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Dual Statehood in Cyprus: Nation-Building Process and the
Shaping of Greek and Turkish Cypriots

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Deutsches Abstract

Diese Masterarbeit untersucht die Entstehung und das Fortbestehen der Zweistaatlichkeit auf Zypern, die trotz fehlender internationaler Anerkennung eine dauerhafte politische Realität darstellt. Auf der Grundlage konstruktivistischer Theorien wird analysiert, wie die Nationenbildungsprozesse innerhalb der griechisch- und türkisch-zyprischen Gemeinschaften unterschiedliche politische Identitäten sowie Wahrnehmungen von Legitimität und Souveränität geprägt haben. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung stehen die Verfassung der Republik Zypern von 1960 und die Verfassung der Türkischen Republik Nordzypern von 1985. Die Studie bewertet, inwiefern diese rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen zur Förderung von Frieden und Stabilität beigetragen oder die Teilung der Insel weiter gefestigt haben.

Anhand zentraler historischer Ereignisse und des Einflusses von Nationalismus wird aufgezeigt, wie das Streben der griechischen ZypriotInnen nach *Enosis* (der Vereinigung mit Griechenland) und der türkischen ZypriotInnen nach *Taksim* (der Teilung der Insel) die ethnischen Spannungen verschärft haben. Es wird argumentiert, dass diese Entwicklungen getrennte kulturelle und politische Identitäten institutionalisierten und eine Wiedervereinigung erschweren. Die Arbeit beleuchtet sowohl die politischen und rechtlichen Herausforderungen Zyperns als auch die langfristigen Auswirkungen der Zweistaatlichkeit auf die Insel.

English Abstract

This thesis examines the emergence and persistence of dual statehood in Cyprus, an enduring reality despite lacking formal international recognition. Drawing on constructivist theories, it explores how nation-building processes within Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have shaped distinct political identities and perceptions of legitimacy and sovereignty. The study assesses the roles of the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1985 Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in governance and peace, evaluating whether they mitigated conflict or entrenched division. Through the analysis of key historical events and the influence of nationalism, the research highlights how Greek Cypriots' pursuit of *enosis* (union with Greece) and Turkish Cypriots' alignment with *taksim* (partition with Turkey) deepened ethnic divides, culminating in the island's division in 1974. It argues that these nation-building efforts institutionalized separate cultural and political identities, complicating reconciliation. By tracing constitutional and political developments, this study sheds light on Cyprus' unique challenges and the long-term implications of its dual statehood.

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1. Introduction

The year 2024 marks 50 years since the division of Cyprus, a persistent and unresolved conflict that continues to cast a long shadow over the island's political, social, and cultural life, as well as its role in international affairs. The Cyprus Question is rooted in decades of ethnic tensions and political disputes and continues to influence daily life and global politics. After a Greek-backed coup in 1974, Turkey invaded the island. These events led to the island's *de facto* partition into the Greek-Cypriot-controlled south, governed by the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), and the Turkish-Cypriot-controlled north, known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which lacks international recognition. Despite peace talks and international negotiation efforts, Cyprus had remained divided, with a United Nations buffer zone, known as the Green Line, physically separating the two entities of the island.

Cyprus, situated at the intersection of the three continents Africa, Asia, and Europe, is a historically significant island in the farthest eastern Mediterranean. Its unique geographical position has made it a focal point of international interests and conflicts. Nicosia, the island's largest city and capital, reflects this division, as it remains the only divided capital in the world¹. The Greek Cypriots, who comprise Cyprus' largest ethnic group, made up 78 percent of the population in 1960, while Turkish Cypriots accounted for only 18 percent². These two communities share a history of cultural and political differences, further exacerbated by minimal contact since the division. Two heterogeneous communities share one island. For many Cypriots, the idea of peaceful coexistence is a distant memory.

The roots of the division can be traced back to the independence of Cyprus from British colonial rule on 16 August 1960. While Turkish Cypriots viewed independence and constitutional guarantees as a positive development, Greek Cypriots saw it as a temporary arrangement, with

¹ Oktay, Derya. "Analysis and Review of the Divided City of Nicosia, Cyprus, and New Perspectives" *Geography* 92, no. 3 (2007): 231-247, 231.

² Ker-Lindsay, James. *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020, 2f.

many resenting the need to share power with the Turkish Cypriot minority. The skepticism toward the new republic arose from the extensive powers granted to the Turkish Cypriot community under the constitution³. Furthermore, diverging aspirations - Greek Cypriots' pursuit of *enosis* (union with Greece) and Turkish Cypriots' advocacy for *taksim* (partition) - fueled ethnic tensions and political instability. These tensions culminated in the events of 1974, when a Greek-backed coup prompted a Turkish invasion, leading to the partition.

Since 1974, dual statehood has defined Cyprus' political landscape, shaping the identities and experiences of its two primary communities. On the one hand, the Republic of Cyprus has achieved recognition as a sovereign state and appears to possess a stronger sense of identity, often referring to themselves as Cypriots - implicitly signifying their Greek Cypriot heritage⁴. On the other, the TRNC struggles with questions of legitimacy, governance, and identity. The presence of the Turkish army and Turkish settlers added complexity to the identity problem in the North. Currently, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan supports a two-state solution. TRNC's President Ersin Tatar's advocacy for independence underscores the widening gap between the two communities' visions for the island's future⁵.

The case of Cyprus remains Europe's most long-lasting frozen conflict⁶. While active warfare has ceased, no peace agreement or political resolution has been achieved. Dual statehood has shaped the political landscape and the communities for 50 years. This master's thesis analyzes how dual statehood has emerged as the status quo despite its lack of international recognition. Moreover, the thesis explains how the partition has shaped Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. By examining key historical events and the role of nationalism, this study explores the constitutional frameworks of the Republic of Cyprus (1960) and the TRNC (1985).

³ Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*, 29.

⁴ Carlier, Cedric Etienne. "What Prevents the Reunification of Cyprus and How Can It Be Achieved?" 2022, 84.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Dursun-Özkanca, Oya. "Changing Responses to a Frozen Conflict: The Republic of Cyprus Soft Balancing Vis-à-Vis Turkey." *International Political Science Review* 45, no. 1 (2024): 15–30, 15.

It investigates the extent to which these constitutions have fulfilled their intended purposes and examines their impact on the division of the island and its potential reunification.

The emergence of dual statehood and the nation-building process in Cyprus raises questions about the origins and effectiveness of its two existing constitutions. Have these constitutions fulfilled their declared purposes, and are they still functional? Additionally, have they influenced developments leading up to and following the events of 1974? Dual statehood has reinforced distinct Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities, with each side viewing the other through the lens of a long-standing conflict. The primary research goal is critically assessing whether these constitutions have contributed to peace and stability or perpetuated the division. By addressing questions of legitimacy, functionality, and the influence of nationalism, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the enduring challenges and prospects for reunification on the island.

The thesis begins with Chapter Two *Historical Background* to provide an overview of the Cyprus Question and the key events that led to the division of Cyprus. Chapter Three *Constitutions of Cyprus: The Creation of the Republic of Cyprus and the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'* analyses and compares the 1960 Constitution of the RoC and the 1985 Constitution of the TRNC, with an emphasis on governance structures and external influences. Chapter Four *Nation-Building Process in Cyprus: Identity Shaping and Nationalism(s)* studies the Greek and Turkish Cypriots' nation-building processes, analyzing how these efforts shaped their respective identities. Finally, Chapter Five *Property Disputes and Their Impact on Community Relations* discusses the disputes over ownership and their significance in the broader context of division and reconciliation.

1.1. Literature Review and State of Research

The relationship between dual statehood and its impact on identity construction and constitutionalization is seldom explored in literature. Secondary literature on the constitutions of Cyprus is relatively scarce. This is partly due to the island's unique and complex political situation, which has led to limited academic exploration of its constitutional development. Most available literature tends to focus on the political and historical aspects of the Cyprus conflict rather than an in-depth legal analysis of the constitutions. Consequently, comprehensive secondary sources specifically addressing the content of the Cyprus constitutions are harder. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen's *Südosteuropa-Handbuch*⁷ (1998) provides an in-depth analysis of how the constitutions were implemented. However, since it was published in 1998, it does not address recent developments on the island. Despite this limitation, it remains a valuable source for this thesis.

The Cyprus division's historical context and immediate consequences are discussed in detail in *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic Conflict* (2006) by Marco A. Turk⁸, *Militarisation de l'espace et représentations sociales du conflit à Chypre du Nord* (2020) by Mathieu Petithomme⁹, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (2020) by James Ker-Lindsay¹⁰, or *The Cyprus Question: A Concise Guide to the History, Politics and Law of the Cyprus Question* (2000) by Michael Stephen¹¹ to only name a few. These studies are explanatory works that help to contextualize the topic of the master's thesis. Especially, Turk and Ker-Lindsay explain the political landscape of the island after 1960. The latter examines

⁷ Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev. *Südosteuropa-Handbuch*. 8, *Zypern*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998.

⁸ Turk, A. Marco. "Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic Conflict." *Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review* 28, no. 2 (2006): 205-255.

⁹ Petithomme, Mathieu. "Militarisation de l'espace et représentations sociales du conflit à Chypre du Nord." *Cahiers balkaniques*, 46 (2020): 86–103.

¹⁰ Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*.

¹¹ Stephen, Michael. *The Cyprus Question: A Concise Guide to the History, Politics and Law of the Cyprus Question*. London, 2000.

the reactions of both communities concerning reunification negotiations¹². Petithomme's paper gives a comprehensible overview of Turkey's influence on the northern part. He thoroughly analyzes the Turkish agency in the TRNC¹³. However, they remain on a very descriptive and explanatory level.

There is extensive literature on Greek and Turkish Cypriot identity construction, but scholars often neglect to connect the identity pillar to nation-building or disregard the constitutional aspect altogether. Most studies on this topic primarily focus on linking identity construction to the educational system. Vural Yücel and Evrim Özuynik's *Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks: A Step Towards a United Federal Cyprus*¹⁴ (2008) examines the changes in Turkish Cypriot schoolbooks and provides a brief comparison with Greek Cypriot schoolbooks. The authors also propose solutions for re-writing Cyprus' history by integrating Greek and Turkish narratives. An analysis of Greek Cypriot textbooks to understand the Greek Cypriot identity construction is thematized in the essays *Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a Contested Process*¹⁵ (1998) and *Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the 'History of Cyprus'*¹⁶ (2008) by Yiannis Papadakis. Other studies examining Greek Cypriot identity construction are Caesar V. Mavratsas' *The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1995: Politics, Social Memory and Identity*¹⁷ (1997), Victor Roudometof and Miranda Christou's *1974 and Greek Cypriot Identity: The Division of Cyprus*

¹² Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*, 51f.

¹³ Petithomme. *Militarisation de l'espace*, 94f.

¹⁴ Vural, Yücel, and Evrim Özuynik. "Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks: A Step Towards a United Federal Cyprus." *South European Society & Politics* 13, no. 2 (2008): 133–54.

¹⁵ Papadakis, Yiannis. "Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a Contested Process." *American Ethnologist* 25, no. 2 (1998): 149–65.

¹⁶ Papadakis, Yiannis. "Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the 'History of Cyprus'." *History and Memory* 20, no. 2 (2008): 128–48.

¹⁷ Mavratsas, Caesar V. "The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1995: Politics, Social Memory and Identity." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20, no. 4 (1997): 717–37.

as *Cultural Trauma*¹⁸ (2011), and Nikos A. Stamatakis *History and Nationalism: The Cultural Reconstruction of Modern Greek Cypriot Identity*¹⁹ (1991).

While some of these works date back to the early 2000s, many new works have been published in the last few years. This shows that the topic is still highly relevant today, considering that no reunification has been realized. Studies and reflections on dual statehood and contested statehood are emerging trends in the scholarly field. *Nation Building in Contested States: Comparative Insights from Kosovo, Transnistria, and Northern Cyprus*²⁰ (2020) by Viktoria Potapkina or *Sovereignty Suspended: Building the So-Called State*²¹ (2020) by Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay are crucial books to contextualize and study nation-building in divided societies.

The aspect of forced displacement and resettlement questions are explored in various studies. Particularly, Varosha is examined in this context. *Postcard from Varosha, Cyprus' Ghost City* (2022) by Jonathan Gorvett²² and *Remedying Displacement in Frozen Conflicts: Lessons From the Case of Cyprus* (2016) by Nasia Hadjigeorgiou²³ touch on legal affairs and forced displacement issues on the island. Hadjigeorgiou gives an extensive overview of law and property questions while dealing with resettlement matters²⁴.

There are identifiable waves of scholarship on the Cyprus Question. The waves reflect historical events and evolving academic approaches. Many studies conducted before the 2000s

¹⁸ Roudometof, Victor, and Miranda Christou. "1974 and Greek Cypriot Identity: The Division of Cyprus as Cultural Trauma." *Narrating Trauma*, 1st ed., 163–87. Routledge, 2011.

¹⁹ Stamatakis, Nikos A. "History and Nationalism: The Cultural Reconstruction of Modern Greek Cypriot Identity." *Cyprus Review (Nicosia, Cyprus : 1989)* 3, no. 1 (1991): 59–86.

²⁰ Potapkina, Viktoria, and Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building in Contested States: Comparative Insights from Kosovo, Transnistria, and Northern Cyprus*. [S.l.]: Ibidem Press, 2020.

²¹ Bryant, Rebecca, and Mete Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended: Building the So-Called State*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020.

²² Gorvett, Jonathan. "Postcard from Varosha, Cyprus' Ghost City." *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 41, no. 1 (2022): 46–48.

²³ Hadjigeorgiou, Nasia. "Remedying Displacement in Frozen Conflicts: Lessons From the Case of Cyprus". *Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies*, 18 (2016), 152–175.

²⁴ Ibid. 160.

concentrated on mapping the Cyprus Question by documenting the various events that contributed to the division. Pre-1974 scholarship focused on colonial rule, the independence struggle against Great Britain, and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Post-1974 scholarship analyzed the causes and consequences of the conflict, emphasizing ethnic conflict, geopolitical implications of the division, and the role of external powers. In the 1990s, the focus of research shifted towards peace processes and reunification agreements. Recent scholarship deals with identity construction, EU membership, and human rights issues. Recent studies also explore the Cyprus Question in a broader comparative context, addressing the topics of contested states, divided societies, and geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The changing waves of scholarship result from entangled factors, such as historical developments, societal changes, or shifting geopolitical dynamics, to name a few. The change in scholarship reflects the attempt to address the pressing issues of its time while being shaped by the interplay between global, regional, and local actors.

This research acknowledges the limitation of not utilizing sources in Turkish or Greek due to the author's lack of fluency in these languages. As a result, there may be certain gaps in the analysis, particularly regarding perspectives uniquely conveyed in those languages. However, approaching this topic as a non-Cypriot researcher offers the opportunity to provide a more neutral perspective, which can contribute to a balanced understanding of the complex dynamics. By engaging with diverse sources and methodologies, this research aims to foster a more inclusive dialogue on the Cyprus issue.

1.2. Methodological and Theoretical Reflection

1.2.1. Methodological Approach

The thesis' methodological approach focuses on a qualitative content analysis of the constitutions of the Republic of Cyprus (1960) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1985). This analysis examines key differences in constitutional structures, governance mechanisms, and underlying themes while assessing the influence of external powers. By focusing on these legal frameworks, the study aims to uncover how each constitution reflects the nation-building processes and evolving identities of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The first step in conducting a thorough comparative analysis of the constitutions is to examine each document individually. The analysis begins with carefully analyzing the structure, content, and historical context of each constitution. The approach lays the groundwork for a fundamental understanding of the constitutional framework and the primary topics. Particular attention is given to how each constitution defines a state, disclosing its conception of statehood, sovereignty, and governance. This includes exploring how fundamental principles such as the separation of powers and the role of executive, legislative, and judicial branches are defined within each document.

To enable a content-based comparison, recurring and overlapping themes are identified, including the legal and international status of the entities, power-sharing arrangements between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the framework for protecting human and minority rights, and the mechanisms of constitutional amendments. Each theme reflects critical elements of the constitutions, highlighting their approaches to governance and intercommunal relations.

By comparing these overlapping themes, the analysis underlines the commonalities and divergences. This qualitative method examines whether the provisions are rooted in efforts to

foster unity or create division(s). It sheds light on the influence of governance structures, intercommunal dynamics, and the legal and political context. Ultimately, the analysis identifies differences in constitutional design and illustrates their implications for the ongoing challenges and expectations for reconciliation in Cyprus.

The 1960 Constitution, designed as a bi-communal framework, sought to accommodate both communities but ultimately struggled under the pressures of competing nationalisms. In contrast, the TRNC Constitution emerged under conditions of international non-recognition, prioritizing the consolidation of Turkish Cypriot identity and sovereignty in opposition to the Republic of Cyprus. Both constitutions serve as formal manifestations of distinct political aspirations and affiliations, reflecting divergent paths shaped by Greek and Turkish nationalism and their respective foreign alliances.

This comparison also highlights the legal and political challenges inherent in contrasting a recognized state's constitution with that of an unrecognized entity. To address this complexity, the study incorporates secondary literature to contextualize the implications of dual statehood, emphasizing its role in perpetuating the island's division and shaping the lived experiences of its inhabitants.

1.2.2. Key Concepts

This sub-chapter outlines the theoretical framework, which encompasses three essential elements. First, constructivism serves as a valuable lens through which to explore the issue. Second, the concept of self-determination plays a pivotal role, particularly for the Turkish Cypriots and their contested statehood. Third, the process of identity construction is central to understanding how dual statehood has shaped both communities, revealing the ongoing dynamics that influence their distinct national identities and political realities.

Constructivism provides a relevant framework for analyzing dual statehood in Cyprus, focusing on how identity, norms, and political structures are socially constructed and continuously reshaped²⁵. A constructivist lens explores how the existence of two state entities on the island has formed their respective identities, legitimacy, and political narratives. For instance, constructivism underscores the role of historical interactions, cultural meanings, and shared understandings in shaping the competing claims to statehood. The identities of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not fixed but evolved through processes of nation-building, conflict, and external influences, including colonial legacies and international recognition practices. Additionally, the international community's non-recognition of the TRNC reflects how legitimacy is constructed within global political norms. The theoretical approach focuses on the dynamic social and political life continuously shaped and reshaped through interactions, norms, and shared understandings²⁶. Constructivism offers insights into the persistence of division and the challenges of reconciliation, grounded in the socially created realities of identity and governance.

Another key aspect of dual statehood is the issue of self-determination, which remains a fundamental element of international law and politics. The Turkish Cypriot demand for self-determination centers on the right to govern and shape their political future²⁷. Self-determination portrays a pivotal issue in global politics and is rooted in questions of legitimacy within the international system. It raises fundamental debates. Who has the right to govern? Which groups constitute a 'nation'? Should 'they' establish their own state? While the modern state system is based on the principle of territorially defined sovereignty, the nature and structure of these 'states' vary significantly, reflecting the complexity of defining nationhood

²⁵ McCourt, David M. *The New Constructivism in International Relations Theory*. Bristol: Bristol University Press, University of Bristol, 2022, 2.

²⁶ Ibid., 3.

²⁷ Cop, Burak, and Doğan Eymirliolu. "THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW TOWARDS THE 40th ANNIVERSARY OF THE ADOPTION OF ICCPR AND ICESCR". *PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs* 10, no. 4 (January 2005): 115-46, 131.

and statehood, as Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham argues²⁸. In modern politics, self-determination refers to the right of a ‘people’ to govern themselves and shape their own political future. However, this concept is open to various interpretations, making its application complex and contested²⁹. The Cyprus case exemplifies the complexities and disputes surrounding the concept of self-determination. It also showcases the difficulty of applying self-determination, particularly as political solutions often require balancing the desires of conflicting parties. Implementing self-determination has been a controversial issue in public international law³⁰.

Adding to this, territorial claims play a central role in the negotiations over Cyprus’ reunification³¹. The complex application of self-determination rights manifests in the constitutional designs, which are influenced by territorial divisions and political geometry. Those cleavage patterns reflect demographic and narrative divides between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities³². Territorial cleavages are produced through demographic and narrative interactions. One pattern of political geometry is the majority-minority pattern. Here, the minority group (Turkish Cypriots) demand territorial autonomy and power-sharing provisions³³. Moreover, in Cyprus, external powers are participants in the agenda-setting of the constitution-making process and direct parties in the conflict³⁴.

Constitutions present a „complex piece of machinery that prescribe a political order and establish the basic rules of institutional engagement”³⁵. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was the principal vehicle for creating a common political identity while living in a

²⁸ Gallagher Cunningham, Kathleen. *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, 3.

²⁹ Ibid., 11.

³⁰ Cop, Eymirliolu. *THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION*, 116.

³¹ Anderson, George, and Sujit Choudhry. *Territory and Power in Constitutional Transitions*. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 14.

³² Ibid., 16.

³³ Ibid., 16.

³⁴ Ibid., 23.

³⁵ Mendez, Fernando, and Vasiliki Triga. “Constitution-Making, Constitutional Conventions and Conflict Resolution: Lesson Drawing for Cyprus.” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 11, no. 4 (2009): 363–80, 363.

territory with divided societies³⁶. Forging a common identity was tried to be achieved through the process of negotiating and debating a constitution³⁷. Consociationalism and power-sharing arrangements were proposed for conflict resolution. Especially, because comparative federalism or bi-communal type conflicts issues and acquires an all or nothing logic and „seem to be far harder to resolve than multiple-group conflicts”³⁸. The territorially separated population requires subnational governments for the respective communities to assume important power. However, it is inevitable to create a central government:

„As the population of the smaller community or communities fear majority decision-making would disempower it, an accord requires arrangements for power-sharing with each community having a collective veto within the central government”³⁹.

Finally, the construction of identity plays a central role in shaping the dual statehood of Cyprus. Wilfried Loth emphasizes that identity is not static but rather constantly redefined through an ongoing process of conflict and negotiation between societal expectations and individual uniqueness⁴⁰. Identity evolves through adaptation, emphasizing a sense of belonging vital for creating collective identity, which fosters shared beliefs and social cohesion⁴¹. Furthermore, community identity is also framed by a permanent process of change⁴².

³⁶ Mendez, Triga. *Constitution-Making*, 366.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 373.

³⁹ Anderson, Choudhry. *Territory and Power*, 44.

⁴⁰ Loth, Wilfried. *Europäische Identität in historischer Perspektive*, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Discussion Paper, C113, 2002, 4.

⁴¹ Bach, Maurizio. “Kollektive Identität in Europa. Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem Mythos der Gegenwart”. Kadelbach, Stefan. *Europäische Identität*, 17-24. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2008, 17.

⁴² Loth. *Europäische Identität*, 5.

Social memory plays a crucial role in symbolically constructing identities, as historical narratives frame representations of the past and inform national identity formation⁴³. This ideological process is vital for promoting and forming a national identity. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities were constructed through social memory and historical narratives, with each side using the past to frame their present national identity and political legitimacy. Unity and union are communicated externally through symbols that are typically national. Identity is historically founded and based on alterity and collective solidarity among the states⁴⁴. National concerns are closely linked to political ideologies. The ‘historicization’ of present problems defines populist rhetorics⁴⁵. ‘Historicizing’ is also a key ideological factor to promote and organize public discourses and a nation’s ‘truths’⁴⁶. This ideological process involves the strategic use of history, symbolic representation, and the framing of national identities in opposition to each other.

Nation as a notion can have two meanings. The category nation can mean a territorial state or/and a group of people. For both overlapping meanings, as the historian William Rankin states in his commentary, the map is a crucial element for interrogating and reconstituting these meanings⁴⁷. Cartography has been an important field in the maintenance and construction of a modern nation-state ideal⁴⁸. The redrawing or reimagining of borders is especially important for the Cyprus issue. Geography, polity, and identity are factors merged into 19th-century imperialism and 20th-century diplomacy⁴⁹.

Under atavistic nationalism, one understands a new and extensive model of extremist ideology that fosters exclusive political identities. These identities are based on the community’s

⁴³ Stamatakis. *History and Nationalism*, 59.

⁴⁴ Badel, Laurence. *Diplomaties européennes. XIXe-XXIe siècle*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2021, S.374.

⁴⁵ Stamatakis. *History and Nationalism*, 59.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 64.

⁴⁷ Rankin, William. “What Is a Nation?” *Dialogues in Human Geography* 12, no. 1 (2022): 41–44, 41.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 42.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

narrative of ‘imagined reality’ or ‘truth of history’⁵⁰. Over time, nationalism develops while being a narrative process. To instrumentalize nationalism, a specific, exclusive group is being prioritized in the use of political resources of a state⁵¹. However, this process is „a threat to peace at all levels - domestic, regional, and global”⁵².

A nation is either defined as civically or ethnocentrically: „Nationalism relies upon existing inter-group boundaries based on ethnicity and religion to promote cultural homogeneity, despite inherent societal heterogeneity”⁵³. Civic nationalism grants every citizen the same privileges and rights, which promotes loyalty to the state and democracy. Ethnocentric nationalism wants to achieve exclusive state power and cultural homogeneity.

According to Ulas, unrecognized states have the following characteristics:

„ a) a violent, unilateral secession from a parent state, whose *de jure* territories this new entity claims and controls *de facto*; b) independently existing for more than four years, running state institutions; c) lack of recognition by a majority of the international community (non-recognition); d) exhibiting high internal legitimacy and low external legitimacy; and lastly e) they are not completely dependent on any other state for policy-making and domestic affairs.”⁵⁴

After the Annan Plan, a schism with the Turkic atavism emerged parallel to asserting a distinct Cypriot identity. A new atavistic narrative against Turkish immigrants arose.

⁵⁰ Ulas, Hilmi. “EVOLUTIONARY POSSIBILITIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND ATAVISTIC NATIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF UNRECOGNIZED STATES.” *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs (Bitola)* 6, no. 3 (2021): 11–23, 12.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 13.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

The founding of the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC legally and constitutionally institutionalized two rigid, separate identities - Greek and Turkish. Chapter Five will delve into these legal and constitutional foundations, exploring how they have reinforced separation while shaping the narratives of nationhood. These two separate entities have repeatedly been shaped „within a conflicting Self/Other dichotomy”⁵⁵. Achieving a unified Cypriot identity requires mutual recognition and acceptance of the ‘Other’ within these divided identities, as scholars like Evangelina Moisi and Alexandros Zachariades posit⁵⁶.

⁵⁵ Moisi, Evangelina, and Alexandros Zachariades. “Performing Identity: The Case of the (Greek) Cypriot National Guard.” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 21, no. 1 (2021): 26–45, 27.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

2. Historical Background

In 1960, Cyprus claimed its independence from Great Britain. After the independence, however, the conflicts between Greeks and Turks increased. The British army drew the Green Line through Nicosia's center⁵⁷. The total population in that year was about 600,000. 79 percent were Greek Cypriots, and 18 percent were Turkish Cypriots⁵⁸. The remaining percentage consisted of Armenians, Maronites, and others. After its independence, Cyprus was founded as a consociational republic⁵⁹. The republic compromised two main ethnic communities, sharing political power on a 30 percent Turkish and a 70 percent Greek basis⁶⁰. Judicial, executive and legislative functions were allocated based on community size. Both communities maintained distinct religious and educational systems while upholding a bilingual culture.

Three years after Cyprus' independence, intercommunal conflicts broke out, which left no opportunity for a unified Cypriot nationhood to unfold. The Greek Cypriot majority took part in the ethnic cleansing of the Turkish Cypriot minority. During these phases of cultural cleansing, Cyprus' built heritage was destroyed many times over⁶¹. The capital city was initially divided in 1963 to ease intercommunal tensions between the two communities.

The period from 1963 to 1970 saw significant population displacement, with an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Turkish Cypriots forced to flee due to intercommunal conflict⁶². From 1962 to 1964, many Turkish Cypriots were forced to move to larger villages and towns. Consequently, around 42 Turkish-controlled enclaves were established. In each enclave were

⁵⁷ Bevan, Robert. *The Destruction of Memory. Architecture at War*. London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2006, 163.

⁵⁸ Kliot, Nurit, and Yoel Mansfeld. "Resettling Displaced People in North and South Cyprus: A Comparison." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 7, no. 4 (1994): 328-359, 328.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Bevan. *The Destruction of Memory*, 133.

⁶² Kliot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 329.

both local populations and the displaced persons from neighboring towns⁶³. Also, around 200 Greek Cypriots had to flee from their villages⁶⁴.

Both parties began to resume their talks in May 1968 under the auspices of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General. The negotiations continued for six years. Adding to this, the then-Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou (1963-1965) rejected the US-backed Acheson Plan, which proposed double *enosis* (partition along ethnic lines) despite his initial interest. He resisted partition and federation as solutions, favoring Cyprus' unrestricted independence followed by *enosis*⁶⁵.

The Greek Military dictatorship (1967–1974) publicly advocated *enosis* but sought a secret deal with Turkey for partition under US consent, betraying Cypriot aspirations for independence⁶⁶. The Greek Military Junta leader Georgios Papadopolous attempted to pressure the Republic of Cyprus' President Archbishop Makarios into concessions to Turkey. Still, they avoided direct confrontation due to Makarios' prestige and potential Soviet involvement⁶⁷.

In 1974, the situation changed. On July 15, the Greek Cypriot forces and the Greek Junta opened fire on the presidential palace in the capital city. The military regime of the Greeks under Dimitrios Ioannidis took on an anti-Turkish stance and ordered Greek officers in Cyprus to overthrow President Archbishop Makarios, who was democratically elected⁶⁸. He was „intensely nationalistic and very suspicious of Turkish goals in Cyprus and the Aegean’’⁶⁹. Even though he didn't want to annex Cyprus to Greece, he wanted to remove Makarios to

⁶³ Klot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 329.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Sakkas, John. “The Greek Military Regime and the Cyprus Question”. Anastasakis, Othon, and Katerina Lagos. *The Greek Military Dictatorship: Revisiting a Troubled Past, 1967-1974*, 320-39. New York: Berghahn Books, 2021, 322f.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 324.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 324f.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 329.

facilitate a relationship with Turkey. However, Ioannidis underestimated the Turkish military readiness⁷⁰.

Makarios escaped the city to go to the UN headquarters in New York. He fled the island even though the *coup d'état* failed. Nikos Sampson, a former underground nationalist EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston, National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) gunman, took over the Cypriot administration with the help of the Junta⁷¹.

The coup wasn't left unnoticed by the Turkish community. In return, a full-scale invasion by the Turkish armed forces was ordered by Bülent Ecevit, the then-Turkish prime minister, after the British government declined to help them because they weren't prepared for a military coup. Consequently, the Turkish invasion was a reaction to the Athens-backed *coup d'état* that tried to assimilate Cyprus into Greece (*enosis*).

The Junta's miscalculated support for the 1974 coup against Makarios in Cyprus triggered a Turkish invasion, resulting in the division of the island. This national humiliation further eroded the regime's legitimacy. The Greek military dictatorship (1967–1974) failed due to a combination of internal and external factors. The regime's miscalculated support for the 1974 coup against Makarios in Cyprus triggered a Turkish invasion, resulting in the division of the island. This national humiliation further eroded the regime's legitimacy. It forced the demoralized Junta to resign, paving the way for democracy in Greece to be restored under Konstantinos Karamanlis' leadership⁷³. After the fall of the Junta in 1974, Greece adopted a more moderate stance on Cyprus. Greek leaders, including Karamanlis, pursued a more diplomatic approach, seeking to resolve the Cyprus issue through international channels rather than military means.

⁷⁰ Sakkas. *The Greek Military Regime*, 329f.

⁷¹ Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*, 42.

⁷³ Sakkas. *The Greek Military Regime*, 332.

Ultimately, Turkey invaded Cyprus with the help of 35,000 Turkish troops from the Turkish mainland in the northern part of Cyprus, which represents 37 percent of its territory⁷⁴. Even though Makarios later returned to Cyprus to resume his power and political order was reestablished, „the Turkish troops continued to occupy the northern part of the island’’⁷⁵.

Severe cultural and ethnic cleansing and population displacement promptly followed. The Greeks sought to prevent Turkish Cypriots from fleeing to the northern part of the island, while the Turks carried out ethnic cleansing in the north⁷⁶. During these events, thousands of Greek Cypriots were injured or killed, and approximately 40 percent of the Greek Cypriot population was forced to flee areas occupied by Turkey, becoming refugees within their own island⁷⁷.

The coup resulted in the partition and creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which was recognized only by Turkey. In the following years, thousands of Turkish Cypriots were allowed to move to the north in exchange for halting the expulsion of Greek Cypriots to the south of the Green Line.⁷⁸ Many Turkish farmers were relocated from Turkey to the newly established TRNC to replace the displaced Greek population. Interestingly, if one reflects on the 1974 events, Marco A. Turk analyzes that

„depending on the particular point of view, Turkey either invaded the island to occupy the northern part, or was forced by international inaction to send troops to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from the potential abuse by the Greek Cypriot majority’’⁷⁹.

⁷⁴ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 205.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 211.

⁷⁶ Bevan. *The Destruction of Memory*, 163.

⁷⁷ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 211.

⁷⁸ Bevan. *The Destruction of Memory*, 163.

⁷⁹ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 206.

This quote highlights the polarized perspectives on Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. From one viewpoint, it is framed as an invasion and occupation of the northern part of the island. From another, it is portrayed as a necessary act to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from potential harm due to rising tensions and violence from the Greek Cypriot majority. This dual interpretation underscores the complexity of the Cyprus conflict, where historical narratives and political viewpoints shape opposing understandings of the same event. Adding to this, the conflict can be characterized as domestic because it comprises groups within a single state recognizable by characteristics such as language, religion, ideology, ethnicity, ideology, or geographic region⁸⁰.

The history of ethnic conflict on the island is not one that first occurred in the 20th century. During Ottoman rule (1571 to 1878), contrasting religious and cultural interests represented major factors in the conflict between both communities on the island⁸¹. The religious differences between Orthodox Christians and Muslims kept the two entities apart which maintained their identities.

Under the Orthodox Church's political leadership, Greek Cypriot nationalism developed. Later, the Turkish Cypriots leaned on a different strand of nationalism to counterpart the Greek Cypriot's anti-colonial nationalist movement, leading to the Turkish Cypriot support of the British rule in Cyprus⁸². The conciliation toward the Turkish Cypriot minority aggravated the inter-ethnic correlation and „politicization of the traditional power structure’’⁸³.

After the British withdrawal and Cyprus' independence, equal power-sharing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not materialize⁸⁴. Ethnic conflict continued to escalate, further

⁸⁰ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 206f.

⁸¹ Kopaka, Katerina, and Gerald Cadogan. "Two Mediterranean Island Life Modes, Two Island Archaeologies. Crete and Cyprus: How Near, How Far?" *British School at Athens Studies* 20 (2012): 17–33, 27.

⁸² Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 208.

⁸³ Ibid., 209.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

dividing the two communities. While the Turkish Cypriot community demanded the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey (*taksim*), the Greek Cypriots sought unification (*enosis*) with Greece.

Despite ongoing UN-led negotiations since 1974 aimed at fostering peaceful coexistence and reestablishing a central government between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the conflict remains deeply entrenched and complex.

3. Constitutions of Cyprus: The Creation of the Republic of Cyprus and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’

The two constitutions - the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus and the 1985 Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) - play a central role in shaping the identity and political structures of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The 1960 Constitution established a power-sharing framework between both communities, but its failure to accommodate the political realities of Cyprus led to tensions. After the Turkish intervention/invasion in 1974, the TRNC Constitution formalized the division, creating a separate political entity for Turkish Cypriots. These constitutional developments have reinforced the dual statehood and nation-building processes in Cyprus.

3.1. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)

3.1.1. Aims of the 1960 Constitution: A New State Model for Cyprus

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus of 1960 is a 97-page document, comprising 13 parts and a total of 199 articles⁸⁵. The Constitution was designed to govern a newly independent Republic of Cyprus after Great Britain’s colonial rule (1878 to 1960) and was written and implemented in 1960. It put into effect a bicomunal power-sharing scheme between the two main communities, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, aiming to balance their political representation and governance. The power-sharing was meant to guarantee that the Turkish Cypriot minority has a say in national governance⁸⁶.

Important to note is the context in which the Constitution was written. It was part of a bigger legal framework, including the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom and the Treaty of Alliance (1960) between Cyprus, Greece, and

⁸⁵ The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, 1960.

⁸⁶ Anderson, Choudhry. *Territory and Power*, 44.

Turkey. The Treaty of Guarantee gave the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey the right to intervene in Cyprus if the constitutional order was in danger. The purpose of the Treaty of Guarantee was to ensure the territorial integrity, independence, and constitutional order of Cyprus allowing the three guarantor powers to intervene if any of these conditions were threatened. These states were permitted to act individually to restore the state of affairs⁸⁷. The United Kingdom also kept hold of its two military bases Akrotiri and Dhekelia, still functioning today, established in the Treaty of Establishment⁸⁸. The Treaty of Alliance created a military alliance between the three countries to ensure the territorial integrity and independence of the newly founded Republic of Cyprus. Greek and Turkish military units were stationed in Cyprus to prevent threats to its sovereignty. These troupes were intended to stabilize the interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and maintain peace⁸⁹.

The goal was to establish a balanced republic with two co-existing communities while recognizing separate identities. However, the rigid power-sharing system was intended to prevent unilateral governance. Greece's, Turkey's, and the UK's interests were tried to be balanced through the Constitution.

The Constitution's content analysis helps reveal its complex and distinctive structure and character. It was designed to balance the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and to satisfy the external geopolitical interests of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The following pages include a short content description of the Constitution, giving a comparative framework for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Constitution (1985), thematized in the next sub-chapter.

⁸⁷ Rumpf, Christian. "Verfassung und Recht". Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev. *Südosteuropa Handbuch 8, Zypern*, 155-95. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998, 159f.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 159.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 160.

3.1.2. *Structure and Key Provisions*

Part I: General Provisions

Part I *General Provisions* establishes the character of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent and sovereign presidential republic with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President (Article 1). The document functions as an ethnic group constitution instead of assuming a Cypriot nation.

Ethnic identities are defined in Article 2. Greek Cypriots are those of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek. They also should share Greek cultural traditions and be a member of the Greek Orthodox Church. Turkish Cypriots are those of Turkish origin whose mother tongue is Turkish. They should share Turkish traditions and be Muslims. Article 2 explains what requirements and procedures are needed if there are Cypriots that belong neither to Greek nor Turkish descent. Maronites and Armenians found a place in the new order as minorities with limited rights⁹⁰. The citizens who don't fit this description must either choose to belong to one or the other community or write a statement about why they want to belong to another community. The fluidity of belonging is highlighted in Article 2, Paragraph 5. If either Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots want to change to which community they belong to, they can submit a declaration to their respective Communal Chamber. The gender aspect is only touched upon very briefly in Article 2, Paragraph 7. Women can only choose to belong to communities through their husbands. Also, age is a crucial factor. An unmarried child under 21 years old belongs to the community to which the father belongs. However, if the father is unknown, the child belongs to the mother's community. Article 2 is already a very complex and long article with various pillars of community definitions. The Constitution tries to build bridges, and a

⁹⁰ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 158.

certain flexibility to something that per definition, is inflexible. It already separates both communities in a rigid matter.

The official languages are Greek and Turkish (Article 3). Article 4 consolidates the guidelines for the Cypriot flag. The Republic should have a flag with a neutral design and color. However, on holidays, the Cypriot flag is allowed to fly together with the flags of Greece and Turkey. Also, Greek and Turkish national holidays are allowed to be celebrated (Article 5). This underlines the strong connection towards the ‘motherlands’.

Part II: Fundamental Rights and Liberties

The Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights to all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, ensuring equality before the law. The rights include freedom of speech, religion, property, and assembly. The Supreme Constitutional Court serves as a mediator in resolving conflicts between communities while safeguarding these rights. The individual rights the Constitution committed to were all-embracing, particularly if one reflects on the post-colonial context. However, collective rights for communities sometimes conflict with the application of these individual rights, especially in the scope of intercommunal debates.

Article 6 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity. Specific protections are outlined, including the right to life and personal integrity (Article 7), freedom from torture (Article 8) and forced labor and slavery (Article 10). The security and freedom of the person is determined in Article 11. Fundamental procedural rights are specified in Article 12. Freedom of movement and settlement, prohibition of banishment and expulsion, the protection of private and family life, and the sanctity of the home (Article 16) are other guidelines for the Constitution (Articles 13 to 15). The following articles of Part II contain classical democratic freedoms of communication, opinion, and press, as well as religion, assembly, and association. The right to property has been concretized with detailed expropriation provisions (Article 23). The state is tasked with ensuring these rights are practically upheld (Article 35).

Part III: Executive Power

Both communities took on significant roles in governing the newly independent island. Part III *The President of the Republic, The Vice President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers* conceptualizes the new state as a presidential republic. The executive power in the Republic of Cyprus was shared between a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President, intending to balance the interests of both communities. This power-sharing model was crucial due to the minority position of the Turkish Cypriots. Both leaders had co-determination rights, including veto power over critical issues such as defense, foreign policy, and taxation (Articles 48 and 49). Article 46 establishes the 7:3 Greek-to-Turkish Cypriot ratio of the Council of Ministers, reinforcing the ethnic division within the governance structure.

Part IV: Legislative Power

The legislative power was vested in a 50-member House of Representatives, with a fixed 70:30 ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots (Article 62). This fixed ratio reflected the communities' respective population sizes according to Part IV *The House of Representatives*. Reflecting on this, the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus institutionalized ethnic division by validating communal representation in political offices, considering the need to protect minority rights. Yet, this rigidity partly contributed to its failure, as mutual vetoes make settlement and resolution matters more complex.

Part V: Communal Autonomy

Next, communal autonomy is a crucial feature of the Constitution. Part V *The Communal Chambers* grants communal autonomy through two self-governing chambers, each handling issues like religion, education, culture, and personal status (Article 87). Both chambers deal separately from each other and have legislative authority over their respective communal affairs. This system aimed to protect the minority, allowing both communities separate

legislative control and financial support for cultural and religious matters from their respective ‘motherlands’(Article 108). The communal structure provided internal autonomy for each community, formalizing self-governance over religious and cultural issues. However, it cemented ethnic segregation because it limited cooperation between the two groups on important national issues.

Parts VI-XI: Judicial Provisions

Part VI *The Independent Officers of the Republic* deals with authority organization. The Attorney-General and his Deputy are jointly appointed by the President and Vice President and function as the head of the prosecuting authority (Article 112). They perform the functions of legal advisors and are objective representatives of the law.

Part VII *The Public Service* sets the provisions on the Public Service and deals with ethnic quotas (7:3) (Article 123). The Public Service Commission is responsible for personal matters (Articles 124 and 125). Article 125 lays down complicated voting mechanisms in Commission meetings, reinforcing the complexity of the Constitution’s character.

Part VIII *The Forces of the Republic*, deals with security matters. The Republic of Cyprus has an army of 2000 men with a quota of 6 Greek Cypriots to 4 Turkish Cypriots (Article 129). Article 130 postulates that the security forces, police, and gendarmerie, also consist of 2000 men, with a quota of 7 to 3. This can be categorized as an attempt to create a security apparatus that integrated both groups. However, the 7:3 ratio caused tensions, particularly due to each community trying to protect its interests. The government’s effective responses to security matters are complicated because of the joint control over the defense. Article 131 regulates the election of the commanders of the respective security forces. The Heads and Deputy Heads are appointed by the President and Vice President. In areas with almost 100 percent of the population of one ethnic group, only forces of that specific group shall be stationed (Article 132).

Part IX deals with the provisions of *The Supreme Constitutional Court*. Article 133 manages the composition of the court. The judges need to be one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and a neutral judge who is the court's president. The neutral judge is not allowed to belong to any guarantor state, including the Republic. According to Article 136, the Supreme Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate on all constitutional matters. Article 137 postulates that no law or action should discriminate against the communities.

The judicial power in the narrower sense is the subject of Part X *The High Court and the Subordinate Courts*. The provisions on the composition of the High Court issue two judges belonging to the Greek ethnic group in addition to a Turkish Cypriot (Article 153). The High Court is the court of appeal regarding the application of the law of the Republic for the lower courts (Article 155). The High Judicial Council is responsible for the personnel and disciplinary matters of judges and public prosecutors (Article 157). A crucial point is that the Constitution founded a unitary state while granting significant autonomy to local authorities. The Constitutional Court and High Court of Justice were established to guarantee fair administration as well as a stage to resolve intercommunal disputes.

Part XI *Financial Provisions* provides for financial questions. It establishes the framework for a Consolidated Fund of the Republic and a Consolidated Fund of the Communal Chambers (Article 165) for significant financial elements (Article 166). Furthermore, the role of the Minister of Finance is defined (Articles 167 and 168).

Part XII-XIII: Miscellaneous and Final Provisions

Article 169 of Part XII *Miscellaneous Provisions* sets the guidelines for international agreement settlements. Part XII elaborates on the international framework for the Constitution. Article 170 guarantees a most-favored-nation treatment to the guarantor powers in agreement and treaty matters. Article 171 contains provisions on the scope of broadcasting programs for Greek and Turkish Cypriots in both languages. Article 173 plans the establishment of separate

municipalities in the five largest towns, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos, by the Turkish community. Municipal administration and the relations between citizens and municipalities are subject to Articles 174 to 178.

In the *Final Provisions* of Part XIII, the validity of the Constitution is highlighted. The Constitution acts as the supreme law (Article 179) and should be made available in Greek and Turkish languages (Article 180). The last part also regulates the rank and relationship of the Constitution to the treaties concluded with the guarantor powers (Article 181). Especially Article 182 plays a crucial role. It stipulates that no articles can be amended, varied, repelled, or added except with a two-thirds approval of the deputies of the communities. This provision also introduced the idea that constitutional amendments can be unconstitutional. It highlights the rigidity of the document. In case of public danger or war, the Council of Ministers, with the approval of the House of Representatives, can declare a state of emergency. The President or Vice President is subject to the veto right. The duration of the state of emergency is two months, with the possibility of an extension (Article 183).

Article 185 is particularly striking because it concerns the integrity of the island. It prohibits the division of the territory of the Republic. It also excludes any possible union with a state or separatist independence. The transitional provisions, Articles 187 to 199, mainly focus on the transitional period from British rule to the new independent state.

3.1.3. Reflection: Challenges and Weaknesses of the Constitution

In practice, the Constitution's power-sharing model proved infeasible due to the differences and mistrust between the Greek Cypriots leaning toward *enosis* and the Turkish Cypriots leaning toward *taksim*⁹¹. The result was the outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1963 when Turkish Cypriots withdrew from government. This led to the collapse of the bi-communal power-

⁹¹ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 209.

sharing agreement and the division of Cyprus in 1974 following a Greek-led *coup d'état* and an ensuing Turkish invasion⁹². Greek Cypriots' *enosis* aspirations and Turkish Cypriots' *taksim* inclinations had massive consequences on constitutional stability.

The enactment of the Constitution did not bring out a united Cypriot nation. On the contrary, the document focuses on keeping both communities separate from each other. A balance of power was envisioned through the establishment of proportional representation in governance structures. However, mutual distrust and ethnic distance didn't allow this proportionality to fully work and often hindered important decision-making processes.

Moreover, without mutual consent from both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, amendment-making was made nearly impossible. Certain articles require the approval of both communities to change, particularly those related to communal rights. This displays the weakness, complexity, and rigidity of the Constitution. The ineffectiveness of altering key provisions made the document unadaptable to changing political realities⁹³.

The Constitution is a complex document, highly rigid in its demands, and difficult to revise and alter without the consent of both communities. This rigidity was intended to avoid unilateral amendments by the Greek Cypriots, representing the majority. It seemed to be unalterable for Greek and Turkish Cypriots while simultaneously institutionalizing ethnic divisions rather than fostering unity⁹⁴.

Since 1964, the Turkish Cypriots have not been involved in the power exercise of Cyprus, weakening the power-sharing agreements, and the normative force of the Constitution has been limited to the Greek ethnic group⁹⁵.

The Constitution is characterized by the practically inadequately implemented attempt to do constitutional justice to the two ethnic groups⁹⁶. The aim of preserving the Republic's unity and

⁹² Cop, Eymirliolu. *THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION*, 134f.

⁹³ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 156.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 168.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 156.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

ensuring the cohesion of the two ethnic groups in one state was jeopardized by missing or counterproductive mechanisms. These shortcomings include granted influence of the ‘motherlands’ in the field of education or the division of the municipal administrations into Greek and Turkish ones in the five largest cities of Cyprus⁹⁷. The reconciliation of the opposing national goals of the Greek Cypriot desire for *enosis* and the Turkish Cypriot desire for *taksim* was not realized. These divides ultimately led to the collapse of the state model established by the Constitution.

To conclude, the 1960 Constitution attempted to establish a multiethnic, bi-communal, independent, and balanced state but failed due to its rigidity, external pressures, and mistrust between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Dominated by the Treaty of Alliance, Treaty of Guarantee, and Treaty of Establishment, it reflected external powers rather than Cypriot self-determination. The three treaties inserted and implanted external power in Cyprus’ sovereignty. While it sought justice for both communities, mechanisms like divided municipal administrations deepened divides. Christian Rumpf argued that the Constitution, intended to resolve the Cyprus problem, ultimately fueled its failure, leaving the island divided contrary to its original provisions⁹⁸.

3.2.The Constitution of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (1985)

3.2.1. Background of the Constitution of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’

In 1963, President Archbishop Makarios proposed thirteen amendments aimed at ‘improving’ the 1960 Constitution. This sparked violent conflict between the two ethnic communities⁹⁹. Threats of intervention by Turkey prompted the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force

⁹⁷ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 158.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 162.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 168.

to Cyprus in March 1964¹⁰⁰. In turn, the Turkish ethnic group terminated its cooperation with the relevant provisions of the constitution in 1964 and gradually withdrew from the positions of central authority¹⁰¹. The Cypriot government undertook further measures to adapt the state organization of the constitution. The Greek Cypriot National Assembly was dissolved in 1965, its powers were transferred to the House of Representatives, and the jurisdiction of the Greek National Courts was transferred to the district courts. In July 1965, the three vacant Turkish ministerial positions in the Council of Ministers were filled by Greek Cypriots. Additionally, a new law extended President Makarios' term and ended the tenure of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President. In this way, the Greek Cypriot ethnic group consolidated its claim to identity with the sovereign of the Republic of Cyprus¹⁰².

Following the division, the Turkish Cypriot community formed a self-declared autonomous administration in the north. Initially called the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975, the TRNC was declared in 1983 after a long and complex history of ethnic tension, political division, and external interventions in Cyprus¹⁰³. The TRNC needed a formal legal framework to govern itself, assert sovereignty, and provide legal order. The creation of its Constitution was a direct response to these conflicts and the need to establish a functioning governance structure for the Turkish Cypriot community.

The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was adopted on May 5, 1985. It represents the foundational legal document for the TRNC, a state that remains unrecognized by the international community except for Turkey. The Constitution of the TRNC of 1985 is a 67-page document, comprising 8 parts and a total of 164 articles¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰⁰ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 210.

¹⁰¹ Cop, Eymirliolu. *THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION*, 135.

¹⁰² Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 169.

¹⁰³ Potapkina, Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building in Contested States*, 63f.

¹⁰⁴ The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1985.

3.2.2. *Structure and Key Provisions*

Preamble

The preamble establishes strong, idealistic ties between the TRNC and its ‘motherland,’ Turkey, presenting Cyprus as a state that owes its existence to Turkish support. Turkish Cypriots are portrayed as an „inseparable part of the great Turkish nation”, liberated from colonial rule and post-1955 conflicts through Turkey’s ‘heroic’ intervention¹⁰⁵. The preamble emphasizes Turkey’s role as a guarantor and savior, legitimizing the urgent need to create a separate state. The driving force behind the constitution is not a nation but the ‘people’. Another important point is the reclaiming of the legitimacy and right of self-determination the Turkish Cypriots had lost due to the „racist and discriminatory policy” of the Republic of Cyprus since 1963¹⁰⁶. Atatürk’s principles are also highlighted to reinforce the ideological foundation for a separate state.

Part I: General Provisions

Part I defines the state’s character. Article 1 establishes the TRNC as a secular republic, grounded in social justice, democracy, and parliamentary governance, diverging from the Republic of Cyprus’ presidential system¹⁰⁷. Article 2 emphasizes the indivisibility of the state and the people, designating Turkish as the official language and Lefkoşa as the capital. Sovereignty lies with the people (Article 3). The Constitution ensures separation of powers: the Assembly legislates (Article 4), the President and Council of Ministers execute (Article 5), and independent courts hold judicial power (Article 6). Every individual is equal before the law (Article 8). The provisions of Articles 1, 2, and 3 cannot be changed (Article 9).

Part II: Fundamental Rights, Liberties and Duties

¹⁰⁵ The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 176.

Part II of the TRNC Constitution extensively outlines fundamental rights and liberties, starting with Chapter I, Article 10, which ensures every individual's rights. It also restricts and guarantees rights (Article 11), prohibits actions undermining the constitutional order (Article 12), and allows limitations on foreigner rights within international law (Article 13).

Chapter II delves into personal rights, such as the prohibition of any kind of torture (Article 14), respect for personal liberty (Article 16), and the right to fair judicial access (Article 17). It covers freedoms including movement, religion, opinion, and communication (Articles 21 to 25), guarantees against censorship (Articles 26 to 31), and protects peaceful assembly and association (Articles 31 and 33). These provisions reflect modern democratic principles.

Chapter III emphasizes social and economic rights, liberties, and duties of the citizens. Articles 35 to 58 address family, property, education, cultural preservation, labor, and social welfare, emphasizing justice and equality. The protection of works and monuments of great cultural and historical importance and natural wealth shall be protected by the state (Article 39). Matters concerning the acquisition and requisition of Vakf properties are regulated by the Basic Principles of Evkaf (Article 42). Article 50 highlights the gender aspect of the constitution and limits women's roles in the workforce. Special protections are emphasized for different people regarding age, sex, and capability. Education, inspired by Atatürk's principles, is compulsory and free at the primary level (Articles 59 to 61). The TRNC Constitution places a significant emphasis on promoting Turkish Cypriot culture, traditions, and heritage. It underscores the importance of education in fostering national identity and the development of Turkish Cypriot youth, ensuring education is free and compulsory at the primary level.

Chapter IV defines citizenship (Article 67), acknowledging complex nationality issues due to historical circumstances¹⁰⁸. Every person having acquired citizenship from the Republic of Cyprus, resident in the TRNC, and Cypriots of Turkish origin or born in the TRNC are citizens

¹⁰⁸ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 177.

of the TRNC (Article 67)¹⁰⁹. According to the article, the citizens of the TRNC initially included those who became Cypriots upon its foundation and were permanently resident in the Turkish north on November 15, 1983. The same applies to those naturalized in the “Turkish Federal State of Cyprus”. Other Cypriots of Turkish origin should be able to naturalize more easily¹¹⁰. Turkish Cypriots, and those of Turkish descent living in Northern Cyprus, are primarily recognized as citizens, reflecting the Turkish Cypriot identity of the state. Article 68 grants voting rights at 18 and eligibility for office at the age of 25. Public service, national defense, and tax obligations are detailed (Articles 72 to 75), while citizens have the right to petition authorities (Article 76). These provisions collectively highlight the TRNC’s focus on rights, identity, and governance within its constitutional framework.

Part III-IV: Executive Power

Part III, *The Assembly of the Republic*, outlines legislative provisions. Chapter I (Articles 77 to 88) addresses the Assembly’s composition, duties, and operations. The 50 deputies oversee the Council of Ministers and enact, amend, and repeal laws (Article 78). Chapter II (Articles 89 to 95) regulates bills, resolutions, and international agreements, which require Assembly approval (Article 90). During a state of emergency or war, the authorization to use armed forces is made by the Assembly (Article 91). Chapter III (Articles 96 to 98) details the Assembly’s procedural rules.

Part IV, *The Executive*, Chapter I focuses on the President (Articles 99 to 105), who serves as head of state, holds significant powers, including a legislative veto. Eligible citizens over the age of 35 residing permanently in Cyprus may serve a five-year term (Article 99). Chapter II frames the functions, establishment, and duties of the Ministers. The President appoints the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers (Articles 106 to 112). While the Council includes non-

¹⁰⁹ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 177.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

parliamentary ministers, the number of ministries is capped at ten (Article 108). The Security Council advises on internal and external security matters (Article 111). In emergencies, the Council of Ministers can issue decrees limited to economic policy (Article 112).

Chapter III explains the different administrative bodies of the TRNC (Articles 113 to 123). The state administration blends centralized and local self-government elements (Articles 113, 116, 119). It introduces an independent ombudsman appointed by the President with Assembly consent to oversee administration, excluding foreign policy, defense, and justice (Article 114).

Chapter IV (Articles 124 to 128) addresses states of emergency, declared in crises like natural disasters or economic instability, limited to three months (Article 124). Acts of violence to eliminate the liberal and democratic order of the Constitution or the fundamental rights and liberties are reasons for declaring a state of emergency (Article 125).

Chapter V (Articles 129 to 131) regulates the professional bodies of a public nature, the broadcasting programs, Vakfs Organizations, and the Office of Religious Affairs.

Chapter VI (Articles 132 to 135) oversees public funds, utility enterprises, and socio-economic planning. This framework balances governance, rights, and public welfare.

Part V: Legislative Power

Part V, *The Judiciary*, outlines the judicial framework of the TRNC. Articles 136 to 142 define the courts' functions and the role of judges. The High Judicial Council serves as the supreme supervisory body, ensuring judicial independence and efficiency. The Supreme Court, comprising a President and seven judges, fulfills the roles of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Council, Court of Appeal, and High Administrative Court (Article 143). Articles 144 to 150 regulate the Constitutional Court's duties, including resolving disputes between state bodies (Article 145), conducting preventive judicial reviews (Article 146), and initiating abstract reviews of norms upon the President's request. The Court of Appeal acts as the highest appellate

authority (Article 151), while the High Administrative Court has exclusive jurisdiction over administrative disputes (Article 152). Articles 153 and 154 elaborate on the Supreme Court's operational rules. Additionally, the Subordinate Court exercises judicial power under the Constitution and the laws (Article 155). Military courts and disciplinary courts exercise judicial power relating to military matters (Article 156), with the Military Court of Appeal reviewing their decisions (Article 157). The Law Office of the TRNC operates independently under the Attorney-General, who acts as a legal adviser to the state and key government bodies (Article 158). Judicial independence is guaranteed to ensure the fair and impartial application of laws.

Part VI-VII: Other Provisions

Part VI *Miscellaneous Provisions* covers various provisions related to property and employment rights. Article 159 ensures state ownership over certain immovable properties, particularly following the 1974 events. Article 160 guarantees the employment rights of public personnel, preserving their benefits despite changes in administration. Article 161 mandates that all official laws and notices be published in the Official Gazette.

Part VII *Transitional Provisions* consists of thirteen articles, which outline the necessary legal, administrative, and governance adjustments for the implementation of the new constitution.

Finally, Part VIII *Final Provisions* establishes the process for amending the constitution (Article 162) and affirms the preamble as part of the constitutional text (Article 163). The provisions can be amended if at least ten members of the Assembly of the Republic make the proposal and a two-thirds majority of the total number of the members of the Assembly approve.

3.2.3. Reflection: Can One Speak of the 'TRNC' as a State?

The Security Council Resolutions 541¹¹¹ and 550¹¹² explicitly state that the declaration of TRNC's independence is invalid. This reaffirms the international community's refusal to recognize the TRNC. Statehood, as Bryant and Hatay argue, is based on validation and expectations from internal and external actors. The state needs to be seen and recognized as a state so that statehood can unfold¹¹³. The idea of what a state is and should be is taken up by the notion of statehood, while the state's agency is represented in the notion of statecraft. Having a 'real' state is made impossible by the lack of international recognition. The state, in TRNC's case, only emerges through the practices of statecraft but not through statehood¹¹⁴.

However, under constitutional and international law, the qualification as a 'state' does not depend on who designates the entity as a state, as Christian Rumpf argues¹¹⁵. Here, the question of self-determination arises. Self-determination is contextualized in terms of „who the holder of the right to self-determination is”¹¹⁶. Self-determination entails territorial integrity, independence, the right to freedom from intervention and interference in international affairs, and the unity of a state. It also means the self-determination of people's own destiny¹¹⁷. Some scholars argue that the TRNC is not a state but a *de facto* administrated entity and that its existence depends on the presence of the Turkish troops in the North¹¹⁸.

The theory and practice of international law, in most constitutional laws, accepts three objective criteria constituting a state: a territory that can be delimited from other states, an effective

¹¹¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, 1983, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/58970?ln=en&v=pdf> (Accessed on November 13, 2024).

¹¹² United Nations Security Council Resolution 550, 1984, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/67600?ln=en&v=pdf> (Accessed on November 13, 2024).

¹¹³ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 113.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 114.

¹¹⁵ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 174.

¹¹⁶ Abdullah, Maya. *The Right to Self-Determination in International Law. Scrutinizing the Colonial Aspect of the Right to Self-Determination*, Master Thesis, Göteborg, 2006, 55.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 60.

¹¹⁸ Cop, Eymirliolu. *THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION*, 140.

government, and its own people¹¹⁹. These objectives are also explicitly determined in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. “Effective” government in this context means that the government in question - in a democracy based on the separation of powers, which includes all three powers - can enforce the norms it has set without being subject to the political dictates of an external power. Furthermore, the state must be legally independent. In applying these criteria, both parts of the island are states. Christian Rumpf underlines that a state was formed through secession, which is irrelevant under Constitutional Law¹²⁰. Interestingly,

„the exchange of population in 1975 between the Greeks living in the north and the Turks staying in the south completed the social evolution of the island towards the existence of two separate peoples living in different geographical areas”¹²¹.

Another complex issue is the validity of the North’s secession. The TRNC’s 1983 declaration can be viewed as a secession from the Republic of Cyprus because the latter is an internationally recognized political entity and sole sovereign authority over the island¹²². Constitutionally, neither the 1960 Constitution nor the associated treaties allow any part of the island to secede. Thus, the 1983 secession of the North or the partition in 1974 was unconstitutional.

Additionally, Rumpf argues that it is uncertain whether the Greek Cypriot community’s ongoing opposition to the TRNC has legal significance¹²³. This contradiction only makes sense if the 1960 Constitution and treaties are viewed as still valid. However, the Greek Cypriot community

¹¹⁹ Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, 3.

¹²⁰ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 174.

¹²¹ Cop, Eymirliolu. *THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION*, 137.

¹²² Ibid., 142.

¹²³ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 171.

effectively abolished the Constitution's core principles, already before the declaration of the TRNC. The participation of both communities stopped in 1963, and the Greek Cypriots amended the Constitution and assumed the functions of the Republic's powers. Consequently, the Turkish Cypriot community existed as a legal fiction and a "minority" without actual minority rights. These actions contradict the prohibitions established by international treaties. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots alone cannot be seen as breaking away from the constitutional order.

Although the TRNC is economically dependent on Turkey, it is not legally dependent. It is also not subject to the instructions of the Republic of Turkey, even if Turkey tries to exert influence on domestic political processes in Northern Cyprus. In the legal sense, it is neither a province, protectorate, nor puppet republic. Even the fact that the TRNC has not been recognized does not automatically play a role in its status as a state. This is because it is disputed whether recognition has a declaratory or constitutive effect on a state in the sense of international law¹²⁴.

In principle, it can be argued that one is dealing with two states on the island, of which - because of international legal practice - only the Republic of Cyprus can act under international law. Under international law, the government of the Greek Cypriot ethnic group is the government of the Republic of Cyprus. It also follows from this that diplomatic protection for members of both communities can only be granted by the government of the Republic of Cyprus, i.e., the government of the Greek Cypriot community. Regardless of whether the TRNC can be described as a state, it has its own administration, which enforces its own constitutional norms and is enforced by its own democratically legitimized parliament¹²⁵.

¹²⁴ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 174f.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 175.

3.3. Comparative Analysis

3.3.1. *Constitutional Framework*

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus reflect two very different historical and political realities on the island. In 1960, Cyprus was framed as a sovereign and neutral state, avoiding strong affiliations with either Greece or Turkey, though their influence was undeniable. The TRNC defines itself as a Turkish state, reflecting the strong Turkish cultural, political, and military influence.

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus is a detailed document that intended to establish a new, bicommunal Republic, balancing the rights and power of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was designed to reflect the demographic reality and ensure equal political participation for both communities. Its structure reflects the British colonial legacy, but it was crafted as a unique, independent state constitution with extensive provisions for communal representation and minority protection¹²⁶. A complex power-sharing scheme was established to prevent the communities from exerting control and to ensure a sense of security for both. The Constitution emphasizes the coexistence and equal representation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots within a state. Greek and Turkish Cypriots shared Cypriot citizenship, and Greek and Turkish were both official languages. The aimed balance, however, led to considerable structural complexities, contributing to political friction.

In contrast, the TRNC Constitution is simpler in structure. It reflects the political realities post-1974 and emphasizes Turkish Cypriot autonomy. The document focuses on self-determination and asserting a Turkish Cypriot identity, reflecting on a unitary state structure. The Constitution does not provide a bicommunal framework, underlining that it exclusively serves as a Turkish Cypriot electorate. Moreover, with nationalist themes, such as the connections to Turkey or

¹²⁶ Mendez, Triga. *Constitution-Making*, 375.

Atatürk's principles, the TRNC Constitution tries to assert the right to self-govern and protect cultural preservation. Turkish is the sole official language, and the Constitution emphasizes the Turkish Cypriot identity. It is closely aligned with Turkish nationalism and Turkey's role as a protector.

3.3.2. Structure and Key Provisions: Power-Sharing Arrangements Between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

The 1960 Constitution emphasized a power-sharing arrangement. The presidency was divided, with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President. Each held veto powers on critical issues such as defense, taxation, and foreign policy (Article 50). This bicomunal executive structure aimed to ensure equal participation and prevent dominance by either community. Governmental posts and parliamentary seats were distributed based on a 7:3 ratio. The House of Representatives was designed to reflect bicomunal representation, with designated seats and voting rights for both communities (Article 62). Mechanisms like the communal chambers granted autonomy over religious and cultural matters. A Supreme Constitutional Court was intended to resolve intercommunal disputes, with separate judicial appointments for each community. However, the judicial structure faced challenges, particularly after 1963, when the Turkish Cypriot representatives withdrew¹²⁷. The practical implementation of these provisions proved difficult due to underlying tensions and competing interests between the two communities.

The TRNC Constitution, on the other hand, reflects a unilateral Turkish Cypriot governance structure. Its provisions emphasize the sovereignty and self-governance of Turkish Cypriots, with no focus on bicomunal governance. The TRNC follows a parliamentary, secular republic model, with a President as head of state and a Prime Minister as head of government (Articles 1, 5, and 107). Executive functions are centralized within Turkish Cypriot leadership, with no

¹²⁷ Cop, Eymirliolu. *THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION*, 135.

bicommunal framework. The unicameral Assembly of the Republic governs legislative matters, with members elected solely by Turkish Cypriots (Article 4). The TRNC has its own judicial system with courts that interpret and apply the constitution as per Turkish Cypriot law (Article 6). Judicial roles are centralized to support the unitary governance of TRNC.

3.3.3. International Legal Status and Recognition

The Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized as the legitimate government of the island, a status that has persisted despite the island's division and the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from government institutions in 1963. This legitimacy is reinforced by its membership in international bodies, including the United Nations and the European Union¹²⁸. The 1960 Constitution established Cyprus as an independent republic under a system of external guarantees by the UK, Greece, and Turkey¹²⁹. This treaty allowed each guarantor power to intervene under specific conditions, which Turkey eventually invoked in 1974.

The TRNC is only recognized by Turkey. Internationally, the TRNC lacks formal recognition, which limits its ability to participate on a global stage or engage in formal diplomatic relations¹³⁰. This disparity in recognition has profound implications. It impacts international negotiations, trade relations, and foreign aid for Turkish Cypriots¹³¹.

3.3.4. Human Rights Issues and Minority Protection

Both constitutions contain provisions for human rights and minority protections. The 1960 Constitution includes human rights guarantees, especially for freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, and prohibits discrimination (Articles 19, 18, and 28). It also seeks to safeguard

¹²⁸ Carlier. *What Prevents the Reunification*, 60.

¹²⁹ Rumpf. *Verfassung und Recht*, 160.

¹³⁰ Petithomme. *Militarisation de l'espace*, 124f.

¹³¹ Country Report: Cyprus, 11 July 2019. "EU Warns Turkey Against Oil and Gas Exploration Off Cyprus.", Gale Academic OneFile, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A610266817/AONE?u=43wien&sid=bookmark-AONE (Accessed on November, 7 2024), 1.

collective rights through ethnic quotas and veto powers, though this arrangement often hindered governance and created additional friction.

The TRNC Constitution pledges respect for basic human rights. Still, it is criticized by the international community and human rights groups for limitations on Greek Cypriot property rights in the north, among other issues¹³². Given the political and ethnic separation, this constitution's human rights protections are solely oriented toward the Turkish Cypriot population.

3.3.5. *Role of External Powers*

The 1960 Constitution's framework was shaped by the interests of Greece, Turkey, and the UK, formalized through the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment (Article 195). These treaties not only allowed for foreign intervention under specific conditions but also left Cyprus susceptible to influence from these external powers, which eventually contributed to the island's division. Also, British military bases have remained on the island¹³³.

The TRNC Constitution's external role is largely defined by Turkey, which remains its sole supporter and primary political and economic partner¹³⁴. This alignment underscores Turkey's influence in the TRNC, from military support to economic aid and policy alignment, indicating a dependency and continued influence of 'motherland' dynamics. The document is already in the preamble explicit about the role of Turkey as a protector and guarantor. While the UN does not recognize the TRNC, international efforts continue to focus on reunification under a federal framework, as evidenced by the UN-backed Annan Plan in 2004 and other peace initiatives¹³⁵.

¹³² Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*, 85.

¹³³ Rognon, Pierre. "Chypre et Malte: deux États insulaires dans l'Union européenne / Island-State of the European Union: Cyprus and Malta." *Annales de géographie* 114, no. 644 (2005): 383–98, 384.

¹³⁴ Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*, 7.

¹³⁵ Carlier. *What Prevents the Reunification*, 67.

However, Turkey's influence remains paramount within the TRNC, reinforcing its separate status¹³⁶.

3.3.6. *Constitutional Amendments and Rigidity*

The rigidity of the 1960 Constitution, particularly its amendment process, is one of the reasons for its failure. Constitutional amendments required approval from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, making it nearly impossible to adjust the document in response to evolving political realities (Article 182). In practice, this rigidity aggravated the divide as political disagreements became insurmountable without mutual consent.

The TRNC Constitution has greater flexibility for amendments as it operates under a single-community governance structure, meaning amendments can be made without requiring approval from a separate Greek Cypriot representation. Amendments require a two-thirds majority in the Assembly of the Republic (Article 162). However, this flexibility does not extend to bridging the divide on the island, given the TRNC's lack of recognition and its reliance on Turkey.

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus represented an ambitious attempt to create a balanced, bicomunal state in Cyprus, albeit with inherent rigidity and dependence on external powers. Its inability to adapt to changing dynamics and mediate ethnic tensions ultimately led to its failure. While the Constitution of the TRNC offers an approach to governance for Turkish Cypriots, its lack of international recognition limits its effectiveness and contributes to the island's ongoing division. Together, these constitutional frameworks underscore the complexity of Cyprus' political landscape and the challenges of creating a unified Cypriot identity within a framework dominated by ethnic and geopolitical influences.

¹³⁶ Petithomme. *Militarisation de l'espace*, 128.

4. Nation-Building Process in Cyprus: Identity Shaping and Nationalism(s)

This chapter examines the nation-building process and the concurrent construction of identities and senses of belonging among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Nationalist ideologies have shaped the historical narratives of both communities, underpinning the persistence of separate entities and the dual statehood in Cyprus.

4.1. Nationalist Ideologies and Connection to the ‘Motherlands’: Enosis and Taksim

4.1.1. Nationalist Ideologies: Creation of a Nation and an Identity

Nationalism is a phenomenon that must be examined within its specific historical context to be fully understood. Nations, ethnic identities, and national ideologies are not timeless, ahistorical, or primordial entities. Instead, they are socially constructed and operate within distinct historical and social frameworks¹³⁷.

The current Cypriot conflict traces its roots to the rise of Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the island. These nationalisms were shaped and amplified by various factors, including geographical dynamics, the processes of modernization, and the policies implemented during the colonial period¹³⁸. The longer an ethnic group has resided in a territory, the stronger its claim to ownership of the land becomes¹³⁹. Another key basis for territorial claims by nationalist groups comes from demographic realities. When a national group constitutes the majority population in a region, it often asserts control over that territory, invoking the „democratic principle of majority rule”¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁷ Kızıltepe, Beyza Hatun. *The Politicization of Memory Between Past, Present, and Future: Generational Remembering Among Turkish Cypriot Families*. ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020, 75.

¹³⁸ Morag, Nadav. “CYPRUS AND THE CLASH OF GREEK AND TURKISH NATIONALISMS.” *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 10, no. 4 (2004): 595–624, 595.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 596f.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 597.

Each side constructs and utilizes memory by emphasizing mutual denial rather than engaging in an exchange or integration of memories to establish common ground. This selective use of memory reflects how the past is instrumentalized to serve political objectives in the present and future in Cyprus¹⁴¹. Memory plays a crucial role in establishing and practicing national identity. War experiences are retold and reproduced as national glory and heroism¹⁴². A state's idea of itself reestablishes, changes, or reinforces a fixed identity¹⁴³. These changing identity narratives are made more complex by borders and movement¹⁴⁴. Identities are dispersed over generations, cultural experiences, and space: „Identities can be hybrid and incorporate multiple subject positions and contradictions”¹⁴⁵.

The Green Line also functions as a European border. In turn, it is a symbol of combatting ‘illegal immigration’, although, the Green Line is not a de facto European border due to the non-recognition of the TRNC as a state¹⁴⁶. The border prevents Cypriots from moving freely within their territory and „it takes on the new function of preventing asylum seekers and other third country nationals from entering European territory”¹⁴⁷. It is false to assume that a nation-state is a „place where politics, ethnicity, and culture coincide as coherent and homogenous unity so as to be seen as the undivided point of origin of our identity”¹⁴⁸.

Political power distribution was socially strengthened with the help of ideologies fixated on Greek and Turkish nationalism. This is also why, until today, there has been either only a Greek or Turkish cultural identity and national self-image¹⁵⁰. ‘Cypriotness’ was never promoted. Both

¹⁴¹ Kızıltepe. *The Politicization of Memory*, 85f.

¹⁴² Innes, Alexandria J. “Mobile Diasporas, Postcolonial Identities: The Green Line in Cyprus.” *Postcolonial Studies* 20, no. 3 (2017): 353–69, 356.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 357.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 358.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 363.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 364.

¹⁴⁸ Ilter, Tugrul. “The Island of Love/The Island of Conflict: Hospitality and Hostility of Turkish Cypriot Identity and Citizenship in North Cyprus.” *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 12, no. 1 (2015): 19–41, 22.

¹⁵⁰ Axt, Heinz-Jürgen, and Jeanette Choisi. “Politisches System”. Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev. *Südosteuropa-Handbuch 8, Zypern*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998, 196-239, 196f.

the 1960 Constitution and the 1985 Constitution exclusively addressed two distinct communities, rather than a unified Cypriot community. Both ideologies can be defined as ideological nationalism because they are more concentrated on legitimizing their power. There is an artificial connection to the respective ‘motherlands’ that grounds emotional and political tensions.

The significance of the events of 1974 and the establishment of the TRNC began to be questioned and criticized, particularly by the political left and certain intellectual circles. In this context, a shift in Turkish Cypriot nationalist discourse emerged, giving rise to a new narrative: Cypriotism¹⁵¹. This movement will be explained later.

Until today, some power structures are based on tensions that have been responsible for the failure of the Cyprus solution. Politicians and the media often thematize the Cyprus Question using nationalistic rhetoric¹⁵². The omnipresent meaning of the national heroes of Cyprus’ history is underlined by many statues and street and building names. There exist determinants of conflicts shaped by historical developments based on contrary nationalisms. These posit enemy images that refer to an emotional and irrational level and hinder the Cyprus Question’s potential solution¹⁵³.

The 1960 Constitution established a united, institutionalized state while simultaneously contributing to the creation of community divisions. However, the creation of the Republic of Cyprus couldn’t lift certain differences and contrasts of its communities. Their religious and cultural identities weren’t seen as a common whole. The respective historical consciousness seems arbitrary in that those historical phases contradicting the claimed ‘national’ continuity are ignored. The Greek Cypriots suppressed those periods in which the island was under Frankish, Venetian, and Ottoman rule, while the Turkish Cypriots mainly referred to the

¹⁵¹ Kızıltepe. *The Politicization of Memory*, 82.

¹⁵² Axt, Choi. *Politisches System*, 198f.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 201.

latter¹⁵⁴. The prospects for coexistence in Cyprus are weighed down if the population internalizes nationalism.

4.1.2. *Conflicting Ideologies: Enosis Versus Taksim*

Nationalism has been a dominant political ideology in the modern history of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot nationalism initially manifested through a sense of kinship with Turkey as well as strong anti-Greek sentiment. *Taksim* emerged as a political project and in the popular imagination. This project anticipated a separate space of its own, however, united with Turkey. It was utilized to make the Turkish Cypriots, a minority in Cyprus, feel seen and evident as political actors, wanting to give them sovereign agency¹⁵⁵. Over time, it shifted to focus on a connection to the land. This change became more pronounced following the arrival of Turkish settlers on the island¹⁵⁶.

The Greek Cypriot identity is based on the perception that their culture is linked to the Hellenic world. The Greek-Orthodox Church functioned as a crucial institution in Cyprus during the Ottoman rule and shaped the intellectual and cultural lives of the Greek Cypriots¹⁵⁷. The religion acts as an ethnic, national, religious, and cultural identity of the Greek Cypriots¹⁵⁸. From 1960 to 1974, *enosis* represented the dominant Greek-Cypriot ideological orientation. *Enosis* charged intercommunal disputes, partially leading to the Turkish invasion of 1974¹⁵⁹. From 1974 to the mid-1980s, Greek-Cypriot nationalism was repressed. During these years, Cypriotism emerged. This ideology pledged for the political independence of the island¹⁶⁰. However, the withdrawal of nationalism was only temporary. After the mid-1980s, an adjusted version of Greek-Cypriot nationalism reemerged as a dominant ideology. The reaffirmation of

¹⁵⁴ Axt, Choisi. *Politisches System*, 238.

¹⁵⁵ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 31.

¹⁵⁶ Kızıltepe. *The Politicization of Memory*, 83.

¹⁵⁷ Axt, Choisi. *Politisches System*, 200.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 718.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Greek identity is tied to Greek culture and the Greek state. This identity is strongly connected to Cyprus' independence.

Internal stability was achieved during the colonial rule of the British by using nationalism to establish a moral value system and to externally demarcate its own national identity and self-esteem¹⁶¹. Even though during British colonial rule in the 1930s 'Cypriotness' was promoted as a political instrument against Greek-Cypriot nationalism, public education in both communities has never cultivated a common Cypriot identity¹⁶². It rather fostered allegiance to the 'motherlands' and Greek and Turkish patriotism.

A key characteristic of European colonial rule was the effort to simplify pre-existing political structures to facilitate easier administration of colonies. Driven by their nationalist ideologies, colonial powers often classified colonized populations along ethnic lines rather than considering other factors¹⁶³. In Cyprus, the British adopted an ethno-national classification system, overlooking the shared culture and values between Turks and Greeks, as well as the commonalities among individuals from the same social classes¹⁶⁴. This approach reinforced divisions between the two communities. Ultimately, the British viewed the island's inhabitants as either Greeks or Turks, never as Cypriots or individuals. They promoted the development of two parallel sociopolitical systems grounded in secularism and ethnic identities defined by language and heritage rather than religion¹⁶⁵.

The anti-colonial struggle against the British was initiated by the Greek Cypriots and was based on Greek nationalism ideology. National unity in the Greek world is best explained through the notion of *Hellenism (Ellinismos)*, which first emerged during the Greek campaign to revive the

¹⁶¹ Axt, Choisi. *Politisches System*, 199.

¹⁶² Vural, Özuynik. *Redefining Identity*, 139.

¹⁶³ Morag, Nadav. "CYPRUS AND THE CLASH OF GREEK AND TURKISH NATIONALISMS." *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 10, no. 4 (2004): 595–624, 611.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 611.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 612.

Byzantine Empire in the 19th century. Simultaneously, it was promoted by another campaign *Megali Idea (Great Idea)*, a Greek nationalist vision seeking to unite all territories with Greek populations, including Cyprus¹⁶⁶. Consequently, this ideology inspired the *enosis* movement in Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots aspire to unite Cyprus with Greece. The concept of *Hellenism* goes hand in hand with the idea of the Turks being the archenemies responsible for the Byzantine's territorial downfall¹⁶⁷. The island was defined as Greek (Hellenic) while calling for union (*enosis*) with Greece¹⁶⁸. This understanding of the freedom struggle against British colonial rule underlined the self-identification of Cypriots. However, Greek nationalism continued to be the main factor of self-identification, even after the independence¹⁶⁹. As already mentioned, Turkish nationalism was picked up in response to Greek nationalism:

„In a mirror image polarisation of difference vis-à-vis Greek Nationalism asking for union with Greece, Turkish nationalists in North Cyprus declared that there are no Turkish Cypriots but only Turks who belong to the Turkish nation.”¹⁷⁰

This perception was especially omnipresent during the first Turkish Cypriot leadership under Rauf Denktaş, who argued that the TRNC is part of Turkey. There exists a constant threat of becoming a minority in their own home, whether this is real or imagined, due to the „dependent and colonising relation with Turkey”¹⁷¹. Since the early 1950s, Turkish policy has sought to maintain strategic control over Cyprus, among other things, to counter Greek influence and

¹⁶⁶ Papadakis. *Greek Cypriot Narratives*, 157.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 155.

¹⁶⁸ Ilter. *The Island of Love/The Island of Conflict*, 24.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 25.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 26.

prevent the island's full Hellenization¹⁷². The *taksim* policy advocated the partition of the island. On 27 May 1960, the Turkish military overthrew Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who had initially been more open to diplomatic solutions regarding Cyprus¹⁷³. This event shifted Turkish policy towards a more nationalistic and security-driven approach. The military regarded Cyprus as crucial to Turkey's national interests¹⁷⁴.

Greece and Turkey have affected the two Cypriot communities in terms of teaching history. The nationalist demands and ideas of both countries over Cyprus' territory have generated antagonisms that have found their way into the narratives of history¹⁷⁵. Both countries have also followed the idea that Cyprus is a natural extension of their own and translated this into an ethno-nationalist perspective in history teaching. This narrative comes in handy as an ideological instrument that „stipulates popular loyalty to the nationalist interpretation of history and that justifies nationalistic projects of *enosis* and *taksim*”¹⁷⁶. Denktaş established himself as the hero and symbol of Turkish Cypriot independence and monopolized political power. Until 2000, the TRNC was tainted by corruption, patronage networks, and aid from Turkey¹⁷⁷. Atavistic identity was also promoted through state-controlled schools and media, and nationalist symbols across the North's landscape such as flags¹⁷⁸.

To sum up, both communities have had strong ties with their respective motherland nationalisms throughout history. These ties have changed across time and space¹⁷⁹. Shared perceptions of historical and cultural ties to Turkey or Greece have been crucial in mobilizing

¹⁷² Evaghorou, Evaghoras L. “Turkey's Policy on the Cyprus Question: Strategic Goals and Negotiating Positions towards a Solution of the Cyprus Problem.” *Cyprus Review (Nicosia, Cyprus : 1989)* 35, no. 2 (2023): 113–39, 118.

¹⁷³ Gourisse, Benjamin. “What Politics Does to the Army: Divisions and Reconfigurations to the Military Institution in the 27 May 1960 Coup in Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 58, no. 1 (2022): 70–86, 72.

¹⁷⁴ Evaghorou. *Turkey's Policy on the Cyprus Question*, 117.

¹⁷⁵ Vural, Özuynik. *Redefining Identity*, 138.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ulas. *EVOLUTIONARY POSSIBILITIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION*, 14.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Loizides, Neophytos G. “Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus.” *International Studies Perspectives* 8, no. 2 (2007): 172–89, 173.

the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities around competing nationalist agendas. Over time, both groups have envisioned their futures as intrinsically connected to their respective ‘motherlands’. For Greek Cypriots, nationalism was fueled by opposition to British colonial rule, reinforced by support from influential figures in mainland Greece. This sentiment was further intensified by Britain’s refusal to transfer sovereignty to Greece or propose a viable alternative. Conversely, Turkish Cypriot nationalism emerged primarily as a defensive response to Greek Cypriot aspirations, driven by concerns over security and marginalization. Symbolically, Turkish Cypriots found motivation in themes of ‘motherland nationalism’, drawing strength from their association with Turkey¹⁸⁰. The mental attitude towards internalized nationalism is evident in the demand for *enosis* and the 1985 TRNC Constitution, which states that „the Turkish Cypriot People is an inseparable part of the great Turkish Nation’’¹⁸¹. Not only is nationalism instrumentalized as a political ideology. It is also used as a social construction of world views and identities, analyzed as a broader cultural discourse¹⁸².

4.2. Between 1960 and 1974: Cypriots’ Reaction to Nationalism and Partition

4.2.1. Between Independence and Enclavement

The reflection on national identity in both Cypriot communities can be discerned in the 1960s when the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus induced ethno-nationalists to be apprehensive of the idea that their respective ethnic identity was being erased by a collective Cypriot identity¹⁸³. The newly established state distanced itself from its bi-communal character after intercommunal fights in the mid-1960s. Failed bicommunalism led to the establishment of a separate Turkish-Cypriot administration. The territorial separation of the two communities was

¹⁸⁰ Loizides. *Ethnic Nationalism*, 174.

¹⁸¹ The Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1.

¹⁸² Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 718.

¹⁸³ Vural, Özünyik. *Redefining Identity*, 134.

finalized after the military coup sponsored by the Greek Junta and the military invasion of Turkish troops in 1974.

The external dimension of the Cypriot conflict had two main components. The first was nationalist, linked to domestic politics in Greece and Turkey, both influencing the situation in Cyprus. The second involved international *Realpolitik*, particularly the strategic importance of the island within the ongoing tensions between Greece and Turkey, as well as the broader context of the Cold War¹⁸⁴. As nationalism grew in both Greece and Turkey, each group would form strong ties with their counterparts on the mainland. While Greeks were the majority on the island, the proximity of Turkey made them feel like an oppressed minority¹⁸⁵.

After the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed, it was quickly realized that the Greek Cypriots who followed *enosis* weren't satisfied with the constitution. The *sui generis* state gave the Greek and Turkish Cypriots the right to elect their leaders separately. The Greek Cypriot community leader became President while the Turkish Cypriot leader became Vice President¹⁸⁶.

Physically, the division was completed in 1974, following the Greek nationalist coup and the subsequent invasion/intervention by Turkey. The processes that led to the division began earlier. In 1960, Cyprus became independent, however, „adopted an unworkable constitution that fixed ethnic identity into separate interest groups”¹⁸⁷. In 1963, Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution. The Akritas Plan outlined Makarios' vision to integrate the Turkish Cypriots as a minority rather than within a consociational framework. In December 1963, intercommunal violence began with great intensity, duration, and scope. The escalation forced the Turkish Cypriot minority to retreat into isolated Turkish-controlled urban sectors and

¹⁸⁴ Morag. *CYPRUS AND THE CLASH*, 618.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 619.

¹⁸⁶ Temizkan, Yasin, Jatswan S. Sidhu, and Sheila Devi Michael. “Understanding Turkish Cypriots' Constantly Deepening Distrust Towards Greek Cypriots.” *Malaysian Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 1 (2023): 128–44, 132.

¹⁸⁷ Innes, *Mobile Diasporas*, 354.

the countryside. Greek Cypriot paramilitary forces subsequently blocked off these areas. This period of enclavement further deepened the divide and aggravated tensions between the two national communities¹⁸⁸.

The Cypriot government imposed an economic blockade on Turkish enclaves to pressure their inhabitants into abandoning the enclaves and negotiating. Greek Cypriots developed infrastructure, including roads, electric lines, and water systems around the enclaves¹⁸⁹. The intercommunal violence in 1963, followed by the enclave period, deepened divisions between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. As a reaction to the blockades, Turkish Cypriots began renaming villages under their control with Turkish names.

In 1964, Turkish Cypriots were forced into enclaves to protect them from Greek nationalism and imprisonment. The Green Line was drawn across the map of Cyprus in the same year by British Major General Peter Young. The Line functions as a ceasefire zone, dividing the country in two. The Green Line is a non-conventional border, symbolizing ontological insecurity, as Alexandria J. Innes posits¹⁹⁰. The border forms and produces the identity of Cypriots, „implicating a complex and relational ontological security comprising identity, memory, state and society”¹⁹¹.

The creation of a consociational democratic system is inherently complex. It relies on the idea that deeply divided societies, are separated along ethnic lines. These ethnic groups are often subject to two competing sources of authority - their ethnic leadership and the state itself. This „dual authority policies” can be fragile¹⁹². Following the establishment of the Cypriot state, socio-economic disparities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots extended. Turkish Cypriots

¹⁸⁸ Morag. *CYPRUS AND THE CLASH*, 601.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 610f.

¹⁹⁰ Innes. *Mobile Diasporas*, 355.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Morag. *CYPRUS AND THE CLASH*, 617.

faced economic and political marginalization due to government policies that prioritized Greek Cypriots in financial aid, education, development, and housing¹⁹³.

4.2.2. *Reinforcing Separate Identity through the Education System*

Existing educational structures kept existing after the British occupied Cyprus in 1878¹⁹⁴. Christian and Muslim schools were maintained as separate institutions, ensuring that the curriculums of the two communities reflected those in Greece and Turkey, respectively. The two Boards of Education appointed the schoolbooks, requiring that the history textbooks be written in the ‘motherlands’. Consequently, the contents of the books underlined the conflicting relationship between Greece and Turkey¹⁹⁵. Greek and Turkish Cypriot’s nationalisms were not a product of local historical consequences but more so imported through Greek and Turkish teachers, books, and newspapers from the mainland.

History and the educational system are often instrumentalized in societies to propagate a narrative based on the nation’s suffering and the legitimization of its political goals. This is especially true for societies divided through ethno-national disputes like those in Cyprus, as Yiannis Papadakis claims¹⁹⁶. Educational textbooks were often tainted by political goals and two nationalisms - mainly Greek and Turkish - stressing the close connection to their respective ‘motherlands’¹⁹⁷. Common descent, language, culture, religion, and history with the people of the ‘motherlands’ were found in their political agenda. *Hellenism* was reproduced in Greek Cypriot schoolbooks, postulating a transcendental historical connection and continuity of the ancient and modern times¹⁹⁸. The use of this campaign has been under academic critique:

¹⁹³ Morag. *CYPRUS AND THE CLASH*, 610.

¹⁹⁴ An, Ahmet. “ ‘Cypriotism’ and the Path to Reunification.” *Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution*, edited by James Ker-Lindsay, 24–30. London: I.B.Tauris, Bloomsbury Collections, 2015, 24.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁹⁶ Papadakis. *Narrative, Memory and History*, 128.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 131.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 132.

„According to the logic of this model (*Hellenization thesis*) others (Turkish Cypriots, for example) have (historically speaking) no rightful place in Cyprus, hence the category ‘Cypriots’ is constantly used in a manner that excludes them”¹⁹⁹.

After 1960, both communities realized that neither the objectives of *enosis* nor *taksim* had materialized. Turkish Cypriot educational textbooks thematize the Turkish invasion in 1974 as an act of salvation, while Greek Cypriot textbooks ignore the events between 1963 and 1974. No unified national education system was created. Rather, two separate systems were under the supervision of the Greek Communal Chamber and the Turkish Communal Chamber²⁰⁰. Each Community Assembly oversaw all educational matters of their respective community, according to Article 87 of the Constitution. Consequently, two separate spheres through education were established. Each community had the pursuit to „reproduce and be legitimised on a collective level”²⁰¹. Incorporating the Turkish Cypriot community into the Turkish nation held the Turkish Cypriot community back and „stopped any development that could lead to the questioning of their policy in Cyprus”²⁰². In contrast to the Greek Cypriot education, where the Church played and still plays an important role, the Turkish Cypriot educational system eliminated every religious element. It was developed and operated in the realm of Turkish nationalism and Kemalist secularism put through by Atatürk²⁰³. Interestingly, Greek and Turkish Cypriot accounts of history tend to thematize the same issues and topics: „Individual stories of sacrifice, endurance, pain and pride”²⁰⁴. Turkish Cypriots are generally pointed out as a community instead of a nation. The historiography of 1960 to 1974 is characterized by an

¹⁹⁹ Papadakis. *Narrative, Memory and History*, 132f.

²⁰⁰ Michael, Michalis N. “Creating a New Identity: From the Secular Turkish Cypriot to the Muslim Turk of Cyprus.” *Cyprus Review (Nicosia, Cyprus : 1989)* 26, no. 2 (2014): 15–32, 16.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 17ff.

²⁰⁴ Potapkina, Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building*, 67.

apologetic history writing tone, focusing on the victimization and defenseless role of the Turkish Cypriots²⁰⁵.

4.3. Between 1974 and 1985: Partition and the Rise of Cypriotism

4.3.1. Establishment of a New State

The collapse of the consociational arrangements in 1963 brought significant hardships for the Turkish Cypriot community. Many were displaced, forced into enclaves, and endured dire living conditions. Right-wing terror campaigns, notably those led by the Turkish Cypriot TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, a pro-*taksim* paramilitary resistance organization), further undermined prospects for intercommunal cooperation. The Turkish government „sent officers and special forces veterans, who arrived secretly on the island and (...) trained Turkish Cypriots in the tactics of unconventional warfare”²⁰⁶. Consequently, ‘motherland nationalism’ became the prevailing ideology among Turkish Cypriots, especially in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion.

Rauf Denktaş unilaterally proclaimed the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC) in 1975. The state, however, was not internationally recognized as a separate Cypriot state. In February 1975, the Constitution Assembly of the TFSC came together to discuss and write their new constitution. The assembly constituted nationalist leaders who were already active in the Communal Chamber and parliament and representatives of associations and unions²⁰⁷. Even though the uncertain atmosphere about the form and future of the ‘state’, „offices were being established, representatives were sent to foreign countries, transports of people arrived from Turkey, and state-building proceeded apace”²⁰⁸.

²⁰⁵ Potapkina, Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building*, 69.

²⁰⁶ Pelt, Mogens. *Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and Its Demise*. London New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2014, 112.

²⁰⁷ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 115.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 116.

In the spring of 1976, the constitution passed a referendum. In the summer, elections were hosted. All these nation-building developments were highly contested internationally and in the Republic of Cyprus. Refugees were encouraged to settle down and start living in the new place²⁰⁹. How the state would be shaped was the most contested and debated topic during the constitution-making process of the future TRNC²¹⁰. The ambiguities of statehood and the demands of statecraft have been in constant conflict with each other because of the state's 'transition period'²¹¹. Implementing and planning a state was in disjuncture with the anticipated resolution of the Cyprus Question:

„While that denial is most obvious in the factitiousness of their statehood, it appears already in the materiality of statecraft, which quite obviously *does* exist even though as it *should not*.“²¹²

This quote underlines the ambiguous and paradoxical character of unrecognized statehood, where material and functional aspects of governance undeniably exist despite the denial of legitimacy on an international level. It reflects the tension between the tangible presence of statecraft and the refusal to acknowledge its political status. This process complicates the discourse around sovereignty and recognition.

Another important step in the establishment of the new 'state' was the process of *Turkification*. The northern landscape was changed shortly after 1974, making „the island's north look, sound, smell, and feel like a separate, 'Turkish' space“²¹³. This development goes hand in hand with the *dehellenization* process of the north. Greek statues, monuments, churches, and cemeteries

²⁰⁹ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 121.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 123.

²¹¹ Ibid., 132.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid., 60.

with Greek writing almost fully disappeared from the north - „erasing the Other’s claim on the visible landscape”²¹⁴. *Turkification* reinforced a distinct national identity separate from the Greek Cypriot identity. It legitimized the Turkish Cypriot claims to sovereignty and fostered a feeling of unity.

Making sense of an identity is realized through the territorial sense of feeling ‘at home’. The majority of Turkish Cypriots have experienced internal displacement and enclavement. The devastation of war meant that the space they found after settling was not the place they had left behind. New toponyms, flags, and statues underlined the ‘sovereignty’ effect of the new so-called state. These were enactments expressed through Turkish nationalism²¹⁵.

Initially, Turkish Cypriots regarded the arrival of Turkish troops as a liberation. However, this sentiment diminished over time due to growing international isolation, Turkey’s interference in their domestic affairs, economic stagnation, and the influx of Turkish settlers. The Turkish government encouraged settlers from mainland Turkey to move to the northern part of the island to increase the population of Turkish Cypriots and strengthen Turkey’s claim to the territory²¹⁶. In turn, the community became increasingly dependent on Turkey for international representation, as the Greek Cypriots retained exclusive rights to represent the Republic of Cyprus at the United Nations²¹⁷. Since 1974, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have grown up with little to no interaction with one another. Additionally, the Turkish-controlled north has seen an influx of settlers from mainland Turkey, who lack a shared history with Greek Cypriots and often differ culturally from Turkish Cypriots themselves²¹⁸.

²¹⁴ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 64.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 62f.

²¹⁶ Kızıltepe. *The Politicization of Memory*, 83.

²¹⁷ Loizides, Neophytos G. “Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus.” *International Studies Perspectives* 8, no. 2 (2007): 172–89, 176.

²¹⁸ Morag. *CYPRUS AND THE CLASH*, 607.

On 12 September 1980, another military coup in Turkey strengthened the state's control over the Cyprus Question, further emphasizing the need for a permanent Turkish presence in the North²¹⁹.

In 1983, Greece submitted the Cyprus Question to the General Assembly of the UN, in response to the declaration of the TRNC, seeking to deal with the issues of the right of refugees to return, international morality, and Turkish aggression²²⁰. Greece wanted to challenge the legitimacy of the TRNC and internationalize the Cyprus Question in an effort to gain more international support for the reunification of the island. As a reaction, Denktaş and the Turkish Cypriot Assembly proclaimed the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the same year. The UN Security Council voted 13 votes to 1 against the declaration and pleaded to withdraw it²²¹.

4.3.2. *Changing Ideologies and the Rise of Cypriotism*

Cypriot post-war nationalism concentrates on the border of the island²²². After the war and the partition, Greek Cypriots define the time after 1974 as the invasion and ongoing occupation. Adding to this, the 'Other' – here, the Turkish - on the northern part of the island became significantly threatening because of its illegally placed military troops²²³.

The construction of nationalism after 1974 is based on the dynamics between a victim and protector²²⁴. The distance to the 'Other' is promoted by the discourse of the „occupation”²²⁵. After 1974, Greek Cypriots emerged more dependent on Greece, being the only ally in the

²¹⁹ Marcella, Valentina. “12 September 4 Am: Mapping Turkey's 1980 Military Coup.” *Studi Magrebini* 20, no. 2 (2022): 277–90, 278.

²²⁰ Potapkina, Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building*, 64.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Efthymiou, Stratis Andreas. *Nationalismus, Militarismus und Männlichkeit im Nachkriegs-Zypern*. 1st ed. 2023. Cham: Springer International Publishing Imprint: Springer VS, 2023, 31.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid., 82.

²²⁵ Ibid., 91.

sphere of international politics and the European Community²²⁶. The community started to lean into the idea of the previous state of coexistence

„in order to justify their vision of a united Cyprus cohabited by the two ethnic groups and to counter official Turkish Cypriot claims that the history of relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is one of pure conflict (thereby proving that they can never live together)“²²⁷.

To find one community being the only victim of Cyprus' partition is wrong. More importantly, Papadakis argues that every Cypriot citizen was a victim:

„Greek Cypriots were the main victims of the Turkish invasion, while Turkish Cypriots were the victims of the superpatriots' aggression - and possibly also the victims of the Turkish invasion because, as they say, 'before they used to live well with the Greek Cypriots' and presumably shared in the rapid economic development of Cyprus“.²²⁸

The Cyprus Problem is concerned with the constant challenge and definition of, and interplay between exclusion and inclusion, territoriality, and history²²⁹.

The rise of the Cypriotism movement marked a turning point. It challenged the ethnonationalist narratives of division by promoting a shared Cypriot identity, fostering hopes for reconciliation and unity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The rise of Cypriotism happened as an

²²⁶ Papadakis. *Greek Cypriot Narratives*, 152.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

immediate consequence of the Turkish invasion. It spread out on the Greek-Cypriot political culture and temporarily marginalized nationalism²³⁰. Reunification became the main political priority emphasizing the independence of Cyprus.

After 1974, widespread dissatisfaction with the two motherlands, particularly Greece, spurred the creation of organizations like the New Cyprus Association. This association aimed to foster loyalty to Cyprus, encourage intercommunal understanding, and strengthen democracy. While acknowledging their ethnic origins and cultural ties, its members urged Cypriots to identify primarily as Cypriots rather than Greeks, Turks, or others.

The relationship between Greece and Cyprus was tainted by a feeling of betrayal and bitterness, especially after the 1974 events. Greek Cypriots felt that their ‘motherland’ was not protecting them against the Turkish invasion. Greek Cypriots blamed the Greek military Junta and the underground paramilitary organization (EOKA-B) for the success of the Turkish invasion²³¹. Symbolically, *enosis* was connected to the disastrous events of 1974 - „terrorism, fascist authoritarianism and the overthrow of democracy, foreign invasion and occupation, and violent displacement”²³².

Although Turkish Cypriots initially maintained a strong attachment to Turkey following 1974, this sentiment gradually shifted over the years with the rise of a politicized form of Cypriotism. Much like their Greek Cypriot counterparts, Turkish Cypriots did not seek to establish a new form of nationalism. Instead, their efforts focused on collaboration with Greek Cypriots to work toward a federal solution that would facilitate the reunification of Cyprus and pave the way for its eventual accession to the European Union²³³.

²³⁰ Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 719.

²³¹ Stamatakis. *History and Nationalism*, 69.

²³² Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 720.

²³³ Loizides. *Ethnic Nationalism*, 180.

Independence was finally officially seen as the definitive stage in the constitutional status of Cyprus. It also presented the only feasible solution for the Cyprus Question. Consequently, the ideology of *enosis* „had to be pronounced dead”²³⁴. Once the definite acceptance of independence was official, „a whole system of national symbols, institutions, celebrations, etc., had to be ‘invented’ or ‘re-discovered’ (since they were forgotten for more than fifteen years) and used in public”²³⁵. The Republic of Cyprus disconnected symbolically from Greece.

The founding of the New Cyprus Association composed of members of the Cypriot elite in 1975 instrumentalized the ongoing creation of an independent Cyprus. It declared a separate Cypriot identity paired with the ideology of Cypriotism which opposed *Hellenism*²³⁶. Cypriotism is an attempt to rewrite Cypriot history and is based on reshaping the roots of Cypriot origins. The Cypriot nation „emerged out of strong Phoenician influences”²³⁷.

Cypriotism embodies the idea that Cyprus has an independent *sui generis* nature. As a result, the island must be considered an entity independent of Greece and Turkey. This autonomy is characterized through history, culture, politics, and social structure. Important to note in this context is, however, that:

„Cypriotism does not deny the Greek or Turkish ethnicity of the inhabitants of the island; it stresses, however, that their ethnic identity - and, thus, on a more general level their culture - has also acquired *sui generis* features which not only differentiate the Greek and Turkish Cypriots from the Greeks and the Turks but also create some common ground between the two communities of the island”²³⁸.

²³⁴ Stamatakis. *History and Nationalism*, 76.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid., 77.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 721.

Cypriotism does not promote one Cypriot nation, except if the notion of nation is used in a strictly political territorial category. What matters for the Cypriots is the citizenship instead of the importance of ethnicity. Cypriotism has primarily emerged in direct opposition to Greek nationalism in Cyprus. However, one can argue that Cypriotism is also a form of nationalism because it stresses history, culture, and homeland²³⁹.

In the early 1980s, the momentum of the Cypriotist movement began to wane and a new Greek-Cypriot nationalism emerged. With the victory of Andreas Papandreou's socialist PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) in Greece in 1981, a new shift was induced²⁴⁰. Democratization in Greece and the rise of Andreas Papandreou and the anti-junta Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) party rekindled Greek Cypriot alignment with Greece. Greek Cypriots could again identify with this new Greece without *enosis*, distancing themselves from the Greece that had 'betrayed' Cyprus in 1974. The Greek-Cypriot Socialist Party EDEK, formed in 1970, reclaimed its nationalist elements and „eventually transformed itself into what is today perhaps the most extreme nationalist Greek-Cypriot political party”²⁴¹. Additionally, the New Cyprus Association faced criticism, including accusations of promoting the idea of a non-existent Cypriot nation, further undermining its credibility²⁴².

4.4. After 1985: Estrangement or Rapprochement of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots?

4.4.1. Between 1985 and 1990s: Isolation and Negotiations

The groundwork for nationalization had already been laid, with Greek Cypriots striving for unification with Greece and Turkish Cypriots aligning with Turkey. After the war, the labor

²³⁹ Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 723.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 725f.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 726.

²⁴² Loizides. *Ethnic Nationalism*, 179.

shortage was seen as an opportunity to strengthen the north's Turkish identity. This political objective was formalized with the signing of the *Agricultural Workforce Protocol* in February 1974, initiating migration from Turkey²⁴³.

Communities initially seeking relocation within Turkey due to socioeconomic and environmental challenges were later directed to Northern Cyprus. The second wave of migration, beginning around 1985, was not governed by any formal protocol. Instead, migration became a personal decision, with most migrants settling in urban areas to access better economic opportunities rather than in rural regions. The third wave, starting in the 2000s, reflects patterns of informal global migration, characterized by an influx of poorer, less-skilled migrants. Notably, a significant portion of second- and third-wave migrants have not acquired Northern Cyprus citizenship, and there is a substantial presence of illegal workers²⁴⁴.

Settlement in the northern part of the island was made less and less attainable, which caused many problems for the TRNC and its attempt to participate on the international stage. The gap between the economies of the two states was widened. Consequently, this led to the increasing dependence of the Turkish Cypriots on subsidies from Turkey. The gap replicates the bifurcation, „making the Republic of Cyprus part of desirable and developed Europe, and the North, conversely, part of the global south, a transit zone through which move refugees”²⁴⁵. As a result, a fluid and intersectional identity is produced.

For the South, Glafkos Clerides won in 1993 the Greek-Cypriot presidential elections. He established a right-wing coalition comprising the Democratic Rally of Clerides and the Democratic Party DIKO (Dimokratikó Kómma) of Spyros Kyprianou²⁴⁶. The new Greek-

²⁴³ Soganci, Nihal. “An Ethnographic Study of Migration from Turkey to Northern Cyprus: Interaction of Conflicting Identities During the Day and Shared Intimacy at Night.” *Der Donauraum* 55, no. 3–4 (2015): 155–64, 155.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 156.

²⁴⁵ Innes. *Mobile Diasporas*, 356.

²⁴⁶ Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 726.

Cypriot nationalism aimed at strengthening its ties with Greece. This can be explained by the ongoing military presence of Turkey and the need for Greece's protection against another Turkish military offensive. The new nationalism rejected the idea of a federation and stressed that a bicomunal federation would have an undemocratic character. The representatives argued that the only reasonable solution to the Cyprus Question would be one that upholds democratic majority rule while safeguarding the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority²⁴⁷. Ideologically, the slogan 'Cyprus is Greek' began dominating non-communist political discourse and concentrated on the ideological orthodoxy in Cyprus' political culture²⁴⁸. They placed the responsibility for 1974 upon the enemies of Hellenism and the narrow confines of the Greek Junta.

The second wave of nationalism involved a selective reinterpretation of Cyprus' recent history, especially around figures like General Georgios Grivas and the EOKA movement (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)²⁴⁹. Grivas, a nationalist hero and leader of EOKA, was celebrated by the new nationalists as a defender of Hellenism despite his role in the divisive EOKA-B movement and its association with the 1974 coup²⁵⁰. Conferences and public events in the 1990s sought to rehabilitate Grivas' image, positioning him as a patriot opposed to Turkish aggression rather than as a figure of political extremism. This reimagining of Grivas and EOKA's legacy symbolized a broader attempt by Greek-Cypriot nationalists to claim the moral high ground, arguing that Greek-Cypriot aspirations for self-determination and cultural unity were unjustly interrupted by foreign intervention rather than domestic failings²⁵¹. In contrast, Cypriotists countered this narrative,

²⁴⁷ Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 727.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 728.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 732f.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 733.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 730.

stressing that nationalist extremism, including EOKA-B's actions, had fueled the conditions leading to division and war.

Both sides assert what they hold as the 'true' history and accuse each other of either ignoring or distorting it²⁵². The second wave of Greek-Cypriot nationalism increasingly positioned itself in opposition to Cypriotism, accusing Cypriotists of undermining Greek identity and contributing to cultural erosion. By the 1990s, 'Neocypriot' had become a derogatory term for those who were perceived to prioritize Cypriot independence and peaceful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots over the assertion of Greek identity²⁵³. Cypriotists, for their part, criticized the new nationalism as divisive and argued for a genuine unity that recognized both Greek and Turkish Cypriots' shared Cypriot identity²⁵⁴.

This ideological contest extended to historiography, with each side vying to control narratives about Cyprus' past. Greek-Cypriot nationalists highlighted the 'glorious Greek history' and the concept of Hellenochristian continuity. Cypriotists emphasized Cyprus' distinct and pluralistic heritage, advocating for a more syncretic identity that could facilitate reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots²⁵⁵. Emphasizing 'Greekness' of the island hinders „accepting cohabitation, in whatever form, with the Turkish Cypriots”²⁵⁶. History, when interpreted through nationalist lenses, constructs images of perpetual enemies and irreconcilable differences.

From 1974 to 2003, Turkish Cypriots were confined in a space subject to the propaganda of their 'motherland'. Both domestically and internationally, the so-called 'state' restricted movement by issuing identity documents, making it also more difficult for Greek Cypriots to pass the cease-fire line. Adding to this, young Turkish Cypriot males of conscription age were hindered from exiting the North except if they were able to prove that they had completed

²⁵² Mavratsas. *The Ideological Contest*, 732.

²⁵³ Ibid., 731.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 733.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 729.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 733.

military service or the exemption from it²⁵⁷. These border practices carve into stone a ‘territorial state’, controlling the exit and entrance of people to their ‘domestic’ territory. The northern part also started to appear as a province of Turkey after the adoption of a Turkish postal code, telephone prefix, and money. Some Turkish Cypriots started to oppose the uncontrolled migration from Turkey by the 1980s after the ‘state’ began importing labor forces from Anatolia²⁵⁸. Furthermore, underlining the dependence on Turkey, Turkish Cypriots were trained under Turkish supervision. All those practices created a forced order and territory.

They experienced the *Turkification* of the culture, education, media, and landscape that was utilized to reinforce belonging to the Turkish nation and Turkish identity²⁵⁹. Turkish Cypriot schoolbooks followed the same agenda of ethnic nationalism. Those were written „at a period when the right monopolized power on the Turkish Cypriot side with the explicit aim of preserving the *de facto* partition of Cyprus” and presented Cyprus’ history as a Turkish history²⁶⁰.

To trace back Turkish-Cypriots’ origins old history textbooks of TRNC emphasized the descendants of the Turkish immigrants after Cyprus’ conquest by the Ottomans in 1571²⁶¹. Ethnic purity was used to connect the Turkish Cypriots to Turkish nationalism implying an absolute uniformity of pure ethnic heritage. Because of this, the Turkish Cypriots are expected to stay loyal to Turkey. Creating such a difference in ethnic groups strengthens the argument of the inability of both communities to cooperate and coexist under a common political entity²⁶². Intercommunal relations were seen in old textbooks as something negative and being

²⁵⁷ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 55.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 57.

²⁵⁹ Petithomme. *Changing Identities*, 145.

²⁶⁰ Papadakis. *Narrative, Memory and History*, 135.

²⁶¹ Vural, Özünyik. *Redefining Identity*, 145.

²⁶² Ibid.

constructed on enmity. Nationalism is defined as the responsible power for the destruction of intercommunal relations²⁶³.

From the late 1980s onwards, this ethno-nationalist perception of identity was questioned by Turkish-Cypriot intellectuals who highlighted the importance of a civic identity²⁶⁴. New textbooks present the Greek Cypriots as a political partner rather than an enemy, giving the ‘other’ a more positive connotation²⁶⁵. A peaceful coexistence and harmony between both communities are narrated. Bettering intercommunal relations to aim for a federal solution was a goal for CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, Republican Turkish Party) to connect ethnicity and territoriality again. The ethno-nationalist parties remained in power until 2003 and followed a pro-separation agenda, maintaining territorial partition. The political opposition, also CTP, aimed to strengthen Turkish-Cypriot identity to distinguish between Turkish-Cypriot identity and the Turkishness of Turkey, criticizing the growing Turkish impact on TRNC²⁶⁶.

In 1996, the possibility of a war between Greece and Turkey was growing because of a battle between both capital cities, Ankara and Athens, over an uninhabited Aegean isle. This event raised some concerns in the international community: „If Athens and Ankara could come to blows over a tiny Aegean islet, what of Cyprus (...)?”²⁶⁷ Adding to this, several deadly incidents occurred in the same year near the Green Line, which threatened to surge into something dreadful. UN- and US-initiated diplomatic efforts came to a standstill because of this tense situation²⁶⁸. The incidents were reported by the international press. Controversial military maneuvers and the swift buildup of arms on both sides of Cyprus were worsening the political landscape.

²⁶³ Vural, Özuynik. *Redefining Identity*, 147.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 134.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 146.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.,

²⁶⁷ Bahcheli, Tozun, and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos. “The Cyprus Impasse: What Next?” *World Policy Journal* 13, no. 4 (1996): 27–39, 27.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 28.

4.4.2. *After 2000: Status Quo? Annan Plan, EU Membership, Green Line Opening*

Turning points of the post-traumatic narrative of the Greek Cypriots would be the opening of the Green Line in 2003 and the Annan Plan referendum in 2004 because these „have ruptured the routinization of the ‘1974’ cultural trauma”²⁶⁹. Adding to this, the emotional burden of the trauma has led to unrealistic expectations regarding what constitutes an acceptable political solution²⁷⁰.

The political solution to the Cyprus question was affected after the failed referendum in April 2004. Greek-Cypriot proponents of ethno-national identity promoted a unitary state and sovereignty with majoritarian decision-making. Turkish-Cypriot proponents of ethno-national identity followed the idea of separation of state organization²⁷¹. Proponents of Cypriot society’s multicultural or civic vision opted for a united federal Cyprus. This development again divided Cypriot politics, complicating the island’s peace process. This vision began to be seen in a negative light after the failure of the Annan Plan. Intercommunal co-existence and a united federal Cyprus based on bicommunality, bizonality, and political equality are still points followed by the two parties CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, Republican Turkish Party) and Greek-Cypriot AKEL (Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú, Progressive Party of Working People)²⁷². Both parties, however, differ in their approach towards the issue of Turkish settlers. CTP doesn’t oppose the existence of Turkish settlers, while AKEL excludes them from Cypriot people, seeing Turkish settlers as ‘others’.

The EU membership has given many Greek Cypriots advantages, namely the feeling of being protected by the EU. However, the EU hasn’t made any substantial solution proposals, which

²⁶⁹ Roudometof, Christou. *1974 and Greek Cypriot Identity*, 182.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Vural, Özuynik. *Redefining Identity*, 135.

²⁷² Ibid.

constituted the main reason for the accession²⁷³. The EU and UN support negotiations and mediations but there were no active efforts to end the frozen conflict.

After the AKP (Justice and Development Party), led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, won the elections in Turkey in 2002, Erdoğan prioritized joining the EU, which included resolving the Cyprus issue. The UN quickly reacted and helped to realize this by creating the Annan Plan, named after and proposed by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan²⁷⁴.

The Annan Plan, a UN-led solution, was considered a significant turning point in the negotiation process in the early 2000s²⁷⁵. Around the same time, discussions about the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU became apparent. The UN-sponsored meditations between the North and the South began in 2001. These negotiations put forward the formation of the so-called Annan Plans from 2002 to 2004. From the outset, international actors complicated the situation by exerting pressure on the two communities, effectively marginalizing non-elite citizens and limiting their access to the negotiations²⁷⁶.

A large part of the Greek Cypriot community feared that the Annan Plan's land provisions would infract their property rights as recognized by the ECtHR and validate their perception of Turkey's illegal occupation: „When put to vote, Annan V passed among Turkish Cypriots generally, but was rejected by over seventy-five percent of voting Greek Cypriots”²⁷⁷.

The rejection of the plan undermined the political basis for further negotiation. The Annan Plan was an attempt to unite Cypriot communities to discuss the common aim and wish for political resolution. This illustrates that even though the Annan referendum was a well-constructed and internationally celebrated project it couldn't succeed because of the lack of local legitimacy.

²⁷³ Efthymiou. *Nationalismus, Militarismus und Männlichkeit*, 243.

²⁷⁴ Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*, 61.

²⁷⁵ Potapkina, Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building in Contested States*, 65.

²⁷⁶ Matson, Laura. “Completing Land Rights, Legal Redress, and Political Settlement in Cyprus.” *Law & Inequality* 31, no. 1 (2012): 199-231, 213f.

²⁷⁷ Ibid. 214.

International stakeholders, such as the *United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus* (UNFICYP), can provide a great basis of bureaucratic expertise and an awareness of neutrality so long as third-party interests are not taken as a priority²⁷⁸.

After the fate of the Annan Plan was decided on 24 April 2004, the Republic of Cyprus alone joined the EU on 1 May 2004. This again failed the hope for negotiations and enhancement of the opportunity for a solution of the Cyprus problem. Erol Kaymak explains that the accession itself was „a mere formality as a result of the signing and ratification of the Accession Treaty in prior months”²⁷⁹. There were no negotiations or derogations about the territorial division of Cyprus, nor the presence of foreign forces²⁸⁰.

Even though the Greek Cypriots voted against the UN-backed plan, the EU was apprehensive not to fully isolate the Turkish Cypriot community and the international community reconsidered their role as absolute aggressors and remorseless secessionists. The EU Commission, following its mandate from the Council, moved forward with drafting additional regulations aimed at ostensibly ‘lifting the isolation’ of the Turkish Cypriot community, who, according to the UN Secretary-General, remain outside the EU through ‘no fault of their own’²⁸¹.

From 2003 onwards, crossing points were gradually opened: one in Lefkosia/Lefkoşa, at the British military bases near Dhekelia (Aghios Nikolaos/Strovilia and Pyla/Pergamos), and one in Astromeritis/Zodeia. In 2008, the checkpoint of Ledra Street (the shopping street of Nicosia) was opened. The Green Line, which has existed since 1964, comprises 180 km and has a surface area of 346 km². It is a demilitarized zone controlled by UNFICYP²⁸².

²⁷⁸ Matson. *Completing Land Rights*, 229.

²⁷⁹ Kaymak, Erol. “If At First You Don’t Succeed, Try, Try Again: (Re)Designing Referenda to Ratify a Peace Treaty in Cyprus.” *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 18, no. 1 (2012): 88–112, 91.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 103.

²⁸² Ibid., 130.

Since the opening of the Green Line in 2003, TRNC's separation from the rest of the island made Turkish Cypriots realize that they live in a *no man's land*, as Mathieu Petithomme argues²⁸³. Many people have lost hope of being recognized as a state on an international level. Some Turkish Cypriots perceived the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus as an injustice after the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan. They have also started to question the legitimacy of their own TRNC passport being unusable and an illegal document outside of their borders. Obtaining a passport issued by the Republic of Cyprus would also mean access to the EU, put an end to isolation, and a protest is subject to a state that is not recognized internationally²⁸⁴.

The border creates refugees and diasporas. The Green Line is also a getaway to Europe symbol for asylum seekers. The line, drawn and enforced by British and Turkish colonial powers to ensure security for Cypriots, paradoxically generates insecurity. In practice, it displaces people and creates refugees, while also challenging the identities of Greek and Turkish Cypriots as *enosis* and *taksim* remain unattainable, and the potential for a shared Cypriot identity is suppressed²⁸⁵. The impact of British colonization has deeply shaped Cypriots' mentality and social consciousness. Among Turkish Cypriots, their modern self-perception has contributed to negative attitudes toward immigrants and settlers from Turkey, who are often viewed as 'Orientals' undermining their 'modern Cypriot' identity. Since the opening of the Green Line in 2003, Turkish Cypriots have been allowed to cross into the South and obtain EU passports, while immigrants remain barred from doing so. This dynamic reinforces group identity and solidifies the boundaries between the communities²⁸⁶.

TRNC issues its own passports to the citizens, but most governments don't recognize these passports as valid²⁸⁷. Turkey, as an alternative, issues Turkish passports to TRNC citizens for

²⁸³ Petithomme. *Changing Identities in Northern Cyprus*, 145.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 150.

²⁸⁵ Innes. *Mobile Diasporas*, 363.

²⁸⁶ Soganci. *An Ethnographic Study of Migration*, 157.

²⁸⁷ Potapkina, Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building in Contested States*, 82.

travel. Legally, Turkish Cypriots are entitled to apply for passports of the Republic of Cyprus, allowing them to visit many countries visa-free²⁸⁸. However, under TRNC law, obtaining a passport of the Republic of Cyprus was deemed illegal until 2004. In 1998, the government announced severe penalties for Turkish Cypriots holding the Republic of Cyprus passports, including a fine and imprisonment. The Denktaş administration's threats discouraged citizens from obtaining such documents, framing it as a betrayal or alignment with Greek Cypriot policies, thereby stigmatizing the act as shameful and disloyal²⁸⁹.

Hopes concerning uniting Cyprus were resurrected as the left-wing Republican Turkish Party (CTP) rose to power in 2003 in the northern part of Cyprus, and reunification became the focus point of school history textbooks.

The policy of CTP was about revising the TRNC's identity in the sense of internalizing ethnicity (Turkishness) and territoriality (Cypriotness) while parallelly improving the attitude of the other community²⁹⁰. The new CTP-sponsored book marked a significant departure from its predecessor, promoting critical thinking and encouraging students to examine issues from multiple perspectives²⁹¹. The notion of *Cypriot* was used to describe the people on the island, including both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The notion of *motherland* was removed in favor of Cyprus being called *our country* and *our island*²⁹². The content concentrated rather on the similarities of both communities. The issue of redefining boundaries of identity and nation is entangled with the political transformation. Stressing Turkish-Cypriotness underlines the existence of Turkish Cypriots in a unified federal Cyprus signifying a cultural uniqueness away from the idea of Turkish nationalism „which sees Turkish-Cypriots as a natural-integral part of

²⁸⁸ Potapkina, Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building in Contested States*, 83.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Vural, Özuynik. *Redefining Identity*, 134.

²⁹¹ Potapkina, Recorded Books, Inc. *Nation Building in Contested States*, 72.

²⁹² Ibid.

the Turkish nation”²⁹³. Revising the history textbook contents by CTP reflects on the challenge of ethnic conceptualization of identity and community.

Another positive development in negotiation matters and resurrection of hope happened in 2008 when Demetris Christofias (2008-2013) was elected. Mehmet Ali Talat (2005-2010), the Turkish Cypriot leader, and Demetris Christofias were dedicated to agreeing to certain settlement parameters. Both came from parties with a similar ideological background²⁹⁴. The 2008 talks wanted to function as ‘Cypriot’ talks instead of internationally mediated negotiations. The Ministry of Education in the Republic of Cyprus aimed to solidify the idea of a culture of peaceful coexistence, collaboration, and mutual respect between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It also aimed at removing occupation and reuniting Cyprus and its people²⁹⁵. It’s the first time since 1974 that the ministry’s leadership underlined the idea of an „educational system that nurtures a culture of reconciliation” between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots²⁹⁶. However, teachers’ unions argued that the already overloaded curriculum could not accommodate an additional goal that might be challenging to implement²⁹⁷.

The promising outlooks were soon silenced when the Turkish Cypriot right-wing party National Unity Party UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi) came to power in 2009. New schoolbook versions were printed, giving the stage again to nationalist history. The Turkish Cypriot educational system underwent changes attempting to bring back the importance of Islam. The religious framework aims to reshape the identity of the Turkish Cypriot community, renewing efforts to Turkify them²⁹⁸.

²⁹³ Vural, Özuynik. *Redefining Identity*, 135f.

²⁹⁴ Kaymak, *If At First You Don’t Succeed*, 94.

²⁹⁵ Roudometof, Christou. *1974 and Greek Cypriot Identity*, 179.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Michael. *Creating a New Identity*, 25.

5. Property Disputes and Their Impact on Community Relations

Forced displacement is a result of the partition of Cyprus. Dispossession has affected and impacted the forced-displaced people in various ways. Many families were forced to move repeatedly between overcrowded and temporary housing situations²⁹⁹. Integration challenges and their loss of livelihood, cultural institutions, community, and home weighed heavily on most displaced people. Refugee settlement and the distribution of abandoned property were humanitarian questions but also perceived as critical instruments for constructing a new state. Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay explain as follows: „The *factum* of Turkish Cypriots settling and going on with their lives began to build a de facto border and create a space that was ‘theirs’”³⁰⁰.

Until today, the United Nations failed to realize the reunification of both communities in conflict. There has been, however, an increase in calls for reunification, especially from the Turkish side. This can be explained by the fact that since the division, the North has experienced economic stagnation, particularly when compared to the South, which has advanced significantly, especially after gaining EU membership³⁰¹. The week after the Greek Cypriots were accepted into the EU in 2004, the northern government responded to its own people’s threats by opening border crossings for the first time since partition³⁰².

5.1. Forced Displacement and Cypriot Refugees: Impact on Identities

Around 200,000 Greek Cypriots fled to the south while around 60,000 Turkish Cypriots were forcibly displaced to the north³⁰³. As mentioned, Cyprus became a partitioned state with two ethnically consolidated territories. Those people born to refugee families after 1974 grew up

²⁹⁹ Matson. *Completing Land Rights*, 201.

³⁰⁰ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 43.

³⁰¹ Bevan. *The Destruction of Memory*, 163.

³⁰² Ibid., 167.

³⁰³ Klot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 329.

with accounts of the traumatic events and forced displacement, adopting a refugee identity. Second-generation refugees are left with a „heavy legacy of memory and the to realize the mythical return’’³⁰⁴.

Almost every Turkish Cypriot was relocated to the North, while Greek Cypriots were forced to leave the North³⁰⁵. The Turkish displacement was proportionally larger than the displacement of the Greeks. It is also necessary in this context to correctly label the status of Cypriot refugees. According to Nurit Kliot and Yoel Mansfeld, the internally displaced Cypriots are legally categorized as ‘con-national refugees’ or ‘national’³⁰⁶.

The definition of *refugee* has a wider connotation in the North. The people who relocated between 1958 and 1974 were labeled as ‘voluntary refugees’. Settlement was perceived as permanent in the North³⁰⁷. The definition of a refugee differed in the South, where the state classified them as ‘temporary refugees’, meaning their status was contingent on returning to their previous homes³⁰⁸. The status of refugees in the South was a separate one, maintained by three measures. First, separate identity cards were issued. Second, title deeds for their houses and land were not granted to the refugees. Third, the status of refugees was bestowed, even on the second refugee generation³⁰⁹.

The people from mainland Turkey who wanted to stay in the North, i.e., civil servants or military personnel, were granted property ownership rights and citizenship by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Both the South and North implemented regulations prioritizing the resettlement of families who had lost a member in the 1974 conflict or previous intercommunal violence³¹⁰. The status of a refugee didn’t have a negative connotation in the North. Being a

³⁰⁴ Roudometof, Christou. *1974 and Greek Cypriot Identity*, 178.

³⁰⁵ Kliot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 329.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 336.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 337.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid., 337.

refugee there didn't last long. It was seen as an improvement in the standard of housing and livelihood, whereas many Greek Cypriot refugees held on to the hope of return, cherishing their villages in the North³¹¹.

Forced displacement and (re)settlement are complex economic and sociocultural processes that produce trauma and disruption. Involuntary migration often involves the expulsion from an environment where society has developed long-standing patterns of adaptation over centuries³¹². Egon Franz Kunz discerns between anticipatory and acute refugees. According to Kunz, the Turkish Cypriots were anticipatory refugees because they left their homes before military or political events could prevent their departure³¹³. Greek Cypriots were acute refugees because their movement arose from political changes.

Between 1963 and 1974, particularly from 1963 to 1967, Greek paramilitary forces and military units carried out numerous attacks on Turkish Cypriots residing in predominantly Turkish villages surrounded by Greek or mixed communities. As a result, many Turkish Cypriots relocated to Turkish quarters in Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol, or larger Turkish towns, seeking refuge within the 42 Turkish enclaves³¹⁴. Following recommendations from the Turkish Cypriot leadership in 1964 and guidance from Turkey in 1965, the Turkish Cypriot community withdrew from the Cypriot government to form their own administrative units within the enclaves. All 42 of these enclaves came under the control of the Provisional Turkish Administration. After the 1974 Turkish invasion, Turkish Cypriots relocated from the southern enclaves to the North. This movement resulted in 8,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees resettling in

³¹¹ Kliot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 338.

³¹² Ibid., 330.

³¹³ Kunz, Egon Franz. "The Analytic Framework of Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory". *International Migration Review* 15, no. 1 (1981): 42-52, 47f.

³¹⁴ Kliot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 329.

Turkish-occupied areas in the north, while 34,000 Turkish Cypriots remained displaced in areas controlled by the Cypriot government in the south³¹⁵.

Some of them moved themselves. Others moved in the final population exchange. Many people fled with only their personal belongings. Everything got left behind. Many Greek Cypriots from Kyrenia area who couldn't escape to the south because of health reasons or because they clung to their properties were „held for more than a year in the Dome Hotel, far beyond its capacity (...) (and) were not allowed or did not dare to venture beyond those confines’’³¹⁶.

Abandoned Greek Cypriot houses and property that have been left behind were perceived by some Turkish Cypriots and Turks as property that could be looted. The new sense of belonging to a new ‘state’ made all immovable and movable objects and property issue naturalization³¹⁷. During the short period immediately after the Turkish invasion, some Turkish Cypriots looted Greek Cypriot houses, businesses, and villages. Some even settled themselves in Greek homes³¹⁸.

The resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees was highly planned, organized, and centralized by the Provisional Turkish Administration³¹⁹. In contrast, Greek Cypriots fleeing the north faced a more chaotic and unstructured displacement, disrupting well-established communities. Both groups were forcibly displaced, losing all their possessions and requiring significant assistance³²⁰. Yet, because the Turkish Cypriots had fewer displaced persons, they had the advantage of coping better with the resettlement. A large part of the inventory of Greek Cypriot property was used for the resettlement of the Turkish Cypriot refugees. This also eased their

³¹⁵ Klot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 334.

³¹⁶ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 46.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 47.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Klot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 334.

³²⁰ Ibid., 336.

absorption in the occupied North. 18 percent of the Cypriot population gained 37 percent of the richest area of the island³²¹.

The declaration of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” didn’t give the population much certainty of Cyprus’ future and „no one knew if a federation would be established or if the establishment of such federation would necessarily imply that they would remain in the north”³²².

The Vienna Agreement in 1975 made people perceive the temporality of their displacement differently, stating that the reunification of families is accorded by both leaders. During that time, the majority of Turkish Cypriots in the south moved to the island’s north. It is from 1975 that the north experienced „an increasing institutionalization in the north, with a referendum on the new state’s constitution and the first parliamentary elections”³²³. With this development, it became clear to many that the division had become long-term or even permanent. The displacement of Turkish Cypriots to the north goes hand in hand with the emergence of liberating discourses. Writings, speeches, or buses used to transport the people from the south to the north had a rescue character to them. Buses were called ‘freedom transport’ (zgürlük nakliyatı), and the north was called the ‘free area’ (özgür bölge) or ‘rescued area’ (kurtarılmış bölge)³²⁴.

Marco A. Turk explains that a bottom-up restorative justice could heal ethnic division, which is the counterpart of the „official ‘elite diplomacy’, where deals are made among representatives of governments without considering reactions of the general population”³²⁵.

Furthermore, forgiveness among displaced individuals can only occur when victims are emotionally ready, a process that cannot be forced. Both communities must relearn the

³²¹ Klot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 336.

³²² Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 41.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid., 43.

³²⁵ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 250.

necessary skills and techniques to engage with one another and communicate constructively on equal terms. Additionally, it is essential for both sides to recognize that the other is not the enemy. The enemy is rather the problem of the conflict itself³²⁶. Here, the problem of the Self/Other dichotomy arises again, influencing identity construction³²⁷.

The isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community must also end, and both sides of the communities must show a willingness to compromise to create a new united Cyprus. Because, for the most part, Greek and Turkish Cypriots don't trust each other and are distant, the reunification causes trouble³²⁸. For both sides, it is crucial to discover how to engage in a dialogue where issues are openly addressed. A solution that is in the best interest of each should be the aim of the integration.

Over the last decades, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has addressed cases where forcibly displaced individuals seek remedies for their lost properties and violations of their rights.³²⁹ Institutions addressing the remedies for forced displacement should prioritize two main objectives: Complying with human rights and working towards unfreezing the conflict by trust-building between the parties³³⁰.

5.2. Dispossession of the Communities and its Impact on Legal Frameworks

The dispossession influenced the creation of legal frameworks and policies to manage claims over abandoned properties, population exchanges, and the rights of displaced persons³³¹.

³²⁶ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 251.

³²⁷ Moisi, Zachariades. *Performing Identity*, 27.

³²⁸ Turk. *Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue*, 253.

³²⁹ Hadjigeorgiou. *Remedying Displacement*, 152.

³³⁰ Ibid., 153.

³³¹ Samy, Shahira. "Cyprus". Samy, Shahira. *Reparations to Palestinian Refugees: A Comparative Perspective*, 94-126. Routledge, 2010, 102.

Aid for Greek Cypriot refugees was distributed through 312 centers and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), playing a key role in the initial steps of distribution and rehabilitation³³². The aid provided included weekly food rations, footwear, clothing, household items, and financial allowances.

Three government departments were responsible for the resettlement of refugees in the South: *The Department of Town Planning and Housing in the Ministry of the Interior*, *The Central Committee for the Protection of Turkish Cypriot Properties*, and *The Department of Special Services for the Care and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons in the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance*³³³. Additional agencies such as *The Planning Bureau* and *The Pan-Cyprian Refugee Committee* also contributed to the resettlement efforts. For the North, the provision of aid was similar. The *Ministry of Housing and Rehabilitation* was the body that dealt with the resettlement and integration of refugees³³⁴. These macro-resettlement policies varied in terms of resources for resettlement and the availability of housing³³⁵.

The time that has passed since the displacement plays a crucial role because „other individuals might have moved into the abandoned properties of IDPs’’³³⁶. The more time passes, the more inevitable the balancing act of the interests of secondary occupiers with those of the original property owners becomes. This balancing exercise, however, is not considered in the foundational *UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons*. These principles simply assert that all displaced persons and refugees have a legitimate claim and the right to have their property, land, or housing restored if they were unjustly, forcibly, or unlawfully deprived of it³³⁷.

³³² Klot, Mansfeld. *Resettling Displaced People*, 339.

³³³ Ibid., 342.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Ibid., 343.

³³⁶ Hadjigeorgiou. *Remedying Displacement*, 154.

³³⁷ Ibid.

Responding to a frozen conflict and forced displacement, such as in Cyprus, requires effective remedies and tackling the root cause of the issue. This approach is essential to fostering long-term improvements in inter-ethnic relations within the divided society. The Immovable Property Commission (IPC) was created by Law 67/2005 and allows the 1974 displaced Greek Cypriots to seek remedy for the loss they suffered³³⁸. Applicants can choose from three sorts of remedy:

„payment of *compensation* for the loss of their property; its return (*restitution*); or the *exchange* of their property found in the north of the island, with a TC (Turkish Cypriot) property of equal value in the south’’³³⁹.

The first type remains the most common remedy among applicants. Today, property market prices in the North do not reflect their true value, as demand has declined since 1974. Additionally, legal uncertainty over rightful ownership complicates and discourages foreign investment³⁴⁰. A common issue in frozen conflicts is that properties are often subject to conflicting legal claims and obligations³⁴¹. In some cases, a single property may be claimed by multiple displaced individuals, further restricting potential solutions for reunification.

5.2.1. *Property Issues and Regulations*

Both sides take different approaches to property issues. Turkish Cypriots advocate for property exchanges in some form and compensation for the swaps, while Greek Cypriots insist on the full return of property to all displaced persons.

³³⁸ Hadjigeorgiou. *Remedying Displacement*, 160.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 162.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 166.

The Greek Cypriots categorize any venture to dispossess people from their land as a violation of their human rights. Turkish Cypriots are attempting to create ethnically homogenous areas by preventing Greek Cypriots from returning to their lands. Due to this, the division is maintained, and fundamental EU principles on the right to settle within the union and the freedom of movement are infringed³⁴². Planting and settling people and communities to villages in the north was a strategy applied by the TRNC and was a way to set in stone the creation of a 'nation' and 'border'. The space was turned into 'territory' and the line into 'border'³⁴³. In the south, Greek Cypriots were settled mostly individually, leaving scattered communities „as the politics of return made any suggestion of settling them together sound like a nod at permanence’’³⁴⁴.

The main obstacle to the conflict seems to be the lack of political will among Greeks and Greek Cypriots to implement agreements³⁴⁵. Cyprus has never been a unitary state, and Turkish Cypriot leaders have been unwilling to accept a system where Greek Cypriots, due to their numerical majority, could dominate the entire island³⁴⁶. Northern Cyprus accepts that the two communities have lived apart since 1963 and views the 1960 Constitution as defunct. The TRNC considers Northern and Southern Cyprus as two equal political entities capable of forming a new political arrangement mutually accepted by both sides. In contrast, the Greek Cypriot leadership regards Southern Cyprus as the sole legitimate government of the entire island and views Turkish Cypriots as a rebellious minority³⁴⁷. These fundamentally opposing perspectives on reconciliation create significant challenges in reaching an agreement.

Another key concern is how the settlement will be financed. Questions remain about who will compensate displaced persons and what forms of international aid or grants will be provided to

³⁴² Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem* , 85.

³⁴³ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 49.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Stephen. *The Cyprus Question*, 58.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 61.

ensure the swift economic convergence of both entities. In the case of Varosha, this issue is particularly significant, given the extensive need for the demolition or reconstruction of numerous buildings. Varosha's case will be explained in detail in the next sub-chapter.

The Immovable Property Commission was responsible for handling claims to regain access to abandoned properties in the North. It was never designed to play a role in resolving the Cyprus Question, as Meliz Erdem and Steven Geer posit³⁴⁸. Instead, its purpose was to offer a remedy for the systemic violation of the right to peacefully enjoy property, arising from the losses experienced by Greek Cypriots displaced from the north to the south in the 1970s³⁴⁹.

Its closure in 2013 left displaced individuals without a local remedy for their losses.³⁵⁰ The IPC negotiated land claims on a case-by-case basis, which contributed to slow and passive political negotiations³⁵¹. The European Court of Human Rights became the primary international forum for adjudicating Cypriot land disputes. However, the ECtHR has gained quite a disputed image because it

„generally declined to hear property cases where the alleged violations occurred before the European Convention on Human Rights fully entered into force in the relevant state (and) rejected these claims, holding Turkey liable for property-based human rights violations, and compelling Turkey to pay substantial damages’’³⁵².

This has led to the forum being controversially perceived as viewing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a puppet of the Turkish government while recognizing the Republic of

³⁴⁸ Erdem, Meliz, and Steven Greer. “HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY COMMISSION.” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 67, no. 3 (2018): 721–32, 728.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Matson. *Completing Land Rights*, 202.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid., 204.

Cyprus as the island's sole legitimate authority. Recently, however, Laura Matson argued that the forum has made efforts to acknowledge the legitimacy of the North, a move that was met with strong opposition from the Greek Cypriot community³⁵³.

Despite their successful integration, displaced Greek Cypriots have continued to protest their resettlement by Turkish forces. The Greek Cypriot government has actively supported their claims, while international and regional campaigns have raised awareness of their rights and pressured authorities in the North to acknowledge and address them³⁵⁴.

Cypriots have been under the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights since 1962. Since 1976, the Republic of Cyprus has filed applications against Turkey with the European Court of Human Rights, addressing human rights violations from the Turkish occupation in the northern part³⁵⁵. Since the TRNC is not recognized as an independent state, Turkey has been held responsible for violations of human and property rights.

The UN Set of Ideas of 1992 established the foundation for addressing the dispossession aspect of the Cyprus conflict by recognizing property claims from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It emphasized the principle of acknowledging the property rights of the displaced, with restitution seen as the appropriate remedy for dispossession³⁵⁶. However, considering the need for territorial adjustment, the document imposed limitations on full property restitution. Negotiations were suspended in early 1993 due to the Greek Cypriot presidential elections. The victory of Clerides, who opposed the Set of Ideas in his campaign, led to a setback in the negotiations for a settlement³⁵⁷.

³⁵³ Matson. *Completing Land Rights*, 205.

³⁵⁴ Global IDP Database Project. "Profile of Internal Displacement: Cyprus. Compilation of the Information Available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council.", 2005, 5.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., 6.

³⁵⁶ Samy. *Cyprus*, 108.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., 109.

Regarding displacement and dispossession, the Set of Ideas extended the connection between territorial adjustment and displacement beyond all previous proposals. Shahira Samy analyzes that the document includes two alternative maps, which specify that the Turkish Cypriot side would relinquish 7 to 8 percent of the land it controls, reducing its share of the island to approximately 29 percent³⁵⁸. However, the document does not provide figures on how many displaced Greek Cypriots would be able to return.

When a new settlement is implemented, potential delays and postponements are likely. Turkish Cypriots will not be expected to immediately return land and property to their rightful owners, as new housing must first be built for displaced Turkish Cypriots. Additionally, the Turkish military will need to be redeployed before any new arrangements can take effect³⁵⁹.

5.3. Case Study: Varosha

The small town of Varosha is located within the Famagusta area of Cyprus and symbol of the divided island. It was a popular tourist destination in the 1960s and 1970s, known as one of the wealthiest districts. The *Chicago Tribune* referred to it as „mini-Miami”, drawing numerous international celebrities, including Brigitte Bardot and Elizabeth Taylor³⁶⁰.

In 1974, the war led to half of the Famagusta area becoming a restricted zone, while the other half was closed to residents and has remained empty and unused ever since. Greek Cypriot inhabitants were forcibly displaced, leaving behind abandoned hotels, buildings, and homes.

³⁵⁸ Samy. *Cyprus*, 108.

³⁵⁹ Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*, 91.

³⁶⁰ Pyla, Panayiota, and Petros Phokaides. “ ‘Dark and Dirty’ Histories of Leisure and Architecture: Varosha’s Past and Future.” *Architectural Theory Review* 24, no. 1 (2020): 27–45, 27.

With the intervention of the Turkish army, Varosha and the rest of the Famagusta area were occupied. Residents were forced to flee, fearing mass violence³⁶¹.

Before 1974, Varosha was home to thousands of Greek Cypriots. The invasion prompted a mass evacuation, with around 40,000 people fleeing the town and surrounding Famagusta area in just a few days³⁶². No one was allowed to return to their properties, businesses, or hotel rooms. As a result, with the Turkish military's takeover, Varosha was sealed off, remaining inaccessible to both its original inhabitants and Turkish Cypriots, as well as mainland settlers from Turkey.

Today, the southern part of Famagusta remains barred. The UN Security Council has acknowledged the need for the restitution of these properties. Under the UN administration, the Council voted in 1984 for the return of Varosha to its rightful owners³⁶³. UN Resolution 550 states:

„Deeply concerned about the recent threats of settlement of Varosha other than its inhabitants, *Reaffirming* its continuing support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, (...) Considers attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of that area to the administration of the United Nations’’³⁶⁴.

However, the actualization was never realized³⁶⁵. According to law, restitution should be provided in practice where it's possible. This has not been the case for Varosha, where

³⁶¹ Arsoy, Aysu, and Hacer Basarir. “Post-war Re-settlements in Varosha: Paradise to Ghetto”. *Open House International* 44, no. 2 (2019): 52-61, 52.

³⁶² Gorvett. *Postcard from Varosha*, 46.

³⁶³ Hadjigeorgiou. *Remedying Displacement*, 168.

³⁶⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 550, 1984, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/67600?ln=en&v=pdf> (Accessed on November 13, 2024), 13.

³⁶⁵ Pyla, Phokaides. *Dark and Dirty*, 28.

significant concerns regarding violations of fair trial and property rights have been raised³⁶⁶. Since 1974, residents have been barred from returning to their properties³⁶⁷.

The Immovable Property Commission (IPC) has not addressed or restituted any land in Varosha. Nasia Hadjigeorgiou argues that the „most plausible explanation for this is that the Varosha cases are politically controversial and are therefore better left undisturbed’’³⁶⁸.

The former residents of Varosha mostly resettled in Limassol, while internal Turkish Cypriot refugees were relocated from Paphos in the south to Kato Varosha in the north. The coastal area of Varosha came under the control of the Turkish army in the subsequent years. Since then, Varosha has been referred to as a ghost town or the ‘Forbidden Zone’. The demilitarized zone surrounding the former resort town is patrolled by UN peacekeeping forces and remains under Turkish military control. The town’s ruins further emphasize its status as a ghost town. Varosha is often referred to as „a political bargaining chip in the peace negotiations of the unresolved conflict’’³⁶⁹. Furthermore, in 1992, the UN Security Council resolutions 550 and 789 „called for the former Varosha residents’ return under UN control’’³⁷⁰.

Controversies over political and legal issues have emerged following Turkey’s announcement to demilitarize 3,5 percent of Varosha, with plans for the area to be resettled under the Turkish Cypriot administration³⁷¹. This plan hasn’t been realized yet. The return of former residents is a complex, multi-faceted process. A complex domino effect characterizes the return of former residents because it requires a rework of decades-long arrangements³⁷².

³⁶⁶ Hadjigeorgiou. *Remedying Displacement*, 167.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Akdeniz, Nafia. “Hope in the Ruins of Home: Narrative Meaning-Making of Forced Displacement, Place Attachment, and Deferred Future Resettlement in Varosha.” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 37, no. 1 (2024): 25-50, 25f.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., 26.

³⁷¹ Ibid., 28.

³⁷² Ibid., 39.

Varosha has become a key focal point in reunification negotiations between the two communities. Both the EU and the UN emphasize the town's importance as a crucial step towards unification, viewing it as a potential hub of „future reconciliation’’³⁷³. However, after the failure of talks between the communities in 2017, proposals emerged suggesting the possibility of appropriating Varosha unilaterally under Turkish Cypriot administration’’³⁷⁴.

A recent trend has shifted the focus toward property-driven interests and real estate speculation, which risks overshadowing the broader goals of reunification. This trend suggests that the future development and use of the area could be controlled by small, select groups, neglecting the interests of both communities³⁷⁵. Varosha is increasingly seen as a potential investment rather than a symbol of reconciliation and peace. The situation reveals the influence of intercommunal and geopolitical conflicts on urban and spatial reconstruction.

In November 2020, Ersin Tatar announced that he was abandoning the idea of reunification and would instead focus on discussions surrounding the international recognition of the two separate states of Cyprus³⁷⁶. This declaration caused concern among pro-reunification Turkish and Greek Cypriots, who feared that Varosha would gradually be bought up, demolished, and redeveloped, primarily by mainland Turkish developers with close ties to Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The Turkish administration in Cyprus opened the city to public visits, sparking a new wave of tourism in the area. Streets and bicycle lanes were newly paved, but this move was condemned by the UN Council in 2021³⁷⁷. It also sparked new reunification talks, with Erdoğan stating that negotiations on Cyprus could only proceed if the international community recognized the

³⁷³ Pyla, Phokaides. *Dark and Dirty*, 28.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 29.

³⁷⁶ Gorvett. *Postcard from Varosha*, 46.

³⁷⁷ UN News. Global Perspective Human Stories. “Security Council Calls for ‘Immediate Reversal’ of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Decision on Varosha.” UN.
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1096352> (Accessed on January 2, 2025).

sovereignty of the TRNC and granted equal international status to the Turkish Cypriot people in the North. For the forcibly displaced former residents, the reopening of Varosha after 46 years of closure only allowed them to visit the ruins of their former homes. Nafia Akdeniz describes in that context that the city is treated as simply an intriguing site of post-conflict devastation³⁷⁸.

When Tatar re-opened some parts, he invited former Greek Cypriot residents to either return to their properties or seek restitution through the Turkish Cypriot Immovable Property Commission, recognized by the European Court of Human Rights³⁷⁹. However, those who chose to return would automatically become residents of the TRNC, which created complications.

The main issue of forced displacement seems to stay untouched. Streets have been repaved. Every tourist can visit the city after paying an entrance fee. The only restriction is entry into the deteriorating buildings, which is prohibited for safety reasons. Max Holleran and Samuel Holleran explain in this context: „Tourists take photos and cycle through the ruins, but locals, and particularly those involved in urban planning and architecture, do not want this to be Northern Cyprus’s draw”³⁸⁰. Many view the reopening as a strategic move to sidestep the complex peace process, taking advantage of the global focus on the COVID-19 pandemic³⁸¹. The displaced residents of Varosha appear increasingly doubtful about ever returning to their homes. Nevertheless, they remain deeply attached to their past narratives, maintaining hope for the future.

UN troops regularly monitor the abandoned buildings in Varosha to prevent looting. While the town’s revival remains uncertain, it is far from abandoned in spirit. Cypriots continue to hope for its revitalization as a hub of bi-community life. Should former residents be allowed to return

³⁷⁸ Akdeniz. *Hope in the Ruins of Home*, 26.

³⁷⁹ Pyla, Phokaides. *Dark and Dirty*, 40.

³⁸⁰ Holleran, Max, and Samuel Holleran. “Resisting Dark Tourism: Northern Cyprus’s ‘Ghost City’ of Varosha.” *City (London, England)* 28, no. 5–6 (2024): 1066–78, 1071.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

to their properties, it is important to recognize that many buildings would need to be demolished for safety reasons. Furthermore, if the town is reopened, it is crucial to resist any efforts at homogenization by a single ethnic group, aiming instead to restore the area's diversity as a foundation for social reconciliation³⁸².

Till today, the fate of Varosha remains uncertain, as reconciliatory and divisive rhetoric continue to surface³⁸³. Some argue that if traumatic spaces are opened and curated appropriately, they can serve as places of healing³⁸⁴. However, others critique tourism and spectatorship at sites of violence, viewing them as risking a shift toward voyeurism and sensationalism³⁸⁵. As a result, Varosha stays entangled in conflict. Already in the 1960s, „modern landscape and its iconography of leisure existed in stark contrast to the intensively contested nature of the city's development during that very decade’’³⁸⁶.

As the case of Varosha illustrates, both sides and communities are determined to resolve the issue on their own terms. The UN Security Council has called for Varosha to be placed under United Nations administration. However, negotiations surrounding the conflict have been at a standstill since 2017³⁸⁷.

³⁸² Dobraszczyk, Paul. *The Dead City: Urban Ruins and the Spectacle of Decay*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2017, 106.

³⁸³ Pyla, Phokaides. *Dark and Dirty*, 39.

³⁸⁴ Holleran, Holleran. *Resisting Dark Tourism*, 1075.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ France 24. “La Turquie et l’ONU s’écharpent sur le statut de Varosha, ville symbole du conflit à Chypre.” 2021, French ed. edition.

6. Conclusion

The thesis has shown the complexity island's division. Historical events, sociopolitical complexities, and international dynamics have shaped the dual statehood in Cyprus and the nation-building process. Since its independence in 1960, Cyprus has experienced an ongoing and often contentious journey of constitutional development and national identity formation. The 1960 Constitution was initially crafted to support a bicommunal state, aiming to balance the rights and governance roles of Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. However, this constitution proved challenging in practice as tensions escalated between the communities, leading to violent conflicts in the 1960s and eventually to the division of the island in 1974 following Turkey's military intervention of the different impacts and consequences on the Turkish and Greek Cypriots after the Cyprus' 1960 foundational constitutional act took place in the context of independence from the British³⁸⁸. The 1960 Constitution was a product of an elite agreement and elite-driven in terms of adoption and representation. Adding to this, the constitutional settlement was regarded by the Greek Cypriots as externally imposed³⁸⁹.

In the aftermath of 1974, two separate state entities emerged, resulting in the 1983 declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. This division brought forth two competing constitutional frameworks: the original 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, which remains in force in the internationally recognized southern part of the island, and the TRNC Constitution, which governs the Turkish Cypriot-administered north. These constitutions were each intended to establish democratic governance and protect the rights of their respective communities. Yet they have faced substantial challenges in fulfilling their declared purposes. Both constitutions have been central to the political developments on the

³⁸⁸ Mendez, Triga. *Constitution-Making*, 375.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 376.

island, serving not only as foundational legal frameworks but also as tools reflecting the contrasting nation-building aspirations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Since 1960, Cyprus' constitutional development has been deeply affected by historical events and international influences, from decolonization to the island's accession to the EU. These events have underscored the complexities of reconciling the dual-state structure and have complicated efforts to achieve a unified Cypriot identity. Even though the majority of Turkish Cypriots prefer a state of their own, the economic difficulties of the TRNC don't favor this settlement solution. A federal solution that creates two politically equal states that are only tenuously affixed is aimed at³⁹⁰. The continued political divide and the challenges of constitutional functionality demonstrate the far-reaching impacts of historical and geopolitical forces on Cyprus' constitutional journey. Because there is no acute conflict on the island now, the current situation can continue indefinitely. Still, the current situation is „likely to become less and less appealing for both sides” if time passes³⁹¹. First, because Turkey pursues to approach the EU and strengthen its position on the world stage, it seems obvious that the Cyprus Problem constitutes a continuing hurdle to these political aspirations. Second, the rise in the number of lawsuits concerning Greek Cypriot property losses is becoming progressively expensive for Turkey.

Furthermore, tensions with Turkey have intensified after the discovery of oil and gas reserves in the Republic of Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)³⁹². The ownership and rights questions of gas deposits between the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC add tensions to this issue. Turkey views Cyprus as a critical geostrategic location for state security, control over the Eastern Mediterranean, and energy resources³⁹³. In the last two decades, Turkey has been

³⁹⁰ Bahcheli, Rizopoulos. *The Cyprus Impasse*, 35.

³⁹¹ Ker-Lindsay. *The Cyprus Problem*, 103.

³⁹² Country Report: Cyprus, 9 November 2020. “Oil and Gas Discoveries Exacerbate Turkey-Cyprus Tensions.”, Gale Academic OneFile, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A643385627/AONE?u=43wien&sid=bookmark-AONE (Accessed on November 17, 2023), 2.

³⁹³ Evaghorou. *Turkey's Policy on the Cyprus Question*, 113f.

systematically working under the rule of the AKP to rearrange and strengthen its power in all sectors³⁹⁴. This means that Turkey aims to obtain „an autonomy of actions” and emerge as a hegemonic power in the Eastern Mediterranean³⁹⁵. More recently, the Cyprus Question is to be understood in a larger framework of Turkey’s foreign policy because it is closely linked to geostrategic aspirations.

A major concern has been the equal treatment of both ethnic groups on the island. However, the communities are often treated separately, as the state separation makes differences clear at various levels (i.e., everyday life, media, etc.)³⁹⁶. On both sides, the distrust is continually being boosted by national celebrations, heroic figures, commemorations, symbols, policies, or schoolbooks³⁹⁷. The content that is being taught in history lessons is being presented as facts. However, each fact is redefined and perceived and taught „in harmony with the way the nation is perceived”³⁹⁸. Collective identity is passed on to new generations through socialization. The history of the community is portrayed and reported to highlight the links between past and present³⁹⁹. National identity and its particularities are transmitted through the education system and social interactions.

Furthermore, while reflecting on the history of community the difference between ‘self’ and ‘other’ is automatically highlighted to explain the existence and particularities of the community independent of the ‘other’. It is therefore impossible to define ‘self’ without the ‘other’ and to perceive ‘self’ from the ‘other’ separately⁴⁰⁰.

The North and the South are divided through a drawn line that hasn’t been previously there. The Green Line creates a border and territory. The new border parted an undivided island and

³⁹⁴ Evaghorou. *Turkey’s Policy on the Cyprus Question*, 116.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Steffani, Winfried, and Peter Zervakis. “Einführung”. Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev. *Südosteuropa-Handbuch*. 8, *Zypern*, 9-18. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998, 13.

³⁹⁷ Temizkan, Sidhu, Michael. *Understanding Turkish Cypriots*, 135.

³⁹⁸ Vural, Özuynik. *Redefining Identity*, 137.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 136.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., 137.

began to limit a territory where people began to regard themselves as belonging to it⁴⁰¹. The territory effect permits recognition of a so-called North Cyprus state. Orders and practices of settlement into new homes were adapted to give the newly displaced persons a sense of belonging to a space. The ‘border’, a line drawn on the map, appears real but somewhat also performs to keep the other side out and regulate the territory⁴⁰². Particularly, the line was drawn without a demographic or geographical precedent⁴⁰³.

To create a history of Cyprus, intercommunal interactions must be narrated, and the networks of bicomunal existence under Ottoman and British colonial rule must be highlighted⁴⁰⁴. Ethical equality between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, stressing a common element in identity without generalizing and hiding diversity, and recognizing the agony and loss of all are important steps to consider when dealing with (re)constructing a united Cypriot identity.

The dual statehood in Cyprus reflects the divergent nation-building trajectories of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, shaped by competing nationalisms and identities, which continue to define and challenge the island’s path toward coexistence and unity. The process of dual statehood highlights the deeply rooted and consolidated divisions between both entities.

To conclude, the present policy has the effect of stagnation and rigidity. International efforts for settlements for both communities are hoped for but international acceptance of the present reality of the island is to aim for. If the international stage recognizes both states as legitimate states of Cyprus, both communities will likely deal with each other on equal footing and respectfully. Only with this approach can a foundation for closer association between Greek and Turkish Cypriots be realized.

⁴⁰¹ Bryant, Hatay. *Sovereignty Suspended*, 37.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 38.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., 39.

⁴⁰⁴ Vural, Özuynik. *Redefining Identity*, 141.

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