



universität
wien

DIPLOMARBEIT

Titel der Diplomarbeit

The Corfu Process in the OSCE

Verfasserin

Esther Valerie Osorio Jaramillo

angestrebter akademischer Grad

Magistra der Philosophie (Mag.^a phil.)

Wien, im Juni 2011

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 300

Diplomstudium lt. Studienblatt: Politikwissenschaft

Betreuer: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Heinz Gärtner

Ich versichere, dass ich die Diplomarbeit ohne fremde Hilfe und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Quellen angefertigt habe, und dass die Arbeit in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen hat. Alle Ausführungen der Arbeit, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß übernommen wurden, sind als solche gekennzeichnet.

Wien, am

Esther Valerie Osorio Jaramillo

Preface

In July 2009 I got the chance to work as an intern at the Austrian Foreign Ministry, in the Mission to the OSCE. It was a month after the Corfu Process had begun and the general atmosphere in the OSCE was one of great excitement. I had the opportunity to attend sessions of all forums, from the Permanent Council meetings, to the EU coordination meetings, and the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance Consultations. The Corfu Process was much discussed in all of them. In 2010 I had the opportunity to delve a little more into the topic when I came back as an intern in February and from May to June. The Corfu Process had already advanced, and been officially initiated at the Ministerial Council in Athens in December. Discussions were very animated and I was able to see negotiations on possible future security arrangements live and first hand. I decided then that I wanted to write my diploma thesis on this new exciting process, which might change the existing European security architecture.

I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Gärtner and my colleagues for valuable input. Also, I particularly want to thank my parents who supported me throughout the authoring of this thesis.

Contents

1. Introduction	7
1.1. Research Outline	8
1.2. Methodology	9
2. Background	11
2.1. The History of the OSCE	11
2.2. Structures and Institutions	16
2.3. The Decision-Making Process	18
2.4. The OSCE's Three Dimensions	19
3. The Russian draft European Security Treaty	21
4. The Corfu Process.....	29
4.1. Launching of the Corfu Process	29
4.2. Development of the Corfu Process	34
5. The OSCE's Approaches to Security	36
5.1. Comprehensive Security	38
5.1.1. The Military Sector	39
5.1.2. The Environmental Sector	40
5.1.3. The Economic Sector	42
5.1.4. The Societal Sector	43
5.1.5. The Political Sector	45
5.2. The Cooperative Approach and Indivisibility of Security	47
5.3. The OSCE's Approach to Comprehensive, Cooperative and Indivisible Security	49
6. The Corfu Process and its Relation to the EST	58
6.1. Analysis of the Corfu Process "ticks"	59
6.1.1. Implementation of all OSCE Norms, Principles and Commitments	60
6.1.2. The Role of the OSCE in Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation	62
6.1.3. Role of the Arms Control and Confidence and Security Building Regimes in Building Trust in the Evolving Security Environment	65
6.1.4. Transnational and multidimensional Threats and Challenges	67

6.1.5. Economic and Environmental Challenges	69
6.1.6. Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms, as well as Democracy and the Rule of Law	72
6.1.7. Enhancing the OSCE's Effectiveness	74
6.1.8. Interaction with other Organizations and Institutions on the Basis of the 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security	76
6.1.9. The Cross-Dimensional Approach to Security	78
6.1.10. General Questions of Euro-Atlantic Security	80
6.2. Conclusion	81
7. Possible Future Developments	83
7.1. The Astana Summit	83
7.2. After Astana	85
7.3. The EST	87
8. Conclusion	89
Glossary of Acronyms	93
Bibliography	95
Annex	
A.1. Ministerial Declaration on the Corfu Process	101
A.2. Draft European Security Treaty	103
A.3. Astana Commemorative Declaration	107
Abstract Deutsch	111
Abstract English	113

1. Introduction

In this thesis, I will outline the Corfu Process in the OSCE and offer a political analysis of it, taking into account the theoretical framework the OSCE has committed itself to – the comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible approach towards security. I will describe how the understanding of this theory has developed over the last decades. Furthermore, I will consider the Russian proposal for a new European Security Treaty, which triggered the Corfu Process, and explore how these two attempts to reshape pan-European security correlate.

Europe has seen many changes in its political and social frontiers in the last century. Until only twenty years ago Europe was divided between the Warsaw Pact and the Western, mostly NATO states. Today the Warsaw pact has vanished and the number of independent sovereign states has increased markedly. Many of them are members of the European Union and/or NATO and practically all of them are Participating States of the OSCE. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe is an organisation founded to provide a platform for dialogue and cooperation between East and West – from Vladivostok to Vancouver.

To begin with, the geographical area of what is considered Europe has to be defined. Does Europe only consist of the 27 EU Member States? Does it embrace the entire territory from the west of Iceland to the Ural? Or does it reach from Vancouver to Vladivostok? Opinions vary on this point, but in this paper I will go with last, the OSCE approach.

The OSCE does not only include the European countries, but also Canada, the US and central Asian countries. Hence, it is a Euro-Atlantic Eurasian organisation, including 4 out of 5 permanent UN Security Council members.

It is the only Security Organisation in Europe “which has officially proclaimed itself a regional agreement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter”.¹ Also, it is the only security organisation based on a theoretical framework whereas in all other cases theoretical frameworks are inductively derived from the political reality. The OSCE has committed itself to a comprehensive approach towards security, including

¹ Gheballi, 2009, p.55.

military, economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects of security. The comprehensive approach is based on the conviction that only by including all these different aspects, greater and more permanent security can be provided. The OSCE seeks to create an inclusive, comprehensive security environment in its region by addressing issues through its three dimensions.

However, since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the two power blocks, the role and importance of the OSCE as an organisation has changed. European security is no longer about making concessions and avoiding military escalation but about jointly combating threats from in- and outside. Unresolved problems prevail and prolonged conflicts inside the OSCE area have still not ceased to exist. Also, new ones can break out, like the crisis in Georgia in summer 2008 has shown. In order to face the new threats that have appeared and to act in the new constellation of the world, a renovation of the security architecture was needed. The Russian Federation had realised that in 2008 and put forward a proposal to hold a pan-European summit discussing a legally binding security treaty for Europe. After the crisis in Georgia in summer 2008, the relationship between Russia and most of the western OSCE Participating States had become rather hostile and the idea to agree on a security treaty with a legal personality was close to impossible. Anyhow, it was clear that a change in the current arrangements had to be made. The OSCE was considered the most appropriate forum for such talks and for this reason the Greek Chairmanship of 2009 initiated the Corfu Process, a dialogue with the aim of reforming European and Eurasian security through the framework of the OSCE. The Corfu Process was divided into separate topics to make discussions easier and it was intended to be concluded at the OSCE Summit in Astana in December 2010.

1.1. Research Outline

In my thesis I will start by investigating the relationship between the Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty (EST) and the Corfu Process in the OSCE. While looking at the EST, I will also look at the discontentment of the Russian Federation with the western countries and NATO member states. Following this, I will explore

the concepts of co-operative security and comprehensive security which are fundamental to the structure and guiding principles of the OSCE. With this theoretical background in mind I will outline the Corfu Process, addressing the single topics separately. I will have a look at the ideas that were put forward during the negotiations and the process, investigate how the particular topics relate to the framework for analysis, and compare it to the draft European Security Treaty. Subsequently, I am going to analyse to what extent the Corfu Process is continuing and in how far this process already has or still can change the security order in Europe.

1.2. Methodology

My main objects of analysis will be OSCE documents related to the Corfu Process. This includes Ministerial Declarations and mostly official, but partly also informal statements at OSCE meetings. I will also look at speeches by relevant politicians, and documents and treaties regarding European security by other organisations. Of course secondary sources, relevant academic articles and expert papers, will help me to support my arguments and to formulate my thesis. The theoretical framework I am resorting to is the comprehensive framework for analysis formulated in 1998 by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde in “Security: A new Framework for Analysis” and of course the comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible approach the OSCE itself has developed over the last decades. Structuring the analysis into different sectors, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde split their framework into the Military, the Environmental, the Economic, the Societal and the Political Sector. As the OSCE is divided into 3 dimensions – the political-military, economic-environmental and the humanitarian dimension – this framework is applies very well.

2. Background

2.1. The History of the OSCE

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was not founded as an International Organisation in terms of International Law. The Organisation today arose from the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This conference took place between 1973 and 1975 in Helsinki and Geneva; its main objective was to regulate security political principles, introduce confidence building measures and codes of conduct for the political military area, as well as the agreement to be dealing with a wide scope of economic and humanitarian issues.² 35 countries participated “*outside military alliances, [...] as sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality*”³.

In 1975 the Helsinki Final Act was signed at the first summit of Heads of Government of the Participating States in Helsinki and set goals for common security and co-operation in the Euro-Atlantic area. It had a great impact on Security Still, the “*Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*” cannot be compared with the official foundation charters other organisations have, comprising rules, membership and purpose, or a treaty, as no legally binding commitments were made. It was a set of agreements – binding on a political level – set out in three baskets. The first dealt with questions on security in Europe, like principles for the inter-state treatment, confidence building measures and the effort to promote disarmament. The second basket dealt with “Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment” and the third with cooperation in humanitarian matters in the Mediterranean.

Especially the principles outlined in the first basket are still timely and relevant, as they are guidelines for the mutual relations between the participating states.

Ten principles were listed in the “*Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations*

² Cf. Hauser, Gunther, p. 49.

³ OSCE Handbook, p.2.

between Participating States”, which became known as the Helsinki Decalogue:

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
3. Inviolability of frontiers
4. Territorial integrity of States
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
6. Non-intervention in internal affair
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
9. Co-operation among States
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law ⁴

Today, the OSCE is still similarly structured with its three dimensions; it's guiding principles and continues dealing with these topics. Important is, that the Helsinki Final Act was nor is in some way legally binding, meaning that the Participating States agreed on these principles but not on some kind of consequences in case these principles would be violated. Also later CSCE/OSCE documents did not carry a legal character. Considering the purpose the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was introduced one can say that most probably the agreement on a legally binding treaty would not have been possible at the time.

The CSCE was supposed to be a multilateral forum for exchange between East and West during the time of the Cold War. The two sides were able to come together and negotiate within the only forum besides the UN that included States that wouldn't be members of either the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or the Warsaw Pact. Meetings continued during the years following the Helsinki conference in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna to discuss, update and review the commitments made in 1975. In 1986 at the third follow-up meeting in Vienna the decision to further the confidence- and security-building measures was made and the discussions and negotiations finally led to the introduction of the CFE – the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in*

⁴ Cf. Conference on Security and Cooperation Final Act, Helsinki 1975, p.4ff.

Europe in 1990. Although important agreements on human rights topics were made during the foregoing meetings, the introduction of a supervisory mechanism for the exchange of information pertaining to human rights, called the *Vienna mechanism*, was the most substantial one. For the first time the term “*Human dimension*” was used, as well as further conferences on humanitarian matters were decided. They were held in the following years and introduced crucial agreements, like free elections, freedom of the media and children’s rights to only name some of them.⁵

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the End of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990, France invited the Participating States to a summit. The new situation in Europe had to be discussed, now that the political bipolarity of the last 40 years had ended. In the “*Charter of Paris for a new Europe*” basic rules for international relations were codified and the CSCE was introduced as guarantor of security in the new arranged Europe. The guiding principles were Democracy, Human Rights, market economy and co-operation on the field of economy and security. Also a need for more institutionalisation arose. It was decided that the Heads of State would meet more frequently and the CSCE council was established. Here the Participating States agreed that their foreign ministers would meet at least once a year. These meetings were to be prepared by senior officials, who would carry out its decisions, consider current issues and think of future work the CSCE could get involved with. Small support bodies for the committee, which already had each CSCE staff of three to four officers – a secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna and an office for free Elections in Warsaw were created.⁶

After the Paris summit high-level parliamentarians from the Participating States founded the Parliamentary Assembly of the CSCE in 1991 and set up their Secretariat in Copenhagen. Also dozens of newly founded and former Soviet Union and Ex-Yugoslavian States joined the CSCE in the years from 1991 to 1993.

The eruption of the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgian South Ossetia and the breaking away from Moldova by Transnistria were a reason for speeding up the institutionalisation process. Quickly institutions, mechanisms and instruments for responding to the wars and preventing further crises were developed. A court for

⁵ Cf. OSCE Handbook, p.5.

⁶ Ibid., p.6.

Conciliation and Arbitration was established in Geneva, the Free Elections Office in Warsaw was transformed and renamed Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – ODIHR, an annual Economic Forum was established and the Conflict and Prevention Centre was given the new authority to initiate fact-finding and monitoring missions in connection with unusual military activities.⁷ During this period also the call for a conference of the foreign ministers to negotiate the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh led to the establishment of the Co-Chairs and the Minsk Group, who continue to operate to this day, trying to find a negotiating basis for both sides. Also, the participation in the OSCE of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was suspended in 1992 and only gained re-entry in form of several new states over the next couple of years, after the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995.

In 1992 a follow - up summit was held in Helsinki where the CSCE officially became a regional arrangement according to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.⁸ The permanent committee was established and the Forum for Security Co-operation was introduced. Both convene on a weekly basis in Vienna. Also the position of High Commissioner on National Minorities was created and the same year the post of Secretary General was introduced. It was decided to move the Secretariat from Prague to Vienna in 1993 and at the Budapest Summit in 1994 the U.S. proposal to rename the CSCE “*Organisation for Security and Cooperation*” in Europe was adopted.

*“The CSCE is the security structure embracing States from Vancouver to Vladivostok. We are determined to give a new political impetus to the CSCE, thus enabling it to play a cardinal role in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. To reflect this determination, the CSCE will henceforth be known as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).”*⁹

In 1996 at the Summit in Lisbon the Participating States convened for the first time as OSCE.

⁷ Ibid., p.7.

⁸ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml>, 14.09.2010.

⁹ Budapest Summit Declaration, Art.3.

The Permanent Committee had become the Permanent Council, the CSCE Council the Ministerial Council and the Committee of Senior Officials had been renamed Senior Council. Several institutions, field missions and operations were set up during the 1990ies. The last important step was made in 1999 at the Istanbul Summit.

The need for a new security model was in the air since the renaming of the OSCE. In Lisbon first steps had been made towards a Declaration and finally in Istanbul the “*Charter for European Security*” was adopted. The Platform for Co-operative Security was implemented, which is a model for co-operation with other international and regional organisations and should prevent different organisations from working side by side instead of together on similar projects and encourages them to join forces. Furthermore it was agreed to develop the OSCE’s role in peacekeeping and a Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Team (REACT) was created which should allow the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for further staff or assistance in field operations.¹⁰ Also, the Forum for Security Co-operation adopted the “*Vienna Document 1999*”. This document is an important asset to the politico-military dimension of the OSCE, regulating confidence- and security building measures adapted in accordance with regional needs.

Also an essential non-OSCE document for European Security was transformed and adapted at the Istanbul summit: the “*Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*” as well as its accompanying “*Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty*”. This treaty has not been ratified and the Russian Federation has suspended its participation in 2007.¹¹

The twenty-first century brought a number of assets to the OSCE that had not been there in the 1990ies. The Secretariat in Vienna with a well-equipped Conflict Prevention Centre, the Vienna based office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, which had been established in 1997, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the ODIHR worked active- and effectively. The Parliamentary Assembly met on a regular basis and cooperated with ODIHR on election observation

¹⁰ Cf. Charter for European Security, p.1.

¹¹ see Chapter 5.3. for details.

and many field operations were set up between South-Eastern Europe and Central Asia.¹²

Priorities were shifted from short-term missions to long-term projects after the recovery of several states from the wars in the decade before. These countries had to be re-socialised now that the armed conflicts were mostly settled. Democratisation and Rule of Law became important topics, and training of police, judges, civil servants and civil societies were initiated. Border security was made an important topic through the “*OSCE Border Security and Management Concept*”. The “*OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension*” gave the second Dimension new importance. A focus was set on fighting discrimination and intolerance against minorities and an Academy for post-gradual international studies was founded in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in 2004.

Also in the Forum for Security Co-operation changes had been made - the “*Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*” and the “*Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition*” were negotiated and the “*Treaty on Open Skies*” entered into force. The latter is not an OSCE document, however it is closely linked to it. It initiated a regime of unarmed observation flights over the territories of States Parties and contains specific regulations and detailed specifications on, for example, the entry and the amount of the flights.¹³

Today the OSCE faces new challenges. Trafficking in human beings has become an important issue as well as drug trafficking within the OSCE Region. Corruption remains an issue throughout the whole of Europe. Terrorism is also a new phenomenon that has to be dealt with increasingly in the 21st century. Thus combating and preventing those issues is a new priority for the OSCE.

2.2. Structures and Institutions

Founded as a Conference the 56 OSCE countries call themselves Participating States instead of Member States like in other international organisations.

¹² Cf. OSCE Handbook, p.10.

¹³ OSCE Handbook, p.99.

The OSCE decision-making body is structured into various sections. The highest is the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government – the Summit. They are attended by the delegations of the Participating States and are open to the Mediterranean and Asian Partners of Co-operation and other international and non-governmental organisations.

The Ministerial Council is the central decision-making and governing body between summits.¹⁴ The Foreign ministers of the Participating States meet on an annual basis to review the activities of the OSCE, except in years when Summits take place.

The regular body for political consultation and decision-making is the Permanent Council (PC), meeting weekly in Vienna. Permanent Representatives of the Participating States negotiate and make decisions on current activities of the OSCE, like field operations, employment of high-level positions and financial and budgetary matters. Its sessions are prepared through the Preparatory Committee, which meets on a weekly basis. Furthermore, the PC dispose over the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance (ACMF), which deals with the internal regulations of the OSCE such as staff and wages and the Security Committee, meeting on a regular – monthly basis, discussing the current issues. Finally, the Economic and Environmental Committee also reports to the PC on activities and issues in this sector.

The above-mentioned Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) also convenes weekly in Vienna. Its main objective is to discuss and negotiate agreements on topics concerning the OSCE Participating States' security. These include confidence and security building measures, arms control and disarmament.

Each year the OSCE is chaired by a different Participating State, designated two years in advance at a Summit or Ministerial Council. The Chairmanship is in charge of co-ordinating and over-viewing the work-process in the OSCE as well as setting the priorities of the OSCE for the term in office. The Chairman in Office (CiO), the participating States' foreign Minister, is assisted by the OSCE Troika, which consists of the incoming chair, the preceding CiO and the current one. The CiO is very powerful and the organisations political leader, representing the Organisation

¹⁴ OSCE Handbook, p.15.

externally, guiding the OSCE bodies and chairing the political organs.¹⁵ The current Chairman-in-Office is Audronius Ažubalis, of Lithuania.

The Vienna-based Secretariat of the OSCE is in charge of assisting the Chairmanship-in-Office. The Secretary General, currently Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, who is elected for a term of three years, heads it. He oversees the implementation of OSCE decisions, advises the CiO on political, economic and legal issues and has an important co-ordination function.¹⁶ Also, he has to present an annually report on the OSCE activities. The Secretariat is divided into different subsections. The Action against Terrorism Unit, the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, the Strategic Police Matters Unit, the Conflict Prevention Centre and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. Of course also administrative sections like the Department of Human Resources, the Department of Management and Finance, and the Office on Internal Oversight are included in the Secretariat. The Department of Management and Finance is in charge of preparing the OSCE unified budget each year. This budget is composed of the contribution of the 56 Participating States according to scales, based on variables like economic, social and military power of each State. Each Country can make voluntarily additional extra-budgetary contributions.

2.3. The Decision-making process

All OSCE Participating States have an equal vote and decisions are adopted by consensus after a certain time if no objections were brought in. This decision-making process is on the one hand fair to all parties but makes it often difficult to find a solution and agreement on the other hand. A possibility not to block the decision-making process but still express disagreement is to ask the secretariat to circulate the reservations the Participating State has after the decision has been made.

Anyhow, two exceptions to the consensus decision exist. The first is the consensus-minus-one decision. This can only be applied when the country excluded from the

¹⁵ Löberbauer, 2006, p. 23.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 24.

decision-making has violated the OSCE commitments. The decision to introduce this exception was made in February 1992 in Prague at the 2nd CSCE Council¹⁷ and applied in July of the same year suspending Yugoslavia from the CSCE.

The second exception is the consensus-minus-two decision. This can be applied when two Participating States are having a dispute and a decision concerning their dispute has to be made. Both disputing parties would have to give up their votes. This decision-making modus had been introduced at the 3rd CSCE Council in Stockholm, in the framework of the “*Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*”¹⁸ also in 1992, but has never been applied until today.

Again, it has to be underlined that the OSCE is in no way entitled or has the authority to enforce any rules, norms or mechanisms the Participating States decide upon. The only actual way to apply pressure the OSCE has is political leverage.

2.4. The OSCE’s three dimensions

The three dimensions of the OSCE developed out of the so-called “Blue Book”, which was a set of recommendations the informal preparatory talks for the Conference of Security and Cooperation had produced. The Blue Book suggested dividing the conference in three thematic blocks, the first relating to security issues, the second should deal with cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology and environmental issues and the third with cooperation in the humanitarian field. These recommendations were respected and resulted in the three

¹⁷ Prague Document on Further Development of Further CSCE Institutions and Structures, IV, 16.: „The Council decided, in order to develop further the CSCE's capability to safeguard human rights, democracy and the rule of law through peaceful means, that appropriate action may be taken by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments. Such actions would consist of political declarations or other political steps to apply outside the territory of the State concerned. This decision is without prejudice to existing CSCE mechanisms.”

¹⁸ Third Meeting of the Council, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Annex 4, Provisions for directed Conciliation, 4.: “The parties to the dispute may exercise any rights they otherwise have to participate in all discussions within the Council or CSO regarding the dispute, but they will not take part in the decision by the Council or the CSO directing the parties to conciliation, or in decisions described in paragraph 2(a).”

Baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. Today, they are referred to as the OSCE's three dimensions.¹⁹

The Politico-Military dimension includes commitments, mechanisms and principles of the Participating States, which help improving conflict prevention and resolution. Also improvement in military security is been sought through openness, transparency and cooperation. The main forum is of course the Forum for Security Cooperation. Here a range of documents has been produced which are essential to European security today. The *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*, the *Vienna Document 1999* regulating Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and the *OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons* (SALW) are only some of the agreements that have been made.

The Economic and Environmental Dimension observes developments in this field, helps creating policies and initiatives related to it. The biggest meeting in this dimension is the Economic and Environmental Forum, a two-day conference. First held in 1993 the Forum comes together at ambassadorial level once a year following two preparatory conferences. It is supposed to review the implementation of the norms and principles by the Participating States and to promote the dialogue on economic and environmental issues.

The Human Dimension seeks to guarantee the respect of Human Rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, to enhance tolerance and non-discrimination and to keep the Rule of Law up. ODHIR is it's primary institution monitoring the implementation by the Participating States and also helping them to develop the necessary mechanisms. Election observation missions are one very important example of the fieldwork under the umbrella of the Human Dimension.

¹⁹ Cf. OSCE Homepage, <http://www.osce.org/item/44318>, 30.03.2011.

3. The Russian draft European Security Treaty

This chapter will give a short outline of changes in the Russian attitude towards the OSCE and its initiative to change the European security architecture through a European Security Treaty.

Many think that since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union the world has developed into a western-dominated unipolar system. The NATO states and especially the US have become so powerful that they clearly dominate world politics. The Russian Federation had generally been kept out of big decisions, it even complains to have been “*shut out of decision-making processes in the Euro-Atlantic area*”.²⁰

Looking at Russia's foreign policy since the end of the Soviet Union, we can distinguish three phases. The first phase starts in with the Yeltsin-Kozyrev government, Russia being a weak country with a dependent foreign policy. During the second phase, the Yeltsin-Primakov government, Russia can still be characterised as a weak country but it already had an independent foreign policy, while the third phase, starting with President Putin, can be seen as that of a strong Russia with an independent foreign policy. These phases also can be discerned in Russia's attitude towards the OSCE. In the first period great importance was given to the CSCE, it was seen as the potential centre for the co-ordination of European politics. It was also “*the only European security institution where it [the Russian Federation] occupied a legitimate place*”.²¹ However, first disappointment arose as most other Participating States were also members of, or applicants to regional institutions taking over a similar role. The second phase was dominated by NATO enlargement and Russia trying to get compensation for it. The CFE treaty was going to be updated but apart from that a relapse into old patterns took place.²² Anyhow, Russia gave big importance to the founding principles of the OSCE throughout the 1990s, with a special focus on the inviolability of borders, stemming from the fear of territorial

²⁰ Monaghan, 2008, p.3.

²¹ Ghebali, 2009, p.67.

²² Cf. Dunay, 2006, p.68.

claims like Germany's claiming Königsberg/Kaliningrad or Finland's claim of Eastern Karelia.²³ The turning point, introducing the third phase, came at the OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999, when Russia was criticised for its policy in Chechnya. The chaotic situation within the country was the main subject of concern for the western countries while Russia was rather looking with apprehension towards the humanitarian and human rights issues on the OSCE's agenda. Criticism arose that the OSCE was becoming a forum for the realisation of other organisations' plans and ideas. Foreign Minister Lavrov gave proof of the increasing Russian disengagement by claiming that a wall between NATO and EU member states and the rest of the Participating States was being erected. While NATO was in charge of security and the EU of economic issues, the OSCE would only serve as a body for adoption of their values in the remaining countries. In this way he denied the OSCE area a common set of values and strength.

Since then, Russia has felt rejected by most Participating States when offering ideas for innovating some OSCE operational principles, and has feared at the same time that the agenda of the OSCE might destabilise Russia's neighbouring countries and, as a result, Russia too.²⁴ Moreover, the Russian Federation feels that there is a general rejection of its proposals and initiatives, "*not for "objective" reasons but because they are Russian*".²⁵ They regard the Kozak Memorandum of 2003 as an example, which suggested a solution for the resolution of the Transnistria – Moldova conflict. Therefore Russia's attitude has become rather defensive.

The relationship between the Russian Federation and the Euro-Atlantic community has been growing apart and the need for a reform has arisen. But the Russian Federation is not looking for innovation exclusively in terms of security. New strategic concept documents like the long-term concept for the development of the Russian Federation until 2020 and the new foreign policy and national security concepts intend to turn the country into an essential actor in the Eurasian region not only in security matters but also in energy and financial aspects.²⁶

²³ Cf. Morozov, 2005, p.70.

²⁴ Cf. Dunay, 2006, p.70f.

²⁵ Monaghan, 2008, p.2.

²⁶ Cf. Monaghan, 2010, p.8f.

The Russian Federation has been setting some drastic signs of its discontentment concerning security politics, like the cancellation of the CFE treaty in 2007 or the crisis in Georgia in summer of 2008 to name but a few. Still, the first direct statement demanding a change was made in June 2008 when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called for a pan-European summit to negotiate a legally binding „*European Security Treaty*“ during his first visit to Germany. The time had come for the Russian Federation to demand new power and importance in world politics. President Medvedev claimed that the existing European security architecture would meet 21st century needs and called for the reconstruction and modernisation of Europe’s institutional framework. Especially NATO and the OSCE were subject to Moscow’s criticism.²⁷ NATO enlargement was considered a significant external threat by the Russian Federation in its new military doctrine issued in February 2010. Today, already 28 out of the 56 OSCE participating states are member countries of NATO. Furthermore, NATO has been considering membership of the Russian neighbours Ukraine and Georgia, which would leave the Russian Federation incarcerated between NATO member states.²⁸ President Medvedev’s call for a treaty came only two months after the NATO summit where these possible memberships were discussed. Also, this was not the first time that Russia proposed a treaty following NATO enlargements. In 1954 and 1955 then Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had drafted a treaty, which had parallels to President Medvedevs European Security Treaty. This draft was released after it became clear that Western Germany was going to join NATO.²⁹

In addition to the imminent NATO enlargement, issues like the “*US missile defence deployment plans, the use of force in ways unsanctioned by the UN (Kosovo 1999 and Iraq 2003), support for the dismemberment of some OSCE Participating States (Kosovo 2008) in tandem with insistence on the territorial integrity of others (Georgia, Moldova), and the militarization of countries on Russia’s borders (Georgia)*”³⁰ are a cause of concern to the Russian Federation and a reason to propose a reform of Euro-Atlantic security.

Still, the Russian Federation regards the European Union as an autonomous security actor and sees many possibilities for cooperation even if the Russia would only play

²⁷ Cf. Ibid., 2008, p.3.

²⁸ Cf. Kupchan, 2010, p.101.

²⁹ Cf. Klijn, 2010, p. 156.

³⁰ Lynch, 2010, p. 27.

an assisting role and moreover rights and power would not be equally distributed in decision-making processes, something that would not be possible in the NATO-Russia relationship.³¹

The joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council of the OSCE on 18th February 2009 gave the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Alexander Grushko, the opportunity to address the meeting with a speech on the European Security Architecture. Although he stated that the OSCE should not be the only forum for developing the treaty, the OSCE should have an exclusive role in the area of arms control. This would “*represent a real way of strengthening security*”³². Also, he said that the Euro-Atlantic security matrix would have to be reloaded, and the best way would of course be through developing and concluding the EST together. The latter would become some kind of “Helsinki plus”, a legally binding set of principles for inter-state relations, which would be “*based on complete respect for the interests of every State in the pan-European area and recognition of their equal rights when it comes to ensuring security*”³³. The Deputy Minister also stated that today’s problems were due to a lack of trust, which is the foundation for a successful dialogue.

This absence of trust between the Participating States has not been able to be diminished over the last decades. However, confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) were developed in the framework of the OSCE but have not been able to establish the network of trust needed to encounter modern threats unified as one cooperative organisation. The need for reformation of the OSCE and the pan-European security structures, led to the initiation of the Corfu Process in summer 2009.

Andrew Monaghan, NATO Defence College Research Advisor, analysed in summer 2009 the variety of possible aims the Russian Federation could have with its proposal, from a minimum to maximum scenario. In his view the minimum aim would be to interrupt ongoing processes like NATO enlargement or the US missile defence

³¹ Cf. Klijn, 2010, p. 158.

³² Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Alexander Grushko, FSC-PC.DEL/9/09, 18 February 2009, p.2.

³³ Ibid., p.4.

project. Moreover, it could challenge the western community by splitting a unified position into individual, national, responses to their proposal. Then, the activation of the Platform for Co-operative Security and the inclusion of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) could be an aim, showing “*the inability of the EU, OSCE and NATO to meet current challenges*”. The “maximum” goal according to Monaghan could be a long-term prospective, giving the still basic proposals more substance and shaping them according to Moscow’s interest.³⁴

At the end of November 2009 a draft version of the treaty was published on the official website of the Kremlin and a proposal of the treaty was distributed by the Russian Federation to all heads of state and government of the OSCE’s Participating States (PS) as well as to the heads of international organisations like NATO, the European Union, the CSTO, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, of course, the OSCE. The treaty was released only four days before the NATO-Russia Council would convene, and two days before the OSCE Athens Ministerial Council, where the future of the Corfu Process was to be discussed. Several western countries saw this as an attempt to weaken or even sabotage the Corfu Process, which was to discuss precisely this topic – the future of European security.³⁵

Key elements of Medvedev’s initiative were the opposition to NATO enlargement and the planned US missile defence system. Anyhow, the OSCE was considered an important actor in the shaping of the European Security Treaty as the Participating States overlap completely with the State Parties foreseen by the Russian Federation to the future treaty. An “added value” of the treaty would lie in making legally binding commitments compared to the previously agreed documents within the OSCE/CSCE and NATO-Russia Council (NRC).³⁶

The treaty consists of 14 articles of which 9 deal with practical matters concerning the relation between countries in the politico-military area and five with formal issues from adoption to ratification.³⁷ The treaty is designed for nation states, although by

³⁴ Monaghan, 2009, p.4.

³⁵ Cf. Richter, Schmitz, 2010, p.2.

³⁶ Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ministerial working lunch, 4. December 2008.

³⁷ The full text of the treaty can be found in the annex.

signing the treaty countries which are members of international organisations or alliances also agree that neither they nor the organisation/alliance/coalition of which they are members would take any security threatening measures against another party to the treaty.³⁸ Furthermore, the treaty regulates the exchange of information between the parties to the treaty and measures in case a party to the treaty gets attacked.

The Russian proposal focuses mostly on the politico-military dimension, giving special prominence to the principle of indivisibility of security and leaving behind humanitarian and economic issues. It specifically controls the relationship of the parties to the treaty towards each other in terms of hard security issues. The treaty practically incorporates indivisibility of security not only through the promise not to undertake any actions that would endanger another party's security but also especially by regarding an attack against one of the parties to the treaty as an attack against all parties.³⁹ The indivisibility of security is of such high importance to Russian because of recent developments, in the course of which an armed conflict erupted between two OSCE PS. The OSCE PS are bound by commitments not to use force against each other, but as these commitments are not legally binding, the OSCE lacks explicit rules. Moreover, while there is an organisation dealing exclusively with "soft" security issues, namely the Council of Europe, the Russian Federation misses an organisation concerned solely with "hard" issues.⁴⁰

The EST is designed for the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian zone, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, to create a legal space of politico-military security. It can be compared to a non-aggression pact, containing provisions for what to do in case the pact gets violated or aggression happens from outside this framework. The great difference between the EST and earlier treaties and agreements is the fact that it would be a legally binding treaty. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated in his speech during the 46th Munich Security Conference in February 2010 that the principle of indivisibility had been promoted to such a high extent in the 1990s that it should not be a problem to make it legally binding. As he claims, it is the only practical principle left in the draft treaty, while all other practical issues have been included in the Corfu

³⁸ Cf. Draft European Security Treaty, Art.1, Art.2.

³⁹ Cf. Ibid., Art.7.

⁴⁰ Cf. Lavrov, The Euro-Atlantic Region, 2010.

Process. However, the EST was also included and discussed during in the Corfu Process sessions.

The first official discussion of the European Security Treaty within the OSCE took place on 27th January 2010 in the framework of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). As the Russian Federation is concerned to keep the EST focused on the politico-military dimension, claiming that the biggest problems can be found in this area, the FSC was considered the most appropriate body. The U.S., Belgium, France and Great Britain agreed with the Russian Federation that changes in European security had to be made, still Great Britain indicated the necessity for a cross-dimensional approach while the others made a clear link to the Corfu Process and assured their willingness to discuss European Security within this context and especially alluding to the OSCE as the appropriate framework for discussions on that topic.

An early reaction from the U.S. was Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's speech at the Ecole Militaire in Paris on 29th January 2010. She confirmed the commitment of the United States to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and pointed out the importance it has for U.S. foreign and security policy. The core principles for the American security policy are, according to the Secretary of State, sovereignty and territorial integrity for all states, indivisibility of security, commitment to Art.5 of the NATO treaty which states that "*an attack on one is an attack on all*", and transparency in "*the dealings in Europe*". Russia is pointed out to be a partner instead of an adversary, still Clinton criticised Russia's attitude regarding Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Russian Federation highlighted that the EST was not intended to weaken "western" organisations or to build a new European security architecture, but to give a legal framework to the indivisibility of security, a principle that had been acknowledged by all OSCE PS. Through the adoption of the treaty, the existing flaws in the OSCE area could be extinct in a quick way. Specific politico-military issues were excluded from the treaty and it would only focus on the principle of indivisibility, which would support the creation of a "*legal military-political space in*

*Europe without zones of different degrees of security“.*⁴¹ Furthermore, the Russian Foreign Minister highlighted that while the OSCE still constituted an appropriate platform for discussing the draft treaty, the EST should be treated separately from the Corfu Process as it was an independent project.

Through introducing the draft European Security Treaty the Russian Federation has unwillingly initiated a dialogue on the current European security architecture in the OSCE. The western PS of the OSCE are not ready to commit to a legally binding treaty, but agree on the need to review and possibly change the OSCE's approach towards security in order to improve European and Eurasian security.

⁴¹ Ibid.

4. The Corfu Process

4.1. Launching of the Corfu Process

The European Security Treaty has been proposed as Russia sees deficits in the current Euro-Atlantic security. Twenty years after the end of the cold war Europe has gone through major changes and most parts of Europe do not have to deal with significant threats to their security anymore. Still, further improvements have to be made – today Europe is facing very different threats and challenges than twenty years ago. The economic crisis, the run for natural resources like gas and oil and new threats to security like terrorism, cyber crime and transnational threats as trafficking in human beings, arms trade as well as drugs-trafficking are only some of the numerous challenges Europe has to deal with.

Also territorial disputes are still posing an inner threat to European Security. Although the iron curtain fell in 1989, the final setting of frontiers between the post-UDSSR countries has not been reached today. Conflicts between successor states still remain a current issue, looking at Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova and Georgia.

The latter unfortunately brought a real life example of the problems in European Security in august of 2008. The Conflict in Georgia showed that still dangers to Security within the OSCE region exist and the concept of cooperative security is not fully implemented. Participating States of the OSCE resorted to the principle of use of force against each other. Thus, after the events in Georgia in summer of 2008 it became clear that the OSCE's aim, to achieve indivisible security within the OSCE area had still not been realised.

With President Medvedev's call for a new security dialogue in Europe and a legally binding treaty in June 2008, a first sign of discontentment with the current European security policies had been set.⁴² First official reactions to the Russian initiative within the OSCE came from France, holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 2008. Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner addressed the OSCE Permanent Council on 17

⁴² For details go to the Chapter „The European Security Treaty“.

July 2008, communicating that discussions should be held in the OSCE but should also be linked to debates on Security issues happening in the European Union.⁴³

3 months later, French President Nicolas Sarkozy met with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on 8th October 2008 in Evian at the World Policy Conference. In his speech there President Sarkozy underlined the importance of reconciliation with Russia for Europe. Their partnership would be essential to world politics, for stability and prosperity. As Russia had been gaining power and strength in terms of security and economy the European Union would need a good neighbour, “*et un bon voisin, c’est un voisin heureux*”.⁴⁴ Still, he criticised the Russian Actions in Georgia and highlighted that the events of August 2008 had been a step back in Euro-Russian relations. As a response to the Russian initiative for a European Security Treaty he agreed on the need for further development, thus readiness to discuss the topic. Although NATO and the NATO-Russia Council would be appropriate frameworks for such discussions certain coherence would be missing. President Sarkozy proposed to hold an OSCE summit in the End of 2009, as this forum was the only one that would include all actors concerned with pan European security on an equal level. In this framework, a discussion of the Russian initiative and ideas of the European Union could lead to new concepts of defence. Talking of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok would of course also include the American partners. Sarkozy lined out that for a functioning dialogue the willingness to promote fundamental factors like democracy and human rights and the willingness to compromise and being honest to each other would be essential.⁴⁵

Still, the relationship between the European countries as well as the US with Russia continued to cool down. Only some months after the war in Georgia, the Russia-NATO Council was discontinued and the OSCE became the only forum for communicating on European Security with Russia.⁴⁶

The need for innovation in European Security remained of importance, and became for the first time since the Russian call for change an important topic in the OSCE at

⁴³ PC.DEL/628/08.

⁴⁴ „and a good neighbour is a happy neighbour“.

⁴⁵ Cf. President Nicholas Sarkozy at the World Policy Conference, Evian, 8th October 2008.

⁴⁶ Cf. Lynch, 2010, p.35.

the Ministerial Council in Helsinki in December 2008. The Chairman in Office at the time, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb expressed again that the OSCE would be the most appropriate forum for discussions on security and found overall agreement on this point. The Finnish Chairmanship initiated a working lunch for the OSCE foreign ministers on the future of European Security, from which the Foreign Minister drew several conclusions. He noted that there was a broad agreement on the need for discussions on European Security, new ideas had to be taken into account, the discussion were rather to be focused “on substance than on form” and the basic principles of the OSCE should persist. A wide approach had to be sought, including both hard and soft security, and also “so-called frozen conflicts” should be addressed.⁴⁷ All in all it was agreed among all participants that the starting point for discussions should be the founding OSCE principles. A decision was released which called on the FSC to continue and to intensify the Dialogue on Security and to include other “*international forums if appropriate*”.⁴⁸

Discussions on the European Security Architecture continued during Spring 2009 at a retreat of the permanent representatives, unofficial expert-level seminars and the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference where Minister Lavrov presented President Medvedevs proposal.

It was agreed upon that challenges in all three OSCE dimensions remained to be solved. Apart from “*the need to settle protracted conflicts,[there remained a need] to revitalize arms control and CSBM regimes, to deepen co-operation in addressing threats arising from outside the OSCE area and new threats (such as cybercrime), to address economic and environmental challenges (including energy and water), to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to counter intolerance and discrimination.*”⁴⁹ Also, it was decided to base the future dialogue upon existing OSCE documents and agreements, as they should be enhanced instead of superseded.

An informal ministerial meeting initiated by the Greek Chairmanship at the Island of Corfu from 27th to 28th June 2009 launched the “Corfu Process”, which should reconfirm “*the vision of a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area, from*

⁴⁷ MC.DEL/92/08.

⁴⁸ MC.DEC/13/08.

⁴⁹ Amb. Mara Marinaki, Expert Meeting on European Security, CIO.GAL/61/09, 08.05.2009, p.2.

*Vancouver to Vladivostok, free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security.”*⁵⁰

The foreign ministers of the OSCE Participating States and representatives of the CSTO, EU, NATO and CIS discussed three questions the Greek Chairmanship had posed in a background paper previously to the meeting. They centered on first, how the OSCE participating States had *“failed to live up to the principles of comprehensive and indivisible security and how can they do more to abide them?”*

*Second, how can states strengthen the implementation of commitments across all three OSCE dimensions of security? Finally, what are the challenges that the participating States need to address?”*⁵¹

The discussions were influenced by various facts, as the worsening of the economic situation due to the crisis and the absence of accordance in Georgia. In Chairwoman Dora Bakoyannis’ concluding statement to the press, it was highlighted that Europe is still not a united continent and that it was time to *“Reconfirm our acquis, Review the state of play of European Security and Renovate our mechanisms to deal with traditional and new challenges”*⁵². This way and reconfirming the OSCE commitments the challenges Europe is facing would be dealt with. Again, the OSCE was named the most appropriate body for discussions uniting the countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok but other institutions were welcomed to contribute – specifically in the framework of the platform for cooperative security. Still, it was clear that restoring of trust between the different parties in the discussions within the OSCE was essential. The goal of the Corfu Process was set to *“build a whole and lasting security in Europe for all”* on the one hand and *“ensuring the security of Europe against common threats and challenges”*⁵³ on the other hand, addressing these issues in all three OSCE dimensions. With the recommendation to look for more structure and priority topics in the following months as preparation for the Ministerial Council in Athens in December the Corfu Process was launched on 28th June 2009.

In autumn of 2009 several informal meetings of the Corfu Process at ambassadorial level took place. The topics discussed sourced from all three dimensions, e.g. energy

⁵⁰ MC.DOC/1/09.

⁵¹ Lynch, 2010, p.37.

⁵² Corfu Informal Meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers on the Future of European Security. Chair’s Concluding Statement to the Press.

⁵³ Ibid.

security, conflict resolution, crisis management, human rights, fundamental freedoms and general principles and commitments. The informality of the meetings allowed the delegates to exchange in an open and forthcoming way and prepare the topics that would be taken forward in Athens. Still, a lack of confidence could be noticed between the Participating States.⁵⁴

At the Seventeenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council of the OSCE in Athens in December 2009 finally an official “*Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu Process*” was released.⁵⁵ The OSCE Foreign Ministers reconfirmed their commitment to the OSCE principles, as well as they acknowledged the need for new security measures as new challenges were being faced, including the financial instabilities. The Corfu Process already had started to enhance a political dialogue on security within the OSCE and this document invited organizations and institutions dealing with security related issues to participate and contribute to the process. Also, three guidelines were formulated to regulate the discussions:

- “(a) *Adherence to the concept of comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security, as enshrined in the OSCE fundamental documents;*
- (b) Compliance with OSCE norms, principles and commitments in all three OSCE dimensions, in full and in good faith, and in a consistent manner by all;*
- (c) Determination to strengthen partnership and co-operation in the OSCE area, as well as to enhance the effectiveness of the OSCE and its contribution to security in our common space.”*⁵⁶

Within these cornerstones for discussions the Corfu process was officially set to continue in Vienna throughout the year 2010.

⁵⁴ Cf. Lynch, 2010, p. 38f.

⁵⁵ Relevant extracts of the Athens Ministerial Declaration can be found in the annex.

⁵⁶ MC.DOC/1/09, par.5.

4.2. Development of the Corfu Process

To make the discussions easier, the Kazakh Chairmanship split the Corfu Process into 8 “ticks” that were discussed at a two-day Ambassadors retreat in the Austrian countryside in February 2010. 2 further ticks were added at a later moment. The Chairmanship had formulated “Questions to be addressed” for the retreat that included topics that had come up in the forgoing discussions. This way, the debates could center on the specific topic and be kept in a certain framework.

The single ticks were:

1. The Role of the OSCE in Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation
2. Transnational and Multidimensional Threats and Challenges
3. General Questions of Euro-Atlantic security
4. The Cross-Dimensional Approach to Security
5. Role of the Arms Control and Confidence- and Security Building Regimes in Building Trust in the Evolving Security Environment
6. Economic and Environmental Challenges
7. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as Democracy and the Rule of Law
8. Enhancing the OSCE’s Effectiveness
9. Implementations of all OSCE Norms, Principles and Commitments
10. Interaction with other Organizations and Institutions on the basis of the 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security

As one can see, half of the ticks are located within the first, politico-military dimension, while only one tick was designated to the second – economic and environmental – and one to the third – humanitarian – dimension. The last three ticks relate to formal and effectiveness issues of the OSCE. Also, Ambassadors from different Participating States were assigned the coordination of single ticks. They were in charge of informing, chairing and organizing the discussions on their specific topic. The Ambassadors were members of the OSCE and FSC troika, or Chairs of the three PC committees. Each Participating State could contribute alone or in a group by submitting Food-for-Thought papers (FfT-papers). They suggested a possible way of

addressing or handling an issue. Participating States could express their official alienation with the FfT-paper and be subsequently mentioned in the Paper, along the other Participating State(s). However, they could also just express their support for the FfT-paper, without aliening themselves. This way, the possible internal inconsistencies a State could have with the content of the Paper (due to a pending conflict or internal policy) or another Participating State aliened with the Paper would not be given. The more support and of course alienations these FfT-papers got, the higher was the possibility that the idea would be included in the Process.

In spring 2010 it seemed to specialists that no end would be found in the Corfu process, as the United States formally agreed to it, but did not show an overactive involvement. Although it was a good framework to hold the discussions for the moment, a more specific dialogue would have to be found after some time.⁵⁷ Also, the functioning of the decision-making process in the OSCE might have presented a problem to find solutions and progress in the Corfu process. As decisions can only be adopted if no objections were brought in, the way to find an answer in the Corfu Process must have been very hard.

In the beginning of July 2010, the Kazakh Chairman in Office released an Interim Report, summing up and discussing the achievements that had already been made in the Corfu Process.

Also in July 2010 finally a meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan was held where the progress made in the Corfu process was reviewed. There also an OSCE summit at the end of the year in the Kazakhs Chairmanships capital Astana was decided. It would be the first time in 11 years that an OSCE summit would be realized.

During the next six months the Corfu discussions continued and were narrowed down. They were prepared for the summit to be discussed during the time there and possibly lead to an action plan or solution of the security crisis happening in Europe.

⁵⁷ Cf. Mankoff, p.77f.

5. The OSCE's approaches to Security

Since the end of the Cold War, new perceptions of security have arisen. No longer only “hard” military aspects were of importance but also “soft” issues that include human rights and fundamental freedoms. The OSCE incorporated “soft” issues in its founding charter in Helsinki, too. Also among the fundamental principles of the OSCE are the concepts of comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security. They are not only mentioned as part of the guidelines for the Corfu Process in the background paper released before the first meeting but also constitute a substantial part of the OSCE principles. The aim is to include all possible aspects relevant to security through this approach. It helps to provide a broader view of the given situation and can lead to more efficiency in practice if all aspects affected and concerned are included in the analysis and later, in policymaking.

To start the discussion of the theoretical background of the OSCE, the term security in international relations itself has to be defined. Traditionally security is endangered when something existentially threatens an object (this can be a state, sovereignty, nations, religions, a species...). So security is the absence of danger.⁵⁸ In the context of international relations security is “*a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having power to define security*”.⁵⁹

When looking at security one has to look at the different forms in which it appears as well. The American political scientist Joseph Nye has developed the concept of “soft power” in comparison to hard, military power. Soft power works through attraction, international and/or democratic institutions and ideology, while hard power relies on military strength. The latter occurs when one country commands another country to do what it wants whereas soft power is when it gets the other country to want what *it* wants.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Cf. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p.21ff.

⁵⁹ Buzan et al. after Bigo, *Policies en réseaux: l'expérience européenne*, 1996 forthcoming, p. 31.

⁶⁰ Cf. Nye, 1990, p.166f.

Security has been defined and analysed on different terms and from different points of view in the course of time. To understand the concepts of comprehensive and cooperative security more easily, earlier concepts can help.

National security or state security is one of the oldest security concepts. It is a realist approach and consists in the capacity of a state to survive as a sovereign state and having basic means to act towards the outside and the inside. It encourages an anarchic system and the security dilemma, which means that security of one state, is obtained at the expense of that of another. It is defined by the government and the elite and pursued through national means or alliances and the balance of power. Cooperation is rather rare, as other states are not considered trustworthy.

“Collective security” emerged in the 19th century and moves away from the anarchy of the state security concept. States have alliances and are part of a collective system. Collective actions are more important than individual demands. The states in the collective system hold of common interests, rules and institutions, which can evolve into common sets of values. They have settlement systems in case of disputes but the collective system can still be affected or even collapse if one element does not work.

This concept developed into the one of alliances, which relies on collective defence. It is the contrary of collective security, as the members stand together against an external threat or enemy. Security is given for the alliance at the expense of others. The defence relies mainly on military aspects but economic and political elements are added.

From collective security the concept of “common security” evolved. The Palme Commission⁶¹ introduced the concept in 1982 in face of the threat of nuclear weapons and their proliferation. This concept would join two opponents to act together on military issues, controlling the spread of (nuclear) weapons and limiting them. They should also act together on economic and environmental issues.⁶²

⁶¹ Olof Palme was the Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues who issued the report: *Common Security: A Blueprint for survival*. The Report was considered by a special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in June 1982 and included recommendations on disarmament, arms control and security issues.

⁶² Cf. Archer, 2001, p.9ff.

5.1. Comprehensive Security

Comprehensive security makes a step away from the traditional approach towards security issues, which focused primarily on the military agenda. It is no longer only the declaration of war which is seen as a possible security issue endangering the sovereignty of a state. The comprehensive approach includes many aspects beyond the military and political dimension, such as social, societal, economic, ecologic and cultural aspects of security. Societal security would include a specific group of people (e.g. religious, ethnic, minorities) that feel the need to protect their identity against an aggressor or the need of securing the society itself.⁶³

The comprehensive approach was developed academically in the middle of the 1990s by Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School as a reaction to the new world order.⁶⁴ During this time the concept of security was extended in four ways: looking at the security of nations, security was first extended downwards to the security of groups or individuals and upwards to the security of the international system, to the supranational level. These two extensions concern the “*entities whose security is to be ensured*”.⁶⁵ The third extension is the one directly related to the comprehensive approach – security was expanded horizontally to different areas, including different sorts of security. So, “*from military security to political, economic, social, environmental or “human” security*”.⁶⁶ Human security includes safety from existential threats such as hunger, epidemics or repression on the one hand and safety from disruptions in everyday life on the other.⁶⁷ The forth extension happens in all directions as the subject of expansion is the political responsibility ensuring security. The nation state expands the responsibility upwards to the supranational level, downwards to regional and local governing institutions and horizontally to non-governmental organisations, the media, public opinion and the market.⁶⁸ Today, all these levels are being included when dealing with security issues. The theoretical framework outlined by Buzan, de Wilde and Weaver gives an appropriate background

⁶³ Cf. Archer, 2001, p.14.

⁶⁴ Cf. Gärtner, 2008, p.217f.

⁶⁵ Rothschild, 1995, p.55.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.55.

⁶⁷ Cf. Gärtner, 2008, p.100f.

⁶⁸ Rothschild, 1995, p.55.

for an understanding of the commitments made by the OSCE participating states during the last 3 decades and their relation to Security and Cooperation in Europe. In this chapter their framework will therefore be described step by step, the concept of cooperative security will be explained, followed by an overview of the OSCE documents relating to comprehensive and cooperative security.

Buzan, de Wilde and Weaver categorise the fields of security in their framework for analysis in the military sector, the environmental sector, the economic sector, the societal sector and the political sector. They divide the analysis in object(s) of reference, actors and regions. Each sector has to deal with different threats to their sectoral security on a different level and way. While the state is an important actor and object of reference in almost all sectors, the areas affected by threats vary a lot between the individual themes.

5.1.1. The Military Sector

The military sector is the most traditional sector of security studies. Security is most likely to be institutionalised in this sector. Threats to military security can come up internally and externally. When internal threats to security arise it is the task of the military sector to maintain peace, territorial integrity and protect the constituent institutions. Externally this sector concerns the (armed) offensive and defensive potential of a state, and the evaluation and perception of the power and intention another state might have. The referent objects of the military sector traditionally are states or would-be states. While in the past dynastic or national states were the sole objects of reference, today civic constituents and the government of a state can correlate on military issues. Alliances, international and regional organisations can become objects of military security too. Looking at governments, one has to take into account that in practice tensions between the ruler and the ruled can exist, which gives room to (non-state) units endangering military security. Military insecurity can exist between but also within states. The latter occurs especially when units within the state seek statehood. This can include tribes, rebel movements and religion, which forms

part of the state in some cases. Seeking statehood they become a danger to the sovereignty of the existing nation/state and stimulate use of force.

Territorial integrity is a traditional object of military security, whose endangerment is one of the few defined objective threats. Still, one can say that military threats are often intentional and coordinated. *“When used, they represent a breakdown or abandonment of normal political relations and a willingness to have political, economic and social issues decided by brute force.”*⁶⁹ Also, the absolute powers of potential attackers define the nature and extend of the menace they are posing. The reaction to the threat depends on the society as different societies respond in different ways. Today, military security still prevails in regional security dynamics but can also be found in local dynamics in weak states.⁷⁰

5.1.2. The Environmental Sector

Environmental security has become a more and more important issue since the mid 1980s. It even gets awarded the title of “ultimate security” by some. The political structure of environmental issues has not been defined completely, although NGOs, governmental departments, social movements and international organisations have been founded to deal with them. Therefore the political power environmental issues have is limited. Two agendas evolved out of it, the first being the scientific one, formulated by science and NGOs, and the second the political one, drawn up by governments and intergovernmental organisations. The scientific agenda determines the threat, while the political one is in charge of informing the public, getting the approval for taking action and allotting the resources to deal with the issue. Short-term events influence the political agenda heavily, as media, governmental and public standards can shape it. The political choices have to be made on an intuitive basis because they have to follow conclusions made in science, which the politicians cannot prove themselves but simply have to believe that the facts are such as the scientists claim them to be. This is true for all sectors but is especially relevant in the environmental sector. What makes this sector so complicated is the great variety of

⁶⁹ Buzan et al., 1998, p.57f.

⁷⁰ Cf. Ibid., p.49-70.

issues dealt with. *“The ultimate referent object of environmental security is the risk of losing achieved levels of civilisation – a return to forms of societal barbarism – while apparently being able to prevent doing so.”*⁷¹

So, the referent objects are the environment itself as well as the linkage between environment and civilisation. All human enterprises depend on the preservation of not only the local but also the planetary biosphere.

The actors in the sector are of economic and governmental nature. The economic ones are mostly transnational corporations and industries. They stand in direct relationship to the quality of the environment and although they affect it they usually stay out of the political and security dialogue. The government actors (government itself, some of its agencies and some international organisations) define the rules on environmental issues and check how well they are enforced. Also, they allow the institutionalisation of environmental security by international law, environmental ministries and intergovernmental organisations. Still, governmental actors can also damage the environment through nuclear testing or production and disposal of all kinds of weaponry, for example. Also, the actors causing environmental problems are in most cases not the ones affected by it.

Environmental security has strong local dynamics, although it is an issue of global relevance. The amount of different issues simply makes it easier to deal with them at a regional and even local level. They become global issues through media coverage and actions to securitize are made at all levels, mainly at the global one, but it has proven that local moves are the most successful. This is because in most cases they show locally and there some action can be taken instead of waiting *“for a global-level solution to tackle these local problems”*⁷². Also, political insecurities at the local level caused by environmental problems are more likely to happen in “weak” states than in strong ones.⁷³

⁷¹ Ibid., p.75.

⁷² Ibid., p.92.

⁷³ Cf. Ibid., p.71 – 93.

5.1.3. The Economic Sector

The economic sector has to deal with controversies and is highly politicised. As there are different theoretical approaches to economics and economic security is seen somewhere between “*the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market*”⁷⁴ the different views have to be presented. For mercantilists and neomercantilists politics come first. The state plays a big role, providing security for markets and firms. Economic security is part of national or state security and the economic success is considered as zero sum.

Socialists see economics at the root of the social fabric and it is the responsibility of state to gear economics “*toward social and political goals of justice and equity*”⁷⁵. Economic security is aimed at the weak and opposes the strong. These two views can also be categorised as economic nationalisms. Both, the (neo-) mercantilists and the socialists grant the state a big role. The economy is, at least partly, controlled by the state, which also provides economic security.

The liberals by contrast think of economics first and see it, like the socialists at the root of the social fabric. The market should be free with as little state interferences as possible. Economic security protects the capitalist elite or/and consists of rules that were created to allow ability to move between national economies.

Economic security is largely influenced by the liberal view – through the increasing interdependence of states in economies, a larger dependency on the stability and functioning of the respective economies arises. This leads to questions of instability and inequality. Also, economic security is much interconnected with other sectors and can depend on the survival of other sectors. Anyhow, “*Only fears that the international economy will fall into crisis are clearly economic security issues*”⁷⁶. For individuals, economic security means the access to their basic human needs.

Among the many referent objects are individuals, (social) classes, the global market and most importantly the state itself. Firms usually do not count as referent objects, apart from two exceptions: firstly at a local level, when individuals up to a whole town are concerned and local authorities try to save the firm and secondly at a national level. This is when a firm has an important position in the national economy

⁷⁴ Buzan et al., 1998, p.95.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.96.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.116.

(this can be in times of war a weapon factory for example). Still, one should be careful not to mix up political issues such as employment or regional development with economic concerns. It is for this reason that the local level rarely applies or even fails when it is not linked to the national one.

The actors can be found at all levels but are mostly state representatives and IGOs. Anyhow, here also firms can act in the background.

The regional dynamics of the economic sector are first of all global, as the economy is less and less affected by distance and we can talk of a global market today. The problems here are stability, more competition and surplus capacity in many economic sectors. These make the dynamics on a regional level still, or again, attractive – in case of a crisis states still take recourse to their regional economic ties, that cause lower costs in transportation and communication than on a global level. Also, the regional culture is preserved in comparison with the homogenised global market. Thus, “*economic regionalism is [partly] based in the desire to preserve societal security*”⁷⁷. At a local level economic security is basically linked to the provision of basic human needs and the capacity of the state to survive.⁷⁸

5.1.4. The Societal Sector

Societal security is not to be confused with social security, which is generally about individuals and their economic needs and does not concern the society of a state, which is more concretely its state population. The societal sector is closely related to the political security sector. Still, most of the time state and societal boundaries do not overlap. While a state has, at least in most cases, a defined territory, societies can exist across borders. They are composed of individuals sharing the same ideas and practices, creating a common identity.

“The organizing concept in the societal sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.114.

⁷⁸ Cf. Buzan et al., p.95 – 117.

their survival as a community”⁷⁹. Threats to the common identity can end in a conflict when one self-defined identity group prevails over another.

The most frequent issues threatening societal security are: migration, when the identity of one group influences or even changes the identity of another group; horizontal competition, where the identity of one group is changed by influences of a neighbouring identity group; and vertical competition. Here groups stop being individual groups because a project links them to wider or narrower identities. A fourth threat can be depopulation, which is not distinctively part of societal security, apart from explicit policies determining the extinction of an identity group or cases “*where quantity turns into quality*”⁸⁰. These issues can appear alone but also combined on a spectrum from intentional, programmatic and political opposed to appearing united and structural.

Essentially societal security issues are always about identity. Reactions to threats can consist either in undertakings by the identity group itself or in taking the issue to the political or military sector by putting the threat on the state agenda. Non-state means for minorities to survive are to “*dominate the existing government, [...] to form their own government*”⁸¹ or to run their own system, not using institutions of the dominant society.

The referent objects in the societal sector are groups that can establish the argument that their “we” is threatened. In the past, these groups were usually limited to a local level, or even families, having close ties with the ruling political structures. Today it they can reach from tribes and nations to civilisations and religious groups. The media has become an important actor in the societal sector because parties and the reasons for the conflict are identified with its help.

As every society has different weaknesses also different patterns causing conflicts can be found. Identities that are formed through isolation or separateness from others can be troubled by very little admixture from outside. States that are governed by an identity group that is larger only by a little difference than the other groups, or that are ruled by repression of the bigger group, can be irritated by immigration or a higher fertility rate of the non-governing group. If the national identity is tied to the culture, the overrunning of the “general” culture can become a threat to their society. Nations

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.119.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.121.

⁸¹ Ibid., p.122.

that unite different ethnic identity groups can be endangered if one ethnic group seeks self-determination or independence but also if nationalism spreads among one or all groups.

The regional dynamics of the societal sector is generally limited over small distances. Still, trends towards more global dynamics can be observed. Issues related to migration such as diseases, or even crime that are related to poverty and are spread through migration concern the generally poorer southern hemisphere of the planet. Also the spread of a global – western – culture is a sign for a globalization of the societal sector. However, every region of the world has different dynamics and issues and must therefore deal in first place on this level with it.⁸²

5.1.5. The Political Sector

The political sector is a very complex sector, as it includes many different aspects, considering that “*all security is political*”.⁸³ All threats to security discussed in the sections above are also political. Still, it is a sector of its own. Political security is about non-military threats to the sovereignty of a state, about the organisational stability of states, their systems of government and the ideologies that give the governments their legitimacy.⁸⁴ Threats can be made to the internal legitimacy of the political unit, e.g. its ideology and constitutive ideas – its social orders. Another factor affected by political threats to security is the external recognition of a state, its external legitimacy through recognition. Threats coming from outside do not have to be directed against the sovereignty of a state but are in many cases directed against the states’ ideology. The degree of vulnerability of course varies between strong and weak states. In weak states often nation and state do not overlap and that can lead to internal threats. Typically they are directed against the basic institutions and the ideology. Furthermore, political violence can arise. If nationalism and ideology, the two components that hold most units together, are endangered this can lead to the loss of the political order. But not only weak states have to deal with political insecurity.

⁸² Cf. Ibid., p.119 – 140.

⁸³ Buzan et al., after Jahn, Lemaitre, and Waever, *Concepts of Security: Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects*, 1987, p.141.

⁸⁴ Cf. Buzan et al, 1998, p. 119.

*“Strong states can also experience political security threats from integration projects that threaten their sovereignty (and their recognition and status).”*⁸⁵ However, political security can also concern threats to political units other than states, such as international society, order, and law, which are the referent objects in the international arena. They represent directives that can be threatened through non-acceptance, violation or challenge.

Obviously the main object of reference of the political sector is the territorial state. Besides, emerging quasi-super states, self-organized and/or stateless societal groups and transnational movements that can mobilise their followers to a large extent, can be objects of reference.

The actors are mostly states and governments. International organisations are collective actors, which have an approved securitizing capacity (as for example the United Nations disposes over the UN Charta, which includes rules for when securitizing measures can be effected and by whom).

As for the regional dynamics of this sector, threats do not happen exclusively at a global nor at a local level. In most cases it comes to disputes arise between two or more states, so mostly at a bilateral level. Often these disputes are linked to a global level (through the involvement of an international organisation) but can also become cross regional. Buzan, de Wilde and Weaver define nine possible cases of political insecurity: Intentional threats to (weak) states on the basis of their state-nation split; intentional threats to (weak) states on political-ideological grounds; inadvertent, unit-based threats to state-nation vulnerable states; unintentional threats to states on political-ideological grounds; security of and against supranational, regional integration; systemic, principled threats against states that are vulnerable because of a state-nation split; structural (systemic) threats to (weak) states on political-ideological grounds; threats to transnational movements that command supreme loyalty from their members; threats to international society, order, and law. In most of these cases, the smaller constellations happen at the same time on a regional level.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 152.

⁸⁶ Cf. Ibid., p.141-162.

The OSCE was the first organisation that took a comprehensive theoretical approach to security. It has thereby influenced the situation in Europe with it since 1975. The comprehensive approach can be seen in the three dimensions the OSCE is divided into since the so-called three baskets were formulated in the Helsinki Final Act. Importance was given not only to political and military security issues but also to environmental, economic and humanitarian problems. While the first dimension of the OSCE deals with the “hard” security issues, the second and third dimensions relate to societal, “soft” and “civic” security topics that are still essential for an all-embracing, extensive approach to security. Civic security refers to everything concerning the civic aspects of soft security that are not related to military issues. While Buzan, de Wilde and Weaver deal with economic and environmental issues separately; the OSCE unites them into one, the second dimension, for the reason that they stand very close together, sharing many threats and challenges.

With the End of the Cold War a need for reaction of the CSCE to the new global order in security, politics, economics and ideologies arose. Confidence and security building measures, conflict prevention and resolution, the protection of Fundamental Freedoms were only some of the issues that became relevant in the institutionalised OSCE and gave the organisation a broader perspective than the one it had had.

The OSCE’s comprehensive approach can be seen in the commitments made by the Participating States starting with the Helsinki Final Act and continuing up until today through the Corfu Process.

5.2. The Cooperative Approach and Indivisibility of Security

It is not only the concept of comprehensive security, which has to be considered when looking at the OSCE. There is a second approach, which has to be taken into account: cooperative security. The two concepts stand closely together. However, the cooperative approach emphasises in the indivisibility of security. This can be understood as taking the view that the classical two sides are no longer given but that all sides work together. States benefit from their cooperation but can also all be affected when one country has security issues. *“Therefore, no participating State should enhance its security at the expense of the security of another participating*

State.⁸⁷ Thus, security becomes a responsibility shared by all Participating States. Cooperative security also means that states act together against commonly proclaimed threats but have no legal support obligations. So cooperative security is not automatically free of violence, but it can be. It is the tie between the states that enhances security and prevents aggressions and wars. What is important is that the commitments to cooperate that are being made are not of a legal but of a political nature. This is also where for some of the weaknesses of this system lie, as no sanctions can be introduced against a cooperation partner who violates the agreements. Furthermore, a cooperative security system has no army or military instrument of power of its own, thus it is not safe against attacks from outside the system. Consequently, conflict and crisis prevention are important mechanisms in the cooperative approach and therefore in the OSCE.⁸⁸

Examples of cooperative security are the participation in International Organizations and affiliation with arms control treaties and multi- and bilateral agreements.⁸⁹ Cases are the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Agreement can be named. The OSCE counts to its cooperative approach also its cooperation and collaboration with other organizations and its Partners for Cooperation.

The reason for claiming that the OSCE uses a cooperative approach to security is not only implicit in the agreements and decisions, which will be listed subsequently but also because the OSCE openly declares it itself. Many OSCE documents underline the cooperative, comprehensive and indivisible security approach the Participating States commit themselves to. Furthermore, the Participating States have to work together on a cooperative basis as since the beginning of the Organisation participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was voluntary. Also its successor organisation, the OSCE, works today on a cooperative and not a normative basis.

⁸⁷ OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, 2009, p.1.

⁸⁸ Cf. Magenheimer, 2001, p.36f.

⁸⁹ Cf. Gärnter, 2008, p.127f.

5.3. The OSCE's Approach to Comprehensive, Cooperative and Indivisible Security

Naturally the OSCE's comprehensive and cooperative approach to security is much more practical than the theoretical framework laid down by Buzan, de Wilde and Waever. Still, with this framework for analysis in mind one can recognise the parallels between the theory and the decisions for actual intrastate treatment made by the Participating States in the course of time. The theoretical background provided by the three political scientists can be found again in the OSCE documents, which will be presented below. In the OSCE the comprehensive approach is translated quite literally into practice. All sectors overlap and correlate in the documents and the comprehensive approach is implemented in a cooperative way by the Participating States. In the following, the OSCE decisions and commitments relevant for the comprehensive and cooperative approach as mentioned in *the OSCE Concept for Comprehensive and Cooperative Security*, which was released for the 2009 Annual Security Review Conference, are being listed. They are presented in chronological order, as it is easier to understand the developments made year after year in a historical context. This is partly because of the circumstances they were decided for (the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s for example) and partly because the comprehensive and cooperative approach simply developed naturally and new ideas complemented the old ones.

The first relevant commitments touching all OSCE dimensions and relating to all sectors in the framework for analysis were made in 1975 in the Helsinki Decalogue.⁹⁰ The East and the West had come together and managed to express their will to cooperate through common principles.

In 1990 the first big steps in the economic and environmental dimension were made. The document of the Bonn Conference includes principles and guidelines that are typical for a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security. The principles of market economy were supported to enhance a greater economic cooperation between the Participating States and democratic institutions and economic freedom were

⁹⁰ See Chapter 2.1. History of the OSCE.

highlighted to be essential for economic and social progress. Like the liberal approach to economic security the Participating States committed themselves to the development of a free, competing market economy. Still, economic growth and development should take place in an environmentally sustainable way.

The same year, at the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension crucial commitments for the third dimension were made. It was stated, that the basic purpose of government was the protection and promotion of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Looking at the dangers to security in the societal sector this decision can prevent most of the afore-named issues.

In November 1990 the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* was produced. One year after the fall of the Berlin wall this document is full of hope and does not only start by introducing “*a new era of democracy, peace and unity*” but also outlines the importance of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), the promotion of disarmament and arms control to create more transparency between the Participating States and most relevantly the indivisibility of security. “*Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others. We therefore pledge to co-operate in strengthening confidence and security among us and in promoting arms control and disarmament.*”⁹¹ The decision to fight non-military threats to security such as illegal activities linked to pressure from outside, threats to territorial integrity and dangers such as terrorism and drug trafficking clearly fit into the political sector of the comprehensive approach. Also the decision of the development of mechanisms for peaceful conflict prevention and resolution can be placed in that sector.

Furthermore, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed by 22 states – a very important step towards future European security arrangements and a key document for military security.

As for the societal sector, it was decided to promote the improvement of the situation of national minorities.

The meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in Moscow in 1991 led to the creation of the “*Moscow Mechanism*”, which designed the possible initiation of ad

⁹¹ Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 1990, p.5.

hoc missions of independent states or rapporteurs in case of a dispute. The mission should find facts and report them and give advice on possible questions as well as promote the dialogue and cooperation between the conflicting parties. The mission could be initiated without the consent of the relevant Participating States. Furthermore, the Moscow document proclaims the respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and rule of law to be part of the foundation of the international order. Protecting the political security, the Moscow document commits to supporting democratically elected governments in case of an attempt at overthrowing them and sees law enforcement, the executive and the judicial control ideally under direction and control of civil authorities. Being an important actor in the societal sector, the media and its freedom is included in the document as well as gender equality and the protection of human rights in states of emergency.

1992 brought the *Helsinki Document*, which put again a focus on indivisible and comprehensive security. To prevent terrorism and illicit trafficking the root causes of these issues would have to be addressed. Also early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management were to be strengthened. Among the Participating States new security relations based on cooperative and common approaches to security were aimed to be established. In light of the cooperative approach, higher involvement with NGOs, the United Nations and non-Participating States were set as goals. The Mediterranean States should participate at review conferences in the future. The establishment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) again strengthened the societal security sector. An amalgamation between the military and political security sector was achieved by the decision to include civilian and military personnel in peacekeeping and building operations. Another focus on this sector was set through the establishment of a conflict prevention centre and the FSC.

At the Rome Ministerial Council in 1993 again a focus on the comprehensiveness of the OSCE's approach was laid, also it was aimed to strengthen the OSCE as a forum for cooperative security. Furthermore, *“by utilizing the CSCE agreed set of standards and principles, participating States can demonstrate their unity of purpose and action and thus help to make security indivisible.”*⁹² It was agreed that issues lying in the

⁹² CSCE and the New Europe – Our Security is Indivisible, 1993, p.1.

human dimension, as well as issues of economic transformation, development and cooperation were essential to the comprehensive concept. Another important factor for societal security in the OSCE was that it was decided to strengthen the CSCE's role in combating xenophobia, racism, chauvinism, nationalism and anti-Semitism – some of the biggest threats to societal security. In the same light, the HCNM was to receive more resources, and the Human Dimension should also be included in the mandate of (field) missions. A sector-overlapping decision was the addressing of issues of displacement and refugees (societal sector) in the context of conflict prevention and early warning (political sector). Within the military sector it was agreed to make cooperative arrangements ensuring that a third party in a conflict area would act in accordance with the CSCE principles and commitments, which were the following: “*respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; consent of the parties; impartiality; multinational character; clear mandate; transparency; integral link to a political process for conflict resolution; plan for orderly withdrawal.*”⁹³ Cooperative security was applied by deciding to strengthen the cooperation with other organisations, on all levels, in crisis prevention and management, which again can be counted as part of political security.

The *Budapest Document* of 1994 again highlights the importance of cooperation between the CSCE and other organisations. It also grants the option to refer disputes to the UN Security Council. An essential document for the first dimension, and the military security sector was introduced, namely the *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*. This Code of Conduct specifically regulates the role of armed forces in democratic societies. The protection of the biggest value of military and political security, sovereign equality, was stressed. Mutual security relations should be based on a cooperative approach. Again, cooperation should happen on all levels and the Participating States should act in solidarity in case of violation of norms and/or commitments. A duty of non-assistance to States that turned to the use of force or threatened the territorial integrity and thus sovereignty and political independence of another state was expressed. Also, states should have at their command only as much military capacity, as they needed for their individual or collective security. As an important element for the indivisibility of security the Participating States should

⁹³ Decision of the Rome Council Meeting, 1993, p.8.

implement commitments in arms control, disarmament and CSBMs. As for the other sectors relating to security, it was decided that in order to avoid tensions between states, economic and environmental cooperation should be expanded and only constitutionally established authorities should be in control of any sort of military and security forces, which of course should act conforming to international humanitarian law and political neutrality.⁹⁴

After the institutionalisation as the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the *Lisbon declaration on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century* of 1996 underlined the goal of the Participating States to create “a common security space free of dividing lines in which all States are equal partners” in Europe.⁹⁵ The Participating States were granted a free choice of their security arrangements – also including treaties of alliance (this obviously was included for NATO member countries), but it was also laid down that no individual or group of State(s) nor organizations within the OSCE region should have greater responsibility than others for the maintaining of peace and stability in the area. Furthermore, cooperation and coordination between the Participating States and other organizations and institutions would be required in order to guarantee European security, and the OSCE with its comprehensive approach would be a very suitable forum for this purpose. In the *Framework for Arms Control* that was adopted at the Lisbon Summit, too, the principle of indivisibility of security is again highlighted. By connecting and promoting obligations of arms control the Participating States expressed their willingness to act jointly in this field. The FSC was granted a major role in this particular issue and it was pointed out, that existing documents and decisions were interconnected and should be handled in this way.

In 1999 the *Vienna Document* was developed, which set important measures for security in all sectors, but especially the military and political one. It includes confidence and security building measures for several areas through sharing of military information on manpower, equipment and weaponry. In the field of defense planning it was agreed to report on plans, doctrines and policies as well as budget used for military purposes. In light of the cooperative approach, mechanisms for risk

⁹⁴ Cf. OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, 2009, p.8f.

⁹⁵ Lisbon Document, 1996, p.10.

reduction were agreed upon. They included consultations and cooperation on unusual military activities, cooperation when coming to hazardous incidents of military nature and voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concern about military activities. Through these mechanisms much transparency between the Participating States was introduced. Of the same nature were the agreements to invite observers to special military activities and to inform the other States about them in writing. From the comprehensive approach, regional measures were taken into consideration. The importance of regional particularities in matters of security was highlighted and Participating States were urged to adapt the CSBMs to their particular regions, and their needs.

A further important document for the comprehensive and cooperative approach is the *Charter for European Security*, which was adopted like the *Vienna Document* at the Istanbul Summit of 1999. In the political and military sector, it laid down the importance of strengthening the OSCE in areas of conflict prevention and settlement and the post-conflict restoration of societies. Here a Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Team (REACT) was created, in order to be able to react to Participating States asking for civil but also police assistance in conflict situations. A wider and more dedicated dialogue on security had to take place to enable “a common and indivisible security space free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security.”⁹⁶ Furthermore, it was decided to intensify work with the Partners for Cooperation. In the societal sector the rejection of any policy indicating the cleansing or expulsion of an ethnic group was stated. An important development in the third dimension was the decision to invite election observers from other Participating States, the ODHIR and the Parliamentary Assembly, who would also assess the elections and pronounce recommendations in the follow-up phase. This was an important step towards democratic and free elections in the whole OSCE region. The *Platform for cooperative security*, a part of the Charter, was aimed at strengthening the cooperation with other international and regional organizations and institutions. The single organizations should be treated with equal importance, shared their values and show each other mutual support. Their common work should be improved on a case-by-case basis.

⁹⁶ OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, 2009, p.10.

The last document mentioned in the OSCE Concept for Comprehensive and Cooperative Security is the 2003 OSCE strategy to address threats to Security and Stability in the 21st century. At the Maastricht ministerial council, the Maastricht Strategy was adopted, which stated that armed conflicts would be less likely to happen in the OSCE region, than threats to security cutting through all dimensions and leading to destabilization. “*The OSCE, with its broad membership and “its multidimensional concept of common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security” is particularly well-equipped to address the qualitatively new security challenges that have emerged in recent years.*”⁹⁷ Threats like terrorism and organized crime could arise from weak governance and malfunctioning democratic institutions. A suggestion looking at the cooperative approach sees the need to address the source of the problems, which are, in addition to the before mentioned weak governance, also intolerance and economic imbalance. The comprehensive concept is connected to Human Security in this strategy. Again the cooperative view of need for more intense cooperation was expressed as the Participating States realized that threats to security were not limited to the OSCE area and no organization or state would be able to address them alone.

As one can see from the documents above, especially the issues of the societal sector, in particular minorities in nation-states are highly relevant topics in the OSCE. Most of the OSCE Participating States have large minority groups, thus minority issues also dominate domestic politics – not only the supranational level. Addressing issues related to them was recognized at an early stage to possibly have a conflict and crisis preventive effect.

Also important are two treaties, which are not OSCE documents per se, but were negotiated under the umbrella of the OSCE. Namely, the *CFE treaty* and the *Treaty on Open Skies*. A big part of the OSCE PS are parties to one or both of these treaties.

Although the *Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe* (CFE) is not part of the OSCE and not an official OSCE document, negotiations and signing of documents happened

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.11.

in the past at OSCE summits. The reason for this is that all States involved in the CFE treaty are at the same time OSCE Participating States. However, not all CFE parties are OSCE Participating States. Anyhow, an organisation uniting the former blocks of NATO and the Warsaw treaty seemed to be the ideal place to negotiate this agreement.

The CFE Treaty was signed in December 1990 at the CSCE Paris summit, ratified the following year and entered into force two years later, in 1992.

This treaty became a cornerstone for European security – especially when coming to hard security issues. It regulated the amount of weapons and conventional military equipment the countries were allowed to have and set a limit in the numbers. Until 1995 big parts of European military equipment and weaponry could be reduced.

In 1999, at the OSCE Istanbul summit an agreement on an adapted version of the CFE Treaty was signed - the ACFE (Adapted CFE). While the first version of the treaty still had the limits of the allowed forces divided into blocks, this adapted version set limits to the number of conventional forces the single nation-states were allowed to have on a national level and on a territorial level. The adapted treaty would reduce the amount of conventional armour in Europe by around 10% and would only come to effect until all 30 parties have ratified the treaty. Until this point the original CFE treaty stays valid. Some parties however only wanted to ratify the adopted version if the Russian Federation would withdraw from Georgia and Moldova.

A throwback in the ratification process clearly was the suspension of the Treaty by the Russian Federation in 2007.

The *Treaty on Open Skies* was suggested by former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower back in 1955 but was only realized at a meeting between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990. It was officially signed in 1992 at the OSCE summit in Helsinki. Only 10 years later, in 2002 the treaty went into force for an unlimited period of time. 34 states are currently parties to the treaty, among which one can find the Russian Federation and the United States. It initiated unarmed observation flights over the territories of the parties to the treaty. Quotas for the observation flights, notification of the point of entry in the territory and technical characteristics the sensors used for observation are regulated among others in this treaty. A consultative

commission meets on a regular basis in Vienna to discuss the putting into practice of the treaty.

Seeing all the OSCE commitments and decisions it is hard to imagine how conflicts in the OSCE region, like the 2008 crisis in Georgia, could happen anyways. After all, all Participating States agreed to these common principles. This is why it has to be recalled, that the OSCE agreements are not legally binding and no consequences can be imposed by the OSCE in case of violation. It may be for this reason, that the Budapest Document conceded the option to refer to the United Nations Security Council in case of disputes, as the Security Council has the power to act if it comes to unanimous agreement. Although the OSCE possesses of several mechanisms to act preventively or after a conflict, the ideal situation of a conflict-free OSCE region has not been achieved at this time. For this reason, a call for innovation arose in the last years. The Corfu Process aims at tackling the issues existing in the OSCE area and finding solutions for equipping and improving the work of the Organisation in the 21st century.

6. The Corfu Process and it's relation to the EST

This chapter deals with the substance of the Corfu Process and its relationship to the Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty. For a better understanding of the subject matter, a little insight into the relationship between the Russian Federation and the OSCE concerning this topic has to be given. Two speeches, one of the Ambassador to the OSCE of the country initiating the Corfu Process, Greece, and the other from a representative of the Russian Federation, will give a short example of the relation between the Russian Federation and the OSCE.

In spring 2009, before the meeting in Corfu, Amb. Mara Marinakis, then Chairwomen of the Permanent Council, gave a speech at an expert meeting on European Security. She outlined that the Security dialogue that had started in the OSCE had been initiated by the Russian proposal for a pan-European summit to draft a Security Treaty. Given the unresolved situation in Georgia and the Russian suspension of the CFE treaty, the general position of the “western” PS towards the Russian Federation was rather animus. The Ambassador outlined that the OSCE was the ideal forum for treating with the renewal of European Security, considering the toolbox and the comprehensive approach of the OSCE including the Human and Economic and Environmental Dimension. In her speech, side blows towards the Russian Federation could be clearly noticed. She did not only underline that for taking the Corfu Process forward trust had to be rebuilt between the OSCE Participating States, but also that all Participating States would have to implement the agreements made in the OSCE. Furthermore she made a very harsh comment on Georgia, which was still a big topic in the OSCE at the time. If there were to be agreement on the OSCE presence in Georgia, it would show commitment to the common cause, while failure could mean a step back from seeing the OSCE principles in action.⁹⁸

In a joint meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation and the Permanent Council in September 2009 Vladimir Vronkov, the director of the Department of Pan-European Co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, addressed the

⁹⁸ Amb. Mara Marinaki, Expert Meeting on European Security, CIO.GAL/61/09, 08.05.2009, p.2.

question which approach should be followed concerning European Security. He stated that the “Greek Corfu meeting initiative” and the EST would be overlapping but were not replaceable approaches. The difference would be as simple as the difference between a document and a meeting. *“The Treaty on European Security is a document drawn up with the involvement of all the international structures of the Euro-Atlantic region, while the “Corfu Meetings” are discussions within the framework of the OSCE covering a broad agenda that includes the enhancement of the Organization’s effectiveness and its three “baskets”.”*⁹⁹

Nevertheless, he also assured the meeting of the co-operation of the Russian Federation in the Corfu Process and the gratefulness for its’ launching. In continuation the Russian Federation participated actively in the discussions.

Looking at the five ticks related to the politico-military dimension of the OSCE one could say that there was an attempt to counterbalance the Russian proposal of a European Security treaty,¹⁰⁰ or even to thwart it. Anyhow, the Kazakh Chairmanship announced that the EST would be included in the talks on the new European security architecture. Still, Kazakhstan is seen as a “*close ally*”¹⁰¹ of the Russian Federation and “*not the “neutral” broker it claims to be*”¹⁰².

However, the Russian Federation is well aware that their proposal has introduced changes to the European Security landscape. Russian foreign minister Lavrov said during his speech at the 2010 Munich Security conference, that “[...] *there would be no shake-up in the OSCE*” if it had not been for President Medvedevs initiative.¹⁰³

6.1. Analysis of the Corfu Process “ticks”

The 10 ticks the Corfu Process is divided into, address the main issues European security and the OSCE are confronted with today. Because the OSCE is a security

⁹⁹ Voronkov, FSC-PC.DEL/28/09, p.2.

¹⁰⁰ See Chapter 3. The European Security Treaty.

¹⁰¹ Zellner, 2010, p.237.

¹⁰² Richter, Schmitz, 2010, p.3.

¹⁰³ Speech by H.E. Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, 46th Munich Security Conference, 6.02.2010.

organisation, security of its region of influence is of course the main subject the Corfu Process deals with. However, the ticks include not only political issues and (possible) threats to security but also formal, bureaucratic, internal issues of the OSCE as a regional and international security organisation. In continuation I will outline the contents of these “ticks”, analyse them one by one through the theoretical framework of analysis described in the foregoing chapter and set them in the context of comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible security. Moreover, I will compare the single ticks of the Corfu Process to the Russian draft for a European security treaty. The aim of this comparison is to analyse how much they have in common, considering that they have been initiated for the same reason, to renew the European security architecture and some even claim that the Corfu Process could have been initiated to give an answer to the EST. Also, I will look at the possible outcome or future development in the OSCE of this particular topic. I will base my speculations on the issues discussed and negotiated before and at the Summit of Astana. The documents used in this section are mostly not accessible to the public, which is why they cannot be cited nor can the countries making statements to give their opinions, be named.

6.1.1. Implementation of all OSCE Norms, Principles and Commitments

This tick is dedicated to the Principles, Commitments and Norms that the OSCE has developed over time and partly failed to put into practice. It transcends all other ticks, in the Corfu Process it was discussed during sessions on all other ticks and no proposals or Fft-papers were developed specifically for this topic. This tick can be seen as the most important one, as all other topics can be developed as profoundly as possible, but if no implementation by the Participating States occurs, all work and discussions become redundant. As mentioned several times already, the OSCE has no legal force and the commitments made by the Participating States in its framework are of a political nature only. The lack of implementation so far and the urgent need to do so will recur in many other ticks.

The absence of a legal obligation to implement principles and commitments was the starting point for discussions for the Participating States. The common work in the

OSCE happens purely on a voluntary basis, a fact that was considered as a reason for improving the application of the commonly decided norms, principles and commitments. Furthermore, the Participating States emphasised the coherence of this issue with the cross-dimensionality of the OSCE concept of indivisible and comprehensive security. All dimensions and all issues dealt with in the OSCE depend on the subsequently occurring implementation.

While it was noted that the first dimension is the most developed one when coming to reports and notifications on the implementation, the second – economic and environmental – dimension was the least advanced in this field. A possible solution to this problem was the application of practices used in the politico-military dimension in other dimensions, keeping in mind the differences in conditions. The Human Dimension led to the biggest controversies between the Participating States, as many different perspectives prevailed. Possibilities for further action were identified and listed in an OSCE document, namely: the strengthening of the review mechanisms (for example through merging the dimension-specific review conferences into a single one), enhancing the existing decision-making bodies, the cross-dimensional role of review conferences, the sharpening of existing tools and the development of self-assessment tools, where peer review is included. The mechanisms for putting decisions and commitments into action would have to be developed in the individual dimensions but Participating States could provide annual reports on their actions in this matter. This could show the issues of primary concern. Progression in each dimension could be improved by commitment to a predetermined or unfolding agenda laid out for several years.

This tick particularly embodies the cooperative approach. The states work together, but have no legal obligation to do so or towards each other. Actions are only taken, and implementations only realised if the PS in question has the political willingness to do so. For this reason, many agreements have not been put into practice by various PS and they have no legal consequence to fear if failing to do so. In this case, the functioning of the OSCE as an organisation relies on the good will and collaboration of the Participating States. Also, the idea of sharing information on the implementation and their activities annually would be a sign for active cooperation. More transparency would exist between the PS, what can also be seen as confidence building measure.

As this tick is about OSCE-internal treatment of commitments etc., it bears no relation to the EST. The signing parties of the treaty would be legally bound to their commitment while this is not the case for the Participating States in OSCE matters.

The implementation of the OSCE norms, principles and commitments in the future depends on the Participating States and their willingness. The PS have realised that by taking this step, improvements in the whole OSCE can be made. All other ticks of the Corfu Process, representing the issues considered relevant and worth discussing depend on the implementation step subsequently to finding a solution in the form of a regulation or guideline. Another important measure will be to review the existing OSCE principles, commitments and norms. It has to be seen if they are still applicable and also their timeliness has to be checked. Agreements made in the early 1990s might be outdated, and reviewing them could change whole ways of procedure. This could make processes (like for example the conflict cycle) easier or even faster and increase the OSCEs effectiveness.

6.1.2. The Role of the OSCE in Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation

Compared to the first, the second tick led to many discussions and a great deal of proposals and Fft-papers. The large amount of Participating States engaging in these issues showed the importance they have within this Process. Again, it was recognized that the OSCE lacks effectiveness although a large number of instruments for conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, early warning and post-conflict rehabilitation are available, and it was stated that this area has to be improved. Especially the conflicts still existing in the OSCE area were highlighted. As the Corfu Process was created to restore trust between the Participating States and to create a security area free of dividing lines, these conflicts should finally be settled.

Four sub-topics were identified as the most discussed issues. First, the need to strengthen the OSCE structures to act quicker and more effectively. Secondly, the need to look at the existing mechanisms and procedures of the OSCE, to that the

Participating States do not revert sufficiently. The toolbox should be revised on the timeliness of the tools, and maybe new principles could be added (for example when coming to issues such as national minorities). Also they should be homogenised, unifying principles for conflict management and prevention. Thirdly, it was realised that early action is of high priority in conflicts. In this discussion the decision-making process of the OSCE came up, since action can only be begun after the acknowledgment of a conflict. It was accentuated that the consensus principle has to be maintained and that the parties concerned by the conflict would have to give their consent to action. Some PS would concede the CiO and/or the institutions the advanced authority to decide upon whether to act or not, which would leave the decision-making process out of the discussion. The fourth point was the role of the PC, which was commonly agreed to be the central forum of the OSCE and thus should therefore be strengthened through closer cooperation with the FSC and more informal sessions.

This tick is particularly cross-dimensional: it is linked to many other issues, through all dimensions. It can be seen that the comprehensive approach is of special importance here, as not only the mechanisms for well performed conflict prevention and resolution require that all sectors are taken into account but also the reason for conflicts can come from all sectors mentioned in the framework for analysis. Especially the societal, the political and the military sector are closely linked in conflicts in the Eastern regions. The OSCE region still has unresolved conflicts in areas with mostly “new” states, with a very diverse ethnicity. In some of these unresolved conflicts, ethnical identity plays an essential role for the creation of a stable state, while in others simply typical interstate conflicts about territory prevail. However, the OSCE essentially expresses the comprehensive approach in this tick through “*a shared commitment to political means of conflict resolution*”.¹⁰⁴

The cooperativeness of this tick is found in the willingness to cooperate more with the FSC but also in the procedural method of the PS approaching the issue. Informal consultations were held with experts to find solutions – a step outside the framework of the OSCE. Furthermore, not only Participating States wrote FfT-Papers on this tick. Also a NGO and an agency of another International Organisation were given the

¹⁰⁴ Buzan et al., 1998, p. 62.

possibility to contribute through a FfT-Paper. Both examples show that the cooperative security approach was put into practice through giving outside opinions a forum in an internal process.

This tick has some important links to the EST. Being about how to handle a conflict and how to react when it occurs; parallels to the Security treaty proposed by the Russian Federation are obvious. First of all, with the signing of the EST, parties of the treaty are obliged through Art. 2.1. not to take any action against another party that would affect its security in any way, which can be seen as fundamental conflict prevention. Like the OSCE, the EST establishes mechanisms to settle (armed) conflicts when they arise between the parties of the treaty. Art. 7 of the treaty deals with the action that can be taken when an attack occurs. Namely, all parties to the treaty can consider an attack on one party as an attack to themselves and are legitimated through Art.7.2. to execute the right of self-defence in accordance with Art.51 of the UN Charta until the UN Security Council takes measures. In practice this would be a form of early action, as mentioned by the PS in the Corfu Process. Like in the OSCE, the parties to the treaty take decisions on actions unanimously, in an extraordinary conference that would be initiated in case of an attack. The EST also stipulates that if the attacker is party to the treaty *“the vote of that Party shall not be included in the total number of votes of the Parties in adopting a decision.”*¹⁰⁵ This article echoes the consensus-minus-one regulation of the OSCE. However, the discussions in the Corfu Process underlined the importance the consent of the parties concerned has.

The restoration of trust and confidence within the OSCE area is essential for the continuation of this topic. Especially the pending conflicts in the OSCE area have to be highlighted. They still pose a threat to big parts of the OSCE area, especially in the east. The parties to the conflicts have to regain trust between each other and increase confidence. It will be essential to the whole development of the OSCE that these conflicts will be finally settled (in a peaceful way). That way, negotiations and decision-making in the OSCE will become easier and no clearly set fronts will arise concerning specific issues. It surely will be also partly the responsibility of the OSCE

¹⁰⁵ Draft European Security Treaty, Art.8.4.

to support the peace negotiation processes. Furthermore, the strengthening of the capabilities and structures the OSCE provides in conflict prevention, resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation and crisis management will continue to be an important step to move forward in this tick. Here, the CiO, the secretariat and civil society could play a more important role through mediation and by providing information.

6.1.3. Role of the Arms Control and Confidence and Security Building Regimes in Building Trust in the Evolving Security Environment

This tick was considered by all PS to be particularly important for a functioning security in the OSCE area. The principles of the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the 1996 Framework for Arms Control were still seen as premises for arms control and CSBMs.¹⁰⁶ Also, arrangements on a political but also legally binding basis, which are not necessarily part of the OSCE but within it's umbrella are highly important. Here the CFE treaty, the Treaty on Open Skies and the Vienna Document of 1999 are named. An undermining of these arrangements could affect the whole OSCE region and have a negative effect on the cooperative, comprehensive and indivisible approach the OSCE takes towards security. Not only because of the openness and information exchange the States granted each other through them, these arrangements are crucial. They also contribute to conflict prevention and can help handling a crisis. The PS discussed furthermore that the existing instruments should be adapted to changing the security environment of the OSCE region. Here, regional conflict prevention, tackling of new threats to security and taking into account developments in capabilities and doctrines of the individual militaries were considered as possible ways of addressing the latter issue.

The CFE regime was especially highlighted. In view of the fact that it is not an OSCE document per se, the parties to the treaty are responsible for resolving the issues here themselves. However, many OSCE Participating States are members to the regime and the crisis within thus affects trust and confidence among them. Therefore, its resolution would contribute to the Corfu Process. Moreover, adaptation of the Vienna

¹⁰⁶ see Chapter 5.3. The OSCEs approach to comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible security.

Document of 1999 has been discussed in the FSC and benefitted greatly from the Corfu discussions. Although no consensus could be found, a decision in the FSC on “Establishing a Procedure for incorporating relevant FSC decisions into the Vienna Document” was adopted. Moreover, it was decided, that the Corfu Process should dedicate thoughts to the UNSCR 1540, and the PS discussed which areas in the OSCE, old and new ones, should be strengthened in this context.

The third tick is located exclusively in the first dimension and the military and political sector of the comprehensive framework of analysis. The FSC plays a big role in this tick, as do legally and politically binding commitments. Arms Control Regimes are still of great importance after the end of the Cold War, even if just to build and maintain trust between the states. Threats to military security in the comprehensive approach depend on the size and amount of equipment of armies. If they are being reduced, the threat they impose is too. The cooperative approach can be seen in the fact, that the PS act together and security is an issue addressed by all together. However, the cooperative approach only includes political and not legally binding commitments, and in this tick the Open Skies Treaty and the CFE treaty can be found which have legal implications. The concept of the indivisibility of security is also apparent in this tick as there are no two sides, but all sides (and PS) benefit from their cooperation.

Although this tick is mainly about (the prevention of) military threats to security, it does not have as many parallels to the EST as one might think. First of all, the similarities: Art.1 of the European Security treaty engages the parties of the treaty to cooperate on the basis of indivisible, undiminished and equal security. As mentioned several times, these principles are part of the fundamental principles of the OSCE. All PS have an equal status and no state should resort to violence towards another state. Nonetheless, the EST underlines the indivisibility of security with the aim of legally securing this principle, whereas the Corfu Process does not aspire to draft a legally binding document. Art.3 of the draft EST gives the parties to the treaty the opportunity of requesting information on activities of other parties of the treaty. Anyhow, this request can only be made if the requesting party considers this action as a possible threat to its security. As no information exchange is stipulated previously, the treaty assumes distrust between the parties.

However, the mechanisms enshrined in Art.4 of the EST, which should help prevent conflicts and settle disputes among the parties to the treaty, are only consultations among the parties, conferences and extraordinary conferences. Also, Art.2.2. only foresees that parties to the treaty that are members of other alliances, coalitions or organisations should ensure that the latter act in accordance with documents decided by the OSCE, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter for European Security. It is however not mentioned that parties to the EST must act in accordance with those rules and principles.¹⁰⁷ The third tick of the Corfu Process goes much further by including the CFE treaty and the UNSCR 1540 apart from considering the need to reform the existing OSCE documents which are relevant for this point.

The future of the role of arms control and confidence and security building regimes depends very much on the CFE treaty. As mentioned by the PS in the discussions, the outcome of the CFE treaty discussions and the resolution of the present crisis are essential to the development of trust and confidence between the OSCE PS. Conventional arms control is an essential asset to the European security architecture, endorsing confidence between the parties to the CFE treaty and also to the OSCE PS. Furthermore, the renovation and modernisation of the Confidence and security building measures available to the OSCE, plays an important role in the future development of this tick. The first dimension might be the most developed one comparing all three dimensions, but it still needs some reinforcement to secure a stable security environment.

6.1.4. Transnational and Multidimensional Threats and Challenges

The Corfu discussions started as the PS agreed on the importance of the role the OSCE plays in combating transnational and multidimensional threats and challenges. As a regional organisation, with a comprehensive approach to security from Vancouver to Vladivostok it was considered the ideal platform for such issues. New and uprising threats were found in cyber crime, drug trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as terrorism, and

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Draft European Security Treaty.

trafficking in human beings. The OSCE already possesses programs for confronting some of those issues; however a need to boost the activities was commonly identified. Anyhow, it was conceded by the PS that resources were limited and other actors would become more and more important. The OSCE should be placed in the spotlight again as a relevant actor in this field.

The PS identified specific areas, which should be improved. First of all, the strategies and mandates of the OSCE could be renewed and adapted to current threats, also the possibility that new ones should be added was considered. Secondly, again the need for better coordination between the OSCE executive structures, institutions and also field operations was highlighted. This issue is meant here specifically for transnational and multidimensional threats but was identified as problematic in many other “ticks”, too. More cooperation is also a recurrent issue – the PS should cooperate more closely among each other and also with other international and regional organisations. The platform for cooperative security was highlighted as a possible framework for this. So, internal and external coordination and cooperation should be improved. As transnational threats are not limited to the OSCE area, consideration was also given to threats coming from outside. The improvement of border management skills and police training were possible ways of addressing these issues that were considered. Furthermore, a special focus on new areas should be created, and the possibilities for the OSCE to contribute in the field.

As already highlighted by the PS, cooperation is a keyword in this tick. Cooperation has to exist not only between the PS but also between the OSCE PS and adjacent states. The comprehensive approach recognizes that the regionality of military security, and thus between states in a certain area (the OSCE region), might diminish through the advances in technology. It also is a particularly comprehensive tick, as the expression “multidimensional threats” already indicates. Threats do not only concern military or political security, especially the economic but also societal and environmental sector have to be taken into account. Cyber crime for example can affect all areas, from private homes to government facilities. The same applies to terrorism, which can harm individual citizens but also entire nations. Thus, as stated by the PS, enhancing coordination and cooperation, thereby addressing the cooperative approach, is an important first step towards countering these issues.

It has to be emphasised again, that the draft treaty specifically only takes military and political threats to security into account. Furthermore, the treaty focuses on threats to the security of one country triggered by aggression from another country, thus inter-state conflicts. However, transnational threats could be stopped through information exchange, which is explicitly mentioned in Art.3.1. of the draft EST:

*“A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request, [...] information on any significant legislative, administrative or organizational measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security.”*¹⁰⁸

Especially in the case of transnational threats such as illicit drug trafficking, the introduction of measures by one state could affect another country's security in a positive or also negative way. Still, transnational and multidimensional threats are not specifically mentioned in the EST.

Transnational threats are dangers that will not disappear in the near future. The OSCE has to establish clear fields of contribution and how to act in them. Especially new challenges such as cyber security require exploration. OSCE mandates and commitments will have to be updated and renewed. Threats like trafficking in illicit drugs and chemical precursors have to be tackled through a commonly decided approach. Money-laundering and financing of terrorism are issues that will have to be combated in a cooperative manner. Border security and management concepts will have to be updated to enable the PS to identify in particular the threats lying in illicit trafficking (ranging from human beings to WMD). Information sharing and enhanced cooperation and coordination between the PS and also the Partners for Cooperation is exceptionally crucial in this tick. The OSCE must not work alone but complement the work of other organisations active in this field.

6.1.5. Economic and Environmental Challenges

The second dimension of the OSCE only was dedicated one tick solely for challenges in this field and will therefore get more attention than some other ticks. In general, one can say that there is much more emphasis on the other two dimensions. Although

¹⁰⁸ Draft European Security Treaty, Art.3.1.

all three dimensions are theoretically regarded as equally important, the economic and environmental dimension (EED) is left a little behind in practice. However, the PS underlined in the Corfu discussions that the second dimension is a substantial part of the OSCE, especially since it completes the comprehensive approach towards security. The PS made clear that they wished to strengthen this dimension, especially by implementing the recommendations the Chairmanship of 2009 had made in a report on the future orientation of this dimension.

The Greek CiO had formulated 15 recommendations for improving the work in the second dimension. First of all, increased continuity would be needed; secondly, the *Maastricht Strategy* should continue to function as a basis for the work in the EED. Thirdly, the progress achieved since implementing the Strategy should be reviewed. Furthermore the PS were advised to shift the focus from one theme for each year to several core issues that would be dealt with over several years. However, the system of one topic should not be abolished but combined with the new system of several themes. The issues dealt with should be carefully selected. The Greek chairmanship suggested energy security; environment and security (water management and climate change); the global financial crisis; good governance (e.g. border security, anti-corruption, anti-money laundering); migration; transport (this includes all sorts of anti-trafficking). Each of these six topics should have a chef de file¹⁰⁹. Also, a closer link to the other dimensions should be established and more focus should lie on security aspects of these issues. Moreover, the EED should be better used as confidence building measure.¹¹⁰

The recommendations made at the time are relevant to the Corfu Process, as the same issues remained pending. They had much support but some differences could not be solved and they were not adapted. The thematic fields, identified as relevant by the Greek chairmanship, were again highlighted by the PS during the Corfu discussions. Also, a link to the second tick, early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, was established and the role the EED could play in CSBMs was highlighted. From the FfT-papers and discussion released by the PS, it emerged that the 2009 Report on the Future Orientation of the Second

¹⁰⁹ A Chef de File is in charge of one particular topic, coordinates actions and informs the other PS on activities in this matter.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Chairmanship's Report, CIO.GAL/97/09.

Dimension should be implemented and further tools and instruments should be developed. Another big topic and challenge for the second dimension is energy security.

The comprehensiveness of the OSCE security approach can be found again in this tick. First of all, the actors related to economic security are can have many faces and different tasks when coming to securitizing, depending on the economic approach of the state. In case of the liberal governments, who normally oppose to much state involvement in the economy, banks collapsed and endangered the international (global) economy in the last couple of years.¹¹¹ Focusing on the financial aspect of this tick again, further cooperation is needed between the PS to create regional ties like the comprehensive approach suggests, to have an auxiliary network in case of another breakdown. This also applies to commonly proclaimed threats such as climate change, which affects all PS and can only be fought in a cooperative manner. Although it is dedicated to economic and environmental challenges, the PS underlined in their discussions the interconnection between this tick and the second, early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. So again, one dimension never stands alone – all issues are interconnected and influenced positively as well as negatively by issues from other ticks and dimensions. On the cooperative side one can find contributions and FfT-papers by partners concerning cooperation, so there is again input from outside the OSCE PS circle.

Economic and environmental challenges are not included in the Russian draft for a European Security Treaty. The treaty is specifically designed for issues in the first OSCE dimension, while the fifth tick of the Corfu Process focuses mostly on the second dimension, also taking into account consequences which economic and environmental challenges can have on other OSCE issues.

Economic and environmental challenges will grow instead of decrease in the future and might therefore also become more and more important in the OSCE. Energy security, transport security and migration are essential issues that will continue to be

¹¹¹ Cf. Buzan et al., 1998, p.100f. Buzan et al. predict in their framework what triggered the financial crisis of the last years.

discussed. Wide parts of the OSCE area are currently suffering from weak economies, which have to be modernised through cooperation and innovations in the economic and technological sector. Corruption is an extensive problem that has to be fought through good governance. The environment needs to be better protected and cooperation between the PS on human actions endangering the environment and natural catastrophes has to be improved. The tools the OSCE possesses in the second dimension have to be revised and adapted to the current challenges.

6.1.6 Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms, as well as Democracy and the Rule of Law

This tick of course is interconnected with all other issues but stands alone as a single tick dedicated exclusively to issues of the human dimension. Respect of fundamental freedoms, human rights and democracy and rule of law is anchored in the OSCE funding principles. During the Corfu discussions, the PS commonly decided that the commitments made in this dimension should be fully implemented and were directly and legitimately relevant to all PS equally way. A recurring issue affecting this tick also is the lack of implementation by the PS. However, the deficits in the human dimension are especially visible. Freedom of the media (including responsible reporting, broadcasting pluralism, the need to combat violence against journalists); freedom of movement, assembly and association; non-discrimination; protection of national minorities and migrants, and combating trafficking in human beings are issues that still have not been resolved across all of the OSCE area. Many PS have not yet applied to practice the commitments made in the OSCE. Therefore, it was highlighted that the political will and objective analysis of the problems would be essential for resolving these issues. Meetings had to be made more effective and mechanisms reinforced as well as new ones introduced. Election observation also was named as important part of the OSCE activities in the third dimension. For improving the work in all these fields closer cooperation with NGOs and civil society was considered, also it was underlined that it should be avoided to redo the work of other international organisations. Moreover, the legal framework of the OSCE should be strengthened. Details on the legal questions will be discussed in the next tick. To

make implementation of the OSCE commitments easier, the PS considered a support system that could be based on reviews. Furthermore, it was suggested to strengthen the cooperation with other organisations, in particular the UN and the Council of Europe.

This tick embodies the comprehensive as well as the cooperative approach to security. On the one hand the societal sector is the most interconnected one, depending so much on activities in other sectors; on the other hand cooperation is needed very strongly to fulfil the commitments made in the Human Dimension. Especially national minorities are an important issue in the OSCE, which unites a multiplicity of ethnic and identity groups. Although originating from very different problems, societal security issues can be traced back in most cases to identity issues – a problem that easily spreads across borders and is carried to another sector – the military one. Moreover, the second large issue in this tick is the media, “*an important actor that contributes significantly to the definition of situations*”¹¹². The comprehensive approach sees the media as a decisive actor in this field.

This tick again has no parallels at all with the Russian European Security Treaty. The Russian Federation claims, that the issues the humanitarian dimension and partly also the Corfu Process deal with have been exploited by western countries at the expense of other baskets. For this reason the Council of Europe is included in their list of relevant security organizations as the Council is known for focusing on Human Rights issues and possesses legally binding instruments in this field.¹¹³ Anyhow, also the Russian Federation sees a need to face current security issues with a comprehensive approach, as they are multidisciplinary problems. Still, they should not be dealt with in one single treaty in their opinion, this way focus on the single issues could get lost. Politico-military, economic and environmental and humanitarian issues could be dealt with separately to avoid dispersal.¹¹⁴

Therefore, the EST focuses exclusively on politico-military security issues and no references to the human dimension or its issues are being made.

¹¹² Cf. Buzan et al., 1998, p.124.

¹¹³ Cf. Klijn, 2010, p.158.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Statement by H.E. Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Grushko, FSC-PC.DEL/9/09, p.4.

The third dimension is the most discussed and contested one of the OSCE. Many PS have still not been able to reach the standards set. Human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are topics that would typically be seen as western assets. However, in the whole of the OSCE these issues are still of relevance. Still, they are seen as essential to developing democratic and free societies, which are still at the core of the comprehensive approach to security the OSCE has chosen for itself. The commitments the PS have made have to be implemented and consultations have to be carried out to fully make the Human Dimension work. Freedom of assembly, gender equality and independent jurisdiction are only some issues that will have to become standard in the whole OSCE region. Especially freedom of expression through the media, as well as combating discrimination and intolerance are topics that need further commitments and actions. Here the protection of national minorities, of which the OSCE area is rich, and a thorough confrontation with IDPs and refugees will be essential. Issues such as trafficking in human beings are of transnational nature, a threat to all OSCE PS, will also need more consideration. Moreover, the OSCE PS might consider freer movement of persons across the whole OSCE region.

6.1.7. Enhancing the OSCE's Effectiveness

This tick is especially linked to all other themes discussed in the Corfu Process. As put down in the previous points, the effectiveness of the OSCE plays an important role in each tick and dimension and is therefore dependent on the developments made in the other ticks. For this reason, a group of PS especially interested in reforming the OSCE formulated an extraordinarily large number of Fft-papers.

During the discussions, it was decided that in order to enhance the OSCE's effectiveness, two elements would be essential: re-restored trust between the PS and improved work processes in the OSCE institutions. In the discussions the PS identified approaches to resolve this issue. One would be to make the OSCE a more important political forum. If the PS would fall back more on the OSCE and use it more for joint action, future challenges could be met more easily. Also, the executive structures of the OSCE would have to be strengthened. Different opinions on how to address this tick emerged. Some PS considered that unified procedures and

standardised executive structures would bring about a greater degree of transparency. In this way, misunderstandings and double standards could be avoided. Efficient work in the decision-making bodies and during their meetings would also improve the work in the organisation. Other PS found that with a more effective OSCE, new and future challenges could be encountered. The cross-dimensional approach would have to be outlined in a better way and all commitments made should be implemented, especially the conflict prevention and resolution capabilities. Tangible proposals on the strengthening were, among others, better planning of programs and budgets, time- and labour-saving preparations of OSCE MC Meetings, formulating guidelines for field operation activities, coordination of the cooperation with NGOS and the introduction of a mechanism for assessing field operations. Internal regulations on e.g. the periods of service or the secondment system were decided to be discussed in the relevant body or institution of the OSCE.

In the discussions also the “weakness” of the OSCE, as some consider it, came up: its legal status. A proposal for a basic constituent document was put forward by a group of PS and also became a matter for discussion in all other ticks of the Corfu Process. The idea was to give the OSCE a legal personality. These PS suggested through granting OSCE staff privileges and immunities through a convention, the OSCE could increase its effectiveness.

In this tick the theoretical framework of the OSCE is especially visible. The PS agreed to cooperate first through a conference, and today in an organisation. The cooperative approach, which relies on voluntary cooperation and is based on political rather than legal commitments, would not be given any longer if a constituent document and thereby, a legal personality were to be introduced. If on the contrary the political relevance of the OSCE were to be strengthened without adding a legally binding agreement, the cooperative approach could be (re-) confirmed. The OSCE began life with the cooperation between the then opposing two blocks – the NATO states and the Warsaw pact and today the actual effectiveness of the OSCE relies on the will to implement the commitments that were made towards each other on this cooperative basis. The comprehensive approach can be found in the need to implement all commitments in all dimensions, as well as in the need to strengthen the cross-dimensional approach the PS had identified during the discussions.

The idea to strengthen the OSCE by introducing a basic constituent document can be related to the EST, which explicitly entitles other parties to the treaty to draw consequences if the imposed rules are violated. The proposal made in this tick and the draft treaty share the idea to create a legally binding basis for European security. However, the draft EST only sets regulations for intra-state treatment, while the idea proclaimed for and in the OSCE goes further and wants to introduce privileges and immunities to the organisations' staff, thus aiming to introduce formal directives not only contextual ones.

The OSCE effectiveness will have to be increased and improved to face 21st century challenges. Many different factors will have to be altered, like the decision-making process, budgetary planning, the work of the field operations and the OSCE programme. In this tick also the role of the Chairmanship will be of importance in the future. The legal framework could be strengthened and maybe even a legal personality could be provided for the OSCE. Furthermore, the provision of information in a timely manner to the PS is crucial in order to improve awareness raising and enable rapid response. The OCSE secretariat could get an enhanced supporting role and civil society could be involved more, especially in situations of conflict and crisis. Moreover, the Parliamentary Assembly could be involved more by using its proficiency and experience.

6.1.8. Interaction with other Organizations and Institutions on the Basis of the 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security

This tick again highlighted the importance of the implementation of the commitments made in the past. Once more, actual commitments for this purpose were already made. Only very few FfT-papers were presented by the PS. During the discussions, the PS pointed out that they wanted to improve the cooperation with other organisations and institutions making better use of the Platform for cooperative security, which had been introduced in 1999. Also the Maastricht Strategy of 2003, which addresses threats to Security and stability in the Twenty-First Century, and the Athens Ministerial Declaration of December 2009 indicated further directions for possible

collaboration and should be taken into account. In the Corfu discussions, guidelines for this cooperation-building process were subsequently discussed and it was agreed to focus on particular topics and concerns in all three dimensions. A particular focus was put on transnational threats and conflict prevention and resolution. International, regional, sub-regional organisations and institutions that would act in a specific region or special field should be taken into account. It was emphasised that a comprehensive approach without any discrimination against relevant actors should be applied. Also cooperation should take place on a sensible basis, identifying the specific needs and tackling them. Cooperation with other organisations should be made more efficient by joint actions and united efforts without redoing the others work. Cooperation could take the form of sharing best practices, comparing experiences in operations, and strategic assessments. Especially the Asian and Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation and adjacent regions to the OSCE area were highlighted as particularly important partners. Afghanistan for example, being a breeding ground for transnational threats, is a field where many issues have to be tackled.

The cooperative approach to security can be closely related to the cooperation with other organisations and institutions. Not only the PS find a common goal or threat that has to be fought, but also entire organisations, thus several states. Through cooperation threats to security of the particular region or also the whole OSCE area can be averted. Their cooperation is based on political commitments and not legal ones, and the OSCE itself highlights that cooperation with Partners and other organisations and institutions is included in their interpretation of their cooperative approach.

The goal of the European Security Treaty is to enhance security between the parties to the treaty. In article 1 of the treaty the parties agree not to take measures – also in IOs where they are members – that would threaten the security of other parties to the treaty in any way. To ensure each other's security is also the goal of the cooperation of the OSCE and other institutions and organisations, however the main target is not to avoid threats to security but to tackle already existing ones. In the EST it is assumed that threats to security come from other states or organisations, it is a treaty only shaped for inter-state treatment. The Corfu Process by contrast reverts to the comprehensive approach, considering threats from all sectors and all three

dimensions. This is why cooperation with other relevant actors is sought.

The 1999 Platform for Cooperative Security will very likely continue to serve as a basis for the OSCE to interact with other organisations and institutions. Many fields cannot be addressed alone, especially when looking at issues such as transnational threats. That the new challenges the world is facing have to be confronted together was also realised by the OSCE PS. The Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Cooperation could be involved more and the OSCE also could work as a coordinating framework for cooperation between security organisations collaborating on an equal basis in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security. Information exchange could be conducted through it, comparing the most suitable practices and effective endeavours. Joint activities will surely increase, regular exchange between the collaborating parties could take place and also new contacts could be developed.

6.1.9. The Cross-Dimensional Approach to Security

This tick was discussed by the PS together with the first tick, “implementation of all OSCE norms, principles and commitments”. Several ideas on how to tackle this issue emerged. More cooperation between the PC and the FSC by holding joint meetings and having joint decisions, CSBMs in the non-military field and the potential of the OSCE to confront root-causes of conflicts were discussed. The proposal to strengthen the role of the HCNM as well as the suggestion to focus more on IDPs and refugees came up. Furthermore, transnational threats were a topic of discussion too, as a cross-dimensional approach could deliver answers to this issue. Gender-related issues were discussed as a possible key area across all dimensions as well as root causes for conflict situations arising from issues of the economic, environmental and human dimension. Although the cross-dimensional approach to security did not elude many Pft-papers, the discussion evolved into two directions:

While all PS agreed on the equal importance all three dimensions have for and in the OSCE, some PS claimed that the different dimensions were addressed with an unequal amount of attention and links between the dimensions were artificially established. Other PS claimed that the lack of implementation of some commitments

would lead to more focus on those areas where the implementations had not been made.

Furthermore, some PS considered the Corfu Process as an opportunity to investigate how communities with a certain risk of being displaced react to conflict issues and how to prevent displacement and include those communities in conflict resolution processes. This could happen through cooperation with the UNHCR.

The practical cross-dimensional approach to Security of the OSCE incorporates the theoretical comprehensive approach. Ideally, all factors are being included when dealing with preventing or handling conflict situations. Not only military factors but also economic, environmental and humanitarian issues are taken into account. Moreover, it was realised that refugees and IDPs can weaken a country from inside and cause societal instability and, in this context, identity insecurity. Especially OSCE PS in the east still are still quite vulnerable in this respect and partly struggle with national identity problems. Even a small admixture from outside to such a society could cause issues and can easily lead to a conflict. To search for the root causes of issues can have a preventive effect. More joint work and action between the PC and the FSCE, two of the most important forums for cooperation between the PS in the OSCE, can be very helpful in this matter and also underlines the comprehensive approach.

The EST takes a very different approach towards security than is sought through the cross-dimensional approach. The Russian draft focuses exclusively on the military and political aspects and moreover on inter-state relationship. While the OSCE cross-dimensional approach looks for root-causes of conflicts in the other two dimensions, the EST solely attempts to prevent violations of security from one state to another. Other organisations where parties of the treaty are members are also included in this effort of securitizing; however internal problems of a state (which can often spill over to neighbouring countries through factors such as migration and/or refugees) are not taken into consideration.

The OSCE will surely continue to take a cross-dimensional approach to security. In all documents the importance of the cross-dimensionality of the OSCE is highlighted and looking at the ways of approaching issues, it might not have reached the ideal setting but will surely continue moving in this direction in the next years. Although

some PS complain about the fact that there is more focus on some dimensions than on others, all agree that it is the cross-dimensionality of the OSCE that makes its comprehensive approach work.

6.1.10. General Questions of Euro-Atlantic Security

From Vancouver to Vladivostok countries with very different backgrounds in historical, cultural and especially political terms can be found. The PS indicated in the Corfu discussions that for this reason divisions from inside may be possible and also threats from outside such as terrorism or spill-over issues from adjacent countries (Afghanistan was especially outlined during the discussions) represent a danger to the OSCE area.

The comprehensive, cooperative and especially the indivisible approach the PS commonly agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act was highlighted again and it was underlined that it had been strengthened through the Charta of Paris for a new Europe as well as other treaties. The common framework for security was pointed out to be crucial but still not at the peak of its development. The PS are still not completely united and again the lack of implementation of commitments was accentuated. Also they acknowledged that challenges in the arms control regime are arising and the principle of indivisibility of security has become a topic again, looking at the EST. The PS came to a common objective to create a security community, which would be free of dividing lines and different levels of security within the OSCE area, where no use of force could or would take place. This community would deal with hard and soft security issues, would allow PS to be members of alliances which they could choose freely and at the same time be compatible with the concept of indivisibility of security, not enhancing their own security at the expense of that of another PS.

During the discussions a possible action plan that could be adopted at the Astana Summit came up and the idea had a lot of support. The suggestion was that the action plan should strengthen the arms control regimes, enhance the capacities to encounter crises and conflicts, support the implementation of the commitments by the PS, provide a strategy against transnational threats, intensify cooperation with other organisations and strengthen the OSCE's institutions. Basically the action plan should

include first solutions and steps towards encountering all issues that were discussed during the Corfu Process across all ticks.

This tick sums up the challenges and issues raised during the Corfu discussions. It puts a focus on the theoretical framework the OSCE has built up since its foundation as CSCE and makes a step farther towards not only an international security organisation but also a security community. Again the comprehensive approach is underlined and the cooperative approach is visible in the goal to work more closely with other organisations. Indivisibility of security is highly important in this tick, looking at the aim to unite all PS in a security community free of violence.

The EST is specifically mentioned in the general questions of Euro-Atlantic security, as it promotes the indivisibility of security. The draft treaty made visible that a debate on indivisible security in the European and Eurasian area is pending and needed. However, the OSCE approaches it in a quite different way than the Russian draft treaty. While the EST mainly speaks of the indivisible approach, the OSCE also includes soft security issues and tackles this issue with its comprehensive framework.

In the near future especially Afghanistan will become an important topic in general questions of Euro-Atlantic security. The OSCEs contribution to the stability inside the country and border management between Afghanistan and the adjacent OSCE countries will certainly play a role. Also the cooperation with the OSCE Partners for Cooperation will probably intensify over this issue. Concerning the possibility of founding a Security community, it remains to be seen in which directions the discussions and the follow up process of the Corfu Process will go under the Lithuanian chairmanship until the end of 2011.

6.2. Conclusion

Over all one can say that the pending conflicts in the OSCE region dominated the discussions from the backdrop. Bearing in mind that the situation in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh have not been

resolved, the focus of the discussions can be easily understood. Most ticks derive from conflict prevention and resolution, or are linked to this topic in the course of discussions. An attempt to give the OSCE again importance as securitizing institution in Europe and Euroasia could be one way of looking at it. The view is rather deflating, as it can also appear as if the OSCE had no other reason to exist than to resolve these conflicts. Another view and the more idealistic one, is that the Corfu Process will change the European Security architecture through giving the OSCE more importance and boosting it as regional security organisation.

One thing is obvious, the PS have realised that the OSCE cannot stand alone in tackling the problems that are being faced from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Cooperation with other organisations is essential, work has to be done through joint action - not only with the UN as the biggest international organisation, but also smaller regional organisations and institutions have to be included in the OSCEs' efforts.

It may seem that following the comprehensive approach, the PS should only fully implement the commitments they have made over the last three decades and security in the OSCE region would be fully achieved. All ticks of the Corfu Process derive at least partly from the lack of implementation of commitments by the PS. However, many factors have to be taken into account here. Probably the most important and obvious one is that every country in this area has different policies and considers different things relevant. The EU states may have a similar view on some issues, nevertheless national interests can still prevail and lead to divergence from the common opinion. Some PS are still very traditional and/or lack implementation of some commitments for religious reasons. With countries east of Vienna this is even more strongly the case – some of them still lean against bigger states, looking for support in their interests and matters. Others function exactly opposite and make attempts to stand alone and independent in the political arena of the OSCE. Many different factors lead to this positioning, some for economic reasons, and some for energy security reasons. Other reasons date back twenty years or longer.

7. Possible Future Developments

7.1. The Astana Summit

The Astana Summit from 1st to 2nd December 2010 was the first OSCE summit in eleven years. Generally, high expectations were had in the forefront as it was a chance to change things. Still, many of the Heads of State of the Participating States did not attend the summit, a fact that troubled the atmosphere, and the failure to adopt a concrete proposal, which would restyle the OSCE at least partly lead to general deception. However, the *Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community* was realised, reconfirming the OSCE's comprehensive and indivisible approach to security. Although no new arrangements or fundamental changes were made in this declaration, it was an important and positive step that the Participating States reconfirmed their Aquis of 1975.

In the Declaration, the OSCE's commitment to its comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible approach to security is highlighted and reconfirmed. Especially the indivisibility of security is pointed out. The PS declare that their security is inseparably linked to one another, all have the right to choose freely their security arrangements or to remain neutral. Furthermore neither states, nor groups of states, nor other organisations have the right to take over the responsibility for security in the whole region and of course they pledge not to strengthen their security at the expense of others. The Astana Declaration has no legal personality, so no PS will face consequences if violating this commitment, but renewing this commitment at least set a sign.

Another important fact is the reaffirmation by the PS that their commitments made in the Human Dimension do not only concern the internal affairs of a state but are subject of relevance to all PS.¹¹⁵ This way, the importance of the third dimension was highlighted after having had many discussions about lately. Moreover, in this way civil society or regional organisations working in this field have a document to resort

¹¹⁵ Cf. Astana Declaration, 2010, par. 6.

to towards their national governments.

An action plan like the one proposed in the 10th tick “General Questions of Euro-Atlantic Security” had been realised by the Participating States (PS) and elaborated at the Astana Summit during long night-sessions. However, an agreement between the PS was not found and the action plan could not get adopted. While in the Corfu Process the different issues were divided into separate ticks, the action plan addressed, in a comprehensive manner and even if in separate chapters, possible challenges and changes the single issues are related to.

The Astana summit was the first in eleven years and but the outcome is not very significant. Some see the problem in the fact that Kazakhstan was been given the Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 in first place. A country that could not fully stand behind the commitments of the third, human, dimension was only been granted the leadership of the OSCE for geopolitical and geostrategic reasons. Afghanistan and Iraq, two of the big “problem areas” in the world could be brought into focus more easily: the natural resources of the country, and thus promotion of energy security; and prevailing over the disagreements between the western post-soviet states and the Russian Federation and the Central Asian countries were some of the reasons named for the Kazakh Chairmanship.¹¹⁶ At the same time, Kazakhstan repeatedly failed to introduce democratic and fundamental rights according to its commitments. Anyhow, it has to be stated that Kazakhstan stood by its commitment to strengthen ODIHR. Furthermore, it was the first time that a Central Asian country was chairing the OSCE – an organisation that repeatedly stressed that its area of influence reaches from Vancouver to Vladivostok and not only from Vancouver to Vienna.

One of the reasons for which the Astana action plan could not be adopted was that it contained points, which countries suffering from protracted conflicts could not possibly accept. Thus, these countries blocked the decision-making process and the adoption of this version of the action plan. However, it has to be noted that several big states could hide behind the disapproval of those conflict-ridden states. That several points in the action plan would not be acceptable for the countries with protracted

¹¹⁶ Cf. Zhovtis, 2010, p. 255f.

conflicts was clear at an early stage, so these big states did not have to intervene themselves and could remain in the background. The US for example had signalled that it would not be accomplished some weeks before the Astana summit by not formulating the adoption of the action plan as one of their goals for the summit.

7.2. After Astana

It appears that the OSCE has been losing importance over the last years. More and more OSCE participating states are NATO and/or EU member states and both organisations have planned further enlargements. Obviously both have greater assets coming to military resources as well as political and economic influence.

Still, their expansion has limits within the OSCE region, both geographically and geopolitically and the OSCE will remain of great importance to those Participating States who are likely not become members of either one of the two “western” organisations somewhere soon.¹¹⁷

After Astana the dialogue on a new security architecture and renovation of the OSCE has not ended. In the *Astana Commemorative Declaration* the incoming Chairmanship was requested to organise a follow-up process, taking into account the issues and topics discussed by the PS in the Corfu Process and the preparatory talks for the Summit.¹¹⁸ The Lithuanian Chairmanship follows the assignment and makes talks continue in a way similar to that in which the Corfu Process dialogues were held. They are referred to as “*V to V dialogue*” – Vancouver to Vladivostok, via Vienna and Vilnius, and aim to build on the work that was realised during the Corfu Process. The talks are being held in the form of informal ambassadorial meetings and discussions, and are partly followed by events on the topic. These events address issues across all dimensions and can be hosted by think tanks, experts from academia or NGOs, and be co-sponsored by PS. Examples are workshops organised by the International Peace Institute (IPI) in cooperation with the Chairmanship.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Ghebali, p.63.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community, 2010, par. 12.

To show what these V-to-V dialogues (could) look like, the second tick of the Corfu Process, early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation will serve as an example. The Lithuanian Chairmanship gives great importance to this issue and highlighted it as a priority during their time in office. The Chairmanship considers the OSCE a distinctive forum for dealing with those issues and thinks they should remain at the top of the OSCE's agenda. Already during the Corfu Process it could be seen that this particular issue is of special importance to the PS. 16 proposals to this tick were put forward. Also, the Crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 had shown the OSCE that their mechanisms for conflict and crisis prevention and resolution were not fully functional and needed further development.

To continue the talks after Astana, an informal ambassadorial meeting was already held in March to discuss the further development of this former tick. The framework for action that could not be approved in Astana helps as orientation on the themes and issues the PS generally want to tackle. The Lithuanian Chairmanship issued in the forefront a paper to encourage discussions, suggesting themes and areas that could be explored. Also expert-level events were planned to be held over the period of several months, to support the discussions. During the first meeting at the ambassadorial level it was agreed to use the proposals made during the Corfu discussions as well as the draft Astana framework for action as a basis for further talks. In general the wish for taking action and making final decisions was noticed among many PS. Political decisions should be forwarded to the responsible bodies on a case by case basis and others which only require approval of OSCE executive structures should, if possible, be put into action in the course of this year. While all issues discussed during the Corfu Process were explored, including possible ways of action, it was commonly decided that in this particular tick no need for additional mechanisms was needed (which had been considered during the preceding dialogues). The existing ones should, however, be reviewed and reconsidered.

Also, an expert level meeting was already held on 15 April 2011. Five speakers had been invited, who were from the academia or relevant OSCE institutions. They made contributions to the topic "Enhancing the Early Warning and Analytical Capacity of the OSCE" and also formulated recommendations on how to deal with it. It was decided to appoint a coordinator for this specific issue (like the Chef-de-file during

the Corfu Process), to facilitate the follow-up of the meeting and the continuation of the discussions.

Anyhow, it has to be recalled that even if enthusiasm to take action could be noticed, the further steps and possible decision-making process still depends on the will of the PS to collaborate and cooperate.

The next point in time where a real outcome of this dialogue on a new European security architecture will be seen, is the OSCE Ministerial Council in Vilnius in December 2011. Here the CiO will present the work that has actually taken place in the OSCE under the Lithuanian Chairmanship. Further developments can be expected under the Irish Chairmanship in 2012 and it will be very interesting to see in which direction the Ukrainian Chairmanship will go in 2013. Considering the initiation of the Corfu Process in 2009 and the non-accomplishment to find an agreement until the end of 2010, the Chairmanship of 2013 might still get the chance to alter something in the discussions on a new OSCE and Eurasian security architecture. Especially the Eurasian security architecture will probably become an important issue in the OSCE in the closer future, considering the unstable situation in countries like Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.¹¹⁹

7.3. The EST

It is highly improbable that the Russian Federation should have expected the EST to be adopted by all the states. The treaty contains many ambiguities and therefore leaves a big margin for interpretation. It gives Russia a power of veto over a large territory, a fact that western states would probably not accept, at least at this moment. Furthermore, it is not very likely that the western countries will engage into entering a common security zone with the Russian Federation. Too many issues remain unsolved, such as Georgia, energy security issues, and the Russian unilateral suspension of the CFE Treaty. The latter is especially relevant when looking at the EST: Russia has since then only partly fulfilled the commitments made in the CFE treaty. Through the breach of this security regime Russia becomes an unreliable

¹¹⁹ Cf. Kuchins, 2011.

partner for discussing new contracts.¹²⁰ Further developments will therefore depend to a certain degree on the developments in the CFE discussions. At the moment the Russian Federation has resumed discussions but still persists in its demand that all parties to the treaty have to ratify the adapted CFE. Only after this Russia will resume its participation.

While it is clear that the Russian Federation has to be involved when shaping the security architecture in Europe in order for it to be able to meet the current challenges, the general attitude Russia is showing the western states makes it rather uncertain that the EST will be adopted.

¹²⁰ Cf. Schroedel, 2010, p.4.

8. Conclusion

The OSCE is an organisation which was originally founded to provide a platform for dialogue and cooperation between the East and the West – from Vladivostok to Vancouver. This role was of particular importance in the time of the cold war, but the situation has changed drastically since the fall of the iron curtain. Having developed from a conference to an international security organisation, the OSCE went on to pass through many stages and experience many transitions.

The OSCE's comprehensive and cooperative approach towards security surely represents a crucial asset of the Organisation – it is what defines the OSCE. No other organisation orients itself on an academic theoretical framework. The comprehensive approach is what makes the OSCE particularly special: through its structure of three dimensions it attempts to include all aspects which might potential cause conflict. The politico-military dimension deals with “hard” security issues, while the second and especially the third dimension tackle the “soft” issues. However, only the inclusiveness in approaching threats to security in the OSCE region makes this organisation exceptional. Especially considering the very different standards of living, multiple ethnicities and religions, and also the political and military agendas of the 56 OSCE PS, a comprehensive approach is needed in order to be able to cope with the variety of problems that could endanger the common security. A variety of issues from very different sectors come together when talking about security nowadays – this includes military threats but also energy security, food security, economic and environmental threats and human security. To enable a secure and stable environment, the OSCE PS have developed a large number of guidelines, principles and codes of conduct in line with their theoretical framework, including aspects from all three dimensions, over the last decades.

In late 2008, the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev presented the idea to launch a new European Security Treaty in order to replace the old instruments dealing with security and create new guarantees for non-use-of-force as well as improved cooperation in countering new forms of security threats. However, this draft version

of a treaty had too many inconsistencies, leaving loopholes allowing states to attack each other so that western states could not possibly agree to it.

However, the call for a pan-European summit to discuss a legally binding treaty on European security by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was the trigger for discussing major changes in the OSCE. European security needed strengthening and required a new framework, as the existing one failed to meet current challenges. Unresolved problems, like ongoing conflicts, still existed and created a threat to stability and security in the OSCE area.

Therefore, when the „Corfu Process“ was launched half a year later under the Greek OSCE chairmanship on the island of Corfu at an informal OSCE foreign ministers' meeting, it tackled the problems and challenges of European security and introduced an open dialogue on security within the framework of the OSCE with the aim to restore confidence and trust among the OSCE participating states.

In December 2009 a ministerial council was held in Athens, where Decision No. 1/09 was made for „*Furthering the Corfu Process*“. The discussions on what could be reformed and improved in the OSCE had got an official framework. Over a period of almost two years discussions were held and ideas were gathered. The Participating States engaged in an active dialogue, taking all three OSCE dimensions into consideration.

The Astana summit, which had been expected to make a fundamental change, turned out to be a deception for most PS. However, the Corfu Process had had an important impact on the organisation itself. The PS had (re-) started a dialogue and actively tried to find solutions to current issues and challenges. Although the proposed Action Plan could not be adopted, dialogues continue in the OSCE and for the moment it seems that the PS have the will to take action and start making actual changes.

Theoretically the OSCE should be able to confront most security issues in a fast and inclusive way through its mechanisms and instruments. However, in order to be able to face today's threats and challenges, all commitments, norms and principles that have been made across these three dimensions have to be implemented by all PS. So far many PS have failed to do so, because they do not have to fear any sanctions. Anyhow, it seems that the PS have realised over the last years through the Corfu

discussions that the implementation is essential for progress in the OSCE. If they fulfil their commitments now, a big step towards a working comprehensive security approach will be made. Moreover, especially the second and in particular the highly debated third dimension have to be given more importance by all PS in order to create a basis for a functioning discussion. Issues related to all three dimensions have to be worked on more intensively and cooperating with other International Organisations will become more important in order to facilitate the course of action and enhance the outcome. Furthermore, peace in Europe will not be increased without looking closer at minority issues. Here, as well as with all other issues, interaction has to be based on a number of commonly agreed principles to facilitate communication and discussions.

It is clear that the Corfu Process is not just an answer to the Russian draft *European Security Treaty* but can go far beyond it. While the Corfu Process discusses issues across all dimensions, trying to find solutions to old, pending conflicts and new threats and challenges, the EST only deals with inter-state affairs. The EST seeks to create a zone free of military threats in Eurasia through a treaty, while the Corfu Process could naturally establish this zone through commitments in all dimensions. Current issues in security are not really addressed in the EST, instead it is designed to establish an area of influence which is to include not only states but also organisations, like NATO. In this way ex parte decisions by NATO for example would be avoided and other organisations like CSTO or the CIS would enhance their status. Indivisibility of security is highlighted as an asset of substantial importance to the treaty, which provides for a council to discuss further proceedings in case of transgression. However, the treaty is mainly a code of conduct for troops, disregarding topics the Russian Federation prefers not to deal with, like democratic control or arms control. While the EST was a treaty proposed by one country, the Corfu Process was a process in which all PS sought solutions together, with the aim to restore trust among each other. The opposing sides can be brought together through inclusion in the dialogue, seeking compromises together and learning about the other parties' wishes and goals through discussions. Anyhow, the Russian proposal made it clear that the principle of indivisibility needs reconfirmation. In the *Astana Commemorative Declaration* the PS make a first step towards it, reconfirming the principle and putting special prominence to it. Still, the time has not yet come to agree on a legally binding document which would commit the PS to a security zone from

Vancouver to Vladivostok. Since the OSCE Summit in Astana, the *European Security Treaty* has not been subject to any official discussion in the OSCE.

Harm Hazewinkel sums up well the situation in the OSCE by saying: “*The OSCE has up until now always been able to come up with some solutions, as long as political will existed.*”¹²¹ The keyword for progress in the OSCE is political will – as long as the PS collaborate and cooperate, work will be done. This only happens on a voluntary basis and with the current regulations for decision-making already a little group of countries disagreeing can stop the cog in the wheel. Shared values are therefore the key to communication between the PS and functioning discussions.

Apart from the particular national governments and their policies, it is up to the next Secretary General of the OSCE and countries chairing the OSCE, as well as the Chairperson in Office, to support decision finding processes and moderate discussions between the Participating States in the future. The Corfu Process was an excellent way to begin a dialogue between the Participating States but has by far not ended.

¹²¹ Hazewinkel, 2010, p.151.

Glossary of Acronyms

CFE – Conventional armed Forces in Europe Treaty

CIS – Community of Independent States

CSBMs – Confidence and Security Building Measures

CSCE – Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organisation

EED – Economic and environmental dimension

EST – European Security Treaty

EU – European Union

Fft-Papers – Food-for-Thought Papers

FSC – Forum for Security Cooperation

HCNM – High Commissioner on National Minorities

IDPs – internally displaced persons

MC – Ministerial Council

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

ODIHR – Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PC – Permanent Council

PS – Participating States

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees

WMD – Weapons of mass destruction

Bibliography

Archer, Clive, What security? What order? In: Smith, Martin A., Timmins, Graham (Eds.), *Uncertain Europe. Building a new European security order?* Routledge, London 2001. pp.3 – 19.

Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, de Wilde, Jaap, *Security. A new Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., London 1998.

Charnysh, Volha, Russia drafts European Security Pact. In: *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2010.

Dunay, Pál, The OSCE in crisis. Chaillot Paper, Nr. 88, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, April 2006.

Gärtner, Heinz, *Internationale Sicherheit. Definitionen von A – Z*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2008.

Ghebali, Victor-Yves, Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation. In: Tardy, Thierry, Ed., *European Security in a Global Context*. Routledge, Oxon, 2009.

Hauser, Gunther, *Das europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungssystem und seine Akteure*. BMLV, Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien, Wien, Februar 2008.

Hazewinkel, Harm J., OSCE Summit in Astana. In: *Security and Human Rights*, No. 3, 2010, pp. 151 – 152.

Klijn, Hugo, European Security à la Russe. In: *Security and Human Rights*, No. 3, 2010. pp. 156 – 159.

Kupchan, Charles A., NATO's Final Frontier. Why Russia should join the Atlantic Alliance, In: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, Nr. 3, May/June 2010.

Lavrov, Sergei, Euro-Atlantic Region: Equal Security for all. Russia in Global Affairs, 7 July 2010.

[http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The_Euro-](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The_Euro-Atlantic_Region:_Equal_Security_for_All-14888)

[Atlantic_Region: Equal Security for All-14888](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The_Euro-Atlantic_Region:_Equal_Security_for_All-14888), last access 2 June 2011.

Löberbauer, Harald, The OSCE system: Institutional Design and conflict management in the 21st century. GRIN Verlag, Norderstedt, 2006.

Lynch, Dov, The Corfu Process. In: The Indivisibility of Security: Russia and Euro-Atlantic Security. NDC Forum Paper, Rome, January 2010.

Magenheimer, Heinz, Comprehensive Security. Zum erweiterten Verständnis von Sicherheit, Schriftreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2/2001, Wien 2001.

Monaghan, Andrew, At the table or on the menu? Moscow's proposal for strategic reform. Research Report, Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome, June 2009.

Monaghan, Andrew, Russia's „Big Idea“: „Helsinki 2“ and the reform of Euro-Atlantic Security. Research Report, Research Division, NATO Defense College, Rome, 3 December 2008.

Monaghan, Andrew (Ed.), The Indivisibility of Security: Russia and Euro-Atlantic Security. NDC Forum Paper, Rome, January 2010.

Morozov, Viatcheslav, Russia's Changing Attitude towards the OSCE: Contradictions and Continuity. In: S+F, Sicherheit und Frieden/Security and Peace. Vol. 23, No. 2, 2005.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr., Soft Power. In: Foreign Policy, No.80, 1990. pp. 153 – 171.

Richter, Solveig, Schmitz, Andrea, Security Dialogue or Talking Shop? The Corfu Process under Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship. SWP Comments 3, Stiftung

Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 2010.

Rothschild, Emma, What is security? In: Daedalus, Vol. 124, No.3, 1995. pp. 53 – 98.

Schroedel, Livia, Europäische Sicherheit: Reaktionen im Westen auf Russlands Initiative. SWP Zeitschriftenschau 4, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, July 2010.

Zellner, Wolfgang, From Corfu to Astana: The way to the 2010 OSCE summit. In: Security and Human Rights, Vol. 21, No.3, November 2010. pp. 233 – 241.

Zhovtis, Evgeniy, The Summit is over, what's next? In: Security and Human Rights, Vol. 21, No. 4, December 2010. pp. 255 – 257.

Documents

The Draft of the European Security Treaty, 29 November 2009.

<http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/275>, last access 2 June 2011.

Speech of the President of the French Republic, Nicholas Sarkozy, at the World Policy Conference in Evian (Haute-Savoie), 8 October 2008.

<http://www.elysee.fr/president/a6d0964c6/page.5184.html>, last access 31 march 2011.

Speech of H.E. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 46th Munich Security Conference, 6 February 2010.

<http://www.securityconference.de/Lavrov-Sergey.573.0.html>, last access 2 June 2011.

OSCE Documents and Decisions

Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris 1990.

Chairmanship's Report. Findings and recommendations of the chairman of the informal group of friends on the future orientation of the economic and environmental dimension of the OSCE. CIO.GAL/97/09, 28 July 2009.

Corfu Informal Meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers on the Future of European Security. Chair's Concluding Statement to the Press. Concluding Statement to the Press by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, 28 June 2009.

CSCE Budapest Document 1994. Towards a genuine Partnership in a new Era, 5 – 6 December, Budapest, 1994.

Discussion on the future of security in Europe at the OSCE Ministerial working lunch on 4 December 2008. MC.DEL/92/08, 15 December 2008.

Fourth Meeting of the Council, CSCE and the New Europe - Our Security is Indivisible. Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting, Rome, 1993.

Lisbon Document, DOC.S/1/96, 3 December 1996.

Ministerial Council Helsinki 2008, Decision No. 13/08, Issues relevant to the Forum for Security Co-operation. MC/DEC/13/08, 5 December 2008.

Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu Process: Reconfirm – Review – Reinvigorate Security and Co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. MC.DOC/1/09, 2 December 2009.

The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security. An Overview of Major Milestones, OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, Operations Service. SEC.GAL/100/09, 17 June 2009.

OSCE Handbook, OSCE Press and Public Information Section, Vienna, 2007.

OSCE Istanbul Document 1999, Istanbul, 1999.

Statement by H.E. Bernard Kouchner, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, to the OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEL/628/08, 17 July 2008.

Statement by H.E. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ministerial working lunch on 4th December 2008. Issued as MC.DEL/44/08, Russian Initiative regarding a Treaty on European Security. 5 December 2008.

Statement by H.E. Alexander Grushko, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Joint Meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council. FSC-PC.DEL/9/09, 18 February 2009.

Websites

CICS discussion: After the Astana Summit: What is next for the OSCE? Panellists: Susan Elliott, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Michael Haltzel, SAIS, Ambassador Erlan Idrissov, Embassy of Kazakhstan, Andy Kuchins, CSIS. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 17 December 2010.

<http://csis.org/event/after-astana-summit-what-next-osce>, last access 2 June 2011.

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations.

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml>, last access 2 June 2011.

The three OSCE dimensions

<http://www.osce.org/item/44318>, last access 2 June 2011.

Annex

A.1.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Ministerial Council
Athens 2009 Second day of the Seventeenth Meeting
MC(17) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8

MC.DOC/1/09
2 December 2009

MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON THE OSCE CORFU PROCESS: Reconfirm-Review-Reinvigorate Security and Co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the 56 participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, meet, for the second time this year after our informal meeting in Corfu, to mark the significant progress that we have achieved together since the reunification of Europe and the elimination of Europe's old divisions. We reconfirm that the vision of a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security remains a common goal, which we are determined to reach.
2. To achieve this goal, much work remains to be accomplished. We continue to be seriously concerned that the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and OSCE commitments are not fully respected and implemented; that the use of force has not ceased to be considered as an option in settling disputes; that the danger of conflicts between States has not been eliminated, and armed conflicts have occurred even in the last decades; that tensions still exist and many conflicts remain unresolved; that stalemates in conventional arms control, resolution of disagreements in this field, resumption of full implementation of the CFE Treaty regime, and restoration of its viability require urgent concerted action by its States Parties; and that our common achievements in the fields of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms need to be fully safeguarded and further advanced. This is occurring at a time when new emerging transnational threats require, more than ever, common responses.
3. We recognize that these security challenges, further accentuated by the ongoing international financial and economic crisis, should be tackled with a renewed commitment to achieve results through multilateral dialogue and co-operation. At this stage, our highest priority remains to re-establish our trust and confidence, as well as to recapture the sense of common purpose that brought together our predecessors in Helsinki almost 35 years ago. In this context, we welcome the dialogue on the current and future challenges for security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area, initiated at the 2008 Helsinki Ministerial Council and launched by the Greek Chairmanship in June 2009 as the "Corfu Process", aimed at achieving the aforementioned goals. We consider the first ever OSCE Informal Ministerial Meeting in Corfu, with broad participation, as a milestone in this process, where we expressed our political will to confront security challenges, in all three OSCE dimensions.

4. The Corfu Process has already improved the quality and contributed to the revitalization of our political dialogue in the OSCE on security and co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. We are committed to continue and further develop this process, setting ambitious, concrete and pragmatic goals, while also focusing on the key issues identified in our work so far. The OSCE, due to its broad membership and its multidimensional approach to common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security, provides the appropriate forum for this dialogue. We welcome the valuable contributions of all relevant organizations and institutions dealing with security, on the basis of the Platform for Co-operative Security.

5. The dialogue within the Corfu Process will be grounded in the OSCE and in the principles of equality, partnership, co-operation, inclusiveness and transparency. It will aim at addressing disagreements openly, honestly and in an unbiased manner, acknowledging our diversities and concerns, in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding. It will build on three basic guidelines:

- (a) Adherence to the concept of comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security, as enshrined in the OSCE fundamental documents;
- (b) Compliance with OSCE norms, principles and commitments in all three OSCE dimensions, in full and in good faith, and in a consistent manner by all;
- (c) Determination to strengthen partnership and co-operation in the OSCE area, as well as to enhance the effectiveness of the OSCE and its contribution to security in our common space.

6. The Corfu Process will be taken forward by our Permanent Representatives to the OSCE in Vienna, in accordance with the decision we are adopting today. We remain committed to provide strong political impetus to the Corfu Process, and we are looking forward to reassessing its progress in 2010, in the format and level that we will deem appropriate, taking into consideration the results we achieve.

7. We welcome Kazakhstan in the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship, the first ever to be exercised by a Central Asian OSCE participating State. We note with interest its proposal to hold an OSCE summit in 2010. We point out that such a high-level meeting would require adequate preparation in terms of substance and modalities. We task the Permanent Council to engage in exploratory consultations to determine the extent of progress on the OSCE agenda to inform our decision.

A.2.

EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY

(Unofficial translation)

Draft

The Parties to this Treaty,

Desiring to promote their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation in conformity with international law,

Guided by the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975), as well as provisions of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (1982) and Charter for European Security (1999),

Reminding that the use of force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other way inconsistent with the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations is inadmissible in their mutual relations, as well as international relations in general,

Acknowledging and supporting the role of the UN Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to join efforts in order to respond effectively to present-day security challenges and threats in the globalized and interdependent world,

Intending to build effective cooperation mechanisms that could be promptly activated with a view to solving issues or differences that might arise, addressing concerns and adequately responding to challenges and threats in the security sphere,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

According to the Treaty, the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security measures taken by a Party to the Treaty individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any international organization, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of all other Parties. The Parties shall act in accordance with the Treaty in order to give effect to these principles and to strengthen security of each other.

Article 2

1. A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.
2. A Party to the Treaty which is a member of military alliances, coalitions or organizations shall seek to ensure that such alliances, coalitions or organizations observe principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Helsinki Final Act, Charter for European Security and other documents adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as in Article 1 of this Treaty, and that decisions taken in the framework

of such alliances, coalitions or organizations do not affect significantly security of any Party or Parties to the Treaty.

3. A Party to the Treaty shall not allow the use of its territory and shall not use the territory of any other Party with the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed attack against any other Party or Parties to the Treaty or any other actions affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.

Article 3

1. A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request, through diplomatic channels or the Depositary, any other Party to provide information on any significant legislative, administrative or organizational measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security.

2. Parties shall inform the Depositary of any requests under para.1 of this Article and of responses to them. The Depositary shall bring that information to the attention of the other Parties.

3. Nothing in this Article prevents the Parties from undertaking any other actions to ensure transparency and mutual trust in their relations.

Article 4

The following mechanism shall be established to address issues related to the substance of this Treaty, and to settle differences or disputes that might arise between the Parties in connection with its interpretation or application:

- a) Consultations among the Parties;
- b) Conference of the Parties;
- c) Extraordinary Conference of the Parties.

Article 5

1. Should a Party to the Treaty determine that there exists a violation or a threat of violation of the Treaty by any other Party or Parties, or should it wish to raise with any other Party or Parties any issue relating to the substance of the Treaty and requiring, in its opinion, to be considered jointly, it may request consultations on the issue with the Party or Parties which, in its opinion, might be interested in such consultations. Information regarding such a request shall be brought by the Requesting Party to the attention of the Depositary which shall inform accordingly all other Parties.

2. Such consultations shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than (...)days from the date of receipt of the request by the relevant Party unless a later date is indicated in the request.

3. Any Party not invited to take part in the consultations shall be entitled to participate on its own initiative.

Article 6

1. Any participant to consultations held under Article 5 of this Treaty shall be entitled, after having held the consultations, to propose the Depositary to convene the Conference of the Parties to consider the issue that was the subject of the consultations.

2. The Depositary shall convene the Conference of the Parties, provided that the relevant proposal is supported by not less than (two) Parties to the Treaty, within (...) days from the date of receipt of the relevant request.

3. The Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least two thirds of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus and shall be binding.

4. The Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 7

1. In case of an armed attack or a threat of such attack against a Party to the Treaty, immediate actions shall be undertaken in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Treaty.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 8 of the Treaty, every Party shall be entitled to consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself. In exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it shall be entitled to render the attacked Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Information on measures taken by Parties to the Treaty in exercise of their right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the UN Security Council.

Article 8

1. In cases provided for by Article 7 of this Treaty, the Party which has been attacked or threatened with an armed attack shall bring that to the attention of the Depositary which shall immediately convene an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties to decide on necessary collective measures.
 2. If the Party which became subject to an armed attack is not able to bring that to the attention of the Depositary, any other Party shall be entitled to request the Depositary to convene an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties, in which case the procedure provided for in Para. 1 of this Article shall be applied.
 3. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties may decide to invite third states, international organizations or other concerned parties to take part in it.
 4. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least four fifths of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be taken by unanimous vote and shall be binding. If an armed attack is carried out by, or a threat of such attack originates from a Party to the Treaty, the vote of that Party shall not be included in the total number of votes of the Parties in adopting a decision.
- The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 9

1. This Treaty shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, as well as rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that their obligations under other international agreements in the area of security, which are in effect on the date of signing of this Treaty are not incompatible with the Treaty.
3. The Parties to the Treaty shall not assume international obligations incompatible with the Treaty.
4. This Treaty shall not affect the right of any Party to neutrality.

Article 10

This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok as well as by the following international organizations: the European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Community of Independent States in ... from ... to

Article 11

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States and to approval or adoption by the signatory international organizations. The relevant notifications shall be deposited with the government of ... which shall be the Depositary.
2. In its notification of the adoption or approval of this Treaty, an international organization shall outline its sphere of competence regarding issues covered by the Treaty.

It shall immediately inform the Depositary of any relevant changes in its sphere of competence.
3. States mentioned in Article 10 of this Treaty which did not sign the Treaty during the period indicated in that Article may accede to this Treaty by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.

Article 12

This Treaty shall enter into force ten days after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification with the Depositary in accordance with Article 11 of the Treaty.

For each State or international organization which ratifies, adopts or approves this Treaty or accedes to it after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification of ratification, adoption, approval or accession with the Depositary, the Treaty shall enter into force on the tenth day after the deposit by such State or organization of the relevant notification with the Depositary.

Article 13

Any State or international organization may accede to this Treaty after its entry into force, subject to the consent of all Parties to this Treaty, by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.

For an acceding State or international organization, this Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of accession with the Depositary, provided that during the said period no Party notifies the Depositary in writing of its objections against such accession.

Article 14

Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty should it determine that extraordinary circumstances pertaining to the substance of the Treaty have endangered its supreme interests. The Party intending to withdraw from the Treaty shall notify the Depositary of such intention at least (...) days in advance of the planned withdrawal. The notification shall include a statement of extraordinary circumstances endangering, in the opinion of that Party, its supreme interests.

November 29, 2009

**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Summit
Astana 2010**

**ASTANA COMMEMORATIVE DECLARATION
TOWARDS A SECURITY COMMUNITY**

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the 56 participating States of the OSCE, have assembled in Astana, eleven years after the last OSCE Summit in Istanbul, to recommit ourselves to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals. As we mark the 35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, we reaffirm the relevance of, and our commitment to, the principles on which this Organization is based. While we have made much progress, we also acknowledge that more must be done to ensure full respect for, and implementation of, these core principles and commitments that we have undertaken in the politico-military dimension, the economic and environmental dimension, and the human dimension, notably in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. We reaffirm our full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and to all OSCE norms, principles and commitments, starting from the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the Charter for European Security and all other OSCE documents to which we have agreed, and our responsibility to implement them fully and in good faith. We reiterate our commitment to the concept, initiated in the Final Act, of comprehensive, co-operative, equal and indivisible security, which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and links economic and environmental co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations.

3. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence. We will maintain only those military capabilities that are commensurate with our legitimate individual or collective security needs, taking into account obligations under international law, as well as the legitimate security concerns of other States. We further reaffirm that all OSCE principles and commitments, without exception, apply equally to each participating State, and we emphasize that we are accountable to our citizens and responsible to each other for their full implementation. We regard these commitments as our common achievement, and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate and legitimate concern to all participating States.

4. These norms, principles and commitments have enabled us to make progress in putting old confrontations behind us and in moving us closer to democracy, peace and unity throughout the OSCE area. They must continue to guide us in the 21st century as we work together to make the ambitious vision of Helsinki and Paris a reality for all our peoples. These and all other OSCE documents establish clear standards for the participating States in their treatment of each other and of all individuals within their territories. Resolved to build further upon this strong foundation, we reaffirm our commitment to strengthen security, trust and good-neighbourly relations among our States and peoples. In this respect we are convinced that the role of the OSCE remains crucial, and should be further enhanced. We will further work towards strengthening the OSCE's effectiveness and efficiency.

5. We recognize that the OSCE, as the most inclusive and comprehensive regional security organization in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area, continues to provide a unique forum, operating on the basis of consensus and the sovereign equality of States, for promoting open dialogue, preventing and settling conflicts, building mutual understanding and fostering co-operation. We stress the importance of the work carried out by the OSCE Secretariat, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and Representative on Freedom of the Media, as well as the OSCE field operations, in accordance with their respective mandates, in assisting participating States with implementing their OSCE commitments. We are determined to intensify co-operation with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and encourage its efforts to promote security, democracy, and prosperity throughout the OSCE area and within participating States and to increase confidence among participating States. We also acknowledge the Organization's significant role in establishing effective confidence- and security-building measures. We reaffirm our commitment to their full implementation and our determination to ensure that they continue to make a substantial contribution to our common and indivisible security.

6. The OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative approach to security, which addresses the human, economic and environmental, political and military dimensions of security as an integral whole, remains indispensable. Convinced that the inherent dignity of the individual is at the core of comprehensive security, we reiterate that human rights and fundamental freedoms are inalienable, and that their protection and promotion is our first responsibility.

We reaffirm categorically and irrevocably that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. We value the important role played by civil society and free media in helping us to ensure full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, including free and fair elections, and the rule of law.

7. Serious threats and challenges remain. Mistrust and divergent security perceptions must be overcome. Our commitments in the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions need to be fully implemented. Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law must be safeguarded and strengthened. Greater efforts must be made to promote freedom of religion or belief and to combat intolerance and discrimination. Mutually beneficial co-operation aimed at addressing the impact on our region's security of economic and

environmental challenges must be further developed. Our energy security dialogue, including on agreed principles of our co-operation, must be enhanced. Increased efforts should be made to resolve existing conflicts in the OSCE area in a peaceful and negotiated manner, within agreed formats, fully respecting the norms and principles of international law enshrined in the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act. New crises must be prevented. We pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

8. Conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes remain major instruments for ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency, and should be revitalized, updated and modernized. We value the work of the Forum for Security Cooperation, and look forward to the updating of the Vienna Document 1999. We value the CFE Treaty's contribution to the creation of a stable and predictable environment for all OSCE participating States. We note that the CFE Treaty is not being implemented to its full capacity and the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty (ACFE) has not entered into force. Recognizing intensified efforts to overcome the current impasse, we express our support for the ongoing consultations aiming at opening the way for negotiations in 2011.

9. At the same time, in today's complex and inter-connected world, we must achieve greater unity of purpose and action in facing emerging transnational threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats and the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, drugs and human beings. Such threats can originate within or outside our region.

10. We recognize that the security of the OSCE area is inextricably linked to that of adjacent areas, notably in the Mediterranean and in Asia. We must therefore enhance the level of our interaction with our Partners for Co-operation. In particular, we underscore the need to contribute effectively, based on the capacity and national interest of each participating State, to collective international efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan.

11. We welcome initiatives aimed at strengthening European security. Our security dialogue, enhanced by the Corfu Process, has helped to sharpen our focus on these and other challenges we face in all three dimensions. The time has now come to act, and we must define concrete and tangible goals in addressing these challenges. We are determined to work together to fully realize the vision of a comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security community throughout our shared OSCE area. This security community should be aimed at meeting the challenges of the 21st century and based on our full adherence to common OSCE norms, principles and commitments across all three dimensions. It should unite all OSCE participating States across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, free of dividing lines, conflicts, spheres of influence and zones with different levels of security. We will work to ensure that co-operation among our States, and among the relevant organizations and institutions of which they are members, will be guided by the principles of equality, partnership co-operation, inclusiveness and transparency. Drawing strength from our diversity, we resolve to achieve this overarching goal through sustained determination and common effort, acting within the OSCE and in other formats.

12. To this end, we task the incoming Chairmanship-in-Office with organizing a followup process within existing formats, taking into consideration ideas and proposals put forward by the participating States, including in the framework of the Corfu Process and in the preparation of the Astana Summit, and pledge to do all we can to assist the incoming Chairmanships- in-Office in developing a concrete action plan based on the work done by the Kazakhstan Chairmanship. Progress achieved will be reviewed at the next OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius on 6 to 7 December 2011.

13. We express our deep gratitude to Kazakhstan for hosting our meeting, and for the energy and vitality the country has brought to the challenging task of chairing the OSCE in 2010. We welcome Lithuania's Chairmanship of the Organization in 2011, Ireland's in 2012 and Ukraine's in 2013.

Zusammenfassung

Die OSZE ist die einzige internationale Organisation, die auf einem wissenschaftlichen theoretischen Rahmen aufgebaut ist. Sie ist in drei Dimensionen gegliedert: die politisch-militärische, die Wirtschaft- und Umweltdimension und die humanitäre Dimension. Eine Schwierigkeit bezüglich der Effizienz der OSZE liegt in der Tatsache, dass ihre Entscheidungen nur Empfehlungen darstellen.

Als die Russische Föderation im Dezember 2008 eine Reform der europäisch-atlantischen Sicherheitsarchitektur durch die Einführung eines rechtlich verbindlichen Vertrags, des Europäischen Sicherheitsvertrags (EST), vorschlug, löste das einen umfassenden Sicherheitsdialog innerhalb der OSZE, den sogenannten Korfu-Prozess, aus. Der Korfu-Prozess besteht aus zehn „ticks“, d.h. Aspekten, in denen Reformbedarf bestand. Diese werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit, gestützt auf den umfassenden analytischen Rahmen von Buzan, Waever und de Wilde (1998), im Detail analysiert und mit den politischen Intentionen und dem Anwendungsbereich des EST verglichen. Es wird erläutert, dass der Korfu-Prozess die Rolle der OSZE stärken sollte, wobei wichtige militärische und politische Aspekte aus dem EST aufgegriffen, im Einklang mit dem traditionellen umfassenden Sicherheitsansatz der OSZE jedoch auch wirtschaftliche, Umwelt- und humanitäre Aspekte hinzugefügt wurden.

Abstract

The OSCE is the only international organisation based on an academic theoretical framework. It is structured in three dimensions: the political-military, the economic-environmental and the humanitarian dimension. One difficulty regarding the efficiency of the OSCE lies in the fact that its decisions are only recommendations.

When in December 2008 the Russian Federation proposed a reform of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture through the introduction of a legally binding treaty, the European Security Treaty (EST), this triggered a comprehensive security dialogue in the OSCE, the “Corfu Process”. The Corfu Process consists of ten “ticks”, aspects that needed reforming. These are analyzed in detail in the present thesis against the comprehensive framework of analysis proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) and compared to the political intentions and the scope of the EST. It is argued that the Corfu Process was designed to invigorate the role of the OSCE, picking up important military and political aspects from the EST but adding also economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects in line with the OSCE's traditional comprehensive security approach.

CURRICULUM VITAE

First names: **Esther Valerie**
Last names: **Osorio Jaramillo**

Date & place of birth: 17 July 1987, Vienna, Austria

Nationality: Austrian/ Colombian

Education

Since March 2009 Bachelor programme History
University of Vienna

Since October 2005 Magister programme Political Sciences
University of Vienna

14 January 2008 – Erasmus semester abroad Political Sciences
30 June 2008 Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium

September 1997 – *Matura* at the Akademisches Gymnasium, Vienna
June 2005

Professional experience

July 2009, Internship at the Austrian Mission to the OSCE, Dept. II.7
February 2010, Fed Ministry for European and International Affairs
May/June 2010 Minoritenplatz 8, 1014 Vienna

9 July 2008 – Internship at the Austrian Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia
10 October 2008 Carrera 9 N° 73 – 44, Oficina 401, Bogotá, Colombia