



universität
wien

MASTER THESIS | MASTER'S THESIS

Titel | Title

“Between Complementarity and Overlap: Evaluating the EU and NATO Policy
Toolbox in Response to Russia's 2022 Invasion of Ukraine”

verfasst von | submitted by

Zofia Maria Sosnowska

angestrebter akademischer Grad | in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S.)

Wien | Vienna, 2026

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt | UA 992 940
Degree programme code as it appears
on the student record sheet:

Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt | Internationale Studien | International Studies
Degree programme as it appears on the
student record sheet:

Betreut von | Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Patrick Müller, Privatdoz. M.A.



diplomatische
akademie wien
Vienna School of International Studies
École des Hautes Études Internationales de Vienne

Between Complementarity and Overlap: Evaluating the EU and NATO Policy Toolbox in Response to Russia's 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Master's thesis

Zofia Maria Sosnowska

Supervisor: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Patrick Müller, Privatdoz. M.A.

“On my honour as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorised assistance on it.”



Abstract

This thesis assesses how the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) altered in the face of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Described as a critical juncture of European security governance, the crisis led both institutions to implement hitherto unheard-of policy measures in four main areas, namely military, financial, legal-regulatory, and political-symbolic. To address the research puzzle of whether these responses strengthened functional complementarity or created institutional overlap, the thesis made use of a qualitative comparative case study design. The analysis shows that even though a broad division of labour was maintained, with NATO acting as the cornerstone of collective defence and the EU leading economic coercion and regulatory sanctions, the conflict caused substantial functional convergence. Whereby the EU assumed a role of supportive military actor through the development of the European Peace Facility and its military training mission, EUMAM Ukraine. A distinctive functional overlap was established with NATO's creation of the Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). However, this seeming duplication has led to improved coordination and constructive complementarity rather than institutional rivalry. Moreover, the aspirations for European strategic autonomy appear to be bolstered by the unpredictability of the foreign policy of the U.S., which in turn allow for the reinforcing of the European pillar of the transatlantic partnership. This thesis aims to give insight into the inter-institutional dynamics within the security governance during the times of systemic crisis.

Diese Arbeit untersucht, wie sich die Beziehung zwischen der Nordatlantik-Vertragsorganisation (NATO) und der Europäischen Union (EU) angesichts der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine im Jahr 2022 verändert hat. Die Krise, die als entscheidender Wendepunkt der europäischen Sicherheitspolitik beschrieben wird, veranlasste beide Institutionen dazu, in vier Hauptbereichen, nämlich im militärischen, finanziellen, rechtlich-regulatorischen und politisch-symbolischen Bereich, bisher beispiellose politische Maßnahmen zu ergreifen. Um der Forschungsfrage nachzugehen, ob diese Reaktionen die funktionale Komplementarität stärkten oder zu institutionellen Überschneidungen führten, stützte sich die Arbeit auf ein qualitatives vergleichendes Fallstudien-Design. Die Analyse zeigt, dass zwar eine grobe Arbeitsteilung beibehalten wurde, wobei die NATO als Eckpfeiler der kollektiven Verteidigung fungierte und die EU wirtschaftliche Zwangsmaßnahmen und regulatorische Sanktionen anführte, der Konflikt jedoch zu einer erheblichen funktionalen Konvergenz führte. Dabei übernahm die EU durch die Entwicklung der Europäischen

Friedensfazilität und ihrer militärischen Ausbildungsmission EUMAM Ukraine eine unterstützende militärische Rolle. Mit der Einrichtung des Programms „Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine“ (NSATU) durch die NATO kam es zu einer deutlichen funktionalen Überschneidung. Diese scheinbare Doppelung hat jedoch zu einer verbesserten Koordination und konstruktiven Komplementarität geführt, anstatt institutionelle Rivalität zu schüren. Darüber hinaus scheinen die Bestrebungen nach europäischer strategischer Autonomie durch die Unvorhersehbarkeit der Außenpolitik der USA gestärkt zu werden, was wiederum eine Stärkung der EU ermöglicht. Diese Arbeit soll Einblicke in die interinstitutionelle Dynamik innerhalb der Sicherheitspolitik in Zeiten systemischer Krisen vermitteln.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	7
Chapter 2: Literature Review	10
2.1. EU's CFSP and CSDP	10
2.2. NATO and Collective Defence	12
2.3. EU-NATO Relations	14
Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework	17
3.1. The Concept of Policy Toolbox	18
3.2. Typology of Security Instruments	18
3.3. Decision-Making and Institutional Constraints	19
3.4. Cooperation and Competition Between International Organizations	19
3.5. Crisis and Institutional Change	21
3.6. Crisis and Institutional Overlap	22
3.7. Division of Labour and Institutional Complementarity	22
3.8. Strategic Autonomy & Strategic Cooperation	23
Chapter 4: Research Methods	24
4.1. Comparative Case Study Design	24
4.2. Case Selection Justification	25
4.3. Data Sources	25
4.4. Operational Focus	26
4.5. Limitations of the Research Design	28
Chapter 5: Background: The Evolution of the EU and NATO Security Cooperation	30
5.1. Initial Developments and Relations (the 1990s)	30
5.2. The Beginning of Institutionalised Relations (2000-2016)	31
5.3. The Era of Joint Declarations and the Deepening of the EU-NATO Relations	33
Chapter 6: Analysis of the Conflict Responses	36
6.1. Responses of the European Union	36
6.1.1. Restrictive Legal-Regulatory Measures Towards the Russian Federation	36
6.1.2. Restrictive Measures Towards Third States	42
6.1.3. Measures in Support of Ukraine	44
6.1.4. Measures in Support of Third States	49
6.1.5. Measures Safeguarding the Member States	49
6.2. Responses of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization	51

6.2.1. Measures Implemented Against the Russian Federation.....	51
6.2.2. Measures in Support of Ukraine	51
6.2.3. Measures Safeguarding the Members of the Alliance	54
6.3. Uncertainty and the Issue of Trust	55
6.4. Functional Overlap and the Division of Labour Introduced by the Responses	56
6.4.1. Coordinated Complementarity and the Use of Comparative Advantage	57
6.4.2. Cooperative Functional Overlap and Its Implications	59
6.4.3. Potential Competitive Overlap and Interinstitutional Tensions	62
Chapter 7: Conclusion.....	65
Bibliography	68

Chapter 1: Introduction

The outbreak of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 24th, 2022, proved to be a turning point in European security governance (Daehnhardt 2022). In addition to challenging long-held beliefs about the post-Cold War security order, the deployment of substantial conventional force on the European continent put European and transatlantic institutions to the test (Krastev and Leonard 2022). Particularly in terms of their capability to effectively manage a significant interstate conflict just behind their borders. The European Union's and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's responses in this regard were both unprecedented in their breadth and insightful from an institutional standpoint (Becker, Bendiek, and Kempin 2025). The EU mobilised a wide range of economic, political, and security-related tools, such as sanctions, providing financing for military support, and introducing energy policy measures (Smit 2024), whereas NATO quickly strengthened its deterrence and defence posture, particularly on its eastern flank (Daehnhardt 2022). When faced with an existential security challenge, the simultaneity and magnitude of these responses pose important questions about how the two institutions function in times of crisis and how their respective mandates interact.

An elaborate division of labour between NATO and the EU has defined European security governance for decades (Tardy 2021). While the EU has been seen as a primarily civilian or comprehensive security actor with a strong emphasis being placed on crisis management, economic statecraft, and norm-based external action, NATO has historically been seen as the cornerstone of collective defence (Biscop 2021; Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024). However, according to Baciú and Friede (2020) a clear-cut definition of the functional division between the two institutions did not ever fully clarify. As the institutional borders have frequently been compromised by overlapping memberships, common strategic backgrounds, and expanding policy mandates, especially since the establishment of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (Biscop 2020). Further highlighting that the relations between the institutions often oscillate between cooperation and competition in the area of security (Koschut 2018). According to the International Crisis Group (2022) these dynamics heightened in the face of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when both organizations were forced to take decisive action in a concurrent manner. The long-standing discourse over complementarity, duplication, and institutional rivalry consequently came up again with a renewed sense of urgency (Howorth 2017; Smith 2019; Williams et al. 2025).

In light of this, the main research question posed by this thesis is the following: *How did the EU and NATO vary in their use of available policy instruments in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and did the crisis reinforce complementarity and cooperation or produce overlap of competences and rivalry between the institutions?* The study ought to, hence, investigate whether and how the war affected the relationship between the EU and NATO. The invasion is perceived as a critical juncture for European security governance, one that sheds light on the underlying institutional reasoning, limitations, and capacities of actions rather than merely a geopolitical event. While acknowledging that the institutional change can be attributed to a wider array of factors constituting the polycrisis the European Union is facing as well (Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024).

The scholarly relevance of this thesis stems from its interaction with the literature on institutional change brought about by crises and on the cooperation or competition between international organizations. Consequently, crises can be viewed as events that interact in path-dependent ways with existing institutional structures rather than merely constituting external shocks. While some crises reveal inefficiencies, create overlap, or initiate gradual institutional change, others strengthen current arrangements by confirming established roles and competencies (Boin et al. 2016). As the war in Ukraine forced both the EU and NATO to engage an array of policy tools under circumstances of uncertainty, urgency, and high political stakes, it represents a rich instance for analysing these dynamics.

Importantly, the theory does not presuppose that institutional overlap is intrinsically problematic (Hofmann 2009). The overlapping competencies may, in some circumstances, improve resilience, flexibility, and burden-sharing (Coleman and Mwangi 2015). According to Faude and Fuss (2020) overlap may be both an intentional and an unintentional result of state actions within respective international organizations. Consequently, exploring whether it resulted in constructive complementarity and cooperation or ineffective duplication and rivalry is of importance.

This thesis, additionally, contributes to the discussions about the changes and evolutions of the EU-NATO relations in the post-2022 security landscape. Significant events, including higher EU defence expenditures, the activation of the European Peace Facility, and the admission of historically non-aligned states to NATO, all occurred during the war (Simonet 2023; Becker, Bendiek, and Kempin 2025). The aforementioned developments raise the question of whether the crisis strengthened the EU's role as a security actor, potentially altering the long-term

balance between strategic autonomy aspirations and strategic cooperation, or whether it merely confirmed NATO's supremacy in European security.

From the methodological point of view, this thesis employs a comparative case study, concentrating on the EU and NATO as two separate yet interrelated security organizations faced with the same external shock. The overarching goal is to produce theoretically and empirically substantiated insights by deliberately comparing their policy tools, decision-making procedures, and patterns of interaction. This approach pays particular attention to the institutional changes, the developments of various policy instruments, and alterations across time and institutional mandates, rather than assessing the success or failure of the responses to conflict in absolute terms.

This thesis shall be structured in the following way: namely, Chapter 2 will explore the existing literature on CFSP and CSDP, NATO, and the EU-NATO relations. Chapter 3 will outline the conceptual framework used, including the notions of cooperation and competition between international organizations, crisis-induced institutional change, as well as complementarity, and institutional overlap. It will be followed by Chapter 4, outlining the research design and methodology. Chapter 5 will provide a historical overview of the development of European security governance prior to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Chapter 6 will contain the main analysis of this study and provide insight into the responses to the Russian aggression and the subsequent alterations in the European security governance landscape. Lastly, Chapter 7 ought to conclude the findings of this study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Academic literature on security governance in the context of Europe and its transatlantic relations can be divided into three primary strands, namely, the scholarship on the European Union's Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its collective defence and deterrence efforts, and analyses of the relationship between the EU and NATO.

2.1. EU's CFSP and CSDP

When it comes to the security governance structures within the European Union, the most prominent instruments and mechanisms are included within the former second pillar of the Union, namely within the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the inherently connected with it Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Kuijper et al. 2015a). The 2003 European Security Strategy and the Treaty of Lisbon set forth the broad and value-based objectives of CFSP. These include ensuring that the principles and objectives of the Union are safeguarded, preserving peace, preventing hostilities, bolstering international security, and advancing the founding principles of the Union, namely, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights (Gregout 2010). Moreover, the mandate of CSDP has been broadened since its establishment in 1992 and now includes elements such as the Solidarity Clause (art. 222 TFEU) and the Mutual Assistance Clause (art. 42(7) TEU). Thereby, further safeguarding the Union's citizens from direct security threats both abroad and domestically (Coelmont 2019).

A wide array of national and EU actors is involved in the governance of CFSP. The Council of the European Union, where foreign ministers adopt CFSP decisions, and the European Council, which establishes the strategic direction of the policy, play a key role here (Kuijper et al. 2015a). The intergovernmental nature of the policy is reflected in the literature's constant emphasis on the power the Member States yield within these bodies (Gregout 2010; Lachmann 2010). As Gregout (2010) highlights, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy plays a pivotal role in maintaining external representation and cohesion at the institutional level. Since Lisbon, this office has bridged intergovernmental and supranational elements by holding the dual roles of Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and Vice-President of the European Commission. Although academics agree on the enhanced coordination this office has brought about, they also tend to emphasise that its effectiveness is dependent on the political support from the Member States (Tomescu 2015; Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024).

The CFSP receives assistance from the European External Action Service (EEAS), which coordinates EU delegations and provides aid through policy planning and crisis response. Lachmann (2010) contends that while the EEAS had improved the administrative coherence, it continues to encounter resource and strategic authority constraints. Similarly, the European Defence Agency has grown in importance in the defence sector, particularly, in its role as a coordinator of capabilities development, despite its efficiency being heavily reliant on voluntary state contributions (Petrov and Romanyshyn 2020).

The CFSP can be operationalised through a collection of political and legal tools that enable the EU to take coordinated action and express common positions. These include decisions made by the Council that specify the CSDP operational actions, diplomatic strategies, sanctions, and strategic objectives (Tomescu 2015). The Council has the authority to take restrictive measures under the CFSP framework against non-state entities, natural or legal persons, and third states. Importantly, these sanctions may be independent Union measures, or they may be a form of implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Kuijper et al. 2015b). Moreover, the EU has recently substantially strengthened and broadened its sanctions instruments, moving the emphasis from conventional human rights violations to coercive actions against state actors (Becker, Bendiek, and Kempin 2025).

The greatest practical manifestation of CFSP may be found in CSDP missions and operations. Literature makes a distinction between military missions, aiming at training, advisory work, or marine security, and civilian missions focused on the rule of law, policing, and reforms of the security sector (Lachmann 2010; Smit 2024). Despite the recent expansion of the missions and their mandates, authors like Smit (2024) contend that civilian CSDP is still inherently reactive rather than truly strategic due to a lack of funding, disjointed mandates, and inadequate political direction. Concurrently, since 2016, defence capability programs like the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) rose in prominence. Many classify the aforementioned tools as attempts to improve the CFSP and CSDP's material underpinnings without altering their intergovernmental nature (Petrov and Romanyshyn 2020; Drent 2018).

Many scholars, however, point out an array of shortcomings when it comes to CFSP and CSDP. Baciu and Friede (2020) identify four main points of contention in the design and operations of the Union's common security and defence, namely, its fragmentation, lack of agency, institutional decay, and failure of initiatives. The former two refer to the patchwork-like design

of many of the CFSP policies and to the decisions being made and actions being taken by either unilateral statements of the Member States or by ad hoc coalitions. Concurrently, Gregout (2010) posits that the CFSP system continues to be fundamentally intergovernmental, hence heavily influenced by national interests and domestic agendas of the Member States. Implying its operations are subject to a set of robust internal, external, and legal constraints that significantly alter and restrain the EU-wide policy outcomes. Moreover, the CSDP is marked by an ongoing disconnect between ambition and reality, whereby the Member States are restricted by an intergovernmental structure based on consensus and the unfulfilled military capability commitments (Lachmann 2010).

2.2. NATO and Collective Defence

Since its founding in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a key component of Euro-Atlantic security. The literature presents NATO as a political-military institution rooted in a common set of values rather than just a military alliance (Tomé 2022). Gheciu (2022) identifies the primary components of the community as shared norms and values, mutual trust, and common practices. Collective defence, as put forward in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, is central to NATO's mandate. As Tertrais (2016) showcases, Article 5 represents a political and legal commitment that was deliberately crafted with an inherent strategic ambiguity to maintain national discretion in its execution while guaranteeing unity. This mandate was initially targeted at the prevention of Soviet aggression during the Cold War. However, NATO's perceived obligations significantly expanded in the post-Cold War era and, coupled with significant shifts in the global security landscape, have brought about various alterations to the goals, mandate, and decision-making procedures within the Alliance (Kriendler 2004).

The design of NATO's security governance is a complex and multilayered one. At the political level, national governments continue to have a decisive vote (Biscop 2020). They are represented in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) by permanent ambassadors as well as foreign and defence ministers or heads of state and government, depending on the necessity and gravity of the meeting (NATO 2025a; Kriendler 2004). Moreover, the Secretary General, acting as the chair of the NAC and the main public representative of the Alliance as a whole, plays a vital role in setting the agenda and coordinating the operations. Subject to political approval, NATO's integrated command structure, headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe

(SACEUR), is in charge of operational planning and implementation at the military level (Scaparrotti et al. 2020).

NATO's consensus-based decision-making procedure is one of its distinguishing characteristics. Due to the intergovernmental nature of NATO and the political sensitivity of security and defence concerns, all significant decisions are made jointly by the Member States (Biscop 2020). Albeit guaranteeing legitimacy and unity, consensus can also impede decision-making, particularly in critical situations, as literature suggests. The Alliance's main decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has the prerogative to approve operations, invoke Article 5, and offer political direction. Tertrais' (2016) study of Article 5 showcases that this fundamental component of NATO's mandate is conclusively political in nature, necessitating consensus on whether an armed attack has materialised and the proper course of action and response from the Alliance.

According to Tardy (2019), NATO has increasingly functioned at the nexus of projecting stability and deterrence and defence, particularly since 2014, when Russia's actions in Ukraine restored collective defence as a top priority for the Alliance. However, crisis management and cooperative security have prevailed as vital elements of the Alliance's effort to stay relevant in a world marked by terrorism, cyber and hybrid threats, and instability outside its borders. This extended mandate has been institutionalised since 1991 by NATO's Strategic Concepts, listing crisis management as one of the organization's three primary responsibilities, along with defence, cooperative security, and deterrence (NATO 2025a).

The literature outlines a variety of tools at NATO's disposal that allow the Alliance to carry out its mandate. These tools have historically focused on military capabilities, such as integrated command structures, force planning, and deterrence strategies (NATO 2025a). Cordesman and Hwang (2022) emphasise that tangible national and collective force planning, advancement, and interoperability are more substantial for credible deterrence than abstract burden-sharing criteria. In addition to collective defence, NATO has created a wide range of crisis management instruments. The evolution of the aforementioned types of measures from a largely military role during the Cold War to a multifaceted strategy including political consultation, partnership mechanisms, and collaboration with other international organizations was traced in Kriendler's (2004) work. These tools include non-Article 5 operations, namely, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, which are frequently carried out in accordance with UN or OSCE mandates.

2.3. *EU-NATO Relations*

The EU's and NATO's mandates and the extent of their overlap are oftentimes discussed in academia (Reynolds 2010, Biscop 2021). According to the Washington Treaty, collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security are at the core of NATO's mandate (Tardy 2019). Accordingly, for years, the organization has been viewed as a purely military alliance focused on defence and deterrence against outside threats. The EU's mandate in the area of security and defence has evolved more gradually (Kaynar and Ak 2017). The EU has obtained capabilities for both military and civilian crisis management under the CSDP, including limited military deployments, rule-of-law operations, and police missions (Smit 2024). Smith (2017) notes that it is exactly that capability to integrate economic, diplomatic, and regulatory tools with military ones that constitutes the competitive advantage of the Union. The intersection of the aforementioned mandates becomes the most evident in the area of crisis management. While both institutions are responsible for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises, they do so under divergent legal and political limitations and are equipped with different tools. Biscop (2020) contends that while the EU is frequently more successful in post-conflict stabilization and long-term capacity building, NATO is better suited for high-intensity military operations.

Many scholars have speculated on what the cooperation and division of tasks between the EU and NATO ought to look like in terms of collective security. While both institutions highlight the need for cooperation between them, literature suggests that the initiation of the CSDP could have contributed to the rise of institutional competition given the EU's venture into the mandate of NATO (Giegerich 2013). Moreover, institutional path dependencies, significant overlap in membership, and particular decision-making processes effectively limit the interactions between the EU and NATO (Howorth 2017). Nissen et al. (2020) identify two opposing views that may further hinder the cooperation between the two institutions and the development of European security governance, namely the Atlanticist and the Europeanist outlooks. The former refers to the fears of sub-optimal utilisation of resources as the defence mechanisms begin to overlap, as well as the fears of the solidarity of NATO becoming undermined in the event of increased European security autonomy. Consequently, the proponents of the latter viewpoint are troubled by the potential hindrance of the development of European security governance as a result of the US influence.

Tardy and Lindstrom (2019), however, provide some insight into why the cooperation between NATO and the EU is necessary, highlighting that neither institution possesses sufficient tools and capabilities to address the wide array of contemporary security issues. They also emphasise the impact of shared membership on EU-NATO relations, as it implies being subject to similar external threats. Therefore, proposing that the best way forward is to utilise the comparative advantages of the respective institutions, allowing for the optimization and generation of synergies between NATO and the EU. Importantly, NATO is still portrayed as the dominant provider and guarantor of European security and the main actor in the collective military defence of the European territory (Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024). Some scholars envision the European Union assuming a more supportive role alongside the Alliance, whereby it ought to take the initiative in the areas related to the strengthening of the defences against non-military threats, including cyberattacks, economic coercion, and subversion (Biscop 2021).

Many studies highlight the importance of the Berlin Plus Agreement for EU-NATO relations. This agreement marked the start of the official strategic partnership and increased cooperation efforts between the two institutions, allowing the EU to access and make use of NATO's planning capabilities as well as assets for an array of EU-led operations (Aghniashvili 2016). Despite the declarative willingness for institutional cooperation, the relations between the EU and NATO have been characterised as lacking momentum and strategic coherence (Lachmann 2010). This can be further evidenced by the long periods of inaction in developing the EU-NATO relations, whereby the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of 2016 was the first step forward in over ten years, signalling that the cooperation is more on an ad hoc basis rather than being a continuous effort (Himmrich and Raynova 2017). Since then, two more joint strategy-setting documents have been issued, in 2018 and most recently in 2023, the latter published after a significant delay indirectly connected with the outbreak of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Simonet 2023).

Some sources suggest that there exist alternative reaction mechanisms not connected per se with either the European Union or NATO. An example of that is the French-led European Intervention Initiative, which allows states to take certain military and non-military action in response to a crisis without the specific institutional constraints of the aforementioned international organizations (Młynarski 2023; Tardy 2021). Alternatively, a new NATO-enabled framework for collective defence has emerged, namely the enhanced Forward Partnership (eFP). Functioning outside the formal NATO command structure, the eFP allows

for more rapid responses to crises than the consensus-based approach would traditionally allow for (Leuprecht 2019).

Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

The following section will aim to situate the discussion brought forward in this thesis into a conceptual framework. It ought to supply the theoretical and analytical grounds for the analysis of the responses of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and their subsequent implications for the strategic cooperation or competition between said institutions. This study views the response to the aforementioned crisis as a result of a structured institutional behaviour affected by a set of pre-existing capabilities, decision-making procedures, and strategic self-understandings. In lieu of perceiving it as a sequence of ad hoc policy decisions.

There are two primary analytical goals to be addressed by this framework. Firstly, it aspires to explain why the EU and NATO used distinct types of policy tools, albeit being faced with the exact same external shock. Secondly, it provides an opportunity to assess whether the crisis significantly transformed the way Europe strikes a balance between strategic autonomy aspirations, perceived by some as a sign of competition between the EU and NATO, and strategic cooperation in its security governance (Giegerich 2013). To achieve these goals, the framework makes use of the ideas from the literature on crisis governance, crisis and institutional change, and inter-organizational relations that can take on a form of either cooperation or competition. It views the EU and NATO as separate yet interconnected organizations responsible for security matters and functioning in a common strategic environment.

In line with this perspective, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union operate with distinct institutional identities. Those are ingrained in the provisions of their respective treaties, decision-making processes, and common standards and shared values of what constitutes an appropriate course of action (Gregout 2010; Gheciu 2022). Therefore, institutional responses in the face of crises are seldom free from constraints or simply reactive. Rather, until the crisis threatens the existence of the institution, the organizations tend to adhere to the established behavioural patterns (Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024).

Importantly, the war in Ukraine, which can be characterised as a systemic external shock for both international organizations in question, did not occur in what some scholars describe as an institutional vacuum (Tardy and Lindstrom 2019). This makes this conceptualization particularly pertinent. As both the EU and NATO had pre-existing toolkits at their disposal, as well as legal competencies when the crisis arose, which influenced their early responses.

3.1. The Concept of Policy Toolbox

The policy toolbox constitutes one of the key analytical concepts in this study. The literature defines this notion as a collection of tools that an organization or an institution can utilise for the achievement of its strategic goals. Crucially, this accounts for both politically acceptable behaviours and actions as well as formal capabilities (Tomescu 2015, Simonet 2023). As Singh and Bharadwaj (2022) note responses to conflict can encompass both coercive measures short of war and potentially measures including the use of military might.

The majority of policy tools at NATO's disposal are of a military nature. They consist of interoperability mechanisms, force deployment, operational planning, deterrence posture, and collective defence obligation as part of both Article 5 and non-Article 5 measures (NATO 2025a). The toolkit of the Alliance is distinguished by its high degree of military legitimacy and its capability to generate swift and tangible security results (Scaparrotti et al. 2020).

Concurrently, the EU's policy toolkit can be described as more extensive yet less coercive in the military manner. For, it includes measures such as economic sanctions, trade and financial regulation, macrofinancial assistance, and, more recently, defence-industrial programs and financing of military-related expenditures (Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024). Said toolbox is an embodiment of the Union's historical transformation from an economic and regulatory alliance to one with a much broader mandate (Drent 2018).

3.2. Typology of Security Instruments

This framework differentiated between four types of security instruments, namely, military, financial, legal-regulatory, and political-symbolic measures, with the aim of comprehensively analysing institutional responses.

The first category of instruments is the military one, referring to the deployment, preparedness, and coordination of armed troops. In the context of NATO (2025a), those include increased forward presence, battle groups, force posture alterations, and military exercises. On the other hand, the military tools in the context of the EU tend to be channelled through individual Member States and are, therefore, more indirect (Simonet 2023).

Financial instruments, representing the second category of instruments, are utilised to mobilise and redistribute resources to support particular security goals (Kuijper et al. 2015b). Those can manifest in the form of spending commitments on defence and providing funds for military aid,

as well as microfinancial support (Becker, Bendiek, and Kempin 2025). The European Union's response relies predominantly on this type of measures.

Another category of instruments is the so-called legal-regulatory measures. Those consist of sanction regimes, export controls, asset freezes, and regulatory limitations (European External Action Service 2021). Such tools demonstrate the EU's capacity to weaponise economic interdependence and its strengths as a rule-making and environment-shaping actor on the regional and global stage (Gregout 2010).

Lastly, there are the political-symbolic instruments, allowing for the necessary and particular framing of the crisis (Mahé and Martel 2023). Examples of those include declarations, summit statements, and rhetorical commitments. Albeit oftentimes being written off as merely symbolic and the least impactful out of the four groups, these actions can prove crucial for expressing commitment, setting expectations, and justifying additional action to be taken by either of the organizations (Simonet 2023).

3.3. Decision-Making and Institutional Constraints

Another one of the explanatory variables in this framework is the decision-making process. Fore, institutions vary not only in their innate capabilities but also in the way the decisions made by the representatives of participating states regarding their actions are reached. Albeit the decision-making process within NATO is ostensibly based on consensus, the organization reaps the benefits of a clear military mandate and a comparatively uniform security culture (Smith 2019). Such conditions facilitate a swift consensus, particularly in the event of an existential threat to the Alliance.

Conversely, in the case of CFSP and CSDP, the EU decision-making continues to be principally intergovernmental and requires unanimity among the Member States (Kuijper et al. 2015a). This poses certain constraints, particularly when delicate security issues are at hand, as the states may favour their own security policy agendas over the Union-wide ones (Gregout 2010). Nonetheless, the framework acknowledges that the EU makes use of what could be called incremental policy stacking. Whereby an array of small decisions facilitates a substantial change, which compensates for perhaps a slower decision-making process, as historically evidenced.

3.4. Cooperation and Competition Between International Organizations

A dense institutional network, where a myriad of international organizations operate concurrently across overlapping mandates, geographical regions, and functional domains, has grown into the setting for the governance of modern international security (Biermann 2007). Security organizations like NATO and the EU operate within what has been called a “crowded house” of international security governance rather than operating independently (Giegerich 2013). Therefore, the analysis of institutional responses to crises like the Russian invasion of Ukraine necessitates understanding of the dynamics of cooperation and competition among international institutions.

The term "international cooperation" denotes organised exchanges of information, coordination of activities, and cooperative implementation of policies amongst international organizations (Koschut 2018). It oftentimes materialises in the scheme of crisis management operations and might entail many levels of coordination in the realm of international security (Aris and Snetkov 2018). Giegerich (2013) contends that the complexity, multidimensionality, and transnational scale of current security concerns make it unfeasible for any singular organization to have all the necessary tools. To address the arising threats, it is frequently necessary to combine military, political, economic, and civilian means.

Conceptually, international cooperation can be justified by numerous complementary arguments. Transactional argument is one of them, whereby due to scarce resources, organizations decide to collaborate to procure the capabilities they may lack themselves (Biermann 2007). Such an exchange can have two favourable outcomes, namely, minimization of duplication and of cost. Another prominent argument refers to the notion of complementarity. Through which organizations with distinct comparative advantages could realise that by pooling their capabilities, they contribute to the improvement of problem-solving within the group (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2018). While political or economic institutions may offer legitimacy, civilian expertise, or financial resources, military alliances may offer security and enforcement oversight.

However, cooperation does not completely eradicate competition, albeit it may seem operationally sensible and desirable. In fact, as Giegerich (2013) emphasises, functional overlap across institutions fosters rivalry while simultaneously encouraging cooperation. Since institutions must function within the same issue environment in order to interact, overlap proves to be a prerequisite for meaningful cooperation (Aris and Snetkov 2018). Yet

concurrently, this very overlap may lead to a heated rivalry for resources, political clout, legitimacy, and mandates (Koschut 2018).

There are various ways in which institutional competition may appear. First, when mandates are vaguely specified, organizations may engage in covert rivalries over the distribution of competencies (Koschut 2018). For instance, as Giegerich (2013) contends, issues over autonomy and labour division arose as the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy expanded the functional overlap with NATO in military crisis management. Second, since Member States frequently belong to several organizations and may strategically employ institutional frameworks to further their own interests, competition may emerge at the state level (Lupu and Greenhill 2017). Even if this leads to duplication, governments may direct contributions through the organization that most accurately resembles their political interests at a given moment (Dijkstra et al. 2025).

3.5. Crisis and Institutional Change

The notion of crisis is central to this framework, representing moments when political uncertainty and urgency levels are heightened. Fore, literature on crisis governance denotes crises as circumstances that concurrently intensify the need for action and diminish tolerance for procedural inertia. As Boin et al. (2016) highlight, in such situations, organizations can follow one of the two paths. They can either follow the well-known and pre-established procedures or capitalise on the situation to broaden their purview and mandates. Concurrently, Mahé and Martel (2023) view crisis as a socially constructed and discursively produced window of opportunity for change that permits the acceptance of policies that would not have otherwise been considered. Rather than just a manifestation of the objective forces of the actors invested in the crisis.

This study embraces the idea of a crisis as a potential critical juncture, in line with existing literature in the field (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Koppa 2022). That can be broadly defined as a time when long-standing institutional constraints and limits may be abruptly lifted to facilitate the development of new policies. This approach, however, does not presuppose that crises will inevitably lead to institutional change (Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024). It is down to the political willingness of the Member States and the compatibility of new measures with the already-established capabilities to determine whether the change will take place.

In this way, the conflict in Ukraine can and has, by some, been identified as a test to the security governance of both the EU and NATO (Koppa 2022). Thus, it opened the door for slight but

perhaps long-lasting alterations while simultaneously emphasizing the advantages and disadvantages of the institutional design of the international organizations at hand (Boin et al. 2016; Zandee and de Baedts 2024).

3.6. Crisis and Institutional Overlap

Crisis and conflict management capabilities ought to be regarded as a sequence of interconnected actions undertaken by various policy actors, rather than singular decision-making instances. According to Diehl and Regan (2015) conflict management tends to follow certain trajectories in which the international community's initial response influences subsequent decisions and signals future resource commitments. Consequently, the choice of one strategy may actively impede or facilitate another, resulting in long-term path dependencies that impact the effectiveness of conflict resolution. This notion can be further extended to the concurrent actions of multiple international actors, as they rarely operate in an organizational vacuum. Under such conditions an institutional overlap is likely to occur.

Faude and Fuss (2020) describe institutional overlap as the intersection of the mandates of independently constituted international institutions. Concurrently, disclosing that institutional overlap is equally likely to emerge as an unintended by-product of purposive state action and as an intentional outcome. With the latter notion becoming an increasingly observable phenomenon, particularly in the event of dissatisfaction with the decision-making mechanisms and with the institutional fit of the mandate of the organization, when addressing issues critical to the existence of the institution.

3.7. Division of Labour and Institutional Complementarity

Whether the EU's and NATO's responses profess a clear division of tasks or an institutional overlap is another main analytical question this framework attempts to answer. The former notion could be described as a functional distribution of tasks between the two actors in accordance with their capabilities and mandate (Tardy 2021). Consequently, many scholars point out that, in line with the natures of both the EU and NATO, the EU ought to prioritise long-term resilience, financial support, and economic pressure on the aggressor, while NATO ought to concentrate on military deterrence and defence (Nissen et al. 2020; Simonet 2023). The latter notion, namely, the institutional overlap, occurs when organizations engage in equivalent activities without notable coordination or added value (Hofmann 2009). Such overlap in action need not be hazardous, yet it might potentially lead to political unrest or inefficiencies (Kaynar and Ak 2017). Moreover, this study does not exclude the possibility of

the emergence of a hybrid form between a clear-cut division of tasks and an institutional overlap as a result of the conflict in Ukraine.

3.8. Strategic Autonomy & Strategic Cooperation

Strategic autonomy quickly arose as one of the most controversial concepts in modern European security discourse. This framework will adopt the following definition of strategic autonomy, namely, it is the EU's ability to reach decisions and take effective action on security-related issues without being structurally dependent on any outside parties, especially the United States. Importantly, this definition does not imply either isolationism of the Union or the withdrawal of any of its Member States from NATO (Biscop 2021; Biscop 2025). Thereby, rather than being perceived as a binary condition, autonomy is now considered a matter of degree. Furthermore, a distinction can be made between an operational autonomy and a rhetorical autonomy, focusing on the former. Some consider the funding of military aid through designated EU instruments a step towards operational autonomy, albeit limited. Since the primary military and defence activities continue to be deeply ingrained in NATO (Zandee and de Baedts 2024).

Conversely, a pattern of interaction known as strategic cooperation occurs when institutions purposefully coordinate duties, steer clear of duplication, and support their respective initiatives. For instance, in the case of a strategic cooperation between the EU and NATO, both institutions ought to acknowledge their respective comparative advantages as well as common strategic goals (Tardy and Lindstrom 2019; Tardy 2021). Therefore, a cooperation between organizations stems from autonomous capability development within their mandate rather than the absence of autonomy. In this way, cooperation and autonomy may reinforce one another rather than being mutually exclusive (Coelmont 2019).

Chapter 4: Research Methods

The responses of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in light of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are to be examined in the subsequent sections of this thesis using a qualitative research design. The nature of the research question, which centers around the institutional behavior, the decision-making procedures, the interpretation of the implications of the measures implemented, and perhaps most importantly, the division of tasks and potential institutional overlap rather than around quantitative measurement or making causal predictions, informs the choice of the qualitative approach.

The goal of the thesis is to learn more about the roles, capabilities, and strategic direction of the two security-focused agencies at hand, as well as to examine what their respective responses were when faced with an identical external shock. Therefore, the interpretive analysis that may identify the meaning, rationale, and institutional context appears to be crucial for such conundrums. A qualitative design proves to be an ideal method for the analysis of how particular actions were made, framed, and maintained throughout time.

This thesis will be guided by the following main research question:

How did the EU and NATO vary in their use of available policy instruments in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and did the crisis reinforce complementarity and cooperation or produce overlap of competences and rivalry between the institutions?

4.1. Comparative Case Study Design

The EU's and NATO's responses to crises are viewed as two analytically divergent yet structurally interrelated cases in this comparative case study analysis, as previously done by Howorth (2014). The Russian invasion of Ukraine offers a shared political and temporal background for the aforementioned investigation, allowing for a systematic comparison while keeping the external stimuli relatively uniform. By enabling the analysis of the differences in the use of policy instruments between the two institutions, this methodology directly serves the main research question. Fore, the study may expose and identify the differences in the selection of instruments employed, the dynamics of decision-making, and institutional adaptability that stem from the organizational design of the EU and NATO rather than the variations in threat perception displayed by the two.

A similar approach was used in the paper by Howorth (2014), where the researcher compared the institutional developments between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization across multiple security interventions. Lachmann (2010) utilised a similar approach while examining the asymmetric relationship and hindered cooperation between NATO and the EU in the area of security. Therefore, such a study design can be particularly useful to address the issues of cooperation and competition between international organizations, as well as the issues of complementarity and institutional overlap. As the study can only assess whether the observed crisis responses indicate a functional division of labour or a growing institutional convergence by comparing the two organizations side by side.

4.2. Case Selection Justification

The cases of the EU and NATO prove to be relevant both on a theoretical and an empirical plane. Whereby, in theory, the two aforementioned organizations stand for divergent frameworks for security governance. While the EU can be described as a hybrid political system whose security role has historically relied on economic, civilian, and regulatory mechanisms, with defence remaining primarily on the intergovernmental level, NATO is a solely military alliance focused on collective defence and deterrence (Nissen et al. 2020). Empirically, both organizations played a significant role in determining how Europe reacted to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine (Becker, Bendiek, and Kempin 2025). Defining the kinds of measures each institution used, how these metrics mirrored institutional mandates, and conducting an analysis of the responses of the respective institutions enables the research question to be addressed.

The time frame this thesis focuses on starts in February 2022 and lasts until the end of 2025. Encompassing, therefore, the immediate crisis responses and the consecutive institutional adaptation phase, which is crucial for addressing the short- and long-term consequences for European security governance design. Additionally, it facilitates the evaluation of whether early emergency measures translated into more permanent alterations of institutional practices.

4.3. Data Sources

The empirical analysis will be grounded in a systematic review of primary and secondary sources. Press releases, official statements, decisions made by the European Council, NATO summit declarations, strategy documents, speeches by prominent institutional officials, and other official sources published by the EU and NATO represent the primary sources used for the purpose of this study. They can be particularly relevant, for they offer clear information about the policies implemented and the ways in which organizations justified their respective

responses in relation to their mandates. Such sources also provide additional insight into their own perception of the institutions and their role in European security.

Consequently, secondary sources are comprised of reports from respectable international news outlets like Reuters and the Financial Times, as well as policy assessments released by well-known think tanks and recently published academic articles analysing the implications of the conflict in Ukraine. These resources ought to aid with the contextualization of the official press releases, verification of timeframes, and evaluation of whether the declared actions materialised and were sustained in reality. Such a process of triangulation is crucial for assessing both decision-making dynamics and institutional change.

4.4. Operational Focus

The conceptual framework and the research question posed are directly linked to the methodological approach utilised in this thesis. In the case of the invasion of Ukraine, the implications for the European security governance will be assessed by investigating whether the measures used were timely, consistent, and sustainable in relation to the respective institutional mandates of the EU and NATO, and whether they altered the institutional interlinked environment and brought about significant changes in the cooperation or competition between the institutions, the study is able to address its main research question.

The speed and cohesion of decision-making are examined by assessing the timing and sequencing of crucial decisions as well as clear indicators of procedural bottlenecks such as consensus in NATO or unanimity in the EU. The variations in responses are to be clarified when taking institutional rules into consideration rather than being perceived as the sole indicators of political will.

Moreover, the substance and timing of the EU and NATO policies will be analysed in order to make inferences on the complementarity and overlap of competencies between the aforementioned institutions. The study will inquire into whether the activities seem coordinated, reinforce one another, or are redundant, as well as whether the organizations specifically recognise their respective functions in official communication, inferring whether cooperation or competition is more evident in the relations between them. The definitions and operationalisation of the variables utilised in this study are enclosed in Table 1 below.

Variable type	Variable Name	Operationalisation	Indicators
Dependent Variable			

DV (level 1)	Coordinated Complementarity (Cooperation)	Actions taken by the institutions are in line with their respective mandates, mutually reinforce each other, and showcase a division of labour.	- Clear-cut differentiation of tasks - Joint declarations and alignment in rhetoric - Actions taken in sequence and supporting each other - The roles of each respective organization are explicitly recognised - Information exchange, coordination of activities
DV (level 2)	Cooperative Overlap	Actions taken by the institutions stem from the overlapping policy areas, the coordination of efforts aims to prevent the exact duplication of responses, and rivalry in either influence exerted or mandates.	- Duplicated/mirrored responses get coordinated with joint command structures - Information exchange - Greater resources pooled together from various sources - Complementary application of comparable instruments
DV (level 3)	Competitive Overlap (Rivalry)	Actions taken by the institutions stem from the overlapping policy areas, the lack of coordination efforts results in duplication of responses, rivalry, and contestation of either influence exerted or mandates.	- Comparable tools utilised without coordination - Duplication of means proving some of the actions redundant - Conflicting narratives and/or priorities - Evident push for institutional autonomy - Displayed distrust in the actions/intentions of international partners - Uncoordinated parallel responses
Independent Variables			
IV1	Crisis Pressure	The degree to which institutions are compelled by necessity	- Policy innovation happening at a rapid pace

		to develop or alter standardised functions.	- Expansion existing of tools and mechanisms - Divergence from usual behaviour
IV2	Inter-Institutional Trust	The extent to which the EU and NATO view one another as trustworthy, respectable, and supporting allies.	- Positive vs critical remarks in officially released statements - Perceived trustworthiness of the partners involved - A clear recognition of the role played by the other institution - The displayed willingness to delegate and arrange tasks - Proof of information exchange and cooperative efforts
IV3	Type of Policy Instrument Used	What are the tools utilised by the respective institutions in response to conflict?	- Military (troops, deterrence, exercises) - Financial (aid, funding mechanisms) - Legal-regulatory (sanctions, export controls) - Political-symbolic (statements, summits)
IV4	Decision-Making Structure	How did the institutions reach their decisions, and how did they shape the subsequent responses?	- Time between the proposal and implementation of the measures - Potential delays or bottlenecks - Evidence of consensus and unanimity among the members

Table 1. Operationalisation of the variables analysed in the study. Includes three levels of the dependent variable and four distinct independent variables.

4.5. Limitations of the Research Design

The design of this thesis is, however, not without limitations. Firstly, insight into internal discussions and informal negotiation processes is hindered by the use of solely publicly available data. Furthermore, national-level dynamics and preferences are only accounted for insofar as they are reflected in the institution-wide policy and action outcomes, therefore, the

study focuses on institutions rather than specific Member States. Internal shocks, such as changes in the overall foreign policy agenda of the United States, are also predominantly disregarded. Additionally, the thesis does not aspire to assess whether the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was successful from either a humanitarian or military and strategic standpoint. It intentionally puts focus on institutional change in a more limited and analytically controlled manner.

Chapter 5: Background: The Evolution of the EU and NATO Security Cooperation

To provide a comprehensive analysis of the responses of the EU and NATO to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as their implications for the relations between the institutions, it is essential to place them within a broader context of their respective security tasks. The ability to respond to crisis possessed by both of the main security actors in Europe was shaped by their historically developed sets of tools, skills, and institutional procedures. Thus, this chapter charts the historical development of the policy toolboxes that NATO and the EU have at their disposal inexplicably linked to the historical trends of cooperation and competition between them. By doing so, it aims to paint a broader institutional context that has made the invasion of 2022 a unique test of European security governance.

5.1. Initial Developments and Relations (the 1990s)

While NATO has been well established as a guarantor of international security ever since its creation in the aftermath of World War II (Tardy 2019), the European Union took on a more active role in security and defence as a result of the structural changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Howorth 2017; Biscop 2020). Consequently, when the world was divided between the eastern and western blocks, it was the Alliance that acted as a primary security provider by fusing political unity among its members with military deterrence. Its dual nature as a political-military alliance made it possible for the Western powers to build a common strategic culture in addition to engaging in defence planning (Tardy 2019). In contrast, security and defence were mainly marginalised in the institutional framework of the broader European integration, which had developed as a more civilian and economic endeavour. According to Winn (2003), the EU prioritised economic regulation, diplomacy, and multilateralism over military force because of the predominance of its civilian character.

A more multifaceted and unpredictable security environment was brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union, whereby the primary mobilizing threat of the Cold War period became eliminated (Kriendler 2004). Consequently, the division of labour between NATO and the EU grew more challenging (Biscop 2020). The 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia revealed an array of shortcomings in both institutions. As NATO was initially faced with issues with adapting its existing structures to crisis management outside of the scope of territorial defence (Tardy 2019), while the EU was unable to handle violent conflict in its immediate neighbourhood (Kriendler 2004). The aforementioned setbacks made it clear that new methods

of collaboration and capacity building were not solely a want, but rather that they were a requirement and a necessity.

In order to close this gap, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was initiated with the means of the Petersberg Declaration by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 (Coelmont 2019). CFSP, however, remained firmly intergovernmental in nature, reflecting Member States' unwillingness to cede sovereignty in highly sensitive domains such as defence (Petrov and Romanyshyn 2020). Moreover, instituting unanimity as the predominant decision-making mechanism hindered the EU's capacity to take decisive action and produced the lowest-common-denominator results (Gegout 2010). Hence, NATO continued to dominate European security governance through the 1990s.

Simultaneously, initiatives commenced to fortify a European defence component within the NATO structure. In line with the aspirations to allow European allies to assume more responsibility while still being part of the Alliance, the idea of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was created in the mid-1990s (Tams 1999). In addition to exposing a crucial conundrum, namely, how to boost European autonomy without jeopardizing NATO and the transatlantic relations, these initiatives represented a wider understanding that the European governments needed to bolster their individual capabilities (Howorth 2017).

The larger course of European integration served to further exacerbate this polarization. As European nations became more politically and economically intertwined, concerns about their role as global players in security issues emerged. The architecture of European security governance became structurally unbalanced on account of lack of a cohesive EU-wide security policy and the heavy dependence on NATO (Biscop 2020). As the XX century was coming to an end, it was becoming increasingly apparent that to function as a reliable security provider, the EU would have to devise its own toolbox (EUR-Lex 2007; Kriendler 2004). The subsequent institutional developments of the early 2000s were facilitated by this realization.

5.2. The Beginning of Institutionalised Relations (2000-2016)

A pivotal period in the institutionalization of EU-NATO relations occurred in the early 2000s as both organizations strove to adapt themselves to the shifting security landscape (Kriendler 2004). Following the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998, the European Union was bestowed with the goal of conducting independent crisis management operations with the introduction of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 (Młynarski 2023).

This marked the emergence of a more comprehensive security actor and a significant departure from the EU's previous civilian emphasis.

Importantly, the growth and advancements of ESDP were clearly articulated in terms of NATO. The strategic collaboration between the two institutions was formalised for the first time in 2002 with the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP and in 2003 with the Berlin Plus Agreements. By granting the EU access to NATO planning resources and capabilities for EU-led operations, these agreements integrated EU military operations into the larger transatlantic framework (EUR-Lex 2007; Himmrich and Raynova 2017). Simultaneously, they established a functional division of labour by reiterating NATO's pivotal role in collective defence.

In reality, the Western Balkans were where this division was most apparent. Operation Concordia in North Macedonia and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina are two examples of NATO-led missions that the EU successfully assumed, proving the viability of the newly established operational complementarity (Himmrich and Raynova 2017; Kriendler 2004). These experiences demonstrated how EU-led missions concentrating on long-term governance, rule of law, and capacity building may be utilised following NATO's efforts in the initial military stabilization period (Coelmont 2019).

Despite these initial achievements, institutional and political issues continued to limit the extent of the relational ties between the EU and NATO. The problem of partially non-overlapping memberships was a significant barrier and hindrance to further developments, especially the dispute between Cyprus, which is an EU member but is not a NATO member, and Turkey, which is a NATO member but not an EU member (Nissen et al. 2020). The experienced difficulties proved counterproductive to deeper institutional cooperation, especially in the area of information exchange, as both sides proved reluctant to find common ground. Consequently, rather than proceeding via streamlined institutionalised channels, cooperation frequently remained ad hoc and heavily reliant on political circumstances (Himmrich and Raynova 2017).

Concurrently, both institutions broadened their respective crisis management measures, capabilities, and actions. While the EU created a wide range of military and civilian missions under the CSDP framework, NATO became more actively involved in expeditionary operations, such as those in Afghanistan (Bisogniero 2011; Leuprecht 2019). These simultaneously yet independently occurring developments also raised concerns about increased competition and duplication (Drent 2018). Researchers have underlined that overlapping functions and inefficiencies could potentially stem from an unclear division of labour between

the two institutions (Aghniashvili 2016). Consequently, the relationship continued to be unbalanced structurally. While the EU focused on civilian crisis management and hybrid methods, NATO maintained its superior military capabilities and continued to dominate in high-intensity operations. Because EU Member States continued to rely on NATO, and especially on the United States, for territorial defence, this disparity was a reflection on both institutional design and political realities (Lachmann 2010).

All things considered, the years 2000-2016 can be classified as a time of pragmatic institutionalization. Deeper strategic integration continued to be restricted, despite the establishment of formal legal frameworks for cooperation and the demonstration of practical complementarity in the aforementioned cases of international interventions. Unresolved tensions lingered beneath the surface of the partnership, which was sculpted by a continuous balancing act between autonomy and cooperation.

5.3. The Era of Joint Declarations and the Deepening of the EU-NATO Relations

Due to the escalating severity of the security situation and a renewed sense of political commitment, EU-NATO cooperation gained significant impetus. The 2014 annexation of Crimea, the emergence of hybrid threats, and growing geopolitical rivalries brought attention to the shortcomings of the arrangements in place and spurred a desire for more extensive coordination of actions and efforts between the two security institutions in shaping and safeguarding European security governance (Drent 2018; Nissen et al. 2020).

In this sense, the 2016 Warsaw Joint Declaration signed together by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization marked a critical point (Council of the EU 2024a). The document explicitly defined the EU and NATO as “unique and essential partners” and further emphasised the necessity for tighter cooperation in a number of specific areas, such as cyber security, hybrid threats, and defence capabilities (European Council, European Commission, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). Subsequent proposals for implementation as well as further joint declarations in 2018 and 2023 expanded the cooperation into dozens of tangible action points with both short- and long-term deliverables (Simonet 2023).

The growing institutionalization of the longstanding cooperation between the EU and NATO was one of the major advances during that time (European Council, European Commission, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2018). Coordinated exercises, newly improved information exchange channels, and joint working structures were formed by the respective

institutions. Over 70 areas of collaboration have been identified and actively worked on by the late 2010s, when the cooperation had reached unprecedented levels in both scope and intensity (Council of the EU 2017). These changes constituted a reflection of the heightened understanding that complex security issues and increasing geopolitical tensions necessitated a multi-institutional, coordinated approach.

Concurrently, structural issues did not simply disappear, despite the continued reiterations of unity and shared understanding in subsequent progress reports submitted to the councils of the respective institutions (European External Action Service 2017a, 2017b). Divergent political priorities among Member States, institutional autonomy concerns, and restricted information sharing remained obstacles to cooperation. According to Himmrich and Raynova (2017), both organizations pursued parallel but not fully integrated methods, and while cooperation on an operational level improved substantially, strategic alignment was yet to be achieved.

The relationship was further strained by the notion of European strategic autonomy. Concerns regarding duplication and possibly increasing rivalry with NATO were raised by the EU's goal to strengthen its capabilities and lessen reliance on outside parties, especially the United States. The European Union's quest for strategic autonomy has always been accompanied by a paradox, as Howorth (2017) points out. Namely, despite its ambitions for independence, it is still largely dependent on NATO for collective defence.

Concurrently, the United States during the first Trump administration proved to be quite apprehensive about the growing relations and interconnectedness between the two institutions (Badawi and Zreik 2025). This point becomes evident with the address given by President of the European Council Donald Tusk ahead of the NATO Summit in July 2018. During his speech, Tusk strived to convince the American leader that investment into the cooperation between NATO and the EU is the most beneficial and sound way of securing both American and European defence (European Council 2018).

In an effort to ease the aforementioned tensions, the EU's Strategic Compass and NATO's Strategic Concept were adopted in 2022. Both publications placed a strong emphasis on complementarity, stressing the EU's role in countering hybrid threats and addressing resilience, as well as more general security issues, while reiterating NATO as the cornerstone of collective defence (Daehnhardt 2022). This convergence hinted at an evolving relationship with a more distinct but still progressing division of labour.

Considering all the aforementioned factors and developments, the years 2016-2022 can be viewed as a time of increased but still imperfect integration (NATO 2025d). Although practical cooperation developed considerably, the relationship was nonetheless shaped by underlying grievances over autonomy, sovereignty, trust, and strategic visions. Importantly, it was precisely in this European security governance landscape that the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine transpired and threw yet another challenge onto the still-clarifying cooperation between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Simonet 2023).

Chapter 6: Analysis of the Conflict Responses

6.1. Responses of the European Union

Overall, the responses of the European Union can be largely divided into two main categories of measures, namely the restrictive measures and the supportive measures. In the former category, a further division can be made between the legal-regulatory measures directed at the Russian Federation itself and those directed at third-party states acting in support of the invasion, including Iran, Belarus, and Syria. Conversely, the latter category can be further split into financial, military, and political measures instilled to provide support to Ukraine, to the EU Member States, and to third states such as the Republic of Moldova. Such classification showcases the breadth and complexity of the security measures activated in the aftermath of the invasion.

6.1.1. Restrictive Legal-Regulatory Measures Towards the Russian Federation

In response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has showcased a strong and unwavering stance ever since the early days of the conflict. On February 22nd, 2022, which can be considered the eve of the invasion, the High Representative of the Union issued a formal warning against the escalation of the impending conflict. It was accompanied by a verbal commitment of political and economic sanctions to follow if Russia did not back down (Council of the EU 2022b). Such sentiment can be further evidenced by the immediate condemnation of the actions of the Russian Federation that have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another state, as well as by following discussions regarding the first package of sanctions (Council of the EU 2022a). The aforementioned package of sanctions was adopted on February 23rd and consisted of targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities as well as restrictions imposed on trade and investments in the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine (European Council 2022). The geographically targeted scope of trade restrictions became more extensive as the Russian aggression progressed later in the year (Council of the EU 2022aj).

The measures imposed on individuals and entities involved freezing the assets and prohibiting any funds from being made available to the listed persons, as well as travel bans. While initially they were targeted at high-state officials, such as the members of the Russian State Duma, oligarchs, and military commanders (Council of the EU 2022c; European Council 2022), they shortly came to include also the members of their families and people openly supporting the

Russian cause (Council of the EU 2022y). The latter group encompassed politicians, those sharing regime propaganda, and leading businesspeople (Council of the EU 2022e).

The scope of the economic sanctions invoked against the Russian Federation grew quite rapidly and shortly affected sectors vital for the functioning of the Russian economy. The targeted sectors comprised financial, energy, transport, and technology ones. The severity and the comprehensiveness of the aforementioned sanctions grew along with the advancements of the Russian army. In the first days of the invasion, the EU has also announced that Russian state officials, including those in the diplomatic field, will no longer be beneficiaries of the provisions of the visa facilitation agreement (Council of the EU 2022c). Importantly, the initial measures were intended to target the state's apparatus in order to inflict pressure to stop the invasion and not to affect regular citizens. The aim was to disrupt the underlying workings of the state, predominantly by gradually eroding Russian industries and affecting its state revenue.

The most rapid developments occurred within the transportation sector. What initially was only supposed to encompass export bans of technologies used in aviation and space industries and a prohibition on the sale of aircrafts and their parts quickly turned into a prohibition of the provision of maintenance and other services (Council of the EU 2022c). Furthermore, all Russian air carriers have been banned from entering the airspace of the EU Member States as well as using any of the EU-based infrastructure to execute their flight operations (Council of the EU 2022d). The aforementioned changes materialised within a scope of four days.

The continuing armed activities in the Ukrainian territory have also resulted in a media ban applied to most of the major regime or state-owned media outlets. Initially the ban affected TV stations such as Sputnik and RT/Russia Today (Council of the EU 2022g). Consequently, their broadcast has been suspended all over the EU. Since then, the list of media outlets grew to encompass more than 50 entities, all relevant distribution agreements, licenses, and authorizations previously issued have been withheld. Such measures were introduced to prevent the Russian regime from spreading misinformation and propaganda-fueled content.

When it comes to the banking sector, the sanctions imposed included not only the prohibition from entering into transactions with virtually all Russian banks, including the Russian Central Bank, but also the so-called SWIFT ban. The latter measure is massively disrupting the flow of financial assets from and into the Russian economy. Moreover, measures have also been imposed to prevent the sales, relocation, and trade of euro-denominated banknotes into the

territory of the Russian Federation as well as to persons who intended to use them within its territories (Council of the EU 2022h).

One of the most overall impactful sectoral restrictive measures was the one imposed on Russian oil. Due to the high degree of reliance of the EU Member States on oil and other petroleum products originating in the Russian Federation, the energy security of Europe became vulnerable. The Union had to seek alternative import sources while accounting for a lengthy transition period. In light of this, the Union has initially decided to introduce a grace period of 6 and 8 months for crude oil and other refined petroleum products, respectively (Council of the EU 2022x). Moreover, a price cap for the aforementioned goods was introduced to balance the variance of global energy prices and to alleviate the fallout on the energy supplies (Council of the EU 2022ap).

Importantly, there were several sectors that were not to be affected by the restrictive measures of the European Union, namely the food and agricultural sectors of the economy. Such regulations have been imposed in order to prevent further deterioration of food security both on a global and, most notably, on a regional scale. As the invasion of Ukraine has already disrupted the supply chains within that industry to a considerable extent (Council of the EU 2022at). Furthermore, the bans were not to include products intended for medical use and pharmaceuticals, as such measures could endanger the well-being and lives of many.

In cooperation with its international partners, the EU has also issued a statement in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Whereby, it expressed its readiness to halt the extension of particular privileges to Russia stemming from its membership in the organization, namely, waiving the most-favoured-nation treatment (Council of the EU 2022k). Moreover, the EU imposed import and export bans on many goods, including raw materials, luxury goods, and advanced technologies such as semiconductors and highly specialised software. Such measures were implemented to further weaken the Russian economy and prevent significant developments in the military and defence realm.

The Union took special precautions to ensure the measures introduced were being implemented and hard to circumvent. This was done with the aid of what became known as the “maintenance and alignment” package of sanctions (Council of the EU 2022ac). With that, the EU extended the already extensive list of prohibited items that could enhance Russian military and technological capabilities. Conversely, the Council decided to clarify the scope of existing sanctions, including those related to aviation, justice, and public acquisitions.

Furthermore, in the seventh month of the invasion the Council decided to fully suspend the visa facilitation agreement with Russia. Thereby increasing the cost and time required for the processing of the application, necessitating additional documentation to be presented during the process, as well as implementing more restrictive regulations when it comes to visas allowing for multiple entries into the EU (Council of the EU 2022ah). Concurrently, the Union decided that any Russian travel documents issued in the territories of Ukraine and Georgia would not be considered valid and thus would not give grounds for entering the EU territory (Council of the EU 2022ar).

Until the end of 2022, as a result of no fewer than 9 sanction packages, the EU list of persons under the restrictive measures encompassed 1386 individuals and 171 entities (Council of the EU 2022au). Moreover, the measures affected a wide array of sectors, including energy, finance, technology, transport, media, and services. Another notable development included the suspension of the visa facilitation agreement between the EU and Russia, which made it significantly harder for Russian citizens to travel to and within the Schengen area.

The year 2023 saw fewer new developments in the area of restrictive measures than its predecessor, both in terms of volume and frequency of imposing sanctions. The European Union has, however, extended the period of existing functions for six additional months twice, effectively extending them by a full year. The sanctions subject to the aforementioned included restrictions on trade, dual-use goods, technology, finance, transport, and luxury goods. Furthermore, the bans on the import of oil and petroleum refined products, on broadcasting and licensing of media outlets, and on providing access to the SWIFT system were upheld (Council of the EU 2023a).

The same year the EU adopted three new sanction packages, which mainly contributed to patching up the holes in the sanctions regime by extending the list of products subject to the trade restrictions. Particularly including goods and products that could directly allow the development and strengthening of the Russian defence and security or could be repurposed for the same objective. Examples of such goods are specialised vehicles, parts of various machinery, antennas, drones, specific rare earth materials, and thermal cameras (Council of the EU 2023d, 2023i, 2023n).

Moreover, the EU introduced a transit ban for various goods and technology, whereby no transportation could occur via the Russian territory when attempting to export goods from the EU to third countries. The transporting sector would be further impacted with the adoption of

a decision prohibiting any goods from being transported into the EU by land on trucks and/or trailers registered in Russia (Council of the EU 2023i). Such measures were meant to further disrupt and deteriorate the economic situation of the perpetrator.

One of the new and quite crucial developments was the adoption of the “Wagner package” of sanctions (Council of the EU 2023f). Whereby, the Union has extended the sanctions regime imposed on a private military group known as the Wagner Group for its involvement in Russian aggression. Notably, the aforementioned entity has previously been sanctioned under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. Simultaneously, RIA FAN, a news and media outlet, chaired by the same individual financing the activities of the Wagner Group, became listed as a sanctioned entity for spreading propaganda and disinformation.

Moreover, the Union reached a decision regarding the levels of the oil price cap, setting them at \$45 per barrel and \$100 per barrel for discounted and premium crude oil, respectively. Such price levels are subject to changes and ought to be reevaluated by the Council on a two-month basis. Importantly, one particular exemption has been made, namely if the petroleum products originating from Russia were to be sold at or below the set price, the transporting vessels would not be subjected to some of the sanctions imposed on the transit of this group of products (Council of the EU 2023c). Within the energy sector, the EU also decided to impose an import ban on liquefied propane, albeit with a year-long transition period (Council of the EU 2023n).

Furthermore, to shield the EU's critical infrastructure and its crucial operations, the Union decided to officially prohibit any Russian nationals from holding any position within its governing bodies. The reasoning for such action is based on the presumption that such individuals could be easily influenced by the Russian apparatus and undermine the performance of the EU bodies (Council of the EU 2023d).

Over the course of 2024, some of the restrictive measures imposed were a part of a broader sanctions regime agreed upon with international partners such as Group 7 (G7). An example of such measures can be the ban on diamonds of Russian origin adopted with the aim of diminishing the value of an important revenue source for the Russian Federation (Council of the EU 2024b). Moreover, the previously introduced restrictive measures have been prolonged twice by 6 months with relevant decisions of the Council to exert greater pressure on Russia and highlight further support for Ukraine (Council of the EU 2024d, 2024h). Crucially, additional third states decided to participate in the EU sanction regime targeting particular industries and products. For instance, the United Kingdom, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland

decided to introduce import restrictions on iron and steel products originating in Russia, thereby aligning themselves with the position of the European Union (Council of the EU 2024g, 2024m).

Furthermore, the Council made a decision to shelve the revenues accumulating from assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia being held by Central Securities Depositories (CSDs). The assets deposited in the CSDs, which are to be subject to this regulation, must exceed the amount of €1 million. Moreover, the CSDs were tasked with accounting for and reporting all extraordinary cash balances separately to avoid any net profit being made and omitted from relevant statements (Council of the EU 2024f). Consequently, by the subsequent decisions of the Council, the accumulated funds were to be redistributed and used to provide continuous military support to Ukraine and to enhance its defence capabilities (Council of the EU 2024l).

To further disrupt the financial sector of the Russian economy, the EU decided to prohibit the use of the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) which was designed by the Central Bank of Russia to ease the effect of previously imposed restrictive measures. Thereby, EU operating banks are not allowed to make any transactions using the aforementioned system with the entities listed (Council of the EU 2024m).

While the EU has halted the broadcasting activities of many Russian media outlets connected to and actively acting in support of the regime, it has not prevented their staff from conducting other activities such as interviews and research (Council of the EU 2024k). Moreover, the Council adopted a decision barring political parties, foundations, NGOs, and media providers from welcoming funding from the Russian Federation and agents acting in its name (Council of the EU 2024m).

In 2025, the EU has majorly focused on measures directly targeting the Russian shadow fleet, which enables the Russian regime to continue parts of its trade operations abroad, albeit under the flag of third states. The list of vessels subject to restrictive measures has been successfully expanding. Sanctioned entities are not permitted to access EU ports and receive any form of maintenance or other support from EU-operating actors. Within the realm of maritime sanctions, the EU has also banned EU vessels from making any transactions with particular airports, ports, and locks, especially those that facilitate the transfer of military-related goods (Council of the EU 2025a, 2025c).

Within the same sanction package, the Council reached a decision to further hinder the transport sector of the Russian economy by expanding the flight ban for listed Russian carriers

within the EU territory. Conversely, it has tightened the road transport of various goods, which now prohibits any form of transit to entities that are controlled by Russian legal or natural actors in at least 25%. Additionally, the Council decided to further broaden the catalog of items under the export bans to now include certain chemical substances, software facilitating the use of computer mechanical control machines, and game controllers used to operate UAVs. The EU has also outlawed the provision of construction services to Russia and the occupied territories of Ukraine (Council of the EU 2025a, 2025f).

To further impact the Russian energy sector, the EU substantially extended the breadth of its restrictive measures. Firstly, it reevaluated its price cap for crude oil and set it at \$45 per barrel, a drop of \$15 from the previous \$60 per barrel. It also targeted the shadow fleet across the entirety of its supply chain. Moreover, the Council decided to ban the imports of refined petroleum products from Russian crude oil and those transported from any other state, with the exception of products imported from the EU partner states, namely Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. Simultaneously, virtually all transactions with both Nordstream 1 and Nordstream 2 pipelines were barred. Thus, implying the hindrance of completion, operation, and maintenance of the aforementioned energy infrastructure (Council of the EU 2025e). Moreover, the Council decided to completely restrict the import of Russian liquified natural gas subject to a transition period (Council of the EU 2025f).

On a political level, the EU decided to enact a stricter regime when it comes to travel of Russian diplomats within the Schengen area beyond the country they are accredited to. With the introduction of the new regulations, they will be obligated to inform the intended state of visit in advance, and they may be subject to additional authorization requirements based on the visas or residence permits of that state (Council of the EU 2025f).

6.1.2. Restrictive Measures Towards Third States

While the Russian Federation is the sole main perpetrator in the crisis at hand, it has received considerable support from third states since the beginning of the conflict. In light of that, the European Union decided to impose targeted restrictive measures on individuals and entities from Belarus and Iran as well. Such instruments were put in place on persons who either provided significant aid to the Russian government or took part in the planning and decision-making during the invasion (Council of the EU 2022f). The aforementioned aid came in a form of both political support and supplying the Russian armed forces with lethal military equipment (Council of the EU 2022a).

The restrictive measures towards third-state individuals have predominantly taken on the form of asset freezes, prohibition of making funds available to persons listed by the sanction's regime, and travel bans (Council of the EU 2022f). Therefore, the procedures implemented towards individuals of other states directly mirrored the ones implemented on the Russian-originating individuals.

Furthermore, the EU introduced restrictions on the trade of various goods when it comes to Belarus. Those mainly included the trade of raw materials and the export of dual-use goods and technology that could be later used to enhance the military and security capabilities of Russia and its accomplices (Council of the EU 2022f). Later on, the sanction regime was expanded to target the financial sector of Belarus and included the restriction of access to the SWIFT system and the restriction of entering into transactions with the Central Bank of Belarus, as well as the exclusion of Belarus state-owned entities from listing and providing services on EU trading venues (Council of the EU 2022j).

The Council decided to implement a separate sanctions regime toward the Syrian regime in response to its involvement in the war in Ukraine (Council of the EU 2022ad). This affected mainly military officials of high rank, who had been tasked with recruiting combatants for the Russian cause. Moreover, successful businesspeople benefiting from the actions of the Syrian regime and conducting their business operations within its territory came under scrutiny, albeit to a lesser extent.

Some high-profile pro-Russian Ukrainian citizens came under the sanction regime as well. Notably, the former president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, and his son. The decision was reached in light of their involvement in undermining the security and stability of the Ukrainian state, also in the form of financial support provided to the separatist groups in the occupied territories of Ukraine (Council of the EU 2022af).

The EU expanded the list of sanction regime-subjected persons to include Iranian individuals and entities for their role in devising and distributing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Council of the EU 2022as). These have been used by the Russian Federation to target many civilian and military targets in Ukraine, thereby contributing to the advancements of the Russian army (Council of the EU 2022al). This has been used to send a signal that providing any form of aid to Russia will be met with a response from the Union irrespective of one's country of origin.

Moreover, in 2023, the EU has for the first time in its history-imposed sanctions on Iranian enterprises specializing in the manufacturing of military unmanned aerial vehicles. Such

restrictions stem from the fact that these tools have been used by the Russian army's military operations in Ukraine, especially in cases when civilian infrastructure was being targeted (Council of the EU 2023d).

In light of the increasing support and involvement of Belarus in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Council decided to extend the package of restrictive sanctions towards the enabling state to mirror the ones imposed on the Russian Federation. Moreover, the previously existing sanctions regime has been prolonged until February 2026 (Council of the EU 2025a). The EU also proposed trade restrictions to be introduced on agricultural products and certain fertilizers originating in Russia and Belarus that have previously not been subject to the sanctions. The aim of such action is to lessen the dependence of the Union on fertilizers coming from the perpetrating states (Council of the EU 2025b). Furthermore, the EU continued its efforts in targeting individuals and entities providing support to the Russian regime by sanctioning legal and natural persons from China, Israel, and Belarus (Council of the EU 2025c).

6.1.3. Measures in Support of Ukraine

Ever since the threat towards the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine materialised, the European Union has pledged its unwavering support to the state and to the peace efforts (Council of the EU 2022a). Initially, the European Council committed to political, humanitarian, and financial assistance (Council of the EU 2022b). The EU has almost immediately adopted a decision to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with both military equipment and other supplies, including personal protective equipment, first aid kits, and fuel. Such assistance measures were implemented within the scope of the European Peace Facility, a Union's financing mechanism. In light of the invasion and the subsequent continuously growing Russian aggression, the EU decided to, for the first time in its history, provide a third state with lethal equipment to further support Ukrainian defence (Council of the EU 2022d). The initial support under the EPF was equivalent to €500 million and grew systematically by the same amount with the adoption of subsequent Council decisions made on March 23rd, April 13th, May 24th, July 21st, and October 17th (Council of the EU 2023b). By the end of 2022, the aforementioned support provided amounted to €3.1 billion.

In May, the Council voiced its commitment to establishing a Solidarity Trust Fund to support Ukraine, following the previous decision of the Council. This mechanism is streamlined across three concrete lines, namely, providing humanitarian support, addressing short-term liquidity needs, and making reconstructive efforts. In line with that, an array of macro-financial

assistance measures became mobilised along with the EU's international partners, particularly to cover the costs of running the Ukrainian state during the invasion. The future reconstruction will be promoted by both the EU and NATO and will materialise once suitable peace agreements are in place. The additional €1 billion long-term loan within the scheme of macro-financial assistance (MFA) provided to Ukraine was subject to a certain conditionality, namely, the funds were released following a memorandum of understanding declaring increased transparency and reporting on the use of the funds provided (Council of the EU 2022aa). The MFAs were subsequently expanded by an additional €5 billion (Council of the EU 2022ai).

Moreover, the Union extended its aid not only to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian government but also to the people fleeing the war. With the adoption of the decision on temporary protection for such persons, the EU granted special privileges to those seeking refuge and established special programs to provide them with any aid necessary for their safety. The temporary protection was to last for the initial period of one year, subject to prolongation if the situation so necessitated (Council of the EU 2022i). The EU also advised its Member States to facilitate the exchange of the Ukrainian currency, hryvnia, into any of the EU currencies to allow the people access to funds and alleviate financial hardships while trying to settle in a new environment. This measure was, however, based on a non-binding recommendation from the Council (Council of the EU 2022s).

The EU decided to amend the mandate of its already existing civilian mission, namely the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). The new extended mandate intends to support the Ukrainian authorities in the facilitation of the investigation and prosecution of any war crimes committed in the context of the invasion. These developments were to strengthen the previous efforts of bolstering Ukraine's security services and its rule of law (Council of the EU 2022u). Conversely, to ensure that no war crimes go unpunished due to lack of evidence and therefore grounds for conviction, the EU adopted a new mandate to allow Eurojust to gather, evaluate, and accumulate relevant documentation. Such data could include anything from written and printed to audiovisual files and would be processed in collaboration with Europol and national and international authorities, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Council of the EU 2022v).

To support the Ukrainian economy during this critical time, the EU has adopted a regulatory measure allowing for a temporary liberalization of trade and other trade-related concessions.

This was undertaken in lieu of the food security crisis intensified by the war (Council of the EU 2022w).

One of the most significant and impactful developments was granting Ukraine the status of a candidate country in recognition of its commitment to European values and to the reforms undertaken even in the challenging environment. During the eighth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Council, crucial developments and endeavours were highlighted, namely, the aim to integrate the Ukrainian market into the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), allowing for easier transfer of funds. Conversely, the European Investment Bank ought to provide a loan of about €1 billion to secure priority necessities of the Ukrainian government (Council of the EU 2022ag).

Furthermore, the EU decided to bring to life the Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). This measure was intended to improve the military capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in particular in the field of effective military conduct. The mission ought to operate within the territory of the EU Member States, with its Operational Headquarters in Brussels, and be chaired by the Director of Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) (Council of the EU 2022ak). The EUMAM launched on November 15th, and its mandate is limited to an initial period of 2 years and has allocated funds of approximately €107 million. Moreover, the Council decided to allocate a further €16 million under EPF to support the building of capabilities under the aforementioned mission (Council of the EU 2022an).

In addition to further support provided under the EPF, the EU introduced a new assistance measure to bolster the efforts of the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). This new assistance measure initially amounted to €45 million and was intended to supply non-lethal equipment and other supplies and services with the aim of endorsing the training of Ukrainian forces (Council of the EU 2023b). Over the course of 2023, EUMAM Ukraine received additional funding with the assistance measures under the EPF amounting to €255 million and successfully conducted the required military training for over 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers (Council of the EU 2023m).

Moreover, an additional €1 billion assistance measure has been adopted under the EPF, allowing for the reimbursement of funds to the Member States for the provision of ammunition to Ukraine. Crucially, this step has been the first out of three in the plan to facilitate the delivery and joint procurement of artillery ammunition within the Union (Council of the EU 2023e).

Such developments were accompanied by phase two of the project, whereby the provision of artillery rounds and missiles to the Ukrainian army was financed under EPF and jointly acquired by the Member States from the European defence industry. The last step of the project was a legislative act adopted by the Commission on May 3rd, known as an Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) (Council of the EU 2023g). The aforementioned regulation allocated €500 million in the form of grants from the budget of the Union to increase the manufacturing capabilities for the production of missiles and various types of ammunition (Council of the EU 2023j).

Moreover, for the first time ever, a third country decided to on a voluntary basis provide funding to the operations of the European Peace Facility with a transfer agreement signed between the EU and Norway. Initially, Norway decided to contribute around €14.5 million in support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and later on declared it would provide an additional €22 million (Council of the EU 2022aq, 2023k). Thereby confirming close ties between the Union and the Kingdom of Norway, as well as highlighting the commitment of both parties to bolster security and defence in Europe.

According to the joint statement released after the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit, the European Union as a whole as well as its Member States individually have been particularly diligent in providing in-kind and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. The former amounted to €527 million and was released under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, while the latter amounted to €485 million in the previous year. During the same summit, the EU has reiterated its commitment to support not only the rebuilding of Ukraine but also the rehabilitation and reintegration of the combatants in the aftermath of the war (European Council 2023a). Thereby showcasing that the Union intends to stand by its ally for as long as necessary.

The Council renewed the temporary trade liberalization with Ukraine for an additional year, showcasing its continued political and economic support for its neighbour. Furthermore, such measures allow for the strengthening of the Ukrainian economy, albeit still severely weakened by the Russian aggression (Council of the EU 2023h). Conversely, the Council agreed to extend the temporary protection of refugees until March 2025. By doing so, it allowed for the people fleeing the war to enjoy an array of rights across the EU, including the right to residence, access to housing and labor markets, medical help, and education (Council of the EU 2023l).

In 2024, the EU proposed and adopted a new measure called the Ukraine Facility with the aim of gathering all the EU's financial support for Ukraine into one instrument worth €50 billion.

By doing so, the Union would increase coherence and would make the implementation of various supportive measures easier and more predictable (Council of the EU 2024c). Moreover, the reporting with regard to spending of said supportive measures would be much more transparent and comparable than in the case of singular instruments utilised prior. The measure is intended to cover the support for the period of three years, commencing in 2024 and ending in 2027. The structure of the Ukraine Facility would rest on three main pillars. The first would cover the “Ukraine Plan” to be prepared by the Ukrainian authorities and highlight the pathway to recovery, reconstruction, and modernization of the country along with the reforms to be made on the way to EU accession. The second pillar, the Ukraine Investment Framework, would center around the funds to be provided to Ukraine in the form of loans and grants. And the last pillar would encompass more administrative and technical assistance in Ukraine's accession efforts (Council of the EU 2024e).

Moreover, the Council enlarged the pool of funds available for the support for Ukraine by setting a new financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility and by instituting the Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) within the EPF structure. The newly formed mechanism was to further assist with the growing needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of training and provision of lethal and non-lethal military equipment (Council of the EU 2024i). The EU has also decided to prolong the previously extended mandate of the civilian mission under CSDP, namely the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) until mid-2027. Thereby further showcasing the commitment to support Ukraine not only in its fight for independence but also in its accession efforts (Council of the EU 2024j). Conversely, the mandate of the military mission EUMAM Ukraine has been prolonged for two years and will now be in place until November 2026. The decision reached by the Council hinted at increased cooperation and information exchange of the aforementioned military mission with NATO and its NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) (Council of the EU 2024q).

With the previously agreed-upon implementation of the Ukraine Facility, the EU released a substantial amount of funds in the form of non-repayable grants and loans to Ukraine across 2025. The financial support was intended to strengthen the macro-financial stability of the state, to contribute to the further recovery, reconstruction, and modernization, as well as to reinforce the operations of the public administration. Each subsequent release of funds was conditional on Ukraine meeting a set of criteria set out in the Ukraine Plan. Importantly, over the course of

the year the country managed to successfully accomplish virtually all required steps, allowing for timely and systematic payments (Council of the EU 2025g).

Additionally, the temporary protection granted to persons fleeing the war has been extended until the first quarter of 2027. The Council has, however, signaled an intention to slowly move away from the temporary measure and towards switching to other legal statuses of stay. Thereby showcasing the readiness to gradually facilitate the homecoming of the misplaced people (Council of the EU 2025d). Moreover, the EU, alongside its like-minded partners with the crucial role of the US, has reiterated its commitment to provide support to Ukraine in a humanitarian, financial, military, political, and diplomatic manner (European Council 2025).

6.1.4. Measures in Support of Third States

The EU has also increased its cooperation with third states particularly affected by the war in Ukraine. One of the main beneficiaries became the Republic of Moldova, which received support in the area of border management. The agreement signed between Moldova and the EU allowed Frontex to provide increased operational support to the state faced with increased levels of migration connected with people fleeing the war (Council of the EU 2022n). Moreover, the EU agreed to allocate €150 million of macro-financial assistance to Moldova, in the form of grants and loans, to bolster the country's resilience in the present security landscape (Council of the EU 2022p).

The EU decided to provide further support to the Republic of Moldova with the establishment of a new civilian mission under CSDP. The aim of the partnership mission was to bolster the country's crisis management capabilities and its resilience to hybrid threats. Moreover, under the European Peace Facility, the Union decided to provide Moldova with an additional €40 million with the aim of further enhancing its capabilities in terms of defence (Foreign Affairs Council 2023).

6.1.5. Measures Safeguarding the Member States

To alleviate the weight of the collective response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on its Member States the European Union adopted new and amended previously adopted legislative acts. One of such developments was the proposal on the mechanism of Cohesion's Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE) (Council of the EU 2022m). Such change in the Union's legislature allowed the Member States to access and reassign certain funds previously intended for other purposes within the cohesion programs, such as the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund, and use them to combat the pressure on national budgets

stemming from unprecedented migration movements. Moreover, the EU released additional funds under the REACT-EU scheme for the same purpose. Amendments have also been made in the 2014-2020 home affairs funds and the 2021-2027 asylum, migration, and integration fund based on the Council's new negotiating mandate, allowing for €420 million to be released from the unused funds. All of the legislative changes combined with the funds from the Fund for European Aid for the Most Deprived (FEAD) were expected to amount to almost €17 billion according to the Council (Council of the EU 2022q).

When it came to the allocation of said funds, the EU decided that the Member States faced with the biggest volume of refugees, irrespective of whether they were just transit or final destination countries, would be allocated a larger share of the funds (Council of the EU 2022r). Moreover, the Council has proposed a unit cost per person to facilitate a quicker discharge of the funds. Initially its value was set at €40 per week for the period of 13 weeks and later rose to €100 per week with the extended period of 26 weeks. Such funds were intended to cover the basic needs of the refugees. The increase in the funds and the application period came about as a result of a legislative proposal denoted as FAST-CARE (Flexible Assistance for Territories) (Council of the EU 2022ab).

Moreover, the European Union initiated and adopted a decision to add the violation of the sanction regime to the list of EU crimes listed in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Such an amendment did not only express a formal commitment to the implemented measures but also allowed for further strengthening of the application and fulfillment of the sanctions (Council of the EU 2022z, 2022ao).

In the last quarter of 2024, a new development has been made when it comes to safeguarding the European Union and its institutions, with the introduction of a new sanctions' framework, the EU is now able to address a wide array of hybrid threats. Such threats include impairing electoral processes and the operations of democratic institutions, endangering and sabotaging critical infrastructure and the economy of the Union, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and other activities. The decision was made based on a proposal of the High Representative in light of heightened malicious activities of the Russian Federation undertaken on the European territories (Council of the EU 2024n).

Moreover, the EU decided to implement safeguards to shield European companies from legal proceedings in Russia based on specific provisions of Russian legislation that prohibit other states from conducting proceedings in other jurisdictions once a case has reached the Russian

courts. Consequently, any rulings made in the Russian Federation cannot be executed against EU-operating entities in Europe (Council of the EU 2024r).

6.2. Responses of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

6.2.1. Measures Implemented Against the Russian Federation

NATO's primary and most significant response to the Russian aggression towards the perpetrator has been the condemnation of its actions. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Alliance urged the Russian Federation to halt and reverse the mobilization of its troops in its official statements and press releases. Conversely, in each of the official documents published in the aftermath of the invasion, NATO and its representatives have condemned the Russian conduct and reiterated their calls for cessation of the escalating military activities (NATO 2022a, 2022b). While such political measures can serve a multitude of agendas, what they tend to lack is agency. Especially given that the war is still ongoing despite the peace efforts coming from many sides, including ones from within the Alliance championed by the United States (Sanger 2025).

In terms of sanctions and the legal-regulatory measures, NATO relies on the restrictive measures imposed by individual Allies, be they unilateral or connected with more regional-based sanction regimes, such as the EU ones (NATO 2025c). At an institutional level, the Alliance is yet to devise a plan on the establishment and implementation of penalties.

Moreover, virtually all relations of what was previously regarded as a NATO-Russia partnership were severed. Cooperation in civilian and military terms has been in a standstill ever since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the situation is not likely to alter. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has, however, kept the communication channels between Brussels and Moscow open to reduce hazards and prevent further acceleration and spread of the conflict (NATO 2025c).

6.2.2. Measures in Support of Ukraine

NATO's role in monitoring and responding to the invasion of Ukraine has likewise begun before the official outbreak of the hostilities (NATO 2025e). This becomes evident when taking into consideration the two meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission taking place in January and February of 2022. During the first of the aforementioned meetings, the escalating build-up of Russian military forces at the Ukrainian borders and within the previously occupied territories was discussed. The latter took place just two days prior to the start of the invasion and concluded with an official condemnation of Russian actions as well as a call for

demobilization of the Russian Armed Forces (NATO 2025b). Importantly, however, the initial support pledged to Ukraine after the start of the invasion was only “political and practical” in nature (NATO 2022b, 2022c).

The NATO-Ukraine Council, launched following the 2023 NATO Summit and replacing the NATO-Ukraine Commission, is an enhanced mechanism for cooperation and dialogue between the two actors, which is of particular prominence in this case. The change in name reflects that their standing is on equal footing and that all decisions reached will take the positions of all respective participants into consideration (NATO 2025b). The aforementioned alteration was also a part of strong political messaging, demonstrating the increasingly tight-knit integration between NATO and Ukraine. As proof of the further political engagement, the Allies have also reinforced the NATO Representation to Ukraine (NRU) by appointing a NATO Senior Representative to oversee its operations (NATO 2024c).

One of the important mechanisms developed and implemented in response to the Russian aggression, albeit over two years after the outbreak of the war, is the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). Its main role is to organise the military training and equipment provided by the Allies to Ukraine and to provide support in the area of logistics (NATO 2024c). Moreover, NSATU duties include coordinating the delivery of military donations worth billions of euros and managing the repair and maintenance of the military equipment provided. All the actions undertaken by this NATO command aim to enhance Ukrainian forces tasked with defence and security to increase their capabilities to protect the state and its citizens (NATO 2025e).

Another mechanism launched as part of the responses was the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap. This initiative is to have two-way benefits for both actors involved. Whereby, on one hand, Ukraine is to benefit from adopting innovative technologies and incorporating them into traditional warfare. On the other hand, NATO is to profit from lessons learned in the Ukraine case and further introduce similar measures in all other relevant areas (NATO 2024d). Conversely, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC) was established to further facilitate the efforts of identifying and applying the lessons from the Russian aggression (NATO 2024b). This mechanism was agreed upon two years after the outbreak of hostilities and has become operable in February 2025.

Moreover, a Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine has been signed during the 2024 Washington Summit. With that, the Alliance reiterated its commitment to provide aid and

support to Ukraine. This time such aid was to encompass a broader spectrum of measures, including political, military, humanitarian, economic, and financial ones (NATO 2024b). The military support promised to amount to €40 billion annually proved to be of particular importance, as it was intended to bolster Ukraine's defence capabilities.

NATO Trust Funds to Ukraine are some of the most vital elements of the financial support extended to Ukraine, encompassing an array of divergent funding mechanisms. The most notable ones include the Ukraine CAP Trust Fund and the NSATU Trust Fund (NATO 2025e). The former one facilitates the delivery of both financial and in-kind donations coming from both the Allies and their partners. This measure has also merged and transitioned all previously established support funds for Ukraine into a sole instrument, which in mid-2025 amounted to over €1 billion (NATO 2026). The latter fund allows addressing Ukraine's pressing wartime needs, ergo facilitating accelerated procurement and consignment of goods and services to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (NATO 2025e).

The Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine is tasked with the provision of necessary non-lethal equipment and assistance upon request and with building more long-term capabilities in the defence and security sector of Ukraine. The aforementioned non-lethal assistance includes the short-term delivery of supplies intended for medical use, military rations and equipment required for the preparation of said rations, power generators, shelters, vehicles, and fuel, as well as different kinds of protective mechanisms against CBRN weapons. When it comes to the development of more long-term capabilities, the Allies helped to enhance the areas of cyber defence, logistics, training and education of the military forces, and hybrid threats (NATO 2024c, 2026). In 2023, the CAP was turned into a multi-year, multi-layered program relying on viable funding and focused on three primary areas, namely, the recovery and reconstruction, transformation of the institutional environment, and conversion towards increased interoperability with NATO (NATO 2023b, 2025e).

Many of the NATO initiatives in support of Ukraine were developed and implemented after substantial time. For instance, the NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) was agreed upon only in July 2025 with a major involvement of the United States and saw its first contributions a month later (NATO 2025f). This initiative will build upon routine contributions of equipment and munitions worth \$500 million, subsidised by European Allies and Canada and procured from the US defence industry. So far, many states have participated in this

endeavour either unilaterally or multilaterally (NATO 2025g, 2025h, 2025i, 2025j, 2025k). PURL accompanies other initiatives aimed at providing support to Ukraine.

6.2.3. Measures Safeguarding the Members of the Alliance

Immediately following the outbreak of the war, NATO initiated the Article 4 procedure. Thereby calling a special meeting of the Allies to debate on the newly materialised threat to the Euro-Atlantic security. During said meeting, they decided to pool all collective efforts into strengthening defence and deterrence and, consequently, into ensuring the security of their members (NATO 2022a). As an immediate response to strengthen and shield the Alliance itself, parts of the NATO Response Force were redistributed and situated around 40,000 troops along its eastern flank in combination with maritime and air assets under its explicit command (NATO 2024b). Moreover, continuous efforts are made in order to strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence capabilities and posture as well as advance a comprehensive range of ready forces (NATO 2025c). In line with that, the Allies are also increasing their respective defence expenditures with the aim of bolstering their own and collective capabilities in this field.

The conflict in Ukraine has led to a newfound appreciation for the commitments under Article 5 and collective defence (NATO 2022a). Consequently, through a plethora of doctrinal and structural developments, NATO attempted to further operationalise collective security. The creation of revised defence plans, military forces at high alert, and the establishment of an Allied Reaction Force ought to be perceived as a significant shift towards preparedness for substantial and multifaceted combat (NATO 2024b). These actions encompass the functional areas such as space integration, air and missile defence, and conventional land forces. All the aforementioned improvements are meant to showcase NATO's transition into a fully integrated security provider that can respond in all domains necessary to preserve and guard Euro-Atlantic peace and security (NATO 2022b).

Moreover, interoperability and capability development were clarified as the indispensable components of the Allied response. The goal of increased defence spending, cooperative procurement programs, and coordination of activities through the NATO Defence Planning Process is to ensure that its members can jointly yield adequate military power (NATO 2024b). Moreover, the focus on large-scale military exercises, like Steadfast Defender 24, serves a two-fold purpose. As it enhances operational preparedness while showcasing solidarity and resolve to possible adversaries (Didier 2025). This is further enhanced by NATO functioning as a hub

for the integration of defensive actions, allowing the Allies and their partners to coordinate on a deeper level outside of official frameworks.

When it comes to measures enacted to safeguard the Allied states, NATO assumes a comprehensive approach accounting for resilience and emerging threats in addition to conventional military tactics. A thorough grasp of security is emphasised by initiatives to improve military mobility, cyber defence, logistics, and the guarding of critical infrastructure (NATO 2022b). The strategic depth and regional defence posture of the Alliance are further bolstered by the inclusion of Finland and Sweden, the two newest NATO members who joined after the war in Ukraine started, in its planning and command structure, particularly in Northern and Eastern Europe (NATO 2023a, 2024b).

6.3. Uncertainty and the Issue of Trust

All this being said, the security guarantees for Ukraine remain uncertain and are subject to changes, particularly within the NATO realm in connection with the position of the United States. The war in Ukraine saw a change in the ruling administration of the US from the Biden presidency since the outbreak of the hostilities to the second Trump administration since early 2025. The increased levels of distrust and unpredictability could be attributed mainly to the shifting stance of the United States under the latter president. Some scholars attributed the astonishing initial unison of the NATO responses to the Biden presidency (Kaarbo, Oppermann, and Beasley 2023). Whereby, prior to the hostilities and in their first hundred days, the US, in line with its allied partners, strongly condemned the Russian actions and declared strong support for Ukraine. Moreover, the United States has led many of the multilateral efforts within NATO, albeit without the direct involvement of US troops. This, however, was expected to alter with the change of administration following the presidential elections of November 2024.

Consequently, many speculated that the new (second) Trump administration would follow suit and repeat the foreign policy positions and actions of the first one. Thereby once again demonstrating a strong commitment to bilateralism and burden-sharing as well as threatening to withdraw from NATO completely, which disrupted the transatlantic multilateral framework in the past. Importantly, such changes became a crucial catalyst of change in the European security governance bubble, forcing Europe to develop an array of mechanisms safeguarding its people, such as the European Defence Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (Badawi and Zreik 2025). Importantly, even prior to the second Trump administration assuming office, the war in Ukraine was highly politicised in the domestic politics in the US.

The members of the Republican Party holding congressional posts blocked the delivery of substantial military aid to Ukraine for several months back in 2023 (Kakissis 2024). The uncertainty over the US' stance and its aid intensified in the light of statements made by Trump after his reelection, when he claimed that the amount of support granted is too vast and that he is capable of bringing the war to an end in a 24-hour time frame. He did, however, proclaim that Ukraine would have to exchange or give up parts of its territory if the peace treaty so required (Commander, Feng, and Whisnant 2025).

This sentiment did not hold for long, as in 2025 President Trump decided to alter his stance on the foreign policy of the United States. Essentially claiming that Ukraine is capable, with support of Europe and to a large extent NATO, of winning all its illegally annexed territories and therefore of winning and ending the war (Commander, Feng, and Whisnant 2025). Although he gave no actual explanation for his turnabout, a number of European officials surmised that the president was disassociating himself from the war, which he had before pledged to resolve in a matter of days. The issue of NATO-US discourse is, however, much more complex, as while the US may seem to be distancing itself, the military command within NATO remains in the hands of American generals (Sanger 2025). Concurrently, some degree of rapprochement can be seen in the deal struck between the NATO's Secretary General and President Trump in July 2025 on the procurement of munitions from the American defence industry for the support of the Ukrainian Armed Forces financed by the members of the Alliance (Congressional Research Service 2025).

Therefore, as evidenced, some of the uncertainty connected with the wavering stance of the United States can and did disrupt some of the relief efforts provided to Ukraine (Congressional Research Service 2025; Kaarbo, Oppermann, and Beasley 2023). With the European officials no longer being able to put full trust in one of the most powerful members of NATO, alternative routes had to be devised and implemented. While it can be perceived as a push towards institutional change and enhancement of the European defence capabilities, it is also worrisome, especially in light of certain statements made by President Trump putting the future of NATO and its security guarantees into question (Badawi and Zreik 2025). When asked about the delivery of the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in light of potential aggression towards any of the Allies, he responded evasively, effectively making a response or lack thereof highly circumstantial (Sanger 2025).

6.4. Functional Overlap and the Division of Labour Introduced by the Responses

Overall, as all the strategic communication coming from either NATO or the EU underlined, the institutions safeguarding European security governance have for the longest time attempted to create functional complementarity and build upon their already preexisting capabilities (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2025). However, it has become evident that with growing uncertainty and rising geopolitical tensions there is a need for institutional change and adaptation to the new security environment (Smit 2024; Smith 2019). The Russian invasion of Ukraine has only exacerbated these tensions, as it constitutes what both institutions described as the gravest security threat in recent history.

6.4.1. Coordinated Complementarity and the Use of Comparative Advantage

When analysing the responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine from a purely problem-solving perspective, one would expect that the EU would focus solely on its sanction's regime. Concurrently, one would anticipate that NATO would take on the majority of military related activities. Such sentiment can be observed in certain responses not in others, however. This coincides with the existence of additional external and internal factors influencing the decisions made in each of the institutions (Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024). For instance, one of the findings of this thesis is that the European Union has devised several mechanisms akin to those already established by NATO. Such developments can be attributed to both the perceived lack of action on the Alliance's side and to the lack of interinstitutional trust exacerbated by the return of the Trump administration.

That being said, some of the responses coming from both of the security organizations seem to fall in line with the problem-solving perspective. Whereby, the European Union being more of an economic, political, and civilian actor was the one who implemented restrictive measures against the Russian Federation and its accomplices. As this is the area in which the EU had the preexisting capabilities and comparative advantage, such turn of events can be understood as exploiting complementarity between the institutions. Likewise, NATO's swift mobilization of forces and reinforcement of its Eastern flank and the establishment of an Allied Reaction Force showcase the same characteristics. Hence, when it comes to the aforementioned responses one can clearly observe the clear-cut division of tasks and utilisation of the strengths of each respective institution to address a common security threat.

As evidenced prior, the European Union had primacy when it came to the restrictive measures imposed not only on the Russian Federation but also on its accomplices. The EU established and successfully expanded its sanctions regime to target and affect an extensive array of sectors

of the Russian economy and target prominent actors supporting the regime (Council of the EU 2025f). Such a mechanism was the prerogative of the Union and has therefore been utilised within its existing framework of capabilities. Concurrently, NATO has not imposed any sanctions as an institution and has relied solely on the ones implemented unilaterally by its members and multilaterally by its partners (NATO 2025c). In this area one can notice a clear-cut division of labour between the two international organizations at hand based primarily on the complementarity between them and the innate characteristics of the EU, as a historically economic actor.

Concurrently, NATO's initial response was centred on bolstering its defensive and deterrence capabilities on the Alliance's eastern flank. Whereby, the Alliance extended its forward presence in Central and Eastern Europe by deploying additional multinational battlegroups and increasing force readiness (Daehnhardt 2022). The strategic focus of this response contributed to the reinforcement of NATO's long-standing mandate and role as the cornerstone of the guarantor of the collective defence in Europe. Moreover, particular emphasis was put on the reassurance of the Member States, prevention horizontal escalation of the invasion, and maintenance of the credibility of the Article 5 duties (NATO 2022a). All those efforts combined contributed to the cultivation of NATO's traditional security role rather than its alteration. The possibility of direct institutional rivalry seemed to be further diminished by NATO being continuously acknowledged as the main provider of European security, despite the Union's expanding involvement in defence-related policy areas. This became especially pertinent in the wake of Finland's and Sweden's accession to the Alliance, as both countries recognised NATO membership as the best security guarantee against Russian aggression (NATO 2023a, 2024b). Consequently, the expansion strengthened the strategic importance of the organization at a time of intensified worries regarding European strategic autonomy.

All the aforementioned responses reflected the documented comparative advantages of each of the respective institutions. Whereby, NATO has the operational command structures, force integration protocols, and the military legitimacy indispensable for defence and deterrence missions (Scaparrotti et al. 2020). Alternatively, the EU made use of its regulatory and economic authority to exert pressure on the aggressor and to extend sustained economic assistance to Ukraine (Drent 2018; Simonet 2023). Thus, the conflict in its initial phases seemed to reinforce complementarity and division of labour between the security actors. The institutions focused on policy areas where they had historically been recognised as more legitimate and competent rather than compete over capabilities possessed.

6.4.2. Cooperative Functional Overlap and Its Implications

There were however multiple areas in which the institutions either used the preexisting overlapping instruments at their disposal or developed new instruments that contributed to the emergence of new overlap. Consequently, each of the respective institutions either developed new mechanisms and tools or adjusted the already existing ones to respond to the crisis in a timely and relevant manner (Daehnhardt 2022; Smit 2024). While the previous subsections of this chapter aimed to describe the tangible responses to the war in Ukraine, this subsection will attempt to point out concurrently developed instruments that could have contributed to the creation of institutional overlap or to the further clarification of the existing division of labour.

First and foremost, since February 24th, 2022, the EU and NATO have showcased unparalleled levels of political unity. Both in terms of voicing utmost condemnation of the actions of the Russian Federation and of declaring support for Ukraine and its inherent right to self-defence (Council of the EU 2022e; Kaarbo, Oppermann, and Beasley 2023). Therefore, when it comes to political measures implemented in the form of official statements, both institutions could be considered at par. Such a notion does not imply a harmful duplication of efforts. Rather, it points towards a substantial and strategic alignment of perspectives on the European security environment and the challenges it is faced with. This materialised in the area of political instruments constituting an area of preexisting overlap between the institutions.

Importantly, as previously hinted, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine delayed the publication of the third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation until 2023 (European Council, European Commission, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2023). In this document, the institutions for the first time acknowledged that the partnership is based not only on shared values but also on a common commitment to preserving peace, prosperity, and freedom in the Euro-Atlantic. Moreover, reliance on the complementarity of the capabilities of the respective institutions was highlighted. Whereby the EU and NATO vowed to further deepen and expand their cooperation and to utilise all instruments at their disposal to address and tackle the diverse challenges ahead for the benefit of their citizens. In the subsequent progress reports the institutions noted the establishment of highly specialised NATO-EU Staff Coordination on Ukraine responsible for the collaboration in terms of responses to the conflict at hand (Hussain 2023). The joint ammunition procurement efforts, which will be discussed in detail in the following paragraph, from both the European and American defence industries are the result of such collaboration in the newly emergent area of institutional overlap.

These developments marked an emergence of a new area of institutional overlap between the two primary security actors, as the European Union ventured into more military-related measures, which used to be the prerogative of NATO. Consequently, when it came to the delivery of military supplies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, one could observe significant contributions being made by both NATO and the EU (Becker, Bendiek, and Kempin 2025). The procurement of munitions took place on both accounts, albeit from a distinct source. As within the structures of the former institution, the military equipment was predominantly sourced from the defence industry of the United States (Congressional Research Service 2025). Concurrently, in the case of the latter institution, the ammunition and support delivered originated from the European and Norwegian defence industries (Council of the EU 2024i). Such a structure allowed addressing a broader spectrum of Ukrainian military requirements. The measures in this department within NATO were motivated by the reasoning that the supplies coming from the European Allies and Canada alone would not be sufficient to meet the aforementioned demands (NATO 2025f). On the side of the European Union, however, the development and innovation of the defence sector were crucial in not only providing aid to Ukraine but also in building and enhancing the European defence capabilities (Council of the EU 2023j; Williams et al. 2025). This could potentially point to a certain degree of competition between the industries on either side of the Atlantic and to a move towards the bigger autonomy of Europe.

Moreover, the Russian invasion of Ukraine saw a substantial departure from the previously established division of labour between the EU and NATO, particularly in the area of military activities at various stages of the conflict. Historically, it was the Alliance that took on the majority of the responsibilities and aid during the active phases of conflict and conflict resolution. Only in the post-conflict stabilization phase did the Union ascend an active role (Coelmont 2019). Since 2022 one can however notice a substantial conversion from this preestablished division, whereby the Union became a hands-on player even during the ongoing hostilities. In this context, the European Peace Facility's (EPF) expansion and activation were among the most important events. A historic change in the Union's security role occurred when the EU funded the delivery of deadly military weapons through the EPF. This marked a significant shift from the Union's customary focus on economic and civilian instruments. Consequently, the EU entered a field of policy that had previously been dominated by NATO and individual Member States by directly funding military assistance. Thus, the EPF serves as

an example of how the crisis blurred institutional lines that had separated NATO's military mandate from the EU's civilian-security function in the past.

Along the same lines, when it came to training provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, both institutions set up their respective instruments for that purpose, namely through the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) and through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine within the European Peace Facility. According to the official documents, it would appear that the Union was the pioneer in this area of support, launching the new mechanism in 2022 (Council of the EU 2022an) and commencing its military training activities in 2023 (Council of the EU 2023b), despite not being a military organization itself. It has, however, provided extensive military training to over 60,000 Ukrainian soldiers (Council of the EU 2024q). NSATU was brought to life and became operational only in 2024 (NATO 2024c). This constitutes yet another area in which the institutional overlap was created. Importantly, while the EU has deployed and utilised civilian missions under CSDP, EUMAM Ukraine was its first fully military mission. Concurrently, the Alliance has bigger experience in the deployment and conduct of military missions and operations, as they have previously existed solely in its domain, and the gathered know-how was what constituted its comparative advantage. Importantly, the EU and NATO decided to cooperate when it comes to military training measures rather than engage in active competition between their respective instruments and their effectiveness.

Moreover, both the EU and NATO put in place an array of reform monitoring and funding mechanisms to facilitate the Ukrainian road to membership in each of the respective organizations. Importantly, the payments coming from the funding instruments, namely the Ukraine Facility in the EU case and the CAP Trust Fund in NATO, are based upon conditionality (Council of the EU 2024c; NATO 2026). This is where the mandates and operations of the institutions can overlap, as with simultaneous reforms and monitoring activities, the efficiency of certain operations can be hindered. While the values of the EU and NATO are complementary (Gregout 2010), it is the former institution that is considered the one facilitating an array of democratic reforms in the candidate states. With that, NATO's endeavours can be perceived as venturing into the prerogative of the European Union. However, even in the case of funding mechanisms, there are some functional and operational areas in which the EU has mirrored NATO's actions. For instance, in 2021, it was the Alliance that consolidated multiple funding instruments into a sole entity, namely the CAP Trust Fund, first

(NATO 2026). The Union has done the same with the creation of the Ukraine Facility, albeit 3 years later in 2024 (Council of the EU 2024c).

Crucially, throughout the crisis thus far, the cooperation established by the overlap contributed to the enhancement of institutional flexibility. Both institutions were able to make up for their respective shortcomings in some areas because they had partially overlapped capabilities. The EU had many financial and regulatory mechanisms, but it lacked NATO's integrated command structures and military deterrence capabilities. NATO, on the other hand, maintained its military dominance but was mostly dependent on its members and allies for economic cooperation and the enforcement of sanctions. Thus, overlapping institutional involvement led to a more comprehensive group response.

6.4.3. Potential Competitive Overlap and Interinstitutional Tensions

The conflict concurrently produced developments that had the potential for bringing about competitive overlap and institutional rivalry, even if the responses of the EU and NATO were primarily typified by cooperative overlap and coordinated complementarity. The rivalry between the institutions may become more severe due to the increase of the Union's position in defence-related policy sectors, discourse about strategic autonomy, and doubts about the long-term dependence and reliance on the security guarantees coming from the United States (Biscop 2025).

Crucially, overlap by itself does not always signify institutional rivalry. Overlap is essentially a structural state that arises when institutions function across intersecting policy domains, as described in the conceptual framework of this thesis. Political coordination, institutional trust, and strategic alignment or lack thereof play a crucial role in determining whether such overlap translates into cooperation or competition. The growth of Union's military and defence-related activity was one of the most obvious sources of potential competitive overlap. In the past, NATO has consistently held a dominant position in the domains of operational military coordination, deterrence, and territorial defence (Tardy 2021). In contrast, the EU relied on economic statecraft, sanctions, and regulatory authority to operate primarily as a civilian or comprehensive security actor (Biscop 2021).

This conventional division was somewhat altered by the responses to the invasion as described before. With the launch of the European Peace Facility, the creation of EUMAM Ukraine, and the growth of defence-industrial cooperation programs, the EU has progressively ventured into areas of policy that have been associated with NATO, its mandate, and national military

structures of the Member States. The Union's operational role in security governance was significantly expanded by the aforementioned measures, even if they remained mostly supplementary throughout the conflict. Long-running discussions about institutional rivalry and duplication of capabilities in European security governance were rekindled by this development. Since the founding of CSDP, academics and policymakers alike have frequently voiced apprehensions that further European defence integration would erode NATO unity or result in the creation of openly rivalrous security frameworks on the European continent (Giegerich 2013; Howorth 2017).

Such debates intensified in an array of ways in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Firstly, the crisis sped up the creation of defence projects at the EU level that would have encountered significantly bigger political opposition in the past. With the conflict in the background, responses like the provision of widespread funding of deadly military aid became normalised. Moreover, the conflict bolstered political justification for lessening Europe's reliance on external security guarantors, especially the US. Alliance's involvement remained crucial, however the conflict also revealed Europe's structural dependence on American military might, intelligence resources, and logistical capabilities (Becker, Bendiek, and Kempin 2025). Calls for increased operational autonomy and more robust European defence capabilities were bolstered by this realisation (Zandee and de Baedts 2024).

As a result, one of the most politically delicate aspects of EU-NATO relations throughout the hostilities thus far has been the question of strategic autonomy. Whereby, it caused some Member States, especially those geographically closer to the perpetrating state, to grow worrisome about the potential endangerment of NATO's transatlantic assurances and centrality. States such as Poland and the Baltics continued to be more cautious of efforts that were presumed to jeopardise the Alliance's prim in collective defence (Krastev and Leonard 2022). On the other hand, nations like France persisted in pushing for increased operational autonomy and deeper European defence integration (Williams et al. 2025). From this angle, the war illustrated both the need for NATO and the structural weakness brought about by Europe's ongoing reliance on outside parties for vital military assets (Becker, Bendiek, and Kempin 2025). The possibility of competitive overlap within the broader transatlantic security architecture was facilitated by the coexistence of these divergent strategic outlooks. Institutional tensions could increase significantly if the Union's growing defence role was perceived as a viable alternative to NATO rather than a supplement.

Crucially, though, no direct institutional rivalry materialised in the aftermath of the conflict. The rise of open competition was significantly hindered by an array of factors. Namely, the unity between the institutions became strongly encouraged given the gravity of the external security threat. The Russian invasion reduced the political room for institutional fragmentation and constituted a structural challenge to the European security governance. Additionally, during the war, NATO's military might and strategic gravity remained essentially unchallenged. As the Member States continued to view the Alliance as essential for collective defence and deterrence despite the Union's growing defence role. The legitimacy and significance of NATO were further reinforced with the accession of Finland and Sweden (Hoeffler, Hofmann, and Mérand 2024).

Moreover, throughout the dispute, political rhetoric demonstrated a strong commitment to prevent newly materialised overlap from turning into full-fledged rivalry. As stronger European defence capabilities ought to strengthen NATO, not diminish it, as European leaders have often stressed in their official statements and speeches. In a similar vein, NATO has been welcoming increased expenditures in European defence as long as it remained compatible with Alliance's structures and commitments.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

To ascertain whether the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine strengthened the preexisting complementarity or contributed to the creation of institutional overlap and rivalry between the EU and NATO, this thesis explored how each of the respective institutions used their policy instruments in response to the conflict. Although both organizations mobilised quickly and extensively, the analysis disclosed that their responses predominantly mirrored the divergent institutional frameworks and toolkits, leading to a pattern that can be labeled as functional complementarity constrained by structural stipulations.

The analysis demonstrates that the European Union can no longer be viewed as merely a civilian and economic player it once was. For the first time in its history, the EU was able to mobilise the European Peace Facility (EPF) to deliver lethal military weapons to a third state in response to the conflict (Council of the EU 2022d). Nonetheless, the legal-regulatory and financial instruments continue to be the most important pillars of the EU toolbox. Consequently, by targeting the financial, energy, and transportation sectors of the Russian economy, the Union has effectively weaponised economic interdependence through nineteen packages of sanctions imposed until the end of 2025 (Council of the EU 2025f). These findings support the idea that the competitive advantage of the EU can be found in its capacity to incorporate economic and regulatory measures into a more comprehensive security strategy.

Concurrently, the crisis seems to have confirmed NATO's status as the cornerstone of collective defence in European security governance. The institution responded by bolstering its deterrence and defence posture, particularly on the eastern flank, while the EU focused on externally projected soft power, economic sanctions, and aid. The deployment of 40,000 troops under direct NATO command (NATO 2024b) and the use of Article 4 (NATO 2022a) showcased that the Alliance possesses exceptional capacity to produce quick and tangible military outcomes that the EU currently lacks. Furthermore, NATO's position as the dominant security guarantor was reinforced with the accession of Finland and Sweden (NATO 2023a, 2024b), indicating that despite the EU's growing military-adjacent capabilities, the Alliance remains the only entity capable of preparedness in terms of high-intensity combat.

During the analysis, it has been discovered that a functional overlap materialised in the areas previously covered under distinct institutional mandates. Most notably, where the simultaneous supply of military training was concerned. Mechanisms under NATO's NSATU and the EU's EUMAM Ukraine were created in an effort to enhance the capabilities of the Ukrainian army.

Although the EU could be considered a pioneer in this department, as it initiated its training mission in 2022, the possibility of duplication arose when NATO introduced its respective instrument in 2024. Instead of direct rivalry, the evidence indicates that this overlap has been alleviated by means of incremental policy stacking and coordination (Council of the EU 2024q). The EU and NATO are attempting to turn this unintentional overlap into a more constructive complementarity with the establishment of the NATO-EU Staff Coordination on Ukraine (Hussain 2023). By splitting the cost of training, the EU alone has provided military training to over 60,000 soldiers (Council of the EU 2024q), the two institutions significantly increased the adaptability and breadth of the global conflict response.

The areas of funding and reform monitoring showcase a similar trend. With both NATO's CAP Trust Fund and the EU's Ukraine Facility leveraging conditionality to promote military and democratic changes in Ukraine (Council of the EU 2024e; NATO 2025e). Although such efforts may be viewed as venturing into the prerogative of the European Union, NATO's participation in reform monitoring reveals a strategic alignment of values, whereby both institutions perceive a stable, democratic Ukraine as vital for Euro-Atlantic security.

Moreover, the role of the United States and its foreign policy is not to be overlooked when investigating the EU-NATO relations. The analysis disclosed that the changing political climate in Washington puts a serious strain on inter-institutional trust. Particularly with the second Trump administration assuming office, the future of the Alliance came into question. As the US seemed to be wavering over its commitments to the obligations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the continuation of military assistance to Ukraine (Sanger 2025).

Moreover, the aforementioned uncertainty brought back the debate about European strategic autonomy. A significant step towards lessening the reliance on NATO can be seen in the EU's aspirations to increase its own ammunition manufacturing through the European Defence Fund and the ASAP legislation (Council of the EU 2023g). The subsequent developments disclosed that strategic cooperation and strategic autonomy need not be mutually exclusive. Rather, by minimizing structural dependence on the United States, the Union's development of independent military-related capabilities, such as the joint acquisition of missiles and ammunition from European industries, can help enhance the European pillar of NATO.

One of the limitations of this research was the reliance on publicly available data, hence, elements such as informal negotiation procedures and the unique impact of individual state actors may have been concealed. In light of that, interviews with prominent institutional actors

and decision makers ought to be utilised in further research on this matter to gain insight into the informal channels of the collaboration between the EU and NATO in response to crises. As the conflict progresses into a potential post-war reconstruction phase, which will inevitably pose additional difficulties for the division of labour, it will also be crucial to keep an eye on the long-term viability of the Ukraine Facility and the corresponding mechanisms within NATO. Additionally, the further impact of the continuously changing US foreign policy is yet to be fully researched by academia. Further studies ought to also incorporate the impact of the Trump administration on security and political climate in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East.

Ultimately, the 2022 invasion did not result in a zero-sum rivalry between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Rather, it has fostered a synergistic relationship, whereby NATO's military might and the EU's financial and regulatory authority are increasingly perceived as two sides of the same coin. The capacity of these interconnected yet separate institutions to manage their overlapping duties for the benefit of the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole will determine the future shape, scope, and longevity of the European security governance.

Bibliography

- Aghniashvili, Tinatin. 2016. "Towards More Effective Cooperation? The Role of States in Shaping NATO-EU Interaction and Cooperation." *Connections* 15 (4): 67–90. <https://doi.org/10.2307/26326460>.
- Aris, Stephen, and Aglaya Snetkov. 2018. "Cooperating and Competing: Relations between Multilateral Organizations in International Security." In *Inter-Organizational Relations in International Security: Cooperation and Competition*, edited by Stephen Agis, Aglaya Snetkov, and Andreas Wenger, 1–18. Routledge.
- Baciu, Cornelia Adriana, and Alexandra M Friede. 2020. "Towards an Alternative Vision of Power?" *New Perspectives* 28 (3): 398–412. <https://doi.org/10.2307/27203598>.
- Badawi, Habib, and Mohamad Zreik. 2025. "Counting Allies' Coins: Trump's NATO Strategy and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 23: 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-025-00135-9>.
- Becker, Max, Annegret Bendiek, and Ronja Kempin. 2025. "Strengthening Europe's Capacity to Act in Foreign and Security Policy." *Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (SWP)*. <https://doi.org/10.18449/2025C17>.
- Biermann, Rafael. 2007. "Towards a Theory of Inter-Organizational Networking." *The Review of International Organizations* 3 (2): 151–77. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-007-9027-9>.
- Biscop, Sven. 2020. "The Future of the Transatlantic Alliance: Not without the European Union." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 14 (3): 81–94. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26937412>.
- . 2021. "EU and NATO Strategy: A Compass, a Concept, and a Concordat." JSTOR. 2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30609>.
- . 2025. "NATO: The Damage Is Done – so Think Big." Egmont Institute. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep70602>.
- Bisogniero, Claudio. 2011. "NATO in a Globalised World." *New Zealand International Review* 36 (3): 10–12. <https://doi.org/10.2307/45236104>.
- Blavoukos, Spyros, and Dimitris Bourantonis. 2018. "Inter-Organizational Relations in a Nested Environment: Regional Organizations in the UN." In *Inter-Organizational Relations in International Security: Cooperation and Competition*, edited by Stephen Aris, Aglaya Snetkov, and Andreas Wenger, 38–53. Routledge.

- Boin, Arjen, Paul t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. 2016. "Learning and Changing: From Crisis to Reform." In *The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure*, 126–44. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316339756.007>.
- Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2007. "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism." *World Politics* 59 (3): 341–69. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100020852>.
- Coelmont, Jo. 2019. "Which Military Level of Ambition?" Egmont Institute. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep21389>.
- Coleman, Eric A., and Esther Mwangi. 2015. "Conflict, Cooperation, and Institutional Change on the Commons." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (4): 855–65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24582952>.
- Commander, Anna, John Feng, and Gabe Whisnant. 2025. "Donald Trump Makes Major Shift on Russia-Ukraine War." *Newsweek*. September 23, 2025. <https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-makes-major-shift-on-russia-ukraine-war-10477142>.
- Congressional Research Service. 2025. "Russia's War against Ukraine: Diplomatic Talks and U.S. Policy." *Congressional Research Service*. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12534/IN12534.4.pdf.
- Cordesman, Anthony H., and Grace Hwang. 2022. "Focusing on the Right Strategic Priorities for NATO." Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 2022. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep39637.2>.
- Council of the EU. 2017. "Defence Cooperation: Council Adopts Conclusions on EU-NATO Cooperation, Endorsing Common Set of New Proposals for Further Joint Work." Consilium. 2017. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/05/defence-cooperation-council-adopts-conclusions-on-eu-nato-cooperation-endorsing-common-set-of-new-proposals-for-further-joint-work/>.
- . 2022a. "Statement by the Presidents of the European Council and European Commission on Russian Aggression against Ukraine." Consilium. February 22, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/22/statement-by-the-presidents-of-the-european-council-and-european-commission-on-russian-aggression-against-ukraine/>.
- . 2022b. "Ukraine: Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the European Union on the Decisions of the Russian Federation Further Undermining Ukraine's

- Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity.” [Www.consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/22/ukraine-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-decisions-of-the-russian-federation-further-undermining-ukraine-s-sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity/). February 22, 2022.
- . 2022c. “Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine: EU Imposes Sanctions against President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov and Adopts Wide Ranging Individual and Economic Sanctions.” Consilium. February 25, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/25/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-imposes-sanctions-against-president-putin-and-foreign-minister-lavrov-and-adopts-wide-ranging-individual-and-economic-sanctions/>.
- . 2022d. “EU Adopts New Set of Measures to Respond to Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine.” Consilium. February 28, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/28/eu-adopts-new-set-of-measures-to-respond-to-russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine/>.
- . 2022e. “Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine: Council Imposes Sanctions on 26 Persons and One Entity.” Consilium. February 28, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/28/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-council-imposes-sanctions-on-26-persons-and-one-entity/>.
- . 2022f. “Belarus’ Role in the Russian Military Aggression of Ukraine: Council Imposes Sanctions on Additional 22 Individuals and Further Restrictions on Trade.” Consilium. March 2, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/belarus-role-in-the-russian-military-aggression-of-ukraine-council-imposes-sanctions-on-additional-22-individuals-and-further-restrictions-on-trade/>.
- . 2022g. “EU Imposes Sanctions on State-Owned Outlets RT/Russia Today and Sputnik’s Broadcasting in the EU.” Consilium. March 2, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-owned-outlets-rtrussia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/>.
- . 2022h. “Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine: EU Bans Certain Russian Banks from SWIFT System and Introduces Further Restrictions.” Consilium. March 2, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/russia-s->

[military-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-bans-certain-russian-banks-from-swift-system-and-introduces-further-restrictions/](#).

- . 2022i. “Ukraine: Council Unanimously Introduces Temporary Protection for Persons Fleeing the War.” Consilium. March 4, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/04/ukraine-council-introduces-temporary-protection-for-persons-fleeing-the-war/>.
- . 2022j. “Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine: EU Agrees New Sectoral Measures Targeting Belarus and Russia.” Consilium. March 9, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/09/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-agrees-new-sectoral-measures-targeting-belarus-and-russia/>.
- . 2022k. “Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine: Fourth EU Package of Sectoral and Individual Measures.” Consilium. March 15, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/15/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-fourth-eu-package-of-sectoral-and-individual-measures/>.
- . 2022l. “Ukraine: Council Adopts Negotiating Mandate to Unlock Additional Support under the Home Affairs Funds.” Consilium. March 16, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/16/ukraine-council-adopts-negotiating-mandate-to-unlock-additional-support-under-the-home-affairs-funds/>.
- . 2022m. “Ukraine: Council Approves Swift Release of Cohesion Resources to Help Refugees.” Consilium. March 16, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/16/ukraine-council-approves-swift-release-of-cohesion-resources-for-ukrainian-refugees/>.
- . 2022n. “Moldova: Council Adopts Decision to Sign Agreement for Frontex Operational Support in Light of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” Consilium. March 17, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/17/moldova-council-adopts-decision-to-sign-agreement-for-frontex-operational-support-in-light-of-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine/>.
- . 2022o. “EU Support to Ukraine: Council Doubles Funding under the European Peace Facility.” Consilium. March 23, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/23/eu-support-to-ukraine-council-doubles-funding-under-the-european-peace-facility/>.

- . 2022p. “Council Adopts €150 Million Assistance to the Republic of Moldova.” Consilium. April 4, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/04/council-adopts-150-million-assistance-to-the-republic-of-moldova/>.
- . 2022q. “Ukraine: €17 Billion of EU Funds to Help Refugees.” Consilium. April 4, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/04/ukraine-council-unlocks-17-billion-of-eu-funds-to-help-refugees/>.
- . 2022r. “Ukraine: Council Approves Immediate Disbursement of €3.5 Billion to EU Countries Welcoming Refugees.” Consilium. April 6, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/06/ukraine-council-approves-immediate-disbursement-of-35-billion-to-eu-countries-welcoming-refugees/>.
- . 2022s. “Council Agrees Recommendation on the Exchange of Ukrainian Hryvnia Banknotes into EU Currencies to Support People Escaping the War in Ukraine.” Consilium. April 13, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/13/council-paves-the-way-for-enabling-ukrainians-to-exchange-their-currency-hryvnia-in-all-eu-countries-at-a-fair-exchange-rate/>.
- . 2022t. “EU Support to Ukraine: Council Agrees on Third Tranche of Support under the European Peace Facility for Total €1.5 Billion.” Consilium. April 13, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/13/eu-support-to-ukraine-council-agrees-on-third-tranche-of-support-under-the-european-peace-facility-for-total-15-billion/>.
- . 2022u. “EUAM Ukraine: Council Further Amends the Mandate to Also Provide Support in the Investigation and Prosecution of International Crimes.” Consilium. April 13, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/13/euam-ukraine-council-further-amends-the-mandate-to-also-provide-support-in-the-investigation-and-prosecution-of-international-crimes/>.
- . 2022v. “Eurojust: Council Adopts Its Mandate on New Rules Allowing the Agency to Preserve Evidence of War Crimes.” Consilium. May 6, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/06/eurojust-council-adopts-its-mandate-on-new-rules-allowing-the-agency-to-preserve-evidence-of-war-crimes/>.
- . 2022w. “Ukraine: Council Adopts Temporary Trade Liberalisation with Ukraine.” Consilium. May 24, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/24/ukraine-council-adopts-temporary-trade-liberalisation-with-ukraine/>.

[releases/2022/05/24/ukraine-council-adopts-temporary-trade-liberalisation-with-ukraine/](#).

- . 2022x. “Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine: EU Adopts Sixth Package of Sanctions.” Consilium. June 3, 2022. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions/](#).
- . 2022y. “Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine: The EU Targets Additional 65 Individuals and 18 Entities.” Consilium. June 3, 2022. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-targets-additional-65-individuals-and-18-entities/](#).
- . 2022z. “Sanctions: Council Requests European Parliament Consent to Add the Violation of Restrictive Measures to the List of EU Crimes.” Consilium. June 30, 2022. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/30/sanctions-council-requests-european-parliament-consent-to-add-the-violation-of-sanctions-to-the-list-of-eu-crimes/](#).
- . 2022aa. “Council Adopts Additional €1 Billion Assistance to Ukraine.” Consilium. July 12, 2022. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/12/council-adopts-additional-1-billion-assistance-to-ukraine/](#).
- . 2022ab. “FAST-CARE: Council Adopts Negotiating Mandate on Further Help for Refugees from Ukraine and on Addressing the Consequences of Russia’s Aggression.” Consilium. July 20, 2022. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/20/fast-care-council-adopts-negotiating-mandate-on-further-help-for-refugees-from-ukraine-and-on-addressing-the-consequences-of-russia-s-aggression/](#).
- . 2022ac. “Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine: EU Adopts ‘Maintenance and Alignment’ Package.” Consilium. July 21, 2022. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/21/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-maintenance-and-alignment-package/](#).
- . 2022ad. “Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine: The EU Targets Additional 54 Individuals and 10 Entities.” Consilium. July 22, 2022. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/22/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-targets-additional-54-individuals-and-10-entities/](#).
- . 2022ae. “Russia: EU Renews Economic Sanctions over Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine for Further Six Months,” July 26, 2022.

- <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/26/russia-eu-renews-economic-sanctions-over-russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-for-further-six-months/>.
- . 2022af. “Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine: The EU Imposes Restrictive Measures on Viktor and Oleksandr Yanukovich.” Consilium. August 4, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/08/04/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-imposes-restrictive-measures-on-viktor-and-oleksandr-yanukovich/>.
- . 2022ag. “Joint Press Release Following the 8th Association Council Meeting between the EU and Ukraine.” Consilium. September 5, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/05/joint-press-release-following-the-8th-association-council-meeting-between-the-eu-and-ukraine/>.
- . 2022ah. “Council Adopts Full Suspension of Visa Facilitation with Russia.” Consilium. September 9, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/09/council-adopts-full-suspension-of-visa-facilitation-with-russia/>.
- . 2022ai. “Council Adopts Additional €5 Billion Assistance to Ukraine.” Consilium. September 20, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/20/council-adopts-additional-5-billion-assistance-to-ukraine/>.
- . 2022aj. “EU Adopts Its Latest Package of Sanctions against Russia over the Illegal Annexation of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Regions.” Consilium. October 6, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/06/eu-adopts-its-latest-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-over-the-illegal-annexation-of-ukraine-s-donetsk-luhansk-zaporizhzhia-and-kherson-regions/>.
- . 2022ak. “Ukraine: EU Sets up a Military Assistance Mission to Further Support the Ukrainian Armed Forces.” Consilium. October 17, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/17/ukraine-eu-sets-up-a-military-assistance-mission-to-further-support-the-ukrainian-armed-forces/>.
- . 2022al. “Ukraine: EU Sanctions Three Individuals and One Entity in Relation to the Use of Iranian Drones in Russian Aggression.” Consilium. October 20, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/20/ukraine-eu-sanctions-three-individuals-and-one-entity-in-relation-to-the-use-of-iranian-drones-in-russian-aggression/>.
- . 2022am. “Council Presidency and European Parliament Provisionally Agree Not to Accept Russian Travel Documents Issued in Ukraine and Georgia.” Consilium.

- November 10, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/10/council-presidency-and-european-parliament-provisionally-agree-not-to-accept-russian-travel-documents-issued-in-ukraine-and-georgia/>.
- . 2022an. “Ukraine: EU Launches Military Assistance Mission.” Consilium. November 15, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/15/ukraine-eu-launches-military-assistance-mission/>.
- . 2022ao. “Sanctions: Council Adds the Violation of Restrictive Measures to the List of EU Crimes.” Consilium. November 28, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/28/sanctions-council-adds-the-violation-of-restrictive-measures-to-the-list-of-eu-crimes/>.
- . 2022ap. “Russian Oil: EU Agrees on Level of Price Cap.” Consilium. December 3, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/03/russian-oil-eu-agrees-on-level-of-price-cap/>.
- . 2022aq. “EU and Norway Sign an Agreement in Support of EUMAM Ukraine.” Consilium. December 6, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/06/eu-and-norway-sign-an-agreement-in-support-of-eumam-ukraine/>.
- . 2022ar. “Council Adopts Decision Not to Accept Russian Documents Issued in Ukraine and Georgia.” Consilium. December 8, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/08/council-adopts-decision-not-to-accept-russian-documents-issued-in-ukraine-and-georgia/>.
- . 2022as. “Iran: EU Adopts Council Conclusions and Additional Restrictive Measures.” Consilium. December 12, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/iran-eu-adopts-council-conclusions-and-additional-restrictive-measures/>.
- . 2022at. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: EU Adopts 9th Package of Economic and Individual Sanctions.” Consilium. December 16, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/16/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-9th-package-of-economic-and-individual-sanctions/>.
- . 2022au. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: The EU Blacklists Additional 141 Individuals and 49 Entities.” Consilium. December 16, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/16/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-the-eu-blacklists-additional-141-individuals-and-49-entities/>.

- . 2023a. “Russia: EU Prolongs Economic Sanctions over Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine.” Consilium. January 27, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/27/russia-eu-prolongs-economic-sanctions-over-russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine/>.
- . 2023b. “Ukraine: Council Agrees on Further Military Support under the European Peace Facility.” Consilium. February 2, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/>.
- . 2023c. “EU Agrees on Level of Price Caps for Russian Petroleum Products.” Consilium. February 4, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/04/eu-agrees-on-level-of-price-caps-for-russian-petroleum-products/>.
- . 2023d. “One Year of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion and War of Aggression against Ukraine, EU Adopts Its 10th Package of Economic and Individual Sanctions.” Consilium. February 25, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/25/one-year-of-russia-s-full-scale-invasion-and-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-its-10th-package-of-economic-and-individual-sanctions/>.
- . 2023e. “Ammunition for Ukraine: Council Agrees €1 Billion Support under the European Peace Facility.” Consilium. April 11, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/04/13/ammunition-for-ukraine-council-agrees-1-billion-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/>.
- . 2023f. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: Wagner Group and RIA FAN Added to the EU’s Sanctions List.” Consilium. April 13, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/04/13/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-wagner-group-and-ria-fan-added-to-the-eu-s-sanctions-list/>.
- . 2023g. “EU Joint Procurement of Ammunition and Missiles for Ukraine: Council Agrees €1 Billion Support under the European Peace Facility.” Consilium. May 4, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/05/eu-joint-procurement-of-ammunition-and-missiles-for-ukraine-council-agrees-1-billion-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/>.
- . 2023h. “Ukraine: Council Adopts Renewal of Temporary Trade Liberalisation and Other Trade Concessions.” Consilium. May 25, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/25/ukraine-council-adopts-renewal-of-temporary-trade-liberalisation-and-other-trade-concessions/>.

- . 2023i. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: EU Adopts 11th Package of Economic and Individual Sanctions.” Consilium. June 23, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/23/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-11th-package-of-economic-and-individual-sanctions/>.
- . 2023j. “ASAP: Council and European Parliament Strike a Deal on Boosting the Production of Ammunition and Missiles in the EU.” Consilium. July 7, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/07/asap-council-and-european-parliament-strike-a-deal-on-boosting-the-production-of-ammunition-and-missiles-in-the-eu/>.
- . 2023k. “Norway: Second Norwegian Financial Contribution to the European Peace Facility.” Consilium. July 25, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/25/norway-second-norwegian-financial-contribution-to-the-european-peace-facility/>.
- . 2023l. “Ukrainian Refugees: EU Member States Agree to Extend Temporary Protection.” Consilium. September 28, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/09/28/ukrainian-refugees-eu-member-states-agree-to-extend-temporary-protection/>.
- . 2023m. “European Peace Facility: Council Greenlights Further Funding for Training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces under EUMAM Ukraine.” Consilium. November 28, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/28/european-peace-facility-council-greenlights-further-funding-for-training-of-the-ukrainian-armed-forces-under-eumam-ukraine/>.
- . 2023n. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: EU Adopts 12th Package of Economic and Individual Sanctions.” Consilium. December 18, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-12th-package-of-economic-and-individual-sanctions/>.
- . 2024a. “Milestones in EU-NATO Cooperation.” Consilium. 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-nato-cooperation/milestones-in-eu-nato-cooperation/>.
- . 2024b. “Russian War of Aggression against Ukraine: Council Adds 1 Person and 1 Entity to EU Sanctions List.” Consilium. January 3, 2024.

- <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/03/russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-adds-1-person-and-1-entity-to-eu-sanctions-list/>.
- . 2024c. “Ukraine Facility: Council Agrees on Elements of New Support Mechanism for Ukraine.” Consilium. January 10, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/10/ukraine-facility-council-agrees-on-elements-of-new-support-mechanism-for-ukraine/>.
- . 2024d. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: Council Renews Economic Sanctions for a Further 6 Months.” Consilium. January 29, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/29/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-renews-economic-sanctions-for-a-further-6-months/>.
- . 2024e. “Ukraine Facility: Council and Parliament Agree on New Support Mechanism for Ukraine.” Consilium. February 6, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/06/ukraine-facility-council-and-parliament-agree-on-new-support-mechanism-for-ukraine/>.
- . 2024f. “Immobilised Russian Assets: Council Decides to Set aside Extraordinary Revenues.” Consilium. February 12, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/12/immobilised-russian-assets-council-decides-to-set-aside-extraordinary-revenues/>.
- . 2024g. “Russia: Two Years after the Full-Scale Invasion and War of Aggression against Ukraine, EU Adopts 13th Package of Individual and Economic Sanctions.” Consilium. February 23, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/23/russia-two-years-after-the-full-scale-invasion-and-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-13th-package-of-individual-and-economic-sanctions/>.
- . 2024h. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: EU Individual Sanctions over Territorial Integrity Prolonged for a Further Six Months.” Consilium. March 11, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/12/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-individual-sanctions-over-territorial-integrity-prolonged-for-a-further-six-months/>.
- . 2024i. “Ukraine Assistance Fund: Council Allocates €5 Billion under the European Peace Facility to Support Ukraine Militarily.” Consilium. March 18, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/18/ukraine->

[assistance-fund-council-allocates-5-billion-under-the-european-peace-facility-to-support-ukraine-militarily/](#).

- . 2024j. “EUAM Ukraine: Council Extends the Mandate of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform until 2027.” Consilium. May 14, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/14/euam-ukraine-council-extends-the-mandate-of-the-eu-advisory-mission-for-civilian-security-sector-reform-until-2027/>.
- . 2024k. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: Council Bans Broadcasting Activities in the European Union of Four More Russia-Associated Media Outlets.” Consilium. May 17, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/17/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-bans-broadcasting-activities-in-the-european-union-of-four-more-russia-associated-media-outlets/>.
- . 2024l. “Extraordinary Revenues Generated by Immobilised Russian Assets: Council Greenlights the Use of Net Windfall Profits to Support Ukraine’s Self-Defence and Reconstruction.” Consilium. May 21, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/21/extraordinary-revenues-generated-by-immobilised-russian-assets-council-greenlights-the-use-of-windfall-net-profits-to-support-ukraine-s-self-defence-and-reconstruction/>.
- . 2024m. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: Comprehensive EU’s 14th Package of Sanctions Cracks down on Circumvention and Adopts Energy Measures.” Consilium. June 24, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>.
- . 2024n. “Russia: New Sanctions Framework against Those Responsible for Destabilising Activities against the EU and Its Member States.” Consilium. October 8, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/08/russia-eu-sets-up-new-framework-for-restrictive-measures-against-those-responsible-for-destabilising-activities-against-the-eu-and-its-member-states/>.
- . 2024o. “Immobilised Assets: Council Agrees on up to €35 Billion in Macro-Financial Assistance to Ukraine and New Loan Mechanism Implementing G7 Commitment.” Consilium. October 9, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/09/immobilised-assets-council-agrees-on-up-to-35-billion-in-macro->

[financial-assistance-to-ukraine-and-new-loan-mechanism-implementing-g7-commitment/](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/23/immobilised-assets-council-greenlights-up-to-35-billion-in-macro-financial-assistance-to-ukraine-and-new-loan-mechanism-implementing-g7-commitment/).

- . 2024p. “Immobilised Assets: Council Greenlights up to €35 Billion in Macro-Financial Assistance to Ukraine and New Loan Mechanism Implementing G7 Commitment.” Consilium. October 23, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/23/immobilised-assets-council-greenlights-up-to-35-billion-in-macro-financial-assistance-to-ukraine-and-new-loan-mechanism-implementing-g7-commitment/>.
- . 2024q. “Ukraine: Council Extends the Mandate of the EU Military Assistance Mission for Two Years.” Consilium. November 8, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/08/ukraine-council-extends-the-mandate-of-the-eu-military-assistance-mission-for-two-years/>.
- . 2024r. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: EU Adopts 15th Package of Restrictive Measures.” Consilium. December 16, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/16/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-15th-package-of-restrictive-measures/>.
- . 2025a. “Three Years of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion and War of Aggression against Ukraine: EU Adopts Its 16th Package of Economic and Individual Measures.” Consilium. February 24, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/24/three-years-of-russia-s-full-scale-invasion-and-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-its-16th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/>.
- . 2025b. “Trade: Council Adopts Negotiating Position on Tariffs for a Number of Agricultural Products and Fertilisers from Russia and Belarus.” Consilium. March 14, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/14/trade-council-adopts-negotiating-position-on-tariffs-for-a-number-of-agricultural-products-and-fertilisers-from-russia-and-belarus/>.
- . 2025c. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: EU Agrees 17th Package of Sanctions.” Consilium. May 12, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/20/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-agrees-17th-package-of-sanctions/>.
- . 2025d. “EU Member States Agree to Extend Temporary Protection for Refugees from Ukraine.” Consilium. June 13, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/13/eu-member-states-agree-to-extend-temporary-protection-for-refugees-from-ukraine/>.

- [releases/2025/06/13/eu-member-states-agree-to-extend-temporary-protection-for-refugees-from-ukraine/](#).
- . 2025e. “Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: EU Adopts 18th Package of Economic and Individual Measures.” Consilium. July 18, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/>.
- . 2025f. “19th Package of Sanctions against Russia: EU Targets Russian Energy, Third-Country Banks and Crypto Providers.” Consilium. October 23, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-eu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/>.
- . 2025g. “Ukraine Facility: Council Approves Sixth Payment of around €2.3 Billion to Kyiv.” Consilium. December 11, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/11/ukraine-facility-council-approves-sixth-payment-of-around-23-billion-to-kyiv/>.
- Daehnhardt, Patricia. 2022. “NATO’s New Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass Face Reality: EuroAtlantic Security and Defense in the Context of the War in Ukraine.” *Atlantisch Perspectief* 46 (4): 6–11. <https://doi.org/10.2307/48732617>.
- Didier, Brice. 2025. Review of *NATO and the Russian War in Ukraine. Strategic Integration and Military Interoperability*, by Janne Haaland Matlary and Rob Johnson. *European Review of International Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.2307/27389818>.
- Diehl, Paul F, and Patrick Regan. 2015. “The Interdependence of Conflict Management Attempts.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32 (1): 99–107. <https://doi.org/10.2307/26267289>.
- Dijkstra, Hylke, Laura von Allwörden, Leonard Schütte, and Giuseppe Zaccaria. 2025. “Conclusion.” *The Survival of International Organizations*, February, 161–81. <https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198948445.003.0006>.
- Donno, Daniela, Shawna K Metzger, and Bruce Russett. 2015. “Screening out Risk: IGOs, Member State Selection, and Interstate Conflict, 1951-2000.” *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (2): 251–63. <https://doi.org/10.2307/43868270>.
- Drent, Margriet. 2018. “European Strategic Autonomy: Going It Alone?” JSTOR. 2018. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21311>.

- EUR-Lex. 2007. “Summary of EU Legislation: Cooperation with NATO. EUR-Lex - L33243 - EN.” Eur-Lex.europa.eu. 2007. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/cooperation-with-nato.html>.
- European Council. 2018. “NATO Summit, Brussels.” Consilium. 2018. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2018/07/11-12/>.
- . 2022. “EU Adopts Package of Sanctions in Response to Russian Recognition of the Non-Government Controlled Areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine and Sending of Troops into the Region.” Consilium. February 23, 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/23/russian-recognition-of-the-non-government-controlled-areas-of-the-donetsk-and-luhansk-oblasts-of-ukraine-as-independent-entities-eu-adopts-package-of-sanctions/>.
- . 2023a. “Joint Statement Following the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit.” Consilium. February 3, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/03/joint-statement-following-the-24th-eu-ukraine-summit/>.
- . 2023b. “Remarks by President Charles Michel at the Press Conference of the EU-Ukraine Summit in Kyiv.” Consilium. February 3, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/03/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-press-conference-of-the-eu-ukraine-summit-in-kyiv/>.
- . 2025. “European Union Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine.” Consilium. August 12, 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/12/statement-by-european-union-leaders-on-ukraine/>.
- European Council, European Commission, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. *Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*.
- . 2018. *Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*.
- . 2023. *Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*.
- European External Action Service. 2017a. “Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals Endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016.”
- . 2017b. “Second Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals Endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016.”

- European External Action Service (EEAS). 2021. “What We Do: Policies and Actions | EEAS Website.” [Www.eeas.europa.eu](http://www.eeas.europa.eu). 2021. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/what-we-do-policies-and-actions-0_en.
- Faude, Benjamin, and Julia Fuss. 2020. “Coordination or Conflict? The Causes and Consequences of Institutional Overlap in a Disaggregated World Order.” *Global Constitutionalism* 9 (2): 268–89. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045381719000376>.
- Fiott, Daniel, Gustav Lindstrom, and Thierry Tardy. 2019. “Defence Industry, Industrial Cooperation and Military Mobility.” *NATO and the EU*. NATO Defense College. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep19964.11>.
- Foreign Affairs Council. 2023. “Foreign Affairs Council, 24 April 2023: Main Results.” Consilium. April 24, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2023/04/24/>.
- Gegout, Catherine. 2010. *European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions, and American Hegemony*. Toronto: University Of Toronto Press.
- Genini, Davide. 2025. “How the War in Ukraine Has Transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.” *Yearbook of European Law*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yeaf003>.
- Gheciu, Alexandra. 2022. “Protecting NATO’s Security Community.” NATO Defense College. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep41479>.
- Giegerich, Bastian. 2013. “NATO and Interorganizational Cooperation.” In *NATO beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, edited by Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti, and Benjamin Zyla, 297–317. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” *International Organization* 42 (3): 485–507. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787>.
- Ham, Peter van. 2018. “Implications for European Security.” *Trump’s Impact on European Security*. Clingendael Institute. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep17340.6>.
- High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2025. “Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.” Consilium.
- Himmrich, Julia, and Denitsa Raynova. 2017. “EU-NATO Relations: Inching Forward? Inching Forward?” European Leadership Network. 2017. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17438>.

- Hoeffler, Catherine, Stéphanie C Hofmann, and Frédéric Mérand. 2024. "The Polycrisis and EU Security and Defence Competences." *Journal of European Public Policy* 31 (10): 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2362762>.
- Hofmann, Stephanie C. 2009. "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP." *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (1): 45–52. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40407213>.
- Hofmann, Stephanie C. 2013. "The Success and Failure of European Security Cooperation." *European Security in NATO's Shadow*, January, 36–76. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139245920.003>.
- Howorth, Jolyon. 2014. *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2017. "Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation: Squaring the Circle." JSTOR. Egmont Institute. 2017. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06626>.
- Hussain, Danish. 2023. "EU and NATO Strengthen Cooperation for Tackling Challenges." *The Diplomatic Insight*. June 16, 2023. <https://thediomaticinsight.com/eu-and-nato-strengthen-cooperation-for-tackling-challenges/>.
- International Crisis Group. 2022. "Answering Four Hard Questions about Russia's War in Ukraine." JSTOR. 2022. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep45704>.
- Kaarbo, Juliet, Kai Oppermann, and Ryan K Beasley. 2023. "What If? Counterfactual Trump and the Western Response to the War in Ukraine." *International Affairs* 99 (2): 605–24. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad030>.
- Kakissis, Joanna. 2024. "What Will Trump's Presidency Mean for Russia's War on Ukraine?" NPR. November 7, 2024. <https://www.npr.org/2024/11/07/nx-s1-5181985/2024-election-trump-russia-ukraine-war>.
- Kaynar, Mete Kaan, and Gökhan Ak. 2017. "The EU/CFSP and NATO: Possibility of a Co-Existence as Brothers-In-Arms?" *International Journal of Research - GRANTHAALAYAH* 5 (1): 111–36. <https://doi.org/10.29121/granthaalayah.v5.i1.2017.1728>.
- Koppa, Marilena. 2022. *The Evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy: Critical Junctures and the Quest for EU Strategic Autonomy*. Springer EBooks. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99158-6>.
- Koschut, Simon. 2018. "Inter(B)Locking Institutions. NATO, the EU, the OSCE and Inter-Organizational European Security Governance." In *Inter-Organizational Relations in*

- International Security: Cooperation and Competition*, edited by Stephen Aris, Aglaya Snetkov, and Andreas Wenger. Routledge.
- Krastev, Ivan, and Mark Leonard. 2022. "The Crisis of European Security: What Europeans Think about the War in Ukraine." JSTOR. 2022. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep39678>.
- Kriendler, John. 2004. "NATO Crisis Management: Cooperation with PfP Partners and Other International Organizations." *Connections* 3 (4): 59–68. <https://doi.org/10.2307/26323065>.
- Kuijper, Pieter Jan, Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister, Geert de Baere, and Thomas Ramopoulos. 2015a. "Common Foreign and Security Policy." In *The Law of EU External Relations: Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the EU as an International Legal Actor*. Oxford University Press.
- Kuijper, Pieter Jan, Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister, Geert de Baere, and Thomas Ramopoulos. 2015b. "EU Sanctions and Countermeasures." In *The Law of EU External Relations: Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the EU as an International Legal Actor*, 215–94. Oxford University Press.
- Kulesa, Łukasz. 2018. "Implications for Deterrence Stability." European Leadership Network. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep17437>.
- Lachmann, Niels. 2010. "The EU-CSDP-NATO Relationship: Asymmetric Cooperation and the Search for Momentum." *Studia Diplomatica* 63 (3/4): 185–202. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44838587>.
- Leuprecht, Christian. 2019. "The Enhanced Forward Presence: Innovating NATO's Deployment Model for Collective Defence." JSTOR. 2019. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19859>.
- Lewis, Simon, and Gram Slattery. 2024. "Trump Allies Have Presented Plan to Halt US Military Aid to Ukraine Unless It Enters Peace Talks with Russia." USA TODAY. June 25, 2024. <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/ukraine/2024/06/25/trump-advisers-ukraine-russia-peace-plan/74211531007/>.
- Lundgren, Magnus. 2016. "Conflict Management Capabilities of Peace-Brokering International Organizations, 1945–2010: A New Dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33 (2): 198–223. <https://doi.org/10.2307/26271419>.
- Lupu, Yonatan, and Brian Greenhill. 2017. "The Networked Peace: Intergovernmental Organizations and International Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (6): 833–48. <https://doi.org/10.2307/48590477>.

- Mahé, Anne-Laure, and Stéphanie Martel. 2023. "Crisis Narratives and Institutional Resilience: A Framework for Analysis." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 26 (3): 505–29. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-023-00304-3>.
- Marten, Kimberly. 2017. "The Growth of NATO-Russia Tensions." Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05770.9>.
- Milevski, Lukas. 2019. "The Logic of Integrating Various Forms of Power in Conflict." Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep20077>.
- Młynarski, Tomasz. 2023. "The Implications of Strengthening 'European Strategic Autonomy' and Its Defence Capabilities for the Growth of France's Global Importance and Power." *Politeja* 88: 223–37. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27327697>.
- NATO. 2022a. "Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Russia's Attack on Ukraine." North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). February 24, 2022. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2022/02/24/statement-by-the-north-atlantic-council-on-russias-attack-on-ukraine?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2022b. "Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government." North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). March 24, 2022. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2022/03/24/statement-by-nato-heads-of-state-and-government?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2022c. "Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers." North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). November 29, 2022. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2022/11/29/statement-by-nato-foreign-ministers?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2023a. "Statement by the North Atlantic Council Marking One Year of Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine." North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). February 24, 2023. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2023/02/24/statement-by-the-north-atlantic-council-marking-one-year-of-russias-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2023b. "Statement by the NATO-Ukraine Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers." North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). November 29, 2023. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2023/11/29/statement-by-the-nato-ukraine-council-at-the-level-of-foreign-ministers?selectedLocale=>.

- . 2024a. “Statement by the NATO-Ukraine Council Marking Two Years of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). February 24, 2024. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2024/02/24/statement-by-the-nato-ukraine-council-marking-two-years-of-russias-full-scale-invasion-of-ukraine?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2024b. “Washington Summit Declaration.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). July 10, 2024. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2024/07/10/washington-summit-declaration?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2024c. “Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Council.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). July 11, 2024. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2024/07/11/statement-of-the-nato-ukraine-council?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2024d. “Summary of the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). August 5, 2024. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2024/08/05/summary-of-the-nato-ukraine-innovation-cooperation-roadmap?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2025a. “Crisis Management.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/crisis-management>.
- . 2025b. “NATO-Ukraine Council.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-structure/nato-ukraine-council?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2025c. “Relations with Russia.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-russia?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2025d. “Relations with the European Union.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-the-european-union>.
- . 2025e. “Relations with Ukraine.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-ukraine?selectedLocale=>.
- . 2025f. “Secretary General Welcomes First Package of U.S. Equipment for Ukraine Funded by the Netherlands under New NATO Initiative.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). August 4, 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/news-and->

- [events/articles/news/2025/08/04/secretary-general-welcomes-first-package-of-us-equipment-for-ukraine-funded-by-the-netherlands-under-new-nato-initiative](https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/08/04/secretary-general-welcomes-first-package-of-us-equipment-for-ukraine-funded-by-the-netherlands-under-new-nato-initiative).
- . 2025g. “NATO Allies Denmark, Norway and Sweden Announce \$500m Package of Support for Ukraine.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). August 5, 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/08/05/nato-allies-denmark-norway-and-sweden-announce-500m-package-of-support-for-ukraine>.
- . 2025h. “Germany to Fund \$500m PURL Package for Ukraine.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). August 13, 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/08/13/germany-to-fund-500m-purl-package-for-ukraine>.
- . 2025i. “Canada to Fund \$500m PURL Package for Ukraine.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). August 24, 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/08/24/canada-to-fund-500m-purl-package-for-ukraine>.
- . 2025j. “Nordic and Baltic Allies to Fund Joint \$500m PURL Package for Ukraine.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). November 13, 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/11/13/nordic-and-baltic-allies-to-fund-joint-500m-purl-package-for-ukraine>.
- . 2025k. “NATO Allies and Partners Fund over 4 Billion in PURL Packages for Ukraine.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). December 10, 2025. <https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/12/10/nato-allies-and-partners-fund-over-4-billion-in-purl-packages-for-ukraine>.
- . 2026. “Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2026. <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/comprehensive-assistance-package-cap-for-ukraine?selectedLocale=>.
- Nissen, Christine, Felicia Stokholm, Jakob Linnet Schmidt, Mikkel Runge Olesen, Hans Mouritzen, Jon RahbekClemmensen, Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Graham Butler, and Louise Riis Andersen. 2020. “Relationship between the EU and NATO.” *European Defence Cooperation and the Danish Defence Optout*. Danish Institute for International Studies. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep25193.10>.
- Petrelli, Niccolò. 2021. “NATO, Strategy and Net Assessment.” NATO Defense College. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep32323>.
- Petrov, Petar, and Iulian Romanyshyn. 2020. “Capability Development in Europe: How Can the EU Defense Push Benefit the Transatlantic Partnership?” *Atlantisch Perspectief* 44 (3): 54–58. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48600559>.

- Petrov, Petar, Leonard Schütte, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2020. "The Future of EU-NATO Relations: Doing Less Better." *Atlantisch Perspectief* 44 (2): 38–44. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48600531>.
- Reynolds, Christopher. 2010. *Understanding the Emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy*.
- Sanger, David. 2025. "In a Sudden Shift, Trump Says Ukraine Can Win the War with Russia." *The New York Times*, September 23, 2025. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/23/us/politics/trump-russia-ukraine.html>.
- Scaparrotti, Curtis M, Colleen B Bell, Wayne Schroeder, Clementine G Starling, and Conor Rodihan. 2020. "Revitalizing the Military Mobility Effort: A Survey of Current Efforts." *MOVING OUT*. Atlantic Council. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep24666.6>.
- Simonet, Loïc. 2023. "The Third EU-NATO Joint Declaration (10 January 2023): Was It Worth the Delay?" JSTOR. 2023. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48757>.
- . 2025. "Navigating Neutrality: How to Find the Best Match between NATO and Its Four Remaining Neutral Western European Partners (WEP4)?" OIIPAustrian Institute for International Affairs. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep70011>.
- Singh, Harshita, and Sameeksha Bharadwaj. 2022. "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in International Relations." *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 27 (12): 6–14.
- Smit, Timo. 2024. "Towards a More Strategic Civilian CSDP: Strengthening EU Civilian Crisis Management in a New Era of Geopolitics and Risk." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep64902>.
- Smith, Simon J. 2019. "Partners in Capacity Building." In *Partners in Capacity Building*, 52–62. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep36294.10>.
- Tams, Carsten. 1999. "The Functions of a European Security and Defence Identity and Its Institutional Form." In *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, 80–103. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198207955.003.0004>.
- Tardy, Thierry. 2019. "Calibrating the Scope of NATO's Mandate." NATO Defense College. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep19845>.
- . 2021. "For a New NATO-EU Bargain." Egmont Institute. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep30606>.

- Tardy, Thierry, and Gustav Lindstrom. 2019. "The Scope of EU-NATO Cooperation." *NATO and the EU: The Essential Partners*. NATO Defense College. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19964.6>.
- Tereszkiewicz, Filip. 2025. "EU Identity in the Context of the Russian–Ukrainian War: A Constructivist Analysis of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence." *International Politics*, April. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-025-00691-z>.
- Tertrais, Bruno. 2016. "Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: Its Origins, Meaning and Future." NATO Defense College. 2016. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10238>.
- Tomé, Luis. 2022. "NATO as a Community of Values and Its New Political Role." *Atlantisch Perspectief* 46 (4): 24–28. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48732620>.
- Tomescu, Ghenea-Viorel. 2015. "'EU in Crisis: Current Challenges in the Area of CFSP' / a Legal Perspective." *Challenges of the Knowledge Society* 5 (1): 868–72. <https://doaj.org/article/72d0ed4bdd3b45d0aad6e950c665b837>.
- Urpelainen, Johannes, and Thijs van de Graaf. 2015. "Your Place or Mine? Institutional Capture and the Creation of Overlapping International Institutions." *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (4): 799–827.
- Williams, Heather, Nicholas Smith Adamopoulos, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Catherine Murphy. 2025. "Competitive Arms Control and 'Player Europe.'" *Game On*. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep69507.6>.
- Winn, Neil. 2003. "CFSP, ESDP, and the Future of European Security: Whither NATO?" *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9 (2): 149–60. <https://doi.org/10.2307/24590473>.
- Zandee, Dick, and Roman de Baedts. 2024. "European Defence: The Future of EU Missions." Clingendael Institute. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep60146>.