

MASTERARBEIT | MASTER'S THESIS

Titel | Title

Authoritarian Regime Legacies and Migrant Political Participation in Europe

verfasst von | submitted by

Muhammet Said Nuhoglu

angestrebter akademischer Grad | in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (MA)

Wien | Vienna, 2025

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt |
Degree programme code as it appears on the
student record sheet:

UA 066 824

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt | Degree
programme as it appears on the student
record sheet:

Masterstudium Politikwissenschaft

Betreut von | Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Thomas Meyer PhD

Abstract in German

Diese Arbeit untersucht, wie politische Erfahrungen aus unterschiedlichen autoritären Regimen das politische Verhalten von Migrantinnen und Migranten der ersten Generation nach ihrer Ansiedlung in europäischen Demokratien weiterhin prägen, wobei zwischen links-autoritären und rechts-autoritären Herkunftskontexten unterschieden wird und Umfragedaten aus zwölf europäischen Ländern genutzt werden, um Wahlbeteiligung, Protestteilnahme und den Kontakt zu politischen Entscheidungsträgern zu analysieren.

Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass autoritäre Prägungen auch nach der Migration fortbestehen, sich jedoch je nach Form politischer Beteiligung unterschiedlich auswirken, wobei der stärkste Effekt beim Wählen zu beobachten ist.

Insgesamt macht die Studie deutlich, dass Migrantinnen und Migranten aus autoritären Regimen keine einheitliche Gruppe bilden und dass regimebezogene politische Sozialisation eine nachhaltige Rolle für demokratische Beteiligung spielt.

Abstract in English

This thesis examines how political experiences formed under different types of authoritarian regimes continue to shape the political participation of first-generation migrants after they settle in European democracies, focusing on differences between migrants from left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian contexts and drawing on cross-national survey data from twelve European countries to analyze voting, protest participation, and contact with politicians.

The findings show that authoritarian legacies persist after migration but affect participation in uneven ways, with the strongest effects observed in electoral behavior.

Overall, the study demonstrates that migrants from authoritarian regimes cannot be treated as a single group and that regime-specific political socialization plays a lasting role in democratic engagement.

Acknowledgements

During the preparation of this thesis, I made limited use of artificial intelligence tools and various dictionary and language support programs to assist with proofreading, grammatical corrections, and stylistic improvements at the sentence level. These tools were used solely to enhance language accuracy and clarity. The intellectual content, research design, data analysis, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this thesis are entirely my own. The use of such tools did not influence the substantive arguments or the scholarly contribution of the study.

The empirical analysis conducted in this thesis is based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), which is collected through regularly conducted, high-quality cross-national surveys. All raw data and datasets used in this study were constructed from European Social Survey Rounds 6, 7, and 8. Upon reasonable request, the datasets generated for this thesis can be made available by the author.

Table of Contents

1	INTRODUCTION.....	8
1.1	The Aim of the Study	9
1.2	Summary of Key Findings	11
1.3	Broader Context: Migration, Democracy, and Political Socialization	11
1.4	Structure of Thesis.....	13
2	LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	14
2.1	Political Participation: Conceptual Foundations	15
2.2	Classifications and Forms of Participation.....	15
2.3	Participation in Migrant Contexts	16
2.4	Factors Influencing Migrant Political Engagement	17
2.4.1	Factors at the Individual Level.....	17
2.4.2	Factors of the Host Country	18
2.4.3	Factors Related to the Origin Country	19
2.4.4	Transnational Factors	19
2.5	Authoritarian Legacies and Migrant Political Participation.....	20
2.5.1	Left- and Right-Authoritarian Regimes as Distinct Socialization Contexts	20
2.5.2	Mechanisms of Political Socialization under Authoritarianism	22
2.5.3	Regime Type and Migrants' Political Behavior	22
2.5.4	Divergent Experiences of Left- and Right-Authoritarian Émigrés	23
2.6	Research Gaps and Theoretical Rationale.....	24
2.6.1	Restricted Comparative Examination of Left- vs Right-Authoritarian Migrants ..	24
2.6.2	Empirical Discrepancies in Elucidating Protest Versus Institutional Modes of Participation	25
2.6.3	Contribution to Political Sociology, Migration Studies, and Regime-Type Literature	25
2.7	Theoretical Frameworks on Migrant Political Participation	26
2.7.1	Theoretical Framework for Hypothesis 1: Voting	26
2.7.2	Theoretical Framework for Hypothesis 2: Protest Participation	27

2.7.3	Theoretical Framework for Hypothesis 3: Institutional Contacting.....	29
3	DATA AND METHODOLOGY	30
3.1	Methodological Approach	30
3.2	Data and Case Selection	31
3.3	Operationalization of Variables	33
3.3.1	Dependent Variables.....	34
3.3.2	Independent Variable: Regime Type of Country of Origin	34
3.3.3	Control Variables	35
3.3.4	Country-Level Controls and Fixed Effects	36
3.4	Data Cleaning and Sample Size	36
3.5	The Analytical Method.....	37
4	EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS	40
4.1	Overview of Empirical Approach	40
4.2	Overview of the Analytical Sample	41
4.3	Descriptive Statistics	41
4.4	Model 1 – Voting Participation	43
4.5	Model 2 – Protest Participation	45
4.6	Model 3 – Contacting Political Officials.....	49
4.7	Cross-Model Comparison, Robustness Checks, and Methodological Reflections	51
4.8	Concluding Reflection.....	53
5	DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION.....	53
5.1	Interpreting the Empirical Findings Against Theoretical Expectations	53
5.1.1	Voting Participation	53
5.1.2	Protest Participation	54
5.1.3	Contacting Politicians	55
5.1.4	Summary of Theoretical Alignment	56
5.2	Institutional vs. Non-Institutional Participation	56
5.3	Concluding Remarks	59
6	List of References.....	60

List of Tables

Table 1. Classification of Origin Countries by Authoritarian Regime Type	38
Table 2. Descriptive Overview of the Data	41
Table 3. Political Participation Rates by Authoritarian Regime Type.....	42
Table 4. Political Participation of Migrants by Host Country	42
Table 5. Voting Participation – Regression	43
Table 6. Voting Participation - AME	44
Table 7. Protest Participation – Regression.....	46
Table 8. Protest Participation - AME.....	47
Table 9. Reduced Model Results (No Controls).....	47
Table 10. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Protest Participation	48
Table 11. Contacting Political Officials – Regression.....	49
Table 12. Contacting Political Officials - AME	50
Table 13. Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) Across Models	52

1 INTRODUCTION

Migration and democracy are increasingly interconnected in contemporary Europe (Schwiertz, 2022). As societies across the continent grow more varied, questions about the political participation of newcomers have become prominent subjects in both scholarly inquiry and public dialogue (Hunger, 2018). The political involvement of migrants is essential for integration processes, democratic legitimacy, and the overall effectiveness of representative institutions (Dollmann, 2022). Democracies must guarantee that migrants are not only integrated into their societies but also empowered to express their opinions in the political sphere to remain open and responsive (Blok, and Häuser, 2025).

This issue gains heightened significance when considering migrants from authoritarian regimes. These individuals differ from migrants from democratic nations in that they have been politically socialized in environments marked by substantial limits, manipulation, or repression of involvement (Neundorff, and Pop-Eleches, 2020). Authoritarian regimes employ various control techniques; some rely on coerced mobilization and ideological indoctrination, while others promote apathy and disengagement through repression and depoliticization (Chan, 2024). These formative experiences shape citizens' political attitudes, their sense of efficacy, and their behavioral habits (Quintelier, and Deth, 2014). Individuals who relocate do not leave such legacies in their wake. Instead, they introduced into more democratic environments where participation is both expected and encouraged (Fitzgerald et al., 2023).

The examination of political involvement among refugees from authoritarian regimes is significant for three primary reasons. Initially, it stimulates theoretical discourse in political science (Wackenhut, and Orjuela, 2023). Research on political socialization has continuously highlighted the importance of early experiences; yet, there is a lack of studies investigating the global continuity of authoritarian legacies. This thesis elucidates the impact of different varieties of authoritarianism on political behavior by discriminating among regime situations. Secondly, it addresses some deficiencies in empirical migration research. Much of the literature has focused on the legal, economical, or ethnic aspects influencing participation; however, the impact of the regime structure of an individual's origin country has not been widely and in detail examined. Third, it significantly influences policy. In an era of heightened political polarization and contention around migration, it is essential to understand how migrants from authoritarian contexts engage with democratic systems to formulate inclusive integration policies and counter the notion that migrants lack political interest.

Recent studies on migrant engagement indicate that multiple factors influence political participation. Legal frameworks determine the eligibility of migrants to vote or hold public office (Bloemraad, 2006). Socioeconomic position affects access to vital resources for participation (Verba et al., 1978). Associational networks enable mobilization (Fennema, and Tillie, 1999). Transnational ties affect the degree to which migrants focus their political efforts on their country of origin or on their host country (Guarnizo et al., 2003). These contributions have been vital, however, they sometimes underestimate the influential impact of political culture and regime

experience. Migrants from authoritarian regimes may display comparable socioeconomic characteristics to other migrants; nonetheless, their political viewpoints could be influenced by distinct histories of compulsion, repression, or indoctrination.

Understanding the distinction between left- and right-authoritarian regimes is crucial. Left-authoritarian regimes, such as the Soviet Union, emphasized popular engagement through ritualized methods—including predetermined elections, compulsory organizational membership, and ideological displays. These events shaped citizens' perception of engagement as performance rather than as agency (Loewenstein, 2007). Upon relocating to a new country, these individuals may harbor distrust towards democratic elections, perceiving them as managed rather than as genuine choices (Bilodeau et al., 2010). Conversely, right-authoritarian governments completely curtailed public participation, prioritizing obedience, nationalism, or religious authority (Chan, 2024). Individuals raised in such circumstances sometimes lacked substantial political experience; nonetheless, this deficiency may render them more receptive to novel democratic prospects.

Europe functions as an essential testing ground. Individuals from various authoritarian regimes – both right and left authoritarian - reside in Europe. The world encompasses various political systems, including inclusive and restrictive integration models, proportional and majoritarian electoral frameworks, as well as diverse methods for public protest and community engagement (Mansouri, and Elias, 2025). Analyzing migrants from authoritarian backgrounds across different host nations allows us to identify both general patterns and context-specific variations (El-Awad et al., 2025).

Ultimately, this research is significant due to the crucial role of political involvement for people and the overall vitality of democracy (Zaslove et al., 2021). The involvement, or absence thereof, of migrants signifies the level of inclusion in democratic institutions. If authoritarian legacies persistently obstruct participation, democracies face challenges in effectively representing all citizens. Conversely, if individuals from authoritarian regimes exploit democratic chances, it demonstrates the resilience and adaptability of both the populace and institutions (Adler et al., 2023).

To address these questions, the thesis draws on cross-national survey data and compares migrants from different authoritarian contexts across multiple European democracies to analyze how left- and right-authoritarian legacies influence the political participation of migrants in democratic Europe.

This thesis argues that political orientations shaped under authoritarian rule continue to influence migrants' political behavior after settlement in democratic contexts. Different types of authoritarian regimes create distinct patterns of political socialization, making it inappropriate to treat migrants from left- and right-authoritarian backgrounds as a uniform group (Lindemann, 2023). By comparing migrants originating from different authoritarian contexts, the thesis highlights how regime legacies shape democratic engagement in varied and enduring ways.

1.1 The Aim of the Study

The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the influence of authoritarian regimes on the political participation of first-generation migrants in European democracies. This emphasis encapsulates a core tenet of political behavior research: political orientations and repertoires are not formed in isolation but are contextualized within the institutional and cultural frameworks of individuals' upbringing. Political socialization during childhood and adolescence establishes lasting influences that continue to shape conduct, even as individuals move to other environments (Brown et al., 2023).

In democratic contexts, early political education often fosters pluralism, civic trust, and participatory norm. Educational institutions, family, and civil society instill ideals of tolerance and efficacy (Kiess, 2022). Conversely, authoritarian regimes constrain individuals to exceedingly restricted political roles. These regimes employ propaganda, indoctrination, repression, and ritualized involvement to regulate individual behavior (Leber et al., 2023). Such experiences elucidate the nature of politics, the various forms of participation available, and the potential risks associated with engagement.

Left-authoritarian regimes, grounded in Marxist-Leninist ideology, compelled participation from individual (Adler et al., 2023). Elections characterized by predetermined outcomes, mandatory organizational affiliation, and ideological mobilization cultivate a culture of "participation without choice". This experience may instill enduring cynicism towards elections, as migrants nurtured in such contexts may perceive voting as manipulation rather than genuine representation (Adler et al., 2023).

Right-authoritarian regimes, conversely, dissuaded collective assembly and promoted obedience while discouraging political engagement (Winter et al., 2022). Individuals residing under such regimes frequently lacked opportunities for participation, even symbolically. Individuals who relocate from such countries may prioritize genuine opportunities to participate in democratic elections; nevertheless, they may also exhibit reluctance to engage with politics due to a lack of trust in the government (Fliess et al., 2025).

The differences between coerced mobilization in left-authoritarian systems and enforced depoliticization in right-authoritarian regimes suggest that migrants socialized in these contexts may engage differently in various forms of democratic participation.

From this overarching question, the following hypotheses emerge:

- H1 (Turnout): Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are expected to be more likely to vote than migrants from left-authoritarian regimes.
- H2 (Protest): Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are expected to be more likely to participate in protests (e.g. lawful demonstrations) than migrants from left-authoritarian regimes.

- H3 (Contacting politicians): Migrants from left-authoritarian regimes are expected to be more likely to engage in institutional political participation – such as contacting government officials – than those from right-authoritarian regimes.

These hypotheses allow for systematic testing of the differentiated effects of regime type.

To test these expectations, the thesis employs pooled data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Rounds 6–8. The ESS provides high-quality, cross-national survey data that captures self-reported political behaviors across twelve European democracies, which are; Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Norway and Denmark. Focusing on first-generation migrants ensures that analysis captures the direct influence of origin-country legacies.

The methodology relies on logistic regression models with host-country fixed effects, which isolate the impact of origin regime type from national institutional differences. Control variables include age, gender, education. Results are interpreted using odds ratios and average marginal effects, providing both substantive and statistical clarity.

1.2 Summary of Key Findings

The empirical results show that authoritarian regime legacies influence political participation among first-generation migrants, although their effects differ across participation types. In line with H1, migrants originating from right-authoritarian regimes report higher levels of voting than those from left-authoritarian contexts, and this pattern remains consistent after adjusting for demographic characteristics and host-country differences (Just, 2019). For protest participation, the findings provide only limited support for H2: differences between left- and right-authoritarian migrants are small, context-dependent, and in several specifications statistically weak once controls are included, indicating that protest is shaped more by host-country opportunity structures and individual resources than by origin-regime background. With respect to contacting politicians, the results provide only weak support for H3, as migrants from left-authoritarian regimes display slightly higher levels of institutional contact, but these differences are not statistically significant and overall engagement remains low. Across all models, individual resources such as education influence participation more strongly than regime type in activities that demand higher levels of information or institutional familiarity. Taken together, the findings demonstrate that authoritarian legacies persist after migration but do so unevenly: they are most visible in electoral participation, weaker in institutional contact, comparatively limited in expressive, non-institutional forms such as protest.

The study helps to improve scholarly understanding of how regime type affects migrant engagement by distinguishing between left- and right-authoritarian legacies.

1.3 Broader Context: Migration, Democracy, and Political Socialization

Migration is among the most significant phenomenon of the twenty-first century (Dao et al., 2021). It has transformed communities and compelled political institutions to engage with individuals from diverse backgrounds (Castles et. al., 2020). Migration has become both a demographic reality and a political concern in Europe. Debates about multiculturalism, integration, and national identity have gained significant importance in party competition and electoral outcomes. Consequently, it is imperative to understand the political engagement of migrants (Van Mol, and de Valk, 2016).

Legitimacy in democratic systems is often understood to depend on the representation of all citizens (Arnesen, and Peters, 2018). The principle of political equality is undermined when significant segments of the public are excluded from participation (Armingeon, and Schädel, 2015). For migrants, participation constitutes not merely a right but also a mechanism for integration (Grabowska et al., 2025). Engaging in politics demonstrates belonging, confers authority, and influences policies impacting migrant populations. Conversely, exclusion from politics may exacerbate social alienation, marginalization, and the emergence of alternative societies (Eldemerdash, 2025).

However, inclusion is not invariably equitable. A multitude of migrants lack citizenship for extended periods following their arrival, complicating their ability to vote (Mentesoglu Tardivo, 2025). Institutional obstacles, such as stringent residency prerequisites or citizenship regulations, exacerbate the difficulty of entry. Despite the provision of constitutional rights, informal obstacles such as prejudice, language hurdles, and a lack of understanding of institutional operations might hinder participation. These structural constraints intersect with migrants' prior political experiences, shaping their overall engagement patterns (Mentesoglu Tardivo, 2025).

Comparative politics has recognized the persistent influence of authoritarian legacies (Neundorf, and Pop-Eleches, 2020). Juan Linz, among others, has asserted that authoritarian governments vary in their methods of controlling and mobilizing populations (Linz, 2000). These disparities result in divergent cognitive frameworks among individuals that persist long after the government collapses or individuals relocate (Neundorf, and Pop-Eleches, 2020).

In left-authoritarian regimes, participation was obligatory but insubstantial (Lilly et al., 2025). Individuals discovered that voting did not alter outcomes and that political engagement was a need rather than an option. This experience undermines confidence in elections and may lead to apathy in democratic environments (Linz, 2000; Pop-Eleches, and Tucker, 2020).

In right-authoritarian regimes, citizens experienced depoliticization and repression (Neundorf et al., 2025). Political existence was confined to demonstrations of allegiance, and disagreement was harshly penalized. Relocating from such environments might evoke ambivalent emotions; individuals may harbor distrust towards authorities while simultaneously expressing gratitude for newfound liberties. Such ambivalences may result in distinct involvement patterns, particularly in non-institutional forms such as protest (Kivisto, and Vecchia-Mikkola, 2013).

Europe is a particularly important setting for analyzing authoritarian-background migrants. Initially, it accommodates individuals from various authoritarian regimes, including post-

communist nations, Middle Eastern autocracies, and African military regimes (Neundorff, and Pop-Eleches, 2020). This variety provides a natural method to evaluate our theoretical concepts.

Secondly, European democracies employ diverse methods for the integration of migrants (Schimmelfennig et al., 2023). Certain nations, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, prioritize multiculturalism and inclusion, whilst others, like France, emphasize assimilation (Blanc-Noël, 2010). These institutional contexts affect participation opportunities; nonetheless, the use of host-country fixed effects ensures that this thesis clarifies the implications of regime legacy.

Third, migration has emerged as a politically significant issue throughout Europe. Populist parties often depict migrants as apathetic or opposed to assimilation (Ambrosini, 2025). This study enhances informed discourse and addresses misconceptions by presenting evidence of migrants' actual participation.

Understanding the participation of migrants from authoritarian contexts has direct policy implications. Language acquisition and employment are frequently the primary objectives of integration programs; however, civic integration remains inadequately established (Grabowska et al., 2025). To foster involvement among migrants from authoritarian regimes who possess legacies of suspicion or disengagement, targeted civic education and institutional outreach may be crucial (Grubb, and Vitus, 2022). Conversely, recognizing that certain migrants from authoritarian regimes are enthusiastic about adopting democratic principles might facilitate the formulation of measures that promote and sustain this involvement (Jiang et al., 2023).

1.4 Structure of Thesis

This thesis is organized into six chapters, each of which contributes to the overall argument in distinct ways.

Chapter 2 - Literature Review and Theoretical Framework; surveys scholarship on political participation, migration, and political socialization. It distinguishes between conventional and unconventional forms of participation, reviews theories of authoritarian legacies, and highlights the gap concerning left- vs. right-authoritarian migrants. Based on this review, the chapter formulates hypotheses to guide the empirical analysis.

Chapter 3 - Data and Methodology; describes the research design in detail. It introduces the ESS dataset, explains the pooling of Rounds 6–8, and justifies the focus on first-generation migrants in twelve European democracies. It discusses the classification of origin regimes, the operationalization of dependent and independent variables, and the use of logistic regression with country fixed effects. The chapter also reflects on limitations such as sample size constraints, self-reporting biases, and the exclusion of second-generation migrants.

Chapter 4 - Empirical Analysis; presents the results systematically. It begins with descriptive statistics to show general patterns of participation. It then reports regression models for voting, protest, and contacting politicians, interpreting the findings in relation to hypotheses. Differences

across regime types are highlighted, and the results are presented with both statistical and substantive interpretation.

Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusion; connects the empirical findings back to theory. It evaluates the extent to which the hypotheses are confirmed, explains surprising results, and discusses why certain participation forms are more or less affected by authoritarian legacies. It emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between institutional and non-institutional participation and reflects on broader implications for theories of political socialization and migration.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The political participation of migrants has become a crucial focus of inquiry in political science and migration studies, especially with liberal democracies accommodating immigrants from authoritarian regimes. To create a definitive conceptual foundation for the analysis, certain essential terms must be defined. Political participation encompasses the actions performed by individuals to affect political decision-making, including election activity, protests, and lobbying efforts (Teorell, 2006). Migrant political behavior denotes how persons with a migration background participate in political processes within their host nations, influenced by their prior experiences and the new political opportunities accessible to them (Schönwälder, 2009).

Authoritarian regimes are political systems defined by restricted political plurality, concentrated authority, and diminished civil freedoms (Linz, 2000). In this typology, right-authoritarian regimes generally prioritize nationalism, traditionalism, and conservative social hierarchies, frequently upheld by militaristic or hierarchical governmental apparatuses (Lilly et al., 2025). Conversely, left-authoritarian governments are founded on socialist or Marxist principles, advocating for state-directed economic planning and frequently stifling dissent under the pretext of collective equality or anti-capitalist objectives (Nilsson, 2024).

Scholars have long emphasized the importance of civic voluntarism and resource availability in shaping participation among diverse populations (Verba et al., 1995). More recent cross-national analyses based on the European Social Survey highlight systematic patterns of immigrant mobilization and the role of residence duration in participation (de Rooij, 2012). Comparative evidence from Canada and Australia demonstrates that pre-migration political repression continues to influence migrants' protest engagement (Bilodeau, 2008), while studies in Europe reveal how transnational connections and dual loyalties shape voting behaviors abroad (Ciornei and Nielsen, 2020). Large-scale register studies further show how contextual factors—such as local networks and settlement locations—facilitate or hinder political integration (Bratsberg et al., 2021).

This thesis examines the influence of the regime type in migrants' countries of origin—specifically right-authoritarian versus left-authoritarian—on their political behavior in the host country. It analyzes how previous political socialization under various forms of authoritarianism affects migrants' political engagement once they are integrated into democratic nations. Understanding this relationship is essential for academic research and policy development, as it highlights the

long-lasting impacts of authoritarian governance and provides insight into the integration pathways of migrant groups in Europe (Wackenhut and Orjuela, 2023).

The primary aim of this chapter is to establish the theoretical and conceptual foundations for the empirical analysis. It begins by reviewing the principal definitions and classifications of political participation, then examines the determinants that affect migrant political involvement. The section next outlines the characteristics of authoritarian regimes and the differences between left- and right-authoritarianism, emphasizing their relevance for political socialization. Finally, it presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses and clarifies the research gaps that the thesis aims to address.

2.1 Political Participation: Conceptual Foundations

Political participation is a fundamental notion in the analysis of democratic governance and public involvement. It is regarded as a fundamental mechanism by which individuals and groups articulate their interests, preferences, and values within a democratic system (Verba, 1967). Political participation is intricately linked to the health and quality of democracy, as it shows the inclusivity and responsiveness of political institutions (Verba, 1967). Early theories of democracy prioritized voting as the main pillar of political will, while contemporary studies have expanded the focus to encompass diverse aspects of behaviors occurring both within and beyond institutional contexts (Teorell, 2006). Comprehending the conceptual basis and classifications of political participation is crucial for assessing how individuals engage in political life.

Political participation has been defined in several ways across the literature, frequently influenced by disciplinary emphasis and normative presuppositions. A prominent definition is provided by Verba, who characterizes political involvement as “those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba, 1967). This concept emphasizes the legality and purpose of participation, concentrating on actions designed to influence political actions.

Subsequent scholarship has analyzed and broadened this definition. Kaase established the concept of unconventional participation, positing that political activity might transpire outside official institutional avenues, including protests, petitions, and boycotts (Kaase, 1984). This transition indicated the increasing significance of protest politics, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, when conventional methods of participation became inadequate for marginalized groups (Kaase, 1984). Norris argued that political involvement exists on a continuum from voting to more expressive and confrontational actions, highlighting the growing legitimacy and normality of protest in post-industrial democracies (Norris et al., 2005).

2.2 Classifications and Forms of Participation

Political scientists have systematically created diverse typologies to classify the numerous forms of political activity. The Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM), argued by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in 1995, delineates political participation as contingent upon three principal factors: resources

(time, financial means, civic competencies), psychological engagement (political interest and efficacy), and recruitment (invitation to participate) (Verba et al., 1995). This model effectively elucidates the reasons for varying levels of participation among individuals and how structural inequalities manifest as disparities in participation.

Another important typology differentiates between conventional and unconventional participation. Conventional forms generally encompass voting, party affiliation, and communication with elected representatives—actions that are formalized and endorsed by the political framework (Sabucedo and Arce, 1991). In contrast, unconventional forms include protests, strikes, civil disobedience, and activism (Sabucedo and Arce, 1991). These approaches are frequently regarded as more emotive or symbolic and are employed by people or groups aiming to highlight concerns beyond mainstream politics (van de Velde, 2024). Charles Tilly's research on contentious politics further elucidates the rationale behind unconventional participation, highlighting the influence of collective identity and state reactions on protest dynamics (Tilly, 1995).

A third method of categorizing participation is based on its instrumental versus expressive characteristics. Instrumental participation is goal-oriented, seeking to attain particular policy changes or results (Moynihan, 2003). Expressive participation is, conversely, symbolic, seeking to validate identity, solidarity, or moral commitment (Moynihan, 2003).

This thesis examines three main concepts of engagement. Voting is the most formal and prevalent mode of political engagement. Voting offers citizens, including naturalized immigrants, a direct influence in determining government and policy (Hunger, 2018). Protest participation includes involvement in demonstrations, marches, rallies, and various forms of collective action intended to articulate opposition or advocate for change (D'Amato and Schwenken, 2018). Institutional political activities include communication with elected officials, participation in advisory councils, attendance at official meetings, and engagement with political parties or NGOs (Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014). Although these modes are analytically separate, they frequently interrelate in practice.

2.3 Participation in Migrant Contexts

Migrants' political participation significantly differs from that of native-born citizens. The legal standing is of crucial importance. In numerous European countries, participation in national elections is limited to citizens, although municipal and regional voting rights may be granted to permanent residents. Consequently, access to the ballot box is influenced by immigration and naturalization rules (Engdahl et al., 2020). Furthermore, language hurdles, insufficient understanding of host-country systems, and experiences of discrimination may serve as impediments to participation (Müssig and Okrug, 2024).

Political participation is also affected by migrants' status within the host society. Economically deprived or socially excluded migrants may encounter significant barriers to participation, notwithstanding their legal entitlement to join (de Rooij, 2012). Conversely, integration into job markets, educational institutions, and civil society networks can enhance political participation

(Bratsberg et al., 2021). Community organizations, religious institutions, and migrant associations frequently serve a vital function in supplying the resources, expertise, and networks that enable political participation (Portes et al., 2008).

Migrant political engagement must additionally be comprehended in transnational contexts. Numerous migrants have solid connections to their country of origin and may persist in engaging in homeland politics by voting, lobbying, or advocacy efforts. This dual engagement can mold their political identities and affect their perception of their role within the host culture (Kyei et al., 2022). These issues highlight the necessity for a sophisticated and multifaceted comprehension of political participation that reflects migrants' legal, social, and psychological status in both host and origin countries.

2.4 Factors Influencing Migrant Political Engagement

Comprehending the political participation of migrants necessitates an analytical framework that incorporates the varied and interconnected causes influencing their actions. The participation of migrants in the politics of their host nation is influenced by various factors at the micro, meso, and macro levels, rather than solely by their personal preferences. This encompasses individual resources and traits, institutional frameworks in the host nation, the political context of the country of origin, and enduring transnational connections post-migration. Each variable influences the possibilities, incentives, and capacities for political engagement in many forms, including voting, protesting, or institutional participation (Guarnizo et. al, 2003).

2.4.1 Factors at the Individual Level

At the individual level, the literature highlights that political participation is strongly shaped by personal attributes such as education, socioeconomic status, age, and gender (Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014). These factors are widely recognized as fundamental predictors of political behavior among both migrant and native populations, serving as the foundation for understanding variations in participation across different social groups (Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014).

Education is a consistently strong predictor of political participation (Kam, and Palmer, 2008). Higher levels of education are mainly associated with enhanced political awareness, increased political efficacy, and a stronger propensity for both traditional and unorthodox kinds of participation. Educated individuals are more inclined to comprehend institutional protocols, assess political platforms, and obtain information that enables action (Emler, and Frazer, 1999). Education obtained in either the country of origin or the host nation can augment the participative capabilities of migrants, although qualifications from their origin countries may not always receive full recognition.

Socioeconomic status is also significantly important on political participation. Individuals with stable employment and elevated income levels are typically more equipped to participate in politics, especially in time- and resource-demanding activities such as campaigning, attending meetings, or contacting officials (Cohen et al., 2001). Economic stability can promote a sense of

connection and commitment to the host country, hence facilitating political integration. Many migrants encounter structural obstacles, such as underemployment, labor market segmentation, and discrimination, which might inhibit political activity despite formal access being provided (Dollmann, 2022).

Age constitutes another relevant aspect. Older persons exhibit a higher propensity to vote and engage in traditional political activities, whereas younger individuals are more inclined towards protest or digital activism (Melo, and Stockemer, 2014). For migrants, the age at which they arrive and their life stage during migration are significant factors.

Gender can influence involvement in intricate manners. Although women generally engage less in formal political activities worldwide, this disparity is exacerbated in migrant groups due to intersecting obstacles, including childcare obligations, cultural norms, and limited access to political networks (Pensiero, and Janmaat, 2025). Nonetheless, women's participation in community-based groups or protest movements has risen in numerous migrant communities, indicating that the gendered dynamics of involvement can differ based on context and format (Jones-Correa, 1998).

2.4.2 Factors of the Host Country

The legal and institutional framework of the host country significantly influences the political opportunities accessible to migrants. This encompasses the formulation of political opportunity frameworks, the accessibility of legal avenues to political rights, and the existence or lack of integration initiatives that promote civic inclusion (Solano et al., 2024).

Political opportunity structures denote the institutional frameworks and contextual elements that facilitate or hinder political action (Princen, and Kerremans, 2008). These include election systems, the transparency of political parties, the room for civil society, and the responsiveness of political institutions. Host countries that facilitate local participation, endorse civil society involvement, and permit non-citizen participation in some areas (e.g., local elections or advisory councils) generally promote higher levels of migrant political action (Pilati, and Herman, 2020). Conversely, restrictive environments characterized by high participation thresholds or discriminatory discourses may deter engagement (Pilati, and Herman, 2020).

Legal access to vote is an essential prerequisite for electoral participation. In numerous European countries, national voting is restricted to citizens, although certain countries permit non-citizens to participate in local or municipal elections, especially following a designated time of residency or via bilateral agreements (Caramani, and Grotz, 2015). The attainment of citizenship is a crucial element, since it facilitates formal engagement and may also indicate dedication and belonging to the host society. The process of naturalization can be protracted and intricate, with considerable diversity among countries.

Integration policies are also significant. States that allocate resources to civic integration programs, language education, political education, and anti-discrimination initiatives generally promote

enhanced political inclusion of migrants (Neureiter, 2019). Access to civic education and political information in migrant languages, along with outreach efforts by political parties and local authorities, can enhance participatory engagement. Conversely, policies that characterize integration as assimilation or link political rights to prolonged exclusionary criteria may estrange migrants and reduce their opportunity for participation (Solano et al., 2024).

The discourse of the host country and public sentiments towards migrants also affect behavior. In countries where migrants are depicted as threats or outsiders, political mobilization may manifest more through protests or campaigning against discrimination, rather than through conventional avenues (Wright, and Moorthy, 2018).

2.4.3 Factors Related to the Origin Country

The political environment of the country of origin continues to influence migrants' views, perceptions, and behaviors long after their resettlement (White et al., 2008). Political culture denotes the collective ideals, conventions, and practices associated with authority, governance, and civic participation within a specific community (Kim, 1964). Migrants from countries with a robust legacy of participatory culture may exhibit a greater propensity for political engagement, even under authoritarian regimes.

A further consideration is the motivation for migration. Refugees and asylum seekers escaping persecution may possess heightened political grievances and intensified impulses to participate in political activism, particularly for human rights, homeland politics, or anti-authoritarian campaigning (Dollmann, 2022). In contrast, labor migrants or those migrating for family reunification may prioritize economic and social integration rather than political participation, although this may evolve with time (Dollmann, 2022).

2.4.4 Transnational Factors

Cross-border connections encompass communication with relatives and acquaintances, remittance transfers, consumption of homeland media, and travels to the country of origin. These ties maintain political engagement and emotional affiliation with homeland politics, potentially fostering ongoing participation in elections, lobbying, or advocacy directed at the government of the country of origin (Ahmadov, and Sasse, 2016). Diaspora networks and organizations play a vital role. Migrant groups, religious organizations, and ethnic media serve as venues for the transmission of political knowledge, the reinforcement of collective identities, and the facilitation of mobilization (Portes et al., 2008). These organizations may advocate for either host-country involvement or domestic activism, and occasionally both concurrently (Portes et al., 2008). They act as middlemen between migrants and host political institutions, providing resources, language assistance, and advocacy training.

Migrants who are committed to the political future of their country of origin may choose transnational involvement over participation in the host country, particularly if they view the host state as uncaring or restrictive (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Conversely, some individuals may cultivate new political identities and allegiances grounded in the democratic norms observed in the

host culture. The cohabitation of diverse political views is becoming more prevalent, especially among second-generation migrants who inherit perspectives from both their homeland and host country (Krejčova et al., 2025).

In some cases, political participation in the country of origin enhances participation in the host nation, particularly as migrants acquire organizational skills, networks, and political capital through transnational action (Pilati, and Herman, 2020). Nonetheless, conflicting allegiances or legal constraints—such as prohibitions on dual citizenship or participation in national elections—may exacerbate these dynamics.

This section identifies four key domains that emerge across the existing scholarship: individual-level characteristics, host-country contexts, origin-country legacies, and transnational linkages. These dimensions are interrelated and often overlap, jointly influencing migrants' opportunities, motivations, and capacities for political engagement in complex and dynamic ways.

2.5 Authoritarian Legacies and Migrant Political Participation

Building on the preceding discussion of the multiple factors shaping migrant political engagement, this section narrows the lens to the role of origin-country legacies, with a particular emphasis on political socialization under authoritarian rule. While prior research has substantially examined individual, host-country, origin, and transnational determinants, the regime-specific socialization mechanisms that differentiate authoritarian contexts—and how these mechanisms travel with migrants into democratic settings—often remain under-specified or treated as background context rather than as theorized pathways shaping participation. Focusing on this dimension clarifies how perceptions of authority, efficacy, and acceptable modes of engagement are formed and later re-activated or reshaped after migration.

Accordingly, the section analyzes how political regimes influence political behavior by examining the mechanisms of socialization, ideology, and institutional control characteristic of different types of authoritarian rule. It distinguishes between left- and right-authoritarian regimes and explores how these systems shape political attitudes and behaviors—particularly political involvement, orientations toward authority, and civic engagement—thereby providing the theoretical foundation for the thesis's comparative analysis.

2.5.1 Left- and Right-Authoritarian Regimes as Distinct Socialization Contexts

Despite differences in classification systems, there is widespread consensus that authoritarian regimes stifle political competition, restrict civil liberties, and endeavor to retain power through a blend of coercion, patronage, and legitimation (Neundorff, and Pop-Eleches, 2020). These traits are essential for comprehending how individuals under such regimes engage—or fail to engage—with political institutions.

Although authoritarian regimes share core characteristics, they differ substantially in ideology, historical evolution, and methods of political control. A central distinction exists between left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian systems, a divide that is particularly relevant for understanding

the socialization experiences migrants carry with them. This thesis adopts the left–right classification because it provides an ideologically grounded and conceptually coherent framework for examining how authoritarian contexts shape political socialization. Unlike institutional typologies such as military, personalist, or single-party regimes—which primarily focus on structures of power (Linz, 2000)—the left–right distinction emphasizes the normative content, ideological orientation, and indoctrination mechanisms that directly affect citizens’ political attitudes (Linz, 2000), perceptions of authority, and expectations of participation.

Left-authoritarian regimes are typically rooted in Marxist-Leninist doctrine or its derivatives and emphasize collective ownership, state-managed economic systems, and the supremacy of the ruling party (Ivanov, 2024). These regimes frame themselves as guardians of social equality, anti-imperialist struggle, and revolutionary transformation. Historically, examples include the former Soviet Union, Cuba, and several Eastern European states during the Cold War. Governance in these systems extends across political and economic domains and relies heavily on mass organizations, centralized educational institutions, and single-party rule (Ivanov, 2024). Repression is often justified through ideological narratives centered on class conflict, counter-revolutionary threats, or foreign interference. Surveillance commonly operates through party-affiliated intelligence services and local informant structures (Chan, 2024). While political pluralism is restricted, participation can be encouraged in tightly controlled spaces such as trade unions or sanctioned assemblies, creating a political environment structured around choreographed participation within the limits of official ideology (Qin and He, 2022).

Right-authoritarian regimes, in contrast, typically emphasize nationalism, traditional hierarchies, religious or ethnic identity, and capitalist economic structures (Linz, 2000). These regimes often arise in reaction to perceived leftist or revolutionary threats. Well-known examples include Franco-era Spain, Pinochet’s Chile, and contemporary Gulf monarchies. In such systems, order, stability, and loyalty to authority take precedence over ideological mobilization (Praet, 2024). Repression is frequently enforced through militarized policing, emergency laws, and national security discourses. Political opposition may be framed as a threat to national unity, religious heritage, or cultural foundations (Praet, 2024). Participation is discouraged unless it reinforces regime legitimacy—for example, through controlled elections or state-sanctioned civic organizations (Benton, 2016). While economic liberties may be selectively permitted, civil and political freedoms remain tightly constrained.

The distinction between left- and right-authoritarian regimes therefore encompasses institutional structures, socialization mechanisms, and expectations of citizen behavior (Lilly et al., 2025). These ideological and coercive differences shape how individuals perceive authority, dissent, and participation. For migrants, these divergent contexts generate distinct political dispositions that continue to influence their attitudes and behaviors after migration. Whereas left-authoritarian systems may cultivate highly structured but ideologically confined patterns of engagement, right-authoritarian systems more often instill political withdrawal, caution, or fear of arbitrary repression. Consequently, the authoritarian legacy is not uniform but varied, producing different political

trajectories and attitudes among migrants depending on the ideological and institutional features of their origin-country regime (Lindemann, 2023).

2.5.2 Mechanisms of Political Socialization under Authoritarianism

Political socialization denotes the process through which individuals assimilate political norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors (Brauen, and Harmon, 1977). In authoritarian regimes, this process is frequently managed by the state to foster obedience, suppress opposition, and legitimize the governing class. The instruments of socialization vary but typically encompass propaganda, civic education, surveillance, and repression (Lee, 2024). These instruments are intended not merely to constrain political behavior but also to shape individuals' comprehension of politics itself.

Taken together, these regime characteristics and socialization mechanisms provide the backdrop against which the political behavior of migrants in democratic host countries must be understood.

2.5.3 Regime Type and Migrants' Political Behavior

The political behavior of migrants in democratic host nations is shaped not only by the institutional environments they encounter after migration but also by the political systems in which they were socialized prior to departure. Authoritarian legacies—regardless of ideological orientation—can exert enduring influence on political ideals, attitudes, and behavioral repertoires (Dollmann, 2022). Understanding the regime type of migrants' countries of origin is therefore crucial for explaining the heterogeneity observed in migrant political engagement across Europe. In this context, the following section analyzes how authoritarian regime types shape political behavior, clarifies the differences between refugees and labor migrants from authoritarian settings, and introduces comparative insights into the distinct experiences associated with left- and right-authoritarian regimes.

Political socialization within authoritarian regimes plays a central role in shaping individuals' long-term political attitudes. The notion of political habitus, rooted in Bourdieu's broader sociological theory, refers to the ingrained norms, cognitive structures, and behavioral inclinations developed through early political socialization (Carlson, and Schneickert, 2021). In authoritarian settings, this habitus is often characterized by institutional skepticism, apprehension toward political expression, and diminished trust in the efficacy of participation (Pernia, 2022). These dispositions may persist after migration, influencing how migrants assess opportunities and risks associated with political engagement in democratic environments.

Migrants from authoritarian regimes may therefore exhibit cynicism toward democratic institutions, hesitation to voice dissent, or unfamiliarity with participatory practices (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, 2020). Such tendencies can reduce their likelihood of engaging in institutional forms of participation or affect their preference for non-institutional modes of expression. However, authoritarian legacies do not uniformly suppress political mobilization. In certain cases, exposure to repression generates a desire for political transformation, encouraging migrants to participate in activism while in exile, particularly in relation to homeland politics (Quinsaat, 2013).

Evidence from cross-national datasets demonstrates that regime type significantly shapes political activity among migrants (Pilati, and Herman, 2020). Studies indicate that migrants from authoritarian regimes generally show lower levels of voting and institutional participation in democratic host contexts compared to migrants originating from democratic systems (Bilodeau, 2014). Yet authoritarian regimes differ markedly in their ideological content, degree of repression, and civic infrastructures, producing heterogeneous patterns of political behavior. Individuals socialized under highly repressive or ideologically mobilized regimes may experience either stronger demobilization or heightened political involvement through protest and diaspora activism, depending on their personal experiences and the opportunity structures of the host country (Dollmann, 2022).

These findings show the limits of treating authoritarian origins as a single, uniform category. Distinguishing among different types of authoritarian regimes—specifically left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian models—offers a more nuanced understanding of how political socialization shapes migrant political conduct after migration.

2.5.4 Divergent Experiences of Left- and Right-Authoritarian Émigrés

Significant distinctions arise among emigrants originating from left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian governments, shaping their political attitudes, types of engagement, and trust in institutions within the host country.

At the same time, many emigrants from left-authoritarian regimes express disenchantment with ideologically motivated politics and may demonstrate skepticism toward both their origin-country and host-country institutions (Berlinschi, and Harutyunyan, 2019). Symbolic and tightly controlled participation in their countries of origin may contribute to perceptions of limited efficacy within formal political processes.

At the same time, migrants from right-authoritarian contexts may show a stronger inclination toward expressive or oppositional forms of participation, including protest or social movement activism, especially when these align with host-country discourses on democracy, human rights, or opposition to authoritarianism. Engaging in such activities may require overcoming gaps in civic knowledge, institutional access, and political confidence.

Cross-national research in Europe shows that host-country policies moderate these effects. In countries with inclusive political systems, migrants from different authoritarian contexts are more likely to overcome initial barriers and engage in democratic processes (Geese, 2023). Still, the ideological orientation and intensity of prior authoritarian experiences continue to shape attitudes, political efficacy, and preferred modes of engagement, even after long periods of residence (Neundorff, and Pop-Eleches, 2020).

Overall, the regime type of the country of origin interacts with migrants' legal status, migration motivation, and host-country context to influence political behavior. The political habitus formed under authoritarian rule intersects with institutional structures and individual characteristics in the

host society, shaping opportunities and constraints for political action. Distinguishing between left- and right-authoritarian origins — and between refugees and labor migrants — allows for a more nuanced understanding of the diverse patterns of migrant political engagement. This section concludes the literature review and the next section outlines the theoretical framework and hypotheses of the thesis, while also highlighting key research gaps in the literature and the contributions the study aims to offer.

2.6 Research Gaps and Theoretical Rationale

While existing scholarship has extensively examined the individual, institutional, and transnational determinants of migrant political engagement, several critical gaps remain. In particular, the literature has rarely addressed how distinct types of authoritarian regime experiences shape migrants' subsequent political behavior. Despite the growing body of research on migrant political participation—highlighting the roles of personal attributes, legal structures, and host-country institutions—the influence of regime type in the country of origin remains insufficiently explored.

2.6.1 Restricted Comparative Examination of Left- vs Right-Authoritarian Migrants

One of the deficiencies in the current literature is the absence of a comprehensive comparison of migrants from left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian regimes. Numerous studies have extensively analyzed the political engagement of migrants from authoritarian regimes; however, they frequently regard authoritarianism as a monolithic characteristic. This method conceals significant differences in the ideological underpinnings, institutional practices, and socialization processes of various authoritarian regimes.

Moreover, while the subject of authoritarian legacies and political behavior has garnered academic attention, a significant portion of this research has focused on particular geographical contexts, namely the United States or post-socialist Eastern Europe. In the U.S. context, researchers have examined the political participation of Latin American, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian refugees and immigrants, concentrating mostly on protest movements, citizenship, and voting patterns (Portes et al., 2008). In Eastern Europe, focus has shifted to the political engagement of citizens and migrants from former communist nations, frequently examining how the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transition of former "Iron Curtain" countries influenced democratic perspectives (Auerbach, and Petrova, 2022).

These studies have produced significant findings; nevertheless, they infrequently compare migrants from various regimes—specifically left- vs right-authoritarianism—within a wider European framework. They also do not adequately consider how these ideological disparities might affect political behavior following migration, particularly in Western European democracies where integration policies, legal structures, and civic opportunities markedly diverge from the U.S. model or post-authoritarian transitional states.

2.6.2 Empirical Discrepancies in Elucidating Protest Versus Institutional Modes of Participation

A significant deficiency in the literature is the inadequate theoretical framework and insufficient measurement of distinctions between protest-oriented and institutional types of political participation among migrants. Although electoral participation has garnered significant focus—particularly concerning naturalization and voting rights—there is relatively limited research on how migrants interact through non-electoral avenues such as rallies, petitions, or contacting representatives.

This is especially troubling considering the increasing significance of unconventional political engagement in European democracies. For numerous migrants—particularly those without full citizenship or legal representation—protest and other informal outlets may constitute the limited options for articulating complaints and pursuing political objectives.

While certain studies have investigated protest participation or institutional involvement, they frequently emphasize macro-level opportunity frameworks or host-country integration models. They seldom investigate how migrants' previous encounters with state repression, ideology, and political socialization under authoritarian regimes influence their inclinations for protest as opposed to formal avenues (Bilodeau, 2008). Even fewer research delineates this distinction within a comparative regime-type paradigm.

This thesis examines these deficiencies by categorizing political participation into voting, protest, and institutional engagement, and evaluating how each is affected by the migrant's country of origin.

2.6.3 Contribution to Political Sociology, Migration Studies, and Regime-Type Literature

The study contributes to political sociology by deepening the understanding of how political habitus—enduring dispositions shaped through formative political experiences—continues to influence behavior after migration. Migrants' political engagement is shaped not only by host-country conditions but also by prior socialization under specific authoritarian regimes, showing how early political experiences structure later perceptions of authority, participation, and civic responsibilities (Dollmann, 2022). This reinforces existing debates concerning political continuity, democratic learning, and the transformation of political behavior across borders.

Within migration studies, this thesis challenges the frequent assumption that migrants from authoritarian regimes constitute a uniform analytical category. By distinguishing between left- and right-authoritarian political environments, it offers a more nuanced understanding of migrant political engagement and highlights that migrants bring with them differentiated political backgrounds shaped by ideological, institutional, and cultural features of their origin regimes. This also underscores that political participation cannot be fully explained by host-country structures alone; migrants' political attitudes and capacities are also shaped by the political environments of their countries of origin.

The thesis further contributes to regime-type scholarship by drawing attention to how authoritarian legacies extend beyond national borders and continue to shape behavior in contexts that differ fundamentally from those in which political orientations were initially formed. Much of the regime-type literature has focused on internal political dynamics of authoritarian systems, while giving limited attention to how these dynamics influence political behavior in diasporic or post-migration contexts. By applying regime classification frameworks to migrant populations, this study shows how the ideological and institutional variations across authoritarian systems can reappear in democratic host societies through political attitudes, dispositions, and participatory repertoires.

Taken together, the section emphasizes the importance of adopting a regime-sensitive perspective when analyzing migrant political engagement. The differentiated political experiences carried by migrants from left- and right-authoritarian systems illustrate how political socialization under authoritarian rule interacts with democratic opportunity structures after migration. This highlights the need to situate migrant political participation within a broader framework that captures both origin- and destination-country influences.

2.7 Theoretical Frameworks on Migrant Political Participation

Understanding the political participation of migrants from authoritarian regimes requires an integrated theoretical framework that connects individual-level resources, early political socialization, repression-based political learning, and transnational experiences with their subsequent behavior in democratic host societies. Migrants' political engagement emerges through the interaction of these multiple dimensions, as their attitudes are shaped by origin-country experiences, transformed—or reinforced—through resocialization in the host country, and informed by ongoing cross-border political ties (Dollmann, 2022). Anchored in the three hypotheses introduced in Chapter 1, this section reorganizes the theoretical foundations accordingly.

2.7.1 Theoretical Framework for Hypothesis 1: Voting

The theoretical basis for Hypothesis 1 – Voting combines the Resource Model of Participation and the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) with insights from authoritarian political socialization and transnational political engagement. Voting, as a structured and institutionally regulated form of political participation, depends on both individual capabilities and the political meanings individuals attach to electoral behavior.

The Resource Model and the Civic Voluntarism Model argue that political participation requires three fundamental resources—time, money, and civic skills—supported by psychological engagement and mobilization (Verba et al., 1995). Migrants often face constraints in these areas, such as limited financial stability, language barriers, or weak ties to civic organizations. These resource limitations reduce participation unless host-country institutions and migrant associations help compensate for them. At the same time, integration into civil society and local networks can provide opportunities to develop civic skills, accumulate relevant resources, and enhance political interest (Martinez-Damia et al., 2024).

While the CVM does not directly predict differences between migrants from left- and right-authoritarian regimes, its underlying logic can be extended to explain how distinct authoritarian contexts shape civic competencies and perceptions of voting. In many right-authoritarian regimes, although elections lack competitiveness, they maintain symbolic centrality and reinforce norms emphasizing civic duty, hierarchy, and procedural legitimacy (Ali, and Lin, 2013). Citizens may learn that voting is a routine expectation of responsible citizenship, even when outcomes are predetermined. This ritualized but meaningful perception of voting can translate into higher electoral participation once migrants enter democratic contexts where voting is genuinely consequential. Resocialization processes in democratic host countries may further reinforce this alignment, especially when democratic institutions mirror the procedural stability or order migrants associate with public authority (Stallbaum, 2025).

Left-authoritarian regimes rooted in Marxist-Leninist traditions tend to subordinate elections to ideological goals and party control, limiting citizens' perception of electoral outcomes as meaningful (Ivanov, 2024). Voting often becomes a performative expression of ideological conformity rather than an act of individual political agency. Such experiences may weaken migrants' post-migration sense of electoral efficacy. Socialization research underscores that formative political experiences—particularly during adolescence (Brauen, and Harmon, 1977; Sears, and Funk, 1999)—continue to shape political attitudes even after relocation. Although resocialization in democratic host societies can modify these tendencies, its effects are contingent on institutional outreach, integration conditions, and individual agency (White et al., 2008).

Transnationalism further shapes migrants' voting behaviors. Migrants engaged in homeland elections, diaspora political organizations, or extraterritorial political debates may carry forward understandings of electoral participation formed under authoritarian rule. If homeland elections were symbolic or devoid of genuine political choice, continued transnational engagement may reinforce skepticism toward electoral participation in the host country. Conversely, if migrants associate homeland voting with acts of resistance or symbolic political agency, transnational involvement may increase overall interest in democratic voting opportunities (Bauböck, 2003; Pilati, and Herman, 2020). As political participation tends to be cumulative rather than zero-sum (Finn, 2020), active cross-border engagement may enhance rather than diminish voting in host societies.

This combination of CVM dynamics, authoritarian socialization, and transnational embeddedness provides a cohesive theoretical basis for Hypothesis 1 – Voting, which anticipates higher voting rates among migrants from right-authoritarian regimes than those from left-authoritarian contexts.

2.7.2 Theoretical Framework for Hypothesis 2: Protest Participation

The theoretical foundations for Hypothesis 2 – Protest Participation are grounded in repression theory, political learning under authoritarianism, mobilization models, and reactive protest theory. These frameworks explain how experiences of political closure or coercion in authoritarian regimes shape migrants' likelihood of engaging in protest once they arrive in democratic host countries.

Repression theory establishes that exposure to censorship, surveillance, imprisonment, or violence can produce divergent outcomes. According to the demobilization perspective, repression instills fear and discourages political engagement (Opp, 1994; Lewis, 2023). Individuals learn to avoid politics to protect themselves and their families, resulting in long-term political apathy or disengagement (Zhukov, 2023). This dynamic is especially prevalent in right-authoritarian contexts where state control is enforced through militarized mechanisms that delegitimize overt dissent.

Conversely, the mobilization perspective posits that repression can generate moral outrage, solidarity, and oppositional consciousness, particularly once individuals relocate to safer environments (Yılmaz, and Demir, 2023). The theory of political learning under repression argues that individuals interpret repression through various cognitive and emotional frameworks that subsequently guide their behavior (Bartusevičius et al., 2023). When democratic contexts provide safety, transparency, and pluralism, formerly repressed individuals may re-engage politically or discover new avenues for expression.

The reactive protest model extends this logic by asserting that migrants prevented from expressing grievances in their origin countries are particularly inclined to participate in protests in democratic host societies (Bilodeau, 2008). Protests offer expressive and symbolic arenas for political agency, and participation may serve psychological, emotional, and political functions (Harris, and Hern, 2019). This model helps explain why individuals from highly repressive contexts may become politically active after migration despite prior disengagement.

These theoretical perspectives inform Hypothesis 2 – Protest Participation, which posits that migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are expected to demonstrate higher levels of protest participation than those from left-authoritarian regimes. In right-authoritarian systems, citizens typically lack institutionalized channels for grievance expression, leading to accumulated frustration and suppressed dissent. After migration, the freedom to protest may represent a psychologically liberating and politically meaningful opportunity (Just, 2019). Moreover, right-authoritarian repression often produces “exile radicalization,” where migrants become more engaged in oppositional politics abroad (Wackenhut, 2025).

By contrast, left-authoritarian regimes incorporate citizens into mass organizations and structured political rituals, shaping a political culture in which protest is often delegitimized or seen as ideologically deviant (Chen, and Moss, 2018). When protests do occur, they are frequently state-organized, performative, and devoid of substantive political challenge (De Leeuw et al., 2021). Migrants from these contexts may thus perceive protest as ineffective or illegitimate even after migration.

Transnational activism further reinforces these patterns. Diaspora communities, especially those escaping right-authoritarian repression, often become hubs of oppositional mobilization abroad (Adamson, 2020). Digital communication, diasporic media, and international advocacy networks allow migrants to publicly contest authoritarian practices that were previously unchallengeable. Meanwhile, authoritarian governments may attempt to monitor or intimidate their diasporas

abroad, creating additional grievances that fuel protest (Glasius, 2018). Migrants from left-authoritarian systems may engage in transnational politics as well, but their political repertoires may lean more toward institutionalized engagement rather than protest.

Together, repression theory, political learning, reactive protest theory, and transnational activism collectively establish the basis for Hypothesis 2 – Protest Participation.

2.7.3 Theoretical Framework for Hypothesis 3: Institutional Contacting

The theoretical foundations for Hypothesis 3 – Institutional Contacting center on political socialization theory, institutional familiarity, political habitus, and processes of democratic resocialization. Institutional contacting—engaging with elected representatives, local authorities, or public bodies—requires procedural knowledge, institutional trust, and a sense of political efficacy (Prats, and Meunier, 2021).

Political socialization theory explains how individuals acquire political orientations through long-term exposure to societal and institutional agents such as family, schools, media, religious organizations, and peer groups (Niemi, and Hepburn, 1995; Brauen, and Harmon, 1977). Early political experiences are highly formative and stable over time (Sears, and Funk, 1999), shaping migrants’ expectations of state–citizen relations even after relocation. Migrants’ contact behavior in democratic host societies is thus mediated by their prior exposure to institutional structures.

Left-authoritarian regimes, especially those built on socialist or Marxist-Leninist foundations, maintain dense institutional frameworks that embed citizens in bureaucratic and administrative engagement through mass organizations, youth movements, and workplace committees (Peters, 2023). Although undemocratic, these frameworks cultivate procedural familiarity with state institutions. Migrants from such contexts may find it easier to navigate institutional channels in host democracies, as prior experience reduces psychological barriers to contacting officials (Sears, and Funk, 1999).

In contrast, right-authoritarian regimes often restrict citizen–state interaction and cultivate perceptions of political institutions as distant, punitive, or unresponsive (Praet, 2024). This institutional distance fosters skepticism, fatalism, or anxiety toward engagement, making migrants from right-authoritarian contexts less inclined or less prepared to pursue institutional contacting after migration (Lindemann, 2023).

Political habitus provides a conceptual bridge between authoritarian political socialization and migrants’ later institutional behavior. Through repeated exposure to hierarchical and bureaucratic environments, individuals develop durable emotional and cognitive dispositions that condition their perception of institutional contexts (Voicu, and Tufiş, 2017). Those accustomed to engaging with administrative structures may approach democratic institutions confidently, whereas those socialized under coercive or opaque systems may struggle to develop institutional trust.

Resocialization in democratic host societies plays a crucial role in modifying these dispositions. Migrants may acquire new norms through interactions with transparent institutions, responsive

public agencies, and inclusive local governments. But resocialization is uneven and depends on integration conditions, language acquisition, socioeconomic incorporation, and interactions with civil society (White et al., 2008).

Transnational factors further shape institutional contacting. Migrants who remain embedded in homeland political networks may maintain expectations about institutional responsiveness based on authoritarian experiences (Maehler et al., 2021). Conversely, involvement in diaspora organizations may enhance institutional confidence by providing intermediary support, political education, and opportunities to engage with host-country structures (Aydemir, and Vermeulen, 2023). In some cases, authoritarian states attempt to monitor or influence their diasporas abroad (Glasius, 2018), which can create mistrust toward formal institutions in the host country or, conversely, increase appreciation for democratic responsiveness.

These theoretical components collectively underpin Hypothesis 3 – Institutional Contacting, explaining why migrants' willingness and ability to contact political institutions varies depending on their authoritarian backgrounds, early socialization experiences, and opportunities for resocialization within the host-country context.

3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Methodological Approach

In order to investigate how political socialization under authoritarian regimes influences first-generation migrants' political participation behaviors in European democracies, this thesis employs a quantitative research methodology. Voting, protesting, and interacting with political leaders are the three main behaviors that are the focus of this multifaceted analysis of political participation (Van Deth, 2014). Instead of being expressions of a single latent construct (like general "engagement"), these are considered to be analytically distinct forms of participation that are influenced by different socialization processes.

Data from Rounds 6, 7, and 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS) are used in the thesis. Using the ESS variable *brncntr*, the sample is limited to first-generation migrants, defined as respondents who were born in a country different from their current country of residence. Only participants from authoritarian countries (either left- or right-authoritarian) are included. People without information on crucial factors or those born in democracies are excluded. Several thousand observations suitable for regression analysis make up the aggregated dataset after these filters have been applied.

Additionally, for each host nation, dummy variables are included. These are incorporated to account for contextual variation across countries, including integration regimes, institutional frameworks, and particularly, political opportunity structures that shape migrants' chances to engage politically. Political opportunity structures, derived from social movement theory, have become central to understanding migrant and minority political participation (Meyer, 2004). They

refer to the extent to which the political environment offers accessible, transparent, and stable avenues for participation (Meyer, 2004).

These structures are influenced by legal provisions (e.g., voting rights, eligibility for office); institutional openness (e.g., availability of advisory councils or forums); cultural receptivity (e.g., societal attitudes toward migrants); and state policies on inclusion (e.g., naturalization rules, integration programs) (Tarrow, 1998). Opportunity configurations vary significantly across Europe. For instance, Sweden and the Netherlands offer relatively inclusive conditions, such as local voting rights and non-citizen participation platforms (Seidle, 2015), while Austria and France enforce stricter criteria, limiting access to formal politics (Hadj-Abdou, and Rosenberger, 2019). These differences help explain disparities in migrant participation even among similarly positioned individuals.

Beyond structural access, subjective perceptions also matter. Migrants who perceive their engagement as meaningful and impactful are more likely to participate (Klarenbeek, and Weide, 2020). Conversely, negative media narratives, discrimination, or exclusionary bureaucratic practices can lead to political disengagement. These contextual dynamics interact with migrants' prior experiences and expectations, especially for those from authoritarian backgrounds. Research indicates that unless such individuals perceive clear and low-risk openings, their likelihood of participation remains low (Wackenhut, and Orjuela, 2023). Institutional pathways like referenda, advisory councils, or inclusive party structures can facilitate engagement—but their absence tends to reinforce withdrawal.

In this study, host-country dummy variables are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity across host societies. In a pooled cross-sectional setting, this approach effectively accounts for country-specific contextual differences (e.g., integration regimes and opportunity structures), even though it does not constitute a panel fixed-effects design. Controlling for such country-level variation is essential in isolating the impact of origin-based political socialization on migrant political participation.

Finally, using ESS data requires careful consideration of weights. Because design weights for migrant subsamples in various countries are not consistently available, weights are not used in this study to guarantee consistency across pooled waves. We'll investigate robustness checks using weights later.

3.2 Data and Case Selection

The European Social Survey (ESS) data used in this study are cross-sectional data from ESS Rounds 6 (2012), 7 (2014), and 8 (2016). The three rounds are appropriate for examining immigrant political engagement because they provide a coherent set of basic survey variables and wide-ranging country representation from the mid-2010s. Later rounds, such as ESS Round 9 (2018) and subsequent waves, were reviewed but not included due to inconsistencies in the availability of key variables and reduced coverage of several major host countries, which could compromise the comparability and balance of the pooled dataset. The study ensures consistent measurement of all

relevant variables (such as demographic controls and political involvement indices) and consistent host nation selection across the data by limiting the analysis to Rounds 6–8. By using this technique, comparisons become more reliable and any biases caused by missing country data or changed question wording in later rounds are reduced. To sum up, using Rounds 6–8 and leaving out Round 9 guarantees a more consistent and comparable dataset for hypothesis testing.

The focus of the analysis is immigrants living in twelve host European democracies. The selection of the twelve host countries—Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Belgium, and Finland—was based on their participation in previous ESS rounds and their importance as major immigrant-receiving countries in Europe (Semyonov, and Raijman, 2021). Together, they represent a broad range of well-established democracies in both Western and Northern Europe, providing diverse yet comparable contexts for analyzing political conduct. It is crucial to recognize that not all countries are included in every data round due to differences in ESS fieldwork: Austria was not included in ESS Round 6, Italy was not included in ESS Round 7, and Denmark was not included in ESS Round 8. Although Austria was considered one of the main host nations at first, its exclusion from Round 6 prevented it from being consistently included in the pooled dataset. As a result, the combined dataset includes all twelve countries in the rounds in which they took part, and any omissions for a single round for a particular country are removed for that year. Each designated host nation is represented in at least two rounds by combining the three rounds, guaranteeing evenly distributed coverage. By maintaining comparability, which is essential for drawing broad conclusions across countries, this pooling technique maximizes the number of host settings.

Only first-generation migrants in these host country samples—that is, respondents who were born outside the country where the survey interview took place—are included in the study. To identify first-generation immigrants, the ESS has a country of birth variable. We ensure that all respondents in the sample have firsthand knowledge of the political and socioeconomic circumstances of their country of origin during their formative years by selecting only those who personally immigrated rather than those born in the host country to immigrant parents. This criterion is crucial to the research question because it shows that the people being examined had been raised in a foreign system—specifically, an authoritarian one—before moving to a democratic host nation. As a result, native-born citizens and second-generation immigrants are not included because they were not exposed to the political environment of their origin country. Focusing on first-generation migrants improves the framework for studying the impact of political socialization because any differences in their political participation can be more plausibly attributed to their exposure to a particular type of regime abroad rather than the influence of the host nation during childhood (Dollmann, 2022).

After identifying the relevant sample of first-generation migrants, the next step involves classifying origin-country regimes, as discussed in detail in Section 3.3.

There are multiple methodological justifications for the decision to combine different ESS rounds and apply these selection criteria. The three rounds combined yield a sizable sample of first-generation immigrants from authoritarian countries—roughly 3,000 respondents—improving the

findings' statistical power and dependability. Every ESS round has a limited number of migrant respondents per nation, but by combining rounds 6–8, we aggregate cases over time while keeping the focus on a comparatively stable period, which makes it easier to spot patterns that would be difficult to discern with a smaller sample size. Second, consistency in measuring key variables across all included observations is guaranteed by the aggregated dataset. No matter which round a respondent comes from, their responses will be similar because the basic survey questions regarding political participation and attitudes are the same for ESS6, ESS7, and ESS8. On the other hand, ESS9 made changes and left out certain countries, like Denmark and, initially, Spain and Sweden, which might have led to a biased design or missing data for our target countries. These issues are lessened by using a regular range of rounds (6–8), and we account for any temporal effects in our analysis by including dummy variables or controls for the survey round. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this method of selecting samples and cases is capable of investigating how regime-type socialization affects political behavior in a variety of contexts. We can distinguish the effects of origin-regime socialization while taking the host-country context into consideration by examining migrants from left- and right-authoritarian backgrounds in a number of democratic host countries. To ensure that any observed differences in political involvement among migrants from different regime types are not solely due to their current country of residence, we use host country fixed effects in the analysis to account for the country of residency. This means that we are comparing people with different origin stories who live in the same host environment. Assuming their current surroundings stay the same, systematic differences can be attributed to the political socialization legacy of their country of origin if they occur, such as migrants from right-authoritarian regimes engaging in more or less particular political activities than those from left-authoritarian regimes. The results' generalizability is further enhanced by the wide representation of 12 host countries: finding similar trends in various democratic contexts would indicate a strong influence of the origin regime type, but host country-specific variations would also be discernible. In conclusion, the chosen data and case selection approach—incorporating relevant ESS rounds, focusing on first-generation immigrants, and categorizing origin regimes—creates a strong foundation for investigating the ways in which different authoritarian origin experiences impact migrants' political engagement in Europe. This approach improves the validity of findings regarding the effects of regime socialization on immigrant political behavior by balancing the practical considerations of data uniformity and accessibility with the requirement for a clear comparison of regime types.

3.3 Operationalization of Variables

This section describes how the main variables used in the analysis were conceptualized and converted into measurable indicators. The study looks at how the type of regime in early life influences a number of aspects of first-generation migrants' political participation in Europe. To ensure cross-context comparability, the operationalization technique involves categorizing participation behaviors, assigning regime types, and carefully recoding individual-level control variables.

3.3.1 Dependent Variables

Voting, taking part in protests, and interacting with political leaders are the three distinct forms of political engagement that are examined. These are viewed as qualitatively different behaviors influenced by different aspects of political socialization, rather than being assumed to represent a single latent category like "political involvement" (Graham, and Pride, 1972).

1. Voting Behavior: Respondents were asked if they voted in the most recent national election. With additional categories for missing responses, the original variable is encoded as "1 = Yes," "2 = No," and "3 = Not eligible" (7, 8, 9). Only the first and second valid answers were kept. With '1' standing for 'Voted' and '0' for 'Did not vote,' a binary variable was created. To avoid bias resulting from non-comparability, respondents who were considered ineligible were excluded from the model (Zinn, and Gnambs, 2018). While excluding ineligible voters ensures the comparability of voting behavior, this approach may introduce bias if voting eligibility varies systematically across origin regime types or immigration waves. For example, migrants from left-authoritarian regimes may be more likely to acquire citizenship and voting rights, which could affect the observed participation patterns. Future research could explore this dimension further, possibly by modeling voting eligibility or employing methods that account for selection effects.

2. Participation in Protests: Participants were asked if they had participated in a lawful public protest in the previous 12 months. A binary variable was created from the original variable (pbldmn), where "1" denoted "Yes" and "0" denoted "No."

3. Contacting Political Officials: The variable "contplt" was used to measure interaction with governmental or political representatives. Once more, a binary recoding was used, with "1 = Contacted" and "0 = Not Contacted." This item is considered an elite-focused, high-threshold form of engagement that requires a high level of political efficacy (Kim, and Hoewe, 2023).

3.3.2 Independent Variable: Regime Type of Country of Origin

The regime type of the respondents' countries of origin, as determined during their political socialization (i.e., adolescence), is the main explanatory variable. The classification of regimes into 'left-authoritarian' and 'right-authoritarian' is based on pre-2000 typologies using data from V-Dem and Freedom House (De Leeuw et al., 2021). Countries with strong state ideology, like Soviet-style governments, are labeled left-authoritarian, while regimes with personalist or militarized rule with no clear ideological framework, like Iran and Syria, are labeled right-authoritarian (De Leeuw et al., 2021).

Sorting the countries of origin of migrants by type of regime is an important part of case selection. We concentrate on migrants from authoritarian governments, classifying them as either left- or right-authoritarian based on their ideological stance. In reality, this means assessing the political system of each first-generation immigrant's home country (usually in the late 20th century, before the immigrant left or in 2000) and assigning it to one of two suitable groups. The former Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe, as well as other Marxist-Leninist regimes, are examples of left-authoritarian regimes, which are defined as authoritarian governments that

function under a communist or socialist one-party system (Dinas, and Northmore-Ball, 2020). Non-communist authoritarian governments, such as military dictatorships, personalist or monarchic autocracies, or other regimes characterized by nationalist, religious, or anti-communist beliefs, such as those in Latin America, Africa, or Asia, are referred to as right-authoritarian regimes (Dinas, and Northmore-Ball, 2020).

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project and Freedom House indices are two external academic datasets that are used in this classification to ascertain the level of authoritarianism and the ideological inclinations of the regimes in each country of origin. Depending on historical and ideological factors, such as the dominance of a single communist party or opposition to communism in line with right-wing governance models, a country was classified as either left- or right-authoritarian. A country was considered authoritarian if it did not meet democratic standards on established measures of political freedom. The sample did not include migrants from countries that did not fit into either of these regime categories. This exclusion mostly applies to people from democratic countries (who are not the focus of this study) and any ambiguous situations in which the ideology of the original government cannot be clearly classified as left or right authoritarian. By eliminating respondents who do not support the main hypothesis on regime-type legacies, this filtering technique concentrates the analysis on a comparison between two distinct types of authoritarian political socialization.

The ESS variable "cntbrthc" was used to extract the country of birth. This ensured consistent integration across datasets by matching external regime data with ISO number codes. Respondents were retained only from countries that could be categorically classified into one of the two regime types.

3.3.3 Control Variables

The models include some common control variables that are frequently associated with political behavior in order to reduce the bias caused by omitted variables:

1. Age: Measured using the 'agea' variable. In regression models, it is considered a continuous predictor that captures life-cycle effects on political behavior.
2. Gender: '1 = Female' and '0 = Male' are the binary indicators created from the variable 'gndr'. '9 = No answer' respondents are not included.
3. Education: With a scale ranging from 0 (no harmonization possible) to 7 (graduate-level education), the ESS variable "eiscde" represents educational attainment. For the sake of simplicity, the variable is represented as continuous due to its systematic structure and wide-ranging use in ESS-based research. However, to take into consideration potential non-linearity at educational thresholds, sensitivity analyses should include categorical dummies (Cinelli, and Hazlett, 2020). The cases with the designations 55, 77, 88, and 99 were left out.

These control variables—education, age, and gender—are consistently included across all models due to their widely recognized influence on political engagement and on the transmission and

activation of political socialization (Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014). Education is derived from the `eiscd` variable, gender from `gnr`, and age from `agea`. Their inclusion ensures that any observed effects of origin regime type are not confounded by these individual-level characteristics. This approach is particularly important given the existing literature suggesting that political attitudes and participatory behaviors can vary significantly across demographic subgroups (Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014). By controlling for these factors, the analysis can more confidently isolate the influence of regime socialization legacies.

3.3.4 Country-Level Controls and Fixed Effects

In order to account for institutional and cultural differences among the 12 host countries in the combined dataset, the analysis uses dummy variables for each of these countries to incorporate country fixed effects. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Belgium, and Finland.

The ESS variable `"cntry"` was used to record the country of residence, which was then reclassified to conform to ISO numeric values.

Including these fixed effects helps to isolate the influence of origin-country regime type by accounting for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level — such as differences in political opportunity structures or integration policies.

Although there are several weighting options available in the ESS (design, population, and post-stratification weights), none were used in the current models. This decision, which prioritizes relative relationships over national-level population estimates, follows standard protocols in subsample studies (Gaughan et al., 2015).

In ESS rounds 6, 7, and 8, all variable construction, coding choices, and transformations were carried out consistently. Comparability and internal consistency between models that address different political behaviors are ensured by this harmonization.

3.4 Data Cleaning and Sample Size

To ensure the validity and reliability of the dataset, extensive data cleansing procedures were put in place before the regression analysis was conducted. The European Social Survey (ESS) data from Rounds 6, 7, and 8 were combined into a single cross-sectional dataset. Two main criteria were used to select respondents from this dataset: they had to be first-generation migrants, meaning they were born outside the host country, and their country of origin had to fall into one of two pre-2000 classifications: left-authoritarian or right-authoritarian.

Additionally, only respondents with complete data on key variables were included in the final dataset. This includes the primary independent variable (origin regime type), the three dependent variables (voting, protesting, and contacting officials), and the control variables (education, age, and gender). The analytic sample sizes show slight differences among the three models due to item-specific non-response and wave-specific coverage of specific questions.

In particular, there are roughly 3,000 respondents in all three models. There are some minor differences among the sample sizes. Item non-response and variable availability across ESS waves are the primary causes of sample size disparities. Due to missing data, all regression models are calculated using listwise deletion. It is not expected that the results will be substantially distorted by the relatively small amount of missing data. This limitation is acknowledged, though, and future iterations of the analysis might look into imputation or robustness evaluations. The comparability of results across models is not substantially jeopardized by these small adjustments, which are typical of cross-national survey research (Davidov et al., 2015).

To ensure uniform interpretation across ESS rounds, all categorical variables were recoded. "Don't Know," "Refused," and "Not Applicable" values were reclassified as missing and left out of the analysis. Additionally, in order to improve the interpretability of logistic regression models, key independent variables—such as regime type—were converted into binary indicators. By ensuring that the final analytical dataset is theoretically and methodologically sound, these procedures provide a solid foundation for evaluating how socialization under authoritarian regimes affects migrant political participation in diverse European contexts. Having established the cleaned and recoded dataset, the next section details the modeling approach used to test the hypotheses.

3.5 The Analytical Method

Logistic regression has been chosen as the analytical tool. This approach works well for forecasting the likelihood of binary outcomes, such as whether a respondent engaged in a particular kind of political activity. Different perspectives on how the legacies of authoritarian regimes impact interaction patterns are made possible by the distinct modeling of each participation behavior. By breaking down behaviors, the analysis can better spot patterns that might be hidden in a single, aggregated indicator.

The primary independent variable is the country of origin's regime type, which is divided into two categories: left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian. Based on research on regime ideology and structure, this classification separates right-authoritarian regimes by their repression, personalism, and ideological incoherence, and left-authoritarian regimes by their advanced ideological socialization (e.g., communist systems) (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2020).

This thesis uses a logistic regression modeling approach to investigate the relationship between first-generation migrants' political participation and their political socialization in authoritarian regimes. It focuses on three dependent variables: voting, protest participation, and contacting political officials. The binary nature of the outcome variables, each coded to indicate whether a respondent exhibited the specified behavior (1) or not (0), makes logistic regression appropriate. The analysis incorporates country fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity among countries of residence. For each host country in the sample, these are implemented through a set of dummy variables that take into consideration the influence of institutional, cultural, or policy-related factors unique to that country that might otherwise skew the estimates of interest. By

including these dummy variables, it is ensured that structural differences between host nations are not the only cause of the observed variation in participation outcomes.

Based on historical regime data from V-Dem, Freedom House, and other secondary sources, the regime type of the migrant's country of origin—which can be classified as either left-authoritarian or right-authoritarian—is the main independent variable of interest. This categorization evaluates whether political socialization in diverse authoritarian settings results in measurable variations in post-migration political behavior. The classification of countries according to their respective authoritarian subtype is provided below, distinguishing left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian origin contexts.

Table 1. Classification of Origin Countries by Authoritarian Regime Type

Left-Authoritarian	Right-Authoritarian
Albania	Afghanistan
Angola	Algeria
Armenia	Argentina
Azerbaijan	Bangladesh
Belarus	Brazil
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Burkina Faso
Bulgaria	Chile
Cambodia	Egypt
China	Indonesia
Cuba	Iran
Czechia	Iraq
Estonia	Jordan
Ethiopia	Libya
Georgia	Morocco
Hungary	Pakistan
Kazakhstan	Philippines
Kosovo	Syria
Kyrgyzstan	Tunisia

Laos	Turkey
Latvia	Venezuela
Lithuania	Zimbabwe
Moldova	
Mongolia	
Montenegro	
North Macedonia	
Poland	
Romania	
Russia (USSR)	
Slovakia	
Slovenia	
Tajikistan	
Turkmenistan	
Ukraine	
Uzbekistan	
Vietnam	

Odds ratios, which show the multiplicative effect of each independent variable on the likelihood of engaging in political activity, are used to display model results (Oser, 2022). Along with odds ratios, the analysis also computes Average Marginal Effects (AMEs). Marginal effects provide a more understandable understanding of how a unit change in an independent variable affects the estimated chance of political participation, even though odds ratios are useful for explaining multiplicative changes in likelihood. Rather than fixing covariates at their means, these computations use post-estimation techniques in R, averaging across all sample values. Marginal effects improve comprehension and give non-technical audiences clarity, even though odds ratios are the primary statistic. This improves data interpretation, particularly for categorical or binary factors such as gender or regime type. However, the study also includes average marginal effects (AMEs) because it can be challenging to interpret odds ratios in relation to absolute probabilities. When all other variables are controlled for, Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) show the expected

change in the probability of political participation that would arise from a one-unit change in an explanatory variable (Long, and Mustillo, 2021).

The analysis maintains the conceptual distinction between different types of political participation by independently estimating each model for voting, protesting, and contacting. This is consistent with the theoretical framework, which views these behaviors as distinct repertoires impacted by different socialization processes and resource needs. A suitable and robust method for demonstrating how regime legacies impact migrant political behavior in liberal democracies is logistic regression with fixed effects.

4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Overview of Empirical Approach

The empirical study of how political socialization under various authoritarian regimes—left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian in particular—influences the patterns of political participation of first-generation migrants living in European democracies is presented in this chapter (Voicu, and Peral, 2014). The analysis is directed by the main goal of the study, which is to determine whether and how the type of regime in the migrants' home country affects their participation in the democratic public life of the host nation.

The chapter addresses this question by concentrating on three different types of political participation: contacting political or government officials, taking part in public protests, and voting in national elections. Institutional, non-institutional, and elite-oriented participatory behaviors are represented by these forms, respectively (Talò, and Mannarini, 2015). To represent the conceptual difference between them, each is modeled separately and treated as a distinct dependent variable. The theoretical premise that distinct mechanisms of political socialization under authoritarian rule may shape different political behaviors is supported by this separation, which enables a more nuanced analysis (Stallbaum, 2025).

To calculate the probability of each kind of participation, the analytical approach uses logistic regression models. Along with a set of control variables that capture demographic traits like age, gender, and educational attainment, the models incorporate important independent variables, chief among them the regime type of the country of origin. Furthermore, to account for institutional and contextual variation among the 12 European host countries in the sample, country-specific dummy variables are used to incorporate fixed effects for the host countries.

Two complementary metrics are used to improve the results' interpretability. The multiplicative effect of independent variables on the odds of participation is first described using odds ratios. Second, to show the significant influence of regime type and other covariates on the expected likelihood of engaging in each behavior, average marginal effects (AMEs) are calculated (Long, and Mustillo, 2021).

Voting, protesting, and contacting are the three behavioral models that are presented in separate subsections as the chapter progresses. Descriptive statistics will be presented for each model to

show how participation is distributed among regime types and demographic groups. Regression outputs, including odds ratios and marginal effects, are then presented, and the main conclusions are interpreted in the context of the theoretical framework developed in previous chapters.

When combined, this empirical approach makes it possible to systematically examine the distinct impacts of authoritarian legacy on different types of political engagement while keeping in mind the contextual and demographic variations between host and migrant communities.

4.2 Overview of the Analytical Sample

This thesis's empirical analysis is based on pooled cross-sectional data from Rounds 6, 7, and 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS), with a particular focus on first-generation migrants living in 12 European host countries: Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Belgium, and Finland. These nations were chosen due to their substantial immigrant populations and steady attendance at the pertinent ESS waves.

The sample sizes utilized in the regressions vary slightly based on the political behavior outcome being studied after removing cases with missing values from the relevant models and filtering for valid responses on important variables. Due to either item nonresponse or question availability in some countries, voting behavior (H1), protest participation (H2), and contacting political officials (H3) all involve varying degrees of nonresponse across ESS waves. Notwithstanding these variations, each model maintains a robust analytical sample size.

The final sample sizes for each of the three models are shown in the table below, along with the proportion of respondents who were classified as coming from left- or right-authoritarian regimes:

Table 2. Descriptive Overview of the Data

Political Behavior	Total N	Left-Authoritarian N	Right-Authoritarian N
Voting (ESS 6–8)	2,103	864	1,239
Protest (ESS 6–8)	3,236	1,365	1,871
Contacting Officials (ESS 6–8)	3,228	1,362	1,866

While taking item-specific missingness into account, this structure guarantees consistency. The dataset uses both odds ratios and average marginal effects to interpret regression results, and country-level fixed effects are included in all three behavioral models to account for host-country variation. Despite the minor variations in sample composition, this method allows for meaningful comparisons between models.

4.3 Descriptive Statistics

Before turning to the regression models, this section offers a descriptive overview of the analytical sample and key variables, including political participation outcomes and relevant individual-level controls. This provides a clearer picture of the composition of the sample and highlights potential differences between migrants from left-authoritarian and right-authoritarian regimes in Europe.

Political Participation by Regime Type of Origin

The percentage of respondents who reported voting, protesting, or contacting political officials is compiled by the type of regime in their home country in order to analyze baseline participation trends. This breakdown makes it easier to see whether migrants from left- and right-authoritarian backgrounds initially differ from one another.

Table 3. Political Participation Rates by Authoritarian Regime Type

Political Behavior	Left-Authoritarian (%)	Right-Authoritarian (%)
Voted	57.4	64.4
Protested	7.7	10.5
Contacted Officials	10.4	12.4

As the table shows, conventional political participation such as voting is considerably more frequent than either protest or contacting politicians among migrants from both regime types. This suggests that institutional engagement remains the most common channel of political activity within the sample. Furthermore, respondents from right-authoritarian regimes consistently exhibit higher levels of participation across all three forms, indicating that those who were politically socialized in more repressive but less mobilized systems may display greater engagement when exposed to democratic opportunities.

Table 4. Political Participation of Migrants by Host Country

Host Country	Voted (%)	Protested (%)	Contacted Officials (%)
BE	77.5	7.5	11.6
CH	44.7	4.7	8.7
DE	61.3	11.9	8.3
DK	82.3	7.1	12.2
ES	49.7	12.3	12.0

Host Country	Voted (%)	Protested (%)	Contacted Officials (%)
FI	56.2	9.1	0.0
FR	67.1	14.7	13.0
GB	61.4	3.9	16.7
IT	29.6	4.8	5.6
NL	64.9	4.1	16.6
NO	60.3	8.8	16.5
SE	73.6	14.6	14.1

The table illustrates notable cross-national variation in migrants' political participation across European democracies. Voting rates are highest in countries with strong civic traditions such as Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium, while lower levels are observed in Italy and Switzerland. Protest and contacting activity show similar variation, reflecting national opportunity structures and political cultures. These differences emphasize that host-country context plays a crucial role in shaping migrants' engagement beyond individual or origin-related factors.

4.4 Model 1 – Voting Participation

This subsection presents the results of a logistic regression model examining the likelihood of voting participation among first-generation migrants, with a specific focus on the regime type of their country of origin. The dependent variable is binary (*voted_binary*), coded 1 for respondents who reported voting in the most recent national election in their host country and 0 otherwise. The key independent variable is *origin_regime_type*, a dummy variable distinguishing between migrants from left-authoritarian (1) and right-authoritarian (2) regimes. Control variables include age, gender (female), and years of education. Fixed effects for host countries (*cntry*) are included to account for institutional and contextual differences across the European countries in the sample.

Table 5. Voting Participation – Regression

Variable	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	p-value
Origin regime type	1.51	[0.99 – 2.31]	0.054
Age	1.05	[1.03 – 1.06]	<0.001
Education (years)	1.07	[1.03 – 1.13]	0.002
Female (=1)	0.82	[0.56 – 1.20]	0.311
Constant (Intercept)	0.36	[0.08 – 1.60]	0.178

Variable	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	p-value
Model Fit Statistics			
Number of observations	2,103		
Log-likelihood	-330.24		
Host-country fixed effects	Included (reference: Belgium)		

Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are more likely to vote than those from left-authoritarian regimes, according to the logistic regression results in Table 5. (OR = 1.51, $p \approx 0.05$). However, the 95% confidence interval includes 1.00, and therefore the effect does not reach conventional significance levels (Rainey, 2014). This implies that the association should be interpreted cautiously even though the relationship's direction is consistent with regime legacy theory, which forecasts lower participation among those raised in highly institutionalized, ideologically rigid regimes (Rainey, 2014).

Age and education behave as expected and are positively associated with voting likelihood, in line with established findings in the political participation literature (Smets & Van Ham, 2013). Gender does not appear to have a significant impact on voting in this sample.

Table 6. Voting Participation - AME*

Variable	AME	95% CI	p-value
Origin regime type	0.078	[-0.001, 0.156]	0.052
Age	0.0087	[0.0064, 0.0109]	0.000
Education (years)	0.0135	[0.0050, 0.0219]	0.0018
Female (=1)	-0.0364	[-0.1068, 0.0339]	0.3101

The logistic regression model's average marginal effects (AMEs) for predicting first-generation migrants' propensity to vote in Europe are shown in Table 6. By estimating the change in the predicted probability of the outcome associated with a one-unit change in the predictor, all other things being equal, AMEs provide an intuitive method of interpreting the influence of each independent variable.

Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are 7.8 percentage points more likely to vote than those from left-authoritarian regimes, according to the AME for `origin_regime_type`, which is 0.078.

* Average marginal effects estimated from the logistic regression model presented in Table 5.

This effect closely matches the results from the odds ratio model and is marginally significant ($p = 0.052$). The result indicates a potentially significant trend that is in line with theories of political socialization and regime legacy, even though the 95% CI includes zero. People from left-authoritarian governments might have been raised in settings where political participation was forced or ideologically inflexible, which could have decreased their long-term participation in democratic processes (Dinas, and Northmore-Ball, 2020). Voting, on the other hand, might be seen as a more significant or empowering act in their host countries by migrants from right-authoritarian backgrounds (Just, and Anderson, 2012).

Additionally, the model validates the anticipated impact of demographic controls:

The predicted probability of voting increases by about 0.9 percentage points for each additional year of age ($AME = 0.0087$, $p < 0.001$), indicating a clear age-related increase in electoral engagement. The effect of education is also positive and significant ($AME = 0.0135$, $p = 0.0018$), with roughly a 1.4-point increase per additional year of schooling. Both effects are moderate in size but larger than the gender coefficient, confirming that age and education remain key predictors of voting among migrants in Europe.

On the other hand, the effect of gender (female) is negative but not statistically significant ($AME = -0.0364$, $p = 0.3101$). When other factors are taken into account, there is no discernible difference in voting participation by gender, even though the estimate implies that women may be slightly less likely than men to cast ballots. This is because the confidence interval includes zero.

When combined, these AME results provide a more precise substantive interpretation in terms of probability and support the findings of the odds ratio. They indicate that in European democracies, voting behavior is significantly influenced by both sociodemographic traits and the political context of migrants' countries of origin. Overall, these results lend partial support to the initial hypothesis that migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are more likely to vote than those from left-authoritarian ones. Although the effect is only marginally significant, its consistent direction across models suggests a meaningful trend aligned with regime legacy theory, indicating that authoritarian socialization continues to shape political engagement after migration.

4.5 Model 2 – Protest Participation

This subsection presents the logistic regression results for protest participation among first-generation migrants, focusing on the effect of the political regime type in their country of origin. Protest is modeled as a distinct, non-institutional form of political behavior, often linked to contentious or expressive participation. Drawing on theories of political socialization and authoritarian legacies, this model tests whether migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are more inclined toward protest compared to those from left-authoritarian backgrounds, who may have been socialized under more repressive or ideologically rigid systems that discourage confrontation. The dependent variable is binary (*protested_binary*), coded 1 if the respondent reported having participated in a lawful public demonstration, and 0 otherwise. The key independent variable is Origin regime type, where 1 = left-authoritarian and 2 = right-authoritarian. Control variables

include age, gender (female), and years of education, and fixed effects for host countries (centry) are included to account for structural variation across the 12 European countries in the sample. Results are presented using both odds ratios and average marginal effects (AMEs).

Table 7. Protest Participation – Regression *

Variable	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	p-value
Origin regime type	1.40	[1.06 – 1.86]	0.018
Age	0.99	[0.98 – 1.00]	0.024
Education (years)	1.13	[1.06 – 1.21]	< 0.001
Female (=1)	0.63	[0.49 – 0.81]	< 0.001
Constant (Intercept)	0.12	[0.05 – 0.27]	< 0.001
Model Fit Statistics			
Number of observations	3,169		
Log-likelihood	–935.20		
Host-country fixed effects	Included (reference: Belgium)		

Contrary to theoretical expectations, the logistic regression model does not show a strong or substantively dominant effect of regime type on protest participation in this initial specification. Although the odds ratio for `origin_regime_type` is statistically significant (OR = 1.40, $p = 0.018$), indicating that migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are more likely to protest than those from left-authoritarian regimes, the magnitude of this effect remains relatively modest. The confidence interval ([1.06, 1.86]) suggests a limited substantive impact when compared to other covariates in the model.

By contrast, control variables exhibit more pronounced and consistent effects. Education is positively associated with protest participation, with each additional year increasing the odds of protest by approximately 13% (OR = 1.13, $p < 0.001$), while female respondents are significantly less likely to engage in protest activities (OR = 0.63, $p < 0.001$). Age shows a small but statistically significant negative association with protest participation (OR = 0.99, $p = 0.024$).

* The slight difference in the number of observations across protest models (N = 3,236 vs. N = 3,169) is due to item-specific missingness in individual-level covariates (age, education, and gender) across ESS waves. All robustness models reported in Tables 7. – 10. are estimated on the same complete-case sample (N = 3,169) to ensure comparability across specifications

Table 8. Protest Participation - AME*

Variable	AME	95% CI	p-value
Origin regime type	0.028	[0.005, 0.051]	0.018
Age	-0.001	[-0.0014, -0.0001]	0.024
Education (years)	0.010	[0.005, 0.016]	< 0.001
Female (=1)	-0.038	[-0.058, -0.017]	< 0.001

The average marginal effects largely mirror the results of the odds ratio model. The effect of origin-country regime type on protest participation remains statistically significant but modest in magnitude. Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are predicted to be approximately 2.8 percentage points more likely to participate in protests than those from left-authoritarian regimes (AME = 0.028, $p = 0.018$).

By comparison, individual-level characteristics exert a more substantial influence. Each additional year of education increases the predicted probability of protest participation by about 1.0 percentage point (AME = 0.010, $p < 0.001$), while female migrants are approximately 3.8 percentage points less likely to protest than their male counterparts (AME = -0.038 , $p < 0.001$). Age shows a small but statistically significant negative association with protest participation (AME = -0.001 , $p = 0.024$).

To better understand the relatively modest regime-type effect observed in the main specification reported in Table 8., a series of follow-up tests were conducted. Specifically, a reduced model including only `origin_regime_type`, without any individual-level controls or host-country fixed effects—was estimated. This specification reveals a statistically significant and substantively larger effect of regime type on protest participation.

Table 9. Reduced Model Results (No Controls)

Variable	Odds Ratio	95% CI	p-value
<code>origin_regime_type</code>	1.42	[1.11, 1.83]	0.006
Constant (Intercept)	0.06	[0.04, 0.09]	< 0.001

* Average marginal effects estimated from the logistic regression model presented in Table 7.

In the reduced model, migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are significantly more likely to protest than those from left-authoritarian regimes (OR = 1.42, $p = 0.006$), indicating a statistically significant and substantively meaningful gap. This finding aligns with the raw descriptive statistics, which showed protest rates of 10.5% among right-authoritarian origin migrants compared to 7.7% for those from left-authoritarian regimes.

The contrast between the reduced and full models highlights an important point: while the protest gap by regime type is clearly visible in the raw data, its magnitude and statistical strength vary across model specifications once demographic controls and host-country fixed effects are included.

This shift can be attributed to several key factors, which were examined through additional robustness models. To identify variation across specifications stem from individual-level or contextual factors, two supplementary models were run: one including only individual-level controls (age, education, and gender) and another including only host-country fixed effects.

Table 10. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Protest Participation

Variable	(1) Reduced Model	(2) + Individual Controls	(3) + Country Fixed Effects
Origin regime type	1.42 *($p = 0.006$)	1.49 ($p = 0.002$)	1.37 ($p = 0.024$)
Age	—	0.99 ($p = 0.029$)	—
Education (years)	—	1.13 ($p < 0.001$)	—
Female (=1)	—	0.64 ($p < 0.001$)	—
Constant (Intercept)	0.06 ($p < 0.01$)	0.06 ($p < 0.001$)	0.10 ($p < 0.001$)
Model Fit Statistics			
Observations (N)	3,169	3,169	3,169
Log-likelihood	-984.2	-967.7	-950.8
Country fixed effects	No	No	Yes (reference: Belgium)

The results, reported in Table 10. , show that when only country fixed effects are included, the regime-type coefficient remains statistically significant (OR = 1.37, $p = 0.024$). Likewise, when only individual-level controls are added, the effect of regime type remains statistically significant and even slightly increase in magnitude (OR = 1.49, $p = 0.002$). This pattern suggests that the magnitude of the regime-type coefficient varies across model specifications, while its statistical significance persists. Rather than being eliminated by either individual-level or contextual adjustments alone, the regime effect appears to operate alongside both sets of factors.

The methodological choice to include multiple controls and fixed effects serves to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias and allows for a more precise assessment of the robustness of the regime-

type effect. While the regime of origin continues to exhibit a statistically detectable association with protest participation across model specifications, its substantive impact remains modest when compared to individual-level determinants. In particular, education and gender emerge as more stable and powerful predictors of protest participation among migrants (Bilodeau, 2008).

These results underscore the importance of careful model specification and highlight the value of sensitivity analysis in distinguishing between statistically significant effects and substantively dominant drivers of political behavior. Ultimately, the regime of origin matters, but its influence appears limited and operates alongside — rather than overriding — migrants' individual resources and the structural context of the host country.

4.6 Model 3 – Contacting Political Officials

The results of a logistic regression model that looked at first-generation migrants' propensity to get in touch with political officials—with a particular emphasis on the impact of regime type in the country of origin—are shown in this subsection. For respondents who reported contacting a politician, government official, or civil servant, the dependent variable (`contacted_binary`) is coded 1; otherwise, it is coded 0. `Origin_regime_type`, which differentiates between migrants from left-authoritarian (1) and right-authoritarian (2) regimes, is the primary independent variable. Age, gender (female), and years of education are examples of control variables that are frequently linked to political behavior. In order to account for contextual and institutional variation among the 12 European states, fixed effects for host countries (`cntry`) are included. The findings, which provide information on the relative and absolute likelihood of engaging in this elite-focused and institutionally complex form of political engagement, are displayed using both odds ratios and average marginal effects.

Table 11. Contacting Political Officials – Regression

Variable	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	p-values
Origin regime type	0.98	[0.64 – 1.52]	0.943
Age	1.00	[0.99 – 1.01]	0.790
Education (years)	1.10	[1.05 – 1.15]	<0.001
Female (=1)	0.80	[0.54 – 1.20]	0.287
Constant (Intercept)	0.06	[0.01 – 0.24]	<0.001
Model Fit Statistics			
Number of observations	3,228		
Log-likelihood	-338.44		

Variable	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	p-values
Host-country fixed effects	Included (reference: Belgium)		

Table 11. displays the odds ratios from a logistic regression model estimating the likelihood of contacting political officials among first-generation migrants. *Origin_regime_type*, the main independent variable, examines whether migrants from left-authoritarian regimes (coded 1) are more likely to participate in this elite-oriented activity than migrants from right-authoritarian regimes (coded 2).

The results indicate no statistically significant difference based on regime type, which is contrary to theoretical expectations. Regime background does not consistently influence the likelihood of contacting political elites, as evidenced by the *origin_regime_type* odds ratio of 0.98 and the 95% CI of 1 ([0.64, 1.52]). This result casts doubt on the notion that migrants from left-authoritarian environments, where the emphasis is on state-sanctioned participation, are more likely to engage with institutions in their host countries (Pop-Eleches, and Tucker, 2020).

Education is one of the most powerful and significant predictors among the control variables. The established relationship between formal political engagement and educational attainment is further supported by the fact that the odds of contacting a political official increase by approximately 10% for every extra year of education. Although the estimate for females is negative, neither age nor gender has a statistically significant effect, indicating that women may be somewhat less likely to participate in this form of activity—though not definitively.

These findings imply that individual resources (like education) have a greater influence on contacting behavior than do demographics or previous regime exposure. The lack of a regime-type effect sets this model apart from theoretical predictions and emphasizes the need for a sophisticated comprehension of the cross-border transmission of political repertoires.

Table 12. Contacting Political Officials - AME*

Variable	AME	95% CI	p-value
Origin regime type	-0.0016	[-0.0441, 0.0410]	0.943
Age	-0.0002	[-0.0015, 0.0011]	0.790

* Average marginal effects estimated from the logistic regression model presented in Table 11.

Variable	AME	95% CI	p-value
Education (years)	0.0089	[0.0043, 0.0136]	0.0002
Female (=1)	-0.0214	[-0.0610, 0.0181]	0.288

The average marginal effects (AMEs) of contacting political officials are shown in Table 4.6.2. When all other factors are held constant, these effects calculate the impact of each predictor on the expected likelihood of participating in this elite-focused type of political activity.

With an *origin_regime_type* AME of -0.0016, migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are marginally less likely than those from left-authoritarian regimes to get in touch with officials. Nevertheless, the confidence interval contains zero, and the result is not statistically significant ($p = 0.943$). This implies that prior regime socialization does not systematically affect the likelihood of contacting political elites, which is in contrast to theoretical expectations. The outcome supports the previous odds ratio conclusion and raises the possibility that increased elite-oriented engagement in the host country context may not always result from institutional familiarity or learned repertoires from left-authoritarian regimes (Ivanov, 2024).

Education is the only significant predictor among the control variables. The predicted probability of contacting officials rises by almost 0.9 percentage points for every extra year of education, with an AME of 0.0089 ($p < 0.001$). This reaffirms how important education is for facilitating institutional political participation and negotiating intricate administrative procedures (Ahearn et al., 2023).

The AMEs for age and gender are not statistically significant. The estimate for female suggests a lower predicted probability of contacting officials, but the effect size is small and the confidence interval [-0.061, 0.018] includes zero, meaning the gender difference is not conclusive in this case.

When combined, these findings show that education, not regime background or demographic traits, is the main factor influencing contacting behavior. The results show that elite-oriented participation may be influenced more by personal ability than by political socialization, which contrasts with previous models (e.g., voting), where regime type seemed to have a greater impact.

4.7 Cross-Model Comparison, Robustness Checks, and Methodological Reflections

The results of the three logistic regression models examining first-generation migrants' voting, protesting, and contacting political officials are combined in this chapter. It accomplishes two goals: first, it synthesizes the comparative insights that emerge from the empirical models; second, it critically evaluates the results' robustness and considers the study's main methodological limitations. The analytical link between empirical results and the more general theoretical and policy implications covered in the next chapter is provided by these conversations taken together.

Table 13. Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) Across Models*

Variable	Voting (AME)	Protest (AME)	Contacting (AME)
Origin regime type	0.078	0.028*	−0.002
Age	0.0087 ***	−0.001*	−0.0002
Education (years)	0.0135 **	0.0103***	0.0089 ***
Female (=1)	−0.0364	−0.0376***	−0.0214

The comparative overview of average marginal effects (AMEs) provides clear evidence that the influence of migrants' regime of origin varies according to the type of political participation. As shown in Table 13., the voting model demonstrates the strongest and most consistent effect. When individual characteristics and host-country context are controlled for, migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are predicted to be 7.8 percentage points more likely to vote than those from left-authoritarian contexts. This finding supports the first hypothesis on voting participation and lends credence to the idea that regime socialization under left-authoritarian systems may stifle democratic habitus, possibly due to politicized or coercive electoral experiences that undermine trust in democratic institutions (Neundorf, and Pop-Eleches, 2020).

However, this effect is considerably weaker for other forms of participation. For protest participation, the regime-type effect is statistically significant but modest in size (AME = 0.028), indicating that migrants from right-authoritarian regimes are predicted to be approximately 2.8 percentage points more likely to protest than those from left-authoritarian regimes. While this suggests that authoritarian legacies are not entirely absent in non-institutional participation, the magnitude of the effect is substantially smaller than for voting and is overshadowed by individual-level characteristics. By contrast, contacting political officials shows no meaningful effect of regime type (AME = −0.002), indicating that this form of participation is largely independent of origin-regime socialization. Taken together, these results suggest that non-institutional participation and direct engagement with political authorities are shaped less by authoritarian

* The table reports average marginal effects (AMEs) from the logistic regression models for voting, protest, and contacting politicians, estimated using pooled ESS Rounds 6–8. Each coefficient represents the average change in the predicted probability of the dependent variable associated with a one-unit change in the predictor, holding other variables constant.

Stars indicate statistical significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

These AMEs correspond to the logistic regression models presented, providing a direct comparison of effect magnitudes across participation types.

legacies and more by host-country opportunity structures, personal efficacy, and issue-specific motivations (Koppenfels, 2025).

Education, on the other hand, has a consistently significant impact across all three models, with the largest effect on voting (AME = 0.0135), followed by contacting officials (AME = 0.0103) and protesting (AME = 0.010). This pattern underscores the critical role of personal resources in fostering political engagement and integration. Political literacy, awareness of participatory opportunities, and confidence in navigating formal institutions are all likely enhanced through education.

4.8 Concluding Reflection

Taken together, the comparative models and robustness tests indicate that the legacy of origin-country regime type matters—but selectively. It appears most clearly and consistently in institutional, electoral participation (voting), while appearing weaker in non-institutional forms of participation such as protest and largely absent in elite-oriented behaviors such as political contacting. This distinction supports the view that regime socialization affects habitual and normative forms of engagement, but that issue-based or resource-dependent behaviors are shaped more by education, gender, and individual capacity (Koppenfels, 2025).

The analytical consistency of education and the gender gap across models suggests that future integration policies should focus on civic education, language access, and gender-sensitive engagement strategies, particularly in marginalized communities. By merging theoretical insights with robust empirical evidence, this chapter lays the foundation for the broader discussion that follows in Chapter 5.

5 DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION

5.1 Interpreting the Empirical Findings Against Theoretical Expectations

Chapter 4's empirical findings provide a detailed understanding of how political socialization in authoritarian regimes influences migrants' engagement in democratic settings. The findings indicate that regime legacies are significant, however their effects vary by involvement type and are not unambiguous in their direction. The results indicate that authoritarian backgrounds influence the type of participation, the precise subtype of regime (left- vs. right-authoritarian), and individual-level resources. This part carefully interprets the findings in relation to the theoretical expectations presented in Chapter 2 and the study design established in Chapter 3.

5.1.1 Voting Participation

The initial outcome examined in Chapter 4 was voting. The hypothesis based on the theoretical framework posited that migrants from left-authoritarian regimes, having undergone coercive mobilization and ritualized electoral procedures, would exhibit diminished levels of electoral participation in democratic settings. Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes, who were generally marginalized from significant involvement and depoliticized, were anticipated to place greater

significance on democratic elections once they became accessible, resulting in comparatively elevated turnout rates (Just, 2019).

The regression outcomes validated this expectation. Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes consistently show a higher report to vote compared to those from left-authoritarian contexts, even when accounting for education, age, gender, and fixed effects of the host nation. This pattern is noteworthy as it highlights that the legacies of coerced involvement do not result in increased engagement, but instead foster skepticism and disengagement. Individuals accustomed to non-competitive elections seem less likely to perceive voting as significant, even when presented with authentic opportunities in democratic environments.

This result further emphasizes the uniqueness of right-authoritarian legacies. While these regimes suppressed participation and fostered compliance, their citizens did not inherently adopt a rejection of voting. Once democratic opportunities emerged in host nations, migrants from right-authoritarian backgrounds participated in elections at higher rates than those from left-authoritarian backgrounds. This indicates that political socialization during repression fundamentally different from that during forced mobilization. In one instance, elections were ubiquitous yet devoid of significance; in the other, elections were either nonexistent or severely constrained (Hassan et al., 2022). The former appears to cultivate skepticism, whereas the latter promotes the acknowledgment of democratic chances when subsequently confronted.

Nevertheless, the findings indicate a significant caveat. Voting is significantly contingent upon legal eligibility, especially citizenship (Ferris et al., 2020). Chapter 3 indicated that not all first-generation migrants in the ESS sample possessed the ability to vote in national elections, with eligibility criteria differing significantly among European democracies. Consequently, the discerned disparities among regime types may also indicate selection effects, wherein individuals who naturalize have a greater propensity to vote. Nevertheless, the same pattern observed across models corroborates the theoretical assertion that authoritarian subtypes have unique influences on electoral behavior.

5.1.2 Protest Participation

The second outcome examined was protest participation, which signifies a non-institutional and frequently expressive mode of engagement (Alscher, and Jana, 2025). The theoretical expectation was less clear. Migrants from left-authoritarian regimes, familiar with state-organized demonstrations and huge mobilizations, may perceive protest as an illegitimate or useless endeavor. Migrants from right-authoritarian countries, who have witnessed severe repression of dissent, may perceive protest as either excessively perilous or as a new avenue for political expression (Mitchell et al., 2025).

The empirical results demonstrated that regime background possesses a more limited and less consistent explanatory capacity for protest participation than for voting. While differences between migrants from left- and right-authoritarian regimes are observable in some model specifications, these differences diminish once demographic and contextual factors are taken into account, and the

overall magnitude of the regime-type effect remains modest. This pattern suggests that protest participation is less strongly structured by authoritarian legacies than institutional forms of political engagement.

One possible interpretation is that protest behavior is shaped primarily by the opportunity structures of host countries than by experiences from the country of origin (Strijbis, 2015). European democracies exhibit significant disparities in their protest cultures: in France, protests are a customary mode of political expression, whereas in nations such as Switzerland, they are quite infrequent (Borbáth, and Gessler, 2020). Migrants can acclimate to these environments irrespective of their place of origin, acquiring new strategies of resistance through exposure to the traditions of the host nation. This adaptability differs from voting, which is more strongly associated with entrenched beliefs regarding the legitimacy of elections (Lever, 2025).

Another interpretation is that protest is influenced by generational and educational disparities (Grasso, and Giugni, 2022). Chapter 4 demonstrated that younger and better educated migrants exhibited a higher propensity to protest, irrespective of their regime of origin. These findings correspond with extensive participation research that identified education and age as determinants of non-institutional engagement (Pilati, 2018). In this regard, participation in protests is more indicative of resources and life stage than of authoritarian legacies (Dollbaum et al., 2025).

Taken together, the comparatively weak and context-dependent role of regime type in shaping protest participation constitutes an important finding in itself. It indicates that whereas authoritarian legacies influence perceptions of formal institutions such as elections, their impact on expressive and collective forms of participation appears more limited. Migrants might adjust their protest conduct more readily than their voting behavior, indicating the adaptability of non-institutional involvement.

5.1.3 Contacting Politicians

The third result examined was contacting politicians, a formal yet demanding type of participation (Dubrow et al., 2022). Contacting requires familiarity with institutional pathways, assurance in effectiveness, and frequently resources like time and education (Dubrow et al., 2022). The theoretical expectation posited that authoritarian legacies would inhibit this type of participation, especially among migrants from right-authoritarian countries, where authorities instilled fear and engagement with elites was restricted. Migrants from left-authoritarian regimes may exhibit less hesitation due to their experience with mandatory institutional interactions, although in coercive conditions (Chan, 2024).

The empirical results partially corroborated these expectations. Migrants from left-authoritarian regimes show a slightly higher but statistically insignificant propensity to contact officials compared to those from right-authoritarian regimes, however the disparities were neither as consistent nor as substantial as shown in the voting models. While this non-significant difference is directionally consistent with the idea that prior exposure to institutional routines may reduce reluctance to engage with authorities, the data do not provide statistical evidence for such an effect.

Simultaneously, the overall levels of engagement were minimal across all groups, indicating the elevated threshold of this activity. Chapter 4's models demonstrated that education serves as a significant predictor of engagement, implying that resources are more influential than regime background in this type of participation. Gender disparities were evident, as men were more inclined to initiate contact than women, highlighting the interplay between regime legacies and wider demographic trends.

These findings align with theoretical expectations while also underscoring the intricacies of evaluating authoritarian legacies. Right-authoritarian origins may inhibit communication owing to fear of authorities, whereas left-authoritarian backgrounds may cultivate a superficial familiarity with institutional interaction, however compulsory and false. In democratic circumstances, this may reduce psychological obstacles to engaging with authorities, while resources remain critical.

5.1.4 Summary of Theoretical Alignment

The empirical data collectively affirm that authoritarian legacies are significant, however their impacts differ depending on the sort of participation.

- Voting: Marginally significant regime-type influences, with right-authoritarian migrants exhibiting greater engagement than their left-authoritarian counterparts.
- Protest: A weak and context-dependent effect of regime type, with host-country opportunity structures and individual resources exerting greater impact.
- Contacting: Regime type shows an insignificant and substantively small effect, indicating a null influence on involvement; nonetheless, overall engagement remains low and is significantly influenced by educational attainment.

These data support the overarching assumption that authoritarian legacies endure post-migration, however they interplay with the form of involvement and contextual circumstances. Participation is not consistently hindered nor promoted; instead, it illustrates the interaction of inherent skills, host-country institutions, and personal resources.

5.2 Institutional vs. Non-Institutional Participation

The empirical analysis disclosed significant disparities between institutional and non-institutional modes of political participation among migrants from authoritarian countries. These distinctions are essential for comprehending both the manifestation of authoritarian legacies and the manner in which migrants navigate democratic opportunity frameworks upon arriving in Europe.

This research indicates that institutional engagement, assessed through voting and contacting politicians, demonstrates more pronounced effects of authoritarian regimes than non-institutional protest. The voting results, analyzed in Section 5.1, reveal a significant disparity between migrants from left- and right-authoritarian regimes. However, contacting politicians, though slightly higher among left-authoritarian migrants, does not show a statistically significant regime-type effect.

Collectively, these findings emphasize that institutional forms of engagement are more directly influenced by previous socialization experiences.

Voting exemplifies how the legacies of coerced participation and election manipulation persist in shaping attitudes. Migrants from left-authoritarian regimes, conditioned by ritualistic yet superficial voting rituals, exhibit diminished participation in democratic elections (Just, 2019). This indicates that their cynicism toward organized political channels continues even after resettlement in democratic environments. Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes seem more inclined to engage in electoral engagement, indicating a lack of prior ritualized mobilization in their political upbringing (Dollmann, 2022).

Contacting politicians, however less common overall, exhibits a similar yet more nuanced pattern. Migrants from left-authoritarian backgrounds exhibited a higher alignment for this type of participation, potentially attributable to their familiarity with institutionalized yet insincere forms of engagement in their countries of origin. Although such communication was coerced and meticulously regulated, it afforded some exposure to the practice of interacting with authorities (Lindemann, 2023). Migrants from right-authoritarian regimes, conditioned to eschew governmental institutions, had diminished levels of contact behavior (Neundorf, and Pop-Eleches, 2020). This discrepancy highlights that authoritarian varieties do not yield universal disengagement but rather varied patterns of interaction with institutions (Neundorf, and Pop-Eleches, 2020).

Institutional participation indicates that authoritarian legacies persist when migrants encounter traditional forms of political engagement. Elections and interactions with officials evoke memories of past events, whether forced or suppressed, resulting in varying degrees of engagement.

Non-institutional engagement, defined in this context as protest activity, reveals a distinct perspective. In contrast to voting and contacting, protest participation shows weaker and less consistent differences between migrants from left- and right-authoritarian regimes once controls are applied. Protest participation seemed to be influenced more significantly by individual-level resources (such as education and age) and the settings of the host country than by experiences with the government in the place of origin (Grasso, and Giugni, 2022).

This finding underscores the adaptive nature of non-institutional engagement. While institutional participation is directly linked to political repertoires acquired in authoritarian settings, protest is less constrained by these legacies. Migrants are more inclined to adjust their protest behavior in accordance with the norms and opportunities of the host society (Pilati, 2018).

The comparatively limited and context-dependent role of regime type in shaping protest participation suggests that authoritarian legacies do not constitute insurmountable barriers to non-institutional engagement. In contrast to elections, which migrants may perceive as manipulative, or contacts, which may instill fear of authorities, protest emerges as a versatile strategy that migrants can readily employ in democratic contexts (Pilati, 2018). This malleability emphasizes the necessity of differentiating between institutional and non-institutional involvement instead of regarding participation as a singular continuum.

The disparity between institutional and non-institutional participation can be analyzed within the framework of political socialization. Authoritarian regimes influence individuals' attitudes toward formal political institutions, but have a diminished and transient impact on extra-institutional activities (Neundorf, and Pop-Eleches, 2020).

In left-authoritarian regimes, forced mobilization instructed citizens that elections and formal participation were vacuous activities lacking genuine agency. This distrust directly influences democratic elections, resulting in diminished voter turnout (Neundorf, and Pop-Eleches, 2020). Nonetheless, these regimes offered restricted possibilities for protest, and when migrants discover democratic protest opportunities, they may not perceive them with the same degree of cynicism. Conversely, protest in host nations is perceived as an innovative mode of expression, relatively free from the influence of state-directed mobilization (Pilati, 2018).

In right-authoritarian regimes, repression stifled all types of political activity (Hassan et al., 2022). Importantly, many of these regimes did not depend on mandatory electoral rituals, resulting in migrants from these contexts not adopting a sense of futility concerning elections. When presented with democratic opportunities, they were comparatively more inclined to vote than their left-authoritarian counterparts (Brancati, 2014). Protest was, however, uncommon in their upbringing, and although repression may have instilled caution, the cultures of host countries can swiftly transform perceptions of dissent into something respectable and safe (Brancati, 2014).

This analysis elucidates why voting and contacting officials—both intrinsically linked to institutions—exhibit distinct patterns based on regime type, although protest does not. Institutional involvement aligns more closely with authoritarian practices, while non-institutional engagement is redefined in democratic contexts.

The distinction between institutional and non-institutional contexts also correlates with resources and demographics. Chapter 4 illustrates that education was a significant predictor of all types of participation, with especially pronounced effects on contacting politicians. Higher education provides individuals with the knowledge and confidence necessary to traverse intricate institutional pathways, hence enhancing participation, especially among those with authoritarian backgrounds (Grasso, and Giugni, 2022).

Age effects were consistently observed, with younger migrants exhibiting a higher propensity to protest and older migrants demonstrating a greater inclination to vote. These patterns reflect wider participation trends in established democracies, however are significant due to their consistency across various regime histories. They propose that although authoritarian legacies influence foundational tendencies, life-cycle and resource factors are pivotal to participation results.

Gender disparities further exacerbate the disparity between institutional and non-institutional contexts. Men exhibited a higher propensity to engage with politics, whereas women's involvement was comparatively diminished, especially in protest activities. These differences underscore the intersection of authoritarian legacies with broader social inequities, resulting in varied patterns of involvement.

The empirical differentiation between institutional and non-institutional participation carries multiple implications. Initially, it illustrates that authoritarian legacies are not universally pervasive. Migrants can swiftly acquire new forms of non-institutional involvement, indicating a stronger capacity for democratic flexibility (Just, 2019).

Secondly, it emphasizes that participation should not be examined as a singular dimension (Van Deth, 2014). Consolidating voting, contacting, and protest into a single indicator would obscure the distinct impacts of regime legacies. Disaggregating participation types facilitates a more sophisticated comprehension of how past experiences inform current behaviors.

The findings underscore that institutional trust and familiarity constitute significant obstacles for migrants from authoritarian backgrounds. Although protest can be embraced with relative simplicity, institutional participation necessitates entrenched doubt or apprehension stemming from authoritarian upbringing. Policies designed to promote migrant participation must consequently tackle both psychological and structural impediments, in addition to ensuring legal rights.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

The differentiation between institutional and non-institutional participation is crucial for analyzing the empirical results of this thesis. While institutional mechanisms like voting and contacting are influenced by authoritarian legacies, non-institutional protest is less restricted and more flexible to the settings of host countries. This disparity substantiates the theoretical assertion that authoritarian socialization influences attitudes toward institutions more profoundly than those toward extra-institutional actions.

By acknowledging this divide, the study enhances the comprehension of migrant political engagement. Authoritarian legacies do not universally suppress participation; rather, they interplay with the nature of participation, the institutional framework, and individual resources. This nuanced understanding transcends simplistic binaries of "active" vs "passive" migrants, emphasizing the intricacies of engagement within both institutional and non-institutional spheres.

Overall, the findings of this thesis show that the political engagement of migrants from authoritarian regimes cannot be explained by a single factor. Instead, participation emerges from the interaction between past political socialization, host-country conditions, and individual resources. Institutional forms of participation, such as voting and contacting officials, are more closely connected to experiences formed under authoritarian rule, whereas non-institutional protest tends to be shaped by opportunities and norms in the host society.

At the same time, the results highlight the importance of education, age, and gender in shaping participation across all regime backgrounds. These factors operate alongside, and sometimes more strongly than, authoritarian legacies. Taken together, the evidence illustrates that migrants adapt to democratic environments in varied ways, combining inherited attitudes with new experiences. This reinforces the need to approach migrant political participation as a diverse and dynamic process rather than a uniform pattern.

6 List of References

- Adamson, F. B. (2020). Non-state authoritarianism and diaspora politics. *Global Networks*, 20(1), 150–169. <https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12246>
- Adler, P. S., Adly, A., Armanios, D. E., Battilana, J., Bodrožić, Z., Clegg, S., Davis, G. F., Gartenberg, C., Glynn, M. A., Aslan Gümüşay, A., Haveman, H. A., Leonardi, P., Lounsbury, M., McGahan, A. M., Meyer, R., Phillips, N., & Sheppard-Jones, K. (2023). Authoritarianism, Populism, and the Global Retreat of Democracy: A Curated Discussion. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 32(1), 3–20. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10564926221119395>
- Ahearn, C. E., Brand, J. E., & Zhou, X. (2023). How, and For Whom, Does Higher Education Increase Voting? *Research in Higher Education*, 64(4), 574–597. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-022-09717-4>
- Ahmadov, A. K., & Sasse, G. (2016). A Voice Despite Exit: The Role of Assimilation, Emigrant Networks, and Destination in Emigrants' Transnational Political Engagement. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(1), 78–114. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015600468>
- Ali, S. N., & Lin, C. (2013). Why People Vote: Ethical Motives and Social Incentives. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 5(2), 73–98. <https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.73>
- Alscher, P., & Jana, C. (2025). Exploring the Relationship Between Non-institutionalized Political Participation and Political Efficacy Among High School Students. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 54(9), 2143–2154. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-025-02186-9>
- Ambrosini, M. (2025). The populist far right paradox: The identification of the enemy and its exceptions in the immigration policies of the Meloni government in Italy. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 13(1), 17. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-025-00438-y>

- Armingeon, K., & Schädel, L. (2015). Social Inequality in Political Participation: The Dark Sides of Individualisation. *West European Politics*, 38(1), 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.929341>
- Arnesen, S., & Peters, Y. (2018). The Legitimacy of Representation: How Descriptive, Formal, and Responsiveness Representation Affect the Acceptability of Political Decisions. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(7), 868–899. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720702>
- Auerbach, K., & Petrova, B. (2022). Authoritarian or Simply Disillusioned? Explaining Democratic Skepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. *Political Behavior*, 44(4), 1959–1983. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09807-0>
- Aydemir, N., & Vermeulen, F. (2023). Political preferences across a transnational space: Interviews with dual citizens of the Netherlands and Turkey. *European Political Science*, 22(1), 159–174. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-022-00410-9>
- Barrett, M., & Brunton-Smith, I. (2014). Political and Civic Engagement and Participation: Towards an Integrative Perspective. *Journal of Civil Society*, 10(1), 5–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2013.871911>
- Bartusevičius, H., Van Leeuwen, F., & Petersen, M. B. (2023). Political repression motivates anti-government violence. *Royal Society Open Science*, 10(6), 221227. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.221227>
- Bauböck, R. (2003). Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism. *International Migration Review*, 37(3), 700–723. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00155.x>
- Benton, A. L. (2016). How “Participatory Governance” Strengthens Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Electoral Authoritarian Oaxaca, Mexico. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 8(2), 37–70. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1600800202>
- Berlinschi, R., & Harutyunyan, A. (2019). Do Migrants Think Differently? Evidence from Eastern European and Post-Soviet States. *International Migration Review*, 53(3), 831–868. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918318777745>

- Bilodeau, A. (2008). Immigrants' Voice through Protest Politics in Canada and Australia: Assessing the Impact of Pre-Migration Political Repression. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(6), 975–1002. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830802211281>
- Bilodeau, A. (2014). Is democracy the only game in town? Tension between immigrants' democratic desires and authoritarian imprints. *Democratization*, 21(2), 359–381. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.712515>
- Bilodeau, A., McAllister, I., & Kanji, M. (2010). Adaptation to Democracy among Immigrants in Australia. *International Political Science Review*, 31(2), 141–165. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110364737>
- Blanc-Noël, N. (2010). Multicultural Sweden, assimilationist France: How and why national identity narratives evolve. *Sens public*, 1064039ar. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1064039ar>
- Bloemraad, I. (2006). Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization and Immigrant Political Incorporation. *Social Forces*, 85(2), 667–695. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2007.0002>
- Bloks, S. A., & Häuser, D. (2025). Denizenship and democratic equality. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 28(1), 60–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2024.2436261>
- Borbáth, E., & Gessler, T. (2020). Different worlds of contention? Protest in Northwestern, Southern and Eastern Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 59(4), 910–935. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12379>
- Brancati, D. (2014). Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17(1), 313–326. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052013-115248>
- Bratsberg, B., Ferwerda, J., Finseraas, H., & Kotsadam, A. (2021). How Settlement Locations and Local Networks Influence Immigrant Political Integration. *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(3), 551–565. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12532>

- Brauen, M., & Harmon, K. N. (1977). Political Socialization: A Topical Bibliography. *Youth & Society*, 8(3), 299–320. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0044118X7700800304>
- Brown, J., Cantoni, E., Chinoy, S., Koenen, M., & Pons, V. (2023). *The Effect of Childhood Environment on Political Behavior: Evidence from Young U.S. Movers, 1992–2021* (w31759; p. w31759). National Bureau of Economic Research. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w31759>
- Caramani, D., & Grotz, F. (2015). Beyond citizenship and residence? Exploring the extension of voting rights in the age of globalization. *Democratization*, 22(5), 799–819. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.981668>
- Carlson, S., & Schneickert, C. (2021). Habitus in the context of transnationalization: From ‘transnational habitus’ to a configuration of dispositions and fields. *The Sociological Review*, 69(5), 1124–1140. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00380261211021778>
- Castles, S., de Haas, H., & Miller, M. J. (2020). *The Age Of Migration: International Population Movements In The Modern World* (6th ed.). Guilford Press.
- Chan, K. N. (2024). Public administration in authoritarian regimes: Propositions for comparative research. *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, 46(3), 213–235. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2024.2306554>
- Chen, X., & Moss, D. M. (2018). Authoritarian Regimes and Social Movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi, & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (1st ed., pp. 666–681). Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119168577.ch38>
- Cinelli, C., & Hazlett, C. (2020). Making Sense of Sensitivity: Extending Omitted Variable Bias. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology*, 82(1), 39–67. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rssb.12348>
- Ciornei, I., & Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2020). Transnational turnout. Determinants of emigrant voting in home country elections. *Political Geography*, 78, 102145. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102145>

Cohen, A., Vigoda, E., & Samorly, A. (2001). Analysis of the Mediating Effect of Personal-Psychological Variables on the Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation: A Structural Equations Framework. *Political Psychology*, 22(4), 727–757. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00260>

D’Amato, G., & Schwenken, H. (2018). Protests Revisited: Political Configurations, Political Culture and Protest Impact. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), *Protest Movements in Asylum and Deportation* (pp. 273–291). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74696-8_13

Dao, T. H., Docquier, F., Maurel, M., & Schaus, P. (2021). Global migration in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: The unstoppable force of demography. *Review of World Economics*, 157(2), 417–449. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-020-00402-1>

Davidov, E., Cieciuch, J., Meuleman, B., Schmidt, P., Algesheimer, R., & Hausherr, M. (2015). The Comparability of Measurements of Attitudes toward Immigration in the European Social Survey. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 79(S1), 244–266. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfv008>

De Leeuw, S. E., Rekker, R., Azrout, R., & Van Spanje, J. H. P. (2021). Are would-be authoritarians right? Democratic support and citizens’ left-right self-placement in former left- and right- authoritarian countries. *Democratization*, 28(2), 414–433. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1827230>

de Rooij, E. A. (2012). Patterns of immigrant political participation: Explaining differences in types of political participation between immigrants and the majority population in Western Europe. *European Sociological Review*, 28(4), 455–481. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23272532>

Dinas, E., & Northmore-Ball, K. (2020). The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(12), 1957–1991. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019852699>

Dollbaum, J. M., Meier, L. D., Daphi, P., & Haunss, S. (2025). Protest types and protester profiles: Testing meso–micro-associations between event characteristics and

participant attitudes. *Acta Politica*, 60(3), 621–647. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-024-00345-7>

Dollmann, J. (2022). The Political Integration of Immigrants: How Pre- and Postmigration Contexts Matter. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 23(3), 1091–1125. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-021-00867-5>

Dubrow, J. K., Tomescu-Dubrow, I., & Lavrinenko, O. (2022). Contacting a public official: Concept and measurement in cross-national surveys, 1960s–2010s. *Social Science Quarterly*, 103(4), 810–819. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13177>

El-Awad, U., Eves, R., Hachenberger, J., Bozorgmehr, K., Entringer, T. M., Hecker, T., Razum, O., Sauzet, O., & Lemola, S. (2025). Post-migration stress mediates associations between potentially traumatic peri-migration experiences and mental health among Middle Eastern refugees in Germany. *BMC Public Health*, 25(1), 2582. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-025-23660-w>

Eldemerdash, N. (2025). Physically Here, Mentally There? A Study of Transnational Links and Civic Engagement Among Migrants in the USA. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 26(3), 2019–2044. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-025-01259-9>

Emler, N., & Frazer, E. (1999). Politics: The education effect. *Oxford Review of Education*, 25(1–2), 251–273. <https://doi.org/10.1080/030549899104242>

Engdahl, M., Lindgren, K.-O., & Rosenqvist, O. (2020). The Role of Local Voting Rights for Non-Naturalized Immigrants: A Catalyst for Integration? *International Migration Review*, 54(4), 1134–1157. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918319890256>

Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (1999). Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: Civic communities and ethnic networks. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25(4), 703–726. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.1999.9976711>

Ferris, D., Hayduk, R., Richards, A., Schubert, E. S., & Acri, M. (2020). Noncitizen Voting Rights in the Global Era: A Literature Review and Analysis. *Journal of*

International Migration and Integration, 21(3), 949–971.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-019-00687-8>

Fliess, N., Kiani, A., & Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2025). Why do autocracies enfranchise their citizens abroad? A large-N event history analysis, 1990–2010. *Democratization*, 32(3), 659–683. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2024.2383795>

Finn, V. (2020). Migrant voting: Here, there, in both countries, or nowhere. *Citizenship Studies*, 24(6), 730–750. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2020.1745154>

Fitzgerald, J., Schauer, K., O’Neal, R. J., & Bačovský, P. (2023). To Belong: Feeling “At Home” and Support for Democracy. *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie*, 75(S1), 235–258. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-023-00908-0>

Gaughan, A. E., Stevens, F. R., Linard, C., Patel, N. N., & Tatem, A. J. (2015). Exploring nationally and regionally defined models for large area population mapping. *International Journal of Digital Earth*, 8(12), 989–1006.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17538947.2014.965761>

Geese, L. (2023). Does Descriptive Representation Narrow the Immigrant Gap in Turnout? A Comparative Study across 11 Western European Democracies. *Political Studies*, 71(4), 1277–1297. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211067129>

Glasius, M. (2018). Extraterritorial authoritarian practices: A framework. *Globalizations*, 15(2), 179–197. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1403781>

Grabowska, I., Hansen, C., Jastrzebowska, A., Lind, J., Manafi, I., Nienaber, B., Powell, R., & Shahrokh, T. (2025). Young migrants, “integration” and the local: Critical reflections from European stakeholders. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 13(1), 43.
<https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-025-00454-y>

Graham, G. J., & Pride, R. A. (1972). Styles of Political Participation, Want Conversion, and Political Support among Adults and Students in a Metropolitan Community. *Youth & Society*, 3(3), 277–310. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0044118X7200300302>

Grasso, M., & Giugni, M. (2022). Intra-generational inequalities in young people's political participation in Europe: The impact of social class on youth political engagement. *Politics*, 42(1), 13–38. <https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957211031742>

Guarnizo, L. E., Portes, A., & Haller, W. (2003). Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants. *American Journal of Sociology*, 108(6), 1211–1248. <https://doi.org/10.1086/375195>

Grubb, A., & Vitus, K. (2022). Civic Integration through Commissioned Communities: On the Cross-Sector Co-Production of Conditioned and Clientised Participation. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 12(3), 326–345. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48711599>

Hadj Abdou, L., & Rosenberger, S. (2019). Party activism: The permeability of the asylum protest arena in Austria. *Social Movement Studies*, 18(4), 391–407. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2019.1567321>

Harris, A. S., & Hern, E. (2019). Taking to the Streets: Protest as an Expression of Political Preference in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(8), 1169–1199. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018806540>

Hassan, M., Mattingly, D., & Nugent, E. R. (2022). Political Control. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 25(1), 155–174. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-013321>

How do Europeans differ in their attitudes to immigration?: Findings from the European Social Survey 2002/03 – 2016/17 (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 222; OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, Vol. 222). (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1787/0adf9e55-en>

Hunger, S. (2018). No naturalization, no participation? The influence of citizenship regimes and naturalization on immigrants' political participation. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 12(1), 279–296.

Ivanov, D. (2024). Left authoritarianism and positional shifts of populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe. *East European Politics*, 40(3), 447–472. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2024.2303712>

- Jiang, J., Xia, S., & Zhang, D. (2023). Birds of a feather: Sharing democratic values eases immigration in a postmaterialist society (SSRN Working Paper No. 4872302). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4872302>
- Jones-Correa, M. (1998). Different Paths: Gender, Immigration and Political Participation. *International Migration Review*, 32(2), 326–349. <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791839803200202>
- Just, A. (2019). Political Regimes and Immigrant Party Preferences. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(5), 651–686. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018797938>
- Just, A., & J. Anderson, C. (2012). Immigrants, Citizenship and Political Action in Europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 481–509. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000378>
- Kaase, M. (1984). The Challenge of the “Participatory Revolution” in Pluralist Democracies. *International Political Science Review*, 5(3), 299–318. <https://doi.org/10.1177/019251218400500306>
- Kam, C. D., & Palmer, C. L. (2008). Reconsidering the Effects of Education on Political Participation. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(3), 612–631. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608080651>
- Kiess, J. (2022). Learning by doing: The impact of experiencing democracy in education on political trust and participation. *Politics*, 42(1), 75–94. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395721990287>
- Kim, B., & Hoewe, J. (2023). Developing contemporary factors of political participation. *The Social Science Journal*, 60(4), 862–876. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2020.1782641>
- Kim, Y. C. (1964). The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 26(2), 313–336. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2127599>
- Kivisto, P., & Vecchia-Mikkola, V. L. (2013). Immigrant Ambivalence Toward the Homeland: The Case of Iraqis in Helsinki and Rome. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 11(2), 198–216. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2013.759000>

- Klarenbeek, L. M., & Weide, M. (2020). The participation paradox: Demand for and fear of immigrant participation. *Critical Policy Studies*, 14(2), 214–232. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2019.1569540>
- Krejčova, E., Kostelka, F., & Sauger, N. (2025). Change in migrants' political attitudes: Acculturation and cosmopolitanization. *American Journal of Political Science*, ajps.70012. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.70012>
- Kyei, J. R. K. O., Koomson-Yalley, E. N. M., & Dwumah, P. (2022). Transnational political practices and integration of second generation migrants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 48(5), 1177–1192. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1816812>
- Leber, A., Carothers, C., & Reichert, M. (2023). When Can Dictators Go It Alone? Personalization and Oversight in Authoritarian Regimes. *Politics & Society*, 51(1), 66–107. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292221078661>
- Lee, M. (2024). Authoritarianism at School: Indoctrination Education, Political Socialisation, and Citizenship in North Korea. *Asian Studies Review*, 48(2), 231–249. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2023.2300631>
- Lever, A. (2025). Democracy and the ethics of voting. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 28(5), 831–847. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2024.2426113>
- Lewis, J. S. (2023). Repression and bystander mobilization in Africa. *Social Movement Studies*, 22(4), 494–512. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2022.2052837>
- Lilly, K. J., Costello, T. H., Sibley, C. G., & Osborne, D. (2025). Identifying “Types” of authoritarians: A latent profile analysis of left- and right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. *European Journal of Personality*, 39(4), 518–534. <https://doi.org/10.1177/08902070241280319>
- Lindemann, K. O. (2023). Lingering Memories Of The Past? The Ideological Behaviour Of Immigrants Socialised In Authoritarian Regimes (Working paper). Hertie School. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4872302>
- Linz, J. J. (2000). *Totalitarian And Authoritarian Regimes*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Loewenstein, K. E. (2007). Ideology and Ritual: How Stalinist Rituals Shaped *The Thaw* in the USSR, 1953–4. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8(1), 93–114. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14690760601121671>
- Long, J. S., & Mustillo, S. A. (2021). Using Predictions and Marginal Effects to Compare Groups in Regression Models for Binary Outcomes. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 50(3), 1284–1320. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124118799374>
- Maehler, D. B., Daikeler, J., Ramos, H., Husson, C., & Nguyen, T. A. (2021). The cultural identity of first-generation immigrant children and youth: Insights from a meta-analysis. *Self and Identity*, 20(6), 715–740. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2020.1765857>
- Mansouri, F., & Elias, A. (2025). Pluralist diversity governance: Deepening the multiculturalism-interculturalism nexus. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 13(1), 23. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-025-00446-y>
- Martinez-Damia, S., Paloma, V., Luesia, J. F., Marta, E., & Marzana, D. (2024). Uncovering the relationship between community participation and socio-political control among the migrant population. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 52(1), 58–73. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jcop.23085>
- Melo, D. F., & Stockemer, D. (2014). Age and political participation in Germany, France and the UK: A comparative analysis. *Comparative European Politics*, 12(1), 33–53. <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2012.31>
- Mentesoglu Tardivo, Z. (2025). Immigrant political participation across Western Europe: The role of political rights, public attitudes, and discrimination. *Acta Politica*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-025-00402-9>
- Meyer, D. S. (2004). Protest and Political Opportunities. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30(1), 125–145. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110545>
- Mitchell, A. M., Inata, K., & Higashijima, M. (2025). Political and economic protests in authoritarian regimes. *Public Choice*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-025-01316-y>

- Moynihan, D. P. (2003). Normative and Instrumental Perspectives on Public Participation: Citizen Summits in Washington, D.C. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 33(2), 164–188. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074003251379>
- Müssig, S., & Okrug, I. (2024). Discrimination and Civic Engagement of Immigrants in Western Societies. A Systematic Scoping Review. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 25(4), 2143–2189. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-024-01154-9>
- Neundorff, A., & Pop-Eleches, G. (2020). Dictators and Their Subjects: Authoritarian Attitudinal Effects and Legacies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(12), 1839–1860. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020926203>
- Neureiter, M. (2019). Evaluating the effects of immigrant integration policies in Western Europe using a difference-in-differences approach. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 45(15), 2779–2800. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1505485>
- Niemi, R. G., & Hepburn, M. A. (1995). The Rebirth of Political Socialization. *Perspectives on Political Science*, 24(1), 7–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.1995.9941860>
- Nilsson, A. (2024). Antidemocratic tendencies on the left, the right, and beyond: A critical review of the theory and measurement of left-wing authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, 45(4), 693–708. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12951>
- Norris, P., Walgrave, S., & Van Aelst, P. (2005). Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone? *Comparative Politics*, 37(2), 189. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20072882>
- Opp, K.-D. (1994). Repression and Revolutionary Action: East Germany in 1989. *Rationality and Society*, 6(1), 101–138. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463194006001007>
- Oser, J. (2022). Protest as One Political Act in Individuals' Participation Repertoires: Latent Class Analysis and Political Participant Types. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 66(4), 510–532. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642211021633>

- Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003). The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices. *International Migration Review*, 37(3), 760–786. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00157.x>
- Pensiero, N., & Janmaat, J. G. (2025). Why do women develop lower levels of political interest? Examining the influence of education, family socialisation and adult roles. *Acta Politica*, 60(4), 723–758. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-024-00349-3>
- Pernia, R. A. (2022). Authoritarian values and institutional trust: Theoretical considerations and evidence from the Philippines. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 7(2), 204–232. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891121992118>
- Peters, B. G. (2023). Public administration in authoritarian regimes. *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, 45(1), 7–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2023.2169820>
- Pilati, K. (2018). Gaps in protest activities between natives and individuals of migrant origin in Europe. *Acta Sociologica*, 61(2), 105–125. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0001699317710704>
- Pilati, K., & Herman, B. (2020). Comparing engagement by migrants in domestic and in country-of-origin political activities across European cities. *Acta Politica*, 55(1), 103–129. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-018-0102-4>
- Portes, A., Escobar, C., & Arana, R. (2008). Bridging the gap: Transnational and ethnic organizations in the political incorporation of immigrants in the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(6), 1056–1090. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870701874827>
- Praet, J. (2024). Bringing authoritarianism into the limelight: The implications for populist radical right ideology. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2024.2442334>
- Princen, S., & Kerremans, B. (2008). Opportunity Structures in the EU Multi-Level System. *West European Politics*, 31(6), 1129–1146. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802370484>

- Qin, X., & He, B. (2022). The politics of authoritarian empowerment: Participatory pricing in China. *International Political Science Review*, 43(5), 613–628. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120985511>
- Quinsaat, S. M. (2013). Migrant Mobilization for Homeland Politics: A Social Movement Approach. *Sociology Compass*, 7(11), 952–964. <https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12086>
- Quintelier, E., & Van Deth, J. W. (2014). Supporting Democracy: Political Participation and Political Attitudes. Exploring Causality using Panel Data. *Political Studies*, 62(1_suppl), 153–171. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12097>
- Prats, M., & Meunier, A. (2021). Political Efficacy And Participation: An Empirical Analysis In European Countries (*OECD Working Papers on Public Governance No. 46*). *OECD Publishing*. <https://doi.org/10.1787/4548cad8-en>
- Rainey, C. (2014). Arguing for a Negligible Effect. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4), 1083–1091. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12102>
- Sabucedo, J. M., & Arce, C. (1991). Types of political participation: A multidimensional analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 20(1), 93–102. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1991.tb00257.x>
- Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., & De Vries, C. E. (2023). Differentiated integration in the European Union: Institutional effects, public opinion, and alternative flexibility arrangements. *European Union Politics*, 24(1), 3–20. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221119083>
- Schönwälder, K. (2009). Einwanderer als Wähler, Gewählte und transnationale Akteure. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 50(4), 832–849. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-009-0158-x>
- Schwartz, H. (2022). Radical democratic theory and migration: The Refugee Protest March as a democratic practice. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 48(2), 289–309. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453721996398>

- Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1999). Evidence of the Long-Term Persistence of Adults' Political Predispositions. *The Journal of Politics*, 61(1), 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2647773>
- Seidle, F. L. (2015). Local Voting Rights for Non-Nationals: Experience in Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 16(1), 27–42. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-014-0335-7>
- Semyonov, M., & Raijman, R. (2021). Immigration and Immigrants in European Countries. In A. M. Orum, J. Ruiz-Tagle, & S. V. Haddock (Eds.), *Companion to Urban and Regional Studies* (1st ed., pp. 420–449). Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316916.ch20>
- Smets, K., & Van Ham, C. (2013). The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level research on voter turnout. *Electoral Studies*, 32(2), 344–359. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2012.12.006>
- Solano, G., Schmid, S. D., & Helbling, M. (2024). Extending Migrants' Rights but Limiting Long-Term Settlement: Migrant Integration Policy Trends in EU and OECD Countries Between 2010 and 2019. *International Migration Review*, 58(3), 1568–1591. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183231172102>
- Stallbaum, L. (2025). Socialism's legacy: The impact of political socialization on citizens' conceptions of democracy. *Democratization*, 32(1), 53–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2024.2392280>
- Strijbis, O. (2015). Beyond opportunity structures: Explaining migrant protest in Western Europe, 1975–2005. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 3(1), 5. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40878-015-0005-8>
- Talò, C., & Mannarini, T. (2015). Measuring Participation: Development and Validation the Participatory Behaviors Scale. *Social Indicators Research*, 123(3), 799–816. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-014-0761-0>

Teorell, J. (2006), Political participation and three theories of democracy: A research inventory and agenda. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45: 787-810. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00636.x>

Van De Velde, C. (2024). The power of slogans: Using protest writings in social movement research. *Social Movement Studies*, 23(5), 569–588. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2022.2084065>

Van Deth, J. W. (2014). A conceptual map of political participation. *Acta Politica*, 49(3), 349–367. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2014.6>

Van Mol, C., & De Valk, H. (2016). Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective. In B. Garcés-Mascreñas & R. Penninx (Eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe* (pp. 31–55). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_3

Verba, S. (1967). Democratic Participation. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 373(1), 53–78. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000271626737300103>

Verba, S., Nie, N. H., & Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. University of Chicago Press.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Harvard University Press.

Voicu, B., & Tufiş, C. D. (2017). Migrating trust: Contextual determinants of international migrants' confidence in political institutions. *European Political Science Review*, 9(3), 351–373. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773915000417>

Voicu, M., & Bartolome Peral, E. (2014). Support for democracy and early socialization in a non-democratic country: Does the regime matter? *Democratization*, 21(3), 554–573. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.751974>

Von Klekowski Von Koppenfels, A. (2025). Democrats abroad: What motivates core activists to engage in political transnationalism? *International Migration*, 63(2), e13251. <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13251>

Wackenhut, A. F. (2025). Between (de-)mobilization, polarization, and transnational repression: The Egyptian diaspora in the wake of the January 25 uprising. *Globalizations*, 22(1), 66–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2023.2300849>

Wackenhut, A. F., & Orjuela, C. (2023). Engaging the next generation: Authoritarian regimes and their young diaspora. *European Political Science*, 22(1), 143–158. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-022-00409-2>

Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. A. (2020). *Communism's Shadow: Historical Legacies And Contemporary Political Attitudes*. Princeton University Press.

Tarrow, S. (1998). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly C. (1995) To Explain Political Processes, *American Journal of Sociology*, 100(6), 1594–1610. <https://doi.org/10.1086/230673>

White, S., Nevitte, N., Blais, A., Gidengil, E., & Fournier, P. (2008). The political resocialization of immigrants: Resistance or lifelong learning? *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 268–281. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314713>

Winter, T., Jose, P. E., Riordan, B. C., Bizumic, B., Ruffman, T., Hunter, J. A., Hartman, T. K., & Scarf, D. (2022). Left-wing support of authoritarian submission to protect against societal threat. *PLOS ONE*, 17(7), e0269930. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0269930>

Wright, T. M., & Moorthy, S. (2018). Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression. *International Interactions*, 44(1), 132–155. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2017.1273915>

Yilmaz, I., & Demir, M. (2023). Emotions and resistance in diaspora: the case of Australia's Kurds from Turkey. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 46(15), 3249–3270. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2023.2205528>

Zaslove, A., Geurkink, B., Jacobs, K., & Akkerman, A. (2021). Power to the people? Populism, democracy, and political participation: a citizen's perspective. *West European Politics*, 44(4), 727–751. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2020.1776490>

Zhukov, Y. M. (2023). Repression works (just not in moderation). *Comparative Political Studies*, 56(11), 1663–1694. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152778>

Zinn, S., & Gnambs, T. (2018). Modeling competence development in the presence of selection bias. *Behavior Research Methods*, 50, 2426–2441. <https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-018-1021-z>