



universität
wien

MASTER THESIS | MASTER'S THESIS

Titel | Title

Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

verfasst von | submitted by

Karlo Zangurashvili

angestrebter akademischer Grad | in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S.)

Wien | Vienna, 2025

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt | UA 992 940
Degree programme code as it
appears on the student record sheet:

Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt | Internationale Studien | International Studies
| Degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:

Betreut von | Supervisor: Priv.Doiz. Robert Schuett, Ph.D



diplomatische
akademie wien
Vienna School of International Studies
École des Hautes Études Internationales de Vienne

On my honour as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

Karlo Zangurashvili
Vienna Diplomatic Academy
05.06.2025

Abstract

Background: The turning point in post–Cold War European stability in terms of conventional military power and transparency between NATO and former Warsaw Pact members was the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The treaty first succeeded until the reality of NATO's eastward expansion and the changes in security dynamics reduced its relevance. Russia saw this expansion as a threat, and the CFE Treaty could not adjust to the evolving political and technological landscapes, such as the war in cyberspace and autonomous weapons. Thus, this research fills the treaty's gaps by addressing the requirement of adaptable arms control organizations equipped to be resourceful in reacting to present-day security dangers and upholding European harmony.

Methodology: The methodology used in the research is based on the qualitative method with secondary data for the analysis of the downfall of the CFE Treaty and its consequences for European security. The research applies three main theoretical lenses, realism, institutionalism, and constructivism, to show how power relative dispersal, institutional impediments, and identity transformation affected the making of post-Cold War Pan-European arms control. The analysis looks at the CFE's disparity with NATO's expansion and emerging security threats.

Findings: The research found that when the CFE treaty first served to enhance European security, it did not prove flexible enough to NATO expansion, Russian security personnel, and today's cyber warfare. The study's limitations indicate that future arms control frameworks should not be fixed, ignored, or adaptable to changing global dynamics. Arms control frameworks will result in sustained strategic instability in a rapidly evolving security space.

Conclusions and recommendations: The study concludes that in achieving the enhanced European security created by the CFE treaty during its first decade through transparency and

arms reduction, the treaty became obsolete with geopolitical shifts and technological advances. Future arms control will require flexible, modular frameworks built on cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence and satellite monitoring. Cutting-edge technologies are flexible on verification and regular on treaty reviews, confidence-building measures, and regional agreements for sustaining global security and cooperation.

Keywords: CFE Treaty; Adaptable Frameworks; European Security; Arms-Control; NATO Expansion; Cyber Warfare; Geopolitical Shifts.

Abstrakt

Hintergrund: Der Wendepunkt in der Stabilität Europas nach dem Kalten Krieg im Hinblick auf konventionelle militärische Macht und Transparenz zwischen der NATO und ehemaligen Mitgliedern des Warschauer Pakts war der Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa (KSE) von 1990. Der Vertrag war zunächst erfolgreich, verlor jedoch an Relevanz, als die NATO sich nach Osten ausdehnte und sich die sicherheitspolitische Dynamik veränderte. Russland sah diese Ausdehnung als Bedrohung an, und der KSE-Vertrag konnte sich nicht an die sich wandelnden politischen und technologischen Rahmenbedingungen anpassen, wie etwa den Krieg im Cyberspace und autonome Waffensysteme. Diese Forschung schließt die Lücken des Vertrags, indem sie die Notwendigkeit anpassungsfähiger Rüstungskontrollorganisationen betont, die in der Lage sind, auf heutige Sicherheitsbedrohungen flexibel zu reagieren und die europäische Stabilität zu erhalten.

Methodologie: Die angewandte Methodologie basiert auf einer qualitativen Herangehensweise unter Verwendung sekundärer Daten zur Analyse des Niedergangs des KSE-Vertrags und seiner Auswirkungen auf die europäische Sicherheit. Die Forschung nutzt drei theoretische Ansätze – Realismus, Institutionalismus und Konstruktivismus – um zu zeigen, wie die relative Machtverteilung, institutionelle Hindernisse und Identitätsveränderungen die Gestaltung der gesamteuropäischen Rüstungskontrolle nach dem Kalten Krieg beeinflusst haben. Die Analyse beleuchtet die Diskrepanz des KSE-Vertrags im Hinblick auf die NATO-Erweiterung und neu aufkommende Sicherheitsbedrohungen.

Ergebnisse: Die Forschung ergab, dass der KSE-Vertrag anfangs zur Stärkung der europäischen Sicherheit beitrug, sich jedoch nicht ausreichend flexibel gegenüber der NATO-Erweiterung, der russischen Sicherheitsstrategie und der heutigen Cyberkriegsführung zeigte.

Die in der Studie aufgezeigten Begrenzungen deuten darauf hin, dass künftige Rüstungskontrollsysteme weder starr noch unbeachtet bleiben dürfen, sondern an sich verändernde globale Dynamiken anpassbar sein müssen. Unflexible Rüstungskontrollsysteme führen in einem sich schnell wandelnden Sicherheitsumfeld zu strategischer Instabilität.

Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen: Die Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass der KSE-Vertrag zwar in seinem ersten Jahrzehnt durch Transparenz und Rüstungsreduzierung zur europäischen Sicherheit beitrug, jedoch durch geopolitische Verschiebungen und technologische Entwicklungen obsolet wurde. Zukünftige Rüstungskontrollregime müssen flexible, modulare Rahmenwerke sein, die auf modernen Technologien wie künstlicher Intelligenz und Satellitenüberwachung beruhen. Solche Technologien bieten flexible Verifikationsmöglichkeiten, ermöglichen regelmäßige Vertragsüberprüfungen, vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und regionale Vereinbarungen zur Aufrechterhaltung globaler Sicherheit und Kooperation.

Schlüsselwörter: KSE-Vertrag; anpassungsfähige Rahmenwerke; europäische Sicherheit; Rüstungskontrolle; NATO-Erweiterung; Cyberkrieg; geopolitische Veränderungen.

Table of Contents

Abstract	2
Chapter One: Introduction & Literature Review	10
Introduction.....	10
Background of Study	10
Research Aim.....	13
Research Objectives.....	13
Research Questions.....	14
Structure of Study	14
Literature Review.....	15
The CFE Treaty’s Design and Objectives: Verification Mechanisms, Numerical Limitations, and Transparency.....	15
Impact of NATO Enlargement and Post-Cold War Security Concerns	17
Russia’s Perspectives on the Treaty: Military Imbalances and Security Threats	19
Collapse of Arms Control Frameworks in Europe: Parallels with Other Treaties (INF, Open Skies).....	22
Research Gap	28
Chapter Summary	29
Chapter Two: Theory/concepts & Methodology	30

Theoretical Framework	30
Realism Perspective	30
Institutionalist Perspective	32
Constructivist Perspective	35
Methodology	37
Research Philosophy	37
Research Method	39
Research Approach	41
Research Design	42
Data Collection	43
Data Analysis	44
Research Reliability and Validity	45
Potential Challenges and Limitations	47
Ethical considerations	48
Chapter Summary	49
Chapter Three: Analysis and Finding	51
The CFE Treaty: Foundations and Impact on Post-Cold War European Security	51
Geopolitical and Institutional Challenges: Factors Leading to the Breakdown of the CFE Treaty	57
Building a New European Security Architecture: The Role of Arms Control in Long-Term Stability and Conflict Prevention	61
Building a New Arms Control Mechanism for Contemporary Security Challenges Based On the Ukraine War	62

Chapter Summary	68
Chapter Four: Analysis and Discussion	70
Re-engineering Strategic Trust: How the CFE Treaty Re-shaped Transparency Norms in Post-Cold-War Europe	70
Technology Outruns Treaty: The Limits of Legacy Verification in the Cyber-Precision Age	74
Perception Gaps and Power Shifts: NATO Enlargement, Russian Insecurity, and the Spiral of Distrust	78
Designing the Next Generation: Toward an Adaptive and Inclusive Arms-Control Framework for Europe	82
Reimagining Arms Control: A Post-CFE Mechanism for the Ukrainian War and Beyond	85
Chapter Summary	86
Significance and Contribution of the Research	87
Potential Challenges and Limitations	88
Chapter Five: Conclusion	89
Recommendations	92
Future Research	92
Study Implications	93
Bibliography	95

Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review

Introduction

Background of Study

A pivotal breakthrough in transforming Cold War Europe into a peaceful post-Cold War region arrived with the 1990 signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The international agreement sought solutions for the extensive global changes after the Soviet Union dissolved and the Warsaw Pact collapsed.¹ A new security era emerged after the Cold War, requiring the reorganization of European defense systems. Arms control established itself as the fundamental instrument for establishing stability, suppressing potential new conflicts, and promoting alliances between past enemies.² The CFE Treaty established its position as an essential pillar of this redesigned European security system, which was intended to regulate conventional military force levels to minimize NATO-Warsaw Pact military tensions. The CFE Treaty established a primary objective to regulate the number of traditional weapons, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters held by NATO and Warsaw Pact states within the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains region.³ The treaty established apparent force limitations on conventional military equipment while cutting down capabilities to avert sudden conflicts; through its verification processes that involved sharing data routinely and performing on-site inspections and information sharing, the treaty established open

¹ Mark Kramer, *The Fate of the Soviet Bloc's Military Alliance: Reform, Adaptation, and Collapse of the Warsaw Pact, 1985–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025): 22.

² John R. Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French, *Future War and the Defence of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021): 16.

³ Wolfgang Richter, "The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty," in *Research Handbook on International Arms Control Law*, edited by Eric Myjer and Thilo Marauhn (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2022): 2.

perspectives that diminished potential confrontations between previous Cold War enemies.⁴

These security measures formed the basis for developing European confidence and advancing regional peace-building initiatives.

The European geopolitical environment underwent significant changes because NATO grew during this period. Many former Warsaw Pact states chose Western alignment as the Soviet Union dissolved, leading NATO to undertake its eastern expansion.⁵ NATO's initial expansion received a positive reception as a symbol of European dedication to democratic principles, peace, and stability.⁶ During its operational period, the CFE Treaty functioned as a stabilizing mechanism by confining the state's conventional military strength and blocking harmful security growth. The early NATO expansion benefited from this agreement, which prevented military forces from reaching a state of open conflict.

The CFE Treaty started to exhibit weakening points after NATO continued its eastward expansion into Eastern European territories. The expectations about the treaty's ability to preserve European peace waned because diplomatic circumstances transformed. The treaty's original aim at military force stabilization between NATO and the Warsaw Pact became inadequate when security issues developed.⁷ Entering former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO shifted Europe's military and political structure.⁸ Russia, which dominates the former Soviet

⁴ William E. Wilcox, *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Russian Foreign and Security Policy, from the End of the USSR to the War in Ukraine* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2024). 256

⁵ Danny Singh, "NATO During the Cold War and Dissolution of the Soviet Union," in *The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia's Invasion of Ukraine*, edited by Danny Singh (Cham: Springer, 2023), 67–82.

⁶ Zeynep Arkan, *European Security and Hybrid Threats* (Cham: Springer, 2025), 77.

⁷ Łukasz Kulcsar, "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe," *Survival* 60, no. 4 (2023): 8.

⁸ Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviets, the Warsaw Pact, and the Eastern European Militaries," in *Central And Eastern Europe*, edited by William E. Griffith (London: Routledge, 2021): 140.

republics, began viewing its security situation unfavorably as NATO expanded throughout the territories.⁹ Russia grew displeased with the CFE Treaty because it failed to adapt to post-Soviet European realities and because Russia felt direct threats to its security.¹⁰ According to existing literature, the CFE Treaty served as a catalyst for early cooperation between NATO and countries that belonged to the Eastern Bloc. The research lacks clarity regarding the effects of the treaty's decline on European security after the Cold War period. Research on the CFE Treaty mainly examines its initial critical phase after the Cold War. However, the analysis of how this treaty's improper evolution alongside NATO's growth and shifting security patterns hindered sustained area peace remains unclear. The expansion of NATO created Russian security concerns while revealing the inadequacy of military control pacts created for past geopolitical realities.¹¹ The CFE Treaty faced problems addressing modern security threats developed through military technological progress, such as cyber warfare, autonomous weapons systems, and hybrid warfare methods.¹² These technological innovations created significant obstacles for conventional arms control systems that managed predictable security environments. Thus, the treaty structure failed to anticipate cyberattacks and non-state actor involvement by not providing regulations for physical equipment control, since it predates current non-conventional threats. New security challenges have pushed the necessity to establish flexible arms control systems to handle advanced warfare complexities.

⁹ John E. Herbst et al., "European Security, NATO–Russia Relations, and the Post–Cold War Order," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 26, no. 3 (2024): 210.

¹⁰ Ibid: 1.

¹¹ Nick Megoran, "'Russian Troops Out! No to NATO Expansion!': A Pacific Geopolitics for a New Europe," *Political Geography* 98 (2022): 2.

¹² William E. Lippert and Jordan Becker, "Conventional Arms Control and Military Balance in Europe," *Contemporary Security Policy* (26 March 2025): 9.

The European arms control history records the CFE Treaty as essential, yet its restricted effectiveness for modern defense concerns shows that fresh arms control models should emerge. Research must address the shortcomings in current studies about European arms control framework development strategies for today's geopolitical dynamics and technological advances.¹³ The security environment and political developments require adaptable arms control systems. The current research investigates the transformation of the CFE Treaty alongside European arms control systems, which is necessary to adapt to present security threats from cyber-attacks, alongside autonomous weapon technology. The changing security situation across Europe requires new arms control systems that address evolving conventional military limitations and modern, non-threatening security threats. The research will analyze how CFE Treaty limitations in handling NATO growth and new technological dangers can create better adaptable arms control agreements. The study will advance a universal understanding of European arms control through its research gap analysis, which provides valuable direction for designing future security control systems.

Research Aim

The research sought to explore past arms control instruments, especially the CFE Treaty, to acquire functional knowledge that will help build adaptable security architectures.

Research Objectives

The present research paper has three main objectives:

1. To assess how the CFE Treaty shaped European security patterns since the Cold War ended.

¹³ Steven Pifer, "The Future of Strategic Arms Control," *Sicherheit & Frieden* 36, no. 2 (2018): 73.

2. To take a comprehensive look at geopolitical elements and institutional structures with strategic frameworks that caused the CFE Treaty to fail.
3. To investigate possibilities for the international community to create a new weapons control system that inherits essential CFE Treaty standards such as open reporting, mutual weapon restrictions, and independent verification systems.

Research Questions

The central research questions for this study are:

1. How did the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) shape post-Cold War security dynamics, contribute to arms control in Europe, and what geopolitical, institutional, and strategic factors led to its eventual breakdown?
2. What role can arms control play in shaping a new European security architecture that ensures long-term stability and conflict prevention?
3. How can the international community build a new mechanism based on the CFE's fundamental principles to address contemporary security challenges, particularly in the Ukrainian war and its aftermath?

Structure of Study

The research paper follows this structure in its organization:

1. Introduction and literature review: The first chapter presents the research topic while detailing its goal, objectives, and research question, together with explaining the study's significance. The CFE Treaty receives historical context in European post-Cold War security, and the paper examines key literature about arms control and NATO expansion alongside contemporary security dangers. The research recognizes absent knowledge in academic fields while establishing the requirements for conducting this study.

2. Theory and methodology: The research bases its framework on realism, institutionalism, and regime theory. The qualitative research design uses case study analysis, thematic document review, detailed explanations of data sources, and ethical and scope-related concepts.
3. Analysis of findings: The third section demonstrates the study's principal results by examining the CFE Treaty's actual effects, operational deficiencies, and the geopolitical and institutional elements that caused its demise due to NATO enlargement and Russia's evolving security policies.
4. Discussion: The findings about modern security difficulties are interpreted in this chapter. This review examines past knowledge from the CFE Treaty to help establish future controls, particularly regarding cyber war, hybrid threats, and new technology developments.
5. Conclusion: A summary of findings, policy recommendations, and directions for future research.

Literature Review

The CFE Treaty's Design and Objectives: Verification Mechanisms, Numerical Limitations, and Transparency

European arms control policies have transformed because of global political changes since the end of the Cold War. This study puts particular weight on understanding how arms control frameworks, especially the CFE Treaty, helped secure European security after the Cold War ended. Koivula and Simonen state that the CFE Treaty remains vital for conventional force

control and transparency.¹⁴ However, McCausland suggests its rigid framework made it ill-suited for evolving geopolitical realities, especially NATO's expansion and Russia's security priorities.¹⁵ The strict structure of the CFE Treaty established control of conventional forces. Still, it could not adjust when NATO expanded, and Russia began developing security concerns during the changing geopolitical environment. The treaty lost its ability to handle emerging strategic issues because of its rigid nature. According to McCausland, the treaty maintained a simplified view of European security by assuming that military force balances could permanently ensure peace.¹⁶ In contrast, Rotfeld et al. claimed that traditional arms control frameworks became less effective because the treaty failed to evolve when faced with emerging security challenges, including cyber warfare and autonomous weapons systems.¹⁷ Technological advancements, including cyber and hybrid warfare operations, have proved to be significant obstacles to conventional arms control systems created for predictable security situations, according to Koivula and Simonen.¹⁸ Schaller's observations support the idea that emerging technologies have created security issues that the CFE Treaty struggled to handle.¹⁹ Although Koivula, Simonen, and Schaller claim that cyber operations and autonomous systems reveal the CFE's verification regime as "outdated," other experts minimize the independent effect of technology. Futter argues that since cyber tools are mostly intangible, they do not undermine or

¹⁴ Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen, *Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats* (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2017): 120.

¹⁵ Jeffrey D. McCausland, "European/Eurasian Security and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013): 589.

¹⁶ Ibid: 1.

¹⁷ Adam Daniel Rotfeld et al., "The Future of Arms Control and International Security," in *Arms Control* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2000): 44.

¹⁸ Koivula and Simonen, *Arms Control in Europe*: 121.

¹⁹ Benjamin Schaller, "Artificial Intelligence in Conventional Arms Control and Military Confidence-Building," (Cham: Springer, 2022): 135.

violate the treaty's quantitative rationale; rather, political non-compliance is what matters most.²⁰ Similarly, Ibarra demonstrates that on-site inspections in the late 2000s continued to operate effectively despite precision-guided munitions, indicating that the technical framework was still effective when nations opted to collaborate.²¹ Collectively, these studies reframe technology as a catalyst for political motives instead of an independent cause of treaty deterioration, an understanding that this research paper examines by separating material factors from strategic ones. Furthermore, this research points out that the CFE Treaty's historical significance demonstrates why new arms control systems need adaptable mechanisms to handle technological developments and recurring political changes. Future arms control systems must show greater responsiveness and flexibility because the former military stability has transformed into a dynamic international order. The treaty's failure to adapt reveals that arms control mechanisms should be understood as living processes that need periodic updates to stay significant in confronting new threats.

Impact of NATO Enlargement and Post-Cold War Security Concerns

After the Cold War, European geopolitical changes significantly impacted arms control because of NATO's military expansion toward Eastern Europe. Based on Lippert's ideation, the CFE Treaty originally intended to manage military forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but it lost its relevance when NATO expanded.²² This point was supported by Marten, who claimed that NATO's addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members created a significant shift in Europe's military and political structure, which weakened Russia's security

²⁰ Andrew Futter, *Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 5.

²¹ Lisa Ibarra, *NATO's Vital Role in the Cold War: Strategic Triumphs, Defending Europe, and Safeguarding Peace* (np: Nicholas Horne, 2010): 51.

²² William E. Lippert, "A European Military Balance Organization and Dynamic Conventional Arms Control," *Bulletin of Carol I National Defence University* 12, no. 3 (2023): 59.

concerns.²³ The treaty, which was intended to stop conflicts through stabilizing military forces, became obsolete when NATO expanded because it failed to solve new strategic threats. The CFE Treaty lost its purpose of restricting NATO-Warsaw Pact military forces because NATO evolved through expansion. When former Warsaw Pact countries joined NATO, the military and political equilibrium changed, which made Russia feel more insecure. The treaty functioned to maintain force stability and prevent conflicts, yet it did not solve the emerging operational challenges that NATO's growth brought. According to Graef and Rotfeld et al., the post-communist expansion resulted in dual advantages through its support of Eastern Bloc economic growth and stability within the region.^{24,25} The security advancements strengthened European security but showed the inadequacies of arms regulation systems made for a previous security framework. The analysis from all the sources above on arms control deterioration fails to incorporate several opposing views. For instance, Shackett maintains that NATO expansion alone did not trigger arms control deterioration because NATO was unable to support confidence-building measures that could have sustained stability through membership changes.²⁶ It suggests that the CFE Treaty would have remained viable if there had been proper supportive mechanisms, and NATO's expansion alone was not the reason for its failure. Furthermore, Idarand et al. demonstrate that Russia amplified its security fears as diplomatic leverage to attain multiple foreign policy objectives,

²³ Kimberly Marten, "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating Its Consequences in Russia." *International Politics* 57, no. 3 (2020): 401-426.

²⁴ Alexander Graef, "Beyond Stability: The Politics of Conventional Arms Control in Europe," *Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* 10, no. 2 (2021): 220.

²⁵ Rotfeld et al., "The Future of Arms Control," 44.

²⁶ Stanton S. Shackett, *Building Without a Cornerstone: The Indispensable Role of CFE in the European Security Structure* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013): 17.

while the supposed CFE violations served as strategic bargaining tools.²⁷ This evidence contradicts the main idea linking Russian security concerns to NATO expansion. Based on this argument, the claims made about CFE violations could have been meant to be bargaining tools rather than expressions of true insecurity. Graef also added that the CFE Treaty collapse was not due to NATO expansion but because it contained faulty fundamental concepts that emphasized counting weapons instead of measuring battlefield capabilities.²⁸ The explanation of arms control failures through NATO expansion proves insufficient compared to these contrasting perspectives, which show other comprehensive causal factors.

Russia's Perspectives on the Treaty: Military Imbalances and Security Threats

The institutional and political obstacles to arms control measures proved essential in destroying frameworks such as the CFE Treaty. Koivula and Simonen identify the failure of arms control institutions to adapt to changing geopolitical circumstances as the principal explanation for the CFE Treaty.²⁹ Graef added to this viewpoint by claiming that the refusal to update the treaty showed how hard it is to modify institutional frameworks when geopolitical dynamics change, especially regarding NATO's expansion.³⁰ Pifer also argued that arms control institutions need adaptable response systems to counter security threats as they change.³¹ Koivula and Simonen, along with Graef and Pifer, contend that the rigidity of institutions was key to the weakening of the CFE Treaty, especially emphasizing the treaty's failure to adjust to NATO's geopolitical growth and changing security challenges. Hayashi directly contradicts this

²⁷ Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony, *The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?* (Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security, 2023): 21.

²⁸ Graef, "Beyond Stability," 230.

²⁹ Koivula and Simonen, *Arms Control in Europe*: 118.

³⁰ Graef, "Beyond Stability," 220.

³¹ Pifer, "Future of Strategic Arms Control," 70.

perspective, claiming that arms control institutions provided substantial flexibility via verification measures and possible treaty modifications; however, it was political actors, not institutional frameworks, who intentionally hindered these possibilities.³² At the same time, Mason highlights technological hurdles, including precision weapon systems, which have made conventional verification approaches outdated³³, while Ibarra presents the treaty's end as a logical outcome of its initial transitional objectives.³⁴ These varying viewpoints suggest three separate explanations that rendered arms control measures ineffective: institutional inflexibility, political hindrance, and technological outdatedness, which the research paper will methodically evaluate against historical data.

Political obstacles have proven to be equally essential barriers to arms control. According to Kulesa, major nations, especially the United States and Russia, face strategic differences that regularly create deadlocks during arms control dialogues.³⁵ Moreover, Graef demonstrates how America's independent foreign policy strategy prevents the maintenance of international weapons control agreements.³⁶ The research indicates that major powers' opposing political agendas and declining trust between nations have made substantial European arms control agreements impossible. In support of this point, Glod explained that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other institutions face organizational inefficiencies that make it

³² M. Hayashi, "Suspension of Certain Obligations of the CFE Treaty by NATO Allies," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 18, no. 1 (2013): 140.

³³ Ronald Mason, "Conventional Forces and Stability in Europe: Some Thoughts on Force Structures," in *[book title n.a.]* (London: Routledge, 2019): 160.

³⁴ Lisa Ibarra, *NATO's Vital Role in the Cold War: Strategic Triumphs, Defending Europe, and Safeguarding Peace* (n.p.: Nicholas Horne, 2010): 51.

³⁵ Łukasz Kulesa, "Strategic Arms Control Deadlock and the Possible Ways Out," in *[book title n.a.]* (Cham: Springer, 2023): 119.

³⁶ Graef, "Beyond Stability," 220.

difficult to manage recent challenges, including cyber threats and non-state actors, and thus create additional obstacles.³⁷ Koivula and Simonen added to this topic by claiming that the absence of political support and insufficient organizational backing for arms control strategies constrains European arms control progress.³⁸ On the contrary, several researchers challenge the views expressed above. In light of this point, Hayashi disapproves of institutional failure by arguing that verification protocols and treaty changes received significant flexibility from institutions, yet political actors strategically undermined these institutions.³⁹ The notion of institutional rigidity as the leading cause of CFE treaty failure receives direct opposition from this information. Furthermore, according to Mason, political barriers remained secondary to technological innovations, especially dual-use technologies and precision weapons, since these developments made counting methods outdated beyond any political interference.⁴⁰ The point that arms control frameworks experienced failure received a complete rejection from Ibarra, who demonstrated their success in achieving their transitional goals to manage Cold War force reductions while guiding NATO's expansion toward the East without military conflicts.⁴¹ The CFE Treaty served as a planned transitional instrument that finished its designated function instead of becoming an enduring institution that experienced failure. Based on these researchers'

³⁷ Katia Glod, "Assessing the OSCE Toolbox: Opportunities for a Safer Europe," *European Leadership Network* (March 2025): 35.

³⁸ Koivula and Simonen, *Arms Control in Europe*: 127.

³⁹ M. Hayashi, "Suspension of Certain Obligations of the CFE Treaty by NATO Allies," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 18, no. 1 (2013): 140.

⁴⁰ Ronald Mason, "Conventional Forces and Stability in Europe: Some Thoughts on Force Structures," in *[book title n.a.]* (London: Routledge, 2019): 160.

⁴¹ Lisa Ibarra, *NATO's Vital Role in the Cold War: Strategic Triumphs, Defending Europe, and Safeguarding Peace* (n.p.: Nicholas Horne, 2010): 51.

perspectives, it is evident that political and institutional restrictions do not explain all aspects of the CFE Treaty's failure.

Collapse of Arms Control Frameworks in Europe: Parallels with Other Treaties (INF, Open Skies)

The European disarmament frameworks, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, ended due to geopolitical, technological, and institutional reasons. Pifer, Steven, and Oliver Meier indicate that the two treaties brought revolutionary changes to global security during the Cold War, yet lost their relevance because of worldwide strategic alterations.⁴² The decline of the INF and Open Skies Treaties can be linked to several key factors. The treaties failed because they did not adapt to new security realities, and their verification systems could not address emerging threats. The INF Treaty of 1987 received additional analysis from Lanoszka, who described it as one of the most significant achievements of nuclear arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴³ Anderson, Justin, and Amy explained that the INF Treaty resulted in the total removal of nuclear missile types that operated within the 500 to 5,500 km range because they posed the most significant security threat to Europe with their precise delivery capability.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Hodgson mentioned that the verification system established through the treaty achieved its success through data exchanges and on-site inspections.⁴⁵ Despite its success, the INF treaty failed due to several

⁴² Steven Pifer and Oliver Meier, "Are We Nearing the End of the INF Treaty?" *Arms Control Today* 48, no. 1 (2018): 21.

⁴³ Alexander Lanoszka, "The INF Treaty: Pulling Out in Time," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (2019): 50.

⁴⁴ Justin V. Anderson and Amy J. Nelson, "The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-Bound Success," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (2019): 122.

⁴⁵ Grant Hodgson, "Cyber Attack Treaty Verification," in *Treaty Verification* (Columbus, Ohio: State University, 2016): 5.

reasons. According to Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, the INF Treaty failed because its strict framework proved unworkable.⁴⁶ Cimbala supplemented this idea by claiming that Russia began seeing the treaty as incompatible with its developing security requirements.⁴⁷ New missile threats from China and North Korea appeared after the Soviet Union's collapse. The INF Treaty experienced failure due to the combination of these explanatory viewpoints. On the contrary, Bezabh claimed that the INF Treaty's failure to accommodate new geopolitical events did not serve as its primary cause for collapse, since the treaty achieved its core objective of minimizing nuclear missile risks between the United States and the Soviet Union before dissolving.⁴⁸ Thus, this factor can be classified as a change in strategic goals instead of treaty structural weaknesses. Another perspective from Oğuz and Erol indicated that the INF treaty failed when the United States officially withdrew from the agreement in 2019 because Russia developed the SSC-8 missile.⁴⁹ Therefore, it can be determined that the INF Treaty collapsed significantly due to its inability to adapt to emerging geopolitical developments, such as the rise of new missile powers in the world.

Various researchers have investigated both the strengths and shortcomings of the Open Skies treaty. Jones mentioned that the Open Skies Treaty started operating in 2002 as a military

⁴⁶ Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker, “‘The Reward of a Thing Well Done Is to Have Done It’: The Rise and Fall of the INF Treaty, 1987–2019,” in *[book title n.a.]* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020): 12.

⁴⁷ Stephen J. Cimbala, “The INF Treaty and New START: Escalation Control, Strategic Fatalism, and the Role of Cyber,” in *The INF Treaty and New START* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2021): 195.

⁴⁸ Abebe Bahiru Bezabh, “The Legal Requirements and Impacts of Unilateral Withdrawal from International Treaties: The Case of the INF Treaty,” *CIFILE Journal of International Law* 4, no. 2 (2023): 62.

⁴⁹ Şafak Oğuz and Mehmet S. Erol, “End of the INF Treaty: Are We Entering a New Cold War Era?” *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 14, no. 28 (2021): 5.

transparency agreement through aerial surveillance cooperation.⁵⁰ Member states under this treaty gained permission to perform aerial surveillance across one another's land for military force and activity assessment. Prokhorova explained that Open Skies started as a transparency-building agreement that assisted former opponents in establishing trust between each other.⁵¹ After the Cold War ended, the treaty was vital to track conventional military forces in European territories with the CFE Treaty. However, the combination of satellite reconnaissance technology and better military intelligence reduced the practical usefulness of certain parts of the treaty. Sokov supported this assertion by explaining that the Open Skies regime experienced significant pressure through the United States' departure from the treaty because Russia failed to honor overflight requirements.⁵² The failure of both the INF and Open Skies Treaties occurred because of multiple additional factors. According to Bell et al., the original political circumstances that formed these agreements have entirely disappeared from the current world situation.⁵³ As mentioned above, the INF Treaty emerged because both the United States and Soviet Union were fighting a heated nuclear arms race where missiles with intermediate ranges presented significant security risks to their nations. Oğuz and Erol agreed with the idea of Bell et al. by claiming that after the Cold War ended and new worldwide dangers appeared, especially the Asian nations'

⁵⁰ Peter Jones, "Making a Better Treaty on Open Skies," *James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies* (2021): 6.

⁵¹ Anastasia Prokhorova, "Reducing Military Risks Through OSCE Instruments," *Strategic Security Analysis* 15 (2021): 7.

⁵² Nikolai Sokov, "The U.S. Withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty," *Pathways to Peace and Security*, no. 1 (2021): 140.

⁵³ Alexandra Bell, Wolfgang Richter, and Andrei Zagorski, "Deep Cuts Issue Brief #9: How to Fix, Preserve and Strengthen the Open Skies Treaty" (Hamburg: Deep Cuts Commission, March 2020), 5.

nuclear weapons, the standardized terms of the INF Treaty proved difficult to uphold.⁵⁴

Therefore, it can be established that the INF Treaty demonstrated its constraints through its failure to regulate missile development by third-party states, particularly China, as the world security situation evolved.

Similarly, the Open Skies treaty faced several challenges that deterred its success. Fox and Ismail pointed out that Open Skies faced problems because it could not adjust to new circumstances.⁵⁵ This viewpoint was backed by Kertysova et al., who claimed that Open Skies started as an initiative for European security but lost value when new satellite technology and reconnaissance reduced the need for aerial surveillance.⁵⁶ As mentioned by McCauley, the other factor that led to the failure of the Open Skies Treaty was the evolving security conditions because NATO expanded and the Soviet Union dissolved.⁵⁷ Furthermore, insufficient verification systems proved to be major contributors to the demise of the INF and Open Skies treaties. In light of this point, Woolf explained that on-site inspections proved successful for the INF Treaty until Russia violated its terms by deploying the SSC-8 missile, which exposed weaknesses in the verification system.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Jones argued that the failure of these treaties should not be solely attributed to verification problems since global military evolution

⁵⁴ Oğuz and Erol, “End of the INF Treaty,” 7.

⁵⁵ Sarah Jane Fox and Rosida Ismail, “‘The Skies the Limit!’ Aviation Law Perspectives on the Open Skies Treaty,” *European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance* 4, no. 1 (2017): 20.

⁵⁶ Katarina Kertysova, Alexander Graef, et al., “Open Skies in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities” (London: European Leadership Network, 2021), 9.

⁵⁷ Martin McCauley, *Russia, America and the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2013): 116.

⁵⁸ Amy F. Woolf, *Russian Compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016): 6.

played a role in the failure.⁵⁹ In this case, Jones explained that during their initial design phase, the treaties maintained outdated frameworks because they failed to foresee the advanced warfare elements of cyber threats and hybrid operations.⁶⁰ The lack of timely mechanisms for addressing violations led to the substantial loss of trust between the involved parties. Based on Kertysova et al., it is evident that the Open Skies Treaty encountered similar verification difficulties due to evolving satellite technology that let member states avoid treaty standards.⁶¹ Therefore, it can be established that the primary causes of treaty failure between INF and Open Skies are their insufficient adaptation to changed security conditions and insufficient verification procedures. The two agreements faced difficulties when geopolitical conditions evolved. The INF suffered from NATO expansion and Russian violations, while Open Skies became irrelevant because of advanced satellite technology development. The lack of proper verification methods between treaty members led to mistrust because violations remained unidentified or unresolved until both agreements collapsed.

The CFE Treaty faced difficulties comparable to the INF and the Open Skies Treaties. According to Baranovsky, when it was created, the CFE Treaty emerged from a period of geopolitical stability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.⁶² Futter demonstrated that NATO expansion, together with emerging security risks such as new cyber threats and Russian military

⁵⁹ Jones, “Making a Better Treaty,” 10.

⁶⁰ Ibid: 1.

⁶¹ Kertysova et al., “Open Skies in the Arctic,” 9.

⁶² Vladimir Baranovsky, “Political Changes in Europe,” in *The Security Watershed*, edited by Alexei G. Arbatov (London: Routledge, 2020): 3.

strength, resulted in the CFE Treaty's incapable structure.⁶³ The treaty depended on quantitative restrictions while maintaining a passive view of military potency because contemporary combat evolves differently than anticipated. Therefore, it is evident that this treaty implemented quantitative limits on weapon systems while maintaining a limited view of military capabilities. The treaty proved insufficient to address swift advances in war technology, new weapons development, and transformations in military doctrines. The treaty lost its original value because it failed to predict future warfare developments, leading to its framework's permanent obsolescence. Moreover, Wilcox explained that the CFE Treaty faced significant criticism because it failed to transform with changing geopolitical conditions, especially regarding NATO growth and Russian security concerns.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, Shackett offered an opposing viewpoint, contending that NATO expansion by itself did not necessarily result in the treaty's collapse.⁶⁵ Rather, Shackett highlights the inadequate execution of supportive confidence-building initiatives, indicating that the treaty's structure could have stayed workable if properly backed. Regardless of this differing perspective, the main conclusion still holds that the arms control framework faltered mainly due to the treaty's inability to adjust its terms following NATO's enlargement.⁶⁶ This setback reflected the scenario with the INF Treaty, which failed to adjust to emerging missile technologies. The INF and Open Skies Treaties failed along with the CFE Treaty, which emphasized the need for flexible terms in contemporary arms control agreements. These important agreements served their intended functions well when initially created, but their

⁶³ Andrew Futter, *Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 5.

⁶⁴ Wilcox, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces*: 256.

⁶⁵ Stanton S. Shackett, *Building Without a Cornerstone: The Indispensable Role of CFE in the European Security Structure* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013): 17.

⁶⁶ Ibid: 1.

eventual failure to adapt to evolving geopolitical and technological situations resulted in their decline.

Future arms control constructions must develop from existing failures by implementing adjustable systems for verification processes, dispute settlement, and periodic analyses to remain applicable in evolving global defense environments. These treaties failed to demonstrate effectiveness because the world needs flexible control systems to adapt to changing strategic situations and emerging peril.

Research Gap

The existing literature about arms control delivers essential knowledge about expanding controlling frameworks, yet it explores these frameworks from a general, wide-angle perspective instead of studying European-specific dynamics. Koivula and Simonen, Wilcox, and Graef analyze arms control within the context of NATO growth and contemporary threats, including cyber warfare alongside autonomous systems.⁶⁷⁶⁸⁶⁹ The authors examine global and regional dynamics instead of conducting thorough research into European security patterns. Once European security dynamics become recognized in scholarly literature, researchers fail to investigate the 'direct impacts on European arms control practices. Fortunately for European security and arms control systems, the influence of technical weapons system upgrades, geopolitical adjustments, and institutional operational hurdles has received ample investigation. However, researchers still need to uncover the sophisticated effects these elements create on these systems. The research objective addresses this gap by analyzing European arms control frameworks, especially the CFE Treaty, and their encounter with geopolitical forces,

⁶⁷ Koivula and Simonen, *Arms Control in Europe*: 125.

⁶⁸ Wilcox, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces*: 25.

⁶⁹ Graef, "Beyond Stability," 220.

technological developments, and institutional barriers. This research examines the European region specifically to show how arms control needs to change its approach to handling modern European security needs.

Chapter Summary

This chapter analyzes the collapse of major European arms control agreements, notably the Treaty on the Conference on Exchange of Forces, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty. The CFE Treaty, essential for transparency and conventional force control, became inoperative due to NATO's post-Cold War expansion and Russia's growing security concerns. Moreover, the Treaty failed due to new developments in information technology, such as cyber warfare and autonomous weapons. The expansion of NATO destroyed the military equilibrium. NATO alienated Russia from the CFE Treaty because of its mistrust on the one side, and because the CFE Treaty was becoming obsolete. Its demolition of the INF Treaty was similar as it made it ineffective for new missile threats from China and North Korea. Moreover, the Open Skies Treaty had become outdated with the development of satellite technology. Thus, the chapter emphasizes the importance of flexible, changeable arms control frameworks conceived and revised to deal with emerging security threats, which are proceeding dynamically.

Chapter Two: Theory/Concepts & Methodology

Theoretical Framework

This research examined the collapse of the European arms control framework through Realism and Institutionalism and Constructivism theoretical frameworks, which focused on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and its relationship with the INF and Open Skies Treaties. The field of international relations produced these theories at different times, which provide unique yet compatible understandings about arms control systems and international safety.

Realism Perspective

Realism is an essential theory in the field of international relations. According to Wicaksono, Suyastri, and Sundari, this theory was shaped by scholars such as Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli, and further developed in the 20th century by theorists like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz.⁷⁰ Rosenberg added to this topic by stating that the realist theory posits that the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no overarching authority to regulate state behavior.⁷¹ As a result, states operate in a self-help system, driven by the imperative to secure their survival through the pursuit of power. Rosecrance and Stein further developed this argument by claiming that this pursuit often leads to conflict, as states compete for limited resources and influence.⁷² In the context of the current study, realism offered a

⁷⁰ Agung Wicaksono, Cifebrima Suyastri, and Rio Sundari, "Understanding Political Realism," *Journal of Government and Political Issues* 2, no. 2 (2022): 1.

⁷¹ Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 2024): 2.

⁷² Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, "Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy," in *Grand Strategy*, ed. [editor n.a.] (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020): 5.

framework for understanding why arms control treaties, such as the CFE Treaty, are prone to failure. Maitra supports the central tenet of realism, which is that arms control frameworks are fragile when states perceive a threat to their power and security. Maitra argues that arms control agreements often falter when states, preeminent powers like Russia, view their security concerns as paramount and perceive such agreements as inadequate to address shifting power dynamics.⁷³ This view finds substantial support from Eichler, who emphasizes that the CFE Treaty was designed during the Cold War and could not accommodate the post-Cold War realities of an expanding NATO.⁷⁴ For Russia, NATO's expansion represented an existential threat that redefined its security calculus and made arms control agreements increasingly obsolete. This aligns with the broader Realist perspective that arms control fails when it cannot account for changes in the balance of power. Thus, it can be determined that the failure of arms control frameworks like the CFE Treaty was a direct consequence of these geopolitical shifts, underscoring the relevance of Realism to arms control studies.

The realism theory receives significant criticism because of its universal prediction of inevitable conflict. Davis points out that Realism fails to recognize cooperative possibilities, which proves essential for studying complete international relations and arms control procedures.⁷⁵ This assertion demonstrates how realism-centered thinking about conflict causes experts to dismiss diplomatic processes and international institutions that could solve security problems. The other criticism was from Spanger, who claimed that realism exhibits an overly rigid perspective because it does not acknowledge how states can cooperate when security

⁷³ Sumantra Maitra, *The Sources of Russian Aggression: Is Russia a Realist Power?* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2024): 163.

⁷⁴ Jan Eichler, *NATO's Expansion After the Cold War* (Cham: Springer, 2021): 30.

⁷⁵ Zachary S. Davis, "The Realist Nuclear Regime," in *The Realist Tradition*, ed. [editor n.a.] (London: Routledge, 2020): 82.

challenges become serious.⁷⁶ Spanger's criticism of Realism matches observations about the CFE's failure because she demonstrates that states can maintain cooperation through institutional structures when facing security threats. The significant aspect of this critique shows that Realism overlooks the diplomatic potential between states to cooperate internationally. Even though these critiques reveal shortfalls of Realism, they demonstrate that Realist knowledge about security and power helps clarify why international arms control agreements have failed. The pragmatic aspects of realism deliver a fundamental understanding of how security-driven national choices trigger the imminent downfall of multilateral agreements like the CFE Treaty. The adjustment of Russian security perspectives towards NATO's threat status enabled Realism theory to explain why post-Cold War security frameworks faced increasing instability.

Institutionalist Perspective

The institutionalist theory was also applied in the current research. According to Ragatz, institutionalism emerged in the mid-20th century because scholars believed that realism needed improvement due to its emphasis on conflict and power competition.⁷⁷ Keohane also supported this assertion by mentioning that the scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye led the way toward establishing institutional creation as a fundamental means of achieving global cooperation through dispute resolution systems, transparency mechanisms, and collaboration frameworks.⁷⁸ Mayer also shared their opinion by describing what this perspective represents. In this case, Mayer revealed that the institutionalism perspective holds that international bodies and

⁷⁶ Hans-Joachim Spanger, "Rethinking European Security" (Vienna: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2019): 18.

⁷⁷ Julie Ragatz, "The Eclipse of Institutionalism? An Investigation into Consensus around Neoclassical Economics in the 1950s" (PhD diss., Pennsylvania State University, 2025): 33.

⁷⁸ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (London: Routledge, 2020): 15.

legal frameworks decrease business costs between states to establish trust across an anarchic international system.⁷⁹ This perspective provides essential insights into arms control treaties because it demonstrates how institutions, including the OSCE and NATO, support the operational aspects of the CFE treaty. According to Koivula and Simonen, the CFE treaty required institutional methods, including verification systems, transparency standards, and mutual trust elements for its success.⁸⁰ Furthermore, Glod emphasizes the significance of these mechanisms, especially within the framework of the CFE Treaty, because on-site inspections proved essential for verifying compliance.⁸¹ The arms control approach extends beyond reducing military capability because it develops collaborative frameworks that increase security for all participating actors. Therefore, it can be established that the institutionalist perspective highlights the importance of legal frameworks and international institutions, such as NATO and OSCE, in supporting arms control efforts, particularly within the CFE treaty. Some institutional mechanisms, such as transparency standards, verification systems, and mutual trust, fostered compliance between states involved in the agreement.

The institutionalist framework receives criticism from several researchers. For instance, Antonov and Hoffmann disagreed with Keohane's perception that institutionalism helps achieve global cooperation through dispute resolution systems, by maintaining that NATO and the OSCE failed to maintain arms control agreements like the CFE Treaty because they did not adjust to

⁷⁹ Sebastian Mayer, "Institutionalism," in *Handbook of International Relations Theories*, ed. [editor n.a.] (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2023): 39.

⁸⁰ Koivula and Simonen, *Arms Control in Europe*: 119.

⁸¹ Glod, "Assessing the OSCE Toolbox," 35.

changing security threats, including NATO growth and new technological developments.⁸² Su supported the ideation of Antonov and Hoffmann by claiming that most institutionalists demonstrate excessive optimism about the ability of institutions to address security dilemmas, even though political actors may manipulate institutional structures if it serves their national interest goals.⁸³ The strategic intervention of powerful states such as the U.S. and Russia becomes clear through their efforts to undermine institutional structures after realizing that these structures do not serve their national interests. Moreover, Johnson and Heiss argued that institutionalist perspectives fail to recognize that political actors usually pursue their domestic interests ahead of multilateral teamwork.⁸⁴ This point was further backed by Glod, who demonstrated that institutional inefficiencies, together with significant political disengagement, played a major role in the breakdown of arms control agreements.⁸⁵ Based on these ideas, it can be noted that although institutionalism excels at clarifying institutional importance, it underperforms at evaluating states' strategic actions along with their willingness to pursue arms control agreements successfully or not. Despite valid objections, Institutionalism serves as a beneficial approach that requires incorporating awareness of political factors. New geopolitical realities reveal that institutions failed to uphold the CFE Treaty because they remained unprepared to adjust its provisions. The success of arms control depends heavily on key state

⁸² Alexander Antonov and Thomas Hoffmann, "The NATO-Russia Council—An Assessment of the NRC prior to the Ukraine Crisis," in *NATO-Russia Relations*, ed. [editor n.a.] (Cham: Springer, 2020): 245.

⁸³ Hengrui Su, "Revisiting Neoliberal Institutionalism in the Modern Context," *Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences* 7, no. 1 (2023): 3.

⁸⁴ Tana Johnson and Andrew Heiss, "Liberal Institutionalism," in *International Relations Theory*, ed. [editor n.a.] (London: Routledge, 2023): 129.

⁸⁵ Glod, "Assessing the OSCE Toolbox," 35.

actors supporting institutional frameworks because their effectiveness remains dependent on such support. The application of the institutionalist perspective in the current research served well in explaining how arms control works, focusing on institutions such as the OSCE and NATO that are required to ensure compliance and trust between states.

Constructivist Perspective

Constructivism offers a compelling alternative to the materialistic focus of Realism and Institutionalism. Finnemore and Wendt explain that constructivism emerged during the 1980s through Alexander Wendt and other scholars to demonstrate how international relations develop through physical power, institutional elements, and social constructs of identity, norms, and perceptions.⁸⁶ In addition, McDonald suggested that constructivists explain how historical, cultural, and political narratives guide actors to form their security concepts and alliance perceptions while determining their behaviors and interests.⁸⁷ Constructivism explains the breakdown of the CFE Treaty when Russia developed a new national identity and started perceiving NATO as dangerous. State identity development and its impact on security threat understanding remain essential for comprehending the complete breakdown of arms control agreements from a Constructivist perspective. NATO's expansion became especially threatening to Russia because it transformed from a Soviet adversary to a post-Soviet state seeking to defend its sovereignty. How Russia changed its perspective on NATO based on identity factors became a major reason arms control frameworks collapsed. According to Woolf, Russia's view of NATO as a survival-threatening entity became more important than its previous dedication to arms

⁸⁶ Martha Finnemore and Alexander Wendt, "When 'Old' Constructivism Was New," *Perspectives on Politics* 22, no. 4 (2024): 1250.

⁸⁷ Matt McDonald, "Constructivisms," in *International Relations Theories*, ed. [editor n.a.] (London: Routledge, 2023): 1.

control, leading to the breakdown of both the INF and Open Skies Treaties.⁸⁸ Constructivism demonstrates how international relations work beyond material factors by emphasizing state identities alongside norms and perceptions. The transformation of Russia from a Cold War enemy to an independent post-Soviet nation directly influenced its growing concern about NATO as an escalating danger.

Several researchers have criticized Constructivism for its identified weaknesses, although it provides beneficial knowledge. The subjective aspects, including identity and narrative in Constructivism, received criticism from Phillips because they overshadow material and institutional elements.⁸⁹ According to Kühn, Constructivism fails to explain why states decline arms control frameworks, which they potentially endorse, because it ignores material threats, technological progress, and institutional frameworks that shape state actions.⁹⁰ According to Galal, the constructs of ideas and perceptions in constructivist theory may diminish states' strategic interests and the essential functions of international institutions.⁹¹ Constructivism's identification of identity and subjective elements fails to explain how institutional structures and state interests based on power and material factors determine international relations and arms control results. Analysis using Constructivism provides vital insight into arms control breakdowns by proving that political conduct exceeds fundamental material or organizational elements. The research justifiably used constructivism because this theoretical approach

⁸⁸ Woolf, *Russian Compliance with the INF Treaty*: 6.

⁸⁹ Matthew J. Phillips, "Towards a Social Constructionist, Foucauldian-Informed Approach," *SN Social Sciences* 3, no. 10 (2023): 2.

⁹⁰ Ulrich Kühn, *The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020): 154.

⁹¹ Abdelraouf Mostafa Galal, "External Behaviour of Small States," *Review of Economics and Political Science* 5, no. 1 (2020): 56.

delivered an advanced understanding of the collapse of the CFE Treaty by demonstrating how states construct their security concerns through their identity frameworks. Russia's shift from Cold War enemy to post-Soviet independent state led it to view NATO as a security threat, which became the main factor in destroying arms control agreements. Constructivism supports different theoretical approaches because it shows how identity and perception influence international relations while controlling arms.

Methodology

The research methodology section of this study details the chosen philosophy and process alongside the framework and design, as well as data collection methods and analysis techniques. The methodology section thoroughly describes research execution methods, their reasoning, and their connection to research objectives and questions. The research depends on qualitative secondary data to investigate the breakdown of the CFE Treaty (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty) while examining its broader effects on European security. The methodology establishes clear transparency and reliability standards, making the findings replicable for additional researchers to use in future work.

Research Philosophy

Research philosophy is the basis of topic development in any research. It helps develop the research phenomenon by defining beliefs and assumptions about knowledge creation and understanding.⁹² The research process receives its guiding principles from this foundation, including method selection for data collection and interpretation techniques. Research

⁹² Uche M. Mbanaso, Lucienne Abrahams, and Kennedy C. Okafor, "Research Philosophy, Design and Methodology," in *Research Philosophy* (Cham: Springer, 2023): 81.

philosophies, including positivism, interpretivism, pragmatism, and realism, present separate ways to study the world and its phenomena. As a research philosophy, positivism supports using quantitative methods to discover objective truths within the world.⁹³ According to this view, reality maintains its independent nature from human perception. Thus, it may be studied by observing actual things around the researcher's surroundings. This research approach relies on measurable data collection to generate generalized results across populations.⁹⁴ Extensive data pattern detection studies find value in this method, yet this technique provides limited support when studying complex human subjective experiences. The interpretivist philosophy places value on comprehending the meaningful social systems that people and communities assign to their experiences.⁹⁵ Qualitative research is linked with interpretive studies because it reveals the subjective aspects of human experiences, social behaviors, and cultural practices. According to this philosophy, knowledge does not exist independently because it takes shape from the context in which researchers create it.⁹⁶ Interpretivist enquirers research people's ways of understanding their world context, behavioral motivations, and cultural and social environmental impacts.

The pragmatic philosophy enables researchers to choose their research methods based on research problems independently from traditional philosophical frameworks. According to pragmatist philosophy, qualitative and quantitative methods can complement each other to

⁹³ Citra Maretha, "Positivism in Philosophical Studies," *Journal of Innovation in Teaching and Instructional Media* 3 (2023): 126.

⁹⁴ Yoon Soo Park, Lars Konge, and Anthony R. Artino, "The Positivism Paradigm of Research," *Academic Medicine* 95, no. 5 (2019): 2.

⁹⁵ Nasrin Pervin and Mahani Mokhtar, "The Interpretivist Research Paradigm," *International Journal of Academic Research in Progressive Education and Development* 11, no. 2 (2022): 8.

⁹⁶ Husam Helmi Alharahsheh and Abraham Pius, "A Review of Key Paradigms: Positivism vs Interpretivism," *Global Academic Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 2, no. 5 (2020): 41.

understand a specific phenomenon comprehensively.⁹⁷ This approach proves helpful for problems that need extensive examination or situations where one technique fails to resolve the research inquiries. According to realism, reality exists independently from human perception, yet human understanding depends on social and cultural factors.⁹⁸ Realist researchers try to discover the fundamental structures or processes that lead to observable effects, yet recognize that our perception of things depends on context. The research philosophy selected for this study was interpretivism. This research examines the collapse of the CFE Treaty while studying its effects on European security through a thorough analysis of the social and meaning-based aspects involved in these events. Interpretivism offers the best framework to analyze historical events, political elements, and social factors behind the treaty breakdown while studying the diverse viewpoints of scholars and policymakers who participated in this issue. Through this philosophy, the researcher gains access to a deeper understanding of how participants view geopolitical dynamics, historical events, and institutional challenges that shaped the treaty's development and dissolution. Interpretivism supports the study because it helps understand European security implications from the CFE treaty breakdown, which cannot be measured through objective quantitative methods alone.

Research Method

The research method involves particular methodologies for finding data sources, selecting them, and analyzing them to match the research goals and questions. The main goal of qualitative research involves collecting detailed descriptive information that reveals a

⁹⁷ Thomas C. Powell, "Can Quantitative Research Solve Social Problems?" *Journal of Business Ethics* 167, no. 1 (2019): 46.

⁹⁸ Katherine A. Tamminen and Zoë A. Poucher, "Research Philosophies," in *Routledge Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. [editor n.a.] (London: Routledge, 2020): 3.

comprehensive understanding of the studied phenomenon.⁹⁹ This study utilizes qualitative research methods, which depend on second-hand data from scholarly articles, policy papers, government reports, and historical records. The researcher selected a qualitative approach because it allows exploration of intricate historical and geopolitical aspects related to the CFE Treaty collapse. The research objective focuses on uncovering the fundamental reasons, behavioral patterns, and outcome effects that led to the treaty's collapse. Qualitative research offers the most appropriate method for studying these objectives because it focuses on understanding contextual meanings. Secondary qualitative data served as the primary research material because they deliver a thorough and detailed understanding of the analyzed subject. The breakdown of the CFE Treaty is studied through multiple secondary resources, which combine academic articles with government documents and expert assessments generated by think tanks. The research benefits from these sources, which deliver extensive details about the treaty history and implementation, as well as its ultimate breakdown.

The research followed multiple stages as part of its methodology. The researcher extensively examined available literature regarding the CFE Treaty and European security and arms control in Europe. The research review produced essential findings and areas needing further investigation in existing studies. The researcher identified and selected appropriate secondary data sources that demonstrated credibility, relevance, and depth of analysis. The research data underwent organization and analysis, which enabled the researcher to answer the research questions while obtaining meaningful findings. The advantages of using secondary data in this study are that it builds on existing research by scholars and experts who have studied the

⁹⁹ Elaine Denny and Annalise Weckesser, "How to Do Qualitative Research?" *BJOG* 129, no. 7 (2022): 2.

CFE Treaty and its effects on European security. Moreover, utilizing multiple secondary data sources enables a broader look at the subject by merging multiple viewpoints and studies that the direct collection of primary data would not reveal.¹⁰⁰

Research Approach

The research approach specifies the methods for processing and coding data while analyzing it to answer research questions. The qualitative research framework helps researchers interpret data through a structured approach that maintains coherent and systematic analyses.¹⁰¹ The research utilized an abductive approach for data analysis since it proved effective in studying complex phenomena that lack extensive research.¹⁰² The reasoning method of abduction uses a combination of deductive and inductive techniques. This framework uses theoretical predictions, adapting to additional information from database investigations. Abduction enables researchers to shift between data and theory while modifying hypotheses through new findings because it differs from deductive testing of existing theories and inductive data-based theory development.¹⁰³ The research method proves valuable for scientists who need to analyze unanticipated or complicated outcomes that do not align with established theoretical systems. The abductive method serves this research because it enables exploration of the effects of the CFE Treaty breakdown on European security. The study requires an abductive framework because it needs to combine historical, geopolitical, and institutional factors to generate new

¹⁰⁰ Nicole Ruggiano and Tam E. Perry, "Conducting Secondary Analysis of Qualitative Data," *Qualitative Social Work* 18, no. 1 (2017): 83.

¹⁰¹ Weng Marc Lim, "What Is Qualitative Research? An Overview," *Australasian Marketing Journal* (2024): 1.

¹⁰² Stefan Timmermans and Iddo Tavory, *Data Analysis in Qualitative Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022): 20.

¹⁰³ Chris Janiszewski and Stijn M. J. Van Osselaer, "Abductive Theory Construction," *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 32, no. 1 (2021): 177.

insights and refine theoretical understanding. The researcher establishes new perspectives and finds explanations within the data through an abductive approach by combining existing knowledge with open-mindedness. Such adaptability allows the research to respond to developing data outcomes, guaranteeing that the study fully comprehends the CFE Treaty's collapse and its wide-ranging effects.

Research Design

A research design establishes the approach to answer research questions using suitable methods and techniques to conduct the study. The research design keeps the process on track by aligning with research objectives. This research employed an exploratory design to meet its goals. Research that explores topics proves valuable in two situations: when researchers face little available literature about their subject, and when they need to study a topic without established hypotheses in depth.¹⁰⁴ The research topic concerning European security implications from the CFE Treaty collapse remains under-studied, so an exploratory research design proved suitable. Through this research method, the investigator gains vital insights about the topic while developing innovative concepts and revealing noticeable patterns hidden from the beginning of the research process. The research design enables the researcher to use multiple secondary sources, such as academic papers, policy reports, and historical documents. The study benefits from this flexible research design because it handles complex matters that include historical, political, and geopolitical elements that have developed throughout time. New research findings enable the researcher to shift study focus through the exploratory design structure, which maintains active research responsiveness. Furthermore, the exploratory design works well to

¹⁰⁴ Asenahabi Muyembe, "Basics of Research Design," *International Journal of Contemporary Applied Researches* 6 (2019): 85.

develop innovative hypotheses that could become foundations for future research studies.

Therefore, by adopting this design, the present research was able to build a new understanding of the CFE Treaty breakdown process and add valuable insights to the European security and arms control fields.

Data Collection

Qualitative research gathers data from multiple sources directly related to the study. The current research relied on secondary data. The secondary data collection method is centered on finding and evaluating already published materials that address the research questions.¹⁰⁵ The core material for this research relied on treaty documents, official diplomatic files, and reports from institutions like NATO and the OSCE. The research also utilized scholarly articles, books, dissertations, policy papers, expert opinions, and news archives as its secondary sources. This research included interview data from security experts and information from policymakers and diplomats. The current researcher utilized academic databases, including JSTOR, Web of Science, ProQuest, and Scopus, to obtain scholarly publications and reports. The researcher selected these databases because they demonstrated high credibility standards and enabled access to peer-reviewed research materials that matched the study requirements. The researcher utilized the search terms “CFE Treaty” along with “European security,” “arms control in Europe,” and “geopolitical breakdown of the CFE Treaty” to conduct their research. Furthermore, Boolean operators “AND” and “OR” were utilized to increase the accuracy of the search process.¹⁰⁶ The following search terms were generated: "CFE Treaty" AND "European security" AND "arms

¹⁰⁵ Vicky Heap and Jaime Waters, “Data Collection Methods,” in *Criminological Research* (London: Routledge, 2019): 143.

¹⁰⁶ Anju Grewal, Hanish Kataria, and Ira Dhawan, “Literature Search for Research Planning,” *Indian Journal of Anaesthesia* 60, no. 9 (2016): 30.

control in Europe" AND "geopolitical breakdown of the CFE Treaty" OR "CFE Treaty" AND ("European security" OR "arms control in Europe") AND "geopolitical breakdown of the CFE Treaty" OR "CFE Treaty" AND "European security" AND ("arms control in Europe" OR "geopolitical breakdown of the CFE Treaty")

The researcher applied three key criteria to determine which data sources would be included: credibility of the information, its relevance to the study, and the depth of analysis provided. Moreover, the research utilized only peer-reviewed articles, books, and reports from established, credible sources to guarantee data reliability.¹⁰⁷

Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis requires researchers to study and interpret gathered data to identify patterns, themes, and relationships that answer research questions. The main data analysis approach used for this study was narrative synthesis. The analysis method of narrative synthesis unifies different study findings into a single narrative structure, which presents the research topic.¹⁰⁸ The analysis method differs from quantitative analysis because narrative synthesis uses multiple qualitative and textual data sources to identify patterns by studying similarities and differences between data sets.¹⁰⁹ The analysis technique proves valuable when studying intricate subjects, including the CFE Treaty breakdown, because it evaluates diverse elements and historical occurrences.

¹⁰⁷ Laura E. Happe, "Distinguishing Predatory from Reputable Publishing Practices," *Journal of Managed Care & Specialty Pharmacy* 26, no. 8 (2020): 959.

¹⁰⁸ Mohamed Alblooshi et al., "Requirements, Challenges and Impacts of Lean Six Sigma Applications," *International Journal of Lean Six Sigma* 12, no. 2 (2020): 5.

¹⁰⁹ Nicholas Mays and Catherine Pope, "Synthesising Qualitative Research," in *Narrative Synthesis*, ed. [editor n.a.] (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2019): 155.

The analytical procedure started with extracting essential details from secondary resources centered on the treaty's historical development, geopolitical obstacles, and security control effects. The researcher systematically categorized the data before discovering patterns between different sources. Through this coding system, the researcher developed a unified report that answered research questions and presented significant discoveries from the data. The researcher implemented narrative synthesis to comprehensively understand the importance of the CFE Treaty and modern security effects by integrating policy knowledge with historical and geopolitical aspects. The research follows a structure based on three essential frameworks. Firstly, a historical analysis will evaluate the CFE Treaty through a retrospective review of its development process from inception to modern evolution. A historical review will reveal the treaty's creation process, its formation against political and security dynamics, and how these elements transformed because of shifting global dynamics. Furthermore, the analysis will determine why the CFE Treaty failed by examining geopolitical elements and institutional and strategic influences. Secondly, causal analysis investigates what factors caused the CFE Treaty to break down to reveal which fundamental influences destabilized the agreement and ultimately led to its end. Thirdly, policy analysis will evaluate present-day arms control initiatives using CFE lessons to determine their practicality. The analysis examines recent arms control initiatives and their performance in generating policy recommendations based on observing the advantages and drawbacks of the CFE Treaty.

Research Reliability and Validity

The trustworthiness and accuracy of study findings heavily depend on proper adherence to research reliability and validity. The concepts remain essential in qualitative research, although they have slightly different definitions from those found in quantitative studies.

Research reliability describes the ability to reproduce both research methods and discovery results.¹¹⁰ Qualitative research depends on data stability and dependable analysis methods for maintaining research reliability. When using secondary data, the research reliability was secured by selecting high-quality peer-reviewed sources from academic databases, including JSTOR, Web of Science, and Scopus. The research foundation relied on consistent documentation from these sources about the events that led to the collapse of the CFE Treaty. The researcher used a systematic approach to select secondary data, which evaluated the research question against the source credibility and original study methodological rigor. The researcher documented the data collection process to strengthen reliability and enable future researchers to duplicate the study using the same research materials.

Research validity describes the precise and suitable methods researchers use to collect and analyze data when pursuing their research objectives.¹¹¹ The researchers established validity by selecting secondary sources that directly investigated the collapse of the CFE Treaty and its effects on European security. The research examined intricate geopolitical events and historical analyses, so the selected secondary data, consisting of academic articles, policy reports, and official government publications, underwent thorough evaluation to verify their accuracy regarding important events and relevant perspectives and analyses for the study. The researcher employed an abductive approach to data analysis, which provided a flexible yet rigorous interpretation of data based on the research objectives. The method produced findings that accurately captured the subject matter's multiple dimensions. The reliability and validity of this

¹¹⁰ Vu Thi Thanh Nha, "Understanding Validity and Reliability," *VNU Journal of Foreign Studies* 37, no. 3 (2021): 4.

¹¹¹ Paulo Hayashi, Gustavo Abib, and Norberto Hoppen, "Validity in Qualitative Research: A Processual Approach," *The Qualitative Report* 24 (Jan 2019): 100.

study were achieved through thorough secondary data selection, critical analysis, and a transparent, well-documented research process. The research process included these measures, which produced trustworthy and accurate findings and aligned perfectly with the research objectives.

Potential Challenges and Limitations

This research used qualitative secondary data analysis as its methodology, yet various methodological constraints affect the findings' depth and breadth. The study faced its main drawback from an insufficient amount of secondary data that addressed the subject matter. The quantity of available relevant data from scholarly articles, policy reports, and historical records proved inadequate to meet initial expectations when studying the breakdown of the CFE Treaty. The narrow focus on the CFE Treaty breakdown as it relates to European security created restrictions in data availability. Due to the narrow subject matter, the available secondary literature base proved restricted, leading to the limited study of perspectives about the topic. The study faced a vital constraint because it depended on previously collected data. As a result of its nature, secondary data might contain biases, together with incomplete reporting or methodological issues, which researchers may not readily identify.¹¹² The researcher obtained data from reputable academic journals and policy reports, yet different sources might present varying interpretations of events and specific issue frames. The differences between interpretation methods and viewpoints presented difficulties for achieving complete objectivity in the analysis. A thorough review method picked reputable peer-reviewed publications as primary sources, and the data analysis stage included systematic bias evaluation of these sources.

¹¹² Jessie R. Baldwin et al., "Protecting Against Researcher Bias in Secondary Data Analysis," *European Journal of Epidemiology* 37, no. 1 (2022): 1.

The analysis was restricted in gathering primary data via surveys or interviews, so it could not directly obtain critical insight from field experts and key stakeholders. The secondary data collection provided extensive knowledge, but researchers could not directly study the perspectives or experiences of modern policymakers or diplomats participating in the CFE treaty dissolution. The study addressed this limitation through secondary sources comprising expert analyses, official reports, and government publications that provided an in-depth understanding of the treaty's breakdown. Time restrictions and limited resources affected the data collection process as a fundamental limitation. The thorough analysis and selection process for secondary data restricted the number of sources that could be reviewed appropriately during the available period. The data collection procedure became more efficient by focusing on essential themes while accessing high-quality academic databases, including JSTOR, Scopus, and Web of Science for relevant material retrieval. The study generated significant findings by analyzing carefully selected secondary sources, maintaining research quality and reliability.

Ethical Considerations

The research integrity and credibility depend heavily on ethical considerations during all stages of investigation. The moral emphasis of this study, based on secondary data, centers on properly using and citing already published literature.¹¹³ This research study followed multiple ethical principles from the beginning to the end of its research process. The study does not require informed consent because researchers did not need direct contact with human participants. The research used publicly accessible secondary data sources obtained ethically from all available sources. The research maintains ethical guidelines for the use of reliable

¹¹³ Intakhab Khan, "Ethical Considerations in Educational Research," *British Journal of Education, Society & Behavioural Science* 13, no. 2 (2015): 4.

published material.¹¹⁴ The study retains complete academic integrity when it comes to plagiarism. The research contains proper citations of all referenced sources to eliminate plagiarism throughout the work. The ethical use of existing research is ensured through this practice, strengthening the study's credibility.

The study does not collect personal information from people, so confidentiality and anonymity remain irrelevant throughout the research process. The study demonstrates transparency and accountability through detailed documentation of every source and method used for data collection and analysis steps.¹¹⁵ The documented methods enable researchers to share the research process, thus making it reproducible while validating final results for a strong foundation in the study conclusion. The ethical framework used in this research study maintains research integrity and author and contributor rights and follows established academic responsibility standards.

Chapter Summary

Chapter Two presents the theoretical framework and research methodology (qualitative research) employed to study the collapse of the CFE treaty and its security impact on Europe. The chapter presents and discusses three key theories: Realism, Institutionalism, and Constructivism. As a realist, one might say that the Treaty was undermined through power conflicts, changes in security priorities, and, most notably, the Russian response to NATO's expansion. Russian realists argue that when nations perceive what they perceive as existential threats, the arms control systems fail, which is why arms control agreements with NATO could

¹¹⁴ Gold Nmesoma Okorie et al., "Ethical Considerations in Data Collection and Analysis," *International Journal of Applied Research in Social Sciences* 6, no. 1 (2024): 12.

¹¹⁵ Anna-Maija Pietilä et al., "Qualitative Research: Ethical Considerations," in *The Application of Content Analysis in Nursing Science Research*, edited by Helvi Kyngäs, Kristina Mikkonen, Maria Kääriäinen (Cham: Springer, 2019): 55.

not appease Russia. Although it acknowledges the inability of these organizations (NATO and the OSCE) to adjust to NATO's expansion, institutions emphasize their role in supporting arms control. Conversely, arms control is interpreted through the prism of state identities and historical beliefs by constructivism. By enhancing trust in Russia's foreign policy, moving from a Cold War adversary to a post-Soviet republic changed its identity and eroded confidence in NATO, thus defeating the Treaty. The mechanisms employed in the collapse are analyzed through secondary data, focusing on historical, geopolitical, and institutional factors in the conclusion of the chapter.

Chapter Three: Analysis and Findings

The CFE Treaty: Foundations and Impact on Post-Cold War European Security

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) established a historic approach to stabilize Europe following the end of the Cold War. According to Altmann et al., the agreement functioned as a significant pillar to prevent conventional military confrontations by implementing reductions of military equipment and confidence-building steps when Europe emerged from the Cold War.¹¹⁶ However, Foulon and Thompson claimed that the historical impact of this treaty remains marred by major problems that arose due to changes in geopolitical conditions.¹¹⁷ This idea is supported by a Russian commentator's remark that refers to the CFE treaty as "a true relic of the Cold War and an example of how outdated agreements negotiated 'a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away' perpetuate adversarial relationships."¹¹⁸

Multiple academic experts and geopolitical analysts present different interpretations regarding the treaty's effectiveness, operational boundaries, and global effects. For instance, Charap et al. argued that the CFE Treaty achieved its primary purpose by reducing conventional military forces across European territories.¹¹⁹ Another evidence to show the benefits of the CFE treaty was obtained from a group of Western military leaders, researchers, and diplomats who wrote a letter in 2008 claiming that the breakdown of this treaty would "...undermine co-

¹¹⁶ Jürgen Altmann et al., "Verification and Conventional Arms Reductions," in *Arms-Control Verification in a Changing World*, edited by John P. Holdren and Andrei A. Kokoshin (London: Routledge, 2019): 203

¹¹⁷ Michiel Foulon and John Jack Thompson, eds., *The Future of European Strategy in a Changing Geopolitical Environment: Challenges and Prospects* (The Hague: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2021): 21.

¹¹⁸ David Speedie, "U.S.-Russia Relations: Under Stress, And in Need of Care," Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs: 1

¹¹⁹ Samuel Charap et al., *A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020): 19.

operative security in Europe and lead to new dividing lines and confrontations."¹²⁰ Similarly, Steneck supported this assertion by claiming that the treaty served as an essential tool to end the Cold War era suspicions and military confrontations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.¹²¹ Furthermore, Gwyn mentioned that the treaty integrated mandatory inspections and data sharing protocols, which stopped unanticipated military growth.¹²² Altmann et al. supported the idea that the CFE treaty positively affected the post-Cold War era by claiming that verification systems are crucial because they build trust between former rivals through their establishment.¹²³

Furthermore, the CFE treaty was able to maintain verification of compliance with the Treaty's provisions, as evidenced by the CFE Treaty excerpt: "*(A) to verify, on the basis of the information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, the compliance of States.*"¹²⁴

According to the excerpt above, it can be determined that to guarantee the verification of adherence to the Treaty provisions, Article XIV of the CFE Treaty required the States Parties to send notifications and share information per the Protocol on Information Exchange, and also granted them the authority to carry out inspections and the duty to accept such inspections, as outlined in the Protocol on Inspection.

Based on this analysis, it can be determined that the CFE treaty brought initial success by establishing military tension reduction and cooperative relations between NATO and Eastern

¹²⁰ Jeffrey McCausland, "After Georgia: Russia, NATO, and the CFE," Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs: 1

¹²¹ Nicholas Steneck, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty," in *Routledge Resources Online: The Cold War*, edited by A.M. Kalinovsky and C. Daigle (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2025): 5

¹²² Gwyn Prins, "Military Restructuring and the Challenge of Europe," in *Non-Offensive Defence: A Global Perspective*, edited by B. Møller and G. Cawthra, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2020): 105.

¹²³ Jürgen Altmann et al., "Verification and Conventional Arms Reductions," 165–203.

¹²⁴ CTFE, "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," 13

Bloc states. However, some researchers disagree about how significant the treaty's lasting effects were after its initial reported victories. In light of this point, Bell argued that the CFE treaty was unfavorable because it overlooks future security threats beyond conventional weapons by passing over non-state actors alongside asymmetric warfare.¹²⁵ According to this analysis, the Cold War era treaty operated within an outdated system since emerging advanced weapons technologies, such as precision tools and cyber warfare, rendered traditional weapons obsolete after the Cold War. The treaty started as a transparency tool but proved inadequate when NATO moved east and Russia reacted to these developments.

More researchers also contributed to the impacts of the CFE treaty on the post-Cold War era. For instance, Meyer and Sens acknowledge that the CFE treaty was instrumental in eliminating Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) units, which reached 58,000 during the 1990s.¹²⁶ Early in European arms control history, this reduction process represented a significant success for the treaty. However, other findings show that the treaty receives criticism because it did not adapt to the changing European geopolitical situation during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this regard, Bluth asserted that the CFE Treaty failed to address new security threats stemming from the NATO expansion and the Warsaw Pact dissolution, demonstrating its fundamental weaknesses.¹²⁷ Thus, Russia developed an increasing sense of insecurity after NATO expanded into Eastern Europe, which ultimately destroyed the cooperative spirit established by the treaty. Moreover, Casier claimed that the CFE Treaty failed to address Russia's concerns because it did

¹²⁵ Alexandra Bell, "Euro-Atlantic Arms Control: Past, Present, and Future," in *Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security: Views from the Younger Generation Leaders Network*, edited by Andrew Futter (Cham: Springer, 2019): 47.

¹²⁶ Dierk Meyer and Allen Sens, "Multinational Formations in NATO: From Forward Defense to Rapid Reaction," in *Routledge eBooks* (London: Routledge, 2019): 111.

¹²⁷ Christoph Bluth, "Soviet Forces and Security Issues," in *Soviet Military Power In A Changing World*, edited by Susan L. Clark (London: Routledge, 2019): 37.

not adapt to post-Cold War geopolitical changes.¹²⁸ Similarly, Clark added to this topic by claiming that the breakdown of the CFE treaty occurred mainly due to changing military technology and global security conditions rather than NATO's expansion.¹²⁹ Clark further explained that Russia suspended CFE in 2007, primarily because arms control systems remained obsolete despite the rise of precision-guided ammunitions, cyber warfare, and asymmetrical methods.¹³⁰ Based on this analysis, it can be noted that the CFE centered its focus on conventional weapon quantities while overlooking major technological changes in warfare. NATO's inability to transform with new realities explains most of the treaty's collapse. However, another point is evidenced in the emphasis that NATO's expansion toward the east was an essential cause of its demise.

The inability of the treaty to embrace new security risks, together with modern technological progress, stands as the main critical point among academic examinations. Most researchers agree that the priorities of arms reduction and verification worked. However, Bava viewed these security areas as ineffective against modern non-traditional threats.¹³¹ Therefore, it is clear that the treaty brought stability to Europe after the Cold War, but it lost its importance as security challenges from new sources appeared. Additionally, according to Sagramoso, the treaty revealed weaknesses when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014 through

¹²⁸ Tom Casier, "Stumbling from Incident to Incident: The Systemic Crisis of the Post-Cold War Order," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 36, no. 3 (2021): 422

¹²⁹ Wesley K. Clark, "NATO Enlargement and Russia: A Military Perspective," in Daniel S. Hamilton, ed., *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2019): 18.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 1.

¹³¹ Ummu Salma Bava, "Impact of the Ukraine War on Security in the Baltic Region," in *The CFE Treaty* (Singapore: Springer, 2024): 34.

non-traditional warfare methods.¹³² Likewise, Gill disagreed with the treaty's deficiencies by stating that technological and conceptual deficiencies existed. The author explained that the treaty functioned with a conventional military threat paradigm that prevented it from handling emerging non-state actors with irregular conflicts and cyber threats.¹³³ The sources' findings also revealed that the political consequences of implementing the CFE Treaty continue to create debate among researchers. In light of this point, Šulejić and Stefanović claimed that the initial achievement of the treaty to create transparency between NATO and former Warsaw Pact states during the 1990s helped stabilize European relations.¹³⁴ This assertion was supported by Kosaka, who maintained that the treaty helped decrease tensions while stopping potential military growth that could have triggered warfare.¹³⁵ However, the treaty's collapse during the 2000s, following Russia's suspension of its obligations, revealed the constraints arms control faces in the current changing geopolitical circumstances. This point was evidenced by Herbst et al., who demonstrated that the treaty deteriorated because it did not accommodate NATO expansion and Russian security concerns.¹³⁶ Based on this analysis, it can be established that the treaty's failure to keep pace with evolving military technology demonstrates a general problem in arms control because treaties cannot adapt to changing capabilities.

¹³² Domitilla Sagramoso, *Russian Imperialism Revisited* (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2020): 250.

¹³³ Amandeep S. Gill, "Conclusion: The NSS as a Learning Forum," in *Nuclear Security Summits: A History*, edited by Amandeep S. Gill (Cham: Springer, 2019): 207.

¹³⁴ Marina Kostić Šulejić and Andrej Stefanović, "European Arms Control in Crisis — Understanding the Sources, Russian Position and Future Prospect," in *European Arms Control in Crisis* (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2023): 290.

¹³⁵ Hirofumi Kosaka, "Overcoming the Second Cold War: The Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the Relaxation of East-West Tensions, 1983–1986," *International History Review* (online first, 2023): 17

¹³⁶ John E. Herbst et al., "European Security, NATO–Russia Relations, and the Post-Cold War Order," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 26, no. 3 (2024): 204

Ukraine's experience since 1992 illustrates the dilemma outlined earlier, where existing arms-control measures are most effective against the specific threats they were intended to address, but they become ineffective when the strategic landscape shifts. Simonet revealed that as a successor state of the CFE, Kyiv disposed of over 4,000 treaty-restricted items of equipment, comprising 2,450 tanks, 2,222 armored combat vehicles, and 550 aircraft, and permitted more than 150 declared facilities to undergo 153 onsite inspections from 1992 to 2001, achieving what an OSCE inspector later commended as “the fastest compliance learning curve in the post-Soviet region.”¹³⁷ These visits offered an initial method of independent verification and were supported by quarterly data submissions as per the Vienna Document, which granted Moscow satellite-level awareness of Ukrainian troop placements, an example of transparent reporting.¹³⁸ However, Hernández presented contradictory findings that revealed the failure of the CFE treaty by claiming that the effectiveness of the arms control frameworks' mechanisms depends on mutual behavior between member states.¹³⁹ In light of this point, Hernández explained that following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its large-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine persisted in submitting CFE and Vienna Document notifications, while Moscow had already stopped CFE reporting in 2007 and in 2023 declined to engage in the yearly Vienna exchange.¹⁴⁰ Thus, by withdrawing unilaterally, Russia eliminated the treaty's fundamental requirement of mutual arms limitations, transforming transparency into a one-sided affair and undermining the regime's stabilizing role. In summary, the Ukrainian situation supports the chapter's main conclusion that

¹³⁷ Loïc Simonet, “The CFE Treaty Is Dead. Could It Still Inspire a Ceasefire in Ukraine? | Arms Control Association,” 2-3

¹³⁸ United States. Department of Defense, *2018 Nuclear Posture Review*, 30

¹³⁹ Gabriela Iveliz Rosa Hernández, “Whither Conventional Arms Control in Europe?” in *Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG eBooks*: 109.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*: 1.

conventional-arms transparency regimes can yield substantial stability benefits, but this is contingent upon each party perceiving mutual restraint, under impartial observation, as an overall security advantage.

Generally, it can be established that the post-Cold War European security gained shape from the CFE Treaty because it helped diminish conventional weapons while developing military partnerships among European nations. The capability of this treaty to adjust to developing safety perils along with emerging technological progress stands as an essential argument for discussion. The treaty showed significant achievements in arms reduction during its first period, but the changing geopolitical and technological factors made its enduring impact less significant. The treaty maintained short-term success despite its limited influence and requires updated frameworks because it lacks modern security solutions. Objecting views about the treaty's influence reveal how difficult arms control has become in a fast-changing world where military technologies merge with geopolitical tensions, which present challenges for international security governance.

Geopolitical and Institutional Challenges: Factors Leading to the Breakdown of the CFE Treaty

European security and arms control entered an essential turning point when the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty expired. At the same time, geopolitical forces, institutional constraints, and strategic challenges created this critical situation. The collapse of the CFE Treaty demands a multi-dimensional analysis because it requires an understanding of scholarly and analyst perspectives and international European security actors. Various scholars concur about essential factors leading to the breakup of the treaty, yet significant debates remain about the importance of NATO expansion, institutional limitations, and Russian security concerns. Numerous scholars agree that NATO's expansion toward the east

represented the main reason behind the collapse of the CFE Treaty. For instance, Fasola and Lucarelli claimed that the post-Cold War expansion of NATO is the primary reason for Russia's perceived sphere of influence challenge.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, Zhang added to this topic by arguing that NATO's admission of former Warsaw Pact states and Baltic nations provoked Russia's perception of geopolitical violation and broken promises from the Cold War negotiation periods.¹⁴² Based on the arguments above, it can be noted that military intervention in Kosovo during 1999 became a decisive milestone because it demonstrated that NATO acted without international support in European territory and thus threatened Russian security interests and regional authority. Rumer and Sokolsky also highlighted the struggles between NATO expansion and Russian security needs.¹⁴³ According to Rumer and Sokolsky, NATO's expansion altered Europe's strategic balance, causing Russia to implement countermeasures against what Moscow saw as Western attempts to control the European security system.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, Vershbow acknowledged NATO's enlargement yet focuses more deeply on Russia's domestic political factors, which influenced Putin's assertive foreign policy as much as NATO's expansion did.¹⁴⁵ These sources discussed above demonstrate NATO expansion and Russian perceptions of

¹⁴¹ Nicolò Fasola and Sonia Lucarelli, "Ups and Downs of NATO-Russia Relations: A Cognitivist Perspective," *Interdisciplinary Political Studies* 5, no. 2 (2019): 353

¹⁴² Longtai Zhang, "Examining Post-Cold War Geopolitical Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe," *Journal of Research in Social Science and Humanities* (2024): 77.

¹⁴³ Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, "Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security" (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020): 17.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 1.

¹⁴⁵ Alexander Vershbow, "Present at the Transformation: An Insider's Reflection on NATO Enlargement, NATO-Russia Relations, and Where We Go from Here," in *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security after the Cold War*, edited by Kristina Spohr and Daniel Hamilton (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2019): 442.

security imbalance as fundamental factors that led Russia to suspend CFE Treaty participation. However, multiple researchers maintained different perspectives about NATO's role in causing the collapse of this treaty. According to Zannier, the CFE Treaty failed because of its built-in limitations, which included its inability to adjust to new security conditions.¹⁴⁶ Russia left the treaty because it disliked how the agreement could not match contemporary security requirements, including cyber warfare, non-state actor threats, and geopolitical motives. Therefore, it is evident that NATO expansion worsened Russia's security concerns, but institutional weaknesses in the CFE framework proved the final reason for its collapse.

Many studies identify institutional weaknesses within the CFE Treaty as the main reason behind its demise. Terry explained that the treaty exhibited inflexible design elements that failed to meet the evolving security needs of post-Cold War Europe.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, Fiszer emphasized that since the treaty established its structure based on a two-sided world system, which featured NATO and the Warsaw Pact as its primary defense organizations, it lost its relevance following the Warsaw Pact dissolution and NATO's expansion because its provisions were initially designed during the era of Cold War hostility.¹⁴⁸ Russia developed a strong sense of irrelevance regarding the treaty because it failed to adapt to changes in the political environment that created a disconnect with national security needs. Schmidt also highlighted that the lack of institutional methods for NATO to handle non-standard security threats contributed to the breakdown of the

¹⁴⁶ Lamberto Zannier, "Post-Cold War Weapons Reduction: The Role of NATO," in *Routledge eBooks* (London: Routledge, 2019): 146.

¹⁴⁷ Sarah M. Terry, "Beyond the Cold War: Prospects for Central European Security and Cooperation in a Post-Communist World," in *The Soviet Empire Reconsidered*, edited by Sanford R. Lieberman, David E Powell, Carol R Saivetz and Sarah M Terry (London: Routledge, 2019): 229.

¹⁴⁸ Fiszer, Józef M. "Poland's road to NATO—objective and subjective obstacles." *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 20, no. 2 (2022): 47-73, 73.

CFE treaty.¹⁴⁹ This viewpoint was supported by Alberque et al., who pointed out that although the treaty minimized traditional military threats, it could not tackle both cyber and hybrid warfare types.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, it can be determined that the transparency mechanisms within the treaty became obsolete because both NATO and Russia developed their military strategies beyond what these methods could monitor. The institutional structure failed to evolve as quickly as these advancements, resulting in deteriorating trust and a loss of cooperation. Again, it is evident that the treaty's inability to adapt proved a significant shortcoming that directly led Russia to suspend its participation in 2007.

However, other researchers gave contradicting findings. For instance, the institutional failures of the CFE Treaty received less weight from Durhin et al. compared to geopolitical factors in the breakdown of the CFE treaty.¹⁵¹ In this case, Durhin et al. argued that the treaty collapsed mainly because of incompatible NATO-Russian military strategies rather than any structural weaknesses of its organizational framework.¹⁵² Therefore, it is evident that the CFE Treaty's inability to resolve Russia's security concerns alongside NATO's strategic goals became the leading cause of the breakdown of the CFE Treaty. Furthermore, Foerster and Larsen disagreed with the perception that the CFE treaty failed due to geopolitical and institutional challenges by demonstrating that NATO and Russia maintained mutually incompatible goals

¹⁴⁹ Hans-Joachim Schmidt, "Force Comparison and Conventional Arms Control at the End of the East–West Conflict," in *Comparisons in Global Security Politics*, edited by Thomas Müller, Mathias Albert and Kerrin Langer (Bristol: Bristol UP, 2024): 236.

¹⁵⁰ William Alberque et al., *The Future of Arms Control in a Multilateral and Multi-Domain Environment* (Washington, DC: U.S. DOE OSTI, 2021): 20.

¹⁵¹ Nathalie Durhin et al., *NATO's Strategic Foundations: Values, Deterrence, and Arms Control*. (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2020): 31.

¹⁵² Ibid.

regarding their military and security domains.¹⁵³ Foerster and Larsen explained this point further by claiming that the shifting strategic priorities in Russia and the deepening geopolitical rift between Russia and NATO prevented the CFE Treaty from achieving its original objectives.¹⁵⁴ Generally, the analysis above on the CFE Treaty's failure presents matching and conflicting views in the research findings. The debate about NATO enlargement and Russian security issues produces general agreement about their significance. Still, some researchers disagree about how much institutional breakdown affects these developments relative to geopolitical factors. The matching and conflicting areas highlight various elements that contributed to the breakdown of the CFE Treaty. The failures of the CFE Treaty stemmed from the combined influences of institutional flaws and geopolitical changes, thus demonstrating a complete series of related factors as the primary cause of its collapse. A proper understanding of the collapse of the CFE Treaty demands consideration of institutional deficiencies in its framework and strategic conflicts that evolved during severe changes in European security dynamics. Future arms control agreement design requires understanding this complex perspective to succeed in a multipolar world system.

Building a New European Security Architecture: The Role of Arms Control in Long-Term Stability and Conflict Prevention

The initial segment of scholarly research analyzes the effect of conventional arms-control agreements on creating transparency and promoting stability in European regions. Various empirical research studies prove that arms-control treaties positively affect European stability.

¹⁵³ Schuyler Foerster and Jeffrey A. Larsen, "NATO Strategy: Integrating Defense and Collaborative Security," *NATO Defense College Research Paper* 18 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2021): 7

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

Charap et al. confirm that the original Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) supported European stability by implementing substantial heavy conventional weapons reductions while developing a detailed verification system.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, destroying more than 50,000 treaty-limited items alongside 2,700 inspections according to Dembinski and Schmidt enhanced military transparency, diminishing the risk of surprise attacks.¹⁵⁶ Additionally, Arbatov claimed that the verification system developed through the CFE treaty proved successful in creating mutual trust between adversaries because it demonstrated clear advantages of structured arms control.¹⁵⁷ Stefanović and Kostić-Šulejić supported this idea by emphasizing that transparency functions as a basis for preventing crises in the long term and maintaining stability.¹⁵⁸ Thus, it is clear that productive arms-control deals generated confidence between states through ascertainable methods such as weapon destruction and site visits, which helped minimize aggression-related uncertainty. However, Lodgaard challenged the viewpoint of Stefanović and Kostić-Šulejić by pointing out that transparency remains inadequate to tackle new dangerous threats such as cyber warfare and hybrid conflicts because conventional verification systems fail to address them.¹⁵⁹ To improve transparency and verification systems, Grand recommended eliminating systems that are inconsistent with maintaining a minimum-credible-

¹⁵⁵ Samuel Charap et al., *A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020): 35.

¹⁵⁶ Matthias Dembinski and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, “An Unfinished Agenda: Arms Control and Disarmament in Europe,” in *Routledge eBooks* (London: Routledge, 2019): 181.

¹⁵⁷ A. G. Arbatov, “Arms and Diplomacy,” *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences* 90, no. 6 (2020): 633.

¹⁵⁸ Andrej Stefanović and Marina Kostić-Šulejić, “Making a Comprehensive Arms Control Agreement for Europe in Times of Crisis,” *Politika Nacionalne Bezbednosti* 27, no. 2 (2024): 100.

¹⁵⁹ Sverre Lodgaard, “Arms Control and World Order,” in *Routledge eBooks* (London: Routledge, 2021): 216.

deterrent posture and ensuring a robust verification regime. This information is evidenced in the excerpt below:

“...This also means eliminating systems that are inconsistent with maintaining a minimum-credible-deterrent posture... Any future agreement must also include a robust verification regime. Otherwise, it will be difficult to ensure signatories’ compliance.”¹⁶⁰

The conflict in eastern Ukraine offers the most evident modern setting to assess the effectiveness of CFE-style norms in critical situations. Mackiewicz and Friedrich introduced this case by claiming that after the Minsk “Package of Measures” (February 2015), UN Security Council resolution 2202 supported an OSCE function in open reporting, mutual disengagement of heavy armaments, and independent verification.¹⁶¹ The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) reacted by issuing near-real-time cease-fire maps and executing over 1.5 million observation events, which featured unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights and on-site inspections, from 2016 to 2021.¹⁶² However, the success of this monitoring mission was hit by practical limits that ranged from limited access, direct rejections, and the use of threat and force, especially in regions controlled by Russian-supported forces.¹⁶³ This viewpoint was supported by a quote from a former OSCE Chief Monitor, who confirmed that the OSCE experienced limitations in its efforts to achieve peace and stability in Ukraine. It is evidenced by the quotation below:

¹⁶⁰ Camille Grand, “Missiles, Deterrence and Arms Control: Options for a New Era in Europe: 25.

¹⁶¹ Łukasz Mackiewicz and Julia Friedrich, “Presence Without Power,” GPPI, 4

¹⁶² OSCE, *Restrictions of SMM’s Freedom of Movement and Other Impediments to Fulfilment of Its Mandate*: 9.

¹⁶³ OSCE, “Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Small-arms Fire Hit SMM Vehicle in Marinka:1.

“...Since the establishment of the Special Monitoring Mission, we have come a long way and have achieved a lot, often under challenging circumstances. The extension of our mandate means that we will continue to effectively respond to the situation on the ground.”¹⁶⁴

Furthermore, the findings from an interview conducted with a former OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) deputy chief monitor also revealed how difficult it was to maintain transparency between member states. Further, it reflected on the collapse of balanced verification after Russia withdrew from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). It is evidenced by the SMM deputy chief monitor’s assertion below:

“...It didn’t matter how many violations were recorded if there was no political follow-up...”¹⁶⁵

Therefore, it can be determined that the situation in Ukraine supports the main argument of this chapter, which holds that transparency, equal force limits, and neutral inspection can be effective, but only if all parties trust that the rules are being applied fairly. The interpretation of transparency and verification based on the sources above creates a contradiction because the organizations differ on traditional transparency through conventional arms reduction versus contemporary threats beyond conventional military transparency. Any new arms-control structure needs to establish classical transparency mechanisms and advanced security monitoring techniques, which prove essential as an alternative to rigid numerical limitations.

The second critical scholarly debate pertains to the limitations and rigidity inherent in the original CFE structure in the face of changing geopolitical circumstances and the possible

¹⁶⁴ OSCE, “OSCE Chief Monitor in Ukraine Welcomes Extension to the Special Monitoring Mission’s Mandate,” 1

¹⁶⁵ Łukasz Mackiewicz and Julia Friedrich, “Presence Without Power,” GPPI: 16.

solutions to build a new European security architecture. Several researchers agreed that the original CFE structure has multiple limitations affecting its effectiveness. Mehrotra indicated that the treaty's bloc-based static framework lost its effectiveness because of shifts in global politics after NATO military expansion toward Eastern Europe.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, Menkiszak argued that the treaty dissolved because Russia intensified its strategic imbalance concerns while demonstrating how rigid bloc frameworks struggle to adapt to new political situations.¹⁶⁷ Menkiszak explained that Russia suspended compliance in 2007 because the treaty failed to transform, which led to the complete breakdown of the regime.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, Steneck disclosed that the CFE treaty suffered from inadequacies in handling present-day security challenges because it maintained a non-flexible design.¹⁶⁹ Thus, based on Steneck and Menkiszak, it is evident that modern political developments need flexible arms-control systems since inflexible bloc approaches prove ineffective for handling current geopolitical challenges. On the contrary, Charap et al. proposed a modular approach instead of an extensive replacement for CFE.¹⁷⁰ According to Charap et al., flaws exist in inflexible comprehensive agreements since they lack enough flexibility to adapt quickly to emerging geopolitical and technological advancements.¹⁷¹ This contradiction shows two competing views about adaptable systems. Steneck and Menkiszak advocate for an extensive framework that reduces the previous inflexibility of the CFE treaty, while Charap et al.

¹⁶⁶ O. N. Mehrotra, "NATO Eastward Expansion and Russian Security," *Strategic Analysis* 46, no. 2 (2022): 248.

¹⁶⁷ Marek Menkiszak, *A Strategic Continuation, a Tactical Change: Russia's European Security Policy* (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2019): 42.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid: 1.

¹⁶⁹ Nicholas Steneck, "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty," in *Routledge Resources Online: The Cold War* (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2025): 5.

¹⁷⁰ Samuel Charap et al., *A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020): 35.

¹⁷¹ Ibid: 1.

recommend adaptable action by enabling modular changes. The modular approach in arms control requires the creation of several independent agreements that handle distinct concerns or geographical areas instead of one unified treaty. The modular approach enables security forces to modify their strategies based on modifications within their security environments. Therefore, it is recommended that agreements should be designed to handle distinct weapon systems, regional security problems, or verification system requirements.

Scholarly investigations predominantly examine the importance and effects that future arms-control talks should have toward multilateralism and inclusivity. Researchers agree that future arms-control arrangements should establish genuine multilateralism and include new participants. In this regard, Dean advocated expanding arms control by including NATO allies from Eastern Europe, Baltic and Nordic states, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).¹⁷² Likewise, Driggers emphasized that properly handling present-day security threats demands full inclusion of previously overlooked states, since their exclusion could destabilize results.¹⁷³ Moreover, Jurrjens and Sizoo pointed out that genuine multilateralism would boost legitimacy and effectiveness while stopping future perceptions of exclusion that harmed previous agreements.¹⁷⁴ Similarly, Charap et al. argued that broader participation would create unity by establishing shared control of security measures across different international viewpoints.¹⁷⁵ Based on these researchers' perspectives, it can be determined that involving multiple

¹⁷² Jonathan Dean, "Using Arms Control to Promote NOD in Europe," in *Routledge eBooks* (London: Routledge, 2019): 40.

¹⁷³ Michael H. Driggers, "NATO's Enlargement and Russia: A Strategic Challenge in the Past and Future," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 35, no. 1 (2022): 155.

¹⁷⁴ Jan Jurrjens and Jan Sizoo, *Efficacy and Efficiency in Multilateral Policy Formation: The Experience of Three Arms Control Negotiations* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2023): 356.

¹⁷⁵ Charap et al., "A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century." 77.

stakeholders strengthens arms-control agreements by establishing solid legitimacy and stability, cutting the probabilities of political seclusion or pact collapse. However, Prem challenged this viewpoint by claiming that involving multiple stakeholders' participation during negotiations presents potential drawbacks, where the enlargement of participants tends to weaken negotiations and challenge consensus formation, slowing arms-control progress.¹⁷⁶ Based on these sources, it can be determined that the conflict resides in selecting the proper relationship between extending participation to diverse parties versus achieving effective negotiating outcomes. Efficiency stands above inclusivity as a priority for Prem, while Jurrjens, Sizoo, and Charap et al. support broad inclusivity for stability purposes. Therefore, a successful arms-control architecture requires organizations to find balanced solutions between inclusive multilateralism and practical negotiation factors using different negotiation platforms at various stages.

Building a New Arms Control Mechanism for Contemporary Security Challenges Based On the Ukraine War

As the Ukrainian war and its aftermath, the policy principles of CFE should be modified to meet contemporary challenges to applied security. During the Cold War, arms reductions, transparency, and systems for verification were the trademarks of the CFE's approach and stability. These approaches are becoming less and less relevant to ever-changing security realities.¹⁷⁷ The example of the conflict in Ukraine highlights the drawbacks of traditional arms control because when a party refuses to be verified or hinders its transparency, it will not work.

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and other antiquated weapons

¹⁷⁶ Berenike Prem, "The False Promise of Multi-Stakeholder Governance: Depoliticizing Private Military and Security Companies," *Global Society* 35, no. 2 (2020): 154

¹⁷⁷ Wilcox, Mark. *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Russian Foreign and Security Policy, from the End of the USSR to the War in Ukraine*. Walter de Gruyter, 2024: 35.

limitation accords have flaws that have been made clear by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.¹⁷⁸ This can be accomplished by introducing technological innovation, such as using UAVs for live monitoring, placing limits on modular arms control agreements, and looking into particular geographical or threat areas.¹⁷⁹ It is also essential, though, that the same be emphasized in the experience of the Ukrainian conflict in arms control negotiations, particularly their multilateral ones. It would be more legitimate to include a broader range of stakeholders, such as Eastern European and CSTO governments, and avoid future exclusions that have undermined previous agreements.¹⁸⁰ Future ceasefire agreements in Ukraine may be influenced by the CFE Treaty's tenets, which include armaments constraints, monitoring, and verification, even though it is seen as obsolete.¹⁸¹ The international community can create a more robust and adaptable arms control system that considers the geopolitical and technological realities of post-Ukraine crisis Europe by fusing transparency, technological developments, and inclusion.

Chapter Summary

The evaluation of the CFE Treaty takes a critical approach to study its first achievements before it ultimately failed. The chapter demonstrates how the treaty served as a vital instrument to decrease conventional forces while developing post-Cold War European trust relations. The

¹⁷⁸ Mukarzel, Rima. *The Russo-Ukrainian War and Its Transformative Impact on European Security Dynamics: Shifting Power, Emerging Challenges, and Future Implications*. PhD diss., Notre Dame University-Louaize, 2023: 110.

¹⁷⁹ Wilcox, Mark. *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Russian Foreign and Security Policy, from the End of the USSR to the War in Ukraine*. Walter de Gruyter, 2024: 40.

¹⁸⁰ Wilcox, Mark. *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Russian Foreign and Security Policy, from the End of the USSR to the War in Ukraine*. Walter de Gruyter, 2024: 60.

¹⁸¹ Mukarzel, Rima. *The Russo-Ukrainian War and Its Transformative Impact on European Security Dynamics: Shifting Power, Emerging Challenges, and Future Implications*. PhD diss., Notre Dame University-Louaize, 2023: 180.

agreement did not succeed in adjusting to modern security threats stemming from asymmetric warfare and technological progress. The stability of the CFE Treaty collapsed due to NATO expansion and Russian security worries, which created complex geopolitical tensions. The deterioration of the treaty became more rapid because of institutional resistance as forces connected to the security ecosystem changes failed to evolve. Research results show that the CFE improved European security initially, yet time made its original structure unfit for evolving strategic developments. The research explores future frameworks of European security architecture through recommendations for adaptable and component-based arms control methods. To solve today's security concerns, a more adaptable, inclusive, and technologically sophisticated approach is required, as the Ukrainian war demonstrates the shortcomings of conventional arms control methods. Future initiatives toward arms-control agreements should establish flexible frameworks that address contemporary technologies while involving multiple parties to maintain permanent security in dangerous multiple-country relations.

Chapter Four: Analysis and Discussion

Re-engineering Strategic Trust: How the CFE Treaty Re-shaped Transparency Norms in Post-Cold-War Europe

The current research findings established the CFE Treaty as the primary tool that rebuilt trust between European powers following the end of the Cold War. A comprehensive verification process combined with data sharing activities and site inspection procedures enabled the Treaty to establish revolutionary transparency tools, which reduced military tensions between NATO and former members of the Warsaw Pact. The CFE verification protocol, which destroyed prescribed weapons and carried out persistent site inspections, substantially developed European military transparency and reliability standards. Further, it was revealed that the mechanisms that initially proved effective for the Treaty became inadequate when NATO expanded and Russia changed its security perceptions.

The results of the current study indicate that the CFE Treaty served as a significant confidence-building tool in the 1990s, as its detailed data-sharing and inspection processes reassured previous rivals. The results of the current study correspond with various existing studies. For example, Koivula and Simonen endorsed this paper's conclusions regarding transparency-as-deterrence by asserting that the CFE's quarterly data reports and 2,700 on-site inspections established predictable military patterns that reduced the likelihood of surprise attacks.¹⁸² Similarly, McCausland echoed the present paper's findings that an inspection culture

¹⁸² Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen, *Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats* (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2017): 121.

changed cautious “blocs” into allies who anticipated adherence instead of dishonesty.¹⁸³ Agreement with these authors emphasizes a shared belief that carefully structured transparency can transform zero-sum security dynamics into positive-sum collaboration. Pifer supports this conclusion by stating that the Treaty’s data-sharing framework provided “predictability dividends” unmatched by subsequent agreements.¹⁸⁴ Glod’s archival research on the OSCE likewise links the increase in mutual reassurance to standard transparency protocols, reinforcing our assertion that institutions enhanced trust.¹⁸⁵ Conversely, Hayashi argues that harmonization primarily arose from strong political will at high levels instead of verification processes, moderating our understanding of the CFE’s role in building trust.¹⁸⁶ However, the research also revealed constraints to the success of the CFE treaty, where the literature presents differing opinions. In this regard, McCausland challenged the present study’s positive view on lasting trust by indicating that the verification measures were crafted for a static force stance, and thus became overly rigid after NATO’s expansion.¹⁸⁷ Likewise, Rotfeld et al. contended that the Treaty’s transparency model diminished in significance as cyber and precision-strike abilities emerged as a measure of power.¹⁸⁸ These discrepancies suggest that trust fostered by established

¹⁸³ Jeffrey D. McCausland, “European/Eurasian Security and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” in *[book title n.a.]* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013): 589.

¹⁸⁴ Steven Pifer, “The Future of Strategic Arms Control,” *Sicherheit & Frieden* 36, no. 2 (2018): 73.

¹⁸⁵ Katia Glod, “Assessing the OSCE Toolbox: Opportunities for a Safer Europe,” *European Leadership Network* (March 2025): 35.

¹⁸⁶ M. Hayashi, “Suspension of Certain Obligations of the CFE Treaty by NATO Allies,” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 18, no. 1 (2013): 140.

¹⁸⁷ Jeffrey D. McCausland, “European/Eurasian Security and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” in *[book title n.a.]* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013): 589.

¹⁸⁸ Adam Daniel Rotfeld et al., “The Future of Arms Control and International Security,” in *Arms Control* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2000): 44.

transparency is precarious, in that it only endures while the items in focus remain the primary sources of danger. The alignment with Koivula, Simonen, and McCausland shows that thorough validation can reshape strategic trust. On the other hand, the disparity with McCausland and Rotfeld et al. emphasizes to academics and professionals that this trust requires ongoing re-negotiation as technology and alliance structures change.

The analysis above suggests that although the CFE Treaty effectively restored strategic confidence in Europe after the Cold War, its methods, especially verification and transparency measures, grew less effective with changes in geopolitical and technological landscapes. At first, the Treaty's strong verification measures facilitated the shift of adversaries into collaborators, promoting stability. Nevertheless, as NATO grew and new dangers, such as cyber warfare and precision strike abilities, surfaced, the Treaty's fixed structure struggled to adjust. This emphasizes the need for future arms control pacts to stay adaptable, allowing trust fostered through transparency to endure amid changing power dynamics and technological progress.

The findings closely match institutionalism as a theoretical framework. International structures, which Keohane supports, facilitate stable state-to-state interactions even during chaotic global conditions, create binding relationships, reduce operational expenses, and enhance forecasting capabilities between countries.¹⁸⁹ The confirmation mechanisms in the CFE Treaty succeeded in creating new strategic trust between European nations, confirming Institutionalism's argument that institutional frameworks can reduce security problems between states. The CFE Treaty demonstrates that institutional programs use open information sharing to transform mutual state assumptions, thus reducing potential conflicts. The research outcomes relate to the Constructivist theory presented in Chapter Two above. The CFE Treaty achieved

¹⁸⁹ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (London: Routledge, 2020): 20

more than conventional military control because Constructivist principles demonstrated how it transformed the security identities of former Cold War rivals through their shared norms, perceptions, and collective identities. European states developed new shared understandings of transparency and cooperation because of the mutual openness and inspection culture that emerged through the CFE Treaty. Under the CFE Treaty, countries transformed from enemies into partners who gained stability through mutual transparency. However, the Realist theory tempers this optimism. Based on Rosenberg's explanation, Realism explains that the strategic trust developed through the CFE Treaty required balanced power dynamics and mutual interests, which vanished as NATO expanded and Russia regained its strength.¹⁹⁰ Realism teaches that states will break trust in their institutions if they detect threats to their survival, so the trust becomes quickly reversible. The initial formation of strategic trust through the Treaty failed due to changes in global politics, which proved Realist predictions that arms control agreements cannot endure in competitive international dynamics. Wicaksono, Suyastri, and Sundari backed the current study's assertion that states turn to self-help when regulations fall behind technology by contending that anarchy inherently connects to security maximization.¹⁹¹ Maitra also supported the present study's perspective that Russia abandoned the CFE after cyber and precision advantages shifted in NATO's favor, labeling it a classic Realist reaction.¹⁹² Eichler also agreed, emphasizing that Moscow viewed the treaty as "strategically outdated" following

¹⁹⁰ Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 2024): 2.

¹⁹¹ Agung Wicaksono, Cifebrima Suyastri, and Rio Sundari, "Understanding Political Realism," *Journal of Government and Political Issues* 2, no. 2 (2022): 1.

¹⁹² Sumantra Maitra, *The Sources of Russian Aggression: Is Russia a Realist Power?* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2024): 163.

the expansion and thus lost faith in the CFE treaty.¹⁹³ Generally, the CFE Treaty proved a seminal achievement that developed extensive strategic trust relations in Europe through implementing transparency standards. The vulnerability of this trust amid propagating geopolitical changes underlines the necessity for future international agreements to link adhesive institutional structures with the ability to counteract new security risks so they can fulfil Constructivism and Institutionalism demands alongside Realist foresight.

Technology Outruns Treaty: The Limits of Legacy Verification in the Cyber-Precision Age

The research showed that the CFE Treaty achieved successful monitoring and verification of conventional European military forces at its inception, but these systems lost effectiveness because of technological progress. Research showed that the Treaty employed outdated static counting protocols that lacked flexibility to detect emerging cyber warfare platforms and hybrid threats alongside precision-guided munitions. New warfare tactics transformed conventional threats into non-conventional threats, making the CFE Treaty's verification frameworks obsolete. The CFE's verification methods, designed during the Cold War era, failed to identify modern non-heavy equipment threats because they were built for predictable mass force structures, which made the entire Treaty less effective.

The current research demonstrates that swift technological spread, such as cyber weapons, autonomous systems, and precision munitions, rapidly exceeded the CFE's fixed counting regulations. The results of the present study coincide with numerous existing studies. For example, Schaller backed the conclusions of this paper regarding verification obsolescence

¹⁹³ Jan Eichler, *NATO's Expansion After the Cold War* (Cham: Springer, 2021): 20.

by stating that sensors adjusted for heavy armor could not detect software-driven strike assets.¹⁹⁴ Koivula and Simonen also concurred that the rapid pace of technology rendered Cold War treaties consistently outdated.¹⁹⁵ These convergences suggest that future regimes should assess capabilities, not merely hardware, to improve arms control frameworks. In contrast, Bezabh challenged the current study's claim that technology was solely responsible for failure by demonstrating that state-centric power recalculations equally contributed to the CFE treaty breakdown.¹⁹⁶ The U.S.'s aim to counter China and Russia's pursuit of regional influence was more significant than drones or malware. Mason expands on this critique, stating that autonomous and cyber systems only revealed existing political divides and did not create new ones.¹⁹⁷ The misalignment indicates that technology is an accelerant rather than a separate factor in treaty erosion. Anderson and Nelson expand on this critique by demonstrating how the INF Treaty's rigid missile-counting regulations fell apart once maneuverable boosters emerged, mirroring the challenges faced by the CFE.¹⁹⁸ Hodgson similarly shows that sensor suites from the 1990s could not document precision-guided artillery, supporting the current study's

¹⁹⁴ Benjamin Schaller, "Artificial Intelligence in Conventional Arms Control and Military Confidence-Building," in *[book title n.a.]*, ed. *[editor n.a.]* (Cham: Springer, 2022): 129.

¹⁹⁵ Tommi Koivula and Katariina Simonen, *Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats* (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2017): 113.

¹⁹⁶ Abebe Bahiru Bezabh, "The Legal Requirements and Impacts of Unilateral Withdrawal from International Treaties: The Case of the INF Treaty," *CIFILE Journal of International Law* 4, no. 2 (2023): 62.

¹⁹⁷ Ronald Mason, "Conventional Forces and Stability in Europe: Some Thoughts on Force Structures," in *The Guns Fall Silent*, edited by Ian Cuthbertson and Peter M E Volten (London: Routledge, 2019): 160.

¹⁹⁸ Justin V. Anderson and Amy J. Nelson, "The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-Bound Success," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (2019): 122.

obsolescence argument.¹⁹⁹ In contrast, Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker argue that the political unwillingness to renegotiate, rather than the inability of sensors, was crucial, redirecting some of the blame from the technology itself.²⁰⁰ The analysis above indicates that although the CFE Treaty first worked well in monitoring conventional military forces, its verification systems became outdated because of swift technological progress. The Treaty's inflexible protocols from the Cold War did not consider new threats such as cyber warfare, precision-guided weapons, and autonomous systems. The Treaty's emphasis on equipment and large force frameworks became insufficient as military strategies evolved from conventional to unconventional threats.

The analysis above underscores the necessity for future arms control frameworks to evaluate capabilities instead of just monitoring equipment. Nevertheless, the study also indicates that political elements, like shifts in power dynamics, significantly contributed to the Treaty's collapse, highlighting that even the most effective technical solutions fall short without continuous political dedication and adjustment. Future arms control frameworks must be technologically adaptable and politically strong to tackle emerging security issues.

The findings match Realism's theoretical principles during the evaluation process. Realism demonstrates how states within an anarchic international system work to increase their security at all times. States returned to self-help approaches because the CFE Treaty failed to detect cyber operations and precision-guided capabilities. Furthermore, Realism explains Russia's decision to leave the Treaty because the country perceived NATO had superior military technologies, thus showing that arms control agreements fail when states believe they need extra

¹⁹⁹ Grant Hodgson, "Cyber Attack Treaty Verification," in *Treaty Verification* (Columbus, Ohio State University, 2016): 5.

²⁰⁰ Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker, "'The Reward of a Thing Well Done Is to Have Done It': The Rise and Fall of the INF Treaty, 1987–2019," in *[book title n.a.]* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020): 12.

protection. Institutionalism also offers valuable insights. According to Institutionalists, verification systems and compliance architectures foster trust between states while lowering uncertainties. The CFE Treaty lost its institutional value because it failed to update its verification mechanisms, which could handle modern technologies. The institutional theory, as presented by Glod, receives support through this observation because institutions must adapt to new technologies and geopolitical changes to remain relevant.²⁰¹ State behavior remains mediated by institutions, yet institutions require flexibility to maintain operational power. The constructivist perspective complements the current findings, where constructivists establish that institutions must develop new norms while building mutual understandings. During the Cold War era, the CFE Treaty established the principle that significant visible military forces represented the main security threat. This normative framework no longer meets the current warfare demands because cyber warfare and hybrid tactics have emerged as dominant forces. The lack of mutual security threat perception between Russia and NATO destroyed the social base that the Treaty required to survive. The CFE's collapse aligns with the Constructivist theory because it shows how the inability to reform security norms failed when facing new technological challenges. This research reveals how technological progress exceeded established verification methods, which were part of the CFE Treaty. The CFE Treaty succeeded in enhancing stability through its regular inspection protocol, but failed to deal with emerging security threats that led to its collapse. Future arms control systems need verification frameworks that adjust to emerging technologies and new security needs over the future years. The ever-

²⁰¹ Katia Glod, "Assessing the OSCE Toolbox: Opportunities for a Safer Europe," *European Leadership Network* (March 2025): 35.

changing environment ensures that strict traditional agreements fail to deliver expected outcomes.

Perception Gaps and Power Shifts: NATO Enlargement, Russian Insecurity, and the Spiral of Distrust

As the findings show, NATO's membership expansion after the Cold War and changes in Russian security concerns led to extreme strategic mistrust, which eliminated the stability created initially by the CFE Treaty. NATO's expansion strategy to secure independent European states provoked Russian perceptions of a direct threat, which deepened their insecurity and distrust. Russian decision-makers observed the Treaty as giving NATO strategic advantages while failing to protect Russian security needs during this evolving security environment. The CFE framework, which began as an arms control mechanism and transparency tool, evolved into a key element of strategic discussions regarding power distribution that significantly led to its collapse.

The results from this study indicate that NATO expansion and Russia's changing identity created perception discrepancies that weakened the cooperative basis of the CFE treaty. The results of the present study are consistent with several existing publications. For example, Marten backed this paper's findings on insecurity caused by enlargement by asserting that the 1999 and 2004 accessions redefined the military frontier directly at Russia's doorstep, contributing to Russia's loss of faith in the CFE treaty.²⁰² Thus, it can be determined that the expansion of NATO established a new European military system, and this new order pushed Russia toward greater opposition against the CFE Treaty. As a result of moving the military boundary closer to Moscow, Russia became more insecure and threatened. This led to dropping

²⁰² Kimberly Marten, "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating Its Consequences in Russia," 239.

support for the treaty until it finally ceased to be an effective arms control instrument. The treaty failed to adjust to power dynamics and Russian security concerns because geopolitical changes made its core security provisions inadequate. Similarly, Lippert noted that after former Warsaw Pact nations joined NATO, the initial bipolar force limits failed to reflect the power distribution.²⁰³ This assertion aligns with the current research paper's findings. The alignment here suggests that arms-control limits cannot stay unchanged when alliance boundaries evolve. Nonetheless, other researchers disagree with the current study's findings. For instance, Shackett challenged the present study's conclusions regarding the inevitability of the collapse of the CFE treaty by demonstrating that NATO's Partnership-for-Peace and the 1997 Founding Act provided confidence-enhancing measures that, if utilized, could have preserved the Treaty.²⁰⁴ Similarly, Idarand et al. contend that Russia's assertions of imbalance primarily acted as leverage for other foreign-policy goals, which strategically exaggerated misunderstandings rather than providing genuine sentiments.²⁰⁵ These discrepancies indicate that political motives, rather than geographical factors, influence whether expansion leads to the breakdown of the CFE treaty. The combination of harmonious and conflicting perspectives suggests that future arms control frameworks should align flexible quantitative limits with systems that directly tackle changing threat perceptions and national identities.

²⁰³ William E. Lippert, "A European Military Balance Organization and Dynamic Conventional Arms Control," *Bulletin of Carol I National Defence University* 12, no. 3 (2023): 59.

²⁰⁴ Stanton S. Shackett, *Building Without a Cornerstone: The Indispensable Role of CFE in the European Security Structure* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013): 17.

²⁰⁵ Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony, *The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?* (Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security, 2023): 21.

According to the detailed analysis above, it can be established that NATO's growth following the Cold War and the ensuing shifts in Russian security issues were crucial factors in the collapse of the CFE Treaty. The expansion intensified Russia's feelings of vulnerability, as NATO's increasing presence close to its borders altered the power dynamics, rendering the CFE Treaty progressively insignificant. This research indicates that the Treaty, originally intended to foster transparency and trust, became caught up in larger strategic debates regarding power allocation, ultimately failing. The results highlight that arms control systems must be flexible, responding to geopolitical changes like alliance shifts and developing security issues. Nonetheless, the study also uncovers varying perspectives, indicating that although NATO's growth played a role in the treaty's collapse, political motives and power dynamics, rather than merely geographic changes, were essential influences. These differences suggest that future arms control frameworks must strike a balance between adaptability and political involvement, ensuring they tackle both material security issues and the evolving identities and viewpoints of the participating nations. Kulesa's discussions with Russian negotiators support the present research findings that each round of accession was perceived in Moscow as proof of encirclement.²⁰⁶ Futter likewise links the growing threat perception to the expanding qualitative disparity in precision strikes, bolstering the power-shift narrative presented here.²⁰⁷ However, Baranovsky contends that the Treaty's failure was inevitable due to its Cold War dual-bloc framework, rendering enlargement a catalyst instead of a fundamental reason.²⁰⁸ Resonating with

²⁰⁶ Łukasz Kulesa, "Strategic Arms Control Deadlock and the Possible Ways Out," in *[book title n.a.]* (Cham: Springer, 2023): 119.

²⁰⁷ Andrew Futter, *Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 5.

²⁰⁸ Vladimir Baranovsky, "Political Changes in Europe," in *[book title n.a.]* (London: Routledge, 2020): 3.

this doubt, Ibarra depicts CFE as a consciously transitional instrument whose political directive had lapsed by the mid-2000s, thereby questioning any idea of unavoidable failure solely caused by NATO's expansion.²⁰⁹ The research advocates for systems that integrate flexible boundaries with dynamic strategies to address changing threat perceptions and national identities.

The present research results match the theoretical models that formed the basis of this study. Realism provides a solid theoretical explanation of the studied phenomena. All nations put survival and security before every other consideration within an international anarchy. Realism demonstrates how Russia viewed NATO enlargement as threatening, despite NATO expansionists maintaining peaceful rhetoric, because states base their actions on perceived threats rather than actual threats. According to Realist theory, Russia needed the CFE Treaty to end when it perceived European power dynamics moving against its strategic interests. Institutionalism also provides essential insight in connection with the present paper's findings. The study shows that institutions like NATO and OSCE failed to modify their conflict mitigation efforts when Russia changed its threat perception. Research by Keohane demonstrates that institutions help decrease uncertainty. However, this study indicates that institutions lose effectiveness when actors view institutions as unbalanced or unable to adapt to political realities.²¹⁰ Thus, based on the analysis provided above, it can be noted that the institutional framework of the CFE Treaty failed to reduce the growing perception gap between NATO and Russia.

²⁰⁹ Lisa Ibarra, *NATO's Vital Role in the Cold War: Strategic Triumphs, Defending Europe, and Safeguarding Peace* (n.p.: Nicholas Horne, 2010): 51.

²¹⁰ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (London: Routledge, 2020): 8.

Furthermore, the current theme finds its most precise theoretical explanation through Constructivism. State conduct depends on how they identify themselves, the norms they follow, and their perception of the situation. The research demonstrates how Russia shifted its identity from being a former Soviet ally to a threatened power fighting against Western expansion. The security community identity that NATO shifted towards clashed with Russia's developing sense of itself as an essential global power that felt left out. The identity dispute between these countries led to growing mistrust that any arms control measures proved insufficient to resolve. According to Finnemore and Wendt, security dilemmas exist beyond material concerns because they stem from social constructs.²¹¹ It explains why the CFE Treaty, based on Cold War structures, lost relevance after the Cold War. The current research demonstrates that NATO expansion combined with Russian insecurities and perceptual differences generated distrust, destroying the CFE Treaty's foundation. The strategic misperceptions and identity-driven insecurities proved more decisive than technical and institutional deficiencies in breaking down the Treaty. Future arms control frameworks should prioritize both material strength equilibrium and effective perceptual control, as well as comprehensive security identity integration and responsive reaction to shifting fears and ambitions of essential participants.

Designing the Next Generation: Toward an Adaptive and Inclusive Arms-Control Framework for Europe

The present research results showed that Europe requires a new adaptive arms-control architecture not limited by past Cold War era bloc restrictions and can implement flexible multilateral security structures resulting from contemporary security threats. The analysis

²¹¹ Martha Finnemore and Alexander Wendt, "When 'Old' Constructivism Was New," *Perspectives on Politics* 22, no. 4 (2024): 1250.

confirmed that the CFE Treaty succeeded as a stabilizing factor. Still, its fixed structure, inability to adapt to changed geopolitical conditions, and restrictions on inclusion were significant elements in making the treaty obsolete. Future structures in security policy should embrace lessons from past setbacks through their capability to adapt to technological transformations, their extensive involvement of stakeholders, and their development of cutting-edge verification systems for hybrid and cyber threats.

The research suggests a flexible, inclusive, modular arms control framework as the rational next step following the CFE treaty. The results of this study correspond with multiple sources in the existing literature. For example, Charap backed the paper's conclusions on modularity by stating that it is more appropriate for varied threat environments than universal treaties.²¹² Menkiszak also supports the current study's focus on adaptability, contending that only tools equipped with integrated update meetings and technology assessment provisions can endure the innovation cycles of the twenty-first century.²¹³ Agreement with these researchers highlights the notion that the resilience of the arms control framework lies in established adaptability. Simultaneously, Prem challenged the present study's optimistic view on extensive inclusivity by pointing out that larger negotiation platforms frequently exchange ambition for agreement, potentially undermining verification robustness.²¹⁴ This point implies that as the number of participants in negotiations grows, the process often shifts towards prioritizing

²¹² Charap et al., "A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century." 57.

²¹³ Marek Menkiszak, *A Strategic Continuation, a Tactical Change: Russia's European Security Policy* (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2019): 42.

²¹⁴ Berenike Prem, "The False Promise of Multi-Stakeholder Governance: Depoliticizing Private Military and Security Companies," *Global Society* 35, no. 2 (2020): 153.

consensus (agreement) over pursuing ambitious objectives. Consequently, this may result in diluted contracts that do not include efficient verification systems, essential for maintaining adherence to arms control protocols. Similarly, Graef cautions that overly broad frameworks may fall back on minimalist commitments, mimicking the eventual stagnation of the CFE treaty.²¹⁵ These discrepancies suggest a design challenge that forces arms-control frameworks to balance inclusiveness with assertiveness. Bell et al. provide empirical support for the modular approach, demonstrating that treaties featuring built-in review conferences maintain greater compliance over two decades.²¹⁶ Fox and Ismail also support layered verification by integrating satellites with drone overflights to address the monitoring gaps that led to the failure of Open Skies.²¹⁷ Oğuz and Erol, nevertheless, warn that modularity lacking enforceable limits can permit arms expansions, urging designers to maintain ambition while ensuring flexibility.²¹⁸ Woolf's analysis of inspection crises in the late-INF regime highlights that even advanced verification fails when parties politicize non-compliance results, emphasizing the current study's appeal for quick-response dispute mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness of future arms control frameworks.²¹⁹ Thus, it can be determined that verification must be layered by combining satellites and drones with on-site inspections to close evasion gaps. At the same time, rapid-response dispute panels defuse politicized non-compliance.

²¹⁵ Graef, "Beyond Stability," 220.

²¹⁶ Alexandra Bell, Wolfgang Richter, and Andrei Zagorski, "Deep Cuts Issue Brief #9: How to Fix, Preserve and Strengthen the Open Skies Treaty" (Hamburg: Deep Cuts Commission, March 2020): 5.

²¹⁷ Sarah Jane Fox and Rosida Ismail, "'The Skies the Limit!' Aviation Law Perspectives on the Open Skies Treaty," *European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance* 4, no. 1 (2017): 20.

²¹⁸ Oğuz and Erol, "End of the INF Treaty," 7.

²¹⁹ Amy F. Woolf, *Russian Compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016): 6.

Reimagining Arms Control: A Post-CFE Mechanism for the Ukrainian War and Beyond

The Russo-Ukrainian War revealed the Cold War Conventional Arms Forces in Europe Treaty as inadequate and created a new arms control mechanism based on transparency, balance, and restraint. According to Mukarzel, sustainable European security must go beyond technical arms limitations and add identity-forming elements to address post-Soviet national narratives not accommodated in the original CFE Treaty.²²⁰ Kulesz also understands arms control frameworks as obsolete in light of NATO's eastern expansion and the emergence of new threat vectors such as hybrid and cyber warfare; Mukarzel advocates flexible and real-time monitoring and inclusive regional engagement.²²¹²²² Charap et al. validate this with the argument that we must move to a new arms control architecture beyond alliance-based architecture (with verification and transparency enabled by modern technology). Unlike Mukarzel, however, Charap et al. do not emphasize social and political identity changes as much as institutional and technological changes.²²³²²⁴ Graef contributes by making the case for reintegrating arms control into multilateral diplomacy, following up on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in

²²⁰ Mukarzel, Rima. *The Russo-Ukrainian War and Its Transformative Impact on European Security Dynamics: Shifting Power, Emerging Challenges, and Future Implications*. PhD diss., Notre Dame University-Louaize, 2023: 250.

²²¹ Kulesz, Łukasz. "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe." *Survival* 60, no. 4 (2023). Routledge: 89.

²²² Mukarzel, Rima. *The Russo-Ukrainian War and Its Transformative Impact on European Security Dynamics: Shifting Power, Emerging Challenges, and Future Implications*. PhD diss., Notre Dame University-Louaize, 2023: 250.

²²³ Mukarzel, Rima. *The Russo-Ukrainian War and Its Transformative Impact on European Security Dynamics: Shifting Power, Emerging Challenges, and Future Implications*. PhD diss., Notre Dame University-Louaize, 2023: 200.

²²⁴ Charap, Samuel, Alice Lynch, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot, and Giacomo Persi Paoli. "A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe." In *Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2020: 21.

Europe's (OSCE) contribution to shifting from crisis response to long-term strategy.²²⁵ The technical innovation, regional inclusiveness, and identity-sensitive diplomacy support the view that such a future arms control regime will be effective if it adequately blends these attributes to address a regional interest-focused security environment.

Chapter Summary

This chapter focused on the impact of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) on transparency and strategic trust in Europe beyond the Cold War. Strict verification measures such as data sharing, site inspections, and bilateral oversight were key to the CFE Treaty as they were used to reduce military tensions and foster trust between former adversaries. It helped particularly in the stability of Europe through the 1990s political changes. Nevertheless, the analysis discovered that the Treaty's mechanisms were insufficient when geopolitical factors changed, especially with NATO's eastward expansion and Russia's growing security concerns. The verification mechanisms of the CFE Treaty, which were created for conventional forces, found it difficult to handle new threats such as precision-strike weapons and cyber warfare. The international community can build a strong arms control system that can adapt to the changing demands of the Ukrainian conflict and its aftermath by updating the fundamental ideas of the CFE. Research shows that future arms control frameworks should be inclusive and modular to enable flexible participation and adaptation to changing threats. The findings emphasized that inclusivity and decision-making efficiency must be balanced for future agreements to continue to be effective in the face of technical and geopolitical difficulties.

²²⁵ Graef, Alexander. "From Crisis to Strategy: The OSCE and Arms Control in a Divided Europe." 2025: 30.

Significance and Contribution of the Research

This research critically contributes to academic and policy discourse by examining the evolution and collapse of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and assessing its contemporary relevance, particularly in the context of Russia's military resurgence, NATO expansion, and emerging security threats such as hybrid warfare and cyber operations. The analysis of this treaty's collapse becomes vital for future arms control development because it occurs when NATO expands while Russia boosts its military strength.²²⁶ Moreover, the significance of this research is amplified by the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, which underscores fundamental weaknesses in existing European security frameworks, highlighting an urgent need for renewed and adaptable arms control mechanisms.²²⁷ Additionally, the study evaluates how evolving military postures and technological advancements impact strategic arms control considerations, providing critical insights into the role of international institutions like NATO, OSCE, and the UN in developing effective policies.²²⁸ Additionally, the research proposes policy recommendations emphasizing transparency, robust verification processes, and mutual limitations designed to reduce tensions and foster stability. Finally, by analyzing arms control initiatives within Europe's broader security architecture, this research advocates for adaptable, resilient, and inclusive frameworks capable of withstanding shifting geopolitical pressures and effectively responding to contemporary security dynamics.

²²⁶ Heather Williams, "Strategic Stability, Uncertainty and the Future of Arms Control," *Survival* 60, no. 2 (2018): 50.

²²⁷ Davide Genini, "How the War in Ukraine Has Transformed the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy," *Yearbook of European Law*: 3

²²⁸ Alexander Graef, "Beyond Stability: The Politics of Conventional Arms Control in Europe," *Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* 10, no. 2 (2021): 220.

Potential Challenges and Limitations

The challenges and limitations of this research involve obtaining unbiased data on this topic, as NATO expansion and Russia's security concerns are issues with strong geopolitical sensitivities. Many sources may represent the views of the powers of dominance, leaving it difficult to write a fully balanced account. Furthermore, secondary data limits the scope of real-time diplomatic communications or classified policy deliberations that may provide a more comprehensive understanding of the reasoning behind the chosen course of action in the treaty. Such modern challenges to the nature of warfare, such as cyber and autonomous technology, also bring analytical challenges (which arms control literature has not fully caught up with yet).²²⁹ The historical scope of the CFE Treaty may limit the ability to generalize findings to the present and future security contexts; thus, another limitation. Finally, there may be theoretical differences based on whether the Realist, Institutional, or Constructivist approach is emphasized in theoretical interpretation, which may affect the conclusion's objectivity. This indicates the possible need for cautious interpretation and meaningful empirical studies.

²²⁹ Heather Williams, "Strategic Stability, Uncertainty and the Future of Arms Control," *Survival* 60, no. 2 (2018): 50.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

The study investigated the historical development and military effects of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), its dissolution process, and its influence on European security and future arms control possibilities. A thorough examination of historical politics, technology, and institutional factors led to multiple critical findings about modern arms control attempts within international relations. Following the end of the Cold War, the CFE Treaty unambiguously altered how European states conducted strategic trust and transparency practices. The Treaty established a historic level of trust between previous adversaries by implementing verification protocols, which included routine data transmission, site inspections, and bilateral monitoring. The substantial decrease of 50,000 Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) items during the 1990s demonstrates how the Treaty achieved its goal of reducing conventional military tensions. The force posture stabilization provided by the treaty paved the way to peaceful political changes, which occurred throughout Eastern Europe in the initial stages of the post-Cold War era. The findings showed initial success, but this short-lived achievement was due to political changes and new security challenges, revealing Treaty limitations.

Furthermore, the investigation showed that modern technological progress exceeded the verification systems established by the CFE Treaty. Logical and technological progress in cyber warfare capabilities and precision-guided weapons, along with autonomous systems and hybrid warfare strategies, made traditional numerical limitations and physical checks obsolete. The Treaty effectively controlled visible weapon systems but proved inadequate against actual hostilities involving non-conventional and asymmetric forces during contemporary warfare. The research also identified a significant growth in the conflicting views between Russia and NATO, which intensified after NATO expanded eastward. NATO's expansion policy led Western

nations to see it as an approach to advance stability and democracy, but Russia regarded it as an immediate danger to its national security. The failure to establish security agreements that included Russian interests, together with different strategic perspectives, led Russia to suspend the Treaty in 2007. The research also presented essential guidance about how future arms control structures should be developed. The system of arms control needs to evolve past relying on static numerical restrictions because it requires adaptable verification systems that can address cyber, space, and hybrid warfare threats. Future agreements will retain their legitimacy and effectiveness through time only when inclusivity and multilateral participation become core principles.

The research project successfully addressed all research questions and accomplished the initial research objectives defined at the start of the introduction chapter. The first research question, which was “How did the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) shape post-Cold War security dynamics, contribute to arms control in Europe, and what geopolitical, institutional, and strategic factors led to its eventual breakdown?” was answered as follows. The CFE Treaty proved essential for European security development after the Cold War through its promotion of transparency, reduction of forces, and lower risk of conventional armed conflict. The Treaty became less meaningful because four fundamental factors, including geopolitical changes, institutional resistance to change, technical progress, and strategic disagreements, repeatedly diminished its value and performance. The research examined both positive results and weaknesses of the Treaty to establish a comprehensive view of its historical significance. The second research question, “What role can arm control play in shaping a new European security architecture that ensures long-term stability and conflict prevention?” was also addressed fully. The research demonstrated that European stability requires arms control, yet the

necessary approaches should transform to comply with present-day conflict dynamics. While important arms control core concepts such as verification and transparency need preservation, they must be placed into adaptable structures capable of handling emerging security challenges alongside political realignment changes. Modern frameworks must cover cyber warfare systems alongside autonomous weapons and hybrid warfare concepts to embrace contemporary military power concepts beyond Cold War limitations.

The third research question, “How can the international community build a new mechanism based on the CFE’s fundamental principles to address contemporary security challenges, particularly in the Ukrainian war and its aftermath?” was also addressed as explained below. Developing new security mechanisms based on the foundational principles from the CFE served as the third research question. Rebuilding confidence and guaranteeing long-term security in post-war Ukraine and the larger European region requires adjusting the CFE's core principles to today's geopolitical environment. The study proved that contemporary arms control structures could develop existing CFE transparency and trust elements, though they must establish flexible arrangements beyond traditional bloc structures. Future agreements featuring modular elements allowing different levels of participation and separate commitments would succeed in responding better to regional variations, technological changes, and various political circumstances.

Furthermore, in developing a new arms control system, countries ought to maintain the three pillars of the CFE treaty: transparent exchange of weapon information, balanced restrictions for all parties, and evaluations by impartial monitors. Ukraine’s experience indicates that these tools are effective only when all parties have unrestricted access and anticipate equitable treatment. The international community must learn from the Ukrainian crisis and develop arms control frameworks based on flexibility, inclusivity, and sophisticated verification methods to guarantee

long-term stability and avert future conflicts. The research addresses all research questions with complete findings that build a solid base for European arms control policy dialogues and academic discussions beyond Europe.

Recommendations

Future arms control agreements are suggested to adhere to a modular framework to accommodate the evolution of geopolitical and technological conditions. Modular agreements permit states to agree on particular arms control areas while reserving the flexibility of later revisions of those commitments. The verification systems should use modern technologies like satellite surveillance, cyber monitoring, and AI-based data analysis to detect violations in areas where classical inspections are not executed. Agreements must also include periodic review mechanisms to assess how the threat environment has changed and to see whether the deal continues to be state-of-the-art in meeting evolving threats and international shifts. These reviews bring forth areas of need for improvement and prevent obsolescence. Among the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMS) spearheaded by the transparency of military exercises and diplomatic engagement, they are crucial in fostering trust and lowering the risk of conflict in a multipolar world with varying security interests. Moreover, local threats and disputes are to be addressed within the framework of broader structures by incorporating regional partners into regional goals for securing global stability. This regional inclusiveness guarantees that even apart from larger and more accomplished states, developing states can also participate in or be part of successful arms control strategies.

Future Research

The research presents that rapid developments in the military, particularly in cyber war, autonomous systems, and hybrid war, have exceeded the verification capacity of current

corroboration mechanisms under the CFE Treaty based upon physical inspections and numerical limits. Future arms control must incorporate new technologies of modern threats: AI, satellite monitoring, drones, and cyber surveillance for verification to be real-time, data-driven. While the research looked at the hybrid threats and non-state actors, it was considered which arms control frameworks can be adapted to respond to nonconventional threats such as cyber defense, information warfare, or economic tools. The research also notes that Russian security concerns caused NATO's post-1999 expansion to trigger the CFE Treaty's collapse. Further research should examine the effects of NATO expansion on arms control participation in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, as well as how Russia and non-NATO governments view security. Additionally, with the rise of nations like China and India, the international order is becoming more multipolar, and future arms control needs to consider a broader range of actors with different interests. Research should focus on developing trust and inclusive multilateral collaboration to guarantee that future treaties maintain legitimacy and address regional and global security concerns efficiently.

Study Implications

Because geopolitical tensions and technological change are evolving rapidly, the study underlines the need to re-engineer arms control in the current geopolitical circumstances. The existence of such a treaty of concessive force and transparency, however, is revealed to be a falling away of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which succeeded where many treaties could not by fostering post-Cold War trust and transparency, yet both the unrealized potential for constraining future conventional force growth and the inability to adjust to contemporary threat dynamics caused CFE to become obsolete. The study's result sounds the alarm that monitoring compliance is not guaranteed without adaptability, multilateral support,

and integration of Advanced Technologies like AI and cyber surveillance in arms control measures. The research also gives prominence to the principle of regional inclusivity and periodic treaty review to enable such relevance in changing political alliances and belligerence domains well beyond the traditional ones, such as cyber and hybrid war. In addition, the research confirms that balanced obligations, mutual respect, and transparency continue to serve as the foundations for building trust. These are essential findings for directing policymakers' and international institutions' efforts to design resilient and flexible arms control frameworks within a multipolar global security environment.

Bibliography

- Alberque, William, Andrea Chaimpan, Stephen R. Covington, Liana Fix, Christopher Ford, Dominik P. Jankowski, and A. Peczeli. *The Future of Arms Control in a Multilateral and Multi-Domain Environment*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information, 2021.
- Alblooshi, Mohamed, Mohammad Shamsuzzaman, Michael Boon Chong Khoo, Abdur Rahim, and Salah Haridy. "Requirements, Challenges and Impacts of Lean Six Sigma Applications – a Narrative Synthesis of Qualitative Research." *International Journal of Lean Six Sigma* 12, no. 2 (May 27, 2020): 318–67.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/ijlss-06-2019-0067>.
- Alharahsheh, Husam Helmi, and Abraham Pius. "A Review of Key Paradigms: Positivism vs Interpretivism." *Global Academic Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 2, no. 5 (June 30, 2020): 39–43. <https://doi.org/10.36348/gajhss.2020.v02i03.001>.
- Allen, John R., Frederick Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French. *Future War and the Defence of Europe*. Oxford University Press eBooks, 2021.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198855835.001.0001>.
- Altmann, Jürgen, Peter Deák, Catherine McArdle Kelleher, and Vadim Makarevsky. "Verification and Conventional Arms Reductions." In *Arms-Control Verification in a Changing World*, 165–203. London: Routledge, 2019.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429267079-10>.
- Antonov, Alexander, and Thomas Hoffmann. "The NATO-Russia Council—An Assessment of the NRC Prior to the Ukraine Crisis." In *Springer eBooks*, 231–45, 2020.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38399-2_13.

Arbatov, A. G. “Arms and Diplomacy.” *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences* 90, no. 6 (2020): 633–44. <https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331620060039>.

Arkan, Zeynep. *European Security and Hybrid Threats*, 2025.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-86793-4>.

Baldwin, Jessie R., Jean-Baptiste Pingault, Tabea Schoeler, Hannah M. Sallis, and Marcus R. Munafò. “Protecting Against Researcher Bias in Secondary Data Analysis: Challenges and Potential Solutions.” *European Journal of Epidemiology* 37, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10654-021-00839-0>.

Baranovsky, Vladimir. “Political Changes in Europe.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 241–60, 2020.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003111375-12>.

Bava, Ummu Salma. “Impact of the Ukraine War on Security in the Baltic Region.” In *The CFE Treaty*, 15–34. Singapore: Springer, 2024.

Bell, Alexandra, Wolfgang Richter, Andrei Zagorski, and Deep Cuts. “Deep Cuts Issue Brief #9: How to Fix, Preserve and Strengthen the Open Skies Treaty.” March 2020.
https://deepcuts.org/media/pages/publications/issue-briefs/issue-brief-how-to-fix-preserve-and-strengthen-the-open-skies-treaty/843a191b0a-1701960398/deep_cuts_issue_brief_9-open_skies_treaty.pdf.

Bell, Alexandra. “Euro-Atlantic Arms Control: Past, Present, and Future.” In *New Security Challenges*, 35–50. Cham: Springer, 2019.

Bezabh, Abebe Bahiru. “The Legal Requirements and Impacts of Unilateral Withdrawal from International Treaties: The Case of the INF Treaty.” *CIFILE Journal of International Law* (September 1, 2023). <https://doi.org/10.30489/cifj.2023.394143.1066>.

Bluth, Christoph. "Soviet Forces and Security Issues." In *Routledge eBooks*, 33–62. London: Routledge, 2019.

Casier, Tom. "Stumbling from Incident to Incident: The Systemic Crisis of the Post-Cold War Order." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 36, no. 3 (2021): 410–28.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1869182>.

Charap, Samuel, Alice Lynch, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot, and Giacomo Persi Paoli. "A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe." In *Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2020, 21–40.

Charap, Samuel, Alice Lynch, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot, and Giacomo Persi Paoli. *A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020.

Cimbala, Stephen J. "The INF Treaty and New START: Escalation Control, Strategic Fatalism, and the Role of Cyber." In *World Scientific eBooks*, 189–217, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811219160_0009.

Clark, Wesley K. "NATO Enlargement and Russia: A Military Perspective." In *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security after the Cold War*, edited by Daniel S. Hamilton, 1–18. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2019.

CTFE. "TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE," March 9, 1989.
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/9/14087.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Davis, Zachary S. "The Realist Nuclear Regime." In *Routledge eBooks*, 79–99, 2020.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003089087-5>.

Dean, Jonathan. "Using Arms Control to Promote NOD in Europe." In *Routledge eBooks*, 37–47. London: Routledge, 2019.

Defense, United States. Department Of. *2018 Nuclear Posture Review*, 2018.

Dembinski, Matthias, and Hans-Joachim Schmidt. “An Unfinished Agenda: Arms Control and Disarmament in Europe.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 151–81. London: Routledge, 2019.

Denny, Elaine, and Annalise Weckesser. “How to Do Qualitative Research?” *BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology* 129, no. 7 (April 17, 2022): 1166–67. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-0528.17150>.

Driggers, Michael H. “NATO’s Enlargement and Russia: A Strategic Challenge in the Past and Future.” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 35, no. 1 (2022): 154–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2022.2045801>.

Durhin, Nathalie, Diego J. Sánchez Caamaño, Christos Vasileiadis, Michel Lipski, and Stephen J. Mariano. “NATO’s Strategic Foundations: Values, Deterrence, and Arms Control.” *NATO Defense College Research Paper* 12. Rome: NATO Defense College, 2020.

Eichler, Jan. *NATO’s Expansion After the Cold War*. Global Power Shift, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66641-5>.

Fasola, Nicolò, and Sonia Lucarelli. “Ups and Downs of NATO-Russia Relations: A Cognitivist Perspective.” *Interdisciplinary Political Studies* 5, no. 2 (2019): 319–71. <https://doi.org/10.1285/i20398573v5n2p319>.

Finnemore, Martha, and Alexander Wendt. “When ‘Old’ Constructivism Was New: Reflections on Classical Constructivism.” *Perspectives on Politics* 22, no. 4 (December 1, 2024): 1248–68. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592724001464>.

Fiszer, Józef M. “Poland’s Road to NATO – Objective and Subjective Obstacles.” *Questa Soft Papers* (2022): 47–73.

- Foerster, Schuyler, and Jeffrey A. Larsen. "NATO Strategy: Integrating Defense and Collaborative Security." *NATO Defense College Research Paper* 18. Rome: NATO Defense College, 2021.
- Foulon, Michiel, and John Jack Thompson, eds. *The Future of European Strategy in a Changing Geopolitical Environment: Challenges and Prospects*. The Hague: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2021.
- Fox, Sarah Jane, and Rosida Ismail. "'The Skies the Limit!'" *European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance* 4, no. 1 (January 30, 2017): 7–42.
<https://doi.org/10.1163/22134514-00401001>.
- Futter, Andrew. *Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security*. New Security Challenges, 2019.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19730-8>.
- Galal, Abdelraouf Mostafa. "External Behaviour of Small States in Light of Theories of International Relations." *Review of Economics and Political Science* 5, no. 1 (January 13, 2020): 38–56. <https://doi.org/10.1108/REPS-11-2018-0028>.
- Gassert, Philipp, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker. "'The Reward of a Thing Well Done Is to Have Done It': The Rise and Fall of the INF Treaty, 1987–2019." In *Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht eBooks*, 9–42, 2020.
<https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666352171.9>.
- Genini, Davide. "How The War in Ukraine Has Transformed the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy." *Yearbook of European Law*, April 11, 2025.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yeaf003>.
- Gill, Amandeep S. "Conclusion: The NSS as a Learning Forum." In *Springer eBooks*, 173–207. Cham: Springer, 2019.

Glod, Katia. "Assessing the OSCE Toolbox: Opportunities for a Safer Europe." March 2025.

https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/25_03_OSCE-report_V2.pdf.

Graef, Alexander. "From Crisis to Strategy: The OSCE and Arms Control in a Divided Europe." 2025, 1–30.

Graef, Alexander. "Beyond Stability: The Politics of Conventional Arms Control in Europe." *Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* 10, no. 2 (October 1, 2021): 219–45.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s42597-022-00070-y>.

Grand, Camille. "Missiles, Deterrence and Arms Control: Options for a New Era in Europe." IISS, September 25, 2023. Accessed April 29, 2025. <https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2023/09/missiles-deterrence-and--arms-control-options--for-a-new-era-in-europe/>.

Grewal, Anju, Hanish Kataria, and Ira Dhawan. "Literature Search for Research Planning and Identification of Research Problem." *Indian Journal of Anaesthesia* 60, no. 9 (January 1, 2016): 635. <https://doi.org/10.4103/0019-5049.190618>.

Happe, Laura E. "Distinguishing Predatory from Reputable Publishing Practices." *Journal of Managed Care & Specialty Pharmacy* 26, no. 8 (July 27, 2020): 956–60.
<https://doi.org/10.18553/JMCP.2020.26.8.956>.

Hayashi, M. "Suspension of Certain Obligations of the CFE Treaty by NATO Allies: Examination of the Response to the 2007 Unilateral Treaty Suspension by Russia." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 18, no. 1 (February 20, 2013): 131–50.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/JCSL/KRT003>.

Hayashi, Paulo, Gustavo Abib, and Norberto Hoppen. “Validity in Qualitative Research: A Processual Approach.” *The Qualitative Report* (January 14, 2019).

<https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2019.3443>.

Heap, Vicky, and Jaime Waters. “Data Collection Methods.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 141–76, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315143354-8>.

Herbst, John E., Philip D. Zelikow, Charles Gati, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Petr Luňák.

“European Security, NATO–Russia Relations, and the Post-Cold War Order.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 26, no. 3 (2024): 204–41. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_c_01233.

Herbst, John E., Philip D. Zelikow, Charles Gati, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Petr Luňák.

“European Security, NATO–Russia Relations, and the Post–Cold War Order.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 26, no. 3 (2024): 204–41. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_c_01233.

Hernández, Gabriela Iveliz Rosa. “Whither Conventional Arms Control in Europe?” In *Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG eBooks*, 109–20, 2023.

<https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748917366-08>.

Herspring, Dale R. “The Soviets, the Warsaw Pact, and the Eastern European Militaries.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 130–55, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429033162-6>.

Hodgson, Grant. “Cyber Attack Treaty Verification.” *Treaty Verification* (January 1, 2016).

<https://kb.osu.edu/handle/1811/80041>.

Ibarra, Lisa. *NATO’s Vital Role in the Cold War: Strategic Triumphs, Defending Europe, and Safeguarding Peace*. Nicholas Horne, 2010.

Idarand, Tõnis, Kalev Stoicescu, Ian Anthony, and International Centre for Defence and Security. “The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?” 2023.

https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2023/05/ICDS_Report_The_Future_of_Arms_Control_Idarand_Stoicescu_Anthony_May_2023.pdf.

Janiszewski, Chris, and Stijn M. J. Van Osselaer. “Abductive Theory Construction.” *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 32, no. 1 (November 16, 2021): 175–93.

<https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1280>.

Johnson, Tana, and Andrew Heiss. “Liberal Institutionalism.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 120–32, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003266365-12>.

Jones, Peter. “Making a Better Treaty on Open Skies.” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2021.

https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/making_a_better_open_skies_treaty.pdf.

Jürgen Altmann et al., “Verification and Conventional Arms Reductions *,” in *Routledge eBooks*, 2019, 165–203, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429267079-10>

Jurrijens, Jan, and Jan Sizoo. *Efficacy and Efficiency in Multilateral Policy Formation: The Experience of Three Arms Control Negotiations: Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2023.

Keohane, Robert O. *International Institutions and State Power*. Routledge eBooks, 2020.

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429032967>.

Kertysova, Katarina, Alexander Graef, European Leadership Network, and North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network. “Open Skies in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities.” Report. European Leadership Network, 2021.

https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Open-Skies-in-the-Arctic-Challenges-and-Opportunities.final_.pdf.

- Khan, Intakhab. "Ethical Considerations in Educational Research: A Critical Analysis." *British Journal of Education, Society & Behavioural Science* 13, no. 2 (November 19, 2015): 1–8. <https://doi.org/10.9734/BJESBS/2016/21821>.
- Koivula, Tommi, and Katariina Simonen. "Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats." Doria, 2017. Accessed April 18, 2025.
<https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2951-3>.
- Kosaka, Hirofumi. "Overcoming the Second Cold War: The Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the Relaxation of East-West Tensions, 1983–1986." *International History Review* (2023): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2023.2298457>.
- Kramer, Mark. *The Fate of the Soviet Bloc's Military Alliance: Reform, Adaptation, and Collapse of the Warsaw Pact, 1985-1991*. Cambridge University Press, 2025.
- Kühn, Ulrich. *The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe*, 2020.
<https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903239>.
- Kulesa, Łukasz. "Strategic Arms Control Deadlock and the Possible Ways Out." In *Contributions to Political Science*, 109–19, 2023.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32221-1_8.
- Kules, Łukasz. "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe." *Survival* 60, no. 4 (2023). Routledge: 75–89.
- Kules. "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe." In *Survival* 60.4, 2023.
<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003422327-8/future-conventional-arms-control-europe-%C5%82ukasz-kules>.
- Lanoszka, Alexander. "The INF Treaty: Pulling Out in Time." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* season-02 (2019).

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-2/Lanoszka.pdf.

Lim, Weng Marc. “What Is Qualitative Research? An Overview and Guidelines.” *Australasian Marketing Journal* (July 25, 2024). <https://doi.org/10.1177/14413582241264619>.

Lippert, William E., and Jordan Becker. “Conventional Arms Control and Military Balance in Europe.” *Contemporary Security Policy* (March 26, 2025): 1–32.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2025.2474873>.

Lippert. “A European Military Balance Organization and Dynamic Conventional Arms Control.” *Bulletin of Carol I National Defence University* 12, no. 3 (October 6, 2023): 41–59.
<https://doi.org/10.53477/2284-9378-23-31>.

Lodgaard, Sverre. “Arms Control and World Order.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 216–34. London: Routledge, 2021.

Mackiewicz, Łukasz, and Julia Friedrich. “Presence Without Power.” GPPi, April 16, 2025. Accessed May 1, 2025. <https://gppi.net/2025/04/16/presence-without-power>.

Maitra, Sumantra. *The Sources of Russian Aggression: Is Russia a Realist Power?* Lexington Books, 2024.

Maretha, Citra, and SMP Negeri 58 Palembang, Indonesia. “Positivism in Philosophical Studies.” *Journal of Innovation in Teaching and Instructional Media* 3 (May 2023).
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9e89/639ea6052cf6fe7714717090868f0f2542c9.pdf>.

Marten, Kimberly. “NATO Enlargement: Evaluating Its Consequences in Russia.” In *Springer eBooks*, 209–49, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23364-7_7.

- Mason, Ronald. "Conventional Forces and Stability in Europe: Some Thoughts on Force Structures, Qualitative Factors and Their Control." In *Routledge eBooks*, 157–64, 2019.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429311505-10>.
- Mayer, Sebastian. "Institutionalism." In *Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks*, 36–51, 2023.
<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839103391.00012>.
- Mays, Nicholas, and Catherine Pope. "Synthesising Qualitative Research." *Narrative Synthesis* (December 6, 2019): 151–68. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119410867.ch11>.
- Mbanaso, Uche M., Lucienne Abrahams, and Kennedy C. Okafor. "Research Philosophy, Design and Methodology." In *Research Philosophy*, 81–113, 2023.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30031-8_6.
- McCauley, Martin. *Russia, America and the Cold War*. Routledge eBooks, 2013.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315834108>.
- McCausland, Jeffrey. "After Georgia: Russia, NATO, and the CFE." Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, November 3, 2008.
<https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/article/after-georgia-russia-nato-and-the-cfe>.
- McCausland. "Chapter 2 European/Eurasian Security and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe." JSTOR. Accessed April 18, 2025.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11934.5>.
- McDonald, Matt. "Constructivisms." In *Routledge eBooks*, 52–66, 2023.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003247821-5>.
- Megoran, Nick. 'Russian Troops Out! No to NATO Expansion!' A Pacific Geopolitics for a New Europe." *Political Geography* 98 (June 22, 2022): 102699.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102699>.

- Mehrotra, O. N. "NATO Eastward Expansion and Russian Security." *Strategic Analysis* 46, no. 2 (2022): 248–55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2022.2080473>.
- Menkiszak, Marek. *A Strategic Continuation, a Tactical Change: Russia's European Security Policy*. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2019.
- Meyer, Dierk, and Allen Sens. "Multinational Formations in NATO: From Forward Defense to Rapid Reaction." In *Routledge eBooks*, 91–111. London: Routledge, 2019.
- Mukarzel, Rima. *The Russo-Ukrainian War and Its Transformative Impact on European Security Dynamics: Shifting Power, Emerging Challenges, and Future Implications*. PhD diss., Notre Dame University-Louaize, 2023, 1–250.
- Muyembe, Asenahabi, and Kibabii University. "Basics of Research Design: A Guide to Selecting Appropriate Research Design." *International Journal of Contemporary Applied Researches* 6 (May 2019). <https://www.ijcar.net>.
- Nha, Vu Thi Thanh. "Understanding Validity and Reliability from Qualitative and Quantitative Research Traditions." *VNU Journal of Foreign Studies* 37, no. 3 (June 30, 2021). <https://doi.org/10.25073/2525-2445/VNUFS.4672>.
- Oğuz, Şafak, and Mehmet Seyfettin Erol. "End of the INF Treaty: Are We Entering a New Cold War Era?" *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 14, no. 28 (June 10, 2021): 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.19060/GAV.948852>.
- Okorie, None Gold Nmesoma, et al. "Ethical Considerations in Data Collection and Analysis: A Review." *International Journal of Applied Research in Social Sciences* 6, no. 1 (January 2, 2024): 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.51594/IJARSS.V6I1.688>.

OSCE. “OSCE Chief Monitor in Ukraine Welcomes Extension to the Special Monitoring Mission’s Mandate,” March 15, 2015. Accessed May 1, 2025.

<https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/145001>.

OSCE. “Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Small-arms Fire Hit SMM Vehicle in Marinka,” January 17, 2016. Accessed May 1, 2025.

<https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/216561>.

OSCE. *Restrictions of SMM’s Freedom of Movement and Other Impediments to Fulfilment of Its Mandate: July - December 2018*, 2019.

Park, Yoon Soo, Lars Konge, and Anthony R. Artino. “The Positivism Paradigm of Research.”

Academic Medicine 95, no. 5 (December 2, 2019): 690–94.

<https://doi.org/10.1097/ACM.0000000000003093>.

Pervin, Nasrin, and Mahani Mokhtar. “The Interpretivist Research Paradigm: A Subjective

Notion of a Social Context.” *International Journal of Academic Research in Progressive Education and Development* 11, no. 2 (April 25, 2022).

<https://doi.org/10.6007/IJARPED/V11-I2/12938>.

Phillips, Matthew J. “Towards a Social Constructionist, Foucauldian-Informed Qualitative Research Approach: Opportunities and Challenges.” *SN Social Sciences* 3, no. 10

(October 10, 2023). <https://doi.org/10.1007/S43545-023-00774-9>.

Pietilä, Anna-Maija, Sanna-Maria Nurmi, Arja Halkoaho, and Helvi Kyngäs. “Qualitative

Research: Ethical Considerations.” In *Springer eBooks*, 49–69, 2019.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30199-6_6.

Pifer, Steven. “The Future of Strategic Arms Control.” *Sicherheit & Frieden* 36, no. 2

(January 1, 2018): 67–73. <https://doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-2-67>.

- Powell, Thomas C. "Can Quantitative Research Solve Social Problems? Pragmatism and the Ethics of Social Research." *Journal of Business Ethics* 167, no. 1 (June 13, 2019): 41–48. <https://doi.org/10.1007/S10551-019-04196-7>.
- Prem, Berenike. "The False Promise of Multi-Stakeholder Governance: Depoliticising Private Military and Security Companies." *Global Society* 35, no. 2 (2020): 149–70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2020.1791055>.
- Prins, Gwyn. "Military Restructuring and the Challenge of Europe." In *Non-Offensive Defence: A Global Perspective*, 52–105. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Prokhorova, Anastasia. "Reducing Military Risks Through OSCE Instruments: Revisiting the OSCE Institutional Process and Capacities." *Strategic Security Analysis* (January 2021). <https://www.gcsp.ch/sites/default/files/2024-12/SSA-15-reducing-military-risks-through-osce-instruments-revisiting-the-osce-institutional-process-and-capacities.pdf>.
- Ragatz, Julie. "The Eclipse of Institutionalism? An Investigation into the Formation of Consensus around Neoclassical Economics in the 1950s." Accessed April 21, 2025. <https://www.proquest.com/openview/a276b69cded6b5fc8d8156915c938474/1?cbl=18750&diss=y>.
- Richter, Wolfgang. "The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty." In *Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks*, 314–46, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788111904.00035>.
- Rosecrance, Richard, and Arthur A. Stein. "1. Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy." In *Cornell University Press eBooks*, 3–21, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501737701-003>.

Rosenberg, Justin. *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*. Verso Books, 2024.

Rotfeld, Adam Daniel, Ian Anthony, Shannon Kile, and Zdzislaw Lachowski. “The Future of Arms Control and International Security.” In *Arms Control*, 2000.

<https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI01AnRo/SIPRI01AnRo01.pdf>.

Ruggiano, Nicole, and Tam E. Perry. “Conducting Secondary Analysis of Qualitative Data: Should We, Can We, and How?” *Qualitative Social Work* 18, no. 1 (April 14, 2017): 81–97. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1473325017700701>.

Rumer, Eugene, and Richard Sokolsky. “Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security.” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020.

Sagramoso, Domitilla. *Russian Imperialism Revisited*. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2020.

Schaller, Benjamin. “Artificial Intelligence in Conventional Arms Control and Military Confidence-Building.” In *Springer eBooks*, 129–44, 2022.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11043-6_10.

Schmidt, Hans-Joachim. “Force Comparison and Conventional Arms Control at the End of the East-West Conflict.” In *Bristol University Press eBooks*, 216–36. Bristol: Bristol UP, 2024.

Shackett, Stanton S. “Building Without a Cornerstone: The Indispensable Role of CFE in the European Security Structure.” March 1, 2013.

<https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA589429>.

Simonet, Loïc. “The CFE Treaty Is Dead. Could It Still Inspire a Ceasefire in Ukraine? | Arms Control Association,” March 2025. Accessed May 1, 2025.

<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-03/features/cfe-treaty-dead-could-it-still-inspire-ceasefire-ukraine>.

Singh, Danny. "NATO During the Cold War and Dissolution of the Soviet Union." In *Cold War*, 67–82, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2_3.

Sokov, N. "The U.S. Withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty." *Pathways to Peace and Security* no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 133–50. <https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-133-150>.

Spanger, Hans-Joachim. "Rethinking European Security," 2019. <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/wien/15743.pdf>.

Speedie, David. "U.S.-Russia Relations: Under Stress, And in Need of Care." Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, April 9, 2008. Accessed April 29, 2025. <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/article/u-s-russia-relations-under-stress-and-in-need-of-care>.

Stefanović, Andrej, and Marina Kostić-Šulejić. "Making a Comprehensive Arms Control Agreement for Europe in Times of Crisis: Rationale, Structure, and Outcomes." *Politika Nacionalne Bezbednosti* 27, no. 2 (2024): 79–107. <https://doi.org/10.5937/pnb27-51889>.

Steneck, Nicholas. "Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty." In *Routledge Resources Online: The Cold War*. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2025. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367199838-recw54-1>.

Su, Hengrui. "A Systematic Review: Revisiting Neoliberal Institutionalism in the Modern Context with Political Philosophy Considerations." *Advances in Economics Management and Political Sciences* 7, no. 1 (September 12, 2023): 91–104. <https://doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/7/20230219>.

- Šulejić, Marina Kostić, and Andrej Stefanović. “European Arms Control in Crisis — Understanding the Sources, Russian Position and Future Prospect.” In *European Arms Control in Crisis*, 285–314. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2023.
- Tamminen, Katherine A., and Zoë A. Poucher. “Research Philosophies.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 535–49, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315187259-39>.
- Terry, Sarah M. “Beyond the Cold War: Prospects for Central European Security and Cooperation in a Post-Communist World.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 229–62. London: Routledge, 2019.
- Timmermans, Stefan, and Iddo Tavory. *Data Analysis in Qualitative Research*, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226817729.001.0001>.
- Vershbow, Alexander. “Present at the Transformation: An Insider’s Reflection on NATO Enlargement, NATO-Russia Relations, and Where We Go from Here.” In *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security after the Cold War*, 425–42. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2019.
- Wicaksono, Agung, Cifebrima Suyastri, and Rio Sundari. “Understanding Political Realism.” *Journal of Government and Political Issues* 2, no. 2 (July 22, 2022). <https://doi.org/10.53341/JGPI.V2I2.52>.
- Wilcox, Mark. *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Russian Foreign and Security Policy, from the End of the USSR to the War in Ukraine*. Walter de Gruyter, 2024.

Williams, Heather. "Strategic Stability, Uncertainty and the Future of Arms Control."

Survival 60, no. 2 (March 4, 2018): 45–54.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1448561>.

Woolf, Amy F. *Russian Compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty:*

Background and Issues for Congress. 2016.

<http://goodtimesweb.org/overseas-war/2015/R43832.pdf>.

Zannier, Lamberto. "Post-Cold War Weapons Reduction: The Role of NATO." In *Routledge*

eBooks, 139–46. London: Routledge, 2019.

Zhang, Longtai. "Examining Post-Cold War Geopolitical Transformations in Central and Eastern

Europe: The Baltic States' Path to EU and NATO Membership and the Evolving

Dynamics of Relations with Russia." *Journal of Research in Social Science and*

Humanities (2024): 70–77.