



MASTERARBEIT | MASTER'S THESIS

Titel | Title

From Empire to Union: Tracing the Imperial Legacy of the
European Economic Community

verfasst von | submitted by

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angestrebter akademischer Grad | in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien | Vienna, 2025

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt | Degree
programme code as it appears on the
student record sheet:

UA 066 803

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt | Degree
programme as it appears on the student
record sheet:

Masterstudium Geschichte

Betreut von | Supervisor:

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Zusammenfassung:

Die Thesis hinterfragt die Darstellung der europäischen Integration als Friedensprojekt und analysiert, wie koloniale Hinterlassenschaften die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) durch den Vertrag von Rom im Jahr 1957 geprägt haben. Mit Schwerpunkt auf dem Konzept von Eurafrika, dem Vertrag von Rom und den damit verbundenen Verhandlungen zeigt die Thesis, wie die europäische Integration koloniale Strukturen institutionalisierte und imperiale Hierarchien in die postkoloniale Ära hinein verlängerte, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf den späten 1950er bis frühen 1960er Jahren liegt. Anhand von Fallstudien zur Demokratischen Republik Kongo, Algerien und Côte d'Ivoire wird untersucht, wie diese Politiken und Strukturen, insbesondere durch den europäischen Entwicklungsfonds (EEF), die wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit aufrechterhielten, aber durch Gatekeeping auch im Interesse der lokalen Eliten sein konnten. Die Forschung nutzt historische und postkoloniale Theorien, um die Erzählung infrage zu stellen, dass die europäische Integration durch die EWG einen Bruch mit dem Empire darstellte, sondern vielmehr eine Anpassung, um den europäischen Einfluss inmitten globaler und dekolonialer Druckausübung durch Assoziierung und indirekte Herrschaft durch lokale Eliten zu bewahren. Die Externalisierung von Kosten, selektive Offenheit und administrative Kontinuität verändern die Interpretation der frühen EWG. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass es notwendig ist, die historische Erzählung der Gründung der EWG im Lichte der imperialen Anpassung neu zu schreiben.

Abstract:

The thesis questions the narrative of European integration as a project of peace, analysing how colonial legacies shaped the creation of the European Economic Community, the EEC, through the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Focusing on the concept of Eurafrica, the Treaty of Rome and the surrounding negotiations, the thesis demonstrates how European integration institutionalised colonial structures and extended imperial hierarchies into the postcolonial era, with a focus on the late 1950s to early 1960s. Case studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, and Côte d'Ivoire explore how these policies and structures, especially through the European Development Fund, the EDF, perpetuated economic dependency but could also be in the interest of local elites through gatekeeping. The research uses historical and postcolonial theories to challenge the narrative that European integration through the EEC was a rupture from Empire, but instead an adaptation to preserve European influence amid global and decolonisation pressures with association and indirect rule through local elites. Externalisation of costs, selective openness, and administrative continuity change the interpretation of the early EEC. The findings suggest that there is a need to rewrite the historical narrative of the EEC's formation in light of imperial adaptation.

Contents

Zusammenfassung:	i
Abstract:	ii
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1. Literature review	5
1.2. Theoretical Frameworks	9
1.3. Methodology	12
2.0 Eurafrica	14
2.1. Imperial Origins and Ideological Foundations	15
2.2. French Elites and the Strategic Logic of Eurafrica	18
2.3. Strategic Revival: Empire Reimagined in the Aftermath of War	22
2.3.1 Geopolitical Disruption and the Redefinition of Empire	22
2.3.2. African Soldiers	24
2.4 From the Hague to the Schuman Plan: Colonial Priorities in Post-War European Integration	26
2.4.1. French Union	28
2.5 Strategic Crisis and the Turn to Integration	33
3.0 Institutional Embedding	38
3.1. Context and Origin.	38
3.2. Negotiation Part IV: from Messina to Rome	38
3.3. Exclusion Through Rhetoric and Legal Ambiguity	43
3.4. Imperial Continuity, Exclusion, and Agency: Case Studies of Association in Algeria, French West Africa, and the Congo	51
3.4.1. Algeria	51
3.4.2. French West Africa	55
3.4.3. Congo	60
3.5. Legal Fictions, Self-Determination, and Political Exclusion	64
4.0. The European Development Fund: Economic Dependency, Colonial Legacies, and Elite Networks	69
5.0. Discussion	74
6.0. Conclusion	81
7.0. Bibliography	83

1.0 Introduction

The story of the European Union (EU) is primarily written as one of peace, compromise, and prosperity, rising out of the ashes of the Second World War, mending Franco-German relations.¹ The EU even received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012,² yet this hides a deeper historical dimension, namely the continuation of imperial structures and ambitions in the aftermath of the Second World War through economic and political integration. When the European Economic Community (EEC) was founded in 1957, the Treaty of Rome had explicit provisions for the association of African territories.³ This fact reveals direct continuities with colonial policies and practices. The thesis argues therefore that the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the EEC did not represent a clean break from colonialism, on the contrary, it institutionalised imperial hierarchies and economic dependencies within new legal and supranational forms, continuing the dominance of Europe over Africa through mechanisms of association and development.

How have the colonial legacies of European powers influenced the Treaty of Rome, the foundation of the European Economic Community, and its policies? In what ways have these legacies shaped the EEC's relationship with Africa during the decolonisation period and beyond? Furthermore, how can the concept of indirect rule help explain the externalisation of empire's costs and the involvement of African actors in this process?

The thesis explores the concept of Eurafrika, an idea that extended the logic of empire. This concept was rooted in nineteenth century and interwar period European thought, and it symbolises an early intellectual and also political project which wanted to integrate Africa economically and politically into European structures, this under the guise of development and cooperation.⁴ The formation of the EEC must also be seen under the at that moment prevailing global dynamics. Decolonisation and imperial decline were acute problems for the

¹ Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* 2 ed. (London/New York 2000) P.1.

² The Norwegian Nobel institute, *The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012- European Union (EU)*, (Access: 2. April 2025).

³ Article 131 - Article 136. In: *The Treaty of Rome* (25 March 1957) P.46-47.

⁴ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrika, the Untold History of European integration and Colonialism. Theory for a global age series* (London/New York 2014). P.51-57.

European colonial empires. As such, France and Belgium looked for new frameworks in which they could manage to retain their influence over their colonies.⁵ Not all the founding members of the EEC possessed overseas empires, but for France, it was a non-negotiable topic.⁶ The thesis uses theory such as the coloniality of power⁷, positional superiority⁸, core-periphery⁹, indirect rule¹⁰, or doxa¹¹ to analyse how European integration transformed the prevailing colonial hierarchies into similar but new forms of economic dependency and political hierarchy, while at the same time keeping a discourse of partnership, development and cooperation alive. The thesis demonstrates how integration preserved colonial economic and geopolitical hierarchies by institutionalising the imperial structures in a new framework. The thesis tries to push back against Eurocentric interpretations of integration and by doing so neatly integrates itself into the historiographical debate. The thesis builds upon the works of, for example, Hansen, Jonsson, Moser¹² and Dimier¹³. It uses the work of the latter to show how administrative continuities from the French Union transferred into the EEC's Directorate-General for Development (DG8) and the European Development Fund (EDF). Detailed case studies of Algeria, the Congo and the Côte d'Ivoire also reveal how European policymakers institutionalised indirect rule and constrained African agency. However, the thesis also attempts to show how African agency could resist it, acted and used the system and helped sustain economic dependency and political hierarchies.

⁵ Giuliano *Garavini*, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957–1986* (Oxford 2012) 46-50.

⁶ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson. *Eurafrica, the Untold History...* P.168.

⁷ Aníbal *Quijano*, Michael *Ennis*, *Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America*. In: *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no.3 (2000), P.533–580.

⁸ Edward W. *Said*, *Introduction*. In: *Orientalism* (New York 1979).


⁹ Immanuel *Wallerstein*, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham 2004) P.28.

¹⁰ Mahmood *Mamdani*, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, 2018). P.60.

¹¹ Pierre *Bourdieu*, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. In: *Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology* (Cambridge: 2013) P.168.

¹² Thomas *Moser*, *Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Eurafrika. Eine historische Analyse über die Entstehungsbedingungen der Eurafrikanischen Gemeinschaft von der Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum Jaunde-Vertrag, 1929–1963* (Baden-Baden 2000).

¹³ Véronique *Dimier*, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy: Recycling Empire*. *Palgrave Studies In European Union Politics* (2014).



The left Map, Figure 1: The European Economic Community¹⁴ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, The European Economic Community.

The right Map, Figure 2: Africa, Administrative Divisions¹⁵ *United States Central Intelligence Agency*, Africa, Administrative Divisions. Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division. (Washington, D.C,1958).

Some concepts should be clarified before the analysis continues. First, “Colonial legacies” is a central term. This means political and economic structures established under colonial rule. These are for example economies oriented towards resource exportation or legal structures which privilege metropolitan interests.¹⁶ It is also important to differentiate between direct and indirect rule. The former is direct rule by the metropole and its authorities and the latter by local elites or intermediaries. While it often divided citizens from subjects, the thesis uses indirect rule as a concept of ruling through an intermediary.¹⁷ Neocolonialism then is a concept which shows that when the formal empires ended, political and economic dependence remained, allowing the old colonial powers to maintain influence.¹⁸ This creates a core-

¹⁴ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, The European Economic Community.

¹⁵ *United States Central Intelligence Agency*, Africa, Administrative Divisions (Washington, D.C,1958), Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division.

¹⁶ Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. In: *American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001), P.1369–1401.

¹⁷ Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, 2018). P.60.

¹⁸ Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London 1965). P.8.

periphery dynamic another important concept.¹⁹ Integration creates dependency, but it also continues the coloniality of power, which means that systems such as hierarchy and domination continue even after colonialism ends.²⁰ The way Europeans acted was perceived as natural to them, as it was a natural assumption of a doxa.²¹ The other was always seen as backward and in need of help from the civilised West, a juxtaposition which is described as positional superiority.²²

The thesis builds on and contributes to a growing corpus of scholarship that challenges the conventional historiography of European integration as a peace-driven, post-war reconstruction project. While that narrative focuses on Franco-German reconciliation, economic cooperation, and the prevention of future conflict, it often overlooks how colonial interests continued to shape European political and economic agendas well into the post-war period. Recent works by scholars such as Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson have foregrounded the role of colonialism in shaping the institutional logic of the EEC, especially through the concept of Eurafrica.²³ These critiques reveal that narratives of peace and unity were not necessarily incompatible with endeavours to maintain European influence abroad. Quite the contrary, they could be intertwined with different strategies devised to maintain imperial economic structures and advantages through the process of integration. By focusing on the colonial dimensions of the EEC's foundation, this research seeks to push back against Eurocentric interpretations and reframe European integration as a process marked not only by internal reconciliation, but also by the transformation and continuation of colonialism and empire.

The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 entails the Introduction, Literature review, theoretical framework and methodology. Next comes Chapter 2, in which Eurafrica as an ideological concept will be explored and the role it played in the process of European integration but also the French Union as a prelude to integration. Chapter 3 will be a close reading of the Articles 131 to 136 of the Treaty of Rome as well as three empirical case studies to show how the process around association developed. Chapter 4 will be about the

¹⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, ... P.28.

²⁰ Aníbal Quijano, Michael Ennis, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America. In: *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no.3 (2000), P.533–580.

²¹ Pierre Bourdieu, ... P.168.

²² Edward W. Said, Introduction. In: *Orientalism* (New York 1979).

²³ Ibid, P.57-63.

European Development Fund, the EDF, and its role as a tool of colonial continuity through administrative continuities. Chapter 5 entails the discussion and Chapter 6 the conclusion. The thesis provides a more comprehensive understanding of European integration by taking a more global perspective.

1.1. Literature review

The historiography of European integration can be distinguished into three major strands. First, a traditional, internalist literature frames integration as a peace-driven project, driven by the functions of institutions and national interests. Second, there is a revisionist strand which introduced colonial entanglements and revealed how empire was transformed through supranational mechanisms. The most recent, global and postcolonial approach interrogates ideological and administrative continuities and calls for better integration of African agency and non-European intellectual traditions. How one engages these traditions shapes the fundamental question: Was the EEC a break with empire, or its institutional adaptation? The thesis foregrounds the significance of colonial legacies in shaping European integration's legal and economic frameworks. Although the perspective is necessarily Eurocentric, I attempt to engage with African agency where the sources permit and remain attentive to the methodological limits and silences that result.

The functionalist and intergovernmentalist schools, as articulated by Ernst Haas²⁴ and Stanley Hoffmann²⁵, understand European integration as a technical and political response to the devastation of war, emphasising the spillover logic of supranational institution-building and the resilience of national interests.

Jean Monnet's memoirs reinforced this internally focused perspective, celebrating European unity as a civilising achievement born from war, rather than from empire.²⁶ Gary Marks continues this line of thinking by framing integration in terms of multilevel governance and domestic contestation, downplaying external or imperial dimensions.²⁷ What unites these works is their assumption that Europe's imperial past had been severed or became irrelevant

²⁴ See: Arne Niemann, Zoe Lefkofridi, Philippe C. Schmitter, Neofunctionalism. In: Thomas Diez, Antje Wiener, *European Integration Theory* (Oxford 2018).

²⁵ See: Andre Moravcsik, Frank Schimmelfennig, Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: Thomas Diez, Antje Wiener, *European Integration Theory* (Oxford 2018).

²⁶ See: Jean Monnet, *Memoirs* (London 2015).

²⁷ Gary Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC. In: *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond* (Boulder 1993) P. 391–410.

by the time of the Treaty of Rome. However, by isolating European integration from its global entanglements, this literature risks obscuring the structural influence of empire in influencing what integration was, and who it served. The thesis calls into question the internalist paradigm by repositioning empire as a central theme within the discourse.

A growing historical scholarship has sought to integrate colonial and imperial dynamics into the narrative of European integration. Gérard Bossuat's archival research has been instrumental in demonstrating how the French Fourth Republic utilised European integration as a means to maintain, rather than relinquish, its imperial sphere.²⁸ He shows, France conditioned its EEC participation on retaining influence over its overseas territories, framing association as a strategic response to decolonisation. Guy Vanthemsche's work provides context for understanding Belgium's entanglement with Congo, particularly the economic anxieties that surfaced as independence approached. He details how Belgian policymakers prioritised the retention of access to Congolese resources such as copper and uranium, and how these economic stakes shaped their attitudes during the decolonisation crisis.²⁹ While Vanthemsche himself does not offer an in-depth analysis of Belgium's actions within the EEC association framework, his findings help explain why Belgium was ultimately willing to support mechanisms for continued European involvement in Africa. For both France and Belgium, Eurafrika was not simply a rhetorical device, but a negotiated instrument for managing imperial retreat.

Thomas Moser and Kiran Klaus Patel represent German perspectives. Moser definitively traces the evolution of Eurafrika thinking from the Great Depression to the post-war era and shows how geopolitical crises such as the Suez Crisis and the Algerian War shaped integration. Germany's stance showed an ambiguity. The country was reluctant to become embroiled in France's colonial wars but remained keen on a Europeanised approach to Africa that would stabilise relations between European nations.³⁰ Patel demonstrates that West Germany's initial scepticism toward overseas association was rooted in pragmatism and not colonial ambition. The colonial question was a burden to Bonn, but ultimately, they conceded

²⁸ Gérard Bossuat, *L'Europe des Français, 1943–1957. La IVe République aux sources de l'Europe communautaire* (Paris 1997). P.195-275.

²⁹ Guy Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo, 1885–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

³⁰ Thomas Moser, *Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Eurafrika. Eine historische Analyse über die Entstehungsbedingungen der Eurafrikanischen Gemeinschaft von der Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum jaunde-Vertrag, 1929-1963*, (Baden 2000).

in the interest of European unity.³¹ Together, these studies do not agree with the notion that colonial interests were external to European integration. On the contrary, they reveal that the EEC was an arena of strategic negotiation where colonial legacies were embedded in supranational institutions. Which raises the question of whether integration marked a break with empire, or rather its transformation.

The historiographical roots of the Eurafrica debate trace back to Guy Martin's intervention in 1982, which was the first to treat the Association and the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions as the multilateralisation of neo-colonial dependency rather than a post-imperial blank slate. Martin argued that the ideology of complementarity and interdependence justified both colonial domination and the persistence of unequal exchange after independence, thereby ensuring Africa's continued role as Europe's "dowry" and market for surplus goods. His work emphasised both the logic of "balkanisation" in French West Africa and African nationalism. Critiques of association anticipated the core arguments of later postcolonial scholars.³²

Building on the work of Guy Martin, Peo Hansen, and Stefan Jonsson's "Eurafrica," the argument is that colonial ambitions were central to the EEC's design, rather than peripheral.³³ They show that the Treaty of Rome institutionalised Africa's role as a "dowry to Europe", rationalising the transformation of colonial rule into supranational development aid and economic dependency.³⁴ Their critique targets Eurocentric narratives that frame the EEC as a peace-driven project, revealing how the decolonisation process did not liberate African states, but instead managed to preserve European privilege. They also show how Eurafrica emerged as a direct reaction to the Suez Crisis and anticolonial mobilisations, with European leaders like Adenauer and Mollet explicitly viewing African association as vital for Europe's global standing.³⁵ They argue that the EEC's association agreements perpetuated economic dependency and clientelism, and that the logic of Eurafrica aligned national colonial policies with supranational objectives. Meanwhile, Anne-Isabelle Richard also emphasises the pivotal

³¹ Kiran Klaus *Patel*, *Project Europe: A History* (Cambridge 2020).

³² Guy *Martin*, *Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica: Neo-Colonialism or Pan-Africanism?* In: *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 20, no. 2 (1982), P. 221–238.

³³ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*. *Eurafrica ...* (2014).

³⁴ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*, *Brining Africa as a "Dowry to Europe": European Integration and the Eurafrican Project, 1920–1960*. In: *Interventions: international journal of Postcolonial Studies* 13, no. 3 (2011) P.443–463. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2011.597600>.

³⁵ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*, *A Statue to Nasser? Eurafrica, the Colonial Roots of European integration, and the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize*. In: *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 24 no. 4, (2013) P.5–18.

role Eurafrica played in European cooperation projects, thereby setting it in relation to global dynamics.³⁶ The legal analysis of Hannah Eklund also strengthens the Eurafrican interpretation. The Treaty of Rome codified colonial hierarchies by systematically excluding the colonised populations from full legal status, thereby embedding Eurafrican logics within European law.³⁷

More recent postcolonial literature demonstrates the need to incorporate African agency and intellectual traditions. Frederick Cooper's "Colonialism in Question" is especially critical of Eurocentric narratives that portray colonial legacies as a fixed structure. Instead, Cooper emphasises the agency of African leaders and movements, showing that colonial frameworks were actively negotiated, resisted, and repurposed by Africans themselves, this then constitutes Agency. However, elites who monopolise access to external capital and use the imperial structures for their own gains are called "gatekeepers".³⁸ Cooper's perspective complements the work of Hansen & Jonsson, revealing an important other side. Colonial legacies are not an unmoving construction, but rather sites for dynamic contestation.

Other authors, such as Mark Mazower, Giuliano Garavini, Sara Lorenzini, and Béatrice Dimier have produced literature which helps deepen the research domain in different ways. They show how imperial systems were not dissolved by decolonisation but transformed through new forms of governance, trade, and development. Mazower demonstrates how post-war internationalism embedded Western dominance in global institutions.³⁹ Garavini⁴⁰ and Lorenzini⁴¹ focus on development rhetoric and aid policies, showing how association agreements perpetuated dependency, with development aid functioning as a mechanism of soft power and economic leverage. Brown's study of Algeria's formal EEC inclusion demonstrates that the extension of "Europe" was a means for France to retain economic and political dominance even in the era of formal decolonisation.⁴² Dimier's work is especially important for tracing the career trajectories of French colonial officials into the EEC's

³⁶ Anne-Isabelle Richard, "A Global Perspective on European Cooperation and Integration since 1918," In: *The Cambridge History of the European Union*, ed. Mathieu Segers and Steven Van Hecke (2023) P.459-480.

³⁷ Hannah Eklund, "Peoples, Inhabitants and Workers: Colonialism in the Treaty of Rome. In: *European Journal of International Law* 34, no. 4 (2023). P.831-854.

³⁸ Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley 2005).

³⁹ Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London 2012).

⁴⁰ Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires ...*

⁴¹ Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton 2019).

⁴² Megan Brown, *The Seventh Member State: Algeria, France, and the European Community*. (Cambridge/ London 2022).

Directorate-General for Development “DG8”. Her research constitutes an important part for the thesis. She demonstrates how “neo-patrimonial” bureaucratic structures survived formal decolonisation and managed to shape the development policy to reproduce colonial hierarchies and dependency under the guise of modernisation and aid.⁴³ Dimier’s focus on bureaucratic, and personnel continuity provides an empirical complement to the ideological and legal analyses offered by Eklund.

The historiographical debate is centred around the question of whether the Treaty of Rome marked a clear rupture with empire, or instead a transformation of imperial structures. Functionalist and intergovernmentalist scholars view integration as a peace project, free from the colonial dynamics. Contrasting this, are the revisionist or postcolonial authors. They argue that the colonial legacies were consciously integrated into the EEC through mechanisms such as association agreements, development aid through the EDF, and Eurafrica. A critique on this school is about the question of African agency, as Cooper or Fanon have emphasised how African actors, negotiated, contested or profited from European dominance, challenging narratives of European structural determination. The thesis builds on these debates and aligns with the postcolonial and revisionist school, but it also tries to implement the critique of African agency, by integrating African agency around the association framework and Eurafrica, showing that colonial legacies were not simply imposed but constantly renegotiated, sometimes in the interests of local elites.

1.2. Theoretical Frameworks

The European Economic Community is frequently depicted as a project of peace, prosperity, and reconstruction. However, through a postcolonial and global perspective, its formation demonstrates continuities with Europe’s imperial past. The thesis adopts a theoretical framework, incorporating theories of colonial power, structural dependency, and epistemic domination, to interpret these continuities as neither accidental nor peripheral, but structurally embedded in the very core of European integration. It draws therefore upon theories of colonial power, structural dependency, and epistemic domination. It also integrates African intellectual traditions that not only challenged but actively theorised the reconfiguration of imperialism in the post-war world.

Frantz Fanon’s pioneering critique of colonial domination in his work “*Les Damnés de la Terre*” emphasised that the effects of colonialism continued beyond formal independence

⁴³ Véronique *Dimier*, *The Invention of a European ...*

through structural dimensions.⁴⁴ Fanon's observation revealed the continuity of paternalistic discourses in Euro-African agreements, perpetuating notions of European superiority and African dependence. His concept of the "national bourgeoisie" helps to understand the behaviour of the new national elites.⁴⁵ They often reproduced colonial structures because they acted as intermediaries between former colonisers and local populations, perpetuating economic and political subordination. However, as Achille Mbembe explained, was decolonisation not a clean break. Colonial and post-colonial logics could co-exist.⁴⁶ Elites should further be read through their everyday apparatus not a simple oppressor resister dynamic.⁴⁷ The thesis therefore uses Fanon in a narrow margin. The goal is to denote metropole-linked intermediary elites who reproduce colonial logics, often in a similar way of Frederick Cooper's concept of "gatekeepers".

Mahmood Mamdani complements this by refining this analysis through the concept of indirect rule or "decentralised despotism". In his work "Citizen and Subject"⁴⁸, Mamdani argues that colonial powers governed the different colonies not directly but through recognised local intermediaries, creating different legal and political categories of citizens and subjects. This understanding helps clarify the EEC's association regime as a form of indirect rule transformed into a supranational system. As Catherine Boone critiqued it by showing different variations of power and centre-periphery relations in Africa, Mamdani is only used in the thesis to show bifurcation and elite mediation and is not to be understood as a singular template.⁴⁹

Frederick Cooper's "gatekeepers" also belongs to those categories, it meant elites who facilitated the flow of external capital and used the imperial architecture to keep themselves in power. Agency, on the other hand only begins when the actors restructure the system for autonomous means, which will be flagged in the thesis. This perspective helps analyse the different African actors in their different circumstances.⁵⁰ Jean- François Bayart's idea of extraversion shows that some elites actively cultivate external dependence as a strategy to

⁴⁴ Frantz *Fanon*, *The wretched of the Earth* (New York 1963). P.120-124.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, P.149-153.

⁴⁶ Achille *Mbembe*, *On the Postcolony*. Vol. 41. (Berkeley 2001) P.14.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, P.43-47.

⁴⁸ Mahmood *Mamdani*, ... P.37.

⁴⁹ Catherine *Boone*, *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*. (Cambridge 2003) P.1-4.

⁵⁰ Frederick *Cooper*, *Colonialism in Question*, P.235-240.

rule, this is not necessarily contradicting Cooper but can help to better define gatekeeping.⁵¹ The usage of gatekeeping is often wanted and cultivated and can be a form of agency. as will be later shown especially in the EDF chapter.

However, Mamdani's focus on internal governance structures is not sufficing and must be complemented by dependency and world-systems theories to fully capture the external economic pressures institutionalised through global trade dynamics. The economic dimension of these continuities is elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein's "world-systems" theory allows to see how the EEC represented a spatial reorganisation of core-periphery dynamics, not a new phenomenon or a real disbanding of empire, but continuing to integrate African economies into a global system which was oriented towards European core accumulation.⁵² The association regime can be understood as a tool to institutionalise this dynamic but also frames the project priorities and economic outcomes. Still, Theda Skocpol critiqued the world-systems theory, saying that it underplayed the role of state structures, legal regimes, and institutions in sustaining these economic relations.⁵³ The thesis applies the world-system theory to show how legal and bureaucratic instruments helped create and continue core-periphery dynamics.

Aníbal Quijano's concept of "coloniality of power" helps analysing the hierarchical relationships that colonial rule established and persisted after formal empire.⁵⁴ The thesis uses Quijano's concept to explain how legal and administrative practices continued from the colonial era to the EEC's DG8 and the European Development Fund. It provides a framework for how colonial administrative logics have shaped European policies, revealing the structural continuities in governance and project allocation. Arif Dirlik argued that structure and systemic context play an important role, forgetting to take them into account risks missing

⁵¹ Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis. "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion." In: *African Affairs* 99, no. 395 (London 2000): 217–67. P.218-219.

⁵² Immanuel Wallerstein, ... P.28.

⁵³ Theda Skocpol, Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. Immanuel Wallerstein. In: *The American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 5 (1977): 1075–90.

⁵⁴ Aníbal Quijano, Michael Ennis, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America. In: *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no.3 (2000), P.568.

parts of the explanation.⁵⁵ The thesis avoids this by focusing on treaty clauses and administrative files.

The concept of Pierre Bourdieu's doxa refers to the taken for granted beliefs and values that structure social reality and are perceived as natural or self-evident by actors within a given field. This clarifies how Eurafrica emerged as a framework for European policymakers. This concept supports the analysis of Eurafrican discourses, speeches, and drafting choices, particularly with regard to the ideological justifications provided by policymakers such as Kalergi, Schuman, and Monnet but also drafting choices.⁵⁶ Richard Jenkins warned that Bourdieu's framework can be deterministic unless it is empirically constrained.⁵⁷ The doxa and habitus in the thesis therefore allow for dissent, evolution, and exception and it is tied to identifiable texts, discourse and administrative moves and does not argue that everybody acted upon it, but that it remained a strong force.

Finally, Edward Said, and the concept of "positional superiority" remain an insightful frame of reference, providing a critical lens through which to examine the hierarchical relationships established by European discourse. Through the act of "othering" non-Europeans, it constructed superiority over African populations. The act of othering itself is knowledge embedded in power structures. The concepts are used to underline how the Treaty and language surrounding it normalised hierarchy. The thesis attempts to keep it narrow and only uses it when it is relevant.

The thesis attempts to apply these theoretical frameworks to do concrete analytic work with specific evidence. This may be directly related to language or discourse or be based on legal structures or administrative practices, and actors.

1.3. Methodology

The thesis's methodological approach uses a qualitative historical method to analyse the institutionalisation of colonial continuities within the European Economic Community's association regime. As a primary source the thesis will use the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957 by the six founding nations. Instead of interpreting the process of European integration as a

⁵⁵ Arif Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*. In: *Critical Inquiry* 20, no. 2 (1994): 328–56. P.330-331.

⁵⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, ... P.168.

⁵⁷ Jenkins, R. "BOURDIEU, PIERRE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF DETERMINISM." *Sociology (Oxford)* 16, no. 2 (1982): 270–81. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038582016002008>.

rupture in the history of colonialism, the thesis will explore how colonial structures remained and continued within the EEC's legal, political, and economic frameworks.

To enable the analysis, the thesis uses different methodological approaches, a central one being the critical discourse analysis as explained by Pierre Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power and the doxa.⁵⁸ This approach helps to analyse implicit assumptions, hidden hierarchies and legitimisation strategies within the European discourse surrounding African relations, helping to inform why European elites adopted the way of European integration with the help of the African territories in such a natural way. This can be found through speeches. Edward Said's theory of Orientalism helps to complement the approach, helping to analyse how hierarchical distinctions between Europe and Africa are constructed through paternalistic narratives and othering, legitimising ongoing colonial dynamics.⁵⁹

The theoretical framework includes key concepts from postcolonial theory as well as dependency analysis. For one, the thesis includes the theory of indirect rule and bifurcation by Mamdani, to frame governance structures that extended colonial rule into the EEC's supranational framework.⁶⁰ Quijano's "coloniality of power" is an important tool to help show how colonial hierarchies continued within administrative and political frameworks even after the "official" decolonisation, meaning independence, as seen in the continued dependency and relationships.⁶¹ This dependency can also be understood in the world-system theory of Wallerstein as the continued access to resource extraction defined the interactions between Europe and associated African territories.⁶²

The framework of the national bourgeoisie as conceptualised by Fanon is used to interpret the roles and limitations of African elites within these structures acting as metropole-linked intermediaries.⁶³ Cooper's concept of gatekeeping complements this. The national bourgeoisie and gatekeeping often overlap, the former is social class tied to the metropole, the latter when metropole-linked intermediaries used the connection to the outside world as a tool of internal leverage to stabilise their position. If outside connections are actively used for their benefits

⁵⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, P.165-168.

⁵⁹ Edward W. Said, ...

⁶⁰ Mahmood Mamdani, ... P.60.

⁶¹ Aníbal Quijano, Michael Ennis, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America. In: *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no.3 (2000), P.568.

⁶² Immanuel Wallerstein, P.28.

⁶³ Frantz Fanon, P.120-124.

then it is argued as Bayart's extraversion.⁶⁴ Agency is when the limitations are actively negotiated, or more obvious, outright contested.

As a primary source, the Treaty of Rome with the Articles 131 to 136, is primarily used, complemented with quotes and speeches from some contemporary actors. European perspectives are still dominant in the thesis, however, the thesis attempted to actively integrate African perspectives and voices into the thesis, such as Senghor, Lumumba and Houphouët-Boigny, to properly integrate African agency and their contributions and reactions to the integration process, to not merely denote African voices as passive reactions.

In the domain of historiography, the thesis situates itself with critical scholars of European integration and postcolonial studies. Hansen and Jonsson's work emphasises the early Eurafrican ideological constructs within European integration which predated it. Dimier is used for thorough analysis of the EDF and administrative focus and the continued colonial legacies through this chapter.⁶⁵

To conclude, the thesis integrates qualitative historical analysis, critical discourse, and postcolonial theoretical frameworks to analyse the EEC's foundational frameworks and their continued colonial legacies. It goes against the classical historiographies of European integration by using both European discourses and African responses.

2.0 Eurafrica

This chapter argues that Eurafrica was the central ideological and strategic framework through which European integration institutionalised colonial hierarchies in the EEC, transforming imperialism into a structure of supranational dependency. The founding six members of the EEC included several nations that still possessed overseas colonies and sometimes used violence to stop the decolonisation and fought to keep possession over them. European integration was therefore for one not peaceful, and secondly deeply connected to the structures of colonialism. The Treaty of Rome reconfigured imperial logic. This imperial logic, had a concept behind it, called "Eurafrica", a political, economic, and ideological project to integrate Africa into the European project on unequal, still colonial terms.

⁶⁴ Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis. "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion." In: *African Affairs* 99, no. 395 (London 2000): 217–67. P.218-219.

⁶⁵ Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development ...*

This chapter agrees with the findings of Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, that Eurafrica became central to European integration, as they correctly put it by quoting an analyst in 1957, “It is in Africa that Europe will be made”.⁶⁶ Eurafrica was a form of ideological programme, deeply embedded in the logic of elites and their different visions and strategies for European unity.⁶⁷ Historical debates, strategic visions and institutional structures, show that Eurafrica offered a framework for maintaining European global influence during decolonisation by transforming direct imperial control into economic and legal dependency under a supranational structure, becoming a form of indirect rule. This was especially of importance in France, being the biggest continental colonial power.

2.1. Imperial Origins and Ideological Foundations

The ideological foundations of Eurafrica were constructed upon racialised doctrines of European superiority and empire, what Bourdieu would call, the doxa. “Othering” Africa to a “other”, created a specific image of the continent and helped present Africa as subordinate and essential to European survival and influence. Eurafrica as an idea can trace its origin to the nineteenth century, so before even the Second World War and European integration. These ideological roots of Eurafrica were shaped by what Pierre Bourdieu called the doxa, what he would see as the implicit perceived structures that render domination natural and uncontested.⁶⁸ Africa, in this view, was never to be treated as a sovereign actor, but as a spatial object to be conquered, managed and civilised, reproducing the prevailing hierarchies in the name of universal progress.

Victor Hugo’s speech in 1879 is a clear example of this as he wrote: “*Unissez-vous, allez au sud! Au XIXe siècle, le Blanc a fait du Noir un homme ; au XXe siècle l’Europe fera de l’Afrique un monde. Refaire une Afrique nouvelle, rendre la vieille Afrique maniable à la civilisation. Tel est le problème, l’Europe le résoudra*”⁶⁹ translated to “Unite, go South! In the nineteenth century, the White man made the Black man a human being; in the 20th century, Europe will make Africa a world. To remake a new Africa, to make the old Africa manageable

⁶⁶ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica, the Untold History ... P.12.

⁶⁷ Thomas Moser, Europäische Integration...

⁶⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, ... P.168.

⁶⁹ Charles-Robert Ageron, L’idée Eurafrrique et le débat colonial Franco-allemand de l’entre-deux-guerres. In: Revue d’histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, (Paris 1954), 22, no. 3, (1975) P.446.

for civilisation. That is the problem, and Europe will solve it.” One might argue that Hugo’s paternalistic rhetoric represents the racialised doctrine of civilisational superiority and hierarchy that became later central to Eurafrican discourse, even explicit as Hugo sees Africa as place to act upon. The foundation of Eurafrica operated through these implicit, ideological, even racial assumptions.⁷⁰ They could therefore easily reappear in the post-war situation, since the inherited logic of power and hierarchy was so obvious it did not need to be made explicit.

Said argued that Orientalism was a self-reinforcing system, rather than several singular prejudices, and as such a system, Orientalism worked through the repetition of the claim strengthening the legitimacy. “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors,” he writes, in which the authority of one text is strengthened through its repetition across others.⁷¹ The authority of the Eurafrican idea was founded on Europe’s repeated production of meaning within its own ideological system, stabilising its identity in the face of Africa. He further noted that, “The Orient was almost a European invention.” Africa was similar for Europe, as it was the site on which European identity was projected and affirmed.⁷² One can see that Africa became a canvas onto which Europe projected its needs and anxieties. Kalergi and Hugo possessed worldviews which were not singular. On the contrary, they reflected imperial hierarchies and also laid the foundation to institutionalise them later and revive them under a new framework in the post-war project of European integration.

The concept gained ideological and organisational clarity in the interwar period even after the First World War, as it initially destroyed at first any idea of European Unification. One important moment in the racialised consolidation of Eurafrican thought came during the occupation of the German Rhineland after World War I, when France deployed colonial troops. This sparked a racist backlash across Europe, called “Black Horror on the Rhine”, as media outlets, women’s organisations, and political parties from every colour, including liberals and socialists, decried the presence of African soldiers as a humiliation to European civilisation. Of course, the far right⁷³ also echoed this sentiment, showing that a wider societal consensus on the racial perception existed.⁷⁴ This episode helps to showcase an alignment of

⁷⁰ Anne-Isabelle Richard, *A Global Perspective...* P.475-477.

⁷¹ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*. Twenty-fifth anniversary edition. (New York, 2003).

⁷² Ibid, P.1.

⁷³ Hitler namely decried as a conspiracy against the white race.

⁷⁴ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Bringing Africa as*. P.446.

fascist and mainstream democratic discourse and how deeply entrenched the racialised logic of European identity had actually become across the political spectrum.

These views, intrinsic to the European thought and worldview, reflect the doxa of the time, reinforcing by itself the racialised logic of European identity. While Europe shall exercise control of Africa, Africans shall not invade and sully the symbolic and cultural core of Europe, it was unthinkable for the European worldview. Eurafrica therefore emerges as an economic and civilisational project, as a racialised spatial fix, in which Africa should serve Europe, but from a far distance.

A plethora of actors promoting the idea of European unity emerged after the First World War. A significant lot of them were pacifist and internationalist.⁷⁵ One of those actors was a young Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, who, in 1923 founded the Pan-Europe movement sought to channel racial hierarchy into a supranational order, a movement which also gained the support from statesmen such as Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer and Aristide Briand⁷⁶.

In his 1929 writings, he explicitly framed Eurafrica as the future of Europe, a supranational federation that would incorporate Africa as both a territory and resource reservoir. He coined the term in 1929 “Eurafrica”, and the concept focused on a continuous Empire, meaning, if necessary that territories should be exchanged with the British Empire, like in the old days of colonialism.⁷⁷ Europe was to be the “head” of this entity, Africa its “body,” bound together by a civilising mission and economic necessity, comparing it to the US and the Americas.⁷⁸ Incorporating Africa’s territory and resources had been proposed as a strategy to help sustain Europe’s industry and surplus population, the assimilation of Africa becomes a crucial necessity and strong argument for the unification of Europe.⁷⁹ This framing by Kalergi subordinated Africa in a form of Quijano’s coloniality of power, ordering the world in an epistemic way that assigns subordinate value to the non-European, further mirroring the flexible positional superiority of Said, the “head” and the “body” being the European mission to civilise, the latter remaining intact under the façade of supranationalism.

⁷⁵ Thomas Moser, *Europäische Integration...* P.47-P.48.

⁷⁶ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Bringing Africa as*, P.448.

⁷⁷ Benjamin J. Thorpe. *Eurafrica: A Pan-European Vehicle for Central European Colonialism (1923–1939)*. *European Review* 26, no. 3 (2018). P 506.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798718000200>.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, P 507.

⁷⁹ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Bringing Africa...* P. 449.

The objective was twofold. First, it was to integrate Germany⁸⁰ and Italy into the Eurafrica framework, through absolute and equal colonial access.⁸¹ Immigration of any African workers or soldiers was to be restricted at all costs, as Kalergi saw deep racial differences between the European and Africans.⁸² Eurafrica was a narrative about the superiority of European civilisation and further also a coherent strategy to help manage the imperial decline and transform the empires, even though phrases such as complementary and interdependence are used, as they mean dependence and subordination of Africa towards Europe.⁸³ This interwar discourse shows that these doxic assumptions predisposed negotiators to design institutions that naturalised hierarchy. This is the reason why Articles 131-136 were written the way they were; they are similar to earlier civilising rhetoric. Association becomes tutelage and not citizenship. After World War II, this mindset would be revived and adapted as European policymakers needed to confront imperial decline and sought to stabilise Europe's global position.

2.2. French Elites and the Strategic Logic of Eurafrica

Some elites in the interwar period started adopting the Eurafrica concept as a strategy to sustain imperial power as well as influence and reconfigure the colonial hierarchies within a broader European framework, European describing the circulating ideas and proposals being discussed in different parts of European society. In France, the goal of the strategy was to stabilise her global position by fusing the different aspects of colonial development, economic recovery, and political influence into broader plans founded on European cooperation.

In the 1920s, certain French elites, such as Sarraut who himself had served as Minister of the Colonies and even twice as Prime Minister of France, saw that it was necessary to consolidate the Empire as it was too burdensome for the economy, while a lack of capital and funds stifled the development of the colonies.⁸⁴ Grand commerce for example, favoured European integration of the economy and market.⁸⁵ Aristide Briand, eleven times Prime Minister of

⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the Nazi administration itself showed no interest, as their focus was Europe, and not the control of African populations. Hitler even wrote that France's Empire is in the process of a "mulatto State", a state with an inferior mixed race.

⁸¹ Thomas Moser, P.103.

⁸² Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Bringing Africa ... P.450.

⁸³ Guy Martin ... P.222-225.

⁸⁴ Joseph Bohling, Colonial or Continental Power? The Debate over Economic Expansion in Interwar France, 1925–1932. In : Contemporary European History 26, no.2 (2017) P.225-226.

⁸⁵ Laurence Badel, Conclusion. In : un milieu liberal et européen, Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique. (2013) P.465-474.

France, wanted to maintain peace and stability on the continent, and to rationalise European production and trade through European integration to compete on a global scale.⁸⁶ It is important to note that the debate in France developed more in a Eurafrica direction, as the French Empire could be transformed into a more cost-effective structure, exporting the surplus products and human capital to Africa, helping to develop the extensive underdeveloped African colonies which, alone would cost too much capital, especially in the economic crisis of the 1930s.⁸⁷ In general, as the 1930s came around, gathered the idea of Eurafrica significant support for a while, as a synthesis of France's continental and imperial visions, securing continental markets and influence and finding economic resources to develop the colonies, but the will to relinquish some sovereignty over the markets was not always apparent.

French political and commercial elites wanted to profit economically from the Eurafrican idea. Syndicalist Georges Valois, for example, envisioned a ten-year Eurafrican plan for labour migration, infrastructure, and raw material extraction.⁸⁸ He suggested that in Africa, Europeans needed to find "development sites, not markets."⁸⁹ The concept was transformed into a political initiative through the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation, the latter being tasked in 1931 with finding possible solutions to unemployment in Europe, its director travelling to Berlin for talks.⁹⁰ E.-L. Guernier, a French economist, argued in his 1933 work "*L'Afrique, champ d'expansion de l'Europe*", that Africa would supply Europe with land, minerals, and manpower, while Europe would provide civilisation and governance, a typical European perspective. He believed that both continents would profit from the establishment of such an organisation, which would further help to balance the global system, although this interdependence was hierarchical. Africa was "a continent without history," in need of European leadership.⁹¹ It reflects a paternalistic worldview that perceives Africa as an undeveloped, primitive "other". Guernier's narrative helps reframe dependency into a logic of development, yet such interdependence binds Africa into a perpetual periphery as world-systems theory describes. Elite brokerage is already implicit, mechanism that will later reappear as gatekeeping.

⁸⁶ Joseph Bohling ... P.228-232.

⁸⁷ Thomas Moser ... P.104-105.

⁸⁸ Thomas Moser ... P.104.

⁸⁹ Joseph Bohling ... P.237.

⁹⁰ Thomas Moser ... P.104.

⁹¹ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson... P. 450.

Guernier's vision should therefore not be seen as one of mutual development, but of a functional subordination in a European-led hierarchy. European integration further combined economic modernisation and European safekeeping, and also was an answer to preserve Europe's global standing in the face of rising American, Soviet and Japanese power.⁹² For these French elites, Africa became the solution and was subsequently othered as Europe's indispensable subordinate, remaining in the ideological tradition of Hugo and Kalergi. Essential for European survival, yet always constructed as an object in need of European patronage.⁹³

The socialist Prime Minister of France, Léon Blum, proposed in 1937 to put the African colonies under European control.⁹⁴ It was a French proposal that aimed to reinforce European control by creating a collective framework, predating the logic of association in the Treaty of Rome. The proposal was formulated in the backdrop of rising tensions and colonial instability. Blum hoped that it would help reduce those problems and at the same time secure strategic resources. However; the proposal met considerable opposition by conservatives and colonial lobbies, who feared a dilution of national sovereignty, while also many in Blum's own socialist ranks remained ambivalent, fearing legitimising imperialism in the name of internationalism. The polarised reception ultimately doomed the plan. One can argue that it nevertheless foreshadowed how future European cooperation would be pursued within the very framework of colonial continuity. One can also interpret Blum's initiative as how Eurafrican thinking, long before the Second World War, was a serious institutional vision rather than a marginal one. One should also not forget, that the imperial culture in France was widespread, with the territories around the globe being a fundamental part of the French self-image. Interwar propaganda campaigns popularised the ideas such as „la France aux cent millions d'habitants" and "la France d'outre-mer". External France, France with one hundred million inhabitants and other names, they all evoked a sense of national grandeur, the term "l'empire" becoming increasingly spread far and wide in the press during the late 1930s.⁹⁵ They represent a form of doxa, as the overseas territories a central part of the "grande nation". A French Minister and delegate at the League of Nations, Henri de Jouvenel, advocated for a French-British federation that would unify their colonial empires, even with the inclusion of

⁹² Anne-Isabelle Richard, *A Global Perspective ...* 466-472.

⁹³ Ibid, 475-477.

⁹⁴ Thomas Moser, P.106.

⁹⁵ Pascal Blanchard, Sandrine Lemaire, *Culture impériale, Les Colonies au cœur de la République 1931-1961*. (Paris 2004) P.13-14.

Germany and Italy.⁹⁶ In Belgium, Jules Destrée a socialist politician and once minister, used Kalergi's ideas to promote Belgian colonial engagement as a civilisational endeavour.⁹⁷ The Netherlands was an important supporter of the principles of the League of Nations, with various actors in civil society whom supported the League, the most prominent being the VeV, the Volkenbond en Vrede, which was the Dutch League of Nations. They counted members of government, academia and the general population in its ranks constituting as such an influential group in the Netherlands. The VeV supported internationalism through the League of Nations, and maintained a degree of scepticism of European integration projects and, more generally speaking, opposed the creation of borders around Eurafrica, undermining their trade around the world.⁹⁸ One might argue this was typical for a global trading nation. Over time those opinions started to shift, hoping for economic recovery and stability, as long as no central European authority would be implemented. Cooperation became desirable as the European states were dependent on each other.⁹⁹ For Belgium the Congo is important, for the Netherlands its trade, those are positions which will be relevant again in the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome.

It is therefore evident that Eurafrica emerged as both discourse and strategy. Its ideological foundations combined pan-European fears over decline in a changing world in regard to America and the Soviet Union,¹⁰⁰ with a civilisational mission and an economic calculus of dependency. These pre-1945 visions set the stage for their post-war revival and could be used as concrete templates for reconfiguring colonial power within European integration. The idea of Eurafrica, which was in essence the doxa for huge parts of the European elites, by combining imperial economics with civilisational rhetoric, othering and seeing the African populace as racially inferior, functioned as a discursive bridge between formal colonialism and postcolonial institutional structures such as the EEC. This chapter centred on French discussions, but the European form of Eurafrica took shape through the wider discussions and ideas that existed in elites from different countries, which became more obvious in the post-

⁹⁶ Thomas *Moser*, P.103.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, P.103

⁹⁸ The preferential rights that Europeans and industries would enjoy have the potential to place the Netherlands in a challenging position. In the Dutch East Indies, the country would be required to terminate its open-door policy with regard to Britain, the United States and Japan.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, P.105-108.

¹⁰⁰ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*, P.448.

war period.¹⁰¹ France as the biggest colonial power of continental Europe played a key role in the discussion as without it the discussion around association might not have happened. France therefore was a principal driver of the hierarchy later generalised at EEC level, while elites in different European countries already discussed the idea, the true European form of Eurafrica emerged when French officials negotiated to embed it into the Treaty of Rome.

2.3. Strategic Revival: Empire Reimagined in the Aftermath of War

2.3.1 Geopolitical Disruption and the Redefinition of Empire

World War II was not the nail in the coffin for European imperial ambitions, instead it forced elites to adapt the Eurafrica concept turning wartime strategies of imperial survival into the blueprints of the post-war integration and the supranational management of empire. This was most notably visible in France as it attempted to save its Empire from collapse.

The collapse of the traditional European empires during and after the Second World War triggered an urgent redefinition of empire. European elites, faced with declining power, tried to find new ways to keep it intact, increasingly looking towards collective and indirect strategies for maintaining influence, particularly in Africa. Recent scholarship also pushes into that direction, showing how European integration absorbed and transformed imperial mechanisms rather than discarding them.¹⁰² Empire evolved and did not constitute a break. Post-war cooperation plans were deeply shaped by colonial imaginaries, global pressures and institutional inheritances.¹⁰³ This redirects the standard narrative of European integration away from a history of peace and towards a continued story of imperial influence and conflict. As the thesis presented in the previous chapter, the interwar period had already laid much of the ideological groundwork for Eurafrican visions that would later materialise in the Treaty of Rome.

Existing sentiments fed directly into Eurafrican thought. Proposals such as Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneuropa saw Africa as vital to stabilising Europe's geopolitical and economic decline. As Richard notes, "Eurafrican cooperation, in whatever form, would diminish European competition and buttress Europe's global position, both after the First World War

¹⁰¹ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *A Statue to Nasser? ...* P.12-13.

¹⁰² Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica, the Untold History of European integration and Colonialism. Theory for a global age series* (London/New York 2014). P. 15–16.

¹⁰³ Anne-Isabelle Richard, *...* P.459-460.

and after the Second World War."¹⁰⁴ By grounding integration in racial hierarchy and colonial possession, this logic reinforced the idea of Africa as a resource for Europe's survival, rather than a partner.

One of the most dramatic early moments of this logic was in 1940, when Jean Monnet and René Pleven proposed the Franco-British Union, in an attempt to save the empire and salvage the strategic depth of it.¹⁰⁵ With France facing imminent military collapse under the German Invasion of the Second World War, did they hope to merge the French and British Empires into a single political and military entity, helping to preserve colonial access and strategic depth, while at the same time keeping French troops and navy in the fight. Charles de Gaulle saw it as a way to continue resistance and protect French imperial interests. Churchill supported it too, thereby supporting Prime Minister Paul Reynaud's intention to continue the fight in exile from north Africa.¹⁰⁶ However some of the other members of the cabinet rejected the idea outright, they feared the loss of sovereignty and the subordination of France to British control. Ybarnégary, at that moment Minister of State and subsequently Minister in Pétain's Government, infamously declared, "Better be a Nazi province. At least we know what that means"¹⁰⁷ This internal discord let the plan, and the French military effort in the metropole collapse. It also sets a stage for the contradictory impulses within French imperial strategy, to cling either to national Empire or to embrace supranational survival. Nonetheless, the proposal reflects a conceptual transformation already underway, European unity would be achieved through the colonial world. Eurafrica could adapt to shifting power structures. As Nazi Germany sought to redraw colonial maps through its vision of "Mittelafrika",¹⁰⁸ French collaborationist elements within Vichy France attempted to negotiate their own place under the sun of a new imperial German order. Some French elites such as Jacques Benoist-Méchin envisioned a future where France's African empire could serve as a maritime extension to Germany's continental hegemony.¹⁰⁹

In contrast, De Gaulle's Free French had planned to liberate France using the African territories as a component to reconstitute national sovereignty. The Empire was treated not as

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, P.478.

¹⁰⁶ Avi Shlaim, *Prelude to Downfall: The British Offer of Union to France, June 1940*. In: *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, No 3 (1974) P.27-63.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/002200947400900302>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid P.53.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas Moser ... 107-108.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 190-111.

a relic but as the foundation of national regeneration, it became a beacon of imperial glory and the vision of a liberated France. The colonies became the saviour of France and the Empire, both in spirit and through material action, as they represented the unoccupied part of a Free France.¹¹⁰

2.3.2. African Soldiers

African soldiers were essential to the liberation of Europe, but the experience and treatment of them during and after World War II exposes the continuation of the racial hierarchies and colonial doxa within both French and European strategies. Systematically marginalised, excluded even from symbolic recognition, and subjected to discriminatory policies, imperial logic was reproduced in both the military and post-war contexts.

African soldiers had an important but systematically marginalised role in the military campaigns that liberated Western Europe. The French Armée d'Afrique and the Tirailleurs Sénégalais, constituted a central part of the Free French forces and were recruited from across North, West and Equatorial Africa. During the 1940 Blitzkrieg, and German forces inflicted heavy casualties on these troops and carried out massacres on black prisoners of war.¹¹¹ As the war progressed, colonial soldiers made up a major part of the Free French forces. However, their sacrifices were not equally honoured. As the Free French 2nd Armoured Division was about to enter Paris, De Gaulle ordered the "whitening" of the troops. Black soldiers were replaced by whites. All for preventing the demoralisation of the liberated civilian population.¹¹² France's debt to its colonial troops was deemed politically inconvenient and, in that logic, had therefore be erased.¹¹³ This scene fits well with the Theory of Orientalism, as Orientalism depends on its strategy on this flexible positional superiority. Europe's role is that of an administrator, liberator, the African troops must remain the other, the racial inferior. They could not be represented in the symbolic act of reclaiming the capital. Essential in function, but excluded in form. This scene follows the post-war strategy, in which Africa is central, but marginalised discursively.

¹¹⁰ Pascal Blanchard, Sandrine Lemaire, ... P.129-130.

¹¹¹ Ruth Ginio, *The French Army and Its African Soldiers: The Years of Decolonization* (Lincoln, 2017) P.16.

¹¹² Ruth Ginio, *The French Army and Its African Soldiers*. P.17-18.

¹¹³ Timothy Parsons, *The Military Experiences of Ordinary Africans in World War II*. In: *Africa and World War II* (Cambridge 2015) 2015 P.9.

Throughout the campaign African troops had to face inferior conditions compared to their European counterparts. As such, pensions were denied, the pay was less than their European counterparts, and the offered housing and medical treatment was inadequate. Officials even further imposed racial boundaries to prevent African troops from intermingling with French women, fearing the breakdown of colonial racial hierarchies.¹¹⁴ Racial fears are still strong. In the 1944 massacre at Camp Thiaroye came the contradictions to a halt, as dozens of demobilised soldiers were shot for by their French allies for protesting unpaid wages and were violently suppressed for demanding recognition of African demands.¹¹⁵ In light of often never receiving their recognition, political awareness and activism grew. It intensified, as the obvious contradiction between their wartime sacrifice and the post-war marginalisation, helped them grow into central actors in the early phases of nationalist mobilisation.¹¹⁶

Other scholars such as Gregory Mann would caution against oversimplifying the link between soldiering and nationalism, as he argues that veterans occupied a hybrid position in what he calls a “war of position”. Veterans did not necessarily seek independence for a nation, he argues, but independence from an emerging idea of a nation, as their claims to privilege might no longer be relevant when they break with the metropole.¹¹⁷ Some allied themselves with radical parties such as the RDA.¹¹⁸ The RDA, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, a federation of African parties founded by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the future President of the Côte d’Ivoire and loyalist to the French Union, was not anti-French nor demanded independence but equality for Africans. It was at first founded with communist support in 1946, but the RDA broke its relationship with the communists in 1950. This angered parts of the Party and resulted in a split between moderates and radical, with Houphouët-Boigny firmly belonging to the moderate camp as he went on to cooperate with Paris acting as a gate-keeper using the connections to Paris.¹¹⁹

Other soldiers remained aligned with more conservative local elites.¹²⁰ France in the 1950s would gradually win over the former career soldiers but also the combat veterans. In

¹¹⁴ Timothy *Parsons* ... P.18.

¹¹⁵ Ruth *Ginio* ... P.22.

¹¹⁶ Timothy *Parsons* ... Parsons, P.22.

¹¹⁷ Gregory *Mann*, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (Durham, 2006) P.109-110.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid* P.129-131.

¹¹⁹ Martin *Meredith*, *The State of Africa, A History of the Continent since independence* (London 2005) P.70-72.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, P.129-131.

particular, the relationships of the career soldiers with the military as an institution would remain important.¹²¹ Even as “flag independence” arrived remained the African-French relationship of the veterans vital after in the post-imperial era.¹²² The colonality of power, hierarchies of race and civilisation that were structured long after the formal end of empire remained, while these relationships would help strengthen networks to colonial overlords. Similarly, the doxa helps to explain how racial hierarchies operated as unspoken norms. The veterans protest thus challenged the symbolic order that had naturalised white European authority in both war and peace. France’s efforts to win over former professional soldiers could be seen as a slow transformation of the doxa, but also a reconfiguration of positional superiority. Those veteran networks could become gateways to patronage and leverage, being reliable relationships for later influence. The bargaining of pensions, rewards, etc., even if deserved, could be seen as a foreshadowing of later agency and extraversion by African actors.

2.4 From the Hague to the Schuman Plan: Colonial Priorities in Post-War European Integration

After the Second World War, the negotiations and planning around European integration reveal that the preservation and reconfiguration of colonial hierarchies remained a natural, unquestioned objective for European elites. This can be argued by using Bourdieu’s concept of doxa and it continued to be prevalent in the European leadership. Africa was an integral part in this discussion, declared central to Europe’s economic recovery and strategic vision. This grounded the colonial priorities within the emerging supranational structures.

In The Hague, May 1948, the Congress of Europe was gathered a significant debate about the future of Europe. Hundreds of prominent Europeans elites from different aspects of society attended. For example, the congress included intellectuals, trade unionists, church leaders, businesspeople and high-ranking statesmen such as Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer. The Council of Europe, champion of human rights is born. At the same time, wanted the Congress to prioritise colonial cooperation. The former French Prime Minister Reynaud, for example stated:” We must also, if free Europe is to be made viable,

¹²¹ Ibid, P.134.

¹²² Ibid, P.145.

jointly exploit the riches of the African continent, and try to find there those raw materials which we are getting from the dollar area, and for which we are unable to pay.”¹²³

On 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, announced the Schuman Plan. This plan would help to create the European Coal and Steel Community. It played an fundamental role in the early days of European integration. It created a supranational authority to control the production of coal and steel, attempting to prevent another War on European Soil.¹²⁴ Interestingly, the Schuman Declaration initially stated that, even if later removed:” With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.” Even now remains Africa a central part. This passage was proposed by Jean Monnet and René Mayer. Mayer being the Minister of Justice and also represented the region Constantine in Algeria.¹²⁵ It is interesting to note that the IOM, “le groupe des indépendants d’outre-mer”, the French party of the overseas parliamentarians, were actually in favour of the Eurafrican idea! They hoped that it would create an overarching framework in which the spirit of decolonisation could really be fulfilled as it could create new dynamics for the process.¹²⁶ They feared the Schuman Plan initially, because they did not want to become a resource basin but wanted their own raw material processing industry.¹²⁷ Likewise, they were for the same reason disappointed that they did not become integrated into the European Coal and Steel Community.¹²⁸ While negotiations for the European Coal and Steel Community were complicated by diverging opinions on how much access different countries should have to the colonial markets, Italy’s case was further complicated by the migration of Algerian labourers to France’s heavy industries.¹²⁹ French and German policymakers quickly translated this idea into proposals for a European Development Fund for Africa. Supranational integration and the management of colonial resources were already combined.¹³⁰ This proposal was viewed positively in West German circles as a chance to regain old African markets, and the ECSC itself would help to industrialise the African territories.¹³¹

¹²³ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, A Statue to Nasser? ... P.12-13.

¹²⁴ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica ... P.120.

¹²⁵ Ibid P.123.

¹²⁶ Thomas Moser, ... P.240.

¹²⁷ Ibid, P.173-174.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 240.

¹²⁹ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica... P.122.

¹³⁰ Ibid, P.124.

¹³¹ Ibid, P.125.

2.4.1. French Union

The creation of the French Union after World War II, which was built on a pre-1946 “direct-rule”, the *indigénat*, started the institutionalisation of indirect rule, legal stratification and preserved imperial hierarchies under a new legal framework, being the direct predecessor of the EEC’s association regime and providing a direct model. Especially the French Union’s *Loi-cadre* was a pivot away from direct rule and devolved some powers and administrative costs to local assemblies. African authority was fragmented into smaller units, transferring costs away from the *Metropole* and creating a bifurcated system that preserved core metropolitan dominance and enabled gate-keeping elites who controlled the access to resources.

Before continuing with post-war French Union, it is relevant to explain from where the pre-1946 French colonial rule rested on, namely the *indigénat* which cemented direct rule in the Empire. It was a special penal regime and explicitly administrative system under which colonial administrators could impose punishments outside of ordinary courts.¹³² In Algeria, the law of 28 June 1881, renewed until 1927, centralised these powers in the hands of so-called “*administrateurs des communes mixtes*”, communes where the majority of the Algerians lived. On the other hand, lost the “*adjoints indigènes*” progressively the authority to use repressive measures. There remained a debate if special punishments outside of courts should be allowed, as Algeria should be ruled the same as metropolitan France, it being seen as an integral part of France.¹³³ In Indochina, a similar decree was applied with the decree of 1881 serving as a template.¹³⁴ A difference between Algeria and Indochina was that the “*adjoints indigènes*” kept some of the powers, while some indigenous penal codes remained intact.¹³⁵ This template was also transferred to other colonies, Senegal in 1887, Madagascar in 1901, in French West Africa in 1910 and French Equatorial Africa in 1911, adapted to local circumstances.¹³⁶ In places like French West Africa, the participation of Africans in the *indigénat* remained more theoretical, as argued by Thénault.¹³⁷ French pre-war colonial administration was of a direct nature, even if some small, theoretical elements of indirect rule

¹³² Sylvie Thénault, “L’*indigénat* dans l’Empire français: Algérie/Cochinchine, une double matrice,” (2024) P.23.

¹³³ Ibid, P.25-26.

¹³⁴ Ibid, P.27.

¹³⁵ Ibid, P.28.

¹³⁶ Ibid, P.32-33.

¹³⁷ Ibid, P.36.

already existed. This stood in contrast with the French Union which was a turn towards indirect rule, where territorial elites gained more responsibilities while Paris kept control of strategic levels.

The growing discontent in the colonies forced French rule to adapt the structures of empire at the same time as France needed to rebuild from the destruction of the World War. Battered and tired, it was forced to adapt its imperial structures to the growing pressures in the colonies. The adoption of the Constitution in 1946 was a key moment in French colonial history and a transformation of the French empire, away from direct rule and a first move towards indirect rule, a move which is interpretative of the future association articles of the Treaty of Rome. As such it is important to dedicate a few pages to the French Union, as it still existed in 1958 when the Treaty of Rome got signed. It took over the colonies and allowed some localised autonomy. African politicians participated in the decision-making process in Paris.¹³⁸ The French Union creates the basis on which the association agreements of the Treaty of Rome are built upon.

The constitution's Articles 80, 81 and 82 were the foundation. Article 80 stated that all people living in overseas territories were citizens, but specific laws would decide the implications. Article 81 introduced a new legal status; it was a new "layer" that was above the countries so to speak. Everyone living in the French Union became a legal French citizen, but this did not mean that everyone was equal. Citizens from Africa were now Citizens, but being a French person remained a separate thing. The separation between being a citizen and being a French person maintained racial differences by creating two separate legal statuses. This broke the promise of equality for all. This means that not everyone was truly a full rights-bearing citizen. Article 82 specified that people who didn't have French citizenship could still keep their personal status and their citizen rights, maintaining colonial practices.¹³⁹ These Articles helped formalise a distinction between citizenship and being French, and as such prepared the administrative framework of indirect rule without giving up metropolitan control. The articles 80-82 are in tradition of a long-standing debate of citizen and subject produced by assimilation, filiation and personal-status law.¹⁴⁰ Even then, it was not universal in every colony, while in Indochina the question was the most acute, the old colonies Guadeloupe

¹³⁸ *The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica*. "French Union". *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 3 Oct. 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/French-Union>. Accessed 12 May 2025.

¹³⁹ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica* P.121.

¹⁴⁰ Emmanuelle Saada, Arthur Goldhammer, *Empire's Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies*. (Chicago 2012) P.18-20.

Martinique, etc. had no discussion about it since 1848 everyone had universal citizenship removing the split of subject and citizen. French West Africa had less attention to the matter.¹⁴¹ In Algeria, French law was the common law while a European could never become a native, which meant that a French wife of an Algerian husband would not take on the legal Status of the husband and the children would have full citizenship.¹⁴²

Agency for the people living in the colonies was limited, as they were not allowed to vote on their adoption. The empire was just renamed, not necessarily reformed or disbanded.¹⁴³ True equality was not achieved. The framework for broader participation and citizenship was one of deeply uneven power relations, even with the inclusion of African deputies such as Senghor and Césaire. They were limited in what they could accomplish, but it still ensured some form of representation.¹⁴⁴

Léopold Sédar Senghor was a poet, intellectual and politician and served as the first president of Senegal from 1960 to 1980. He sat in the Constituent Assembly in 1945 and endorsed an indivisible French Union. He was first a Member of the Socialist Party of France but then founded his own political party, the IOM, and advocated for an African road to socialism, while at the same time remaining loyal to the French cause showing that he was a gatekeeper. But at the same time did he also show agency as he hoped for a new political federation between France and West Africa, as small political states would be weak and have no true sovereignty, and further make use of European resources to help Africa develop.¹⁴⁵ This was in contrast to other African leaders, who wanted sometimes bilateral relations or outright independence, as will be analysed later. He was a loyalist gatekeeper who wanted to reform from the inside. He is contrasted in the loyalist camp by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, his arch-rival, this being further strengthened as Houphouët-Boigny was minister in Paris when Senghor was in Opposition.¹⁴⁶ A true gatekeeper, part of the national bourgeoisie and Cabinet Member of six French governments and first President of the Côte d'Ivoire. The largest Plantation owner in the rich Côte d'Ivoire, he favoured French connections for their economic

¹⁴¹ Ibid, P.22.

¹⁴² Ibid, P.28.

¹⁴³ ¹⁴³ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica ...* P.122.

¹⁴⁴ Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton 2014). P. 83.

¹⁴⁵ Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa, ...* P.63-65.

¹⁴⁶ Tony Chafer, *...* P.208.

potential, profiting massively from capital investments and bilateral trade deals for coffee and cocoa exports.¹⁴⁷

Several problems existed for Senghor, he wanted to make sure that there was no racial discrimination for once, but this wasn't written into the constitution. With the double citizenship, there was a legitimate risk of creating a second-class citizenship.¹⁴⁸ Even though the colonies were renamed overseas territories, the legislature stayed in Paris. There were only a few Africans in the legislature, so they were a very small minority and the impact limited. The French president of the French Republic was also the president of the French Union, but he didn't have any ministers or a cabinet. The union assembly was only there to give its opinion. But African leaders like Senghor saw it as a win. They changed the ideas and the text.¹⁴⁹ The strategies of African deputies to achieve recognition of rights were not passive. In September 1946, "overseas deputies argued vociferously to put citizenship rights into the constitution, and at one point boycotted the assembly to demonstrate that the new republic would have no legitimacy overseas if their demands were not met"¹⁵⁰ This episode shows that African agency within the French Union operated through both negotiation and direct confrontation, forcing the French government to respond to overseas political demands even if only at the margins. It was presented as a new way of organising the country that was based on the ideas of the postcolonial federalism movement. But in practice, it actually kept a lot of the inequalities that were there during the colonial period. The Fourth Republic's constitution created different categories of citizenship. French citizens from mainland France profited from full political rights, but were still seen as colonial subjects in a legal limbo.

Paris wanted to build better relationships with its African territories, but it could not hide the differences. This was a problem, as France needed Africa to remain a power of the first rank. African leaders used this conundrum of Paris to bait it with the idea of assimilation to attempt gaining equal rights, not to become French.¹⁵¹ It was unclear what France's real long-term plans were for its colonies. The support of major part of the French people to form a French Union, helped Africans who had been educated in France to believe in the idea of a French

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, ... P.72.

¹⁴⁸ Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, ... P.102.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, P.121-123.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 114.

¹⁵¹ Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's successful decolonization* (Oxford 2002) P.110.

Union, based on the idea that everyone is equal.¹⁵² Although some political representation was granted, the social aspect was not successful. African trade unionists and politicians campaigned for the promise of equal rights and social rights in the constitution. It was too expensive for the metropole to accept that the African populace gains the same economic and labour rights as in mainland France. France did not make social equality a priority, and it did not keep its promises.¹⁵³

An important piece of the puzzle is the 1956 law *Loi-cadre* as it shifted the French imperial structure stronger to indirect rule. The law was supported by Houphouët-Boigny who wanted to decentralise the West African federation and keep the financial resources in his own territory.¹⁵⁴ The law devolved power from the Government-General to the territorial assemblies, but also drew a distinction between “Services d’état and “Services Territoriaux.” It remained ambiguous which services would fall into which category, but Strategic areas would remain in French hands. A benefit for the French colonial administration was that it could be taken out of the front lines by transferring responsibility for unpopular decision to African decision makers, being now burdened with question of budgets for their respective responsible areas of policy. As a result, France could lower the administration costs, as the territorial civil services would be paid out of the local budgets but at the same time keep control of the strategic layer.¹⁵⁵ But the *Loi-cadre* also devolved power, giving to African political leaders a first glimpse of patronage and clientelist networks, which made attempts of resisting this process, as Senghor did, rather futile.

In this wider system, local political structures existed such as the Territorial Assemblies existed, but the ultimate authority remained with the metropolitan government. Still, administration costs could be transferred to the territories. The French deputies from Africa were allowed to join the National Assembly and the Union Assembly. It is a concrete example of a bifurcated system, of indirect rule by design.¹⁵⁶ The people who really had the power to make decisions were still those in control of the mainland, and they controlled the way the country was organised and the colonial hierarchy remained. France might have seemed to be making changes, but it was still in control of the parts of its territory that used to be called

¹⁵² Ibid, P.90-P.91.

¹⁵³ Ibid, P.109-111.

¹⁵⁴ Martin *Meredith*, *The State of Africa* P. 73.

¹⁵⁵ Tony *Chaffer*, ... P.165-166.

¹⁵⁶ Mahmood *Mamdani*, ... P.94-95.

colonies but now overseas territories. This shows how the future EEC's association system will work.

Geopolitical alignments and economic imperatives drove imperial restructuring by French elites. It is their habitus to remain in the framework of empire, even if the hierarchies themselves are embedded in new structures framed as cooperative, developmental or modernisation. Symbolically erased African troops were essential to liberation, yet their role was erased. The language changes, but the processes remain. The French Union and the Loi-cadre devolved costs to territorial budgets, fragmented representation, empowered territorial "gatekeepers" and therefore the creation of a national bourgeoisie, helping to cement indirect rule. It was further a blueprint for Part IV of the EEC association, as French, European elites were in control of the process only offering consultation, externalising the costs of governance through shifting budgetary burden to the independent countries. At the same time keeping the authority through the Treaty and reserved implementing the rules to the Council. Several pressures arose which will force the system to evolve.

2.5 Strategic Crisis and the Turn to Integration

The Suez Crisis of 1956 exposed the exhaustion of direct imperial sovereignty and catalysed a strategic turn toward supranational integration. Imperial ambitions were not abandoned. European powers namely attempted to reconstitute them within new legal and institutional forms. European Elites were compelled to replace colonial rule with institutionalised legal ambiguities and association agreements. Tools with which they could preserve economic control and political hierarchy without direct rule. The end of formal empire did not dismantle coloniality but rather transformed it, embedding its logic in new supranational mechanisms.¹⁵⁷ The revival of Eurafrica between 1945 and 1956 was a structural feature of post-war European cooperation, founded on the prewar debates. Integration was conceived on the foundations of empire.¹⁵⁸ French colonial priorities were the drive, but the other European states quickly joined and the response became truly European.

The 1956 Suez Crisis was a watershed moment. It exposed the limits of imperial sovereignty of France and the United Kingdom and showed that direct imperial actions became obsolete. Being a canal of a geostrategic and economic importance, the loss of it was unacceptable for Britain and France. France further saw Nasser, who was pushing back against imperial

¹⁵⁷ Aníbal Quijano, Michael Ennis, P.567.

¹⁵⁸ Anne-Isabelle Richard, ... 466-475.

actions, as the main supporter of the FLN, the front de libération nationale.¹⁵⁹ The FLN was formed in 1954 and was a revolutionary movement fighting for independence of Algeria and resisted assimilation into France, which contrasted France desire to maintain control over Algeria and associate it with the EEC.¹⁶⁰ Without a response the struggle in Algeria was deemed useless.¹⁶¹ The failed military intervention in Egypt, condemned by both the United States and the Soviet Union, exerted immense pressure on France and the United Kingdom. In Germany, Adenauer supported the invasion. He also supported Frances military operation in Algeria and feared Soviet encroachment in the Mediterranean.¹⁶² While his cabinet was split on the question, Adenauer shared the Paris line. He believed and feared, as quoted by Hansen and Jonsson, “that Africa, as a black continent, could be independent alongside the other continents”. He feared the rise of non-White political actors as well the Suez Crisis, believing in the natural superiority of Europe.¹⁶³ He visited Paris on the 6th of November as a declaration of support, while the USSR threatened nuclear strikes on the French capital. The visit was received greatly and with much happiness in Paris. As the United Kingdom folded to US pressure, Adenauer instructed the German delegation in Brussels to fold to demands in the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome.¹⁶⁴ This moment became a critical turning point for European diplomacy and the imperial order. European integration was an answer to these outside pressures. In that way, Suez marked a crisis but also an opportunity. It revealed the fragility and decline of the imperial system, while it encouraged strategic European reorganisation, through what would become, the EEC. France and its partners did not seek to abandon their imperial behaviour and relations but rather institutionalised them within a new supranational framework. The association agreements included in the Treaty would offer legal mechanism to manage this transformation, allowing Europe privileged access to African resources and markets in a core-periphery relationship, while avoiding political equality, keeping the political and economic hierarchy and alive

A year earlier, the Bandung Conference of 1955 marked an important shift. Twenty-nine decolonised African and Asian states rejected alignment with both the Western and Soviet blocs. Global power shifted away from Europe. European leaders, being accustomed to being

¹⁵⁹ Martin *Evans*, *Colonial Fantasies Shattered*. In: Dan *Stone*, *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European history* (Oxford 2012). P.494.

¹⁶⁰ Martin *Meredith*, ... P.53.

¹⁶¹ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*, *Eurafrica* ... P.157.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, P.160-161.

¹⁶³ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*, *Bringing Africa...* P.456.

¹⁶⁴ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*, *Eurafrica* ... P.162-163.

in a superior, central position, meaning the doxa, feared this development as the Global South started to look for their own way. Europe feared that the African states would align with the Soviet Union or other non-European initiatives. The European colonial project was deemed a failure, the paternalistic and developmental promises not kept.¹⁶⁵

French motivations for the intervention in Egypt were closely linked to the Algerian War, as Nasser's support for the FLN threatened both France's regional position and its hold over Algeria. This was stated by French Foreign minister Christian Pineau who used it to defend the intervention in Algeria.¹⁶⁶ Algeria had economic importance, the Sahara was described in internal documents as a strategic reservoir, rich in oil and uranium.¹⁶⁷ Adenauer, too, wanted access to the resources for the resource poor economic European states.¹⁶⁸ It was a central part of post-war planning. At the same time, the internal contradictions of French rule in Algeria became more visible. Officially a part of metropolitan France, Algerian Muslims remained under their own legal regime. Calls for independency were brutally suppressed by Paris in the Algerian War.¹⁶⁹ Those divisions would not end, even if Algeria was, for a time, an integral part of the EEC while the Algerian Muslims weren't. This is also shown by Hannah Eklund. She shows that the Treaty institutionalised bifurcated membership producing "legal ambiguity as policy". Algerians and Africans were not fully inside nor were they completely outside the Community.¹⁷⁰ Mahmood Mamdani's concept of indirect rule and "decentralized despotism" is relevant here, it was a bifurcated state, in which citizens and subjects coexisted but in unequal legal systems.¹⁷¹ The ambiguous legal status of Algeria in the EEC was not a result of any bureaucratic confusion but instead a calculated French strategy. It allowed France to demand Algerian recognition as a part of the Community, while simultaneously denying full political and social rights to Muslim Algerians. France went so far to demand it as a *sine qua non*, a non-negotiable demand.¹⁷² It was very important for the French political elite, also arguing that it would bring considerable influence for France into the discussion, so

¹⁶⁵ Frank Gerits, Bandung as the Call for a Better Development Project. In: Cold War History 16, no.3 (2016). P.257-259.

¹⁶⁶ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica ... P.157.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, P.216.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, P.217.

¹⁶⁹ Megan Brown, ... P.108.

¹⁷⁰ Hannah Eklund, ... P.852.

¹⁷¹ Mahmood Mamdani, ... P.61.

¹⁷² Megan Brown, ... P.107.

considered Jean Masson, the French economy minister that the overseas territories were an instrument of strength, which should give France a 50% influence in the Common Market.¹⁷³

While France sought to defend its imperial interests by embedding them within European structures, West Germany aimed above all to gain valuable access to African resources and markets without the burden of colonial responsibility.¹⁷⁴ It was also important for Bonn to stabilise its position within the European project.¹⁷⁵ It was a pragmatic arrangement. Germany contributed financially to the development of associated territories, while France retained control. Jean Monnet, one of the main architects of post-war integration, also recognised the opportunity in the aftermath of Suez.¹⁷⁶ Supranationalism became a tool for collective geopolitical and economic survival. The doxa helps to explain that the ideas of African dependency and the necessity of European leadership were enacted as common sense and rarely questioned, but as the superiority of Europe became less evident, the doxa also changed.¹⁷⁷ The desire to keep the access to the resources open represents a classic case of core-periphery structure. Crises such as Suez and Bandung heightened European anxieties about declining global influence. The necessity of integration to maintain Europe's "natural" position became apparent. This dynamic also connects to Said's idea of flexible positional superiority, meaning Europe constructs Africa as always lagging, always in need of guidance and therefore continuing hierarchies.¹⁷⁸

The EEC's policies actively reproduced a core-periphery structure. African territories became sources of raw materials and markets for European goods by institutional design, fitting Immanuel Wallerstein's World-systems theory.¹⁷⁹ And as Lorenzini further has shown, Cold War development policy was aimed not only at growth, but at geopolitical containment. It used aid and trade mechanisms to prevent African states from aligning with rival blocs.¹⁸⁰

Yet, these association agreements were contested from different actors by the outset. Some African leaders such as Nkrumah criticised the system as a new form of neocolonialism, arguing that imperial relation persisted under the guise of supranational "partnership". The

¹⁷³ Gérard Bossuat, ... P.235.

¹⁷⁴ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica* ... P.115.

¹⁷⁵ Kiran Klaus Patel, ... P.126.

¹⁷⁶ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica* ... P.158.

¹⁷⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, ... P.164.

¹⁷⁸ Edward W. Said, ...

¹⁷⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, P.28.

¹⁸⁰ Sara Lorenzini, ... P.111-114.

critiques did not emerge in a vacuum, but in response to the structural and legal foundations created during this period.¹⁸¹

As we have seen, constituted the Suez Crisis and its aftermath not a rupture nor a retreat from imperial logic. Confronted with geopolitical and colonial crises and reduced room for agency, European policymakers needed to construct new supranational mechanisms to safeguard access to resources, strengthen imperial interests and project European unity. French officials imposed inclusionary language to reinforce sovereignty over Algeria, while their German and other European counterparts acceded, for different reasons such as legitimisation, containment and economic gain. The resulting framework institutionalised exclusion and dependency through calculated legal and economic design. Global, non-European actors pressured Europe for decolonisation, sometimes violently. This laid the groundwork for the Treaty of Rome's association regime. The next chapter traces how these strategic logics became codified in Community law, embedding the colonial legacy in the legal and economic architecture of European integration.

¹⁸¹ Kwame *Nkrumah*, ... P.36.

3.0 Institutional Embedding

3.1. Context and Origin.

The Treaty of Rome was the culmination of the post-war processes. While on the one hand, it was a European project focusing on the creation of a common market with the free movement of goods, services, capital, labour, eliminating trade barriers, and promoting economic growth. On the other hand, it was an especially French attempt to associate overseas territories to the nascent EEC, helping them and Belgium to maintain control of their colonies and resources.

By the early 1950s France and Belgium were struggling to keep their African empires together. The French Union was an attempt at transferring the costs of the colonies onto themselves without granting real equality.¹⁸² The debacle at Suez exposed the military limits of France and the United Kingdom and their decline in global influence.¹⁸³ The Conference of Bandung further underlined the decline of global influence as the Global South began to organise a diplomatic front against colonialism.¹⁸⁴ For France and Belgium the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome and the EEC were an opportunity to reform their empires in the name of development partnership under a supranational umbrella. These political and colonial pressures outlined above set the stage for the subsequent bargaining, which the following section will explain.

3.2. Negotiation Part IV: from Messina to Rome

This chapter traces how the Six founding members turned the late-imperial troubles into the association clauses of the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty, signed in 1957, was not the break from Europe's colonial past. Instead, one might argue, that it formalised the core-periphery relationships, hierarchies, and legal ambiguities. The association regime of the EEC established a system that perpetuated imperial dependency and exclusion. At the same time, it maintained administrative continuity, even if these mechanisms were concealed behind the rhetoric of development and partnership. The negotiations on the status of the colonies shows the dominant doxa of European superiority. The drive for association was French in nature, but the other partners brought their own positions in and the association of the overseas

¹⁸² Tony *Chafer*, ... P.165-166.

¹⁸³ Martin *Evans*, ... P.494.

¹⁸⁴ Frank *Gerits*, P.257-259.

territories became a European affair. Belgium followed the lead of France hoping to associate its colonies, the Netherlands wanted to limit problems for its trade, Germany sought access to new markets and resources without the direct colonial entanglement and Italy traded sectoral wins and migration concerns for African access.

The negotiations that produced Part IV of the Treaty of Rome were shaped by competition between the six founding Member States. Following the collapse of the European Defence Community, debate on integration was reignited at the Messina Conference in June 1955. Here, France and Belgium proposed the concept of "Eurafrica", which envisaged Africa's resources and markets being permanently linked to the EEC.¹⁸⁵ As the country with the largest empire, France pushed for the direct association of its overseas territories with the Common Market, representing a strategic effort to institutionalise colonial structures within supranational law. France aimed to externalise the costs of empire while retaining political and administrative control through European mechanisms, representing indirect rule, as costs were moved to new structures while keeping the core authority centralised.¹⁸⁶ On 17 May 1956, Gaston Defferre, the Minister for Overseas Territories, wrote to Prime Minister Guy Mollet to propose that "the overseas territories be integrated into the Eurafrican common market and, second, that the overseas countries and territories enter this common market while benefiting from special clauses, justified by their state of underdevelopment". He stressed that the free movement of people must be limited, whether from underemployed European countries such as Italy, or to protect Europe from Algerian migration.¹⁸⁷ These demands were presented at the Venice Conference and were received positively, particularly by Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak. The newspaper *Le Figaro* remarked that the Eurafrican idea would finally come to fruition. Belgium joined the French effort and hoped to associate the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.¹⁸⁸ The negotiators integrated asymmetrical relations with the associated territories, and hid them behind a language of development and partnership.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 strengthened France's determination, revealing Western Europe's vulnerability and making control of African resources a strategic necessity, as it would create a resource hinterland.¹⁸⁹ Following the Suez affair, France officially added that colonial

¹⁸⁵ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica ...* P.147.

¹⁸⁶ Mahmood Mamdani, ... P.94-95.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, P.150.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, P.153.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, P.157-160.

association was a non-negotiable condition for its participation in the Common Market.¹⁹⁰ Part IV of the Treaty was an evolution of the French shift from direct rule to indirect rule. Now, association on a European level should continue the process. So declared Guy Mollet, the French Prime Minister, that the Eurafrican bloc would be based upon cooperation and mutual independence, a reformed Algeria being the corner stone uniting Africa and the EEC.” France is negotiating at this time with her European partners for the organisation of a vast common market, to which the Overseas Territories will be associated. All of Europe while be called upon to help in the development of Africa, and tomorrow Eurafrica may become one of the principal factors in world policy. Isolated nations can no longer keep pace with world. What would Algeria amount to by itself? On the other hand, what future might it have, as one of the foundations of the Eurafrican community now taking shape?”¹⁹¹

The German and Dutch delegations initially resisted, citing financial burdens, political risks and incompatibility with GATT¹⁹² obligations.¹⁹³ Their objection contested the continued imperial structures embedded in the French proposal, before it was absorbed into the negotiation and integrated into the doxa, especially as Adenauer was already operating within this doxa. Dutch dissatisfaction stemmed from the high projected costs, divergent trade policy and the risk of deepening colonial entanglement. Nevertheless, the Dutch, while critical of the financial implications, even quite strongly supported the French position in Algeria and remained open to compromise.¹⁹⁴ Their primary concern as a mercantile economy was trade. 60% of Dutch exports went outside the EEC, with only 20% reaching French Africa.¹⁹⁵ The main problem was the financing of the investment fund. The Dutch economy was always more focused on global markets, ties to Africa were in that regards more limited. Italy also had some objections, but they were mostly of a technical and demographic nature, as the government prioritised reopening access to former colonies and accommodating Italian settlers.¹⁹⁶ They yielded on issues such as Latin American banana imports, in order to gain access to African resources via the Eurafrican framework.¹⁹⁷ Colonial asymmetries were

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, P.168.

¹⁹¹ Martin *Evans*, ... P.493.

¹⁹² The GATT Agreement is a general agreement on Tariffs and Trade of a multitude of countries around the world.

¹⁹³ Thomas *Moser*, ... P.347.

¹⁹⁴ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*, Eurafrica... P.175-176.

¹⁹⁵ Thomas *Moser*, P.348.

¹⁹⁶ Peo *Hansen*, Stefan *Jonsson*, Eurafrica... P.175.

¹⁹⁷ Thomas *Moser*, ... P.350.

absorbed into the negotiation field and reframed as a technical compromise, integrating the different countries into a European colonialism.

While there was concern about the financial commitment, Vice Chancellor Franz Blücher made it clear that German industry viewed Africa as a key export market: "The attitude of the Federal Republic towards Africa is clear – German trade and German industry look upon it as target no. 1."¹⁹⁸ However, this betrays the fact that, in reality, Africa is at that moment a quite marginal, market for German exports.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Adenauer overruled internal opposition, motivated by access to African resources, for example oil.²⁰⁰ Global geopolitical reasons, the necessity of Franco-German cooperation for European integration, and the unthinkability of an independent African state further played an important role in his decision.²⁰¹ This civilisational anxiety translated into concrete policy terms during negotiations. Africa's association was justified not only in terms of economics but as a moral and racial imperative. The goal was to secure a place for Europe in a world perceived as increasingly dominated by non-European powers.²⁰²

The negotiations then became explicitly imperial. Belgium demanded the Belgian Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, Italy demanded Somalia and the Netherlands sought New Guinea. France wanted to include all its overseas territories and overseas departments, and even proposed inviting Morocco and Tunisia. Only the Dutch Caribbean possessions required local authority approval. The terms of association were agreed through a series of proposals and counterproposals, mainly about regarding the division of the investment fund for economic infrastructure.²⁰³ This mirrors the Berlin Congress, as Nkrumah already commented in contemporary times²⁰⁴, where European nations decided the fate of the continent, each state announcing its wishes. European powers and elites were so firmly rooted in the doxa of colonialism that they could not imagine African independence. Hannah Eklund provides a fundamental critique by stating that the Treaty of Rome did not make any legal provisions for

¹⁹⁸ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica*... P.173.

¹⁹⁹ Thomas Moser, ... P.355.

²⁰⁰ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica*... P.216.

²⁰¹ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Bringing Africa* ... P.456.

²⁰² Anne-Isabelle Richard... P.471-477.

²⁰³ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica*... P.220.

²⁰⁴ Guy Martin, ... P.229.

what would happen if an associated territory were to gain independence. It was simply unimaginable.²⁰⁵

Ultimately, the most controversial issue was the financing of the EDF, which became a central tool to institutionalise dependency by formalising the financial architecture of Eurafrica. The final compromise established a five-year development fund totalling \$581.25 million, the vast majority earmarked for the French territories. Germany and France each contributed \$200 million, while Belgium and the Netherlands contributed \$70 million, Italy contributed \$40 million, and Luxembourg contributed \$1.25 million. \$511.25 million alone were earmarked for the French territories, which included Algeria. The remaining funds were distributed as \$30 million to Belgium, \$35 million to the Netherlands, and \$5 million to Italy. Algeria was included as an integral part of France and would benefit from the fund, but with special legal provisions.²⁰⁶ This distribution of EDF resources favoured French territories. Dominance of French West Africa within the overseas territories was reflected, reinforcing the economic hegemony of Paris over the colonies while presenting an image of European solidarity. It guaranteed that the primary beneficiaries of development would be actors from the metropole and allied local elites. The distribution was European in financing but the orientation was French and cemented the structural asymmetries and dependencies of empire under a supranational framework, hiding continued economic exploitation under the guise of partnership and aid. Doxa is visible in how these arrangements were normal, common sense even, for negotiators as European advantage was assumed natural, legitimised through a language of progress

National governments and assemblies debated, as Senghor and other people criticised the evident lack of consultation and limited benefits for the African populace. Some African assemblies, businesses and trade organisations actually welcomed the Treaty. They wished and hoped of faster development and better investments. This however met resistance and was not the view of everybody, as the youth, anti-colonial movements, and trade unions rejected it as a new form of imperialism. 78% of African deputies in the French National Assembly voted in favour of the Treaty, including Senghor. Support was evidently limited to elite circles.²⁰⁷ An interesting fact is, that France even sent three African representatives from its colonies to the Parliamentary Assembly of the EEC, the forerunner of the European

²⁰⁵ Hannah Eklund, ... P.841.

²⁰⁶ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica... P.224.

²⁰⁷ Thomas Moser, ... P.390-394.

Parliament. A symbolic gesture, as actual power was concentrated in European hands.²⁰⁸ This inclusion strengthens the appearance of consultation and partnership. Nonetheless, as Fanon critiqued, this form of inclusion is a type of colonial representation. It conceals continued subordination and exclusion from true decision-making processes, thereby maintaining hierarchies. He called it the national bourgeoisie. African elites were co-opted into new power structures that offered prestige, but not genuine autonomy, being closer to the metropole than their countrymen.²⁰⁹

The resulting compromise formalised the logic of Eurafica and collective imperial management at a supra-national level. The costs and benefits of empire would be shared through the EDF. Africa remained subordinate. It is the consolidation of a core-periphery system at the heart of European integration, with Africa as a fixed periphery. The legal outcome of these bargains is codified in Articles 131-136, which will be analysed in the following section.

3.3. Exclusion Through Rhetoric and Legal Ambiguity

The Treaty of Rome institutionalised Eurafican ideas into legal form. This section shows how the negotiated articles, which were a central point of negotiation, codified colonial hierarchies into European law under the rhetoric of association, partnership and development. The imperial structures and colonial legacies in return became then embedded in the very structure of the EEC itself.

*“Determined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.”*²¹⁰ This is the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, excluding colonial subjects from the political community of European integration as it was done for a closer union of the peoples of Europe. Although African territories were economically tied to the project, so are the political ties and rights not defined. This legal ambiguity worked as policy, to make sure that the territories would be subject to European trade, economic forces and institutional policies without receiving the same rights or being even included as equal members of the community.²¹¹ This ambiguity is a legal strategy that embedded hierarchical control in an apparently neutral administrative framework achieving indirect rule, similarly, coloniality of power is also applied. The exclusion of African territories from true political equality is naturalised and

²⁰⁸ Giuliano Garavini, ... P.47.

²⁰⁹ Frantz Fanon, ... P.149-153.

²¹⁰ The Treaty of Rome (25 March 1957) P.2.

²¹¹ Hannah Eklund, ... P.843.

legitimised through legal rhetoric. Most populations remain outside the political community while the territories are brought inside the Common Market, bifurcation as seen through Mamdani.²¹²

Article 131:

The Member States hereby agree to bring into association with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. These countries and territories, hereinafter referred to as “the countries and territories”, are listed in Annex IV to this Treaty.

The purpose of this association shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole.

In conformity with the principles stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, this association shall in the first place permit the furthering of the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in such a manner as to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development which they expect.”²¹³

Article 131 prepared the rhetorical foundation for association. The “economic and social development” of overseas countries and the “prosperity of the inhabitants” present an image of working together, cooperating for a better future. This uplifting language is however undermined by the actual failure to establish concrete rights. The article does not entail any timeline for self-determination, or a guarantee of political equality. The language, however lofty, is not binding the promises. The language of development and prosperity hid in reality the still existing colonial system. European leadership was naturalised and legalised, with Africans being defined as passive recipients of this new order. Europeans decided who is included under which rules and how benefits are distributed, maintaining the preexisting hierarchical position. The Member States unilaterally decide the association, defining and listing the eligible territories under the Annex IV. African and overseas agency is structurally excluded from the outset. The research of Eklund shows that this ambiguity was not an oversight on the part of diplomats, but rather a deliberate policy that enabled Eurocentric administrative oversight to persist under the guise of partnership.²¹⁴ The concept of

²¹² Mahmood Mamdani, P.61.

²¹³ Article 131. In: Treaty of Rome 1957 P.46.

²¹⁴ Hannah Eklund, ... P.840-846.

development, when invoked and presented as a European gift, positions the colonised as passive receivers. European leadership is a natural doxa, the unchallenged assumptions of European tutelage.²¹⁵ The choice of “association” rather than “integration” or “inclusion” was calculated, reflecting a paternalistic logic in which European states know what is best for African societies. The language of association historically suggests cooperation between unequals, selling the association as a developmental partnership. In reality, the change from colonial status to association institutionalised imperial structures within a framework of legal cooperation.²¹⁶ In this way, the Article 131 adopted association instead of integration with the overseas territories. The colonial continuity is embedded in the Article as the Six unilaterally decide who is listed and hierarchy is presented as “Development” in language.

Article 132

“Such association shall have the following objects:

- 1. Member States shall, in their commercial exchanges with the countries and territories, apply the same rules which they apply among themselves pursuant to this Treaty.*
- 2. Each country or territory shall apply to its commercial exchanges with Member States and with the other countries and territories the same rules which it applies in respect of the European State with which it has special relations.*
- 3. Member States shall contribute to the investments required by the progressive development of these countries and territories.*
- 4. As regards investments financed by the Community, participation in tenders and supplies shall be open, on equal terms, to all natural and legal persons being nationals of Member States or of the countries and territories.*
- 5. In relations between Member States and the countries and territories, the right of establishment of nationals and companies shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions, and by application of the procedures, referred to in the Chapter relating to the right of establishment and on a non-discriminatory basis, subject to the special provisions made pursuant to Article 136”*²¹⁷

²¹⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, ... P.168.

²¹⁶ Hannah Eklund, ... P.840.

²¹⁷ Article 132. In: Treaty of Rome 1957 P.46.

Article 132 clearly extends the principle of reciprocity to ensure equal trade treatment, opening investment and establishment opportunities to all Member States. It also obliges the Member States to invest in the development of the territories, to help improve the possibilities of resource extraction. The right of establishment and the regulation of investment are subject to "special provisions" and future agreements, showing long term planning on the European side, there was never a real attention to grant true independence, no provisions specified what would have happened if an associated territory became independent. The content and implementation of these provisions remain under exclusive European control.²¹⁸ The promise of "open tenders" for development funds hides the administrative reality that former colonial personnel staffed the EDF and its associated agencies, and that European companies overwhelmingly received contracts instead of local actors.²¹⁹ This reinforced the cycle of economic colonialism and financial flows. Monetary investments circulate back to Europe, benefiting companies while simultaneously constructing infrastructure that deepens structural dependency and strengthens core-periphery dynamics. The dependency becomes institutionalised in new legal forms, embedding Africa in a subordinate role in a European dominated economic system. This is core-periphery dynamics at play, with Africa's position being fixed. In combination with the broader negotiations, Article 132 also institutionalised equal access to tenders and establishment for firms from the six European states. This provision was central to the interests of European states as it allowed access to the rich resources of Africa without naming it directly. This provision legalised continued European dominance over African resources and effectively hindered the efforts of African states to achieve full economic sovereignty and independence. While European companies retained privileged access to African markets, the association regime tightly limited African states' ability to set independent resource and investment policies.²²⁰ This article funnels EDF money to development, while the metropolises keep in control through the special provisions, making sure that the financial resources of Money flow back to European firms.

Article 133

"1. Imports originating in the countries or territories shall, on their entry into Member States, benefit by the total abolition of customs duties which shall take place progressively between Member States in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty."

²¹⁸ Ibid, P. 837–840.

²¹⁹ Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a European ...* P. 21–47.

²²⁰ Hannah Eklund, ... P.839.

2. Customs duties imposed on imports from Member States and from countries or territories shall, on the entry of such imports into any of the other countries or territories, be progressively abolished in conformity with the provisions of Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17.

3. The countries and territories may, however, levy customs duties which correspond to the needs of their development and to the requirements of their industrialisation or which, being of a fiscal nature, have the object of contributing to their budgets. The duties referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph shall be progressively reduced to the level of those

imposed on imports of products coming from the Member State with which each country or territory has special relations. The percentages and the timing of the reductions provided for under this Treaty shall apply to the difference between the duty imposed, on entry into the importing country or territory, on a product coming from the Member State which has special relations with the country or territory concerned and the duty imposed on the same product coming from the Community.

4. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to countries and territories which, by reason of the special international obligations by which they are bound, already apply a non-discriminatory customs tariff at the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.

5. The establishment or amendment of customs duties imposed on goods imported into the countries and territories shall not, either de jure or de facto, give rise to any direct or indirect discrimination between imports coming from the various Member States.” ²²¹

Article 133 further entrenches the economic asymmetry at the heart of association. While it for all intents and purposes abolishes customs duties, the schedule and level of reduction are determined by the EEC, and any duties “for development and industrialisation” must be progressively reduced to the levels set by the European state. This creates managed dependency as European states decide when, how and why duties change. African economies and budgets are allowed limited protectionism, which is temporary and subordinate to European defined timetables. While the gradual abolition of customs duties was intended to promote economic integration, in practice these measures forced African states to open their markets to European goods and investment while curtailing any genuine protectionist or autonomous industrial policies. Some African leaders, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, a coffee plantation owner, saw advantages in this arrangement, preferring a

²²¹ Article 133. In: Treaty of Rome 1957 P.46.

trade framework that secured elite interests against regional competitors, even if it undermined broader prospects for regional integration and African industrialisation dividing African agency along elite lines.²²² The clause on non-discrimination applies only to trade among Member States, not between Europe and the associated territories. The purpose of the association negotiations was to preserve European access to African raw materials and markets, thereby ensuring that the end of the colonial era would not affect the existing trade privileges of France, Belgium and the other founding members.²²³ This arrangement, seen in the context of the Cold War, show how the association regime, alongside the development policy and investment flows, restricted the fiscal sovereignty of African states, as existing networks of clients and patronage could continue, locking them into a position of economic dependency on Europe as both exporters of primary commodities and importers of European manufactured goods.²²⁴ These policy choices manifest the core-periphery logic. African economies were systematically incorporated as suppliers of resources and consumers in a Europe-dominated global economy.²²⁵ The Article creates a timetable the European countries control for their own benefit, and forced the overseas territories to lower tariffs in Europe's favour.

Article 134

*"If the level of the duties applicable to goods coming from a third country on entry into a country or territory is likely, having regard to the application of the provisions of Article 133, paragraph 1, to cause diversions of commercial traffic to the detriment of any Member State, the latter may request the Commission to propose to the other Member States the measures necessary to remedy the situation."*²²⁶

Article 134 then provides direct safeguards for European Member States. If tariff arrangements under Article 133 result in "trade deflection to the detriment of any Member State", then the Commission authorises action and proposes corrective measures. These and other association mechanisms were devised exclusively by and for European policymakers, with no political representation for the territories. Consequently, Member States reserved the power to remedy any negative consequences of association only for themselves, while the associated territories had to adapt to the rules imposed on them, thereby reinforcing the

²²² Thomas Moser, ... P.239.

²²³ Giuliano Garavini, ... P. 47–49.

²²⁴ Sara Lorenzini, ... P. 76–81.

²²⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, ... P.28.

²²⁶ Article 134. In: Treaty of Rome 1957 P.46-47.

fundamental asymmetry and colonial logic of the regime.²²⁷ Only when Member States suffer can these remedial powers be triggered, but never for overseas territories. This shows that it was centred around the welfare of European countries.

Article 135

*“Subject to the provisions relating to public health, public safety and public order, the freedom of movement in Member States of workers from the countries and territories, and in the countries and territories of workers from Member States shall be governed by subsequent conventions which shall require unanimous agreement of Member States”*²²⁸

At first glance, Article 135 appears to address labour mobility, but it perpetuates instead exclusion. The Treaty does not grant freedom of movement outright. Instead, it moves this question and right to future agreements, each of which requires the unanimous approval of Member States. This exclusion was not accidental, but rooted in the ethnicised legal categories embedded in the Treaty. Workers were split in two distinct categories, “workers from Member States” and “Workers from the countries and territories.” This ensured, that European nationals remained privileged to the Benefits of the Common Market, while African workers are regulated separately by the Member States.²²⁹ While the Treaty facilitated the flow of resources and commodities from Africa to Europe and Europe to Africa, it imposed at the same time strict restrictions on African people’s movement. This logic of selective integration is similar to the denial of French citizenship to Algerian Muslims despite their status as integral Part of France.²³⁰ This preproduces late colonial differences between citizen and subject, and reinforces the bifurcated structure of inclusion and exclusion that defines the association regime, creating two different frameworks of agency for the involved parties.²³¹ Those in power used legal ambiguity to mask and perpetuate a core principle of colonial governance. It is a bifurcated state as different legal frameworks apply for different populations and institutionalise hierarchy under the cover of law and development. Europe needs to continue to define and police the boundaries of membership, mobility and economic participation in its own interest. In the end, this article allows goods and capital to circulate, but not African labour.

²²⁷ Hannah Eklund, ... P. 838.

²²⁸ Article 135. In: Treaty of Rome 1957 P.47.

²²⁹ Hannah Eklund, ... P.853-854.

²³⁰ Megan Brown, ... P.136.

²³¹ Mahmood Mamdani, ... P.61.

Article 136

“For a first period of five years as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, an Implementing Convention annexed to this Treaty shall determine the particulars and procedure concerning the association

of the countries and territories with the Community.

Before the expiry of the Convention provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote, shall, proceeding from the results achieved and on the basis of the principles set out in this Treaty, determine the provisions to be made for a further period.” ²³²

Article 136 brings the section to a close by entrusting the procedural details of association to an “Implementing Convention”, which is renewable and modifiable only by a unanimous decision of the Council. This creates a provisional regime where all aspects of association, including rights, obligations, and mechanisms, are subject to indefinite renegotiation at the leisure of the Member States. It is clear that the associated territories often serve as objects rather than agents of law and policy.²³³ Details are deferred to implementing Conventions, ambiguity itself becomes a tool of governance.

Taken together, Articles 131–136 form the basis of a legal framework for the externalisation and management of Europe’s colonial legacy. The articles operationalise four things: cost-sharing without power-sharing, channelling development funds but retaining metropolitan control while associated territories had to bear administrative costs. Second, it was managed dependency, enforcing tariff reductions, market opening and trade provisions. Third, integration was selective, as goods and capital were free to move however not African labour. Fourth, legal ambiguity, using renewable conventions and open-ended rules which were in control of the Europeans. It was a reconfiguration of the colonial past. The association regime transformed the late colonial hierarchies into supranational law, instead of resolving the fundamental issues of African agency and equality. This was clearly never the goal. Further, it was then reframed as “association”, “partnership”, and “development”. European administrative and economic dominance was a central part of the Treaty and embedded at the core of the EEC. The analysis supports the claim of continuity and transformation, as argued by Hansen & Jonsson, Eklund, and Dimier, as the association regime evolved colonial

²³² Article 136. In: Treaty of Rome 1957 P.47.

²³³ Hannah Eklund, ... P.840.

relationships and embedded them in supranational law and practice. The idea of Eurafrica was arguably alive and well in the Treaty of Rome and by extension in the EEC.

3.4. Imperial Continuity, Exclusion, and Agency: Case Studies of Association in Algeria, French West Africa, and the Congo

3.4.1. Algeria

Algeria's inclusion in the EEC was a deliberate strategy by France to maintain and strengthen imperial claims over Algeria, secure economic interests, and to undermine nationalist and international opposition through legal ambiguity and managed exclusion.

The French government's insistence on Algeria's inclusion in the Treaty of Rome was a direct reaction to the Algerian War of Independence and growing international pressure, for example, from the United Nations.²³⁴ France made its EEC membership conditional on Algeria being named a constitutive part of the Community, as France saw Algeria as part of metropolitan France, thus using European integration to legitimise its imperial claims and undermine nationalist demands.²³⁵ The French legal move was contested by Algerian nationalists who refused to recognise the legitimacy of European negotiations. Instead, they redirected their efforts to the international stage, the United Nations. There, they fought diplomatically for their sovereignty.²³⁶ Two ministers were key in this process as they primarily organised the process namely Gaston Defferre, the Minister for Overseas France, and Christian Pineau, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Defferre first proposed the idea of associating overseas territories, and later Algeria itself, within the structures of the EEC to maintain French imperial influence, particularly following the humiliation of Suez. His plan was developed in the wake of the Loi-cadre²³⁷ and aimed to bind the French Union more closely through European structures and secure continental resources for overseas development. Pineau worked on these demands during the negotiations, relying on his public servants to fulfill the plans in Brussels. His goal was to secure international legitimacy for France's position at a time when American, Soviet and UN scrutiny of French colonial policy was intensifying.²³⁸

²³⁴ Megan Brown, *The Seventh Member State...* P.109.

²³⁵ Ibid, P.107-108.

²³⁶ Ibid, P.109-110.

²³⁷ As Brown argues, the goal of the law was to decentralise governance in Africa in order to strengthen bonds and maintain unity in a federalised future.

²³⁸ Ibid, P.107-119.

Negotiations excluded representatives from Algeria and other overseas territories, regardless of the vocal support for European Integration and Eurafrica by figures such as Léopold Senghor and others, as “imperial inclusion in European institutions stood not as a potential conduit of equality but as a cudgel against decolonisation.”²³⁹ While Senghor and others used Eurafrica as a tool for negotiated postcolonial integration, Algerian nationalists rejected this framework. They contested domination by non-cooperation, as Algerian nationalists ignored the ongoing process in Brussels and instead contested it in the United Nations.²⁴⁰ The FLN even established a government-in-exile to improve the legitimacy at the United Nation to contest the French framework of the negotiations in Brussels and seek international recognition.²⁴¹ The government-in-exile was led by Ferhat Abbas, the future first President of free Algeria and established in Cairo.²⁴² Abbas was in his earlier days pro-French before later joining the FLN.²⁴³ The FLN rejected imposed frameworks and disrupted the doxa of European institutional legitimacy by using a different global stage. Only later were they confronted with the result of the negotiations, as Eklund argues: “a centuries-long practice of colonialism.”²⁴⁴ At the same time, the Algerian War of Independence intensified, as Algerian resistance took the form of mass strikes, boycotts, student movements and urban protests in Algiers, which France tried to repress severely.²⁴⁵ Urban guerrilla warfare spread throughout the city, while even rural women did their part for the rebellion.²⁴⁶ French troops used techniques which divided and reminded the French population back home of the Nazi occupation.²⁴⁷ Even in Paris, Algerians demonstrated and over a hundred were killed on 17 October 1961 by the French police.²⁴⁸ Algerian agency was plural, as the rivalry between FLN and MNA, the Mouvement national algérien, escalated. The former attempted to dominate the latter, including within the Algerian Community in France.²⁴⁹ The MNA was destroyed and

²³⁹ Ibid, P.109.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, P.109.

²⁴¹ Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, L.J. Butler, *Algeria's Violent Struggle for Independence*. In *Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States* (London 2015) 193–209. P.205. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474262392.0019>.

²⁴² Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962* (New York 2006) P.371.

²⁴³ Ibid, ... P.373.

²⁴⁴ Hannah Eklund, P.840.

²⁴⁵ Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, L.J. Butler, *Algeria's Violent Struggle for Independence...* P.201.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, P.198.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, P.203.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, P.206.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, P.196.

mostly absorbed by the FLN.²⁵⁰ The MNA was different, insofar as it attempted for an autonomous republic federated to a French republic, and not outright independence.²⁵¹

In light of this escalation, the original central French concern was diplomatic optics, not meaningful integration: “Naming Algeria was the French goal; whether or how the Treaty’s regulations would be implemented across the Mediterranean was, for the moment, at best a secondary concern.”²⁵² Article 227 explicitly singled out Algeria, yet French and EEC officials effectively implemented mechanisms for legal and social exclusion, this being in regard to labour mobility and social benefits. The Treaty preserved the legal fiction of Algerian integration while in practice perpetuating colonial relations of domination.²⁵³ French Algerians, overwhelmingly Muslims, were at the same time citizens and systematically excluded from equal participation in political life, both locally and in Paris.²⁵⁴ Brown shows that these exclusions were intentional on the part of France as, “they were willing to force DOM²⁵⁵ and Algerian residents to prove that they were French and therefore deserving of equal treatment under European law. The racism undergirding this choice is apparent.”²⁵⁶

While European partners were ambivalent or opposed to Algeria’s inclusion, they ultimately accepted it as the price of French participation. This effectively tied the EEC to imperial preservation. Brown concludes that the construction of the EEC “cannot be disentangled from the history of empire,” and that Algeria’s inclusion was performative in that it served French diplomatic needs while maintaining legal, social and political exclusions for Algerians.²⁵⁷ French law promised equal citizenship to colonial subjects, but most Algerian Muslims continued to be governed by separate frameworks until the very end of empire.²⁵⁸

Until independence in 1962, Algeria was for five years included as an integral part of Europe through its relationship with France. Its status was unresolved throughout the period.²⁵⁹ This resulted in it being a part of the EEC Common Market and treated under the Article 227, which stipulated favourable tariffs in trade with the Six and obligated them to support

²⁵⁰ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 – 1962* (New York 2006) P.284.

²⁵¹ Ibid, P.55.

²⁵² Megan Brown, ... P.107.

²⁵³ Hannah Eklund, ... P.841.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, P.845.

²⁵⁵ Département d’outre-mer.

²⁵⁶ Megan Brown, ... P.140-141.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, P.106.

²⁵⁸ Hannah Eklund, ... P.845.

²⁵⁹ Megan Brown, ... P.150.

development projects. France could also now demand financial aid for the development of projects in Algeria.²⁶⁰ They even compared Algeria to southern Italy's hoping to divert funding towards it.²⁶¹ This created frictions with their EEC allies, who were unhappy about the financial burden.²⁶² What made them quite happy was the outlook for "European" oil. France offered the found sources to European investors to bind the Member States deeper to Algeria. The First President of Algeria, Ferhat Abbas wanted European investors to wait to invest until they could negotiate with an independent Algeria, but to no avail.²⁶³ A further problem was the question of Algerian worker migration.²⁶⁴ While in theory they could migrate to France, it was mostly feared that they would have to compete with Italian labourers.²⁶⁵ This direct integration ended on 5 July 1962 when Algeria declared independence.

The exclusion of Algerian and overseas representatives from the Treaty negotiations, the use of terms such as "inhabitants" instead of "peoples" and the intentional ambiguity demonstrate coloniality of power as European authority managed for a time to be preserved.²⁶⁶ The Treaty's formal naming of Algeria further strengthened those points, as in practice it continued the legal and social exclusion of Algerian Muslims, creating a bifurcated state. Citizenship was conditional, and Algerians had to prove they deserved rights. The EEC's association with Algeria represents a continuation of Empire, reformulated under a new legal integration.²⁶⁷ Even after association as an integral part of the EEC, there remained many ambiguities as tensions between Member States flared up, but could be smoothed by the flow of oil. The Member States attempted to deepen the economic hierarchies.²⁶⁸ Still Algerian actors contested this fiercely, especially as the FLN's provisional government-in-exile manged to be recognised as the sole legitimate representative of Algerian nationalism, forcing France in 1961 to the negotiation table for independence.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁰ Ibid, P.147.

²⁶¹ Ibid, P.159.

²⁶² Ibid, P.170.

²⁶³ Ibid, P.169.

²⁶⁴ Ibid. P.154.

²⁶⁵ Ibid. P.162-163.

²⁶⁶ Aníbal Quijano, Michael Ennis, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America. In: *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no.3 (2000), P.534-535.

²⁶⁷ Mahmood Mamdani, ... P.60-61.

²⁶⁸ Megan Brown, ... P.169.

²⁶⁹ Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, L.J. Butler, Algeria's Violent Struggle for Independence. ... P.205-206.

3.4.2. French West Africa

The association regime in French West Africa was designed to weaken and fragment collective African agency and perpetuate French control through territorialisation. As a result, it institutionalised economic dependency, fostered elite co-optation and managed the exclusion of direct popular participation. This helped to directly implement a form of indirect rule in a supranational framework, and even before the Treaty of Rome.

The association regime was applied to French West Africa as a set of “associated territories”, rather than as direct extensions of Europe. Negotiations were largely managed by French officials and codified a system that excluded local populations from political representation or substantive participation in the drafting process. The legal language was deliberately shaped to omit any reference to self-government or collective rights to ensure subordination within a European dominated legal order.²⁷⁰ The 1956 Loi-cadre law had a significant impact on French West Africa. It devolved political power to territorial assemblies and not to a regional federation. It changed as a result the framework of African political agency. As noted by Tony Chafer: “the effect of the Loi-cadre was to reinforce territorial rather than federal identities, encouraging political leaders to look to their own political advancement in their home territories rather than to broader regional goals.”²⁷¹ Radical nationalists even accused the government of balkanising Africa, something Senghor already in 1956 warned against, favouring the federalist structures of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa.²⁷² This process helped limit the emergence of an unified counter agency. Some leaders, such as Houphouët-Boigny, would quickly adapt to prioritised their local autonomy and economic interests for fear of redistribution, favouring privileged relations with France over pan-African or federal projects.²⁷³ A direct link to France was seen as more advantageous.²⁷⁴ This dynamic marginalised radical nationalist and unionist calls for “independence in unity,” as reflected in the decline of organisations like UGTAN, the Union Générale des Travailleurs d’Afrique Noir.²⁷⁵ Persistent critique from youth and student movements showed rising frustration and condemned the “collaboration and opportunism” of the elite.²⁷⁶ This is in the vein of the

²⁷⁰ Hannah Eklund, ... P.839-841.

²⁷¹ Tony Chafer, ... P.195.

²⁷² Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present*. (Cambridge 2019). P.105.

²⁷³ Tony Chafer, ... P.195.

²⁷⁴ Cooper, Frederick. *Africa since 1940* ... P.110.

²⁷⁵ Ibid, ... P.202.

²⁷⁶ Ibid, ... P.205-207.

national bourgeoisie analysis of Fanon, as the youth and student groups accused the elites of collaborating with imperial interests, instead of going through with genuine liberation.

In the end, French policy was successful insofar as that territorialism and elite bargains triumphed. Independence was achieved within a framework of continued association and structural dependency, as “the independent states that emerged in 1960 did so within the framework of a continuing association with France, both politically and economically”. They were content to transfer power to local elites they regarded as “*interlocuteurs valables*”, confident that the continued economic and political ties would preserve French interests.²⁷⁷ In this context, Martin’s notion of “balkanisation” as a deliberate French tactic is especially relevant. He argued that dismantling the regional coherence of French West Africa enabled France to manage decolonisation through controlled bilateralism rather than federation, thus maintaining greater economic and political leverage over each territory. The fragmentation of political space under the Loi-cadre, and the subsequent refusal to establish a collective West African negotiating channel for the Treaty of Rome, reflect this logic. It is a reproduction of the colonial bifurcated state. Consequently, the association regime was a separation of collective African agency.²⁷⁸ The Loi-cadre also represented a divergence of opinion in African elites, as Senghor opposed it and Houphouët-Boigny, as already explained in Chapter 2.4.1 was an active supporter. There was no unified African agency, but a diversity of competing ideas, which allowed France to co-opt some elites and their followers while isolating more radical actors.

While the formal structure of association was designed to perpetuate European control, the period also witnessed debate and agency among the diverse African political elites over different visions for their futures. Senghor, for example, “sought to push political reform toward the creation of a layered form of sovereignty: each territory would choose a government with authority over local affairs; French West Africa as a whole would constitute an African federation... this federation would associate with other territories and federations in a reformed French Union in which all inhabitants would be rights-bearing citizens”²⁷⁹

Senghor’s approach reflected a tactical balance between autonomy and pragmatic collaboration, seeking to preserve African agency in a federalist setting while managing the realities of external dependency. The defeat of a true French West African federalism was

²⁷⁷ Ibid, ... P.215-217.

²⁷⁸ Guy Martin, ... P.228-231.

²⁷⁹ Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship* ... P.116.

primarily caused by the Loi-cadre and the territorialisation of the territories instead of regional federalisation.²⁸⁰

However, not all African leaders shared this federal vision to start, with many looking for their localised options. As Cooper notes, “Other African leaders wanted to bypass the West African federation while favouring direct membership of each territory in a Franco-African Community. Such possibilities were being debated in Africa as the French government came to realise that it was caught in a trap between following through on the logic of citizenship, expensive, and the risk of a cycle of rebellion and repression, like the one it faced in Algeria”²⁸¹ The resulting divisions, federation versus bilateralism, fractured African responses to the association regime and constrained collective leverage. French West African nationalism was, in reality, a fragile and fragmented affair. Students, youth, trade unionists, and political parties, all brought their own, sometimes conflicting agendas to the table. Under such circumstances, it was too difficult for Senghor to have a unified anti-colonial movement.²⁸²

Houphouët-Boigny, the first President of the Côte d’Ivoire, is part of the pragmatic strand of African elite politics. His early anti forced-labour activism and leadership of the RDA reflected a commitment to inclusive citizenship and economic integration. As Cooper details, “Coming to power with independence in 1960, Houphouët-Houphouët-Boigny understood quite well that the economic development of his territory depended on people from elsewhere in former French Africa.”²⁸³ His strategy prioritised integration with France and personal networks in Paris, aiming to protect Ivorian interests within the existing order, rather than upend it through radical rupture or pan-African federation. This is the “national bourgeoisie” with extraversion as the relationships to Paris remained central. His pragmatism was shaped by his background as the biggest coffee plantation owner in the relatively prosperous Côte d’Ivoire, which he knew would also benefit his fellow farmers. His relationship to Paris as a Cabinet member also made it natural for him to be a gatekeeper as he profited on all counts with deep ties to France. He wanted a privileged position for his country within the French Union, as well as protection from the economic problems caused by a potential pan-African

²⁸⁰ Gary *Wilder*, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World*. (New York, 2015) P.155.

²⁸¹ *Ibid*, ... P.117.

²⁸² Tony *Chaffer*, ... P.193.

²⁸³ Frederick *Cooper*, *Citizenship ...* P.122.

union of poorer neighbours.²⁸⁴ The port of Abidjan already exported in the mid-1950s more than one million tonnes of tropical wood, coffee and cocoa.²⁸⁵ French capital invested strongly in the country, allowing it to grow economically better than its neighbours. He wanted to keep those profitable relationships and traded loyalty to France for massive French aid. He preferred the direct bilateral relations and supported the Loi-cadre, as it freed his territory of the burden of helping to finance the poorer neighbours, contrasting Senghor's federalist approach.²⁸⁶

These strategic choices shaped how African leaders responded to the association regime of the Treaty of Rome. Senghor voted for the Treaty, as did his colleagues from the former IOM, who hoped that genuine federalism could defuse tensions between radical secessionists and conservative colonial actors, while still safeguarding their own African agency within the system.²⁸⁷ Most African representatives were more sceptical. Some saw the development fund as a relatively positive factor, but argued that most of the population would not benefit from cheaper imported goods, only small urban elites would. Others criticised the lack of African representation in Community bodies and the absence of humanism. People like Senghor himself were disappointed that their local assemblies had not been consulted during the negotiations and demanded a role in establishing the Eurafrican community. While Senghor welcomed the lowering of tariffs, others feared the loss of revenue for their territories.²⁸⁸

Large sections of the African political and economic elite supported the association regime. In the decisive vote on the association, African members of parliament voted in favour of the Treaty.²⁸⁹ Similarly, many local territorial assemblies, as well as trade, industry and agricultural chambers, officially supported the association. For these groups, the prospect of deeper integration into world markets, economic development and improved political and administrative structures was seen as an opportunity to strengthen their territories' autonomy and prospects for independence. However, this support was largely limited to elite circles and

²⁸⁴ Thomas Moser, ... P.239.

²⁸⁵ Abou B. Bamba, Producing an Imperial Bridgehead: The Making of Abidjan in Ivory Coast, 1908-1955. In: World History Connected Vol 13, no.1 (February 2016). P.7.

²⁸⁶ Martin Meredith, ... P.70-73.

²⁸⁷ Thomas Moser, ...P.239.

²⁸⁸ Ibid, P.394.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, P.390.

coexisted with considerable scepticism and opposition from youth movements, trade unions and other sections of the population.²⁹⁰

The elite's African youth did not agree with the Treaty. As they wanted true independence and were anti-colonial and anti-capitalist, denouncing the Eurafrican Community as a West European imperialist project.²⁹¹ The radical critique from students and young activists was harsh. They accused African leaders of betraying the nationalist cause and collaborating with the colonial overlord for their personal enrichment.²⁹² French policymakers were content to transfer power to "*interlocuteurs valables*", as they were confined within the existing doxa of European structures, preserving ties and French interests.

The association regime set out in the Treaty of Rome structurally tied African economies to exporting primary commodities and importing European manufactured goods. This secured ongoing access for European firms and states, while perpetuating economic dependency.²⁹³ The EDF was predominantly staffed by former colonial administrators who carried their methods, networks and decision-making routines over from the empire to the EEC's development apparatus.²⁹⁴ Administrative practices, including regular touring, project selection and contract allocation, followed neo-patrimonial logics, rooted in late colonial governance.²⁹⁵ The fracturing of the West African political landscape into smaller territories helped to perpetuate this dynamic, as African leaders kept their ties to Paris and Brussels and were influenced by the EDF. The EDF was administered by a small cadre of European officials, who distributed aid using networks and focused on European priorities. Most contracts went to European firms, reinforcing patterns of administrative and economic dependence established during colonial rule.²⁹⁶ The assertion of African unreadiness for industrial development justified that aid would be primarily used to prepare the conditions of it, and most of the funding flowing into rural development, serving Europeans and local elites.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁰ Ibid, P.390-394.

²⁹¹ Ibid, P.393.

²⁹² Tony Chafer, ... P.205.

²⁹³ Giuliano Garavini, ... P.46-49.

²⁹⁴ Véronique Dimier, The Invention of ... P.31-42.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, P.43-58.

²⁹⁶ Sara Lorenzini, ... P.71.

²⁹⁷ Ibid, P.77.

The exclusion of Africans from negotiations, the use of legal language such as “inhabitants”, and the dominance of French and European administrators in the EDF show how formal empire was replaced by legal and economic hierarchies that preserved European control.²⁹⁸ The export of primary commodities and the reliance on European imports entrenched French West Africa’s position as a periphery.²⁹⁹ The discourse and practice of France, the EEC and the Treaty of Rome, presented persistent inequalities as natural and normalised hierarchies as doxa.³⁰⁰ It is in a way a bifurcated system, indirect rule, working through the proxies in the African elites such as Houphouët-Boigny. African independence movements became territorialised, and the territories were granted legal association, but were denied substantive political participation, creating “interlocuteurs valables” as a tie to their former territories. This reproduced colonial dualism between citizens and subjects in a supranational form with the EEC being an overarching construct in the tradition of the French Union or the French Community, with the European Member States as the metropole, the core, and the associated states being the territories ruled by their native “governors”.³⁰¹ The selective accommodation of African agency, offering limited economic concessions while excluding genuine political inclusion in the EEC, further demonstrates the managed and unequal nature of postcolonial integration. In this way, colonial legacies remain reproduced, while a form of indirect rule is being maintained, even sometimes in the interest of local African elites through gatekeeping, but not necessarily for the masses.³⁰² Imperial hierarchy was stabilised, while African agency and political structures were fragmented.

3.4.3. Congo

The Congo example explains how Belgian strategies attempted to institutionalise core-periphery dependency and legal ambiguity, while at the same time excluding Congolese agency and ensuring continued access to resources and administrative continuity. Belgian strategies focused on the management of the rising tensions in their prized possession, generally focusing on economic extraction and political control, keeping alive the cover of modernisation and decolonisation while marginalising Congolese agency within both national and EEC association frameworks.

²⁹⁸ Aníbal Quijano, Michael Ennis, ... P.567.

²⁹⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, ... P.28.

³⁰⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, ... P.168.

³⁰¹ Mahmood Mamdani, ... P.94-95.

³⁰² Fanon Fanon, ... P.120-124.

The approach adopted by Belgium was shaped by preserving the profitable economic extraction while managing the appearance of decolonisation. As Spaak framed it, the Congo was the “Jewel”.³⁰³ It played an important role for power and imperial prestige, being a tool to leverage within European negotiations, being closely aligned more with French interests, even if a specific commitment to the inclusion of the colonies was not existing as some Belgians feared the loss of their efforts in the Congo.³⁰⁴ The formal integration of the Congo into the EEC framework, as well as Rwanda and Burundi, served to stabilise flows of raw materials, particularly through continued investments and development of infrastructure and was biased against industrialisation, while trying to avoid transferring any meaningful power over decision-making.³⁰⁵

It was one of the main producers of raw materials worldwide.³⁰⁶ Further, it played an important role for Belgian industry as a supplier of raw materials, be it copper, uranium, rubber or other raw materials.³⁰⁷ For example, the Shinkolobwe Mine had the highest concentration of uranium in the world, being an important provider of uranium to the Manhattan project.³⁰⁸ The uranium delivered to the Americans would even be used in the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.³⁰⁹ The banking sector as well as investors had investments in the Congo.³¹⁰ Even if the Congo was open to trade, in contrast to France’s or Great Britain’s, Belgian capital continued to invest a lot into the colony. Profits for investors exceeded the expectations.³¹¹

In 1947, for example, the Belgian union Minière promoted the "civilising mission" and the need for guidance, development and resource extraction in the Congo, combining resource extraction with a paternalistic rhetoric of development.³¹² In 1949, Belgium drew up for the Congo the ten-year plan, aiming at modernising the colony focusing on economic

³⁰³ Giuliano Garavini, ... P. 50.

³⁰⁴ Guy Vanthemsche, Belgium and ... P.136.

³⁰⁵ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica ... P.274.

³⁰⁶ Guy Vanthemsche, ... P.122.

³⁰⁷ Ibid, P.192.

³⁰⁸ Robert Alvarez, Uranium Mining and the US Nuclear Weapons Program. In: Federation of American scientists (2013). <https://fas.org/publication/uranium-mining-u-s-nuclear-weapons-program-3/#reference-item-15> (13.05.2025)

³⁰⁹ Guy Vanthemsche, ... P.134

³¹⁰ Ibid, P.184-185.

³¹¹ Ibid, P.199.

³¹² Giuliano Garavini, ... P.50.

extraction.³¹³ The Congo had to borrow the required funds itself and pay the interest, creating a financial dependency.³¹⁴ While being framed as a modernisation initiative, its main goal was the stabilisation of extractive infrastructures and the consolidation of Belgian, and by extension European, access to strategic resources. It preceded the language of development of the Treaty 's, but was in the same line of paternalism thought and European superiority. Dependencies needed to be entrenched.

Despite the Belgian paternalism, Congolese agency remained active. Political movements such as ABAKO, l'Alliance des Bakongo, a major political party which advocated independence and the reunification of the Bakongo people, who were divided in Belgian Congo, the French Congo and Angola and their leader since 1954 Joseph Kasa-Vubu who once trained as a priest and became the first President, articulated demands that both challenged the colonial state and the emerging order, demanding independence.³¹⁵ Kasa-Vubu, who is acting with agency, contesting the colonial structures, therefore declared in 1956 that the Congolese people were fully capable to run their own country without Belgian interference or paternalistic guidance, which contrasted with the Catholic elite which endorsed the 30-year plan of von Bilsen's.^{316 317} As ABAKO declared, "It is in this way that the Congo Independent state was only a pretence of independence for twenty-four years. None of us, in fact, could be found at the Berlin Conference. And however, everything was decided for us... the Congo possessed neither a ruler of his race, nor any at least of his choice, nor a government of his liking; the citizens were never citizens."³¹⁸ They advocated for an independent country in a federal structure as they declared in their counter-manifesto and gained a landslide victory in the municipal elections of 1957 in Kinshasa with the support of also non-Bakongo people, showing their broad base of support.³¹⁹ They were not alone in their denouncements of paternalistic structures. In his famous speech at the independence ceremony, Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the Congo, founder of the MNC, Mouvement National Congolais, which advocated for Congolese nationalism in a unitarian

³¹³ Ibid, P.47-48.

³¹⁴ Guy Vanthemsche, P.163.

³¹⁵ Martin Meredith, ... P.95.

³¹⁶ In this plan the country would get independence after a 30-year process.

³¹⁷ Yolanda Convington-Ward, "Joseph Kasa-Vubu, Abako, and Performances of Kongo nationalism in the Independence of Congo" *Journal of Black Studies* vol 43, no 1 (2012) 72-94. P.80. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021934711424491>.

³¹⁸ Ibid, P.77.

³¹⁹ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*. (London/ New York 2002) P.83.

state, was the first true nationalist party and sought a broad base in all the different strata.³²⁰ In general, a lot of different parties existed but most were of a tribal and regional nature, not encompassing wider regions or even the country.³²¹ In his famous speech at the independence ceremony for full sovereignty, Lumumba, showing radical agency against imperial structures, rejected Belgian King Baudouin claims of a benevolent civilizing mission. He stated: “Although this independence of the Congo is being proclaimed today by agreement with Belgium, an amicable country, with which we are on equal terms, no Congolese will ever forget that independence was won in struggle, a persevering and inspired struggle carried on from day to day, a struggle, in which we were undaunted by privation or suffering and stinted neither strength nor blood.”³²² This speech signalled a sharp break with the paternalist, exclusionary logic the Congolese fought for. The speech of Lumumba demanded the genuine dissolution of colonial logic and not just a pro forma political transfer.

As Young demonstrated, the Belgian blueprint for decolonisation and association systematically marginalised Congolese agency. The Working Group on the future structure of the Congolese state was made up almost entirely of Belgian officials, with only minimal consultation with Africans. “But after consultation, Belgium intended to make the decision itself; “negotiations” were not proposed.”³²³ Even when local and national bodies were created, power remained filtered through indirect elections and European participation, with actual decision-making processes reserved for Belgian authorities, maintaining colonial hierarchies even as administrative reform was made, a case of a bifurcated state.³²⁴ This exclusion prompted sharp criticism from Congolese nationalists. The embryonic group of intellectuals that became the MNC, the Mouvement national Congolais, denounced the absence of African members on the Working Group, and stated that its conclusions were in their eyes suspect. This view was growing with firmness in 1959, culminating in the refusal of the ABAKO to take part in the December 1959 elections.³²⁵ Joseph Kasa-Vubu, in his capacity as president of ABAKO, made a critique of the Belgian approach, suggesting that it

³²⁰ Ibid, P.83-84.

³²¹ Ibid, P.83.

³²² Jean-Marie *Kuzituka Did'ho*, In Memory of Patrice Emery Lumumba: His Speech at the Proclamation of the DRC's Independence—A Systematic Reflection In: International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 16, no.1 (2021) P.52-63. P.57.
doi.org/10.1080/18186874.2021.1957694.

³²³ Crawford *Young*, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence (Princeton 1965) P.163.

³²⁴ Ibid, P.164.

³²⁵ Ibid, P.165.

would yield “a Belgian independence and not an African independence... this jeu de dupes puts the Congo leadership in difficulty. Remember, when colonialism is in power... it can’t permit parties to develop freely; and these parties can only develop the day when we have independence in our own hands. What will happen tomorrow, after these elections (of December 1959) which are not ours? The country will not accept institutions imposed upon it from outside...”³²⁶ Even as independence approached, Belgian and European officials remained deeply involved in the administrative and technical apparatus, and the constitutional framework was largely modelled on the Belgian precedent. It was hoped that Congolese leadership would be content with mere formal authority and not conflict with vital European interests.³²⁷ The Treaty of Rome should have flanked this development of creating institutional dependencies, transferring colonial independence on Belgian terms, ensuring that networks and dependencies remained and restructured in the interest of European actors.

The Congolese situation is a good example of key postcolonial and dependency theories. It is a bifurcated state, and it is evident in the legal and administrative design of associations.³²⁸ Even if the Congolese people were formally included in European legal frameworks, were they still systematically filtered and marginalised from meaningful participation in the decision-making processes. The Congolese economy continued its orientation towards primary resource extraction for European benefit, maintaining its role as a peripheral supplier. Development aid given through the EDF,³²⁹ reinforced this core–periphery dependency instead of dismantling it.³³⁰ Belgian authorities treated them as objects of development and imposed knowledge and policy hierarchies without Congolese input.³³¹ Still, Congolese resistance and actors managed to contest it and secure independence, even as asymmetry remained in agency, resources and authority, especially regarding the secession of Katanga and the assassination of Lumumba, which will be talked discussed in the next chapter.

3.5. Legal Fictions, Self-Determination, and Political Exclusion

The EEC’s association regime institutionalised a façade of legal inclusion across its African partners while preserving exclusion and dependency in structure. Even formal mechanisms of association, legal status, and political rights, did not equal true equality or autonomy. The

³²⁶ Ibid, P.165-166.

³²⁷ Ibid, P.182.

³²⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, ... P.61.

³²⁹ Véronique Dimier, The Invention of a European... P.121.

³³⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, ... P.28.

³³¹ Aníbal Quijano, Michael Ennis, ... P.561.

measures enforced dependency and subordination, readying it for association in a supranational context. This process already started in the French Union and continued into the EEC. Responses to African agency show that subordination or association, even if some autonomy was granted, were expected.

The insistence of France to integrate the EEC as a core territory created an illusion of equality. Muslim Algerians were systematically excluded from political and social rights. It created a need to fight against this bifurcated status, as only European settlers received full privileges.³³² While the Loi-cadre was also applied in Algeria, it evolved in West French Africa a more direct dynamic. Empowering local elites helped to balkanise the territories. This process helped create a class of administrators which would help rule the fragmented territories and putting a layer between Paris on the one side, and radical nationalists and unionists on the other side. “*Divide et impera*”, as already formulated by the Romans and Guy Martin.³³³ Indirect rule evolved and remained, real power concentrated in European hands, true to the coloniality of power.³³⁴ Inclusion and participation were a front, as free agency remained blocked and local elites became intermediaries, not full sovereign actors.

Contesting European power and defying the rule book came with a price, as seen with Guinea. Guinea was led by Ahmed Sékou Touré, his background and base was trade union politics and used this build up his PDG, the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, the local party of the RDA, until he formed it as a nationalist mass movement which in the 1957 elections got fifty-six out of sixty seats and he became then Prime Minister. Different than Houphouët-Boigny or Senghor, he acted in agency and fervently for independence and favoured pan-Africanism. The three leaders all shared different aspirations for the future of their African territories and West Africa itself, and showed the limitations of African collaboration and unity.³³⁵

When the French Union evolved in 1958 into the French Community, African territories could decide if they wanted to become Member States or granted independence. De Gaulle of course expected that political leaders remained loyal to the current system, as they should be enough entrenched into it. Only Guinea under the leadership of Touré and the PDG voted for independence and broke with the RDA. The French response was harsh.³³⁶ As Nkrumah

³³² Mahmood Mamdani, ... P.61.

³³³ Guy Martin, ... P.227.

³³⁴ Anibal Quijano, Michael Ennis, ... P.534.

³³⁵ Martin Meredith, ... P.69.

³³⁶ Frederick Cooper, Africa since ... P.108-109.

notes: “Fearing that the example of Guinea might be followed by other states which had decided to join the Community, the French Government removed everything of value from the territory. Administrators and teachers were withdrawn. Documents and even electric light bulbs were removed from government buildings. Financial assistance, trade support and the payment of pensions to Guinean war veterans were discontinued”³³⁷ It was a punishment, a form of deterrence, warning other African leaders against challenging the structural dependency embedded in the association regime. In the vein of Fanon, the colonial order never accepts genuine reversal without resistance. It is a radical confrontation. As he wrote, “Decolonisation, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a programme of complete disorder.”³³⁸ “The last shall be first and the first last.”³³⁹ “For if the last shall be first, this will only come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.”³⁴⁰ The example of Guinea confirms that genuine independence provoked a harsh answer of colonial violence, to discipline the colonised and warn others against asserting agency, real decolonisation brings violent confrontation and colonial violence is used. While France could not stop Guinea, it managed in a successful operation in Niger to defeat the independence movement, while Houphouët-Boigny remained an Advocate of territorialisation.³⁴¹ Senghor, always warning against balkanisation, was now also trapped in the process of territorialisation.³⁴²

In the end, each territory was in a bilateral relationship with France, and by proxy, the EEC, rather than being part of a Franco-African collective.³⁴³ This undermined their individual position, strengthening France’s and the EEC’s leverage. Local elites and their networks to France would remain closely connected, even when the French Community ceased to function and all African States declared their independence. France and the EEC would remain in a position of superiority, with foreign aid being distributed through those networks, without being responsible for social or political problems.³⁴⁴

In the Congo a similar pattern unfolded, the Congo crisis, which happened between 1960-1965, showed how postcolonial legal sovereignty still endured continued external control and

³³⁷ Kwame *Nkrumah*, *Neo-Colonialism ...* P.24.

³³⁸ Frantz *Fanon*, ... P.36.

³³⁹ *Ibid*, P.37.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid*, P.37.

³⁴¹ Tony *Chafer*, ... P.213.

³⁴² Frederick *Cooper*, *Africa since ...* P.109.

³⁴³ *Ibid*, P.109.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid*, P.114.

influence and dependency.³⁴⁵ While representative institutions and the façade of consultation were introduced, but the consultation process and real sovereignty remained in the hands of Belgian officials. The then forced independence and quick Belgian withdrawal in 1960 left Congolese institutions completely underdeveloped.³⁴⁶ The rivalries between different political parties came a head. Twelve parties were in a coalition in the government including bitter rivals, with MNC for example having half of its 33 seats, of a total of 137, from only one province. Power bases are fractured and the movements in the Congo were not united behind the same goals.³⁴⁷ These presented was breeding ground instability which resulted in the province of Katanga, rich in important resources and having been a focal interest point for Belgium and European exploitation, seceded immediately under Moïse Tshombe.³⁴⁸ He was a son of a wealthy Katanga businessman and favoured, together with his party CONAKAT, meaning Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga, autonomy of his home province of Katanga who advocated for continuing ties with Belgium.³⁴⁹ He did not only represent gate-keeping but a form of separatist gate-keeping as he attempted to maintain control over Katanga's resources as a national bourgeoisie.

Tshombe was backed by Belgian mining corporations, such as the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, foreign mercenaries, but also the logistical and political support of neighbouring settler regimes, such as the Central African Federation and Southern Rhodesia. Those different actors assembled behind by their shared determination to keep white control over Katanga's resources. This group was called the "Katanga lobby", funding the secessionist movements with resources, supplies, military equipment and mercenaries.³⁵⁰ The cooperation of Tshombe with white minority rulers is another scene how local elites managed to use Europeans for their own goals, while at the same time constituting a practical network of keeping influence, control, and access to resources, also through the "balkanisation" of African territories. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba, further symbolises the suppression

³⁴⁵ *World History Edu*, The Congo Crisis of 1960-1965: History, Causes & Effects (2022). <https://worldhistoryedu.com/congo-crisis-of-1960-1965-history-causes-effects/> (Accessed 19.06.2025)

³⁴⁶ Matthew Hughes, Fighting for White Rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, Katanga, and the Congo Crisis, 1958–1965, *The International History Review*, 25, no. 3 ((2003) P. 592-615. P.592-593. DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2003.9641007

³⁴⁷ Martin Meredith, ... P.96.

³⁴⁸ Ibid, P.595-596.

³⁴⁹ Martin Meredith, ... P.96.

³⁵⁰ Matthew Hughes, Fighting for ..., P.595-596.

of radical African agency.³⁵¹ By eliminating him, the only national figure who might have unified the Congo against secession and foreign control was removed. The Katanga crisis thus exposed the limitations of formal independence, structures of resource extraction and external leverage survived, with local elites creating regional alliances and cooperating with Europeans and the use of violence. Sovereignty is undermined by continued economic domination and sustained instability. Local elites are co-opted to make sure that core-periphery dynamics may continue. Fanon's view is also confirmed again, that colonial powers would resort if necessary to violence to combat genuine African agency, and replacing it through new intermediaries.³⁵² Through the willing proxies, the national bourgeoisie, could Europe continue accessing the needed resources while renouncing legal, political and social control, creating a new form of indirect rule.

The persistence of European dominance even after formal independence is evident in Guinea, Congo, Katanga, Algeria, and the broader West African territories. Genuine autonomy was thwarted in Guinea through the hard cut rupture. In Congo, the independent state faced undermining of its sovereignty. Algerian demands for equality and independence were answered with external intervention, economic sabotage, or violent repression being the response. In the rest of West Africa, legal autonomy and later independence were granted only within a fragmented, territorialised structure designed to prevent collective sovereignty, making it easier to dominate the individual parties. Federalist and pan-African efforts were undermined, and elite co-optation-maintained dependency binding the elites to the metropole. In all cases, new legal and administrative frameworks sustained economic, political and psychological leverage, thus validating Nkrumah's and Fanon's arguments that neocolonialism and exclusion persisted beneath the surface of postcolonial reform. African agency remained structurally constrained by the logic of European control. Formal independence was often no true autonomy, while the countries continued to remain in an imperial hierarchy.

³⁵¹ See: Ludo de Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London 2001).

³⁵² Frantz Fanon, ... P.149-153.

4.0. The European Development Fund: Economic Dependency, Colonial Legacies, and Elite Networks

The European Development Fund institutionalised economic dependency in African states by reproducing colonial administrative structures and perpetuating European, particularly French, economic dominance, which Nkrumah called the “last stage of colonialism”.³⁵³ Despite being presented as a tool for partnership and development, the EDF was in fact fundamentally shaped by the logic, practices, and mostly personnel of French colonial rule. This ensured that postcolonial aid systems sustained European interests and neocolonial hierarchies.³⁵⁴ This process represents the “sedimentation of empire”. This pattern is visible in early EDF approvals and sectoral allocations which will be returned to below. The first EDF, from 1959-1964, authorised 580 million unités de compte, of which most flowed to former French territories.³⁵⁵ Instead of rupture, the postcolonial transition managed to layer new rules on top of resilient administrative and economic logics from the colonial era.³⁵⁶

At the heart of the EDF’s operations was the Directorate-General for Development also called DG8, former French colonial officials constituted a major part of the employees. These administrators imported a sense of esprit de corps, patronage-based networks and informal, personalised decision-making, creating an organisational culture that prioritised loyalty and discretion over rules, procedures and formal oversight.³⁵⁷ The DG8 was internally described as a “family” or “clan”, where regulatory mechanisms were minimised and authority was based on personal trust and mutual obligation.³⁵⁸ Jacques Ferrandi, a senior French colonial administrator and the first Director of DG8, and his associates established a “parallel system of administration”, which they justified by claiming that it was necessary to be flexible and adaptable in order to respond to African realities, continuing the logic of indirect rule and personal ties. Legitimacy and effectiveness were not measured by standardised procedures, but by the capacity to compromise with African elites, sustaining political realities and keeping project goals and criteria deliberately vague.³⁵⁹ Cold War development policy also

³⁵³ Kwame Nkrumah, ... P.4.

³⁵⁴ Véronique Dimier, The Invention of ... P.1-2.

³⁵⁵ *Commission des Communautés européennes*, Fonds européen de développement: Financement et exécution des projets approuvés (situation au 31 mai 1962) (Bruselles 1962), P.44.

³⁵⁶ Véronique Dimier, The Invention of ... Ibid, P.209.

³⁵⁷ Ibid, P.35.

³⁵⁸ Ibid, P.29.

³⁵⁹ Ibid, P.40-42.

functioned as a geopolitical containment. It used networks, aid and trade mechanisms to prevent African states from aligning with rival blocs, in fear they would especially fall to the communist bloc.³⁶⁰

DG8's core methods reflected those of colonial indirect rule. "Authority and legitimacy were based on mutual trust and obligations, personal and affective ties, opaque and anti-bureaucratic methods linked to the discretionary powers of leaders, permanent exception to the rule and compromise, the core of what was termed 'indirect rule' during colonial times."³⁶¹ Even as the EEC expanded, and new Member States sought stricter rules, the colonial clan resisted reform. Instead, neo-patrimonial methods and practices were merely extended, with new bureaucratic tools such as programming and evaluation layered atop enduring clientelist logic.³⁶² This path dependency sustained a system in which new procedures rarely displaced older power structures.³⁶³ Internal publications and the "metro-circulaire" staff play even ridiculed the system's focus on serving European, but especially French, interests rather than African development priorities.³⁶⁴ Project selection and implementation thus became sites where the core-periphery logic of world-system theory played out. Resources and priorities served European economic interests, with political and administrative structures being leveraged to serve those. DG8 practices are the administrative face of cost externalisation, producing continued dependencies while prioritising projects that stay export oriented.

Within this administrative logic, functioned the "contrôleurs techniques" as modern colonial district officers. Former colonial officials helped them serve as intermediaries between Brussels and African rulers. They employed similar methods of proximity, persuasion and cultural adaptation as in colonial days, perpetuating the colonial system.³⁶⁵ In practice, projects were often proposed, modified or approved not based on abstract technical priorities, but on local relationships and political expediency. Monitoring missions would sometimes set aside official evaluation protocols to accommodate the requests or interests of influential African partners, a process that was mirroring of the governance of the late colonial era, as

³⁶⁰ Sara Lorenzini, ... P.111-114.

³⁶¹ Véronique Dimier, The Invention of ... P.2.

³⁶² Ibid, P.98-91.

³⁶³ Ibid, P.7.

³⁶⁴ Ibid, P.38.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, P.193.

Europeans could never have full control on the ground on their own.³⁶⁶ African elites became "gatekeepers," using their place in society and networks for the distribution of aid, and managing patronage networks, becoming dependent on the economic aid.³⁶⁷ Those "gatekeeper states" are an African-European mixed institution, as they grew out of the colonial history.³⁶⁸ Real power was in the global markets, which the local leaders could access to their advantage, distributing the benefits to their clients, ensuring their loyalty, reiterating the coloniality of power.³⁶⁹

The practical outcome of this system was that French and European firms dominated EDF contracts. This of course reinforced the core-periphery pattern. Informal networks disrupted competition and prioritised French interests.³⁷⁰ The main preoccupation of the EDF Committee was ensuring that money spent in Africa would come back to Europe, the logic of neocolonialism already feared by Nkrumah.³⁷¹ Even after open tenders were introduced, contemporary observers and EEC civil servants noted that administrative and technical assistance networks continued to give French firms an advantage, with German and Dutch companies only gaining access when France conceded a share in return for their EDF contributions.³⁷² In the first EDF financing and development document of 1962, 216 projects of a total of 249 were allocated to the French firms, this represented 271.607 million of a total 300.8656 million. Belgium had 21 projects for a sum of 11.155 million while Germany had none.³⁷³

A significant proportion of the EDF investments went into railways, roads and port facilities designed to enable the extraction and export of raw materials to Europe. These infrastructure choices prioritised export logistics over internal integration or local industrialisation, embedding colonial trade patterns into postcolonial economies. Some connection plans even dating to colonial times.³⁷⁴ For example, EDF-funded the railway modernisation of the

³⁶⁶ Ibid, P.194-198.

³⁶⁷ Frederick Cooper, *Africa since ...* P.239.

³⁶⁸ Ibid, P.240.

³⁶⁹ Ibid, P.235.

³⁷⁰ Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of ...* P.62-63.

³⁷¹ Véronique Dimier, *The European Development Fund, a Dowry for French Companies?* In: *The Business of Development in Post-Colonial Africa*, (2021). P.257
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51106-7_9

³⁷² Ibid P.267-269.

³⁷³ *Commission des Communautés européennes*, *Fonds européen de développement ...* P.2.

³⁷⁴ Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a ...* P.131-133.

Abidjan-Niger railway in Côte d'Ivoire, connecting the interior with the main export port.³⁷⁵ Similarly, the port of Dakar was expanded and a railway line constructed from Dakar to Niger.³⁷⁶ In the first three EDF periods, 37% of all credit was allocated to the transport sector.³⁷⁷ This allocation of financial resources prioritised export and in that way reinforced economic dependency structures.³⁷⁸ In the economic category infrastructure dominated over agriculture promoting the investment into export corridors, infrastructure being 188.536 million in contrast to 51.739 of agriculture. In general, financing focused on the primary sector and logistics, deepening the dependencies.³⁷⁹ By 31 May 1962, EDF approvals already centred in key territories. For example, Côte D'Ivoire had 14 projects and 23.846 million units of account, Senegal had 13 projects and 22.042 million, Congo 12 projects and 13.503 million, Algeria 7 projects and 17.680 million, and Cameroon 19 projects and 33.796 million.³⁸⁰

African leaders managed to strategically exploit their roles as gatekeepers creating a mutual dependency.³⁸¹ Senghor for example wished and got a bridge, despite technical concerns.³⁸² Houphouët-Boigny continued to maintain close ties with French officials and business circles. This ensured that the flow of EDF resources and French aid fortified his model of “miracle” economic growth.³⁸³ He tied the Côte d'Ivoire in the CFA franc, which was tied to a fixed exchange rate to the French franc, and later to the Euro, which arranged French capital. Houphouët-Boigny himself called his commitment to France “Françafrique”.³⁸⁴ Fanon would have called this the national bourgeoisie, profiting from foreign capital and entrenching his position while at the same time becoming more dependent.³⁸⁵ He used his position to direct aid towards modernisation projects, often in construction and urban development.³⁸⁶ To be

³⁷⁵ *Commission des Communautés européennes*, Fonds européen de développement ... P.42

³⁷⁶ *Ibid*, P.36

³⁷⁷ Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a ...* *Ibid*, 126.

³⁷⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, ... P.28.

³⁷⁹ *Commission des Communautés européennes*, Fonds européen de développement ... P.3.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid*, P.44.

³⁸¹ Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a ...* 137-138.

³⁸² *Ibid*, ... P.36.

³⁸³ Abou B. Bamba, *Displacing the French? Ivorian Development and the Question of Economic Decolonisation, 1946–1975*. In: *The Business of Development in Post-Colonial Africa*, Cambridge University Press, (2021) P.294-295. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51106-7_10. P.294-295.

³⁸⁴ Jean Merckaert, *Bitter chocolate: “Wealth extraction in Côte d'Ivoire”* *peri working Paper series: Capital Flight from Africa* (2020) P.2.

³⁸⁵ Frantz Fanon, ... P.149-153.

³⁸⁶ Abou B. Bamba, *Displacing the French? ...* P.302-304.

more precise, the EDF had approved expansions to the port of Abidjan, the already mentioned railway modernisation, five new hospitals, roads to the cacao regions, 60 new primary schools and more.³⁸⁷ He further distributed resources to local allies to strengthen his rule.³⁸⁸ In 1962 CAISTAB, the Caisse de stabilisation et de soutien des prix des productions agricoles, was founded to oversee the buying and selling of coffee and cocoa in order to stabilise and improve the incomes of the workers of the sector. The fund financed the state budget, but it was also used to later set quotas for local companies or fund prestige projects. Houphouët-Boigny directly approved the involved companies. As such it became a direct tool of patronage of loyalist networks and gatekeeping as the *élus*, the chosen ones, belonged to the political class, old friends or close individuals, with some of those being 40 years later still in influential positions.³⁸⁹ As Houphouët-Boigny declared in a Speech in 1965 at the 4th Party Congress: “In the aftermath of independence, the general tendency was to give in to nationalisation. We always listened respectfully to the reasons that others advanced... But we forcefully said that in Ivory Coast we did not have factories to nationalise but to set up... it would be an economic nonsense to launch in the nationalisation of I don’t know what, and thus dry up the sources of goodwill necessary and even essential for our economic development”³⁹⁰ He accepted the supremacy of French business in major sectors for rapid growth, prioritising political security and diplomatic support from Paris over attempts at economic autonomy. While some Ivorian firms made progress in agriculture and small industry, French expatriates and companies continued to dominate the most lucrative infrastructure, consulting and trade operations.³⁹¹ Criticism of this model arose from both within the ruling elite and from social scientists such as Moustapha Diabaté, who described the Ivorian economy as “dominated”, and from figures in the opposition, such as Laurent Gbagbo, who denounced the regime as the most successful example of French neocolonialism.³⁹² This also shows how influential France remained even after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, as old French colonies could attempt to continue the colonial bonds as independent associated territories. The elites could act as gatekeepers and act in their own

³⁸⁷ *Commission des Communautés européennes*, Fonds européen de développement ... 15-16.

³⁸⁸ Abou B. *Bamba*, *Displacing the French?* ... P.296.

³⁸⁹ Jean *Merckaert*, *Bitter chocolate* ... P.49-51

³⁹⁰ Abou B. *Bamba*, *Displacing the French?* ..., P.297.

³⁹¹ *Ibid*, P.293.

³⁹² *Ibid*, P.291-292.

benefit, however this is also agency, as they used the available resources to leverage their own positions.

Analysing the EDF's administrative practices, investment priorities and forms of African agency or gatekeeping has revealed consistent structural and institutional continuities in postcolonial Euro-African relations. One could say, the local leaders continued to act in the role of "governors", not by name but in function. The EDF is the fused entity of the theoretical frameworks.

5.0. Discussion

"The Treaty of Rome, which brought into being the European Common Market, can be compared to the Treaty that emanated from the Congress of Berlin in the 19th century; the former Treaty established the undisputed sway of colonialism in Africa; the latter marks the advent of neocolonialism in Africa." Kwame Nkrumah ³⁹³

This discussion synthesises the empirical findings and theoretical underpinnings of the thesis in order to address the research questions: How have the colonial legacies of European powers influenced the Treaty of Rome, the foundation of the European Economic Community, and its policies? In what ways have these legacies shaped the EEC's relationship with Africa during the decolonisation period and beyond? Furthermore, how can the concept of indirect rule help explain the externalisation of empire's costs and the involvement of African actors in this process?

The thesis has shown that Africa was a central part of European integration, the history of Integration should not be told without including it. It shows that the early EEC was an imperial evolution of the pre-EEC colonial systems, most importantly, the French one evolved into an "European Empire" It is not surprising that France spearheaded formal association, and even threatening a veto for the customs union, with support of Belgium.³⁹⁴

Institutionalisation of the colonial legacies happened in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome and through the EDF. It shared costs without the sharing of power as Europeans remained in control over association through Article 136 renewable convention and Council unanimity. It

³⁹³ Kwame Nkrumah, Address to the Ghana National Assembly, May 30, 1961. Quoted in: Guy Martin, ... P.229.

³⁹⁴ Megan Brown, ... P.107.

managed dependency with Article 132 to 134 with fixated tariff timetables and special provisions, hindering fiscal and industrial sovereignty of overseas territories. It was a bifurcated system with selective openness as seen in Article 135 with free movement of goods and capital but restricted African labour mobility. Administrative colonial structures continued as shown through DG8 and the EDF, where old colonial officials continued working with their personnel networks, managing financial aid and steering it into favourable export-oriented projects and European firms.

Contrasting this to earlier colonialism in the early post-war or even pre-war, the postcolonial colonialism shifted several points after 1957. While before Authority rested with ministries of empires and governors, it now changed to the Council and DG8. The legal status changed, as former subjects became sovereign associates, even if levers to keep in control remained in European hands. While before European governments financed colonial budgets, and were in the 50s already in a process of offloading those costs, as seen in France, now the sovereign African states had to stem it by themselves, while European financing shifted to “aid” through the EDF, this also continued the shift to indirect rule. Language also changed, the “civilising mission” changing to development and cooperation or partnership. African agency took the form of gatekeeping, as some African elites kept their links to the metropole intact, such as Houphouët-Boigny and in that form also continued indirect rule as associated sovereign gatekeepers. Non-gatekeepers showing real agency contesting it are suppressed as before. Old colonial hierarchies remain.

The thesis shows how hierarchy moved into EEC law and how it was practiced. The aforementioned points can be seen in the Treaty Text to the EDF and in the case studies. Eurafrica is in that form not only an idea or a framework but an Institution. It further explains the coexistence of peace discourse in Europe on the one hand and the imperial adaption in law and administration. The thesis also show that France was a central driver of the association, as the French Union was the blueprint for it. The geopolitical pressures, Algeria and the unrest in French West Africa forced Paris to push for Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. The French logic was supranationalised, French Empire evolved with the agreement of the other 5 partners to an “European Empire” with a French solution to the EEC external regime.

Answering the research questions concretely, the colonial legacies, especially the French ones, but also Belgium, shaped Articles 131 to 136 of the Treaty of Rome. Hierarchy was by design with elective integration and externalisation of costs, renewable conventions. These

legacies shaped the relationships insofar as that a core-periphery relationship and dependencies remained. The EDF prioritised financing export corridors and the primary sector, giving contracts to European firms while at the same time restricting African labour mobility. The EDF also helped operationalise indirect rule through personal networks promoting gatekeeping of African elites. Administrative, state costs are outsourced to independent African states, while African elites who remained connected to Europe bargain for projects and leverage those connections for their own gains. African actors who contested this are sanctioned or suppressed.

Eurafrica provided the intellectual foundation but also political rational for this imperial structure. Eurafrika was not just a fringe discourse. This demonstrates that the concept of Eurafrika, which was rooted in nineteenth Century and interwar European visions, provided the intellectual and political basis for reconfiguring empire in the context of decolonisation.³⁹⁵ Key figure such as Victor Hugo, Coudenhove-Kalergi and E.L. Guernier, but also French and Belgian policymakers, as for example Robert Schuman in the Schuman declaration imagined Africa as a necessary other.³⁹⁶ Schuman framed the development of Africa as a European mission, making it a justification for European unity, presented a vision in which Africa was not only seen as a source of resources for Europe, but also as a child, a junior partner to be reached and necessary for European renewal, survival and integration. Such a discourse and ideological framing directed created the foundation that will constitute the European Empire, the EEC as it allowed the changed the language from civilising mission to development and partnership.

The racial hierarchy background of the debate is not to be underestimated even if it less directly seen in later years. Scenes, like the “Black Horror on the Rhine” show how Europeans thought about Africans in the middle of Europe.³⁹⁷ Adenauer for example too, could not see Africans as independent actors, reflecting the deep-rooted Eurocentrism that shaped both discourse and institutional design.³⁹⁸ This racial, civilisational view of a superior Europe can also be seen in the way, how the continent treated its African soldiers who paid dearly fighting the Second World War.³⁹⁹ Their sacrifices were not honoured as European

³⁹⁵ Guy Martin, ... 228-231.

³⁹⁶ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Bringing Africa as a “dowry to Europe”... P.448.

³⁹⁷ Ibid, P.446.

³⁹⁸ Ibid, P.456.

³⁹⁹ Ruth Ginio, ... P.16.

elites, such as de Gaulle tried to erase their Efforts to liberate the capital from public memory.⁴⁰⁰ This conception of superiority, was often steeped in a concept of racial superiority, as seen in the examples.⁴⁰¹ This produced an image of Africa as Europe's necessary other, helping to cement their own political superiority.⁴⁰² This ideological doxa normalised Africa's subordinate role, presenting the continued extraction and control of African resources as mutual progress rather than exploitation.⁴⁰³ It is not surprising that in the Articles 131-136 power remained in European hands, language could change, but the hierarchy remained.

The doxa of European superiority, can also help understand the European shock of the rise of non-European actors.⁴⁰⁴ Most leadership throughout history would not be pleased of the decline of their empire, in that sense, Europe leadership is not special. The Crisis of the 50s and the global pressures forced Europe to a strategic turn towards integration. After 1945, following the devastation of World War II, the Suez crisis, Bandung, the Cold War and the wave of anti-colonial mobilisation forced European states, but especially France to rethink their situations and imperial strategies. European integration was not just a product of imperial nostalgia and did not just happen in regional context, but global pressures forced Western European states into action. These global pressures were important in forcing French leaders to start institutionalising their imperial relationships through the supranational mechanisms of the EEC together with the understanding of the other five, forming the operational structure of the "European Empire". Therefore, the history of European Integration needs to be rethought in a global context.⁴⁰⁵ Eurafrica, was the solution. It is in the moment of the Suez Crisis, when the Soviet Union threatened nuclear strikes, that Adenauer accepted French demands. The Crisis created a context in which the risk of further European imperial disintegration and Cold War escalation compelled West Germany to accept France's association demand, as evidenced by Adenauer's own statements.⁴⁰⁶ The Suez Crisis and the Algerian War showed the limits of unilateral imperial control, prompting France for association through the EEC. Eurafrica offered an institutional solution to preserve economic

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid P.17-18.

⁴⁰¹ Anne-Isabelle Richard, A Global Perspective... P.475-477.

⁴⁰² Edward W. Said, ...

⁴⁰³ Pierre Bourdieu, P.168.

⁴⁰⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, P.168.

⁴⁰⁵ Anne-Isabelle Richard, ... 466-475.

⁴⁰⁶ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica ... P.162-163.

flow, maintaining access to African raw materials and consolidating European power projection. The EEC did not represent a break from the past as a peace project, rather the transformation of empire to a supranational level and cementing the core-periphery dynamics, which in return also makes the Treaty of Rome and the association regime specifically the constitutional basis of this European Empire, embedding imperial legacies within European law and governance.

The balkanisation of West African territories in the French Union, created a space of “divide and conquer” as already correctly assessed by Martin.⁴⁰⁷ It made it easier to control African agency, setting boundaries on smaller political entities which had to act in a specific framework. This strengthens the dependencies through gatekeeping of African elites, and helps to implement the new form of neocolonialism.⁴⁰⁸ Thus responses become fractured if existent, helping setting the stage for the reformed European Empires. However, African agency and gatekeeping was prevalent. They acted as intermediaries to the Europe and the outside world on the exterior, while on the other side they managed their country. The leaders could profit from this arrangement and even managed it in their benefit. Relationships from Pre-Treaty of Rome era remained maintained in the immediate aftermath and prevailed beyond independence, being characterised as patron-client relationships.⁴⁰⁹ Breaking away from association and attempting for true independence without the approval of European powers, created harsh responses as seen in the case of Guinea, the Congo Crisis and the Katanga province as seen in chapter 3.5. Fanon had called these local elites the national bourgeoisie, as they acted more in the interest of their own power and the Europeans.⁴¹¹ They recreated dependencies and acted in the interest of the European countries, but as the Europeans wanted to keep the relationships intact, some leaders managed to ask for specific investments through the EDF. The EDF took a central role, being staffed with colonial administrators, which had specific relationships to different African leaders.⁴¹² This ensured the continuity of colonial legacies. Following up on this, if the colonial legacies are continued

⁴⁰⁷ Guy Martin, ... P.227.

⁴⁰⁸ Guy Martin, ... P.227.

⁴⁰⁹ Kwame Nkrumah, ... P.7.

⁴¹⁰ Véronique Dimier, The Invention of a ... 137-138.

⁴¹¹ Frantz Fanon, ... P.149-153.

⁴¹² Véronique Dimier, The Invention of a ... 137-138.

and did not fundamentally disappear, coloniality as well as dependencies remained, if the European empires evolved and integrated, their overseas territories became associated even in independence, sovereign associates. This analysis demonstrates that it is justified to conclude that the European Empires evolved and integrated, thereby institutionalising colonial hierarchies and within the EEC, resulting in the EEC being a form of “European Empire”, even if it mostly grew out of the French Union.

Therefore, the concept of indirect rule was by far not obsolete, but remains a core framework. Local government sovereignty was granted, but always under the shadow of metropolitan supervisors and their generosity. Formal equality could be proclaimed, but the boundaries of African agency were defined by Europe. Indirect rule became the *modus operandi* as the primary administrative method through which the European Empire maintained control over nominally sovereign associated African States. Not playing by the rules and trying to create their own paths, as was the case with Guinea or Lumumba in the Congo, would end in foreign involvement and punishment. Some African actors, of course, adapted. The thesis showed how Houphouët-Boigny leveraged the financial resources from the EDF and the personal networks of the old colonial administrators who staffed the EDF, to improve his position and consolidate power. EDF rules were navigated, contracts negotiated and the clientelist networks managed. Infrastructure would be built and investment into economic sectors, which aligned with metropolitan interests, would help foster economic growth and integration into the markets. Still, this recreated dependencies, and Houphouët-Boigny would act as an intermediary, a gatekeeper, a kind of governor for European economic interests and the local populace, recreating hierarchies. Fanon’s warning about the national bourgeoisie became true, the underlying asymmetry remained, leaders becoming “company presidents”.⁴¹³ The balkanisation of African territories further helped to entrench this, as smaller political entities and respective leaders helped to create easier to maintain networks. Individual states remained weaker, and benefits through the EDF could be distributed better to compliant elites creating neocolonialist structures, while contracts returned to European firms. It is these cases which demonstrate how the administrative practices, economic dependencies, and restricted agency shaped the special form and function of this European Empire.

While the thesis tries to address a wide range of institutional, legal, and discursive continuities, certain limitations remain. The empirical focus is mainly on Francophones and in

⁴¹³ Frantz *Fanon*, ... P.163-166.

part Belgian cases. While this is not wrong, as especially the French played a central role, could other cases bring interesting perspectives. Especially, if one would widen the temporal or spatial timeframe, British, Portuguese, Spanish or even non-associated African experiences could be interesting to research. A specific case by case research, meaning country by country analysis, could be useful. How did the specific African countries all individually integrate? The thesis also did not do a deep analysis of the Italian influences, even if it was a Member of the Six. The analysis further centres mainly on elite negotiations, networks and administrative evolution. Topics such as grassroots dynamics, gender, or local agency are not analysed. Further research might therefore explore the reception and contestation of association policies in African media, the roles of women or other non-elite actors in the negotiations, or the adaptation of the structures after 1963 under the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, which other scholars have already done in part. Deeper economic analysis might also shed new light on how association and dependency worked.

The peace narrative in EU historiography remains powerful, but the thesis insists on a revaluation. I challenge more traditional internalist scholars such Hass⁴¹⁴, Hoffmann⁴¹⁵ or Mark.⁴¹⁶ Integration was built on the fundament of empire. Integration and decolonisation need to be accounted together, if not it remains a Eurocentric view, not including global pressures and dependencies that shaped the EEC's creation. The works of Bossuat⁴¹⁷, Dimier⁴¹⁸, Hansen and Jonsson⁴¹⁹, signal a needed reassessment in scholarship as well as institutional memory, a necessity the thesis strongly agrees with. Bossuat's archival research on the centrality of association, Hansen and Jonsson's work on Eurafrica as a genuine institutional project, all supported by the thesis. Furthermore, my analysis from French Union to the EDF and DG8 reinforce Dimier's conclusion and show the logic of indirect rule, continued colonial legacies, dependency and bounded agency were structurally integrated in a

⁴¹⁴ See: Arne Niemann, Zoe Lefkofridi, Philippe C. Schmitter, Neofunctionalism. In: Thomas Diez, Antje Wiener, *European Integration Theory* (Oxford 2018).

⁴¹⁵ See: Andre Moravcsik, Frank Schimmelfenning, Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: Thomas Diez, Antje Wiener, *European Integration Theory* (Oxford 2018).

⁴¹⁶ Gary Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC. In: *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond* (Boulder 1993)

⁴¹⁷ Gérard Bossuat, *L'Europe des Français, 1943–1957. La IVe République aux sources de l'Europe communautaire* (Paris 1997). P.195-275.

⁴¹⁸ Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy: Recycling Empire*. Palgrave Studies In European Union Politics (2014).

⁴¹⁹ ⁴¹⁹ Peo Hansen, Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica, the Untold History of European integration and Colonialism. Theory for a global age series* (London/New York 2014).

supranational Europe, which the thesis dubbed the “European Empire”. The thesis acknowledges that literature on African agency, and agrees with recent literature that African actors were not simply passive recipients. Their use of networks, resources, negotiations and pressures necessitated reforms and on the European project. However, as was shown, such agency was acted in enduring structures of dependency and institutional control. As such the thesis positions itself within the postcolonial and revisionist turn in integration scholarship, supporting a needed reassessment of scholarship as well as institutional memory. The thesis focuses on how imperial hierarchy was embedded into EEC law and practice, tracing how cost-sharing without power-sharing, rule-making, unequal openness and administrative continuity came from the French Union to the EEC and the EDF. It was an adaptive response to the challenges of imperial decline and retreat. Negotiated and contested in Africa as much as in Europe, this often in the form of gatekeeping, an integral part of the equation, as without it European control, indirect rule would have not been feasible. In that way, the dream of early Eurafricanists, meaning that Europe would be made in Africa in a way fulfilled. Recognising European integration as the institutionalisation of a “European Empire” provides a necessary if maybe daring reframing of post-war history, a period not of the erasure of empire, but the integration of it, highlighting even ongoing colonial legacies in EU-Africa relations.

6.0. Conclusion

The thesis had as a goal to answer three connected research questions. How have the colonial legacies of European powers influenced the Treaty of Rome, the foundation of the European Economic Community, and its policies? In what ways have these legacies shaped the EEC’s relationship with Africa during the decolonisation period and beyond? Furthermore, how can the concept of indirect rule help explain the externalisation of empire’s costs and the involvement of African actors in this process? The conclusion now incorporates the key findings of the study, emphasising the historical and contemporary significance as well as giving an outlook to future research.

The thesis has argued that the EEC was not a radical break from Europe’s colonial past but rather an institutional adaptation of imperial legacies. The thesis demonstrated, how colonial structures, embedded through the ideological concept of Eurafrica and the association regime of the Treaty of Rome, were fundamental to European integration. Ideological ideas of European superiority were central to the Eurafrican idea and influenced key players in the

negotiations. The EEC did not eliminate imperial relations, but it rather managed to transform colonial rule into a partnership that appeared cooperative and developmental, institutionalising dependency. Colonial economic structures continued, as seen with the EDF. It did this by maintaining the neo-patrimonial networks and administrative cultures which were inherited from colonial governance. The colonial personnel and their practices in the DG8 are proof of that. Some African leaders managed to navigate these networks acting as gatekeepers, as seen with Houphouët-Boigny or Senghor. When leaders in Guinea or the Congo tried to claim greater independence, the reaction was met with severe repercussions, be it political interference or the retreat of aid. Agency was existed, but was bounded by institutional design.

Trying to integrate the thesis into the historiographical debate, the thesis aligns with and expands upon the work of Hansen, Jonsson and Bossuat and Dimier. They focus on the imperial dimensions inherent in European integration, challenging the traditional narrative. Especially Dimier's work is a core piece in showing the applied continuity of imperial legacies and should therefore be recommended. The thesis has focused on ideological, legal and institutional continuities and helps to strengthen their arguments. Integration did not simply emerge as a post-war continental peace project but as an imperial reconfiguration shaped by global pressures and colonial legacies by mostly French desires and Belgium. This reconfiguration is precisely what the thesis has found and termed the "European empire", a supranational institutionalisation of former colonial relationships and hierarchies. Still, research dark spots remain. This analysis primarily centred around the French and Belgian colonial empires and the integration of their legacies into the Treaty and EEC. Researching how British, Spanish or Portuguese 'legacies would influence the EEC or EDF would remain an interesting vantage point. Also, it would be helpful to look more closely at local responses and the economy to better understand the complexities involved. How did different African states individually navigate or challenge EEC constraints after independence? What roles did gender, class, or regional inequalities play in responses to European integration?

In the end, the thesis insists on the reconsideration of the European integration narrative, and focusing on the deep connections to Europe's imperial past. The institutional continuities as seen with colonial administrators and early European integration tell a different story to classic narrative to European integration. It helps provide a clearer understanding of the past of the European Union and helps frame its modern relations with Africa. Contemporary

interactions are shaped by the history of colonial structures in the EEC and the dependencies created by it. These imperial continuities need to be recognised as they continue to shape the modern day and as such it is crucial for addressing persistent inequalities in contemporary EU-Africa relations. Only by fully acknowledging and critically addressing these legacies can future relations between Europe and Africa be truly cooperative and on historical equal footing.

7.0. Bibliography

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