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DISSERTATION

Reading Identity/Ideology of Military Documents

The gendered constructions of US military 'perception management' doctrine and implementation between 1991 and 2003

lic rel. int., DEA rel. int. Elgin Medea Brunner

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I – INTRODUCTION: The Puzzle

On April 2, 2003 a success story about a historical episode of the military conflict in Iraq made the international headlines. For the first time since World War II, an American prisoner of war (POW) was successfully extracted from enemy hands. Private first class Jessica Lynch, ‘a young, blond, pretty’ American soldier deployed with the 507th maintenance company in Iraq and who had been held as a POW at Saddam Hussein hospital in Nasiriyah since March 23, was rescued by the task force 20 team, a covert US special operations unit responsible only for the highest American priorities in Iraq such as “hunting for weapons of mass destruction, weapons scientists and Baath party leaders” (Priest 2003) and who’s primary goal was to capture or kill so-called high value targets. Not only did the unit carry a night-vision video camera and record the rescue at the request of the military public affairs office, but also did it apparently stage firefight inside the hospital. The building had actually been abandoned by the Iraqi military personnel and even “her Iraqi guards had long fled” (Kampfner 2003). Nevertheless, the President himself, two days later, publicly thanked those “Marines and Special Operations forces [who] set out on a daring rescue mission” (Bush 2003). The edited version of the videotape was immediately released and accompanied by a Pentagon statement claiming that Lynch suffered from stab and bullet wounds, that she had been slapped and interrogated. At a crucial moment of the early war in Iraq, when media reports grew increasingly sceptical and experts publicly started to question the military strategy of the allied forces¹, this story labelled ‘Saving Private Jessica’ and endowed with all the necessary elements to become an heroic epic appeared to be highly successful in reinvigorating the patriotic creed perceived at stake in Iraq. And ever more details spread in the media. It was soon ‘known’ that the first request of recuperating Jessica was “pink casts for her fractured legs and arm [and] a new hairbrush”, that she had won the “Miss Congeniality [contest] in the beauty pageant at her county fair” in her pre-army life and that, upon her rescue “she was silent, a sheet pulled tightly over her head” and only responded when the soldiers called “We’re here to protect you and take you home” by squeezing the hand of an army ranger and asking “[d]on’t let anyone leave me.” (Morse 2003)

¹ I.e. questions were raised by both media and some senior commanders in the field as to whether the US had sent sufficient manpower. Moreover, “Defense Secretary Rumsfeld complained about media ‘mood swings’ [and] Peter Arnett, who was appearing on NBC and MSNBC, went on Iraqi television and claimed the US had underestimated the forces they were up against and were having to redraw their battle plans” (Chinni 2003).

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Though, as it first appeared in a Guardian article and a BBC documentary² in mid May “there was [no sign] of shooting, no bullet inside her body, not stab wound – only RTA, road traffic accident”. Moreover, Anmar Uday, a doctor at the Nasiriyah hospital, who witnessed Lynch’s rescue recounted:

“We heard the noise of helicopters. We were surprised. Why do this? There was no military, there were no soldiers in the hospital. It was like a Hollywood film. They cried, ‘Go, go, go’, with guns and blanks and the sound of explosions. They made a show – an action movie like Sylvester Stallone or Jackie Chan, with jumping and shouting, breaking down doors. All the time the camera rolling” (Kampfner 2003).

Hence, while the twisted truth of the official narrative finally broke and forced not only the media to correct their recount but also the army to proceed to an analysis of the circumstances under which the 507th maintenance company had been ambushed (US Army 2003), the ‘Saving Private Jessica’-story is representative of two interlinked phenomena: the readiness of both the military personnel and the government executives to rely on what some call perception management or public affairs operations and others outright propaganda or psychological operations on the one hand, and the reference to flagrant gender stereotypes within these – supposedly more neutrally denominated – semantic information operations on the other hand. Apparently the videotaped rescue of private Jessica Lynch and the representation of it delivered by the US central command’s public affairs office in Qatar can be qualified an “action[...] to convey/or deny selected information [...] to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning [...] resulting in [...] behaviors favorable to the originator’s objectives” (USAF JP3-53 2003) , and thereby concurs with the definition of so-called perception management.

Moreover, multiple elements point to the gendered underpinnings of this manufactured rescue narrative in both the official and the media projections. A male POW fearfully covering under a sheet at the very moment of his rescue would have been precluded from becoming a hero, unlike “the picture of the doe-eyed Lynch swaddled in an American flag while being whisked to safety on a military stretcher [that] had already become an icon” (Morse 2003) within a few hours of the news.

² Called ‘War Spin’ and first broadcast on *BBC two* on May 18, 2003.

The combination of these two phenomena points to the core of an issue which is all too seldom merely noticed not to mention duly scrutinised: the gendered underlying assumptions of the increasingly important so-called semantic information operations³ and the mutual and constitutive potential implications thereof. This is precisely the topical complex this study is interested in. Therefore, in the following sections of the introduction the research question for this project shall be developed along a two-pronged strand: the empirical but in the fields of political science and international relations underscrutinised phenomenon of the increasingly important semantic information operations as a presumably powerful policy instrument within the environment of the so-called and propagated ‘information age’ on the one hand, and as linked to the theoretically inspired consequential observation about gender as an equally powerful analytical category intrinsic to the competition over power on the other hand.

1.1 From 1991 to 2003

The second gulf war was labeled by many as the first information war (Campen 1992). This characterisation depends on the focus on the novel technological aspects of information operations having appeared for the first time in an armed conflict. The five Dutch hackers gained prominence for their intrusion into the computer systems of 34 American military sites, including those directly supporting operation desert storm, and for later, supposedly offering the information gained to Saddam Hussein who, fearing a trap, apparently declined the offer (Denning 1999). The manoeuvres to shaped perceptions – to influence emotions, control behaviour, and forge the outcome – on both sides remained the more traditional ones of media control and censorship, such as the exclusive admittance of only 126 journalists accredited by the Pentagon, assembled in the media pools and dependent on both military escort and facilities to investigate and transmit their stories (Gloaled.org a). Nevertheless, one particular incident gained prominence for its cruelty first and drew the attention to the active attempts to shape perceptions second: the so-called incubator baby incident accusing Iraqi invaders of Kuwait to have removed babies in the premature unit of a hospital from their incubators. An anonymous girl tearfully testified in US Congress upon this incident but was later unmasked as the daughter of Saud al Sabah, Kuwait’s ambassador to the United States.

³ The term *semantic* information operations is used here in order to specify that the focus of interest lies on the cognitive rather than the technological constitutive elements of information operations; this implies that both perceptions management and psychological operations are at times used interchangeably. For definitional details and differentiations see chapter II, section 2.4 below.

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Moreover, it was also disclosed that Hill and Knowlton, a large public relations firm, had helped prepare her testimony, and that the girl had rehearsed before video cameras in the firm's Washington headquarters (Gloaled.org b). This is another example for the fact that psychological operations⁴ are used in war times and again. Regardless hereof, in 1991 the only doctrine document published on psychological operations dated from 1979 (Department of the Army 1979). In contrast hereto, the 1990s – starting immediately after operation desert storm – became the decade in which multiple doctrine documents on information operations were compiled and published.

Consequently, the time period under examination in this project shall start from 1991 and cover the major conflicts up to the latest war of US involvement. Namely, the Persian Gulf War of 1991 labeled the first information war, the Somalia intervention of 1993 which gave birth to the so-called CNN-effect, the Kosovo war of 1999 dubbed by some as the first virtual war, the Afghanistan campaign as component of the 'war on terror' and finally the Iraq War of 2003. It is assumed that the development of the military doctrine on the state's intentions to shape perceptions in conflict is representatively traceable within this period by comparing and contrasting it with the specific products issued by the United States' armed forces in each of these military encounters. Moreover, such an analysis is expected to expose the dynamics the so-called information revolution increasingly unfolds upon the state's actual (in)capacity to uphold its monopoly on 'information' during conflict. Moreover, this research project shall focus exclusively on the United States. As a consequence of the US's overwhelming, and widely agreed upon, power lead – whatever the definition thereof – vis-à-vis the rest of the world, its military doctrine is not only and naturally at the cutting edge but it also best reflects the conceptual development of interest here. Also, the US military doctrine documents are the only ones accessible to a relatively comprehensive degree, while all other official utterances, strategic and planning papers are entirely accessible.

Narrowed by this context, the research question has now become more precise: *how has the United States' military doctrine on, and implementations of, perception management developed between the second Gulf War of 1991 and the third Gulf War of 2003 in general and with a particular focus on operations Desert Storm 1991, Restore Hope 1992/1993, Allied Force 1999, Enduring Freedom 2001, and Iraqi Freedom 2003. What were the goals and procedures? How was it supposed to operate and how was it implemented?*

⁴ See footnote above.

After having briefly developed the empirical strand generating the above formulated more precise research question, in the following section the second, theoretically based strand shall be developed before the two traces are then merged in order to concisely reflect the entire scope of this study.

1.2 Perception management as a gendered discourse

First, semantics – the aspects of meanings that are expressed in language – are core to those aspects of information operations coming under scrutiny in this research project since informational manipulation relies on the selective but purposeful projection of meaning. There are of course different ways of paying tribute to the importance of written and/or spoken language in social science research, but a common feature is the focus on a defining moment of interrelatedness between power and discourse. This interrelatedness manifests itself in different ways, such as in the societal establishment and maintenance (disciplining) of knowledgeable practices (norms) or in the development of commonly accepted historical narratives. “From ancient Greek philosophy through the present time, logocentrism has been the dominant operation for constructing meaning in Western thought” (Gregory 1989: xvi). Logocentrism refers to the belief that the assumed underlying bases of reality can be revealed by pure reason and truth. The term is derived from the Greek word *logos* meaning word, reason, and spirit, and ‘logocentrism’ therefore implies a conflation and monopolising of truth and its production. Hence, the production of meaning constitutes one nexus linking power and discursive agency; the forging of a certain intelligibility to become accepted. The phenomenon of “discourses as being productive (or reproductive) of things defined by the discourse” (Milliken 1999: 229) subsumes a whole and complex process in which knowledgeable practices are defined and disciplining techniques and practices are elaborated and applied. Most importantly, through the quality of discourses “to work to define and to enable, and also to silence and to exclude [...] by [...] endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified” (Milliken 2001: 139), the relevance of attempting to examine and analyse such mechanisms becomes evident. This process has the potential to denaturalise dominant practices by exposing them.

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Second, it is clearly established that “texts as elements of social events have causal effects – i.e. they bring about changes” (Fairclough 2003: 8). It is the discursive framing mechanism that mediates the process. Within the process, frames are to be understood as central basic perception categories and structures through which the actors perceive their environment and the world (Dunn and Mauer 2006). These categories are preexistent in the culture and in the collective memory of the actors. Therefore, the actors attribute meaning to the things they perceive through their recognition as things corresponding to the previously structured world (Donati 2001). Hence, discursive framing is the rhetorical (written and spoken) allusion to such preexisting cognitive models and thereby shapes and perpetuates them. When this is done successfully, discursive framing imprints the existing social reality correspondingly. To put it differently, through the framing mechanism, discourse becomes (among other things) productive of reality. Milliken (1999) distinguishes three main theoretical commitments of discourse analysis, including ‘discourses as systems of signification’, ‘discourse productivity’, and the ‘play of practice’.

While all of these commitments evidence that power is an effect of, and is instantiated in, discourse (language), their complex operation mechanisms differ. For the purposes of the research aimed at here, two of these three theoretical commitments are particularly relevant for each of the procedural steps of analysis:

First, the ‘discourses as systems of signification’ are central to the analysis of both the doctrine documents and their implementations on the battlefield. As I alluded to above and shall elaborate in the theory chapter (chapter III), I shall be focusing on a particular set of systems of signification, namely the constructions of gendered identities.

Second, the process and procedures of ‘discourse productivity’ shall then become the major analytical tool for the analysis of the implications the gendered constructions bear on the state, on policy and on society. Fairclough (2003), while insisting on the social effects of texts (discourse productivity), also underlines the ideological effects of spoken and written words, seeing ideology as a modality of power.

Thus, it is also a particular aim of this study to make seizable the ideological dimensions of how identities are discursively constructed relying upon gendered underpinnings. The conflation of power and discourse is pervasive. And it articulates in ideology. Power is – as is gender – relational. Drawing on Derrida’s philosophical work, we understand discourses as being “structured largely in terms of binary oppositions [...] that [...] establish a relation of power” (Milliken 1999: 229). These binaries are hierarchically gendered and thereby they

univocally empower and disempower. I regard that analysis as convincing and as a suitable model that can aid our understanding of the gendered framing of the US semantic information operations and their performativity, appreciating Derrida's insights on how "discourses make intelligible some ways of [...] operationalizing a particular 'regime of truth'" (ibid.), as well as its contribution in directing "us towards studying dominating or hegemonic discourses" (ibid.: 230). It is the particular hegemonic discourse deployed by the US military in its doctrine documents on semantic information operations and the very products this doctrine generates that shall come under close scrutiny here.

On the one hand, the constitutive consequentiality, or performativity (Butler 1997), of discursive framing, called discourse productivity points to the unambiguous importance of doing a discourse analysis of the United States information operations. On the other hand, this constitutive consequentiality also provides us with a focus within information operations. Obviously, the latter will lie on semantic information operations and not on the technologically determined aspects, such as data mining or computer network attacks (e.g.). Most importantly, the understanding of discourse as having a productive/constitutive power generates a second research question – related to the first set of questions developed above: What implications do the United States' perception management operations in the conflicts between 1991 and 2003 perform on the state itself, on its policy and on society at large? Linking this up with the decisive focus on the pervasive gendered underpinnings of these very operations this study strives to, more precisely, ask: *how do the United States' perception management operations in the conflicts between 1991 and 2003 draw on gendered tropes and thereby performatively shape the state itself, its policy and its society at large?*


In sum, both a state's intentional attempts to shape perceptions of whatever audience and the often unconscious constructions of gender in war, peace and security depend on discursive frameworks in order to perform. Consequently, discourse analysis is claimed here to be the most suitable tool to unravel the respective mechanisms at work. Discourse analysis as epistemological framework is located within the theoretical strand of poststructuralism. At the core of poststructuralist International Relations (IR) is the reciprocally performative (as opposed to causal) relation between foreign policy and identity. Discourse analysis therefore attempts to read identity of foreign policy texts and vice versa (Hansen 2006). The focus of interest exhibited here lies on the United States' military perception management in conflict

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between 1991 and 2003: a particular strand of US foreign policy. *How has the United States' perception management developed in this time period, what were its goals and procedures, how was it supposed to operate and how was it implemented?* Further, the aim is to look at the performative relation between perception management and a particular articulation of identity: the constructions of and through gender. *How do the United States' perception management operations within this time period draw on gendered tropes and in what manner do they thereby constitutively shape the state, its policy and its society?*

Hence, as the synthesis of the above developed separate questions, the aim of this research project **is to do a discourse analysis of the United States' military perception management doctrine and products in the period between 1991 and 2003 and ask how this particular discourse draws on gendered constructions of identity and what implications these constructions perform on the state, on its policy, and on its society.** The project can be, thus, schematized as follows⁵.

Figure 1 – scheme of the research project



⁵ A detailed presentation of the theoretical framework, its assumptions and mechanisms is available in chapter III.

1.3 Relevance

First, while the implementation of this particular military doctrine's informational policies on the conceptual and ethical level interferes with some normative founding pillars of democracy – the freedom and independence of the press as a guarantor for both the monitoring of politics and the trustworthiness of official information – they did neither provoke detailed media coverage or further investigation nor did they, as a consequence hereof, provoke a sustained public outcry. This is surprising insofar as the activities officially often subsumed under the unsuspecting label of International Public Information (IPI) – a fact that in itself might already constitute a propaganda attempt – whether called psychological operations, perception management, strategic communication or international military information ought to be controversial for the very reason mentioned above. Therefore, a sound analysis is duly needed.

Second, psychological operations which are the crystallisation point of semantic information operations and defined as planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organisations, groups, and individuals, are of crucial importance insofar as they are a manifestation of the political and military authorities' intent to shape the security environment through active and explicit manipulation on the informational level. The conflation of the terms of information and influence which characterises the doctrine of information operations in general and of psychological operations and perception management in particular on the one hand, and the growing importance of this specific domain within the general military doctrine which explicitly cross cuts the distinction between the civilian and military realms on the other hand, provide evidence of a fundamental paradigm shift taking place. A crucial underlying assumption of any reliance upon one's manipulation capabilities what so ever is that the social reality is a constructed one and therefore influenceable as opposed to the belief that social reality is a product of the rational calculation in which any manipulation intent aims at changing the material relation between costs and benefit. As a consequence of the former, social reality can become subject to (not only) discursive de- and reconstruction – something which can also, for the sake of fitting into the military doctrinal language, be labeled 'manipulation'. This perspective has not yet found its way into research on the subject matter of this particular strand of military discourse.

Third, neither psychological operations doctrine nor its implementations – or products, as they are called – are exempt from the pervasiveness of gendered constructions which percolate the entire range of societal representations, discourses, and practices. These constructions constitute a highly relevant focal point of research on the interaction between operational military doctrine and sociopolitical and societal developments. Nevertheless, the very aspect of the gendered constructions within perception management doctrine and implementations has not yet come under systematic scrutiny. The presumed functionality of psychological operations on the one hand and the theoretical suggestions of discourse productivity on the other hand make it not only truly interesting but also highly relevant to ask how this particular military doctrine draws on gendered tropes, whether and how it conceives of gender as a category, and how, in its implementation on the ‘global battlefield’, it might instrumentalises gendered underpinnings and underlying assumptions. Also does the exposition of the contingency of heteronormative patriarchy and masculinism bear the potential to denaturalise the dominant practices and thereby opens up spaces for alternatives. Last but not least, wondering about the performativity of both semantic information operations and the gendered constructions therein represents a contribution to a theoretical corpus which is substantially built on exemplary analyses.

1.4 The set-up

In order to step by step tackle the above elaborated research questions, this study in the following proceeds as follows: The chapter coming next aims to draw a picture of the context within which the phenomena this study strives to scrutinise situate. It strives to provide the varying historical and literary backdrops of the research undertook here by proceeding from the general to the specific. The consecutive theoretical chapter then lays out the analytical framework this study relies upon. The poststructuralist theoretical edifice as applied in the discipline of international relations shall be elaborated and its three core elements addressed, namely the power/knowledge nexus, the centrality of identity and the mediation of meaning through discourse. Further, the theoretical strand of poststructuralist feminism and its application to the analysis of international relations in general and to security studies in particular shall be deployed and the particularity of the performative relation between foreign policy and gendered identities tackled. Moreover, the two analytical tools that shall be used for this analysis – namely intertextuality and performativity – shall be elaborated and the methodology applied made transparent. Following are then the two empirical chapters both

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addressing the two individual bodies of documents coming under scrutiny: the military doctrine documents on the one hand and the products deployed on the various battlefields on the other hand. Reflecting the first analytical step of this analysis, these chapters shall display the outcome of the first rounds of the process of multiple reading that is going to be applied to both of these bodies of documents. The properly analytical chapter shall consecutively strive to tackle the very heart of the questions this study aims to address. Based on the findings of the previous chapters, it shall proceed to first disentangle the mutually constitutive relation between identity constructions and foreign policy formulations in order to lay bare the traits of its workings. Analytically building thereupon, these traits shall then be individually discussed and their performative powers examined in order to, finally, re-entangle them again and come to a picture about how gendered identity traits influence US foreign policy and vice versa.

II – THE CONTEXT: Studying gender and war in a changing environment

It is the aim of this chapter to draw a picture of the context within which the phenomena this study strives to scrutinise situate. As it is crucial for the understanding and interpretation of any matter to thoroughly historicise it, this is particularly what the following chapter strives for. The attempt to provide these varying backdrops is led to proceed from the general to the specific. This means that it starts with an overview of the general and recent societal transformations in order to then successively narrow, providing a cursory survey of what is in the literature often called ‘the changing nature of warfare’ and including some of its differing aspects and perspectives. Further, aim is to portray the matters and enquiries into the topical area of gender and war and to finally briefly display the recent historical developments of the US military’s manipulative influence operations. In successively addressing these different but for this particular research undertaking equally relevant contexts, I shall simultaneously set out the ‘factual’ and the literary context whereupon the literature gains in importance the more specific the contexts become. While of course aspiration is to draw a contextual picture of really what is judged relevant, this picture can never be complete should it not entirely burst the scope of the present undertaking. The focus of this study decisively lying on the genuine research question as displayed in the previous chapter, it is the aim of this chapter to provide a concise but still due and adequate contextualisation to this end.

2.1 General and recent societal transformations

Some major societal transformations that have taken place in the last decades are as relevant as a general societal context to the research undertaking of this study as they are commonplace knowledge on the one hand and as their implications are ‘natural’ to all those who have not consciously experienced their absence on the other hand. Including these societal transformations are: the discontinuation of conscription in the United States in 1973, the successive integration of women into the US armed forces, the end of the cold war and the rise and heyday of the neoliberal globalisation coupled with what is called the ‘information revolution’. Each of these particular transformations is spectacular in their own right. Nevertheless, due to the scope and focus of the analysis aimed at in this study they are in the following only briefly addressed and in so doing attention is mainly paid to their ‘factual’ aspects beyond controversy.

The *abolition of the draft* in the United States is often causally linked to the ending period of the Vietnam War. While in the 1968 presidential election Nixon had campaigned on the promise to end conscription based on the assumption that protests against the war would cease once the possibility to escape draft established, his administration nevertheless continued conscription until 1973 when the US left Vietnam (Berstein and Milza 1996) while the war really only ended in 1975 with the fall of Saigon (Mourre 2001). As much as the Vietnam war cannot be claimed the single causal factor for the abolition of the draft as Stachowitsch (2010) has shown, as much it is true that the increasingly and outspokenly unpopular war at the Gulf of Tonkin and the ultimate American defeat in Vietnam weakened the military as an institution and opened up spaces for social movements and societal liberalisations. In Niva's words, “[t]he defeat in Vietnam created a crisis in American foreign policy by raising fundamental questions about the dominant political and military paradigms of how war could be conceptualized, organized, and fought and fostered” (Niva 1998: 115). The introduction of the All-Volunteer-Force can be understood as one part of the response to shifting paradigms in the military realm.

What came with the introduction of the All-Volunteer-Force was the competition of the military as an employer with the private sector for those young individuals judged competent leading to an increase of the salaries paid by the armed forces on the one hand but also to the intensified *integration of women* and members of minorities on the other hand since these were, due to their discrimination on the civilian job marked, still available at low cost (Stachowitsch 2010: 44). Note that women were at this stage increasingly integrated as members of the armed forces in non-combatant functions – in domains such as health care the armed forces factually depended long-since upon women. In the 1970s the percentage of women serving in the armed forces mainly in maintenance rose to about 8%, then relatively consistently lasted on this level and increased again to reach 14% at the end-1980s and even an 18% climax in 1995. While many restrictions on women’s serving in the military were successively abolished some crucial ones such as the exclusion from serving in infantry and ground combat troops, sub-marines and special forces remain. These restrictions close particular qualification avenues for women, such that they are still underrepresented in the high ranks relative to their overall participation in the military (ibid.: 61).

The *end of the Cold War* marks a caesura in the structuring of our world of the last decades. Without going into the query about the nature of the ‘global order’ that has since its demise replaced the bipolar rivalry we can establish that the implications of this major historical development are abound, pervasive and substantial. These implications cover the

way conflicts are carried out and wars are waged (see section 2.2 below), they cover the perceptions of and responses (or lack thereof) to political and humanitarian crises worldwide, and they also cover the shifting and necessary adaptation of the self-image of the main actor under the scrutiny of this study: namely the US military. Abruptly deprived of its longstanding enemy, the US military had to – due to the discontinuation of the single most important conflict that had, since more than 40 years, substantially fostered its identity – reorient, find a new enemy and prepare for a supposedly ‘new’ kind of conflict (Moskos 2000). It precisely is one part of this reorientation of the US military that this study strives to subject to scrutiny.

The end of the Cold War appeared in conjunction with a development that originated on the technological level: the *so-called information revolution*, which constantly unfolds manifold political, economic, societal, and cultural repercussions. Since the holding of information and its potential quantitative and/or qualitative manipulation was a traditional element of state power, the dispersal of access to, and diffusion of, information has disempowered the state and simultaneously empowered non-governmental actors, whether societal or economic. Whether these multiple impacts are perceived threatening or promising largely depends on what part of the upper statement one focuses on: the actual or potential loss of power for the major political entities certainly poses new challenges to cope with while the actual or potential empowerment of the individual in last instance opens prospective opportunities for issue-related but global democracy projects but also for potentially malign non-governmental groups. More precisely, the transnational architecture of the global information network has made territorial borders less significant; as a consequence of the empowerment with information of an ever growing number of actors, the distribution of power has become increasingly volatile and complex not only among state members of international society but also with regard to private economic and political, transnational and non-governmental entities. It is to state that, when “already, information capabilities are the central motor of ‘globalization’” (Goldstein 2003: 14), this globalisation has particularly empowered the economic realm and disempowered the state as a political entity. In particular this means that multinational corporations have increasingly grown into the position to blackmail their hosting states into deregulation. Thus, the so-called information revolution has also led to the heyday of the neoliberal world economic order. Whether this particular and exploitative organisational structure is now, in 2010, going into retreat is a question to be observingly analysed in the years to come.

Further, the application of information technologies to both the military and the civilian realm also incurs blurring boundaries between the political, military, and civilian space. Alberts and Papp, authors of a major anthology on the so-called information age, identify four main consequences of this information revolution unfolding: traditional power relations will be disrupted, regionalisation and globalisation will accelerate, skewed patterns of distribution of wealth will increase, and the emerging international system will be more diffuse than the previous one supposedly was (Papp and Alberts 1997). Common to the analysis of these and many other theorists of change in the international realm in general and of the ‘information revolution’ in specific is one particular feature: information is seen as having become a major resource of power. This does impact the ways conflicts are carried out and wars are waged, as we shall see in the section below.

2.2 The changing nature of warfare

There are two separate bodies of literature, which address what is often called ‘the changing nature of warfare’. First there are those trying to seize change as originating purely on the technological level and there from transforming war-fighting and leading to a computerisation of war. And second, there are those who try to embed cotemporary wars in the changing societal circumstances of our times and varying according to where the violent encounters happen. Mostly, these two bodies of literature do not speak to each other. In the following, these two perspectives are addressed separately.

The literature engaging with both the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the impact the ‘information revolution’ bears on issues of peace, war and security traces the evolution of military policy and doctrine, how technological change is conceptualised and the role information plays in relation to the conceiving of power. This literature body is very vast and disparate, ranging from those enthusiastically heralding the RMA and its potential impact and dreaming of concepts such as ‘information superiority’ and ‘full spectrum dominance’ to those insistently pointing to the multiple dangers of applying new informational technologies to the realm of warfare. More precisely, the varying foci generate four different schools of thought respectively: the system of systems school, the dominant battlespace knowledge school, the global reach, global power school and the vulnerability school (O’Hanlon 2000). From the early 1990s, the concept of information warfare (Campen 1992) was replaced first by the conceptual pair of cyberwar and netwar (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997), focusing more

on the organisational implications of so-called information age conflicts (Dunn 2002) and second by the concept of virtual war, which was prominently exemplified by Ignatieff by means of the Kosovo conflict (Ignatieff 2000). The common premise to these analyses is that information has become the major strategic resource (not only) in conflict. For Arquilla and Ronfeldt conflicts in the current ‘information age’ are about knowledge (see also Rosecrance 1999) and have not only technological but also organisational implications. Networked forms of organisation need to replace hierarchical forms of organisation in order to cope with the new challenges posed to the state and its society by threats, which are diffuse, dispersed, nonlinear and multidimensional. It is technology that assures, according to these authors, the United States of ‘keeping the edge’ (Carter and White 2001). In this setting, the concept of cyberwar applies to high intensity conflict involving state entities and netwar to social conflict involving civil society⁶. According to O’Hanlon (2002), the Pentagon, in its Quadrennial Defense Review, has – rhetorically at least – become one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the revolution in military affairs. This stands in contrast to the widely agreed upon observation that military organisations tend to be conservative and stems from the influence civilian leaders had on this very document. Many of the more conservative military strategists try in their analyses to link the innovations forged by the ‘information revolution’ to conventional modes of warfare. Accordingly, information technologies are conceptualised as force multipliers, which do not imply groundbreaking changes in strategic or tactical thinking (Bendrath 1999), similar to the manner semantic influence operations are generally conceptualised. According to the advocates of revolutionary change, firepower is no longer decisive in future warfare. Since ‘information superiority’ has become the decisive feature, warfare strategies no longer target the adversary’s bodies but his and her mind. Therefore, the argument goes, the perception of the adversary must be influenced so that behavioural change can be achieved without the use of military force. The main point of contention is of course whether warfare in the ‘information age’ thereby has become less bloody than conventional conflict. While some follow the doctrine in the conceiving of semantic information operation – or perception management – as first and foremost a force multiplier and second but no less important as the most effective non-lethal weapon others insist that not only the bloodiness of a war depends on the perspective but also that the technological and informational “superiority is [...] not a guarantee of national security and there is no reason to believe that

⁶ Such as the Zapatistas in the southern region of Mexico, Chiappas, which were capable to generate support for their cause from all over the globe by means of the internet.

zero-casualty, zero-risk, zero-defect warfare will actually result in a safer world, or even a world safer just for Americans. Virtual war, therefore, is dangerous illusion.” (Ignatieff 2000: 212) Others identify important tendencies of convergence between the military and civilian technologies, which supposedly lead to the militarisation of society at large and turn every conflict into information warfare. As a consequence hereof, Krutskikh for example, insists on the “sham humanitarian nature of information weapons” (Krutskikh 1999: 32). Colonel Charles Dunlap – representative of the relatively important strand of literature emanating from military personnel and individually highly reflexive on very concrete questions the USAF get involved in while deployed⁷ – points out the need for both statespersons and soldiers to recognise technology’s potential. More important thereafter, he argues, is that they clearly understand that “it will never substitute for answering the kind of ‘hard questions’ of law, ethics, and policy that will continue to recomplicate the moral life on the 21st century battlefields” (Dunlap 2004: 34).

As I tried to show on another occasion (Brunner and Dunn 2009), what can be observed both in this literature and in the contemporary armed forces is an extreme instance “of the general technological fetishism of contemporary culture” (Latham 2002: 245). In certain circles, information infrastructure is considered to be the key to victory in force-to force combat operations. The meta-rules of this kind of war are set almost entirely in the realm of information and its interpretation. Information becomes a weapon, a myth, a metaphor, a force multiplier, and edge and a trope – and the single most significant military factor (Hables Gray 1997: 22f). The contemporary RMA is most often ascribed to the application of recent technological developments to the whole range of weapons systems, information-gathering and communication and surveillance. These kind of RMA theorists want to shape US military policy around weapons systems that will provide complete situational awareness, full-dimensional protection, precise targeting, etc. – in other words, systems that will provide perfect information at all times (O’Hanlon 2000). While the impossibility of such a dream seems apparent to many, it has, nonetheless, “inspired the militaries into developing specific technologies and information-saturated doctrines” (Hables Gray 2005: 43).

⁷ He was himself deployed for Operations Restore Hope (Somalia 1992/93), Vigilant Warrior (Saudia Arabia 1994) and Desert Fox (Iraq 1998).

But, as I wish to insist with Hables Gray, “[f]or all the flash of high-tech cyborg systems, *war is still political* and it always comes down to what is done to messy bodies”! (ibid.: 41, emphasis added). Hables Gray is one of the very few authors to combine technophilia and *political* analysis in the sense that he strives to culturally and societally embed his observations about the technologically determined changing nature of warfare linking the current globalisation process with contemporary conduct of war. And ultimately he is fiercely critical about a development that “proliferates [war] into culture” (ibid.: 44). This is also true for Der Derian (2001), who, examining what he calls the military-industrial-media-entertainment network, shows how the links of this network are becoming increasingly intense and “also demonstrates how military thinking makes sense of the new forms of warfare via analogies with business and the market” (Hutchings 2008).

What is common to both these authors as well as to those far less critically enquiring the implications of rapidly changing technology for war-faring is their quasi exclusive focus upon the conduct of violent conflict affordable and implementable only for the United States and maybe some countries of the West and some of the traditional strategic counterparts of the US such as Russia and China. What is not addressed are the changing features of warfare in the context of so-called ‘failing states’, increasingly pervasive privatisation, globalisation and generally neoliberalised international relations.

The literature with pretence of addressing these very questions specifically converges mainly around the term of ‘new wars’ – whether as a standalone (Münckler 2002) or as explicitly opposed to ‘old’ ones (Kaldor 2006). In her much-debated book, Kaldor argues that since the end of the Cold War “a new kind of organized violence developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe” (ibid.: 1) and that the new type of violence it involves is an aspect of the current globalised era. These new wars blur the distinction between war and peace and between soldiers and civilians; increasingly they render futile the distinction between “what is private and what is public, state and non-state, informal and formal, what is done for economic and what for political motives” (ibid.:2). In particular, contrasting these ‘new’ wars against the ‘old’ ones brings three main distinctive features to the fore: first, new wars are, Kaldor argues, about identity politics and no longer about geo-political or ideological goals (ibid.:7), second, they are fought by means of “counter-insurgency techniques of destabilization aimed at showing fear and hatred” (ibid.: 9) as implicitly opposed to supposedly more ‘civilised’ modes of warfare in ‘old’ wars, and third, new wars rely on the

current globalised economy insofar as their actors accede both the local and the global; the “fighting units finance themselves through plunder, hostage-taking and the black market” and also through external assistance from “remittances from the diaspora, ‘taxation’ of humanitarian assistance, support from neighbouring governments, or illegal trade in arms, drugs or valuable commodities such as oil or diamonds or human trafficking.” (ibid.: 10). All this is set in and becoming true in the context of a profound crisis of statehood on both the legitimacy and the factual level. It is not surprising therefore that Kaldor’s response to the phenomenon of new wars essentially is cosmopolitan law-enforcement, a concept which she externalises from the European to the global level in her call for a “European capacity for cosmopolitan law-enforcement as a contribution to global security” and supposedly generating “agents of legitimate organized violence, under the umbrella of transnational institutions” (ibid.: 190). Thus the crisis of (southern) statehood is in this argument faced by a further delegation of power on an (occidental) supra-state level fitting her analysis which “links new wars rhetorically to barbarism and disease” (Hutchings 2008:396) needing a ‘civilised’ response which only the occident can deliver.

These two strands of literature trying to seize change in and of contemporary modes of war – be it evolutionary or revolutionary⁸ – are both highly relevant for the research undertaking of this study. While the first is mainly committed to the paradigm of technological determinism and thus an important backdrop to draw on for the doctrine analysis, the second allows to see the bigger picture which is more diffuse, ambiguous but no less worrisome as the thorough analysis of Kaldor compels us to notice. Hence, the bunch of this literature is indispensable insofar as it helps contextualising and historicising the particular military doctrine and products that come under scrutiny in this research project. Moving up one level on the scale towards a context again more specific to my research undertaking, it is the aim of the following section to set up the specificities for addressing the earlier formulated questions of gender and of performativity in the context of war-faring and its analysis. I claim that it is precisely here that my research has a valuable contribution to make.

⁸ The major debate within this literature is whether the recent technological changes mainly on the informational level have evolutionary or revolutionary impact on military affairs. The proponents of the RMA hold that the ‘information revolution’ is comparable to the earlier RMA’s such as the development of the nuclear device. The proponents of the evolutionary development contrariwise suggest that the recent technological developments are more continuous and consecutive steps ahead (Davis 1997).

2.3 Gendering international relations and war

Although feminist perspectives made their heard entry into the discipline of international relations only in the late 1980s, there is today a vast body of literature and research available on many strands and aspects of how gender and IR intersect, condition and produce each other. In this section I shall draw a cursory picture of the abundant literature of invaluable worth to the research undertaking of this study.

If we today have many valuable volumes addressing in depth the varying aspects of gender and international relations from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, the struggle of feminists to be heard in the discipline of IR was a fierce one that generated heated debate (see e.g. Keohane 1989, Withworth 1989, Weber 1994, Tickner 1997) and even today “there is little sign that the [...] fundamental aspects of feminist theoretical critique have been taken on board by those working in non-feminist theoretical frameworks. From 1988 to the present feminist discourse has remained categorized as a critical voice, rather than a mainstream approach, in the study of international politics” (Hutchings 2008a: 105). The fundamental aspects of feminist theoretical critique of the early period cover the inherent gender bias in the mainstream theoretical approaches and research agendas of IR. Therefore, strive was to ask ‘where are the women’ (Enloe 1989) and demonstrate how asking this question would “shift[...] conceptual boundaries and alter[...] preconceptions about what [...] is] relevant to understanding, explaining and judging international affairs” (Hutchings 2008a: 97-98). It is the conventional state-centric view and the rigidly structural approaches to theorizing IR and political science that came under scrutiny for their partiality and masculinist tradition of thought (Peterson 1992, Kreisky and Sauer 1995). The feminist approaches to IR as coming late in comparison to the humanities and the social sciences which have been profoundly affected by feminist interventions since the 1960s, drew and draw on the various works of feminist philosophy (e.g. Butler and Scott 1992, Benhabib, Butler, Cornell and Fraser 1993). Thus anchored, in political science as in IR, fundamental assumptions are increasingly queried for both their gendered preliminaries and consequences (Kreisky and Sauer 1998), for their conceptions of the state and the nation (Peterson 1992, Yuval-Davis 1997, Hooper 2001, Ivekovic 2003), of power, its distribution and production on the political, economic and individual levels (Petman 1996, Steans 1998, Tickner 2001, Sylvester 2002). Lately, methodological explorations (Tickner 2005, Ackerly, Stern and True 2006) have gained much attention as well as debates and reflections upon the past and prospects of and

contentions among feminist researchers in international relations (Wibben 2004, Tickner 2004, Zalewski et al 2008, Hutchings 2008a).

Two particular strands of feminist literature in the discipline of IR are core to the research aimed at in this study: it covers what is often called the ‘gender and war’ question and conflates to a high degree and increasingly so with a new focus on masculinities in IR. It was the seminal book of Elshtain that opened the women and war question to the field. Tracing the historical development of our being seduced into war by the conceptual pair of beautiful souls/just warriors, she uncovers the manifold facets of this stereotypical identification and shows how it has been disempowering for women and empowering for men to be seen and treated as life givers and life takers respectively (Elshtain 1987). In a very different manner showing how women’s lives are militarised all over the globe, Enloe’s manoeuvres (Enloe 2000) addresses issues ranging from gays in the military to sexual services of women provided to soldiers or the recruitment of women into the armed forces. Gathering articles from varying perspectives but having in common their close look on the social and societal mechanisms at work in outbreaks of organised violence, the volume of Cooke and Woollacott draws a highly differentiated picture of how war has historically been and still is gendered and gendering. No longer talking solely about women but consciously shifting issues towards gender, this volume strives to particularly show how gender “is constructed in and through war, and conversely, how warlike values are reinforced through the behaviour normally expected from women ... and men” (Cooke and Woollacott 1993: vii). Informedly tracing the ways and mechanisms of how the ‘war system’ shapes the ‘gender system’ and vice versa and how both systems mutually depend upon each other and are therefore mutually reproductive of each other, Goldstein (2001) takes the same line.

The focus having gradually shifted from women to gender, masculinities as subject of inquiry increasingly gained attention. A fruitful link was made between masculinity studies (e.g. Withehead 2002) and gender and war studies (e.g. Cohn and Enloe 2003, Hutchings 2008), based upon Connell’s (1987) argument that there is no single form of masculinity or femininity in Western societies, only different ways of being a man or a woman. However, the culturally dominant forms of gendered being are hegemonic masculinity and emphasised femininity. Historical analysis of how masculinities have been linked to and are instrumentalised in and for war (Capdevila 1998, Dudnik, Hagemann and Tosh 2004) are as important as is the research particularly addressing ‘the “man” question in international

relations' (Zalewski and Parpart 1998). Based on the belief that "men are, [...] necessarily involved in gender-equality reform" (Connell 2005: 1801) on the global scale, recent feminist analysis build upon and connect the varying strands of approaches. This is particularly observable in the abundant literature analysing the gendered and gendering impacts of '9/11'⁹ and the 'global war on terror' (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2002, Pettman 2004, Youngs 2006, Shepherd 2006, Hunt and Rygiel 2006, Steans 2008). Tickner for example demonstrates "how gendered discourses are used [...] to reinforce mutual hostilities" and suggests "that men's association with war-fighting and national security serves to reinforce their legitimacy in world politics while it acts to create barriers for women" (Tickner 2002: 333). She addresses the models of masculinity and the cultural representations that were used early in the 'War on Terror'. Moreover, she points out some ways in which Afghan women did and still do fight against their oppression, stressing their often-denied status as autonomous agents and denying their exclusive victimisation.

Of particular relevance for my research project insofar as it shares the focus on military discourse is an article by Cohn which exemplarily illustrates the performativity of strategic discourse by showing how in national security narratives "certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings, and meanings are marked [...] as feminine, and are devalued" (Cohn 1993: 231), and as a consequence thereof, either silenced or not heard. In conjunction with her seminal article of 1987 disclosing the performative mechanisms of defence intellectuals' war talk (Cohn 1987) this research provides sound ground for anchoring my own undertaking.

Analysing military doctrine documents means analysing documents, which are issued by an institution of hegemonic masculinity. The concept of hegemonic masculinity is referred to as characterising a particular societal setting's standard defining what is conceived of as 'real' manhood. It is composed of those elements defining masculinity deemed most desirable in a given social and cultural context; it is, as defined by Connell (1987), the most lauded form of masculinity at a particular time in history and thereby highly normative. A society's gender order is structured not only by the hegemony of masculinity over femininity, but also by the domination of one masculinity – hegemonic masculinity – over other masculinities: "[m]en

⁹ See e.g. the 'Roundtable discussion on Gender and September 11' in *Signs*, Vol. 28, No. 1 of 2002, or the 'Forum on the Events of 11 September 2001 and Beyond' in *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 28 of 2002.

occupying a hegemonic masculinity are asserting a position of superiority” (Haywood and Mac an Ghail 2003: 9-10).

Institutions of hegemonic masculinity are societal institutions where men attempt to separate themselves from and hold power over women (Whisenant/Pedersen/Obendour 2002) and other men and therefore refer to stereotypical notions of masculinity such as dominance over women and other men, physical strength, aggressiveness, bravado, exclusive heterosexuality, emotional detachment, competitiveness, etc. It is evident that the military is such an institution and the integration of women into the military body did not change this very feature. Based upon an analysis of the 1991 Tailhook Convention¹⁰ and the popular movie *GI Jane*, Höpfl showed that the incorporation of women into the military body “is achieved via a cancellation of the feminine. Women, [...] can either be playthings or else quasi men” (Höpfl 2003: 13) and thereby unmasked some abusive dynamics stemming from mechanisms forged by institutions of hegemonic masculinity such as the armed forces. Concurrent with a relatively vast body of literature it is established that “[m]ilitary, defense, and security related institutions have historically been ‘owned’ by men and occupied by men’s bodies” (Kronsell 2006: 109)¹¹. This feature, of course, influenced the agendas, politics and policies of these very institutions. Hence, the USAF is an institution of hegemonic masculinity and the doctrine it issues is a strand of its predominantly internal discourse. This links to the seminal contribution by Kronsell on methods for studying silences in institutions of hegemonic masculinity, such as the Armed Forces, suggesting to study gender dynamics through the analysis of documents, place and narratives and to rely on methods of deconstruction (ibid.). This will be particularly important for the methodological part of the analysis of the doctrine documents.

As we have come to see, for my research undertaking I can refer to and rely on an abundant body of literature with regard to the core of my undertaking – namely the analysis of the gendered and gendering underpinnings of a particular US military doctrine and practice.

¹⁰ This event became known as “the military’s worst sex scandal in history”, see e.g.: Center for Military Readiness (2002).

¹¹ An example for the fierce defense that this remains so is, e.g., Martin Van Creveld (2000) and (2001). Holding that Van Creveld is, in his defense of the military as a male/masculine institution to be protected against its feminisation, shooting at the wrong target, is in particular Elshtain (2000).

2.4 From propaganda to perception management: evolving challenges

Last but not least, this section strives to display the context of what is generally called propaganda. It does so, of course, for the case of the United States. Propaganda does most often work through the manipulation of the media. Since it is the aim of this study not to examine this sort of propaganda but rather the military's own and direct manipulation operations of enemy civilians and soldiers, a brief sketch of the recent developments of this very doctrine and its context shall bring this chapter to an end.

Providing the indispensable background for historically contextualising this study is the literature documenting US propaganda of the last decades such as the early standard book of the late 1920s by Edward Bernays (1928/2005). This 'mass manipulation manual' for both government and corporations aims to show how to control how we think and act. Providing another good historical backdrop on very concrete US propaganda operations is the volume by Kenneth Osgood on the intentional manipulation of perceptions during the Cold War (Osgood 2006). Having the even broader pretence of covering the US American propaganda since 1917 is the excellent overview by Elter (2005) or the one by McDonald (2007). While each of them are original, these works have in common that they examine what they call propaganda as an inclusive influence phenomenon utilised by the state and all its agencies, to success when thoroughly coordinated. In all these manipulations the media play a crucial role, which is often thoroughly addressed such as in the volume by Rid (2007) explicitly examining the relation between the military and the media since the Vietnam war. Also Taylor (e.g. 1997, 2010) does in his abundant and diverse work carefully differentiate between the civilian influence operations of the state agencies other than the Pentagon and precisely those undertook by the military and also shows where and how these differentiations have recently started to intermingle.

Some of the recent technological developments do substantially impact the tools by which influence operations are executed, specifically the communications technologies assuring both the immediacy of news coverage (TV and CNN-effect) and the potentially global access to any single story projected (via the internet). Some of the literature on media and war within the field of media studies does potentially contribute important insights while simultaneously the very focal point of interest of this study – the *military's* manipulative interventions – is not hit. The media is generally conceptualised as independent according to democratic standards. Of the three key narratives concerning the role of the media in conflict generally identified and scrutinised in media studies one is of particular interest for

contextualising this research project: the media as “battleground, the surface upon which war is imagined and executed” (Kishan Thussu and Freedman 2003: 5) besides its role as critical observer (watchdog) and as publicist. The mainstream media, the argument goes, “reproduce the frameworks of political and military leaders and in so doing provide propaganda rather than ‘disinterested’ journalism” (ibid.: 6). A prominent example of this mechanism was the reporting on the *casus belli* by the two major US newspapers (New York Times and Washington Post) in run-up to operation Iraqi Freedom, which later caused both of these news outlets to proceed to a public ‘*mea culpa*’ (see: The New York Times 2004 and Washington Post 2004). Gathering an excellent bunch of analytical articles particularly on propaganda and media distortion in the attack on Iraq is the volume edited by Miller (2004) and providing an individual case study of the very same is the book by Jahrmarkt (2004). While these manipulation mechanisms facilitate the political and military authorities’ capacities to shape perceptions they do only provide subsidiary context to my research – although an important one – since the focus of this study lies on the exclusive agency of the state’s institution of organised violence abroad.

Also in the domain of military doctrine and policy the same so-called information revolution (as discussed above in sections 2.1 and 2.2) bears tangible fruits, causing some enthusiasts to stress the importance of a revolution in military affairs taking place due to the application of the recent technological developments to the whole range of weapons systems, information gathering, communication and surveillance (Dunn and Brunner 2007). According to this view, the global information environment has become a “battlespace in which [...] technology is used to deliver critical and influential content in order to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behavior” (Kuehl 2002: 4). Due to the hallmarks of the information revolution such as the transparency of events and the global immediacy of coverage, the concepts of information warfare and information operations are playing an increasingly important role to the extent that, for some, “the most – perhaps only – effective weapon in this battlespace is information” (ibid.). Hence, in conjunction with the technologically driven RMA the salience of so-called information operations is constantly growing. While some of the core constitutive elements of this particular military doctrine bear an existence as longstanding as warfare itself, others are qualitatively and conceptually new in multiple regards. Intelligence gathering, deception strategies, or propaganda did and still do find widespread resonance outside the expert community not only but also due to popular science fiction movies. Other concepts inherent in the current revolution in military affairs such as computer network

operations, electronic warfare, or operations security remain much more vaguely perceived in public.

The current main document available on the entire range of the specific component of information operations in overall military doctrine has been partially declassified (Rumsfeld 2003). Therein, information operations, commonly defined as actions “which focus on degrading an adversary’s decision-making process while preserving [one’s] own” (ibid.:10)¹², are assigned to become a core military competency in order to “keep pace with emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by innovation and rapidly developing information technologies” (ibid.:1). Furthermore, the United States’ roadmap for the Department of Defense’s information operations utters three principal recommendations, one of which stands out for pointing to the core of the interest exhibited here. Prominently, you can read there that “[w]e must improve PSYOP!” (ibid.:6)¹³ What does this mean and what are the potential consequences of such an exclamation? Included as a constitutive component of information operations, the definition of psychological operations gives a hint: “Psychological operations (PSYOP) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” (USAF, JP 3-53, 2003: xi). This covers what is commonly understood as propaganda – or the so-called ‘battle for the hearts and minds’. So far, these psychological operations are explicitly and exclusively supposed to be addressed to a foreign audience. But despite the explicit exemption of the home audience from becoming the target of PSYOP – a tribute to the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 which prohibits the US government from making the American public subject to propaganda¹⁴ – and due to the globalisation of both, information networks and information access, the demarcation line between information operations abroad and the news media at home has become increasingly volatile. This is also recognised in the latest

¹² A more elaborate definition can be found in (USAF, JP 3-13, 2006: xi): “Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own”.

¹³ The other two recommendations are, first, “We must fight the Net” and “We must improve Network and Electro-Magnetic Attack Capability”.

¹⁴ And its amendments of 1972, banning the dissemination of any “information about the U.S., its people, and its policies prepared for dissemination abroad within the United States” and of 1985, placing a ban on domestic public diplomacy (Lungu 2001:14).

information operations roadmap insofar as it calls for the necessity to establish a boundary between the two while admitting that “information intended for foreign audiences, including for public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by [the] domestic audience and vice-versa”. Further, it draws the consequence thereof that “the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of USG [US government] intent rather than information dissemination practices” (National Security Archive 2006: para. 2). Consequently, the practices of what is often also captiously called public diplomacy are supposed to target the international audience only but there are no established mechanisms but the vague ‘government intent’ to prevent the domestic audience from becoming subjected to such ‘information’ projected abroad.

Noteworthy is moreover the fact that these government and military actions are conceived to be used during both peacetime and conflict (USAF, JP 3-53, 2003). The specific doctrine of psychological operations distinguishes between strategic, operational and tactical PSYOP. Within this categorisation, strategic PSYOP cover those “international information activities conducted [...] to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions and behaviors [...] during peacetime and in times of conflict [...] and] are conducted predominantly outside the military arena” (Armistead 2002: 72)¹⁵ as opposed to both operational and tactical PSYOP which “are conducted across the range of military operations” (ibid.: ix-x). Hence, by their assigned utilisation predominantly in the civil arena strategic PSYOP become also a good and characteristic example for both the increasingly blurring boundaries between the civil and the military realm and the increasing and for some, problematic, integration and synchronising of military information operations, political public affairs operations, and strategic public diplomacy. On account of this it becomes clear that the differentiation between strategic PSYOP and the more general perception management, which “in various ways, combines truth projection, [...] cover and deception, and psychological operations” (USAF, JP 3-53, 2003:GL-7) is superfluous.

This very brief sketch of the recent developments within the military doctrine of one core aspect of information operations – the one striving for the manipulation of the emotive human

¹⁵ Therefore, strategic PSYOP can be equated with so-called International Public Information operations (IPI), which per definitionem are a combination of public affairs, international military operations and public diplomacy.

mind as opposed to the other basically technical components such as electronic warfare, computer network operations or operations security – allows for identifying three focal points.

First, in the current environment forged by the so-called information revolution, information operations are assigned with growing importance in general and the management of perceptions in particular as a tool to address new threats and exploit new challenges. The ‘Saving Jessica Lynch’-story is a telling example hereof.

Second, while supposed to target foreign audiences only, due to the new information and communication technologies the discrimination between target audiences of psychological operations has become increasingly difficult on the one hand and thereby opens up potentialities for the government to reach the domestic audiences nevertheless on the other hand. Exemplarily hereof, it is undecided at best whether the target audience of the videotaped rescue operation of POW Lynch ordered by the United States central command’s public affairs office in Qatar indeed was the international public opinion or the domestic one.

Third, due to their application during both peacetime and conflict, information operations contribute to the blurring of boundaries between the military and the civil domains. This also points to the fact that the ‘communications armoury’ of the state increasingly integrates such that it becomes ever more difficult to distinguish between military information operations, civilian public diplomacy, and political news management the techniques of which stand in between the “manipulation implied in information operations Doctrine and the ‘objectivity’ advocated by public diplomacy practitioners” (Brown 2003: 91).

Having proceeded from the general to the specific, this chapter thus laid out the context within which the particular phenomena this study strives to scrutinise situate. It attempted to give a cursory overview of the general and recent societal transformations contextually relevant for this research undertaking, it further displayed the literary backdrops particularly addressing the changing nature of warfare and the gendering of international relations and security studies, and finally it briefly traced the evolution and recent challenges of the US military’s ‘manipulation operations’. It is this contextual backdrop that completes the picture of the analysis aimed at with this research undertaking.

III – THEORY AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: Seizing gender in military discourse

Based on a conception of foreign policy as a discursive practice in accordance with the poststructuralist research agenda in the discipline of International Relations, this chapter lays out the analytical framework deployed in this study in order to seize the gendered narratives within the particular military discourse of so-called perception management. Therefore both what is understood by the term perception management as well as how the term discourse is used is specified to start with and the particularities of analysing issues of gender in the setting of military doctrine documents and their implementation are set up. The chapter then first consecutively addresses the poststructuralist theoretical framework this study relies upon and elaborates on its three core elements, namely the power/knowledge nexus, the centrality of identity and the mediation of meaning through discourse. Second, the theoretical strand of poststructuralist feminism and its application to the analysis of international relations in general and to security studies in particular is then deployed and it is shown how both power relations and ascriptive identities are still fundamentally gendered. Third, the particularity of the performative relation between foreign security policy and gendered identities and its application to what is under the scrutiny of this study is then developed and the two analytical tools that shall be used for this analysis – namely intertextuality and performativity – are elaborated. Last but not least, the methodology applied and the precise data scrutinised is made transparent.

Perception management, defined in the military doctrine as “in various ways combin[ing] truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations” (USAF 2003, JP 1-02: 411), is not only attributed with growing importance by the military’s strategic thinkers, but it also involves the media as a tool and a target in the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the potentially global audience. While the receiving side of perception management is of crucial importance to its supposed effectiveness, the focus of this study lies exclusively on the issuing side. It is the media that often is responsible for the transfer – for the home audience at least. This component too is excluded from the focus of this study, since we shall here look exclusively at the *military* doctrine that codifies perception management and the products that are thereafter issued by the military itself in accordance with this doctrine. Due to this particular military doctrinal corpus of documents, which conceptualises

information as “information for effect”, the delineation between information and influence is increasingly blurred as is the distinction between peace and war, since “these operations [are] used during peacetime and in times of conflict” (USAF 2003, JP 3-53: xi). As seen in the introduction to this study, a showcase example of the supposed effective use of perception management was the videotaped rescue of Private Jessica Lynch and the way it was represented by the US central command’s public affairs office in Qatar in an effort that has to be qualified as an “action [...] to convey/or deny selected information [...] to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning [...] resulting in [...] behaviors favorable to the originator’s objectives” (USAF 2003, JP 3-53: GL-7). With this qualification, the Jessica Lynch story concurs with the doctrinal definition of perception management.

For the purposes of the following analysis, the instances of perception management are conceptualised as *discourse*, whereas discourse is understood to mediate meaning between subjects and objects and as thereby being a constitutive institution (Huysmans 1997). This is to say that discourse covers both language and practice since in order to be mediated, meaning needs to be articulated in practice. This articulation is practice. Thereby, practices are as central to the reproduction of discourses as are texts (Müller 2008). Also, practices enroot discourses in their specific historical context. At moments tough, texts are practices themselves. In this study, the discourse under scrutiny is the military one of perception management. This discourse is issued by an institution of hegemonic masculinity (see Chapter II, section 2.3) – the US armed forces – and it has two strands: the internal doctrine documents and the externally deployed products (the implementation of the doctrine in the field, e.g. through leaflets).

A first reading of the doctrine documents shows that they contain neither the category of gender nor that of sex. The only explicit reference within these documents is a phrase in the most recent army field manual on psychological operations stating that “unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men” (Department of the Army 2005: v). This phrasing simultaneously points at two interrelated and key issues. First, a resolute silence on gender is often characteristic of institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell 2006). If the attribute of hegemonic masculinity is a necessary precondition for becoming a member in the institution, diversity within is supposedly inexistent. As opposed to the relation maintained towards the outside other, the

internal composition of the institution is conceived of as being made up of homogenous (male) elements. One outcome of this perception of homogeneity is that gender is perceived as being both inexistent and irrelevant at the inside level. This absence is transmitted to the discourse formulated in the documents produced by such institutions. Second, a strong normative power resides in these mechanisms. Both the implicit silence on gender and the above-mentioned explicit reference to masculinity as the norm – supposed to include women – nourish this specific hegemonic discourse. The assumption of the ‘male-as-the-norm’ naturalises the effects of dichotomous gender stereotypes by rendering them invisible. The invisible, thereby, is depoliticised: what is natural is not problematic (Peterson and True 1998). In institutions of hegemonic masculinity such as the military, this phenomenon, which I shall call the ‘silence on the invisible’, is “connected to implementing practices and ways of making these [hegemonic discourses] intelligible and legitimate” (Milliken 1999: 230). This points to the core of what this chapter aims at: *it enquires as to how the silence on the invisible can be studied*. Kronsell (2006), in her seminal contribution researching military conscription in Sweden from a gender perspective, shows that examining doctrine documents from a gender perspective means that one needs to study what is not said, since both gender and sex are absent from this discourse as explicit categories. To study this silence will in practice mean to “rely on methods of deconstruction, to study what is not contained within the text, what is ‘written between the lines’. [... Moreover,] it may mean that we study what is not there, what is hidden in the text.” (2006: 115) Such a deconstruction of intertextual references, it will be argued, render visible the invisible.

Unlike the doctrinal discourse, the products of perception management applied on the ‘global battlefield’ are very explicit with regard to their gendered underlying assumptions. The narratives these leaflets establish are thus assumed to draw on manifold and longstanding gendered stereotypes which rest on ‘Derridian’ qualificative binaries (1972). Surely, dualistic thinking is deeply enrooted in our Western strategies for comprehension in general and in structuring discourses in particular. Binary oppositions such as normal/pathological, educated/ignorant, and modern/traditional are but a few of the pairs structuring our perception of the world. Again, this points to the core of what this chapter aims at: *it enquires about the best approach to grasping the manner by which the often binarily gendered stereotypes are perpetuated*.

Hence, while the characteristic and determining silence on gender does apply to the doctrinal (internal) strand of this military discourse, it does not apply to the externally deployed one. In order to first deconstruct this normative silence on gender – and its depoliticising power – one needs to study not only what is not said in the doctrine documents, since both gender and sex are absent from this discourse as explicit categories, but it is also necessary to search for arguments and the establishment of authority through references to other narratives. And second, unlike the doctrinal documents, the products of perception management are very explicit with regard to their gendered underlying assumptions of identity construction. Through its recurrent articulation of variants of the persistent gendered stereotypes, this externally deployed military discourse performatively reproduces the hierarchically gendered relations of power inherent in current security practices.

Concurrent with these two strands of the military discourse of perception management, the two concepts of intertextuality and performativity are introduced as suitable aids for unravelling the mechanisms at work that are reproductive of the authoritative relations of gender within a core aspect of foreign policy, i.e., the military practices of security. Correspondingly, it is argued that gender as a categorising characteristic is an intrinsic feature of the competition over power on the one hand, while gender as a category of analysis creates the potential for the transcendence of power on the other hand.

3.1 Poststructuralism in international relations theory

The approach that informs this study, and which provides the ontological as well as the epistemological cornerstones for it, is commonly known as ‘poststructuralism’. Alternatively, the terms ‘post-positivism’ (epistemological) or ‘post-modernism’ (ontological) may be applied. While these labels are deliberately conflated or assimilated by some (DerDerian and Shapiro 1989, Gregory 1989: xiii), others strive to meticulously differentiate between them (Angermüller 2007). Since it is not the purpose here to venture into this debate, which ranges from terminology to substance, the following section strives to elaborate briefly on the understanding and usage of the – as I will call it – poststructuralist theoretical approach that underlies this work. As Angermüller (2007) shows convincingly in his analysis of the theoretical discourse and the French intellectual field of the 1970s, the label ‘post-structuralism’ was attached to an arguably disparate group of French thinkers including Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Derrida, and others by their recipients in the US in the late 1980s

and early 1990s, in order to then travel back and gain currency in Europe apart from France, where the term is still rarely used. It is the reference to this second phase – the reception of this diverse, though specific, strand of French thought – that determines my choice of terminology, specifically the reception of this strand of thought in the discipline of International Relations of English tongue. At the heart of this theoretical approach I consider the ontological claim that the world may exist independently of our gaze, but that it gains meaning only through our grasp on it. The world can only be understood through interpretation. According to Derrida, the world resembles a text, in that it cannot simply be grasped, but has to be interpreted (Derrida 1967, Smith and Owens 2005: 287). The world and the subjects within it are thus constructed by our interpretation of it. An entire chain of logical consequences derives from this theoretically foundational claim. A first element of this chain is the negation of the ontological potential for a unitary truth; secondly, this is simultaneously the cause and the consequence of the fact that meaning/sense is intersubjectively constructed and in need of mediation. Therefore, third, the epistemological distinction between fact and value has no substance, but is a simple instance of power. In the concise terms of Shapiro, this means that “[m]eaning is always imposed, not discovered, for the familiar world cannot be separated from the interpretative practices through which it is made” (1989: 11). Building upon this fundament, the reception and creative absorption of poststructuralism in International Relations centres around three closely interlinked conceptual issue areas, which will be addressed below. They include the nexus between power and knowledge, the centrality of identity, and the textual strategies involving the mediation of meaning, truth, and power through discourse.

3.1.1 The power / knowledge nexus

In general, mechanisms of power are inherent to all three of the above-mentioned logical consequences, based on the awareness that the world exists and comes into being through our interpretation of it. In particular, the mechanisms of power are a core concern of the discipline of International Relations. The very rejection of the idea that a unitary truth might exist is founded on an awareness of the mechanisms of power inherent to truth production. The reasoning runs both ways. Since there is no objective reality waiting to be discovered, every claim to ‘discovery’ is an instance of power. The knowledge claim is an intersubjectively reached understanding that brings forth meaning and sense. Truth is produced, and the mechanisms of power are the foundation of this production. One example of such a power

mechanism is the attempt to impose the (gendered) distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘value’, which attributes objectivity (and therefore truth) to ‘fact’ and subjectivity (and therefore emotion, corrupting truth) to ‘value’. Conversely, since every ‘discovery’ is an instance of power, there is no objective reality that could be discovered. In positive terms, not only does power produce knowledge, but knowledge claims are also conducive to reproducing power. However, because the concept of truth is not empirically valid, but depends on power structures, it can also be seen as a tool for resisting power (Foucault 1984, Smith 1996: 29f.). Hence, in Cox’s famous words, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128); this assertion includes both potentialities – the reliance on and reinforcement of power, and the resistance to and reversal of power. The manner in which this purposefulness of theory and knowledge, which are simply different words for the workings of power, manifests itself is another central tenet of post-structuralist theoretical approaches. In order for the power/knowledge nexus to be reified, the crucial dimension of discourse has to be added. Problematising the mechanism by which the subject is empowered shows that the interrelatedness between power, knowledge, and discourse is intimate and pervasive. Since language is connected to the subject, problematising agency means focusing on this defining moment of interrelatedness. On the one hand, the connection manifests itself in the societal establishment and maintenance (disciplining) of knowledgeable practices (norms) and in the development of commonly accepted historical narratives. The mediation of power, the phenomenon of “discourses as being productive (or reproductive) of things defined by the discourse” (Milliken 1999: 229), includes a complex process where knowledgeable practices are defined and where disciplining techniques and practices are elaborated and applied. On the other hand, the intimate connection of power, knowledge, and discourse is linked to agency. The holding of discursive agency is simultaneously derived from the occupation of a privileged (knowledgeable) position and is empowering (renders knowledgeable). What Der Derian as early as 1989 called “the aspirational element” of poststructuralist research in International Relations covers not only its aim to expose and defamiliarise these workings of power, but also efforts to „posit [...] heterological, multipolar grids of knowledge and practice“ (1989: 6) by generating new interpretations that create space for alternative practices. A crucial element in the generation of these potential alternatives is reflexivity about the relation between meaning and knowledge (hence, our own role as researchers and producers of ‘knowledge’) and power (Guzzini 2000: 150) because, of course, science, like everything else, is fundamentally political.

3.1.2 The centrality of identity

Identity is central not only to the study of international relations. The delineation between the Self and the Other, between the inside and the outside, is a constitutive feature of both collectivities (such as statehood) and particularities (such as individual personalities). Within the poststructuralist approach to the study of international relations, identity is crucial insofar as “foreign policies rely upon representations of identity” while simultaneously “it is through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced” (Hansen 2006: 1). The performative ‘nature’ of identity imparts its character to the relation between identity and foreign policy. Hence, there is no essential moment in identity; it has “no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality” (Campbell 1992: 9). Due to the lack of a foundational essence, identity is thus theorised as depending upon its enactment. Moreover, identities are also always in the process of being negotiated. The negotiation occurs in a space structured by binaries pairing off identity against difference, the self against the other, inclusion against exclusion, but also unity against diversity, or universality against particularity (Walker 1993, Hansen 1997). The composite elements of these – and many more – binaries are conditional on and dependent upon one another. The three concepts of spatiality, temporality and ethicality are best suited for grasping the signs of identity in the binarily structured space within which its negotiations and articulations take place, since “they bring out the important political substance of identity construction” (Hansen 2006: 46, emphasis added; 46–51) that is central to the study of international relations.

The spatial constructions of identity are the most straightforward. They relate to the longstanding classical concepts of territoriality, statehood, and sovereignty and are historically tied to the nation-state. The spatial constructions of identity are articulated and enacted by the delineation of space through the construction of boundaries. These identities are filled with an explicitly political content; they are often perceived and articulated as the very essence of the body politic.

The temporal constructions of identity relate to a temporal motif, which most often includes a notion of progress, such as development, transformation, continuity, or change. The European Union, for example, can be seen as “constituted [...] against a temporal Other: the fear of a return of its own violent past” (Hansen 2006: 40, Waever 1996).

Ethical constructions of identity relate to the articulations of morality and responsibility. Such constructions are often based upon historical narratives about the Self and its vocation. A very obvious contemporary example of ethical identity construction is the articulation of

“America [as ...] the greatest force of good in world history” (Bush 2001: para. 30, Brunner 2008).

Thus, identities are articulated through the enunciation of signs relating to spatiality, temporality, and ethicality in a “dual process of linking and differentiation” and thereby constitute degrees of sameness and otherness (Hansen 2006: 42). While the individual and the collective Self and its continued construction are inextricably linked with that of the individual and collective Other, poststructuralist research strives to focus on how and where the boundaries between the two come into existence and are maintained or changed. Moreover, “[s]ince strangers and other marginal[ised] elements of human collectives ‘embody’ their borders” (Neumann 1996: 167), their societal treatment is a crucial site for analysis because the performative instantiation of identity is constitutive of political agency.

3.1.3 The mediation of meaning through discourse / textual strategies

The insistence on the constitutive ‘nature’ of language is a third pillar of poststructuralist theoretical approaches. As alluded to earlier, the world needs interpretation in order to become the one we live in. This interpretative appropriation happens through language. As Gregory states, logocentrism – derived from the Greek word *logos* meaning word, reason, and spirit – has been “the dominant operation for constructing meaning in Western thought” (1989: xvi) from ancient Greek philosophy through present time. Logocentric meaning construction refers to the belief that the assumed underlying bases of reality can be revealed by pure reason and truth, and it therefore implies a conflation and monopolising of both truth and its production. Hence, logocentrism represents the very linchpin of the nexus between power, knowledge, and truth. In other words, the production of meaning constitutes the nexus linking power and language. Since we, as subjects, have no immediate access to the world, our relation to objects is always mediated by language (Der Derian 1988; referred to in Huysmans 1997: 339). Mediation produces meaning, and thereby language becomes discourse. Therefore, poststructuralist research should, according to Shapiro, focus on discourses rather than on language alone, since discourses, as opposed to language, are concerned with meaning- and value-producing practices (1989: 14). It is the linguistic practice of discursive framing that mediates meaning between objects and subjects (Der Derian 1992, cited in Huysmans 1997). Frames are to be understood as central basic perception categories and structures through which actors perceive their environment and the world (Dunn and Mauer 2006). These categories have a pre-existence in the perception of

collective culture and in the memory of the actors. Therefore, the actors attribute meaning to the things they recognise as corresponding to the previously structured world (Donati 2001). In short, discursive framing is the rhetorical (written and spoken) allusion to such pre-existing cognitive models, while simultaneously, through these iterative references, the particular cognitive models are shaped and perpetuated. When this is done successfully – with resonance – discursive framing leaves an impression on social reality. To put it differently, through the framing mechanism, discourse imparts meaning to the material world by paying tribute to the meanings absorbed earlier. In this way, discourse is constitutive of reality.

It is the aim of poststructuralist research to expose these workings. Because discourses “work to define and to enable, and also to silence and to exclude [...] by [...] endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified” (Milliken 2001: 139), the analytical relevance of such mechanisms becomes evident. By exposing them, the analysis acquires the potential to denaturalise dominant meanings and practices and to disclose their contingency. In striving to do so, poststructuralist research resorts to what are called textual strategies including deconstruction and multiple reading.

First, for the purpose of this study, I will follow Butler’s understanding and use of the term ‘deconstruction’ as involving the calling into question of naturalised assumptions and not as involving the abolishment of these assumptions (Butler 1993: 52); I understand and use the term ‘deconstruction’ as involving the production of uncertainty and incertitude (Bublitz 2002: 44). This production of strangeness strives not only to challenge the prescribed structures of signification, which are – as mentioned above – mostly organised in hierarchical binaries (Derrida 1972), but through this challenge, it also provides the potential for the production of other truths, since “in the deconstructive method, the contingent nature of a discourse is revealed through textual analyses that show how internally to a text, the poles of oppositions which it privileges and the realities it thereby makes basic or original can be reversed” (Milliken 2001: 152). According to this understanding, the assertion of truth is replaced by a historically contextualised construction and not by emptiness.

Second, the multiple readability of texts conditions deconstruction as a textual strategy. It engages different foci while reading a text; it may mean “the repetition of the dominant reading, to show how it achieves its coherence” (Smith and Owens 2005: 287) or the reversal of the hierarchies and the subsequent undoing of the pairing (Gregory 1989). It can also mean the juxtaposition of a previously unacknowledged ‘truth’ over the dominant ‘truth’ or the

focused engagement with subjugated bodies of knowledge, showing how these are silenced (Milliken 2001). Multiple readability is the tool for textual deconstruction.

This theoretical framework closely interlocks with some strands of contemporary feminism in International Relations. I shall now turn to this intersection.

3.2 From women to gender – poststructuralist feminism in international relations and security studies

Despite a growing body of convincing and compelling feminist research both within the discipline of International Relations and within one of its sub-disciplines, Security Studies, the acknowledgement and consideration of this literature is still marginal. However, gendered discourses and assumptions are, so to speak, omnipresent in questions of war and peace and security. Amongst many other things, they are used to reinforce mutual hostilities (Tickner 2002) through the depictions of friend and foe, to generate support on the ‘homefront’ (Goldstein 2001), to motivate soldiers into fighting, to warrant “differentiated forms of carnage and destruction” (Milliken and Sylvan, 1996: 323), to prevent gendered insecurities from being noticed, either as the consequence of an incapacity to voice insecurity or as the consequence of the intimate inter-linkage between the subject’s gendered identity and other aspects of its identity such as religion (Hansen 2000). Not only the underlying assumptions but also the very practices of international politics and of security are gendered and gender-biased – they are often pervasively dichotomous and define the ‘masculine’ as the norm and the ‘feminine’ as a deviation thereof. While feminist research has provided powerful studies for at least three decades, its focus in the discipline of International Relations underwent a continuous shift. As Zalewski and Parpart provocatively formulate it, the focus went from “‘adding women and stirring’ to ‘including women as objects’ to considering the theoretical implications of ‘including women as subjects’” (1998: 11). More precisely, the analytical categories of feminist research not only changed, but also broadened. While it was indispensable 20 years ago to ask ‘where are the women?’ (Enloe 1989) – and it still is today –, it is also pressing today to include men into the emancipatory project. The category shift from ‘women’ to ‘gender’ exemplifies the broadening range of questions relevant to feminist research, where gender can be generally described as “refer[ring] to a symbolic system, a central organizing discourse of culture, one that not only shapes how we experience and

understand ourselves as men and women, but that also interweaves with other discourses and shapes them” (Cohn 1993: 228). Studies embedded in the theoretical framework of constructivism and poststructuralism are sensitive to such discursive constructions of gender related to war, peace, and security. This research not only builds on the recognition of the constitutive power of discourse, but often also proceeds through discourse analysis. An example of such scholarship is a piece by Milliken and Sylvan that exhibits the extraordinary power of the words of high-level US officials during the Vietnam War. They show both how “the world of their words was implemented” (Milliken and Sylvan 1996: 323) and how this implementation varied according to the gendered differences in the framing of the Other – North and South Vietnam – and of the Self. Due to the verbal constitution of policy-making, the depiction of “the occupants of North Vietnam [as] manly fanatics, whereas the inhabitants of South Vietnam are hysterical and immature” (Milliken and Sylvan 1996: 336) gave rise to a corresponding differentiation in the war-fighting strategies of the US.

Asking the ‘man’-question in the context of the new world order, Steve Niva (1998) looked at both the Vietnam War and the Second Gulf War from an evolutionary perspective and came to the conclusion that “the American defeat in the former generated a crisis that made explicit the links between foreign policy and particular conceptions of masculinity that in turn significantly assaulted dominant paradigms of American manhood” (Zalewski 1998: 10). This is to say that the war against Iraq in 1991 was a “push to overcome the Vietnam syndrome [and was] intimately related to restoring American manhood as it was restoring the national belief in military intervention” (Niva 1998: 110).

Such analyses expose the still prevalent and highly stereotyped association of manhood with the framing of the nation’s strength, seen as the ability to take ultimate recourse to military means in order to force an adversary into compliance. Hence, in the discipline of International Relations, too, the categorical focus of feminist research has shifted from ‘women’ to ‘gender’ by looking at the mechanisms of how the categories of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are constructed and perpetuated. It strives to question the well-established gender hierarchies with the goal of making explicit and thereby denaturalising the gendered constructions of power and identity therein. Simultaneously, such research aims at the realisation of its inherently normative aspirations (Locher-Dodge 1998).

Thus, the common ground between current feminist approaches and poststructuralist theoretical approaches becomes apparent. The initial commonality consists of the rejection of

the concept of the universal (and essential) human subject. Both feminist and poststructuralist approaches hold that the subject is not rooted in nature *per se* and that there is no essential pre-given objectivity about the subject, but that each subject is a construct and the product of specific contextual circumstances. Secondly, both approaches commonly acknowledge, and therefore strive to demonstrate, that the very claim of the above-mentioned idea of a universal (essential) human subject is an instance of (dis-)empowerment by which reality is forged. And thirdly, both feminist and poststructuralist approaches recognise the insufficiency of simply reversing the position and opposition of the dichotomous power structures, since power-mechanisms saturate all aspects of the debate, including the subject-position of the critic (Klinger 1998; Butler 1993: 36).

Despite this considerable common ground, the problematic issues between feminist approaches and poststructuralist theoretical approaches become apparent too. They revolve around the famous debate over equality versus difference and crystallise in connection with the question of political agency. Since this debate is intimately tied to the theorising of identity, it will be addressed in the corresponding section below (3.2.2).

3.2.1 Gendered relations of power

As mentioned above, gender, as it is understood and used here, refers to a “central organizing discourse of culture” (Cohn 1993) that includes at “set of variable, but socially and culturally constructed relational characteristics” (Tickner 2002: 336). These inherently relational social classifications of what is deemed ‘masculine’ and what is deemed ‘feminine’ are pervasively structured according to Derrida’s binary oppositions that empower one element of the binary and simultaneously disempower the other (1972). The stereotypical classifications are dichotomous and mutually exclusive: notions such as power, autonomy, rationality, activity, and the public sphere are associated with the ‘masculine’, while their opposites, such as weakness, dependence, emotionality, passivity, and the private sphere are associated with the ‘feminine’. One intrinsic aspect of this attribution of characteristics is that they construct a hierarchical social relationship between the ‘male’ and the ‘female’. Hence, it is this culturally original very dichotomy that imparts a qualificative character to dichotomies, which are always, even if implicitly, hierarchical (Derrida 1972; Hansen 1997; Milliken 1999). Moreover, as Peterson and True aptly put it, “the gender dichotomy gains its ‘givenness’ by (mistaken) association with biological (‘natural’) sex differences. Because of this interaction, gender dualisms have political significance far beyond their role in male-female relations:

Gender informs multiple dichotomies that structure how we think about and act within world politics – how we make yet reify our world(s)” (1998: 19). Since this accordingly gendered and constitutive discourse also interweaves with and shapes other discourses, it is precisely this interweaving that produces a pervasively gendered discourse of general culture.

By iteratively referring to explicit and implicit binary gender stereotypes, these discourses establish qualificative dichotomies empowering the one side and disempowering the other, valorising and devalorising; hence, these narratives constitutively establish, sustain, and reproduce a relation of power and subordination that draws on dichotomous relations of gender which remain unproblematised. Consequently, the more a discourse is structured into dichotomies that make implicit or explicit reference to unproblematised gender stereotypes, the more this discourse is gendered. Simultaneously, the gendered dichotomies mask “more complex social realities and reinforce [...] stereotypes” (Hooper 2001: 45). This is how, mutually, power-relations are pervasively gendered and gender-relations are power-saturated. The alternative is not only to expose these workings, but also to document the diversity of both femininities and of masculinities (Connell 2005) in order to transcend one of the pervading origins of dichotomous thinking, while avoiding essentialist attempts to proceed to the reverse assessment within the very same dichotomies.

As seen, the relations of power are pervasively gendered, and this is due to the respective societal identity constructions. In the next section, the gendered identity constructions in the context of international relations will be briefly addressed.

3.2.2 Gendered identities

Like wars, “gender norms [...] help [...] to constitute the norms of statecraft”. The analogy is significant: since the body – which is traditionally conceived of as the essential locus for naturalising gendered identity – has to be “understood as historically well-established analog for the constitution of state identity” (Campbell 1992: 11), the gendered body has an evident value for an analytical examination of how identity is forged (not only) in times of war. What has seduced men and women to accept the rationale of war since times immemorial has been the very fundamental gender formulation of ‘beautiful souls’ and ‘just warriors’, according to which women are seen as life givers and men as life takers (Elshtain 1987). As Goldstein (2001) has shown, the ‘war system’ and the unproblematised ‘gender system’ are mutually constitutive of each other; or, formulated differently, Elshtain’s ‘beautiful souls/just warriors’

formulation (1987) simultaneously requires war and gains legitimacy by the existence of wars. This shows how the identities of “men and women, protectors and protected, are constructed in relation to each other, just as, or as part of, the related construction of masculinity and femininity” (Pettman 1996: 99). Importantly, these conceptions and identities are neither static nor monolithic. As Hooper shows, gender identities are “fluid and always in the process of being produced through the interaction between [... the] three dimensions” (2001: 38) of embodiment, institutional practices, and language or discourse. Nevertheless, “gender identities are neither totally self-created nor completely determined, [...] nor can they be separated from other factors of identity formation; notably class, race, and sexuality” (Hooper 2001: 38).

Hence, because identities – including gender – are susceptible to shaping, the exposure of the often pervasively stereotypical referencing is indispensable for the forging of transformation. Moreover, this exposure is intimately linked to the inherent aim of feminist research to strive towards democratic gender relations, defined by Connell (2000) as moving toward equality, nonviolence, and mutual respect. But how does the pursuit of transformation become most effective? How is (political) agency constituted? Identity is often seen as the locus of agency: agency is conditional on the subject position. Consequently, thinking about ways of transformation and emancipation has its nucleus here, which is why the identity issue is the main feature of debate among feminisms. It is also the place where the juncture of poststructuralism and feminism is problematically vulnerable for some, while the very poststructuralist feminist theory is the only one intellectually rigorous enough for others. Hence, these questions represent the main point of contention between positivist and post-positivist feminisms. Without an essential identity, it is argued by proponents of materialist approaches, mobilisation is not possible. The counter-argument is that the assertion of an essential identity of ‘woman’ is a mirror image of the patriarchal strategies of ‘saming’ and ‘othering’, as suggested by Mouffe, for example (1992). While this problematique is inherently virulent among feminist theoretical approaches, it is not exclusive to them. Similarly, the theoretically rigorous poststructuralist approaches are frequently criticised for their ‘suspicious’ lack of the potential for political agency and their diffusion of power such, that it can supposedly no longer be systematically challenged. In the same way, we may regard the problem as being caused by the theoretical mistake of confusing and amalgamating universalism with essentialism (Klinger 1998). This is to say that the very rejection of essentialist categorising, the absence of a female (or male, racial, sexual, or religious) essential identity does not preclude the formation of various and multiple forms of common

action based upon the potentially universalistic principle of solidarity. As a principle of common action, solidarity is predicated on difference. Since a space void of power is virtually inexistent, political abstention is impossible. Therefore, constant normative positioning is inevitable and it is duly needed that it happens consciously. Consequently applied, being aware of the pervasive power mechanisms can only lead to one exercising her multiple and shifting solidarities. What I claim, hence, is that agency does not naturally come with ‘essence’ nor is it declared dead with its absence. As Butler has aptly put it, to criticise the subject of feminism by politically scrutinising the power relations through which it is formed is “*not* the advent of a nihilistic relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but, rather the very precondition of a politically engaged critique” (Butler 1992: 6, emphasis in the original).

3.3 The performative relation between foreign policy (military discourse) and (gendered) identities

It is the constitutive consequentiality – or performativity – of discourse that points to the acuteness of examining both military perception management and the authoritative relations of gender displayed therein. Therefore, the question, which this section strives to answer is: how can the gendered narratives within the military discourse of perception management be grasped analytically? As I shall argue below, the poststructuralist approach to International Relations theory provides us with suitable tools to undertake such a feminist analysis. Moreover, this theoretical approach also discloses how gender is inherent to the competition over power and, simultaneously, how, as a category of analysis, it generates the potential for transcendence of power and thereby lives up to the feminist intrinsic pretence of emancipation.

At the core of poststructuralist research in the discipline of International Relations is the reciprocally performative – as opposed to causal – relation between foreign policy and identity. By means of discourse analysis, such research attempts to read identity of foreign policy texts and vice versa (Hansen 2006). The focus of interest exhibited here is on a particular strand of foreign policy – military perception management – and on a particular aspect of identity articulations – the constructions of gender. The relation between the two is reciprocal and mutually constitutive, and it manifests itself through discourse. Therefore, it is at the discursive level that the analysis sets in. Milliken (1999) identified three main aspects of how discourse theory and analysis has theoretically committed to the discipline of

International Relations, including ‘discourses as systems of signification’, ‘discourse productivity’, and the ‘play of practice’. The discursive systems of signification can be understood as “a structure of meaning[s]-in-use” (1999: 231). This structure is expected to appear “largely in terms of binary oppositions” (1999: 229), and it is within these binary hierarchies that the gendered power mechanisms reside. She uses the term “discourse productivity” to capture the process by which narratives are productive of our world in terms of what they tell. Power here resides in the disciplining of sense, in the establishment of ‘regimes of truth’. The play of practices connects the hegemonic discourses to the practices implementing them. What thereby becomes intelligible and legitimate is an instance of power. While all three of these theoretical contributions are highly relevant and particular to some extent, I do not think that they are as clearly distinguishable as the above categorisation implies, since they are all modes of reality-making. Therefore, deconstruction as a method is applicable not only to the unravelling of the plays of practice alone (Milliken 1999: 241), but – understood as the attempt to bring about a sense of alienation regarding all three modes of reality-making – also to the processes of disclosing the dominant ‘meanings-in-use’ as well as denaturalising the ‘regimes of truths’. In this way, the contingency of the systems of signification in place, of the dominant forms of knowledge, and of the hegemonic practices can be brought to light – what is assumedly stable, fixed, and true becomes unstable and susceptible to shaping and transformation. Finally, all three theoretical contributions significantly rely on the establishment of authority through intertextual references. This means that what could be called meta-narratives are, of course, contained within the systems of signification, within the mechanisms of discourse productivity, and within the legitimisation of practices; they are, in fact, an integral part of the very emergence of these systems, bodies of knowledge, and practices. Moreover, these meta-narratives are comparable to the, albeit constructed, pre-existing cognitive models of collective culture that condition our interpretation of the world. Since post-modernism was defined by Lyotard (1984: xxiv) as essentially an “incredulity towards meta-narratives” (referred to in Smith and Owens 2005: 285), dismantling both the substance and mechanisms of these intertextual references represents a crucial ‘post-modern’ move that enables us to disclose how these same stories pervasively rely on authoritatively (dis-) empowering relations of gender.

3.3.1 Intertextuality – generating hegemonic discourses

The theoretical framework for the “intertextualizing [of] foreign policy” as thoroughly developed by Hansen is applicable to the analysis of gendered underpinnings of foreign policy in general, and to the analysis of these underpinnings in the military discourse of perception management in particular. As she puts it, “all texts make references, explicitly or implicitly, to other texts” (Hansen 2006: 55) in striving to establish authority. What is at first sight narrowly labelled a ‘text’ can also be seen, as mentioned above, as a ‘meta-narrative’, depending on the text’s frame of reference. Pushing the boundaries of Hansen’s argument on “conceptual intertextuality, where the articulation of concepts [...] rely upon implicit references to a larger body of earlier texts on the same subject” (2006: 57), I argue that the less explicit the enunciations of identity in a text are, the more broad and culturally sedimented its intertextual references are. In other words, since the identity categories of both gender and sex are absent in the military doctrine documents on perception management, the intertextual references in these documents are to be found in broad, inexplicit, but culturally sedimented narratives. The ‘silence on the invisible’ as discussed above – which naturalises dichotomous understandings of gender by assuming the male-as-the-norm – maintains and perpetuates the authoritative character of the gender conceptions contained in these documents by alluding to the very ample narratives about statehood and citizenship, the bearing of arms and subjectivation, and military service and gendered duties. In the specific context of the military doctrine of perception management, which to a large extent also displays the fierce belief in technological determinism that is widespread among military strategists, these narratives are also expected to draw on linkages between technological mastery and victory, and between information superiority and power. All of these, and potentially many more, broad narratives – or meta-narratives – build identities through linking and differentiation by referring to spatiality, temporality, and ethicality. Hence, while the “[s]ilence on gender is a determining characteristic of institutions of hegemonic masculinity” (Kronsell 2006: 109), I argue that a close investigation of the intertextual references that naturalise this silence on gender is a useful tool for feminist analysis. This look enables us to undermine the naturalised absence of gender in military doctrine and the (dis-) empowering conceptions of gender that come with this absence. It enables us to make visible what is generally not seen and is therefore claimed to be inexistent, and to problematise what was assumed to be unproblematic.

When the military doctrine is translated into the products of perception management which are applied on the battlefield, the silence on both gender and sex disappears. Leaflets

dropped with the intention to persuade the adversary into retreat by psychological coercion, for example in Afghanistan, but also public diplomacy efforts mounted to show that “the fight against terrorism is also a fight for the dignity of women” (Bush L. 2001, para. 4) or stories such as the heroic rescue of “doe-eyed” (Morse 2003) prisoner of war Jessica Lynch are representative of how these narrative products draw on manifold and explicit, stereotypical and hierarchically gendered dichotomies. These textual bodies explicitly build identities through linking and differentiation by making intertextual reference to very specific dichotomously gendered concepts of identity contrasting men against women, protectors against the protected, but also civilisation against barbarism, or progress against backwardness (in terms of both technology and manhood), to name just a few. The reading of these more specific intertextual linkages is potentially easier than the one denaturalising the silences on gender. Nevertheless, it is neither less effective nor less important. On the contrary, the laying open of these narratives is a first step in making them strange. The deconstruction of the manner in which the (dis-)empowering hegemonic discourses are intertextually generated is also the first step for showing both how these discourses are perpetuated, and conversely, how they can be transcended.

3.3.2 Performativity – constitutive consequentiality

All three theoretical contributions of discourse theory to the discipline of International Relations (Milliken 1999) not only rely on intertextual referencing in their establishment of authority, but all three of them are also evident instances of the social construction of reality. It is this constitutive consequentiality of discourse that the term ‘performativity’ attempts to capture. What does it mean and how is it significant for a feminist analysis of military discourse? This section argues that the concept of performativity – as a complementary concept to that of intertextual deconstruction – is a powerful tool for feminist analysis because it allows the analyst to disclose how the dichotomously (dis-)empowering gender relations are perpetuated, and thereby it simultaneously generates the potential for transcending these very relations of power. Performativity stems from one of the basic underlying assumptions of poststructuralism: the understanding that language is constitutive of what is brought into being. The constitutive nature of language and discourse must be differentiated from the causal effects of language and discourse in the sense that constitutivity designates discourse itself as practice, while the causal understanding of language assumes the antecedence of discourse to practice. ‘Performativity’ can therefore be described as referring to the process

by which discourses enact what they articulate. Through iterative citations, the impression of a repeatable materiality is generated (Bublitz 2002). In the same way, identity and subjectivity (and agency) are not antecedent on to the other but rather mutually constitute one another in an open-ended process.

Performativity becomes relevant to both the discipline of International Relations and to feminisms as soon as we understand language and discourse as political, because thereby “it becomes a site for the production and reproduction of particular subjectivities and identities while others are simultaneously excluded” (Hansen 2006: 18f.). If not only the performative enactment of foreign policy brings identity into being, but the performative enactment of identity also brings foreign policy into being, it is this ontology of the linguistic construction that harbours the potential for change.

First, the military doctrine documents on perception management and also the products thereof as deployed on the field are clearly an important aspect of a state’s foreign policy. Second, the conceptions of gender relations that can be discerned in these documents are clearly significant articulations of identity. Disclosing the reciprocally performative relation between these two features exposes the contingency of both the gendered underlying assumptions of military perception management and the formulated necessity of this particular and presumably crucial tool of foreign policy as a function of identity constructions. Once this contingency is disclosed, political agency follows suit. Deriving from the more vague, but culturally deeply sedimented identity enunciations that are discernible in the military doctrine documents, the externally deployed discourse of perception management does performatively reproduce the hierarchical gender relations inherent in current security practices through its repeated articulations of variants of the ever same explicitly gendered identity articulations. The most relevant aspect as far as the feminist project within the discipline of International Relations is concerned is, of course, primarily the dismantling of these gendered underpinnings of foreign policy in general, and of military discourses in particular. Therefore, the concept of performativity is an analytically suitable tool. Following Butler (1990), we may state that gender is a doing rather than a being; and it is done in International Relations – also and prominently – through military discourses. In order for the currently hegemonic doing to crumble, it needs to be exposed in the first place. Agency is as immanent in ‘doing’ as it is absent from ‘being’.

Hence, relying on the poststructuralist theoretical approach to International Relations and elaborating its core aspects, this chapter has hitherto argued that the two concepts of intertextuality and performativity are suitable tools in order to analytically seize the constructions of and through gender in military discourse. Still, gendered hierarchies are as intrinsic to the relations of power as are the workings of both manifesting through discourse. Therefore, no analysis of power mechanisms is possible without the analytical category of gender, nor is it possible to envision the transformation of power without this very category. I have tried to show how gender is inherent to the competition over power and how it simultaneously, as a category of analysis, generates the potential for its transcendence. Such an approach does, in fact, live up to the feminist emancipatory project. First, a closer look at the intertextual references that naturalise the silence on gender in military doctrine enables the analysis to undermine the absence of gender and the (dis-) empowering relations that come with this absence. Hence, intertextuality helps to make visible the invisible and to problematise the unproblematic. Second, analysing performativity enables us to show how the hierarchical gender relations are continuously reproduced by the current security practices. Moreover, the concept of performativity locates feminist political agency at the discursive level – it is therefore empowering.

Having set the theoretical terms for the research undertaking of this study, it remains to the following section to set its methodology and address the particular data coming under scrutiny.

3.4 Methodology and Data


This section strives to make transparent the particular way by which I shall tackle my discourse analysis of US military documents.

3.4.1 Hansen's discourse analysis model

To my knowledge one of the very first contributions discussing “how discourse analysis can be ‘put to work’” (Hansen 2006: 73-74), I shall build my analysis on this book by Hansen, since it provides the, in my opinion, best possible grounding for the analysis aimed at in this project. Not only does it address the questions of textual selection but also the methodology of

reading. Three intertextual research models are developed related to the analytical focus, the object and the goal of analysis. These models are combined with decisions along three substantive dimensions: first, “whether to focus on one Self or multiple Selves; second, whether to make a study of a particular moment or analyze a longer historical development; and third, whether to examine one foreign policy event or compare foreign policy discourses across a larger number of events”. In accordance herewith, Hansen’s design for discourse analysis demands the researcher to decide along these four dimensions and it looks as follows (Hansen 2006: 81, figure 5.2):

Figure 2 – Hansen’s research design for discourse analysis



Correspondingly, in the following section I shall specify each of these dimensions for the particular research undertaking of this study, namely the selection of documents first, the number of Selves and of events coming under scrutiny second and third, and fourth the temporal perspective chosen for this study.

3.4.2 Documents, analytical focus, temporal perspective and events under scrutiny

First, it is the very first *intertextual research model* which comes to application in this project, since I shall be analysing an official discourse. The focus lies on a particular strand of the official discourse: the military doctrine on how this institution intends to shape perceptions in

conflict. These documents include an overall of 26 military doctrine documents issued by the United States' military between 1991 and 2007, with one document dating from 1979. Thereof, nine are joint publications, seven stem from the department of the army, three from the department of the navy and two from the air force. Further, four documents were issued by the department of defence and one is a CRS report for congress. The list specifying all the documents with their precise references is available in the bibliography quoting all the sources used for this study.

The second component of the official discourse coming under scrutiny is the body of documents by which the military intends to shape perceptions in conflict – namely the products of perception management issued by the US military. These products include the so-called psychological operations leaflets dropped over the conflict zones and the loudspeaker messages issued. Overall, a total of 285 leaflets, which were dropped by the United States' armed forces and Nato in the conflicts the US military was involved in between 1991 and 2003 are analysed. A table with the individual numbers of the leaflets analysed for each conflict is available in the introduction to chapter V and a precise list providing the individual references for each of the leaflets referenced is available in the bibliography quoting all the sources used for this study.


The data-corpus composed by the above named documents meets the criteria of textual selection for discourse analysis as formulated by Hansen (2006: 82). The key texts are primary sources – the doctrine documents and the products of implementation on the battlefield – and the material stems from agencies of real formal authority, the US military and its composing units. Moreover, the unclassified doctrine documents are relatively easily available through websites such as the national security archive of the George Washington University or of the Federation of American Scientist, which make consistent use of the Freedom of Information Act. Also, the products of semantic information operations, namely the leaflets dropped over enemy territory, are relatively easily accessible due to websites supported by retired generals of the USAF which provide vast archives of such products; e.g. www.psywar.org.

Second, as elaborated earlier, in this research project the analytical focus is on a *single Self*: the United States. I do not compare the US to the political entities it consecutively engages in military conflict with. Since a Self can only come into being in implicit or explicit differentiation to an Other, I expect to find ascriptive articulations of such an Other too,

though more so in the products of implementation than in the military doctrine. I shall wonder how this single Self – namely the United States – constitutes through, by and in these military documents and in particular, how this constitution of the Self relies on gendered framings of identity.

Third, closely interlinked are the choice of the temporal perspective and the choice of the number of events. The *temporal perspective* of this research project is, as formulated earlier, the time period between the second and the third Gulf Wars (1991 – 2003). As concerns the doctrine documents, this time period covers precisely the development of this very particular military doctrine. It is specifically with the second Gulf War 1991 that the United States decided that it has to firmly go into information operations and ‘gain advantage’ out of applying the ‘information revolution’ to military affairs. Thus, with regard to the doctrine documents a historical development is traced by examining the documents consecutively issued over the time period under scrutiny. With regard to the leaflets though, I hold that this time period is too short to constitute a historical development. Rather, and in concurrence with Hansen, the focus on each of the military engagements of the United States within this time period (except Haiti) makes of the analysis of the leaflets dropped over each of the conflict zones one of comparative moments “across well defined moments, usually rather close in time” (Hansen 2006: 79). These well-defined moments are given by Operation Desert Storm 1991, Operation Restore Hope (1993), Operation Allied Force (1999), Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003).

And forth, this temporal perspective with well-defined moments already generated the *number of events* under scrutiny, of course. The five above mentioned military operations are related by issue insofar as they all involve the US military, they were all wars of major US involvement. Hence, having specified the individual dimensions of the research project of this study, the design for my discourse analysis now looks as follows:

Figure 3 – Research design for the discourse analysis of this study

The next section shall address how to concretely proceed to this discourse analysis.

3.4.3 Multiple reading – continuous category building

The United States armed forces are an institution of hegemonic masculinity. The focal point of interest formulated here does not focus on the institution of the USAF as such, but on one particular strand of its discourse – the doctrine on, and implementation of, this institution's psychological operations. The discourse which comes under scrutiny is a two-pronged one: first, the body of documents constituting the military doctrine of US psychological operations, and second, the implementation of this same very doctrine, namely the narratives composed by the texts and pictures designed to be disseminated in order to achieve behavioural change of both the adversary civilians and combatants in favour of the own objectives.

A common process of multiple reading is applied to the analysis of both these bodies of documents. Thus in order to find both the grand and supposedly inexplicit gendered narratives of identity construction in the military doctrine documents and the more explicit articulations of binarily gendered stereotypes of the very same in the products of perception management, these documents are subjected to a process of multiple reading. In this process of multiple reading each reading round is expected to generate an analytical category, which thus structures the consecutive reading round. It is therefore continuous category-building, that structures the analysis. This analytical process shall be repeated up to the moment, when the analyst decides that she has found the elements core to her analysis. It is important to note that

such a process is also open to findings, which were not anticipated and that it thus allows for gradually integrating these findings.

Concurring with the assumptions about the ‘silence on the invisible’ within the doctrine and about the explicit articulation of gendered stereotypes in the implementation products (see section 3.3.1), I shall be applying two slightly differentiated foci during the reading process to each of these bodies of documents.

On the one hand, the doctrine documents, as articulations issued by an institution of hegemonic masculinity, shall be approached by a focus on the deconstruction of silences on issues of gender (Kronsell 2006) by looking for systems of signification of inarticulate ascriptions. Since doctrine documents are straightforward expressions of strategic discourse, in the reading process applied to these documents I shall wonder whether and how the deconstruction of the silences within this discourse renders visible what Cohn identified as the “masculinity of strategic discourse” more than twenty years ago when it was still „hard not to notice the ubiquitous weight of gender, both in social relations and in the language itself” (Cohn 1987: 688). These documents, thus, shall be searched for intertexts, which are written between the lines and in the silences and also in the elements, which are posed as most natural, as matters of fact not worth reflecting on. With regard to this body of documents it is assumed that it is these elements, which offer valuable clues to uncovering how the construction of identity operates. Hence, here the question shall be: how do these silences and naturalisations construct identity and what kind of identity do they forge?

On the other hand, the analysis of the products of implementation shall look for explicit articulations (Hansen 2006) of the Self, the Other and the relation between the two. As discursive framing must refer to preexistent perception categories in order to resonate with the target audiences, dichotomies and dualistic concepts are predestined for structuring framing mechanisms and the occidental attempts to shape perceptions. Dualistic thinking and framing proceeds through a double move of homogenisation within the categories (the earlier mentioned normative dimension of silencing) and a simultaneous insistence on the (claimed qualitative) differences between the categories. In order to identify these binary stereotypes while reading I shall adopt Hansen’s methodology of reading which relies on explicit articulations to this body of documents and shall be looking for signs of these (dis)qualifying and (dis-)empowering binaries in the discursive constructions of the Self and the enemy and non-enemy Other within the perception management products.

Thus, undertaking a discourse analysis of the United States' presumed functional efforts to shape perceptions shall unravel how the pervasive societal constructions of identity by and through gender underpin both the doctrine and products of US military semantic information operations.

Last but not least, the findings of these two slightly differentiated forms of reading identity (gender) out of foreign policy texts (doctrine and products of military information operations) shall then be scrutinised for their performative impacts. Question of this surely interpretative undertaking will be: how do the formulations identified in the doctrine and products of military semantic information operations relate to concrete issues of the state, its policy and its society. Based upon the theoretical understanding of what performativity means, its workings shall be illustrated by endeavouring examples of how particular issues of the state, its policy and society directly relate to and are instances of the identity formulations identified in the previous analysis.

The inherent contingency of each and every interpretation is evidence of the hermeneutic foundation of discourse analysis. As the features bear an interpretative existence, measuring them is as foreign to the attempt of hermeneutic understanding (interpretatives *Verstehen*) as predicting a causal or even a constitutive connection. I agree that the hermeneutic character of this whole approach does require sound argumentation and conscious reflection on the whys and why nots, the hows and how nots rather than a 'remedial' attempt of previously establishing 'well-defined' categories and directed relations into which the features either do or do not fit. It is the aim of this study to thoroughly provide these sound argumentations and conscious reflections to the best of my knowledge.

IV – DOCUMENTS ANALYSIS I: The doctrine

Reflecting the first analytical step of the analysis, this chapter strives to thoroughly display the outcome of the first rounds of the process of multiple reading that was first applied to the military doctrine codifying so-called information operations. As specified earlier (in section 3.4.2) an overall of 26 military doctrine documents issued by the United States' military between 1991 and 2007 were subjected to this analytical process of reading. This chapter displays the chronological development of what are identified as the key concepts, major paradigms and core aspects discernible within this particular body of documents.

4.1 Information operations – information (age) warfare

Issued over the last decade, a great number of military doctrine papers as well as other documents address ways in which to win a multifaceted 'information (age) war'. This doctrine represents a systematic attempt to make sense of warfare as an exercise in information processing and manipulation and it encompasses efforts to attack or defend the information necessary for the conduct of military operations at all levels. Overall, the dangers identified and the opportunities spotted include both dimensions, information as a referent object (that which has to be protected) and as threat subject (that which has the potential to threaten) and condition the means by which the armed forces intend to act upon these dangers and opportunities and thereby actively shape their environment. A doctrine document on information operations that was partially declassified in January 2006 puts the reaction to what is within the time period under examination here more and more seen exclusively as a threat and ever the less as an opportunity this way: "We Must Fight the Net", "We Must Improve Network and Electro-Magnetic Attack Capability", and "We Must Improve PSYOP" (Department of Defense 2003: 6f.). This means, as formulated in Joint Vision 2010, that "we must have information superiority" (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996a: 16) at all levels. Information superiority in turn is to be achieved through the conduct of various kinds of "Information Operations" (Department of the Air Force 1998). The term information operations is defined as "the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting

our own” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a: ix). It is used as a framework for bringing together existing activities and is based on the belief that achieving information dominance over an adversary will decide conflicts long before it becomes necessary to resort to more violent forms of warfare. While these different ideas must be treated and analysed carefully, as this chapter attempts to do below, they have in common the saturation with information and communications technologies and the very fundamental assumption about the instrumentality of information.

In the following sections I shall analyse the US military doctrine documents concerned with what are today called information operations. The emergence and evolution of this doctrine coincides with the time period under examination in this study, i.e. the years between 1991 and 2003. Within this period the doctrine on information operations underwent both substantial and terminological change. In the following, the evolution of this particular military doctrine shall be traced. It is the aim of the coming section to do this by concisely displaying the chronological conceptual development of what are identified as the key concepts, major paradigms and core aspects discernible in the doctrine documents on information operations in topical sub-sections. Namely these include the so-called ‘information age paradigm’ that gains the armed forces, the conceptual instrumentality of ‘information’ and the depiction of the stipulated adversaries within these doctrine documents.

4.1.1 The advent of the ‘information age’

While the second Gulf War (1991) was not only perceived but also conceptualised by many as the “first modern information war” (Department of the Army 1995: 4-2.) the echo hereof in the military doctrine is audible only some years later. One of the earliest documents is issued by the Navy in April 1994 and treats ‘information warfare’ and ‘command and control warfare’ (Department of the Navy 1994). Underlying the entire doctrinal corpus on information operations is the omnipresent idea about the advent of the so-called ‘information age’. It is based upon the assumption that “[t]he information age paradigm will change army organizations, doctrine, processes and operations” (Department of the Army 1995: Foreword). In this not only early but first substantive army document aiming at no less than laying the foundation to “win the information war” (ibid.: 1-3.) the ‘information age paradigm’ is conceptualised as the major trigger of pervasive and constant change. It has impacted and continues to “irreversibly impact[...] the fundamental approach to warfare” (ibid.: 2-1.) by enabling “to visualize the battlefield [...] such that] the Army of today and into the twenty-first

century will meet the challenges of the Information Age and provide the means to control and dominate the battlespace in any situation” (ibid.: 1-2.). The at this time but dawning change is seen as revolutionary and majorly technologically driven since resting on “the impact of speed and [the] pervasiveness of data [...] revolutioni[zing] the conduct of modern military operations” (ibid.:2.1.). The document called “Cornerstones of Information Warfare” published in the subsequent year by the air force (Department of the Air Force 1996) makes an even bolder statement already in the foreword: “we are crossing a new frontier – the Information Age. [...] Information technology advances will make dramatic changes in how this nation fights wars in the future”. The impending changes are enthusiastically heralded for the “information age technology is turning a theoretical possibility into a fact: *directly* manipulating the adversary’s information”¹⁶ (ibid.: 2, emphasis in the original). Quasi exclusively conceptualised as technologically driven, the substance of this powerful paradigm grows to become more than that with the Army Field Manual of 1996. The term of the so-called global information environment (GIE) appears, an environment in which multiple actors may intrude and which therefore “contains those information processes and systems that are beyond the direct influence of the military [...] including t]he media, international organizations, and even individuals” (Department of the Army 1996: 1-1). The GIE is differentiated from the military information environment (MIE) consisting of those “information systems [...] and organizations [...] that support, enable, or significantly influence a specific military operation” (ibid.: 1-4). The merging of civilian and military technology and use is acknowledged and new challenges and opportunities are identified: “with the easy access to the global or national information network, suppression, control, censorship, or limitations on the spread of information may be neither feasible nor desirable” (ibid.: 1-2).

Clearly, the ascension of this particular post-cold war paradigm undergoes evolutionary change and it is – while from the beginning and up to the current day, technologically triggered – continually filled with new and additional contents. While in the earliest documents the so-called information age is dawning at the horizon, the above-mentioned 1996 army publication understands itself as providing no less than “Army capstone doctrine and facilitat[ing] the transition to the Information Age” (ibid.: vi, emphasis added). Little later, in 1998 the times are conceptualised as having gone into this new age, the transition as

¹⁶ “Direct manipulation changes the adversary’s infomration *while completely bypassing the adverary’s perceptive, analytical, or decision processes.*” (Air Force 1996:2, emphasis in the original).

having taken place. The challenge no longer is the transition itself but rather to constantly adapt and never fall behind, to keep an edge on the “high-quality systems” available to multiple adversaries and foremost to “have the capability to achieve and sustain information superiority” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998: I-2). It is now a central feature of the times to undertake “information-related activities that provide [...] the timely, accurate, and relevant information on friendly forces, adversaries or potential adversaries, and the battlespace [, ...] to leverage friendly information systems [...] and to affect[...] adversary lines of communication” (ibid.). In 2003, information operations are firmly anchored in military doctrine as “core military competency”. Nevertheless, the information operations roadmap stands, as specified by then Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld, “as another example of the Department’s commitment to transform our military capabilities to keep pace with emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by innovation and rapidly developing information technologies” (Department of Defence 2003: 1-2).

While the ‘information age paradigm’ will change everything in 1995, it effectively has changed everything in 2006: the information environment now contains three dimensions – the physical, the informational and the cognitive (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a: I-1 - I-2) each of which are connected to particular concepts. The physical dimension of information is linked to the constant technological development, the ‘informational’ dimension must be defended and the cognitive dimension, “encompass[ing] the mind of the decision maker and the target audience” (ibid.: I-2), offers offensive opportunities.

From Command and Control Warfare (C2W) to IO

A central aspect of the raise of the so-called ‘information age paradigm’ and its specification in the military doctrine is the both terminological and conceptual evolution from what is first called command and control warfare (C2W), then information warfare (IW) in order to finally become information operations (IO). At the very beginning of this specific doctrinal development C2W and IW are used interchangeably. Both navy documents of 1994 and 1995 intend to establish policy and implementing instructions for IW/C2W (see Department of the Navy 1994 and 1995). In 1994, C2W policy aims “to enhance joint military effectiveness through a strategy that integrates the military disciplines of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction” (Department of the Navy 1994: 1). The 1995 navy document specifies that “C2W is the action taken by the military commander to realize the practical effects of IW on the

battlefield” (Department of the Army 1995: 1). The earlier document lacking a definition of IW it is here defined as

“the use of information in support of national security strategy to seize and maintain decisive advantage by attacking an adversary’s information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and influence, while protecting friendly information systems. [Moreover,] Information Warfare is implemented in national military strategy by C2W” (ibid.: Enclosure (2) 1).

C2W is definitionally differentiated from IW by its specified aim “to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities” (ibid.). It is in the 1995 Army document that the term information operations appears for the first time. These are introduced as

“continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the commander’s decision cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations. Information operations include interacting with the global information environment and, as required, exploiting or degrading an adversary’s information and decision systems.” (Department of the Army 1995: 1-5.).

Again a year later the stringent distinction between information age warfare and information warfare is disclosed. While information age warfare understands information technology as a tool and is therefore supposed to affect all combat operations, information warfare “views information itself as a separate realm, potent weapon, and lucrative target” (Department of the Air Force 1996: 2). The orientation of IW is overtly offensive, it targets the enemy “with the intent to degrade his [sic!] will or capability to fight” (ibid.: 3). At this moment in time, information warfare is the warfare for the coming information age. The Army field manual of the same year adopts a broad approach to IW by not delimiting it to the traditional context of warfare but rather permeating the full range of military operations “from peace through global war” (Department of the Army 1996: 2-2).

The next incremental change in the conceptual evolution from C2W to IO is articulated in one of the most essential respective documents, the Joint Doctrine for Information Operations of 1998 (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998). While this document has to be understood as an overt

commitment of the US to the planning and waging of offensive information warfare, it does also undertake a shift from IW to IO while simultaneously broadening the content and scope of IO. These now include Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4I), psychological manipulation by use of mass communication, hacker warfare, business information warfare, and cyber war (Geiger 2002: 11). Also, a definitional shift takes place. Information operations are now those “[a]ctions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998: I-9). At the same time information warfare now “is information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries” (ibid.: I-11). Hence, the concept of IW is absorbed in the increasingly vast concept of IO with the sole difference that IW now is confined to times of crisis and conflict while IO are to be conducted across the range of theatre engagement including peacetime, crisis, and war (ibid.: I-4).

In the first policy revision document on IO issued by the Department of Defence in 2001, both the stakes and scope are unambiguously stated: “[i]n conflict, as in peacetime, [information operations] enable the DoD to direct the full power of [the] Information Age” (Department of Defense 2001a: 1). The 2006 revision of the joint doctrine document, finally, completely “removes information warfare as a term from joint IO doctrine” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a: iii). The abandoning of the term ‘information warfare’ is a signifier for the perceived arrival of the military in the ‘information age’ the adequate form of encounter of which now recurs to ‘information operations’.

IO as a total mindset

Increasingly replacing information warfare as both a term and a concept, information operations are, from the beginning, very broad and inclusive. In its information age-enthusiasm, the army document of 1995 conceptualises IO as “a total mindset” offering “the commander the tools to acquire, manage, use and protect information, as well as the capability to attack (deny, disrupt, and exploit) the adversary’s information system [and thereby] enable[ing] operations throughout all stages of force projection” (Department of the Army 1995: 3-1.). The core of the concept is the strive to gain not only so-called information superiority but information dominance.

While the centrepiece of the early efforts and prospects is the technological development and its military applications amounting to what is proposed as a revolution in military affairs

(RMA) due to “the speed and pervasiveness of data transmission in the Information Age [...] causing a revolutionary change in the nature of military operations and warfare” (Department of the Army 1996: iv), another aspect increasingly gains terrain. As the same manual states in its preface, public affairs (PA) and civil affairs (CA) are coming into focus in the established strive to “influence [...] perceptions” (ibid.: v). Since it is acknowledged that “the impact of media coverage can dramatically affect strategic direction” (ibid.: 1-3) it comes as no surprise that civil affairs, public affairs and psychological operations “activities that support, enable, or influence operations have become integral to the[...] decision process and operations and require careful coordination and synchronization to achieve maximum effect” (ibid.: 1-13). While the C2W component of IO is fully technologically oriented, CA and PA are aligned to unfold their shaping force upon both the military (MIE) and the global information environment (GIE). Providing the doctrinal foundation for the conduct of joint information operations, the joint publication 3-13 of 1998 authoritatively states IO to “apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war”, they “target information or information systems [...] whether human or automated” and must integrate “many different capabilities and activities” while “intelligence and communications support are critical to conducting offensive and defensive IO” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998: vii).

This indeed amounts to a total mindset in which the delimitations between peace and war, civilian and military, offence and defence increasingly blur. Due to the identified importance of dominating the information spectrum, in 2003, information operations are transformed to become a “core military competency on par with air, ground, maritime and special operations” (Department of Defense 2003: 4).

Torn between vulnerability and opportunity

A further characteristic feature of how the US military discerns the ‘information age’ as affecting its security environment is the conception of information as both a threat and an opportunity. There are two interlinked dimensions to this representation of the current times as subjected to the so-called information revolution – the technological dimension present from the very start and the societal dimension adding on as sophistication grows. The percipience of this age as a double-edged sword is crystal clear already in the ‘cornerstones of information warfare’ document of 1996: “We need to use that technological sophistication to avail ourselves of all the opportunities that information, as a target, presents. We also need to

be aware that our technical dependencies represent potentially crippling vulnerabilities” (Department of the Air Force 1996: 14). Up to 1998 the focus of doctrinal development is on the vulnerabilities, that is to say, information operations are defence-oriented.

Yet, in addition to the purely technological perspective the societal implications of technological development increasingly gain attention also in military doctrine. On the one hand, in the global information environment (GIE) with increasingly “easy access to the global or national information network, suppression, control, censorship, or limitations on the spread of information may be neither feasible nor desirable” (Department of the Army 1996: 1-2). On the other hand, in this same very environment actors have multiplied, empowered by the very technological developments of the times such that:

“Adversaries and other non DOD-organizations, including many actors, agencies, and influences outside the traditional view of military conflict, intrude into the [military information environment] MIE. Adversaries, perhaps supported by nonaligned nations, will seek to gain an advantage in the GIE by employing battlespace systems and organizations. In addition, the media, think tanks, academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international agencies, and individuals with access to the information highway are all potentially significant players in the GIE. These entities can affect the strategic and operational direction of military operations” (ibid.: 1-3).

At this moment in time, the threats to information and information and communication systems stemming from these multiple sources include unauthorised access, the spread of malicious software, the corruption of data, the collection of electronic intelligence, the conduct of electronic attack and the use of psychological operations (ibid.: 1-6). Facing the new challenges of the ‘information age’, which crystallise around the concepts of information security, the continuity of operations, public opinion and the morale of the soldiers, the commanders are held to deploy information dominance as defence. This amounts to “the degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary” (ibid.: 1-9).

Focusing on the vulnerabilities – the loss of control due to the multiplication of actors and the democratisation of access to information due to technological development – the early doctrine documents do not yet openly articulate the inherent potential of actively shaping both

the global and military information environment. This step is taken in 1998 with the capstone doctrine document defining the scope and range of joint information operations. As one analyst formulates, a taboo is infringed upon (Geiger 2003): information operations are no longer purely defence oriented but defence and offence are differentiated which has to be interpreted, as mentioned earlier, as an open commitment of the US armed forces to the waging of offensive information warfare.

Offensive IO “involve the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision makers and achieve or promote specific objectives” while defensive IO “integrate and coordinate policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information systems” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998: viii). While the processes by which they are conducted amount to the same, it is truly only their goal (offensive IO target the adversary decision maker and the defensive IO protect the own information and information system) that distinguishes defensive from offensive information operations. This rather ambiguous delimitation further blurs by the assertion that not only “[o]ffensive IO also can support defensive IO” (ibid.: viii) but also that “[b]ecause they are so interrelated, full integration of the offensive and defensive components of IO is essential” (ibid.: ix). It is only consequential that the 2006 update of this most fundamental doctrine document “[d]iscontinues [the] use of the terms ‘offensive IO’ and ‘defensive IO’ but retains the recognition that IO is applied to achieve both offensive and defensive objectives” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a: iii). This, of course, represents a substantive merger.

From hierarchy to network

Further characterising the so-called information age paradigm is the shift in organisational structure of the armed forces from hierarchical to network-based which is firmly rooted in both the military and analytical thinking on the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA). This supposed revolution is understood as due to the application of the recent technological developments to the whole range of weapons systems, information gathering, communication and surveillance (Dunn Cavelty and Brunner 2007). The advocates the RMA strive to shape US military policy around weapons systems that will provide ‘complete situational awareness’, ‘full-dimension protection’, ‘precise targeting’, etc – in other words, systems that will provide perfect information at all times (O’Hanlon 1999). The advantages provided by the RMA, it is argued, favour and strengthen networked forms of organisation over

hierarchical forms due to their flexibility and adaptability. In the context of so-called full situational awareness “the advantage of nonhierachical INFOSYS [information systems] that enable decentralized adaptation and action” is heralded already in 1996. Moreover, “[d]eveloping the flexibility of nonhierachical structure” is seen as crucial since “[i]nformation technology now makes it possible for a senior commander’s intent and concept to be relatively easily shared throughout the command whenever doing so will enhance the operation” (Department of the Army 1996: 1-12).

The global information environment is regarded as having become a “battlespace in which [...] technology is used to deliver critical and influential content in order to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behaviour” (Kuehl 2002: 4). Omnipresent in the doctrine under scrutiny here, these aspects reveal a pervasive technological determinism: the new technologies do not only “revolutionize the battlefield” (Department of the Army 1995: Foreword) but also “allow the Army to transform itself” (Department of the Army 1996: iv). The availability and immediacy of real-time information permits the decentralisation and flattening of command structures, taking control functions down to the lowest practical level of command and thereby diffusing responsibility. Also, it is argued, will conflicts increasingly be waged by networks as opposed to hierarchies (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997). To embrace this idea of flat hierarchies, called ‘network centric warfare’ (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998), as a principle of formation implies a move from linear to adaptive forms of organisation (Libicki 1998).

It is in this perspective that the call for perpetual military innovation, linked to the fast pace of technological development discernible in the doctrine, has to be understood. While the dynamic world of the military doctrine in the mid 1990s calls for the recognition that “change is the only real constant” and that, therefore, the “complex strategic environment requires an Army that is flexible and adaptive” (Department of the Army 1996: 1-1) ten years later the goal of the United States armed forces to become a “network-enabled force” is supposedly achieved (U.S. Army War College 2006: 2), the military apparatus has supposedly become networked itself.

4.1.2 The instrumentality of ‘information’

A congressional research service report summarises the Department of Defence’s (DoD) conception of information succinctly: “the DoD views information itself as both a weapon

and target in warfare” (CRS 2007: 1). This expresses the fundamental ambiguity related to technological and societal development with regard to the military’s affectedness by information itself and by its technologies: information and the contemporary communication technologies imbue society as a whole and the military in particular with both immense opportunities and new vulnerabilities. Three interlinked levels on which information is perceived both as a referent object of security (that which needs to be protected) and as a threat subject (that which threatens) can be identified: The first instance focuses on information infrastructure providing information or data, the second on the ability to generate information superiority or dominance at all times, and the third on information shaping images about certain situations or things (Brunner and Dunn: 2009). These three closely interlinked aspects of information are also discernible in the official military definition of information stating that information is “1. [f]acts, data or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation” (Department of Defense 2001/2007: 260). What is common to all three aspects of how information is perceived of is the assumption of its fundamental instrumentality. Information is conceptualised as instrumental with regards to both aspects, the own and increased vulnerability it poses (due to the access to the whole range of information as tool by the adversary – information as a target) and the opportunities it offers (the own access to the whole range of information as a tool – information as weapon). This most fundamental assumption about the instrumentality information is a pervasive theme in the entire doctrine under scrutiny here.

The instrumentality ascribed to information is unambiguously stated already in one of the earliest documents. The Army’s concept for information operations of 1995 “identifies information as an essential enabler of military power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels” (Department of the Army 1995: Summary). While in the overall approach information and the rise of the new information and communication technologies are conflated also in the conceptualisation of their instrumentality for the waging of war, the following document no longer understands information ‘only’ as a key enabler but “views information itself as a separate realm, potent weapon, and lucrative target”. Moreover, it states that information now is seen as “technology independent” (Department of the Air Force 1996: 2). Thus, not only is “information [...] the currency of victory” (Department of the Army 1996: iv) but its independence from technology allows for its understanding as instrumental to “influencing perceptions” (ibid.: v) and thereby shaping the above mentioned second definitional aspect

inherent to the term – the meaning that a human assigns to data. There is no halt as to whom shall be subjected to this influence: “The U.S. national information strategy [...] influences attitudes and behaviours of friends, adversaries, and neutral parties” (Department of the Army 1995: 2-1.).

Two analytical dimensions of information as instrumentality have to be differentiated. On the one hand, there is the omnipresent struggle for access to or denial of information. In this perspective, the information *per se* is not conceptualised as alterable but its instrumental power rather resides in the access to information or denial thereof. Due to the recent technological development in information and communication technologies and their widespread diffusion, this dimension is generally linked to the level of information infrastructures providing data. Thus, the instrumentality of information resides in the technologically determined components of the military’s adaptation to the ‘information age’. The doctrine mirrors this aspect with its concepts of information superiority/dominance. In 1996, information dominance is advanced as the response to the challenges posed to the military by the rapidly changing global information environment (GIE) and is defined as the situation allowing its “possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary” (Department of the Army 1996: 1-9).

Hence, the instrumentality of information at this stage is technologically determined; it amounts to the use of information systems and capabilities. In the Joint Doctrine Document of 1998, not much has changed except for the replacement of dominance by superiority, which has to be maintained over adversaries and potential adversaries (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998: I-2). Information superiority now is defined as “[t]he capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversaries ability to do the same” (ibid.: GL-7). More explicitly, it here is the uninterrupted flow of information that is instrumental for the military operational advantage over adversaries. Hence, it is crucial to assure and protect the own accessibility while denying the very same to one’s adversary. In 2001, the DoD bases its policy of information operations on the very concept of information superiority: “[i]n conflict, as in peacetime, information superiority enables the DoD to direct the full power of Information Age concepts and technologies; transforming capabilities for maneuver, strike, logistics, protection and situation awareness

into full spectrum dominance” (Department of Defense 2001a: 1). Still, the instrumentality of information is pronouncedly technologically focused.

On the other hand, there is the dimension to the instrumentality of information identifying a powerful potential in subjecting ‘information’ to alteration, shaping and moulding. It is this dimension that introduces a no longer exclusively technologically determined understanding of the instrumentality of information. And it is within this dimension that the introduction of perceptions and their management as well as psychological operations as integrative part of information operations has to be understood. Also, the concepts of strategic communication and its related capabilities such as both civil and public affairs and diplomacy, but also civil military operations and so-called defence support to public diplomacy are at the core of the understanding of this aspect of the military’s handling of information as instrumental to victory. In the following, the occurrence of these aspects within the general information operations doctrine is only briefly displayed since the entire section 4.2 is dedicated to this aspects’ own doctrine documents.

The goal to influence the adversary with information is at the core of any doctrine that frames information as a targeted device. This, of course, is the basic assumption of so-called psychological operations which are, in the IO doctrine, a supporting capacity first (Department of the Army 1995: 3-1.i (2)), an instrumental capability of IO second (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998: I-9) and become an integrated and definitional component of IO third (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a: ix). In 1996, “C2W, CA [civil affairs] and PA [public affairs] are [understood] as interrelated operations” (Department of the Army 1996: 3-0). While “CA specialists [shall] help the commander shape his [sic!] MIE [military information environment] and assist him in dealing effectively with NGO’s, PVOs [private voluntary organisations], and civil authorities”, it is “[t]he objective of PA [...] to ensure military operations are put in the proper context for an external audience [the media as a very important member of the GIE], as well as to keep soldiers informed and protected from the effect of enemy propaganda and disinformation” (ibid.). Concurrent with the official defense-orientation of IO at this time, PA operations yet only imply active shaping of information as opportunity. In 2001, the human factor as crucial to the dimension of the instrumentality of information understanding the same as subject to shaping is for the first time explicitly defined in doctrine. It includes “the psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization” (Department of Defense 2001a: 1-2).

The “continuous synchronization and coordination between IO, public affairs (PA), [and] public diplomacy (PD) [... as] imperative” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006: I-6) and the understanding of “the free flow of information present in all theaters, such as television, phone, and Internet, [such that] conflicting messages can quickly emerge to defeat the intended effects” as a full-grown danger are both explicitly articulate expressions of the second dimension of how the US armed forces conceptualise ‘information’ as instrumental to their operations. Moreover, in the same document the term strategic communication appears in relation to and within IO doctrine. The joint IO doctrine of 2006 includes strategic communication as “constitut[ing] focused USG (United States Government) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to the advancement of USG interests. [... Moreover, the DoD is held to] support and participate in USG strategic communication activities to understand, inform, and influence relevant foreign audiences” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a: I-10, emphasis added). In order to do so, strategic communication resorts to public affairs, defence support to public diplomacy (DSPD), and IO for its accomplishment (ibid.).

The information operations primer issued by the U.S. Army War College concisely pronounces the creative dimension inherent to the US armed forces’ understanding of information as basically instrumental for their task: “Information Operations seeks to influence the behavior of target-decision makers or audiences” and they are “normally performed by military forces at both the operational and tactical levels. [But] IO at the strategic level is a critical component of strategic communication” (U.S. Army War College 2006: 1).

These aspects point to two additional aspects of this very dimension of information’s instrumentality: not only do the supporting capabilities to both IO (i.e. CA and PA) and strategic communications (i.e. PA and DSPD) blur the boundaries between the military and the civilian domains of the US government’s power projection, but also is there an increasingly bold intertwining between the meaning of information and influence. It comes with this intertwining that the inherent characterising feature of information in modernity as ‘neutral’ and/or ‘objective’ is deliberately abandoned on the one hand, while for the very instrumental power of ‘information’ to perform, it is crucial that the targeted audience remains ignorant of this abandoning. This means that as soon as “the most – perhaps only – effective weapon in this battlespace is information” (Kuehl 2002: 4) understood as a weapon shapeable at will, the term loses its supposed ‘objectivity’ while for this very weapon to be effective it relies on the same supposed ‘objectivity’. That information is nothing less than an

instrument of national power becomes crystal clear by the formulation in the IO primer of 2006 which also exposes the justificatory argument endeavoured: “Effective IO leverages the power of information to complement the other instruments of national power resulting in the achievement of national objectives with less expenditure of blood and treasure” (U.S. Army War College 2006: 8).

4.1.3 The stipulated adversaries

The entire doctrinal body of documents under scrutiny in this analysis draws a picture both implicitly and explicitly of the adversaries against whom the US armed forces prepare to fight. Since the so-called rise of the ‘information age’ and the warfare concepts coming with this rise coincides with the end of the Cold War, the adversaries stipulated within the military doctrine documents have undergone fundamental change. As this analysis’ focus lays on the period between 1991 and 2003 this shortly previous and very fundamental change, which can be truncatedly called the shift from state to non-state actors, is not covered here. Rather does this section trace the evolution of the picture drawn of the adversaries within the same doctrinal corpus as above with a focus on whom the US armed forces depict as challenging the security of the United States and by what means. It comes with this query that as soon as you draw a picture of the other you simultaneously do the same of your own. Of course the US military doctrine is no exception. Hence, in the following the substance of these pictures is traced uncovering both the ascribed characteristics of the stipulated adversary as well as those of the US armed forces themselves.

The conceptual Army document on information operations of 1995 precisely names the adversaries the fight against whom “[t]he Force XXI Army” has to prepare: “those enemies are agrarian war lords, industrial armies, or Information Age peers” (Department of the Army 1995: 1-2). Hence, in 1995 the character of the stipulated adversaries is still relatively similar to what traditionally was the unit organised as a state although an agrarian warlord does not entirely fit this description. Nevertheless, a key characteristic of the so-called ‘information age’ is already prominently present – it is the concept of asymmetry which, of course, simultaneously ascribes definitional characteristics to the adversary and to the Self.

“Force XXI armies will now know the precise location of their own forces, while denying that kind of information to their foes. [...] Shared situational awareness, coupled with the ability to conduct continuous operations, will allow Force XXI armies to observe, decide and act faster, more correctly, and more precisely than their enemies. [...] Today’s Army has asymmetrical capabilities” (ibid.).

Importantly and fundamentally differing from the later conceptualisation of asymmetry, at this stage, asymmetry is seen as working in favour of the US while it still is purely technologically determined. Nevertheless, the later development focusing more on increased vulnerability due to asymmetrically empowered adversaries, is already seizable in the same document, as it states that “the U.S. currently has the world’s most sophisticated, yet vulnerable, information engagement capabilities” (ibid.: 2-2).

Three years later, the depiction of the potential enemy has already considerably changed. While on the abstract level the image of the adversary is still bound to a group organisational unit such that the “term adversary broadly [...] include[s] organizations, groups or decision makers that may adversely affect the joint force accomplishing its mission” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1998: I-1), on the more concrete level, this capstone document in terms of threats precisely names its enemies including individual “computer hackers, criminals, vandals, terrorists, and nation states” (ibid.: I-15). Moreover, asymmetry now has become a full-grown danger since “US dependence on information and information systems, and the resultant vulnerabilities this entails exposes the United States to [...] this] wide range of threats” (ibid.).

In the update document of the joint doctrine the adversaries are again explicitly named: “[p]otential information adversaries come in many shapes: traditionally hostile countries who wish to gain information on US military capabilities and intentions; malicious hackers who wish to steal from or harm the US Government (USG) or military; terrorists; and economic competitors” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a: I-5). No longer solely technologically determined, “possible threat information techniques” now also include “propaganda and psychological operations” (ibid.).

Hence, while the Self is stipulated to be both morally and technologically superior to the enemy at the very beginning of the ‘information age’ – (technological) asymmetry is in favour of the US – the technological dimension increasingly fades and even turns into asymmetric vulnerability with this ‘new’ era’s heyday. Increasingly the enemy is conceptualised as an asymmetrically empowered threat such that asymmetry becomes a key condition of the

‘information age’. The empowerment of non-state and individual actors with skill and the affordable access to technological devices undermines the state’s informational monopoly on power. In this complex information environment, potential adversaries lurk everywhere. In the theory of the doctrine, attacks can be carried out in innumerable ways by anyone with a computer connected to the internet, and for the purposes ranging from juvenile hacking to organised crime, political activism, or strategic warfare. In this threat and enemy conception, the same agents that are empowered with the skill to attack neuralgic information features are also empowered through information and communication technologies to unleash their creative energy upon the information environment. This means a loss of control not only over the forces that are potentially able to destroy the new information environment, but also over those that are able to shape and influence it. It is noteworthy that the range of tools and weapons that the enemy is expected to employ includes the same range of activities that the US military doctrine envisages. Hence, in striving to confront the asymmetrically shaped threat landscape, the US believes it necessary to adjust its strategies to those used by the adversary by imitation. Thereby, the claimed moral superiority fades completely as well of course.

4.2 Perception management and psychological operations – moulding the human mind

The army document of 1995 defines information infrastructure as including people, the electromagnetic spectrum and computers (Department of the Army 1995: 1-2.). While this definition discloses the military’s very functionalist approach to the human being, it does also provide us with the focus of this section of the doctrine chapter, which shall lie on people as definitional element of the ‘information infrastructure’. As noticed earlier, it is the prevalent view among strategic thinkers that the global information environment has become a “battlespace in which [...] technology is used to deliver critical and influential content in order to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behavior” (Kuehl 2002, 4). While this quote points to the importance attributed to technological capabilities for manipulative control, the specific focus of this section lies on those concepts in the doctrine that are typical for the attempts to manipulate the “hearts and minds” of human beings. It is the level on which information is perceived as a referent object of security as forming images and representations, and more particular, the image of the US in the world. While this is closely interlinked with the characteristics of information operations in general sharing the basic

assumption about the instrumentality of information, its focus is less on the technological marker than on the human emotions. More precisely, elements such as the empowerment of other actors than the state by means of the new information and communication technologies also apply to what has been called the “war of ideas” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 2004: 39).

This section shall, hence, look at how the US armed forces codify their attempts to systematically exploit these capabilities in order to manipulate the ‘hearts and minds’ in the many different spots of the global ‘war of ideas’. These manipulations can be summarised under the heading of the appearingly civilian term of perception management. In the more explicitly military context these efforts are called psychological operations. Both perception management and psychological operations not only are a sub-category of information operations in general, but they also have in common the understanding that information is a crucial power-resource and they share the notion that it is instrumental for shaping perceptions, and therefore ultimately behaviour.

In order to further dissect the doctrine on both perception management (PM) and psychological operations (PSYOP) the terminology first needs to be tackled. The DoD dictionary of military and associated terms states that perception management covers

“[a]ctions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations” (Department of Defense 2001: 411; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003: GL-7).

While this definition does vary very little from the one of psychological operations and is held broad and inclusive, the difficulty is, however, that the nuances between the particular aspects named (i.e. truth projection, operations security, cover and deception and PSYOP) are very hard to differentiate, even for the military itself (Beavers 2005). In Clausewitzian terminology, we may say that semantic inaccuracies form a linguistic variant of the fog of war. There is a lot of overlap between the different concepts. Truth projection is not officially

defined. Operations security (OPSEC) and military deception both contribute to cover and concealment for information operations, but both also support perception management (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a). Information operations (IO) encompass a lot of concepts, as shown above. Moreover, perception management as planned and systematic manipulation is deployed on all three levels – the political level where it is often called public affairs, the diplomatic level where it is called international public information or strategic influence and the military level where it comes under the heading of information operations in general and psychological operations in specific. This does further blur not only the terminology but also the concepts. Hence, perception management strives to influence cognition in order to consecutively manipulate emotions, ‘rational’ thinking, decision-making and ultimately behaviour. Contentwise this amounts to pretty much the same as psychological operations, making a clear conceptual delineation nearly impossible as we shall see below.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are an integral and core capability of information operations besides electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), military deception (MILDEC) and operations security (OPSEC) (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a). More precisely, they are defined as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996: v; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003: ix). As we see, this definition is highly similar to the one covering perception management. Differentiation only comes with the further elaboration of PSYOP – which is lacking for perception management since the concept does not have a doctrine of its own.

First, through from 1997 to 2005 “the purpose of PSYOP is [stated as] to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objective” (Department of the Navy 1997: 1; Department of the Army 2005: GL-16). Still there is no real differentiation discernible. Nevertheless, it is PSYOP’s stated purpose which experiences some specifying elaboration in both major joint doctrine documents. Identical in 1996 and 2003, “PSYOP are [understood as] a vital part of the broad range of US diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996: v; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003: ix). This is surprising in so far as the military term PSYOP is deliberately applied to the civilian realm, and this is done in a military doctrine document. In the 2003 joint doctrine it is further defined that “PSYOP are delivered as information for effect, used during

peacetime and conflict, to inform and influence. [Moreover, w]hen properly employed, PSYOP can save lives of friendly and/or adversary forces by reducing adversaries' will to fight." (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003: ix). And finally, common again to both documents "[b]y lowering adversary morale and reducing their efficiency, PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks, ultimately inducing surrender" (ibid. 1996: v; ibid. 2003: ix). The different aspects of these definitional characteristics codifying psychological operations do, of course, all fit into the analytical categories of so called 'information (age) warfare' – i.e. the advent of the 'information age', the instrumentality of information, and the stipulated adversaries (and Self) – elaborated on in the sections above (4.1).

Not only are the three categories of military PSYOP including strategic, operational, and tactical – in 1996 there is an additional category covering consolidation PSYOP – "used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political and economic power and resolve", which is, note, assumed and perceived as strong, but also are they considered to "multiply and magnify the effects of military deception [...], reinforce apparent perceptions of the adversary, plant seeds of doubts, [...] and magnify the image of US superiority" (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996: I-7). Overtly blurring the delineation between the military and the civilian realm, strategic PSYOP are defined as "international information activities conducted by US Government (USG) agencies [...] which] are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense (DOD) assets", while operational and tactical PSYOP are both conducted across the range of military operations – the first "in a defined operational area to promote effectiveness of the joint force commander" and the second "to support the tactical mission against opposing forces" (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003: ix-x). Particularly, the missions of PSYOP include advising the commander through the targeting process, "influencing foreign populations [...], providing public information to foreign populations [...], serving as the supported commander's voice to foreign populations [...] and] countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political will of the United States" (ibid.: x).

Several ambivalent aspects emerge from displaying the conceptual elements of this particular military doctrine. Not only is there a relatively explicit distinction discernible between 'good' and 'bad' activities tied solely to the question whether the author is the Self or the Other, but

also is this differentiation linked to the one between two sets of audiences: the foreign audience and the domestic audience. This is rather explicit in the definition of PSYOPS given above: The target of these operations is ‘foreign’, whereas the domestic audience is exempt. The need for such a statement and such a differentiation stems from the Smith Mundt Act of 1948, passed as a Cold War measure to regulate US public diplomacy or propaganda, which prohibits domestic distribution of propaganda information intended for foreign audiences. In other words, the US public should not be lied to by its government. Strikingly, this distinction implies that these operations can be effectively targeted and controlled. The illusion of such control in the virtual realm of perception management is openly acknowledged by the information operations Roadmap, which states that “information intended for foreign audiences, including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa” (Department of Defense 2003: 26). This allows the argument that “the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of USG [U.S. government] intent rather than information dissemination practices” (Department of Defense 2003: 24).

The objectionable nature of such legally questionable statements is ‘balanced out’ by the urgency attributed to information operations – and to psychological operations as a subset thereof. They are depicted as a force multiplier of tremendous importance in the context of asymmetric warfare. Furthermore, they are presented as the most effective “non-lethal” weapon of superior morality, epitomised in the following quote by Roman military strategist Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, writing in 378 AD: “to seduce the enemy’s soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003: I-7).

Another line that is deliberately blurred in this doctrine is the distinction between war and peace. Perception management activities and psychological operations are not restricted to conflicts, rather “full-spectrum information operations are full-time operations requiring extensive preparation in peacetime” (Department of Defense 2003: 8). With regards to PSYOPS, as seen above, these operations are “characteristically [...] delivered as information *for effect*, used during *peacetime* and in times of *conflict*, to inform and influence” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2003: ix, emphasis added). Furthermore, as perception management can be located at three levels simultaneously – the political, the diplomatic, and the military – the call for integrating the communications arsenal of the entire state leads to the impossibility of distinguishing clearly between military PSYOPS, civilian public diplomacy, and political

news management. A clear distinction between the civilian and the military realms is thus neither feasible nor honestly intended.

Last but not least, what emerges from this what could be called a conceptual quagmire is the distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘lie’. Good, or rather noble and morally acceptable activities in the information domain are those that are aimed at ‘telling the truth’. In the military domain, this role is attributed to public affairs operations (PA) that project the ‘truth’ about military operations through public information, command information, and community relations activities directed at both internal and external audiences (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005). So-called public diplomacy efforts are broader measures incorporating “all instruments of national power” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006: xii). Public diplomacy seeks to undermine the morale of the enemy while raising the spirits of the allies and aims to build “personal and institutional relationships and dialogue with foreign audiences by focusing on values” (van Ham 2003: 429). Public diplomacy is always meant to aim for truthfulness, even if foreign audiences are targeted. The ‘Brand USA’ is managed using techniques directly derived from commercial practice such as ‘place marketing’ and ‘location branding’ (ibid: 433). But while PA and public diplomacy are about the truth, “falsehood and deception, [...] are important ingredients of perception management; the purpose is to get the other side to believe what one wishes it to believe, whatever the truth may be” (Goldman 2004: 149). The active shaping of perceptions in this domain “will range from spin-doctoring and information warfare to outright devious lies” (van Ham 2003: 438).

More specifically, even within the very doctrine documents codifying PSYOP some blatant incompatibilities come to the fore. The joint doctrine document of 1996 states that “PSYOP techniques are used to plan and execute truth projection activities intended to inform foreign groups and populations persuasively [while p]ublic affairs (PA) provide objective reporting, without intent to propagandize” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996: vi). And, immediately following the same formulation in the 1997 Navy document is the phrase: “PA does not use PSYOP techniques” (Department of the Navy 1997: 3-4). It follows from this that, first, the intent of PSYOP is ‘to propagandize with truth projection’ and that, second, PSYOP (‘truth projection’) nevertheless has to be differentiated from PA which is concerned with providing ‘objective reporting’. It is no challenge to notice the inconsistency here.

Hence, according to PSYOP doctrine the ‘information’ projected by its activities has to be based on truth in order to be credibly received by the foreign audience and it has to simultaneously inform and influence. Underlying this is of course the premise holding that ‘if

the target audience comes to know the truth about us, they will join our side'. At the same time, the domestic audience has to be protected from becoming subjected to this same very 'truth'. While information and influence come side by side, it is unambiguously clear that influence is the goal and 'truth' only the selling argument in the strive to democratically 'legitimise' these activities. As commanders are blatantly instructed in an Army doctrine document: "[t]he perception of America's Army [...] is as important to the Army's success as actual combat" (Department of the Army 1997: 13) and fleet marines are held to "remember [that...] in the 'Information Age', the perception of what happened is often more important than what actually happened" (Joint Public Affairs Office, no date).

Reflecting the first analytical step of this study, this chapter has traced the development of the military doctrine codifying so-called information operations. It showed how the paradigm of the 'information age' gained the armed forces, how information is in this body of documents conceptualised as instrumental to victory and how these developments have influenced the depiction of the adversaries. Further it has shown, how the 'moulding of the human mind' is theorised and what implications and inherent weaknesses come with this theorisation. Leaving it here for the very moment, it will be the task of the properly analytical chapter (chapter VI) to subject these findings to another round of reading in order to enquire the identifications within these particular foreign security policy texts.

V – DOCUMENTS ANALYSIS II: Psychological operations leaflets

In the preliminary section focus was put in sequences on the overall doctrine of information operations and its major components and then on perception management and psychological operations. The coming second empirical chapter shall now lay focus upon the very concrete products of psychological operations. Among these products the aerially distributed leaflet is by far the most used, influential and accessible (Whitenack 1993). Moreover, since messages among the different product types are harmonised not only due to doctrinal requisition but also due to so-called efficiency considerations it is mainly leaflets that are analysed in the following. Further, the leaflets scrutinised include those dropped by US-American military in their martial encounters in Iraq 1991 (desert storm), in Somalia 1992 (restore hope), in Kosovo and Serbia 1999 (allied force), in Afghanistan 2002 (enduring freedom) and Iraq 2003 including some of 2004 (Iraqi freedom). In brief, I shall be looking at the explicitly military attempts to influence and manipulate relatively concisely defined target audiences. The audiences addressed by these military issued leaflets include two different groups: the enemy troops on the one hand and the adversarial civil population on the other hand.

Coming to the fore in the first round of the process of multiple reading applied to this second document corpus were four major thematic categories. It is these thematic categories that structure the coming chapter. They comprehend: first, the different dimensions in which the examined products picture the enemy; second, the narratives of the honourable soldier variably appealed to as susceptible to brotherhood on the one hand or rationally reasoned enough to behave disloyal on the other hand; third, the people conceived of as in need of both protection and guidance; and forth, the multifaceted stories of the supposed own supremacy. As shall become clear in the next but one chapter (chapter VI), on the identificatory level these thematic categories intertwine.

This empirical chapter is based on the analysis of a total number of 285 leaflets dropped by the United States armed forces and Nato in the conflicts the US military was involved in between 1991 and 2003. The following table provides the individual numbers of the leaflets analysed (available for analysis as of August 2009) for each conflict and distributed according to the thematic categories.

Table 1: leaflets analysed:

	Total	Iraq '91	Somalia	Kosovo/Serbia	Afghanistan	Iraq '03
Total	285	41	15	20	46	163
Adversary	53	9	0	5	13	26
Soldier	46	18	0	4	3	21
People	150	6	15	5	18	106
Supremacy	36	8	0	6	12	10

The leaflets are referenced in a numbered way (mostly) in order of occurrence. The list of references is to be found in the second part of the sources of the bibliography.

5.1 Picturing the enemy/adversary

The act of decrying the adversary belongs to the fundamentals of war since the existence of martial encounters between two or more groups, states or nations. What can be subsumed under the heading 'demonisation of the enemy' does mostly precede the outbreak of hostilities but rarely cease therewith. On a general level it is held that the build-up of a precisely drawn overheighteningly negative picture of the enemy produces the will and resolve to stand firm behind a decision to 'solve' a particular conflict by recourse to violent means. While this applies to (mostly) civilian propaganda targeting the population of the own side things are different when it comes to military psychological operations targeting both the adversary civilian population and the adversary troops and leaders. Evidently in these occasions, manipulative endeavours seek to degrade the adversary morale, break the will to resist, increase the fears – in short, they seek to enhance one's own chances to prevail. While, of course, this is true for all of the thematic categories discerned below, question in this section is: how is the enemy or adversary pictured in these leaflets, which address the very same adversary civilian and military audience? Do the pictures discernible undergo change within the time period under examination in this analysis? Do they differ from one conflict to

another or do they rather share similar traits? The following section strives to provide answers to these questions based on the body of empirical material specified above.

With the exception of Somalia, in all the conflicts under scrutiny in this analysis the picturing of the enemy ties to a single person: Saddam Hussein for the two Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, Milosevic for the Kosovo ‘intervention’ of 1999, and mainly Ossama Bin Laden for the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan of 2002. It is to mention however, that in both cases of the so-called ‘War on Terrorism’ – Afghanistan ‘02 and Iraq ‘03 – additional enemies include individually named Mullah Omar (Afghanistan) and al-Zarqawi (Iraq) and as more vaguely determined groups the Taliban (Afghanistan) and the terrorists (Iraq). There are several features running through all these enemy depictions. It is these features, which shall be made accessible below.


A very first theme common to those leaflets addressing the enemy population as a whole is the **blame for the hostilities on their leaders**. For Iraq 1991 this takes the form of an Iraqi flag with blotches of blood all over it and a cartooned Hussein shrugging shoulders while walking off with a text saying: ”Saddam’s aggression is the reason that the whole world is against Iraq” (1). A variant of the same is the information on a leaflet for the Serb population that it is “Milosevic ... who dragged the country into war with the world” (2). Also, in the strive to demoralise the adversary populations, their leaders are depicted as gambling with the fate of the country’s populations and its wealth. A NATO leaflet dropped over Serbia in 1999 states that “Slobodan Milosevic has gambled with the future of the Serb people. His policies have lost him Krajina, Western Slavonia, Baranja, and Sarajevo. Now he gambles again with his pogrom in Kosovo. He is wagering Serbia’s sacred places, her place in the world, and the lives of his own people.” (9) In Afghanistan the argument is slightly different calling Mullah Omar a “murderer, a coward and a traitor to the freedom-loving pushtun people” and blaming him to have “made millions of dollars selling evil drugs to muslims” while he “did not use his fortune to help the pushtun people” but rather “helped Usama Bin Laden murder innocent civilians” and he now “hides in safety and comfort while pushtuns suffer” (3). In Iraq of 2003 leaflets were dropped depicting Hussein’s cars and houses with ribbons draped as gifts sided by pictures of apparently starving human beings in a refugee camp accompanied by a text saying: “Saddam wastes your money to buy loyalty of government officials with gifts of cars and houses leaving you and your family to starve” (10) and an other one depicting a crying

infant besides Hussein and his palaces escorted by the text: “Your children suffer whilst Saddam spends money on houses, cars and parties. Saddam does not care for your children” (11).

Secondly, the different manners the designated individual enemies in all these wars are portrayed as simultaneously both **evil and brutal and cowards** do not vary greatly. While Mullah Omar is simply but repeatedly even in the same leaflet called “a murderer and a coward and a traitor” (op cit. 3) the messages on the others are only slightly more elaborate. Hussein in 1991 is “the cold face of death in war” (4) and portrayed as “the Butcher of Baghdad” (5) grinningly throwing the entire contents of a pictured Iraq into smoky fires. Printed on fake Iraqi banknotes by the CIA this message along with the others of the same series showing a cartooned Hussein as ferocious patriarch overlooking his poverty stricken and emaciated and hollow-eyed children (6) or as blatantly sitting with a majestic chair upon a mountain of skulls (7) are clear cut.



(6)




(7)

While for the Kosovo/Serbia conflict flagrant parallels can be identified on the textual level, the very same hinge on the pictorial level for the Afghanistan conflict laying open of course the assumptions about the respective populations' literacy skills. On the one hand, Milosevic is elaborately blamed for “no fuel, no power, no trade, no freedom, no future” and on the leaflet's reverse side the population is averted that: “As long as Milosevic continues his pogrom of destruction, rape, and murder throughout Kosovo-Metohija, Serbia will drift further into International Isolation. [So] don't let Milosevic hold you hostage to his atrocities” (8). Bin Laden, on the other hand, is, similar to the Hussein of 1991, in one leaflet pictured as

cruel warlord sitting on a pile of dead human beings of different (Afghan) ethnic background (discernible upon their different local cloths) and shooting in the air with a machinegun (12). Several leaflets strive to make it crystal clear that Bin Laden is nothing else but the impersonation of evil: Whether it is that he is depicted as a spider spinning its web all over Afghanistan and having trapped the different local leaders in its sticky web added by an unambiguous representation of Taliban judicial system showing three supposed criminals publicly hanged (13) or whether he is depicted as the foreign ruler playing chess with the figures of the local leaders on the chessboard (chess was prohibited under Taliban rule) painted on a map of Afghanistan and accompanied by a picture on the leaflet's reverse side showing Bin Laden holding Mullah Omar pictured as a 'kuchi' – a dog of nomads – on a chain besided by a text saying: "Who really runs the Taliban? Expel the foreign rulers and live in peace" (14 and Friedman, 2008). In again another leaflet he is pictured as speaking through a doll and saying: "We fight for money and power! Oops I mean religion!" (27). Most impressive is the following leaflet:



(15) front side: The Taliban reign of fear...



back side: ...is about to end!

The individual on the far left is identified as "Muttawakil", and is believed to represent the Taliban Foreign Minister Mullah Abdul Wakil Muttawakil. The next is Bin Laden and the third is identified as "Haggani" and would appear to be Jalaluddin Haggani, a senior Taliban commander, and the forth figure is not explicitly labelled but wears a black Taliban turban. In the background of the front side picture we see three Afghans hanging from a gallows. At the right and left of the leaflet we can just make out the fearful face of a snarling Jinn. The Koran identifies the jinn as creature created from smokeless fire. They lie and practice deceit to fulfil their own desire for evil. When turned over, the back of the leaflet shows the four faces

altered to resemble skulls. In place of the gallows an explosion is shown with debris thrown into the air (*op. cit.* Friedman 2008).

A third feature common to the US representation of the individual enemy Other in the two Iraq conflicts of 1991 and 2003 and the Kosovo conflict of 1999 is the systematic **inclusion of family members** in the attempts to demonise the adversarial leaders. More precisely this is to say that both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic are discredited on behalf of their sons. For example is Milosevic's family in general and his son Marko explicitly included in the message of a leaflet which reads: "War and sacrifice for you; Good money for him, his family and his friends. ... Serbia is crippled ... but Milosevic, his family and his inner circle have managed to make millions.... His son Marko waits out the war in comfort. He does not serve as ordinary Serbs must. While your sons and husbands fight, Marko Milosevic parties in Belgrade or works on his sun-tan at the family villa in the Mediterranean. ..." (*op. cit.* 2). In the Iraq conflict of 2003 two variants of the same leaflet including the two sons of Hussein are dispersed. First an illustrated deck of cards depicting Hussein and his two sons Oday and Qusay as most wanted was issued (Friedman 2003) with Hussein as ace of spades, Qusay as ace of clubs, and Uday as ace of hearts. And then, when this two sons were killed in July 2003 another most wanted leaflet was dropped with the three male family members on which the two sons are crossed out accompanied by a text reading: "The two men are no longer a threat to you and your families, thanks to the loyalty of one man to his country. That man provided us with information about the location of Oday and Qusay Saddam Hussein. Your patriotism may win you 25 million dollars. With information that will lead us to Saddam Hussein El-Tikriti, you will protect the future of your country ..." (16). This ties to the whole bunch of reward leaflets as a common instance of picturing the enemy and disseminated in this and the other conflicts.

While no **reward leaflets** were issued in the gulf war of 1991 due to the course of the hostilities, many different reward leaflets were disseminated in both Afghanistan and Iraq '03 and again a more elaborate leaflet version naming those watched by the the Hague Tribunal was disseminated in Kosovo. Among these particular leaflets it is interesting to note their differing standards of complexity. The ones dropped in Afghanistan look like this:




(17)

The wish to capture Bin Laden is figuratively pictured and so are both the reward money and the process leading to possessing it. The leaflets dropped in Iraq 2003 generally looked like this:



(18)

Instead of a figurative imprisonment different pictures of how al-Zarqawi could look like are displayed. These are accompanied by a brief text stating the reason why he is searched and what the reward for information leading to his capture amounts to. Neither arrows nor figuratively pictured money is used in the attempt to get the message understood. Varying more elaborately from both these reward leaflets are those dropped in Kosovo. These were not precisely promising a reward but rather warning some eight specifically named commanders with their rank and troops responsibility displayed by listing their crimes: “Reported Atrocities: Genocide, Murder, Human Shields, Ethnic Cleansing, Rape, Forced Evacuations, Mass Graves, Robbery, Deportation, Destruction of protected property, Crimes against humanity” and further alerting them that “the world is watching you. Every leader is accountable for the actions of his subordinates”. (19) The backside of this same leaflet is the following:



(19)

It is important to note that not only this leaflet operates with no single picture or pictogram, but it further draws a parallel between the the Hague tribunal and the Nuremberg trials and does also address the commanders and the soldiers separately. Hence, it is heavy on text and demands a clear understanding of historical knowledge.

A correlative to the reward leaflets are, of course, the **‘we trapped them’ leaflets**. Besides the killing of Hussein’s two sons so far the only high ranking success is the capture of Saddam Hussein. We sure all remember the pictures released after his capturing. Of course, these were used for a leaflet dispersed for the Iraqi population in 2003. It showed the picture of his capture, bedraggled from hiding side by side with one of the toppling of a statue of his in the city-centre of Baghdad in April 2003. The text of this particular leaflet reads as follows: “Saddam Hussein has been captured by Iraqi and Coalition forces and his EVIL regime will never be back. Now, the future of Iraq is bright for all Iraqis” (20, emphasis in the original). From then on, leaflets showing Hussein in jail (cartooned) and reflecting upon justice and the evil he has done as well as on ways to keep the “Iraqi money he stole” (21, 22, 23) are abound. Another trap-leaflet series addressed the then uncaptured al-Zarqawi (he was killed in an encounter with US special operations forces in June 2006). This series includes two cartoon leaflets showing al-Zarqawi having gone into a rattrap while the cleverer rats managed to escape.



(24)



(25)

He is trapped and held by a muscular and cartoonishly strong arm representing the new Iraqi state. The text on both leaflets reads: “This is your future Zargawi”. Comparable on the level that it is also trying to completely ridiculise and thereby dishonour the adversary leader is the following leaflet dropped over Iraq in 1991 and showing a doltish Hussein accidentally beheading himself. On the front the text reads: “Saddam’s prediction: Be assured that I will solve the problem of Kuwait by 30 February 1991”. On the reverse side comes this:



(35).

Back to Zargawi – as an individual adversary he is often addressed in the Iraq conflict of ‘03. And as an individual he goes under the heading of a ‘terrorist’. Alike the other individual enemies, he is pictured as the incarnation of evil. For example in a leaflet where he is cartooned as standing amidst several distinguishable mountains of skulls each of which has a sign stuck in it designating a different country – Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq. The viewer is supposed to read his thoughts: “I will kill, slaughter and kidnap more and

more humans to satisfy my desires and be worthy to receive the title of murderer” (26). Zaraqawi too, as all these incredibly brutal and cruel and ruthless individuals, is described as a **coward** – with no respect for eventual internal inconsistencies with other messages. Beneath his picture it says: “Why is this the only picture you ever see of Zaraqawi? Because he is a coward! Bin Laden at least shows himself on TV and takes responsibility for his desecration of liberty. Zaraqawi cowers away from the heat and leaves danger while his followers die in his place. What kind of leader is this?” (28) This is practically the same as “Saddam is a coward. Saddam wants you to die. He will use you and your family as human shields whilst he hides behind his palace walls” (29) or “Moqtada is a nobody! He is nothing more than a coward and a killer whose violent actions are only justified by his own selfish desires. He has nothing to offer to Iraq or the world. His actions are driven by personal greed and without the consent of any legal authority” (30).

Further, both the terrorists as a **group** for the Iraq conflict of '03 and the Taliban for the Afghanistan conflict are frequently addressed by the leaflets analysed in this section, which scrutinises the picturing of the enemy/adversary. They are depicted as abusing religion, often of foreign descent, and completely indifferent with regard to civilian ‘casualties’. A leaflet dropped over Afghanistan for example shows a picture of a Taliban men (with a black turban) with a stick beating a completely veiled women in public on the street in front of a watching child. Beneath it reads: “Is this the future you want for your women and children?” (31). Or, with a picture of a bridge destroyed by a bomb you can read: “The damage was done by terrorists mufisdoons. Criminals who destroy your way of life are not freedom fighters they are Muharim fighters against society and your family.” (32) With appeals for the population to help tracking the terrorists come stories about “those attackers who seek to darken the future of the Iraqi people. Whether they hide behind innocent civilians or in a hole in the ground, those attempting to hinder the progress of Iraq will be relentlessly pursued, captured, or killed” (33) and narratives like this one:



(34)

The text on it says: “Evil deeds like these cause a lot of pain for you”.

5.2 Honourable soldiers torn between brotherhood and reason

Besides the adversary civilian population, the enemy soldiers or combatants are the other group primarily and specifically targeted by psychological operations. The coming section shall lay focus upon those leaflets dropped in the conflicts under scrutiny in this analysis, which do explicitly address the adversary soldiers and combatants. How are the soldiers addressed? With what messages are they addressed? And how are they themselves depicted in these messages?

Some patterns run through this confined corpus of leaflets targeting the adversary combatants. On the one hand, there is the theme of surrender. Calls for surrender come in many forms and with an entire panoply of reasonings advanced – ranging from the simple promise of enjoying better food in the case of surrender up to the threat of annihilation for the case of effectively refusing to surrender. On the other hand, there are the multiple attempts to more elaborately demoralise the adversary combatants. Often intertwining with the calls for surrender, demoralising leaflets similarly advance multiple different reasonings ranging from the cut of supply lines to pointing out the overwhelming power of coalition forces. Indistinguishable at times, both calls for surrender and demoralisation leaflets are focused on breaking the adversary’s will to resist by increasing the fears of the combatants. Further common themes cover the conceptions of honour, loyalty and brotherhood. Overall, these leaflets do, as those picturing the enemy/adversary, tell us a grand lot about identity frames inherent to this specific military produce.

The classical form of a **call for surrender** is the so-called safe conduct pass. In variants this form of surrender leaflet was mainly dropped over Iraq in 1991. The safe conduct pass includes a detailed list of how to proceed in surrendering including the following points: “Remove the magazine from your weapon. Place weapon over your left shoulder with the muzzle down. Place your hand over your head and proceed slowly. Wave a white cloth to signal your peaceful intent or hold up this leaflet” (36). It is mostly accompanied with a picture of either an Iraqi soldier illustrating the just listed instructions or an Iraqi soldier lifting hands and waving a white cloth, the weapon placed over the left shoulder and facing down with a thought-balloon picturing his family – wife and kids happily unified (37). Further, the bearer of the leaflet is assured to “receive good treatment from everybody ... [and that] it will also allow the bearer of this leaflet from our bothers in the Iraqi Forces to join the Combined Forces with peace of mind and without being subjected to any harm. He will be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention” (37b). A variant of the same safe conduct pass comes as an invitation to Iraqi soldiers. On the reverse side of this leaflet



it says: “You are invited to join the Joint Forces and enjoy full Arab hospitality, security, safety and medical care. ... my brother Iraqi soldier... this invitation is open to you and your comrade soldiers”. This leaflet is signed by the Commander, Joint Forces and Theater of Operations.

As soon as they are not labelled as such, the delimitation between calls for surrender and demoralisation leaflets is blurred of course. Many calls to cease resistance do not come as safe conduct passes but rather advance multiple different reasons for low morale and hopelessness. A first and prominently advanced reason in all conflicts under scrutiny here is the simple **threat**. Whether it is that: “to stay here means death” (39) written upon a leaflet depicting a

dying Iraqi soldier surrounded by skulls and bombers flying over in the first Iraq war of 1991, the threat that “your ship may be sunk if you support or assist Al Qaida terrorists or Usama Bin Laden” (40), or whether a historical parallel is drawn such as by this leaflet, does not make much of a difference.



front side

reverse side

Other leaflets recurring to the simple threat as a demoralising device are those about imminent bombing coupled, of course, with the message that the superiority is so overwhelming that there is no hope for escape. This message for Iraqi soldiers in 1991 comes as a warning: “WARNING! Your position will be bombed tomorrow” (42). So does another one dropped over Kosovo in 1999. Besides a picture of a B-52 dropping bombs it reads:

“Attention VJ Forces, Leave Kosovo, NATO is now using B-52 bombers to drop the MK-82 225-kilogram bombs on the VJ units in Kosovo-Metohija. Each aircraft can carry in excess of 50 of these bombs! These aircraft will return as many times as required to drive your unit from Kosovo-Metohija, and stop you from committing atrocities. If you want to live to see your family again, leave your unit and equipment and get out of Kosovo-Metohija now! Thousands of bombs... and the will, capability, and the support of the entire world to drop them on your unit!” (43).

Another instance of such ‘warning’-leaflets is one dropped in Afghanistan averting “Al-Qaeda, your escape routes are mined. YOU ARE TRAPPED” (56), written upon a two sided picture showing mines on the one and a vehicle going up in flames on the other side. Many calls for surrender operate by insisting on the consequences for ignoring the so-called warnings: “take an offensive posture and you will be destroyed” it reads with a picture of a tank going up in flames (44), “Iraqi Soldiers DON’T DIE NEEDLESSLY” they are told (45)


and averted of “severe retribution” for the eventual use of weapons of mass destruction. These messages come with appalling pictures such as this:



(46)

Further, the **families** of the soldiers as a motivating factor for following the instructions are often invoked: “Return home where you are needed... before Milosevic treats Paracin... like Pristina” (47) combatants are held and “think about your family. Do what you must to survive” is written besides a picture of a whipping women with her children (48).

Another element in the strive to demoralise the adversary combatants is to point out that their **leaders** have first exploited and then abandoned them and are therefore **not worth of loyalty**. On the reverse side of this picture dropped over Iraq in 1991 soldiers are told that:



(49)

“Your supply lines are cut! You will receive no material or reinforcements.” Contending multiple demoralizing messages such as the above leaflet – your leader walks off shrugging shoulders, US-American bombing airpower is overwhelming, the situation of Iraqi soldiers is hopeless as they are dreadfully dying – is also another one dropped over Kosovo. Conjuring up a friction between the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the Ministry of the Interior Police (MUP).

It says on the one side of the message: “Your blood ... their rewards”, in order to specify on the other side of the leaflet:

“Attention VJ Troops! While you endure NATO bombing, in the field, low in fuel and supplies, unpaid, and past your service obligation... The MUP returns home, to count the profits from their ‘confiscated’ booty. ... you have been drafted and forced from your families to wage a war against civilians, a war which you know is dishonorable and wrong. The only thing you share is blame for the MUP’s atrocities” (50).

Less elaborate with additionally a humiliating message for the combatants addressed themselves is the message dropped over Afghanistan telling anyone literate that: “Usama bin Laden sends his murderers into the world to kill for his cause. ...[He] laughs at you because you don’t know he has sent you to your death” (51).

Furthermore, the soldiers are addressed with messages as old and archetypal for male societies as war and its gendered duties themselves. **Fraternisation** across enemy-lines has its recurring place – “My Iraqi Brother, what we want is peace” (52) – as has the sacrifice of the sons to the mother nation – “O’ sons of Iraq! In death you lengthen the life of Saddam, but you shorten the life of your land, Iraq” (4). In December 2002 the US-American commando solo radio messages aircraft started broadcasting over Iraq after having dropped thousands of leaflets alerting the Iraqis to radio frequencies and the times to tune in. In the sample of the scripts being broadcast the soldiers of Iraq are specifically addressed with this message:

“Soldiers of Iraq. Since the beginning of time, there has been no profession more honorable than that of a soldier. Soldiers are decorated with awards and medals that show their achievements and mark their skills. The uniform of a soldier is an article that demands respect, and loyalty. Soldiers are the defenders of their people, and the protectors of women and children. A soldier is willing to sacrifice himself for his country and their way of life. Soldiers sacrifice their own personal freedoms to protect others. Saddam has tarnished this legacy. Saddam spews forth political rhetoric along with a false sense of national pride to deceive these men to serve his own unlawful purposes. Saddam does not wish the soldiers of Iraq to have the honor and dignity that their profession warrants. Saddam seeks only to exploit these brave men. ... Saddam does not care for

the military of Iraq. Saddam uses his soldiers as puppets, not for the glory of Iraq, but for his own personal glory.” (53)

After the second war in Iraq is supposedly over, leaflets distributed in order to recruit the new National Guard and the new Iraqi Army are very specific as to the understanding of heroism and the skills needed to qualify as is discernible below.



(54)



(55)

5.3 The people – in need of protection and guidance

The major part of the leaflets gathered for the sake of this analysis target the adversary population – particularly so in the case of the latest conflict under scrutiny, the one that ravages Iraq since 2003. These leaflets, under analysis in the coming section, address the adversary civilian population with manifold messages. In the process of multiple reading applied to the study of this vast empirical corpus of documents, six thematic categories came to the fore. First, there is apparently a discerned need to explain to the adversary population why a war suddenly befalls their life and also to further clarify that this apparent war is not aimed at them. This thematic category mainly contains the message: ‘We are here to help you’. The messages of the second thematic category are argumentatively interlinked with the first and can be summarised under the header: ‘Our adversaries are your evil leaders and we are here to end their cruel practices’. Thirdly, many leaflets try to convince the civilian population of the achievements gained since the military encounter has started. The fourth category contains leaflets aimed at increasing the morale of the civilian populations; calls for

unity and tolerance, and the will to ‘progress’. Fifth, multiple leaflets were and are dropped in order to instruct the civilian population as to manifold aspects of daily life – ranging from the declaration of a curfew to the benefits of brushing one’s teeth. Linked to these instruction leaflets are those that, sixth, call upon the population to hand in weapons at their disposal and also those that try to raise mine awareness. Below, these thematic categories shall be addressed in the above consecutive order.

It appears to be important for the US military to let the adversary civilian population know what their **reasoning** is behind the war faring activities in the respective countries. These leaflets picture a Self that is highly benign. In Somalia the US armed “forces are here to assist...”(57) and to “PROTECT THE RELIEF CONVOYS!”(58) and simultaneously they make a very clear stance concerning their resolve to do so: “We are prepared to use force to protect the relief operations and our soldiers. We will not allow interference with food distribution or with our activities. We are here to help you.” (57) This message comes with a picture of a geared soldier and an unarmed Somali shaking hands and surrounded by a tank on the one side and a helicopter on the other side. Distributed over Serbia in 1999, Nato leaflets try to get their stance heard among the civilian population: “Nato has no quarrel with the Serb people, or their right to national sovereignty. NATO and the international community still desire a peaceful solution for Kosovo”(59). On the reverse side the same leaflet lays out Nato reasoning in more detail insisting on the process, which has lead to the Nato air strikes as the “direct result of your government’s actions” (ibid.). Further, “NATO defends the defenceless” (60). Also the Afghan civilian population is assured about the ‘true’ reason of military operations. While on the one hand retaliatory practices are ‘hinted at’ on the visual level as one leaflet sides pictures of the smoking and tumbling down Twin Towers in New York with a collapsing Afghan building (61), on the textual level, another leaflet claims that “[t]he partnership of nations is here to help.” And on the back side of the same: “[t]he partnership of nations is here to assist the people of Afghanistan” (62). This message again comes with a picture of a geared soldier shaking hands with an unarmed Afghani. Hence, despite all the benign intentions, these messages are nevertheless conflicted. The same with this one:



Not only is the partnership of nations spoken of on the one side of the leaflet reduced to the US on the reverse depicting both an Afghan and an US-American family but also are those from whom the Afghan people needs rescue not entitled to tell the same how to live while the partnership of nations apparently is. The same messages recur in Iraq of 2003. Iraqi civilians are assured of the humanity of US soldiers by informing them that “[c]oalition soldiers have families too. They do not want to see you get hurt” (64). Further, the attempt is made to convince the Iraqi of US-American respect for them as this leaflet shows.




This leaflet depicts school children visiting the Shaheed (Martyr’s monument). The blue monument commemorates the Iraqi dead in the Iraq-Iran war. At the left side, coalition jets are showed firing rockets at Iraqi tanks hiding near the monument. The text on the reverse side of the leaflet is: “Coalition forces do not wish to harm the noble people of Iraq. To ensure your safety, avoid areas occupied by military personnel.” Not only does the Coalition want to avoid harm for the Iraqis but their true “wish [is] only to liberate the people of Iraq from Saddam’s tyranny” (66).

While these leaflets strive to tell the adversary civilian populations that they are being helped and rescued by the invading military forces there is a whole bunch of leaflets striving to

simultaneously tell civilians **what** they are being helped with and **whom they are being rescued from**. According to these messages discernible in all of the conflicts under analysis here it is the fault and entirely sole responsibility of the multiple evil leaders that war is coming to the respective countries. Further do these messages imply that the military forces with their noble mission to liberate these peoples have in fact no other choice than doing so – it apparently is a command of ethics.

Dropped over Serbia one Nato leaflet with pictures of crying women every age, an old one and a younger one on each side and in the middle a very sad looking little girl besides a dead body asks Serbs: “Guess what Milosevic isn’t telling you. Milosevic uses lies to misdirect your patriotism in support of his own power. He censors your media, and silences any and all criticism.” (67) Coming with a picture of a coffin another leaflets tells civilians “[y]our sons and husbands are being sacrificed in an unnecessary war. Every day they spend in Kosovo-Metohija increases the chance they will be killed by a sniper’s bullet or NATO bombs. ... You need your family more than you need war in Kosovo” (68). The cruel practices of the leaders the foreign military forces are here to combat are listed in many different messages with text and pictures. An accusation commonly made against Milosevic, the Taliban and Al-Qaida and also against ‘the Terrorists’ operating in Iraq since 2003, is the one of using human shields for military operations: “NATO will never deliberately target non military related activities. However, your government’s placement of military targets in civilian areas, and the continued use of civilian facilities to support the military has increased the risk to you. ... don’t become another victim of Milosevic’s war” (69). The same message for the Afghan civilian population is: “Taliban and Al-Qaida use innocent women and children as shields for protection” (70) and the message for Iraqis comes with a cartoon of a smoky Mosque with machine guns pointing out of its windows and out of the minaret with a text reading above: “In the name of God *Mosque are for God, Don’t involve other than God* God said the truth.” And below: “Are the places of God and worship turning into hide outs for terrorists and their weapons?” (71). The list of the atrocities committed by those the civilian population needs liberation from continues to include the below depicted shooting of women:




(72)

The reverse side of this leaflet shows a picture of happy children and Afghans distributing USA labelled food; the text says: “America has provided over \$170 million in aid to Afghanistan”. In Kosovo, it is claimed by another leaflet, “heads of families have been pulled from the arms of their wives and children and shot” (op. cit. 60) and in Iraq, civilians need to worry to “Don’t let your Children be Exploited” by terrorists.



(73)

Another version of the three frightened woman leaflet is this one distributed in Iraq in 2003 and elaborating on the narrative about the disrespectful terrorists and their dishonouring of the holy month of Ramadan.



(74)

Opposed to these depictions of the evil adversary and their cruel practices from which the civilian population is in urgent need of rescue are those messages, which try to convince the civilian population of all the **achievements** made since the liberating forces are operating on their behalf. Such messages are mainly dropped in Afghanistan and in Iraq of 2003 where they come in multiple versions covering many different aspects of life. But also in Somalia a leaflet was dropped depicting all the different daily activities that are supposedly again possible since the multilateral forces are taking care of the Somali plight such as cultivating the lands, repairing the huts, preparing food, and distributing rice (84). The back of the leaflet lists goals and achievements:

“UNITAF’s mission is to provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts throughout Somalia. Initial emphasis was on securing key cities; now the focus is on expanding that security to smaller towns and villages. As they are secured, relief agencies are beginning to distribute dry food, seeds and farm utensils to help displaced families return to their farms, rebuild their homes and plant their fields. Now is the harvest time for many crops. Preparations need to be made for the next planting.” (84)

In Afghanistan it is mainly proclamatory to contend that “A United Afghanistan – Peace, Prosperity – new government – new freedoms” (75) has materialised. These claims are accompanied by pictures of smiling girls and elderly, and families happily united over an Afghan map. In Iraq the messages are more varied. Whether it is that the “Citizens of Iraq” are assured that “continuous progress is being made” (76), that “schools have re-opened, electricity has improved and businesses are thriving” (77) or that “The Ba’ath Party will never

regain power” (78) – it is claimed all due to the relentless and courageous efforts being made by the brave soldiers. Happily, Iraqis “are no longer prisoner of the regime”.



(79)

In the rebuilding of the country Iraqis are assured to have their say since it is apparently “up to you what kind of future you give Iraq” (80). The influence spoken of here amounts to the call to “[e]xercise your role in reconstruction efforts by reporting anti-coalition activity and by denying these agitators support” (ibid.) and “by participating in the Neighborhood Watch” (81). In order to make sure the newly liberated do not misunderstand their new role they are also reminded that

“Freedom = Responsibility. With liberation you now have the right to protest without fear of repercussion. But with this right comes the responsibility of protesting peacefully. Your voice is heard through your participation. Violence against civilians, Iraqi Police, or Coalition Forces will not be tolerated and will be dealt with decisively” (82).

Combining a list of achievements with an appeal to enhancing morale of the civilian population is the “Visions of Freedom for Iraq” leaflet enumerating the “13 points agreed to by the Future of Iraq Forum held on April 15, 2003” and including elements ranging from “how to best chart a course toward a democratic representative government” over the

importance of respecting diversity “including respect for the role of women” to condemning “the looting that has taken place and the destruction of documents” (83).

A forth theme among the leaflets distributed to target the civilian population in a conflict is the **appeals to people’s morale**. This can be in the sense of striving to enhance morale and ‘mental strength’ but it can also strive to negatively target the morale of adversary civilians. Both types of messages were dropped for example in the first US-American war in Iraq. Positively appealing to Arab brotherhood were messages trying to discredit the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. With a picture of soldiers wearing uniforms of different Arab countries came a text saying: “We are all brothers... Arab neighbours... we desire peace” (85) or with a picture of two soldiers hand in hand walking towards sunset and the flags of Iraq and Saudi Arabia besides them coming with the text: “With peace we will always remain united” (86). Trying to break the morale of Iraqi civilians in 1991 were leaflets dropped as fake banknotes printed on thin Bible paper with messages claiming that “at least it has a value now” (87) or “The money in Iraq has no value” (88) or “There is no difference between your money and this paper” (89). In Afghanistan what I classified as morale leaflets for the civil population mostly came as positive messages. Recurring is the positive appeal to diversity and step by step-progress: “Many threads make one rug. Together you can make one Afghanistan” (90) and: “Brick by Brick... Together you can make one Afghanistan” (91); both messages accompanied of course with pictures of a rug and a brick-wall respectively. Similar messages are distributed in Iraq. Striving to give a positive account of diversity are leaflets such as these:



(92)



(93)



(94)


Others try more to insist on the tolerance aspect of diversity by linking it to progress. With a children's cartoon telling the story of a brave boy interrupting a fight of someone pushing aside another for the sole reason of having a different religion comes the message: "Progress can only be made through tolerance. Our Youth are the Future. With Respect and Understanding we can rebuild a strong Iraq" (97) Also is the attempt made to strengthen morale of the stricken population with this message:

"The strong refuse to be terrorized! There are people in Iraq who want to destroy our children's future. They are bombing schools, and other places of education. They don't care that the children of Iraq are our future. These dogs only want our children to be ignorant so they can influence them with their teaching of hate. We need to help our multinational brothers by showing them that we will do whatever it takes to regain our country. We need to root out the thugs who are responsible for these heinous crimes. The people of Iraq refuse to be victims for they are survivors and strong." (96).

Many of the leaflets aimed at the civilians in the conflicts under scrutiny here include manifold **instructions** about how to behave in various situations induced by the conflictuous encounter. These what I call instruction leaflets include some that give general instructions and some that give very specific instructions concerning the prohibited weapons and weapons systems, calls to hand weapons in and also reward-promises for doing so, and mine-awareness leaflets.

In Somalia instruction leaflets of both categories were dropped. With a charted picture of a city street in Mogadishu being freed of debris come the following instructions: "Operation CLEAN STREETS beginning 28 December 92 from 9:00 pm till 4.00 am." And on the back it is elaborated that this operation "will clear main routes from curb to curb, form the airport and US Embassy to the seaport of all fixed objects, abandoned vehicles, sand rocks and other debris. Please move your market stands, vehicles and other property completely off the roadways. Together we can rebuild Somalia" (97). Another leaflet instructs Somalis "not to drink water form the ravine or other surface water; only drink water form wells; clean all water containers before using wells. To prevent disease, boil water from 5-10 minutes before using" (98). Further, Somalis are reminded that "Looting, stealing, or throwing rockets is not Somali, it's criminal" (99). Instructions for the Serb population during Nato bombing in 1999 mainly covers advice over how to behave during bombardments – while simultaneously

blaming these on Milosevic. With a list of critical infrastructures to avoid comes the call to “evacuate your family form these areas if you are able. If you choose to remain, and you hear explosions of gunfire, stay away from your windows, and move immediately below ground level whenever possible” (*op. cit.* 69). A multitude of instruction leaflets were and still are dropped over Iraq. Early on in the conflict civilians were reminded not to “Interfere with Coalition Forces”. Coming as a safety message, Iraqis were told to “Stay in your homes, Do not become a refugee, Do not be confused for a target, Stay off the streets, Do not Drive” (100). Other advice tells about the declaration of a curfew (101) or its lifting (103), the illegality of the black market (102) or the opening of a legal market (104), the start of schooling (105) and the dangerousness of throwing rocks (106) or aiming laser pointers at police officers (107). Further, civilians are instructed not to fire weapons in the air but to celebrate peacefully (108), not to “release oil into waterways” (109) and to tune into “information radio” (110) to get further instructions in times of crisis. Besides the calls to “assist downed Coalition Pilots [to] help them return to their families!” (111) the instruction leaflets dropped further range from the demand to report the activities of “those threatening Baghdad’s future” (112) to this one:



Finally, a bunch of leaflets with the same message holds Iraqis to “stop repairing military fiber optic cable” since they “are tools used by Saddam and his regime to suppress the Iraqi people” (114) on the one hand and not to “steal electrical wire [but rather] report theft to Local Police [since this] is the duty of every law-abiding citizen” (115).

Briefly, we shall turn to the second category of instruction leaflets. The calls to hand in **weapons** and weapon systems, to pay attention to unexploded ordnances and to be aware of

mines are numerous, particularly in the current Iraq conflict. These leaflets are more or less the same in each and every country. In Afghanistan they insist: “Do not touch! Help us keep you safe” (120). The variation to Somalia is minimal: “Help us help you. Report mines!” (116). Further, weapons and weapons systems prohibited are listed (117) and promises of rewards for turning-in weapons such as shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles (118) and manpad systems (119) are made. Focusing on the fact that “Bombs Don’t Care Who They Kill!” (121) these leaflets put the danger that mines and unexploded devices pose to children at the centre. Little girls are preferably portrayed as potential victims (ibid.) and little boys as potential little heroes discovering the unexploded ordnances and reporting it – thus bringing it to a good end – as for example in this leaflet, which is only one of many with the same narrative:



(122)

Finally, epitomizing the various contents the US-military tries to make heard by the different adversary civilian populations is the so-called “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People”, also distributed as a PSYOP leaflet on April 16, 2003 after the war was declared victoriously won

by then US President George W. Bush. The message is signed by the then Commander of Coalition Forces General Tommy R. Franks and it contains all the elements separately displayed in the above section and variously addressed by manifold individual leaflets dropped addressing the civil population. It claims that “Coalition Forces in Iraq have come as liberator, not as conquerors” and lays out its reasoning for the need of this ‘liberation’ from the evil regime. It claims the achievement that the Ba’th Party is to be “hereby disestablished” and calls for the Iraqi people to “heal their wounds, build their own representative government [and] become a free and independent people” with all of which they are helped with by “the Coalition” of course. Further, the ‘freedom-message’ even contains instructions to hand-in weapons. (123)


5.4 Multiple-level supremacy

A last theme ubiquitous in the entire corpus of empirical documents analysed for this chapter is the stipulated supremacy of the invading forces. This supremacy is implied covering different levels and it comes in manifold and varying articulations with messages addressing both the enemy soldiers and the adversary civilian populations. The levels covered include the military, the technological, the civilisational and the ethical. On the empirical stage these levels can at times barely be separated. Particularly, the military and the technological on the one hand, and the civilisational and the ethical on the other hand are often intermingled. Further, the stipulated supremacy at all levels is often articulated by recurring to symbolic representations in these leaflets. In the following, the attempt is made to consecutively address these levels separately in order to facilitate the analytical tasks later on.

First, the **military supremacy** claim is articulated multiple times in order to dissuade the soldiers from fighting, in order to frighten them into retreat, in order to demoralise them. Almost the same leaflet is dropped over Iraq in 1991 and over Serbia/Kosovo in 1999. It shows a B-52 bomber dropping an uncountable number of bombs. The textual warning coming with the picture for the Iraqi soldiers is: “Tomorrow we will rain death upon the 16th Infantry Division” (124) and for the Serbs: “Thousands of bombs... and the will, the capability and support of the world to drop them on your unit!” (*op. cit.* 43). Overwhelming military power is also conveyed with pictures such as a sky full of coalition aircraft flying

over and bombing the stumbling Iraqi soldiers and tanks on the ground coming with the text “staying here means death” (125) or with pictures of anti-tank helicopters, tanks and fully geared coalition soldiers displaying their strength on the one side of a leaflet dropped over Afghanistan and showing off their benign character on the other side with the pictured distribution of whatever gadgets to Afghan children (126). Whether it is that “Coalition Air Power can strike at will[, a]ny time, any place” (127) or that they simply “outnumber you” such that “you cannot win”, since “you do not have the capability to fight the coalition forces” (128) does not make much of a difference.

Overwhelming military power is also often illustrated symbolically. This leaflet, which was stuffed into bottles and set adrift for the shores of Kuwait, apparently catching the predesignated current and hence washing up on the beaches of Kuwait on January 14, 1991, one day before the deadline (for Hussein to comply with the request for withdrawal), is a good example:




(129)

On the symbolical level this leaflet contains multiple messages. First, the wave supposedly reaching the shores of Kuwait is overwhelming. Identifying as representative of the United States of America by a flag stitched to it, the wave exhibits an angry face and is holding a bloody sword in its hand. On its front the Navy/Marine Corps logo is displayed. The wave is further accompanied by a helicopter – the symbol for the air force – an eagle – the heraldic animal of the United States – and the navy fleet. The Iraqi soldiers are fleeing in fear.

Also operating on the symbolic level in order to convey overwhelming military power are pictures of an Iraqi soldier standing alone and surrounded by Coalition tanks (130) or of an

Iraqi soldier pointed at with a huge gun on which all the flags of the Coalition are displayed (131). Both of these were dropped in the Iraq conflict of 1991. Further, it is highly symbolic to overprint genuine banknotes with the message: “Our goals will be achieved, if not willingly, then by overwhelming force” as it was done in Afghanistan – the overprinted banknotes were then airdropped as leaflets (*op. cit.* Freedman 2008).

Technological and **military** supremacy of course intertwine and condition each other. Many messages in all conflicts looked at here strive to declare the invincible technological supremacy of the intruding armed forces. The technological advantages over the adversary put forward in these messages group mainly around two categories: superior locating skills on the one hand and superior weapons accuracy on the other hand. Coupled with messages of military superiority such as the picture of an Apache helicopter (a tank destroyer) firing at a Serb tank coming with the text: “Don’t wait for me! You can hide, but NATO forces can still see you” (132) the narrative is unambiguous. The stipulated superior capacity to precisely locate the adversary is recurring. In Afghanistan these messages claim: “Taliban: we know where you are” (133). Recurring is also the ‘all-seeing’-claim as shows this leaflet dropped over Iraq in 2003:




(134)

Variants of this all-seeing pretence claim that “there is nowhere to hide” (135) or that “we can see everything ... [since we have] superior satellite technology” coming with a picture of a satellite zooming into Iraq (136) or the photographs of coalition forces on terrorist hunt with night-vision equipment (137). Combining the argument about military/technological superiority with the one about unprecedented high targeting accuracy is this leaflet dropped over Afghanistan:




(138)

The message it strives to convey again is unequivocal even without the text which says on the front side: “Taliban and Al Qaida Fighters We know where you are hiding”, and on the back side: “Taliban and Al Qaida Fighters: You are our targets”. In general, the message about the invader’s precise targeting skills due to overwhelming technological supremacy is prominent. In a radio broadcast of October 18, 2001 addressing the Afghani civilian population and the Taliban supposedly hiding among civilians, the US military claims not only that “our helicopters will rain death down upon your camps before you detect them on your radar [but also that o]ur bombs are so accurate we can drop them through your windows” (*op. cit.* Freedman 2008). Illustrating such claims about bombing accuracy and technological supremacy are these leaflets below:




(139)



(140)

As mentioned earlier, the supremacy claim made by the invading forces does also reach out to include both the ethical and the civilisational dimensions. On the **ethical** level the message is the following: as your liberator we adhere to the unattended ethical standards of the West, which we do thereby universalise. Intertwining with the civilisational level these messages additionally purport that what these populations are liberated from is backwardness and barbarism.

A leaflet dropped over Iraq in 1991 is this one coming with the promise that “The United States is conforming to the Geneva Convention”:



(141)

The pretence to ethical supremacy takes the following note in the Kosovo/Serbia encounter: “We are fully committed... The arsenals of democracy run deep ... you just don’t fight ... the whole world.” (142). Creating an argument ethically intertwined with a civilisational one are manifold leaflets setting up an opposition or dichotomy – displaying a before and afterwards situation, depicting what/whom the liberated ones needed liberation from and by whom this is/was done and how. This can be pictures such as the one displayed in the previous section

showing the execution on an entirely veiled woman, the skeleton of an bombed Afghan building and a severely wounded individual on the one side and the distribution of food marked with the brand USA causing happily smiling faces of children on the other side (*op. cit.* 72). It can also look like this.



(143)

Avowedly adhering to the stance on **civilisation** as succumbing to different subsequent states of progression are leaflets “showing pictures of food parcels and explaining how the contents should be consumed. For instance, there is a drawing showing how a tube of peanut butter should be squeezed.” (*op. cit.* Friedman 2008). Exemplary herefore is also this leaflet:



(144)

Note that the word written on the picture of the man opening the package is Halal. Discernible in the claim that “the result of all our effort will be a better, more modern, and efficient electrical system” (145) is again the notion of civilisation as an active engagement in terms of gradual and progressive adherence to modernity.

Symbolically, the stipulated supremacy at all levels is laid claim to with messages showing the overthrown statue of Saddam Hussein and stating that “Coalition Forces remain steadfast and resolute” (146) or pictures of these steadfast and resolutely walking soldiers in the desert heavily packed and geared (147). On both the symbolical level and content wise, this leaflet, finally, displays the ‘omnipotence’ of coalition forces:



Again reflecting the first analytical step of this study, this chapter has traced the key aspects and major themes that came to the fore subjecting the second body of documents – namely the psychological operations leaflets – to the first round of the analytical process of multiple reading. It has shown how the picturing of the enemy in these documents relies on blaming the hostilities on the leaders who are portrayed as evil and brutal cowards, how family members are included in these depictions, which also operate by means of reward leaflets and what I called ‘we trapped them’-leaflets. Further, the enemy combatants are mainly addressed by calls for surrender either promising good treatment or relying on simple threats of

annihilation; also their supposedly lost cause is invoked as well as their leaders' decadence unworthy of honourable but erroneous loyalty. This chapter also traced the main messages addressed to the civilian population. These strive to advance the invaders' reasoning behind the military operations, they tell what the civilian populations are supposedly helped with and whom they are being rescued from. These leaflets further strive to convince about achievements made, appeal to people's morale and give them manifold instructions of varying nature. Last but not least, the manifold claims and supposedly multiple-layered supremacy of the invader as depicted in these leaflets are exposed. Leaving it here for the very moment, it will be the task of the next chapter to subject these findings to another round of reading in order to enquire the identifications within these particular foreign security policy texts.

VI – ANALYSIS: The masculinist neoliberalism and Orientalism of the omnipotent saviour

Enrooted in the poststructuralist theoretical understanding about the reciprocally performative nature of the relation between foreign policy and identity it is the analytical aim of this study to unravel, first, the gendered constructions of identity discernible in the US military doctrine on semantic information operations and its products disseminated in the battlefields, and, second, to then discuss the repercussions these constructions potentially trigger for the articulation of US foreign security policy. Based on the findings of the previous chapters, this chapter shall consecutively proceed to tackle these very aims. Hence, the mutually constitutive relation between identity constructions and foreign policy formulations is first disentangled in order to lay bare the traits of its workings. Analytically building thereupon, these traits are then individually discussed and their performative powers examined in order to, finally, re-entangle them again and come to a picture about how gendered identity traits influence US foreign policy and vice versa.

The following chapter strives to read identity of foreign policy texts. Further, it strives to do so with the specific focus on the gendered constructions of political identity. Political identities are built through and rest on processes of linking and differentiation on the three dimensions of spatiality, territoriality and ethicality (Hansen 2006: 46-51). It is these dimensions which shall come under close scrutiny below. Question is as to how identification elements are built up in the foreign policy texts examined in the chapters above and what character traits these identities carry. Given the explicit focus on the gendered aspects of identity, two specific working hypotheses were formulated beforehand the investigation of the two separate document bodies.

First, for the military doctrine documents in which both the explicit categories of gender and sex are absent, intertextual references building-up identificatory elements were expected to reside in allusions to ample and culturally sedimented but with regard to sex and gender inexplicit narratives. Assuming the male-as-the-norm these narratives would naturalise a silence on gender and draw among others on linkages between technological mastery and victory, information superiority and power (see section 3.3.1). Analytically delving into these

aspects is section 6.2 below. Second, with regard to the other documents body examined – consisting of the information operations products deployed in the various battlefields – the silence about both sex and gender was expected to disappear. The narratives discernible within the leaflets dropped over the conflict zones would draw on manifold and explicit, stereotypical and hierarchically gendered dichotomies (see section 3.3.1). Analysing these aspects is section 6.3 below.

Subjecting the military doctrine documents to the process of multiple reading, an unexpected feature came to the fore: manifold ideological inclusions appeared; posed as most natural, paradigmatic changes are advanced in these documents positioning the monopolised institutional location of coercive power in a perspective which disempowers hierarchies, diffuses responsibilities, links achievement to constant change and flexibility. The so-called ‘information age’ is hailed as *the* paradigm of the present times (see section 4.1.1). Generally speaking, our living in an omnipresent and pervasive ‘information society’ where immediate communication and unlimited accessibility of both individuals and contents are an ultimate disciplinary/disciplining standard is conjured up on a daily basis. Notwithstanding the digital divide, there is no single aspect of individual and social life spared: if ever as separable, neither arts nor economics, neither individual intimacy nor public politics, neither hegemonic nor marginalised life is thinkable today as untouched by information and communication technologies which are invoked as the primer of the age we live in. This is also true for the military and it became evident in the scrutiny of the doctrine documents: coming under the header of the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) the ‘information age’ has gained military thinking and practice in precisely the time period this analysis covers. Virulently debated at the outset, the nature of this revolution is no longer at the centre of attention as the idea that information is supposedly the major resource of power is now widely embraced among western strategic thinkers and military planners. This embrace of “information as the new metaphysics of power” (Dillon 2002: 73, see section 4.1.2) is highly consequential not only for both the articulation and enactment of threat imaginaries shaping the current security environment we live in (Brunner and Dunn 2009) but also on an ideological level of discourse constitution.

Analytically speaking, this second level invokes wondering about these ideological dimensions of the ‘information age’. With reference to Stuart Hall (1983) we therefore come

to ask: what are the traits of the mental frame invoked to make sense of societal mechanisms discernible in both military language and practice of the ‘information age’? Or, more specifically: What is meant by the terms and the concepts the military’s ‘information age’ paradigm involves and how are they used to make sense of current societal mechanisms? Is the ‘information age’ paradigm eventually rather a discursive weapon within a much broader and pervasive ideological context than simply an analytically useful concept to discern recent technological developments profoundly affecting ‘the world of our making’? Approaching these questions, section 6.2.1 below strives to scrutinise what is identified as the US military discourse of the ‘information age’ for its ideological contents in order to trace the discursive constitution of a particular ideology – neoliberalism – within a particular military context – the information operations doctrine.

Not only was it inherently unexpected but also is the concept of ideology at first sight incommensurable with the discourse analytical approach this study is based upon. In the genealogy of the discipline of political theory and science and of international relations it is the concept of discourse which replaces the one of ideology starting in the early 1980s (Hall 1985, Eagleton 1991/1993, Rehmann 2008). Based on the commonality of the two concepts about the impossibility of unconditioned thinking (Eagleton 1991/1993, Foucault 1969) respectively diverging inferences can be and most often are drawn by discourse theory and by ideology theory. In order to approach the above mentioned queries about the ideological inclusions discerned in the particular military discourse scrutinised in chapter IV above, an additional theoretical insert questioning the potential compatibility of these two approaches has become necessary. The following section 6.1 is therefore striving to compare and evaluate these two approaches and develop an argument about both their compatibility and complementarity thus enabling us to account for the previously unaccountable.

6.1 Accounting for the unaccountable: ideology and discourse – a strained relation?

Speaking of discerning ideological inclusions in the specific military discourse under scrutiny in this analysis, one must first ask what is meant by ideology. And what is it that differentiates ideology from discourse? Surely these issues were worth an entire book of their own, nonetheless in this section the attempt is made to give them a due treatment albeit a cursory one. As with the concept of discourse, the concept of ideology is not only hotly debated but definitions vary greatly and substantially. In his classic on the subject Terry Eagleton

(1991/1993) gathers no less than sixteen different definitions of ideology ranging from the conceptual understanding that views ideology as covering a set of erroneous beliefs which are strategically set up in order to legitimise the dominant political power on the one side to the conceptual understanding of ideology as a semiotic closure on the other side with manifold intermediate positions in between (ibid.: 7-8). While it is consequential for the argument about the compatibility of ideology with discourse, what definitions of both to adhere to, one element is common even to the two contrasting understandings of ideology displayed above: they both share the aspect of a strategic instance of power involved. In the first understanding this strategic instance of power obviously is the dominant political power while the second understanding of ideology as a semantic closure implicitly needs a strategic instance of power in order to come to this very closure. When highlighting the consistent relevance of asking the ‘ideology question’ it is this strategic power element, which catches our approval: whether it is the “troubling questions of the ‘consent’ of the mass of the working class to the system in advanced capitalist societies in Europe and thus their partial stabilization” (Hall 1983: 59), the exploration of how humans come to invest in their own disadvantage (Eagleton 1991/1993: 3) or, as Jaeggi insists, a query into those ideas that are shared and supported even by those who cannot expect anything positive from their actualisation (Jaeggi 2009: 271). It is also this element of a strategic power involved, which accounts for a main difference between the theoretical concepts of ideology and discourse as shall be elaborated below. For now, it is important to note that due to this very element of a strategic power, the concept of ideology does inherently compel the analyst to question this same power arrangement. This makes, as I shall argue, the strength of the approaches criticising ideology as compared to most discourse analytical approaches since the later do not inherently compel but allow for criticism only contingently and from a ‘scattered’ perspective. When the aim is to unashamedly and consciously politicise societal conditions through scientific political analysis, an ideology critical approach is often to privilege over the discourse analytical one, since, as compared to most linguistic and discourse-analytical approaches, reflecting on ideology always involves thinking about political purposes (Eagleton 1991/1993: 233). Hence, what is ideology? And what is it as compared to discourse?

Ideology...

Stuart Hall defines ideology as the “mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (Hall 1983: 59). Thus, according to Hall’s understanding and to which I adhere, ideologies are mental frameworks deployed to make sense of societal workings. It is important to note that no qualificatory element resides in this definition thus rendering the concept of ideology applicable to “*all* organised forms of social thinking [and thereby leaving] open the degree and nature of its ‘distortions’” (ibid.: 60, emphasis in the original). While Hall does link the specific sense-makings to “different classes” and hence suggests that thinking about ideologies should still be rooted in materialist theory, ideology understood so is not bound to cover the dominant power’s mental framework only. Though anchored in materialist theory, Hall does, with his conceptualisation of ideology, advance a shift from the classical “determination [by the economic] in the last instance” to become a “determination by the economic in the *first* instance” (Hall 1983: 84, emphasis in the original) in order to account for the economic without succumbing to economic reductionism. This also means that we can now dissociate class from consciousness – this element is covered in the definition by the term “social groups” designating a social formation, which is not an economically determined societal stratum alike “class”. As Laclau has shown and Hall reiterates it, the permanent linking of particular ideas to particular classes is untenable (Laclau 1977). Most importantly, the leaving open of the degree of an ideology’s distortions represents the abandonment of the true/false binary inherent to most approaches to the question of ideology. This is an aspect, which is key for three reasons.

First, leaving open the degree of a distortion means that there still is a distortion only that it varies according to perspective. In order not to purge the concept of ideology of its analytical added value vis-à-vis the discourse analytical approach, a qualificatory element is needed. This qualificatory element resides in the thorough application of criticism towards ideologies and not in the ideologies or their definitions themselves. This differentiation is crucial. Second, in the process of showing how to qualify such a distortion, Hall recurs to what he identifies with Marx not as a logical or argumentative failure of the bourgeois political economy but as the failure to acknowledge “the fact that they *assumed* the[ir] categories ... as the foundation of *all* economic calculation, [thus] refusing to see the historical determinacy of their starting-points and premises” (Hall 1983: 67, emphasis 1 in the

original, emphasis 2 mine). Hence, the distortion is generated by a lack of reflexivity. Third, the strict true/false qualificative binary of conventional critical approaches to ideologies is replaced in this approach by the reality of the practical experience. Successful ideologies do discursively structure real interests and experiences. Therefore, an ideology has to be queried not for what is false about it but rather for what is true about it, whereas true means plausible (Hall 1988/1989: 198).

Interlinked with the last point, it is the linchpin of Hall's conceptualisation of ideology that he turns to language as the “medium *par excellence* through which things are ‘represented’ in thought and thus the medium in which ideology is generated and transformed” (Hall 1983: 71). This leads us to a potential plurality of ideologies. Varying representations of the very same societal condition become possible due to the nature of the relation of language to its referent, which is not fixed but multi-referential (ibid.).

Combining the above elements incites to conclude that falseness does not arise from an ideological trick or illusion but from an inadequate or partial explanation of a process which is rooted in real experience, since the relations in which people exist are always the ‘real relations’ (ibid.: 75). Concisely put, ideologies are thus mental frameworks generated through language and developed in order to make sense of societal workings which are rooted in human practices. Qualifying the adequacy or inadequacy of these frameworks is incumbent upon the reflexive analysis, which strives to lay bare the partial, distorted or incomplete representation of societal processes within a particular framework.

...and discourse

How does such an understanding of ideology relate to discourse analytical approaches in general and to the particular discourse analytical approach adopted for this study specifically? What are the differences and what commonalities are discernible between the two? From an epistemological perspective both theoretical approaches share the fundamental assumption that presuppositionless thinking is impossible (Eagleton 1991/1993: 10, Gregory 1989). This means that our look upon the things we study is always already imbued with a perspective. Insofar as due to this impossibility of presuppositionless thinking our entire thinking is ideological (Eagleton 1991/1993:10), this position is compatible with post-structuralist approaches which insist on the pervasiveness of the power-knowledge nexus producing discourses as ‘regimes of truths’ (Smith and Owens 2005: 285, Gregory 1989). Nevertheless,

generally incommensurable inferences are drawn from this basic assumption the two approaches share.

It is in what derives from the assertion of our inescapable perspective and what is held to determine the very same that the two approaches differ and may lead to antagonistic positions. For some, critical approaches to ideology succumb to the assumption of a superior and universalising standpoint of their own mistaking the same for scientific objectivity (Bieling 2009: 460). While this is a harsh characterisation, it does nevertheless problematise an aspect of analyses critical of ideology, which does merit reflexion. How treat on both the theoretical and normative level the strive to criticise an edifice of ideas without belittling this edifice while setting up the inevitably needed criteria for critique; how legitimise one's own access to these criteria? Or differently put, how avert what is widespread in politics: the attitude that it is always and only the others who are ideologically gilded. On the other side, as concerns discourse analytical approaches, some characterisations are no less harsh. For example is discourse analysis accused of conducting fictionalism and codifying the inevitable perspective as the 'un-true' *per se* thereby generally fictionalising the 'truth' (Rehmann 2008: 144). Again, while cartoonish, such accusations should and do incite to contemplate on particular aspects of how to deal with certain theoretical premises of poststructuralism. Thorough arguing is necessary in order not to get trapped in simple relativism due to the refusal to claim a direct access to 'truth'. From holding that not only no direct access to truth is available but that an univocal truth is *per se* unavailable it does *not* logically follow that critical evaluation of whatever societal circumstances, mechanisms, frameworks, and sense-makings is impossible or not desirable.

As I would and do argue, it is quite the opposite that is true: consciousness about our own and everyone else's *perspective* of and on truth puts to the fore the very negotiated character of truth and thus incites us to enter into this negotiation. While acknowledging that no permanent stabilisation of a might partially and temporarily reached negotiation consensus can ever be established, we do nevertheless strive to influence the temporal stabilisation according to *our* perspectives. What is crucial though, is, on the one hand, not to forget that our ability to choose a standpoint does not discharge us from doing so, and, on the other hand, as Hall formulates it as a reminder for approaches critical of ideologies: while temporal stabilisation in sense-making is necessary for our being and acting in the world, we need to remain aware of its fundamental contingency (Hall 1985: 105).

Compatibility

While external ascriptions of both ideology and discourse can easily be positioned as antagonistic either claiming direct access to normativity and truth telling ideology from reality or claiming the general inexistence of truth and an equally unsatisfactory notion of “total free floatingness of all ideological elements and discourses” (Hall 1983: 79), it goes missing in these mutually cartoonish ascriptions not only that there are manifold conceptual overlappings between the two approaches but also that they are compatible and even complementary as soon as one engages honestly with each of these analytical approaches. If we recall the conceptualisation of discourse used here (see section 3.1.3) and its three main constitutive analytical elements, we immediately discern the compatibility with the above displayed understanding of ideology and its criticism.

Thereafter, discourses are systems of signification constructive of social realities, second, they are productive of so-called regimes of truth, that is to say discourses produce meaning and third, discourses are reflective of the play of practice, which means that they guide us towards hegemonic framings of societal workings all the while reminding us of changeability and historic contingency (Milliken 1999). Such an understanding of discourse which is widespread among those working with discourse analytical approaches in international relations does perfectly match with what I posited earlier as the defining characteristics of ideology.

First, ideologies defined as mental frameworks deployed in order to make sense of the way society works can be reframed to cover a discourse understood as structure of signification which constructs social realities. Note that in this aspect ideologies *help making sense* of society, with society, thus, having an independent existence of its own, while discourses are structures of signification which *construct* social reality. This links to the subtlety of differentiating sense making ascribed to ideology from meaning production ascribed to discourses. Second, ideologies are generated through language and the societal workings they strive to make sense of are rooted in human practice. This is compatible with the aspect of discourse understood as the (linguistic) reflection of the play of practice directing us “towards studying dominating or hegemonic discourses, and their structuring of meaning as connected to implementing practices and ways to make these intelligible and legitimate” (Milliken 1999: 230).

As soon as one disavows the often externally ascribed position to discourse theories reducing everything to discourse and thereby meaning that everything is but language, the commonality of discourse and ideology as both being rooted in human practices and experiences comes to the fore. While Hansen, for example, does rigorously develop and apply a poststructuralist theoretical framework to the study of international relations in general and to security studies in particular, she does also vehemently state that “the concept of ‘discourse’ is not equivalent to ‘ideas’; discourse incorporates *material* as well as ideational factors” (Hansen 2006: 17; emphasis mine). Hence, both the concept of discourse and the one of ideology have in common a concern for sense making/meaning production, they operate through language but they are both also firmly rooted in human practice.

Building bridges

Besides these commonalities two significant potential divergences remain covering the aspect of the strategic power element involved on the one hand and the epistemological assumptions about the analytical value of the qualificative binary true/false on the other hand. In order to retrieve compatibility without one concept completely absorbing the other and thus each losing its particular analytical added value, these potential divergences need to be questioned and their interconnectedness uncovered.

Starting with the true/false binary, it is important to the notion of ideology and its criticism adopted in this analysis that this very binary is abandoned while nonetheless a qualificatory element is kept. It comes with the acknowledgement that the qualification of a distortion and its degree varies upon ones perspective, that access to qualifying resides in reflexivity. If we do comprehend criticism of ideologies with Jaeggi as part of a societal self-understanding ambitiously put as an aspect of a (self-)disclosing of distortions (Jaeggi 2009: 295, translation mine) it is precisely this reflexivity which is meant to give us access to criticizing/qualifying an ideology without claiming unilateral access to truth. Reversely, the blunt rejection of the true/false binary becomes relative, or, differently put, a qualificatory capacity becomes possible only at the very moment one allows for the (albeit temporal) fixation of meaning. A completely free-floating meaning is none. This is why discourses understood according to the elaboration above are always set in a historical context. It is the historical context which conditions the discourse, while the same historical context has, at an earlier stage, also been discursively constituted (Veyne 2008/2009; Sarasin 2005/2006).

Moreover, if we accept with Stäheli that a fixation of meaning in a discourse is indeed fundamentally instable and alterable, but also dependent upon the respective power structures (Stäheli 2009: 266), we come to see the close interconnection between the two potentially diverging aspects of discourse and ideology. While for Hall ideology is “precisely this work of fixing meaning” (Hall 1985: 93), Laclau and Mouffe attribute this fixing to the workings of hegemonic power structures. Accordingly, it is this very process of fixing what is contingent (meaning) – named articulation – which is at the core of the political (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). In order not to misunderstand contingency as anything goes, its conjunction with power is significant (Stäheli 2009).

Thus, not only are both levels of the two initially diverging aspects of ideology and discourse analytically closely connected but also does a honest engagement with each of them render further compatibilities discernible. While a strategic power element is inherent to the concept of ideology problematising the access to qualifying, which I identified as residing in a thoroughly reflexive application of criticism, the strategic power element is not *per se* present in discourse analytical approaches but is rather theorised as decisive in order to (temporally) fix (contingent) meaning and thereby seize the core of politics as the workings of power and its impacts on articulation. As a consequence hereof, a discourse analysis strives to lay bare the schemes of power operating within discourses (Laclau and Mouffe 1985/2001). For approaches critical of ideologies it is characteristic that through the analysis of societal circumstances these very circumstances are already subjected to criticism, thus purporting a symptomatic conjunction of analysis and criticism (Jaeggi 2009: 270). Contrasting these features, the distinct pretensions of discourse analysis and criticism of ideology become apparent. It simultaneously becomes apparent that their respective pretensions are varyingly far-reaching but nevertheless fully compatible: the laying bare of the schemes of power operating within discourses does, from an analytical perspective, precede the critical analysis of societal circumstances characterised by its conjunction of analysis and criticism.

Applicability

Question now is: how, on the analytically practical level, proceed to such an undertaking? If ideology, as delineated above, is generated through the discursive structuring of real experiences and interests (Hall 1988: 189) urging us to ask what is ‘true’ about a particular ideology and, simultaneously, ideologies are understood as *perspectives* on a particular

societal situation and as such variable (ibid: 183), it becomes feasible to query a discourse for its ideological inclusions as well as to look at ideologies from an discourse analytical angle without one concept absorbing the other but rather each keeping its respective analytical value added vis-à-vis the other.

Derived from the elaborations above, I shall, thus, apply the concept of ideology as compatible with the one of discourse. With reference to Hall, I understand ideology to cover the process of a mental framework becoming-true through the discursive structuring of real experiences and interests. Therefore, we might consecutively ask: What are the interests and experiences that structure the specific discourse under scrutiny in this analysis? Further, what are the traits of the mental framework, which is becoming true through this discursive structuring? And finally, we might apply our criticism to the contents of what has so become true – a particular ideology – through the discursive structuring. This criticism of ideology has to rest, as elaborated above, on the principles of honest reflexivity in order to discern inadequate and partial explanations within the presumably monolithical sense-making which characterises the mental framework identified (Hall 1983). Jaeggi more elaborately furnishes criteria for our access to sound qualifying with her setting up of ‘immanent criticism’. Thereafter, immanent criticism starts from the norms which are inherent to a particular societal situation and which are constitutive of social practices; it further strives to unravel the inherent incompatibilities between the framework’s normative pretence and its actualisation; it is oriented towards the inner contradictions between reality and the norms; it has a transformative pretence; and the transformation aimed at covers both norms and reality (Jaeggi 2009: 285-288).

In a nutshell, the potential for social change resides in contingency for discourse analytical approaches while for approaches critical of ideologies it resides in the very critique.

Having briefly fathomed the theoretical divergences, convergences, the (in)compatibilities and complementarities of approaches critical of ideologies and discourse analytical ones, the reminder of this section shall succinctly display the analytically practical reasons why this brief theoretical insert was estimated necessary and what it is expected to deliver that the strict sticking with discourse analysis is incapable of.

First, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, while subjecting the military doctrine documents to the first step of the discourse analysis manifold ideological inclusions

caught my eye. In order to proceed to the second, interpretatory step of analysis and seize these ideological inclusions as what they are – precisely ideological – an examination of the concept of ideology and its relation to the concept of discourse could not be circumvented. Neoliberal sense-making structures striving to naturalise their particular meaning structures are, as I claim and elaborate in the following section (6.2), omnipresent in the military doctrine documents under scrutiny in this study. I do want to call the neoliberal mental framework an ideology.

Second, I do strive to subject this ideology identified to open criticism in the particular context of my study. While criticism is possible with the sticking to the discourse analytical approach from a scattered perspective, which potentially diffuses power to reside everywhere (Hall 1988:199), it remains contingent and therefore, I think, less powerful. An ideology critical approach compels critique, and this critique is centred on the power mechanisms fostered by an ideology. I do believe that thereby the politicisation of an aspect of military doctrine which has had, up to now, no attention should gain potential.

Third, the becoming-true of the neoliberal power structures operates through the discursive structuring of the military doctrine documents. Besides subjecting the power structures to critique, the process of the discursive structuring can come under scrutiny with the complementarity of the approaches chosen here and as elaborated above.

Fourth, the theoretical combination allows us to see that the neoliberal ideology is, in the case of the US military doctrine documents, a meaning attribution system that strives to specifically structure the real experiences of, in this case, the soldiers.

Fifth, the becoming-true of the neoliberal and masculinist ideologies can be analytically seized as a strategy for hegemony with the complementarity of the approaches critical of ideologies and discourse analysis.

And sixth, with such an analysis ideology becomes and can be analytically captured as an element constitutive of identity. Thereby, ideology perfectly sits in the poststructuralist theoretical framework adopted for this analysis and striving to read identity of foreign policy texts. This is precisely what is to be done in the next section: it shall read ideology as identity of the military doctrine texts examined earlier (in chapter IV).

6.2 Reading identity I: (not so) silent documents

The military doctrine documents analysed in chapter IV bring to the fore a set of particular identity traits the tracing of which is aimed at below. In these documents processes of linking are constitutive of positive identity while those of differentiating are constitutive of negative identity (Hansen 2006: 42). Though this dual process of linking and differentiating is two-pronged, it cannot be disentangled. This means that while both positive and negative identity aspects can stand alone they do nevertheless always – albeit implicitly at times – mirror each other. The following sub-section strives to first display the positive identity traits discernible in the military doctrine documents (6.2.1). Often, these are interconnected with their negative aspects – who we supposedly are is also defined through who we are not. Second, the focus is shifted to cover negative identity traits. Discerning from the aspects portraying the adversary/enemy within the doctrine documents (thus through linking establishing the (ascriptive) positive identity of the adversary) we shall come to a more elaborate picture about negative identity (6.2.2). Sure, negative and positive identity traits are contrasted against each other. But ambiguities shall also add up to the picture. Since my focus is on the political, I strive to scrape out the political dimensions of foreign (security) policy identity. These reside within the concepts of space, time and responsibility (Walker 1993, Hansen 2006). Therefore, analytically guiding the reading and tracing effort undertook for this section are the temporal, spatial and ethical constructions both underlying and put in place in these military documents. This means that “[s]patiality, temporality and ethicality are [the] analytical lenses that bring out the important political substance of identity construction, [while they are] not explicitly articulated signs.” Finally, the identity traits worked out shall be thoroughly queried for their gendered intertexts (6.2.3).

6.2.1 Flexibility, speed, precision: neoliberal information age identity

As elaborated in chapter IV, the so-called ‘information age’ is the acclaimed paradigm gaining the military doctrine in the time period under scrutiny in this study. It is the ‘information age’ which forges US military identity. Hence, what does this paradigm stand for? What contents are associated with the term ‘information age’? What is its analytical value? In short, what kind of mental framework does the hailed ‘information age’ promulgate in the military doctrinal context and to what ends? What are the particular identity traits offered and hailed by and with this very paradigm?

The defining characteristics can be subsumed under five particular but closely interlinked aspects, each of which shall be briefly elaborated below. Ordered by their direct interlinkages, these aspects include: the competition for information (speed), the networked organisational structures, flexibility, the technological omnipotence (precision), and the integration of military and civilian operation capabilities.

First, generative for the so-called ‘information age’ is a basic and pervasive *competition for information*. With the understanding that information is increasingly *the* resource of power it comes that the virulence of this competition amplifies. As power is associated with what is codified in the documents as ‘information superiority’ and ‘information dominance’ it is imperative to seize each and every opportunity. In this ‘age’ as conceptualised by the military in its doctrine documents, information is both instrumental for power and power itself. That is why information ultimately has to be appropriated under the condition of competition. Further, in order to successfully compete several aspects are defined critical: not only speed, which is technologically determined, but also the aptitude to sell ones argument in advertising style through open or covert manipulation of both the global information environment (GIE) as well as the military information environment (MIE) and thus allowing to shape perceptions of friend and foe. The positive identity trait discernible here is thus posed as the requirement to be successfully competitive in the contest for information. At this level successful competition is attached to speed and manipulative capabilities.

This first identity trait discerned is directly linked to a second one. In order to compete for the availability and immediacy of real-time information, the decentralising and flattening of command structures, taking control down to the lowest practical level is held to be decisive. This means that *networked forms of organisational structure* are increasingly understood as key to success. It is true and clearly accountable for in the documents analysed above that “network operations are now claimed to deliver to the US military the same powerful advantages that they produced for American and global businesses” (Dillon 2002: 72). Not only do networks decentralise hierarchies but simultaneously they do diffuse responsibility; a feature which is of considerable importance within a military context, where decisions over life and death are at times of daily occurrence. Networked forms of organisation, it is claimed, are also increasingly the manner by which conflicts are waged as opposed to hierarchies. The positive identity trait here is, hence, the networked nature of

organisation. It is mirrored against a hierarchical form which is, supposedly, dull, ineffective and slow as compared to a network and therefore no longer useful for meeting the competitive challenges that arose with the heyday of the ‘information age’.

Again closely interlinked is, third, *flexibility*. On the organisational level networks are understood as the tool to increase flexibility. More generally, flexibility as a concept and as a requirement is omnipresent in the military doctrine documents. In an environment of constant and pervasive change, survival and success are tied to the capacity to adapt. When it is claimed that ‘change is the only real constant’ flexibility is of crucial importance. As a positive identity trait, flexibility is directly linked to both perpetual technological innovation and to the organisational structure of decentralised hierarchies. Further, flexibility is mirrored against stasis and the dangers coming with the failure or refusal to constantly adapt to changing circumstances and the evolving threat landscape.


Fourth, technological determinism conjuring up *technological omnipotence* is another pervasive feature in the entire military doctrine of the time period under scrutiny here. It comes in many shapes and is linked to all other defining identity traits. Technological omnipotence is framed as the capacity to control and dominate the battlespace in any situation, as the capacity to access and provide timely, accurate and relevant information at any instance, or exhaustively general as the competence of the armed forces to unilaterally direct the full power of the so-called information age. The myths of complete situational awareness, full-dimensional protection and precise targeting come to full bloom in this particular military doctrine. In order to constantly live up to this technologically omnipotent portrayal of the Self, perpetual military innovation is imperative as it is to never fall behind. Further, it is key and self-evident at the same time that power in the form of information superiority/dominance resides with the Self. Technological mastery equates power and therewith, victory.

Fifth, a crucial part of this technological omnipotence is the *integration of operation capabilities*. This does not only mean that “wars in the future would have their outcomes determined by the integration of new communications technologies into both kinetic and non-kinetic fighting” (Taylor 2010: 427) but also that defensive and offensive operations increasingly blur in order of the differentiation to finally get abandoned all together. Further, under the header of integration the, in the military context crucial, delimitations between the state of peace and the condition of war are soaringly thought of as irrelevant alike the

differentiation between military and civilian operations. While this ascribed irrelevance of formerly generative demarcations is not explicitly formulated as such, it is implicitly made crystal clear due to explicit articulations about the applicability of these particular military operations in both times of peace and times of war and across the range of the political spectrum including the civilian aspects of diplomacy and economy as well as the military aspect of armed conflict. The integration of operation capabilities means that “the continuous synchronization and coordination between [military] information operations, [civilian] public affairs [and] public diplomacy is imperative” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a: I-6).

It is these five traits which are constitutive of US military identity as discernible in the military doctrine on information operations. They all are closely interlinked and combined they characterise a particular US-Self which sets itself within what is called the ‘information age’. Therefore, as an abstract term, the so-called information age does not have any analytical value. It needs to be disassembled in the particular context in which it is identified – here the military one. The displaying of the above individual constitutive identity traits can be understood as one element of this disassembling of the term. Accordingly, and adapting Hansen’s depiction of positive identity construction (Hansen 2006: 20), we can now picture US military identity in the ‘information age’ as discernible in the doctrine documents as follows:

Figure 4 – US military Self in the ‘information age’



_____ processes of linking (positive identity)

The above illustration of the processes of linking which are constitutive of the positive US military identity is mirrored with the corresponding processes of differentiating. This differentiating is, at this stage, not conjured up against an Other but against a temporally antecedent Self, i.e. the US military Cold War Self (Moskos 2000) which is understood as no longer effective in the present times. In the doctrine the processes of differentiating are subtler than those of linking; they shine through as allusions to the dooming failure to successfully compete, as the tying to stasis and hierarchy and as the danger of not meeting the challenges posed by constant technological evolution.

Corresponding with the above, it is important to note what kind of picture is drawn in the doctrine of the context in which the so characterised US military Self situates. It is a context in which chaos, danger and relegation lurks everywhere. The danger of everything getting out of control is as omnipresent as is the danger of not coping with requirements of speed, flexibility and accuracy. As actors multiply and access to technology is increasingly affordable, the perceived threats and enemies multiply too. Interaction in and with the so-called global information environment is as crucial as are the increasing and potentially fatal vulnerabilities that come with new technologies and their imperatives. Further, characterising the environment of the so-called information age from the perspective of the state is the condition of asymmetry. While at the dawning of this ‘age’ asymmetry is tied to manifold empowering opportunities, this defining condition is increasingly understood as to shift power structures to the disadvantage of the state and its military. This means that asymmetric advantages, which initially are understood to reside with the Self due to technological sophistication and empowerment, increasingly shift to empower the adversary. Not only does technological sophistication itself now represent a double-edged sword offering both tremendous opportunities and multiplying vulnerabilities, but also does the multiplication of asymmetrically empowered actors unravel the state’s monopoly on (informational) power. Hence, with the heyday of the ‘information age’, asymmetry is framed as this ‘age’s’ key condition. And, as an underlying feature it runs through all five of the identity traits discerned above.

Bringing together the US military identity traits discerned earlier with the context in which they are set, we come to see unambiguously how this military doctrine discursively structures

a **neoliberal mental framework to become true**. I qualify this particular mental framework *neoliberal* due to its characterising features, which fit into the large societal project self-proclaimedly called neoliberalism (Rehmann 2008).

In contrast to political liberalism, which strives for the freedom of and for politics, economic liberalism strives for the freedom of economics from politics (Kreisky 2009). Rooted in economic theory, neoliberalism has long become a pervasive societal project and is as such the determinative narrative of the present (Kreisky 2001). It can be variedly characterised and is as such not an univocal ideology. As a political and economic doctrine it was rigorously applied first in the military dictatorship of Pinochet in Chile, in the United Kingdom under Thatcher and the United States under Reagan. This first phase of politically applied neoliberalism relied on a strong state in order to roll back state interference in economics and consolidate the functioning of market mechanisms. In its second phase neoliberalism gained the ‘left’ and was in its application extended to the social domain. Thereby state policies were rolled out and thereby the state underwent transformation to become marketised itself. The triumph of neoliberalism came under the header of globalisation in the 1990s and is tied to the mobility of capital, the sanctification of free trade and market mechanisms and the demands on labour to become as flexible as the other factors of production (Munck 2005). As Munck rightly states,

“the international system that developed in the last quarter of the twentieth century has variously been called ‘globalisation’, the ‘information society’, and the ‘network society’, but its fount and matrix has undoubtedly been the global market. The emphasis on ‘competitiveness’ at all levels of society and at the various scales of human activity ... prevail utterly” (ibid.: 64).

Though it is crucial to consider, as Foucault has put it to our attention as early as 1979, that notwithstanding the fact that the essence of the market is competition, it is characteristic for this competition that it does not happen under a condition of equivalence but, on the contrary, under a condition of inequality (Foucault 1979/2006: 171, translation mine). Further, he insists that the pervasive condition of competition is not a natural condition, but rather it is one that needs to be produced by an active governmentality (ibid.: 174). This governmentality has, in the meantime, actualised as a “program to methodically destruct the collective” (Bourdieu 1998: 109, translation mine) as a valuable organisational structure and

thereby “atomised the individual” (ibid.: 110). These shifts are by their proponents posed as elements of societal modernisation; individualisation is propagated as achievement and social detachment is a high valued quality of the neoliberal and entirely flexible person (Kreisky 2001: 39), which thereby becomes ‘human capital’ (Foucault 1979/2006: 315).

In the particular case scrutinised here the condition of asymmetry puts the once powerful state and, moreover, its, in the traditional view, most powerful institution – the military – in a situation of fragility: technologically omnipotent while simultaneously tremendously vulnerable. What generally applies to the individual’s condition in the neoliberal economic system does here come to apply to the state and its military set in the global threat landscape. As characteristic for the neoliberal ideology (Rehmann 2008: 174-183), a general condition of mercy is established in which the only eventual potential to survive is tied to performance.

It is precisely the inherent contradiction between a system of mercy and a system based on the belief of success linked to performance which turns this particular mental framework into an ideology susceptible to fierce criticism. This ideology is neoliberalism. Thus, as an ideology it generates huge persuasive capacities from suggesting that it is meritocratically organised and creative of an achievement-oriented society. This suggestion plants the responsibility for success or failure entirely within the very individual. Simultaneously, the market/anarchy is positioned as the fathomless environment in which this ultimately responsible individual has to succeed. Its workings come as phenomena of nature and therefore no-one can ever be made or held responsible for the failure of those individuals who are frustrated by market/anarchy’s mechanisms, since ‘at times’ performance does not link to success. It is this particularly strategic argumentative set-up, which makes of neoliberalism an ideology.

And it is precisely these two elements which come to the fore in the military doctrine analysed for this study. The international threat landscape structured by asymmetry has the characteristics of a system of mercy. While it is inherent to mercy that it is fathomless, the only chance for the state to survive is nevertheless portrayed as tied to particular performance related identity traits such as competition, flexibility, omnipotence, networked organisation, and integration of capabilities. The equation established with the advent of the ‘information age’ substituting information for power does simultaneously unravel the states monopoly on the same. It further situates the state and with it the military in a condition of pervasive

competition. Yet, the competition is no longer one among state actors only as it was conceptualised during the period of the Cold War; on the contrary, the newly structured international environment of the ‘information age’ is one in which actors have multiplied and the state’s military is forced to compete with non-state actors which are asymmetrically endowed while the Self is asymmetrically vulnerable. The parameters structuring this competition are similar to what are called the market structures, such that the state has to “begin to act even more clearly as a market ‘player’ itself and not a ‘referee’ as in the old national order of states” (Munck 2005: 63).

And while these structures are posed as naturally flowing from circumstances, they are as made as they are central (ibid.). With the above identified identity traits which are similar to those applied to the successful individual in the neoliberal economy as her own entrepreneur (Foucault 1979), the state is thought of as capable to compete. Or, differently put, it applies to both the individual and the state on a global scale that in “the wilderness of the market [success or failure is comes ...] according to performance. In this wilderness the readiness to assume risk, toughness, robustness, courage, proficiency and perseverance are required and idealised as ‘flexibility’, ‘activity’ and ‘capacity’” (Kreisky 2001: 45, translation mine). This means that, as a further step in the neoliberal project, the transformation of the state by getting itself marketised as has gained one of its – in the traditional view – most tangible institutions, the military. This has been achieved through the paradigm of the so-called information age.¹⁷

Thus, from the analytical perspective, the term ‘information age’, has had little value as a standalone. It starts to make sense as soon as one strives to disentangle the paradigm it yields and fan out the contents it is filled with. Thereby, it becomes seizable as an ideological tool: the contents that make up the aggregated term ‘information age’ show that as a stand alone, the term helps to naturalise the features of the neoliberal project. Thus, by means of the ‘information age’ these doctrine documents discursively structure the US military identity according to neoliberal traits. Thereby, this particular mental framework becomes true for yet another state institution – the military. This is how the neoliberal ideology is discursively produced and the hegemony of the respective power arrangement maintained. What I call

¹⁷ A complementary aspect not touched upon here but taking the same line is the state’s contracting with private military companies.

neoliberal identity has replaced the US military identity in crisis due to the demise of the Cold War as qualified by Moskos (2005) and others. The denouncing of the particular masculinist power mechanisms characteristic for these neoliberal identity traits (Kreisky 2001, 2009) shall be the focus of the next but one section (6.2.3).

6.2.2 Others and Selves

This sub-section shall scrutinise the identity constructions forged in the doctrine documents through descriptions of the adversary/enemy. By positively ascribing identity traits to the adversary a picture of the negative identity of the Self gets established. Thus, these elements in the doctrine documents do indirectly draw a picture of the Self in differentiating it from the traits that are ascribed to the Other. They do so on the basis of the five core aspects as elaborated below. Though not only is the Self contrasted against an adversary Other, as soon as one looks closely enough this Self, which comes into being through the ascriptive depiction of the Other, also bears multiple ambiguities, inconsistencies and incompatibilities.

The first element of the description of the adversary discernible in the doctrine documents is based on the alleged change in the structural power configuration of the international realm. The adversary/enemy increasingly is understood to be a *non-state actor*. The very concrete descriptions of the enemy vary greatly but they have in common to only marginally focus on ‘information age peers’, ‘industrial armies’ or simple nation states as the opponent. Rather, challenging the so-called XXI century armed forces are ‘agrarian warlords’ and terrorists, computer hackers, criminals and vandals, but also organisations, groups and decision makers that negatively affect US armed forces’ mission accomplishment. Further, in the global information environment in which the US military has to succeed, even the media, think tanks, academic institutions and non-governmental organisations are named potential adversaries in the – note – *military* doctrine documents. Hence, the enemy is a non-state actor, it can be an organised or unorganised group but also some individuals qualify. This disparate qualification of the potential enemy is characteristic for the earlier circumscribed ‘information age’. This enemy stands in stark differentiation to the US military Self which is, of course, a *state actor*. And as such the US military has to re-configure its identity and therewith its capacities accordingly; it has to become equally flexible, fast and precise as its multiple potential opponents.

Second and inherently linked to the above, is the fact that these multiple potential enemies are *asymmetrically empowered* while the Self is increasingly *asymmetrically vulnerable* due to the fact that it is a state actor. This again is owed to the characteristics of the ‘information age’ in which access to information and technology is ‘democratised’ and thus affordable for non-state actors. While non-state actors disproportionably gain advantages from this easy and affordable access to information and technology and can flexibly move in the characteristic so-called global information environment, state actors are, it is held, becoming increasingly and disproportionably more vulnerable due to their dependency on dual-use technology and the complexity of information systems allegedly easily penetrable by the above named potential opponents.

Third, it is a fundamental premise of the entire military doctrine scrutinised for this study that the enemy is thought of as *influenceable*. It is the very condition of existence of information operations to influence the adversary. This influencing consecutively targets emotions first, motives second and objective reasoning third. Subject to this influence are, as specified in the doctrine, not only adversaries and enemies, but also civilian populations, friends and allies. While the vis-à-vis is influenceable the Self is, in differentiation hereto, steadfast and firm and influencing.

Nevertheless, it is, fourth, the same vis-à-vis that issues propaganda, misinformation and *disinformation* which the US military, of course, has to *counter and correct*. The Self has to provide a ‘true’ representation of what is happening unlike the opponent who does only polarise and cause rupture with its false representations of US will and actions. In short, differentiating itself from the opponent who is held to be a liar, the Self is constructed as truthful and benign.


The last and fifth dimension on which the US military doctrine does characterise the adversary and thereby simultaneously the Self, is the even more explicitly ethical one. It is in the doctrine ascriptively ascertained that the opponent acts *ethically ruthless*, brutal and irresponsible while the actions of the US military are characterised as the exact opposite. The entire aim of subjecting the adversary (including friends, allies and civilians) to information operations are argued legitimate on the very ethical dimension: when properly done, information operations and psychological operations save lives and ultimately strive to win war with hardly any bloodshed due to persuasion and (surgically) precise targeting – it is

argued. The Self does, by virtue of these very operations themselves, occupy the *ethical high ground*.

Thus, these five elements characterise the ascriptive positive identity of the opponent as discernible in the military doctrine documents. Simultaneously, the US military Self comes into being by explicitly differentiating from this very Other. Transferring Hansen's illustration of the processes of political identity construction (Hansen 2006: 42, figure 3.1), the figure below illustrates the above elements of linking and differentiating in US military identity as discernible in the military doctrine documents.

Figure 5 – identification adversary-Other and Self

adversary-Other



As it shines through at several occasions though, this constitution of the Self is not as univocal as it strives to appear. Ambiguities reside here and there, inconsistencies too and

even incompatibilities are traceable. Particularly with regard to the two dimensions of truthfulness and explicit ethicality, the articulated constructions of the Self operate on shaky grounds.

It is a characteristic and inherent feature of information operations in general and of psychological operations in particular, that they blur long-established boundaries between peace and war, civilian and military realms, defensive operations and offensive ones, even between domestic and foreign theatres. This very blurring is highly informative in so far as these differentiations can be understood as generative of the modern self-understanding of western societies and their warfaring. Codified on multiple occasions in the laws of war (particularly the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the four Geneva Conventions latest amended in 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977) these differentiations were highly consequential for the claim to moral and ethical supremacy over an allegedly barbarian and uncivilised opponent. It goes without saying what the abandonment of these very standards would, if thoroughly analysed, mean for the respective self-understanding. Rather than thematised though, these particular aspects remain muted. When brought into context with some of the particular aspects of this military doctrine, the picture becomes even sharper. The conceptualisation of information as instrumentality and with it the openly articulated understanding to use ‘information’ to produce an effect, to inform but also to influence represent the complete abandonment of self-established standards which are simultaneously still claimed relevant – as it is, according to the same doctrine, only the enemy Other who issues lies and propaganda. Further do the multiply applied distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ activities, between the foreign and the domestic audiences, between peace and war and between ‘truth’ and ‘lie’ blatantly disclose their own very futility.¹⁸ Implicitly, these features produce a vacuum on the ethical dimension of US military identity. All over sudden, the ethical high ground is no longer as firmly established as it seems. In an attempt to fill this breach, another set of arguments is brought forward on the ethical dimension. It suggests the moral supremacy of both information operations and psychological operations as weapons due also to their applicability in peacetime already: they are, it is argued, a force multiplier and non-lethal, surgically precise and therefore ultimately render possible ‘humane

¹⁸ Whether these distinctions have ever been honest is, of course, disputable. What has changed though, as I claim, is that with the increasing blur between peace and wartime operations the applicability of manifold of these influence operations has enormously expanded into the civilian domain and in peacetime. This represents the abandonment of a pillar of ethical self-understanding of western societies.

warfighting’. Hereby, the ethical high ground so fundamentally important for US self-understanding is allegedly re-established again.

6.2.3 Gendered intertexts: masculinist neoliberalism

It is the goal of this section to trace the gendered underpinnings of the identification elements worked out in the above sections of this chapter. Question is as to how these with regard to both gender and sex inexplicit identificatory narratives draw on intertexts and what kind of intertexts they draw on. As intertextual referencing is an instrument for establishing authority (Hansen 2006) it is an inevitable tool of both discourse and ideology. We shall thus now scrutinise the US military identity as read above of the doctrine codifying military ‘information operations’ for its gendered intertexts.

Integrating the affirmative aspects of US military identity construction (6.2.1) with the distinguishing aspects of US military identity construction (6.2.2) we shall come to see that there are two different levels of gendered intertexts present therein. The first dimension covers the immediate qualities of the identificatory elements offered and propagated in this military doctrine. This dimension is particularly striking at the instances of negative identity construction since the distantiation of the Self from an Other heavily relies on qualificative binaries which are most blatantly gendered. More subtly though, manifold gendered intertexts are also discernible in the affirmative immediate identificatory qualities. The second dimension of referencing gendered intertexts then covers what was earlier assumed to reside in ample and culturally sedimented narratives. I claim that the neoliberal ideology is such a narrative. A third aspect of the gendered intertexts intertwines the two dimensions: hegemonic masculinity. Mutually constitutive of each other, the immediate identificatory elements and the neoliberal mental framework not only build upon gendered intertexts, but they both rely on the construction and maintenance of shifting but masculinist hegemonic masculinity and thereby perpetuate power-relations which are undemocratic on both levels, gender and sex and thus suppressive of all but the hegemonically masculine male.

Immediate identity level: qualificative binaries

The first dimension thus covers the immediate identificatory qualities as discernible in the doctrine documents. As seen above, the US military identity in the ‘information age’ is characterised on the one hand as tied to the following qualities: flexibility, successful

competition for information, networked organisation, integrated capabilities and technological omnipotence. On the other hand, it is characterised as opposed to the adversary Other who is an ethically ruthless non-state actor, issues propaganda but is influenceable nevertheless and furthermore draws on asymmetric empowerment. The corresponding Self, thus, is tied to the opposing characteristics: state-actor, countering enemy propaganda, acting on the ethical high ground, influencing the Other, but asymmetrically vulnerable. Question now is, what are the gendered underpinnings of these immediately ascriptive identity qualities?

A first aspect of the manner by which these identificatory elements reference gendered intertexts is their structuration in binaries. Since these binaries are qualifying, as always (Derrida 1972), they attribute a positive connotation to the one element of the binary and the negative connotation to the other. Thereby, they empower the one side and disempower the other. Moreover, this mechanism of simultaneous (dis-)empowering does fiercely and long-establishedly operate along externally and internally ascriptive gender identities (see 3.2.1). Not fix at all but rather continuously in the process of (re-)negotiation and thus susceptible to transformation, these gender(ed) identifications do, however, still endeavour blatant stereotypes. While this may be different for societal spheres other than the military domain, in this very institution of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell 2006) it is, as I shall show below, by referencing to stereotypically gendered binary oppositions that identity comes into being.

Thus, there are manifold unambiguously gendered hierarchical binary oppositions discernible. Of the qualities defining US military identity in the ‘information age’, those depicted as needed for successfully participating in the pervasive competition for information are not only strongly stereotyped but also associated with the qualities of current hegemonic masculinity. They include the articulated superiority and dominance (however both of these may be defined) as opposed to inferiority and subordination and also the pervasive exigence of speed as opposed to slowness. Thus, success is tied to the straightforward attributes of power, which are superiority and dominance – i.e. these very attributes themselves *mean* power; and they appertain to the very essence of stereotypical masculine power. The necessary and constitutive counterpart hereof is, as mentioned, inferiority and subordination – both are, stereotypical to the same degree, associated with a supposed ‘very essence’ of femininity.

Further, the technological omnipotence both required in order to successfully compete and ascribed to the Self does also represent a straightforward association of the Self with pervasive power. Grounded in sound technological determinism, it links technological

versatility to power and victory on the battlefield. Both, the networked organisational structures and the integration of operation capabilities are only particular variants of this same overarching theme of technological omnipotence which is oppositionally posed against technological backwardness and as its consequence, powerlessness.

These elements of power attribution to the Self strive to disempower the Other. The intertexts of this empowering of the Self and simultaneous disempowering of the Other are gendered insofar, as they recur to the most basic stereotypes about what masculinity and femininity imply, namely the holding of and the respective subordination to power – a power which is based on the blunt claim to superiority on the one hand and on masculinist technophilia (Hooper 2001) on the other. These basic very intertexts are then linked to the Self and the Other. Thereby, the Self is (hegemonically) masculinised and the Other is feminised. Note that as with regards to these positive identity traits they are opposed to an Other which is a temporally antecedent Self and also a looming feminised Self, which would not be capable to successfully compete in the changed threat environment of the ‘information age’.

Similarly straightforward, two elements emanating from negative identity construction do rest on an univocal (dis-)empowering binary. Positing the adversary Other as a non-state actor and as influenceable makes of the Self a powerful state-actor who influences this same Other. This binary opposition again is unambiguous as concerns its gendered underpinnings. Particularly with regard to the influencing/influenceable dichotomy, the gendered intertext is immediately seizable. The capacity to influence is amongst the active and shaping qualities associated with masculine power and skill. It has as positive a connotation as the quality of being influenceable has a negative one – this second one, again, is associated with feminine subordination and an inherent need for guidance.

Besides these direct and long-established power attributes resting with the thereby masculinised Self, some traits of US military identity discernible in this body of doctrine documents are less unambiguous as with regards to where power resides and of what quality this power is.

First, the pervasive requirement for flexibility is more complicated compared to the elements displayed above. Flexibility is posed as a condition to accede power and it is binarily

positioned against stasis. It is to note that flexibility as a quality is required for the Self as an evolutionary capacity differentiating the current times of the ‘information age’ from the earlier times of the cold war. While the very term ‘flexibility’ today has an entirely positive connotation it earlier may have been named flightiness or adaptability, both terms of which are stereotypically associated with femininity and subordination. Simultaneously, stasis is today entirely negatively cast and associated with stubbornness and the failure to adapt to the changing requirements of time. Thus, the very raise of the positively noted term ‘flexibility’ associated with what its contents today mean – precisely a positive and active adaptability; the capacity to spot the requirements of the time and turn them into one’s own advantages – show that, as soon as a capacity gets positively associated, it also gets associated with masculinity. In our society flexibility today is a characteristic of and for male achievement. This also shows that hegemonic masculinities considerably shift over time, as I shall elaborate below.

Second, some of the binaries discernible in the process of differentiating are ambiguous as with regards to their very contents. On the level of identity construction it is interesting to see that with the functional depiction of the adversary Other as asymmetrically empowered it comes that the Self is portrayed as asymmetrically vulnerable. As a character trait, vulnerability does not fit hegemonically masculine power attributes. The ambiguity of this particular trait of US military identity has to be understood as a functional argument on the one hand and it needs contextualisation within the neoliberal ideological context on the other hand. The latter shall be done in the section below endeavouring the second dimension of the gendered underpinnings of US ‘information age’ military identity.

Slightly ambiguous with regards to blunt power considerations is furthermore the trait attributing the issuing of propaganda to the adversary Other and therewith the countering of propaganda to the Self. Besides standing in blunt contradiction with the self-attributed influencing capacity, this quality on the one hand strives to contribute to the establishing of the ethical high ground as a character trait by anchoring the own agency in moral superiority, on the other hand though, it puts the Self in a position of re-acting. This means that the leading part of action is conferred to the adversary Other; it is the Other who, with her action, compels the Self to re-act. The power attribute is with this particular trait – as with the following one – conveyed to the ethical domain. Superiority is claimed on the ethical dimension. This is also true for the dichotomy opposing the ethically ruthless practices of the adversary Other to the established ethical high ground guiding the Self. The gendered underpinning of this last binary resides in specifically gendered and orientalist ascriptions (see

also section 6.3) to both, the Other and the Self. Here, the adversary is depicted as ruthless and brutal – a deviant form of masculinity, backwarded and uncivilised while the Self is as enlightened as western modernity and unilaterally and indisputably occupying the ethical high ground by restricting its practices voluntarily to be ‘humane’. This latest aspect is highly important to contemporary western hegemonic masculinity.

Table 2: 1st dimension gendered intertexts – stereotypical binaries

		Masculinized powerful Self	Feminized powerless timely antecedent and/or looming Self (Other)
Unambiguous	linking	Superiority	Inferiority
		Dominance	Subordinance
		Technological omnipotence • versatility • networked structures • integrated capabilities	Technological backwardedness • ineptitude • hierarchical structures • distinct capabilities
		Speed	Slowness
		Flexibility	Stasis
			adversary Other
	Differentiating	State actor	Non-state actor
Influencing		Influenceable	
Ambiguous		Asymmetrically vulnerable	Asymmetrically empowered
		Counters propaganda	Issues propaganda
	On the ethical high ground	Ethically ruthless	

Ideological level of identification: male society and masculinist protection

The second dimension of how the above displayed identification elements of the US military in the ‘information age’ reference gendered intertexts operates through the intermediary of the

neoliberal ideology. This ideology represents, as I claim, the ample and (in our western societies) culturally sedimented narrative harbouring the inexplicit but crucially constitutive gendered underpinnings of power hypothesised at the outset of this examination. Thus, this sub-section strives to lay bare the gendered underpinnings of what was earlier called the military neoliberal information age identity. These underpinnings converge around mainly three aspects. First, there are multiple elements characteristic for male societies discernible; second, the environment constituted by this ideology corresponds to a prototype situation of what is called masculinist protection; and third and intertwining with the first dimension of the gendered intertexts, the propagated condition of asymmetry and the associated loss of power forges hegemonic masculinities to shift and restructure – a phenomenon, which has often unfortunate side-effects. These shifts of hegemonic masculinity linked to the restructuring of the power-attributions do articulate and overlap with some particular elements of the immediate identity qualities addressed above.

As it is established and elaborated by Kreisky (e.g. 2001), the neoliberal ideology was born and then developed out of a setting of male society. It is characteristic for such societies that, despite their at times formal openness for female members, they practice an informal closure towards women and the female existence *per se*. Further, they are discernible through their common ideology, the configuration of their enemy depictions, their tendency towards secrecy, their bizarre forms of companionship (as e.g. practiced in fraternities). It is “the application of a pronounced friend or foe framework, the ‘us’ and ‘the other’ within a visible relation of domination and subordination that regulates the demarcation vis-à-vis the ‘outside’ and administers the emotions of the mostly male members” (ibid.: 43-44) at the inside.

As the first dimension gendered intertexts have shown, these characteristics do also apply to the US military and they are traceable in its ‘information age’ identity framework although the US military is formally open for women and many women do indeed take this route and become a member of the armed forces. As Höpfl (2003) has convincingly demonstrated, becoming a member of the military body as a women still means becoming a member in a male society institution. Membership, therefore, is only accessible through two mechanisms both of which are achieved via the cancellation of the ‘feminine’: the demonstration of mastery and the acquisition of the metaphorical phallus. As a consequence hereof, women can only “either be playthings or else quasi men” (ibid.: 13). In this context thus, “the denial of

difference can become synonymous with the implicit valorisation of the masculine” (ibid.: 28), a masculine which is stereotypical in the crudest of wits and therefore, once again, suppressive of all but those who subject themselves to the requirements of military hegemonic masculinity. **The first gendered intertext of the second dimension, thus, lies in the referencing of male societies:** the neoliberal mental framework and the military as an institution. Both these institutions, which carry the traits and exclusionary mechanisms of male societies (alternatively called ‘Männerbund’ in German or also institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell 2006)), represent ample and culturally sedimented narratives. In the general societal consciousness both of these institutions are not perceived as representative for male societies – for the military this holds true due to and since the incorporation of female members into the military body. By this unawareness, both the neoliberal ideology and the military as an institution naturalise the silence on gender and thereby reproduce a particular hegemonic male as the norm. This does not only perpetuate but reinforce hierarchically gendered relations of power.

A second aspect of how ‘information age’ US military identity makes intertextual reference to a gendered narrative operating through the intermediary of neoliberal ideology is the principle of **masculinist protection**. In order to unravel this aspect, we need to consider once again the context within which the earlier identified neoliberal identity traits situate. As displayed above, this environment is depicted in the doctrine as one in which chaos, danger and relegation lurks everywhere, an environment in which enemies have multiplied and the impending demise is only avertable under the imperative to cope with requirements of speed, flexibility and accuracy. In short, this is an environment that can be called one of wilderness or anarchy. It can also be called a system of mercy or simply ‘market’. In this very system one’s only chance to survive is tied to fighting/performing – though high performance does neither guarantee survival nor success. And, this environmental condition is the prototype situation for the principle of masculinist protection to unfold its workings, as in this ‘Hobbesian’ environment “masculine protection is needed to make home a haven” (Young 2003: 4).

The concept rests on multiple premises that determine the relationship between the protected (stereotypically the woman and children at home/inside) and the protector (stereotypically the man dealing with the anarchic and therefore dangerous

environment/outside). This relationship rests as much on the willingness to make a sacrifice for the sake of others, and the related sense of gratitude, as it does on overt domination and claims to superiority. Moreover, it is a relationship that encapsulates the prevalent hegemonic gender relations. The prototypical unit that it is based upon is, of course, the nuclear family. “In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy” (ibid.: 4). As I have elaborated on another occasion (Brunner 2008), this logic also applies to the relationship between the US state and its citizens as regards the adoption of the multiple measures which aimed at re-establishing the security of the homeland in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 2001. The constant reference to a condition of emergency – the evocation of a situation of ‘Hobbesian’ anarchy – served to mobilise fear and thereby established the rationale according to which special measures such as surveillance, obedience and unity, to name but a few, were necessary in order to ensure protection. Protection, according to this very principle, is conditional on obedience; the populace had to concede critical distance from decision-making and succumb to the bargain inherent to the principle of masculinist protection. As Young brought it to our attention, the former US government “has repeatedly appealed to the primacy of its role as protector of innocent citizens and liberator of women and children to justify consolidating and centralizing executive power at home and dominative war abroad” (Young 2003: 10). Only that the borders between home and abroad have been dislocated in the so-called global war on terrorism. The battlefield has come to the US and therewith anarchy is no longer relegated to the international arena, but has come to the front door, causing the ‘inside’ to go private (Brunner 2008).

The same very mechanism holds true and is thus duplicated by the neoliberal ideology and its implications for the individual and how we strive to live our lives. The battlefield – the omnipresent competition and our ultimate need to succeed – is at the front door. This situation offers a stereotypical and seductive identification for male competitors within our world as it is structured according to the neoliberal mental framework to “wage war abroad and expect[...] obedience and loyalty at home” (Young 2003: 2). It is the politicisation of the gender(ed) relations of power, which falls by the wayside of this particular mechanism. Thus, by furnishing fertile grounds for the principle of masculinist protection the neoliberal ideology, which has gained the US military depoliticises the problematisation of gender.

Shifting hegemonic masculinity

The principle of masculinist protection has, further, another aspect to it, which renders it important in the context of this examination. This aspect covers the strong identificatory elements the principle furnishes for men and soldiers. This leads us to look at the elements of hegemonic masculinity. As Hooper (2001) has elaborated, what qualities are associated with masculinity is, first, not fixed but rather revealed plural and fluid as soon as it is historically contextualised, and second, it is crucially a political question and therefore subject to societal power struggles. Further, Hooper identifies the power of hegemonic masculinity in this struggle to reside “in part in its flexibility in comparison with the restricted and monological representation of subordinate masculinities” (ibid.: 76). This means that the contents of hegemonic masculinity do shift in historical perspective while the contents of what is associated with the subordinate (deviant masculinities and femininity) are more stable. Thus, what traces of shifting hegemonic masculinity are discernible in US military identity of the ‘information age’ as carved out from the doctrine documents?

As we have seen, a relatively fundamental shift in the allocation of power is articulated in the military doctrine documents covering the period since the end of the cold war. This power shift is thought to disempower the state and empower non-state actors. As an institution, the military is at the intercept between the neoliberal pretension to a weak state and its own vocation to strength and its claim to represent the states monopoly over the use of violence. It is the condition of asymmetry that encapsulates not only the recent power shift but also this particular interception. On the concrete level, these shifts and changes are in fact a loss of power. They represent a loss of power for the state and they represent a loss of power for the military. And this loss does link to “flagging masculinity” as Kreisky has called it (Kreisky 2008, translation mine). The asymmetry concept as a proxy for the effective power loss – a loss, which does not simply ‘happen’ but is rather ideologically produced – does threaten traditional images of masculinist state and military power. On the identity level this is destabilising.

On the one hand, the reaction to a power loss is most often a sort of radicalisation accounting for what Scheub (2010) calls the “remasculinisation” due to the perceived threat to stereotypical traits of masculine identity. On the other hand, the power loss does also lead to an adjustment of identification traits. Hence, encapsulating the loss of masculinist power the condition of asymmetry urges a change of hegemonic masculinity. This change is discernible

in the immediate identity traits displayed above and it is discernible as a characteristic of the neoliberal mental framework. In an epitomised way the shift can be called, in reference to Hooper, as moving hegemonic masculinity from a patriarchal heroic warrior model to a rationalist model that “idealizes individualism, reason, and self-control or self-denial, combining respectability as breadwinner and head of household with calculative rationality in public life. [Further, i]n this model superior intellect and personal integrity is valued over physical strength” (Hooper 2001: 98). In particular, the shifts are tied to those identity elements displayed as binaries above which appear to be somehow ambiguous. Their perceived ambiguity within the binaries is specifically due to their shifting quality on the symbolic level.

Thus, while both hierarchical organisation and the associated distinct capabilities have traditionally been representative of powerful masculinist organisations (and male societies) both these qualities appear to be no longer desired. They are now feminised and associated with technological backwardness and the stubbornness of refusing to adapt to the changing requirements of time. Their opposed qualities – networked structures and integrated capabilities – are now hailed as those that empower their holder. It now belongs to the traits of hegemonic masculinity to integrate one's capacities and organise them in a networked manner. Thus, specialisation is no longer required but it is rather these two qualities, which render their holder technologically and otherwise ‘omnipotent’. Further, as mentioned, the change from what is now called stasis to be replaced by flexibility is also a considerable one. While the earlier called stability has long been associated with masculine power and thoughtfulness and depicted as a capacity women were chronically in lack of, it is nowadays negatively coined ‘stasis’ and seen as a sign of weakness and incapacity. The exact opposite is true for ‘flexibility’. It is *the* pervasive requirement of our time to be flexible and adaptable. As such, this quality does now also belong to hegemonic masculinity. As a consequence of both technological versatility and pervasive flexibility asymmetric vulnerability is inescapable. This vulnerability does, as such, not explicitly belong to the traits of hegemonic masculinity but it neither is detrimental to it. Induced by the conceived loss of power as epitomised in the condition of asymmetry and threatening some traditional notions of hegemonic masculinity, it is a further gendered intertext of this military doctrine that it contributes to a shift of hegemonic masculinity, the particular traits of which are discernible in the table below. This shift does not mean, though, that the so altered hegemonic masculinity is less masculinist or more inclusive of the subordinate (masculinities and femininities). Rather, some masculinities

are empowered by this shift while many others are tremendously weakened and rendered precarious (Kreisky 2008).

Table 3: Shifting qualities of hegemonic masculinity

hierarchical structures	→	networked structures
specialised capabilities	→	integrated capabilities
stability	→	flexibility
vulnerability = detrimental to masculinity	→	vulnerability no longer detrimental to masculinity

In sum, this section strived to reveal the gendered intertexts of US military doctrine as discernible in the specific documents. As hypothesised, these gendered intertexts reside mainly in an ample and culturally sedimented narrative. This narrative is the neoliberal ideology. The ‘information age’ military identity is fundamentally an identity suited for the requirements of the current neoliberal times. Not only do we therefore need to denounce the term ‘information age’ as what it is, namely an ideological tool in the toolkit for hegemony, externalising and naturalising the instrumentalised workings of technological change but also do we need to focus attention straight on the gendered underpinnings of these, our neoliberal times and the hegemonic identity requirements that come with it. As with regards to the doctrinal military context examined here, these unfold their workings particularly through stereotypical and hierarchical dichotomies on the immediate identity level and through the mechanisms of male society and the principle of masculinist protection on the ideological level of identification. Intertwining the immediate ‘information age’ military identity with the neoliberal intermediary of identification, a shift of particular traits of hegemonic masculinity is further detectable.

6.3 Reading identity II: telling articulations

It is the aim of this sub-chapter to subject the products of information operations deployed in the various battlefields of the conflicts the US military was involved in in the time period covered by this analysis to a second round of scrutiny. The scrutiny puts focus once again on the gendered underpinnings of identity construction discernible in the leaflets and loudspeaker

transcripts analysed in chapter V above. It was hypothesised at the outset that the narratives discernible within the leaflets dropped over the conflict zones would draw on manifold and explicit, stereotypical and hierarchically gendered dichotomies. The following section shall thus tackle this hypothesis.

As it has come to the fore in chapter V, immediate identity ascriptions are directly palpable in this second body of documents. And, these ascriptive identity constructions are inevitable and eye-catchingly prominent in the leaflets. They portray the enemy/adversary as the impersonation of the evil, the honourable soldier as torn between brotherhood and reason, the civilian population as in dire need of protection and guidance and the Self as the omnipotent saviour. Having worked out the manifold aspects of each of these identity constructions in chapter V above, we shall now focus on their gendered intertexts. These uncover as soon as we relate the ascriptive identity constructions to one another. What then surfaces is a multi-relational identity setting that is heavily gendered and orientalist, the separate aspects of which are individually addressed in the sections below.

6.3.1 A multi-relational identity setting

Articulations of identity happen through the double processes of linking (positive identity) and differentiating (negative identity) (Hansen 2006). Both the Self and the Other come into being by relating to one another. The examination of this particular body of documents blatantly shows that “identities are constructed through, not outside, difference”, and that, further, “this entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term – and thus its ‘identity’ – can be constructed” (Hall 1996: 4-5; Derrida 1972, Laclau 1990, Butler 1993). It is the *quality* of these relations between the Self and the Other that are at the focus of the coming sections since the gendered intertexts of the multiple identity constructions forged by this second body of documents reside in the very quality of the varying relations between the Self and the Other. Several aspects are important to these relations.

First, while the Self aimed at is somehow monolithical in its pretence to supremacy, the individual dimensions of this claimed supremacy articulate in the varying quality of the particular relations to varying Others. Second, thus, the Other is – as opposed to the Self – not monolithical but diverse. It includes the enemy-Other, the soldier-Other and the civilian-

Other. The relation of the Self to each of these Others is of a different quality. Though, thirdly, the processes of linking and differentiating, of positive and negative identity construction, all happen on the same four dimensions. These are the dimensions on which the supremacy of the Self is claimed. They include the military, the technological, the ethical and the civilisational levels. Not only do these levels at times intertwine but also does the relational identity construction show that in this instance, the Self is conceived as more complex than each of the Others since the Self integrates the varying qualities from the processes of differentiating to each of the Others.

In the sections below we shall come to see how the Self, conceived of as an omnipotent saviour claiming supremacy on all levels (see section 5.4), comes into being through its maintaining of an aggressive relation towards the enemy-Other striving to destroy this very same, through its protective relation towards the civilian-Other striving to rescue this very same and through its sparing relation towards the soldier-Other striving to belittlingly pull this very same over. Each of these particular relations and the respective identity traits of both the Self and the Other are heavily gendered and thus constitutive of hierarchical relations of power based thereupon.

6.3.2 Destroying the hyper-masculine Other

First, the quality of the relation between the Self and the enemy-Other is aggression. The mutually constitutive construction of the Self and the enemy-Other is based upon the suggested supremacy of the Self on all four levels: the military, the technological, ethical and civilisational. On the analytical dimension the military and the technological levels as well as the ethical and the civilisational levels often intermingle due to their inherent proximity. Further, it is interesting to note that the identity traits discernible on the military and the technological levels are Self-ascriptive and constitute the enemy-Other by differentiating it from the Self while on the ethical and civilisational levels it works the other way round. This means that on the ethical and civilisational levels the characterising features are mainly ascriptive to the enemy-Other and Self-identification operates in differentiating from this Other.

Hence, in relation the enemy-Other on the military level the Self is portrayed as overwhelmingly superior due to blunt outnumbering. The military supremacy of the Self vis-à-vis the enemy is inextricable from the constantly suggested technological supremacy. The

supposed *military/technological* invincibility of the Self due to its all-seeing locating and surgical targeting skills and weapons accuracy determines the ultimately powerful Self on the level of the use of violence. Paired with the Self's readiness to effectively use this power in an aggressive way, this positive identification is completed. Epitomising the claim to the Self's ultimate military/technological supremacy paired with the will to use this very power to the destruction of the enemy-Other is the leaflet called 'the wave', deployed in the second Gulf war of 1991 (see section 5.4). The angry-faced wave holding a sword blurred with blood overrides the fleeing soldiers and is accompanied by the entire spectrum of the US armed forces including the army, the marines, the navy and the air force. It comes with this characterisation of the Self that the Other is militarily and technologically completely inferior. This inferiority comes to the fore for example in depictions of the enemy as hiding in caves – caves which are, evidently found and bombed by 'our smart weaponry'; this message thus, combines the military with the civilisational claim to superiority.


Most of the immediate identity traits ascribed to the enemy-Other relate to the *ethical and civilisational* dimensions. As seen in chapter V, the enemy-Other is, independently of who particularly is meant in the leaflets, identified as a brutal murderer responsible for the worst cruelties upon humankind. He is (invariably male and) depicted as the holder of a deviant, pathological masculinity, a hyper-masculinity gone wild as characterised by manifold barbarian attributes such as indiscriminate killing, raping and destructing; acts despicable on the ethical level for their very quality and acts despicable on the civilisational level since associated with backwardness and barbarism conferred to times where 'men were instinct driven brutes'.

Among all the gruesome ascriptive traits one worse than the other but all evidence of the enemy-Other's irrational and instinct-driven bestiality, glimpses of ascribed rationality shine through at times nevertheless. These glimpses can be found in contexts where rationality links to and is evidence of a lack of human compassion and becomes thereby an abhorrent rationality such as the cold-hearted rationality ascribed to the enemy-Other of using women and children as human shields or of playing chess with the unknowing figures representing both the civilian population and the soldiers.

Simultaneously, this same enemy-Other is, besides being so cruel, indiscriminate and (ir)rational in his use of violence and thus the holder of a deviant masculinity, portrayed as effeminate. Qualities such as cowardice, decadence and masquerade are omnipresently

ascribed to the enemy-Other. Further, he is also depicted as incarcerated and dumb enough to be trapped like any rat. The pictures of Hussein's capture and the toppling of his stature combinedly turned into leaflets are representative for the manner by which the dismantling of the leadership is portrayed as fallen masculinity associated with loss of honour and dignity. These ascriptive identity traits strive to render the enemy-Other feeble and weak but not worth of protection. This Other is not manly enough to honourably fight, he deserves no spare.

In differentiation from this Other, the Self is ethically superior – precisely by this ascription of qualities to the Other the Self is defined through what it lacks – and civilisationally ahead – due to the same very reasons. The mutually constitutive identity construction of Self and enemy-Other draws on a principal and historically longstanding gendered dichotomy: the one opposing civilisation to barbarism. This dichotomy associates the prototype of the 'civilised' with the positive aspects such as freedom, progress, strength and sacrifice as opposed to the negative association of the barbarians with cruelty, primitivity, backwardness, and cowardice. An extension hereof can also be discovered in the narrative of the 'clean warfare' that the United States so prominently claims. The high-tech military arsenals of the US, which allegedly allow for humane warfare and minimise 'collateral damage' are seen as opposed to primitive Genghis Khan-like warriors who are "rugged men, bearded and battle-scarred, ford rivers on horseback and attack the enemy in screaming hordes. They're armed with Kalashnikovs and rocket launchers instead of battleaxes and bows. But when they corner someone in a dark hole they still pour oil in and set it alight" (Barry 2001). This story of civilised 'high tech' warfare against pathologically hypermasculine barbarians is in line with the idea of Western 'dignified' hegemonic masculinity as opposed to the inferior 'barbarian' masculinity of the enemy and it is one of the essential messages of the body of documents examined in chapter V. Also "the military's new 'technowar' paradigm for capital-intensive, high-technology warfare highlight[s] the differences between economies and political systems and thus, the superiority of Western men over other men" (Niva 1998: 119). The following figure succinctly shows the elements of the mutually constitutive identifications of the Self and the enemy-Other as discernible in the leaflets analysed.

Figure 6 – identification enemy-Other and Self

————— Processes of linking: positive identity

----- Processes of differentiating: negative identity

Constitutive of the Self, the pathologically hypermasculine and simultaneously effeminate enemy-Other has to be eradicated in the name of progress, civilisation and humanity (ethics). This is why the quality of this relation is aggression and annihilation.

6.3.3 Coming at rescue of the Other in need of protection

Next, the quality of the relation between the Self and the civilian-Other is framed in the terms of protection. The Self is portrayed as coming at rescue of the civilian-Other who needs to be

rescued from the enemy-Other as characterised above. We shall again look at the identifications on the four dimensions of the claimed supremacy of the Self.


First, on the military level the process of differentiating is based upon inherently differing premises: the very presence of the Self is a military one in a civilian context. These basically unequal terms fundamentally instil the relation between this Self and the civilian-Other; the Self is the holder of ultimate power as its very presence is based upon the use of violence while the Other is inherently disempowered on this dimension. The civilian population deserves protection due to its very civilness which is precisely tied to the abdication of the use of violence as a tool of conflict resolution. It is inherent to this dimension of the relation between the Self and the civilian-Other that the Self is powerful and strong – ultimately prepared to use violence – and the Other is weak and in need of protection. The ascriptive identifications of this relation succinctly come to light in claims discernible in the leaflets under the category striving to explain the reasoning of the war (see section 5.3) such as ‘we defend the defenceless’ or ‘we are here to help you’ and many others.

This character of the Self /civilian-Other identification is consolidated on the other dimensions – the technological, ethical and civilisational. These dimensions interlock to such a degree that they become inseparable. This is to say that the ascriptive identity traits of Self and civilian-Other on the technological level also bear messages on the civilisational or ethical ones and vice-versa. Thus, many of the instructions given to the civilian population portray this very same as not only technologically incompetent but also as civilisationally backwarded or simply as dumb. Simultaneously, the Self is depicted as the bearer of elucidation; knowing how to do this and that and generously sharing this knowledge with the civilian population whether it’s the need of brushing one’s teeth or drinking only clean water and boiling it beforehand.

The civilian-Other is further characterised as victimised by the barbarian enemy-Other abusing women and children and civilians *per se*. By insisting on what the Self rescues the civilian-Other from, these leaflets are constitutive of the identity of the Self, the enemy-Other (as seen above) and the civilian-Other. When it comes as the command of ethics to proceed to the liberation of the civilian-Other from the enemy-Other and democracy is posed as naturally superior to the rule the civilian-Other has heretofore been subjected to, when further achievements such as the suggestedly increased security or even the production of freedom and prosperity are claimed as due to the invader’s presence, the dimensions on which the

supremacy pretence is articulated can no longer be separated – in particular the ethical and the civilisational levels mutually condition each other.

Thus in sum, the relation between the Self and the civilian-Other is not only one of fundamental power disparity but also one of dependency. The civilian-Other depends on the Self to be rescued from the enemy-Other. Due to this dependency the Self can also demand obedience – as it is inherent to the principle of masculinist protection (see section 6.2.3). This claim for obedience comes in the form of warnings that ‘we do not tolerate interference’ and that ‘freedom means responsibility’ and others more. Additionally to the power disparity and dependency, this relation is also characterised by ethical and civilisational disparity. While on the ethical level the respectability of the civilian population is to some extent conceded – in affirmations addressing the ‘honourable people of ...’ – and lost again as easily as it was seemingly established – by affirmations such as ‘you know better than abusing your women’ – on the civilisational level the supremacy claim is univocal, comprehensive and mostly unveiled – articulated in contentions about the progress that is brought, about how democracy has to be charted or how technologically versatile the invader is. The figure below shows the identity traits of the Self and civilian-Other constituted through a relation the quality of which is mainly dependency and a disparity in agency and power.

Figure 7 – identification Self and civilian-Other

———— Processes of linking: positive identity

----- Processes of differentiating: negative identity

6.3.4 Sparring with the irrationally loyal Other

The quality of the relation between the Self and the soldier-Other is less univocal than both the relations of the Self with the enemy-Other and with the civilian-Other. It carries aspects of sparring with an equivalent. At these instances mechanisms of manly competition, fraternisation and the honour of warriorship are prevalent. At the same time, this relation is characterised once again by the ultimate claim to the supremacy of the Self on all levels. This


means that while elements of equivalence are prominently identifiable, they are charted as of instrumental use for the establishment of the multifaceted hegemonic masculinity of the Self as ultimately superior to the Other. Thus, not surprisingly, on the military and the technological levels the ascriptive identity traits do not differ from those characterising the relation of the Self with the enemy-Other. Hence, the Self is framed as militarily and technologically invincible due to its overwhelming power, skill and resources. On these dimensions the soldier-Other is menaced with death, destruction and annihilation. The situation is portrayed as offering no escape but surrender. The Self so is once again technologically versatile and military predominant over an Other who is overwhelmingly inferior on these dimensions and has consequently no alternative but to concede. This same characterisation varies on two tones: the blunt threat of annihilation on the one hand and the logical reasoning on the other hand.

The picture is more varied on the intermingling ethical and civilisational dimensions. On the ethical level the family-theme is appealed to as a commonality. The portrayal of wife and kids happily unified with their protecting soldier-father, but also depictions of women and children weeping and suffering or horrifying images of baby-victims of weapons of mass destruction appeal to the on this dimension supposedly common ethos of family values and the need to protect them. This commonality establishes the masculine responsibility for the protection of women and children. Thus, the ethos of masculinist protection is appealed to as a shared trait of hegemonic masculinity of both the soldier-Other and the Self. More prominently even, the values of warrior honour are variedly invoked in order to appeal to brotherhood among soldiers across enemy lines, fraternisation is multiply bestirred and the sacrifice to the mother nation glorified (see section 5.2).

Thus, on the ethical dimension the stereotypical masculinist traits of warrior manhood are instrumentalised in order to construct a common identity and in order to thereby impose a friction between the soldier-Other and the enemy-Other (the leadership). Based upon this particularly masculinistic warrior manhood ethos, the soldier-Other is moreover offered a fundamentally westernised representation of heroism as the two exemplary leaflets at the very end of section 5.2 show. This depiction of manhood does play into the civilisational dimension. It is westernised (masculinistic) masculinity that is posed as heroic and superior; it is posed as what every man should strive for; it is posed as hegemonic.

Further, interlocking the ethical and the civilisational dimensions are those ascriptive characteristics that come under the header of advise. It is basically establishing a paternalistic/paternalising relation of identification when the invader addresses the invaded by telling him (invariably male), that he should know that the war he fights is dishonourable and wrong, that the invader is coming in order to stop the atrocities committed by the invaded, that their leaders laugh at them because they are so unknowing and ignorant about being sent to death.

Thus, in sum the quality of the relation between the Self and the soldier-Other is more ambivalent than both the relations scrutinised above. On the ethical level some traits of equivalence between the Self and the soldier-Other are allowed. These are based upon the masculinistic characteristics of stereotypical and westernised warriorship. On all the other dimensions – namely the military, the technological and the civilisational – the claim to the supremacy of the Self remains unquestioned. Bringing these traits together leads me to contend that the Self strives to pretend that it spars with the soldier-Other, that the military encounter is somehow comparable to a manly competition while truly the Self paternalistically belittles the soldier-Other. The figure below shows these identifications discernible in the relation between the Self and the soldier-Other.

Figure 8 – identification Self and soldier-Other

————— Processes of linking: positive identity


----- Processes of differentiating: negative identity

6.3.5 The masculinist Orientalism of the omnipotent saviour

When we now merge these individual but mutually constitutive traits of identification the dense picture of a masculinist Orientalism comes to the fore. As mentioned above (in section 6.3.1), the Self is depicted as integrating the qualities of identification relating to each of the individually more homogenous Others. Thus, the Self generates its claim to supremacy out of its suggested capacity to simultaneously annihilate the enemy-Other, rescue the civilian-Other

and outcompete the soldier-Other. The figure below shows the qualities of the multi-relational identity setting that bring into being this particular Self.

Figure 9 – relational qualities Self and Others



Integrating these qualities, the Self becomes omnipotent. This omnipotence is based upon blunt domination on the one hand and upon a particularly carved understanding of masculinity on the other hand. These two components – domination and ‘masculinity’ – are the constitutive traits of what I call masculinist Orientalism.

Understanding “Orientalism [a]s a discourse of domination, [as] both a product of ... subjugation... and an instrument in this process” (Halliday 1993: 179), it becomes clear at first sight that the above elaborated traits of identity construction conform to Orientalism. It is at the very heart of the identity constructions scrutinised in this analysis that the Self – the Occident, namely the United States – is both understood and constructed as superior to the

Other – an Orient, but not exclusively as the ‘Balkans’ and Somalia¹⁹ are included. Further, this pervasively claimed superiority has to be understood as the product of both temporally antecedent and contemporary subjugation; and it has to be understood as the predominant instrument in the very process of the subjugation in the happening. This is to say that the above identity constructions themselves are an instrument of domination of course. Thus, it is crucial that Orientalism is not just about representations of the orient-Other but about how these representations are linked and integral to projects of domination.

Moreover, the “power of Orientalism comes from its power to construct the very object it speaks about and from its power to produce a regime of truth about the other and thereby establish the identity and the power of the subject that speaks about it” (Abu-Lughod 2001: 105). Hence, it comes with the instantiation of the subjugated Other as either brutal barbarians, incognisant civilians or failing concurrents that the identity and the power of the Self is established and perpetuated. The domination of the Self over the Other is so taken over from the past, affirmed for the present and reinstalled for the future. It embraces all the levels elaborated above and finds its epitomising consolidation on the civilisational dimension for the ranking of “different places according to a single standard of cultural achievement” (Connolly 1999, para. 1) has come back into currency should it have ever been out of currency. It is this ranking and the assumption of a single standard that again links to what we know as Orientalism, what we know as the systematic creation of the categories ‘West’ and ‘Orient’ – or Self and Other – which pivot on an “absolute and systematic difference between the ‘West’, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior” (Said 1978: 300). This is precisely what the above identity constructions do, and they do it fiercely.

Thus, the latest *mission civilisatrice* as cast in the documents analysed for this study strives to make it very clear that while the mission is to “enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy ... after all ... power is the only language they understand” (Said 2003/2004: 873). It is a profound Orientalism that “enables the simplistic division of the world into the Orient, or the hotbed of terrorism, ignorance, poverty, oppression, racism and misogyny, and the US-led West, or the savoir, beacon of light and teacher of democracy and equality *par excellence*” (Nayak 2006: 46). It is only the worst aspect of these powerful and ultimately

¹⁹ As a matter of fact, this makes no difference.

violent ascriptions “that human suffering in all its density and pain is spirited away” (Said 2003/2004: 873).

It comes as no surprise that this Orientalism is also profoundly masculinist. While Nayak argues that Orientalism and its crucial role in US state identity making on the political level “only works because of the violent remaking, disciplining and construction of race and gender” (ibid: 47) the aim here is to discern how these US identity constructions on the military level are indeed masculinist and thereby violently remake, discipline and construct gender. The Orientalist domination of identity making established, it remains crucial to insist on how this domination is tied to particular carvings of masculinity.

Thus, all the different disparities of power discerned in the identificatory relations of the Self with the varying Others articulate in terms of masculinity. The standard is of course attributed to the Self – a standard which has, once more, a civilisational pretence. The Self is the bearer of hegemonic masculinity integrating enough toughness and determinacy to annihilate the barbarian enemy-Other, enough compassion to rescue the civilian-Other and enough fairness to honourably compete with the soldier-Other. In relation to the dominating Self, the Others are positioned in hierarchical terms of masculinity and femininity. The enemy-Other is the holder of pathologically deviant hypermasculinity and simultaneously rendered effeminate. By inscribing cowardice to the brutal barbarian the aim is to emasculate the enemy-Other; as emasculation is associated with the loss of dignity and respect. Things are similar with regard to the civilian-Other only with reversed prefixes. The feminised good victim in need of rescue generates the very identity of the Self as its protector. Thus both the enemy-Other and the civilian-Other condition the identity of the Self – an identity which is intimately tied to its own hegemonic masculinity and to the deviant masculinity of the enemy-Other and the ascribed femininity of the civilian-Other. It is empowering for the Self to, on the one hand, violently, relentlessly, mightfully – ‘manly’ – destroy the enemy-Other and to, on the other hand, compassionately, protectively, but with no tolerance for resistance – ‘manly’ again – rescue the civilian-Other. As sure as both these mechanisms empower the Self they disempower the Other.

The same is true for the slightly more ambivalent ascriptive identifications with regard to the soldier-Other. Though this Other is attested the warrior honour and the associated decency – which is both fundamentally masculinistic and patriarchal as based upon the mechanisms of male society and fraternisation, sacrifice, martyrdom and patriotism, historically generating

agency and the subject position out of the exclusively male use of violence – he is assured of his failure to live up to the standard as beard by the Self. This Other fails in terms of achievement – as soldier – and he fails in terms of manhood – as protector of his family. This Other is cast as eternally challenged to cope with the truly civilised standard of masculinity; he needs to be told to respect his wife and daughter. He is told, that his attempt is honourable but that he fails. This is domination in the making. With Said (2003/2004: 873): “You have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern Orientalist”. This failure and wrong-going includes masculinity. Adding up to the above mentioned (dis)empowering, the relation constitutive of the identity of the Self and the soldier-Other so instantiates masculinist domination. In this domination Orientalism and hierarchically structured masculinities (Connell 1999) conflate.

In sum, we can now validate the hypothesis formulated at the outset: the narratives discernible in the leaflets dropped over the conflict zones by the US armed forces draw on manifold and explicit, stereotypical and hierarchically gendered dichotomies in their making of identities. In their casting of an ultimately superior Self they rely on Orientalist representations amalgamating the Other into an uncivilised, incognisant, defaulting Other. In order to reinforce and reproduce the Orientalist polarisation between the Self and the Other (Steans 2008) gendered hierarchies of masculinities and emasculation are instrumentalised as are the heavily gendered mechanisms of masculinist protection and the denial of agency upon the victimised. Thereby the hierarchical relation of power and domination relying upon the instrumentalisation of (dis)empowering gendered representations is basically constitutive of US identity as cast in these military documents.

6.4 Performing identity / foreign (security) policy

As it was argued in chapter III, the concept of performativity is a powerful tool for feminist analysis because it allows to disclose how (dis-)empowering relations are enacted, how they come into being and are perpetuated. Thereby performativity as a theoretical concept simultaneously generates the potential for transcending these very relations of power in practice. Performativity locates (feminist) political agency on the discursive level and is therewith empowering. It is the aim of this last section of the current chapter to discuss the

reciprocally performative relation between identity and foreign (security) policy in light of the findings of this very analysis. Therefore, the following section consecutively addresses performativity as a concept and puts an emphasis on its historicised background, it then briefly looks at the particular identifications in order to then enquire the locus of agency and finally tackle the feedback-loop of the analytical set-up of this study, namely by asking how the above discerned identifications performatively back-impact the formulation of US foreign security policy.

Both the military doctrine documents on ‘information operations’ and their products dispersed on the various battlefields are instances of US foreign security policy. As such the doctrine documents are authoritative articulations of US military intent and for US military practice in the concise field of so-called information operations. Further, the leaflets dropped over the battlefields and the loudspeaker transcripts of the messages addressed to the populations and combatants of the various countries invaded by the US armed forces in the time period under scrutiny in this analysis constitute themselves particular practices of US foreign security policy. As instances of US foreign security policy these documents are the starting point of the analysis undertaken here. Theorised as maintaining a mutually constitutive relation with identity, these foreign security policy documents were then enquired for their articulations of identity. This query for identity in the particular US foreign security policy focused on the gendered aspects of identity enactments. The claim is, thus, that these particular practices of US foreign security policy performatively enact the gendered constructions of identity discerned in the sections above. The reading of identity of foreign security policy documents strives to lay bare the contents of what is enacted by these practices. This means that the identity traits of both Self and Other as displayed in the above sections of this chapter come into being through the foreign security practice of the US military as articulated in the particular doctrine documents and their products.

Butler defines **performativity** as the “reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler 1993: 2). What does this mean with regard to the analysis undertaken here? First, the phenomena regulated and constrained by and through these foreign security policy documents cover identifications. Regulating and constraining what both the Self and the Others identify with these documents do, hence,

produce this particularly cast Self and the particularly cast Others. As seen in the sections above, the identifications available as in the military doctrine documents and as in their respective products confine the Self to masculinist neoliberalism with a vocation to dominance that manifests in an equally masculinist Orientalism. All eventual ambiguities for identification are marginalised. Second, performativity operates through the reiterative power of discourse. What does this mean? It is only through their constant repetition that utterances become normative (Becker-Schmitt/Knapp 2000: 93). The power of discourse – so conceptualised as performativity – resides in the citational and ritualised practice of referencing. In this concept, the term ‘reiteration’ ties to repetition but includes the potential for adjustment. The referencing, thus, on the one hand produces the contents of what it refers to and, on the other hand, allows for the slight, step-by-step shifting of these same contents.

Further and importantly, the centrality of referencing to the concept of performativity leads us to look at the substance of what is being referenced. The making of a reference, implicitly or explicitly, to another narrative is only seizable when we do understand the present as situated in a **historical context**. This is what so-called intertextuality tries to grasp. In order to claim authority and ultimately become hegemonic, an utterance references an earlier and thus already established narrative. It needs to resonate with something already known – be it in affiliation or in distantiation. This means that no articulation happens in a vacuum; while some utterances explicitly refer to precise and historically situated narratives others do so only implicitly. The latter is the case as soon as a particular narrative is culturally and socially sedimented to such a degree that it is no longer perceived as historically contingent but rather ‘a matter of fact’. It is naturalised; it is understood as a fact of nature, as a fact of simply ‘how things are’ – indisputable and therefore completely moved out of the arena of the political. It is thus crucial for the understanding of both the concept and the workings of performativity to “think the present historically” (Campbell 1992: 213). The entanglement of performativity and intertextuality – or more precisely, the fundamental importance of intertextuality for the workings of performativity – empower us with precisely this historical thinking of the present. What does this mean in the light of the findings of this analysis?

The **identification** traits found as performatively produced by the foreign security policy documents of the US armed forces all are historically rooted. Some references are more explicit and others are more naturalised. As seen in the analysis of the sections above, the carved identities of the Self and the Other precisely rely on historically rooted intertexts –

namely neoliberalism and Orientalism. And both these (historical) intertexts are explicit and outspokenly seizable for the analyst. Far more naturalised in contrast therewith are the masculinist underpinnings of both these historical intertexts and their particular contemporary articulations. However, these too are firmly rooted in a narrative that is historical. The dichotomies associating superiority and dominance with masculine power and inferiority and subordination with feminine subordination have long established and documented historical origins (Elshtain 1987, Peterson 1992, Pettman 1996, Steans 1998), all the while particular attributions and their interpretations do shift over time. Further, both male societies and masculinist protection, both intertexts identified in the sections above, have equally been historically constitutive of male ‘democratic’ subjectivity and female objectivation (Elshtain 1987, Goldstein 2001, Dudnik/Hagemann/Tosh 2004). Also the conflation of Orientalism and masculinism – and in particular, masculinism operating with the hierarchical structuring of masculinities and femininity – is a well-known and historically rooted instrument of domination and colonialism (Yuval-Davis 1997).

This all to say that performativity cannot work in a vacuum. Closely entwined, for the workings of performativity to become effective intertextual referencing is needed. It is this intertextual referencing which situates the performatively established present within a context that is historically conditioned. The present, thus, cannot become the one it is without referring to what has earlier been. In the light of the analysis undertaken for this study, this means that the identities of both the Self and the Other that performatively come into being by the particular US foreign security policy rely on narratives that are historically rooted. These identities are, thus, historically conditioned. But they are not historically determined. It also means that what these documents reiteratively produce, regulate and constrain are identities that empower and disempower along the lines of gendered domination.

This brings us to the query for the **potential of agency**. As formulated at the outset, the concept of performativity locates agency on the discursive level. What does this mean? The answering of this question is tied to the manner by which performativity accounts for change over time. As said above, reiteration ties to repetition but includes gradual adjustment. The citational practice of reiteration as the core of the performative practice involves that “instead of there being a singular moment of constitution or invention that brings subjects into being, there is a process of recitation and repetition that is constrained by cultural and historical practices, but which also gives rise to new formations and possibilities (Bialasiewicz et al 2007: 407). This is to say that no identity is brought into being by a single constitutive

discursive act. Rather, the citational practices of performativity gradually bring into being these identities; it is through repetition that these identifications become normative as mentioned above. It is also in these citational practices that the potential for change or subversion resides. Being aware of the (dis)empowering intertexts allows us to discontinue these particular citational practices; it enables us to shift attributive meaning of particular contents; it empowers us to make new and ‘strange’ citational connections; it can give rise to new formations and possibilities.

Not only does, according to the theoretical framework deployed for this study, the performative enactment of foreign policy bring identity into being but simultaneously does the performative enactment of identity bring foreign policy into being. The process, thus, runs both ways. This is what is meant when we say that the relation between foreign policy and identity is reciprocally performative. As a consequence of this theoretical understanding, the identity frameworks as analytically exhibited in the previous sections of this chapter do performatively enact a foreign security policy that concurs with these identifications. What does this mean? How does the US foreign security policy based upon its masculinist neoliberal and orientalist identity look like? Bringing both this section and this chapter to an end, this shall be exemplarily illustrated below.

A first example are the *US politics of securing the ‘homeland’* in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 and thereby I particularly mean the judicial and institutional homeland security initiatives including the creation of the Office of Homeland Security, the adoption of the USA PATRIOT Act, the publication of the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security through the Homeland Security Act of November 2002. In this example, the domestic scene of 11 September 2001 is particularly important. Concurring with the neoliberal omnipresence of struggle and competition, one of the founding binaries of statehood and sovereignty – the safe inside (home) as opposed to the anarchic and dangerous outside (abroad) – crumbles. The homeland is no longer a safe haven. The anarchic and dangerous outside has intruded. This experience causes the US president to state that the US is confronted with a declaration of war. The reciprocal declaration of the ‘war on terror’ does, at first sight, operate within the clearly drawn boundary separating peacetime from conditions of war. But it has also become clear immediately that this is no traditional war. The repetitive insistence on the novelty of both the war and the threat not only creates a situation of emergency, but also one of exceptionality, and thereby establishes a rationale that calls for the

application of new means and measures in order to face the danger, i.e. it demands the acceptance of ‘whatever it takes to win the war’. This observation applies on both levels, at home and abroad; the rationale of exceptionality is invoked by the US in order to legitimise the transgression of norms and rules of both international and domestic law. The external realm is used in order to legitimate extraordinary measures at home. The interweaving of military and civilian terms becomes evident furthermore at such moments as when the US president calls the Washington police force *troops* or a firefighter *soldier*. It is thus military language and practice that seizes the inside, it conquers the domestic space. As president Bush has put it: “America is now the battlefield” (Bush 2002a) and “the front of the new war is here in America” (Bush 2002b). Because the war is won through the patriotism and the unity of the American people it is clear that someone who is not ‘with us’ can only be with the enemy. Such utterances are practice and not only do they ‘discipline’ the objects of security (the population), but also do they raise the pressure on the private sector to cooperate. The exceptionality rationale of the so-called homeland security practices militarises the domestic space and simultaneously forestalls any potential challenge to the policy options chosen and the responses adopted.

Further, the concept of war – representative here of how through this war’s claimed novel quality, the military rationale has intruded the inside – *per se* inherently draws on dichotomous thinking. It needs to do so in order to establish the supported rationale that political ends, the security of the homeland, can be achieved through violent means, namely by the ‘war on terror’. Not only is war as opposed to peace most efficiently legitimating the exceptionality rationale but also is its ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomous identification a fundamental precondition for gaining support when nations fight an Other. Both of the major characteristics of dichotomous thinking, the homogenising within the one category – the ‘us’ – and the insistence upon the qualitative difference between the categories – the assigning of inferiority to the ‘them’ – give rise to conflict and are reinforced by conflict. Thus, the policy of recurring to war as a response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 in itself represents a prominent instance of how US identity constructions and foreign security policy mutually and simultaneously enact each other. The US policy practices in response to ‘9/11’ and the endorsement of the ‘new’ politics of securing the homeland by recurring to war are thus, as I claim, an instance of the performative enactment of the previously discerned identity framework. Moreover, this response represents the standard hegemonic action in times of crisis. As David Campbell puts it:

“[t]he response of the war machine is consistent with the logic of previous state responses to crises. The response that would have changed the world would have seen Presidents and Prime Ministers stand before the cameras and say that because it was the principle of respect for civilian life that had been assaulted, we would unite with others in the laborious, step-by-step, time-consuming task of justice [to capture indicted suspects and bring them to an international tribunal], so that our actions would not be the ones which validated the terrorist logic of ends justifying means” (Campbell 2002: 165).

This option, which is often mistaken as more ‘feminine’ whereas it is simply less gendered – two fundamentally different assertions – is carefully ridiculed by the US president. On the one hand, in nearly every single utterance in the aftermath of ‘9/11’ relating to the attacks he claimed that the evildoers need to be brought to justice. In a democratic political system resting on the principle of legal certainty such rhetoric framing unambiguously evokes the holding of a regular court trial. On the other hand, what reappeared in manifold utterances of the US president as regards homeland security is also the following phrase in obvious mockery of the above mentioned allusion: “they probably thought we might file a lawsuit or two” (Bush 2002c). Each time this phrase is followed by (in the transcript mentioned) laughter. Not only is such silencing of alternative policy options powerful, but also does it ridicule the principle of legal justice as a tool for the ‘weak’ that is incompatible with the strong and independent Self.

On the *societal level*, what it means to be an American was in this instance intimately linked to who is framed to ‘have saved us on 9/11’. The glorification of an ethos of masculine bravery and action, sacrifice, brotherhood, and responsibility was contrasted against a pre-‘9/11’ identity inspired by personal gain and decadence. The fact that the role of men as heroic protectors regained its full force within American society as a consequence of the attacks manifested in the image of fire-fighters, police officers, politicians and defence specialists, and soldiers. These images of a militarised form of hegemonic masculinity represented the ‘inherent force of good’ and strength of the US American nation. As one columnist formulated it:

“Hardly anyone is confused about gender anymore. It’s men we’re sending into alien landscapes of Afghanistan, and we’re praying they’re tough and strong and mean. There’s no confusion about leadership either. It’s George W. Bush and his battle-savvy Cabinet we’re grateful for, and we pray they’re tough, strong and mean enough too” (Parker 2001).

This shows that the stereotype of masculinised toughness was again elevated “to the status of an enshrined good” (Enloe 2005), implying not only the use of military means as the most appropriate response but also the militarisation of internal police forces, firefighters and homeland security workers since they call for conformity with the ideals of the stereotypical attributes of hegemonic and militarised masculinity – toughness, strength, sacrifice.

A second example of how the earlier discerned identifications of the US as cast in its military documents performatively enact foreign security policy is the *endeavouring of women’s rights as a cause and reason to ‘liberate Afghanistan’*. Starting with a joint effort by the then First Lady Laura Bush using her husband’s weekly radio address (Bush L. 2001) and then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the defence of Afghan women’s rights was from the beginning of the so-called ‘war on terror’ ventured in order to legitimise the war effort. Several aspects of the earlier discerned identifications play in one another’s hands in this tracing of Afghan women as victimised by their brutal oppressors. These women are deprived of agency, they cannot liberate themselves but need to be rescued by the civilised and benign, cultivated and strong US soldiers; a male duty upon which Afghan men fail. Not only, however, have Afghan women been fighting for their rights long since (see e.g. RAWA – the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan founded as early as 1977) but the Taliban themselves have come to power through the help of the United States in their effort to push back the Soviet Union; their waiving of women’s rights though remained as uncriticised by their supporter as their blunt misogyny (Evans 2002).

It is highly informative to read in a recently leaked CIA Red Cell document that since “counting on apathy might not be enough” (CIA Red Cell 2010: para. 1), Western European publics need to be influenced in order to better support the war effort in Afghanistan by drawing once again attention to the plight of Afghan women. In particular, the French largely secular public is thought of as receptive to the “prospect of the Taliban rolling back hard-won progress on girls’ education” (ibid.: para. 13) since the French are “focused on civilians and

refugees” (ibid.: para. 11), their plights “are likely to resonate with French audiences” (ibid.: para 14). In short, this document bluntly states that and how “Afghan women could serve as an ideal messenger in humanizing the ISAF” (ibid.: para 22). This confidential document leaked in March 2010 makes it crystal clear that the claimed defence of women’s rights in Afghanistan is a hollow façade. Women’s rights and girl’s education are not a motive in themselves, but rather it is the humanisation of the ISAF that is envisioned in order “overcome pervasive scepticism in Western Europe toward the ISAF mission” (ibid.: para 22). This understanding of the women’s rights-claim as not a genuine interest but as functional to the war effort is also discernible in the recent creation of the so-called women engagement teams. The marines have created women-only teams with the assignment to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan population. Thus, female soldiers are thought of as of higher functionality to the winning of the hearts and minds of civilians than are male soldiers. In particular, they are instructed to “breaking the ice by playing with the kids” (Tages Anzeiger 2010).

A third example of how, in this case, particularly the masculinist and orientalist traits of identification performatively enact aspects of foreign security policy is how *religion* is endeavoured and amalgamated with both race (implicitly) and ‘manliness’ (explicitly) in the current war effort of the United States. We do all remember the crusade analogy ventured by George W. Bush in the immediate aftermath of ‘September 11th’ (Bush 2001a). Although, an effort to rectify and control damage was issued after European countries protested the wording and thinking (Ford 2001), these early statements succinctly brought to the fore the mental framework of those practicing war as the ‘adequate’ response to terrorism. A mental framework that is, supposedly, deeply entrenched also in US military thinking. Only in January 2010 a message hit the news, which went as largely unnoticed as it is revealing: “U.S. Military Weapons Inscribed with Secret ‘Jesus’ Bible Codes” it read (Rhee et al 2010). More precisely, in obscene violation of US military rules specifically prohibiting the proselytising of any religion in Iraq or Afghanistan, high-powered rifle sights used by the US troops precisely in Iraq and Afghanistan are inscribed with citations of the new testament. These read: “For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ” and “Whoever follows me will never walk in darkness, but will have the light of life” (ibid.: para. 5 and 6).

This does also correspond with the spirit of the then-CEO of the mercenary company formerly known as Blackwater and now rebranded as Xe, Erik Prince, who's company has won government contracts worth at least hundreds of millions of dollars since 2001. In a sworn statement made to the court examining the killing of civilians by employees of the firm in July 2009 by a former employee, Prince is portrayed as viewing himself as “as a Christian crusader tasked with eliminating Muslims and the Islamic faith from the globe” (Declaration of John Doe No. 2 2009, para. 9) and to that end “intentionally deployed to Iraq certain men who shared his vision of Christian supremacy, knowing and wanting these men to take every available opportunity to murder Iraqis. Many of these men used call signs based on the Knights of the Templar, the warriors who fought the Crusades” (ibid.: para. 10). The personal and institutional entanglement between this mercenary firm and those practicing war as the policy in response to terrorism is tight and pervasive (Van Heuvelen 2007).

Thus, as the well-known columnist and former speech-writer of Ronald Reagan, Peggy Noonan, did put it as early as October 2001, “God is Back”. In her opinion, “the cross survived. This is how God speaks to us ... [because] this whole story is about good and evil, about the clash of good and evil” leading her to “experiencing Sept. 11 not as a political event but as a spiritual event” (Noonan 2001, para. 1-5). Further she amalgamates her experiencing of the return of God with the return of men, real men. Those who have been pushed back by “feminists [and] peaceniks, leftists, intellectuals, [and] others” (ibid.: para 23) those

“who push things and pull things and haul things and build things, men who charge up the stairs in a hundred pounds of gear and tell everyone else where to go to be safe. Men who are welders, who do construction, men who are cops and firemen. They are all of them, one way or another, the men who put the fire out, the men who are digging the rubble out, and men who will build whatever takes its place. And their style is back in style. We are experiencing a new respect for their old-fashioned masculinity, a new respect for physical courage, for strength and for the willingness to use both for the good of others.” (ibid. para. 8-9)

These men should be cheered, clapped and kisses thrown at (ibid. para 12). “Why? Well, [because] manliness wins war. Strength and guts plus brains and spirit wins wars.” (ibid. para. 19).

These are but a few of the policies and societal developments exemplary showing how policy-making and identity-making mutually rest upon and performatively enact one another.

VII – CONCLUSIONS

Concluding this analysis, the following last chapter strives to succinctly recall what this study was set out for, how it is theoretically anchored and how its analysis empirically proceeded and summarise its results in order to then reflectively draw some conclusions about what its particular achievements are.

Based on the observation about the intersection of two phenomena which is all to seldom merely noticed not to mention duly scrutinised, it is at the core of the interest of the research undertaken for this study to tackle the gendered underlying assumptions of the so-called semantic military information operations and the mutual and constitutive implications thereof. Both these phenomena are conceptualized as crucial to the constitution and therefore analysis of power, its distribution and its challenge. Further, since both a state's intentional attempts to shape perceptions of whatever audience and the constructions of and through gender in war, peace and security depend on discursive frameworks in order to perform, discourse analysis was chosen as the most suitable tool to unravel the respective mechanisms at work. Hence, *this research project set out* to do a discourse analysis of the United States' military perception management doctrine and products in the period between 1991 and 2003 and ask how this particular discourse draws on gendered constructions of identity and what implications these constructions perform on the state, on its policy and its society.

Set in the *context* of some general and recent societal transformations such as the abolition of the draft and the introduction of the All-Volunteer-Force in the United States in 1973, the following intensified integration of women into the United States' armed forces, the end of the Cold War and the rise and heyday of the neoliberal globalisation coupled with the so-called information revolution, the research undertook for this study could draw on a vast body of scientific literature on the so-called changing nature of warfare, on issues of gender in war, peace and security and on recent military doctrinal and conceptual developments.

Since discourse analysis as epistemological framework is located within the *theoretical strand of poststructuralism* it is this approach to the study of International Relations that anchors the

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research undertook for this study. At its core is the reciprocally performative *relation* between *foreign policy and identity*; identity is crucial insofar as “foreign policies rely upon representations of identity” while simultaneously “it is through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced” (Hansen 2006: 1). It was thus the aim of this analysis to read identity of foreign policy texts and vice versa. In this reading, identity is understood as lacking a foundational essence but depending upon its enactment. It is the concepts of spatiality, temporality and ethicality that bring out the political substance of identity construction. In order to bring out these substances, a process of multiple reading was applied as the tool for textual deconstruction of dominant meanings and practices in order to disclose their very contingency.

Therefore, the *particularities of studying issues of gender* in the setting of *military doctrine documents* and their implementation had to be first set up. On the one hand, not only is a resolute silence on gender often characteristic of institutions of hegemonic masculinity such as the military but also, on the other hand, does a strong normative power reside within the mechanisms of silencing: both the implicit silence on gender and the explicit reference to masculinity as the norm naturalise the effects of dichotomous gender stereotypes by rendering them invisible. The theoretical enquiries of this study are thus led by the quest for how the silence on the invisible can be studied. Further, the narratives established by the implementation products of US military perception management draw on manifold and longstanding gendered stereotypes resting on qualificative binaries. The theoretical enquiries of this study are thus further led by the quest for how to grasp the manner by which the binarily gendered stereotypes are perpetuated. Responding to these quests, the analytical tools of intertextuality and performativity are advanced as suitable and practicable.

Intertextuality as a strategy for the generation of hegemonic discourses relies on texts making references to other texts in their strive to establish authority. On the one hand, the close investigation of the intertextual references that naturalise the absence of gender in military doctrine documents is a useful tool for feminist analysis. Such a reading enables us to undermine the naturalised absence of gender and the (dis-)empowering conception of gender that comes with this absence. It enables us to make visible what is generally not seen and is therefore claimed to be inexistent, and to problematise what was assumed to be unproblematic. On the other hand, the textual bodies constituted by the military products of perception management explicitly build identities by making intertextual references to very specific dichotomously gendered carvings of identity. The laying open of these narratives is

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crucial to making them strange; the deconstruction of the manner in which these hegemonic discourses are intertextually generated shows how these discourses are perpetuated, and conversely, how they can be transcended.

Performativity, or the constitutive consequentiality of discourse, is core to this study because it concretely is the site “for the production and reproduction of particular subjectivities and identities while others are simultaneously excluded” (Hansen 2006: 18f). If not only the performative enactment of foreign policy brings identity into being, but the performative enactment of identity also brings foreign policy into being, it is this ontology of the linguistic construction that harbours the potential for change. First, the military doctrine documents on perception management and also the products thereof as deployed on the field are clearly an important aspect of a state’s foreign policy. Second, articulations of identity that can be discerned in these documents rely significantly on gendered constructions. Disclosing the reciprocally performative relation between these two features exposes the contingency of both the gendered underlying assumptions of military perception management and the formulated necessity of this particular and presumably crucial tool of foreign policy as a function of identity constructions. Once this contingency is disclosed, political agency follows suit.

Relying on the elaborate research model for discourse analysis by Hansen (2006) the two individual bodies of documents were each subjected to an individual process of *multiple reading and continuous category-building* in order to trace both the grand and inexplicit gendered narratives of identity construction in the military doctrine documents and the more explicit articulations of binarily gendered stereotypes of the very same in the products of perception management. Importantly, this process of multiple reading, each round of which generated the analytical category applied to the consecutive one, is also open to unanticipated findings and allowed for integrating these.

Reflecting the first analytical step of this study, the development of the **military doctrine** codifying so-called information operations was traced first. It was shown how the paradigm of the ‘information age’ gained the armed forces, how information is in this body of documents conceptualised as instrumental to victory and how these developments have influenced the depiction of the adversaries. Further it was shown how the ‘moulding of the human mind’ is theorised and what implications and inherent weaknesses come with this theorisation.

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Properly reading identity out of these foreign policy texts, the second analytical step of this study then concretely asked how identification elements are built up in these texts examined and what character traits these identities carry. One of the early and unanticipated findings covers the pervasive ideological inclusions that the identifications, specifically those discernible in the military doctrine documents, are operating with. As hypothesised, the gendered intertexts reside mainly in an ample and culturally sedimented narrative. This narrative is the neoliberal ideology. *The 'information age' military identity is fundamentally an identity suited for the requirements of the current neoliberal times.* Not only do we therefore need to denounce the term 'information age' as what it is, namely an ideological tool in the toolkit for hegemony, externalising and naturalising the instrumentalised workings of technological change but also do we need to focus attention straight on the gendered underpinnings of these our neoliberal times and the hegemonic identity requirements that come with it. As with regards to the doctrinal military context examined, these unfold their workings particularly through *stereotypical and hierarchical dichotomies* on the immediate identity level and through the mechanisms of *male society* and the principle of *masculinist protection* on the ideological level of identification. Intertwining the immediate 'information age' military identity with the neoliberal intermediary of identification a *shift* of particular traits of *hegemonic masculinity* is further detectable.

Again reflecting the first analytical step, the key aspects and major themes that came to the fore subjecting the second body of documents – namely the **psychological operations leaflets** – to the first round of the analytical process of multiple reading were traced secondly. It was shown how the picturing of the enemy in these documents relies on blaming the hostilities on the leaders who are portrayed as evil and brutal cowards, how family members are included in these depictions, which also operate by means of reward leaflets and what were called 'we trapped them'-leaflets. Further, the enemy combatants are mainly addressed by calls for surrender either promising good treatment or relying on simple threats of annihilation; also their supposedly lost cause is invoked as well as their leaders' decadence unworthy of honourable but erroneous loyalty. This analytical step also traced the main messages addressed to the civilian population. These strive to advance the invaders' reasoning behind the military operations, they tell what the civilian populations are supposedly helped with and whom they are being rescued from. These leaflets further strive to convince about achievements made, appeal to people's morale and give them manifold instructions of varying

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nature. Last but not least, the manifold claims and supposedly multiple-layered supremacy of the invader as depicted in these leaflets were exposed.

Hence, immediate identity ascriptions are eye-catchingly prominent in the second body of documents. The second analytical step applied to these documents thus again properly focused on their gendered intertexts. What then came to the surface is a multi-relational identity setting that is *heavily gendered and Orientalist*. The narratives discernible in the leaflets dropped over the conflict zones by the US armed forces draw on manifold and explicit, stereotypical and hierarchically gendered dichotomies in their making of identities. In their casting of an *ultimately superior Self they rely on Orientalist representations amalgamating the Other into an uncivilised, incognisant, defaulting Other*. In order to reinforce and reproduce the Orientalist polarisation between the Self and the Other gendered *hierarchies of masculinities and emasculation* are instrumentalised as are the heavily gendered mechanisms of *masculinist protection* and the *denial of agency upon the victimised*. Thereby the hierarchical relation of power and domination relying upon the instrumentalisation of (dis)empowering gendered representations is basically constitutive of US identity as cast in these military documents.

Sticking to Butler's definition of **performativity** as the "reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains" (Butler 1993: 2) the identifications discerned in the military doctrine documents and in their respective products confine the Self to masculinist neoliberalism with a vocation to dominance that manifests in an equally masculinist Orientalism. These identities of both the Self and the Other that performatively come into being by the particular US foreign security policy rely on narratives that are *historically rooted* – neoliberalism and Orientalism and the conflation of both of them with masculinism. These identities are, thus, historically conditioned. But they are not historically determined. Further, what these documents reiteratively produce, regulate and constrain are identities that empower and disempower along the lines of gendered domination. Examples illustrating how the identity frameworks based upon masculinist neoliberalism and Orientalism back-impact on the state, its policies and its society can be found in the *US politics of securing the homeland* in the aftermath of 11th September 2001, in the endeavouring of *women's rights as a cause and reason to 'liberate Afghanistan'* and also in

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the way *religion* is endeavoured and *amalgamated with both race and 'manliness'* in the current war effort of the United States.

The intertextual analysis ventured here claims to have denaturalised the silence on gender and undermined the supposed absence of gender and the (dis)empowering relations that come with this absence in military doctrine documents and their products. It claims to have made visible the invisible and problematised the supposedly unproblematic. By pointing to the close entwining of the intertextual referencing for the unfolding of performativity, the analysis further claims to have shown how the hierarchically gendered relations of power inherent to masculinism and characteristically associating power with hegemonic masculinity as discernible in both the doctrine documents and their implementations are continuously reproduced by the mutual enactment of current security practices and identities.

Based on the argument made about the compatibility of discourse analysis and approaches critical of ideologies, I claim that it is a further *achievement* of the research presented here to have shown how a discourse analysis can be complemented with analytical elements stemming from the approaches critical of ideologies. Mainly, it showed that and how ideology can be analytically captured as an element constitutive of identity; how ideology can be read as identity. Such a reading discloses the power inherent to the particular ideologies discerned as constitutive of US identity and as carved in the military documents analysed since it is the very naturalising features ascribed to identity that enable ideological inclusions without being noticed as what they are, namely ideological and thus, having a vocation to strategically (dis-)empower. As specified in the respective section, by ideology I mean a mental framework procedurally becoming true through the discursive structuring of (some) real interests and experiences. It is these interests that give an ideology its vocation to strategically (dis-)empower.

The analysis presented here showed how the identity structured by and through the military doctrine documents concurs with neoliberalism and masculinism. Both are ideologies; they are mental frameworks continuously becoming true through the discursive structuring of – in this case – the experiences of the military personnel. The strategic (dis)empowering resides on the one hand in the subjecting of the individual to constant adaptability, flexibility and responsibility and thereby atomising it and on the other hand, in

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subjecting it to qualificative dichotomies and homogenising standards systematically privileging the supposedly male by symbolically linking (hegemonic) masculinity and power. As seen in the analysis, neoliberalism and masculinism conflate.

Further, the analysis presented here also showed how the identities structured by and through the military leaflets dropped over the particular conflict zones concur with Orientalism and how this Orientalism is masculinist. Orientalism too, of course, is an ideology; it is domination in the making, it is both a product of and an instrument in the process of subjugation (Halliday 1993). In taking the domination of the Self over the Other over from the past, affirming it for the present and reinstalling it for the future, the Orientalism traceable in the identity constructions of the military psychological operations leaflets relies on the instantiation of the subjugated Other as either brutal barbarians, incognisant civilians or failing concurrents – and this on both dimensions, civilisation and masculinity.

A strict discourse analysis strives to lay bare the schemes of power within the particular discourses under scrutiny – in the case of the research presented here these are the subjugating features of atomising the individual soldier by imposing on him or her the identity traits of the ‘information age’ and its heavily gendered intertexts on the one hand, and the equally subjugating features of saming and othering along the conflating lines of race and gender, invader and invaded, Self and Other on the other hand. The research presented here does provide this. But it does not stop there. Rather it does, based on the argument about the compatibility and complementarity of such an approach with one critical of ideologies, name the schemes of power having come to the fore and continuously becoming true through their discursive structuring in the very documents analysed here. Thereby, these schemes of power are associated with and located within a larger set of a mental framework. Temporarily fixing the meaning of these schemes of power, they come to confer with an ideology. The ideologies namely are neoliberalism and Orientalism and the conjunction of both with masculinism. Further, by their location within a larger context of a mental framework with vocation to hegemony, these schemes of power also become criticisable more systematically. Thereby, they are brought into the realm of the politically contestable, they are politicised on a larger scale. Thus, exemplarily showing the potential complementarity of discourse analysis and approaches critical of ideologies, the laying bare of the schemes of power operating within

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discourses does, from the analytical perspective, precede the critical analysis of societal circumstances characterised by its conjunction of analysis and criticism. The analysis presented here has done both, but to varying degrees. It has provided a sound discourse analysis of military documents. It has laid open the schemes of power operating within this particular discourse.

In conveying this analysis into an analysis critical of ideologies, however, it relies on the criticism issued upon these particular ideologies by other analyses and namely on the characteristic conjunction of analysis and criticism. This means that while the analysis presented here claims to have thoroughly shown how and why the identifications conjured up in the discourse scrutinised concur with a masculinist neoliberalism and an equally masculinist Orientalism, it is beyond its scope to show with the same degree of elaborateness how and why these ideologies only deliver inadequate, partial and monolithical sense-making. However, in its strive to not only lay bare the schemes of power operating within the discourses scrutinised but to also conjoin analysis and criticism, this study does live up to its inherent standard that the ability to choose a standpoint – offered by the theoretical framework of poststructuralism – does not, by no means, discharge one from doing so.

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- 4) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code (The cold face of death in war).
- 5) CIA, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code (25 Dinar banknote CIA issue – The Butcher of Baghdad).
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- 10) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ L011 (Do not trust them).
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- 27) USACAPOC; 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ GG05-0002, (We fight for money and power! Oops I mean religion).
- 28) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G05-060, (Why is this the only picture you ever see of Zarqawi?).
- 29) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ L013, (SADDAM is a coward. Saddam wants you to die).
- 30) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D0982, (Moqtada is a nobody!).
- 31) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D24, (Drive out the foreign terrorists!).
- 32) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ C32523, (This damage was done by Terrorists/Mufsideons).

SOURCES

- 33) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8568d, (Progress in Iraq continues despite of those attackers who seek to darken...)
- 34) USACAPOC, 2006, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ07HB5055 (Helping evil people will lead to destruction).
- 35) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (Saddam's prediction).
- 36) 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), 1991, 'Leaflets of the Persian Gulf War', (Safe Conduct Pass), p. 22
- 37) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (SAFE CONDUCT PASS).
- 37b) 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), 1991, 'Leaflets of the Persian Gulf War', (Safe Conduct Pass), p. 17.
- 38) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (SAFE CONDUCT PASS).
- 39) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Strom, No Code, (To stay here means death).
- 40) USACAPOC, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF G12a, (Your ship maybe sunk).
- 41) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ L016a, (Your brother were destroyed when they fought the Coalition in 1991).
- 42) USACAPOC; 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (Your Time is up!).
- 43) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 03-NN-17-L002, (Zilhade bombi...).
- 44) USA; 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D005, (Do not take an offensive posture and you will not be destroyed).
- 45) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D7505, (Iraqi Soldiers your position has been targeted for destruction by Coalition Forces).
- 46) USA, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D019a, (Nobody benefits from the use of weapons of mass destruction).
- 47) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 04-B-02-L017, (Only Unity will save the Serbs).
- 48) USA, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZD1bd05, (Before you engage Coalition Aircraft, think about the consequences).
- 49) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Strom, No Code, (Your supply lines are cut!)
- 50) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 03-K-06-L001, (Your blood ... their reward).
- 51) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, TF11-RP05, (Usama Bin Laden sends his murderers into the world to kill for his cause).
- 52) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (My Iraqi brother).
- 53) USA, 2002, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 'Commando Solo Radio Messages Over Iraq'
- 54) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G05-0068, (Heroism has a new face. Terror has no sanctuary).
- 55) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZGG012, (SECURE IRAQ'S FUTURE. COME WITH US).
- 56) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D94, (Al Qaeda, your escape routes are mined).

SOURCES

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- 58) UNITAF, 1992, Operation Restore Hope, No Code, (Wasaanu Xagan Unimid in Aanu Difaacno Dadca Idin Caawinaya), Translation provided in: op. cit . Zinni.
- 59) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, No Code, (NATO Napadi)
- 60) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 04-B-02-L001. Translation provided in: Friedman, SGM Herbert A., (1999), 'Kosovo and Serbia' in The Falling Leaf. The Quarterly Journal of the PsyWar Society, No. 165.
- 61) USACAPOC, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D22b, (Smoking World Trade Center & Collapsed Afghan building).
- 62) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D10c, (The partnership of nations is here to help).
- 63) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, No Code, (Friendship).
- 64) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G4028, (Coalition soldiers have families also).
- 65) USA, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D027, (Coalition forces do no wish to harm the noble people of Iraq).
- 66) USA, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D7509, (Our fight is against Saddam and his regime – not the Iraqi people).
- 67) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 04-B03-L001, (Guess What).
- 68) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 05-B03-L001, (Sinovi, a ne kovechzi).
- 69) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 04-R-11-L001, (Ne dozvolite Miloshevich da vac napravi metom).
- 70) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D114, (Taliban and Al-Qai'da use innocent women and children as shields).
- 71) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ GG05-0001, (Are the places of God and worship turning into hide-outs for terrorists and their weapons?)
- 72) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D12b, (America has provided over \$170 million in aid to Afghanistan).
- 73) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ Q05-0075a, (Terrorists poison the minds of our children).
- 74) USACAPOC; 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8562b, (Terrorists are criminals that demonstrate little regard for Iraq's prosperity)
- 75) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D124, (A United Afghanistan – Peace prosperity – new government – new freedoms)
- 76) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8571da, (Citizens of Iraq, continuous progress is being made...)
- 77) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8598, (Citizens of Baghdad. In the six months since Saddam's defeat).

SOURCES

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- 80) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ C8521, (Anti-Coalition agitators are not serving your interests).
- 81) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8560, (The Coalition thanks you for your assistance in helping to reduce crime and terrorism).
- 82) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ C8519CI, (Freedom = Responsibility).
- 83) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G143, (Visions of Freedom for Iraq).
- 84) UNITAF, 1993, Operation Restore Hope, No Code, (UNITAF'S vision is to provide a secure environment), in op. cit. Zinni, p. 16.
- 85) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (We are all brothers...)
- 86) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No code, (With peace we will always remain united).
- 87) CIA, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (25 Dinar banknote (CIA issue)).
- 88) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (25 Dinar banknote).
- 89) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Strom, No Code, (25 Dinar banknote).
- 90) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D88, (Many Threads make one rug).
- 91) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, No Code, (Brick by brick).
- 92) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ GG013, (We serve one Iraq).
- 93) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G104, (STRENGTH IN UNITY).
- 94) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ GG05-0003, (Terrorists don't have the right to vote).
- 95) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8575, (Mustafa! Look at that! Hey! Stop that!).
- 96) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ Q05-0059, (THE STRONG REFUSE TO BE TERRORIZED!).
- 97) UNITAF, 1992, Operation Restore Hope, No Code, (OPERATION CLEAN STREETS), in op. cit. Zinni, p. 14.
- 98) UNITAF, 1992, Operation Restore Hope, No Code, (Moving the bodies), in op. cit. Zinni, p. 17.
- 99) UNITAF, 1992, Operation Restore Hope, No Code, (Looting, stealing, and throwing rocks), in op. cit. Zinni, p. 18.
- 100) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D7502, (Saddam's war criminals are fleeing).
- 101) USACACOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ C149, (Coalition Provisional Authority Directive to ensure safety).
- 102) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ Q8528a, (Citizens of Baghdad).

SOURCES

- 103) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, CI C8557, (Attention Citizens of Baghdad).
- 104) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ C8520iCI, (INDEPENDENCE MARKET).
- 105) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8545, (THIS IS AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE To All Parents of School-Aged Children).
- 106) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8539a, (Throwing Rocks is Dangerous!)
- 107) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, CI G8539, (Do Not Aim Laser Pointers at Iraqi Police or Coalition Forces).
- 108) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8532, (Do not fire your weapons into the air).
- 109) USA, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D046, (Dumping oil poisons Iraqi waterways, as well as your family's future).
- 110) USA, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D061, (Coalition forces support the people of Iraq in their desire to remove Saddam).
- 111) USA, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D1000, (Assist Downed Coalition Pilots).
- 112) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8568b, (Like the morning sun rising on the horizon, progress in Iraq will continue).
- 113) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, No Code, (Hey what's wrong? I'm hurting).
- 114) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D0010a, (Military fiber optic cables have been targeted for destruction).
- 115) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8514a, (Citizens of Baghdad. Theft of electrical wire and supplies only delays).
- 116) UNITAF, 1992, Operation Restore Hope, No Code, (UNITAF engineers working to help Somali people), in op. cit. Zinni, p. 15.
- 117) UNITAF, 1992, Operation Restore Hope, No Code, (THESE ARE FORBIDDEN IN AFGOOYE...), in op. cit. Zinni, p. 13.
- 118) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8726b, (Reward for handing rocket propelled grenades).
- 119) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8726c, (Criminals and terrorists are using these MANPAD missile systems).
- 120) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AFD-DG2, (Danger!).
- 121) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8546, (Bombs don't care who they kill!).
- 122) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8548, (Let's explore this lot!)
- 123) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ C148, (FREEDOM MESAG TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE).
- 124) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Strom, No Code, (This is your first and last warning!).

SOURCES

- 125) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (Staying here means death).
- 126) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D102c, (Help the Partnership of Nations bring peace and stability to you).
- 127) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 020-20D, (Coalition Air Power can strike at will. Any time. Any place).
- 128) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ L006, (LEAVE THIS AREA NOW).
- 129) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (CEASE RESISTANCE BE SAFE).
- 130) USA, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (Soldier Surrounded), in 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) (1991), Leaflets of the Persian Gulf War, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 131) USA, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (Big Gun), in 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) (1991), Leaflets of the Persian Gulf War, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 132) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 03-Q09-L004, (Ne chekaj za mene!)
- 133) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D062, (Stop fighting for the Taliban and live).
- 134) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G7527, (No matter where you run. No matter where you hide).
- 135) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D7529, (Coalition forces will end the Saddam Fedayeen).
- 136) USA, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ D038, (We can see everything).
- 137) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8533, (The Ba'ath Party will never regain power).
- 138) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AFD 040f, (Taliban and Al Qaida fighters we know...)
- 139) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D69b, (Al-Qai'da do you think that your are safe...)
- 140) USACAPOC, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D96, (Bombing underground caves).
- 141) USACAPOC, 1991, Operation Desert Storm, No Code, (The United States is conforming to the Geneva Convention)
- 142) NATO, 1999, Operation Allied Force, 04-B-02-L009, (Mi smo potpuno angazhovahi).
- 143) USACAPOC, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, EF2C11L1, (Task Force Sword).
- 144) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D16g. (Halal).
- 145) USACAPOC, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8529 (Many of the power outages affecting Baghdad are due to acts of sabotage).
- 146) USACAPOV, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G8539b, (Coalition Forces remain steadfast and resolute).

SOURCES

- 147) USA, 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom, AF D102b, (Marching soldiers with heavy backpacks).
- 148) USACAPOC, Operation Iraqi Freedom, IZ G4013, (Coalition Forces are here to:).

Annexe

I. Abstract German

Diese Arbeit liefert eine Diskursanalyse der Militärdoktrin der Vereinigten Staaten zu Perceptionsmanagement und ihrer Produkte zwischen 1991 und 2003. Sie fragt danach, wie sich dieser spezifische Diskurs auf vergeschlechtlichte Konstruktionen von Identität bezieht und mit welchen Auswirkungen für den Staat, seine Politik und seine Gesellschaft.

Die theoretische Verankerung dieser Arbeit liefert der Poststrukturalismus und seine Anwendung im Fach der internationalen Beziehungen. Dessen Kern ist die reziprok performative Beziehung zwischen Außenpolitik und Identität, wobei Identität entscheidend ist insofern, als dass "Außenpolitiken auf Repräsentationen von Identität angewiesen sind" während es gleichzeitig "durch die Formulierung von Außenpolitiken zur Produktion von Identität kommt" (Hansen 2006: 1, Übersetzung der Autorin). Es ist also das Ziel dieser Analyse, Identität aus Außenpolitiktexten zu lesen und umgekehrt. Bei diesem Lesen wird Identität verstanden als von ihrer in Kraft-Setzung abhängig und nicht als in einer Essenz fußend. Um die Substanz dieser in Kraft-Setzungen hervorzubringen, wird ein Prozeß des mehrfach-Lesens als Instrument für die Dekonstruktion von herrschenden Sinngebungen und Praxen auf die Texte angewendet. Erstens sind die militärischen Doktrindokumente zu Perceptionsmanagement wie auch die aus dieser Doktrin entstandenen und im Feld angewendeten Produkte ein wichtiger Aspekt der Außenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten. Zweitens sind die Artikulationen von Identität, die in diesen Dokumenten ausgemacht werden können, angewiesen auf vergeschlechtlichte Konstruktionen. Das Aufzeigen der reziprok performativen Beziehung zwischen diesen zwei Befunden beleuchtet die Kontingenz sowohl der dem US militärischen Perceptionsmanagement zugrundeliegenden vergeschlechtlichten Prämissen als auch der formulierten Notwendigkeit dieses spezifischen, und unterstellt entscheidenden, Instruments von Außenpolitik als Funktion von Identitätskonstruktionen.

Diese Analyse zeigt, dass die vergeschlechtlichten Intertexte in den Militärdoktrindokumenten vor allem in einem weitläufigen und kulturell verankerten Narrativ zu finden sind. Dieses Narrativ ist die neoliberale Ideologie. Die militärische Identität, gebunden an das sogenannte 'Informationszeitalter', ist eine Identität, die den Anforderungen der neoliberalen Zeit entspricht. Die hegemonialen Identitätsansprüche, die damit einhergehen entfalten ihre Wirkung durch stereotype und hierarchische Dichotomien auf der unmittelbaren

Identitätsebene einerseits und durch männerbündlerische Mechanismen und das Prinzip des/der ‘maskulinistischen Schutzes/Schonung’ (masculinist protection) auf der ideologischen Ebene der Identifikation andererseits. Des Weiteren verflacht eine Verschiebung von bestimmten Eigenschaften der hegemonialen Männlichkeit die unmittelbare, militärische ‘Informationszeitalter’-Identität mit der durch die neoliberale Ideologie vermittelten Identifikation. Die hier vorgelegte Analyse zeigt, wie die Identität, die von und durch diese spezifischen Militärdoktrindokumente strukturiert wird, mit dem Neoliberalismus und dem Maskulismus zusammentrifft. Beides sind Ideologien. Deren strategische Be/Ent-Mächtigung operiert einerseits dadurch, dass das Individuum dem Anspruch der konstanten Anpassungsfähigkeit, Flexibilität und Verantwortlichkeit unterworfen und damit vereinzelt wird und andererseits dadurch, dass es den qualifizierenden Dichotomien und homogenisierenden Standards unterworfen wird, welche das vermutet Männliche gegenüber dem vermutet Weiblichen systematisch privilegieren, indem sie hegemoniale Männlichkeit symbolisch an Macht knüpfen. So verschmelzen Neoliberalismus und Maskulismus.

Des Weiteren zeigt die Analyse, dass die Flugblätter der psychologischen Operationen auf einem multi-relationalen Identitätssetting beruhen, das hochgradig vergeschlechtlicht und orientalistisch ist. Die in den über den verschiedenen Kriegsgebieten abgeworfenen Flugblättern zu findenden Narrative stützen sich auf mannigfache und explizite, stereotype und hierarchisch vergeschlechtlichte Dichotomien in und bei ihren Konstruktionen von Identität. Sie zeichnen ein ultimativ überlegenes Selbst und sind dabei auf orientalistische Repräsentationen angewiesen, die das Andere zu einem unzivilisierten, unwissenden und versagenden Anderen verschmelzen. Um die orientalistische Polarisierung zwischen dem Selbst und dem Anderen zu bekräftigen und zu reproduzieren, werden vergeschlechtlichte Hierarchien von Männlichkeit und Entmannung instrumentalisiert, genauso wie die vergeschlechtlichten Mechanismen des/der ‘maskulinistischen Schutzes/Schonung’ (masculinist protection) und der Aberkennung der Agenz von Opfern. Die hier vorgelegte Analyse zeigt, wie die Identitäten, die von und durch diese vom Militär in den verschiedenen Kriegsgebieten abgeworfenen Flugblätter strukturiert werden, mit Orientalismus zusammentreffen und wie dieser Orientalismus maskulinistisch ist. Orientalismus ist, auch eine Ideologie; ist Beherrschung in der Mache, ist ein Produkt vom und Instrument im Prozeß der Unterwerfung (Halliday 1993, Übersetzung der Autorin). Bei der Übernahme der Vorherrschaft des Selbst über das Andere aus der Vergangenheit, ihrer Bekräftigung für die Gegenwart und ihrer Wiedereinsetzung für die Zukunft verläßt sich der Orientalismus, wie er in den Identitätskonstruktionen der militärischen Flugblätter zu finden ist, auf die

Instantiierung des unterworfenen Anderen als entweder brutale Barbaren, unwissende Zivilisten oder versagende Konkurrenten

II. Abstract English

This thesis provides a discourse analysis of the United States' military perception management doctrine and products of the period between 1991 and 2003 and asks how this particular discourse draws on gendered constructions of identity and what implications these constructions perform on the state, on its policy and its society.

It rests on a poststructuralist theoretical framework, the core of which is the reciprocally performative relation between *foreign policy and identity* whereas identity is crucial insofar as “foreign policies rely upon representations of identity” while simultaneously “it is through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced” (Hansen 2006: 1). It is thus the aim of this analysis to read identity of foreign policy texts and vice versa. In this reading, identity is understood as lacking a foundational essence but depending upon its enactment. In order to bring out its enacted substances, a process of multiple reading is applied as the tool for textual deconstruction of dominant meanings and practices. First, the military doctrine documents on perception management and also the products thereof as deployed on the field are clearly an important aspect of a state's foreign policy. Second, articulations of identity that can be discerned in these documents rely significantly on gendered constructions. Disclosing the reciprocally performative relation between these two features exposes the contingency of both the gendered underlying assumptions of military perception management and the formulated necessity of this particular and presumably crucial tool of foreign policy as a function of identity constructions.

The analysis shows that for the military doctrine documents, the gendered intertexts reside mainly in an ample and culturally sedimented narrative. This narrative is the neoliberal ideology. *The military identity as tied to the so-called ‘information age’ is fundamentally an identity suited for the requirements of the current neoliberal times.* The hegemonic identity requirements that come with it unfold their workings particularly through *stereotypical and hierarchical dichotomies* on the immediate identity level and through the mechanisms of *male society* and the principle of *masculinist protection* on the ideological level of identification. Intertwining the immediate ‘information age’ military identity with the neoliberal intermediary of identification a *shift* of particular traits of *hegemonic masculinity* is further discernible. The analysis presented here shows how the identity structured by and through the military doctrine documents concurs with neoliberalism and masculinism. Both are ideologies. Their strategic (dis)empowering resides on the one hand in the subjecting of the individual to constant adaptability, flexibility and responsibility and thereby atomising it and

on the other hand, in subjecting it to qualificative dichotomies and homogenising standards systematically privileging the supposedly male by symbolically linking (hegemonic) masculinity and power. Neoliberalism and masculinism conflate.

The analysis further brings to the surface that the military psychological operations leaflets rest on a multi-relational identity setting that is *heavily gendered and Orientalist*. The narratives discernible in the leaflets dropped over the conflict zones by the US armed forces draw on manifold and explicit, stereotypical and hierarchically gendered dichotomies in their making of identities. In their casting of an *ultimately superior Self they rely on Orientalist representations amalgamating the Other into an uncivilised, incognisant, defaulting Other*. In order to reinforce and reproduce the Orientalist polarisation between the Self and the Other, gendered *hierarchies of masculinities and emasculation* are instrumentalised as are the heavily gendered mechanisms of *masculinist protection* and the *denial of agency upon the victimised*. The analysis presented here also shows how the identities structured by and through the military leaflets dropped over the particular conflict zones concur with Orientalism and how this Orientalism is masculinist. Orientalism too, of course, is an ideology; it is domination in the making, it is both a product of and an instrument in the process of subjugation (Halliday 1993). In taking the domination of the Self over the Other over from the past, affirming it for the present and reinstalling it for the future, the Orientalism traceable in the identity constructions of the military psychological operations leaflets relies on the instantiation of the subjugated Other as either brutal barbarians, incognisant civilians or failing concurrents – and this on both dimensions, civilisation and masculinity.

III. Curriculum Vitae

Lebenslauf

Elgin Medea Brunner

Lic rel. int., DEA rel. int. spécialisation science politique

Kontakt und Personalien

Kontakt: elgin.brunner@gmail.com

Geburtsdatum: 24.11.1976

Nationalität: Schweiz

Ausbildung

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| 2006-2010 | Doktorat am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Wien.
Titel: „ <i>Reading Identity/Ideology of Military Documents. The gendered constructions of US military ‘perception management’ doctrine and implementation between 1991 and 2003</i> ”. Betreuung durch: Prof. Dr. Eva Kreisky. Eingereicht: November 2010. |
| 2006 | 17.11-1.12: PhD-course “Security Theory – Critical Innovations”, Prof. Ole Waever, Department of Political Science, Universität Kopenhagen, Dänemark. |
| 2004-2006 | Nachdiplomstudium der Internationalen Beziehungen mit Schwerpunkt Politikwissenschaft am Genfer <i>Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Développement</i> (IHEID). Abschluss: Diplôme d’Etudes Approfondies (DEA) en relations internationales, spécialisation science politique (entspricht MA) Titel der Abschlussarbeit: „ <i>Gender and the Framing of War: From 9/11 to Guantánamo. A Transatlantic Comparative Discourse Analysis</i> ”. Betreuung durch: Prof. Keith Krause. |
| 2000-2004 | Studium der Internationalen Beziehungen (Volkswirtschaftslehre, Zeitgeschichte, Internationales Recht und Politikwissenschaft) am Genfer <i>Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Développement</i> (IHEID). Abschluss: licence en relations internationales (entspricht MA). |

ANNEXE

2001-2002	Studium der Spanischen Sprache und Literatur an der <i>Faculté des Lettres</i> der Universität Genf, erstes Jahr mit Prüfungsabschluss.
1998-2000	Grundstudium mit abgeschlossenen Akzessprüfungen in Ethnologie an der Universität Zürich. Nebenfächer Politologie und Philosophie.
1999	Februar – April: Studienreise nach Süd-Mexiko, Belize und Guatemala.
1992-1996	Kantonsschule Trogen (Schweiz, AR), Matura Typus E.
1984-1992	Primar- und Sekundarschule in Teufen (Schweiz, AR).

Forschungsanstellung

2005 -	am Center for Security Studies , Crisis and Risk Network, ETH Zürich, Researcher Information Operations und Schutz kritische (Informations-) Infrastruktur , Unterstützung der Lehre (Seminare) im Programm des Master of Arts in Comparative and International Studies der ETH Zürich (MACIS).
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Sprachen

Deutsch	Muttersprache
Französisch	Fliessend schriftlich und mündlich (Studiumssprache), von 2000-2005 wohnhaft in Genf.
Englisch	Fliessend schriftlich und mündlich (Studiumssprache).
Spanisch	Grundkenntnisse

Publikationen

referierte Artikel:

Brunner, Elgin M. and Dunn Cavelty, Myriam (2009), 'The Formation of In-Formation by the US Military: Articulation and Enactment of Infomantic Threat Imaginaries on the Immaterial Battlefield of Perception', in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22 (4), pp. 625-642.

Brunner, Elgin M. (2008), 'Consoling Display of Strength or Emotional Overstrain? The Gendered Framing of the Early 'War on Terrorism' in Transatlantic Comparison', in *Global Society Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations* Vol. 22 (4), pp. 217-251.

Buchkapitel:

Brunner, Elgin M., (forthcoming) ‘Grenzen der Diskursanalyse – Möglichkeiten von Ideologiekritik. Überlegungen zur Vereinbarkeit von ideologiekritischen und diskursanalytischen Ansätzen’, in Kreisky, Eva, Löffler, Marion und Spitaler, Georg (Hrsg.), *Lehrbuch: Einführung in die Theoriearbeit der Politikwissenschaft*, Wien: UTB.

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Brunner, Elgin M. and Suter, Manuel (2008), *International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009. An Inventory of 25 National and 7 International Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Policies*, Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 650 pages.

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