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An Analysis of Populism in the Habsburg Empire's Cisleithanian House of Commons as Exemplified by the Transition to the Gold Standard

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Abstract

This thesis investigates debates of the Cisleithanian *Abgeordnetenhaus* on the monetary reform to the gold standard of 1892. The primary research aim centres on the presence and use of modern populism defined in the ideational tradition. The goal is to expand the understanding of its origins, operation and its connection to nationalism beyond modern liberal democracies. The relevant stenographic protocols concerning the monetary transition were compiled into a corpus to enable a mixed-method study (frame and keyword analysis) at both club and individual levels.

The findings demonstrate that Cisleithania's gold standard debate was a moment in which globalisation shocks intersected with issues regarding legitimate representation, sovereignty, national identity, and mass politics. This resulted in the emergence of a salient populist rhetoric within some factions and individuals, particularly among those opposing the reform. They frequently employed anti-elitist, people-centrist, and exclusionary frames and keywords to attack alleged connections between the government, grand capital, and perceived Hungarian dominance. Thus, populism was present in Cisleithania, suggesting that it can be meaningfully applied as an analytical lens without anachronism.

Zusammenfassung

Diese Arbeit untersucht Debatten des cisleithanischen Abgeordnetenhauses zur Währungsreform hin zum Goldstandard von 1892. Das zentrale Forschungsziel konzentriert sich auf die Präsenz und Nutzung des modernen Populismus im Sinne des ideationalen Ansatzes. Die Absicht ist das Verständnis seiner Ursprünge, Funktionsweise und Verbindung zu Nationalismus über moderne liberale Demokratien hinaus zu erweitern. Die relevanten stenographischen Protokolle zum Währungsübergang wurden in einem Korpus vereint, um eine Mixed-Method-Analyse (Frame- und Schlüsselwortanalyse) auf Klub- und Individualebene zu ermöglichen.

Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Cisleithaniens Goldstandarddebatte einen Moment darstellte, in der Globalisierungsschocks mit Fragen der legitimen Repräsentation, Souveränität, nationaler Identität und Massenpolitik zusammentrafen. Dies führte zur Entstehung einer ausgeprägten Populismusrhetorik unter einigen Fraktionen und Individuen, insbesondere unter Reformgegnern. Sie verwendeten oft anti-elitäre, volkszentrische und ausgrenzende Frames und Schlüsselwörter um angebliche Verbindungen zwischen Regierung, Großkapital und einer wahrgenommenen ungarischen Dominanz anzugreifen. Somit war Populismus in Cisleithanien präsent, was darauf hindeutet, dass er ohne Anachronismus sinnvoll als Analyseinstrument eingesetzt werden kann.

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Introduction

Populism – Made of Gold

Populism is on the rise throughout the world. The re-election of Donald Trump as the 47th president of the United States,¹ the normalisation and success of far-right populist parties such as the Austrian FPÖ in 2024,² or the continued success of India's Narendra Modi,³ are all telltale signs that populism seems to be a relevant and viable strategy for political triumph.

Pappas Takis argues that a liberal democracy understands the undeniable heterogeneity of any society, whose ability to reach compromises must be safeguarded by a stable rule of law to create positive-sum outcomes. Populism works against this understanding.⁴ It is a political communication style where an *us versus them* narrative is placed at the centre of its rhetoric. Recent research has defined three core tenets of populism: it is *people-centrist*, *exclusionary*, and *anti-elite*. This actively exploits societal differences for political gain. While populists rarely succeed in dismantling the system they reach power in, their rule leads to consequences that are seemingly contrary to the populist tenets: an increase in judicial constraints, inflation, inequality, and debt, as well as decreases in trade, and media and electoral freedoms. These outcomes stay consistent for left and right-wing populists in different societal contexts and cultures,⁵ which begs the question: How do populists rise to power despite the often-observed negative impact of their policies? While there is no single root cause that determines the growth or decline of populism, the potential for their recent gains could be found in socio-economic issues, which are present in most regions and cultural contexts – be it in Europe, the Americas, or Asia.⁶ Current debates on populism highlights two broad fields of origin: macro-economic shocks,⁷ and

¹ Cf., Joosse, Paul and Dominik Zelinsky. 2022. *Berserk!:* Anger and the Charismatic Populism of Donald Trump. In: *Critical Sociology* 48 (6), 1073–1087, 1081.

² Cf., Wodak, Ruth. 2018. Vom Rand in die Mitte – „Schamlose Normalisierung“. In: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 59 (2), 323–335, 323.

³ Cf., Vasudeva, Feeza. 2025. Political Deification and Religious populism in Modi's India. In: *Populism* 8 (1), 133–160, 133.

⁴ Cf., Pappas, Takis S. 2019. Populists in Power. In: *Journal of Democracy* 30 (2), 70–84, 70.

⁵ Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch. 2023. Populist Leaders and the Economy. In: *American Economic Review* 113 (12), 3249–3288, 3250/3285-7.

⁶ Cf., Young, Clifford. 2024. Populism in 2024: Populism, Anti-Elitism and Nativism. Ipsos. <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-02/Ipsos%20Populism%20Final%20February%202024.pdf> (accessed on 20th April 2025).

⁷ Cf., Stankov, Peter. 2018. The Political Economy of Populism: An Empirical Investigation. In: *Comparative Economic Studies* 60 (1), 230–253, 230.

rapid cultural changes,⁸ which contribute to anxieties and losses. Both factors likely influence each other and are, more often than not, exacerbated by globalisation and technological progress.⁹

Centrally for this thesis, as populist parties and policies are on a fast ascent in large parts of the world, and as the connection between economic globalisation and a populist backlash has become clear,¹⁰ researchers have focused not just on the causes but also on the origins of populism. Betz Hans-Georg writes that “[d]espite all obvious differences between [the 19th century] and today, the conditions provoking populist response as well as the arguments and rhetoric employed by the populist movements then and today bear a striking resemblance.”¹¹ Importantly, as in the present, the origins of modern populism are closely related to globalisation and socio-economic changes. Especially central are developments surrounding monetary sovereignty and commercial connectiveness, which are also at the crux of this thesis. Just as populists critiqued the Euro as a tool of industrialists that would benefit the rich, the 19th century saw the emergence of the international gold standard – a different system facing similar criticisms by early populists.¹²

The gold standard cemented itself during the *First Globalisation*. Lasting from 1870 to 1913, it saw rapid market convergences, and the emergence of new economic mechanisms amid the increased trade of goods, services, ideas and technology.¹³ Amid these developments, the gold standard became the dominant global monetary system. In it, a currency is directly linked to, and secured by, the established value of gold.¹⁴ Its uncertain rise, beginning with Britain’s embrace in 1816, picked up pace only in the 1870s as the

⁸ Cf., Margalit, Yotam. 2019. Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered. In: *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 33 (4), 152–170, 166.

⁹ Cf., Rodrik, Dani. 2021. Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism. In: *Annual Reviews of Economics* 13 (1), 133–170, 135/166.

¹⁰ Cf., Rodrik, Dani. 2018. Populism and the economics of globalization. In: *Journal of International Business Policy* 1 (1), 12–33, 13.

¹¹ Betz, Hans-Georg. 2013. A Distant Mirror: Nineteenth-Century Populism, Nativism, and Contemporary Right-Wing Radical Politics. In: *Democracy and Security* 9 (3), 200–220, 201.

¹² Cf., Parlament Österreich. 1997. Stenographisches Protokoll – 101. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich. Wien, 13/25.

¹³ Cf., O’Rourke, Kevin H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2002. When did globalisation begin? In: *European Review of Economic History* 6 (1), 23–50, 27–28/45–46; cf., Cf., Broadberry, Stephen and Kevin H. O’Rourke. 2010. *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 100/120.

¹⁴ Cf., Ford, A. G. 1989. International financial policy and the gold standard. In: Mathias, Peter and Sidney Pollard (eds.). *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the Decline of the Roman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197–249, 199.

newly unified Germany, the United States, and the Latin Monetary Union, among others, followed Britain's example.¹⁵ Thus, as most of the world's largest and most developed markets pegged their currency to the metal, the gold standard seemed central in shaping and navigating socio-economic changes. López-Córdova and Meissner argue that trade flows between two countries increased by up to 30% if they both followed the gold standard, while 20% of the rise of global trade between 1880-1910 can be accounted to the gold standard.¹⁶ The economic weight and success of the countries that had adopted gold gave legitimacy to it, while ideologically demoting other commodity metals as lesser and unsuited for a civilised monetary system.¹⁷

However, just as in the present, this phase of sustained globalisation created economic shocks, losers, anxiety, and distributional struggles.¹⁸ Therefore, embracing the gold standard was neither uncontroversial nor straightforward, despite its positive sides. The gold standard entered the political limelight and represented both progress and distress, as heated discussions took place on the political battlefields to decide one's economic future. The most well-known case is the short-lived *People's Party*, also called *Populist Party*, in the United States, which disrupted the country's political scene from 1891 to 1896. One of their main goals was to stop the spread of monometallism and ensure the continuation of a bimetallist silver and gold system. This is best exemplified by the populist democratic nominee for the 1896 presidential election, William Jennings Bryan, and his famous *Cross of Gold* speech. His electoral defeat ended the political aspirations of a populist, bimetallist party program. However, it enabled the term and concept of populism to survive to the current day¹⁹ – connected through the common core tenets but without one universally accepted definition (see Chapter 3.3).

19th century American and, although to a lesser degree, German populism has been analysed already, as the possibility of parallels between the origins of populism and

¹⁵ Cf., Vurpillat Taylor. 2014. Empire, Industry, and Globalization: Rethinking the Emergence of the Gold Standard in the 19th-century World. In: *History Compass* 12 (6), 531–540, 532–534.

¹⁶ Cf., López-Córdova, Ernesto and Christopher Meissner. 2003. Exchange-Rate Regimes and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era. In: *The American Economic Review* 93 (1), 344–353, 344.

¹⁷ Cf., Yeager Leland. 1984. The Image of the Gold Standard. In: Bordo Michael/Schwartz Anna. *A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard. 1821-1931*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 651–670, 657.

¹⁸ Cf., Rodrik, 2018, 12–13; cf., Bräuer, Richard and Felix Kersting. 2023. Trade Shocks, Labour Markets and Migration in the First Globalisation. In: *The Economic Journal* 134 (1), 135–164, 135.

¹⁹ Cf., Fuentes, Juan Francisco. 2020. Populism, The Timeline of a Concept. In: *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 15 (1), 47–68, 53.

today's continued existence of the concept makes potential findings significant.²⁰ However, the political developments and rhetoric of other states going through similar socio-economic developments have not yet received as much attention in this matter. It is for this reason that this thesis focuses on the Habsburg Monarchy's political landscape.

Austria-Hungary – Anachronism or Revision?

The histories of the late Habsburg Empire and its society have long been written through a nationalistic lens that sees states, cultures and peoples only in the classifications of ethnicities and borders, and which has often been applied retrospectively. Grand narratives of an oppressive, doomed state dominate this discourse. For example, the oppression of Czechs by the Habsburgs opposed by the earlier golden age of a Czech state with the Přemyslids and the Luxembourg dynasties.²¹ Or the persisting image of the Monarchy as a people's dungeon in Slovenia whose end after 1918 meant the salvation into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.²² Importantly, these narratives primarily restrict themselves to the national context. Conversely, works on the *Gesamtmonarchie*, the entire monarchy, are relatively few and sparse compared to the national historiography.²³

Pieter M. Judson challenges this assumption, asserting that the Habsburg state was not doomed to collapse due to unbridgeable cultural differences.²⁴ In his highly influential work "The Habsburg Empire : A New History", he presents a revisionist interpretation on the empire's nationalism, stating that political conflicts created forms of nationalist self-identification as a top-down process, instead of the traditional view of nationalism

²⁰ See, for example: Peal, David. 1989. The Politics of Populism: Germany and the American South in the 1890s. In: *Comparative studies in society and history* 31 (2), 340–362; Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1997. Monetary Populism in Nineteenth-Century America: An Open Economy Interpretation. In: *Journal of economic history* 57 (2), 367–395; Dent, Christopher M. 2020. Brexit, Trump and trade: Back to a late 19th century future? In: *Competition & Change* 24 (3), 338–357; Giesen, David. 2019. Agrarian Populism in the 19th Century: Four Sources of Partial Success. In: *American journal of economics and sociology* 78 (3), 649–674; Azari, Julia and Marc J. Hetherington. 2016. Back to the Future? What the Politics of the Late Nineteenth Century Can Tell Us about the 2016 Election. In: *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 667 (1), 92–109.

²¹ Cf., Winkelbauer, Thomas. 2013. Die Habsburgermonarchie (1526-1918) als Gegenstand der modernen Historiographie. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 13–15.

²² Cf., Vodopivec, Peter. 2013. Die Habsburgermonarchie in der slowenischen Geschichtsschreibung. In: Winkelbauer, Thomas. 2013. Die Habsburgermonarchie (1526-1918) als Gegenstand der modernen Historiographie. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 200–210, 200-201.

²³ Cf., Winkelbauer, 17.

²⁴ Cf., Judson, Pieter M. 2016. The Habsburg Empire : A New History. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 270–271.

emerging as a bottom-up movement that inevitably led to conflict.²⁵ The underlying reasoning for this revision can be found in an apparent paradox in Austro-Hungarian society: Nationalism dominated public discourse in mass media and nonreligious civic life, but contemporary accounts showcase that these classifications and calls for nationalist loyalty were often disregarded in everyday conduct. Judson asserts that nationalism was primarily a political phenomenon played out within political institutions by public actors, such as elected officials. Recognising this, he applies the term *nationalist conflicts* instead of *nationalities conflicts* to emphasise the political character of Austria-Hungary's ethnic disputes. The importance of these political agendas lies within the expansion of suffrage and the rise of mass politics in the Habsburg state since 1867, so Judson. Political movements adapted their programs to broader voter bases, becoming increasingly populist in the process. They often utilised cultural-nationalist arguments based on language use and exclusionary tactics, such as antisemitism, to unite constituents from different social classes. Voting reforms in the 1880s allowed new, more radical populist nationalist factions to enter the legal and institutional structures, amongst them the *Jungtschechen* and Karl Lueger's Antisemites. They challenged incumbent, often liberal politicians by painting them as self-serving, corrupt and traitors to the national cause.²⁶

Thus, throughout his work, Judson connects nationalism to mass-based, democratic politics maintained by populist practices. However, his work's focus relegates populism to a secondary role in which it is not studied deeper. This lack of a distinct definition of populism means that, among other criticisms that are unrelated to this thesis,²⁷ Judson's connection between nationalism, democratisation and populism is not as clear cut as it might seem. Additional analysis and reflection are necessary to understand the role populism played in the struggle between political forces of old and new, and to gain a varied and nuanced interpretation of the Austro-Hungarian state and society.

²⁵ Cf., Szivós, Erika, Jan Surman, Jakub Beneš, Mladen Medved, Tamara Scheer, Maureen Healy, and Pieter M. Judson. 2019. Debate on Pieter M. Judson's *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*. *East Central Europe* 46 (2/3), 343–384, 343–345.

²⁶ Cf., Judson, 269–273/300/339.

²⁷ Cf., Szivós, 354–360.

Research Gap and Aim

When sitting members of the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, the lower house of the Austrian half of the Habsburg Dual Monarchy, debated a potential reform towards gold from the 11th to the 20th of July 1892 – almost concurrently to the American debates – they did so amidst socio-economic developments related to the two causes of populism: rapid cultural and economic change.²⁸ On an international level, the socio-economic tensions of the First Globalisation led to the emergence of modern populism. Nationally, political forces of old such as liberalism still dominated large parts of the political discourse, but the aforementioned new and more radical factions consolidated together with the ongoing democratisation and the rise of mass politics. However, while the effects and success of the reform have been analysed already,²⁹ the arguments and rhetoric that led to the adoption of the gold standard have not received much attention. All this together means that the debates capture a moment suitable for understanding the role populism played in the late Habsburg society.

Thus, this thesis aims to add to the renewed work on the historiography of Austria-Hungary by analysing previously neglected debates and employing new conceptual tools in the form of populism (see Chapter III). The goal is to evaluate the extent of which modern populism was used by Austria's political elite of the late 19th century and analyse their argumentative framing. Taking Judson's historiography into account, the following expectations arise for the analysis of populist rhetoric:

First, the analysis is expected to show that populism was employed primarily by the newer and radical nationalist forces to construct their own identity that goes beyond classes and encompasses a broad electorate, while clearly excluding peoples perceived as hostile, such as other ethnicities. This reflects Judson's results that populism is connected to

²⁸ Cf., Flandreau M. and J. Komlos. 2002. Core or Periphery? The Credibility of the Austro-Hungarian Currency 1867-1913. In: *Journal of European Economic History* 31 (2), 293–320, 306.

²⁹ See, for example: Flandreau M. and J. Komlos. 2002. Core or Periphery? The Credibility of the Austro-Hungarian Currency 1867-1913. In: *Journal of European Economic History* 31 (2), 293–320; Kramer Andreas. 2022. The Gold Standard in Austria-Hungary. In: *Procesos de Mercado: Revista Europea de Economía Política* 29 (2), 13–49; Tullio Giuseppe and Jürgen Wolters. Monetary Policy in Austria-Hungary, 1876:1913: An Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of the Central Bank's Discount Rate and the Liquidity Ratio. In: *Open Econ Review* 18 (1) 2007, 521–537.

nationalist ideologies benefitting from the democratisation to rouse the expanding electorate and change the political landscape as part of the nationalist conflicts.

Second, populism was used in its modern understanding as a conscious political strategy to exploit socio-economic and political tensions and mobilise constituents for political gain. This would support Judson's arguments that conflicts were oftentimes construed in the institutional setting of the Habsburg state.

Third, the existence of populist *and* non-populist rhetoric argues against the existence of an inevitable, teleological demise of Austria-Hungary into a clear set of nation-states. Instead, a variety in rhetoric and arguments will reveal the complexity and non-linear development of Habsburg society, thus, confirming Judson's notion that nationalist movements did not fatally weaken the state.

Lastly, all this is expected to show that the application of modern populism as an analytical lens can effectively contribute to a deeper understanding of the Cisleithanian state and society, displaying that the empire was not a historical anachronism. Instead, it reacted to socio-economic changes with political phenomena similar to those found in other states, such as the US and Germany. Classifying certain actors as populist is, therefore, not teleological, but has meaning outside of the present political happenings.

To confirm or deny these hypotheses, statements made by parliamentarians on the currency transition from the silver to the gold standard are put under scrutiny to answer the following main and secondary research questions underlying this thesis and its expectations:

1. To what extent can the debates in the Cisleithanian House of Commons on the gold standard be interpreted as an early example of populism?
 - a. Which rhetoric and arguments employed in the Cisleithanian parliamentary debates on the gold standard resemble populist discourse, if any?
 - b. How did different political factions in the *Abgeordnetenhaus* frame their position on the transition to the gold standard, and to what extent did these positions align with modern populism's core tenets?
2. Can the concept of populism be meaningfully applied to the Cisleithanian political context of the 1890s, or is it an anachronism?

- a. What can the application of populism as an analytical lens reveal about the politics of the multi-national Cisleithania?

Importantly, this thesis limits itself to the Cisleithanian House of Commons, leaving the Upper House of the *Reichsrat* and Transleithania out of the picture. Including them would be just as useful, but analysing them might go beyond the scope of this paper, due to the effort needed to extract the relevant information and the different economic and social factors of Transleithania, ultimately complicating and limiting potential findings.

To be successful in this research endeavour, chapters I and II cover the necessary historical context and background information for both the gold standard and the Habsburg Monarchy. Sections 1.1 to 1.3 show the historical context and rise of the monetary system, as well as its socio-economic significance. Chapters 2.1 to 2.2 present the institutional framework of the monarchy, the political setting of the debates, and the socio-economic situation leading up to the reform towards the gold standard.

Chapter III delves deeper into populism. Section 3.1 and 3.2 detail the origin and causes of the concept, while chapters 3.3 and 3.4 summarise the current scientific understanding of populism, define it for the purpose of this thesis, and, consequently, operationalise it for the analysis.

Chapter IV contains the literature review for the analysis, with subchapter 4.1 focusing on corpus analyses and 4.2 on the analysis of populism through corpora such as the one used in this thesis. Chapter V deals with methodological aspects. It presents how *Optical Character Recognition* software (OCR) was employed to extract the data, and details the make-up of the custom corpus containing all speeches held by the 53 speakers of the dataset. Next, the mixed-method approach is described, which consists of frame, keyword and qualitative analyses that build upon each other, going from the faction to the individual speaker levels. Lastly, limitations of this approach are given, as well as ways to account for them. The entire analysis is based on chapter III's definition and operationalisation of populism, which allows to ascertain populism as a uniform concept for comparisons both within and outside of the Cisleithanian context.

Chapter VI presents the results of the analysis, showcasing the occurrence and frequency of populist arguments and rhetoric to see if they were used by whom targeting which groups. Chapter VII finishes the thesis by presenting its most central conclusions and providing clear answers to the laid-out hypotheses.

I. The Gold Standard

Nowadays, the international monetary system is a set of arrangements negotiated (and renegotiated) carefully by government officials, experts and other actors. An example can be seen in the post-Bretton Woods financial order, where global organisations such as the *International Monetary Fund*, the *World Trade Organisation* or the *European Union* play an important role in regulating markets and finances. However, before, monetary arrangements depended on individual countries making individual decisions that more spontaneously gave birth to international financial orders. The gold standard was such a process.³⁰ In this chapter, the necessary international and financial context needed to understand the *Abgeordnetenhaus* debates will be established. To achieve this, I will, firstly, shortly discuss the workings of the international gold standard, outlining the theory, practical ramifications, and limitations of it, before section 2 will give an overview of the system's history, discussing how it spread across a multitude of different economies. Lastly, chapter 1.3 presents the socio-economic impact it had, showing who profited or lost why from the initial spread of the monetary system, and why its implementation was not an obvious choice.

1.1. The Functioning of the International Gold Standard

John Stuart Mill, one of the most influential economists of the 19th century, stated in his *Principles of Political Economy* that:

“[a]ll variations in the value of the circulating medium are mischievous: they disturb existing contracts and expectations, and the liability to such changes renders every pecuniary engagement of long date entirely precarious [...] Great as this evil would be if it depended only on accident, it is still greater when placed at the arbitrary disposal of an individual...”³¹

³⁰ Cf., Eichengreen, Barry. 2019. *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System* – Third Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 5.

³¹ Mill, John Stuart. 1848. *Principles of Political Economy*. Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 634.

To counteract these arbitrary price changes, Mill strongly recommends that a currency should be pegged to the commodity whose value is least liable to fluctuations, which he determines to be precious metals.³² The gold standard was such a commodity-based system, which was made up of three basic features: Firstly, it had to define its national currency units in terms of weight of gold. Secondly, if notes entered circulation alongside gold, then they had to be freely convertible at face value into gold bullion. Thirdly, gold exports and imports had to be permissible.³³ Precious metals were ideal for such a system, as they are durable, portable, standardisable, and money creation was limited to the existing stock and metal extraction. Thus, so the theory goes, the gold standard would ensure the price stability that 19th century states sought, as each country following the standard would clearly define the value of each part of their currency in gold and keep this price fixed. Furthermore, monetary authorities often ensured free convertibility between their currency and gold bullion, allowing public actors to trade between notes and metals freely. Because the public trusted the market to determine the real value of gold, convertibility ensured both confidence in the currency and reliable (legal) access to its value.³⁴ The established trust in a currency allowed states to use a so-called *fractional reserve gold coin standard*, which prevailed during the classical gold standard from 1870/80 to 1914. This specific system issued government- and commercial-notes to be used for everyday transactions, thereby working around the scarcity of gold, which was kept as a reserve and security in banks. Lastly, the gold standard is called international as any two or more countries adhering to the gold standard would automatically establish a connection to another's currency through the value of gold, despite relying on sovereign monetary systems. Domestically, it regulated money supply and discouraged reckless monetary policies. Internationally, it regulated the external value of a currency through fixed exchange rates and allowed for efficient trade and investment.³⁵

The public's trust in the market's ability to determine the accurate gold price rested on the assumption that it would automatically regulate and adjust itself. I.e., it would distribute gold evenly between all adhering nations to create an equilibrium, which disallowed any actor to hoard or exhaust themselves of the metal. The most influential theory explaining this process is David Hume's *price-specie flow model* of the mid-

³² Cf., *ibid*, 634.

³³ Cf., Ford, 199.

³⁴ Cf., Bordo, Michael D. 2009. *The Gold Standard & Related Regimes: Collected Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27–28.

³⁵ Cf., *ibid*, 28.

eighteenth century.³⁶ Hume states that any sudden change of a country's money supply would influence prices such that they would inevitably revert to their original level. For example, if four-fifths of a country's money supply would disappear, then the price of labour and wares would sink proportionally, causing the nation to massively undercut other competitors on the international stage. The consequent growth in exports would increase profits, leading to an inflow of money until the state reaches the price level of its trading partners, whereafter the export advantage disappears. The original situation is reestablished. Conversely, if the money supply were to increase massively, then the opposite effect would take place: wages and commodities would be expensive, leading to an influx of imports as foreign products become comparatively cheap, which leads to an outflow of money. Consequently, the local price level falls and equality is reached yet again.³⁷ Thus, the gold standard's automatic distribution mechanism would ensure world price stability, which, in turn, would allow for the classical principles of free enterprise and free trade due to the lack of human intervention.³⁸ However, as the gold standard reached its heyday in the late 19th century, a hundred years after Hume's death, it became increasingly clear that the idealised equilibrium Hume envisioned did *not* unfold automatically.

The main strength of Hume's model, its simplicity, failed to capture central aspects of the international gold standard. His equilibrium process proved to be too slow – which was, however, only fully recognised after World War I.³⁹ Further, as the exchange rates were fixed, monetary authorities had to adopt measures to ensure that the exchange rate would actually follow mint parity – i.e., that the exchange rate of two currencies remained stable while simultaneously following market prices of gold.⁴⁰ Thus, central banks frequently intervened, and they were expected to do abiding by, what Keynes famously termed, the *rules of the game*. This refers to central bank policies needed to maintain currency

³⁶ Cf., Eichengreen, Barry and Marc Flandreau. 1997. *The Gold Standard in Theory & History*. London: Routledge, 23.

³⁷ Cf., Hume, David. 1752. On the balance of trade. In: Eichengreen, Barry and Marc Flandreau. 1997. *The Gold Standard in Theory & History*. London: Routledge, 24–30, 25.

³⁸ Cf., Bordo, Michael D. and Anna J. Schwartz. 1984. *A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 29.

³⁹ Cf., Eichengreen, 23.

⁴⁰ Cf., Morys, Matthias. 2007. Adjustments under the Classical Gold Standard (1870s–1914): How Costly Did the External Constraint Come to the European Periphery? In: *Proceedings of OeNB Workshops, The Experience of Exchange Rate Regimes in Southeastern Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective* 13 (1), 50–79, 51–52.

convertibility and international monetary stability. If a country experienced gold and capital outflows, interest rates were supposed to be raised to stem further losses and lower price levels, which attracted capital. A country gaining too much gold and capital could lower interest rates to avoid excessive accumulation and inflation and encourage imports, as local price levels rose. However, such policies came at a price. Changing the interest rates influenced the cost of government debt, local borrowing, price levels and wages, which brought significant consequences for employment, investment, and domestic consumption. Italy, for instance, was forced to suspend convertibility from 1891 to 1903, and Argentina did so multiple times between 1876 and 1899, to allow their economy and budgets to stabilise. To conclude, central banks often had to choose between sticking to the rules – prioritising gold convertibility amid limited fiscal independence – or breaking the rules – emphasising national economic stability. Importantly, monetary authorities *could* deviate from the rules of the game in the short term, provided they maintained long-term credibility by signalling a continued commitment to convertibility.⁴¹

However, not every economy had equal financial liberties. The largest economies, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, or also Austria-Hungary could get away with breaking the rules of the game more frequently, as they possessed enough ‘pulling power’ to revert any financial outflow. This is especially true for the global financial centre of London, whose dominance in finance and capital enabled rapid wealth-mobility.⁴² On the other side of the spectrum were countries on the economic periphery, oftentimes smaller states, such as Serbia, Norway or Sweden. They had little room to manoeuvre and had to stick to the rules more rigidly to ensure trust in their commitment to the gold standard. This process was further exacerbated by the cross-influences central banks had, as the financial policies of one country could negatively influence another. Thus, to prevent financial chaos, central banks looked towards the Bank of England to harmonise their policies. This further reduced their ability to prioritise domestic stability.⁴³

A deeper examination of the shortcomings of the gold standard system would go beyond the research aim of this paper. Instead, this short overview serves to showcase both the

⁴¹ Cf., Eichengreen, 23–27/30–31/38.

⁴² Another example can be found in Austria-Hungary, whose gold reserves alone covered around 12% of the metal covered in worldwide national banks and treasuries, or 5.5% of the publicly traded stock. For more information, see ‘Morys 59’, or ‘Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei. 1892. Stenographische Protokolle über die vom 8. bis 17. März abgehaltenen Sitzungen der nach Wien einberufenen Währungs-Enquête-Comission. Wien, 214.’

⁴³ Cf., *ibid*, 30; cf., Morys, 53–54/70.

dominant economic theory of the time, Hume's price-specie flow mechanism and the rules of the game, and the evident failure of this assessment to recognise the need for continuous manual intervention to keep the system going. Although in theory it would ensure equality, in practice, its implementation remained not only controversial but also a source of socio-economic anxiety in many of the states that adopted it.

1.2. The Rise of the International Gold Standard

The origins of the gold standard can be found in eighteenth century England. A change to the legal ratio of silver to gold led to a silver outflow due to *Gresham's Law*.⁴⁴ This states that 'bad money drives out good'. To be precise, when two monetary units have the same nominal value, but a differing real (market) worth, then the cheaper money will replace the more expensive one.⁴⁵ England was, thus, put on a *de facto* gold standard as it was simultaneously emptied of its silver supply while a steady inflow of gold followed.⁴⁶ In 1816, recognising the circumstances, Britain switched to a *de jure* gold standard.⁴⁷ This would lay the groundwork not just for its own monetary stability, but for the eventual scramble for gold of the 1870s. This describes the transition of the global monetary system from a fixed exchange rate regime centred on bimetallist currencies to monometallism. This process, which is deeply intertwined with Britain's global economic and ideological influence, led the largest industrial economies to settle on gold.⁴⁸

A number of explanations can be found for the spread of the monometallist gold standard beyond Britain, which are all, individually, not enough to fully account for the ascent of the metal. The different causes suggested in the literature suggest that they may be seen as interrelated, and all influenced a potential adoption of the gold standard.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Cf., Duckenfield, Mark. 2016. *The Monetary History of Gold : A Documentary History, 1660-1999*. London: Routledge, 4–5.

⁴⁵ For a detailed discussion of the validity of Gresham's Law, see: 'Greenfield, Robert L and Hugh Rockoff. 1992. *Gresham's Law Regained*. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1–47.'

⁴⁶ Duckenfield, 5.

⁴⁷ Cf., Fay, C. R. 1935. Newton and the Gold Standard. In: *Cambridge Historical Journal* 5 (1), 109–117, 117.

⁴⁸ Cf., Wiegand, Johannes. Destabilizing the Global Monetary System: Germany's Adoption of the Gold Standard in the Early 1870s. In: *IMF Working Paper* 19 (32), 2–28, 4.

⁴⁹ Cf., Milward, Alan S. 1996. The Origins of the Gold Standard. In: Eichengreen, Barry, Jaime Reis and Jorge Braga de Macedo. *Currency Convertibility : The Gold Standard and Beyond*. London: Routledge, 85–100, 85–86; cf., Vurpillat, 532.

Firstly, shifts in gold and silver supply played a key role. Gold discoveries in California and Australia around the 1850s onwards eased scarcity, raising global circulation of monetary gold from £400 million to £750 million between 1848 to 1870. The 1870s saw a depreciation of silver prices by as much as 8% per annum, making it attractive to exporters of primary goods due to the increased competitiveness of their products. Gold, however, dominated in manufacturing and financial markets,⁵⁰ and was preferred by the creditors' class, the bourgeoisie, for its stability.⁵¹

Secondly, gold became associated with 'modernity' and 'civilisation' due to its connection to Britain. Its enormous economic, military, and social weight during the *Pax Britannica* encouraged states to adopt gold as part of a liberal, global trading system.⁵² Silver was seen as a lesser metal susceptible to international speculation.⁵³

Lastly, geopolitical changes accelerated the shift. Prior to the Franco-Prussian War, France stood as the bastion of bimetallism, playing an important role for balancing the silver-to-gold ratio due to its large share in global specie circulation. I.e., France's specie stock would change through either absorbing or ejecting silver or gold depending on market movements.⁵⁴ However, Germany's victory in 1871 brought large French war indemnities.⁵⁵ These enabled Bismarck to switch to the gold standard and sell the – now mostly defunct – German silver.⁵⁶ France, fearing that the resulting silver inflows might disconnect them from global capital streams and trade, followed suit.⁵⁷ Thus, the day after the indemnities were paid off and full financial freedom regained, France suspended silver coinage in 1873.⁵⁸ Subsequent attempts to bolster silver failed, leading to most industrialised nations joining the now-international gold standard (see Figure 1 and Table 1).⁵⁹ Thus, in the 1870s, gold was firmly entrenched as the leading metal of the 'modern' world. Yet, its continued rise was far from determined. Between 1870 to 1885, 15 states joined the gold standard, while the following 15 years saw only 6 countries adopt gold –

⁵⁰ Cf., Vurpillat, 533; cf., Milward, 86/88–89; cf., Eichengreen, 9.

⁵¹ Cf., Flandreau, Marc. 1996 The French Crime of 1873: An Essay on the Emergence of the International Gold Standard, 1870-1880. In: *Journal of Economic History* 56 (4), 862–897, 863.

⁵² Cf., Vurpillat, 533; cf., Milward, 86/88–89.

⁵³ Cf., Yeager, 657.

⁵⁴ Cf., Wiegand, 4/6–8.

⁵⁵ Cf., Vurpillat, 533.

⁵⁶ Cf., Michell, H. 1951. The Gold Standard in the Nineteenth Century. In: *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economie et de Science Politique* 17 (3), 369–376, 373.

⁵⁷ Cf., Oppers, Stefan Erik. 1995. Was the worldwide shift to gold inevitable? An analysis of the end of bimetallism. In: *Journal of Monetary Economics* 37 (1), 143–162, 144.

⁵⁸ Cf., Wiegand, 15.

⁵⁹ Cf., Michell, 872.

among them, Austria-Hungary. The following section details the global economic circumstances surrounding this slow-down and the eventual adoption of gold by the Habsburg Empire.




Figure 1, Number of Countries on the Gold Standard, 1816-1910 (see Table 1 for sources).

Country	Standard 1868	Standard 1908	Date of first joining
<i>Europe</i>			
Belgium	Bimetallic	Gold	1878
Denmark	Silver	Gold	1872
France	Bimetallic	Gold	1873
German States/Germany	Silver	Gold	1873
Greece	Bimetallic	Gold	1885
Habsburg Empire	Silver	Gold	1892
Italy	Bimetallic	Gold	1884
Netherlands	Silver	Gold	1875
Norway	Silver	Gold	1875
Portugal	Gold	Gold	1854
Romania	Bimetallic	Gold	1890
Russia	Bimetallic	Gold	1897
Spain	Bimetallic	Bimetallic	/
Sweden	Silver	Gold	1873
Switzerland	Bimetallic	Gold	1878
United Kingdom	Gold	Gold	1816
<i>North America</i>			
Canada	Gold	Gold	1854
United States	Bimetallic	Gold	1879
<i>Latin America</i>			
Argentina	Bimetallic	Gold	1883
Brazil	Gold	Gold	1846
Chile	Bimetallic	Gold	1895
Costa Rica	Bimetallic	Gold	1896
Guatemala	Bimetallic	Silver	/
Honduras	No specific system	Silver	/
Mexico	Silver	Gold	1905
Nicaragua	Bimetallic	Bimetallic	/
Peru	Bimetallic	Gold	1901
Salvador	No specific system	Silver	/
Venezuela	Bimetallic	Gold	1910
<i>Asia and Pacific</i>			
Australia	Gold	Gold	1852
China	Silver	Silver	/
Egypt	Gold	Gold	1885
India	Silver	Silver	/
Indonesia	Silver	Gold	1878
Japan	Silver	Gold	1897
Ottoman Empire	Bimetallic	Gold	1881
Persia	Bimetallic	Bimetallic	/
Philippines	Bimetallic	Gold	1903
Siam	Silver	Gold	1908

Table 1, *Global Currency Systems, 1868/1908*⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Cf., Eichengreen, Reis and Braga de Macedo, 113/118.

1.3. The First Globalisation and the Slowing Spread of Gold

The gold standard's implementation is interrelated to a drastic change of socio-economic circumstances taking place between 1870-1914, known as the *first globalisation*. This describes a sustained and prolonged period of integration of markets, which began in the 1820s, as is evident by global commodity price convergences.⁶¹ It reached its height between 1870-1913 and ended abruptly due to the First World War.⁶² Advances in railroad, shipping and communication technologies connected continents and made their interiors accessible. As transport prices dropped as a result, the Americas could quickly and forcefully enter the world market.⁶³ As an example, the layout of telegraph cables between the United Kingdom and the United States in 1866 reduced transmission time from 10 days to mere minutes, which lowered uncertainty and increased market integration. Consequently, North American wheat exports more than quadrupled from 1870 to 1913.⁶⁴ These advances, as well as accompanying financial systems such as new banking systems or the gold standard, were embraced quickly by the wealthier classes. However, the resulting changes also brought with it a globalisation shock, as ordinary citizens living in states affected by lowered prices were oftentimes unable to adapt to the socio-economic changes.⁶⁵ The gold standard arose precisely during this time. It allowed capital flows to easily shift from domestic to overseas investments, further fostering a global financial system. Trade accelerated as costs decreased and currency institutions were standardised due to the shared money regime, Fiscal spending was also restricted, which both limited and stabilised government finances. Lastly, the cost of borrowing on international capital markets decreased once a nation joined the gold standard.⁶⁶ However, despite its advantages, there exist clear reasons for the decrease in the spread of gold during the 1880s. These are similarly interrelated as the causes of its initial rise and can be separated into two main reasons: Firstly, changes in the global specie makeup,

⁶¹ Cf., O'Rourke and Williamson, 27–28/45–46.

⁶² Cf., Karlsson, Lars and Peter Hedberg. 2021. War and trade in the peaceful century: the impact of interstate wars on bilateral trade flows during the first wave of globalization, 1830–1913. In: *Economic History Review* 74 (3), 809–830, 809.

⁶³ Cf., Bräuer, Richard and Felix Kersting. 2023. Trade Shocks, Labour Markets and Migration in the First Globalisation. In: *The Economic Journal* 134 (1), 135–164, 138.

⁶⁴ Cf., Chilosì, David and Giovanni Federico. 2020. The effects of market integration during the first globalization: a multi-market approach. In: *European Review of Economic History* 25 (1), 20–58, 21/24.

⁶⁵ Cf., Fuentes, 55.

⁶⁶ Cf., Meissner, 10–11/14/17.

and, secondly, political developments. The wave of currency switches in the 1870s upset world trade drastically. Silver lost more than 17% of its value against gold until 1876 alone,⁶⁷ but its production would surge in the later 1870s. Gold production, on the other hand, decreased. Combined with the now-larger demand for it, severe deflation of almost 20% between 1873 to 1885 followed suit (as measured on the London market). Thus, gold itself lost one of its main arguments against silver: its stability. This economic period, named *the great depression* by contemporaries (see Chapter 2.2), was characterised by low economic growth and social conflicts between creditors and debtors, due to the deflationary increase in the real value of debt.⁶⁸

These global economic shocks revived discussions on bimetallism and the validity of silver, of which those in the United States and British India are the most important. If one or both settled on silver or bimetallism, then their large market could stabilise its price. If they would settle on gold, then silver's value could freefall. Eventually, the American presidential elections of 1892 and 1896 confirmed its commitment to gold, which ended any aspirations for the return of silver or bimetallism. Finally, in the second half of the 1890s, new gold discoveries in South Africa, Australia, and the Yukon alleviated the deflationary pressures.⁶⁹ Consequently, as gold stabilised and silver fell further, the pace of countries adopting gold as their lead metal began to increase again.

To conclude, I hope to have shown that the ascent of gold in the late 19th century was as much an outcome of contingency as of economic logic, due to the shifting economic realities and uncoordinated socio-political changes of the time. This paper's focus rests precisely within this last phase of renewed debates. Just before the economic and political uncertainties surrounding gold were solved, the question of the Austro-Hungarian monetary transition entered centre stage. The next chapter turns to the Habsburg Monarchy, exploring how its specific national complexities, economic conditions, and institutional framework shaped its political landscape and the debates to adopt the gold standard.

⁶⁷ Cf., Vurpillat, 534.

⁶⁸ Cf., Oppers, 155; cf., Wiegand, 4/8.

⁶⁹ Cf., Vurpillat, 535–536

II. Austria-Hungary

“This Austro-Hungarian political feeling was an entity so curiously constructed that it seems almost useless to try to explain it to someone who has not experienced it. It was not made of a Hungarian part and an Austrian part which would have, as one might have thought, completed each other, but indeed of a part and of a whole, that is, of one Hungarian feeling and of one Austro-Hungarian, the latter being at home in Austria, so that Austrian citizens had properly speaking no homeland. [...] at home they [the Austrians] called themselves citizens-of-the-kingdoms-and-lands-of-the-Austro-Hungarian-monarchy-represented-at-the-Imperial-Council, which amounted to saying ‘one Austrian plus one Hungarian minus that very same Hungarian’...”⁷⁰

At the end of the 19th century, the second-largest country in Europe by landmass and the third largest by population was the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire. Over the course of the 1840s to the 1870s, it would find itself at the losing side of multiple conflicts, as the unifications of Italy and Germany changed its political situation profoundly. It not only had to contend with an altered foreign policy and immense loss of status, but also mounting fiscal and domestic pressure. As such, the Habsburg state was forced to adapt to survive – which it did reluctantly and gradually over a number of years.⁷¹ This chapter provides the institutional, political and economic background necessary to understand the issue of currency reform in Austria-Hungary – and, by extension, the parliamentary debates at the centre of this thesis, which are shaped by the unique dualist structure, multi-ethnic composition, and competing socio-economic interests of the empire. Section 2.1 outlines the framework of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This includes its political system, and the composition of the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, presenting the immediate setting and key factions at the time of the debate. Subchapter 2.2 offers an overview of the empire’s economic and fiscal conditions before 1892 and financial differences within the state(s).

⁷⁰ Musil, Robert. In: Flandreau, Marc. 2006. The logic of compromise: Monetary bargaining in Austria-Hungary, 1867-1913. In: *European Review of Economic History* 10 (1), 3–33, 3.

⁷¹ Cf., Deak, John. 2015. *Forging a Multinational State : State Making in Imperial Austria From the Enlightenment to the First World War*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 137–138/179–180.

2.1. Austria-Hungary's Institutional Framework

Austria-Hungary's dualist structure originated in the so-called *Ausgleich*, or *compromise*, of 1867. The defeat against Prussia and Italy meant that the Habsburgs could no longer afford to continue with the neo-absolutist course that Franz Joseph had set since 1848. Instead, the empire was now made up of two halves. One half was clearly defined as the *Lands of the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen* or *The Kingdom of Hungary*, which will be titled *Transleithania* for compactness, and follows the borders of the historical Hungarian kingdom. The other half carries the official name *The Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Reichsrat* but was often unofficially styled as *Cisleithania* (the names Austria and Cisleithania will be used interchangeably to refer to this half of the Empire). As is apparent in the latter half's official name, these lands were connected primarily by the fact that they were not Hungarian, and were an assortment of regions, peoples and traditions.⁷²

The dualist structure rested on the premise that the compromise was a treaty between two independent states of equal rights. Both halves had their own government and parliament located in Vienna and Budapest, respectively, with their separate constitutions and ministries. However, the empire remained connected through shared key institutions and competencies. First and foremost among them was the role of a Habsburg and his heirs as King of Hungary and Emperor of Austria. Then followed the common ministries of foreign affairs, war, and finance, which enabled Austria-Hungary to act as one in international matters. Every ten years, delegates of the two halves convened to negotiate further collective areas. Central among them were key economic matters, such as currency regulations, although these were also subject to the separate parliaments. Therefore, the question of which metal standard to follow – and what to do with the ongoing suspension of specie redeemability (see chapter 2.2.2) – was not only for Vienna to decide, but an answer had to be negotiated in the Hungarian parliament as well. Importantly, this also included the share in common expenditure. Until 1907, Transleithania was responsible for 30% of shared costs, after which it rose to 36.4%. This was part of a perceived Hungarian privilege in Cisleithania and was critiqued greatly in

⁷² Cf., Stourzh, Gerald. 2011. *Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte : Ausgewählte Studien 1990-2010*. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 105–107.

the debates at the core of this thesis (see Chapter VI).⁷³ Thus, they were not merely connected through a personal, but through a real union. To conclude, the compromise was to form the basic legal framework of one Habsburg Empire made up of two, in major respects, sovereign states. Austria-Hungary was not a federation, as no state existed above the two halves, and it was also not a confederation, as neither Cis- nor Transleithania were fully sovereign. Instead, the compromise created a political structure *sui generis*.⁷⁴

A further presentation of the Ausgleich, its merits, and its shortcomings would go beyond the research aim of this paper. Instead, it is imperative to now focus on Cisleithania and turn towards its political and economic institutions, which dictated the setting of the debates.

The Cisleithanian parliament, the *Reichsrat* or Imperial Council, was established in 1861 as a bicameral body. The upper house, the *Herrenhaus*, included the higher nobility, ecclesiastical dignitaries and any other people appointed by the emperor for merit. The posts were held for life and ensured that the traditional upper echelons of society would remain a powerful voice in the slowly modernising Habsburg-machine. The lower house, the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, was an elected body where the right to vote rested on either the payment of a minimum amount of taxes, the ownership of property, on personal income, or on a successful higher education (clergy, civil servants, teachers, military officials, and university graduates could qualify). Additionally, for *Abgeordnetenhaus*-elections, voters were grouped into one of four curiae: (I) great landowners, (II) chambers of commerce and industry, (III) cities and towns, and (IV) rural communities. A voter's representation through the curiae system was highly unequal. Certain statutory towns, among them Vienna, required a higher absolute tax rate to be eligible to vote, while women were excluded unless they were part of the first curia.⁷⁵ Further, the great landowners, of which only 5.000 existed, could elect 85 out of 353 representatives, while 21 were elected by the second curia. The 400.000 voters of the cities and towns designated 118 deputies,

⁷³ Modern estimates do show, however, that the ratio matches GDP-figures, with Hungary's GDP comprising around 36.43% of the total Austro-Hungarian economy. See 'Schulze, Max-Stephan. 2000. Patterns of growth and stagnation in the late nineteenth century Habsburg economy. In: *European Review of Economic History* 4 (1), 311–340, 316.' for more.

⁷⁴ Cf., Kann, Robert A. 1974. *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 333–334.

⁷⁵ Cf., Bader-Zaar, Birgitta. 2024. Expanding the Electorate in Habsburg Austria, 1860s-1918: (Dis)Integrations of Economic and Educational Qualifications, Gender, and "Universal" Suffrage. In: Cottrell-Sundevall, Fia and Ragnheidur Kristjánsdóttir (editors). *Suffrage, Capital, and Welfare : Conditional Citizenship in Historical Perspective*. Cham: Springer Nature, 59–80, 63–65/70.

while the lowest curia, the rural communities, had only 129 representatives elected by 1.500.000 electors to represent 18.000.000 citizens. I.e., a member of parliament designated by the first curia represented approximately 58 landowners, while a delegate of the rural communities was elected by ~11.627 citizens and represented almost 140.000. The large disparity between eligible voters and the actual number of members of the fourth curia can be explained by the minimum tax requirement. One had to pay at least 10 guilders annually until 1882, after which it was lowered to five guilders due to social pressures – stemming primarily from workers in industrialising towns. However, this still eliminated practically all daily wage earners from official political participation, as well as large parts of artisans and small peasants.⁷⁶

As is evident, the political system of 1890s Cisleithania was not designed for inclusion or equality. Instead, it adapted to social pressures in a way that interlocked socio-economic standing with political strength. Nevertheless, both houses played an equally important role in the legal framework of Cisleithania, as the agreement of the Herren- and Abgeordnetenhaus was necessary for a law to be brought before the emperor, whose signature would let it take effect. The competences parliament dealt with were laid out in the December Constitution of 1867 and remained unchanged until the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. They include treaties on trade, borders, and diplomacy; and decisions on military matters and mobilisation, taxes, debts, the budget, state monopolies, currency, tolls, epidemic laws, and education. Laws in these areas could either be suggested by members of the *Reichsrat* or by ministers as a government bill. It was the latter option that led to the debates on the gold standard, with the ministry of finance formulating the relevant law. Additionally, both houses had the official power to monitor the ministries and government through interpellations and specific commissions.⁷⁷

Importantly, this thesis only analyses the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, as its members were actually elected and, thus, were connected to the people so central to populism. Whereas a comparison with the *Herrenhaus* would certainly be fruitful for understanding internal differences in Cisleithania, this sadly falls outside the scope of this thesis and must be left to future research.

⁷⁶ Cf., Kann, 425–426; cf., Parlament. N.D. Geschichte des Wahlrechts. <https://www.parlament.gv.at/verstehen/historisches/wahlen/geschichte-des-wahlrechts> (accessed on 5th May 2025).

⁷⁷ Cf., Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei. 1867. Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Österreich. Wien, 389–394, 391–393.

2.1.1. The VIII. Legislature Period - the *House of Commons* in 1892

Before the analysis of the debates can take place, it is necessary to firstly establish the central factions and actors of the House of Commons.

Unlike modern parliaments, the Cisleithanian *Reichsrat* lacked formal political parties. Instead, it was organised around informal factions known as *Klubs*. Officially, a Member of Parliament (=MP) was only categorised according to their curiae and the region they represented. However, the daily life of parliament required a different political organisation, the *Klubs*, which were organised through individual choices and can be seen as an informal cooperation between MPs. Parliament did offer lists of these clubs and the delegates decided their seating arrangements within the *Abgeordnetenhaus* according to their club membership, but this is where the officiality of clubs ended. The *Klubs* varied widely in socio-political character, as some were ideologically clear while others combined different viewpoints or centred on one charismatic leading figure. This is where the clubs' importance to the hypotheses underlying this paper become apparent: The VIII. legislature period saw a combination of different ideologies clash that allows for comparisons between their general political directions and their rhetoric.

Out of the 353 seats spread across 14 factions (see Table 2), 252 were held by eight nationalist factions. The largest of these was the 110 delegate-strong *Vereinigte Deutsche Linke* (VDL), whose main goals were the preservation of the Habsburg Monarchy's unity, the safeguarding of German influence in the bureaucracy and government, and the protection of the liberal school of thought. As such, they were not radical nationalists that sought their own nation-state but actively acknowledged and defended the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire – under German leadership, however.⁷⁸ Their long tradition of liberalism aligned them with the reform, seeing gold as the natural way forward. Also largely supporting the reform was the mighty *Polenklub*, representing the large Polish minority and most delegates of Galicia. They backed the government and its traditional catholic-conservative values since 1879, seeing it as mutually beneficial for their national

⁷⁸ Cf., N.A. 1909. Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon : Sechste Auflage : Zwanzigster Band. Leipzig und Wien: Bibliographisches Institut, 48.

cause.⁷⁹ These two represent the established nationalist forces, whereas the next two nationalist factions emerged only in the 1880s and 1890s:

The *Jungtschechen* and the *Deutschnationale* stood for reform and democratisation, opposing the government and established forces. Their more radical worldview was primarily dictated by nationalist thoughts – once for the Czechs and once for the Germans – aiming to secure additional rights for ‘their people’.⁸⁰ This strand of German nationalism differed from that of the VDL through its alignment to a German nation state, instead of the multiethnic Habsburg Empire.

The last four nationalist clubs – the *Südslawen*, the *Ruthenenklub*, the *Unabhängiger Kroaten und Slowenenklub* and the *Trentinoklub* – did not participate in the debates. Thus, as not to clutter the thesis, they will be left out here.

In accordance with Judson’s work, it is expected that these nationalist clubs will be the primary users of populism, utilising it to mobilise broader voter bases from different social backgrounds. Although differences between them are probable, as only the *Jungtschechen* and *Deutschnationale* were part of the radical new nationalist factions emerging during the 1880s and 1890s.⁸¹

An additional three factions can be seen as supranational, the largest of which is the *Klub der Konservativen*, centring on their leader Karl Sigmund von Hohenwart. Their 55 delegates make them the third most powerful club in the House of Commons, and their conservative worldview a traditionally strong supporter of the government – although they traditionally stand at odds with liberal reforms such as a move to the gold standard. The other two clubs, the *Klub des Liberalen Centrums* and the *Mährische Mittlere Partei* make up only 10 and 4 delegates, respectively. The former embodies liberal ideals without the VDL’s nationalist flavour, supporting the reform towards the gold standard, while the latter centres on the crownland of Moravia and takes no stance on the debate at all.⁸²

One last faction is central to this thesis: the *Freie Vereinigung für wirtschaftliche Reform auf christlicher Grundlage*, often called the Antisemites. Although it controlled only 11 seats in 1892, it would go on to form the Christian-Socialists in 1893 – one of the two

⁷⁹ Cf., Kwan, J. 2013. *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1891-1895*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 216.

⁸⁰ Cf., Binder, Harald. 2005. *Galizien in Wien : Parteien, Wahlen, Fraktionen und Abgeordnete im Übergang zur Massenpolitik*. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 336.

⁸¹ Cf., Judson, 339.

⁸² Cf., *ibid*, 316/320.

major ideologies that shape Austria to this day. Its leader, Karl Lueger, combined catholic values with socio-economic reforms, propagating a platform that advanced the struggling middle class. Importantly, although his platform is traditionally *not* seen as nationalist, Lueger has been described as a populist. For example, by frequently employing strong antisemitism to unite the population against a Jewish minority portrayed as controlling capitalists.⁸³

Thus, if the Antisemites can be classified as populist while lacking a nationalist agenda, the expectations underlying this thesis may be proven incorrect.

In addition to the ideologically pluralist make-up of the House of Commons, the 1891 elections left the government without a fixed majority. Minister-president Taaffe, ruling since 1879, could previously rely on a coalition of conservative, anti-liberal, and Slavic factions. Namely, the Poles, conservative Bohemian nobles, and the Conservatives, among other, smaller clubs. Known collectively as the *Iron Ring*, they conceived themselves as protecting the emperor and conservative ideals.⁸⁴ However, the rise of the *Jungtschechen* to the fourth-largest group meant the demise of the conservative Bohemians and, consequently, the government's secure backing. Disagreements among the Liberals – who promoted German centralism – and the strong nationalist parties such as the Poles and Young Czechs, however, meant that Taaffe stayed on as minister president until 1893.⁸⁵

Precisely because the government could not pass legislation uncontested, the ministry in 1892 depended on the success of the debates. This circumstance increases the importance of political rhetoric, as arguments were no longer formalities but could be instrumental in shaping the outcome of the reform. It was this complex political constellation that dictated the debates on the transition to the gold standard, and makes the linguistic strategies employed especially revealing.

⁸³ Cf., Benesch, Markus. 2013. Die Wiener Christlichsoziale Partei 1910-1934. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 21–22.

⁸⁴ Cf., Kwan, 123/

⁸⁵ Cf., Binder, 335.

Nr. of Delegates in 1891 (Nr. of Delegates in 1885)	Club Names	Additional Information
110 (112)	Vereinigte Deutsche Linke/ United German Left	
58 (58)	Polenklub /Polish Club	
55 (59)	Klub der Konservativen/ Conservative Club	Often called Hohenwartklub after their leader.
38 (7)	Klub der böhmischen Nationalabgeordneten/ Club of the Bohemian national representatives	Often called Jungtschechen/ Young Czechs
17 (18)	Deutschnationale/ German Nationalists	
12 (59)	Konservative böhmische und mährische Adelige und tschechische Abgeordnete/ Conservative Bohemian and Moravian nobles and Czech representatives	Often called Mährer und Altschechen/ Moravians and Old Czechs
11 (2)	Freie Vereinigung für wirtschaftliche Reform auf christlicher Grundlage/ Free Association for Economic Reform on a Christian Basis	Often called the Antisemites, previously known as the <i>Lueger Club</i>
10 (11)	Klub des liberalen Centrums/ Club of the liberal Centre	Often called Coroniniklub/ Coronini Club, after their leader, Franz Coronini- Cronberg
10 (0)	Südslawen/ South Slavs	
9 (0)	Fraktionslos, schwebend/ factionless and floating	
7 (4)	Ruthenenklub/ Ruthenian Club	
7 (7)	Trentinoklub/ Trentino Club	Representing the Italians
5 (7)	Unabhängiger Kroaten und Slowenenklub/ Independent Croats and Slovenians Club	
4 (5)	Mährische Mittlere Partei/ Moravian Middle Party	

Table 2, parties by seat allocation after the Reichsrat elections of 1891⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Cf., Kwan, 216–217; cf., Binder, 321.

2.2. Austria-Hungary's Economy before 1892

This section presents the economic situation of the Habsburg monarchy in order to connect the international circumstances surrounding the rise of the classical gold standard (see chapters 1.2 and 1.3) with the national context of Austria-Hungary.

To begin with, it is important to highlight that encapsulating the economic situation of Cis- or Transleithania in the late 19th century, let alone the whole empire, is a difficult process – a challenge comparable to that of understanding the monarchy's complex socio-political workings, which lie at the heart of this thesis. The dissolution of the empire and the scarcity of consistent statistical data in much of Central and Eastern Europe make it difficult to reconstruct an accurate image of the monarchy's economic standing.⁸⁷ Historians have constructed various economic models of Cis- and Transleithania, but their conclusions diverge in regard to the overall strength of the Habsburg economy. Two main positions emerge: Firstly, that Austria-Hungary experienced prolonged economic hardship between 1873 and 1895, which were fostered by the dualist structure and rising social tensions.⁸⁸ The second view emphasises the benefits of the economic integration, citing a general market expansion, rising industrial output, and converging commodity prices and wages across the two halves of the empire. Despite regional disparities, therefore, the economic union may be seen as a clear success.⁸⁹

This thesis does not attempt to resolve this debate. Rather than judge the economic union in hindsight through aggregate data, the aim here is to present the structural and regional dynamics that shaped perceptions of economic hardship or success at the time – dynamics that informed the populist arguments voiced in parliament. The focus lies on the overlapping features of both academic perspectives: persistent geographic and ethnic disparities, uneven recovery from crisis, and rising anxieties about fiscal and monetary policy, especially in the western half of the monarchy.

By the early 1890s, the Habsburg economy was marked by structural imbalance and growing uncertainty. Three structural constraints underpinned the monarchy's economic

⁸⁷ Cf., Schulze, Max-Stephan. 2000. Patterns of growth and stagnation in the late nineteenth century Habsburg economy. In: *European Review of Economic History* 4 (1), 311–340, 311.

⁸⁸ Cf., Cf., Schulze, Max-Stephan. 1997. The machine-building industry and Austria's great depression after 1873. In: *Economic History Review* 2 (1), 282–304, 286.

⁸⁹ Cf., Sked, Alan. 2013. *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815–1918*, 2nd Edition. New York: Routledge, 202–204.

position. First, the periodic tensions over the compromise and its decennial renegotiations injected persistent instability into long-term planning and investment. Geographic fragmentation posed a second major obstacle and fostered regional disparities: the empire's key industrial region of Bohemia was commercially oriented toward Germany via the Elbe – not towards Vienna or Budapest; Galicia-Lodomeria was separated from the rest of the monarchy by the Carpathians; and port facilities at the Adriatic were cut off by the Alps and lacked a river route to the centre of the Empire. Nearly two-thirds of the monarchy was covered by hills or mountains, which further complicated internal connectivity. Finally, the empire's complex ethnic makeup led to political and institutional paralysis, which often made coordinated economic policy elusive.⁹⁰

Despite these challenges, the empire experienced strong economic growth from 1848 until 1873. This expansion ended abruptly with the crash of the Viennese stock market, an event that led to a global depression known in the German-speaking world as the *Gründerkrach*.⁹¹ The causes were both international and domestic: Internationally, financial instability followed the Franco-Prussian War and the German shift to gold (see chapter 1.2); domestically, speculative overinvestment in the run-up to the 1873 Vienna world fair, whose disappointing opening caused the bubble to burst. 78 businesses declared bankruptcy on the first day alone. The crisis intensified four months later, when the New-York based bank Jay Cooke & Co. collapsed, spreading panic through the Anglo-American markets. The *Gründerkrach* reached its highest point in 1879, as Austro-Hungarian specie convertibility had to be suspended (see chapter 3.3), and a period of stunted growth followed.⁹²

In Austria-Hungary, this would last definitively until 1895 – after the timeframe of this thesis – although the impact of the downturn was uneven. Cisleithania bore the brunt of the depression, while Hungary experienced a comparatively stronger performance as growth rates for Transleithania even increased. Following the stock market crash, Austrian capital increasingly flowed into Hungary. This allowed the Hungarian government to finance its regular expenditure without resorting to tax increases. As a result, Hungary weathered the crisis with relative ease and even facilitated a first wave of industrialisation in the Kingdom. In contrast, the lack of domestic venture capital

⁹⁰ Cf., *ibid.*, 202.

⁹¹ Cf., Schulze, 1997, 286.

⁹² Cf., Grabas, Margrit. 2011. Die Gründerkrise von 1873/79 – Fiktion oder Realität? Einige Überlegungen im Kontext der Weltfinanz- und Wirtschaftskrise von 2008/2009. In: *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 52 (1), 69–95, 74/86–87/90.

prolonged the symptoms of depression in the western half of the monarchy. Cisleithanian machine production, for instance, only returned to its 1872 peak in 1888.⁹³ By comparison, Hungarian exports of industrial, agricultural and manufactured goods not only rebounded quickly, but rose by 49.19% by 1882. This pattern reversed after 1895, as capital flows shifted, and Cis- and Transleithania's growth rates switched.⁹⁴

Importantly, the monarchy as a whole failed to match the pace of economic development seen in Western Europe between 1873 and 1895. In terms of GDP per capita growth rates, it lagged behind other major powers such as Germany, France or even Italy. These averages, however, mask significant regional variation: Bohemia, Moravia, and the Alpine lands were able to industrialise quickly and benefitted from the proximity to the markets of Western Europe. Other regions such as the Polish and Ruthenian dominated Galicia-Lodomeria were, however, unable to catch up and remained largely underdeveloped (see Figure 4⁹⁵).⁹⁶




Figure 1, Income per Capita between 1870 to 1900 in the three richest and three poorest regions of Cisleithania, as well as Transleithania, Cisleithania and Austria-Hungary as a whole.

⁹³ Cf., Schulze, 1997, 287/290–291.

⁹⁴ Cf., Komlos, John. 1983. *The Habsburg Monarchy As a Customs Union : Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 120/132.

⁹⁵ Cf., Good, David F. 1992. *The Economic Lag of Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from the Late Nineteenth-Century Habsburg Empire*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, *Center for Austrian Studies Working Paper* 93 (7), 1–41, 15–17.

⁹⁶ Cf., Schulze, Max Stephan. 2007. *Origins of catch-up failure: Comparative productivity growth in the Habsburg Empire, 1870-1910*. In: *European Review of Economic History* 11 (1), 189–218, 190–191.

2.2.1. Economic Policy in a Divided Empire

The structural disparities and uneven development following the 1873 economic crisis outlined above directly shaped economic policy, both internationally and within the empire. The basic international picture is the following: Hungary, supported by Cisleithanian capital inflows, industrial momentum and a strong and growing agricultural sector, generally advocated for liberal free trade. This would not only ensure access to Cisleithania – which accounted for more than 70% of Transleithania's overall exports – but also deepen integration to the general European market. Cisleithania, on the other hand, burdened by depression and more reliant on industry than agriculture, favoured protective tariffs.⁹⁷

In 1878, the empire accommodated both halves by passing the Autonomous Tariff Act, which contained protectionist duties on cotton and woollen textiles, while leaving raw products untouched. In the 1880s, however, Austria-Hungary embarked on a protectionist course. As a reaction to newly imposed German duties, the monarchy introduced new tariffs on industrial goods, grain, and raw products such as iron and steel in 1882 and 1887. Then, in 1886, Hungary introduced tariffs against Romania to protect her own economy, as an exception to the general pattern laid out above. These tariffs – both foreign and domestic – led to a sharp decline in exports and left Austria-Hungary increasingly isolated from broader European trade networks. Thus, Austria-Hungary's international policies protected her economy at the cost of a severely damaged trade position.⁹⁸ Domestically, Cisleithania also argued for tariffs against Hungarian agriculture to offset the economic hardships of the crisis – it effectively taxed Hungary. Consequently, Hungarian politicians tried to restore their economic parity and even demanded counter protectionist measures for their products within the economic union.⁹⁹

This protectionist stance eventually changed in the early 1890s, as the fall of Bismarck led to a change in German policy. Germany – under the leadership of its new chancellor, Leo von Caprivi – approached the dual monarchy, among other countries like Russia or Italy, to negotiate and structure trade. The so-called *Caprivi Treaties* all followed a similar

⁹⁷ Cf., Kann, 462.

⁹⁸ Cf., Eddie, Scott M. 1989. Economic policy and economic development in Austria-Hungary, 1867-1913. In: Mathias, Peter and Sidney Pollard (eds.). *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe from the Decline of the Roman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 814–886, 825/827–829.

⁹⁹ Cf., Eddi, Scott M. 1972. The Terms of Trade as a Tax on Agriculture: Hungary's Trade with Austria, 1883-1913. In: *The Journal of Economic History* 32 (1), 298–315, 310.

principle: Germany would reduce agricultural tariffs, if the treaty partners lowered duties on industrial goods.¹⁰⁰

The success of these treaties ended a decade of uncoordinated, autonomous mutually antagonistic tariff policy between the great powers of Europe. This coincided with the Cisleithanian recovery to the 1873 crisis. Austria reached a budget surplus in 1889 (Hungary had done so since 1882, with one exception in 1884), after which the dual monarchy finally had the means to stabilise its economy. One of the first steps was to solve the volatility of its currency regime.¹⁰¹ Consequently, the next section shortly details the recent history of the Austrian monetary system.

2.2.2. The Road to the Austro-Hungarian Currency Reform

The Habsburg currency was known internationally as the *Florin Österreichischer Währung*, or fl. Ö. W., and as a *Gulden* (=Guilder) nationally, which was further split up into 100 *Kreuzer*.¹⁰² *Gulden*, Guilder and Florin will be used interchangeably in this paper. Prior to 1870, the monarchy officially followed a silver standard. However, the losses suffered during the Italian and German unifications meant that the Habsburg empire had to reorient its monetary policy alongside its newfound political situation. For this very reason, it first looked towards France and its bimetallic Latin Monetary Union. In 1870, it created gold coins that had the same metal content as French coins, although it only used them as an administrative unit and did not mint them, and in 1872, the Austro-Hungarian bank began to exchange some of its silver reserves for gold. However, no definitive action was taken, until the crisis of 1873 ended all prospects at a quick transition, as the central bank's financial reserves were strained by the costs needed to deal with the depression.¹⁰³

The collapse of the silver price (see chapter 1.3) led to further issues. Austria-Hungary, suddenly surrounded by neighbouring states wanting to rid themselves of silver, had to contend with an influx of the metal. Thus, to stabilise the *Gulden*, they were forced to

¹⁰⁰ Cf., Torp, Cornelius. 2014. *The Challenges of Globalization – Economy and Politics in Germany, 1860-1914*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 114.

¹⁰¹ Cf., Eddie, *Economic policy*, 825–826/854–855.

¹⁰² Cf., Kramer, 18.

¹⁰³ Cf., Flandreau, Marc and John Komlos. 2002. Core or Periphery? The Credibility of the Austro-Hungarian Currency, 1867-1913. In: *Journal of European Economic History* 31 (2), 293–320, 296.

suspend private specie coinage in 1879. However, the inability to redeem Austro-Hungarian notes for metal created its own stability issues. The *Gulden's* value decoupled from other commodity-based currencies and appreciated against silver.¹⁰⁴

Further, with the parity to gold purely nominal and a return to silver convertibility impossible due to its instability, the *Gulden* was now essentially a floating exchange rate system. However, silver still acted as a 'floor' for the value of the *Gulden*: if the value of the Guilder were to depreciate below the price of silver, the Austro-Hungarian bank would be forced to sell its silver reserves to keep the *Gulden* afloat – or else risk the devaluation of Habsburg government bonds. Consequently, despite the 1879 severance between the Florin and silver, the latter's value still had an influence on the former. When the silver price suddenly rose in 1890 – mainly due to the ongoing discussions on silver in the United States and consequent market speculation – the dual monarchy had to face exchange fluctuations which affected its trade position negatively. The value of the Florin measured in German marks went from 62.5 per 100 in 1888 to 54.5 in 1890, for example – an instability that made trade with the Habsburgs difficult.¹⁰⁵

Spurred by these developments, and finally able to act due to the newfound strength of the Habsburg economy and changed political situation, the Cis- and Transleithanian ministers of finance met in 1889 to tackle their unstable valuta.¹⁰⁶ To ensure that such a massive undertaking would be well prepared, the respective governments in Vienna and Budapest invited experts to debate the topic in a currency enquête commission in March 1892. Both commissions settled on gold and debated technical details, including the conversion rate of the *Gulden* to the new gold-based *Krone* (=crown).¹⁰⁷ As a result, a law was drafted to transition Austria-Hungary to the gold standard, which was put before the Cisleithanian parliament in July 1892 and debated in ten sessions between the 11th and 21st.

¹⁰⁴ Cf., Kramer, 18–19.

¹⁰⁵ Cf., Flandreau and Komlos, 297–301.

¹⁰⁶ Cf., Eddie, Economic policy, 855.

¹⁰⁷ Cf., Zuckerkandl, Robert. 1892. Stenographische Protokolle über die vom 8. bis 17. März abgehaltenen Sitzungen der nach Wien einberufenen Währungs-Enquête-Kommission. In: *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 58 (3), 752–753, 752.

III. Populism

Just as Judson does in his work, populism is often used without definition and can encapsulate several different meanings. In its colloquial usage, populism is generally confused with and connected to different terms such as demagoguery and opportunism. Consequently, populism is boiled down to encapsulating simple solutions for complex problems, which are oftentimes mixed with an emotionally charged discourse. However, this understanding does not allow serious analyses, as it is extremely difficult to determine when something is emotional as opposed to rational, or simple instead of serious and concise. Further, any politician may use simple messages at the core of their communication, but this does not automatically make them populists.¹⁰⁸ Academic research sees populism differently. However, such a large number of definitions for populism exist – depending on the research aim and content – that perhaps no explanation can fully grasp its meaning.¹⁰⁹ Thus, to operationalise populism for the purposes of understanding populism's role in the Habsburg Empire and its nationalist conflicts, a look at the concept's origin and central definitions may create a useful clarity.

3.1. Populism's Origins

Facets of populism can be found in antiquity, as statesmen and orators from Themistocles and Demosthenes to Caesar and the Gracchi brothers, recognised the political value of mass mobilisation. They would go on to shape their polities through successfully incorporating measures to gain popular support in their political programme. In this effort, some similarities to modern populism can be found. Donald Kagan, one of the leading experts on antique Athens, states that "Athenian politics typically involved shifting groups which came together, often around a man, sometimes around an issue, occasionally with reference to both."¹¹⁰ Roman elites presented themselves as representatives of the Roman people – often trying to outcompete each other for the people's followership. As a result, land redistributions or grain subsidies, among other

¹⁰⁸ Cf., Mudde, Cas. 2004. The Populist Zeitgeist. In: *Government and Opposition* 39 (4), 541–563, 542–544.

¹⁰⁹ Cf., Fuentes, 51.

¹¹⁰ Kagan, Donald. 1974. *The Archidamian War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 96.

actions, were introduced by the Roman oligarchs.¹¹¹ However, the use of emotional rhetoric and the political handouts given to the populace to gain their support do not correspond to our concurrent understanding of populism. Antique societies operated within vastly different political systems, social categories and understandings compared to our modern world. Attempts at finding parallels to populism are, thus, misplaced.

Therefore, despite certain political strategies often used by modern populists certainly preceding the advent of modern politics, the contemporary term was, in fact, born from US-American farmer movements of the late 1800s. It entered the spotlight for the first time in the 1890s, as a consequence of the changing socio-economic circumstances during the *first* globalisation (see Chapter 1.3). In the United States, the resulting *Gilded Age* had the nation in its grasp. Some of the world's first billionaires and richest men of modern history, such as Rockefeller and Carnegie, rose to prominence, while poverty was rampant across a large share of the population. The unemployment rate of the 1890s averaged at 15%, while crop failures, debt, and bankruptcies wreaked havoc – especially among farmers impacted by price changes. Importantly, the federal government refused to aid its citizens. President Grover Cleveland's policies were based on supporting *laissez faire* policy to let the free market regulate itself – so much so that he vetoed a bill giving aid to drought-stricken farmers.¹¹²

The resulting social tensions gave birth to the US-American *Farmer's Alliance* of the 1870s, which saw itself as a union of 'the people' fighting against wealth and power. In 1891, as socio-economic issues had not receded, the alliance reorganised itself into the so-called *People's Party*, which was one of the most successful third-party movements in the nation's history. Soon after, in 1892, the term *populist* was first used to refer to members of the party, which led to the creation of the word *populism*. The party's political programme was characterised by a rejection of elite-notions: the gold standard, railroad companies, financiers and established political leaders were seen as an enemy of the *populists*. One of their main goals was, thus, to stop the spread of monometallism, and ensure the continuation of a bimetallist silver and gold system. This was seen to be advantageous for the lower socio-economic classes, while gold was connected to the elites of the *Gilded Age*.¹¹³ A striking example of this rhetoric appears during the presidential

¹¹¹ Cf., Kenny, Paul. 2023. *Why Populism? Political strategy from ancient Greece to the present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 26–29/40–42.

¹¹² Cf., Unterman, Katherine. 2017. 1896: A Populist Insurgency in America's First Gilded Age. In: *South Central Review* 34 (2), 26–31, 26–27.

¹¹³ Cf., Fuentes, 53–56.

election of 1896, where William Jennings Bryan delivered his famous *Cross of Gold* speech, which he ended by stating:

“Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: ‘You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns; you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.’”¹¹⁴

Here, Bryan clearly makes use of the modern populist tenets. He positions himself as the representative of ‘the people’, putting them at the centre of his argument, while excluding the elites and portraying them as the enemy.

As the nominee of both the democratic and populist party, Bryan made populism fashionable and introduced the term to international audiences. However, his electoral defeat against Republican candidate William McKinley ended any serious political success of the People’s Party.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, the context and drive behind the populist party’s creation is similar to today’s populist rise, which is one of the reasons why their -ism continues to be used today.

3.2. Populism’s Causes

The continued rise of populism today has given rise to an academic debate that mainly focuses on two explanations. The first rationale sees the key source of populism in economic issues and insecurities. This allows for theoretically clear research, which makes it the more prominent reasoning in the literature.¹¹⁶ Stankov, for example, identifies eight major factors for the rise of populism that fuel a sense of economic insecurity: recessions, inflation, unemployment, austerity, income inequality, immigration, trade and financial openness, and natural resource abundance. A change of these factors consistently predicts a surge in populist votes, which confirms that populism can be quantified.¹¹⁷ Importantly, populists thrive off of globalisation, as globalisation shocks strongly influence these factors, as “international economic integration seems to have produced domestic *disintegration* in many countries, deepening the divide between

¹¹⁴ Bryan, William J. 1896. *The First Battle: A Story of the Campaign of 1896*. Chicago: W. B. Conkey Company, 206.

¹¹⁵ Cf., Fuentes, 56.

¹¹⁶ Cf., Margalit, Yotam, Shir Raviv and Omer Solodoch. 2025. The Cultural Origins of Populism. In: *Journal of Politics* 87 (2), 393–410, 393.

¹¹⁷ Cf., Stankov, 232/252.

the winners and the losers of exposure to global competition.”¹¹⁸ To be specific, the international trade, finance and labour flows that make up globalisation seem to work together with other (abovementioned) economic factors to amplify populist demand.¹¹⁹ However, although economic factors do critically influence the *outcome* of populist successes such as Brexit, they do not show the whole picture and are unable to fully account for the rise of populist sentiment. Margalit calls this a lack of *explanatory significance*. This is where the second rationale, cultural causes, come in. Central to this argument are changes to the hierarchy of a society, which cause anxiety and distress. Thus, viewing worries about issues such as immigration through an economic lens only seems to be incorrect, as voters concern themselves with demographic shifts, progressive cultural changes, or (real or perceived) threats to national sovereignty – e.g., through the European Union.¹²⁰ Thus, economic grievances may aggravate social ones, or social issues aggravate economic anxieties, or both interact with each other and it is impossible to determine what came first – the cultural chicken or the economic egg.¹²¹

Importantly, this thesis does not wish to attempt to solve this discussion, as my research goal is not to answer either why people voted for populists or why their share is increasing. Instead, I wish to determine whether and by what degree populism was present in the Cisleithanian parliamentary debates. However, this short theoretical overview does show that populism is not confined to either the economic or cultural domain but can be found in both. Further, I hope to have shown successfully that academic findings on the causes of modern populism remain remarkably similar to the historic context of the concept’s origin – a time when economic and social anxieties and unrest served as a hotbed of populist tendencies.

¹¹⁸ Rodrik, 2021, 134.

¹¹⁹ Cf., *ibid*, 134.

¹²⁰ Cf., Margalit, 2019, 153/159.

¹²¹ Cf., Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 35.

3.3. Operationalising Populism

Having now discussed both the origins and the enduring causes of populism, the next step is to outline how this concept will be applied for the context of an analysis of the Cisleithanian *Abgeordnetenhaus*. To do so, I will firstly cover definitions of populism that will not be used in this thesis to ascertain why they are unsuited and if aspects remain important to include, nonetheless. Next, I go on to define populism as an ideational approach and focus on identifiable rhetorical and argumentative strategies.

Just as the question about the cause(s) of populism is being actively debated, so too is the issue of a working definition. The reason being precisely the different contexts and causes that give rise to (a form of) populism.¹²² To ensure clarity, it could be useful to distinguish between what I categorise as two definitional strands. The first consists of highly contextual definitions such as *neoliberal (neo)populism*, *ethno-populism*, *techno-populism*, *social populists*, or *agrarian populists*.¹²³ These approaches are very helpful for analysing specific populists in great detail, which is, however, not applicable in this thesis. Instead, the aim is to, firstly, find out if and how much populism is featured at all, and only then further analyse the forms it appears in. Thus, using any one contextual approach as my analytical lens could hinder a holistic study that tries to discover populism in a general facet. Therefore, the contextual definitions of populism will take a secondary role. The second strand centres on holistic approaches to populism, which have their own advantages and disadvantages. Importantly, they all share overlaps, but differ in their focus and the way they recognise populism. Accordingly, I wish to discuss the central holistic definitions to construe and justify the rationale used in this thesis. To do this, I combine classifications by Priester, Devinney & Hartwell, as well as Weyland, to highlight four universal definitions of populism.

¹²² Cf., Devinney, Timothy M. and Christopher A. Hartwell. 2019. Varieties of populism. In: *Global Strategy Journal* 10 (1), 32–66, 33.

¹²³ Cf., Weyland, Kurt. 2017. Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach. In: *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 48–72, 49; cf., Beyme, Klaus von. 2018. Rightwing Populism: An Element of Neodemocracy. Heidelberg: Springer, 28.

3.3.1. Economic Populism

This definition is typically characterised by pitting two groups against each other, one of which is made up of economically less secure members of society, who are portrayed as fully opposite to elites, immigrants, or any other group that is made responsible for economic woes. Thus, economic populism is defined through a distribution of economic benefits, which are oftentimes at the expense of long-term stability and growth, to a wide range of interest groups. Importantly, the voter base is homogenised through shared economic hardships, whereas other social markers are left out of the equation. The approach's main advantage is that a review of politician's economic policies may provide a clear populist agenda – short-term income redistribution for interest groups which are often at the expense of long-term prosperity and productivity growth.¹²⁴ Further, it certainly fits the economic causation of populism, pinpointing its rise to, for example, globalisation shocks and identifying it solely through economic measures. However, as Weyland notes, a number of populist politicians, especially in Latin America, used populist strategies and rhetoric to boost their appeal, but enacted only orthodox economic reforms in line with international organisations, such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund.¹²⁵

Thus, while populism is strongly connected to economic issues, as laid out above, viewing populism only through an economic lens cannot encapsulate the entire concept. This is especially true for the purposes of this thesis, as disregarding any statements in the *Reichstag* debates that do not centre on economic measures, such as currency conversion or trade barriers, would omit potentially crucial findings.

3.3.2. Political-Strategic Populism

This definition sees populism as a political strategy, whose aim is to win and exercise power. To be precise, it encompasses strategies that structure political participation towards an individual politician. I.e., this approach centres populism on personalistic leadership, and any attempts to combat the established political class to rise above it. To

¹²⁴ Cf., Devinney and Hartwell, 35–36.

¹²⁵ Cf., Weyland, 51.

achieve this goal, this rationale highlights how populists use ‘numbers’, i.e., ‘the people’, to attack elites with special privileges, such as economic clout. In practice, populists frequently make use of instruments of direct democracy, such as mass rallies or plebiscites, to reach potential voters and legitimise themselves, while simultaneously decrying other politicians as disconnected from ‘the people’. To measure populism through this definition, Weyland introduces so-called *fuzzy sets*. These describe the qualitative analysis of certain metrics, such as the degree of party rules and institutional constraints, a cult of personality, or the presence of intermediary organisations like worker unions. If a politician adjusts their personal ambitions to institutional limits and rules of conduct, then they receive a number closer to 0.0 and constitute little to no populism. If they are in charge of a highly personalistic and opportunistic party willing to move outside of institutional frames, they receive a number closer to 1.0, which constitutes a high degree of populism.¹²⁶

However, the political-strategic definition is not without disadvantages. Firstly, some populist organisations have not relied on a strong degree of personalistic leadership, but have tried to broaden political participation – among them, the prominent US-American People’s Party that lies at the origin of the concept, and which existed contemporaneously to this paper’s research object. Secondly, the definition mainly rests on Latin-American cases of populism, as it seems to overlook differences between cultural variations of populism: In Latin-America, populists use social tensions to rouse the support of excluded groups against elites. In Western countries, populists gain the support of already included people by focusing on excluding others, such as migrants or so-called *Sozialstaatsschmarotzer* – welfare-state-parasites. Thus, the political-strategic approach is unable to account for all populist cases.¹²⁷ Weyland recognises this issue and specifies that the political-strategic definition does not classify parties such as Le Pen’s *Front National* as populist due to their institutional entrenchment. “[T]hese ideological extremists do not qualify [...] given the clear disjuncture between rhetoric and reality. I.e., it narrows the scope of populism and delineates them as right-wing extremists.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Cf., *ibid*, 56–58/65–67.

¹²⁷ Cf., Priester, Karin. 2011. Definitionen und Typen des Populismus. In: *Soziale Welt* 62 (2), 185–198, 192.

¹²⁸ Cf., Weyland, 62.

However, besides the active debate about the nature of populism,¹²⁹ this thesis *does* focus on rhetoric and discourse, making this definition less viable.

Lastly, the fuzzy set analytical lens is difficult to employ for the purposes of this paper for two reasons: Firstly, this paper mainly looks at parliamentary debates and does so with an open focus – as opposed to a close look at specific politicians and their institutional structures, policies, and long-term behaviour. Secondly, employing only fuzzy sets would overlook any quantitative findings that corpus analyses allow, which, again, potentially omits findings.

3.3.3. Discourse Populism

This approach was largely conceived by Ernesto Laclau, professor at the University of Essex, and sees populism not within the content of a group or person, but rather in how those contents are articulated. He foregrounds the discursive practices of populism, and even states that the discourse, apart from its contents, has a structuring effect. Through this definition, populism forms when a number of socio-economic demands are unmet, after which people link them not based on similarity of their demands but based on a shared frustration. If the frustrations remain unaddressed, then all demands, despite their differences, add to the totality of the other demands – they add up and become unified. Laclau calls this an *equivalential chain*. Once these frustrations successfully unite against a common enemy, such as the established government or elites, a homogeneous ‘people’ form, and society is dichotomised between ‘the people’ and their enemy. Over time, so Laclau, a single demand (e.g., *justice*) starts to symbolise all frustrations and, thus, represents the united ‘people’. At the same time, this demand sheds specific meaning and becomes an ‘empty signifier’. In the extremes, a leader’s name or image may become an empty signifier, thus, embodying the collective will. It is precisely this empty signifier that shifts focus away from the actual content, which is, therefore, seen with little importance, and towards how frustrations are communicated. Importantly, discourse

¹²⁹ See, for example Müller, Jan-Werner. 2017. Populism and Constitutionalism. In: *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 590–606; or Hopkin, Jonathan and Mark Blyth. 2019. The Global Economics of European Populism: Growth Regimes and Party System Change in Europe. In: *Government and Opposition* 54 (2), 193–225.

populism is not seen as an all-or-nothing concept but as a continuum, as every political movement features, to different extents, a fight of ‘the people’ versus a common enemy.¹³⁰ However, as with the other holistic definitions, this rationale has some disadvantages. Firstly, it is unclear whether any signifier can truly be seen as ‘empty’, both linguistically and politically, as populists are not able to choose their signifiers at will – showing how they are restricted by the populist core tenet of anti-elitism. Secondly, Laclau raises populism from socio-economic causes and connects it directly to a philosophical question about political ontology. I.e., how politics and populism are formed, but not how to classify and measure the concept.¹³¹ Thus, his definition is less suited to analysing content, as he instead assesses populism according to the existence and strength of an equivalential chain and the use of empty signifiers.¹³²

Disregarding the contents of the *Reichstag* debates seems ill-advised, as it would, again, leave out potentially crucial findings. Nevertheless, the approach of empty signifiers – denoting one demand that encompasses multiple issues – seems to be a useful analytical term, as it showcases how populist leaders legitimise themselves by creating the image of a homogeneous ‘people’ they can claim to represent.

3.3.4. Ideational Populism

The ideational definition of populism conceptualises it as a distinct set of interrelated ideas instead of a full ideology.¹³³ It is defined by Mudde, in his widely influential work on populism, as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.”¹³⁴ Therefore, it is the mirror-image of both elitism – which shares the worldview of populists but from the perspective of the elites – and the opposite of pluralism – which argues for a heterogeneous society that thrives through compromise and equal representation. Importantly, populism is seen as a *thin* ideology. It lacks a fully-

¹³⁰ Cf., Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. Populism. What’s in a name? In: Howarth, David. 2014. Ernesto Laclau: Post-Marxism, Populism and Critique, London: Routledge, 152–164, 153–157/162.

¹³¹ Cf., Priester, 194.

¹³² Cf., Laclau, 157/161.

¹³³ Cf., March, Lukas. 2017. Left and right populism compared: The British case. In: *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19 (2), 282-303, 284.

¹³⁴ Mudde, 2004, 543.

fledged socio-political core – as opposed to *full* ideologies such as liberalism or socialism.¹³⁵ Thus, populism covers so-called first-order principles concerning society's hierarchical structure, whereas questions regarding the fulfilment of their promises – the second-order principles – remain unanswered. This allows populists to steer clear of commitment to any one political direction, as it can instead adapt to, and consist of, a multitude of different values and principles¹³⁶

Centrally, 'the people' are not differentiated from 'the elite' through ethnicity, class or religion, but instead through morality. 'The people' are perceived and presented as pure and moral, whereas 'the elite' are seen as having betrayed these ideals. This allows populists to disregard classes or other common social markers, and for billionaires to become legitimate representatives of 'the people' – at least as long as it fits with the accompanying full ideology. To construe a sense of homogeneity, populists cater to an idealised conception of community. To be successful in this endeavour, the self-idealisation of the target group(s) is utilised, which means that one must know their audience. A typical Central European populist will hardly connect to 'the people' through Muslim values but rather rely on Christian tradition, while a social populist might use certain class values. 'The elites' are construed similarly, as populists tend to use the same social markers that construct the pure moral of 'the people' to describe the corruptness of an enemy group. E.g., if 'the people' are all hard-working, Christian, family-loving and strive for freedom, then 'the elites' are lazy, atheist, childfree, and under the 'woke mind virus'. Centrally, Mudde highlights that ideational populism *does* recognise the importance of populist content in the form of the abovementioned *general will*. It functions similar to Laclau's empty signifiers – in that the *vox populi* expresses its general will through 'common sense solutions' – but the theoretical focus lies not on how well the signifier unifies the people, but what it contains. This approach has four main strengths for analysis: (1) it is distinguishable, as both qualitative and quantitative methods can reliably identify the presence of populist ideas in speeches, texts, or programmes using the core tenets. (2) it is categorisable, as its *thin* ideology allows it to be combined with different *full* ideologies, while still being recognisable in its core tenets. (3) It is not limited to a specific context, but applicable globally due to its flexibility. (4)

¹³⁵ Cf., *ibid*, 543–544.

¹³⁶ Cf., Norris and Inglehart, 4.

It is versatile, as it can analyse parties, leaders, speeches, voter attitudes using mixed-method approaches.¹³⁷

Three main critiques of the ideational approach are salient: Firstly, its case-by-case analysis is static and binary, seeing populism as an ‘is’ or ‘is not’ concept. Thus, it may overlook the fluidity of politics. This is true especially when already entrenched mainstream parties go through a transformation, whereas newer movements on the margins of the political system are better suited to this definition. Secondly, the oftentimes central leader of a populist system is relegated to secondary importance, as it is seen as a central, but non-defining factor.¹³⁸ Lastly, Laclau argues that it is difficult to separate populism from the full ideologies it is combined with, stating that calling movements or ideologies “populist would involve differentiating that attribute from other characterisations at the same defining level, such as ‘fascist’, ‘liberal’, ‘communist’, etc.”¹³⁹

To conclude, each of the four holistic approaches to populism provides valuable advantages, but none are without limitations. Economic populism is easily quantifiable and closely aligned to the economic causes of populism, yet its narrow focus on material interests fails to account for non-economic, rhetorical elements. The political-strategic approach captures the importance of individual actors and leadership, but proves too focused on personalism and is difficult to apply in corpus-based, discourse-focused studies. Laclau’s discourse theory offers a deep, ontological understanding of populism, yet its highly abstract rationale is de-emphasised from actual content, making it difficult to employ in specific case-studies. Lastly, the ideational approach remains as the most analytically practical definition, despite its binary structure and limited attention to leadership. Its definitional clarity, mixed-method compatibility, and focus on content make it highly versatile for textual and discourse analysis – such as the parliamentary debates examined in this thesis. Importantly, no holistic definition limits itself to nationalism. Thus, despite the expectation that populism is connected to nationalists as

¹³⁷ Cf., Mudde, Cas. 2017. Populism: An Ideational Approach. In: *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 27–47, 30/32–39.

¹³⁸ Cf., Torre, Carlos de la and Oscar Mazzoleni. 2019. Do We Need a Minimum Definition of Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde’s Conceptualization. In: *Populism* 2 (1), 79–95, 86–87/90.

¹³⁹ Laclau, 152.

done by Judson, it is not preset that all populists are nationalists and vice versa. It is left to the analysis to confirm or deny this hypothesis.

In the following section, I will outline how this definition will be operationalised to suit the specific context of my thesis, as well as how its limitations will be addressed.

3.4. Operationalising the Ideational Approach

Despite different applications of the ideational understanding of populism, recent research has coalesced around three core tenets, which consistently appear across conceptualisations and studies of the approach in one combination or another. Firstly, populism justifies itself by always justifying its actions with ‘the people’ – it is *people-centrist*. Secondly, populism constructs ‘the people’ as a homogeneous and morally virtuous group, which defines itself in opposition to an excluded ‘other’ on the basis of categories such as class, ethnicity or religion – it is *exclusionary*. Thirdly, populism and populists fight for ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ – it is *anti-elite*.¹⁴⁰ It is the presence or absence of these core tenets within arguments and speeches that will serve as the core analytical framework for this thesis. Importantly,

The three core tenets also help address the key limitations of the ideational approach. Firstly, they allow for a gradual analysis instead of a binary populist/non-populist classification. Rather than applying the concept statically to entire speakers or parties, this thesis will assess the ratio of populist rhetoric by each parliamentarian. This allows for nuanced interpretations and enables a flexible analysis. Secondly, once populist arguments are identified, their content can be analysed further. This helps separate populism from the full ideologies it may be combined with, countering Laclau’s critique specifically. Lastly, to counteract the missing focus on leadership and charisma when analysing political parties, this study will incorporate an additional manual analysis of

¹⁴⁰ Cf., Jagers, Jan & Walgrave, Stefaan. 2006. Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties’ discourse in Belgium. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (1), 319–345, 322; Cf., Pajnik, Mojca & Fabijan, Emanuela. 2023. The Transversal Political Logic of Populism: Framing the ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Slovenian Parliamentary Debates. In: *Europe-Asia Studies* 75 (5), 742–768, 745; Cf., Mudde, 2004, 542–544; Cf., De Cleen, Benjamin & Stavrakakis, Yannis. 2017. Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism. In: *Javnost – the Public* 24 (4), 301–319, 312; Cf., Stanley, Ben. 2008. The thin ideology of populism. In: *Journal of political ideologies* 13 (1), 95–110, 106–108.

indicators such as speech length and internal and external party interactions, to assess the centrality of individual figures within the *Abgeordnetenhaus* debates.

While the three tenets define the ideological core of populism, their expression relies heavily on rhetorical and stylistic performances. Thus, defining populist strategies is necessary for understanding the political discourse of the parliamentary debates in more detail – and they will serve as an important cornerstone of the qualitative analysis, as detailed in the methodology. Populist discourse seeks to polarise through an emotional, often Manichean language that splits society into a moral binary: the pure people versus the corrupt elite.

The regular use of vague formulations and symbolic language – including Laclau’s (empty) signifiers – allows populists to link and unify a number of disparate feelings to simple ideas and slogans. This rhetorical style is particularly effective when populists know their audiences well, and when they mobilise public sentiment using negative emotions such as anger or fear. Importantly, populists increase legitimacy in the construed in-group by presenting themselves as part of the ‘homogeneous’ people one claims to represent.¹⁴¹ Regular interaction with adherents through speeches, rallies or media performances further reinforces this effect. These performative acts help construct a homogeneous people in the form of a *collective identity*, which allows for the in- and exclusion of social groups.¹⁴² By combining the core tenets with rhetoric and emotion, populists are able to split society and claim legitimacy as the sole ‘authentic’ voice of ‘the people’.

¹⁴¹ Cf., Langa, Enrique Arroyas and Victoria Fernández Ilundain. 2019. The politics of authenticity in populist discourse: Rhetorical analysis of a parliamentary speech by Podemos. In: *Populist Discourse*, London: Routledge, 17–32, 22–3/25.

¹⁴² Cf., Gheorghe, Andrei. 2022. Discursive Strategies of a Populist Leader in 2020 Romanian Legislative Elections: The Rhetoric and Political Style of George Simion. In: *Journal of Romanian Studies* 4 (2), 201–213, 204–6.

IV. Literature Review

At the heart of this thesis lies a corpus that contains all relevant speeches on the aforementioned law to transition the *Gulden* to the gold standard. Before analysing the corpus and any subcorpora to ascertain the presence and usage of populism in the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, it is necessary to outline the theoretical foundations and define technical terms. As such, the following section briefly discusses literature on corpus analyses, while the latter subchapter consults papers on the analysis of populism through corpora.

4.1. Corpus analysis

It is necessary to briefly describe the term *corpus*, which has, until now, been used uncommented. A corpus is broadly defined as a collection of texts of which it forms a collection or sample one can then analyse linguistically, for “the ultimate goal of corpus analysis is a generalizable empirical description of language use in a target discourse domain.”¹⁴³ It is highly adaptable in design and scope, which disallows the formation of a universal definition.¹⁴⁴

Thus, rather than adhere to one specification of the term, the usefulness of a corpus is instead dependent on its relation to the research aim – i.e., how it is designed. As Ädel and others argue, the most basic criterion of corpus design centres on *representativeness*. To make valid claims from corpus analysis, it is necessary to answer what speaker(s) and/or language situation the corpus wishes to represent.¹⁴⁵ Definitional differences of representativeness create difficulties in cross-paper comparability, as the claim of any study to be representative does not necessarily translate to generalisable findings. Some are based on proportional sampling or corpus size, while others see any corpus as representative. However, these often obscure the fact that corpora are inherently constructed with a purpose in mind. Thus, this thesis follows the view that a corpus is

¹⁴³ Egbert, Jesse, Douglas Biber and Bethany Gray. 2022. *Designing and Evaluating Language Corpora: A Practical Framework for Corpus Representativeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5.

¹⁴⁴ Cf., *ibid*, 2–3/5.

¹⁴⁵ Cf., Ädel, Annelie. 2020. *Corpus Compilation*. In: Paquot, Magali, Stefan Th. Gries (eds.). *A Practical Handbook of Corpus Linguistics*. Berlin: Springer, 3–4.

valid insofar as it fits its intended analytical goal – namely, the study of populist discourse in a limited parliamentary setting.¹⁴⁶

This approach is mirrored in existing studies of populist language – albeit outside of parliamentary settings. Cohen’s analysis on the discourse of Betsy DeVos, Trump’s first Secretary of Education, constructs a corpus limited to a single speaker and her predecessors, which enables meaningful comparisons in a set context without straining claims and going beyond the corpus’ validity.¹⁴⁷ Similarly, this thesis centres on a self-contained and finite corpus of *Abgeordnetenhaus* speeches, therefore, not aiming for broad generalisability but for a detailed understanding into the rhetorical features of a specific moment.

Technical details of data collection and corpus architecture, such as document processing methods and divisions into subcorpora, are elaborated in Chapter V, the Methodology. It should be noted that this corpus does not require extensive annotation, as it consists of complete, transcribed primary data extracted directly from parliamentary stenographic protocols.

4.2. Analysing Populism through Corpora

The difficulties surrounding populism as a definitive concept translate to controversy on how to measure it. Poblete offers three main efforts to assess populism as a discourse, each possessing their own methodological techniques and approaches. The first and second approaches are based on Laclau’s Discourse Populism and on positivism, respectively. However, they both lack clear research strategies and rely on second order interpretations within a hermeneutic context – a context which is difficult to construe with the limited information available on the relevant *Abgeordnetenhaus* discussions and speakers. The third method “understands [populist] discourse as explicit linguistic allocation, clearly stated in the content of a text”.¹⁴⁸ It centres on content analysis and involves deciphering the language of a text to classify them according to a populist

¹⁴⁶ Cf., Egbert et al., 36.

¹⁴⁷ Cf., Cohen, Michael Ian. Education Populism? A Corpus-Driven Analysis of Betsy DeVos’s Education Policy Discourse. In: *Education Policy Analysis Archives* 29 (16), 1–30, 1/7.

¹⁴⁸ Poblete, Mario E. 2015. How to assess populist discourse through three current approaches. In: *Journal of Political Ideologies* 20 (2), 201–218, 202.

intensity. Thus, it is this approach that best lends itself to the data available for this study – the stenographic protocols.¹⁴⁹

Hidalgo-Tenorio et al., in their extensive handbook on populist discourse, present a range of methods that have been employed to capture populism effectively. Two approaches are of interest for this thesis: *content and framing analysis*, and *corpus-assisted discourse analysis*. Both methods are frequently employed together, enabling a well-supported academic base for this thesis, which follows a similar hybrid approach in a novel setting.¹⁵⁰

Entman defines framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.”¹⁵¹ It is a way of political communication that promotes specific perceptions to benefit one group at the cost of another.¹⁵² I.e., in the context of political communication, the populist core tenets can be understood as the defining frames of populism.

Arroyas Langa and Fernández Ilundain, for example, analysed a central parliamentary speech in the vote of no-confidence against then Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy. Their findings, based in Mudde’s ideational approach, confirm that populists use emotions to rhetorically construe a narrative plot with antagonistic characters. This delegitimises the government while doing the opposite for the speaker, portraying them as the saviour of ‘the people’ and fostering an us-versus-them dichotomy.¹⁵³ The qualitative analysis of one specific speech and its emotions prove useful for the qualitative analysis of the *Abgeordnetenhaus* speeches.

Similarly, García-Marín and Luengo analysed 10.591 tweets made by politicians from Bolivia, Venezuela and Spain, focusing on the frames constructed to achieve the us-versus-them dichotomy and anti-elitist sentiment. To achieve this, they employ a mixed-method approach: A machine-learning algorithm automatically processes their corpora using frame analysis, before a manual content analysis presents and interprets the results.

¹⁴⁹ Cf., *ibid*, 202.

¹⁵⁰ Cf., Hidalgo-Tenorio, Encarnación, Miguel-Ángel Benítez-Castro and Francesca de Cesare. 2019. Introduction. In: *Populist Discourse – Critical Approaches to Contemporary Politics*, London/New York: Routledge, 1–14, 7–8.

¹⁵¹ Entman, Robert M. 2003. Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11. In: *Political communication* 20 (4), 415–432, 417.

¹⁵² Cf., *ibid*, 417.

¹⁵³ Cf., Langa & Ilundain, 25/30.

Additionally, methods such as word frequencies or keyword-relationships are employed (more on them below). Their results support the existence of populist frames that show remarkable similarities across global socio-economic contexts, while successfully adapting to local environments.¹⁵⁴

Pajnik and Fabijan further specify frames as a text and/or argument that implicitly or explicitly includes two parts: a problem (diagnosis) and a solution (prognosis). They employ this distinction in their manual study on populism in Slovenian parliamentary debates (combining Mudde's and Laclau's approaches), deconstructing arguments using populism's core tenets to arrive at a quantifiable list of populist frequency and usage. These findings allow them to locate populism in parties and individual speakers, enabling a broad analysis of the Slovenian political spectrum. A further qualitative analysis shows differences between the extent and manifestation of populist frames between parties, confirming the validity of the three established tenets.¹⁵⁵ Their analysis provides a clear model for analysing a broad and diverse political landscape, thus, fitting perfectly for the context of this thesis.

Taken together, these studies confirm that frame analysis is well-suited to understanding the construction of populism's core components and its rhetoric – particularly the us-versus-them dichotomy, anti-elitist narratives and emotional appeals. Whether applied to singular speeches, tweets, or, centrally, parliamentary debates in a corpus, this approach has proven effective across political and socio-economic contexts. As such, it provides a solid foundation for research question 1 of this thesis.

Breeze, analysing British opposition parties in 2017, works largely outside frame analysis, instead basing her study completely on corpus-assisted discourse analysis. To strengthen the validity of her findings, she created two corpora per party, fostering internal consistency. Using semantic tagging, she was able to identify key language areas, enabling a direct comparison of her research objects. A subsequent qualitative analysis underpins the discourse used by the parties. Breeze introduces *evaluative regimes* – the underlying system of values, judgments and assumptions that shape how politicians present events. While similar to frames, evaluative regimes represent a party's or

¹⁵⁴ Cf., García-Marín, Javier and Òscar G. Luengo. 2019. Populist Discourse in the 21st Century – The definition of otherness on Twitter in the cases of Spain, Bolivia and Venezuela. In: Hidalgo-Tenorio, Encarnación, Miguel-Ángel Benítez-Castro and Francesca de Cesare (eds.). *Populist Discourse – Critical Approaches to Contemporary Politics*, London/New York: Routledge, 81–99, 83–85/92–96.

¹⁵⁵ Cf., Pajnik and Fabijan, 748/756/765.

movements foundational worldview that then explains why certain frames are preferred. Breeze finds that some parties value ‘common sense’ and national sovereignty, expressing them through simplistic language (“easy”, “sensible”, “foolish”). Others lack such wording and use nuanced phrasing (“difficult”, “failure”), pointing to a more complex understanding of the world.¹⁵⁶ A similar analysis might uncover the evaluative regimes of the Cisleithanian clubs, deepening our understanding of its society.

Pérez-Paredes centres his corpus analysis of right-wing tabloid discourse on keywords and collocations – a staple of corpus analysis. They uncover patterns of language that may otherwise be invisible to the human eye (see Chapter V, Methodology, for more). Comparable to Pajnik and Fabijan’s application of frame analysis, this approach quantifies populism’s key tenets. However, whereas the former begin with theoretical categories and manually code arguments according to the populist tenets, Pérez-Paredes takes a bottom-up approach – he identifies statistically significant patterns first and interprets their meaning and relation to populist discourse from there. As a result, his study shows how language is instrumentalised to frame populist discourse in practice,¹⁵⁷ providing another angle for this study’s analysis.

To conclude, corpus-based methods such as keyword analysis or semantic tagging highlight the make-up of populist rhetoric. Their focus on linguistic structures allows researchers to examine rhetorical arrangements that might go unnoticed otherwise, allowing one to understand how frames are created linguistically. Thus, corpus-assisted discourse analysis effectively complements potential gaps left by frame analyses, increasing the total validity of claims made. Taken as a whole, the reviewed literature demonstrates the value of combining frame-based and corpus-assisted methods to study populist discourse. Especially in historical settings with limited contextual data, such as the House of Commons debates, this mixed-method approach allows for a deep empirical analysis and interpretation.

¹⁵⁶ Cf., Breeze, Ruth. 2019. Imagining the people in UKIP and Labour. In: Hidalgo-Tenorio, Encarnación, Miguel-Ángel Benítez-Castro and Francesca de Cesare (eds.). *Populist Discourse – Critical Approaches to Contemporary Politics*, London/New York: Routledge, 120–135, 121–122/128–130.

¹⁵⁷ Cf., Pérez-Paredes, Pascual. 2019. *Little old UK* voting Brexit and some Austrian friends: a corpus-driven analysis of the 2016 UK right-wing tabloid discourse. In: Hidalgo-Tenorio, Encarnación, Miguel-Ángel Benítez-Castro and Francesca de Cesare (eds.). *Populist Discourse – Critical Approaches to Contemporary Politics*, London/New York: Routledge, 152–171, 154–155/167.

V. Methodology

This thesis adopts a corpus-based mixed method approach to address the research aims. Firstly, all relevant speeches were collected using *ALEX*, a web-based service of the Austrian National Library.¹⁵⁸ A custom code was used to create a corpus out of the original stenographic protocols for the quantitative analysis (see Appendix). The code worked within Google's cloud console services and its *Google Cloud Vision API* to extract the letters of the *Fraktur* script employed in the protocols.¹⁵⁹ The resulting product was then cleaned: Any errors were corrected and unnecessary text such as headings or page numbers removed. Additionally, text passages that do not concern the monetary transition, i.e., speeches on other topics such as natural catastrophes or administrative issues, were separated into a different corpus, as not to distort the analysis. The finished product consists of a general corpus of well over 2.000.000 characters, and 51 subcorpora of the individual speakers organised further by club memberships.

Consequently, all corpora were analysed quantitatively using a manual *frame analysis*, which serves as a mapping tool for classifying and quantifying populist arguments, before other methods check its results. For this, Pajnik and Fabijan's approach is adapted slightly. Whereas they focus only on problem-solution pairs – one solution is given for one problem – the *Abgeordnetenhaus* debates often feature unequal numbers of problems and solutions. Consequently, this thesis does not collect problems and solutions together but instead tags them as separate. The corpus was annotated using CATMA,¹⁶⁰ which allows for the creation of custom tags. Once arguments were identified, they were marked as either non-populist or as populist depending on the application of the three tenets. Akin to Pajnik and Fabijan, arguments were categorised as people-centrist when reference was made to 'the people' as a unifying whole, including references to the nation, us, and kinds of 'the people', such as the working class or a specific nationality one represents. Exclusionary rhetoric included mentions of an us-versus-them dichotomy, where a group of others are presented as a threat to 'the people' – for example, if an out-group is framed

¹⁵⁸ The original stenographic protocols of the 152nd to 160th sessions of the Cisleithanian *Reichsrat* can be found under the following link from pages 7038–7498:

<https://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=spa&datum=0011&page=7025&size=45>.

¹⁵⁹ More information on Google Cloud Vision API can be found here: <https://cloud.google.com/vision?hl=en>.

¹⁶⁰ <https://app.catma.de/>

as an economic or cultural burden to the in-group. Anti-elite arguments are based on the perception of elites as corrupt and self-serving, going against ‘the people’s’ needs. This includes economic and political actors, the media, global capital, etc.¹⁶¹ Lastly, arguments were split into further sub-tags for the diagnosis or prognosis, ascertaining whether a problem or solution was being presented in conjunction with the three tenets.

To deconstruct the frame analysis’ results, two salient speakers – Minister of Finance Dr. Steinbach and Karl Lueger – will then undergo a *keyword* analysis as done by Pérez-Paredes,¹⁶² for which the open-access programme AntConc was used.¹⁶³ This compares two corpora with one another, further highlighting differences between speakers and their linguistic foci. It complements the frame analysis by applying a bottom-up approach, comparing vast amounts of language to identify salient words for a further qualitative analysis. Keywords are defined following Scott’s well-known approach, as “a word which occurs with unusual frequency in a given text.”¹⁶⁴ To ascertain this saliency, a comparative corpus is needed. In this case, this is, firstly, the general corpus consisting of all debates on the law to transition to the gold standard *minus* the speeches by the representative to be analysed; as well as the subcorpora of the other speaker that is analysed. A disparity in any word’s frequencies present between the two corpora is expressed in a number, the *keyness* – the greater the number, the larger the disparity.¹⁶⁵ Lastly, a qualitative analysis of the keywords serves to further connect the patterns uncovered through the two quantitative measures to populism itself. For this, the author reviewed every usage of a given keyword manually and looks at its deeper meaning, analysing keywords in their context.

Additionally, emotion and sentiment analyses were applied to the corpus to deepen the analysis further. The goal was to establish if populist arguments are, or are not, accompanied by a stronger emotive rhetoric. For this purpose, two different models were employed: Firstly, Lalk’s German emotion analysis models, which includes 27 emotions and has a RoBERTa base.¹⁶⁶ Secondly, Guhr’s BERT-based sentiment analysis model

¹⁶¹ Cf., Pajnik and Fabijan, 748/753.

¹⁶² Cf., Pérez-Paredes, 154.

¹⁶³ For more on AntConc, see: <https://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/> (accessed on 27th of June 2025).

¹⁶⁴ Scott, Mike. 1997. PC Analysis of Key Words – and key key words. In: *System* 25 (2), 233–245, 236.

¹⁶⁵ Cf., *ibid*, 236.

¹⁶⁶ Cf., Lalk, Chris. 2022. German-Emotions. In: *Hugging Face* <https://huggingface.co/ChrisLalk/German-Emotions> (accessed on 26th June 2025).

which annotates text as positive, neutral or negative.¹⁶⁷ However, the resulting data showed that the language employed by the Cisleithanian representatives was, apparently, too complex for the LLMs, as a manual control showed that a large part of sentences was classified incorrectly. A manual review of 1.000 classifications showed an error rate of approximately 39%. For example, Karl Lueger's sentence "Nur ist natürlich immer Ungarn der Löwe und Österreich wenigstens bisher immer noch der Esel, speciell der Packesel",¹⁶⁸ is classified as neutral with a 99.95% probability by the Lalk's emotion analysis model, although the sentence is clearly negative in nature. Causes for this could be the complicated nature of parliamentary language¹⁶⁹ and the simple fact that the discourse analysed uses formulations from the late 19th century, which might both require a specialised model. However, a detailed exploration of current model's shortcomings would go beyond the scope of this thesis and is left to future research.

It is for this reason that these methods had to be excluded from the thesis.

5.1. Limitations

"[A]ll methods of research have associated problems which need to be addressed and are also limited in terms of what they can and cannot achieve"¹⁷⁰ This is especially true for corpus data, which does not interpret itself, but rather relies completely on the researcher to interpret findings and hypothesise reasons for their existence.¹⁷¹

Therefore, to begin with the primary data used – the debates within the corpus. Being a case study, it is limited by the fact that it includes only data from a specific set of debates, restricting claims to a limited context. Importantly, Ädel emphasises that no score determines if a corpus is sizeable enough. Instead, research aims need to be adjusted to the data at hand.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ Cf., Guhr, Oliver. 2021. German-Sentiment-Bert. In: *Hugging Face* <https://huggingface.co/oliverguhr/german-sentiment-bert> (accessed on 26th June 2025).

¹⁶⁸ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei. 1892. Stenographisches Protokoll. Haus der Abgeordneten. XI. Session, 157. Sitzung am 16. Juli 1892. Wien, 7327. Author's translation: 'But of course Hungary is always the Lion and Austria, at least until now, still the donkey, especially the pack mule.'

¹⁶⁹ Cf., Hames, Sam, Michael Haugh and Simon Musgrave. 2025. "How is that unparliamentary?": The metapragmatics of 'unparliamentary' language in the Australian Federal Parliament. In: *Lingua* 320 (1), 1–24, 1.

¹⁷⁰ Baker, P. 2006. *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis*. London: Continuum, 7.

¹⁷¹ Cf., *ibid*, 18.

¹⁷² Cf., Ädel, 8.

As for the methods chosen: the frame analysis identifies an absolute number of populist arguments, but does not, by itself, disclose anything about the length thereof, or how often speakers engage in neutral or technical language besides populist rhetoric. To counteract these issues, the density of populist arguments per 10.000 characters is calculated and keyword analysis included. Lastly, frame analysis is a manual, subjective process, leading to differing results depending on the researcher. To counteract this, every speech was annotated through multiple rounds, controlling and specifying tagging and increasing inner consistency. Further, the specialised code of conduct in parliament adds a level of complexity to the ascertainment of populism. It does not feature, for example, political speeches prewritten for particular constituents. Instead, parliamentary discourse is a highly institutionalised rhetoric, where explicit offensive language is often avoided, or highlighted and discredited.¹⁷³ Similarly, a large share of populist arguments made in the *Abgeordnetenhaus* are not explicit and direct. Thus, the automatic machine-based keyword analysis combined with a qualitative review serve to increase the validity of any annotations made, strengthening the findings of the frame analysis.

VI. Analysis

To effectively display the findings of the analysis without overwhelming the reader, this chapter takes the following structure. First, selected results of the frame analysis are presented in chapter 6.1.¹⁷⁴ This covers the club and speaker levels to establish a macro- and micro-overview of populist tendencies and statistical outliers. Next, section 6.2 moves on to the keyword analysis and qualitative review of the two selected, salient speakers. It is important to highlight again that the *Südslawen*, *Unabhängiger Kroaten und Slowenenklub*, *Trentinoklub* and the *Mährische Mittlere Partei*, totalling 26 out of 353 delegates, did not participate in the debates. 46 delegates representing nine clubs, three factionless representatives, as well as the ministers of agriculture and finance participated in the debates. Lastly, the Ruthenian Club held only a single speech for a total length of 2.351 characters, totalling 0.11% of the corpus. Combined with the fact that it's only two arguments, both people-centrist and nationalist, skew the results of the populist density, they are disregarded in the analysis.

¹⁷³ Cf., Hames, Haugh and Musgrave, 1.

¹⁷⁴ See the Appendix for a table covering all results of the analysis.

6.1. Ascertaining Populism – Results of the Frame Analysis

6.1.1. Populism on the Club Level




Figure 2, Absolute Number of Populist Arguments (Thick Columns) and Populist Density (Thin Columns; Calculated as Populist Arguments per 10.000 Characters in the General Corpus) by Club and Affiliation




Figure 3, Total Length of all Speeches by Club and Affiliation in Characters

The frame analysis clearly shows that populism *was* present in the *Abgeordnetenhaus* debates on the monetary transition to the gold standard. In absolute numbers, five clubs stand out from the rest, ranging from the VDL 67 populist arguments to the German Nationals' 86. However, all clubs varied in the application of populism.

First of all, it is evident that some clubs spoke much more about the topic (see Figure 6). The *VDL*, the liberal German-based party, whose speakers primarily advocated for the reform, made up a total of 24.42% of the debates on the gold standard. However, despite their prominence in the debate, the club only ranks fifth in the total number of populist arguments and eighth in populist density. Further, 47 out of the VDL's 67 populist arguments are part of the people-centrist sub-tag, hinting that they portrayed the reform as serving 'the people'. Importantly, they are also one of the only two factions that included more prognoses than diagnoses (38 to 29), focusing their rhetoric on offering solutions rather than identifying problems. Combined with the simultaneous scarcity of anti-elitist (5) or exclusionary arguments (15), this suggests that their people-centrist arguments did not necessarily aim at creating the us-versus-them dichotomy so central to populism, but instead tried to create a broad in-group, excluding few and including many. This result would stay in line with their non-radical nationalist stance (see Chapter 2.1.1). They are followed by two clubs that stand diametrically opposed to the Liberals: The *Jungtschechen* as one of the emerging radical factions, and the Conservatives that are mostly against liberal ideals. First, the nationalists Czechs, contributing 15.07% to the discussions, employ a balanced distribution of populist diagnoses. While anti-elite arguments (18) do dominate slightly, exclusionary (13) and people-centrist (13) rhetoric is also given. However, they focus almost exclusively on people-centrist prognoses (26 out of 38), which hints towards their nationalist focus. Their populist density, twice as high as that of the *VDL*, indicates a considerably greater reliance on populist rhetoric. Second, the Conservatives, who make up 14.77% of the corpus, rely heavily on anti-elitist arguments (42 out of 81), of which two-thirds identify problems. People-centrism (26), although less salient than anti-elitism, is still employed frequently – especially in the prognosis (16) – whereas excluding (13) appears little. In terms of populist density, the Conservatives rank even with the *Jungtschechen*, ranking in the upper end of the middle third. This result is in line with the expectations, with them opposing liberal ideology while being a supranational faction that has long played a role in the multi-ethnic Habsburg structures.

The *Deutschnationale* and the *Freie Vereinigung für wirtschaftliche Reform auf christlicher Basis*, the *Antisemites*, stick out as the two parties that combine a high absolute number of populist arguments with a long speech length and a high populist density. The German Nationals achieve the highest number of populist arguments while making up 12.19% of the corpus, reaching the second highest populist density with 3.32 – 2.5 times that of the *VDL*. Centrally, their populist rhetoric centres primarily on exclusionary arguments (55 out of 86) – both in the diagnosis and prognosis. Anti-elitism (19) and people-centrism (12) take second stage. This fits their highly nationalist worldview, which dominates their rhetoric.

As for the *Antisemites*, anti-elitism (38) is the largest group, followed by excluding (21) and people-centrism (21). Thus, while one tenet does dominate, the other two still feature in significant numbers. Interestingly, in the diagnosis, exclusionary arguments (16) remain higher than people-centrist ones (6), while this switches in the prognosis, with 5 exclusionary to 15 people-centrist cases. I.e., their problem identification rests strongly on anti-elite and exclusionary rhetoric, whereas possible solutions are justified by anti-elite and pro-people language. Combined with a high populist density of 3.19, the *Antisemites* seem to potentially be a central populist actor, as hypothesised in Chapter 2.1.1 – the frequent exclusionary frames also point to a nationalist character previously unrecognised in the literature, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.2.

The remaining five groups are all related through their small absolute number of populist arguments. However, they, again, vary in speech length and populist density. The three factionless representatives, although in the centre third on populist density if taken together, will be omitted here, as their lack of club membership makes a unified analysis unproductive. The *Alttschechen* only featured one speaker, František Weber, whose analysis can be found in the section 6.1.2.2. on individual speakers outside the top quartile.

Two groups, the *Polenklub* and the government officials – made up of the two ministers – show a high degree of similarity. Firstly, both are strong advocates for the reform. Secondly, their very limited employment of populist tenets is characterised primarily by people-centrist language. The Poles feature them more heavily in the diagnosis (4 out of 8 total arguments) than the prognosis (1 out of 3 solutions), whereas the government officials identify fewer problems (3 in total, out of which one is people-centrist), but instead propose only people-centrist prognoses (6). Thus, this suggests that the Poles,

advocating for the reform, connect it to issues facing ‘the people’. The government officials instead base the reform they represent on solutions for ‘the people’. The lack of exclusionary and anti-elitist language argues against the existence of an us-versus-them dichotomy and a populist rhetoric, which is supported by their populist densities remaining below 0.5 – the lowest in the entire corpus by far.

The last club is the *Klub des Liberalen Zentrums*, whose already small contribution of 1.27% to the corpus is split further between three speakers. Their populist density, although slightly higher than that of the *VDL*, remains relatively low, while the populist arguments they do use are split between the exclusionary (2) and people-centrist (2) tenets – omitting anti-elitist framing. All factors taken together argue against populist usage among the liberal centre, which is why they are left out of further analyses.

Summa summarum, among the various clubs represented in the House of Deputies, only a few display characteristics necessary to qualify them as populist under the established balanced-tenet framework: the *Deutschnationale* and Conservatives exhibit a high absolute number of populist arguments and density, but their language use is skewed heavily towards exclusionary and anti-elitist rhetoric, respectively. The *VDL*, the *Klub des Liberalen Zentrums*, the government officials and the *Polenklub* combine this reliance on one or two tenets with a significantly lower populist density, pointing against the existence of a populist rhetoric within these factions. By contrast, the *Jungtschechen* present a relatively even application of all three tenets – especially in their diagnoses – and feature a high average density. Similarly, the Antisemites combine the third-highest density with a large volume of populist arguments, featuring framing of all three tenets. Thus, these two clubs remain as key populist contenders for further analyses.

6.1.2. Populism on the Speaker Level

Whereas entire parties can employ populist rhetoric, individual figures are also central to populist movements. However, the ideational definition does not include leaders, although their importance has been recognised by its supporters and in other attempts at a universal definition (see Chapter 4.3.2).¹⁷⁵ Thus, while a charismatic leader may not be

¹⁷⁵ Cf., Torre and Mazzoleni, 90,

the defining factor of populism, it is still an essential factor that must not be disregarded. Therefore, the following section evaluates the speaker level, ascertaining if individual speakers took on a central role in the debates and if they employed populist rhetoric. Consequently, this subchapter mainly focuses on speakers that have considerable total speech lengths. Speakers are separated into four quartiles, with the first going from 0 to 11.225 characters, the second up to 25.685 characters, the third reaching 59.775, and the fourth going up to 171.550 characters. Additionally, populist density is also given. Afterwards, remaining statistical outliers will be discussed as not to forego important findings.

6.1.2.1. *The Top Quartile of Representatives in the Abgeordnetenhaus Debates and their Employment of Populism*




Figure 4. Absolute Number of Populist Arguments (Thick Columns) and Populist Density (Thin Columns) inside the Top Quartile

Reflecting the total club speech lengths discussed above, four representatives – Menger, Dr. Suess, Dr. Jaques and Edler v. Plener – belong to the VDL. As is apparent, Menger, a brother of Carl Menger, one of the leading economists of Austria-Hungary, has both the highest populism usage and density among his club peers. He totals 25.88% of the VDL's characters (i.e., speech length) and 34.32% of their populist arguments made. However,

his populist density of 1.71 remains comparatively low to other parties. Further, his rhetoric features no anti-elitist arguments, focusing strongly on people-centrist diagnoses (6) and prognoses (9). This also applies to his three colleagues and generally mirrors the party line presented above. I.e., while some variations in argumentative lines are given – Dr. Jaques and Edler v. Plener do include some limited anti-elitist views – their populist rhetoric generally centres on ‘the people’ but lack the excluding ‘other’.

Two speakers of the *Jungtschechen* are present in the top quartile: Dr. Kaizl and Dr. Kramár. The former’s six diagnoses are evenly split between the three tenets, whereas his solutions centre completely on a people-centrist rhetoric (5). His populist density of 1.15, 1.41 points lower than the party average, however, argues against identifying Kaizl as a populist. Dr. Kramár’s populist density of 2.82, on the other hand, puts him 0.26 above the party mean and makes him a top populist among the featured speakers. His diagnoses are primarily anti-elitist (6), whereas people-centrism (3) and excluding (2) take a secondary role. His prognoses reverse this trend, with people-centrist rhetoric (6) taking centre-stage, whereas anti-elite (1) and exclusionary arguments (0) are barely present. Kramár’s contribution of 19.92% of the *Jungtschechen*’s total speeches – as opposed to Kaizl’s 29.87% – relates well to his proportion of populist arguments within the club (21.95%).

The *Klub der Konservativen*, the Conservatives, also features two speakers: Dipauli and Morsey. Their populist densities of 2.99 and 2.84, respectively give them the second and third highest density amongst the top speakers. Both are characterised strongly by their anti-elite sentiment in the prognosis and in the diagnosis. In fact, Dipauli has the highest total number of anti-elite arguments (28) out of all top speakers – a characteristic reflected in the club analysis. He covers 41.97% of all populist rhetoric made by the Conservatives, and 36.25% of their total speeches. Morsey employs a slightly more balanced populist framing, with a slightly larger share of exclusionary (6 out of 21) and people-centrist (4) arguments, although anti-elitism still dominates (11). Although still in the top quartile, he seems to take on a secondary role within the party, achieving 25.92% of their populist arguments and 23.55% of their speeches. This may indicate Dipauli’s prominence within the party – a role often associated with the rise of populist movements. The simultaneous lack of exclusionary and people-centrist arguments, however, point against identifying Dipauli as a populist.

One other club features two speakers, the *Antisemites* with Dr. Lueger and Jax. Lueger stands out as the top speaker with both the largest number of populist arguments made

and the highest populist density. His populist rhetoric is split relatively evenly between anti-elite (24), exclusionary (19) and people-centrist (18) arguments, showing a balanced application of the populist tenets – supporting the idea of an us-versus-them dichotomy. Differences do exist between the diagnosis and the prognosis. Whereas the former is dominated by anti-elitist (15) and exclusionary (12) framing, the latter centres primarily on people-centrist solutions (14 out of 28). I.e., problems are connected primarily to outsiders and elites, whereas solutions cater to ‘the people’. Further, Lueger is responsible for 73.75% of all populist arguments made by his club, as well as 52.30% of their total character count. His total speech length is surpassed only by the Minister of Finance and *Berichterstatter* Szczepanowski, discussed below, and the abovementioned Menger. The club’s second most prolific parliamentarian, Jax, pales in comparison to Lueger. His low populist density of 1.17 gives little importance to the few populist frames that are used. This is extended to the rest of the *Antisemites* whose average populist density drops from 3.19 to 1.75 without Lueger. All points taken together make him *the* salient populist speaker of the entire debates – a point discussed further below.

This leaves three other groups that feature only one speaker in the top quartile. One of them, Dr. Fuß of the German Nationals, relies heavily on exclusionary discourse, which dominates his populist rhetoric with 22 out of 28 total. This is true for both the diagnosis (14) and the prognosis (8) – which, again, mirrors the club proportion. Nevertheless, despite Fuß being the dominant speaker of the German Nationals, making up 48.40% of his club’s speeches, he makes up only 32.55% of the German National’s populist arguments, while his populist density of 2.23 is below the club average of 3.32. As a matter of fact, Fuß has the lowest density amongst all German Nationals. Thus, this heavy reliance on only one tenet combined with the low populist density argues against the existence of a broad populist rhetoric amongst the leading speaker of this club.

Minister of Finance Dr. Steinbach has the longest total character count in the entire corpus and the second lowest populist density, featuring only 9 populist arguments in 171.550 characters. Seven of these arguments are people-centrist, with the majority (6) part of the prognosis, and two are anti-elite problems identified in the speech. His extremely limited populist rhetoric, therefore, focuses on portraying the reform as for ‘the people’, unifying them as a whole without using excluding language that would create an in- and out-group. The last representative, Szczepanowski, is officially a member of the *Polenklub*, but acted as the *Berichterstatter*, a rapporteur, for the law. I.e., he was responsible for collecting

information regarding the draft law, providing a knowledge base that any representative may use to decide their vote. Szczepanowski achieves the lowest populist density at 0.37, expressing only a total of 6 populist frames, out of which five are people-centrist (4 in the diagnosis) and one anti-elite prognosis. While this may hint towards Szczepanowski connecting the reform to issues surrounding ‘the people’, his lack of exclusionary or anti-elite sentiment positions him as a non-populist.

Thus, both the main government agent arguing for the reform, the Minister of Finance, and the delegate collecting data to support the reform seem to disregard populist rhetoric, instead focusing on framing the reform in non-populist terms.

6.1.2.2. Populist Speakers outside the Top Quartile




Figure 5, Absolute Number of Populist Arguments (Thick Columns) and Populist Density (Thin Columns) outside the Top Quartile

The eleven representatives shown in the table above contain all speakers with a populist density of 3.0 and higher, with the only exception being Dr. Lueger due to his inclusion in the top quartile.¹⁷⁶ However, a majority of these speakers rely on primarily one or two

¹⁷⁶ Including a larger number of delegates would prove fruitless, as the lower populist density often meets with little proportionality between the three populist tenets. This argues against the existence of populism in the other speakers and would, thus, serve to only obscure relevant findings.

populist tenets, including Kaiser, Keil, Hofmann v. Wellenhof, Eim, Dr. Bareuther, Formánek, Fürnkranz, Kraus, Weber, and Dr. Kindermann. This disqualifies them for further analysis regarding populism, leaving their language use to future research.

Nevertheless, Pfeifer and Dr. Herold remain as individuals with a high populist density *and* a balanced application of the three populist tenets. Pfeifer, a member of the Conservative Club, splits his arguments between anti-elitist (2), exclusionary (3), and people-centrist (2) framing. However, his small total character count of 17.745 makes it difficult to make statements about larger patterns concerning diagnosis and prognosis or language use. Opposingly, Dr. Herold fulfils a number of requirements to be seen as a potential populist for further analysis: Firstly, he employs 18 populist frames, 5 of which are anti-elitist, 6 exclusionary, and 7 people-centrist. Secondly, as a member of the *Jungtschechen*, Herold's populist density of 3.60 makes him one of the club's top contenders in this regard, falling only behind the abovementioned Eim and Formánek. However, his fourth spot in terms of total speech length shows that he is not a central leading figure, although his 49.948 characters do enable a greater analysis than Pfeifer's. Bibliographical data on Herold seem to confirm these results: he was a founding member of the *Jungtschechen* and one of its most effective speakers. However, at the time of the debates in 1892, he had only been a member of the *Reichsrat* since 1888. It seems that his time in the political limelight began in the later 1890s, with him becoming responsible for all bohemian counties in 1896, and the president of the Czech national parliament in 1906.¹⁷⁷

In sum, while a number of speakers stand out – either because they contributed significantly to the debates or due to their high populist densities – only a handful demonstrate the necessary characteristics to qualify them as populist actors. Figures such as Menger, Fuß, or Kaizl, despite their prominence within their respective clubs, rely overwhelmingly on one or two populist tenets while displaying low to moderate densities. Dr. Kramár, Dipauli, and Morsey, while achieving a very high populist density and contributing extensively to the corpus, similarly leave out part of populism's core concepts. By contrast, two speakers represent the most consistent and salient populist voices of the debates. Firstly, Dr. Lueger stands out as the single most prolific and

¹⁷⁷ Cf., N.A., 1959. Herold Josef. In: Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815-1950, Band 2. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 289.

consistent populist speaker. He combines the highest populist density in the top quartile with a large speech share and a remarkably even application of all three tenets. Outside of the top quartile, only Dr. Herold combines an equally balanced framing with a substantial speech length – although not close to Lueger’s – making him another possible populist.

Combining the findings from both the club and speaker levels reveals that populism in the *Abgeordnetenhaus* debates cannot be attributed uniformly to entire factions. While certain clubs such as the Conservatives or the *Jungtschechen* did demonstrate populist tendencies on a macro level, these patterns were not always pushed by the club’s most prominent delegate. In the case of the former, for example, the central figure Dipauli does not fulfil the definition of a populist, whereas other members like Pfeifer show a significantly stronger populist profile. Taking this into account, this chapter has, nevertheless, identified strong populist tendencies among some speakers that require a closer analysis. To this end, the following chapter will examine a key populist speaker, Dr. Lueger, and a salient non-populist, Minister of Finance Dr. Steinbach, in greater detail to compare and better understand the rhetoric employed. Coincidentally, Lueger is against the reform while Steinbach is, as the main propagator behind the law, for it. Whereas the analysis of more speakers would be preferable, the aforementioned omission of the emotion and sentiment analyses disallow this aim. The reason being that the following keyword analysis requires a detailed manual review, which disallows the inclusion of more speakers.

6.2. Results of the Keyword Analysis

6.2.1. Karl Lueger's Rhetoric in the 152nd to the 160th Sessions of the House of Commons

Word	Target Frequency	Ref. Frequency	Keyness
er	193	1307	131.839
wenn	207	1693	98.815
silbercourantmünzen	16	1	87.358
suklje	28	42	76.244
herr	131	1006	71.015
prälat	15	4	69.796
ungarn	85	522	67.661
dann	78	537	51.625
silber	51	275	48.748
bezahlen	21	50	43.573
verzeihe	7	0	41.498
polen	18	37	41.091
excellenz	51	313	40.596
sie	190	2094	39.869
finanzminister	56	378	38.306
papiersschulden	8	2	37.630
goldwährung	74	588	37.376
eigentlich	36	182	37.360
wir	191	2146	37.354
es	295	3737	34.496
österreich	62	471	34.254
sage	24	91	34.121
ihnen	36	198	33.499
silberschulden	10	10	32.617
eingelöst	11	15	31.376
treuinfels	15	36	30.951
ist	326	4312	30.267
sind	116	1200	30.019
boschan	5	0	29.641
prälaten	7	3	29.598
jetzt	48	346	29.260
jaques	13	29	28.170
folgendes	12	25	27.163
müssen	43	307	26.667
vereinigten	10	16	26.332
papiergeld	14	40	25.430
sagen	57	483	25.039
professor	28	161	24.499

neugierig	6	3	24.430
goldschulden	7	6	24.188
hat	170	2071	23.829
helfy	4	0	23.712
seine	56	487	23.170
kein	32	211	22.740
silberschuld	6	4	22.533
bin	35	249	21.839
österreichs	19	89	21.598
landesgerichtsrath	5	2	21.477
papier	15	57	21.276
vorsehung	6	5	20.941

Table 3, Top 50 keywords in Lueger's statements compared to the General Corpus

The table above shows the number of times Lueger used a word (Target Frequency), the number of times that same word was used in the reference corpus (Ref. Frequency), and the resulting keyness, by which the keywords are ordered. To calculate the keyness, the log-likelihood is calculated using the following formula:

$$LL = 2 * \left[O1 * \ln \left(\frac{O1 (N1+N2)}{N1(O1+O2)} \right) + O2 * \ln \left(\frac{O2 (N1+N2)}{N2(O1+O2)} \right) \right]$$

where O1 and O2 are the frequencies in the target and reference corpus, and N1 and N2 the respective corpus sizes. The formula compares observed versus expected frequencies under the assumption that the word were evenly distributed, and measures any divergences using logarithms. The resulting term is multiplied by 2 to fit a chi-squared distribution, which allows for statistically significant results to emerge. I.e., the higher the keyness, the more characteristic of a specific corpus it is.

As is apparent, the list contains a large number of lexical items related to a variety of topics. In order not to oversaturate the analysis with an explanation of every single keyword, central terms are allocated to categories. Firstly, references to others feature heavily in Lueger's speech, in the form of *er* – the top keyword – *sie*, *ihnen* and *seine*, as well as direct naming of colleagues through *Suklje*, *Herr*, *Prälat*, *Excellenz* and *Finanzminister*, *Treuinfels*, *Boschan*, *Prälaten*, *Jaques*, *Professor*, *Helfy*, and *Landesgerichtsrath*.

Lueger also heavily refers to certain aspects of the monetary reform: *Silbercourantmünzen*, *Silber*, *Goldwährung*, *Silberschulden*, *Papiergeld*, *Goldschulden*, *Silberschuld* and *Papier*.

Further, he disparately includes mentions of certain geographic terms. First and foremost, *Ungarn*, followed by *Polen*, *Österreich* and *österreichs*.

Lastly, his rhetoric clearly rests on the employment of certain discursive measures. *Wenn* appears on rank two, while *dann* follows on the eight spot. Additionally, keywords such as *eigentlich*, *wir*, *sage*, *jetzt*, *folgendes*, or *müssen* influence his rhetoric, as discussed below table 4.

However, as stated above, these findings are a result of comparing Lueger's speeches to *all* others held on the topic. I.e., also those that heavily feature certain aspects of populism as shown in the frame analysis. Thus, before Lueger's keywords can be analysed and connected to populism, Lueger's rhetoric will firstly be compared to the chosen non-populist speaker, Minister of Finance Dr. Steinbach. Importantly, Steinbach's speeches consist of 171.550, and Lueger's of 130.965 characters. Thus, differences in term frequencies are not because of a large disparity in speaking time.

Word	Target Frequency	Ref. Frequency	Keyness
excellenz	51	0	87.622
ungarn	85	13	83.703
wir	191	85	81.275
er	193	95	71.307
österreich	62	10	59.521
goldwährung	74	17	58.242
finanzminister	56	13	43.750
millionen	40	6	39.693
partei	21	0	36.060
suklje	28	2	35.594
polen	18	0	30.907
abgeordneter	21	1	29.026
silbercourantmünzen	16	0	27.472
müssen	43	14	25.733
bezahlen	21	2	24.674
wenn	207	170	24.032
volk	13	0	22.320
herr	131	95	22.215
dann	78	48	19.424
dr	62	34	19.168
eingelöst	11	0	18.885
österreichs	19	3	18.405

Table 4, All Keywords in Lueger's statements compared to Steinbach's subcorpus

The comparison of Lueger and the Minister of Finance shows findings that remain largely similar to the keywords found in the comparison to the General Corpus. To begin, terms related to the political setting and others feature just as heavily. *Excellenz*, *er*,

Finanzminister, Suklje, Abgeordneter, Herr, and *Dr* all address specific speakers, while *Partei* encompasses multiple representatives.

Aspects of the monetary reform almost disappear entirely. Only *Goldwährung* and *Silbercourantmünzen* are featured in both keyword analyses, while *Millionen*, *bezahlen* and *eingelöst* – in the sense of cashing in – appear only when compared to Steinbach.

Geographic language stays prominent, with Lueger referring to *Ungarn, Österreich, Polen* and *österreichs* far more frequently than Steinbach.

Discursive measures are also apparent, but frequency differences are, overall, less significant. Still, *wir*, clearly stands out. Despite Lueger representing only a small faction, he uses the term far more often than Steinbach – perhaps as a way of linguistically positioning himself as speaking for ‘the people’ – highlighting the need for further analysis found below. Differences in other discursive measures, such as *müssen*, *wenn*, and *dann* still feature with a lower keyness.

Lastly, Lueger employs *Volk* thirteen times while Steinbach never uses the term. While it does appear 98 times in speeches by all other delegates, Lueger makes up 11.71% of all uses of *Volk* while contributing only 4.97% of all characters and 5.16% of all words in the corpus.

Thus, table 3 and 4 display clear trends and confirm certain tendencies to be analysed further. Firstly, in both cases, Lueger directly addresses his colleagues far more often than they do, by using *ihnen* or *sie* to refer to more than one speaker, or *er* for individual representatives. Some representatives, such as Suklje or Prälat Treuinfels are named directly, as is the Minister of Finance through the disparately frequent usage of *Excellenz* or *Finanzminister*. This tendency for personalistic discourse may point to Lueger’s focus lying not necessarily on discussing the reform through his own arguments, but rather on discussing the arguments made by others on the transition.

Secondly, his rhetoric heavily features economic terms which focus mostly on nouns that highlight silver over gold, such as *Silbercourantmünzen* or *Gold-* and *Silberschulden*. He does also include verbs such as *bezahlen* or *eingelöst*, pointing towards a tendency to centre on the costs and not the benefits of the reform – a hypothesis that may be supported by Lueger’s disproportionate focus on different kinds of debts. This could be explained by his contrary stance to the transition.

Thirdly, in both comparisons, the same geographic terms stand out with a similar keyness, with Hungary taking centre-stage, and Poland and Austria following behind it. This might

signify geographic, but also political delineations of in- and out-groups, highlighting a necessity for further analysis to confirm if Lueger is construing an us-versus-them dichotomy so central to populism.

Lastly, his discursive measures show an employment of conjunctions that stand out compared to his peers. This may help to create conclusions to his arguments which he can present as logical. For example, by stating:

“Meine Herren! Wenn die Goldwährung eingeführt ist, wenn wir sagen, dass ein Gulden [...] gleich ist zwei Kronen [...] und wenn er meint, der Herr Finanzminister würde schon dafür Sorge tragen, solange es eine Silberschuld geben wird, würde auch der Silbergulden nicht verschwinden [...] dann kriegen wir die Goldwährung nie, wenigstens nicht in menschlich absehbarer Zeit.“¹⁷⁸

Terms such as *eigentlich*, *wir*, *sage*, *jetzt*, *folgendes*, or *müssen* act to support this approach, as they create a sense of urgency (*jetzt*) and foster inferences, as something ‘must’ ‘actually’ happen to ‘us’ as Lueger ‘says’. Additionally, the heavy usage of *wir* may also foster the construction of an in-group, as does the disproportionately high inclusion of *Volk* where Lueger directly references ‘the people’ – as opposed to Steinbach.

To confirm the validity of these hypotheses, the following section aims to analyse Lueger’s speech in connection to the identified central keywords and populism, before the Minister of Finance’s language is analysed similarly.

6.2.1.1. A Review of Karl Lueger’s Keywords

To further ascertain the existence of populism in Lueger’s rhetoric, the keywords and their categories identified above will be connected to the three populist tenets in an analysis akin to Arroyas and Ilundain’s work on Spanish parliamentary speeches. A close look at keywords in their context serves to uncover the themes and arguments through which the tenets are manifested. I.e., the worldview that populist rhetoric is used to express.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7125–7126. Author’s translation: ‘Gentlemen! If the gold standard is introduced, if we say that one guilder [...] is equal to two crowns [...] and if he thinks that the Finance Minister will take care of this, as long as there is a silver debt, the silver guilder will not disappear [...] then we will never get the gold standard, at least not in the foreseeable future.’

¹⁷⁹ Cf., Arroyas and Ilundain, 25/30.

As populists always justify their actions with ‘the people’ – be that explicit or implicit – the first term to analyse is *Volk* – a direct reference to ‘the people’.¹⁸⁰ Importantly, it is not a term that distinguishes between specific socio-economic classes. At closer inspection, Lueger uses it in accordance with the people-centrist and anti-elitist populist tenet. An example for the former is one of Lueger’s many critiques of gold:

“[U]nd wenn wir in Österreich unser Silber beseitigen und Gold einführen [...] brechen wir dabei eine Schutzmauer ein, welche uns bisher geschützt hat und speciell die agrarischen Verhältnisse geschützt hat, und mit dem Einbrechen dieser Schutzmauer richten wir unser Volk zugrunde. Das möchte ich dem Herr Suklje sagen.”¹⁸¹

As is apparent, Lueger directly connects the introduction of the gold standard to destroy ‘the people’ in general, but also the farmers especially, arguing automatically that his arguments to keep the silver standard are *for* ‘the people’. Additionally, this quote already hints to his anti-elitist rhetoric, as Lueger frequently references the *Volk* to critique both the financial elite and his colleagues, whom he accuses of being disconnected of ‘the people’. This is further exemplified in other cases, such as:

“Eine große Zukunft der Börse, das heißt soviel als: das arme Volk wird großartig ausgebeutet werden. Und wissen Sie, wer zahlen muss? [...] Sie sehen: die Börse jubelt, das Volk wird Steuern zahlen. Nachdem ich nun der Meinung bin, dass keiner von Ihnen zu dem Zwecke gewählt worden ist, damit die Börse jubelt oder eine große Zukunft hat [...] so glaube ich, dass es unsere Verpflichtung ist, unter jeder Bedingung gegen die Goldwährung zu stimmen.”¹⁸²

Thus, the financial elites are directly connected to exploitation, while he appoints himself the protector of ‘the people’ by stating that it is his opinion that he was elected to defend the *Volk* and attack the elites. Any representatives that vote contrary to this argument are, consequently, cooperating with the elites. Lastly, he directly attacks Prälat Treuinfels and Professor Suklje, both members of the Conservatives, stating multiple times that they do not represent ‘the people’ and explicitly laying out the betrayal of his fellow parliamentarians:

¹⁸⁰ Cf., Jagers & Walgrave, 322.

¹⁸¹ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7127. Author’s translation: ‘[A]nd if we eliminate our silver in Austria and import gold [...] we will break down a protective wall that has protected us so far, and especially the agrarian conditions, and by breaking down this protective wall we will destroy our people. I would like to say this to Mr. Suklje.’

¹⁸² Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7129. Author’s translation: ‘A great future for the stock exchange means that the poor people will be greatly exploited. And do you know who will have to pay? [...] You see: the stock exchange cheers, the people will pay taxes. Now, since I am of the opinion that none of you were elected for the purpose of ensuring that the stock exchange would cheer or have a great future [...] I believe, it is our obligation to vote against the gold standard under all circumstances.’

“[I]ch glaube, dass es die Aufgabe der göttlichen Vorsehung sein wird, die unschuldigen Völker Österreichs vor den Folgen der Beschlüsse jener Personen zu schützen, welche eigentlich berufen sind, das Volk zu vertreten.”¹⁸³

Thus, the closer analysis of the term *Volk* has confirmed the existence of populist rhetoric in two of the three populist tenets. Furthermore, the third tenet, excluding, is just as present and used by Lueger to construe the borders of an in- and out-group that is adapted to the Cisleithanian context. This is best exemplified by the term *Ungarn*, which stands out in both table 3 and 4 as the top geographic term by far. Lueger strongly rattles against the Hungarian half, seeing it as oppressing Cisleithania:

“Ich habe bisher immer nur gesehen, dass Österreich ohnmächtig und Ungarn übermächtig ist [...] Nur ist natürlich immer Ungarn der Löwe und Österreich wenigstens bisher immer noch der Esel, speciell der Packesel [...] und ich bemitleide ja mein Vaterland Österreich, dass es zu dieser Rolle herabgesunken ist.”¹⁸⁴

The second president of the House of Commons made a call to order as a reaction to this statement, seeing it as a breach of the parliamentary code of conduct. Lueger construes Hungary as an out-group referring to it 79 times, the vast majority out of which is purely negative. He states, for example, multiple times that Cisleithania is a vassal of Hungary that pays tribute in the form of financial and legal subordination. Further, his in-group is constructed in direct opposition to Hungary:

“[W]ir Österreicher waren ja bisher so gute Lämmer [...] die sich geduldig scheren ließen und die Wolle wanderte ruhig hinüber jenseits die Leitha. [...] Ja, wie kommt es denn, dass wir 70 Procent zahlen und die Ungarn 30, dass aber die Ungarn 70 und wir 30 Procent Einfluss haben [?]”¹⁸⁵

By employing words such as *wir* and constantly putting Cisleithania in opposition to Transleithania, Lueger rhetorically creates an us-versus-them dichotomy. Furthermore, both groups are seen as homogeneous – ‘the Austrians’ as morally virtuous, suppressed

¹⁸³ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7126. Author’s translation: ‘I believe that it will be the task of divine providence to protect the innocent peoples of Austria from the consequences of the decisions of those persons who are actually called to represent the people.’

¹⁸⁴ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7327–7328. Author’s translation: ‘I have until now always seen that Austria is powerless and Hungary is overpowering [...] But of course Hungary is always the lion and Austria, at least so far, is still the donkey, especially the pack mule [...] and I pity my fatherland Austria that it has sunk to this role.’

¹⁸⁵ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7414. Author’s translation: ‘[W]e Austrians have been such good lambs [...] who patiently allowed themselves to be sheared, and the wool traveled quietly across the Leitha. [...] Yes, how is it that we pay 70 percent and the Hungarians 30, but that the Hungarians have 70 percent influence and we have 30 percent influence [?]’

by ‘the Hungarians’. Thus, Lueger’s lack of distinctions within his in- and out-group is in accordance with the definition of populism’s exclusionary tenet. Another great instance of who Lueger sees as part of his in-group, how he claims to represent all of them, and how he distances himself from some of his fellow representatives is found in the closing sentence to his first speech on the matter:

“Der Herr Prälat Treuinfels erklärte, er werde leichten Herzens für die Goldwährung stimmen, und ich gebe die Retourkutsche und sage, ich werde leichten Herzens gegen die Goldwährung stimmen, weil ich überzeugt bin, dass hinter mir nicht bloß meine Wähler, nicht bloß die deutsche, sondern alle Nationen Österreichs ohne Unterschied der Sprache stehen und meine Anschauung theilen.”¹⁸⁶

The examples above also include keywords such as *müssen*, *eigentlich* or other direct references to his colleagues through, e.g., *ihnen*, that are used disproportionately frequent by Lueger. They make Lueger’s arguments seem like the only logical choice instead of one of many views. His rhetoric clearly produces a rejection of pluralism so central to populism.¹⁸⁷

Lastly, Lueger’s disproportionate usage of certain economic terms may also reveal how the socio-economic changes of the time were or were not connected to populist rhetoric. To begin with *Goldwährung* – the central topic of discussion. It is mentioned 74 times by Lueger, making up 11.17% of usages in the entire debates and appearing 4.35 times as often here than in Steinbach’s speeches. This is despite Lueger making up only around 5.24% of the corpus. At closer inspection, it quickly becomes apparent that Lueger connects opposition to gold to the true will of ‘the people’. In the following quote he critiques, for example, the perceived elitist composition of the enquête that advised the government prior to the debates in the House of Commons:

“Aber wenn man die Geringschätzung, welche in der Zusammenstellung der Enquêtemitglieder so recht zu Tage tritt, [...] so sieht man, auf wessen Ausbeutung es abgesehen ist. [...] [W]eil man sehr gut weiß, dass die Folgen der Goldwährung schließlich

¹⁸⁶ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7131. Author’s translation: ‘Prelate Treuinfels declared that he would vote for the gold standard with a light heart, and I am giving him the back hand and say that I will vote against the gold standard with a light heart, because I am convinced that not only my voters, not only the German, but all the nations of Austria, without distinction of language, stand behind me and share my views.

¹⁸⁷ Cf., Mudde, 2004, 543.

an dem Bauer, an dem Gewerbsmann ausgehen werden, darum hat man diese nicht gefragt, sondern Juden und Judengenossen.“¹⁸⁸

Lueger is extremely direct in this statement, showing explicitly who he considers the elitist enemy of ‘the people’: Jews. This is, of course, not surprising if one knows Karl Lueger – he was *the* central founder of Cisleithanian Christian-Socialism and relied heavily on antisemitic rhetoric.¹⁸⁹ Additionally, he again directly connects the introduction of the gold standard to economic harm against ‘the people’. Therefore, any agreeance with the gold standard is a betrayal of the ‘the people’s’ true will, as exemplified here:

„Bis jetzt ist mir nur eine Demonstration gegen die Goldwährung bekannt, eine Demonstration für die Goldwährung bringen Sie in ihren eigenen Kreisen nicht zustande. [...] Prälat Treuinfels ist von einer Curie des Großgrundbesitzes gewählt, er vertritt nur einen kleinen Wählerkreis; diejenigen, die das Volk von Tirol vertreten, werden gegen die Goldwährung stimmen, und wenn einer oder der andere nicht gegen die Goldwährung stimmen würde, so wird das Volk von Tirol wissen, was es mit denselben zu beginnen hat.“¹⁹⁰

A multitude of other examples exist that show how Lueger uses economic terms together with populist rhetoric. For instance, the first quote of this subchapter’s critique of gold or the embedding of the gold-versus-silver dichotomy into Lueger’s Cis-versus-Transleithania dichotomy.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, Lueger shows that the consequences of the ongoing First Globalisation are well known by centring his argument on the imminent danger of the United States for the Cisleithanian economy:

“Die Folge wäre die Überflügelung Europas durch die Vereinigten Staaten auf dem amerikanischen und asiatischen Markt und die Überschwemmung Europas mit den billig producirten Erzeugnissen beider Erdtheile. [...] Wenn, was wahrscheinlich ist, Amerika

¹⁸⁸ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7130. Author’s translation: ‘But if one considers the disdain that is so clearly evident in the origins of the members of the inquiry, [...] one sees whose exploitation is intended. [...] Because it is well known that the consequences of the gold standard will ultimately be felt by the farmer and the tradesman, they were not asked, but rather Jews and their fellow Jews’ comrades.’

¹⁸⁹ Cf., Boyer, John W. 2010. Karl Lueger (1844-1910). Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 73/89.

¹⁹⁰ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7130. Author’s translation: ‘So far, I know only of a demonstration against the gold standard; you cannot manage a demonstration for the gold standard in your own circles. [...] Prelate Treuinfels was elected by a curia of large landowners, he represents only a small constituency; those who represent the people of Tyrol will vote against the gold standard, and if one or the other does not vote against the gold standard, the people of Tyrol will know what to do with them.’

¹⁹¹ Cf., Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7127/7319.

sich dem Silber zuneigt und wenn wir hier das Gold haben, dann wird es mit dem Exporte agrarischer Producte aus Österreich vollständig zu Ende sein“¹⁹²

However, this argument and many others that primarily deal with economic matters are not always populist. Lueger *does* also use a number of statistics and combines them with economic theories and nationalist statements. While the validity of these theories can and was critiqued, an allocation to the populist tenets is not as clear. Nevertheless, if contrasted with his strong populist density, this does little to argue against a potential populist classification.

Thus, while more can be said about other instances of populist rhetoric featured in Lueger’s speeches, the highlighted keywords should suffice to confirm the results of the frame analysis – that Lueger can be categorised as a populist in the modern sense. Nevertheless, to be fully certain, it is necessary to also analyse the rhetoric of someone previously defined as opposite to Lueger, which is why the following section will examine Minister of Finance Dr. Steinbach.

6.2.2. Dr. Steinbach’s Rhetoric in the 152nd to the 160th Sessions of the House of Commons

Word	Target Frequency	Ref. Frequency	Keyness
hochverehrten	153	5	769.610
mir	227	806	235.919
herren	234	919	214.185
ich	666	4767	192.231
meine	188	726	175.772
verehrte	62	55	175.570
hinsicht	49	30	159.730
verehrten	58	62	150.888
erlauben	74	131	144.042
hochverehrte	29	9	113.721
durchlaucht	26	7	104.992
professor	57	132	90.570
sie	285	1994	86.874
was	129	739	63.257
that	29	46	60.629
resultate	18	12	56.955

¹⁹² Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7127. Author’s translation: ‘The result would be the United States overtaking Europe on the American and Asian markets and flooding Europe with cheaply produced goods from both continents. [...] If, as is likely, America turns to silver, and if we have gold here, then the export of agricultural products from Austria will come to a complete end.’

sagen	89	449	55.493
bitte	51	183	52.158
erlaubt	26	46	50.595
darf	35	91	50.246
gegenwärtigen	35	94	48.757
plättchen	9	0	47.791
erwägen	18	19	47.090
das	466	4369	46.107
nun	101	625	41.839
sache	55	247	41.445
professors	14	13	38.845
möchte	55	260	38.231
selber	10	4	36.933
hier	83	499	36.677
ihnen	44	189	35.423
bereits	37	140	35.410
zunächst	21	46	34.899
kann	113	787	34.725
aufmerksam	21	47	34.299
zugestehen	10	6	32.806
übergangsperiode	8	2	32.764
bedacht	9	4	32.325
frage	75	456	32.317
überwertige	6	0	31.860
hoc	6	0	31.860
bemerken	17	32	31.677
inflation	11	10	30.805
gesetzgebung	15	27	28.842
namentlich	21	59	28.012
darauf	48	252	27.839
zu	413	4125	27.776
forschung	6	1	26.264
mich	66	416	26.168
fabrik	10	11	25.640

Table 5, Top 50 keywords in Dr. Steinbach's statements compared to the General Corpus

Just as Lueger, Steinbach frequently refers to other representatives. In fact, this category makes up some of his top keywords, such as *hochverehrten*, *Herren*, *verehrte*, *verehrten*, *hochverehrte*, *Durchlaucht*, *Professor*, *sie*, *Professors* and *ihnen*.

Interestingly, despite Steinbach's position as the Minister of Finance making him the central government figure to propose and justify the transition to the gold standard, he does not seem to discuss economic aspects more so than all other colleagues through the General Corpus. Terms such as *Plättchen*, *Übergangsperiode*, *überwertige*, *Inflation*,

Gesetzgebung and *Fabrik* do appear in his keywords, but references to metal, debt or costs do not.

One category that clearly stands out is his variety of discursive rhetoric. *Mir, ich, meine, Hinsicht, erlauben, was, That, Resultate, sagen, bitte, erlaubt, darf, gegenwärtigen, erwägen, das, nun, Sache, möchte, selber, hier, ihnen, bereits, zunächst, kann, aufmerksam, zugestehen, bedacht, Frage, hoc, bemerken, namentlich, darauf, zu, Forschung* and *mich* make up well over half his top keywords.

Language referring to geographic or political boundaries is completely absent, as is any reference to 'the people', such as *Volk*, or other terms that may, at first glance, point to the rhetorical creation of a dedicated in- and out-group. The comparison to the General Corpus seems to confirm that Steinbach's speech does not, as previously determined during the frame analysis, employ populist rhetoric, as the keywords lack terms representing 'the people' and to a dedicated out-group. However, does this hold up when comparing Steinbach directly to Lueger?

Word	Target Frequency	Ref. Frequency	Keyness
hochverehrten	153	0	169.150
verehrte	62	0	68.449
mir	227	56	65.327
verehrten	58	0	64.029
hinsicht	49	0	54.086
herren	234	72	48.092
erlauben	74	7	46.049
meine	188	55	42.063
that	29	0	32.000
hochverehrte	29	0	32.000
gegenwärtigen	35	1	31.201
ganz	69	11	30.972
erlaubt	26	0	28.689
durchlaucht	26	0	28.689
ich	666	354	25.765
zu	413	206	21.883
dieser	97	29	20.876
darauf	48	8	20.765
was	129	47	18.765
bemerken	17	0	18.755
über	74	20	18.678

Table 6, All Keywords in Steinbach's statements compared to Lueger's subcorpus

Again, references to others are among the top keywords, as *hochverehrten, verehrte, verehrten, Herren, hochverehrte* and *Durchlaucht* all appear disproportionately often.

Discursive measures – *mir, Hinsicht, erlauben, meine, That, gegenwärtigen, ganz, erlaubt, ich, zu, dieser, darauf, was, bemerken* and *über* – make up the other part of these

keywords, which can be grouped in a large variety of word classes. They include five pronouns, three verbs, two prepositions, nouns, and adverbs, respectively, as well as one adjective.

Lastly, continuing the trend from the General Corpus, economic terms and language referring to geographic or political entities and ‘the people’ are left out completely when Steinbach’s language is compared to Lueger’s. However, *Goldwährung* and *Silbercourantmünzen*, as well as *Ungarn*, *Österreich*, *Polen*, *österreichs* and *Volk* do appear in the comparison of Lueger to Steinbach, signifying that the Minister of Finance refers to these terms fewer times than Lueger.

Therefore, the direct contrast of Steinbach and Lueger again validates the hypothesis that the former does not employ language that could correlate with a populist rhetoric. To confirm this, Steinbach’s central keywords and their categories are reviewed in a close reading corresponding to the analysis of Lueger’s rhetoric. Next, keywords that appeared in Lueger’s rhetoric but that were largely missing from Steinbach’s keywords will be examined. This aims to display differences between the usage of language central to populist rhetoric, such as *Ungarn* or *Volk*. I.e., if terms are employed outside the keywords that could fulfil the populist tenets, then how are they actually used by Steinbach?

6.2.2.1. *A Review of Emil Steinbach’s Keywords*

As for the frequent references to the representatives that characterise Steinbach’s speeches over that of his colleagues: he uses them mostly to present an argument to the entire House of Commons. For example, 131 out of 153 uses of *hochverehrten* are coupled with *Herren*. At closer inspection, it is apparent that the Minister of Finance addresses the elected representatives so often to reply to specific arguments that were brought forth against the reform – the same is true for the terms *verehrte*, *verehrten* and *hochverehrte*.. For example, in the following sentence where he replies to an argument about inflation by Lueger:

“Meine hochverehrten Herren! Ich habe gegen derlei drastische Beispiele gar nichts einzuwenden [...] Der verehrter Herr Abgeordnete sagt, das Papiergeld sei eine sehr kräftige Speise [...] Aber sowie es bei einer sehr nahrhaften Speise, wenn sie jemand sehr

gut schmeckt, sehr häufig geschieht, dass man zu viel davon isst, so geht es mit dieser Speise – wenigstens hat die bisherige Finanzgeschichte es gezeigt – immer so.“¹⁹³

His arguments often follow a similar structure – he addresses the entire room first, aiming to gain all representatives’ attention, after which he turns to the one speaker that made the actual argument. Thus, Steinbach only differentiates between two groups in his rhetoric: all parliamentarians and one single individual speaker who changes depending on the argument. He does not seem to aim at the creation of two fixed separate groups – one against the reform and one for it – but instead only singles out individual speakers when they argue against the transition. However, through the qualitative review, no clear pattern emerges that would connect these unproportionally frequent references to the elected officials to populism. He replies to arguments with wildly different content matters, ranging from discussions of specific articles of the law to transition to the gold standard to statements about the future of silver.¹⁹⁴ Another example is his usage of *hochverehrten Herren* to simply express general thanks:

“Vor allem, meine hochverehrten Herren [...] habe ich Ihnen Dank zu sagen. Ich habe im Laufe der Debatte vielfaches Vertrauen gefunden seitens der verschiedensten Herren [...] Bei der Vertretung so schwieriger Gesetzesvorlagen wie der gegenwärtigen that es wohl, wenn der gute Wille zum mindesten anerkannt wird.“¹⁹⁵

Thus, it is difficult to ascertain if these direct addresses are related to populism in any way – rather, it seems reasonable to argue against connecting these references to populism, as Steinbach does not single out individual speakers but instead seems to want to include the entire House of Commons. I.e., he does not seem to want to create an in- and out-group in parliament. This result would also fit the simple fact that the Minister of Finance is *the* government official responsible for the monetary reform, thus, making him an easy target for attacks. Conversely, Steinbach seemed to lack one such figure representing the opposition, which might be explained by the fragmented nature of the House of Commons in 1892 (see Chapter 2.1.1).¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7159. Author’s translation: ‘My dear gentlemen! I have nothing against such drastic examples [...] The honourable Member says that paper money is a very hearty dish [...] But just as it very often happens with a very nutritious dish, if someone likes it very much, that one eats too much of it, so it is with this dish – at least financial history has shown it so far – always.’

¹⁹⁴ Cf., Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7159/7317.

¹⁹⁵ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7156. Author’s translation: ‘First of all, my esteemed gentlemen [...] I have to thank you. In the course of the debate, I have found great confidence on the part of a wide variety of gentlemen [...] When representing such difficult bills as the present one, it is good that the good intentions are at least acknowledged.’

¹⁹⁶ Cf., Kwan 216–217; cf., Binder, 321.

The next large category of keywords, the discursive measures, is difficult to analyse regarding populism due to the large amount of word classes. Especially when compared to Lueger, whose reliance on conjunctions and specific modal verbs is directly connected to the strength of his arguments. Nevertheless, an analysis of individual keywords may still reveal relevant findings.

The top keyword of this category, *mir*, makes up 20% of all mentions of the word in the General Corpus – despite Steinbach’s speeches containing 6.66% of the corpus’s total character count. Similarly, Steinbach uses the pronoun over five times as often as Lueger, while Lueger’s speeches are only approximately one quarter shorter. Again, the reason for this heavy use can be found in Steinbach’s centrality to the law. His speeches primarily respond to criticism of the transition he represents, suggesting he counters objections from a personal rather than neutral standpoint. This is especially apparent in the following example, where the Minister of Finance explicitly states that it is he who proposes the transition – or is at the very least responsible for it:

“Meine Aufgabe kann sich doch zunächst nur darauf beschränken, das zu vertreten, was ich mir erlaubte, Ihnen vorzuschlagen, und vor allem, verehrte Herren, wird zugestanden, dass in den Vorlagen, wie sie hier sind, die zukünftige Gestaltung des Silbercourants offen geblieben ist und der Gesetzgebung vorbehalten wird.”¹⁹⁷

Another frequent keyword, *meine*, is related to both the reference to others and the way Steinbach connects the reform to himself. 171 out of 188 instances of *meine* are paired either with *hochverehrten*, *verehrten* or *Herren*, while the other 16 sentences signify his opinion, explanations or duties. Similarly, *erlauben*, *erlaubt* and *bemerken* centre on Steinbach’s way of communicating his explanations and arguments. He uses them to establish politeness when responding to criticism, such as:

“Nur Eines möchte ich mir erlauben, Ihnen zur Charakteristik der Sache zu sagen: dass die Schweiz, die gewiss sparsam ist, noch im vorigen Jahre für dieselbe Lieferung Nickel 15 Francs per Kilo gezahlt hat, wofür wir 5 fl. bezahlen. Ich bitte Sie also, bei der Beurtheilung der Sache im vorhinein vorsichtig zu sein.”¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7316. Author’s translation: ‘My task can only be limited to representing what I have allowed myself to propose to you, and above all, gentlemen, it is acknowledged that in the proposals as they are here, the future design of the silver currency has been left open and is reserved for legislation.’

¹⁹⁸ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7240. Author’s translation: ‘I would like to say just one thing about the nature of the matter: that Switzerland, which is certainly thrifty, paid 15 francs per kilo for the same delivery of nickel last year, for which we pay 5 florins. I therefore ask you to be cautious in your assessment of the matter in advance.’

This argument also demonstrates how Steinbach combines polite rhetoric with factual information and an appeal to the members of parliament. Again, this argues against the existence of populist rhetoric here, as it is characterised by an overly emotive discourse instead.¹⁹⁹

However, the lack of language that may be connected to populism amongst the Minister of Finance's keywords does not automatically confirm his classification as a non-populist. Thus, it is also necessary to compare the instances where Steinbach does employ terms that were connected to the populist tenets within Lueger's rhetoric.

To begin with references to 'the people'. Steinbach uses words that include *Volk* or a related form such as *Volksmassen* a total of eight times. Out of these instances, he criticises the rash decision for any solution for the monarchy's monetary situation a total of four times. For example, when he argues against seeing paper currencies as a *Volksgeld*:

“[E]s war ja der verehrte Herr Professor Schlesinger, der vom Volksgeld gesprochen hat. Volksgeld! Er hat damit Papierzettel gemeint [...] Sie wissen, dass man damals eine bedeutende Vermehrung des Papiergeldes vorgenommen hat, und welche die entsetzlichen Folgen dieses Umstandes waren. Freilich hat man es nicht Volksgeld genannt.“²⁰⁰

Two other times, he warns the representatives of misinforming the populace by speaking against the financiers and the press, stating that:

“Die Ideen, die Sie sich selbst von den Gesinnungen der haute finance und der Presse machen, die sind so grundfalsch, dass mir nie gar etwas Falscheres vorgekommen ist [...] Ich kann mir ja recht gut denken, dass das Bild, dass Sie nach außen hin aufstellen, ein recht bewegliches ist und dass das auf große Volksmassen einen bedeutenden Eindruck machen muss [...] das Bild ist von einer Unrichtigkeit, die schon gar nicht mehr erlaubt ist.“²⁰¹

Steinbach goes on to state that the issues discussed by the wealthy and the press are completely different to what their political enemies may imagine. Instead of fighting against the elites, the minister protects them, pointing against the inclusion of core

¹⁹⁹ Cf., Langa & Ilundain, 22–25.

²⁰⁰ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7158. Author's translation: '[I]t was the esteemed Professor Schlesinger who spoke of people's money. People's money! He meant paper notes [...] You know that at that time there was a significant increase in paper money, and what the terrible consequences of this were. Of course, it wasn't called people's money.'

²⁰¹ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7238. Author's translation: 'The ideas you yourself have about the attitudes of the haute finance and the press are so fundamentally wrong that I have never seen anything more wrong [...] I can well imagine that the image you present to the outside world is quite fluid and that it must make a significant impression on the crowds [...] the image is of an inaccuracy that is no longer permissible.'

populist tendencies. The last two direct references to ‘the people’ use the term *Volksklassen* and are, again, connected to a rebuttal of the anti-elitist idea that gold favours the wealthy and silver the working classes.²⁰² Thus, in his direct inclusion of terminology referring to ‘the people’, the Minister of Finance does not employ populist framing.

Consequently, it is necessary to analyse the presence of a dedicated out-group in Steinbach’s rhetoric. Whereas his keywords already argue against this sentiment, *Ungarn*, *ungarische* and *ungarischen* are still used a total of 34 times. This, of course, stands against the 102 mentions of *Ungarn*, *Ungarns*, *ungarischen*, and *ungarische* in Lueger’s speeches. Furthermore, Steinbach primarily uses these terms to neutrally describe negotiations with the Hungarian half, or to defend Hungary by arguing against anti-Hungarian sentiment. This stands in direct opposition to Lueger’s language related to Hungary, as expressed in the following quote:

“Die hochverehrten Herren sagen immer, es geschehe in diesem Parlamente alles, was Ungarn will. Meine hochverehrten Herren, ich kann darauf nur folgendes sagen: Wenn das wahr wäre, so würden Sie ja gegen sich selber ein Misstrauensvotum aussprechen. Aber wenn sie die Güte haben, die Verhandlungen im ungarischen Abgeordnetenhaus zu lesen, so werden Sie finden, dass dort immer das Umgekehrte gesagt wird.”²⁰³

Additionally, this demonstrates again how Steinbach does not differentiate between clubs in the House of Commons. Especially as a plurality between the different factions *did* exist. Some of the largest clubs, such as the Conservatives or VDL, did not include frequent anti-Hungarian references while the *Deutschnationale* and *Antisemites* did.

Terms related to Cisleithania such as *Österreich*, *Österreichs*, *österreichisch*, *österreichischen* and *österreichische* present a similar picture. Mentioned only 29 times – versus Lueger’s 89 instances of the same words – and done in a variety of ways that disallow a fundamental allocation to the populist worldview. For example, he discusses the Austrian flag, titles of the emperor, a printing factory in Austria, the history of attempts at a monetary transition in the Cisleithanian ministry of finances etc. While he does also express criticism against actors, he directs his statements not against one faction or people singled out to be the out-group, but rather addresses representatives, the press and any other public actor at once, as exemplified by the following statement:

²⁰² Cf., Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7236–7237.

²⁰³ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7162. Author’s translation: ‘The distinguished gentlemen always say that whatever Hungary wants happens in this parliament. My dear gentlemen, I can only say this: If that were true, you would express a vote of no confidence against yourselves. But if you are kind enough to read the proceedings in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, you will find that the opposite is always said there.’

“[M]eine hochverehrten Herren, es ist in Österreich allzusehr Sitte geworden, dass man demjenigen, der etwas äußert, was von der eigenen Meinung des Kritisirenden abweicht, nur die Wahl lässt, ob er lieber – ich bitte um Verzeihung für die Worte, die ich gebrauche – ein Schuft oder ein Trottel sein will. Das ist eine der schlimmsten Erscheinungen in Österreich, und wenn etwas das öffentliche Leben vergiftet, so ist es dies.“²⁰⁴

Here, Steinbach critiques a large variety of Cisleithanian actors – unlike Lueger who focuses his attacks on dedicated groups. This, again, negates the creation of a populist us-versus-them dichotomy.

Lastly, the term *wir*, used 85 times in the minister’s speeches, also exemplifies inclusion in a group. Steinbach uses it to signal affiliation with two factions. Firstly, the government he represents, as he employs *wir* to respond to arguments from the government’s perspective, as seen here:

“Gerade in dieser Hinsicht glaube ich, so gut gemeint der Vorschlag seiner Durchlaucht auch ist, so discutabel er gegenüber den anderen ist, so hat er doch weit mehr den Charakter eines Experiments als das, was wir uns erlauben zu proponiren.“²⁰⁵

The second use signifies Steinbach’s membership with all listeners, i.e., he connects himself to all representatives of the House of Commons, catering to one big in-group rather than the creation of a dedicated out-group. Take, for example, the following sentence:

“Halten wir doch daran fest: Solange die österreichische Währung besteht, sind die Silbergulden Silbergulden österreichischer Währung; in dem Moment als wir zur Kronenwährung übergehen, werden die Silbergulden silberne Zwei-Kronenstücke mit voller Zahlkraft.“²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7241. Author’s translation: ‘My dear gentlemen, it has become all too common in Austria that anyone who expresses something that differs from the critic’s own opinion is only given the choice of whether he would rather be called – I beg your pardon for the words I use – a scoundrel or an idiot. This is one of the worst phenomena in Austria, and if anything poisons public life, it is this.’

²⁰⁵ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7241–7242. Author’s translation: ‘It is precisely in this respect that I believe that, however well-intentioned His Highness’s proposal may be, however debatable it may be compared to the others, it has far more the character of an experiment than what we allow ourselves to propose.’

²⁰⁶ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7355. Author’s translation: ‘Let us hold on to this: As long as the Austrian currency exists, the silver guilders are silver guilders of Austrian currency; the moment we switch to the crown currency, the silver guilders will become silver two-crown pieces with full legal tender.’

6.3. A Synthesis of the Frame and Keyword Analyses

To conclude, the combined results of the methods applied offer a comprehensive assessment of populist rhetoric in the *Abgeordnetenhaus* debates. The frame analysis successfully answered research question 1.a. It revealed the existence of populist rhetoric but also showed that it was neither evenly distributed nor uniformly expressed – both across and within club lines. Only a few factions and actors, most notably Dr. Karl Lueger, consistently employed all three populist tenets at high densities and across diagnostic and prognostic framing. Conversely, speakers such as Berichterstatter Szczepanowski or Dr. Emil Steinbach largely refrained from employing such rhetoric, whereas clubs such as the VDL primarily relied on one populist tenet out of three.

The keyword analysis reinforced these findings, answering research question 1.b in the process. Lueger's disproportionately frequent usage of terms such as *Volk*, *Ungarn*, and *Österreich* were employed in a pattern that aimed to construct clear in- and out-groups; a populist us-versus-them dichotomy that fits the three tenets. At the centre of his populist rhetoric stand questions on representation and national sovereignty amid economic integration, which are reminiscent of Rodrik's trilemma of the world economy.²⁰⁷ These grievances are collected within and expressed by terms such as *Ungarn*, which are not completely dissimilar to Laclau's *empty signifiers*.²⁰⁸ However, Lueger's discourse is still accompanied by specific demands that stops it from being *empty*. As such, Lueger's discourse might more closely resemble Mudde's *general will*. As an opposing figure, Steinbach's rhetorical style lacked a sustained engagement in a possible populist rhetoric and terminology. His language centred on formality, politeness and inclusion despite frequent defences to criticism. This is exemplified by keywords such as *hochverehrten*, *mir* or *erlauben*, which underscore his (self-)positioning as a public actor working for a consensus, rather than a self-declared leader of 'the people'.

Thus, it is apparent that the Cisleithanian debates on the transition to the gold standard held in the House of Commons *do* feature actors that may be interpreted as an early example of economic populism. The extent of which is limited to a small number of actors who are, nevertheless, key figures of the debate measured by the total speech length and

²⁰⁷ Cf., Rodrik, Dani. 2011. The globalization paradox : why global markets, states, and democracy can't coexist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, XVIII.

²⁰⁸ Cf., Laclau, 153–157.

mentions in the General Corpus. The next chapter concludes this thesis by connecting the findings of this analysis to recent Habsburg historiography, ascertaining what the application of populism as an analytical lens may reveal about Cisleithania and nationalism.

VII. Conclusion – Populism, Nationalism, and Anachronism

This thesis operated under four expectations derived from Pieter Judson's work on the Habsburg Empire. The analysis largely confirmed Judson's theses, although some differences are also apparent.

Firstly, the hypothesis that populism was primarily employed by upcoming nationalist forces is validated by the analysis, although the conclusions are more nuanced than expected. The Conservatives stand out as a non-populist faction with a high degree of populist elements – although their framing is skewed against exclusionary framing. However, all other clubs with strong populist tendencies can be classified as nationalist. Out of the new radical nationalist factions, only the *Jungtschechen* featured all three tenets and a high populist density. The *Deutschnationale's* omission of people-centrist framing makes them only partially populist. The VDL and *Polenklub*, making up the major longstanding nationalist factions, are classified as non-populists – which goes in line with Judson's hypotheses.

Centrally, the faction most clearly determined to be populist, Lueger's Antisemites, does not fit a traditional nationalist perspective. Lueger *does* appear to be nationalist and *does* propagate his view using populist rhetoric, but he is not advocating for one ethnicity or language group. Instead, he claims to represent all *Völker*, or nations, of Cisleithania. Accordingly, he does not openly distinguish between the different languages and ethnicities found in Cisleithania. The exception to this rule is found in the significant Cisleithanian Jewish minority. They are his 'elites', as he equals them to a perceived capitalist class fully controlling the stock market at the cost of 'the people'. Lastly, his out-group is clearly found in Transleithania – they are oppressing Cisleithania and all its people, and any Hungarian influence in its territory must be impeded. Thus, it seems as though the most dominant populist identified in this study orientated his rhetoric towards one Cisleithanian identity, capturing multiple ethnicities, religions and languages within it. This seems contrary to the image of Cisleithanian society often portrayed in the grand narratives written about the Empire after its downfall.²⁰⁹ In any case, this only adds a

²⁰⁹ Cf., Winkelbauer, 13–15.

strong nationalist element to the Antisemites, adding another of the newer, radical factions to the populist-nationalist groups.

Therefore, with the established nationalist factions being decidedly non-populist, the factions that do use populism fit Judson's results. They are primarily newer and more radical in their nationalist aspirations, and appeal to the expanding electorate of the late 19th-century. Thus, populism may be connected to the democratisation process of the empire, as Judson also argues with nationalism itself.

The second hypothesis was also mostly supported by the findings: modern populism was clearly used to exploit socio-economic and political tensions for political gain. Lueger, for example, connected the gold standard to questions of representation, language, democracy, and in- and exclusion. Importantly, he personally admits that he employs arguments only if the voters react positively to them, stating:

“Bevor ich nämlich den Angriff hier im hohen Hause eröffne, probire ich immer an Wählerversammlungen, ob das Eis hält. Und da habe ich nun gefunden, dass, so oft ich in Wählerversammlungen auf das Verhältnis Österreichs zu Ungarn zu sprechen kam, die gesamten Anwesenden, auch wenn Liberale da waren, mit einem Worte, alle, ohne Unterschied der Partei, auf dem Standpunkt gestanden sind, dass Österreich eigentlich von Ungarn unterdrückt werde. Das Eis hat gehalten, habe ich mir gedacht, jetzt gehst zu ins Parlament, sprichst dort darüber, und siehst, wie es anderswo ist.”²¹⁰

Additionally, his employment of typical populist strategies, such as portraying political rivals as elitist traitors and fostering the creation of an excluded group like the Hungarians, was recognised and openly opposed by non-populists – among them Dr. Steinbach, Berichterstatter Szczepanowski, and Dr. Jaques.

Yet, while this does all serve to confirm that populists aimed to foster social categories through rhetorical means, Judson's view that nationalistic conflicts were construed in the institutional setting of the empire as a top-down process – a *nationalist conflict* – cannot be fully supported. At most, Lueger's statement above seems indicative of him adopting his political stances from ‘the people’ and not the other way around. In general, however,

²¹⁰ Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7121. Author's translation: ‘Before I launch my attack here in this parliament, I always test at electoral meetings if the ice holds. And I have found that whenever I have brought up Austria's relationship with Hungary at electoral meetings, everyone present, even if there were liberals there, in a word, everyone, regardless of party, has taken the view that Austria is actually being oppressed by Hungary. The ice has held, I thought to myself, now I'll go to Parliament, talk about it there, and see how it is elsewhere.’

this thesis holds little informative value regarding the origin of nationalist stances, as it only analyses debates in an institutional setting.

Next, the varied rhetoric employed in the debates does support Judson's hypothesis wherein nationalist movements did not fatally weaken the Habsburg state. The largest and second largest clubs by number of delegates, the VDL and *Polenklub*, were both nationalist in nature but argued in non-nationalistic ways, instead emphasising the positive effects of the reform on all peoples of the empire. The fourth largest faction, the nationalist *Jungtschechen*, neglected exclusionary framing when compared to people-centrist and anti-elitist arguments. Thus, they largely lack an ethnic group to fight against. As for the antisemites, the seventh-largest club discussed at length already, a case can be made that they propagated against Transleithania, supporting a divide between the two halves. However, they were scarcely arguing for the breakup of the empire along ethnic lines but rather discussed a perceived political oppression. Lastly, the *Deutschnationale* remain as the only faction with a dominant usage of exclusionary rhetoric – two thirds of their arguments centre on excluding another group. However, their position as the fifth largest club with only 4.81% of all delegates hardly points to a nationalist movement strong enough to warrant the notion of an inevitable demise of Cisleithania into nation-states – at least during the time of the debates.

Lastly, the story of Cisleithania's political development amidst the First Globalisation supports Judson's view that Austria-Hungary was not an anachronous polity distinct from other contemporary states.²¹¹ The monarchy was hit hard by the *Gründerkrach*, just as Germany and the United States were.²¹² This was clearly acknowledged in the parliamentary debates, with Steinbach highlighting the need for a stable currency system in the light of the recent economic troubles,²¹³ and Lueger referencing the international situation when mentioning the influence of the United States and India, as well as the hardships that the agricultural class specifically had to contend with. Combined with the strong anti-elitist focus among the Conservatives, *Jungtschechen*, Antisemites and *Alttschechen*, who all rejected the gold standard as a tool of the capitalists, Cisleithania shows clear similarities to the United States. American farmers suffered heavily from

²¹¹ Cf., Judson, 271.

²¹² Cf., Grabas, 75.

²¹³ Cf., Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1892, 7157.

economic changes and Grover Cleveland's liberal policies,²¹⁴ which gave rise to the populist People's Party with their rejection of elite-notions such as gold and the capitalist class, and focus on the agricultural sector. This means that, despite the vastly different socio-economic and political context of Cisleithania, a rhetoric very similar to that in the democratic United States emerged. That it did so around the same time – the People's Party was founded in 1891, and the term populist used first in 1892 – may further indicate a similarity in socio-political developments.²¹⁵

Thus, analysing populism's usage in the late Habsburg Empire can and did contribute to gaining a deeper picture of the monarchy. Instead of the traditional view of Austria-Hungary as a nation resisting its inevitable dissolution, it seemingly reacted to socio-economic changes with political phenomena comparable to other states of its time.

To conclude this thesis, the analysis of Cisleithania through a populist lens is not teleological but instead holds meaning through its existence outside the current importance of populism²¹⁶ – although that does not mean that it is disconnected from the present or that no lessons can be learnt from multiethnic Cisleithania's experiences with the concept. With this thesis I hope to have shown that research on populism in the Habsburg Empire can uncover nuances in its society that remained previously unrecognised, making future research viable and fruitful.

As the debates analysed here only cover one case study of a specific economic event, it is still necessary to determine populism's use and density beyond the parliamentary debates on the transition to the gold standard. Especially after the introduction of a general, although not equal universal male suffrage in 1907, from which social democrats profited the most – although figures such as Karl Lueger still successfully defended their position.²¹⁷ The analysis of populism's tenets outside this snapshot can offer perspectives on how 'the people', the excluded others, and 'the elites' were construed by different politicians, highlighting the development of larger narratives of victimhood, oppression, exclusion, and identity formation amid Judson's *nationalist conflicts*.

²¹⁴ Cf., Untermann, 26–27.

²¹⁵ Cf., Fuentes, 53–56.

²¹⁶ Cf., Sor, Federico. 2023. Metaphysics in History: Notes on the Origins of Authoritarianism and Populism. In: *History and Theory* 62 (2), 225–250, 231.

²¹⁷ Cf., Beneš, Jakub. 2012. Social Democracy, František Soukup, and the Habsburg Austrian Suffrage Campaign 1897-1907. In: *Střed* 4 (2), 9–33, 33.

Lastly, as this thesis focuses on only one half of the Cisleithanian parliament, it does, of course, only show part of the story. Therefore, additional research on the upper house of the *Reichsrat*, the *Herrenhaus*, and on Transleithania is necessary to fully understand populism's role in the *Gesamtmonarchie*.

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Appendix

The Code used for the Extraction of the Stenographic Protocols

```
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install tesseract-ocr

import cv2
import numpy as np
from google.cloud import storage
import pytesseract

def process_images(input_bucket,
output_bucket):
    storage_client = storage.Client()
    input_bucket_obj =
storage_client.bucket(input_bucket)
    output_bucket_obj =
storage_client.bucket(output_bucket)
    blobs = list(input_bucket_obj.list_blobs())
    print(f'{len(blobs)} Dateien gefunden im
Bucket '{input_bucket}'')

    for blob in blobs:
        if not blob.name.lower().endswith((''.jpg',
'.jpeg', '.png')):
            print(f'Überspringe: {blob.name} (kein
unterstütztes Bildformat)')
            continue

        print(f'Verarbeite Bild: {blob.name}')

        local_input_path =
f'/tmp/{blob.name.split('/')[-1]}'

        blob.download_to_filename(local_input_path)

        try:
            centered_image_path, left_image_path,
right_image_path =
process_and_split_image(local_input_path)

            centered_blob =
output_bucket_obj.blob(f'centered_{blob.name.
split('/')[-1]}')
            left_blob =
output_bucket_obj.blob(f'{blob.name.split('/')[-
1].split('.')[0]}_left.jpg')
            right_blob =
output_bucket_obj.blob(f'{blob.name.split('/')[-
1].split('.')[0]}_right.jpg')

            centered_blob.upload_from_filename(centered_
image_path)

            left_blob.upload_from_filename(left_image_pat
h)

            right_blob.upload_from_filename(right_image_
path)

            print(f'Erfolgreich verarbeitet und
gespeichert: {blob.name}')

        except Exception as e:
            print(f'Fehler beim Verarbeiten von
{blob.name}: {e}')

def process_and_split_image(image_path):
    image = cv2.imread(image_path)
    if image is None:
        raise ValueError(f'Konnte Bild
{image_path} nicht laden.')
    gray = cv2.cvtColor(image,
cv2.COLOR_BGR2GRAY)
    straightened = straighten_image(gray)

    data =
pytesseract.image_to_data(straightened,
output_type=pytesseract.Output.DICT)
    heights, widths = straightened.shape[:2]
    left_x_positions = []
    right_x_positions = []

    for i in range(len(data['text'])):
        text = data['text'][i]
        if text.strip(): # Nur nicht-leere Wörter
            berücksichtigen
            x, y, w, h = data['left'][i], data['top'][i],
data['width'][i], data['height'][i]
            if x < widths // 2:
                left_x_positions.append(x)
            elif x + w > widths // 2:
                right_x_positions.append(x + w)
            if not left_x_positions or not
right_x_positions:
                raise ValueError("Konnte keine plausible
Spaltenbegrenzung finden.")

    left_boundary =
int(np.percentile(left_x_positions, 5)) # Links:
5. Perzentil
    right_boundary =
int(np.percentile(right_x_positions, 95)) #
Rechts: 95. Perzentil
```

```

    print(f"Linke Grenze: {left_boundary},
    Rechte Grenze: {right_boundary}")

    margin = max(left_boundary, widths -
    right_boundary)
    centered =
    cv2.copyMakeBorder(straightened, 0, 0, margin
    - left_boundary, margin - (widths -
    right_boundary), cv2.BORDER_CONSTANT,
    value=255)
    center_x = centered.shape[1] // 2
    left_image = centered[:, :center_x]
    right_image = centered[:, center_x:]
    centered_output_path =
    f"/tmp/{image_path.split('/')[-1].split('.')[0]}_centered.jpg"
    left_output_path =
    f"/tmp/{image_path.split('/')[-1].split('.')[0]}_left.jpg"
    right_output_path =
    f"/tmp/{image_path.split('/')[-1].split('.')[0]}_right.jpg"

    cv2.imwrite(centered_output_path, centered)
    cv2.imwrite(left_output_path, left_image)
    cv2.imwrite(right_output_path, right_image)

    return centered_output_path,
    left_output_path, right_output_path

def straighten_image(image):
    edges = cv2.Canny(image, 50, 150,
    apertureSize=3)
    lines = cv2.HoughLines(edges, 1, np.pi / 180,
    200)

    if lines is None:
        print("Keine Linien gefunden. Bild wird
        nicht gedreht.")
        return image
    angles = []
    for rho, theta in lines[:, 0]:
        angle = (theta - np.pi / 2) * 180 / np.pi
        if -10 <= angle <= 10: # Nur fast vertikale
        Linien berücksichtigen
            angles.append(angle)

    if not angles:
        print("Keine plausiblen Winkel gefunden.
        Bild wird nicht gedreht.")
        return image

    mean_angle = np.mean(angles)
    print(f"Bild wird um {mean_angle:.2f} Grad
    gedreht.")
    (h, w) = image.shape[:2]
    center = (w // 2, h // 2)
    M = cv2.getRotationMatrix2D(center,
    mean_angle, 1.0)

```

```

    straightened = cv2.warpAffine(image, M, (w,
    h), flags=cv2.INTER_LINEAR,
    borderMode=cv2.BORDER_CONSTANT,
    borderValue=255)
    return straightened
process_images("stenographische_protokolle",
"verarbeitete_bilder")

```

```

from google.cloud import storage, vision
import os

```

```

def extract_text_from_all_images(input_bucket,
output_bucket):
    storage_client = storage.Client()
    input_bucket_obj =
    storage_client.bucket(input_bucket)
    output_bucket_obj =
    storage_client.bucket(output_bucket)

```

```

    vision_client =
    vision.ImageAnnotatorClient()

```

```

    blobs = list(input_bucket_obj.list_blobs())
    print(f"{len(blobs)} Dateien gefunden im
    Bucket '{input_bucket}'.")

```

```

    all_text = "" # Variable, um den gesamten
    extrahierten Text zu speichern

```

```

    for blob in blobs:
        if not blob.name.lower().endswith((''.jpg',
        '.jpeg', '.png')):
            print(f"Überspringe: {blob.name} (kein
            unterstütztes Bildformat)")
            continue

```

```

        print(f"Verarbeite Bild: {blob.name}")

```

```

        local_input_path =
        f"/tmp/{blob.name.split('/')[-1]}"

```

```

        blob.download_to_filename(local_input_path)

```

```

        text =
        extract_text_from_image(local_input_path,
        vision_client)

```

```

        if text:
            all_text += f"Text aus Bild
            {blob.name}:\n"
            all_text += text + "\n\n" # Text des
            Bildes + zwei Zeilenumbruch
        else:
            print(f"Kein Text gefunden in
            {blob.name}")

```

```

        if all_text:
            output_text_path =
            "/tmp/extracted_text_all_images.txt"

```



```

with open(output_text_path, 'w',
encoding='utf-8') as f:
    f.write(all_text)

output_blob =
output_bucket_obj.blob("extracted_text_all_ima
ges.txt")

output_blob.upload_from_filename(output_text
_path)
print(f"Gesamter Text gespeichert:
gs://{output_bucket}/extracted_text_all_images.
txt")
else:
    print("Kein Text aus den Bildern
extrahiert.")

```

```

def extract_text_from_image(image_path,
vision_client):
    with open(image_path, 'rb') as image_file:
        content = image_file.read()

    image = vision.Image(content=content)
    response =
vision_client.text_detection(image=image)
    texts = response.text_annotations
    if texts:
        return texts[0].description
    else:
        return None

extract_text_from_all_images("verarbeitete_bil
der", "extrahierter_text")

```

Results of the Analysis

Cl ub s	Nr. Of Populist Arguments	D- Anti- Elitis m	D- Exclu sionar y	D- People centris t	P- Anti - Elite	P- Exclu sionar y	P- People centris t	Total length of speeches
Klub der Konservativen								
Borcic	5	1	1	1		1	1	23.645
Gregorec	2			1			1	8.035
Dipauli	34	18	2	1	10		3	113.707
Morsey	21	7	4	1	4	2	3	73.854
Pfeifer_Viljem	7	2	2			1	2	17.745
Suklje	4			2			2	32.469
Treuinfels	8			4			4	44.148
Klub der Ruthenen								
Barvins'kyj	2			1			1	2.351
Polenklub								
Berichterstatte r Szczepanowsk i	6			4	1		1	160.110
Pininski	2	1			1			6.673
Klub der Deutschen Nationalpartei								
Dr. Bareuther	4		2			2		8.418
Dr. Fuß	28	4	14		1	8	1	125.324
Dr. Hofmann v. Wellenhof	13		8	1		3	1	25.685
Dr. Kindermann	6		1	2	1		2	17.245
Dr. Steinwender	5	1	1		2	1		18.311
Fürnkranz	13	1	7			5		32.997
Kaiser	17	6	3	1	3		4	26.785
Polzhofer	0							4.158

Vereinigte deutsche Linke								
Dr. Beer	1						1	10.645
Edler v. Plener	9	1	2	1			5	71.182
Dr. Groß	2	1	1					31.394
Dr. Jaques	9	1		1	1		6	79.400
Dr. Keil	4			1			3	6.500
Menger_Max	23		4	6		4	9	134.132
Dr. Suess	10		2	5	1		2	90.733
Neuber	0							10.153
Ritter v.								
Gomperz	1						1	15.189
Schwab	0							32.839
Tausche	8		1	2		1	4	36.090
Klub der böhmischen Nationalabgeordneten, Jungtschechen								
Dr. Herold	18	2	4	2	3	2	5	49.948
Dr. Kaizl	11	2	2	2			5	95.566
Dr. Kramár	18	6	2	3	1		6	63.727
Dr. Slavik	0							11.081
Dr. Vasaty	15	4	1	5	3		2	55.824
Eim	8	3		1			4	16.679
Formánek	12	1	4			3	4	27.012
Krumbholz	0							52
Freie Vereinigung für wirtschaftliche Reform auf christlicher Grundlage								
Dr. Lueger	59	15	12	4	9	5	14	130.965
Jax	8	2	2	1	2		1	68.401
Prinz								
Lichtenstein	8	5			3			32.594
Schlesinger	0							1.536
Schneider	5	2	2	1				16.906
Klub des Liberalen Zentrums								
Dr. Rizzi	1		1					7.109
Rolsberg	1			1				7.661
Stalitz	2		1				1	12.191
Mährischer Klub								
Weber	11	9		1	1			30.147
Fraktionslos								
Dr. Foregger	7		3	1			3	23.393
Fries	0							12.520
Kraus	6	1	2	1			2	16.457
Regierungsbeamte								
Ackerbaumini								
ster Graf								
Falkenhayn	0							11.369
Finanzminister								
Dr. Steinbach	9	2		1			6	171.550

Table 7, Appendix – Results of the Analysis