub) groups tend to specialize in migration to particular areas, cities, or even city quarters, either within the same country or abroad.” (De Haas

2007, 34). Levitt (2001) has described the ties that connect the village of Miraflores in the Dominican Republic with Jamaica Plains, a neighbourhood in Boston in the USA. Maybe, what I stumbled upon in Suleymani was a kind of Miraflores in the transnational migratory space between Sweden and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

Massey et al. (2002) include the development of a culture of migration in the accumulative causation processes that can lead to a perpetuation of migration. A culture of migration is more likely to develop in places with a high frequency of out-migration. "As migration grows in prevalence within a community, it changes values and cultural perceptions in ways that increase the ability of future migration." (Massey et al. 1993, 452). When emigration develops into a culture of migration, individuals who do not have strong economic or political motives to emigrate, and that would not have considered emigration as an option in another context, might still move abroad because that is something 'people do'.

Nine of the respondents to my survey in Suleymani who reported having relatives in Sweden indicated that they had received money from their relatives in Sweden. Sweden was the country from where the highest number of respondents had received remittances: Three respondents had received money from the UK, two from Norway, two from Germany and one respondent from the Netherlands and the US respectively.

Who sends money to receivers in Suleymani? A result from my survey in Suleymani that I found striking was that transfers within the same generation dominated. That is, transfers between siblings. 47 percent of those that had received remittances had done so from a sibling. In contrast, only two individuals responded that they have received money from their parents or children. A possible interpretation of this pattern is that this is a consequence of laws regulating family reunification in the European countries from where remittances have been sent. According to the Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), in all of these countries (Sweden, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands) residency permits on the grounds of family reunification are granted to the nuclear family only, and not to adult siblings (Huddleston et al. 2011). In some countries, dependent parents and grandparents can reunite with their families in their country of asylum/immigration on certain conditions. According to Swedish law, family reunification also includes other relatives if these have shared a household with their sponsor in Sweden. The relatively low age of the respondents can also be a reason why there were only a limited number of elder parents who receive remittances from their children among the respondents.

9.2.5 Frequency: Summary

How common are transnational practices? While my interviewees in Uppsala all said they remit money, the results from the survey I made among Kurds in Uppsala show that roughly half have sent money home, almost half of whom a year ago or earlier. If the transnational practice of sending remittances is more common among Kurds than among other immigrants, it might be connected with the fact that return to Kurdistan is a more feasible option than return to countries such as Iran. Very few respondents to the postal questionnaire answered yes on the question “Have you sent money to charity or an organisation in your country of origin”, but my interviewees argued that ‘all’ Kurds would contribute to the collection of money in connection with dramatic political events, such as the clashes in Qamishli in Syria in 2004.

The transnational practice of sending remittances was more common among Kurdish women in Uppsala than among their male peers. The frequency of remittance senders increased with increasing age, but this might be a reflection of the fact that the act of sending remittances was much more common a decade ago than it is today. It was also more common among individuals with a university degree, possibly reflecting the fact that higher education generally is associated with higher income, and therefore a higher capacity to remit. The fact that remittances are often sent in connection with religious festivities, or as part of religious practice, might mean that the frequency of remittance senders is higher among religious people than among non-practicing individuals.

It is difficult to establish what share of the population in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq are involved in transnational practices. Data from the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES) can be interpreted as an indication that this share is higher in the northern, Kurdish region than in the rest of Iraq. Data from the IHSES shows that even though the Kurdish governates are wealthier than other governates in Iraq, it is in the Kurdish governates that the largest share of households receive support from households outside Iraq. In Suleymani, I stumbled upon a remarkably high share of people with relatives in Sweden. Among the respondents to my survey in Suleymani, it was common to receive money from siblings abroad. This can be interpreted as an indication that transfers within the same generation are frequent, but I cannot exclude the possibility that it is a reflection of the age of the respondents to the survey, many of whom were too young to have adult children.

9.2.6 How Transfer Methods Might Influence Intensity and Frequency

Would more people send remittances, and would people send remittances more often if it was cheaper and easier to send money from Uppsala to Kurdistan? That is, do the characteristics of the

transfer channels available (in terms of pricing, security, or speed) influence the intensity and the frequency of the transnational practice of sending remittances? In an empirical study on flows of remittances from more than 100 countries carried out for the World Bank, Freund and Spatafora (2005) conclude that formal and informal remittance channels are substitutes: “the cost of sending remittances primarily affects the channel by which money is sent home and not the amount” (Freund and Spatafora 2005, 9). If the financial sector is poorly developed, which makes it expensive to use formal channels to transfer money, migrants will chose informal channels instead.

This seems to be true also for the respondents to my questionnaire in Uppsala (table 34 below). Only two respondents indicate that the cost of sending money determines the amount they send, and that they would send more money if it was cheaper. Instead, it seems that the needs of the recipients (38.8 percent of the respondents chose this answer) or the senders income (42.8 percent) that determines the amount of remittances sent.

Table 34: Question 26. “When you send money, what determines the amount you send?”

	Number	Percentage
The needs of my family or of my relatives	19	38.8 %
My income (I would send more money if my income was larger)	21	42.8 %
The cost of sending money (if it had been cheaper I would send more money)	2	4.0 %
Other alternative	7	14.3 %
Total number of respondents	49	100.0 %

Source: Postal survey in Uppsala.

The reason why the cost of sending money seems to be irrelevant might be connected to the fact that a majority of the senders send their money for free with the help of relatives or friends who are visiting the country of origin. 54.3 percent of the respondents to the question “How do you primarily send money to your country of origin?” used this method of transfer. Even though this method of transfer for free, transferring money this way might be problematic. For one, it might be difficult to find someone who is travelling. One Kurd in Uppsala who remits to his relatives in a town close to the Turkish border said “I do not send every month. [It is] difficult to find someone every month that is going there”. (Interview in Uppsala 2009-05-05). It might also be difficult to find someone who can be trusted with money. The Kurdish man in Uppsala who remits to a town close to the Turkish border again: “Many have been fooled, a lot of money didn’t arrive”. (Interview in Uppsala 2009-05-05).

In my postal survey in Uppsala, 14 percent of the respondents indicated that they send money home through the Hawala system. The Hawala system is common in the Arab world, but similar systems also exist in Asia. The Hawala system is built upon trust between brokers in different countries called hawaladar. When a hawaladar receives money from a client in country A, he or she contacts another hawaladar broker in country B. The hawaladar in country B disburses the money from his or her cash reserves. This way, the money is not actually transferred between the countries. Instead, the debt is cleared later. The debt can be cleared when the hawaladar brokers remittances in the reversed direction, by goods swaps or through business deals. Hawaladars also use bank transfers, but by transferring larger sums at a time, they can keep costs low for their clients. An essential basis for the Hawala-system is the fact that Muslim faith forbids the charging of interest. This makes it possible for Hawala agents to balance their books days or even months later (Buencamino and Gorbunov 2002). It is difficult to know if this transfer method is more common among Kurds than among other ethnic communities in Sweden. When I made my survey in Uppsala, Statistics Sweden had compiled but not yet published data on private transfers made through Hawala agents (information confirmed in e-mail conversation with Marcus Ershammar, Statistics Sweden, 5 October 2010).

In 2009, the think tank Global Utmaning commissioned a survey of transfer channels and costs of remittances sent by Kurds from Sweden to two cities in Turkey (Istanbul and Diyarbakir) and two cities in Iraq (Erbil and Baghdad). The journalist Jindar Erdal Toprak conducted a survey among 118 Kurds in 15 different Swedish cities during two weeks in October 2009. The results of the survey were published by Global Utmaning in March 2010 (Pelling 2010).

According to Erdal Toprak's survey, there are important differences between the remittances corridor linking Sweden to Turkey and the corridor linking senders in Sweden to receivers in Iraq. Remittances to Turkey are predominantly sent through formal channels, whereas money sent through Hawala brokers dominate in the Sweden-Iraq corridor.

In the Sweden-Iraq corridor, it was more or less equally common to send money in cash with friends or relatives (87 percent of their respondents who had sent money to Iraq had transferred it this way) as it was to transfer money with the help of a Hawala agent (95 percent had used this alternative). Particularly those that indicated that they often send money had used the services of a Hawala agent. Only 13 people had transferred money through Western Union, and that had been done at single occasions only. None of the respondents in Erdal Toprak's survey had transferred money through a Swedish bank.

Also in the Sweden-Turkey corridor, transfers in cash were common. 72 percent of the respondents to Erdal Toprak's survey had sent money in cash with someone travelling to the

destination. But at the time of the survey, money transfer companies were much better established in the Sweden–Turkey corridor than in the Sweden–Iraq corridor. 59 percent of the respondents had sent money with MoneyGram (22 individuals) and/or Western Union (14 individuals). Also a Swedish bank, Swedbank, had been able to establish an alternative to cash transfers in this corridor. 11 percent of the respondents sending money to Turkey indicated that they had done so through Swedbank. Maybe the most striking difference between the two corridors was that none of the respondents that had transferred money to Turkey said they had used a Hawala agent (contrary to 95 percent of the remitters to Iraq, as mentioned above).

An important reason for the dominance of cash transfers and transfers through Hawala agents to Iraq is that other alternatives were much more costly. At the time of the survey, Erdal Toprak found that Hawala agents charged a flat rate of six percent of the transferred sum. At the same time, Swedbank charged a fee of 250 SEK to transfer 1,000 SEK, that is, the equivalent of a fee of 25 percent. While money transferred through Hawala reaches its receiver almost immediately, Swedbank charged 250 SEK for transfers that took two to four days. For faster transfers (within one day) Swedbank charged 450 SEK, or 45 percent of 1,000 SEK. See table 35 and 36.

Table 35: Transfer costs in the corridor Sweden–Iraq, October 2009

Transfer method	Fee charged to transfer 1,000 kr	%	Fee charged to transfer 5,000 kr	%	Speed
Western Union	190 kr	19 %	340 kr	7 %	same day
Western Union (next day)	70 kr	7 %	140 kr	3 %	next day
Swedbank	250 kr	25 %	250 kr	5 %	2 – 4 days
Swedbank (express)	450 kr	45 %	450 kr	9 %	next day
Agent	140 kr	14 %	290 kr	6 %	same day
MoneyGram	150 kr	15 %	370 kr	7 %	same day

Source: Survey conducted by Erdal Toprak (Pelling 2010, 16–17).

Table 36: Transfer costs in the corridor Sweden–Turkey, October 2009

Transfer method	Fee charged to transfer 1,000 kr	%	Fee charged to transfer 5,000 kr	%	Speed
Western Union	190 kr	19 %	340 kr	7 %	same day
Forex–Moneygram	150 kr	15 %	370 kr	5 %	same day
Swedbank	250 kr	25 %	250 kr	5 %	2 – 4 days
Swedbank (express)	450 kr	45 %	450 kr	9 %	next day

Source: Survey conducted by Erdal Toprak (Pelling 2010, 16–17).

One conclusion of Erdal Toprak's survey of transfer methods, and my own research among respondents and informants in Uppsala, is that transfers through banks and money transfer companies such as Western Union are underdeveloped. This is particularly true for the corridor linking Swedish remitters with their receivers in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. A large share of transfers in this remittances corridor are made in cash, and transfers that are not made in cash are made through Hawala agents. Contrary to money transferred in cash, money sent through the Hawala system enter the economy. As has been explained above, Hawala agents can lend the money that it entrusted to them by their clients, and balance their books at a later stage. In the meantime, the money can be used to facilitate trade or investment. But a drawback of Hawala transfers is that the end-receiver picks up the money in cash. In a report to the US centre for policy analysis Inter-American Dialogue, Castillo, Romei and Orozco argue that increased use of banking services, such as receiving remittances into a bank account, would be positive for economic development of countries and regions that receive remittances. If the use of banking services increases, the importance of remittances for the local economy will increase as well (Castillo, Romei and Orozco 2010).

According to Castillo, Romei and Orozco increased financial literacy is crucial to an increased use of banking services. In the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, another, potentially larger obstacle to increased banking is that the banking sector is very poorly developed. Most transactions in the local economy are still made in cash. One of my informants in Erbil who at the time worked as a security officer at a construction site told me that he got to accompany his boss when he went to the bank to get the payment for the workers. All the workers were paid in cash. "Me and my boss, we go to the bank and pick up one million, two million dollar. Like that. They give you the money in a plastic bag, and put it in there [he points at the trunk of the car]. Sometimes more than two million dollar!" (Interview in Erbil 2010-05-27).

A key informant pointed at another reason for not using the services of companies like Western Union: the detailed questions asked on the form that all senders have to fill out in order to be able to make the transfer. The informant said that many of the questions are perceived as intrusive. "When you fill in the form at Western Union... You do not want to cross all the questions on the form". (Interview in Uppsala 2009-05-05).

9.3 Implications For The Migration Between the Kurdistan Region and Sweden

In this chapter, I have looked at how transnational practices carried out by Kurdish immigrants and their relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq can be related to the facilitation, creation and perpetuation of migration between Iraq and Sweden. What practices help facilitate and encourage cross-border movements between Iraq and Sweden? Given what is known about the intensity and the frequency of transnational practices involving Kurds in Sweden and in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, how can these transnational ties be expected to shape migration between Iraq and Sweden in the future?

The transnational practices might be intensive, and they might involve a lot of people. But is the character of the transnational practices such that they might help cause and/or sustain migration? Trying to explore the link between transnational practices and migratory flows, I encountered at least two concrete ways in which Kurds in Uppsala facilitated migration to Sweden.

One way of facilitating migration was replacing the sending of remittances with bringing the receivers of remittances to Sweden. I encountered several examples of families who arranged for their relatives to come to Sweden, including by helping to cover the costs of immigration, and where this was described as an alternative to sending remittances. Another example of how transnational ties between Kurds in Sweden and their families and communities in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq help facilitate migration from Iraq to Sweden was different practices that helped lowering the costs of migration by helping newly arrived. In the following two section (sections *Helping to Cover the Costs of Migration as an Alternative to Remittances* and *Lowering the Costs of Migration by Helping Newly Arrived*) I look at these two sets of practices in turn. I conclude the chapter with some reflections on how transnational contacts might actually *lower* the motivation to migrate (section *Impressions about Sweden and Motives to Migrate from to Sweden*).

9.3.1 *Helping to Cover the Costs of Migration as an Alternative to Remittances*

Helping a relative to migrate can be an alternative to sending remittances. The practice of funding migration can be seen as a part of remitters support of their relatives' livelihood strategies. Just as in the case of the remitter himself or herself, earning an income abroad makes it possible to send remittances back to the original household. Carling, Bivand Erdal and Horst found that the provision of assistance for migration is quite common among Somalis and Pakistanis in Norway (Carling, Bivand Erdal and Horst 2012, 303). This kind of support has the additional effect of potentially relieving the remittance sender of a part of his or her burden of remittances.

This practice links actual remittances to future migration. When this practice is carried out in the transnational space linking the Kurdistan Region in Iraq with Sweden, transnational support through

the transfers of remittances is replaced by support through financing of migration. Patterns and practices of remittance sending are therefore of interest in the context of predicting future migration from Iraq.

I encountered several examples of families that had ‘invested’ in the migration of a relative, in order to alleviate the burden of caring for relatives in the country of origin. A 23 year old man told me: “We try to make people come here instead. We pay the money they have to pay in order to come here, then they have a job here and can pay back. And then my brother doesn’t have to send money to them.” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31).

Even at times when the only door into Sweden was through the asylum system, it could be a rentable strategy to pay what it takes to get the someone into Sweden. The relatives in Sweden could obviously not guarantee their relative a residence permit. But, says the same informant as above, “some are smart. They get ahead and start working immediately. I had a cousin who was here for seven years without a residence permit, and then they expelled him, but [he worked all the time] so it payed off for him.” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31).

When interviewing a family in Koya, I was told how the oldest son of the family had worked in Sweden to finance the migration of his younger sibling. Instead of asking his brothers to pay him back what he had to spend to get them to Sweden, he asked them to help pay for the next brother’s migration. We can call the oldest son of the family, this family’s migration pioneer, Segvan. His younger brother told me: “In 1991, Segvan helped one brother to get to Sweden. He worked to give him the money back, [what] it cost him to go to Sweden. Segvan said: do not give me the money, do the same, pay for the younger brother so that he can also get to Sweden.” (Group interview in Koya 2010-05-27). At the time of the interview, three brothers of Segvan and their families were living in Sweden.

9.3.2 Lowering the Costs of Migration by Helping Newly Arrived

Asylum seekers in Sweden are offered two alternative housing options. Asylum seekers can choose to live either in accommodation provided by the Migration Board, or to organise their housing on their own while they are waiting for their asylum request to be processed. The Swedish Migration Board has a number of reception centres where asylum seekers and their families can stay during their application is being process. Generally, these reception centres are placed in smaller municipalities where flats can be acquired more cheaply than in the bigger cities. The Migration Board charges a fee for the accommodation, unless the asylum seeker is unable to pay.

Asylum seekers made use of the opportunity to organise their accommodation privately, generally by staying with friends or relatives, in all parts of Sweden. However, the phenomenon is more

common in and around the largest cities. In 2007, Södertälje had the highest concentration of asylum seekers living in private houses together with Botkyrka, another municipality in the Stockholm region who also hosts a relatively large communities of newly arrived Iraqi asylum immigrants (Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning 2008, 5). Because of the scarcity of available housing in metropolitan areas such as the municipalities around Stockholm, individuals and families often continue to live in over-crowded flats long after they have obtained their residence permit (Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning 2008). In 2006, 14,470 out of a total of 27,920 immigrants who were granted residence permit in Sweden had lived in private accommodation during their asylum process. This represented around 52 percent of all immigrants who settled in Sweden in 2006. In Södertälje, who as has been described above received a large share of asylum seekers from Iraq in 2006 and 2007, the share of settling immigrants who had been living in private flats was 88 percent in 2006 and 80 percent in 2007 (Swedish Migration Board 2007b and 2008b).

In fact, during these years, immigrants from Iraq made use of the possibility to arrange their own accommodation to a larger extent than other immigrants. 68 percent of all Iraqi citizens who were granted a residence permit in Sweden in 2006 had lived in private accommodation. Among the top twenty countries of origin in 2006, this share was only higher among immigrants from Syria (74 percent). (Swedish Migration Board 2007b).

In late 2007, politicians in Södertälje decided that the problem with overcrowded flats had become so serious that new regulations were adopted limiting the maximum amount of inhabitants per room in council flats. According to the new regulations, maximum three people can live in a one-room flat, and maximum four people in a two-room flat, etc. An exception is made for families with children. (Södertälje 2008-02-20). It is unclear if these regulations have been respected. At the time of writing, Södertälje is again receiving a large share of asylum seekers from the Middle East to Sweden. This time, the asylum seekers come from Syria, another country with an important Syrian/Assyrian Christian minority. Judging from the argumentation of leading politicians (for instance the mayor Boel Godner, SVT 2012-09-06), poor housing conditions as a result of too many people in too few flats remains a concern.

There are several reasons why it might be valuable for newly arrived asylum seekers to stay with friends or family members close to a larger city, rather than at the reception centres of the Swedish Migration Board in a smaller town. One reason is of course the proximity to friends and family itself: for people fleeing from violence and oppression, staying close to dear ones is a source of solace and shelter. In an interview study carried out among 58 asylum seekers in Uppsala and the county of Västmanland in 2007, Lennartsson conclude that most of her informants describe the

choice to organise their accommodation privately as an act of actively choosing *not* to live at a reception centre (Lennartsson 2007, quoted in Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning 2008,18). Life outside of the reception centres offers better possibilities to live a ‘normal’ life, with more freedom, more independence and less surveillance. Other reasons for choosing private accommodation are connected to the opportunities available in metropolitan areas. Above all, it is often easier to find a job in these areas. This is true not least for informal jobs, which are often the only jobs newly arrived can hope to get. Those asylum seekers who have had to borrow money in order to finance their migration, might be under pressure to get a job and start working as soon as possible after arriving in Sweden.

These positive aspects seem to outweigh the negative aspects of private accommodation described by Lennartsson’s informants and in other studies of housing standard and quality of life of newly arrived immigrants in private accommodation (e.g. Brekke 2004). Asylum seekers living in private accommodation are almost exclusively sub-tenants. It is a housing situation characterised by tensions between the newly arrived and their hosts families, as well as frequent moves. According to Boverket, children suffer most from living in cramped flats with little space to play or do their homework, and from having to change homes and neighbourhoods again and again (Boverket 2008).

Also in Uppsala, the percentage of newly arrived immigrants who staying in private accommodation has been higher than average (63 percent of the newly arrived in 2006). Many of my respondents and their families in Uppsala had helped newly arrived relatives by letting them stay in their homes. A young man from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq told me: “I have cousins who got a flat in Uddevalla, but there were no jobs there. So they had to live at our place in order to be able to work in Göteborg. (...) I remember that time. It was very hard, always five extra people. We had to take care of them.” A 20 year old women who had immigrated together with her parents from Turkish Kurdistan said: “We have had three families who have come, all have stayed at our place. It went well for them, all have residency permits.” A 21 year old man with a similar background: “Until I was fifteen, there were always people staying at our home.” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31).

9.3.3 Impressions about Sweden and Motives to Migrate from to Sweden

Replacing remittances with helping the remittance receivers to migrate, and support to newly arrived immigrants are two examples of transnational practices that facilitate migration. I did however, encounter examples of how transnational contacts seemed to decrease the motivation to migrate. People who have relatives abroad might gain a more realistic view on the benefits and

drawbacks of migration. According to my survey among a sample of PUK activists in Suleymani, those who had relatives in Sweden were less likely to want to live in Sweden, and had a less enthusiastic view on both the economic and the political situation in Sweden than respondents without relatives in Sweden. It seems closer contacts with the realities of life in Sweden had a negative impact on people's impression of Sweden and their willingness to migrate to Sweden.

As has been mentioned above, more than 40 percent of the respondents to the questionnaire had relatives in Sweden. It is important to note that only one of the respondents had ever been to Sweden. That is, all the others lacked first hand experience of Sweden. The respondents of the survey in general had a very positive impression of Sweden.⁵⁷ Of all the respondents to the questionnaire, 74.6 percent responded that they would like to live in Sweden. The most common reason stated was that they would like to live in Sweden in order "to study" (67.3 of those that would like to live in Sweden), followed by "because the political situation is better in Sweden" (see table 37).

Table 37: Question 14. "Why would you like to live in Sweden?"

Reason to live in Sweden*	Percentage	Number of respondents
To work	23.1 %	12
To study	67.3 %	35
Because the economic situation is better in Sweden	28.8 %	15
Because political situation is better in Sweden	38.5 %	20
To gain access to better healthcare	17.3 %	9
Another reason	21.2 %	11
Total number of respondents		52

Source: Survey in Suleymani

* The entire question read: "14. If you answered yes to question 13, why would you like to live in Sweden? You can tick more than one alternative if you want."

⁵⁷ It is likely that the view of Sweden that the participants expressed in the questionnaire was influenced by the fact that the conference was organised by and paid for by Swedish organisations. The results of the questionnaire must be interpreted with caution. For more details on the questionnaire see chapter Intercept Survey in Suleymani Intercept Survey in Suleymani.

There are signs that those that have relatives in Sweden have a more nuanced picture of the country up north: of those that had relatives in Sweden, “only” 64.3 percent would like to live in Sweden. In contrast, 85.7 percent of those that did not have relatives in Sweden would like to go to Sweden to live there. Both the economic and the political situation in Sweden appeared less attractive to people with relatives in Sweden. This negative view was mirrored in some of the interviews: A 39 year old man, who had lived in Sweden from 2001 to 2009 said: “The Swedish economy is not that strong, not like in England. I have a brother who lives in England. A relative in England can help more [than one in Sweden].” (Group interview in Suleymani 2009-12-08). An engineer who has returned from Sweden to Erbil said: “In Switzerland you earn more money, in Sweden you do not earn that well”. (Interview with returnee couple in Erbil 2009-12-10).

As might be expected, those respondents who have relatives in Sweden but have not received any financial support from them have the most negative view of Sweden. “Only” 60 percent of these respondents would like to live in Sweden. This should be compared to those that have received money from Sweden: 75 percent of them would like to live in Sweden. Van Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema (2005) argue that remittances can trigger migration by the ‘message’ they convey. Remittances tell the receiving household that the migrant has been successful, which makes the migration option appear more attractive.

When it comes to negative impressions about Sweden, there was also an interesting difference between men and women. One third of the men would not like to live in Sweden, but only one fifth of the women were negative towards living in Sweden. My interviews confirm the impression that women have a much more positive view of Sweden than men. Also, women that have actually migrated to Sweden seem to make more positive experiences of living in Sweden than their men. One 30 year old woman from Suleymani, whose sister had lived in Sweden since 2009, said “My impression [is that Sweden] is a paradise worth to kill yourself for. Where you can achieve your own goals and aims.”

This impression was shared by other of my informants. When interviewing a family in Rania, I asked how the family members who had migrated to Sweden had changed. When a daughter in the family answered “They have not changed, but their wives have changed!” there was an acknowledging round of laughter. She continued: “The women, when they go back, even if they are only there one year, they are proud of themselves, [they] act as if they were from a different level.” (2010-05-27, family in Rania). I asked the same question to another family I interviewed in Rania: “They change in the way of speaking. When he was here, he was like a boss. There he is washing dishes with his wife!” (2010-05-27 in Rania).

10 Tracing Transnational Ties into the Future

In this chapter, I look at what factors might contribute to make transnational ties last. One indication of durability into the future of the transnational ties are the dependencies that exist between migrants in Sweden and non-migrants that have stayed behind in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. As I will show, these dependencies are complex webs of mutual assistance with support flowing in both directions: there are remittances sent from Uppsala to the Kurdistan Region, but also support sent from Kurdistan to people living in Sweden. At the core of my exploration in this chapter is the question of whether the transnational ties are durable enough to shape immigration from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq to Sweden over time.

How durable are the transnational practices of the Kurdish community in Uppsala? What is the durability of the transnational ties that connect people in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq with their relatives in Sweden? One way to look for answers to this question is to look at what functions the transnational practices have today, and on the basis of their current functions try to make projections about what functions they will have in the future. Will today's needs and motivations persist in the future? I start with taking a look at the present needs and motivations to send and receive remittances.

10.1 What the Use of Remittances Today Might Say about the Future

The actual use of remittances can be used as an indication of the needs of the receivers. According to the answers to the question "How is the money that you send used?" in the Uppsala questionnaire, "food and clothes" together with "healthcare and medication" are the most common destinations of remittances sent by Kurds in Uppsala (see table 38). 65 percent of the respondents reported that remittances are used for food and clothes.

The same number of respondents answered that remittances were used to pay health care and medication: "When someone gets ill, then they call" (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-01-11). "When my husband sends money, it is above all for medicines, because they need medicine, and that's what costs". The need for medicines, or urgent medical care like surgery are needs that are difficult to negotiate. "In Lebanon, if you do not pay at the clinic, you do not get any health care. That's the problem, it is the health care, if you do not work and have no salary." (Interview in Uppsala 2010-01-14b). A man in Uppsala whose family lives in Dohuk in the Kurdistan Region in

Iraq has a poorly paid job and a large family to support in Sweden. He is under a lot of pressure to make ends meet in his daily life in Sweden. Still, when his relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq need his help to be able to buy medication, he has no choice. “Someone has to take that responsibility, to pay for medicines. (...) I have to do it. I have no other choice.” (Interview in Uppsala 2009-05-05).

Table 38: Question 27. “How is the money that you send used?” (Multiple answers possible)

	Percentage	Number of respondents
Food, clothes	65.7 %	31
Capital goods (for instance TV, car)	8.5 %	4
Education (tuition fees, school books, university studies, etc.	25.5 %	12
Healthcare and medication	65.7 %	31
Rent or purchase of housing, construction of housing	14.9 %	7
Investments	2.1 %	1
Savings	0.0 %	0
Payback loans	14.9 %	7
Funeral	10.6 %	5
Wedding	8.5 %	4
Other alternative	10.6 %	5
Total number of respondents: 47		

Source: Postal survey in Uppsala.

I got similar results when I asked about the use of remittances in my survey in Suleymani. 42.9 percent of the receivers of remittances in the survey in Suleymani said they use the money they receive from abroad for food and clothing. Nineteen percent of the Suleymani respondents indicated that the money received from relatives abroad was used to pay different kinds of housing costs: to pay rent or to build a house. The third most common use of remittances was health care and medication.

It is important to note that it is difficult to measure the real impact of remittances on household income and expenditures. Taylor (1999) points out that household income is fungible: remittances are rarely checks earmarked for specific purposes. Instead, remittance are added to the household income and are usually spent the same way as household income obtained from other sources. If the household spends most of its income on food and clothes, remittances will also be used to buy food and clothes.

The fact that a relatively large share of respondents both in Uppsala and in Suleymani say that remittances are used for food, clothes and health care can be interpreted as an indication that the receivers use the money they get from abroad to cover very basic needs. This would in turn imply that the receivers of remittances are dependent upon remittances to meet their basic needs. Such a dependency could be the basis for strong bonds between Kurds in Uppsala and their family and relatives in Kurdistan.

The question is if this dependency is durable, if it will last into the future. As I have shown in my overview of migration theories above, the concern that remittances would create dependencies on out-migration was central to the rather pessimistic view on the links between migration and development that dominated in the 1970s. If migrant sending areas become more or less dependent upon the income from remittances is, however, a strange benchmark of development that is seldom used outside of migration studies (Taylor 1999, 65). This criterion, Taylor points out, would not be applied when assessing the sustainability of the economic development of suburbs who generate their incomes by ‘exporting’ labour to the nearby city. Also, the fact that a certain area is dependent upon remittances at a certain point in time does not mean that this dependency will remain. Remittances can indeed be used to generate income from other sources.

Economic growth might decrease the need for remittances. The need for support from relatives abroad, however, will be determined by how the wealth created by the economic growth is distributed. Will economic growth lead to an eradication of poverty in the Kurdish region of Iraq? Or will the economic growth merely lead to increased differences in standard of living between different segments of the population? And those that indeed do get wealthier: will they be confident that the improvements in their standard of living will last? Are the improvements perceived as secure and durable? If not, an economic incentive (or an insurance motive) to keep strong ties with family members and relatives abroad will persist. The first sections of this chapter look into aspects of distribution and predictability of economic growth. After that, I look at a number of reasons for remittances to be sent other than financial needs of the receivers. As I have discussed above (chapter 4), motivations to send remittances cannot be limited to purely altruistic concerns for the well-being of the receivers. I look at motivations connected to upholding an image of the emigrant as a gift-giver and provider, and at reasons to remit connected to plans of return.

10.2 How Economic Growth Weakens the Need for Remittances

In the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, there has been a dramatic improvement in the overall level of living standard during the last decade. The Kurdish region in Iraq has experienced tremendous economic growth since the end of the 1990s (RTI International 2008, Heshmati 2007, 2011;

Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 179). This is not only because economic activity was so low during the blockade and the civil war in the 1990s. Economic activity in Northern Iraq has also benefited from a “gateway-effect”. The levels of violence have been very low in the Kurdish region, while the level of violence has remained high in other parts of Iraq. The Kurdish region in general and Erbil in particular have therefore received a strategic position as the “gateway to Iraq” (*Financial Times*, 14 April, 2010). A student I interviewed in Erbil in 2009 said “Erbil changed from a village to a capital city in those six years!” (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-10). Already in 2007, Emanuelsson quoted one of her Iraqi Kurdish informants in Sweden “half-jokingly” saying “In the 1990s we sent money to them, now they have such a good situation that soon they will have to start send money to us” (Emanuelsson 2007, 265). A few years on, it seems this prediction is increasingly coming true. In 2012, the economy is booming, and the security situation in the Kurdish region is very much better than in the rest of Iraq.

The relation between economic growth and remittances is not straightforward. On the one hand, one might expect remittances to be sent as a compensation for poor economic opportunities in the receiving countries, that is, to be sent primarily to countries with low growth rates. On the other hand, migrants will have more incentives to invest in economies experiencing high growth, and therefore countries with higher GDP growth might be expected to attract more remittances. In an analysis of panel data from 1970 to 2000 covering 87 countries, Buch and Kuckulenz find that effects of growth on remittance indeed seem to cancel out (Buch and Kuckulenz 2010, 8)⁵⁸.

I have recorded many accounts on how migrants in Sweden discover that their relatives who stayed in Northern Iraq are now wealthier than their relatives in Sweden. Sometimes the wealth of people in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has increased to the point of reversing the flows of support: remittances from Sweden to Iraq are replaced by support from relatives in Iraq to poorer relatives in Sweden. One of my interviewees in Uppsala told me of a case: “Yes, I know of someone! He lives here with his wife. He doesn’t work, and he doesn’t study either, so his dad has to send him money from Kurdistan.” (Interview in Uppsala 2010-01-16). Several of my interviewees in Kurdistan told me of cases of support sent to people who had not yet been able to establish themselves in Sweden. A student told me about his cousin in the Swedish city of Göteborg, who has been denied asylum in Sweden and now lives underground: “his mother sends him money from here because he cannot find a job, he cannot support himself.” (Interview with returnee students in Suleymani 2009-12-11). A similar situation was described by an interviewee who has a brother in Sweden and a brother and

58 The data on remittances in Buch and Kuckulenz’ study are data on workers’ remittances (B19A.9) from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.

a sister in Norway: “We were sending money to them from here before they got a residency permit.” (Group interview in Suleymani 2009-12-11).

One of my informants in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, a man who had returned from Sweden to set up a successful hotel business said he sent money to Kurdistan in the 1990s, but was now remitting money to Sweden instead: “The last two years, it has been like that for me, it has been the other way around. You earn that well here.” (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-12). A 30-year old man who has four sisters in Sweden said “All of my sisters borrow money from my father here!” (Group interview in Suleymani 2009-12-11). One informant declared: “I don’t think anyone send money from abroad to Kurdistan anymore. If I go abroad, am sure my family would send me money from here.” Also the flow of gifts has been reversed in some cases. A 29 year old student from Iranian Kurdistan told me: “I get a lot better gifts from them than I give them... My relatives are better off than I, they have *everything*.” (Group interview in Uppsala 2011-04-14).

Economic growth has also made it possible to replace transnational flows of financial support with transfers between households within Kurdistan. A student in Erbil told me his grandmother used to receive support from her daughter in Sweden “But now my other aunts and uncles [in Kurdistan] have good jobs.” (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-10).

10.3 Remittances for Self-Support

It has been observed that remittances can provide the capital needed to start a new business in countries with insufficient credit markets (see for instance Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006b). I encountered many examples of support that was sent with the explicit aim of making family members and relatives independent of further support. A 23-year old from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq said his relatives in Sweden “have become a little more smart, a little more long-term. They try to make them [the relatives in Kurdistan] self-sufficient in some way.” A 20 year old woman from Turkish Kurdistan said “My uncles are much better off than we are now... My dad has helped them to invest in different businesses, and they have set up enterprises and stuff. Like, they sell fish and so.” A 25 year old woman from Turkey interviewed in Uppsala said “In our case, it has been this thing with education. In order to support yourself you need education. Especially if you are a woman”. In Turkey, students have to pass a national exam in order to enter university. Those that are not able to pass the exam straight after school, take a one year long preparatory course. “I know my dad has paid for a cousin who had to sit the exam twice...” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31). The following quote from a 20-year old woman from Turkish Kurdistan summarises:

A lot of things have happened... My parents have lived here for 20 years. When they first sent money it was very poor over there. Now, now they have hot water and electricity, they can get into the city to buy things. Now they maybe send money so that someone can study. I have three cousin-families there. We focus on them being able to study. (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31)

To build a house can be part of a long-term strategy. One interviewee, a 27 year old man from Iranian Kurdistan, said it is common that emigrants build a house, and then rent it out and let the relatives in the country of origin take care of the rent. “Then you both have a house if you are planning to return in the future, and you do not have to send money”. (Group interview in Uppsala 2011-04-14).

In the following sections, I will look at reasons for transnational economic support in the form of remittances to persist even though the general economic situation in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has improved. I analyse what I believe are major reasons why transnational economic support will continue. The uneven distribution of wealth in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq means that there will be persisting needs for support from abroad. The instability of the political as well as economic situation in the region constitutes an insurance motive for remittances: transnational ties are a kind of insurance. One aspect of the durability of transnational ties is how transnational ties can be seen as a kind of social capital, an investment in an enhancement of possibilities in people’s professional and educational careers. I also look into an issue often mentioned by my informants: remaining expectations on the part of receivers of remittances. The prospect of return is another incentive to send remittances. .

10.4 Persisting Needs for Support from Abroad

The fact that the economic and security situation is now so much better in the Kurdish region in Iraq could indicate that the dependencies that contributed to uphold strong transnational ties in the 1990s are now fading. However, the wealth created by the present economic boom has not been evenly distributed within the population. A 23-year old man from the province of Dohuk said “Yes, after the invasion of Iraq things have become a lot better, but it has also created many new poor people”. (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-03-31). Mechanisms for redistribution between richer and poorer members of the population, as well as between different stages of life (such as pensions and child benefits) are underdeveloped. For instance, there is no income tax. Poor mechanisms for re-distribution means that pockets of poverty are likely to persist even if the region as a whole becomes wealthier. My respondents in Uppsala reported that one of the most important ways of using their remittances was to cover health care costs. Even though rudimentary health care is

provided for free, my respondents indicated that those that need more complicated treatment or surgery usually need to pay for this themselves.

Thus an important reason why transnational ties between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden are likely to endure, is that the benefits of the economic development have been unevenly distributed. Also the economic development itself is not happening everywhere. The economy is booming in Erbil, but in smaller towns, many people are still struggling to make ends meet. In the town of Koya, a mother who has three sons and a daughter in Sweden said “We do not have anything, just God and Sweden.” (Interview with family in Koya 2010-05-27).

In the predominantly Kurdish city of Kirkuk, a city with up to 800,000 inhabitants only 83 kilometres south of Erbil and some 100 kilometres west of Suleymani but on the other side of the green line separating the KRG area from the rest of Iraq, the economy is at a standstill because of the security situation. High levels of violence (sectarian as well as criminal violence) are paralysing the economy: “Kirkuk should be the richest city in the world because of the oil. But when you enter the city what you see is a village” described a 24 year old man from Kirkuk. (Group interview in Erbil 2009-12-12 with young men from Kirkuk). Here, many families still depend on support from abroad: “Many people totally depend on their relatives in Sweden. Life expenses have increased, the salaries have stayed the same.” the 24-year old continued. “*All* families with a relative abroad receive money” said a 26 year old whose cousin has spent seven years in Sweden. Another 26 year old, a restaurant worker in Kirkuk, said “I get money from my brother who has a German residence permit, and from my brother in Sweden I get what he can send. They do send.” The 24 year old again: “Old people... they depend 100 percent on what their relatives in Sweden send.” (Group interview 2009-12-12 in Erbil with young men from Kirkuk).

10.5 Transnational Ties as an Insurance

Another important reason why remittances from abroad are likely to play a role in the future in the Kurdish region is the level of insecurity in the rest of Iraq. One interviewee expressed it like this: “We might even have more than our relatives in Sweden, but we do not know what happens tomorrow, if you manage to get the right contacts to get into university, if you get a job. Security: that’s the big difference.” (A man who has lived in Sweden 2001 to 2009 and has a cousin in Sweden, group interview 2009-12-08). That is, families and individuals that have a good current income, might still have problems to make sure that the standard of living that they have achieved will last into the future. There is a lack of social security (in terms of publicly funded pension systems, unemployment insurance, etc.). As my guide put it “if you work, you get money. If you cannot work, the money stops” (2010-05-28).

Also, the political situation is volatile. “(...) people still worry about the future: because there are so many different people living here in Iraq, the situation is not *stable* and some people do not feel safe.” (Interview with returnee students in Suleymani 2009-12-11). This lack of security is an insurance motive to keep transnational ties. Support from family members of relatives abroad might be needed again in the not so distant future. To maintain close ties with relatives and family members abroad ensures access to financial support in the form of remittances if times turn bad again. This insurance motive can also motivate further migration. As a central tenant of the New Economics of Labour Migration has it, it makes sense for a household to spread its risks, by making sure that not all of its members work on the same labour market (Stark 1991). Even if expected earnings on a foreign labour market, after deducting the costs of migration, are not higher than on the local labour market, it might still be valuable to ‘place’ a member of the family or household abroad. While applying for asylum or looking for a job, this person receives support from the household in Kurdistan. In exchange, he or she is expected to remit a part of his or her earnings back home if the original household needs financial support. The durability of transnational ties will thus not only depend on the economic development of the Kurdish region, but also of how stable and durable this development is perceived.

My respondents often blamed the lack of security and predictability in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq on a high prevalence of nepotism and ‘wasta’. The Arabic term ‘wasta’ can be translated with influence. It refers to influential people who maintain their influence by hiring or appointing their trustees to different positions, often regardless of their formal qualification (Stonaker 2010). To a student I interviewed in Erbil: “wasta, that is if you have a friend, a relative you will get a job. It doesn’t depend on your qualification here”. (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-10). ”In ninety percent of the cases“ you need to know someone in order to get a job, said a 23 year old law student at the Salahaddin University in Erbil (Group interview in Erbil 2010-05-25).

In international research on remittances, the issue of the possible negative macroeconomic impacts of remittances has received a lot of attention. There is some evidence that public investments might be crowded-out by remittances (Chami et al 2008, Abdih et al 2008). Remittances can be seen as a ‘moral hazard’ for politicians, because incomes from remittances reduce people’s incentives to pressure the government for reforms (Chami et al 2008). There is also evidence that remittances might fuel corruption. In a comparison of 111 countries, Abdih et al (2008) found that a higher ratio of remittances to GDP was associated with lower indices of control of corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of law.

There is, however, also evidence that remittances can contribute to reducing poverty. Also remittances that are used to cover basic needs can contribute to reduce poverty. If remittances are

consumed in a way that makes people healthier (through investments in better housing, nutrition and health care), remittances will contribute to higher productivity (Vertovec 2004). Remittances are no development panacea, but there is evidence that given the right circumstances, remittances can contribute to increase economic growth and reduce poverty (Page and Plaza 2006, Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh 2009). In an attempt to calculate the effect of remittances on poverty reduction, Adams and Plaza have concluded that a ten percent increase in the volume of remittances would lower the share of people living in poverty by 3.5 percent (Adams and Page 2005). If conditions for development are insufficient, remittances can fuel inflation, create corruption and increase social tensions. But in countries where there are functioning social institutions and good conditions for investment, remittances can enhance a positive development. A general conclusion of evidence of the impact of remittances on development is that long-term and sustainable reduction of poverty require broad development strategies, where the income from remittances can be just one part (DfID 2007, 37–40).

The development impact of remittances is often compared to the impact of foreign aid. One of the advantages with remittances are that they are assumed to go straight to their receivers in developing countries, without passing through costly government bureaucracy. However, this might be a too rosy picture. Firstly, also when remittances are transferred money is lost ‘on the way’. Transaction costs are often important, not least when remittances are sent to poor developing countries with underdeveloped banking systems. Secondly, remittance receivers belong the migrant households who tend not to be the poorest households. It takes resources to migrate abroad: therefore migrants are positively selected from relatively wealthy households.

This can be illustrated with data from Iraq. According to the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey from 2007, household income in the Kurdistan region was higher than in most other province in Iraq. Still, the share of households receiving assistance from households abroad was larger in the three Kurdish governates than in other governates of Iraq (also see section 5.7). In the Kurdish governates, 12.3 percent of the households reported that they had received assistance from households outside Iraq during the past 12 month. In the Baghdad region, 4.8 households reported the same and in the rest of the governates the share was only 3.2 percent (IHSES 2009b, 659). On average, households in the three Kurdish governates received 164,900 ID from households abroad during the past 12 months, while households in Baghdad received on average 50,800 ID and households in the other governorates 46,700 ID (IHSES 2009b, 661). The history of out-migration from the Kurdish region is probably the most important reason why the inflow of remittances was larger to the Kurdish region than to other, poorer parts of Iraq.

10.6 Remaining Expectations

Many of my respondents in Uppsala mentioned how important the support from Sweden was for family members and relatives in Iraq in the 1990s. Interviewees from Lebanon gave similar accounts of the importance of remittances from Sweden during the years of civil war in Lebanon⁵⁹. The view that the relatives in Sweden should be able to share their wealth with those left behind in the country of origin remains even though the differences in standard of living have diminished. “There are people in Lebanon that could easily give me money, but that doesn’t happen” said one of the interviewed (Interview in Uppsala 2010-01-14a). “Even the millionaires in Turkey think we are better off than they are” (Group interview in Uppsala 2010-01-11). It is possible that these expectations will contribute to uphold the ties, even if the differences in living standards have faded or even disappeared.

Since neither the KRG nor the Iraqi state collects any income taxes, families who have access to an income from a business or the administration often have a higher income than people with comparable jobs in Sweden. This income-based wealth is visible not least through the large number of brand new cars who travel on the roads in Erbil and Suleymani. Many people boast cars that are so new that the plastic wrapping is still covering parts of it. To keep the plastic wrapping on is probably a good protection against the dust from the ever-present desert sand, but surely also a way of showing off with a brand new car. Complains a man from Koya who has lived in Sweden since 1985 but is in Koya on a month’s long visit: “They have a great situation. They have their own house, they have their own cars, and all cars are new. I, I have not been able to buy a new car”. He says people who have remained in Kurdistan are still envious of those who live abroad. “They are jealous, they think we have everything. But they can not be jealous of us, we still live in a rented apartment, we have no new car.” (Interview in Koya 2010-05-27). The emigrants might also have an interest in upholding the image of life in Sweden as more ‘successful’ than it actually is. This is a way of maintaining a certain social status in the eyes of non-migrants.

10.7 Transnational ties as a Career Resource

Remittances—the act of transferring support to the country of origin—can be seen as an investment in upholding transnational ties. Transnational ties can be a resource. Based on interviews with young people of immigrant decent of predominantly Turkish/Kurdish, Bosnian and Chilean ethnicity in Stockholm, Lundqvist and Olsson (2012) argue that having access to a transnational network is a career resource. A transnational network enables young immigrants to form their career in a context that extends beyond the borders of their country of residence, and to converse capital

⁵⁹ The civil war in Lebanon was sparked by clashed between Phalangist gunmen and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 1975 and lasted until October 1990 when Syrian troops ousted the Maronite president Aoun. (BBC 2011-08-24)

between different national contexts. A university degree that is not prestigious (and therefore relatively easy to obtain) in Sweden, writes Lundqvist and Olsson (2012, 128) might have a high potential value in the country of origin (or another country in the transnational network) if it can be converted into attractive employment there. The transnational network was not always confined to one country, but could include several countries where the informants had relatives or contacts. Even though the young immigrants interviewed by Lundqvist and Olsson often regarded their chances in Sweden as limited, they were optimistic about their careers since they could include opportunities in other countries in their transnational network to improve their career prospects. The young people interviewed by Lundqvist and Olsson were affiliated to a transnational network, and had access to the resources mediated through the network even though they had not migrated themselves. That is, these transnational resources are passed from one generation to the next.

10.8 The Prospect of Return

The durability of transnational practices is often linked to the prospects of return. As has been shown above, migrants who plan to return are more likely to engage in transnational practices than migrants who envisage to spend the rest of their lives in their host country. One reason for the correlation between transnational practices, such as staying in touch, remitting money or engaging in transnational business is that these practices are often a way of preparing for returning to the country of origin.

Among my interviewees, an important motivation to return was the desire to live closer to friends and family. This desire had to be balanced against a more insecure life in Kurdistan, where social safety nets are underdeveloped or non-existent. A man who had returned from Göteborg, whom I interviewed in Erbil explained:

There are large differences among Kurds in Göteborg: if you want to live close to your families, or earn money. Here there is nothing social, you are always worried about the future. For us: [it was] very important to live close to our families, our brothers, (...) my wife's siblings. It depends on how the person thinks! Those that think like this, who want to be close to their family: I tell them to return! Particularly because you can earn money here now. If you are worried about the future: then you should stay in Sweden. (Interview with returnee couple in Erbil 2009-12-10).

There is some evidence that men are more involved in transnational practices than women. This has been connected to the observation that the kind of increased social status that transnational activities render the migrant in his or her country or community of origin seems to be more valuable

for men, because men are more likely to want to return to their country of origin than women. Women migrants who move from developing countries to more developed countries generally move to societies with better conditions for women, which makes return to the country of origin less attractive for women than for men. In her research among Kurds from Iraq in Sweden, Emanuelsson (2005) encountered many families in which the husband had returned to Kurdistan while his wife and children had remained in Sweden. One of them described the situation like this: “We want to live close to our families in Kurdistan, but we have to be totally sure that we can manage and my work is important. We have decided that I will travel back and forth in the beginning and that she and the children will come when everything is arranged.” (Emanuelsson 2005, 267).

Emanuelsson’s research (2007)⁶⁰ among Kurds from Iraq in Sweden confirms that there are important differences between men and women when it comes to return. Often, the act of migrating to Sweden has tipped the balance of power within the family to the woman’s advantage. Swedish society offer women better possibilities to enjoy their rights, to get an education and to work outside of home. In a survey among Kurdish parents in Uppsala and Stockholm, Mayi (2003) finds that Kurdish mothers are more positive towards integration into Swedish society than Kurdish fathers. Mayi thinks this makes sense: “The Kurdish man can perceive integration as a loss of his own authority at home, and the Kurdish woman can perceive integration into the Swedish society as a liberation from the authority of the man.” (Mayi 2003, 49).

While migration has often been interpreted as a phenomenon that reinforces the exploitation of women, Phizacklea (1998, quoted by Castles and Miller 2009, 39) has suggested a more transformatory interpretation: Migration can indeed provide women with an escape from patriarchal societies. As a consequence, women might be more hesitant to return to their countries of origin since returning could involve losing new-won possibilities.

The last years’ improvement of the situation in the Kurdish region in Iraq opens up real possibilities for Kurds to return to Southern Kurdistan. Because women are often less eager than their men to return, the possibilities for return can lead to conflicts between Kurdish spouses. One of my informants, a man who had returned to Erbil from Stockholm said “The man returns, but the family stays in Sweden. (...) Schools are the first and the largest problem. And then Kurdistan is not a particularly good country for women.” (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-12). One of Emanuelsson’s informants, ‘Sazan’, who had reluctantly moved back to Kurdistan two years earlier said “I know many women in Sweden who are in the same situation. The man is not happy in Sweden, the

⁶⁰ The quotes here are taken from a material including around 60 deep interviews carried out in the second half of 2005 among above all Kurds from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq living in Sweden and having Swedish citizenship. See Emanuelsson 2007.

children do not want to move to Kurdistan, and the mother does not know what to do.” (Emanuelsson 2005, 271).

In comparison with governorates in Central and Southern Iraq, the Kurdish areas are less religious. This makes a difference for women, and is visible on the street: women more often wear colourful clothes, and not all women wear a veil. Traditional Kurdish dances involve men and women holding hands, and Kurdish love songs are more explicit. Also, even though most Kurds are Muslims there is a strong support for a secular, non-religious political system (Emanuelsson and Salih 2012, 194–195). Nevertheless, southern Kurdistan has a long way to go to achieve gender equality. In Kurdistan Region, women have the formal right to vote and participate in society as equals, but in practice women are discriminated against in all areas of life. Honour killings are forbidden by law, but remain a reality. Arranged marriages, a feature of societies dominated by traditional, honour values are still common.⁶¹ Iraqi Kurdistan is also one of few areas in the world where female genital mutilation is still practiced. According to an survey conducted by the German association WADI (Association for Crisis Assistance and Development Co-operation), a majority of all women in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq have been victims of female genital mutilation (WADI 2010).

My female informants had a lot to say about the subject of gender equality. A female student in Uppsala who has many relatives in Suleymani described herself as a “gender police” in her extended family in Kurdistan. She spent her time there constantly arguing about gender relations, and trying to change her relative’s views on gender equality (interview in Uppsala 2010-01-15). Visitors are usually struck by how much the dress code varies between the KRG capital Erbil/Hawler and Suleymani, the second largest city in the area. On my visits in 2009 and 2010 I observed that whereas almost all women wore a veil in Erbil, this was not the case in Suleymani. According to the female student quoted above, one should not be led to believe that Suleymani, that is known to be a progressive and metropolitan city, is spared from traditional values: “Suli is like a wolf in a sheep’s coat: there is morality panic there as well” my informant argued (interview in Uppsala 2010-01-15).

In contrast, in international comparisons such as the Human Development Index of the UN, Sweden is regularly placed among the two or three most gender equal countries in the world. In Sweden, women have enjoyed the right to vote since 1919, and without a formal quota, women occupy practically half the seats in parliament and close to half the portfolios in the government. An

⁶¹ It is controversial to make a distinction between ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’ marriages. In his thesis on the transnational lives of Iraqi Kurds in Norway, Gran (2007) argues that arranged marriages that allows Kurdish women to move to a spouse in Norway are not entirely negative for the women since these marriages offer a possibility to move away from an oppressive society where women’s possibilities to advance are constrained (Gran 2007, 168–178).

extensive, tax subsidised child care system as well as tax subsidised elderly care has led to the highest quota of women on the labour market in Europe: in 2010, the female employment rate was the highest among the 27 EU member states with 70.3 percent (Eurostat 2011a).

During her research among Kurds in Göteborg, Alinia found that Kurdish men more often than women experienced that they were victims of discrimination and racism (Alinia 2004, 176). One of Alinia's Kurdish informants in Göteborg says "Generally, a coloured man is less respected than a coloured woman. I have often seen that my husband does not have the same possibilities that I have." (Alinia 2004, 177).

However, Emanuelsson underlines that the situation of Kurdish women in Sweden is complex, and that returning to Kurdistan brings advantages for women as well (Emanuelsson 2007, 264). Having access to a larger social network was a motivation among several of Emanuelsson's female informants. One of them, 'Perwin' said: "My husband and I want to return because we have it better socially in Kurdistan among our relatives and friends. I have lived here for thirteen years, and it was only last year that we became acquainted with a Swedish family." (Emanuelsson 2007, 268). The desire to move back to Kurdistan in order to live close to relatives was particularly pronounced among women with small children (Emanuelsson 2007, 267). It is important, writes Emanuelsson, not to let "dichotomies such as Sweden/Kurdistan, modernity/tradition and development/stagnation" dictate an analysis of the gender aspects of return.

The complexity of the situation has resulted in new forms of transnational family life in the Iraqi Kurdish community in Sweden, with different members of the same nuclear family living in different countries, and family life taking place in a transnational social space in between the two countries.

It is important to note that people who return permanently do not necessarily terminate their transnational contacts. In the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, I encountered many returnees who tried to keep in touch with Sweden in different ways. "We both hope to find something that has to do with Sweden" said a returnee couple about their future career. (Interview in Erbil 2009-12-10).

10.9 Durability: Summary

On one hand, the evidence I found that remittances sent to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq are used primarily for food, clothes and healthcare can be seen as an indication that the receivers of remittances are dependent upon remittances to meet basic needs. Such a dependency could be the basis for strong bonds between Kurds in Uppsala and their family and relatives in Kurdistan. On the other hand, both in Iraq and in Uppsala I came across many accounts of how improvements of the economic situation in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has led to a reversed flow of remittances: that is,

families in Iraq sending money to support their relatives in Sweden. I conclude that the need for support from relatives abroad will be determined by how the wealth created by the current economic boom is distributed. Since mechanisms for redistribution of wealth are underdeveloped in the region under the KRG, it is unlikely that—however strong—economic growth will eradicate poverty altogether. Moreover, also individuals and households that do get wealthier will suffer from relative deprivation if inequalities in the distribution of income continue to grow. In addition, even when differences in standard of living between people in Sweden and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq are levelled out, it might take time before this change takes place in people's minds. Many of my informants witnessed that even though their cousins and uncles in Kurdistan had become wealthier than their relatives in Uppsala, the perception that the standard of living is better in Sweden still remained. However, results from my survey in Suleymani indicate that those people that have relatives in Sweden have a more realistic picture of life in Sweden and others.

Another important factor that will influence the durability of transnational practices is connected to the stability of the situation in Iraq, and to people's ability to insure themselves against unpredicted events. As long as the political and thereby also the economic situation is volatile, and as long as social safety nets are lacking or insufficient, people will have incentives to keep strong ties with relatives abroad as a kind of insurance. A number of non-altruistic reasons to send remittances might also impact on the durability of transnational ties between Kurds in Sweden and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. As the economy grows, opportunities for investments will be created. Said a woman in Koya who has a sister in Sweden and a brother in the UK: "No, [they] do not send money like before, for the daily needs. But [they] send money to buy property, for the future."

11 Post-Remittances? Tracing the Transition of Transnational Ties

In this dissertation, I examine the transnational ties between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden with a particular focus on how these transnational ties affect migration. I analyse how the transnational ties between Kurds in Sweden and their relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq evolve as the Kurdistan Region moves from an extreme situation with high levels of violence, close to economic collapse and grim outlooks, to a situation with a booming economy, high levels of security, and optimism about the future. I look at the importance of transnational practices for the creation, the direction and the perpetuation of migration with empiric evidence from the migration corridor between Iraq and Sweden and through a case study of the transnational ties forged between Kurdish immigrants in Uppsala and their families and relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

I find support for a network effect on migration from Iraq to Sweden. The existence of a Kurdish population in Sweden and their transnational ties are indeed important in explaining asylum migration from Iraq to Sweden. I also find evidence that the social networks created by former asylum seekers have an influence on more recent labour immigration from Iraq to Sweden. Moreover, I conclude that transnational practices, including the sending of remittances, will continue to be carried out for years to come, and the resulting transnational ties will facilitate and encourage migration between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden in the future.

In the background chapter I describe how, over the past century, Sweden has been transformed from a country experiencing mass-emigration to a country of immigration. Sweden has been a country with more immigration than emigration since the 1930s, but the fact that a large share of immigrants originate in Iraq is a relatively recent phenomena. In addition to analysing how migration between Iraq and Sweden has looked like in the past, I have made an attempt to trace the immigration of Kurds to Sweden. I have had to conclude that it is not possible to establish the exact number of Kurdish immigrants. This is due to the lack of statistics: there is no independent Kurdish state that could issue Kurdish birth certificates or passports, and Swedish authorities do not register people's ethnicity or maternal language. Instead, I have had to rely on a number of different sources to draw a picture of the size and composition of the Kurdish population in Sweden. In particular, I have tried to understand how the immigration of Kurds from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has looked like. Clearly, Kurds dominated the immigration from Iraq to Sweden during the 1980s and 90s, whereas other groups, such as Christians and Arab-speaking Iraqis from non-Kurdish parts of Iraq, have been more important from 2003 onwards.

The most senior members of the Kurdish population in Uppsala are students who came to the city in the 1950s. They were followed by Kurdish labour immigrants from Turkey, while the more recent Kurdish immigrants to Uppsala came from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq during the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, a relatively important group of Kurds from Syria have settled in Uppsala. The experience of Kurds in Uppsala has been mixed. On the one hand, there are plenty of examples of successful Uppsala residents who have Kurdish origins, including local politicians as well as Kurdish leaders with an international standing. On the other hand, discrimination and difficulties to cope with cultural differences has left many disappointed with life in Sweden.

It is not possible to tell with any reasonable accuracy how the numbers of Kurdish immigrants have changed over time, neither in Uppsala nor on the national level, which makes it difficult to make a quantitative analysis of the reasons for the movements of people between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden. However, by combining data from different sources, not least interviews (both my own and from other sources) I argue that it is possible to make some conclusion on how transnational practices have shaped migration in the migration corridor that links Sweden with the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, as well as on the durability of the transnational ties and their impacts.

Since Kurds are not visible in the statistics on neither migration nor remittances, it is difficult to know if and how their 'Kurdishness' has shaped their transnational ties. I argue that it is possible to draw some conclusion on the transnational capacity of Kurds in Sweden by comparing the situation of Kurds in countries such as France and Germany. In comparison to the situation in other European countries, the conditions for transnational practices seem to be more favourable in Sweden, thanks to the relatively generous Swedish citizenship regime, Sweden's comparatively open integration model, and—largely a consequence of the two previous aspects—the increasing possibilities for Kurds in Sweden to travel to and return to Kurdistan.

In my analysis of the transnational ties between Kurds in Uppsala and their relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, ethnic aspects have not played an important role. I have not tried to find out if and how the 'Kurdishness' of my respondents is relevant in explaining their transnational practices. Instead, I have found it useful to analyse the evolution of the transnational ties in the context of the profound changes of the situation in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. The situation that Kurds in Iraq fled from during the 1980s and 90s—as described by the UNHCR and human rights organisations and so often brought up in the accounts of my informants—is radically different from the situation in the present-day Kurdistan Region, and so are the conditions for transnational practices.

While it is understandable that there is a lack of statistics on the Kurdish population in Sweden, I did not expect that as I finalise this text in March 2013, there would be no up to date statistics on remittances from Sweden. In the last section of the background chapter, I look at attempts to study remittances from Sweden, and what they—despite the lack of up to date official statistics—have yielded so far. This overview of previous research on remittances from Sweden provides a background to my own attempts (described in chapters 6, 9 and 10) to analyse the flow of remittances from Sweden.

In two theoretical chapters, I have looked at how transnational ties can be linked to migration. I conclude that theories concerned with the role of social networks in shaping migration, supplemented with a transnationalist perspective on migration, are best suited to understand the role of networks of Kurds in shaping migration from Iraq to Sweden, including the durability of cross-border social networks and their impacts on migration. The importance of social networks in explaining the perpetuation of migration over time, makes transnational networks relevant in understanding how migration between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden will look like in the future. Also in a situation when social networks cannot help people get into Sweden through the asylum system, social networks remain important. Not least because access to a social network in Sweden can be decisive for the possibilities to enter Sweden through the ‘new way in’ opened by the changes in Swedish labour immigration legislation that were made 2008.

I find that a transnationalist perspective adds important aspects to the understanding of how cross-border social networks shape migration over time. A transnational perspective helps shed light on the existence and functioning of transnational social fields, in which migrants as well as non-migrants have access to transnational resources and where people conceive their lives in a cross-border space. Transnationalist research has shown that integration in the host country doesn’t necessarily result in weaker ties with the country of origin. Rather, successful integration can strengthen peoples’ possibilities to act transnationally. Remittances are a crucial part of transnational practices and thus central to understand how transnational practices shape migration.

A political theory perspective on migration often consists in relating migration with state sovereignty and constraints on states’ abilities to control their borders. Are states—like Sweden, for instance—actually loosing control over their borders because of international migration? Are the forces that move people across borders so powerful that states cannot prevent the flows from breaking through the administrative and physical barriers erected along their borders? Are states loosing sovereignty? Or do states have better tools than ever before to control migration? I would answer that the transnational practices indeed play an important role in shaping patterns of migration. However, the state is definitively not powerless: it shapes the outlook of the transnational

corridor together with the transnational ties that build it. In addition, as pointed out by Bauböck (2009), state sovereignty might not need to entail closed borders: it can indeed be favourable for states to keep their borders open to the movement of people.

Transnational ties can be perceived as a threat to state sovereignty when they produce uncontrollable and undesirable migration. However, they can also be perceived as an important ally of the state in its attempts to attract foreign labour. In this perspective, the study of the relationship between state sovereignty and migrant transnationalism becomes an issue of how the state can encourage transnational practices that lead to desirable migration. However, as Castles and Miller have pointed out, migration cannot be “turned on and off like a tap” (Castles and Miller 2009, 33). It is difficult to restrict immigration and it might indeed also be difficult to attract immigration.

I argue that among different transnational practices, the act of sending remittances merit particular attention. Remittance sending is crucial to understand the relationship between transnational ties and migration. There are at least two reason for this: The need to secure assistance from abroad in the form of remittances is an important incentive for migration, and remittances are often used to finance further migration.

Inspired by the methodological approach of critical realism, and in an attempt to achieve a methodological triangulation, I have combined quantitative methods, including statistical analysis of large quantities of household survey data, with qualitative interviews with a more limited number of migrants and migrant families. The integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches has been central to my conclusions.

I draw my conclusions from empiric evidence gathered from sources at different levels. At the macro level, analysis of data from the latest available official household economic survey (HEK 2007) show how transnational practices such as sending remittances vary over the life course. HEK includes data from both native Swedes as immigrants, which makes it possible to compare patterns of gift-giving and economic support between immigrants and non-immigrants. In a way, data from HEK demystifies remittances: in the analysis I have carried out together with Hedberg and Malmberg it turned out that non-immigrants were just as likely to give gifts and economic support as immigrants. However, when life course aspects were taken into account, important differences emerged. According to data from HEK, native Swedes are more likely to give gifts and economic support to relatives at higher ages and when they have adult children who have moved away from home, while immigrants from developing countries tend to be younger and have children living at home. As can be expected, we found that the propensity of native Swedes to give gifts and economic support increases with increasing income. However, this was not the case for migrants from developing countries, leading us to conclude that other factors than income are more decisive

for the propensity to remit for migrants from developing countries. (Pelling, Hedberg and Malmberg 2011).

Statistics on the labour immigration from Iraq to Sweden can be placed at a meso level between the general data in the household survey HEK and micro data raised among Kurds. Data on labour immigration to Sweden after the introduction of the new legislation on labour immigration in December 2008 provide some support for the importance of social networks in facilitating immigration. Between 2009 and 2011, most labour immigrants to Sweden have come from the same countries of origin as the ten most important groups of foreign born residents. A feature of labour immigration from Iraq is that it almost exclusively consists of labour immigration into sectors where there is surplus of workers on the Swedish labour market. That is, employers who give job offers to Iraqi labour immigrants seem to have other motives for 'importing' labour than difficulties to find people with the same skills already in Sweden. A recent report from the Swedish Migration Board points at a high prevalence of 'ethnic recruiting', that is Iraqi employers recruiting Iraqi labour immigrants. This makes it relevant to relate labour immigration from Iraq to the low approval rates on asylum applications from Iraq. The fact that a high proportion of labour immigrants from Iraq have 'changed tracks' from asylum to labour immigration is another sign that the labour immigration door has become an alternative for people who have humanitarian reasons to leave Iraq, but who cannot pass through the needle's eye of the current asylum legislation. I argue that these factors—the fact that Iraqi labour immigrants get employed in sectors where it is difficult for residents to find a job, the high prevalence of ethnic recruitment, and the fact that a large proportion are former asylum seekers—are indications of the importance of social networks among labour immigrants from Iraq.

On the micro level, I have analysed the transnational practices of Kurds in Uppsala and in four cities and towns in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. On the basis of the results of my postal survey among Kurds in Uppsala, and group and individual interviews in Uppsala and in four locations in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, I look first at the intensity and the frequency of transnational practices. I conclude that even though transnational practices might be intensive (that is, carried out often), and frequent (involve a lot of people) these practices must not necessarily cause and/or sustain migration. Indeed, I present a situation in which transnational contacts seem to actually *lower* the motivation to migrate. Exploring the link between transnational practices and migratory flows, I encountered at least two concrete ways in which Kurds in Uppsala facilitated migration to Sweden: replacing the sending of remittances with bringing the receivers of remittances to Sweden, and facilitating migration by helping newly arrived.

In the last empiric chapter I trace transnational ties into the future. Has the relation between Kurds in Sweden and their relatives in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq entered a post-remittances stage? I conclude that there are a number of reasons why transnational ties will continue to exist. The transnational ties have changed character, but have not disappeared. During the dark years of oppression under the Saddam Hussein regime, the support sent by Kurdish exiles in Sweden often saved their relatives in the Kurdish areas in Iraq from outright misery. Nowadays, the situation in the Kurdistan Region is radically different. It might be painful for many families in exile to realise that their relatives back home have now become wealthier than the emigrants, but the contributions made through remittances will not become obsolete. Also through the practice of remittance-sending, the transnational ties will continue to influence patterns of migration between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden.

I conclude that there are a number of reasons why remittances will continue to be sent from Sweden to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

Persisting needs for support from abroad

Even though the Kurdish region as a whole gets wealthier, systems for income redistributions are likely to remain insufficient to lift all parts of the population out of poverty. That is, needs for support from abroad will persist within some segments of the population. An unequal distribution of income will also contribute to relative deprivation, affecting also individuals and households who do get wealthier.

Insurance

Support from relatives abroad will continue to fill different insurance purposes. It is likely that systems for income distribution over the life course will not be sufficient in the short to medium term. As long as the social transfer systems in the region are insufficiently developed, upholding transnational ties will remain a part of peoples efforts to insure themselves against unemployment, illness, disability and old age. As long as the political situation, not least the position of the KRG within Iraq, remains volatile, keeping in touch with relatives abroad will continue to be important. In a situation characterised by instability and unpredictability, the migration option will remain attractive.

Remaining expectations

Differences in standard of living between people in Sweden and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq are being levelled out, but it is likely that it will take time before this process changes people's

mindsets. Many of my informants witnessed that even though their relatives in Kurdistan had become wealthier than their relatives in Uppsala, the perception that the standard of living is better in Sweden still remained. Upholding the image of life in Sweden as more ‘successful’ than it actually is can be a way for emigrants to maintain a certain social status in the eyes of non-migrants in the country of origin.

Transnational ties as a career resource

Transnational ties can serve as a resource for people in their educational as well as their professional career. Transnational ties is a kind of social capital: By keeping doors open to possibilities in several countries at a time, people enhance their chances of a successful academic career or work life. Among my interviewees, several told me of how they had chosen an education in Sweden that would enable them to work in both countries.

Prospects for return

Finally, people are likely to uphold transnational ties with their families, friends and communities in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq as long as return from Sweden is an attractive option. As the economic and security situation in the Kurdish region continues to improve, returning to Iraq will become a realistic choice for a growing number of exiled Kurds in Sweden. Keeping transnational ties is a way of paving the way for return, including for instance by building a house or nurturing personal contacts that remain essential to get a job. In a way, this can be seen as a change in nature of remittances: from supporting family and relatives, to supporting oneself.

I have found evidence that the share of Kurds in Sweden who engage in transnational practices is fairly small. Consequently, the role of transnational ties in shaping migration should not be exaggerated. In addition, I have found some evidence that people in Iraq with strong social ties to Sweden (defined as individuals who have close relatives in Sweden) seem to be less likely to idealise migration to Sweden than people who do not have a relative in Sweden. Presumably, this is because their relatives make negative experiences of life in Sweden. In the future, if and when more countries open their borders to labour immigrants from Iraq, people from the Kurdish region might very well opt for other destinations than Sweden.

* * *

The large inflow of immigrants from Iraq to Sweden in the years 2006 and 2007 was in many ways exceptional. It is likely that the fact that there was already a relatively large number of Iraqis living in Sweden at the time—Kurds and a large community of Assyrians and Syriacs—partly directed the flow of Iraqi asylum seekers towards Sweden. However, the unprecedentedly high numbers should be related to the extremely high levels of violence directed against civilians in Iraq at this time, and to the Swedish asylum system that was relatively liberal in a European perspective. When asylum rules were tightened, and as the levels of violence dropped in Iraq, the inflow of Iraqi asylum seekers decreased sharply.

Even if it is unlikely that the combination of events that led to the ‘dramatic’ situation in 2006 and 2007 will repeat itself (though it cannot be excluded) I conclude that Sweden will continue to experience important numbers of immigrants from Iraq well into the future. A relatively large number of people with Iraqi origins live in Sweden, and they provide people in Iraq with the kind of social network in the country of destination that is essential in facilitating migration.

People will continue to move between Iraq and Sweden. If the security situation in Iraq deteriorates, a new flow of refugees might seek asylum in Sweden. With accelerated improvement of living conditions in the Kurdistan Region, the rate of return migration will also increase. Alongside the movement of people, ideas and values will move between the two countries as well. Teens will grow up in Sweden with half their friends in Iraq: what happens on the streets of Erbil will have consequences in classrooms in Uppsala, and village gossip in Rania will be the talk of town in the Uppsala suburb of Gränby. Returnees will keep the doors open to a flow of know-how, ideas and values. Cultural clashes will have to be negotiated: a number of Swedish-Kurdish ‘gender police’ will make their opinions heard when visiting Kurdistan, and Iraqi parents in Sweden will struggle with raising their teens in a culture where alcohol consumption and sex before marriage is the norm for both men and women.

Analysing the evolution of transnational practices connected to Kurdish emigration from Iraq to Sweden, two somewhat extreme situations can be contrasted: the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s with the time after 2003. I conclude that even though having ties to relatives abroad is not a life line in the same way as it was during the regime of Saddam Hussein, people in the Kurdistan Region still have a number of reasons to nurture their transnational ties. With increasing political stability and expanding economic opportunities, Kurds in Sweden will also have reasons to cultivate the social capital that transnational ties entails.

Moreover, the possibilities to engage in transnational practices will continue to improve in the years to come. It is much easier to stay in touch nowadays: today’s transnational actors need not wait months for a letter to arrive by mail, or make prohibitively expensive phone calls, but can use

the Internet to stay in touch daily. However, there are still room for improvement of the possibilities to act transnationally between Sweden and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. There are direct flights from Sweden to several cities in the Kurdish region, but the flights are still quite expensive. It also remains expensive to transfer remittances, not least from bank to bank. Transnational businessmen need better opportunities to do business, and to trade and invest in the two countries.

Last, but maybe most important: the movement of people between Iraq and Sweden is severely restricted today. With the exception of those that are willing and able to use the door opened by the new legislation on labour immigration to Sweden, moving between the two countries is largely limited to those who have Swedish citizenship or a permanent residence permit. In 2012, for students, businessmen and relatives it is very difficult to obtain a visa to enter Sweden. For asylum seekers, it is impossible.

A bi-lateral Swedish-Iraqi government commission on the migration corridor that connects the two countries would have its work cut out for it: from easing investment in both countries to making agreements on the portability of pensions. The persistence of transnational ties is likely to make its work worthwhile.

12 References

- Abdih, Yasser with Ralph Chami, Jihad Dagher, and Peter Montiel. 2008. "Remittances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?" *IMF Working Paper* 08/29. Washington: IMF Institute. Accessed on 15 February 2009 at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp0829.pdf>
- Adams, Richard H. Jr., and John Page. 2005. "Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries?" *World Development*, Vol. 33, Issue 10, October 2005, 1645–1669.
- Adams, Richard H. Jr. 2005. "Using Household Surveys to Study Remittance Flows in Developing Countries". International Technical Meeting on Measuring Remittances, January 24–25, 2005. Washington, DC: Development Research Group (DECRG), World Bank.
- Alakom, Rohat. 2007. *Kurderna : fyrtio år i Sverige (1965–2005)*. Skarpnäck: Serkland.
- Alfvén, Sten, ed. 1996. *Minnesanteckningar–med Uppsalapolisen från Stora torget till Salagatan*. Uppsala: Polismyndigheten.
- Alinia, Minoo. 2004. *Spaces of Diasporas: Kurdish identities, experiences of otherness and politics of belonging*. PhD diss, Göteborg Studies in Sociology No 22, Department of Sociology Göteborg University. Göteborg: Göteborg University.
- Amman, Birigit. 2005. "Kurds in Germany". In Ember, Melvin, and Carol R. Ember, (eds.), *Encyclopedia of diasporas: immigrant and refugee cultures around the world*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
- Amuedo-Dorantes Catalina, and, and Susan Pozo. 2006a. "Remittances as insurance: evidence from Mexican immigrants." *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 227–254.
- . 2006b. "Remittance Receipt and Business Ownership in the Dominican Republic." *World Economy* 29, No. 7, pp 939–956.
- Anderson, Liam D., and Gareth R. V. Stansfield. 2009. *Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise*. Philadelphia, PA.: University of Pennsylvania Press.

- Andersson, Jens. 2011-11-14. "Statistik över förlängning av arbetstillstånd". E-mail from Jens Andersson, Statistical office (*Statistikfunktionen*) at the Swedish Migration Board.
- Asaad, Arkan. 2011. *Stjärnlösa nätter : en berättelse om kärlek, svek och rätten att välja sitt liv*. Stockholm: Nordstedts 2011.
- Aslan, Senem. 2009. "Incoherent State: The Controversy over Kurdish Naming in Turkey." *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, No. 10.
- Associated Press, "Nearly 25 percent of Iraqis live in poverty: First study defines impoverished as people living on \$2.50 or less per day." *NBC News*, 20 May, 2009. Retrieved 2011-10-26 from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30849286/#>
- Bailey, Adrian J. 2008. "Population geography : lifecourse matters." *Progress in Human Geography*, June 2009, 33: 407–418, first published on December 17, 2008.
- Barton, H. Arnold. 1994. *A Folk Divided: Homeland Swedes and Swedish Americans, 1840–1940*. Carbondale (IL): Southern Illinois University Press.
- Basch, Linda Green, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. 1994. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. London: Routledge.
- Baser, Bahar. 2012. "Inherited Conflicts: Spaces of Contention Between Second-Generation Turkish and Kurdish Diasporas in Sweden and Germany." PhD thesis, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute.
- Bauböck, Rainer. 2003. "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism". *International Migration Review* Vol. 37 No. 3 (Fall 2003):700–723.
- . (project coordinator). 2006. "Acquisition and loss of nationality policies and trends in 15 European countries: Results of the Comparative Project NATAC". *Imiscoe Policy Brief* (Institute for European Integration Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna). Accessed at <http://www.imiscoe.org/natac/documents/NATACpolicybrief-revised.pdf> , on 8 October 2011.
- . 2007. "Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting." *Fordham Law Review* 2393 (2006–2007).

- . 2009. "Global Justice, Freedom of Movement and Democratic Citizenship." *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 50, Issue 01, April 2009: 1–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bauböck, Rainer, and Thomas Faist (eds). 2010. *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- BBC News. "Iraq profile: Kurdistan timeline". 26 October 2011. Accessed on 14 December, 2011 at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15467672?print=true>
- BBC News. "Iraqis choose Sweden as new home." 6 June, 2007. Accessed at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6275864.stm>.
- Bendixen, Sergio. 2007. *Remesas de España a Latinoamérica: Resumen ejecutivo*. Washington, D.C.: Multilateral Investment Fund of the Interamerican Development Bank
- . 2008. *Survey of Latin American Immigrants in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank.
- Behnke, Joachim, Nina Baur, and Nathalie Behnke. 2010. *Empirische Methoden der Politikwissenschaft*. 2d revised edition. Wien: Schöningh.
- Berggren, Henrik, and Lars Trädgårdh. 2011. "Social trust and radical individualism. The paradox at the heart of Nordic capitalism". In *Shared Norms for the New Reality : The Nordic Way*. Brief distributed at the World Economic Forum in Davos 2011 by Global Utmaning.
- Berruti, Davide., E Doru, E. Erle, F. Gianfelici, and Khalid Khayai. 2002. *Kurds in Europe – From Asylum Right to Social Rights*. Naples: Marsico.
- Betts, Alexander. 2011. *Global Migration Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blom, Svein, and Kristin Henriksen eds. 2008. "Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005/2006." *Rapport 2008/5*. Oslo: Statistics Norway.
- Bollard, Albert, David McKenzie, Melanie Morten, and Hillel Rapoport. 2009. "Remittances and the Brain Drain Revisited: The Microdata Show That More Educated Migrants Remit More." *Discussion Paper* (Institute for the Study of Labor, IZA) No. 4534, October 2009.
- Bolt, G. A., Özüekren, S., and Phillips, D. 2010. "Linking Integration and Residential Segregation." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(2), 169–186.

- Bommes, Michael. 2003. "Der Mythos des transnationalen Raumes. Oder: Worin besteht die Herausforderung des Transnationalismus für die Migrationsforschung?". In Thränhardt, Dietrich, and Uwe Hunger, eds. *Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat*. Leviathan Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, Sonderheft 22/2003. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Boon, Martin. 2006. *BME Remittance Survey*. London: DfID/ICM.
- Boswell, Christina. 2007. "Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?" *International Migration Review* Vol. 41 No. 1 (Spring 2007): 75–100.
- Boswell, Christina, and Oana Ciobanu. 2009. "Culture, utility or social systems? Explaining the cross-national ties of emigrants from Borsa, Romania." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 32 No. 8 October 2009, 1346–1364.
- Brekke, Jan-Paul. 2004. "While we are waiting: Uncertainty and empowerment among asylum-seekers in Sweden." *Institute for Social Research Report* 2004:10. Stockholm: Institute for Social Research.
- Brekke, Jan-Paul, and M. F. Aarset. 2009. "Why Norway – understanding asylum destinations." *Institutt for samfunnsforskning Report* 2009:012. Oslo: Institutt for samfunnsforskning.
- Brettell, Caroline B., and James F. Hollifield, eds. 2008. *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*. Second Edition. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis Group.
- Brinkberg, Sara. 2009. "Migration and Remittances : Differences in Ability and Propensity to Remit among Migrant Groups in Sweden." Master thesis. Department of Economics, University of Uppsala.
- Brinkberg, Sara, and Mattias Engdahl. 2006. "Remitteringarnas bestämningsfaktorer—en studie av det svenska remitteringsflödet." Undergraduate dissertation. Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. "The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24, 531–548.
- Buch, C. M., and A. Kuckulenz. 2010. "Worker Remittances and Capital Flows to Developing Countries." *International Migration* 48(5): 89–117.

- Buencamino, Leonides, and Sergei Gorbunov. 2002. Informal Money Transfer Systems : Opportunities and Challenges for Development Finance, DESA Discussion Paper No.26, November 2002, accessed at <http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2002/esa02dp26.pdf>.
- Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. 2007. *Arbeiterpartei Kurdistan (PKK), Volkskongress Kurdistan (KONGRA GEL): Strukturen, Ziele, Aktivitäten*. Köln: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz.
- Can, Mustafa. 2006. *Tätt intill dagarna : berättelsen om min mor*. Stockholm: Månocket.
- . 2008. "Vad får vi säga om Kurdistan?". In *Dagens Nyheter*, 30 August, 2008. Retrieved on 2012-01-01 16:56:50 from <http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/debatt-essa/vad-far-vi-saga-om-kurdistan>.
- Carling, Jørgen. 2008a. "The determinants of migrant remittances." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 24(3), 582–599.
- . 2008b. "Toward a Demography of Immigrant Communities and Their Transnational Potential." *International Migration Review* Vol. 42 No. 2 (Summer 2008):449–475.
- . 2008c. "Interrogating Remittances: Core Question for Deeper Insight and Better Policies". In Castles, Stephen, and Raúl Delgado Wise (eds.), *Migration and Development: Perspectives från the South*. Geneva: IOM. Retrieved on 15 February 2009 from http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/MD%20Perspectives%20from%20the%20South.pdf
- Carling, Jørgen, Marta Bivand Erdal, Cindy Horst, and Hilde Wallacher. 2007. *Legal, Rapid and Reasonably Priced? A Survey of Remittance Services in Norway*. Oslo: The International Peace Research Institute (PRIO).
- Carling, Jørgen, Marta Bivand Erdal och Cindy Horst. 2012. "How does Conflict in Migrants' Country of Origin Affect Remittance-Sending? Financial Priorities and Transnational Obligations Among Somalis and Pakistanis in Norway" *International Migration Review* vol. 46 no 2 (Summer 2012):283–309.
- Carson, Carol S., and Laliberté, Lucie. 2002. "Assessing Accuracy and Reliability : A Note Based on Approaches Used in National Accounts and Balance of Payments Statistics." *IMF Working*

Paper No. 02/24. Accessed on 5 February at
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0224.pdf>

Castillo, Nancy, Landen Romei, and Manuel Orozco. 2010. *Toward financial independence : Financial literacy for remittance senders and recipients*. Washington, D. C.: Inter-American Dialogue.

Castles, Stephen. 2004a. "The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies." *International Migration Review* Vol. 38 No. 3 (Fall 2004):852–884

———. 2004b. "Why migration policies fail" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol 27 No. 2 March 2004, 205–227.

———. 2008. "Development and Migration – Migration and Development: What comes first?" Paper presented at Social Science Research Council Conference "Migration and Development: Future Directions for Research and Policy" on 28 February – 1 March 2008 in New York City, USA.

Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. 2009. *The Age of Migration : International Population Movements In The Modern World*. 4th edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chami, Ralph with Adolfo Barajas, Thomas Cosimano, Connel Fullenkamp, Michael Gapen, and Peter Montiel. 2008. "Macroeconomic consequences of remittances." Occasional paper no. 259. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2012. *The World Factbook*. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed on 2012-04-18 at :
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>

Clark, Ken, and Stephen Drinkwater,. 2007. "An Investigation of Household Remittance Behaviour: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *The Manchester School* Vol 75 No. 6, December 2007.

Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global diasporas: an introduction*. London: UCL.

Cohen, Jeffrey H., and Ibrahim Sirkeci. 2012. "Theoretical Appraisal: Understanding Remittances". In Sirkeci, Ibrahim, Jeffrey H. Cohen, and Dilip Ratha (eds.) *Migration and Remittances during the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond*. Washington: The World Bank.

- Collyer, Michael. 2005. "When Do Social Networks Fail to Explain Migration? Accounting for the Movement of Algerian Asylum-Seekers to the UK." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31:4, 699–718 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691830500109852>
- Committee on Circular Migration and Development. SOU 2011:28. *Cirkulär migration och utveckling – förslag och framåtblick. Slutbetänkande av Kommittén för cirkulär migration och utveckling*. Stockholm: Swedish Government.
- Council of Europe. 1994. Resolution 1022 (1994) "on the Humanitarian Situation and Needs of the Displaced Iraqi Kurdish population", 27 January 1994, 1022 (1994). Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b37f4c.html> on 8 October 2012.
- Cox, Donald, Zekeriya Eser, and Emmanuel Jimenez. 1996. "Motives for Private Transfers over the Life Cycle: An Analytical Framework and Evidence for Peru." *Working Papers in Economics* (Boston College). Boston: Department of Economics of Boston College.
- Dagens Nyheter*. "Svensk väntas leda syrisk opposition". 9 June, 2012. Retrieved 2012-06-09 at <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/uppsalabo-kan-bli-snc-ledare>.
- Dagens Nyheter*. 2004-03-31. "Svenskkurd kvar i turkiskt militärhåkte". Retrieved 2012-01-17 at <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/svenskkurd-kvar-i-turkiskt-militarhakte>.
- . 2007-11-22. "Södertälje tar emot fler irakier än USA och Kanada".
- . 2008-04-11. "Södertäljes kommunalråd i USA-kongressen".
- d'Ardenne, Jo. 2011. "Cognitive Interviewing Skills." Presentation made at the University of Vienna on 1 December 2011. Retrieved from http://gzsowi.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/proj_gradzentrum_sowi/Programme_Cognitive_Interviewing_Skills.pdf
- De Haas, Hein. 2006. *Engaging Diasporas: How Governments and Development Agencies can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries*. London: Oxfam Novib. Accessed on 29 January 2010 at <http://www.heindehaas.com/articles.htm>
- . 2007. "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective". Paper presented at the conference on 'Transnationalisation and Development(s): Towards a North-South Perspective', Center for Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld, Germany, May 31–June 01, 2007. COMCAD Arbeitspapiere–Working Papers No. 29, 2007.

- . 2010. "Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective." *International Migration Review* vol. 44 no. 1 (Spring 2010):227–264. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00804.x
- Demirbag-Sten, Dilsa. 2008-08-13. "Ett fuskverk". In *Expressen* 2008-08-31. Retrieved on 2012-01-01 from <http://www.expressen.se/kultur/skribenter/dilsademirbagsten>
- . 2010. *Fosterland*. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag.
- DeSipio, Louis. 2000. *Sending Money Home... For Now: Remittances and Immigrant Adaptation in the United States*. Washington, D. C.:Inter-American Dialogue and Tomás Rivera Policy Institute.
- Devitt, Camilla. 2011. "Varieties of Capitalism, Variation in Labour Immigration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37:4, 579–596.
- Department for International Development (DfID). 2007. *Moving out of poverty –making migration work better for poor people*. London: DfID.
- Dodge, Toby. 2003. *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*. London: Hurst and Company.
- Eliassi, Barzoo. 2010. "A stranger in my homeland: The politics of belonging among young people with Kurdish backgrounds in Sweden." Doctoral Thesis at Mid Sweden University. Östersund: Mid Sweden University, Department of Social Work. ISSN: 1652K893X.
- Emanuelsson, Ann-Catrin. 2005. "Diaspora global politics : Kurdish transnational networks and accommodation of nationalism." Göteborg : Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University. ISBN 91-87380-64-1.
- . 2007. "Ska vi återvända, stanna eller pendla? Politiska förändringar i Kurdistan och transnationell dynamik i kurdiska flyktingfamiljer i Sverige". In Eastmond, Marita, and Åkesson, Lisa (red.) *Globala familjer: transnationell migration och släktskap*. Hedemora: Gidlund.
- Emanuelsson, Ann-Catrin, and Khaled Salih. 2012. *Drömmen om Kurdistan*. Stockholm: Emsal.
- Encyclopædia Britannica. 2007a. *Treaty of Sèvres*. Retrieved May 26, 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9066977>
- . 2007b. *Peacemaking, 1919–22: The Reorganisation of the Middle East*. Retrieved May 26, 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-32852>

- Engblom, Samuel 2010. "Promemoria: Så kan reglerna för arbetskraftsinvandring vårdas och förbättras". Stockholm: TCO. Accessed at <http://www.tco.se/995bfca9-a420-4b52-9f35-a36819e1a80f.fodoc>.
- Engdahl, Mattias. 2007. "Penningförsändelser från Sverige till utlandet: Kartläggning av den svenska remitteringsmarknaden." Master thesis. Uppsala: Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
- Eniro. 2010. *Årsredovisning för 2009*. Accessed on March 4, 2011 at http://investors.eniro.com/index.php?p=reports&s=detail&afw_id=1158646&afw_lang=sv
- Esipova, Neli, Ray, Julie, and Pugliese, Anita 2010. "Gallup world poll: the many faces of global migration." *IOM Migration Research Series* no. 4. Accessed 2012-05-03 at <http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MRS43.pdf>
- Esser, Hartmut. 2004. "Does the 'New' Immigration Require a 'New' Theory of Intergenerational Integration?" *International Migration Review* Vol. 38, No. 3 (Fall, 2004): 1126–1159. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27645428> .
- European Council. 2009. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 "on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment." *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 155/17. 18.6.2009.
- European Commission. 2006. "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on the Regions: Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004–30 April 2006)." COM(2006) 48 final. Brussels, 8.2.2006.
- Eurostat. 2011a. "Employment rate by gender, age group 15–64." Last update: 05.10.2011. Accessed on 12 October 2011. Hyperlink to the table: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsiem010>
- . "Average exit age from the labour force—Annual data." Last update: 27-09-2011. Accessed at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsi_exi_a&lang=en#
- Faini, Riccardo. 2006. "Remittances and the Brain Drain." *Discussion Paper* No. 2155 June 2006. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

- Faist, Thomas. 2000. "Transnationalization in international migration: implications for the study of citizenship and culture." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(2), 189–222.
- . 2007. "Transnationalism and Development(s): Towards a North-South Perspective." *Migration Letters* 4(2), 183–199.
- . 2008. "Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round of the Migration–Development Nexus." *Population Space Place* 14, 21–42 (2008). Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/psp.471.
- Financial Times*. "Turkey finds a gateway to Iraq". 14 April, 2010. Retrieved on 2011-09-13 from <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/4e027bc0-47e6-11df-b998-0014>.
- Fischer, Peter A., and Gunnar Malmberg. 2001. Settled People Don't Move : On Life Course and (Im-)Mobility in Sweden. *International Journal of Population Geography*, 7: 357–371.
- Forsgren, Ida. 2009. Household Income : Description of the Statistics (*Hushållens ekonomi HEK : Beskrivning av statistiken*). Statistics Sweden. 2009-02-19. Retrieved from http://www.scb.se/Pages/DataCollectionProductInfo____259791.aspx?PageID=97611andSelectedTab=1
- Freeman, Gary P. 1995. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States." *International Migration Review* 24(4): 881–902.
- . 1998. "The Decline of Sovereignty? Politics and Immigration Restriction In Liberal States". In Joppke, Christian, ed. *Challenge to the Nation State : Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Freund, Caroline, and Nikola Spatafora. 2005. "Remittances : Transaction Costs, Determinants, and Informal Flows." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* No. 3704. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Gamlen, Alan. 2006. "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?" *Working Paper* (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society of University of Oxford) No. 32.
- . 2011. "Diasporas". In Betts, Alexander ed. *Global Migration Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 266–286.

gapminder. 2012. "Stop call them developing countries" entry at <http://www.gapminder.org/world> accessed on 15 October 2012.

Glick Schiller, Nina. 2010. "A global perspective on transnational migration: Theorising migration without methodological nationalism". In Bauböck, Rainer, and Thomas Faist (eds.) *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). 2005. *Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action*. Report of the Global Commission on International Migration. Genva: GCIM.

Gran, Espen. 2007. "Imagining the Transnational Lives of Iraqi Kurds." Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor Rerum Politicarum, Department of Sociology and Human Geography, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo November 2007.

Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller. 2003. "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants." *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 108 no. 6 (May 2003): 1211–1248.

Guiraudon, Virginie, and Joppke, Christian (eds.). 2001. *Controlling a new migration world*. London: Routledge.

Gulyás, Miklós. 1978. *Kurderna och biblioteken*. Lidingö.

———. 1982. *De boklösa barnen*. Norrköping: Statens invandrarverk

Gunter, Michael. 2004. "The Kurdish Question in Perspective." *World Affairs* Vol. 166, No. 4 (SPRING 2004): 197–205 Published by: World Affairs Institute. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672696>

Gupta, Sanjeev, Catherine A. Pattillo' and Smita Wagh. 2009. "Effect of Remittances on Poverty and Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa." *World Development* Vol. 37, Issue 1, January 2009: 104–115.

Hagen-Zanker, Jessica, and Melissa Siegel. 2007. "The Determinants of Remittances : A Review of the Literature." *Maastricht Graduate School of Governance Working Paper* No. 003.

- Hansen, Peo. 2009. "Post-national Europe without cosmopolitan guarantees." *Race and Class* vol. 50 no. 4: 20-37. doi: 10.1177/0306396809102994.
- . 2012. "I dynamiken mellan marknad och murar – EU:s migrationspolitik och den sociala sammanhållningen i Europa". In Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, A. et al. (eds.) *Arbetslöshet, migrationspolitik och nationalism*. Stockholm: Santérus.
- Heckathorn, Douglas D. 1997. "Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the Study of Hidden Populations." *Social Problems* Vol. 44, No. 2 (May, 1997): 174–199. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096941> .
- Hedberg, Charlotta. 2005. "The Finland-Sweden Wheel of Migration: Identity, Networks and Integration 1976–2000." *Geografiska regionstudier* 61. ISBN 91-506-1788-5.
- Hedberg, Charlotta, and Bo Malmberg. 2008. *Den stora utmaningen: Internationell migration i en globaliserad värld. Underlagsrapport till Globaliseringsrådet*. Stockholm: Globaliseringsrådet.
- . 2010. "Transnationell migration" *Social rapport 2010*. Stockholm: Socialstyrelsen.
- Heintzen, Markus. 2002. "Staats- und Verfassungstheorie." Lecture at Frei Universität Berlin 22 November 2002. Retrieved on 13 June 2007 from http://www.fu-berlin.de/FB09/2Forschung/WE3/LS_Heintzen/Veranstaltungen/0203WS/Staatstheorie_Heintzen/211102STAAT_Die_drei_Elementen_lehre.pdf
- Hernandez-Coss, Raul (Task Team Leader), Fred Levy, Wameek Noor, Emiko Todoroki, Isaku Endo, and Matteo Vaccani. 2007. "Bilateral Remittances Corridor Analysis (BRCA): Research Guidelines." *Document for Consultation*, Financial Market Integrity (FPDFI), The Financial and Private Sector Development Vice-Presidency The World Bank. Original Version: August, 2005, updated Version: September, 2007. Washington: The World Bank. Accessed at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAML/Resources/BRCAResearchGuidelinesSeptember2007.pdf>.
- Heshmati, Almas. 2007. "Review of the Recent Trends in Development Economics Research: With Experience from the Federal Region of Kurdistan." *Discussion Paper* (Institute for the Study of Labor) no. 3208.

- . 2011. "Realities of Economic Development in the Federal Region of Kurdistan." Presentation made at meeting of KSAF-U (Kurdish Student Association Uppsala), Uppsala, Sweden on 26 January 2011.
- Swedish Parliamentary Committee for Labour Immigration. SOU 2006:87. *Labour immigration to Sweden: proposals and consequences*. Final report from the Swedish Parliamentary Committee for Labour Immigration. Stockholm: Ministry of Employment.
- Hollifield, James F. 2004. "The Emerging Migration State." *International Migration Review* vol. 38 no. 3 (Fall 2004):885–912.
- . 2008. "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We 'Bring the State Back In'?" In Brettell, Caroline B., and James F. Hollifield, eds. *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*. Second Edition. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis Group.
- Holmqvist, Göran. 2009. *Impact of the Financial Crisis on Africa: Remittances and Aid – Unpredictable Flows*. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.
- Holst, Elke, Andrea Schäfer, and Mechthild Schrooten. 2008. "Gender, Migration, Remittances : Evidence from Germany." *SOEP papers* 111. German Institute for Economic Research (DIW).
- Holst, Elke and Mechthild Schrooten. 2006. "Migration and Money: What Determines Remittances? Evidence from Germany." *DIW Discussion Papers* no. 566. German Institute for Economic Research (DIW).
- Houle, René and Grant Schellenberg. 2008. "Remittances from Recent Immigrants. Statistics Canada." *Perspectives*, July 2008. Catalogue no 75–100–X.
- Howard, Marc Morjé. 2009. *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huddleston, Thomas and Jan Niessen with Eadaoin Ni Chaoimh and Emilie White. 2011. *Migrant Integration Policy Index III*. Brussels: British Council and Migration Policy Group.
- Human Rights Watch. 1993. *Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds*. New York: Human Rights Watch. ISBN: 1-56432-108-8. Accessed on 1 March 2012 at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/>

- . 2006. *Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds. Report Summary*. Retrieved on March 1 2012 from http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2006/08/14/13979_txt.htm
- Hunte, C. K. 2004. "Worker's Remittances, Remittance Decay and Financial Deepening in Developing Countries." *American Economist* 48(2): 82.
- IHSES. 2009a. *Iraq Socio-Economic Household Survey 2007: Vol I Tabulation Report*. Baghdad: Department of Public Relations and Dissemination Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT).
- . 2009b. *Iraq Socio-Economic Household Survey 2007 : Vol. II Data Tables*. Baghdad: Department of Public Relations and Dissemination Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT).
- IMF. 2009. *International transactions in remittances: guide for compilers and users*. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.
- . 2010. *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6)*. Sixth Edition. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 2007. "The Worldviews of Islamic Publics in Global Perspective". In Moaddel, Mansoor (red.) *Values and perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern publics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Institute Kurd de Paris. 2009. "Kurdish Baby Names". Accessed on April 29, 2009 at http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/kurdish_baby_names.php .
- Integrationsverket. 2007. *Statistikrapport 2007 – uppdatering av aktuella siffror, relevanta nyckeltal och indikatorer om integration*. Norrköping: Integrationsverket.
- International Organisation on Migration. 2011. "About Migration." Accessed at <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/lang/en>
- Iraq Body Count. 2010. *Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010: Analysis of the year's civilian death toll from Iraq Body Count*. First published Dec 30 2010. Accessed at <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2010/> on September 28, 2011.
- Izady, Mehrdad M.R. 1992. *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook*. Washington: Crane Russak.

- Jacobson, David. 1996. *Rights across Borders*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Jiménez-Martín, Sergio, Natalia Jorgensen and José María Labeaga. 2007. "The volume and geography of remittances from the EU." *European Commission*. Accessed on 25 March 2009: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication10089_en.pdf
- Jellinek, Georg. (1914) 1960. *Allgemeine Staatslehre*. Third edition. Bad Homburg vor der Höhe: Hermann Gentner Verlag. Citations refer to the 1960 edition.
- Jonsson, Håkan. 2012. "Irakiska AT 2011." Report. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- Joppke, Christian, ed. 1998. *Challenge to the Nation State : Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jørgensen, Martin Bak. 2008. "National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany." PhD dissertation. *Spirit PhD Series* 19. Aalborg: Aalborg University Institut for Historie, Internationale Studier og Samfundsforhold.
- . 2011. "Understanding the Research–Policy Nexus in Denmark and Sweden: The Field of Migration and Integration." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 13: 93–109. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2010.00441.x
- Karpathakis, Anna. 1999. "Home Society Politics and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The Case of Greek Immigrants in New York City." *International Migration Review* Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring, 1999): 55–78. Article Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/stable/2547322>
- Kapur, Devesh. 2004. "Remittances: The new development mantra?" *G-24 Discussion, Paper* No.29. Geneva: UN Conference on Trade and Development.
- Kareem, Selen Tonkuş and Ortadoğu Uzman Yardımcısı. 2011. "Observations from 'Tahrir' of the Regional Kurdish Administration." Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), Ankara, Turkey. Retrieved from <http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=425> on 9 March 2011.
- Karlsson, Ingemar. 2008. *Kurdistan – Landet som icke är*. Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand.
- Khayati, Khalid. 2005. "Kurdish refugees and immigrants in Sweden: Diasporic identity and transnational ties" *The Globe* 2005-10-25, No. 29.

- . 2008. "From Victim Diaspora to Transborder Citizenship? Diaspora formation and transnational relations among Kurds in Sweden and France." PhD Thesis. *Linköping Studies in Arts and Science* No. 435. Linköping: Linköping University Department of Social and Welfare Studies.
- King, Russel. 2002. "Towards a new map of European migration" in Martinello, Maroc and Rath, Jan (eds.). *Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Klinthäll, Martin. 2003. *Return Migration from Sweden 1968-1996. A Longitudinal Analysis*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
- . 2006. "Immigration, Integration and Return Migration". Contribution to International Symposium on International Migration and Development 20 June 2006 in Turin, Italy.
UN/POP/MIG/SYMP/2006/06
http://www.un.org/esa/population/hldmigration/TURIN/Symposium_Turin_files/P06_Klinthall.pdf
- Koser, Khalid. 1997. "Negotiating entry into 'Fortress Europe': the migration strategies of 'spontaneous' asylum seekers" in Muus, P., (ed.) *Exclusion and Inclusion of refugees in contemporary Europe*. Utrecht: ERCOMER. 157–170.
- Koser, Khalid and Nadjie Al-Ali. 2002. *New approaches to migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home*. London: Routledge.
- Koopmans, Ruud with Paul Statham, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy. 2005. *Contested Citizenship : Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kraler, Albert and Christof Parnreiter. 2005. "Migration Theoretisieren". *PROKLA Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft* vol. 140, 35, 2005, no. 3, 327–344.
- Kropf, Annika. 2011. "Economic diversification in the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council : an Evaluation and Systematic Comparison." PhD Dissertation, University of Vienna. Vienna: University of Vienna.
- Kurdish Library in Stockholm. 2009. "Kurdiska personnamn" (*Kurdish first names*). Provided by the Kurdish Library in Stockholm by E-mail to the author on 4 May 2009.

- . 2012. Official Internet Site. Accessed at http://www.kurdishlibrary.org/Kurdish_Library/OmBiblioteket/NB960903.htm
- Kurdiska Riksförbundet (Kurdish National Federation of Sweden) 2011. Internet site accessed on 2d March 2011 at <http://www.fkks.se/details.aspx?an=32>
- Kuutmann, Alar. 1980. *Flyktingar i Uppsala: intervjuer med latinamerikaner, kurder och östeuropéer: bakgrund till flykten–tiden i Uppsala och Sverige*. Internationella nämnden. Uppsala: Uppsala kommun.
- League of Nations. 1920. *The Covenant of the League of Nations*. Published by the Avalon Project at Yale University. Retrieved June 9, 2007 from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm>
- Lee, Everett S. 1966. "A Theory of Migration." *Demography* vol. 3, no. 1 (1966): 47–57. Article Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/stable/2060063>
- Lennartsson, Carin, Merril Silverstein and Johan Fritzell. 2009. "Generations in Swedish Families : Time-for-Money Exchanges Between Older and Younger." *Journal of Family Issues* vol. 31; 189.
- Lennartsson, Rebecka. 2007. *Mellan hopp och förtvivlan: Erfarenheter och strategier i väntan på asyl, Asylmottagande i fokus*. Stockholm: NTG asyl och integration.
- Levitt, Peggy. 2006. "Transnational Migration: Conceptual and Policy Challenges" in Palme, Joakim and Kristof Tamas (eds.) *Globalizing Migration Regimes: New Challenges to Transnational Cooperation*. Aldershot, Ashgate.
- Levitt, Peggy. 2007. *God Needs No Passport: How Immigrants are Changing the American Religious Landscape*. New York: New Press.
- . 1999. "Towards an Understanding of Transnational Community Forms and Their Impact on Immigrant Incorporation." Paper to be presented at Comparative Immigration and Integration Program, Winter Workshop, University of California at San Diego, February 19, 1999. Published in *Research & Seminars* <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs/>, February 1999 Vol. 5 No. 4. Accessed 2009-03-24 at <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs/printfriendly.php?....>
- . 2001. *The Transnational Villagers*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press.

- Levitt, Peggy and Nina Glick Schiller. 2004. "Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society." *International Migration Review* Vol. 38 No. 3 (Fall 2004):1002–1039.
- Levitt, Peggy and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen. 2004. "Global migration perspectives: The transnational turn in migration studies." *Global Migration Perspectives* (Global Commission on International Migration), No. 6. Accessed at www.gcim.org
- Levitt, Peggy and B. Nadya Jaworsky. 2007. "Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33:129–56.
- Lindberg, Annsofi. 2007. "Bibliotek i exil: det Kurdiska biblioteket i Stockholm." Master Thesis, Högskolan i Borås, Bibliotekshögskolan/Biblioteks- och informationsvetenskap.
- Lindley, Anna. 2007. "The early morning phonecall: Remittances from a refugee diaspora perspective." University of Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society *Working Paper* No. 07-47.
- . 2011. "Remittances" in Betts, Alexander (ed.) *Global Migration Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 242–265.
- Lindgren, Karin. 2010-10-15. "Bilaga 6- Personliga remitteringar." Internal document. Stockholm: Statistics Sweden ES/UI .
- Lindvall, Johannes, and Joakim Sebring. 2005. "Policy reform and the decline of corporatism in Sweden." *West European Politics*, 28(5), 1057–1074.
- Loudwin, Bernd. 1983. "Die konkludente Anerkennung im Völkerrecht." Band 10 von *Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht*. Duncker & Humblot, 1983. ISBN: 3428053389, 9783428053384.
- Lopez, Mark Hugo, Gretchen Livingston and Rakesh Kochhar. 2009. *Hispanics and the Economic Downturn: Housing Woes and Remittance Cuts*. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, January 2009. Accessed on 21 December 2009 at <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/100.pdf>
- Lucas, Robert E.B. and Oded Stark. 1985. "Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana." *Journal of Political Economy* 93: 901–918.

- Lundqvist, Catarina and Erik Olsson. 2012. "Beyond a Swedish Horizon: Young migrants in Sweden and their transnational prospects." *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* 2(2): 124–132. doi: 10.2478/v10202-011-0034-9
- Marouf, Khabat Aref and Amed Tigris. 2012. "Mångkultella almanackan: kurdiska namn." Mångkulturellt centrum. Accessed on 23 January 2012 at <http://www.mkc.botkyrka.se/alma/namn/kurdiska.html>
- Marx, Karl. 1891. "Wage Labour and Capital". Translation by Frederick Engels of pamphlet first published in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, April 5–8 and 11, 1849. Online Version: Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org) 1993, 1999. Transcription/Markup: Zodiac and Brian Baggins. Proofed and corrected by Alek Blain, 2006.
- Massey, Douglas S., Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouchi, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. 1993. "Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal." *Population and Development Review* vol 19, Sept 1993: 431–466.
- . 1998. *Worlds in motion: Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 2002. *Worlds in motion: Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Original published in 1998.
- Mayer, Karl Ulrich. 2009. "New Directions in Life Course Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* vol. 35: 413–433.
- Mayi, Nazif. 2002. "Kurdiska ungdomars integration i det svenska samhället". Dissertation (Bachelors). Faculty of Educational Sciences, Uppsala University.
- . 2003. "En grupp kurdiska föräldrars syn på sina barns integration i det svenska samhället." Master thesis. Faculty of Educational Sciences, Uppsala University.
- McDowall, David. 2004. *A Modern History of the Kurds*. Third Revised Edition. London: I. B. Tauris.
- McNeill, William H. 1978. "Human Migration: A Historical Overview," in William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams. *Human Migration: Patterns and Politics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- McKenzie, David J. and Johan Mistiaen. 2007. "Surveying Migrant Households: A Comparison of Census-Based, Snowball, and Intercept Point Surveys." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 4419.
- McKenzie, David J. and Marcin J. Sasin. 2007. "Migration, Remittances, Poverty, and Human Capital: Conceptual and empirical challenges." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 4272, July 2007.
- Martin, Susan. 2007. "Women, Migration and Development" *Transatlantic Perspectives on Migration Policy Brief* 1, June 2007. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University.
- Mayda, Anna Maria. 2008. "International Migration: A Panel Data Analysis of the Determinants of Bilateral Flows". *CREAM Discussion Paper* 07/07, Center for Research and Analysis on Migration, University College London.
- Merkle, Lucie and Klaus F. Zimmermann. 1992. "Savings, remittances, and return migration." *Economics Letters* vol. 38, Issue 1, January 1992: 77–81.
- Menjívar, Cecilia, Julie DaVanzo, Lisa Greenwell, and R. Burciaga Valdez. 1998. "Remittances Behavior Among Salvadoran and Filipino Immigrants in Los Angeles." *International Migration Review* 32 (1) (Spring): 97–126.
- Millis, Bryanna, Manuel Orozco and Zaki Raheem. 2008. "Mining Remittance Data: Practical Considerations on Survey Design and Administration." *microREPORT* #119. Produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development, prepared by DAI and IAD.
- Moore, W. H. and S. M. Shellman. 2007. "Whither Will They Go? A Global Study of Refugees' Destinations, 1965–1995." *International Studies Quarterly* 51, 811–834 .
- Morawska, Eva. 2007. "International Migration: Its Various Mechanisms and Different Theories that Try to Explain It." *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations* Issue 1/2007.
- Moré, Íñigo (main author) with Alfonso Echazarra de Gregorio, Bouchra Halloufi and Ramona Petru. 2008. "Cuantificación de las remesas enviadas por mujeres inmigrantes desde España." Accessed on 19 April 2009 at <http://www.remesas.org/09cuantificacionmujeres.html>

- Moustakis, Fotios, and Rudra Chaudhuri. 2005. "Turkish-Kurdish Relations and the European Union: An Unprecedented Shift in the Kemalist Paradigm?" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Fall 2005: 77–89.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. 1957. *Rich Lands and Poor*. New York: Harper and Row.
- National Board of Health and Welfare. 2010. "Social rapport 2010". *National Board of Health and Welfare publication* no. 2010–3–11.
- NAVEND Centre for Kurdish Studies. 2011. "Kurden in Westeuropa (Schätzungen für das Jahr 2002)." Retrieved 2011-03-13 from <http://www.navend.de>
- Nekby, Lena. 2006. "The emigration of immigrants, return vs onward migration: evidence from Sweden," *Journal of Population Economics* vol. 19(2):197–226.
- Newland, Kathleen. 2009. "The paradox of permanency: an incentive-based approach to circular migration policy in the European Union," paper presented at the Swedish EU Presidency Meeting on Labour Migration and its Development Potential in the Age of Mobility, Malmö, 15–16 October 2009. Accessed at http://www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.16135!menu/standard/file/bakgrundsdocument2_090222_webb.pdf
- Niessen, Jan, Thomas Huddleston and Laura Citron. 2007. *Migrant Integration Policy Index*. Brussels: British Council and Migration Policy Group.
- Niimi, Yoko, Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff. 2008. "Remittances and the Brain Drain: Skilled Migrants Do Remit Less." *Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) Discussion Paper* No. 3393, March 2008.
- Nilsson, Torbjörn. 2010. "Efter Sahlin" *Fokus* 2010-11-19.
- OECD. 2008a. *International Migration Outlook 2008 edition*. Paris: OECD.
- . 2008b. "DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective from 2006 for reporting on 2005, 2006 and 2007." Accessed on 25 October 2010 at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/51/35832713.pdf>
- . 2010b. "Different concepts of what a developing country is". Article published on the OECD Internet site. Accessed on 25 October 2010 at http://www.oecd.org/document/55/0,3343,en_2649_34447_35832055_1_1_1_1,00.html#Concepts

- . 2011a. *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Sweden 2011*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- . 2011b. “Table A.1.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries: Version 1—Last updated: 01-Jun-2011.” Accessed on 8 October 2011 at oecd.org.
- Reid, Alice, and Caroline Miller (Office for National Statistics). 2011. “Regional Characteristics of foreign-born people living in the United Kingdom.” *Regional Trends* (2011) 43, 103–133. doi:10.1057/rt.2011.4
- Okonkwo Osili, Una. 2007. “Remittances and savings from international migration: Theory and evidence using a matched sample” *Journal of Development Economics* 83 (2007) 446–465. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.06.003
- Orozco, Manuel, Lindsay Lowell and Johanna Schneider. 2006. “Gender-Specific Determinants of Remittances: Differences in Structure and Motivation.” Report to the World Bank Group Gender and Development Group, PREM. June 2006.
- Orozco, Manuel (principal researcher) Lindsay Lowell, Micah Bump and Rachel Fedewa. 2005. *Transnational Engagement, Remittances and Their Relationship to Development in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D. C.: Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University. Accessed on 25 September 2010 at <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Orozco-%20Transnational%20Engagement.pdf>
- Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2003a. *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany*. New York: Routledge.
- . 2003b. “The Politics of Migrants’ Transnational Political Practices” *International Migration Review* Vol. 37, No. 3: 760–786. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30037756>
- Page, John and Sonia Plaza. 2006. “Migration remittances and development: A review of global evidence.” *Journal of African Economies* 15, 245–336.
- Palloni, Alberto and Douglas S. Massey, Miguel Ceballos, Kristin Espinosa, and Michael Spittel. 2001. “Social Capital and International Migration: A Test Using Information on Family Networks.” *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 106, No. 5 (March 2001): 1262–1298.
- Parkvall, Mikael. 2009. “Sveriges språk: vem talar vad och var?” Rapporter från Institutionen för lingvistik vid Stockholms universitet. Stockholm: Stockholm University.

- Paul, Manuela. 2008. "Transnational Political Practices of Turkish and Kurdish Organisations in Germany." Course paper. IR 505 Turkish Politics and Foreign Policy, Master of European Studies, Bilgi University İstanbul. Submission date: 19 December 2008.
- Pelling, Lisa. 2009. *Remitteringar från Sverige*. Stockholm: Global Utmaning.
- . 2010. *Transnationella band : en fallstudie om remitteringar från Sverige*. Stockholm: Global Utmaning.
- . 2012. *Ny väg in: Forskningsstudie om migrationskanaler*. Stockholm: Global Utmaning.
- Pelling, Lisa, Charlotta Hedberg och Bo Malmberg. 2011. "Remittances from Sweden: An Exploration of Swedish Survey Data" *Institute for Futures Studies Working Paper* 2011:1.
- Pedersen, Peder J., Mariola Pytlikova and Nina Smith. 2008. "Selection and network effects—Migration flows into OECD countries 1990–2000." *European Economic Review* 52 (2008) 1160–1186. Elsevier B.V.
- Pettersson, Thorleif and Yilmas Esmer. 2005. "Vilka är annorlunda?" *Integrationsverkets rapportserie* 2005:03.
- Pfeiffer, Lisa Marie, Richter, Susan Materer, Fletcher, Peri and Taylor, J. Edward. 2007. "Gender in Economic Research on International Migration and Its Impacts: A Critical Review," in Morrison, ed. A. R., Maurice Schiff, and Mirja Sjöblom. *The International Migration of Women*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1999. "Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities." In Hirschman, Ed. C., P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind. *Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Portes, Alejandro, Luis E. Guarnizo and Patricia Landolt. 1999. "The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 22 No. 2 March 1999.
- Portes, Alejandro and Josh DeWind, J. 2004. "A Cross-Atlantic Dialogue: The Progress of Research and Theory in the Study of International Migration." *International Migration Review* 38: 828–851. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00221.x

- Rabo, Annika. 2007. ”Familjen betyder allt eller ‘Vi blir snart lika kalla som svenskarna’: Assyrier/syrianer i Södertälje” in Eastmond, Marita and Åkesson, Lisa (eds.). *Globala familjer: transnationell migration och släktskap*. Hedemora: Gidlund.
- Rapoport, Hillel and Docquier, Frédéric. 2005. “The Economics of Migrants, Remittances.” *Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) Discussion Paper* No. 1531. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=690144>
- Rapport. 2006-02-24. “De olika spåren i Palmeutredningen: Holmér fokuserade på PKK” SVT. Retrieved 2011-10-01 at www.svt.se/2.48530/1.545581/holmer_fokuserade_pa_pkk
- Ratha, Dilip and Zhimei Xu. 2008. *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008*. Washington: World Bank. Permanent URL: <http://go.worldbank.org/O3Q14VQR00>.
- Ratha, Dilip, Sanket Mohapatra, and Zhimei Xu. 2008. “Outlook for Remittance Flows 2008–2010: Growth expected to moderate significantly, but flows to remain resilient.” *Migration and Development Brief* 8. Accessed at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MD_Brief8.pdf
- Ratha, Dilip, Sanket Mohapatra and Ani Silwal. 2011. *The Migration and Remittances Factbook*. Washington, D.C.: Development Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank.
- . 2011b. “Factbook Data Notes.” Accessed at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/FactbookDataNotes.pdf>.
- Ravenstein, Ernst Georg. 1885. “The Laws of Migration.” *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun., 1885): 167–235. Published by: Blackwell Publishing for the Royal Statistical Society. Article Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/stable/2979181>
- Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. 2007. “relative deprivation” in *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*. 15th ed. 32 vols. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Accessed at <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/496842/relative-deprivation>
- Rådet för Syriskas Kurder i Sverige. 2012. Homepage. Retrieved on 29 January 2012 from <http://www.kurdo.org/indexswe.htm>

- Riak Akuei, Stephanie. 2005. "Remittances as unforeseen burdens: the livelihoods and social obligations of Sudanese refugees." *Global Migration Perspectives* No. 18, January 2005. Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration.
- RTI-International. 2008. "Kurdistan Region Economic Development Assessment. Final Report." Produced for review by United States Agency for International Development.
- Ruhs, Martin. 2011. "Who needs migrant workers? The potential role of an independent expert commission in future EU labour immigration policy" in Karlsson, Jan O and Lisa Pelling. *Moving Beyond Demographics – Perspectives for a Common European Migration Policy*. Stockholm: Global Utmaning.
- Russell-Johnston, Lord David (rapporteur). 2006. "The cultural situation of the Kurds." Report to the Committee on Culture, Science and Education. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 11006. 7 July 2006. Retrieved on 12 April 2012 from <http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc06/edoc11006.htm>
- Röshammar, Martin. 2009. "Från Mesopotamien till Södertälje" in *Fokus* 2009-06-12.
- Sassen, Saskia. 1996. *Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 1998. "The de facto Transnationalization of Immigration Policy" in Joppke, Christian, ed. 1998. *Challenge to the Nation State : Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- . 2006. *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Schaeffer, Nora Cate and Stanley Presser. 2003. "The science of asking questions" *Annual Review of Sociology* Vol. 29 (2003): 65–88. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036961> .
- Schierup, Carl-Ulrik. 1991. "The Ethnic Tower of Babel. Political Marginality and Beyond" in Aleksandra Ålund and Carl-Ulrik. Schierup (eds.). *Paradoxes of multiculturalism. Essays on Swedish society*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Schachter, Jason P. 2008. "A Comparison of Recent Internationally Coordinated Household Surveys on International Migrant Remittances: In Search of Common Ground." Presentation made at the

Expert Group Meeting on the Contribution of Household Surveys to Measuring Remittances.
Suitland MD, January 14–5, 2008.

Schoorl, Jeanette. 1998. "Analysing the factors generating international migration: A multi-country approach to study the determinants of migration." Paper No.IV/1 presented at the Technical Symposium on International Migration and Development of the United Nations ACC Task Force on Basic Social Services for All (BSSA) in The Hague, Netherlands 29 Juni – 3 July 1998.

SFS 2005:716. Aliens Act. Issued on 29 September 2005. With amendments: up to and including Swedish Code of Statutes 2009:16. Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice.

SFS 2009:1542. Act amending the Aliens Act 2005:716. Issued on 17 December 2009. Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice.

SFS 1991:481. Population Registration Act . Issued on 30 May 1991. Amendments until Act amending the Population Registration Act SFS 2011:489. Stockholm: Ministry of Finance S5.

Shain, Yossi. 2008. *Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs*. University of Michigan Press.

Shain, Yossi and Aharon Barth. 2003. "Diasporas and International Relations Theory." *International Organisation* Vol. 57 No. 3 (Summer, 2003), pp 449–479. MIT Press. Stable URL at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594834>.

Sheyholislami, Jaffer. 2009. "Language and Nation-Building in Kurdistan-Iraq." Paper presented at the Middle Eastern Studies Association 43th Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, USA, November 21–24, 2009.

Snel, Erik, Godfried Engbersen and Arjen Leerkes. 2006. "Transnational Involvement and Social Integration." *Global Networks* 6(3):285–308.

SIOS. 2011. "Kurdiska riksförbundet: Medlem i SIOS". Retrieved on 2011-11-09 from <http://www.sios.org/page4/page32/index.html>

Sirkeci, Ibrahim, Jeffrey H. Cohen, and Dilip Ratha (eds.). 2012. *Migration and Remittances during the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Södertälje. 2008-02-20. "Södertälje inför nya regler för att motverka osunda boendeförhållanden." Accessed on 29 October 2012 from

http://www.sodertalje.se/Nyhetsarkiv/Sodertalje_infor_nya_regler_for_att_motverka_osunda_bondeforhallanden/#

- Somer, Murat. 2005. "Resurgence and Remaking of Identity : Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds." *Comparative Political Studies* 2005 38: 591 DOI: 10.1177/0010414005277268.
- Spång, Mikael. 2008. "Invandringspolitikens demokratiska dilemma" *Fronesis* no 27.
- Stark, Oded. 1991. *The migration of labor*. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.
- Stark, Oded and David E. Bloom. 1985. "The new economics of labor migraton" *American Economic Review* 75, 173–178.
- Statistics Sweden. 2009a. "Familjeband vanlig orsak till invandring". *Välfärd* No 4/2009. Örebro: Statistics Sweden.
- . 2009b. "Namndatabasen." Retrieved from <http://www.scb.se/namnsok> in May 2009.
- . 2010a. "Invandringen sjönk och antalet utvandrade ökade under 2010." Enheten för befolkningsstatistik. Örebro: Statistics Sweden.
- . 2010b. "Befolkning efter bakgrund." SCB, enheten för befolkningsstatistik. Örebro: ———. 2011a. "Population and Population Changes 1749–2010." Retrieved on 2011-12-21 from [scb.se](http://www.scb.se)
- . 2011b. "Immigrants (non-Nordic citizens) on grounds for residence, country of birth, gender and time 2004–2010." Retrieved from www.scb.se
- . 2011c. "Immigrants and emigrants on country of origin/destination." Year 2000–2010. Last updated 2011-02-18 09:34. Retrieved from www.scb.se
- . 2012a. "Foreign born in the country on country of birth and gender. Year 2000–2011." Last updated on 2012-02-20 09:30. Retrieved from www.scb.se
- . 2012b. "Immigrants (non-Nordic citizens) on ground of residence, country of birth and gender." Last updated on 2012-03-22. Retrieved from www.scb.se

- Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. 2010a. "Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2010." *Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2*. Published on 26 September 2011.
- . 2010b. "4. Ausländische Bevölkerung am 31.12.2010 nach Staatsangehörigkeit" in Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. *Fachserie 1 Reihe 2–2010*: 42.
- Stonaker, Mary E. 2010. "Nepotism and Wasta in the Middle East." Washington, D. C.: Middle East Institute.
- Stryjan, Miri. 2007. "Att skicka pengar till hemlandet: En studie av remitteringsmotiv bland somaliländare i Sverige." Master thesis. Stockholms universitet: Nationalekonomiska institutionen.
- Sundelin Wahlsten, Viveka, Abdulbaghi Ahmad and Anne-Liis von Knorring. 2001. "Traumatic experiences and posttraumatic stress reactions in children and their parents from Kurdistan and Sweden" *Nordic Journal of Psychiatry* 55, 395.
- Suro, Robert. 2004. "Remittance Senders and Receivers: Tracking the Transnational Channels." Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, August 2004. Accessed on 21 December 2009 at www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/23.pdf
- Svenska Dagbladet*. 1996-03-05. "Förbjudna böckers bibliotek".
- Svt*. 2012-09-06. "Syrier flyr till Södertälje". Accessed on 29 October 2012 from <http://www.svt.se/nyheter/regionalt/abc/syrier-flyr-till-sodertalje>
- Svt*. 2011-11-17. "Migrationsverket skärper villkoren för arbetskraftsinvandring". Accessed on 2011-11-18 at http://svt.se/2.58360/1.2606916/utskriftsvanligt_format?printe
- Swedish-Kurdish Friendship League. 2012. "2005: Fyra kurder bland Sveriges 100 mäktigaste." Accessed on 2012-01-12 at <http://swedishkurdishfriendshipleague.blogspot.com/>
- Swedish Government. SOU 2004:132. "Tidsbegränsat uppehållstillstånd vid oklar identitet och resväg". Swedish Government Inquiry, Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Swedish Government. 2007. Swedish Government Proposal 2007/08:147 Nya regler för arbetskraftsinvandring. Stockholm: Ministry of Justice.

- Swedish Government Offices. 2008. *Nya regler för arbetskraftsinvandring*. Stockholm: Regeringskansliet.
- Swedish Migration Board. 2006a. *Årsredovisning 2005*. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2007a. *Årsredovisning 2006*. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2007b. “Kommunmottagna enligt ersättningsförordningen helåret 2006.” Updated on 2010-06-30 16.17. Accessed on 29 October 2012 at <http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/2523.html>
- . 2008a. *Årsredovisning 2007*. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2008b. “Kommunmottagna enligt ersättningsförordningen helåret 2007.” Updated on 2010-06-30. Accessed on 29 October 2012 at <http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/2523.html>
- . 2009a. *Årsredovisning 2008*. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2010a. *Årsredovisning 2009*. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2010b. *Migration 2000-2010 Rapport*. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2011a. *Årsredovisning 2010*. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2011b. “Work permits, granted in 2009.” Published 2011-03-03. Retrieved from www.migrationsverket.se/info
- . 2011c. “Work permits, granted in 2010.” Published 2011-01-01. Retrieved from www.migrationsverket.se/info
- . 2011d. “*En samlad analys av asylprocessen under åren 2007 – 2010*.” Dnr 112-2011-12282. Swedish Migration Board 2011-04-29.
- . 2011e. “‘Labour Market’ in Overview of Residence permits granted 1980–2010.” Retrieved from www.migrationsverket.se/info
- . 2011f. “Om Migrationsverket.” Accessed on 2013-02-12 at <http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/om.html>
- . 2011-11-23. “Skärpta regler för att motverka skenanställningar - Migrationsverket.” Accessed on 2012-10-05 at <http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/5091.html.printable>

- . 2011-12-08. "IRAK SSYK.xls." E-mail from Rita Ylikivelä, Statistics unit of Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2012a. "Beviljade uppehållstillstånd 1980-2011 flyktingar, m fl." Retrieved from Swedish Migration Board on 6 June 2012 at <http://www.migrationsverket.se/info/793.html>
- . 2012b. "Beviljade uppehållstillstånd till nära anhöriga 1986-2011." Retrieved from
- . 2012c. *Årsredovisning 2011*. Norrköping: Swedish Migration Board.
- . 2012d. "Work permits, granted in 2011." Published 2012-01-01. Retrieved from www.migrationsverket.se/info
- . 2012e. "Rådata gällande irakiska migranter: ärendenummer 138203." E-mail from Swedish Migration Board on 2012-02-16.
- Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning. 2008. *Asylsökandes eget boende, EBO - en kartläggning*. Karlskrona: Boverket.
- Swedish National Agency for Education. 2009. "Beskrivande data om förskoleverksamhet, skolbarnsomsorg, skola och vuxenutbildning 2009." Retrieved 2012-01-21 from http://www.skolverket.se/2.3894/publicerat/2.5006?_xurl_=http%3A%2F%2Fwww4.skolverket.se%3A8080%2Fwtpub%2Fws%2Fskolbok%2Fwtpubext%2Ftrycksak%2FRecord%3Fk%3D2281
- . 2010. Uppgifter om antal elever som deltar i modersmålsundervisning: Uppgifter insamlade av SCB och Skolverket för läsåret 2005-2006. Mats Wennerholm, MSU, 2007-03-07. Retrieved on 29 January 2010 from <http://www.skolverket.se/statistik-och-analys>.
- Swedish Parliamentary Committee on Labour Immigration. SOU 2006:87. *Arbetskraftsinvandring till Sverige – förslag och konsekvenser*. Final report from the Swedish Parliamentary Committee on Labour Immigration. Stockholm: Ministry of Labour.
- Swedish Radio. 2012-05-28. "Utrikesfödda högre utbildade än inrikesfödda - SR International på svenska." Accessed on 2012-05-31 from <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=3993&artikel=5124116>
- Swedish Radio. 2011-11-27. "P3 Dokumentär: Hedersmordet på Pela." Accessed on 2012-12-21 at <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/default.aspx?programid=2519>

- Szylkin, Ryszard. 2012. "Se upp för dörrarna, dörrarna stängs" *Framtider* No 4/2012.
- Taloyan, Marina. 2008. "Health, Migration and Quality of Life among Kurdish Men in Sweden". Thesis. Department of Neurobiology, Care Sciences and Society, Center for Family and Community Medicine, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden.
- Takenaka, Ayumi. 2007. "Secondary Migration: Who Re-Migrates and Why These Migrants Matter." Migration Policy Institute. Accessed on 2011-10-17 at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=597>.
- Tamas, Kristof and Rainer Münz. 2006. *Labour Migrants un-bound? EU Enlargement, Transitional Measures and Labour Market Effects*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Futures Studies.
- Tayfun, Mehmet (Malm sanij). 1998. *Kurdiskt författarskap och kurdisk bokutgivning: bakgrund, villkor, betydelse*. Spånga: Apec.
- Taylor, J. Edward. 1999. "The new economics of labour migration and the role of remittances in the migration process." *International Migration* 37: 63–87.
- Taylor, J. Edward. 1986. "Differential migration, networks, information and risk" in Stark, Oded (ed.) *Research in Human Capital and Development*. Vol 4. Migration, Human Capital and Development. Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 147–171.
- The Guardian. 2010. "Iraq Body Count 2010: how many died and who was responsible?" Accessed at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/dec/31/iraq-body-count-2010-deaths/print>.
- Treaty of Sèvres. 1920. World War I Document Archive. Retrieved from World War I Document Archive <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/sevindex.html>
- Tripp, Charles. 2002. *A History of Iraq*. 2d edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ulku, Hulya. 2010. "Remitting Behaviour of Turkish Migrants: Evidence from Household Data in Germany." *Brooks World Poverty Institute Working Paper* No. 115. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1599101>
- UNDP. 2009. *Human Development Report: Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*. UNDP.
- UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) Population Division. 2009. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision. POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008 July.

- UNHCR. 2008. *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2008: Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and Selected Non-European Countries*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- . 2009. *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2008: Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and Selected Non-European Countries*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- . 2010. *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2009: Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and Selected Non-European Countries*. Country Data Sheets, 23 March 2010. Geneva: UNHCR.
- . 2011. *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2010: Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and Selected Non-European Countries*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- UN Security Council. 1991. UN Security Resolution 688 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting on 5 April 1991. Accessed on 12 February 2012 at <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm>
- UNT. 2 February, 2004. "Sorg bland svenska kurder". Retrieved 2012-01-20 at <http://www.unt.se/inc/print/sorg-bland-svenska-kurder-590532-default.aspx>
- . 17 March, 2005. "Kvinnomaktsgrupp och ung kurd får jämställdhetsstipendier". Retrieved 2012-01-20 at <http://www.unt.se/inc/print/kvinnomaktsgrupp-och-ung-kurd-far-jamstallldhetsstipendier-665334-default.aspx>
- . 29 October, 2007. "Första besluten i Musikens Hus". Retrieved on 2013-02-10 from <http://www.unt.se/inc/print/forsta-besluten-i-musikens-hus-299599-default.aspx>
- Uppsala Konsert & Kongress. 2011. "Sivan Perwer." Retrieved 2012-12-28 from <http://www.ukk.se/Konsert/sok-konsert/kalendariearkiv2011/SivanPerwer/>
- U.S. Census Bureau. 2009. *American Community Survey Design and Methodology Report*. Accessed on on November 24 2010 at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/methodology_main/
- Vadean, Florin-Petru. 2007. "Citizenship Status and Remittances: Evidence from German Micro Data." *Asia Research Institute Working Paper* No. 89.

- van Bruniessen, Martin. 1999. "The Kurds in Movement: Migrations, mobilisations, communications and the globalisation of the Kurdish question." *Islamic Area Studies Project, Tokyo, Japan Working Paper* no. 14. Retrieved from http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/publications/Kurds_in_movement.htm
- van Dalen, Hendrik P., George Groenewold, and Tineke Fokkema. 2005. "The effect of remittances on emigration intentions in Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey." *Population Studies* Vol. 59, No.3: 375–392.
- Venturini, Alessandra. 2011. "Should Europe speed up integration strategies?" in Karlsson, Jan O., and Lisa Pelling. 2011. *Moving Beyond Demographics: Perspectives for a Common European Migration Policy*. Stockholm: Global Utmaning.
- Verket för Högskoleservice. 2012. antagning.se searched for "Kurdiska"
https://www.antagning.se/se/search?period=VT_2012&freeText=kurdiska
- Vertovec, Steven. 2004. "Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation." *International Migration Review* Vol. 38 No. 3 (Fall 2004): 970–1001.
- Vetenskapsrådet. 2007. *Forskningsetiska principer inom humanistisk-samhällsvetenskaplig forskning*. Stockholm: Vetenskapsrådet.
- Wiesbrock, Anja. 2011. "The integration of Immigrants in Sweden: a Model for the European Union?" *International Migration* Vol. 49 (4).
- Vink, Maarten P., and Gerard-René de Groot. 2010. "Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe: International Framework and Domestic Trends." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* vol. 36 issue 5: 713-734. doi: 10.1080/13691831003763914.'
- Vogel, Joachim. 2001. 'The Swedish System of Official Social Surveys' in F. Kraus, and G. Schmaus eds. 2001. "Official Social Surveys in Europe : Towards a European System of Social Reporting and Welfare Measurement." *EuReporting Working Paper* No. 27.
- Von Koppenfels, Amanda Klekowski. 2009. "From Germans to Migrants: Aussiedler Migration to Germany." In Tsuda, Takeyuki, (ed.) *Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return Migration in Comparative Perspective*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 103–132.
- Wadensjö, Eskil. 1973. *Immigration och samhällsekonomi*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

- . 2012. "Nationell migrations- arbetsmarknads- och socialpolitik som utmaning för den europeiska sammanhållningen." In Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Antonina, Lars Oxelheim, and Thomas Persson, (eds.) *Arbetslöshet, migrationspolitik och nationalism*. Stockholm: Santérus.
- WADI (Association for Crisis Assistance and Development Co-operation) 2010. *Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi-Kurdistan: An Empirical Study by WADI*. Frankfurt am Main: WADI.
- Wahlbeck, Östen. 1998. "Transnationalism and diasporas: the Kurdish Example". Paper presented at the International Sociological Association XIV World Congress of Sociology, July 26–August 1, 1998, Montreal, Canada. Research Committee 31, Sociology of Migration.
- . 2002. "The concept of diaspora as an analytical tool in the study of refugee communities." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 28, No. 2: 221–238.
- Warnes T. 1992. "Migration and the life course" in Champion, Tony, and Tony Fielding (eds.). 1992. *Migration Processes and Patterns. Research Progress and Prospects*. Vol. 1(2). London, New York: Belhaven Press.
- Weber, Max. [1964] 1974. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York NY: The Free Press.
- Weiss Fagen, Patricia. 2007. *Iraqi Refugees: Seeking Stability in Syria and Jordan*. Washington, D. C.: Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University and Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.
- Westin, Charles. 2006. "Sweden: Restrictive Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism." Migration Information Source. Accessed 2010-04-02 at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/print>.
- Wikan, Unni. 2008. "In Honor of Fadime: Murder and Shame: an excerpt." Accessed on 2012-12-21 at <http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/896861.html>
- Willis, Gordon B. (2005). *Cognitive interviewing: a tool for improving questionnaire design*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2003. "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology." *International Migration Review* Vol. 37 No. 3 (Fall 2003):576–610. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30037750> .

- World Bank 2005. "International Remittance Senders Household Survey Belgium, English Version." Retrieved from [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/Questionnaire_Nigeria_\(English_Version-FINAL\).pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/Questionnaire_Nigeria_(English_Version-FINAL).pdf)
- . 2006. *Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration*. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank.
- . 2007. "Bilateral Remittances Corridor Analysis (BRCA): Research Guidelines." Financial Market Integrity (FPDFI), The Financial and Private Sector Development Vice-Presidency. Original Version: August, 2005, Updated Version: September, 2007.

Appendix 1: Details on the Identification of Addresses

I used two lists of Kurdish first names to identify Kurdish individuals in Uppsala. One list was provided by the Kurdish Library in Stockholm (Kurdish Library 2009) and one list was taken from the internet site of the Institut Kurde de Paris (2009). The original list from Institut Kurde de Paris contained 527 female names and 565 male names. The list was accessed on 29 April 2009 from http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/kurdish_baby_names.php. I have kept a print-out of this list. The list of the Kurdish Library in Stockholm was not online at the time, but provided directly to me by staff at the Kurdish Library. The list of the Kurdish Library contained 1904 male names and 2141 female names.⁶² The two lists were merged into one.

Some Kurdish names have the same spelling as very common Swedish first names. The following names were excluded from the list: Karîn, Malîn, Nina, Elin, Ester, Kaja (female names); Arî and Goran (male names). It was sometimes difficult to distinguish first names from surnames. I used the online name register of Statistics Sweden to see if a name is more common as a first- or surname. (Statistics Sweden 2009b).

According to Marouf and Tigris (2012)⁶³ Kurdish girls are often named after beautiful things in nature, while boys are named after good attributes. While it would be impossible to name a boy Bahar (which means spring), many names are both female and male names, such as Newroz (new year) och Khabat (struggle). Again, I used the name register of Statistics Sweden to determine if a name was more likely to be male or female. When a name appears on the lists as both female and male, I have chosen to register its most common use in Sweden according to Statistics Sweden. The following names were taken out of the list of female names since they also appear as a more common male name: Araz, Avan, Aran, Baran, Reben. The following names were taken out of the list of male names since they appear as more common female name: Nalîn, Hana, Jiwan. Then each name was entered into the search field of the largest Swedish online phonebook at www.eniro.se.⁶⁴ A first round of search was made based on the first names.

62 The Kurdish Library in Stockholm (2009) cites the following sources for their compilation of Kurdish first names: Fexreddîn, Gulbijêrêkî nawî kurdî, Stockholm, 1990; Hawar, Navên kurdmançî, Hejmar 31, r. 6-9; Kartal, H. Kurdische Namen, Osnabrück, 1992; Karvani, S. Kurdish name dictionary, Jönköping, 1999; Kaynak, Y. Bi kurdî navên mirovan, İstanbul, 1991; Rezazî, N. Names and titles in the Kurdish community, Spånga, 1991; Tigris, A. Navên kurdî, Spånga, 1990.

63 Amed Tigris has written a book on Kurdish names (in Kurmanji) published in 1991. It was used as one of the sources for the listing on the site of the Kurdish Library in Stockholm (see above).

64 According to Eniro's Annual Report for 2009 released on March 31, 2010, Eniro is the "leading search-company on the Nordic media market". Eniro is traded at the Stockholm Stock Exchange NASDAQ OMX. (Eniro 2010).

Original spelling was always used, but the letters ç, ê, î, and û were exchanged for c, e, i and u since it is in this way they appear at eniro.se. Eniro.se also returns results with similar spelling. I consulted Felemez Akad, a teacher of Kurdish as mother tongue and Nasrin Samini (library assistant) to determine what names with spelling slightly different than the ones on the original list were likely to be Kurdish names.

If two or more individuals with an identified Kurdish first name was found having the same surname, I made a second search based on these surnames. The following common Arabic/Muslim surnames were excluded: Ahmad, Ahmed, Ali, Amjad Khalid, Aziz, Majid, Mohammad, Mohammad Ali, Mohammad Saleh, Sharif, and Saied. A total of 876 addresses of individuals with either first or second names having been identified as Kurdish were found. I found 393 addresses on the basis of a female name and 483 addresses belonging to male names.

Some of these individuals shared the same address. In order not to distribute several questionnaires to the same nuclear family, only one individual with the same surname per address was chosen. When possible, the individual registered as the owner of the landline to the address (not cellular phone) was included in the sample. When there was no land-line number registered at an address with several individuals with the same surname, the choice was made in alphabetic order. After reducing the sample to only one individual per address with the same surname, the sample finally contained a total of 652 addresses. 303 of these addresses belonged to individuals with female names, and 349 addresses belonged to individuals with male names.

Appendix 2: Questionnaire and Covering Letter Used for Postal Survey in Uppsala

Uppsala / Stockholm, October 2009

Dear Sir/Madam,

You've been selected to participate in an important survey on how people in Uppsala of Middle East background send money to friends and relatives abroad. The survey is conducted by the organisation Global Challenge. It takes about ten minutes to answer the questions.

Responses are ANONYMOUS and treated confidentially. No outsiders can see how you have responded. It is important that you respond for the results to be as good as possible. We hope you'll take the time to participate!

Please put the completed survey in the enclosed envelope. Put it in the mailbox today! No stamp is needed. All surveys mailed before the 31th of October 2009 will receive a gift certificate worth 50 SEK. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me on telephone number 0708-67 39 96 or via email to lisa.pelling@globalutmaning.se

Thank you for taking time to answer the questions!

With friendly greetings,

Lisa Pelling

Project manager, PhD student in political science

PS. Would you like to participate in an interview on sending money to your home country? Participants in the interview will receive a small remuneration. Please contact Lisa Pelling on telephone number 0708-67 39 96 or via email to lisa.pelling@globalutmaning.se

[only on the online version]

1. First, I must ask you to enter your personal code: _____

[on all versions:]

First, some general questions. Please tick the most appropriate answer!

2. Are you ...

☐ Man

☐ Woman

3. How old are you ? _____ years

4. Were you born in Sweden?

☐ Yes

☐ No

5. Were both of your parents born in Sweden?

☐ Yes

☐ No

If you have answered yes to question 5, please go directly to the last page!

6. In what country were you born?

☐ Iraq

☐ Iran

☐ Jordan

☐ Lebanon

☐ Palestine

☐ Syria

☐ Turkey

☐ Other country, which? _____

7. In what country was at least one of your partents born?

☐ Iraq

☐ Iran

☐ Jordan

☐ Lebanon

☐ Palestine

☐ Syria

☐ Turkey

☐ Other country, which? _____

8. What is your mother tongue?

☐ Kurdish

☐ Arabic

☐ Turkish

☐ Persian

☐ Swedish

☐ Other language, which? _____

9. If you have immigrated yourself, what year did you move to Sweden for the first time?
Year _____ (eg 1982)
10. What fits you best?
☐ I am planning to stay permanently in Sweden
☐ I am planning to move back to my country in the future
☐ None of the alternatives
11. How often did you visit your home country during the past five years?
☐ Never
☐ Once
☐ Less than five times
☐ More than five times
12. How many weeks did you stay when you last visited your home country? _____ weeks
13. Are you a member of an association for people from your home country?
☐ Yes
☐ No
14. Are you ...
☐ Married
☐ Cohabiting but not married
☐ Single without children
☐ Single with children
☐ Widowed
☐ Other, what ? _____
15. How do you live?
☐ Rented apartment with a first hand contract
☐ Apartment rented in second or third hand
☐ I rent a room in a shared apartment / house
☐ Self-owned apartment
☐ Own house
☐ Other alternative, what? _____
16. How many rooms are there in your house/flat?
_____ rooms
17. How many people live in your household?
_____ persons
18. What has been your main occupation during the last three months?
☐ Full-time work
☐ Part-time work
☐ Studies
☐ Jobseeking
☐ I have been on sick-leave
☐ I am retired
☐ Other alternative, (for instance parental leave) _____

19. What is your highest completed educational level?
- ☐ School 1-6 years
 - ☐ School 6-9 years
 - ☐ Corresponding to Swedish gymnasium / 9-12 years
 - ☐ University graduation
 - ☐ PhD
 - ☐ Other, what? _____

Now some questions about sending money to your home country

20. Have you sent money to family or relatives in your home country?
- ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No, never -> please continue to question number 30!
21. When was the last time you sent money to your home country?
- ☐ About a week ago
 - ☐ About a month ago
 - ☐ Several months ago
 - ☐ Last year or earlier
22. How much money did you send when you sent money last time?
- ☐ 1-300 kr
 - ☐ 301-500 kr
 - ☐ 501-1000 kr
 - ☐ 1001-2000 kr
 - ☐ 2001-3000 kr
 - ☐ 3001-5000 kr
 - ☐ 5001-10000 kr
 - ☐ More than 10000 kr
23. According to your estimation, how much money did you send in the last year?
- ☐ 1-1000 kr
 - ☐ 1001-5000 kr
 - ☐ 5001-10000 kr
 - ☐ 10001-30000 kr
 - ☐ 10001-30000 kr
 - ☐ 30001-50000 kr
 - ☐ 50001-70000 kr
 - ☐ 70001-100.000 kr
 - ☐ Mer än 100.000 kr
24. Who did you send money to? Select several alternatives if you like.
- ☐ Spouse
 - ☐ Children
 - ☐ Parents
 - ☐ My wife / my husbands parents
 - ☐ Siblings
 - ☐ Cousins
 - ☐ Some other relative, who? _____

25. Were do the people you send money to live in your home country?
- ☐ On the countryside
 - ☐ In a village or small town
 - ☐ In a middle-sized city (about 20 000-200 000 inhabitants)
 - ☐ In a large city (more than 200 000 inhabitants)
26. When you send money, what determines the amount you send?
- ☐ The needs of my family or relatives
 - ☐ My income (if my income had been higher, I would have sent more money)
 - ☐ The cost of sending money (if it had been cheaper, I would have sent more money)
 - ☐ Other alternative: _____
27. The money you sent, on what was it used? Chose several options if you like.
- ☐ Food, clothes
 - ☐ Durable goods (TV, car)
 - ☐ Education (school fees, school books, university studies, etc.)
 - ☐ Medical care and medicines
 - ☐ Hire or purchase of housing / building a house
 - ☐ Investments
 - ☐ Savings
 - ☐ Repayment of loans
 - ☐ Funeral
 - ☐ Wedding
 - ☐ Other, please give examples: _____
28. Have you sent money for charity or an organisation in your home country?
- ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No
29. How do you mainly send money to your home country?
- ☐ Through a bank transfer
 - ☐ Through money-transfer companies (such as Forex, X-change, Western Union, etc.)
 - ☐ Through relatives or friends who bring the money in cash when they visit your home country
 - ☐ With the help of an agent (for instance Hawala)
 - ☐ Otherwise, how? _____
30. Finally, would you like to add some comments on sending money to your home country?
- _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

Thank you for your participation!

On our website www.globalutmaning.se/svara you can read more about the survey.

Please put the survey in the enclosed envelope. Do not forget to mail the questionnaire before the 31th of October. All people who participate in the survey before the 31th of October will receive a gift certificate worth 50 kr.

Appendix 3. Key Informants

Sweden

Ala Riani, Shirin Alemdar, and Awni Ali officers at the Kurdistan Regional Government Nordic Office, Stockholm

Iris Elofsson and Eva Egnell, Office for Education and the Labour Market, Municipality of Uppsala

Anita Gradin, former EU Commissioner

Conny Fredriksson, Chair of the Socialist International Working Group on the Kurdish Issue

Sermîn Aycan Bozarslan, President of the The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden

Thair Ismail, Handling Officer Iraq, The Olof Palme International Center

Jørgen Carling, Research Director at the Peace Research Institute PRIO in Oslo, Norway

Marta Bivand Erdal, PhD student at the Peace Research Institute PRIO in Oslo, Norway

Mohamad Hassan, chairperson, Education and Employment Board of Uppsala.

Joma Barwari, chairperson of Kurdistan's Association in Uppsala

Felemez Akad, chairperson of the Swedish Kurdish Association of Uppsala (until 2009)

Huseyin Alpergin, chairperson of the Swedish Kurdish Association of Uppsala (from 2009)

Abdullbaghi Ahmad, MD, PhD, Assistant Professor and Founding Director, Department of Child Mental Health, College of Medicine - University of Dohuk, Iraq and Consultant Child Psychiatrist and Director of Studies, Department of Neuroscience, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Uppsala University Hospital.

Iraq

Carl Henrik Assargård, Secretary General of Qandil (until 2010) and Swedish Honorary Consul in Erbil

Narin Akreyi president of the association for Swedish returnees in Souther Kurdistan „TOR“ and Asos Shafeek, former advisor to Taha Barwari (former Head of KRG Nordic Office and Minister in the Kurdistan Regional Government).

Kurt Dünnhaupt, General Director of AGEF (*Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Bereich der Migration und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*)

Shokr Yaseen Yaseen, Director of the Bureau of Migration and Displaced of the KRG

Dr. Hussein Tofiq Faizullah, Dean of the College of Law and Politics, Salahaddin University.

Vian Yousif Elia, General Director of Finance and Administration, Ministry for Sports, Youth and Culture.

Dr Govend H. Sherwari, General Director of Scholars and Cultural Relations, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.

Author's Biography

LISA PELLING

Office:

Global Utmaning
Birger Jarlsgatan 27
S-111 34 Stockholm, Sweden
+46-8-7021027

Citizenship: Swedish

Degrees:

M.A. (with honours), Political Science, Department of Government, Uppsala University
B.A. (with honours) Political Science, Department of Government, Uppsala University

Dissertation Title:

“Post-Remittances? On Transnational Ties and Migration Between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Sweden”

Supervisor:

Professor Hans-Georg Heinrich, University of Vienna

Professional Experience:

Programme Manager, Global Utmaning, 2011 to present
Project Manager, Global Utmaning (think tank), 2009–2010
First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden in Vienna, Austria, 2007 and 2010
Political Advisor to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ms Laila Freivalds, 2005–2006
Political Secretary, County Government, County of Uppsala, 2005
Columnist, Aftonbladet (Sweden's largest daily newspaper), 2004
Project Manager, Department for Economic Analysis, Swedish Trade Union Confederation LO, 2003–2004
Political Advisor to the Swedish Minister for Development Aid, Migration and Asylum Policy Mr. Jan O Karlsson 2002–2003
Secretary General, International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), 1997–2001
International Secretary, Social Democratic Youth of Sweden (SSU), 1996–1997

Publications:

“The New Way In - A Migrant Perspective”, with Veronica Nordlund. Stockholm: Global Utmaning, 2012.
“Migration och utveckling: målkonflikter och motsättningar i försöken att skapa en sammanhållen EU-politik” (*Migration and Development: Conflict and Contradictions in the Attempts to Create a Coherent EU Policy*) in Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, A. et al. (eds.) *Arbetslöshet, migrationspolitik och nationalism*. Yearbook for European Studies 2012. Stockholm: Santérus.
Moving Beyond Demographics : Perspectives for a Common European Migration Policy. Editor (with Jan O. Karlsson). Stockholm: Global Utmaning, 2011.

- “Remittances from Sweden : An Exploration of Swedish Survey Data”, with Charlotta Hedberg and Bo Malmberg. Stockholm: Global Utmaning and The Swedish Institute for Futures Studies, 2011
- Transnationella band: en fallstudie om remitteringar från Sverige (*Transnational Ties: a Case Study on Remittances from Sweden*). Global Utmaning, 2010
- Remitteringar från Sverige (*Remittances from Sweden*), Global Utmaning, 2009
- “Migrationens betydelse för framtida försvars- och säkerhetspolitik” (“*The Importance of Migration for Future Defence and Security Policy*”) in Socialdemokratin i krig och fred (*Social Democracy in War and Peace*), 2009, Gidlunds Förlag, Stockholm
- “Den fria men begränsade rörligheten” (“*The Free but Limited Mobility*”) in Fronesis no 27, 2008 with Rickard Andersson, Olav Fumarola Unsgaard and Magnus Wennerhag.

Grants:

Forschungsstipendium 2011, University of Vienna

Talks:

- “New Way In: Interview Study with Iraqi Migrants”, General Directors’ Immigration Services Conference (GDISC) Stockholm 13–14 December 2012.
- “Post-Remittances? Tracing the Transition of Transnational Ties” at International Conference on Kurdish Migration and Diaspora. Hugo Valentin Centre at Uppsala University in collaboration with the Department of Sociology at Uppsala University; Department of Linguistics and Philology at Uppsala University; Swedish network for studies of transnationalism and diaspora located at The Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO) at Stockholm University; Middle Eastern Studies at Stockholm University; and Kurdish Studies Network. Uppsala 12-14 April 2012.
- “Ekonomiska remitteringar från Sverige: En analys av data från SCB:s årliga hushållsundersökning HEK” with Charlotta Hedberg and Bo Malmberg. Institute for Futures Studies and Global Utmaning. Rosenbads Konferenscenter, Stockholm 20 January 2011.
- “Saving the Welfare State with Labour Immigration – The Case of Labour Immigration from Iraq to Sweden “ at Migration and Welfare – Challenges for the EU? Workshop organised by the The Centre for European Research (CERGU) at the University of Gothenburg. Gothenburg 3-4 November 2010.
- “The Other Swedish Experience” at The Welfare State and the Issue of Migration in Europe: New Class Conflict or “Clash of Civilizations” organised by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, University of Vienna and the Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue. Vienna 10-11 October 2011.
- “Remittances from Sweden: An Exploration of Swedish Survey Data”, Migration Working Group of the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) at Georgetown University, Washington, DC. 26 October 2010

Social Work:

- Board Member, Qandil www.qandil.org, 2004–2006
- Member of the Editorial Committee, Fronesis (Swedish Cultural Magazine of the Year 2004), 2002-2006
- Co-Chair of the Youth Council, UNESCO, 1999–2001
- Chair of the Drafting Committee, Third World Youth Forum of the United Nations System in Braga, Portugal, 1998
- City Councillor, City Council of Uppsala, 1991–1996

Language Skills:

Swedish (native), English (excellent), German (excellent), Spanish (excellent), French (intermediate)

Further Education:

Introduction to the Statistics Programme SPSS, Center for Doctoral Studies, University of Vienna

Austrian German Diploma, 2000

Erasmus, Third Year, Economic and Social Administration, Université Rennes II, France, 1995/96

Specialised Language Course in French, Uppsala University, 1995

Specialised Language Course in Spanish, Uppsala University, 1995

Summer Course in Arabic Language, Birzeit University, West Bank, 1994

Cambridge Proficiency Exam, 1993

Contemporary History and English at Queen's University of Belfast, UK, 1992/93

Summer course in Spanish, Universidad Autónoma de México in Mexico City, Mexico, 1991

References:

Professor Bo Malmberg
Department of Human Geography
University of Stockholm
Frescati
S-106 91 Stockholm
bo.malmberg@humangeo.su.se

Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, Ph.D.
Director, MA in Migration Studies
University of Kent, Brussels
Boulevard de la Plaine 5
1050 Elsene, Belgium
A.K.von-Koppenfels@kent.ac.uk