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# Diplomarbeit

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**Good Governance in Tanzania:**

The political culture under pressure of the International Organizations and  
Donors

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*Dependent nations can never be considered developed.*

Walter Rodney

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## ***List of Abbreviations:***

ADB	African Development Bank
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolution Party)
CG	Consultative Group
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
EU	European Union
GBS	General Budget Support Group
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDI	Gender-related Development Index
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
HPI-1	Human Poverty Index for developing countries
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFMS	Integrated Financial Management System
IMF	International Monetary Fund
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
LDC	Least Developed Country
MDF	Multilateral Debt Relief Fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MKUKUTA	Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
REPOA	Research on Poverty Alleviation
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TAS	Tanzania Assistance Strategy
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VDCs	Village Development Committees
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

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## ***Preface***

My interest in developmental issues, theories and realities arose continuously from my political science studies. Furthermore, I focused my attention towards the international system and its role in developing countries. Therefore I chose to write my diploma thesis on Tanzania and its unique history as an independent country. The first books I have read on this subject convinced me, that it was indeed a peaceful, however, poor country. To satisfy my curiosity I examined the reasons for its state of art. Certainly, the question for the country's poorness can be easily answered by the fact of colonialism, nonetheless deserves an in-depth examination of Tanzanian's recent history of independence. Viewing today's Tanzanian domestic politics one can easily observe its significant influence, made by the international organizations and donors. Frankly, the impression that the government is acting more in the interest of the financial aid institutions and countries and less in the interest of its own citizens is quickly made. These impressions were the starting point for my thesis and ultimately my research about the changes of the political culture in Tanzania through the influence and intervention of the international organizations and donors.

# Chapter I:

## *Introduction*

Presently, Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world. In the Human Development Index (HDI) it ranks 152<sup>nd</sup> out of 179 countries with 0,503 points.<sup>1</sup> Its political history as an independent country started in 1961 (Mainland, Zanzibar in 1963) with the implementation of the African Socialism by President Julius K. Nyerere. During the 1980s the liberalisation process led to a significant change, namely to a multi-party democracy in 1992. From 1995 elections were held in 5-year-cycles. Even to this day in Tanzania, one can still trace the overwhelming support for the former single party leader, Chama Cha Mapinduzi<sup>2</sup> (CCM). Since the 1990s many International Organizations and donors participated in Tanzania's development via different means, for instance, with financial aids, technical assistance, advice etc. My objective for this diploma thesis is the assessment of the government's decision-making process. I assume that this process is dominated by the interests of the International Organizations, i.e. the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) and donors. Furthermore, I suppose that the growing influence of the aid giving organizations and countries is continuously changing the citizen's attitudes and values towards the politics.

## *Historical Background*

From 1884 to 1918 Tanganyika was a German colony and more specifically a part of the German-East-African region. From 1890 onwards, the islands of Zanzibar became a British protectorate. At the end of the First World War Tanganyika became a British trusteeship territory.<sup>3</sup> On December 9<sup>th</sup> 1961 Tanganyika reached the independence from Great Britain and was proclaimed a sovereign Republic, one year later. The Prime Minister Julius K. Nyerere was elected as the first President of

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<sup>1</sup> HDR 2008: [http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/2008/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_TZA.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/2008/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_TZA.html)  
13.8.2009

<sup>2</sup> Revolution Party

<sup>3</sup> Fischer Weltalmanach 2006: p. 446

Tanganyika. Zanzibar became independent on December 10<sup>th</sup> 1963, and after a short revolution the islands were declared a Republic on January 12<sup>th</sup> 1964. The Union of these two states was proclaimed on April 26<sup>th</sup> 1964, where the new name Tanzania emerged.<sup>4</sup> The Tanganyika African National Union Party (TANU) was proclaimed as the only legal party in 1965.<sup>5</sup> President Nyerere established a new political system according to his ideology of the “African Socialism”.

„Socialism–like democracy–is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare. “<sup>6</sup>

The first decisions made by the new government had the priority to create peace and unity among the citizens. When the collective experience of colonialism and the fighting for independence was still alive, few measures were needed to create a nation. In this context it was mainly the implementation of the Swahili as the national language which united the people from the mainland and the islands together, hence, creating a national identity. This way peace was ensured and the borders between the tribes, the cultures and religions were crossed. However as an ideology, the system failed to build up a stable and sustainable economy and thus failing to reduce poverty. With the upcoming wave of globalization and the ideological victory of capitalism over socialism in 1989, the urgent need for a change of the political system at its core emerged. Coupled with an input that came from the IMF and WB, the multi-party system was proclaimed in 1992. Since then, Tanzania remained a peaceful, however poor country.

## ***Statement of Problem***

The International Financial Institutions (IFIs), i.e. mainly the IMF, WB and Africa Development Bank (ADB) play a major role in the ongoing development matters of African countries. In order to receive grants and loans the countries are bound to

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/profile1f.html> 12.6.2007

<sup>5</sup> Clark (1978): p. 28

<sup>6</sup> Nyerere (1968): p.1

certain conditionalities. Since the early 1990s one of these conditionalities is known under the term of “Good Governance”. Since its founding, this expression is lacking a clear definition; however there is a consensus that it includes political conditions like transparency, accountability, rule of law, protection of human rights etc. In Tanzania these new conditionalities were given by the IFIs in a period of political transitions and were accepted as one of the new goals to achieve. In my study I want to focus on the aforementioned conditionalities which are bounded to the keyword “Good Governance” and their impact on the political culture of the country, as such.

### ***Objectives of the Study***

My aim is to define the extent and range of the term “Good Governance”, its ideological meaning and ability to be a tool of pressure in the hands of the IFIs and donors. Furthermore, I want to focus on its intervening power to alter the political culture, and thus creating dependence not only on foreign aid but also in ideological terms and real politics. To examine these dynamics, I will seek to observe the power relations within the decision-making process of current Tanzanian politics.

Besides of my aim to seek a definition for the term “Good Governance”, as it is my understanding that it is a synonym for the current international developmental politics, including strategies and objectives. In this context it is crucial, to point out that this term and its meaning (ideological and in real politics) was introduced by foreign organizations and did not occur in the places of its later implementation.

In my thesis, I assume that the decision-making process in Tanzania is determined by these conditionalities suggested by the IFIs and donors and does not respond to the citizen’s needs in wider context. Since the introduction of the multi-party system and the involvement of the IFIs and donors in the domestic politics of Tanzania the relationship between the government and the inhabitants is deteriorating. The delivery of social services did not improve through the new approach of capitalist politics. All in all Tanzania remains in strong dependency on foreign aid without outstanding improvements in economy and poverty reduction.

## ***Research Methodology***

My research is based on a literature analysis, combined with interviews I made on my visit in Tanzania in 2008. The literatures I studied are official government publications and the International Organization's studies on the one hand and scientific literature on the other. Concerning the scientific literature I have focused on current domestic researchers. Most of the literatures quoted in this thesis are available in libraries located in Dar es Salaam. The interviews were held in Dar es Salaam and Arusha; the interview partners were experts in the fields of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Hakikazi, HakiElimu and Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). The third source I will be using is based on my own personal experiences during my stay in Tanzania. The information I obtained is based on my observations and conversations with citizens, whom I consider as experts since they are the one who are affected the most by the given circumstances.

## Chapter II:

### ***The Ideology of African Socialism and Tanzania's Political Culture***

#### **Political Culture:**

In this section I will first of all introduce and define the terms of “Political Culture” and “African Socialism”. In the second part, I will discuss the political culture of Tanzania along with its political history, as well as internal and external influences of world politics, economy and globalization.

The phrase “Political Culture” was introduced into the social sciences by Almond and Verba in 1963. In their book “The Civic Culture”, they studied the political attitudes in five democratic (western) nations. Their definition of this term remained a standard among the scientific community, to this day.

Almond and Verba identified political culture as “(...) the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.”<sup>7</sup> In other words, political culture is a set of values, attitudes and orientations of the citizens towards the political system as a whole and its parts in particular. Furthermore, they stated that the political culture can, however, must not harmonize with the political system. In their study they identified three types of political cultures, namely, the parochial, subject and participant culture. The differences between these types rest on the citizen's knowledge and feelings about the particular political system and their degree of participation in it. The different types of political cultures do not replace each other but are mostly combined. The ideal type of a political culture would be what they name the civic culture.

“(...) the civic culture is a participant political culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruent. (...)”

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<sup>7</sup> Almond/Verba (1963): p 14f

Individuals become participants in the political process, but do not give up their orientations as subjects nor as parochials.”<sup>8</sup>

Political cultures are imperative for the functioning of political systems. Therefore political outputs should reflect the inputs from the members of society. Furthermore, Almond and Verba identified the relationship between the political culture and the political structure as “(...) one of the most significant researchable aspects of the problem of political stability and change.”<sup>9</sup>

Generally speaking, in the context of Third World countries and specifically in the case of Tanzania authors also refer to Almond and Verba’s classification.

“The developing nations are of parochial culture (...) while structures are participant. (...) Tanzania is more subject-participant than parochial-participant.”<sup>10</sup>

While Okema refers to Almond and Verba he claims that their classification is useful, however, does not explain the complexity of cultures (social and political) in developing countries.

In my thesis, I will not classify the political culture of Tanzania in the aforementioned categories that Almond and Verba devised. It is my understanding that these classifications are not useful in the context of developing countries and in the present political global structure. Furthermore, I will refer to a definition of political culture, as the relationship between the citizens and the state. Moreover, the values, knowledge and orientations of the citizens towards the political system and its parts. On the other hand also the orientations of the decision-makers and the political outputs.

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<sup>8</sup> Almond/Verba (1963): p 31f

<sup>9</sup> Almond/Verba (1963): p 34

<sup>10</sup> Okema (1996): p 3f

## ***African Socialism:***

In this part I will define the ideology and implementation of “African Socialism”, in regards of the initial meaning formulated by Julius Nyerere and its meaning among scientists. As a next step, I will describe Tanzania’s political culture from a historical retrospective.

In 1962 Julius Nyerere published an article called: “Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism”, where he essentially explains the fundamental ideas behind his ideology.

For Julius Nyerere the main difference between the European and the African socialism is that the former emerged as a counter strategy against capitalism. It was a reaction on the ongoing exploitation by the class society. Nyerere claims that before colonialism there was no known class system within the traditional African society, hence no exploitation occurred. The concepts of salaried employees and land property were brought to Tanzania through the Europeans, i.e. as a part of colonialism.

Nyerere advocated that society should return to the more traditional values and social orders, which were a part of their culture beforehand. In this case, all people would work together for the greater good. According to his philosophy, all revenues are shared and society is perceived as a type of family, in the widest sense. This is the basic essence of Nyerere’s ideology and the meaning behind the word “Ujamaa” (which can be translated as “Familyhood”<sup>11</sup>), that is a term that is often used synonymously to the policy of African Socialism. Hence, it is necessary to separate Nyerere’s ideology and its implementation from the European concept of Socialism and its underlying theory of Marxism.

Point was also made by Hydén, when he characterized Marxism. In Accordance to Hydén, the emerging struggles for a socialist revolution in Western Europe are rooted in the previous technological achievements made by capitalism. Moreover he claims that a socialist revolution in the African context cannot be compared with the one in Europe. Owing to the fact that in predominant cases the

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<sup>11</sup> „Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of ,society‘ as an extension of the basic family unit.“ Nyerere (1968): p 12

means of production are not controlled by the ruling class but are in the hands of the producers themselves.<sup>12</sup> Nyerere's aim was to transform society back and evoke the former values and structures in order to begin a development.

“The environments are reflected in the state in the form of responses. The state may respond by adopting problems of the society as its own. This was the case with the desire for development. It can take the problems, reinterpret them and come out with policies that suit its interests but in a language understood by the society. This was the case with **ujamaa** and the application of Kiswahili language.”<sup>13</sup>

The conditions for this transformation profited from the struggle for independence. As a matter of fact, it proved to be a uniting feature of all citizens. The importance of unity was clear to all people; for Nyerere this situation created the perfect ground to implement his ideology. Under Nyerere's leadership the Tanganyika African National Union Party (TANU) led the country into independence and henceforth found a large support among Tanzania's citizens, especially the peasantry, which makes out the largest group among the citizens.<sup>14</sup>

The first development strategy was conceived by the government in 1961. It was a Five Year Plan where the main emphasis was set on the industrial sector through which modernization should take place. In this period, Tanzania received a great deal of external financial assistance. Hence the development strategy was additionally influenced by external voices, in particular the WB.<sup>15</sup> This policy of modernization found little acceptance amid the peasants. This was also reflected in their low degree of participation among the peasants. The main beneficiaries of the subsequent economical growth and improvements in social services were the middle classes in urban areas, a fact which further widened the income gap between the middle class

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<sup>12</sup> Hydén (1982): 244ff

<sup>13</sup> Okema (1996): p 11

<sup>14</sup> Many authors declare the party's character at that time as a “national movement“. For ex. Pratt (1976), Dashwood (2000), Havnevik (1993) et.al.

<sup>15</sup> Jennings (2003): p 164f; Pratt (1976): p 166

and the peasants. According to Pratt this led to class stratification by the end of this period, i.e. by 1967.<sup>16</sup>

Concerning rural development, the government introduced in 1962 a new policy under the key word of “self-help”. The planning of this development policy involved the rural population and thus represented “(...) a new take on an old practice, a combination of tradition and innovation.”<sup>17</sup> The Village Development Committees (VDCs) were established in 1962, and they ought to be the authority channels for the creation of development plans at all levels, i.e. the village, district and regional level. Additionally, the plans had to fit into the national development plan in order to get the official’s support. Within this development strategy, projects would be targeted, initiated and implemented by the communities themselves with the help from the officials in form of fundings. Though the projects were targeted, they were never fully realized according to the official’s plans. As Hydén claims, the aim of the installation of the VDCs was to create a relationship between the peasants and the government where the former would be dependent on the latter. Hence the peasants would also be vulnerable to their policies.<sup>18</sup> Hydén further refers to the peasants influence on politics during the colonial rule. According to Hydén, it was based on active resistance and participation. After independence in 1961 their power was centered on their influence on the political process itself, while the government did not force them into active participation. Therefore, it was in their own power to determine the issues and directions of the government policies, via frustrating the implementation or through patron-client relations.<sup>19</sup>

Due to a reorganization of administrative responsibilities for the rural areas and their lacks of funding the self-help development strategy formally collapsed in 1965/66. However, in Tanzanian’s reality it remained visible among the peasant’s behavior; since there were schemes initiated outside the official channels and brought to them after completion.<sup>20</sup>

"The Tanzanian state had mobilised the populace in a massive outpouring of self-help, raised expectations of what could be

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<sup>16</sup> Pratt (1976): p 230; p 221

<sup>17</sup> Jennings (2003): p 165

<sup>18</sup> Hydén (1982): p 86ff

<sup>19</sup> Hydén (1982): p 91

<sup>20</sup> Jennings (2003): p 170

expected as the fruits of independence, and yet held scarce resources with which to develop the nation."<sup>21</sup>

According to Jennings, the approach of the self-help development strategy and its realization shaped the relationship between the peasants and the government.<sup>22</sup> However, the policy of self-help changed by 1969, when the VDCs were transformed into Ward Development Committees, which had a greater executive power. Their targets were planned at the central state level. Hence, the control over development was shifted away from the people and their active participation to the central government. After these changes were established, the peasants were expected to implement the development schemes, even upon compulsion. In this context Jennings claims that by 1969 the former policy of self-help had developed into statism.<sup>23</sup>

“(...) Nyerere and his government moved sharply to establish complete domination over the development process, and in the event undetermined the concepts of popular participation that lay at the heart of the rhetoric surrounding Ujamaa.”<sup>24</sup>

With the collapse of the self-help policy a new period began, which was introduced with the articulation of the “Arusha Declaration”. This document was not only the first official constitution of the single party TANU, it also expressed a new approach of development politics in Tanzania. There were several previous events which had influenced the declaration and the following policies. It was recognized that the country was too dependent on foreign aid and hence fragile to external crisis in the aid giving countries. Furthermore, Nyerere acknowledged the need for a foreign policy of non-alignment and a recommitment to democracy and socialism.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Jennings (2003): p 175

<sup>22</sup> Jennings (2003): p 165f

<sup>23</sup> Jennings (2003): p 175ff

<sup>24</sup> Jennings (2003): p 186

<sup>25</sup> Pratt (1976): p 171

“(…) Tanzanians had come to recognize that an overreliance upon foreign aid exposes a country to donor pressures which can seriously undermine its capacity for independent action.”<sup>26</sup>

The attitudes and values of leaders on different levels that came up until 1966, forced Nyerere to the decision of clear rules, in order to avoid capitalist behavior, corruption that could possibly endanger the party and its relationship to the people, as a whole.<sup>27</sup> Overall it is clear that Tanzania’s experiences with domestic development policies and external financial assistance on its several levels (i.e. aids, technical advice, political advice etc.) within the first five years after their independence did not lead to the expected results and hence required rearticulating.

The Arusha Declaration was pronounced in 1967, introducing several changes in domestic policies, developmental strategies and a recommitment to democracy and socialism, in addition to its values and attitudes favoured by the country.

The TANU party was proclaimed as a socialist party with the basic principles built on human rights, and citizen participation on every level – the “(…) country shall be governed by a democratic socialist government of the people.”<sup>28</sup>. The TANU constitution is also the first document that expresses the principles of their socialism.

“(…) to ensure economic justice the State must have effective control over the principal means of production; and (…) it is the responsibility of the State to intervene actively in the economic life of the Nation so as to ensure well-being of all citizens and so as to prevent the exploitation [at all levels] (…), and so to prevent the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society.”<sup>29</sup>

The party is of the opinion, that the Tanzanian society is classless because of the fact that all people are workers and peasants. Those are the ones, who elect the single party to power, in order, to ensure democracy. The policy of self-reliance is

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<sup>26</sup> Pratt (1976): p 232

<sup>27</sup> Pratt (1976): p 232f

<sup>28</sup> The Arusha Declaration (1967): p 2

<sup>29</sup> The Arusha Declaration (1967): p 1

one of the major ideological pillars of the party's constitution. It is built upon the key factors of development, which are now considered to be the people, good policies, land and good leadership. In the first years of independence this was considered to be money, but after the experience with foreign aids they were recognized as a threat of independence. Another lesson that was learned after the first years of independence was the overemphasis on industry. The main idea was that development would enable industry; however it is not its cause. Since there is a lack in finance and know-how, they shall not be among the countries priorities. The consequence is a spending of budget in the rural areas (i.e. agriculture) and from loans the industries in urban areas are build up. The industrial products shall replace some of the imports; the agricultural production needs to be exported to get foreign currency which is necessary to repay the loans. Combined with the right of the government to intervene into the economy, this ideological background is a justification for the establishment of the "Ujamaa villages". Hence, the new development strategy which was introduced by the Arusha Declaration was based on changes in the production technique in rural areas. For instance, the peasants' mode of production, which is the fundamental basis of Tanzania's economy. This adjustment was expected to cause an all encompassing transformation of society.<sup>30</sup>

The regulation of economy and production by the government strongly reminds us of the economical policies implemented by the USSR. An important difference is, that the policy of the Soviet Union was a result of a revolution, thus the control over the economy had a different purpose. In Tanzania the aim was to prevent further exploitation and dependence, however in the USSR the goal was to become a powerful opposite against the capitalist states in economical and ideological terms.

Over all the Arusha Declaration was a mile stone in the political history of the Tanzanian State. On the national and international level the keyword describing the new policies and developmental strategies from now on became "Ujamaa". Among social sciences, there seems to be, from past to present, no doubt that this aforementioned policy is the key element of socialism in Tanzania. For example, Boesen points out in his writing:

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<sup>30</sup> Hydén (1982): p 33f

“(…) and ujamaa is now almost exclusively understood to mean the contemporary Tanzanian socialist ideology and policies, with a strong emphasis on state-controlled or collective production.”<sup>31</sup>

The word itself with the original meaning of “Familyhood” was expanded by Julius Nyerere and from now on has a political meaning, additionally to it. The policies designed under the umbrella of “Ujamaa”, are aimed to encourage peasants to a new form of production since agriculture was recognized to be the basis of Tanzania’s economy. The developmental strategy foresaw an increase in the agricultural output, hence higher exports. Moreover, Nyerere believed that these policies will reduce the developing inequalities within the different sectors of society.<sup>32</sup>

The proclamation of the Declaration was followed by the implementation of several Acts which aim was to realize the goals designed before<sup>33</sup>:

- Industrial (Acquisition) Act of 15.2.1967
- National Bank of Commerce Act of 14.2.1967
- State Trading Corporation Act of 14.2.1967
- National Agricultural Products Board Act of 15.2.1967
- National Insurance Corporation Act of 15.2.1967
- National Milling Corporation Act in 1968
- Tanzania Sisal Corporation Act of 27.10.1967

Trough these Acts, the government took over most of the industry and agriculture. To protect the economy from foreign investments the government nationalized all private banks, acquired complete control over the insurance sector and nationalized about half of the sisal estates. The National Milling Corporation was created to buy

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<sup>31</sup> Boesen et al. (1977): p 11

<sup>32</sup> Boesen et al. (1977): p 12

<sup>33</sup> Clark (1978): p. 45f.

the peasant's products and in times of overproduction make them available for exports.

Furthermore, the state should control the economy to ensure fairness and avoid the enrichment of property which would essentially endanger the classless society.

“The five-year period from 1968 to 1973 marked the first stage of the policy of ujamaa vijijini, when the mobilization of the peasants to establish communal economic ventures in the rural areas received top priority by the Tanzanian government and the single party, TANU. In 1973 the emphasis shifted towards compulsory mass villagization and resettlement of the country's entire rural population, while ujamaa was only supposed to develop later in the new villages.”<sup>34</sup>

As the authors state, the implementation of the “Ujamaa” policy came along with some violations on human rights. With this policy Julius Nyerere wanted to deepen the citizen's attitude of mind towards socialism. This was also the aim of the Acts (stated above) which would step by step, politicise the whole society. In 1973, there were officially 5 556 Ujamaa Villages with about 2 million inhabitants (around 15% out of the population) with a variety of conditions.<sup>35</sup> As a consequence, from the the villagers resettlements was the construction of new communities. As a result, the communal production was not realizable.

As Havnevik explains, the policies of the Arusha Declaration were supported by the people only for a short period of time and later failed to mobilize the people for further participation.<sup>36</sup>

Hence the whole concept of the Ujamaa villages and their expected success and contribution to the realization of the African Socialism ideology can be estimated as

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<sup>34</sup> Boesen et al. (1977): p. 11; vijijini means “in the village” in Kiswahili

<sup>35</sup> Boesen et al. (1977): p 15

<sup>36</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 25

a utopia. Like Boesen writes, the concept had to fail because it missed to formulate a realistic strategy.<sup>37</sup>

„One of the weaknesses of the ujamaa ideology (...) is its underestimation of the need for a through analysis of class structure and class formation as the basis for a socialist rural development strategy in post-colonial Tanzania. Any policy acts upon and is reacted upon by the developing class-relations in the country and consequently its fate is to a large extent determined by how it-consciously or unconsciously-relates to different class forces.“<sup>38</sup>

The main pillow of Ujamaa, i.e. the change of the peasant mode of production to communal farming faced in practice many problems. The poor peasants were not able to contribute on shared farms, because of their priority of self-subsistence. Hence, only those who were better-off could spread their labour, meaning working on both fields and being able to sell their products to the National Milling Company. Subsequently the opposite effect happened and the government's expectations remained unrealized. As a result, the income gap between ordinary and better-off farmers widened.<sup>39</sup> After the first five years of Ujamaa, there were no significant increases in production and productivity, hence, the government had to rethink its strategy. In order to encourage peasants to produce more, international aid cycles recommended elevating the producer's prizes. The measures taken by the government of Tanzania were including this recommendations along with improvements in infrastructure and social services, in addition to welfare after 1973. These offers had limited impact upon the peasant's mode of production.<sup>40</sup>

“It would be wrong, however, to create the impression that peasants did not try to apply *ujamaa* in their villages. It was not laziness as much as a different set of priorities and limited capacity that explain *ujamaa* shortfalls in rural areas. The peasants did not have a

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<sup>37</sup> Boesen et al. (1977): p 15f

<sup>38</sup> Boesen et. al. (1977): p 19

<sup>39</sup> Hydén (1982): p 114ff

<sup>40</sup> Hydén (1982): p 119ff

capitalist orientation and were thus unconcerned with the need for a surplus as an end in itself.”<sup>41</sup>

Despite significant success of the Ujamaa policies, the revolutionary character of this development remains unquestioned within the scientific community, for its main aim it was to transform society.<sup>42</sup>

Nyerere saw that neither the parliament nor the local governments are significant tools of policy-making, policy-review or public accountability. Thus, he changed his strategies which later on had significant impacts on Tanzania's policy. The differences of incomes between leaders and ordinary citizens were lowered, and TANU was restructured into a democratic organization, where elections for major positions at all levels were held.<sup>43</sup>

When the government acknowledged the slow process of implementation of the Ujamaa policy among its the population, it decided to use coercive powers to create the villages and increase production. In 1972, the decentralization reform was introduced to increase the party and government's power over the peasants and lower the autonomous character of the local authorities and district councils.<sup>44</sup> The power over the development process has been shifted to the central control, dismantling local governments and co-operations in the expectation that peasants would address the government's authorities, i.e. bureaucracies at the local levels. Hence, the reform also aimed to increase the interaction between the people and the decision-makers.<sup>45</sup>

„In Tanzania the major result, after nationalizations and establishment of a large number of government and parastatal institutions, was the near-elimination of the national bourgeoisie and establishment of a new working relationship between the emerging economic bureaucracy and international capitalism.“<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Hydén (1982): p 114

<sup>42</sup> See for ex. Boesen et al. (1977); Jennings (2003)

<sup>43</sup> Pratt (1976): p 257ff

<sup>44</sup> Hydén (1982): p 134ff

<sup>45</sup> Jennings (2003): p 182f; Loxley (1979): p 89f

<sup>46</sup> Boesen et al. (1977): p 161

In the years 1973 and 1974 the international oil crisis affected Tanzania's economy, leading to less production and hence, a higher need for imported food. At the same time the government started to resettle major parts of the rural population, a measure that led to mass villagization. In the leader's eyes the villagization strategy was successful, as the number of people in registered villages rose from 1,890 in 1972 to 13 million in 1977. According to Havnevik, "[a]bout 70 per cent of the rural population had been resettled in the course of about three years."<sup>47</sup> Moreover, in 1974 the government initiated two countrywide campaigns. The first campaign should stimulate more food production. The second was named "Operation Vijiji". Its aim was to encourage rapid raise of production and the improvement of the regional crop production by effective resettlements. Additionally, till 1977 all peasants should live and work in registered villages.<sup>48</sup> Along with these policies came new producer price policies in 1973, whose aim was to increase the production of food crops, as well as, the national food sufficiency. The state fixed prices annually to shift the financial surplus from the peasants to the government.<sup>49</sup> All these policies of this period meant a dropping of the previous Ujamaa concept which on its core had the voluntary participation and gave the state an authoritarian character.

In 1976, the government extended its power to food production by banning all private co-operations and replacing them with government crop authorities with the sole responsibility for purchasing, processing and sales of food crops. In contrast to all expectations, these measures led to agricultural stagnation and an increase of parastatals.<sup>50</sup> It becomes obvious, that these policies further undermined the civil society and popular participation.

In this time period, the dependence on foreign aid became palpable. Tanzania's foreign policy had to orient its internal needs towards the international interests.

As Wangwe explains

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<sup>47</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 48

<sup>48</sup> Boesen et al. (1977): p 171f.

<sup>49</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 48

<sup>50</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 48f

“[t]he willingness of donors to extend substantial amounts of aid to Tanzania can be explained from two perspectives. First, Tanzania's development policies during that time were fairly congruent with the dominant views of the social democrats in the North. Second, Tanzania was considered to be strategically important in terms of foreign policy considerations.”<sup>51</sup>

After the oil price rose in late 1970s the foreign aid coming to the country was trimmed down.<sup>52</sup>

“The rapid increase in foreign assistance to Tanzania during the 1970s (...) had the effect of compensating for the underlying tendency of economic stagnation and strengthened authoritarian statism, which became the dominant trend from around 1973. The priorities of external aid coincided with those of the Tanzanian state, i.e. the expansion of industry and state institutions as well as the maintenance of the social profile of the development model. Thus the expectations of both the bureaucratic class and the social forces, which had supported the nationalist movement, could continue to be met, at least to some extent.”<sup>53</sup>

During the same time period, Nyerere made significant changes in domestic politics. The transformation of TANU into Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM - Revolution Party) became official on 5th February 1977. The new party was a union of the TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar with a recommitment to socialism. The party was even more committed to become close to the peasantry and at the same time to combat corruption and favourism. The selection of party and political leaders became a more regulated process, enabling new elections of leaders, at all levels. These new leaders were not having a real mass base among Tanzanians. They were commonly higher educated, generally better off and highly committed to Nyerere's demands.<sup>54</sup> The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania was pronounced in the same

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<sup>51</sup> Wangwe (1997): p 1

<sup>52</sup> Okema (1996): p 30f

<sup>53</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 54

<sup>54</sup> Hydén (1982): p 137f

year. The existing civil society groups were transformed into organs of the CCM. Opposition parties and associations were banned, in practice exiled or jailed.<sup>55</sup>

“(...) [Nyerere] achieved in fact within the framework of the single-party system what would in multi-party systems be called a change of regime. His ability to orchestrate this change without any serious political disruptions bears witness of the enormous respect that Nyerere enjoys in Tanzania.”<sup>56</sup>

In 1967/68 the external financing amounted to 22% of Tanzania's development budget, until 1974/75 this sum rose to 54%. A similar scenario can be observed on the dependence of imports, it only shifted from consumer goods to capital goods, however, remained strong. Furthermore, the nationalization measures only opened the employment market to Tanzanians, however, they did not change the dependence on foreign expertise and technology. The 1974/75 fiscal crisis began with difficulties to balance budget, production and payments and ended up with the reducing of government employees by 20%.<sup>57</sup>

The economic crisis in 1978/79, was influenced by external events, however in Tanzania it had also social and political dimensions. Previously the wages in all sectors were eroded and the state authoritarianism increased. By weakening the peasantry, the state subsequently faced growth of unaccounted expenditures in government and parastatals. According to Havnevik “[t]hese trends gave rise to an increasing loss of political legitimacy on the part of the state and the party.”<sup>58</sup>

The debt crisis caused negative growth rates in the industrial and agricultural sector and at the same time was marked by lower exports and higher imports. Social services, such as, education, provision of health and water supplies also suffered under the given circumstances. Another sign of the crisis was a growing rate of unemployment, especially among the youth. All together, these benchmarks of crisis were threatening Tanzania's political stability. The state's response to these

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<sup>55</sup> Kelsall (2002): p 608

<sup>56</sup> Hydén (1982): p 138

<sup>57</sup> Loxley (1979): p 81f

<sup>58</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 54

developments resulted in two Acts, namely, the Economic Sabotage Act (No. 9 of 1983) and the Human Deployment Act (No. 6 of 1983). Giving the authorities expanded powers to meet the political threats and at the same time violating the rights of the affected parts of population. Hence, the population's respect for the legal system lowered after the implementation of these Acts. The state used those even against its own bureaucratic class. Overall, it can be argued that the aforementioned Acts decreased political legitimacy.<sup>59</sup>

The international aid crisis in the years 1978/79, made the IFIs and donors put focus on the repayment of the loans given to the Third World Countries. Further to this, they steps were made to evaluate and coordinate the aid within the institutions, and therefore ensure security for their loans. These steps resulted in the introduction of the "Structural Adjustment Programmes" (SAPs), in the 1980s.<sup>60</sup>

In the 1980s, the government of Tanzania finally made an agreement with the IMF, which introduced the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) – or in Tanzania's case, the "Economic Recovery Programme" (ERP). The trade liberalisation was part of this programme. According to Okema, these changes have led to a new set of inequalities amongst society.<sup>61</sup>

"At the same time this was evidence of the extent to which Tanzania's sovereignty had been eroded by the need for aid. Subsequently IMF instructions such as retrenchment, privatization, abolition of free medical services have all been carried out in spite of the mass sufferings they entailed. Thanks to donor power opposition parties and figures can say and do more than otherwise would have been the case. The point here is that since colonial times Tanzania has always been in a state of dependency. The extent of this dependency has varied with time. It seems to have been deeper than ever in the 1980s and 1990s."<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 56ff

<sup>60</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 22f

<sup>61</sup> Okema (1996): p 150

<sup>62</sup> Okema (1996): p 33

In the Arusha Declaration from 1967, Nyerere stated that for its future development, Tanzania needs to focus on four main aspects, namely, the people, good policies, land and good leadership. At this time, good leadership can be seen synonymously to good governance.<sup>63</sup> According to the Arusha Declaration, the responsibility for good leadership/governance remains in the hands of the government. In Tanzania's case, it was first in the hands of Nyerere (1961 - 1985) and then President Mwinyi (1985 - 1995). Predating, before it became a target for aid policies from the IFI's and donors.

The democratisation procedure, that occurred predominantly in villages was a top-down process. This strategy was supposed to lead to more involvement among the people in the rural areas into the decision-making process which affected their lives.<sup>64</sup> The decentralisation in the 1970s was a disaster.<sup>65</sup> The central planned economic strategy failed miserably and led to an economic crisis in late 1970s and early 1980s.<sup>66</sup> The nationalization of the economy, furthermore, led to increased corruption at the levels among the elites.<sup>67</sup> The next strategy was the initiation of Local Governments in the years 1982- 1994, as a result of failing to involve the local people in the decentralization strategy. Local authorities were installed after 1982 in accordance to the 1977 Constitution. The local authorities were supposed to be free and independent from the central governance, however, were in practice controlled and determined in their work by the government officials. Moreover, they were required to obtain an approval for their decisions, by the central government.<sup>68</sup> Thus, a change towards opening the markets and liberalisation of politics led to a need of a multi-party system and a new understanding of "good governance".

The IMF was offering aids bound to certain conditionalities, however, did not respond to the national programmes. In 1985, President Mwinyi came to power; up until 1990 the government started working towards economic liberalisation. "In 1986, [Mwinyi] signed an agreement with the IMF, liberalised trade and financial

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<sup>63</sup> Mkisi (2001): p 42

<sup>64</sup> Mukandala (1997): p 10

<sup>65</sup> Shivji (2006): p 48

<sup>66</sup> Mkisi (2001): p 43

<sup>67</sup> Transparency International Country Study 2003: p 12

<sup>68</sup> Mukandala (1997): p 14

regimes, which in effect meant liberalised imports.”<sup>69</sup> As a consequence, corruption increased. Through the SAPs stringent conditionalities on economics, the fragile economies were destroyed, mainly by imported industrialisation and cheap goods. The agriculture stagnated and the industrial sector could not develop itself. After the end of the Cold War, the IFIs added another condition, namely, the political ideology of "democracy", now noticed by multi-party democracy, human rights, “good governance” and in conclusion poverty reduction.<sup>70</sup>

“Among the most important realities of the 1980s and 1990s is the growing power of aid donors. In combination with international institutions like the World Bank and IMF the donors have been able to dictate terms using the threat of withdrawal of aid as a most portent weapon. Many African countries instituted multipartism as a result. (...) Tanzania policy towards donors changed from the adamancy of the Nyerere era to that of avoiding conflict. No effort was spared to keep donors pleased. In return donors never criticized the Tanzanian Government publicity.”<sup>71</sup>

Until the 1990s the government provided good governance only in terms of gender equality and decentralisation.

“(...) there are some bench marks for good governance which were not fulfilled to a reasonable extent. For instance, corruption reached the hiper extent, there were lack of accountability, transparency and integrity in the management of public affairs, there was lack of the rule of law, poor protection of human rights and freedom; inefficiency in delivery of services to the citizens, lack of participation of citizens in political, social and decision making. And above all there was no informed and skilled society that could hold its governors accountable because there was no freedom of press.”<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Shivji (2006): p 8

<sup>70</sup> Shivji (2004): p 2

<sup>71</sup> Okema (1996): p 7f

<sup>72</sup> Mkisi (2001): p 43f

In 1990 Nyerere stated openly that multi-partism can be up for discussion. In the same year President Mwinyi installed the Nyalali Commission to analyze the citizens' views on a shift towards multi-partism. According to their report, 80 per cent of the citizens would have preferred the one-party state. During 1990-1995, several reforms introduced the multi-party system, which was followed by a rapid growth of independent and private press-media.

“This is also the period which witnessed the beginning of the donor sponsored workshop or seminar ‘industry’, as well as the mushrooming of NGOs and human rights groups. The intellectual elite embraced liberal ideology uncritically as it joined the IFIs in demonising the state and debunking nationalism and socialism.”<sup>73</sup>

The 1990s marked a period of social, political and economic reforms towards liberalization.

“(…) the call for good governance in the 1990s can be seen as a coincidental relationship between the external influence of World Bank and IMF (…) and the internal crisis and problems of governance existing in African countries, Tanzania in particular.”<sup>74</sup>

President Mkapa laid his focus on the establishment of institutions promoting “good governance” and democratisation. Additionally, to economic stability, his main efforts were to promote good governance and henceforth meeting the IFI's and donor's demands. One of these demands focused on combating the country's corruption problem. In 1995, he created a ministry under the President's office, with its main responsibility being “good governance”. Furthermore, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau was established. One year later, the Wairoba Commission was installed to survey a report, including recommendations on the state of corruption, in Tanzania. In their report, the Wairoba Commission documented, that the corruption has reached pandemic levels in nearly all sectors, public and private institutions. The

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<sup>73</sup> Shivji (2006): p 9

<sup>74</sup> Mkisi (2001): p 45

general poverty in the country contributed to increased corruption. On the other hand, corruption emphasised the poverty and worsened the pre-conditions to build good governance. Moreover, some citizens have lost all hope in the government and the deliverance of services without bribery, hence, corruption became part of an enhanced culture.<sup>75</sup>

The policy paper “Vision 2025” was published in 2000, describing long-term national development targets. In the same year, President Mkapa introduced the National Framework on “Good Governance”, to undermine the principles and activities of the government. The bureau should prepare a clear definition of "Good Governance" and its dimensions. Additionally to this, it should provide comprehensive reviews on the activities and progresses made by the government and recommend a framework of initiatives.<sup>76</sup>

With great support of the IFIs, the economy was stabilised and the macro economy grew, even when corruption still remained a major problem.

“[President Mkapa] (...) saw the economy through the eyes of the IMF or World Bank: society as an object of engineering and leadership as a process of admonishing, rather than persuading, the people.”<sup>77</sup>

Among scientists, the policies implemented under President Mkapa earned a lot of criticism. For most authors, the Tanzanian state introduced a new dependency on itself, letting the external voices dictate the internal conditions.<sup>78</sup>

The Tanzanian state is supposed to be characterized by the ideology of the CCM – meaning it belongs to the workers and peasants, however, it is in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie and works on behalf of imperialism. Thus, according to Okema, there is need for a new definition of the Tanzanian state, which is in fact belongs to the donors more than to the citizens.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Transparency International Country Study 2003: p 13

<sup>76</sup> Mkisi (2001): p 46f.

<sup>77</sup> Shivji (2006): p 11

<sup>78</sup> for ex.:Okema (1996); Shivji (2006)

<sup>79</sup> Okema (1996): p 9f

“Since capital found in Tanzania is mainly foreign capital the “state” is correspondingly alien. It is an extension of metropolitan states who have the final say. Sighted as proof is the fact that the international finance institutions, donor countries and agencies and private foreign investors dictate terms.”<sup>80</sup>

Other observers like Mukandala claim, that Tanzania is in serious need of a new political culture. This way Tanzania would be able to reach sustainable human development, therefore he argues:

“Human development entails developing human beings in a holistic manner and also one that can be sustained from year to year and from generation to generation.”<sup>81</sup>

Later he explains:

“Development of a participatory political and social culture should have as its major elements: democratic participation, tolerance of diversity and even dissent citizen competence and confidence.”<sup>82</sup>

Another interesting view comes from Shivji, who is questioning the concept of democracy in itself:

“(…) if democracy is about the use and abuse of political (state power), it cannot be divorced from the ultimate source of power, i.e., property. Democracy at the level of the state is intertwined with democracy at the level of civil society. Divorce one from the other and you may get the shell but not the substance of democracy. Indeed your shell may cover a substance which may not be democratic at all.”<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Okema (1996): p 9

<sup>81</sup> Mukandala (1997): p 15

<sup>82</sup> Mukandala (1997): p 16

<sup>83</sup> Shivji (2006): p 45

## ***The Concept of Good Governance***

Since the 1990s until today the term “Good Governance” appeared every so often in the context of developing countries and aid, mostly used by the IFIs and donors. The term became a synonym for international development policies. However, there is no clear and singular definition for this expression.

In the 1980s the conditionalities laid on Third World countries by the IFIs and donors were externally oriented and concerned economical issues. This changed after the end of the Cold War which meant the ideological victory of democracy over socialism and free market economy over central planned economy. After this turning point in the world’s history the concept of “Good Governance” was developed and became the most important conditionality for an aid relationship. In the first years its meaning was almost equal with a call for multi-partism. After the first experiences, the conditionality was expanded with further dimensions.

With the extension of the conditionalities to concrete policy matters, donors risked to get involved in the internal politics of the aid-recipient countries. This is a responsibility they would not be willing to bear.<sup>84</sup> The IFIs and donors came to believe that the western model democracy, now propagated through the new catchword “Good Governance” is the only way to reach economic growth resulting in poverty eradication.

The discourse around the term and concept of “Good Governance” is driven along two fronts, namely the scientific community and the IFIs/donors. Even when there is interaction between the two discourses, the purposes of them are different. As Doornbos points out, the scientific discourse is oriented towards a better understanding of state-society relations in their institutional linkages including the concerns of different contexts. The donor discourse on the other hand concerns the enhancing of policy effectiveness and a conceptual preparation for policy intervention.

For Doornbos the guiding motive behind the donor’s discussions is

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<sup>84</sup> Doornbos (2004): p 382

“(…) the establishment of new global-institutional patterns of hegemony, through a ‘disciplining’, in a Foucauldian sense, including the governance of ‘self’, of state and policy structures in individual countries to conform to the norms set by global institutions.”<sup>85</sup>

Many authors claim that the current discourse about “Good Governance” doesn't consider the relationships of power, it is more a moral paradigm between good-bad-evil and hence it's theoretical value is weak. Thus it

“(…) has become a flexible tool in the hands of global hegemonies, to undermine the sovereignty of African nations and the struggle for democracy of the African people. The people are no longer the agents of change but, rather the victims of "bad governance", to be delivered or redeemed by the erstwhile donor-community.”<sup>86</sup>

The Good Governance agenda is intervention oriented; its aim is to influence the countries internal conditions as a preference of the relationship between states and international institutions.<sup>87</sup> Where the external influences are rising (i.e. international markets, globalization etc.) the nation state becomes less powerful and hence is providing more of governance than governing the country. Furthermore since the governance agenda became the leading path for growth the governments are facing a new power constellation where they are sharing the provision of public services with lots of new actors (i.e. civil organizations etc.).<sup>88</sup>

Among the scientific community, there is a lot of criticism about the absence of a definition. Many authors point out, that there is not even a common sense about the meaning of the term “Governance” itself. Along with this problem, comes the use of the term, which appears to be more of a normative than analytical.<sup>89</sup> According to Pettai and Illing there is a need to redefine the term “Governance” in the first place.

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<sup>85</sup> Doornbos (2004): p 376

<sup>86</sup> Shivji (2004): p 3

<sup>87</sup> Doornbos (2004): p 377ff

<sup>88</sup> Knill (2004): p 353ff

<sup>89</sup> Knill (2004): p 353

“It is perhaps one of the key questions in governance research to what extent the state has been a representative of public interests and an authoritative decision-maker for problems in the society. At the same time, the increasing role or importance of private and non-profit actors in ‘governance’ itself presupposes a change in the role of the state in deciding the matters of society and fulfilling the public interest. It demands special attention to how these new directions influence the roles and tasks of public, private and nonprofit actors in formulating and implementing public policies and public services, and whether the changes brought by ‘governance’ include in addition to their positive characteristics also pitfalls or even threats.”<sup>90</sup>

According to Kabudi, “Good Governance” also limits the state power by separating the three main organs – Legislature, Judiciary and the Executive; they must be ruled by separate organs of the state.<sup>91</sup>

“The principle of ‘good governance’ has been advocated in particular by international organizations, such as the World Bank. The guiding motive behind this development was the establishment of state-society relations and market mechanisms in developing countries that conform to the standards of Western liberal-capitalist systems. By invoking the principle of conditionality, these countries should be induced to adopt governance patterns that were globally seen as the most effective and efficient.”<sup>92</sup>

The several interpretations of “Good Governance” have a number of common key factors, namely: democracy, accountability, transparency, rule of law, human rights, civil society and political participation. These key factors are considered as necessities for ensuring democracy after the model of Western European countries.

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<sup>90</sup> Pettai/Illing (2004): p. 348

<sup>91</sup> Kabudi: p.2

<sup>92</sup> Knill (2004): p 355

The concept is normative and focuses on the organizational and institutional structures in the state. According to the IFIs, "Good Governance" is supposed to be the only path to sustainable development in terms of economic growth and political stability.<sup>93</sup>

In Tanzania, there are several institutions with the goal to strengthen "Good Governance" which were established under Pres. Mkapa. All of them are monitored and advised not only by national institutions, but also by the international actors, single donor states or organizations.

Among the critical viewers on these mechanisms is Shivji, who wrote: "(...) we are not even sure if "good governance" means the same thing as democratic governance of, for and by the people of Tanzania!"<sup>94</sup> In this context, he speaks about the need of a struggle for a "second independence" - i.e. the people's sovereignty.<sup>95</sup>

In his conclusion, Shivji claims that the struggle for an overall independence remains incomplete.

"Democratic reforms (...) [are] the prerogative of the people. It is the exercise of their sovereignty and their right to self-determination. (...) This was, and is, precisely the essence of anti-imperialist struggles. It follows, therefore, that economic and political conditionalities, including those on good governance, are an expression of the reassertion of imperial domination, however it may be labelled."<sup>96</sup>

Another explanation for the influence of donors and IFIs on domestic policies of Third World Countries can be offered by the phenomenon of Globalization. This term is used by researchers in the First as well as in the Third World; with the difference that most of the researches in the Third World just take over the definition over as a fact without any meaningful criticism. As Shivji claims, the research of the phenomenon of globalization in developing countries is supposed to be done by researchers coming from that context, rather than taken over.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup>IMF (1997): p v

<sup>94</sup> Shivji (2004): p 4

<sup>95</sup> Shivji (2004): p 6

<sup>96</sup> Shivji (2004): p 5

<sup>97</sup> Shivji 1998 & 2002

“Globalisation gives the triad of highly undemocratic world financial institutions, the WB/IMF/WTO unprecedented powers, reminiscent of the conquering and plundering states of the early centuries.”<sup>98</sup>

The same can be considered about the term “civil society” which was developed in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the struggle of Eastern European countries for independence on one hand and the US on the other. Applied on Africa, it is necessary to speak about a state-civil society. The term does not respond to the traditional societies. Thus, “civil society” and “globalisation” are both realities put on Africa from above.<sup>99</sup> Those terms have become very popular in recent years and get very well along with the conditionality and context of “Good Governance”.

“The underlying assumption - albeit largely un-stated - was that African societies had no effective 'civil society' outside trade unions, cooperatives and other such organisations. The governance agenda, like the colonial definition of 'civilisation' half a century earlier, was in essence an attempt to transport Western traditions in Africa. Few efforts were made to base the new organisational capacity of African communities on more traditional forms of organisation and community effort.”<sup>100</sup>

The IMF and WB started the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 1999 with the purpose to link debt relief and poverty reduction. The initiative asked the aid receiving countries to formulate Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to receive debt relief. In the initiative paper which was formulated by staff of the WB and IFM “Good Governance” is recognized as a requirement for sustained economic growth, mainly to avoid corruption in economics.<sup>101</sup> Although it points out the importance of establishing good governance, it provides no clear definition

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<sup>98</sup> Shivji (1998): p 6

<sup>99</sup> Shivji (1998)

<sup>100</sup> Jennings (2004): p 184

<sup>101</sup> WB/IMF (1999): p. 3

whatsoever and does not formulate the key factors or even strategies for this politics. This can be seen also in the following point, stated as a key element of an enhanced framework for poverty reduction:

“Broad-based participation is essential to sustained implementation of an anti-poverty strategy. In addition to the policy transparency that can result from participation, other dimensions of good governance are key.”<sup>102</sup>

Tanzania’s first PRSP addresses the monitoring systems for components of good governance. It further states that by an UNDP study the country’s governance was recognized as weak and poor marked by a lack in transparency and accountability. A way to improve the governance named in this document is “(...) donor coordination, improved integration of external assistance into the exchequer system, and simplification of aid disbursement procedures.”<sup>103</sup>

In 1992 the United Nations Committee for Development Planning formulated the following attributes for Good Governance:

1. ”Territorial and ethno-cultural representation, mechanisms for conflict resolution and for peaceful regime change and institutional renewal;
2. Checks on executive power, effective and informed legislatures, clear lines of accountability from political leaders down through the bureaucracy;
3. An open political system of law which encourages an active and vigilant civil society whose interests are represented within accountable government structures and which ensures that public offices are based on law and consent;
4. An impartial system of law, criminal justice and public order which upholds fundamental civil and political rights, protects personal security and provides a context of consistent, transparent

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<sup>102</sup> WB/IMF (1999): p 21

<sup>103</sup> URT(2000): Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: p 50

- rules for transactions that are necessary to modern economic and social development;
5. A professionally competent, capable and honest public service which operates within an accountable, rule governed framework and in which the principles of merit and the public interest are paramount;
  6. The capacity to undertake sound fiscal planning, expenditure and economic management and system of financial accountability and evaluation of public-sector activities;
  7. Attention not only to central government institutions and processes but also to the attributes and capacities of sub-national and local government authorities and to the issues of political devolution and administrative decentralisation.”<sup>104</sup>

Those attributes should be the guidelines for the work of the UN in developing countries. In Tanzania this can be seen in several projects run by the UN. The monitoring of the long term effects of those is not concerned as much as the reporting of current improvements.

The World Bank and IMF have several statements concerning the criteria of “Good Governance”. They also developed several instruments to measure the development within the key sectors which are important for the implementing of this policy. In the following part some of those criteria shall be presented. Later on, the development of the key sectors in Tanzania according to the measurements of the World Bank will be displayed.

"We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and

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<sup>104</sup> Kabudi, p.1

(iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them."<sup>105</sup>

The World Bank's six dimensions of Governance for Tanzania are<sup>106</sup>:

1. Voice and accountability
2. Political stability and lack of violence/terrorism
3. Government effectiveness
4. Regulatory quality
5. Rule of law
6. Control of corruption

The following figures show the development of these indicators within the years 1996-2007 presented by the World Bank.<sup>107</sup> Below the figures are the World Bank's definitions of those dimensions.

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<sup>105</sup> WB:


<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20678937~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html> 18.9.2009

<sup>106</sup> WB Country Data Report for Tanzania (2008): p 1

<sup>107</sup> [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc\\_chart.asp#](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp#) download 7.11.2008

Table 1: Voice and Accountability

TANZANIA (Percentile Rank (0-100))



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2007

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official purpose.

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“*Voice and accountability* measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.”<sup>109</sup>

<sup>108</sup> “These charts show the percentile rank of the country on each governance indicator. Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country. Higher values indicate better governance ratings. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to account for changes over time in the set of countries covered by the governance indicators. The dashed lines indicate the statistically-likely range of the governance indicator. For instance, a percentile rank of 75% with the dashed lines at 60% to 85% has the following interpretation: an estimated 75% of the countries rate worse and an estimated 25% of the countries rate better than the country of choice. However, at the 90% confidence level, only 60% of the countries rate worse, while only 15% of the countries rate better.”


Source: [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc\\_chart.asp#](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp#) Accessed 7.11.2008

<sup>109</sup> <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/va.pdf> Accessed 7.11.2008

According to this figure the possibilities of political participation were significantly lower in the election year of 1995 than in 2000 and 2005. The election results of these years are presented in the next chapter. Political participation also includes the organization and function of the civil society.

According to the Transparency International Country Study of 2003 Tanzania's civil society remains underdeveloped in terms of human and material resources. Most NGOs criticize the government for the NGO Bill which threatens their function as watchdogs and independent analysis makers. It also undermines the space for public transparency and participation which are crucial for good governance.<sup>110</sup>

**Table 2: Political Stability**




Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2007

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official purpose.

<sup>110</sup> TI Country Study 2003: p 28

“**Political stability and absence of violence** measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”<sup>111</sup>

**Table 3: Government Effectiveness**



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996–2007

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official purpose.


“**Government effectiveness** measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.”<sup>112</sup>

<sup>111</sup> <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/pv.pdf> Accessed 7.11.2008

<sup>112</sup> <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf> Accessed 7.11.2008

Table 4: Regulatory Quality

TANZANIA (Percentile Rank (0–100))




Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996–2007

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official purpose.

“**Regulatory quality** measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.”<sup>113</sup>

<sup>113</sup> <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf> Accessed 7.11.2008

Table 5: Rule of Law



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2007


Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official purpose.

“**Rule of law** measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”<sup>114</sup>

<sup>114</sup> <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf> Accessed 7.11.2008

**Table 6: Control of Corruption**

**TANZANIA (Percentile Rank (0–100))**



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996–2007

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official purpose.

“**Control of corruption** measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.”<sup>115</sup>

The country’s efforts in improving the control over corruption have also been positively marked in the studies of Transparency International. Institutional changes and the awareness rising among the citizens have also contributed to enhance accountability and transparency. The country report of 2003 that the ranking improved from 1,9 points in 1998 to 2,7 in 2002.<sup>116</sup> The Corruption Perception Index measures from 0- highly corrupt to 10- highly clean points. In the last report form 2008 Tanzania scored 3,0 points.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>115</sup> <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf> Accessed 7.11.2008

<sup>116</sup> Transparency International Country Study 2003: p 14

<sup>117</sup> Transparency International Global Report 2008

## Chapter III:

### ***Statistical Facts on Tanzania***

In this chapter, I will present data that I consider helpful in understanding Tanzania's current economic and social situation. I will introduce key statistics concerning poverty elevation, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and, furthermore, I will include the results of the elections which took place after the implementation of a multi-party system in 1992.

The data below are taken from the World Development Indicators database<sup>118</sup>; the selection of certain statistics is done by the author.

- Population, total (2008): 42,48 million
- Population growth, annual (2008): 2,9%
- Life expectancy at birth, total (2008): 56 years
- Fertility rate, total (2007): 5,6 births per woman
- Mortality rate, under 5-years (2007): 116 (per 1000)
- Births attended by skilled health staff (2005): 43% of total
- GDP (2008): US\$ 20,49 billions
- GDP growth, annual (2008): 7,5%
- Inflation, GDP deflator, annual (2008): 8,9%
- GNI per capita, PPP (2008): US\$ 1,230
- Official development assistance and official aid (2007): US\$ 2,811 million
- Agriculture per cent of GDP (2005): 46
- Industry per cent of GDP (2005): 17
- Services etc. per cent of GDP (2005): 37

Additionally, important indicators applied by international politics, is for instance the Human Development Index (HDI). Developed by the agencies of the United Nations they serve two functions. Firstly, they show the country's economic and social performance, and secondly they open up the opportunity to compare

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<sup>118</sup> [http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT\\_ID=9147&REQUEST\\_TYP E=VIEWADVANCED](http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYP E=VIEWADVANCED) Accessed 11.8.2009

different countries in respect to one another. This comparison is made on the economical level (in terms of numbers) but also in terms of quality of life.

The HDI, which was developed in 1990 by the UNDP goes beyond the GDP as a significant factor of wealth and includes life expectancy, adult literacy and enrolment at all school levels and the purchasing power parity (PPP) in a country.<sup>119</sup> The index goes from 0 to 1; the higher points a country reaches the more prosperous it is. Tanzania's HDI is 0,503 which is rank 152<sup>nd</sup> out of 179 countries.<sup>120</sup>

Moreover, the UNDP developed the Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI-1) which measures the identical levels as the HDI, however, the focus is set on the proportion of people below a threshold level. Hence, the HPI-1 looks beyond income deprivation and focuses on multiple dimensions of poverty. In distinction to the HDI the HPI-1 measures the proportion of people who are not expected to survive the age of 40 years, the adult literacy rate, the proportion of people without access to an improved water source and the proportion of underweight children under the age of 5 years. The data is presented in per cent, lower number means more development. This index represents an alternative to the poverty measure of \$1 per day.

In the HPI-1 Tanzania reaches a significant high percentage of 32,9% and ranks henceforth 98<sup>th</sup> among 135 countries, for which the index has been calculated.<sup>121</sup>


The following map, originally illustrated in Tanzania's Poverty and Human Development Report of 2002 provides a first good impression of the inter-regional disparity in terms of poverty. It is very similar to the nature of maps which display disparities in regards to distribution of electricity, access to clean water etc. The variations basically persist and the distribution continuous to be comparable to this day.

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<sup>119</sup> Human Development Report 2008, Country Fact Sheet – Tanzania

<sup>120</sup> For comparison: Austria: 0,951 HDI - rank 14; Russia: 0,806 HDI - rank 73; China: 0,762 HDI – rank 94; India: 0,609 HDI – rank 132. Source: Human Development Indicators

<sup>121</sup> Human Development Report 2008, Country Fact Sheet – Tanzania



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In 1995 the UNDP introduced an alternative Index that focuses in capturing inequalities between genders, employing the same indicators like the HDI. The gender disparity in a country is displayed in contrast between the HDI and the Gender-related Development Index (GDI). Tanzania reaches a GDI value of 0,500 which is almost equal to the country's HDI value of 0,503. In comparison ranks at 98<sup>th</sup> out of 157 countries measured with this index.<sup>123</sup>

The final UNDP's measure that I would like to introduce is the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) which exposes inequalities in opportunities in selected areas of economics and political participation. Tanzania's GEM value is 0,600. This means it ranks 48<sup>th</sup> out of 108 measured countries.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Human Poverty and Development Report 2002, Tanzania : p 60

<sup>123</sup> Human Development Report 2008, Country Fact Sheet – Tanzania

<sup>124</sup> Human Development Report 2008, Country Fact Sheet – Tanzania

Overall, the different measures and indexes indicate that Tanzania's performance relating gender issues is quite well. However, when it comes to the country's most targeted problems (economic growth, poverty elevation, health care etc.) its performance can be considered rather poor.

The table below presents a number of poverty types among the population with a special focus on women's interests. I especially appreciated the comparison of the years 1991/1992 and 2000/2001, as well as the distinction between the areas of observation. The table displays the development of poverty over a decade in different environments.

**Table 7 : Poverty Trend in Tanzania: 1991/92 – 2000/01<sup>125</sup>**

<b>Attribute</b>	<b>Dar 91/92</b>	<b>Dar 00/01</b>	<b>Other Urban 91/92</b>	<b>Other Urban 00/01</b>	<b>Rural 91/91</b>	<b>Rural 00/01</b>	<b>Mainland 91/92</b>	<b>Mainland 00/01</b>
<b>Food Poverty (%)</b>	13.6	7.5	15.0	13.2	23.1	20.4	21.6	18.7
<b>Basic needs poverty (%)</b>	28.1	17.6	28.7	25.8	40.8	38.7	38.6	35.7
<b>Female Households Heads (%)</b>	14.1	20.9	23.9	27.9	16.7	22.1	17.6	22.9
<b>(%) Females with no education</b>	11.7.	10.6	18.7	17.7	36.0	37.1	32.3	32.5
<b>(%) Widowed</b>	10.9	16.9	19.1	26.1	37.9	37.9	32.8	34.4

“What the comparison of growth and poverty trends reveals is that much of the growth between 1991/92 and 2000/01 did not translate into poverty reduction. In other words, the growth process was not pro-poor.”<sup>126</sup>

Not only was the growth process during this aforementioned decade not pro-poor, in some of the areas the conditions even worsened. Taking a deeper look at the table it becomes clear that the only significant improvements can be witnessed in the city of Dar es Salaam. In rural areas the percentages are almost stagnating in the respected period. Especially the high percentage of the basic needs poverty as well as females without education is a significant sign of insufficient development. Considering the

<sup>125</sup> UNDP: Country Information on Tanzania: p 4

<sup>126</sup> UNDP: Country Information on Tanzania: p 4

fact that most Tanzanian's live in rural areas and work in agriculture, these numbers show that the implemented policies and programmes were not successful.

As aforementioned, I will now present the election results from the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. The aim is to showcase that the former single party CCM is still and by far the country's leading political voice. The implementation of the multi-party system which was, as mentioned before, not desired by the population did not lead to a diversified political landscape.

Between the years 1965 and 1992 Tanzania was proclaimed a single-party republic with elections held in 5-year cycles. Clearly without opposition the TANU and after 1977 the CCM party always won the elections for the national assembly and Julius Nyerere was re-elected as president until 1985 when he resigned. In the 1985 presidential elections the only candidate was Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who was re-elected in 1990. The attendance of registered voters at the elections in the one-party system always reached more than 70%, and during the elections in the years 1975 and 1980 gained more than 80 per cent.

The implementation of the multi-party system was a step in meeting the interests of the IFIs and donors. However, it could have also been a significant threat to the political stability of Tanzania. The following election results proved, that the CCM party and its leaders did not have to fear to lose its power to the new formed opposition parties.

In 1995 76.7% of the registered voters attended the Presidential election. Of those 61,82% voted for Benjamin Mkapa, the CCM candidate and 59,22% voted for CCM in the National Assembly elections. In 2000 the attendance of voters rose to 84,4% and Mkapa was re-elected receiving 71,74% of all votes. CCM's popularity rose and the party reached 202 out of 231 elected seats in the National Assembly. In the year 2005, 72,4% of the registered voters participated at the elections. CCM's new candidate Jakaya Kikwete was elected for president receiving 80,28% of the votes. In the same elections CCM received 206 out of 232 seats (70%).<sup>127</sup> Observing these election results it becomes apparent, that the tradition of CCM and its strength among the voters is still sustainable.

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<sup>127</sup> All election results quoted from the African Elections database:  
<http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html> Accessed 14.8.2009

Ever since of the first appearance of multi-party elections, voices are getting louder concerning electoral frauds. These debates, however, appear to be more like arguments between the government and opposition than real threats that could possibly effect Tanzania's political stability in the long run.<sup>128</sup>

### ***The development Programs***

To complement the previous chapters and to further provide the reader with a broader understanding of the several contents of current international development politics the following pages will introduce the most important development programs in and for Tanzania. As I have previously mentioned, the most important international development agencies are the IFIs and the UN. Hence, the chief development programs are originating from these agencies. The differences between these programs are based on the actors who formulate them. On the one hand there are agendas set up by international institutions and on the other hand there are various developed by the government itself. In the following section I will illustrate that the targets of the several programs do not differentiate at all. They are firmly interrelated not only in their objectives but also in the interests behind them.

First of all, I would like to introduce the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which I consider one of the chief guidelines for development politics today. The power of the MDGs results on its underlying Declaration, which was signed by all members of the UN, on the other hand the approach which the articulation provides is very open and inclusive and hence, applicable in many contexts.

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<sup>128</sup>For more information on this topic see the FreedomHouse 2009 Country Report on Tanzania: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7716&year=2009> Accessed 4.1.2010

## The Millennium Development Goals

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the result of the Millennium Declaration of 2000. It was signed by all the members of the United Nations. The main points and targets of the Declaration are formulated as followed:

“The Declaration sets out within a single framework the key challenges facing humanity at the threshold of the new millennium, outlines a response to these challenges, and establishes concrete measures for judging performance through a set of inter-related commitments, goals and targets on development, governance, peace, security and human rights.”<sup>129</sup>

In addition to that, all the members agreed that achieving of the MDGs shall be reached by actions, which should take the given particular conditions into account and not be placed upon unanalyzed circumstances.

“The actions foreseen at global and national levels will be connected with one another for coherence and effectiveness but will be designed and implemented *primarily* according to the particular needs, opportunities and constraints prevailing at each level – in other words, a context specific approach rather than a standard or uniform model will be followed. The objective will be to ensure that the MDGs become an integral part of the priorities and actions of a broad range of actors globally, regionally and in individual countries.”<sup>130</sup>

Hence, the MDGs are articulated in a broad language and are able to be applied in different contexts and communities. With this approach, the MDGs also aim at encouraging the affected people to take over responsibility and action to resolve their problems.

The UN’s contribution to reach the goals is defined as followed:

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<sup>129</sup> UNDP: The UN and the MDGs: p 1

<sup>130</sup> UNDP: The UN and the MDGs: p 2

“Goal-driven assistance to address directly key constraints to progress on the MDGs, guided by the mandates, comparative advantage and resources of the UN system at the country level and recognising that the achievement of the MDGs is ultimately the responsibility of member states.”<sup>131</sup>

Further it is pointed out, that the local civil society organizations (CSOs) play a major role in holding the leaders into account and giving the actions a “bottom-up” push. According to the UN these organizations are a pre-condition for the success for the strategy.<sup>132</sup>

Resolving from that, the achievements of the MDGs are the responsibility of each participating government, its civil society, with and through the guidance and assistance of the UN agencies and its partners.

Another important part for the success of the MDGs are the reports that are one of the most important instruments in promoting the projects and in keeping the public informed. That is why they ought to be written in a straightforward language, understandable for the communities and promoting awareness about the programs in and outside of the targeted countries.

“(…) used properly, the MDG reports will help focus attention and stimulate action in the developed world on aid, trade, debt relief, new technology and investment flows.”<sup>133</sup>

Aside of the reports that will inform about the overall progress, the studies form single countries will report about the achievements and relation to other programs that are being implemented at the same time. Special attention needs to be drawn on the interrelationship of the MDGs and the PRSPs.

“These country level studies will be essential to develop specific, credible and monitorable proposals for achieving the MDGs which can be addressed through the policy dialogue and country-driven

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<sup>131</sup> UNDP: The UN and the MDGs: p 2

<sup>132</sup> UNDP: The UN and the MDGs: p 3

<sup>133</sup> UNDP: The UN and the MDGs: p 6

strategy-setting process envisaged through the PRSPs (or other similar national plans and strategies).”<sup>134</sup>

The national campaigns shall be formulated by local actors with the UN as a supporting partner. The UN system should be “(...) supporting rather than supplanting national leadership and ownership of action (...)”<sup>135</sup>. Therefore the articulation of the priorities relies on the participating countries themselves, similar to the PRSPs. The responsibility relies on the governments and it legitimates the role of the IFIs and the UN. Furthermore, it also justifies the interest of all participating partners, which are inherited in each program. As the UN point out, the combination of these tools are efficient.

“(...) the growing significance of the PRSP in many countries, as a tool for setting national priorities and strategies for poverty reduction, makes it an ideal instrument for integrating the MDGs fully within priorities, policies and resource allocation. As a consequence, the UN system will have to continue its active participation in the PRSP process, with the agreement of Governments and in collaboration with the World Bank and IMF.”<sup>136</sup>

The following chart shows the goals and indicators for Tanzania, and their alterations between the years 1990 and 2005. The targets for 2015, according to the MDG plan are also displayed, as well as additional remarks.

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<sup>134</sup> UNDP: The UN and the MDGs: p 6

<sup>135</sup> UNDP: The UN and the MDGs: p 7

<sup>136</sup> UNDP: The UN and the MDGs: p 8

**Table 8: MDG Status**

	1990	2000	2005	2006/2007	MDG Target 2015	Remarks
<b>GOAL 1: ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER</b>						
Proportion of people living below national basic needs poverty line (%)	39	36	-	33.6	19.5	Needs attention
Proportion of people living below national poverty line (food poverty)	22	19	-	16.6	11	Needs attention
Percentage of under-weight under-five children (wasting)	28.8	29.5	21.9	-	14.4	On track
<b>GOAL 2: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION</b>						
Primary net enrolment ratios (%)	54.2	58.7	94.8	97.2 (2008)	100	On track
Primary gross enrolment ratio (%)		77.7 (1999)	112.7	-	100	Achieved
<b>GOAL 3: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN</b>						
Ratio of girls to boys in primary school (%)	98 (1991/92)	98	98	101	100	Achieved
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary school (%)		45.91	46.64	105	100	Achieved
Ratio of females to males in tertiary education (%)		33.52	37.12	68.0	100	Needs attention
Proportion of women among members of Parliament (%)		21	30.4	30.3	50	
<b>GOAL 4: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY</b>						
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)		147 (1999)	112 (2004)		64	Needs attention
Infant mortality rates (per 1,000 live births)	115	99	68 (2004)		38	Needs attention
Proportion of children vaccinated against measles		78.2	80	85	90	On track
<b>GOAL 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH</b>						
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)	529 (1996)		578		133	Needs attention
Births attended by	43.9	35.8	46	62	90	Needs attention

skilled health personnel						
<b>GOAL 6: COMBAT HIV and AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES</b>						
HIV prevalence rate	5.5	9.4	6.8	5.7	<5.5	On track
Number of malaria cases and incidences (cases per 100,000)		500,000	65,7453	27,030	18,062	On track
Number of tuberculosis cases and incidences (cases per 100,000)	188		479	164		
<b>GOAL 7: ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY</b>						
Proportion of land area covered by forest	46%		37.5%	36%		Needs attention
Proportion of people using solid fuels (wood, charcoal, dung)	90%	90%	94%			
Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source (Rural/Urban)		42/85 (2002)	53/73 (2003)	57/83	74/84	Needs attention
Proportion of people with access to improved sanitation (Rural/Urban)		91 (2002)	88.9/98.5			Needs attention
<b>GOAL 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT</b>						
External resources - direct budget support (USD mill.)		1,100		1,067 (2207/08)		
Total external debt stock (USD mill.)		7,482	8,135	5,368		

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The chart unmistakably shows that Tanzania is far away from achieving the MDGs. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that this chart, among many others, does not differentiate between quantitative and qualitative development. This difference can be crucial for the understanding of the several challenges that national development is facing.

The most important goal for my study is goal number eight: “Develop a global partnership for development.”<sup>138</sup> It is the only goal within the MDGs that addresses Good Governance, namely in its target 12:

<sup>137</sup> [http://www.tz.undp.org/mdgs\\_progress.html](http://www.tz.undp.org/mdgs_progress.html) Accessed 6.3.2010

<sup>138</sup> UNDG(2003) : p 4

“Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally.”<sup>139</sup>

Furthermore “Goal 8 addresses the way developed countries can assist developing countries to achieve the other seven goals through more development assistance, improved access to markets and debt relief.”<sup>140</sup>

With this articulation, the UN addresses the industrial countries and encourages them to get involved in the development of the developing countries. Furthermore, it is stated that this development assistance should enable the developing countries to reach the other seven goals. As all UN papers, goal number eight and its targets enable the addressed actors to interpret their commitment to this goal in their own terms.

As stated in the MDG Indicator Handbook, there are several pointers for this goal and its targets. For my study I picked out the ones that are directly linked to foreign aid and hence have to some extent inherited the power for economical intervention – Indicators no. 33, 34, 35, 43.

- Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as a percentage of OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income
- Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)
- Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied
- Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative

The following section will present the charts which are taken from in the Indicator Handbook. The purpose is to create a more accurate impression of the aid flows coming from the developed countries towards the developing world under the UN’s initiative. Before that, I would like to introduce the official definition of the Official

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<sup>139</sup> UNDG (2003): p 4

<sup>140</sup> UNDG (2003): p 7

Development Assistance (ODA), other definitions for terms used in this section are presented in the annex.

“*Official Development Assistance* are grants and loans to developing countries and territories on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) list of aid recipients that are undertaken by the official sector with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective and at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). Technical cooperation is included. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Also excluded is aid to more advanced developing and transition countries as determined by DAC.”<sup>141</sup>

Tanzania’s major donors are also known as the General Budget Support Group (GBS). The group includes: the African Development Bank (ADB), Canada, Denmark, the European Union (EU), Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the World Bank (WB). The following section will provide data about the GBS countries on the selected indicators of Goal 8 and Target 12 presented in the MDG report 2007.<sup>142</sup>

Indicator 33<sup>143</sup>: Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as a percentage of OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income

**Table 9: Net ODA total in percent of OECD/DAC donors’ GNI; Net ODA in million US\$**

Country/ Year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2007
Canada	0,44% 2469,88	0,38% 2066,67	0,25% 1743,60	0,34% 3756,34	0,28% 3921,92
Denmark	0,94% 1171,16	0,96% 1622,67	1,06% 1664,18	0,81% 2108,92	0,81% 2563,02
Finland	0,65%	0,31%	0,31%	0,46%	0,40%

<sup>141</sup> UNDG (2003): p 70

<sup>142</sup> UN: MDG Report 2007, Statistical Annex

<sup>143</sup> <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=33> Accessed 31.10.2008

	846,30	388,32	370,84	901,94	973,48
Germany	0,42%	0,31%	0,27%	0,36%	0,37%
	6319,67	7523,58	5030,00	10082,16	12267,13
Ireland	0,16%	0,29%	0,29%	0,42%	0,57%
	57,28	153,33	234,00	718,94	1189,79
Japan	0,31%	0,27%	0,28%	0,28%	0,17%
	9053,78	14489,27	13507,96	13146,58	7690,69
Netherlands	0,91%	0,81%	0,84%	0,82%	0,81%
	2526,07	3226,08	3134,78	5114,69	6215,30
Norway	1,17%	0,86%	0,76%	0,94%	0,95%
	1204,83	1244,43	1263,56	2786,05	3727,05
Sweden	0,91%	0,77%	0,80%	0,94%	0,93%
	2001,99	1703,96	1798,95	3361,68	4334,08
Switzerland	0,32%	0,34%	0,34%	0,44%	0,37%
	749,74	1083,57	890,37	1771,59	1680,27
United Kingdom	0,27%	0,29%	0,32%	0,47%	0,36%
	2630,14	3202,21	4501,26	10771,70	9920,67

**Table 10: Net ODA to the LDCs in percent of OECD/DAC donors' GNI; Net ODA to the LDCs in million US\$**

Country/ Year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006
Canada	0,13%	0,08%	0,05%	0,09%	0,10%
	740,02	444,12	308,11	1047,82	1243,52
Denmark	0,37%	0,30%	0,34%	0,31%	0,31%
	462,42	511,20	537,28	814,11	878,37
Finland	0,24%	0,09%	0,09%	0,13%	0,14%
	317,48	106,24	111,94	245,37	296,00
Germany	0,12%	0,07%	0,07%	0,07%	0,09%
	1769,38	1612,46	1212,22	1883,53	2641,71
Ireland	0,06%	0,12%	0,14%	0,21%	0,28%
	21,04	65,69	114,46	364,67	524,45
Japan	0,06%	0,04%	0,04%	0,05%	0,07%

	1753,00	2665,21	2158,67	2326,11	3340,14
Netherlands	0,30%	0,21%	0,21%	0,27%	0,21%
	834,20	932,85	793,65	1657,51	1394,65
Norway	0,52%	0,26%	0,26%	0,35%	0,34%
	531,80	502,22	427,26	1029,13	1128,56
Sweden	0,35%	0,24%	0,24%	0,31%	0,30%
	775,35	500,16	532,01	1100,63	1151,65
Switzerland	0,14%	0,11%	0,10%	0,10%	0,11%
	325,11	346,70	269,79	404,92	452,61
United Kingdom	0,09%	0,07%	0,10%	0,12%	0,16%
	834,13	826,54	1425,77	2709,18	3827,23

In comparison, the tables above show the net ODA which is provided by the OECD/DAC donors in total and the proportion that flows to the LDCs. These numbers clearly showcase the commitment from the Scandinavian countries towards the provision of aid over the observed time. It becomes even clearer when we consider the total ODA sum. Most donors are able to achieve stable numbers for the aid to the LDCs. However, in the proportion to the total aid the performance displayed is rather poor.

Indicator 34<sup>144</sup>: Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)

**Table 11: ODA to basic social services as percentage of sector allocable ODA; ODA to basic social services in million US\$**

Country/ Year	1996	2001	2006
Canada	6,29%	22,55%	31,02%
	48,08	111,60	410,35
Denmark	12,61%	6,55%	22,94%
	140,45	28,78	170,20

<sup>144</sup> <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=34> Accessed 31.10.2008

Finland	5,78% 9,43	12,50% 25,67	10,26% 40,41
Germany	7,99% 440,46	8,74% 231,92	13,54% 646,71
Ireland	19,33% 0,33	5,91% 24,43	21,90% 174,52
Japan	2,23% 310,89	3,50% 289,82	3,98% 322,32
Netherlands	13,96% 195,55	30,47% 360,32	45,42% 2275,93
Norway	13,22% 69,88	9,26% 71,48	21,81% 371,21
Sweden	10,28% 82,30	10,63% 65,58	19,72% 378,68
Switzerland	11,46% 20,69	20,06% 83,58	5,56% 39,54
United Kingdom	28,79% 442,95	24,10% 414,47	35,55% 1717,88

The table above displays that for most of the observed donors the provision of aids to basic social services is becoming more important.

Indicator 35<sup>145</sup>: Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied

**Table 12: ODA that is untied in percentage and million US\$**

Country/Year	1990	1995	2000	2006
Canada	46,6% 530,08	40,8% 615,15	24,9% 232,89	62,9% 1111,10
Denmark	N/A N/A	61,3% 754,31	80,5% 655,53	95,3% 1231,56
Finland	31,5% 143,61	75,8% 107,97	89,5% 111,84	86,5% 360,66

<sup>145</sup> <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=35> Accessed 31.10.2008

Germany	61,8% 2253,43	60,3% 2638,43	93,2% 1066,12	93,3% 5700,82
Ireland	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	100,0% 578,10
Japan	88,9% 7644,08	96,3% 13043,20	86,4% 8991,83	95,6% 10592,29
Netherlands	55,5% 632,76	78,9% 1678,91	95,3% 2201,78	100,0% 10206,28
Norway	61,3% 357,53	77,0% 540,99	97,7% 636,22	99,8% 2041,89
Sweden	87,5% 968,10	93,9% 1118,92	85,4% 80,25	100,0% 2825,75
Switzerland	78,5% 320,55	91,3% 508,74	93,6% 514,32	96,3% 1041,24
United Kingdom	N/A N/A	86,2% 613,51	91,5% 1528,88	100,0% 6311,35

This table clearly illustrates that the OECD/DAC donors are concerned with the importance of untied aid. Most of the recipient countries are bound to political and economic conditionalities through multilateral agreements with the IFIs.

Indicator 43<sup>146</sup>: Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative

The debt relief for Tanzania committed under HIPC initiative was 2658 million US\$ in February 2008. Furthermore, 1713 million US\$ have been relieved under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) by February 2008.

**Table 13: The debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services for Tanzania<sup>147</sup>:**

Year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006
Percentage	31,3	17,2	11,8	5,4	2,0

(The debt service payments are adjusted to reflect the HIPC debt relief.)

<sup>146</sup> <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=43> Accessed 3.11.2008

<sup>147</sup> <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx> Accessed 3.11.2008

In addition to the chapter dealing with the UN and the MDG mechanism, I want to introduce another important agency which is operating in the developing countries and, hence, is another connection between the UN, the IFIs and the governments. The United Nations Development Framework (UNADF) is a central actor in the process of planning and coordinating of development. It is concerned with the connection of the findings of the above mentioned MDG reports, as well as, the findings deriving from other national and international priorities and strategies, such as the PRSPs.<sup>148</sup> In Tanzania it was initiated in the year 2001 after a new articulation of a cooperation between the UN and the Tanzanian government. It was

“(…) designed to achieve greater integration among all UN Funds and Programmes and Specialised Agencies. (…) [It is] based on analytic work underpinning the development of the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Common Country Assessment for Zanzibar, the UN’s assessment of the development challenges facing Tanzania, and on an understanding of the UN’s comparative advantages.”<sup>149</sup>

The following agencies and offices of the United Nations are represented in Tanzania: FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNAIDS, UNCDF, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNOPS, UNV, WFP, WHO and UNIC. Others are operational agencies and offices in the country, but based elsewhere.<sup>150</sup> The main actor within the UNDAF is the UNDP. Relating to work provided in Tanzania the organization establishes in its report that “Good Governance is recognized as a precondition for sustained pro-poor economic growth (…)”.<sup>151</sup>

In 2007 the UN added a further step towards improving efficiency in its work in Tanzania – the document of “One UN” was signed. It is part of a reform within the UN to reduce transaction costs on the one hand, and to simplify the ongoing streamlines of investments in Tanzania.<sup>152</sup> Tanzania is one out of eight countries

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<sup>148</sup> UNDG (2003): p 8f

<sup>149</sup> UNDP (2005): p. 2

<sup>150</sup> UN Communication Group: 10 Facts about the UN in Tanzania

<sup>151</sup> UN Communication Group: 10 Facts about the UN in Tanzania: p 6

<sup>152</sup> UMOJA – One UN in Tanzania

worldwide where the pilot program of “One UN” started within the period of 2007 to 2008. From my understanding, it is yet another agency concerned with roughly the same targets. Like so many other agencies it is complicating the mechanisms between the vast number of actors within the developing process rather than simplifying them.

During my interview with a staff member of the UNDP Tanzania I sought to find more information on subject matter of relationship, differences and ultimately the meaning of these two programs. My interview partner explained to me that the main difference between the UNDAF and One UN was that UNDAF was articulated in cooperation with the government of Tanzania and, thus, concerns the strategies from both internal and external interests. One UN was found on recommendation from the Secretary General and the General Assembly. Its main objective is to strengthen the efficiency and transparency of the UN for the governments. The main target of this project is to create one budget, one office, one program and finally one leader. Even though it was articulated without the governments help it aims to make future cooperations with the UN easier.<sup>153</sup>

Given the present state of maintaining over 15 different UN agencies, which are operating in Tanzania on more or less similar goals, the transparency and legitimacy of these agencies are becoming progressively a challenge in itself. As I will demonstrate in the following topics, in the eye of the public, including the media, the results of the work do not cover up for the promises made. Resulting from a significant lack of transparency, these mechanisms of current development politics make the relationship between the citizens and the government even more complicated.

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<sup>153</sup> Interview at UNDP office, Dar es Salaam. 28.5.2008. The interview partner wishes to stay anonymous.

## The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

In 1996, the World Bank and IMF proposed the Debt Initiative for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) as an approach within the official creditors. Its chief objective was “to bring down debtor countries’ external debt to sustainable levels.”<sup>154</sup> In September 1999, an enhanced account of this proposition was released to the HIPCs including the relief of debts bound to certain political and economical conditionalities. The debt relief was expected to ultimately lead to poverty reduction.

“The expectation was that, in turn for debt relief, beneficiary countries would commit themselves to policies that advanced sound economic management and poverty reduction. The initiative emphasized structural and social policy reforms, particularly in delivering basic health care and education services, facilitated where needed by additional financing under the HIPC Initiative.”<sup>155</sup>

The participating countries had to prepare national strategies on poverty reduction, namely, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in order to benefit of this initiative and receive debt relief.

The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) of Tanzania was framed in 1999 and published by the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) in the same year. It states that “[t]he strategy aims at attacking the country’s deep and pervasive poverty by raising growth and enhancing the participation of the poor in the development process.”<sup>156</sup>

In addition to that, the document highlights the state of poverty in Tanzania, admitting that the poverty prevalence has stagnated and even worsened during the 1990s. In 1999 approximately 15 to 18 million, which constitutes half of Tanzania’s population, lived below the poverty line of 0,65 US\$ per day. Among those, there were almost 12,5 million Tanzanians living in abject poverty, spending less than 0,50US\$ a day.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> WB (2001): p. vii

<sup>155</sup> WB (2001): p. vii

<sup>156</sup> URT (1999): p 1

<sup>157</sup> URT (1999): p 1

For all indicators of poverty there are many variations within the country's regions, as well as, disparities between urban and rural areas. Furthermore, there are noticeable differences between the sexes.

Previous to entering the HIPC initiative and the PRSP process, the government of Tanzania adopted, a so called, National Poverty Eradication Strategy in 1997. Its articulation is in-line with the International Development Goals. In this document, the government has identified priority areas for public expenditure. The Poverty and Welfare Monitoring Indicators were developed in the year 1999 as a foundation for monitoring the impact and implementation of several poverty eradication programs. The monitoring is therefore to be considered a guide for the following policies and programs for reducing poverty. The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) was established to finance the governments' defined priority areas. The implementation ought to be then monitored in the Public Expenditure Review (PER).<sup>158</sup>

In 1998, the government initiated the Multilateral Debt Relief Fund (MDF). The purpose of this fund can be compared to the HIPC Initiative. In the first year the fund received 88US\$ million from seven contributing countries. The amount was employed in paying off debts to the World Bank, IMF and African Development Bank. In 1999/2000 the donors gave 81US\$ million to the MDF. The progress is monitored in quarterly meetings between the government and the donors.

The government is also developing the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), to guide foreign aid and improve its efficiency. The PRSP process is seen as an essential component of TAS.

The I-PRSP points out the most important components of the PRSP, which shall be completed by 2000.

“[It] (...) will not substitute for existing sectoral programs but will strengthen the prioritization of actions within and across sectors targeting poverty.

It will:

- Assemble baseline data on poverty and develop a national poverty line.

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<sup>158</sup> URT (1999): p 1f

- Set medium-term poverty reduction targets, including monitorable indicators of main poverty objectives that can be achieved within one to ten years. These indicators will at the minimum cover income poverty, and essential human development.
- Set poverty reduction targets for each of the priority sectors, including primary education and health, rural roads, water, and extension services in agriculture.
- Shift budgetary resources to meet specified poverty reduction targets.”<sup>159</sup>

The I-PRSP also monitors the process of articulating the PRSP. It addresses the participating actors and the timeline. The participating actors include international and national NGOs, church-based organizations and regional networks. Donors are given the role of developing partners.

On the issue of “Governance”, the I-PRSP draws attention to the need for a National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Plan, which shall be completed by 2000.

Considering the above mentioned strategies and initiatives, namely the National Poverty Eradication Strategy, MTEF, PER, MDF and TAS which were initiated in Tanzania before the introduction of the HIPC Initiative, the PRSP process does not appear as a new and better approach for poverty reduction and economical growth. A major difference between the PRSP and the previous strategies lies in its initiator, which in this case is the WB and the IMF, representing the interest powers in this process.

However, the PRSP is an important and acknowledged development plan, that I would like to examine in greater detail, before introducing the National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP).

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<sup>159</sup> URT (1999): p 2f.

## Tanzania's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Tanzania's PRSP came to appearance after the goals were set out in the interim paper by the government, its development partners and stakeholders. The important difference between this strategy paper and the initiatives mentioned above, is that it states that "(...) the PRSP encompasses poverty-oriented extra-budgetary activities, and various non-financial considerations that have an important bearing on poverty reduction."<sup>160</sup>

Overall, it is encouraging to see that the lessons learned from previous programs and initiatives are taken into account in the PRSP. This becomes apparent in the question of financing, for example. However, the entire articulation of the paper makes it obvious, that even though it is supposed to be a national strategy, it is written in a language more likely to attract the IFIs and donors and less Tanzania's society. Therefore, it becomes difficult to implement in Tanzania's society.

In the PRSP, the focus is even less so on objectives, such as, Governance and Good Governance. Governance remains a field which can be improved only by efficiency and effectiveness, namely through decentralization. Furthermore, all improvements related to the topic of governance, like strengthening accountability and improved performance of the public sector are linked to actions in the fields of anti-corruption and budget coordination.<sup>161</sup> The document does not provide any definitions on how to make governments transparent in these fields. More emphasis is laid on monitoring the budget spending and advising. It becomes even more evident that the government's main concern related to Good Governance relies in the anti-corruption measures.

"The government will also institute a system of "independent" monitors within the framework of the Tanzania Assistance Strategy to follow up governments commitments to improve governance and institutional framework for higher integrity and more transparent accountability as well as donor coordination, improved integration of

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<sup>160</sup> URT(2000): p 4

<sup>161</sup> URT (2000): p 46f

external assistance into the exchequer system, and simplification of aid disbursement procedures.”<sup>162</sup>

Even when the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is well formulated, the monitoring of its implementation and process is another uneasy target. For this purpose, several poverty monitoring systems (PMS) and strategies have been developed. In 2001 the Poverty Monitoring Master Plan was realized and introduced the Poverty Monitoring Steering Committee. The committee has approximately 30 members coming from national and international NGOs as well as other Tanzanian CSOs and working groups with specific targets. Since 2002 there is the Poverty Policy Week, an annual document which is considered as a forum for public debate on domestic policy and development issues. It can be seen as an independent scientific report. Another monitoring system is emerging from the Consultative Group Meeting (CG), including the government, international donors and members of the civil society. Outcomes of these meetings are the Annual Progress Reports. With this large number of monitoring instruments and documents, the government intends to strengthen the whole monitoring system.<sup>163</sup> There is an importance to outline the difference between the monitoring of budget spending, which is a quantitative measure and the outcome oriented monitoring which focuses rather on the qualitative changes through the PRSP process. Furthermore, PRSP-Watch points out, that according to some authors, the articulation process of the PRSP includes national and international NGOs and other CSOs. However, it also indicates that the donors were more likely the dominant actors.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> URT (2000): p 50

<sup>163</sup> PRSP-Watch, Tanzania Country report: p. 2f

<sup>164</sup> PRSP-Watch, Tanzania Country Report p. 1f

**Table 14: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators**

	<u>1991-93</u>	<u>1994-96</u>	<u>1997-99</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>
				<u>Preliminary</u>	<u>Estimates</u>
		(In percent)		<u>Out-turn</u>	
Real GDP growth rate	1.7	3.1	4.0	4.9	5.9
Per capita GDP growth rate	-1.1	0.2	1.0	1.8	3.0
Inflation rate	24.8	27.3	12.3	6.0	5.0
Budget Deficit/GDP <sup>1</sup>					
Before grants	5.6	3.9	4.0	4.8	6.0
After grants	2.2	1.3	0.3	0.2	0.7
Investment/GDP	26.3	20.5	18.5	18.9	19.0

Source: Ministry of Finance, and National Bureau of Statistics.

<sup>1</sup>Refers to fiscal years (July – June), beginning in the years indicated in the column header.

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The table above exemplifies the expectations that are laid upon the PRSP process, but also on the TAS, the MDF and other initiatives. Apart from illustrating the real GDP growth rates in a slightly more positive light, moreover it indicates the inflation rate. The latter was reaching extraordinary levels in the 1990s and is expected to lower to a sustainable stage.

After the publication of the PRSP in the year 2000 the government of Tanzania and its developing partners, the CGs, are preparing annual PRSP progress reports. These should help evaluating the implemented and outstanding targets of the PRSP and also strengthen its efficiency. Furthermore, it is linked to the commitment of the TAS and other related programs. In the first report of 2001 it is also pointed out that “[t]he annual process of updating the PRSP will also provide opportunity for periodic consultations with a wide range of domestic stakeholders, especially the poor, to obtain needed feedback and foster ownership.”<sup>166</sup> The realization and impact of these consultations which should be part of zonal workshops is hard to measure, but nonetheless very interesting to the context of this thesis.

In the first Progress Report of 2001 the Government states, that during the first year of implementation of the PRSP the actions to strengthen Governance concentrated around the areas of the fight against corruption, strengthening financial

<sup>165</sup> URT (2000/2001): p 11

<sup>166</sup> URT (2000/2001): p 1

management and control. Moreover, great emphasis was set on strengthening the juridical system. The first target acquired the establishment of the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) to strengthen transparency in government expenditures at all levels and thus combat corruption. The IFMS were to be fully implemented by the years of 2002 and 2003. Furthermore, offices of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau have been expanded to the regional levels. Additionally, it is planned to be expanded further to the district levels. A new strategy occurring in this field, is the call for an active support from the mass media.<sup>167</sup>

The Human Rights and Good Governance Act was introduced in 2001, together with a monitoring committee. Other important institutions employed in this phase, were the Ethics Secretariat and a Juridical Ethics Committee.

Overall, the progress that is surrounding the matter of governance and Good Governance does neither include qualitative changes nor measurements. The improvements described are only on the institutional level and capacity but does not report on other important components, like transparency and accountability. There is no evident sign that the government or the PRSP are also aiming to create a better relationship between the citizens and the authorities. It is only claimed, that the process of implementation and evaluation would encourage participation. This expectation, among others, could remain unfulfilled. It may be caused by a missing definition of Good Governance and, henceforth, a false understanding of priorities within this important development program which the PRSP represents. However, the government of Tanzania is since the mid 1990s understanding this policy as a commitment to the combating of corruption and does not obligate itself with targets concerning its status and relation with the society.

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<sup>167</sup> URT (2000/2001): p 34

## **The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty**

The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), in Swahili known as MKUKUTA (Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania) was published by the government of Tanzania, in 2005. It represents a national strategy that is concerned with the same goals like the MDGs, the PRSP and similar development plans. At the same time, it represents the second generation of the PRSP, since it includes not only the lessons learned from the progress reports but also from several other review reports and consultations. Furthermore, the strategy “(...) strives to widen the space for country ownership and effective participation of civil society, private sector development and fruitful local and external partnerships in development and commitment to regional and other international initiatives for social and economic development.”<sup>168</sup>

The strategy builds on the PRSP and its reviews, as well as the Poverty Policy Week conferences and is planned for 5 years, meeting the same end point, such as the National Poverty Eradication Strategy from 1997. It unites the goals of the MDGs which are to be completed by 2015, and the longer term goals of Vision 2025.

The NSGRP also presents some weaknesses of the PRSP process, which are basically resulting from a tight timeline, infrequent consultations with the stakeholders and a general lack of communication strategies. Moreover, the synchronization with TAS did not succeed and CSO involvement was very limited due to its inadequate understanding and resources.<sup>169</sup> Therefore, the NSGRP aims at encouraging and ensuring participation along the line of human rights, giving a special focus on the freedom of opinion, media, information and association. The local governments are central for the communication at the grass-roots level. For the realization of these approaches, capacity building at all levels is needed.<sup>170</sup> The debt relief achieved through the articulation and implementation of the PRSP did not provide the expected improvements in priority sectors (i.e. education, health, water, agriculture, rural roads, judiciary and land). After three years the poverty level and inequality levels remain still considerably high.<sup>171</sup> The NSGRP is set out to be an “outcome-approach” to raise the efficiency.

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
<sup>168</sup> URT (2005): p 1

<sup>169</sup> URT (2005): p 17f

<sup>170</sup> URT (2005): p 18

<sup>171</sup> URT (2005): p 2

**Table 15: MKUKUTA clusters in relation**



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The chart above is taken from the NSGRP. It presents a graphic simplification of the relations between the major problems and, hence, it additionally targets at Tanzania’s development.

The major clusters of the NSGRP are 1) growth and reduction of income poverty, 2) improved quality of life and social well-being and 3) good governance and accountability. The document states that the third cluster provides possibilities to essentially fulfill the former two. However, the articulation of concrete actions and strategies which ought to ensure that good governance and accountability will be implemented remains unsatisfying. On the one hand, the commitment to this policy is held up, as for example in this sentence: “NSGRP recognizes public access to information as a human right as well as a key means to facilitating effective policy implementation, monitoring and accountability.”<sup>173</sup>; on the other hand, the only real actions which are described are institutional changes and reforms on several different

<sup>172</sup> URT (2005): p 27

<sup>173</sup> URT (2005): p 31

sectors, for example: local governments, legal sector, public service, financial sector and so on, which aim it is to contribute towards good governance.<sup>174</sup> Relating to this cluster, the impression can be made, that the leadership did not evaluate the experiences of institutional changes and their impact on governance and government's performance to the same strengthening levels as the others.

The table beneath portrays the goals and additional targets for the third cluster. The improvements that are pointed out in the table are one of a qualitative nature. The NSGRP also addresses strategies to reach those goals, which include capacity building and further implementation of the National Framework on Good Governance, increasing participation of vulnerable groups (for example women, children, people with disabilities etc.), as well as the separation of powers between legislation, judiciary and executive. Moreover, the strengthening of local authorities and governments is addressed as a crucial component of successful good governance.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> URT (2005): p 32

<sup>175</sup> URT (2005): p 50f

**Table 16: Goals and Targets of MKUKUTA's Cluster III**

1. Structures and systems of governance as well as the rule of law are democratic, participatory, representative, accountable and inclusive.
  - *Ensure representative, inclusive (poor and vulnerable groups) and accountable governance institutions operating at all levels*
2. Equitable allocation of public resources with corruption effectively addressed
  - *Public resources are allocated, accessible and used in an equitable, accountable and transparent manner*
  - *Institute effective regulations and mechanisms regarding petty and grand corruption*
3. Effective public service framework in place to provide foundation for service delivery improvements and poverty reduction
  - *Administrative systems of public institutions are managed transparently and in the best interests of the people they serve.*
  - *Decentralisation by devolution institutionalised and implemented to enhance public ownership of the development and poverty reduction process*
4. Rights of the poor and vulnerable groups are protected and promoted in the justice system
  - *Ensure timely and appropriate justice for all especially the poor and vulnerable groups.*
5. Reduction of political and social exclusion and intolerance
  - *Develop political and social systems and institutions, which allow for full participation of all citizens including the poor and vulnerable groups.*
6. Improved personal and material security, reduced crime, eliminate sexual abuse and domestic violence
  - *Ensure institutions and agents of government such as the police, courts and prisons observe human rights and ensure justice and security of all citizens.*
7. National cultural identities enhanced and promoted
  - *Policies, strategies and legal frameworks for national language, cultural and moral development are in place and operational.*

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The NSGRP offers a deeper commitment to good governance and its components than programs and strategies that have been introduced in Tanzania previously. However, the articulation of concrete actions to reach the goals appointed in the document does not seem innovative. Measures, such as, decentralization of power, capacity building and enhancing participation, have been already addressed in the previous programs as well. Even though they have not been directly linked to the matter of Good Governance. Hence, the NSGRP does indeed represent a far more prepared and inclusive document than the PRSP of 2000. In the articulation the government not identified mistakes from previous documents but particularly described how these shall be improved. In the case of good governance, valid efforts have been made but still need focus and attention because of their qualitative

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<sup>177</sup> URT (2005): p 50

inheritance. It is obvious, that in contrast to the PRSP the articulation process of NSGRP did include national and international actors of interest which strengthen the government's commitment to the underprivileged of the country. However, as the following table shows the integration of the people into the most important national development plan is lacking.

**Table 17: National Awareness of MKUKUTA**

Have you heard of MKUKUTA?	Dar es Salaam %	Other Urban Areas %	Rural Areas %	All %
Yes	40	44	34	38
No	60	56	66	62

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<sup>178</sup> Tanzania Poverty and Human Development Report 2007: p 60

## **Chapter IV:**

### ***Good Governance versus Political Culture***

The aim of this chapter is to finally connect the two major pillars of this thesis and to explore their relationship to one another. On the theoretical level, the question arises whether good governance and political culture are interrelated and if so in what way. Furthermore, I will look whether they can function in complete separation. Additionally it is also important, to examine the power of these two theoretical fields in practice and describe their influence on the citizens of Tanzania. This chapter and the following will introduce my findings in this field, which will deal with my personal experiences during my research and subsequent stay in Dar es Salaam.

First of all, there is a need to recapitulate the definition and aim of Good Governance as a term, as well as a tool in the hands of the IFIs and donors. For its full understanding it is necessary to shortly explain the historical events which ultimately lead to the term Good Governance and to the current international development politics.

As aforementioned, Good Governance appeared on the political scene after the failing efforts of establishing of sustainable development and growth through financial aids in the years before 1990. At the same time, Good Governance was the perfect expression for the victory of democracy and market economy over socialism and central planned economy in the years after the end of the Cold War.

After the most African developing countries like Tanzania became independent in the early 1960s the international strategy to help these new states develop themselves focused on the distribution of loans. This strategy proved to be successful during the post-World War II period and the rebuilding of European countries and their economies, which became widely known as the Marshall Plan. This recovery programme relied mainly in the hands and responsibility of the Bretton Woods Institutions, namely the IMF and the World Bank. After the end of colonization and the raising of new countries especially on the African continent, the same institutions became automatically concerned with the economical development of the new nations. The adaptation of similar strategies for enhancing economic

growth as were used in Europe did fail in the African context, because there was not enough to build upon. Industries were rare and basically nonexistent; the only economical forces that were built up in Africa during the colonial period were relying on agriculture. Hence, the loans which flew into the young African states often resulted in corruption affairs, instable governments and in some cases even in civil wars. The failure to establish growing economies under democratic governments became a painful experience for the African continent. The international development policies led the countries into deeper dependence not only on external financial resources but also on other goods to fulfil the people's basic needs. When it became clear in the 1980s that the development strategy relying on loans failed, the IMF offered a restructuring of debt through a Structural Adjustment Facility to lend money to those economies in order to help them repay their debts. Dambisa Moyo states in this context: "Necessary though this was, the end result only served to increase poor countries' aid-dependence and put them deeper into debt."<sup>179</sup>

The case was slightly different in Tanzania where the government was relatively stable and the Nyerere regime was accompanied with a strong commitment on self-reliance. But none the less the loan policies left the country, among numerous others, heavily indebted and henceforth, in continuing dependence. While the IFIs and donors recognized that their development strategy did not lead to the expected economical growth, nor did it reduce poverty, they started a wide number of other initiatives. The UN became deeply involved into the development of its poorest members, mainly through the UNDP and additional programmes. Furthermore, independent organizations concerned with growth and development in the Third World countries established themselves in all parts of the world. Their work for development, based on projects in the field, reminds strongly on the missionary activities which took place before and during colonization. Their aim was not only to help the poor people but primarily to civilize them.

In this context it is also important to mention another aspect of world politics which had a strong and lasting impact on the development agenda. While the African countries were busy building up state structures and ensuring basic needs for their citizens, the industrialized countries were having a battle on their own, namely the Cold War. This situation did not make it any easier for the developing countries which closed themselves together in the Non-Alignment Movement. This movement

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<sup>179</sup> Moyo (2009): p 19

enabled them to act as a unit and to some extent protect their common interests on international level. At the same time these countries wanted to prevent themselves of becoming involved in the Cold War.

As I have previously referenced, the international development strategy of loans pushed by the IFI's and donors, most of who were the previous colonial powers, lead the African states into even deeper financial problems. The advice which was a part of the aid programmes did not lead to economical growth but to more dependence on foreign expertise and vulnerability to international market changes. Whenever there was an international financial crisis, the developing countries were affected by it tremendously. As aforementioned, the international oil crisis in the 1970s and the following international debt crisis in the 1980s both had a strong influence on the Tanzanian state and its economy. With the international development policies based on loans, the industrial countries generated more harm than help. Thus is one reason, among others, for the rise of the term Good Governance. In the eyes of the IFIs and donors, this expression combines and enhances all important components which would ultimately lead to development. Development in this context can be roughly described as economic growth and sustainability, as well as poverty reduction. The first changes in the international development politics came along with the recognition of the deep debts of African states and the initiation of the HIPC and PRSP process. At the same time loans became transformed into grants and other forms of bilateral and multilateral contracts. However, these measures did not elevate the dependence on foreign money, technology and to some extent ideology.

“Aid has not lived up to expectations. It remains at the heart of the development agenda, despite the fact that there are very compelling reasons to show that it perpetuates the cycle of poverty and derails sustainable economic growth.”<sup>180</sup>

Almond and Verba stated that political culture is crucial for the functioning of political systems. Furthermore, they claim that: “[t]he relationship between political culture and political structure becomes one of the most significant researchable

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<sup>180</sup> Moyo (2009): p 28

aspects of the problem of political stability and change.”<sup>181</sup> Examining Tanzania’s political culture, it is important to focus on the periods of colonial rule as its starting point. The struggle for independence was one of the most significant experiences to the Tanzanian people. Moreover, it contributed to the creation of a shared national feeling among its citizen. From the beginning of independence in 1961, development was the major concern of domestic politics and additionally the one preoccupying aim of foreign politics and relations. From the 1960s onwards the government of Tanzania was dealing with the participation of its citizens in the development process, in order to make it a successful endeavour. At the time the most powerful group among them were the peasants, who had significant control over the means of production and henceforth, the power to influence the political decision-making process.<sup>182</sup> The government responded by setting up national development plans, offering the peasants to participate. The official position changed in the 1970s, when the response for development was shifted to the central level and participation was expected in the form of implementation.<sup>183</sup> This political strategy was deepened with the articulation of the official paper and even more in the implementation of the Ujamaa villages. The Arusha Declaration from 1967, did not only legitimize the government’s policies concerning the economy, but also in the case of agriculture, in particular a new approach towards the peasants. Furthermore, the approach towards foreign aids changed with the Tanzanian state taking over more responsibility. The international development politics were seen as a threat not only to the country’s independence but also to its ideology. However, the state could never afford to decline aid completely. Hence it became obvious that the state and its power had to enhance. On one hand it resulted in further authoritarian character of governance, on the other the socialist government also started to politicize the whole society.

Since the independence of Tanzania, there have been governmental advised committees in the rural areas that worked as channels of communication between the state and the peasants. In the 1970s, along with the villagization a decentralization process began, aiming to enhance the government’s power at all levels of the society and ultimately increase production. Concerning the Ujamaa villages, the peasants’ participation shifted from voluntarism to enforcement. The state party’s commitment

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<sup>181</sup> Almond/Verba (1963): p 34

<sup>182</sup> Hydén (1982): p 24ff

<sup>183</sup> Havnevik (1993): p 46ff

to socialism was further enhanced with the transformation of TANU into CCM in 1977. The pattern of democracy still remained at its core, due to the importance that it was imposed by donors who acknowledged this political system as the only one that could enable economic growth. However, Moyo claims that "(...) far from being a prerequisite for economic growth, democracy can hamper development as democratic regimes find it difficult to push through economic beneficial legislation amid rival parties and jockeying interests."<sup>184</sup> Moyo concludes that democracy is not the prerequisite for economic growth however leads to the opposite effect.

The amount of foreign aid that Tanzania received in the late 1960s and early 1970s grew steadily. However, these flows of monetary aid lead to an economy that slowly but steadily became dependent and hence, vulnerable to external changes. That is why the international financial crisis of the late 1970s reached far into the social and political sectors in Tanzania. The stability and legitimacy of the political system became weakened by this, which in turn lead to further increase of the authoritarian state character. Shivji claims that by the end of the 1970s "[t]he combination of economic crisis at home and the rise of neo-liberalism globally made many an African country a ready victim of the IMF-World Bank structural adjustment programmes or SAPs."<sup>185</sup>

After all, the state was unable to enhance its production and productivity in these levels that would ultimately enable sustainable growth and development. What it did reach was a tradition of state control at all levels, mainly because of the system of local governments which prevails until today. The citizens and specifically the peasants, had always the right to participate but only between borders lined out by the government in the national plans. Hence, they found their own ways how to work through and around this system. They became self-responsible for their own life and well being, holding the government accountable for all other sectors especially the development of the state as a whole. This is a major characteristic of the political culture prevailing among the citizens of Tanzania today.

From the 1980s onwards, the position of the Tanzanian government towards foreign aids and the involvement of foreign countries and institutions in the country's development has changed. From the time when Julius Nyerere resigned from his presidency, it became obvious that Tanzania would have to accept economical

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<sup>184</sup> Moyo (2009): p 42

<sup>185</sup> Shivji (2004): p 2

agreements with the IFIs to overcome its economical crisis and their consequences. The first of these agreements was signed under president Mwinyi between the government of Tanzania and the IMF.<sup>186</sup> It introduced the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) which led to a market liberalization. Opposite to the expected improvements, the policies under this programme brought higher corruption, stagnation in the agricultural sector and did not benefit the citizens of Tanzania. The power of the IFIs and donors rose after the end of the Cold War and the Tanzanian government had no choice but to acknowledge the predominant belief that democracy and capitalistic market economy are the pre-requirements for development in terms of poverty reduction and economical growth. The implementation of the multi-party system, which ended the period of the socialist one-party-state in 1992 was unquestionably a decision of the government preferring foreign relations over the interests of its people. The election results indicate, that the multi-party system as laid out on the paper has not yet been fully realized.

The table below, which was presented in the Human and Poverty Development Report for Tanzania from 2007, shows the people's views on the multi-party politics 15 years after its implementation.

**Table 18: Perceptions on Single versus Multi-Party Politics**

Statement	Dar es Salaam %	Other Urban %	Rural Areas %	All Areas %
'I am glad Tanzania became a multi-party system'	46	47	44	45
'I wish Tanzania had remained a one-party state'	37	40	42	41
'Single party/multi-party system makes little difference'	8	7	6	7
No opinion/undecided	9	7	7	7

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Furthermore, different rights and improvements that are integral parts of democracy are questionable in current Tanzania. In this context, I want to present an example of HakiElimu an NGO that I have visited during my stay in Dar es Salaam. From my point of view, it was one of the most effective and outstanding organization

<sup>186</sup> Shivji (2006): p 8

<sup>187</sup> Tanzania Human Poverty and Development Report 2007: p 72

that, if it became acknowledged by the government, would be a very helpful tool for the development of the country.

HakiElimu (right for education) is an NGO founded in 2001 and is primarily concerned with the promotion and improvement in the quality of education. Furthermore, the organization believes, that quality education that encourages critical learning and thinking is primarily linked with human rights and democracy. Hence, the major part of the organization's work is based on encouraging communities in rural areas to monitor and address the government's work with the goal, not only to achieve new progress in the education system but also to influence the policy-making-process. HakiElimu's understanding of education is one that "(...) promotes a culture and practice of human rights, democracy and active citizenship."<sup>188</sup> The organization believes that pressure from the public is the most effective way to reach the government and enhance its accountability. In their annual reports the organization provides information on its work, achievements and challenges, as well as recapitulating the vision, goals and strategies, and offers further a financial statement for funders and partners. In addition to that, HakiElimu produces cartoon booklets, newsletters, TV-spots in Swahili to keep the public informed about its policy developments related to the organization targets. These materials are distributed not only to individuals and educational institutions but also to other CSOs and government departments. Furthermore, there are research studies published by the Policy Analysis and Advocacy unit, dealing mainly with the implementation of reforms in the education sector and government-citizen relations focused on the access to information and accountability of government promises, as well as questions concerning budget spending.<sup>189</sup> Finally, Working Papers are published, by independent authors, as well as those who work for the organization itself. During my research in Dar es Salaam I found these papers to be insightful and highly informative. In the organization's understanding independent reports create "(...) greater awareness, accountability and policy and public action."<sup>190</sup>

Ever since, HakiElimu has been doing critical research and publishing its findings in the national media. In September 2005, the Ministry of Education and

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<sup>188</sup> <http://www.hakielimu.org/> Accessed 12.6.2008

<sup>189</sup> [http://www.hakielimu.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=96](http://www.hakielimu.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=96)

Accessed 12.6.2008

<sup>190</sup> HakiElimu (2006): p 5

Culture banned the organization from these activities. Furthermore, it criticized the radio and TV spots for undermining the government's efforts. This decision was met with a lot of criticism from other local NGOs as well as from abroad.<sup>191</sup> In 2006 the ban was lifted and the organization could continue its work. HakiElimu's position on this dispute is that not only it resolved for the organization's benefit, moreover, it was a step towards creating a civil society and a participatory society. "The Government treatment of HakiElimu is a vivid case in point, and the overall situation of CSOs is characterized by an uneasy tension when government is criticized."<sup>192</sup>

This example illustrates how the government is dealing with criticism and its practice of responding on discomforting issues. Ever since the introduction of the multi-party system and the implementation of laws regulating civil society and non-governmental organizations, the raising number of NGOs in Tanzania. They established themselves in society and are consulted by the government or organs only on certain occasions. This was the case in the articulating process of MKUKUTA. The government knew that it was important to implement the expert knowledge of these specialized organizations in order to ensure that civil society participation was adhered on the papers. This was the case with REPOA (Research on Poverty Alleviation) an NGO based in Dar es Salaam. REPOA specializes in economic and social research and Hakikazi Catalyst, a CSO which I have visited in Arusha. Both of these organizations participated in the MKUKUTA articulation process. REPOA is currently one of the countries' leading research organizations and receives funds from foreign governments as well as from the government of Tanzania itself. Furthermore, it does research upon request from the WB, UN agencies, etc. Their approach is to deliver constructive criticism to the government and the public. Hakikazi's work is based in the field of empowering the people especially in rural areas to hold their government accountable, address it with their demands and participate in political decisions. They also translate and simplify policy papers into booklets and cartoons to raise public awareness about the government's plans, aiming to enhance a bottom-up influence on decision making.

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<sup>191</sup> <http://216.69.164.44/ipp/guardian/2007/07/16/94513.html>  
<http://www.tzaffairs.org/2006/05/haki-elimu/>  
<http://216.69.164.44/ipp/guardian/2007/01/31/83436.html>  
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61596.htm>

all accessed on 4.2.2010

<sup>192</sup> HakiElimu (2006): p 31f

The organization is not as critical as HakiElimu,. They try to work in cooperation with the government and its plans rather than in confrontation. Hence, they are trying to contribute in reaching the country's goals which are targeted in the several development plans.<sup>193</sup> During my interviews with both of these organizations, the interview partners described that the donors do play a major role in the government's decisions and plans, however they have difficulties to understand the complexity of the country's problems. Moreover, they agreed that the donors' approach is slowly changing and acknowledging previous mistakes.<sup>194</sup>

In spite of the fact that representatives of REPOA and Hakikazi Catalyst tried to highlight the improvements in the articulation of the development plans, however the government's response on criticism remains slow and the importance of it underestimated. The previously referenced example of HakiElimu clearly displays the government's ongoing effort to control its society, civil society and the borders of criticism. Even to this day state control remains a great force at all levels of society, even if this state character speaks against the concept of Good Governance agenda. Instead of enhancing the transparency factor in its own rank, the government still attempts to silence critical voices. The emphasis the leaders put on components like transparency and accountability is more of a good will game towards the IFIs than a reliable promise to its citizens.

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<sup>193</sup> Interview with Hakikazi Staff Member, 18.6.2008, Arusha

<sup>194</sup> Interview with Hakikazi Staff Member, 18.6.2008, Arusha; Interview with REPOA Staff Member, 9.6.2008, Dar es Salaam

## ***My personal experiences in Dar es Salaam***

The aim of this final chapter is to give the reader a broader understanding of the Tanzanian society, its political and social commitments as I have experienced during my stay in Dar es Salaam. I have to admit, that my everyday life there, taught me more about the complex situation in the country, than any literature I could have read. I want to share the knowledge I have acquired, in order to express my sincere gratefulness to the people of Tanzania.

My journey began with an overnight stay at the International Airport in Doha, where I met a young woman from Kenya who lived in Vienna for two years at that time. During our conversation I told her about my trip and research ambitions and she shared her point of view on the Tanzanian society with me, especially pointing out the difference to the people in Kenya. She explained that the people in Tanzania still trust their government to solve their problems. In Kenya everybody knows that only he himself is responsible for his life and well-being. Therefore, the people therefore act under the principle of Charles Darwin's "survival of the fittest". She mentioned that the people in Kenya want to be like the people in the USA – even when their perception is based on television. The people in Tanzania struggle to be like the people in Kenya, but do not recognize that they are developing too slowly. What impressed me most about this woman was her feeling about self-responsibility to development when she said: "I have legs and arms. I am healthy so I have to do something for my country."<sup>195</sup> As most of the Africans who live in Europe, she is sending parts of her salary to her family in Kenya. I saw her strong ambitions and wondered how the people in Tanzania would be like.

I arrived at the Julius Nyerere International Airport on an early afternoon at the end of April 2008. Before landing, I already could see how vast the city of Dar es Salaam is. My first impressions were made while I was on my way to my hostel riding a taxi. I saw people all along the streets, carrying all kinds of goods on their heads and on wooden trails. The road we were driving on appeared to be in a bad condition with many potholes. However, later on I have learned that a bad condition in African terms means far more damage. The taxi driver commented this with the words: "Our government is working on other issues now, and we can't do anything

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<sup>195</sup> 29.4.2008, Doha (International Airport)

without our government.”<sup>196</sup> This sentence, later on, appeared to be very representative to the Tanzanian’s position towards their government and its commitments.

My first glimpses of Tanzanian life were based on public transportations, such as, buses and small businesses. It all appeared very lively and colorful, but on the other hand also terrifying for a young European woman who visited an African country for her very first time. I was seeing houses covered with corrugated iron roofs, like I used to be shown in documentary movies about the poor, without a clue that I would find myself living under one of these as well, in just a few weeks.

The hostel that I have previously booked via Internet is situated in a village called Changanyikeni. It is located on a hill near the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) and about 13km from the city center away. The asphalt road ends at half way between the village and the university. The village has approximately 2000 inhabitants. Many of these are the students and the professors. The Eastern Africa Statistical Training Centre is also located in this village and I have been told that it is one of the best statistics schools in Africa.

By the time I arrived in Dar es Salaam it was rain season. On the second day of my stay, I have discovered what this means in reality. Within minutes the dust roads, that are covered with potholes, transformed into a muddy ground bearing dangers for pedestrians, passengers and even more so for vehicles. My first experiences with public transportation happened the day I arrived and was seeking for a public phone or Internet to get in touch with my family. The buses are actually cars that in Europe are allowed to carry 9 persons, including the driver. However, in Tanzania they carry the driver, a conductor and have seats for 12 to 15 persons, depending on their body size and luggage. There is also room enough for at least 5 passengers to stand. Naturally, they are not always fully loaded when driven, however there was this one ride when I counted 28 people inside a car, including myself. Some buses are bigger and can carry at least twice this number of people. School children are allowed to travel for free if they are wearing their uniforms. The conductors however, do not like this regulation and during rush hours allow only a few of school kids on their bus.

The infrastructure of the city of Dar es Salaam is a typical example of a rapidly growing city without planning. Some people there are of the opinion that  $\frac{3}{4}$

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<sup>196</sup> 30.4.2008, Dar es Salaam

of the city are slums. My impression is that, probably around 60% of the housings are slums. The main roads are asphalt roads, the side roads are mostly out of dust. In the city center, the areas where international organizations and embassies, government buildings as well as big hotels are located are asphalt roads. However, there is lack of sewerage system which causes major flooding during the rainy season. I was lucky that I never experienced this myself; however I have had the chance to see it on the news a couple of times. The unplanned growth of the city raises several more problems, for example insufficient water and electricity supply. Moreover, one of the city's major problems is the high number of unemployed people. The city centre is a perfect example where even tourists can experience the consequences of this growth. The frequently visited places, such as, the big bus stands etc. there are a lot of young men who earn their living with selling their art. Most of this art are postcards and paintings of typical Tanzanian scenarios like Massai men in traditional clothing or women carrying baskets on their heads. The prizes are negotiable, hence I cannot tell how much they really earn and if it is indeed enough for them to make a living. When they speak about themselves, they use phrases like "I have to travel to work for two hours each morning." which creates the impression of a real labor condition not only to the listener but also for themselves. On the other hand, they might say good bye with the words "Visit me next time you're in town. I'll be under my tree.", which describes the location of their workplace.

The difference between the tourist and non-tourist season in Dar es Salaam is easy to recognize. During my stay I witnessed the change in people's behavior during the end of June and the beginning of July. Suddenly, there were more beggars on the streets, knowingly looking for tourists. Before they were not only fewer, they were also not focused on begging from foreigners. During this time it also happened to me a few times, that the conductors in the public busses tried to charge me higher prices. Sadly they did not succeed because I knew the correct prices, as well as how to ask for my change. The number of so called "flycatchers" also increased rapidly. The flycatchers are people working for small companies which offer safaris, trips to Zanzibar, and so forth. They walk along the tourist trails and try to "catch" as many tourists as they can, to bring them into their bosses office. I have been in a couple of these offices and at least I could make myself a picture of the service they provided. In the eyes of a European, their efforts are appreciable, but they do not necessarily

one of their professionalism. Even though I would not doubt that they do not provide the service which they are offering at their best efforts, I think they are losing most of their potential customers because there are countless companies offering the same services for almost the same price. Approximately the same is happening to other businesses. On some streets of Dar es Salaam the business owners specialize on some goods, for example furniture. Customers know that if they are looking for a new table, bed or something of that assortment of goods, they can find it at that particular street. At the same time the business owners are in constant competition over the customers and are forced to negotiate their prices to lower levels, instead of working together and be able to widen their range of products. In Tanzania, people have a strong feeling of self-responsibility for their well being. They complain on unfulfilled government promises and bad luck, but they are also making serious efforts to improve their life situation. For example I found out that one watchman at the hostel where I stayed the first 4 weeks, had to pay half of his monthly salary on public transportation in order to come to work every day. After a long time of saving money he managed to buy himself a bicycle – worth a 2 months' salary. This recognition and the practical realization impressed me very much.

Due to high unemployment the people seek for self-employment. Like the street artists, who are mostly underage, there are lots of men and women selling goods in the city and around the city center. Women are selling fruits and fried fish, which they carry typically on their heads. Their typical customers are not tourists but ordinary Tanzanians who are used to buy food on the street. In the areas that follow the city center and where bigger companies are located, the streets are full of people who sell food especially around noon time. One can buy different kinds of fruits and sugarcane juices and pieces of fresh fruits, fried or cooked cassava, barbecued meat on sticks, maize and so on. In the evenings, when most of the people are on their way home from work, the bigger bus terminals transfer into markets with an even wider variety of take away food. To me, those were incredible opportunities to experience the local cuisine, but as I have been told, to buy this kind of food every day is financially not advisable. For a foreigner like me, those were special moments where I saw and felt the cultural difference between the developed and developing world in a positive light. However the reality behind this, did not draw necessarily such a nice picture. This is another part of the problem with the employment situation in Dar es Salaam. These people who sell the food on the streets are self-employed, those who

are their customers and mostly enjoy the privilege of an employment contract have in most cases working hours which Europeans could legally not afford, and hence have to buy their breakfast, lunch and dinner as a take away. As far as my impression goes, the government is not successful in dealing with this situation of high unemployment on the one hand and bad working conditions in the formal sector on the other. The efforts are made to integrate the informal sector into the legal system. Often I had the impression, that the poorer people get, the harder they are trying to sell something. In Tanzania, a lot of those who work on the streets speak about their work as their business. It is true that a lot of courage and creativity is needed to earn one's living with such work.

Other versions of self-employment that are parts of the informal sector concern the selling of all kinds of goods from water to shoes, newspapers, cashew nuts, DVDs, chargers for cell phones etc. The people who sell those items are seeking their customers in cafés, between cars on the streets and at bus stops. All of their prizes are negotiable and the origin of the goods they sell is questionable. In better cases, they bought it at a market for a low prize, but sometime it seems that those items might have been stolen.<sup>197</sup> Hence, the issue of unemployment is closely linked to criminal behavior and in some cases even be encouraging this behavior.

Shortly after my arrival I have noticed the overwhelming presence of police and military officers in the public space is very high. Additionally to that, there were also many private security companies that had their own staff guarding banks, hotels etc. Even the hostel where I stayed hired three watchmen who worked in shifts, during the nights. It gave me a certain feeling of confidence when I saw policemen on the streets, who at least winked at me, to signal everything is alright. On the other hand, I have heard various stories about police brutality and even more of rough treatment of the militaries. This problem, which has been described to me by the locals, is strongly related to corruption. As in almost all sectors of public services the salaries of the police officers are very low, which makes them very prone to engage in corruption. Even the people complain about the ongoing corruption in high political and economical ranks, however are very tolerant towards bribery on lower levels. Hence it is no problem to ride a car without a driving license or under the influence of alcohol, if you have enough cash with you. On the surface it seems, that little payments to police officers are not causing that much harm, and those citizens

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<sup>197</sup> Like the cell phone which I bought, that had a lot of contacts on it already.

who engage in these transactions perceive it on the one hand as a means to seek help from the police and on the other as helping them financially. But in my eyes, the attitude towards bribery within society is a huge hindering factor in the government's fight against corruption and it even contributes in widening the problem as it is. The table below makes the acceptance of bribery in the society very clear.

**Table 19: Contact with Government Services and Whether Bribe was Paid**

Service Sector	Dar es Salaam		Other Urban		Rural Areas	
	Contact (%)	Bribe (%)	Contact(%)	Bribe (%)	Contact (%)	Bribe (%)
Police	20	55	9	33	9	33
Legal system	14	43	9	22	9	22
Registry and permits	14	29	6	17	6	17
Taxation	7	14	4	0	4	0
Education	27	15	31	10	32	3
Utilities	12	17	5	0	5	0
Health services	42	24	43	9	43	9

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During my stay, I also learned more about the bureaucratic system in Tanzania, when I was struggling to receive permission for visiting and using the library of the University of Dar es Salaam. According to their homepage, foreigners and foreign researchers have to pay a fee which permits them access to the library for a duration of three months. However, when I first arrived there and asked for this permit, the staff sent me around from office to another until I was finally told that I have to get a letter of recommendation from a professor of the University of Vienna. The problem was that the University of Vienna and the UDSM have an agreement within the Joint Study programme. According to the staff, I could not be treated as a foreign researcher because of this agreement, even when I came to Tanzania without engaging the Joint Study programme. In the end it took me almost two weeks, to contact a professor in Vienna who would write me a letter of recommendation that I could present to the responsible person in the library. I received a stamp on the copy of that e-mail, which later on served as my ID and allowed me to use the library for 17 days. Luckily it that was all the time that I needed there and it was just one of several libraries in the city. I found it ironic, how much effort and time it took me to get the permission, regardless of the information which the UDSM provided on the

<sup>198</sup> Tanzania Poverty and Human Development Report 2007: p 64

Internet. Regardless I have to say that all the staff have been helpful and nice, as well as, teaching me patience towards the African time conception.

After I have spent a month in a hostel, I have made several friends at the Changanyikeni village and was invited to stay at a young woman's apartment for the rest of my sojourn. She lived at the other end of the village in a two room apartment. Moving to her place and additionally experiencing living under the same conditions (the previously mentioned corrugated iron roof) like many other people in Dar es Salaam was a very impressive experience to me. The apartment was part of a block of 5 apartments which belonged to a landlord, whose house was located there as well. In the middle was a standpipe which supplied the people of these apartments however also other nearby houses. The distribution and the costs were divided between all of them. It was filled with clean (not drinking) water which arrived in a truck once a week. On the days when the water was brought, the standpipe was occupied for hours when all the people came to gather the water into huge buckets which they would keep at home. My roommate told me, that you can use the water for cooking, only if you gather it fresh. After standing in the pipe for more than two days, it can be only used for cleaning dishes, washing clothes and bathing. It never occurred to me before, how much water a person needs every day, until I had to go out for water just to be able to take a shower or wash a shirt. Furthermore, I have experienced how it is when the water supply is not on time. . It occasionally happens that without any further explanation the truck with clean water comes one or even two days later that it should. If one expects this, it would probably cause less trouble but the water was scarce even if it came on time. On those occasions where it came late, we had to buy some water for cooking, give some to our neighbors and cut back on water where it was possible. The cost of drinking water from the shop, compared to the water which is brought by the truck is beyond the means of many people. The value of water as one of the most necessary resources for life and living obviously got lost in our culture of prosperity. Similar is the case with the value of food and knowledge about nutrition.

After I have spent lots of time with Tanzanians of different societal ranks, I have learned how they value food. The typical breakfast for many people is a strong black tea with herbs (Indian chai), milk and lots of sugar, which counts for a whole meal. Of course there are many foods available for breakfast, most of them fried like chapati ( a kind of bread, originally from India), rice flour balls and others.

Nonetheless, the tea remains the foremost kind of breakfast. Most Tanzanians eat only one proper dish per day, mostly in the early evening. In Europe, the main parts on our plates are meat with a vegetable sauce which we eat with potatoes, pasta, rice etc. In Tanzania the main part is maize, rice, potatoes or cooked bananas, meat and vegetables are on the side. The reason is not only that the rice and maize is cheaper and more available, it also contains more calories and fills the stomach for a longer period of time. In Tanzanian terms it “makes you strong”. Even when I could afford to buy European style food in Tanzania, I ate the same as the people there and can tell that the cuisine is not poor at all, especially when it comes to vegetables and spices. A big advantage is also the availability of fresh fruits that the country offers, as such. Concerning the nutrition it is also important to mention the importance of soda drinks. Soda drinks from the Coca-Cola Company and Pepsi Company are highly popular among Tanzanians. They are usually offered to guests and are also refreshments at other occasions. Unlike in Europe where we drink soft drinks in high doses, in Tanzania they are sold in small recycled bottles. One day I was invited to a neighbor who lived nearby. It was early afternoon and he was at home with his grandmother only. He made us sit down in the front yard and served us each a bottle of soda. His grandmother, who was religious, made a cross in front of her chest before she took the first sip, as a lot of people here do before eating. If people in the European countries would be aware that even sodas are a part of their daily nutrition we might have less problems with overweight as a societal disease. During my visit at my friend’s home, we were talking a lot about differences between cultures. He asked me whether if it was true, that we in Europe “give our old people in special houses” instead of living with them. This was an instance when I felt deeply ashamed about our culture. He was right with his assumption and even when I tried to explain that life in Europe is much faster and apparently so complex that we do not have the time to take care of our older generation anymore, I admitted that there is nothing to this practice that would make it appreciable.

The views on Europeans that prevail in the Tanzanian society to this day astonished me to a great deal. At first I was confronted with the predominant perception that all Europeans are rich and healthy. When I was walking down street, regardless in what part of the city, I was constantly greeted. A greeting in Tanzania is far more than a “Hello, how are you?”, especially when you are of white skin. Everyone wants to be your friend and know everything about you. This meant in my

case that most of the people greeted me were men. Some of them were not even embarrassed to reveal to me, that they would like to marry me and come with me to Europe. They did not mean it in any offensive way, but walking around and appearing to be a free ticket to prosperity certainly did not give me much confidence. However in other cases, the people just wanted to welcome me to their country and ask me about my visit. I had difficulties dealing with the fact that I was always provoking attention and that so many people wanted to talk with me. Later on I learned to handle it better and tried to make the best out of it. When I got malaria, which happened during my fifth week in Dar es Salaam, many people expressed how sorry they were and at the same time told me that now I have the full Africa experience. Some people were also astonished and I have been told that until today there is still the believe that white people never get sick. One day, our landlords' daughter invited me over for oranges. She was exited to speak with me because she was attending a private school that teaches in English and she believed she could learn this way something from me. First she was surprised, that English was not my mother tongue. I explained to her, that each nation in Europe has their own first language and English is in most cases the second language that is taught in schools. In Tanzania the importance is laid upon the international language, however the knowledge among the citizens is very poor. English is taught in private schools that only rich people can afford for their children. Furthermore, there are secondary schools, which are by far not attended by all children. The quality of teaching in public schools is mostly poor, especially in the rural areas. In our conversation, we talked a lot about differences between our cultures. I have learned that the picture that the film industry presents in their movies and sitcoms is the one which prevails in people's heads. The young woman asked me how it is possible that all people in Europe are slim and how it works that women recover so fast after giving birth. I told her not to believe what the movies show and that reality is almost always the opposite. Other differences in our cultures concern the values we have in life.

In Tanzanian's society still the most important goals are considered marriage, having a big and healthy family. But in the first place, people want to achieve a stable financial ground for themselves and later on for their families. That is why so many people seek to come to Europe and earn as much money as possible. I have tried to explain what usually happens to Africans who come to Europe the difficulties they immediately face and disillusionment. I did not talk about laws

which make it almost impossible to stay and work under legal conditions. I was trying to make the point what racism means in these territories, which are the predominant challenges for Africans living in European countries. It appeared to be impossible to make it clear, because the opinion prevails that a white person is always worth more. This became even more obvious to me on several different occasions, for instance, in buses when I was offered a better seat, in restaurants when I got served first and especially during conversations when I tried to make a point that we are all the same, no matter where we live on and how wealthy or poor we are. The disillusioning cognition came to me that racism has spread so far, as to the people's minds and appears to be the norm. Dealing with this fact was difficult to me, especially when I tried to talk a friend out of his plans to come to Europe no matter what it costs. At least I convinced him, to keep on trying it the legal way and not to risk his life for something which appears to be a dream but could ultimately end in a nightmare.

Every time I got the chance, I have tried to gather some of people's views on development and responsibility. It is truly not in the Tanzanian character to complain much about things which one himself cannot change. People usually do not engage in the debate concerning responsibility for the country's development. Moreover, they are struggling to support and ensure the well-being of their families. A lot of people with regular incomes who live in towns are sending money to their relatives in rural areas, especially to support those who are receiving education. This is a very important concern to all, because it is widely acknowledged that a solid education is the first and most important step towards a prosperous future. The best choice is private schooling, which unfortunately remains a privilege for wealthy children. The public schools lack in quality of the teaching, but in some cases can also provide good education. Children who attend public secondary schools and later on universities have to put in a lot of effort, that is incomparable to the effort which is displayed by European students. This is how new elites are build and the future leaders of the country are selected. Concerning the development of the country the citizens' count on their government. They admit that the progress is slow and the results are rather poor, however they hope and trust in the development. I was positively surprised when I saw, how interested the people are in progress and in their country. Every day I saw people standing around newsstands and reading the headlines. Buying the newspapers would be too expensive which the salesmen

understand and this is why they let them read it for free, or at least read the front page or the headlines. In the evening people come together in bars and watch the news on TV, those are the times when the bars are populated the most. They show many programmes regarding domestic news and only very little on international issues. Not one day goes by, when at least one of the headlines, whether in the newspapers or at the news on TV talks about new contracts with development partners, organizations or donors. The huge sums of money are exposed as the government's achievements along with promises, of investing this money in infrastructure, health care, and so on. It made me wonder, why the people were not complaining more about the insufficient fulfillment of these promises, because of this overly presence in the media which also creates the impression of populism among the side of the development partners. The government is basically only raising quantitative data which are presented to the public eye and internationals, but the qualitative improvements which would be felt directly by the citizens are still rare. Hence it would be false to say, that the citizens have apathy on the issues of development. Moreover, I got the impression that they rely on their leaders like they did once on Julius Nyerere, whom they called the nation's teacher.<sup>199</sup> Even when the political landscape changed in recent years, through the implementation of multi-party politics and the wider and deeper involvement of international organizations and others into the domestic politics, the people's perceptions remained almost unchanged. This fact speaks a lot for the politics and it ensures the stability of the system, on the other hand it is another sign that the government in the past and in the presence remains unsuccessful in its efforts to engage its citizens in the development.

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<sup>199</sup> The name often appears as "Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere", which in Swahili means teacher.

## **Conclusion:**

In my diploma thesis I sought to connect the different levels of international development politics with domestic concern in political culture. Throughout my research I came across many studies that shared a variety of aspects with either one of the field. However, they never seemed to intervene. My main focus was to find a connection between these two levels, in order to obtain a different angle on international development politics and strategies and their subsequent impact in their respective target countries. I selected Tanzania for a number of reasons. First of all, because of its unique political history within the African countries, as well as because of my previous knowledge of the Swahili language. Finally, I decided to take a further look at “Good Governance.” This expression emerged in recent years on the political scene and has ever since become a synonym for political strategies of development politics. Moreover, it has expanded the concept and understanding of democracy. Despite lacking a clear and finite definition, it does provide a set of values among which some can clearly be attributed to the domain of political culture.

Since the end of the Cold War the development policies and strategies of the International Organizations and donors were widely extended by political conditionalities. “Good Governance” provides a link between the ideological values and the demands laid on Third World countries’ governments, which rely on the support from the IFIs and donors. Ever since the involvement of these organizations in the domestic politics of the target countries is rising.

In Tanzania, this involvement resolved in changes like economical liberalization and the introduction of multi-party politics. Furthermore, it led to many other modifications of laws, regulations and on institutional levels. The government however, did those changes primarily upon the demand of foreign interests instead of answering to domestic claims. The enhancement of political participation and the establishment of a civil society which are both important components of Good Governance were not yet achieved to satisfactory levels.

The integration of the citizens into the development process proved to be a struggle for the government ever since its independence. During Nyerere’s regime, this integration was partly successful, the citizens were aware of the national strategies. The mobilization and participation of the people was foremost voluntary,

but at times as well upon compulsion. The citizens have found their own strategies to work around these regulations, which prevail until today. The government was not successful to implement the nation's development as a collective responsibility. On the contrary, the regulations and limitations of participation that were established during the time of African Socialism are still fundamental to peoples' attitudes. They rely on their leaders and show very little efforts for the greater good. The involvement of international interests in the domestic policies, which are crucial for the receiving of aids, widened the gap between the government and its citizens. From the 1990s on the CSOs and NGOs were established. They continually are making efforts to enhance participation and to create a bottom-up development process.

The former single party CCM is stable and confident in its role as the leaders of the nation. The election results prove that the opposition parties have only very little impact on the political landscape in Tanzania. This confidence is one of the chief reasons why the enhancement of political participation in terms of a critical society is not popular in the government's ranks. Moreover, the participation which is requested only if it fits the official plan has become a traditional approach even for the citizens. The values of the government have shifted over time, from an emphasis on nationality and strong commitment to the nation towards meeting foreign demands. The reason for this can be located in the country's history and in the pressure that is put upon the government by the IFIs and donors. The government and its country as a whole are heavily dependent on foreign aid. These grant can only be obtained upon fulfilment of these conditionalities. Hence, the government is bound to these requests that in the other hand should be beneficiary for the citizens. This top-down approach of development politics does not fulfil its goals, but remains the foremost strategy.

The political culture in Tanzania has slowly changed in the years since its independence. The switch from a participatory in the years after independence, to a rather passive position during the times of Ujamaa. After the change of the official position towards the involvement on the IFIs and donors into Tanzania's politics, the citizens are confronted with a new situation. Their representatives are making big promises upon the background of received aids. Moreover, the international interests are put on top of political outputs. The IFIs and donors are very present in the public to almost the same extend as the government itself, but none of them are taking over responsibility for the lacking success of the development process. The citizens

however, lost confidence that their voices will be still heard and answered by their leaders. Under these circumstances the political system can still remain stable, as well as the development process which is slow and not satisfactory. Unless both, the government and its donors acknowledge the importance of political participation and a critical civil society, this trend will continue and development will remain an issue of higher ranks.

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## Appendix :

Official definitions of terms used in OECD/DAC studies:

*“Bilateral official development assistance is from one country to another.”*<sup>200</sup>

*“Untied bilateral official development assistance is assistance from country to country for which the associated goods and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries.”*<sup>201</sup>

*“Imports and imported value of goods (merchandise) are goods that add to the stock of material resources of a country by entering its economic territory.”*<sup>202</sup>

*“Goods admitted free of duties are exports of goods (excluding arms) received from developing countries and admitted without tariffs to developed countries.”*<sup>203</sup>

*“There is no established convention for the designation of *developed* and *developing* countries or areas in the United Nations system.”*<sup>204</sup>

*“Debt relief committed under HIPC Initiative (in United States dollars) as a component of official development assistance has been recorded in different ways over time. (...) Since 1993, forgiveness of debt originally intended for military purposes has been reportable as “other official flows”, while forgiveness of other non- ODA loans (mainly export credits) recorded as ODA has been included in both country data and total Committee ODA, as it was until 1989.”*<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> UNDG (2003) : p 71

<sup>201</sup> UNDG (2003) : p 73

<sup>202</sup> UNDG (2003) : p 76

<sup>203</sup> UNDG (2003) : p 76

<sup>204</sup> UNDG (2003) : p 76f

<sup>205</sup> UNDG (2003) : p 84

### ***Abstract English:***

In my diploma thesis I examine the impact of the international organizations and donors on Tanzania's political culture. More precisely, I observe the influence through the term "Good Governance" which is the main conditionality laid on the government. In my hypothesis, I assume that the domestic decision-making process is dominated by the donors' interests. Thus, the position of the government towards its citizens and vice versa is changing as they both drift apart from each other. The articulation of the demands is in many cases less concerning those who are affected by the circumstance, but is rather done by the international organizations, whose economic power is thereby strengthened. This process started with the liberalization of the political structure in the 1980s, resulting in the implementation of the multi-party system in 1992. At the same time Tanzania introduced several development programs, which are more or less dominated by international interests.

The structure of my thesis starts with a theoretical introduction on the basic terms of "Political Culture" and "Good Governance". Furthermore, an analysis is carried out on Tanzania's political culture at the background of the politics of the African Socialism. The most important external and national development programs that gained importance since the 1990s are introduced. In the last part of my thesis I examine the field of tension of the (post-) African Socialism regime and the concept of "Good Governance", which is responsible for the alteration of Tanzania's political culture.

## ***Abstract Deutsch:***

In meiner Diplomarbeit gehe ich der Frage nach, welchen Einfluss die Internationalen Organisationen und Geldgeber auf die Politische Kultur Tansanias haben. Konkret befasse ich mich mit den Einflüssen auf den Entscheidungsprozess durch den Begriff „Good Governance“, welcher als Vorbedingung für finanzielle Unterstützungen an die Regierung gestellt wird. In meinen Hypothesen vermute ich, dass der innenpolitische Entscheidungsprozess von den Interessen der Geldgeber dominiert wird. Dadurch verändert sich zwangsläufig die Haltung der Regierung gegenüber der Bevölkerung und umgekehrt, beide entfernen sich dabei zunehmend voneinander. Die Artikulation der Bedürfnisse obliegt in vielen Fällen nicht den Betroffenen, sondern den internationalen Organisationen und mit anderen Worten jenen, welche ihre Macht finanziell stützen. Dieser Prozess hat bereits mit der Liberalisierung der politischen Struktur in den 1980er Jahren begonnen, welche zur Einführung des Mehr-Parteien Systems geführt hat. Zeitgleich wurden zahlreiche Entwicklungsprogramme in Tansania eingeführt, welche mehr oder weniger von internationalen Interessen geleitet wurden.

Der Aufbau meiner Arbeit umfasst eine theoretische Einführung in die Begriffe der „Politischen Kultur“ sowie des Begriffs „Good Governance“. Weiters stelle ich eine Analyse der Politischen Kultur, vor dem Hintergrund der Politik des Afrikanischen Sozialismus dar. Ich stelle die wichtigsten externen und internen Entwicklungsprogramme und Initiativen, welche seit den 1990er Jahren zunehmend an Bedeutung gewonnen haben vor. Im letzten Teil meiner Arbeit wird das Spannungsverhältnis vom (Post-)Afrikanischen Sozialismus und dem Konzept von „Good Governance“ untersucht, welcher für den Wandel der Politischen Kultur ausschlaggebend ist.



# CURRICULUM VITAE

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### **Personal Information**

Date of Birth: 20.7.1086  
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### **Study tours**

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### **Other activities**

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