



universität
wien

MASTERARBEIT | MASTER'S THESIS

Titel | Title

The Intraparty Role of Political Youth Wings and the Influence of Party Performance

verfasst von | submitted by

Till Augustin Iglar BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad | in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien | Vienna, 2025

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt |
Degree programme code as it appears on the
student record sheet:

UA 066 824

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt | Degree pro-
gramme as it appears on the student record
sheet:

Masterstudium Politikwissenschaft

Betreut von | Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Mag. Mag. Dr. Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik

Mitbetreut von | Co-Supervisor:

Dr. Matthias Kaltenegger BA MA

Acknowledgements

I want to thank everyone who supported me during the completion of this Master's thesis. First and foremost, I want to thank Prof. Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik and Dr. Matthias Kaltenegger for their great supervision, for all their helpful feedback and suggestions, and for the opportunity to gain valuable experience while working with them at the Department of Government. Furthermore, I want to thank my family, especially my parents Eva and Bernd, for supporting me during my studies and for always having trust in my decisions and abilities. I am also very grateful to my friends for always offering me an open ear and sometimes a much-needed break. Last but certainly not least, I want to thank Michaela for all the support, patience, and motivation she offered me throughout the whole process of writing this thesis.

Contents

1	Introduction.....	7
2	Literature review: Different aspects of the intraparty role of youth wings.....	10
2.1	The recruitment and steppingstone function	10
2.2	The critical intraparty attitude	11
2.2.1	Case studies on the critical intraparty attitude	11
2.2.2	Reasons for the critical intraparty attitude.....	13
2.3	The youth representation function.....	15
2.4	Contributions of the thesis.....	16
3	Theoretical framework.....	18
3.1	Strong critical intraparty attitude and weak youth representation function as aspects of the challenging intraparty role.....	18
3.2	The influence of electoral performance on the intraparty role of youth wings.....	22
3.3	The influence of government participation on the intraparty role of youth wings	23
3.4	Changes in the intraparty role of youth wings over time	25
4	Case selection: The Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and its youth wings	30
4.1	Justification of the case selection	30
4.2	Overview of the SPÖ youth wings	33
4.2.1	The Austrian Socialist Youth (SJÖ)	33
4.2.2	The Young Generation in the SPÖ (JG).....	34
4.2.3	The Austrian Association of Socialist Students (VSStÖ)	35
4.2.4	The school student organizations of the SPÖ (VSM & AKS)	37
5	Data and variables.....	39
5.1	Data basis: youth wing speeches at SPÖ party congresses	39
5.2	Operationalization of the dependent variables	42
5.2.1	The critical intraparty attitude	42
5.2.2	The youth representation function.....	47
5.3	Operationalization of the independent variables.....	48
5.3.1	Electoral performance.....	48
5.3.2	Form of government participation	49
5.3.3	Time.....	50
5.4	Control variables	51
5.4.1	Youth wing affiliation and gender of speaker	51

5.4.2 Length of sentences and speeches	53
5.4.3 Time gap between speech and last election	56
6 Analysis.....	59
6.1 The relationship between the critical intraparty attitude and the youth representation function.....	59
6.2 The critical intraparty attitude (H1a, H2a, H3a)	64
6.2.1 Bivariate analysis.....	64
6.2.2 Multivariate analysis.....	69
6.3 The youth representation function (H1b, H2b, H3b)	77
6.3.1 Bivariate analysis.....	77
6.3.2 Multivariate analysis.....	81
7 Discussion and Conclusion	87
References	91
Appendix.....	101
A1 Overview of the included party congresses.....	101
A2 Coding scheme (German).....	102
A3 Abstract (English).....	112
A4 Abstract (German).....	113

List of figures

Figure 1. Overview of the hypotheses	29
Figure 2. Overview of the numbers of speeches per party congress by youth wing	41
Figure 3. Distribution of share of critical sentences (grouped).....	43
Figure 4. Distribution of share of supportive sentences (grouped).....	44
Figure 5. Distribution of the indicator for intraparty attitude (grouped)	46
Figure 6. Distribution of the share of youth-related sentences (grouped)	48
Figure 7. SPÖ vote share in the elections for the National Council 1945-2019	49
Figure 8. Distribution of form of SPÖ government participation.....	50
Figure 9. SPÖ vote share and form of government participation over time	51
Figure 10. Distribution of youth wing affiliation of speakers.....	52
Figure 11. Gender distribution among youth wing speakers over time	53
Figure 12. Distribution of mean sentence length	55
Figure 13. Distribution of speech length.....	55
Figure 14. Scatterplot and local polynomial regression plot (including 95% confidence bands) illustrating speech length and mean sentence length over time	56
Figure 15. Overview of the time gaps between party congresses and the preceding elections	58
Figure 16. Comparison of mean share of youth-related sentences per speech between SJÖ/JG and VSSStÖ/VSM/AKS members (including 95% confidence intervals)	60
Figure 17. Comparison of mean indicator for intraparty attitude between SJÖ/JG and VSSStÖ/VSM/AKS (including 95% confidence intervals).....	62
Figure 18. Scatterplot and linear regression line illustrating the correlation between intraparty attitude indicator and share of youth-related sentences (for the case of SJÖ/JG)	63
Figure 19. Scatterplot and linear regression line illustrating the correlation between intraparty attitude indicator and share of youth-related sentences (for the case of VSSStÖ/VSM/AKS)	63
Figure 20. Comparison of the mean intraparty attitude indicator between party congresses following elections with and without electoral loss (including 95% confidence intervals)	64
Figure 21. Comparison of the mean intraparty attitude indicator between different forms of SPÖ government status (including 95% confidence intervals).....	66
Figure 22. Scatterplot and local polynomial regression plot (including 95% confidence bands) illustrating intraparty attitude over time.....	67

Figure 23. Intraparty attitude of youth wing speakers and ideological position of the SPÖ over time. Local polynomial regression plot based on Figure 7	73
Figure 24. Predicted intraparty attitude indicator for speeches held after electoral loss/no electoral loss and during SPÖ coalition participation/no SPÖ coalition participation	75
Figure 25. Comparison of the mean share of youth-related sentences between party congresses following elections with and without electoral loss (including 95% confidence intervals)	78
Figure 26. Comparison of the mean share of youth-related sentences during different forms of SPÖ government status (including 95% confidence intervals)	79
Figure 27. Scatterplot and local polynomial regression plot (including 95% confidence bands) illustrating the share of youth-related sentences over time	80
Figure 28. Predicted share of youth-related sentences for speeches held after electoral loss/no electoral loss and during SPÖ coalition participation/no SPÖ coalition participation	85

List of tables

Table 1. Correlation between the indicator for intraparty attitude and the share of youth-related sentences (grouped by youth wings)	59
Table 2. Two-tailed t-tests comparing the means of the dependent variables between SJÖ/JG and VSSStÖ/VSM/AKS members	61
Table 3. Results of several two-tailed t-tests comparing the mean intraparty attitude indicator between different groups.....	65
Table 4. OLS regression models (DV: indicator for intraparty attitude). Standard errors clustered by party congresses.....	70
Table 5. Results of several two-tailed t-tests comparing the mean share of youth-related sentences between different groups	78
Table 6. Fractional logit regression models (DV: share of youth-related sentences). Standard errors clustered by party congresses	82
Table 7. Overview of the hypotheses and conclusions	86
Table A1. Summary of key facts regarding the included party congresses	101

1 Introduction

Despite constituting a significant share of the population, young people and their interests remain underrepresented in many democracies. Young people not only lack descriptive political representation (Kurz & Ettensperger, 2023; Stockemer & Sundstrom, 2022) but also frequently state that they do not feel heard and taken seriously by policymakers (e.g. ANU Reporter, 2024; McNamara, 2024; UNICEF USA, 2024). The latter notion is likely to have a true core since studies have found a positive relationship between descriptive and substantive political representation (Celis, 2006; Kittilson, 2008; Lowande et al., 2019; Sobolewska et al., 2018), suggesting that the lack of young people in politics might lead to politicians focusing less on the interests of younger generations. This is especially concerning since the consequences of many global political challenges such as climate change will be more severely felt by today's youth than by older generations (e.g. Thiery et al., 2021).

For the improvement of the political representation of young people and their interests, political parties are of great importance. Parties are often conceptualized as intermediary actors who ensure a *linkage* between citizens and the state (Dalton et al., 2011; Lawson, 1980). In many parties, political youth organizations are driving forces towards the representation and inclusion of young people. In this context, youth wings, on the one hand, foster the descriptive representation of younger generations by supporting the political career of their young members in various ways (Davies, 2020; Gruber, 2009; Hooghe et al., 2004). On the other hand, party youth factions also foster the substantive representation of young people by acting as the intraparty voice of the youth and by engaging with youth-specific topics and problems (Hülsken, 2023; Janušauskienė, 2002; Roon, 2022). Following these considerations, the youth wings of political parties can be viewed as crucial actors when trying to bridge the apparent gap between young people and the political system.

The above mentioned functions of youth organizations suggest that they play a constructive intraparty role, benefitting both the party and young people in general. There is, however, also evidence suggesting that youth wings, in some contexts, take a more challenging and less constructive intraparty role. Case studies from the UK (Lamb, 2002; Layton-Henry, 1976) and Germany (Krabbe, 2001) show that youth organizations sometimes display rather extreme ideological standpoints and criticize the program and leadership of their parent parties for being too moderate. In such cases, youth wings often focus more strongly on ideological questions

and mainstream political areas like foreign affairs or economic policies and less on youth-specific issues like education or youth participation.

Following this, the intraparty role of youth wings seems to be varying. In some cases, youth organizations are clearly fostering the descriptive and substantive representation of young people inside and outside their parties. In other cases, youth factions display a more challenging and rebellious intraparty role which leads to them focusing less on youth-specific problems (weaker substantive representation) and being less able to help their young members climb the intraparty career ladder (weaker descriptive representation) due to the resulting tensions with their respective parent party. Following this, the ability of party youth organizations to bridge the concerning gap between young people and politics depends on the role they play inside their party which makes the latter an important field for scholars. However, the research on political youth factions and especially on their intraparty behavior is rather scarce. There are hardly any studies that systematically examine factors that could explain the intraparty role of youth organizations.

As an attempt to close this research gap and generate novel insights into the behavior of youth factions, this thesis introduces party performance as an explanatory variable. Thereby, it is the first scholarly work that quantitatively analyzes the relationship between party performance and the intraparty role of political youth wings. In this context, party performance is understood as the party's electoral performance and its success in obtaining government office. These factors have been used by scholars to explain different aspects related to political parties (e.g. Bawn & Somer-Topcu, 2012; Ennser-Jedenastik & Müller, 2015; Klingelhöfer & Müller, 2024) and there are theoretical arguments (see chapter 3) that suggest that they should also influence the intraparty role of youth organizations. In accordance with the research interest, the thesis will be guided by the following research question: *How does party performance influence the intraparty role of political youth wings?*

Regarding this intraparty role, two central aspects will be analyzed: first, how critically youth factions position themselves vis-à-vis their parent party and, second, how strongly they focus on the representation of youth-specific issues. These variables will be operationalized with speech data from party congresses of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) that took place after 1945. For this, a sentence-by-sentence coding scheme was developed, indicating how much criticism or support youth wing speakers express towards their parent party and how frequently they refer to youth-related topics in their speeches. Besides the main research focus,

potential time trends regarding the intraparty role of youth organizations will also be discussed and analyzed throughout the thesis, whereby the corresponding expectations are based on the literature on party transformation (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009, 2018; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988).

The thesis is divided into several chapters. After this introduction follows a literature review in which three central aspects of the intraparty role of youth wings analyzed by previous scholars will be discussed (chapter 2). Based on this, chapter 3 will present the theoretical framework of the thesis and develop the corresponding hypotheses. In the subsequent chapter 4, the case selection (i.e. the SPÖ and its different youth organizations) will be discussed. Chapter 5 will provide an overview of the data, the coding process, and the variables that are used to conduct the analysis and to test the hypotheses. The results of the analysis will then be presented in chapter 6. The thesis concludes with chapter 7 in which the most important insights will be summarized and discussed.

2 Literature review: Different aspects of the intraparty role of youth wings

As mentioned in the introduction, the body of research on political youth organizations is rather scarce. Three central aspects of the intraparty role of youth wings that appear in the existing literature will be discussed in this section. First, youth organizations often play an important role in recruiting future politicians, training them, and fostering their political career (*recruitment and steppingstone function*). Second, in many parties the party youth displays a rather critical attitude towards the party elite and the official party line (*critical intraparty attitude*). Third, youth wings often represent youth-specific interests inside their parties and act as the “intraparty voice of the youth” (*youth representation function*).

2.1 The recruitment and steppingstone function

Although this thesis does not directly examine the recruiting channels between parties and their youth wings, the *recruitment and steppingstone function* of political youth organizations has to be mentioned since this aspect of party youth factions seems to be by far the one most extensively studied in previous scholarly work. Many studies focus on how youth wings recruit future politicians (on different political levels), how they provide young party members with experience and training, and how they foster political careers (e.g. by allowing their members to build intraparty networks).

Hooghe et al. (2004), for example, survey Belgian city councilors and find “solid evidence for the recruitment function of youth organizations: 41 percent of all councilors indicated that they had started their political career in the youth organization of their party.” (p. 201) Furthermore, most of these former youth wing members stated that they had received some form of political training within their youth organizations (p. 205). Another fitting example for a study on the *recruitment and steppingstone function* of political youth organizations is the dissertation of Hülksen (2023). By interviewing former and active youth wing members of German parties, the author finds that youth organizations provide their members with important training and skills (e.g. public speaking) and with helpful contacts inside the youth wing but also to high-level party officials (pp. 333-335). Additionally, by selecting their own representatives, party youth wings give young political talents the chance to present themselves on the intraparty stage and to be recruited for higher tasks inside or outside the party (pp. 336-338).

Gruber (2009, pp. 131–137) shows that not only a high number of top-ranking German politicians started their careers in the youth factions of their parties but also that, when being asked about their experiences in the youth organizations, most politicians underline the steppingstone function of party youth wings for their careers. Similar conclusions are drawn by Davies (2020) who studies the career backgrounds of members of parliament of the British Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The author shows that “party youth wings are now the most common origin point for social democratic legislators.” (p. 192) This supporting factor of youth wing engagement for the career paths of members of parliament is also underlined by Korom (2022) and Ohmura et al. (2018).

2.2 The critical intraparty attitude

Another aspect of the intraparty role of youth wings that can be found in the existing literature is their appearance as rather rebellious intraparty actors that often criticize the party leadership or the official party line. In the following, this aspect is summarized as youth organizations’ *critical intraparty attitude*. Although there is hardly any systematic or comparative research that looks into the question of political youth wings’ intraparty behavior, the *critical intraparty attitude* is suggested by various case studies on youth wings from different countries (see section 2.2.1). Furthermore, from these studies two central reasons for the often displayed *critical intraparty attitude* can be deducted. Namely, party youth wings are often more ideologically extreme and have a different party goal prioritization than their respective parent party (see section 2.2.2).

2.2.1 Case studies on the critical intraparty attitude

There are some case studies that suggest that youth factions often take more radical stances than their parent parties which regularly results in intraparty conflicts. The majority of these case studies is about the often rebellious youth wings of British parties. Layton-Henry (1976), for example, provides a historic overview of the Labour Party’s relationship with its youth organization that changed names several times since the 1920s. One constant, however, seems to be the critical attitude of the youth faction towards its own party and the ideologically more extreme standpoints of the party youth (oriented towards Marxist and Trotskyist views). The first half of the 1960s can be seen as one exemplary phase of intraparty opposition by the then-called Young Socialists. For example, in 1962, the youth organization rejected key policies of its parent party, called upon the party leader to resign, and disturbed public speeches of Labour

politicians (p. 298). When taking into account the differentiation of party goals by Strøm & Müller (1999), the Young Socialists clearly prioritized the pursuit of their ideologically more extreme and uncompromising agenda (*policy*) over electoral gains (*votes*) or obtaining government responsibility (*office*):

“Other sections of the Labour party were uniting behind [the party chairman] Hugh Gaitskell in preparation for the next general election, and party leaders were emphasizing their responsibility and readiness to assume government office. But the promotion of an artificial unity based on moderate policies did not accord with the extreme radicalism gripping the Young Socialists and the absolute priority most of them gave to upholding socialist (i.e. marxist) principles.” (Layton-Henry, 1976, p. 298)

Similarly, Lamb (2002) shows that the Conservative Party in the UK had to struggle with rebellious and ideologically extreme youth organizations at least over some periods of time. Starting from the 1980s, the party’s student wing, the Federation of Conservative Students (FCS), and its youth wing, the Young Conservatives (YC), both endorsed extremely conservative and libertarian policies that were incongruent with the official party line. The FCS, for example, expressed “support for right-wing rebel troops in Nicaragua, Angola and elsewhere and for several authoritarian regimes” (p. 220) while the chairman of the YC, Andrew Rosindell, “frequently talked of spearheading a moral crusade to regenerate the nation's youth, focusing on campaigns against Sunday trading, cannabis and abortion and in favour of re-criminalizing homosexual activity” (p. 223). These deviating standpoints as well as the criticism towards the official party line and the party leadership led to severe tensions between the youth organizations and their parent party. The Conservative Party took active measures against its rebellious party youth by closing down and relaunching its student organization in 1986 (p. 234) and its youth wing in 1998 (p. 246). In this context, Lamb’s explanation for parties distancing themselves from their ideologically extreme youth wings seems reasonable:

“[T]he parent party, in seeking to portray itself as being a acceptable and reasonable political party to a mainly moderate British electorate, would not take kindly to an extremist youth wing whose perceived extremism could help blight the image of the parent party and give easy ammunition to their political opponents.” (p. 226)

The history of tensions between British parties and their party youth during the 20th century is also underlined by Kimberlee (2002) who states that “each major political party has had to deal with problematic young members challenging party orthodoxy.” (p. 89) Similarly, Pickard (2015) indicates the recurring extremist tendencies of party youth wings from the UK by pointing out that nearly all of them have “undergone name changes over the years, often to distance themselves from unfavourable and/or extreme reputations.” (p. 6)

Although the rebellious role of British party youth wings seems to be documented most extensively, there are different case studies that suggest that party youth organizations from other countries often show similar tendencies. Krabbe (2001), for example, shows that the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), especially in the 1950s and 1960s, struggled with extremely left-wing student and youth wings that publicly accused the SPD of betraying its own character as a working-class party. In 1961, the party even decided to expel its own student organization due to its intraparty opposition course (pp. 298-299). The Free Democratic Party (FDP) had similar problems with its unofficial youth organization who started to openly challenge the party and its policies in the 1960s and finally distanced itself from the FDP in 1981 (pp. 299-300). According to Krabbe, one aspect that all German party youth wings have in common is that they view themselves as the defenders of the “pure doctrine” of their party (p. 305).

2.2.2 Reasons for the critical intraparty attitude

As mentioned earlier, from the above discussed literature, two central “sources” of the *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wings can be deducted. First, many youth wings are more ideologically extreme than their parent party and therefore dissatisfied with the official (rather moderate) party line. McDonnell et al. (2025) ask members of 12 different party youth factions in six different countries to place themselves and their parent parties on a left-right scale. They find that a majority of youth wing members estimate their own position as being further away from the ideological center than the position of their party (suggesting more extreme ideological attitudes). The authors find that this is especially true for youth organizations of center-left parties. Janušauskienė (2011) argues that the ideological differences between parties and their youth wings (and the following intraparty frictions) “could be best explained by the generation differences between the youth organizations and their ‘mother parties’.” (p. 68) This explanation seems reasonable since studies have shown that there are systematic differences in the ideology and the political preferences of younger and older generations (Jennings & Niemi,

1981; Tilley, 2005; Van Der Brug & Kritzinger, 2012). It can be assumed that these differences should also play a role in the relationship between parties and their youth wings since members of youth factions are not only younger than the average party member but also represent and speak for the younger generations and their potentially differentiating political preferences and beliefs (as will be argued in section 2.3).

Second, when taking into account the differentiation of party goals by Strøm & Müller (1999), the party youth is often more focused on *policy* goals and less interested in *office* or *votes* than its parent party. The prioritization of party goals will be discussed in much more detail in the theoretical framework of the thesis (more precisely, in section 3.3). However, it should be noted at this point that these priority differences can partly be explained by the fact that members of the party elite have better chances to benefit personally from *office* and *votes* (e.g. by obtaining prestigious, influential, and well-paid offices) than youth wing members. This is consistent with Müller (1999, pp. 183–184) who suggests that the prioritization of a party goal is significantly influenced by the personal benefits that an intraparty actor derives from it and with scholars arguing that members of the party leadership are typically more concerned with *office* and *votes* while party activists are usually more focused on questions regarding *policy* (Cotta, 2000; Strøm, 1990). Even though these authors do not explicitly mention the party goal focus of political youth organizations, based on their work it can be expected that youth wings should be more concerned with *policy* than the party elite (see argumentation above) but display a weaker *policy*-focus than party activists since their *recruitment and steppingstone function* makes it more likely that they will benefit from *votes* and *office* in the future.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that it is not always possible to clearly separate the two “sources” of the *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wings. For example, if political youth organizations criticize their parent parties for moderating the party line in order to become more electable, both of the above discussed reasons for the *critical intraparty attitude* could explain the dissatisfaction of the youth factions. They could be upset because the official party course moves further away from their ideologically derived preferences or because their parent party seems to focus more strongly on gains in *votes* and less on the pursuit of *policy*. Furthermore, it can be expected that intraparty actors with a strong ideology should, in general, also be more focused on *policy* goals (Müller & Strøm, 1999, p. 292) which also makes it harder to distinguish between the two potential reasons for the *critical intraparty attitude*.

2.3 The youth representation function

The third aspect of the intraparty role of youth wings that can be found in the existing research is their *youth representation function*. Many youth organizations view themselves as the intraparty voice of young party members and young people in general and focus on representing youth-specific interests and raising youth-specific issues inside their party. Roon (2022), for example, dedicates a whole chapter of her dissertation about Dutch party youth wings to this intraparty representation function and discusses different aspects of it. Most importantly in this context, she shows how youth organizations aggregate and articulate the interests of their young members. To examine the aggregation of interests by party youth wings, Roon analyzes their political programs and presents that in the recent years most political youth organizations in the Netherlands had their own programs and that members of these organizations were given the opportunity to participate in the programmatic decisions (pp. 114-118). Furthermore, by analyzing survey data, she shows that there is a high *salience-based ideological congruence* between youth wing members and the political programs of their organizations, meaning that the programs focus broadly on the same topics that are important to the members (pp. 118-121). The author also suggests that the *position-based ideological congruence* between youth wings and their members is rather high by showing that members estimate their own position and the position of their youth organization on different policy-scales as well as on a left-right scale as relatively close to each other (pp. 121-125).

As mentioned above, Roon not only examines how youth wings aggregate the interests of their members but also how youth factions articulate these interests inside their parent party and try to influence the party line accordingly. The author shows that youth wings, on the one hand, use their *insider access* to influence party policies which, for example, means that they are in contact with the parliamentary group of their parent party, attend party congresses, or meet with members of the party executive (pp. 125-131). Youth factions also try to exert influence on political decisions by gaining media attention and thereby a platform for the promotion of their political arguments (*outsider access*) (pp. 131-136). In summary, Roon provides a detailed and convincing outline of how youth organizations represent the interests of their members inside their parent parties. It can be assumed that the majority of youth wing members do not hold any public office or high-ranking position inside their party but are rather “ordinary” young people with youth-specific interests (even though these youth-specific interests can be expected to vary between youth factions of different parties). Following this, the findings of Roon cannot only be applied to the representation of the interests of party youth wing members

but also to the intraparty representation of youth-specific interests by youth organizations in general.

Besides the extensive considerations of Roon, there are also other scholars that deal with the *youth representation function* of party youth wings. Hülsken (2023, p. 32), for example, views the aggregation and articulation of youth-specific interests as one of the core functions of political youth organizations. Mycock & Tonge (2012, p. 145) underline that parties are especially receptive to the input of their youth wings when it regards youth-specific policies. Lastly, Janušauskienė (2002) identifies different goals of party youth factions in the context of Lithuania and views the representation of youth-specific issues as one of them:

“The fifth group of goals involves representing youth problems and making them heard. Youth political organizations prepare various proposals about youth problems and try to influence the decisions on youth problems through the members of the Parliament representing their 'mother parties' or directly through the organizations responsible for certain decisions. Thus, youth political organizations operate as lobby groups.” (p. 344)

Borrowing from the literature on party stratarchy (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1964), it can be argued that youth wings enjoy a certain degree of intraparty autonomy in youth-related areas. The representation of young people and their interests (inside and outside the party) lies primarily in the responsibility of youth organizations. Following the arguments on party stratarchy, this relative autonomy of youth wings is accepted and even desired by the party leadership. The connection between the *youth representation function* and party stratarchy will be discussed in more detail in section 3.1.

2.4 Contributions of the thesis

After reviewing the existing literature on the intraparty role of political youth organizations, this section will shortly discuss which new insights the thesis is able to provide and why these insights might be important. First of all, the focus of this work will be on the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* which are considerably less extensively covered by previous scholars than the *recruitment and steppingstone function*. While previous research primarily examined these two aspects separately and from a qualitative case study perspective, the present thesis will include both of them in the same quantitative analysis and in the same theoretical framework. Following this, the thesis is the first study that is able to empirically

assess the potential relationship between the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* of youth wings (see the theoretical considerations in section 3.1).

Furthermore, by introducing party performance as an explanatory variable, the thesis provides an innovative view on the intraparty role of youth organizations. Unlike in many previous studies, the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* of youth wings are not understood as static characteristics but rather as outcome variables that are dependent on different factors and that might be prone to change over time. In order to analyze the influence of party performance, the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* are operationalized with coded speech data, thereby providing the first systematically gathered data on the intraparty behavior of youth wing members over an extended period of time.

The above discussed aspects are novel contributions to the existing research on youth wings and should help to improve the understanding of their relationship to their parent parties. As mentioned in the introduction, parties and their youth wings are central actors when it comes to reducing the apparent distance between young people and politics. Therefore, it is an important task for researchers to deepen the understanding on the intraparty role of political youth factions as well as to identify factors that might influence this role. Based on such insights, new solutions might be developed which could improve the intraparty inclusion of youth wings and foster the descriptive and substantive representation of young people in politics. By analyzing the effect of party performance (i.e. electoral performance and success in obtaining government office) on the behavior of youth organizations, this thesis contributes to this important objective.

3 Theoretical framework

In this chapter, the theoretical framework of the thesis will be presented. Before discussing the theoretical arguments and deriving the corresponding hypotheses, it should be noted under which scope conditions these hypotheses are most likely to hold. Most importantly, the theoretical considerations can only be applied to political parties with relatively independent youth wings which are able to select their own representatives, develop their own political positions, and pursue their own interests. In other words, the theoretical framework should be especially applicable when youth organizations act similar to intraparty factions (Boucek, 2009; Zariski, 1960). Furthermore, due to the literature that the theory is based on, the hypotheses should be especially likely to hold for major parties in Western democracies.

3.1 Strong critical intraparty attitude and weak youth representation function as aspects of the challenging intraparty role

As mentioned above, previous research mostly dealt with the different aspects of the intraparty role of youth wings separately and did not consider possible interactions between them. The theoretical framework of this thesis introduces a novel view on this topic by arguing that the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth-representation function* of youth organizations are related aspects. More precisely, they are both central aspects of the same analytical concept that will, in the following, be referred to as the *challenging intraparty role* of youth wings. The *challenging intraparty role* captures the willingness of youth wings to enter into conflict with their parent party by not fulfilling the intraparty functions or playing the intraparty role desired by the latter.

The *challenging intraparty role* of youth wings could also be related to other variables that will not be considered in the following sections of the thesis. For example, very challenging youth factions could potentially focus less on their *recruitment and steppingstone function* which would also constitute a deviation from the intraparty behavior desired by the party leadership. Additionally, due to the potential tensions resulting from youth wings' *challenging intraparty role*, the party leadership could provide members of youth organizations with fewer political career opportunities which would also lead to a weaker *recruitment and steppingstone function* of youth organizations. However, the thesis will focus primarily on the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* since the relationship between these aspects and the *challenging intraparty role* seems to have the soundest theoretical foundation. Furthermore, the *youth representation function* and the *critical intraparty attitude* can be operationalized

with the same speech data (see section 5.2) which allows for a clearer and more intuitive analysis.

It can be expected that different youth wings (as well as the same youth wings at different points in time) vary regarding their focus on their *critical intraparty attitude* and their *youth-representation function*. In this section, it will be argued that youth wings with a strong *challenging intraparty role* should display a strong *critical intraparty attitude* but a comparably weak *youth representation function*. Conversely, youth organizations with a weak *challenging intraparty role* should have a stronger focus on their *youth representation function* but display less of a *critical intraparty attitude*. Regarding the latter, it seems rather intuitive to argue that the *critical intraparty attitude* can be viewed as an important indicator of the *challenging intraparty role* since youth wings with extreme ideological views and deviating political preferences that constantly criticize their parent party are not acting according to the preferences of the party leadership. The latter should be interested in avoiding intraparty conflict in order to protect the image of the party among the electorate (Greene & Haber, 2015; Lehrer & Lin, 2020) as well as to secure its own elite intraparty position.

The argumentation for the relationship between the *youth representation function* and the *challenging intraparty role*, on the other hand, is more complex and draws on the literature on party stratararchy (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1964). In the context of party organizations, stratararchy usually refers to the distribution of decision-making power between the different *strata* of the party (i.e. between the national party and regional or local party organizations). For example, in many stratararchical parties, the national party organization is granted relative autonomy regarding programmatic decisions while sub-national organizations enjoy a certain degree of autonomy regarding candidate selection. In this context, Carty (2004) compares stratararchical parties to franchise enterprises with the national (or central) party organization serving as a common brand or company and sub-national party organizations serving as individual local franchises:

“Typically, parties’ central organizations are responsible for providing the basic product line (policy and leadership) [...]. Local units, however they are defined (geographically or otherwise), more often provide the basic organizational home of most party members, and are typically charged with delivering the product, i.e. creating organizations that can find and support candidates as well as mobilizing campaigns to deliver the vote on the ground.” (p. 11)

Nevertheless, party stratarchy does not indicate a complete separation of decision-making power between the different organizational levels. Regarding the dispersion of power and autonomy, Bolleyer (2012) views party stratarchy as a middle ground between party hierarchy and party federation. Similarly, Cross (2018) shows that neither the central party nor local party organizations have the sole autonomy when it comes to decisions regarding candidate selection, leadership selection, or policy development. While the central party organization might often have greater autonomy in policy development and the local organizations more influence in candidate selection, the author underlines that these power distributions are not static and undisputed but rather dynamic and contested:

“[T]he equilibrium, in terms of who has the upper hand, is constantly contested, with both levels of the party wanting to exercise as much influence as possible in all areas. Balances are reached that represent temporary agreement (akin to Carty’s franchise model) but are quickly challenged as one side or the other pushes for greater influence.” (p. 211)

Coming back to the main focus of the thesis, it can be argued that the relationship between youth organizations and their parent parties has certain similarities to the relationship between central and local party organizations. Both local parties and youth wings seem to be in a constant struggle to defend or expand their intraparty influence and their autonomy vis-à-vis the party leadership. Furthermore, both of them have designated (and more or less contested) areas of autonomy. While in many stratarchical parties local organizations are, for example, rather autonomous regarding candidate selection, youth wings seem to have the greatest degree of autonomy in youth-related areas. As it was discussed in the context of the *youth representation function*, youth wings have the responsibility to represent the interests of young party member (Roon, 2022, pp. 114–136), raise youth-specific problems (Janušauskienė, 2002, p. 344) and provide input on youth-specific policies since “parties typically seek to consult with youth wings only on youth-specific policies rather than on mainstream political issues.” (Mycock & Tonge, 2012, p. 145).

Following these considerations, the autonomy of youth wings in youth-related areas can be viewed as rather uncontested and even desired by their parent parties. This means that, by focusing on their *youth representation function*, youth organizations do not display a *challenging intraparty role*. When members of youth factions, for example, discuss youth-specific issues publicly or inside the party, they stay inside their designated area of autonomy and do not

challenge any unwritten agreement with their parent party. Although disagreement between youth factions and their parent parties over youth-specific policies might occur, the deviating opinions of the party youth are likely to be perceived as more acceptable when they regard youth-relevant issues. However, when wing members start to discuss the official party line in non-youth-related areas like economic policies or foreign affairs, they are clearly outside their designated autonomous range. This means that they are contesting the existing borders of autonomy and competence and thereby do not act according to the expectations of the party leadership (i.e. they display a *challenging intraparty role*). When assuming that a weaker focus on youth-specific issues correlates with a stronger focus on non-youth-related topics, it can be argued that youth wings with a weak *youth representation function* are displaying a more *challenging intraparty role* than youth organizations that focus more strongly on the representation of youth-related aspects.

In summary, the above discussed arguments suggest that the more challenging the intraparty role of youth wings (i.e. the more youth wings are willing to enter into conflict with their parent party and to revolt against their designated intraparty role and functions), the stronger their *critical intraparty attitude* and the weaker their focus on their *youth representation function*. This, in turn, means that there should exist a negative relationship between these two latter aspects. Besides the theoretical deduction of this hypothesized relationship, it also seems rather intuitive that a youth wing that constantly intervenes in the programmatic cornerstones of its party and ignores the boundaries of its area of responsibility will also be more critical towards its parent party. Conversely, a youth faction that hardly ever criticizes its party in order to avoid direct conflict with the party leadership seems unlikely to rebelliously challenge the intraparty distribution of autonomy by intervening in non-youth-specific policy areas that are important to the party elite.

The expectation that the *youth representation function* and the *critical intraparty attitude* are related aspects is also suggested by previous scholars. The existing literature shows that critical youth organizations with strong ideological standpoints more frequently discuss their parent parties' positions in mainstream political areas like foreign affairs, social policies, or economic policies. The parties' policies in youth-specific areas like youth welfare, education, or youth participation, on the other hand, seem to be less focused on by youth organizations that critically engage with their parent parties' programs. This can, for example, be seen in the above presented case studies on youth wings of the major parties of Germany and the UK (Krabbe,

2001; Lamb, 2002; Layton-Henry, 1976). The relationship between the *youth representation function* and the *critical intraparty attitude* will be assessed empirically in section 6.1.

3.2 The influence of electoral performance on the intraparty role of youth wings

Turning to the explanatory variables, there are two central arguments that support the expectation that youth wings display a stronger *challenging intraparty role* when their parent parties perform poorly at elections. First, disappointing electoral results of the parent party potentially boost the confidence of youth wings in their often more radical alternative positions. For example, Weber (2017) shows, for the case of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), that young party members “adopted the idea that electoral results serve as benchmark to check party ideology.” (p. 124) Following this, it can be argued that members of more ideologically extreme party youth organizations should view electoral losses as proof that the party needs to shift from a rather moderate to a more radical programmatic line. This increased trust in their deviating ideological views and policy positions should lead to youth wings behaving more confidently vis-à-vis their parent party and being more willing to enter into conflict with the latter (i.e. displaying a more *challenging intraparty role*).

The second argument is based on studies that show that bad election results increase the likelihood of party leaders being replaced (Andrews & Jackman, 2008; Ennser-Jedenastik & Müller, 2015). It can be expected that the whole party leadership is affected by this increased vulnerability and that members of the party elite will try to appease dissatisfied intraparty actors by providing them with different forms of incentives (Strøm, 1990) in order to prevent losing their leading positions. Kaltenegger et al. (2021) show that, after electoral losses, one appeasement strategy of the party elite is to be more responsive towards the policy preferences of the party’s rank and file. In the wording of party stratarchy, poor election results weaken the party elite in their struggle with the rank and file over authority in programmatic decisions. Cross (2018) explicitly mentions electoral defeat as “a precursor to party organizational reform, almost always in the direction of granting greater authority to the local branches” (p. 225). Although youth wings cannot be fully equated with the rank and file of a party, it still seems likely that youth organizations view bad election results as a window of opportunity to pressure the weakened party elite in order to extract policy concessions from them. In other words, after bad election results youth factions should have a higher willingness to enter into conflict with

their parent party (i.e. display a *challenging intraparty role*) since they see increased prospects of success of such an intraparty conflict.

To summarize the above mentioned arguments, poor electoral party performance should increase youth wings' confidence in their deviating ideological views and policy positions and open a window of opportunity for them to pressure a weakened party elite into granting policy concessions to them. Both of these dynamics should strengthen the *challenging intraparty role* of youth organizations (i.e. increase the willingness to enter into conflict with their parent parties). Following the argumentation of section 3.1, a more *challenging intraparty role* should lead to youth factions displaying a more *critical intraparty attitude* and focusing less on their *youth representation function*. From these considerations, the first set of hypotheses can be derived:

H1a: The worse the electoral performance of a party, the more critical the intraparty attitude of its youth wings.

H1b: The worse the electoral performance of a party, the less its youth wings focus on the representation of youth-specific issues.

3.3 The influence of government participation on the intraparty role of youth wings

As another aspect of party performance, a party's success in obtaining government office can be taken into account. At first glance, it might seem intuitive to assume that intraparty actors are simply more satisfied with their party when the latter is able to acquire more positions in government. However, when including the differentiation of party goals by Strøm & Müller (1999), the theorized relationship gets more complex. According to the authors, parties seek to obtain governmental power (*office*), to realize their political programs (*policy*), and to maximize their electoral success (*votes*). There are, however, many situations in which these goals are in conflict with each other and where parties have to disregard one goal in order to pursue another (pp. 5-11). Depending on the distribution of preferences among intraparty actors, the decision which party goal to favor in such trade-off situations can potentially lead to intraparty conflict. As will be argued in this section, regarding the theoretical considerations on the intraparty role of youth wings, the trade-off between *office* and *policy* is especially important:

“In some cases, policy pursuit may conflict with a party's ability to capture office. When parties bargain over participation in a new government coalition, for

example, they may often be asked to sacrifice some of their policy preferences in order to gain seats at the cabinet table. In order to find coalition partners, party leaders may need to dilute their policy commitments and thus potentially antagonize their own activists.” (p. 9)

From a pragmatic standpoint, one could question if this trade-off between entering a coalition government and pursuing the party’s policy preferences really exists. It could be argued that a party participating in a coalition government, despite the need of programmatic compromises, is still able to realize at least some parts of its preferred policies. If the party decides to stay in opposition, on the other hand, it usually has severely less leverage to influence public policies. The authors recognize these considerations but emphasize that, for a party participating in a coalition government, it is often necessary to support measures that are clearly against the own party line:

“[P]arties may also experience policy sacrifices when they are asked to endorse policies that substantially deviate from the commitments they have previously made or from their most preferred policies.” (p. 7)

Such compromises can be perceived as stronger sacrifices or betrayals of party policies and values than staying in opposition with less influence but the possibility to maintain a clear ideological profile. It can be argued that this should be especially true for political youth organizations since many of them have more extreme ideological views and are primarily focused on *policy* (as mentioned and reasoned in detail in section 2.2.2). When applying these considerations to different forms of government participation, it can be hypothesized that political youth organizations should be especially critical towards participating in a coalition government since this constantly requires policy compromises with at least one other party (i.e. in many scenarios *office* needs to be prioritized over *policy*). Due to their stronger ideology and *policy*-focus, youth wings should tend to perceive such compromises as unacceptable betrayals to the “pure doctrine” and core values of their party. This hostility of youth factions towards political compromises is explicitly mentioned by Hülsken (2023, pp. 333–334).

Following this, youth wings should prefer their parent party either ruling in a single-party government or being in political opposition since these scenarios require significantly fewer compromises. In a single-party government, a party is able to implement many of its planned policies in their original form (although there are still certain boundaries like the constitution, political veto players, or the state’s budget). When being in opposition, a party has significantly

less opportunity to implement its programmatic ideas but is able to propose strong and ideologically clear policies without having to immediately act on them. Conversely, it can be expected that youth wings should be rather dissatisfied with their parent parties when they participate in a coalition government where policy compromises are more frequent. This dissatisfaction, in turn, would make them more likely to display a *challenging intraparty role* by openly criticizing the decisions of the party leadership (strong *critical intraparty attitude*) and by focusing on non-youth-related policy areas in which they see the “pure doctrine” endangered by coalition politics (weak *youth representation function*). These arguments lead to the second set of hypotheses:

H2a: The participation of a party in a coalition government leads to a more critical intraparty attitude of its youth wings.

H2b: The participation of a party in a coalition government leads to a weaker focus of its youth wings on the representation of youth-specific issues.

3.4 Changes in the intraparty role of youth wings over time

Despite the main focus of the thesis being on the influence of party performance on the intraparty role of youth wings, time trends could also have an important influence on this intraparty role and will therefore be taken into account. As it was shown above, party youth wings are likely to be more *policy*-focused and ideologically extreme than their parent parties. In this section, it will be argued that the differences in ideology and political goal priorities between parties and their youth factions (and thereby the latter’s *challenging intraparty role*) can be expected to have been increasing over time. This expectation is based on studies suggesting that the strong ideology and *policy*-focus of youth wings has been rather consistent over time while many of their parent parties have undergone transformation processes that made them more ideologically flexible and more focused on electoral success and maintaining political office.

Scholars have conceptualized different models to describe the developments of political parties in Western democracies in the decades after World War II. Kirchheimer (1966), for example, describes how former *mass parties* (Duverger, 1954) that were trying to integrate a certain social strata into the political arena transform into *catch-all parties*. The latter focus less on representing the interests of one specific social group and more on achieving electoral success. For this, they try to persuade voters from different societal backgrounds by promoting widely

popular and consensual policies and presenting themselves as largely de-ideologized parties. Similar in some aspects, Panebianco (1988) develops the concept of the *electoral professional party* and claims that parties are incrementally transforming into highly professionalized organizations that primarily focus on campaigning and electoral performance. Since these professionalized parties rely heavily on polls and public opinion experts, they increasingly shift from clear ideological standpoints to more moderate mainstream positions when deciding on their policy courses. Lastly, Katz & Mair (1995, 2009, 2018) propose that, since the 1970s, existing *catch-all parties* are more and more turning into *cartel parties* which are increasingly dependent on state resources and start to collude with each other in order to maintain their privileged positions in the state. One consequence of the emergence of such political “cartels” are decreasing levels of competition and ideological difference between parties.

The scholars mentioned above do not claim that their new party models replace existing models instantly or all together. On the contrary, it is possible that there are significant country differences when it comes to the emergence of new party types and even in the same country different models of parties can co-exist over periods of time. Furthermore, these party models are ideal types which means that, in reality, most parties are not, for example, pure *catch-all parties* or pure *cartel parties*. “Rather, all of these models represent heuristically convenient polar types, to which individual parties may approximate more or less closely at any given time.” (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 19)

However, one central similarity between the different models is the suggestion that parties, starting with the emergence of the *catch-all party* after the end of World War II, have been becoming increasingly pragmatic and flexible regarding their ideological and programmatic standpoints and that their political goal focus has been shifting more and more towards *votes* and *office* and away from *policy*. Studies on political youth organizations, on the other hand, suggest that youth wings, in this regard, have not been following the same development as their parent parties. The case studies discussed in section 2.2.1 provide examples of youth factions with strong ideologies and uncompromising *policy* demands existing throughout the second half of the 20th century. Furthermore, Weber (2017) and Roon (2022) provide evidence that today’s young party members and youth wings still advocate rather strong ideological standpoints and are critical towards their parent parties’ more moderate party courses and their weak *policy*-focus. Similarly, McDonnell et al. (2024) present findings from a recent survey among youth wing members from six different countries. They show that for about 87% of the

members one central motivation for joining their youth organization was to be able to influence the party policies, indicating a strong focus on the *policy* dimension (p. 10).

In summary, these studies suggest that youth wings, unlike many of their parent parties who have developed *catch-all*, *electoral professional*, or *cartel* characteristics, did not (or at least not to the same degree) give up their strong ideology and *policy*-focus. One possible explanation for these deviating developments of parties and their youth factions could be that the latter usually do not participate in elections where they have to appeal to a broad electorate. Therefore, they do not have to adapt to electoral competitors that benefit from *catch-all*, *electoral professional*, or *cartel* features.

Following this, it can be expected that youth factions have always been opposing the incremental transformation processes of their parent parties and that the gaps in ideological positions and goal orientations between parties and their youth wings has been increasingly widened since the end of World War II. Since these ideological differences are likely to negatively affect the relationship between youth factions and their parent parties, it can also be expected that youth wings' willingness to enter into conflict with the party elite (i.e. their *challenging intraparty role*) should have been increasing over time. Following the arguments in section 3.1 regarding the connection between the *challenging intraparty role*, the *critical intraparty attitude*, and the *youth representation function*, youth organizations should have become more critical towards their parent party and less focused on representing youth-specific issues over time.

Another similarity between the above discussed party models is that they suggest that parties have become increasingly less dependent on their membership base. For example, due to professionalized campaigning and increased public funding, it has become less important for parties that their members promote their policies personally among the population or support the parties financially with membership fees. Furthermore, because of the possibilities of professionalized polling or, more recently, the observation of social media it has become less important that members provide their parties with information about the distribution of preferences and the general atmosphere inside the electorate. The latter is especially true since membership numbers have been declining significantly over time (e.g. Kölln, 2016; Van Biezen et al., 2012) which suggests a decreasing representational ability of party members. The number of young people joining a party has declined particularly strong which skews the intraparty age ratio stronger towards older party members (Cross & Young, 2008; Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010;

Whiteley, 2011). Furthermore, a smaller number of young party members suggests that the representational power of youth wings has also been decreasing over time.

Following these arguments, it can be expected that youth organizations have grown less important for their parent parties and have provided increasingly less incentives for the party leadership to respond to their preferences and demands. This suggests that the responsiveness of the party elite towards the party youth should have been declining over time, leading to youth wings growing more dissatisfied with their parent parties. Such dissatisfaction is likely to make youth factions more willing to enter into conflict with their parent parties and thereby display a *challenging intraparty role*. In other words, over time, youth wings should have become more critical towards their parent parties (stronger *critical intraparty attitude*) and less focused on fulfilling their intraparty task of representing youth interests inside their party (weaker *youth representation function*). The latter expectation is also supported by the above mentioned assumption that the representational power of youth organizations should have declined due to the decreasing number of young party members.

In summary, the arguments laid out above suggest that youth wings' dissatisfaction with their parent parties has been increasing over time. This is due to the ideological moderation of the official party course and the stronger focus of the party leadership on *votes* and *office* (which are developments that the youth organizations did not follow). Another reason for growing dissatisfaction of youth factions might be the declining responsivity of the party elite towards the party youth's preferences and demands which can be explained by the decreasing dependency of parties on their youth wings. The growing dissatisfaction of youth organizations should lead to a stronger *challenging intraparty role*, thereby strengthening youth wings' *critical intraparty attitude* and weakening their *youth representation function*. From these arguments, the third set of hypotheses can be derived. An overview of the six hypotheses of the thesis is provided in Figure 1.

H3a: Over time, the intraparty attitude of youth wings has grown more critical.

H3b: Over time, youth wings have focused increasingly less on the representation of youth-specific issues.




Figure 1. Overview of the hypotheses

4 Case selection: The Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and its youth wings

To test the above presented hypotheses, the intraparty role of the youth organizations of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*) will be examined over an extended period of time (between 1945 and today). In section 4.1, it will be argued why the SPÖ and its youth wings are well-suited cases for the analysis. Following this, section 4.2 will provide an overview of the relevant SPÖ youth organizations in order to account for potential differences in their intraparty behavior.

4.1 Justification of the case selection

There are several arguments why the SPÖ and its youth organizations are well fitted to empirically test the hypotheses that were theoretically developed in the previous chapter. First, looking at Austria as a country, it seems to be a good fit since it not only fulfills the theoretical scope condition of being a stable Western democracy but also constitutes an interesting case due to its comparably high party membership numbers. Van Biezen et al. (2012) compare party membership in European countries between the years 1980 and 2008 and show that Austria consistently has the highest share of party members among its electorate (although this number is declining since the 1980s). Since a relatively broad share of the population is included in Austrian parties, it seems more likely that societal conflicts, like generational disagreements, are also represented and visible inside the parties. Focusing on the SPÖ in particular, according to the MAPP dataset (van Haute & Paulis, 2016), the party has reached its highest membership number in the year 1960 when it registered 727,265 members. SPÖ membership, however, has also been steadily declining since the 1980s.

Second, as Kaltenegger et al. (2021) point out, “the SPÖ has been the key party of the left over the entire post-war period, maintaining high organizational continuity” (2021, p. 366). Such continuity seems crucial in order to be able to draw meaningful conclusions from the examination of the relationship between the SPÖ and its youth organizations over the decades since 1945. One explanation for the SPÖ’s organizational stability could be its long history preceding the events of World War II and its prohibition under the National Socialist and the Austrofascist regimes (Holtmann, 1996; Maderthaner, 1996).

Third, as will be presented in the following section, all of the SPÖ youth wings (at least to a certain degree) seem to display the three aspects of the intraparty role that were discussed in

the literature review in chapter 2. All of the youth organizations organize trainings, seminars, and other events in order to prepare their members for political activities and careers (*recruitment and steppingstone function*). Furthermore, they all have a certain focus on youth-specific interests and problems (*youth representation function*) but also regularly criticize the SPÖ's programmatic line and the party leadership (*critical intraparty attitude*). Since the theoretical framework and the hypotheses are built on these aspects, the SPÖ youth organizations can be seen as typical cases. This means that they are representative for youth wings in general and that the insights generated by the empirical analysis of this thesis, therefore, are likely to be applicable for other youth organizations as well (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Although all SPÖ youth wings show the expected characteristics discussed in chapter 2, there are certain differences regarding their intraparty attitude and their focus on the representation of youth-specific issues. This means that, based on comparisons between the different youth factions, additional theoretically informed conclusions can be drawn (see for example section 6.1).

Fourth, when turning to more practical arguments, it can be mentioned that a very comprehensive data foundation is available to analyze the intraparty role of SPÖ youth organizations. As will be discussed in detail in section 5.1, this thesis is able to use a large collection of systematically gathered and coded speeches that were held at Austrian party congresses since the 1940s. In comparison to other parties, the speech data for SPÖ party congresses is the most comprehensive which allows for a meaningful analysis of the intraparty role of the youth wings over time.

Fifth, besides the just mentioned continuity, the SPÖ provides sufficient variation in the independent variables which is crucial for testing the hypotheses. The SPÖ's share of votes in national elections varied between 21% and 51% and the party has governed in single-party governments, has participated in coalition governments, and has been in opposition at different points of time.

Lastly, it can be pointed out that the hypotheses H3a and H3b (regarding the increased *challenging intraparty role* over time) should be especially likely to hold for the SPÖ and its party youth. There are three central arguments supporting this expectation, namely the typical party transformation of the SPÖ, changes in the SPÖ membership structure over time, and the emergence of new issues in the Austrian political discourse. Regarding the first argument, the SPÖ has undergone the typical transformation from *mass party* to *catch-all party* and partly to *cartel party* (Müller, 1996, pp. 323–326). Since youth wings are expected to oppose these

transformational dynamics, it can be argued that the *challenging intraparty role* of SPÖ youth organizations is especially likely to have grown stronger over time (compared to youth wings of parties that did not follow the typical organizational transformation discussed in section 3.4).

Regarding the second argument, there are certain dynamics in the SPÖ party membership structure that also suggest that young party members should have become more challenging towards their own party over the decades. For one, between the 1940s and the 1990s the share of young party members (under 30 years of age) decreased consistently (pp. 320-321). In 2023, the average party member was about 63 years old (Mayerhofer & Leibetseder, 2023). Also, as was mentioned above, the overall number of party members decreased significantly since the beginning of the 1980s (van Haute & Paulis, 2016). Furthermore, surveys among party members show a general trend towards ideology becoming a more important reason for SPÖ membership compared to material benefits like patronage (Müller, 1996, p. 278). Taken together, these developments suggest that, over time, fewer young people have been deciding to join the SPÖ but the ones that do are more ideologically driven and less concerned about career advantages or other material benefits. Assuming that a considerable share of young party members participates in one of the SPÖ's youth factions, there should be a general trend towards youth organizations taking stronger ideological positions and being less willing to make policy compromises in exchange for *office* or *votes*. This trend directly contradicts the development of the SPÖ towards a *catch-all* and *cartel party*, further widening the gap between the party youth wings and their parent party.

Regarding the third argument, another factor that might have increased the differences between the SPÖ and its youth wings could be the emergence of new political issues in Austria that led to certain divisions along generational lines. As an example, debates regarding environmental and climate protection can be mentioned. One central event that helped these issues to reach the Austrian political mainstream was the occupation of the Hainburg floodplain (*Hainburger Au*) by environmental activists in 1984 (Schneider, 2022). Since it can be assumed that younger generations, on average, focus more strongly on environmental and climate protection than older generations (e.g. Lorenzini et al., 2021), the appearance of these issues is likely to have further widened the existing gap between the SPÖ party leadership and the younger members of the SPÖ youth organizations. Summing up the arguments, due to the above mentioned dynamics (typical party transformation, changes in membership structure, emergence of new issues), the SPÖ youth wings can be seen as most-likely cases when it comes to the hypothesized development towards a growing *challenging intraparty role* of youth organizations over time.

4.2 Overview of the SPÖ youth wings

This section provides an overview of the relevant SPÖ youth organizations. For all the youth wings included in the analysis, the German translation of their names is shown in parenthesis.

4.2.1 The Austrian Socialist Youth (SJÖ)

The Austrian Socialist Youth (SJÖ, *Sozialistische Jugend Österreich*) constitutes the SPÖ youth wing in the most traditional sense. While the other youth organizations, that will be discussed in the following sections, were established for a more narrow focus (young voters, school students, university students), the SJÖ is, more generally, concerned with party activities among young people and the organizational inclusion of young party members. Although no clear age definition of the SJÖ target audience can be found in the most recent version of the SPÖ party statute (SPÖ Federal Party, 2023), in the 1960s it was explicitly defined that the SJÖ is the party organization for the 14- to 20-year-olds (Pelinka, 1984, p. 42).

The history of the SJÖ goes back until the 19th century when its predecessor organization (the Association of Young Workers) was founded in 1894. After its prohibition in 1934 by the Austrofascist regime, the then-called Socialist Workers' Youth (SAJ) turned into an underground organization called the Revolutionary Socialist Youth (RSJ) which offered resistance against the fascist government. The RSJ stopped its activities after the annexation of Austria by the National Socialist Germany in 1938. After the end of World War II, the SJÖ was founded in April 1945 whereby the first SJÖ leadership mainly consisted of former SAJ and RSJ activists (pp. 4-7).

When looking at the history of the SJÖ since 1945, all of the aspects of the intraparty role of youth wings that were described in the literature review in chapter 2 can be found. The SJÖ has been fulfilling the *recruitment and steppingstone function* by providing their members with different forms of training programs and seminars and by portraying itself as the “cadet school of socialism” (p. 9). Furthermore, the SJÖ has always had a particular focus on youth-specific issues like youth unemployment or compulsory military service (*youth representation function*). However, in this context, it can be mentioned that two factions inside the SJÖ can broadly be identified: While one faction seeks to focus on youth-specific issues and the representation of youth interests, the other faction views the SJÖ as the “revolutionary conscience” of the SPÖ that should remind the party of its core ideological values without restricting itself to youth policies (p. 10).

Lastly, throughout its history, there were several periods in which the SJÖ displayed a very *critical intraparty attitude* and entered into conflict with its parent party. One of the strongest conflicts between the SJÖ and the party leadership was over the introduction of the Austrian Armed Forces in 1955 (which the SJÖ opposed). As mentioned in section 2.2.2, one of the reasons for this *critical intraparty attitude* could be the ideological gap between the SJÖ and its parent party. While the SPÖ has undergone the transformation from *mass party* to *catch-all* and *cartel party* (see section 4.1) which typically includes ideological moderation, the SJÖ, for example, still emphasized its commitment to Marxist ideology on its conferences in the years 2000 and 2014 (Bauer et al., 2014, pp. 44, 64). McDonnell et al. (2025) include SJÖ members in their youth wing survey project (YOUMEM) and show that over 90% of all SJÖ respondents estimated their own ideological position as more left-wing than the overall position of the SPÖ. Consistent with the theoretical consideration in section 3.3., the SJÖ was especially critical towards its parent party participating in different coalition governments and towards the SPÖ's development into a *catch-all-party* with increasingly moderate ideological positions (Keller, 1988).

4.2.2 The Young Generation in the SPÖ (JG)

The Young Generation in the SPÖ (JG, *Junge Generation in der SPÖ*) was founded in 1958 and officially embedded as the party's young voters' department in the party statute in 1962 (Sapetschnig, 2018, p. 4). The JG has its roots in local young voters' committees that were established during the campaign for the Austrian national parliamentary election in 1956. In the first years after its foundation, the JG had little independence as an organization which, for example, meant that its leadership was appointed directly by the SPÖ instead of elected by its members. This changed in the 1970s when the JG was granted autonomy in the selection of its own representatives. The more the JG gained organizational independence from its parent party, the more it appeared as an intraparty competitor for the SJÖ (Pelinka, 1984).

In this context, however, it should be noted that the age groups that the two organizations target differ to some degree. While the SJÖ, as was mentioned above, has been focusing on people from about 14 to 20 years of age, the JG was primarily founded to target young voters. Although the Austrian voting age was lowered incrementally over the decades, until 1992 people had to be at least 19 years old (or even 20 years before 1968) to be allowed to vote. In 1992 the voting age was set to 18 years until it was lowered again to 16 years in 2007 (Austrian Parliament, n.d.). Although Austria was the first European country that lowered its voting age to 16

years in national elections (Wagner et al., 2012), looking back at the history of the Austrian voting age shows that, for the first three decades after its foundation, the JG was primarily focused on people with at least 19 or 20 years of age. Therefore, it can be summarized that the targeted age groups of the SJÖ and the JG, while overlapping, have been far from congruent.

Turning to the different aspects of the intraparty role of youth organizations, the JG, similar to the SJÖ, has been fulfilling its *recruitment and steppingstone* function by providing its members with different trainings and seminars (Sapetschnig, 2018, p. 6). Furthermore, the JG developed into an attractive steppingstone opportunity for people with intraparty career ambitions (Pelinka, 1984, p. 42). Regarding its *youth representation function*, the JG has been focusing on youth-specific topics like, for example, youth unemployment, tuition fees, or the reduction of the compulsory military service. Due to the higher age of its key target group, it has also put a certain emphases on topics like family or marriage policies that (according to the coding scheme that will be discussed in section 5.2.2) are not considered primarily youth-related issues (Sapetschnig, 2018).

Lastly, it can be expected that the JG should display a comparably weak *critical intraparty attitude*. As was mentioned above, especially in the years after its foundation, the JG was mainly under the control of the party leadership and had very little autonomy that would allow it to enter into conflict with its parent party. However, after gaining more organizational independence, the *critical intraparty attitude* seems to have developed to a certain degree. This, for example, can be seen by the fact that, in the 1970s, the JG joined the criticism of the SJÖ against the SPÖ minister of defense, Karl Lütgendorf, who made a controversial statement criticizing the anti-military movement (Pelinka, 1984, p. 50).

4.2.3 The Austrian Association of Socialist Students (VSStÖ)

The Austrian Association of Socialist Students (VSStÖ, *Verband Sozialistischer Studenten Österreichs*) was officially founded as the SPÖ university student organization in July 1946 (Heilingsetzer et al., 1989, p. 7). Besides the intraparty inclusion and representation of students, one of the key responsibilities of the VSStÖ is to represent the SPÖ in the elections for the Austrian Union of Students (ÖH) which it did for the first time in November 1946 (p. 14). This participation in student representative elections could explain why the VSStÖ has always had a rather strong focus on its *youth representation function*. When participating in these elections, it is necessary to address student-specific and thereby, according to the coding scheme, youth-specific issues to compete for student votes. Therefore, the VSStÖ has been putting emphasis

on topics like tuition fees, student housing, financial support for students, but also broader youth-specific issues like youth unemployment. Consistent with the findings of Mycock & Tonge (2012, p. 145) that were discussed in section 2.3, the SPÖ has been receptive to the youth- and student-specific positions of the VSStÖ and implemented many of them in its party programs (Heilingsetzer et al., 1989, p. 42).

Similar to the SJÖ and the JG, the VSStÖ has been fulfilling its *recruitment and steppingstone function* by offering trainings and seminars to its members, whereby it has often invited guest speakers from the SPÖ, from the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB), or from different universities (p. 48). Consistent with the theoretical consideration of section 3.3, another similarity to the SJÖ is the criticism that the VSStÖ has expressed at various points in time towards the SPÖ being part of a coalition government (pp. 21, 42).

Furthermore, the history of the VSStÖ provides an insightful example for the theorized relationship between the *youth representation function* and the *critical intraparty attitude* as both being influenced by the *challenging intraparty role* of youth wings (see section 3.1). During the first two decades after its foundation, there was a constant struggle between a “left” and a “right” faction inside the VSStÖ. While the “left” faction was in favor of taking strong socialist positions in a broad range of political issues and willing to openly enter into conflict with the SPÖ when these positions would contradict the official party line, the “right” faction proposed to stay within the area of student and university politics, thereby fulfilling the intraparty role that was prescribed to the VSStÖ by its parent party (pp. 31, 41).

The consequences of these deviating intraparty positions can be examined during the 1960s. At the beginning of the decade, the “right” faction was dominating the VSStÖ leadership which led to the association focusing on student-specific issues and not even criticizing its parent party for incidents that were strongly criticized by other SPÖ youth organizations (e.g. the scandal surrounding the SPÖ minister for the interior, Franz Olah, in 1964). However, after the “left” faction was able to take over the VSStÖ leadership in 1966, the focus shifted away from the *youth representation function* and the *critical intraparty attitude* of the VSStÖ grew significantly stronger. Regarding the latter, there was, for example, strong disagreement between the SPÖ and its student association regarding questions about the war in Vietnam which even led to VSStÖ activists being expelled from the party (pp. 60-72).

4.2.4 The school student organizations of the SPÖ (VSM & AKS)

In contrast to the youth wings discussed in the previous sections, there is not one single SPÖ school student organization that has been existing continuously throughout the post-war period but rather two organizations that have been existing at distinct periods of time. While in the period between the First and Second World War, the SPÖ already had an official pupils' organization, between 1945 and 1953 there was no such organization and the SJÖ was in charge of issues regarding school students. This changed when the Association of Socialist Middle School Students (VSM, *Verband Sozialistischer Mittelschüler*) was officially constituted in 1953. However, after many conflicts with the SPÖ leadership, in 1972 the VSM delegate congress decided to break the organizational ties with its parent party. In the following year, the SPÖ ended all cooperations with the VSM following a scandal involving an allegedly antisemitic leaflet that VSM activists handed out at the University of Vienna (Svoboda, 1986).

In 1976, the SPÖ reactivated its pupils' agenda by starting an intraparty working group called the Socialist School Student Center (SSZ) in which different intraparty organizations concerned with certain aspects of school or education were represented. The SJÖ had a strong influence inside the SSZ and inherited the task of administrating the former VSM members. In the 1980s, the SSZ was renamed Initiative of Critical School Students (AKS, *Aktion Kritischer Schüler*) whereby, at first, the AKS was still less of an autonomous organization and more of an intraparty working group with close ties to the SJÖ. On the surface, however, the AKS already tried to present itself as an SPÖ affiliated but generally independent interest group. After the demands for more autonomy grew stronger, in 1989 the AKS was officially founded as an association. The SJÖ, however, kept its close organizational ties to the AKS until the latter gained independence from the SJÖ through a statute reform in 2014 (Götschhofer, 2024).

The different aspects of the intraparty role of youth wings discussed in chapter 2 can, to varying degrees, be found in the VSM and the AKS. The VSM used to display a very *critical intraparty attitude* that (as argued in section 2.2.2) could be explained by its strong ideological standpoints that differed from the more moderate party course. Pelinka (1984, p. 40) describes that the VSM was a meeting place for Marxist actors inside the SPÖ in which the rather critical school students were organized, while the less critical and more career driven pupils were more active inside the SJÖ. The VSM, therefore, viewed itself as the ideological conscience of the party and, for example, criticized the SPÖ for distancing itself from Marxist wordings and its character as a working-class party (Svoboda, 1986, pp. 82–84). The AKS, on the other hand, seems

to have been focusing more strongly on its *recruitment and steppingstone* function by providing multi-day seminars for AKS members and interested pupils and “cadre trainings” for AKS representatives (Götschhofer, 2024, p. 59). The political skills and knowledge learned in these seminars can be expected to generally benefit intraparty career ambitions. Similarly, the AKS has been displaying its *youth representation function* very clearly by focusing on youth- and school-specific topics like school reforms, democratic participation of pupils, social equality in schools, or the reduction of the voting age to 16 years (pp. 113-147).

5 Data and variables

5.1 Data basis: youth wing speeches at SPÖ party congresses

In order to test the hypotheses presented in chapter 3, speeches of youth wing members held at national party congresses between 1945 and today will be analyzed. Previous research has showcased that speeches held and motions submitted at party congresses are well-suited to examine different intraparty aspects, like power relations or the distribution of preferences among intraparty actors (Ceron & Greene, 2019; Greene & Haber, 2016; Kaltenegger et al., 2021; Schumacher et al., 2019). The speeches used in this thesis were collected and are provided by the project Party Congress Politics (PCP) led by Wolfgang C. Müller (Müller et al., forthcoming). A speech is considered to be held by a youth wing member when the records of the PCP project noted the corresponding speaker to be associated with one of the above mentioned SPÖ youth organizations.

The *critical intraparty attitude* of SPÖ youth organization members and the degree to which they focus on their *youth representation function* (i.e. the dependent variables) are operationalized with the use of a coding scheme that was designed for this purpose (and that will be discussed in more detail in section 5.2). About half of the available speeches of youth wing members (229 out of 453) were coded. There are two selection criteria that each lead to youth wing members' speeches being included in the coding process: speeches have to be either held at the first party congress after an election for the Austrian National Council or at the first party congress after the government status of the SPÖ changes from coalition government to either opposition or single-party government, or the other way around. In total, youth wing members' speeches held at 23 national party congresses are included in the analysis by applying these selection criteria. The national party congress from the year 2014 would have fulfilled the election criterion but the corresponding speeches are not available in the PCP data.

There are two key reasons for the above mentioned selection criteria of speeches: First, it seems reasonable to assume that the effect of electoral performance and coalition government participation should be visible most clearly at the first congresses after an election or after a respective change in government status. This means that speeches held at these party congresses can be viewed as most likely cases regarding the confirmation of the hypotheses. Second, as will be discussed in section 5.2, the speeches are coded on the sentence-level which makes the coding process very time-intensive. For example, the 229 speeches included in the analysis are comprised of a total of 5,651 sentences that have to be coded individually. Following this, to

include all 453 speeches in the analysis would mean to go significantly beyond the prescribed working time frame for a Master's thesis. Future research with increased resources could potentially extend the dataset by coding the remaining 224 speeches of SPÖ youth wing members or by including youth speeches held at congresses of other parties.

It should be noted that nearly all the speeches included in the analysis fulfill the election criterion, with some of them fulfilling both the election and the coalition change criterion. This can be explained by the fact that the time window between the elections for the National Council and the formation of a new government is usually relatively small. Although, compared to other European democracies, the time needed for government formation in Austria is above average, in the clear majority of cases a new government is created in less than three months after the last election (Imre et al., 2022, p. 204). The only party congress included in the analysis that was not the first congress held after an election is the one of the year 1967. This party congress was the first one held after the SPÖ changed from participation in a coalition government to opposition in 1966 (Müller, 1999) but already the second party congress after the 1966 national elections (since the 1966 party congress took place between the election and the finalization of the government formation).

Figure 2 provides an overview of the years in which the 23 relevant party congresses took place and the total number of youth wing speeches that were held at each congress. Furthermore, the bar graph subdivides the number of speeches to show the amount of speakers affiliated with each youth organization. This figure shows that the majority of youth wing speeches included in the analysis were held at the comparably recent party congresses. This can be illustrated by the fact that the 11 party congresses that took place between the years 1983 and 2021 only constitute 48% of the total number of party congresses but, nevertheless, contain 72% of all coded youth wing speeches. Regarding differences between the youth organizations, Figure 2 shows that SJÖ members rather consistently hold most of the speeches, followed by members of the JG and the VSStÖ. The smallest share of speeches is held by speakers affiliated with the VSM or the AKS. The distribution of youth wing affiliation will be further discussed in section 5.4 (see Figure 10).




Figure 2. Overview of the numbers of speeches per party congress by youth wing
[note: before 1972 = VSM; after 1972 = AKS]

Table A1 in the appendix provides more detailed information on the party congresses included in the analysis (e.g. the location, the date, the duration, and the date of the preceding election for the National Council). By displaying the overall number of speeches held at a congress as well as the number of speeches by youth wing members, it also illustrates that not only the total number of youth wing speeches but also their relative share increased over time. From the 642 speeches recorded at the first ten party congresses included in the analysis (1945-1972), only 50 speeches (8%) were held by members of the SPÖ youth organizations. However, for the 13 more recent party congresses (1976-2021), this share increased to 17%, with 179 of 1,064 speeches held by youth wing members.

In most party congresses, there are certain agenda items during which all delegates are allowed to take the floor and express their opinion. Therefore, the increasing share of youth wing speeches could be interpreted as the SPÖ youth factions being more willing to actively interfere in the decision-making process of their party. Although this more active speaking behavior of youth wing delegates does not allow any direct conclusions regarding the content of their speeches, it could be interpreted as an indication for a stronger *challenging intraparty role* of the youth factions since they seem to less often quietly accept the decisions of their parent party. This development would be consistent with the hypotheses H3a and H3b which are based on the expectation that the intraparty role of youth wings grows more challenging over time.

5.2 Operationalization of the dependent variables

As was mentioned in the previous section, the two dependent variables (i.e. the *critical intraparty attitude* and the focus on the *youth representation function*) are operationalized by coding party congress speeches of SPÖ youth wing members on the sentence level. For this, a detailed coding scheme was developed that defines when a sentence should be coded as critical or supportive towards the parent party as well as when a sentence should be coded as youth-related. This coding scheme can be found in the appendix (see A2). The coding instructions are written in German which can be explained by the fact that all coded speeches were held in German and that it was easier to provide examples, establish linguistic rules, and define certain signaling expressions in the original language of the speeches.

In the following two sections, an overview of how this coding process enables the operationalization of the two dependent variables will be presented. One central rule, applying to both the coding of support and criticism as well as to the coding of youth representation, is that every sentence is examined and coded independently from its context and from the previous and subsequent sentences. Section 4 of the coding scheme defines some exceptions to this rule (e.g. when the context of a sentence is needed in order to know who or what is addressed with a certain pronoun). Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the reliability of the coding instructions was tested. For this, at the beginning of the coding process, 12 speeches were randomly selected from the first three party congresses that were already coded by the author. Then, the first 15 sentences of these speeches were coded again by another trained person. If a speech was shorter than 15 sentences, it was coded in its entirety ($n = 161$ sentences). The coding decisions of the author and the trained coder were then compared. By calculating Cohen's kappa (κ), this test suggests that the coding scheme leads to very reliable results regarding the binary variables for support ($\kappa = 0.780$), criticism ($\kappa = 0.804$), and youth reference ($\kappa = 0.953$).

5.2.1 The critical intraparty attitude

To measure the *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wing speakers, in a first step, two binary variables are coded for each sentence of the speech. These variables indicate if a sentence contains criticism (first variable) or support (second variable) towards decisions or actions of the SPÖ party elite, towards official party policies, or towards the party organization as a whole. The coding scheme explicitly defines which actors and committees are considered part of the party elite and which policy "sources" can be viewed as representative for the official party

line (e.g. party congress motions submitted by the party executive, election manifestos etc.). When the SPÖ is participating in a coalition government or forming a single-party government at the time of the party congress, support or criticism towards government policies or SPÖ government members are also considered relevant. It is possible that one sentence contains criticism and support at the same time.

In a second step, the two sentence-level binary variables are accumulated to speech-level variables that indicate the number of critical and supportive sentences contained in a speech. To provide an overview of the data, two additional variables are created, indicating the percentage share of critical and supportive sentences for every speech. Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the distribution of these variables. In both cases, it can be seen that a clear majority of speeches contain no or only few (i.e. a share smaller than 10%) critical or supportive sentences. In 24% of the speeches, more than 20% of the sentences were coded as critical. Regarding support, only 5% of all speeches contain a share of supportive sentences greater than 20%. The mean percentages of critical and supportive sentences in speeches are 11.7% and 5.4%, respectively. The median percentage is 5.3% for critical and 2.7% for supportive sentences.




Figure 3. Distribution of share of critical sentences (grouped)




Figure 4. Distribution of share of supportive sentences (grouped)

In a final step, the variables regarding the amount of critical and supportive sentences are merged into one variable that indicates the strength of the *critical intraparty attitude* that is displayed in the speech. In the creation of this variable, one central underlying principle is that every critical sentence should lead to a stronger and every supportive sentence to a weaker *critical intraparty attitude*. One intuitive approach to build such a variable for the intraparty attitude (A) would be to subtract the number of critical sentences (C) from the number of supportive sentences (S) and normalize it by the total number of sentences (N):

$$A = \frac{S - C}{N}$$

The result would be a variable that can take values between -1 and 1, whereby -1 indicates that every sentence contains criticism and no sentence contains support and 1 indicates the opposite. Lowe et al. (2011) discuss this approach in the context of scaling policy positions with text data, whereby sentences are not coded as critical or supportive but as left or right. Thereby, the authors mention a central disadvantage of this approach which, as was shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, should also apply to the data of the thesis: “Empty” sentences that do not contain any information about the position on the left-right or critical-supportive scale still move the indicator value towards the center of the scale (i.e. towards 0). To illustrate this with an example: the speech of a youth wing member contains 10 sentences from which two are supportive and six are critical. The intraparty role indicator for this speech would be -0.4. If the same speech

was prolonged by six “empty” sentences (e.g. sentences with only procedural content), the same indicator would be altered to -0.25. This would suggest a substantially weaker *critical intraparty attitude* although no additional information on critical or supportive statements was provided.

According to Lowe et al. (2011), another disadvantage of using the above presented approach could be that every additional critical or supportive sentence has the same marginal effect ($1/N$) on the intraparty attitude indicator. The authors, however, claim that the higher the number of sentences that shift a position into a certain direction, the lower should be the impact of additional sentences shifting it to the same direction. This claim is reasoned by the fact that the “decreasing marginal effect of an extra unit is a general property of many perceptual quantities such as temperature, heat, or loudness studied by psychophysicists.” (p. 130) Applied to youth speeches at party congresses, this would, for example, mean that the first three sentences in which the speaker expresses criticism towards the party elite are very informative since they suggest that he/she holds certain critical attitudes towards his/her parent party. However, the 17th, 18th, and 19th critical sentence after an extensive and critical monologue on the alleged wrongdoings of the party leadership provide less additional information on the intraparty attitude of the speaker (since it was already clear that he/she thinks rather critically of its parent party).

Following these arguments, the authors propose a logarithmic indicator that is not influenced by “empty” sentences and that is decreasingly less influenced by additional sentences shifting it in the already assumed direction. This approach is used to create the actual indicator for intraparty attitude (A) with the number of critical sentences (C) and the number of supportive sentences (S):

$$A = \log \frac{S + 0.5}{C + 0.5} = \log(S + 0.5) - \log(C + 0.5)$$

In this formula, the natural logarithm (with the base e) is used. It is necessary to add the term $+ 0.5$ to both sides of the fraction line since both the numerator (because $\log(0)$ is undefined) and the denominator (because it is not allowed to divide by 0) cannot take the value 0. Although this indicator variable does not have natural lower or upper limits, empirically the variable does not take values smaller than -3.7 or greater than 3. Figure 5 provides an overview of the distribution of the variable. It shows that for over one fourth of the speeches the variable takes the value 0 (i.e. the speech contains the same amount of critical and supportive sentences).

Focusing on the remaining 170 speeches (with the indicator $\neq 0$), 109 of them (64%) take negative values which means that they contain more critical than supportive sentences. This can be interpreted as the speaker displaying a more or less *critical intraparty attitude* (depending on the how low the actual negative value is). At the other side of the scale, only 61 (36%) of these 170 speeches take positive values which means that the number of supportive sentences is higher than the number of critical ones. This would suggest that the speaker, overall, does not display a *critical intraparty attitude* but, on the contrary, mainly shows supportive sentiments towards the parent party.




Figure 5. Distribution of the indicator for intraparty attitude (grouped)

In this context, it should be noted that taking into account supportive sentences to estimate the intraparty attitude of youth wing speakers (instead of focusing solely on the critical ones) seems like an intuitive decision since explicit criticism and explicit support can be viewed as counterbalancing each other to a certain degree. However, this methodological operationalization of the intraparty attitude as either being predominantly critical or predominantly supportive is not precisely congruent with the theoretical view on youth wings as either having a stronger or weaker *critical intraparty attitude*. This can be explained by the fact that the theoretical framework of the thesis builds on previous scholarly work which strongly focused on the critical but hardly on the supportive aspects of the intraparty attitude of youth wings. Nevertheless, the methodological integration of supportive elements seems reasonable and this thesis could be the starting point for future research to also theoretically include supportive intraparty attitudes

more strongly. However, due to the theoretical perspective and the hypotheses, the interpretation of the results will mainly be framed through the *critical intraparty attitude*. For example, an increase in the above explained indicator would be mainly interpreted as the intraparty attitude of youth wings becoming less critical instead of more supportive.

5.2.2 The youth representation function

To operationalize how strongly youth wing speakers focus on their *youth representation function*, the share of youth-related sentences in their speeches is used. For this, every sentence of a speech is coded as either being youth-related (i.e. containing at least one reference to a youth-specific subject) or not being youth-related. The coding scheme defines that subjects are classified as youth-related when they exclusively or primarily affect people between 12 and 25 years of age. This age definition of “youth” was borrowed from the well-established Shell youth study that is conducted periodically by the University of Bielefeld (Albert et al., 2020). Due to this age range, examples for youth-related topics would be all issues regarding high school, apprenticeship, university studies, reforms of the voting age, or compulsory military or civil service. Furthermore, sentences in which “the youth”, “young people”, “the young generation”, or similar expressions are explicitly mentioned are also counted as youth-related. More detailed information regarding the definition of youth references are provided in the coding scheme (see A2).

As just mentioned, to operationalize the focus on the *youth representation function*, the share of youth-related sentences in a speech is calculated. In contrast to the measurement of the *critical intraparty attitude* (see section 5.2.1), it is necessary to take into account the “empty” sentences (i.e. sentences that do not contain youth-related elements). In this context, such sentences contain relevant information on the speakers’ youth focus (or, more precisely, the lack thereof). Furthermore, contrary to the measurement of the *critical intraparty attitude*, it seems reasonable to not use a logarithmic indicator for the operationalization of the *youth representation function*. In the case of the *critical intraparty attitude*, it was necessary to infer from the observable behavior of a speaker to his/her underlying stances and opinions towards the parent party (thereby taking into account the decreasing marginal effect of every additional information unit). The representation of youth-specific issues, on the other hand, is more of an actual behavior that can directly be observed in the speeches of youth wing members. In other words, the degree to which speakers talk about youth-specific issues captures their focus on the *youth representation function* more directly. Therefore, it is reasonable to also operationalize this

variable in a more direct way. Following the logic of the operationalization, a speech with 60% of its sentences being youth-related, for example, indicates a focus on the *youth representation function* twice as strong as a speech in which only 30% of the sentences contain youth references.

Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of this youth representation variable. It shows that about two thirds of the speeches contain no youth-related sentences (43% of speeches) or a share smaller than 20% (23% of speeches). The share of youth-specific sentences in the remaining 34% of the speeches is relatively evenly distributed between 20% and 90%, whereby only three speeches reach a share of over 90%. The mean and median share of youth related sentences is 21.6% and 4.8%, respectively.




Figure 6. Distribution of the share of youth-related sentences (grouped)

5.3 Operationalization of the independent variables

5.3.1 Electoral performance

The first step in the operationalization of electoral performance is to calculate the SPÖ's exact vote share for every election for the Austrian National Council since 1945. For this, the number of votes for the SPÖ are divided by the total number of votes casted (Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, n.d.). To operationalize electoral performance at the time of the party congress, a new variable is created by subtracting the vote share of the second last election before the

party congress from the vote share of the last (i.e. most recent) election. Following this, the variable takes negative values when the SPÖ was performing worse at the last election than at the second last election and, conversely, positive values when the party could improve its electoral performance in the most recent election. Since the 1945 election is the first one after the restoration of democracy in Austria, for speeches held at the subsequent congress of 1945 the electoral performance variable takes the value 0. Figure 7 provides an overview of the SPÖ results in all elections for the Austrian National Council between 1945 and 2019. This graph illustrates that, since the 1980s, there is a rather linear decrease in the party's vote share. While in the 1979 election, about 51% of the votes were casted for the SPÖ, this share reduced to about 21% in the 2019 election.




Figure 7. SPÖ vote share in the elections for the National Council 1945-2019

5.3.2 Form of government participation

For the operationalization of the form of government participation, a binary variable is created that indicates if the SPÖ has been participating in a coalition government at the time of the party congress (= 1) or if the party was in opposition or forming a single-party government when the congress was held (= 0). This operationalization follows the theoretical arguments presented in section 3.3, according to which the intraparty role of youth wings should primarily differ between times when the party participates in a coalition government and times when it does not. This was reasoned by the assumption that participation in coalition governments requires more political compromises than being in opposition or ruling in a single-party

government. These expectations regarding the similarity between times of opposition and single-party government will also be tested empirically in the analysis in chapter 6.

Although the variable regarding the form of government participation will be included as a binary one, Figure 8 provides an overview of how the speeches are distributed across the three categories opposition, coalition government, and single-party government. The bar graph shows that more than half of the speeches (55%) were held at times of SPÖ coalition government participation while about a third of them (35%) took place when the party was in opposition. Only 10% of the speeches by youth wing members were held at party congresses during SPÖ single-party government. The details on the composition of governments and the inauguration dates were retrieved online from the Austrian Federal Chancellery (n.d.).




Figure 8. Distribution of form of SPÖ government participation

5.3.3 Time

The third independent variable, time, is operationalized by the number of years passed since 1945 (i.e. since the year of the first party congress included in the dataset). While speeches held at the 1945 party congress are assigned the value 0, the variable extends up to 76 (for the party congress that took place in 2021). An overview of all the years in which relevant party congresses were held was shown earlier in Figure 2. In this context, it should be noted that there is no year in which two relevant party congresses were held. Regarding the relationship between time and the other two independent variables, Figure 9 provides an overview of the

electoral vote share and the form of government participation of the SPÖ since 1945. Most notably, it can be seen that, since the 1980s, the party's electoral share has been decreasing nearly constantly. In the 2019 election, for example, the SPÖ could only reach less than half its vote share compared to the elections in the 1970s. Figure 9 also shows that during the majority of party congresses included in the analysis (14 out of 23) the SPÖ was part of a coalition government while during five congresses the party was in opposition. There are only four party congresses which were held at times of SPÖ single-party government, whereby these congresses took place consecutively between 1970 and 1979.




Figure 9. SPÖ vote share and form of government participation over time
[note: data points = party congresses]

5.4 Control variables

Besides the dependent and independent variables, there is a range of control variables that will be included in the analysis. The arguments for including these variables as well as their operationalization will be discussed in the following sections.

5.4.1 Youth wing affiliation and gender of speaker

Since, as it was shown in section 4.2, certain differences regarding the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* can be expected between the SPÖ youth wings, the analysis includes binary control variables for each youth organization. Figure 10 provides an

overview of the distribution of youth wing affiliation. It shows that half of all speeches were held by speakers of the SJÖ. The second and third greatest share of speeches can be attributed to the JG (25%) and the VSStÖ (17%). The smallest amount of speeches was held by speakers affiliated with the SPÖ school organizations, the VSM (2%) and the AKS (6%).




Figure 10. Distribution of youth wing affiliation of speakers

Another variable that will be controlled for is the gender of the speaker. In general, people's gender has shown to have an impact on different political attitudes and the way these attitudes are expressed (Atkeson & Rapoport, 2003; Diekmann & Schneider, 2010; Pratto et al., 1997). Furthermore, Ammassari et al. (2023) show that certain gender differences exist regarding the political ambition of party youth wing members, with female members, on average, showing less electoral ambition. These studies, both on general gender differences among the population and specific gender differences among members of political youth organizations, suggest that the gender of a speaker could have an influence on the intraparty attitude and the youth representation displayed in speeches of the party youth. In the original PCP dataset, coders could select between "male", "female", and "non-binary". Since no speaker included in the analysis was coded non-binary, the gender variable is treated as a binary one (with 1 indicating female and 0 indicating male gender).

Figure 11 provides an overview of the share of speeches held by female youth wing members for every party congress. It shows a steep increase in the women's speech share since the 1980s. In the first 12 party congresses included in the analysis (that took place between 1945 and

1979), the share of speeches held by female speakers was only about 5% (3 speeches out of 65). On the other hand, focusing on the five most recent congresses (between 2004 and 2019), the share of speeches held by women was 60% (45 out of 75). The red line in Figure 11 displays the overall share, showing that 31% of all speeches (71 out of 229) were held by female youth wing speakers.




Figure 11. Gender distribution among youth wing speakers over time

5.4.2 Length of sentences and speeches

Another set of factors that will be controlled for in the analysis relate to the length of sentences and speeches. The mean sentence length of a speech (i.e. the mean number of words per sentence) can be expected to have a positive influence on the amount of critical, supportive, or youth-related sentences since it seems logical that a higher number of words per sentence also increases the likelihood that at least one of these words contains a negative, supportive, or youth-related connotation.

The speech length (i.e. the number of words that a speech consists of) could, on the contrary, decrease the share of supportive, critical or youth-related sentences. Here, the expected mechanism would be that speakers who want to issue a critical, supportive, or youth-related statement have less time to depart from their core message when their speech is shorter. For example, a speaker intending to hold a short speech expressing his or her position on a youth-related issue would have to use a higher share of the overall sentences and words to deliver his or her

youth-related message than a speaker who wants to express the same message in a longer speech. In this example, the latter person would have more time to explain potentially non-youth-related aspects of the overall political context in more detail or add rather procedural statements at the beginning or the end of the speech. These dynamics can be expected to reduce the overall share of youth-specific sentences in a speech.

Although, as mentioned in section 5.2.1, the logarithmic indicator for intraparty attitude is not influenced by the share of critical or supportive sentences but rather by their ratio, it still seems reasonable to expect that the speech length could influence this variable. A youth wing member wanting to express criticism or support on a party congress by only using few words has to formulate his or her message rather sharply and without considering all the nuances of an issue. On the other hand, a speaker holding a longer speech could express the same message more nuanced by discussing the pros and cons of a decision or expressing some understanding for competing positions before arriving at his or her final (supportive or critical) conclusion. The latter scenario makes it more likely that an overall critical speech also contains supportive elements (or vice versa) which would shift the indicator for intraparty attitude towards the neutral center of the scale (i.e. towards 0).

In summary, the arguments stated above suggest that the mean sentence length of a speech as well as the overall speech length could influence both of the dependent variables in different directions and should therefore be included as control variables in the analysis. Figure 12 and 13 provide insights into the distribution of the mean sentence length and the overall length of speeches. Figure 12 illustrates that the majority of speeches (62%) have a mean sentence length between 16 and 25 words per sentence. There are no speeches with a mean sentence length below 10 words and only six speeches with an average of over 35 words per sentence. Regarding the length of speeches, Figure 13 shows that more than half of them (55%) are between 201 and 600 words long. Less than 10% of the speeches are over 1,000 words long, with four outliers even containing more than 1,400 words.




Figure 12. Distribution of mean sentence length




Figure 13. Distribution of speech length

Figure 14 illustrates the average sentence and speech length over time. This figure suggests that the mean speech length of youth wing members has been decreasing rather constantly over the decades that are included in the analysis. The average speech before the year 1960 was 783 words long, whereas the mean speech length after the year 2000 was only 349 words. This suggests that, on average, the speech length has been reduced by more than half. One possible

explanation for this trend towards shorter speeches could be the introduction of stricter rules regarding speaking time at congresses. It might also be possible that, over the decades, less speaking time was designated by the party leadership for reports or presentations of the youth organizations. One alternative factor could be that, due to the increasing number of youth wings represented at the party congresses, the provided speaking time had to be distributed among more youth wings speakers (making the individual speeches shorter).

Looking at the mean sentence length per speech, no linear time trend can be detected. Whereas the mean amount of words per sentence has been increasing from 20.1 in the 1940s to 26.5 in the 1970s, the following decades show a decreasing trend. For party congresses that were held after 2010, the average sentence length of youth wing speeches was 19.8 words which is very close to the initial sentence length of the 1940s. Since the mean sentence length is considered to have a negative influence on the comprehensibility of a speech (Lin & Osnabrügge, 2018; Spirling, 2016), these results can be interpreted as youth wing members keeping the complexity and comprehensibility of their speeches rather constant over time.




Figure 14. Scatterplot and local polynomial regression plot (including 95% confidence bands) illustrating speech length and mean sentence length over time

5.4.3 Time gap between speech and last election

The last control variable relates to the time passed since the last election. This variable is included since it seems likely that the effect of electoral performance on the intraparty role of

youth wings grows smaller, the further in the past the determining election was held. Somer-Topcu (2009), for example, examines the effect of electoral performance on policy change and finds that “the effect of past election results dissipates with the passage of time.” (p. 238) Focusing on the intraparty role of youth organizations, if a party performed very poorly in an election that took place just a few weeks before the party congress, the bad election results will certainly be one central topic of discussion and provide the youth wing speakers with clear and recent evidence on which they can base their criticism regarding the official party course and their dissatisfaction with the leadership of their parent party. In such scenarios it seems likely that youth organizations display a strong *challenging intraparty role* by openly criticizing their parent party (strong *critical intraparty attitude*) and by not staying in their youth-related sphere of autonomy but instead focusing on the party course regarding big ideological issues (weak *youth representation function*).

However, if there is a large time gap of several months or even years between the dissatisfying election and the first party congress afterwards, the bad electoral performance can be assumed to lend the criticism of the youth wing members less argumentative power. In the time since the last election, many different dynamics (e.g. change in party leadership, improvement in polls, political scandals or crises) could have shifted the focus of the intraparty debate away from the last election and blurred the responsibilities for the electoral loss. These dynamics could strengthen the position of the party elite and lead to youth wings displaying a less *challenging intraparty role* by not criticizing their parent party as offensively (weaker *critical intraparty attitude*) and focusing more strongly on youth-related issues without intervening too much in other policy areas of the party (stronger *youth representation function*).

Following these arguments, it can be expected that an interaction effect exists, whereby the time passed since the last election weakens the effect of electoral performance on the intraparty role of youth wings. Based on these arguments, a variable indicating the number of months between a party congress speech and the last election as well as the interaction term between this control variable and electoral performance is included in the analysis.

Figure 15 provides an overview of the time gaps between every party congress included in the analysis and the preceding election for the Austrian National Council. The red line shows that the overall average time gap is nearly one year (11.3 months). However, there are considerable differences over the decades, with a general trend towards growing time gaps between congresses and preceding elections. For the oldest 13 party congresses (1945-1983), the average

speech was held 5.6 months after the last election for the National Council, whereby no party congress was held over one year after the preceding election. Looking at the 10 most recent party congresses (1987-2021), six of those congresses took place over one year after the last election, whereby the average time gap (on the speech level) is about 14 months. The 2004 party congress was even held a little more than two years after the 2002 national election.

This trend towards greater time gaps between an election and the subsequent party congress can partly be explained by changes in the party statute due to which the mandatory frequency of holding congresses was raised from yearly to every two years in 1959 and then to every three years in 2018. These changes were decided on the party congresses of 1959 (see motion 3) and 2018 (see motion 13.02) which is why they can be reconstructed with the PCP data. One alternative explanation might be that, over time, party congresses were used more strategically (e.g. to promote a new program or an election campaign) which also requires more strategic timing. While the first 13 SPÖ party congresses after World War II (from which a majority is not included in the analysis of this thesis) were held once a year between October and December, such a clear regularity cannot be detected for congresses held after the 1950s. The latter can also be seen when examining the starting dates of the included party congresses displayed in Table A1. This development suggests that, over time, strategic timing might have become more important in the planning of party congresses which could partly explain the growing time gaps illustrated in Figure 15.




Figure 15. Overview of the time gaps between party congresses and the preceding elections

6 Analysis

6.1 The relationship between the critical intraparty attitude and the youth representation function

In a first analytical step, the relationship between the two dependent variables, intraparty attitude and youth representation, will be examined. There is no hypothesis regarding this relationship since it is not expected that these two variables influence each other directly. However, they are both aspects of the intraparty role of youth wings, whereby a *challenging intraparty role* is characterized by a strong *critical intraparty attitude* and a weak *youth representation function* (see section 3.1). When applying these theoretical considerations to the coded speech data, a speaker displaying a *challenging intraparty role* should score low values in the indicator for intraparty attitude and in the variable for the share of youth-related sentences. The less challenging, on the other hand, the intraparty role of a youth wing member, the higher should be the values for the intraparty attitude indicator and the share of youth-related sentences. This means that, when following the theory, the data should show a positive correlation between the indicator for intraparty attitude and the share of youth-related sentences. In the first row of Table 1, the correlation (Pearson's r) between these two variables over all youth wings is displayed. It shows a very weak positive correlation ($r = 0.081$) that fails to reach statistical significance ($p = 0.220$). Throughout this thesis, the conventional threshold for statistical significance ($p < 0.05$) is used.

Table 1. Correlation between the indicator for intraparty attitude and the share of youth-related sentences (grouped by youth wings)

Youth wings	Pearson's r	p-value	N
Overall	0.081	0.220	229
SJÖ/JG	0.152	0.046	173
VStÖ/VSM/AKS	0.111	0.417	56

However, when looking at the overview of the different SPÖ youth organizations in section 4.2, it can be argued that a differentiation between the youth wings is necessary in order to obtain reliable data on the correlation between the two dependent variables. This can be explained by the fact that the SPÖ not only has youth organizations that represent the issues and interests of young people in general (the SJÖ and JG) but also organizations that focus more specifically on school-specific (VSM/AKS) or university-specific (VStÖ) topics. The latter youth wings focus on a more narrow clientele (school and university students) and have a more

clearly defined area of expertise (school and university education) than the other youth organizations. Furthermore, they have more pressure to talk about school and university policies since they also participate in school and university body elections.

Following this, it can be expected that speakers of the VSM, AKS, and VSStÖ should have a stronger incentive to focus on their designated topics than speakers of the SJÖ or the JG since the latter represent a broader group of young people and a more diverse and less definite set of issues. Since educational topics are considered youth-relevant in the coding scheme, it can be expected that speakers of the VSM, AKS, and VSStÖ should score higher percentages of youth-related sentences in their speeches than speakers of the SJÖ and the JG. Figure 16 shows that this expectation can be confirmed with the coded data. The mean share of youth-related sentences in speeches held by members of the VSM, AKS, or VSStÖ (41%) is clearly higher than in speeches of SJÖ or JG members (15.4%). This difference in the mean share of youth-related sentences is statistically significant, as can be seen in the t-test that is reported in the first row of Table 2.




Figure 16. Comparison of mean share of youth-related sentences per speech between SJÖ/JG and VSStÖ/VSM/AKS members (including 95% confidence intervals)

Table 2. Two-tailed t-tests comparing the means of the dependent variables
between SJÖ/JG and VSStÖ/VSM/AKS members

Dependent variable	SJÖ/JG		VSStÖ/VSM/AKS		Diff.	t	p
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD			
Share of youth-related sentences	0.154	0.246	0.410	0.337	-0.256	-6.144	0.000
Intraparty attitude indicator	-0.260	1.421	-0.642	1.199	0.382	1.811	0.072

As argued above, the varying share of youth-related sentences can mainly be explained by differences in the groups and issues that are represented by these youth organizations and less by a weaker *challenging intraparty role* played by the VSM, AKS, or VSStÖ. On the contrary, especially the VSM and the VSStÖ took rather rebellious stances towards their parent party over several periods of time (Heilingsetzer et al., 1989; Svoboda, 1986). Figure 17 shows that the latter statement is also congruent with the coded speech data. The mean value of the intraparty attitude indicator for the VSM, AKS, and VSStÖ (-0.642) suggests that these youth organizations have a stronger *critical intraparty attitude* than the SJÖ and the JG (-0.260). As can be seen in the second row of Table 2, according to the t-test, this difference in the mean values is statistically significant at the 10% level. In summary, the data confirm the expectation that the degree of youth representation and the intraparty attitude differ systematically between rather broad youth wings (SJÖ and JG) and youth wings with a more narrow target group (VSM, AKS, and VSStÖ). Therefore, it seems reasonable to control for the youth wing affiliation of the speaker when examining the relationship between the *youth representation function* and the *critical intraparty attitude*.




Figure 17. Comparison of mean indicator for intraparty attitude between SJÖ/JG and VSStÖ/VSM/AKS (including 95% confidence intervals)

The second row of Table 1, therefore, displays the correlation between the intraparty attitude indicator and the share of youth-related sentences for speeches held by members of the SJÖ and the JG. With this selection, Pearson's r increases to 0.152 and the correlation becomes statistically significant ($p = 0.046$). This positive correlation can be seen graphically with a scatterplot and a fitted regression line in Figure 18. When selecting only the VSM, AKS, and VSStÖ members (see third row of Table 1), the correlation also increases ($r = 0.111$) but the relationship fails to reach statistical significance ($p = 0.417$). The latter could be explained by the relatively small number of observations for the school and university students' organizations ($n = 56$) compared to the SJÖ and JG ($n = 173$). The correlation between the dependent variables for the case of the VSM, AKS, and VSStÖ is also displayed graphically with a scatterplot and a fitted regression line in Figure 19. In summary, grouping the youth wings leads to increased and partly statistically significant correlations between the intraparty attitude and the degree of youth representation in the hypothesized direction. Although this relationship is rather weak, the data provide some indications for the theoretical expectation that the *challenging intraparty role* of youth wings is not only displayed by direct criticism towards the parent party but also by youth wings focusing less on their youth-related area of autonomy and expertise. Furthermore, the results underline the importance of controlling for organizational affiliation in the analysis.




Figure 18. Scatterplot and linear regression line illustrating the correlation between intraparty attitude indicator and share of youth-related sentences (for the case of SJÖ/JG)




Figure 19. Scatterplot and linear regression line illustrating the correlation between intraparty attitude indicator and share of youth-related sentences (for the case of VSSÖ/VSM/AKS)

6.2 The critical intraparty attitude (H1a, H2a, H3a)

6.2.1 Bivariate analysis

This section examines the relationship between the intraparty attitude and the independent variables from a bivariate perspective. Starting with the first independent variable (electoral performance), Figure 20 displays the mean intraparty attitude indicator for speeches held at party congresses that followed electoral loss (i.e. after the SPÖ lost part of its vote share in the last national election) and for speeches held at congresses that did not follow electoral loss (i.e. after the SPÖ either increased its vote share or participated in the first national election in 1945). It should be noted that the overall findings of this bivariate analysis do not change when the three speeches held in the year 1945 are excluded instead of being assigned to the “no loss” category. The figure shows that, after electoral losses, youth wing speakers score lower mean values in the intraparty attitude indicator (-0.463) than when the SPÖ did not lose parts of its vote share in the previous election (0.073). As can be seen by the results of the two-tailed t-test that is displayed in the first row of Table 3, the difference in the mean intraparty attitude indicator between speeches that are held at party congresses following and not following electoral loss is statistically significant. These findings suggest that, in accordance with H1a, negative electoral performance leads to a more *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wings.




Figure 20. Comparison of the mean intraparty attitude indicator between party congresses following elections with and without electoral loss (including 95% confidence intervals)

Table 3. Results of several two-tailed t-tests comparing the mean intraparty attitude indicator between different groups

Group 1	Group 2	Group 1		Group 2		Diff.	t	p
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD			
Electoral loss	No electoral loss	-0.463	1.391	0.073	1.249	-0.536	2.403	0.017
Coalition gov.	Opposition	-0.636	1.434	-0.055	1.194	-0.580	-3.016	0.003
Coalition gov.	Single-p. gov.	-0.636	1.434	0.156	1.347	-0.792	-2.458	0.015
Opposition	Single-p. gov.	-0.055	1.194	0.156	1.347	-0.212	-0.728	0.468
Coalition gov.	No coalition gov.	-0.636	1.434	-0.008	1.226	-0.628	3.514	0.001
1980s/1990s	Other decades	-1.171	1.362	-0.001	1.229	-1.171	6.397	0.000

Continuing to the second independent variable (coalition participation), Figure 21 compares the mean intraparty attitude indicator for speeches held during different forms of SPÖ government status. The figure shows that youth wing speeches, on average, score lower values in this indicator when the SPÖ participates in a coalition government (-0.636) than when the party is in opposition (-0.055) or ruling in a single-party government (0.156). These results suggest that, like expected in H2a, participation in a coalition government leads to youth wings displaying a stronger *critical intraparty attitude*. This finding is also underlined by the results of the four two-tailed t-tests that are presented in the rows 2-5 of Table 3. These tests show that the mean intraparty attitude indicator is significantly lower during times of SPÖ coalition government participation than during times of opposition, during times of SPÖ single-party government, and during times of opposition and SPÖ single-party government combined. The fourth row of Table 3 also shows that there is no significant difference in the mean intraparty attitude indicator between times of opposition and SPÖ single-party government. This is consistent with the expectation that the main difference in the intraparty attitude should exist between coalition government participation on the one side and opposition and single-party government on the other side (since both of the latter do require significantly less political compromises than coalition participation). This finding also justifies the empirical decision to include government status as a dummy variable in the models, indicating if the SPÖ is participating in a coalition government at the time of the party congress or not.




Figure 21. Comparison of the mean intraparty attitude indicator between different forms of SPÖ government status (including 95% confidence intervals)

Lastly, to examine the effect of the third independent variable (time), Figure 22 illustrates the development of the intraparty attitude between 1945 and 2021. Contradictory to H3a, it shows no decreasing time trend of the intraparty attitude indicator but rather a U-shaped form that suggests an especially strong *critical intraparty attitude* in the 1980s and 1990s. The latter is also shown by the results of the t-test presented in the sixth row of Table 3. According to this test, speeches held in the 1980s and 1990s, on average, score significantly lower values in the intraparty attitude indicator than speeches held in other decades. In this context, it should be mentioned that the U-shaped relationship between time and intraparty attitude shown in Figure 22 is mainly driven by two influential party congresses, namely the ones of 1987 and 1991, at which 47 of the 229 youth wing speeches (21%) were held. The mean intraparty attitude indicator for speeches delivered at these two party congresses (-1.498) suggests a much stronger *critical intraparty attitude* than the mean value for the remaining 182 speeches (-0.058).




Figure 22. Scatterplot and local polynomial regression plot (including 95% confidence bands) illustrating intraparty attitude over time

Although at the party congresses of 1987 and 1991 the *critical intraparty attitude* of the SPÖ youth wings is stronger than at other party congresses, there are two central arguments why these two party congresses should not be treated as outlier cases that can be excluded from the analysis. First, as was mentioned in section 5.1, due to the time-intensive coding process, the dataset is comparably small (229 speeches held at 23 party congresses). The party congresses of 1987 and 1991 make up about 9% of all congresses and 21% of all speeches. In this context, there would have to be very convincing theoretical or historical arguments that would justify to simply treat over one fifth of all data points as outliers that should not be considered in the analysis. Second, besides such arguments not being apparent, many of the speeches held in 1987 and 1991, on the contrary, suggest that the *critical intraparty attitude* that is displayed in them can be explained by the theoretical framework of this thesis. The latter will be shown in the following paragraphs.

Especially the arguments regarding the effect of coalition government participation (see section 3.3) seem to apply for the party congresses of 1987 and 1991. Both congresses took place during times when the SPÖ was participating in a coalition government with the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP). Therefore, a great share of the critical sentences expressed at these two party congresses regard policies implemented or planned by SPÖ-ÖVP coalition governments. At the 1991 party congress, different policies of the coalition government (e.g.

regarding labor market policy, asylum policy, or university policy) as well as the SPÖ government members were openly criticized by the speakers of the youth organizations. Similarly, the critical speeches at the 1987 congress strongly focused on the package of measures for budget consolidation introduced by the SPÖ-ÖVP government (Pelinka, 1988, pp. 104–105) which was called a burden package (“Belastungspaket”) by several youth wing speakers. Exemplary for the latter criticism, one passage of the speech of Andrea Kuntzl (JG) can be quoted:

“The central point of our identity is to stand on the side of the socially weak. This spirit is not found in the current austerity package. On the contrary. It primarily targets those whose interests we promised to represent. Not even an attempt was visible to implement revenue-side measures like the already mentioned tax on interest income and the value-added tax.”

(Andrea Kuntzl, October 27, 1987. Translation by the author)

Another central cause of criticism was the reform of the party organization introduced at the 1991 congress. This reform included the renaming of the party from “Austrian Socialist Party” to “Austrian Social Democratic Party”. The renaming was clearly opposed by the youth wing speakers which is congruent with the theoretical expectation that youth organizations are critical towards the ideological moderation of their parent party over time (see section 3.4). A similar argument can be made for the critical sentences of youth wing speakers towards the new SPÖ chancellor Franz Vranitzky at the party congress of 1987. Vranitzky was a former banker and often associated with a rather elitist image. During his time of chancellorship, the SPÖ was further transformed into a left-wing catch-all party with more flexible ideological standpoints (Pelinka, 2005, p. 75). Following this, it can be argued that youth wing speakers were particularly critical towards Vranitzky since, similar to the renaming of the party, he represents the ideological moderation of the party over time. In this context, a passage of the speech of Christian Cap (JG) can be quoted as an example:

“The vision of modernization à la Vranitzky takes place against the backdrop of great shortcomings in environmental policies, bottom-up redistribution, layoffs in the nationalized industry, called restructuring, reform of the pension system that mostly affects the poorest, but no cuts in the subsidies for the Raiffeisen bank, called agricultural price support funds, fear and hesitation towards the withholding tax, and 300 million for pointless missiles.”

(Christian Cap, October 28, 1987. Translation by the author)

Furthermore, the SPÖ performed rather poorly at the elections preceding the party congresses of 1987 and 1991. In the 1986 election, the SPÖ lost 4.5 percentage points of its vote share. In the election of 1990, the party was not only unable to regain some of these lost votes but, on the contrary, reduced its vote share by another 0.3 percentage points. According to the theoretical arguments, these electoral losses are expected to strengthen the confidence of youth wings in their alternative views and lead to them criticizing their parent party more offensively (see section 3.2). In other words, the strong *critical intraparty attitude* displayed by speakers of the youth organizations in 1987 and 1991 is congruent with the theoretical expectations regarding the effect of electoral performance.

In summary, at the two party congresses of 1987 and 1991, all factors that should theoretically lead to a stronger critical intraparty attitude were at play. The party was participating in a coalition government where it was forced to make unpopular compromises, it performed poorly at elections, and symptoms of a long-dated ideological moderation (like the new SPÖ chancellor Vranitzky or the renaming of the party) became apparent. This means that the party congresses of 1987 and 1991 should not be viewed as random outliers but rather as extreme cases in which all the independent variables simultaneously strengthened the critical intraparty attitude of youth wing speakers.

6.2.2 Multivariate analysis

This section analyzes the relationship between the intraparty attitude indicator and the independent variables from a multivariate perspective. For this, five different OLS models are estimated and presented in Table 4. The standard errors of the coefficients are clustered at the party congress level since the relevant independent variables (electoral performance, coalition government participation, and time) do not vary between speeches at the same congress. Failing to account for this could lead to an underestimation of standard errors and an overestimation of the statistical significance of the coefficients. The models mainly differ in their approach to capture the development of youth wings' intraparty attitude over time (with the exception of Model 5). Therefore, in contrast to the order of the theoretical arguments and the hypotheses, this section will start with the discussion of trends over time and thereby explain the differences between the models.

Table 4. OLS regression models (DV: indicator for intraparty attitude).

Standard errors clustered by party congresses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Electoral performance (E)	0.068 (0.086)	0.045 (0.090)	0.094 (0.101)	0.033 (0.075)	
SPÖ coalition government	-0.805* (0.317)	-0.314 (0.264)	-0.583+ (0.294)	-0.556+ (0.272)	-0.254 (0.240)
Time	-0.020 (0.014)			-0.017 (0.013)	
JG	0.517+ (0.254)	0.438+ (0.228)	0.425+ (0.235)	0.512+ (0.255)	0.443+ (0.233)
VStStÖ	-0.212 (0.182)	-0.241 (0.176)	-0.203 (0.191)	-0.240 (0.171)	-0.264 (0.169)
VSM/AKS	-0.424 (0.538)	-0.427 (0.520)	-0.438 (0.529)	-0.417 (0.530)	-0.388 (0.520)
Gender (female)	-0.056 (0.221)	-0.170 (0.256)	-0.159 (0.260)	-0.084 (0.216)	-0.143 (0.234)
Mean sentence length (words)	0.001 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.021)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.020)
Speech length (100 word steps)	0.037 (0.027)	0.048* (0.022)	0.048* (0.023)	0.039 (0.026)	0.039 (0.028)
Months since last election (M)	0.076* (0.036)	0.042+ (0.022)	0.035+ (0.020)	0.074+ (0.036)	0.042 (0.025)
Interaction E x M	-0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)
SPÖ left-right position		-0.593+ (0.303)		-0.475 (0.292)	-0.596* (0.245)
Shift in SPÖ left-right position			0.025 (0.168)		
Electoral loss (binary)					-0.490 (0.428)
Constant	-0.081 (0.591)	-1.146* (0.550)	-0.536 (0.541)	-0.635 (0.503)	-0.815 (0.538)
Observations	229	229	229	229	229
R^2	0.161	0.159	0.137	0.174	0.167
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.116	0.093	0.128	0.125

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Model 1 includes all the variables as discussed in the sections 5.3 and 5.4. In this first model, the time variable shows a negative but statistically not significant effect. This lack of a significant linear time effect is consistent with Figure 22 which (contrary to the expectation of H3a) showed a non-linear and rather U-shaped development of the intraparty attitude indicator over time. Following these findings, it seems worth further investigating potential explanations for these unexpected long-term dynamics.

Like discussed in section 3.4, the central argument behind the hypothesis that youth wings have developed a stronger *critical intraparty attitude* over time (H3a) is based on the expectation that the ideological position of parties has increasingly been moderated over the decades since the end of World War II. This expected ideological moderation over time is based on the literature on party transformation presented in section 3.4 (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009, 2018; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988). It was argued that youth wings should not have been following this long-term development towards ideological moderation (or at least not to the same degree as their parent parties). Therefore, the distance between the political positions of youth organizations and their parent parties should have been growing over time, leading to the former being increasingly more critical towards the latter. Assuming that the theoretical expectation that youth wings oppose ideological moderation is correct, one explanation for the non-linear time trend shown in Figure 22 could be found in the long-term development of SPÖ party ideology. More precisely, the non-linear time dynamics of the intraparty attitude might be explained by a non-linear development of the ideological position of the SPÖ.

To test this alternative explanation, Model 2 replaces time with the ideological position of the SPÖ as a proxy variable for party transformation. The ideological position is operationalized with data on SPÖ election manifestos provided by the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al., 2024). This dataset contains different content analytical variables that indicate the share of quasi-sentences about a specific topic in the manifesto. For example, the variable “per201” indicates the percentage of quasi-sentences focusing on “Freedom and Human Rights”. For many topics there are two variables, indicating the share of positive and negative quasi-sentences towards a subject. The variable “per110”, for example, displays the percentage of quasi-sentences that can be assigned to the category “European Community/Union: Negative”. (Volkens et al., 2020)

These content variables can be used to estimate the overall ideological left-right position that is expressed in an election manifesto. For this, one commonly used measure is the RILE score

which defines 13 of the content variables as left-wing and 13 of them as right-wing. By subtracting the share of “left” quasi-sentences from the share of “right” ones, the RILE score takes negative values when a manifesto contains more “left” sentences than “right” ones and positive values when the opposite is the case (Budge, 2013). This thesis uses the modified version of the RILE measure proposed by Lowe et al. (2011) which transforms the original RILE score into a logarithmic ratio score. The principle behind this approach as well as its advantages were already discussed in detail in section 5.2.1 since the indicator for intraparty attitude is created analogously (only using critical sentences instead of “left” ones and supportive sentences instead of “right” ones). Same as for the original RILE score, higher values indicate a more right-wing position expressed in the manifesto whereby positive values show that a manifesto contains more “right” sentences than “left” ones and negative values show the opposite. In the historical context of the SPÖ, higher values in this variable can be viewed as an indication for a stronger ideological moderation. The latter can be underlined by the fact that for all election manifestos (with the exception of the 1995 manifesto) the party ideology variable takes negative values. This means that higher (but still negative) values can mainly be interpreted as the SPÖ positioning itself closer to the ideological center and showing less signs of a clear left-wing ideology.

After calculating the logarithmic ideology values for all available SPÖ election manifestos, a new variable is created which assigns every youth wing speech the ideology value of the last election manifesto published before the party congress. One exception was made for the three speeches held at the party congress of 1945. Since no election manifesto was published before this party congress, the ideological position of the SPÖ is estimated with the manifesto that was published closest to the date of the party congress (i.e. the 1949 election manifesto). To guarantee that this approach does not lead to biased results, all models presented in this thesis were also run without the three speeches of the 1945 party congress. This test showed that none of the models would come to any different conclusions regarding the hypotheses when excluding the speeches of the year 1945.

Model 2 shows that, after excluding time, the above described party ideology variable has a negative effect on the intraparty attitude indicator that is significant at the 10% level. This suggests that a more right-wing (i.e. more moderate) party ideology leads to youth wings showing a stronger *critical intraparty attitude*. This relationship is also illustrated in Figure 23 which plots the two variables over time. The figure suggests that during the 1980s and 1990s the estimated party ideology was, on average, more right-wing and the intraparty attitude of youth

wings more critical than in the other decades. While the manifestos published in the 1980s and 1990s, on average, score a value of -0.31 in the party ideology variable, this value is lower (i.e. more left-wing) for the manifestos published in the decades before (-0.85) and after (-1.12). Conversely, the mean intraparty attitude indicator for speeches held before (-0.02) and after (0.01) the 1980s and 1990s is higher than for speeches that were held in these two decades (-1.17). In summary, Model 2 and Figure 23 suggest that, like theoretically expected, youth wings react critical to the ideological moderation of their parent party.




Figure 23. Intraparty attitude of youth wing speakers and ideological position of the SPÖ over time.

Local polynomial regression plot based on Figure 7

Model 3 replaces the party ideology variable included in Model 2 with a transformed version of the variable. The transformed party ideology variable does not indicate the overall ideological position of the SPÖ but rather the change in this position between the last two elections. This variable is included since it seems reasonable to expect that youth wings should not only take into account the overall ideological position of the party but mainly if this position, from their point of view, developed in a positive (i.e. more left-wing) or negative (i.e. more right-wing) direction. For this, the ideological left-right value for the second most recent election manifesto is subtracted from the value for the most recent one. Therefore, positive values indicate a shift towards a more right-wing position while, conversely, negative values mean that the ideological position became more left-wing. Model 3 shows that, contrary to the overall ideological position in Model 2, the ideological shift variable has no significant effect on the

intraparty attitude of youth wing members. The adjusted R^2 is reduced from 0.116 in Model 2 to 0.093 in Model 3, suggesting that less of the variation in the dependent variable can be explained by the latter model.

Model 4 then includes both the time variable and the overall ideological position of the SPÖ as proxy variables for party transformation. This model is estimated to test if a significant time effect can be found when controlling for party ideology and if the negative effect of party ideology stays significant when controlling for time. In this model, both time and ideology do not show a significant effect. The latter might be explained by the fact that there exists a correlation between the two variables (Pearson's $r = -0.37$) which leads to increased uncertainty in the estimations.

While the first four models all differed in their operationalization of party transformation, Model 5 (like Model 2) only includes the party's overall ideological position without time which proved to be the most convincing approach. The difference between these two models, however, is that Model 5 replaces the continuous variable for electoral performance with a binary variable that only indicates if the party decreased its vote share in the last election or not. The rationale behind this step will be explained when discussing the evidence for H1a. In this model, like in Model 2, the variable for party ideology shows a negative effect. The significance of this effect is stronger in Model 5, with the p-value now being below the threshold of 0.05.

In summary, the hypothesis that the intraparty attitude of youth wings has grown more critical over time (H3a) cannot be confirmed based on the estimations of the five models. Time did not show any significant effect in Model 1 and Model 4 where it was included. This conclusion is also congruent with the bivariate analysis in section 6.2.1. Nevertheless, the rationale behind H3a could partly be confirmed. Models 2 and 5 suggested that ideological moderation does indeed strengthen the *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wings. However, as was illustrated in Figure 23, the data suggest that no linear moderation of the SPÖ party ideology took place which might explain the missing evidence for H3a.

Similarly to the conclusion regarding H3a, the hypothesis that worse electoral performance leads to a stronger *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wings (H1a) cannot be confirmed based on the analysis. The continuous electoral performance variable in the Models 1-4 does not show a significant effect. Model 5 includes a binary instead of a continuous variable for electoral performance, indicating if the SPÖ suffered electoral losses in the last election or not. The

rationale behind this step is to test the possibility that it might be primarily important for youth wing members to see if their party loses or gains votes at an election and less important how large these losses or gains actually are. Although this dummy variable does not show a significant effect, it should be mentioned that the adjusted R^2 in this model (0.125) is higher than in Model 2 (0.116) which included the continuous variable for electoral performance but, except for that, did not differ to Model 5. This suggests that more variation in the dependent variable (i.e. the intraparty attitude indicator) can be explained when looking at the electoral performance of the SPÖ from a binary perspective.

Although no model found a significant effect of party performance, it should be mentioned that, in accordance with the theoretical expectations, the coefficients in the first four models are all positive and the coefficient for the electoral loss dummy variable is negative. The latter is also illustrated by plotting the predicted values based on Model 5 in Figure 24. These findings, as well as the results of the bivariate analysis presented in section 6.2.1, provide some indications that electoral performance could have the expected effect on the intraparty attitude of youth wings and that evidence for H1a might potentially be found when including a larger number of cases into the analysis. However, based on the available data and the analysis, H1a cannot be confirmed.




Figure 24. Predicted intraparty attitude indicator for speeches held after electoral loss/no electoral loss and during SPÖ coalition participation/no SPÖ coalition participation

Turning to H2a, the conclusion regarding the hypothesis that coalition government should lead to a stronger *critical intraparty attitude* is inconclusive. While the bivariate analysis showed that the mean intraparty attitude at times of coalition participation is significantly more critical than at times of opposition or SPÖ single-party government, not all OLS models found this effect. While Model 1, Model 3, and Model 4 estimated a significant negative effect of coalition participation (at least at the 10% level), Model 2 and Model 5 did not. The latter two models, however, can be viewed as the more informative ones since they only include the ideological position of the SPÖ as a proxy variable for party transformation which proved to be the most convincing approach. Nevertheless, these two models also estimate that coalition government participation has a negative effect on the intraparty attitude indicator (although this effect fails to reach statistical significance). This negative effect is also illustrated by the predicted values in Figure 24 which are based on Model 5.

Lastly, looking at the control variables, it can be seen that the effects of most of these variables fail to reach statistical significance in all five models (and will therefore not be discussed in detail). Regarding the binary variables for youth wing affiliation, a significant effect was found for being a members of the JG. More precisely, all five models find a positive effect of JG affiliation that is significant at the 10% level. In this context, SJÖ membership serves as the base category since about half of the speeches in the dataset were held by SJÖ speakers (see Figure 10) and the SJÖ can be seen as the main youth wing of the SPÖ with the longest organizational history. This means that the models suggest that speakers of the JG display a weaker *critical intraparty attitude* than SJÖ members. This can be explained by two factors that were already mentioned in section 4.2.2. First, the JG was, especially in the first years after its foundation, strongly dependent on the party leadership (Pelinka, 1984) which is likely to have decreased the willingness of JG members to openly criticize their parent party. Second, the JG represents the interests of an older age group and likely consists of older members than the SJÖ. In section 2.2.2 it was argued that one central reason for the *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wings are generational differences between the party youth and the parent party (with younger party members holding more ideologically extreme views and attitudes). Following this, it seems reasonable that the older JG members are less critical towards the rather moderate party course than the younger members of the SJÖ.

The only other control variables for which significant effects are found regard the time since the last election and the length of the speech. A significant positive effect of the time passed since the last election is found in Model 1 whereby this effect also reaches statistical

significance at the 10% level in the Models 2, 3, and 4. The positive coefficients suggest that speakers display a weaker *critical intraparty attitude* when more time has passed between the party congress and the previous national election. One explanation for this finding could be that the general atmosphere at a congress held shortly after an election is more heated compared to a congress that takes place at a later point in time when the excitement and turbulence of the campaign and the election itself have mostly settled. The speech length variable shows a significant positive effect in the Models 2 and 3 which suggests that speeches containing more words are less critical. Following the considerations of section 5.4.2, this finding could potentially be explained by the fact that shorter speeches require a critical speaker to deliver his or her criticism more sharply and without considering the nuances (and the potential positive aspects) of an action or decision of the party leadership.

6.3 The youth representation function (H1b, H2b, H3b)

6.3.1 Bivariate analysis

This section analyzes the relationship between the share of youth-related sentences (as a measure for youth wing members' focus on the *youth representation function*) and the independent variables from a bivariate perspective. Starting with electoral performance, Figure 25 compares the mean share of youth-related sentences for speeches held at party congresses that followed elections with and without electoral loss. The bar graph, congruent with the expectation of H1b, suggests that electoral loss (i.e. bad electoral performance) leads to youth wings focusing less on the representation of youth-specific issues. The results of a two-tailed t-test reported in the first row of Table 5 shows that this difference in the mean share of youth-related sentences between speeches held after the SPÖ suffered and after it did not suffer electoral losses is statistically significant at the 10% level.




Figure 25. Comparison of the mean share of youth-related sentences between party congresses following elections with and without electoral loss (including 95% confidence intervals)

Table 5. Results of several two-tailed t-tests comparing the mean share of youth-related sentences between different groups

Group 1	Group 2	Group 1		Group 2		Diff.	t	p
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD			
Electoral loss	No electoral loss	0.200	0.290	0.279	0.296	-0.079	1.667	0.097
Coalition gov.	Opposition	0.220	0.293	0.200	0.296	0.020	0.485	0.628
Coalition gov.	Single-p. gov.	0.220	0.293	0.253	0.285	-0.033	-0.504	0.615
Opposition	Single-p. gov.	0.200	0.296	0.253	0.285	-0.054	-0.773	0.441
Coalition gov.	No coalition gov.	0.220	0.293	0.212	0.293	0.008	-0.216	0.830
Before 1980	After 1980	0.320	0.304	0.175	0.278	0.144	-3.445	0.001

Focusing on the second independent variable (coalition government participation), Figure 26 compares the mean share of youth-related sentences during different forms of SPÖ government status. Contrary to the theoretical expectations (H2b), youth organizations do not seem to focus significantly less on youth-specific issues during times of SPÖ coalition government participation than during times of SPÖ single-party government or opposition. This can also be seen in the results of the two-tailed t-tests reported in the rows 2-5 of Table 5. According to these tests, no significant differences in the mean share of youth-related sentences can be found when

comparing speeches held during the three different forms of SPÖ government participation. Furthermore, no significant difference can be detected when comparing speeches held during SPÖ coalition government participation with speeches held during opposition and single-party government combined (see row 5). In summary, the bivariate analysis finds no evidence for the hypothesis that youth wings focus less on the representation of youth-specific issues when their parent party is participating in a coalition government (H2b).




Figure 26. Comparison of the mean share of youth-related sentences during different forms of SPÖ government status (including 95% confidence intervals)

Lastly, looking at the development of the share of youth-related sentences over time, the local polynomial regression plot in Figure 27 illustrates that (in accordance with H3b) there is a time trend towards a smaller share of youth-related sentences in speeches of youth wing members. While a strong decrease in the share of youth-related sentences can be observed in the first 40 years after 1945 (from a youth-specific sentence share of nearly 40% to under 20%), during the 1980s this trend seems to have faded out. Since then, the share of youth-related sentences in speeches of youth wing members has more or less stagnated near the 20% mark. The data even suggest a small increase in the youth relation since the 1980s, whereby this positive trend is so weak that the share of youth-specific sentences stays inside the 95% confidence area for the youth-related sentence share of the 1980s at all times. The decreasing trend of the share of youth-related sentences is also illustrated with the t-test in the last row of Table 5, showing that

speeches held before 1980 include a significantly higher share of youth-related sentences compared to speeches held after 1980.




Figure 27. Scatterplot and local polynomial regression plot (including 95% confidence bands) illustrating the share of youth-related sentences over time

Following the theoretical framework of the thesis (see section 3.1), this decreasing focus on the representation of youth-specific issues over time could be interpreted as the intraparty role of youth wings becoming more challenging in the four decades after 1945 and then staying on that rather challenging level since then. One alternative explanation, however, could be that in the decades after 1945, youth-related problems were more present and urging which led to youth organizations talking more about these issues. Central youth-related problems that frequently appeared in speeches held in the years after the end of World War II, for example, regarded the re-education and politicization of young people that grew up during the National Socialist regime, the high share of youth unemployment, or the general lack of political representation of young people. University-related problems like the lack of student housing, the low number of socialist students, or the continued employment of university staff with National Socialist background were also discussed frequently in the first decades after 1945. As an example for the latter, a passage from the speech of Hugo Pepper (VSSStÖ) held at the party congress of 1949 can be quoted:

“Today’s motion aims at counteracting the development at universities that Nazi professors who were expelled in 1945 are reinstated to their academic chairs. The gentlemen Nadler, Fichtenau [note: two Austrian professors with National Socialist background], and the like introduce, much to the applause of the Nazi students and similar minded, a teaching method that produces a kind of university graduate that we know too well. They are again occupying the administrative, judicial and teaching positions in our republic and act according to the old spirit. This will then result in Jewish and socialist students being violently kicked out of universities again.”

(Hugo Pepper, November 3, 1949. Translation by the author)

It seems possible that after these kinds of youth-related concerns became less salient youth organizations started to increasingly focus on more broad political issues. The level that the share of youth-related sentences reached in the 1980s and stagnated on since then (about 20%) might be a natural limit that youth representatives cannot fall below without delegitimizing their role as the voice of the youth inside their party.

6.3.2 Multivariate analysis

Finally, this section looks at the relationship between youth wings’ focus on the representation of youth-specific issues and the independent variables from a multivariate perspective. For this, five fractional logit models are estimated, using the share of youth-related sentences per speech (as a value between 0 and 1) as the dependent variable. These models are presented in Table 6. Fractional logit models are well-suited to analyze fractional dependent variables, even when many cases take the extreme values 0 or 1 (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). The latter is important since the share of youth-related sentences is a fractional response variable for which over 40% of all cases take the value 0 (as was shown in Figure 6). As explained in section 6.2.2, the standard errors of the coefficients are again clustered at the party congress level since the independent variables do not vary between speeches held at the same congress.

Table 6. Fractional logit regression models (DV: share of youth-related sentences).

Standard errors clustered by party congresses

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Electoral performance (E)	-0.083* (0.042)	-0.058 (0.094)	-0.039 (0.088)	-0.082+ (0.050)	
SPÖ coalition government	-0.399 (0.269)	0.151 (0.318)	0.020 (0.242)	-0.402 (0.380)	-0.379 (0.304)
Time	-0.038*** (0.011)			-0.038** (0.012)	-0.038** (0.014)
JG	0.026 (0.308)	-0.173 (0.305)	-0.177 (0.305)	0.025 (0.306)	0.010 (0.304)
VStStÖ	1.245*** (0.221)	1.198*** (0.242)	1.221*** (0.245)	1.246*** (0.227)	1.202*** (0.230)
VSM/AKS	1.747*** (0.530)	1.652*** (0.489)	1.651*** (0.485)	1.747*** (0.530)	1.699** (0.523)
Gender (female)	0.428 (0.302)	0.205 (0.250)	0.209 (0.253)	0.429 (0.305)	0.433 (0.304)
Mean sentence length (words)	0.007 (0.015)	0.002 (0.017)	0.001 (0.017)	0.007 (0.015)	0.004 (0.016)
Speech length (100 word steps)	0.033 (0.028)	0.052+ (0.028)	0.052+ (0.029)	0.033 (0.028)	0.025 (0.028)
Months since last election (M)	0.080** (0.025)	0.007 (0.019)	0.003 (0.020)	0.080** (0.026)	0.065* (0.030)
Interaction E x M	0.003 (0.003)	0.007 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)
SPÖ left-right position		-0.274 (0.387)		0.007 (0.329)	
Shift in SPÖ left-right position			0.065 (0.153)		
Electoral loss (binary)					0.124 (0.422)
Constant	-1.252+ (0.664)	-2.318** (0.719)	-2.026** (0.634)	-1.245 (0.847)	-1.044+ (0.618)
Observations	229	229	229	229	229
Pseudo R^2	0.100	0.076	0.075	0.100	0.098

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The five fractional logit models, similar to the five OLS models, mainly differ in their approach to explain the development of the share of youth-related sentences over time (with the exception of Model 10). Therefore, this section will start with the analysis of time dynamics (H3b) and, thereby, illustrate the differences between the models. The first fractional logit model (Model 6) is presented in the first column of Table 6. It includes all the independent and control variables as discussed in section 5.3 and 5.4. According to this model, time has a highly significant negative effect on the share of youth-related sentences. In order to facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of the fractional logit coefficients, the average marginal effect (AME) of variables can be calculated. The AME for time (-0.006) indicates that, on average, for each year passed since 1945 the share of youth-related sentences is reduced by about 0.6 percentage points. This finding is congruent with the hypothesis that youth wings focus' on the representation of youth-specific issues grows smaller over time (H3b).

Although a significant negative time effect was found in the first fractional logit model, Model 7 (analogous to the second OLS model) includes the ideological position of the SPÖ instead of time as a proxy variable for party transformation. The creation of the party ideology variable as well as the theoretical considerations behind this alternative operationalization of party transformation were discussed in detail in section 6.2.2. In summary, in the context of the share of youth-related sentences, Model 7 examines if the negative time trend found in Model 6 might be explained by an increased ideological moderation of the parent party which is expected to lead to a stronger *challenging intraparty role* and, thereby, a weaker *youth representation function* of youth organizations. However, contrary to Model 2, Model 7 does not find that party ideology has a significant effect on the dependent variable.

Model 8 (analogous to Model 3) includes the transformed version of the party ideology variable which indicates the change in the ideological position between the last two elections (see section 6.2.2. for details regarding rationale and operationalization). Similar to the ideology variable included in Model 7, the transformed party ideology variable does not have a significant effect on the share of youth-related sentences. Comparing the Pseudo R^2 for Model 6 (0.100), Model 7 (0.076), and Model 8 (0.075) shows that replacing time with either one of the two party ideology variables significantly decreases the explanatory power of the models. Taken together, these findings suggest that, contrary to the analysis of the first dependent variable (i.e. the intraparty attitude indicator), time is a better predictor of the share of youth-related sentences than party ideology. This is also underlined by Model 9 which includes both time and the SPÖ's ideological position and shows that the negative effect of time stays highly

significant when controlling for party ideology. Lastly, this negative time effect is also found in Model 10 which only includes time without a measure for party ideology but (like Model 5) exchanges the continuous variable for electoral performance with a binary one that indicates if the party suffered electoral losses in the last election or not.

Based on these findings as well as on the bivariate analysis, the hypothesis that, over time, youth wings have focused less on the representation of youth-specific issues (H3b) can be confirmed. However, contrary to the theoretical arguments (see section 3.4), this decreasing focus on youth representation cannot be explained by the ideological moderation of the parent party. One alternative explanation that was already discussed in detail in section 6.3.1 might be that after the end of World War II youth-specific problems (like the re-education of young people that grew up during the National Socialist regime, youth unemployment, or severe university-related problems) were more salient and the youth organizations were forced to focus on these issues more strongly than in the decades after.

Moving on to the influence of electoral performance, the hypothesis that worse election results lead to youth wings focusing less on the representation of youth-specific issues (H1b) cannot be confirmed. Although the bivariate analysis suggested that speeches held after electoral loss (i.e. negative electoral performance) contain a lower share of youth-related sentences, this effect was not found in the fractional logit models. On the contrary, Model 6 even estimates a significant negative effect of electoral performance which would suggest that worse electoral performance leads to a stronger focus on youth-specific issues. This negative effect is also found in Model 9 where it reaches significance at the 10% level. The contradicting results between the bivariate and multivariate analysis could be explained by the fact that electoral performance correlates with time (Pearson's $r = -0.46$) which Model 6, Model 9, and Model 10 control for.

Model 10 includes the binary version of the variable for electoral performance which indicates if the party lost part of its vote share in the previous election or not. Like mentioned in section 6.2.2, the rationale behind this step is that youth wings might primarily want to see if their party loses or gains votes at an election but care less about the actual magnitude of these losses or gains. However, Model 10 finds no significant effect of this dummy variable. This is also illustrated by Figure 28 which plots the predicted values based on Model 10 and shows that there exists only a small difference in the predicted share of youth-related sentences after electoral loss and after no electoral loss.




Figure 28. Predicted share of youth-related sentences for speeches held after

electoral loss/no electoral loss and during SPÖ coalition participation/no SPÖ coalition participation

Similarly, no evidence was found for a negative effect of coalition government participation on the share of youth-related sentences in youth wing speeches (H2b). The expected effect of coalition participation was neither found in the bivariate analysis nor in any of the five fractional logit models. In this context, it should be mentioned that a negative (although not significant) effect was estimated in the Models 6, 9, and 10 which proved to be the models with the strongest explanatory power. The predicted values in Figure 28 illustrate that, based on Model 10, the share of youth-related sentences is predicted to be about five percentage points lower at times of SPÖ coalition government participation than at times when the SPÖ was not part of a coalition. Nevertheless, based on the bivariate and multivariate analysis, H2b cannot be confirmed. With this conclusion, the empirical evidence on all six hypotheses has been discussed. An overview of all hypotheses and the corresponding conclusions regarding their confirmation or non-confirmation is provided in Table 7.

Table 7. Overview of the hypotheses and conclusions

Hypothesis	Content	Conclusion
H1a	Worse electoral performance → more critical intraparty attitude	Not confirmed
H1b	Worse electoral performance → less focus on youth representation	Not confirmed
H2a	Coalition participation → more critical intraparty attitude	Inconclusive
H2b	Coalition participation → less focus on youth representation	Not confirmed
H3a	Over time → more critical intraparty attitude	Not confirmed
H3b	Over time → less focus on youth representation	Confirmed

As a last step, the control variables included in the fractional logit models are discussed. Most of them do not show a statistically significant effect on the share of youth-related sentences and will therefore not be analyzed further. Affiliation with youth organizations that focus specifically on school students (VSM or AKS) or university students (VSStÖ) has a highly significant positive effect on the youth focus of speeches. In this context, analogous to the OLS models, affiliation with the SJÖ serves as the base category. The positive effect of the binary variables for VSM/AKS and VSStÖ affiliation is found in all five models. As discussed in section 6.1, this can partly be explained by the fact that these organizations have a more narrow focus on school- and university-specific (i.e. youth-specific) issues and participate in school and university body elections which also increases the pressure to talk about issues that are important to their electorate.

A positive effect that is significant at the 10% level was also found for speech length in the Models 7 and 8. This suggests that speeches with more words, on average, contain a higher share of youth-related sentences. Furthermore, Models 6, 9, and 10 suggest that youth wing members talk more about youth-related issues when more months have passed between the party congress and the last election. A similar effect was found in section 6.2 where it was shown that youth wing speakers are less critical towards their parent party, the longer ago the last election took place. Taken together, these results suggest that members of youth organizations display a less *challenging intraparty role* (i.e. a weaker *critical intraparty attitude* and a stronger *youth representation function*) at party congresses that take place longer after the last election.

7 Discussion and Conclusion

This thesis contributes to the scarce research on political youth wings by examining their intraparty role and how this role is influenced by party performance. Thereby, the thesis focuses on two central aspects of the intraparty role of political youth wings: their *critical intraparty attitude* and their *youth representation function*. The former describes that youth factions often take critical stances towards the party leadership and the official party course (Krabbe, 2001; Lamb, 2002; Layton-Henry, 1976) while the latter means that many youth organizations act as the intraparty voice of the youth by representing youth-specific issues and opinions inside and outside their party (Hülksen, 2023; Janušauskienė, 2002; Roon, 2022). Both the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* were operationalized with data on speeches held by youth wing members at party congresses of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) between 1945 and 2021. For this, a sentence-by-sentence coding scheme was developed. Regarding party performance, two aspects were considered in the thesis: the party's performance in the last election and the form of government participation (i.e. if the party is in opposition, participates in a coalition government, or rules in a single-party government).

The analysis found hardly any evidence for the overall expectation that party performance influences the intraparty role of youth wings. While the bivariate analysis suggested that poor electoral performance might lead to youth wings being more critical towards their own party (as expected in H1a) and focusing less on the representation of youth-specific issues (as expected in H1b), the multivariate analysis did not find these effects when controlling for other variables. Regarding office performance, it was theoretically expected that coalition government participation should lead to youth wings displaying a weaker *youth representation function* (H2b) but neither part of the analysis found any evidence for this hypothesis. On the other hand (in accordance with H2a), the bivariate analysis as well as three out of five models in the multivariate analysis found that participation in a coalition government leads to a stronger *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wings. However, since the two most convincing models did not find this effect, the conclusion regarding H2a is inconclusive.

Besides the effect of party performance, this thesis also analyzed the long-term development of the intraparty role of youth wings. In this context, it was expected that, over time, youth wings should have grown more critical towards their parent party (H3a) and less focused on the representation of youth-specific issues (H3b). While no linear time trend towards a stronger *critical intraparty attitude* was found, both the bivariate and the multivariate analysis showed

that the SPÖ youth organizations have indeed been focusing less on their *youth representation function* over time. More precisely, the analysis suggested that their focus on youth-specific topics grew increasingly smaller in the first four decades after World War II and has stayed on a comparably low level since then. Although no evidence for H3a was found, the analysis showed that one underlying expectation of the hypothesis could be confirmed: Speakers of youth factions were more critical towards their own party when the ideological party position (expressed in the most recent party manifesto) was more moderate. A significant effect of party ideology on the *youth representation function*, on the other hand, was not found.

After discussing the main findings of the thesis, some final conclusions regarding the theoretical perspective on youth wings and the empirical approach can be drawn. First, the analysis did not find strong evidence for one of the central theoretical arguments, namely the connection between the *youth representation function* and the *critical intraparty attitude*. In the theoretical framework of the thesis, it was argued that these two concepts are both aspects of the *challenging intraparty role* which describes the willingness of youth wings to enter into conflict with their parent party. More precisely, it was argued that youth wings with a strong *challenging intraparty role* should display a strong *critical intraparty attitude* and a weak *youth representation function* (see section 3.1 for detailed rationale).

Although the analysis in section 6.1 found the expected correlation between the latter two aspects, the relationship was rather weak. This was also illustrated by the long-term developments of the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* which did not follow similar time trends. Similarly, while party ideology showed to have a significant effect on the *critical intraparty attitude* of youth wings, it did not influence their *youth representation function*, suggesting that these two aspects are driven by different factors. The expectation that a strong *challenging intraparty role* leads to weak youth representation was based on the literature on party strataarchy (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1964). More precisely, it was argued that the party leadership expects youth wings to focus on their designated youth-specific area of expertise (i.e. to display a strong *youth representation function*) and that, by not doing so, the party youth acts challenging towards its parent party. Based on the weak link between the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function*, it can be concluded that a lack of youth representation should not necessarily be viewed as a form of rebellious or challenging behavior of youth wings towards their own party. Other factors, like a low salience of youth-specific topics, could be superior explanations.

Second, the analysis supported the theoretical view on the intraparty role of youth wings as a dynamic concept influenced by different factors. Previous scholars have mostly looked at the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* from a more descriptive case study perspective without analyzing potential drivers for these aspects. This approach could lead to the impression that the intraparty role of youth wings is a rather static concept which is independent from other aspects and stable over time. The analysis of this thesis, however, showed that both the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* are influenced by other variables and that certain long-term changes can be observed. By analyzing the effects of party performance, the thesis is one of the first studies to consider how youth wings' intraparty role is influenced by other factors. Although the analysis did not find clear evidence for the effect of party performance on the *critical intraparty attitude* or the *youth representation function*, it was clearly shown that other variables do have a significant effect. This suggests that the analysis supports the theoretical view on the intraparty role of youth wings as a dynamic concept.

Third, focusing on the effects of party performance on the intraparty role of youth factions, it should be noted that, although none of the hypotheses could be confirmed, the analysis showed that most of the theoretical expectations could not clearly be rejected either. On the contrary, the findings suggest that some of the expected effects might exist but could not be confirmed in the analysis due to the limited statistical power of the models. For example, the bivariate analysis found that youth organizations display a stronger *critical intraparty attitude* when their parent party lost votes in the last election (congruent with H1a) and when the party participates in a coalition government (congruent with H2a). In the multivariate analysis, the coefficients in all five OLS models indicated these effects but most of them failed to reach statistical significance. Following this, future research might find evidence for these hypotheses when including a higher number of cases in the analysis. The speech coding process used in this thesis was very time-intensive which only allowed to include a limited number of speeches ($n = 229$). However, scholars could find alternative, less time-consuming ways to operationalize the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function* (e.g. with automated text analysis) and thereby increase the number of observations and the statistical power of the models, potentially finding evidence or new insights regarding the effects of party performance on the intraparty role of youth wings.

Fourth, there seem to be systematic differences between different kinds of youth wings which indicate that the theoretical considerations might not be applicable to all party youth

organizations to the same degree. Most importantly, the bivariate and multivariate analysis showed that clientele-specific youth factions (i.e. the ones focusing specifically on school and university students) displayed a significantly stronger *youth representation function* than the more general youth wings. This was explained with the higher pressure for clientele-specific organizations to focus on the school- and university-specific (and thereby youth-related) interests of their target audience. Also, the bivariate analysis in section 6.1 suggested that the clientele-specific youth wings displayed a stronger *critical intraparty attitude*, although this effect did not reach statistical significance in the multivariate analysis. While the theoretical framework of this thesis did not consider potential differences between different types of party youth organizations, future research could include such distinctions theoretically and analyze them empirically.

Lastly, it should be noted that one central limitation of this thesis is that it only includes two of the three aspects of youth wings' intraparty role identified in the literature review (see chapter 2). More precisely, while the thesis focused on the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function*, it did not consider the *recruitment and steppingstone function* in depth in the theoretical or analytical sections. The *recruitment and steppingstone function* summarizes that youth wings play an important role in the recruitment and training of future politicians and that they foster the political careers of their members (Davies, 2020; Gruber, 2009; Hooghe et al., 2004). One central reason why this aspect was not included as a dependent variable in the analysis was that it could not be operationalized with the same party congress speech data as the *critical intraparty attitude* and the *youth representation function*.

This limitation, however, presents itself as an important avenue for future research. As was mentioned in the introduction, by recruiting young people and fostering their political careers, youth wings can help to increase the descriptive political representation of younger generations. By including all three aspects of youth wings' intraparty role and analyzing the interplay between the *recruitment and steppingstone function*, the *critical intraparty attitude*, and the *youth representation function*, future research could provide new insights into how youth wings help bridge the gap between young people and the political system. In this context, the present thesis might serve as a starting point, providing new theoretical and empirical insights into the dynamics of the intraparty role of youth wings and the relation between different aspects of this intraparty role.

References

- Albert, M., Quenzel, G., Hurrelmann, K., Schneekloth, U., Leven, I., & Wolfert, S. (2020). *Shell Jugendstudie 2019 (Kumulation 2002, 2006, 2010, 2015, 2019)* (Version 1.0.0) [Dataset]. GESIS Data Archive. <https://doi.org/10.7802/2106>
- Ammassari, S., McDonnell, D., & Valbruzzi, M. (2023). It's about the type of career: The political ambition gender gap among youth wing members. *European Journal of Political Research*, 62(4), 1054–1077. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12560>
- Andrews, J. T., & Jackman, R. W. (2008). If Winning Isn't Everything, Why Do They Keep Score? Consequences of Electoral Performance for Party Leaders. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(4), 657–675. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340800032X>
- ANU Reporter. (2024, March 5). *Young people passionate about political action, but forging new pathways to change*. <https://reporter.anu.edu.au/all-stories/young-people-passionate-about-political-action-but-forging-new-pathways-to-change>
- Atkeson, L. R., & Rapoport, R. B. (2003). The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 67(4), 495–521. <https://doi.org/10.1086/378961>
- Austrian Federal Chancellery. (n.d.). *Regierungen seit 1945*. Retrieved October 24, 2024, from <https://www.bundestkanzleramt.gv.at/bundestkanzleramt/geschichte/regierungen-seit-1945.html>
- Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior. (n.d.). *Historischer Rückblick*. Retrieved October 21, 2024, from https://www.bmi.gv.at/412/nationalratswahlen/historischer_rueckblick.aspx
- Austrian Parliament. (n.d.). *Überholte Regeln für Nationalratswahlen*. Retrieved October 10, 2024, from <https://www.parlament.gv.at/verstehen/historisches/wahlen/ueberholte-regeln>
- Bauer, M., Miloradovic, M., Lindner, P., Herr, J., & Pay, S. (2014). *120 Jahre Sozialistische Jugend*. Sozialistische Jugend Österreich. https://issuu.com/sjoe.at/docs/120_sj_broschuere_neu_rgb

- Bawn, K., & Somer-Topcu, Z. (2012). Government versus Opposition at the Polls: How Governing Status Affects the Impact of Policy Positions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(2), 433–446. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00563.x>
- Bolleyer, N. (2012). New party organization in Western Europe: Of party hierarchies, stratar-
chies and federations. *Party Politics*, 18(3), 315–336.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810382939>
- Boucek, F. (2009). Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three
Faces of Factionalism. *Party Politics*, 15(4), 455–485.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068809334553>
- Budge, I. (2013). *The standard left-right scale*. [https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/download/
papers/budge_right-left-scale.pdf](https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/download/papers/budge_right-left-scale.pdf)
- Carty, R. K. (2004). Parties as Franchise Systems: The Stratarchical Organizational Imperative.
Party Politics, 10(1), 5–24. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068804039118>
- Celis, K. (2006). Substantive Representation of Women: The Representation of Women's In-
terests and the Impact of Descriptive Representation in the Belgian Parliament (1900–
1979). *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 28(2), 85–114.
https://doi.org/10.1300/J501v28n02_04
- Ceron, A., & Greene, Z. (2019). Verba volant, scripta manent? Intra-party politics, party con-
ferences, and issue salience in France. *Party Politics*, 25(5), 701–711.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068819836034>
- Cotta, M. (2000). Defining Party and Government. In J. Blondel & M. Cotta (Eds.), *The Nature
of Party Government* (pp. 56–95). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333977330_4
- Cross, W. (2018). Understanding Power-Sharing within Political Parties: Stratarchy as Mutual
Interdependence between the Party in the Centre and the Party on the Ground. *Govern-
ment and Opposition*, 53(2), 205–230. <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.22>
- Cross, W., & Young, L. (2008). Factors Influencing the Decision of the Young Politically En-
gaged To Join a Political Party: An Investigation of the Canadian Case. *Party Politics*,
14(3), 345–369. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068807088126>

- Dalton, R. J., Farrell, D. M., & McAllister, I. (2011). *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy*. Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199599356.001.0001>
- Davies, L. J. (2020). *The role of youth and student wings in shaping Social Democratic Parliamentarians in Germany and Great Britain* [PhD, Aston University].
<https://publications.aston.ac.uk/id/eprint/42466/>
- Diekman, A. B., & Schneider, M. C. (2010). A Social Role Theory Perspective on Gender Gaps in Political Attitudes. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 34(4), 486–497.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2010.01598.x>
- Duverger, M. (1954). *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. Methuen.
- Eldersveld, S. J. (1964). *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis*. Rand McNally.
- Enns-Jedenastik, L., & Müller, W. C. (2015). Intra-party democracy, political performance and the survival of party leaders: Austria, 1945–2011. *Party Politics*, 21(6), 930–943.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813509517>
- Götschhofer, C. (2024). *Die Geschichte der Aktion kritischer Schüler_innen (AKS)* [MA thesis, University of Vienna]. <https://theses.univie.ac.at/detail/70651>
- Greene, Z., & Haber, M. (2015). The consequences of appearing divided: An analysis of party evaluations and vote choice. *Electoral Studies*, 37, 15–27.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.11.002>
- Greene, Z., & Haber, M. (2016). Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(3), 611–632.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000283>
- Gruber, A. K. (2009). *Der Weg nach ganz oben: Strukturmuster politischer Karriereverläufe*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91802-0_5
- Heilingsetzer, A., Mesner, M., Rögl, H., & Weber, F. (1989). *Zur Geschichte des Verbandes Sozialistischer Studenten Österreichs (VSSTÖ): 1945—1970*. Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Forschung.

- Holtmann, E. (1996). Die Organisation der Sozialdemokratie in der Ersten Republik, 1918–1934. In W. Maderthaner & W. C. Müller (Eds.), *Die Organisation der Österreichischen Sozialdemokratie 1889—1995* (pp. 93–168). Löcker.
- Hooghe, M., Stolle, D., & Stouthuysen, P. (2004). Head Start in Politics: The Recruitment Function of Youth Organizations of Political Parties in Belgium (Flanders). *Party Politics*, 10(2), 193–212. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068804040503>
- Hülsken, C. (2023). *Zwischen Sozialisation und Selektion: Die Rolle der Parteijugend bei der Rekrutierung von Berufspolitikern in Deutschland*. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40390-4>
- Imre, M., Krauss, S., & Meyer, T. M. (2022). Regierung und Regierungsbildung. In K. Praprotnik & F. Perlot (Eds.), *Das Politische System Österreichs* (1st ed., pp. 187–212). Böhlau Verlag. <https://doi.org/10.7767/9783205215950.187>
- Janušauskienė, D. (2002). Youth Political Organizations in Lithuania. *Polish Sociological Review*, 139, 337–356. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41274827>
- Janušauskienė, D. (2011). *Post-Communist Democratisation in Lithuania: Elites, Parties, and Youth Political Organisations. 1988-2001*. Rodopi.
- Jennings, M. K., & Niemi, R. G. (1981). *Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents*. Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400854264>
- Kaltenegger, M., Heugl, K., & Müller, W. C. (2021). Appeasement and rewards: Explaining patterns of party responsiveness towards activist preferences. *Party Politics*, 27(2), 363–375. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068819854205>
- Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. *Party Politics*, 1(1), 5–28. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068895001001001>
- Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (2009). The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement. *Perspectives on Politics*, 7(4), 753–766. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709991782>
- Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (2018). *Democracy and the cartelization of political parties* (1st ed.). Oxford University Press; ECPR.

- Keller, F. (1988). Die Opposition der Pimpfe. Die vom Parteitag beaufsichtigten Jugendorganisationen. In P. Pelinka & G. Steger (Eds.), *Auf dem Weg zur Staatspartei: Zu Geschichte und Politik der SPÖ seit 1945* (pp. 153–164). Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik.
- Kimberlee, R. H. (2002). Why Don't British Young People Vote at General Elections? *Journal of Youth Studies*, 5(1), 85–98. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676260120111788>
- Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems. In J. La Palombara & M. Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development* (pp. 177–200). Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400875337-007>
- Kittilson, M. C. (2008). Representing Women: The Adoption of Family Leave in Comparative Perspective. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(2), 323–334. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002238160808033X>
- Klingelhöfer, T., & Müller, J. (2024). When do voters perceive intra-party conflict? A democratic life cycle perspective. *European Political Science Review*, 16(2), 207–224. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773923000243>
- Kölln, A.-K. (2016). Party membership in Europe: Testing party-level explanations of decline. *Party Politics*, 22(4), 465–477. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068814550432>
- Korom, P. (2022). *Half a Century of Little Change within the Austrian Legislative Elite. A Prosopographical Study of ÖVP and SPÖ Members of Parliament (1945-2019)*. <https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.6389997>
- Krabbe, W. R. (2001). “Rekrutendepot” oder politische Alternative? Funktion und Selbstverständnis der Partei-Jugendverbände. *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft*, 27(2), 274–307. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40186027>
- Kurz, K. R., & Ettensperger, F. (2023). Exploring the conditions for youth representation: A qualitative comparative analysis of party parliamentary groups. *European Political Science*, 23, 49–397. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-023-00460-7>
- Lamb, M. (2002). *Young conservatives, young socialists and the great youth abstention: Youth participation and non-participation in political parties* [PhD, University of Birmingham]. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/1764427945?parentSessionId=j26QsB9Bd3cyRwazTZD8LAjmw56r1i7T38zRzdUykw%3D&pq-origsite=primo&>
- Lawson, K. (Ed.). (1980). *Political parties and linkage: A comparative perspective*. Yale University Press.

- Layton-Henry, Z. (1976). Labour's Lost Youth. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11(2/3), 275–308. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/260261>
- Lehmann, P., Franzmann, S., Al-Gaddooa, D., Burst, T., Ivanusch, C., Regel, S., Riethmüller, F., Volkens, A., Weßels, B., & Zehnter, L. (2024). *Manifesto Project Dataset* (Version 2024a) [Dataset]. Manifesto Project. <https://doi.org/10.25522/MANIFESTO.MPDS.2024A>
- Lehrer, R., & Lin, N. (2020). Everything to everyone? Not when you are internally divided. *Party Politics*, 26(6), 783–794. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068818812222>
- Lin, N., & Osnabrügge, M. (2018). Making comprehensible speeches when your constituents need it. *Research & Politics*, 5(3). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018795598>
- Lorenzini, J., Monsch, G.-A., & Rosset, J. (2021). Challenging Climate Strikers' Youthfulness: The Evolution of the Generational Gap in Environmental Attitudes Since 1999. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 3. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.633563>
- Lowande, K., Ritchie, M., & Lauterbach, E. (2019). Descriptive and Substantive Representation in Congress: Evidence from 80,000 Congressional Inquiries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(3), 644–659. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12443>
- Lowe, W., Benoit, K., Mikhaylov, S., & Laver, M. (2011). Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 36(1), 123–155. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00006.x>
- Maderthaner, W. (1996). Die Entstehung einer demokratischen Massenpartei: Sozialdemokratische Organisation von 1889 bis 1918. In W. Maderthaner & W. C. Müller (Eds.), *Die Organisation der Österreichischen Sozialdemokratie 1889—1995* (pp. 21–92). Löcker.
- Mayerhofer, M., & Leibetseder. (2023, March 21). *140.000 Senior:innen stimmen über die Zukunft der SPÖ ab*. <https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/140000-seniorinnen-stimmen-ueber-die-zukunft-der-spoe-ab/402373065>
- McDonnell, D., Ammassari, S., Valbruzzi, M., Bolin, N., Werner, A., Heinisch, R., Jungar, A.-C., & Wegscheider, C. (2024). Inside party youth wings: The YOUMEM project. *Party Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688241310349>
- McDonnell, D., Ammassari, S., Werner, A., Bolin, N., Valbruzzi, M., Lopes, H. F., Heinisch, R., Jungar, A., & Wegscheider, C. (2025). Young radicals, moderates and aligned:

- Ideological congruence and incongruence in party youth wings. *European Journal of Political Research*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.70000>
- McNamara, P. (2024, June 21). *Young people feel politicians do not listen or care about them, says survey* [News report by Channel 4]. <https://www.channel4.com/news/young-people-feel-politicians-do-not-listen-or-care-about-them-says-survey>
- Müller, W. C. (1996). Die Organisation der SPÖ, 1945—1995. In W. Maderthaner & W. C. Müller (Eds.), *Die Organisation der Österreichischen Sozialdemokratie 1889—1995* (pp. 195–356). Löcker.
- Müller, W. C. (1999). Decision for Opposition: The Austrian Socialist Party's Abandonment of Government Participation in 1966. In W. C. Müller & K. Strøm (Eds.), *Policy, Office, or Votes?* (1st ed., pp. 172–191). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625695.007>
- Müller, W. C., Kaltenegger, M., & Schüberl, T. (forthcoming). *Party Congresses in Austria* [Dataset].
- Müller, W. C., & Strøm, K. (1999). Conclusions: Party Behavior and Representative Democracy. In W. C. Müller & K. Strøm (Eds.), *Policy, Office, or Votes?* (1st ed., pp. 279–310). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625695.012>
- Mycock, A., & Tonge, J. (2012). The Party Politics of Youth Citizenship and Democratic Engagement. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 65(1), 138–161. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsr053>
- Ohmura, T., Bailer, S., Meißner, P., & Selb, P. (2018). Party animals, career changers and other pathways into parliament. *West European Politics*, 41(1), 169–195. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1323485>
- Panebianco, A. (1988). *Political parties: Organization and power*. Cambridge University Press.
- Papke, L. E., & Wooldridge, J. M. (1996). Econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, 11(6), 619–632. [https://doi.org/10.1002/\(SICI\)1099-1255\(199611\)11:6<619::AID-JAE418>3.0.CO;2-1](https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1255(199611)11:6<619::AID-JAE418>3.0.CO;2-1)
- Pelinka, P. (1984). *Die Geschichte der Sozialistischen Jugend: 90 Jahre SJÖ 1894-1984*. Sozialistische Jugend Österreich.

- Pelinka, P. (1988). Quadratur des Kreises. Die Große Koalition II. In P. Pelinka & G. Steger (Eds.), *Auf dem Weg zur Staatspartei: Zu Geschichte und Politik der SPÖ seit 1945* (pp. 95–107). Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik.
- Pelinka, P. (2005). *Eine kurze Geschichte der SPÖ: Ereignisse, Persönlichkeiten, Jahreszahlen*. Ueberreuter.
- Pickard, S. (2015). Trying to Turn up the Turnout: Youth Wings and the Youth Vote in the 2015 General Election. *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique. French Journal of British Studies*, 20(3), Article 3. <https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.503>
- Pratto, F., Stallworth, L. M., & Sidanius, J. (1997). The gender gap: Differences in political attitudes and social dominance orientation. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 36(1), 49–68. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1997.tb01118.x>
- Roon, C. J. de. (2022). *The functioning of Dutch party youth wings: A comparison of the 1980s and 2010s* [PhD, Leiden University]. <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3480135>
- Sapetschnig, C. (2018). *60 Jahre Junge Generation: Die Festschrift*. Junge Generation in der SPÖ.
- Scarrow, S. E., & Gezgor, B. (2010). Declining memberships, changing members? European political party members in a new era. *Party Politics*, 16(6), 823–843. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068809346078>
- Schneider, N. (2022). *Beteiligungsmotive von Umweltaktivist*innen in Österreich an den Fallbeispielen Besetzung der Hainburger Au 1984 und Fridays for Future Austria* [MA thesis, University of Vienna]. <https://theses.univie.ac.at/detail/63552>
- Schumacher, G., Hansen, D., Van Der Velden, M. A. C. G., & Kunst, S. (2019). A new dataset of Dutch and Danish party congress speeches. *Research & Politics*, 6(2). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168019838352>
- Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294–308. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077>
- Sobolewska, M., McKee, R., & Campbell, R. (2018). Explaining motivation to represent: How does descriptive representation lead to substantive representation of racial and ethnic minorities? *West European Politics*, 41(6), 1237–1261. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1455408>

- Somer-Topcu, Z. (2009). Timely Decisions: The Effects of Past National Elections on Party Policy Change. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(1), 238–248. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608090154>
- Spirling, A. (2016). Democratization and Linguistic Complexity: The Effect of Franchise Extension on Parliamentary Discourse, 1832–1915. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(1), 120–136. <https://doi.org/10.1086/683612>
- SPÖ Federal Party. (2023). *Das neue Organisationsstatut. In der Fassung nach dem 46. Ordentlichen Bundesparteitag 11. - 12. November 2023, Messe Graz*. https://www.spoe.at/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/SPOE_Statut2023.pdf
- Stockemer, D., & Sundstrom, A. (2022). *Youth without Representation: The Absence of Young Adults in Parliaments, Cabinets, and Candidacies*. University of Michigan Press. <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11459940>
- Strøm, K. (1990). A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(2), 565–598. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111461>
- Strøm, K., & Müller, W. C. (1999). Political Parties and Hard Choices. In W. C. Müller & K. Strøm (Eds.), *Policy, Office, or Votes?* (1st ed., pp. 1–35). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625695.001>
- Svoboda, W. (1986). *Revolte und Establishment: Die Geschichte des Verbandes Sozialistischer Mittelschüler, 1953-1973*. H. Böhlau.
- Thiery, W., Lange, S., Rogelj, J., Schleussner, C.-F., Gudmundsson, L., Seneviratne, S. I., Andrijevic, M., Frieler, K., Emanuel, K., & Geiger, T. (2021). Intergenerational inequities in exposure to climate extremes. *Science*, 374(6564), 158–160. <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abi7339>
- Tilley, J. R. (2005). Research note: Libertarian-authoritarian value change in Britain, 1974–2001. *Political Studies*, 53(2), 442–453. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00537.x>
- UNICEF USA. (2024, August 14). *Are We on Mute? Youth Speak Out in New UNICEF USA/Harris Survey*. <https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/are-we-mute-youth-speak-out-new-unicef-usaharris-survey>

- Van Biezen, I., Mair, P., & Poguntke, T. (2012). Going, going, . . . gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 51(1), 24–56. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01995.x>
- Van Der Brug, W., & Kritzinger, S. (2012). Generational differences in electoral behaviour. *Electoral Studies*, 31(2), 245–249. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.11.005>
- van Haute, E., & Paulis, E. (2016). *MAPP Dataset* [Dataset]. Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.61234>
- Volgens, A., Burst, T., Krause, W., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S., Weßels, B., & Zehnter, L. (2020). *The Manifesto Project Dataset—Codebook* (Version 2020a). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/download/data/2020a/codebooks/codebook_MPDataset_MPDS2020a.pdf
- Wagner, M., Johann, D., & Kritzinger, S. (2012). Voting at 16: Turnout and the quality of vote choice. *Electoral Studies*, 31(2), 372–383. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2012.01.007>
- Weber, R. (2017). *Young people in old politics. Motivation, experiences and future perspectives of young members in the professionalised party organisation* [PhD, University Duisburg-Essen]. <https://d-nb.info/113964064X/34>
- Whiteley, P. F. (2011). Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world. *Party Politics*, 17(1), 21–44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810365505>
- Zariski, R. (1960). Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 4(1), 27–51. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2108754>

Appendix

A1 Overview of the included party congresses

Table A1. Summary of key facts regarding the included party congresses

Start date	Duration (days)	Location	N speeches	N youth speeches	% youth speeches	Date last election
1945-12-14	2	Vienna	64	3	4.69	1945-11-25
1949-11-02	2	Vienna	80	11	13.75	1949-10-09
1953-11-04	4	Vienna	100	6	6.00	1953-02-22
1956-11-26	3	Vienna	43	3	6.98	1956-05-13
1959-11-10	4	Vienna	68	4	5.88	1959-05-10
1963-06-06	3	Vienna	49	4	8.16	1962-11-18
1966-04-15	1	Vienna	55	2	3.64	1966-03-06
1967-01-30	3	Vienna	78	9	11.54	1966-03-06
1970-06-11	2	Vienna	33	2	6.06	1970-03-01
1972-04-16	4	Villach	72	6	8.33	1971-10-10
1976-03-11	3	Vienna	63	9	14.29	1975-10-05
1979-11-15	3	Vienna	42	6	14.29	1979-05-06
1983-10-27	3	Vienna	60	10	16.67	1983-04-24
1987-10-27	3	Vienna	124	24	19.35	1986-11-23
1991-06-14	2	Linz	112	23	20.54	1990-10-07
1995-10-02	3	Vienna	139	8	5.76	1994-10-09
1997-04-09	1	Linz	43	4	9.30	1995-12-17
2000-04-28	2	Vienna	64	20	31.25	1999-10-03
2004-11-29	2	Vienna	82	4	4.88	2002-11-24
2008-08-08	1	Linz	28	5	17.86	2006-10-01
2010-06-12	1	Vösendorf	74	19	25.68	2008-09-28
2018-11-24	2	Wels	124	23	18.55	2017-10-17
2021-06-26	1	Vienna	109	24	22.02	2019-09-29

A2 Coding scheme (German)

1 Vorbereitung

Alle Reden, welche Delegierte der SPÖ-Jugendorganisationen Sozialistische Jugend (SJÖ), Junge Generation in der SPÖ (JG), Verband Sozialistischer Student_innen in Österreich (VSStÖ), Verband Sozialistischer Mittelschüler (VSM) und Aktion Kritischer Schüler_innen (AKS) auf einem Parteitag halten, werden in einzelne Sätze zerlegt. Für jeden Parteitag wird ein eigenes Excel-Sheet erstellt, in welches diese Sätze eingefügt werden und die Codierung durchgeführt wird. Dabei wird für jeden einzelnen Satz eine Tabellenzeile verwendet.

Folgende Variablen werden vor der eigentlichen Codierung des Textmaterials für jeden Satz erfasst:

- Spalte A („date“)
 - *Das Datum der Rede, in welcher der Satz enthalten ist*
- Spalte B („year“)
 - *Das Jahr, in welchem der Parteitag stattgefunden hat*
- Spalte C („name“)
 - *Der Name des/der Redners/Rednerin im Format „Nachname, Vorname“*
- Spalte D („gender“)
 - *Das Geschlecht des/der Redners/Rednerin (0 = männlich, 1 = weiblich)*
- Spalte E („youth organization“)
 - *Die Jugendorganisation, welcher der/die Redner*in angehört (Ausprägungen: „SJ“, „JG“, „VSSTÖ“, „AKS“). Für Reden von VSM-Mitgliedern wird ebenfalls „AKS“ codiert.*
- Spalte F („document“)
 - *Die Benennung des Word-Dokuments, in welchem die Rede gespeichert ist*
- Spalte G („speech number“)
 - *Information darüber, in der wievielten Rede eines/einer Redners/Rednerin auf dem jeweiligen Parteitag der Satz gefallen ist (hält eine Person z.B. nur eine Rede, nehmen dementsprechend alle Sätze den Wert 1 an)*

- Spalte H („sentence number“)
 - *Die Sätze jeder Rede werden in aufsteigender Reihenfolge nummeriert (beginnend mit 1, 2, 3, ...). Hält eine Person mehr als eine Rede auf einem Parteitag, beginnt die Nummerierung bei jeder Rede von Neuem.*
- Spalte I („word count“)
 - *Anzahl der Wörter des Satzes (wird automatisch mithilfe von Formel eingefügt)*
- Spalte J („text“)
 - *Der Wortlaut des Satzes*

2 Codierung von Kritik und Unterstützung

Für jeden Satz wird erfasst, ob dieser Kritik oder Unterstützung in Richtung der Mutterpartei bzw. deren Parteiführung ausdrückt. Hierfür wird in Spalte K („criticism“) für jeden Satz „0“ (enthält keine Kritik) oder „1“ (enthält Kritik) eingetragen. In Spalte L („support“) wird in analoger Weise erfasst, ob der Satz unterstützende Elemente enthält oder nicht. Es ist möglich, dass ein Satz sowohl unterstützende als auch kritische Elemente enthält.

2.1 Wann liegt Kritik oder Unterstützung vor?

Konkret wird für die beiden Variablen der Wert „1“ codiert, wenn ein Satz Kritik oder Widerspruch (Spalte K) bzw. Lob, Zustimmung oder Unterstützung (Spalte L) enthält für:

a) Verhaltensweisen und Aussagen von Mitgliedern der Parteilite

Folgende Personen werden als Vertreter*innen der Parteilite gewertet:

- Bundesparteivorsitzende*r + Stellvertreter*innen
- Bundesgeschäftsführer*in (bzw. Zentralsekretär*in)
- NR-Abgeordnete
- Europaabgeordnete
- Landesparteivorsitzende
- Vorsitzende der Vorfeldorganisationen und Referate (mit Ausnahme der Jugendorganisationen selbst)
- SPÖ-Regierungsmitglieder

Neben diesen Personen gibt es auch Gremien, die als Teil der Parteilite betrachtet werden können, da sie i.d.R. den Willen der Parteilite widerspiegeln. Hier ist es entscheidend, dass sich die Kritik oder die Unterstützung an das Gremium als Ganzes richten muss, um erfasst zu werden. Wenn ein einfaches Mitglied dieser Gremien kritisiert oder gelobt wird ist dies alleine noch nicht ausreichend, um Kritik oder Unterstützung zu codieren. Eine solche Kritik oder Unterstützung würde jedoch codiert werden, wenn das Gremiums-Mitglied in seiner Rolle/Funktion als Repräsentant*in eines Gremiums kritisiert oder gelobt wird (beispielsweise, wenn dem/der Vorsitzenden der Antragsprüfungskommission eine undemokratische Vorgehensweise bei der Antragsbehandlung vorgeworfen wird o.ä.). Kritik oder Unterstützung an Gremiums-Mitgliedern wird weiters natürlich codiert, wenn dieses eine der oben aufgezählten individuellen Eliten-Funktionen innehaben (z.B. Bundesgeschäftsführer*in, Nationalratsabgeordnete/r etc.).

Folgende Gremien werden als Teil der Parteilite gewertet:

- Parlamentsklub
- EP-Delegation
- SPÖ-Allein- oder Koalitionsregierungen
 - *Ausnahme: Kritik oder Unterstützung wird nicht codiert, wenn sie explizit an den Koalitionspartner bzw. dessen Regierungsmitglieder gerichtet wird.*
- Bundesparteivorstand
- Bundesparteipräsidium
- Antragsprüfungskommission
 - *Hierunter fällt beispielsweise jede Kritik oder Unterstützung, die sich explizit auf die ausgesprochenen Empfehlungen der Antragsprüfungskommission bezieht.*
- Andere parteitagsbezogene Gremien (z.B. Wahlkommission, Mandatsprüfungskommission, Tagungspräsidium etc.)
- Parteischiedsgericht

Kritik oder Unterstützung kann auch codiert werden, wenn sich diese nicht explizit auf eine der oben genannten Personen oder Gremien bezieht, aber aufgrund der Formulierung mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit angenommen werden kann, dass die Parteilite adressiert ist (beispielsweise wenn von „der Parteispitze“, „der Parteiführung“ oder „den Spitzenfunktionären“ gesprochen wird). Die Parteilite muss in solchen Fällen aber klar der primäre Adressat sein.

Wenn beispielsweise Formulierungen wie „alle Mitglieder unserer Partei“ verwendet werden, ist die Parteilite hier zwar mitgemeint, wird aber nicht primär adressiert. Demnach würde Kritik oder Unterstützung in diesem Beispiel nicht codiert werden.

b) Policy-Positionen der Bundespartei

Kritik bzw. Unterstützung kann sich hier beispielweise auf folgende „Quellen“ für die Policy-Positionierung der Bundespartei beziehen:

- Offizielle Partei- oder Wahlprogramme
- Presseaussendungen der Bundespartei oder von Mitgliedern der Parteilite
- Parteitage von Mitgliedern der Parteilite
- Parteitage von Mitgliedern der Parteilite
- Inhaltliche Arbeit des Parlamentsklub
- Regierungsprogramm bzw. Regierungsarbeit bei SPÖ-Allein- oder Koalitionsregierung
 - *Ausnahme: Kritik oder Unterstützung wird nicht codiert, wenn explizit der Koalitionspartner bzw. dessen Regierungsmitglieder für einen bestimmten Inhalt im Regierungsprogramm oder für eine bestimmte Maßnahme verantwortlich gemacht werden.*

Auch wenn keine der oben genannten „Quellen“ explizit genannt wird, kann Kritik oder Unterstützung codiert werden, wenn aus einer Formulierung klar ersichtlich wird, dass sich auf offizielle inhaltliche Positionen der Bundespartei bezogen wird (beispielsweise wenn von „der Parteilinie“, „dem inhaltlichen Kurs der Partei“ o.ä. gesprochen wird).

c) Tätigkeiten der Bundespartei (als Organisation)

Im Gegensatz zum ersten Punkt (Verhaltensweisen und Aussagen der Parteilite) bezieht sich die Kritik oder Unterstützung hier auf Tätigkeiten oder Entscheidungen der Bundespartei, welche unabhängig von der Verantwortung einzelner Personen oder Gremien diskutiert werden. Solche Tätigkeiten und Entscheidungen „der Partei“ können beispielsweise sein:

- Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Bundespartei (z.B. verschiedene Arten von Kampagnen, Plakate, Werbespots, Internetauftritt etc.)
- Veranstaltungen/Events, die von der Bundespartei organisiert werden (z.B. Wahlkampfevents, Bundesparteitage, Demonstrationen etc.)
- Parteiliche Postenbesetzungen (in Politik, Wirtschaft, Verwaltung, Partei etc.)

- Innerorganisatorische Maßnahmen der Bundespartei (z.B. Abbauen/Aufstocken von Personal, Veränderung der Höhe der Mitgliedsbeiträge, Digitalisierung der Parteiarbeit, Statutenänderungen, Einbindung der Parteibasis in Entscheidungen, Reformen bei der innerparteilichen Kommunikation etc.)
- Eintreten, Fortführen oder Aufkündigen einer Koalitionsregierung auf Bundesebene

2.2 Wann liegt keine Kritik oder Unterstützung vor?

Wenn keines der oben aufgezählten Kriterien für Kritik oder Unterstützung zutrifft, wird für einen Satz in der Kritik- bzw. Unterstützungsvariable der Wert „0“ (keine Kritik bzw. Unterstützung) eingetragen.

Im Folgenden finden sich drei regelmäßig auftretende (und potentiell im Graubereich befindliche) Beispiele, die nicht als Kritik oder Unterstützung gewertet werden:

a) Anregungen und Forderungen, wie sich die Parteilite, eine Policy-Position oder die Partei als Organisation in Zukunft verändern sollte (oder auch nicht verändern sollte), welche aber keine explizite Kritik oder Unterstützung beinhalten.

Handlungsaufforderungen an die Parteilite können nur in Ausnahmefällen als Kritik gewertet werden, wenn sich eindeutig auch auf das falsche oder fehlende Handeln der Partei in der Vergangenheit bezogen wird (z.B.: „Unser Regierungsteam müsste hier doch endlich aufhören, die Augen vor diesem Problem zu verschließen!“)

b) Kritik oder Lob für die Parteitagsteilnehmer*innen

Dies kann damit begründet werden, dass die meisten Delegierten i.d.R. keine Mitglieder der Parteilite sind. Kritik und Lob kann sich in solchen Fällen beispielsweise beziehen auf:

- Besonders wenig oder besonders viel Anwesenheit oder Aufmerksamkeit im Saal
 - z.B. *Kritik an hohem Lärmpegel während Debatte*
- Abstimmungsverhalten der Delegierten
- Allgemeine Stimmung oder „Klima“ im Saal

c) Kritik oder Lob für nicht direkt steuerbare Entwicklungen der Partei

Wird nicht als Kritik oder Unterstützung gewertet solange nicht klar aus der Rede hervorgeht, dass die Parteilite für die Entwicklungen verantwortlich gemacht wird, und die Möglichkeit besteht, dass andere Akteure oder Faktoren dafür ausschlaggebend sind/waren.

Beispiele für solche nicht direkt steuerbaren Entwicklungen sind:

- Steigende/Sinkende Mitgliederzahlen
- Umfrage- und Wahlergebnisse
- Veränderungen im „Image“ der Partei in der Bevölkerung
- Gewinn/Verlust von parlamentarischen Mehrheiten oder Regierungen

3 Jugendbezug

Analog zur Codierung von Kritik und Unterstützung wird in Spalte M („youth relation“) für jeden Satz codiert, ob dieser jugendbezogene Elemente enthält (= 1) oder nicht (= 0). Als Jugendliche werden Menschen im Alter zwischen 12 und 25 Jahren definiert.

Ein Jugendbezug besteht, wenn in einem Satz eine Thematik behandelt wird, welche ausschließlich oder vorwiegend Menschen in der eben erwähnten Altersspanne betrifft. Folglich werden zum Beispiel alle Sätze als jugendbezogen codiert, welche eine Verbindung zu einem oder mehreren der folgenden Themenbereiche herstellen:

- Grundwehr- bzw. Zivildienst
 - *Allgemeine Debatten rund um das Bundesheer (z.B. um dessen Notwendigkeit oder Abschaffung) werden nicht als jugendbezogen gewertet.*
- Reformen des Wahlalters
- Jugendschutz
- Lehre
- Partizipation junger Menschen
- Schule
 - *Exklusive Thematiken rund um die Volksschule und rund um Erwachsenenbildung.*

- *Auch Fragen rund um die Ausbildung bzw. die Arbeitsbedingungen von Lehrer*innen werden aufgrund ihrer Auswirkungen auf die Lehre als jugendrelevant gewertet.*
- Studium
 - *Nicht alle universitätspolitischen Diskussionen werden als jugendbezogen gewertet. Es muss jedenfalls ein Bezug zu Lehr- bzw. Studiums-Thematiken bestehen.*
 - *Auch das Besprechen von hochschulpolitischen Handlungen der ÖH oder anderer Parteien/Jugendorganisationen (z.B. Organisieren von Uni-Demonstrationen, Herausgeben von hochschulpolitischen Statements etc.) wird als jugendbezogen gewertet.*
 - *Das Besprechen von ÖH-Wahlergebnissen wird alleine nicht als Jugendbezug gewertet (solange nicht auf inhaltliche Aspekte wie z.B. Wahlkampfschwerpunkte o.ä. eingegangen wird).*
- Jugendarbeitslosigkeit

Familienpolitische Thematiken (z.B. finanzielle Unterstützungen für Eltern, Ausbau von Plätzen in Kindergärten oder Kindergruppen, Wohnbauförderung für Familien etc.) werden nicht als jugendbezogen codiert. Auch wenn diese Thematiken durchaus auch einen Teil der 12 bis 25-Jährigen betreffen (nämlich jene, die in dieser Altersspanne bereits Eltern sind), kann man davon ausgehen, dass die Mehrheit der Betroffenen älter ist. Damit ist die oben erwähnte Bedingung nicht erfüllt, dass die Themenbereiche ausschließlich oder vorwiegend Menschen im Alter zwischen 12 und 25 Jahre betreffen müssen.

Auch wenn in einem Satz kein direkter Bezug zu einem jugendspezifischen Thema hergestellt wird, kann dieser Satz als jugendbezogen codiert werden, wenn Jugendliche (bzw. „die Jugend“, „junge Menschen“, „Teenager“, „die junge Generation“ o.ä.) oder StudentInnen oder SchülerInnen explizit erwähnt oder angesprochen werden. Der Kontext, in welchem eine solche Erwähnung stattfindet, ist dabei egal. Das Erwähnen von Kindern wird hingegen nicht als jugendbezogen gewertet.

Die einzige Erwähnung von Jugendlichen, die nicht als Jugendbezug gewertet wird, ist, wenn über die Stärke bzw. die Funktionär*innen der eigenen Jugendorganisation gesprochen wird. Dies kann beispielweise geschehen, wenn über die Altersstruktur der Mitglieder berichtet wird, wenn ein*e Redner*in auf die eigene Jugendlichkeit anspielt, wenn eigene Wahlergebnisse

(z.B. zu ÖH-Wahlen) besprochen werden, wenn über eine innerorganisatorische Veranstaltung (z.B. einen Verbandstag o.ä.) berichtet wird, wenn über die Rekrutierung neuer Mitglieder gesprochen wird oder wenn Begriffe wie „Jugendreferent*innen“ oder „Parteijugend“ fallen. Auch die Thematisierung von Stärke oder Funktionär*innen konkurrierender Jugendorganisationen anderer Parteien wird nicht als Jugendbezug gewertet. Das Berichten über bestimmte Tätigkeiten der Jugendorganisationen (oder der Konkurrenz), die sich ganz klar an das Zielpublikum richtet (z.B. Kampagnen an Universitäten, Veranstalten von Demonstrationen an Schulen etc.) zählt hingegen schon als jugendbezogen.

4 Abgrenzung von Kritik, Unterstützung oder Jugendbezug in Satzsequenzen

Regelmäßig kommt es vor, dass eine Rede Kritik, Unterstützung oder Jugendbezug in einer der oben definierten Formen enthält und sich die kritischen, unterstützenden oder jugendbezogenen Ausführungen dabei über mehrere Sätze oder Absätze hinweg ziehen. Bei solchen ausführlich dargelegten Standpunkten (welche beispielweise auch Fallbeispiele, Anekdoten oder andere Exkurse zur Untermauerung eines Arguments beinhalten können) ist es oftmals schwierig abzugrenzen, welche Sätze als substantieller Teil der Kritik, der Unterstützung oder des Jugendbezugs zu werten sind und welche nicht.

Um in solchen Fällen einheitliche Codierentscheidungen zu garantieren, wird festgelegt, dass Sätze für sich alleine stehend (also ohne den jeweiligen inhaltlichen Kontext) als kritisch, unterstützend oder jugendbezogen zu erkennen sein müssen, um als solches codiert zu werden. In anderen Worten muss die Kritik, die Unterstützung oder der Jugendbezug eines Satzes auch erkennbar sein, wenn man den Satz ohne die vorangegangenen und nachfolgenden Sätze betrachten würde.

Folgende Ausnahmen gibt es für diese Regelung:

a) Unterscheidung zwischen relevanter und nicht-relevanter Kritik/Unterstützung

Teilweise kommt es vor, dass ein Satz auch ohne die restlichen Sätze der Rede als kritisch oder unterstützend erkannt werden kann (was der oben genannten Regel entsprechen würde), aber die vorangegangenen und nachfolgenden Sätze notwendig sind, um zu erkennen, ob es sich um für die Codierung relevante Kritik oder Unterstützung handelt oder nicht (also ob sich dabei auf die Parteilite, die Policy-Positionen oder die Tätigkeiten der Bundespartei bezogen wird oder nicht). Wenn sich bei solchen Sätzen mithilfe der restlichen Rede zeigen lässt, dass die

Kritik oder Unterstützung auf einen dieser relevanten Aspekt abzielt, wird die Rede dementsprechend als kritisch oder unterstützend codiert.

Als Beispiel kann ein Satz aus der Rede von Gerhard Weißenberg am Parteitag 1947 betrachtet werden:

- „Wir freuen uns, daß es allen jungen Menschen möglich werden soll, die unentgeltlichen Mittel einer Begabtenförderung vom Staat zu bekommen.“
 - *Hier sieht man klar Unterstützung für eine Policy-Position, aber nur mithilfe der vorangegangenen Sätze wird ersichtlich, dass sich diese Befürwortung auf eine Stelle aus dem neuen Parteiprogramm bezieht (und der Satz deshalb tatsächlich als unterstützend codiert werden kann).*

b) „Rückübersetzung“ von Pronomen

Wenn in einem Satz Pronomen verwendet werden und die „Rückübersetzung“ dieser Pronomen mithilfe vorangegangener Sätze notwendig ist, um die im Satz enthaltene Kritik, Unterstützung oder Jugendbezug zu erkennen, wird der jeweilige Satz trotzdem als kritisch, unterstützend oder jugendbezogen codiert.

Als Beispiel kann hier ein Satz aus der Rede von Paul Blau am Parteitag 1947 dienen:

- „Im Namen der Sozialistischen Jugend Österreichs danken wir allen Genossen, die in ihren Beratungen und Diskussionen *diese Forderungen* in das Aktionsprogramm der Partei aufgenommen haben.“
 - *Das Wort „diese“ ist hier ein adjektivisch gebrauchtes Demonstrativpronomen. Nur durch die vorangegangenen Sätze wird klar, dass sich mit „diese Forderungen“ auf eine Reihe von jugendbezogenen Maßnahmen (Wahlaltersenkung, Reformen bei Lehrlingsausbildung etc.) bezogen wird. Deshalb wird dieser Satz als jugendbezogen codiert.*

c) Verbindung von zwei Sätzen durch Konjunktionen

Teilweise kommt es vor, dass ein Satz, welcher für sich alleine stehend keine kritischen, unterstützenden oder jugendbezogenen Elemente enthält, durch eine Konjunktion (ein Verbindungswort) mit einem vorangegangenen oder nachfolgenden Satz eindeutig verbunden ist, welcher wiederum Kritik, Unterstützung oder Jugendbezug enthält. Als Beispiele für solche Konjunktionen können u.a. Wörter wie „beispielsweise“, „nämlich“, „deshalb“, „denn“ etc. genannt

werden. Wenn der (für sich alleine stehend betrachtet) nicht kritische, unterstützende oder jugendbezogene Satz nicht nur über die Konjunktion mit einem kritischen, unterstützenden oder jugendbezogenen Satz verbunden ist, sondern auch inhaltlich einen gewissen Beitrag zur kritischen, unterstützenden oder jugendbezogenen Argumentation leistet, kann der Satz ebenfalls als kritisch, unterstützend oder jugendbezogen codiert werden.

A3 Abstract (English)

Despite their important role in the political representation of young people, research on political youth wings and especially on their relationship to their parent party is rather scarce. In order to contribute to a better understanding of the latter, this Master's thesis examines the intraparty role of political youth wings and how this role is influenced by party performance. For this, two aspects of the intraparty role of youth organizations are analyzed: how critically youth wings position themselves towards their parent party and how strongly they focus on the representation of youth-specific issues inside their party. Similarly, two aspects of party performance are considered in the thesis: the electoral performance of a party as well as whether and in what form it participates in the national government. According to the theoretical expectations, poor electoral performance and participation in a coalition government should lead to youth wings taking more critical stances towards their parent party and focusing less on the representation of youth-specific issues. To test these hypotheses, speeches held by youth wing members at party congresses of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) between 1945 and 2021 are analyzed ($n = 229$), using a coding scheme that was created for this purpose. Although the bivariate section of the quantitative analysis finds some indications for the expected effects, the multivariate analysis generates no clear evidence for any of the hypotheses, meaning that they cannot be confirmed. However, the analysis shows that youth organizations' focus on the representation of youth-specific issues has grown smaller over time, that youth wings are more critical towards their parent party when the latter takes more moderate ideological positions, and that there exist considerable differences between the different SPÖ youth factions regarding their intraparty role.

A4 Abstract (German)

Trotz ihrer wichtigen Rolle in der politischen Repräsentation junger Menschen gibt es vergleichsweise wenig Forschung zu politischen Jugendorganisationen und insbesondere zu ihrem Verhältnis zur jeweiligen Mutterpartei. Um den bestehenden Wissensstand auf diesem Gebiet zu erweitern, untersucht diese Masterarbeit die innerparteiliche Rolle politischer Jugendorganisationen und wie diese durch Parteipermanenz beeinflusst wird. Dabei werden zwei Aspekte der innerparteilichen Rolle von Jugendorganisationen analysiert: wie kritisch sich Jugendorganisationen gegenüber ihrer Mutterpartei positionieren und wie stark sie sich auf die Vertretung jugendspezifischer Themen innerhalb der Partei konzentrieren. Ebenso werden zwei Aspekte von Parteipermanenz betrachtet: die Wahlperformanz der Partei und ob beziehungsweise in welcher Form sie an der nationalen Regierung beteiligt ist. Die theoretischen Erwartungen sind, dass eine schlechte Wahlperformanz sowie die Beteiligung an einer Koalitionsregierung dazu führen sollten, dass Jugendorganisationen kritischere Positionen gegenüber ihrer Mutterpartei einnehmen und sich weniger auf die Repräsentation jugendspezifischer Themen konzentrieren. Um diese Hypothesen zu überprüfen, werden Reden untersucht, welche von Mitgliedern von Jugendorganisationen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) auf Parteitag zwischen 1945 und 2021 gehalten wurden ($n = 229$). Hierfür wird ein speziell für diese Untersuchung entwickeltes Codierungsschema verwendet. Während der bivariate Teil der quantitativen Analyse einige Indizien für die erwarteten Effekte findet, werden im Zuge der multivariaten Analyse keine klaren Belege für die genannten Hypothesen generiert. Damit kann keine der Hypothesen eindeutig bestätigt werden. Allerdings zeigt die Analyse, dass der Fokus der Parteijugend auf die Repräsentation jugendspezifischer Themen im Laufe der Zeit abgenommen hat, dass Jugendorganisationen kritischer gegenüber ihrer Mutterpartei sind, wenn diese eine moderatere ideologische Position einnimmt, und dass sich die verschiedenen SPÖ-Jugendorganisationen hinsichtlich ihrer innerparteilichen Rolle deutlich unterscheiden.