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TO FLY AMONG GIANTS: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INDONESIA'S GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM WITH AMERICA'S PACIFIC PIVOT AND CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

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Abstract

Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) is an ambitious project introduced by President Joko Widodo in 2014 to make Indonesia the focal point of maritime activities worldwide. This thesis addresses two purposes. Firstly, applying a Constructivist approach, this study strives to discuss the inherent characteristics of Indonesia's contemporary foreign policy and hedging strategy by investigating the creation and the implementation of the GMF, an initiative born out of Indonesian norms and values. Secondly, this research endeavors to confirm whether the GMF was really made and/or implemented as part of Indonesia's hedging strategy foreign policy. There is still no GMF blueprint at the time of writing and submission of this thesis, so this research seeks to develop a greater understanding of the GMF and what its limits and limitations are. The data for this project was collected through analyzing the pertinent speeches of Widodo and his foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, from 2014 to 2019, and interviewing the two core creators of the GMF and several diplomats involved in the GMF implementations. The findings of this research point out that the GMF was made to facilitate a vast array of Indonesia's interests, foreign and domestic alike, that the US Pivot to Asia and China's Belt and Road Initiative only make up two of the four megaprojects studied by the GMF creators as one out of the three elements that makes up the secondary considerations behind the GMF creation, and that the GMF is regarded by relevant Indonesian officials as an umbrella terms that encloses both domestic and foreign affairs. These findings encourage an immediate reassessment of the US and China influences on Indonesia's foreign policy, as they are in case of the GMF less significant than expected. Moreover, they amplify the need for a much needed blueprint and technocratic document for the GMF to give it a proper implementation onwards.

Abstrakt

Indonesiens „Global Maritime Fulcrum“ (GMF) ist ein ehrgeiziges Projekt, das Präsident Joko Widodo 2014 ins Leben rief, um Indonesien zum Mittelpunkt maritimer Aktivitäten weltweit zu machen. Dieses Forschungsprojekt verfolgt zwei Ziele. Erstens untersucht diese Studie die inhärenten Merkmale der aktuellen indonesischen Außenpolitik und Absicherungsstrategie (hedging), indem sie die Entstehung und Umsetzung des GMF mit einem konstruktivistischen Ansatz untersucht – einer Initiative, die auf indonesischen Normen und Werten basiert. Zweitens soll geklärt werden, ob das GMF tatsächlich als Teil der indonesischen Absicherungsstrategie konzipiert und/oder umgesetzt wurde. Da zum Zeitpunkt der Erstellung und Abgabe dieser Doktorarbeit noch kein GMF-Konzept vorlag, zielt diese Forschung darauf ab, ein besseres Verständnis des GMF und seiner Grenzen und Beschränkungen zu entwickeln. Die Daten für dieses Projekt wurden durch die Analyse der relevanten Reden Widodos und seiner Außenministerin Retno Marsudi zwischen 2014 und 2019 sowie durch Interviews mit den beiden Hauptinitiatoren des GMF und mehreren an der Umsetzung des GMF beteiligten Diplomaten erhoben. Die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung zeigen, dass das GMF geschaffen wurde, um eine Vielzahl indonesischer Interessen – sowohl innen- als auch außenpolitischer – zu befördern. Der amerikanische „Pivot to Asia“ und Chinas „Belt and Road-Initiative“ stellen nur zwei der vier von den GMF-Gründern untersuchten Megaprojekte dar und bilden eines der drei Elemente, die die sekundären Überlegungen hinter der GMF-Gründung darstellen. Die zuständigen indonesischen Beamten betrachten das GMF als einen Oberbegriff, der sowohl innen- als auch außenpolitische Angelegenheiten umfasst. Diese Ergebnisse legen eine Neubewertung des Einflusses der USA und Chinas auf Indonesiens Außenpolitik nahe, da dieser im Falle des GMF geringer als erwartet ist. Zudem unterstreichen sie die Notwendigkeit eines dringend benötigten GMF-Entwurfs und eines technokratischen Dokuments für das GMF, um dessen ordnungsgemäße Umsetzung zu gewährleisten.

Preface

The geopolitics of and in the 21st century can be described as dynamic and ever-changing. Significant shifts and trends occur all around the globe as the great power competition returns to center stage. For example, at the time of writing, the Transatlantic Alliance between the US and Europe is practically headed to a bitter end, at least de facto, after eight decades, following the White House's increasingly aligning interests with the Kremlin in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This decision shocked the world, of course, but especially Europe. I cannot even begin to imagine the anxiety felt by many European policymakers presently as they head to uncharted waters after close to 80 years of relative certainty.

Be that as it may, perhaps no competition for global power and influence is more pertinent and grabs more attention than the one that has been happening between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific, particularly since the 2010s. At the heart of the region is Southeast Asia, and residing right between the Indian and Pacific oceans is Indonesia, my homeland.

Having been born and raised in the world's largest archipelago, I am not exactly unaware of the mixed reputation of its foreign policy. The second half of the 20th century saw Indonesia becoming the founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and then the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but a common criticism toward Indonesian foreign policy in the 21st century so far is that it has been punching below its weight, especially as a member of the G-20, as Southeast Asia's largest economy, and as the world's third largest democracy. Denying the geopolitical importance of Indonesia is senseless, for were it to exclusively align with one side in the great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, then the scale would significantly tip in favor of that side. It is interesting to ponder if this realization was in Mohammad Hatta's mind when he proposed for Indonesia to adhere itself to the Free-and-Active doctrine not that long after the country declared its independence in 1945.

Personally, interacting with different people from different countries, both online and offline, prior to my doctoral studies, I cannot help but feel that Indonesia is often misunderstood in the West and little understood in the East. Some amusingly mistook it as part of Bali, some mischaracterized it as being specifically Sinospheric or Indospheric for whatever reason, some only knew it as a place where President Barack Obama spent a few years as a child, some simply saw it as a place where you could find more Muslims than anywhere else on earth, some recognized it as an emerging economy, and some simply painted it with the same brush alongside other ASEAN member states as if they all shared a hive mind somehow. There are so many possible reasons for this. Perhaps it is Indonesia's lack of soft power? Considering the fact that the Indonesian language is almost solely spoken in Indonesia and there is no form of Indonesian entertainment that has ever truly gone global, so to speak, unlike Japanese anime or Korean K-pop? Fried rice is known all over the world, but most people would not know it to be Indonesia's national dish, while Batik is commonly mistaken to have come from Malaysia instead of

from Indonesia. Naturally, this lack of knowledge about Indonesia extended likewise to its foreign policy. Then again, it is not unlikely that, if we are just talking about the West, one of those reasons is there is comparatively little research forwarded about Indonesian foreign policy in the West. I guess that played a part in two things: my decision to contribute to the Indonesian foreign policy scholarship and my choice to do it in the West.

Picking the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) and whether the US-China rivalry had anything to do with it was not a difficult option for me to make. The US-China rivalry has been mentioned and their significance is plain to see for many people, myself included. As to the fulcrum, when first introduced in 2014, the GMF was something that Indonesia had never tried to do before. It sounded as if it were going to be the confluence of many maritime-related elements in Indonesia but ended up giving the impression of appearing to be a lot of things to many people, so I became more interested to know more about its creation and application, especially since it seemed to unfortunately have become an afterthought by the time 2019 rolled around.

Meanwhile, opting to do the research at the University of Vienna was a logical approach following the willingness of Mag. Dr. Alfred Gerstl, Privatdoz. MIR, an Adjunct Professor at the institution, an Associate Professor at Palacky University Olomouc (Czech Republic), and an expert on the international relations of Southeast Asia, to supervise my proposed research. Vienna being in Austria was, and still is, a good stroke of luck as well. After all, I preferred to conduct the research outside of the Indo-Pacific to avoid any potential bias while still doing it in the West, and Austria ticked both boxes. The next step was to be a recipient of the Indonesia-Austria Scholarship Programme under the care of Indonesia's DIKTI (Directorate General of Higher Education) and Austria's OeAD.

Doing my doctoral research in Austria presented a set of whole new challenges for me. Different cultures in research and studying, among other things. On top of arriving in Vienna in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic, I had to adopt a new mindset and a new approach to engaging with other students and finishing the tasks given in the courses. I also had to learn the theory and the methodology that I was going to use in my research from scratch. This included using and training myself to utilize tools that I previously never even knew to have existed. From a data collection standpoint, I could not truly say that it was easy. The Indonesian institutions that I had to approach were not always cooperative, and the Indonesian sources that I had to interview in order to finish my research properly were not exactly accessible for different reasons. Close to the end of the third year of my research, I was also advised to adjust my dissertation properly in order to make the final thesis a success. Sleepless nights are not uncommon, and self-doubt was never in shortage. Nonetheless, I accepted the necessity carried by experiencing all of these elements, and I think this perspective also helped me to mentally prepare myself to eventually finish the research. Now that it has ended, I can only say that I am glad to have done it. In many ways, I would like to think that doing my doctoral studies in a land far, far away from my homeland, a world so unlike my own, had made me a better person in every way possible, including as an academic and a scientist.

Finally, my dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the topic of my research, the second part contains this research's analytical framework, and the third part presents my empirical analysis. I hope my research benefits both Indonesia and the West. For Indonesia, I hope the policymakers in Jakarta are willing to give the GMF a second try because the potentials it still holds are abundant and should not be wasted, for they can catapult the country to an even higher level across all sectors. For the West, but particularly for Europe, I hope what I wrote could help them to understand Indonesia at least a bit better. Now that multipolarity looks to be making (or, to some, has even made) a grand return, I genuinely believe that countries can only survive and prosper by developing stronger partnerships with one another, and a deeper understanding of each other is prerequisite for that to take place. Indonesia and Europe are certainly no exceptions to this requirement. Besides, in navigating the mercurial and uncharted waters of global geopolitics, I prefer for all of us to remember the words often attributed to the Japanese writer Ryūnosuke Akutagawa: "Individually, we are one drop. Together, we are an ocean."

Omar R. Joenoes

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Table of Contents

PART I INTRODUCTION OF RESEARCH TOPIC AND CONCEPTS 1

Chapter 1: Introduction 2

1.1. Hypothesis and Research Questions 4

1.2. Theoretical Framework & Methodology 6

1.2.1. Discourse Analysis 7

1.2.2. Reflexive Thematic Analysis 8

1.3. Literature Review 10

1.3.1. First Camp: The Meaning of the GMF 12

1.3.2. Second Camp: The GMF Trajectory and Challenges 13

1.3.3. Third Camp: The GMF's Potential Ties with the US and Actual Ties with China 19

1.3.4. Previous Constructivist Studies 24

1.4. The Structure of the Dissertation 30

Chapter 2: A Brief Overview of Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the History of the US-Indonesia and China-Indonesia Ties 31

2.1. Outlining Two Core Components of Indonesia's Foreign Policy 31

2.1.1. Free-and-Active Doctrine 32

2.1.2. ASEAN Centrality 36

2.2. Indonesia-US: A Brief History 37

2.2.1. 20th century 37

2.2.2. The 21st century: Indonesia, the US, and the Pivot 43

2.3. Indonesia-China History 47

2.3.1. Pre-20th Century 47

2.3.2. The 20th Century 48

2.3.3. The 21st Century: Indonesia, China, and the BRI 50

2.4. US-China Rivalry 56

2.5. Indonesia-US-China 61

Chapter 3: Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum 66

3.1. The GMF's Origin 66

3.2. The GMF's Challenges 69

3.3. Indonesia's Geostrategy: Behind the GMF's Creation 75

3.4. The GMF as Indonesia's Maritime Strategy and Its Implementation in the IOP 77

3.4.1. The GMF as Indonesia's Maritime Strategy 77
3.4.2. The GMF's Implementation in the IOP 80
3.5. The GMF-BRI Relations 89
3.6. The GMF-US Pivot Relations 97
3.7. Preliminary Criticisms of the GMF 99
3.8. How Widodo Views the GMF 100
PART II ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 103
Chapter 4: Theory 104
4.1. Constructivism 104
4.1.1. Brief History 104
4.1.2. Definitions 106
4.1.3. Research Design 110
4.1.4. Indonesia's Personal Identity as an Actor 113
4.1.5. Indonesia's Role Conception and Others 119
4.2. Hedging Strategy 121
4.2.1. Definition, Variants, and Conceptualizations of Hedging 121
4.2.2. Gerstl's Hedging Concept 125
Chapter 5: Method 129
5.1. Discourse Analysis 129
5.1.1. Definition of Discourse 129
5.1.2. Definition of Discourse Analysis 130
5.1.3. Speech Acts 133
5.1.3.1. Searle's Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts 135
5.1.4. Content Analysis 137
5.1.4.1. Definition 138
5.1.4.2. Using Content Analysis within a Discourse Analytic Approach 139
5.1.4.3. Qualitative Content Analysis 140
5.2. Reflexive Thematic Analysis 145
5.2.1. Preparation 148
5.2.2. Braun & Clarke's Six Steps of Reflexive Thematic Analysis 151
5.2.3. Application of the Reflexive Thematic Analysis 152

PART III EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 156

Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis - Discourse Analysis 157

6.1. President Joko Widodo 157

6.1.1. Discussing Widodo's Speeches 158

6.1.1.1. 2014 Speeches 158

6.1.1.2. 2015 Speeches 165

6.1.1.3. 2016 Speeches 171

6.1.1.4. 2017 Speeches 175

6.1.1.5. 2018 Speeches 182

6.1.1.6. Analyzing the Concomitant Traits of Widodo's Discourse in his first term 185

6.2. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi 196

6.2.1. Discussing Marsudi's Speeches 196

6.2.2. Analyzing the Concomitant Traits of Marsudi's Discourse from 2014 to 2019 208

6.3. Addressing Two Unsaid Points from the Speeches of Widodo and Marsudi 215

6.3.1. The Declining Momentousness of the GMF in Widodo's Speeches 215

6.3.2. Not Because of the Pivot and BRI? Indonesia as a Hedger, and Why Indonesia Hedged against the US and China 217

6.3.2.1. Indonesia as a Hedger 217

6.3.2.2. Applying Gerstl's Hedging Components to Indonesia 220

6.3.2.3. Why Indonesia Hedged Against China and the US 226

6.3.2.4. The AOIP: How Indonesia Hedged Against China and the US 229

Chapter 7: Empirical Analysis - Reflexive Thematic Analysis 242

7.1. Brief Overview 242

7.2. Thematic Discussions 242

7.2.1. The Bases Backing GMF's Making 242

7.2.2. How the GMF Creators Differentiate Between the GMF and Indonesia's Hedging Strategy 257

7.2.3. The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns 271

7.2.3.1. The Creation and Implementation of the GMF 276

7.2.3.2. The GMF Framing by Its Creators 278

7.2.3.3. The GMF Criticism 286

Chapter 8: Conclusion 290

8.1. Opening Remarks 290

8.2. Answering the Research Questions 290

8.3. Concluding Remarks 301

Bibliography 307

List of Figures

Figure 1. The Number of International Treaties Signed between Indonesia and China. 51

Figure 2. Steps of Inductive Category Development. 142

Figure 3. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2014 speeches. 164

Figure 4. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2015 speeches. 169

Figure 5. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2016 speeches. 173

Figure 6. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2017 speeches 181

Figure 7. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2018 speeches. 184

Figure 8. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's speeches from 2014 to 2018. 186

Figure 9. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2015 speeches. 198

Figure 10. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2016 speeches. 200

Figure 11. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2017 speeches. 203

Figure 12. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2018 speeches. 205

Figure 13. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2019 speeches. 207

Figure 14. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's speeches during Widodo's first term. 209

Figure 15. The World Cloud for the codes for The Bases Backing the GMF's Making. 243

Figure 16. MAXQDA's proximity similarity for the codes for The Bases Backing the GMF's Making (screenshot by the author)..... 244

Figure 17. MAXQDA’s occurrence similarity for the codes for The Bases Backing the GMF’s Making (screenshot by the author)..... 245

Figure 18. The World Cloud for the codes for How the GMF Creators Differentiate Between the GMF and Indonesia’s Hedding Strategy. 257

Figure 19. MAXQDA’s proximity similarity for the codes for Between Indonesia's Hedging and the GMF: The Creators' Distinction..... 258

Figure 20. MAXQDA’s occurrence similarity for the codes for Between Indonesia's Hedging and the GMF: The Creators' Distinction..... 259

Figure 21. The World Cloud for the codes for The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns. 272

Figure 22. MAXQDA’s proximity similarity for the codes for The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns. 273

Figure 23. MAXQDA’s occurrence similarity for the codes for The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns. 274

List of Tables

Table 1. Gerstl's Five Hedging Components. 127

Table 2. How to Use Content Analysis and Discourse Analysis Compatibly. 140

List of Abbreviations

ADMM: ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AOIP: ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAPPENAS: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional
BRI: Belt and Road Initiative
CCP: Chinese Communist Party
CPTPP: Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
CSIS: Centre for Strategic and International Studies
EAS: East Asia Summit
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
FOIP: Free and Open Indo-Pacific
IMO: International Maritime Organization
IOP: Indonesian Ocean Policy
IR: International Relations
JSC: Joint Steering Committee
KIH: Koalisi Indonesia Hebat
KMP: Koalisi Merah Putih
LEMHANNAS: Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional
LIPI: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia
MEF: Minimum Essential Force
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
NNA: National Names Authority
OBOR: One Belt, One Road
PRC: People's Republic of China
RCEC: Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridor
UN: United Nations
USCG: United States Coast Guard
WTO: World Trade Organization

PART I
INTRODUCTION OF
RESEARCH TOPIC AND CONCEPTS

Chapter 1: Introduction

As far back as 2011, the realization of an incoming rivalry between China and the United States of America in the Indo-Pacific region was already present, including in Indonesia (Sukma, 2011). China was rising as an economic power then, while the US was just shifting its focus back to the region with its *Pacific Pivot* (or *the Pivot*). Because Indonesia is literally located in the intersection between the Indian and Pacific oceans, making it central in Southeast Asia, the geopolitical heart of the Indo-Pacific, the choice of ignoring the inevitable US-China rivalry did not really exist for Jakarta. In 2013, only two years after the US announced its pivot, China debuted its initiative now widely known as *the Belt and Road Initiative* (*BRI*).

The author of this study is an Indonesian who has a professional interest in the archipelago's foreign policy, so when President Joko Widodo, then newly elected, announced not long after his victory in 2014 that he planned to make Indonesia to be *the Global Maritime Fulcrum* (*GMF*), it was an immediate eye-catcher. Ever since, the author of this study kept track of the GMF from time to time.

As the years rolled closer into 2019, the end of Widodo's first term, the GMF became mentioned a lot less often. Because it did not arrive with a genuine blueprint, it was always difficult to truly know if a latest infrastructure achievement was part of it or not. Its most commonly heard accomplishment was the sinking of illegal fishing vessels that were caught stealing in Indonesian waters from countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and even China.

On the other hand, it was well known that the anticipated US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific came true and Indonesia is among the countries where the two powers competed for influence. From the perspective of economic goals, the numerous Chinese investments in Indonesia, particularly from 2014 to 2019, were impossible to miss. China also rose to become the archipelago's largest trading partner, whereas the US-Indonesia ties largely focused on security and defense. This strategy is commonly known as hedging, and it is a comfortable foreign policy adopted by many countries across Southeast Asia as they interact with more than one side in a rivalry. In Southeast Asia, this commonly means economic engagement with China and security engagement with the US (Murphy, 2017, p. 165, as cited in De Silva, 2020, p. 95).

Then, a curiosity came to the author: the GMF was announced only a year after the BRI, which in itself was announced only two years after the Pivot. Could they somehow be related? To add, one of the pillars of the GMF was called Maritime Diplomacy, so could Indonesia's hedging strategy be part of the GMF?

Unfortunately, the GMF being bereft of blueprint means it is difficult to tell whether or not those hedging attempts could be considered to have been part of the GMF as a whole. Moreover, the author was never able to find any literature that discusses any potential and direct influence that the US, particularly with its Pivot, and China, specifically with its BRI, might have had in Indonesia's decision to create the GMF and deploy its hedging strategy. Starting from this realization, the author of this study felt emboldened to address this gap in the scholarship for two reasons.

Firstly, an innate desire to contribute to further understanding of Indonesia's contemporary foreign policy, particularly from within. After all, there are numerous literatures produced in the English language about how Western powers or major powers should approach Indonesia or understand its foreign policy, but, in comparison, there is not that many literature in the English language discussing the inherent nature of Indonesia's contemporary foreign policy and hedging strategy, let alone a literature that specifically addresses what kind of Indonesian norms and values gave birth to them both, even the ones written in Indonesian.

Secondly, the author wanted to confirm whether the GMF was truly created and/or implemented as part of Indonesia's hedging strategy at all. Out of all the plans announced by an Indonesian president in the 21st century so far, none sounded grander than the GMF. Even if its implementation from 2014 to 2019 was not optimal, it does not mean that the GMF should be discarded altogether. Since the GMF has no blueprint still at the time of writing, the author wanted to contribute to a study that would likewise deepen the general understanding of the GMF and thus more clearly draw its limits and limitations. Hopefully, by contributing to a deeper understanding of the GMF, in the near future, more Indonesian officials will look into the GMF again, draw up a proper blueprint for it, and apply it accordingly for the good and prosperity of Indonesia.

With the research presented in this dissertation, in a study that explored the social norms, belief, and identity behind the creation and the implementation of the foreign policy of Indonesia with the US and China by researching into the creative process and

the implementation of Indonesia‘s GMF and the impact of the Chinese BRI and the US Pivot had toward its creation, the author became the first to deliver the exact analysis of the creation, development, and implementation of the GMF.

1.1. Hypothesis and Research Questions

To kickstart this research, firstly the author came up with three hypotheses. They are as follows:

1. The GMF was initially meant to be implemented as an Indonesian hedging strategy framework against Beijing and Washington.
2. The creation of the GMF was mostly caused by the presence of both the Pivot and the BRI.
3. The GMF is considered to be an umbrella term covering both domestic politics and foreign affairs by relevant Indonesian officials.

Then, to ascertain the veracity of the above hypotheses, this study presents three sets of research questions, each will be done with a specific approach. They are as follows:

1. The first set of questions will investigate the perspective of the GMF creators during the commencing of the initiative in 2014. This set will seek to understand how the fulcrum was first created and then implemented as a component initially.

   It will also venture to comprehend Indonesia’s reason behind its hedging strategy against the US and China in Widodo’s first term and grasp the depth of the influence the US Pivot and China’s BRI had toward the shaping of Indonesia’s hedging strategy.

   The questions included in this set are:

   RQ_1: How was the GMF conceived and/or implemented as an element of Indonesia’s hedging strategy in the first place?

   - RQ_1.1: During Widodo‘s first term (from October 20, 2014, to October 19, 2019), why did Indonesia hedge against China and the US?
   - RQ_1.2: During President Widodo‘s first term, how far did the presence of the Pivot and BRI affect the shaping of Indonesia‘s hedging strategy and the GMF?

2. The second set will delve deeper into the creative process behind the fulcrum and the indication the US Pivot and China's BRI might have had toward Indonesia and the GMF. This set will seek to understand the reason behind the GMF creation by Rizal Sukma and Andi Widjajanto, the two main creators of the GMF, to begin with. Not only that, the details of the GMF process of creation from the start until Widodo accepted it will also be searched for.

   This set likewise pursues to confirm whether the GMF was ever meant by its creators to be part of Indonesia's hedging strategy against the US and China, and whether the Pivot and the BRI affected the creation of the GMF at all.

   The questions included in this set are:

   RQ_2: What purpose led Sukma and Widjajanto toward the creation of the GMF in the first place?

   - RQ_2.1: What is the detailed process of the creation of the GMF from the moment it was first suggested until the moment the initiative was accepted by President Widodo as a strategy?

   - RQ_2.2: During its formulation phase, did Sukma, Widjajanto, and their team mean for the GMF to be implemented as part of the Indonesian hedging strategy foreign policy discourse against China and the US?

   - RQ_2.3: How did the presence of BRI and the Pivot affect the GMF's creative process?

3. The final set attempts to fathom how the theory of constructivism in international relations interprets the viewpoint of pertinent Indonesian officials regarding how the GMF was implemented in Widodo's first term. Firstly, the Speech Act theory is utilized to analyze the GMF-related speeches in the first term of both Widodo and Retno Marsudi, Indonesia's Foreign Minister in both of Widodo's terms, in order to unearth the illocutionary acts, traits, and potential shifts in their GMF discourse. Then, the emergent pattern of the GMF discourse of both Sukma and Widjajanto will be located.

   The questions included in this set are:

RQ_3: During Widodo's first presidential campaign and first presidential term, which illocutionary acts did Widodo and Marsudi perform in their speeches?

- RQ_3.1: What concomitant traits of the discourse did Widodo and Marsudi display? Did the discourse experience any change during Widodo's first presidential campaign and the first presidential term?
- RQ_3.2: Did Sukma and Widjanto generate an emergent pattern of the GMF Discourse in their respective interviews?

With the constructivist theory at the steering wheel, the approach of this research will be driven by *discourse analysis* and *reflexive thematic analysis* (RTA). Discourse analysis will be used to examine the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi, which means that this study would also employ speech acts theory and content analysis. Meanwhile, an in-depth interview with Sukma and Widjajanto will be conducted in order to produce interview transcripts. These transcripts will then be used as the basis of the RTA. Both analyses will be conducted using a qualitative data analysis software and a research project management tool called *MAXQDA*.

1.2. Theoretical Framework & Methodology

This research understands that hedging is a neorealist concept. However, this research adheres to the viewpoint of Gerstl who has propounded the salience of perceptions in hedging strategy analysis. Of particular significance is the the perceptions of the political leader(s) in regards to the risks and opportunities related to the hedging target (2020, pp. 111-113). The perceptions of Widodo as Indonesia's president and Marsudi as his foreign minister during the time when the GMF was created and implemented are considered to be pertinent for this dissertation. Even more so because a fair number of foreign policy literature generally unite the individual and state level analyses by focusing on the leaders of the state (Thies, 2009, p. 14).

Their being in positions of great powers in Indonesian politics matter a great deal to this research because their powers allowed them to construct a social reality, or their own intersubjective conceptions of interests, that then prevailed over others. Constructivism fits to empirically study such conditions (Adler, 1997, pp. 334 & 336-337) because it is an International Relations (IR) theory that considers the comprehension of interests, identities, how things are crafted and how they occur to be pivotal in explaining how

they behave and what leads to political outcomes (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, pp. 392-395), while power and the content of interests are mostly described as ideas' function and explicating ideas can hence help examining the materiality of power and interests themselves (Wendt, 2003, p. 96). The constructivist theory becomes even more suitable for this research because the GMF itself ingeminates the spirit of Indonesian maritime identity and is a reflection of Indonesia's foreign policy and geopolitical thinking reality, among other things (Aufiya, 2017, pp. 144-145).

On that note, this study's main method is qualitative. It is chosen because the qualitative method can help in developing ideas and motivations that are not always promptly understandable (DeFranzo, 2011). In order to make sure the theory and methodology of this research are in harmony with each other, this research makes sure the chosen analysis method is shaped by the constructivist premise itself. Two types of analysis are thereby picked, discourse analysis (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, as cited in Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 395) and RTA (Finlay, 2021, p. 107).

The next two sub-sub-chapters will briefly explain this decision.

1.2.1. Discourse Analysis

The choice for discourse analysis came about after weighing the fact that this study was, unlike in the case of Widodo, only able to gather a few of Marsudi's speeches. This lack of material from her perspective could have been detrimental for this research. However, discourse analysis does not need a complete story to recognize textual data's deep structures and it is able to work on a different array of texts to reveal what other methods cannot (Bondarouk & Ruël, 2004). Such a benefit is hard for the author to resist.

However, there are many kinds of discourse analysis, including pragmatics, conversation analysis, and speech acts (Van Han, 2014). Among these choices, speech acts, or a study about the use of language by speakers and listeners (Yule, 1996, as cited in Hidayat, 2016, p. 3), stood out in particular. Further reading of speech acts showed that this type of analysis is directly tied to the history of constructivist thinking itself (Kratochwil & Peltonen, 2022, pp. 7-8; Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969, as cited in Kratochwil & Peltonen, 2022, p. 8).

This study's decision to pick speech acts is further motivated by the work of a key constructivist, Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, who wrote that the constructivist theory regards people to be the makers of society and society to be the maker of people in a two-way and unbroken process. A third element called rule, or a statement that directs people about what they ought to do, is a necessity in order to put oneself between people and society to study it. These rules will help agents, or those who rules describe to be society's active participants, to take possible courses of action under different circumstances. Onuf likewise believed that, by and large, any agent can create a rule's contents that would likewise assume the form of a rule, and saying what rules are is precisely the same as to speak in a manner that gets any listener to reply with what one is saying. According to Onuf, the act of speaking in a way that induces others to act is commonly known as a speech act (1998, p. 59-62 & 66).

Having known that constructivism and speech acts have very robust ties with one another, the author then decided to pick speech acts for good to analyze the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi in order to scrutinize, as deeply as possible, every relevant information to help this study find the answer to its research questions.

1.2.2. Reflexive Thematic Analysis

With both Sukma and Widjajanto having been successfully interviewed online, via zoom, in a mix of English and Indonesian by the author of this study, the RTA will be used to analyze the transcripts of their interview. Additionally, relevant writings of theirs that might elucidate the points they make in their interview will be used to scrutinize the content of their interviews accordingly.

According to Mortensen (2021), a RTA endeavors to pinpoint thematic patterns in the data and defines an iterative process to proceed from tangled data to a map of the data's most important themes. It is a flexible method that can apply for both an explorative study, where the researcher might not have a clear idea of which patterns to search for initially, and a deductive study, where the researcher knows exactly what is being searched. Mayring (2014, p. 104) likewise stated that thematic analysis takes place at several points in the content-analytical literature. Boyatzis (1979, as cited in Mayring, 2014, p. 104) described thematic analysis as data driven or theory driven. The reification of thematic qualitative content analysis primarily as an inductive process, Grounded Theory-oriented, meanwhile, was put forward by Kuckartz (2014, as cited in Mayring,

2014, p. 104). This flexible appeal of RTA was exactly what this research needed, so this research first familiarized itself with the reflexive thematic analysis that was forwarded by Braun & Clarke (2006) and several worked examples of it.

The RTA in this research itself is performed according to the six steps outlined by Braun & Clarke (2006). To clarify, they pointed out that there is no clear definition of thematic analysis and how it is done. It might even be considered as a highly abjectly branded method since it is not properly named as an analysis, like how Grounded Theory or Narrative Analysis for examples exist as named analyses (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 6). This results in it often explicitly obviated as a method of analysis despite the fact that plenty of analysis is thematic in essence but is either claimed to be something else, like discourse analysis or content analysis (Meehan et al., 2000, as cited in Braun & Clarke, 2006, pp. 6-7), or stated to be no particular method at all, like when data that are used to search for frequently recurring themes are simply said to be analyzed via qualitative analysis (Braun & Wilkinson, 2003, p. 30, as cited in Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 7).

Braun & Clarke (2012, p. 58) argued that thematic analysis provides a way for qualitative research that methodically teaches the coding mechanics and analysis of qualitative data to be then connected to wider theoretical or conceptual issues. Only a deep understanding of the meaning of the acquired data would allow this research to truly provide its research questions with proper answers. For this reason, thematic analysis was chosen to proceed with the analysis of the creators' interviews.

In preparation for applying RTA accordingly, this research learned that it was not uncommon for qualitative research to be conducted using specific softwares. A popular software to do it is known as MAXQDA. Upon learning more of MAXQDA, it was discovered that the company producing it also provided a free manual and even free lessons to use it. On top of that, some worked examples of doing thematic analysis with MAXQDA are also provided, such as by Uştuk (2022) and Soloshchenko (2019; 2022). Hence, it was eventually decided to use MAXQDA to do RTA according to Braun & Clarke (2006; 2022).

Around that same time, this research learned that Braun & Clarke (2022) just released a book providing a practical guide to RTA in 2022. Aside from procuring this book, to strengthen the analysis for this research, a coding manual by Saldaña (2012) and a qualitative research guide by Yin (2016) were also acquired. To mitigate any lack of

understanding the research might have due to English not being the researcher's first language, the study also seeked such guidelines or examples in the Indonesian language, such as a brief coding guideline by Mahpur (2017) and other worked examples of RTA according to Braun & Clarke (2006) by Heriyanto (2018) and Byrne (2021).

Be that as it may, three factors eventually solidified this study's decision to stick with RTA to analyze the creators' interview transcripts. Firstly, the RTA that Braun and Clarke designed has a decidedly constructivist outlook (Finlay, 2021, p. 107) and therefore fits the direction of this study. Secondly, this study fulfills several conditions mentioned by Braun & Clarke (2020, pp. 7-8) to utilize their RTA. Lastly, Braun & Clarke have written that using RTA requires the researcher's awareness of both theoretical transparency and the researcher's own decision to use it (2019, pp. 594-595). This is in accord with constructivism since a constructivist researcher has to be aware and recognize their own subjectivity throughout the research process (Boyland, 2019, p. 30), which the author has accepted.

More about the theory and methodology of this research are presented in Chapter 4. The next sub-chapter will be this study's literature review.

1.3. Literature Review

Prior to reviewing literature related to the GMF's ties with other initiatives, this study dedicated a significant portion of its time to read literature involving the current US-China rivalry, the Pivot, the BRI, any potential ties between the Pivot and the GMF, and the ties between the BRI and the GMF.

The interaction between China and the US in Southeast Asia and how the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) each attempt to maneuver and the degree to which they align with one or the other power have been scrutinized in depth (e.g. Shambaugh, 2020).

How Indonesia individually reacted to the power competition between China and the US in Southeast Asia, too, has received a fair share of inspection (e.g. Hamilton-Hart & McRae, 2015; Pandjaitan, 2018), including into the hedging strategy Jakarta adopted (e.g. Javadi, 2016; Mubah, 2019; Sukma, 2015; Wardoyo, 2020).

The US Pivot to Asia is a much debated topic, especially by American authors, from its conception and meaning (e.g. Manyin et.al, 2012), and its apparent failure in implementation (e.g. Robertson, 2017), to its original objectives, future prospects, and veiled but tangible successes within Asia (e.g. Campbell, 2016). Naturally, the intricacies behind China's BRI, from its definition and implementation to its impact on global economy, politics, and future, have also been discussed in great detail (e.g. Aris, 2016; Garlick, 2019; Maçães, 2019).

Taking into account the subject of this study, the review regarding previous GMF literature is given considerable attention in this section.

To start with, according to Trihartono et al. (2021), three elements held great importance in Indonesian security. The first element is the ability of Indonesia to enforce territorial security without any intervention by foreign actors that compels Indonesia to possess de jure recognition for its lands and waters. The second element is the Indonesian geographical and historical experiences justify this paradigm because the archipelago's strategic location and richness in natural resources means that other countries would never just leave Indonesia be. The last element is the history of upholding the sovereignty and unity of Indonesia, particularly in the New Order era, which was described as protecting the country from domestic threats such as separatists and communists.

While Trihartono et al. (2021) did not argue against the importance of such discourses, they nonetheless argued that such views have diminished the importance of the sea for the Indonesian people because they led people to think that only military threats are security threats. That is why, Trihartono et al. (2021) stated that strategic viewpoints still dominate the literature related to Indonesia's maritime world and the GMF is no exception to this rule.

Regardless, the general discourse related to the GMF could be divided into three camps:

- The first camp is the GMF literature that attempts to explain what the GMF is meant to be;
- The second camp is the GMF literature that dives more deeply into its challenges and trajectories. Here, usually the accomplishments and/or shortcomings of the GMF are also discussed;

- The third camp underlines the GMF's potential ties with the US and actual ties with China.

Lastly, since this research is driven by the constructivist theory, the literature review of this study will also present several successful examples of constructivism explaining the foreign policy dynamics of China and two countries in Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia. Of particular importance is the research conducted by Gerstl (2020).

The next sub-sub-chapter will start with the first camp of the GMF literature.

1.3.1. First Camp: The Meaning of the GMF

Of the three camps, this study found this one to be the smallest of the group, and its contributors are predominantly Indonesian authors.

Wardhana (2016) contributed to this camp by asserting that understanding Indonesia's maritime culture and history is required to understand Indonesia's justification of the GMF, while understanding the defense economic perspective is necessary to comprehend the challenges and the prospects of the GMF. This assertion led him to believe that *the Sea Toll* depicts the relationship between the archipelago's national interests and maritime trade because its proper function relies on Indonesia's naval forces ability to ascertain the security above its waters (Wardhana, 2016, p. 378). The Sea Toll is considered crucial in making Indonesia to be the GMF. After it was created, Indonesian citizens across different parts of the archipelago were expected to not have to endure scarcity of commodities any longer. The Sea-Toll itself takes the form of a six-lane water freeway that was planned to connect the ports throughout Indonesia (Aufiya, 2017, p. 149).

Meanwhile, the work of Yakti & Susanto (2017) contributed to this camp by arguing that the GMF is largely a change from Indonesia's previous maritime strategy. According to them, the GMF is essentially a value that is inherited from the administration prior to Widodo's but was adapted to be applied to contemporary situations. The interviews conducted by this study did reveal that there are elements from the past that interact with the creation and the implementations of the GMF, so what Yakti & Susanto (2017) asserted are certainly credible in hindsight.

The next sub-sub-chapter features the second camp of the GMF literature.

1.3.2. Second Camp: The GMF Trajectory and Challenges

This camp is practically the biggest of the three camps, and it appears that most of the contributors to this camp are Indonesian.

Contribution to this camp was made as quickly as weeks after Widodo was sworn in 2014, when his ideas, what it meant for Indonesia's grand maritime strategy, and what obstacles Indonesia had to face were examined by Shekhar & Liow (2014).

They stated improving Indonesian inter-island connectivity, naval defense, fixing the anomalous threats perceptions in the archipelago by bringing up maritime security to make it mainstream among Indonesia electorates, vivifying Hatta's worldview of Indonesia's strategic importance due to its location between two continents and two oceans, by planning to bring the Indian Ocean back to the regional canvas of Indonesia and position the archipelago as a power composed of thousands of Islands between two continents (Asia and Australia) and two Oceans (the Indian and Pacific), to be several key points in Widodo's maritime ambition,

Shekhar & Liow (2014) came to the conclusion that the first five years of Widodo's rule would be fundamental in the formation of the required policy framework to bolster his ideas to make Indonesia a maritime power. To accomplish this, they argue for the necessity of several elements to convergence:

- A fully fleshed-out and debated blue-print;
- Sufficient political support from Indonesia's legislature;
- The establishment of effective local infrastructure to produce and develop technology and equipment;
- A positive global image to attract international investments.

Another contributor to this camp includes Sambhi (2015), who pointed out the opinion of Aaron Connelly's in that the GMF is not really a maritime projection, but first and foremost inherently focused on domestic affairs with Indonesia's geostrategy being secondary considerations. This opinion is contrary to what Widodo and Sukma have stated, however, since they both highlighted the significance of Indonesia's geostrategy when introducing the GMF to the public.

Other contributors, Negara & Das (2017), also highlighted three challenges in Widodo's attempt to build maritime connectivity and infrastructure in the archipelago to make Indonesia the GMF, namely land acquisition, coordination problem, and skepticism against Chinese funding.

A contribution to this camp was also made by Wicaksana (2017), who praised Widodo's Sea Toll program as a versatile megaproject that would provide fruitful solutions to the economy of Indonesia on a gargantuan scale.

Another contributor to this camp, Puspitawati (2017), concluded that the implementation of regional stability, maritime security, and national security are required to properly implement the GMF doctrine. Maritime security in particular is a field that has plagued Indonesia with problems for a long time. Puspitawati (2017) identified three key areas of maritime security where Indonesia's biggest hurdles lie: combating piracy and armed robbery at the sea, working with neighboring countries to settle unresolved border disputes, and fighting off illegal fishing and illegal exploitation of marine resources. As far as maritime security goes, she argued that Indonesia needs its own national law which is more up to date than the current one it has to accordingly deal with fisheries and piracy and submitted thus Indonesia needs a single national maritime security arrangement to apply the GMF doctrine aptly.

A contribution by Andika (2017) credited the GMF for bolstering the efforts of the Indonesian government to take considerable action regarding maritime border diplomacy. Andika (2017) considered the settlement of maritime border disputes to be pivotal in supporting the GMF goals because only then Indonesia could effectively manage all of the resources within its sovereign territory for the benefit of its people.

Aufiya (2017) likewise made a contribution that credited the application of the GMF to several positive effects of the sea toll program starting from 2015 to June 2016. Among the positive GMF effects that Aufiya (2017, pp. 1491-53) highlighted were:

- The construction of the Sea-Toll lowering the prices of basic needs in East Indonesia due to allowing easier distribution, such as reducing the price of plywood by 17%, cement by 22%, sugar by 28%, bulk cooking oil by 15%, chicken meat by 28%, wheat flour by 29%, and eggs by 49% by 2016;
- Widodo encouraged the implementation of the South China Sea Code for Unlimited Encounters at Sea (CUES) and Communication (Hotline Communication), as well as

urging for the establishment of a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). He also supported the East Asia Summit (EAS) Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation agreement to be implemented in 2015;

- Utilized the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to build coalitions aimed at reducing the returning great power rivalry and domination, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the EAS, and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus);
- Tougher stance at combating illegal fishing in Indonesian waters;
- Responding to non-traditional security threats, including combating terrorism;
- Firmer efforts at combating drug trade into the archipelago;
- The Indonesian Navy created a special task force, known as the *Western Fleet Quick Response* (*WFQR*), to maintain security along the waters of the Malacca Strait to the South China Sea to fight sea robbery and piracy.

It should be noted, regardless, that both Andika (2017) and Aufiya (2017) did not neglect mentioning the challenges or untapped potentials waiting for the GMF. Andika (2017, pp. 63-64) underlined the lack of a detailed strategic map to effectively implement the GMF, the economic slowdown that was experienced by Indonesia, and the difficulties in maintaining the technical and political principles when dealing with neighboring countries to perform border diplomacy. Meanwhile, Aufiya (2017, p. 156) pointed out to three potential ways to expand the GMF:

- Developing a master plan of Indonesia's maritime policy;
- Increasing Indonesia's participation in maritime organization such as *the Indian Ocean Rim Association* (*IORA*) to better handle maritime threats, both the traditional ones and the non-traditional ones;
- Cooperating with China's BRI to gain financial benefits and increase confidence when handling China's aggression in the South China Sea. Cooperation with other maritime countries must also be kept in mind.

Interestingly, even four years after the contribution by Shekhar & Liow (2014), their work proved prescient because a contributor named Marzuki (2018) echoed their conclusion that the GMF still needed a blueprint. To be more precise, he argued that the

GMF needed a defense policy blueprint that completes Indonesia's broader sea policy to ensure that GMF stakeholders all acquire a common point of reference. In particular regarding the strategic dimension and courses of action of the GMF that would need to be properly followed through.

Moving on, a contribution made by Laksmana et al. (2018) from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) submitted the argument that an overlapping of authorities in Widodo's administration regarding the GMF was a legit problem that impeded effectively implementing the GMF. They considered the GMF to be too general and abstract for it to be a successful foreign policy for Indonesia and argued for the need for Indonesia to have a Grand Strategy for the GMF. Laksmana et al. (2018, pp. 32-33) stated that, all in all, the Indonesian government had to pay attention to several principles:

1. A grand maritime strategy to derive and personalize the GMF, especially taking into account Indonesia's identity as an archipelago;
2. The characters of Indonesia's maritime challenges and cross issues make it a necessity for more than the Indonesian Foreign Ministry to be involved, because, at least the Indonesian Navy, Coast Guard, Transportation Ministry, and Marine and Fisheries Ministry have to be involved as well;
3. A serious leadership from the President not just in coordinating, but also in directing, a variety of maritime actors according to the Grand Strategy in order to rise to the challenges in the South China Sea;
4. A strategic allocation of the maritime resources according to the empirical accomplishments of maritime diplomacy to fulfill the goals of the Maritime Grand Strategy.

Laksmana et al. (2018, p. 33) also mentioned that the proposed Maritime Grand Strategy itself should:

- Integrate the strengths and the weaknesses of maritime defense diplomacy instruments;
- Define the policies to integrate a variety of instruments and actors for maritime defense diplomacy purposes, both in their daily operations or strategic institutional processes;

- Be formulated by an institution directly under the office of Presidency that handles maritime issues, such as the Ministry of State Secretariat or Chief of Staff to the President;
- Be stipulated as a Presidential Decree or Regulation to give its legality a solid base and foundation.

Laksmana et al. (2018, p. 33-35) concluded their work by recommending:

1. The President to reformulate and support the legal structuring process and institutions to enhance security enforcement authority in Indonesian territorial waters;
2. The Government to form a node that assists the Office of Presidency to bridge the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs where both hold the function of coordinating various maritime sector actors. Information and cross-policy considerations, especially involving the Indonesian Navy, Bakamla, Water Police, Task Force 115, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have to be further distilled and merged;
3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to regularly consult and coordinate with other maritime defense actors, particularly the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, Indonesian Navy, Bakamla, Task Force 115, and Ministry of Defense;
4. The creation of a crisis management system, be it bilaterally or regionally, that can be activated whenever maritime incidents capable of increasing tension occur and require thorough attention;
5. To consider several instruments related to maritime security in the forms of international law and regional convention that have not been adopted by Indonesia, particularly the ones involving naval warfare;
6. Indonesia's foreign policy actors to rethink Indonesia's traditionally multilateral foreign policy mindset based on its ASEAN leadership, especially since the current situation in the region demands a rethinking beyond traditions;
7. To explore bilateral frameworks that are more in line with the changes in Indonesian maritime environments, such as joint counter-Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing operations or joint counter-piracy, and pay more attention to the

distribution of maritime diplomacy activities and cooperation with partner countries.

Be that as it may, around one year later, Laksmana (2019) wrote a scathing critique of the GMF only weeks after Widodo was inaugurated as president for the second time. He began by pointing out Widodo's 2014 goal before highlighting the fact that Widodo's inauguration speech in 2019 mentioned neither the words *maritime* nor *foreign policy* at all while focusing on regulatory and bureaucratic reforms, infrastructure, and human capital. Marsudi, meanwhile, did not include the word *maritime* even once in her outlined priorities for her second appointment as the Foreign Ministry.

Laksmana (2019) stated that the GMF practically died without ever being a grand strategy in the end for several reasons. To begin with, Laksmana (2019) claimed that it was not supported by years of conceptual research and development. Secondly, during his first administration, Widodo was more interested in development projects such as social welfare and infrastructure. Even the national sea policy was only a large bureaucratic umbrella that could connect, but not truly corral, pre-existing programs between ministries under a single network. Meanwhile, as far as civil-military relations and defense policy went, Widodo opted to rely on his advisers instead. Marsudi was also criticized as being too *process-oriented* by relying heavily on existing multilateral platforms like ASEAN and spending so much time on bureaucratic reform.

Laksmana (2019) argued that, during Widodo's first administration, the geopolitical interests of Indonesia did not receive a significant attention due to domestic politics, bureaucratic inertia, and idiosyncrasies. The two coordinating ministries overlapping conducts also did not help the GMF's case. He also criticized *the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific* (*AOIP*) as largely flawed and stated that Indonesia should have used the GMF as a baseline to establish a strategy and policies that can be used to aptly respond to the tension in the South China Sea and China's aggressiveness in Indonesian waters instead of depending on ASEAN again.

Finally, a contribution by Pikoli (2021) concluded that the lack of implementation toward the GMF's vision can be attributed to two factors: governmental and individual. In addressing the governmental factor, Pikoli (2021, p. 164) underlined the fact that a blueprint to guide the GMF, and thus the actors relevant to it, did not exist. Not having a blueprint to guide them caused many Indonesian ministries and agencies to have an

overlapping sense of authority and responsibility toward the GMF. On other hand, Pikoli (2021, p. 165) explained that the individual factor referred to Widodo himself, whom Pikoli (2021, p. 165) considered to have lacked leadership in providing the GMF concept with a single definition and thus exacerbating the miscoordination in his administration.

The next sub-sub-chapter presents the third camp of the GMF literature.

1.3.3. Third Camp: The GMF's Potential Ties with the US and Actual Ties with China

This camp is the second biggest of three and can, at its core, be divided into two sides: the one that explores the GMF's potential ties with the US and the one that explores the GMF's actual ties with China.

There seems to be a drought of literature exploring how the GMF is related to the US. Nonetheless, the stunted relationship between the US and Indonesia has been underscored over the years, mainly from a strategic viewpoint (e.g. Denmark, Sukma, and Parthemore, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2018). Indonesia's blatant disapproval over the military elements of the US Pivot, ergo, also received recognition (e.g. Anwar, 2013; Sambhi, 2013; Shekhar, 2012).

A sole contribution to this side, regarding how Washington can prioritize its strategic relations with Jakarta by taking advantage of Indonesia's GMF dreams to foster better US-Indonesia ties, was provided by Quirk & Bradford (2015) for the Pacific Forum CSIS around a year after Widodo was inaugurated in 2014. They (2015, pp. 8-10) proposed three actions for the US to take:

1. Washington should try harder to close the economic gap between the US-Indonesia and China-Indonesia as to avoid being outmaneuvered by China's numerous existing investments in Indonesia and strong economic ties with the archipelago;
2. The US Department of Defense should promote more intricate joint-training between the US and Indonesia since the US is already a pivotal security partner for the archipelago. This more complex cooperation has to keep in mind Indonesia's non-aligned stance and focus on helping Indonesia to defend its maritime sovereignty against threats both traditional and nontraditional. A more comprehensive training program for Indonesian naval personnel should likewise be considered. Additionally, the US Navy should seek to ensure that no American sailor

missed the opportunity to engage with their Indonesian counterpart while sailing in the Indian and Pacific oceans;

3. The US Government should encourage Americans to learn more about Indonesia and its culture to foster a stronger partnership based on shared priorities, mutual trust, and common principles between the two countries.

Aside from this contribution, for all intent and purposes, there does not seem to be any literature yet that addresses the influences of the Pivot toward the GMF.

Meanwhile, unlike Pivot-GMF, the strong China-Indonesia relations and the ties between the BRI and the GMF have been examined quite a number of times.

Writing for CSIS, a contribution by Damuri et al. (2014) tried to explain how the BRI was going to be positioned in Indonesia's development and strategic perspective. More importantly, they (2014, pp. 35-38) submitted several recommendations for the BRI if it truly wishes to be welcomed by and synchronized with the GMF:

- China has to be proactive in engaging any potential partner countries and allow them to help Beijing shape the BRI action plan instead of arriving to them with a non-negotiable ready-made term of reference;

- China should specify how the BRI can help Indonesia to attain its ambition to become a maritime state and, eventually, a maritime fulcrum,

- When both countries are waiting for stronger detail regarding the basis for GMF and BRI plans, existing bilateral and multilateral commitments they share must not be neglected;

Damuri et al. (2014, pp. 38-41) also added that five economic issues must be addressed before the BRI can be fully accepted and labeled as compatible to be synchronized with the GMF:

- The first is the issue of connectivity. The BRI must set complementing and improving ASEAN Connectivity as a goal so that it can increase its reach far beyond the ASEAN border. Also, whenever possible, try to include non-ASEAN member states in BRI frameworks;

- The second issue is Indonesia's ambition to enlarge and improve its shipbuilding industry. Since China is the world's largest ship producers, Beijing should help

Jakarta to realize its goals in the shipbuilding and related industries, whereas Indonesia should provide better facilitation for such investment and related projects from China;

- The third issue is Indonesia's plan to secure its sea lanes. China should participate in the investment and technology that Indonesia would need to prop up its electronic highways and gates for its plan;
- The fourth issue is infrastructure development. Following its establishment, any Chinese loan for Indonesia that is intended for infrastructure development should be channeled via the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB);
- The fifth issue is currency. In the transaction between China and Indonesia, both countries might want to consider using their own currencies, Yuan and Rupiah respectively, for trade, investment, and reserve.

Another contribution was made by Pradhan (2016). In his writing, Pradhan (2016, p. 11) reached the conclusion that the BRI and the GMF are indeed strongly complementary because Chinese and Indonesia maritime agendas have overlapping facets, especially in regards to connectivity. In Indonesia, China can acquire a much needed ASEAN ally, whereas in China, Indonesia can find a much needed partner to realize its GMF ambitions by building Indonesia. Regardless, Pradhan (2016, p. 11) also made it clear that the BRI and the GMF being complementary does not automatically mean the cooperation between Beijing and Jakarta would be a smooth sailing. For both countries to cooperate on stronger terms, Indonesia still has to deal with its nightmarish bureaucratic red-tape hampering potential foreign investments, while China needs to tone down its aggressiveness in the South China Sea.

The conclusion drawn by Pradhan is echoed by the conclusion drawn by SD et al. (2017). They (2017, p. 14) stated that China can help Indonesia to become the GMF while Indonesia can be a valuable friend for China in building better ties with other ASEAN countries. SD et al. (2017, p. 14) also similarly recommend China to dial down its ambition in the South China Sea to convince Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries of its willingness to cooperate, while Indonesia is recommended to build more trust in China to deepen cooperation between the two countries.

Another relevant contribution to this side is written by Yakti (2019), who averred the notion of the GMF being Indonesia's hedging strategy to respond to China's BRI, provided the various exceptions and preconditions that (Yakti, 2019, p. 152):

- China was not yet a superpower in the region, and Chinese country officials had never made an official statement regarding China's aim to be a hegemon;
- The BRI was still running and, at the time of writing, had not stepped on for three years. Therefore, Yakti stated that the evaluation points included in his paper did not necessarily justify future conditions;
- A disparate case in that China had to contend with US unipolarity, meanwhile Indonesia only anticipated Chinese threats while also taking advantage due to the bilateral closeness between Jakarta and Beijing.

In his paper, Yakti (2019, p. 152) argued that Indonesia actually wanted to see the BRI as the Chinese effort of economic approach to countries within the Indo-Pacific because having China deconcentrate to embrace an area large enough under specific limits can be used to decrease threats that were faced by Indonesia and vice versa to increase future opportunities. To justify his reasoning that the GMF is Indonesia's hedging strategy against China's BRI, Yakti (2019, p. 160) explicated that:

- Indonesia was actually trying to locate the right formula to build a bridge between its own national interests to change and bolster itself from a developing country to a developed one with China's interests to form a new economic order in the Indo-Pacific that would also shift the geo-economic order of the whole world;
- Indonesia was looking for a considerable foreign investment to develop its infrastructure, both inside and outside the scope of the GMF. This means that China became one of the prospective countries as an investment source;
- The Indonesian government implemented strict restrictions on the entry for Chinese investors that brought them to the same position with investors from other countries like Japan and Singapore. Among these restrictions included limiting the sectors to which China can make an entry into and using local regulations to limit the number of funds invested by China;
- Indonesia applied a double standard in its dealings with China, because Indonesia accepted Chinese cooperation by joining the Belt and Road Forum and received

> Chinese investment through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, while, at the same time, continued building military bases in Indonesia's outermost islands for political and security purposes.

Yakti's (2019, p. 160) fourth point is likely related to the statement from the Indonesian Army that it was going to build military bases in the archipelago's outermost islands, such as Natuna, Morotai, and Biak (Sutrisno, 2017). As of 2023, Indonesia's effort to increase its defensive capabilities was even increased with the announcement that the Indonesian army would start building defense clusters in the uninhabited islands near the Indonesian borders (Achmad & Santosa, 2023). Yakti (2019, p. 160) did confirm that what Indonesia had been doing could be attributed to its *Free-and-Active* foreign policy, because its ties with China did not stop Indonesia from receiving assistance from countries like the US or Japan as well. However, it should be noted that Yakti (2019) himself admitted that his conclusion required stronger foundation and, thus, further research.

Writing after Widodo's re-election, Lai (2019) mentioned that, despite China's numerous BRI projects in Indonesia, the trading scale between the two countries was not up to par yet in comparison to China's trade with other Southeast Asian countries. In 2017, Indonesia was only China's fifth largest Southeast Asian trading partner. Lai (2019) nevertheless admitted that the ties between Jakarta and Beijing remained firm and that Indonesia's tight checks and balances actually decreased the kind of implementation problems which had hampered the BRI's application in other countries and this should bode well for deeper economic cooperation between the two in the future.

Lalisang & Candra (2020) contributed a study to this topic as well. They (2020, p. 20) concluded that, after China started applying its BRI plans in Indonesia, its bilateral ties with Indonesia became stronger. Be that as it may, they consider it to be rather doubtful whether the improvement was directly caused by the policies of the BRI and the GMF, especially since Indonesian bureaucratic red tape, anti-Chinese sentiment in the archipelago, and tension in the South China Sea persisted. Lalisang & Candra (2020, p. 20) also inferred that no immediate correlations between the BRI and the GMF could be insisted to exist. They admitted that both initiatives came at the right moment to foment deeper cooperation between Jakarta and Beijing. Hence, whether or not both policies are coordinated or complement each other requires further research.

One other contribution was provided by Pratiwi et al. (2021). They (2021, pp. 48-49) argued that Indonesia used the GMF as its middle power strategy to respond to power geopolitics like the ones displayed by China's BRI and *the Quad's Free and Open Indo-Pacific* (FOIP). Furthermore, Pratiwi et al. (2021, p. 49) stated that their analysis showed that, when interacting with the BRI, Indonesia would exhibit middle power characteristics by boosting its own resources and resorting to niche diplomacy. Meanwhile, in responding to FOIP, they (2021, p. 49) wrote that Indonesia displayed the 5Cs of middle power variables:

- Capacity, in other words Indonesia's power;
- Concentration, where Indonesia uses the GMF to link it with the FOIP while also trying to benefit from the FOIP;
- Creativity, which Indonesia displayed by actively formulating values for ASEAN concerning the FOIP;
- Coalition-building, in which Indonesia tried to enhance its relations not only with the FOIP, but also with other countries, especially in the EAS;
- Credibility, which Indonesia projected by maintaining neutrality when having to choose between the FOIP and the BRI. This leads to the assumption that, even when dealing with both initiatives, Indonesia tried to maintain its own agenda, values, and capacity.

Lastly, no literature concerning the influences the US Pivot & China's BRI had on Indonesia's GMF seem to have been written, including from the constructivist perspective. For this reason, this study aims to fill that void.

The next sub-sub-chapter will exhibit several studies where constructivism was successfully used to explain the foreign policy dynamics of Indonesia, China, and Malaysia.

1.3.4. Previous Constructivist Studies

By deciding on constructivism, this study is convinced of constructivism's strong explanatory power shown in previous studies in explaining the foreign policy dynamics of Indonesia, the dynamics around and after China's becoming a member of the World

Trade Organization (WTO), China's approach toward the South China Sea, and the hedging strategy of Malaysia, one of Indonesia's fellow ASEAN member and closest neighbors.

The first among which is Muzakki (2017), who applied constructivism to explain Indonesia's Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine. He argued that the circumstances surrounding Indonesia's independence in 1945 constructed a situation where Indonesia became a free country while also still having to be active on the global stage to avoid being swayed by either bloc at that time. According to Muzakki, Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia's first Vice President, was aware that Indonesia still have to enhance social justice and prosperity for the Indonesian people after its independence and therefore built the Free-and-Active doctrine up based on five fundamentals (2017, pp. 17-18):

- Defending the freedom of Indonesia and protecting the country itself;
- Obtaining an adequate living standard;
- Earning capital in order to rebuild things which have been destroyed, including industry, infrastructure, and agriculture;
- Enhancing the principles of international law and achieving social justice on the international level;
- Fostering better relations with neighboring countries.

Furthermore, Muzakki explained that Indonesia's foreign policy was also driven by the Indonesian public's historical background as a Dutch colony, which compelled the Indonesian people to help ensure no one else in the international stage had to endure the plight of colonization like they once did. This also fueled Indonesia's actions toward and during *the Asian-African Conference* in Bandung in 1955 (2017, pp. 18-19) as has previously been mentioned. Muzakki's (2017, pp. 21-22) research also explained that, even in Widodo's era, public opinion and media coverage remain influential in steering Indonesia's foreign policy to certain directions, such as the Rohingya genocide by the ruling junta in Myanmar, where public sympathy and media coverage toward it compelled Widodo's government to send the Rohingyan people humanitarian aid (Kuwado, 2017). These historical and societal elements convinced Muzakki that constructivism can best explain Indonesia's foreign policy (2017, p. 23).

Next, there was deLisle (2018) who used constructivism to explain China's joining the WTO and its behaviors afterwards. deLisle (2018) stated that the Chinese move toward the WTO was a textbook constructivist tale because, for constructivism, a state's behavior can be framed by its socialization into accepting international norms and, from the start of of its Post-Mao Reform Era, China has seeked to join international economy and its primary institutions mostly by accepting the terms of the status-quo. When China joined the WTO in 2001, Beijing notably agreed to some unfavorable terms, although there were also favorable terms like China being treated as a developing nation. From the American side, its policy of constructive engagement with China as Washington brought Beijing to global economic institutions also largely rested on constructivist premises. However, according to deLisle (2018), as is known by now, China ended up using its acceptance into the WTO to defy WTO rules many times and to frame them to Beijing's liking. Regardless, according to deLisle (2018), even China's well-known behaviors in violating its WTO obligations and flouting WTO rules afterwards were consistent with a constructivist account since the chance at shaping WTO rules was among China's motivation to join it in the first place and compliance was never an apt bar for a successful constructivist analysis.

Up next there was Freundlieb (2019) who opted for constructivism to explain China's approach toward territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Freundlieb (2019) based his work on the constructivist approach of Jutta Weldes (1996; 1999, as cited in Freundlieb, 2019), who put the importance of language in the formation of interests. In using this constructivist approach, Freundlieb (2019) stated that one acquires the capability to comprehend how the policy decisions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were influenced by linguistic practices and recall the meaning and connotations of linguistic items for the Middle Kingdom's citizens and administration. This, in turn, would allow one to understand what the CCP leadership truly wants to achieve in its geoeconomics. The term 'geoeconomics' itself refers to the utilization of economic tools to push geopolitical objectives forward (Schneider-Petsinger, 2016).

Freundlieb (2019) pinned down China's self-perception to four themes:

- An upright member of the international community who adheres to its rules.

  According to Freundlieb (2019), statements made by Xi and Prime Minister Li Keqiang also reflect their perspective in seeing China as part of the international community and not an outside force going against the Western-dominated world

order. Even when rejecting to follow the arbitration ruling in 2016, Beijing still pointed out China's right to omit mandatory arbitration on maritime demarcation and sovereign disputes (Liu, 2016, as cited in Freundlieb, 2019). The arbitration case itself was brought by Manila in 2013 to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague against China. It concerned a range of issues pertinent to the ongoing sovereignty dispute between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea (Swaine, 2016).

The linguistic item 'law' was associated with linguistic items such as 'justice', 'legitimacy', 'facts' and 'equity' (Wang, 2016, as cited in Freundlieb, 2019). For this reason, Freundlieb (2019) argued that this means China did not really see itself as challenging international norms as many critical legal scholars would suggest, but rather respecting international norms as a law-abiding member of the international community.

- Growing and strong nation seeking a 'defensive' defense-policy.

  For years, Xi has consistently remarked that China's economic power would continue to grow over time and this would translate to China's global influence improving almost concurrently. However, neither Xi himself nor Chinese media, such as the China Daily newspaper, framed China's rise as a threat to other, smaller countries, since it pursues a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. This reveals that China associates itself and its policies with the linguistic items 'peaceful', 'defensive' and 'cooperative'. For this reason, China was unable to understand why its actions are considered as aggressive by the US or ASEAN member states (Freundlieb, 2019).

- The holder of historical rights concerning the territories in the South China Sea.

  Freundlieb (2019) outlined that Chinese statements often pointed to China's long history to substantiate its territorial claims. For example, the statement made by the foreign ministry of China that not only China was the first to discover, name, explore, and exploit the South China Sea islands of Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha, and Nansha, and relevant waters, but China was also the first to exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over them continuously, peacefully, and successfully (MFA, 2016b, as cited in Freundlieb, 2019).

  Such claims are rooted in *the Century of Humiliation*, which began in 1840 with the First Opium War and ended with Mao Zedong's New Republic proclamation in 1949

(Freundlieb, 2019) where China saw itself being controlled by the West and Japan in different ways for 109 years. This compelled present-day China to swear off being the subject of humiliation and domination by outside forces from the West again. As far as the Chinese administration is concerned, the Century of Humiliation is a warning of what might happen when two elements converge: the drought of military capabilities to defend itself against foreign involvement and regional disputes in Southeast Asia that came to be due to outside forces (Freundlieb, 2019).

- A nation following a strict non-interference policy.

  China perceives itself as valuing the fundamental principle of non-interference. For example, a remark made by Xi in his report at the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress claimed that China respects the rights of the people of all countries to choose their own path toward development (Xi, 2017, as cited in Freundlieb, 2019). China's foreign policy has also claimed to be dedicated toward promoting non-interference in the domestic politics of other countries (Xu, 2018, as cited in Freundlieb, 2019).

Freundlieb (2019) noted that many Chinese foreign policy statements carry this motive and are commonly associated with linguistic items such as 'international law', 'justice' or 'bully'. Thus, from the perspectives of China, this non-interference principle allows it to demand respect for its sovereignty in the South China Sea and to reiterate its commitment to international law since non-interference is central in the UN Charta.

To add, Chinese sources commonly view the US as a self-declared world police intruding regions outside of its hemisphere, limiting Chinese growth, and showing little respect toward international law. Interestingly, Chinese sources often portray ASEAN member states, including the ones China has territorial disputes with (namely Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam) under friendly and warm light, including by calling them good neighbors, good partners, and good friends, and highlighting the cooperation to maintain stability in the region (Freundlieb, 2019).

Freundlieb (2019) closed out his research by saying that, although broad concepts such as power, wealth, and security are not misplaced in analyzing Chinese's approach in the South China Sea, one element that is often neglected in this topic is emotions. Especially so since the humiliation and pain China had to endure strongly influenced the decision-making of Beijing. Freundlieb (2019) opined that comprehending why individuals act a

certain way can be explored from their perspective on an issue, which in turn is exposed by their choice of linguistic items and chains of associations.

Finally, as mentioned previously, the research of Gerstl (2020), who has successfully utilized constructivism to explain Malaysia's hedging strategy towards China under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad from 2018 to 2020. In analyzing Malaysia's decision to further hedge against China, Gerstl found it important to examine the perspectives of Malaysian leadership regarding the risk and the opportunities carried by China from his speeches and interviews. According to Gerstl, Mahathir, who was conscious of Malaysia's limited influence on China, considered China's behavior to be ideal-typical for a great power. Malaysia under Mahathir eventually opted to hedge against China due to a mix of risks and opportunities concerning China's behavior and the strategic options which were available for Malaysia. The BRI and closer economic relations with China were the opportunities Mahathir generally highlighted in the bilateral Malaysia-China ties. While he clearly stated the risks of getting closer with China, such as economic reliance, Chinese immigration, and decreasing autonomy in decision-making, he nonetheless played their danger down. Mahathir also verbally soft-pedaled the risk posed by Chinese behavior toward the territorial integrity of Malaysia and Malaysia's claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea. Instead, the heightened risk of a military, notably naval confrontation between China and the US due to Washington's *Freedom of Navigation Operations* (FONOPs) was depicted as the considerable, yet more abstract, threat for Malaysia as a trading nation, whereas China was not portrayed as an immediate threat. Gerstl's work also revealed that both the BRI and Chinese actions in the South China Sea caused no major change in the hedging strategy Malaysia applied towards China and instead boosted existing trends. As a result, Malaysia's foreign policy under Mahathir displayed the middle power's pragmatism and continuity. To add, the BRI led the political, economic, and diplomatic ties between China and Malaysia to improve, to the point where Malaysia's hedging strategy towards China allowed it to renegotiate better BRI project terms. Furthermore, Gerstl explained that, to avoid the risk of becoming politically and economically reliant on China, Malaysia's hedging strategy also scored another success with it actively promoting omnidirectional economic and political-diplomatic ties with Japan, the United States, and other ASEAN members to ascertain Malaysia's capability to reap economic benefits from all of its partners (2020, pp. 18-21).

With all four studies having been presented in this sub-sub-chapter, the next sub-chapter will outline the structure of this dissertation.

1.4. The Structure of the Dissertation

Finally, this dissertation is structured into three parts, described as follows.

The first part is the introduction part and consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research itself. The two cores of Indonesia's foreign policy, and the history of the US-Indonesia and China-Indonesia ties, as well as Indonesia's place in the US-China rivalry will be discussed in Chapter 2. The GMF will be introduced in greater detail in Chapter 3, including its origin, implementation, and criticism.

The second part is the analytical framework of this research and consists of two chapters, theory and method. The theory chapter will discuss constructivism and how it is applied in this research and hedging strategy and its relevance to Indonesia's foreign policy practice. The method chapter will mention discourse analysis, explicate the speech acts, including its types and how it is used in this research, outline content analysis that is performed for this study, including its steps, include in-depth interview and everything about its practice for this research, and finally explain reflective thematic analysis, including its definition and steps that this research follow.

The third part contains the empirical assessment of this research. The sixth chapter will analyze the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi, while the seventh chapter will examine the interview transcripts produced after interviewing Sukma and Widjajanto. The final chapter is where the conclusion of this research and the answers to the research questions are presented, the limitations of the thesis critically reflected and an outlook on the need for future research given.

Chapter 2: A Brief Overview of Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the History of the US-Indonesia and China-Indonesia Ties

This chapter will start with the outline of the two nucleuses of Indonesia's foreign policy, the Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine and *ASEAN Centrality*. Then, the history between the US-Indonesia and China-Indonesia ties will be examined. Finally, what Indonesia's position is in the US-China rivalry will be discussed.

2.1. Outlining Two Core Components of Indonesia's Foreign Policy

All nations, when formulating their own foreign policy and thereby molding their own social relations, are influenced by socially constructed norms and beliefs. Because no states are the same, a distinct world is thus constituted by the relationships among nations in international relations (Onuf, 1989, p. 59). The permanent possibility of dynamic change within these social relations are likewise ensured by the existence of actors, commonly powerful ones such as leaders, institutions, and influential citizens, capable of shaping, and even reshaping, how one nation interacts with others through their policies (Theys, 2018, p. 1).

Not even the world's largest archipelago, Indonesia, is exempt from this reality. The significance of Indonesia to the Indo-Pacific region arises from not only its fast-growing economy, but also the archipelago's tremendously strategic and dynamic location that spans between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. That is to say, Indonesia is the intersection between four of the seven major maritime sea-lanes of communication in the world: Malacca Strait, Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait and Sunda Strait (Aufiya, 2017, pp. 144-145). To top it off, while Indonesia may not be the most economically and militarily impressive nation in its own immediate neighborhood, Indonesia enjoys greater regional influence than any other emerging power in the developing world. This, in no small part, is due to Indonesia's frequent role as a mediator of Asian conflicts, even compared to the region's major powers, such as China, India, and Japan, combined (Acharya, 2014). In addition, Indonesia has the world's fourth-largest population with over 270 million citizens. At the time of writing, over 70% of the archipelago's citizens are between the ages of 15 and 64, making Indonesia benefit from a demographic advantage commonly known as the 'demographic dividend'. These facts matter for Indonesia because this statistical occurrence is a desirable quality for global investors and a redoubtable

impetus for economic growth. To add, a demographic dividend has also historically contributed to an increase in a country's foreign direct investment (Wirakusumah, 2023), which is pertinent for Indonesia because the free flow of capital across national borders could pave ways for the capital to find the highest return rate, encourage the trend of best practices in the rules of accounting, legal traditions, and corporate governance, and restricts the government's capability to proffer bad policies. FDI allows opening up the paths for transfer of technology, generating profits that can contribute to corporate tax revenues in the host country, and providing its recipients with employee training that can improve the human capital development in the host country (Feldstein, 2000; Razin & Sadka, n.d., as cited in Loungani & Razin, 2001).

At any rate, being an emerging power in Southeast Asia necessitates Indonesia having to be able to properly conduct its foreign policy in order to continue growing and fulfilling its potentials, including in dealing with the growing tension between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific region. At the nucleus of Indonesia's contemporary foreign policy are the Free-and-Active doctrine and ASEAN Centrality. Hence, it is necessary to understand both components to truly comprehend Indonesia's foreign policy history and choices.

2.1.1. Free-and-Active Doctrine

The Free-and-Active doctrine was first introduced in a speech by Hatta on September 2, 1948 (Adryamarthanino, 2022), a little over three years after Indonesia declared its independence on August 17, 1945. The idea to set this principle in motion toward Indonesia's foreign policy came to Hatta after realizing that the promises and potentials of the then newly-independent Indonesia was put in danger due to the threat of the Cold War (Ryvantya, 2022). In a speech that is now known as *Mendajung di Antara Dua Karang* (or *Rowing Between Two Reefs* in English), that was later rewritten with added detail by Hatta himself in the 1953 issue of Foreign Affairs (Murtado, 2022), he likened Indonesia's fate to a small boat trapped between two giant reefs due to its being a newborn postcolonial country in the middle of a rivalry between two superpowers. Hatta was justifiably worried that, in their relentless pursuit for more power, neither the Western Bloc nor the Eastern Bloc would forego injecting their control and influences into emerging postcolonial countries, such as Indonesia and India, who were still busy trying to build their own political and economic orders after a lengthy and often grueling

effort to gain their own independence. Both Blocs are also not beneath trying to discredit any country who did pick their side (Ryvantya, 2022). Thus, instead of letting any other country dictate what Indonesia should or should not do on the global stage, Hatta insisted that Indonesia, as a sovereign country, should be free to decide its own foreign policy while still being actively engaged in maintaining world peace. For that reason, Hatta argued that Indonesia's Free-and-Active principle must be based on humanity or internationalism that is found in Indonesia's philosophical and constitutional pillars: *Pancasila* and *UUD 1945* (Murtado, 2022).

Pancasila (or *the Five Principles* in English) itself is the ideological pillar of Indonesia that functions to formulate and to guide the Indonesian people in the way they act within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The five principles themselves are: Belief in the one and only God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy, led by the wisdom of the people's representatives, and social justice for all Indonesian people (Nadia, 2022). Two common examples of practicing Pancasila in Indonesia are accepting differences and employing tolerance in social life ("Mempraktikkan Nilai-Nilai Pancasila Dalam Kehidupan Sehari-Hari - Direktorat Sekolah Dasar", 2022). Meanwhile, UUD 1945 (abbreviation of *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* or *the 1945 Constitution* in English) is Indonesia's highest constitution and source of law from which all other applicable laws and regulations in Indonesia originate (Sabiila, 2022). It is from these foundations that Indonesia immediately adopted Hatta's Free-and-Active principle into Indonesian foreign policy.

How is the principle Hatta proposed different from neutrality? In the first place, neutrality in international politics is defined as not choosing sides between disputing countries. On the other hand, Hatta made it clear that Indonesia still wanted to be actively involved in the global order, only that Indonesia truly sides with international solidarity to achieve and uphold world peace instead of simply siding with just specific actor or actors (Ryvantya, 2022).

A prime example of this doctrine in practice is Indonesia's involvement in the founding of *the Non-Aligned Movement* (NAM) alongside India, Ghana, Egypt, and Yugoslavia, where over 100 countries (Pakpahan, 2022) made the commitment to side with neither the Western Bloc nor the Eastern Bloc (Ningsih, 2022). This movement itself was a follow-up to the Asian-African Conference that was held in Bandung, West Java, from April 18 to April 24, 1955. The large-scale conference was attended by 29 countries from

all over Asia and Africa who were mostly newly independent. It was promoted by Indonesia alongside Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. In 1953, Indonesia resolved to work with countries across Asia and Africa to decrease global tension due to the Cold War between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc that threatened to sweep many Asian and African countries in its wake. The Colombo Conference was then held in Sri Lanka in 1954 as a follow-up to this idea. This conference was attended by Ali Sastroamidjojo (Indonesia), Sir John Kotelawala (Sri Lanka), U Nu (Myanmar), Jawaharlal Nehru (India), and Mohammed Ali (Pakistan). In the Colombo Conference, Sastroamidjojo suggested holding an even larger conference involving many Asian and African countries, which was accepted by the conference. Indonesia then approached 18 countries across Asia and Africa regarding the possibility of a large-scale conference. In general, their reactions were positive. The Bogor Conference was held in 1954 between the same five countries to decide which 25 countries would be invited to the Asian-African Conference. The Bogor Conference also agreed that Indonesia would host the Asian-African Conference. During the 1955 Asian-African Conference, for seven days, all the participants discussed the common interests among Asian and African countries, especially in regards to economy, culture, colonialism, and world peace. The conference resulted in ten principles known as the Dasasila Bandung, which upholds human rights, integrity and sovereignty, equality for all races and nations, and togetherness (Ningsih, 2023).

Back then, Hatta was quick to shoot down any accusation that Indonesia, by fighting colonialism, was trying to create a third block alongside many other Third World countries. What Indonesia was trying to do was simply coordinating the Third World countries to persuade both the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc to cease hostility and live alongside each other in harmony for the sake of world peace (Ryvantya, 2022).

This doctrine and Indonesia's non-aligned stances were carried over even to Indonesia's New Order period. For example, *the Jakarta Informal Meeting* (JIM). This abbreviation refers to two series of meetings to conclude the Cambodian-Vietnamese War (the Third Indochina War in general). The bloody conflict peaked in late 1978 during a battle between Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge where many Cambodians of Vietnamese-descent were brutally massacred by the Khmer Rouge regime. Vietnam then decided to storm Phnom Penh to stop the genocide and, in January 1979, managed to topple the Khmer Rogue regime. Following their victory, the Vietnamese installed Heng Samrin to rule Cambodia, but this was met with strong rejections from all over Cambodia. These

rejections then led to numerous conflicts that claimed plenty of casualties over the years. To stop these constant conflicts, Indonesia employed shuttle diplomacy, where an intermediary nation shuttles back and forth between disputing nations to carry out negotiations, by meeting up with all parties involved in the conflict to broker peace between them. The first JIM took place in the Bogor Palace from July 25 to July 28, 1988, and was aimed mostly to mediate all warring factions in Cambodia. The second JIM took place from February 19 to February 21, 1989, and was attended by 6 foreign ministers from ASEAN, Vietnamese foreign minister, and warring factions in Cambodia. Two of the results were a ceasefire all around Cambodia and, following that, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, no later than September 30, 1989. The end of the Cambodian-Vietnamese War was marked with the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements (Sabat, 2021; Utami & Nailufar, 2021).

Another Indonesian involvement in practicing the Free-and-Active principle during the New Order period was the 1996 Final Peace Agreement that was signed in Manila after the 1976 Tripoli Agreement failed to end the violent conflicts in the Southern Philippines between the government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front because there was no ceasefire following the agreement. In 1993, Manila approached Jakarta to mediate the conflict because Indonesia was neutral and fair in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Indonesia was only willing to do it if all parties involved in the conflict were in on the mediation. In a meeting at Cipanas, West Java, from April 14 to April 16, all relevant parties in the conflict agreed to mandate Indonesia to become the mediator. From 1993 to 1996, there were a total of 77 meetings (Wirajuda, 2013, as cited in Manan & Santi, 2013).

It is interesting to note that, in essence, upholding sovereignty and maintaining world peace appear to be the values shared by both NAM and the Free-and-Active principle. Ever since the 1950s, the Free-and-Active principle has ergo been maintained as Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine (Ningsih, 2022), even up to the time of writing, including when responding to ongoing dynamics such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the situation in Myanmar, and the rivalry between the US and China (Natalegawa, 2023, as cited in Kurnia, 2023).

2.1.2. ASEAN Centrality

ASEAN Centrality can best be understood as the supposition that ASEAN ought to deservedly be the nucleus and prime mover of the evolving regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific. The association's centrality and proactivity are included in the ASEAN Charter itself, where they are supposed to fuel the motivity in ASEAN's open, transparent, and inclusive external relations and cooperation in the region (Tan, 2012, p. 26). Be it with the regional structures mentioned by Sukma (2011) on the first extract or through direct membership, ASEAN is the regional glue that holds key actors together (Bower, n.d., as cited in Tan, 2012, p. 26) and an association whose centrality, combined with ASEAN-centered modalities, can profit Southeast Asians in their engagement with outside powers. The first secretary-general of NATO, Lord Ismay, famously said that the Cold War aim of NATO was to exclude the Russians, to include the Americans, and to rein in the Germans. Then, it could be said that ASEAN regionalism in the Indo-Pacific is broadly meant to keep ASEAN in charge, China in check, and the US included (Tan, 2012, pp. 26-27). In this regard, it is difficult to deny that ASEAN Centrality has elements of hedging strategy. Kuik (2022) labels ASEAN's hedging as Institutional Hedging, which happens when the member states of a multilateral body collectively try to use institutional tools as a pillar to hedge against the threat around rivalries, precariousness, and dissymmetry.

Be that as it may, the current geopolitical dynamic might have put ASEAN Centrality at risk because ASEAN state members do not necessarily see eye-to-eye regarding the US and China. For example, Laos and Cambodia are heavily dependent on China for their economy, so their perspectives tend to be Sinocentric. Meanwhile, there are ASEAN member states like Singapore and Vietnam who enjoy a good relationship with the US, so they prefer to cooperate with Washington (while also cooperating with China regardless). Such disparity among ASEAN member states certainly do not convince the outside powers that ASEAN is united in regards to ASEAN Centrality (Wangke, 2022). More shockingly, around 82.6% of respondents in the 2023 State of Southeast Asia expert survey considered ASEAN to be ineffectual, sluggish, and is becoming increasingly insignificant (Cooper, 2023). Regardless, Indonesia, who served as the ASEAN Chair of 2023, remains adamant about upholding ASEAN Centrality (Nurmalasari, 2023).

There is an explanation for Indonesia's persistence regarding ASEAN Centrality: as a founding member of ASEAN, Indonesia's entry to it was driven by a collective interest to

institutionally enmesh Indonesia into the association. To be more precise, prior to the founding of ASEAN in 1967, Indonesia was still in the Old Order era whose foreign policy promoted nationalism and assertiveness. However, when Indonesia became a founding member state of ASEAN, Indonesia was already led by General Soeharto. During this transition, other Southeast Asian states tried to mold Indonesia's foreign policy from that of assertiveness to that of accommodation by integrating the latter into ASEAN. Due to its participation in founding ASEAN, Indonesia's change of external behavior then materialized. Ever since then, Indonesia adhered to the habits of dialogues and consensus through consultation in interacting with other ASEAN member states (Drajat, 2019).

In the 1970s, Jakarta designed ASEAN as the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy because it served Indonesia's priorities by nurturing greater regional stability and durability from great power rivalry that was fundamental for Indonesia to strive for its own national resilience (Willis, 2017). Now that Indonesia is aware that it can only build its economy in a stable and peaceful regional environment, Indonesia's economic vision has been enmeshed with its international vision. Even now, as one of the world's most important emerging economies, Indonesia still relies on ASEAN Centrality as one tool of its hedging strategy to manage the Great Power politics in the region (Choiruzzad, 2022).

In discussing Indonesia's interaction with great power politics, it is thus a necessity to understand the history between Indonesia with the US and China. Thereby, this study presents the history between the US-Indonesia and China-Indonesia ties in the two subsequent sub-chapters.

2.2. Indonesia-US: A Brief History

2.2.1. 20th century

In all fairness, it only took several years for Indonesia and the US to interact with one another following Indonesia's Declaration of Independence in August 1945.

The Netherlands, who had colonized Indonesia for centuries, came back to re-seize control of the archipelago in October 1945 by piggybacking the British allied forces who landed in Surabaya on October 25, 1945 as the Allied Force for Netherlands East Indies (AFNEI). The Allied Forces, led by Brigadier Aubertin Walter Sothern Mallaby, demanded

the citizens of Surabaya to surrender the weapons they had taken from Japanese forces. This demand was met with ardent refusal, however. Tension and miscommunications kept piling up between every party involved until Mallaby met his demise after his car exploded on October 30, 1945. This led to a fierce war between the British forces and the citizens of Surabaya for around three weeks in November 1945. The whole thing ended after the British decided to withdraw itself from the brutal conflict (Faaizah, 2023).

However, the Netherlands insisted on reclaiming its former colony due to the beliefs that the Dutch must remain as the sole ruler of what they had called the Indies. After deadlocks in the diplomatic arena between Indonesia and the Netherlands ensued in 1946, the Dutch cabinet meeting on July 17, 1947, decreed that war was inevitable and launched a military aggression to reclaim control over Indonesia. Prior to their armed invasion, the Netherlands had told the US and the UK that what they would do to Indonesia was simply a *Police Action* to retake control of their territory (Ahsan, 2017). On July 21, 1947, the Netherlands began attacking Indonesia. The conflict did not end until August 15, 1947, following international pressure in the UN for the Dutch to stop their military aggression on Indonesia. Although Indonesia and the Netherlands accepted a UN resolution for ceasefire on August 17, 1947, the Dutch launched its second military aggression on Indonesia on December 19-20, 1948. This time, the war lasted for months and did not stop until July 1949, where the Netherlands finally caved in to international pressure to stop attacking Indonesia. That same year, the Netherlands finally recognized Indonesia's sovereignty (Salim, 2023) in The Dutch–Indonesian Round Table Conference held in The Hague from August 23 to November 2, 1949, although the Netherlands maintained control over its colony in West Papua. The matter related to West Papua was supposed to be dealt with within the next one year, but would eventually remain unresolved for 12 years (Prinada, 2021).

Among the international critics who pressured the Netherlands to put a stop to both military aggressions were the Soviet Union, India, Australia, the UK, and the US. Following the Dutch second military aggression in 1948, the US reacted by threatening to cut off its Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands (Berkel & Goei, 2010, as cited in Wyrwisz, 2019, p. 75). This was a shock for the Dutch because, during World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt actually favored the Netherlands maintaining its colony (Wyrwisz, 2019, p. 76). This sharp turn by the US was influenced by the fact that, in September 1948, Indonesia actually crushed the communist uprising in Madiun, East

Java. This convinced Washington that Indonesia should gain its independence (Berkel & Goei, 2010, as cited in Wyrwisz, 2019, p. 75). Furthermore, the Cold War was just starting and Washington was worried that a prolonged conflict in Indonesia would encourage Jakarta to side with the Eastern Bloc (Wyrwisz, 2019, p. 76).

While Washington considered Soekarno to be on friendly terms with the US upon entering the 1950s, the dynamic changed for several reasons. Among them are Indonesia's refusal to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) under the US to prevent the spread of communism in 1954 and Indonesia's hosting the Asian-African Conference in 1955 where China was invited to the conference. After all, Indonesia's foreign policy doctrine and non-aligned stance meant that Jakarta was willing to nurture close ties with Moscow and Beijing, two capitals Soekarno visited following his trip to Washington. This caused the US to worry that the Eastern Bloc could eventually win Indonesia over because Jakarta was refusing to align exclusively with the Western Bloc (Utama, 2017).

Around April and May of 1958, Indonesia had to deal with some separatist movements in the peripheral islands ("The Year of Living Dangerously – Indonesia and the Downed CIA Pilot, May 1958", 2013). On May 18, 1958, Indonesia shot down an American bomber over Ambon, Maluku, after it attacked a base of Indonesian Air Force in the city and arrested its pilot, Allen Pope. His arrest and the documents he carried revealed that he was flying in a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) covert mission and thus exposed CIA's involvement in backing the Permesta Rebellion in South Sulawesi that was aimed to eventually topple Soekarno from presidency because he was regarded as too close to Communist powers by Washington ("Allen Pope, Agen CIA yang Ditangkap di Indonesia dan Dibarter dengan Pesawat", 2020). Even more so because, although Indonesia was not a communist country, Soekarno allowed Indonesia's communist party to be active in Indonesia's political scene ("The Year of Living Dangerously – Indonesia and the Downed CIA Pilot, May 1958", 2013). Indonesia sentenced Pope to death in 1960, but his execution was eventually not carried out because Soekarno used him as a bargaining chip with the US to procure ten Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport planes. The planes were then used by Indonesia to take West Papua back from the Netherlands ("Allen Pope, Agen CIA yang Ditangkap di Indonesia dan Dibarter dengan Pesawat", 2020).

On April 4, 1960, the Netherlands held a flag exhibition in West Papua that was accompanied by warships. Then, in 1961, the Dutch began forming a parliament in the

region. Indonesia saw this as an attempt by the Dutch to create a puppet state and hence a threat to its sovereignty by its former colonizers. In what is now known as Operation Trikora that lasted from December 19, 1961, to August 15, 1962, Indonesia began retaking West Papua from the Dutch forces. Although it ended with the New York Agreement in 1962 that saw the Dutch ceding control of West Papua to the UN (United Nations) via United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) (Prinada, 2021). On May 1, 1963, UNTEA formally relinquished control of West Papua to Indonesia, but the whole conflict had caused the ties between Indonesia and the West to become weaker (M, 2023).

Tension between Indonesia and the West grew even larger after the UK when Britain recognized and encouraged the formation of the Malaysian state (Sasmita, 2021). Soekarno considered the formation of Malaysia to be an attempt at neocolonialism by the British and began a series of hostilities against Malaysia in 1963. Responding to the election of Malaysia as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Soekarno withdrew Indonesia's membership from the UN (Nailufar, 2020). On May 3, 1964, Soekarno released the order known as Dwi Komando Rakyat or Dwikora (the People's Dual Command in English) to begin a confrontation with Malaysia. This order is meant to retain Indonesia's revolution and support revolutions in Brunei, Sabah, Singapore, Sarawak, and Malaysia. At that time, Soekarno did not particularly care that Malaysia had the backing of England and Australia. Additionally, despite Indonesia receiving the backing of the Soviet Union at that time, the Indonesian military did not wish to carry out Soekarno's order at first. The People's Dual Command, regardless, gained visibility in several places in the Malayan peninsula and Northern Kalimantan. While tension between Indonesia and Malaysia was high from May to October 1964, it finally decreased over time because some parties simply did not support the way the confrontation was done. Of course, Soekarno losing power in 1965 eventually paved the way for Indonesia and Malaysia to reconcile on August 12, 1966 (Naufal, 2024).

The end of Soekarno's presidency itself began in the early morning of October 1, 1965, when Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI or the Communist Party of Indonesia) murdered six senior generals in the Indonesian army to seize control of the country. Prior to the brutal murders, the Indonesian political scene was fraught with tension between the conservative military leaders and the PKI, at that time the third largest communist party on earth. In response, the commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve, General Soeharto, led his own forces to quell the communist rebellion in a matter of days. Over

the next one year, Soeharto presided over the mass purging of around half a million members and associates of PKI (Cribb, 2015). In March 1966, Soeharto deposed Soekarno from power and replaced him as president for the next 32 years. Today, in Indonesia, Soekarno's presidency (1945-1966) is known as the Old Order era, whereas Soeharto's presidency is known as the New Order era (1966-1998).

Soeharto proved to be a lot more friendly toward the US than his predecessor. Nearly all of the ministers related to the sectors of economy and international relations under his rule were educated in the University of California, Berkeley, to the point that they were nicknamed the Berkeley Mafia. It was these Berkeley graduates who first initiated the application of liberal economic politics in Indonesia in hope to improve the economic conditions of the archipelago after a new helmsman took control of its steering wheel. Also, unlike Soekarno, Soeharto was willing to hint siding with the US in the then ongoing Vietnam War. Seeing this as an opportunity to establish better relations with Indonesia, the US began providing hundreds of millions of dollars of financial assistance to Indonesia starting in 1967. From 1968, the US also assisted Indonesia in solving its food crisis problems that had persisted since the Old Order by supplying Indonesia with rice. As a result, in 1984, Indonesia was able to reach rice self-sufficiency without relying on American imports. In 1969, Nixon became the first US president to ever visit Indonesia. The New Order saw an increase of trade between the US and Indonesia, where Indonesia's exports to the United States rose by 20.2 % until 1983 before it decreased by 13.1% in 1991. The machinery sector also saw an improvement because Indonesia imported American machinery to construct its first satellite, the Palapa satellite, which was launched on July 9, 1976, in Cape Canaveral, Florida. Not only that, a rise of American investments in the archipelago was also felt, because, from 1967 to 1970, the US became the top foreign investor in Indonesia (Setia, 2023, pp. 49-51).

Perhaps the most well-known of all these investments is the establishment of the American mining company, PT. Freeport Indonesia, in West Papua. The contract between Indonesia and PT. Freeport, known as Kontrak Karya, which lasted for 30 years from 1967 to 1997, is notoriously one-sided in favor of the US, especially because Indonesia only had less than 10% of shares. Whereas Indonesia should have controlled the majority of the shares, goods, technology, and human resources, the contract stipulated the divestment process rule of 51% as the mutually agreed rule that allowed Indonesia to enjoy very little of its natural wealth that was mined by the US for decades. Nonetheless, Soeharto's government was more than willing to sign the contract

(Sirwanto, 2020, as cited in Setia, 2023, p. 52). It was not until 2018, under Widodo's presidency, that Indonesia finally gained majority ownership of the giant gold and copper mine (Karmini, 2018). Be that as it may, this newfound proximity between Indonesia and the US in the New Order era allowed Indonesia to increase its annual income by 7% to the point where its status as a low-income country was elevated into middle-income status (Setia, 2023, p. 53).

On the global stage, Soeharto also presented himself to be friendlier toward the West. For a start, he ended the confrontation against Malaysia and brought Indonesia back to the UN. As previously stated, under his rule, Indonesia became a founding member of ASEAN to nurture better ties with its neighboring countries and establish a regional foothold. Soeharto also preferred a more low-profile approach in the international arena compared to Soekarno (Azurra, 2021).

Indonesia's newfound friendliness with the West came to a point where a declassified 1975 memo written prior to then-US President Gerald Ford's December 1975 visit to Indonesia and meeting with Soeharto revealed that then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated that Indonesian annexation of newly independent Timor-Leste would be preferable for the former Portuguese colony. For context, following the collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1975, all overseas territories of Portugal were given independence. Timor-Leste, located in the outer edge of the Indonesian archipelago, was a constant security concern for Soeharto. So, he planned to integrate Timor-Leste into Indonesia. Kissinger's realpolitik view led him to be concerned over a possible Chinese entry to the eastern part of Timor right after the US had just been ousted from Vietnam, and Kissinger thus saw Indonesia as a stabilizing political ally in the turbulent Southeast Asia. In the December 6, 1975 meeting between the US and Indonesia, the US gave its implicit approval of Indonesia's plan to annex Timor-Leste and Kissinger personally told Soeharto that whatever he wanted to do should ideally be successfully done as quickly as possible after the American officials returned to the US. The Indonesian annexation of Timor-Leste itself began the very next day, December 7, and eventually lasted until 1999. Between 1975 and 1981, Indonesia's takeover of the former Portuguese colony resulted in the death of over 300.000 people (Lundström, 2023; "East Timor Revisited", 2001; "State Department, embassy Jakarta, telegram, [text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto discussion], secret, December 6, 1975", n.d.; The National Security Archive, n.d.). Interestingly, it was also a Timor-Leste related event that caused the US-Indonesia relations to be frayed for some time. To be more precise, the Jakarta-

Washington ties were put under a strain in 1991, nonetheless, after Indonesia opened fire at demonstrators in East Timor. This eventually caused Washington to accuse Jakarta of human rights violations and decided to implement an arms embargo on Indonesia that lasted from 1995 to 2005 (Kusumadewi & Armenia, 2016).

2.2.2. The 21st century: Indonesia, the US, and the Pivot

In the new Millennium, 9/11 and a series of bombings by the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network in Indonesia, including twice in Bali in 2002 and 2005, the J.W. Marriott hotel in 2003, and the Australian Embassy bombing in 2004, then made it important for the US to prioritize security cooperation with Indonesia despite Indonesia's lingering opposition to U.S. policy, in particular the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Additionally, the 2004 Tsunami tragedy ended up being the catalyst to broaden the relationship between Jakarta and Washington beyond security issues. The election of President Obama in 2008 gave the relationship between Washington and Jakarta several additional boosts, especially with President Obama voicing out his desire for US reengagement in Asia in his November 2009 speech at Suntory Hall and then Indonesian President Sosesilo Bambang Yudhoyono offering an ambitious vision 21st century partnership between the two countries at a speech to the United States–Indonesia Society in Washington. This eventually made way for negotiations over the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement. However, there were challenges for both countries to realize this potential, not only during the Obama administration, but dating back to the days following the aftermath of World War II: Washington's limited understanding of, and engagement with, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia's precarious economic recovery and growth, corrupt domestic institutions, and suspicion of foreign, especially Western, influence in elements of Indonesian society (Denmark et al., 2010, p. 14-17).

With the benefit of hindsight, both the Obama Administration and the Yudhoyono Administration overestimated how quickly their attempt to usher in greater bilateral cooperation between the two countries would bear a fruit because, up to 2018, the economic relationship between the two nations has made only limited progress in spite of growing American investment (Kurlantzick, 2018).

The lukewarm partnership between Washington and Jakarta also poured into their diplomacy. For example, Jakarta's initial reaction to the announcement of the Pivot back in 2011 was one of wariness toward the de facto establishment of US military base in

Darwin, Australia's closest city to Indonesia, in no small part due to historical suspicions of US interference in Indonesia and what the Pivot would mean for Indonesia's security. Additionally, any move toward favoring the US Pivot by Indonesia might upset the regional balance due to the competition between the US and China (Sambhi, 2013).

The Pivot itself was first mentioned by Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, in October 2011. Secretary Clinton (2011) believed with the war in Iraq winding down and the US troops in Afghanistan beginning to withdraw, the United States stood at a pivot point and it needed to allocate its time and energy wisely for the next ten years in order to sustain its leadership, secure its interests, and advance its values. Thus, the next step was to substantially increase investment in the Asia-Pacific region, whose growth and dynamism is a focal point of the American strategic and economic interests, and a center point of global politics, where almost half the world's population reside, and several important American allies and emerging power such as China, India, and Indonesia are located in.

In November 2011, President Barack Obama (Southgate, 2017, p. 2 & 3) spoke of America's aspiration for Asia-Pacific during his speech to the Australian Parliament. Obama introduced five principles that would shape America's shift to Asia: commitment to security in the region; reengagement with regional organizations (particularly ASEAN); focus on creating a cooperative relationship with China; a pledge to forward shared prosperity between the US and Asia; and support for the fundamental rights of every human being (Southgate, 2017, p. 2 & 3).

The Pacific Pivot did not transform as much as it expanded a number of aspects of American policy, but it did present three broad new features of the US policy that ought to be underlined: new military priorities and deployments; an arguably more integrated and region-wide approach to the Asia-Pacific; and including the Indian Ocean in the vision of the region's geography (Manyin et al., 2012, p. 4). The Obama administration followed a long-standing tradition of the US since the end of World War II of underpinning stability and security in the Asia-Pacific (Manyin et al., 2012, p. 2). Nye (2011) argued that shifting the American pivot from the Middle East to Asia-Pacific should not be seen as neglecting other parts of the world or a clarion move to contain rising China, but an acknowledgment of the great potential of Asia-Pacific. To add, Thomas Donilon , then the National Security Advisor, explained that the ultimate goal of the pivot is to forward the American interests by lending a hand in creating the norms

and rules of the Asia-Pacific region (Manyin et al., 2012, p. 1). Whether or not President Obama's pivot to Asia was a success could be put to a debate. It was pretty telling that President Obama did not mention the pivot in his farewell address, letter, or press conference (Robertson, 2017), although it must be pointed out that the Pivot was never going to be a short-term plan to begin with (Campbell, 2016, p. 349).

In March 2017, Susan Thornton, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State, confirmed the end of Obama's Pacific Pivot since the succeeding administration wished to formulate its own plan for the region (Mehta, 2017). Regardless, in 2021, the US withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan and announcing the submarine deal with Australia are considered both a reflection of Washington's future security concern and President Joe Biden's actual revival of the Pivot by redefining it to his own interpretation (Myre, 2021).The year 2017 also saw Former Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, successfully reviving the Quad, a diplomatic partnership between Japan, India, Australia, and the US with a shared vision for a region that is governed by accepted rules and norms, in response to China's rising aggression in the East and South China Seas (Fraser, 2023). Regardless, in 2018, a survey was published that revealed most Indonesians to be ambivalent toward the Quad (Muhibat & Dzakwan, 2018).

Change, however, arrived with the Biden Administration's reinterpretation of the Pivot, where Southeast Asia is once again under the US's radar. This, alongside Indonesia's omni-directional maritime maneuvers in 2021, which includes signing its first ever bilateral defense agreement with Japan in March, conducting a joint naval exercise with China in the waters off Jakarta in May, and signing a deal in mid-June to buy eight frigates from Italy, meant that it was only a matter of time before the interests of Washington and Jakarta intertwine. Indeed, on June 25, 2021, the US and Indonesia held a ground-breaking ceremony to establish a Maritime Training Centre in Batam, the largest city in the province of Riau Islands, Indonesia. Costing US$3.5 million to create, the training center came to be with the cooperation between the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut or BAKAMLA), the US Embassy in Jakarta, and the US State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) (Darmawan, 2021).

Be that as it may, 2021 did not only bring good news for Jakarta-Washington ties, but also a reminder of the disparity between the visions of both Indonesia and the US following the announcement of AUKUS.

AUKUS itself is a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK, and the US announced in September 2021 that drew strong reactions from many countries (Gunawan, 2021). In Europe, France was angered over AUKUS leading to Australia's decision to cancel their submarine deal. Because Paris was blindsided by Canberra's choice, eventually, the EU Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, demanded Canberra to explain Australia's treatment of France (Remeikis, 2021). Meanwhile, China was incensed because Beijing considered AUKUS to be aimed at countering the Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia almost immediately voiced their concern over the possibility of AUKUS leading to a nuclear arms race in the region (Gunawan, 2021), especially because the AUKUS pact allowed Australia to buy nuclear-powered submarines from the US. Widodo was also annoyed at the fact that Canberra did not share the alliance's plans with Jakarta until after US President Joe Biden announced the strategic pact on September 15, 2021. To add to it, the AUKUS announcement arrived only six days after the Indonesia-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministers two-plus-two meeting in Jakarta where Australia simply told Indonesia that there would be a security issue announcement without deeper details. This whole thing upset Widodo enough to decline then-Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison's request to have a stop over in Jakarta on his way back to Australia following his White House summit with Biden and then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson (Purba, 2022).

Jakarta's strong chagrin over the AUKUS happened because the establishment of AUKUS could be perceived as Washington's way to rein in China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific (Novita, 2022, p. 12) and Indonesia considers US-anchored minilateral groupings not only to underline the imbalance of power, but also to be exclusionary. Not to mention that Jakarta sees such groupings as enervating the ASEAN Centrality since they augment the voices of security goods provided by non-ASEAN alternatives (Laksmana, 2023).

In addition, while several traditional American allies in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, might be more important for the regional military interests of the US, the strategic importance of Indonesia's geography cannot be disputed. Being able to pass through Indonesian waters is a requirement for Washington if the US wants to project its power from North of Australia into the Taiwan Straits or South China Sea. In a scenario that the US needs to implement a Taiwan blockade contingency, several defense planners have underlined the need of the US convincing

Indonesia to help Washington by shutting off China's access to the Malacca Strait (Chivvis et al., 2023).

While it has to be noted that, by 2023, Widodo's stance has softened by calling AUKUS and the Quad as partners instead of competitors (Connors, 2023), there remains a domestic push in Indonesia, be it from some Indonesian politicians or academics or former military officials, to disallow Australian nuclear-propelled submarines from entering Indonesian maritime territories (Barrett & Rompies, 2023). However, the legality of such a ban would be questionable at best since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled that asking permission is only legally required from any nation who enters the sovereign waters of another country, but not legally required if the passage is through a strait. Similar rules apply to waters under the control of archipelago nations, including Indonesia, for all crafts with no exception to submarines and warships (Connors, 2023).

All the differences in their vision for the Indo-Pacific region did not stop the US from becoming, at the time of writing, Indonesia's largest security partner. Annually, both countries hold more than 220 defense activities from smaller expert exchanges to large-scale multilateral military exercises. Jakarta also remains looking at Washington to modernize its military, including by exploring the possibility of bolstering interoperability and replacing the Russian jets that Indonesia currently own with American aircrafts in order to improve their defense cooperation (Chivvis et al., 2023).

2.3. Indonesia-China History

2.3.1. Pre-20th Century

While it is difficult to correctly pinpoint when the first contact between China and Indonesia took place, some archeological findings have led to a clearer picture. Setiono (n.d., as cited in Galih, 2020) pointed out that some ancient pottery found in West Kalimantan, Lampung, and West Java showed similarities to those found in China from the same period. There were also stone axes from the Neolithic era found in modern China and Indonesia that share similarities. A large bronze drum discovered in South Sumatra, calculated to have been from the period between 600 BC and 3rd century AD, also shared similarities to the Chinese bronze drum from the Han Dynasty (202 BC – 9 AD, 25–220 AD). Several Han Dynasty chronicles also revealed that the ancient Chinese

civilization referred to the Indonesian archipelago as Huang Tse. A Chinese monk known as Fa Hian visited the Java Island from 399 to 414 during his journey to India. Some Chinese colonies from the days of the Kahuripan Kingdom (an 11th century Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in East Java) were also found across Java Island, such as in Banten, Jepara, and Gresik, which means that Chinese settlers have long mingled and interacted with Indonesian locals.

During the days of Majapahit Empire (1293-1527), the last major Hindu-Buddhist empire in Southeast Asia that was based on Java Island and whose power and influences stretched throughout not only modern day Indonesia, but also modern day Malaysia, Singapore, and even beyond during its zenith in the 14th century ("Majapahit Empire", n.d.), Indonesia was visited by Admiral Zheng He, or Cheng Ho as he is known in Indonesia, from China. A Ming Dynasty's envoy, Cheng Ho was a Chinese Muslim mariner and explorer who sailed seven times, including to Indonesia, during his journeys between 1405 and 1433 ("Kisah Laksamana Cheng Ho, Panglima Penyebar Islam di Indonesia", 2023). He made contact with the Majapahit Emperor and was permitted to spread the teachings of Islam in the archipelago. Among the locations he landed in Indonesia include modern day Aceh, Palembang, Semarang, Surabaya, Cirebon, and Gresik. Known in Indonesia for his peaceful and friendly approach, Cheng Ho's explorations are credited to have significantly helped the spread of Islam in Indonesia, including in the establishment of Java Island's first Islamic kingdom, the Demak Sultanate (Hafil, 2022). It was established in the late 15th century by a Chinese-Indonesian Muslim called Jin Bun, who is more known by the name of Raden Patah in Indonesian ("Awal Berdirinya Kesultanan Demak", 2023). As of March 2025, Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim majority nation (Wafa, 2025).

2.3.2. The 20th Century

The modern ties between Indonesia and China can be traced back following Indonesia's declaration of independence from the Netherlands in 1945 and the archipelago's ensuing war of independence against the Dutch that ended in 1949 after the Dutch agreed to accept Indonesia's sovereignty (Setyawan, 2019).

Indonesia was among the first countries to accord recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC) following its formation on October 1, 1949. The two countries established diplomatic ties on April 13, 1950. From the very start, Indonesia had recognized the One

China Principle, a decision that remained even when Indonesia severed diplomatic ties with China later in the 1960s (Anwar, 2019, p. 2). Indonesia sent its first Ambassador to China, Arnold Mononutu, in 1953, not long before China and Indonesia signed a two-year trade deal (Utomo, 2017, p. 68). The ties between the two countries were fundamental because Indonesia played a major role in elevating China as a third world country at the 1955 Asian-African Conference (Hamilton-Hart & McRae, 2015, p. 8). In that same conference, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai denied any claim that China would utilize the Chinese descendants in other countries to steer their domestic affairs. Their relations further improved in 1956 when Soong Ching-ling, then vice-chairwoman of the CCP (also known as Madame Sun Yat-sen), visited Indonesia in August. In return, a month later, Soekarno made his visit to China and was welcomed not only by Mao Zedong himself, but also by hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens. In the years between 1956 to 1958, Soekarno tried to apply the Chinese model in reshaping Indonesia's political system (Utomo, 2017, pp. 68-69). The strong ties between Indonesia and China were carried to 1960, when Indonesia voiced its support for China to be accepted as a member of the UN. Furthermore, in 1962, Indonesia refused to host Taiwan during the 1962 Asian Games because Indonesia already accepted China's One China Principle and thus considered Taiwan not as a sovereign country, but as an inalienable part of China (Darmayana, 2019).

Their ties reached their peak in 1965 when Indonesia's worsening relationship with the US and Western powers led to a declaration of an anti-imperialist axis that included Beijing and Pyongyang. In 1966, however, Soekarno was removed by Soeharto. As previously mentioned, Jakarta was pretty much an unofficial partner of the US during the Cold War, so, unsurprisingly, the New Order was quick to associate Indonesia's communist movement with China and to accuse the Chinese of interference in Indonesia, which led to those accused of communist association to be either imprisoned or killed. In 1967, the New Order severed Indonesia's diplomatic relations with China (Hamilton-Hart & McRae, 2015, p. 8).

Normalization talks between Jakarta and Beijing did not occur until 22 years later, in 1989 as the Cold War was ending, when Soeharto attended the funeral of Emperor Hirohito in Japan and happened to meet then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. In 1990, right as the Cold War finally came to an end, the two countries signed *the Joint-Communique on The Resumption of The Diplomatic between The Two Countries* in Beijing. To China, this normalization was a significant diplomatic win because, at that

time, Beijing was still facing backlash from the West due to what had transpired in the Tiananmen Square. Normalizing its diplomatic relations with Indonesia also led China to being accorded the status of ASEAN's full Dialogue Partner in July 1996 in Jakarta ("Hubungan Indonesia-Tiongkok: dari Soekarno hingga Jokowi", 2015).

2.3.3. The 21st Century: Indonesia, China, and the BRI

Going into the new millennium, Indonesia and China remained close, including when adopting the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 and Guidelines for the Implementation of DoC in 2011. Indonesia's ties with China improved under Yudhoyono's presidency that saw Jakarta and Beijing signing the Strategic Partnership in 2005, the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) protocol in 2011, and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013 ("Hubungan Indonesia-Tiongkok: dari Soekarno hingga Jokowi", 2015).

In 2013, during a visit to Indonesia, current Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled China's intention to build a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that drew heavily on historical imagery of the 2,000 year-old Silk Road that ran from China to Europe through Central Asia. Over the next few years, a number of core Chinese foreign-policy concepts have been gathered around the idea that increased connectivity is the recipe for international development and stability. Sea connectivity was added to the road and they are presented as mechanisms by which other countries and regions can benefit from the gains of China's *Harmonious Rise*, by engaging in *win-win* cooperation (Aris, 2016, pp. 2-3).

After President Widodo assumed office in 2014, the relationship between Beijing and Jakarta improved greatly. After all, from January 2012 to November 2018, Indonesia and China had signed 66 international treaties where over 50 of those were signed from 2014 to 2018. Compared to the US and Japan who, from 2012 to 2018, Indonesia only signed 29 and 18 international treaties respectively.



Figure 1. The Number of International Treaties Signed between Indonesia and China. Adapted from Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum & China's Belt and Road Initiative – A Match Made at sea? by A. E. Y. Lalisang & D. S. Candra, 2020, April, p. 11. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/indonesien/16770. pdf. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2020).

As can be seen from graph 3, around 80% of the aforementioned 66 international treaties were signed during President Widodo's first term. Analysts from the United States, Australia, and Singapore saw the current Beijing-Jakarta partnership would possibly put forward the interest of China in fending off Western-aligned powers from the South China Sea dispute and amplify Indonesia's reliance of China to fund infrastructure projects (Lalisang & Candra, 2020, p. 10). Regardless, the rise in identity politics in Indonesia, which gathered momentum in late 2016 and resulted in the increase and acceptance of anti-Chinese sentiments, means every issue which has arisen in Indonesia-China bilateral relations must be handled with great care to maintain gains made by both nations and Indonesia's hard-won yet brittle inter-racial harmony (Anwar, 2019).

In assessing how the BRI and the GMF complement each other, the keyword one should pay attention to is 'connectivity', because President Xi desired to 'connect' China to Europe by way of Southeast Asia and Africa via the BRI while President Widodo wished to 'connect' the countless islands all over Indonesia via the GMF (Pradhan, 2016, p. 7). On the other hand, the contradictory aspects between the BRI and the GMF lie in the issue of illegal fishing and the escalating tension in the South China Sea (Pradhan, 2016, pp. 9-10). Surprisingly, President Xi's attempts to persuade Indonesia to immediately

embrace the BRI were not particularly successful. Although President Xi and President Widodo released a joint statement during President Widodo's first official visit to China in March 2015 that acknowledged how the BRI and the GMF complemented one another (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2015, as cited in Lalisang & Candra, 2020, p. 13), Indonesia refrained from fully engaging with the BRI until relatively late in October 2018 by signing a specific bilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU), whereas Malaysia, Singapore and Myanmar already signed a similar MoU even before 2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2018, as cited in Lalisang & Candra, 2020, p. 14).

In 2015, China released an official framing document entitled *Visions and Actions*, which suggests that three general routes by land and two general routes by sea are at play. They reclassified a number of projects already completed, underway, or agreed prior to President Xi's 2013 initiative under the heading of the BRI. Additionally, Beijing expects foreign partners along the Belt and Road to contribute to the initiative because all BRI routes ultimately rely on mutual engagement of partners and will only be considered useful if they assist the wider aims of Beijing: the economic growth of China; taking up a more prominent mantle in the global stage; and the Chinese notion of international relations and development receiving recognition (Aris, 2016, p. 3). Now, BRI comprises two major programs: Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Sarker et al., 2018, p. 624). In their analysis, Sarker et al. (2018, p. 634) concluded that the BRI would influence the future of global development and hold a beneficial impact for the economy of China's partners. However, in order for China's partner countries to receive full fruits of the initiative, Beijing and its partners need strong coordination among themselves to meet the challenges BRI faces, like titanic infrastructure development and different geography & topography.

An interesting sector for BRI's investment in Indonesia lies in the technology transfer based on article 4 (10) of Indonesia's Law No. 25/2007 on Foreign Investment where it was explicitly stated that, "Foreign investment firms that employ foreign nationals are required to train and conduct technology transfer to Indonesian employees". As a result, China is committed some BRI-related infrastructure projects in Indonesia, most famously the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, included training and some degree of technology transfer from China to Indonesia and generated positive contributions for Indonesia' aim to participate in the fourth industrial revolution (Lalisang & Candra, 2020, p. 16). Other projects bankrolled by China in Indonesia included the $12.7 billion investment of Chinese companies into Indonesia's nickel and steel projects since 2013

or three industrial parks in Qingshan, Weda Bay, and Morowali. In April 2021, Xi even informed Widodo that Beijing would endorse Chinese domestic firms to amplify their investments in the archipelago. The massive inflows of Chinese investments to Indonesia unsurprisingly helped Indonesia to boast the highest number of billion-dollar start-ups in all of Southeast Asia as of December 2021 (Yee, 2021).

However, not everything was smooth sailing with the China-Indonesia relations. In Indonesia, President Widodo's attempts to benefit as much as possible from BRI faced an enormous amount of resistance from his oppositions whom, alongside many Islamic clerics, depicted him as a pro-China and anti-Muslim leader. Massive negative sentiments against China to further exacerbate the rancor between President Widodo and his own public were launched during Jakarta's 2016/2017 gubernatorial election. This election saw then Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, one of President Widodo's most trusted men, losing his re-election bid to a candidate favored by the opposing elites before being imprisoned under the charge of alleged blasphemy against Islam sponsored by the Islamist hardliners, who also labeled President Widodo and his supporters as enemies of Islam. This announced a signal of Indonesian oppression against prominent minority politicians to the global stage and was considered as a prime example of anti-Chinese xenophobia by Beijing. As a leader of the largest Muslim majority country, being portrayed as a follower of anti-Islamic attitude by the opposing elites presented a gargantuan challenge for Widodo to expand Indonesia's partnership with China (Lalisang & Candra, 2020, pp. 8 & 20).

Meanwhile, in China, the main challenge toward expanding BRI in Indonesia came from Beijing's aggressiveness in the South China Sea. Pradhan (2016, p. 11) argued that, for BRI to really be attractive toward Indonesia, China would have to dial down its tendency to strong-arm weaker countries, especially in Southeast Asia. For Indonesia, especially, the maritime domain is key. However, the first semester of 2016 alone saw no fewer than three incidents involving both Chinese and Indonesian vessels in Indonesia's Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands, where the Chinese vessels violated Indonesia's sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the waters. This led Indonesia to question China's willingness to act civilized toward its partner and eventually retaliate by sending assertive signals of its commitment to safeguard its sovereignty, for example by having the Indonesian Navy and Air Force conduct their largest military exercise in the South China Sea waters in the proximity of the Natuna Islands, where the maritime skirmishes with China took place, in 2016. To further deter China's continuing

aggressiveness near the Natuna seas, Indonesia deployed six warships, on top of President Widodo visiting the Natuna island amid the stand-off in early 2020. Jakarta also initiated a cooperation with Japan to further bolster the Indonesian coastguard (Lalisang & Candra, 2020, p. 11). In 2017, China's outbound global investment significantly decreased because the Chinese government implemented policies that restricted outbound investment to deal with concerns related to large-scale capital outflows and to attenuate the perceived risks rapid overseas investment had toward China's financial system ("Is China's Declining Outbound FDI a Cause for Concern?", 2018). This means, even in Indonesia, the total number of Chinese investments have been continuing to decrease since 2017, after experiencing a rising trend since 2010 (Lalisang & Candra, 2020, p. 8).

Nonetheless, back in 2018, then Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Li Keqiang (2018) complimented the strong synergy developed between BRI and the GMF (as can be seen from previously mentioned examples), the fruitful business cooperation between the two countries, and the successful people-to-people exchange. Lalisang & Candra (2020, p. 10) explicated that Indonesia is among the only five countries, and also the only Southeast Asian country, with which China has developed such a forum to discuss bilateral cooperation in politics and security, economics, as well as people-to-people exchanges. The aforementioned forum is known as *The China-Indonesia High-Level Meeting on People-to-People Exchange Mechanism*.

Furthermore, the 2020s has seen the ties between Jakarta and Beijing improve thanks to China's successful *vaccine diplomacy* during the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia, where around 80% of the vaccines Indonesia received were produced by China. Jakarta was fine with reciprocating Beijing's help, too, for example in October 2021 by joining China in expressing serious concern over AUKUS. It is the fact that China kept engaging Indonesia constantly, and not only when an opportunity to one-up the US in their great-power competition arose, that gives Beijing the edge over Washington in their current dynamics with Jakarta (Yee, 2021).

Most recently, in October 2023, Widodo visited China to attend the Belt and Road Forum (Parameswaran, 2023). More importantly, however, in that very same month, Indonesia's first high-speed train, called Whoosh, inaugurated its commercial operations. The first of its kind both in the archipelago and in Southeast Asia, it is a milestone moment for not only Indonesia, but also the BRI that bankrolled the $7.3

billion project. The funding for this project was initially a rivalry between Japan and China. In the 2000s, Japan scored a massive success with Indonesia by building Jakarta's Mass Rail Transit System. Hence, the high-speed train project was seen as an opportunity to improve the connectivity between cities, in this case Jakarta-Bandung. In 2015, both Japan and China submitted a bid to Indonesia (Prakash & Sato, 2023). In what is considered a shocking decision, Japan lost the bid to China despite having prepared itself for seven years for the project, including by having done a Japanese government-sponsored feasibility study regarding the project in 2009 (Harner, 2015). A reason that is commonly cited for Japan's loss was Tokyo's insisting on Jakarta to guarantee a loan for the project (Prakash & Sato, 2023). Indonesia, meanwhile, firmly demanded that the project should not be included in the government's budget and, as such, no government guarantee would be provided by Indonesia. China's willingness to shoulder the entirety of the cost was what won Indonesia over (Harner, 2015).

Unfortunately, the high-speed train project that started construction in 2016 encountered many delays and troubles, which among other things were also caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. It eventually caused the budget to be overrun to the tune of US$1.2 billion. Moreover, Beijing played hardball when Jakarta insisted that it pay the budget excess. Although Indonesia eventually decided to cover the budget excess itself, it was clear that, by maintaining its own agency over such initiatives, Indonesia's actions toward Japan and China underlined its effort to maintain its own instrumentality (Prakash & Sato, 2023).

Regardless of everything that had happened during Whoosh's construction, on October 31, 2023, Kartika Wirjoatmodjo, the Deputy Minister of Indonesia's Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, revealed that the extension of the Jakarta Fast Train project to Surabaya will be worked on together with China (Binekasri, 2023). This potential new project means that Indonesia and the BRI will likely still interact quite closely for the foreseeable future.

With the US-Indonesia and China-Indonesia ties having been discussed by this point, this study will now venture to discuss the rivalry between Beijing and Washington before then discussing Jakarta's position in this rivalry.

2.4. US-China Rivalry

The rivalry between the US and China can be strongly felt nowhere else than Southeast Asia, an area which demands attention and presents enormous opportunities and challenges in the wider Indo-Pacific. For Washington, the US cannot afford to lose the region to China in their competition for global dominance (Maude, 2020). Meanwhile, Southeast Asia occupies a key role in ensuring the success of the BRI (Kuik, 2021).

D. D. Agusman (interview transcript, December 7, 2022) argued that the current rivalry between the US and China truly began with the Chinese economic rise and eventually manifested in the ongoing conflict in the South China Sea.

China's economic rise in four decades (starting from the late 1970s) is one of the world's most significant events in the last 50 years. Not long after the PRC was first founded in 1949 (following the Chinese Communist Revolution), the average income of a Chinese adult was barely above 20% of the world's average. Today, it is possible for the same person to enjoy the living standard of the average world citizen. China is presently the second largest economy in the whole world and can lay claim to being the largest exporter on earth. It took more than an increase in population to achieve this. To start with, China had strictly followed the neoclassical tenets of economy along the way, for example by amassing human capital, industrialization, striving for technological progress, pursuing high investment, and seeking high savings. Secondly China also enjoyed commendatory demographics, embraced an advantageous international environment as its economy rose according to its own pace, and chose a managed exchange rate alongside lopsided export and import policies. Above all, what was really tremendous from China's economic growth remained the structural transformation that took place across the country and catapulted it to become one of the world's most complete production networks (Yang, 2019, pp. 3-4). China's rapid economic growth has now led it to become both the largest merchandise trading partner and the largest import source of the US. However, Chinese emergence as a global economic power has also raised concern among American policymakers, for example due to China's setting up a plethora of trade and investment barriers that decrease the chances of American firms to sell in China and because Beijing's requiring American firms to establish production facilities in China to do business there (Morrison, 2019, p. 1).

Then, how did this economic tension translate into real tension? For the US, its tension with Beijing grew due to China's desire to challenge the US power and leadership to create a new international order. Meanwhile, China considers Washington's refusal to acknowledge the Chinese great power status and legitimacy during what it perceives to be the US inevitable decline as China's point of contention (Sussex & Clarke, 2022). This strategic clash also extended to Southeast Asia because China and the US have contrasting visions of Southeast Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific region (Stromseth, 2019, p. 1).

For Washington, the American vision of the Indo-Pacific region truly began upon establishing the San Francisco System right after the end of World War II. This system refers to the US-led hub-and-spokes alliance model between the US and several countries across the Indo-Pacific (namely Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines) that, for the US, has become the pillar of stability in the region throughout the cold war and well into the present time. No less than the US National Security Strategy and the US National Defense Strategy recognize this system as an asymmetric advantage for the US. The fact that China has risen to challenge the US primacy in the region is hitherto of considerable concern for the US. After all, as far as Washington is concerned, the San Francisco System is a fundamental variable for peace in the world's most dynamic region, and at the heart of the system lies deterrence (Richey, 2019). It is hence no stretch to state that the American credibility in the region depends on its ability to uphold its security commitments and shield the freedom of navigation principles. This concerns Southeast Asia because it is located at the intersection of two of the world's most heavily traveled sea-lanes: the north-south route that connects Australia and New Zealand to Northeast Asia and the east-west route that links the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. It is impossible to undermine the importance of these waterways to American allies including Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. Thereby, ensuring freedom of navigation in those waters means providing Washington with the platform to exhibit how committed the US truly is to the security of the region (Sokolsky et al, 2000, pp. 5, 10-11, and 14). To add to it, in 2017, Southeast Asia is considered as a pivotal part in the Quad's FOIP strategy that was conceived as a framework where the US would assume a leading role alongside Japan, India, and Australia to defend the rules-based order and freedom in the Indo-Pacific (Anwar, 2019). It needs to be mentioned, nonetheless, that the US also has direct engagements with Southeast Asia. Not only the US and ASEAN celebrated 45 years of partnership in 2022,

but the US also remains ASEAN's largest source of foreign direct investment as of 2021 collectively ("The United States-ASEAN Relationship", 2022).

For Beijing, Southeast Asia experiences the rapid rise of China more acutely than other regions in the world due to their proximity and Beijing thus sees it as a testing ground for Chinese great power status on the global stage (Stromseth, 2019, p. 1). To begin with, the trade between China and Southeast Asia has lasted for around a millennium, with archeological findings indicating a relationship that has spanned as far back as the 1100s and mostly persisted throughout history. In the late 1990s, as China was still enjoying a rapid economic growth, Southeast Asia was hit with the Asian Financial Crisis. In response, China employed its *Going Out* policy in 1999 to encourage Chinese companies to invest heavily all around Asia. It took only three years after that for China to become ASEAN's first dialogue partner to sign a free trade agreement with the association. In 2003, China even became the first country to ever establish a strategic partnership with the region by signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia ("How trade links between Southeast Asia and China have thrived for more than 1,000 years", 2018). From 2009 to 2022, China has been enjoying the status as ASEAN's largest trading partner ("China remains ASEAN's largest trading partner", 2022). Beijing's vision for Southeast Asia itself came to fore in 2013 when Xi promoted a highly-dynamic form of neighborhood diplomacy that is aimed at turning China's surroundings into *a community of common destiny* where China's neighboring countries are incorporated into a Sino-centric network that encompasses security, political, cultural, and economic dimensions. This doctrine demands an economic statecraft, which China employed through a merger between economic inducements and coercion to accomplish its strategic goals in the region. The BRI itself is among the projects created to fulfill this objective (Stromseth, 2019, p. 3).

To answer it, this study has to reiterate and explicate a bit more detail into the FOIP and the fact that the present US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific is now happening because Washington and Beijing have conflicting designs on Southeast Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific region (Stromseth, 2019, p. 1).

Although the US adopted FOIP in 2017 for Washington's Indo-Pacific concept, it did not originate from the White House. It was masterminded by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan who, in his first (and short-lived) tenure as Japanese prime minister back in 2007 speech at the Parliament of India who introduced the term Indo-Pacific. He introduced

the Japanese vision for the Indo-Pacific as a region built on shared values, including freedom, human rights, and democracy. This vision petered out once Abe's stint at the top of Japan's leadership ended in September 2007. It was not until 2016, four years after Abe returned to power in 2012, that this concept was brought back not only as Abe's personal initiative, but as part of Japan's foreign policy. This time, because Tokyo considered Beijing's attempt to dominate the South China Sea as a threat to the conditions that Japan's need to grow its economic prosperity, the FOIP was imbued with a growing accentuation on the exigency for maritime environment and regional stability that are open and secure (Rossiter, 2018, pp. 116-117). On November 6, 2017, at the Japan-US Summit, the Japanese delegation elucidated to their American counterparts the goals of FOIP: promoting economic prosperity, establishing and maintaining the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, and committing to the promotion of peace and stability in the region (MOFA, 2017b, as cited in Rossiter, 2018). This was at a time when Obama's Pivot is confirmed to have been ended by March 2017 (Mehta, 2017).

According to Heiduk & Wacker (2020), Japan's attempt to pull the US into adopting its Indo-Pacific concept was successful. Only several days later, the US presented its FOIP vision at the APEC summit in Hanoi that was held on November 10-11, 2017. The *Free* in the FOIP refers to good governance and protecting civil and human rights at the national level and the freedom of all countries to employ their sovereignty without the intrusion from other states at the international level. *Open* itself corresponds to open access to markets, fair and mutual trade, digital space, international waters, and airspace. As far as Washington is concerned, Beijing was eroding this openness principle, for example by militarizing the artificial islands that China built in the South China Sea. The FOIP-relevant documents that the US published made it clear that FOIP is essentially directed to respond to China's behavior that Washington deemed to be growingly pugnacious and harmful toward the rules-based international order. The Pentagon's FOIP paper particularly spent more pages to display China as a revisionist power than actually outlining American FOIP goals and strategy. It is no stretch to say that the FOIP quickly became embroiled in the US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Unsurprisingly, China and Russia have both rejected the FOIP (Panda, 2023).

Moreover, it goes without saying that a hegemonic China would herald the end of the San Francisco System (Richey, 2019), but how is this related to the South China Sea? To put it simply, the South China Sea lies at the geographic heart of Southeast Asia (Leifer, 1996, as cited in Ba, 2016, p. 47). As a consequence, ASEAN member states would always

be affected by any event that unfolds in the South China Sea (Ba, 2016, p. 47). An example that was pointed out by Agusman (2022) was the clash between Washington's FONOPs and China's Nine-Dash Line claims. He stated that he never saw the BRI as the source of conflict between the US and China because he did not perceive the BRI as something that the US was particularly against. However, the US was and still is against China amplifying the Chinese influences. His argument might be more insightful than it initially appears to be because, factually, on May 4, 2017, Washington announced the conclusion of a US-China trade deal. Included in the agreement was a major concession where the US recognized the importance of China's BRI (Meltzer, 2017). To clarify, FON itself is a customary international law enshrined in UNCLOS and dictates that other states shall not interfere on ships who fly a sovereign state flag on the high seas. The said ships would also be entitled to lesser freedoms in EEZs and in territorial seas. Although the US has not ratified UNCLOS yet (as of this writing), Washington nonetheless saw the American navy as an important guarantor of the norms of FON (Kowalewski, 2016). For this reason, FONOPs refers to America's primary tool since the late 1970s to challenge any maritime claim that it deems excessive under international law ("Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide", 2017) via the deployment of American naval and air forces to fortify internationally-recognized rights and freedoms (Freund, 2017, p. 19).

Meanwhile, China's Nine-Dash Line is utilized by the CCP to illustrate Beijing's sovereignty and maritime claims over the South China Sea (Strating, 2022). The concept of China's Nine-Dash Line itself had existed as far back as 1947, but it was not until 2009, during a dispute with Vietnam, that China submitted documents which included a map marking the nine-dash line to the UN (Shukla, 2020). The nature of what the line itself represents has always been left ambiguous by China, leaving the likes of academics, international lawyers, and arbitral tribunal to expound on what China's claims really are by utilizing, among other things, Chinese actions, maps, and policies as means of analysis. What is clear from the line is that it circumscribes around 90% of the three million square kilometer of the South China Sea (Strating, 2022) which included the territories of some ASEAN member states, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This unavoidably caused tension between China and many countries in Southeast Asia (Tsirbas, 2016). In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Den Haag found China's nine-dash line in the South China Sea to have no legal basis in a 500-page unanimous ruling in Republic of Philippines v. People's Republic of China. Even

prior to the ruling, Beijing had already decided to ignore it altogether (Macias, 2016). That aside, beginning from October 2015 to November 2016 alone, the US conducted four FONOPs in the South China Sea without prior announcement or permission to challenge China's requirement that military vessels obtain authorization prior to entering Chinese territorial seas because Washington considered Beijing's requirement to be among the excessive claims that it wanted to prevent. China has unsurprisingly lamented that these FONOPs undermined China's sovereignty and security interests (Kowalewski, 2016). From 2017 to early 2019, the US Navy conducted a FONOP once every two months in the South China Sea. As a response to each operation, China sends the air and surface units of its People's Liberation Navy (PLAN) to verify, identify, and then warn US warships to leave (Xiaobo, 2019). No fewer than nine FONOPs were conducted by the US Navy in the South China Sea in 2019 (Larter, 2020). However, this decade so far saw a decrease of American FONOPs in South China Sea with nine operations in 2020, eight operations in 2021, and four operations in 2022. Perhaps not so shockingly, China has continued labeling all of these operations to be *island-intrusive* ("An Incomplete Report on US Military Activities in the South China Sea in 2022", 2023).

2.5. Indonesia-US-China

Located at the heart of Southeast Asia, it is interesting to note that not only Indonesia even now remains a vital Asian partner for the BRI (Grossman, 2021), but also the country with the best position, both from the economic and strategic perspectives, to provide Washington's Pivot to Asia with the counter-weight to Beijing and Moscow in the region (Weiss, 2016).

Regardless, the ongoing rivalry between Beijing and Washington in the region led hedging to be a foreign policy optioned by most countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia (Valencia, 2023). Going by its pure definition, hedging is supposed to furnish smaller powers with indemnity against the inimical impacts of the capriciousness of a great power (Gerstl, 2020, p. 109). However, in contrast with most ASEAN countries, whose hedging strategy depends heavily on their attachment to the US or China, Indonesia employs its hedging strategy flexibly because Jakarta is reluctant to trade off its strategic autonomy to acquire any potential benefit exclusive to hedging with either great power. Other reasons for Indonesia's choice include the fact that (Javadi, 2016):

Indonesia benefits from an economic engagement with China;

- The activities of China as an emerging power is concerning for Jakarta, but not yet to the point where they pose a fundamental threat to the Indonesian interests;
- China constructs at least part of its policies toward Indonesia within the context of its competition with the status-quo power (the United States).

Hamilton-Hart & McRae (2015, pp. 1 & 24) stated that, as a developing country attempting to balance its relationship with both Beijing and Washington, a productive relationship with both world powers is possible for Indonesia due to its flexible foreign policy. Middle-power status in a relatively temperate strategic environment is something Indonesia would likely continue to enjoy, for only time shall tell if Indonesia can live up to its *big country* goals as the security environment of Southeast Asia changes.

The prescience of their conclusion is supported by insight from Luhut B. Pandjaitan (2018), Indonesia's former Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, who expressed that aligning with either side exclusively would eviscerate any leverage that Indonesia has in its relations with both the US and China. He stated that Indonesia enjoys the luxury of being situated in the middle of a shifting balance in Asia and this provides the archipelago with the ability to play an honest broker's role in relations between China and the US, a role Indonesia does not covet but would accept gracefully should the two world powers consider Indonesia a credible intermediary (Pandjaitan, 2018).

Regardless of Indonesia's willingness to be a good neighbor, Jakarta never thought twice about protecting the sovereignty of the archipelago in the region. After all, while Indonesia has neither formally claimed any South China Sea area or having any conflict with China on the North Natuna Sea, in reality the archipelago does have overlapping claims with China in the North Natuna Sea since Beijing considers some parts of the area to fall under China's Nine-Dash Line (Pratama, 2023). In addition, Widodo's presidency still saw Indonesia boosting its military and law enforcement capability in the area (Connelly, 2017). In July 2017, Indonesian Maritime Ministry (Sulistiawan, 2017) even released a new official map where Indonesia's territorial waters northeast of the Natuna Islands (or the far southern end of the South China Sea) that fall under Indonesia's claimed EEZ were renamed the North Natuna Sea. Notably, prior to the announcement, Widodo made two high-profile visits to the Indonesian military base at Ranai on Natuna Besar (where the administrative center of the Natuna archipelago is located) to display

his readiness in protecting the sovereignty of Indonesia, particularly concerning the rights of the islands and Indonesia over the resources in the adjoining EEZ (Connelly, 2017). Additionally, Agusman (2022) revealed that Indonesia never had any problem cooperating with China, whether in terms of economic cooperation, including in Indonesia's nickel industries and the high-speed train project. However, when China was bothering Indonesia in the Natuna waters, Indonesia was more than willing to rise to the occasion. He said that many other countries might have hesitated, but, despite being fine with befriending anybody, Indonesia does not accept having the Indonesian sovereignty questioned. This is why the strong economic ties between Indonesia and China did not stop Indonesia from pushing back against Chinese territorial claims near Indonesia's Natuna Islands (Lin et al., 2020, p. 14).

Jakarta's renaming Natuna waters was considered by Indonesia's Maritime Research Institute as Indonesia's decision to further develop a foundation for the archipelago to become the GMF by sending a strong signal to other countries about how serious Indonesia is in establishing international legal certainty to avoid further frictions in the region (Rompon, 2017, as cited in Sulistiawan, 2017). Indonesia's decision quickly drew China's ire and Beijing wasted no time in protesting it. China even demanded for Indonesia to cancel the name change (Chakravarty, 2017) since the EEZ renamed by Indonesia overlapped with China's nine-dash line (Connelly, 2017). China's complaint, however, fell on deaf ears. Former Indonesian Maritime and Fisheries Minister, Susi Pudjiastuti (2017, as cited in Ariyani, 2017), for instance, simply stated that Indonesia has the sole rights to name Indonesian waters.

Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) or Indonesia's Institute of Sciences, the Indonesian governmental authority for the archipelago's science and research before its dissolution in 2021, considered the renaming of the Natuna waters by Indonesia to be justifiable based on three reasons ("Laut Natuna Utara: Penegasan Kedaulatan Indonesia", 2017):

- Since Indonesia was acknowledged as an archipelago by UNCLOS 1982, Indonesia's rights to determine the borders and the names of its territorial waters has therefore been solidified;

- The renaming of the North Natuna Sea was conducted only to and under the jurisdiction of Indonesian seas, not the South China Sea as a whole. The South China Sea is a semi-closed area to the west of the Pacific Ocean and is encircled by the

lands of Southeast Asia. Every archipelago who directly borders the South China Sea reserves their right to determine their sea borders;

- The renaming of the North Natuna Sea was done in order to reinforce Indonesia's sovereignty over the North Natuna Sea area. This is vital considering the fact that the strategic location of that area in the borders that are prone to be misused by certain parties, such as the rampant illegal fishing by boats or ships flying the flags of foreign nations.

So, what does Indonesia's Natuna decision and China's reaction to it mean as far as Jakarta's reaction to Washington's interests in the South China Sea go? From the political and diplomatic perspectives, Indonesia is closer to the US than it is to China, especially since both Indonesia and the US accept that China wishes to dominate the Indo-Pacific. However, this does not mean that Indonesia has taken the American side in the region, since the Free-and-Active doctrine still drives every Indonesian foreign policy.

For example, the fact that the shared Indonesian-American perspectives regarding China's Indo-Pacific ambitions did not stop Indonesia from rejecting a 2020 proposal by the US to permit the American P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance planes to land and refuel in Indonesia. For context, the P-8 plays a key role for the US to keep an eye on Chinese military activity in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the tenets of the Free-and-Active doctrine means that Indonesia does not permit the operation of foreign militaries in Indonesian territories. Not even the United States' (Allard, 2020).

Dino Patti Djalal (2020, as cited in Allard, 2020), a former Indonesian ambassador to the US, explained that Indonesia and the region felt distraught over Washington's combative and unsuitable anti-China policy. Keeping in mind the strong economic ties that Indonesia has with China, it became clear as to why Indonesia did not wish to be bilked into an anti-China campaign by the US. Greg Poling (2020, as cited in Allard, 2020), a Southeast Asia analyst from CSIS Washington, has labeled the US's attempt to get the landing rights for American spy planes from Indonesia a maladroit overreach that indicates just how little exactly the US government understand Indonesia, because, to begin with, Jakarta would never allow Washington to put American boots on Indonesian ground.

Indonesia's defense ties with the US also did not alter Indonesia's refusal to recognize Taiwan as a country. Following the visit of Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the United

States House of Representatives, to Taiwan in August 2022 that drew China's spleen, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry called for tension to be reduced by all parties involved, but nonetheless confirmed that Indonesia still recognized China as the only China in the world (Medistiara, 2022).

All of the aforementioned examples sum up Indonesia's response to the US-China tension in the South China Sea perfectly: Indonesia wants none of it. Should Indonesia be pushed to make a decision, Indonesia would always follow its own long standing foreign policy tenets first and everything else second.

With the US-Indonesia and China Indonesia ties, alongside Indonesia's position in the US-China rivalry having been discussed, the next chapter will venture to discuss the most important element of this study: Indonesia's GMF.

Chapter 3: Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum

Of the foreign policy strategies employed by Indonesia since entering the 21st century, none so far is more ambitious in scale than the GMF.

This chapter will begin by outlining the GMF origin and addressing its scholarship as the maritime strategy of Indonesia and what obstacles it had to contend with. It is then followed up by addressing the geostrategic influence behind its creation, and then by its implementation. Finally, how it interacts with the BRI and then with the Pivot will be discussed. Finally, criticism toward the GMF will be discussed.

3.1. The GMF's Origin

The GMF is the brainchild of two Indonesian IR scholars (Yakti & Susanto, 2017, p. 114):

- Rizal Sukma, former Executive Director of (CSIS Indonesia and former Indonesia's Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ireland and the International Maritime Organization (IMO);
- Andi Widjajanto, former Cabinet Secretary and former Governor of Lemhannas (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional or the National Defense Institution).

During Widodo's presidential campaign in 2014, both men were part of his campaign team and suggested the idea of the GMF to Widodo, which he accepted. Upon winning the Presidential office, Widodo adopted it in actuality (Yakti & Susanto, 2017, p. 114, as cited in Yakti, 2019, p. 154). As president, Widodo conveyed the GMF as an attempt at manifesting Indonesia's geostrategy which sets sail from the efforts to utilize Indonesia's marine assets both economically and strategically ("Diplomasi Poros Maritim: Keamanan Maritim Dalam Perspektif Politik Luar Negeri", 2016, p. 4).

When he first announced it at the 2014 EAS, Widodo stated that Indonesia's ambition to become the GMF depends on five core pillars: maritime culture, maritime infrastructure and connectivity, protection of maritime resources, maritime diplomacy, and maritime defense; and two auxiliary pillars: maritime governance and maritime environment. The GMF envisages Indonesia as a point where many regional initiatives, among them – the BRI, the IORA, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific

Partnership (CPTPP), conjoin by using its strategic location at the crossroads of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean as an advantage. From a conceptual perspective, the fulcrum could impact Indonesia's strategic frame of mind considerably for it not only re-accentuates and plans out Indonesia's maritime defense and security issues to remedy a paradox where a continental army is meant to defend an archipelago, but also reflects an evolution in Indonesia's security outlook where the country's strategic environment is now a priority (Marzuki, 2018). Indonesian leaders not only regarded the geo-strategic shift to Asia as dependent on the rising prevalence of global commerce using maritime traffic through Indonesia (Hamilton-Hart & McRae, 2015, p. 5), but also as an opportunity for Jakarta to establish Indonesia as the GMF and actualize President Widodo's aim to boost Indonesian maritime sector so it could oil the wheels of the economic growth of Indonesia (Andika, 2017, p. 46).

Around the time of this announcement, the GMF was brought into the Foreign Ministry and directed to the the Directorate-General of Legal Affairs and International Treaties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia because the Directorate-General took care of all things related to maritime, South China Sea, sea borders, and so on. However, the Foreign Ministry then began wondering how the GMF was supposed to be construed as an ocean policy (more about this in 3.4), because the Directorate-General only took care of the legal aspects of the ocean (Agusman, 2022). In order for the implementation of the GMF initiative to be properly implemented, a new institution was required.

Widodo was receptive and welcoming toward the need for a new ministry to handle the GMF, so, in 2015, the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia was created as the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Resources Affairs before its name was changed in 2016 into the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs. This name underwent another change into the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment Affairs in 2019 after Widodo started his second administration (Yuniarto, 2020). This decision was considered as a surprising move by A. H. Oegroseno (interview transcript, November 4, 2022), since not even the creators of the GMF thought Widodo was willing to go that far to the point where a new ministry was created.

The Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia itself was a new idea that was embraced by Widodo, especially since many had actually asked for such a ministry to be created in the first place. However, this request was not fulfilled by the previous Indonesian presidents. The concept of a Maritime Ministry itself first came to the surface

during the Presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia's fourth president, commonly known by his nickname, Gus Dur, who led the country from October 20, 1999, to July 23, 2001. Wahid was only willing to accommodate such a request by creating the Maritime and Fishing Ministry. Even then, the *fishing* part never really stuck and the officials working on it were taken from the Directorate General of Fisheries and Ministry of Agriculture. The Directorate General of Fisheries used to be under the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, land fisheries, ocean fisheries, and wild fisheries had no ocean outlook because any oceanic issue was framed from the agricultural perspective. The first minister of the Maritime and Fishing Ministry was called Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, who added to it. He also knew that the idea to create a Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia kept getting rejected. It was not until the time of Widodo's first administration that the idea finally came to fruition (Oegroseno, 2022).

In hindsight, Oegroseno (2022) considers the decision to push creating the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia to be a good one, since Indonesia now not only has a specific mechanism to coordinate different ministries, but also has a strong basis for its Ocean Policy since most of the GMF was forwarded to the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia. Then, Oegroseno (2022) outlined that the GMF needed a policy action plan in order for it to have a legal basis as a government initiative, because it would eventually need a monitored evaluation. It was from this realization that a document known as *the Indonesian Ocean Policy* (IOP) had to be made for the initiative to function. Oegroseno (2022) was then tasked by the Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs to construe that document. The GMF used a Presidential Decree as its legal basis and took around a year of internalized discussion to produce because the interests of different parties had to be accommodated. The whole thing had to be explained to them properly, while at the same time Oegroseno (2022) and his team had to report to Widodo around three times: once in Jakarta, once in Toba, and once in Bali.

Additionally, in 2016, the Indonesian foreign ministry released a document called *Diplomasi Poros Maritim: Keamanan Maritim Dalam Perspektif Politik Luar Negeri* (or Maritime Fulcrum Diplomacy: Maritime Security from a Foreign Policy Perspective in English) and recommended the Indonesian government to accelerate the formulation of the national maritime policy as mandated in Article 61 Paragraph 1 of Law No. 32 of 2014 that includes an all-inclusive strategy for maritime security control without being sectoral in nature, alongside a coordinating mechanism between institutions that is clear

and does not overlap. It is hoped that the national strategy can provide synergy over the older laws to regulate the responsibilities and authorities between institutions so they do not jugate with one another ("Diplomasi Poros Maritim: Keamanan Maritim Dalam Perspektif Politik Luar Negeri", 2016, p. 97).

In 2017, following the signing of Presidential Decree No. 16 of 2017 the IOP by Widodo, the GMF officially became a vision according to Indonesian law.

Be that as it may, considering the subject of this research, this study considers it necessary to mention the obstacles that the GMF faced in the succeeding sub-chapter.

3.2. The GMF's Challenges

In implementing the fulcrum, it goes without saying that Indonesia had many challenges to deal with. Several authors have investigated these challenges previously.

Firstly, there was Sambhi who explored key security and defense components that the GMF needed to address in its implementation that she divided into (2015, pp. 43-55):

- Infrastructure, since Indonesia lacked sufficient infrastructure to move both people and goods across its 17.000 islands and that was why the construction of tolls, highways, and ports were prioritized by the Widodo administration to increase connectivity. She noted that Widodo's predecessor, Yudhoyono, had actually included increasing Indonesia's infrastructure and connectivity in Indonesia. However, bureaucratic challenges contributed to his programs moving at a snail's pace and eventually only seven major projects started during Yudhoyono's second term (2009-2014). While, at the time of Sambhi's writing in 2015, four of Widodo's plans to build twenty four deep-sea ports had already commenced construction, Widodo's administration still had to secure adequate funds. Widodo himself tried to solve this concern by pursuing foreign investments, especially from Japan and China;

- Territorial disputes and the South China Sea, because Indonesia had to protect its vast archipelago, Jakarta had always been aware of the vulnerability of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. That is why Indonesian leaders have always been vocal regarding their concern over the South China Sea being a potential flashpoint arising from territorial disputes and China's maneuvers in the region. Although Indonesia is a non-claimant state in the dispute itself, Indonesia still

maintains a strong interest for the disputes in the region to be solved peacefully and thus Indonesia still urged for China and ASEAN to agree on a Code of Conduct. However, two challenges made Indonesia's desired position as an honest broker in the disputes more challenging to maintain. Firstly, Indonesia had skirmishes with China in the waters off of Natuna, not far from the territory claimed by China's Nine-Dash Line. Secondly, Indonesian government agencies had previously made conflicting statements about the South China Sea. To be fair, however, this happened prior to Widodo's administration. While Indonesia's official stance is it has no dispute with China, in March 2014, Indonesian Air Commodore Fahru Zaini stated that China's claiming Natuna waters to be its territory would impact their security. This prompted the Indonesian Foreign Ministry to reaffirm Indonesia's *no dispute* stance with China. Around a month later, regardless, the Commander of Indonesian Armed Forces wrote that his country was dismayed to find out that China had mapped part of the Natuna region within its nine-dash line. To top it off, Widodo's administration had to contend with the rising rivalry between China and the US in the region as well;

- Crackdown on illegal fishing, because Indonesia suffered from significant losses due to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and this led Widodo's administration to take an assertive approach by destroying the illegal fishing vessels seized in the Indonesian waters. Sambi nonetheless noted that Widodo's policy was underlined by some analysts to possibly increase tension in the region. Indonesia also had to carefully deal with Chinese vessels found in its waters, which led to an uneven application of this policy when dealing with Chinese fishing vessels. Sambhi also affirmed the importance of Indonesia needing a competent coast guard body in protecting its territorial waters, which Widodo started off with the introduction of BAKAMLA in late 2014;

- Military Modernisation, including the points highlighted previously when mentioning the need for Indonesia to boost its military maritime abilities, among which was done by bolstering the traditionally land-focused Indonesian Armed Forces with a military modernisation program so that Indonesia could meet the Minimum Essential Force (MEF). The MEF itself had already started in Yudhoyono's administration, so Widodo's administration had pledged to have it resumed. Sambhi, natheless, mentioned that the Indonesian Armed Forces' assuming a number of prominent roles in matters related to law enforcement and civilians, that already

started in Yudhoyono's second term, would distract them in terms of resources and fundings that they would truly require.

Secondly, there was Negara & Das (2017) who highlighted three challenges for Widodo's plan to develop maritime connectivity and infrastructure across Indonesia. They are:

- Land Acquisition = Even prior to Widodo's assuming presidency, land acquisition in Indonesia has hampered infrastructure projects consistently, especially since the private sector is required to cover around 30-40% of the total investment costs. While a new law was introduced in 2012 to hasten this process, its implementation still depends on the ability of agencies responsible to carry the law out and the existence of a clear operational framework. Furthermore, Indonesia had no nationwide land tenure data that is both transparent and integrated. A well-known case about the difficulty of land acquisition in Indonesia is the development of Batang Power Plant in Central Java, where it took five years for the investors to clear the land alone (Negara & Das, 2017, pp. 9-10);

- Coordination Problem = Another notorious bureaucratic problem in Indonesia is the lack of coordination between governments on the central, provincial, and regional levels. This problem is exacerbated by Indonesia's government being decentralized, because then it was not uncommon for regional permitting agencies to issue conflicting approvals. The Public Private Partnership permission process in Indonesia is inconvenient and requires obtaining more than 40 permits across a plethora of government agencies. The aforementioned Central Java power plant, for example, needed more than 50 permits and licenses prior to construction. Widodo's administration tried to address this issue by establishing the Committee for Acceleration of Priority Infrastructure Delivery in 2016, regardless (Negara & Das, 2017, p. 10);

- Skepticism against Chinese Funding = Chinese investment in Indonesia has awakened a long dormant dubiety toward Beijing in the archipelago. It is common for the increase of Chinese funding to be used as a political tool to lambast the policies of Widodo's administration. Accusations are also abound in social media that Chinese funding is invited by Widodo's government alongside Chinese blue collar-workers and communist ideology. While this xenophobia and anti-foreign sentiments had always been part of Indonesia even before its independence in 1945, today's anti-Chinese sentiment paints China as a modern colonizer akin to the

Netherlands of the past. In the face of Beijing-led multilateral agencies, such as the AIIB, such facile and fallacious views remain as a challenge (Negara & Das, 2017, p. 10).

Thirdly, there was also Wicaksana (2017) who identified Indonesia's challenges for deeper maritime connectivity and separated them into two sides:

- Domestic Challenges

  - Political Elite = According to Wicaksana (2017, pp. 6-9), after Widodo assumed the presidency in 2014, the political arena in Jakarta became a volatile stage between two sides. The first is a party coalition supporting Widodo that consisted of four parties called Koalisi Indonesia Hebat (KIH/the Coalition of Great Indonesia) that obtained 42% of the seats in the parliament in the 2014 election. The second is the opposing coalition, named the Koalisi Merah Putih (KMP/the Red and White Coalition), that was composed of six parties which gained the majority of 58% of the seats in parliament. With the opposition being stronger, they were able to not only dominate parliamentary chairmanship and procedures, but also hampered Widodo's ambitious maritime infrastructure plans, for example by stalling to reform the Transportation Act that would have been crucial for the Sea Toll development. On another occasion, the leader of the KMP, who at that time was also the deputy head of the parliament, outright opposed the Sea Toll development and called such a program a waste of resources. However, KMP's reign in the parliament did not last long because, in 2016, two of the parties on their side decided to join the KIH and thus gave the pro-government side a majority with 66% seats in the parliament. The KMP's weakening caused their critical representatives to try to portray Widodo as an incompetent leader instead. Being the first Indonesian president to come from a civilian background, Widodo also found himself having to stand against a political system whose oligarchic nature is the legacy of the New Order. Long story short, he consistently found the formative stages of his maritime infrastructure plan intervened by people who did not really care about the maritime infrastructure projects.

    Firstly, almost all of the factions in the parliament, regardless of coalition, brushed off creating a supportive political milieu for the Sea Toll program in favor of receiving the aspiration fund. In Indonesia, the aspiration fund is given to

every parliament member (around 20 billion IDR, annually) so that the money can be used to develop infrastructure in their respective electoral areas. Not only this contravenes the law on state finance, the make-up of the parliament (around 60% majority from Javanese areas) would also mean that most of the money would again be used to develop Java Island, whereas Widodo wanted to also develop islands all across Indonesia and bolster economies outside of Java. This caused Widodo to object to the parliament's aspiration, even though a compromise was eventually reached between Widodo and the Indonesian parliament.

Secondly, ever since the start of his presidency, Widodo's administration has seen his cabinet members raising many inexpedient polemics. This usually involved the internal ministerial workings, especially when the government's economic affairs were concerned. For example, the plan to build new highways and railways connecting Sorong Papua and its surrounding towns had to have its infrastructure planning be put on hold until 2017 because of the opposing policies of the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of State Corporation. Thirdly, the lack of political support for the Sea Toll program has affected Widodo. For example, despite his urging toward domestic and foreign investors to invest in the maritime infrastructure, up until December 2015, private business involvement in the project was negligible due to the poor climate of investment. This despite Widodo's earlier promise to remove bureaucratic hindrances over private investments. Therefore, Widodo blamed the Coordinating Agency for Investment for its inability to promote a better climate of investment in Indonesia. Amusingly, projects that were more or less unrelated to maritime infrastructure, such as the Jakarta-Bandung super express train that was at first met with Widodo's unapproval because it was proposed to utilize government's funding despite having attracted significant domestic and foreign investment. It was not until an intensive lobbying by the Minister of State Corporation and her business associates that Widodo finally supported that project.

- Local Governance = In this challenge, Wicaksana (2017, pp. 9-10) drew a similar conclusion to that of Negara & Das's (2015): the frail coordination between governments across levels heavily limited the viability of the project to build maritime structure across the archipelago. The aforementioned decentralization

and local autonomy were likewise unsuccessful in holding local governments to account or promote considerable participation from grassroots.

- International Challenges

  - Regional Power Competition = Due to the rising tension in the Indo-Pacific region around the time of Widodo's rise to presidency, Indonesia's maritime ambition had to take into account resolving the clashing strategic and politico-economic interests of its neighboring maritime powers. The tension caused by the rivalry between Beijing and Washington in the region means that Indonesia had to tread carefully between the two competing powers. Even more so because the cruciality of China in Widodo's foreign policy cannot truly be ignored, if, for nothing else, due to the massive amount of investments that China had poured into Indonesia under Widodo. In the meantime, while bilateral relations between the US and Indonesia had stagnated following the end of Obama's second term, Jakarta–Washington military and security cooperation remained tight. In other words, in applying Indonesian foreign policy, including its diplomacy to support Widodo's maritime infrastructure goals, Widodo was attempting to balance Indonesia's ties between the US and China. Normatively, this stance was correct due to Indonesia's free-and-active foreign policy doctrine since Jakarta does not officially ally with either Washington or Beijing while playing a non-aligned role. However, infrastructural investments and assistance can have profound geostrategic indications in foreign policy that depend on the geographic location of the expected access. Long story short, Indonesia's Sea Toll program was absorbed into external great power politics looking out to satisfy their individual concerns (Wicaksana, 2017, pp. 11-14).

  - Diplomatic Capacity = Wicaksana (2017, pp. 14-16) warned against Indonesia's apparent neglect of ASEAN as a diplomatic tool since it would be detrimental to Indonesia and therefore to its maritime ambitions.

With the challenges facing the GMF now outlined, this study will now venture to discuss the element behind the GMF's creation, Indonesia's geostrategy, in the next sub-chapter.

3.3. Indonesia's Geostrategy: Behind the GMF's Creation

Three years prior to the release of the GMF, Sukma (2011) already argued that the efforts of ASEAN circles did not truly convince major powers, in this case China and the US, to avoid a strategic rivalry in East Asia. As a result, Indonesia needed to prepare itself for the incoming rivalry between China and the US in the region so that Jakarta could position itself in the complex relations between Beijing and Washington without leaning specifically to one side. In order to rise to this challenge, Indonesia essentially needed to ensure regional resilience by continuously calling for, and working toward, the unity and consolidation of ASEAN. By taking into account Indonesia's geopolitical considerations with its strategic considerations, Sukma (2011) essentially highlighted the importance of Indonesia's geostrategy in handling its reactions toward the US-China rivalry in the region.

The term 'Geostrategy' itself was first used in 1942 by Frederick L. Schuman in his article Let Us Learn Our Geopolitics. It was translated from the German term *Wehrgeopolitik* that was used by Karl Haushofer, a German geostrategist who was an expert of political geography. Interestingly, it is not uncommon for a geostrategist to also be a geographer who specialize in a subfield of geography, not only in political geography, but also, for example, human geography, military geography, and cultural geography. Geostrategy merges geopolitical considerations, which combine geographical and political components to decide on the fate of state and highlight the impact of geography on politics, with strategic considerations, which refers to extensive and deliberate implementations of measures to accomplish a core objective or to crucial assets of military importance (ur Rehman, 2014).

True enough, when introducing the GMF to broader public after Widodo was elected president for the first time, Sukma (2014) wrote that one of the three meanings of the GMF is accepting it as a doctrine based on Indonesia's geostrategic, geographic, and geoeconomic realities as the GMF whose future depends on, and can certainly influence, the dynamics surrounding the Indian and Pacific oceans. Since both Widodo and Sukma underlined the importance of Indonesia's geostrategy in introducing the GMF to the wider public, it is thus necessary to discuss Indonesia's geostrategy when discussing the GMF.

The formulation of Indonesia's geostrategy was first promoted by Lemhannas (the institution that Widjajanto happened to be a governor of during Widodo's second term) in 1972 as part of its Ketahanan Nasional or National Resilience concept which is defined as a dynamic condition comprised of toughness and tenacity that is based on *Astra Gatra* (or the Eight Aspects): socio-cultural, security, defense, geography, ideology, natural resources, economy, and demography. However, while geostrategy is traditionally characterized as aggressive, militaristic, and outward-looking (Endiartia, 2021, p. 86), Lemhannas considers Indonesia's geostrategy to be defensive, less militaristic, and inward-looking in nature (2010, as cited in Endiartia, 2021, p. 86). Indonesia's geostrategy is also influenced by the Free-and-Active doctrine, while in turn influencing ASEAN'S non-interference principle and consensus-based decision-making as the association's primus inter pares (Endiartia, 2021, p. 98).

This also opens up a path to understand how the GMF and ASEAN are related according to Lemhannas: since the GMF is meant to boost Indonesia to greater heights, then the GMF should ideally function in a stable and peaceful region. One that Jakarta maintains is using ASEAN as its Indonesia's foreign policy tool, so to speak, which explains why Indonesia, under the GMF framework of maritime defense diplomacy, was adamant about getting the ASEAN Outlook on the AOIP done. The creation of the AOIP itself not only highlighted Indonesia's germaneness as a figurehead in sculpting the region's economic and security architecture, but was also fueled by the implementation of the GMF, which led to Indonesia creating a proposal to convince other ASEAN member states that it mattered for ASEAN to have its own view of the Indo-Pacific and what role it would like to assume in it. After a period of lobbying that also served as a litmus test to appraise Indonesia's weight in ASEAN (de Lecea & Zozaya, 2022, p. 46), the 34th ASEAN Summit in June 2019 adopted the AOIP as the association's vision for the Indo-Pacific. The AOIP was not intended to create any new mechanism, but was meant to be implemented through the current ASEAN-led mechanism (Ishikawa, 2022).

The most pre-eminent item of the AOIP is that it highlights the importance of maritime domain, and thus also of Indonesia, by viewing confluence between the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific as both a seamless maritime space and a dynamic region where economy is connected and integrated that also happens to have Southeast Asia right in the middle of it all. At the moment, the AOIP is the only counterbalance that ASEAN has against the leverage Washington and Beijing are putting on its member states as the two compete for domination (de Lecea & Zozaya, 2022, pp. 46-47). The eventual aim of the

AOIP is, after all, accomplishing prosperity and development goals to achieve an inclusive regional order that does not necessitate countries to pick a side between Washington and Beijing (Lin et al., 2020, p. 57).

Seen in hindsight, Indonesia's accomplishment here echoed the argument of Sukma's (2019), who stated that, under Widodo, Indonesia tried to balance its past preference for norm-building with more interest-driven approaches in its foreign policy. For Indonesia to be successful, Sukma (2019) pointed out that Jakarta must continue implementing the GMF agenda comprehensively and drive the intra-ASEAN discussion regarding common policy and strategy to navigate the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, this also goes to show that, not even being the main actor in the creation of the AOIP, which, in many ways, is an alternative outlook that combines many goals that Washington outlined in the US Indo-Pacific strategy with regional interests (Lin et al., 2020, p. 57), means that the strategic interests between Jakarta and Washington are aligned. In other words, even under a GMF framework, Indonesia is not acquiescent to the US strategic interests.

The next sub-chapter will delve deeper into understanding the GMF as Indonesia's maritime strategy and what its implementation in the IOP is like.

3.4. The GMF as Indonesia's Maritime Strategy and Its Implementation in the IOP

3.4.1. The GMF as Indonesia's Maritime Strategy

For this sub-sub-section, this study will refer to the work of Yakti & Susanto (2017) because they seem to be the only ones who have examined the GMF as Indonesia's maritime strategic approach.

To begin with, they (2017, p. 109) argued that the GMF is something Widodo's administration inherited from its predecessor but adapted to be utilized for contemporary situations by outlining that Indonesia's maritime strategy has six variables:

- Situational background, which describes the constellations of international politics during the time the maritime strategy is implemented as Indonesia's policy;

- National self-image, referring to how Indonesia sees itself from both positive and negative historical perspectives;
- The role of state, which refers to Indonesia‘s initiatives in holistically implementing its maritime strategy both domestically and internationally;
- Trajectory, or the direction Indonesia aimed to achieve by implementing its strategy;
- Pillars, which describes important events in establishing Indonesia‘s maritime strategy;
- Prioritized Issue, describing the inherited policies and issues faced by Indonesia.

In applying these six variables to the GMF, Yakti & Susanto (2017, pp. 115-120) explained that, as far as Indonesia‘s maritime strategy is concerned, the application of the GMF:

1. Displayed a change in Indonesia‘s situational background. Prior to the GMF, Indonesia had to react to the Cold War between Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. During the implementation of the GMF, Indonesia had to react to China as a geo-economic threat in the region and the Indonesian government’s desire to increase maritime domain awareness. This study finds this application agreeable because the history of China’s aggression in the South China Sea is evident (see “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea”, 2024) and Jakarta’s desire to raise maritime domain awareness is included in the IOP itself;
2. Displayed a similarity with Indonesia‘s previous national self-image. Pre-GMF, the legacies of the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires were used as a positive historical perspective, while being colonized by the Netherlands was used for a negative historical perspective. During the application of the GMF, the legacies of the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires were again used as a positive historical perspective, while the previous era‘s experience of turning Indonesia‘s back on the sea was used as the negative one. This study regards this application to be in line with examples displayed by Widodo himself who positively highlighted the Srivijaya and Majapahit legacies and negatively underlined Indonesia’s colonial history (see “Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo Pada Silaturahmi dengan Penerima Penghargaan Adibakti Mina Bahari Tahun 2015, di Istana Negara, Jakarta, 11 Desember 2015”, 2015; Yuwono, 2014, pp. 153-154);

3. Displayed a change in Indonesia‘s role of the state in maritime strategy. Previously, the state‘s role was an inward-looking one by preparing its maritime strategy to handle domestic threats. During the GMF, the state‘s role was an outward-looking one by preparing its maritime strategy to handle geoeconomic threats from other countries. This change happened because the perception of threats have shifted from the confrontational Cold War geopolitics to geoeconomic threats posed by other nations. This application has some traction based on the fact that Indonesia did increase its efforts to combat illegal fishing conducted by many foreign boats, including in Widodo’s first term. As of 2018, Indonesia had sunk 488 foreign boats caught committing illegal fishing within the archipelago (Kembaren, 2018);

4. Displayed a similarity in Indonesia‘s trajectory. Pre-GMF, Indonesia‘s trajectory was to have the dominant navy in the Southeast Asian region. During the GMF, Indonesia‘s trajectory was to be a mediating force and a balancing power in the Asia-Pacific region. However, this study believes that this trajectory might not be entirely realistic since Indonesia does not have any real way to contend with American or Chinese navies to be the most dominant navy in the region;

5. Displayed a change in Indonesia‘s maritime strategy pillars. Previously, the pillars of Indonesia‘s maritime strategy included fundamental events such as sea wars and being acknowledged as an archipelagic state. During the GMF, Indonesia's trajectory changed into more contemporary issues such as problems related to borders, logistics, distribution, and maritime regionalism. The existence of Widodo’s Sea Toll lends credence to this application;

6. Displayed a change in the priorities of Indonesia‘s maritime strategy. Pre-GMF, Indonesia‘s maritime strategy was prioritized to deal with issues related to state ideology in sea disputes that came down to choosing between diplomacy and war. During the GMF, the issues Indonesia‘s maritime strategy prioritized were more pragmatic as they pertained to the economy and transactional above the waters. Similar to the fifth application, this one is supported by the fact that Widodo’s Sea Toll actually exists.

The clearest available document for the GMF’s implementation is the IOP, and that is why the next sub-sub-chapter will discuss it.

3.4.2. The GMF's Implementation in the IOP

The IOP served as a guideline for the archipelago's ocean policy to implement its steps through a variety of programs and a slew of different ministries or agencies in the oceanic field until 2019. All of this is meant to accelerate the implementation of the GMF because the IOP aims to make Indonesia a developed, sovereign, independent, and strong maritime nation who is capable of positively contributing to the security and peace of the region and the world according to the Indonesian national interests (Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia, 2017).

Even prior to the release of the IOP, it was apparent that managing and utilizing Indonesian waters, be it the territorial waters or EEZ waters, would greatly contribute to improving the prosperity of the Indonesian people. Regardless, as of 2016, these potentials had not been used optimally. The fishing sector contributed to only around 2.46% of Indonesia's national gross domestic product. Aside from that, only around 10% of Indonesia's oil potential had been explored and made use of despite the fact that Indonesian waters had 70% oil potential. If the potentials of Indonesian oil resources can be fulfilled at maximum, becoming a developed country is within Indonesia's grasp (Putri, 2022). Furthermore, Indonesia's strategic and vast waters make them prone to a slew of maritime threats, such as piracy, illegal exploitation of natural resources, irregular migrations, and so on. With such a background, Indonesia's identity as a maritime nation is strongly dependent on how the Indonesian people manage their ocean. Indonesia therefore must optimize its strategic position and oceanic management & operation for its national purposes, including politics, economics, social, cultural, defensive, and security purposes ("Diplomasi Poros Maritim: Keamanan Maritim Dalam Perspektif Politik Luar Negeri", 2016, pp. 3-4). This is accomplishable with the help of the IOP.

To realize the GMF ambitions, the IOP itself has six principles. They are as follows (Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia, 2017):

1. Archipelagic Insight

   This principle refers to a national insight based on Pancasila and the 1945 State Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia that governs Indonesia's perspective and attitude regarding itself and its environment by favoring unity and unionship of the nation, as well as the oneness of territory in social life. Its implementation was

outlined in Ketetapan MPR Nomor II/MPR/1993 tentang Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (or MPR Decree No II/MPR/1993 concerning Outlines of State Policy) and encompasses the realization of the archipelago as a united entity in the security, defense, economy, cultural, social, and political spheres;

2. Continuous Development

   According to this principle, economic developments have to be based on the continuous development principle so that it can fulfill the needs of both the current generation and future generations so that:

   - The utilization of resources does not exceed the regenerative rates of the renewable sources or the path of innovation substitution of non-renewable sources;
   - The current utilization of resources must not qualitatively or quantitatively sacrifice the needs of the future generations;
   - Any utilization of resources has to be supported by a credible scientific research;

3. Blue Economy

   An integrated model of economic development where the developments on land and sea are conducted by taking into account natural resources and environmental capabilities. In principle, land, sea, and air have to be synergized so they become Indonesia's strength;

4. Integrated and Transparent Management

   Integrated management is employed across regions, sectors, and intersectors under one management system instead of having them separated. The relations between them also have to be cleared thoroughly to avoid overlapping. The management also has to be transparent, as in clear regulations, open arrangement and application, and the existence of an adequate and understandable information for the shareholders;

5. Participation

   Stakeholders function actively and according to their respective roles. They must also have adequate information regarding government policy and proper access to utilize resources;

6. Equality and Equity

   No individual is discriminated against in enjoying the development of Indonesia. For this reason, the development of the outer islands or the more remote areas of the country, especially outside of Java, Sumatera, Lombok, and Bali, takes precedence.

Oegroseno explained that the IOP is comprehensive since it encompasses different things. After all, it not only touches geopolitical dynamics in the region, but it also addresses problems such as pollution, rising sea level, environmental issues, crime, and terrorism in order to allow Indonesia to become more developed (2022). Of course, this does not mean that the implementation of the IOP was particularly smooth sailing. As the below explanation will show, some examples of its implementations happened after Widodo's first period was over.

Interestingly, since the IOP is meant to achieve the GMF goals, the GMF pillars laid the foundation to what eventually became the seven IOP pillars (Hanggarini et al, 2022, p. 166). The seven IOP pillars are described as follows (Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia, 2017):

- **Ocean Resources Management and Human Resources Development =** This pillar is aimed at optimizing the utilization and endeavoring of marine resources continuously based on the blue economy principles, while the human resources in the marine sector is nurtured so it can properly support the optimized marine resources development.

  The main programs of Ocean Resources Management include, but are not limited to, sustainable management and utilization of fishing resources, for example by involving the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in activities related to marine and fisheries management in the eastern end of the Arafura and Timorese waters (Ambari, 2019), improving the management, marketing, added values, standard and safety of ocean and fishing products, for example by promoting tuna ecolabeling among ASEAN countries to build sustainable tuna products and traceability in the region (Ambari, 2018), enhancing the protection toward the sustainability of natural marine diversities via conserving the ecosystem, genetics, and types. For example, in 2018, the Indonesian government released two protected marine species, 25 egg-laying lobsters and 1,000 Banggai cardinal fishes, to their natural habitats to protect them from dwindling numbers (Ambari, 2018), and

strengthening the ocean data and information, inventory, and maritime resources evaluation system. A notable example would be Indonesia's monitoring the traceability of shark and ray products to conserve them and henceforth protect more endangered species ("Perlindungan Hiu Paus di Indonesia Lebih Ketat Dibanding Aturan CITES", 2019).

Meanwhile, the main programs of Human Resources Development include, but are not limited to, improvement of maritime services and employment availabilities, for example by providing more advanced equipments, such as the GPS and Fish Finder, to fishermen in Nias Island to enhance their productivity ("Meningkatkan Produktifitas Nelayan Melalui Bantuan Teknologi dan Kualitas Peralatan", 2018), enhancement and strengthening of the role of science and technology, research, and the improvement of maritime information system, such as the application of rob calendar for coastal areas to monitor the movements of tides in anticipation of greater threats such as the tsunami (Aris, 2018), creating a maritime-oriented educational curriculum, which was done by the Coordinating Ministry ("Kurikulum Kemaritiman Tak Akan Menambah Pelajaran Baru", 2018), providing incentives and educational assistance toward the maritime and strategic maritime research sectors, for example by considering to increase more funding in maritime-related sectors (Jannah, 2018), and boosting the management of maritime science and technology, boosting the science and infrastructure facilities of marine technology alongside developing a strategic marine research agenda, for example by having Indonesia Institute of Sciences perform oceanic research for deeper mapping purposes to investigate into, and eventually allow, Indonesia to build new maritime technologies that archipelago did not have yet (Ambari, 2017).

- **Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and Safety at Sea** = This pillar is aimed at upholding the law, defending the sovereignty, protecting the unity of Indonesia and securing the Indonesian people out of harm's way. Its programs include integrating improvement of defense and security capability and workrate across all waters and jurisdictions, even outside of jurisdictions according to the international law, for example by signing the Plan of Action on Maritime Cooperation with Australia in 2018 to increase maritime collaborations between the two countries across a variety of sectors (Mardiastuti, 2018), enhancing the development in the ocean borders and outer islands, including by accepting grant funds from Japan in 2018 to develop port and fisheries in 6 Indonesian outer islands (Fajar, 2018), enforcing sovereignty and

the law in Indonesian waters and jurisdictions. A prime example of this program would be the sinking of illegal boats found trespassing in Indonesia's territorial seas, including the ones from China, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines among others things ("Indonesia has sunk 556 illegal boats: Pudjiastuti", 2019), and thereby letting the region know that Indonesia was serious in its maritime aspirations (Andika, 2017, p. 47), and increasing the safety and security of shipping, for example by implementing the Automatic Identification System for ships sailing across Indonesian waters as a measure to prevent risks and accidents (Ambari, 2019).

- **Marine Governance and Institution** = This pillar is aimed at creating a comprehensive, integrated, effective, and efficient national marine management network, especially so because an effective and synchronized implementation of the law both nationally and regionally must be in harmony with international marine and maritime laws. This pillar has three programs: arranging a national maritime law system, implementing the international maritime law according to the national interests, and creating a solid, transparent, and responsible maritime management system. The example for this pillar and its programs did not truly come around until 2022, when Widodo's administration launched the Integrated Maritime Intelligent Platform as a command center and data center for maritime events (Ocampo, 2022).

- **Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare** = With this pillar, the ocean becomes the foundation of economic development, including by boosting connectivity and infrastructure across all of the Indonesian waters, in order to improve the welfare of the people, especially in more remote islands. Some of maritime economy's programs are arranging, and developing center for maritime economy data and information, creating a conducive and efficient climate for investment, an integrated development of a maritime economy area under the principles of blue economy in coastal areas, small islands, outer islands, and realistic Indonesian waters, development of business partnership in the maritime sector that benefits all sides between smaller and medium-sized businesses with larger businesses, and enhancement of continuous economic partnership with strategic partners in the maritime sector.

  It should be noted regarding the programs of Maritime Economy that, according to Oegroseno (2022), the IOP made it a necessity for the Indonesian government to

calculate the maritime economy. Under his supervision, the Coordinating Ministry, alongside Indonesia's Central Statistic Institution, first defined the Maritime Economy concept by looking at the statistics of its would-be elements, such as fisheries, offshore drilling, biotechnology at sea, coastal and marine tourism, sea services, and port development. The next step included calculating how much of Indonesia's state revenue budget was spent on law enforcement, a variety of aspects the Indonesian government provided to the fishermen, different insurances, including how much workforce was involved in the maritime economy sector. Up until 2017, Indonesia's marine economy did not reach even 10% and was significant enough at 6% or 7%, where the majority of Indonesian industrial economy, around 30%, were land-based. In short, this was a new idea that compelled the calculation of the Indonesian economy's composition.

Meanwhile the programs of Marine Infrastructure include synergizing the strategic national interests to decide on areas of maritime infrastructure development, development of capability and capacity of national business entities in maritime development and management of marine infrastructures sectors capable of competing on the international level, and creating a good investment climate to develop and manage maritime infrastructures. In regards to the programs of Marine Infrastructure, there is no example more evident than the Sea Toll program.

Lastly, the programs of Improving Welfare include constructing infrastructure and facilities required to develop businesses for fishermen, fish breeders, and salt farmers, for example by directing the Tulungagung Regency to be a fish breeding center ("Bantuan Program Prioritas - Tulungagung Diarahkan Jadi Sentra Perikanan Budidaya", 2017), providing ease of access to science, technology, information, land, and funding to expand the businesses of fishermen, fish breeders, and salt farmers, for example by introducing digitalization and e-commerce to fish breeders so they could better engage their customers (Ambari, 2018), and increasing ocean resources management for continuous maritime tourism for the people in coastal areas and smaller islands, for example by exploring the development of marinas in Maluku and Northern Maluku to increase the maritime economy in both provinces ("Pengembangan marina dukung wisata bahari ekonomi maritim", 2019).

- **Marine Spatial Management and Protection of the Marine Environment** = In this pillar, the marine resources are protected and nurtured according to local wisdom and damages to the marine resources are prevented. The programs of Marine Spatial

Management include accelerating the determination of maritime spatial plan, accelerating the zonation determination of coastal areas and small islands, and accelerating the zonation planning for national strategic areas, zonation planning for specific national strategies, and zonation planning between areas. An example of this pillar would be the creation of Regional Regulations for Zoning Plans for Coastal Areas and Small Islands in all Indonesian provinces which became the basis for regulating national marine spatial planning (Ambari, 2018). Meanwhile**,** the Protection of the Marine Environment programs include enhancing the management of watershed areas, coastal areas, seas, and small islands via a consolidated and continuous management, for example through the application of the National Movement for the Restoration of River Watersheds through Forest and Land Rehabilitation (Adelin, 2019) and a sustainable development of the usage and infrastructure of the coasts and the ocean. An example of this was conducted in East Kalimantan by its provincial government by appointing a team to continue developing sustainable tourism in Maratua District, Berau Regency, in order to realize a blue economy in the Blue Carbon Program for Community Welfare ("Pemprov Kaltim kembangkan pariwisata berkelanjutan di Maratua Berau", 2023).

- **Marine Culture** = With this pillar, a thorough understanding is given to the people regarding the archipelago's marine culture as to ensure the optimization of the continuous and harmonious national marine development. Among its programs are identification and inventorization of cultural values and social marine system in Indonesian territories as parts of the system of national culture, for example the inventorization done by the Tourism Office of West Seram Regency, Maluku Province, of leading tourist attractions, including leading maritime attractions, in a district known Saka Mese Nusa ("Dinas Pariwisata SBB inventarisasi objek wisata unggulan", 2023), and harmonizing and developing elements of local values to the system of managing and utilizing sustainable ocean resources. An example of this program would be the induction of Pinisi from South Sulawesi as an intangible heritage by UNESCO in 2017 (Finaka, 2017). Pinisi itself is an art of boatbuilding in South Sulawesi that refers to the 'Sulawesi schooner' and represents the pinnacle of the Archipelago's indigenous sailing craft that presently can still be found at Bira, Tana Beru, and Batulicin. In these three areas, shipbuilding and sailing remain vital to the economic, social, and cultural fabric of the community ("Pinisi, art of Boatbuilding of Peoples of South Sulawesi Province", 2017).

- **Maritime Diplomacy** = The most relevant pillar for this study, it is described as a foreign policy practice where the marine resources are optimized for national interests according to both national and international laws. Its scope does not extend only to international marine negotiations, determining borders or navy diplomacy, for it is related to every maritime aspect bilaterally, regionally, and globally, be it civil or military. Maritime Diplomacy has seven main programs (Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia, 2017):

  - Bolstering of leadership across maritime cooperation bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally;

  - Boosting of active role in creating and protecting the world's peace and safety in the marine sector;

  - Leadership or an active role in drafting a variety of international norms of the ocean; All three of the above programs share one similar example: Indonesia's spearheading the AOIP in ASEAN (de Lecea & Zozaya, 2022, p. 46).

  - Speeding up negotiations to decide Indonesia's maritime borders with neighboring countries. A prime example of this program is the Indonesian House of Representatives ratifying the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines regarding the determination of EEZ boundaries in 2017, after negotiations that lasted for 20 years (Fatmawati, 2017);

  - Accelerating the submission of appropriate determination of the continental shelf's extension according to international law. The Indonesian House of Representatives eventually passed the Draft Law concerning the Continental Shelf into Law in 2023 (Hayati & Sari, 2023) as Law No. 16 of 2023 ("UU 16/2023: Landas Kontinen", 2023);

  - Improving the amount of Indonesian citizens placed across international maritime organizations. There does not seem to be concrete examples for this program. However, for what it is worth, Indonesia managed to vote in as a council member of International Maritime Organization from 1983 ("Indonesia dan IMO", n.d.) up to the time of writing (Herin, 2023);

  - Standardizing names of islands. In 2018, the Indonesian government delegation had reported 16,056 named islands in Indonesia to the UN. This had to be done

for two reasons. Firstly, one of the contents of UN resolution Number 4 of 1967 is to call on member countries to form a National Names Authority (NNA) whose responsibilities include standardizing the names of topographic elements in their respective countries. Secondly, Resolution Number 16 of 1977 made it clear that any name standardization or name change that does not go through the NNA will not be recognized by the UN. At the time of writing, the number of named islands in Indonesia is officially 16,056 islands (Asril, 2018).

Concerning this pillar, it ought to be mentioned also that Indonesia seemed to prefer maritime defense diplomacy to solve its long-standing maritime security issues, such as terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing in and around Indonesian waters, in no small part due to Indonesia's limited equipment and personnels in securing its territorial waters. Indonesia mitigated this weakness by amplifying its diplomatic engagements in the maritime defense sector both bilaterally and multilaterally. The bilateral examples include Exercise Cassowary between Indonesian Navy and Royal Australian Navy, Philindo Exercise between Indonesian Navy and Philippine Navy, and INDINDO between Indonesian Navy and Indian Navy. The multilateral examples include the Malacca Strait Patrol with Singapore and Malaysia, and several initiatives in ASEAN, such as the AOIP and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and terrorism, transnational crimes, all of the aforementioned diplomatic efforts eventually resulted in the decrease in the number of piracy, transnational crimes, and maritime terrorism cases in Indonesia, which means that Indonesia's diplomatic efforts essentially provided Indonesia with greater control over its seas. This naturally helped Indonesia to realize its goal to become the GMF (Samy & Kusumadewi, 2021, pp. 51-53, 56, and 58).

Another example of this pillar would be the release of the Maritime Diplomacy White Paper by the Coordinating Ministry ("Buku Putih Diplomasi Maritim", 2019). Sukma (2018, as cited in Kusumaputra, 2018) explained that the release of Indonesia's Maritime Diplomacy White Paper would serve two functions. Firstly, codifying what has been done and would continue to be done. Secondly, the white paper would contain an important agenda that is a priority in implementing maritime diplomacy. In this regard, the release of the white paper ensured the synchronization this pillar was aiming for.

3.5. The GMF-BRI Relations

At the time of writing, Indonesia and China have signed several MoUs under the presidency of Widodo. These MOUs were sought by this research to better explain how the GMF and the BRI are related, because no less than Sukma (2014, as cited in Javadi, 2016, p. 1) himself argued that the ideas of what is now China's BRI complement Indonesia's maritime development agenda. Additionally, the IOP (Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia, 2017) states that the GMF has to pay a comprehensive attention toward the bilateral constellations across Asia, as well as several initiatives in the region, such as the ASEAN Community, China's BRI (or *One Belt, One Road/OBOR* on the extract), India's Act East, and the US Re-Balance. If need be, to provide and contribute positively to peace, the GMF can synchronize with the aforementioned initiatives as long as a national interest is met. Since the IOP was released in 2017 and the synchronization took place in 2018, this also means that the BRI has always been under the GMF radar as a possibility for synchronization.

Interestingly, this alignment between Indonesia and China was actually mentioned by Agusman (2022) who explained that the emergence of the GMF and the appearance of the BRI took place almost at the same time. Thus, Indonesian foreign policy officials were faced with *the BRI question* in regards to how Indonesia would adjust to the BRI, and not reject it, in order to complement Indonesian interests with the BRI. Oegroseno (2022) mentioned, regardless, that China's invitation to link up the BRI with the GMF was only accepted by Indonesia provided that China would be willing to acknowledge the GMF on Indonesian terms. It bears repeating that Oegroseno (2022) was directly responsible for the creation of the IOP and, thereby, it can be argued that a synchronization between the GMF and the BRI was indeed a notion that has always existed in the outlook of Indonesian officials pertaining to the GMF and the BRI.

Also, although Indonesia has MOUs with both China and the US, the significance of these MOUs becomes even greater when seen from the Chinese lens. For a country with a common law tradition like the US, MOUs mean little compared to actual signed deals. However, China is a country with a civil law tradition and ergo follows the concept of a good faith negotiation where walking away from a MOU is considered unacceptable since it would add up to *bad faith*. It is a core component of the 1999 Chinese contract law and, under the Chinese law, a MOU is binding if the attitudes of the foreign side account for bad faith (Harris, 2012).

Either way, this bolstering of Indonesia-China relations is also in harmony with the previously discussed points regarding the currently robust trading ties between Jakarta and Beijing. Despite the tension that was caused by Chinese ambition in the South China Sea, China has never really stopped correctly considering Indonesia, with its growing tech sector and rising economy, to be both a fundamental BRI partner and a gateway to expand into the promising Southeast Asian market (Yee, 2021).

While there are many MOUs between China and Indonesia under Widodo's presidency, only five among the MOUs that were signed and entered into the Indonesian Foreign Ministry database were also found to have been made during the period of this research (2014-2019). Therefore, only five MOUs will be discussed in this section:

1. The first of the five MOUs was signed on May 7, 2018 concerning the development of Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridors (RCEC) between the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China. RCEC itself refers to the two sides' agreeing to cooperate in developing North Sumatera, North Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, and Bali, based on the principles of enterprise-oriented, government-promoted, and market-based cooperation as well as domestic laws and regulations of the two countries. Indonesia and China also agreed to reaffirm the importance of aligning the GMF and the BRI in the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Cooperation on the Development of Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridors between the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China, 2018). More follow-ups about RCEC will be discussed below on number 3 and 4, but this MOU by itself is followed up by the MOU signed on October 23, 2018, that will be discussed in more detail on number 2 below.

2. The next MOU was signed on October 13, 2018, and it concerned Indonesia's welcoming China's initiative to jointly promote the GMF and the BRI for mutual benefits and to host the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation and Indonesia in hosting activities related to the GMF. Both parties also agreed to note that, in jointly promoting both initiatives together, the two countries would explore opportunities to form synergies and develop mutual prosperity (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the

Government of the People's Republic of China on Jointly Promoting Cooperation within the Framework of the Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision and the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, 2018).

It appears that there is little follow-up to this MOU. Firstly, there does not seem to be any known program for either China or Indonesia to actively promote their respective initiatives jointly. Secondly, the Belt and Road Forum itself serves as part of China's bid to exhibit the achievements of the BRI to the global stage (Phaicharoen & Pearl, 2023). As of this writing, it has been held three times: 2017, 2019, and 2023. While there does not seem to be any source that indicates Widodo coming to the forum in 2019, not long after the MOU signing, Widodo did join the 3rd Belt and Road Forum in October 2023 ("President Jokowi: Strengthen BRI Synergy and Cooperation for Infrastructure Development", 2023). He even met up with Xi to discuss further investment (Intan, 2023) and expressed his hopes for equal partnership in the BRI when he delivered his remarks in the forum ("Jokowi hopes for equal partnership in Belt and Road Initiative", 2023).

3. The next MOU was signed on October 23, 2018, and it concerned following-up the May 7 MOU by creating a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) for Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridors in order to formulate the overall planning for cooperation on the RCEC. The JSC will be co-chaired by minister level officials from the two sides, establish a joint working group, and have at least one meeting per year between the co-chairs (Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing a Joint Steering Committee for the Development of Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridors between the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China, 2018).

   At the time of writing, it appears that there are two follow-ups to this MoU:

   - The first, and so far the only, JSC annual meeting was in March 2019. This meeting kickstarted China's investment under the BRI framework in Indonesia ("Indonesia-China akan mulai eksekusi investasi Inisiatif Belt and Road", 2019), and was attended by Luhut Pandjaitan, Indonesia's Coordinating Ministry, and the deputy minister of China's National Development and Reform Commission ("Bangun Industri Skala Besar, Siapkan Lapangan Kerja untuk Generasi Muda", 2019);

- An MOU signed on April 25, 2019, after the first JSC meeting, which will be discussed below.

4. This MOU was signed on April 25, 2019, and outlined the cooperation blueprint that China has to fulfill for the RCEC in the four provinces mentioned on the first MOU: North Sumatera, North Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, and Bali. The cooperation blueprint for RCEC is as follows (Cooperation Plan between Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of Republic of Indonesia and National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China on Promoting the Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridors, 2019, pp. 5-18) and its follow-ups are as follows:

   a. Indonesia Economic Corridor I - North Sumatra

      - The development of the Kuala Tanjung International Hub Port

        Follow-up = In November 2019, Indonesia signed a Head of Agreement with Rotterdam Authority from the Netherlands and Zhejiang Provincial Seaport Investment & Operation Group to invest in the development of Kuala Tanjung port in North Sumatera (Salsabila, 2019).

      - The development of the Kuala Tanjung Industrial Estate

        Follow-up = In May 2022, the Shandong Timber and Wood Products Association company signed an investment MoU with the Sei Mangkei Special Economic Zone in North Sumatra ("Kabar Gembira, Perusahaan China Setuju Danai Proyek Besar di Sumatera Utara", 2022). Note that Sei Mangkei and Kuala Tanjung complement one another. An increase of activity in either one means an increase of activity in both of them (Sumadi, 2022, as cited in "Kuala Tanjung Port should improve logistics distribution services", 2022).

      - The building of the Kuala Namu Industrial Estate

        Follow-up = None. At the time of writing, Kuala Namu Industrial Estate does not even exist yet in North Sumatra. Ergo, there is no clear follow-up to this plan.

❖ The Planning and Feasibility Study and Master Plan of the Lake Toba Flower Garden

Follow-up = There does not seem to be any after the MoU was signed. However, around 2 years prior to the MoU signing, reportedly several Chinese investors voiced their interest to make an investment in the Lake Toba area (Mola, 2017).

❖ The Sustainable Palm Replanting for Poverty Alleviation Cooperation

Follow-up = None located. Be that as it may, as of 2020, China was the largest importer of palm products from North Sumatra ("BPS: Ekspor Sumatera Utara terbesar ke China", 2020).

b. Indonesia Economic Corridor II - North Kalimantan

❖ The development of clean energy base in the Kayan River Region

Follow-up = In August 2019, PowerChina and Central Asia Capital Limited invested US$ 27 billion in Kayan Hydro Energy to plan and construct Indonesia's largest hydroelectric power plant in Kayan River, North Kalimantan. The electricity that was going to be produced by this plant was also hoped to eventually be able to power the island, especially since Indonesia's new capital, Nusantara, was going to be built there (Arvirianty, 2019).

❖ The development of the Tanah Kuning deep-water port

❖ The development of the Tanah Kuning Industrial Estate

According to the MoU, the follow-ups to the Tanah Kuning cooperation blueprints have to be run simultaneously, so the follow-ups related to Tanah Kuning are mentioned together as follows =

- In December 2019, Sinosteel Corporation offered to invest US$ 2.7 billion in Tarakan, North Kalimantan, in the form of a steel factory (Poltra, 2019) nearby Tanah Kuning beach and expressed an interest to invest in the Tanah Kuning Industrial Estate ("KIPI Tanah Kuning-Mangkupadi Diminati Sinosteel", 2019);

- In December 2021, Widodo inaugurated the giant Green Industrial Complex in Bulungan regency, North Kalimantan, where the Tanah Kuning Industrial Estate is located, that was backed by investments from China and the United Arab Emirates (Nirmala, 2021). This industrial complex is the largest in the world and is planned to have its own port built in ("KIPI Tana Kuning-Mangkupadi Disebut Kawasan Industri Terbesar Di Dunia", 2021).

c. Indonesia Economic Corridor III - North Sulawesi

❖ The development of the Bitung Economic Zone

Follow-up = Unclear. Head of the North Sulawesi Regional Development Planning Agency, Jenny Karouw (2022, as cited in Yunus, 2022), claimed that, as of 2022, Chinese investors were actually interested to invest in Bitung Economic Zone, but their investment hit a roadblock due to economic recession.

❖ The development of the Likupang Tourism Economic Zone

Follow-up = None located.

❖ The Lembeh International Tourist Resort

Follow-up = None located.

In June 2023, the Indonesian central government deemed the regional government and business entities in North Sulawesi to lack the political will and managerial capacity to manage the Bitung and Likupang Special Economic Zones. Therefore, the Indonesian central government gave them one year to finish up their development strategy. Otherwise, both zones would be closed down (Prasetyadi, 2023).

This does not mean that China has no investment in North Sulawesi, however. For example, in October 2019, Chinese investors agreed to spend over IDR 2 trillion to develop an industrial area in Bolaang Mongondow in North Sulawesi (Pratomo, 2019).

d. Indonesia Economic Corridor IV - Bali

- ❖ The improvement of tourist infrastructure

  Follow-up = In September 2023, Pandjaitan revealed China as one of the three potential investors for Bali's light rail transit project, the other two being Japan and South Korea (Joharsoyo, 2023).

- ❖ Joint development of flagship tourist products

  Follow-up = None located.

- ❖ Bali's Kura Kura Island Technology Parks and Regional Hub

  Follow-up = At the time of writing, Kura Kura Island is already an economic zone ("PP 23/2023: Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus Kura-Kura Bali", 2023). In February 2023, it was revealed that one of the two shareholders behind the developer of the economic zone in Kura Kura Island, PT Bali Turtle Island Development, is Goodwill Property Investment Ltd. from Hong Kong, China (Kamalina, 2023).

- ❖ Joint training of human resources

  Follow-up = In the MoU, it was stated that, for this program, both countries would push for the creation of Tsinghua University Southeast Asia Center in Bali to nurture talents, including in management and innovation. On November 16, 2022, the launching ceremony for the center was held in Bali as the annual G20 meeting (that was hosted by Indonesia back then) opened ("Tsinghua Southeast Asia Center Campus is Launched in Bali, Indonesia", 2022).

  China also invested in Bali outside of this corridor. For example, in November 2019, after signing an agreement with Shanghai Electric Group Corp, the Indonesian government revealed the plan to build a gas power plant in Buleleng, Bali. This investment is worth around US$ 1.3 billion (Ihsanuddin & Rastika, 2019).

  The latest follow-up to RCEC was a promise by China in September 2023 to make the RCEC and a project called *Two Nations, Twin Parks* the new flagship projects for the BRI ("China-Indonesia perkuat hubungan ekonomi

dalam Sabuk dan Jalur Sutra", 2023), before Xi explained in October 2023 that both China and Indonesia will have to work together to promote the RCEC development (Intan, 2023).

5. The final MOU was signed on June 19, 2019, and it concerned the outlining of the development cooperation schemes that the Chinese side will provide Indonesia with in the forms of grants, interest-free loans, concessional loans, and other funds. Both sides agreed that the fields of cooperation may include social infrastructures and facilities, feasibility study for and construction of major infrastructures, capacity building support for the public management field, and short-term training in China or academic and formal higher degree education in several fields. The MOU also includes attachments detailing the procedures for the grants and the concessional loans where China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) and Indonesia's National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional or BAPPENAS in Indonesian) will be the focal point for Chinese and Indonesian sides respectively in any discussion and consultation about the schemes outlined in this MOU (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Development Cooperation, 2019).

It is unclear if there is any follow-up at all to the schemes outlined in this MOU. A Google search containing the keywords *BAPPENAS China International Development Cooperation Agency* provided no result regarding, or reference to, any of the schemes agreed in this MoU. It needs to be stated, in addition, that the two MOUs in the database (signed in 2021) immediately following this one are unrelated to it, because one is about strengthening maritime cooperation between the two countries while the other one is about developing a cooperation for the previously mentioned *Two Nations, Twin Parks* project. In fine, there did not seem to be any concrete follow-up to this MoU.

From the five MOUs outlined above, it can be stated that the connection between the GMF and the BRI almost exclusively took place in the economic sector that Widodo used as a way to bolster Indonesia's economy and infrastructure. This happened because there was a confluence of interests between the leaders of the two countries: Widodo made improving Indonesia's dilapidated infrastructures to be a priority in his leadership, while Xi made infrastructure investments the nucleus of his diplomatic strategy (Perlez et al., 2023). This was why Widodo was eager to embrace Chinese investments in the

archipelago. In 2019, Thomas Lembong, then-chairman of Indonesia's National Investment Coordinating Board, even stated that he believed that China's leadership was willing to do anything to make the BRI a success (Syamsudin, 2019), so arguably Jakarta also trusted Beijing enough to bet on China's capability to realize their numerous investment projects in Indonesia.

With the ties between the GMF and BRI having been discussed, the next sub-chapter ventures toward exploring the ties between the GMF and US Pivot.

3.6. The GMF-US Pivot Relations

Due to both the IOP (Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia, 2017) compelling the GMF to synchronize with a variety of regional initiatives, including the Pivot (or the US Re-Balance as it is written in the document), as long as Indonesia's national interest is met and Indonesia's Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine compelling Indonesia to be non-aligned, Indonesia did not only collaborate with China to realize its GMF ambitions, but also with the US.

The most tangible interaction between the GMF and the US Pivot can be seen from the existence of Bakamla Maritime Training Center in Batam, an Indonesian port city located near the North Natuna Sea and Malacca Strait (Darmawan, 2021).

Bakamla itself was created in 2014 as a manifestation of the fourth and fifth pillars of the GMF to spearhead the security of Indonesia's maritime territories. It works alongside the Indonesian navy and other institutions to protect Indonesia's territorial waters. Presently, one of Bakamla's most important cooperation partners is the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The cooperation between the two institutions started with the signing of an MOU between Indonesia and the US on October 24, 2015. The MOU was not only meant as part of a strategic partnership between the two countries, but also to prevent more threats from approaching Indonesian waters. The signing of this MOU had several follow-ups (Iswardhana, 2021, pp. 7-13):

1. The Indonesia-United States Ocean Law and Maritime Policy Dialogue that was done biennially, starting from 2016, to ensure that both countries are on the same page regarding maritime law conventions (Nusantara Maritime News, 2015, as cited in Iswardhana, 2021, p. 9). The first of the dialogues was held in Washington DC

(Petro Energy, 2016, 2015, as cited in Iswardhana, 2021, p. 9), whereas the second one was held in Jakarta in 2018 (Maritim, 2019, as cited in Iswardhana, 2021, p. 9);

2. An MOU between the Bakamla and the USCG was signed in 2018 (Gunawan, 2019, p. 29) for further joint-exercise purposes that started in 2019 ("U.S. Coast Guard Conducts Joint Exercise with Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA)", 2019). The joint drill itself was held in Batam on August 2019 (Liputan 6, 2019, as cited in Iswardhana, 2021, p. 9);

3. Training for Bakamla personnels in the USCG Training Center in the US in 2020 (Ayo Jakarta, 2020, as cited in Iswardhana, 2021, p. 9).

Their intensive cooperation led to Bakamla being able to receive technical training, improve the agency's technology, adopt safety standards, acquire a maritime defense guideline, learn more about handling maritime crimes, and conduct information sharing. The Bakamla's uniforms, logos, organization, planning, and even usage of the fleet also refer to the USCG's. The Bakamla and the USCG cooperated together to combat illegal fishing, expand maritime science and technology cooperation, increase sea and ports security, and assist and protect irregular migrants movements (Iswardhana, 2021, pp. 7-13).

According to Darmawan (2021), Indonesia-US maritime cooperation culminated when, in 2021, INL and the US Embassy in Jakarta cooperated together with the Bakamla to build the previously mentioned Maritime Training Center in Batam to help the Bakamla amplify its maritime law enforcement capabilities. Prior to this development, Bakamla never had a well-established maritime security training centre, so the joint-project was highlighted by the current US Ambassador for Indonesia, Kim Sung, to be a display of America's commitment toward Indonesia's willingness in assuming the role of maintaining regional peace and security and a support toward any Southeast Asian partners willing to increase its maritime security, which is still in lieu with the vision of the Pivot. A significant geopolitical message was also carried by this Washington-Jakarta cooperation, since the city of Batam is near the North Natuna Sea and Malacca Strait, strategically vital locations where frictions rose during the last decade between Indonesian fishermen, law enforcement and even navy vessels with China's fishing, coast guard and navy vessels in the North Natuna Sea. While Beijing claimed no sovereignty of the Natuna Islands in Indonesia, the waters surrounding this island were claimed by China under its nine-dash line that was declared unlawful by the 2016 arbitral

tribunal's award. Indonesia's concern over its maritime security was worsened by China's introducing a new coast guard law in 2021, which privileges its coast guard vessels with the authority to open fire at foreign vessels in any territory claimed by China. This certainly bolstered Indonesia's drive to increase its maritime security components, including by cooperating with the US, among other things.

Since the IOP was released in 2017, whereas Indonesia and the US signed MOUs in 2016 and 2018, before following their cooperation up to this decade, this means that the Pivot has always been under the GMF radar as a possibility for alignment, much like the BRI.

As far as the ties between the GMF and the Pivot with Indonesia go, there is an important difference between them. Under Widodo, the ties nurtured by Indonesia toward China are overwhelmingly in the economic sector, while the ties between Indonesia and the US are largely in the defense sector. The defense partnership between Jakarta and Washington has fulfilled nearly all of its potential at the time of writing.

3.7. Preliminary Criticisms of the GMF

Naturally, for the GMF to succeed, a few necessary components had to converge. A fleshed-out and debated blueprint is one of them (Shekhar & Liow, 2014). Be that as it may, from the very beginning, the GMF did not exactly have the support of years of research and conceptual development (Laksmana, 2019). Thereby, no authoritative entity — such as the Office of the President — ever issued a blueprint that provides clear GMF benchmarks and allows the fulcrum to avoid bureaucratic discord when implementing it. This led the GMF's true goal to be nebulous and cause every agency with GMF-related authority to unreservedly create and apply their own interpretations and strategies of the fulcrum, which generated an even bigger bureaucratic disorder and gargantuan profit loss, in particular in the marines and fisheries sector (Pikoli, 2021, p. 164). Additionally, the decisions made by President Widodo in navigating the Indo-Pacific dynamic, too, have been considered as a hedging strategy, particularly against China, the US, and Japan (Sukma, 2015).

However, not only the lack of GMF blueprint means that it is challenging to tell whether those hedging attempts were part of the GMF as a whole, but it also beclouds whether the GMF is really meant to be Indonesia's answer toward the BRI and the Pivot. Thereby,

this study aims to throw light on these problems and contribute to a deeper understanding of the GMF from an additional perspective.

What separates this research from all other studies about the GMF is that this study is the first among them to have not only successfully interviewed the two main creators of the fulcrum, Sukma and Widjajanto, and several key officials of its implementation, but also successfully analyzed both their interviews and the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi. Following its empirical analysis, this study revealed important research findings about the creation, development, and implementation of the GMF during Widodo's first term.

Therefore, it is requisite that this dissertation outlines Widodo's own view of the GMF.

3.8. How Widodo Views the GMF

Incipiently, Widodo has actually hinted that even the GMF is meant to support his economic diplomacy. For example, in front of the IMO Forum in April 2016, Widodo admitted that his infrastructure projects, including the Sea Toll, are intended not only to accelerate and better distribute Indonesia's economy, but also to make it more competitive and efficient ("Pidato di Sidang IMO, Presiden Jokowi Komitmen Jadikan Indonesia Poros Maritim Dunia", 2016). Then, in 2021, when highlighting the increase of investments outside of Java Island, even when comparing it to the investments within Java Island, Widodo credited the improvement of infrastructures across the archipelago to be the main factor of this accomplishment ("Presiden Jokowi: Pemerataan Infrastruktur Tingkatkan Investasi di Luar Jawa", 2021). Nevertheless, this research argues that the most indispensable point to understand how Widodo truly views the GMF comes from his 2015 assembly address with Widodo's outright acknowledgment of the significance of the Sea Toll for his own agenda. In his own words in 2015 ("Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Annual Session of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia 2015", 2015):

> "One of my most important agendas is to realize the Sea Toll program. The Sea Toll program is part of the maritime infrastructure that will be equipped with productive shipyards. Insya Allah, this policy will encourage sustainable growth of the maritime economy, sea preservation, and good marine spatial management."

To Widodo, infrastructure is the main foundation under which Indonesia's capability to compete with other nations is founded. He states that infrastructure is beyond simply building roads or ports to him. As far as he is concerned, infrastructure has six more meanings beyond that. Firstly, it functions as a source to create more jobs for the Indonesian people. Secondly, he sees infrastructure as capable of creating new points for economic growth, where ease of access to a region means larger economic activities in the said region. Thirdly, infrastructure means the betterment of Indonesia's logistics network that in turns would link different production centers with one another. Fourthly, he regards infrastructure as a public facility that the Indonesian government must provide to the Indonesian people. Fifthly, he considers building infrastructure to be building civilization itself, because introducing new infrastructures to different regions means introducing different habits not previously known. Lastly, he deems creating infrastructure to be an embodiment of the fifth Pancasila by providing social justice to all Indonesian ("Presiden Jokowi Ungkap Pentingnya Pembangunan Infrastruktur bagi Indonesia", 2019).

For this reason, from 2015 to 2016, Widodo attempted to realize his maritime ambitions by making the concept of the sea tolls, a six-lane highway freeway connecting ports throughout Indonesia, a six-lane highway freeway connecting ports throughout Indonesia, as the key implementation of the GMF to ensure that no part of the archipelago will suffer from drought of commodities. From 2015 to June 2016, his administration managed to build six sea toll lanes from western to eastern Indonesia and established 24 ports as Marine Link Nodes. As a result, the prices of basic commodities in Eastern Indonesia went down significantly, for example rice by 22%, sugar by 28%, eggs by 49%, chicken meat by 28%, and wheat flour by 29% compared to before the sea toll operated (Aufiya, 2017, pp. 149-150). Additionally, the Sea Toll itself was implemented by Widodo because of the significant disparity of prices of goods in Western Indonesia and Eastern Indonesia ("Program Tol Laut Resmi Diluncurkan", 2015). Because Indonesia's economic development is centralized in the Java Island for decades, sea transportation in the entire country became expensive and inefficient as a consequence of areas with low economic development, especially the ones in Eastern Indonesia, being unable to furnish return cargo. Thus, the Sea Toll was aimed at operating sea transportation regularly to connect ports across Indonesia, from Sumatra to Papua, by utilizing large ships so that economic gains could be acquired ("Jadikan Laut Pemersatu Indonesia Menuju Poros Maritim Dunia", 2018). In 2021, or seven years since

the Sea Toll's official launch on October 20, 2014, Indonesia's Ministry of Trade reported that the Sea Toll has helped reduce prices of goods between 20% to 50% in the areas passed by its route. As of 2021, the Sea Toll was operated with 32 ships that stop at 114 ports, including routes in the Papua and West Papua provinces. This newfound connectivity has also given birth to a new trading pattern from new food estate areas, for example from Merauke to other areas in Papua, West Papua, and East Nusa Tenggara (Anwar, 2021).

These newfound benefits thus hint at Widodo's announcing them to further gain political capitals by framing his GMF-related speeches under the lens of economic interests as this study will underline later in Chapter 7. It is perhaps unsurprising when the Sea Toll is seen as an illustration of the ties between Indonesia's maritime trade and national interests, since it depends on a naval force capable of ensuring maritime security and trade above waters (Wardhana, 2016, p. 378).

The next part of this dissertation explains the analytical framework of it, which is the theory and method the author used for this study.

PART II
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter 4: Theory

This study is driven by the Constructivist theory, whose major thesis argues that the international system is socially constructed and composed of the means with which human beings think and interact with each other (Chernoff, 2008, as cited in Behravesh, 2011), and by the understanding of hedging strategy as forwarded by Gerstl (2020; 2022). This chapter, hence, will outline them both.

4.1. Constructivism

4.1.1. Brief History

While the emergence of social constructivism in IR could not be attributed to any sole individual (Peltonen, 2017), the term *Constructivism* itself was first introduced to the IR theory in 1989 by Onuf, who stated that states and individuals are similar in that both live in a world of their own making, where *social facts* are made by human action instead of human condition, unlike *brute facts*. The rise of Constructivism in IR was also fueled by the end of the Cold War, which the neorealists and neoliberals failed to predict correctly because most predicted a victory for the Soviet Union at that time. According to Behravesh (2011), this failure, in turn, made way for disappointed rational choice-oriented IR theorists to challenge the explanatory and analytical capabilities of both Neorealism and Neoliberalism by welcoming an alternative constructivist perspective to readjust the then dominant discourse in IR theory, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s after having been bolstered not only by Onuf or the above mentioned Wendt, but also thinkers such as John Gerard Rugie, Friedrich Kratochwil, Peter Katzenstein, and Emanuel Adler.

Constructivism itself underwent an evolution in the 1990s that led to it alternatively being categorized into three different forms: *systemic*, *unit-level*, and *holistic*. Systemic Constructivism brackets domestic politics of states and its role in creating or changing their interests and identities because it is influenced by the writings of Wendt, who criticized neorealists and neoliberals for precluding any possibility for structural and institutional change in the international politics because they concretize the structure of states system and assume the permanence of its ontological and ideational properties. For focusing on the domestic political realm of states, the Unit-Level

Constructivism is the *inverse* of Systemic Constructivism by focusing on the domestic political dimension of states and well-represented by the work of Katzenstein. Finally, Holistic Constructivism aims to explain how state identities and interests are formed by bridging the divide between *the international and the domestic* and is embodied by the work of Kratochwil and Ruggie.

Therefore, from the very beginning, the IR constructivist family tree has had plenty of roots and intertwining stems (Peltonen, 2017). Behravesh (2011) asserted that there are generally two major varieties of constructivism: one appeared in Europe, the other in North America. Cardinally, they differ both in the questions they ask in regards to foreign policy-making and international relations and in the method they employ to answer said questions. In assembling international politics and shaping the end products of foreign policy, the roles of *identities* and *social norms* are the core of the North American variant, also known as the *American*, *conventional* or *standard* constructivism championed by such theorists as Onuf, Adler, Ruggie, Wendt, Katzenstein and Martha Finnemore. Conversely, the North European variant largely values the roles of *social discourses*, *language* and *linguistic constructions* in molding social reality and is advocated by *interpretivist* scholars, such as Kratochwil and Ted Hopf, who explain the causality of (identity) change by examining the conditions behind the possibility for such change and what produces the change in the first place through the use of inductive strategies.

While there are divergences among constructivists, in world politics, they all concentrate on attributing greater weight to the social instead of the material. Additionally, concepts such as *norms*, *identity*, and *discourses* are essential to constructivist arguments and therefore frequently used regarding a variety of international concern issues such as *globalization* or *security policy* (Behravesh, 2011). In short, constructivism has something for everyone (Weber, 2010, as cited in Behravesh, 2011).

As such, the next sub-chapter will outline how some of the aforementioned IR scholars who have contributed to the constructivist scholarship define constructivism.

4.1.2. Definitions

As a start, according to Wendt (1994, p. 385), constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that posits three key claims. Firstly, the core units of analysis for international political theory are the states. Secondly, the key structures in the system of the state are intersubjective instead of material. Thirdly, the interests and identities of the state are in a pivotal part constructed by these social structures, not exogenously given to the system by domestic politics as maintained by neoliberals or by human nature as argued by neorealists. Before the turn of the millennium, Wendt (1999, pp. 1 & 7) argued that it has become commonplace in academic scholarship to witness international politics defined as ``socially constructed.'' By drawing on disparate social theories, such as structuration theory, feminist theory, postmodernism, and critical theory, Wendt stated that students of international politics have increasingly accepted the two basic constructivist tenets. The first one is that, rather than material forces, it is shared ideas that primarily determine the structures of human association. Wendt pointed out that this tenet represents an idealist approach to social life. The second one is that, instead of provided by nature, it is these shared ideas that construct the interests and identities of purposive actors. Wendt called this a holist or structuralist approach for it places an emphasis on the social structures' emergent powers. Wendt also added that the sensibilities of constructivism encouraged the constructivists to look at how actors are socially constructed, but not at which actors to study or where they are constructed. That is why, before a constructivist can be constructivist about anything, it is a necessity to pick *units* and *levels* of analysis, or *agents* and the *structures* in which they are embedded.

There was also Onuf who posited that the proposition that human beings are social beings is salient to constructivism and, without our social relations, we would not be human. Rather than offering general explanations about why the world changes or what people do, Onuf argued that constructivism makes it feasible to theorize about matters that appear to be unrelated because the concepts and propositions commonly utilized to discuss such matters are likewise unrelated (1998, pp. 58-59).

Another perspective to comprehend constructivism is offered by Hopf. According to him, there are a number of vital themes in International Relations theory, including the likelihood of change in world politics, power's elaboration, how state identity and interests are related to each other, and the definition of anarchy and balance of power,

that constructivism propounds alternative understandings for. The assumption of world politics as an integrated whole, regardless of time or territory, is accepted in mainstream international relations theory. Hopf argued that when constructivism created theoretical and epistemological distance between itself and its origins in critical theory, it became *conventional* constructivism, and conventional constructivism rejects both the critical position in that the world politics is thoroughly heterogenous that one should presume to look only for the differentiating and the unique and the mainstream presumption that homogeneity is prevalent in world politics that valid generalizations can be anticipated to come of theorizing about it. As opposed to either mainstream and critical approaches, conventional constructivist argues that one should search for communities of intersubjectivity in world politics, domains within which actors share understandings of themselves and one another, yielding predictable and replicable patterns of action within a particular context. To add, conventional constructivism aims to treat identities as possible causes of action and acknowledges that the world is an intricate and colossal array of different domains. A thoroughly coherent picture of international politics could not be drawn by apprehending it all, although the inability to account for any of them sets the seal on a theoretically unsatisfying understanding of the world. In effect, the promise of constructivism is to reintroduce a kind of partial order and alikeness to world politics that hails from an appreciation of difference as opposed to imposed uniformity (Hopf, 1998, pp. 172, 181 184, and 199-200).

Adler (1997, p. 334), meanwhile, asserted that, for most constructivists, progress happens via the redefinition of identities and interests of political actors themselves, is not based solely on what theorists say but also chiefly on what political actors do, and is inevitably about universal normative ideas even if their definitions vary from time to time and place to place. Furthermore, constructivist theory can actually be both critical, in the sense that it is separate from the prevailing world order and inquires how that order transpire, and problem-solving, in the sense that, once institutions and practices are reified, it utilizes the world as it discovers it as the designated framework for action.

Naturally, there is a more recent categorization of constructivism as well, such as the one proffered by Xymena Kurowska & Kratochwil in 2012, where constructivism is divided into two labels: mainstream and consistent constructivism. According to them, mainstream constructivism is characterized by an endorsement for the scientific method because of its supposed guarantee to produce warranted knowledge, a belief in hard data that can settle scientific questions, and the acceptance that researchers can

distance themselves from the objects being studied. On the other hand, consistent constructivism denies the probability that scientific realism fits with a consistent constructivist perspective, argues that even so-called hard data are based on conceptual choices and hence are not self-evident because they believe that truth is always relative to the system of meaning within which specific actors are embedded (Kurowska & Kratochwil, 2012, pp. 88, 90, and 95 as cited in Peltonen, 2017, p. 7).

Be that as it may, while Peltonen claimed to have sympathized with the discontented constructivists like Kurowska & Kratochwil because they did identify vital concerns in the state of IR constructivism, he also considered this dissatisfaction to be misplaced. Firstly, Peltonen argued that there could easily be a marginalized version of constructivism that is not inconsistent and thus labeling constructivism as mainstream and consistent are not really ideal. Secondly, regarding this specific case of contemporary IR constructivism, there is a risk of measuring all versions based on a single criterion set and that might be improper. For Peltonen, combined with the notable dissatisfaction about the present state of IR constructivism, the arguments that say that several forms of social constructivism are bereft of something and that something was lost along the way appear to have reason from the notion that there is some *proper* kind of constructivism. He posited that, just like biology, IR constructivism has evolved in its own ways and hence it does not make too much sense to label a specific evolutionary path to be *wrong*. That is to say, unless consistent constructivists want to risk being inconsistent by forgoing a core constructivist insight that social constructivism is likewise socially constructed, they have to accept that IR constructivism has evolved, although it may not be in the path that they would have liked. After all, social constructivism is subject to social reconstruction and change, which is what has happened.

As far as Peltonen is concerned, IR constructivism experienced evolutionary branching that resulted in two *genera* in the constructivist *family* that can be differentiated depending on the kind of cognition behind them. The term *cognition* itself is used by Peltonen as a shorthand for the mental process of knowing, which includes judgment, perception, and reasoning, and he preferred this over ontology and epistemology because he believed cognition to allow him to take both ontology and epistemology together and simultaneously. The first cognition offered by Peltonen is called joined cognition, because its key insight is the inseparability of interpretation and science that leads early constructivists like Onuf and Kratochwil to put an emphasis on context, reflexivity, historicity, and contingency. The second cognition is called separate but

equal, for it regards science and interpretation to hold equal value, but nonetheless keeps them separate and eventually leads the centrality of the scientific method in the production to be something that its adherents believe. Peltonen concluded that if new ways of reasonings start to influence constructivism, then a new general would not be difficult to add, and it remains to be seen how the practice turn and its way of reasoning influences constructivist evolution, for example in case David M. McCourt (2016) is accurate about practice theory and relationalism forming the new constructivism (Peltonen, 2017, pp. 1, 7-8, 11, and 14).

McCourt (2022, p. 3) himself has previously criticized the 'old' constructivism to have turned into a theoretical approach that almost exclusively emphasizes the role of identities, culture, norms in world politics and, in exchange, downplays exactly the constructing of world politics, the effort to build, adjust, or break culture, norms, and identities in international affairs. Interestingly, McCourt (2022, pp. 3-5) argued that he has foreground eight key features underpinning the potential of 'new' constructivism, and they are as follows:

1. Antifoundationalist = New Constructivism centres on how we make norms, identity, culture, their role in international politics, ideas, meaning, and consciousness, including as objects within IR, and how we imbue them with meaning and ability to communicate, and then live our lives through, as, and within, those moderate-sized dry goods (McCourt, 2022, p. 3).

2. Rigorously anti-essentialist = "New Constructivism is incompatible with unproblematic assertions of foundations to knowledge rooted in supposedly unchanging verities of scientific method, objectivism, or empiricism" (McCourt, 2022, p. 4).

3. Methodologically omnivorous = New Constructivism is methodologically promiscuous. Although traditional discourse analyses might be the most proper, constructivists should search far and wide for the best way to frame and prove their arguments (McCourt, 2022, p. 4).

4. Conceptually pluralist = New Constructivism is a vast church capable of housing diverse conceptual categories (McCourt, 2022, p. 4).

5. Reflexive = New Constructivism is completely and self-consciously reflexive (McCourt, 2022, p. 4).

6. Necessarily historical = The “New Constructivism’s reflexivity sits neatly alongside, and is informed by, another of its signal features—its essentially historical nature” (McCourt, 2022, p. 4).
7. Politically agnostic = New Constructivism does not have a politics, or a theoretically-informed perspective regarding what constitutes as good versus bad social changes, and should not look for an alliance with critical theory in order to adopt one (Barkin & Sjoberg, 2019, as cited in McCourt, 2022, p. 4).
8. Attuned to emotions and affect in human action

On top of all this, constructivism also carries with it advantages that other theories like realism and liberalism are unable to provide. Take the neorealist approach, for example, where anarchy is the structure of international relations and thereby national interests must be the orientation point of every country (El Bilad, 2012, p. 70). Aside from being able to explain the role of political leaders and diplomats, constructivism can likewise accommodate non-material or abstract things, such as national identity and domestic political norms, as the key elements to solve international relations problems (Ambadatu, 2024). These advantages are attractive for this research considering the sources of this study.

With the various definitions of constructivism having been exhibited, the next sub-chapter will present the constructivist research design for this research.

4.1.3. Research Design

There are three major reasons behind this study’s decision to apply constructivism to steer its course.

The first reason is, as has been mentioned in the literature review, among the behaviors constructivism has explained are the US decision to both increase military presence in the Asia-Pacific and continue interacting with China (deLisle, 2018), China’s approach toward territorial disputes in the South China Sea (Freundlieb, 2019), and the Indonesian Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine (Muzakki, 2017). The compatibility between constructivism and the explanation of the dynamics of the foreign policies of Jakarta, Beijing, Washington encourages this research to employ the constructivist approach as well as risks and opportunities related to the hedging target.

The second reason is, while hedging is a neorealist concept, this research follows the understanding forwarded by Gerstl (2020, pp. 111-113), who emphasized the importance of perceptions in a hedging strategy, specifically the perceptions of state leaders regarding the hedging target, their own power and the strategic utility of potential hedging partners. This research considers the perceptions of Widodo as the president of Indonesia during the GMF creation and implementation and Marsudi as his foreign minister to be of great importance. After all, in many applications of foreign policy literature, the individual and state level analyses are commonly united through a focus on the leaders of the state (Thies, 2009, p. 14). Barnett offered three approaches to justify applying theories and language developed for the individual to the state. Firstly, the state could be equated with its top officials. Secondly, the state could be regarded as an institutional actor where its top officials convey the continuance of its institutions. Thirdly, the state could be depicted as a corporate entity with a stable identity (1993, p. 274, as cited in Thies, 2009, p. 14). Into the bargain, no less than a key constructivist like Wendt himself clearly preferred Barnett's third justification by asserting that the state is a corporate actor with its own self, identity, interests, and intentionality (1999, pp. 215-224, as cited in Thies, 2009, p. 14).

Drawing from the work of Gerstl (2020; 2022), who investigated the perceptions of Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad using his speeches and interviews, this research will examine the perceptions of Widodo and Marsudi through their speeches. The decision to scrutinize their speeches becomes even more crucial when taking into account the power they wield in their respective office as the Indonesian president and foreign minister, especially because a key constructivist like Adler propounded that power must play a pivotal role in constructing social reality. Power does not refer only to the resources necessary to impose one's view on another, but also the authority to influence the shared meanings that both compose the interests, practices, and identities of states, and the conditions that grant, capitulate, or dismiss access to 'goods' and benefits. Thereby, constructivism is conducive to the empirical study of the conditions that cause one specific intersubjective conception of interest to prevail over others (Adler, 1997, pp. 336-337).

The final reason is the argument by Wendt who proclaims that the definition of power and the content of interests are primarily a function of ideas. Therefore, the materiality of power and interests can only be assessed after explaining ideas themselves (2003, p. 7). There was also an argument by Ruggie who wrote that at the international polity

level, the social constructivist concept is suffused with ideational factors (1998, p. 879). Even other key constructivists like Goldstein & Keohane wrote that the broadest impact of ideas on human actions takes place when they assume the form of worldviews (1993, p. 8).

This research finds their arguments to be relevant for two reasons.

The first reason is that this research has to understand Widodo's foreign policy thinking that drove him to employ economic diplomacy. So, this study has decided to delve deeper into Widodo's perceptions and worldview because constructivists focus on the role carried out by ideational factors in explaining behavioral regularities in world politics (Phillips, 2007, p. 68). Even Ben Bland, the first person to write an English-language bibliography of Widodo, argued that to understand Widodo as a politician, one must first understand Widodo as a furniture maker (2020, p. 12). His opinion evokes in mind the opinion of Kissinger who declared that, since leaders do not have much time to reflect, the convictions they have formed prior to assuming high office are the intellectual capital that they shall consume as long as they remain in office (n.d., as cited in Wehner, 2015).

When asked about his leadership style as a president on October 20, 2015, Widodo admitted that his educational and professional background did not have much to do with politics, but values such as honesty, diligence, and hard-work have shaped his life and his character ("Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia", 2015, as cited in Pattinussa, 2021, p. 96). As such, this study agrees that, to truly comprehend the behavior of Widodo's leadership, it is necessary to also explain his personal background briefly because his personal experiences shaped his principles in leading. His father was a carpenter who also had to work as a bus driver after the 1960s economic crisis in Indonesia. As a child, he lived with his family in a city called Solo, presently the third largest city in Central Java, and spent his after school hours helping his mother to sell wood in a local market. He ended up developing an idea to expand his sales by offering their wood door-to-door. His family also experienced being evicted by the local government from their home. Having grown up without riches imbued him with a transactional approach that he carried in his career as a carpentry entrepreneur and then as a politician. His start in politics arrived after he was elected as the Mayor of Solo in 2005. During the time of his inauguration, Solo was known as one of the most unclean places in Java island due to its numerous and disorderly street vendors. Instead of

resorting to force like many of his predecessors, he became the first Mayor in the city's history to solve the problems by relocating over 5.000 street vendors to a specified market peacefully after meeting them directly in discussions after discussions that lasted for months. Among the arguments he used to convince them to relocate was that making Solo a more clean city would invite more investments and tourists, which in turn would benefit the vendors as well as the city itself because then its infrastructures would also improve (Zaenuddin, 2012, as cited in Pattinussa, 2021, p. 99). As a leader, because he liked things low cost and efficient, he is also known to have had very little qualms about firing or replacing anybody who failed to meet their targets on time or misuse their authority (Pattinussa, 2021, pp. 96-98). In short, his economic diplomacy preference that has been mentioned previously in this research was influenced by his personal background.

The second reason is because the GMF as this dissertation's subject is an Indonesian initiative that ingeminates the spirit of Indonesian maritime identity. The fulcrum also reflects the reality of Indonesia's foreign policy, geopolitical thinking, and strategic centrality in relation to both major and middle powers in the region, such as the US, China, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea from the perspectives of economy, politics, and military (Aufiya, 2017, pp. 144-145), particularly since Indonesia is a middle power employing a hedging strategy in the Indo-Pacific due to its Free-and-Active doctrine.

This study hence requires an approach that could best do the GMF justice, and the arguments posited by key constructivists such as Ruggie (1998) and Wendt (1999) convinced this study that the constructivist approach is one such option. After all, even other key constructivists such as Finnemore & Sikkink (2001, pp. 392-395) have attested that, for constructivists, comprehending identities, interests, how things are put together, and how they occur is not mere description, because understanding the constitution of things is essential in explaining how they behave and what causes political outcomes. As such, this dissertation must now discuss the significance of Indonesia's identity.

4.1.4. Indonesia's Personal Identity as an Actor

According to Wendt (1999), whose work this study refers to, an actor can only have one kind of identity out of four: personal or corporate, type, role, and collective. Of these

four, Wendt described personal identities, or when talking of organizations, corporate identities to be composed of the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that distinguish actors as entities. In other words, in a personal or corporate identity, the state is fully aware of the attributes attached to itself. This identity is not merely a product of physical characteristics belonging to an actor, but also the actor's awareness of their own characteristics (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224-225).

As far as Indonesia is concerned, after being aware of its characteristics, Indonesia accepted its identity as a maritime nation.

So, how did Indonesia embrace its identity as a maritime nation? And how is this relevant with the GMF or Indonesia's foreign policy at all? To answer both of these questions, this study must first discuss Indonesia's national identity.

According to Tiah (2023), the Indonesian national identity itself refers to the manifestation of cultural values that grow and develop from the lives of hundreds of tribes that unite under the Indonesian banner as the national culture, with Pancasila and the spirit of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as its foundation and guidance. Pancasila has been previously explained, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (*unity in diversity*), meanwhile, refers to the willingness of the Indonesian people to be loyal to the institution known as the Indonesian state and government without discarding their ties to their respective ethnicity, customs, race, and religion. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is also considered to be one of the eight factors that formed Indonesia's national identity. The other seven factors are (Tri, 2012; Prasetyo, 2022, as cited in Tiah, 2023):

1. The Primordial Factor, which refers to the natural hereditary factors attached to a nation, like its demography, geography, and ecology;
2. The Conditional Factor, which refers to conditions that influence the founding of a national identity, such as a nation's history, social, politics, and culture;
3. The Sacred Factor, which covers a similar religion or doctrine that the people embrace;
4. Leaders, or a person/persons that the people respect or approve who can unite the people under a shared cause;
5. History, or a common historical perception shared among the people that unites them under one nation;

6. Economic Development, which will give birth to a variety of jobs and services according the needs and demands of the people;

7. Institutions, which refers to government and political institutions, such as bureaucracy, military, judiciary, and political parties.

Of these factors the primordial factor, leaders, and history are arguably at play when Sukma (2014) described the first elements of the GMF because of Indonesia's lengthy history as a nation with strong maritime culture (Kasnowihardjo, 2017). For example, the relief of an outrigger wooden ship, used at least since the era of Sriwijaya Kingdom in the 7th century, lies at Borobudur Temple as an Indonesian maritime record (Matanasi, 2016).

Contemporary research conducted by Robert Dick-Read also exhibited how nomadic sailors from Austronesian-speaking regions (now Indonesia) left significant civilization traces in a few places in Africa and that Indonesian sailors reached East Africa, including exotic cities such Lamu and Zanzibar, in the fifth century, long before the Europeans, Chinese, Arabs, and Shirazi even discovered such places. It is also common for Indonesian historians to believe that, in the past, Indonesian ships have even reached Madagascar ("Sejarah Pelaut Indonesia", 2019).

Indonesian maritime culture is also summarized in a popular Indonesian children song called *Nenek Moyangku Seorang*. This historical maritime culture is something even Widodo himself has mentioned when talking about the GMF before, including by naming Srivijaya Kingdom and Majapahit Kingdom as inspirations for Indonesia to reclaim its maritime glory through the application of the GMF. To reiterate, both kingdoms are ancient Indonesian kingdoms (prior to the Dutch colonization of Indonesia for around 350 years) whose glory days came primarily from ruling the seas (2015, as cited in Nugroho, 2015).

Regardless, simply having a maritime history does not explain why Indonesia chose identities like 'maritime country' or 'archipelagic state' to define itself to begin with. One must also remember that Indonesia's most obvious physical characteristics or geography is that the whole country is an archipelago separated by seas. As a result, this geographical fact led to the birth of the awareness or national identity that Indonesia is a maritime country or an archipelagic state. Different from identities like 'the third largest democracy' or 'the world's largest muslim majority country', identities like

‘maritime country’ or ‘archipelagic state’ were generated from Indonesia’s physical characteristics instead of from its socio-political-cultural characteristics. That is to say, Indonesia’s identity as a ‘maritime country’ or ‘archipelagic state’ predated even the existence of Indonesia’s consciousness as a nation. This characteristic eventually became Indonesia’s national identity due to the acknowledgement from the Indonesian people and government that a geographical characteristic is a necessity to distinguish one country from another (Rosyidin, 2023, pp. 14-15). In this case, it is to distinguish Indonesia from another country. It then goes without saying that Indonesia’s personal or corporate identity as a maritime country and an archipelagic state is relevant to this research, especially for two reasons. Firstly, as the previous chapters have explained, the importance of being an archipelagic state for Indonesia reached a point where Jakarta seeked global recognition for it that eventually led to the birth of UNCLOS in 1982. Secondly, no less than Widodo and Sukma themselves have confirmed that Indonesia’s identity as a maritime country and an archipelagic state significantly influenced both Indonesia’s foreign policy and the creation of the GMF (Sukma, 2014; Rizal Sukma, interview transcript, March 28, 2024; Rosyidin, 2023, pp. 52-53). As an additional note, the fact that it was a key constructivist like Wendt (1999) who offered up this understanding about personal or corporate further convinced this dissertation that choosing constructivism for this research is apt.

Moreover, Indonesia’s embrace of its archipelagic nature, and therefore of its identity as a maritime nation, also extends to its foreign affairs. This mostly comes from the Djuanda Declaration on December 13, 1957 (Sinaga, 2017), which is now regarded as the turning point of Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty. Prior to its existence, Indonesia referred to its territorial integrity as a former colony of the Netherlands and seas across Indonesia were separated between islands thanks to inheriting the sea law from the Dutch colonizers known as *Zee en Maritieme Kringen Ordonantie 1939* which provisions that Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty extends only up to 3 miles ashore with the rest of the waters being free waters. This became a problem because ⅔ of Indonesia’s territory are waters and Indonesia consists of around 13,000 islands. Due to the old law, instead of being an asset to Indonesia, the Indonesian waters became a dividing line between Indonesian islands and made it a pretty tall order for an archipelagic nation like Indonesia to protect its sovereignty (Nur, 2017).

Hence, on December 13, 1957, Djuanda Kartawidjaja, Indonesia’s Prime Minister at that time, took the initiative to unilaterally unleash a government promulgation regarding

the Indonesian Territorial Waters and Maritime Environment to set up boundary of such territorial waters by extending it up to 12 miles from the sea baseline of the outer boundary points and that Indonesian seas include the seas around, between and within the Indonesian archipelago under the absolute sovereignty of Indonesia. This was then enforced by several Acts and diplomatic efforts that would eventually last for around 25 years (Tangkilisan, 2017).

These diplomatic efforts to have other countries accept Indonesia as an archipelagic state began in the 1958 UNCLOS in Geneva, Switzerland, where Indonesia, for the first time ever, introduced the *Archipelagic State Principles* that were met with heavy disagreement by the US. The Indonesian diplomatic efforts continued to the 1960 UNCLOS that, again, were met with a serious dissent by the US. Despite Washington's disapproval, Jakarta insisted on enforcing its 12-mile maritime boundary to protect the Indonesian lands and waters. Indonesia's continuous diplomatic efforts eventually bore fruit in 1982 and resulted in the birth of the UNCLOS that recognizes the Archipelagic State Principle as claimed by Indonesia (Tangkilisan, 2017).

For this reason, UNCLOS is accepted as the world's acknowledgement over Indonesian maritime sovereignty that first began with the Djuanda Declaration in 1957 (Nur, 2017). According to Indonesia's Foreign Ministry, the Djuanda Declaration happens to be a foundation from which the GMF sprung up (Fachir, 2017, as cited in Hasan, 2017).

To add, according to Widjajanto (2022, p. 14), the Djuanda Declaration that facilitates the concept of a united state and declares that Indonesia adheres to the principles of an archipelagic nation is influenced by *Wawasan Nusantara* (or *Indonesian Archipelagic Vision* in English). Wawasan Nusantara itself is an important Indonesian geopolitical pillar that functions as the nation's perspective and attitude regarding its identity and environment that promotes not only the unity and unitedness of the nation, but also the unity of the state to achieve the fulfillment of national needs.

Arguably, Wawasan Nusantara is echoed by the first GMF element that urges the Indonesian people to reembrace their entrenched national identity as a people of an archipelagic nation that is constantly reminded of the past accomplishments of their predecessors and use this constant reminder to fuel their resolve as the GMF march them forward into the future as a united, prosperous, and dignified maritime power. As note of interest, the application of the GMF contributed to the Indonesian government's

need to increase its maritime domain awareness (Yakti & Susanto, 2017, p. 119) for a reason. Namely, how the salience of the maritime domain in this century continues to grow.

Truthfully, the increasing importance of maritime domain is related to the rising geographic and strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific in the 21st century. Throughout all of its history, the maritime security of the Indo-Pacific region is inseparable from the region's rich history of trade, exploration, and geopolitical dynamics. In ancient times, it was the core part of trading networks for ancient civilizations such as the Mesopotamian, Mediterranean, Chinese, and Indian. In the colonial era, powers ranging from the British, French, and Spanish to the Dutch and Portuguese exerted control over various locations across the region. World War II saw the region becoming the stage for the Pacific Theater, before the post-World War II era earning the region's emergence of independent nations a major spot in Cold War dynamics. The end of the Cold War saw the US trying to contain the rise of China in the region. Today, economic powerhouses like China, India, Australia, and South Korea consider the region to be home, while global heavyweights like the US and Russia strongly influence the dynamics of the region. The added existence of Southeast Asian countries likewise contribute to the unique shaping of regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific (Niazi, 2024).

The maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific region became important in geopolitics due to the 21st century's technological advancements amplifying threats that could come from anywhere, including the seas. With today's technology, the seas whose previous credible threat in the olden days was limited to an invasion, now became a place where sea bases could be built to launch missiles and unleash destruction to the resources of another country. The maritime space is also presently utilized to conduct joint naval exercises between countries to prepare for the event of an adversary. The seas are also used for experiments with nuclear technologies. Mahan, an American naval officer and historian who researched the rise and fall of naval powers and popularized the theory of sea power, once argued that showing dominance at the seas is vital for a country's political and economic success. He believed that a country needs a favourable geographical position, functional coast lines, a territorial extent, and a government that is inclined to dominate the seas. To add, controlling maritime space provides an enormous advantage for countries with maritime boundaries, especially in comparison to landlocked countries. That geostrategic location is more important than technological capabilities can even be said to be a status quo. For example, because of India's geography, India

has far easier access to the gigantic Indian Ocean that can give it an advantage over China. While China has better technological abilities than India, its access to the Indian Ocean is still limited because of the crowded geography of the region (Anand, 2022).

Of course, the rising relevance of maritime domain is also related with the vitality of maritime domain awareness, or the awareness of things related to the global maritime domain concerning economics, safety, security, and the environment (Cheng, 2019), and, as has been previously mentioned, the application of the GMF contributed to the Indonesian government's need to increase its maritime domain awareness (Yakti & Susanto, 2017, p. 119).

Speaking of Indonesia's identity and environment, this study should point out that Sukma himself (2024) mentioned the importance of Holsti's role theory toward the GMF during his interview. As such, this study will briefly discuss it next.

4.1.5. Indonesia's Role Conception and Others

First and foremost, the role theory itself is not unrelated to constructivism. According to Sekhri (2009, p. 428), the application of the role approach in analyzing foreign policy can call for social constructivism when examining the impact of cultural identity on the perceptions of decision-makers. Beasley et al. (2021, p. 9) also argued that, in comparison to other approaches of constructivism toward sovereignty, the perspective of a role theory highlights an actor's agency to apply and contest disparate norms of sovereignty to adopt specific roles.

The role conception theory itself was brought to the IR scholarship by K. J. Holsti in 1970. According to Holsti, a role conception is defined as a set of norms that steer foreign policies, such as decisions, responses, attitudes, commitments made by, and functions of the government (1970, p. 245, as cited in Karim, 2018, pp. 6-7). Holsti argued that role conception is derived from two sources. Firstly, the perceptions of policymakers. These are commonly drawn from domestic political traditions, geography, public opinion, socio-economic needs, and national historical experiences. Secondly, external expectations put on the actor enacting the role (1970, p. 239, as cited in Agastia, 2020, p. 294).

Either way, Holsti himself identified 17 major roles that were expressed by states between 1965 and 1967, including regional leader, regional protector, active

independent, liberation supporter, developer, and bridge (1970, pp. 260-270, as cited in Akubo, 2019, p. 50). Interestingly, scholars commonly describe Indonesia's role in ASEAN to be that of a regional leader, or a state that thinks of itself as having a specific leadership responsibilities related to its regional counterparts ("Le Notes #39: Role theory in International Relations – Holsti's national role conception", 2019).

Sukma (2024) himself regards Indonesia as a fulcrum with the responsibility to both ensure norms, rules, and stability in the oceans and assure it is cooperation, and not rivalry, that major powers set their eyes upon in the region. In other words, he considers Indonesia's role conception is to be that of a regional leader. Indonesia's conduct in and with ASEAN that has been discussed many times by this study certainly showed that Indonesia has assumed its own role to be a regional leader in Southeast Asia for decades.

Regardless, Indonesia's role conception as a regional leader and behaviors in and with ASEAN also necessitate this research to discuss who Indonesia's Others are next to better understand Indonesia's foreign policy behavior.

It was Wendt (1999, p. 225) who stated that what separates an intentional actor's personal or corporate identity from that of beagles and bicycles is a consciousness and memory of Self as a distinct locus of activity and thought. These Ideas of Self have an 'auto-genetic' quality (Schwalbe, 1991, as cited in Wendt, 1999, p. 225) and, ergo, personal and corporate identities are constitutionally exogenous to Otherness. The theorist who particularly linked the question of identity formation to the self/other conceptual pair was Hegel, who refined the idea that the self has the power to furnish or withhold recognition by knowing the Other in order to be constituted as self at the same time (1977, p. 112, as cited in Neumann, 1999, p. 3). Because identity is constituted over time, continuously updated, if not outright rewritten, with many contrasting scripts (Guzzini, 2022, p. 44), the self is reconstituted via an Other, or that which it is not over time. This Other does not have to be an enemy, because even friends can inform any identity narrative pertinently (Hansen, 2006; Neumann, 1999; Roschin, 2006, as cited in Guzzini, 2022, p. 44).

Interestingly, in 2013, Nguitragool surveyed 277 IR students in Jakarta and Yogyakarta (Java), Makassar (South Sulawesi), and Samarinda (East Kalimantan) who are directly exposed to the production of knowledge in IR in Indonesia as part of a wider investigation of the concepts of the West in Asia by examining IR students' perceptions

through a self-completion questionnaire survey. When asked about Indonesia's important Others, ASEAN is by far considered the most important Other in Indonesia's foreign relations. The association was ranked first by 48.4% of the respondents. In second place was the US with 20.6%, while China was ranked third with 15.9% (Nguitragool, 2013, pp. 1-2 & 15-17).

Considering the topic of this research, the fact that ASEAN Centrality is one of the nucleuses of Indonesia's foreign relations, and Indonesia is an archipelagic state hedging against both China and the US, this study considers Nguitragool's (2013) findings to be agreeable and will mention it from hereon accordingly.

The next sub-chapter will discuss hedging strategy and how it relates to Indonesia.

4.2. Hedging Strategy

4.2.1. Definition, Variants, and Conceptualizations of Hedging

According to Haacke (2019, pp. 375-377), there is a strong consensus often made regarding Southeast Asia which says that many secondary states have opted to adopt security strategies best known as 'hedging'. This argument became clear when scholars examined how states in China's neighborhood responded to its re-emergence as a military and economic power. In defining hedging strategy, Goh (2005, p. viii) described it as a set of strategies meant to avoid or plan for contingencies in a situation in which states are unable to decide on more straightforward alternatives such as neutrality, bandwagoning, or balancing. Hedging is likewise perceived broadly as an expression of alignment or positionality, especially in regards to the security strategies of Southeast Asia. Regardless, some also viewed hedging as a way to address both the unsureness carried by the intentions and future policies of China and to maintain a US-led regional order as regional states interact with China. For others, hedging is used to legitimize their regime. Haacke (2019, p. 2) stated that, even though there are competing conceptualizations of hedging, seeing it as a portfolio approach is presently the most popular way, to the point where, in many scholars' empirical studies, a basic version of hedging as a portfolio approach is frequently applied. There are, however, variants that have been proposed. Some examples of these variants that Haacke (2019) gave include:

a. Goh (2016, as cited in Haacke, 2019, pp. 2-3), who proposed viewing hedging strategies as enclosing containment or balancing elements along with engagement;

b. Kuik (2016, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 3), who saw hedging as including mixed and 'opposite' positioning where both power-acceptance and power rejection displayed by states;

c. Tunsjø (2017, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 3), who comprehended hedging simply as an intermix of cooperation and confrontation.

Due to these differing interpretations, it is occasionally called into question whether a country truly hedges. Also, if it hedges, then which set of policies the said country actually applies. This leads to there being no fixed criteria to measure hedging behaviors and no definite way for a hedging strategy's successes to be gauged (Ciorciari, 2019: 527–533; Koga, 2018: 636–637, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 108).

For Haacke (2009, p. 3), conceptualizing hedging matters to differentiate which countries hedge and which ones do not. Haacke (2009, p. 3) pointed out the example of Kuik's work that argues that hedging strategies are composed of every combination of opposite behaviors short of 'pure' balancing and 'pure' bandwagoning. However, the 'pure' forms of these conventional security strategies are supposedly rare and, as such, hedging would become instead a particularly massive 'residual' category because, to put it another way, which countries then are not hedging?

That is why, to Haacke (2009, p. 3), focusing on how a security challenge is understood is prerequisite to truly ascertaining hedging because, as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, conceptualizing hedging as a form of risk management would likely point out that the respective Indonesian and Malaysian responses to China's security challenge in the South China Sea should be categorized as hedging, whereas the findings for countries such as Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, and even Singapore might yield a different result. However, if the portfolio approach is the one applied, then it is likely to reach the conclusion that no less than most of the regional states, including Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and even the Philippines (at least under President Rodrigo Duterte's Administration) are hedging. On the other hand, whether Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Brunei Darussalam are also found to be hedging might be more open to debate.

Haacke (2019, p. 3) argued that a hedging strategy that is applied in the context of triangular relations with two major powers should involve alignment signaling that leaves open the reaction of a state should a potential security challenge arise. The conceptualization of hedging is also important because it would likely affect how different the empirical findings which could be found. After all, since we are in an age of risk, hedging could also be conceptualized as a form of risk management. Under this conceptualization, hedging would be a security strategy created to address major security risks. Haacke (2019, pp. 376-378) himself has pointed out that there are four broad conceptualizations of hedging:

1. Hedging as a response to a perceived risk in view of particular economic and strategic vulnerabilities. While works on energy security fall into this (Tunsjø 2013; Tessman and Wolfe 2011; Salman & Geeraerts 2015, as cited in Haacke, 2019, pp. 376-377), so do works on other forms of security, such as economic and financial security (Ciorciari, 2019, as cited in Haacke, 2019, pp. 376-377);

2. Hedging as a calibrated choice that is adopted to respond to security challenges, including the ones experienced by small and middle powers vis-à-vis major power. An example Haacke (2019, p. 377) provided is a work by Goh (2005a, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 377) who argued that when small and middle powers hedge, then the hedging they do amounts to fostering a 'middle position' between balancing and bandwagoning;

3. Hedging as an outlook to risk management concomitant with specific alignment choices vis-à-vis one or more major powers. For example the argument from Koga (2018, p. 638, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 377) who wrote that reducing the uncertainties and risks connected to a specific course of action, whether balancing or bandwagoning, is the fundamental motivation in the application of hedging;

4. Hedging as a mixed policy approach. For example the work of Medeiros (2005, p. 145, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 378) who saw hedging to be composed of policies that stress both on realist-style balancing in regards to external security cooperation and national military modernization and on integration and engagement mechanisms.

So, what comprises hedging in Southeast Asia? Goh (2005, p. viii) explained that hedging in Southeast Asia is composed of three elements:

1. Soft or indirect balancing that predominantly involves convincing other major powers, in particular the US, to be a counterweight against the regional influence of China;

2. A complex engagement of China at the strategic, economic, and political levels with the hope that leaders of China might be convinced or socialized into abiding by international rules and laws in their conducts. In this regard, a constructive hedge against a possibly aggressive Chinese domination is one way to perceive engagement policies;

3. A general policy of enmeshing a number of regional great powers to provide them with a stake in a stake in a stable regional order.

Goh (2005, p. viii) also proclaimed that, all in all, Southeast Asian states are in fact hedging against three key undesirable outcomes: an unstable regional order, the withdrawal of the United States from the region, and China's hegemony or domination.

Then, is every hedger the same? Kuik (2017) does not think so because, while he wrote that all Southeast Asian states hedge, some hedge heavier than the others. By observing the degrees of Southeast Asian states' defiance behavior vis-à-vis China and the extent of both their risk-contingency and benefit-maximizing measures, Kuik (2017) divided Southeast Asian hedgers into two types:

a. Heavy hedgers, or states who perceive bigger risks from the uncertain external environment and thus apply bigger measures to the perceived risks, e.g. Indonesia and Vietnam;

b. Light hedgers, or states who perceive external risks in a less alarming manner and adopt a more relaxed way to manage risks, e.g. Cambodia and Laos.

Having discussed the definition, variants, and conceptualizations of hedging strategy, the next sub-chapter will discuss how Indonesia is as a hedger.

4.2.2. Gerstl's Hedging Concept

According to Gerstl (2020, p. 108), as far as IR goes, hedging is currently in vogue as a concept because it provides an auxiliary strategic choice for smaller nations in reacting to the policies exercised by more powerful states, notably those of rising power, whose behaviors might carry equivocation and risks. In the conceptual sense, hedging puts the commonly austere dichotomy between bandwagoning and balancing in the neorealist balance of power theory (Waltz, 1979, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 108) to a challenge because, instead of dedicating themselves to unbendingly balance or bandwagon, middle powers can have a choice to amalgamate elements of both by deciding to hedge against the unforeseen behaviors of great powers. In other words, within a new theoretical framework, hedging conceptually harmonizes palpable opposites. Nonetheless, harmony requires a proper divergence between balancing and hedging on the conceptual level to erase any confusion toward the concept of hedging (Haacke, 2019, pp. 389-391, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 108).

Gerstl (2020, p. 108) wrote that what added to hedging's popularity is the fact that hedging was also utilized by many authors, such as Beeson (2019, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 108), to discover empirical evidence that many countries, primarily in Southeast Asia, concomitantly engage with and partly balance against the same great power. This is evident from its being common for Southeast Asian countries to economically engage with China while also hedging the United States for security co-operation purposes against the negative ramifications of China's ascendance in power (Gerstl, 2020, p. 108).

Gerstl (2020, p. 108) has likewise pointed out that the exact details of how Southeast Asian governments hedge are not only fairly disparate, but they also received a variety of interpretations by wide-ranging authors. That is to say, Gerstl (2020, p. 108) posited that the conceptualization of hedging is an ongoing work. As such, Gerstl (2020, pp. 109-110) himself brought to the fore at least five fundamental characteristics of hedging strategy:

1. Hedging is a mixed policy approach that is not inherently restricted to economic, security, or political-diplomatic dimensions. Relatively, merging approaches and policies from all three policy areas are required by a propitious hedging strategy (Gerstl, 2020, p. 109);

2. Since hedging as a concept originated in finance theory, then the inception to conceptualize it lies at mitigating risks. This means that, in IR, a set of policies is employed by a hedger to react to widely defined risks and uncertainties instead of to clearly defined ones (Gerstl, 2020, p. 109). It is the distinction between risks and threats that separates hedging from balancing and bandwagoning, as they eventually attend to threats in lieu of risks (Ciorciari & Haacke, 2019, p. 369, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 109). Be that as it may, any notion of hedging should also weigh in the probability of a risk expanding to become a threat (Haacke, 2019, p. 393, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 109);

3. As an IR approach, hedging is intrinsically both reactionary and precautionary. On that account, it is possible for secondary powers to employ a comprehensive hedging strategy in order to profit in security and economic dimensions from their relations with their hedging targets. After all, in the finance sector where it originated, investors used hedging to secure themselves from falling stock market prices (Gerstl, 2020, p. 109);

4. Hedging must allow the hedger to sustain ambiguity as far as its strategic alignments are concerned (Lim & Cooper, 2015, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 110). In principal, hedging is a dynamic strategy (Goh, 2016, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 110) for, in order to hold fast to its ambiguity and lessen the risk of having to align to a specific greater power, hedging necessitates continual adjustments from the hedger. This also means that hedging strategy requires a conducive global environment to avoid the possibility of secondary powers having to bandwagon or balance to a certain great power, who might make such a demand should a conflict arise (Gerstl, 2020, p. 110);

5. Not only has hedging been criticized as an umbrella term that encompasses supposedly contradictory policies, it also carries with it a conceptual danger since it might embroider the extent of middle powers's autonomy in decision-making in international politics when conducting themselves around the behavior of the hedging target with an elaborated and orderly strategy. For this reason, a methodical hedging framework has to be capable of divulging whether a nation solely responds to a great power's policies with ad hoc actions separate from one another or whether it truly applies an undeviating hedging strategy (Gerstl, 2020, p. 110).

Furthermore, Gerstl (2020, pp. 110-113) built on the framework proposed by Kuik (2008; 2016a; 2016b, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 110) and amendments made by Hiep (2013, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 110) to introduce five components of a hedging strategy that unite both confrontative and cooperative measures applicable simultaneously for a hedger:

Component	**Criteria**
Why does a state hedge?	
Perception of risks and opportunities related to the hedging target	*Risks*: security (sovereignty and territorial integrity), economics (dependency), domestic politics (autonomous decision-making) *Opportunities*: security (increase), economics (increased exchange), domestic politics (increased regime legitimacy due to socio-economic development)
Perception of the strategic value of other great powers and international organisations	Politics, security, and economics (i.e. their strategic value as potential balancing partners)
How does a state hedge?	
Political-diplomatic engagement	Political-diplomatic relations (political visits, number and depth of agreements)
Limited balancing	Security relations (1) – internal (economical and military capacity building) and soft balancing (bi- and multi-lateral non-military partnerships)
Limited bandwagoning	Security relations (2) – political and security agreements with hedging target

Table 1. Gerstl's Five Hedging Components.
Content created by Gerstl (2020, pp. 110-113). Table created by the author.

All five components that Gerstl (2020) introduced will be further discussed in regards to Indonesia's hedging strategy in the empirical findings part. Now, having outlined Gerstl's

hedging concept in this chapter, the next one will address the methodology of this dissertation.

Chapter 5: Method

While there appears to be no single specific constructivist method or research design, the methods constructivists prefer to answer their questions, which include discourse analysis, process tracing, genealogy, structured focused comparisons, interviews, participant observation, and content analysis have been influenced by central constructivist premises (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 395). Of these, discourse analysis and RTA will be the primary methods adopted for this research to answer all its research questions and find proper conclusions. Therefore, this chapter will be dedicated to outline them all.

5.1. Discourse Analysis

5.1.1. Definition of Discourse

According to Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili (2018, p. 286), while discourse has no standard definition, it broadly refers to taken-as-read structures of shared meaning. For example, the discourse on Europe determines what could be said and could not be said regarding Europe (e.g., a continent, an organization, an order, but not a company) or who can speak about Europe. Fairclough (2003, p. 124), meanwhile, sees discourses as a manner to illustrate aspects of the world, such as the social world, the processes, relations and structures of the material worlds, feeling, beliefs, thoughts, and so forth. Since particular aspects of the world may be represented distinctively, a discourse analyst must always keep in mind the relationship between different discourses, since they naturally mean different outlooks of the world and are thus connected to people's different relationships with the world. These relations, in turn, rely on their social relationships wherein they stand to other people, their social and personal identities, and their positions in the world. Additionally, discourses are linked to projects to change the world in specific directions, because discourses make up portions of the resources that people employ when relating to one another or seeking to change how they relate to each other.

The next sub-sub-chapter will discuss the definition of discourse analysis, the prerequisite to employ it, and why this study decided to use it.

5.1.2. Definition of Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis regards language as an active and constructive process that frames and is framed by human experiences (Price, 1998, as cited in Alek, 2023). A practitioner of discourse analysis accepts that language is not merely a tool to convey information, but also a tool to actively construct and reflect social ideologies, realities, and identities (Alek, 2023). According to Pedersen (2009, pp. 5-8), discourse analysis probes, be it in statements or texts, the possibility of validating a recurrence in the appointed actors (subjects), the explored objects, the causality between objects and subjects, the anticipated result from the influences subjects imbue to objects, their action's goals, and the duration aspect mapping out these relations. Presently, discourse analysis is among the approaches of the Constructivist (or Social Constructivist) within social sciences and humanities and perceives any form of political order to be implanted in language & institutions and interlocked by the utilization of speech acts and perceives the basic assumptions concerning being, self, and the world to be assembled by living individuals whose speech acts produced and reproduced a historical and cultural context. When applied to political science, discourse analysis considers it as a form of knowledge that adds up to a historically constructed comprehension of what can be studied as politics and a historically constructed interpretation of those assumed to be true statements about politics. By fusing critical and analytical approaches, discourse analysis is identified as standing at the crossroad of several approaches in the study of politics. It allows political science to build a closer relationship with linguistics, history, institutional theory, and narrative theory.

It must be stated that, in approaching the texts used for the discourse analysis in this dissertation, this study will adhere to the argument outlined by Fairclough (2003, p. 11) in that, since meaning-making relies both on what is explicit in a text and on what is implicit or assumed, then what is 'said' in a text always depends on 'unsaid' assumptions because approaching texts as elements of social events means being concerned with the processes of meaning-making. There are three analytically separable elements in processes of meaning-making: the production of the text, the text itself, and the reception of the text. Meanings are created through the interplay between all three (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 10-11), and, as such, in analyzing the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi, this study will also consider pertinent elements to its topic that both officials might have left unsaid.

Additionally, the research design of this dissertation draws on the steps to conduct discourse analysis as described by Neumann (2008, pp. 63-74):

a. **Prerequisite: Cultural Competence** = To gain a certain cultural competence is a prerequisite for discourse analysis, because cultural competence makes it easier to use the tools of discourse analysis to denote variants in meanings and representations. The author of this dissertation is a native Indonesian who is naturally fluent in the language and able to recognize the genres of Indonesian texts relevant to this research, on top of knowing the general Indonesian social and political setting pertinent to this research, which means that the discourse analysis conducted by this research has fulfilled its prerequisite. Regardless, Neumann warned that a native speaker would know a culture as only a native can and might thus lose touch with a native's own biases. Therefore, while it is possible to conduct discourse analysis in the culture one's know best, a certain distance must still be maintained.In conducting this research in Austria, located over 10,000 kilometers away from Indonesia, and having it driven by the European variant of constructivism, this dissertation considers the required distance mentioned by Neumann fulfilled.

b. **Step One: Delimiting Texts** = The first step includes determining the boundaries of the discourse to a vast yet viable range of sources and timeframes. To begin with, any discourse cannot be completely separated from all other discourses. That is to say, it is crucial to draw some lines when selecting the texts to be analyzed, including the type and the timeline of the texts analyzed. Also, one has to be able to decide when one has read enough texts for the analysis. The timeframe of this research is limited to Widodo's first presidential campaign (from June 4, 2014, to July 5, 2014) and first term (from October 20, 2014, to October 19, 2019). The texts specifically analyzed are the speeches delivered by Widodo and Marsudi when addressing foreign policy strategies. Since Widodo assumed the highest office in Indonesian society and Marsudi was his foreign minister, this dissertation considers their speeches to be dominant representative texts in Indonesia's foreign policy interests. To provide further context, this dissertation includes a brief history of the Indonesia-China and the Indonesia-US relations, and the history of hedging strategy employed by Indonesia.

c. **Step Two: Mapping Representations** = From these texts, the analyst then adopts for their case the representations that comprise the discourse, bearing in mind certain practices that shape the handiness of text. The discourse will principally carry the

'memory' of its own genesis and therefore open up a way to display how each text is made possible by the texts that preceded it. Through this, finding a prehistory to the main representation is a possibility. The methodological significance lies in the fact that one should go back to discover 'pioneer texts' that foreshadow a given representation in the discourse. A number of formal and informal practices, such as legal systems and censorship, makes it possible to determine which representations are allowed into the discourse. Since all of them are publicly accessible, the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi do not fall under Indonesia's censorship laws and could therefore be proper representations of the texts for this research.

d. **Step Three: Layering Discourses** = Finally, to explore change, one uncovers layering within the discourse. The more actions that the analysis may account for by demonstrating its preconditions, and the more specifically this may be done, the better the discourse analysis. After all, due to difference in degree of dominance/marginalization in the discourse and a variety of historical depth, not every representation is equally lasting. Some discourse representations will thus be slower to change. To ensure the place of representation of material objects in the discourse, one has to specify what changes and what does not, and how. Therefore, the concomitant traits of the GMF discourse and the changes toward it displayed by Widodo and Marsudi in their speeches during his first presidential campaign and his first term are analyzed in this research.

More importantly, discourse analysis does not require a full story to reckon deep structures of textual data like narrative semiotics, and its capability to work with disparate texts in investigating their interrelationships to unearth what other methods do not advance (Bondarouk & Ruël, 2004). The next decision was to decide on which discourse analysis was this study going to use because, with the array of societal, cultural, and philosophical phenomena it holds, discourse analysis axiomatically contains various approaches, such as speech acts, pragmatics, conversation analysis, variation analysis, and critical discourse analysis (Van Han, 2014). Among these approaches, the speech acts, a study of how the speakers and listeners utilize language (Yule, 1996, as cited in Hidayat, 2016, p. 3), is chosen for this research.

5.1.3. Speech Acts

Speech Acts refers to a probe into the usage of a language by speakers and listeners, because an action in verbal communication contains a message in itself, which means both language and action make up communication (Hidayat, 2016, pp. 1-3). It should be noted that, while *Discourse* often refers to extended, multi-sentence texts, it originally had reference to speech or talk. Hence, discourse should be understood processually to be a type of (contingent) product of conversation (Schegloff, 2001, pp. 229-230). Interestingly, since speeches are usually written beforehand instead of improvised on the spot, speeches could also be regarded as texts in a way (Reisigl, 2008, p. 243, as cited in Holzmann, 2017, p. 13). This arguably includes speeches that are written for politicians, such as the speeches picked to be analyzed for this research. After all, according to Ifversen (2003, p. 64), 'discourse' delegates a totality of statements which are created by a designated configuration, and discourse analysis is not only limited to the analysis of semantics, but also includes elements related to the use of language. This also means that the entries to text and language are not restricted to discourses and concepts, because several other structures can also serve in the same role, such as argumentative structures, narrative structures, and actional structures or speech acts. The decision to utilize speech acts in this study is reinforced upon discovering the procedures language choice undergoes to achieve particular effect is among the fundamental objectives of political discourse analysis (Wilson, 2001, p. 410) and learning that speech acts are related to constructivism itself in at least two ways:

- Firstly, according to Kratochwil & Peltonen (2022, pp. 7-8), after Immanuel Kant revealed that truth cannot simply be read off of the objects in the world out there by showing that causality is not a property of the world but of reason and the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein underlined that the understandability of one's assertions and utterances is not because of reference but due to the use of the terms according to inter-subjective criteria, the salience of *forms of life* and *ordinary language* was highlighted. This, in turn, made way for the investigation of speech acts (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969, as cited in Kratochwil & Peltonen, 2022, p. 8) and how language is utilized to do something rather than merely describing an event or an action. That is to say, **the elevated importance of speech acts cannot be separated from constructivism itself**;

- Secondly, drawing from the work of Onuf (1998), speech acts are intrinsically tied to understanding constructivism. **According to Onuf, constructivism holds that people make society and society makes people in a two-way and continuous process.** In order to study it, it is necessary to place oneself in the middle between people and society by introducing a third element called rules. Onuf defined a rule as a statement that tells people what we should do. Failing to do as the rule says invites consequences from some other rules by other people who follow the rule that calls for consequences. Among much else, rules define who the participants in society are, and constructivists named these participants as agents. People are agents, but only as far as the rules allow them to participate in the numerous situations for which there are rules. In other words, no one is an agent for every situation. Rules also give agents choices, and agents act in society to achieve their goals. Only human beings can actually make choices because humans alone (although not all humans) have the mental faculty to weigh the possible consequences of making choices available to them. While agents make choices in disparate situations, rules help to describe every such situation from an agent's viewpoint. Whether by design or by accident, rules and related practices often make a stable, though not fixed, pattern fitting the intention of the agents. These patterns are called institutions, and while Onuf considers it possible and even useful to think of all agents as institutions, it is more common to think of agents as operating in an institutional context that provides them with at least some chances at choice. He also added that any stable pattern of rules, institutions, and unintended consequences gives society a structure that is recognizable as such to any observer, and agents are always observers. In principle, any agent, including an observer with adequate information, can formulate the contents of a rule in the form of a rule. Saying what a rule is is exactly the same as speaking in a form that gets any listener to respond to whatever one is saying. The purpose of speaking in this manner is to get something to take place or to achieve something with the help of someone else. **Onuf asserted that the act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act is generally called a speech act** (1998, p. 59-62 & 66).

Speech Acts themselves can be divided into three types: Locutionary Act, or what is said, Illocutionary Act, that is performed by the communicative force of an utterance, and Perlocutionary Act, that refers to an utterance's effect has toward the thoughts or actions of the other person (Hidayat, 2016, pp. 3-4). Of these, there are five types of

Illocutionary Act that Chilton & Schäffner attested to be relevant for political discourse: declarations, directives, assertives, expressives, and commissives (1997, p. 216, as cited in Holzmann, 2017, p. 27). The aims of this research apodictically mean that deeper attention will be given to illocutionary acts, considering the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi is analyzed by using discourse analysis. Nonetheless, although the decision to deploy the Speech Act theory may quadrate with the securitization framework advanced by the Copenhagen School to an extent, specifically Wæver's (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26, as cited in Glover, 2011, p. 1), who regarded security as a speech act, it should be ingeminated that this research does not automatically interlace with any aspect of securitization. It is also salient to understand that while Speech Acts could usually refer to any form of use of language, the speech act's successful performance depends on its social circumstances, for examples capacity, location, and time (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 10; Lê & Short, 2009, p. 23, as cited in Holzmann, 2017, p. 23). That is to say that not everybody can just perform any type of speech acts (Holzmann, 2017, p. 23). Finally, the political discourse analysis previously mentioned is compatible with and essential toward the purpose of speech acts, which is acquiring an apt perception of the main actors and their roles. After all, it is common for a single speech, for example, to fulfill several functions accomplished in a sequence of speech acts (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 216; Reisigl, 2008, p. 253, as cited in Holzmann, 2017, p. 17).

Therefore, the next sub-sub-chapter will explain why Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts is relevant for this research.

5.1.3.1. Searle's Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts

Although it was J.L. Austin who introduced the speech acts in 1955, this study followed the understanding offered by his pupil, John Searle, who directed criticisms toward Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Chief among Searle's criticisms to this categorization is that, according to Searle (1975, p. 354), Austin's taxonomy has no consistent principle in classification. Additionally, Searle's approach to the Speech Acts differed from Austin's in two ways: Firstly, Searle preferred to put far more importance to describing the Illocutionary Act compared to Austin, who distinguished between Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary acts (Smith, 1991, p. 3). Secondly, their approach toward the force and the meaning of a speech act were worlds apart, since Austin put more importance on individual acts while Searle prioritized the illocutionary

force, where the force of a speech act is a form of gradation of a specific type of speech act. For example, supposing directive is accepted as a description for speech acts attempted by the speaker to get the hearer to bring off a certain action, then a suggestion would contain a weak force while a command would be imbued with a stronger force. Searle even used this idea to especially be the main pillar of his illocutionary logic theory (Searle & der Veken, 1985, as cited in Smith, 1991, p. 3). Nonetheless, much like Austin, Searle, too, came up with five categories of illocutionary acts. They are assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations (Searle, 1975, pp. 354-358). Interestingly, according to Chilton & Schäffner (1997, p. 216, as cited Holzmann, 2017, p. 27), Searle's five types of Illocutionary Acts are relevant for political discourse. Apodictically, the aims of this paper mean illocutionary acts and Searle's taxonomy of them will receive a closer attention:

a. **Representatives** = Speech Acts that are meant to commit, in varying degrees, the speaker to the veracity of the proclaimed proposition (Searle, 1975, p. 354). For example, when someone says "the earth is flat", it represents the speaker's assertion about the earth (Hidayat, 2016, p. 5). Examples of verbs of this class are: conclude (Searle, 1975, p. 355), report (Hidayat, 2016, p. 5), and boast (Acheoah, 2017, p. 2). This speech act will help this study pinpoint whether Widodo and Marsudi commit themselves to the veracity of their proclaimed proposition and whether this commitment affected Widodo's foreign policy and GMF goals in his first term.

b. **Directives** = Speech Acts that signify the efforts of the speaker to get the hearer to carry something out (Searle, 1975, p. 355). For example, when someone says, "Could you lend me a pencil, please?", the utterance represents the imploration of the speaker toward the hearer so that the hearer does something for him or her, which in this case is lending him or her a pencil (Hidayat, 2016, p. 6). Examples of verbs of this class are: ask, request, and entreat (Acheoah, 2017, p. 2). This speech act will help this study pinpoint whether Widodo and Marsudi get the hearers of their speeches to carry out certain actions and what the implication of these actions are toward Widodo's foreign policy and GMF goals in his first term.

c. **Commissives** = Speech Acts whose goal is to commit the speaker, in varying degrees, to a discrete future course of action (Searle, 1975, p. 356). For example, when someone says "I'll be back", this means the speaker promises that the speaker will return in the future (Hidayat, 2016, p. 6). This class shares the same examples with Austin's Commissives (Acheoah, 2017, p. 2). This speech act will help this study

pinpoint which discrete future course of action Widodo and Marsudi committed themselves to and how their commitment affected Widodo's foreign policy and GMF goals in his first term.

d. **Expressives** = Speech Acts that aim to express a psychological state earnestly. Examples of verbs of this class are: condole and thank (Searle, 1975, p. 356). For example, when someone says "Don't be shy, my home is your home" upon inviting someone else to his or her home, the speaker means to tell the hearer that he or she is being welcomed (Hidayat, 2016, p. 6). This speech act will help this study pinpoint which psychological state that Widodo and Marsudi expressed in earnest and how it affected Widodo's foreign policy and GMF goals in his first term.

e. **Declarations** = Speech Acts whose successful application guarantees that reality is altered according to the propositional content. For example, when someone says, "I appoint you chairman", to a hearer and the hearer becomes chairman, then the act is considered successfully performed (Searle, 1975, p. 358). This speech act will help this study pinpoint whether a specific reality was altered according to the propositional content by Widodo and Marsudi after the successful application of their speech act and what this revealed about Widodo's foreign policy and GMF goals in his first term.

Pinpointing the use of speech acts by Widodo and Marsudi matters for this research because will pave a way to understand not only what dominated their GMF discourse, but also why it happened that way and what it means for the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy and the GMF during Widodo's first term. To realize this objective, this study will carry out its speech act analysis alongside content analysis that will be detailed in the next sub-sub-chapter.

5.1.4. Content Analysis

Hardy et al. (2004, p. 19) suggested that, while discourse analysis and content analysis are not cut from the same cloth philosophically and assume different roles in the research of social science, both can nonetheless be reciprocal and obliging toward each other in traversing social reality. Their argument is further reinforced by Parveen & Showkat (2017, p. 6), who contended that, even though the salience of content analysis has been enfeebled by many scholars in comparison with discourse analysis, a proper discourse analysis is actually impossible to do without content analysis. Hence, since

content analysis is resorted to analyze the political communication elements of this research, this sub-sub-chapter will underline it briefly before discussing Hardy et al.'s (2004) proposition and Mayring's (2000; 2014) notion of qualitative, the core of this dissertation's methodological approach.

5.1.4.1. Definition

Content Analysis is defined by Holsti (1968, as cited in Prasad, 2008, p. 2) as any technique to enkindle inferences by methodically and impartially detecting ordained attributes of messages and can be applied, according to Harwood & Garry (as cited in Parveen & Showkat, 2017, p. 5), to mostly study five types of texts: hypertexts, audio visual texts, oral texts, iconic texts, and written texts. To boot, much like any other research methods, content analysis adheres to three basic scientific methods, namely generalizability, objectivity, and systematic (Berelson, 1952, as cited in Parveen & Showkat, 2017, p. 5). For this study, content analysis is regarded as a social sciences method and theory-based approach for fixed communication analysis (Mayring, 2010, pp. 12-13, as cited in Holzmann, 2017, p. 29) and therefore provides the way toward a fairly candid compilation of comparative data because it is relatively liberated both from time constraints and the individual researcher (Brosius et Furthermore, content analysis can also be utilized for a qualitative research, in spite of mainly being a quantitative research method (Parveen & Showkat, 2017, p. 3), because central to the idea of a Qualitative Content Analysis is starting from the methodological basis of Quantitative Content Analysis, but following content analytical rules by conceptualizing the process of assigning categories to text passages as a qualitative interpretive step (Mayring, 2000, p. 1). Lastly, this study feels the need to briefly underline the fundamental difference between both: Quantitative approach is mainly concerned with objectivity, while Qualitative approach focuses more on the procurement of profound ken (Knapp, 2008, pp. 20–21, as cited in Holzmann, 2017, p. 30). However, in utilizing Qualitative Content Analysis, Mayring (2000, p. 3) argued that the strength of Quantitative Content Analysis will be preserved by it and even specified four advantages:

a. Rules of analysis: A step by step analysis is performed on the material, with the rules of procedure being followed closely and with the material getting devised into content analytical units;

b. Categories in the center of analysis: Conforming to the research questions, the text interpretation's aspects are placed into their respective categories, that were previously and meticulously founded and revised inside the range of the analysis process (feedback loops);

c. Fitting the material into a model of communication: Which part of the communication inferences shall be made ought to be first ascertained, be it to the communicator's aspects (such as his experiences, opinions feelings), to the text production's situation, to the socio-cultural background, to the text itself or to the message's effect;

d. Criteria of reliability and validity: The procedure has the pretension to be intersubjectively fathomable, in order to juxtapose the result with other studies in the triangulation sense and to perform reliability checks. To estimate the sureness of the inter-coder, qualitative content analysis uses only trained members of the project team and reduces the standard of coder agreement.

How content analysis can be used in tandem with discourse analysis is discussed next.

5.1.4.2. Using Content Analysis within a Discourse Analytic Approach

Hardy et al. (2004, p. 20) offered an explanation in what qualitative forms of content analysis can be used in a compatible manner with discourse analysis, including within a broad discourse analytic methodology in social reality analysis: those that do not assume particularly stable meanings of words but are instead imbued with the context in which they are utilized and a susceptivity to the employment of words. Speech Acts should thus fit this approach comfortably because it, after all, studies the utilization of a language by speakers and hearers (Yule, 1996, as cited in Hidayat, 2016, p. 3). Below, Hardy et al. (2004, p. 21) also indicated how to use content analysis in a compatible manner with discourse analysis:

Dealing with Meaning	There is no inherent meaning in the text; meanings are constructed in a particular context; and the author, consumer, and researcher all play a role. There is no way to separate meaning from context and any attempt to count must deal with the precarious nature of meaning.

Dealing with Categories	Categories emerge from the data. However, existing empirical research and theoretical work provide ideas for what to look for and the research question provides an initial simple frame.
Dealing with Technique	The categories that emerge from the data allow for coding schemes involving counting occurrences of meanings in the text. Analysis is an interactive process of working back and forth between the texts and the categories.
Dealing with Context	The analysis must locate the meaning of the text in relation to a social context and to other texts and discourses.
Dealing with Reliability	The results are reliable to the degree that they are understandable and plausible to others i.e. does the researcher explain how s/he came up with the analysis in a way that the reader can make sense of?
Dealing with Validity	The results are valid to the degree that they show how patterns in the meaning of texts are constitutive of reality.
Dealing with Reflexivity	To what extent does the analysis take into account the role that the author plays in making meaning? Does the analysis show different ways in which this meaning might be consumed? Is the analysis sensitive to the way the patterns are identified and explained.

Table 2. How to Use Content Analysis and Discourse Analysis Compatibly.
Table and content created by Hardy et al. (2004, p. 21).

The next part discusses qualitative content analysis as offered by Mayring (2014).

5.1.4.3. Qualitative Content Analysis

According to Mayring (2014, p. 39), the Qualitative Content Analysis is conducted via a mixed methods approach by assigning categories as a qualitative step and by working through many text passages and analysis of frequencies of categories as a quantitative step. Mayring (2014, p. 40) explained that, while the category system is the omphalos of a quantitative content analysis, this does not mean a qualitative content analysis

should neglect it. Instead, concretizing in category form should be the purpose of qualitative content analysis itself, for, in due course, this will lead to furthering to retain the procedure's intersubjectivity and allowing others to reconstruct or repeat the analysis. After all, while the proponents of the qualitative method might claim that comprehension of the material is stalled by employing an analytically dissecting methodology, prominence to methods with synthetic category construction could still be accorded by the qualitative content analysis, where the findings of the analysis it comprised of category system. Within the last decade or so, special computer programs like MAXQDA or ATLAS/ti were created and have proved themselves useful for qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2014, p. 117). As "the process whereby raw data are systematically transformed and aggregated into units which permit precise description of relevant content characteristics", this is where coding comes in, because it governs the positive result of an analytical process aided by the computer by striving for the conceptional merger of designated text passages (Holzmann, 2017, p. 32). Moreover, with rigorous data preparation, coding, and interpretation, qualitative content analysis's results are going to assist the formation of new theories and models, endorse existing theories, and give proper explanations of specific phenomena or settings or phenomena (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, as cited in Parveen & Showkat, 2017, p. 3).

So, what can be the object of qualitative content analysis? According to Mayring (2000, p. 2), any type of record communication, such as transcript of interviews, discourses, video tapes and documents. Mayring nonetheless noted that relevant content for the specific research question can occur at disparate points of the material. So, in order to employ a quicker, more specific and more economic procedure in this context, he created the Inductive Category Assignment summarize categories directly from the material itself, as opposed to from theoretical considerations, which makes way for an inductive ongoing that allows true description to be gained without bias owing to the preconceptions of the researcher (2014, p. 79). This process can be explained by the following model:



Figure 14: Steps of inductive category development

Figure 2. Steps of Inductive Category Development.
From Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solution by P. Mayring, 2014, p. 80. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-395173. Copyright 2014 by Social Science Open Access.

Mayring (2014, pp. 80-81) explicated that there are several points to remember in performing this procedure:

1. The level or theme of categories that will be developed must be described heretofore within the logic of content analysis. A criterion for the selection process in category formation must be present. This is considered a deductive element and

must be established within theoretical considerations about the subject matter and the aims of analysis;

2. The material is then worked through line by line. A category has to be constructed upon the first discovery of a material fitting the category definition. Serving as category label will be a term or short sentence, which marks the material as near as possible (e.g. formulations if possible out of the material);

3. The next time a passage fitting the category definition is detected, it has to be scrutinized to determine whether it falls under the previous category before it can be subsumed under this category (a reductive process); if not, a new category has to be invented;

4. After working through a good deal of material (ca. 10 - 50 %), and no new categories are located, comes the time for a revision toward the whole category system. It has to be inspected, to confirm whether the logic of categories is perspicuous (e.g. no overlaps) and if the level of abstraction is sufficient to the subject matter and aims of analysis. The category definition feasibly has to be changed;

5. Any changes in the category system axiomatically means that the complete material once again has to be sorted out;

6. The level of abstraction is oft defined in a manner that best fits the research question, and this is tested within the pilot phase (step 4). If too many categories had been formulated to the point where a clear picture of the object area does not occur, the level of abstraction should be steered toward a more general one. As a guidepost, a set of ten to thirty categories provides a good overview. From time to time, however, it would be interesting to bring this set of categories into an order by composing main categories. A more inductive process toward this step could be employed only by enhancing the level of abstraction in the sense of summarizing, whereas a more deductive process could be applied to it by introducing theoretical considerations in the foundation of main categories.

7. Mayring (2014, pp. 81-82) stated that, following this analysis, we have a set of categories to a specific topic, connected with specific passages in the material. The further analysis can go different ways. Either the aims of analysis and used theories can be used to construe the entire system of categories or how categories and

passages are related in the material could be analyzed quantitatively. E.g. By examining the most frequently occurring categories in the material.

Prior to creating a category system that reflects actual GMF goals, this study had to contend with the fact that the GMF does not yet have a blueprint (see Laksmana, 2019) even at the time of writing. Therefore, this study decided to create categories based on the GMF pillars already mentioned. At first, this study created only five category systems based on the five pillars based on the 2014 speech where Widodo first introduced the GMF. However, after a period has passed and further re-reading of the IOP, this study decided to add two more category systems to make a total of seven category systems. They are based on the seven GMF pillars outlined by the IOP as Chapter 2 of this study has discussed. Finally, after a preliminary speech act analysis, this study also decided to add five more category systems based on all five speech acts. In total, there are twelve category systems. After the summarising analysis of the GMF pillars are done, the text passages of the speeches are coded to a variety of categories (coding units) and, then, the largest stretch of the content that are considered for contextual purposes (context units) are provided with definition (Holsti, 1969, 116 & 118, as cited in Holzmann, 2017, p. 45). Additionally, proper definitions, examples, and encoding rules are introduced to the aforementioned category system. Lastly, five main categories based on the five types of illocutionary acts as proposed by Searle are also added to the categories set. To better illustrate the content of the analysis, a screenshot made using MAXQDA is displayed after every year. Each figure displays a statistic of the themes and the illocutionary acts within its respective speech in the form of a table. This is achieved by activating a document and the codes, named after the aforementioned categories, in MAXQDA and right-clicking on the document before selecting 'codes' in order to gain access to the statistics of the codes assigned to that document. Then, the option to single out the activated codes is chosen before selecting to display the desired statistic. Naturally, considering the topic of this research, this study will also include whether there is any mention toward the US, China, the Pivot, and the BRI in the speeches and the context of their inclusion. After a speech is displayed, the illocutionary acts, the GMF elements presented, and the mention of China, the US, the BRI, and the Pivot in it are mentioned. Then, after every speech delivered in a year is displayed or summarized, a picture of a table detailing the five GMF pillars presented, the illocutionary acts performed, and the mention toward China, the US, the BRI, and the Pivot in the speeches will be displayed and explained. At last, once all speeches of an official are displayed, an

analysis discussing the content of the speeches and the speech acts performed in the speeches will be featured. This study is helped by the fact that MAXQDA allows the option to display select codes in their diagrams or charts. First, to separate the codes selected as categories and codes this study considers highly relevant to the topic with any code not belonging to either one, both the categories codes and relevant codes are activated, alongside related document files, to make sure that only those codes will be displayed on the figure.

The actual application outlined here will be featured in the empirical findings of this dissertation.

5.2. Reflexive Thematic Analysis

Before starting any analysis at all, this study had to make sure that any analytical approach chosen must have the potency to produce a solid analysis and, eventually, a cogent result. So, this study decided to consider applying RTA proposed by Virginia Braun & Victoria Clarke after reading several worked examples of it. RTA itself is a fluid method to identify thematic patterns that can be applied to either an explorative study or a deductive study. The identification of patterns of meaning and the generation of themes both inductively and deductively from the data will provide an in-depth comprehension to this study's dataset (Mortensen, 2021). Furthermore, Braun & Clarke (p. 58, 2012) argued that RTA provides a way for qualitative research that methodically teaches the coding mechanics and analysis of qualitative data to be then connected to wider theoretical or conceptual issues.

After some careful consideration, this study eventually decided to choose the RTA forwarded by Braun and Clarke (2006) to analyze the interview transcripts produced from interviewing Sukma and Widjajanto for three reasons. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, **the RTA designed by Braun and Clarke is explicitly constructivist in its approach** (Finlay, 2021, p. 107). It is thus suitable for this research. Secondly, there are some conditions proffered by Braun & Clarke (2020, pp. 7-8) where fulfilling one or more of them would warrant using their RTA. These conditions include, but are not limited to the data sample being quite small and/or homogenous, the goal of the research being to identify patterns in data, to describe and interpret those patterns, and/or to provide a theoretically informed interpretation of them, and the research questions and interests of the research are not primarily or exclusively oriented to the effects of

language (such as subject positions). **This research fulfills all three conditions to apply RTA**.

The data sample produced by the in-depth interviews for this study consists only of two transcripts after interviewing two former Indonesian officials who were part of Widodo's campaign in 2014 and later on became part of his administration. Identifying patterns in their data to describe and interpret those patterns in regards to the GMF are likewise the goals of this study. To add, the research questions and interests of this dissertation are beyond the sole effects of language, since the GMF creation and implementation are also the interests of this study. Thirdly, Braun & Clarke explained that the implementation of RTA necessitates the researcher to strive to be fully aware of theoretical transparency and knowingness behind the researcher's choice to perform it. After all, positionings and assumptions are always part of qualitative research and reflexive practice is important to comprehend and reveal these because it is good practice to to reflect on and identify what one is assuming and then interrogating whether those assumptions hold true for one's project (2019, pp. 594 & 595).

In other words, when doing RTA, the researcher must be aware of the requirement to make decisions around analysis and knowingly engage and make them (Braun et al., 2017, as cited in, Braun & Clarke, 2019, p. 594). **This is in harmony with constructivism** as outlined by Boyland, who wrote that constructivism proffers an investigative thinking paradigm where a researcher and participants journey together into a headroom of interpreted reality. This space is as personal and individual as each person in the cumulative sampling and as manifold as the abundance of the profiled lived experiences. Accepting how one's own interpretations of lived experience might influence one's interpretation of the data, the researcher recognizes, embraces, and explicitly deals with personal subjectivity throughout the process of investigation (2019, p. 30). **The author of this study hence acknowledges that his personal subjectivity, or his positionings and assumptions, matter a great deal both during the preparation to conduct this research and during conducting the research itself**. After all, the author of this study has forwarded three hypotheses regarding this research in the first chapter that signify his positionings and assumptions about this research. He also accepts that he needed to make decisions around analysis for this study, and he knowingly engaged and made them.

Then, before performing qualitative analysis on the two interview transcripts from Sukma and Widjajanto produced for this research, this study first had to conduct several in-depth interviews to produce said transcripts. Boyce & Neale (2006, p. 3) described the in-depth interview as a qualitative research technique where intensive individual interviews are held with a small number of relevant respondents to examine their perspectives on a particular situation, idea or program to discover detailed information, thoughts and behaviors or to simply explore new issues in depth. The strongest advantage of in-depth interview lies in the more detailed information it provides when compared to what could be acquired via other methods, such as surveys, especially since in-depth interviews could also afford to have a more relaxed atmosphere in collecting information, for people may feel more comfortable having a conversation than filling out a survey. Forbye, this study feels the need to state that the in-depth interview performed for this research is a **Semi-Structured Interview.** It is based on some key questions while also maintaining a room to maneuver for the interview to probe the topic in greater detail, revolving around how the conversation goes. It commonly starts with more general topics or questions and plausibly, within a predetermined general framework, the interview would witness the emergence of numerous questions. Naturally, pre-defined probes mean that the interview is less likely to prance beyond the researcher's categories (Harvey, 2022). The two main sources interviewed for this research are Sukma, interviewed on March 28, 2024, and Widjajanto, interviewed on April 9, 2024. Additionally, several figures were also interviewed to better explicate the implementation of the GMF throughout this dissertation. The first is Arif Havas Oegroseno, interviewed on November 4, 2022. He is also the current Indonesian Ambassador to Germany and a Vice-Minister in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Prior to that, he was Indonesia's Deputy Minister of the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs during most of President Widodo's first period who led the modification of the Global Maritime Fulcrum and its implementation as the Indonesian Ocean Policy. Then, Damos Dumoli Agusman, interviewed on December 7, 2022. He is the current Indonesian ambassador to Austria (since November 17, 2021). Lastly, DD, interviewed on October 2, 2022. They are a senior Foreign Ministry official that does not wish to be identified. This official was involved in interpreting the GMF as a foreign policy. After the interviews were finished, the author transcribed them into transcripts.

According to Mayring (2014, p. 45), transcription rules are necessary when transforming spoken language in an interview or a focus group into text. After all, an interview

transcript almost always indicates a focus on only some spoken language's features or even a loss of information. While the content of the language tends to be of primary interest, enriching the text with additional aspects, too, is possible. Mayring (2014, pp. 45-47) introduced several transcription systems depending on how much information is preserved. However, the one adopted by this research is called Pure Verbatim Protocol, where the transcription is done word for word including every utterance from the recording tools/apps. This system maintains articulation, fillers and dialect formulations, which means the transcript produced by this system will be very close to the natural language.

How the author of this research prepared to apply RTA is outlined in the next sub-sub-chapter.

5.2.1. Preparation

Braun & Clarke (2006, pp. 9-15) claimed that, before performing RTA, a number of choices should be made clear:

a. What counts as a theme? To begin with, a theme captures an important part about the data in relation to the research questions and constitutes some level of patterned response or definition within the data set. For this reason, an important question to address in terms of coding is what size does a theme need to be or what does count as a theme. Since this is a qualitative analysis, there is no easy answer to the question of what proportion the data set has to display evidence of the theme for it to be considered a theme, because the *keyness* of a theme depends not on quantifiable measures but on whether it encapsulates something decisive concerning the overall research question. Therefore, the judgment of the researcher is compulsory in determining what a theme is. Pliability must also be maintained since rigid rules are ineffective here;

b. A rich definition of the data set, or a comprehensive account of one specific aspect, particularly related to the type of analysis a researcher wishes to do in relation to the data set and the claims a researcher wants to make is vital;

c. Deciding whether the identified themes will be approached inductively (data-driven) or theoretically (analyst-driven);

d. Determining at which level will the themes be identified: semantic (surface meanings) or thematic (underlying ideas, assumptions, conceptualizations, and ideologies);

e. Choosing an epistemology, where an essentialist/realist approach means that motivations, meaning, and experience can be theorized in a straightforward manner, but a constructionist approach means that the socio-cultural contexts and structural conditions are given more importance;

f. Lastly, having the relationship between the research questions, the questions asked to participants during the interview, and the questions that guide the coding and data analysis to be cleared and carefully considered before and during thematic analyses. After all, it is commonly desirable that there is a disjuncture between them.

In addition, Braun & Clarke argued that there are several theoretical assumptions that have to be addressed before conducting RTA. These assumptions are conceptualized as a series of continua that helps a researcher pinpoint the location of their analysis in them, why it is there, and why this conceptualization is appropriate to answer their research questions. These continua are ontological and epistemological considerations, experiential versus critical orientation to data; inductive versus deductive analysis, and; semantic versus latent coding of data (Byrne, 2021, pp. 1394-1395). These theoretical assumptions are addressed for this dissertation below:

a. **Ontological and Epistemological Considerations** = Braun & Clarke points out that, by taking an ontological position, all researchers make assumptions about the nature of reality, while an epistemological position is reflective of the assumptions regarding what meaningful and valid knowledge is constituted by and how it can and should be generated. Interestingly, since this study is driven by the constructivist theory, Braun & Clarke actually addressed whether constructivism and an epistemological position called constructionism are one and the same. They argue that constructivism and constructionism are different, because taking a constructionist position means rejecting the individual constructivist accounts (Raskin, 2002, as cited in Braun & Clarke, 2022, p. 184). According to Braun & Clarke, the constructivist theory is more aligned to an ontological position called critical realism. They define critical realism as a combination of an ontological position called realism, where a knowable world or a truth is waiting to be discovered, with an epistemological position called relativism, where a singular reality that is

independent of human practices does not exist. This combination provides a position that holds fast to a concept of truth and reality but nonetheless acknowledges that human practices can be regarded to give birth to contextual and perspectival truths (2022, pp. 167-184). Because this study is driven by constructivism, this study chooses its ontological and epistemological positions by following the recommendations of Braun & Clarke and picks critical realism.

b. **Experiential versus Critical Orientation** = Braun & Clarke considers these two vast orientations in qualitative research to be a useful starting point because, to some extent, they necessitate different epistemological and ontological assumptions to delimit the theoretical orientations and some design elements of a researcher. They describe an experiential orientation to RTA and qualitative research to be centered in the meanings and experiences articulated by the participants, while a critical orientation center on interrogating patterns of meaning and the effects and implications of them. Experiential orientation is informed by hermeneutics of empathy or an analytic orientation that conforms to understand and make sense of the reality captured in the data, while critical orientation is informed by a hermeneutics of suspicion or an analytic orientation that interrogate the truths and claims presented in the data (2022, pp. 159-160). Since this study uses RTA to understand what goes on behind the GMF's creators mindset when creating the GMF, this study decides to follow the experiential orientation.

c. **Inductive versus Deductive Analysis** = A study that adopts a deductive or theory-driven approach would generate codes relative to a pre-specified conceptual codebook, while an inductive or data-driven approach would generate codes reflective of the content of the data. However, it is arguably impossible to exclusively use just one approach in an analysis, because an inductive viewpoint that represents the ties between different items in the information contained by the data set is a necessity to locate pattern with regard to a pre-decided theory, while a deductive outlook is needed by a researcher as some form of criteria to identify whether the information they have is relevant to their research questions or not. This study adopts a predominantly inductive approach, or open-coding, but applies a degree of deductive approach to ascertain that the open-coding contributes to producing themes that are meaningful and relevant to the research questions (Byrne, 2021, pp. 1396-1397). The tendency for one approach to dominate the other has been acknowledged by Braun & Clarke themselves, who stated that an overall orientation

toward either one indicates whether a research is more their-based or data-based (2012, as cited in Byrne, 2021, p. 1397).

d. **Semantic versus Latent Coding** = Semantic codes can be identified via surface meanings of the data, while latent codes aim for something beyond description and attempt to locate hidden meanings of the data (Byrne, 2021, p. 1397). Both kinds of coding are used by this study without prioritizing either one.

The next sub-sub-chapter details how Braun & Clarke's (2006) six steps to apply RTA are performed for this study.

5.2.2. Braun & Clarke's Six Steps of Reflexive Thematic Analysis

In performing RTA, Braun & Clarke (2006) have presented six steps to follow. They are:

1. **Familiarization** = According to Braun & Clarke (2006, pp. 16-17), it is crucial for a researcher to be immersed in the collected data, to the extent that the researcher is closely acquainted with the depth and breadth of the content.

2. **Generating Initial Codes** = In this phase, the researcher assigns codes to the collected data. A code refers to a concise account of what is being said in the interview. Every time a researcher notes something intriguing in the collected data, a code is written down. This means, it is normal for one section to receive multiple codes. After all, it is not an interpretation, but a description meant to start sorting the collected data into meaningful groups, since a coding, be it done by a software or a handwriting, depends on what is being said and the purpose of one's research. Once all the data is coded, collating all the sections that fit into each code is the next step (Mortensen, 2021).

3. **Searching for Themes** = According to Mortensen (2021), this phase involves an active interpretation of the codes and the data called themes. It starts by looking at a list of codes and the extracts associated with them before collating the codes into broader themes that mark something interesting about the data. This is a reiterative process where codes are moved back and forth in order to try structuring different themes.

4. **Reviewing Themes** = Braun & Clarke (2006, p. 20) elucidated that this phase incorporates two levels of reviewing and refining of a researcher's themes. It takes

place once a set of candidate themes are devised, for it includes refining those themes. Level one encompasses reviewing at the level of the coded data extracts by reading all the collated extracts for every candidate theme and then considering whether they come across as forming a coherent pattern. If they do, move on to the second level of this phase. If they do not, a reconsideration has to take place. Level two calls for a similar process, but applied to the entire data set. This level requires the researcher to consider not only how valid the individual themes related to the data set are, but also whether a candidate thematic map precisely bespeaks the meanings noticeable in the data set as a whole (Braun & Clarke, 2006, pp. 20-21).

5. **Defining and Naming Themes** = Braun & Clarke (2006) regarded this phase as the step where a researcher defines the essence that each theme is about.

6. **Producing the Report** = This phase can only be started when a researcher has a set of fully worked-out themes, because it is about the final analysis and writing up the report. The report has to do more than simply dispensing data, for extracts have to be imbued within an analytic narrative that rivetingly exemplifies the story being told about the data and goes beyond describing the data to make an argument related to a relevant research question (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 23).

How these steps are applied during this research is discussed next.

5.2.3. Application of the Reflexive Thematic Analysis

Before the analysis started, this study first had to pick the right software to conduct its qualitative research. A popular software to do it is known as MAXQDA, sothe author decided to look into it. Upon more learning of MAXQDA, this study discovered that the company producing it also provided a free manual and even free lessons to use it. On top of that, some worked examples of doing RTA with MAXQDA are also provided, such as by Uştuk (2022) and Soloshchenko (2019; 2022). Hence, this study decided to use MAXQDA to do its RTA.

As this study began learning how to use MAXQDA (including by attending MAXQDA workshops), Braun & Clarke (2022) actually released a book providing a practical guide to thematic analysis in 2022. This study saw it as a chance to strengthen its analysis and purchased the book. This study also decided to track down a coding manual by Saldaña (2012) and a qualitative research guide by Yin (2016). To mitigate any lack of

understanding, this study also seeked such guidelines or examples in the Indonesian language. Among the works found were a brief coding guideline by Mahpur (2017) and another worked example of RTA by Heriyanto (2018). The next several weeks were then spent studying up as much as possible with all these reading materials. Fortunately, in March and April 2024 respectively, Sukma and Widjajanto agreed to be interviewed for this research. Following their interviews, the next one week was spent transcribing them before translating them to English. Next up was following the steps outlined by Braun & Clarke (2022, p. 6).

Beginning with step one, this study ergo read all of the dataset several times many times over. This study also wrote down some more comments about a few segments in the transcripts that might prove useful to answer the research questions. After feeling familiarized enough with the dataset, coding with MAXQDA then started as this study moved on to step two. Before beginning to code, this study kept its research questions in mind and then spent the next several days doing coding and writing up all the coding memos and analytical memos that can be used to pinpoint the relevance of the codes to answer the research questions. For some codes, the process of naming it properly took several tries and iterations. This is a necessity to interpret themes properly. RTA is a recursive process and a researcher does not usually follow a linear path through the six phases (Braun & Clarke, 2014, as cited by Byrne, 2021, p. 10).

Next, step three was generating initial themes. This step began by keeping the research questions in mind, arranging the codes properly, erasing codes that only appeared once in the whole dataset, and deciding on the apt categorization of the codes. Since only two transcripts are coded, the themes only contain parent codes with no sub-codes. Braun & Clarke (2022, p. 77) described a theme as “a pattern of shared meaning organised around a central concept”, whereas a central concept is defined by Braun & Clarke (2022, p. 78) as “the idea or meaning that unites a theme”. Braun & Clarke (2022, p. 102) also stated that the importance of a theme does not lie in its frequency, but in its salience and importance of addressing the research question. It is thus possible for a minor theme to offer a vitally important meaning to capture and report. Therefore, to generate themes properly, it was decided to first look into the similarities that exist among the parent codes in order to pinpoint the idea or meaning that unites them accordingly. This is done by grouping them in a minimum pair of 3 codes before then examining and re-examining the extracts coded with them in MAXQDA.

Additionally, MAXQDA is equipped with a function called the Code Map. According to MAXQDA ("Code Map: Position Codes According to Similarity", n.d.), "In the Code Map, selected codes are displayed as on a map. The more two codes co-occur, i.e., the more similar they are in terms of their use in the data, the closer they are placed together on the map." These co-occurrences are vital because the segments coded by the interacting codes are then re-read and discerned in greater detail. If they are considered relevant enough to answer any of the research questions, the segments can be then analyzed more deeply to provide actual answers for the research questions. The circles and lines mark the stronger coincidences between the segments in the codes. So, this study decided to create several rules prior to generating the themes with MAXQDA. Firstly, if MAXQDA shows that even one code in a candidate themes grouping be left out of the Code Map display altogether or appearing as a lone code, be it by being placed too far from the other codes and/or having no line whatsoever with at least one another code, due to lack of interaction with other codes, the type of similarity used to examine that grouping with one of the remaining two options is switched. For example, if occurrence analysis for a grouping of three candidate themes shows a code not having lines with other codes, it is then analyzed with proximity or intersection analysis. This process is repeated until all three options to analyze similarity provided by MAXQDA are used up. Secondly, if, after all three options are used up, MAXQDA still shows even code being left out of the similarities by not being linked via lines or left out automatically by MAXQDA altogether, the grouping is considered to have a weak chemistry and ergo its content is changed before conducting another type of similarity analysis using MAXQDA. In other words, it is important for this study to ascertain that all the codes displayed in the MAXQDA test are not isolated. Thirdly, after doing initial tests with all three options, the occurrence and proximity similarities are the only two similarities shared by all candidate themes. For this reason, only these two similarity types are used by this study to decide whether the grouping of the codes inside the candidate theme is robust enough for the segments coded with them to be analyzed more deeply in order to answer the research questions. Specifically for proximity, the distance was set to be 20 paragraphs between the codes before the similarity analysis began in MAXQDA due to the length of the interview transcripts. Lastly, any individual code can be used more than once and therefore appear in more than one grouping. It needs to be noted that only one code appears in all thematic groupings: The Heightening of Indo-Pacific Tensions. It is thus the most important code made for this study. Next, after the arrangement of the codes is done, the coded segments in each candidate theme are vetted by ascertaining

whether their content is capable of answering the research questions of this study. This is done by reading the coded segments and checking whether they answer or at least can be analyzed to reveal the answer to at least one research question. Then, they are re-checked again to ensure that the coded segments of each code are indeed relevant to answer the research questions. After that, their segments are re-read again in relation to the research questions before the themes are finally generated. Thus, every analysis of the themes presented here is accompanied by three screenshots produced from a MAXQDA analysis showing the codes in the thematic grouping and the two types of similarity that the grouping of its candidate themes shared when displaying its strong chemistry and a display of which research question(s) the contained segments of the theme specifically help to answer.

Once the third step is over, this study moves to steps four and five of RTA, where the themes are reviewed, developed, refined, defined, and named. In reviewing, developing, refining, defining, and naming each of them, several pieces of advice from Braun & Clarke were considered. They take the form of questions (Braun & Clarke, 2022, p. 111) and are answered by the author before delving deeper into every potential theme. The questions are as follows: (1) What is the central organizing concept for this theme? (2) What are the boundaries of this theme? (3) Is there enough meaningful data to evidence this theme? (4) Is the data contained within this theme too diverse and wide-ranging? (5) What importance does this theme convey?

Because the fourth and the fifth steps are closely aligned, and because, in doing the analysis, this study also followed Braun & Clarke's suggestion that its analysis should always move beyond its data (2022, p. 139), this study decided to combine the fourth and fifth steps with step six: writing up the report.

This concludes the analytical framework part of this research. The next part will present this study's empirical findings and conclusions.

PART III
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis - Discourse Analysis

In this chapter, the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi that have been collected will be analyzed. This chapter begins by first discussing Widodo's speeches, then Marsudi's, before addressing the unsaid points related to their speeches. Every speech will be recapped before an annotation about topics relevant to this dissertation is presented. After the speeches of each year are presented the speech acts performed in that year will be discussed.

6.1. President Joko Widodo

The decision to include the speeches of Widodo in the data analysis has to do with the fact that he is the one who announced the GMF and it is starting from his first administration that the implementation of the GMF began. Prior to his election victory in 2014, Widodo only made one speech regarding the GMF during a debate between presidential candidates on June 22, 2014 (Yuwono, 2014). He then mentioned it again during his July 22, 2014 victory speech ("Ini Pidato Pertama Jokowi Sebagai Presiden Terpilih", 2014). After his inauguration into Indonesia's highest office, every speech of Widodo's that he made as President is kept in the database of *Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia* (the Cabinet Secretary of Indonesia). Prior to using this database, this study decided to develop three rules in choosing which speech of Widodo's would be included as part of the analysis. The three rules are: the database has to contain a transcript of the speech, the speech was delivered during Widodo's first term (from October 20, 2014 to October 19, 2019), and the speech is about the GMF or has to mention the GMF by name.

The only two exceptions to these three rules are Widodo's speech on June 22, 2014, during his presidential debate since it is discussed in a book and his presidential election victory speech on July 22, 2014. Otherwise, only if a speech fulfills all three rules the study deems it adequate to be included in this data analysis. These three rules are made because a transcript is a necessity for the content of the speech to be analyzed and a specific timeframe has been chosen for the topic of this study.

In inputting the keyword for the database during the search, this study selected the category of *Transkrip Pidato* (Indonesian for *Speech Transcript*) before inputting *Poros Maritim* (Indonesian for *Maritime Fulcrum*) in the search engine. To clarify, the latter

term is taken from the Indonesian term for *the Global Maritime Fulcrum* (which is *Poros Maritim Dunia* in Indonesian) itself. As such, this study considers it apt to use the GMF's own naming sense to select the speeches included for this study. Using these rules and qualifications, this study found a total of 15 of his speeches from 2014 to 2018. Of these, only his annual state address in 2015 and 2018 have been translated into English in the Indonesian Cabinet Secretary database. The rest had to be translated by the author himself.

This study also ventured to check into Widodo's presidential campaign in 2014 and found one more speech about the GMF delivered during a presidential debate in a book. He also mentioned the GMF in his 2014 presidential election victory speech and it will be included here. Interestingly, the database showed no speech of his in 2019 containing any mention of the GMF or maritime at all. Lastly, after repeated reading of Widodo's speeches, this study noticed that Widodo put so much importance on two elements under his administration: economic interests and infrastructure development. This study hence considers them vital to underline the emergent pattern in Widodo's speeches. For this reason, two codes are made specifically for Widodo's speeches. They are named economic interests and infrastructure development and will be included in the MAXQDA coding and display to confirm their frequency and breadth of mentions in Widodo's speeches from 2014 to 2019.

6.1.1. Discussing Widodo's Speeches

6.1.1.1. 2014 Speeches

1. First Speech: widodo_june_22_2014

a. Recap

This is the only speech of Widodo's that is not stored in the Cabinet Secretary database because it was delivered during his presidential campaign. The very first time Widodo mentioned the GMF in a speech took place in a televised presidential candidates debate on June 22, 2014. The format of the debate is having the presidential candidate deliver a speech under the framing of different topics. The topic discussed during the debate when the GMF is first mentioned is International Politics and National Defense (Yuwono, 2014, p. 147). The three portions of his speech that are discussed here have to do with

the GMF, Indonesia's borders, and China. Widodo began by saying that he thought of Indonesia as a country considered weak on the global stage and, for that reason, every matter related to sovereignty and dignity of the state must be paid close attention to by the president. It would not be good for Indonesia to be underestimated by other countries. The proposition Widodo offered for Indonesia to rise and earn the respect of the world once again harks back at the days of Indonesia's first president, Soekarno, where Indonesia was not taken lightly as a country to the point where Indonesia could be a leader among emerging nations and become a founding member of the 1955 Asian-African Conference. Widodo argued that it is this sort of leadership that Indonesia must aim to regain, and this is why the GMF became important. Widodo explained that, if Indonesia is able to successfully construct the GMF, other countries will have to recalibrate their interests according to Indonesia's design because so many countries have interests in and around Indonesian waters. This will elevate Indonesia on the global stage and afford it a distinguished status. Widodo also talked about the security of Indonesian borders. He proclaimed that, in regards to disputed borders, his government would prioritize diplomacy with the disputing nation(s). However, if there is a clear violation on what is undeniably Indonesia's border(s), his government will not hesitate to take direct action accordingly (Yuwono, 2014, pp. 153-154).

b. Annotation

In this speech, Widodo utilized two speech acts: representatives and declarations. He used representatives when mentioning the rationale behind his answers (such as mentioning the era of Indonesia's first president) and used declarations when mentioning what his government would do in certain scenarios (such as border violations or the South China Sea tension). According to MAXQDA, he used both speech acts in equal measure.

Regarding the content of the speech, the US is mentioned only once in this speech when Widodo was talking about the relationship between Indonesia and Australia, particularly regarding a group both Australia and the US are part of. The group is known as the Inter-Government Group on Indonesia (IGGI) and also has Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as members (Yuwono, 2014, p. 179).

Meanwhile, China is mentioned 11 times by Widodo in this speech when touching upon the tension in the South China Sea. He started by mentioning the speech exclusively between China and Vietnam before noting that, although other countries like Malaysia,

Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines are also involved in this conflict, he considered the tension between China and Vietnam to be the most rigid. Widodo stated that Indonesia desires no conflict with China and does not have an actual interest to inject itself into the South China Sea tension because it is essentially a conflict between other nations. Regardless, Widodo also said that Indonesia should calculate carefully if it were to involve itself in the conflict: would it worsen Indonesia's relations with China or would Indonesia be able to contribute positively to help end the conflict altogether? Unless Indonesia is certain that it is capable of a diplomatic strategy to solve the conflict in the South China Sea, Widodo believed it would be wiser for Indonesia to stay out of it (Yuwono, 2014, p. 176).

He also mentioned Indonesia hosting the Asian-African Conference in 1955. As has been mentioned on pp. 4 and 18 of this study, the conference is one of Indonesia's most notable foreign policy successes that influences countries across Asia and Africa. This suggests that the GMF was, at least initially, meant to amplify Indonesia's standing not only domestically but also regionally.

Lastly, Widodo also underlined the tension in the South China Sea due to China's actions. From here, as has been discussed on pp. 70-71 previously, it is clear how much of geostrategic considerations were truly behind the GMF. Widodo's mentioning China 11 times then is noted because of a hypothesis of this study regarding the relationship between the BRI, which is highly related to the rise of China, and the creation of the GMF.

2. Second Speech: Widodo_july_22_2014

a. Recap

This speech was delivered following his presidential election victory on July 22, 2014. In his speech, Widodo declared that his victory belonged to every Indonesian and he hoped that his victory would pave the way to achieve and to realize an Indonesia that is economically independent, culturally unique, and politically sovereign.

b. Annotation

The GMF is only mentioned once toward the end, when Widodo said that the spirit of mutual cooperation will allow Indonesia to both survive challenges and develop into the GMF as the future locus of great political civilization.

3. Third Speech: widodo_november_6_2014

a. Recap

This speech was delivered on November 6, 2014 to open the 12th Munas Kagama (National Consultation for the Alumni of the University of Gajah Mada, Widodo's alma mater). Widodo began by talking about how the strength and the wealth of human and natural resources that Indonesia have become more evident to him whenever he visited any province in Indonesia. He considered this knowledge to be the reason why, when Indonesia brought up the sea toll program and the GMF to the surface, many other countries wanted to know more about them. According to Widodo, prior to the National Consultation, the foreign ministers from Japan, the US, and China had asked him to inquire more about both initiatives, whereas Russia sent a special envoy to him for this inquiry. Widodo said that he considered such inquiries to be a sign of restlessness by the inquiring nations because Indonesia was, at long last, starting to come to terms with the fact that ⅔ of its territories are waters ("Sambutan Presiden RI pada Pembukaan Munas KAGAMA ke-12, di Clarion Hotel, Kendari, Sulawesi Tenggara, 6 November 2014", 2014).

Widodo also stated that, in the coming APEC annual gatherings (held in Beijing from November 10 to November 12 in 2014), Obama, Xi, Shinzo Abe, and Vladimir Putin have individually expressed an interest to see him in person since he was Indonesia's new leader, and he was sure that they would ask him about the GMF, since the aforementioned foreign ministers of partner countries kept asking him about it. He also mentioned that China was quick to ask in-depth about the GMF and the sea toll and whether or not they can cooperate with China's Belt and Road Initiative (then known as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). Widodo claimed that his response was blunt in that such a cooperation could only take place if both Indonesia and China benefit together ("Sambutan Presiden RI pada Pembukaan Munas KAGAMA ke-12, di Clarion Hotel, Kendari, Sulawesi Tenggara, 6 November 2014", 2014).

b. Annotation

In total, the US is mentioned once and China is mentioned four times in this speech. Here, Widodo also made a mention toward one of the pillars of the GMF, while the Pivot was not mentioned at all, the BRI received a full paragraph when Widodo shared a story of China asking him whether the GMF could be synchronized with the BRI. In addition, in his entire speech, when he talked about the GMF, the speech act he utilized was

exclusively representatives. Several points made by Widodo about the GMF in this speech are particularly eye-catching for this study.

The first point is his mentioning leaders from the US, China, Russia, and Japan wanting to meet him to know more about his sea-toll program. As has been mentioned many times in this study, for example in pp. 52 and 82, the Sea Toll program is a famous initiative under the GMF banner. This also points out to the GMF having domestic importance from early on and is related to the third hypothesis of this study, in that the GMF is used by relevant Indonesian officials as an umbrella term because its reach touches both domestic and foreign policies.

The second point is speaking with China to cooperate with the BRI on the Sea Toll, which again is under the GMF's banner. The intertwining of the GMF and the BRI has likewise been touched upon in this study previously, particularly in pp. 88 and 89. Sukma himself (2024) considered the alignment between the GMF and the BRI to be relative: in some cases, such as port building and maritime investment, the two can align. However, in cases related to sovereignty or China's claims in the South China Sea, he argued that the two are not aligned. This study posits that the point of his argument can best be seen from the four synchronization MOUs between the GMF and the BRI: two of them are about the building of the regional economic corridor, one about the improvement of maritime cooperation, and another one about a twin parks project. Not a single MOU synchronizing the two initiatives is about China's claim in the South China Sea or the Nine-Dash Line.

Lastly, the initiative introduced by Widodo is framed under the lens of economic interests. The term 'economic interests' itself is defined as an economic entity's property that is composed of motivated economic activity to fulfill necessities via the effective utilization of available resources in the process of economic relations for a specific timeframe ("What is Economic Interests", n.d.). Widodo is known for putting the importance of Indonesia's economic interests above all else as president, so it is likely important to underline that the Sea Toll is the only GMF application he singled out and mentioned five times in the speech, since the importance of the Sea Toll to improving Indonesia's economy has been discussed in Chapter 2 previously. It is also interesting to note that the application of the Sea Toll was made public by Widodo before even introducing the GMF pillars only a week later, because this hints at the importance of the Sea Toll program for Widodo.

4. Fourth Speech: widodo_november_13_2014

a. Recap

This speech was delivered in the EAS on November 13, 2014 in Nay Pyi Taw and is the speech that introduced the GMF to the global audience. He outlined all of (then) five pillars of the GMF and what Indonesia would do as the fulcrum, including his wishes for the EAS and the ongoing negotiation for the code of conduct in the South China Sea.

b. Annotation

Here, Widodo utilized three speech acts: representatives, declarations, and directives, with representatives being the one he utilized most often. He did not mention China, the US, the Pivot, and the BRI at all in this speech. This is a particularly straightforward speech that mentions the five GMF pillars. With this speech, Widodo confirmed that the GMF is aimed at improving Indonesia in many sectors. Much like the previous speech, with Widodo mentioning the GDP and profits, this speech again is framed under the lens of economic interests.

Overview of Widodo's 2014 Speeches

Below is how MAXQDA depicts the table of Widodo's 2014 speeches:

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
China	5	9.3	9.3
Declarations	4	7.4	7.4
Defense, Security, Law ...	1	1.9	1.9
Directives	1	1.9	1.9
Economic Interests	3	5.6	5.6
Infrastructure Development	6	11.1	11.1
Marine Culture	1	1.9	1.9
Maritime Diplomacy	5	9.3	9.3
Maritime Economy and ...	2	3.7	3.7
Ocean Resources Management...	3	5.6	5.6
Representatives	6	11.1	11.1
Sea Toll	5	9.3	9.3
The BRI	1	1.9	1.9
The GMF	10	18.5	18.5
The US	1	1.9	1.9
TOTAL (valid)	54	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	54	100.0	

Figure 3. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2014 speeches.
(screenshot by the author).

As can be seen from the table, Widodo literally mentioned all five of the original GMF pillars and in 2014. This is understandable since he had to introduce them to the general public. Based on the table, maritime diplomacy is the pillar he most often mentioned in 2014, followed by Ocean Resources Management and Human Resources Development and then Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare. Marine Culture and Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and Safety at Sea shared the last spot. The year 2014 also saw him utilizing three speech acts in total: representatives, declarations, and directives. Representatives is the one he utilized most often, while directives is the least often.

He commonly utilized representatives whenever he had to explain the rationale behind his decisions, such as the example below when he boasted Indonesia's wealth of natural resources that he considered to be more and more axiomatic as he traveled across provinces to do his job ("Sambutan Presiden RI pada Pembukaan Munas KAGAMA ke-12, di Clarion Hotel, Kendari, Sulawesi Tenggara, 6 November 2014", 2014). Declarations, meanwhile, he used to announce his GMF ideas and plans, such as when he outlined the third pillar and all its programs (Dungkal & Ferdiansyah, 2014). To add, the only instance where he used directives involved the moment when he urged the EAS members to be more involved in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, such as when he urged the EAS to have a more concrete cooperation in energy, food security, manufacturing, and preservation of the sea (Dungkal & Ferdiansyah, 2014) right here.

Widodo mentioned China a lot more often than the US in his 2014 speeches. China is mentioned in its involvement in the increasing tension in the South China Sea and its inquiry to whether the BRI can be synchronized with the GMF, whereas the US is mentioned in its capacity as a member of the IGGI and in its inquiry about what the Sea Toll is. To note, the BRI received one mention while the Pivot did not show up even once.

Lastly, Widodo's three GMF-related speeches in 2014 pertained to the plan of what he initially envisioned the GMF to be for both domestic and foreign affairs of Indonesia. For the most part, the GMF and its pillars were just introduced this year, so in essence, Widodo's GMF content in 2014 is more about what he wants to do. The fact that he highlighted the importance of his Sea Toll program as far back as 2014 is a hint that his domestic GMF interest was already bigger than his interest in GMF as a foreign policy. This is consistent with what will be revealed in Chapter 7 when discussing the interviews of Sukma and Widjajanto (Sukma, 2024; Andi Widjajanto, interview transcript, April 9, 2024). Of course, it is also important to remember that Widodo underlined the economic interests related to the GMF most above all.

6.1.1.2. 2015 Speeches

1. First Speech: widodo_august_14_2015

a. Recap

This speech, delivered on August 14, 2015, is the first state address delivered by Widodo in his capacity as the Indonesian president. Every year, Indonesia's president delivers a

state address in front of Indonesia's congress around August 17 to commemorate Indonesia's Independence Day and the 2015 address marked Indonesia's 70th birthday. In his greetings, Widodo greeted Indonesian congress-members, Indonesian government officials, Indonesia's former leaders, and ambassadors of partner countries. He singled out four names in particular during his greetings. Two of them are former Indonesian presidents, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie & Megawati Soekarnoputri, and the other two are former Indonesian vice presidents, Try Sutrisno & Hamzah Haz (Setiawanto, 2015; "Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Annual Session of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia 2015", 2015).

b. Annotation

Widodo mentioned three pillars of the GMF in this state address: rebuilding maritime culture when he stated that he would like to prove that the Indonesian people no longer turn their backs on the seas, maintaining and managing marine resources due to climate change, maritime diplomacy as he reiterated his administration's continuous fight against illegal fishing, and improving maritime infrastructure through the construction of the sea toll and seaports by proclaiming that remains a big agenda for his administration to continue doing. Also, he utilized three speech acts here: commissives, declarations, and representatives. In addition, none of the Pivot, the BRI, China and the US are mentioned in this speech at all. Economic interests, which included infrastructure needs and accomplishments, made up a bulk of Widodo's speech here, including when talking about the GMF and the Sea Toll program.

Finally, this study would like to underline a vital point made by Widodo in this speech: Widodo outright admitted that the Sea Toll program is one of his most important agendas. This explicit admittance from him lends a strong credence to his focus on economic interests, since a national program under the GMF banner is singled out as an utmost priority of his presidency. Likewise, the discussion contained in the next chapter confirms that Widodo had indeed thought of the Sea toll program in 2014 before the GMF pillars were even a thing (Sukma, 2024). This has also been highlighted when discussing his November 6, 2014, speech.

2. Second Speech: widodo_december_11_2015

a. Recap

This December 11, 2015, speech was Widodo's address delivered in the Presidential Palace to celebrate the Adibakti Mina Bahari Award, an award given by the Indonesian government for accomplishments in the marine and fishing sectors. In Widodo's greetings, he greeted his ministers, the Marine Chief of Staff, the head of Indonesian Coast Guard, and the 2015 awardees of the Adibakti Mina Bahari ("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo Pada Silaturahmi dengan Penerima Penghargaan Adibakti Mina Bahari Tahun 2015, di Istana Negara, Jakarta, 11 Desember 2015", 2015).

Widodo began this speech by thanking the awardees for all their hard work and innovations. He then reiterated his belief that Indonesia's future prosperity truly lies at the sea, much like what had been proven in the past by the Majapahit Empire and Srivijaya Empire, and this marine importance is what he claimed to be the reason why China asked him if the GMF could be synchronized with the BRI and why Singapore and Japan asked whether they could possibly join the GMF initiative. He then complimented successful Indonesian fisheries entrepreneurs before calling out two of the 2015 awardees, Rusidi and Murwati, to have a chat with him in front of everybody present so they can share their experiences and successes. After that, he used their experiences to set up an example for the then Fisheries Minister, Pudjiastuti, regarding what kind of support he expected the ministry to provide the fishermen and the fisheries business owner. He finished up by sharing an encouraging message for bigger successes, both for the government and the private sector ("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo Pada Silaturahmi dengan Penerima Penghargaan Adibakti Mina Bahari Tahun 2015, di Istana Negara, Jakarta, 11 Desember 2015", 2015).

b. Annotation

In this speech, Widodo utilized four speech acts: directives, expressives, commissives, and representatives. He did not mention the US or the Pivot at all, but as summarized in the above, he did mention China and the BRI. He also mentioned every GMF pillar with the exception of building up Indonesia's maritime defense.

Similar to the previous speech, this one mentions the GMF predominantly from the domestic lens. Taking into account the makeup of the audience of the local award ceremony, it should be understandable as to why Widodo also mentioned Indonesia's

past empires, the Majapahit and Srivijaya, and the actions of then Minister Pudjiastuti. The empires, how they relate to the GMF, and Pudjiastuti's actions have been mentioned previously by this study. Indonesia's history and sovereignty are at the core of Widodo's encouragement to the recipient of the awards and the audience, much like how the previous GMF discussion in both Chapters 2 and 3 have underlined the importance of history and sovereignty for the GMF.

Something else to note from this speech is Widodo's straightforward acknowledgement that Indonesia's maritime identity is inspired by both Srivijaya and Majapahit empires (Rosyidin, 2023, pp. 55-56) as has been mentioned previously in this dissertation. Interestingly, the mentions of Majapahit and Pudjiastuti in Chapters 2 and 3 intersect with the mention of China, who is also mentioned here by Widodo in its interest to synchronize its BRI with the GMF. This appears to be the second time Widodo touched upon this synchronization in front of a domestic audience. The GMF-BRI relations has been extensively discussed also by this study, but, with the benefit of hindsight, this study finds it important to mention again that the economic ties between Indonesia and China improved greatly under Widodo's rule to the point where the President himself felt comfortable mentioning a potential synchronization between the GMF and BRI in front of the Indonesian public.

Lastly, this is the only GMF speech of Widodo's that illustrates the rewards for individuals contributing to the betterment of Indonesia's maritime economy. In other words, this speech is again framed under the lens of economic interests.

Overview of Widodo's 2015 Speeches

Below is how MAXQDA depicts the table of Widodo's 2015 speeches:

Variable: Cod. seg. (all documents)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
China	1	1.4	1.4
Commissives	1	1.4	1.4
Declarations	3	4.2	4.2
Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and Safety at Sea	2	2.8	2.8
Directives	15	20.8	20.8
Economic Interests	8	11.1	11.1
Expressives	4	5.6	5.6
Infrastructure Development	9	12.5	12.5
Marine Culture	3	4.2	4.2
Marine Spatial Management and Protection of the Marine Env.	1	1.4	1.4
Maritime Diplomacy	3	4.2	4.2
Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare	3	4.2	4.2
Ocean Resources Management and Human Resources Development	3	4.2	4.2
Representatives	8	11.1	11.1
Sea Toll	4	5.6	5.6
The BRI	1	1.4	1.4
The GMF	3	4.2	4.2
TOTAL (valid)	72	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	72	100.0	

Figure 4. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2015 speeches.
(screenshot by the author)

As can be seen from the table, Widodo mentioned five GMF pillars in 2015. Maritime diplomacy, marine culture, and maritime economy and infrastructure and improving welfare share the first place with three mentions each. Defense, security, law enforcement, and safety at the sea is at the second place, while one mention went to marine spatial management and protection of the marine environment.

In addition, all five speech acts were utilized by Widodo in 2015. Directives is the most frequently used with representatives in second place. Expressives, declarations, and commissives are ranked third, fourth, and fifth respectively. Commissives was utilized only once, when Widodo compelled himself to prove that Indonesia can no longer be a nation that abandoned its ocean and sea (Setiawanto, 2015). Declarations is utilized by Widodo when he announced what his administration was going to do or keep on doing, for example when he said that his administration would continue accelerating the development of infrastructures (Setiawanto, 2015). Expressives is utilized by Widodo

whenever he voiced his gratitude or appreciation toward a certain achievement, for example when he expressed his gratefulness toward the 2015 awardees of the Adibakti Mina Bahari for their contributions, accomplishments, and leadership in developing Indonesian marine and fisheries sector ("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo Pada Silaturahmi dengan Penerima Penghargaan Adibakti Mina Bahari Tahun 2015, di Istana Negara, Jakarta, 11 Desember 2015", 2015). Representatives is commonly utilized by Widodo when mentioning the condition of a problem related to the GMF, such as when he claimed that crimes involving illegal fishing, fish theft, and plundering of marine resources cost Indonesia a great deal (Setiawanto, 2015). Directives is used when he pointed out to some or all of his administrations or fellow Indonesians the requirements they have to do to improve, for example when he addressed Minister Pudjiastuti regarding bolstering fisheries practices, including by providing better tools, bigger funds, or more proper facilities ("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo Pada Silaturahmi dengan Penerima Penghargaan Adibakti Mina Bahari Tahun 2015, di Istana Negara, Jakarta, 11 Desember 2015", 2015).

Although the US or the Pivot was not mentioned in any speech by Widodo in 2015, China and the BRI were mentioned once each when Widodo told a story how the Chinese approached him to see whether the GMF could be synchronized with the BRI. Finally, the GMF-related speeches Widodo delivered in 2015 were predominantly about the domestic economic interests and infrastructure development aspects of the GMF instead of it as a foreign policy. To add, the hint that appeared in Widodo's 2014 speeches regarding his biggest interest in GMF to be inwardly instead of outwardly seemed to have emerged out in the open with his admittance of the Sea Toll program's importance in his 2015 state address. Even more so since his Sea Toll ambition preceded the creation of the GMF pillars back in 2014 (Sukma, 2024), because this further solidifies the notion that Widodo put more importance to his economic goals more than foreign policy goals, even in the application of the GMF.

6.1.1.3. 2016 Speeches

1. First Speech: widodo_april_12_2016

a. Recap

This speech was delivered on April 12, 2016, to open the 2016 International Fleet Review. Widodo started by welcoming the presence of navy fleets from countries all across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean in this exercise before outlining his opinion in regards to the importance of this maritime cooperation and his hopes about what this exercise would provide for all of its participants. He then stated that the seas must no longer be ignored, invigorated the realization of all five GMF pillars one more time, and finally concluded his speech by urging the audience members to commit to the seas ("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo pada Pembukaan International Fleet Review 2016, di Lantamal II Koarmabar, Teluk Bayur, Padang, Sumatera Barat, 12 April 2016", 2016).

b. Annotation

Widodo made use of all five speech acts and mentioned all five pillars of the GMF in this speech. No mention was made toward the US, the Pivot, the BRI, and China, however. Of note, this is so far the only speech of his that does not necessarily mention the GMF under the lens of economic interests.

2. Second Speech: widodo_august_20_2016

a. Recap

On August 20, 2016, Widodo delivered this speech during a select meeting (or a meeting with limited audience) specifically aimed at accelerating the GMF implementation. Widodo started by saying that the GMF has been put into the scholarship for two years at that time and, while some of its implementations have been put into place, the amount of GMF implementations that have not yet been put into place outnumber them when this speech took place. It was for this reason Widodo considered it important to urge having the GMF conversation again. He repeated the importance of embracing Indonesia's maritime nature and the vitality of Indonesia's strategic location between two oceans, and then reiterated how Indonesia's geostrategy must be maximized by building ports all across the archipelago. He followed it up by outlining the essence of the maritime connectivity pillar and the maritime preservation pillar of the GMF one

more time, particularly the seaports part, because he considered the seaports to be able to connect major straits within Indonesia's territory that could bring plenty of benefits to Indonesia. He concluded his speech by re-outlining the maritime diplomacy pillar and maritime defense pillar ("Pengantar Presiden pada Rapat Terbatas mengenai Percepatan Implementasi Poros Maritim, di Hotel Inna Parapat, Simalungun, Sumatera Utara, 20 Agustus 2016", 2016).

b. Annotation

Five pillars of the GMF are mentioned by Widodo this time, whereas the speech acts he utilized are directives and representatives. The Pivot, the BRI, China, and the US received no mention. In spite of that, this speech also mostly framed the GMF under the economic interests lens, particularly from the needs for better infrastructures.

Of note, in English, the title of this speech is "Introduction by the President at the Limited Meeting regarding the Acceleration of Implementation of the Maritime Fulcrum." Therefore, it should come as no surprise that all pillars of the GMF were mentioned here, since the purpose of the speech itself was to accelerate the GMF implementation to begin with. Widodo even took the time to remind the audience that he had thought most of the GMF plans would have been started by the time he delivered the speech, but reality did not match his expectations.

Overview of Widodo's 2016 Speeches

After using MAXQDA and activating all of Widodo's 2016 speeches, all GMF pillars, and the speech acts he utilized in 2016 in MAXQDA, below is how MAXQDA depicts the table of Widodo's 2016 speeches:

Document Variable Statistics

Variable: Cod. seg. (all document

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
Commissives	1	2.9	2.9
Declarations	1	2.9	2.9
Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and Safety at Sea	2	5.9	5.9
Directives	8	23.5	23.5
Economic Interests	3	8.8	8.8
Expressives	2	5.9	5.9
Infrastructure Development	2	5.9	5.9
Marine Culture	2	5.9	5.9
Marine Spatial Management and Protection of the Marine Env.	1	2.9	2.9
Maritime Diplomacy	2	5.9	5.9
Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare	2	5.9	5.9
Ocean Resources Management and Human Resources Development	1	2.9	2.9
Representatives	5	14.7	14.7
The GMF	2	5.9	5.9
TOTAL (valid)	34	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	34	100.0	

Figure 5. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2016 speeches.
(screenshot by the author).

As can be seen from the chart, Widodo mentioned six GMF pillars in 2016 although the IOP has yet to be published this year. Maritime diplomacy, marine culture, defense, security, law enforcement, and safety at the sea, and maritime economy and infrastructure and improving welfare share the first place for most mentions. The second place is shared between ocean resources management and human resources development and marine spatial management and protection of the marine environment.

Following 2015, Widodo utilized all five speech acts again in 2016. Also, much like in 2015, directives remains the speech act he most frequently utilized and it is usually used to urge others to follow the GMF agenda, such as the below example when he stated that maritime diplomacy and building up maritime defense must not be neglected in order to establish marine sovereignty ("Pengantar Presiden pada Rapat Terbatas mengenai Percepatan Implementasi Poros Maritim, di Hotel Inna Parapat, Simalungun, Sumatera Utara, 20 Agustus 2016", 2016).

Representatives also retains its place as the second most utilized speech act by Widodo in 2016 and is often used to state something related to his administration's program. An example of this is when he said that, while the GMF has been around for around two years, the number of GMF programs not yet implemented outweigh the number of GMF programs that have indeed been implemented ("Pengantar Presiden pada Rapat Terbatas mengenai Percepatan Implementasi Poros Maritim, di Hotel Inna Parapat, Simalungun, Sumatera Utara, 20 Agustus 2016", 2016).

Unlike in 2015, this time expressives has the third spot. Widodo used expressives to exhibit his true disposition, such as when ending his speech with a little prayer to the Almighty God so that the participants of the Multilateral Komodo exercise would receive divine blessings before showing his gratitude ("Pengantar Presiden pada Rapat Terbatas mengenai Percepatan Implementasi Poros Maritim, di Hotel Inna Parapat, Simalungun, Sumatera Utara, 20 Agustus 2016", 2016).

The fourth spot is shared by declarations and commissives. Widodo used declarations to express his expectations regarding the GMF programs, such as his hopes that the Multilateral Komodo would strengthen maritime culture across participating nations, cooperation among the navies of countries in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean to uphold wellness and physically fix and develop public facilities ("Pengantar Presiden pada Rapat Terbatas mengenai Percepatan Implementasi Poros Maritim, di Hotel Inna Parapat, Simalungun, Sumatera Utara, 20 Agustus 2016", 2016). Moving on, similar to 2015, commissives was utilized only once, when Widodo outright announced his full support toward the Multilateral Komodo exercise ("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo pada Pembukaan International Fleet Review 2016, di Lantamal II Koarmabar, Teluk Bayur, Padang, Sumatera Barat, 12 April 2016", 2016).

Widodo's analyzed speeches in 2016 did not mention China, the US, the Pivot and the BRI at all. As was mentioned in Chapter 1 of this study, 2016 saw a political turmoil that caused the rise of anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia. This might have served as Widodo's decision in leaving China and the BRI out of the equation.

Lastly, the 2016 state address is not included here in the analysis because it did not mention the GMF at all, although the state address still mentioned the Sea Toll program. Widodo mentioned the US there once, when talking about how Indonesia always encouraged conflicts to be peacefully solved when meeting with the US or Middle

Eastern countries. This study would like to note, however, that infrastructure development and economic interests were among the core elements mentioned by Widodo in his 2016 state address. Nonetheless, the GMF was still mentioned in the multilateral exercise and acceleration introduction speeches. However, even then the GMF pillars only received a passing mention.

The only speech in 2016 where Widodo went into a bit more detail about the GMF is his August 20 speech. He made his displeasure over many GMF programs not running according to his expectations at that time very clear. Even then his dissatisfactions in this speech were clearly more evident in his domestic GMF dreams than his diplomatic ones. Looking back at Chapter 2 of this study, most of the implementations of the GMF plans started after 2016, or from 2017 onwards, so there is a reason behind Widodo voicing his discontent in 2016. This pattern strongly suggests even further that Widodo did put more importance in the domestic goals of the GMF, particularly in serving Indonesia's economic interests and infrastructure development.

6.1.1.4. 2017 Speeches

1. First Speech: widodo_february_14_2017

a. Recap

This speech was delivered during a select meeting that took place on February 14, 2017 and aimed at evaluating the implementation of national strategic projects and priority programs in the province of North Sulawesi. Widodo started by affirming his belief that the province has vast maritime potentials to make Indonesia the GMF and then ordered the development of Bitung Port to be accelerated. He also ordered the acceleration of transportation infrastructures in Northern Sulawesi in order to hopefully boost its tourism and hospitality potentials, especially by aiming for tourists from Japan, China, the Philippines, and South Korea. His next order was for every level of provincial government in Northern Sulawesi to be more active in bolstering the province's tourism and hospitality by increasing the number of tourist attractions, on top of preserving the pre-existing ones such as the Bunaken Sea Garden Dive Resort. He closed his speech by ordering the priority program given to North Sulawesi to be used to eliminate the usual program implementation hurdles ("Pengantar Presiden Joko Widodo pada Rapat

Terbatas Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Proyek Strategis Nasional dan Program Prioritas di Provinsi Sulawesi Utara, di Kantor Presiden, Jakarta, 14 Februari 2017", 2017).

b. Annotation

In this speech, Widodo utilized directives and declarations as his speech acts, while he mentioned two GMF pillars, maintaining and managing marine resources and prioritizing the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity. China is mentioned once as one of the countries whose tourists should be led to find Northern Sulawesi a more attractive tourism destination. The US, the BRI, and the Pivot were not mentioned at all. Again, the GMF elements here are framed under infrastructure development needs and, thus, more interests for economic growth.

2. Second Speech: widodo_march_6_2017

a. Recap

On March 6, 2017, Widodo delivered this speech to open the IORA Business Summit. In his greetings, he greeted his ministers, the ministers attending the summit to represent each IORA member state, the Ambassadors in attendance, and the CEOs, leaders, and the leading officials of Indonesia's Chamber of Commerce. He also singled out South African President Jacob Zuma by name ("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo dalam Indian Ocean Rim Assosiation (IORA) Business Summit, di Jakarta Convention Center (JCC) Jakarta, 6 Maret 2017 Pukul 12.45 WIB", 2017). Although this is a speech to open an IORA event, not everything in it is related to the GMF because the main purpose of the summit is to discuss business, so this discussion will only mention the parts where the GMF and/or its elements are mentioned by Widodo.

b. Annotation

The first GMF-related element that Widodo mentioned in this speech is the challenges and opportunities that come from the importance of the Indian Ocean for the future, including for the future of the global economy. He then stated his wishes to see IORA and the GMF interlinked and for everyone in attendance to perform a profitable business. He followed it up by saying that it is his administration's job to ensure the entire business framework in Indonesia to function smoothly and accordingly to support as many business prospects as possible. Widodo finally closed his speech by saying that it is for the last reason he wanted his administration to partner up with as many people

as possible within the private sectors attending the summit ("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo dalam Indian Ocean Rim Assosiation (IORA) Business Summit, di Jakarta Convention Center (JCC) Jakarta, 6 Maret 2017 Pukul 12.45 WIB", 2017).

The US, the Pivot, China, and the BRI did not receive any mention at all. Meanwhile, three speech acts were utilized: commissives, directives, and representatives. Regardless, three GMF pillars were mentioned: maritime diplomacy, rebuilding Indonesia's maritime culture, and prioritizing the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity. Unfortunately, while Widodo expressed his wish to see the GMF and IORA interlinked, this study did not find any MOU or concrete plan to achieve that effect.

Lastly, it is unsurprising to underline that, considering the event this speech took place, again the GMF is framed from the lens of economic interests, since this speech itself is inherently about economic prospects.

3. Third Speech: widodo_march_29_2017

a. Recap

Beforehand, this study must clarify that this is not a speech in the strictest sense. This one is a joint statement between Widodo and then French president Francois Hollande regarding maritime cooperation between Indonesia and France. In total, there are 17 points included in the statement, so all of them will be outlined here ("Pernyataan Bersama Oleh Republik Indonesia dan Republik Perancis Mengenai Kerjasama Maritim", 2017):

1. Both France and Indonesia express their desire to strengthen their strategic partnership with one another, particularly their maritime cooperation;
2. Hollande acknowledged the importance of the GMF for Indonesia while Widodo acknowledged France's contribution toward international maritime security and safety;
3. Both presidents highlighted the importance of airspace and maritime borders in international trade and how fundamental it is for countries with such borders to sustain peace and security. Hollande acknowledged Indonesia's fitness to be the GMF while Widodo acknowledged the closeness between French waters and French

security commitment to be the reasons why Indonesia and France should bolster their cooperation;

4. Both presidents ordered the full implementation of the France-Indonesia defense cooperation, especially regarding the procurement of submarines;
5. Both men reaffirmed their respective country's commitment to oversee their maritime zone, including to combat crime committed in their waters such as piracy and illegal fishing;
6. Both men agreed on the importance of blue economy and thus urge for French and Indonesian commercial relations to become stronger;
7. Both presidents reaffirmed their commitment to react to climate change;
8. Both presidents agreed that there should be a cooperation between France and Indonesia for sustainability of energy;
9. Both presidents reaffirmed the importance of preserving coral reefs in the efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change and to achieve the goals of continuous development. Both countries agreed to cooperate regarding preservation, especially under the framework of International Coral Reef Initiative, and France would support Indonesia's blue carbon initiative;
10. Both countries also agreed to join hands to combat threats to the seas;
11. Both presidents noted the cooperation between both countries, particularly France's role in Indonesian development in the last ten years;
12. Both men acknowledged the French-Indonesian cooperation in hydro-oceanography, the importance of disaster prevention to ensure maritime and airspace safety;
13. Both men welcome the French-Indonesian cooperation in science and research to promote future solutions to maritime and environmental issues. Therefore, this cooperation will continue, especially in key areas such as preserving natural diversities and promoting scientific research about the seas;
14. Both presidents reaffirmed their commitment to increase the quality of human resources to improve technology, especially renewable energy and its uses in space and in the seas;

15. Both presidents appreciate the roles of ASEAN in peaceful development of international maritime cooperation, highlight the commitment to abide by UNCLOS, and voice their support for ASEAN and China to peacefully solve the tension in South China Sea;

16. Both men reaffirmed their commitments to IORA (then chairmanned by Indonesia), including in regards to the blue economy. Hollande congratulated Indonesia for the Jakarta Concord and declared France's commitment to support any effort to establish stability, peace, and prosperity in the Indian Ocean;

17. To continuously strengthen and review maritime cooperation between Indonesia and France, both presidents agreed to hold frequent discussions led by relevant maritime authorities from both countries.

b. Annotation

In this statement, three GMF pillars are mentioned: maintaining and managing marine resources, maritime diplomacy, and building up Indonesia's maritime defense. China is mentioned once in regards to the tension in the South China Sea. The BRI, the Pivot, and the US received no mention at all. Lastly, because Widodo technically made no single utterance in this speech, this study considers no speech act to have been performed in this statement.

4. Fourth Speech: widodo_may_4_2017

a. Recap

In his greetings, Widodo greeted other state officials and ambassadors from partner countries. In the maritime-related portion of the speech, he began by mentioning the maritime infrastructure sector and several recent developments related to it. He then followed it up by mentioning maritime industry and then science and technology and research. He closed out by drawing examples from tech billionaires to enhance more passion for development.

b. Annotation

In this speech, Widodo utilized directives and representatives. He also mentioned China once, while his speech is dominated by the usual economic interests and infrastructure development.

5. Fifth Speech: widodo_august_16_2017

a. Recap

This speech, delivered on August 16, 2017, is Widodo's third state address and was delivered to celebrate the 72nd birthday of Indonesia. Regarding the GMF-related portion of the speech, Widodo mentioned that Indonesia could never hope to become the GMF unless Indonesian ports are developed accordingly to sustain Indonesian ships, and then he urged the Indonesian people to be more active and vigilant in combating crimes done to or on Indonesian marine resources, even in taking measures such as shrinking foreign vessels caught stealing in Indonesian waters, so that every inch of Indonesia's territory is adequately protected. His final mention toward the GMF element in this speech is when stated that all the developments his administration saw would benefit Indonesians all over Indonesia, including the ones living in the outer islands and near the borders (Barus, 2017; "Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Annual Session of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia 2017", 2017).

b. Annotation

Widodo mentioned two pillars of the GMF in this state address, maritime diplomacy and prioritizing the development of maritime infrastructure, and used two speech acts, directives and representatives. China, the US, BRI, and the Pivot absolutely received no mention whatsoever in this speech.

The GMF or its elements mentioned in this state address remains relatively scant, even more so when compared to the previous year. However, this speech is again dominated by topics related to economic interests and infrastructure development. Widodo even highlighted an achievement in his economic diplomacy.

Overview of Widodo's 2017 Speeches

After activating all of Widodo's 2017 speeches, all GMF pillars, and the four speech acts he utilized in 2017 in MAXQDA, below is how MAXQDA depicts the table for Widodo's 2017 speeches:



Variable: Cod. seg. (all documents)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
China	1	1.6	1.6
Commissives	2	3.2	3.2
Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and Safety at Sea	2	3.2	3.2
Directives	10	16.1	16.1
Economic Interests	14	22.6	22.6
Expressives	1	1.6	1.6
Infrastructure Development	11	17.7	17.7
Marine Spatial Management and Protection of the Marine Env.	1	1.6	1.6
Maritime Diplomacy	3	4.8	4.8
Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare	4	6.5	6.5
Ocean Resources Management and Human Resources Development	1	1.6	1.6
Representatives	8	12.9	12.9
Sea Toll	1	1.6	1.6
The GMF	3	4.8	4.8
TOTAL (valid)	62	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	62	100.0	

Figure 6. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2017 speeches
(screenshot by the author).

Based on the table, Widodo mentioned five GMF pillars in 2017. Maritime diplomacy received the most mention, and then respectively followed by managing marine resources, prioritizing the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity, and both rebuilding Indonesia's maritime culture and building up Indonesia's maritime defense in the last place. The speech act he used most often in 2017 is directives, followed respectively by representatives, commissives, and expressives.

Directives is used when he delivered orders to his administration, such as the orders he gave to the provincial government of Northern Sulawesi to describe, finish, and solve any obstacle and obstruction in implementing priority programs ("Pengantar Presiden Joko Widodo pada Rapat Terbatas Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Proyek Strategis Nasional dan Program Prioritas di Provinsi Sulawesi Utara, di Kantor Presiden, Jakarta, 14 Februari 2017", 2017).

Representatives is used whenever he tried to justify making a point in his speech, for example when he talked about the breadth of the Indian Ocean and how it comes with a ton of challenges that must be faced to create business opportunities from them all

("Sambutan Presiden Joko Widodo dalam Indian Ocean Rim Assosiation (IORA) Business Summit, di Jakarta Convention Center (JCC) Jakarta, 6 Maret 2017 Pukul 12.45 WIB", 2017).

Commissives is still used to express his commitment to a certain course of action, such as when he made a commitment that his administration would lower the amount of roadblocks in achieving ease of business ("Pengantar Presiden Joko Widodo pada Rapat Terbatas Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Proyek Strategis Nasional dan Program Prioritas di Provinsi Sulawesi Utara, di Kantor Presiden, Jakarta, 14 Februari 2017", 2017).

Expressives is utilized to express his appreciation toward certain achievements, such as when he thanked and applauded his ministers and officials, and other delegates, that worked hard to make the IORA Summit in 2017 a success and to legalize Jakarta Concord and Action Plan ("Penutupan KTT Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA 2017), di Assembly Hall, JCC, Jakarta", 2017).

Meanwhile, China is mentioned once regarding the tension in the South China Sea. The BRI, the Pivot, and the US are not mentioned at all.

Lastly, as can be seen from the table, economic interests and infrastructure development dominate the topics of Widodo's discourse in his 2017 analyzed speeches. This is consistent with the previous three years where his domestic goals were always prioritized in his speeches.

6.1.1.5. 2018 Speeches

1. First Speech: widodo_august_16_2018

a. Recap

This speech, delivered on August 16, 2018, is Widodo's third state address and was delivered to celebrate the 73rd birthday of Indonesia. In his greetings, Widodo greeted his vice president, Indonesian congress-members, Indonesian government officials, Indonesia's former leaders, and ambassadors of partner countries. In the maritime-related portion of the speech, he singled out his achievements in developing the infrastructures in islands outside of Java and in the outermost islands ("Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia dalam rangka? HUT Ke-73 Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia di Depan Sidang Bersama Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

dan? Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, 16 Agustus 2018, di Ruang Rapat Paripurna Gedung Nusantara, Jakarta Pusat", 2018).

b. Recap

Widodo mentioned two pillars of the GMF in this state address: defense, security, law enforcement, and safety at sea and maritime economy and infrastructure and improving welfare. Here, he used two speech acts: declarations and representatives. Much like the previous years, China, the BRI, the Pivot and the US are not mentioned at all in this speech. Lastly, infrastructure development and economic interests are consistently mentioned.

2. Second Speech: widodo_october_29_2018

a. Recap

This speech was delivered on October 29, 2018, to open Our Ocean Conference (OOC) in Bali. In his greetings, Widodo greeted other state leaders, the head of the delegates, and invitees to the event. He began by remarking how he and the Indonesian people have now become more aware of Indonesia's maritime characteristics. He then followed it up with outlining data regarding global trade routes that involves a big amount of water transports, speaking of the need to prevent transborder crimes committed above waters, to settle maritime disputes, and to take care of marine resources properly, and encouraging deeper collaborations with other countries to preserve marine resources together. He followed it up by underlining his continuing Sea Toll infrastructure development program and his effort to make Indonesia as the GMF through amplifying maritime cooperation in a variety of international organizations such as ASEAN, IORA, and the UN. He closed his speech by arguing that every little step taken to protect the ocean counts and the OOC must thus synergize the effort of its member countries, before finally reciting a poem about the sea ("Pembukaan Our Ocean Conference (OOC) 2018, 29 Oktober 2018, di Bali Nusa Dua Convention Center, Nusa Dua, Bali", 2018).

b. Annotation

In this speech, Widodo utilized directives, declarations, and representatives. He also mentioned four GMF pillars: marine culture, maritime diplomacy, maritime economy and infrastructure and improving welfare, and marine spatial management and protection of the marine environment. He did not mention the US, the Pivot, the BRI,

and China in this speech. Lastly, this is the only speech where his diplomatic aspirations and accomplishments for the GMF are more highlighted than his domestic ones.

Overview of Widodo's 2018 Speeches

After activating all of Widodo's 2018 speeches, all GMF pillars, and the three speech acts he utilized in 2018 in MAXQDA, below is how MAXQDA depicts the table of Widodo's 2018 speeches:

Variable: Cod. seg. (all documents)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
Declarations	4	12.5	12.5
Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and Safety at Sea	1	3.1	3.1
Directives	3	9.4	9.4
Economic Interests	4	12.5	12.5
Infrastructure Development	2	6.3	6.3
Marine Culture	3	9.4	9.4
Marine Spatial Management and Protection of the Marine Env.	2	6.3	6.3
Maritime Diplomacy	3	9.4	9.4
Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare	2	6.3	6.3
Ocean Resources Management and Human Resources Development	2	6.3	6.3
Representatives	3	9.4	9.4
Sea Toll	2	6.3	6.3
The GMF	1	3.1	3.1
TOTAL (valid)	32	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	32	100.0	

Figure 7. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's 2018 speeches.
(screenshot by the author).

As can be seen from the table, 2018 saw Widodo mentioning five GMF pillars. Maritime diplomacy and rebuilding Indonesia's marine culture share the number one spot, while marine spatial management and protection of the marine environment, ocean resources management and human resources development, and maritime economy and infrastructure and improving welfare all share the second spot. The last spot is occupied by defense, security, law enforcement, and safety at sea.

Meanwhile, 2018 saw Widodo declarations occupying the top spot as the speech acts he utilized most often in 2018. Interestingly, he used directives and representatives on equal measure and they hence share the second place.

Declarations is also used again to explain what his administration is doing or will do, such as when Widodo explained that an Indo-Pacific cooperation concept was being developed by Indonesia alongside other ASEAN member states. This concept will put an emphasis on a habit of dialogue and cooperation, inclusivity, and reverence toward the international law ("Pembukaan Our Ocean Conference (OOC) 2018, 29 Oktober 2018, di Bali Nusa Dua Convention Center, Nusa Dua, Bali", 2018), as can be seen here.

Directives is used by Widodo to convince others, such as when he urged the OOC members to commit to concrete steps in order to frame actual steps that could be felt by the people and taken to protect the seas. He therefore urged the OOC to move toward synergizing the steps of its member states ("Pembukaan Our Ocean Conference (OOC) 2018, 29 Oktober 2018, di Bali Nusa Dua Convention Center, Nusa Dua, Bali", 2018), as can be glanced down below.

Representatives is again used by Widodo when mentioning a condition related to the GMF practices, such as when he claimed that overlapping maritime claims can threaten stability if they are not solved via negotiation and according to the international law, which is why the international law must be a guidance for any maritime claim solution ("Pembukaan Our Ocean Conference (OOC) 2018, 29 Oktober 2018, di Bali Nusa Dua Convention Center, Nusa Dua, Bali", 2018) right here.

Lastly, the Pivot, the BRI, China, and the US received absolutely no mention in Widodo's 2018 speeches, while economic interests and infrastructure development still made their appearances.

6.1.1.6. Analyzing the Concomitant Traits of Widodo's Discourse in his first term

In this part, by tracing into the speech acts he performed in his first term and the most dominant GMF pillar of Widodo's discourse, the associated characteristics of Widodo's discourse will be discussed here to answer a few of this study's research questions. This part will begin by displaying the speech acts he performed and the GMF pillars he mentioned, before discussing how he perceived the GMF, his leadership style, his

foreign policy and diplomatic preference, his economic and infrastructure ambitions, and finally outlining the characteristics of his discourse.

This is how MAXQDA depicts the GMF pillars mentioned, the speech acts performed, and other relevant topics mentioned by Widodo in his speeches from 2014 to 2018:

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
China	7	2.8	2.8
Commissives	4	1.6	1.6
Declarations	12	4.7	4.7
Defense, Security, Law ...	8	3.1	3.1
Directives	37	14.6	14.6
Economic Interests	32	12.6	12.6
Expressives	7	2.8	2.8
Infrastructure Development	30	11.8	11.8
Marine Culture	9	3.5	3.5
Marine Spatial Management a...	5	2.0	2.0
Maritime Diplomacy	16	6.3	6.3
Maritime Economy and ...	13	5.1	5.1
Ocean Resources Management...	10	3.9	3.9
Representatives	30	11.8	11.8
Sea Toll	12	4.7	4.7
The BRI	2	0.8	0.8
The GMF	19	7.5	7.5
The US	1	0.4	0.4
TOTAL (valid)	254	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	254	100.0	

Figure 8. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Widodo's speeches from 2014 to 2018.
(screenshot by the author).

Based on Figure 8, from most often performed to least often performed illocutionary acts, for Widodo it is: directives > representatives > declarations > expressives > commissives. Moreover, based on figures 6 to 10, Widodo's use of illocutionary acts in

each and every year from 2014 to 2018, from most often performed to least often performed, are as follows:

- 2014: Representatives > declarations > directives
- 2015: Directives > representatives > expressives > declarations > commissives
- 2016: Directives > representatives > expressives > declarations = commissives
- 2017: Directives > representatives > commissives > expressives
- 2018: Declarations > directives = representatives

Representatives is the one illocutionary act he performed the most in 2014. It is both the year of his presidential campaign and the early days of his first administration, thus, many elements of his speeches are meant to commit him to the veracity of his proclaimed propositions as he stated what he was going to do. The use of declarations is common in his plans and promises, and directives are used to start getting his administration to carry out his plans.

Directives became the most dominant illocutionary acts of Widodo's from 2015 to 2017. This likely signifies his growing more comfortable into his role in Indonesia's highest office and more confident in getting others to carry out his orders. The use of representatives as the second most frequent illocutionary act he performed from 2015 to 2017 indicates his statements to still commit him to the veracity of his proclaimed proposition, while his use of expressives in the third place pertains to showing his true earnest psychological state in his speeches, particularly displaying his gratitude in the accomplishments of his administration or others, while his decreasing use of declarations denotes his dwindling tendency to propose specific things to alter the reality around him.

Interestingly enough, he performed no act of declarations at all in 2017, so this indicates that he did not venture to make promises in his GMF discourse that year. However, declarations claimed the top spot in 2018, while directives and representatives share the second spot. Expressives and commissives are not used at all. This indicates Widodo's focusing on giving out propositions to alter the realities around him likely because the 2019 presidential election was coming nearer and he had to start making sure to gain political capitals for it, with giving out orders to others and announcing the

accomplishments of his administration receiving equally the second most often mentions he included in his 2018 speeches.

For all that, it is interesting to underline the fact that directives is his most often performed illocutionary acts far above all the other four. This suggests that ordering others to follow his orders dominates Widodo's first term discourse. Considering his position as Indonesia's president back then and his programs that he wanted his administration to carry out, his orders dominating his discourse become understandable.

Now that the speech act analysis has revealed that Widodo's delivering orders in his capacity as president to get his programs done is the principal component of his GMF discourse, it becomes necessary to understand why his orders matter for the GMF and Indonesia's foreign policy. After all, this research considers it crucial to understand how the GMF, Indonesia's foreign policy, and Widodo's presidency are all related. Thereby, it is a necessity to first discuss the GMF pillars he mentioned and then discuss the prevailing priorities that he outlined in his speeches before addressing other points they might unearth.

1. Widodo's Economic Interests and Infrastructure Development Goals

To start with, marine governance and institution is the only pillar that went unmentioned in Widodo's first term. Chapter 2 of this study has explained that this was caused by the application of this pillar not happening until 2022, three years after Widodod's first term ended. Next, of the six GMF pillars he mentioned, marine spatial management and protection of the marine environment is the least often. Above it is defense, security, law enforcement, and safety at sea, and then marine culture. The third most mentioned pillar is ocean resources management and human resources development. The two most often mentioned GMF pillars by Widodo are maritime diplomacy and maritime economy and infrastructure and improving welfare.

Knowing Widodo's two most often mentioned GMF pillars is relevant because economic interests and infrastructure development are the two most significant elements in Widodo's GMF discourse, especially with their being mentioned 32 and 30 times respectively by him. Either one is individually mentioned far more often than maritime diplomacy or maritime economy and infrastructure and improving welfare, and this suggests that Widodo's economic and infrastructure goals stretched even beyond what

constituted the GMF pillars. In other words, his economic and infrastructure goals took priority over the GMF goals. A deeper look into Widodo's own words would display that this revelation is in line with his actual vision. In the majority of the speeches where he referred to the GMF, the mention of the GMF is predominantly dedicated to its economic goals. From encouraging the audience not to turn their backs on the sea, highlighting the problems that need to be resolved in marine environment and security, planning for the Sea toll program, promoting maritime culture and identity, to reiterating Indonesia's goal to become the GMF and reminding the audience of the incoming IOP. All of these points, for that matter, have been previously discussed in this study. With that said, it is clear by now that, in line with what the IOP has outlined, Widodo viewed the GMF as an umbrella term that encompasses matters within both domestic and foreign affairs.

The above table likewise exhibits that it is the goals and accomplishments of GMF pillars related to economy and infrastructure, such as the Sea Toll program and its benefits, that were most often mentioned by Widodo in his speeches. On the contrary, most of the the topics related to Maritime Diplomacy is about what Widodo plans to do with Indonesia's foreign policy and not exactly what the pillar has managed to gain in practice. This realization is significant because it suggests that, although Widodo treated the GMF as an umbrella term that covered both domestic and foreign affairs, his domestic goals were highly prioritized to the point where even his foreign policy was set to further his economic and infrastructure agendas. In other words, foreign policy is something Widodo considered as an instrument to boost his great objectives: the economy, infrastructure, and his personal bank of political capital (Bland, 2020, p. 123).

This realization is not completely baseless. Ever since he was elected President in 2014, Widodo never bothered to attend the UN General Assembly meetings in-person and instead always sent someone else to represent Indonesia, whether it was his vice president or Marsudi. The only two times he attended was virtually during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 (Dwi, 2023). While his continuous absence was criticized for making Indonesia lose the chance to have its leadership capability and affinity with other countries to be displayed and developed, Sudarman, a US expert from Indonesia, argued that Widodo's absence might be influenced by his own preference of avoiding statements that might trigger disputes, resulting in receiving attention from inquiring journalists and several superpowers trying to pressure Indonesia (as cited in Nugraha, 2022). Indonesia's application of its Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine was thus

largely represented by its bureaucracy and other state apparatuses in the international events that he skipped (Arifin, 2023, p. 334). On the other hand, because his multilateral ties prioritized the importance of economy and trade, Widodo frequented G20 and APEC meetings and summits (Pramono, 2019, as cited in "Tantangan Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia Era Presiden Joko Widodo Jilid 2", 2019).

Naturally, this realization begs a look into Widodo's economic diplomacy, which this dissertation will present next.

2. Widodo's Economic Diplomacy

Based on a secondary literature by Arifin (2023, p. 326), Widodo is a realist in the political realm. He argued that Widodo's background as a businessman has ingrained profit-and-loss calculations in his mindset and led him to believe that profit has to be the driving force behind Indonesia's foreign policy. Because his diplomatic style prefers bilateralism over multilateralism, Widodo was enthusiastic about attending multilateral initiatives like IORA, G20, APEC, and the EAS simply because they would provide him with plentiful chances to conducting bilateral discussions with other participating nations so that Indonesia's domestic economic growth could benefit from their investments.

Back in the 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia, Widodo boldly declared that befriending many other countries has to benefit Indonesia. In other words, seeking for profits is his foreign policy principles. His is a pragmatic diplomatic style that is also inward-looking and favors bilateral discussions. This is evident, example granted, in the G20 Summit in Osaka in June 2019 where Widodo held no fewer than 16 bilateral meetings (Rosyidin, 2019). In his first term alone, he made 53 trips overseas and never failed to always discuss the economy and invite investments. Interestingly, most of these visits were made to Asia instead of the US or Europe. Malaysia, Singapore, and China are the three countries he most frequently visited in his first term (Pattinussa, 2021, pp. 99-100).

A further look into the database of Indonesia's Secretary of the Cabinet would reveal that Widodo's economic-minded outlook in his foreign policy was confirmed for the Indonesian public as far back as in February 2, 2015, during a work meeting for Indonesia diplomats, Widodo personally ordered Indonesian ambassadors to put forward economic diplomacy to friendly countries (Saragih & Parlina, 2015). In that February 2

work meeting, Widodo declared that Indonesia's economic growth potential could only be achieved especially if foreign direct investments continue flowing into Indonesian industries, while Marsudi herself affirmed that "Indonesian diplomats will be continuously directed to become marketers for Indonesia. To better understand how the markets are, the diplomats will have to be working on the ground" (Waluyo, 2015). A 2015 speech from Marsudi that will be discussed later even mentions her plan to create a Economic Diplomacy Task Force almost a month prior to the aforementioned February 2 meeting. This indicates that Widodo's foreign policy experts must have been made aware of his economic diplomacy preference. Intriguingly, Widodo repeated this instruction for Indonesian diplomatic missions overseas to put a heavy emphasis on economic diplomacy to increase the flows of trade and investment in front of his ambassadors on January 9, 2020, several months after his second term inauguration (Gorbiano, 2020).

The strategic plan of Indonesian foreign ministry from 2015 to 2019 defined economic diplomacy itself as the use of international political tools to achieve economic goals via a number of cooperation including energy, food, environment, finance, and development ("Rencana Strategis 2015-2019", 2015, p. 31). According to Pattinussa (2021, p. 100), from Widodo's perspective, being reactive would lead Indonesia to be swept away by the tide of the US-China rivalry. For this reason, announcing the GMF was his active measure to let the rest of the world know that Indonesia is on par with other countries and could use its assets according to its national interests or needs without losing respect from other nations.

Pattinusa (2021) also provided a secondary literature that analyzed Widodo's economic diplomacy using the *Rational Decision Making* method where a rational decision making by an actor undergoes several steps. The first step is setting up a goal. Due to the aforementioned capital accumulation, Indonesia had to be ready to meet global challenges. This happened to be in line with one of Widodo's goals as a president, which is increasing the economic and social prosperity of the Indonesian people. The second step is identifying and analyzing every possibility or alternative. Because of Indonesia's size and location, the archipelago can be exploited by other powers. Widodo ergo reached a conclusion that it would be better for Indonesia to be actively participating in the global supply chain instead of living as a global dumping site. The third step is investigating the consequence of every choice. In this regard, Widodo had to recognize the consequence of actively involving Indonesia in the modern competition for capital

accumulation. While Indonesia of course has the freedom to cooperate with other countries so that it has something to say and even win in the global stage, doing so would also make it possible for other countries, such as China and the US, to hold sway over Indonesia's production component. The last step is to pick the most beneficial of the choices. For Widodo, economic diplomacy is the most beneficial choice because not only could Indonesia become part of the global chain supply, but Indonesia could also welcome investments and ripen its own domestic production, eventually turning the archipelago into a formidable economic power on the global stage (Pattinusa, 2021, pp. 100-102).

The significance of economic diplomacy for Indonesia's foreign policymaking under Widodo's presidency was admitted by no less than Marsudi herself. When she gave her 2024 press statement on January 8, 2024, Marsudi announced that in 2014, Indonesia attracted $28.5 billion in foreign investment, while the first nine months of 2023 alone showed that foreign investment in Indonesia reached approximately $37.8 billion, which is an increase by over 32% (Shofa, 2024). She stated that economic diplomacy has been Indonesia's top foreign policy priority for the past decade in order to induce economic growth, enhance Indonesian people's welfare, and improve the self-sufficiency of the nation. Widodo's presidency from 2014 resulted, at the time of her announcement, in a total of 27 economic agreements that have been completed, including the RCEP, Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA), Free Trade Agreements (FTA), and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA). Marsudi expressed that Indonesia was capable of accomplishing this much despite so many global-level challenges, including the US-China trade war, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, in a world where rising geopolitical rivalry, me-first policies, and protectionism added to the intricacy of performing economic diplomacy ("Economic Diplomacy as One of Concrete Manifestation in Foreign Policy", 2024).

It needs to be noted that Widodo's tendency to apply his profits-and-loss calculations also extended to how he viewed real-life geopolitical problems, such as the US-China trade war. In a June 2019 interview, when asked about the trade war Washington was waging against Beijing, Widodo simply said that the situation had given Indonesia many chances to supplant China as an exporter of a variety of products with the US and he had sent a team to the US so this issue could be discussed (Tiola, 2019).

How Widodo's background influenced his worldview as a leader justifies the constructivist thinking in that ideational development is dynamic and can become a variable that affects how actors perceive themselves and their surroundings before they eventually decide on their identities, interests, and actions (Pramono & Purwono, 2010, p. 16). In this case, Widodo's background influenced how he perceived his surroundings and acted when he finally became an actor that is the president of Indonesia in world politics.

So, how is Widodo's economic diplomacy related to the Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine that Indonesia prefers so much? The next section will discuss that.

3. Widodo's Free-and-Active Foreign Policy

Arguably, since Widodo himself has stated that the fruits of Indonesia's Free-and-Active foreign policy has to be directly tangible for the Indonesian people ("Presiden Jokowi: Politik Indonesia Bebas Aktif, Manfaatnya Harus Dirasakan Rakyat", 2015), Widodo's choice to implement Indonesia's economic diplomacy under his presidency is his own expression of the Free-and-Active doctrine.

This argument is further supported by Bland's assertion that Indonesia's Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine is not static in its execution, but can shift depending on time and leadership. Bland, who also wrote that Widodo's approach to the outside world was influenced by both his history and idiosyncrasies, mentioned that even under the presidency of Soekarno, Indonesia's Free-and-Active was at first an attempt to balance itself between the Eastern and Western Blocs from post-independence to the 1950s before the 1960s saw Indonesia leaning closer to the Eastern bloc. Meanwhile, under Soeharto, Indonesia's Free-and-Active foreign policy saw it grow closer to the Western bloc. Neither leader went all in with a formal alliance with either bloc, but they both struggled with domestic security challenges all the same. The doctrine saw a rejuvenated period of regional engagement from 2001 to 2009, but looked more 'free' than 'active' in the 2010s. Bland argued that, in spite of the deep historical roots of Indonesia's contemporary aversion to alliances, the archipelago's warm words are often mistaken by Western officials to indicate an inclination for a deeper regional and global engagement. Because the West wanted to push back against the rising China, it desperately sought for new partners in Asia and thought Indonesia could be one of them. Widodo, however, had no interest in engaging in great-power politics. His foreign policy interest was geared toward attracting investment from anybody who could

provide the most cash with the fewest conditions, and it just so happened that, during his presidency, it was China. For this reason, Widodo's concerns about China are mostly not based on the regional balance of power, but how it could affect him domestically. This included the dispute in the North Natuna Sea and the potential for tensions between Jakarta and Beijing could erode him politically or reagitate violence against Indonesia's ethnic Chinese community. Of course, Widodo's plan to gain long-term friends with benefits was also restricted by Indonesia's own time-honored domestic tradition not to rely exclusively on one single international partner. Bland thus concluded that Indonesia's foreign policy should best be understood to be a reflection of its domestic politics more than any strategic vision to become a new fulcrum for Asia (2020, pp. 134-137).

Of note of interest, Bland's (2020) conclusion echoes the statements of the GMF creators interviewed for this research. Sukma shed light on Widodo's dwindling interest in maritime diplomacy over the years in favor of using his foreign policy to amplify his maritime infrastructure and other infrastructure projects (Sukma, 2024), while Widjajanto outright said that the GMF was unable to become Indonesia's new foreign policy platform due to its lack of a technocratic document (Widjajanto, 2024).

Be that as it may, it needs to be reiterated that, as Chapters 2 and 3 have explained, Indonesia's robust economic ties with China did not make it an ally of China. Interestingly, this was previously mentioned by Scot Marciel, a former U.S. ambassador to both Indonesia and ASEAN, who explained that he saw no reason to be too worried about Indonesia drifting into anyone's orbit, including the Chinese. From his perspective, Indonesia is far enough away from China. Despite working closely with China on things such as infrastructure, the archipelago also has the economy, size, and population to stand up for itself and withstand any gargantuan gravitational pull (2023, as cited in Chivvis, 2023).

With that said, this study must now deduce and outline several points that the above discussions have divulged.

4. Inferences about the GMF and Widodo's Foreign Policy

Taking all of the above revelation into account, this study hence posits three inferences.

Firstly, it was economic diplomacy, and not the GMF, that Widodo really picked to be the tool for Indonesia to endure the great power politics in the Indo-Pacific region. This is confirmed by the statement of Oegroseno (2022), who affirmed that the GMF was not designed in the context of the US-China rivalry, Widodo's own words ("Presiden Jokowi: Politik Indonesia Bebas Aktif, Manfaatnya Harus Dirasakan Rakyat", 2015), the interviews with Sukma (2024) and Widjajanto (2024), and the literature by Bland (2020) and Pattinusa (2021).

Secondly, the GMF was a way for Indonesia to be more competitive in performing its economic diplomacy because becoming the GMF would make Indonesia more attractive for other countries to do business with and a better place for the Indonesian people to live in. This is further corroborated by a statement from DD (interview transcript, October 2, 2022), another direct implementer of the GMF, who substantiated the GMF to be an Indonesian sovereignty concept or idea where the archipelago becomes the center of regional economic growth, similar to a point where a wheel turns.

Lastly, since Widodo's economic diplomacy is his own expression of the Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine as Bland has delineated (2020, pp. 134-137), and the Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine itself is based on the humanity or internationalism residing within Indonesia's philosophical and constitutional pillars Pancasila and UUD 1945 (Hatta, 1953, as cited in Murtado, 2022), then Widodo's economic diplomacy is inherently influenced by Pancasila and UUD 1945 as well. In other words, Widodo's economic diplomacy is shaped by the philosophical and constitutional pillars of Indonesia. This is pertinent for this study to know because UUD 1945 also includes the definition of Indonesia as an archipelagic state in its Chapter IXA. In other words, Widodo's economic diplomacy as his expression of the Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine is formed by Indonesia's constitutional pillars that define Indonesia as an archipelagic state. This substantiates the constructivist thinking that argues that understanding identities is important to understand what causes political outcomes (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, pp. 392-395), because understanding Indonesia's identity helps this research to understand a political outcome caused by Widodo's decisions.

This concludes the portion in which Widodo's speeches are discussed, so the next sub-chapter will discuss Marsudi's speeches.

6.2. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi

6.2.1. Discussing Marsudi's Speeches

On October 27, 2014, Retno Marsudi was inaugurated as Indonesia's first female Minister of Foreign Affairs by Widodo ("Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia", n.d.). She is relevant for this research because the foreign policy elements of the GMF were implemented under her leadership, be it from 2014 to 2019 and from 2019 to 2024. However, since this research's time frame is only from 2014 to 2019, only her speeches within this time frame are discussed. Beforehand, this study wishes to note that there were only five speeches of hers kept by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry where the GMF were even mentioned at all from 2014 to 2019. All five speeches of hers were part of a yearly tradition in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry known as *Pernyataan Pers Tahunan* (or the *Annual Press Statement* in English). None of them had been translated into English in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry database when this study discovered them, however, so the author had to translate them all himself.

The Annual Press Statement itself is usually delivered at the start of the year and serves as both a year-end reflection for the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and a collection of hints at which agendas the ministry will prioritize for the next one year. Axiomatically, Marsudi's press statement included plenty of other topics not directly related to the GMF, such as Indonesia's peacekeeping operations, Indonesia's devotion to the Palestinian Independence cause and Indonesia's commitments on climate change. Hence, the topics discussed below relate only to the GMF and elements of the GMF. Since Marsudi only made one speech per year, the figure showing the themes mentioned and illocutionary acts performed in each of her speeches are included directly in the summary of her every speech. To add, repeated readings of Marsudi's speeches made it clear that the most dominant GMF pillar in Marsudi's discourse in the whole of Widodo's first term is Maritime Diplomacy.

This study has previously touched Maritime Diplomacy in Chapter 2 and thus will not be revisiting its explanation here. Be that as it may, it is necessary to look into Maritime Diplomacy under Marsudi's leadership. There are four topics in her speeches that she steadily highlighted on an annual basis and this study ergo considers to be required to probe deeper understanding into Marsudi's maritime diplomacy. They are border diplomacy, ASEAN Centrality, Indonesian leadership in inter-regional frameworks, and

maritime cooperation. For this reason, to further ascertain the credence of this emergent pattern, this study used MAXQDA to code all four into four different codes, namely ASEAN Centrality, Border Diplomacy, Indonesian Inter-Regional Leadership, and Maritime Cooperation, before coding them accordingly in all of Marsudi's GMF segments.

Lastly, much like Widodo's speeches, every recap of Marsudi's speech is followed by an annotation.

1. First Speech: Marsudi_2015

a. Recap

Based on Marsudi's greetings, the audience consisted of the ambassadors of partner countries invited to the event, the Indonesian congress members in attendance, the officials of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, and the press members. The mention of three names were singled out during the greetings to represent the previous Indonesian foreign ministry officials: Alwi Shihab, Hassan Wirajuda, and Marty Natalegawa. All three of them are former Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Natalegawa being Marsudi's direct predecessor. Since the 2015 statement was delivered only a few months after the first Widodo administration started, the relevant themes mentioned in the speech include the general achievements of Indonesia's diplomacy in 2014, such as Widodo's introduction of the GMF to the global stage and how it will affect Indonesia's diplomacy, and the outline regarding how the Foreign Ministry of Indonesia would conduct the Indonesian diplomacy under Marsudi's leadership by affirming to protect Indonesia's sovereignty and borders, to combat illegal fishing, and to attend to matters related to the Pacific Islands, ASEAN and the South China Sea, and Indonesia's chairmanship of the IORA in late 2015. Last but definitely not the least, she also announced the creation of the economic diplomacy task force (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2015", 2015).

b. Annotation

Below is how MAXQDA displays the categories mentioned in the 2015 statement:

Document Variable Statistics

Variable: Cod. seg. (all documents)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
ASEAN Centrality	1	1.8	1.8
Border Diplomacy	3	5.4	5.4
Declarations	8	14.3	14.3
Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and Safety at Sea	2	3.6	3.6
Directives	1	1.8	1.8
Economic Diplomacy	1	1.8	1.8
Economic Interests	6	10.7	10.7
Indonesian Inter-Regional Leadership	2	3.6	3.6
Infrastructure Development	4	7.1	7.1
Marine Culture	1	1.8	1.8
Maritime Cooperation	5	8.9	8.9
Maritime Diplomacy	8	14.3	14.3
Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare	2	3.6	3.6
Ocean Resources Management and Human Resources Development	1	1.8	1.8
Representatives	9	16.1	16.1
The GMF	2	3.6	3.6
TOTAL (valid)	56	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	56	100.0	

Figure 9. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2015 speeches.
(screenshot by the author)..

As the table displays, six pillars of the GMF in are all mentioned (despite the seven pillars introduced by IOP not coming out until two years later), with Maritime Diplomacy having a clear dominance over the other five as far as topics of the speech go. Maritime cooperation, ASEAN Centrality, border diplomacy, and Indonesian inter-regional leadership also appeared. Additionally, in her 2015 Annual Press Statement, the illocutionary acts performed by Marsudi consisted of declarations, directives and representatives. As can be seen from the table, the number of representatives performed is slightly larger than the number of declarations performed, and the number of directives performed is much smaller than either one. An example of representatives can be seen when Marsudi mentioned an accomplishment, like when Marsudi explained that Indonesia's border diplomacy accomplished several successes in 2014, such as agreeing on three new segments of maritime borders with Singapore and the Philippines, which can be distinguished as either true or false, and thus made use of representatives (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2015",

2015, p. 2). An example of declarations can be seen when Marsudi declared that Indonesian diplomacy would emphasize Indonesia's character as a maritime state and would utilize the archipelago's strategic position between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and thus made use of declarations (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2015", 2015, p. 2). Lastly, there is only one example of directives performed by Marsudi, which took place when addressing the South China Sea situation by representing Indonesia to explicitly urge all countries involved in the South China Sea conflicts to refrain from using violence or threats in order to maintain regional stability and thus made use of directives (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2015", 2015, p. 5). None of the Pivot, the BRI, the US, and China are mentioned in this speech, while the GMF is mentioned by name twice.

2. Second Speech: Marsudi_2016

a. Recap

The 2016 Annual Press Statement was delivered on January 7, 2016. Once again, based on Marsudi's greetings, the audience composition is virtually similar to the 2015 statement. The themes related to the GMF and its elements mentioned in the statement included Indonesia's 2015 accomplishments regarding borders, support toward foreign investment in Indonesia, Indonesia's 2015 accomplishments in ASEAN, EAS, IORA, and with the South Pacific countries, Indonesia's maritime cooperation with England, Denmark, and the US, Indonesia's commitment to the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and improving the ASEAN-China relations, Indonesia's commitment to the Natuna Islands, Indonesia's commitment to be the GMF, and newer bilateral maritime cooperations with Japan, New Zealand, Timor Leste, Vietnam, Panama, and the Netherlands. Marsudi also spent a considerable portion of her statement to describe economic diplomacy gains by Indonesia (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2016", 2016).

b. Annotation

Below is how MAXQDA displays the categories mentioned in the 2016 statement:

Document Variable Statistics

Variable: Cod. seg. (all do

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
ASEAN Centrality	2	3.4	3.4
Border Diplomacy	2	3.4	3.4
China	3	5.1	5.1
Declarations	2	3.4	3.4
Directives	2	3.4	3.4
Economic Interests	7	11.9	11.9
Indonesian Inter-Regional Leadership	4	6.8	6.8
Infrastructure Development	3	5.1	5.1
Maritime Cooperation	4	6.8	6.8
Maritime Diplomacy	8	13.6	13.6
Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare	1	1.7	1.7
Representatives	17	28.8	28.8
The GMF	1	1.7	1.7
The US	3	5.1	5.1
TOTAL (valid)	59	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	59	100.0	

Figure 10. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2016 speeches.
(screenshot by the author).

Due to what her position entails, it came as no surprise that maritime diplomacy is again the most often mentioned GMF pillar in Marsudi's speech. This speech also marks the first time the US is mentioned under bilateral maritime cooperation, examples of which have been discussed previously also in Chapter 2 of this study. In 2016, she only performed three speech acts: representatives leading in the first place by far, followed by declarations and directives equally in the second place.

An example of her making use of representatives in 2016 can be seen when Marsudi claimed that Indonesia had 25 border meetings in 2015. Nine of those were maritime border meetings with six different countries, while sixteen of those were land border meetings with three different countries. Seeing how this could be categorized as either true or false, Marsudi thus made use of representatives (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2016", 2016, p. 4).

Moving on, much like the 2015 statement, an example of Marsudi making use of declarations is when divulging Indonesia's future course of foreign policy actions by declaring that, with ASEAN Community 2015 now being valid, attention must be paid to the vision of ASEAN Community 2025 (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2016", 2016, p. 11).

Next, Marsudi used directives, for example, in this statement ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2016", 2016, p. 10) about the South China Sea tension. For example when she said that, as far as ASEAN-China matters go, Indonesia would continue pushing for the Code of Conduct (CoC) to be finished as soon as possible and thus made use of declarations. She then highlighted Indonesia's position as a non-claimant state to implore every claimant state around the South China Sea to settle their conflicts peacefully and thus made use of directives (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2016", 2016, p. 11).

Lastly, China is mentioned three times in this speech, while the US is mentioned four times. China's first mention is in the above extract. The second one is down below, alongside the US's first mention ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2016", 2016, pp. 11-12). This study likewise notes several things about Marsudi mentioning China and the US in this speech:

- The first mention of China is framed under the ASEAN-China ties;
- Only one of the mentions were in the context of a bilateral between Indonesia and China;
- Two of the mentions were in the context of bilateral ties between Indonesia and the US, although other countries were also mentioned by Marsudi when mentioning the US both times;
- Uncertainties related to the American and Chinese economic situations were mentioned, but not exactly under the framing of their rivalry.

Lastly, Marsudi kept mentioning maritime cooperation, ASEAN Centrality, border diplomacy, and Indonesian inter-regional leadership this year. The 2017 Annual Press Statement was delivered on January 10, 2017. Based on Marsudi's greetings once again, the audience composition and the greetings are virtually similar to the 2016 statement.

Shihab and Wirajuda were each individually named during the greetings, this time around:

3. Third Speech: Marsudi_2017

a. Recap

The 2017 Annual Press Statement was delivered on January 10, 2017. Based on Marsudi's greetings once again, the audience composition and the greetings are practically similar to the 2016 statement. Concerning the themes related to the GMF and its elements mentioned in the statement, Marsudi began by highlighting Indonesia's 2016 accomplishments in successful border meetings with many other neighboring countries, regional cooperation, IORA, APEC, and ASEAN, including initiating the Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States on the Maintenance of Peace, Security and Stability in the Region, reaffirming Indonesia's stance in regards to the South China Sea situation by encouraging countries around the region to follow UNCLOS, by ensuring Indonesia's sovereignty over the Natuna Islands, an d by urging ASEAN and China to finalize their Code of Conduct. Marsudi also mentioned Indonesia's successes regarding the freeing of Indonesian captives from the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Southern Philippines and further commitment to free more of Indonesian captives, the saving of illegal Indonesian migrant workers bound for Malaysia, and the signing of new maritime agreements with India, the US, Russia, New Zealand, South Korea, Hungary, Timor Leste, England, Palau, and the Netherlands (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2017", 2017).

b. Annotation

Below is how MAXQDA displays the categories mentioned in Marsudi's 2017 statement:

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
ASEAN Centrality	4	8.3	8.3
Border Diplomacy	4	8.3	8.3
China	1	2.1	2.1
Declarations	2	4.2	4.2
Defense, Security, Law ...	1	2.1	2.1
Directives	1	2.1	2.1
Economic Diplomacy	1	2.1	2.1
Economic Interests	5	10.4	10.4
Expressives	1	2.1	2.1
Indonesian Inter-Regional ...	1	2.1	2.1
Maritime Cooperation	2	4.2	4.2
Maritime Diplomacy	13	27.1	27.1
Maritime Economy and ...	1	2.1	2.1
Representatives	11	22.9	22.9
TOTAL (valid)	48	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	48	100.0	

Figure 11. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2017 speeches.
(screenshot by the author).

As the table displays, maritime diplomacy still dominates Marsudi's discourse in her 2017 speech. Meanwhile, the three illocutionary acts performed in both 2015 and 2016 are performed again in 2017, this time with the addition of expressives, which Marsudi ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2017", 2017, p. 5) made use of to express Indonesia's appreciation toward China in accelerating the Code of Conduct discussion as relayed in the ASEAN Summit held in Vientiane back in September 2016.

Moving on, there is only one instance of Marsudi making use of directives this time, when she reaffirmed Indonesia's urging that other ASEAN member states and China quicken the code of conduct negotiations between ASEAN and China in order to ensure peace and stability in the South China Sea ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2017", 2017, p. 4). In addition, similarly to the previous two statements in 2015 and 2016, declarations was used by Marsudi when announcing the future course

of actions in Indonesian foreign policy, such as protecting the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2017", 2017, p. 4).

Lastly, Marsudi still used representatives to announce Indonesia's foreign policy accomplishments, this time in 2016. For example when she disclosed that the Hotline of communications between ASEAN and China to respond maritime emergencies in the implementation of Declaration of Conduct during an ASEAN China Summit in September 2016 as can be seen right here ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2017", 2017, p. 5).

In total, China is mentioned three times in this speech. The US, on the other hand, is mentioned only once when Marsudi said that all nations are now waiting to see what kind of policies will the newly elected administration of the US take ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2017", 2017, p. 1).

4. Fourth Speech: Marsudi_2018

a. Recap

Concerning the themes related to the GMF and its elements mentioned in the statement, Marsudi began by highlighting Indonesia's 2017 accomplishments in foreign policy, particularly with ASEAN where a full page is dedicated to, some more economic diplomacy achievements, and then with IORA. Marsudi also mentioned 11 new maritime border agreements, the ratification, exchange of instruments of ratification and Joint Registration of the Boundary Agreement between Indonesia and Singapore at the UN, ratification of the Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary Agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines by Indonesia (and at that time simply waiting for Manila to ratify it), pushing for a more inclusive framework in the Indo-Pacific region, including with ASEAN and IORA, and stronger commitment in combating inter-border crimes such as human trafficking and terrorism (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2018", 2018).

b. Annotation

Below is how MAXQDA displays the categories mentioned in the 2018 statement:

Document Variable Statistics

Variable:

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
ASEAN Centrality	4	9.8	9.8
Border Diplomacy	1	2.4	2.4
China	2	4.9	4.9
Declarations	5	12.2	12.2
Economic Diplomacy	2	4.9	4.9
Economic Interests	5	12.2	12.2
Expressives	2	4.9	4.9
Indonesian Inter-Regional Leadership	3	7.3	7.3
Infrastructure Development	2	4.9	4.9
Maritime Cooperation	1	2.4	2.4
Maritime Diplomacy	8	19.5	19.5
Representatives	5	12.2	12.2
The US	1	2.4	2.4
TOTAL (valid)	41	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	41	100.0	

Figure 12. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2018 speeches.
(screenshot by the author).

Similar to the previous statements, maritime diplomacy is the GMF pillar most mentioned in the 2018 statement. However, unlike the 2017 statement, Marsudi made use of only three illocutionary acts in the 2018 statement: representatives and declarations with equal measure, followed by expressives.

An example of representatives being used comes when she announced that, in 2017, Indonesia conducted 35 border negotiations, including 11 meetings to decide on maritime borders, five meetings between special envoys of the Indonesian president and the Malaysian prime minister, and 19 land borders demarcation meetings ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2018", 2018, pp. 11-12).

Meanwhile, an example of declarations can be seen from when Marsudi voiced Indonesia's commitment for the near future such as when she vowed that Indonesian diplomacy would be strengthened to combat inter-border crimes, including human

trafficking, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, radicalism, and terrorism ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2018", 2018, p. 15).

Lastly, expressives was utilized, for example, when Marsudi conveyed that Indonesia desires for an ecosystem of peace, stability, and prosperity to materialize not only in ASEAN, but also in the circle encompassing the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean or the Indo-Pacific circle ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2018", 2018, p. 15).

In addition, the US is mentioned only once in this speech, when Marsudi outlined how palm oil, a flagship and strategic product for Indonesia's development, faced negative campaign and discrimination in Europe and the US as can be seen from the extract down below ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2018", 2018, p. 9). Meanwhile, China is mentioned twice in this speech. Much like the previous year, China was mentioned in relation to ASEAN-China ties and the South China Sea situation. The US is mentioned alongside the EU in the ongoing palm oil dispute with Indonesia, which has little to do with the GMF. Naturally, Marsudi still mentioned maritime cooperation, ASEAN Centrality, border diplomacy, and Indonesian inter-regional leadership.

5. Fifth Speech: *Marsudi_2019*

a. Recap

The 2019 Annual Press Statement was delivered on January 9, 2019. For the fifth year in a row, the greetings indicate that the audience composition is more or less similar to the four previous statements. Concerning the themes related to the GMF and its elements mentioned in the statement, Marsudi mostly summarized the major accomplishments of the Indonesian foreign ministry ever since she was picked to lead it. This includes the latest economic diplomacy achievements, the numerous border meetings and agreements, some of which have previously been mentioned in discussion of her previous statements, how Widodo's announcing Indonesia to be the GMF shaped the viewpoint and the implementation of Indonesia's maritime diplomacy, and, finally, Indonesia's accomplishments with ASEAN in Southeast Asia and South China Sea, including in the association's relationship with China (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2019", 2019).

b. Annotation

Below is how MAXQDA displays the categories mentioned in the 2019 statement:

Document Variable Statistics

Variable:

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
ASEAN Centrality	4	8.9	8.9
Border Diplomacy	2	4.4	4.4
China	1	2.2	2.2
Declarations	2	4.4	4.4
Directives	1	2.2	2.2
Economic Diplomacy	1	2.2	2.2
Economic Interests	3	6.7	6.7
Indonesian Inter-Regional Leadership	4	8.9	8.9
Infrastructure Development	5	11.1	11.1
Marine Culture	1	2.2	2.2
Maritime Cooperation	3	6.7	6.7
Maritime Diplomacy	7	15.6	15.6
Representatives	10	22.2	22.2
The GMF	1	2.2	2.2
TOTAL (valid)	45	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	45	100.0	

Figure 13. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's 2019 speeches.
(screenshot by the author).

While maritime diplomacy dominated again, the 2019 statement also saw marine culture mentioned by Marsudi (see "Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2019", 2019). The 2019 statement shared the exact illocutionary acts performed in it with the 2017 statement with declarations, directives, and representatives getting utilized.

Directives was used once to state that Indonesia, alongside all other ASEAN member states, encourage their partners to refine an Indo-Pacific cooperation concept presented by Widodo in November 2018 in Singapore because, to Indonesia, ASEAN ought to be

proactive in responding to the strategic development and changes in the region as the one who steer those changes ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2019", 2019, p. 15).

Declarations was used once again to announce a plan for Indonesian diplomacy, while representatives was made use of one more time to highlight an Indonesian foreign policy achievement like when she stated that the framework of Code of Conduct has been agreed in an ASEAN-China meeting in November 2018 where it was agreed upon that the finishing up of the Code of Conducts of the South China Sea would be concluded within the next 3 years ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2019", 2019, p. 17).

China is only mentioned once while the US did not receive any mention whatsoever. As of the time of writing, no Code of Conduct of the South China Sea between ASEAN and China has been completed.

6.2.2. Analyzing the Concomitant Traits of Marsudi's Discourse from 2014 to 2019

Similar to the previous part of this chapter regarding Widodo's discourse, by tracing into the most dominant GMF pillar in Marsudi's discourse and the speech acts Marsudi performed from 2014 to 2019, the meaning of the most dominant GMF pillar in Marsudi's discourse will be made clearer to help answer the third set of research questions.

To start with, this is how MAXQDA depicts the GMF pillars mentioned and the speech acts performed by Marsudi in her speeches in Widodo's first term:

Document Variable Statistics

Variable: Cod. seg. (all documents)

	Frequency	Percentage	Percentage (valid)
ASEAN Centrality	15	6.0	6.0
Border Diplomacy	12	4.8	4.8
China	7	2.8	2.8
Declarations	19	7.6	7.6
Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and Safety at Sea	3	1.2	1.2
Directives	5	2.0	2.0
Economic Diplomacy	5	2.0	2.0
Economic Interests	26	10.4	10.4
Expressives	3	1.2	1.2
Indonesian Inter-Regional Leadership	14	5.6	5.6
Infrastructure Development	14	5.6	5.6
Marine Culture	2	0.8	0.8
Maritime Cooperation	15	6.0	6.0
Maritime Diplomacy	44	17.7	17.7
Maritime Economy and Infrastructure and Improving Welfare	4	1.6	1.6
Ocean Resources Management and Human Resources Development	1	0.4	0.4
Representatives	52	20.9	20.9
The GMF	4	1.6	1.6
The US	4	1.6	1.6
TOTAL (valid)	249	100.0	100.0
Missing	0	0.0	
TOTAL	249	100.0	

Figure 14. The Pillars of the GMF mentioned, the Illocutionary Acts performed, and other relevant subject(s) mentioned in Marsudi's speeches during Widodo's first term.
(screenshot by the author).

Based on the above figure, Marsudi's use of illocutionary acts in Widodo's first term, from most often performed to least often performed, is as follows: representatives > declarations > directives > expressives.

Marsudi consistently used representatives the most frequently every year, which points to her role in announcing the progress or the success of Indonesia's maritime diplomacy that can be regarded as either true or false just like all acts of representatives. That declarations are firmly in second place for four years (out of five years), with it even sharing the first place with representatives in 2018, points out Marsudi using her speeches to alter specific aspects, particularly regarding the reality of Indonesian maritime diplomacy, according to her own propositions. Considering the fact of her position as Indonesia's foreign minister, the use of both representatives and

declarations appears to come with her job description. Marsudi's role in steering the foreign policy of Indonesia likely contributed to directives being the third most often illocutionary act she performed, because her job obviously entailed getting others to carry out her orders over the years. Her limited use of expressives came from expressing her gratitude or hopes regarding the policies she wanted to employ. Lastly, she performed no single act of commissives for the entirety of Widodo's first administration in her speeches.

Regardless, as Figure 14 shows, her use of representatives far surpasses her use of declarations. Even then, her use of declarations is far higher than her combined use of directives and expressives. In other words, representatives is the most relevant speech act of her discourse.

So, what does her speech act analysis truly show about her GMF discourse? Since representatives are intended to commit the speaker to the veracity of his or her proclaimed proposition (Searle, 1975, p. 354), this means that her discourse is not dominated by committing herself to any discrete future course of action but by her alignment toward Widodo's foreign policy vision that has been established as economic diplomacy in the previous sub-chapter. This becomes clearer in the above picture upon underlining that, outside of her most dominant GMF pillar (maritime diplomacy) and her frequent use of representatives, the topic of economic interests and infrastructure developments filled 10.4% and 5.6% of the content of her speeches respectively. This suggests that she was fully committed to carrying out Widodo's economic diplomacy foreign policy vision and was careful enough to not oppose the president's economic ambition.

The seriousness of Marsudi to support Widodo's economic diplomacy foreign policy reached a point where even the official strategic plan of Indonesian foreign ministry from 2015 to 2019 outlined the plan to improve Indonesia's economic diplomacy. They are as follows ("Rencana Strategis 2015-2019", 2015, p. 47):

- Strengthening diplomacy to expand prospective markets;
- Formulating a blueprint for Indonesia's role in APEC and G20 to fight for a strong, balanced, and relevant cooperation;

- Implementing closer policy coordination between member countries of the G-20 in order to achieve global economic recovery and maintain the creation of a strong, sustainable and balanced global economy system;
- Enhancing the role of Indonesia in APEC and the G-20 to fight for the interests of Indonesia and the country's development;
- Increasing political diplomacy in line with economic diplomacy targets;
- Implementation of Indonesia's role in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP);
- Implementation of Indonesia's contribution in the formation of norms/regimes in international regulations that regulate energy and food security as public goods.

Note how economic diplomacy is mentioned and included by name.

Carrying on, since the previous sub-chapter has established that the GMF was an attempt to make the archipelago become a more competitive actor in applying its economic diplomacy, this hints that the GMF pillar most dominant in Marsudi's discourse, maritime diplomacy, is also a means to that same end. Of all the GMF pillars, Marsudi only mentioned maritime diplomacy more often than Widodo, while Widodo clearly outnumbered her mentions of the other GMF pillars. This is unsurprising considering Marsudi was Indonesia's Foreign Minister, so it is only normal that she mentioned maritime diplomacy more often than even the president himself. Maritime diplomacy itself is important for a country's soft power and hard power where a navy is useful for a country's stance in other matters outside of war (Le Mière, 2014, p. 27), because the navy could, after all, be used to ensure the harmony and safety of a trade route (Corbett, 1988, as cited in Wardhana, 2016, pp. 376-378). In addition, the official strategic plan of Indonesian foreign ministry from 2015 to 2019, during Marsudi's ministership, outlined the plan to improve Indonesia's maritime diplomacy to be as follows ("Rencana Strategis 2015-2019", 2015, p. 47):

- Strengthening maritime diplomacy to speed up the settlement maritime and land border issues;
- Implementation of the Global Maritime Fulcrum Doctrine;

- Dissemination of border information including negotiation of agreement to limit the force of radio transmission;

- Strengthening maritime diplomacy to speed up settlement border issues;

- Improving the implementation of Indonesia's national policy as an archipelagic country in accordance with Law no. 17 of 1985, including improving regulation of the right of peaceful passage through archipelagic sea lanes via maritime seas and flight routes for transit that does not violate the sovereignty of the Archipelagic State over water and air space above it, the bottom of the sea and the land beneath it and the sources of wealth therein; arranging return to cooperation in management, conservation of biological natural resources and protection as well as preserving the marine environment; regulating marine scientific research in the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, in the EEZ and Continental Shelf; and improving and strengthening work international cooperation regarding the development and transfer of marine science and technology marine.

Note how the official strategic plan of the Indonesian foreign ministry from 2015 to 2019 contains only one mention of the GMF whereas economic diplomacy has a dedicated slew of plans for it. This further justifies the argument posited by this study in the previous sub-chapter in that, as far as foreign policy tools in Widodo's first administration are concerned, the importance of economic diplomacy surpasses the importance of the GMF, even for the foreign ministry of Indonesia under Widodo's presidency. Aside from that, while the above strategic plan already exhibits the importance of maritime diplomacy for Marsudi, it can be made even more evident by discussing four codes specifically prepared after to probe deeper understanding of maritime diplomacy after repeated readings of Marsudi's speeches: maritime cooperation, ASEAN Centrality, border diplomacy, and Indonesian inter-regional leadership. All four never failed to make their appearance for even a single year in Marsudi's speeches.

In short, from the most often to the least often mentioned, the four codes appear as follows:

1. With 15 mentions, the first spot is shared between ASEAN Centrality and maritime cooperation. Both are practically ever-present in Marsudi's speeches. Not a year went by without her announcing Indonesia's multilateral achievements or plans via

ASEAN and maritime cooperation with countries all across the world, such as the UK, the US, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Panama, and even South Pacific countries;

2. With 14 mentions, next up is Indonesian leadership in inter-regional frameworks or initiatives like IORA;

3. Lastly, border diplomacy with 12 mentions, particularly as a set of plans and achievements. Naturally, this tends to involve border agreements with other ASEAN member states like Singapore and the Philippines or coming to terms with Malaysia and Vietnam regarding the neighboring continental shelf, protecting the sovereignty of Indonesia's waters from disparate threats, progress of ASEAN's Code of Conduct of the South China Sea negotiation with China, and mentions toward respecting UNCLOS or EEZ.

The importance of Maritime Cooperation and Indonesia's inter-regional leadership for Indonesia and their examples have been discussed and mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, so this study will not repeat them here.

Moving ahead, while ASEAN Centrality has likewise been mentioned before, this study wishes to underline the lack of mentions of the US with it.

This research must reiterate that improving Indonesia's role in ASEAN Centrality and handling regional conflicts, including the one with China, are among Indonesia's objectives to increase domestic public readiness and increasing Indonesia's role (contribution) and leadership in ASEAN mentioned in the official strategic plan of Indonesian foreign ministry from 2015 to 2019 ("Rencana Strategis 2015-2019", 2015, p. 46). As such, this study argues that the lack of mention toward the US in Marsudi's speeches indicates that despite Jakarta's employing a hedging strategy against Beijing and Washington, reacting to the actions of China, who is in Indonesia's immediate neighborhood, occupied the minds of the Indonesian foreign ministry much more regularly than the actions of the US, who is an ocean away from the archipelago.

This can be seen in Marsudi's speeches because she consistently mentioned China in relations to the South China Sea and ASEAN, including the negotiation for Code of Conducts in the South China Sea, whereas the US was mentioned only once in relations to the maritime sector. As was again previously mentioned, Indonesia's ASEAN-led mechanism under Widodo's first administration eventually culminated with Indonesia's

introduction of the AOIP on June 23, 2019 in the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok (2023, 'Indonesia Underscores ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) Importance'). This also means that Marsudi ensured that Indonesia's foreign policy continued to adhere to its Free-and-Active Doctrine and ASEAN Centrality traditions that have been detailed prior. This dynamic suggests that, with Marsudi under the helm, Indonesia remained heavily dependent on using ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms to settle the South China Sea tension that was bolstered by China's ambitions and the American reactions toward them.

Moving on to discuss border diplomacy under Marsudi, the practice of it is inherently tied to the concept of sovereignty that Indonesia holds dear. As Chapters 1, 2, and 3 have made clear, Indonesia would not tolerate other ASEAN member states or even China encroaching its waters and would defend its territory by force if needed.

The border is the key element for every state to impose its territory and exclusion, after all (Vaughan, 2012, as cited in Andika, 2017, p. 54). Since Indonesia is an archipelago, it is a given that it needs solid maritime borders to confirm its sovereign territory in order to protect its political stability, economy, security, and national interests. As far as maritime border diplomacy is concerned, maritime boundaries are composed of three types: EEZ, continental shelf boundaries, and territorial sea. Back in 2017, Indonesia had 15 segments of joint continental shelf boundaries, 11 segments of joint territorial seas boundaries, 15 segments of joint EEZ boundaries, and 5 segments of joint land boundaries (Andika, 2017, pp. 54-55).

The importance of border diplomacy for Indonesia reached a point where maritime border negotiations and determining the continental shelf boundaries made up two programs under the Maritime Diplomacy pillar of the GMF. On January 8, 2024, in Marsudi's second term as foreign minister (and Widodo's second term as president), she announced that, in the span of nine years, Indonesia had completed six border agreements with its neighbors. Among these agreements included the 12-year EEZ Boundary Delimitation Agreement with Vietnam back in 2021 and the Indonesia-Malaysia Agreement on two maritime boundary segments in the Sulawesi Sea and the Malacca Strait in June 2023 that was negotiated for 18 years ("Indonesia Completes Several Border Agreements with Neighbouring Countries in the Last 9 Years", 2024).

Having discussed the speeches of both Widodo and Marsudi now, this dissertation will dedicate the next sub-chapter to address a couple of relevant points that went unsaid in their speeches.

6.3. Addressing Two Unsaid Points from the Speeches of Widodo and Marsudi

This study has to address two important points that went unsaid in Widodo's and Marsudi's speeches.

Firstly, evident from Widodo's speeches, there was a declining momentousness of the GMF in Widodo's discourse as the end of his first term became closer to the point where the GMF was unmentioned in Widodo's 2016 state address and the entirety of his 2019 speeches.

Secondly, evident from the discussed speeches from both Widodo and Marsudi, the US, China, and their respective initiatives, the Pivot and BRI, received scant mention from either official. From 2014 to 2019, the Pivot made absolutely no appearance in their speeches, while the BRI was mentioned merely twice by Widodo when addressing its potential to be synchronized with the GMF. Furthermore, although Marsudi mentioned China more frequently than she did the US, China was almost always framed in relation to the tension in the South China Sea.

Adhering to what was stated by Fairclough (2003, p. 11) in that what is said in meaning-making depends on what is unsaid, this study will now address both realizations in the next two sub-sub-chapters to pinpoint what they mean for this research.

6.3.1. The Declining Momentousness of the GMF in Widodo's Speeches

The revelations about Widodo's economic diplomacy preference and illocutionary acts patterns mean that now the declining momentousness of the GMF in Widodo's discourse as the end of his first term came closer has to be mentioned by this study. Case in point, Widodo did not mention the GMF at all in his 2016 and 2019 state addresses. To add, the GMF went completely unmentioned throughout 2019 until the end of Widodo's first term to the point that no 2019 speech of his could be included in this study's analysis. The question now is: what led to this?

After Widodo won the presidential campaign again in 2019, there was something interesting to note about his second time being sworn in as president that has been described by Laksmana (2019):

> "But when Jokowi was sworn in for a second and final term a few weeks ago, the GMF disappeared. In his inauguration speech, neither the words 'maritime' nor 'foreign policy' appeared once. Instead, Jokowi vowed to focus on human capital, infrastructure, regulatory and bureaucratic reforms, and a broader 'economic transformation.'"

The fading of the GMF from Widodo's speeches in his first term, that being the case, does indicate a change in how Widodo viewed its importance, especially since the GMF was first mentioned in how other countries reacted to it before it was introduced on the global stage in 2014, whereas his foreign policy was not even highlighted in Widodo's second inauguration speech in 2019. It must be remembered that, when he first rose to Indonesia's highest office in 2014, he wanted Indonesia to benefit from foreign investments as much as possible (as the previous discussion has outlined) and that is why he announced the GMF and amplified its benefits when he had the chance to do so. To add, Choiruzzad considered Widodo's foreign policymaking in his first term as a moment for trial and error where he was still getting acquainted with his bureaucrats. By 2019, his style that amplified the salience of economic diplomacy to Indonesia's foreign policy has more or less become known, including to most other countries (2019, as cited in "Indonesia's foreign policy is projected as continuity", 2019).

In other words, Widodo's familiarity with his own bureaucrats and other countries, and their familiarity with his style of leadership and preference for economic diplomacy, upon entering his second term to be the reason why *mentioning the GMF* was made inconsequential toward promoting profits in doing business with Indonesia or investing in the archipelago. After all, without even mentioning the GMF to attract attention toward Indonesia in his second term, his public and the countries interacting with Indonesia were regarded as having already recognized that, **as long as Widodo was in charge, it was economic diplomacy for the sake of acquiring profits, and not the GMF, that really steered the wheel of Indonesian foreign policy**. In other words, there is meagre indication that Widodo considered the GMF to be an important foreign policy tool by the end of his first term in 2019.

6.3.2. Not Because of the Pivot and BRI? Indonesia as a Hedger, and Why Indonesia Hedged against the US and China

This study has to discuss this realization since both the Pivot and BRI occupy the core mindset of this research to the point where two of the research questions of this study, RQ_1.1 and RQ_1.2, are meant to explain the reason **why** Indonesia hedged against the US and China from 2014 to 2019 and **how far** the Pivot and BRI affected Indonesia's hedging strategy respectively.

This realization also gave birth to a concern this study has to address: with the Pivot and BRI receiving very little mention, was Indonesia even hedging at all against the US and China, then?

To answer this question, this study will discuss how Indonesia is as a hedger and then apply all five of Gerstl's (2020) hedging components and assess how they measure up when applied to Indonesia's approaches toward both the US and China to ascertain Indonesia's hedging against them both. After that, this research will discuss what paltry mention of the Pivot and BRI by Widodo and Marsudi truly means for Indonesia's hedging.

6.3.2.1. Indonesia as a Hedger

According to Goh (2005, p. 5), by dint of ethnicity, geography, and history, Southeast Asia is a region that is characterized more by its variations and differences than by its similarities. Goh (2005, p. 5) noted that there is a basic divergence between continental and maritime Southeast Asia, in particular Asia—particularly vis-à-vis the roles of China and the United States in regional security. Continental Southeast Asian states conduct themselves under the curtailments of both close proximity to China and continental geopolitics involving competition for influences and shared boundaries, specifically in the Indochina and the Myanmar-Thailand-China nexus. Meanwhile, Maritime Southeast Asian states like Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia are more open toward American presence in the region and American policy has this maritime arc as its focus mostly because of its strategic sea-lanes. Goh (2005, p. 5) underlined Indonesia as the country who bears the deepest worries regarding China's challenge for regional hegemony in Southeast Asia.

So, has the IR scholarship always considered Indonesia to be a hedger? Analyzing major power relationships in mid-2000s Southeast Asia, Goh (2016) had written that Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam most clearly fulfilled the requirements to be identified as hedgers even in the mid-2000s. As indirect balancing against China, all four helped facilitate US forward deployment in the region. Indonesia, for example, after having its defense ties with the US restored in 2005, has hosted visiting American naval vessels in a regular manner. Meanwhile, Roy mentioned that Indonesia, alongside Malaysia and Vietnam, pursued very subtle forms of balancing. In particular, he considered Indonesia's policy as balancing due to Indonesia's threat perceptions vis-a-vis China (2005, pp. 313 & 317, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 380). Ciorciari, though, had a different opinion, since he argued that Indonesia, alongside Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam to have pursued limited alignment with the US starting from the post-Cold War era to late 2000s (2010, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 381).

By the time analyzing the same topic reaches the 2010s. Goh considered Indonesia among the traditional hedgers, alongside countries like Malaysia and Singapore (2016, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 382). Goh (2016) argued that, while hedgers like Indonesia and Malaysia did not deviate from an overall long-term hedging strategy, many hedgers have bolstered components of their insurance policies to deter Chinese aggression in the short term. As far as Indonesia and Malaysia are concerned, Goh (2016) pointed to their renewed maritime foci in the ongoing modernization of their military to manage increasing risks of maritime disputes with China. Indonesia has also cooperated with other regional powers, such as having the Indonesian and American navies held two exercises at Batam Island in 2015 and signing a defense partnership MOU with Japan in that same year to make way for the transfer of specific Japanese-manufactured equipment and *joint research and production* between their defense industries.

Goh is not the only IR scholar to consider Indonesia as a hedger in the 2010s. Lim and Cooper argued that there are four countries in Southeast Asia who truly applied hedging strategy: Indonesia, Singapore, Myanmar, and Brunei Darussalam (2015, p. 709, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 382), while Indonesia is likewise seen as a hedger by Murphy, who underlined Jakarta's diversification of its economic partnerships (2017, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 384).

Additionally, as has been mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, Kuik (2017) regarded Indonesia as a heavy hedger. According to Kuik (2017), Indonesia has retained its political hedge by insistently and publicly showing its defiance vis-à-vis China as a posture of dominance-denial. However, while Singapore and Vietnam hedged by bolstering their military indirect-balancing position mostly by increasing their respective bilateral defense ties with powers near and far, Kuik (2017) highlighted that Widodo's Indonesia chose to restrict its military hedge primarily to self-efforts, demonstrating its resolve and amping up its defense capability without heavy reliance on its its defense partnerships with external powers for its security outlook. When Indonesia actually forges security cooperation with outside powers, such as Japan, the main focus of the cooperation is on capacity building, similar to what Goh (2016) has mentioned. Kuik (2017) considered Jakarta's renaming Indonesia's northern reaches of the Indonesia EEZ in the South China Sea as the North Natuna Sea to be an act of open defiance against China. Kuik (2017) also noted, however, that Jakarta under Widodo has shown quiet deference to Beijing occasionally, for example from the fact that Indonesia has refrained itself from pressuring China in the open following the July 2016 arbitration award. Having quietly enhanced its defense and enforcements capabilities and publicly exhibited determination of political defiance and military posturing over Natuna, Kuik (2017) regarded the Indonesian ruling elites as to have judged that a more prudent China policy to focus on tapping and exploring the modern immediate economic benefits from a rising China, leveraging Xi's BRI and the China-centered AIIB to promote Widodo's own GMF agenda and ergo increasing the leader's performance-based domestic authority and electoral prospects.

Of course, Indonesia is not only considered to be a hedger by IR scholars outside of Indonesia. No less than the GMF creator, Sukma (2015) himself, admitted Indonesia to be hedging when explaining Indonesia's foreign policy under Widodo:

> "Here, as a manifestation of diplomatic 'rebalancing', political and security cooperation between Indonesia and China needs to be further enhanced as well. All these developments reflect Indonesia's strategy of diplomatic 'hedging' in the face of strategic uncertainty in the region."

Having discussed Indonesia as a hedger here, the next sub-chapter of this dissertation will discuss the hedging concept proffered by Gerstl (2020; 2022) that this study follows.

6.3.2.2. Applying Gerstl's Hedging Components to Indonesia

How Gerstl's (2020; 2022) components apply to Indonesia are as follows:

1. Perceptions of risks and opportunities posed by the potential hedging target and perceptions of the strategic value of potential balancing partners

   As a start, how a state's security perceives the partner to which the hedging strategy is to be applied to establishes how a nation prioritizes and employs the policy tools of a hedging strategy (Hiep, 2013, p. 337, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 111). According to Gerstl (2020, pp. 111-112), this first component, otherwise known simply as *Perceptions*, discerns why a country chooses to hedge instead of attempting to utilize a bandwagoning or balancing strategy (while if and how a nation hedges against a superior power is appraised by the four other components) and probes, as an expository variable, into three elements:

   - The hedger's perceptions concerning the risks that the hedging target carries in the realms of economics (dependency), domestic politics (autonomous decision-making), and security (sovereignty and territorial integrity);

   - Concurrent perusal into perceived opportunities that close relations with the hedging target within the realms of security (general increase), economics (increased exchange), and domestic politics (better bilateral security and/or economic relations leading to increased regime legitimacy because of socio-economic development) would bring for the hedger;

   - How the strategic value of prospective balancing partners, namely other great powers and international organizations, is perceived by leaders. Nonetheless, it matters to note that, despite the fact that the perceptions of the leader(s) steer the foreign policy, it is common for such perceptions to be deeply lodged in their country's respective foreign policy practices and traditions. After all, because the continuity factor is generally robust in foreign policy, national interests and the perceptions thereof do not change frequently.

   For this reason, in explaining how this component applies to the archipelago, Indonesia's perceptions in hedging against China and the US must first be discussed.

   Following the end of the New Order era in 1998, Indonesia's foreign policymaking has mostly shifted from a top-down approach to a more pluralistic dynamic with a

larger opportunity for actors beyond the traditionally small circle of power elites to voice their own perspectives. This pluralization is reflected by Indonesia's approach that commonly takes the form of a broader-based and *balanced pragmatism* in approaching the great powers. After all, Indonesian foreign policymakers have to maximize a myriad of interests across sectors and actors while simultaneously being framed and constrained by a plethora of personalities, traditions, demands and so on. To add to it, as was previously explained, Indonesian foreign policy moves are always subjected to the Free-and-Active doctrine that champions autonomy and adjustability. All of these elements stand as the reasons behind Indonesia's decision to simultaneously pursue stronger economic relations with China and seek a deeper strategic tie with the US, especially after increased Chinese aggression in Natunan waters (Kuik, 2016, pp. 22-23).

After all, as a developing country, no issue is more important for Indonesia than economic growth. Thus, while Washington is Jakarta's preferred defense partner and Indonesia understands the risks posed by China, nonetheless Jakarta still approaches Beijing from the prisms of development and economic growth since China is both geographically closer to Indonesia than the US is and more attractive for key Indonesian interests, particularly after taking into account the lack of American economic offerings to Indonesia (Myers, 2023).

This then displays how closely related Indonesia's core economic interest is to its perception in hedging against China and the US.

2. Political-Diplomatic engagement

This component attends to the state and quality of the political and diplomatic relations with the hedging target and other great powers. It can be measured via the number and depth of agreements and the number of political visits (Gerstl, 2020, p. 112).

There are several different reports about the large frequency of Widodo's meetings with Xi. In September 2016, Widodo reportedly had his fifth meeting with Xi in the span of two years, where the two leaders focused more on economic cooperation during the meeting (Parlina, 2016). Widodo himself admitted in September 2016 that, up until that point, he had already made three working visits to China and was frequently on call with Xi ("Bertemu Diaspora, Presiden Jokowi Sampaikan Target Indonesia Datangkan 10 Juta Wisman RRT", 2016). According to Widodo's own

words in 2022, he learned a lot from Xi about long-term planning, infrastructure, and connectivity from as far back as November 2014 (Asmara, 2022). Also in 2022, Lu Kang, Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia from 2022 to 2024, even claimed that Widodo and Xi have actually met more than ten times in total (2022). As if building upon their aforementioned November 2014 meeting, economy, investment, and infrastructure appeared to have dominated the topics during the meetings between the two leaders, including during meetings in 2016 (Asmara, 2016), in 2017 (" Bertemu Presiden Xi Jinping, Presiden Jokowi Ajak Kerja Sama Bangun Proyek Infrastruktur", 2017), in 2018 (Sebayang, 2018), in 2022 ("Presiden Jokowi dan Presiden Xi Bahas Penguatan Kerja Sama Ekonomi hingga Isu Kawasan dan Dunia", 2022), and in 2023 (Septiani & Sindu, 2023). It is hard to deny the relevance of these meetings and all the business talks that have seemingly taken place between Widodo and Xi because, as of 2023, China is Indonesia's largest trading partner at over $130 billion annually, almost double the amount when Widodo was elected to presidency in 2014. China is also the second largest investor in Indonesia in 2022, right after Singapore (Parameswaran, 2023). Meanwhile, Widodo has met his American counterpart(s) four times in total (Perlez et al., 2023).

A search in the Indonesian foreign ministry treaty database also revealed that Indonesia has several MOUs about aligning Indonesia's GMF with China's BRI at the time of writing that have been previously discussed. Meanwhile, Indonesia and the US signed a MOU on Maritime Cooperation in 2015 and then another MOU in 2018 (Gunawan, 2019, pp. 26 & 29).

This underlines the enhanced economic ties with Indonesia and China and the improved maritime cooperation between Indonesia and the US.

3. Economic engagement

This component covers criteria such as trade, investments, trade agreements, and so on to measure a state's attempt at augmenting the economic benefits it could receive from the relations it has with the hedging target and other decisive partners (Gerstl, 2020, p. 112).

While China's status as Indonesia's largest trading partner currently has just been discussed in the previous component, it needs to be noted, though, that the US was still among Indonesia's five biggest trading partners from 2002 to 2018 (Kusnandar, 2019). In 2019, the US was Indonesia's fourth largest trading partner. However, from

2020 to 2022, the US managed to surpass even Japan and Singapore to become Indonesia's second largest trading partner (Mufarida, 2022).

China itself is also a vital source of capital for Indonesia that plays an important role in the archipelago's foreign direct investment landscape. After all, as of 2024, there are 81 projects that Jakarta actively promoted across a variety of business sectors to attract Chinese investors (Interesse, 2024). In 2023, Indonesia reported the highest FDI in the country's history so far at $45.6 billion. Singapore was the largest contributor to Indonesia's FDI with $13.3 billion, while China is in second place with $8.2 billion. Meanwhile, the US is in sixth place with $3 billion (Andriyanto, 2023).

This exhibits the contemporary economic engagement between Indonesia with China and the US.

4. Limited balancing

This component consists of soft balancing, as in the usage of non-military, be it bilateral or multilateral, partnerships with both international organizations and other states to curb a great power's freedom of action, and internal balancing, as in bolstering a nation's military self-help, particularly in the naval maneuvers with both China and the US as far ASEAN member states are concerned since the association lacks a common military means or policy, and economic abilities (Gerstl, 2022, pp. 38-39).

Jakarta's soft balancing of this component can be recognized from Indonesia's involvement in and with ASEAN, particularly the AOIP (more about this outlook below). Outside of ASEAN, to fund Widodo's ambitious infrastructure development dreams for the archipelago, Indonesia has joined not only the BRI but also the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Anwar, 2022, p. 4). Also, as mentioned before, Indonesia has signed a few MOUs with China in order to synchronize the GMF with the BRI. This also suggests that Indonesia under Widodo's leadership saw it fit to use the GMF as an Indonesia foreign policy tool to interact with the BRI, itself a Chinese foreign policy tool.

Regardless, this study believes it is necessary to point out that this did not mean that Indonesia somehow became malleable toward China, even when concerning the GMF and the BRI. After all, Oegroseno already clarified that Indonesia was only willing to cooperate with China's BRI provided that China is willing to acknowledge

Indonesia's GMF on Indonesian terms, including in regards to government to government cooperation, business to business cooperation, advanced and environmentally-friendly technology, and the presence of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia (2022). Here, it is clear that **Indonesia's cooperation with China's BRI would never have happened had China refused to accept Indonesia's terms and, so, this displays the limits of Indonesia's limited bandwagoning with China**. In short, Indonesia fully realized that the BRI is not a mere economic initiative, but is also a geopolitical approach. This led to Jakarta seeking more economic partners as part of its GMF implementation (Lin et al., 2020, p. 57).

Indonesia's internal balancing, meanwhile, involves improving economic and defense capabilities. This means improving its infrastructures to the point where the archipelago is no longer a simple waterway that European or Middle Eastern ships pass up as they sail through Singapore instead of the Sunda Strait when they want to go to Japan or China because there is nothing in the Sunda Strait, or as they sail through the Indian Ocean to Australia instead of the Indonesian Southern Coasts because there nothing there. Interestingly enough, the success of the GMF also depends on whether Indonesian infrastructures became proper enough to liaise Australia and Japan or ASEAN, or even the Middle East/Europe and China. For this reason, starting from Widodo's first period, from Aceh to Papua, there were 42 ports that have been built or refurbished to anticipate the developing economic activity as a pivot. With this, economic activities will be created in the future should foreign ships sail through Indonesia with its developed maritime infrastructures. This is nonetheless a long-term plan that could take more than five or ten years. It might even take 25 years. In this regard, the sinking of foreign fishing vessels caught illegally stealing in Indonesian waters by the former Fishing and Maritime Minister Susi Pudjiastuti was just a small part of the GMF. It served as a therapeutic shock for maintaining economic security because the real concept of the GMF is far larger than that (DD, interview transcript, October 2, 2022).

For context, in 2019, Pudjiastuti stated that Indonesia sank 556 illegal boats from October 2014 to October 2019. Among those 556 illegal boats, 26 were Indonesian-flagged ones, 321 were Vietnamese, 91 were Filipino, 24 were Thai, three came from China, two from Papua New Guinea, and one each from Belize and Nigeria (Rahman & Mawa, 2019). A research by Juned et al. (2019, p. 72) found that major Southeast Asian producing countries of fishers did not have any other choice but to accept

Indonesia's decision to skin illegal fishing vessels for sustainable maritime resources in the region. They (2019, p 72) concluded that, according to the neoclassical reality theory, three key factors that are framed in systemic pressure, domestic politics, and state power allowed Indonesia to find no significant hurdles in carrying out the sinking of illegal fishing ships. Both regional and global scales of the systemic pressure tilted in favor of Indonesia over Jakarta's approach to the illegal fishing threats, and the people around the region have been so vocal to the government regarding their loss of billions of income due to illegal fishing. Finally, what Indonesia did with sinking illegal ships was regarded as much more doable amid Southeast Asian countries' limited national capability, and, as such, there was an implicit admission that Indonesia treated the illegal fishing problem accordingly.

Because Indonesia and the US are located in different continents, there seemed to be no problem between them regarding this matter. Meanwhile, since Indonesia actually sunk Chinese ships, China has actually protested Indonesia's actions several times. It appears that Beijing's protests fell on deaf ears, though, since Pudjiastuti never really stopped sinking illegal fishing ships until her term was over (Rony, 2020).

Indonesia's cooperation with China, with Jakarta's insisting on its own terms in specific areas instead of accepting Beijing's terms completely in all areas, shows Indonesia's limited balancing.

5. Limited bandwagoning

The weaker form of this component can be understood as an agreement between the hedging target and the hedger to align on specified policy issues. This definition takes in the probability of a state sustaining close relations with other nations but bandwagons with a great power synchronously. It differs with traditional diplomacy in that the weaker party between the two needs to make more concessions (Gerstl, 2020, p. 112). Overall, the weaker party does so as to not lose its autonomy or become over-reliant on a great power (Kuik, 2008, pp. 168-169, as cited in Gerstl, 2020, p. 112).

In this respect, Indonesia can be said to have engaged in a limited bandwagoning with China, since, Indonesia consistently reiterated its support toward Beijing's One-China Policy in regards to the Taiwan question (Shofa, 2024). It can then be argued that Indonesia also employs limited bandwagoning with the US, particularly in the

maritime defense areas as has been previously discussed. The existence of Indonesia's Bakamla is the most significant evidence of it.

In fine, it is apparent that the Indonesian hedging strategy fulfills all five components forwarded by Gerstl (2020), and thereby there should be no doubt that Indonesia indeed hedged against the US and China.

With Indonesia's status as a hedger having been confirmed, this study will now move to address the lack of mentions toward the Pivot and BRI in the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi, and what that means for Indonesia's hedging strategy.

6.3.2.3. Why Indonesia Hedged Against China and the US

This portion will begin by discussing whether the Pivot or the BRI could be regarded as a hedging motivation for Indonesia after their inadequate mention in Widodo and Marsudi's speeches. It will then discuss the real reason behind Indonesia's hedging strategy against the US and China.

To start with the Pivot, on top of its zero mentions from either Widodo or Marsudi in their speeches, there is no Indonesian document about the Pivot and its apparent ties with Indonesia that could be found anywhere. For this reason, in addressing the complete absence of the US Pivot from the speeches of both Widodo and Marsudi from 2014 to 2019, this study posits that **there is no convincing indication from the aforementioned speeches to argue that the US Pivot could be significantly considered as an influence for Indonesia's hedging strategy foreign policy in Widodo's first term**.

So, what does this mean for the BRI that was only mentioned twice? Widodo only mentioned the BRI twice when underlining the possibility of it being synchronized with the GMF. As this study has mentioned before, Indonesia only signed its synchronization MOU with the BRI relatively late in October 2018, whereas Myanmar, Malaysia, and Singapore already signed an analogous MOU even before 2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2018, as cited in Lalisang & Candra, 2020, p. 14), and that cooperation only became a done deal after China agreed to accept Indonesia's GMF on Indonesia's terms (Oegroseno, 2022). Regardless of the synchronization being an example of Indonesia's limited balancing toward China, the fact remains that it was Beijing who first approached Widodo to inquire about the GMF, and eventually it was China who had to agree to Indonesia's synchronization terms. In this regard, this study considers it quite

far-fetched to assume that the BRI held an influence toward Indonesia's hedging strategy. While an argument can be made that this synchronization proved that the GMF could be an effective hedging strategy tool when needed, it does not hint toward the hold that the BRI might have over Indonesia's hedging strategy. As a matter of fact, this synchronization hints at the opposite: it hints at Indonesia's bargaining power against even China. As such, this study also posits that **there is no convincing indication from the aforementioned speeches to argue that China's BRI could be prominently considered as a motivation or an influence for Indonesia's hedging strategy foreign policy in Widodo's first term**.

It must ergo be asked: if not for the Pivot or the BRI as some of the foreign policy tools of the US and China respectively, then for what reason was Indonesia hedging against the US and China in Widodo's first term?

As this study has previously mentioned, Southeast Asia is both a key part in Washington's current FOIP strategy (Anwar, 2019) and the long-established San Francisco System (Richey, 2019). Meanwhile, China's geographical and historical proximity to Southeast Asia led Beijing to consider it a testing area for the rise of China's great power status (Stromseth, 2019, pp. 1 & 3). By now, it is known that China's rising power translated into its well-known aggressiveness in the region due to Beijing's tendency to intimidate weaker countries, including in Southeast Asia. As far as Jakarta is concerned, this reached a point where China's belligerence caused the BRI's attractiveness for Indonesia to be lessened (Pradhan, 2016, p. 11). Be that as it may, a Chinese hegemony in the region is equal to the practical end of the San Francisco system (Richey, 2019), so the US could not live with China's supercharging its influences (Agusman, 2022). **Therein lies the point of contention between China and the US: they want different things from the same region.**

In Southeast Asia alone, as this study has outlined, the rivalry between Washington and Beijing put the ASEAN Centrality that Indonesia wanted to maintain so much in jeopardy because the rivalry caused ASEAN member states to lack a concerted response toward China and the US. Countries who massively rely on China for their economy, like Cambodia and Laos, became more Sinocentric in their perspective. On the other hand, countries who already enjoy good ties with Washington like Vietnam and Singapore prefer the US as a cooperation partner (Wangke, 2022).

To be fair, the US-China rivalry has been on Indonesia's radar even before the Pivot or BRI existed. After all, as far back as the mid-2000s, Jakarta had already steered for a middle course between Beijing and Washington (Goh, 2005b, p.5, as cited in Haacke, 2019, p. 381). To put it another way, **Indonesia could not have been aware of the US-China rivalry from as far back as the 2000s without also being aware of their clashing interests in the Indo-Pacific region**.

In addition, back in 2010, which was a year before the Pivot became even a thing, Marty Natalegawa, then Indonesia's Foreign Minister, stated that Indonesia's interest for the region could be described as a dynamic equilibrium where no one power dominates the region but instead for many countries to be more inclusive and be engaged in multi-sectoral issues ("A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa", 2010). Furthermore, the inevitability of a rivalry between the US and China was something that Sukma actually noticed. Only around a month after Obama announced the Pivot back in November 2011, Sukma (2011) published an article warning Indonesia over the looming US-China rivalry and the importance of a new platform for ASEAN to address this rivalry directly.

The reason why Sukma (2011) mentioned ASEAN when warning Indonesia about an incoming competition for hegemony between the US and China can be discovered thanks to the constructivist theory that this research follows. Chapter 4 of this dissertation has mentioned, and thus underscored, an important point to help uncover this reason by way of constructivism: it has something to do with how many scholars, including Sukma (2024) himself, reckoned Indonesia's role conception as the regional leader of Southeast Asia ("Le Notes #39: Role theory in International Relations – Holsti's national role conception", 2019).

To reiterate, even when compared to how other constructivist approaches view sovereignty, the frame of mind offered by role theory amplifies the agency of an actor to employ and dispute different sovereignty norms to embrace particular roles (Beasley et al., 2021, p. 9). On top of Indonesia's role conception as Southeast Asia's regional leader, Chapter 4 has also emphasized that ASEAN, the US, and China are Indonesia's three most important Others (Nguitragool, 2013, pp. 16-17), and a rivalry between two of Indonesia's Others that destabilize the archipelago's one remaining Other is certainly something Indonesia considered to be noxious for its identity and sovereignty to assume the role of regional leader. Others are, after all, given or denied recognition by a Self in order to be constituted as Self at once (Hegel, 1977, p. 112, as cited in Neumann, 1999,

p. 3). How highly Indonesia values its sovereignty and identity has been discussed before, so it is now understandable as to why **a rivalry between two geopolitical giants, to the point where the stability of ASEAN is threatened, is something Indonesia would never find to be desirable: because it directly endangers Indonesia's role as the regional leader among ASEAN member states**. This is why Indonesia eventually hedged against China and the US.

This realization matters because no ASEAN member states can escape from being affected by any event that unfolds in the South China Sea (Ba, 2016, p. 47). Whether or not they want to, they have to deal with the rivalry between Beijing and Washington in the region, and Indonesia is no exception to this necessity. It must thus be questioned: since now it is known why Jakarta hedged against Washington and Beijing, but not by using the GMF as its main hedging tool, then what tool did Indonesia use to hedge against the US and China? This is where ASEAN and the AOIP came in. For this reason, this research will next discuss the AOIP and how Indonesia hedged with it.

6.3.2.4. The AOIP: How Indonesia Hedged Against China and the US

According to Agusman (2022), it was Indonesia's concern over the disagreement among ASEAN member states in regards to how they should respond to the US-China rivalry and the risk it carried for ASEAN Centrality that led Indonesia to reapply its Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine via ASEAN. Jakarta's aim was to ensure peace in the Indo-Pacific region by forwarding a culture of dialogues, dispute settlement, and freedom. Furthermore, after the US announcement of the FOIP, Jakarta was particularly concerned it would entwine the Indo-Pacific concept with the ostracism of China, whom Indonesia was both wary of but intended to profit from economically (Suzuki, 2022). Hence, Indonesia had to act.

The AOIP itself began with a series of instructions from Marsudi at the Indonesian National Coordination Meeting back in February 2018 where the the Assessment and Policy Development Body of Indonesia's Foreign Ministry was tasked with developing an Indo-Pacific Concept. A document called "Indonesia's Perspective for an ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific: Towards a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Inclusive Region" was then produced after a variety of consultations with research institutions, ministries, higher education institutions, and Indonesian representatives overseas (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2019, as cited in Pangestu et al., 2021, p. 14). Widodo, Marsudi, and many

Indonesian diplomats then promoted it in various formal and informal meetings, including the 32nd ASEAN Summit held on April 27-28, 2018, ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Singapore Meeting from July 30 to 4 August 4, 2018, 33rd ASEAN Summit, the 13th EAS on November 15, 2018, and ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat on January 17-18, 2019 (Pangestu et al., 2021, p. 14).

The division among ASEAN member states that was caused by the US-China rivalry was evident during Indonesia's lobbying attempt to get all the other ASEAN members to agree on the AOIP. After Indonesia circulated the AOIP concept paper to other ASEAN member states in August 2018, the reception was not positive because different ASEAN countries mean different security ties whether with China or the US. Above all others, Cambodia and the Philippines reacted most negatively to Indonesia's concept paper. Malaysia also did not like the naming and suggested the name of *ASEAN Inter-Oceanic Concept* instead. In other words, the negativity happened because ASEAN member states were in disagreement over how Beijing and Washington would react to their announcement of an Indo-Pacific initiative. The summit held in November 2018, likewise produced no agreement regarding the AOIP. Tides begin turning for Indonesia's AOIP proposal at the start of 2019 after Thailand, then ASEAN chair, urged other ASEAN members to discuss Indonesia proposal again, this time by incorporating the principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia that embodies friendly cooperation and peaceful cooperation among Southeast Asian states ("Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia", n.d.). Meanwhile, **Indonesia began emphasizing the aspects of economic growth promotion in its AOIP proposal instead of the aspects that concerned security**. Up until the end, Cambodia, at China's behest, urged that the phrasing *freedom of navigation and overflight* be removed from the proposal, whereas Singapore persuaded other ASEAN member states to retain that phrase. On March 18, 2019, ASEAN member states finally agreed on the AOIP (Suzuki, 2022).

The AOIP's adoption was eventually introduced by Indonesia in the 34th ASEAN Summit on June 20-23, 2019 (Pangestu et al., 2021, p. 14). Interesting to note that Marsudi did mention in her 2019 press statement included in this chapter that it was Widodo who presented Indonesia's concept of Indo-Pacific in the November 2018 EAS ("Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2019", 2019).

Kuik (2022, pp. 362-363) explained that Southeast Asian states's hedging strategy by using ASEAN in this manner is known as institutional hedging, or group hedging, where

the goals of the hedging strategy typically involve concurrent attempts at seeking inclusive diversification, active impartiality, and prudent contradictions for cultivating a fall-back position. The AOIP is, regardless, not the first time ASEAN member states have deployed institutional hedging. Kuik (2022, p. 364) wrote that a number of ASEAN-centric regional multilateral institutions, particularly ASEAN, and four ASEAN-led mechanisms, namely the ARF, the ASEAN Plus Three, the EAS, and the ADMM-Plus, are all examples of ASEAN member states applying institutional hedging.

Kuik (2022, p. 375) argued that the AOIP furnishes the ASEAN member states with an avenue to strike a balance between the group- and individual country-level dynamics, while at the same time allowing them to keep their distance from the Quad as a group. In addition, according to Kuik (2022, p. 376), the importance of the AOIP in this discourse came to be due to the fact that, while the interests of ASEAN member states may converge, they are not coordinated. **The AOIP that Indonesia pushed then serves as a platform for ASEAN member states to hedge and mitigate an array of external risks, such as the dangers of entrapment and polarization, while also maintaining the neutrality and centrality of ASEAN itself in regional affairs**. At the moment, the AOIP remains ASEAN's sole plan of counterbalance against the pressures exuded by the US-China rivalry toward ASEAN member states (de Lecea & Zozaya, 2022, pp. 46-47).

This does not mean that the AOIP's journey was all smooth sailing, of course. As underlined by Lin (2024, pp. 3 & 5), Indonesia's advocacy and ASEAN dialogue partners' support did not stop the initial AOIP implementation to face criticism thanks to its laggard progress and assumed drought of tangible initiatives for its first four years. A crucial challenge early on was the ASEAN member states' varying degree of ownership of the AOIP, together with their eagerness and capability to allocate resources to implement it. Not counting discussions and desultory activities with dialogue partners, there was no pertinent plan to implement the AOIP until November 2022, when the *Declaration on Mainstreaming Four Priority Areas of The ASEAN Outlook on The Indo-Pacific within ASEAN-Led Mechanisms* was adopted by ASEAN leaders. It recognized the necessity for collective leadership with ASEAN to proactively tackle emerging regional challenges. The declaration also endorsed a *List of Criteria on Mainstreaming the AOIP* (an internal document) to carry out the AOIP's four priority areas through ASEAN-led mechanisms like the EAS, the ARF, and the ADMM-Plus.

Duarte et al. (2023, pp. 1.003-1.004) referred to the work of John Lovel and William D. Coplin when analyzing Indonesia's strategy in convincing other ASEAN countries to adopt the AOIP. According to them, in developing its foreign policy, every country has the tendency to apply explainable strategies through the examination of its decision makers' strategies about the opponent and their evaluation of their own capabilities. This is called the Strategic or Rational Model and is composed of four mains strategies:

- Leadership Strategy: Signified by the preference of elimination of violence in foreign policy. This strategy is commonly directed toward leaders who desire to encourage peaceful solutions and aim to build consensus.
- Concordance Strategy: Signified by the attempts to make mutually beneficial situations for every party involved. This strategy is aimed at achieving agreements based on mutual interests.
- Accommodation Strategy: A strategy that is used when there is a dominant country in terms of capabilities and other countries have the tendency to accommodate the dominant one for the purpose of maintaining balance and stability.
- Confrontation Strategy: A strategy deployed when a country increases its abilities to a stage others find unmatched, commonly leading to confrontational actions.

Duarte et al. (2023, p. 1.004) argued that, in the context of Indonesia's development of the AOIP, Jakarta had the tendency to combine accommodation strategy with leadership strategy. This is rational since Indonesia enjoys a good reputation in ASEAN and follows the Free-and-Active doctrine, so the archipelago strives to accommodate a variety of interests while attempting to maintain peace simultaneously. Instead of imposing its will on its fellow ASEAN member states, Indonesia seeked common ground to reach a mutual agreement. They (2023, p. 1.004) credited Indonesia's approach for strengthening the values and identity of ASEAN by highlighting non-intervention, peaceful problem-solving, and national sovereignty. While promoting regional stability and prosperity at the same time, Indonesia endeavored to enhance ASEAN as a united and tough regional bloc despite being in the thick of complex geopolitical dynamics.

According to Sesarianto (2023, pp. 63-64), Indonesia's tactic to convince other ASEAN member states by underlining the economic priorities of the AOIP becomes more understandable after recalling prior discussion in this chapter where it was revealed that economic benefit is a concomitant trait in Widodo's discourse from 2014 to 2019 and

economic diplomacy was among the orders that Marsudi did her best to fulfill. This becomes more appealing to point out because there is indeed an influence of Widodo's leadership and preference of economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific construct forwarded by Indonesia, in that the ASEAN Centrality in it is discussed using the logic of profit/loss, especially in the mapping of global value chains. **That is to say, because of Indonesia and Widodo, the AOIP is focused more on economic matters.** In addressing the great power politics attempting to push their Indo-Pacific construct in the region, Indonesia seized the chance to use the conflict to economically profit from both sides by balancing itself, including using the AOIP, between the two sides. In other words, thanks to the influence of Indonesia under Widodo's presidency, the economic interest is now entrenched in the mindset of Indonesia's hedging strategy discourse, including to its long-established foreign policy practice of forwarding ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific region.

The fact that the AOIP was adopted by ASEAN, after being advanced by Indonesia, means that this study now has to bring up how China and the Quad members who promoted FOIP reacted to it to formulate an explanation.

China's reaction toward the AOIP as an ASEAN hedging strategy proffered by Indonesia became more tangible when comparing the AOIP's inclusivity to the FOIP's inclusivity. At the end of the day, the inclusivity suggested by the FOIP in its Indo-Pacific construct still adheres to Western values such as democracy and human rights (Kitaoka, 2019, as cited in Sesarianto, 2023, p. 61), which is pretty much a jab against China and thus makes it clear to Beijing that the FOIP is inherently meant by the US, Japan, Australia, and India to exclude and contain China. Meanwhile, Jakarta did not include any morality aspect in the AOIP's inclusivity, including in its official document that was released by ASEAN, and thus Indonesia did not premeditatedly exclude China from being part of the Indo-Pacific construct under the AOIP by promoting Western values. In return, China seemed to have considered the AOIP's terms to be acceptable, because, in 2022, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a document called the *Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on Supporting ASEAN Centrality in the Evolving Regional Architecture* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2022, as cited in Sesarianto, 2023, p. 63). Beijing's 2022 position paper stated that China acknowledged ASEAN Centrality in the Indo-Pacific discourse and voiced its readiness to cooperate in order to build the inclusivity and openness offered by the AOIP (Sesarianto, 2023, pp. 61-63). China's positive reaction toward the AOIP becomes even more significant when one fact is taken

into account: China is wary of the term 'Indo-Pacific' because it implicitly places China the target of policy objectives due to a series of policies forwarded by the US. Beijing thus sees the 'Indo-Pacific' term as a product of the West and presumes the latter to have an exclusive ownership over the term's parameters (Khoe, 2022).

Moving on, despite being a different initiative from the FOIP, all of the Quad members nonetheless also reacted positively toward the AOIP. Japan was the first of the four to embrace the AOIP by adopting the *Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific* in November 2020 at the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit Meeting ("Diplomatic Bluebook 2022", 2022). The US followed by welcoming it on August 4, 2021 ("U.S. Support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific", 2021). India was next by adopting the *ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the Region* on October 28, 2021 ("ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity in the Region", 2021). Australia was last by adopting the *Joint Statement of the 2nd Annual ASEAN-Australia Summit on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific* on November 12, 2022 ("Joint Statement of the 2nd Annual ASEAN-Australia Summit on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific", 2022). Amusingly enough, even actors as diverse as the EU (Lin, 2021), Russia ("Joint Statement of ASEAN and Russia Foreign Ministers on the Occasion of the 5th Anniversary of ASEAN-Russia Strategic Partnership", 2023) and New Zealand ("ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific", 2023) have welcomed the AOIP positively.

Still, two points must be kept in mind about this whole thing. On the one hand, the fact that Jakarta created and pushed a positively welcomed initiative by relevant Indo-Pacific powers should at least inadvertently prove that **Indonesia's long-established adherence to the Free-and-Active doctrine by not exclusively aligning itself to any foreign power was still in effect under Widodo's presidency**. On the other hand, it cost China, the Quad members, and other Indo-Pacific actors who are competing for influence in the Indo-Pacific nothing to formally endorse the AOIP, particularly because **diplomatic give-and-take is part of the game**. It certainly does not automatically mean that the signatories downright abide by the content of the AOIP.

After all, no endorsement by other Indo-Pacific actors can nullify the fact that the AOIP is still bereft of strategic thrust and thus unable to allow ASEAN to efficiently manage external threats, in particular the ones brought about by China. ASEAN's refusal to condemn Chinese aggression in regional flashpoints such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait unironically amplifies ASEAN's own limitations. Furthermore, the inclusive nature of the AOIP increases the difficulty level for ASEAN to be regarded as a *like-minded* partner by countries that have a vested interest in the Indo-Pacific, such as the Quad members or even European countries. Thanks to this, some observers have argued that the AOIP is primarily a symbol of ASEAN's aspirations rather than an actual offer of a concrete pathway to achieve particular goals. While the AOIP can kick-start more processes and lower-hanging cooperation, tangible strategic outcomes, especially the ones related to security, are out of its reach (Lin, 2024, pp. 4-5). In other words, a glaring weakness of the AOIP is the fact that it is not an actual treaty, but rather a political statement.

Arguably, Jakarta was aware of this weakness. As such, during Indonesia's chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023, the implementation of the AOIP has focused instead on softer cooperation and easier objectives, such green infrastructure, the promotion of trade and investment, and digital developments, rather than focusing on regional security needs (Lin, 2024, pp. 4-5). That is why, in order to implement the AOIP into concrete cooperation, Indonesia held the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum (AIPF) on September 5-6, 2023, in Jakarta as a flagship event during its chairmanship of ASEAN. The AIPF itself is designed to enhance ASEAN unity and leadership in handling geopolitical changes in the region via sustainable confidence building measures by mutually profitable cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. There were three main agendas in the AIPF: (i) Green Infrastructure and Resilient Supply Chain; (ii) Sustainable and Innovative Financing; and (iii) Inclusive Digital Transformation and Creative Economy. The forum itself was able to gather more than 2,500 participants from 51 countries, ranging from heads of state and CEOs to renowned experts in a variety of fields. The AIPF also produced commitments of cooperation of 93 projects worth US$38.2 billion and 73 other potential projects worth US$17.8 billion. The AIPF is expected, in the future, to be capable of maximizing ASEAN market's promising investment potential with its 680 million people and fully reach the Indo-Pacific market which covers 58% of the world's population, 45% of global trade and 61% of global GDP (Mulayana & Yazid, 2023).

Duarte et al. (2023, p. 1.005) asserted that **Indonesia's GMF vision is helped by the existence of the AOIP**. Meanwhile, Lin did not even consider the consequential advancement of the AOIP's implementation in 2023 as a surprise at all because Indonesia's vehement push toward sizable implementation of **the AOIP was in harmony with Widodo's goal to make Indonesia as the GMF**. She also credited Indonesia's Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023 with having overall advanced the AOIP's implementation and therefore elevated **the AOIP as a consequential platform to promote the central role of ASEAN** (2024, p. 2 & 5).

Having said that, at the time of writing, the precise amount of investments realized under the AIPF banner unfortunately remains vague. This should not be understood as the AIPF having no progress at all, though. As of May 2025, its three main agendas have indeed seen some development. Examples granted as follows:

- Green Infrastructure and Resilient Supply Chain agenda = At AIPF 2023, PT Pertamina, an Indonesian state-owned oil and gas company, played an active role in the flagship event by showcasing the Lumut Balai Unit 2 Geothermal Power Plant Project. It was a green infrastructure project that was being worked on by Pertamina's subsidiary known as PT Pertamina Geothermal Energy. The cooperation on this project was carried out together with Japan's Mitsubishi Corporation from Japan, China's SEPCO III Electric Power Construction Co., Ltd., and Indonesia's own PT Wijaya Karya (Prismono, 2023). As of February 2025, the progress of the Lumut Balai Unit 2 Project has now reached 93.49%, with a few more aspects still in need of completion, including technical documents and equipment procurement (Godang, 2025).

- Sustainable and Innovative Financing agenda = At AIPF 2023, Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) showcased a few programs, one of them was related to the company's pipeline achievements in developing a green portfolio for stakeholders in ASEAN countries. It would be distributed to several sectors, including green building, renewable energy, sustainable transportation, waste to energy and waste management, and sustainable natural resources (Damayanti, 2023). The AIPF 2023 also saw BNI sign a MOU with Japan's Shoko Chukin Bank to develop the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) sector (Mayasari, 2023). In February 2025, BNI continued to enhance its commitment to financing in the green sector or green banking, as a form of support for financing based on the Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG).

BNI recorded an increase in total sustainable financing to IDR 190.5 trillion by the end of 2024 from IDR 181.1 trillion the previous year. It also targets sustainable sector credit to continue to grow with a projected outstanding credit of IDR 199.67 trillion by the end of 2025. In addition, around IDR 177 trillion in ESG financing was distributed in 2024 to sectors related to social empowerment and MSMEs (Khairurizqi, 2025).

- Inclusive Digital Transformation and Creative Economy agenda = At AIPF 2023, BNI also signed a MOU with the Export-Import Bank of Korea (Mayasari, 2023). Through its BNI Xpora program, BNI offered a variety of comprehensive services to prepare its MSMEs partners to be able to compete internationally and contribute to Indonesia's economy. An example is an Indonesian MSME called PT Atalya Makmuria Kreasindo (Ataly Coffee), whose participation in BNI Xpora allowed it to expand to the international coffee market by shipping 12 tons of green coffee beans for 1 container to South Korea on December 23, 2024 and continued it with the plan to send 4 containers to South Korea and Taiwan in 2025 (Irda, 2024).

This study thus argues, based on the business commitments of cooperation produced by the AIPF, **the influences of Widodo's economic diplomacy in the AOIP's objectives and results are really extant**. Then again, these examples do encourage one to ponder: what about the dimensions of security and maintaining ASEAN Centrality and the rules-based order? Are they not included in the AOIP's implementation?

According to Duarte et al. (2023, p. 998), the substance of the AOIP in the regional defense context is both multifaceted and profoundly impactful at framing the defense landscape of Southeast Asia and beyond. There are several key aspects to understand the cruciality of the AOIP in this context:

- Inclusive and Rule-Based Security Approach: As a response to the increasing necessity to improve regional security cooperation in the middle of rising military competition and geopolitical tensions, especially between major powers like China and the US, the AOIP offers an inclusive and rule based approach to security. With the AOIP, ASEAN aims to nurture regional stability and peace, stressing the urgency of international law and diplomacy in conflict resolution.

- Facilitating Regional Defense Cooperation: Through the AOIP, ASEAN member states have been able to collaborate more closely in dealing with common threats like

piracy, natural disasters, and terrorism. That is to say, the AOIP is important for ASEAN countries to facilitate their regional defense cooperation.

- Platform for Greater Dialogue and Engagement with Major Powers: With the AOIP, ASEAN is furnished with a platform for deeper dialogue and engagement with other major Indo-Pacific powers. Mechanisms like the ARF and the EAS provide the AOIP with the platform to allow ASEAN to play a more substantial role in regional security diplomacy, which is vital in managing ties with countries who have vested interests in the Indo-Pacific, like China, the US, Japan, and India.

Indonesia seems to share this view as well. One example would come from the statement of Chery Sidharta, then Director of ASEAN External Cooperation at Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Amidst the preparations for the 43rd ASEAN Summit on 5-7 September 2023, he stated that the AOIP itself promoted ASEAN's role in maintaining regional stability while contributing to the progress and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. He pointed out that, through the principles of AOIP, namely strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness, inclusiveness, transparency, non-intervention, and respect for international law, ASEAN has embraced major countries to work together in the Indo-Pacific region (2023, as cited in "Melaui AOIP Indonesia Kukuhkan Peran ASEAN untuk Stabilitas, Perdamaian, dan Kemamuran Kawasan", 2023). He echoes Marsudi's own utterance in that ASEAN has a vital role as a *convening power* or a power that is able to invite all parties to sit and talk together, regardless of their differences (2024, as cited in Nugraha, 2024).

That being the case, Duarte et al. (2023, p. 1.001) also wrote that, while the AOIP is a pertinent step forward in regional defense cooperation, it is not without its challenges for ASEAN countries. These challenges include disparity among ASEAN member states' abilities and security priorities, and the difficulty of retaining an inclusive and efficient defense cooperation in the middle of major powers' competition and differing interests in the Indo-Pacific. So, what will happen to the AOIP beyond Indonesia's ASEAN chairmanship in 2023?

Prior to Laos assuming the ASEAN chair in 2024, the Laotian foreign minister gave the assurance that Laos would continue to implement the initiatives of ASEAN, the AOIP included (Lin, 2024, p. 5). The 2025 ASEAN chair, Malaysia, also stated in 2024 that Malaysia would continue promoting the AOIP through concrete projects (Subramaniam, 2024). Both news indicate that Indonesia's efforts were not in vain. This extends to

Jakarta's push for mainstreaming the AOIP, because it has created some level of institutionalisation by inducing systematic processes like the creation of the *List of Criteria on Mainstreaming the AOIP.* These processes are deployed to pinpoint, examine, track, and oversee AOIP's projects, activities, and programmes endeavored by the ASEAN Secretariat. Regardless of the weight of aspiration and motivation that each ASEAN Chair may possess towards the AOIP, this form of tracking is anticipated to endure across Chairmanships. These developments indicate the increase of ASEAN's internal recognition of the AOIP's importance (Lin, 2024, p. 6). Interestingly, in October 2024, during an ASEAN Summit, Marsudi emphasized the importance of walking the talk when implementing the concept of AOIP and underlined the transformation of the outlook from a mere political concept to currently possessing several crucial derivatives benefiting the community. These derivatives include the AIPF and the launch of the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Business Network that would improve regional business networks (2024, as cited in Nugraha, 2024).

So, another important question must next be asked: is there a way for the AOIP to advance further for ASEAN member states?

According to Lin (2024, pp. 6-7), there are five potential strategies for ASEAN to advance the AOIP:

- Creating a multi-year work plan encompassing vital activities to retain a consistent route and making sure a stronger implementation is carried out. ASEAN should examine its own necessities to prioritize certain areas of cooperation to line up with frameworks that can provide a more coherent direction for the group's maritime efforts, ala the ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO), and not just wait for external partners to propose recommendations for joint activities.

- The group should enhance ASEAN Centrality by taking charge in creating proposals for programs and projects under the AOIP banner. These programs and projects should contribute to the association's community building and realize the priorities of sectoral bodies. Most proper partners to carry out certain projects, based on their strength, should be identified by ASEAN. Across the activities of every ASEAN-led mechanism, synergies should be ascertained to avoid any overlaps in order to achieve a more streamlined implementation.

- Identifying the AOIP initiatives should involve worthwhile attempts and not just simple repackaging of existing cooperation under a variety of action plans. ASEAN should prioritize quality over quantity, because a quantity-minded approach may induce unnecessary competition among dialogue partners, and focus on innovative initiatives that can grow the strategic values of the AOIP's across ASEAN-led mechanisms like the EAS and ADMM-Plus, to ensure the strategic essence of the AOIP is not undermined. Rather than the association's obsession with statistics or numbers, ASEAN should steer its focus towards activities with both high output and meaningful outcomes to raise ASEAN member states' abilities in a strategic competition.

- ASEAN should transform its isolated concrete projects, that it has identified, into a cohesive strategic objectives for the association. This transformation can be done by nurturing knowledge-sharing and collaboration among member states to produce innovative projects and *connecting the connectivities*. A concerted effort should also be conducted to safeguard that as many ASEAN member states as possible receive the benefits of AOIP activities or projects to signify their status as true ASEAN initiatives.

- ASEAN should establish a dedicated fund for the implementation of AOIP activities. In this way, the association can depend more on internal funding for its centrality and neutrality, and to exert greater influence over ASEAN's own priorities. Of course, cooperating with external partners is a must, but having an independent funding mechanism would permit ASEAN to decide on the nature and execution of its own projects. This will also alleviate the burden shouldered by the current and future Chairs of ASEAN when coordinating larger-scale events like the AIPF and furnish them with more incentives to host more of such programs.

Lastly, the fact that a hedging strategy foreign policy tool like the AOIP that was proposed and lobbied by Indonesia as ASEAN's Indo-Pacific construct in Widodo's first term bore fruits in his second term with several Indonesia's hedging targets welcoming should certainly be acknowledged as an accomplishment for Indonesia's foreign policymaking. Of course, this research is aware that other scholars might disagree with the relevance of the AOIP as presented here. After all, it is understandable to think that ASEAN would likely not sign an agreement with other powers like China or Russia without receiving some geopolitical concessions, like having them accept ASEAN's very

own AOIP for example. Even experts in Indonesia do not exactly see eye to eye concerning the AOIP. For example, Lina Alexandra, the Head of CSIS International Department, criticized the outlook's heavy economic leaning because she considered the real challenge in the region to truly lie beyond the economic sector instead (Fajri, 2023). Meanwhile, Ermaya (2024), a member of the Geopolitics and Geostrategy Expert Council of the Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education, wrote that initiatives like the AOIP has to continue to be bolstered to ascertain that the Indo-Pacific region remains peaceful and inclusive in spite of the great power rivalries in it. **In any event, this dissertation considers it important that ASEAN adopted the AOIP, with the term 'Indo-Pacific' in and on it, because China did not like the term due to its being Western-made. In a way, what ASEAN did was hedging.**

This concludes the discourse analysis portion of this research. The next part of this dissertation discusses its RTA.

Chapter 7: Empirical Analysis - Reflexive Thematic Analysis

7.1. Brief Overview

First of all, as has been mentioned in Chapter 5, the RTA in this chapter was performed by using MAXQDA. The software was used from start to finish, from creating codes, investigating the interactions among them, and generating themes in the entire dataset.

In the next sub-chapter, each thematic discussion and analysis starts with addressing the codes in each generated theme, before answering all five questions already mentioned in Chapter 5 and is then completed with an analysis, supported by extracts from the dataset, explanations about the content of the extracts, and why they are relevant to the analysis. Naturally, references from other documents collected by and interview transcripts produced for this study are also utilized accordingly.

7.2. Thematic Discussions

7.2.1. The Bases Backing GMF's Making

Firstly, these are the codes contained in this theme:



Figure 15. The World Cloud for the codes for The Bases Backing the GMF's Making. (screenshot by the author).

The Code Cloud produced by MAXQDA showed that *The Heightening of Indo-Pacific Tensions* is indeed the code most often used in all three thematic discussions, including here, while *3Gs Behind the GMF's Creation* is only slightly more frequently used than *Creators' Framing of the GMF*. Meanwhile, Widodo's Idea of the GMF had the smallest coded segments for this set.

Secondly, prior to generating the theme from this Codeset, the proximity similarity is run by MAXQDA and then shown as follows:



Figure 16. MAXQDA's proximity similarity for the codes for The Bases Backing the GMF's Making (screenshot by the author).

As can be seen from the size of the circles and density of the lines above, *The Heightening of Indo-Pacific Tensions* is the lynchpin code whose proximity with all the other three codes are strong, while the other three codes maintain a more modest proximity with each other. However, no code is left isolated, and then a test for occurrence similarity was conducted. The result shown by MAQXDA is as follows:



Figure 17. MAXQDA's occurrence similarity for the codes for The Bases Backing the GMF's Making (screenshot by the author).

With the above picture ensuring that all four codes indeed occur in the same documents consistently, the segments coded with them were then re-read alongside the research question to pinpoint which research questions they can truly answer. After several re-reading, this study located two research questions that this thematic grouping can help answer. They are:

RQ_2: What purpose led Sukma & Widjajanto toward the creation of the GMF in the first place?

RQ_2.3: How did the presence of BRI and the Pivot affect the GMF's creative process?

From this Codeset, this study generated a theme called **The Bases Backing GMF's Making**.

The purpose of this study is to bring to light why and how the decision to create the GMF came to the fore in the first place. In that regard, a theme is required to facilitate this discussion, and this theme is it.

This theme explores the circumstances and reasons given by the GMF creators to make the fulcrum in the first place. The circumstances can be noticed from the segments where the GMF creators recalled the situation before creating the GMF, such as, "Uh,

the first step is during the political campaign, prior to the presidential debate between Jokowi-JK and Prabowo-Hatta. We were Mr. Jokowi's academic team, Team 11, at that time summoned to Mrs. Megawati's residence in Gadog, Puncak" (Widjajanto, 2024).

The reasons, meanwhile, are probed by this theme when discussing the considerations, both internal and external, that the GMF creators took into account when creating the fulcrum, e.g. "So, the main background was that attempt to formulate an Indonesian platform and foreign policy grand strategy under President Jokowi. That's why the team was formulating this in the 2014 presidential election. Well, naturally, at that time our major consideration was the intensifying US-China rivalry that we felt. Under that context, we identified that the strategic rivalry between the US and China would mainly take place within two major oceans. Thus, an effort to reserve privacy would more dominantly reveal itself in building power and becoming paramount in the two major maritime regions, which were the Pacific and Indian oceans in the Indo-Pacific region and Asia-Pacific region where this rivalry would manifest." (Sukma, 2024).

This study then proceeded with the review of this theme by answering all five questions previously mentioned by Braun & Clarke (2022). The answers this study came up with for them can be seen below:

a. What is the central organizing concept for this theme?

   This theme is created to explain why the GMF was created in the first place, based on the explanations given by the creators of it.

b. What are the boundaries of this theme?

   Anything that does not pertain as to why the plan for Indonesia to become the GMF in the first place is not included in this theme.

c. Is there enough meaningful data to evidence this theme?

   Yes. Among the many things revealed in the interview, the reason behind the creation of the GMF is one of them.

d. Is the data contained within this theme too diverse and wide-ranging?

   No, because anything that does not discuss the initial framing of the GMF is not included in this theme and its discussion.

e. What importance does this theme convey?

Two research questions in this study, RQ_2 and RQ_2.3, seek to understand the purpose behind the creation of the GMF and whether or not the Pivot and BRI affected its creation. This theme provides the answers to both questions.

The next segment discusses the analysis of this theme.

Discussion

When asked whether there were internal or external factors such as the actions of powers in the Indo-Pacific like China, the US, India, Russia, and Japan that influenced the creation of the GMF, Widjajanto answered (2024):

> "Uh, the first step (of the GMF creation) is during the political campaign, prior to the presidential debate between Jokowi-JK and Prabowo-Hatta.[1] We were Mr. Jokowi's academic team, Team 11, at that time summoned to Mrs. Megawati's (as Megawati Soekarnoputri is popularly known in Indonesia) residence in Gadog, Puncak.[2] Uh, Mr. Jokowi was there too, we stayed for one night. The next morning, there were introductions between Mr. Jokowi, Mrs. Megawati, and us. There, Mrs. Megawati told a lengthy tale of Indonesian foreign affairs in Bung Karno's era, then (she) told us that Bung Karno paid great attention to geopolitics about major powers' competitions, when (we were) listening to Mrs. Mega's explanation.[3] Then, Mr. Jokowi asked us to prepare the debate material, particularly concerning foreign policy with a doctrinal nature. There, several desires from Mr. Widodo that we had to accommodate, firstly it had to be doctrinal, secondly it had to project Indonesia's power onwards, and thirdly it had to align with the geographic character of Indonesia as an archipelagic maritime state. That's Mr. Jokowi's message."

Two things can be drawn from Widjajanto's explanation above. Firstly, **the creation of the GMF was prompted not only by Widodo, but also by Soekarnoputri**. Secondly, the reason behind the GMF creation was to **initially find a foreign policy platform** that Widodo could have utilized for his presidential debate. Here, it can be seen that **the GMF was indeed originally prepared for foreign affairs purposes**.

Sukma's account is as follows (Sukma, 2024):

[1] Jokowi is how Widodo is popularly known in Indonesia, JK is how Jusuf Kalla, Widodo's former vice president, is popularly known in Indonesia, and Hatta refers to Hatta Rajasa, Prabowo Subianto's former vice presidential partner.

[2] Megawati is how Megawati Soekarnoputri is popularly known in Indonesia.

[3] Bung Karno is how Soekarno as he is popularly known in Indonesia.

> “So, it was prior to the debate, the team had a discussion with Mr. Jokowi, yes, about which points would be presented and considered as important by Mr. Jokowi to become the basis of his foreign policy if he won. That's what was presented in the debate, at that time, Mr. Jokowi, at that time, he was a very practical man, yeah. That's why, for example, why service became top priority in the foreign policy of Mr. Jokowi. Indonesian foreign policy being a foreign policy that brings direct benefits is his trademark, so service, economy, but at the same time, he also agreed about the bigger geopolitical challenges that Indonesia was facing. Well, it was at that point the team said, 'Sir, we must see ourselves as the Global Maritime Fulcrum.' Luckily, he welcomed it immediately, because even from the start, Mr. Jokowi had the idea to make Indonesia the Sea Toll. The Sea Toll is focused more on maritime infrastructure and, what's it called? Maritime connectivity, something like that. Well, in that context, when we were discussing the strategic perspective of Mr. Jokowi's idea about the Sea Toll, we directly focused on Mr. Jokowi's perspective about Indonesia's position in a greater geopolitical viewpoint. True, at that time we hadn't yet elaborated the five pillars, not yet, that was later. But, the basic idea was, there are two vast oceans and we're right in the middle, and we see ourselves in that map as that fulcrum. That's, the basic idea of the Global Maritime Fulcrum, it was not yet in operation and introduced, then the operational process started after Mr. Jokowi was elected.”

Notice how Sukma admitted Widodo's profit-seeking foreign policy as his **trademark**, which is in line with what Chapter 6 has revealed. Also, per Sukma's explanation, it was not until the concept of the GMF was presented to Widodo by his team, despite there not being the GMF pillars yet at that time, that Widodo approved the initiative nearly immediately because he could also use it to amplify his Sea Toll program and, therefore, **his infrastructure and connectivity goals**. It can then be said that **the GMF's domestic outlook is influenced directly by Widodo**. This certainly is in harmony with what the previous chapter has discussed about Widodo and his domestic priorities. This also reveals that **Widodo has had the Sea Toll program in mind before the GMF pillars were even formed**.

Moving on, in his interview, when asked whether the US-China rivalry was already a consideration to create the GMF back in 2014, Sukma replied and explained the background of the GMF creation as follows (Sukma, 2024):

> “Actually, there were plenty of factors, but the rivalry was indeed on the background of it. Anyway, contextually, we began formulating the GMF when searching for a foreign policy platform for Mr. Jokowi, at that time a presidential candidate, and back then, then the world had to deal with the US-China rivalry and the decline of the unipolar system, on top of the growing relevance of the

maritime domain. What kind of grand strategy would be fitting to be applied to by the new administration that would allow Indonesia to rise up to the numerous challenges that were happening? So, the main background was that attempt to formulate an Indonesian platform and foreign policy grand strategy under President Jokowi. That's why the team was formulating this in the 2014 presidential election. Well, naturally, at that time our major consideration was the intensifying US-China rivalry that we felt. Under that context, we identified that the strategic rivalry between the US and China would mainly take place within two major oceans. Thus, an effort to reserve privacy would more dominantly reveal itself in building power and becoming paramount in the two major maritime regions, which were the Pacific and Indian oceans in the Indo-Pacific region and Asia-Pacific region where this rivalry would manifest. However, at the same time, we recognized within these two oceans the striking and ascendant opportunities for cooperation provided that either ASEAN or major countries in the region would bolster its process, especially after China became a dominant state in the Asia-Pacific. That was a simple background, although there were many domestic considerations as well, such as how Indonesia would face up to the challenges I mentioned, how we would perceive ourselves, like that. In regards to that context, when Mr. Jokowi's campaign team observed a map, we are exactly in the middle of the two oceans where the rivalry and cooperation between the US and China and regional major powers (would take place). For this reason, the correct way for Indonesia to position itself within its geopolitical and geoeconomic constellations is by perceiving itself as the Maritime Fulcrum. It is translated as the Maritime Fulcrum for there is no direct translation of it in the Indonesian language. It's a fulcrum, not an axis but a fulcrum. If it's a fulcrum, it means as if we create a triangle and place a board, that stays upheld, on top of it. That board then is called fulcrum, at the tip of the triangle, you know. So, in my viewpoint, a fulcrum is a point where the responsibility to ensure the balance rests, that is what I meant by Fulcrum. If I have to illustrate, it's like, what is it called? A triangle, this fulcrum."

"In the geopolitical language, we regard a fulcrum as a point on which the responsibility to ensure balance rests. I have written about the meaning of the fulcrum and not the axis before, like that. They're different. Ergo, the responsibility in regards to stability, rules, and norms in the two oceans is in the hands of Indonesia. That is our main concern. We have to be a player and ascertain that the focus of the major powers lie more on cooperation than rivalry, because we are in the middle of what I call a rivalry for influence. So, a concern (about the US-China rivalry) exists, but the US-China rivalry is not a sole consideration. What role Indonesia can assume is a bigger consideration. It is more like, how Indonesia should position itself with the changing geo-politic, economic constellations in the Indo-Pacific. So, it's more about role conception, if we see it, what, from Holsti's concept, yes, it's more about role conception. So, we often say, what, the 20th century was the century where geopolitics and rivalries happened in the Eurasian, Europe and Asian, landscape. The landscape was dominant, where competition took place. However, here in the 21st century,

> seascapes are more dominant. This is the competition to rule over two oceans. Thus, the rivalry and maintaining cooperation matter. For this reason, Indonesia has to become the Maritime Fulcrum, the Global Maritime Fulcrum. The larger map of geopolitics and geoeconomics are the basis of this thinking. The background, so to speak."

As can be seen from the above extracts, two considerations can be regarded as the reasons behind the creation of the GMF as a foreign policy grand strategy: domestic and foreign.

Per Sukma's own admission, the domestic considerations are the bigger reasons behind the GMF creation (Sukma, 2024). This perhaps becomes a bit more obvious once the fact that most of the GMF pillars are about domestic policy and economy (Bland, 2020, p. 122).

This study also inquired, during the Sukma interview, about his choice of word *responsibility* when pointing out that Indonesia's role conception must involve ensuring balance. Sukma's answer is presented below (Sukma, 2024):

> "Well, yes, we have to assume responsibility to ensure security, for example in the Malacca Strait. We have the responsibility according to UNCLOS, to ensure maritime safety and so on. That's why, for example, why did we reject several initiatives that would allow major powers to guarantee security in the Malacca Strait, no? Because we are a coastal state, so the responsibility lies in a coastal state. So we don't want China, don't want the US to act on their ideas like the PSI in the Malacca Strait. That's the responsibility of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, when it comes to the Malacca Strait. However, if we want to have a significant role, well, we have to assume that responsibility."

The PSI that Sukma mentioned refers to the Proliferation Security Initiative offered by the United States in May 2003 after the Spanish military intercepted a ship called the So San in the Andaman Sea. This ship carried with it 12 SCUD missiles that were smuggled under hundreds of tons of cement. This incident led the US to proffer an international security cooperation to prevent deliveries of Weapon of Mass Destruction. However, in June 2004, Indonesia, through a Post article written by Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, then head of the Indonesian Navy, rejected the US offer by stating that any foreign interference in the waters of Malacca Strait is unneeded for it could disturb Indonesian sovereignty. Sondakh also said that American participation in ensuring the security in the Malacca Strait should extend only as far as training, equipment assistance, and information exchange. It needs to be noted, though, that the PSI was welcomed by

Singapore (Kawengian, 2019, pp. 96-98), so even though Sukma mentioned in the above extract that Singapore is one of the three countries responsible for ensuring Malacca Strait security, Singapore does not share Indonesia's role conception as a regional leader at all.

When asked what happened if Indonesia were to deny its responsibility here, Sukma replied (Sukma, 2024):

> "Well, other people like the US, China, Japan, major powers, like Australia, (we) can't be angry then if the big powers, major powers, try to intrude into our region and then, what? Try to ensure their version of stability because we don't want to do it. We should do it. Because, this is our region, and we have plenty of instruments for that."

As the previous chapter has discussed, the instrument that Widodo's first administration ended up creating and using to apply its own Indo-Pacific construct is the AOIP.

Why is the AOIP mentioned here again? Interestingly enough, even though Indonesia's role in the region is commonly regarded as regional leader, a research by Karim (2018, p. 2) revealed that Indonesia searched for its middle-power status not only by performing its role as a regional leader, but also as an advocate of democracy, the voice for developing countries, and a bridge-builder. A research by Agastia (2020, p. 302) argued that, in the process of locating its role in the Indo-Pacific structure, Indonesia has pursued for a more prominent role conception not only as a regional leader, but also as a bridge-builder. This can be seen from the AOIP, whose adoption Indonesia led and fervently pushed, seeking to accommodate all actors instead of isolating specific ones. The use of ASEAN to push forward the Indonesia-led AOIP also displayed Jakarta's willingness to fulfill the structural expectations that one would hope from a middle power. Furthermore, the AOIP getting accepted by great and middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region, as the previous chapter has outlined, means that **Indonesia's capacity to enact its role as a regional leader and a bridge-builder has also been accepted in the region itself**. Another research has even posited that, despite the AOIP's imperfection, if ASEAN were to implement the AOIP by leveraging ASEAN-led mechanisms, especially the EAS, then it is possible for ASEAN to position itself as a vital bridge-builder (Lin, 2024, p. 7). It can then be said that, under a certain circumstance, Indonesia's influence to the AOIP could not only extend itself to imbuing economic interests to the AOIP's mindset, but also shaping ASEAN's role conception. Since the creation of the AOIP is fueled by the GMF, among other things (de Lecea & Zozaya, 2022, p. 46), and since ASEAN Centrality

is crucial for Indonesia's foreign policy, **Indonesia's role conception as a regional leader as Sukma's main domestic consideration behind the creation of the GMF acquires stronger credence** from these analyses.

That aside, although considered smaller in influences when compared to the domestic ones by Sukma, the foreign considerations behind the GMF creation can be said to encompass three components mentioned by Sukma: the US-China rivalry, the declining unipolar world system, and the increasing importance of the maritime domain.

This study has previously discussed the US-China rivalry and will ergo not repeat it here. Nonetheless, this study would still like to note that Sukma's reasoning of the US-China rivalry being a major foreign affairs consideration toward creating the GMF is in harmony with what this study has posited in Chapter 6, **that it was the tension caused by US-China rivalry, and not the existence of the Pivot or BRI exclusively, which led Indonesia to hedge against them**.

Likewise, the above discussion confirms that the foreign affairs considerations behind the GMF creation mentioned by Sukma can practically be seen as external factors. In this regard, Sukma's role perception of Indonesia as a regional leader, that directly influences the creation of the GMF, is arguably meant to prepare Indonesia to contend with all these new challenges. It is interesting to note that **all three foreign considerations of the GMF creation are not only related to the US-China rivalry, but with other elements even beyond that**. For this reason, this study decides to re-read Sukma's interview transcript again and is reminded of these two segments below (Sukma, 2024):

> "India is among the major powers in the region. So, we thought that the competitions between major powers could be troublesome. Thus, Indonesia must take the initiative and try to play a new role in trying to respond to major power strategy rivalry and so on. India, Japan, Australia, the US, Russia, China, everyone."
>
> "Russia is a major power. It doesn't matter simply just because it's Russia, or it's China, or it's India. But it's the pattern of the major power and strategic rivalry between the major power (that matters). So, it's the geostrategic and geo-economic situation in the region that (we) must be focused on. We don't weigh in each case or just one country (exclusively), because this region is truly crowded with strategic players, haha."

Notice how in the second extract above, Sukma used the word *geostrategic* that has also been discussed by this study in sub-chapter 2.2. to be behind the creation of the GMF. This also calls back to Sukma's explanation that one of the GMF's three meanings is to be received as a doctrine that is based on the geostrategic, geographic, and geoeconomic realities of Indonesia (2014). Interestingly enough, the six countries Sukma named in the above extract have been confirmed by this study in the previous chapter to have responded positively to the AOIP that Indonesia promoted. Sukma's statement about a slew of major powers in Indo-Pacific and that ASEAN Centrality is key in Indonesia's foreign policy and Indonesia is using AOIP so that it can use ASEAN to hedge institutionally convince this study to ascertain **whether Indonesia's concern when creating the GMF is truly limited just to the US Pivot and China's BRI alone**.

When asked of his opinion about the view that the GMF is Indonesia's answer to the Pivot and BRI, Widjajanto said (2024):

> "Well, when this (the GMF) was debated in the small team, about a doctrine with geopolitical nuances to project Indonesia's power onwards, we did study megaprojects that would affect the maritime aspect and those two issues (the Pivot and BRI) are the most relevant. Beijing's BRI with Indo-Pacific (Pivot) surely put Indonesia as a strategic area due to, among other things, the global navigation lanes that pass us by and that becomes our concern, be it the BRI or the Pivot."

Meanwhile, when asked the same question, Sukma's reply is as follows (Sukma, 2024):

> "Hm, I think opinions like that are normal. After all, they weren't involved in the thought process, thinking, that occurred back then. That US Pivot, China's BRI, they were all backgrounds in the sense that we should not allow other countries to be the ones who designed our territory. We as a nation that, what's the word? Resident power and located in a point between two oceans where major powers are competing, this requires a vision, (We) also need a strategic view about the region and about ourselves in that region, and the GMF is the attempt at formulating it. Like I said earlier, (we) were concerned with the intensification of the US-China rivalry, and of course the Pivot and the BRI were part of that, and also the growing, more crowded Indo-Pacific with the presence of major powers."

From the above two extracts, this study has now revealed that the Pivot and BRI were indeed among the initiatives studied by the creators of the GMF prior to molding it. However, **the GMF creators' considerations went beyond the US and China exclusively.**

The existence of other major powers and their mega projects in the Indo-Pacific were also kept in the GMF creators' minds.

This study must now discuss what other mega projects, aside from the Pivot and BRI, were studied by the GMF creators in preparation of creating the fulcrum? Apparently, according to Widjajanto, there were two more initiatives studied. The first was from Russia, the second one was from the EU. Unfortunately, he was unable to recall what the names of the projects were. Nonetheless, the extracts containing his statements about them will still be included here.

The one from Russia is mentioned as follows (Widjajanto, 2024):

> "Yes, a Russian project."
>
> "Yes, at that time, we were already interacting with the Valdai Club, yes. It was beginning to take form when we started talking with the Russian ambassador, before, Mrs. Lyudmila.[4] We were talking there, and we asked whether or not there were mega projects that they (the Russian) would do from Vladivostok to Siberia, Moscow? Moscow to Germany by pipelines, whether or not there were such mega projects. That was before the war with Ukraine, a project that was going to enhance the line to the Black Sea, for example, that we asked. Apparently, there were so many Russian mega projects to create energy connectivity, especially with stocks transportation connectivity that connects Vladivostok (with) Central Asia, with Moscow. As well as from Moscow to the Black Sea or Moscow to Germany. That idea was nothing new, maybe ever since the end of World War II it's been around, and it never took off in Russia because of the Eastern Bloc, Western Bloc during the Cold War."

Meanwhile, when asked whether he found any projects from the EU, Australia, and India, he had this to say (Widjajanto, 2024):

> "Yes, from the EU, yes. Especially from the EU at that time, we received a map about energy to Central Asia and there was also another option for them to procure EU products not through the Mediterranean Sea, and Mediterranean Sea, but immediately attempted to arrive at India. There was a mega project we studied there. In India we found nothing then, as well in Australia we found nothing."

And when asked about Japan, he answered (Widjajanto, 2024):

[4] Widjajanto was likely talking about Mikhail Galuzin, who was Russian ambassador to Indonesia in 2014, before Lydumila Vorobieva assumed the station in 2018.

> "Not yet at that time. I only recall (the projects) from the EU, China, Russia, and the US. Only those four megaprojects were found."

His statement that no megaproject from Japan, India, and Australia was found in 2014 is credible. Firstly, as was previously mentioned, Japan's FOIP, that was meant for Tokyo's Indo-Pacific construct, was not introduced until several years after the GMF was introduced, so this lines up with Widjajanto finding no Japanese megaproject in the Indo-Pacific in 2014. Secondly, India was the first to use the term *Indo-Pacific* back in 2007, but as of April 2024 has yet to publish a formal Indo-Pacific strategy. So this naturally explains why Team 11 found no Indian megaproject in Indo-Pacific back in 2014 (Ladwig, 2024). Thirdly, Australia's view of the balance of strategic challenges and economic opportunities in the Indo-Pacific did not start to shift until its the 2016 Defence White Paper looked ahead to the following two decades and identified six key drivers to shape the Australian strategic environment: Sino-US cooperation and rivalry; challenges to the rules-based order; terrorism; state fragility; military modernisation; and new complex, non-geographic threats, including cyber-attacks ("Australia's strategic view of the Indo-Pacific", 2020, pp. 4-5). This also lines up with Team 11 finding nothing from Melbourne in 2014.

Although India, Japan, and Australia ended up not being studied for obvious reasons, and although it is virtually impossible to pinpoint which EU and Russian projects Widjajanto was talking about since he sadly could not recall their names, there is still a silver lining here. His admission that Team 11 studied megaprojects from the US, China, the EU, and Russia, and trying to find similar material from Japan, India, and Australia as one of their preparations toward one of the foreign considerations of the GMF alone is worthwhile. Because, in other words, although the US-China rivalry is not irrelevant to the GMF creators, **it is confirmed that the US Pivot and China's BRI are not the only projects studied on the background of the GMF creation**.

It is nonetheless assuring to receive confirmation that the initiatives from the US and China, two of Indonesia's three most important Others (Nguitragool, 2013, pp. 16-17), are among the projects studied to prepare for the GMF, because this further justifies the notion that the GMF is directly linked to Indonesia's identity as an archipelagic state and thus further warrants the use of constructivism for this study.

To conclude, in accordance with the above discussion of statements made by Sukma and Widjajanto during their interviews, this study sums up seven points:

1. Prompted by Widodo and Megawati ordering Team 11, the GMF was initially created for foreign affairs purposes before Widodo imbued his own infrastructure and connectivity goals, especially the Sea Toll program, into it before the GMF pillars were even a thing.

2. There are domestic and foreign considerations behind Sukma's idea of creating the GMF. However, **Sukma admitted the domestic considerations to have been the bigger influences in the making of the GMF**. In other words, the domestic considerations are primary, while the foreign considerations are secondary.

3. Based on Sukma's acknowledgment, the domestic or primary considerations behind the GMF creation as a foreign policy grand strategy in 2014 came not just from Indonesia's geostrategic, geopolitical, and geoeconomic constellations, but more importantly from Indonesia's role conceptions as a regional leader in Southeast Asia and a bridge-builder in the Indo-Pacific.

4. Three components make up the foreign or secondary considerations behind the GMF creation: the US-China rivalry, the declining unipolar world system, and the increasing importance of the maritime domain.

6. While the US-China rivalry is a relevant foreign affairs consideration in Indonesia's creation of the GMF, due to Indonesia's geostrategic, geographic, and geoeconomic realities, it was the strategic rivalries for influences among a number of major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, not only between the US and China, but also countries like India, Japan, Australia, and Russia, that truly became the core of foreign considerations behind the initial creation of the GMF as a foreign policy grand strategy in 2014.

7. The US Pivot and China's BRI were indeed revealed as two megaprojects studied by Team 11 who created the GMF. However, Team 11 was also studying megaprojects from the EU and Russia. They also inquired Australia, Japan, and India for megaprojects to be studied, although there were none from those three back in 2014. From the statements of Sukma and Widjajanto, it can be inferred that when creating the GMF in 2014, the US Pivot and China's BRI not only belonged to the foreign considerations, which were secondary compared to the domestic ones that were primary, but they also shared that spot with the Russian and European megaprojects (although the US Pivot and BRI are acknowledged to be more relevant than the other two). Therefore, this study posits that the US Pivot and China's BRI

were revealed to be two megaprojects among four that were studied for one of the three components of the foreign or secondary considerations behind the GMF creation in 2014.

8. Lastly, important elements behind the GMF creation that were mentioned by Sukma, including ASEAN Centrality, Indonesia's role conception as a regional leader, the AOIP, Indonesia's geostrategy, and the US-China rivalry, have been discussed in the previous chapters of this study. In other words, the discussion and revelations in this study concerning the aforementioned topics are in harmony with the actual reasoning behind the GMF creation by the GMF creators.

7.2.2. How the GMF Creators Differentiate Between the GMF and Indonesia's Hedging Strategy

Firstly, these are the codes contained in this theme:

Figure 18. The World Cloud for the codes for How the GMF Creators Differentiate Between the GMF and Indonesia's Hedding Strategy.
(screenshot by the author).

The Code Cloud produced by MAXQDA showed that *The Heightening of Indo-Pacific Tensions* is indeed the code most often used in all three thematic discussions, including

here, while *The GMF & Hedging Strategy Differences* is only slightly more frequently used than *Connectivity in Contemporary Geopolitics*.

Secondly, prior to generating the theme from this Codeset, the proximity similarity is run by MAXQDA and then shown as follows:



Figure 19. MAXQDA's proximity similarity for the codes for Between Indonesia's Hedging and the GMF: The Creators' Distinction.
(screenshot by the author).

The Heightening of Indo-Pacific Tensions remains to be the lynchpin code that maintains proximity with all the other codes. This grouping likewise displays that no code is left isolated without lines or circles, so a test for occurrence similarity was conducted. The result shown by MAQXDA is as follows:



Figure 20. MAXQDA's occurrence similarity for the codes for Between Indonesia's Hedging and the GMF: The Creators' Distinction.
(screenshot by the author).

The above display is rather interesting because all three codes are shown together as a large circle with no lines, but MAXQDA also displays not even one being isolated. Recalling what MAXQDA manual about circles and codes, "Each circle symbolizes a code, with the distances between two codes representing how similarly the codes have been applied in the data. As a further option, the larger the circles the more code assignments have been made with that code" ("Code Map: Position Codes According to Similarity", n.d.), it can then be assumed that there is virtually no distance between all three codes and they were applied almost similarly in the data.With the above picture ensuring that all codes indeed occur in the same documents consistently with not even one being isolated or left out by MAXQDA, the segments coded with them were then re-read alongside the research question to pinpoint which research questions they can truly answer. After several re-reading, this study found the research questions this thematic grouping can help answer. They are:

- RQ_1.2: During President Widodo's first term, how far did the presence of the Pivot and BRI affect the shaping of Indonesia's hedging strategy?

- RQ_2.2: During its formulation phase, did Sukma, Widjajanto, and their team mean for the GMF to be implemented as part of the Indonesian hedging strategy foreign policy discourse against China and the US?

The discussion in the previous chapter has revealed, by answering RQ_1.1 and RQ_1.2 respectively, that there is no convincing indication from the speeches of Widodo and Marsudi to argue that either the US Pivot or China's BRI could be seriously considered as an influence for Indonesia's hedging strategy foreign policy in Widodo's first term and that Indonesia's hedging from 2014 to 2019 was applied not only to the US and China, but other major powers as well. These revelations are likewise kept in mind when generating this theme.

From this Codeset, this study generates a theme named Indonesia's Hedging Strategy from the Eyes of the GMF Creator.

Following the discussion in the previous chapter, this study wishes to further comprehend how the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy are related to one another. A theme is thus generated for this purpose, especially because there are segments by Sukma where the difference between the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy are impressed upon, such as "It's different, yes, between hedging and the GMF" (Sukma, 2024). Sukma's statement hence inspired the naming of this theme. Also, this theme will help deepen this study's understanding of Indonesia's hedging strategy dynamics seen by the creator of the GMF itself.

Afterwards, this study proceeded with the review using the five questions previously mentioned by Braun & Clarke (2022). The answers this study came up with for them can be seen below:

a. What is the central organizing concept for this theme?

   The central organizing concept for this theme is how the GMF creators perceive the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy to be. Additionally, to answer some of its own research questions, this study still needs to explain how different the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy are from the perspectives of the GMF's creators and this theme can help this study to accomplish just that.

b. What are the boundaries of this theme?

This theme is contained within the segments of the interview where the GMF creators explain what they consider the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy to be. Anything that does not discuss their view of the definition of the GMF and how Indonesia hedge do not belong to this theme.

c. Is there enough meaningful data to evidence this theme?

Yes. In addition, to back up the statements of the GMF creators, this discussion will also involve their relevant writings and an official Indonesian foreign policy document concerning the topic.

d. Is the data contained within this theme too diverse and wide-ranging?

No, the data contained in this theme comes primarily from the GMF creators' interview transcripts. The aforementioned document and writings are only referred to when necessary.

e. What importance does this theme convey?

One of the research questions for this study, RQ_2.2, is meant to discover whether, during the making of the GMF, Sukma, Widjajanto, and their team meant for the GMF to be implemented as part of the Indonesian hedging strategy foreign policy discourse against China and the US. This theme will answer the question.

Discussion

To start with, when asked whether Indonesia's hedging strategy that was done against major powers, especially the US and China, were among the backgrounds of the GMF creation and implementation, Sukma had this to say (Sukma, 2024):

> "Those are two different things. Well, for me hedging is, what's it called, the modern manifestation of non-alignment."
>
> "For me, okay."
>
> "Hedging is the modern form, contemporary form of non-alignment."

When explaining what he meant by 'contemporary', Sukma's answer is in the below extracts (Sukma, 2024):

> "Contemporary in the sense that it is more active. Hedging against the US, internally, also with China internally. So that one, we also don't want To, uh, what? What's it called, heavily reliant only on one great or middle power. So we will avoid that, so we want to build what, uh, hedging is a plan to build our strategic economy by not siding with one party."

> "So, it (hedging) is more of the contemporary manifestation of non-alignment. So, non-alignment as a principle still exists, but its manifestation is different from non-alignment in the 60s or 70s during the Cold War era, a fight between two nations. Now it is more crowded, like I said, not only the US, but also China-Japan, China-India, then China-Korea. In Sundanese it's a *Pabaliyut* (intricate) pattern, the cooperation and competition pattern. So, it's more in that context. It's different, yes, between hedging and the GMF."

It is clear from the above extracts that the creator of the GMF himself does not consider the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy to be one and the same, for he considers Indonesia's hedging strategy as the modern form of non-alignment. Back in Chapter 2, this study has explained that Indonesia's non-aligned stance is shaped by its long-standing Free-and-Active doctrine. The creator of the doctrine, Hatta, argued that Indonesia's Free-and-Active doctrine must be based on humanity or internationalism that is found in Indonesia's philosophical and constitutional pillars: Pancasila and UUD 1945 (Murtado, 2022). Since the humanity or internationalism imbued within Indonesia's philosophical and constitutional pillars is the nucleus of Indonesia's Free-and-Active doctrine, it could then be said that Indonesia's non-aligned stance and hedging strategy are in line with what it means to be an Indonesian. Amusingly enough, the three other foreign ministry officials interviewed by this study are effectively unanimous in saying that Indonesia's hedging strategy is really the product of Indonesia's Free-and-Active foreign policy doctrine (DD, interview transcript, October 2, 2022; Oegroseno, 2022; Agusman, 2022). To put it another way, in the eyes of both the GMF creator and many high-ranking Indonesian diplomats, it was the Free-and-Active doctrine that eventually gave birth to Indonesia's hedging strategy altogether.

Now, to better understand how different Indonesia's hedging strategy and the GMF from Sukma's perspective are, it is a necessity to confirm what Sukma identifies the GMF to be. This can be seen in the below extract (Sukma, 2024):

> "I mentioned the GMF because our environment is so complex. We, we need a map to see where we are and where we're going, and what kind of role we are going to assume. That's what I wrote in Kompas. You see, there were questions about what the maritime fulcrum really is. You see, it was something new or not

> a principle, no. But it was called, but it was more strategy, on the level of a strategy, see. Not a principle. At play was the way we looked (at) ourselves. So, here, basically the GMF is (a) reflection of our understanding about the geopolitical and geoeconomic map of (the) Indo-Pacific and our place within that map and what role we should play. So, it's like a guiding map, like I said. So, if we want to become the GMF, we have to build those 5 pillars, must have maritime awareness. What I used to imagine was there was one integrated strategy when we talked about the ways to make Indonesia become the GMF. So, to build maritime awareness, then the Education Minister must build maritime museums so schoolchildren, from an early age, can be brought to visit those maritime museums to be shown that they are our oceanic riches. That, what's it called, our identity as a maritime country can be part of the education process and attempt to build that maritime identity of ours. So that was what was called maritime culture. You see, for infrastructure, we needed to build more ports. There had to be maritime, better maritime base(s). See, (we) needed a program for this, and Arif Havas Oegroseno then tried to formulate, what, this in a policy."

In Sukma's own words in the above extract, the GMF is defined as the reflection of how Indonesia comprehends its own geopolitical and geoeconomic map of the Indo-Pacific, the archipelago's place in that map, and what role Indonesia should play in it.

Because Sukma's definition of the GMF is apt, this study must mention that it also inquired to Sukma regarding whether the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy can be said to complement one another. He had this to say (Sukma, 2024):

> "Yes, those maps basically prevented Indonesia from siding with one great power, you see. That's why we also have our own view about, uh, what, geopolitics. So, it's more like that. So, it's not correct to say that the GMF is an Indonesian hedging strategy. I don't think so. In it (the GMF), there are just, for example, we want to implement the construction of maritime infrastructure. Well, let's not do it just with China, but also with Europe, with Japan. Well, that part of hedging is that one, when we want to implement one of the GMF pillars by cooperating with all parties, not dependent on one great power or that major power. That's where the hedging component is visible. So, (it) does not directly mean that the GMF is a hedging strategy. Maybe the application of the GMF can strengthen Indonesia in its attempts to apply a hedging strategy."

As can be drawn from his above statements and definitions regarding the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy, although it is not valid to state that the GMF was meant to be implemented as part of the Indonesian hedging strategy foreign policy, Sukma admitted that the GMF can possibly enhance Indonesia's hedging strategy. Sukma's opinion becomes more significant when the fact that only one GMF pillar is dedicated to diplomacy, while the rest is meant to advance Indonesia's domestic needs and

economy (Bland, 2020, p. 122). Besides, as the previous chapter has shown, Indonesia's hedging strategy in Widodo's first term was truly driven by the president's economic diplomacy, not the GMF pillar that is maritime diplomacy.

However, since Sukma did not deny the possibility of the GMF improving Indonesia's hedging strategy, this study recalled, during the interview, that the GMF and BRI are synchronized and asked Sukma how he viewed this synchronization in light of the US-China rivalry for influences. His answer is displayed below (Sukma, 2024):

> "Yes, of course they (the GMF and BRI) are aligned, yeah. After all, the key here is our interests. Because, when we were formulating this (the GMF), the ones Indonesia wanted to fulfill via that GMF, there were several things that aligned with what China wanted, which was called the BRI. For example, the construction of maritime infrastructure, that one aligned, complemented with us, so we could cooperate with China. Yes, we did cooperate with China to fulfill, to build ports and amplify investments in the Indonesian maritime sector. There was an impression that (we) kept aligning with China, but in the implementation process to find new partners, Indonesia always declared that we were open to others, for example that Patimban (port) with Japan. That part aligned Japan with our interests. Well, that one was able to be put under the GMF implementation framework and they indeed aligned, so nothing conflicting in that context. However, maybe in maritime diplomacy, maybe there were problems when we wanted to find a solution for the South China Sea problems. There, our interests and the Chinese interests in the contexts of the GMF and BRI did not align because there are still huge disparities in opinions about the Nine Dash Lines. You see, and China saw us as part of their traditional fishing ground, this part had no total alignment between the BRI and GMF. In some aspects they align, in some others they don't."

It is clear from the above extract that Sukma's viewpoint is similar to Oegroseno's viewpoint (2022), in that the GMF and BRI are only relatively aligned. The MOUs signed by Indonesia and China, that have been mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2, do back up their shared perspective since the synchronization between the GMF and BRI are only extended to several aspects and are never agreed to be absolute.

Following Sukma's reply, this study inquired whether the US-Indonesia cooperation in Bakamla's training meant that there were also alignments between the two countries that was done under the GMF banner. Sukma's response is as follows (Sukma, 2024):

> "Well, of course there were similarities between interests that allowed for that cooperation to happen. But, whether or not that was done under the GMF banner, I'd rather not say yes or no. Either way, it was clear that it was part of

> Indonesia's strategy to create engagement with all great powers and not just one great power, and that is a manifestation of hedging strategy. That one for example, had a military exercise with the US, but at the same time we were also holding dialogues with China. Indeed, at present for economic, engagement, economic cooperation, we're increasing intensity with China, and for security and military cooperation we have it more with the US. You see, based on my experience, this is not sustainable. If we will position ourselves in the maritime fulcrum, we have to understand that economy and security are interlinked. So, it won't be sustainable, oh, if defense is just with the US and economy with China. We have to engage to convince the US in the economic sector, you see, and we have to build a strategic dialogue with China. So, for example, we have to talk to China about concerns surrounding the region of Southeast Asia, for example about the South China Sea conflicts. About the ties or to reduce tension between China and the Philippines that is worsening because of incidents in Ayungin or the (Second) Thomas Soal that's happening now. And it (the dialogue) is not deep and intense enough, between Indonesia and China to discuss the strategic security problems around the region. With the US there is plenty because it (the US-Indonesia strategic cooperation) took place earlier. So, we have to do both, (we) can't just have security, defense with the US, (with) China in economy. This won't be sustainable onwards."

Although Sukma was not inclined to say whether the Bakamla Training Centre construction was a cooperation under the GMF banner or not, he still admitted that the cooperation is part of Indonesia's engagement against more than one great power. This study then regards his admittance to be in harmony with the argument that this study has posited previously, in that Indonesia employs limited bandwagoning with the US and this cooperation is an example of it.

Another topic this study would like to bring up from the above extract is Sukma's opinion that Indonesia's current hedging strategy is not sustainable in the long term. As he said in the above extract, he considers the need for Indonesia to increase economic engagement with the US and security engagement with China to sustain Indonesia's hedging.

This study would like to posit that there are ways to address Sukma's concern regarding the viability of Indonesia's hedging strategy.

As far as increasing the economic engagement between the US and Indonesia goes, there is a chance that Washington could certainly seize. After all, in AmCham Indonesia 11th US-Indo Investment Summit 2023, Indonesia's Ministry of Investment/Investment Coordinating Board launched 69 investment projects that were included in the

Investment Opportunity Map worth US$13 trillion and invited the US to invest in them. The majority of these projects are concerned with development, industrial infrastructure, and clean energy (Prasetyo, 2023). The US economic decoupling from China in recent years impacted Southeast Asia too since the region can be a vital player in the tech domain, although countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam might lean toward China in this sector because of China's cost-effective and large-scale tech solutions ("US & China Decoupling pt3: The Tech Race", 2024). If the US does not wish for China to leave it further behind, taking the investment projects that Indonesia offered seriously into consideration should be Washington's first step to bolster its economic engagement with the archipelago.

Meanwhile, increasing China's defense ties with Indonesia might be a bit trickier. China's gargantuan economic engagement in Southeast Asian countries did not truly translate into greater Chinese soft power (Haenle & Seah, 2023). In April 2022, China announced its Global Security Initiative (GSI) in the form of broad general principles containing the reiteration of Chinese foreign policy and security statements to promote security for the world in a post-Western-led order where China would assume the main role. Among ASEAN member states, it was only received positively in Vietnam, while the others are ambivalent toward it (Ha, 2023). As of May 2023, the initiative itself was not followed by an actual proposed agreement or formal institution and existed merely in a concept paper. Indonesia was naturally among the countries China invited to join. Be that as it may, while Jakarta has made it clear to Beijing that the archipelago appreciated China's offer, it had no intention to join the initiative. No doubt that China's emphasis in respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity is countered heavily by its own unilateral claims in the South China Sea, which also pit it against Indonesia, played a part in Indonesia's reluctance (Basundoro, 2023). In other words, this study argues that increasing Indonesia's security engagement with China depends more on China's self-awareness in how Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, perceives its decisions in Southeast Asia than it does in Indonesia's willingness.That aside, as a note of interest, Sukma has discussed Indonesia's long term strategic interests for the next few decades. His view is outlined below (Sukma, 2019):

> "First, Indonesia's greatest strategic challenge for the next five to 10 years would be the imperative of positioning itself within the growing rivalry between the United States and China. We often say we will not take sides in that rivalry. We also hope we don't have to choose between the two superpowers. Yet, intention and hope are not policy. We need to actively create conditions that would ensure

> our strategic autonomy. It is imperative for Indonesia to create ballast that will prevent us from being pulled into the rivalry. That ballast should take the form of a regional order that combines norms, institutions and a balance of power."
>
> "Second, that imperative requires a full and coherent implementation of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) as a strategic framework for foreign policy. As President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo declared, "we will put forward Indonesia's identity as a maritime nation and an archipelagic state." We should continue to (1) defend our maritime sovereignty and sovereign rights, (2) protect our marine resources, (3) ensure security and safety of our seas, (4) work with our neighbors to resolve both maritime and land boundaries, (5) play an active role in finding solutions to the South China Sea dispute and (6) support international efforts to ensure good order at sea."
>
> "We should do this through the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), maritime diplomacy, naval enhancement and regional maritime cooperation."
>
> "Third, the GMF needs to be implemented within a maritime outlook that recognizes two strategic oceans around us — the Pacific and Indian Ocean — as a single geopolitical and geoeconomic unit. Indonesia should integrate the two oceans as the focus of foreign policy."
>
> "Whether it is called the Indo-Pacific or the Pacific and Indian Ocean (PACINDO) region, this maritime common area will become a theater where the pursuit of power and welfare will take place for the rest of the 21st century. The construction of an inclusive ASEAN-centered Indo-Pacific outlook constitutes a first step in that direction."
>
> "Fourth, the implementation of the GMF concept and the construction of an Indo-Pacific outlook will require Indonesia to work closely with key major and middle powers in the region. We need to strike a balanced engagement with the US, China, Japan, Russia and India, and deepen our relationship with Australia and South Korea. As the Indo-Pacific is fast becoming the center of gravity of global politics, these are the countries that matter the most for the future of the region."
>
> "Finally, it is imperative to see ASEAN as key strategic capital for Indonesia's foreign policy. Efforts to strengthen ASEAN need to be intensified, so that ASEAN's centrality and relevance do not fade away amid strategic transformation taking place in the region."

In the above extract, the first interest specified Indonesia's increasing need to effectively position itself between the US and China, where Sukma said that conditions to ensure the strategic autonomy must be ensured and a ballast is needed by Jakarta to avoid getting pulled into the Washington-Beijing rivalry. The second interest immediately

pointed out that a full and coherent GMF implementation is required for that ballast to function as a strategic foreign policy framework, and the third interest considered the AOIP to be the first step to implement the GMF within a maritime outlook that recognized the Pacific and Indian ocean as a single geopolitical and geoeconomic unit. The fourth interest explained the GMF implementation and the Indo-Pacific outlook creation means that Indonesia must work in a balanced manner with key major and middle powers in the region, including the US, China, Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, and Russia. Sukma closed his argument by underlining the importance of ASEAN Centrality as Indonesia's fifth interest.

The above extract pretty much clarified how the GMF can help Indonesia's hedging strategy, including against the US and China. As is known by now, Indonesia's strategic autonomy depends on its Free-and-Active doctrine, that under Widodo's administration takes the forms of diplomatic/economic hedging and rebalancing. Sukma (2019) also mentioned in the same extract that, in order for Jakarta to uphold Indonesia's strategic autonomy, a ballast is needed, and this ballast can only work if the GMF is coherently implemented. Since Sukma (2019) stated that the ballast "should take the form of a regional order that combines norms, institutions and a balance of power", it is reasonable then to regard ASEAN to be the ballast that he meant, even more so after the importance of ASEAN Centrality for Indonesia and the congruity of AOIP for Southeast Asia have been made clear both in the above extract and in the previous chapter.

To add, the fact that Sukma (2019) called attention to how long Indonesia would have to be prepared to position itself between China and the US reminds this study of a possible scenario about what Jakarta might have to decide if conflicts between Washington and Beijing escalate like what has been long echoed by Widjajanto (2016). He argued that the current rivalry between the US and China, that is affected by the relative decline of the US and the rise of China, would eventually turn to the *G-Zero* scenario where international politics experience a power vacuum because developing countries focus on their domestic affairs and Western influence diminishes before the scenario finally turned into a regional fight ("Indonesia's Strategic Environment and Nature of Threats", 2016). For this reason, Widjajanto (2016, slide 26) considered Maritime Defense, one of the pillars of the GMF, to be ever more important for Indonesia to defend itself and avoid getting swept up by future conflicts in the region.

Widjajanto (2016, slide 27) himself argued that three elements are needed to properly prepare the Indonesian Maritime Defense to support the GMF to stave off future threats to Indonesian security. They are ("Indonesia's Strategic Environment and Nature of Threats'', 2016):

1. Geomaritim (or *Geomaritime* in English), which is defined as a strategic concept where the framing of geographical ideas and perspectives is used to comprehend the conditions of landscape and culture that underlie the action planning of maritime affairs management. In this regard, Geomaritime is aimed at making Indonesia to be the GMF ("Geomaritim sebagai Sebuah Konsep Mewujudkan Poros Maritim Dunia", 2017);

2. Dinamika Senjata Angkatan Laut (or *Naval Arsenal Dynamics* in English), where the existence of Indonesian Navy's arsenal has to keep in mind its objective and function as the core component of Indonesia's maritime power, the characteristics of Indonesian seas, and accuracy in combating both factual and potential threats (Sutanto et al., 2021, pp. 232-233);

3. Rezim Keamanan Maritim (or *Maritime Security Regime* in English), which refers to a set of arrangements, institutions, or governance containing *principles*, *norms*, *rules*, and *joint decision-making procedures* within institutions or organizations be it formally or informally or explicitly or implicitly that is meant to be in charge of regime member states' behaviors towards the maritime domain so that their expectations are met to fulfill the maritime security and safety interests. Principles are defined as the collective belief held by regime members in the truth, facts, and/or causes of specific problems or issues. Norms are defined as behavioral standards that are summarized based on regime members' rights and obligations to deal with a problem. Rules are defined as fixed provisions about proscriptions or commitments governing the conducts of regime members who abide by the norms. Lastly, decision-making procedures are defined as the regime members' general practice in creating and applying agreed principles, norms, and rules (Young, 2002, pp. 78-92, as cited in Oktavian, 2021, p. 66).

Of the Indo-Pacific region's major powers, Chinese and American influences contribute the most to the rising tension be it just in Southeast Asia (Scott & Lim, 2022) or in the Indo-Pacific as a whole (Ebigghausen, 2022). A potential scenario that Jakarta has to take

into account when conducting Indonesia's foreign policy, and ergo upholding the Free-and-Active principle, in the long-term is what will Indonesia do if physical conflicts between the US and China really take place, Indonesia might be dragged into the conflict for one reason: geography.

Take for example the possibility of the US and China really going to war over Taiwan. Beijing depends on the Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes to supply China's energy needs, especially for its oil. Meanwhile, any US navy currently situated in the Middle East will have to cross Indonesia to get to the North Natuna Sea. On top of that, it is requisite for any US military activities wanting to access Australia to receive permits to cross into Indonesian sea and air territory. If Jakarta were to greenlight Beijing's request to use Indonesia's archipelagic sea lanes to fulfill Chinese energy needs, the US may consider Indonesia to have taken China's side. Likewise, if Jakarta were to allow American battleships to cross Indonesian waters and airspace, then China may consider Indonesia to have sided with the US. So, what should Indonesia do in this case? Whatever it is, the Free-and-Active principle must still play a pivotal role in Indonesia's foreign policy decisions (Sellita, 2023), because this scenario would most likely put Indonesia's hedging strategy and GMF dreams in jeopardy.

In hindsight, Widjajanto's (2016) perspective becomes even more astute after no less than CIA Director William Burns said, in February 2023, that the US knew as a matter of intelligence that China is preparing its military forces to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027 (Hernández, 2023). Granted, in a survey of IR scholars at US colleges and universities conducted between October 2022 and January 2023 regarding some of the most important foreign-policy issues facing the United States by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project at William & Mary's Global Research Institute, the IR scholars surveyed largely agreed that the possibility of a war between China and the US remains low (Blanes et. al, 2023). However, low and zero are not the same thing. Just because such possibility is low does not mean that precautions should not nonetheless be made, including by Indonesia. Some Indonesian IR scholars even admitted that there are tangible challenges for Jakarta in maintaining the archipelago to remain Free-and-Active in conducting Indonesia's foreign policy due to the US-China rivalry (Wardah, 2022) if only because there is no real possibility of either Washington or Beijing simply ignoring Jakarta out of their rivalry equation (Erfina, 2023). It is hence necessary for the Indonesian foreign policy community and Indonesian foreign policymakers to start bringing up this probable scenario into the Indonesian foreign policy discourse more

frequently in order to find a way for Indonesia to preserve the practice of the Free-and-Active principle while still maintaining its strategic autonomy and hedging strategy against both China and the US.

In fine, this study draws four points from this thematic discussion:

1. Sukma considered Indonesia's hedging strategy to be the modern manifestation of Indonesia's long-standing non-aligned stance and defined the GMF as the reflection of how Indonesia comprehends its own geopolitical and geoeconomic map of the Indo-Pacific, the archipelago's place in that map, and what role Indonesia should play in it.

2. Based on Sukma's answers and the revelation presented in the previous chapter, the GMF implementation is fundamentally different from Indonesia's hedging strategy foreign policy discourse, including against China and the US. After all, Widodo's first term foreign policy was steered by Widodo's economic diplomacy and not by the GMF's maritime diplomacy. However, Sukma admitted that it is possible for the GMF to improve Indonesia's hedging strategy.

3. Based on the points outlined by both Widjajanto (2016) and Sukma (2019), the Free-and-Active doctrine, ASEAN Centrality, and the GMF cannot be separated from each other should Jakarta truly wish for Indonesian foreign policy to preserve Indonesia’s long-term strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region, where the US, China, and other major powers are vying for influences.

4. Lastly, since the last chapter has clarified that Indonesia's hedging through ASEAN is also meant for powers not exclusive to the US, and China and the thematic discussion making of the GMF in this chapter has shown that the GMF is meant to prepare Indonesia for power competitions beyond the US-China rivalry, Sukma's opinion that an Indo-Pacific outlook and the GMF implementation are needed to effectively engage with other powers in the Indo-Pacific means that the discussion and revelations in this study concerning the aforementioned topics are in harmony with the viewpoint of the creator of the GMF.

7.2.3. The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns

Firstly, these are the codes contained in this theme:



Figure 21. The World Cloud for the codes for The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns. (screenshot by the author).

The Code Cloud produced by MAXQDA showed that *The Heightening of Indo-Pacific Tensions* is indeed the code most often used in all three thematic discussions, including here, while *The Criticism from GMF Creators* is only slightly more frequently used than *Connectivity in Contemporary Geopolitics*. Notably, *Connectivity in Contemporary Geopolitics* is the only code aside from *The Heightening of Indo-Pacific Tensions* that appeared in more than one set, although the former appeared only in two while the latter appeared in all three. *Sukma & Oegroseno's GMF Difference* has the least frequent use in this set. Meanwhile, *GMF's Creation Phase* is only slightly used more frequently than *GMF's Implementation Phase*. Secondly, prior to generating the theme from this Codeset, the proximity similarity is run by MAXQDA and then shown as follows:



Figure 22. MAXQDA's proximity similarity for the codes for The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns. (screenshot by the author).

Again, *The Heightening of Indo-Pacific Tensions* is the lynchpin code in this RTA as well. This grouping also shows that no code is left isolated, so a test for occurrence similarity was conducted. The result shown by MAQXDA is as follows:



Figure 23. MAXQDA's occurrence similarity for the codes for The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns.
(screenshot by the author).

With the above picture ensuring that all codes indeed occur in the same documents consistently with not even one being isolated or left out by MAXQDA, the segments coded with them were then re-read alongside the research question to pinpoint which research questions they can truly answer. After several re-reading, this study pinpointed the research questions this thematic grouping can help answer. They are:

RQ_1: How was the GMF conceived and/or implemented as an element in the first place?

RQ_2.1: What is the detailed process of the creation of the GMF from the moment it was first suggested until the moment the initiative was accepted by President Widodo as a strategy?

RQ_3: Did Sukma and Widjajanto generate an emergent pattern of the GMF Discourse in their respective interviews?

From this Codeset, this study generates one theme. It is called **The GMF Discourse's Three Emergent Patterns**.

This study aims to highlight the patterns displayed by the creators of the GMF in their discourse. This theme is meant to underline and discuss those patterns. In exploring theme, this study notices the patterns of GMF discourse by its creators can be divided into three:

- A pattern related to the GMF creation and implementation, shown in segments such as "Basically, the first step is the presidential debate material requested by Mr. Jokowi on the doctrinal level and then about geopolitics" (Widjajanto, 2024).
- A pattern related to the GMF framing, exhibited in segments like "At play was the way we looked (at) ourselves. So, here, basically the GMF is (a) reflection of our understanding about the geopolitical and geoeconomic map of (the) Indo-Pacific and our place within that map and what role we should play" (Sukma, 2024).
- And a pattern related to the GMF criticism, i.e. "(...) of all the infrastructure projects done under Jokowi's administration 2014-2024, maybe the maritime connectivity is the slowest to progress" (Widjajanto, 2024).

Afterwards, this study proceeded with the review using the five questions previously mentioned by Braun & Clarke (2022). The answers this study came up with for them can be seen below:

a. What is the central organizing concept for this theme?

   This theme contains any segment where the GMF creators discuss the GMF creation and implementation process, its framing, and the criticisms they have toward it.

b. What are the boundaries of this theme?

   Any segment that does not discuss the GMF creation, implementation, and criticism is not part of this theme.

c. Is there enough meaningful data to evidence this theme?

   Yes. As a matter of fact, since this theme discusses GMF creation and implementation processes, among other things, the interview transcripts from DD, Oegroseno, and Agusman will be referred to as well when required.

d. Is the data contained within this theme too diverse and wide-ranging?

No, because anything that does not discuss the creation and implementation, framing, and criticism of the GMF is not included in this theme and its discussion.

e. What importance does this theme convey?

This theme allows this study to answer three research questions: RQ_1, RQ_2.1, and RQ_3.2.

Discussion

This theme is the last to be generated for this chapter because it is intended also to overview the two other themes to find out the emergent patterns of the whole of Sukma and Widjajanto interviews. This study argues that the GMF discourse within their interviews can be summed up in three emergent patterns. They are as follows:

7.2.3.1. The Creation and Implementation of the GMF

The first pattern shown by both creators is their recollection of the GMF creation and implementation.

The interviews of both Sukma and Widjajanto contain a segment where they recalled their experience when creating the GMF. Ergo, the first part of this discussion will present the extracts from Sukma and Widjajanto concerning the GMF creation before then combining their account with the account of DD, Oegroseno, and Agusman in regard to the GMF implementation in Widodo's first term.

To begin with, since the first half of Widjajanto's full account of the GMF creation has been discussed in the previous theme, this portion will follow it up with the second half of his account (Widjajanto, 2024):

> "The next day, during breakfast, the eight of us, there was myself, there were Rizal Sukma, Edi Prasetiono, Sukardi Rinakit, Kusnanto Anggoro, there was Jaleswari Pramuwardhani, there was Makmur Keliat, had a breakfast at Morrisey Hotel in Menteng (Central Jakarta). Yes, we started discussing Mr. Widodo's request based on Mrs. Mega's story or presentation about geopolitics during Bung Karno's era. Uh, the word 'maritime' appeared soon, then, Rizal Sukma, who floated the term 'maritime fuse' interpreted it into 'axis', then changed it into 'fulcrum', became the Maritime Fulcrum, because there were wishes to

> project Indonesia's power. Then, then it became the Global Maritime Fulcrum, that was the first step. Basically, the first step is the presidential debate material requested by Mr. Jokowi on the doctrinal level and then about geopolitics. The second step was when Mr. Jokowi got elected and then had to attend the G20 and East Asian Summit in late 2014. Then we introduced the Maritime Fulcrum with its 5 pillars and that was what Mr. Jokowi presented in the East Asian Summit. In the process, the Maritime Economy Ministry was formed. Eh, Mr. Indroyono became the Minister of Maritime Economy, then ambassador Harvas became the first deputy and at that point I was already the cabinet secretary, (I) talked to Mr. Indroyono and Mr. Arif Havas Oegroseno and then asked so that the Maritime Economy Ministry formulate operationally those 5 pillars from the Maritime Fulcrum. Then, by a Maritime Economy Ministry team led by Arif Havas Oegroseno, 5 pillars became 7 pillars, and then the action plan document for the Global Maritime Fulcrum about those 7 pillars. That was how the Maritime Fulcrum, which at first was a presidential debate material, became a technocratic framework when formulated by Mr. Indroyono and Arif Havas Oegroseno."

Moving on, Sukma's account is as follows (Sukma, 2024):

> "So, it was prior to the debate, the team had a discussion with Mr. Jokowi, yes, about which points would be presented and considered as important by Mr. Jokowi to become the basis of his foreign policy if he won. That's what was presented in the debate, at that time, Mr. Jokowi, at that time, he was a very practical man, yeah. That's why, for example, why service became top priority in the foreign policy of Mr. Jokowi. Indonesian foreign policy being a foreign policy that brings direct benefits is his trademark, so service, economy, but at the same time, he also agreed about the bigger geopolitical challenges that Indonesia was facing. Well, it was at that point the team said, 'Sir, we must see ourselves as the Global Maritime Fulcrum.' Luckily, he welcomed it immediately, because even from the start, Mr. Jokowi had the idea to make Indonesia the Sea Toll. The Sea Toll is focused more on maritime infrastructure and, what's it called? Maritime connectivity, something like that. Well, in that context, when we were discussing about the strategic perspective of Mr. Jokowi's idea about the Sea Toll, we directly focused on Mr. Jokowi's perspective about Indonesia's position in greater geopolitical viewpoint. True, at that time we hadn't yet elaborated the five pillars, not yet, that was later. But, the basic idea was, there are two vast oceans and we're right in the middle, and we see ourselves in that map as that fulcrum. That's, the basic idea of the Global Maritime Fulcrum, it was not yet in operation and introduced, then the operational process started after Mr. Jokowi was elected."

Then, combining both their accounts and the accounts of DD, Oegroseno, and Agusman, the whole story of the GMF creation and implementation would look like this:

1. Sukma, Widjajanto, and the rest of Team 11 formulated the GMF as part of Widodo's campaign team in 2014, where Widodo then mentioned it for the first time ever during his Presidential campaign;

2. Following Widodo's victory in the 2014 presidential election, the GMF was forwarded to the Foreign Ministry and directed to a post that was, at that time, held by Agusman (2022) in the Directorate-General of Legal Affairs and International Treaties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia to be interpreted as an Indonesian foreign policy. The section that DD (2022) was in, the Directorate General of Policy Review and Development Agencies in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was also involved in interpreting the GMF as a foreign policy, particularly in early 2015;

3. Considering the nature of the GMF, an opinion appeared in the Indonesian foreign ministry that the GMF should have been construed as an ocean policy;

4. Widodo created the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia in 2015. The appearance of this new coordinating ministry led to most GMF-related affairs to be directed there;

5. Oegroseno (2022), a senior diplomat, was made Indonesia's Deputy Minister of the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs in 2015. He then supercharged the creation of the IOP in order to accomplish the GMF goals;

6. The IOP was approved and released in 2017 as a presidential decree by Widodo, called *Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 16 Tahun 2017 tentang Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia*, where the GMF was legally made to be a vision for the archipelago;

7. The GMF's legal status as an Indonesia vision continued even to Widodo's second administration (2019-2024) after he approved and released *Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 34 Tahun 2022 Tentang Rencana Aksi Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia Tahun 2021-2025* in 2022.

7.2.3.2. The GMF Framing by Its Creators

The second pattern shown by both GMF creators is their own framing of the GMF itself.

As mentioned previously in this chapter, Sukma (2024) regarded the GMF as Indonesia's understanding of the geopolitical and geoeconomic map of the Indo-Pacific region and its place in that map, as well as the role it should play, to the point where he stated that his vision of the GMF differs with what Oegroseno eventually interpreted in the IOP in the above extract can better be understood once Sukma's three definitions of the GMF are considered. Back in 2014, Sukma outlined his primary purviews of the GMF itself by presenting it within three definitions: as a vision or a goal regarding what kind of Indonesia is going to be built in the future, as a uniting doctrine for the Indonesian people, and as part of Indonesia's national development plan (2014).

The first definition of the initiative is having the vision/goal involving Indonesia's reacceptance of its national identity as an archipelago before it moves forward to its future as a maritime power. This sets up the GMF as a long-term initiative that, at the same time, appeals to the sense of self in the Indonesian people and their national identity. Interestingly, this definition confirms that using the constructivist theory for this research is the correct decision, because this definition explains how Indonesia's norms and identities affect its policies. After all, Indonesia's norms and identities were used to create the GMF in order to bolster Indonesia's economic diplomacy under Widodo's presidency. Additionally, it is exactly because power plays a vital role in social construction, like what Adler (1997, p. 336) had said, that Widodo was able to do this. Because, when he employed the GMF to bolster the Indonesian economic diplomacy that he preferred so much, he was in Indonesia's highest executive office and the power his office granted thus made it possible for him to implant economic diplomacy as Indonesia's social reality. After all, perhaps the subtlest and most effective form of power in social reality concerns calling the tune on meanings and functions toward physical objects that do not already possess those meanings and functions, the capability to devise the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to be able to get other actors to commit themselves to those rules because they are now part of their self understandings (Adler and Barnett, 1996; Williams, 1996, as cited in Adler, 1997, p. 336). All of these was what Widodo effectively did for economic diplomacy using tools that include the ministership of Marsudi in the Indonesian foreign ministry and the GMF.

It needs to be reiterated that the core stimulus for constructivism-inspired foreign policy analysis concerning identity is identity and norms are not autonomous of, if residual, to interests, but they inform and constitute the latter to begin with (Jepperson et al., 1996,

as cited in Guzzini, 2022, p. 41). Identities are relational and inaugurated in social recognition, and national histories include many scripts that are regularly rewritten. The very delicate adaptation of these state identities and histories can never be separated from a functioning diplomacy for a world order (Guzzini, 2022, p. 51), and that is why understanding the creation and application of the GMF cannot be separated from comprehending the Indonesian norms and identities that inspired its birth. Naturally, to better reinforce this assertion, this study must now discuss Indonesia's maritime heritage.

To start with, the importance of maritime trades and routes for ancient Indonesian societies and kingdoms dated as far back as 1,700 BC and even linked Indonesia with ancient China and India. Axiomatically, living under the colonization of European powers starting from the post-Medieval Era up until the mid-20th century meant that Indonesia was not free to exercise its maritime heritage for centuries while a gargantuan amount of wealth and prosperity was brought to European countries. Ergo, the application of the GMF during the rising globalization of this century can be regarded as Indonesia's attempt at rebuilding its maritime heritage (Wardhana, 2016, pp. 371-374).

Wardhana (2016), who drew from the ideas posited by Alfred Thayer Mahan and J. S. Corbett from their work regarding the importance of ruling the seas for a country's prosperity and applied it to Indonesia's present situation. Mahan (1991, as cited in Wardhana, 2016, p. 375) wrote that there are six characteristics a country has to fulfill in order to become a maritime power:

- Geographical position
- The physical shape of a country
- The size of the country
- The size of a country's population
- The characters of a country's citizens
- The support and willingness of the government

Regardless, changing times means there are several characteristics added to the original six (Tangredi, 2002, as cited by Wardhana, 2016, pp. 375-376):

- The strength of a country's national economy
- Technological development for the advancement of industrial basics
- National political culture
- Dependency on maritime trade
- A stable government

Addressing some of these characteristics, Wardhana (2016, p. 376) argued that:

- Indonesia's location at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific oceans, and the archipelago's overall shape and size, rationalized Indonesia's GMF ambition in this era of globalization and free trade;
- The characters of the Indonesian people as sailors and fishermen, on top of the willingness and support of the Indonesian government also underlined Indonesia's fitness for Mahan's ideas.

In short, the GMF and Indonesia's maritime heritage are inseparable.

This argument is further confirmed by Sukma (2024) himself, who described the GMF as Indonesia's reflection of its own understanding about the Indo-Pacific's geopolitical and geoeconomic map and about Indonesia's place within that map and what role Indonesia should assume. The statement he made in his interview echoes his introduction of the GMF ten years prior in 2014, where Sukma (2014) wrote that the GMF could be understood in several ways, one of them being a vision for Indonesia itself where it serves as call for Indonesia to return to its national identity as an archipelago that will hopefully make Indonesia a maritime power who is united, prosperous, and dignified.

Sukma's (2014; 2024) statements echo Widodo's own official document detailing his vision and mission during his presidential campaign in 2014. In his document, Widodo declared that, as far as foreign policy and diplomacy are concerned, his administration would put forward Indonesia's identity as an archipelagic state in conjunction with Indonesia's identity as a maritime country. Explicitly, Widodo has admitted at least a couple of times that Indonesia's maritime identity is inspired by the glory days of Srivijaya and Majapahit empires. Once during a press conference on August 14, 2014, where he stated that the maritime fleets of both empires were what brought them

prosperity, and once in a 2015 speech that will be discussed later, where he said that neither Srivijaya nor Majapahit empires would have attained the heights they had without their maritime prowess. Even the Indonesian foreign ministry referred to the heyday of both empires to commemorate Indonesia's chairmanship of IORA from 2015 to 2017 by declaring that Indonesia's involvement in the forum was a way for Indonesia to further bolster its global role as a dignified maritime country (Indonesian foreign ministry, 2014; Widodo, 2014; 2015, as cited in Rosyidin, 2023, pp. 52-53 & 55-56).

Moving on, the second definition of the GMF can then be understood as a bridge between the first framing and the third framing. Having the GMF as a doctrine that gives the Indonesian people a common sense of purpose to accept their reality and establish their position between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean from the geostrategic, geopolitical, and geographical perspectives is meant to remind the Indonesian people over its maritime sovereignty. That, through the GMF (and, as such, through reembracing Indonesia's nature as an archipelagic state and developing Indonesia's maritime infrastructure), the Indonesian people can decide their own future as a maritime power despite a changing international dynamic (Sukma, 2014, as cited in Malau, 2014).

The third definition argues for the operationalization and actualization of the GMF by putting a greater importance to the development of the Indonesian maritime infrastructures and capabilities as part of Indonesia's own national development agenda. In explaining this element, Sukma (2014) referred to Widodo's Sea Toll Program to ensure connectivity between islands for example by building ports, improving sea transportation, enhancing the shipping and fishing industries, and to focus on maritime security as proof that Indonesia is serious about becoming the GMF. Each development mentioned is included in Indonesia's own national development agenda and, that means, the GMF is both part of Indonesia's domestic and foreign affairs, as the theme GMF making has shown.

From the three definitions above, it can be said that Sukma's framing of the GMF as a geopolitical and geoeconomic guiding map imagines the fulcrum as something that would transform not only the outward appearance and style of Indonesia the country, but also the inward mindset and behavior of the Indonesian people. In this regard, it can be understood as to why he underlined the difference between his own view of the GMF with what Oegroseno eventually interpreted in the IOP back in 2017. Sukma created the

GMF in 2014, but was already the Indonesian ambassador to the UK the moment the GMF interpretation into the IOP started, and thus had no part with how the GMF was interpreted into the IOP. Oegroseno, meanwhile, was not among the GMF creators, so he interpreted the GMF into the IOP according to his own background.

This study posits that Sukma's framing of the GMF calls to mind Wendt's writing about five material needs of individuals. One of them is called Ontological Security and it pertains to the need of human beings to have fairly stable expectations in regards to the natural and particularly social world around them. Together with the need for physical security, this urges human beings in a conservative, homeostatic direction, and to search for acknowledgment of their standing from society (1999, p. 131). Ontological security itself does not entail a threat to identity but highlights an ongoing concern with its stability (Rumelili, 2015a, p. 58, as cited in Guzzini, 2022, p. 46). Based on the GMF's three definitions by Sukma (2014) previously discussed, the fulcrum was framed by Sukma as a way for Indonesia to assume a stable identity. Then, Indonesia was expected to eventually gain relatively steady expectations about its natural and social world surrounding the country as it is recognized as the global maritime fulcrum by the rest of the world. Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen now that the GMF was unable to fulfill that framing due to a variety of reasons.

Widjajanto, on the other hand, when serving as the Governor of Lemhannas, wrote a scientific oration in 2022 where he considered the GMF to be the latest evolution of Indonesia's geopolitical thinkings and that geopolitics have now entered its fifth era which he called Geo V. The Geo V era is marked by the connectivity competition, including between the US and China with their Indo-Pacific economic framework and BRI respectively (2022). When asked what he meant by this, Widjajanto answered (Widjajanto, 2024):

> "Yes, that process began around October 2021. Mr. Jokowi summoned me then and he told me that Mrs. Mega suggested my name for the governorship of Lemhannas. Then, I interacted with Mrs. Mega, she then told me to study why Bung Karno established the Lemhannas back in 1965 and what he wanted from it. When I studied the early Lemhannas documents, including Bung Karno's documents in the Lemhannas during its inauguration, I realized there that the Lemhannas was established by Bung Karno as a school of Geopolitics to create candidates for national leaders who understood geopolitics, especially between major powers. Of course, in 1965 it meant the US and the Soviet Union. I was inaugurated on February 21, 2022. After the inauguration, Mr. Jokowi and I had

> a chat for an hour. At that time, Mr. Jokowi insisted that the Lemhannas truly be a scientific institution that provides routine inputs regarding geopolitical dynamics to the President. We created a methodology using a technique called net assessment with scenario building. Then, every month, we submitted a geopolitical map to the president, usually on the 29th or 30th of every month, to the president. Then, we waited for his disposition about whom we should deliver those studies to. Usually, the president ordered around 18-21 relevant ministries where I had to present those studies. And, when those studies started, (we) realized that geopolitics have changed, from classical geopolitics related to the theories of Mackinder, finally geopolitics changed due to changes of technology. Then, we created steps or evolutions that offered ideas concerning current geopolitics that, uh, mostly attempt at creating global connectivity. There, (we) realized that the problem or the irony is the global megaprojects done by China, the US, Russia or the EU, those connectivity projects instead led to separations. The US Pivot cannot be combined with China's BRI, Russia's desire to create a Trans-Asia Network would not mesh well with what the EU wants and so on. And, in the end, those projects that were supposed to create connectivity instead severed that connectivity because it created megaproject blocs. That's the core of the Geo V offer that was presented in June 2022."

In his 2022 scientific oration, Widjajanto argued that the Geo V era means that geopolitics are now related to the shifting of geographic borders and the widening definition of power. It identifies the emergence of non-state actors in the international system and analyzes the connection between supply chains, infrastructures, and resources that push away territorial conflicts for connectivity conflicts. These competitions can be seen from China's BRI that is aiming to win over FOIP that was initiated by the US and its allies, mainly. These connectivity competitions are horizontal and marked by increasing territorial inclusion, where the enhancement of the global supply chain is meant to take place. Vertically, these connectivity competitions involve the pillars of production, distribution, consumption, and recycling. According to Widjajanto, the GMF is Indonesia's attempt to apply its own connectivity ideas, for example by building the Sea Toll infrastructure to better inter-island connectivity that can hopefully secure the national resources supply chain (2022, p. 9). Widjajanto also referred to Khanna's connectography theory that says the competition for powers today is more focused on securing the energy market, global supply chain, and the flow of capital sources directed to the establishment of global supply chain and production chain hegemony (n.d., as cited in Widjajanto, 2022, p. 9).

Then, what does Widjajanto mean by recognizing the GMF as Indonesia's latest geopolitical thinking? Widjajanto argued that the evolution of Indonesia's geopolitical

discourses can be divided into four main points. The first point is the country's basic framework that began with Indonesian independence, the unity of Indonesia, and the basic principles of an integralistik nation suggested by Soekarno, Soepomo, Yamin, and Natsir (four of Indonesia's founding fathers). The second point is Bung Karno's global initiative to create the New World Order that impressed upon the importance of the fight for independence against anti-colonialism/imperialism for the nations of Asia and Africa. The third point is the launch of geopolitical pillar of the archipelagic nation via the 1957 Djuanda Declaration that continued until the days of Mochtar Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia's Foreign Affairs Minister from 1978 to 1988) in the form of the international maritime law regime, 1982 UNCLOS. This era also saw the introduction of the ASEAN regional framework to establish stability and harmony in Southeast Asia. The fourth point is the regional autonomy era that was proffered at the start of the Reformation Era (post-1998 Indonesia) to implement central government decentralization paradigm while enhancing the commitment of a unitary state. The fifth point is the era of infrastructure and connectivity development to create an Indonesia-centric development that began with the MP3EI program during the Yudhoyono era before then being enhanced by the GMF during the administration of Joko Widodo (2022, pp. 13 - 14).

Additionally, in an August 25, 2022 press release during the sixth Jakarta Geopolitical Forum, Widjajanto made ten notes. One of them was underlining the possibility of a potential connectivity between the GMF, BRI, and the US Indo-Pacific economic framework. When asked about this during the interview, Widjajanto stated that, after the global supply chain was consistently disrupted due to many factors, from the US-China trade war, Covid-19 pandemic, and the Russian war in Ukraine, what was needed was creating a sole global connectivity that is indestructible and able to ensure that strategic commodities, whether minerals and energy of food and Covid-19 medicines, can never be cut off regardless of the geopolitical situation. He presented it to Pandjaitan first, who then asked Widjajanto to join him in presenting this to Widodo. After that, the idea of a sub-corridor for southern connectivity arose, seeking a way to connect Southern countries to ensure strategic minerals can flow and are stable. This is only possible because of Indonesia's strategic location. To the east, there is Papua New Guinea with its strategic minerals, then South America with Chile, Brazil, and Argentina and their strategic commodity. To the West there are Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, the Middle East with their oil and gas, and a potential hub that can be built in South Asia

between Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, even to Myanmar then to Southeast Asia, where Singapore and of course Indonesia are there. Widjajanto believed that it was possible to map potential strategic commodities for cooperation before deciding where to implement and market its industry in this Southern Corridor. He also confirmed that he referred to the Global South when talking about this Southern corridor (Widjajanto, 2024). The Global south itself commonly refers to the countries belonging to the Group of 77 at the UN, although now that group is composed of 134 countries, and primarily considered developing countries, even though it also includes China and several wealthy Gulf states (Rising, 2023).

Based on Widjajanto's 2022 scientific oration and August 25 press release, he identified **the GMF to be Indonesia's latest geopolitical thinking** in that the GMF could help Indonesia to traverse the shaky path of global connectivity between major powers, including China and the US, by ensuring an adamantine global supply chain, especially in the Southern hemisphere of the world. Of course, at the time of writing, this might not be a realistic goal since the GMF concept is virtually inactive.

7.2.3.3. The GMF Criticism

The last pattern shows the criticism from Sukma and Widjajanto toward the implementation of the GMF itself.

Starting with Sukma, who has one major criticism toward the GMF, namely regarding the Maritime Diplomacy pillar (Sukma, 2024):

> "That maritime diplomacy part, what does it mean? Foreign policy actions. See, if we see the whole ten years of the five pillars, the focus is on the maritime infrastructure. That's the program that aligns with Jokowi's administration national programs. That's why the first pillar, the fifth or the fourth pillar are little seen. Mostly it was the second and third pillars because they became the national strategic priority from Jokowi's administration, as it stands. Well, we're hoping the next administration sees the importance of impressing upon other priorities. That's number one. Next, number two is preferring maritime infrastructure and other infrastructures, it's like, the foreign ministry did not expand its own involvement in steering the Global Maritime Fulcrum. We didn't even hear about it anymore during the second term (of Widodo's). It's as if the fourth pillar were ill, it's in the ICU. Hm, it was as if it were no longer a priority, a focus, that one. All priorities became about maritime infrastructure. There were potential follow-ups, too bad the Foreign Ministry never made them part of their

> agenda so far, for example the idea that Indonesia could be a motor that creates strategic meetings in countries with maritime significance, like the major powers in the Indo-Pacific, like Japan, the Philippines, China, Australia, see. I think Indonesia is capable of getting them to discuss maritime stability. We only initiated the Island State forum, which mattered, although the domestic concerns regarding Papua is a lot more tangible than making our country a maritime power state, power better the two strategic oceans that Mr. Jokowi talked about in Naypyidaw back in November 2014. If I may summarize, in the last ten years, at first the maritime diplomacy dimension was tangible, but as the year went by, how to gain international support for maritime infrastructure and other infrastructure projects became the bigger focus, so did the focus on better services compared to services in the previous years to the point where foreign services became the Foreign Ministry legacy, especially in the period of (the last) ten years."

In short, what Sukma lamented from the GMF implementation was the dwindling importance of maritime diplomacy under Widodo's two terms. While the previous chapter has shown that maritime diplomacy is not completely fruitless, it also has revealed that **Widodo put far more importance in economic diplomacy above all else for his foreign policy**. In the GMF reasons theme, Sukma voiced his awareness of Widodo's preference toward economic diplomacy, so **it is only understandable for Sukma to feel that maritime diplomacy never really had the attention it needed**.

Moving on to Widjajanto who has two criticisms regarding the GMF. The first is the lack of a technocratic document for the GMF. When asked his opinion about the criticism that the GMF has no blueprint, he had this to say (Widjajanto, 2024):

> "Yeah, among other things because the technocratic document is incomplete. The doctrine was there with the Maritime Fulcrum, after the Doctrine, several laws should have been passed concerning the maritime, like the maritime laws, maritime security and also a change in laws concerning the foreign affairs. However, none of this was done. No laws, no revision. As a result, the Maritime Fulcrum document had no robust legality, because there was no order by the laws to interpret it into an action plan document from the Maritime Ministry. No robust legality means no significant organizational change when that document was published at the start, from 2014 to 2016. The only organization that changed was maritime security, but even then it was just from Bakorkamla to Bakamla."

To clarify, a technocratic document or framework is a document containing more or less specific guidelines and ideally even specific means of implementation. When this study brought up the Presidential decree both in 2017 and 2022 that became the GMF action

plan with Widjajanto, he stood by his assessment that the GMF still had no technocratic document at the time of the interview. He also stated that **the lack of a technocratic document for the GMF caused it to be unable to become a new foreign policy platform for Indonesia**. He further explained the effect of the GMF lacking a technocratic document below (Widjajanto, 2024):

> "Of course for bureaucracy to be able to offer working programs relevant to the Maritime Fulcrum, the technocratic documents have to be complete. If the laws remain unchanged, if the presidential decree is unchanged, is not accompanied with governmental decree, then the presidential decree is not followed by relevant ministerial decree, whether in the Foreign Ministry or Fisheries Ministry, then the Maritime Fulcrum would not become a tangible program. From which we can see how much support it would need from the national budget."

As can be seen from Widjajanto's own words, he considered the lack of a technocratic document caused the GMF to fail to be a tangible program. As a matter of fact, in Widodo's first term, the only Ministry that released a GMF-related decree was the Defense Ministry. Even then it was only for a maritime policy to support the GMF ("Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan Republik Indonesia Nomor 9 Tahun 2018", 2018).

His second criticism for the GMF is aimed at maritime connectivity (Widjajanto, 2024):

> "(...) of all the infrastructure projects done under Jokowi's administration 2014-2024, maybe the maritime connectivity is the slowest to progress. Even now, if we take a look at the statistical data of the flow of goods and services, most of it remains concentrated in Java. Even in Kalimantan, maybe in Balikpapan. In Sulawesi, well Makassar and Palu with Morowali, for example. In Sumatra, it's Medan and its surroundings, so no significant progress from the distribution of goods and services, and the logistical cost remains really high. Then, we have to distribute goods to Eastern Indonesia, that's what makes the maritime cost having to focus in an inward-looking manner to build capacity to distribute goods to Eastern Indonesia. From 2019 to 2024, what was worrying was the effectiveness of our connectivity that worsened. Some blamed Covid-19 as a reason, but some knew it was impossible to apply one standardization system globally to enhance efficiency including to our industry. For example, the effectiveness of our industrial productivity with icor, yeah. Then, we can never return to below 6. In the New Order, (our) icor was around the scale of 4.7-4.8, but now it's above 6. There, that's homework, because with the existence of the Maritime Fulcrum, the transportation aspect should change to be more efficient, competitive, but especially in 2019-2023, because of Covid, that did not happen and the index worsened."

Widjajanto explained *icor* as industrial competitiveness, a global index that measures how competitive and efficient a manufacturing industry is. According to him, the higher the number, the worse the condition, and in the late 1980s to the 1990s, Indonesia was on the 4.7-4.8 scale before it worsened to 6. Either way, **what Widjajanto did not approve of Indonesia's maritime connectivity project is its sluggish pace** (Widjajanto, 2024).

Lastly, the criticisms from either Sukma or Widjajanto are like the ones echoed by Laksmana (2019). He also criticized the GMF for lacking proper research and development, lacking in attention from Widodo who favored development projects like infrastructure and social welfare, and underlined that idiosyncrasies, domestic politics, and bureaucratic inertia caused Indonesia's geopolitical needs to suffer from attention-deficit. He also believed that the pre-existing programs between ministries could be connected but not really corralled under a single network by the IOP, which ended up being a large bureaucratic umbrella. Laksmana also underlined the stalled foreign policy element of the GMF that he considered to have been caused by Marsudi's process-oriented approach where plenty of time was pent on bureaucratic reform and heavy reliance on pre-existing multilateral platforms such as ASEAN. He admitted, however, that Marsudi also required time to build a closer rapport with Widodo while also having to attend to diplomatic issues with domestic impacts, such as trade and investment.

In short, the GMF creators showed three emergent patterns:

1. The Creation and Implementation of the GMF
2. The Framing of the GMF
3. The Criticism toward the GMF

Having conducted RTA, the only thing left for this study to do now is to draw its conclusion in the next chapter.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1. Opening Remarks

This chapter will conclude the whole of this dissertation. The answers to all three sets of the research questions (Chapter 1) that guide this research are provided in the next sub-chapter (8.2), and the sub-chapter directly following that (8.3) will address the three hypotheses following displayed in the expose for this research against the findings of this research and present a concluding statement. In finding the answers to every research question, this study followed constructivist thinking.

8.2. Answering the Research Questions

RQ_1: How was the GMF conceived and/or implemented as an element in the first place?

Answer:

In answering this question, this study refers to the points outlined in Chapters 6 and 7 after performing two methods of analysis shaped by the constructivist theory, discourse analysis and RTA.

Firstly, the RTA performed for this research reveals that Rizal Sukma, one of the GMF creators, conceived **the GMF** as **the reflection of Indonesia's comprehension of its own geopolitical and geoeconomic map** of the Indo-Pacific, the archipelago's place in that map, and what role Indonesia should play in it. It needs to be reiterated that he saw it as a different thing altogether from Indonesia's hedging strategy, which he viewed as the contemporary manifestation of Indonesia's time-honored **non-aligned stance**.

Secondly, the discourse analysis performed for this research reveals that, in its implementation, the GMF was treated by Joko Widodo, the President of Indonesia from 2014 to 2024, as a way for **Indonesia to be more competitive in performing its economic diplomacy**. After all, becoming the GMF means that Indonesia would be a more attractive destination for investments and eventually a brighter place for the people of Indonesia to live in. It also needs to be restated that Widodo has opted for economic diplomacy as the main driving force behind his foreign policy. He brought his

profit-and-loss calculations approach into Indonesia's foreign policy psyche and used economic diplomacy as Jakarta's tool to deal with the great power rivalry, particularly between Washington and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. To add, eminent scholars such as Goldstein & Keohane have previously asserted that the widest impact of ideas on human actions happens when they take the form of worldviews (1993, p. 8), and the constructivist analysis done to Widodo's speeches has suggested that Widodo's life and background as a businessman has implanted profit-and-loss calculations in his worldview and influenced him to use profit as the steering wheel behind Indonesia's foreign policy (Arifin, 2023, p. 326). On top of this, Andi Widjajanto, another one of the GMF creators, has stated that the GMF not having any technocratic document prevented it from being a new foreign policy platform for Indonesia altogether.

Thus, **the GMF was neither conceived nor implemented as part of Indonesia's hedging strategy foreign policy**. However, in spite of the GMF and Indonesia's hedging strategy fundamental differences as have been displayed in practice and highlighted by and in this study, Sukma still admitted that it is possible for the GMF to improve Indonesia's hedging strategy, while Widodo utilized it to support his economic diplomacy foreign policy.

> **RQ_1.1: During President Widodo's first term (from October 20, 2014, to October 19, 2019), why did Indonesia hedge against China and the US?**
>
> Answer:
>
> In answering this question, this study refers to the point posited in Chapters 6 and 7 after performing two methods of analysis shaped by the constructivist theory, discourse analysis and RTA.
>
> Firstly, the discourse analysis performed by this study suggested that what led Indonesia to hedge against the US and China in Widodo's first term was **the colliding American and Chinese visions for Southeast Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific region that affected ASEAN Centrality**, one of Indonesia's foreign policy nucleuses, and raised regional tension involving allies of either power that could have been damaging toward Indonesia's economic interests that Widodo proffered so much.
>
> Secondly, the discourse analysis performed by this study has revealed that a key constructivist such as Wendt (1999, p. 225) has argued that an intentional actor's

identity is created by the memory and consciousness of Self as a specific locus of activity and thought. As far as Indonesia is concerned, both the discourse analysis and RTA in this dissertation suggested that Indonesia's identity is confirmed by both Widodo and Sukma themselves to be a maritime country and an archipelagic state. This identity greatly affected both Indonesia's foreign policy and the creation of the GMF (Sukma, 2014; Sukma, 2024; Rosyidin, 2023, pp. 52-53). This matters because a Self itself is reconstituted via an Other, or something that the Self is not over a period of time (Hansen, 2006; Neumann, 1999; Roschin, 2006, as cited in Guzzini, 2022, p. 44), and ASEAN, the US, and China are Indonesia's three most pivotal Others (Nguitragool, 2013, pp. 16-17). Both the discourse analysis and RTA of this research have thus indicated that Indonesia's unwillingness to have the stability of ASEAN disturbed the rivalry between the US and China is justifiable because this whole situation threatens Indonesia's identity as an archipelagic state who sees itself as the regional leader among the member states of ASEAN.

RQ_1.2: During President Widodo's first term, how far did the presence of the Pivot and BRI affect the shaping of Indonesia's hedging strategy?

Answer:

In answering this question, this study refers to the point posited in Chapter 9 after performing a method of analysis shaped by the constructivist theory, discourse analysis, and keeping in mind that Fairclough (2003, p. 11) wrote in meaning-making what is said relies on what remains unsaid.

The utter lack of mention and discussion from Widodo and Marsudi, the two main GMF implementers in Widodo's first term, regarding the US Pivot and the fact that the US Pivot is completely absent from their discourse can only mean that the discourse analysis reveals **there is no convincing argument to consider the US Pivot as an influence toward the shaping of Indonesia's hedging strategy under Widodo's presidency at all**.

However, this does not mean the reverse is automatically true for the BRI that they mentioned twice. After all, the initiative was only mentioned when they underlined the possibility of having it synchronized with the GMF. While the synchronization is an example of Indonesia's limited bandwagoning toward China, Oegroseno clarified that Indonesia did not agree to have the GMF

synchronize with the BRI until after China agreed to accept Indonesia's GMF on Indonesia's terms (2022). Additionally, based on the author's discourse analysis, Widodo also explicated that it was China who approached him first about the synchronization and not the other way around ("Sambutan Presiden RI pada Pembukaan Munas KAGAMA ke-12, di Clarion Hotel, Kendari, Sulawesi Tenggara, 6 November 2014", 2014) so there is no hint toward the influence that the BRI might have against the GMF. On the other hand, this dynamic underlines Indonesia's bargaining power against China and serves as an example of the GMF improving Indonesia's hedging strategy instead. For this reason, the discourse analysis performed for this research exhibits that **there is no real indication of the BRI being influential toward shaping Indonesia's hedging strategy under Widodo at all**.

RQ_2: What purpose led Sukma & Widjajanto toward the creation of the GMF in the first place?

Answer:

In answering this question, this study refers to Chapter 7's RTA.

After receiving their orders from Widodo and Megawati as part of Widodo's presidential campaign team back in 2014, Sukma and the rest of Team 11 initially created the GMF for foreign affairs purposes before Widodo imbued his own infrastructure and connectivity goals, particularly the Sea Toll program, into it before the GMF pillars were even created.

Sukma explained that there are domestic and foreign considerations behind his idea of creating the GMF, although he acknowledged that the domestic considerations were the bigger influences. This study ergo regards the domestic considerations to be primary and the foreign considerations to be secondary.

Building up on Sukma's statement, the RTA performed for this study further reveals that domestic considerations played a bigger role behind the GMF creation as a foreign policy grand strategy in 2014 is derived from both Indonesia's geostrategic, geopolitical, and geoeconomic constellations and from Indonesia's role conceptions as a regional leader and a bridge-builder in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, three components form the foreign or secondary considerations behind the GMF creation: the US-China rivalry, the declining unipolar world system, and the increasing importance of the maritime domain.

RQ_2.1: What is the detailed process of the creation of the GMF from the moment it was first suggested until the moment the initiative was accepted by President Widodo as a strategy?

Answer:

In answering this question, this study refers to the RTA on Chapter 7 and to the three interviews conducted with the diplomats: DD (2022), Oegroseno (2022), and Agusman (2022). Sorting out all their recollection of the events together, the brief process of the creation and implementation of the GMF is as follows:

Back in 2014, the GMF was created in anticipation of the presidential debate between then-presidential candidate Widodo against Prabowo Subianto, who was the other presidential candidate in 2014 and is current Indonesian president. At that time, Widjajanto was both secretary of Widodo's National Campaign team and coordinator of Team 11, Widodo's academic team of experts who was tasked with helping him with numerous strategic issues. Before the debate, Widjajanto said that Team 11 was called up by Soekarnoputri, Indonesia's fifth president (who was Widodo's supporter at that time), to her residence in a village called Gadog in West Java. They stayed the night there before they had a meeting with not only Soekarnoputri, but also Widodo himself, the next morning. Soekarnoputri began by recounting Indonesia's active foreign policy maneuvers during the presidency of her late father, Soekarno, where he paid strong attention to major powers' rivalry that happened on a global scale during the Cold War. Team 11 then discussed with Widodo about his foreign policy plans which were going to be outlined in the debate. Widodo wanted several qualities for his foreign policy material: it had to be doctrinal, it had to project Indonesia's power onwards, and it had to align with the geographic character of Indonesia as an archipelagic maritime state. They headed back to Jakarta and, then the next morning, Widjajanto and Sukma had a meeting with other experts in the team to discuss how they could provide what Widodo wanted, Soekarnoputri's encouragement, and the shifting global geopolitical and geoeconomic balance in a strategy. Sukma was the one who wrote the discussion paper at that time, although they had not yet come up with a name for the plan. Sukma then came up with the plan to include the word 'Maritime' in the plan. At first, it was going to be called Maritime Fuse, before then changed into Maritime Axis. Sukma finally settled on Maritime Fulcrum. After rechecking Indonesia' strategic map

and more intensive discussions, particularly with Widjajanto, to come up with a foreign policy grand strategy, Sukma decided that calling it a Maritime Fulcrum alone is too limiting since Indonesia is located right at the intersection between two oceans and two continents. For this reason, Indonesia's Maritime Fulcrum had to be Global ("Pidato Banjir Pujian, Jokowi Sebenarnya Dikecilkan Anak Buahnya", 2015; Sukma, 2024; Widjajanto, 2024).

As the date of the debate grew closer, Widodo and his experts had more discussions regarding which points he was going to outline during it. Since Widodo was a practical man, apparently he had already planned to prioritize increasing services to Indonesian people abroad and courting numerous benefits for Indonesia in his foreign policy. According to Sukma, Widodo agreed almost immediately with the idea of Indonesia as the Global Maritime Fulcrum that the team proposed because not only was he aware that Indonesia had to prepare for bigger geopolitical problems ahead, but he also had already dreamed of the Sea Toll program that would enhance maritime infrastructure and connectivity across the archipelago. Although the five pillars of the GMF were yet to be created at that point, the idea of Indonesia in the intersection of things was final, and the GMF then became a program that Widodo introduced in the debate as part of his debate material. As has been mentioned previously in this study, Widodo eventually introduced the GMF to a global audience at the East Asian Summit in Myanmar after he was inaugurated as president in 2014 (Sukma, 2024; Widjajanto, 2024).

Afterwards, the concept of the GMF as a foreign policy was forwarded to the Foreign Ministry under Retno Marsudi and directed to a post that was then held by Damos Dumoli Agusman in the Directorate-General of Legal Affairs and International Treaties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia to be interpreted as an Indonesian foreign policy. The section that DD was in, the Directorate General of Policy Review and Development Agencies in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was also involved in interpreting the GMF as a foreign policy, particularly in early 2015. Considering the nature of the GMF, an opinion appeared in the Indonesian foreign ministry that the GMF should have been construed as an ocean policy. In response, Widodo created the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia in 2014 with Indroyono Soesilo as the minister. The appearance of this new coordinating ministry led to

most GMF-related affairs being directed there. In 2015, Arif Havas Oegroseno, a senior diplomat, was made to be Indonesia's Deputy Minister of the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs. Under the Ministership of Soesilo, Oegroseno then supercharged the creation of the IOP in order to accomplish the GMF goals and expanded the five initial GMF pillars into seven. The IOP was approved and published in 2017 as a presidential decree by Widodo, called *Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 16 Tahun 2017 tentang Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia*, where the GMF was legally made to be a vision for the archipelago (DD, 2022; Oegroseno, 2022; Agusman, 2022; Sukma, 2024; Widjajanto, 2024). The GMF's legal status as an Indonesia vision continued even into Widodo's second administration (2019-2024) after Widodo approved and published another presidential decree as its action plan in 2022 ("Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 34 Tahun 2022 Tentang Rencana Aksi Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia Tahun 2021-2025", 2022).

At least one follow-up to this decree took place in 2024 after the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment published *Peraturan Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kemaritiman dan Investasi Nomor 1 Tahun 2023 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Pemantauan, Evaluasi, Pelaporan Rencana Aksi Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia Tahun 2021-2025* to carry out the provisions of Article 3 paragraph (3) and paragraph (4) of the 2022 presidential decree to monitor the progress of said action plan ("Pedoman Pelaksanaan Pemantauan dan Evaluasi Rencana Aksi KKI", 2024).

RQ_2.2: During its formulation phase, did Sukma, Widjajanto, and their team mean for the GMF to be implemented as part of the Indonesian hedging strategy foreign policy discourse against China and the US?

Answer:

For this question, this study refers to Chapter 7's RTA.

While the US-China rivalry is indeed a relevant foreign affairs consideration in Indonesia's creation of the GMF, due to Indonesia's geostrategic, geographic, and geoeconomic realities, it was the strategic rivalries for influences among a number of major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, not only between the US and China, but also countries like India, Japan, Australia, and Russia, that truly became the core of foreign considerations behind the initial creation of the GMF

as a foreign policy grand strategy in 2014. **In short, China and the US are part of the considerations, but not all of them**.

Furthermore, drawing from the explanations from both Widjajanto (2016) and Sukma (2019), the Free-and-Active doctrine, ASEAN Centrality, and the GMF cannot be separated from each other if Jakarta truly wants the Indonesian foreign policy to preserve Indonesia's long-term strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region, where the US, China, and other major powers are vying for influences.

RQ_2.3: How did the presence of BRI and the Pivot affect the GMF's creative process?

Answer:

In answering this question, this study refers to Chapter 7's RTA.

While the US Pivot and China's BRI were indeed revealed as two megaprojects studied by Team 11 who created the GMF, apparently they were also studying megaprojects from the EU and Russia. Other than that, they also contacted Japan, India, and Australia for megaprojects to be studied, although there were none from them back in 2014. In other words, alongside the Russian and European megaprojects, the US Pivot and China's BRI were among the megaprojects studied for one of the three secondary considerations behind the creation of the GMF in 2014.

RQ_3: During Widodo's first presidential campaign and first presidential term, which illocutionary acts did Widodo and Marsudi perform in their speeches?

Answer:

In answering this question, this study refers to Chapter 6's discourse analysis.

To start with, Widodo performed all five illocutionary acts. From most often performed to least often performed illocutionary acts, Widodo performed directives 37 times, representatives 30 times, declarations 12 times, expressives 7 times, and commissives 4 times. In short: directives > representatives > declarations > expressives > commissives.

Since directives is his most often performed illocutionary acts above all the other four, this indicates that ordering others to follow his orders dominates his first term discourse.

Of the GMF pillars in his discourse, his two most often mentioned are maritime diplomacy and maritime economy and infrastructure and improving welfare, while economic interests and infrastructure development are the two most pertinent elements in his discourse. The discourse analysis performed on his speeches has also indicated that his GMF goals were overtaken by his economic and infrastructure goals as far as his priorities were concerned. This can be seen from his constant mentions of his Sea Toll program and his other accomplishments in economy and infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Marsudi used four illocutionary acts in Widodo's first term. From most often performed to least often performed, is as follows: representatives (52 times) > declarations (19 times) > directives (5 times) > expressives (3 times). Of these four, representatives is by far the most common act she performed, while declarations in second place is still far ahead of the remaining two. Her dominant use of representatives denotes her aligning toward Widodo's leadership, in that her speeches and statements were chosen carefully to never contradict Widodo's. When Marsudi was chosen one more time as Indonesia's foreign minister by Widodo for his second term, Laksmana noticed that, "The re-appointed foreign minister Retno Marsudi also recently outlined her priorities for the next five years: trade and investment, citizen protection, sovereignty, regional and global leadership, and diplomatic infrastructure. While she calls this focus a *4+1* approach, she never once uttered the word *maritime*" (2019). Her use of illocutionary acts certainly reinforces the argument that Marsudi was indeed cautious enough to not to be at odds with Widodo and his vision of what Indonesia's foreign policy should be.

RQ_3.1: What concomitant traits of the discourse did Widodo and Marsudi display? Did the discourse experience any change during Widodo's first presidential campaign and the first presidential term?

Answer:

In answering this question, this study refers to Chapter 6's discourse analysis.

As Chapter 6 has discussed previously, the concomitant traits of Widodo's discourse are:

1. Treating the GMF as an umbrella term that spans across both domestic and foreign affairs alike, at least initially;

2. Elevating the importance of domestic affairs, particularly economic interests and infrastructure development, to his highest priority above all others GMF goals;
3. Directing economic profits to be the driving force behind his foreign policy and bringing profit-and-loss calculations into his approach, where Indonesia's ties with other countries have to make profits for Indonesia;
4. Encouraging the prospects and practices to improve Indonesia's maritime economy, fisheries, maritime culture, and marine culture enthusiastically;
5. Injecting economic diplomacy into Indonesia's foreign policy psyche and practice;
6. Utilizing economic diplomacy as an instrument for Indonesia to handle the great power rivalry, particularly between the US and China, in the Indo-Pacific;
7. Actively trying to make Indonesia a more attractive investments destination for other countries;
8. Keenly promoting the Sea Toll program, its benefits, and his dedication to its success;
9. Eagerly publicizing his development goals and achievements, particularly in the sectors of economy, investments, connectivity, bureaucratic reforms, maritime culture, and infrastructure, especially to his domestic audience;
10. And finally, there was a shifting in his perspective of the GMF's importance, where the GMF was prominent in the first two years of Widodo's first term but ended up being less and less relevant in his discourse over the years, to the point where it went unmentioned in the final year of his first term, due to the GMF being treated as a way for Widodo to implement his economic diplomacy for Indonesia in the first place.

Aside from the shift of perspective as outlined in number ten, Widodo's dedication to fulfill his economic and infrastructure goals is pervasive all throughout his first term.

Moving on, as Chapter 6 has discussed previously, the concomitant traits of Marsudi's discourse are:

1. An alignment with most of the stated programs of Maritime Diplomacy contained in the 2017 IOP;
2. An awareness to be in harmony with Widodo's vision in her job delivery;
3. A robust work in border diplomacy, particularly with the neighboring countries of Indonesia;
4. Resumption of long-established dependence on ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms to deal with many problems in Southeast Asia, including the tension in South China Sea caused by China;
5. A dedication to fulfilling the economic diplomacy goals that Widodo ordered;
6. And active efforts to get Indonesia to lead more inter-regional initiatives and to gain more maritime cooperation all across the globe.

Unlike with Widodo's discourse, there is no particular shift in Marsudi's discourse and it stays consistent all throughout Widodo's first term.

RQ_3.2: Did Sukma and Widjajanto generate an emergent pattern of the GMF Discourse?

Answer:

In answering this question, this study refers to the RTA on Chapter 7 where it was revealed that the GMF creators displayed three emergent patterns:

1. **The Creation and Implementation of the GMF**

   This pattern outlines the whole process from the very first time the GMF was suggested, to the time when it was created, and until the time it was implemented. This whole process has been described in greater detail on RQ_2.1 previously.

2. **The Framing of the GMF**

   This pattern reveals that Sukma and Widjajanto each have their own framing of their fulcrum. Sukma frames the GMF as a geopolitical and geoeconomic

guiding map that perceives the fulcrum as an instrument that would alter both the inner viewpoint and conduct of the Indonesian people and the outer style and face of Indonesia as a country (Sukma, 2024). To put it another way, this dissertation argues that, by creating the GMF, Sukma hoped that the archipelago could assume a stable identity and eventually acquire fairly unchanging expectations about its social and natural world that surrounds it. In this regard, Sukma's framing is in line with the constructivist thinking forwarded by Wendt regarding Ontological Security, which refers to human beings' need to possess relatively stable expectations regarding the natural and specifically social world around them (1999, p. 131). Meanwhile, Widjajanto considers the GMF as the latest geopolitical thinking of the archipelago's that can guide its shaky path toward global connectivity between the major powers of the world, including Washington and Beijing, by ascertaining Indonesia with a robust global supply chain, in particular in the Global South (Widjajanto, 2024).

3. The Criticism toward the GMF

This pattern displays what the creators of the GMF's criticisms toward the fulcrum's implementation are. For Sukma, it was the fact that Widodo highly elevated the importance of economic diplomacy above all else in his foreign policy practices to the point the GMF's maritime diplomacy never really received the attentiveness Sukma believed it had required (Sukma, 2024). For Widjajanto, he lamented the fact that the GMF lacked the technocratic document necessary for it to actually be a foreign policy platform for Indonesia and he criticized the pace of Indonesia's maritime connectivity under Widodo to be sluggish (Widjajanto, 2024).

8.3. Concluding Remarks

To begin the concluding remarks on a personal note: This study is conducted by an Indonesian, so the findings of this research have opened the author's eyes into the complex inner workings of not only the GMF, but also Indonesia's foreign policy more generally. This research has allowed the author to learn that the foreign policy of his homeland is not reactionary, or simply a reaction to greater powers in their rivalry in a portion of the world where Indonesia is at the heart of, but is independent and carries

with it Indonesia's own values and interests. How Indonesia's identity as a maritime country and an archipelagic state shapes its foreign policy thinking and influences the creation of the GMF are new to the author and hopefully provide deeper understanding of Indonesia from the constructivist perspective. This is a significant contribution to the academic literature on Indonesia and foreign policy-making in general.

Among the variables that this study has addressed are the successes of the GMF implementation, particularly in the field of maritime diplomacy under Marsudi from 2014 to 2019 that is significant for this research. Of course, the reality of the GMF itself also became something pertinent for this research, including the fact that Widodo showed more pride and focus toward his Sea Toll program and infrastructure developments to the point where the GMF was completely unmentioned in his 2019 speeches that caused this research to exclude his 2019 speeches altogether. The criticisms directed to the GMF, whether by its own creators like Widjajanto and Sukma, or by an Indonesian academic like Laksmana, also underlined the current reality of the GMF and most of its still neglected potentials.

Naturally, the author also realizes that this research is imperfect. Had the author been able to interview Widodo and Marsudi directly, the analysis conducted for this research would no doubt be more improved. Another limitation includes only being able to collect a few of Marsudi's speeches because the author's attempt to access the foreign ministry's archive was hampered by several difficulties and had to ultimately be called off.

This research is also the author's first interaction with the theoretical and methodological approaches chosen for this study. Prior to beginning this research, the author certainly had his own thoughts about how they would play out during the study, but it turned out that having to understand them both in order to apply them correctly was a considerable challenge. Even more than the author had first expected. Trial and error were pretty much part of the deal. Seeking deeper guidance, be it by taking valuable suggestions from the supervisor of this study or from plenty of readings, became a necessity. The author would like to regard the proper theoretical and methodological approaches to have been applied in this research, because the results that led to answering the research questions were able to explain the background and the implementation of the GMF in Widodo's first term. There were some revelations that the author found more revelatory than others, including some of the sources

interviewed openly considering the GMF's implementation to have been incomplete. More so because, in his second term (2019-2024), Widodo further prioritized his infrastructure and investment goals instead of having Indonesia's foreign policy facilitate the archipelago to truly become the GMF. In any case, the author considers the experience as a whole to be rewarding.

In closing, the results of this study are still adequate for the author to now measure all three hypotheses offered in the expose preceding this dissertation with the findings of this research:

1. **That the GMF was initially meant to be implemented as an Indonesian hedging strategy framework against Beijing and Washington.**

   Result: The findings of this research do not appear to support this hypothesis, because they point out to the GMF being created to provide for a wide array of Indonesian interests, both foreign and domestic. On top of that, with ASEAN Centrality being one of the nucleuses of Indonesia's foreign policy, the discourse analysis performed for this research unearths that it is the AOIP that Jakarta formulated and then proffered in 2019 to serve as a stage for Indonesia and other ASEAN member states to have exclusive counterbalance against the pressures exuded by the US-China rivalry toward them. Indonesia's efforts were not for naught because China, the US, Australia, India, Japan, the EU, Russia, and New Zealand have expressed their support toward the AOIP. The tangible implementation of the AOIP itself happened with the AIPF in 2023. This forum is meant to bolster ASEAN leadership and unity in dealing with the region's geopolitical dynamics by a steady work of confidence building via mutually profitable cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. As if to vindicate Indonesia's persistence, the first AIPF in Jakarta in 2023 gathered over 2,500 participants from more than 50 countries and produced commitments of cooperation of 93 projects worth US$38.2 billion and 73 other potential projects worth US$17.8 billion (Mulayana & Yazid, 2023). This research thereby argues that the GMF is not Indonesia's hedging strategy framework against China and the US, but the AOIP is.

2. **That the creation of the GMF was mostly caused by the presence of both the Pivot and the BRI.**

   Result: The findings of this research only appear to halfway support this hypothesis. After all, the creators of the GMF themselves explained that the Pivot and the BRI were only two of the four megaprojects, the other two from Russia and the EU, studied for one out of the three components that composed the secondary considerations behind the GMF creation. However, the constructivist thinking followed by this research, in particular the one proposed by Wendt (1999, p. 225), is crucial in confirming that Indonesia's Self in its corporate identity as a maritime country and an archipelagic state (Sukma, 2014; Sukma, 2024; Rosyidin, 2023, pp. 52-53) is directly related to the presence of the archipelago's three most important Others, which are ASEAN, the US, and China (Nguitragool, 2013, pp. 16-17) in its foreign policymaking. Since Sukma (2014) himself has admitted that Indonesia's identity as a maritime country and an archipelagic state played a salient role in the creation of the GMF, this hints at the US and China's relative importance in the GMF's creation. This research hence argues that, while Sukma has explained that neither the Pivot nor the BRI themselves had primary roles behind the GMF's creation (Sukma, 2024), the presence of the US and China as Indonesia's two important Others cannot be fully separated from the policy made under the influence of Indonesia's identity.

3. **That the GMF is considered to be an umbrella term covering both domestic politics and foreign affairs by relevant Indonesian officials.**

   Result: The findings of this research appear to support this hypothesis, because relevant Indonesian officials, including the President himself, used the term *GMF* for both domestic and foreign affairs of Indonesia that encompass many different fields. As seen in the speeches discussed in this dissertation and as proven by interviewing a range of Indonesian officials for this study: DD (2022), Oegroseno (2022), Agusman (2022), Sukma (2024), and Widjajanto (2024), *the GMF* is a term used freely by them to encompass Indonesia's domestic and foreign interests alike. Based on their actions, this research thus considers this hypothesis to have been confirmed true.

Relevance

The author is pleased to note that, with this research, the author became the first to present and point out the exact analysis of the creation, development, and implementation of the GMF from 2014 to 2019.

Outlook

The author hopes this research will likewise spread the awareness of both the GMF and Indonesia's foreign policy workings in academia and induce more research in the future regarding the GMF's creation and implementation and Indonesian foreign policy in the Widodo era from many different perspectives in order to further understand Indonesia, particularly in the West where Indonesia is often misunderstood or at least little understood. Many countries in the West seem to be struggling to truly formulate the right approach to and for Indonesia, who is often predicted to be among the top ten or even the top five biggest economies sometime this century, but this is a problem that can be addressed by, among other things, studying how Indonesia's identity and viewpoint frame its foreign policy behaviors in order for the West to act and react accordingly.

To add, from the author's own outlook, this research has also allowed the author to be bold enough to state that the influences of great powers that are China and the US in Indonesia may not be as gargantuan as they first appear to be, although its significance can also not be undermined. Therefore, a rethinking of the influences of Beijing and Washington in Jakarta is something the author would specifically encourage because the author believes the constructivist theory that steered this dissertation has forwarded the importance of Indonesia's own identity and viewpoint regarding the role it has assumed and wants to assume in the world.

Furthermore, since Indonesia is a Southeast Asian country, the author would likewise encourage further rethinking of the Chinese and American influences in the foreign policymaking of other Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Most countries in Southeast Asia share a history of being colonized for hundreds of years by foreign powers and then having to survive the Cold War tension where a battle for influences permeated throughout the region for almost 50 years. Their shared fate arguably shaped their own viewpoint of and in the world. Hence, even when they react to Chinese or American foreign policy, more than Chinese and American

influences in Southeast Asia should be taken into account to make sense of their behavior. If how Southeast Asian countries perceive their own identity and the roles they have assumed and want to assume in the world were taken into consideration more frequently when trying to comprehend their foreign policymaking, the field of IR studies would be able to enhance its options and even its abilities to better discern Southeast Asia's foreign policy. For the IR scholarship as a whole, this will be beneficial and enriching.

Lastly, the author also endorses the suggestion of Widjajanto regarding the existence of a necessary technocratic document for the GMF so that it can be applied accordingly, hopefully in the succeeding administration of Widodo's that ended in October 2024. Indeed, for any strategy in Indonesia, let alone a grand one, a thorough preparation on all levels, including the existence of the needed technocratic documents, is demanded yet sadly not met at the time of writing. This research permitted the author to comprehend that Indonesia still truly needs further refinement, from top to bottom, in its grand ambition to be the GMF. A blueprint for the whole initiative is sorely needed like Laksmana said, and an actual masterplan, or borrowing the words of Widjajanto, a technocratic document to ensure the smoothness of this complex operation is required before the global ambition of the world's largest archipelago to be the GMF can be fully realized.

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