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Circulating Ideas of Workers' Self-Management between Socialist Yugoslavia and
(Post)colonial Algeria (1959-1965)

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Abstract (Deutsch)

Die Masterarbeit untersucht die Zirkulation der Idee der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung zwischen dem sozialistischen Jugoslawien und dem (post-)kolonialen Algerien – von den letzten Phasen des algerischen Unabhängigkeitskriegs bis zum Sturz des algerischen Präsidenten Ahmed Ben Bella im Juni 1965. Sie analysiert, welche Rolle die Selbstverwaltung in den jugoslawisch-algerischen bilateralen Beziehungen sowie im weiteren Kontext der Bewegung der Blockfreien Staaten spielte. Die Analyse orientiert sich an drei miteinander verflochtenen Themen: der Rolle des jugoslawischen „Exzeptionalismus“ bei der Gestaltung sowohl der Möglichkeiten als auch der Grenzen der Zusammenarbeit; den methodischen Herausforderungen bei der Vermittlung des jugoslawischen Modells an algerische Akteur:innen; sowie der Spannung zwischen Jugoslawiens politischem Engagement, Algerien zu unterstützen, und seinen zunehmend marktorientierten Wirtschaftspraktiken. Auf der Grundlage archivalischer Primärquellen aus Archiven in Belgrad (Serbien) sowie sekundärer Literatur kommt die Arbeit zu dem Schluss, dass die jugoslawisch-algerische Kooperation im Bereich der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung ein dynamisches, jedoch fragiles Unterfangen war, das durch wirtschaftlichen Druck und politische Instabilität begrenzt wurde. Die Masterarbeit leistet einen Beitrag sowohl zur globalen Arbeitergeschichte als auch zum weiteren Forschungsfeld der Süd-Süd-Kooperationen während des Kalten Krieges.

Abstract (English)

The thesis investigates the circulation of the idea of workers' self-management between socialist Yugoslavia and (post)colonial Algeria from the late stages of the Algerian War of Independence to the overthrow of the Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella in June 1965. It examines what role self-management played in Yugoslav-Algerian bilateral relations and within the broader context of the Non-Aligned Movement. The analysis is guided by three interrelated themes: the role of Yugoslav "exceptionalism" in shaping both the opportunities and constraints of the cooperation; the methodological challenges in presenting the Yugoslav model to Algerian actors; and the tension between Yugoslavia's political commitment to assist Algeria and its increasingly market-oriented economic practices. Drawing on archival primary sources from the archives in Belgrade, Serbia as well as on secondary literature, the research contends that Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation in the field of workers' self-management was a dynamic, yet fragile endeavour limited by economic pressure and political instability. The thesis aims to contribute to the field of global labor history as well as broader field of South-South cooperation during the Cold War.

Table of contents

<i>Abstract (Deutsch)</i>	1
<i>Abstract (English)</i>	1
Table of Abbreviations	4
1. Introduction	5
1.1 Historical context of Yugoslav-Algerian Relations (1954-1965).....	6
1.2 Research Questions and Overview of the Chapters	10
Chapters Overview	12
1.3 State of the Research	13
1.4 Theoretical and Methodological Approaches	21
1.5 Primary Sources – Context and Limitations.....	23
General Overview of the Corpus	24
Contextualizing the Corpus.....	25
1.6 Terminological considerations – <i>Workers' Self Management and Autogestion</i>	27
Yugoslav model	28
Algerian <i>autogestion</i>	28
French <i>autogestion</i>	29
2. Workers' Self-Management for the Independent Future: Trade union cooperation (1959-1962)	30
2.1 The dissemination of the idea of workers' self-management through lectures and seminars	33
2.1.1. Yugoslav "Exceptionalism" and the methodological issues of the seminars	35
2.2 <i>Titoists of the Arab World</i> : Official visits and study stays of UGTA functionaries in Yugoslavia.....	37
2.3 Study Stays in Educational Centers for Workers.....	40
2.4 Yugoslav "Ambassadors": Algerian Workers in Self-Managed Enterprises	42
2.5 Termination of visits and re-establishment of the cooperation	45
3. From Theory to Practice: The implementation of autogestion in Algeria (1962-1965)	46
3.1 From liberation to organization: the creation of management committees in postcolonial Algeria	54
3.2 Legislative path to the implementation of autogestion.....	57
3.3 The structural strains caused by state administration	59
3.4 Marketing and profit distribution.....	62
3.5 The obstruction of the management committees by former soldiers.....	64
3.6 Managers and workers.....	64
3.7 Algerian Charter and the Aftermath	66

4. <i>Our agriculture is in your hands: Yugoslavia's contribution to the development of autogestion in Algeria (1962-1965)</i>	69
4.1 Yugoslav perspectives on the development of autogestion in Algeria	71
4.1.1. Provincializing Yugoslav self-management – Veljko Vlahović's observations of Algerian autogestion	76
4.2 <i>Algeria is building Maghreb with Yugoslav tractors: The role of Yugoslav agricultural machinery in Algerian autogestion</i>	79
4.3 The profit-driven strategy of Yugoslav export-enterprises in delivering livestock	83
4.4 Yugoslav agronomists and projects in the field of self-managed agriculture	90
4.4.1 The importance of Amar Ouzegane's visit to Yugoslavia for further developments in technical cooperation	94
4.4.2 The Unsuccessful Organization of Baba Ali Exemplary Farm	98
4.5 Vocational Trainings and Courses in Yugoslavia	103
5. (Re)building Trade Union and Party-State Cooperation (1964-1965)	105
5.1 Reviving the trade union cooperation	107
5.2 Party-state cooperation: Dialogues during the visit of Ahmed Ben Bella and the FLN delegation	110
5.2.1 Different notions and applications of workers' self-management	115
5.3 Continued Engagement: Follow-up visits and ongoing dialogue	120
6. Conclusion	123
Bibliography	126
Primary sources	126
Secondary literature	130
Online links and sources	135

Table of Abbreviations

AATUF	All-African Trade Union Federation
BCA	Banque Centrale d'Algérie
CCRA	Centres Cooperatifs de la Réforme Agraire
CGSLB	Centrale générale des syndicats libéraux de Belgique
CORA	Coopératives Régionales Agricoles
CRC	Caisses Régionales de Crédit
CTUY	Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia
DPRA	Democratic People's Republic of Algeria
FLN	Front de libération national
GPRA	Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Union
ILO	International Labor Office
IMR	Industrija motora Rakovica
IMT	Industrija mašina i traktora
IVZ	Islamska verska zajednica
LCS	League of Communists of Serbia
LCY	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
OAS	Organisation armée secrete
ONACO	Office National de Commercialisation
ONRA	L'office national de la reforme agraire
OUN	Organisation of the United Nations
PCA	Parti communiste algérien
PKB	Poljoprivredni kombinat Beograd
SAP	Societe agricole de prévoyance
SAWPY	Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia
SFRY	Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
UGTA	Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WU	Workers' University
ZAMTES	Zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju

1. Introduction

After the conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948, the primary characteristic that distinguished Yugoslavia from other socialist countries was the presence of workers' self-management, a system of self-managing bodies integrated into governmental and economic institutions with the goal of organizing socialist society through broad public participation.¹ This system was a global phenomenon that attracted labor movements and intellectuals both in the western and state socialist societies from its inception in the early 1950s.² Moreover, many countries in the Global South found inspiration for their development in this model.³ Algeria was, however, the only country in the world that legally introduced workers' self-management (*l'autogestion*) with a structure based on the Yugoslav model on vacant colonial agricultural properties and smaller industrial enterprises in the early years of its independence (1963-1965).⁴

This thesis wants to shed light on one of the cooperations that goes beyond South-West or East-West eurocentric research frameworks by examining how the idea of workers' self-management was circulated between socialist Yugoslavia and (post)colonial Algeria between 1959 and 1965. The primary objectives of the thesis are to: 1) present the principal state and non-state actors of the cooperation; 2) investigate how these actors spread the concept of workers' self-management, i.e. what vehicles they used to work together and disseminate the idea; 3) identify what the primary goals of this partnership were for participants from both countries and how much they were actually willing and able to promulgate their interests; and 4) determine the degree to which socialist Yugoslavia influenced Algeria's development in terms of workers' self-management.

¹ Musić, Goran, *Making and Breaking the Yugoslav Working Class: The Story of Two Self-managed Factories*, CEU Press, Budapest/New York, 2021, 1.

² Rutar, Sabine, "Towards a Southeast European History of Labour: Examples from Yugoslavia" in *Beyond the Balkans: Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe*, ed. Sabine Rutar, Berlin: Lit 2014, 345.; For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s, the *Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail* (CFDT) promoted the introduction of self-management in French industry, drawing inspiration from the Yugoslav workers' self-management, while in the beginning of the 1980s, the Solidarity Movement in Poland (*Solidarność*) saw it as an alternative to the Soviet model. For more information see: Georgi, Frank, *L'autogestion en chantier. Les gauches françaises et le « modèle » yougoslave (1948-1981)*, Nancy, Éditions de l'Arbre bleu, 2018.; Kowalik, Tadeusz, *From Solidarity to sellout: the restoration of capitalism in Poland*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 2012.

³ These include countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, India or Chile. For more detailed accounts on the influence of the Yugoslav workers' self-management in the Global South, see: Dieter Seibel, Hans and Damachi, Ugandi G., *Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World*, The Macmillan Press, London, 1982.

⁴ Hadži Vasileva, Jokica, *Radnička participacija u Africi*, Izdavački centar "Komunist", Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 1978, 60.

1.1 Historical context of Yugoslav-Algerian Relations (1954-1965)

After being expelled from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslavia was looking for a new foreign policy direction when, in the early 1950s, it turned to the Global South, believing that in these countries, that were going through a challenging period of decolonization at the time, it could find close political and economic partners with whose struggle and aspirations it could relate to.⁵ The new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation, in which, along with the East and the West, the Global South took an increasingly significant place, inevitably implied an engaged attitude towards the colonial issue and a more offensive performance of the Yugoslav representatives in international contacts and institutions that dealt with it, especially in the United Nations Organization (OUN).⁶ In the second half of the 1950s, two events solidified the new direction of Yugoslav foreign policy in the Third World. The first one was the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, when colonialism was condemned and solidarity between liberated and non-liberated countries was called for.⁷ Identifying its non-bloc position with the aspirations of the participating countries to maintain their independence and cooperate internationally on the principles of equality, Yugoslavia expanded its cooperation through the UN, economic assistance and military aid to the national liberation movements.⁸ The second event was the meeting of the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser in Brioni in July 1956, when the *Brioni Declaration* was signed, a document that advocated non-alignment, active peaceful coexistence and decolonization which showed the world that tricontinental unity could have a significant impact on the international scene.⁹

The Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) coincided with the period of implementation of Yugoslav foreign policy towards Global South. The future status of Yugoslavia in the Non-Aligned Movement and Yugoslavia's prestige among the increasingly numerous group of newly liberated countries thus largely depended on the choice of adequate modalities of Yugoslav cooperation with the future leaders of Algeria, the largest and most influential

⁵ Rubinstein, Alvin Zachary, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, Princeton University Press, 1970, Preface XI-XII; Radonjić, Nemanja, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji (1945-1991)*, (2020) (Phd Dissertation, University of Belgrade), 28.

⁶ Bogetić, Dragan, Jugoslavija i borba alžirskog naroda za nacionalno oslobođenje in: *Jugoslavija – Alžir; Zbornik radova sa naučne konferencije održane u Alžiru 27. januara 2013*, urednik Miladin Milošević, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2013, 12.

⁷ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 60.

⁸ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 30.

⁹ Byrne, Jeffrey James, Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment, *The International History Review*, 2015, 37:5, 916. Radonjić, 30-31.

African country.¹⁰ As a result, Yugoslavia embraced the struggle of Algerian liberation movement (*Front de libération nationale* – FLN) with a passion it had never shown for any other.¹¹

At the very beginning of the war, Yugoslavia's support was carried out mainly at the diplomatic level, acting as an intermediary between the French government and the FLN, as well as supporting the Algerian cause in the OUN.¹² Cordial relations were established with the Algerian revolutionaries who showed great respect for the Yugoslav national liberation struggle in the Second World War (1941-1945), which made Yugoslavia a "natural ally" in the eyes of the Algerians due to the similarity of their paths to independence from foreign occupations.¹³ The political elites of Yugoslavia and Algeria thus cultivated a narrative of "two fraternal" peoples by highlighting parallels between their liberation struggles.¹⁴

Since 1957, new modalities of support started to be employed. Large material aid began to be sent to refugees in Morocco and Tunisia; Algerian soldiers were supplied with Yugoslav military equipment, while Algerian students were awarded scholarships for studies at Yugoslav universities.¹⁵ This type of aid intensified especially after the *de facto* Yugoslav recognition of the Provisional Algerian Government (*Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne* - GPRA) formed in 1958. The cooperation between the General Union of Algerian Workers (*Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens* - UGTA) and the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (*Savez sindikata Jugoslavije* - CTUY) that started in 1959 was particularly remarkable because it included not only material support to Algerian refugees, but also visits by trade union leaders to Yugoslavia in order to familiarize their Yugoslav counterparts with the Algerian struggle, but also to study Yugoslav socialism on the spot, particularly its model of workers' self-management.¹⁶ In addition, a large number of Algerian workers were accepted in Yugoslav enterprises for the purpose of vocational

¹⁰ The Algerians believed that their country was particularly well situated at the intersection of numerous regions and international agendas, and that the Third World unity was a desirable goal in and of itself, to maximise their collective power. They reasoned that by serving as a link between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world, Africa and Europe, non-alignment and Afro-Asianism, and the socialist and anti-colonial movements, Algeria could exercise a vast influence in the international affairs. See: Byrne, *Beyond Continents*, 921.

¹¹ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 87-88.

¹² Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i borba alžirskog naroda*, 12.

¹³ Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i borba alžirskog naroda*, 17.

¹⁴ Tot, Dora, *Migration for Cooperation: Mobility of Highly Skilled Yugoslav Labor in Algeria*, *History in flux*, #3/2021, 163.

¹⁵ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 88.

¹⁶ Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i borba alžirskog naroda*, 34.

trainings which served as a preparation for the economic and social development of the future independent Algeria.¹⁷

The FLN leaders considered Yugoslavia as their role model not only in struggle, but also in building the independent Algeria, as well as in the foreign policy of non-alignment.¹⁸ Thus, Algerians portrayed Yugoslavs as their "closest non-Arab allies."¹⁹ Finally, at the First Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in September 1961, the key event in shaping the Yugoslav foreign policy and its fierce support for anticolonial movements,²⁰ Yugoslavia was the first European country that *de jure* recognized the GPRA whose representatives attended the Conference with the status of sovereign government.²¹

The next phase of Yugoslav-Algerian relations moved to interstate bilateral relations in March 1962 after the signing of the Evian Accords²² and the July referendum on self-determination, when Algeria officially became an independent state. Close relations were first established between the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and Algerian Prime Minister, and later, President Ahmed Ben Bella,²³ who was seen as "Tito in the making" by the former,²⁴ considering his determination to invoke socialism in Algeria as it was being built in Yugoslavia.²⁵ The new interstate relations were focused on the reconstruction of the country, given the difficult situation Algeria found itself in after the departure of the European settlers, characterized by a lack of personnel and equipment to start the economy, but also marked by the spontaneous occupation of vacant colonial agricultural estates and smaller number of industrial enterprises by Algerian peasants and workers who were organized into management committees. Hence, Algeria was perceived as a country that was highly receptive of the Yugoslav model of socialism, while the Algerian leadership saw Yugoslavia

¹⁷ Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i borba alžirskog naroda*, 34.

¹⁸ Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i borba alžirskog naroda*, 34.

¹⁹ Byrne, *Beyond Continents*, 918.

²⁰ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 33.

²¹ Byrne, *Beyond Continents*, 919-920. Yugoslav recognition of GPRA was the reason for the withdrawal of French ambassador from Belgrade in early 1962 and for the temporary interruption of diplomatic relations between the two countries at the very end of the eight-year Algerian War of Independence. See: Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i borba alžirskog naroda*, 44.

²² In March 1962, Évier Accords, a set of peace treaties, was signed by France and GPRA. The accords ended the ceasefire in Algeria, and formalized the status of Algeria as an independent nation, but with regard to the economy, it maintained French industrial and commercial primacy. Additionally, Algeria was to receive technical and financial aid from France. See: *Les Accords d'Évier*: <https://archive.org/details/Numrisation16Mars2019/mode/2up>

²³ Ahmed Ben Bela became the president of Algeria in September 1963.

²⁴ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 86.

²⁵ Byrne, Jeffrey James, *Mecca of the Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization and Third World Order*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 165-166.

as a state that was not guided by the intention of exerting political pressure through bilateral cooperation or trying to implement its national goals that were in conflict with the interests of Algeria.²⁶

The pillar of bilateral relations was the scientific-technical cooperation established by the signing of the Agreement on Scientific-Technical Cooperation in July 1963,²⁷ just a few months after the March Decrees were published in Algeria that institutionalized autogestion whose structure of self-managing bodies was inspired by the Yugoslav model on abandoned colonial agricultural estates and a smaller number of industrial enterprises. Partnership with Yugoslavia was regarded by Algerians as an opportunity to diversify the economy and reduce economic and financial dependence on France.²⁸ The importance of technical assistance was best seen in the development of the Algerian self-managed agriculture, and Yugoslavia prioritizing Algeria in its program of technical assistance.²⁹ Between 1962 and 1965, hundreds of Yugoslav agronomists, technicians, economists, and highskilled workers in the field of workers' self-management had helped reshape Algerian agriculture, as well as Yugoslav experts serving as advisers in the Ministry of Agriculture's central administration.³⁰ The exchange of visits by various delegations at the state, party and trade union level played a major role in the development of Yugoslav-Algerian relations in the first years of independence. These delegations often stayed in Yugoslavia in order to familiarize themselves with the working methods of Yugoslav organizations, enterprises, agricultural estates, and workers' self-management.³¹

Following a number of military coups that overthrew some of the African heads of state,³² Yugoslav policy toward Africa changed due to the "fatigue" of decolonization and non-alignment at the same time, as well as what appeared to be a systematic suppression of socialism on the continent, and the decline in economic cooperation.³³ One of the best examples of this shift was the overthrow of President Ahmed Ben Bella by the Chief of the

²⁶ Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i borba alžirskog naroda*, 12.

²⁷ Tot, *Migration for Cooperation*, 163.

²⁸ Tot, *Migration for Cooperation*, 164.

²⁹ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 207.

³⁰ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 207-208.

³¹ Dimić, Ljubodrag, *Jugoslavija i Alžir 1961-1965 in: Jugoslavija – Alžir; Zbornik radova sa naučne konferencije održane u Alžiru 27. januara 2013*, urednik Miladin Milošević, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2013, 62-65.

³² In several military coups some of the following heads of states were overthrown in mid-1960s: Ibrahim Abboud in Sudan (1964), Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria (1965), Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana (1966), and Modibo Keita in Mali (1968) see in: Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 34.

³³ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 34.

Army, Colonel Houari Boumédiène in June 1965. In Belgrade, the news about the overthrow of a man whom Yugoslav leadership saw as a great "friend" and "brother" caused great concern.³⁴ In the second half of the year, the aim of various commissions and committees that dealt with this issue was to determine the attitude of the new Algerian president toward foreign policy, socialism in general, and autogestion. In 1966, Boumédiène visited Yugoslavia. Tito, although reserved, expressed his wish for further development of bilateral cooperation, believing that "relations were created between peoples, not leaders", after which he concluded that the new Algerian leadership was following an "advanced path" because of Boumédiène's willingness to further socialist development and non-alignment.³⁵

1.2 Research Questions and Overview of the Chapters

This thesis investigates the circulation of the idea of workers' self-management between socialist Yugoslavia and (post)colonial Algeria between 1959 and 1965. It looks at how the concept and application of workers' self-management shaped bilateral relations between the two countries, beginning with early contacts during the Algerian War of Independence, continuing through the initial years of independence, and ending with the overthrow of the President Ahmed Ben Bella in June 1965. The main question of this research is what role workers' self-management played in Yugoslav-Algerian relations and what the significance of the cooperation in this field was within a broader context of the Non-Aligned Movement. The research is centered on investigating three factors that shaped the cooperation in this field: Yugoslav "exceptionalism", methodological challenges encountered while circulating the concept of self-management, and tensions between political and economic goals of the cooperation.

One of the central questions guiding the research is how Yugoslav "exceptionalism" – the belief that Yugoslavia represented a unique socialist path distinct from both the Soviet bloc and the capitalist west – influenced its promotion of self-management in Algeria, as well as how this notion was received and contested by various Yugoslav and Algerian actors. While this self-perception drove Yugoslavia's confident attempts to spread its socialist model, it frequently resulted in an idealised and prescriptive approach that failed to account for Algeria's distinctive postcolonial reality. Crucially, figures like Veljko Vlahović, high-ranking member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) will offer the critique of

³⁴ Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Alžir*, 79.

³⁵ Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Alžir*, 78-79.

the Yugoslav model and emphasise the agency of Algerian workers' in developing a specific form of Algerian autogestion. As the thesis will show, his perspective was a clear departure from the prevalent narrative that highlighted the prospects of a more mutual and egalitarian type of cooperation.

Another major focus of this research are the methodological and communicative issues that developed during the circulation of the idea of workers' self-management, as well as how both Yugoslav and Algerian actors dealt with these difficulties. Despite Algeria's sincere interest in the processes and mechanisms of self-management, Yugoslav officials often struggled to explain their system in understandable terms. Presentations on this topic were frequently abstract, too academic, and poorly tailored to the Algerian context – a problem that many of the Algerian participants noticed. However, the thesis will also reveal instances of adaptation and negotiation, with some of the Yugoslav functionaries recognizing the need to improve existing conditions through closer mutual cooperation. On the example of many official and study visits, the limitations of circulation and the importance of close mutual exchange in international socialist cooperation will be demonstrated.

Finally, the thesis investigates how the friction between Yugoslavia's political-ideological objectives and its rising economic pragmatism influenced the trajectory and limitations of the cooperation in the field of self-management. While Yugoslav authorities officially supported Algeria as a demonstration of anti-colonial solidarity and non-aligned values, the reality was more affected by domestic economic reforms and the need for export competitiveness. This tension was especially visible in scientific-technical and trade cooperation that aimed at helping in the development of Algerian agricultural autogestion, where profit motives, late deliveries, and a lack of responsiveness to Algerian dire conditions after the war frequently clashed with the declared values of assistance to Algeria and self-management itself. As the research will demonstrate, some of the Algerian officials, first encouraged by Yugoslav help, became sceptical of what they saw as Yugoslavia's shift toward western capitalist methods. Nijaz Dizdarević, Yugoslavia's Ambassador to Algeria, helped maintain the political ties but even he was hampered by the growing gap between ideological rhetoric and economic performance, where he served as a bridge between lofty political commitments and the real inadequacies of Yugoslav enterprises on the ground.

By examining these three interconnected factors, the thesis offers a critical examination of the limits and possibilities of the socialist and non-aligned solidarity in practice, as well as the

role that political ideals, practical constraints and interpersonal relations played in shaping this cooperation and positioning self-management as one of the key factors in Yugoslav-Algerian bilateral relations. The thesis demonstrates that workers' self-management was a significant and dynamic foundation for strengthening the ties between two revolutionary countries, while also exposing that economic obstacles and a turbulent political context frequently made the cooperation in this field fragile.

Chapters Overview

The thesis is organised chronologically to follow the ebb and flow of Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation. Each chapter focusses on a different stage of the relationship in order to highlight the ideological, institutional, and practical aspects of the interaction between the two countries.

The first chapter presents the theoretical and methodological framework, examines relevant secondary literature, explains and contextualize primary sources used, and defines the key terminology, specifically the concepts of autogestion and workers' self-management. This lays groundwork for the research on the circulation of this idea.

The second chapter looks at early cooperation between the UGTA and CTUY during the Algerian War of Independence. It investigates early contacts, visits to various Yugoslav enterprises, educational programs, and vocational training initiatives that emerged in Tunisian exile and in Yugoslavia. These efforts will reflect both the UGTA's interest in the Yugoslav model and the struggle of Yugoslav functionaries to balance claims of exceptionalism with the practical difficulties of translating the processes and mechanisms of the Yugoslav socialist model to Algerian trade union leaders.

The third chapter focusses on Algeria's post-independence period and the emergence of its own kind of "specific" socialism. It examines the importance of Islamic tradition in developing local form of socialism, formation of management committees on vacant agricultural estates, the influence of legislative reforms such as the March Decrees, and the challenges of implementing autogestion in the face of poor state infrastructure and internal unrest. This chapter also addresses the difficulties in the relationship between workers and managerial layers, as well as further institutionalisation of autogestion in the Algerian Charter of 1964, which led to sector's stagnation and President Ben Bella's overthrow.

The fourth chapter looks at how shared experiences with workers' self-management influenced scientific-technical and trade cooperation, particularly the tension between political and commercial objectives. It shows the perspectives of Yugoslav actors, including Veljko Vlahović's critique of Yugoslav "exceptionalism" and emphasis on the role of Algerian workers in developing autogestion and what they could offer to Yugoslav socialism. Furthermore, it analyses significant moments in providing technical assistance, such as the shipment of urgently needed tractors and cattle. It also looks at the prominent role of Yugoslav agronomists, the reliance on individual political figures such as Algerian Minister of Agriculture, Amar Ouzegane, and the impact of his removal on the cooperation in the field of self-management. Educational programmes for Algerian management cadres in Yugoslavia are also presented as instruments for the spread of Yugoslav socialist principles.

The fifth chapter discusses post-independence trade union and party-state cooperation. It begins by looking at efforts to re-establish ties between UGTA and CTUY, as well as the challenges posed by the UGTA's limited postwar role. It then delves into contacts between FLN and LCY with a focus on Ben Bella and FLN study group's visit to Yugoslavia in March 1964. These discussions will illustrate opposing views on self-management, frequently abstract rhetoric of Yugoslav authorities, and the distinction between Yugoslavia's sociopolitical framework of self-management and Algeria's concept of autogestion as a tool for rapid modernization. The chapter finishes by analysing Algerian interest in Yugoslav self-management through various exchanges, including the visit of Veljko Vlahović to Algeria in February/March 1965.

1.3 State of the Research

The very first studies on Yugoslav-Algerian relations in Yugoslavia were the memoirs of Yugoslav statesmen and journalists, as well as studies that dealt with Algerian history and the causes and course of the 1954 uprising. Namely, during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), the Yugoslav historian and journalist Zdravko Pečar presented in his book *Alžir* (*Algeria*) the history of the country and its revolution, and recorded his personal experiences and events during his stay there, spending time with Algerian fighters.³⁶ In his later book *Alžir do nezavisnosti* (*Algeria until Independence*), Pečar provides extensive information on the background of the independence war, the scope and nature of Yugoslav military

³⁶ Pečar, Zdravko, *Alžir*, Kultura, Beograd, 1959.

assistance, and the extensive modes of Yugoslav non-military aid, including the training of Algerian doctors and therapists as well as the treatment of wounded soldiers in Yugoslavia.³⁷ The memoirs of the president of the CTUY, Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče 2 (The Ongoing Revolution 2)*,³⁸ are significant source because they contain details of his visit to Algeria in January 1963, including conversations with Ahmed Ben Bella and visits to agricultural self-managed estates. These details provide us with a clear insight into Tempo's perspective on the development of autogestion in Algerian agriculture.

During the 1970s, various comparative studies concerning the development of socialism and workers' participation in Africa were published in Yugoslavia as a consequence of social scientists utilizing the opportunity of the openness to the Global South to study the socialist development both in theory and practice through extensive stays in postcolonial socialist countries within the activities of institutions responsible for the research of the international labor movements.³⁹ However, although important due to its thoroughness in the analysis of the socialist development and systematization of the institutions of workers' engagement in Africa, the studies omit the connection between Algerian and Yugoslav self-management. For example, in her comparative study *Radnička participacija u Africi (Workers' participation in Africa)*, that compares various forms of workers' engagement in Algeria, Egypt, Tanzania, and Zambia, Africanist Jokica Hadži Vasileva always mentions the term Algerian self-management in quotation marks („alžirsko samoupravljanje“) as not to be comprehended in the same light as the "untouchable" Yugoslav model.⁴⁰ The only attempt to connect Yugoslav and Algerian model was made by Veselin Djurdjevac, who in his article compares the Yugoslav, French, and Algerian ways of managing enterprises, in which he did not refer to self-managed, but solely to state-owned Algerian factories.⁴¹ The cooperation of various actors and case studies were thus skipped over by social scientists for whom it was then

³⁷ Pečar, Zdravko, *Alžir do nezavisnosti*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1967.

³⁸ Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče 2*, Komunist, Beograd, 1971.

³⁹ Many studies were published within the projects of the Institute for the International Labor Movement in Belgrade (*Institut za međunarodni radnički pokret*), which was a unique institute at the time in Europe due to its rich archive and library, which, due to the non-aligned position of Yugoslavia, contained books and periodicals from various institutes from Eastern and Western Europe and from various trade union, communist, socialist and of all other left-wing organizations with which the party and trade unions cooperated. Some of the published studies within the institute related to post-colonial socialist development are: Hadži-Vasileva, Jokica, *Afrika i Socijalizam*, IMRP, Beograd, 1973 or Gligorić, Stojan, *Arapski svet i socijalizam*, IMPR, Beograd, 1973.

⁴⁰ Hadži Vasileva, Jokica, *Radnička participacija u Africi*, Izdavački centar "Komunist", Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 1978.

⁴¹ Djurdjevac, Veselin, *Étude comparative de trois expériences de gestion des entreprises publiques : algérienne, française et yougoslave*, *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, vol. 15, 1984, n°2. pp. 65-88.

important to study specific institutions, laws, and general processes in order to enrich African studies in Yugoslavia.

During this time, Algerian researchers also published works on autogestion and workers' participation, but they were more descriptive in nature and did not examine the function of autogestion system critically.⁴² Later studies from the 1980s, however, revealed a critical examination, particularly in the area of the establishment and actions of the state administration, as well as examining how democratic participation was reduced to a formality, coming to the conclusion that the self-managed enterprises had merely been converted into socialist state enterprises.⁴³ These studies, however, mainly concentrated on autogestion in the enterprises, whereas the focus of this thesis is on the development of the agricultural self-managed sector, taking into account that the cooperation with Yugoslavia was present there.

I was able to obtain further relevant literature on Algerian autogestion, mostly written by French authors,⁴⁴ with the exception of one study conducted in English language by Ian Clegg that proved to be crucial for the Chapter 3 of the thesis since it focused on explaining the political and social stage of the development of autogestion, as well as the main obstacles such as the superstructure of the state administration in agriculture.⁴⁵ Although these studies are characterized by methodological nationalism, they nevertheless provide a thorough insight into the obstacles of autogestion, such as power relations, but also the different views of the authors on Algerian model, which some saw as incapable of shifting power relations in Algeria,⁴⁶ and some as a solid choice for its socialist development, particularly its agriculture.⁴⁷

In regard to Yugoslav-Algerian relations in the international academic writing during the 1970s, they were observed through the monographies of non-alignment. The most significant

⁴² See, for instance: Ghezali, Mahfoud, *La participation des travailleurs à la gestion socialiste des entreprises*, Publications Universitaires, Alger, 1977.

⁴³ See: Boussoumah, Mohammed, *L'entreprise socialiste en Algérie*, Economica, Paris, 1982.; Tlemcani, Rachid, *State and Revolution in Algeria*, Zed Books, London, 1986.

⁴⁴ See: Laks, Monique, *Autogestion ouvrière et pouvoir politique en Algérie (1962-1965)*, Études et Documentation Internationales, Paris, 1970.; Claudine, Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, SNED, Algier, 1971.; Koulytchizky, Serge, *L'autogestion, l'homme et l'état: l'expérience algérienne*, École Pratique des Hautes Études et Mouton, Paris, 1974.; Raffinot, Marc, Jacquemot, Pierre, *Le Capitalisme d'Etat algerien*, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1977.

⁴⁵ Clegg, Ian, *Workers' self-management in Algeria*, Modern Reader, New York/London, 1971.

⁴⁶ See: Laks, *Autogestion ouvrière et pouvoir politique*, 305-310.

⁴⁷ See: Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, 335-337.; Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija*, 20.

book in this sense was the monograph of the American Sovietologist Alvin Rubinstein *Yugoslavia and the non-aligned world* in which the author presented various directions of Yugoslav foreign policy and cooperation with non-aligned countries, in which he demonstrates the impact of Yugoslav aid to the Algerian national liberation movement through the cooperation of social and political organizations, as well as their strengthened diplomatic relations in the period of independence.⁴⁸

With the beginning of the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, interest in the Third World⁴⁹ decreased. Cooperation with post-colonial countries was even criticized through obscure studies on Yugoslav foreign policy.⁵⁰ Labor was also neglected due to the hyperproduction of studies on the causes of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.⁵¹ The civil war that started in Algeria in 1991 also sidelined labor research. As the Civil War was very often compared to the Algerian War of Independence,⁵² researchers, writers, and artists turned to the past trying to reflect on the genealogy of violence.⁵³

In former Yugoslavia, only recently has there been a breakthrough in the investigation of Yugoslav-Algerian relations in the political, economic, cultural, and social fields within a new international historiographical trend that deals with South-South and South-East relations during the Cold War.⁵⁴ Historian Jeffrey James Byrne's study *Mecca of the Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order*⁵⁵, examines the radicalization of an anticolonial nationalist movement during the Cold War, which led to the ambitious goals of independent Algeria to create its "own brand of socialism"⁵⁶ but also to position itself as a vanguard of the anticolonial movements and a prominent leader in the

⁴⁸ Rubinstein, Alvin Zachary, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, Princeton University Press, 1970.

⁴⁹ I use the term *Third World* in an ideological sense, drawing on its historic relationship with anti-colonial solidarity and the Non-Aligned Movement.

⁵⁰ Radonjić, Nemanja, *(Post)jugoslovenska istoriografija i „Treći svet“*, PUJP, 2018, <https://historiografija.hr/?p=9899>

⁵¹ Musić, *Making and Breaking*, 6-7.

⁵² Tristan Leperlier, L'Algérie coloniale, ou l'Andalousie heureuse, *Socio-anthropologie*, 37 -1, pp. 107-121.

⁵³ Stora, Benjamin, L'Histoire de l'Algérie: sources, problèmes, écritures, *Insaniyat / إنسانيات* [Online], 2004, pp. 25-26.

⁵⁴ See: *Jugoslavija – Alžir*, Zbornik radova sa naučne konferencije održane u Alžiru 27. januara 2013, urednik Miladin Milošević, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2013; Čavoški, Jovan, *Jugoslavija, Alžir, nesvrstane zemlje i velike sile u Hladnom ratu 1954-1962 u: Alžir-Beograd, Jubilej prijateljstva 1962-2017*, Beograd 2017.; Dinkel, Jürgen, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)*, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2018.; *Southern Constelations: The Poetics of the Non-Aligned*, Moderna galerija Ljubljana, 2019.; *Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: Social, Cultural, Political, and Economic Imaginaries*, ed. Paul Stubbs, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2023.

⁵⁵ Byrne, Jeffrey James, *Mecca of the Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization and Third World Order*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016.

⁵⁶ Byrne, *Mecca of the Revolution*, 153.

Non-Aligned Movement. Byrne clearly demonstrates how the cooperation of "small" actors was not only united by a virtuous ideological affinity but rather by a strategic assimilation of shared interests free from concerns about interfering with one another taking as an example Ben Bella's attempt to invoke Tito's Yugoslavia in the early years of Algerian independence.⁵⁷ Byrne's articles that deal with Yugoslav-Algerian diplomatic relations during the Cold War and the importance of initial Yugoslav technical assistance for the development of Algerian agriculture also proved significant.⁵⁸

Historian Nemanja Radonjić's PhD dissertation titled *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji (1945-1991)* (*The Image of Africa in Yugoslavia 1945-1991*) explores the phenomenon of post-colonial Africa's imaginary geography in Yugoslavia.⁵⁹ It examines how the Other is perceived in relation to African nations, peoples, and individuals using sources from archives, the press, travelogues, non-fiction, social science, photography, film, and oral interviews. Images produced at the level of the political and cultural elite, experts, and common people are singled out and analysed using the methodology of imagology and postcolonial studies. Radonjić's work offers a valuable perspective on the evolution of Yugoslav-Algerian relations from the start of the Algerian War of Independence, initially at the diplomatic level. The author also briefly discusses the function of Yugoslav workers in the postcolonial world, and, thus, highlights the significance of Yugoslav highskilled workers in Algeria for the transformation of Algerian self-managed agriculture.⁶⁰

Dora Tot's article *Migration for Cooperation: Mobility of Highly Skilled Yugoslav Labor in Algeria* gives readers the insight into a scientific-technical cooperation between Yugoslavia and Algeria.⁶¹ Tot explores the labor migration of the highly skilled Yugoslav workers as a part of scientific-technical cooperation who were directly employed by the Algerian government between the early 1960s and the end of the 1980s. The article demonstrates how Yugoslav state supported and promoted the mobility of highly qualified experts in Algeria to promote cooperation to further its political and economic objectives in the Global South. Tot's

⁵⁷ Byrne, *Mecca of the Revolution*, 165-166.

⁵⁸ See: Byrne, Jeffrey James, Our Own Special Brand of Socialism: Algeria and the Contest of Modernities in the 1960s, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (June 2009), pp. 427-447.; Byrne, Jeffrey James, Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment, *The International History Review*, 2015, 37:5, pp. 912-932.

⁵⁹ Radonjić, Nemanja, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji (1945-1991)*, PhD Dissertation, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, 2020.

⁶⁰ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 206-208.

⁶¹ Tot, Dora, Migration for Cooperation: Mobility of Highly Skilled Yugoslav Labor in Algeria, *History in flux*, #3/2021, pp. 159-173.

article is thus substantial in the investigation of the role of Yugoslav actors in reanimating Algerian agriculture in the first three years of independent Algeria.

The topic of Yugoslav-Algerian relations got its momentum on the cultural level as well. During the spring of 2023, the Museum of African Art in Belgrade organized the exhibition *Jugoslovenska svedočanstva o alžirskoj revoluciji – arhivski omnibus* (*Yugoslav testimonies about Algerian revolution-archival omnibus*), which is based on archival material and oral testimonies of Yugoslavs who actively provided aid to the Algerian people during their struggle for independence from French colonial rule, until the official liberation in 1962.⁶² Additionally, movie director Mila Turajlić created the documentary diptych *Nesvrstani* (*The Non-Aligned*) and *Filmske gerile* (*Ciné-guerrillas*), which takes the audience on an archival journey through the process of creating the project of Non-Aligned Movement. The films are based on never-before-seen 35-millimeter film materials, shot by Stevan Labudović, the famous cameraman of the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito.⁶³ The documentary *Filmske gerile* presents a behind-the-scenes image of the media battle that was fought during the Algerian War of Independence and reveals the role of the film image in the political struggle against colonialism with Labudović as the main protagonist.⁶⁴

The history of Yugoslav-Algerian relations is therefore becoming more prevalent. Nevertheless, workers' self-management hasn't yet been looked at as a potential research area in these relations. It is just recently that the historiography of labor witnessed the revived interest in this field. One of the latest publications that takes a Thompsonian micro-historical approach to the creation of the Yugoslav industrial working class and the development of the self-management system from the end of the World War Two to the disintegration of

⁶² Past Exhibitions: *Yugoslav Testimonies of the Algerian Revolution – Archival Omnibus*: <https://mau.rs/en/past-exhibitions/yugoslav-testimonies-of-the-algerian-revolution-archival-omnibus.html>

⁶³ The documentaries are a part of the *Non-Aligned Newsreels* project led by director Mila Turajlić, and powered by *Filmske novosti*, a movie archive of the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia, in the sector of cultural heritage protection. A series of performance lectures, video installations, exhibitions, research articles, and online content have all been developed since the project was first started in 2015. For more information on the project and *Filmske novosti* see: *Non-Aligned Newsreels*: <https://www.nonalignednewsreels.com/> and *Filmske novosti Beograd*: <https://filmskenovosti.rs/>; The documentary *Ciné-guerrillas* is available on Al Jazeera English YouTube channel: *Filming the Algerian Independence War: The Legacy of Stevan Labudovic*, Witness Documentary: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54uSB0yckHo>

⁶⁴ For the biography of the Yugoslav cinematographer Stevan Labudović and his contribution to the Algerian revolution and its people, see: *In memoriam: Stevan Labudović (1926-2017)*: <https://mau.rs/sr/arhiva/1296-in-memoriam-stevan-labudovi%C4%87-1926-2017.html>

Yugoslavia is *Making and Breaking the Yugoslav Working Class: The Story of Two Self-Managed Factories*, written by labor historian Goran Musić.⁶⁵

In the fall of 2024, Radio Television of Serbia 2 (*Radio Televizija Srbije 2 -RTS 2*) released a seven-episode documentary series titled *Jedan drugačiji svet* (*One different world*), directed by Valentina Delić.⁶⁶ The series explores workers' self-management in Yugoslavia and is notable for featuring interviews with former workers, directors, and trade unionists who provide firsthand accounts of the successes and challenges of the enterprises in which they were working. Although the series does not particularly discuss the influence of Yugoslav self-management in the Global South, it is relevant to domestic audience. Hopefully, coupled with recent scholarly research, this series would inspire greater interest among historians in former Yugoslavia in this topic.

The wave of interest of Algerian historians in self-management has also only recently become noticeable. The book *L'autogestion en Algérie: Une autre révolution? (1963-1965)* (*Autogestion in Algeria: Another revolution? 1963-1965*) written by Mohammed Harbi and published in 2022, focuses on the emergence and issues that surrounded the creation and development of autogestion in agriculture.⁶⁷ The author himself witnessed these developments while serving as an advisor in Ahmed Ben Bella's cabinet and as an editor of the FLN magazine *Revolution Africaine* until September 1964, where he was tasked with introducing the subject to the Algerian public.⁶⁸ With the aim of reintroducing historiography's interest in this topic, Harbi selected a series of his own writings, texts, and documents, many of them unpublished, and field investigations he had conducted on self-managed farms in the early 1960s. In several instances, Harbi mentions the importance of Yugoslav technical assistance in reviving Algerian agriculture, but the sources he relies on do not provide an insight into Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation.

First published in 2018 (until then only preserved in manuscript), an in vivo study *Les débuts de l'autogestion industrielle en Algérie* (*The beginnings of industrial autogestion in Algeria*) by French sociologist Damien Hélié analyzed industrial self-managed sector during the

⁶⁵ Musić, Goran, *Making and Breaking the Yugoslav Working Class: The Story of Two Self-managed Factories*, CEU Press, Budapest/New York, 2021.

⁶⁶ All episodes are available on the official YouTube channel of the RTS Culture and Art Program (*RTS Kulturno-umetnički program*): *Jedan drugačiji svet* (Playlist): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U0zYSH6MLaA&list=PLxbMnBfiy6iH8-DAnUXy2Hlg47hDd_951

⁶⁷ Harbi, Mohammed, *L'autogestion en Algérie: Une autre révolution? (1963-1965)*, Éditions Sylepse, Paris, 2022.

⁶⁸ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 9-12.

Benbellist regime, based on interviews with workers and representatives of the management bodies in self-managed factories.⁶⁹ The study highlights both factors related to the significantly challenging working conditions, as well as issues related to the consequences of colonialism that left independent Algeria without skilled technicians, which further affected the productivity in the marginalized industrial sector. Although focused solely on the Algerian state of affairs, Harbi's and Hélié's studies are utilized for the chapter on the theoretical and ideological background, as well as implementation and development of *autogestion*.

In addition to the recent publications, I was also inspired by projects that aim to shed light on the circulation of the idea of workers' self-management. As a part of the French-German EURO-DEM project *Workplace democracy: a European ideal?: discourses and practices about the democratization of work after 1945*,⁷⁰ in the winter 2022 and summer semester 2023, the University of Évry Paris-Saclay held a research seminar *Self-management: ideas, practices, circulations, 19th—21st centuries*⁷¹ organized by historians Frank Georgie and Aurélie Andry to whom I am grateful for allowing bachelor, master, and PhD students to participate on site and online every Wednesday afternoon. By encouraging a transnational approach to the issue, the seminar contributed to the dissemination of existing work and opened up new perspectives for my own research and helped me define more precisely the research gaps in the field that is still characterized by the eurocentric framework.⁷²

During winter semester 2022, I attended the seminar *Africa in der globalen Arbeitsgeschichte - Herangehensweisen, Debatten, Quellen* held by Immanuel Harisch at the University of Vienna, Department of African Studies. Debates with colleagues on methodology and the use of primary sources encouraged and inspired me in my archival research, and of particular importance were the sessions that dealt with African unions within the international labour

⁶⁹ Hélié, Damien, *Les débuts de l'autogestion industrielle en Algérie*, Les éditions de l'Asymétrie/Pecos & Robin Publications, Toulouse, 2018. The book was also translated and published in Serbian language: Helie, Damien, *Počeci samoupravljanja u Alžiru (1962-1965)*, Žene u Crnom/MostArt, Beograd, 2019.

⁷⁰ EURO-DEM project, jointly hosted by the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin and the Institute for Social Movements in Bochum, investigates the circulation of the concept of workplace democracy among European trade unions and the academic community from 1945 until the present using conceptual, social, and political theory methods. For more information on the project visit its official website: *EURO-DEM: Workplace democracy: a European ideal?: discourses and practices about democratization of work after 1945*: <https://www.workplacedemocracy.eu/>

⁷¹ *Self-management: ideas, practices, circulations, 19th—21st century*: Modern and Contemporary History Seminar 2022-2023, University of Évry Paris-Saclay: https://dev3.imp10.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/wpd/mam/content/self-management_seminar_2022-2023_e%CC%81vry_programmes2.pdf

⁷² See, for instance: Georgi, Frank, *L'autogestion en chantier. Les gauches françaises et le « modèle » yougoslave (1948-1981)*, Éditions de l'Arbre bleu, Nancy, 2018.; Zaccaria, Benedetto, "Blowing Up the Self-Management Bubble: Yugoslav propaganda and Italian reception in the early 1970s", *Acta Histriae*, 27, 1, 2019, pp. 125-142.

movement in the Cold War period⁷³ considering that the first part of this thesis deals with the analysis of cooperation between Algerian and Yugoslav national trade union centres.

Finally, within the Research Platform for the Study of Transformations and Eastern Europe, University of Vienna the project *A Socialist Workplace In Postcolonial Africa: A Connected History Of The Yugoslav Workforce In Zambia* led by Goran Musić, explores how Yugoslav workers' relationships to the self-management system and its principles were impacted by operations in the Global South, as well as how Zambian actors viewed their ties to Yugoslavia based on archival research and oral history in the former Yugoslavia and Zambia.⁷⁴ The significance of this project lies in the fact that it broadens the field of global labor history by examining the cooperation of two geographical areas that are frequently understudied in these fields, Southeastern Europe and Africa. It is with this particular aim that this thesis analyses state and non-state actors in Yugoslavia and Algeria as well as their attitudes, interests in and comprehension of workers' self-management.

1.4 Theoretical and Methodological Approaches

The apparent newfound wave of historiography on workers' self-management through a global perspective is inspired by attempts to connect different regional labor histories to the field of global history. In the introduction chapter of *Workers of the World*, a labor historian Marcel van der Linden sees methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism as the main obstacles of global labor history, especially given the rise of interest in labor history in the Global South.⁷⁵ The period of decolonization, full of international contacts, demands to be studied through global lenses that would shed more light on those cooperations. Therefore, by applying a transnational approach in researching connections that go beyond the shells of nation-state and eurocentrism, as well as South-North and East-West frameworks, the thesis aims to contribute to the further expansion of the field of global labor history by demarginalizing southeastern state socialist country of Yugoslavia and postcolonial Algeria,

⁷³ Although self-management as a research topic in trade union cooperation has not yet been explored, there are excellent works dealing with trade union's pedagogical cooperation between socialist states and African countries. See, for instance: Harisch, Immanuel, „Mit gewerkschaftlichem Gruß!“ Afrikanische GewerkschafterInnen an der FDGB-Gewerkschaftshochschule Fritz Heckert in der DDR, *Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien*. No. 34/2018, Vol. 18, pp. 77-109.

⁷⁴ *A Socialist Workplace in Postcolonial Africa: A Connected History of The Yugoslav Workforce in Zambia*: <https://www.yuworkzambia.net/>

⁷⁵ Marcel van der Linden, "Introduction", in Marcel van der Linden, ed., *Workers of the World: Essays toward a Global Labor History* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 1-17.

and thus further connect the labor history of Southeastern Europe and Africa to a global framework.

The initial call to include southeastern labor history into the global one was done by Sabine Rutar in her essay, *Towards a Southeast European History of Labour: Examples from Yugoslavia*.⁷⁶ By presenting a plethora of significant topics within Yugoslav labor history such as the emergence of an industrial working class in the interwar period, forced labor during World War II, or labor in the Yugoslav self-managed system, Rutar demonstrates the rightful place of Yugoslav labor history in the global one by highlighting how crucial it is to always link and entangle Southeastern Europe into broader global context. Rutar sees the Yugoslav model of self-management as significant in this respect for two reasons. The first is that it caused reactions and debates in both the capitalist and the socialist world, and the second is that some were even calling for an application of this model.⁷⁷ As Algeria was the only country in the world to apply autogestion structurally based on the Yugoslav model, this research can shed light on what made Algerians decided to implement self-management in their own postcolonial socialist development.

As stated by Stefano Bellucci and Andreas Eckert in their introduction *The "Labour Question" in Africanist Historiography* in *The General Labour History of Africa*, the global labor history approach lets scholars view the wider picture of labor and it allows researchers to find patterns and trends of labor transformations in Africa over a long period of time and that the interaction and entanglements between various globe regions are highlighted by global labor history.⁷⁸ One of five methodological assumptions given for the implementation of African labor history into a global perspective is that labor history looks beyond national boundaries as the scope of inquiry and, instead emphasizes linkages among various actors.⁷⁹ Hence, this is the methodological premise by which this research is inspired in its investigation of the Algerian experience with autogestion and the roles that Yugoslav and Algerian actors played in circulating this idea.

⁷⁶ Rutar, Sabine "Towards a Southeast European History of Labor: Examples from Yugoslavia," in *Beyond the Balkans: Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe*, ed. Sabine Rutar (Berlin: Lit, 2014), pp. 323-357.

⁷⁷ Rutar, "Towards a Southeast European History of Labour", 345.

⁷⁸ Bellucci, S., & Eckert, A. (2019). The "Labour Question" in Africanist Historiography. In S. Bellucci & A. Eckert (Eds.), *General Labour History of Africa: Workers, Employers and Governments, 20th–21st Centuries*, pp. 1440-1464.

⁷⁹ Bellucci, Eckert, The "Labour Question" in Africanist Historiography, 9.

Global historians often use the term *circulation* to describe any movement, transmission or passage as Stefanie Gänger has shown in her article *Circulation: reflections on circularity, entity, and liquidity in the language of global history* by analyzing how often the term was used in *Journal of World History* and *Journal of Global History* and why global historians find this term convenient for their analysis.⁸⁰ The scholars find the term suitable because they use it as a synonym for the dissemination of ideas with organized vessels, hence I use the concept of circulation to describe the motion and course of workers' self-management in specific terms of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Algeria where the education, official and study visits, working in the enterprises or shipping machinery and technicians as to help in implementing autogestion in Algeria, present some of the main vessels in circulating this idea. Gänger still justifiably criticizes that the study of circulation is often focused only on movement, but not on the actors who make this movement possible.⁸¹ In my research, I am dealing not only with the vessels of the circulation, but also with the attitudes and interests of the state and non-state actors such as the statesmen, political parties, socio-political organizations as well as Yugoslav and Algerian workers. These actors are the ones who were circulating the idea of self-management, therefore, the investigation aims to explore both the circulators and their vessels of circulation.

1.5 Primary Sources – Context and Limitations

Algerian and Yugoslav statesmen, political parties, ministries, ambassadors, socio-political organizations and workers cooperated closely together in disseminating the idea of workers' self-management as a part of their close relationship and solidarity networks during the Algerian War of Independence and, later, close partnership as the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, the aforementioned actors are essential for examining interests, conditions, attitudes and changes in these multifaceted connections. This section presents primary sources that helped in investigating how these actors understood their cooperation, how they conditioned it, and how their mutual actions influenced the concept of workers' self-management in theory and practical circumstances.

⁸⁰ Gänger, Stefanie, *Circulation: reflections on circularity, entity, and liquidity in the language of global history*, *Journal of Global History* (2017), 12, Cambridge University Press, pp. 303-318.

⁸¹ Gänger, *Circulation: reflections on circularity, entity, and liquidity*, 310.

General Overview of the Corpus

During my research I collected the sources from three archives in Belgrade, Republic of Serbia: Archive of Yugoslavia, Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, and Archive of the Museum of African Art.

In the Archive of Yugoslavia, the funds of the Central Council of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (AJ-117) and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (AJ-142) turned out to be the most significant for the examination of the activities of sociopolitical organizations. Additionally, the fund of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Commission for International Relations - Relations with Algeria (AJ-507/IX) is used for the undertakings and cooperation between the political parties. For research at the level of heads of state, the publication of the Archive of Yugoslavia, *Dokumenta o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije: Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi 1956-1979 (Documents on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia: Yugoslav-Algerian relations 1956-1979)*⁸² is relied upon since it contains scanned documents from the fund of the Office of the President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito (AJ-837) with conversations between Ahmed Ben Bella and him on the issue of implementation, development, and mechanisms of workers' self-management.

Diplomatic Archive stores mostly the correspondence between the Yugoslav Embassy in Tunis and Algiers and the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia. Very often, the telegrams were simultaneously sent to other organizations such as parties, trade unions, and various Yugoslav associations. These folders contain thematic files, the most significant of which are those concerning trade unions, cooperation in the field of agriculture, and scientific-technical cooperation.

Archive of the Museum of African Art in Belgrade offers documents from the first half of the 1960s, particularly those pertaining to FLN representatives' visits to study Yugoslav socialist model (BOX 3), which are valuable for determining the parties' respective interests and attitude towards their Yugoslav counterparts. What is also kept in the Museum are three volumes of the Algerian revolutionary daily newspaper *El Moudjahid* in French for the period between 1957 and 1961.⁸³

⁸² *Dokumenta o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije: Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi 1956-1979*, urednik Miladin Milošević, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2014.

⁸³ Three volumes of this magazine are in the Museum of African Art in Belgrade thanks to the many contacts that the Yugoslav journalist, historian and ambassador Zdravko Pečar and his wife, a Yugoslav writer and

Although the sources are fruitful in providing a general picture of the cooperation, it often happened that many important documents were missing, such as the texts of lectures or seminars both in Yugoslavia and in Algeria, or more detailed information about the bottom-up perspectives, i.e. about the perceptions of Yugoslav workers in Algeria and vice versa when it comes to the role of their mutual contacts in the development of self-management directly on the field in both countries. Furthermore, the limited years of the funds, particularly for the material found in the Archive of Yugoslavia, represented a major obstacle. The trade union fund, for example, was archived only until 1960, and I was not allowed to gain access to the unarchived part of it.

However, some of these obstacles were successfully overcome since all three archives complemented each other in case of lack of documents in one of them. The following section clarifies in more detail what type of documents were used for each of the issues involved and how the hurdles of the material were managed or not.

Contextualizing the Corpus

Cooperation in the field of workers' self-management was carried out primarily through socio-political organizations, more precisely through the cooperation of Yugoslav and Algerian trade unions. Hence, the fund of the Central Council of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia in the Archive of Yugoslavia gives an immense insight into the theoretical and practical education of both union leaders and Algerian workers in Yugoslavia. Thus, I use plans and preparations for the arrival and education of Algerians in Yugoslavia, and reports on discussions with trade union representatives. Consequently, these documents contain the lists with the enterprises and agricultural cooperatives visited, schools and workers' universities where they were studying, as well as workers' grievances during their time in Yugoslavia which brings, although limited, a bottom-up perspective into research.

A big obstacle for the research is that the documents of the union fund are available only until the year 1960. That barrier is partially broken down by using the fund of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), which is also located in the Archive of Yugoslavia. This organization was the largest mass socio-political organization that cooperated internationally both with its foreign counterparts and with high-ranking officials

political activist, Veda Zagorac, had with the Algerians during the Algerian War for Independence. During the war, as a journalist for a Yugoslav newspaper *Borba*, Zdravko Pečar spent some time with Algerian soldiers and peoples, while Veda Zagorac was a press correspondent in Tunisian exile.

and leaders of political parties and parliaments. I came across documents concerning the visits of trade unions and party representatives, as well as seminars organized in Yugoslavia on the topic of workers' self-management, organized by trade unions. The other way to overcome this impediment was through the union-related folders from the Diplomatic archive. They contain documents concerning Yugoslav opinions on Algerian trade unions, the plans of the visits, and reports on the lectures held in Tunisian exile.

The newspaper articles and embassy reports about Yugoslavia's presence in the Algerian press were beneficial. The FLN's newspaper *El Moudjahid*, attempts to discern how the Algerians saw Yugoslavia in that period and how the cooperation was reported on the issue of workers' self-management. I gathered a short report on one of the visits and stays of trade unionists in Yugoslavia, for the purpose of identifying in which light the cooperation with Yugoslavia was understood as well as one article that explained the role of peasantry in the revolution and postcolonial development which will be mentioned in the chapter that deals with the origins of Algerian autogestion.

For the connections between the heads of state, the collection *Dokumenta o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije: Jugoslovensko-alžirski odnosi 1956-1979 (Documents on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia: Yugoslav-Algerian relations 1956-1979)* has a great value, since some of the dialogues between heads of states concern workers' self-management and collaboration in this matter. In these types of exchange, explicit Algerian interests for practicing Yugoslav self-management model in independent Algeria, as well as Yugoslav positions on spreading this model to its non-aligned partner countries, can be observed. Tito's and Ben Bella's discussion on the subject of workers' self-management therefore serves to find out how the first presented the Yugoslav socialist model, what mechanisms of it were of interest to the latter, as well as how the understood the concept of workers' self-management.

The Fund of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia - Commission for International Relations - Relations with Algeria was used for the partnership of LCY and FLN. From the existing five boxes of this fund in the Archive of Yugoslavia, important contents such as the exchange of letters between party leaders, information on visits and stays of FLN members in Yugoslavia, notes on discussions, as well as reports on FLN study groups in Yugoslavia which studied the Yugoslav system of self-management in Yugoslavia were extracted. The reports on the study groups proved to be the most applicable because they comprehensibly stated many details of the stay, and conversations and discussions with Yugoslav communists

on the development of Yugoslav self-managed socialism. One such report could also be found in the Archive of the Museum of African Art.

As for the cooperation at the level of ministries, documents from the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia were the most constructive. The partnership with the Algerian Ministry of Agriculture could be traced through the correspondence between the Yugoslav embassy and the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade. As the Algerians applied the Yugoslav model of self-management in agriculture to the greatest extent, the reports of the Yugoslav ambassador in Algeria, Nijaz Dizdarević, as well as the conversations with the ministers give not only an insight into the perspectives from above, but also the problems at the level of aid that was going as a part of the agreement on the trade and scientific-technical cooperation. These documents are influential because they make it possible to investigate what agricultural self-management projects Yugoslav high-skilled workers were requested for, as well as the strategy of Yugoslav export enterprises in delivering the agricultural machinery and livestock that further enabled me to investigate if and to what extent Yugoslavia was present in establishing the self-managed agriculture in Algeria, and whether the cooperation in this domain was in line with its political goals. To conclude, these sources were carefully analyzed in order to measure the extent of Yugoslav impact on the agricultural development of the socialist self-managed Algeria.

The corpus of the sources is obviously broad and complex in the sense that certain important segments of the thesis rely on the collection of fragments from several archives. Thus, for certain actors such as political parties there are documents that cover the entire period of the research, but for some other organizations such as the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, more creativity and improvisation was needed by going to other archives to try to create an overall picture of this cooperation. Nevertheless, after all the collected documents, even the incomplete ones, the corpus is precise enough for a general insight into the circulation of the idea of workers' self-management at several levels and in its theoretical and practical concepts and applications.

1.6 Terminological considerations – *Workers' Self Management and Autogestion*

The origins of phrases like "workers' participation," "industrial democracy," or "workers' self-management" can be found during the industrialization era, when a variety of philosophers, socialist utopians, and workers pushed for the democratisation of labor relations in Europe.

Following the Second World War, the call for democratisation underwent new waves and took on various forms in relation to the newly established social and economic order in both Europe and the postcolonial world.⁸⁴ As this thesis deals with workers' self-management, the first goal is to present the differences between its various applications in Yugoslavia, Algeria, and France, considering that they are often mixed-up.

Yugoslav model

Workers' self-management implies the process of establishing social ownership over the means of production in which the working class is the main protagonist. The introduction of democratically elected *self-managing bodies* in every enterprise and institution, along with a concurrent economic liberalisation of the enterprises and the removal of state regulation, was the most crucial component of the demands for economic, social, and political democratisation in this process.⁸⁵ Yugoslavia was the only socialist European country that introduced workers' self-management. It was first introduced, somewhat contradictory, *by the state* at the factory level with the establishment of *workers' councils (radnički saveti)* in the early 1950s, a democratically elected body by all the workers in the enterprise, which over time gained *the decision-making power* in the election of the management board and directors, wages, investments, association, and development.⁸⁶ Thus, Yugoslav workers' councils were entrusted by the whole work collective with *legislative power*, while the management board and director were entrusted by the workers' councils with *executive power*. The fact that the Yugoslav self-management also involved political and social organisation in cities and municipalities, as well as in culture and education, was a significant characteristic that set it apart from workers' participation.⁸⁷

Algerian autogestion

Algeria was most affected by the Yugoslav experience, but there were some significant differences. *Peasants and workers spontaneously* occupied abandoned colonial land and smaller enterprises during the summer of 1962, where they established *management*

⁸⁴ Kester, Gérard, Britwum, Akua O., *Trade unions and workplace democracy in Africa*, Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, 2007, 23-24.

⁸⁵ On the theory of workers' self-management, see: *Self-Management: Economic Liberation of Man*, ed. by Vanek, Jaroslav, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1975.; Horvat, Branko, *Politička ekonomija socijalizma*, Globus/Zagreb, 1984. Horvat's classic was first published in English language: Horvat, Branko, *The Political Economy of Socialism*, Routledge, New York, 1983.; Bayat, Assef, *Work, Politics and Power: An International Perspective on Workers' Control and Self-Management*, Zed Books, London, 1991.

⁸⁶ Kardelj, Edvard, *Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji 1950-1976*, Privredni pregled, Beograd, 1977, 49.

⁸⁷ Kardelj, *Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji*, 49.

committees (comités de gestion) as a fundamental form of democratized labor relations.⁸⁸ Hence, unlike in Yugoslavia, Algerian autogestion was established from the bottom up. The March Decrees of 1963 were based on a Yugoslav model that was utilized to enhance the previous spontaneous action of Algerian peasants and workers. Furthermore, the system was more prevalent in agriculture than in industry.⁸⁹

French *autogestion*

French and Algerian *autogestion* were self-management movements that supported workers' control, but they have significant historical and ideological differences. This model was promoted by Algerian trade unionists during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and its implementation in the post-war period (1962-1965) was closely linked to the country's *anti-colonial* struggle and *socialist* state-building in order to give Algerian workers and peasants control over the land and enterprises that had previously been under French colonial rule, thus playing a vital role in political, economic and social development of the country. French autogestion also promoted workers' control through a variety of institutions, including cooperatives and workers' councils. By including workers in decision-making processes, it aimed to create a more equitable and participative workplace. Nevertheless, it began in post-World War II France and reached its apex in the 1960s and 1970s, as a part of the trade union movement with the aim of fostering self-management within *capitalist* structures.⁹⁰

In conclusion, there are significant differences between Algerian and French autogestion in terms of their historical context, purpose, and ideological influences. While Algerian autogestion emerged in the context of the anti-colonial struggle and sought to empower Algerians after gaining independence, French autogestion focused on democratising capitalist workplaces within capitalist Western society.

⁸⁸ Helie, Damien, *Počeci samoupravljanja u Alžiru*, 6.

⁸⁹ While self-managed industry included, for example, in July 1964, 413 companies and a total of 15,545 workers, agricultural autogestion included around 2,400,000 ha of land with 2,000 self-managed farms and around 240,000 workers. See: Helie, *Počeci samoupravljanja u Alžiru*, 63-64.; Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, 12.

⁹⁰ On the French ideas of autogestion see: Bourdet, Yvon, *Pour l'autogestion*. Paris, Anthropos, 1977.; Lepage, Henri: *Autogestion et capitalisme. Réponse à l'anti-économie*, Paris, Masson, 1978.; Maire, Edmond and Claude Perrignon, *Demain l'autogestion*. Paris, Seghers, 1976.

2. Workers' Self-Management for the Independent Future: Trade union cooperation (1959-1962)

The primary goal of the FLN, which was founded after the declaration of the Algerian War of Independence on the 1st of November 1954, was to organize the various Algerian populations to participate in the independence movement. The French use of force to outlaw all forms of organization and the difficulty the war leaders had in coming together and agreeing on a joint workers' organization made it difficult for peasants and workers to organize.⁹¹ The national trade union federation UGTA was not established until the 24th of February 1956 in order to express the close connection between the labor and national liberation movement carried by the FLN.⁹² The FLN leaders emphasised at the Soummam Conference in 1956 that workers had to actively support the revolution because they were closely connected to the colonizers' properties and could fight from the workplace by organizing strikes, sabotages, and other forms of resistance.⁹³ The UGTA was crucial in organizing the workforce to fight for independence during the war by organizing regional trade unions and waves of strikes,

⁹¹ Algerian workers faced significant barriers in organizing trade unions during colonial rule, owing to their status as second-class citizens and the dominance of French unions such as *Confederation Generale du Travail* (CGT). Many Algerian workers were impoverished, illiterate, and unaware of their rights which made organizing difficult. North African emigrants in France formed the first nationalist trade union, the "Star of North Africa" in 1929. It urged Algerian workers to join CGT branches and form affiliated Algerian trade unions. Algerian unions organized liberation demonstrations in 1945, which led to a massacre by French forces where around 45,000 Algerians lost their lives. In 1946, the nationalist party proposed an independent national trade union for Algerian workers. This resulted in the formation of the *Union Generale des Syndicalistes Algeriens* (UGSA), which later merged with the *Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens* (UGTA) in 1956. See: Branine, Mohammed, Fekkar, Ahmed Foudil, Fekkar, Otmane and Mellahi, Kamel, Employee relations in Algeria: a historical appraisal, *Employee Relations* Vol. 30 No. 4, 2008, 406.; *Historique de l'UGTA*, UGTA, Mars 2008, Algiers, 3.

⁹² Algeria saw the formation of two nationalist trade union federations in February 1956: *Union des syndicats des travailleurs algériens* (USTA) and the *Union générale des travailleurs algériens* (UGTA). Both federations drew their leaders from the UGSA, which had shrunk to approximately 15,000 mostly European members by 1957. The USTA supported a moderate Algerian National Front (MNA), whereas the UGTA supported the FLN. Both claimed to be democratic and autonomous organizations, advocating for the anti-colonial struggle, and supporting indigenous peoples, opposing racial or religious discrimination. However, USTA was not established in Algeria since it was, unlike the UGTA, composed mostly of Algerian workers in France. See: Favret, Jeanne, Le Syndicat, les travailleurs et le pouvoir en Algérie, *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 1964, 46.; von Bülow, Mathilde, Beyond the Cold War: American Labor, Algeria's Independence Struggle, and the Rise of the Third World (1954–62), *Journal of Social History*, Volume 53, Number 2, Winter 2019, Oxford University Press, 458-461.; Djabi, Nasser, Akkache, Fadela, Zobiri, Hocine, et Larabi, Samir, *Les Syndicats en Algérie: Histoire, état des lieux et scénarios*, Travail et Justice Sociale, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Algér, Janvier 2020, 6.

⁹³ Branine, Employee relations in Algeria, 406-407.

enhancing the membership⁹⁴ or demanding the releases of political prisoners and better working conditions for Algerian workers.⁹⁵

Nevertheless, French colonial authorities put more pressure on UGTA by arresting its members and by brutally suppressing strikes. Hence, the UGTA moved to Tunisia in 1957, where it was based until independence. It is in Tunisian exile that UGTA managed to internationalize their struggle by building transnational solidarity networks. The UGTA adhered to the principles of the Bandung Conference in 1955 that called for resisting the bloc divisions and capitalist exploitation in the Global South. In that sense, UGTA firmly supported the idea of a pan-African labor federation, an idea championed by the president of Guinea, Ahmed Sékou Touré, and president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah. The UGTA supported the creation of the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF).⁹⁶

Actively imitating their Tunisian and Moroccan forerunners' strategy by requesting aid from the global labor movement,⁹⁷ it joined the International Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU), received backing from numerous unions around the world, and took part in World Federation of Trade Unions conferences (WFTU) even though it was not officially affiliated with it.⁹⁸ Through maintaining ties with both trade union networks, UGTA managed to obtain not only enormous technical, material, and humanitarian aid, but also pedagogical assistance, which was reflected in the organization of trade union courses, seminars, and vocational trainings.⁹⁹ The UGTA also became known and demonstrated the importance of the trade unionism in Algerian anticolonial struggle through the International Labor Office (ILO) and the UN.¹⁰⁰ Despite the ICFTU's strict rules on the cooperation of its union members with trade union centers outside the organization, UGTA insisted on its neutral position¹⁰¹ and thus cooperated with national trade unions who were neither members of ICFTU nor WFTU such as the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CTUY).

CTUY was not a part of the ICFTU or WFTU for the reasons related to the events of 1948, that is, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. The Yugoslavs supported the

⁹⁴ By the early 1957, UGTA consisted of 150,000 members, making it the largest national union center in Algeria. See: von Bülow, 469.

⁹⁵ Branine, *Employee relations in Algeria*, 407.

⁹⁶ von Bülow, *Beyond the Cold War*, 467.

⁹⁷ von Bülow, *Beyond the Cold War*, 470.

⁹⁸ Branine, *Employee relations in Algeria*, 407.

⁹⁹ von Bülow, *Beyond the Cold War*, 469.

¹⁰⁰ *Historique de l'UGTA*, 7.

¹⁰¹ von Bülow, *Beyond the Cold War*, 468-469.

formation of new regional trade union movements, for example, the AATUF, "as a promising step toward breaking down the polarization of the international labor movement,"¹⁰² a stance that caused them to clash with the Soviet Union. This was done to combat their exclusion from decision-making circles in these bloc-affiliated organizations. The WFTU's ideological monopoly and its capacity to win support from unions in the countries of the Global South were both put to the test by the Yugoslav activities, which also posed a challenge to Soviet policy more broadly. In order to avoid the influence of Moscow, CTUY preferred bilateral cooperation in order to achieve the influence in the Global South.¹⁰³

The first contacts between the UGTA and CTUY occurred at the Fourth Congress of the WFTU in Leipzig at the end of 1957, while the next one happened at the meeting of the Committee of Solidarity with the Struggle of the Algerian People and Workers in September 1958 in Cairo.¹⁰⁴ Ljubomir Mijatović, a CTUY delegate, explained the basis for trade union collaboration in his speech:

*We ourselves knew how to lead a merciless partisan and national liberation war, so we are close to the liberation struggle of the Asian and African peoples as a whole; we built a new social order in our country respecting the principle of self-determination - so the aspiration of the Algerian people to enjoy freedom and to be their own master is all the more justified to us... The previous contacts of our social organizations represent the basis of our existing ties and certainly a base for future more intensive cooperation.*¹⁰⁵

Mijatović highlighted the parallels between the revolutionary wars. The heroic struggle of Yugoslav partisans under Josip Broz Tito against German occupation (1941-1945) was well-known to Algerian soldiers, while Yugoslav shipment of weapons and military equipment contributed to Algerian revolution. He then mentioned the second important factor known to the African and Asian peoples which is the principle of self-determination that Yugoslavia managed to develop through the implementation of workers' self-management and various self-governing bodies ensuring the direct democracy for all the members of the society on political, social, and economic level, independent of the external pressures. Finally, the already established contacts were developed enough in order for trade unions to go beyond

¹⁰² Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 193.

¹⁰³ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 194.

¹⁰⁴ AJ 117-347, AF-IIa/1, Izveštaj o zasedanju Međunarodnog sindikalnog komiteta za pomoć Alžiru održanoj 12-15 septembra 1958. godine u Kairu, 2-15.

¹⁰⁵ AJ 117-347, Govor Ljubomira Mijatovića u Kairu, Septembar 1958, 2.

conference meetings and finally start bilateral cooperation. Hence, after delegates showed great interest in Yugoslav socialist development, the first official visit of the UGTA happened in February 1959, when the trade unions created their agreement on the future help.¹⁰⁶ The revolutionary FLN newspaper *El Moudjahid* also mentioned the visit which speaks about the significance of this agreement for the Algerian union officials.¹⁰⁷

According to the agreement signed during this visit, UGTA needed three different ways of assistance from CTUY:

- 1) Material help;
- 2) Vocational training of Algerian workers and students;
- 3) Short-term seminars aimed at familiarizing trade union leaders with the mechanisms of Yugoslav workers' self-management, workers' education, social security, agriculture, and cooperatives, as well as trade unionism.¹⁰⁸

What distinguishes this international trade union cooperation from that with other socialist European countries is the emphasis on the workers' self-management. First, it will be discussed how lectures and courses held in Tunisian exile and Belgrade helped Algerians gain an initial understanding of workers' self-management, as well as their reactions to the system and the educational process. Following that, detailed reports on trade union leaders' visits and educational activities will be presented to assess their views on workers' self-management as an appropriate system for the development of the future independent Algeria. Finally, in the last section of the chapter, the focus is on determining whether Algerian workers' specialization in Yugoslav enterprises and schools aided their understanding of workers' self-management, as facilitated by the CTUY officials.

2.1 The dissemination of the idea of workers' self-management through lectures and seminars

The first lecture on Yugoslav workers' self-management in Tunis was held by Miljan Komatina, the advisor to the Yugoslav Embassy in Tunisia in February 1959. Djilani Embarek and Safi Boudissa, members of the secretariat of the UGTA, organized the

¹⁰⁶ AJ 117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji– Beograd, 12. III 1959.godine, 1-11.

¹⁰⁷ *Editorial du bulletin politique (No 7) du Ministere de l'information du G.P.R.A, El Moudjahid*, No. 43, p. 300, 8. Jun 1959, in *El Moudjahid* II, Jugoslavija, Grafički zavod jun 1962.

¹⁰⁸ AJ 117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije, 6-7.

lecture.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, no details about the lecture were found in the union fund's records. However, the lecture was followed by a two-hour discussion in which Algerians actively participated.¹¹⁰ Such a long discussion points to the great previous knowledge and the interest of the Algerians about the Yugoslav model of workers' self-management, for which the unions and the youth agitated during the war.¹¹¹ The organization of Miljan Komatina's second lecture, which took place in August 1959 in Tunisia as a part of the UGTA personnel seminar, speaks of the further appeal of the Algerian trade union officials to it. Thus, Komatina states in his report that there was a "lively discussion" in the room and that the Algerians showed a high level of knowledge about the "Yugoslav reality."¹¹² The report states that Algerians showed interest in printing the lecture material in order to use it for further seminars they were planning to organize.¹¹³

UGTA also hosted lectures and seminars on Yugoslav socialism in Tunisian exile in cooperation with other international trade union federation. For instance, the ICFTU ran two two-week trade unionism seminars up until early 1959, during which the UGTA was given broad control over the curriculum that included lessons on Yugoslav socialism.¹¹⁴ Another example is the UGTA seminar mentioned earlier, which took place in August 1959 and was organized with assistance from the General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium (*Centrale générale des syndicats libéraux de Belgique* – CGSLB).¹¹⁵

The lectures held in Tunis show a strong initial interest in deepening the cooperation between UGTA and CTUY. On the one hand, the Algerian audience and seminar organizers expressed the need for further organization of seminars and printed material, and even used the help of other international trade union organizations to learn about it, and on the other hand, the Yugoslavs were satisfied both with such a reaction and with their foreknowledge, which gave them an insight into Algeria's general familiarity with the Yugoslav model of self-management and how, according to the Algerian perspective, they could create study programmes and visits of the UGTA officials that could further ensure Yugoslav influence-building in the future independent Algeria.

¹⁰⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1959, F. 97, d. 3, s. 44881

¹¹⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1959, F. 97, d. 3, s. 44881

¹¹¹ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 13-14.

¹¹² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1959, f. 97, d. 12, s. 421125

¹¹³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1959, f. 97, d. 12, s. 421125

¹¹⁴ von Bülow, *Beyond the Cold War*, 469.

¹¹⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1959, f. 97, d. 12, s. 421125

2.1.1. Yugoslav "Exceptionalism" and the methodological issues of the seminars

According to telegram to the CTUY from April 1960 sent by the Yugoslav ambassador in Tunisia, Ilija Topaloski, the Algerians thought that Yugoslavia, like Hungary or Czechoslovakia, should hold a lecture on anticolonialism or socialism.¹¹⁶ Topaloski proposed to deal with topics such as solutions to the problems of underdeveloped areas, workers' self-management, planning in the economy, agriculture, and the issue of democratization. He believed that Yugoslavs worried too much about whether they were forcing their path to socialism, and he considered this position unjustified because the Algerians themselves believed that the Yugoslav experience would be very positive for the independent and still unliberated countries of Africa.¹¹⁷ He then went further by expressing the "Yugoslav exceptionalism" in comparison to others:

*African officials are looking for answers to a whole series of questions – for which we, the Yugoslavs, are significantly more qualified than others.*¹¹⁸

Topaloski's statement demonstrates a firm belief of the Yugoslav multifaceted diplomacy that Yugoslavia is a country of an enormous importance for Africa that differs from other socialist countries.¹¹⁹ In the context of the Cold War, this shows that Yugoslavia increasingly tied its authority in the interpretation of Africa to Yugoslav uniqueness, being a socialist, self-managed, and non-aligned country.¹²⁰

Yugoslav actors wanted to give answers to Algerian questions, but they happen to encounter some methodological challenges. The best example of this would be the seminar organized for two UGTA officials, Kalach Mohammed and Bouzar Abdelrahman, in the last two weeks of April 1960 in Belgrade. Given that both of them were only then introduced to workers' self-management for the first time, the seminar was created with the intention of dealing with all the experiences and problems that the workers' councils encountered in the last ten years of existence.¹²¹ However, the lectures were too complex, therefore, there were often misunderstandings caused by both bad interpretation and the contradictions in the

¹¹⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1960, f. 98, d. 5, s. 411945

¹¹⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1960, f. 98, d. 5, s. 411945

¹¹⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1960, f. 98, d. 5, s. 411945

¹¹⁹ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 194.

¹²⁰ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 235.

¹²¹ AJ 117-347, Izveštaj o radu na seminaru o radničkom samoupravljanju u Jugoslaviji organizovanom od strane CV SSJ za sindikalne funkcionere Alžira Kaleš Muhameda i Buzer Abdelrahmana od 13.aprila do 1.maja 1960, Beograd, 2. maja 1960.godine

presentations of various lecturers. The subject matter was broad and complex so the lecturers had to improvise by a large number of repetitions in order for the officials to better understand the content of the lectures. Additionally, the UGTA officials did not have a material prepared in advance.¹²² However, the CTUY officials acknowledged that they were not adequately prepared for seminars of this nature. Considering themselves still inexperienced in these types of lecturing for the officials without previous knowledge, they planned on creating more specific content, finding the best lecturers for each of them, and preparing written material in advance so the officials could be prepared for the lectures, thus being able to both reflect on and adapt to the Algerian needs.¹²³

Mohammed and Abdelrahman's discussions with CTUY top officials reveal a cautious and evaluative attitude toward Yugoslav workers' self-management. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, the president of the CTUY, accentuated that replicating others' approaches was not always appropriate and that it was crucial to take into account the unique characteristics of each country's needs because Yugoslavia, too, faced the challenge of developing solutions tailored to its specific context.¹²⁴ The vice-president of the Central Committee of CTUY, Paško Romac, stated that workers' self-management was a good system, but that there was always a space for constructive critics, therefore, he was open for the suggestion and critics from his Algerian comrades.¹²⁵

The manner in which Yugoslavia promoted its socialist model varied according to the actors involved. Thus, Ambassador Topaloski, guided by the Cold War logic, believed that the Yugoslavs should promote their model even more intensively, while CTUY officials emphasized their mistakes in regard to the content of the seminar, problems of self-management and the danger of copying the model, while also being ready to give their Algerian comrades the opportunity to express constructive criticism, showing that cooperation with them was not seen as a paternalistic transfer of knowledge, but also an opportunity to improve the Yugoslav model of workers' self-management with their help.

¹²² AJ 117-347, Izveštaj o radu na seminaru o radničkom samoupravljanju

¹²³ AJ 117-347, Izveštaj o radu na seminaru o radničkom samoupravljanju

¹²⁴ AJ 117-347, Zabeleška o razgovoru koji je vodio drug Tempo sa sekretarima alžirske sindikalne centrale UGTA, Djilani Embarekom i Kalaš Mohamedom, i trojicom alžirskih funkcionera Khelil Ahmedom, Tudji Khaledom i Busar Abdelrahmannom, učesnicima seminara o radničkom samoupravljanju i zadrugarstvu, na dan 29.maja 1960.

¹²⁵ AJ 117-347, AF-II-6, Zabeleška o razgovorima koje je vodio drug Paško Romac sa delegatima UGTA drugovima Kaleš Muhamedom i Buzer Abdelrahmanom na dan 16.V 1960.godine

2.2 *Titoists of the Arab World: Official visits and study stays of UGTA functionaries in Yugoslavia*

The main factors that led Algerian trade union officials to choose to advance the cooperation with their Yugoslav counterparts through regular visits were the parallels between the Yugoslav and Algerian revolutions, the Yugoslav non-aligned policy and the assistance to the Algerian people and the army, as well as the enormous economic and social prosperity of Yugoslavia after the introduction of workers' self-management.¹²⁶

The first trade union officials to visit Yugoslavia at the end of February 1959 were Safi Boudissa and Djilani Embarek, who were the organizers of Komatina's lectures in Tunis. According to the report on the visit, both of them came with already competent knowledge about workers' self-management, therefore, the presentation of the most important tasks of the self-managed bodies such as the workers' councils or management committees and practical problem solving went smooth.¹²⁷ In the very limited time span of the visit that lasted five days, Boudissa and Embarek had a chance to visit various enterprises where they had a chance to talk to the representatives of self-managing bodies. For instance, in Belgrade they visited the mechanical engineering factory *Ivo Lola Ribar*.¹²⁸ There, Boudissa and Embarek held long conversations with representatives of the workers' councils where they particularly wanted to know more about the function and role of the councils, how issues are solved in practice in the factory and what difficulties the management bodies had encountered.¹²⁹

Afterwards, Boudissa and Embarek travelled to Bosnia and Herzegovina, more precisely to Zenica, to visit the *Željezara Zenica* factory (*Zenica Ironworks*), one of the most successful ironworks enterprises in Yugoslavia that turned the city of Zenica into one of the most powerful industrial centres.¹³⁰ Boudissa and Embarek saw new modernized plants and

¹²⁶ During the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, Yugoslavia was among the nations with the fastest economic growth in the world. According to Rudolf Bičanić, between 1950 and 1960, Yugoslavia's total rate of gross national product growth was 8.9 percent, compared to 10.8 percent growth in Japan and Israel. See in: Musić, *Making and Breaking*, footnote 1, 1.

¹²⁷ AJ 117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji. Beograd, 12. III 1959.godine, 1.

¹²⁸ This metalworking enterprise was founded in January 1948, and it was known for as one of the leading ones in the field of producing machine tools for processing by the method of cutting and deformation, machines and equipment for metallurgy, mining, energy, or means of transport. See: Politika, 20.04.2017, *Ivo Lola Ribar-Omladinska fabrika*: <https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/378738/Pogledi/Ivo-Lola-Ribar-omladinska-fabrika>

¹²⁹ AJ 117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji. Beograd, 12. III 1959.godine, 2.

¹³⁰ The factory was founded during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the fall of 1892, and in the post-World War II period its modernization and enhance of production made it one of the most successful ironworks companies in socialist Yugoslavia. For example, see: Ademović, Fadil, *Monografija -*

furnaces in the factory and they talked to both the representatives of workers' councils and management committees.¹³¹ In Zenica, Boudissa was impressed by the fact that the presidents of the workers' councils had their workplaces in the factory like all other workers, and that the relationship between engineers and workers represented a "real revelation" for him, because there were "no white coats and raised heads who just give orders."¹³²

Boudissa and Embarek were highly impressed by the functioning of the self-managing bodies, particularly by the workers' councils, and in many occasions during the conversations with Yugoslav trade union officials, they called themselves *Titoists of the Arab world* who were already seriously considering applying the Yugoslav model by adapting it to specific conditions of the future independent Algeria.¹³³ The reason for such a determined position is best described by the statement given by Safi Boudissa:

*You have chosen a path that may be slower than the paths taken by other socialist countries, but a path that is more far-reaching and ensures a future for the worker.*¹³⁴

The officials' previous knowledge now combined with the visit to the enterprises gave them the better idea of not only what workers' self-management looks like in practice, but also that the system itself should be understood as a process if it were to guarantee the direct participation of and control by the workers in creating an industrial power such as *Željezara Zenica* was. Furthermore, Yugoslavs were having in mind to show them some of the most successful enterprises with the highest industrial achievements in order to leave the officials with the best impressions and to ensure that their model would be of further interest to Algerians.

During other visits, officials were attentive to other aspects of self-management that dealt more with economic policy.¹³⁵ Such was the visit of Sakhri Haddi and Milud Ben Ahmed, members of the Executive Commission of the UGTA, who were invited as the guests of

Željezara Zenica, Zenica: Željezara Zenica (1965) or see: *Raspad industrije u BiH: Željezara Zenica* (2019), Al Jazeera Balkans: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScrxsE1oQNC>

¹³¹ AJ 117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji. Beograd, 12. III 1959.godine, 2.

¹³² AJ 117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji. Beograd, 12. III 1959.godine, 2.

¹³³ AJ 117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji. Beograd, 12. III 1959.godine, 2.

¹³⁴ AJ 117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji. Beograd, 12. III 1959.godine, 4.

¹³⁵ For a detailed account of the economic policy and its shifts in socialist Yugoslavia see: Horvat, Branko, *The Yugoslav Economic System: the first labor-managed economy in the making*, White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, New York, 1976.

CTUY to its Fourth Congress in Belgrade in April 1959. At the shipyard 3.maj¹³⁶ (3rd of May) in Rijeka, Croatia, the presidents of the workers' council and management committees were answering the questions of Algerian delegates that dealt with the reward system, average earnings of highly qualified, qualified and unqualified workers, technicians and engineers.¹³⁷ During their stay in Kranj in Slovenia, while visiting the *Iskra* (*Spark*) enterprise for electromechanics, telecommunications, electronics, and automation, they were also interested in the distribution of the surplus salary fund.¹³⁸

These officials saw the Yugoslav industrial production in high regard.¹³⁹ Questions about automation and increased production were mostly asked during visits to Slovenian factories, as the enterprises in the northern regions of the country housed the most of the modern production facilities that enabled them to produce mostly finished goods in high demands and their geographical position consequently helped them establish better export connections, more educated workforce and greater income than the ones in southern regions of the country.¹⁴⁰ Thus, it should come as no surprise that Algerian delegates were "unusually" satisfied with the *Iskra* tour, according to the CTUY report on the visit.¹⁴¹ After its establishment in 1946, very soon the factory produced its first switch, and, in 1956, its first antenna and capacitor, while at the same time the enterprise was preparing for opening its first design department which occurred in 1961.¹⁴² After seeing such industrial plants, the Algerian delegates were greatly pleased that an agreement had been reached in February 1959 that would enable them to learn about workers' self-management and the transition from an agrarian society to an industrialized nation.¹⁴³ Thus, the Yugoslavs once again ensured, by

¹³⁶ This factory in Rijeka was founded in 1892 by the German company Howaldts Werke. Immediately before the departure in 1945, German army destroyed all vital objects and machines of the shipyard with explosive. The reconstruction of the shipyard was over in 1948, when the smallest ships were put into operation. During the 1950s, the shipyard began to build domestic and overseas ships, which it began to export in 1956. In 1960, it was the biggest shipyard in the country and the 16th greatest in the world. See: 3. maj brodogradilište d. d.: <https://tehnika.lzmk.hr/3-maj-brodogradiliste/>

¹³⁷ AJ 117-347, Izveštaj sa puta sindikalne delegacije Alžira II deo (Alžir, Urugvaj i Čile zajedno u Hrvatsku i Sloveniju čime je Alžir mogao da stupi u kontakt sa latinoamerikanskim delegacijama), 1.; For the reward and income distribution system and its changes through different phases of self-managed development in Yugoslavia, see: Flakierski, Henryk, The Economic System and Income Distribution in Yugoslavia, *Eastern European Economics*, Summer, 1989, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1-104.

¹³⁸ AJ 117-347, Izveštaj sa puta sindikalne delegacije Alžira II deo, 2.

¹³⁹ AJ 117-347, Izveštaj o boravku delegata Alžira na IV kongresu SSJ (20-27. aprila 1959), 3-4.

¹⁴⁰ Musić, *Making and Breaking*, 10-11.

¹⁴¹ AJ 117-347, Izveštaj sa puta sindikalne delegacije Alžira II deo, 2.

¹⁴² *Iskra's strategic milestones*: <https://www.iskra.eu/en/Iskras-Strategic-Milestones/>

¹⁴³ AJ 117-347, Izveštaj o boravku delegata Alžira na IV kongresu SSJ, 6.

showing the most prosperous self-managed enterprises, the further influence on the future development of the independent Algeria.

2.3 Study Stays in Educational Centers for Workers

In addition to the enterprises, Algerian trade union officials had the opportunity to study in centers for workers' education in Yugoslavia, such as workers' universities (WUs). These institutions represented the main educational centers for the adults whose establishment in the early 1950s was connected to the introduction and development of workers' self-management, with the goal of meeting the educational needs of the workforce and install its principles in workers.¹⁴⁴ During their first visit to Yugoslavia in 1959, Algerian officials Boudissa and Embarek visited the WU *Moša Pijade* in Zagreb, one of the most renowned educational centers,¹⁴⁵ where they had the opportunity to talk with its representatives.¹⁴⁶ Later in the conversation with Yugoslav trade union officials, Algerian union leadership was particularly interested in how workers' councils nurture the education of workers and what the enterprises were doing regarding the personnel training.¹⁴⁷

As a part of the agreement during the first visit, Boudissa was enabled to spend a month in Yugoslavia in order to study workers' education during May 1959.¹⁴⁸ Based on the program prepared in advance and extended by his personal wishes,¹⁴⁹ at workers' universities such as *Moša Pijade*, Boudissa had the opportunity to learn through courses, seminars and lectures about general and professional education of workers, organization of supplementary courses and seminars, methods and forms of work on workers' education, and cultural activities of the

¹⁴⁴ For a more detailed account on workers' education and workers' universities see: Filipović, Dragomir, "Workers' Universities, 1959-1968 (in Yugoslavia)", *Yugoslav Survey: A Record of Facts and Information* 4, pp. 119-128; Bertsch, Gary K., Persons, Karen L, Workers' Education in Socialist Yugoslavia, *Comparative Education Review*, Feb., 1980, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Feb., 1980), pp. 87-97.

¹⁴⁵ The WU *Moša Pijade* originated from the *National University* founded in 1907 in Zagreb during the Austro-Hungarian rule. In the 1950s, it evolved into a Workers' University that beside the literacy programmes, seminars, and specialised courses for workers in self-managed enterprises included publishing, cultural and artistic activities such as publishing the magazine *15 days*, screening films at the *Film Club*, and organising theatre performances. Due to these developed activities, construction on the new university building, one of the largest urban planning projects in Croatia at the time, started in the mid 1950s. The building was formally inaugurated in the presence of President Josip Broz Tito in September 1961. See: Galjer, Jasna, Lončar, Sanja, Rubić, Tihana, Društvena uloga Radnog narodnog sveučilišta "Moša Pijade" (RANS), *Andragoški glasnik*, Vol 22, Broj 1, str. 17-26.

¹⁴⁶ AJ-117-347- AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji – Beograd, 12. III 1959.godine, 2.

¹⁴⁷ AJ-117-347- AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji, 3.;

¹⁴⁸ AJ-117-347 -AF-II-IVa, Kompletan program Budisovog boravka u Hrvatskoj i Sloveniji, Zagreb, 9. VII 1959.godine, 1-4.

¹⁴⁹ AJ-117-347, Izveštaj CV SSJ podnet UGTA o boravku Safi Budise i Brahim Hasnaouia u Jugoslaviji, 1.

institution.¹⁵⁰ As to compare methods of learning and teaching, he also visited the WUs in Rijeka and Šibenik in Croatia. Additionally, he spent time at the *Visoka radnička škola (Academy for Workers in Zagreb)*.¹⁵¹ Given the interest in roles of the enterprises in education, he visited some of them such as *Rade Končar* and *Prvomajska* also located in Zagreb, where he gained insight into the duties and activities of the modern personnel department in the context of production and concurrent planning of the education, as well as the responsibilities of educational institutions in that sector and their organisational structure with regard to professional training of workers at the work place.¹⁵²

Boudissa was particularly impressed by the time spent at the WU *Moša Pijade* and the *Academy for Workers* in Zagreb.¹⁵³ During the conversation with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CTUY, Ašer Deleon, Boudissa's assertion that workers' education in Yugoslavia was the closest and most appropriate to Algerian needs and conditions, and that it was not like the East German or Czechoslovakian, which was "rigid and dogmatic and therefore far and unacceptable",¹⁵⁴ is another indication of the Yugoslav success in their intention to increase and consolidate influence on the officials of the UGTA. Boudissa expressed the desire to return to Yugoslavia to further study workers' education. Deleon thought that such a visit was feasible, but that it was necessary to research the requirements and motivations for better planning, familiarisation with new educational techniques, and evaluation of the already attained results prior to the new arrival.¹⁵⁵

For the Yugoslavs, the affirmation of their model in comparison to other state socialist countries was crucial. However, the Yugoslav trade union officials took care to ensure that the conditions for future cooperation would always be improved, novel, and in line with the interests of Algerians in order to maintain the influence of their "exceptionalism." As a result, they were able to strengthen its impact precisely by avoiding a paternalistic approach to the education of Algerian trade union leadership.

¹⁵⁰ AJ-117-347, Plan boravka na izučavanju izobrazbe radnika NR Hrvatske za predstavnika radničkih sindikata iz Alžira (Budisa Safi) – Zagreb 21.V 1959.godine, 1.

¹⁵¹ AJ-117-347, Plan boravka na izučavanju izobrazbe radnika NR Hrvatske za predstavnika radničkih sindikata iz Alžira (Budisa Safi), 1.

¹⁵² AJ-117-347, Plan boravka na izučavanju izobrazbe radnika NR Hrvatske za predstavnika radničkih sindikata iz Alžira (Budisa Safi), 1.

¹⁵³ AJ-117-347, AF-II-4, Zabeleška o završnom razgovoru sa Safi Budisom, sekretarom alžirskih sindikata, Beograd 8. VII 1959, 1.

¹⁵⁴ AJ-117-347, AF-II-4, Zabeleška o završnom razgovoru sa Safi Budisom, 1.

¹⁵⁵ AJ-117-347, AF-II-4, Zabeleška o završnom razgovoru sa Safi Budisom, 1-2.

2.4 Yugoslav "Ambassadors": Algerian Workers in Self-Managed Enterprises

One of the points of the union cooperation agreement was the specialization of a group of 20 Algerian workers in Yugoslav self-managed enterprises and schools that also included courses for acquiring professional qualifications managed by union branches.¹⁵⁶ The Algerians initiated this kind of cooperation not only in order to build a qualified workforce that would manage certain branches of production, but also so the workers could learn about self-management and trade unionism.¹⁵⁷ Yugoslav trade union officials believed that this kind of assistance was easily achievable and could give the greatest results since Yugoslav officials saw these workers as their "ambassadors" who would spread the knowledge and skills they gained during their stay to the Algerians in Moroccan and Tunisian exile.¹⁵⁸

It was agreed that the workers would specialize in the enterprises of the metallurgical and railway industry, but very soon after their arrival in May 1959 it was established that only a few of them had partial knowledge of some of the crafts, which led the Yugoslav organizers to the situation of cancelling already planned positions for workers in some of the factories.¹⁵⁹ It turned out that this point of the cooperation was a painstaking endeavour. Yugoslav officials were surprised when a sizable number of unqualified workers arrived because, according to the agreement, UGTA was supposed to send the qualified ones. CTUY was not informed in advance about their professional training and education, and as a result, was oblivious to their needs and what should be provided to them.¹⁶⁰

Despite all the difficulties and time pressure to create a new plan, CTUY showed great flexibility and willingness to adapt to the needs and interests of UGTA leadership and workers. CTUY had to come up very quickly with a completely new plan where the workers were first given a one-month course in the Serbo-Croatian language at the Institute for Experimental Phonetics in Belgrade.¹⁶¹ After completing the course, workers were allowed to choose their specialization. According to Boudissa's proposal, the workers should focus mostly on agriculture, considering that the future independent Algeria would have the greatest need for the development of the agricultural sector. That was a completely new

¹⁵⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1959, f. 97, d. 4, s. 47758

¹⁵⁷ AJ-117-347, Zabeleška, 27.II 1959; DAMSP, Alžir, 1959, f. 97, d. 4, s. 47758

¹⁵⁸ AJ-117-347, Zapisnik sa sastanka Komisije kojem su prisustvovali drug Mustafa Vilović i Ilija Topalovski, ambasadori FNRJ u Maroku odnosno Tunisu, a koji se održao 9.januara 1960.godine, 1.

¹⁵⁹ AJ-117-347, Informacija o boravku alžirskih radnika i funkcionera u Jugoslaviji, 12. XI 1959.godine, 1.

¹⁶⁰ AJ-117-347, Pismo CV SSJ Generalnoj uniji alžirskih radnika u Tunisu, 1.

¹⁶¹ AJ-117-347, Informacija o boravku alžirskih radnika i funkcionera u Jugoslaviji, 12. XI 1959.godine, 1.

component compared to the original plan that only involved specialization in industrial enterprises. Seven out of twenty workers chose to work on the agricultural estates *Ečka* and *Zlatica*¹⁶² located in the region of Vojvodina, known as the "granary" of Yugoslavia with the most fertile land and most successful agricultural production.¹⁶³ Other workers were assigned to companies such as *Industrija motora Rakovica* (*Rakovica Motor Industry* - IMR) and the *Zavod za izradu novčanica Topčider* (*Banknote Production Institute Topčider*) in Belgrade, the Graphic Institute in Belgrade and Zagreb, and the *Rafinerija Nafta* (*Oil Refinery*) in Rijeka.¹⁶⁴

The workers very often did not like their chosen specialization, so there were frequent requests for transfer which created new challenges. For example, a worker at the Graphic Institute was transferred to work on agricultural farms in Vojvodina.¹⁶⁵ Some wanted to change their specialization because of the health issues, therefore, one of the workers switched from working in agriculture to work in postal, telephone and telegraf services at *PTT* in Belgrade.¹⁶⁶ In addition, workers often felt as if they did not receive enough knowledge in regard to their chosen vocation. The workers who were engaged in the work on farms went to the Tractor School in the city of Zrenjanin, which was located near the *Ečka* and *Zlatica* estates, but they believed that in those schools they would not learn important things such as repairs, therefore, with the consent of Boudissa, they were transferred to the Agricultural School in Osijek, Croatia.¹⁶⁷ It was originally planned that this group of workers would stay for specialization for 6 months to a year, but since a large number of unqualified workers arrived who needed time to decide which specialization they would devote themselves to, as well as due to difficulties with the learning of Serbo-Croatian language, it was decided that workers should stay until February or March 1961 when they would take their exams.¹⁶⁸ Some of the workers expressed their desire to upgrade their education and stay another two or three years in order to complete the regular studies, therefore the Central

¹⁶² AJ-117-347, Informacija o boravku alžirskih radnika i funkcionera u Jugoslaviji, 12. XI 1959.godine, 1-2.

¹⁶³ Maize production in Yugoslavia in early 1960s, *Yugoslav Survey: A Record of Facts and Information* 12, 1753.

¹⁶⁴ AJ-117-347, Informacija o boravku alžirskih radnika, 1-2.

¹⁶⁵ AJ-117-347, Informacija o boravku alžirskih radnika, 2.

¹⁶⁶ AJ-117-347, Informacija o boravku alžirskih radnika, 2.

¹⁶⁷ AJ-117-347, Informacija o boravku alžirskih radnika, 2.

¹⁶⁸ AJ-117-347, Informacija o alžirskim radnicima u Jugoslaviji, januar 1960, 4-5.

Committee of CTUY enabled one to two workers from each enterprise to continue their education in Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁹

In addition to a one-month language course, the workers were provided with Serbo-Croatian language lessons twice a week at the WU *Djuro Salaj* in Belgrade during the specialization, and occasionally lectures on the Yugoslav state system and economic policy were held for them.¹⁷⁰ After workers had improved their language skills and found their desired specializations, secretary Deleon insisted on their more substantial involvement in the activities of the workers' councils because the goal of their stay was to prepare for the development of social and political life in Algeria.¹⁷¹ The political education of Algerian workers and frequent contacts both with the worker' representatives and with experienced workers in the enterprises and agricultural estates were the ways in which the Yugoslav trade union officials wanted to respond to the Algerian interests, which included not only the mere vocational training, but also knowledge about workers' self-management and Yugoslav society.

The question arises though as to how much it was possible to be familiar with self-management in addition to specialization, language courses and few lectures on Yugoslav politics and economy. Yugoslav trade union officials, members of the workers' councils and the Yugoslav workers themselves were satisfied with the hard work of the Algerians and their desire to master all the operations important for their craft.¹⁷² However, in the reports on the vocational trainings of Algerian workers, beside Deleon's appeal for the workers to be more involved in the activities of the workers' councils, there was no information about the ways and extent to which they were taught about the system of workers' self-management and how far they progressed in this regard during their work in the enterprise or theoretical courses, nor whether the exams they took included the topic of self-management. Having a look into the grievances and wishes of the Algerian workers, it seems like there was no need to provide greater assistance on this matter, but to provide them with the best possible specialization and means for work and life such as proper machines, better work equipment, salary, food or housing.¹⁷³ Working in the enterprises, they had the opportunity to become familiar with self-

¹⁶⁹ AJ-117-347, Informacija o alžirskim radnicima, 5.

¹⁷⁰ AJ-117-347, Informacija o boravku alžirskih radnika, 3.

¹⁷¹ AJ-117-347, Ašer Deleon za Sindikalnu podružnicu Zavoda za izradu novčanica, Beograd, Topčider, 31. decembra 1959, 1-2.

¹⁷² AJ-117-347, Izveštaj CV SSJ Uniji alžirskih sindikata o radnicima u našim preduzećima, januar 1960, 2-3.

¹⁷³ AJ-117-347, Informacija o alžirskim radnicima, 1-4.

managing bodies, primarily with the work of the workers' councils, but it seems that the main goal was to get the best possible vocational training, while it was the trade union leadership who was focused on studying self-management during their time in Yugoslavia.

2.5 Termination of visits and re-establishment of the cooperation

The plans for study stays and new group of workers coming to Yugoslavia were put on hold. In March 1960, the UGTA informed the CTUY that it had decided to temporarily stop sending officials and workers abroad due to internal reorganization, therefore, some actions foreseen by the agreement from February 1959 were not realized, such as the study stay of Djilani Embarek for the purpose of studying self-management, the arrival of two UGTA officials to study cooperatives, and the group of 20 new workers for the vocational training.¹⁷⁴ In November 1961, UGTA elected a new leadership. The new general secretary was Abdenour Ali Yahia, while Djilani Embarek was in charge of international relations. In his conversations with Miloš Lalović, the new Yugoslav ambassador in Tunisia, Ali Yahia expressed an interest in reviving the bilateral cooperation between UGTA and CTUY, because, due to the assumption of the end of the war, it was important to study the experiences of the Yugoslav working class, primarily that of self-management and the role of trade unions in the economic building of the socialist countries, since the leaders of the FLN movement decided to build "pure Algerian socialism."¹⁷⁵

As an expression of revitalized contacts, in the early 1962, UGTA requested from CTUY to accept a group of 10 workers for the vocational trainings who would spend one year in Yugoslavia and 10 trade union activists to study self-management and workers' education in the period of five months.¹⁷⁶ CTUY demanded from UGTA, as a condition for the acceptance, to send more precise information on their interests, as well as more detailed information on the foreknowledge of the activists who would potentially visit Yugoslavia, so they could be well prepared,¹⁷⁷ especially regarding the workers for vocational trainings

¹⁷⁴ AJ-117-347, Pismo sekretara Saveza sindikata Jugoslavije Opštoj uniji alžirskih radnika, Mart 1960, 1.

¹⁷⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1961, f.101, d.18, s.433524; Algerian socialist development is for the first time comprehensively defined in the Tripoli Programme from June 1962 that shows the identity and direction of the independent Algeria. Algerian socialism is projected in the nationalization of foreign interest, the establishment of an industrial economy, and the inauguration of agricultural cooperatives. See: REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE, Déclaration du Congrès de Tripoli Juin 1962: Projet de programme pour la réalisation de la Révolution Démocratique Populaire, Juin 1962, Tripoli: https://elmouradia.dz/assets/texts/Congres_Tripoli.pdf

¹⁷⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 3, s. 2; DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f.3, dos 10, s.410866

¹⁷⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 11, s. 412477; DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f.3, dos. 13, s. 411175

where they demanded, that the UGTA lists "verbatim" the technical branches and crafts they wanted to specialize in.¹⁷⁸ Unlike the first visit where self-management was one of the goals for Algerian workers, now the emphasis was only on technical training in factories and cooperatives.¹⁷⁹ This is not surprising given that Algeria was already approaching official independence, therefore, all efforts were focused on building qualified workforce that would help with the economic reconstruction of the country.

The workers arrived in June 1962, but the visits of UGTA members did not happen. Having in mind that Algerians were in the process of officially gaining independence from France by signing the Evian Accords and preparing the self-determination referendum, it is possible that in such a situation the Algerians could not supply the Yugoslavs with the necessary information given that all the Algerian sociopolitical sources were concentrated on the process of their independence, and the UGTA thus decided to solely focus on sending the workers whose skills would be essential in reviving the economy.

As the end of the war and the official proclamation of independence were approaching, Algerian trade unions became increasingly aware of the need for a thorough examination of all aspects of Yugoslav self-management. During their initial contacts with the Yugoslav counterparts, they saw this model as a framework for establishing Algeria as a socialist self-managed state. Furthermore, through setting the conditions for future study visits and vocational trainings, the Yugoslavs were able to admit and correct their own mistakes, as well as to adjust plans in accordance with the interests of union officials and workers in order to provide them with the best possible education and vocational training, particularly in the moment when Algeria was about to become an independent socialist country willing to use Yugoslav know-how in its development, which would soon be proved by implementing autogestion in March 1963 and developing scientific-technical cooperation in this field.

3. From Theory to Practice: The implementation of autogestion in Algeria (1962-1965)

Before proceeding with Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation after Algeria's independence, it is important to understand the post-independence circumstances in Algeria, notably the sociopolitical conditions that impacted the adoption and functioning of autogestion.

¹⁷⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f.3, d. 10, s. 410866

¹⁷⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f.3, d. 10, s. 410866

Understanding this context allows for a more nuanced grasp of the circumstances surrounding bilateral cooperation, as well as the relevance of Yugoslavia's assistance in the development of Algerian autogestion. This chapter thus investigates the ideological basis, practical execution, and problems of autogestion in early postcolonial Algeria with a focus on the interaction of local traditions, Islamic values, and the role of foreign socialist models – most notably the Yugoslav one.

The term "socialism" did not appear in FLN official declarations until the Tripoli Programme of 1962, which unambiguously confirmed the socialist course of Algeria's development.¹⁸⁰ In independent Algeria, socialism had a twofold understanding. Firstly, scientific socialism was seen as a useful technical instrument by taking the economic achievements of socialist countries as an example. As such, it was perceived as a "proven recipe" for the nation's development rather than a deeply rooted ideological commitment.¹⁸¹ Secondly, the oppressed Algerian Muslims' religious and linguistic identity served as a unifying force that set them apart from Europeans during the colonial era, giving rise to a "specific" form of socialism known as Arab-Islamic socialism. The goal of that "specific" socialism was to create a synthesis between upholding traditional values and embracing practices of the socialist world. There are two reasons that explain this position. First, during colonial period, Islam established a racialised judicial system that maintained the settler colony's economic and social hierarchies. The French government's classification of Algerian Muslims as "natives" institutionalised disparities in access to resources, property, and rights. Over time, this system exacerbated economic gaps and reinforced notions of Muslim inferiority that influenced policies of land confiscation, taxation, and labor.¹⁸² Second, the Islamic tradition represented a societal and economic driving factor, especially in the countryside, considering that the impoverished peasants were the foundation of the Algerian liberation struggle and religious cultural identity, as *El Moudjahid* mentions in one of the articles from 1957.¹⁸³ For many of them, taking over the land of French settlers in summer 1962 was not only a revolutionary task, but also aligned with their Islamic faith and the Koran's hadith: *The land belongs to him*

¹⁸⁰ Helie, *Počeci samoupravljanja u Alžiru*, 23.

¹⁸¹ Helie, *Počeci samoupravljanja u Alžiru*, 32.

¹⁸² Davis, Muriam Haleh, *Markets of Civilization: Islam and Racial Capitalism in Algeria*, Duke University Press, 2022, 20-21.

¹⁸³ *Extraits de la Plate-forme: Pour assurer le triomphe de la revolution algerienne dans la lutte pour l'indépendance nationale*, *El Moudjahid*, No. 4, Numero Special, p. 68, 1957, in: *El Moudjahid* I, Jugoslavija, Grafički zavod jun 1962.

who makes it bear fruit.¹⁸⁴ As the Algerian Islamic intellectual Malek Bennabi¹⁸⁵ stated in a lecture he gave in Algiers in 1964:

*It is the Algerian people who have made the Revolution, and it is the fellah (peasant) who had carried its burden before the worker and the intellectual. It was in reality a peasants' Revolution, not only by the number of its martyrs but also by its spirit. (...) It was he, not the intellectual, nor even the worker, more or less uprooted from his spiritual and social origins who made of it a "sacred" struggle. The peasant fought for the independence of Algeria, conscious of being an Arab and a Musulman.*¹⁸⁶

However, the task was to bring the pragmatic prescription of socialist countries closer to the traditional Algerian society, i.e. to achieve the success of these nations, and yet preserve the cultural authenticity aligned with revolutionary anticolonialism and commitment to Third World socialism. The implementation of autogestion, which involved Algerian peasants and workers occupying and collectively managing abandoned settler farms and factories, was crucial for achieving that goal. When drafting the March Decrees, Ben Bella and his left-leaning collaborators such as the Greek Trotskyist and leader of the Fourth International, Michel Raptis or the Egyptian Marxist bookseller Soliman Lotfallah, were researching the experiences of socialist countries such as Cuba, the system of communes in China, or Yugoslav self-management, whose structure was taken as the main tool for the development of the Algerian *autogestion*.¹⁸⁷ As the Algerian historian Mohammed Harbi stated, the

¹⁸⁴ Alleg, Henri, Ichirakya: The revolutionary character of the Algiers Charter, *African Communist* No.16, 1965, 17-18.

¹⁸⁵ Malek Bennabi, born in Constantine in 1905 to a devoted religious family, received his technical education as an electrical engineer in Paris after attending a Franco-Arab lycée. Bennabi, who was initially an enthusiastic supporter of Islamic reformism influenced by the founder of the *Association des Oulémas Musulmans Algérien* (*Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema*), Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis, subsequently criticised religious reformers for putting political alliances ahead of spiritual progress. He studied electrical engineering after being denied admission to the *Institut des Langues Orientales* (*Institute for Oriental Languages*), apparently due to political reasons. Following World War II, Bennabi became a prolific writer who spent the Algerian War of Independence in Egypt translating his works into Arabic. He returned to Algeria in 1963 and briefly served as director of higher education until resigning in 1966. Critical of the colonial system's "pseudo-technocratic" knowledge, Bennabi maintained that it denied Algerians full access to current scientific skills which is a viewpoint moulded by his own struggles under colonial rule. Malek Bennabi attempted to reconcile Islamic ideals with modernity by conducting a historical and intellectual investigation of Islamic civilization and he contended that it might propel cultural and technological advancement. He stressed that Algeria's revival requires moral and intellectual growth based on Islam. Bennabi criticised political nationalism as superficial, instead advocating for deep spiritual and intellectual reform to eliminate *colonizability*, that is, the interior circumstances that allowed colonial dominance. See: Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 168-171.

¹⁸⁶ Kraus, Jakob, The French connection: political Islam from the Algerian War to the Iranian Revolution, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 58, Issue 1, 2022, 219-220.

¹⁸⁷ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 13-14; Byrne, Our own special brand of socialism, 433.

Yugoslav experience prevailed because of the "Algerian experience" itself.¹⁸⁸ Ben Bella himself told the president of CTUY, Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, that the Yugoslav revolution was the closest to the Algerians, and its experiences were the most useful, even though they do not consider themselves communists,¹⁸⁹ clearly thus positioning Yugoslavia's workers' self-management as a "proven recipe" rather than an ideological commitment, utilized to develop "specific" Algerian socialism. While Yugoslav efforts to separate Yugoslav socialism from East and the West depended on secular Marxist ideals, for a society with deeply Islamic cultural roots such as the Algerian one, this ideological trajectory however needed precise theological base and the inclusion of Islamic rhetoric into the lexicon of anti-imperialism and Third World solidarity.

During Algeria's early years of independence, there was a great deal of debate over whether or not workers' self-management was a European orthodoxy or a local expression of economic organisation.¹⁹⁰ Farmers in rural Algeria responded more favorably to the Arabic term *ichtirakiyya* than to the French word *socialisme*, according to Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Amar Ouzegane, and, in order to establish self-management as a local economic organization, FLN publications employed the Arabic word *tasyir al-dhaati* instead of *autogestion*.¹⁹¹ Algeria displayed what French Marxist scholar of Islam Maxime Rodinson defined as the "islamization" of European ideologies, especially socialism, as to make them acceptable and powerful in a postcolonial Muslim culture.¹⁹² In an effort to more clearly reconcile the Muslim identity with the socialist revolution, Ben Bella had already added references to Islam to the Tripoli Programme, which had not previously included any mention of religion in its original draft.¹⁹³ He frequently referred to Islam as naturally egalitarian. For the UGTA magazine *Revolution et Travail* in April 1964, he stated:

¹⁸⁸ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 20.

¹⁸⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 32, s. 41753, 1.

¹⁹⁰ Davis, Muriam Haleh, "You are beautiful like a comité de gestion": Self-Management in Algeria and Yugoslavia, *The Funambulist*, From Issue 42: Algerian independence and Global Revolution 1962-2022: <https://thefunambulist.net/magazine/algerian-independence/you-are-beautiful-like-a-comite-de-gestion-self-management-in-algeria-and-yugoslavia>

¹⁹¹ Davis, "You are beautiful like a comité de gestion"

¹⁹² Rodinson, Maxine, Achcar, Gilbert, *Marxism and the Muslim World*, Zed Books, 2015, 47-49.

¹⁹³ It asserted that Islam was "more than just a religion" and would serve as the primary wellspring of Algerian culture and identity. Religion, combined with a citizenship statute that established Islam as a hereditary basis, gave a cultural framework and a fixed-origin worldview that constituted the foundation of Ben Bella's revolutionary governance. See: Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 120.

*Islam, far from being in opposition to our (socialist) determination, is recognized in the spiritual aspiration of the masses towards equality, therefore, it aspires towards socialism.*¹⁹⁴

However, these flimsy attempts failed to persuade the more religious members of society, particularly those who adhered to the orthodox Salafism taught by the *ulama* (religious scholars).¹⁹⁵ They were not per se completely opposed to socialism, but they were demanding for the creation of a new alternative that would contest the officially proclaimed socialism that was not completely immune from the European doctrines.¹⁹⁶ Thus, they aimed at identifying Islam and socialism that promulgated the utilization of traditional sources of religion, that is, the Koran and Sura.¹⁹⁷ The idea of "Islamic socialism" was spreading thanks to Ben Bella's public statements about his commitment to Islam, as well as the recognition of it as the official state religion, which gave these religious circles both the incentive and the freedom to spread their ideas. For example, since May 1963, the magazine *Al-Ma'rifa* (*The Knowledge*) published in Arabic language, which promoted Islamic socialism, began to be printed in Algeria and it shows how the ideas of social justice in Islam were used to promote socialism.¹⁹⁸

A popular practice in the postcolonial Muslim world was to honour notable Muslims from the past, such as the Prophet's companion Abu Dharr al Ghifari, whose example helped to criticise the rich or to accentuate the distress of the poor.¹⁹⁹ According to the Yugoslav political scientist Stojan Gligorić, *Al-Ma'rifa* labeled Abu Dharr as the father of socialism because he advocated for social welfare and economic justice by promoting the strict practice of *zakat* (obligatory almsgiving) and *sadaqah* (voluntary charity) in order to redistribute wealth and achieve social and economic equality.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁴ Helie, *Počeci samoupravljanja u Alžiru*, 31.;

¹⁹⁵ Gligorić, *Arapski svet i socijalizam*, 66.

¹⁹⁶ For example, on January 5, 1964, an Islamic movement, *al-Qiyam* organised a public gathering that drew about 300 individuals. Speakers condemned Ben Bella's socialist policy, especially the importation of economic models from Yugoslavia and Cuba, which they blamed for causing a moral crisis in the country. See: Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 140.

¹⁹⁷ This was also observed in the statements of the Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser who, for instance, frequently appealed to the Islamic character and origins of the United Arab Republic's officially declared socialism, claiming that Islam was socialist from its inception and that the country created by Prophet Mohammed was the "world's first socialist republic." See: Gligorić, *Arapski svet i socijalizam*, 67.

¹⁹⁸ According to an article in *Al-Ma'rifa*, self-management committees were inspired by the Yugoslav model but embodied *hisba*, an Islamic idea dating back to the Abbasid period, the greatest age of Islam. It traditionally referred to the duty of insuring fair economic transactions and promoting social justice, frequently represented in the role of market inspector known as *muhtasib*. See: Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 128.

¹⁹⁹ Rodinson, Achcar, *Marxism and the Muslim World*, 51.

²⁰⁰ Gligorić, *Arapski svet i socijalizam*, 68.

One of the most important Algerian revolutionaries who best illustrates the „islamization“ of European ideas, was the already mentioned Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, and later editor of *Revolution Africaine*, Amar Ouzegane. He began his political activism in Algiers in the 1920s with the Communist Party and trade unions. After the Second World War, he was elected to the French Constituent Assembly and became secretary of the Algerian Communist Party (*Parti communiste algérien* - PCA). However, he was expelled in 1948 due to nationalist tendencies. After joining the FLN during the war, Ouzegane was arrested by French authorities in 1958 and he spent four years in Fresnes prison near Paris.²⁰¹ Though not a traditional religious figure, Ouzegane regularly used Islam as a moral and historical underpinning for justice and anti-imperialism as to characterise it as fundamentally opposed to colonial dominance and economic exploitation. During the prison years, he wrote his programmatic book *Le meilleure combat* (*The best struggle*), published in 1962, where he argued, just like the *ulama*, in favor of the position that not only socialism was not in contradiction with the Koran, but that the prophet Mohammed and his companions were the true and first precursors of socialism.²⁰² His imagination of Algerian state-building as well as the essence of Algerian "specific" socialism could be best demonstrated in an interview related to his book when he said:

*We are looking for a symbiosis between Islam and Marxism-Leninism... my friends in particular did not understand that I could study Lenin's Empiriocriticism and the Koran at the same time, while precisely the secret of the march forward of Arab countries, of Muslim countries, towards the destruction of colonialism, of feudalism, was precisely the symbiosis between Islam and progressive theories.*²⁰³

He believed that "revolutionaries linked to the people" needed to base their liberation struggle on Islamic principles, and that a misguided understanding of socialism, equated with atheism, could only be supported by a detached elite who was westernised, assimilated, or neutralised by the oppressive colonial ideology.²⁰⁴ In September 1964, the appointment of Ouzegane as the editor of *Revolution Africaine*, a magazine responsible for informing the masses about the development of autogestion, speaks of Ben Bella's intention to please more conservative circles by replacing Mohammed Harbi, a member of the secular left wing of the FLN, and

²⁰¹ Kraiss, *The French connection*, 217.

²⁰² Ouzegane, Amar, *Le meilleure combat*, Julliard, Paris, 1962.

²⁰³ Launay, Michel, Dialogue avec Amar Ouzegane, *Esprit*, No. 319 (7/8), Juillet-Aout, 1963, 17.

²⁰⁴ Kraiss, *The French connection*, 220.

appointing Ouzegane, a devoted Muslim and supporter of "specific" socialism. In his first editorial *Struggle for Socialism* he distributed the blows both at the Islamist fundamentalists whom he considered the supporters of the bourgeoisie, and at the left orthodox Marxists whom he named "the philosophers detached from people."²⁰⁵ By positioning Islam this way, it became an anticolonial force through ethical resonance which enabled Ouzegane to reach a wider audience, notably among peasants.

What many Algerian thinkers such as Ouzegane essentially attempted to do was to build a bridge between Islamic tradition and progressive ideas in order to alter the narrative to make Islam compatible with, if not foundational to, Algeria's revolutionary anticolonial and socialist character. In this sense, Islamic ideals were used not only as religious but also as political instrument to challenge power systems such as colonialism without completely accepting socialism as defined by European doctrine.

Many Yugoslav officials such as the Ambassador in the independent Algeria, Nijaz Dizdarević²⁰⁶ and LCY high-ranking official Veljko Vlahović, understood the importance and viewed this base of Algerian "specific" socialism on Islam as a very positive foundation because it included the masses in the socialist state-building and because fundamentalist religious currents could thus be suppressed.²⁰⁷ As a Marxist who spent years in French prison during the war, where he wrote his already mentioned book *Le Meilleure Combat*, Ouzegane was respected among Yugoslav communists and some of the most important projects of Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation for the development of Algerian self-managed agriculture

²⁰⁵ Adam, André, *Chronique sociale et culturelle, Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, Vol.3, 1964, 176-180.

²⁰⁶ More will be said about Ambassador Dizdarević's role in Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation in the following sections, but it is important to note here that Dizdarević was not only an excellent diplomat, but also one of the gifted Yugoslav orientalists interested in religion and culture on a global level. In 1979, Dizdarević wrote a foreword for the encyclopaedia *Svijet islama (The World of Islam)*, published in 1979, and made it possible for the Yugoslav edition to include an additional chapter dedicated to Islamic civilization in Yugoslavia. His opening presentation at the symposium "Creativity of Jews in the cultural heritage and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina," (*Stvaralaštvo Jevreja u kulturnoj baštini Bosne i Hercegovine*) organised by the Institute for the Study of National Relations in Sarajevo in May 1984, left a lasting impression on the cultural community. Dizdarević's contribution to the conception of the round table "Particular and Universal in International Cultural Cooperation" (*Posebno i univerzalno u međunarodnoj kulturnoj saradnji*) held as part of the "Sarajevo Winter" (*Sarajevska zima*) festival programme on March 21, 1986, with the participation of distinguished artists, philosophers, culturologists, and publicists from all centres of the former Yugoslavia, was also significant. Nijaz emphasised the importance of better communication between different cultures to develop and promote awareness of togetherness and the harmonious realisation of humanistic emancipation goals in the fight for new relations and global peace. See: *Jubileji / 100 godina od rođenja Nijaza Dizdarevića: Partizan sa leptir-mašnom* by Emir Habul, *Oslobođenje*, 13.11. 2020: <https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/dosjei/kolumne/jubileji-100-godina-od-rođenja-nijaza-dizdarevica-partizan-sa-leptir-masnom-604486> ; *Sjećanje na Nijaza Dizdarevića: Čovjek, zavičaj i svijet* by Čedo Kisić, *Oslobođenje*, 31.03.2019: <https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/sjecanje-na-nijaza-dizdarevica-covjek-zavicaj-i-svijet-444421>

²⁰⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 2, d. 3, s. 410553, 9.; DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 19.

were created during Ouzegane's ministerial mandate, and terminated after his departure from that position, as will be demonstrated in chapter 4. Furthermore, even during the war period, Algerian trade union official Safi Boudissa was seen by his Yugoslav comrades as a dynamic leader more oriented towards religious institutions.²⁰⁸ The union leaders often emphasised that they felt "at home" in Yugoslavia²⁰⁹ and, as shown in chapter 2, during the war period saw themselves as "Titoists of the Arab countries" committed to the Yugoslav model of workers' self-management that they saw as the most suitable to Algerian specific needs.

Similarities between Algerian society and the diversity of Yugoslavia's population included the latter's large Muslim population.²¹⁰ During their visits to Yugoslavia, Algerian officials were interested in the position of religion, particularly Muslims within the economic, social and political order.²¹¹ According to a historian Muriam Haleh Davis, an article about Yugoslavia published in *Révolution Africaine* in 1964 concentrated on the Yugoslav support of Islamic endeavours, such as the Qur'anic publishing and Mecca pilgrimages which demonstrated the significant role that the Islamic Religious Community of Yugoslavia (*Islamska verska zajednica - IVZ*) played in the late 1950s diplomatic outreach to the Global South nations like Egypt and Indonesia.²¹² Thus, in addition to the enormous aid and support provided during the war and successful socioeconomic development, the multireligious character of Yugoslavia was an important factor in the decision of the Algerian leadership to introduce self-management inspired by the Yugoslav model.

Yugoslavia served as a model for how a particular type of socialism could incorporate aspects of culture and religion within a framework of socialist state-building. Due to its economic success achieved through self-management and its multireligious demographic structure, Yugoslavia seemed to be the best example for the realization of specific Algerian socialism and the determination of Ben Bella and his associates to introduce self-management according to the Yugoslav model. However, in practice, the introduction of *tasyir al-dhaati* and its further development proved to be a painstaking endeavour considering the difficult

²⁰⁸ AJ-117-348, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije, 5.

²⁰⁹ AJ-117-348, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije, 5-6.

²¹⁰ Religious affiliation was investigated only during the 1953 population census, where 12.3% of the population identified themselves as Muslims. In the early 1960s, Muslims were recognized as an official ethnic and national group. According to the 1971 population census, Muslims as an ethnic group made up 39.6% of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 2.1% in Kosovo. See: *The Population of Yugoslavia*, Centar za demografsko istraživanje, Beograd, 1974, 40.

²¹¹ AJ-117-347, AF-II-1, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije, 3; DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 29, s. 49814

²¹² Davis, "You are beautiful like a comité de gestion"

economic, political, and social conditions in which Algeria found itself after independence, which will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

3.1 From liberation to organization: the creation of management committees in postcolonial Algeria

Algeria faced almost unprecedented political, economic, and social challenges immediately after gaining independence. It descended into a complex web of political disputes where various factions were vying for establishing their claim to revolutionary authority.²¹³ Conflicts between representatives of the GPRA on one side, and Ahmed Ben Bella and the army on the other, managed to be put on hold temporarily, considering that both sides accepted the goals of the Tripoli Programme, which defined the future development of Algeria. The Programme aimed at ending neocolonialism's hegemony, implementing state planning with workers' input, executing agrarian reform with land redistribution, and establishing state agricultural estates. Additionally, it developed an industrialization plan with the long-term goal of nationalising the transportation, banking, insurance, trade, and mining industries.²¹⁴ However, the moment the two sides discussed a new government and party reorganization the temporary unity between different factions ended. Ben Bella wanted to form a Politburo (*le Bureau Politique*) at the head of the FLN, which would consist of a more representative selection of militants than the GPRA, which the latter refused, seeing it as a means for Ben Bella to hand the power of the government over to the party and the army. After several months of armed conflicts arising from the attempts of both factions to form a government, the Politburo took control of most of Algeria by September and held elections on its own single list with support from the army under the command of Colonel Houari Boumédiène.²¹⁵

Meanwhile, around 90% of the *pieds-noirs* (term used for French settlers) hastily fled for the French mainland rather than relying on the protection provided by the Evian Agreements because they had fears of Algerian retaliation for the terrorist attacks of the *Organisation armée secrète* (*Secret Army Organisation* - OAS), the far-right French paramilitary organization who wanted to prevent Algeria's independence by numerous bombing attacks

²¹³ Clegg, *Workers' Self-management in Algeria*, 40.

²¹⁴ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 43.

²¹⁵ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 44.

and assassinations also directed against Algerian civilians.²¹⁶ As a consequence, most administrative and commercial organisations had no one in charge after their departure, effectively halting economic activity. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of fatalities, three to four million people had ended up in the depressing "regrouping camps" of the French army, or crammed into slums near the major cities.²¹⁷ Half a million of refugees were returning from Tunisia and Morocco.²¹⁸ Over two million agricultural and industrial workers were unemployed, while the schools were closed since 20,000 teachers left the country.²¹⁹ The means of production were almost non-existent while time for harvesting and ploughing was approaching.²²⁰ The war had a particularly negative impact on the agricultural sector because the overall production fell by more than one third.²²¹ The land was cultivated with only 800 tractors, whereby 35,000 engineers and technicians, who were most needed at that moment, left the country.²²² According to Bachir Boumaza, head of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs under Ben Bella, 80 percent of those occupying high-ranking positions in education, engineering, agriculture, and medicine left Algeria after independence.²²³ Establishing autogestion was a challenging task because Algeria had no financial resources. The third of the first Algerian budget was used to pay the advances to France as contracted in the Evian Accords.²²⁴ Algeria continued to rely heavily on France as a trading partner,²²⁵ was unable to transform the majority of its primary goods, and experienced a persistent lack of investment capital.²²⁶ Most importantly, there was no political leadership capable of addressing the pressing social and economic issues.²²⁷

It was in these challenging conditions that autogestion was born in Algeria. Algerian peasants and workers *spontaneously* took over agricultural properties and a smaller number of industrial enterprises, and set up management committees (*comités de gestion*) based on the

²¹⁶ Byrne, *Our own special brand of socialism*, 432.

²¹⁷ Byrne, *Our own special brand of socialism*, 432.

²¹⁸ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 44.

²¹⁹ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 21-22.

²²⁰ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 44.

²²¹ Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 121-122.

²²² Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 21-22.

²²³ Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 121.

²²⁴ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 21-22.

²²⁵ The Algerian economy was stuck in a cycle of dependence on France that proved difficult to overcome. In 1963, 75% of Algerian exports went to France, while 81% of Algerian purchases came from it. See: Davis, *Markets of Civilisation*, 121-122.

²²⁶ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 76.

²²⁷ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 40.

idea of equitable profit sharing.²²⁸ Their first responsibility was to restart production, create jobs, and protect these national assets, while their long-term impact was the establishment of a social and economic organisation practise that, along with its corresponding theory defined by Tripoli Programme and, later Algerian Charter, dominated Algerian national political ideology in the years that followed.²²⁹ However, the occupation of these estates was marked by numerous obstacles. First, the Algerian petty bourgeoisie moved in to buy the property of the *pieds-noirs* after their widespread emigration because the former settlers were selling land at low prices.²³⁰ In the conditions of industrial underdevelopment and colonial status, the Algerian bourgeoisie was limited mainly to landowners and a relatively thin layer of richer merchants. However, after independence, the tendencies of sudden enrichment and the purchase of colonial land appeared. At some of the farms, peasants, who believed they had not benefited from the sale of the farms to Algerian bourgeoisie by the colonial owners, set fire to the crops and buildings, while in other places, the permanent workers organised as to keep seasonal or ex-combatants workers out of the estates they now owned.²³¹

The army and former combatants were frequently not welcomed as liberators. The army targeted workers on European estates both during the war and after independence because they saw them as complicit in colonialism.²³² In actuality, a war that had primarily taken place in the mountains and the major cities had been geographically remote from many of the permanent agricultural workers on the expansive estates in the coastal plains. The majority of the ex-combatants, who were peasants, were seen by them as rivals and outsiders rather than as heroes of the liberation struggle.²³³ The initiative to solve these problems came from the management committees and the UGTA, which turned to the state for help, demanding the fulfillment of certain requirements, such as, for example, the prohibition of the purchase of abandoned farms, and further establishment of management committees.²³⁴ The UGTA expanded its activities outside of the cities in September 1962. Peasants had already seized control of the majority of the European lands in the Kabylie region and Constantine in the north-eastern part of the country. The European holdings had typically taken the form of

²²⁸ Byrne, *Our own special brand of socialism*, 433.

²²⁹ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 45.

²³⁰ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 47.

²³¹ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 48.

²³² Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 16-17.

²³³ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 48.

²³⁴ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 37.

sizable estates in the north-western regions of Mitidja and Cheliff, where the UGTA concentrated its efforts.²³⁵

The European land was also redistributed to former combatants,²³⁶ or in the case of sizable estates, put under the direct command of army units. In many instances, management committees that were formed on their own were forcibly disbanded and their original permanent members were fired.²³⁷ By giving land to former militants, whose loyalty was to the army rather than to any other group or organisation, the army hoped to establish a political base. The army opposed the introduction of autogestion and believed that the state should take over agriculture.²³⁸ Many of the *wilaya*²³⁹ leaders were also attempting to settle their own supporters on local European farms in order to lay the groundwork for future political and, if necessary, military support.²⁴⁰

3.2 Legislative path to the implementation of autogestion

During this period many regulations were published in order to solve the forementioned issues. The first decree on the regulation of abandoned properties from August 1962 was shaped according to the Evian Agreements. Namely, the regulation confirmed all the rights of the French owners and demanded their return. Otherwise, one manager should be appointed for each agricultural property.²⁴¹ However, the goal was to put an end to this decree because otherwise the aspirations for an independent Algeria defined by the Tripoli Programme could not be practically realized.²⁴² The aim was to make the management committees permanent bodies with which the owners, in case of return, would *co-manage* the properties.²⁴³ Thus, in October 1962, two decrees were passed that regulated the establishment of management committees and prohibited the sale or lease of properties.²⁴⁴ Ben Bella approached the adoption of these decrees with reserve because of the Evian Accords, but realizing that the

²³⁵ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 50.

²³⁶ The *ancien moudjahid* (a veteran of the war) demonstrates how the revolutionary past influenced access to social and economic resources. As part of land reform, the Algerian government established 338 agricultural cooperatives on 333,000 hectares of land reserved for the former combatants. Often, property owned by military veterans was spared nationalisation. Military duty overshadowed the fact that these men frequently had little experience in agriculture. Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 135.

²³⁷ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 50.

²³⁸ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 22-23.

²³⁹ Seven military regions Algeria was divided into during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962)

²⁴⁰ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 51.

²⁴¹ Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija*, 60.

²⁴² Byrne, *Our own special brand of socialism*, 433.

²⁴³ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 17.

²⁴⁴ Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija*, 60.

idea of management committees mobilized masses, he strongly supported it, seeing in it the legitimacy of his power.²⁴⁵ After this date, the management committees were typically appointed by the local government rather than chosen by the workers.²⁴⁶

Finally, in March 1963, a series of ordinances known as *March Decrees* (*Les décrets de mars*) was published which regulated agricultural autogestion and extended it to a small number of industrial enterprises. The first two degrees were promulgated on the 18th of March. One was concerned with the responsibility of workers in the management of their assets, while the other entrusted management organization and agrarian reform program to a new state body: the National Office for Agrarian Reform (*L'office national de la reforme agraire* - ONRA).²⁴⁷ The decree of March 22 referred to the organization of the management of abandoned agricultural properties. The management system, based on the internal organization of Yugoslav self-management,²⁴⁸ rested on the general assembly of workers (*l'assemblée générale des travailleurs*), the workers' council (*le conseil des travailleurs*) chosen by the assembly, and the management committee (*le comité de gestion*), chosen by the assembly and headed by the president chosen by the committee, and the director elected by ONRA, as a representative of the state, in compliance with the Communal Council for the Revival of Self-Management (*Le conseil d'animation d'autogestion*).²⁴⁹ The last decree of March 28 referred to the distribution of the income of self-managed properties. The decree foresaw several types of mandatory benefits. The state takes the depreciation amounts, as well as those for the national investment fund. The decree determined the minimum income limit for workers, indirect earnings through social benefits and, at the end of the year, a surplus depending on the state of the enterprise.²⁵⁰ The introduced principle of workers' material interest was supposed to strengthen productivity and ensure the economic profitability. According to the decree, the global value of the gross product was divided in principle between the state, the enterprise and the workers, according to their labor input.²⁵¹

²⁴⁵ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 18.

²⁴⁶ A telegram was sent to all prefects even before the decree was released with the requests to give preference to ex-combatants in any elections or appointments to committees. See: Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 51.

²⁴⁷ Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija*, 60-61.

²⁴⁸ Clegg, *Workers' self-management in Algeria*, 16.

²⁴⁹ Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija*, 61.

²⁵⁰ Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija*, 62.

²⁵¹ The workers' portion of the income was further divided into regular wages, social security benefits, production bonuses, and shared profits. The net income of enterprises should not be less than 50% of the gross income, according to an official clarification. The general assembly was in charge of allocating net income

The regulations strongly insisted on the democratic character of the self-managing bodies and on the need for national planning, the solidarity between rich and poor regions, and between the workers and the unemployed.²⁵² They were elaborated in detail, but the practical scope was limited by the conditions under which they were adopted. The texts were prepared in a fairly restricted circle without broad and direct consultation of the workers' representatives, and they were promulgated without being debated by the National Assembly or any other political body.²⁵³ In the following sections, the obstacles in the development of autogestion and the limits of the March Decrees will be presented.

3.3 The structural strains caused by state administration

Even though the decrees required that the self-managed sector was to be run by workers, the FLN believed that there should be some kind of central control to keep an eye on the workers and ensure that they were working for national interests rather than their own.²⁵⁴ The government started building an administrative superstructure in response to the requirement to build some sort of state machinery that would coordinate and supervise the activities of the committees and provide them with financial and technical support. The ex-colonial administration workers, who made up the bulk of state apparatus, were generally opposed to autogestion and incompetent for the tasks assigned to them, while union's role in the implementation of autogestion was significantly reduced. UGTA was an independent organization that was not under the control of the FLN during the Algerian War for Independence. However, after the Algerian government was formed in August 1962, the government wanted to put the unions under its control, which it did at the first UGTA congress in January 1963, by replacing the existing leadership with a new one closer to the government.²⁵⁵ The adoption of the March Decrees put the organization of autogestion in the hands of the state, not the trade unions, given that the state administration was responsible for

roughly in the following proportions: 85% for workers' income and 15% for enterprise funds. See: Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija*, 62.; Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 70-71.

²⁵² Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, 64.

²⁵³ Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, 62.

²⁵⁴ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 65-66.

²⁵⁵ The new leadership was made up of Rabah Djermane, Safi Boudissa, Mohamed Flissi, Cheikh Benghazi, Mohamed Tahar Chafai, Arezki Ziani and Ali Remli. The ousted former leaders of the trade union center, Boualem Bourouiba, Abdelmadjid Ali Yahia, Tahar Gaïd, Rahmoun Dekkar, Mustapha Lassal were accused of jeopardizing the Algerian Revolution because of the refusal to be a "certified copy of the party" as the former leadership stated in its newspaper *L'Ouvrier Algérien*. See: Amer, Mohand Amar, *L'Union générale des travailleurs algériens (UGTA) dans le processus de transition (1962-1963)* in: *Les indépendances au Maghreb*, ed. Amer, Mohand Amar et Benzenine, Belkacem, Oran/Tunis, CRASC/IRMC, éditions du CRASC, 2012.

the organization of management bodies, their election, which resulted in directors and management committees not consulting with union representatives on the matters of organization or elections²⁵⁶ although the March Decrees implied a certain participation of trade unions in the development of autogestion.²⁵⁷

Two of the bodies that presented the character of this centralized superstructure were ONRA and *Société agricole de prévoyance* (Agricultural Provident Society - SAP), the equipment and repairs rental service inherited from the colonial period.²⁵⁸ ONRA served as the oversight body for the democratic election of management committees.²⁵⁹ After the campaign for the democratic election of committees by the workers, ONRA's task was to ensure the legitimacy of the elections. Nevertheless, most of the management committees were appointed by the local officials of the ONRA.²⁶⁰ The local FLN branch, the sub-prefect, and ONRA officials frequently collaborated to form a committee that would accept their control in the rural areas. They were able to accomplish this because the vast majority of agricultural workers were excluded from the campaigns to explain the March Decrees due to the high rate of illiteracy,²⁶¹ and because the UGTA had not yet organised them into union.²⁶² As the role of trade union in autogestion was not obvious and had not given rise to sufficient theoretical reflection or concrete explanations, workers had difficulties understanding its usefulness

²⁵⁶ Branine, Fekkar, *Employee Relations*, 408.; Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 10.

²⁵⁷ Article 23 of the decree of March 22 on the organization of management in industrial, mining and craft enterprises, as well as abandoned agricultural assets, provided that the Communal Council for the Revival of Self-Management includes, in addition to party representatives and the president of the management committee, representatives of the UGTA. A circular of the National Bureau for the Revival of the Socialist Sector from April 29, 1963, recommended that lists of candidates for workers' councils and management committees should be drawn up either from UGTA representatives in each enterprise or estate, or from a group of workers. See: Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija u Africi*, 175-176.

²⁵⁸ The *Sociétés Agricoles de Prévoyance* (SAPs) were founded in 1952 to succeed the *Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance* (SIP) which had been in operation since the late 19th century. Initially responsible with providing loans, equipment, and modern farming techniques to Algerian farmers, the SAPs sought to encourage market-oriented agricultural practices and economic integration. However, they encountered considerable problems such as mismanagement, favoritism toward European settlers, and bureaucratic tendencies, which frequently hampered their ability to assist small-scale Algerian farmers. While designed to modernise agriculture, the SAPs prioritised profit above social development which demonstrates larger paradoxes in colonial economic policies. See: Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 105-111.

²⁵⁹ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 67.

²⁶⁰ For instance, only six out of the 41 estates in the Dar el Beida district in Algiers Province had elected committees, and only 40 out of the 250 estates in the Mitidja had actual elections. See in: Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 145.

²⁶¹ Approximately 90% of Algerians were illiterate in 1962. See: Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 121.

²⁶² Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 145.

which led many workers to think that the UGTA's sole aim was to get its hands on workers' membership fee.²⁶³

UGTA activists were not able to reach many of the workers because of the large distances between the farms, an issue caused by ONRA's regrouping of them. The way the farms were organized suggests that geographical considerations were overlooked when the decrees were issued. They were grouped together by the departmanal commissioner of ONRA around a management committee for each municipality. For instance, the municipality of Medea comprised of six distinct management committies - Damietta, Loverdo, Lodi, Berrouaghia, Nelsonbourg, and Ben Chicao.²⁶⁴ The grouping of vacant farms as practiced by the departmanal commissioner of ONRA seemed to obey technical reasons. Vacant farms were sometimes too small to constitute a self-managed organization because there were not enough workers to set up a committee, workers' council, and a general assembly. The equipment available to all the vacant farms in a municipality was scarce for each operation to operate independently, therefore, ONRA aimed to create this centralized organization to bring together the land, the workers, and particularly the material means of all farms. In reality, the farms were spread over a distance that could reach 15 to 20 km in a mountainous terrain, while the management committees had no means of transport for their workers, and they were unable to provide a cultivation plan for such disparate groups.²⁶⁵ In some cases, more than twenty farms were grouped under one committee, however, as some farms were far from each other, they were neglected and abandoned.²⁶⁶

These farms were to be managed by the illiterate workers to whom no one explained the complex structure of the decrees, and by inexperienced managers who understood the function of the decrees only in theory. As a consequence, it was ONRA as the state representative, that applied the centralized organization that created a technical-administrative state bureaucracy instead of autogestion as it was defined by March Decrees. The farms were thus grouped on the basis of hierarchically top-down decisions. The attitude of the state apparatus towards the workers could best be demonstrated by the description of one of the district delegates chosen by ONRA to monitor the self-managing farms:

²⁶³ Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, 219-220.

²⁶⁴ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 79.

²⁶⁵ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 81.

²⁶⁶ For the management committee of Berrouaghia in the municipality of Medea, out of 26 farms, only 4 were really grouped together, while nearly half of the farms were abandoned either because they were too small or too distant from the others. A single site manager was responsible for 4 to 7 farms, very often far from each other (even up to 15km). See: Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 81.

*Vis a vis the workers, he is spontaneously authoritarian. He does not consult assemblies, but gives orders and settles disputes. Serious and hardworking but angry against the workers whom he considers incapable of managing the farms on which it is necessary to place an administrative apparatus. In Champlain (El Omaria), he insulted the worker, threatened him with expulsion just because the worker asked a wrong question.*²⁶⁷

Agriculture faced significant challenges as a result of the administrative oversight of the provision of equipment and spare parts. SAP was criticized on all farms²⁶⁸ and it was seen by the workers as the "loan shark organization."²⁶⁹ Damaged equipment brought to SAP for repair, with exorbitant prices, could stay there for months before returning. A big number of tractors of the management committees were thus immobilized which made them recourse to the machines of the SAP with high rental prices. In addition, tractors were to be driven by the SAP tractor drivers who refused the ones working on the farms that, as a consequence, affected production.²⁷⁰ The SAP drivers worked as they please without taking into consideration the opinions of the workers' representatives and the workers were no longer able to tell if it was the president of the committee who makes decisions or the director of the SAP.²⁷¹ SAP was disbanded in late 1963, and *Centres Cooperatifs de la Réforme Agraire* (Cooperative Agrarian Reform Centers - CCRA), an affiliate of ONRA, took over their duties being additionally responsible for the provision of short-term loans.²⁷² Thus, in practice, management committees never had any substantial financial autonomy over their own funds.

3.4 Marketing and profit distribution

The state bureaucracy had an impact not only on production but also on the entire marketing system. The ONRA's subsidiary, The National Marketing Office (*Office National de Commercialisation* - ONACO) and the Regional Agricultural Cooperatives (*Coopératives Régionales Agricoles* - CORA) were established by the government to deal with the issue of product distribution by private commerce and profits channelled away from the state.

²⁶⁷ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 73-74.

²⁶⁸ Grievances against SAP were visible the most at the First Congress of Agricultural Workers in October 1963 in Algiers. One of the delegates stated: "The SAP holds all the machinery and finances. We hope that the enterprise will be given its own machinery and have money to make its own purchases. The SAP hires us tractors at exaggerated prices." See: Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 158.

²⁶⁹ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 75.

²⁷⁰ SAP drivers were always driving in the first gear, plowing only 1.5 to 2 hectares a day, while the ones working on the farms could plow 3 to 4 hectares. See: Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 76.

²⁷¹ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 75-76.

²⁷² Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management*, 71.

ONACO was established in order to handle foreign trade in agricultural products, balance consumption and production, adapt products that were poorly suited to their markets, and lower living expenses by importing and stocking food, while CORA was founded as an internal sales-only and marketing organisation.²⁷³ The state established *Magasins Pilotes Socialistes* (Pilot Socialist Stores) to protect consumers from rising prices caused by shortages of goods. Managed by ONACO alongside commercial stores such as *Monoprix* and *Galeries de France*,²⁷⁴ these stores tried to provide affordable items but faced significant shortages. Factors included diminishing domestic output, ONACO's monopoly on critical imports, and widespread speculation, in which commodities were resold at exorbitant prices. Officials decried such practices as damaging revolutionary morale and even suggested heavy sanctions.²⁷⁵ The surplus capital needed to transform the established sector and revitalise industry was to be provided by the vacant properties. However, these organisations were unable to take the place of the previous private marketing networks, so they either exported agricultural products at unprofitable prices or occasionally failed to sell them at all.²⁷⁶

Due to the resulting loss of income, the committees were forced to take loans from the government or private organizations to pay for capital expenditures, turnover expenses, and even basic wages.²⁷⁷ Workers' grievances were best observed at the First Congress of Fellahs in October 1963 in Algiers. Delegates complained about the lack of funds for running farms, loans, poorly distributed and poorly repaired equipment, and faulty marketing, demanding from the state to take responsibility for management and search for competent workers who were dynamic, dedicated, and specialized for working on self-managed assets.²⁷⁸ The delegates affirmed their support for socialism and autogestion, but they recognized the discrepancy between the principles and the reality.²⁷⁹ The March Decrees' objectives were thus lost in the administration's structure as a result of increased state bureaucracy controlling the annual plans for production, sales, raw materials, marketing and machinery as well as suppliers' and sales contracts.

²⁷³ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 72-73.

²⁷⁴ These low-cost stores signed contracts with the Algerian government to protect themselves against nationalisation. See: Haleh Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 137-138.

²⁷⁵ Bachir Boumaza went so far as to claim in front of the National Assembly that such practices should be punished by death penalty. See: Haleh Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 138.

²⁷⁶ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 85.

²⁷⁷ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 86.

²⁷⁸ Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, 65.

²⁷⁹ Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, 66.

3.5 The obstruction of the management committees by former soldiers

In addition to state administration, the workers and their representatives continued to have bitter experiences with ex-soldiers who occupied self-managed properties and used threats and violence to prevent the practice of autogestion through control over management committees where they wanted to appoint presidents of their choice. Mohammed Harbi cites many examples of the military policing farms, one of the most famous being the Ben Chicao group of farms where there were, as he stated, "gangs" consisting of the administration and the gendarmerie.²⁸⁰ On the estates taken over by ex-combatants, they appointed workers as they saw fit, and when the workers addressed such actions, representatives of the prefecture would tell them that it did not concern them, therefore, the state administration together with the former soldiers directly obstructed the democratic elections of committees.

Many forms of protest were suppressed by violence. At one of the farms that belonged to the management committee of Ben Chicao, it was the prefecture that let the gendarmerie act against the workers by beating and arresting them, since the workers were able to conclude that there were self-interested connections between the prefecture and former soldiers who were managing the farms.²⁸¹ In the region of Skikda, one of the organizers of the agricultural workers, Ahcene Bouzemiou, was killed by the *djounouds* (term used for former combatants) after he opposed the undemocratic organization of the farms.²⁸²

The March Decrees were passed at a time when the issue of settlement and employment of veterans had not yet been resolved. Many of the soldiers did not want to work as ordinary workers, but to occupy managerial positions, and the workers could not fight against such a force that was armed and strongly connected among themselves. In such conditions, armed soldiers and civilians coexisted in management committees where the latter remained without the role the March Decrees ascribed to them.

3.6 Managers and workers

Despite the decrees creating the position of director in Algeria, there were very few individuals with the necessary technical training. The director's connections with the party and state, technical knowledge, and the workers' relative inability to assert their formal rights

²⁸⁰ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 27.

²⁸¹ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 71.

²⁸² Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 26-27.

due to illiteracy, a lack of technical knowledge, or inadequate political education, all contributed to the strength of his position. However, directors were frequently less capable of making production decisions than the more experienced workers due to a lack of trained technical or managerial personnel. Few workers could read the published texts because of the extreme level of illiteracy, and there was no really effective campaign organized to explain the March Decrees. In agriculture, the director was frequently the only literate worker and was often asked to explain the decrees.²⁸³ The office of the director also included technical assistants. However, given the lack of administrative staff in the office, they did not have regular contacts with the workers. When Harbi and his research team visited the farms to examine the work of the self-managing bodies, one of the workers stated:

*You understand, since we have been working, the government has not sent us a single technician to tell us if it is good or bad.*²⁸⁴

This led to the situation where the most technically educated workers on the farms were occupied with administrative work, which demonstrates the very limited role of director and technicians on the farms.

The attitude of the management committees towards the workers' councils was in many instances authoritarian. Namely, a third of the members of the workers' councils and management committees were supposed to be directly engaged in production but the members of these bodies were rarely engaged in it and their role was reduced to be the mere site managers who controlled the workers. For example, the management committee of Damietta that consisted of 19 farms (1,283 hectares of land) and 740 workers, had 7 members, of which decisions were made by 4 of them, known among the workers as the "four friends."²⁸⁵ This instance shows a complete disobedience of the decrees. According to the decrees, the workers' council was a body that had legislative power, while the management committee represented the executive body of the workers' council. However, in Damietta, the meetings of the workers' council were reduced to the fact that almost half of the composition of the management committee gave orders to the members of the workers' council.²⁸⁶ Thus, the "four friends" managed to get the control of the money liquid by marketing the fruits without being accountable to anyone. All of this complicated farm

²⁸³ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 166.

²⁸⁴ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 77.

²⁸⁵ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 88-89.

²⁸⁶ Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 88.

operations because the self-managing bodies' responsibilities were not only unclear, but also abused. Thus, management committees turned into bodies where *wilayism*²⁸⁷ was practised due to widespread abuse of position.

3.7 Algerian Charter and the Aftermath

In April 1964, the Algerian Charter was passed at the First Congress of the FLN, which established autogestion as the center of socialist development and warned of the danger of bureaucratization and technocratic temptations, which were considered the negations of socialism. The charter said:

*It (true socialism) is not purely defined by the nationalization of the means of production. It is mainly determined by autogestion: the only real solution to the double contradiction of private property and the separation between decision-making and decision execution... Autogestion is the basic principle of this society which will reach the end of exploitation, and the understanding by each worker of the meaning of his actions because economic and political activities will become inseparable: it is the direct involvement of the producer in production, i.e. the complete opposite of wage labor which will realize the beginning of the reign of liberty.*²⁸⁸

Thus, autogestion became the basic economic and political form of the Algerian revolution. However, the authors of the Charter themselves were aware that these theoretical guidelines were still unfulfilled and that autogestion was a long-term process because there was still no general socialization of means of production and because of the existence of the private sector that hindered the development of autogestion. The state remained the main "manager" of the sector with the aim to:

*preserve the existing socialist experiences and help them to overcome the inevitable difficulties, to intervene in the private sector to speed up the process of socialization, to make good the lack of direct (workers') management where it is not yet possible, without ever losing sight of the fact that this exceptional managerial role which it has to assume is only a temporary phase in the preparation of full autogestion.*²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Wilayism is a term used for tendency of structures, units, or groups to manage their affairs in a clannish way without accountability or external control.

²⁸⁸ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 125-126.

²⁸⁹ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 126.

While acknowledging that some elements of the state must be preserved to strengthen the Revolution, the Charter warned of the constant threat of the bureaucracy, which autogestion in Algeria had already begun to manifest since independence. The Charter calls for "a radical administrative reorganization to make the commune the basis of political, economic, and social organization" to prevent this division and the ensuing establishment of a bureaucratic state.²⁹⁰ The congress temporarily united the Ben Bella group, Boumédiène and his supporters in the army, as well as the ex-willayists. Ben Bella was forced to agree that nine out of the Bureau Politique's seventeen members should be soldiers in exchange for Boumédiène's continued support. He appointed a number of ex-soldiers to the party central committee, who were opposed to the army, in order to balance the military's increasing power.²⁹¹

However, this contradictory attitude toward administration caused the development of the exact opposite practice where the focus was not on the initiative of the workers, but on profitability, standards, and discipline.²⁹² The very difficulties that came from the structure of autogestion were ignored and the isolation of workers continued. The contradictory rhetoric of the party, which agitated the fight against bureaucracy and technocracy, and the practices of the state administration, that in reality supported these technocratic tendencies, constantly created tensions in the agricultural sector, as well as in the industrial one. The management committees were placed under increasing financial control of the state, which the workers protested at the Congress of the *Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de la Terre* (Agricultural Workers' Federation) in December 1964, when they attacked the state administration and the Minister of Agriculture, Ahmed Mahsas, and demanded the proper application of March Decrees. One of the workers demanded that "the *comités de gestion* be allowed to play their role in complete freedom" and that "the ONRA officials confine themselves to their role of advisers and do not impose themselves as managers of farms."²⁹³ The conflict between ONRA and the UGTA came to the fore especially at this Congress. ONRA accused the union of not understanding anything about the country's problems and engaging in demagoguery among workers in the self-managed sector, while UGTA accused ONRA of bureaucratic deviations. Ben Bella admitted that the March Decrees were not

²⁹⁰ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 126-127.

²⁹¹ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 128.

²⁹² Chaulet, *La Mitidja autogérée*, 69.

²⁹³ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 129.

properly implemented, but at the same time he took the Minister of Agriculture, Ahmed Mahsas, an old fighter "whom no one needs to teach what to do," to his protection.²⁹⁴

Ben Bella thus found himself in a situation where he began to lose the support of the workers, which identified him with the state apparatus, and on the other hand, he became completely politically isolated. The conflicts with the army returned only a few months after the FLN Congress, and the Algerian president removed all his opponents at the National Assembly in September 1964 who later sided with Colonel Boumédiène.²⁹⁵ As to create a counterbalance to the military's growing influence, Ben Bella aimed at giving a certain level of autonomy to UGTA. By decree of August 23, 1964, UGTA's responsibilities expanded as to include training programmes and private business promotion and allowed a new executive to be elected at the second UGTA congress in March 1965, even though he had not personally approved them. The new UGTA leaders committed to implementing the Charter and March Decrees but did not promise unconditional support for Ben Bella.²⁹⁶

Ben Bella was in a position of significant power following the dismissal or death of almost all historical political figures. By the start of 1965, he had assumed the positions of president of the republic, party secretary general, prime minister, minister of the interior, finance, and information, and after Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika was ousted, he also assumed the position of foreign minister. In the face of Boumédiène and the army, the only national institution that had thus far eluded his control, this increase in power completely isolated him, which led to his downfall in 1965 after the military coup led by Boumédiène.²⁹⁷

In theory, March Decrees implied a democratic organization of work on self-managed assets, but in practice it turned out that they neglected a number of problems that needed to be solved before their publication. The state administration bodies in charge of implementing agrarian reform, organizing work and procuring means of production, as well as the self-managing bodies, were not sufficiently trained for such an undertaking, therefore, the workers on most of the farms experienced the exact opposite of what the Decrees promulgated. However, the workers and their representatives showed by their protests and attendance at congresses that they supported and understood the principles of autogestion, as well as that

²⁹⁴ Hadži-Vasileva, *Radnička participacija u Africi*, 178-179.

²⁹⁵ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 128-129.

²⁹⁶ Dr Jonathan N.C. Hill, Identity and instability in postcolonial Algeria, Footnote 31, *The Journal of North African Studies*, 11:1, Routledge, 2006, 15.

²⁹⁷ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 131.

they were able to identify obstacles, the flawed mechanisms and the presence of contradictions in the work and roles of state administration and management bodies. The workers did not have the opportunity to truly take the vacant properties into their own hands because at the time of the introduction of the Decrees there was neither the unified party, nor was the transformation of society and state administration carried out, which did not mean that the workers were against the implementation of autogestion. This is best illustrated by the fact that Houari Boumédiène, although an opponent of autogestion, after the military coup in June 1965, still maintained the system in agriculture, at least on a rhetorical level, in order to embrace the mass of agricultural workers with whom Ben Bella connected exactly through the introduction of management committees and the adoption of March Decrees. Precisely for all the above reasons, autogestion in Algeria cannot be evaluated without taking workers' perspective into the account.

As Algeria sought to lay a new foundation for its agricultural sector through autogestion, the need for external assistance became more apparent. The revolutionary spirit alone could not bridge the gap caused by a lack of modern tools and expertise. Foreign assistance, particularly in the form of technical skills and agricultural machinery, was critical to putting ideals into action. Among the countries that stepped forward, Yugoslavia stood out for providing not only equipment but also a vision based on its own experiences with self-management. This emerging partnership would soon demonstrate how shared goals could lead to practical cooperation, paving a way for both complex and hopeful exchange between the two countries.

4. *Our agriculture is in your hands*: Yugoslavia's contribution to the development of autogestion in Algeria (1962-1965)

Following Algeria's independence in 1962, bilateral contacts with Yugoslavia became interstate and quickly flourished. In preparation for Algeria's imminent sovereignty, the Yugoslav government had already developed a plan of economic and technical cooperation with Algeria by the end of May 1962.²⁹⁸ Yugoslavia saw a unique opportunity to expand its influence in the Global South, particularly by promoting its self-managed socialism. In response to Algeria's main concerns regarding its severe shortage of qualified workers, modern equipment and scientific development, economic and technical cooperation quickly

²⁹⁸ Tot, *Migration for Cooperation*, 163.

became the foundation of bilateral relations. It started through interstate agreements and was intended to show how South-South cooperation could be put into practise in an environment of close political relations.²⁹⁹

The goal of Algeria to diversify its economic partners and lessen its reliance on France, as well as to avoid dogmatic ideological influences from the Eastern Bloc, was closely related to a tight economic and technical cooperation with Yugoslavia.³⁰⁰ Immediately after the liberation, The Federal Bureau for the International Cooperation (*Zavod za međunarodnu tehničku saradnju* – ZAMTES) announced that Algeria should occupy one of the most prominent places in Yugoslav aid program.³⁰¹ Algeria served as Yugoslavia's primary partner for technical cooperation in the early years after independence, and the country was very active in this area up until 1965. The Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation was signed by the two nations on July 23, 1963, to formalise the expanding cooperation with ZAMTES. Around 500 Yugoslav professionals in the fields of public works, education, postal and telecommunications, industry, agriculture, and healthcare temporarily relocated to Algeria over the course of the following two years. At its height, Algeria had received about half of all the Yugoslav technical experts working in the Global South.³⁰²

Scientific-technical cooperation aided Yugoslavia's overall foreign policy objectives. Yugoslavia was able to project its socialist ideas through supporting the development of Algerian autogestion. However, the cooperation exposed conflicting political values and commercial goals. While both states emphasised that this was not supposed to be a solely commercial cooperation, Yugoslav enterprises, which were increasingly profit-driven due to domestic economic reforms, frequently battled with the political goals of the cooperation. Algeria also rejected solely commercial connections because it understood Yugoslav assistance, such as tractors shipments or employing high-skilled workers, as a political tool for Algerian post-independence development. Amar Ouzegane believed that, for instance, the shipment of Yugoslav tractors was not just commercial cooperation, but a symbol of the

²⁹⁹ Tot, *Migration for Cooperation*, 163.

³⁰⁰ The initial plan to obtain development assistance from the United States failed because no one was willing to compete with or intrude on the French sphere of interest. The Algerian government was encouraged to support socialism by the West's rejection. However, establishing close ties with the major socialist nations could jeopardise Algeria's ideological independence. Algeria adopted a strategy of pitting socialist nations against one another, especially the Soviet Union and China, to reduce the risk of ideological influence and encourage competition in trade and aid. See: Tot, *Migration for Cooperation*, 164.

³⁰¹ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 207.

³⁰² Tot, *Migration for Cooperation*, 165.

desire to use Yugoslav know-how in the development of Algerian self-managed agriculture.³⁰³ When the technical and economic cooperation plans with Algeria were being drawn up, one of the crucial points was precisely the control of Yugoslav enterprises so that they would not act as "private", i.e. in order not to compete and gouge the prices³⁰⁴ while Ben Bella stated that he did not want the cooperation with Yugoslavia to be on a "mercantile basis."³⁰⁵

This chapter looks at how various Yugoslav actors, ranging from ambassadors to agronomists, understood and shaped this cooperation, as well as the practical challenges that arose, such as tensions between political and economic goals. Through detailed case studies of agricultural equipment exports, technical exchanges, and vocational training programs, this chapter aims to reveal the complexities of scientific-technical cooperation and efforts to promote Yugoslav socialism in the independent Algeria.

4.1 Yugoslav perspectives on the development of autogestion in Algeria

Yugoslavia tried to build its political and economic position in Algeria on an objective and critical analysis of the Algerian reality.³⁰⁶ The first Yugoslav ambassador in independent Algeria, Nijaz Dizdarević, experienced diplomat, an orientalist, fluent Arabic speaker who had close relations with the Algerian authorities,³⁰⁷ and one of the closest confidants of Ben Bella,³⁰⁸ played a major role in informing the Yugoslavs about the problems of Algerian socialist development. Dizdarević wrote objective reports and evaluations of the unfolding of autogestion in Algeria starting with the first year of independence following the introduction of the March Decrees. Along with a thorough explanation of the decrees and even the regulations from October 1962, he provided his assessment of the Algerian circumstances in his report. Yugoslav ambassador identified the expropriation of large estates, typically the largest and most lucrative, as the most significant moment in the development of autogestion at the time because this action sparked a great deal of the initiative from the masses and directly linked them to Ben Bella.³⁰⁹ However, Dizdarević also reflected upon the most

³⁰³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 29, s. 439903, 1-2.

³⁰⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 8, s. 41005, 2.

³⁰⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 25, s. 432908, 2.

³⁰⁶ Dimić, Ljubodrag, Jugoslavija i Alžir 1961-1965 in: *Zbornik radova sa naučne konferencije u Alžiru 2013, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2013*, 61.

³⁰⁷ Radonjic, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 118.

³⁰⁸ Byrne, *Mecca of the Revolution*, 166.

³⁰⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 14, s. 414564, 4.

severe issues that characterised the situation at that time. "The introduction of self-management took place at a time when there was no party or political unity within the Politburo, as well as the government itself", the Yugoslav ambassador notes, citing conflicts between the opponents of autogestion, Mohammed Khider, the general secretary of the Politburo, and Ben Bella.³¹⁰ He also discussed the issue of the strengthening of the bourgeoisie, claiming that it was essential to the understanding of the internal politics in Algeria. He attributed the sudden enrichment of the bourgeoisie, that included some members of the FLN, following independence to the purchase of colonial land, noting that Ben Bella "frequently" had to expropriate the "profiteers" on the spot, supported by the UGTA in his actions in bringing the March Decrees to life.³¹¹

Dizdarević also provided his evaluations of the FLN Congress in April 1964 and the subsequent state of affairs in Algeria, stating that Ben Bella was successful in consolidating his power because, prior to that, he was able to put together two congresses of workers in the self-management.³¹² He believed that the scientific Marxist conception expressed as a way of solving the issues of Algeria's socialist development had been successful, but he understood the documents and resolutions as more of an idea than something that could successfully be applied in practice,³¹³ that ideological and political clarity seemed like an "unadapted booklet" that "did not even correspond to the level of consciousness of FLN functionaries."³¹⁴ Thus, Dizdarević saw as potential problems the "absolutization"³¹⁵ of autogestion and the announcement of its generalization in agriculture before favorable conditions for its development would be created, seeing as urgent actions the reform of the state administration,³¹⁶ being clearly aware of the contradictions that appeared at the Congress.

Being very conscious of how over time the self-managed sector stagnated due to the inability of the government and the Politburo to create economic instruments for its further development, the still economically superior private sector in industry, as well as the activities of the state administration that obstructed the development of autogestion in agriculture, leaving it without personnel and without relying on its own machinery, Dizdarević concluded in March 1965 that the self-managed sector did not produce the desired

³¹⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 14, s. 414564, 4-5.

³¹¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 14, s. 414564, 5-6.

³¹² AJ-143-550, Osvrt na kongres FLN, Nijaz Dizdarević, 26.april 1964, 5.

³¹³ AJ-143-550, Osvrt na kongres FLN, 6.

³¹⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 2, d. 2, s. 410553, 4.

³¹⁵ AJ-143-550, Osvrt na kongres FLN, 6.

³¹⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 2, d. 2, s. 410553, 4.

results, but that it remained "vital".³¹⁷ Consequently, it seemed that Dizdarević also began to lose his firm belief in the consolidated power of Ben Bella, citing the still existing factions. Just three months before Boumédiène's coup, he warned that army was the only force that could break Ben Bella's leadership.³¹⁸

His assessments were crucial both for informing the Yugoslav authorities about the situation in Algeria and for the development and critic of bilateral cooperation, which will be discussed in more detail in further sections of this chapter. However, the observations of other Yugoslav officials who had the opportunity to visit some of the self-managed properties during their stays to Algeria served also as a diplomatic advantage utilized for the further influence-building.³¹⁹ In his memoirs, the leader of the CTUY, Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, described the condition of the self-managed estates he saw during his visit to the UGTA Congress in January 1963 as follows:

*I visited several agricultural estates that were once respectable and well-organized estates. They looked quite neglected, not because the workers would not be able to organize production — they were hired workers on the same estates — but because of the changed position of estates in the economy. Previously, estates were independent in their economic activities, but now state authorities dispose of tractors, decide on sowing, etc. The workers still remained in a kind of rental relationship: they received a salary from the state and did not worry about production. Earlier, the production was done by the colonists, whose existence depended on it, and now that work is done by the state authorities, whose existence is ensured. It goes without saying that the results had to be weak! The condition of the agricultural estates reminded me a lot of the time when we carried out collectivization. Therefore, at the meeting with the political activists of Algeria, I explained in detail the entire path we have traveled — from peasant labor cooperatives to modern agricultural estates that achieve yields equal to those of developed countries in Europe. My presentation was well received by the participants of the meeting, especially Ben Bella, who was also present.*³²⁰

At the invitation of Ben Bella, who pointed out that he wanted to make use of the Yugoslav socialism in agriculture,³²¹ Tempo visited these estates and he noticed the already mentioned

³¹⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 2, d. 2, s. 410553, 5-6.

³¹⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 2, d. 2, s. 410553, 8.

³¹⁹ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, 187.

³²⁰ Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče 2*, Komunist, Beograd, 1971, 449.

³²¹ Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče 2*, 448.

problem of the superstructure of the state administration and its contribution to the inefficiency and lack of incentives for the peasants, which he was somewhat familiar with due to the state of agriculture in Yugoslavia immediately after the war and the period of collectivization characterized by strong state control and numerous conflicts on the countryside among peasantry and with party-state officials.³²² Nevertheless, although he was aware of the dangers and consequences of state control over self-managed estates, Tempo, just like Dizdarević, relied in his assessments on the ambitions of Ben Bella, who assured him on several occasions of his determination to build socialism, in which he would use the Yugoslav experience with self-management according to Algerian conditions, particularly in agriculture.³²³ Accordingly, as stated both in the memoirs and in the embassy's report on the visit, Tempo got the impression that Ben Bella understood the "essence of the revolutionary development" of Algeria.³²⁴

Similarly to Ilija Topaloski who thought the Yugoslavs could offer the best answer to the problem of African countries as mentioned in Chapter 2, Tempo viewed the Yugoslav model as superior by portraying it as a potential answer to the issues confronting Algeria's autogestion. By juxtaposing Yugoslav agriculture with that of other European countries, he paints Yugoslavia as a distinct and prosperous, that is, as a country that managed to modernize its agriculture by creating its own developmental model. In this narrative, Algeria is still in its early stages of development, with Yugoslavia serving as a guide which is a reflection of Yugoslav "exceptionalism." Tempo considers himself a reliable advisor and mentor since he himself played a significant role in Yugoslav economic planning before

³²² Yugoslavia's agricultural sector experienced severe obstacles following the war that included widespread devastation of the land, cattle, and machinery. Between 1946 and 1952, the Yugoslav government attempted collectivisation to stabilise the agricultural sector by incorporating both poor and wealthy landowners into state-run and collective cooperatives modelled after the Soviet system. Both peasants from partisan ranks and those outside of them fought collectivization. They shared sentiments of scepticism toward state actions by expressing dissatisfaction through violence, intimidation, and sabotage. Corruption, insufficient resources, and mismanagement all harmed the system. Yugoslav peasants resisted the shift to collectivization because the system echoed old patterns of paternalism and top-down control that contributed to widespread disengagement and eventual abandonment of the collectivization policy after 1952. For more information on the issues of collectivization in Yugoslavia see: Bokovoy, Mellisa Katherine, *A separate road to collectivization: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia's agrarian policy, 1941–1949*, (PhD Thesis), Indiana University, 1991; Bokovoy, Mellisa Katherine, *Collectivization in Yugoslavia: Rethinking Regional and National Interests*, in: *The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe*, Central European University, 2014; Juriša, Stanko, *Agrarna politika i problemi kolektivizacije u Jugoslaviji u vrijeme sukoba KPJ sa Informbiroom*, ČSP, 15(1), Zagreb 193, pp. 55-73.; Tomasevich, Jozo, *Collectivization of Agriculture in Yugoslavia*, in: *Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe*, Kentucky University Press, 2014.

³²³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 32, s. 43039; Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče* 2, 447.

³²⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 32, s. 43039; Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče*, 448.

becoming the leader of the CTUY.³²⁵ He exemplifies Yugoslavia as a role model for Algeria because it also made mistakes at the beginning, but managed to overcome them to create a modern and efficient agricultural sector.

Nevertheless, his position was balanced and cautious since he explicitly warned Ben Bella about copying Yugoslav model:

*However, you should beware of copying. What suits our conditions does not have to suit yours...You can use our experiences, but you must adapt them to your conditions, the development of the material base, the awareness and mentality of the people.*³²⁶

While Tempo positioned Yugoslav model as a significant example, he emphasised that it should not be adopted blindly which was also his position when talking to UGTA leaders in 1959. His message to Ben Bella was that Yugoslavia was not there as a blueprint, but as a lesson and a proof that it was possible to overcome the encountered challenges and create a functional and modern agricultural sector. Tempo shows his understanding of the significance of local setting, such as economic state of affairs or cultural practices. Thus, he believed that Algerians needed to forge their own way by using Yugoslav mechanisms in line with its own particular postcolonial reality.

The Yugoslav parliamentary delegation that visited Algeria in February/March 1964 gave quite ambivalent perspective of agricultural estates. Unlike Tempo, this delegation witnessed the well-cultivated land, the organized supply of agricultural and food products to the cities, as well as the normal functioning of the central and local administration.³²⁷ The delegates believed that autogestion in agriculture had been asserted and that workers' councils had become not only an important factor of production but also a significant political force on which the management relied, but on the other, the delegation soberly concluded that self-managing bodies were in trouble because they were in conflict with "rigid" centralism, bureaucratism and "material ownership."³²⁸ The organization of government, especially at the local level, as the report states, inherited a "colonial structure" and therefore lagged behind

³²⁵ Before becoming a CTUY leader, Tempo was Minister of Mining Industry, Chairman of the Council for Energy and Extractive Industries of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and Chairman of the Council for Industry of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Since 1953, he had been the Chairman of the Economic Council and Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council (*Savezno izvršno veće - SIV*).

³²⁶ Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče* 2, 448.

³²⁷ AJ-143-550, Poseta delegacije Savezne skupštine Alžiru, Tunisu i Libiji, 6.

³²⁸ AJ-143-550, Poseta delegacije Savezne skupštine, 9.

with the principles of autogestion, concluding at the end that they could not actually analyze in more detail the problems during its visit.³²⁹ On the other hand, as it was the case in the previous instances, they believed that Ben Bella "really" wanted to suppress those bureaucratic and administrative elements for the proper development of autogestion.³³⁰

4.1.1. Provincializing Yugoslav self-management – Veljko Vlahović's observations of Algerian autogestion

In March 1965, in comparison to Tempo's account and general approach of the Yugoslav functionaries to the cooperation with Algeria, a very different perspective of Algerian autogestion was given by one of the senior LCY officials, Veljko Vlahović, during his presentation on the situation in Algeria at the meeting of the Commission for International Relations of LCY after his return from Algeria, where he stayed as a guest of the FLN from 23rd of February until the 4th of March 1965. What Vlahović reflected on, in contrast to Tempo or Dizdarević, were the Algerian workers, considering them "disciplined" "technically literate" with "developed work habits."³³¹ Unlike Dizdarević, Vlahović stated that there was an understanding that "self-management existed without professional personnel" because "illiterate" people took over the estates and organized the sector well despite the problems with the administration, underlining great work enthusiasm that contributed to it.³³² Moreover, unlike Tempo, Vlahović distanced himself from the Yugoslav "exceptionalism" by stating that Algeria had a huge advantage in comparison to all socialist countries - including Yugoslavia - because it inherited modern agriculture and enormous natural potential, thus building "the most modern agriculture in the world" which was in opposition to Tempo's view that positioned the development of Yugoslav agriculture as the suitable one for the Algerian self-managed sector.³³³ Vlahović further stated that Yugoslavia and Algeria could and should not be compared because the logic of the emergence of Algerian autogestion was "quite indigenous" given the spontaneous occupation of the land by the peasants and since the state-building and autogestion were being created simultaneously which was not the case in Yugoslavia.³³⁴ Thus, while Tempo projected the Yugoslav model onto the Algerian

³²⁹ AJ-143-550, Poseta delegacije Savezne skupštine, 8-9.

³³⁰ AJ-143-550, Poseta delegacije Savezne skupštine, 9.

³³¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 13.

³³² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 15.

³³³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 3.

³³⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 12.

development by comparing it to the collectivization period, Vlahović emphasized the "exceptionalism" of the Algerian *tasyir al-dhaati*.

Vlahović did refer to the same problems that the other mentioned Yugoslav functionaries identified, however, he was the only one who did not see the Algerian president as a bastion of autogestion, but rather the great capacities of Algerian workers who, for him, also represented the successful transmitters of the values of self-managed socialism. Considering his activities in Yugoslav politics and society, this bottom-up viewpoint is not unusual as he was one of the LCY's officials known as the politician who stressed the agency of the broader society in political life of the country. In 1965, Vlahović was a member of the Executive Council and president of the Commission for International Relations of the SAWPY, the largest sociopolitical organization in Yugoslavia sponsored by the LCY with the political goal of involving as many individuals and socio-political organizations possible in party activities, having a key role in the development of direct democracy and the inclusion of citizens in the political life of the country.³³⁵ Furthermore, during the Student Demonstrations of 1968 in Belgrade against social stratification, increasing unemployment, and hindering of democracy and self-management, Vlahović was the leading representative of the LCY sent to negotiate with students because of his positive reputation among them, given that he himself was the leader of the Student Movement during the 1930s at the University of Belgrade.³³⁶ On that occasion, Vlahović justified the deep dissatisfaction of the students and regarded their

³³⁵ Although LCY officials could not simultaneously hold an office at SAWPY, the organization's upper echelons were dominated by high-ranking party officials. By 1959, the organisation had 6.3 million individual members and 111 organisations such as CTUY or League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia. This umbrella organisation served as a mass public forum of socialist discussions and thinking, a political basis for all self-managing bodies who were to be, through public discussion and critique, under control of the people. On the international stage, it was the driving force behind Yugoslav internationalism. SAWPY received 53 world delegations in 1965 alone, with 30 of them being led by people such as Veljko Vlahović. See: Spehnjak Katarina, Narodni Front Jugoslavije (SSRNJ – razvoj, programsko-teorijske osnove i procesi u društvenoj praksi, *Povijesni prilozi* 3(1), Zagreb, 1984, 37-38. Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 52.; Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 190-192.

³³⁶ In the mid-1930s, progressive students at the University of Belgrade were the initiators and organizers of numerous political actions in the city and at the University. Vlahović was already one of the prominent organizers and leaders of the struggle of Belgrade students for the autonomy of the University, freedom of science and culture, against nationalist associations and police brutality, for democratic freedoms and social progress of the country. He was a member from its foundation, and in 1935, until July 1936, the president of the Action Committee of professional student associations at the University of Belgrade, and one of the most prominent organizers and leaders of the major student strikes (February 1935 and April 4, 1936) in Belgrade. When Vlahović arrived for negotiations with students in June 1968, he was greeted with shouts "Veljko, lead us, Tito would have led us!" See: *Heroji jugoslavenske narodnooslobodilačke borbe 1941-1945*, Društvo "Slobodna Jugoslavija", 2011, 502.; Popov, Nebojša, *Društveni sukobi/izazov sociologiji*, Centar FDP, Beograd, 1973, 17.

demands as a request for further strengthening of self-management in Yugoslavia.³³⁷ He was also willing to cooperate with Yugoslav socialist-humanist intellectuals from the *Praxis* school who criticized the insufficient implementation of self-management that led to the strengthening of bureaucratic tendencies and whose ideas inspired the Student Movement of 1968.³³⁸ For example, at the conference "Marx and the Present" (*Marks i savremenost*), held in June 1964, in Novi Sad, a city in northern Serbian province of Vojvodina, Vlahović presented the paper which was criticized by one of the most prominent Praxis members, Gajo Petrović, who applauded Vlahović's willingness to engage in a discussion with philosophers.³³⁹

In accordance with his support for the wider inclusion of all members of society in improving self-management, Vlahović described the Algerian model as initially "vague" conception that gradually became "woven" into a system that needed to be further built, considering that it was time for Yugoslavia to engage in more serious research because Algerian experiences could be interesting for the further development of the Yugoslav model, giving a sharp and direct criticism of the Yugoslav "exceptionalism" employed in the assessment of Algerian autogestion:

*I think we need to get rid of the conception that we are the only one who carry the flag, while we do not take into account that life, practice and the people who work there are struggling with a certain reality and they also have something new to offer that would be interesting for our society... There is no mechanical comparison as it shouldn't be. One has to identify with their reality to be able to explain the whole range of problems.*³⁴⁰

Vlahović believed that the comparisons were inappropriate not because he positioned the Yugoslav model as the most evolutionary and unattainable, but because the Algerian self-

³³⁷ Vlahović stated that Yugoslav students were in favor of socialism and that if they were not trusted in this regard, then "there was no confidence in the future." Popov, *Društveni sukobi*, 19.

³³⁸ For more information on the foundation and activities of Praxis school see: *Praxis: Društvena kritika i humanistički socijalizam, Zbornik radova sa međunarodne konferencije o jugoslavenskoj ljevici: Praxis-filozofija i korčulanska letnja škola (1963-1974)*, ed. Dragomir Olujić Oluja i Krunoslav Stojaković, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Beograd, 2012; Blagojević, Una, *Worlds of Praxis: 1968, intellectuals, and an island in the Yugoslav Adriatic* in: *Unsettled 1968 in the Troubled Present: Revisiting the 50 Years of Discussions from East and Central Europe*, edited by Aleksandra Konarzewska, Anna Nakai and Michał Przeperski, Routledge: London, New York, 2019; Blagojević, Una, *The International Philosophical Problem of Self-Managing Socialism: The Case of Praxis*, *Acta Histriae* Vol. 27, No.1, 2019, pp. 89–106.; Petrović, Gajo, *Revolutionäre Praxis: Jugoslawischer Marxismus der Gegenwart*, Verlag Rombach, Freiburg, 1969.

³³⁹ Jakovljević, Branislav, *Alienation Effects: Performance and Self-Management in Yugoslavia, 1945–1991*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016, 118.

³⁴⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 13;15.

management had its own specific characteristics that not only contributed to the positive results of Algerian agriculture, but also potentially offered innovations for further development of Yugoslav self-managed socialism. Furthermore, Vlahović proposed not only to send technical assistance to Algeria, but also to receive it, citing examples such as vineyard³⁴¹ and vegetable processing as the possible fields of assistance from Algeria to Yugoslavia.³⁴²

Yugoslav officials attempted to construct objective reports on the evolution of Algerian autogestion, reflecting on all its essential segments but from different perspectives. However, those balanced views of Algerian general processes were not applied when evaluating the role of Ben Bella, who, both because of his close and friendly ties with the Yugoslav communists, and because of his determination to develop autogestion, was often "absolutized." On the other hand, Vlahović's testimony from below gave agency to the Algerian workers, seeing them as capable of overcoming the problems they faced and as bearers of self-management important for the further development of Yugoslav socialism. These, somewhat similar and somewhat different views of Algerian autogestion, made a crucial impact in the development of Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation, which became more multifaceted in accordance with the new reality of independent Algeria, that will be the subject of the following sections.

4.2 Algeria is building Maghreb with Yugoslav tractors: The role of Yugoslav agricultural machinery in Algerian autogestion

Considering the Yugoslavs as their "most sincere friends"³⁴³, the Algerian government sent a series of aid requests, particularly regarding the lack of equipment and technical personnel. Ahmed Ben Bella, in a conversation with Dizdarević, insisted on the urgent shipment of tractors because they were vital for Algerian agrarian reform, which was then the main point of the government's economic and political program.³⁴⁴ Yugoslavia responded to this request

³⁴¹ The Yugoslav Embassy in Algiers was of a similar opinion, having proposed to the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in Belgrade to request Algerian scholarships for the study of vinification and general wine production in Algeria, as well as scholarships for scientific associates of the Institute for the Study of the Labor Movement to study Algerian autogestion. Yugoslavia also proposed the import of Algerian wine, albeit in smaller quantities, given that Yugoslavia itself was a producer and exporter of wine. See: AJ-559-56, Primedbe na projekt programa kulturne saradnje sa Alžir, Savetnik za štampu jugoslovenske ambasade u Alžiru Miljan Komatina, 24.jun 1964, Alžir; AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o završnim jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima, Brioni, 12. mart 1964.godine, 83.

³⁴² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 22.

³⁴³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 25, s. 432908

³⁴⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 25, s. 432908

by selling 500 *Zadrugar 50/1 Landini* model of tractors³⁴⁵ along with 35 maintenance workers to help with the sewing process, highly regarded in the eyes of the Algerians for their hard work on the vacant farms.³⁴⁶ Together with tractors, ten mobile workshops and 80 camper vans were to be sent.³⁴⁷

Although President Ben Bella and Algerian Minister of Agriculture Amar Ouzegane insisted that the required equipment should be shipped as quickly as possible, there were issues with the delivery itself. The Yugoslav enterprises in charge of shipping the machinery exhibited inconsistent adherence to the contracts both because of price manipulation and local difficulties. As an illustration, the Yugoslav company *Tehnopromet* deliberately delayed the delivery of the mobile workshops because they wanted the Yugoslav embassy in Algiers to mediate so the enterprise could sell the workshops at a new, higher price.³⁴⁸ The embassy rejected the request, believing *Tehnopromet* was required to send the workshops at the price that was previously anticipated.³⁴⁹ In other instances, export enterprises claimed that the reasons for the late deliveries were the storm and the overcrowding of the port of Rijeka in Croatia, which made it difficult to load the goods, as well as additional repairs of the products.³⁵⁰

The Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia demanded that ZAMTES should immediately resolve all disputed issues directly with the enterprises and take care of timely deliveries.³⁵¹ Dizdarević was tirelessly criticizing the enterprises for their trade performance characterized by incorrect prices and late deliveries. For instance, the embassy criticized them because France offered equipment at a much lower price.³⁵² Bearing in mind that the Algerian government relied on Yugoslav equipment and personnel to diversify the economy and reduce economic dependence on France, unaffordable prices could possibly threaten one of the main goals of the cooperation. Dizdarević very often tried to explain the Algerian problems on the field for the enterprises to understand the importance of regular and prompt

³⁴⁵ Tractors called *Zadrugar 50/1* were produced by Industrija Motora Rakovica (IMR) with license from the Italian firm *Landini*. In total, IMR produced 8000 of those models of tractors between 1959 and 1968. See: Tot, *Migration for Cooperation*, 165.

³⁴⁶ Tot, *Migration for Cooperation*, 165.

³⁴⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f.3, d. 27, s. 435563

³⁴⁸ Dizdarević notes that the original price was \$350 per piece but does not mention the amount of the increased price. See: DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f.3, d. 27, s. 436044

³⁴⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f.3, d. 27, s. 436044

³⁵⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 29, s. 439257

³⁵¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f.3. d. 26, s. 433345

³⁵² According to the embassy report, France offered up to \$200 less purchase price for tractors. See: DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f.3, d. 28, s. 412435

delivery. The embassy warned that the delay of tractors could give the impression that the goal was only to sell tractors, which could adversely affect the cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture.³⁵³

Despite Dizdarević's warnings, tractor shipments continued to be delayed to the point where the ambassador stated that the Algerians "got used to it" and that they "reconciled" with late deliveries.³⁵⁴ However, from the conversations between Yugoslav and Algerian officials, it seems that Yugoslav tractors and tractor drivers left a strong positive impression and a solid basis for further cooperation. In March 1964, during his visit to Yugoslavia, Ben Bella said to Josip Broz Tito:

*Let me say again that Yugoslavia helped us a lot in our efforts to reduce the blackmailing of the French. I would only give an example with tractors. The French were supposed to give us tractors, but they did not want to make them available even to the French companies in Algeria. That's why the 500 Yugoslav tractors we received meant a lot to us, because they helped us stand up to French blackmail.*³⁵⁵

In addition to the fact that the delivery of Yugoslav tractors proved to be significant in reducing the economic pressure from France, which was one of the main goals of the technical assistance, it seems they were equally important for expanding political influence in the Maghreb region. This was illustrated by the visit of Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo to Algeria to attend the UGTA congress in January 1963. In the conversation with the president of CTUY, Ben Bella stated that "Algeria is building Maghreb with Yugoslav tractors",³⁵⁶ thus positioning Algeria as the main influence-builder in the region by utilizing Yugoslav machinery. This setting of Algerian autogestion in the wider Maghreb region by Ben Bella and his ability to thereby further secure Yugoslav assistance is particularly visible in the conversation he had with Josip Broz Tito during the same visit on the issue of the relations between Algeria and Morocco after the Sand War (1963-1964),³⁵⁷ when Ben Bella stated:

³⁵³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 29, s. 439903, 4.

³⁵⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 29, s. 48408, 2.

³⁵⁵ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o završnim jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima, in *Dokumenta o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije*, 64.

³⁵⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 32, s. 41753, 1-2.

³⁵⁷ The Sand War was a border conflict between Morocco and Algeria that lasted from September 25 to October 30, 1963, though an official peace treaty was signed on February 20, 1964. The conflict arose because of France's decision to integrate the provinces of Tindouf and Bechar into Algeria in the early 1950s after discovering large oil and mineral deposits in the region. Morocco supported its neighbour during the Algerian War of Independence, but afterward, Moroccan King Hasan II wanted to resolve the border issues, claiming

*We decided to reestablish our relationship. We will fix them as much as possible, although we do not like the regime in Morocco. It is unacceptable to us, but we know that the best way to fight against such a regime is to create conditions that will enable a positive process. Our experience shows that autogestion is the best weapon against Hasan II. Therefore, our successes will encourage the inner forces and enable their action. It would be wrong to export the revolution or spread it by force of arms.*³⁵⁸

Ben Bella established autogestion as a primary driving force within Algeria, whereby its success would serve to promote the policy of peaceful coexistence with its non-aligned neighbour Morocco. Thus, Ben Bella not only glorified Yugoslav tractors as a symbol of building a self-managed Algeria, but he also placed its achievements on the domestic field in a direct connection with the principles of non-alignment by replacing the "force of arms" with further strengthening of autogestion in whose development Yugoslav equipment and high-skilled workers were a necessity. Tito's answer confirms Ben Bella's mastery in ensuring further Yugoslav support and help in implementing autogestion:

*I like the attitude of our friends from Algeria who do not think of exporting their revolution to neighbouring countries...It is understood that the people who carried out the revolution should be given all possible support from the outside to stand firmly on their feet, to strengthen, to implement workers' self-management and other measures. When it does, the internal practice will work best on the neighbours. It will dig like a mole in neighbouring countries and lead to changes. Because the mole goes below the border.*³⁵⁹

Morocco's right to the territories of Tindouf and Bechar, but Ben Bella wanted to deal with the issue later due to the alarming situation in Algeria following the exodus of French settlers. The conflict began when Moroccan troops occupied the border towns of Hassi Beida and Tinjoud. The Arab League, UN, Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie, Mali's President Modibo Keita, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) mediated the suspension of Moroccan and Algerian assaults. The OAU-mediated peace agreement of February 1964 reaffirmed Algeria's previously established borders. Meanwhile, the OAU's first multinational peacekeeping force oversaw the demilitarised zone. The conflict resulted in long-term tensions between the two neighbouring countries, exacerbated by differences in political regimes, as Morocco was a monarchy, and Algeria was a revolutionary socialist republic. Morocco signed the Ifrane Accord in 1972, abandoning all claims to Algerian territory, but refused to ratify it until 1989. This tension also contributed to Algerian support for Western Sahara's independence from Morocco. For more information on Sand War see: James, Alan, The Dispute Between Algeria and Morocco (1963-1964) in: *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, Studies in International Security (SIS), Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 97-98.; Wild, Berko, Patricia, The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict: A Study of New Machinery for Peacekeeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African States, *International Organization* Volume 20, Issue 1, Winter 1966, pp. 18-36.

³⁵⁸ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 58.

³⁵⁹ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 62-63.

Due to such ambitions of the Algerian and Yugoslav heads of state, it was vital to consider and correct the strategy of the Yugoslav enterprises, because the prestige of Yugoslavia in the non-aligned world depended on their performance. However, as the next section on the delivery of livestock demonstrates, the performance of the Yugoslav enterprises was continuously dissonant to the point of prompting first open critical reactions from the Algerian side.

4.3 The profit-driven strategy of Yugoslav export-enterprises in delivering livestock

The shipment of much-needed livestock exhibited a lack of understanding of the conditions under which Algeria was attempting to establish trade relations. On behalf of the Minister Ouzegane, the head of the Cabinet of the Minister of Agriculture requested the immediate delivery of 400 oxen, 400 mules for plowing in the mountainous areas, as well as 20 to 30 young cows for the experimentation in Algerian climatic conditions.³⁶⁰ Additionally, the Algerian side intended to create a cattle and poultry breeding centers with Yugoslav help.³⁶¹ The letter of credit for livestock was opened in November 1962, when the cattle was supposed to be taken over in the middle of the month.³⁶² However, the Yugoslav export enterprise *Interexport* immediately asked for changes in the contract and an extension of the letter of credit due to the delay in the arrival of the contractors and the late opening of the letter of credit by the Algerian buyer, therefore, the cattle was delivered only in January of the following year.³⁶³ The importance that the Algerian government attached to this action was also illustrated by the fact that Ben Bella mentioned this issue in the parliamentary debate, stressing that it was unfortunately not successful so far.³⁶⁴ For the Algerian state administration, more precisely ONACO, which oversaw foreign trade, this was a very challenging action because it was their first letter of credit, which, as Dizdarević states, followed a lot of Yugoslav efforts, such as explaining the meaning and functioning of the payment agreement, but also Algerian hardships and the desire to resume normal trade.³⁶⁵

In other instances, enterprises attempted to mutually compete as it was the case in the trade of farm animals which both countries aimed to expand. Hence, there were new offers for the

³⁶⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 26, s. 433345

³⁶¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 26, s. 433345

³⁶² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 31, s. 441987

³⁶³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 31, s. 441987

³⁶⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 31, s. 441987

³⁶⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 31, s. 441987

purchase of sheep through the already mentioned partner *Interexport*, through which ONACO bought 50,000 sheep.³⁶⁶ Nevertheless, an offer from the Yugoslav enterprise *Agroexport* also emerged, having offered 100,000 sheep, but through the intermediary of a French enterprise.³⁶⁷ Thus, as in the case of tractors, the offer could severely threaten the cooperation since Algerians did not want the mediation of the French company, but rather direct cooperation with Yugoslav enterprises. It was, therefore, insisted that both enterprises act together in direct cooperation with the national organization ONACO, after which it was agreed that Algeria would buy 350,000 sheep from Yugoslavia without the mediation of the French enterprise.³⁶⁸

Nevertheless, the way in which the shipment was conducted completely neglected the contract and caused irreparable damage which caused the Algerian authorities to openly criticize the cooperation with Yugoslavia. Namely, the Algerian Ministry of Economy criticized *Interexport* because they forcibly delivered sheep more than the time-determined quantities, thus not complying with the contract.³⁶⁹ With the forced boost of export, the local Algerian conditions were completely ignored because the surplus of sheep sent was beyond the capacity of the slaughterhouses and the needs of the market and, was, therefore, placed in depots where two thousand sheep died due to inadequate and poor transport conditions organized by the enterprise.³⁷⁰

Dizdarević, therefore, issued an explicit criticism of the strategy of Yugoslav companies in his telegram to the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs in November 1963:

Our livestock exporters forgot the conditions and our moral obligations under which we got this job directly, and not through Paris, and from the beginning they approached the job purely commercially. The Algerian objections (are) essentially justified. Due to the weather conditions and purchases, our companies tried to deliver the goods as soon as possible, disregarding the demands and needs of the Algerian customer. They also neglected their own interests, because in order to save on transport costs, they chartered and reloaded old Greek ships, but because of this they had greater losses due to a large number of deaths (of sheep) under such unfavourable transport conditions (...) It is our opinion, however, that the local

³⁶⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 5, s. 428433

³⁶⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 5, s. 427108

³⁶⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 5, s. 428433

³⁶⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 6, s. 437675, 1.

³⁷⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 6, s. 437675, 1.

*Interexport did not properly approach the job or consider its importance and character, but treated it exclusively from the point of view of its commission. That is why they did not keep us realistically informed during the implementation of the job.*³⁷¹

Dizdarević's criticism demonstrates how export-oriented logic fostered by the economic reform in Yugoslavia was out of control by the authorities regarding the cooperation with the non-aligned countries. Such a strategy not only provoked an open Algerian reaction but also called into question the ability of the enterprises to manage exports. Dizdarević went further by suggesting that this type of action should be "criminally prosecuted"³⁷² because this kind of loss of goods was against the basic principles of Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation in which commercial importance should have come secondary. As he concluded in the telegram:

*The embassy believes that the realization of this business, due to the overly prominent business and commercial effect, and the neglected political aspect, compromised the principles in the eyes of the Algerians for the first time of our cooperation so far, which Algerians pointed out as an example of correctness and great trust.*³⁷³

It was precisely this open criticism by the Algerians that led Dizdarević make such a conclusion because the loss of prestige in Algeria could put an end to further political influence-building in African countries, since it was exactly the Yugoslav-Algerian relations that were supposed to serve as an example of South-South cooperation in which actions would be taken in accordance with the local conditions of countries that were the recipients of Yugoslav products.

Although the sources do not shed light on the reaction of the Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade to this specific case, the conversation on the topic of economic and scientific-economic cooperation between Tito and Ben Bella in March 1964 indicates Tito's concern with the strategy of the export enterprises as well as the willingness to take responsibility for the problems caused. Tito's statement to the Algerian president demonstrates that the disharmony between political and economic relations was caused by export-oriented reforms, which resulted in an inadequate strategy of Yugoslav enterprises:

As far as our cooperation in the economic field is concerned, I would like to point out the possibility that sometimes there may be misunderstandings. This is especially possible since

³⁷¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 6, s. 437675, 1.

³⁷² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 6, s. 437675, 2.

³⁷³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 6, s. 437675, 1-2.

*our export companies are free and that sometimes the development of political relations does not go parallel, or at the same level, with the development of economic relations. In some cases, we had to create ad hoc commissions to prevent abuses. I am warning about this possibility because we would use political means to liquidate misunderstandings in the field of economic cooperation if they arise.*³⁷⁴

The way these ad hoc commissions functioned and who participated in them remain unknown, however, they were not seen as a permanent solution and the Yugoslav side offered to establish a joint Yugoslav-Algerian committee that would deal with all the problems that would possibly arise.³⁷⁵ Ben Bella was in favor of the establishment of such a body and showed a high level of tolerance and trust in Yugoslavia despite the problems caused by Yugoslav enterprises as shown by his response to Tito's statement:

*There will be no problems there because we understand (the issue) perfectly. We have the least problems with our Yugoslav friends. I think it is an excellent idea, proposed by our friend, to form a joint body. The President of Yugoslavia, I and our friends cannot deal directly with those problems all the time.*³⁷⁶

Nevertheless, the shared experience of self-management was not visible as a key principle of trade relations in the performance of the enterprises, which is a consequence of, as Vlahović criticized, Yugoslav "conceit" and the notion of its model as unattainable. This bottom-up agent within the LCY was the only one among them who based his criticism of economic cooperation precisely on this lack of awareness that this was a cooperation between two self-managed countries:

*It seems to me that it is necessary for our economic cooperation to leave classic capitalist forms and somewhat dogmatic, rigid forms of cooperation in relation to such a friendly country as Algeria...Our mistake is that we follow the colonial principle. Both countries have self-management, and we enter the market as if it does not exist.*³⁷⁷

For instance, Dizdarević's criticisms were based on his close contacts with the Algerian political elite, while Vlahović took a much radical position in which he wanted the Algerian autogestion to be understood as an important basis for economic cooperation that would be

³⁷⁴ AJ- 837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o završnim jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima, 86.

³⁷⁵ AJ- 837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o završnim jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima, 83.

³⁷⁶ AJ- 837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o završnim jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima, 86.

³⁷⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 28.

further developed. Regarding the above-mentioned joint Yugoslav-Algerian committee, he even went further by proposing the concept of joint *self-managed* economic organizations that would jointly oversee further cooperation in the future:

*It would be an apparent sacrifice. We should give up profit in Algeria...There should be a socialist practice, the creation of a form of joint development where, for example, the Algerian worker will receive a dinar more than another capitalist pays him.*³⁷⁸

Nevertheless, the trade with Algeria tended more towards profit, than towards, as both Dizdarević and Vlahović pushed for it, sacrifice and tolerance, even with the establishment of joint committees. Dizdarević's report on trade cooperation from July 1965 confirms Vlahović's critique and stagnation of any improvements in trade relations:

*The work of our enterprises is accompanied by the same difficulties and problems, which have characterized it since the very beginning, perhaps somewhat more emphasized during the introduction of the economic system. Despite our indications and requests for numerous interventions, nothing has changed in the way our enterprises operate, nor in the sense of any adaptation to the market. Inaccuracy in the execution of contractual obligations in terms of time and quality, inefficiency in performance, incidental and superficial treatment of the market, are **the characteristics of our work** (....) This state of affairs does not give the slightest flattering image of the work of our enterprises. We cannot attribute the difficulties only to new economic measures because this has been the practice of our companies since the beginning, even when carrying out jobs in which we had a great interest (cattle for slaughter). One gets the impression that our companies have no interest in this market and that they do not want affirmation, even though they are very active in the very phase of getting a job. Hard-earned work is regularly executed incorrectly, without necessarily taking into account the interests and needs of partners, that is, without taking a long-term view of one's own interests. This way of acting can only have bad consequences for the prospect of expanding cooperation, mainly because it involves large businesses and the state as a customer.*³⁷⁹

Dizdarević saw the unacceptable business strategy as a *characteristic* of trade cooperation, whereas Tito described it as a *misunderstanding* that sometimes occurred. As previously stated, the Belgrade authorities were prepared to deal with this problem; however, since a

³⁷⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 413461, 28.

³⁷⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 4, s. 428514, 1.;4.

severe continual issue was viewed as an occasional one, Dizdarević's report demonstrates that they did not solve it effectively. Furthermore, the report indicates that the introduction of the market-socialism in 1965 did not set the stage for the enterprises to employ the inadequate strategy but served rather as an amplifier of the already dire situation in trade relations. Dizdarević also points out that even cooperation with a close country such as Algeria was not immune to Yugoslav enterprises' lack of interest in Global South markets and their lack of desire for affirmation in these countries given the growing interest in the Western market.³⁸⁰

Safi Boudissa, a general secretary of UGTA, who spent time in Yugoslavia during the Algerian War of Independence, commented in a very sharp way on Yugoslav interest for strengthening ties with the West. Namely, in July 1963, a Yugoslav economic delegation paid a visit to Blida, the most successful Algerian cooperative run by Boudissa.³⁸¹ The cooperative, which also consisted of self-managed farms, surprised Yugoslav visitors with the enthusiasm of the workers and the effectiveness of the workers' council.³⁸² However, the visit quickly revealed the negative surprises. The local subprefect was unfamiliar with the Yugoslav model of self-management, while Boudissa openly criticised Yugoslav development. He stated that there were "a lot of bourgeoisie" in Zagreb and and accuses Yugoslav managers of being "too enthusiastic about America."³⁸³ His attempts to cooperate with unions in Zagreb were unsuccessful since he did not get any answer back from them, therefore, that pushed him to seek assistance from the Cooperative Movement in Geneva

³⁸⁰ Since 1966, there had been more open questioning of Yugoslav economic policy towards non-aligned countries. The dispute concerned the economic importance of these countries to Yugoslavia's future development. Despite Yugoslavia's membership in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), expanded trade with COMECON countries (The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), and far-reaching economic reforms designed to make Yugoslav enterprises more efficient and their wares competitive in Western markets, economic relations with the non-aligned states stagnated and were unlikely to rise above 13 to 16% of total foreign trade. The 1965 reforms shifted the focus of the reform-oriented echelon of the Party and government from foreign policy to the political implications of transitioning to market socialism. This led to increased unemployment, political confusion at the commune level, uncertainty about the party's role in society, and rising nationality discord. Profitability replaced political goals as a criterion for material reward and advancement, leading to renewed interest in strengthening ties with Western Europe. See: Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 219-220.

³⁸¹ It was also known as the Aissat Idir Cooperative, named after an Algerian trade unionist who was imprisoned by the French and died in prison in June 1959. It produced and sold vines, citrus, tomatoes, animals, and dairy products. The farms within cooperative, originally abandoned by French settlers, were revived by Boudissa, who reorganized it as a dairy farm and personally imported cattle from Switzerland. See: Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 94.

³⁸² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 442948, 1-2; Mohammed Harbi, however, tells another story. Though self-managed in theory, management was entirely top-down: management committees existed primarily in name, with key members nominated by the president, who wielded nearly complete power. The cooperative had considerable economic results, such as cheaper prices and greater salaries, but workers' contributions were overlooked. Harbi does not even mention workers' councils as an important body in decision-making. See: Harbi, *L'autogestion en Algérie*, 94.

³⁸³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 442948, 2-3.

which helped in creating an agricultural school for the education of property managers.³⁸⁴ This was a huge setback for Yugoslavia. On the one hand, increased interest in the Western market, particularly from more developed north-western pro-reform republics such as Croatia and Slovenia, resulted in Yugoslavia's absence from the formation of the most successful Algerian cooperative, and on the other, it elicited strong negative reactions from Boudissa, who had previously regarded Yugoslav socialist development as the most appropriate for Algerian conditions.

Thus, the simultaneous non-aligned path in foreign policy and market-oriented economic reforms that aimed at boosting exports were an unsuitable recipe for creating cooperation that would be based on consideration of the capacities of the recipient countries and building further political influence in the Global South. As the example of Algeria demonstrates, price gouging of workshops and forced exports of sheep exemplified how that tension between the domestic shifts and foreign policy of Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1960s threatened the basic principles of cooperation with the non-aligned countries. Furthermore, the mutual competition of Yugoslav enterprises in the Global South, as demonstrated on the example of sheep, shows how the system's structure led to tensions that Yugoslav officials and experts attributed to a "disloyal competition" among them.³⁸⁵

As most examples of shipments have shown, Yugoslav enterprises often failed to evaluate their own capabilities when it comes to fulfilling contracts even in the case of Algeria that was prioritized in the assistance program and the only other self-managed country. Often, they quickly agreed to requested conditions without considering climatic, geographical, or institutional factors.³⁸⁶ They granted a specific delivery date despite factors such as storage, weather, or inadequate harbour infrastructure within their own country as it was demonstrated in the shipment of tractors and workshops in the harbour of Rijeka. On the example of the shipment of sheep, neglecting the transport capabilities and inadequate understanding of local conditions could have led to negative consequences such as losing prestige in the eyes of one of its closest partners in the Global South. The performance of Yugoslav enterprises also showed that common self-management experience was not considered as a substantial factor in trade cooperation.

³⁸⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 442948, 3.

³⁸⁵ Spaskovska, Ljubica, Building a better world? Construction, labour mobility and the pursuit of collective self-reliance in the 'global South', 1950–1990, *Labor History*, 2018, 8.

³⁸⁶ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 224.

The Algerian authorities demonstrated a high level of tolerance for the inadequacies in cooperation due to necessity and close relations with Yugoslavia and the ambassador Dizdarević. Furthermore, the delivery of 500 tractors and the hard work of Yugoslav tractor operators, which was applauded by the Algerian leadership and workers, made Yugoslavia participate in agrarian reform and the establishment of self-managed agriculture and it created an opportunity for the further reduction from the economic dependence on France and enhance its political influence-building, not only in Algeria, but in the region of Maghreb as a whole. Tractor drivers, who were highly respected by Algerians for their hard work, became the first bearers of the value of the Yugoslav workers' self-management on Algerian agricultural estates, and the following sections attempt to discern how Yugoslav high-skilled workers shaped Algerian self-managed agriculture, particularly through projects within the framework of scientific and technical cooperation.

4.4 Yugoslav agronomists and projects in the field of self-managed agriculture

During the conversation with Dizdarević, Ben Bella stated as a sign of trust in Yugoslavia that Algerian agriculture was "in Yugoslav hands."³⁸⁷ In addition to livestock, tractors, and tractor drivers, this was also evidenced by requests for many high qualified agronomists to work in the Ministry of Agriculture and on the agricultural estates with the task of organizing experimental self-managed farms. High-skilled workers were also demanded in the field of agricultural planning, statistics, agrarian reform, cooperatives, animal husbandry, and state farms.³⁸⁸ Ben Bella wanted to ensure Yugoslav technical assistance by interpreting the appointing of Yugoslav workers to key positions in the Ministry of Agriculture as his need to show consistency to the socialist orientation and not giving up on the presented concept of agrarian reform, which was reflected in the nationalization of the colonial land and the development of autogestion.³⁸⁹ Technical assistance would thus be a win-win situation for both sides. On one hand, Ben Bella's strategy enabled him to secure a significant number of experts in various fields to achieve his goals which were in line with Yugoslav strategy of spreading the values of its socialism through its high-skilled workers not only on the estates, but at the institutional level too. Given the great trust of the Algerian government in Yugoslavia and the importance of the participation of Yugoslav agronomists in the agrarian

³⁸⁷ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 207.

³⁸⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 31, s. 441576, 8.

³⁸⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 28, s. 412435, 1.

reform, the goal was to send the workers who would have a sense of responsibility and a desire to provide real help and contribute to the development of relations between the two countries through their actions.³⁹⁰

The already solid and growing cooperation was crowned in July 1963 with the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, according to which Yugoslavia was supposed to send a certain number of workers annually.³⁹¹ Among the requests of the Algerian Directorate for Scientific and Technical Cooperation were experts for the procurement department of self-managed farms, capable of centralizing all business orders and establishing the distribution cycle and experts for compatibility of self-managed properties and business management.³⁹² The Ministry of Agriculture was satisfied with the arrival of Yugoslav workers, but they were requesting to make them come in larger numbers and faster. Although the Yugoslavs considered the Algerian demands justified and urgent, they very often exceeded the Yugoslav possibilities. During 1963, there were a total of around 300 Yugoslav experts in Algeria, and 16% of the total funds for technical assistance were spent on the high skilled workers there.³⁹³ Yugoslavia treated the aid to Algeria as urgent, however, it was difficult to solve further financing and lack of technicians considering that Algeria did not participate in the financing of the program from the very beginning as stipulated in the agreement.³⁹⁴

Enormous trust and reliance on Yugoslavia in the development of self-managed agriculture was also reflected in Ben Bella's insistence on sending 80 Yugoslav workers to organize an experimental self-managed farm.³⁹⁵ Yugoslavia accepted this request and sent workers to check the land offered by the Algerians for the organization of the farms. The Yugoslav side wanted to invest in farms that were the most fertile, i.e., the most profitable. For instance, Minister Ouzegane presented his plan to make experimental farms on the land that suffered the most damage during the war, primarily in the Soummam Valley in the northern region of Kabylia.³⁹⁶ However, the Yugoslavs were wary of this idea, especially after the visit of the ZAMTES director, Josip Zmajić, since the region was far from large urban centres, the land

³⁹⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 15, s. 416496, 3.

³⁹¹ Tot, Migration for Cooperation, 165.

³⁹² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 8, s. 426410, 2.

³⁹³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 435409, 1.

³⁹⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 435409, 1.

³⁹⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 25, s. 432908, 2.

³⁹⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 29, s. 439903, 1.

had not been cultivated for many years, and there were no such large complexes that were viable and profitable.³⁹⁷

Although they were not willing to organize the exemplary farm in Kabylia, it seems that the Yugoslavs were aware of the political importance of creating the projects in this region. According to the reports of the Yugoslav embassy, ZAMTES and the Ministry of Agriculture negotiated the possibility of *Energoprojekt*, one of the Yugoslavia's most successful enterprises,³⁹⁸ receiving a permit to create a general project for the development of the Soummam Valley that would focus on preventing soil erosion in Kabylia.³⁹⁹ In February 1963, the enterprise signed a contract with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Directorate for a Plan of Creation of a General Study of the Economic Development of the Soummam Valley. Through the forest valley project, the Directorate also considered the creation of a domestic design bureau with the help and participation of *Energoprojekt*.⁴⁰⁰ This project was politically significant not only because of the damage the war brought upon the region, but also because Minister Ouzegane himself was originally from Kabylia, originating from a peasant family whose land was confiscated by the French settlers.⁴⁰¹ As the following section on Ouzegane's visit will show, the Algerian minister enjoyed great respect among Yugoslav officials, therefore, this project is an indicator of how close relations of the Yugoslav and Algerian political elites shaped projects within the framework of technical cooperation. Furthermore, rejecting initiatives based merely on profitability contradicted the political goals and could have risked being perceived as colonial since the logic of French officials during

³⁹⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 29, s. 439903, 1-2.

³⁹⁸ *Energoprojekt* was established in Belgrade in 1951 by a decree of the People's Republic of Serbia as a state-owned company with then only 250 workers and a total income of USD 145,000 to provide design and consultancy services within hydro and thermal power generation and water management in the field of hydro and thermal power plants, irrigation, land reclamation or water processing with gradual inclusion of construction work in their activities. By 1956, it generated USD 40,000 in profit from international projects. The company began focusing on expanding its business operations in 1961, particularly into non-aligned countries where it was able to build the largest and most complex network of representatives by actively seeking out projects. In 1980, the company had 5800 employees, a total income of USD 400 million, and a profit of USD 45 million from projects abroad. The company Energoprojekt still has a large number of projects in Algeria, especially in the field of water management. See: *Energoprojekt Water management*:

<http://www.energoprojekt.rs/vodoprivreda/?lang=en>; Sekulić, Dubravka, Energoprojekt in Nigeria: Yugoslav Construction Companies in the Developing World, *Southeastern Europe* 41 (2017), pp. 200-229.; Spaskovska, Building a better world?, 7.

³⁹⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 29, s. 439903, 3.

⁴⁰⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 1, s. 47202, 1.

⁴⁰¹ His grandfather's family was well-known in the Azazga region of Kabylia, with a large agricultural estate spanning several hundred hectares. The grandfather was said to have been killed at the Battle of Freha, the final clash with the occupying French army during the 1871 uprising. See: *Ouzegane Amar [Dictionnaire Algérie]* par René Gallissot, Le Dictionnaire biographique, Le Maitron: <https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article157307>

the colonial period was not to assist those in need, but to prioritize areas with strong economic returns.⁴⁰²

Regarding the exemplary farm, a search was made for quality land near the capital. It was decided to create the Baba Ali sample estate only 20 kilometres away from Algiers on 1,500 hectares of land with abandoned buildings that would be used for breeding cattle for milk and erection of a dairy factory.⁴⁰³ The task of agronomists was to organize ploughing and sowing of fodder, as well as to prepare conditions for the later arrival of livestock. As one of the points in the plan, there was the study of management committees on the abandoned estates so that they could be properly set up during the organization of sample farms, as well as establishing a Centre for the Management Training.⁴⁰⁴ The goal of the Yugoslav experts was thus to work with strict care to ensure that those measures were taken in accordance with the specificities of Algerian autogestion.

These projects demonstrate that, unlike in the case of Yugoslav export enterprises, the common experience of self-management was of great significance in the development of scientific and technical cooperation. The Baba Ali project provided an opportunity for Yugoslav workers to not only transfer their skills to Algerian personnel, but also to adapt it to the Algerian model by studying its bodies, thus demonstrating a willingness and desire to consider local conditions and wither away from simply "exporting" the Yugoslav model. This project was created through the collaboration of the world's only two self-managed countries, and could allow, as Tito metaphorically stated in his already mentioned conversation with Ben Bella, "the mole to pass under the border" and enable further influence-building in the non-aligned world by exhibiting the results that two friendly self-managed countries could achieve together. Furthermore, *Energoprojekt* was a giant of Yugoslav industry whose values were based on exporting the positive practice of Yugoslav self-management, as well as fulfilling political obligations to its partners in the countries of the Global South, especially in the new independent African countries.⁴⁰⁵ The project in Kabylia, concluded with the Ministry of Agriculture, showed a desire to strengthen cooperation and employ a strategy based on political goals, given the great respect and trust that Minister Ouzegane enjoyed in

⁴⁰² Haleh, Davis, *Markets of Civilization*, 110.

⁴⁰³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 29, s. 439903, 2.

⁴⁰⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1962, f. 3, d. 29, s. 439903, 3-4.

⁴⁰⁵ Yugoslav investors looked for three characteristics in their investments in developing countries: equitable partner relations, strong integration into the local economy, and high compliance with host country development plans. See: Spaskovska, Ljubica, *Building a better world?*, 7-8.

Yugoslav political circles. To better illustrate the importance of the Algerian Minister of Agriculture for the further development of autogestion through technical assistance, the following section focuses on his visit to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav perspective on both Ouzegane and the rest of the Algerian delegation that accompanied him.

4.4.1 The importance of Amar Ouzegane's visit to Yugoslavia for further developments in technical cooperation

One of the factors in the Algerian government's decision to institutionalise autogestion in accordance with the Yugoslav structure in March 1963 was Yugoslav technical assistance, which included the migration of agricultural experts, shipment of machinery and cattle, as well as preparations for organising a sample of self-managed farm. This made the cooperation between the two countries even more significant. The visit of Minister Amar Ouzegane together with a delegation of 11 members to Yugoslavia just one month after the March Decrees were published speaks of this. The aim of the visit was to see the most developed agricultural estates and factories of agricultural machinery, as well as to get to know as much as possible about workers' self-management and legislation.⁴⁰⁶ The delegation of 11 members headed by Minister Ouzegane was first received by the member of the Federal Executive Council and former President of the Council for Agriculture of the Republic of Croatia, Slavko Komar, who introduced them to the development of cooperatives, socialist farms and the implementation of the agrarian reform.⁴⁰⁷

The number of visited objects was unparalleled. The delegation first visited engine factory *Industrija motora Rakovica* (IMR)⁴⁰⁸ and *Zmaj*, known for the production of agricultural

⁴⁰⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 1.

⁴⁰⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 1.

⁴⁰⁸ IMR is a factory with a long history dating back to the time before World War II. Since its establishment in 1927, it first produced engines for airplanes, and later, on the eve of the Second World War, it switched to the production of trucks. With the introduction of workers' self-management and the government's decision to leave truck production to its rival TAM from Slovenia, IMR turned to the production of diesel engines, obtaining a license from the British factory *Perkins*, which were the basis of Yugoslav industrial motorization. IMR exported a smaller portion of its motors to the UK under the licensing agreement with *Perkins*, bringing much-needed hard currency into the country, while selling the majority of its motors to domestic truck, tractor, agricultural vehicle, and boat manufacturers. IMR also started producing tractors, but by the decision of the local authorities, it was decided that the production of tractors would be taken over by the rival factory *Industrija motora i traktora* (IMT), while the oldest plant of IMR was reorganized as the engine department of its rival. For more information on the implementation and development of workers' self-management in IMR see: Musić, Goran, *Making and Breaking the Yugoslav Working Class: A Story of Two Self-Managed factories*, CEU Press, Budapest/New York, 2021.

machinery⁴⁰⁹, where they got acquainted with the organization of work and the management system of the factories during a tour of the halls. The delegation was impressed with the high quality of the machines.⁴¹⁰ At the factory *14.oktobar*⁴¹¹ in Kruševac, they attended a demonstration of tractors for deep plowing.⁴¹²

In addition to factories, the delegation visited a large number of agricultural combines and farms. During the visit to the *Poljoprivredni kombinat Beograd (Agricultural Combine Belgrade - PKB)*⁴¹³, whose workers would be employed on the Baba Ali project, the director

⁴⁰⁹ *Zmaj* was founded in 1927 as a factory of aero- and seaplanes. After the Second World War in 1946, it became a factory of agricultural machinery. The experience in high technology, gained through the production of aircraft, enabled the dynamic development of the agricultural machinery program. The beginning was marked by the production of simpler agricultural machines. The acquisition of more complex machines was also accelerated by a license agreement with the world-famous company Massey Ferguson. The production of harvesters began in 1955, and the first harvester of Yugoslav own construction left the production facilities in 1961. See: *Industrija poljoprivrednih mašina Zmaj*: http://www.zmaj.co.rs/o_nama.htm

⁴¹⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 427108, 2-3.

⁴¹¹ The factory was founded in 1923 by Austrian and Hungarian investors, as an enterprise specializing in the production and repair of wagons. At the beginning, the production program included the overhaul and repair of passenger and cargo vehicles. Over time, with the parallel expansion of the existing range of products, there was an improvement in quality in production technology, which later resulted in the production of steel for construction, metal products, and products used in the military industry. After World War II, the company was nationalized and rebuilt. It was named in commemoration of the date when Kruševac was liberated by the Yugoslav partisans from the German occupiers in 1944. The company turned to the production of construction, mining, agricultural and transport machinery, and equipment with an emphasis on the production of equipment and machine parts. It was one of the largest manufacturers of heavy machinery in socialist Yugoslavia. See: *Istorija: od remonta vagona do teške industrije*: <https://14oktobar.rs/o-nama/>

⁴¹² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963. f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 5-6.

⁴¹³ PKB was founded on December 27, 1945, with the headquarters in Belgrade. It was the largest agribusiness enterprise in socialist Yugoslavia, with the task of supplying Belgrade with basic foodstuffs: grain, vegetables, meat, and milk. Until 1980, PKB had 100,000 hectares of land where crops and livestock were grown. Agricultural production was the base for a new cycle of creating large and modern livestock farming using the most modern domestic techniques and educated agronomists. PKB owned tens of thousands of dairy cows, calves and fattening pigs, which was one of the largest concentration of breeding and fattening cattle in the world, therefore animal feed was produced in huge quantities. PKB was an inexhaustible source of milk for the markets. Over 100 million liters of milk are produced annually on PKB farms, and close to 130 million liters in the association with producers in the countryside. A huge team of scientists and researchers dealt with the selection of the best breeding heads, the preservation of their seeds and their artificial insemination. Scientists managed to obtain the first calves with a new procedure of transplanting fertilized egg cells. The basis of the development of PKB was the socio-economic connection of production, scientific-research, and business-economic work. The driving force of PKB was its *Institute for Scientific Research Agro-economic*, which published the journal *Nauka u praksi (Science in Practice)*, informing about the results of scientific research work. PKB made great efforts to constantly cooperate with producers in the countryside and thus contribute to the modernization of agriculture on individual farms. By 1980, more than 35,000 rural producers were associated in PKB, according to their conditions and interests. More than 20,000 workers in PKB decided on development plans, as well as on current production and work organization, on the distribution of income and living standards. Every other PKB worker was involved in the work of self-managing bodies. Workers had their own newspaper *Poljoindustrija (Agricultural Industry)*, which was published every Saturday in a print run of 30,000 copies. Almost every day, PKB was visited by domestic and foreign delegations from all over the world. Non-aligned countries such as Algeria, Angola, Tanzania, Iraq or Peru were particularly interested in the results of and cooperation with PKB: See: *PKB: Od kombinata do korporacije*: <https://www.masina.rs/pkb-od-kombinata-do-korporacije/>; PKB – 35 godina postojanja (1980.godina): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nG9IfOI1-vU>

explained the history, organization of work and the management system, and, at the request of the delegation, the system of cow breeding with milk production and processing was explained in detail.⁴¹⁴ The delegation also visited a couple of farms and factories in Slovenia, being most astounded by the fattening of cattle and poultry, and the farm of dairy cows in the *Zalog* combine, as well as the agricultural cooperative in Žalec. One part of the delegation visited the experimental fruit-growing station of the Faculty of Agriculture in Belgrade called *Radmilovac*,⁴¹⁵ toured the fruit plantations in Boleč within the Grocka municipality of Belgrade, where they learned about the role of the commune in the development of agriculture, but mostly being curious about the system of growing vines, whose production was mostly under autogestion in Algeria.⁴¹⁶ The delegation also traveled to the agricultural estate *Verušić* near Subotica where the director of the estate gave the basic information about the management system, together with the members of the workers' council.⁴¹⁷ They were familiarized with financial aspects of the cooperatives such as income distribution and investments during a visit to the General Agricultural Cooperative in Bačka Topola.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 4.

⁴¹⁵ The experimental farm *Radmilovac* was founded in 1941 by the industrialist Milan Vukićević who bequeathed it to the students of the Faculty of Agriculture in Belgrade with a vision of university students gaining practice there, naming the property after his wife Radmila. After the Second World War, the farm was nationalized. At the beginning, it was a vineyard station within PKB, so it was managed by PKB's *Agroeconomics*, and in 1992 ownership of Radmilovec was given to the Faculty of Agriculture of the University of Belgrade. See: *Vodimo vas na ogledno dobro Radmilovac*: <https://agroportal.rs/vodimo-vas-na-ogledno-dobro-radmilovac/>

⁴¹⁶ The independent Algerian government and the workers on self-managed estates had a very complex attitudes toward vine cultivation. The access to land made possible by French conquest of Algeria allowed settlers to plant tens of thousands of hectares of grapevines in the final decades of the nineteenth century. The main export of the colony was wine, which Algerian Muslims were not meant to consume. It brought great wealth to some and employed a sizable portion of the Muslim population of Algeria. Even though Algeria still had the fourth-largest wine industry in the world after independence, it remained the most glaring symbol of the colonial economy and gave the Algerian people the impression that their independence was incomplete. However, wine production was essential to the larger self-management project in Algeria because about 90% of the country's vines were under *autogestion*. The difficulties facing viticulture soon became obvious. Falling yields were the most significant sign of this decline, despite some post-World War II replanting. The Algerian vineyard as a whole was ageing badly, often accelerated by neglect during the Algerian War of Independence. Tractors and other equipment that were now considered essential to the practise of viticulture lacked adequate replacement parts and skilled mechanics to fix them, therefore, there had been much debate about the replacement of vine cultivation with other crops. Nevertheless, the workers on self-managed estates believed that vine production should not be changed for the sake of cultivating other crops because they considered it a "gold" that maintained employment and earnings. Thus, the Algerian government found itself in a difficult situation where it wanted to gradually free itself from economic dependence on France, especially in the export of wine, and on the other hand to maintain the relic of colonialism because it generated and sustained jobs on the self-managed farms. For the central role of vine in the economic life of colonial and post-colonial Algeria see: White, Owen, *Blood of the Colony: Wine and the Rise and Fall of French Algeria*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge/London, 2021.

⁴¹⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 6.

⁴¹⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 7.

On the occasion of visiting Josip Zmajčić, the director of ZAMTES, specific requests were formulated for about 80 Yugoslav experts who would be hired to work in Algeria: veterinarians, mechanics, technical engineers for a machine repair workshop and the formation of domestic mechanics, forestry engineers, hydrologists, professors for the University of Agriculture, agronomists for the positions in the Ministry in the field of agricultural production and livestock breeding, agronomists for plant protection, for agricultural production in the areas, agronomic engineers or agricultural technicians for managing cooperative farms, engineers or technicians for management of the Baba Ali farm, and 2 female agronomists for household formation and milk processing.⁴¹⁹

The Yugoslav perspective of the visit was positive. On the one hand, in the report of the Federal Secretariat for Agriculture and Forestry, the visit was marked as "completely successful."⁴²⁰ Minister Ouzegane was seen as a progressive partner who absorbed with great interest and understanding all the information related to Yugoslav political and economic development, as well as the methods and difficulties encountered.⁴²¹ The Yugoslavs were not surprised by this, considering that Ouzegane was seen as one of the most principled Marxists in the FLN.⁴²² For the rest of the delegation, the Secretariat stated that they were still young and inexperienced, but greatly interested in the development of Yugoslav agriculture from the aspect of production, organization, management or social problems.⁴²³ This was seen as sign of the affirmation of Yugoslav socialism in Algeria, and of specific growing cooperation between the two countries.⁴²⁴ More importantly, the success of the visit is also indicated by the concrete agreement on the establishment of a direct connection between the PKB and the sample farm Baba Ali for the purpose of exchanging experts and developing the project of organizing an exemplary farm.⁴²⁵

Delegation visits provided Yugoslavia with an opportunity to demonstrate its achievements, and thus influence the countries in the Global South. Yugoslavia organised an impressive visit for Minister Ouzegane in such a way that it exhibited what Algeria urgently needed at the time: agricultural equipment, livestock, and organization of the agricultural production which created a solid groundwork for the future marketing of its equipment and promotion of its

⁴¹⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 7.

⁴²⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 9.

⁴²¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 9.

⁴²² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 9.

⁴²³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 9-10.

⁴²⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 10.

⁴²⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 14, s. 411605, 8.

socialist model in Algeria. Delegation led by Ouzegane visited Yugoslavia only one month after the March Decrees were published which indicates the Algerian leadership's reliance on Yugoslav strategy, the importance of its assistance in developing autogestion, and the desire for it to be an important segment of technical cooperation.

Ouzegane's capability of understanding what was presented to him, and, more importantly, his ideological position, were one of the crucial factors in Yugoslav willingness to assist Algeria and participate in agrarian reform. During the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, Yugoslavia focused on the state leaders and government representatives in shaping its image of Africa, and bilateral cooperation was based on relations with them.⁴²⁶ As technical cooperation was the pillar of bilateral relations with Algeria, it was necessary to create strong ties with Ouzegane and inspect whether he was an eligible partner who was willing to secure Yugoslav participation in agrarian reform. Described as a "progressive partner" and "the most principal Marxist within FLN", Ouzegane was categorized as a highly regarded leader who they could count on, and thus further assist in agrarian reform. This reliance on Ouzegane will be particularly visible in the next section, which shows how his removal from the post of minister prompted severe consequences for the Baba Ali project, but also for the position of Yugoslav workers in Algeria.

4.4.2 The Unsuccessful Organization of Baba Ali Exemplary Farm

Cooperation on the Baba Ali project was foreseen in point 21 of the First Periodic Plan of Technical Cooperation between SFRY and DPRA for the year 1963-64, with a special arrangement to be concluded on it. In this regard, a draft of the Agreement was prepared between the Federal Institute for International Technical Cooperation and the institution that was to be determined by the Algerian side.⁴²⁷ From the very beginning, the implementation of this project encountered obstacles that illustrate further limits of scientific and technical cooperation in the field of agriculture. Although ZAMTES took responsibility for the organization of the farm, not much was organized during the realization, considering that ZAMTES did not want to embark on such a serious project without an adequate contract with Algeria.⁴²⁸ Before the actual attempt to sign the contract, in July 1963, six highly qualified Yugoslav workers from PKB, as well as the deputy and assistant director, went to Baba Ali.

⁴²⁶ Radonjić, *Slika Afrike u Jugoslaviji*, 114-115.

⁴²⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 430523

⁴²⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 435409, 1.

Yugoslavs complained about the negative attitude and mistreatment by the currently appointed director of the farm, therefore, some decided to leave the estate and work on the project either in Algiers or Belgrade.⁴²⁹ This problem was supposed to be solved by appointing the new director, who, in the meantime, was on a fifteen-day vocational training at the PKB in Belgrade.⁴³⁰

The deputy general director of PKB and a representative of ZAMTES arrived in Algeria on September 17, 1963 with drafts of the Program and Contract on the Baba Ali project, but the arrival was simultaneous with the reorganization of the Algerian Government and the change of the Minister of Agriculture. After waiting in vain for negotiations, the deputy director returned to Belgrade concluding that the Algerian side was unable to negotiate.⁴³¹ Yugoslavia did not want to further push for the conclusion of the contract in order not to give the impression that they were imposing themselves and that they were more interested in cooperation than their Algerian counterparts.⁴³²

The Algerian state leadership saw the danger of the failure of this project for further cooperation, as evidenced by the visit of Ben Bella and the FLN study delegation to Yugoslavia in March 1964. Lashgar Laid, member of the Central Directorate of the FLN Politbiro, expressed great regret that he was not familiar with the draft of the Baba Ali project and that he would examine the circumstances surrounding it upon his return to Algeria.⁴³³ Ben Bella expressed his desire to, as Tito did in the case of Yugoslav export enterprises, explain the causes of those problems in order to ensure further technical assistance:

I would also like to point out one problem related to bureaucracy. As you know, the French have left our country and the level of our experts and officials is quite low. We are forced to rely on Algerians who worked for the French. They are certainly not traitors, but they do not have our mentality. If we were to remove them abruptly, we would create a very dangerous problem. One man can be a good fighter, but it does not mean that he can be a good director, a good inspector of agriculture and the like. We are aware that we may encounter problems arising from bureaucracy and that sometimes the help we receive is not effective enough

⁴²⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 435409, 1-2.

⁴³⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 435409, 2.

⁴³¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 435409, 2.

⁴³² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 435409, 2-3.

⁴³³ Muzej afričke umetnosti, Dokumentacija Vede Zagorac i dr Zdravka Pečara, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN i problemi socijalizma, mart 1964, 9.

*because of them. This is, as it were, the core of all the problems that are imposed on us and that we have to solve at the same time.*⁴³⁴

During the discussion on bilateral cooperation, Ben Bella pointed out to the Yugoslav president the still existing problem with the lack of experts to replace the French ones, and he asked the Yugoslavs to help them further since Algerians were relying on Yugoslavia in that matter.⁴³⁵ However, within agriculture, if earlier the problem was the impossibility to respond to all Algerian demands regarding the technicians, now the problem was also in their very position and activity. Namely, during a visit to Algeria in November 1964, one of the representatives of CTUY, Svetolik Popović, had the opportunity to visit some of the self-managed estates and to talk with Yugoslav technicians, whereupon he came to the conclusion that Yugoslav workers were not used enough because they were sitting in offices the whole day without anyone consulting them for anything, which was not the case when Ouzegane was the minister because he employed the Yugoslav workers more frequently.⁴³⁶ Although the exact complaints of the Yugoslav workers cannot be traced from the sources, Popović's perspective of the Yugoslav workers is quite congruent with the general position of many technicians on the Algerian self-managed estates who, as already explained in chapter 3, spent more time in offices than on the field which resulted in the fact that Yugoslav workers could not even be adequately acquainted with the state of Algerian self-managed agriculture.

The failure of Baba Ali project caused some kind of mistrust among Yugoslavs. Dizdarević, however, assured them that this should not be the case, given that the new Minister Ahmed Mahsas was close to Ben Bella, who was the main bearer of the pro-Yugoslav policy.⁴³⁷ The Yugoslav communists did not know Mahsas, while Ouzegane was a proven partner and supporter of self-management who had been known to them since the Algerian War of Independence, therefore, his removal caused a certain kind of concern, especially since the new minister was not able to continue further negotiations on the project. Yugoslav officials had the opportunity to meet Mahsas during his visit to Yugoslavia in May 1965 at the invitation of the Federal Executive Council and the enterprise *Rudnap* with which the sale of crawler tractors was contracted.⁴³⁸ In the plan of the visit, it is stated that the minister was mostly interested in the development path and stages of self-management, agrarian reform,

⁴³⁴ AJ- 837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o završnim jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima, 84.

⁴³⁵ AJ- 837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 85.

⁴³⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1964, f. 4, d. 1, s. 41515, 14-15.

⁴³⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 431989, 1.

⁴³⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 412747, 1.

the cooperative movement and financing of the self-management sector.⁴³⁹ In addition, the minister expressed a great interest in the assistance in personnel for the management and organization of agricultural estates, as well as in the issue of education.⁴⁴⁰ Dizdarević even mentioned that the minister stated in the circle of his closest associates that Yugoslavia was the only country with which Algeria was engaged in the closest cooperation, considering the nature of the overall relations and the existence of self-management systems in both countries.⁴⁴¹

Mahsas, therefore, showed no less willingness and excitement than Ouzegane in Yugoslav self-management and cooperation during his visit to Yugoslavia. Visiting various enterprises, he was interested in the organization of work and the profitability of the process of overhauling the tractor factory.⁴⁴² At the agro-industrial combine *Belje* in Osijek, according to the report on the visit, very useful discussions were held with the director of the combine on the structure and organization of work, financing, production, as well as on the issue of remunerations. The delegation, headed by Mahsas, even decided to extend their stay in Osijek in order to get to know the operations of this property as much as possible.⁴⁴³ For hours, they were shown in detail the process of production and self-management in the individual plants of the combine, after which the delegation concluded that combine would be an ideal form for the further development of Algerian agriculture, expressing moreover the desire for Yugoslav high-skilled workers to help them build such a combine.⁴⁴⁴ Upon his return to Algeria, he said to Dizdarević that *Belje* inspired him in plans for further organization of production on the farms.⁴⁴⁵

However, Mahsas did not leave a favorable impression on some of the Yugoslav officials. For example, he spoke with Edvard Kardelj, the President of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, secretary of the Central Committee of the LCY, and one of the main creators of the Yugoslav self-management, who explained the problems of self-management in detail to him and proposed to consider the cooperation of Yugoslav and Algerian agricultural estates in order to exchange self-management and production experiences.⁴⁴⁶ The report nonetheless states that

⁴³⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 412747, 1-2.

⁴⁴⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 412747, 2.

⁴⁴¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 412747, 3.

⁴⁴² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 417201, 4.

⁴⁴³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 417201, 5.

⁴⁴⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 417201, 5.

⁴⁴⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 12, s. 419810, 1.

⁴⁴⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 417201, 3.

Mahsas left an unfavorable impression on Kardelj without further explaining of his position.⁴⁴⁷ On the other hand, the minister stated that the conversation with Kardelj was very significant for him as it confirmed the Algerian practice of self-management and gave ideas for the further measures for its improvement.⁴⁴⁸ Kardelj's attitude was perhaps caused not only by the poor treatment of Yugoslav workers and the failure of the Baba Ali project, but also by the fact that during their discussion, Mahsas did not reflect on the problems that led to the termination of the project. Mahsas's interest in experts could also be effected by the intervention of the authorities, possibly by Lashgar Laid, who said during his visit in 1964 that he would investigate the position of Yugoslav technicians and their employment in Algeria.⁴⁴⁹ Although Kardelj's first impressions were not positive, his proposal for cooperation based on the exchange of experiences in development of self-management speaks not only of the readiness to continue and expand cooperation, despite Ouzegane's dismissal, but also that the Yugoslav political apex attached importance to Algerian autogestion.

On the example of the failure of the Baba Ali project, which represented one of the most significant aspects of scientific-technical cooperation, it is clear that the management personnel issues and bureaucracy in Algeria influenced the limit of Yugoslav technical assistance and its role in the development of Algerian autogestion. First, the state chose the director who was not ready to cooperate with the Yugoslav workers, therefore, the very draft of the project was in jeopardy considering that it was being worked on outside of Baba Ali itself. On top of that, the removal of Ouzegane, who was involved in the project from the very beginning and in whom the Yugoslav government had confidence, contributed to the further limitations of technical assistance by reducing the role of Yugoslav technicians and causing distrust in a new minister Ahmed Mahsas. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, the visit of the party-state delegation in March 1964 and Mahsas in 1965 demonstrated that both sides were willing to try to overcome previous problems and create new forms of cooperation given the already potent political and economic ties and common experience of self-management.

⁴⁴⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 5, s. 417201, 3

⁴⁴⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 12, s. 419810, 1.

⁴⁴⁹ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 9.

4.5 Vocational Trainings and Courses in Yugoslavia

Simultaneously with the Yugoslav workers in Algeria, Yugoslavia provided vocational trainings in Yugoslavia according to the Algerian demands. Articles 11, 12 and 17 of the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation defined the functioning of training and education, which set as a condition a clear indication of the type and duration of education and training, as well as the deadline for completion.⁴⁵⁰ The authorities that wanted to send personnel for training were obliged to submit questionnaires filled in by Algerian candidates, on the basis of which the residency program was prepared that was to ensure there would be no obstacles caused by insufficient preparation before arrival,⁴⁵¹ as it happened, for instance, during the first organization of vocational trainings at the end of the 1950s presented in Chapter 2.

Unfortunately, the sources do not give an insight into the details of the education plans themselves or the residence of workers and students. However, extracting the Algerian requests addressed to the Yugoslav embassy in Algiers could discern in which segments of self-management the Algerians turned to Yugoslavia for assistance. Most of the requests sent for the stay of Algerians in Yugoslavia related to vocational training in Yugoslav enterprises for training in the management of agricultural machines, as well as for practice on agricultural estates in the management of the farms. To illustrate, the Ministry of Agriculture in Algeria confirmed that 12 workers would start their vocational trainings in the Yugoslav companies *Industrija mašina i traktora* (IMT) and *14.oktobar* at the beginning of October 1963.⁴⁵² Since IMT placed its tractors in the course of the agrarian reform campaign and the previously mentioned agricultural delegation led by minister Ouzegane had the opportunity to visit the enterprise *14.oktobar*, Algerian state officials were already familiar with the organization and production of these enterprises. As a result, ZAMTES organised the specialization so that the training was carried out for agricultural machinery which was already familiar and sold to Algerians. Due to the fact that Yugoslav tractor drivers had already travelled to Algeria to instruct their Algerian counterparts, this type of training was given significant weight given the fieldwork that was being done simultaneously in both countries.

⁴⁵⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 433805, 4-6.

⁴⁵¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 2, s. 433805, 5.

⁴⁵² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 8, s. 426410

Courses for the directors were also organized. During the month of July 1963, the Bureau for Personnel Formation at the Presidency of the Government requested that the participants of their course for directors be given a one-month study stay in Yugoslavia during September.⁴⁵³ A group of 35 course participants wanted to visit some of Yugoslav factories and discuss with directors and workers' councils about the problems they faced in Algeria, as well as to organize several lectures on the topics such as the organisation of the enterprise, finances, self-management and the role of directors. In order to better prepare for the arrival of the group, representatives of the management of the aforementioned Bureau from Algeria came to Belgrade at the end of August to discuss the program of stay and courses proposed by ZAMTES.⁴⁵⁴

Algeria requested to ZAMTES 8 scholarships in 1964 for young personnel with work experience in agriculture who would study the management of agricultural assets.⁴⁵⁵ It was also suggested to organize a short course in French on management in agriculture and cooperatives in Belgrade before starting working on the farms, showing the willingness and aptness to convey the interpretation of Yugoslav development as clearly as possible to Algerian students as to avoid the problems during the practical part of specialization. The duration of the studies lasted three to five months, depending on the qualifications and interests of the candidates based on the completed questionnaires required by ZAMTES.⁴⁵⁶

As with Yugoslav workers and projects in Algeria, this type of Yugoslav assistance demonstrates the value of joint self-management experience in scientific and technical cooperation. Algerian personnel were given the opportunity to exchange experiences with their Yugoslav counterparts and acquire the necessary skills, which they could not obtain in Algeria due to a lack of training centres. The intensive preparations were required as to respond to the Algerian demands as precisely and effective as possible since this type of aid was a vital *modus operandi* of exercising political influence beyond political elites because young Algerian workers specializing in Yugoslavia were regarded as the best "Yugoslav ambassadors" who would, with their acquired skills, spread the values of Yugoslav socialism directly on the agricultural self-managed estates.

⁴⁵³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 9, s. 425455

⁴⁵⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 9, s. 425455

⁴⁵⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 11, s. 440863

⁴⁵⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 4, d. 11, s. 440863

This chapter investigated the multifaceted nature of Yugoslav-Algerian scientific-technical and trade cooperation to demonstrate both the aims and contradictions in it in regard to self-management. While Yugoslavia positioned itself as a model through its socialist model, practical challenges – such as profit-driven performance of export enterprises, bureaucratic obstacles, and Algeria's changing political climate – frequently undermined these goals. Individuals such as Nijaz Dizdarević, Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, and Veljko Vlahović reflected a spectrum of Yugoslav perspectives that highlighted the contradictions between top-down official attitudes and worker-oriented engagement. Despite setbacks, the cooperation allowed for the significant interchange through training programs and utilization of high-skilled Yugoslav workers. The chapter demonstrated that, while Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation in the field of self-management was based on shared political goals, its success was dependent on managing the realities of political change and the contrasting logics of political and economic goals.

5. (Re)building Trade Union and Party-State Cooperation (1964-1965)

This chapter looks at the evolving trade union and state-party cooperation between Yugoslavia and Algeria, with a special emphasis on the years 1964-1965. It investigates how both countries exchanged ideas and experiences about workers' self-management and autogestion, and how these exchanges reflected bigger political and ideological issues of the domestic policies of each country.

Algeria was heavily engaged with internal political battles, particularly within the FLN, in the years immediately following independence (1962-1964). As a result, engagement with Yugoslavia during this time was primarily limited to technical assistance. However, by 1964, the temporary resolution of internal issues and the recognition of autogestion as the base of Algerian socialist development in the Algerian Charter sparked renewed interest in Yugoslavia's concept of workers' self-management. UGTA and FLN officials attempted to address significant issues – such as centralized administration, a lack of workers' autonomy, and economic mismanagement – by learning from the Yugoslav example.

This renewed cooperation included efforts to strengthen trade union contacts. Since independence, CTUY had attempted to engage UGTA in further cooperation, but progress was hampered by the strong party control of the latter. The 1964 UGTA delegation's visit to

Yugoslavia, led by the Secretary General Rabah Djermani, marked a breakthrough moment. Although the visit sparked discussion on autogestion and workers' rights, persistent party meddling in union activity prompted concerns about the chances for meaningful partnership.

The 1964 visit by Ben Bella and other FLN leaders, was in the light of the preparation for the FLN Congress and publication of the Algerian Charter. Algeria saw substantial economic developments, such as the nationalisation of nearly two million hectares of land and hundred of thousands of properties⁴⁵⁷, that required firm ideological foundation. Thus, they wanted to take lessons from the development of the Yugoslav model that could be applied to Algeria, as well as to the larger African continent and Arab world.⁴⁵⁸ Hence, the further familiarization with all of the aspects of Yugoslav socialist model was seen as a strategic necessity, given that the FLN officials and Ben Bella believed that Yugoslav economic and political system were the most similar to the Algerian development.⁴⁵⁹

This chapter's main focus is the analysis of the discussions during this visit. These debates brought out both the attractiveness and difficulties of Yugoslav self-management. While LCY representatives were welcoming and supportive, they struggled to provide concrete information to their Algerian counterparts while discussing topics such as decentralisation, mechanisation, and combat against bureaucracy. The analysis also identifies the different notions of self-management by the Yugoslav leadership presented to Algerians that were based on the view of the Yugoslav communists on the pro-market reforms, and contrasts Algerian notions of autogestion as a vehicle for rapid modernization with Yugoslav understandings of it as a gradual, long-term process.

In the end, the chapter concludes that, while the Yugoslav-Algerian discussion on self-management was characterised by enthusiasm and shared ideals, it also exposed limits of the exchange. Despite hurdles, both sides remained determined to working together, aided by strong bilateral relations and Ben Bella's reputation in Yugoslav political circles. Nonetheless, the collapse of these attempts during the political crisis which culminated by the overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella in June 1965, demonstrates that these initiatives were too late and lacked significant bottom-up support, notably from the workers in Algerian autogestion sector.

⁴⁵⁷ More than 200,000 houses, flats, shops or offices were nationalized. See: Alleg, Ichirakya: The revolutionary character of the Algiers Charter, 16-17.

⁴⁵⁸ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 1-2.

⁴⁵⁹ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 2.

5.1 Reviving the trade union cooperation

Cooperation between CTUY and UGTA ceased in 1962 and was not renewed right after independence. According to the minutes on relations with Algerian trade unions, Yugoslavia initiated the creation of a draft of cooperation according to the needs of the newly liberated Algeria, but UGTA did not respond.⁴⁶⁰ Afterwards, the UGTA announced a three-month stay of 10 officials to study workers' self-management, but later withdrew that proposal. In 1963, a delegation at the highest level was invited several times to visit Yugoslavia, but the visit did not occur. UGTA cited as the reason that the organization was occupied with internal affairs.⁴⁶¹

The leader of CTUY, Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, attended the opening of the First congress of UGTA in 1963, however, neither in the report on the visit nor in his memoirs there was any mention of concrete endeavours to revive the cooperation. In regard to the removal of the UGTA leadership at the Congress, Tempo does not provide any information about it except that he gave an opening speech and talked with Soviet delegates in breaks between the sessions.⁴⁶² However, the change of leadership took place on the third day of the Congress⁴⁶³ that Tempo might have not attended since he was visiting the agricultural estates with Ben Bella.⁴⁶⁴ Furthermore, he made no mention of the UGTA's current status or discussions with its officials on any of the topics. As a result, it appears that the purpose of this visit was to ascertain Algeria's adherence to the socialist self-managed path through conversations with Ben Bella as already described in Chapter 4.

Yugoslavia nevertheless continued at its attempts to restore the cooperation with UGTA in a similar fashion to the cooperation that occurred in 1959. For the year 1964, the CTUY plan included: the arrival of the UGTA delegation to the CTUY congress or as a study visit; the arrival of 2 Algerian officials for a study of workers' self-management, workers' education, and social insurance; the departure of Yugoslav journalist to Algeria in order to establish cooperation between the union newspapers of Algeria and Yugoslavia; arrival of a delegation of social workers from Algeria; departure of a Yugoslav study delegation of two members from the Union of Agricultural Workers to Algeria to study the processes in Algerian

⁴⁶⁰ AJ-142-550, Informacija: Veze sa alžirskim sindikatima, Beograd, 23.januar 1964, 4.

⁴⁶¹ AJ-142-550, Informacija: Veze sa alžirskim sindikatima, 4-5.

⁴⁶² Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče* 2, 448.

⁴⁶³ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 117.

⁴⁶⁴ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1963, f. 3, d. 32, s. 41753, 1.

agriculture and provide assistance; and the arrival of the union of metalworkers to visit Yugoslavia.⁴⁶⁵

Finally, in August 1964, the UGTA leadership paid a rather unexpected visit. Having returned from trips to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, they decided to include Yugoslavia in their plan. The delegation led by UGTA general secretary Rabah Djermane came with the mission to learn about Yugoslav self-management, the organization of trade unions, and to introduce CTUY officials to the developments in Algerian autogestion.⁴⁶⁶ After a short visit to the agricultural estate *Godomin* and the enterprises *IMT* and *Zmaj*, representatives of the UGTA spoke with CTUY functionaries, who explained to them the stages of the economic development of Yugoslavia, the system of self-management, income distribution in the enterprises, as well as on strengthening the rights of workers and their initiatives. In particular, the economic unit and its role in increasing the interest of workers in advancing labor productivity was discussed. It was emphasized that the role of the trade union was to train workers to manage enterprises and to develop awareness and solidarity among the working class.⁴⁶⁷ Djermane presented some of the most important problems of the development of Algerian self-management, such as the education of personnel and a whole series of economic issues that the unions tried to solve by organizing lectures and seminars because due to bureaucratic tendencies it was important for the unions to break down certain terms for the workers in order to develop "socialist consciousness."⁴⁶⁸

The dialogue did not however progress to a thorough examination of all issues since Algerian delegates did not ask any questions that would have prompted a deeper discussion. Additionally, there were no discussions on future cooperation. The report on the visit acknowledged the difficulty of assessing the visit's effectiveness due to uncertainty about whether the delegates fully understood the presentations, but hoping that with more insight from the notes they took, the Algerian delegates would be able to grasp them better and create more impactful future visits, since UGTA was going through a reorganization at that moment.⁴⁶⁹ Hence, this visit, given that it was sudden and insufficiently organized, was more informative than studious in nature given the internal crisis of UGTA. However, the Algerian delegation's desire not only to be informed, but also to express union's struggles to Yugoslav

⁴⁶⁵ AJ-142-550, Informacija: Veze sa alžirskim sindikatima, 5.

⁴⁶⁶ AJ-142-550, 05/1316, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije u Jugoslaviji, 6.10.1964, 1.

⁴⁶⁷ AJ-142-550, 05/1316, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije, 2.;

⁴⁶⁸ AJ-142-550, 05/1316, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije, 3-4.

⁴⁶⁹ AJ-142-550, 05/1316, Izveštaj o boravku alžirske delegacije, 7-8.

comrades, could be interpreted as an initial step towards developing a more permanent and defined concept of cooperation in the near future, which would include education on self-management for Algerian trade union officials.

Representatives of CTUY stayed as guests of the Agricultural Workers' Union in Algeria in 1964 but the visit yielded very few results. In the report, Svetolik Popović, one of the Yugoslav representatives, stated that in the Central Committee of the union no interest was expressed in the Yugoslav development path and trade union operations, adding that it was not possible to get a clear picture of the organization of the Algerian trade unions, and even less of number of organized workers⁴⁷⁰ which further speaks of the marginalized position UGTA played in the development of autogestion.

Despite the perspective of "disinterest" and awareness of the crisis Algerian trade unions were going through, CTUY expected that some more permanent type of cooperation would be established after the union crisis was over. It seems that the election of the new UGTA leadership in March 1965 and greater support from Ben Bella given his political isolation, turned to be a positive sign for renewing and creating different forms of cooperation. In 1965, the CTUY delegation was invited to attend the Second UGTA Congress where the new leadership was elected.⁴⁷¹ Furthermore, one of the secretaries of the UGTA, Bensliman Lahuri, visited Yugoslavia with the aim of studying workers' self-management.⁴⁷² Plans for sending a Yugoslav expert for the education of young people in order to exchange experiences on the spot and improve the education system in Algeria were created.⁴⁷³ Thus, both national trade union centres were willing to revive the cooperation. However, with the military coup and the fall of Ben Bella in June 1965, just three months after the Second UGTA Congress, a new round of political conflict and union's unrest occurred, therefore, the freshly revived cooperation was once again put on hold.

⁴⁷⁰ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1964, f. 4, d. 1, s. 41515, 14.

⁴⁷¹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 4, d. 2, s. 49699

⁴⁷² DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 49504, 5. Unfortunately, as the fund of the Central Council of the CTUY for this period is still unavailable, it is not possible to convey the details of his education in Yugoslavia.

⁴⁷³ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 49504, 6-7.

5.2 Party-state cooperation: Dialogues during the visit of Ahmed Ben Bella and the FLN delegation

In the first half of March 1964, the Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella and the FLN study group led by Lashgar Laid,⁴⁷⁴ visited Yugoslavia in order to discuss bilateral cooperation, self-management mechanisms, agriculture, the work of the party, youth and trade unions, as well as individual state institutions and bodies with the Yugoslav president and representatives of the LCY. According to the report of Zdravko Pečar, all members of the delegation showed great interest and knowledge about Yugoslav self-management by having questions prepared in advance.⁴⁷⁵

One of the most significant challenges Algeria encountered was the state bureaucracy. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the administrative superstructure of the state hampered the development of agricultural autogestion. This was evident in institutions such as ONRA, SAP or ONACO, where personnel educated during the colonial period were hesitant to adopt the principles of autogestion. In response to these challenges, particularly in the spirit of the preparation for the upcoming FLN Congress in April and publication of the Algerian Charter, the Yugoslav model became a valuable resource for Algerians, particularly in dealing with bureaucracy, advancing decentralization, as well as training new personnel. The delegates first discussed this topic with the Secretary of the Central Committee of the LCY, Edvard Kardelj, and, later, in dialogues between Ben Bella and Tito, which FLN study group also attended. These exchanges provided a chronological framework for Yugoslavia's immediate post-war development, focussing on the process of nationalization, the disadvantages of centralized management, particularly bureaucratic and technocratic tendencies. The discussions also went over Yugoslavia's gradual decentralization, beginning with the introduction of the consultative bodies in the enterprises and economic authority, culminating in the introduction of self-management in the early 1950s.

Although Tito and Kardelj organized their presentation to highlight many stages of Yugoslavia's socialist development and the difficulties faced along the road, their approach

⁴⁷⁴ The FLN delegation further included: Derradji Lakhdar, Head of the FLN Federation for the Setif area, Amrani Djamal, responsible for the Politburo press issues, Hamadache Ali, member of the Economic Committee of the Politburo and Commission for Autogestion of the FLN, Ouartsu Kamel, officer of the Algerian National Army, Benyakous Abdelkader, Secretary of the Association of Teachers and member of the Executive Committee of the UGTA, and Aouchithe Abdelmajid, member of the Directorate of the Algerian Cooperative Movement, AJ-507/IX, 2, *Sastav partijske delegacije FLN Alžira*, 17.

⁴⁷⁵ MAU, Kutija 3, *Studijska grupa FLN*, 4.

was noticeably academic and abstract. In conversations with Pečar, the leader of the FLN delegation Lashgar Laid mentioned that many of the issues were discussed too theoretically in the conversations with local functionaries after Kardelj's introductory lecture.⁴⁷⁶ However, this tendency toward theoretical explanations was seen even in the conversations with high ranking party officials as well as with the Yugoslav president. The notes from these discussions do not provide specific instances or in-depth explanations of the mechanisms used at different phases of development, therefore, the process was not well supported by the examples on the field or useful insights. Tito, for example, reduced bureaucracy, the process of decentralization and the introduction of self-management to one general paragraph:

*In our development, there was the emergence of bureaucracy, which usually follows any system. Even socialism is not immune from it. It is like a polyp and has many arms. It is difficult to liquidate, once caught. That's why we went in the direction of decentralization, which is the only way to liquidate the bureaucracy in the center. But we have not completely liquidated it, because it also appears below, in the lower bodies. Bureaucracy is like a snake - it lives even when one part of its body is cut off. In addition, control in the factories could not be carried out from the center, and this hampered production. That's why we implemented decentralization, gave the factories first to the republics, and then to the communes. The most important act in that direction was the introduction of workers' self-management, which we definitively legalized in 1952.*⁴⁷⁷

While these metaphors may have helped in understanding how pervasive and complicated the bureaucratic tendencies were, they fell short of providing a comprehensive and detailed explanation of how it actually worked in practice. As a result, no explicit examples of bureaucratic procedures, structures or actual consequences were provided in Tito's statement. Although decentralization is clearly positioned as a solution to these challenges, the process is not thoroughly explained. It fails to address critical issues such as the transfer of the authority, the improvement in governance and workers' control or the exact steps implemented to execute decentralization. The introduction of workers' self-management was mentioned only briefly in a single sentence while simultaneously being presented as the pinnacle of the decentralization process. As a result, the Algerian delegation's primary interests, which were the early stages of Yugoslav socialism and workers' self-management,

⁴⁷⁶ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 7.

⁴⁷⁷ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 73-74.

were only shortly mentioned. Even though Kardelj went into greater detail than Tito, by outlining the creation of early factory bodies such as consultative production councils and the progressive economic independence of the enterprises, such as allowing the trade between them or machinery resale,⁴⁷⁸ his presentation also lacked concrete examples to clarify these procedures and how these bodies operated. The same issue was vivid in the explanation of early stages of self-management. Kardelj explained that in the initial phase of self-management, ministries' responsibilities were increasingly shifted to enterprises, and he recounted the gradual adoption of workers' councils, which began in some of the industrial enterprises and eventually spread to other areas such as railways or postal services, but also the most recent implementation of the system in health or educational institutions.⁴⁷⁹ While Tito mentioned some early challenges, such as workers' confusion about the difference between social and private ownership and instances where directors exploited workers' councils,⁴⁸⁰ he did not provide concrete examples that could have clarified these issues. According to Pečar's report, the Algerian delegates were generally expecting more in the terms of explaining the management processes.⁴⁸¹ Given the importance of these matters for the upcoming Congress and the creation of the Algerian Charter, this was especially significant for the delegates. Furthermore, the proposed administrative restructuring in Algeria, which was supposed to make communes its cornerstone,⁴⁸² was completely left out of the conversation. Kardelj just said that the delegates would see that in practice,⁴⁸³ leaving an important issue unaddressed.

Another topic of interest for the Algerian delegation was the Yugoslav agricultural system. Various questions were asked about the relationship between private producers and cooperatives, various types of the latter, issues around the ownership of the land, the impact of the Yugoslav reforms and mechanisation on the countryside, agricultural products, and management of the farms.⁴⁸⁴ Ben Bella and Tito briefly discussed mechanisation in rural areas, with Tito indicating that machines and loans for the machines were primarily provided

⁴⁷⁸ AJ-507/IX, 2, Razgovori između delegacije CK SKJ i studijsko-partijske grupe FLN-a vođenih 6. marta 1964.godine, 14-17.

⁴⁷⁹ AJ-507/IX, 2, Razgovori između delegacije CK SKJ i studijsko-partijske grupe FLN-a, 22-23.

⁴⁸⁰ AJ- 837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 74-75.

⁴⁸¹ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 8.

⁴⁸² The Charter called for a radical administrative reorganization with the aim of making the commune the basis of political, economic and social organization in order to prevent the establishment of a bureaucratic state. See: Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*, 127.

⁴⁸³ AJ-507/IX, 2, Razgovori između delegacije CK SKJ i studijsko-partijske grupe FLN-a, 23.

⁴⁸⁴ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 4-6; AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške vođene prilikom razgovora između studijske grupe FLN Alžira i jedne grupe drugova iz CK SK Srbije, 19.

for the cooperatives rather than individual producers as to expand the socialist sector, but without going into greater details of the process because of the time constraints.⁴⁸⁵ Instead, Tito focused on promoting Yugoslavia's accomplishments by providing quantifiable statistics such as the agricultural output in the socialist sector of wheat and sugar beet, as well as plans for future productivity increases.⁴⁸⁶ Kardelj did not differ greatly by glossing over the process of agricultural development and mentioning results such as Yugoslavia being the only country that managed to greatly improve its agricultural production in comparison to other socialist countries similarly to Tempo during his already mentioned visit to Algeria in January 1963.⁴⁸⁷ According to Pečar, this appeared to be a defining feature of the Yugoslav approach to discussions which he strongly criticised. He contended that talking about results through the "forest of numbers and percentages" without explaining concrete measures on the ground could be interpreted as "propagandistic."⁴⁸⁸

One possible explanation for not dwelling too much on the topic of agriculture could be that Yugoslav politicians recognized Algeria's achievements in the development of self-managed agriculture. During the conversations with the FLN delegation, Edvard Kardelj acknowledged that Algeria had ensured more rapid progress of agriculture by not introducing collectivization as Yugoslavia did immediately after World War II,⁴⁸⁹ and, as it was mentioned in Chapter 4 through his conversations with the Minister of Agriculture, he was eager to expand the cooperation in this field and learn more about the mechanisms of Algerian autogestion in agriculture. Thus, on one side, there was a need to highlight the distinctive achievements, particularly in comparison to other socialist countries, but, on the other, Yugoslav officials also tried not to, as Vlahović stated, "carry the flag" of self-management after witnessing the results of Algerian autogestion.

Further important topic was the Yugoslav financial policy because of the poor financial literacy in Algeria marked by the lack of skilled accountants and bookkeepers which state administration used as a justification for monitoring the finances of the self-managed agricultural estates and industrial enterprises.⁴⁹⁰ This was especially visible in the field of

⁴⁸⁵ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beležka o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 79-80.

⁴⁸⁶ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beležka o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 80.

⁴⁸⁷ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora između delegacije CK SKJ i studijsko-partijske grupe FLN, 18-19.

⁴⁸⁸ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 8.

⁴⁸⁹ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora između delegacije CK SKJ i studijsko-partijske grupe FLN, 18.

⁴⁹⁰ Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management*, 155.

credits and loans which were hard to obtain despite their importance in acquiring new machinery and subsidising efforts to increase immediate production.⁴⁹¹ While management committees had the statutory right to request loans, financial institutions such as *Caisses Régionales de Crédit* (CRC) for agriculture or *Banque Centrale d'Algérie* (BCA) for industry, were hesitant to invest in autogestion because of perceived lack of profitability and organizational inefficiency which made the committees applying for loans in foreign banks.⁴⁹² Thus, recognizing the gravity of the situation, members of the FLN study group held thorough conversations with the Federal Secretary for Finance, Kiro Gligorov. The delegation was interested in the overall credit and banking system, credit policies toward enterprises, investment financing mechanisms, and investment goals.⁴⁹³ These discussions were highly interactive, with Algerian delegates frequently interrupting to ask questions about the reserve funds and their purposes, loan interest rates, the structure of National Bank of Yugoslavia (*Narodna banka Jugoslavije*)⁴⁹⁴ and its branches, the issuing bank, financial planning authorities, and pricing mechanisms.⁴⁹⁵ Gligorov and other officials participated in the two-hour long discussion in which they gave a detailed explanation of the formation, decentralization and operation of the banking and credit system, having answered to all of the questions in great detail and leaving Algerian delegates with highly positive impressions that

⁴⁹¹ When loans were approved, they were mostly short-term (one year at most) at a 6% interest rate while private institutions rates were between 8 and 15%. See: Laks, Monique, *Autogestion ouvrière et pouvoir politique en Algérie (1962-1965)*, Edition de Paris, Paris, 1970, 45.

⁴⁹² For instance, in July 1963, agricultural estate Ben Aida was granted a loan from the Algiers branch of Barclays Bank which was commented by the Algerian Press Service as a "first mark of confidence of the Western financial world towards the socialist experiment which proceeds in Algeria." See: Laks, *Autogestion ouvrière et pouvoir politique*, 44-45.

⁴⁹³ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške razgovora studijske grupe FLN Alžira kod saveznog sekretara za finansije, održanog 7.marta 1964.godine, 2.

⁴⁹⁴ The National Bank of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was founded on January 15, 1946, and nationalized later that year on September 25, becoming a wholly state-owned organisation. This marked the nationalisation of banks, including the central bank, by laws and decrees from 1945 to 1946. By March 20, 1952, it had become the country's sole bank, responsible for "social records and control." However, centralised banking proved unproductive, having prompted the formation of specialized banks in the mid-1950s (Yugoslav Investment Bank, Yugoslav Foreign Trade Bank and Yugoslav Agricultural Bank) and additional decentralization in 1961. National payment transactions were removed from the National Bank in 1962, when the Social Accounting Service (*Služba društvenog knjigovodstva* – SDK) became independent. The SDK became an important organization that coordinated national payment operations and acting as a financial clearinghouse to ensure the financial system's transparency and efficiency. By focusing on these duties, the National Bank was able to concentrate on its primary central banking functions. A 1965 Statute established the National Bank as Yugoslavia's issuing bank, responsible for executing unified monetary, credit, and foreign currency policies, as well as administering international payments. See: *Istorijat Narodne banke Srbije*: https://www.nbs.rs/sr/o_nbs/jub140/jub_ist/ ; For more information on SDK see: Baković, Jerko, Dvadeset godina djelovanja Službe društvenog knjigovodstva, *Journal of Information and Organizational Sciences*, (2-3), 1979, pp. 335-354.

⁴⁹⁵ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške razgovora studijske grupe FLN Alžira kod saveznog sekretara za finansije, 8-28.

Hamadashi Ali, member of the Commission for autogestion of the FLN, said that they planned on applying some of the things that had been discussed.⁴⁹⁶

Gligorov urged Algerian representatives to examine specific topics covered during their visits to enterprises, neighbouring republics, and communes. However, according to Pečar's account, Laid regretted that some of the aspects in this field were presented in an abstract way during later conversations.⁴⁹⁷ Pečar also reported that Algerian delegates especially criticised the absence of available materials, noting that conversations, such as those with Gligorov, would have been more productive if accompanied by documentation in French that they could then take back with them to Algeria.⁴⁹⁸ Gligorov responded to Pečar's advice by offering to provide further materials to Algeria via the Yugoslav embassy upon request.⁴⁹⁹ The issue of lack of materials provided by the Yugoslav organizers was not novel; it had been a recurring shortcoming since the start of the cooperation in the field of self-management through the national trade union centres in 1959 when materials were produced retroactively rather than in advance. Given the amount of theoretical and numerical data such as branched banking system or various types of loans and interest rates, providing the Algerian delegates with essential documentation during key meetings was crucial, especially because they expressed the willingness to implement Yugoslav mechanisms in their own financial policies. This lack of preparedness thus represent broader issues with the Yugoslav approach to enabling international cooperation, in which logistical and communicative gaps frequently undercut otherwise well-intended initiatives.

5.2.1 Different notions and applications of workers' self-management

During conversations with the FLN delegation and president Ben Bella, there were significant disparities in how Kardelj and Tito conceptualized workers' self-management. Tito, in particular, emphasised that self-management allowed workers to take ownership and control of factories as to stimulate initiative, and thus encourage more concern for the means of production. One of his remarks during the meeting may best encapsulate what he viewed as the cornerstone of a thriving socialist self-managed society:

⁴⁹⁶ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške razgovora studijske grupe FLN Alžira kod saveznog sekretara za finansije, 28.

⁴⁹⁷ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 8.

⁴⁹⁸ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 9.

⁴⁹⁹ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške razgovora studijske grupe FLN Alžira kod saveznog sekretara za finansije, 28.

*Today, our factories are schools not only for managers, but also for workers who manage. They raise them to a higher level both in terms of expertise and in terms of management. The worker must also rise politically. That's why we introduced self-management not only in factories, but also in other institutions, and in residential communities. It can be said that our entire country represents a Yugoslav collective that is being educated and re-educated in its internal development. There are, of course, workers' universities and other vocational schools. But the education of a conscious socialist citizen is a matter for our entire society, our entire community.*⁵⁰⁰

Tito highlights workers' self-management primarily as a **sociopolitical** process based on education and societal upliftment. Factories are depicted not just as centers of production, but educational institutions that were supposed to erase the traditional workers-managers division in order to involve workers more directly in decision-making. He went on to say that the goal was not simply the vocational training but also the political empowerment of workers which would consequently affect broader society. In that sense, he continued by mentioning the social self-management that served as an example of the larger society that strived to rule itself according to socialist ideas.

Throughout the conversations with Ben Bella, Tito mentioned in many instances the importance of the educational institutions and socio-political organizations in this process which is not a coincidence. Namely, the FLN delegation informed the LCY officials that they had launched a statewide literacy campaign, particularly for party officials given that 85% of the FLN activists were illiterate.⁵⁰¹ Furthermore, UGTA was marginalized in this process, while Algeria, unlike Yugoslavia, did not have a mass socio-political organization such as the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY). Pečar stated that the FLN delegation demonstrated little interest in the activity of this organization.⁵⁰² However, the shorthand notes of the conversations between FLN and LCY delegates contradict his conclusion. For example, at the opening speech in a meeting with the members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS), Lashgar Laid praised SAWPY for its role in creating a "revolutionary regime."⁵⁰³ During further conversations with the LCS

⁵⁰⁰ AJ- 837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 77.

⁵⁰¹ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora između delegacije CK SKJ i studijske partijske delegacije FLN, 17-18.

⁵⁰² MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 4.

⁵⁰³ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške vođene prilikom razgovora između studijske grupe FLN Alžira i jedne grupe drugova iz CK SK Srbije, 7. marta 1964.godine, 2.

delegates, as well as in the meeting with Milentije Popović, a member of the Central Committee of the LCY, the FLN delegates asked questions that included enquiries into the relationship between SAWPY and LCY, the organization's budget and subsidies, the leadership structure, as well as the decision-making processes.⁵⁰⁴

Edvard Kardelj told the FLN delegation that workers' self-management should be viewed primarily as a **socioeconomic** relationship rather than a political one.⁵⁰⁵ He concentrated on the issues such as planning procedures, the growth of the free market, and investment methods. When discussing the creation of the workers' councils, Kardelj highlighted that workers required material incentives to effectively manage enterprises. To this goal, remuneration was connected to work production, specifically the income of the enterprise. He went further as to explain that this method incentivised workers to maximize their output as to ensure that their efforts were as efficient as possible, viewing it as the solid foundation for the efficacy of the workers' councils.⁵⁰⁶ Tito, Gligorov, and Milojko Drulović, a member of the Central Committee of the LCS, were, unlike Kardelj, openly critical of the issues surrounding income distribution and remuneration. They noted that many issues remained unsolved by considerable salary discrepancies both inside and across industries and the necessity of rethinking the strategies in this matter.⁵⁰⁷

These differences in conceptualizing workers' self-management arose from internal factions within the high ranking officials of the LCY in regard to the market-oriented economic reforms. On one side there was the pro-reform current, which was mostly made up of functionaries from the more developed north-western republics of Croatia and Slovenia, including Kardelj who originated from the latter. This group argued for decentralization and market mechanisms and claimed that such reforms would boost productivity and efficiency. On the other side was the conservative centralist wing, which was mostly made up of officials from less developed countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia. This faction claimed that such processes could increase economic inequalities, favor more developed republics and

⁵⁰⁴ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora izmedju delegacije CK SKJ i studijske partijske delegacije, 12, 20; AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške vođene prilikom razgovora između studijske grupe FLN Alžira i jedne grupe drugova iz CK SK Srbije, 5, 25.

⁵⁰⁵ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora izmedju delegacije CK SKJ i studijsko-partijske grupe FLN, 22.

⁵⁰⁶ AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora izmedju delegacije CK SKJ i studijsko-partijske grupe FLN, 17-20.

⁵⁰⁷ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 75; AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške razgovora studijske grupe FLN Alžira kod saveznog sekretara za finansije, 27.

promote social stratification.⁵⁰⁸ Tito, however, took a balanced stance, attempting to reconcile these opposing viewpoints while maintaining an ideological commitment to socialism and pragmatic economic measures.⁵⁰⁹

This visit also gives insight into different understandings of self-management between Algeria and Yugoslavia. While the Yugoslav leadership framed the model as a long-term model with the aim of transforming Yugoslav society as a whole, the remarks given by the FLN delegation and Ben Bella revealed a different approach, based on Algeria's urgent need for **rapid modernisation** and economic recovery following 132 years of colonial rule and eight years of war. Pečar's conclusion was that the FLN delegation claimed that it was crucial to skip developmental stages, that is, to adapt their current development to the most recent and effective measures as they saw themselves as capable of quickly adopting and transferring other countries' methods.⁵¹⁰ This is best exemplified by Ben Bella's response to Tito's presentation on the issues of income distribution and remuneration:

*Sorry to interrupt you. In our country, workers' self-management has existed for a little more than a year, but all these negative things appear here as well. You see, how quickly we learn, and how a person is the same, no matter where he is.*⁵¹¹

While Tito noted that challenges such as these remained, but were supposed to be resolved gradually through "perpetual reorganizations" as Edvard Kardelj described Yugoslav socialist development to the FLN group,⁵¹² within a long-term process, Ben Bella, in sharp contrast, interpreted Tito's remark as evidence of Algeria's rapid success by claiming that Algeria accomplished in one year what Yugoslavia had taken more than a decade to achieve. This statement can, therefore, depict Algeria's approach to self-management which was not implemented as a long-term process of social and political transformation, but as an instrument for quick economic recovery. For Algerian president, income distribution was not an ideological difficulty, as it was the case in Yugoslavia, but rather a pragmatic problem that could be solved fast by skipping some of Yugoslavia's developmental stages, such as the decentralization process, bureaucracy reduction and actual workers' control of the agricultural

⁵⁰⁸ For a detailed and in-depth analysis of the party strife regarding to the market-oriented reforms see: Unkovski-Korica, Vladimir, *The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia: From World War II to Non-Alignment*, I.B.Taurus, London/New York, 2016.

⁵⁰⁹ Unkovski-Korica, *The Economic Struggle for Power*, 202.

⁵¹⁰ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 1.

⁵¹¹ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 75.

⁵¹² AJ-507/IX, 2, Stenografske beleške sa razgovora između delegacije CK SKJ i studijsko-partijske grupe FLN, 6.

estates or enterprises. Algerian notion thus represented an understanding of possibility to achieve the same level of development without necessarily pursuing the same long-term framework as Yugoslavia did.⁵¹³

Chapter 3 already mentioned autogestion as a tool of consolidating power domestically, but it was also a tool for gaining international support, thereby improving Algeria's revolutionary image.⁵¹⁴ For instance, during the visit to Yugoslavia, Ben Bella claimed that Algeria's achievements put it in the "forefront of contemporary socialist movements."⁵¹⁵ This visit also demonstrates how he utilized autogestion for his own personal narrative of a revolutionary leader capable of rapidly transforming Algeria. For example, he told Pečar that he would help Tito in providing "new oxygen to world socialism."⁵¹⁶ Rubinstein claimed in his study that this type of statements were "annoying his hosts",⁵¹⁷ but he does not offer specific examples that could support that claim. Statements like these, or the one when Ben Bella said at the end of the conversation with Tito that Yugoslav experience was "not 100% positive" but still "very positive"⁵¹⁸ do indeed pose a good question on Yugoslav attitude toward Ben Bella during this visit. It seems that these statements had no consequences neither on his reputation within Yugoslav political elite nor on the further cooperation. Ben Bella was excellent in balancing three things: positioning Algerian achievements and himself as one of the key factors of socialist self-managed development next to Yugoslavia, admiring Yugoslav achievements by praising the Yugoslav technical assistance as demonstrated in Chapter 4, and reassuring Tito that he understood, if only theoretically, the essence of the long-term process workers' self-management demanded. In the terms of the third point, the exchange between Tito and Ben Bella at the end of the conversation on Yugoslav socialist development was quite paternalistic. Namely, Ben Bella summarized Tito's points by claiming that self-management was a process that had to be continuously studied, and that it was necessary to have trust in workers that Tito, as a satisfied mentor, affirmed with "that's right."⁵¹⁹

⁵¹³ Pečar, in one of his notes, claimed that this type of belief stemmed from Algeria's vast wealth, as evidenced by its agriculture, oil and gas resources. This wealth, he contended, created a politically "grandiose" and "overbearing" mindset. See: MAU, Kutija 3, Neke teze iz zabeleški, Alžir 1963, 5.

⁵¹⁴ Helie, *Počeci samoupravljanja u Alžiru*, 49.

⁵¹⁵ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 206.

⁵¹⁶ MAU, Kutija 3, Studijska grupa FLN, 3.

⁵¹⁷ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 206.

⁵¹⁸ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 81.

⁵¹⁹ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o nastavku jugoslovensko-alžirskih razgovora, 81.

From Tito's perspective, as it was the case with Tempo, this is an affirmation of Ben Bella's further dedication to self-management and readiness to absorb and internalize lessons from Yugoslavia's approach. This exchange thus underlines Yugoslavia's reliance on charismatic leaders in its non-aligned foreign policy. On one hand, Tito saw Ben Bella as a reflection of his younger self, while Ben Bella managed to assert Algeria's position during the visit which all together created a dynamic that aided mutual understanding. Thus, despite Ben Bella's occasional overstatements on Algerian achievements - in comparison to the actual state of autogestion in practice - these discussions ultimately did not give any sign of his diminished image. The FLN study group's considerable interest in different areas of the Yugoslav self-management together with clear determination to implement some of its mechanisms, therefore, solidified further Yugoslavia's influence on Algerian autogestion and created a groundwork for closer cooperation, which will be discussed in the following section.

5.3 Continued Engagement: Follow-up visits and ongoing dialogue

Despite the complex presentations on the topic of Yugoslav self-management, this visit was a strong foundation for further cooperation between the parties. The Vice-President of Yugoslavia, Aleksandar Ranković, emphasised that Yugoslavs and Algerians knew each other very well, but that it was necessary to deepen the knowledge of both sides through frequent visits and exchange of experiences that would contribute to the progress and enrichment of already existing cooperation through study programs for groups of diverse character, as well as the exchange of various materials and information.⁵²⁰ Invitations to the Eight Congress of the LCY in December 1964 followed, while Ben Bella invited Yugoslav delegation to attend the First Congress of Self-Managing Workers in Industry in March 1964 and the First Congress of the FLN in April 1964.⁵²¹

Some of the interests discussed during the visit had the opportunity to be deepened by the visit of the FLN delegation to attend the Eight LCY Congress in December 1964. Delegation members Bouchaib and Cherid visited *IMR* and *21.maj* (May 21st) factories in the municipality of Rakovica in Belgrade, where, after enterprise-viewing, they had a one-hour conversation with representatives of the enterprise and the Municipal Committee. As it was the case in March 1964, these delegates were particularly interested in the method of preparing the principle of remuneration according to work, the delimitation of competences at

⁵²⁰ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o završnim jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima, 87-88.

⁵²¹ AJ-837, I-3-a/2-8, Beleška o završnim jugoslovensko-alžirskim razgovorima, 88.

individual management bodies, and with special attention they analyzed the place and role of the party in the enterprise.⁵²² The director of the WU *Djuro Salaj* in Belgrade and his deputy received the delegation who was attentive to the role of workers' universities in the general system of education, the method of financing, operation, and establishment.⁵²³

The lively interest in and reliance on Yugoslav experiences was best illustrated by Veljko Vlahović's visit to Algeria at the end of February 1965, who led the LCY delegation, planned with the aim of introducing FLN personnel more closely to workers' and social self-management.⁵²⁴ During his stay, Vlahović visited several agricultural properties in the vicinity of Oran in the west, Constantine in the east, and Oases in the south.⁵²⁵ In addition to discussions with Ben Bella and members of the Politburo, a conference of FLN personnel from all over Algeria was organized on behalf of Vlahović's arrival,⁵²⁶ for which the FLN activists prepared a list containing 77 questions related to self-management with the intention to closely present their current problems and find the most suitable ways to solve them. The list of questions affirms some of the already identified interests of Algerians, such as the development of agriculture, the role of directors and the party in self-management, as well as the distribution of income and remuneration, but it also indicates curiosity of the FLN functionaries on the Yugoslav perspective on the direction of Algerian internal development being specifically interested in the opinion on the Algerian Charter, as well as the view on the differences between the Yugoslav and Algerian self-management and what the LCY delegation attributed those differences to.⁵²⁷

Given that the majority of the FLN activists were illiterate, the significant number of questions directed toward Vlahović demonstrates not only the reliance of the FLN activists on Yugoslav self-management, but also their capability of quickly deepening and expanding their knowledge on this issue which Vlahović saw as a quite positive development. Unlike the ambassador Nijaz Dizdarević, who, for instance, believed that FLN personnel was not able to understand the concept of the Algerian Charter, Vlahović considered that the activists he met were "bright" with "very solid political literacy."⁵²⁸ However, he also identified opportunities for improvement, particularly in the development of party cadres and the

⁵²² AJ-507/IX-2, Izveštaj o boravku delegacije FLN Alžira na VIII. Kongresu SKJ, 4.

⁵²³ AJ-507/IX-2, Izveštaj o boravku delegacije FLN Alžira na VIII. Kongresu SKJ, 5.

⁵²⁴ AJ-507/IX-2/2-80, Pripreme za posetu Veljka Vlahovića i delegacije Alžiru od 22.2. do 4.3. 1965, 2.

⁵²⁵ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 46380, 1.

⁵²⁶ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 46380, 1.

⁵²⁷ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f. 3, d. 9, s. 428509, 1-4.

⁵²⁸ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f.3, d. 9, s. 413461, 7.

elimination of the administrative inefficiencies left over from colonial period.⁵²⁹ This dual perspective enabled him to not only provide vital counsel and support to the FLN, but also to convey a sense of mutual respect and dedication to further cooperation in the field of self-management.

The adoption of Algerian Charter, which established autogestion as the foundation of the Algerian socialist development, marked a watershed moment in the country's political trajectory that directed FLN to draw more on Yugoslav mechanisms of self-management. Study groups and mutual participations in congresses were venues of cooperation, where actors included attempted to exchange their ideas and understandings of the common path of self-managed socialism. Even though Yugoslav and Algerian officials had different perspectives on the utilization of the idea, they did not impede further contacts between them. This was largely owing to Yugoslavia's approach to non-aligned foreign policy, which frequently highlighted building ties through charismatic leaders such as Ben Bella was and respecting Algerian specific local conditions. His reputation and affinity with Yugoslav leadership made him a key role in maintaining the strong links between the two countries. Furthermore, FLN displayed a desire to deepen its understandings of Yugoslav self-management through visits that laid groundwork for long-term cooperation and for envisioning more concrete and structured modalities of it in the future.

However, the final year of Ben Bella's leadership posed limitations to cooperation because it started to unfold in the period of rising internal problems. The self-managed sector that was supposed to be a revolutionary vehicle for postcolonial development stagnated as it was engulfed by state administration. Concurrently, a rising political crisis within the FLN, characterised by factionalism and internal power struggles, intensified unrest within Algeria. In addition, workers became increasingly dissatisfied and gradually became disenchanted with Ben Bella's policies and leadership. The mix of systemic inefficiency, political disagreements and social discontent highlighted the vulnerability of the leadership's attempt to implement autogestion. The situation reached a tipping point with Boumédiène's coup d'état in June 1965, which effectively brought the cooperation between Yugoslavia and Algeria to a halt, given the new cycle of political crisis and reserved attitude toward autogestion. The coup marked a significant withering away from autogestion as a core tenet

⁵²⁹ DAMSPRS, Alžir, 1965, f.3, d. 9, s. 413461, 7.

of Algerian socialism and, consequently, the realisation of the long-term plans of cooperation that Yugoslav and Algerian leadership wanted to create.

6. Conclusion

This thesis has shown, through a variety of specific instances, that workers' self-management was not just an ideological export from Yugoslavia to Algeria, but a significant area of cooperation between the two countries where socialist ideas, non-aligned solidarity, and practical obstacles intersected during the late years of Algerian War of Independence and in the early post-independence period.

Algeria's political and union leaders eagerly sought new ways of cooperating with their Yugoslav counterparts and saw self-management as a model for the development of the independent Algeria. This great interest fuelled Yugoslavia's drive to spread the processes and mechanisms of its socialist development and broaden its influence in the postcolonial world. However, as the thesis has shown, this close partnership was far from uncomplicated. Internal tensions challenged Yugoslav attempts, such as those between ideological devotion and economic pragmatism, or balancing the "exceptionality" of its own model and recognizing Algerian specificity as valid.

In investigating Yugoslav "exceptionalism", research discovered that many Yugoslav authorities such as Ilija Topaloski or Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo positioned self-management as a unique achievement of their socialist development that could not be replicated elsewhere, while at the same time they were using this "exceptionality" as an important factor to its diplomatic approach within the Non-Aligned Movement by promoting it as an example and a bridge to the postcolonial world. However, the case of Algeria also demonstrated that this claim was not uncontested. Veljko Vlahović said that Algerian autogestion had its own authenticity that should not be limited by Yugoslav interpretations of it. Such criticism challenges the story of one-way paternalistic approach and indicates a more dynamic and equal cooperation in which Algerian actors could reinterpret or reject certain aspects of the Yugoslav model.

The thesis also highlighted the methodological obstacles of circulating the highly complex system such as Yugoslav self-management to a different postcolonial society. While Algerian

trade unionists, ministers, and President Ben Bella expressed a strong interest in the processes and mechanisms of workers' councils, decentralisation, and workers' education, Yugoslav presentations sometimes failed to transmit these processes in an understandable and practical manner. Accounts from Algerian participants in discussions and seminars indicated a disconnection between the theoretical, often rigid, manner in which the system was described and the lived reality and urgent needs of postwar Algeria. This gap was caused by the lack of proper preparation by the Yugoslav side, but also by the dire conditions in which Algeria found itself in both during the war and early years of independence that could not allow for a better preparation or education on self-management. Nonetheless, research also demonstrated mutual dialogues and willingness to adapt and get to know each other better, as well as to find better ways of educating Algerians by taking into account their needs, wishes and criticism, as the examples of seminars for trade union leaders, vocational trainings for workers or discussions between FLN and LCY officials or Tito and Ben Bella have demonstrated.

The examination of the contradiction between political and economic goals revealed that Yugoslavia's desire to present itself as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement was increasingly challenged by domestic economic reforms and greater integration into the global market. Officially, cooperation with Algeria was based on solidarity between the two revolutionary, self-managed, non-aligned countries rather than on profit, but in fact, scientific-technical and trade cooperation were frequently hindered by Yugoslav enterprises' profit-driven performance. Late deliveries, damaged goods, and a lack of attention to Algerian requests harmed the main goals of Yugoslav-Algerian cooperation in the field of self-management. Ambassador Nijaz Dizdarević attempted to maintain the political relationship and bridge the gap between principles and reality, but structural difficulties remained, including the Algerian ones, such as the lack of skilled managers and directors or the political shifts as the example of Baba Ali project has shown. The outcome was a type of cooperation that could not reach its full potential given that it was highly susceptible to disintegration when political realities changed.

Despite hurdles, self-management shaped collaboration in agriculture by the participation of the large number of Yugoslav high-skilled workers; education by organising study programs and vocational trainings for union leaders and Algerian workers; and technical aid by providing tractors and other agricultural machinery that also contributed to a broader vision of non-aligned solidarity and peaceful coexistence in the Maghreb region. However, a shift in

political interests, particularly after the demise of Ben Bella, resulted in a steady decrease in the intensity of the cooperation.

While this thesis concludes with the political rupture of 1965 and the overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella, the circulation of the idea of workers' self-management in the Yugoslav-Algerian context did not completely cease with the change of leadership. Autogestion remained legally in place under Houari Boumédiène until the late 1960s, when in 1971, the regime introduced reforms that were characterised by a tighter state control over enterprises and agricultural estates. This period provides fertile ground for future research into how the Yugoslav model was reinterpreted and marginalized in a new Algerian development strategy that was less devoted to self-management, but still somewhat interested in the Yugoslav model, especially after 1971. Examining the circulation of the concept in this new political environment may shed light on how non-aligned and socialist cooperation adapted to altering domestic priorities. Furthermore, following how the Yugoslav model, mediated through Algeria, continued to circulate in Africa during Boumédiène period, would contribute to a more global understanding of workers' self-management and autogestion's transformations.

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