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Representing the Unrepresented? On the Relation of Left-Authoritarian Political Attitudes and Support for Radical Right Parties

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Content

Figures and Tables

1. Introduction	5
2. Literature review	10
2.1 The two-dimensional space	10
2.2 The relation of the two dimensions and the left-authoritarian supply gap.....	13
2.3 Electoral behaviour of left-authoritarians and the radical right	14
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses	19
3.1 The two-dimensional political space since the European crises	20
3.2 The radical right in the economic-transnationalist space.....	24
3.2.1 Defining the radical right.....	25
3.2.2 The economic position of radical right parties	25
3.3.1 Radical right parties' economic position	33
3.3.2 Lack of alternatives: The party-system context's influence on left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour.....	33
3.3.3 The crises' impact on left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour	35
4. Data and empirical strategy	39
4.1 Case and data.....	39
4.2 Operationalisation	42
4.2.1 Operationalising the dependent variable: voting for a radical right party ..	42
4.2.2 Operationalising the main independent variable: two-dimensional ideological groups	44
4.2.3 Operationalising further independent variables: party positions, crisis and control variables	47
4.3 Methods	50
5. Results.....	53
5.1 Parties and voters in the two-dimensional space	54
5.2 The effect of taking left-authoritarian attitudes on radical right party support ..	54

5.2.1 Radical right parties' economic positions	63
5.2.2 Centre parties' ideological positions.....	67
5.2.3 Left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour before and since the crises.....	75
6. Discussion of the results.....	79
7. Conclusion.....	82
Bibliography.....	85
Appendix.....	97

Figures and Tables

Figure 1. The two-dimensional political space	24
Table 1. Overview radical right, centre-left and centre-right parties by country	43
Table 2. Questions of items used to construct the economic and the transnational index (ESS).....	45
Figure 2. Parties' two-dimensional positions by country (absolute positions)	55
Figure 3. Share of radical right voters by country	56
Figure 4. Shares of economic-transnational ideological groups by country	57
Figure 5. Recalled vote choice by economic-transnational ideological group.....	58
Table 3. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party ..	60
Figure 6. Predicted probability of voting for a radical right party by economic-transnational ideological groups	61
Figure 7. Boxplot: Distribution of radical right parties' economic positions	63
Table 4. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party - Radical right parties' economic position (only authoritarians)	65
Figure 8. Marginal effects of authoritarians taking a right instead of a left economic position on the logarithmised odds of voting for a radical right party across all observed values of radical right parties' economic positions	66
Figure 9. Difference in predicted probability right economic position vs. left economic position across all observed values of radical right parties' economic positions	66
Figure 10. Boxplot: distribution of centre-left parties' economic positions (relative by country and ESS round)	67
Table 5. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party - Centre-left parties' economic position (only authoritarians)	69
Figure 11. Difference in predicted probability right economic position vs. left economic position across all observed values of centre-left parties' economic positions	70

Figure 12. Boxplot: distribution of centre-right parties' transnational positions (relative by country and ESS round).....	71
Table 6. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party - Centre-right parties' transnational position(only authoritarians).....	73
Figure 13. Marginal effects of authoritarians taking a right instead of a left economic position on the logarithmised odds of voting for a radical right party across all observed values of centre-right parties' transnational positions	74
Figure 14. Difference in predicted probability right economic position vs. left economic position across all observed values of centre-right parties' transnational positions ..	74
Table 7. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party - Pre-crises and since crises (only authoritarians).....	76
Figure 15. Predicted probability of voting for a radical right party by crisis periods ..	77
A1. Predicted probability of voting for a radical right party by economic-transnational ideological groups (varying control variables' values).....	97

Representing the Unrepresented? On the Relation of Left-Authoritarian Political Attitudes and Support for Radical Right Parties

Abstract

Political supply and demand are usually described to be structured by the economic left-right scale and a second ‘non-economic’ (De Vries 2018: 1545) authoritarian-liberal dimension (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002: 966; Kriesi 2010; Grande 2008). While parties in Western European countries represent three of the resulting ideological combinations, left-authoritarian interests remain largely unrepresented (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014). Existing research draws conflicting conclusions on this: On the one side, left-authoritarians are described as ‘cross-pressured’ voters who settle on a one-dimensionally representative compromise (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 10); on the other side, recent research questions the assumption that left-authoritarians are not sufficiently represented (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024) while, due to their ‘protectionist’ claims, radical right parties are considered to provide ideal left-authoritarian representation (Hopkin 2020: 61). Therefore, this thesis concentrates on how left-authoritarian attitudes relate to supporting radical right parties. Settling the contradictions of existing research, I argue that what underlies these ambiguities are different understandings of radical right parties’ economic stances. Since the European crises of the last decades, the pivotality of attitudes on immigration and European integration determining positions on the liberal-authoritarian dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2018) enabled the radical right to effectively link left and authoritarian attitudes through a common welfare chauvinist and protectionist narrative (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Hopkin 2020). As this party family, thus, provides ideal supply to left-authoritarians, this ideological group is as likely as not cross-pressured right-authoritarians to vote for radical right parties. Depending on radical right parties’ economic position and centre parties’ positions, I even expect left-authoritarians’ probability to vote for the radical right to exceed that of right-authoritarians. Relying on multivariate interacting logit regression models based on European Social Survey data from eleven Western member states of the European Union collected between 2018 and 2022, I provide evidence that left-authoritarians, indeed, are as likely to support radical right parties as right-authoritarians and even more likely once radical right

parties take positions left to the median party. Next to clarifying contradictory arguments on the relationship of left-authoritarian attitudes and radical right support caused by different understandings of radical right parties' economic position, I contribute to existing literature assessing left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour by updating the definition of the liberal-authoritarian divide by accounting for the impact of the European crises on political competition.

Politisches Angebot und Nachfrage werden meist als zweidimensional beschrieben, strukturiert durch die wirtschaftliche Links-rechts Skala und durch eine zweite, 'nicht wirtschaftliche' (De Vries 2018: 1545) autoritär-liberale Dimension (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002: 966; Kriesi 2010; Grande 2008). Während Parteien in westeuropäischen Ländern drei der resultierenden ideologischen Kombinationen repräsentieren, bleiben links-autoritäre Interessen größtenteils unvertreten (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014). Bisherige Forschung zieht daraus widersprüchliche Schlüsse: Einerseits werden Links-Autoritäre als unter 'cross-pressure' stehende Wählende beschrieben, die sich mit einem eindimensional repräsentativen Kompromiss zufriedengeben müssen (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 10); andererseits stellt neuere Forschung die Annahme infrage, Links-Autoritäre wären unzureichend vertreten (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024), während rechtsradikale Parteien wegen ihrer 'protektionistischen' Ansprüche/ Forderungen als ideale links-autoritäre Repräsentation betrachtet werden (Hopkin 2020: 61). Dementsprechend konzentriert sich diese Arbeit darauf, inwiefern links-autoritäre Einstellungen mit dem Unterstützen rechtsradikaler Parteien in Zusammenhang stehen. Es wird argumentiert, dass den Unstimmigkeiten der bestehenden Literatur unterschiedliche Verständnisse der wirtschaftlichen Haltung rechtsradikaler Parteien zugrunde liegen. Dass seit den europäischen Krisen der letzten Jahrzehnte Einstellungen zu Immigration und europäischer Integration ausschlaggebend für die Positionierung auf der liberal-autoritären Dimension geworden sind (Hooghe & Marks 2018), hat es rechtsradikalen Parteien ermöglicht, linke und autoritäre Forderungen effektiv durch ein gemeinsames wohlfahrtsstaatschauvinistisches und protektionistisches Narrativ miteinander zu verknüpfen (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Hopkin 2020). Da rechtsradikale Parteien linksautoritären Personen damit ein ideales Angebot bieten, wählt diese ideologische Gruppe genauso wahrscheinlich rechtsradikale Parteien wie Rechts-Autoritäre, die nicht unter 'cross-pressure' (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 10) stehen. Abhängig von der ökonomischen Position rechtsradikaler Parteien und von der Positionierung von Zentrumsparteien wird davon ausgegangen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit Links-Autoritärer eine rechtsradikale Partei zu wählen die Rechts-Autoritärer sogar übertrifft. Die Ergebnisse einer multivariaten interagierenden logistischen Regressionsanalyse, die auf zwischen 2018 und 2022 erhobenen Daten des European Social Surveys aus elf westlichen Mitgliedstaaten der

Europäischen Union beruht, sprechen dafür, dass links-autoritäre Wählende tatsächlich genauso wahrscheinlich rechtsradikale Parteien unterstützen wie rechts-autoritäre und sogar wahrscheinlicher wenn rechtsradikale Parteien eine linkere Position als die Medianpartei einnehmen. Zusätzlich trägt diese Masterarbeit zur bestehenden Literatur über das Wahlverhalten links-autoritärer Personen bei, indem die Definition der liberal-autoritären Teilungslinie auf den aktuellen Stand gebracht wird, da die Auswirkungen der europäischen Krisen auf politischen Wettbewerb berücksichtigt werden.

1. Introduction

2024 saw a new party on the German political landscape: 'Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht – Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit' (BSW). It was founded by and named after the prominent previous politician of the Left, Sahra Wagenknecht who dismissed her former party as 'lifestyle left' due to its emphasis on non-economic liberal issues (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2021). Winning 6.20 percent of the votes in the European parliament election (European Parliament 2024) and more than ten percent of votes in three regional elections each (Thüringer Landesamt für Statistik 2024; Land Brandenburg 2024; Sächsischer Landtag 2024) which brought it into government in two of the regions (ZDF heute 2024; ZEIT Online 2024), the party became instantly successful. In contrast to the Left, the BSW is expected to gain enough votes to take seats in the next *Bundestag* elected in February 2025 (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2024). While several newspaper articles discuss whether the party which advocates 'strong pro-redistribution preferences' while dissenting European integration and immigration (Wagner, Wurthmann & Tomeczek 2023: 627) is to be regarded radical left or radical right (e.g., Politico 2024; Deutschlandfunk 2024), scholars of electoral behaviour clearly classify it as both: left in economic matters and right in socio-cultural ones - or to avoid confusion, left-authoritarian (Wagner, Wurthmann & Thomeczek 2023; Thomeczek 2024; Mudde 2024).

Political supply and demand are usually described to be structured by two dimensions: on the one hand, the conventional left-right scale denoting preferences for more or less state intervention into the economy; on the other hand, a second 'non-economic' (De Vries 2018: 1545) authoritarian-liberal dimension (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002: 966; Kriesi 2010; Grande 2008). Based on the combination of attitudes on both lines of contestation, political positions can be summarised as 'left-libertarian', 'right-libertarian', 'right-authoritarian', and '*left-authoritarian*' (Steiner & Hillen 2021: 2 [own emphasis]; Grande & Kriesi 2012). Because established West European party families represent the first three 'cleavage coalitions' (Grande & Kriesi 2012: 20; Hopkin 2020: 53f.) but no established party type stands for the latter position, left-authoritarianism (ibid.; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66), many scholars are concerned about left-authoritarians remaining unrepresented (e.g., Thomassen 2012; Kurella & Rosset 2017; Steiner & Hillen 2021). As this situation might apply to a substantial share of citizens across Western European countries (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 72), it is no surprise that even before the BSW

competed in its first election, scholars started investigating whether the new party could potentially appeal to this ideological group (Wagner, Wurthmann & Thomczek 2023). More elections and data are needed to draw conclusions on whether the BSW can reach left-authoritarian voters.

Yet, regarding pre-BSW Germany and other countries – there are only few other examples of similar parties, like the Dutch Socialist Party or the Danish Social Democrats (Thomeczek 2023: 2; Mudde 2024) - research disagrees about the concern about left-authoritarians' representation: While some studies suggest that left-authoritarians are more likely to withdraw from political activities, including voting (Hussey 2012; Hillen & Steiner 2019; Hakhverdian & Schakel 2021), others see them as 'cross-pressured' voters who settle for right-authoritarian or left-liberal alternatives (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 10). More recent research, in contrast, questions whether left-authoritarians are indeed insufficiently represented (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024).

Drawing on literature arguing that radical right parties fill the left-authoritarian gap in supply by combining economically left and culturally right positions through 'protectionist' arguments (Hopkin 2020: 61), this thesis asks: how does holding left-authoritarian political attitudes relate to voting for radical right parties?

In favour of research finding left-authoritarians not to feel less well represented than other ideological groups (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024), I argue that left-authoritarians are not 'cross-pressured' (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 10) but that radical right parties provide ideal supply to them (Hopkin 2020), making them as likely as not cross-pressured right-authoritarians to vote for this party family.

If left-authoritarians do not find representation in radical right parties, there is more evidence that they are broadly left without 'substantive' representation and, therefore, do not have a party to vote for which 'act[s] in their interest', potentially causing detrimental consequences for government legitimacy (Pitkin 1972: 144, 166). Yet, if the radical right indeed appeals to left-authoritarian persons, assessing the circumstances under which this ideological group's probability to choose for this party exceeds that of right-authoritarians gives insight into the electoral potential and possible future success of radical right parties - whose world view is incompatible with basic democratic principles (Urbinati 2019).

Furthermore, even though radical right party support has already attracted much scholarly attention, the persistent success of these parties in recent Western European elections, like in Italy or France, points to the continuing relevance of explaining their support. On the one hand, pursuing this question considering the Western European party systems' context, adds to literature drawing attention to how radical right parties' success might be provoked by liberal democracies' flaws. On the other hand, focussing on the importance of left-authoritarian positions in radical right party support, might help to reconcile competing economic and cultural explanatory approaches - a debate summarised by Mudde as 'Economic Anxiety versus Cultural Backlash' (2019: Chapter 6).

This thesis is made up by seven chapters. This introductory part is the first one. Second, after establishing the fundamental premise of this thesis and of previous literature on left-authoritarians that political competition and demand can be summarised by an economic and an authoritarian-liberal dimension, I illustrate previous findings on the lack of supply to left-authoritarians and on their voting behaviour, especially in respect of radical right parties: Both relevant strands of literature support the assumption that left-authoritarians vote for the radical right. However, on the one side, the radical right is merely seen as one alternative of one-dimensional supply (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 10) whereas, on the other side, the radical right is considered to offer ideal left-authoritarian positions (Hopkin 2020).

Third, I illustrate my theoretical argument why left-authoritarian attitudes relate to voting for radical right parties. Before, as the definition of the authoritarian-liberal dimension is very inconclusive, I clarify this thesis' conception of the divide, relying on Hooghe and Marks' 'transnational cleavage' (2018: 109). Importantly, this allows assessing left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour and the relation of the two dimensions for voters and parties using a timely definition which takes account of the impact of the European crises since the last decades on political competition (ibid.).

Matching research findings that left-authoritarians do not seem aware of being less optimally represented (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024), I challenge previous research classifying the radical right as right-authoritarian (Steiner & Hillen 2021; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014) by arguing in favour of seeing them as economically left: While they moved towards the left over the last decades (Rovny & Polk 2020: 254; Afonso & Rennwald 2018: 10; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016:

9), the European crises since the late 2000s caused the authoritarian-liberal dimension to centre around the issues of immigration and European integration (Hooghe & Marks 2018) which, in turn, enables to link left and authoritarian claims effectively through 'welfare chauvinist' (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Mudde 2007: 131f.; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294) and 'protectionist' (Hopkin 2020: 61) claims. Therefore, in line with Downs (1957), radical right parties appeal to left-authoritarians due to ideological congruence. Additionally, left-authoritarians are more likely to be convinced of radical right parties taking a more left economic position (Lodge & Taber 2013; Festinger 1968; Nasr 2021). Consequently, the radical right is as little of an alternative to left-authoritarians as it is to right-authoritarians. After setting up this base expectation, I argue that, even though transnational attitudes are regarded as powerful denominator of radical right support (Rovny & Polk 2020: 261, 263), left-authoritarians are more likely to opt for radical right parties when the parties take a more left position (Nasr 2021). Based on Hopkin's explanation of the left-authoritarian supply gap (2020), I illustrate that they equally have a higher probability to vote for a radical right party when centre-left parties move to the right and centre-right parties moderate their authoritarian views, both results in a somewhat moderated 'neo-liberal consensus' which radical right parties reject (Furedi 2005: 57; Hopkin 2020: 54). Finally, I explain how the European crises preconditioned radical right parties linking left and authoritarian positions to appeal to left-authoritarians.

Fourth, I empirically assess the relationship of holding left-authoritarian convictions and voting for a radical right party in comparison to other ideological groups based on European Social Survey (ESS) data from eleven Western European EU member states from 2018, 2020 and 2022. To test how the crises conditioned this association, I additionally consider ESS rounds from 2004 onwards. Before outlining my empirical strategy, I justify the sample choice and explain how I make all relevant concepts measurable.

The fifth part of the thesis illustrates the analyses' results. While they provide evidence for the underlying expectation that left-authoritarians are as likely as right-authoritarians to vote for the radical right but far more than non-authoritarian ideological groups, the hypotheses on centre parties' positions' role in affecting left-authoritarian voting behaviour are not supported. However, economic positions do additionally draw left-authoritarians to vote for a radical right party once these parties take a position left of the median party on this scale.

After addressing the most relevant shortcomings of my analysis in the sixth chapter, mainly related to limited measuring quality due to the lack of data and the small sample size of country-time combinations, I draw conclusions in the final section.

2. Literature review

Before outlining relevant research strands on left-authoritarians' voting behaviour (section 2.2), especially regarding radical right parties, I address their - and this work's - fundamental presumption: The political realm can be abstracted by two lines of contestation – the economic left-right divide and a second, 'non-economic' dimension (De Vries 2018: 1545; Grande & Kriesi 2012; Downs 1957; section 2.1). As political demand and supply are not allocated congruently to all four resulting quadrants, voters combining left and authoritarian positions are left without matching political representation by established parties (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009).

2.1 The two-dimensional space

In this section, I introduce the concept of the two-dimensional political space which underlies research on left-authoritarians and the notion itself. While there is more agreement on the meaning of the first, economic, dimension, the definition of the second varies considerably and evolves over time: It is generally understood to grasp 'non-economic' attitudes (De Vries 2018: 1545). These initially include positions on 'cultural liberalism' (Kriesi et al. 2006: 933f.; Bornschier 2010: 421; Dolezal & Hutter 2012: 71) and later stances on European integration and immigration (Grande 2008: 53; Stoll 2010: 456; Grande & Kriesi 2012: 20; Dolezal & Hutter 2012: 71) which are, finally, seen as core issues defining the political divide (Hooghe & Marks 2018). However, this trend in the political competition literature is not reflected in research on left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour. Instead, different measures of the liberal-authoritarian dimension are combined irrespectively of the time the analysis is focussed on. Second, scholars of political competition and of left-authoritarians draw different conclusions on whether the two dimensions are related to each other (s. section 2.2). Still, both point to an incongruence of voters' and parties' positions, leading to a lack of representation of left-authoritarian voters who make up around a fourth of Western European populations.

Research on left-authoritarians' voting behaviour presumes that political demand can be represented by a two-dimensional 'spatial' model (Downs 1957: 142; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Lefkofridi, et al. 2014; Hillen & Steiner 2020; Steiner & Hillen 2021). Based on the combination of attitudes on both lines of contestation, political positions can be summarised as 'left-libertarian', 'right-libertarian', 'right-authoritarian', *and 'left-authoritarian'* (Steiner & Hillen 2021: 2; Grande & Kriesi 2012 [own emphasis]).

Scholars of political competition in Western Europe broadly agree on the first line of conflict, the conventional left-right scale, to denote economic preferences for more or less state intervention into the economy, including attitudes towards the extent of income redistribution and welfare spending (De Vries 2018: 1545; Inglehart 1984: 35; Hooghe and Marks 2002: 966; Kriesi et al. 2006: 923; Benoit and Laver 2006: 192; Grande 2008: 318; Stoll 2010: 451; Lefkofridi, et al. 2014: 71; Dassonneville et al. 2024a: 2; Marks, et al. 2021: 180; Grande & Kriesi 2012: 21).

The second dimension to which the labels 'authoritarian' and 'libertarian' above refer to, is commonly seen to encompass 'non-economic' issues (De Vries 2018: 1545). Yet, its exact content is less unequivocally defined (ibid.). In this vein, Inglehart terms it the 'materialist-postmaterialist dimension' (1984: 26). He relates it to a shifted prioritisation of values in industrialised societies, with its 'postmaterialist' pole supporting the causes of 'New Politics' movements, such as the 'environmentalist' or 'women's movement' (ibid). Likewise, Kitschelt (1994) and Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) relate the 'libertarian-authoritarian' (1994: 29), and the 'new politics dimension' (2002: 966) respectively, to new social movements' aims to 'expand [...] personal freedoms and rights' in contrast to the rejection thereof (2002: 967). The latter authors summarise the poles' causes as 'Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL)' opposed to 'traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN)' (2002: 966).

After Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) found parties' positions on the GAL-TAN dimension to explain support for European integration far better than left-right stances, later research, using data from the 1990s until the early 2000s, with few exceptions¹, associates stances in favour of European integration with the 'cosmopolitan' (Kriesi et al. 2006: 933) 'cultural liberalism' (Kriesi et al. 2006: 933f.; Bornschier 2010: 421; Dolezal & Hutter 2012: 71) of the libertarian pole. Accordingly, Eurosceptic and restrictive immigration views are related to the authoritarian pole (s. Kriesi et al. 2006: 949; Grande 2008: 325; Stoll 2010: 456; Dolezal & Hutter 2012: 71).

In line with this, these scholars ascribe a central role to globalisation in the development and salience of the non-economic dimension (Grande 2008: 53; Stoll 2010: 456; Grande & Kriesi 2012: 20; Dolezal & Hutter 2012: 71). Thus, persons who profit from globalisation economically or have a more international outlook – which both goes along with having obtained a higher level of education – take a libertarian position

¹ s. Bornschier 2010, focussing on 'libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values' and Rovny & Marks 2011, concentrating on the initial 'socio-cultural issues'

whereas those who feel threatened by higher competition on the labour market and regarding their national identity usually hold more authoritarian views (ibid.).

While the independence of attitudes on the cultural dimension from left-right positions was often seen as an expression of issue-based voting, bringing an end to voting according to social stratification – ‘dealignment’ (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1985: 451, 459) or ‘destructuration’ (Marks et al. 2020: 23, Inglehart 1984: 68; Kriesi 2010: 678f.), education is, hence, recognised as the sociodemographic factor structuring positions on the non-economic dimension, or, thus, cleavage (Grande & Kriesi 2012: 12-15; Dolezal & Hutter 2012: 72f.; Marks et al. 2020; Hooghe & Marks 2018).

Emphasising the significance of globalisation, based on data until the mid-2010s, Grande and Kriesi (2012: 20), Hooghe and Marks (2018: 109) and De Vries (2018: 1557) find attitudes towards European integration and immigration to have become most central in determining positions on the second dimension. Hooghe and Marks explain this specifically by pointing to the context of the 2008 Euro crisis and the 2015 European migration crisis which caused an increased salience of both issues (2018: 116ff.). According to De Vries’ analysis of data on the Netherlands from the 2014 European Election Study, issues initially seen at the core of the ‘cultural’ divide, like sexual self-determination and environmentalist issues, are unrelated to the non-economic dimension which she terms ‘*cosmopolitan-parochial divide*’ (2018: 1542, 1554 [author’s emphasis]).

Taken together, the definition of the second dimension differs substantially. However, there is a time trend in the issues research identifies to determine it. First, it is seen to structure perspectives on cultural issues, such as gay rights and the environment. Subsequently, acknowledging the influence of globalisation on political attitudes, European unification and immigration are included in the measurement of cultural positions. Finally, these two issues are seen as the main denominators of the second dimension in more recent research (Hooghe & Marks 2018).

This trend is not reflected in the literature focussing on left-authoritarians specifically. Except for Federico, Fisher and Deason (2017) who deviate in their research focus as they perceive authoritarianism as a psychological characteristic instead of political beliefs, scholars always include stances on immigration to measure non-economic issue positions (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009: 317; Thomassen 2012: 17; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 85; Kurella & Rosset 2017: 4; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 338, 340; Hakhverdian & Schakel 2022: 493,495; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 5; Dassonneville,

Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 6). Yet, despite focussing their analysis on the late 2000s, 2010s, or 2020s, next to stances towards European integration (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009: 317; Thomassen 2012: 17; Kurella & Rosset 2017: 4; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 338), they combine these with ‘cultural liberalism’ (Kriesi et al. 2006: 933f.) positions on LGBTQI+ rights (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009: 317; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 338; Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 6), the environment (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 6), or law and order (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 85; Kurella & Rosset 2017: 4; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 338).

2.2 The relation of the two dimensions and the left-authoritarian supply gap

The different choice of denominators illustrated above might explain why literature on left-authoritarians draws different conclusions than other scholars of political competition do on how the economic and the liberal-authoritarian dimension relate to each other: Both agree on an actual two-dimensional structure of voters’ political attitudes (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009: 321; Thomassen 2012: 18f.; Kurella & Rosset 2017: 6; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 340; Hakhverdian & Schakel 2021: 493; Inglehart 1984: 36; Dolezal & Hutter 2012: 73). Only De Vries finds demand-side positions on both axes to be somewhat associated (2018: 1553).

Yet, regarding party positions, scholars of political competition only find an actual relation between the liberal-authoritarian and the left-right dimension when using data until the 1990s (Inglehart 1984: 36; Stoll 2010: 466). The results of research relying on more recent data (Kriesi et al. 2006: 938; Grande 2008: 429), point to unrelated two-dimensionality of the political space’s supply side. Stoll’s (2010) comparison of data from the 1990s and the early 2000s confirm this trend, ascertaining an association between the two in the earlier period which does not apply to the second (2010: 466). Although De Vries identifies a relation of positions on immigration and European unification with economic stances of Dutch parties in 2006, this is not the case anymore in 2014 (2018: 1549).

In contrast, research on left-authoritarians which relies on data from the 21st century mostly stresses party positions to be structured either uni-dimensionally (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009: 320; Thomassen 2012: 18f.) or at least substantially related on the economic and non-economic axis (Kurella & Rosset 2017: 6; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 338). Even if scholars recognise a two-dimensional structure, either they could not identify any party which combined left economic attitudes with restrictive views on immigration, European integration, or cultural liberalism (Lefkofridi, Wagner &

Willmann 2014: 72; Kurella & Rosset 2017: 6; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 6), or they observed that the mean distance between individuals' left-authoritarian positions and party positions was largest (Hakhverdian & Schakel 2021: 497; Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 12).

Although there is disagreement on how much the relationship between dimensions differs between voters and parties, scholars of political competition and of left-authoritarians specifically point to a lack of representation of left-authoritarian political attitudes. While the left-libertarian combination is usually represented by social democratic parties, liberal parties stand for right-libertarian positions and conservative parties for right-authoritarian views, no established party family represents left-authoritarian demands (Grande & Kriesi 2012: 22; Hopkin 2020: 53f.). Since the share of left-authoritarians in previous research's samples reaches from 10.3 (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 10) to 28.8 per cent (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009: 325), a substantial part of the Western European population seems to remain politically unrepresented.

In summary, in contrast to the general literature on political competition which focusses more on identifying the political realm's two-dimensional structure, scholars of left-authoritarianism point out that demand and supply side positions do not align. Persons favouring the state to take a more active role in the economy while opposing liberal cultural attitudes and European integration and immigration – about a fifth to a third of Western European citizens - often do not find a party representing their views ideally (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009: 325).

2.3 Electoral behaviour of left-authoritarians and the radical right

In the previous section I established that the political realm is considered to be two-dimensional, comprising economic and varyingly defined non-economic issues. Yet, voters' and parties' positions in this space do not correspond to each other. In the following, I outline previous findings on what consequences the resulting lack of representation has on left-authoritarian citizens' electoral behaviour, specifically regarding radical right parties.

There are two strands of literature relevant in this context: The first, already referred to in the previous section, which focusses directly on left-authoritarian persons, demonstrates that they are less likely to vote (Hillen & Steiner 2019; Hakhverdian & Schakel 2021). If they do, whether they vote for a right-authoritarian, or a left-libertarian alternative depends on the salience of the dimensions' issues and misperception of

incongruent party positions (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014; Steiner & Hillen 2021). According to the second, concentrating on party-system level explanations, the supply gap is caused by a convergence of left and right parties in the political centre (Hopkin 2020). This is filled by radical right parties making ‘protectionist’ appeals (Hopkin 2020: 61). After all, both literature clusters point to left-authoritarians more likely voting for the radical right. They differ, nevertheless, in how they conceive its economic position. Finally, Dassonneville, Fournier and Somer-Topcu (2024) question the relevance of the left-authoritarian supply gap altogether by demonstrating that individuals taking these positions do not perceive themselves to be represented worse than other voters.

After van der Brug and Van Spanje first flagged up that voters taking left-authoritarian attitudes remain unrepresented in Western European party systems (2009: 315), scholars point out that left-authoritarians, as a consequence, are more likely to show lower levels of ‘diffuse political support’ (Easton 1975: 437), more often withdrawing from political participation: This can be observed in the US context where left-authoritarians and right-libertarians are less likely to support an electoral campaign than those whose views reflect the party system’s uni-dimensionality (Hussey 2012). Accordingly, individuals who tend towards the Republican Party regarding non-economic matters but who share the Democrats’ economic stances, are least likely to submit their vote (Hussey 2012: 107). Hillen and Steiner (2019) and Hakhverdian and Schakel (2021) make similar observations in the Western European context. Hence, according to the analysis of data from the Dutch parliamentary Election Study 2017, ‘left-nationalist voters’ display more distrust in political institutions and dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in their country and are more politically cynical compared to individuals who combine the two issue dimensions differently (Hakhverdian & Schakel 2021: 487, 498-500). Across 14 Western European countries, drawing on 2008 European Social Survey data (Hillen & Steiner 2019: 339), voters in all three other quadrants are equally likely to vote and satisfied with democracy as individuals taking centrist positions (ibid.: 341f.). Yet, left-authoritarians lag behind in both aspects (ibid.). Interestingly, these effects are less pronounced in 2016 which the authors relate to radical right parties slowly closing the supply gap (ibid.: 344f, 338). Similarly, left-authoritarians in 2011 in Finland do not see their vote as less efficacious than other voters anymore (ibid.: 346f.) That year, the radical right party, True Finns, entered the political landscape taking a left-authoritarian stance (ibid.: 345).

Also Federico, Fisher and Deason confirm left-authoritarians' lower diffuse support (2017: 1012). Yet, they diverge from the literature of political competition by conceiving authoritarianism as a psychological instead of a political behaviour concept (ibid.: 1016; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 335).

More relevant to this thesis' research question is what parties left-authoritarians choose if they do vote, a question literature dealing with their more 'specific political support' (Easton 1975: 437) addresses.

Empirical work on the issue investigates which alternatives to ideal two-dimensional representation individuals holding these attitudes choose. In this regard, based on European Election Survey cross-national data from 2009, Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann find out that when the cultural dimension is more salient to them personally - specifically, when they are worried about immigration - these voters are more likely to opt for 'right-authoritarian parties', for instance, *Front National* in France or the Dutch Party for Freedom (*PVV*) (2014: 76, Appendix 4). Yet, according to the authors' study, in general they tend to put more emphasis on economic issues, based on which they vote for 'left-liberal' parties that advocate those (ibid.: 66). Referring to English, French, German, Dutch, and Swiss data collected around 2010, Kurella and Rosset (2017) conflict this latter finding. According to them, most left-authoritarians choose right-authoritarian parties due to their good reputation in addressing cultural matters (ibid.: 7f.).

Steiner and Hillen (2021) confirm Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann's main finding regarding the salience of immigration and voting for a right-authoritarian party (2014) based on German Longitudinal Election Study data surveyed during the 2017 German federal election. Nonetheless, they add that voters are also more likely to vote for right-authoritarian parties – as which they classify the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) - despite caring more about economic issues when they misunderstand the party's economic positions as left (Steiner & Hillen 2021: 7, 10). Drawing on their own survey's responses of voters and experts gathered in 2023 and 2024, Dassonneville, Fournier and Somer-Topcu validate that left-authoritarians often consider the economic views of the party they expect to vote for to be more on the left than it is indeed the case according to experts' classifications (2024: 16).

Second, in context of the 'End of History' (Fukuyama 1989) or the 'decline of left and right' (Furedi 2005: 52; Mouffe 2005; Giddens 1994; Beck 1997), the radical right is

considered to take the left-authoritarian space established parties kept empty due to their convergence on the political centre.

According to Mouffe (2005) and Hopkin (2020), established parties taking less differentiable positions account for the gap in political supply which is used by radical right parties: Sharing a 'pro-market and pro-globalization' outlook, established left and right parties both converge on the centre of the political realm compromising on a liberal market model terminally balanced by some redistributive welfare policies and more liberal cultural positions to include more persons into the market (Hopkin 2020: 54). Thus, moderating left economic positions and conservative attitudes, both leave a gap of decidedly left and authoritarian positions (Hopkin 2020:54). Mouffe (2005: 69) and Hopkin both relate this 'centrist consensus' (2020: 54) to the rise of radical right parties. Mouffe (2005) sees the popularity of radical right parties as a symptom of the lack of possibility to express political conflicts in institutionalised, democratic ways. According to Hopkin, the radical right, in his words, the 'anti-system Right' (2020: 52), provides the missing supply: Questioning the system which universally agrees on somewhat moderated neoliberalism and globalisation, the radical right upholds anti-immigration and Eurosceptic claims not only to 'protect the nation' in cultural terms (2020: 61); Restricting immigration and the EU's free labour mobility also portrays a 'protectionist' stance which promises privileged 'access to the labor market and the welfare state' (Hopkin 2020: 62) to the 'true national citizens' (ibid.: 61). Thereby, it combines non-economically authoritarian policy positions with economically left claims. Consequently, it offers ideal representation to left-authoritarian voters.

Thereby, Hopkin (2020) conflicts Kitschelt and McGann's original 'winning formula' of the radical right combining economically right and authoritarian positions (1995). The authors differ, however, in their understanding of established parties' positions in the political space. In line with Kitschelt and McGann (1995), radical right parties take the space that centre-right parties left on the economic dimension by moving to its centre (de Lange 2007: 414f.). In contrast, in line with the neoliberal consensus, there is no lack of political supply of right economic positions, most forcefully advocated by liberal parties (Hopkin 2020: 54). Yet, the pro-globalisation outlook of this consensus means a shortage of authoritarian positions which reject cultural and economic internationalisation – especially in combination with left economic stances because established left parties embrace multiculturalism as well as European unification (Hopkin 2020: 64f.). The radical right's 'winning formula', in accordance with Hopkin

(2020), thus, combines authoritarian views with left, instead of liberal, economic issue positions, catering to left-authoritarian voters.

Hopkin empirically supports his argument by plotting established and anti-system parties' positions in the two-dimensional space (2020: 55). His analysis remains limited to the descriptive level, however.

Finally, Dassonneville, Fournier and Somer-Topcu (2024) call the concern about the lack of (two-dimensional) representation into question altogether. Between 2023 and 2024, the authors gathered information on where respondents across ten democratic countries position themselves as well as their country's parties on the economic issue spectrum and on the second dimension (*ibid.*: 6), conceived of attitudes on immigration, environmental policy and rights of homosexuals (*ibid.*). When they compared citizens' positions with those of parties as estimated by experts, in line with research described above, persons with left-authoritarian attitudes were on average furthest apart from party positions (*ibid.*: 12). However, their perceived distances to parties and to the party they consider voting for are comparable to those of other voter groups and even centrists (*ibid.*: 12, 16). Consequently, left-authoritarians do not seem to be aware that they are less well represented in the party system than other voters (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024).

Considering the findings of both strands of literature relevant regarding left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour, they both support the assumption that radical right parties appeal to this group. However, they differ in how they regard the relation between left-authoritarian attitudes and radical right parties. The literature empirically exploring left-authoritarians' voting behaviour sees radical right parties only as one of two compromises chosen if they even cast their ballot (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014; Steiner & Hillen 2021). Accordingly, the radical right is solely voted for based on the non-economic issue dimension (*ibid.*). This happens when immigration is regarded as the most significant issue (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014; Steiner & Hillen 2021). Only when left-authoritarians misperceive radical right parties' views on the economic scale, their left position draws them to vote for the radical right (Steiner & Hillen 2021: 7, 10). The second strand, in contrast, sees radical right parties' protectionist appeals as ideal supply to left-authoritarian voters (Hopkin 2020). Most recent research by Dassonneville, Fournier and Somer-Topcu (2024), however, challenges the attention drawn to the representational gap of left-authoritarian attitudes as citizens holding them do not seem to be aware of their disadvantaged situation.

3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses

In this section, I outline this thesis' theoretical framework and the hypotheses I draw from it:

First, since previous approaches to left-authoritarian voting behaviour conceived the second dimension in various ways, I argue for updating it by defining the second dimension in line with Hooghe and Marks' (2018) notion of the transnational-nationalist divide to take into account the impact of European crises since 2008 on political demand and supply (3.1) - in essence, the increased salience of immigration and European integration. This updates previous approaches to left-authoritarians' voting behaviour in line with most recent findings of the literature on two-dimensional political competition. Simultaneously, it allows to reassess the relation of both dimensions for parties. Diverging definitions of the second dimension might account for the different findings on this in political competition research and that on left-authoritarian voting behaviour.

My main point which conflicts most previous empirical research on left-authoritarians' voting behaviour is that voting for the radical right is not a compromise, but that left-authoritarian voters recognise it as ideal representation of their attitudes.

For this purpose, I first set up the supply-side basis of my argument (3.2): The literature points to left-authoritarians voting for the radical right as a right-authoritarian alternative among others (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014; Steiner & Hillen 2021), on the one hand, and as ideal left-authoritarian representation (Hopkin 2020), on the other. Underlying this disparity is a diverging conception of the radical right's economic position. In line with Hopkin's (2020: 61) elaborations on radical right parties' protectionist claims, I argue in favour of considering them economically left. Importantly, the growing salience of immigration and European integration in determining the second dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2018) provides the basis for the radical right to effectively link left and authoritarian positions to appeal to left-authoritarian voters. Since 'radical right' is often confused with other concepts, especially 'populism', I start this section by defining what is understood here as 'radical right' (section 3.2.1).

Subsequently, I come to my core demand-side argument (3.3): Based on Downs' economic model of voting (1957), and literature calling a lack of supply by established parties to account for right-wing populist party support (Mouffe 2005; Hopkin 2020), I argue that voters holding left-authoritarian attitudes are more likely to vote for radical right parties. While it is undebated that they provide ideal authoritarian supply, I conflict previous research by stating that they also match left-authoritarians' economic

preferences: The radical right increasingly provides economically left policy proposals. Additionally, left-authoritarians are also likely to regard it as such while other parties do not provide appropriate alternatives to it – especially since the crises of the last decades. Therefore, the radical right best reflects left-authoritarian political preferences, filling the gap of supply left by established parties across Western European party systems. They do, thus, not only provide a compromise for left-authoritarian voters.

3.1 The two-dimensional political space since the European crises

Since scholars use various names to refer to the second dimension while the meanings attached to it also diverge as illustrated in the literature review, I clarify this divide's understanding in this thesis, updating approaches to left-authoritarian voting behaviour through insights of political competition literature: Since the Euro and migration crises², individuals' and parties' views on the second axis are determined mainly by their attitudes towards European unification and immigration in accordance with Hooghe and Marks' 'transnational cleavage' (2018: 109).

As remarked above, research investigating left-authoritarian electoral behaviour combines the elements of different strands of meaning associated with the second dimension irrespective of the time their analysis concentrates on (e.g., van der Brug & van Spanje 2009: 317; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 338; Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 6; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 85). This is not in line with findings of research on two-dimensional political competition. More recent studies on the two-dimensional space using data around the 2010s find issues which reflect whether a person interprets globalisation as beneficial or disadvantageous for themselves - namely immigration and European integration - as most powerful in grasping positions on the non-economic dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2018: 109; de Vries 2018: 1557; Grande & Kriesi 2012: 20).

The meaning of both issues to determine the non-economic conflict line has gained in importance especially since the euro crisis from 2008 and the 2015 migration crisis (Hooghe & Marks 2018; Hutter & Kriesi 2019, 2022). First, the financial interdependency in the European Monetary Union, split EU member states into "debtor[s]" and "creditor[s]" (Kriesi & Hutter 2019: 21) in the aftermath of the 2008

² In both cases, I use the word 'crisis' as my theoretical argument builds on the assumption that both events had a substantial impact on the space of political competition because they were portrayed and perceived as crises. This is not to judge whether these events actually justify or necessitate to be perceived as such.

financial crisis, pitting interests of Southern European member states and Ireland who had received financing to “save the euro at any cost” (Scharpf 2013: 2) against those of Northern European member states who provided it (Kriesi & Hutter 2019: 21; Schimmelfennig 2018: 977f.). Conditions for these bailouts included strict austerity measures monitored by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Scharpf 2013: 8; Schimmelfennig 2018: 977f.). ‘Debtor’ state governments were thus very limited in their actions to mitigate the financial crisis’ consequences, leading to a ‘deep and persistent economic and social crisis’ in these member states (Scharpf 2013: 8; Kriesi & Hutter 2019: 21). Consequently, the conditionalities imposed by EU institutions entailed strong public objection (Börzel & Risse 2018: 86). The euro crisis, thus, underlined the interdependency of European member states and limited national agency of governments in Southern Europe (Hobolt & Tilley 2016: 973). As a result of this, while European integration was rather neglected by parties until the beginning of the 2000s, its salience increased substantially since the euro crisis (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 1005f.; Hooghe & Marks 2018: 117).

Second, the 2015 migration crisis had a similar effect on the salience of immigration and tied it to the issue of European integration (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 1001). The influx of more than a million asylum seekers (Börzel & Risse 2018: 86f.) revealed the lack of preparedness of the European Schengen system to handle large migration movements (Schimmelfennig 2018: 976). Due to the Dublin rules that put those member states in charge of registering asylum seekers in which they arrived (Börzel & Risse 2018: 91), Mediterranean member states’ capacities, particularly Greece’s and Italy’s, were overwhelmed as well as those of attractive ‘destination states’ (Schimmelfennig 2018: 978). Not least because the media presentation of the large migration movements was often shaped by ‘threatening’ ‘massification’ (Chouliaraki & Stolic 2017: 1169) while radical right parties mobilised heavily on it (Kriesi & Hutter 2019: 23; Schimmelfennig 2018: 979; Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 1001; Hutter & Kriesi 2022: 351-353), the salience of immigration surged – among parties (Hutter & Kriesi 2022: 348) as well as among voters (Hooghe & Marks 2018: 118).

Like the euro crisis, the migration crisis entailed a disagreement among EU member states (Schimmelfennig 2018: 978): Countries which were more affected by the arrivals of migrants insisted on distributing asylum seekers across member states while those less affected opposed this interest (ibid.). The inter-member state conflict and the

events of the migration crisis which made citizens very aware of EU policies' influence on their lives (ibid.: 979) contributed to considering immigration in the context of European integration, linking the two issues 'in a particularly explosive way that is likely to have politicized both of them' (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 1001). In accordance with this, at the party level, European integration's salience exceeded that of immigration during the euro crisis, while both issues' salience levels became equally high at the time of the migration crisis (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 1006).

Both crises signify a 'critical juncture' for party competition in Europe by causing a surge in the salience of both issues (Hooghe & Marks 2018: 126; Hutter & Kriesi 2022: 342; Hutter & Kriesi 2019). While both already structured positions on the non-economic cleavage reflecting endorsement or opposition towards globalisation, their elevated salience intensified the non-economic dimension's power in structuring the political space in Western Europe (Hooghe & Marks 2018; Hutter & Kriesi 2019, 2022). This is reflected in the risen success of parties embodying objection to, or favour of, European integration and immigration, the radical right and green parties (Hooghe & Marks 2018; Hobolt & Tilley 2016).

To account for the impact of the two crises on public opinion and political competition, I update this dimension's conception also in the context of investigating left-authoritarians' voting behaviour by relying on Hooghe and Marks' concept of the 'transnational cleavage' (2018: 109). This conceptualisation also challenges the dimension's 'non-economic' character (de Vries 2018: 1545) as immaterial nationalist reasons underly support of, or opposition to, European integration and immigration as well as economic cost-benefit considerations (Hooghe & Marks 2018: 115f.; Marks et al. 2020: 25) which both often depending on individuals' education level (ibid.; Grande & Kriesi 2012: 12-15; Marks et al. 2020; Dolezal & Hutter 2012: 72f.). Compared to the times when mainly attitudes on LGBTQI+ rights and environment protection constituted the 'cultural' dimension (Inglehart 1984; Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002), at least since the 2015 migration crisis, the transnationalist increasingly reflects economic demands (Hooghe & Marks 2018).

Updating the definition of the second dimension also allows to reassess the two dimensions' relation to each other on the party-level. As discussed above (s. 2.1.1), differing conceptions of the dimension in the literature on the left-authoritarian supply gap compared to the general political competition literature is likely to explain, at least in part, why scholars of the former find the dimensions to be related at the party-level

(van der Brug & van Spanje 2009: 320; Thomassen 2012:18f.; Kurella & Rosset 2017: 6; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 338) while those of the latter do not identify an association between them from the 2000s when migration and European integration started to determine ‘non-economic’ positions (Kriesi et al. 2006: 938; Grande 2008: 429; Stoll 2010: 466; de Vries 2018: 1549).

As my enquiry most closely connects to research focussing on left-authoritarians, I still stick to the notation used by all scholars of this subject, ‘libertarian’, or ‘liberal’, and ‘authoritarian’³. Consequently, persons and parties holding *right-liberal* attitudes favour less state intervention into the economy, less financial redistribution, respectively, and support European unification and immigration; Those with *right-authoritarian* views are equally in favour of a liberal economic system but oppose the European project and immigration; *Left-liberals* share a positive view on European integration and immigration to their country but wish for a system with more state intervention and redistribution; Persons with *left-authoritarian* stances, finally, favour more state intervention in the economy while they reject European integration and immigration. These positions and the two-dimensional space as conceived in this thesis are illustrated in Figure 1 for an overview.

Updating approaches to the electoral behaviour of left-authoritarian voters, I conceive the two-dimensional political space in this thesis to be composed of an economic axis, comprising economic views regarding state intervention into the economy and redistribution, on the one hand, and a transnationalist divide made up by attitudes on European integration and immigration. Left-authoritarians are, thus, citizens who prefer a more active role of the state in the economy and oppose European unification and migration into their country. Bringing the second dimension’s definition up-to-date with research on political competition might also explain differing findings on the two dimensions’ relation to each other (s. section 2.2).

³ Only Hakhverdian and Schakel use the terms ‘nationalist’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ to refer to the dimension’s attitude poles (2021: 492).




Figure 1

The two-dimensional political space, adapted from Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann (2014: 68)

3.2 The radical right in the economic-transnationalist space

Placing radical right parties on the transnationalist dimension is a straightforward task. Yet, underlying previous research's disparate views on whether radical right parties portray a compromise or ideal representation to left-authoritarian voters is a diverging conception of the radical right's economic stances. Therefore, I focus on clarifying their economic position in this section (3.2.2). Even though they rely on ambiguity to appeal to authoritarians across the economic scale (Rovny & Polk 2020, they can be regarded as left: first, because they have moved towards the left by emphasising pro-welfare stances in their party manifestos more often since the 2000s (ibid.; Afonso & Rennwald 2018: 10; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Eger & Valdez 2019); second, due to their 'welfare chauvinist' appeals (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Mudde 2007: 131f.; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022: 373; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014). Like 'protectionist' claims (Hopkin 2020: 61), welfare chauvinism effectively links radical right parties' left and authoritarian attitudes to a common narrative: Immigration hinders the native population's access to welfare and the labour market. The increased salience of immigration and European integration (Hooghe & Marks 2018) provides an ideal basis to mobilise on this argumentation. As

in context of the surge in literature on populism, parties considered part of the radical right are classified by various terms (Rooduijn 2019), I start by defining which parties are regarded radical right (section 3.2.1).

3.2.1 Defining the radical right

According to Mudde's definition of the radical right, a party qualifies as radical right when it combines 'nativism' and 'authoritarianism' as 'core ideological features' (Mudde 2007: 22; s. Rooduijn 2019: Appendix, Table 1; Oesch & Rennwald 2018; Ennser-Jedenastik 2022: 157; Busemeyer, Rathgeb & Sahm 2022: 79). The first ideological characteristic refers to a 'radical' version of nationalism combined with 'xenophobia' which advocates a '*homogenous nation-state*' populated only by '*members of the native group*' while '*nonnative elements*' are perceived as existential harm to this end (Mudde 2007: 19, 2019: Chapter 2, author's emphasis). 'Authoritarianism', on the other side, entails 'the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements on authority are to be punished severely' (Mudde 2019: Introduction, 2007: 23).

Based on these two core characteristics of the radical right, its categorisation on the transnationalist divide is quite evident: The nativist view entails deep anti-immigration sentiments as well as a fear of the European Union undermining 'national sovereignty' (Mudde 2019: Chapter 2) and 'authority' while it promotes immigration from other EU states (Hooghe & Marks 2018: 109, 110). Embodying the 'nationalist pole', i.e. authoritarian pole, of the dimension, Hooghe and Marks even speak of radical right parties as 'TAN parties' who represent objection to European integration and immigration (2018: 115; 123). Whereas 'radical' denominates the rejection of liberal democratic features – mainly 'minority rights' in line with the nativist convictions (Mudde 2019: Introduction), the description 'right' in the term 'radical right', consequently, only refers to the left-right axis in its cultural interpretation (ibid.). Yet, to differentiate it more clearly from the economic dimension, I stick to the denomination of this dimension as transnational with an authoritarian and a liberal pole.

3.2.2 The economic position of radical right parties

Identifying radical right parties' general economic position is more challenging. This is reflected in the disagreement of previous research on left-authoritarian voting on whether the radical right offers ideal or partial representation to left-authoritarian citizens. Whereas Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann (2014: 76) and Steiner and Hillen describe the radical right as '*right-authoritarian*' (2021: 7, 10; own emphasis),

according to Hopkin (2020), they should be regarded as economically *left* due to their protectionist views.

In fact, Rovny (2013) and Rovny and Polk provide evidence that it is far from straightforward to define right-wing populist parties' economic positions as they actively 'blur' them in order to appeal to voters distributed all over the economic scale (2020: 250). In line with this, radical right parties also dedicate somewhat less space in their manifestos than parties on average do to elaborate on their vision on welfare (Enggist & Pinggera 2022: 115).

However, what certainly feeds into the ambiguity of their left-right position is that the radical right has very contrasting prospects on welfare spending depending on who its recipients are: Reflecting its nativist core ideology, the radical right displays 'welfare chauvinist' stances on economic matters (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Mudde 2007: 131f.; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022: 373; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014). Accordingly, support should be reserved for natives only whereas non-natives should be excluded from receiving benefits (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294; Mudde 2007: 131). Consequently, on the economic scale, radical right parties take a left position when it comes to those they regard as belonging to the 'in-group', while they take a right stance in regard to the 'out-group' (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294f.). Therefore, they take a strict position on 'social investment policies' which aim at equating chances by supporting skills, e.g. supporting childcare or education – measures not at last immigrants benefit from (Enggist & Pinggera 2022: 109, 115). On measures which can be more easily restricted to particular groups, such as 'more deserving', "'hard-working" native' pensioners – 'consumption policies' – radical right parties hold decidedly left views which are even recognisable as such to voters (ibid.: 109, 115-118).

Even if welfare measures are directed more towards the 'native' population instead of the general public, several scholars' empirical results, indeed, provide evidence that radical right parties' economic positions have shifted towards the left since the 2000s (Rovny & Polk 2020: 254; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014: 25) as the proportion of statements in radical right parties' election manifestos which support expanding the welfare state (Afonso & Rennwald 2018: 10; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Eger & Valdez 2019) and redistribution (Rovny & Polk 2020: 255f.) increased. For these reasons, I retain that radical right parties can be considered as tending to the left economically.

Furthermore, welfare chauvinism which resonates with Hopkin's (2020: 61) notion of the radical right portraying 'protectionist' views interweaves left and authoritarian interests. Welfare chauvinism favours the nativist population, aiming at excluding non-native groups from welfare benefits. In the same vein, radical right parties' protectionism seeks to privilege the 'true population' by reducing the non-native population in the first place by restricting, or even prohibiting, immigration. Thereby, both approaches effectively link claims on the transnationalist and the economic scales. Drawing a zero-sum situation, they promise a better economic situation for the native population – through reserving welfare benefits and job access for natives – by stopping immigration and consistently banning non-natives from receiving welfare benefits. Immigration is thus considered as the impediment and threat to natives' economic prosperity. Thus, the radical right's welfare chauvinism and protectionist appeals interweave the argumentation for both left and authoritarian claims. The dominance of immigration and European integration in defining the transnationalist conflict line conditions this link, however, since it is (inter-European) immigration which serves to bridge both divides' logics while its salience facilitates the mobilisation along these lines.

Radical right parties – those whose key ideology is composed of nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde 2007: 22) – embody the authoritarian pole of the transnationalist divide (Hooghe & Marks 2018: 115, 123). Even though they display their economic position more ambiguously (Rovny 2013; Rovny & Polk 2020), they have been shifting towards the economic left in the last decade, making increasingly more pro-welfare, yet welfare chauvinist, claims (ibid.; Afonso & Rennwald 2018: 10; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Eger & Valdez 2019). Consequently, in line with Hopkin (2020), they can be considered as economically left. Causing immigration and European integration to become core determinants of the 'non-economic' dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2018), the euro and migration crises provided ground for the radical right to link left and authoritarian claims to a common narrative through welfare chauvinist and protectionist appeals: Immigration serves as the obstacle to native individuals' economic prosperity.

3.3 Electoral behaviour of left-authoritarian voters: Hypotheses

Drawing on Downs' (1957) economic theory of voting model, I explicate that left-authoritarian voters consider radical right parties as closest to them in the political space on both axes: First, as described in section 3.2, the radical right increasingly makes more left claims; as an inherently authoritarian party, it thereby actually provides left-authoritarian supply - especially from the perspective of persons regarding themselves as part of the native in-group. Second, complementing Downs' notion (1957)) with 'motivated reasoning' (Lodge & Taber 2013: Chapter 7; Nasr 2021; Taber & Lodge 2006; Festinger 1968) and connecting to findings of Dassonneville, Fournier and Somer-Topcu (2024), I argue that left-authoritarians are more likely to *perceive* the radical right as economically left. Through their protectionist (Hopkin 2020) and welfare chauvinist claims (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Mudde 2007: 131f.; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022: 373; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014), the radical right ties economic and nationalist issues together and convinces left-authoritarian voters with anti-immigrant attitudes of their economically left outlook. Third, drawing on Hopkin's remarks on the party-system context of radical right demand (2020), the 'neo-liberal consensus' (Furedi 2005: 57) among established parties which was reinforced by the crises of the last decades (White 2019) makes it less likely to compromise on right-authoritarian or left-liberal parties as stated in previous research. For these reasons, based on which I draw up my hypotheses, the radical right is not just a compromise for left-authoritarians but provides ideal representation. Left-authoritarians are, thus, more likely to vote for radical right parties than persons combining other ideological positions.

According to Downs, citizens vote for the party whose policy positions provide them with the maximum advantage if the party was incumbent (1957: 138). To avoid the effort of comparing each policy prospect of a party with their own interests, voters take parties' ideology as a cue to assess which of them will act most in their favour once in government (ibid.: 141). In accordance with Downs (1957: 142) drawing on Hotelling (1929), parties' and voters' ideology can be conceived as a spatial model - the economic left-right scale. Voters then choose the party whose positioning matches their own position on the scale most closely (Downs 1957: 142). Extending Downs' notion (1957) by the 'transnationalist' dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2018), voters choose the party which is most congruent with their own views on both scales. In accordance with this, persons holding left-authoritarian attitudes favour the party which represents their preference for policies supportive of a stronger welfare state and more

financial redistribution on the one side and prospects restrictive regarding immigration and European integration on the other.

Previous research problematises the lack of ‘substantive’ representation of left-authoritarian voters (Pitkin 1972; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Thomassen 2012; Hillen & Steiner 2019; Hakhverdian & Schakel 2021) as, on average, established parties’ positions are furthest away from left-authoritarians’ preferences (Hillen & Steiner 2019: 334). In line with this, no party ‘act[s] in their interest’ when considering the economic and the transnationalist scale (Pitkin 1972: 144, 166; see above). Yet, taking together the illustrations on radical right parties’ positioning in the two-dimensional political space (s. 3.2), radical right parties do not only provide a compromise to left-authoritarian voters, but offer two-dimensional representation:

Taking a clear authoritarian stance on the transnational dimension (Mudde 2007: 22; Hooghe & Marks 2018), the radical right is certainly a proximate option for left-authoritarians on this ideological scale. But I object scholars of prior research by arguing that left-authoritarians see also their economic preferences closely reflected by radical right parties.

First, as presented above, radical right parties have started to move towards the left on the economic scale because they increasingly promise more pro-welfare policies (Rovny & Polk 2020: 254; Afonso & Rennwald 2018: 10; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Eger & Valdez 2019). They take clearly more left stances than centre-right parties (Rovny & Polk 2020: 254) - the only party family which would offer an alternative representation of authoritarian positions. Consequently, when considering both axes of competition, left-authoritarian voters are most likely to see radical right parties’ positioning as closest to them.

This is also supported by Hillen and Steiner who find more moderate effects of holding left-authoritarian attitudes on turnout and dissatisfaction with democracy when they compare data from 2016 instead of 2008 which they explain by radical right parties increasingly filling the gap (2019: 338, 344f.).

Second, due to welfare chauvinist (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Mudde 2007: 131f.; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022: 373; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014) and protectionist (Hopkin 2020) policy prospects of radical right parties, left-authoritarian voters are especially likely to view the radical right as representing their economic preferences closely. On the one side, since persons with authoritarian attitudes are likely to consider themselves part of the ‘native’ ‘in-group’ (Mudde 2007: 19; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294f.) they want to protect and privilege, appeals made by radical right parties which concern them are more left than their

general economic position when considering prospects regarding also ‘non-natives’ (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294f.; Enggist & Pinggera 2022: 109, 115).

On the other side, ‘prior feelings’ towards a political party can influence how information on it is assessed (Lodge & Taber 2013: 149; Nasr 2021). This even applies when the information which caused the positive sentiment in the first place is not related to the information under consideration (Lodge & Taber 2013: 149). Consequently, when voters feel ‘sympathy’ for a party which does not communicate its ideological position clearly, as in the case of radical right parties’ economic position (Rovny & Polk 2020), they tend to underestimate the ideological distance the party has to them (Nasr 2021: 7). This is to avoid a feeling of unease, which Festinger (1968) calls ‘cognitive dissonance’, provoked by being confronted with information which mismatches one’s previous convictions. Therefore, when left-authoritarian voters are drawn towards the radical right based on their authoritarian attitudes, they are likely to also view its economic positions as matching their own, even if the radical right party has not actually adopted a clear left position (yet) (s. Nasr 2021: 7). In a similar vein, given left-authoritarian citizens’ anti-immigrant stances, welfare chauvinist and protectionist arguments are likely to convince them of a pro-welfare position as they reflect their personal convictions. Accordingly, left-authoritarians more ‘quickly (and relatively thoughtlessly) assimilate’ these left claims as, framed by a welfare chauvinist narrative, they confirm their anti-immigrant convictions (Taber & Lodge 2006: 762). In line with this, especially because of the linking of the issues of both dimensions through the same narrative, when left-authoritarians are convinced of the radical right’s narrative on immigration and European integration, it is straightforward to recognise the two as obstacle to economic prosperity and buy into the economic aspect of the same narrative.

Both radical right parties indeed having started to reflect left-authoritarians’ economic positions more closely and the additional overestimation of this proximity would explain Dassonneville, Fournier and Somer-Topcu’s (2024) evidence that left-authoritarian voters do not see their own positions as more alienated from the parties in their country than other voters (2024: 12, 16). As they seem to feel well represented, this finding, like my argumentation, also conflicts research portraying left-authoritarians as ‘cross-pressured’ voters who compromise on a party representing them on only one dimension (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 2017; Kurella & Rosset 2017). Even though Dassonneville, Fournier and Somer-Topcu do not investigate which party left-authoritarian voters settle on, the latter argument is additionally supported by them finding this group of voters tending to estimate their

preferred party's economic position as more left than experts do (2024: 16). Steiner and Hillen's (2021) findings reconfirm this point: According to them, left-authoritarians in Germany vote for the radical right AfD when they perceive it as economically left (2021: 7).

Taken together, left-authoritarian voters are likely to see radical right parties' positions on the transnationalist and economic axis as most congruent with their own: They clearly represent authoritarian positions (Mudde 2007, 2019: Chapter 2) but increasingly supply more left economic policy prospects (Rovny & Polk 2020; Afonso & Rennwald 2018: 10; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Eger & Valdez 2019). Driven by left-authoritarians' agreement with radical right parties' authoritarian stances, they are also more likely to see their left economic views addressed by this party family (Lodge & Taber 2013: 149; Nasr 2021; Festinger 1968): because they rather regard themselves as part of the native in-group which is more generously treated by radical right parties' welfare policy prospects (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294f.) and due to perceiving them as matching their economic views because of sympathising with the radical right based on authoritarian stances (Nasr 2021). In line with the latter argument, persons with left attitudes see their economic positions well represented by the radical right if they take an authoritarian position.

This prerequisite of holding authoritarian attitudes to interpret radical right parties' economic position to be in line with one's own is also in accordance with research finding decisions for the radical right primarily motivated by authoritarian positions (Rovny 2013: 18; Rovny & Polk 2020: 261, 263). In the same vein, Mudde refers to economic factors explaining radical-right party support as 'secondary issues' (2017: 5). Since radical right parties' ideology is centred around nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde 2007: 22) and they embody the authoritarian pole of the transnationalist divide (Hooghe & Marks 2018: 115; 123; Hobolt & Tilley 2016), this comes as no surprise. The same mechanism of exaggerating their economic position (Nasr 2021) might apply to right-authoritarians who see their right economic positions represented after being convinced of radical right parties' authoritarian prospects though.

For this reason, persons taking left-authoritarian views first and foremost are more likely to vote for the radical right compared to persons who do not have authoritarian convictions.

Consequently, I assume that

(H1a) Persons holding left-authoritarian attitudes are more likely to vote for a radical right party than persons taking a right-liberal stance.

(H1b) Persons taking left-authoritarian positions are more likely to vote for a radical right party than persons taking a left-liberal stance.

(H1c) Persons taking left-authoritarian positions are more likely to vote for a radical right party than persons taking centrist positions on both dimensions.

In this context, economic positions presumably do not influence these effects. When radical right parties are indeed associated with representing left positions, right-liberals should be least likely predisposed to voting for the radical right. Due to the vagueness of radical right parties' economic positions (Rovny & Polk 2021) and authoritarian convictions conditioning buying into radical right parties' anti-immigrant economically left argument (Taber & Lodge 2013: 149; Nasr 2021: 7; Festinger 1968), I do not expect this to be the case. Persons with left-liberal beliefs will not recognise the radical right representing left positions. So, this party family will not be more attractive to them as to right-liberals.

Even if persons taking authoritarian positions generally rather vote for radical right parties than persons with liberal or centrist convictions, in contrast to previous research finding left-authoritarians to abstain from voting more often than voters combining other ideological positions due to the lack of matching ideological supply (Hillen & Steiner 2019: 341) or to compromise on right-authoritarian or left-liberal parties (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014; Kurella & Rosset 2017; Steiner & Hillen 2021), I expect persons with left-authoritarian attitudes to be as likely to vote for radical right parties as persons with right-authoritarian attitudes.

(H1d) Persons holding left-authoritarian attitudes are not less likely to vote for the radical right than persons taking a right-authoritarian position.

Comparing all ideological combinations' effect on voting for the radical right also gives insights into the role of both dimensions in explaining radical right support. Especially comparing left-authoritarians' voting behaviour to that of right-authoritarians provides information whether the combination of left and authoritarian positions has an influence on voting for the radical right or if economic positions are solely 'secondary issues' (Mudde 2017: 5).

While left-authoritarians might not be radical right parties' general core constituency, in certain situations I still expect left-authoritarians to choose a radical right party more likely than persons holding any other ideological combinations, even right-authoritarians:

3.3.1 Radical right parties' economic position

Even if left-authoritarians are likely to perceive a radical right party's economic position as matching their own because of their authoritarian congruence with it (Nasr 2021), Downs' initial model (1957) still applies: Despite considering how voters perceive a party's positioning, actual congruence does still influence their voting decision (Nasr 2021: 7). Since radical right parties communicate their economic positions ambiguously (Rovny 2013; Rovny & Polk 2020), left-authoritarian voters should be drawn more likely towards a radical right party the more decidedly it represents left economic claims (Nasr 2021: 7). These would, in fact, more closely match their political preferences in the two-dimensional space. Correspondingly, this also influences how persons holding right-authoritarian attitudes perceive a radical right party's economic position, making it less attractive to them. Therefore, if a radical right party takes a more economically left position, left-authoritarians should be more likely to vote for the radical right. Consequently, I expect that

(H2a) *The more left the economic position of a radical right party is, the higher the probability of persons taking left-authoritarian positions to vote for the radical right compared to individuals holding right-authoritarian views.*

Investigating whether radical right parties with an economically more left profile succeed in appealing to left-authoritarian voters more effectively might also provide insight whether they can attract more voters from the left-authoritarian quadrant in the future by communicating less blurred but more clearly left economic positions. As other parties' distance to left-authoritarians is larger than to right-authoritarians (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 9) and they are, thus, less competed for, this could be an especially promising strategy to further increase votes for radical right parties.

3.3.2 Lack of alternatives: The party-system context's influence on left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour

While I make the point above that radical right parties supply – or seem to provide – ideal left-authoritarian representation, I conflict that left-authoritarians would opt for 'left-liberal' or 'right-authoritarian' parties as alternatives (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021; Kurella & Rosset 2017): Even when only considering one dimension, drawing on Mouffe (2005), Furedi (2005), and Hopkin (2020), as briefly discussed in the literature review (section 2.2), centre-left parties

have diverged from a clear economically left outlook while centre-right parties have admitted more liberal cultural positions. According to Hopkin (2020), this is what caused the left-authoritarian gap in political supply in the first place. Investigating the impact of centre-left and centre-right parties' position in drawing left-authoritarians to radical right parties, consequently, helps to understand the role of established parties in provoking a gap in left-authoritarian supply and increasing the radical right's success.

As the case of the Soviet system forcefully discouraged Western European voters from socialist left schemes during the Cold War (Furedi 2005: 57), capitalist economies were considered the only viable option (Fukuyama 1989). Hence, centre-left parties' original initiative from the labour-movement period (Hobsbawm 2012) dwindled to keeping the remnants of the welfare state alive (Giddens 1994: 9). Accepting the liberal economy, they focus only on balancing it moderately through some redistributive measures (Hopkin 2020: 54; Furedi 2005). Consequently, they moved towards the economic centre (Grande 2008: 325) and thereby disqualify as *left*-liberal compromise.

According to Hopkin, also the 'anti-system Left' contributes to the closure of the left-authoritarian supply gap by rejecting the 'neo-liberal consensus' and through their critical stances toward the European Union as an economic project (2020: 64f.). Yet, they 'mostly embrace the cultural diversity brought by migration' (Hopkin 2020: 64; Grande & Kriesi 2012: 19; Hutter & Kriesi 2022: 351; Hooghe & Marks 2018: 124), refraining from feeding into the narrative of a zero-sum game of welfare benefits and jobs among migrants and national citizens (Hopkin 2020: 64f.). Likewise, 'anti-system Left' parties do not reject European integration altogether, many seeing European cooperation as a chance to curb the neoliberal market collectively (Hopkin 2020: 66). Like the centre-left, the radical left cannot attract left-authoritarian voters because of their transnationalist liberal positions, not differentiating by nativity regarding the distribution of welfare benefits.

Centre-right parties, on the other hand, eased their authoritarian positions by displaying more openness to 'diversity' (Furedi 2005: 58; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022: 371), in favour of including more persons into the market (Hopkin 2020: 54, 58; Giddens 1994: 9). Additionally, centre-right parties rather represent more positive attitudes towards the European Union (Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022: 371). Thereby, they move further to the liberal pole of the transnationalist dimension

(Hopkin 2020: 58). Consequently, these parties become less attractive as right-*authoritarian* alternatives.

In cases in which these developments are more pronounced, it becomes less likely that left-authoritarian voters choose centre parties as alternatives: They disqualify as providing matching representation on just one dimension. The centre-right moving more towards the liberal transnationalist and further away from the authoritarian pole makes left-authoritarians, but also right-authoritarians, more likely to vote for a radical right party in comparison to persons without authoritarian positions like centrists. The centre-left weakening its left position, in contrast, only limits the choice of persons with left-authoritarian convictions but it is unlikely to affect the electoral behaviour of right-authoritarians. Therefore, left-authoritarians become even more likely to vote for the radical right than right-authoritarians. In line with this, I assume that

(H3a) The more right the economic position of a centre-left party is, the higher the probability of persons holding left-authoritarian attitudes to vote for the radical right compared to individuals taking right-authoritarian positions.

(H3b) Centre-right parties taking more liberal transnationalist positions does not make persons holding left-authoritarian attitudes more likely to vote for the radical right than persons with right-authoritarian views.

3.3.3 The crises' impact on left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour

Connecting to my illustrations on the transnational dimension (section 3.1) and on radical right parties' position in the two-dimensional space (section 3.2), the effect of left-authoritarian attitudes relating to voting for the radical right depends on the crises' influence on political competition: On the one side, the 'centrist consensus' and the left-authoritarian supply gap resulting from established parties approaching each other in the political centre (Hopkin 2020: 54), is likely to have intensified since the onset of the crises. On the other side, it is essential for radical right parties to interweave left and authoritarian issues and for left-authoritarians to interpret radical right parties addressing also their left convictions.

First, the resulting 'centrist consensus' of the centrist tendencies of centre-left and centre-right parties coming together, agreeing on a somewhat cushioned liberal economy which gives labour market access to minority groups (Hopkin 2020: 54, 58),

provokes an impression of a lack of alternatives (Mouffe 2005; Furedi 2005: Chapter 3) and led to the gap of left-authoritarian supply in the first place (Hopkin 2020: 54). Since the Euro and migration crises, this is likely to have intensified (Hopkin 2020: 67-73). Especially the extensive measures to handle the Euro crisis (s. section 3.1) were mostly justified by referring to ‘emergency’ (Kreuder-Sonnen 2016: 9) and ‘necessity’ (White 2019: 129), arguing that ‘[t]here [i]s [n]o [a]lternative’ (ibid.: 132). This is to reduce critique of the, in fact, *chosen* measures (White 2019: 128). Yet, leaving less time for democratic contestation, also covers dissent between governing actors and, thus, conceals that there are, in fact, different approaches to deal with the situation one could choose from (White 2019: 134). The political positions of established parties which already converge more on the centre (Hopkin 2020) are, consequently, additionally difficult to differentiate (White 2019: 134). Established parties reducing the welfare state due to austerity measures in some member states (Scharpf 2013: 8; Hopkin 2020: 68) and accelerating European fiscal integration in general (Kreuder-Sonnen 2016: 3), certainly dramatizes the situation for persons with left-authoritarian attitudes regarding left-liberal or right-authoritarian alternatives (Hopkin 2020: 68). Instead, it raises the salience of European integration (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 1001; Hooghe & Marks 2018: 126), which is later tied to the issue of immigration (Hutter & Kriesi 2022: 344), leading to my second point:

Only as immigration – seen as a European issue (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 1001) – dominates in determining positions on the transnationalist conflict line (Hooghe & Marks 2018), the radical right’s welfare chauvinist and protectionist narratives address the core of both issue dimensions at once. Portraying immigration as the impediment to the native people’s economic wellbeing, it combines both dimensions’ concerns into a common logic. This enables the radical right to also appeal to left-authoritarians’ left interests, not only to those on the transnationalist dimension. Hence, the European crises are not only a ‘critical juncture’ for structuring political conflict (Hooghe & Marks 2018: 126) but also for causing left and authoritarian attitudes to interact in explaining left-authoritarians’ support for the radical right. Therefore, I expect that only since the two European crises, left-authoritarians see both their economic and transnationalist preferences reflected by radical right parties. Consequently, I expect that the

(H4) Before the 2008 Euro and the 2015 migration crisis, persons holding left-authoritarian attitudes are less likely to vote for radical right parties than persons taking a right-authoritarian stance. Yet, after the 2008 Euro crisis

and the 2015 migration crisis, persons taking a left-authoritarian stance are not less likely to vote for the radical right than persons with right-authoritarian views.

To summarise, the Euro crisis and the migration crisis require an update of the second dimension's conception (Hooghe & Marks 2018) which varied substantially across previous research (s. section 2.1), potentially explaining why scholars draw different conclusions about the two dimensions' relation (s. section 2.1.1). The crises led to a rise in salience of European integration and immigration (Hooghe & Marks 2018; Hutter & Kriesi 2019, 2022). While the Euro crisis highlighted the interdependency of European member states (Hobolt & Tilley 2016: 973), the migration crisis made immigration to be perceived as an EU problem (Hutter & Kriesi 2022: 344). The two issues, consequently, become core determinants of attitudes on the second dimension which, in accordance with Hooghe and Marks, I refer to as the 'transnational' dimension (2018: 109).

In contrast to preceding research which sees the radical right as right-authoritarian compromise for left-authoritarians (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 76; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 7), I argue that radical right parties – those whose ideology is centred around 'nativism' and 'authoritarianism' (Mudde 2007: 22) – can be conceived as economically left (Hopkin 2020): While they communicate their economic position vaguely (Rovny 2013; Rovny & Polk 2020: 250), they take more left stances since the 2000s (Rovny 2020: 254; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014: 25) and increase their claims in favour of welfare (Afonso & Rennwald 2018: 10; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Eger & Valdez 2019) and redistribution (Rovny 2020: 255f.).

Consequently, they do provide left-authoritarian political supply. Drawing on Downs (1957), persons with left-authoritarian attitudes, thus, vote for radical right parties as they, on average, match their preferences on both issue dimensions most closely.

Additionally, they are also more likely to perceive the radical right's economic position as matching their own: Matching their 'nativist' ideology (Mudde 2007: 22), radical right parties link economically left claims to authoritarian positions through welfare chauvinist (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Mudde 2007: 131f.; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022: 373; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014) and protectionist arguments (Hopkin 2020) to a common narrative. Sympathising with the radical right based on authoritarian convictions and already buying into this anti-immigrant logic, they are more likely to be convinced of a radical

right party's economic stance matching their own (Nasr 2021: 7; Lodge & Taber 2013: 149; Taber & Lodge 2006: 762; Festinger 1968).

This also matches findings that radical right parties are primarily voted for based on authoritarian attitudes (Rovny 2013: 18; Rovny & Polk 2020: 261, 263). Thus, I expect left-authoritarians to vote for radical right parties more likely than persons without authoritarian attitudes in general. Still, as despite overestimating radical right parties' economic positions, their actual economic position influences its perception (Nasr 2021: 7; Downs 1957) I anticipate persons with left-authoritarian attitudes to become more likely to vote for radical right parties even than right-authoritarian voters the more left a radical right party's economic position is.

Because the gap of left-authoritarian supply which is taken by the radical right is caused by established left and right parties approaching each other in the political centre (Hopkin 2020: 54), agreeing on a terminally cushioned 'neo-liberal consensus' (Furedi 2005: 57; Hopkin 2020: 54), I also assume left-authoritarians' voting behaviour to be affected by centre parties' two-dimensional positioning: Centre-right parties taking a more liberal transnational stance makes left-authoritarians and right-authoritarians more likely to opt for the more clearly authoritarian radical right while centre-left parties taking a more right view makes left-authoritarians even more likely than right-authoritarians to choose the radical right. Moderating the ideological position relevant to persons holding left-authoritarian attitudes, centre-left and centre-right parties disqualify as one-dimensionally matching left-liberal or right-authoritarian compromises.

As the lack of political alternatives of established parties (Hopkin 2020: 54; Furedi 2005; Mouffe 2005) is likely to have increased since the Euro and migration crises (White 2019: 128-134) and immigration and European integration dominating the second dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2018) is essential for the radical right to mobilise on left and authoritarian positions through a common narrative, these expectations apply to the time since the two European crises. Before this period, I do not expect persons taking left-authoritarian positions to be as likely to vote for the radical right as right-authoritarians.

4. Data and empirical strategy

In the following, I illustrate how to empirically assess the relationship between taking a left-authoritarian position and voting for the radical right in comparison with other ideological views. First, I explain my focus on Western European EU member states and the time scope of the analysis as well as my choice to rely on data from the European Social Survey (ESS ERIC 2023f, 2023b, 2024). Second, I explicate how the concepts of my hypotheses are made measurable, followed by an outline of the methods used to evaluate my research question empirically.

4.1 Case and data

Since both the literature referring to left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour in systems with sparse left-authoritarian representation and theoretical arguments regarding radical right parties' role in filling this lack of supply are set in the context of Western European party systems (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014; Steiner & Hillen 2021; Mouffe 2005; Hopkin 2020), I focus my investigation on these countries.

The impact of the Euro and the migration crises since the late 2000s – specifically, leading attitudes on European integration and immigration to dominate the authoritarian-liberal dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2018) - acts as a condition for radical right parties to link issue positions of both dimensions. Therefore, I concentrate on the time since the onset of the migration crisis, from 2015, for all hypotheses, except for hypothesis four which tests this exact influence of the crises on left-authoritarians' voting behaviour. For this hypothesis, I include data collected before the onset of the Euro crisis. Additionally, the importance of European integration in shaping transnational attitudes and the case that both crises are set in the context of EU member states' interdependence (Hobolt & Tilley 2016: 973) necessitate to only consider EU member states.

To assess the probability of voting for a radical right party, there must be a radical right option to vote for which is visible enough that citizens are aware of it (Hopmann et al. 2010). Therefore, I restrict my investigation to countries and years in which a radical right party competed in the national election and gained at least five percent of the votes. To determine whether a party qualifies as radical right, I rely on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's (CHES Trend File 1999-2019 and 2023 SPEED CHES - Ukraine) classification as belonging to the '1 Radical Right' party family (Jolly et al. 2022; Hooghe et al. 2024). The CHES estimation closest to the most recent election before

the respective European Social Survey data collection is used. To differentiate parties into families, the CHES draws on Hix and Lord (ibid.: Codebook: 18) according to whom radical right parties share a 'nationalist/xenophobic' ideology and opposition to liberal 'sociopolitical issue[...]' stances (Hix & Lord 1997: 42). Consequently, the classification matches this thesis' understanding of radical right parties based on Mudde's definition of radical right parties as 'nativis[t]' and 'authoritarian[...]' (2007: 22). The CHES' estimation of radical right parties also resembles other classifications such as Rooduijn et al.'s *The PopuList* (2023). Vote shares, too, are taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Jolly et al. 2022).

Two decisive requirements need to apply to the sample: First, to measure left-authoritarian and other relevant combinations of ideological positions, comprehensive information on individuals' preferences on economic issues as well as on immigration and European unification is needed. To assert whether a respondent voted for the radical right, an item on respondents' vote choice is required, too. Second, to also test the influence of radical right and centre parties' issue stances on the expected relation between holding left-authoritarian attitudes and voting for the radical right, a sample with considerable variation in the positions of elected parties since 2015 is required.

The ESS from 2018, 2020, and 2022 (ESS Round 9, 10, and 11, ESS ERIC 2023f, 2023b, 2024) fulfil the two requirements above as they include items on respondents' vote decision in elections since 2015 and extensive information on attitudes on the transnational dimension. While it only includes one item on economic preferences measured over all survey rounds, it outweighs the disadvantages of alternative surveys like the European Election Study (Popa et al. 2024; Schmitt et al. 2022) by covering more years after 2015 and, thus, providing more variation at the level of country-time combinations.

The ESS was conducted between August 2018 and January 2020 (ESS 9), September 2020 and September 2022 (ESS 10), and March 2023 and June 2024 (ESS 11), respectively. Respondents aged fifteen years and older were selected based on 'strict random probability sampling' (ESS ERIC 2023f, 2023b, 2024). Data were collected through in-person and online interviews (ibid.). Only for the ESS 10, in the cases of Austria, Germany, Spain, and Sweden, respondents filled in the online or paper survey on their own because of the COVID pandemic (ESS ERIC 2023b). The national samples include country residents irrespectively of their citizenship (ESS ERIC 2023f,

2023b, 2024). ESS data is relied on widely by social science researchers to assess electoral behaviour (e.g., Rovny 2013; Hooghe, Marks & Kamphorst 2024; Abou-Chadi & Hix 2021; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022; Marks et al. 2021).

After combining the three ESS time series cross-sections to a common dataset, I limit the sample to countries and years in which a radical right party competed in the last national election and gained at least five percent of votes (s. Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 7 for a similar approach). Excluding Ireland as the only Western European member state without a radical right party, this results in a sample containing data from eleven countries for three different years: Austria, Flanders (Belgium)⁴, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. As Denmark is only covered by the ESS 9 and the radical right in the Belgian region Wallonia did not win a substantial share of votes and either did Portugal's radical right party Chega in the most recent election before the ESS 9 data collection, this results in a sample of 30 pairs of different countries and ESS rounds. Keeping only those cases without missing values for the variables used to measure ideological positions, the sample encompasses 50313 observations of survey respondents.

For hypothesis four, I include data from the second ESS round onwards (ESS ERIC 2012b, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2017, 2012a, 2023d, 2023e) into the sample to observe whether the relationship between taking a left-authoritarian position and voting for the radical right compared to right-authoritarians changes since the Euro and migration crises compared to before the crises. The data collection through interviews for the earliest ESS round considered took place between August 2004 and July 2006 and was repeated for later rounds about every two years. The sampling procedures resemble those of the later ESS rounds discussed above. Along the lines of the post-2015 sample selection, I only consider countries with a radical right party receiving at least five percent of the votes. As radical right parties' establishment in European party systems comes along with the raised salience of the issues they mobilise on since the crises' onset (Hooghe & Marks 2018; Hobolt & Tilley 2016), this results in a smaller number of countries included in the sample, adding up to 53 country-ESS round combinations. While in Austria, Flanders, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands there

⁴ Parties in Belgium are 'unilingual', they can only compete in the Francophone, or the Flemish, electoral districts (Hooghe & Deschouwer 2014: 629). As Belgium is, therefore, perfectly separated into two distinct party systems (ibid.), like other scholars (e.g., Hobolt & Spoon 2012; Hix & Marsh 2011; Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014), I distinguish between the Francophone Wallonian region, including Brussels, and the Flemish region.

has been a radical right party scoring at five percent from the first election asked about in the included ESS rounds, Finland and Sweden are added to the sample from the sixth ESS round. Round five of the survey is excluded as, in contrast to all other survey, it does not ask respondents about their opinion on the European Union. Removing cases with missing values for the variables measuring ideological positions results in a case of 75072 observations.

4.2 Operationalisation

The following sections address the operationalisation of variables relevant to answering the research question, starting with the dependent variable, voting for the radical right, the main explanatory variables - the combinations of ideological positions of both issue dimensions - and ideological positions of radical right and centre parties, followed by control variables.

4.2.1 Operationalising the dependent variable: voting for a radical right party

Since my theoretical argument assumes radical right parties not to be an alternative option among others but to portray ideal representation, the hypothesised relation can be tested more adequately relying on vote decision instead of propensities to vote for a particular party. Even though recall questions are used by many scholars to investigate electoral behaviour (e.g., de Vries 2018; Abou-Chadi & Hix 2020; Oesch & Rennwald 2018; Steiner & Hillen 2021; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022), research findings point out survey respondents' recalled vote choice to often be inaccurate, not corresponding to information they provide in panel surveys (Dassonneville & Hooghe 2017: 333). This applies especially when survey participants face recall questions years after they submitted their poll (ibid.: 325ff.; van Elsas, Miltenburg & van der Meer 2016: 270). Yet, since voter-specific factors like political sophistication only have a limited impact but errors in recalled vote choice result mostly from changing electoral preferences, these inaccuracies apply across voters (Dassonneville & Hooghe 2017: 327ff.; van Elsas, Miltenburg & van der Meer 2016: 269). Accordingly, I only need to expect somewhat weakened results but no substantial systematic bias from using this question Dassonneville & Hooghe 2017: 331).

Consequently, I constructed a dummy variable measuring whether respondents voted for a radical right party based on the country-specific ESS items asking respondents to recall their vote choice of the last national election in their country: 'Which party did you vote for in that [last [country] national] election [in [month/year]]?'. If a respondent

voted for a party which is classified as ‘1 Radical Right’ by the CHES closest to the election asked about in the ESS, the variable takes the value one. As illustrated in the data section (4.1), the expert survey’s categorisation based on Hix and Lord (1997) matches the definition of radical right parties I rely on. When an individual indicates to have chosen another party, the variable turns to zero. Table 1 gives an overview of the parties classified as radical right per country.

Table 1. Overview radical right, centre-left and centre-right parties by country (names taken from CHES (Jolly et al. 2022; Hooghe et al. 2024))

Country	RR party	Centre-left party	Centre-right party
Austria - AT	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)
Belgium, Flanders - BE	Vlaams Belang (VB)	Socialistische Partij (Anders) (SP/ SPA)	Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V)
Germany - DE	Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)	Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christlich Soziale Union (CDU/ CSU)
Denmark – DK	Dansk Folkeparti (DF)	Socialdemokraterne (SD)	Venstre (V)
Spain - ES	Vox	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	Partido Popular (PP)
Finland – FI	Perussuomalaiset (PS)	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SDP)	Kansallinen Kokoomus (KOK)
France - FR	Rassemblement national (RN)	Parti Socialiste (PS)	Les Républicains (LR)
Italy - IT	Lega Nord (Lega), Fratelli d’Italia (Fdi) (ESS 11)	Partito Democratico (PD)	Forza Italia (FI)

Netherlands - NL	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
Portugal - PT	Chega	Partido Socialista (PS)	Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular (CDS-PP)
Sweden - SE	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)	Arbetarpartiet-Socialdemokraterna Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (SAP)	Moderaterna (M)

4.2.2 Operationalising the main independent variable: two-dimensional ideological groups

The variables measuring whether an individual combines specific ideological positions of the economic and transnational dimension, first and foremost left-authoritarian attitudes, are based on scales measuring economic and transnational positions individually. Because my theoretical argumentation presumes the dimensions to be defined by persons' positions on specific issues, I choose the indicators of both dimensions' positions a priori, directed by the theoretical basis of my hypotheses instead of selecting them based on reductional approaches like principal component analysis or multi-dimensional scaling. Thereby I follow Rovny and Marks' advice on defining dimensional indicators 'deductive[ly]', using more abstract items as they grasp ideological positions better than context-specific, concrete examples (2011: 10, 7).

Relying on Hooghe and Marks' (2018) conceptualisation of the transnational dimension, I base the variable measuring persons' attitudes on this conflict line on their positions on immigration and European integration. For this purpose, I combine the item measuring whether individuals favour a lower or higher level of European integration compared to the current state with several items asking respondents about how they estimate the effects of immigration on their country and about their preferences to restrict or facilitate immigration. Table 2 gives an overview of the exact questions used to construct the indices. The consistency of the chosen indicators is

subsequently checked through a reliability analysis, estimating Cronbach's alpha. To make sure both main elements are equally decisive in determining a person's position on the transnational scale, I first form an index composed of attitudes on immigration's effects and the preferred level of immigration.

Table 2. Questions of items used to construct the economic and the transnational index (ESS)

Economic dimension	Attitudes on income redistribution gincdif – 'Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.'		
	Attitudes on immigration	Evaluation of immigration's effects	imwbct – 'Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?' imueclt – 'And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?' imbgeco – 'Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?'
Transnational dimension		Preferred level of immigration	imsmeth – 'Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here?' imdfetn – 'How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?' impcntr – 'How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?'
	Attitudes on European integration euftf – 'Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?'		

Both components' indicators are asserted to be consistent as Cronbach's alpha amounts to 0.87, and 0.9 respectively. These values would be lower if any of the items were removed. Checking the reliability of combining both measures of immigration attitudes, results in a Cronbach's alpha of 0.79 and a sufficiently high correlation of both indices of $r=0.73$. Finally, I create an additive index based on the European integration variable and the index measuring respondents' opinion on immigration. With a Cronbach's alpha of 0.64 and an inter-item correlation of 0.59, the consistency of the items is not very high. Yet relying on Hooghe and Marks' concept of the transnational dimension (2018) which explicitly relies on European integration and immigration attitudes, I retain this index as appropriate measure of transnational attitudes. Throughout all stages, I align items' scales where necessary so that they have the same range of values and so that larger values signify more liberal attitudes consistently before combining them to an index.

As discussed in the theoretical part of this thesis, there is wide scholarly agreement on the first, left-right, dimension aggregating preferences on the extent of state involvement into the economy, regarding welfare expenditure and economic redistribution (de Vries 2018: 1545; Inglehart 1984: 35; Hooghe and Marks 2002: 966; Kriesi et al. 2006: 923; Benoit and Laver 2006: 192; Grande 2008: 318; Stoll 2010: 451; Lefkofridi, et al. 2014: 71; Dassonneville et al. 2024a: 2; Marks, et al. 2021: 180; Grande & Kriesi 2012: 21). Unfortunately, the European Social Surveys only contain one item measuring economic preferences across all rounds, asking respondents about their opinion on redistribution (s. Table 2). This is certainly not ideal to reliably measure individuals' positions on this dimension. However, it is not an option to also consider their left-right self-placement since voters' understanding of left and right is by no means restricted to economic issues (Jou & Dalton 2017: 6ff.; de Vries, Hakhverdian & Lancee 2013; Giebler, Meyer & Wagner 2021). In line with Rovny and Marks' recommendations, the question is posed at a more abstract level and, thus, at least is suitable to capture ideology (2011: 15).

Basic descriptive statistics for both dimensions' variables reveal some potential issues regarding the distribution of values. First, based on the limited measure of economic positions, about a third of respondents would take a decidedly left stance while only about two percent hold a clear right position (s. van der Brug & van Spanje 2009: 324 who face the same issue). These answers, thus, seem to display 'acquiescence' bias

resulting from individuals' inclination to rather agree than disagree regardless of the question's content (Costello & Roodenburg 2015: 105).

Second, reflecting the findings of other research (Hillen & Steiner 2019: 340; Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024: 9), the considered countries' respondents vary in their distribution on both scales – especially on the five-point transnational scale on which country-specific medians range between 2.43 (Austria) and 3.33 (Spain). If overall residents of a country were, for instance, extraordinarily left-leaning, more people would be classified as left-authoritarian even if these respondents take a more right stance compared to their country's overall standard. To avoid this and to reduce the acquiescence bias observed for the economic variable, I follow Kurella and Rosset (2017: 5), Hillen and Steiner (2019: 340), Hakhverdian and Schakel (2021: 495) and Dassonneville, Fournier and Somer-Topcu (2024: 9) by categorising respondents into ideological groups based on their relative position in their respective EU member state at that time (Benoit & Laver 2006: 200). Consequently, differentiated by country and ESS round, the lower 40 percent of the distribution on the transnational scale denote an authoritarian position, the middle 20 percent are assigned to the centrist category, and the upper 40 percent are defined as liberal (s. Hillen & Steiner 2019: 340 for a similar approach). On the economic five-point discrete scale, values below the country and ESS round-specific median are considered left, individuals with values equal to the median are considered centrists, whereas values above the median signify right attitudes.

4.2.3 Operationalising further independent variables: party positions, crisis and control variables

The second and third sets of hypotheses consider the role of economic positions of radical right and mainstream centre-left parties as well as centre-right parties' transnational position. For parties' ideological positions and to determine the party type, I rely on Chapel Hill Expert Survey data (1999-2019 trend file, Jolly et al. 2022; 2023 SPEED CHES, Hooghe et al. 2024). Comparisons of party position estimations from expert survey data, manifesto data and voters' assessments of political parties show that these different measures produce very consistent results on parties' ideological placements (Bakker & Hobolt 2013; Hooghe et al. 2010; Ray 2007). Yet, compared to manifesto data, the advantage of expert surveys is that short-term shifts are not exaggerated (ibid.).

Whereas I already explain the classification of parties as radical right in the section on the sample selection (s. section 4.), I pursue a similar approach as that of Wagner and Meyer (2017: 90) and Meguid (2005: 352) to determine which parties qualify as centre-left and centre-right. In addition to the parties' left-right placement by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and its vote share, the party family is considered. Accordingly, the moderately left 'Socialist' (Jolly et al. 2022; Hooghe et al. 2024) party holding the highest vote share in the country is classified as centre-left. On the other hand, the moderately right 'Conservative', 'Liberal', or 'Christian Democratic' (Jolly et al. 2022; Hooghe et al. 2024), party with the country's highest vote share is considered as centre-right (s. Table 1 for an overview of radical right and centre parties).

To measure radical right parties' and centre-left parties' economic position, I use the CHES' item *Irecon* for which experts – in accordance with the definition of the economic dimension I rely on - estimated parties' left-right stance in respect to their preferred extent of state intervention into the economy. To facilitate the interpretation and as I do not consider radical right parties' and centre-left parties' economic positions in the same model, I change the scales' poles to be in line with the direction formulated in the respective hypothesis. In context of hypothesis two, radical right parties' economic positions range from zero – right – to ten – left whereas for hypothesis 3a, higher values denote a more right position.

Along the lines of the construction of the transnational scale which measures voters' positions, for the variable measuring centre-right parties' liberal stances, I create an index variable by combining the CHES item assessing parties' rigidity regarding immigration policy (*immigrate_policy*) with the variable estimating their view on European integration (*eu_position*). As before, I make sure that the combined scales are poled into the same direction and encompass the same values. Consequently, higher values denote more liberal transnational attitudes.

Basic measures of distribution, like in the case of the voter position scales, show that there is substantial variation of parties' left-right and transnational stances across the considered countries: Whereas the country-specific medians on the left-right dimension range between 4.40 and 7.40 on a ten-point scale, the respective median range on the transnational scale reaches from 3.10 to 4.93. To ensure that the used scales do not point out a specific party to be extraordinarily left, or liberal, from a voter's view when in fact, it is not left, or liberal, at all compared to the other parties in the respective country, I rescale both variables through min-max scaling by country and

CHES year. By subtracting the country and CHES year specific minimum from the absolute value and dividing the difference by the country and CHES year specific maximum minus the minimum⁵, for instance, a value of zero is assigned to the most authoritarian party compared to the other parties in the member state at the specific time. Equivalently, a value of ten on the same scale signifies the most liberal position of a party relative to the other parties in the country at that time. The lower the relative position of a party on the resulting range from zero to ten, the closer is the party to the country and CHES year specific authoritarian extreme. While I only exemplified the normalisation by the transnational dimension, the values of the economic scales for radical right and centre-left parties work analogously. Compared to other scaling techniques, min-max scaling keep the original distribution of the values within the fixed range from zero to ten for each country and CHES year, preserving the proportions of the distances between the parties' positions in the individual countries at the time the respective ESS round refers to.

Subsequently, the information from the CHES data is paired to the ESS data: The sample only contains one radical right, centre-left and centre-right party for each country and ESS round. Consequently, the respective values of the three variables measuring radical right parties' and centre-left parties' economic positions and centre-right parties' transnational positions, can be assigned to the sample based on the country and the election year the ESS recall question refers to. In all cases, depending on data availability, I pair the CHES data with the sample data whose 'electionyear' (the national election closest to the expert data collection) is closest to the national election referred to by the ESS recall question.

In order to test the last hypothesis on the influence of the crises on left-authoritarians' voting behaviour, I create a categorical variable indicating whether the ESS round's data, considering the election asked about, was collected before the onset of the Euro crisis, between Euro and migration crisis, or after both crises evolved. Consequently, ESS rounds 2 and 3 are considered pre-crises as all elections referred to by the ESS took place before 2008. Rounds 4 to 8 are considered as inter-crises period and rounds 9, 10 and 11, which correspond to the sample used for all previous hypotheses, denotes the period since the crises with the earliest election taking place in 2015 and the latest in 2023.

⁵ A party's country and time-specific relative position = (absolute position – min position in country at CHES year) / (max position in country at CHES year - min position in country at CHES year)

Further, I also control for possible confounders: Since previous research associates political distrust with voting for the radical right (Rooduijn & Slageren 2022; Hooghe & Dassonneville 2018), I include having low trust in politicians into the model. It might explain support for the radical right to some extent independently of individuals' ideological position whose influence this thesis aims to investigate. Hence, based on the answers to the question *'[...] please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ...politicians?'* I construct a dummy variable to indicate low trust in politicians when an individual is among the least trusting quarter of respondents from their country for a specific ESS round.

Finally, I include basic sociodemographic variables in the analysis: Given that older generations are more likely to cast their vote based on the economic dimension compared to younger ones (Marks et al. 2020: 33), older age might be less associated with voting for radical right parties which, like green parties, put more emphasis on issues of the transnational dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2018). Therefore, I differentiate between persons aged 60 or older (variable takes the value one) and younger individuals (zero).

Previous research also shows that men are more likely to vote for the radical right (Marks et al. 2020: 29; Hooghe & Marks 2022: 12). Consequently, I include a dummy variable which is one when a respondent is male and zero if not.

Furthermore, research findings identify education as powerful determinant of voting for the liberal or the authoritarian pole of the transnational divide (de Vries 2018: 1559; Hooghe & Marks 2022: 12). Accordingly, for individuals who obtained at least 'advanced vocational' education as indicated by the ESS' ISCED (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012) variable, the variable *low education* takes the value zero.

4.3 Methods

Before assessing how left-authoritarian attitudes relate to voting for the radical right compared to other ideological views, I address the inconsistent findings on the correlation between the economic and transnational positions of parties. Having updated the definition of the transnational dimension centring on immigration and European integration according to Hooghe and Marks (2018), for an initial overview, I plot parties' positions in the two-dimensional space by country. As I do not compare

across countries in this first step, I keep the absolute values of positions on both dimensions – before rescaling them by country and year - in contrast to the later steps of the analysis. Subsequently, I reproduce van der Brug and van Spanje's (2009: 318, 322f.), Thomassen's (2012: 18f.), Lefkofridi, Willmann and Wagner's (2014: 71f.) and Hillen and Steiner's (2018: 338ff.) assessment of the relationship between the economic and the transnational conflict line for voters, and especially parties. In respect of the continuous party position scales, I perform Spearman's correlation test, which is preferable over Pearson's due to outliers in the distribution. Regarding voters' categorically measured views, I employ a Chi² independence test.

For the main analysis, I start with a descriptive overview of the main variables, calculating basic descriptive measures and the proportions of radical right voters, and of left-authoritarians – measured relatively by country and ESS round – respectively, overall and by country, summarised by bar plots.

To gain a first insight into a potential relationship of holding left-authoritarian attitudes and voting for the radical right, I check how the shares of voters choosing a radical right party vary with different ideological combinations. After visualising the results through bar plots, I estimate whether the ideological variable and voting for the radical right are independent from each other, relying on a Chi² independence test and Cramer's V to calculate the strength of the relationship (Agresti 2018: 230f.).

For the multivariate inferential analysis of the association between taking a left-authoritarian stance and voting for a radical right party compared to other ideologies, I regress having chosen the radical right in the last national election on the ideological position.

Due to the binary outcome of the radical right vote variable, I employ a maximum-likelihood logit model (Agresti 2018: 472; Kohler & Kreuter 2017: 360). For this purpose, I reform the categorical main explanatory variable indicating the two-dimensional position of a person to individual dummy variables of all relevant ideological positions. Setting the left-authoritarian ideological group as reference by 'excluding'⁶ it from the model, allows to calculate and compare the probabilities of all mutually exclusive ideological combinations to vote for a radical right party to left-authoritarians based on the models' resulting logarithmised odds (Agresti 2018: 474). Consequently, instead of estimating the effect of having left-authoritarian attitudes on

⁶ As reference category, the left-authoritarian dummy's name does not appear in the regression model but the reference observations are not actually excluded from the model.

voting for a radical right party compared to all other ideologies - which makes it impossible to conclude which of the dimensions influences this effect – I study how each ideological position relates to supporting radical right parties compared to a left-authoritarian stance. This enables inferring how decisive each dimension's position is for the vote choice. Especially the comparison with right-authoritarians gives insight into whether left and authoritarian positions act jointly in leading a person to vote for radical right parties as hypothesised.

After estimating the first model to assess the basic first set of hypotheses (H1a-d), I interact the ideological position dummies with radical right parties' economic positions, centre-left parties' economic views, centre-right parties' transnational issue stances, and the crisis period variable, respectively, as I expect those variables and voters' ideological positions to affect voting for the radical right interdependently.

When addressing each of the further hypotheses, I start by describing the additional main explanatory variable and provide trivariate insights regarding voting for the radical right. Because I am interested in the role of economic positions in drawing authoritarians to vote for radical right parties, I limit the respective sample to authoritarians only from hypothesis two onwards which only compare left to right authoritarians. As mentioned above, in contrast to all other models, I extend the sample to pre-crises ESS rounds since 2004 to test hypothesis four. Following Clark and Golder's recommendations for interpreting dependent interaction models with binary outcomes (2023: 369), I start by interpreting the relevant variables' coefficients and marginal effects on the logit scale to assess whether they act in the direction expected in hypotheses two to four and, subsequently, I estimate differences in predicted probabilities to assert the substantiality of the effects.

5. Results

In this section, I illustrate the results of my analysis of the relationship between taking left-authoritarian positions and voting for a radical right party compared to other ideological positions. In the first section, I reassess the association between the economic and transnational dimensions on the voter and party-level. Subsequently, continuing with the main focus of my investigation, I evaluate the general association between ideological views and voting for the radical right as suggested in the first set of hypotheses (H1a-d). After testing whether left-authoritarians are more likely to vote for a radical right party than non-authoritarian, i.e., liberal, voters, I compare them to right-authoritarians in their probability to vote for the radical right. Following this, I estimate how party positions influence the differences between the effect of left- and right-authoritarian positions regarding radical right party support (H2, H3a-c). Finally, I test the underlying assumption that the European crises provide the basis of radical right parties attracting left-authoritarian voters as much as right-authoritarians (H4). Before starting the analysis, I summarise the main findings:

Confirming the conclusions of the party competition literature instead of those of previous research on left-authoritarians, testing the relationship between the two dimensions on the party-level does not provide substantial support of parties' positions to be structured by a single divide reaching from a left-liberal to a right-authoritarian pole – the economic and the updated liberal-authoritarian dimension are only weakly related to each other.

As expected, like right-authoritarians, left-authoritarians are significantly and substantially more likely to support a radical right party than non-authoritarian voters. However, even when the period before the onset of the European crises is considered, there is no significant difference between the two authoritarian groups. Yet, authoritarians' economic attitudes do play a role, as left-authoritarians are more likely to vote for the radical right than right-authoritarians once a radical right party takes an economic view to the left of the median party on this scale in the respective country. While centre-left parties' economic positions do not explain differences between the effects of being left and right authoritarian in voting for the radical right, against expectations, the more liberal the position advocated by the centre-right, the more likely right-authoritarians opt for the radical right compared to left-authoritarians.

5.1 Parties and voters in the two-dimensional space

Turning to the absolute positions of parties first, plotting transnational and economic views reproduces previous literature's findings (s. Figure 2). While parties spread across the left-liberal, the right-liberal (except for Italy) and the right-authoritarian quadrant, left-authoritarian representation is sparse: In most countries, this quadrant remains completely empty. Only the Dutch radical left Socialist Party and the Italian 5 Star Movement take an – even if rather moderate – left-authoritarian position that is not rather centrist on either scale.

Spearman's correlation test confirms that party positions are hardly structured by a left-liberal to right-authoritarian line. There is a highly significant correlation between parties representing more authoritarian positions and taking a more right economic stance, yet this association is weak ($r=-0.26$, $p\leq 0.001$). For voters the correlation of both dimensions is equally indicated as highly significant by a χ^2 independence test ($p\leq 0.001$). Cramer's V signals this association to be very weak ($V=0.07$).


With voters, thus, spread across all ideological quadrants, between 5.50 (Denmark) to 21.98 percent (France) of the countries' populations and 14.09 percent across all countries included remain without ideal representation of their left-authoritarian views. Still, the plots also show that most radical right parties (marked in blue) take a rather centrist economic position. Except for Vox in Spain and, even if only marginally, the AfD in Germany, they are placed to the left of the respective country's centre-right party (marked in black). While radical right parties additionally represent authoritarian views most clearly, this seems to hint in favour of my argument that the radical right offers the best representation to left-authoritarian voters.

5.2 The effect of taking left-authoritarian attitudes on radical right party support

After assessing the relationship of the two dimensions based on the updated measurement, focussing on immigration and European integration positions (Hooghe & Marks 2018), I now turn to the main part of the analysis to estimate how left-authoritarian stances relate to voting for the radical right.

3764 (8.81 %) respondents across all considered countries indicated to have voted for a radical right party in the previous national election. As displayed in Figure 3, Italy has the highest share of radical right voters (13.30 %) while Portugal has the smallest (3.60 %). The average country share of radical right voters is 9.16 percent. This is below the mean vote share for the radical right of 13.07 percent indicated by the CHES.

Figure 2. Parties' two-dimensional positions by country (absolute positions, CHES 2019)



This flaw in representativeness of the sample could be due to social desirability effects if respondents feel uncomfortable displaying their support for a more controversially viewed party.

After categorising individuals' positions on the economic and the transnational scales relative by country and ESS round to take account of the country-specific variation, 6278 (12.48 %) respondents combine left with authoritarian positions. This is about the same proportion as the share of right-authoritarians (13.74 %) but a larger than that of right-liberal (7.50 %) and left-liberal respondents (10.62 %). The shares of people combining left with authoritarian attitudes range between 22.20 (Portugal) and 7.08 percent (Sweden, s. Figure 4 for an overview). This is comparable to the proportions Hillen and Steiner (2019) who also use ESS data identify as such.

Figure 3. Share of radical right voters by country (ESS 2018, 2020, 2022)






Figure 4. Shares of economic-transnational ideological groups by country (ESS 2018, 2020, 2022)



Subsequently, I continue with the bivariate descriptive analysis of the main variables to gain a first insight whether left-authoritarian voters could be more likely to vote for the radical right compared to other ideological groups. Frequency tables show that the share of radical right voters is largest among persons combining left and authoritarian political attitudes - 17.13 percent of left-authoritarians vote for a radical right party. This is just slightly more than the share among right-authoritarians (16.86). Right-liberals are least likely to support a radical right party as only 2.40 percent of them indicated to

have done so. These proportions are displayed in Figure 5 which plots voters' electoral behaviour by their ideological attitudes: The blue bars on the very left show the shares of radical right votes. Matching this first impression, a χ^2 independence test points to a highly significant dependency between the two-dimensional ideological positions and voting for a radical right party ($p \leq 0.001$) even if it is rather weak according to the value of Cramer's V ($V=0.18$). These bivariate proportions support the first set of hypotheses, concentrating on the baseline relationship between each ideological dummy and voting for the radical right:

Figure 5. Recalled vote choice by economic-transnational ideological group (ESS 2018, 2020, 2022)



The difference in shares voting for the radical right between left-authoritarians and right-authoritarians are very small. Yet, the gap is quite large when comparing the two authoritarian groups to non-authoritarians. For instance, among centrists, only 4.40 percent indicated to have voted for this party family.

Consequently, I assess the baseline relationship between ideological combinations and voting for the radical right (hypotheses 1a to 1d) further through a multivariate regression analysis. For this purpose, I split the categorical variable measuring two-dimensional ideology into separate dummy variables. The less clear attitudes – those combining a centrist position on either scale with a non-centrist position – are aggregated to ‘other’. The logit model (s. Table 3) presents the estimates for the log-odds of voting for a radical right party instead of other parties for the respective ideological groups relative to left-authoritarians. Model 1 to 5 only include the ideological dummies. From Model 6, I include the control variables, one at a time. All models encompass 42598 observations. Next, I explain the results for each hypothesis test, from the first set of hypotheses.

(H1a) Including the right-liberal dummy first, according to the variable’s coefficient, compared to left-authoritarian voters, taking a right-liberal stance significantly diminishes the tendency to vote for the radical right ($\beta_0 = -2.27$, $p \leq 0.001$; $\beta_1 = -1.43$, $p \leq 0.001$). When adding the remaining ideology dummies, the Pseudo- R^2 indicates the model fit to increase from Pseudo- $R^2 = 0.01$ to Pseudo- $R^2 = 0.07$. The negative effect of right-liberal positions on voting for a radical right party in comparison to left-authoritarians stays significant at the 0.1-percent level. This also applies when accounting for the control variables: As expected, being among the country’s quarter with least trust in politicians ($\beta_6 = 0.65$, $p \leq 0.001$) makes it more likely to vote for a radical right party as well as having a lower level of education ($\beta_7 = 0.82$, $p \leq 0.001$). Both variables’ influence is statistically highly significant. Equally consistent with expectations, persons aged 60 or above are a bit less likely to vote for radical right parties ($\beta_8 = -0.25$, $p \leq 0.001$) while male gender increases the tendency of someone voting for the radical right ($\beta_9 = 0.36$, $p \leq 0.001$). In support of hypothesis 1a, after including all other dummies and control variables, raising the model fit to Pseudo- $R^2 = 0.11$, having a right-liberal instead of a left-authoritarian view makes it less likely to vote for a radical right party, *ceteris paribus* ($\beta_1 = -1.76$, $p \leq 0.001$). This effect which is significant at the 0.1 percent level exceeds those of the control variables.

Table 3. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
(Intercept)	-2.27 *** (0.02)	-2.17 *** (0.02)	-2.08 *** (0.02)	-2.23 *** (0.02)	-1.58 *** (0.04)	-1.96 *** (0.04)	-2.62 *** (0.06)	-2.54 *** (0.06)	-2.70 *** (0.06)
Right-liberal	-1.43 *** (0.11)	-1.53 *** (0.11)	-1.63 *** (0.11)	-1.48 *** (0.11)	-2.13 *** (0.12)	-1.90 *** (0.12)	-1.68 *** (0.12)	-1.71 *** (0.12)	-1.76 *** (0.12)
Left-liberal		-1.43 *** (0.09)	-1.52 *** (0.09)	-1.37 *** (0.09)	-2.02 *** (0.10)	-1.84 *** (0.10)	-1.68 *** (0.10)	-1.70 *** (0.10)	-1.72 *** (0.10)
Centrist			-1.00 *** (0.07)	-0.85 *** (0.08)	-1.50 *** (0.08)	-1.29 *** (0.08)	-1.22 *** (0.08)	-1.24 *** (0.08)	-1.25 *** (0.08)
Right-authoritarian				0.63 *** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.15 ** (0.05)	0.13 * (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Other					-0.88 *** (0.05)	-0.73 *** (0.05)	-0.65 *** (0.05)	-0.66 *** (0.05)	-0.69 *** (0.05)
Low trust						0.72 *** (0.04)	0.66 *** (0.04)	0.65 *** (0.04)	0.65 *** (0.04)
Low education							0.78 *** (0.05)	0.82 *** (0.05)	0.82 *** (0.05)
Age ≥ 60								-0.25 *** (0.04)	-0.25 *** (0.04)
Male									0.36 *** (0.04)
N	42598	42598	42598	42598	42598	42598	42598	42598	42598
AIC	25144.52	24777.20	24544.34	24324.09	23994.05	23603.75	23299.50	23253.64	23154.46
BIC	25161.84	24803.18	24578.98	24367.38	24046.01	23664.36	23368.77	23331.58	23241.05
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.11

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Sources: ESS 2018, 2020, 2022

Next, I transform the logarithmised odds to probabilities. Since the probabilities based on a logit model depend on all included variables (Clark & Golder 2023: 352), I estimate them based on the chosen scenario where all control variables take the value one: On average, men with low trust in politicians, a lower education level and who are at least 60 years, are 5 times more likely to vote for the radical right if they are left-authoritarian than if they are right-liberal. For these conditions, *ceteris paribus*, the probability of left-authoritarians voting radical right is 24.6 percent compared to only 5.32 percent for right-liberals. Comparing the probability of right-liberals to vote for a radical right party, as well as those of the other ideological groups, to that of left-authoritarians is facilitated by a predicted probability plot (s. Figure 6). The plot only provides the predicted probabilities for the chosen scenario - for male voters with a lower level of trust in politicians and a comparably lower education level who are 60 years old or above. Still, changing the values of the control variables does change the levels of probabilities but does not alter the overall relations between the ideological groups displayed in the plot (s. A1 in the Appendix).

Figure 6. Predicted probability of voting for a radical right party by economic-transnational ideological groups



Note: Probabilities are calculated for the case of all control variables taking the value 1 (men with a lower level of trust and education aged 60 or above)
Sources: ESS 2018, 2020, 2022; The bars on the sides of the dots indicate the 95 % confidence interval

(H1b) Focussing on hypothesis 1b, the regression results produce very similar findings regarding taking left-liberal instead of left-authoritarian attitudes and voting for a radical right party: The dummy's coefficient remains negative and statistically significant throughout all models regardless of including control variables with the coefficients taking only a minimally smaller value than that of taking a right-liberal stance ($\beta_2 = -1.72$, $p \leq 0.001$). Consequently, also left-liberals tend to be less likely than left-authoritarians to vote for a radical right party, *ceteris paribus*. Very similar to right-liberals, a man with low trust in politicians and a lower education level who is at least 60 years old and takes a left-liberal position votes for a radical right party with only 5.52 percent probability, *ceteris paribus*. Thus, he is 19.08 percentage points less likely to do so than a left-authoritarian person with the same characteristics, *ceteris paribus*. Therefore, there is enough statistical evidence to support hypothesis 1b.

(H1c) Taking a centrist position on the economic and the transnational dimension equally lowers the tendency of voters choosing a radical right party compared to left-authoritarians. Similar to the effects of right-liberal and left-liberal attitudes, the centrist dummy's coefficient takes a negative and highly significant, but smaller, value across all models ($\beta_3 = -1.25$, $p \leq 0.001$). In line with this, estimating the probability based on the logarithmised odds, a man taking a centrist view who has a lower level of trust in politicians and of education and who is above the age of 60, on average, has a probability of 8.55 percent to opt for a radical right party compared to 24.60 percent in the case of a left-authoritarian man with the same characteristics, *ceteris paribus*. This supports hypothesis 1c.

(H1d) Finally, I compare both authoritarian groups in respect to voting for the radical right. After the full set of control variables is included, the coefficient of the right-authoritarian dummy turns positive but is not statistically significant and is close to zero ($\beta_3 = 0.08$, $p > 0.05$). In line with this and providing evidence for hypothesis 1d, right-authoritarian voters are not significantly more likely to vote for a radical right party compared to left-authoritarians. Since all other ideology dummies' coefficients are negative but that of right-authoritarians, this finding also lends support to the overall expectation of the first set of hypotheses that persons holding authoritarian attitudes are generally more prone to cast their ballot for a radical right party than persons taking a centrist or more liberal position on the transnational scale. The predicted probability plot (s. Figure 6) illustrates the comparison of the different probabilities of voting for the


radical right for each ideological combination, keeping the control variables at the same values (male respondents with lower trust in politicians, lower education, aged 60 or above). While all non-authoritarian voters are significantly less likely to vote for a radical right party, the overlapping confidence intervals of the probabilities of left-authoritarians and right-authoritarians demonstrate that there is no significant difference between these two authoritarian groups. There is no statistical evidence that leads to the rejection of the first set of hypotheses (1a-d).

5.2.1 Radical right parties' economic positions

After establishing the importance of the transnational dimension in explaining radical right support, comparing the two authoritarian groups provides insight in what way economic considerations impact their vote decision. Consequently, I assess how left-authoritarians compare to right-authoritarians in their voting behaviour under specific circumstances. As mentioned in section four, for this purpose, I restrict the sample to authoritarians only.

(H2) Looking at the distribution of radical right parties' economic positions relative to the parties in their respective country and year, even though they take a rather centrist position in absolute terms (s. Figure 2, p.52), with a median of 2 and a mean of 2.25 on a 10-point scale poled to reach from right (0) to left (10), radical right parties overall take a more right position compared to the other parties in their respective party system (s. boxplot, Figure 7). Across all election years covered by the ESS, Spain's radical right party Vox and Portugal's Chega take the most right relative position of all radical right parties. With a score of 6.27, the True Finns take the most left position among radical right parties relative to their party systems. In line with the expectations, when categorising radical right parties into more left or right depending on their position

Figure 7. Boxplot: Distribution of radical right parties' economic positions (CHES 2014, 2019, 2023)



compared to the median on the relative scale, the share of left-authoritarians voting for the radical right (17.82 %) is higher than that of right-authoritarians (15.35 %) when radical right parties are more left while the opposite can be observed when the radical right parties uphold a more right view (left-authoritarians: 18.54 %, right-authoritarians: 21.66 %).

After reducing the sample to authoritarian voters only, the logit model includes 16854 observations (s. Table 4). Assuming that the effect of being left-authoritarian instead of right-authoritarian on voting radical right is positive and higher when a radical right party takes an economically more left stance, the marginal effect of taking a right view on the tendency to vote for a radical right party should be negative once a radical right party upholds a sufficiently left attitude.

When including all economic ideology dummies, except the one measuring left views which is set as reference, the right dummy's coefficient varies between a positive and negative value while its significance is unsteady. Yet, from Model 6 which includes the interaction terms of the ideology dummies and the radical right economic position and controls for low levels of trust in politicians, elevating the model fit slightly (Pseudo- $R^2=0.03$), the right dummy's coefficient stays positive and is significant at least at the 1-percent level ($\beta_1= 0.23$, $p\leq 0.01$). This means when a country's radical right party takes the most right position in the party system, equivalent to the value 0 on the scale measuring relative economic positions, taking a right economic position makes authoritarians more likely to vote for a radical right party than those holding left views. However, in support of the hypothesis, if a radical right party takes an increasingly left economic position ($\beta_4= -0.09$, $p\leq 0.01$), the marginal effect of holding right views on the tendency to vote for the radical right becomes negative, making it less likely to choose this party family compared to left authoritarians. The marginal effects plot which shows the effect of taking a right instead of a left economic position for all economic positions of radical right parties included in the sample on the logarithmised odds of voting for the radical right indicates voters to become less likely to choose a radical right person than someone taking a left stance once a radical right party represents an economic position of at least 3.3333 points (the control variables' values are held constant, all taking the value 1, Figure 8). This takes account of the 95-percent confidence interval.

Table 4. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party - Radical right parties' economic position (only authoritarians)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
(Intercept)	-1.63 *** (0.03)	-1.50 *** (0.04)	-1.50 *** (0.05)	-1.54 *** (0.05)	-1.59 *** (0.06)	-1.89 *** (0.07)	-2.34 *** (0.09)	-2.24 *** (0.09)	-2.39 *** (0.09)
Right	0.10 * (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.12 (0.08)	0.17 (0.09)	0.23 ** (0.09)	0.28 *** (0.09)	0.27 ** (0.09)	0.24 ** (0.09)
Centrist		-0.22 *** (0.05)	-0.22 *** (0.05)	-0.22 *** (0.05)	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)
RR econ			-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Right x RR econ				-0.07 * (0.03)	-0.09 ** (0.03)	-0.09 ** (0.03)	-0.08 ** (0.03)	-0.09 ** (0.03)	-0.09 ** (0.03)
Centrist x RR econ					-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Low trust						0.58 *** (0.04)	0.55 *** (0.04)	0.53 *** (0.04)	0.53 *** (0.04)
Low education							0.51 *** (0.06)	0.56 *** (0.06)	0.56 *** (0.06)
Age ≥ 60								-0.32 *** (0.04)	-0.31 *** (0.04)
Male									0.33 *** (0.04)
N	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854
AIC	15250.32	15233.96	15235.95	15232.04	15232.43	15042.58	14964.05	14912.47	14854.47
BIC	15265.78	15257.16	15266.88	15270.70	15278.83	15096.71	15025.91	14982.06	14931.79
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Note: Radical right parties' economic positions are relative by country and ESS round (ranging from 0-most right to 10-most left)

Sources: ESS 2018, 2020, 2022; CHES 2014, 2019, 2023

Figure 8. Marginal effects of authoritarians taking a right instead of a left economic position on the logarithmised odds of voting for a radical right party across all observed values of radical right parties' economic positions (ESS 2018, 2020, 2022, CHES 2014, 2019, 2023)





Figure 9. Difference in predicted probability right economic position vs. left economic position across all observed values of radical right parties' economic positions (ESS 2018, 2020, 2022, CHES 2014, 2019, 2023)



In Figure 9, I plot the difference in predicted probability of a man with low trust in politicians, a lower level of education above the age of 60 who takes a right-authoritarian instead of a left-authoritarian position. At the lower end of the scale measuring radical right parties' economic position, being right-authoritarian is associated with a higher probability of voting for the radical right compared to being left-authoritarian. In contrast, in line with hypothesis two, when a radical right party takes a position of about 2.5 points or more left, the probability of voting for the radical right is higher for left-authoritarians. In fact, the difference in the probability of right-authoritarians voting for the radical right and left-authoritarians casting the same vote decreases 10 percentage points when radical right parties take the maximum left position instead of the minimum right economic position. These observations also hold for other values of the control variables.


Although these results support the hypothesis, considering the 95-percent confidence interval, the difference in likelihood of voting radical right between left-authoritarians and right-authoritarians is only significant at the more extreme values of radical right parties' economic positions.

5.2.2 Centre parties' ideological positions

Subsequently, I test how central parties in the respective party-system affect left-authoritarians voting for the radical right (H3a, b).

(H3a) First, I assess the expectation that left-authoritarians are more likely to vote for a radical right party than right-authoritarians in party systems in which centre-left parties represent a more right economic view. Matching their party family name, with an average of 3.274 and a median of 3.0934, centre-left parties' economic positions

Figure 10. Boxplot: distribution of centre-left parties' economic positions (relative by country and ESS round, CHES 2014, 2019, 2023)



range between the most extreme left party and the median party in their respective system (s. boxplot, Figure 10). The most left-leaning centre-left party is the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) (absolute value on the left-right scale 3.17, relative value 2.13) while the most right-leaning one is the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) (absolute left-right position 4.83, relative position 5.31).

The descriptive analysis puts the hypothesis' expectation in question: When estimating the shares of left and right authoritarians voting for the radical right separately for countries with more left and more right centre-left parties (differentiated by the median value), 20.9 percent of left voters and 18.58 percent of right-leaning persons vote for the radical right where the centre-left party takes a position more left than the median. In countries with a centre-left party taking the median position or a more right one, against expectations, the share of left persons voting for the radical right is smaller (16.36 %) than those with a right view (17.15 %). However, these differences are rather small. The inferential analysis provides more information on the probabilities of left and right authoritarians voting for a radical right party depending on centre-left parties' economic stance when including control variables.

Yet, also the results of the multivariate regression analysis conflict the relation suggested by hypothesis 3a (s. Table 5): Looking at the regression coefficients of the full model, the marginal effect of taking a right instead of a left economic stance on the logarithmised odds of voting for a radical right party is, even if not significant, negative when centre-left parties' economic position are zero ($\beta_1 = -0.26$, $p > 0.05$). Consequently, right authoritarians tend less to vote for a radical right party than left authoritarians when the centre-left party takes the most left position in the respective party system. However, this effect is not significant. Given that the coefficient of the interaction term of authoritarians' and centre-left parties' economic position is positive and significant ($\beta_1 = 0.09$, $p < 0.05$), against expectations, the centre-left taking a more right economic position makes persons with a right attitude more, not less, likely to choose the radical right compared to those holding a left one. In line with the right position's coefficient being insignificant, plotting the difference in probabilities of voting for the radical right between taking a right and a left view across all observed economic positions of the centre-left (s. Figure 11), there is no significant difference between the two ideological groups. Hypothesis 3a, therefore, must be rejected: There is no support of left-authoritarians voting for the radical right more likely than right-authoritarians the more right the position of the centre-left.

Table 5. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party - Centre-left parties' economic position (only authoritarians)


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
(Intercept)	-1.63 *** (0.03)	-1.50 *** (0.04)	-0.92 *** (0.07)	-0.86 *** (0.07)	-0.80 *** (0.10)	-1.11 *** (0.10)	-1.56 *** (0.12)	-1.44 *** (0.12)	-1.60 *** (0.12)
Right	0.10 * (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.26 (0.14)	-0.32 * (0.16)	-0.26 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.26 (0.16)
Centrist		-0.22 *** (0.05)	-0.22 *** (0.05)	-0.22 *** (0.05)	-0.32 * (0.14)	-0.23 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.14)	-0.24 (0.14)	-0.25 (0.14)
CL econ			-0.19 *** (0.02)	-0.21 *** (0.02)	-0.23 *** (0.03)	-0.23 *** (0.03)	-0.23 *** (0.03)	-0.23 *** (0.03)	-0.23 *** (0.03)
Right x CL econ				0.08 (0.04)	0.10 * (0.05)	0.10 * (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.09 * (0.05)
Centrist x CL econ					0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Low trust						0.59 *** (0.04)	0.56 *** (0.04)	0.55 *** (0.04)	0.54 *** (0.04)
Low education							0.51 *** (0.06)	0.56 *** (0.06)	0.55 *** (0.06)
Age ≥ 60								-0.31 *** (0.04)	-0.31 *** (0.04)
Male									0.33 *** (0.04)
N	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854
AIC	15250.32	15233.96	15129.86	15128.42	15129.76	14932.91	14855.47	14804.98	14746.38
BIC	15265.78	15257.16	15160.79	15167.09	15176.15	14987.04	14917.33	14874.57	14823.70
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Note: Centre-left parties' economic positions are relative by country and ESS round (ranging from 0-most left to 10-most right)

Sources: ESS 2018, 2020, 2022; CHES 2014, 2019, 2023


Figure 11. Difference in predicted probability right economic position vs. left economic position across all observed values of centre-left parties' economic positions (ESS 2018, 2020, 2022; CHES 2014, 2019, 2023)



Note: Probabilities are estimated holding the control variables constant (all taking the value 1, men with lower level of education and trust in politicians aged 60 or above); Bright blue shades indicate the 95 % confidence interval, centre-left parties' economic positions are relative by country and ESS round, ranging from (0-most left to 10-most right)

(H3b) Second, I analyse the assumption that authoritarians with a left economic stance are not more likely to support radical right parties when centre-right parties take more liberal positions. Reflecting Hopkin's argument (2020) that centre-right parties tend towards more liberal positions, the centre-right parties covered by the sample are mostly positioned on the more liberal half of the transnational spectrum compared to the parties in their country (s. boxplot, Figure 12). Both the median and mean position are moderately liberal (median=6.040, mean=6.333). While the Finnish National Coalition Party represents the most EU and immigration-friendly relative position (8.25 in ESS round 9, absolute EU: 6.43/ 7 (7-most pro-EU), absolute immigration: 4.43/ 10 (10-most anti-immigration)), the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) takes the most restrictive – but still relatively moderate - view on immigration and European integration (4.04, absolute EU: 5, absolute immigration: 8.60).

Figure 12. Boxplot: distribution of centre-right parties' transnational positions (relative by country and ESS round, CHES 2019, 2023, CHES 2014, 2019, 2023)



Grouping the sample by more or less liberal centre-right parties, divided by the median, a larger share of left-authoritarians (19.32 %) than right-authoritarians (16.93 %) recalls having voted for a radical right party in countries where centre-right parties are more authoritarian. In party-systems with a more liberal centre-right party, a larger share of right-authoritarians (19.58 %) votes for the radical right than left-authoritarians (16.38 %).

Against these descriptive results, it is expected that there is no significant and substantial difference between the two groups of authoritarians. Still, I continue assessing this relationship in a multivariate regression analysis. After including the interaction term of taking a right position and centre-right parties' transnational position into the regression model which encompasses 16854 observations of authoritarian voters (s. Table 6), the negative coefficient of a right economic position turns significant and remains negative and significant also after including all controls ($\beta_1 = -0.93$, $p < 0.001$). In line with this, the marginal effect of taking a right instead of a left economic stance on the tendency to opt for the radical right is significantly negative when centre-right parties take the most authoritarian position. Since the coefficient of the interaction term of right and the centre-right's economic position is positive and significant ($\beta_1 = 0.16$, $p < 0.05$), taking a right position increases the tendency to vote for the radical right once a centre-right party takes a more liberal position (s. Figure 13). Drawing on the marginal effects on the logarithmised odds, there is a significant difference between right and left-authoritarians depending on the transnational position of the centre-right. This contradicts hypothesis 3b. Equally contradicting the hypothesis' expectation, plotting the difference in probability of right compared to left authoritarians voting for the radical right across all observed values of centre-right parties' transnational position (s. Figure 14), confirms the impression gained from the marginal effects of the

right economic position: When centre-right parties uphold less liberal transnational positions, male, less educated, mistrusting right-authoritarians above the age of 60 are, on average, significantly less likely to vote for the radical right than left-authoritarians with the same characteristics, centrist paribus, - about 5 percentage points less at the lowest observed value. In turn, when a centre-right party takes a liberal position of 7 or more on the relative transnational scale, right-authoritarians with the same characteristics are up to more than 5 percentage points more likely to vote for the radical right than left-authoritarians ($p < 0.05$). Testing this relationship using different baselines (changing the values of the control variables), reproduces the same effects.

Rejecting both hypotheses on centre parties' positions' influence, 3a and b, according to the analysis results, there is no significant difference between right and left-authoritarians' probabilities to vote for the radical right depending on centre-left parties' economic positions but there is a difference between both authoritarian groups depending on the transnational position of centre-right parties.

Table 6. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party - Centre-right parties' transnational position (only authoritarians)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
(Intercept)	-1.63 *** (0.03)	-1.50 *** (0.04)	-1.15 *** (0.11)	-0.89 *** (0.13)	-0.94 *** (0.18)	-1.22 *** (0.18)	-1.68 *** (0.19)	-1.61 *** (0.19)	-1.76 *** (0.19)
Right	0.10 * (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.92 *** (0.23)	-0.86 ** (0.26)	-0.91 *** (0.26)	-0.92 *** (0.27)	-0.90 *** (0.27)	-0.93 *** (0.27)
Centrist		-0.22 *** (0.05)	-0.23 *** (0.05)	-0.23 *** (0.05)	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.25)
CR transnat.			-0.06 *** (0.02)	-0.10 *** (0.02)	-0.09 ** (0.03)	-0.10 *** (0.03)	-0.10 ** (0.03)	-0.09 ** (0.03)	-0.09 ** (0.03)
Right x CR transnat.				0.15 *** (0.04)	0.14 ** (0.04)	0.15 *** (0.04)	0.17 *** (0.04)	0.16 *** (0.04)	0.16 * (0.04)
Centrist x CR transnat.					-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Low trust						0.58 *** (0.04)	0.56 *** (0.04)	0.54 *** (0.04)	0.54 *** (0.04)
Low education							0.51 *** (0.06)	0.56 *** (0.06)	0.56 *** (0.06)
Age ≥ 60								-0.30 *** (0.04)	-0.30 *** (0.04)
Male									0.33 *** (0.04)
N	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854	16854
AIC	15250.32	15233.96	15223.48	15209.33	15211.13	15016.61	14938.36	14891.59	14834.13
BIC	15265.78	15257.16	15254.41	15247.99	15257.53	15070.74	15000.22	14961.18	14911.45
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Note: Centre-right parties' transnational positions are relative by country and ESS round (ranging from 0-most authoritarian to 10-most liberal)
Sources: ESS 2018, 2020, 2022; CHES 2014, 2019, 2023

Figure 13. Marginal effects of authoritarians taking a right instead of a left economic position on the logarithmised odds of voting for a radical right party across all observed values of centre-right parties' transnational positions (ESS 2018, 2020, 2022, CHES 2014, 2019)





Figure 14. Difference in predicted probability right economic position vs. left economic position across all observed values of centre-right parties' transnational positions (ESS 2018, 2020, 2022, CHES 2014, 2019)



5.2.3 Left-authoritarians' electoral behaviour before and since the crises

(H4) Finally, I analyse how the European crises influenced the association between holding left-authoritarian attitudes and voting for the radical right compared to right-authoritarians. In hypothesis 4, it is assumed that authoritarians holding left economic attitudes only become as likely to choose the radical right as those with a right view since the crises.

In favour of this expectation, when comparing the shares of left and right-authoritarians recalling their vote for a radical right party, before the Euro crisis, the share of the former is smaller (12.93 %) than that of the latter (13.13 %) – even if only slightly – while in elections after 2015, 22.90 percent of left-authoritarians indicated to have voted for the radical right but only 20.20 of right-authoritarians.

Matching these descriptive results, once the interaction term of the right economic position and the crises categories is included (s. Table 7), the marginal effect of taking an economically right position before the crises turns positive and stays so after including all control variables ($\beta_1 = 0.11$), pointing to left-authoritarians tending less likely than right-authoritarians to vote for the radical right before the onset of the Euro crisis. However, this effect is not significant ($p > 0.05$). As the coefficient of the interaction term of the economic position and the 'since crises' period is negative ($\beta_6 = -0.19$), right persons seem less likely to tend to vote for the radical right than left ones. Yet, this effect is not significant either ($p > 0.05$). Because the interaction term's and the right variable's coefficients remain insignificant but the category 'since crises' is positive and highly significant ($\beta_4 = 0.83$; $p \leq 0.001$), there seems to be a positive impact of the period since the crisis on the tendency to vote for a radical right party irrespectively of authoritarians' economic position. Plotting the predicted probabilities for both ideological groups across the different stages of the crises confirms this (s. Figure 15): The probability of radical right party support is higher since the crises (the chances for left-authoritarians almost doubled) and, matching the hypothesis' expectation, given the overlap of the confidence intervals, left and right authoritarians' probability to opt for the radical right does not significantly differ. Yet, against the hypothesis, left and right voters do not significantly differ even before the onset of the Euro crisis. The last hypothesis is, thus, not sufficiently backed by the evidence and must be rejected.


Table 7. Maximum likelihood logit model results on voting for a radical right party - Pre-crises and since crises (only authoritarians)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
(Intercept)	-1.57 *** (0.02)	-1.46 *** (0.03)	-1.86 *** (0.05)	-1.90 *** (0.06)	-1.91 *** (0.08)	-2.30 *** (0.08)	-3.01 *** (0.09)	-2.93 *** (0.09)	-3.13 *** (0.10)
Right	0.02 (0.04)	-0.08 * (0.04)	-0.10 * (0.04)	0.01 (0.10)	0.02 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)	0.15 (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)
Centrist		-0.19 *** (0.04)	-0.21 *** (0.04)	-0.22 *** (0.04)	-0.19 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)
Pre-migration crisis			0.46 *** (0.05)	0.50 *** (0.06)	0.50 *** (0.08)	0.50 *** (0.08)	0.52 *** (0.08)	0.56 *** (0.09)	0.55 *** (0.09)
Since crises			0.59 *** (0.06)	0.63 *** (0.07)	0.69 *** (0.10)	0.72 *** (0.10)	0.76 *** (0.10)	0.84 *** (0.10)	0.83 *** (0.10)
Right x pre-migration crisis				-0.13 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.12)
Right x since crises				-0.12 (0.12)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.13 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.19 (0.14)
Centrist x pre-migration crisis					-0.00 (0.14)	0.02 (0.12)	0.03 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.12)
Centrist x since crises						-0.11 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.14)
Low trust						0.66 *** (0.03)	0.63 *** (0.03)	0.62 *** (0.03)	0.62 *** (0.03)
Low education							0.77 *** (0.05)	0.83 *** (0.05)	0.81 *** (0.05)
Age ≥ 60								-0.37 *** (0.04)	-0.36 *** (0.04)
Male									0.42 *** (0.03)
N	25429	25429	25429	25429	25429	25429	25429	25429	25429
AIC	23497.31	23476.85	23352.27	23354.72	23357.55	22977.83	22748.30	22637.95	22486.19
BIC	23513.60	23501.28	23392.99	23411.73	23430.84	23059.26	22837.88	22735.67	22592.06
Pseudo R ²	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.07

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Sources: ESS 2004-2022; CHES 1999-2023

Figure 15. Predicted probability of voting for a radical right party by crisis periods (ESS 2004 - 2022; CHES 1999-2023)



Note: Probabilities are estimated holding the control variables constant (all taking the value 1, men with lower level of education and trust in politicians aged 60 or above); The bars on the sides of the dots indicate the 95 % confidence interval

Taken together, first, reproducing previous literature's analysis, checking the relationship between the two dimensions but taking account of the updated definition of the transnational scale, there is a highly significant association between the divides for voters and for parties. Yet, in both cases, the relationship is only weak. The empirical evidence, thus, hardly provides support for parties' positions to be structured along a left-liberal to right-authoritarian dimension.

Meeting the baseline expectations on the ideological positions' relationship with voting for the radical right, left-authoritarian voters are significantly and substantially more likely to vote for a radical right party compared to right-liberals and left-liberals. The two liberal groups have an almost 20 percentage points lower probability to do so than left-authoritarians. Equally in line with the theoretical suggestions, there is no significant difference between the probability of right-authoritarians and left-

authoritarians to opt for the radical right. Given these results, overall, it is primarily authoritarian attitudes that drive support for radical right parties.

Still, considering the economic positions of radical right parties in the analysis, voters' economic positions are not irrelevant in their choice for a radical right party. Radical right parties taking a position just more left than the median party in their country on the economic scale instead of the most right position accounts for a difference in left and right authoritarians' probabilities to vote for the radical right of about ten percentage points. Even though this difference is only significant at the more extreme observed economic positions taken by radical right parties, radical right parties upholding a more left view makes left-authoritarians more likely to vote for this party family than right-authoritarians.

The results do not provide evidence, however, that centre-left parties taking a more right economic position or centre-right parties taking a more liberal transnational stance significantly elevates left-authoritarians' probability to vote for a radical right party compared to that of right-authoritarians. Whereas the former does not have a significant influence on left or right authoritarians' probability to vote for a radical right party, in countries where centre-right parties take more liberal positions, right authoritarians are slightly more likely to opt for the radical right than left authoritarians. Finally, comparing left-authoritarians' and right-authoritarians' probability to vote for the radical right over the different stages of the European crises, both have become more likely to decide in favour of a radical right party when comparing the time before the Euro crisis and the period since the migration crisis' onset. Reflecting the results on hypothesis 1d, left and right authoritarians do not differ in their probabilities to cast their vote for the radical right since the crises. However, conflicting expectations formulated in hypothesis 4, this is not a phenomenon novel to the period since the crises. The groups were not significantly unequally likely to vote for a radical right party before the Euro crisis.

6. Discussion of the results

In this section, I discuss some shortcomings of the results that could limit the support for the first two sets of hypotheses but might also be responsible, at least in part, for the lack of evidence in favour of the third and fourth set of hypotheses. The main limitations are caused by the limited data availability.

First, regarding the data on party positions, it can be questioned whether the sample of 30 combinations of party systems and years provides enough variation across the radical right parties and centre parties included in the model for hypotheses 2 and 3a and 3b. Limiting the variation across these cases further, not all countries were covered in all CHES surveys. Since the two most recent CHES surveys only include a selection of countries, the most up-to-date data, for instance, on Austria, is only from the 2019 wave. There is, thus, no variation across the Austrian party positions in the sample as the same values had to be assigned to all ESS rounds. Even when changes in party positions in specific years in fact affected voters' decisions, these changes are not reflected in the sample. This certainly impacts the results of hypotheses 2 and 3a and especially 3b as party positions on transnational issues were only available until the 2019 CHES surveys. Results for left-authoritarians' voting behaviour at specific values on the scales measuring party positions might, thus, be driven by a specific country.

The small sample of countries in specific years is also accounted for in the research design. The interacting third variables from hypothesis 2 onwards likely act together in conditioning left-authoritarians' vote choice in comparison to the other ideological groups. Yet, the sample is too small to interact several party-system level characteristics with the ideological dummies at the same time. Consequently, for instance, hypothesis 3 had to be split up, considering centre-right and centre-left parties' positions only individually because the number of cases for each combination on the two dimensions would not be sufficient to gain reliable results. It was, therefore, not possible to investigate the theory's actual implications on left-authoritarians' voting behaviour once *both* mainstream party families deviate from a more left, or more authoritarian, position *at the same time* which is required to cause an actual gap in political supply (Hopkin 2020).

Further, the limited sample of country-time combinations does not allow to account for additional differences between Western European regions. According to Hutter and Kriesi (2019, 2022) and Hooghe and Marks (2018), both crises had different impacts depending on the country: While the Euro crisis had a more short-term effect on

Northern European countries, it impacted politics in Southern European 'debtor' countries more profoundly (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 20, 21; Hooghe & Marks 2018: 125). Equally, the impact of the migration crisis on European member states varied (Schimmelfennig 2018: 978). States with an external border – in Western Europe primarily Italy – and particularly attractive 'destination states' were more affected than others (Schimmelfennig 2018: 978). A larger sample of country-time combinations would allow for taking such differences into account.

In respect of all these limitations in regard of the small variation across and number of country-time combinations, testing the influence of the interacting third variables on the ideological groups' vote choice in a common model once there are more survey rounds would provide more reliable insight.

Yet also the measures on the voter-level come with some drawbacks. First, as mentioned in the data section, the average country-specific share of persons voting for a radical right party observed in the ESS data (9.16 %) is almost 50 percent smaller than the actual average share of radical right voters in the same countries as reported in the CHES data (13.07 %). This points to a misrepresentation of the national electorates, potentially caused by social desirability if respondents do not feel comfortable standing by their support for a more controversially regarded party family (Diekmann 2016: 447). In any case, this limits the representativeness of the results, making it more difficult to draw conclusions on the actual population.

The most severe shortcoming of the analysis is the rather low quality of the measure of voters' economic attitudes, however. Just relying on a single item to estimate views on this dimension does not allow for precise and reliable information on individuals' position. As the survey question is formulated on a rather general level, the variable is more appropriate to measure ideology (Rovny & Marks 2011: 7), yet, the quality of the measure would be enhanced if an item on preferences on welfare expenditure was included to grasp both main elements of the economic divide (De Vries 2018: 1545; Inglehart 1984: 35; Hooghe and Marks 2002: 966; Kriesi et al. 2006: 923; Benoit and Laver 2006: 192; Grande 2008: 318; Stoll 2010: 451; Lefkofridi, et al. 2014: 71; Dassonneville et al. 2024: 2; Marks, et al. 2021: 180; Grande & Kriesi 2012: 21). Additionally, as research points to persons with welfare chauvinist attitudes favouring 'consumption [welfare] policies' (Enggist & Pinggera 2022: 109) - which can be more easily addressed to groups which are more likely composed of the native 'in-group' (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294f.) - over 'social investment policies' (Enggist & Pinggera

2022: 109), it would be beneficial to make sure both aspects are reflected in the economic measure. Notwithstanding the pivotality of the transnational dimension in explaining radical right party support, the comparably limited explanatory power of the economic dimension in the models might in part be entailed by the inferiority of the measure compared to that of the transnational attitudes composed of answers to seven survey items.

Finally, complementing the analysis through more qualitative investigations on the suggested core mechanism why left-authoritarians would consider the radical right – welfare chauvinism and protectionism – would give more insight how decisive narratives centering around it really are in left-authoritarians' decision for more left radical right parties. In this regard, it is also interesting whether welfare chauvinist and protectionist attitudes are indeed reflected in the answers to survey items measuring economic attitudes, as expected in this thesis, or whether they are already grasped by the transnational divide itself. This could be another reason for the overall high explanatory power of authoritarian stances.

7. Conclusion

In this thesis, I sought to provide insight how left-authoritarian attitudes - the ideological combination least well represented across Western European party systems (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024) - relate to voting for radical right parties. Previous literature investigating this group's voting behaviour attests left-authoritarians to be 'cross-pressured' as they needed to choose between one-dimensional alternatives (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 10). Conflicting this, more theoretical literature which relates the lack in supply to centre-left parties taking increasingly right and centre-right parties representing increasingly liberal positions, points to radical right parties filling this gap by linking left and authoritarian claims through protectionist appeals (Hopkin 2020: 61). Also most recent research findings that left-authoritarian persons do not feel less well represented than other ideological groups (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024) puts existing work on left-authoritarian electoral behaviour in question.

Seeking to settle these contradictions, I argue that at the core of the two sides is a different understanding of radical right parties' economic positions. In this context, my main contribution to the literature on left-authoritarians' voting behaviour is, first, the acknowledgment that radical right parties are not to be considered right-authoritarian but that they provide supply to left-authoritarians (Hopkin 2020); Having moved more to the left pole of the economic spectrum within the last decade (Rovny & Polk 2020: 254; Afonso & Rennwald 2018: 10; Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Eger & Valdez 2019) and upholding left economic positions in line with authoritarian narratives through 'welfare chauvinist' (Schumacher & van Kersbergen 2016: 9; Mudde 2007: 131f.; Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 294; Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022: 373; Lefkofridi & Michel 2014) and 'protectionist' claims (Hopkin 2020: 61), they can be seen and are perceived as left-authoritarian.

Second, drawing on the literature on two-dimensional political competition, I update the definition of the liberal-authoritarian dimension in respect of assessing left-authoritarians' voting behaviour. Acknowledging the impact of the European crises since the last decade, attitudes on European integration and immigration act as the main determinants of positions on the transnational scale (Hooghe & Marks 2018). This allows to reassess the relationship between the two dimensions for which scholars of the left-authoritarian supply gap and of party competition draw conflicting conclusions. While the first finds party positions to be structured along one dimension

(Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009: 320; Thomassen 2012:18f.), or to be substantially related (Kurella & Rosset 2017: 6; Hillen & Steiner 2019: 338), the latter asserts two-dimensionality (Kriesi et al. 2006: 938; Grande 2008: 429).

Matching the results of the party competition literature (ibid.; Stoll 2010: 466) which uses more timely definitions of the second dimension, the evidence hardly provides support for parties' positions to be structured along a left-liberal to right-authoritarian dimension as described by research on left-authoritarianism (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009: 320; Thomassen 2012:18f.).

Supporting the overall expectations on how left-authoritarian attitudes relate to voting for radical right parties, this ideological group is as likely to cast its vote for the radical right as the not 'cross-pressured' (Lefkofridi, Wagner & Willmann 2014: 66; Steiner & Hillen 2021: 10) right-authoritarians. Contradicting that this applies only since the European crises, however, there is no significant difference in the probability of left and right authoritarians to support the radical right even before the Euro crisis. Both authoritarian groups are about 20 percentage points more likely to vote for a radical right party compared to non-authoritarian voters.

While attitudes on the transnational scale, thus, powerfully explain radical right support, economic positions do matter once radical right parties take extremely right or moderately left positions. When radical right parties move just left from the party representing the country's median economic position, left-authoritarian voters are about five percentage points more likely to opt for this party than right-authoritarians. Against explanations of the left-authoritarian supply gap (Hopkin 2020), the results do not provide support for left-authoritarian voters opting rather for radical right parties than right-authoritarians when centre-right parties represent more liberal positions and centre-left parties take more right positions.

These observations have some implications for the future success of radical right parties. Since left-authoritarians, given their most alienated position in the two-dimensional space (Dassonneville, Fournier & Somer-Topcu 2024), are less competed for by parties compared to right-authoritarians, radical right parties could indeed leverage their electoral potential further by representing more left economic positions. Drawing on the regression results, this could prove especially fruitful in countries in which centre-right parties take a more authoritarian position. In this case, even if against expectations based on Hopkin's (2020) explanation of the left-authoritarian

supply gap, right-authoritarians are less likely to vote for the radical right than left-authoritarians.

Contradicting the justification of the founder of the decidedly left-authoritarian BSW, Sahra Wagenknecht, that an alternative to left parties is needed because they ended up as 'lifestyle left' (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2021), at least regarding centre-left parties, the results do not provide support that a moderated left position drives left-authoritarians' support of radical right parties.

In any case, clarifying the role of established parties in driving left-authoritarians' support for the radical right would benefit from a larger sample of countries and time series. This would allow considering several party families' positions in a common model. As centre-right parties' transnationally liberal position should not affect left and right authoritarians' economic considerations, it would be especially interesting to re-estimate whether the difference in the two groups' probabilities to opt for the radical right persists when using a larger sample.

Assessing this further is especially interesting as other research associates centre-right parties aligning with radical right positions – becoming more authoritarian – with an increase in radical right support (Abou-Chadi, Cohen & Wagner 2022). While this conflicts Hopkin's notion of the lack in authoritarian supply (2020), the results, at least regarding right-authoritarians, conflict both points.

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ESS9 - integrated file. 3.2 Hrsg. s.l.:Sikt - Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research.

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
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
ZDF heute, 2024. *Neuer Thüringer Ministerpräsident ernannt sein Kabinett*. [Online] Available at: [zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/deutschland/brandenburg-koalition-vertrag-spd-bsw-einigung-100.html](https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/deutschland/brandenburg-koalition-vertrag-spd-bsw-einigung-100.html) [Access 02 01 2025].

Appendix

A1. Predicted probability of voting for a radical right party by economic-transnational ideological groups (varying control variables' values)




a) Men 60+, lower education, without lower trust b) Men 60+, higher education, lower trust



c) Men younger than 60, lower education, lower trust

d) Not male, 60+, lower education, lower trust



Note: The bars on the sides of the dots indicate the 95 % confidence interval

Sources: ESS 2018, 2020, 2022

e) Not male, younger than 60, higher education, without lower trust