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„To what extent is Nigeria’s oil exploration since the 1950’s to today affected by exogenous and endogenous factors through the lens of the dependency theory?“

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For my grandmother

Elder (Mrs.) Christianah I. Daniel,

my parents

Dorathy Ineife and Preye Ineife

my brothers

Ebikiseye Ineife and Ayebatombra Ineife

and my wife and child(ren)

Jennifer-Marcella Marlovics-Christ, Miles Preye Marlovics-Christ and……

With eternal Love and Gratitude

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Abstract - English

"The Giant of Africa" is a self-designation reflecting Nigeria's large population (the largest in Africa), its emerging market economy, vast land area, and the immense diversity of its people and languages. Additionally, Nigeria's wealth in oil and other natural resources has historically contributed to its economic prosperity. However, this abundance of resources is now considered a "resource curse," adversely affecting the country's political and economic landscape, as well as various other sectors. To tackle this problem that affects many developing countries, several theoretical approaches have been proposed. One of these is the dependency theory, developed in Latin America, which has gained prominence in the Global South over recent decades. This analysis explores the external and internal factors of oil production in Nigeria through the lens of the dependency theory.

Abstract - Deutsch

Nigeria bezeichnet sich selbst gerne als "Der Riese Afrikas", was auf seine enorme Bevölkerung (die größte in Afrika), seine wachsende Marktwirtschaft, seine ausgedehnte Landmasse und die Vielfalt seiner Menschen und Sprachen verweist. Die reichen Öl- und natürlichen Ressourcen des Landes haben historisch zum wirtschaftlichen Erfolg beigetragen. Allerdings wird dieser Reichtum heute oft als "Ressourcenfluch" angesehen, der sich negativ auf die politische und wirtschaftliche Landschaft sowie auf andere Sektoren auswirkt. Zur Bewältigung dieses Problems, das viele Entwicklungsländer betrifft, wurden verschiedene theoretische Ansätze vorgeschlagen, darunter die in Lateinamerika entwickelte Abhängigkeitstheorie, die im Laufe der letzten Jahrzehnte im globalen Süden an Bedeutung gewonnen hat. Diese Analyse untersucht die externen und internen Faktoren der Ölförderung in Nigeria aus der Perspektive der Dependenztheorie.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AG	Action Group
AGIP	Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli
APPO	African Petroleum Producers' Organization
GDP	Gross domestic product
b/d	barrel per day
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CRS	Corporate Social Responsibility
DFID	Department for International Development
DUP	Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
etc.	Etcetera
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GBC	German Bitumen Company

GMOU	Global Memorandum of Understanding
GSDMSM	Geological Survey Department of Ministry of Solid Materials
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
IMS	International Monetary System
IR	International Relations
IDEP	Institut Africain de Développement Économique et de Planification
IFI	International Financial Institution
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JV	Joint Venture
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LIC	Low-income countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEND	Movement of the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MINEFI	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances
MNCs	Multinational Corporations

MNCs	Multinational Companies
MNOC	Multinational Oil Corporation
MNOCs	Multinational Oil Companies
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MSM	Ministry of Solid Materials
NAOC	Nigerian Agip Oil Company
NAE	National Archives Enugu
NCNC	National Congress of Nigerian Citizens
NDA	Niger Delta Avengers
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDM	Niger Delta Ministry
NDPVF	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDSF	Niger Delta Strike Force
NDVF	Niger Delta Vigilante Force
NMC	Nigerian Mining Council
NNOP	Nigerian National Oil Company
NNOC	Nigerian National Oil Corporation
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Company

NPC	Northern People's Congress
NSC	National Steel Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMPADEC	Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDP	The People's Democratic Party
PIA	Petroleum Industry Act
Q.I.T.	Qua Iboe Terminal
RMDC	Raw Materials and Development Council
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SNEPCO	Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Limited
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Developing Company
ToT	Terms of Trade
TOPCON	Texaco Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum Company
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
QIT	Qua Iboe Terminal
TNOC	Transnational Oil Corporation
WAI	War Against Indiscipline

1 Introduction

1.1 Accession to the topic

“Blood may be thicker than water, but oil is thicker than both.”[1]

- Perry Anderson

Since the 1950s, Nigeria's oil exploration has been significantly influenced by a complex mix of external and internal factors, a phenomenon well-explained by the dependency theory. The theory, which moulted into a theoretical assessment of the mid-20th century modernization theories, argues that the economic development of peripheral countries (such as Nigeria) is shaped and limited by their interactions with core countries (industrialized and economically dominant nations). This viewpoint clarifies how external pressures, and internal dynamics have jointly shaped Nigeria's oil exploration path, frequently hindering its independent economic growth and stability.

Exogenous Factors

Externally, MNCs[2] have been pivotal in Nigeria's oil industry since its inception. Companies like Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil etc. entered Nigeria with significant capital, advanced technology, and geopolitical support from their home countries. These corporations have dictated the pace and scale of oil exploration and molded the regulatory and operational frameworks to serve their interests. Consequently, the extraction and export of oil have primarily benefited these foreign entities, leading to a pattern of capital outflow that aligns with dependency theory's assertion of exploitative economic relationships. Furthermore, global oil prices and international political dynamics have had a profound impact on Nigeria's oil sector. The volatility of global oil markets has led to economic instability in Nigeria, exemplifying a key aspect of dependency theory where peripheral economies are vulnerable to fluctuations in the global market dominated by core nations. Additionally, geopolitical actions, including sanctions and trade agreements imposed by powerful countries, have further restricted Nigeria's ability to independently manage its oil sector.

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[1] (Anderson 2001: 30). Popularized by the American film and television actor Larry Hagman, known for his role as the oil tycoon J. R. Ewing in the soap opera Dallas.
[2] Multinational oil corporations.

Endogenous Factors

Internally, Nigeria's political and economic structures have also reinforced dependency. Corruption, bad governance and mismanagement within the government and its institutions have led to the misallocation of oil revenues, poor infrastructure development, and insufficient reinvestment in other economic sectors. This internal dysfunction has been worsened by the "resource curse," where an abundance of natural resources like oil paradoxically results in economic stagnation and conflict rather than development. Additionally, domestic policies and decisions often reflect the interests of a political elite economically intertwined with foreign oil companies. This elite disproportionately benefits from oil revenues, maintaining a system where the broader population sees little improvement in living standards. The dependency theory explains this phenomenon as a result of internal elite complicity with external forces, perpetuating an unequal distribution of wealth and power within the country.

Examining Nigeria's oil exploration through the perspective of dependency theory unveils a twofold framework of external dominance and internal collaboration that has hindered fair economic advancement. Multinational corporations and global market dynamics have dictated the conditions of Nigeria's oil exploitation, while internal elements like corruption and elite influence have aggravated the nation's dependence. This fusion of external and internal factors highlights the necessity for a holistic reform strategy that tackles both international economic ties and domestic governance to attain sustainable development in Nigeria's oil sector.

1.2 Question, research project and the goal of the thesis

Research Question:

To what extent have external and internal factors influenced Nigeria’s oil exploration from the 1950s to the present, when examined through the framework of dependency theory?

Research project:

A comprehensive analysis of how Nigeria’s oil exploration has been shaped by external and internal factors over the past seventy years. The application of dependency theory to offer a theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics of Nigeria’s oil sector. Insights into the dependency relationships that have historically impacted Nigeria’s economic development and continue to influence its oil industry till today. Policy recommendations designed to reduce dependency and promote sustainable development within Nigeria's oil sector.

Goal of the Thesis:

The prime goal of the thesis is to highlight how external and internal factors have influenced Nigeria's oil exploration and development from the 1950s to the present. Utilizing the framework of dependency theory, this research seeks to reveal how Nigeria's role in the global economic system, alongside its internal dynamics, has shaped its oil industry. The study aims to provide a thorough understanding of the interaction between international influences, domestic policies, and economic conditions within Nigeria's oil sector.

Objectives:

Historical Analysis: Provide an overview of Nigeria's oil exploration activities since the 1950s, highlighting key events and milestones.

Exogenous Factors Examination: Analyze the impact of external factors such as foreign investment, global oil prices, multinational oil companies, and international political dynamics on Nigeria's oil industry.

Endogenous Factors Examination: Investigate internal factors including domestic policies, governance issues, economic strategies, and socio-political conditions affecting oil exploration in Nigeria.

Dependency Theory Framework: Apply the dependency theory to understand how external dependencies and internal vulnerabilities have shaped the trajectory of Nigeria's oil exploration.

Policy Implications: Discuss the implications of the findings for current and future policies aimed at enhancing the sustainability and equity of Nigeria's oil sector.

1.3 State of research and relevance for international development

With the inception of the commercialization of oil in Nigeria in the 1950s, extensive research has been dedicated to the country's oil exploration and production. Scholars have explored the economic, political, and social impact(s) of oil production. Key historical analyses have mapped the progression of the oil sector, highlighting pivotal events such as the Biafran War, the nationalization of oil assets, and the advent of militancy in the Niger Delta.

Exogenous Factors:

Foreign Investment and Multinational Corporations: Extensive research has highlighted the role of MNCs like Shell, Chevron, and ExxonMobil in Nigeria's oil industry. These studies often focus on the dominance of foreign capital, technology, and expertise in the sector, and how this has influenced Nigeria's economic dependency on oil.

Global Oil Market Dynamics: Research on global oil price fluctuations, OPEC policies, and international trade agreements has demonstrated the vulnerability of Nigeria's economy to external shocks. Scholars have analyzed how global demand and supply, geopolitical tensions, and financial crises impact Nigeria's oil revenues.

International Political and Economic Pressures: Studies have explored how international sanctions, foreign aid, and economic partnerships influence Nigeria's oil policies along with the part of global financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank etc.) in forming economic reforms and structural adjustments has also been a significant area of research.

Endogenous Factors:

Domestic Governance and Policies: Research has examined the effectiveness of Nigeria's governance structures in managing the oil sector, frequently highlighting issues such as corruption, mismanagement, and insufficient regulatory frameworks. These studies emphasize how domestic policies have either exacerbated or mitigated economic dependency.

Economic Diversification Efforts: Scholars have analyzed Nigeria's attempts at economic diversification, evaluating the successes and failures of policies aimed at reducing the economy's over-reliance on oil. This includes research on the agriculture, manufacturing, and services sectors.

Socio-Political Dynamics: The impact of oil on Nigeria's social fabric, including the exacerbation of regional inequalities and the upsurge of combativeness in the Niger Delta, has been extensively researched. Studies often investigate how oil wealth has fueled conflict, patronage politics, and social unrest.

Dependency Theory Application: Research applying dependency theory to Nigeria's oil industry has provided a critical framework for understanding the persistent economic and political inequalities. Scholars argue that Nigeria's position within the global economic system perpetuates a cycle of dependency, where wealth generated from oil is not equitably distributed and primarily benefits foreign interests and domestic elites.

Relevance for International Development consist of the following:

Economic Implications: Understanding the dynamics of Nigeria's oil industry through the lens of dependency theory is crucial for framing effective international development strategies. It highlights the need for policies that promote economic diversification, equitable resource distribution, and sustainable development practices.

Governance and Policy Reforms: The insights from this research can inform governance reforms aimed at enhancing transparency, accountability, and efficiency in resource management. International development agencies can tailor their interventions to support institutional capacity building and anti-corruption measures.

Conflict Resolution and Social Cohesion: Addressing the socio-political challenges associated with oil exploration, such as regional conflicts and social disparities, is vital for achieving stability and development. Research findings can guide peace-building initiatives and community development programs.

Global Partnerships and Aid Effectiveness: For international donors and partners, understanding the dependency dynamics can improve the effectiveness of aid programs. It ensures that development assistance aligns with the needs and priorities of the local context, fostering sustainable economic growth and reducing dependency.

Environmental Sustainability: Given the environmental impact of oil exploration, research in this area underscores the importance of sustainable practices. International development efforts can focus on promoting environmental protection, rehabilitation of degraded areas, and supporting renewable energy initiatives.

In summary, the state of research on Nigeria's oil exploration from the 1950s to today, viewed through the lens of dependency theory, provides critical insights into the multifaceted influences shaping the sector. This understanding is highly relevant for international development, offering guidance on policy reforms, governance improvements, and sustainable development practices.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The formation of the thesis starts with the theoretical framework of the dependency theory chapter, which is divided into three subchapters. Subchapter 2.1 deals with the history and theoretical origin of the dependency theory. Subchapter 2.2 highlights the concept of underdevelopment according to the dependency theory in a capitalist world system. The final subchapter 2.3 stresses the underdevelopment from a Nigerian perspective. Chapter 3 explores dependency at the state level. 3.1 goes briefly into the depth of the definition of dependency in various terms, through the view of sociology, psychology, political science etc., while subchapter 3.2 deals with identity, intersubjectivity and standards in the political science sphere. 3.3 is committed to the meaning of dependency within the arena of international relations theory. How is dependency viewed in international relations theories, is dependency coerced, how does one become dependent? The final chapter 3.4 views Nigeria analytically via the lens of the dependency theory. How have exogenous factors, such as global oil market trends and international geopolitics, influenced Nigeria's oil exploration strategies and policies over time. What are the specific endogenous factors within Nigeria, such as governmental policies and socio-economic dynamics, that have shaped the trajectory of the country's oil exploration since the 1950s?

Chapter 4 is divided into seven subchapters and highlights the grounds for dependency based on external components. 4.1 brings attention to the theory of exogenous dependency according to Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, while 4.2 places emphasis on the aspects of external factors by Andre Gunder Frank and summing up the theories of exogenous factors is Samir Amin's perspective in subchapter 4.3. Subchapter 4.4 spotlights the terms of trade by Hans Wolfgang Singer and Raúl Prebisch, who made up the Singer/Prebisch hypothesis that has served as a fundamental pillar of the dependency theory but has lost ground on relevance in the past thirty years. Subchapter 4.5 focuses on the role of multinational oil companies and the reverberation of their influence in Nigeria. How have fluctuations in oil prices impacted Nigeria's efforts to diversify away from oil dependence, considering the constraints imposed by dependency theory frameworks? 4.6 quarrels with the financial institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) in their roles both institutions have played in the dependency or independency of Nigeria on a global scale in regard to Nigeria's oil exploration-based economy. The final subchapter 4.7 accentuates Nigeria's membership and the workings of OPEC. How have shifts in global energy dynamic impacted Nigeria's approach to oil exploration and its efforts to break free from dependency patterns?

Chapter 5 is dedicated to the research methodology of the thesis. Subchapter 5.1 presents the quantitative research method, 5.2 introduces the standardized survey, which finds usage in this thesis, while 5.3 briefly highlights the Liker-type scale. Subchapter 5.4. tackles the questionnaire and the survey query in this thesis.

Subchapter 6.1 highlights the survey results and the discussion of the survey findings, while Chapter 7 is devoted to the reasons for dependency based on endogenous factors. Subchapter 7.1 inspects the evolution of the Niger Delta oil production in a historical context. 7.2 deals with the collaboration within Nigeria's petroleum industry. What role have multinational oil corporations played in perpetuating or alleviating Nigeria's dependency on oil revenues and how has this interaction evolved over time? To what extent have efforts to promote indigenous participation in the oil industry contributed to mitigating Nigeria's dependency on foreign expertise and technology, as suggested by dependency theory principles? Subchapter 7.3 emphasizes on the ramifications of the political and economic factors plaguing Nigeria. To what extent has Nigeria's reliance on oil exports as a primary source of revenue reinforced economic dependency on foreign markets, in accordance with dependency theory principles? 7.4 gives prominence to the impacts of oil spills. In what ways have the environmental and social consequences of oil exploration in Nigeria been exacerbated by the country's dependency on oil revenues, as posited by the dependency theory? Subchapter 7.5 calls attention to the socio-political oil conflicts that are very much prevalent on a community, local and federal level. What are the implications of Nigeria's oil dependency on broader societal issues, such as income inequality, political stability, and regional disparities? How have conflicts and tensions between oil-producing regions and the Nigerian government been influenced by dependency dynamics, particularly in terms of resource allocation and distribution? Subchapter 7.6 accentuates the Dutch disease syndrome, while 7.7 puts the rent-seeking behaviour in Nigeria in the foreground. 7.8. dwells on the challenges of good governance in Nigeria and 7.9 deals with corruption, two aspects that seem to be symptomatic for the country's suffering from the resource curse. The final subchapter 7.10 is dedicated to the politization of ethical identity, that is indeed pervasive in the Nigerian society and the access to resource and power.

A final summary in subchapter 9.1 of to what extent Nigeria's oil exploration since the 1950s to today is (being) affected by exogenous and endogenous factors through the lens of the dependency theory in the chapters above, a critical reflection in subchapter 8.2 and a possible outlook in chapter 8.3 concludes the thesis.

2. Theoretical framework of the dependency theory[3]

2.1 History and theoretical origin

The dependency theory can be viewed as a political theory from Latin America, that deals with the ramifications of global capitalism in so-called Third World countries (cf. Treacy 2022: 218). Analyses concerning the impact of capitalism's expansion in Latin America have been ongoing since the early 20th century. During this period, critical questions were being raised on the matter of capitalism and its modes of production, but most importantly was the question if capitalism could sustain itself in the periphery (cf. Treacy 2002: 218-219 as cited in Kay 1989). According to the dependency theorists (economic) dependency can be explained as the core being capable to develop its economy at the expense of the periphery (cf. Anonymous 2018: 15). Furthermore, the relationship of interdependence between multiple economies, and their connection to global

[3] This chapter was handed in as an assignment for the 2024S 210154-1 M13: Master seminar supervised by Mag. Dr. Karin Liebhart, Privatdoz.

trade, becomes one of dependence when dominant countries can expand and sustain themselves independently, while dependent countries solely develop as a result of the cores' expansion. This dynamic can have either positive or negative impacts on the instant development of the dependent countries (cf. Dos Santos 1970: 231). To address the (political) changes following the World Wars[4], many underdeveloped nations viewed import-substitution as the way forward, to which it would function complementary to their traditional exports-oriented economy, aiming to create jobs and foster domestic societal coherence, thus trying to distance the masses from communistic ideas[5] (cf. Treacy 2022: 219). Arndt notes that in this context the core was more than interested in the economy of the periphery after 1945, which had not been the case after World War I. (cf. Arndt 1992: 142 as cited in Altamirano 2001: 71). By this notion it is safe to say that the theory of economic advancement did not become widespread until 1949, when Harry Truman[6] advocated for advancement and amelioration in primitive parts[7] of the world through just and egalitarian trade exchange, aiming to spread the advantage of technological improvement to these regions, while trying to leave imperialism behind (cf. Treacy 2022: 219).

With this premise came with it, the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1945 and the academic focus[8] shifted to issues of underdevelopment, particularly concerning the so-called underdeveloped nations (cf. Ibid.). Latin American development theories emerging during this time sought to explain the particular roles of secondary economies within the global market, involving both regional and external political players (cf. Ibid.). These theories mostly highlighted subjective distinctions as systematic and constructional barriers, making it clear that the tools used to evaluate the development of the core were inadequate for assessing the development prospects of the peripheries (cf. Prebisch 1986). According to Nahón et al. from the 1950s onwards to the 1970s the dependency theory with a main focus on the development of underdevelopment experienced its heyday in Latin America and the Caribbean (cf. Nahón; Rodríguez & Schorr 2006: 6). This intellectual movement rose to a crescendo in the endorsement of Latin American structuralism, entrenched in ECLAC[9], as the dominant economic paradigm (cf. Nahón et al. 2006: 6). With this came debates concerning the

[4] I. and II.
[5] This was rather propagated by the United States during the Cold War.
[6] 33rd President of the United States of America between 1945 – 1953.
[7] With the majority to be found on the African continent.
[8] Mainly in the Anglo-Saxon world.
[9] Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

advancement of the outer economies and their stalled progress within this context, that led to a significant increase in economic literature, reflecting a consensus on the necessity of industrialization to advance production forces in underdeveloped countries. However, the gradualism advocated by developmentalism as a counterpart to this process began to encounter various economic and political obstacles, which in turn led to the critique of structuralism (cf. Treacy 2022: 219 as cited in Arceo 2011). In this regard the dependency theory emerged within the (geo)political context of a polarized world, in which it challenged prepotent development theories and their applications in the Latin America context. By this notion the dependency theory rejected the concept of underdevelopment and development as separate entities, but rather propagated the fact that the capitalistic approach in the periphery does not follow a developmental path as to the capitalism in the core (cf. Treacy 2022: 219).

Structuralism and the dependency theory pinpointed unique traits of Latin American economies and their relationship to the world market. According to Treacy the dependency theory can therefore be viewed as one of the earliest and extreme attempt to identify sequences of which the economic relationship between the core and the periphery replicated development and underdevelopment simultaneously (cf. Treacy 2022: 220). With this prerequisites Marxists theorists and other theorists with their respective political views took diverse approaches in getting to the crux of the dependency theory. Those were André Gunder Frank, Ruy Marini and Theotônio dos Santos on one hand with a Marxist view; Cardoso and Faletto with a Weberian view and Prebisch and Sunkel with a developmentalist view, were all aware of the insurmountable development of the periphery amidst a capitalistic world system, when viewed through a Marxist lens (cf. Treacy 2022: 220 as cited in Palma 1981). In contrast to the Marxist views of the theorists the opposing structuralism, opines that the state is not in a position to manage and maintain capitalistic economic expansion in nations that are dependent on external factors (cf. Dos Santos 2003). Beigel (2008) concludes contextually by highlighting that, the first (practical) contributions to dependency theory were built on the influx of US investments into Latin American societal organizations after World War I. Moreover, this inflow of funds from the core occurred in a context where Latin American nations had achieved formal political sovereignty but still sustained reliant economic links. It can therefore be asserted that, the dependency theory was formed by various conceptual theoretical inputs and the documented expertise of the theorists (cf. Treacy 2022: 220).

2.2 The concept of underdevelopment according to the dependency theory in a capitalist world system

To comprehend underdevelopment or development within the framework of dependency theory, it's essential to highlight the foundational theories it was built upon. According to Borón due to the occurrence of political shifts and the status quo in the Global South the dependency theory was seen within the scope of a political and theoretical movement and was also to be viewed as a Latin American approach in developing the continental economy (cf. Borón 2008). It tackled the notion of industrialization through the lens of import-substitution. Furthermore, the dependency theory viewed import-substitution as a culprit of peripheral dependency, whilst it created a massive gap in the accumulation of wealth between the peripheral populace (cf. Treacy 2022: 220). Furthermore, Marxist dependency theory revised the concept of imperialism to address the context in which Latin America's inferior connection to the core differed significantly from the colonial construction. This theory posited that imperialist predominance was able to exist, because though having achieved de jure dependency, Latin American countries remained de facto economically dependent on the core (cf. Ibid.). Additionally, the core took over the surpluses that were being produced in the periphery and therefore one would have to distance themselves from the idea of industrial development or peripheral import-substitution of being capable to restrain the peripheral dependency (cf. Beigel 2008).

In this context, dependent and underdeveloped economies are generally characterized by the following three structural features:

1. Uneven productivity between sectors. Developed countries typically have small, highly capitalized sectors alongside low-productivity, backward agricultural sectors. These low-productivity sectors are integrated into the world market rather than existing as traditional, independent economies. They engage with the world market in two primary ways. Firstly, they primarily produce for the capitalist market (exchange values) rather than for their own consumption (use values), to which they are forced to sell their labor-produced goods to sustain themselves. Their subsistence production is insufficient for self-sufficiency. Secondly, they act as a reserve army of labor, which, in classical Marxist terms, helps depress wages in the highly capitalized sectors.

2. Disarticulation of the economic system. This means that, there is scarce interchangeability between the different branches of the economy. In addition, agricultural production is oriented towards exports rather than meeting the nation's food consumption needs, leading countries with 80 per cent of their population in agriculture to import food. Raw materials are produced for export rather than for use by local industries, which, in turn, must import most of their capital goods and raw materials.

3. External domination. Most production, be it agricultural, mining, or industrial is oriented towards the demands and conditions set by core countries. External investments generally have authority over the most important divisions of the economy and influences the economic decisions of peripheral countries, which are constrained by externally held debts and the ongoing necessity to borrow more.

(cf. Hansen & Schulz 1981: 14-15).

Against this background dependency theorists have come to the consensus that Ruy Mauro Marini’s 1973 work "Dialectia de la dependencia" (2008 [1973]) represents the pinnacle of explaining the unique mechanisms through which the dependency on capitalism is perpetuated (cf. Osorio 2009: 87; Kay 1989). Marini is of the opinion that, under the blanket of global capitalism the peripheral underdevelopment was or rather is built into the financial development of the core (cf. Treacy 2022: 222). This perspective precluded any possibility of autonomous industrialization that could lead to sustainable development of the periphery (cf. Ibid.). Therefore, the dependency of the periphery was perceived as a subaltern (financial) link amongst antecedent countries, where the relation to the core is being constantly extended through the perpetuation of dependent factors (cf. Marini 2008 [1973]: 111). Marini further argued that this cycle was mostly being upheld in what he categorizes as the “superexploitation of labor” (Treacy 2022: 222 as cited in Marini 2008 [1973]).

Conversely, it can also be claimed that in dependent countries where accumulation is focused on external trade and relies on the needs of accumulation of capital in the core countries, the productive circle is able to function separately from the accumulative circle. Consequently, by this assumption, worker consumption did not significantly influence production and was not a pivotal variable for capital in the accumulation process (cf. Treacy 2022: 222). On the other hand, anti-capitalist perspectives on dependency theory attribute the underdevelopment of dependent countries to global capitalist development. According to Bambirra, he classifies the backwardness of dependent countries on the concurrent advancement of global capitalism, which serves as a precondition for the development among the major global capitalist powers (cf. Bambirra 1999: 13).

Therefore, global capitalism has to be viewed as an impediment to the progression of mankind and it begets an anticapitalistic revolution to overcome the underdevelopment of the periphery. Furthermore, it can be argued that the historical presence of dependent capitalism was shaped by two key factors: a.) the destination of production and b.) disparities in productivity and power dynamics within the world market. These (pre)conditions facilitated a pattern of capital reproduction that relied on the super-exploitation of labor, transforming funds earmarked for income workers expenditure into a fund for capitalist expansion, thus disrupting the cycle of capital in the periphery (cf. Osorio 2016).

2.3 Underdevelopment – a brief overview of the Nigerian case

Governmentally, it was expected that local governments, which represented the interests of the population instead of external entities, would be able to exercise sovereign state authority. Their interactions with other states would resemble those of sovereign nations forming agreements with one another (cf. Alaye 2019: 23). As pursuant to Smith, the basis of sovereignty was intended to be built on an influx of (foreign) capital, combined with technological know-how and these was supposed to uproot the less developed periphery out of their so-called underdevelopment (cf. Smith 2003). According to Alaye, this belief was deemed a façade, due to the term neocolonialism.[10] Neocolonialism opined that, the peripheral nations were in reality not independent, attributable to the Western monetary investment which brought political power with it (Alaye 2019: 14). A proponent of the interpretation of the term neocolonialism was Kwame Nkrumah, who saw in neocolonialism a disguise of colonialism. He was of the view, that in actuality the status quo stayed the same. The financial system and the policies affecting the internal politics were still coming from the core (cf. Alaye 2019: 12 as cited in Nkrumah 1974).

Based on the above, one could argue that after Nigeria gained its independence in the year 1960, which signified the end of direct authority over its state structure, financial power by Western (powers) capitalists would take an abrupt end, but this was not the case. Nigeria was de jure independent in the political sense but was de facto not independent from an economic perspective (cf Alaye 2019: 14). This lack of economic independence deepened its reliance on external powers, leading to the continued persistence of underdevelopment (cf. Alaye 2019: 14). On these grounds encouraged by the number of its population and with the title the giant of Africa, tirelessly searching for financial growth and (semi) independence, Nigeria was bound to take an independent path. This independent path was to be carried out amongst rival native groups, who were fighting for the overall political power in the country and thus contributing to a total mismanagement of the country, which almost led Nigeria to a financial collapse (cf. Alaye 2019: 15).

Furthermore, it can be claimed that the Nigerian path to its financial crisis can be seen as one ideologically motivated. Scholars rather view imperialistic, capitalistic and colonial elements the main cause of the financial decay of the country back then and today (cf. Ajala 2008).

[10] Originally coined by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and popularized by Kwame Nkrumah in the context of African countries gaining independence.

Additionally, Nigeria's dependent underdevelopment has been evident in diverse areas of ideology, culture, religion and education. For instance, Nigeria's educational system is mimicked after the Western education system, making it culturally and ideologically dependent on Britain and America (cf. Alaye 2019: 21). Fayomi concurs the former, noting that in many parts of West Africa, former colonizers' languages, such as English and French, are still widely spoken, making communication difficult without them. This has complicated the search for a national language in Nigeria unsuccessful, further entrenching the country's dependency in terms of linguistics (cf. Fayomi 2008). Moreover, English remains Nigeria's official lingua franca, reflecting cultural dependence on Britain to such an extent that colonial influences are still pervasive in Nigerian society. Consequently, many of Nigeria's rich cultural traditions are being eroded and replaced by Western cultures[11], leading to cultural dependency and further perpetuating the country's underdevelopment (cf. Ibid.).

3. Dependency at the state level

3.1 Definition of dependency

The online lexicon for psychology and pedagogy defines dependence as follows: "In psychology, dependence or reliance initially means that humans, as social beings, are fundamentally dependent on other individuals" (Online Lexicon für Psychology and Pedagogy 2020). The Brockhaus defines dependence as follows: "Dependence refers to a psychological or physical state of a person that is significantly determined by other individuals, institutions, things, or ideas in their existence, thinking, actions, and feelings" (Brockhaus 1986: 47). To further clarify the concept of dependence, additional examples are needed. Kurt von Sury explains dependence in this way: "Physical attachment to individuals, things, or ideas, whereby one's own autonomous thinking and actions are restricted" (von Sury, 1967: 1).

The two psychologists, James Drever and Werner D. Fröhlich, examined dependence from the individual's perspective in relation to society and concluded that it denotes the relationship of an individual to another person or group (society) from whom they receive, or believe they receive, help, without which it seems impossible for the individual to exist or maintain their

[11] This is not a case of recency but has been an ongoing process since the inception of colonialism.

position as a member of society (cf. Drever; Fröhlich 1968: 19). In political science, dependency is defined as reliance on certain services, support, permissions, etc., from individuals, institutions, or (in international politics) other countries (cf. Schubert & Klein 2020). Furthermore, this definition is applied in research on developing countries, including Nigeria. "Dependence (also known as dependency) refers to patterns and conditions that do not allow developing countries to overcome development obstacles and catch up on developmental gaps in the long term. Only this structural (resulting from colonial history or from world market conditions) dependence leads to (permanent) underdevelopment and (lasting) dependence" (Ibid.). The definitions cited above will serve as a benchmark for analyzing Nigeria's dependence on oil exports throughout this thesis. The two definitions from the 1960s refer to "psychological attachment to individuals, things, or ideas" (von Sury 1987: 1) and the perceived impossibility of existing without the expectation of receiving help (cf. Drever; Fröhlich 1968: 19). These definitions can be applied to Nigeria as a national entity. The country has become psychologically ensnared by its dependence on oil exports to the West and appears to have lost its autonomous thinking. Moreover, it acts with restricted autonomy due to various exogenous factors that indirectly or directly impose these limitations.

3. 2 Identity, intersubjectivity and standards

Identity is a concept that defines us as human beings. Psychoanalysts have explored the question of identity extensively. What exactly is identity, and how does it impact both us and others? British sociologist Stuart Hall argues that identity is not as straightforward and unproblematic as it might seem. He suggests that instead of viewing identity as a finished product that merely reflects new cultural practices, we should see it as an ongoing process, which always evolves and always is formed within, rather than outside of representation (cf. Hall 1990: 22). It can therefore be asserted that the identity of a person or a country holds significant importance within the political sphere[12].

To apply the concept of political identity to Nigeria, further explanation is necessary. Identity encompasses the characteristics of an individual or a social group. It serves as a self-image or a means of differentiation, as suggested by Rosa Hartmut (cf. Hartmut 2010: 96f.). Andreas

[12] See the mobilization of the First World War in which national identity played a pivotal role. For further reading see: Wouters & van Ypersele " Nations, Identities and the First World War: Shifting Loyalties to the Fatherland."

Holtz and Nina von Dahlern are of the opinion, that identity encompasses a motivational component (cf. Holtz; von Dahlern 2010: 133). While Heiner Keupp defines identity as follows: “identity refers to the human basic need of recognition and belonging” (Keupp 2000: 1). Utilized on the Nigerian case, Nigeria belongs to a global political structure and wants to be recognized as such beyond its role as a (plain) exporter of oil. Furthermore, identities simplify complexities, thereby producing cognitive effects (cf. Lexicon of Psychology 2019: 133). Through the establishment of meaning, especially in the identities of communities, an emotional connection is achieved (cf. Ibid). This illustrates the transition from individual to societal levels. When one's self-perception is shared within a group or society, it leads to the formation of identity through external structures.

This leads us to intersubjectivity, which involves shared content and meanings (cf. Loges 2013: 97f; Sommer 2015: 51). In intersubjectivity, a common and historically cultural background informs the thinking and actions of individuals. Within the governmental sphere, this is referred to as the core of shared societal connectedness. Identities in intersubjectivity are categorized into four types: (I) personal and (II) collective identity, which are self-organizing; (III) type identity, which labels social units through self or other designation; and (IV) role identity, which describes relationships with other political actors. These categories of intersubjectivity are not inherently good or bad but represent the approaches of political actors.

This brings me to the concepts of values and norms[13], which are among the most prominent sociological tools for describing social order. The belief that adherence to shared values and norms is essential for ensuring a society's unity and stability remains popular, despite its contradictions and the challenges posed by numerous scholarly arguments in public and political debates (cf. Schwietring 2011: 159). When introducing intersubjectivity, it can be asserted that norms act as a working hypothesis for the relations between societal actors. As individuals form their self-image within their identity, norms serve as a benchmark for personal actions. Through these norms, actors can engage socially and collectively while relying on intersubjectivity. This process also involves considering the separation of individual convictions (cf. Sommer 2015: 52). How do standards impact both parties? Norms or standards embody a shared body of knowledge accompanied by mutual expectations, enabling both sides to derive conclusions from the same issue (cf. Sommer 2015: 53f.). Regarding Nigeria, this

[13] Interject standards.

implies that the country's identity is shaped through sustainable discussions with other states, both domestically and internationally.

3.3 Dependency within international relations theory

To understand the dependency within the theory of International Relations[14], it is crucial to first examine IR within the context of political science. The following sections addresses the history and origins of IR and its theories, including realism, neorealism, and the English school on one side. Structuralism, constructivism, and liberal institutionalism on the other side. As an independent academic discipline, IR began to be institutionalized in the 1920s. During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the establishment of scientific institutes for the study of IR was agreed upon in both the USA and Great Britain. As a result, Christiane Lemke refers to the teaching of IR as a product of the First World War (cf. Lemke 2000: 5). Additionally, IR research is founded on two core principles, international law and diplomatic history (cf. Ibid). This raises the question on how IR increased its importance? It can be assumed that, after the end of World War II., states and nations were determined to avoid such a devastating conflict again, given the immense loss of life. During this period, anglophone academia saw the rise of new universities and institutions dedicated to researching and explaining the ever-changing global political landscape (cf. Lemke 2000: 5). Helga Haftendorn elaborated that in the 1980s there were approximately twenty concepts of theory formation within IR (cf. Haftendorn 1990: 448f.). Nevertheless, as specified in the opening of this chapter, realism, neorealism, the English school of international relations theory, and structuralism, are considered the pillars of IR. If one wants to historically classify the genesis of a more systematic, theoretical reflection on IR, we find its origins in early modern times when modern nation-states emerged (cf. Lemke 2000: 17). What underpins realism, neorealism, and the English school of international relations theory from the IR perspective? Christiane Lemke explains that realism offered an optimistic outlook on the years following the Second World War, rooted in the present, as opposed to the idealistic schools, which were future-oriented (cf. Lemke 2000: Ibid.). A prominent spokesperson and theorist of realism, Hans J. Morgenthau, believed that the world existed in a state of anarchy. This implies that there is neither a centralization of power nor a political authority to control or regulate international relations between nations or states. Morgenthau further developed his realism thesis by asserting that states are primarily concerned with

[14] Henceforth abbreviated with IR.

ensuring their own security. Applied to oil exports, this means the West seeks to secure its oil supply for national security reasons.

Neorealism builds upon the ideas and principles of classical realism, emphasizing the roles of states in international relations. It posits that international relations are driven not by cooperation but by anarchy, conflicts, and competition. In contrast to classical realism, neorealism considers economic interests as equally significant as military security concerns (cf. Lemke 2000: 22). Therefore, it is assumed that neorealists (particularly in the West) pursue policies that prioritize their own economy, which may include protectionist and interventionist measures when deemed necessary (cf. Ibid.). Nation-states therefore endeavor to enhance their power within the constraints imposed by the international system. As these constraints are seen to limit their range of actions, a state's power can only be expanded in comparison to others (cf. Ibid.).

The English school of international relations theory, a sub-discipline of IR that flourished primarily in the United Kingdom, focuses on the evolution and role of nation-states in the dynamics of global politics. Hedley Bull, an Australian political scientist and co-founder of the English School of International Relations theory, describes its essence as follows:

> "While the individual is typically subject to an order of state authorities, sovereign states move in their mutual relations, in the absence of a world government, in an anarchic or stateless condition. However, this does not mean that there are no ordering elements in international relations or in world politics [...]. This anarchic society, which has taken shape in Europe since the early modern period and now encompasses the whole world, provides at least some basis for an international order." (Bull 1985: 13)

According to Hedley Bull, IR exhibits anarchic characteristics because only states that possess internal sovereignty know how to exercise it externally. However, these theories are not without challenges, as politics evolves over time and attempts to adapt, rendering certain schools of thought less relevant. In the 1960s, events like the Vietnam War and the struggle for independence[15] among many African states challenged IR's façade and its concepts, which increasingly seemed disconnected from the real world, global issues and paradigm shift. Realist theories faced challenges in explaining political decisions, such as when a state partially relinquishes its sovereignty to an institution. On one hand, the realism theory collided when analyzing foreign policy priorities, as states prioritized their security interests on their agenda. Another criticism of the realistic approach was the Latin America policy approach under the

[15] Referred to in literature as the year of Africa.

Reagan administration, which was considered fatal and misguided by many critics, which displayed contradictory patterns of action (cf. Kegley & Wittkopf 1997: 24f.).

On the other side of the spectrum within IR, there are *structuralism*, *liberal institutionalism*, and *constructivism*, which emerged as alternative perspectives. These schools of thought prioritize norms, efficiency, and political actors at the center of their analysis (cf. Hartmann 2009: 40). Structuralism posits that the economy serves as the bedrock of society. Juergen Hartmann argues that culture, law, and politics are superstructural phenomena (cf. Hartmann 2009: 42). To support his thesis, Hartmann draws on the theory of imperialism by Lenin. Lenin viewed imperialism within the framework of structuralism as the exploitation and colonization of African and Asian countries by European powers (cf. Lenin 1917: 334ff.). Other theorists of accumulation, like the Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre, contended that capitalism sustains itself by continually expanding into new areas in the Global South (cf. Lefebvre 1976: 7). Historian Ulrike Jureit expands on her thesis, asserting that colonial conquests gave rise to diverse claims, legal titles, and possession relations globally and with the conquests the rivalry among European countries intensified in colonial territories, particularly in Central and South Africa since the 1870s (cf. Jureit 2015: 2).

The theses presented above suggest that states, much like companies aiming to maximize their financial returns, behaved in a similar manner. In the 1970s, there was a resurgence in wealth accumulation in the Global South, shifting focus from human capital to resource reserves. David Harvey explored this shift in his book "The New Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession." According to Harvey the global market in the 1970s was synonymous with the phrase overaccumulation (cf. Harvey 2005: 2). And in order to address the crisis emerging since the 1970s, the Global North had developed a spatial-temporal fix. According to David Harvey, this strategy includes (I) investments in long-term capital projects, (II) the development of new markets, production capacities, resources, and employment opportunities in different locations, or (III) a combination of (I) and (II) (cf. Harvey 2005: 5). It is deducible that the spatial-temporal fix was implemented in response to capitalist crises in the Global North.

From an international relations perspective, the state functions as an agent serving capitalist interests. According to Hartmann: “in their relentless competition for markets, they seek control over raw material reserves. By subjugating colonial people, they exploit cheap labour and expand their markets” (Hartmann 2009: 42). Simplified, it reflects the Us versus Them principle, or as Hartmann describes it, the dichotomy between the metropolises (the West) and the peripheries (the South) (cf. Hartmann 2009: 43). Ulrich Menzel challenges the notion and argues that it was not states dictating the structure in IR, but rather multinational corporations and banks in the West, supported by their respective governments and bolstered by export activities in the peripheries. Furthermore, he contends that the structure of the global economy facilitates the prosperity of the West at the expense of the periphery (cf. Menzel 2001: 22f.).

This premise underscores structuralism's assertion that the North exerts dominance over the South. Industrial development in the South only occurs to the extent that it serves the export interests of the metropolises and enhances the prosperity of the ruling class within the South. Moreover, the ruling class in the South lives and consumes akin to the metropolises, thereby perpetuating this lifestyle while keeping their populace mired in poverty, hunger, and illiteracy (cf. Hartmann 2009: 43).

"While *realism* and *neorealism,* as well as the *English school of international relations theory,* analyse international politics from the paradigm of dominant nation-states and national interests, other theoretical approaches start from a global perspective of IR and place institutional interdependence of actors at the center" (Lemke 2007: 27). Institutions rather than states are responsible for the interdependence of today, according to Lemke (cf. Ibid.).

The international system does not impose constraints on the scope of state actions; rather, it serves as a stage where political influence can be wielded and transformed. In the Anglo-Saxon context, liberal institutionalism is frequently linked with neoliberalism. It examines the international actions of states, emphasizing on the role of institutions in particular (cf. Hartmann 2009: 48). These intergovernmental collaborations take on a lasting structure within institutions, such as international regimes and organizations. This is why some experts, particularly those in the German-speaking region, prefer to refer to these theories as institutionalism (cf. Schieder 2006; Krell 2004: 239ff.; List; Behrens; Reichardt; Simons 1995: 34ff.). Therefore, neoliberal institutionalism is also discussed in this context (cf. Menzel 2001: 165ff.). While the terminologies vary, they describe the same concept. This raises the question: what distinguishes neoliberalism from liberalism? The earlier form of liberalism in international relations stemmed from the notion of peaceful cooperation among states (cf. Hartmann 2009: 48). However, the emergence of new liberalism, akin to realism, has been shaped by engagement with scientific theories. Within the institutionalist framework, distinctions can be made between older and newer forms of institutionalism (cf. Hartmann 2009: Ibid.).

Within institutional theory, there are differing opinions. Some view institutions as instruments that states utilize when they are unable to advance independently. In institutional theory, institutions are positioned between states, but with a notable distinction: they are placed lower in the hierarchy compared to states. Conversely, others argue that institutions should be seen not as subordinate to states, but rather as entities alongside them. Once again, the question arises: what is meant by institution(s)? According to the Federal Agency for Civic Education in Germany, institutions are defined as state entities or organizations that hold enduring value and are established for the long term (cf. Schneider; Toyka-Seid 2020). Thomas Schwietring explains that the term "institution" carries different meanings in sociology and political science. In political science, it primarily refers to legal and political entities such as parties, associations, trade unions, judiciary, or parliaments. On the other hand, the sociological definition is broader, viewing institutions as established patterns of behaviour (cf. Schwietring 2011: 165).

Juergen Hartmann defines an institution as a formal international organization with statutes, a secretariat, and mechanisms for state participation, exemplified by entities like the UN, NATO, or the IMF (cf. Hartmann 2009: 49). While international cooperation is often portrayed as a Win-win situation for both parties, as suggested by liberal institutionalism, this isn't always the reality. Let's directly compare both theories within IR: “Neorealism constructs the relationship between states as competition-oriented and permeated by mistrust. Victory and place in the world of states are determined by the assertion and shifting of relative power” (Hartmann 2009: 49). Liberal institutionalism (cooperation theory), on the other hand, asserts that intergovernmental agreements are possible, but one side often gains more benefits than the other. Nonetheless, it is advantageous for both parties to have participated in the agreement (cf. Hartmann 2009: Ibid). Essentially, liberal institutionalism suggests that the outcomes of cooperation are shared between the parties.

Constructivism places perceptions, ideas, and the social construction of meanings in the international political context at its core. Its foremost advocate, Alexander Wendt, outlines its key assumptions: (a) states are the primary units of analysis in IR theory, but (b) their relations are socially constructed, and (c) the identities and interests of states are shaped by their self-image and the images of others within society (cf. Wendt 1994: 385). In essence, Wendt's thesis proposes that politicians interpret global events based on the actions of world governments. Wendt advocates for a realistic variant of constructivism, while his colleagues advocate for social constructivism (Peter Katzenstein), radical constructivism (Thomas Diez), and an institutional variant (Katzenstein, Risse, and Müller) (cf. Lemke 2000: 43). How can the aforementioned be classified? Constructivists assert that reality is socially constructed. The awareness of actors is situated within the actual world environment. All knowledge acquired is considered relative by constructivists, emphasizing the necessity to begin with a history of social and political reality that is context-dependent, historically contingent, and variable. Consequently, structures within international politics hinge on the following factors: (1) actions of actors, (2) normative rules, (3) discourse, and (4) agreed-upon content and concepts (cf. Lemke 2000: Ibid.).

International institutions are at the centre of constructivism. According to Lemke: “the constructivist research programme assumes that these organizations only exist through the practice of the actors who follow certain rules and norms. Ideas, interactions, and intersubjectivity are institutional foundations for the construction of reality” (Lemke 2000: 43). What does this mean? A political actor operates based on values and standards shaped by existing social and institutional conditions, which they depend upon. Moreover, these values and standards establish shared meanings in political contexts. When these foundational norms evolve, the actions of political actors may also change (cf. Ibid.). Another aspect of constructivism, as outlined by Juergen Hartmann, involves acknowledging the diversity of the world and the societal images associated with traditions, religions, and established social practices. This perspective offers a plausible explanation for various political complexities observed in Europe, North America, East Asia, and the Arab world (cf. Hartmann 2009: 61).

From this perspective, constructivism can be interpreted through an economic lens, proposing that people (political actors) primarily act in pursuit of personal advantage (cf. North 1990: 3ff.). Moreover, the constructivist viewpoint does not substitute ideas for economic or military resources. It is also worth noting that powerful states exert greater international influence than smaller or peripheral states, as noted by Sørensen. This contrasts with neorealism, which does not account for the social construction of emerging threat scenarios and remains focused on different factors (cf. Sørensen 2008: 7ff.).

After examining the foundational pillars of IR theory, the focus turns to dependency theory, which explores the causes of dependence and questions whether it can be overcome. According to dependency theory, the underdevelopment of Third World countries, viewed through a Western lens, is attributed not to internal factors like cultural differences, lack of capital, or failed modernization attempts, but rather to external factors originating from the West. These external influences are believed to have contributed to the stagnation and even regression of continents like Africa, which struggled to develop independently and on its own terms after gaining independence. Colonialism is often held accountable for this dependency, with theorists of external factors arguing that it redirected the economic activities of the Global South populations to serve colonial interests, thereby stifling socio-economic development in peripheral regions.

Nevertheless, is the question indispensable on whether colonialism alone can be solely blamed for the dependency of Nigeria? Advocates of external factors assert that colonial policies shaped the economic landscape to benefit colonial powers, limiting the development opportunities of the country. Notably, these theorists do not extensively explore whether colonial actions were driven purely by capitalist motives or if there was a deliberate effort to foster dependency on the colonies over the long term.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s the contested discussion taking place in academia in the West were those of financial growth and the modernization of society (cf. Tetzlaff 2023: 39). This was due to the United States surfacing as the prominent global power after World War II. The United States was keen on promoting economic development worldwide through their policies. Their focus was on developing countries receiving capital from abroad, as the United States perceived the capital gap as the primary distinction between the First World and the Third World (cf. Tetzlaff 2023: Ibid).

The pursuit of economic growth in the Global South, spearheaded by the West, especially the United States, necessitated institutional collaboration. This collaboration was to be buttressed by agencies of the UN, the World Bank and the IMF in a triangular relationship. Their goal was to establish conditions for the periphery to join the already existing global market (cf. Tetzlaff 2023: 40). Furthermore, they were of the (economic) opinion, that with the financial progress that came with their policies, profits and income could trickle down to the penniless and poverty-stricken part of the peripheries (cf. Ibid.). It was under these circumstances that US President John F. Kennedy proposed a decade of development in the early 1960s not only for the United States and the Soviet Union[16] but also for African states, aiming at their socioeconomic progress, which appeared elusive. It is to be noted here, that it was under the ongoing Cold War, that the concept of power dynamics and authority gained increasing prominence during the decolonization era. Despite gaining their independence, former colonies

[16] For more information on the collapse of the Soviet Union, see: https://www.britannica.com/event/the-collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union.

remained confined to peripheral roles, while multinational corporations grew in influence in the global market, these peripheries continued to serve primarily as suppliers of raw materials. Contrary to the promises of modernization theories, they have been and still are denied equitable participation as equal partners in the global economy.

The 1960s marked the emergence of dependency theory, with initial skepticism when detachment from the metropolises did not seem imminent. However, by the 1970s, there was supposed to be a shift in the discourse of dependency theory. In the 1970s it was becoming prevalent that the promised financial advancement in the newly independent countries in the Global South was not coming into fruition. The dependency theorists in this regard vehemently declared that, as long as the periphery were chained to constructional dependency factors by the West in which exploitation served as the driving engine, development in the Global South remained an utter façade (cf. Tetzlaff 2023: 41).

From a historical perspective, it could be argued that the West, but especially African states, have been taught better over the past three decades. This raises the question of why dependency persists? In retrospect, some things are clearer. While achieving gradual independence from the global market sounds straightforward in theory, it is nearly impossible in today's heavily globalized economic landscape. Powerful global financial entities like the World Bank and the IMF, alongside coalitions of nations, would effectively prevent such independence[17].

To understand the enduring financial dependence of the poorest countries since the 1970s, one must closely examine the emergence and magnitude of the debt crisis in the global South. The debt burden of developing countries has sharply risen over the past 25 years, particularly in LICs[18], where excessive debt remains a significant obstacle to economic and social development, as noted by the World Bank in 2004 (cf. World Bank 2004a). Despite current efforts, the situation in developing countries has not substantially improved. Factors contributing to the debt crisis include economic missteps, inadequate debt management, unfavorable terms of trade, natural disasters, and political instability. Lenders' practices have played a crucial role in exacerbating countries' over-indebtedness among these factors of the debt crisis (cf. Matthäus-Maier; Djafari 2006: 62). Furthermore, up until the 1980s, most LDCs[19] had accepted substantial loans on non-concessional terms, often from private banks. The IMF and the World Bank also participated in non-concessional lending, fearing missing

[17] An assumption that is highly controversial.
[18] Low-income countries.
[19] Least Developed Countries.

out on potential growth in developing countries' economies. However, the anticipated economic expansion did not materialize as expected by creditors. International private banks withdrew from financing, multilateral creditors transitioned from non-concessional to concessional lending, and some bilateral creditors shifted their financial policies to provide grants rather than loans to the poorest countries (cf. Matthäus-Maier; Djafari 2006: Ibid.). As stated by Matthäus-Maier and Djafari in 2006, it can be claimed that the debt crises in the periphery were also to be blamed on institutional and political elements embedded in the periphery, which were further exacerbated by the poor choices of the indebted peripheral countries (cf. Matthäus-Maier; Djafari 2006: 64).

In addition, the indebted countries carried out financial policies that were not favourable of the population but rather benign to particular interest groups and ethnicities. To sum up the factors that contributed to the debt crises, the peripheral states in cahoots with state-owned companies were able to have access to loans that were subsidized by the government (cf. Ibid.). Consequently, this created a disincentive for potential savers to invest their money within the domestic financial system. Instead, they diverted their funds overseas or into real estate. As a result, productive investments and subsequent economic growth were impeded (cf. Matthäus-Maier & Djafari 2006: Ibid.). The persistence of the debt crises and the continued stability of dependency are not solely due to political and institutional factors; structural dependency also plays a significant role. According to Tahari et al., the economies of poor developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where many heavily indebted nations are located, have shown slow growth for decades. Economic development in these regions has been minimal. From 1960 to 2002, overall GDP growth averaged 3.2 per cent. By comparison, South Asia (excluding China) experienced growth of 4.6 per cent, East Asia 6.7 per cent, and Latin America 4 per cent, highlighting continental differences directly (cf. Tahari et al. 2004: 21). Middle-income countries have borrowed significantly more than poorer nations, but their stronger economic foundations have enabled them to manage their debt more effectively. According to Matthäus-Maier and Djafari, heavily indebted poor countries rely heavily on a narrow range of exports, with over half of their export earnings coming from one to three primary commodities. This dependence leaves these countries vulnerable to external factors or shocks, such as price collapses in the global market for their export goods and increases in prices for imported goods (cf. Matthäus-Maier & Djafari 2006: 66).

A central question stemming from dependency theory is whether and how dependency can be overcome on the international (political) stage? An example of strategies aimed at overcoming dependency is the HIPC[20] debt relief initiative. Several aid donors forgave the debts of poor recipient countries in the late 1970s and 1980s. Between 1976 and 1988 creditor states agreed to release circa 27 countries from their debts (cf. Matthaeus-Maier & Djafari 2006: 68). The beneficiary countries received debt relief amounting to over $23 billion. However, the share of debt service payments as a percentage of average export earnings for these countries increased from 17 per cent in 1980 to as much as 30 percent by 1986 (cf. Matthaeus-Maier & Djafari 2006: 66 as cited in Daseking & Powell 1999). One factor of the increasing debt service payments was the new loans that the World Bank continued to disburse to highly and over-indebted states as part of its development work. All these measures seemed to be unsuccessful, hence a HIPC II initiative was launched. With the HIPC II initiative, the country's entire money owed is to be reduced to a bearable level to create leeway for poverty reduction (cf. Matthaeus-Maier & Djafari 2006: 66).

The HIPC I initiative aimed not only to address debt payments but also prioritized sustainable poverty reduction in the poorest countries as a prerequisite for admission to the HIPC II initiative. The World Bank and the IMF collaborated on a new approach to ensure the debt sustainability of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), aiming to break the cycle of debt accumulation, debt relief, new borrowing, and repeated debt forgiveness. This involved restructuring the development financing of poor countries based on two main considerations: 1.) the country's capacity to service its debt, and 2.) assessments of macroeconomic conditions, governance, institutional capacity, and organizations. If these criteria were met, a country-specific external financing strategy was initiated, incorporating external funds and an appropriate credit-to-grant ratio. This approach contributed to achieving the MDGs[21]and ensured sustainable debt service where necessary (cf. Matthaeus-Maier & Djafari 2006: 72).

In conclusion, theorists of dependency within international relations have also acknowledged that elites in the peripheries often represent and advance the interests of the metropoles internally, thereby maintaining their cultural influence and power. This adds another layer to IR, which has primarily been viewed from a Western standpoint rather than from the perspective of the Global South outwards to the West.

[20] Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
[21] Millennium Development Goals.

3.4 Nigeria through the lens of the dependency theory as an analytical perspective

Dependency theory can be readily applied to Nigeria, given its location in Africa. However, applying this theory to Nigeria is complex due to its unique stature on the continent. As the world's largest Islamic-Christian nation and home to approximately 200 million people, Nigeria holds the title of Africa's most populous country. Moreover, it stands out as one of the biggest oil manufacturers in Africa, with a daily production of around 2.6 million barrels and reserves totaling 35.9 billion barrels. Notably, Nigeria contributes 41% of the GDP in the West African sub-region (cf. Tull 2007: 108; World Bank Group 2022; Falola et al. 2024).

According to the dependency theory, the advancement of Third World nations remains unattainable as long as they continue to experience structural dependence and economic exploitation via unequal exchange in global capitalist markets (cf. Tetzlaff 2018: 26). To what extent does this assumption hold true for Nigeria? The primary emphasis remains on oil extraction, as it has been the cornerstone enabling Nigeria to establish its international presence. Despite the oil generating an enormous amount of wealth, it has not positively contributed to the development of Nigeria. To exemplify, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, between the year 1965 and 2000 oil profits were totalling circa $350 billion. Simultaneously the poverty rate in the country skyrocketed to an additional 36 per cent. In 2024 circa 63 per cent of Nigerians are categorized as poverty-stricken[22], with the Northern part being poorer as the Southern part of Nigeria (cf. National Bureau of Statistics 2024). Furthermore, the current GDP per capita stands at $1,687.57,[23] which is lower than it was when Nigeria became an independent nation in 1960 and at the onset of oil production (cf. Albaledejo 2003: 13; Statista 2024).

From today's standpoint, a clear regression is evident. Export earnings, which range from 90 to 95 per cent, are entirely derived from oil exports. Similarly, oil exports account for 70 to 80 per cent of government revenues (cf. Tull 2007: 110). Consequently, cash crops, which previously contributed about 75 per cent of government revenues before the country gained independence, were neglected (cf. Forrest 1994: 33).

Attributing the country's challenges solely to oil production would be unjust, considering Nigeria also contends with ongoing exogenous shocks and influences. Throughout the chapter,

[22] There is significant variation in poverty levels among states, with multidimensional poverty rates ranking from 27 per cent in Ondo to around 91 per cent in Sokoto (cf. National Bureau of Statistics 2024).
[23] As of 2023. Data on the year 2024, expected to be released in the year 2025.

it becomes evident that Nigeria's aspirations in international relations are often overshadowed by its reliance on oil and Western buyers, which often comes at the expense of its population. In the early 1970s, pan-African issues dominated the foreign policy agenda, enhancing the country's international visibility (cf. Wright; Okolo 1999: 123f.) Nigeria supported liberation and anti-colonial movements[24] in Southern Africa, while promoting the non-aligned movement[25] (cf. Tull 2007: 117). At the same time, it was crucial for the Nigerian government to foster strong political relations with the West. The United States and Great Britain were particularly pivotal, largely because English served as a common language, and both nations were and continue to be major purchasers of Nigerian oil (cf. Tull 2007: Ibid).

Starting from 1975, during the onset of the oil boom until the mid-1980s, there was a transition from a peaceful to a more radical foreign policy stance, resulting in clashes of interests with Western powers. According to Tull: "as the economic downturn accelerated in the early 1980s, Nigeria's dependence on the West and the constraints on its foreign policy became increasingly apparent. The military government under Ibrahim Babaginda (from 1985 to 1993) was forced to implement structural adjustment programs demanded by international financial institutions (IFIs)" (Tull 2007: 118).

For Nigeria, this entailed shifting away from a radical and assertive foreign policy towards a more conformist approach. This shift is not unique to Nigeria but is typical of states categorized as part of the periphery. During Sani Abacha's rule from 1993 to 1998, repeated human rights abuses created inevitable conflicts of interest with Western nations. Consequently, Nigeria was excluded from the Commonwealth (cf. Tull 2007: 118; cited in Ogwu & Olukoshi 2002). Subsequently, Nigeria faced sanctions[26] from the EU and the USA, from which the oil sector was excluded (cf. Tull 2007: 118). President Obasanjo's rise to power in 1999 marked the abrupt end of Nigeria's diplomatic isolation during Sani Abacha's regime. The new government was eager to embark on a fresh political course, necessitating financial and political backing from Western countries (cf. Tull 2007: Ibid.).

Denis Tull is of the opinion that, there is significant evidence linking Nigeria's resource wealth to its foreign policy decisions. He argues that as oil revenues and economic power increase, there is a stronger inclination for the government to pursue assertive foreign policies. This

[24]For example, the Apartheid regime in South and Southwest Africa.
[25] See https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement.
[26] Vide: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-to-consider-new-sanctions-on-nigeria/.
https://books.openedition.org/ifra/647.

tendency, however, was expected to diminish during the economic decline and oil price drops of the 1980s. Even during periods of high oil prices, Nigeria maintained a crucial need to uphold its pro-Western foreign policy intact. This was due to Western states being the primary consumers of Nigerian oil, their corporations controlling Nigeria's oil industry, and their role as key investors and suppliers of imports to the country (cf. Tull 2007: 118f.). As a result of this dilemma of dependency and interdependence, Nigeria found itself advocating for non-alignment, while the promised new international economic order remains, for now, merely a slogan without substantial impact (cf. Asobie 2002: 58).

In conclusion, it is important to highlight that since gaining independence, Nigeria has predominantly pursued a cooperative and multilaterally oriented foreign policy (cf. International Peace Academy; University of Oxford 2003: 15). Moreover, Nigeria engaged in confrontations with the West on issues of decolonization and the fight against apartheid. This included supporting and recognizing the MPLA[27] in Angola, in direct opposition to US policy at the time. Nigeria also enacted laws to prohibit trade with companies supporting apartheid in South Africa, and nationalized British Petroleum facilities in response to Britain's stance on decolonization in Zimbabwe (cf. Abegunrin 2003: 64ff; 80ff.). It therefore can be contested that the link between resource wealth and foreign policy behavior in Nigeria primarily rested on oil rents serving as the economic foundation of its foreign policy. On rare occasions, oil was partially used as a strategic tool in policies towards the Southern Sahara region (cf. Tull 2007:120).

4. The reasons for dependency based on exogenous factors

4.1 Theory of exogenous dependency pursuant to Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto

Before examining the social conditions and ideological orientations related to external dependence, it is essential to consider the documented and structural elements that formed the new development scenario in Latin America. During the colonial period, Latin America was somewhat integrated into the broader, albeit weak, global economic system. These historical connections have had a lasting impact. However, the independence era (circa 1807-1825) and

[27] Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola.

the subsequent period until the mid-19th century significantly disrupted the established economic ties with Europe and the US. As a result, the young Latin American states experienced a notable economic regression (cf. Boris 2001: 17). With the advent of industrialization, fueled by capitalism and its new transportation and communication networks, the structural transformations in the West brought about changes far surpassing those of previous eras. This progress allowed the Latin American continent to engage in economic activities on a vastly different quantitative and qualitative scale (cf. Ibid.).

In this context, the theory of exogenous dependence by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto emerged between 1966 and 1967 in Santiago de Chile. Cardoso and Faletto worked with economists and planning experts in international institutes to foster a dialogue that addressed the social and political aspects of Latin America's economic development (cf. Cardoso & Faletto 1976: 7). Cardoso, who had been studying Brazilian history within the context of slavery and industrialization, went into exile following the 1964 military coup. During this time, ECLAC[28] and other research institutes developed the dependency theory (cf. Werz 2005: 244). According to Cardoso and Faletto, peripheral economies became integrated into the world market when the Global North shifted from merely controlling the import-export system to making direct industrial investments in the emerging national markets (cf. Cardoso & Faletto 1976: 188f.). Furthermore, Cardoso argued that the relationship between center nations and peripheral nations was not the primary conflict in the global market system, if solely viewed through that perspective, one excludes the domestic factors between the elites and the poor (cf. Tetzlaff 2023: 42). This perspective would overlook the internal divisions within peripheral countries and the appeal that modern development has across various societal levels, not just among the upper class (cf. Ibid.). Additionally, it is important to recognize that development and dependence can occur simultaneously in certain situations (cf. Cardoso 1974: 218f.). Furthermore, Cardoso and Faletto addressed the following tenets to which dependency is perpetuated in the periphery:

1. Viewed economically, dependency can be categorized external, if the periphery lacks domestic elements in its accumulation of capital.
2. Dependency can be codified as endogenous if it’s promoted by the elites in the periphery.
3. Dependency is perpetuated by exogenous and endogenous components.

[28] Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (español: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe).

4. Dependency cannot be viewed through an abstract lens but is definite within a capitalist system.

(cf. Acosta & Cajas-Guijarro 2022: 201).

From this viewpoint, the disparities observed between core and dependent societies arise from their specific circumstances, rendering the generic notion of the periphery irrelevant. Cardoso acknowledges the differentiation between core and dependent economies derive from the interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors. However, he dismisses this distinction when discussing specific instances of dependency (cf. Sonntag 1989: 101). While acknowledging the utility of the dichotomy between the core and the periphery in delineating roles within global capitalism, Cardoso and Faletto argue that it overlooks the sociopolitical factors at play in specific instances of dependency (cf. Cardoso & Faletto 1979: 23-24).

The scenarios described establish a causal link between internal development and external constraints. Both theorists acknowledged that the dependency situations in the Global North and Global South only superficially resemble each other. Moreover, they argued against the possibility of replicating the economic history of industrialized countries in developing nations. Nicolaus Werz posited that Latin America, given its geographical location and peripheral classification, represents a unique case (cf. Werz 2005: 245). Furthermore, unlike the perception in Europe, Latin American elites do not perceive themselves as part of the Third World. It was only after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, amid the emergence of guerrilla movements in several Latin American states, that there was a predominantly rhetorical embrace of Third Worldism[29]. Otherwise, political leaders and many intellectuals in the region view themselves as a continuation of the Western tradition in the Americas (cf. Werz 1995: 66). Lastly, Cardoso and Faletto contend that dependency theory offers a particular perspective. Unlike Andre Gunder Frank, they do not view dependence and imperialism as the exclusive factors driving the existing relationship of peripheries depending on metropolises (cf. Werz 2005: 245).

4.2 Theory of exogenous dependency in accordance with Andre Gunder Frank

In the 1960s, the discussion on external dependence experienced shifts in politics and society, making it pertinent to examine these developments. From 1950 to 1980, the continental GDP

[29] (español: tercermundismo).

grew annually at a 5.5 percentile, resulting in a per capita income rise of approximately 2.7 per cent. Latin America ranked prominently among Third World nations during this period, surpassing pre-industrial revolution levels (cf. Cardoso; Fishlow 1992: 197f.). By the mid-1960s, several Latin American countries adopted economic policies focused on fostering industrial exports. By the mid-1970s, these countries adjusted their import substitution models in response to the break-down of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the oil crisis, and the significant global liquidity proftis in financial markets. Amidst these crises, governments, private entities, and corporations sought financial security through loans and bonds from major international banks (cf. Boris 2001: 55).

During this time, there was a notable rise in social conflicts, prompting attempts to quell them through authoritarian or dictatorial regimes, particularly from the 1960s onward and intensifying in the 1970s (cf. Boris 2001: 47). Based on historical, political, and societal events, Andre Gunder Frank, who viewed underdevelopment in the periphery as the counterpart to development in the metropolis, formulated the following assertion: “I agree with Paul Baran's view when I assert that it is capitalism on a global and national scale that has historically brought about underdevelopment and continues to deepen it today” (Frank 1968: 7).

According to Frank's dependency perspective, a world capitalist system took shape in the 16th century, progressively binding Latin America, Asia, and Africa into unequal and exploitative relationships with more powerful European nations (cf. Thompson 2023: 2). From 1500s to the 1960s, wealthier European nations amassed significant wealth by extracting natural resources from the developing world, using the profits to fuel their own industrialization and economic development. Meanwhile, the developing countries were left impoverished by this process (cf. Ibid.). These dynamics brought about profound social changes in the colonial regions. Colonial powers established local governance systems to facilitate resource extraction and maintain social order. Often, this involved using force, but a more effective approach was to enlist local collaborators to administer governance, rewarding them with money and status in exchange for ensuring the smooth flow of resources back to the colonial powers (cf. Thompson 2023: 2ff.). Frank further contended that in our interconnected, globalized world, some countries emerge as winners while others as losers. He argued that the people of less developed[30] countries should not be held accountable for the stagnation of their societies. Instead, he asserted that Western nations deliberately hindered their development. (cf. Ibid.).

[30] Through the Western perspective.

According to Frank, historically, core nations such as the USA[31] and UK[32], as part of the elite metropolis, exploited peripheral nations by keeping them in a state of dependency and underdevelopment. Developed nations amassed wealth by exploiting the poorest countries, using them for cheap labor and natural resources. This exploitative relationship persisted throughout history and extended into the 20th century through Western domination of international trade, the rise of MNCs[33], and the dependency of less-developed countries on Western aid (cf. NCAA, n. d.: 2). Moreover, Frank argued that contemporary underdevelopment largely originated from historical and ongoing economic relationships between underdeveloped satellite countries and developed metropolitan countries. These relationships can be seen as fundamental to the structure and expansion of the global capitalist system. Consequently, Latin America's current state of underdevelopment reflects its prolonged involvement in the trajectory of global capitalist development (cf. Frank 1970: 102-103; Frank 1971: 393).

In essence, capitalist development inherently fosters underdevelopment. This perspective rests on three fundamental principles:

1. The periphery has been fully unified into the capitalist global market since the colonial era.
2. This early integration transformed the periphery into a capitalist entity.
3. Dependent societies were integrated into the world economy through a hierarchical structure of core, in which the core received the profits from the peripheries.

(cf. Acosta & Cajas-Guijarro 2022: 203).

Therefore, in Frank's view: "if it is satellite status which generates underdevelopment, then a weaker or lesser degree of metropolis / satellite relations may result in less entrenched structural underdevelopment and / or allow for a greater possibility of local development" (Frank 1967: 11).

[31] United States of America
[32] United Kingdom.
[33] Multinational corporations.

4.3 Theory of exogenous dependency as specified by Samir Amin

Since import-substituting industrialization had been pursued for decades, the contradictions and inherent obstacles of this development strategy had intensified. As a result, 1982 is regarded as the year the debt crisis erupted in Latin America (cf. Boris 2000: 80). A new political direction was needed to tackle the economic problems of the past decades. This new approach can be identified as neoliberalism. Several countries in Latin America had implemented neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Ibid.). In the 1970s, the United States and Europe experienced a significant paradigm shift, characterized by the fall of the Bretton Woods system, escalating inflation rates, and widespread unemployment. This shift involved cutting ties from Keynesian[34] economic principles and adopting monetarist-neoclassical economic policies (cf. Boris 80f.). With Britain and the US, two of the most influential nations had already adopted neoliberal economic policies. However, these new policies did not automatically resolve the ongoing crises. The impending debt crisis of Third World countries in 1982[35] was viewed as a threat by major cities and the international financial community. Many governments in the Global North saw the debt crisis as an opportunity to their own advantage (cf. Ibid.).

Samir Amin in this context emerged as a pioneering figure in dependency theory and a significant proponent of World-systems theory (cf. Germ 1997: 1). Amin emphasized the dependency of peripheral economies on the global economy. From a Marxist viewpoint, he suggested that underdeveloped economic structures exhibited three key characteristics:

1. Varying productivity levels among sectors.
2. Disconnection in productive activities between sectors.
3. External dominance or control.

(cf. Acosta & Cajas-Guijarro 2022: 203).

Samir Amin's work is significant amidst the dependency theory, because it offers a perspective on global capitalism that contrasts with the 'semi-nationalist' theories prevalent in Latin America (cf. Blaney 1996: 467). Amin argues from a world-system perspective, suggesting that the accumulation of capital happens on a global scale, which can be differentiated between the

[34] "Keynesians believe that, because prices are somewhat rigid, fluctuations in any component of spending—consumption, investment, or government expenditures—cause output to change. If government spending increases, for example, and all other spending components remain constant, then output will increase" (IMF 2014).
[35] Vide Stephen R. Hurt "Third world debt". https://www.britannica.com/money/Third-World-debt.

core and the periphery and is interlocked and maintained by means of exploitation (cf. Ibid: 467 as cited in Amin: 1976: 287-92, 360, 1977a: 6, 77). Moreover, Amin contends that understanding this situation is impossible if one views the world simply as a collection of independent nations (cf. Amin 1977a: 187-90, 208; Smith 1980). Like Cardoso, Amin argues that due to its various forms, capitalism in the periphery is shaped by its unique histories and circumstances of integration into the global capitalist system (cf. Blaney 1996: 468). Amin concluded that peripheral regions within the Western capitalist world economy cannot economically compete with the core metropolises. This disparity arises from inherent tendencies towards polarization within the system, coupled with Western monopolistic control or efforts to maintain such control. Amin therefore proposed that peripheral regions should consider complete disengagement from the global economy to pursue a self-reliant development path, aiming to break free from prevailing Eurocentrism and modernization theories entrenched within the global economic framework (cf. Kvangraven 2017: 12).

4.4 Terms of Trade as claimed by the Singer/Prebisch hypothesis

The OECD[36] categorizes the terms of trade as the proportion between the lisiting of the export costs and the import costs. Moreover, should the export costs of a country overweigh the import costs, then it can be ascertained, that a state has a positive metric on its terms of trade, to which it can in return invest in more imports (cf. OECD 2024).

Thus, the terms of trade can be quantified as follows:

> A) The most frequently reported, but not necessarily informative, calculation measure is the Commodity terms of trade. They refer to the proportion between export and import prices, in the case of developing countries as the ratio between the prices of exported raw materials and imported manufactured goods.
>
> B) These Commodity terms of trade do not provide information on whether a country's import capacity has changed, that is, whether the quantity of goods a country can buy with its export earnings has increased or decreased. This change in import capacity is reflected in the income Terms of Trade, which is determined by multiplying the Commodity terms of trade by the export volume index.

[36] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

C) The Commodity terms of trade exclusively refer to the exchange of goods and do not consider productivity changes in the export sector (factor productivity). These changes are indicated by the Single Factor Terms of Trade, which, however, only relate to productivity changes in the domestic export sector.

D) The Double Factoral Terms of Trade also considers productivity changes in the foreign export sector from which imported goods originate; they form an indicator of changes in the relative income positions of a country in international comparison.

(cf. Ochel 1982: 175ff.).

Economists have been asking themselves the question of the solely specialization of the periphery in the production and export sector (cf. Cuddington et al. 2002: 1). This debate was particularly influenced by Latin America, which inspired a key contribution to economic theory. Singer and Prebisch argued that this specialization, combined with slow technological advancement in the main divisions of the economy and unfavorable trends in the terms of trade had caused economic underdevelopment in the periphery (cf. Ibid.).

The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis suggests that the relative price of primary commodities compared to manufactured goods tends to decline over time. Singer and Prebisch were concerned with the broader issue of the growing per unit of population salary space between the core and the periphery and its connection to the global market. They asserted that the global focus on specialization based on fixed comparative advantage had prevented developing countries from benefiting from the technological advances that have significantly enriched the industrialized world (cf. Cuddington et al. 2002: 2).

Their argument was based on three key observations:

1. Developing countries concentrated only in manufacturing and trade of goods.
2. Technological advancements rested in the core.
3. The cost of primary goods has been on a gradual decline since the late 1800s.

(cf. Cuddington et al. 2002: 2).

The previously combined suggest that due to their forte in primary goods the periphery hardly profited from the industrial advancement in the core (cf. Cuddington et al. 2-3).



Figure 1: World Market for Primary Commodities Relative to Manufactures (Cuddington et al. 2002: 3).

In addition to the aforementioned premise Prebisch and Singer came to important conclusions from their findings. They both asserted that the solution for developing countries was to promote domestic industrialization. They concluded that the terms of trade had indeed deteriorated for these peripheral economies. Unlike classical and neoclassical theories, Singer and Prebisch suggested that the international division of labor based on comparative costs was linked to a welfare loss. In simplified terms, their model proposed that industrialized countries exported manufactured goods and imported primary goods, while peripheral countries exported primary goods and imported manufactured goods from the metropolises (cf. Cuddington et al. 2002: 4f.).

4.5 Multinational oil companies in Nigeria and the reverberation

To better understand the oil companies in Nigeria, it is important to examine oil production globally. The modern oil industry originated on August 27, 1859, in Pennsylvania, USA, when the American Edwin Drake successfully drilled to a depth of 22 meters (cf. Ganser 2015: 38). During that era, there was a pioneering spirit in the USA, leading many to seek oil through drilling efforts. In 1879, John D. Rockefeller established the Standard Oil Company, one of the most successful enterprises in the history of capitalism, which primarily sold petroleum for lighting (cf. Ibid). Rockefeller aimed to monopolize the oil industry, and to achieve this, he set the oil prices at which refineries operated, forcing his competitors to surrender. Representatives of Standard Oil cleverly negotiated behind the scenes through independent companies that were actually part of the Standard Oil conglomerate. As a result, Standard Oil controlled over 90 per cent of American oil from 1879 onwards (cf. Ganser 2015: 38f.). Additionally, Rockefeller used his influence on securing transport discounts and earn rebates for Standard Oil, an arrangement that was kept hidden from the public and other oil companies, a tactic still used till today (cf. Ibid.).

Royal Dutch Shell was founded in 1907. Although the Netherlands lacked oil resources, its colony, the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia)[37], had abundant oil reserves. Dutchman Aeilko Jans Zijlker convinced King Willem III of the importance of oil for the future and the potential of his plans (cf. Ganser 2015: 44). Competition in the nascent oil industry once again emerged from England, similar to their involvement in the exploration of Africa and Asia. Led by trader Marcus Samuel, the English established The Shell Transport and Trading Company. The British sought to disrupt global oil transportation (cf. Ganser 2015: 45). Marcus Samuel was convinced that discovering new markets was essential to revolutionizing the industry. At that time, three companies, consisting of Standard Oil, The Royal Dutch Company and The Shell Transport and Trading Company were vying for monopoly status in the oil market. To compete against the powerful American Standard Oil in the challenging Asian market, the two European companies looked for opportunities to collaborate (cf. Ganser 2015: 46). Both parties believed that only by working together could they curb the expansion of American oil companies. As a result, Royal Dutch and the Shell Trading Company formed a holding company, with Royal Dutch acquiring 60% of the shares and Shell Trading Company receiving 40% (cf. Ganser 2015: 46f.).

Exploring the history of oil companies and their global pursuit of oil and markets is essential. Over time, these companies have amassed more than 117 years of experience in international oil extraction and over roughly 87 years of oil exploration in Nigeria. From a Nigerian perspective, it's important to ask how these companies were able to extract and produce oil with relatively little interference. According to Loimeier: "when the Royal Dutch/Shell Group,

[37] Vide "The history of Indonesian Oil and Gas. https://midukaritonang.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/history-of-indonesian-oil-and-gas-by-statoil2.pdf.

which had been operating in Nigeria since 1937, began commercial exploitation of oil reserves in Ogoni in 1958, the Nigerian economy rapidly transformed, and the coastal area of Nigeria became the engine of economic development for the entire country, inhabited by 98 million people" (Loimeier 1996: 17). By this mere fact oil production in the Niger Delta has become a crucial source of high-quality crude oil for Western markets and has also proven to be lucrative for Nigeria (cf. De Oliveira 2007 as cited in Watts 2013: 71). Additionally, the Nigerian government's Land Decree of 1978, which transferred land rights and control over oil resources entirely to the government, was highly advantageous for oil companies (cf. Allen 2013: 50). As a result, the Nigerian government was responsible for ensuring stable oil production. It's important to note that Nigeria initially experienced significant economic growth. At this early stage, with most of the workforce still engaged in agriculture, there was little discussion about oil dependency.

Up until the mid-1950s, Shell-BP held a monopoly on the Nigerian oil industry, and its full impact was only realized by the company in the 1970s. After Nigeria gained independence from British control, the new government introduced incentives to attract foreign companies for oil exploration and production. This led to the entry of additional companies such as Chevron, Total, and ExxonMobil. Consequently, the Nigerian government focused on leveraging revenue and tax income from the oil sector (cf. Tull 2007: 111). As the foundation for Nigerian companies partnering with oil firms, the country aimed for a more influential role in the international oil sector. Between 1968 and 1971, Nigeria enacted laws that expanded both government and oil companies control beyond the oil sector (cf. Tull 2007: cited in Biersteker 1987).

Given that the global need for an undisturbed production of oil aligns with the state's interest and its elites reliant on oil profits, the state has become a major beneficiary in the oil business. Nigeria, as the proprietor, is often portrayed as nation, that is solely focused on the protection of global investments and the (over)accumulation of its petrodollars (cf. Omeje 2005: 321). Within this framework of increasing international capital interests, elites etc. are able to pursue their personal gains by extracting natural resource rents and expanding opportunities for corrupt enrichment and misappropriating public resources.

As the state relies heavily on oil revenue, it often prioritizes the interests of international capital over the welfare of its citizens in policymaking and governance. This results in an unholy alliance with oil companies and the use of coercive measures to control oil-rich communities.

It is clear that the primary underdogs and sufferer of the oil-driven politics are the impoverished and silenced inhabitants of oil-rich areas, particularly women. Women endure environmental degradation, marginalization, and vulnerability in ways that are often more severe than their male counterparts (cf. Oluwaniyi 2018: 153). In agrarian regions, they engage in risky sources of income to battle destitution and starvation. Furthermore, in many areas of the Niger Delta, many women work as farmers, traders, and fishers, dedicating their earnings entirely to their families. Consequently, any environmental damage, such as land and water pollution, spills, and flares, disproportionately affects women and exacerbates their susceptibility. Despite their crucial part in safekeeping food, their contributions are widely overlooked in the oil industry. Moreover, their roles and challenges are frequently neglected in policymaking, which is dominated by a patriarchal system that favors male perspectives in the Niger Delta. Thus, issues impacting women and children are often decided by men (cf. Oluwaniyi 2018: 152-153).

It is quite evident that MNOCs contribute to the underdevelopment of host states[38], particularly in developing countries like Nigeria. Their pursuit of global capitalism has led to a stark disparity in development between the core and the periphery, worsening poverty and stagnation in the latter rather than fostering progress. This impact is clearly demonstrated by their operations in the Niger Delta region. The region faces numerous developmental challenges, including environmental degradation, inadequate technology diffusion, poverty, disruptive economic forces, policy distortions, and institutional weaknesses. However, the significance of these issues cannot be fully addressed as long as the Nigerian state continues to play a central role in perpetuating the activities of MNOCs in the Niger Delta.

4.6 The International Monetary Fund and the World bank

To understand the interdependent relationship between Nigeria, the IMF, and the World Bank, it is important to review the history of these organizations in the global market. The IMF and the World Bank were founded in July 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference in the United States, attended by representatives from forty-five countries, about 14 months before the end of World War II (cf. Dreher 2003: 1). The mission of these newly established institutions, both then and now, is to promote transparency and order in international affairs, including trade restrictions, financial markets, and economic and currency issues. They also function as

[38] Whether purposefully or not is a different question.

autonomous, specialized agencies of the UN, aiming to enhance the steadiness and expansion of the world market (cf. Fritz-krockow & Ramlogan 2007).

With the internationalization of politics, it can be argued that these two institutions also began to see themselves as advisors to some governments, especially in the periphery, due to the importance of their roles since the debt crisis of the 1970s and the 1980s. Politicians and economists were skeptical of the organizations, believing that free exchange rates would lead to competitive devaluation and destabilize the global economy. In response, the IMF and the World Bank established a system of fixed parities, as noted by Axel Dreher (cf. Dreher 2003: 1).

Nigeria's membership in the IMF dates back to the year 1961. It was not only till the year 1986, that the IMF exercised its policies on Nigerian soil (cf. Danladi & Peter 2016). The crumple of global oil costs in the 1980s, coupled with a sharp decline in petrol output, pushed Nigeria's economic and financial situation to a precarious state. The abrupt oil price upset led to a stabilization of payments shortage in Nigeria's financial system (cf. Inimole & Enoma 2011). The Nigerian economy was not capable in paying back foreign accumulated debts and the economy in that context was gradually collapsing (cf. Isiami et al. 2021: 6). These economic challenges prompted the IMF to intervene in Nigeria in the year 1986 with its SAP[39]. From the IMF's perspective, the objectives of the SAP in Nigeria were:

- The market had to set the rules
- Public spending had to be severely shortened
- An onset of privatization, deregulation and commercialization had to take place
- The removal of public commodities
- Petrol subsidies were to be cut down and the cancellation of boards in the agriculture sector
- The naira needed to be deflated and
- the reduction of personnel in government

(cf. Isiani et al. 2021: 6 as cited in IMF Handbook, n.d.).

Indeed, if properly implemented, the objectives of the IMF's Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and the accompanying loan could have revitalized the Nigerian economy. Given Nigeria's precarious economic state in 1986, resisting the offer was hardly feasible (cf. Ibid.). The IMF's instructions demanded financial strictness, which was deficient amongst economic

[39] SAP is "seen as the adoption of macro-economic measures and strategies to reform a non -performing economy" (Danladi & peter 2016).

leaders in Nigeria. Frankly put, the requirements set by the IMF became compulsory policies that the Nigerian government was required to adopt, with their implementation closely monitored by IMF officials (cf. Ibid: 6 as cited in IMF Handbook, n.d.). These measures required significant belt-tightening and the abandonment of the extractive policies previously in place in Nigeria (cf. Ibid.).

While it is clear that the IMF's conditionalities imposed considerable hardship from Nigeria's perspective, the situation was not entirely bleak (cf. Isiani et al. 2021: 9). With this historical background, it can be contested that the relationship between Nigeria, the IMF, and the World Bank has been unstable since its inception. Even during his first term as a military ruler from 1976 to 1979, Obasanjo implemented an autarkic policy and cut public spending by one-sixth (cf. Erfler 2011: 90). The reductions in public spending were intended to be allocated to education, agriculture, housing, and healthcare (cf. Erfler 2011: 57). During his terms in office, Obasanjo set up a task force to tackle inflation, successfully reducing the rate to 30 per cent. Despite his strong opposition to Western financial aid, Nigeria, with assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, secured a loan of over one billion US dollars. This move was viewed by left-wing critics as a capitulation to Western capitalism (cf. Llife 2011: 67).

Today, Nigeria’s dependence on these institutions has been further entrenched by declining oil prices and international crises since 2016. In this context, former IMF Director Christine Lagarde extended her support[40]. According to Lagarde, Nigeria should look to Azerbaijan as a model of successful fiscal policy, where the exchange rate serves as an effective buffer. In contrast, Nigeria has not yet reached that level of economic resilience and continues to be vulnerable to external shocks (cf. Finanzen.at 2016).

In conclusion, Nigeria's efforts to extricate itself from the influence of these institutions due to its debt have been unsuccessful. Moreover, while the IMF's prescriptions were painful, they were deemed necessary for revitalizing Nigeria’s economy. Ideally, as stated by Isiani et al.: “an inclusive economic policy would open the economy and allow its vibrant population to play [sic] significant role for its growth” (Isiani et al. 2021: 14). However, this has not been the case in Nigeria, where the existing extractive economic policies primarily benefits a small elite close

[40] See Lagarde: Nigeria needs a ‘sensible’ FX policy. https://www.thecable.ng/lagarde-nigeria-needs-a-sensible-fx-policy/.

to the power center. Thus, the IMF conditionalities could potentially pave the way for Nigeria's economic prosperity, provided they are implemented wisely.

4.7 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

Given the significance of oil, industrialized nations had attempted to control the oil industry, often to the detriment of the peripheries from which the oil was obtained from. This situation was dominated by the seven sisters,[41] a group of Western-owned international oil companies that controlled the wealth, that was being amassed in the oil industry. In response, Third World countries sought to challenge this dominance by creating OPEC in order to collectively combat the core, by stabilizing the global oil trade and ensuring a just profit return for those investing in the global oil trade (cf. Adie et al. 2019: 14 as cited in EuroPetrole 2018).

OPEC in this regard classifies itself as a transnational organization, that works for the benefit of its member states and by this notion its primary objectives, are clearly outlined in Article 2 of its Statute and reads as follows:

> A. "The principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively.
> B. The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations.
> C. Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry." (OPEC Statute 2021:1)

With OPECs rising influence the economist Walter L. Levy published a widely discussed paper in March 1973, on the state of the oil market. He suggested that industrialized nations adopt a unified, confrontational strategy against OPEC countries to proactively counter any further demands (cf. Motzkuhn 2005: 147). The organization in this regard has to a greater or lesser extent successfully reasserted the rights of Third World nations in the petroleum industry and has significantly tried to influence the global oil trade (cf. Gbadamosi; Kupolokun & Oluleye 2007: 27). However, OPEC's global influence has been increasingly scrutinized in recent years

[41] For further information, Baran Can Yücel: https://www.bilkenteprc.com/post/history-of-the-seven-sisters-baran-can-yücel.

due to the emergence of new technologies. As a prominent member, Nigeria must also consider its past, present, and future within OPEC and evaluate whether its membership has been beneficial or detrimental.

OPEC and the state of Nigeria have an history of roughly over 50 years of partnership (cf. OPEC 2021). Since then, Nigeria has played a significant part in highlighting the works of the organization, earning the utmost regard and admiration from fellow associated states. Additionally, Nigeria has been instrumental in steering the organization toward cooperation, goodwill, a sense of belonging, and unity. It has worked diligently to achieve global oil permanence, recognizing the profits that stability brings to both manufacturers and customers (cf. Ibid).

S/No.	Name	Period
1.	Chief M. O. Feyide	1st July, 1975 - 31st 1976
2.	Dr Rilwanu Lukman	1st July, 1986- 30th June, 1988
3.	Dr Rilwanu Lukman	1st January, 1995 - 31st 2000
4.	Dr Edmund Maduabebe Daukuro	1st January, 2006-31st December, 2006
5.	Mohammad Sanusi Barkindo	1st August, 2016 - till date

Table 1: OPEC Secretary Generals from Nigeria (OPEC 2012: 23, OPEC 2016)[42].

Nevertheless, has there been ongoing heated discussions in the Nigerian oil industry amongst experts regarding the exit of Nigeria out of OPEC (cf. Ogunnoiki 2019: 44). The exit is based on a myriad set of factors, the prominent ones being OPEC’s failure to address the declining oil prices in 2014 and the Arab nations desire to firmly hold on to their market stake (cf. Ibid.) Ibrahim Waziri, the former Chairman of the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN), also questioned Nigeria's continued membership in OPEC. He believed that remaining in OPEC out of national sentiment is uncalled for. He further appealed to the government to be unafraid of withdrawal, arguing that Nigeria could obtain the same benefits outside the Saudi-Arabia dominated organization (cf. Ibid.).

In 2016, while visiting Qatar, the then Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari resolved the debate. He stated as follows:

> “Certainly, under my leadership, Nigeria will not withdraw from OPEC. Between 1976 and 1979, I served as petroleum minister. I very much value the institution of OPEC and I think

[42] Mohammad Sanusi Barkindo served as Secretary General till his passing on July 5th, 2022.

Nigeria will make the necessary sacrifice to remain in OPEC." (Talk to Al Jazeera 2016)

From the president's proclamation, it can be alleged that Nigeria's participation in OPEC may not be currently fitting, it is still the country's prime concern to remain an OPEC member (cf. Ogunnoiki 2019: 44).

In recent times, Nigeria has followed a policy of alignment within the organization. In July 2020, OPEC mandated that its allies, including oil-producing countries and OPEC+[43] members, adhere to the agreement made in April 2020 to reduce oil production (cf. Addeh & Uzoho 2020: 1). In conclusion, Nigeria's exit from OPEC might provide the country with the flexibility to manufacture oil at the country's full capability. In spite of that, the production and exportation of unchecked quantities of crude oil could lead to market saturation and a subsequent drop in oil prices, which would not benefit Nigeria. Staying in OPEC means Nigeria would have to adhere to production quotas, which, while limiting its output, helps manage its fossil-fuel resources and supports OPEC in regulating oil production. This could ultimately help stabilize oil prices, benefiting both Nigeria and the organization (cf. Ogunnoiki 2019: 45).

5. Research methodology

5.1 Quantitative research method

Understanding what motivates individuals to pursue research is crucial. According to Kothari several factors may drive people to engage in research:

- The pursuit of a research degree and the associated advantages
- The desire to address unresolved issues, as concerns about actual problem plaguing society often spark research initiatives
- The intellectual satisfaction derived from completing a creative endeavor
- The aspiration to contribute to society
- The pursuit of respect and recognition

(cf. Ghanad 2023: 3794 as cited in Khotari 2004).

[43] See U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61102.

In this context, providing a service to society and addressing the challenges of unresolved issues are of utmost importance.

Quantitative research is characterized as a research methodology with comprehensive steps that a researcher follows when undertaking a study (cf. Leedy & Ormrod 2001; Williams 2011). According to Apuke quantitative research methods focus on quantifying and analyzing “variables to obtain results” (Apuke 2017). This approach consists of collecting “and analyzing numerical data using specific statistical techniques to answer questions such as who, how much, what, where, when, how many, and how” (Ibid.). Expanding on this definition, Aliaga and Gunderson (2002) describe quantitative research as the process of explaining a matter through the collection of numbers and its analysis, using mathematical methods, particularly statistics. Based on this definition, it can be inferred that the primary objective of any research, whether qualitative or quantitative, is to explain a given or an implied phenomenon (cf. Apuke 2017: 41).

Moreover, quantitative research seeks to quantify data and generalize findings from a study sample across different perspectives. It involves collecting, analyzing, and interpreting measurable data to validate the hypothesis of a specific study. This approach is grounded in a logical methodology focused on testing theories, drawing from empiricist and positivist ideologies (cf. Ghanad 2023: 3794 as cited in Bryman 2016). In summary, quantitative research identifies key characteristics and significant differences to draw conclusions. As a result, it provides a more in-depth understanding of the issue (cf. Ibid.).

5.2 Standardized survey

The standardized survey served as the primary tool for data collection in this research, and its details will be elaborated upon in the following sections. The survey was conducted exclusively online, distributed through mailing lists and social networks. Data collection took place from August 5th till September 27th 2024, over a period of two months. The survey was anonymous, with no personal data collected except for the participants email addresses. Additionally, the system ensured that multiple responses from the same IP address were not allowed. The target respondents included solely Nigerians working directly or indirectly in the oil industry in

Nigeria and around the globe. Although the initial goal was to obtain around 100 respondents, achieving this number proved challenging despite considerable efforts[44].

I will further elaborate on why I chose the standardized survey as my method. Survey research is a quantitative approach in which the researcher distributes a set of questions to a sample group. This method is particularly useful when the goal is to describe the characteristics, attitudes, behaviors, and opinions of a large population. During the analysis phase, statistical data is interpreted to determine whether the hypotheses are proven or disproven (cf. Ghanad 2023: 3797). In survey research, respondents provide their answers through questionnaires, surveys, or polls. To gather accurate and meaningful data, it is essential to formulate the right questions. Surveys can be conducted either online or offline and are capable of handling large sample sizes. A sample in a survey refers to a subset of individuals selected from a larger population. The researcher studies this sample and then attempts to generalize the results to the broader population. One of the key benefits of using surveys is the capacity to collect data from a sample that represents a large population. Analyzing large datasets allows for a more reliable generalization of the findings to the entire population, offering greater accuracy compared to data collected through case studies (cf. Ibid.).

Additional reasons for selecting the standardized survey include its uniform data collection process, where each respondent answers the same set of questions in the same manner, resulting in consistent data. This uniformity facilitates easier comparisons of responses across different groups or time periods. Another advantage is the replicability of standardized surveys, which have been tested, validated, and can be repeatedly used with various populations, simplifying the replication of studies and verification of results. Standardized surveys are also time-efficient and cost-effective, often featuring pre-established scoring systems and analysis methods. The standardized format reduces the risk of interviewer bias or variability in question phrasing, leading to higher-quality data.

Moreover, the analysis process is more objective due to clear guidelines on interpreting results, minimizing the chances of subjective interpretation. Additionally, many standardized surveys can be translated and adapted for use in different languages and cultures, enabling valid cross-cultural research. In summary, standardized surveys provide a reliable, efficient, and credible

[44] I can only speculate on this as the issue of oil production in Nigeria is highly contested. Further it has to be explained that the oil industry in Nigeria is one that is almost entirely dominated by men, by this fact and the anonymity by design of the survey, it was not an easy task to incorporate a fair share on women's perspective.

method of data collection, making them an excellent choice for researchers and organizations seeking to systematically gather and analyze data.

5.3 Likert-type scale

A popular scale level for questionnaires is the Likert scale, which is used in this study. This measurement model is commonly employed in social and economic sciences to assess personal attitudes of respondents toward specific topics (cf. Gehring & Weins 2009: 51). This model often utilizes a five- or seven-point scale, allowing respondents to choose a definitive answer. The response options range from strongly positive to strongly negative attitudes. Thus, a Likert scale consists of several different items, the composition of which is determined through item analysis (cf. Greving 2009: 73). According to Stier, attitudes can be understood as emotional, cognitive, and behavioural dispositions towards an environmental aspect, measured through multiple statements (cf. Stier 1999: 80f.). It is important to note that the intervals between the response categories are equal, leading to a symmetric scaling.

5.4 Questionnaire and survey query

The survey is formatted into several distinct parts. The first part focuses on the background and context of Nigeria's financial and political terrain during the early years of oil exploration. Respondents were asked to choose between "promising," "unpromising," "stable," "unstable," or "don't know" to describe the situation.

The second section addresses the relevance of dependency theory, exploring Nigeria's economic (in)dependence within its oil sector and the impact on the country's broader economic development. Participants “could select from: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree, or don't know” (TE IIHUWAKA Education Evaluation Centre 2024).

The third section examines external influences, such as geopolitical factors, foreign governments, international organizations, and the role of these external factors in Nigeria's oil dependency.

The fourth section investigates internal factors related to oil exploration in Nigeria, including local political dynamics, governance issues, corruption, effects on indigenous groups, and the role of these internal factors in perpetuating oil dependency.

In the fifth section, respondents are asked to give their outlook on Nigeria's dependency on oil, with answer options ranging from "strongly agree" to "don't know."

The second-to-last question evaluates Nigeria's position in the global oil industry. Respondents were asked to categorize Nigeria as being in a "weak," "somewhat weak," "somewhat strong," "very strong," or "don't know" position

The final question asks respondents to identify countries or institutions that are supportive of Nigeria's national interests, with options including Germany, the USA, Great Britain, China, Russia, the European Union, OPEC, the World Bank/IMF, or none of the above.

6. Empirical insights

6.1 Survey results and discussion

In the following chapter, the focus is on the presentation of the results from the survey.



To what extent is Nigeria's oil exploration since the 1950's to today affected by ex…

Dear participant,

I would like to invite you to participate in the study mentioned above.

Brief explanation of the dependency theory:

Dependency theory posits that resources move from the "periphery" of impoverished and exploited nations to a "core" of wealthy countries, leading to the enrichment of the latter at the cost of the former. A key argument of this theory is that the integration of poor nations into the global system results in their continued impoverishment while simultaneously enriching the rich nations.

What is the purpose of this study?

The central objective of the study is to highlight the effects of exogenous and endogenous factors of oil exploration in Nigeria, through the lens of the dependency theory.
Furthermore, to garner a political voice in order to bring more attention to the (side) effects of the oil exploration in the Niger Delta, which comes with ecological, political, economic etc. consequences.

Figure 2: Introduction to the study and a brief explanation of the dependency theory[45]

Q1 Section I: Background and Context How would you describe Nigeria’s economic and political landscape during the early years of oil exploration?
Multiple Choice



Choice	Total
Promising	44
Unpromising	0
Stable	1
Unstable	3
Don't know	3

Diagram 1: Categorization of Nigeria’s economic and political landscape at the onset of oil exploration

On the perception of Nigeria's economic and political scenery during the early years of oil exploration, 86.3 per cent of the respondents are of the opinion that the economic and political landscape of Nigeria during the early years of oil exploration was **promising**. This could reflect optimism about the potential for economic growth and prosperity due to the discovery of oil. 1 respondent categorized the political landscape during the early years of oil exploration as unstable, while 5.9 per cent categorized the political landscape as unstable. The remaining 5.9 per cent of the respondents indicated that they were unsure, reflecting a small portion of the sample who didn't have a clear opinion or sufficient knowledge to evaluate the situation. This evaluation suggests that a strong majority saw potential and opportunity in Nigeria's early oil exploration era, while no one viewed it as unpromising, and a very small group were uncertain.

[45] The dependency theory on a theoretical basis is not familiar with all the participants, therefore a brief explanation without going into deep details was needed. Most participants were familiar with the mechanisms of dependency but only few attributed it to the dependency theory perspective.



Diagram 2: The non-applicability of the dependency theory on the Nigerian oil case

The data provided reflects opinions on whether **dependency theory is not applicable** to the Nigerian situation regarding oil exploration. 18 per cent of the respondents **strongly agree** that **dependency theory is not applicable** to the Nigerian matter on oil exploration. This indicates a firm stance that Nigeria's situation doesn't align with the principles of dependency theory, which typically describes a relationship where developing nations are economically dependent on wealthier countries, often through resource extraction. 18 per cent of the respondents **somewhat agree**, suggesting that while they lean toward the belief that dependency theory is not entirely applicable, they may still acknowledge some limited relevance or are not as strongly convinced as those who strongly agree. 18 per cent of the respondents **somewhat disapprove**, implying that they think dependency theory has some relevance to Nigeria's oil exploration situation, though they aren't fully convinced or see some exceptions. 42 per cent of the respondents **strongly disapprove**, which represents the largest group. These individuals believe that dependency theory **does apply** to Nigeria's oil exploration and strongly reject the idea that it is irrelevant. They likely view Nigeria's relationship with foreign oil companies and the global oil market as a classic case of dependency, where Nigeria is dependent on external forces and suffers from economic exploitation or inequality. A mere 4 per cent of the respondent selected "don't know," meaning the respondents did not feel informed enough to express an opinion on this issue. The majority of the respondents believe that dependency theory **does apply** to Nigeria's oil exploration, suggesting they see Nigeria as being economically dependent on more powerful nations or multinational corporations involved in its oil industry. A smaller portion of the group **(18 respondents: 9 strongly agree + 9 somewhat agree)** believe that dependency theory is not applicable, though the strength of this belief varies. The split in opinions reflects a complex understanding of Nigeria's position in the global economy, with most leaning towards the idea that Nigeria's oil sector fits into the dependency theory framework.



Diagram 3: The applicability of the dependency theory on the Nigerian oil case

The data provided reflects opinions on whether **dependency theory is applicable** to the Nigerian situation regarding oil exploration. 51 per cent of the respondents **strongly agree** that dependency theory applies to Nigeria's oil exploration. This represents a clear majority and indicates a strong belief that Nigeria's economic relationship in oil exploration fits within the dependency theory framework. This suggests that these respondents view Nigeria as economically dependent on more powerful nations or multinational corporations that dominate its oil sector, leading to exploitation or unequal development. 25.5 per cent of the respondents **somewhat agree**, indicating that they lean towards believing that dependency theory is applicable but with less certainty or conviction than those who strongly agree. They may acknowledge certain nuances or exceptions but still see a general alignment with the theory. 9.8 per cent of the respondents **somewhat disapprove**, suggesting that they believe dependency theory does not fully apply to Nigeria's oil exploration. However, their disapproval is moderate, indicating that they may see some aspects of the theory as relevant but not entirely fitting. 5.9 per cent of the respondents **strongly disapprove**, which indicates that dependency theory can't be relevant to Nigeria's oil exploration. This lack of strong disapproval suggests that even those who are skeptical of the theory's full applicability still see some potential validity. While 7.8 per cent of the respondents aren't sure of the applicability of the dependency theory on the Nigerian matter, the majority of respondents believe that dependency theory **is applicable** to Nigeria's oil exploration, indicating a dominant view that Nigeria's economic situation in relation to oil fits within the dependency theory framework. Overall, the consensus leans heavily towards the idea that Nigeria's relationship with(in) the global oil market reflects characteristics of dependency, particularly in terms of economic reliance and inequality in international relations.



Diagram 4: Nigerian economic independence in its oil sector

Regarding the question whether **Nigeria has achieved economic independence in its oil sector**. 3.9 per cent of the respondents **strongly agree** that Nigeria has achieved economic independence in its oil sector. This indicates a consensus that Nigeria has not fully detached itself from foreign influence or control in its oil industry. 5.9 per cent of the respondents **somewhat agree** that Nigeria has achieved some degree of economic independence in the oil sector. These respondents may believe that while Nigeria has made progress, it still faces challenges in fully controlling its oil resources and revenues. 27.5 per cent of the respondents **somewhat disapprove**, suggesting they believe Nigeria has not fully achieved economic independence, but they may recognize that there has been some movement towards greater control or autonomy in the oil sector. Their disapproval is moderate, indicating they might see partial independence but not enough to agree. 58.8 per cent of the respondents **strongly disapprove**, representing the majority. These individuals strongly believe that Nigeria has not achieved economic independence in its oil sector. This likely reflects the view that Nigeria remains heavily reliant on foreign companies, technology, and markets, and thus lacks full control over its oil resources and the benefits derived from them. 3.9 per cent of the respondents “don’t know” if Nigeria has achieved economic independence in its oil sector. Overall, the results suggest a broad consensus that Nigeria's oil industry is still under significant external influence or control.



Diagram 5: Negative effects of oil exploration on Nigeria’s broader economic development

The data provided reflects opinions on whether **Nigeria's dependency on oil revenues has negatively affected its broader economic development**. Thirty-nine respondents **strongly agree** that Nigeria's dependency on oil revenues has had a negative impact on the country's broader economic development. This overwhelming majority indicates a strong belief that oil dependency has hindered diversification, led to economic instability, and perhaps caused issues like neglect of other sectors (e.g., agriculture or manufacturing) and exacerbated income inequality or corruption. Six respondents **somewhat agree**, meaning they generally believe that oil dependency has negatively impacted Nigeria's broader economic development, but they might see some positive aspects or believe that the negative impact is not as severe as those who strongly agree. Four respondents **somewhat disapprove**, indicating that while they may acknowledge some negative effects of oil dependency, they also see areas where oil revenues have contributed positively to Nigeria's development or believe the impact is not entirely harmful. One respondent **strongly disapproves** of the idea that oil dependency has negatively affected Nigeria’s broader economic development. This respondent likely believes that oil revenues have been beneficial for Nigeria, perhaps through infrastructure development, government revenue, or foreign investment, and they reject the notion that it has predominantly negative effects. One respondent selected "don't know," indicating that the respondent did not have a clear stance on this issue. The overwhelming majority of respondents **(39 strongly agree + 6 somewhat agree)** believe that Nigeria's dependency on oil revenues has **negatively affected its broader economic development**. This reflects a dominant perception that reliance on oil has stunted the growth of other sectors, created economic vulnerabilities, and potentially contributed to broader socio-economic issues. A smaller group **(4 somewhat disapprove)** is more cautious in their view, while **1 person strongly disapproves**, maintaining that oil dependency has not had a predominantly negative impact. Overall, the consensus leans heavily toward the view that oil dependency has had detrimental effects on Nigeria's economic diversity and stability.



Diagram 6: Geopolitical factors play a role in Nigeria's oil exploration

On the question on whether geopolitical factors play a significant role in Nigeria's exploration activities, thirty-four respondents **strongly agree** that geopolitical factors are significant in Nigeria's oil exploration activities. This majority indicates a strong belief that international politics, global power dynamics, and regional conflicts or alliances heavily influence Nigeria's oil exploration, including decisions made by foreign companies, government policies, and international relations. Sixteen respondents **somewhat agree**, suggesting they also believe that geopolitical factors are important, though perhaps they see these factors as less decisive or impactful than those who strongly agree. They recognize the influence of international politics on Nigeria's oil sector but may not see it as the only or primary factor. One respondent **somewhat disapproves**, indicating that while they see some role for geopolitical factors, they believe it is less significant in comparison to other factors affecting Nigeria's exploration activities. This respondent may think that other considerations, such as economic factors or local regulations, are more important. No respondents **strongly disapprove**, meaning that no one outright rejects the idea that geopolitical factors influence Nigeria's exploration activities. This absence of strong disapproval suggests broad agreement that international politics do play a role. The majority of respondents **(34 strongly agree + 16 somewhat agree)** believe that **geopolitical factors play a significant role** in Nigeria's exploration activities. This indicates a strong consensus that international politics, including global and regional influences, are crucial in shaping the dynamics of Nigeria's oil exploration. A very small portion of the group **(1 somewhat disapprove)** acknowledges some role for geopolitical factors but believes it is less significant, while no respondents strongly reject this view or were unsure. Overall, the results reflect a general agreement on the importance of geopolitical factors in Nigeria's oil sector.



Diagram 7: The roles of foreign governments and transnational organizations

On the matter of foreign governments and international organizations having a significant impact on Nigeria's oil policies and economy, thirty-two respondents strongly agree, and twelve respondents somewhat agree. It is in this regard clear that most participants see external influences as substantial, while two respondents somewhat disapprove, two respondents strongly disapprove, and three respondents don't know of the role(s) of governments and international institutions and their influence on Nigeria's oil policies and economy. This indicates that the majority recognizes the considerable role these entities play in shaping Nigeria's oil sector and broader economic landscape.



Diagram 8: External factors versus internal factors

The responses to whether external factors outweigh internal factors in Nigeria's dependency on oil show a nuanced perspective. Eighteen respondents **Strongly agree** and thirteen **somewhat agree.** A combined total of thirty-one respondents therefore believe that external factors play a more significant role than internal factors in Nigeria's dependency on oil. This suggests a majority view that international pressures, market dynamics, and foreign interests might have a more substantial impact than domestic policies or conditions. Ten respondents **somewhat disapprove,** and seven respondents **strongly disapprove.** A total of seventeen respondents feel that internal factors are more significant or at least equally important as external ones. This indicates a belief that domestic issues, policies, or management might be just as crucial in shaping Nigeria’s oil dependency. Three respondents are unsure about the balance of influence between external and internal factors. Overall, the majority opinion leans towards the idea that external factors are more influential than internal ones in Nigeria's dependency on oil. However, there is a notable portion of respondents who believe that internal factors also play a significant role.



Diagram 9: Cooperation within the Nigerian state and the oil companies

The responses to whether the Nigerian government is in cahoots with multinational oil companies reveal a strong perception of collusion. 58 per cent **strongly agree** and 22 per cent **somewhat agree.** A total of 40 respondents believes that there is a significant level of collaboration or collusion between the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies. This suggests a dominant view that these two entities are closely aligned, potentially at the expense of national interests or transparency. 10 per cent **somewhat disapprove** and 4 per cent **strongly disapprove** the notion of the government and the multinational oil companies colluding. A total of seven respondents do not see a strong connection or collaboration between the government and the oil companies. This indicates a minority perspective that the relationship may not be as problematic or involved as suggested by others. Three respondents are uncertain about interconnectedness between the government and multinational oil companies. Overall, the data indicates a prevailing belief that the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies have a collusive relationship, with the majority of respondents perceiving significant cooperation or mutual benefit.



Diagram 10: Politization of ethnical identity

The responses to whether ethnicity plays a pivotal role in access to power and oil in Nigeria suggest a strong consensus on the influence of ethnic factors. 70.6 per cent **strongly agree** and 15.7 per cent **somewhat agree**. A total of 44 respondents believe that ethnicity significantly affects access to power and oil resources in Nigeria. This indicates a widespread view that ethnic considerations are crucial in determining who gains access to these important resources and positions of power. 5.9 per cent **somewhat disapprove** and another 5.9 per cent **strongly disapprove.** A total of 6 respondents disagrees with the statement, suggesting they believe ethnicity is less influential in these matters or that other factors are more important. One respondent is unsure about this issue. Overall, the responses reflect a strong belief that ethnicity plays a critical role in accessing power and oil resources in Nigeria, with a significant majority agreeing on its pivotal influence.



Diagram 11: The impact of local political dynamics, bad governance and corruption

The responses to whether local political dynamics, bad governance, and corruption impact oil production indicate a strong consensus on the negative effects of these factors. The overwhelming majority (92.2 per cent) of respondents believe that local political dynamics, bad governance, and corruption significantly impact oil production. This suggests a strong conviction that these issues are major factors affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of oil production in Nigeria. 3.9 per cent of the respondents agree, though less emphatically, that these factors have an impact, which further supports the idea that these issues are influential but perhaps not as strongly as those who "strongly agree. "**Somewhat disapprove (1)** and **strongly disapprove (1)**: A total of one respondent strongly disagrees, suggesting a belief that these factors do not impact oil production or that their impact is minimal. One respondent is unsure about this issue, indicating that everyone has a clear opinion on the impact of these factors on oil production. Overall, the responses indicate a strong consensus that local political dynamics, bad governance, and corruption have a significant negative effect on oil production, with almost all respondents acknowledging this impact.



Diagram 12: Impact on local communities and indigenous groups

On the matter of whether local communities and indigenous groups are mostly negatively impacted by oil exploitation activities show a clear consensus that these groups suffer significant adverse effects. The majority of respondents (78 per cent) strongly believe that local communities and indigenous groups are predominantly negatively impacted by oil exploitation. This indicates a strong perception that oil activities have serious detrimental effects on these communities. 10 per cent of the respondents agree to a lesser extent, supporting the view that there are negative impacts, though perhaps with some reservations or less intensity. 4 per cent **somewhat disapprove** and 6 per cent **strongly disapprove.** A total of 5 respondents believes that the negative impact on local communities and indigenous groups is not significant or that the impacts might be positive or less severe. This suggests a minority view contrary to the majority opinion. One respondent is unsure about the effect of oil exploitation on these communities, indicating some uncertainty in the data. Overall, the responses strongly indicate that local communities and indigenous groups are perceived to be negatively affected by oil exploitation activities, with a significant majority agreeing on the severity of these impacts.



Diagram 13: Internal factors outweighing the external factors

The responses to whether internal factors outweigh external factors in Nigeria's dependency on oil reveal a range of opinions. 47.1 per cent of the participants **strongly agree** and 19.6 per cent **somewhat agree.** A total of 34 respondents believe that internal factors are more influential than external factors in Nigeria's dependency on oil. This suggests that a significant portion of respondents think domestic issue, such as local policies, governance, and economic conditions—play a more crucial role in shaping oil dependency than international factors. 5.9 per cent **somewhat disapprove** and 19.6 per cent **strongly disapprove.** A total of 13 respondents believe that external factors are more significant or at least equally important as internal ones. This indicates that there is a notable minority who think international influences, such as global market forces, foreign investments, or international organizations, are more critical in determining Nigeria's dependency on oil. 7.8 per cent of the respondents are uncertain about the balance of influence between internal and external factors, suggesting some lack of clarity or insufficient information on this issue. Overall, while the majority of respondents lean towards the view that internal factors are more significant, there is a substantial minority who believe external factors also play a crucial role. The presence of uncertainty among a few respondents indicates that the debate on this issue is complex and not entirely clear-cut.



Diagram 14: Outlook on Nigeria’s future dependency on oil

The responses to whether Nigeria will always be dependent on its oil show a predominant belief in the ongoing reliance on this resource. 22 questionees **strongly agree** and 17 questionees **somewhat agree.** A total of 39 respondents believe that Nigeria will always remain dependent on oil. This indicates a strong consensus that oil will keep on playing a crucial role in Nigeria's economy and that achieving significant diversification away from oil may be challenging. Eight respondents **somewhat disapprove,** and one respondent **strongly disapproves** to some extent, suggesting that they believe there might be possibilities for Nigeria to reduce its dependence on oil in the future, though they may not be fully convinced about a complete transition. Two respondents are unsure about Nigeria's future dependency on oil, indicating some uncertainty or lack of information on the subject. Overall, the responses reflect a strong belief that Nigeria will continue to be dependent on oil, with a significant majority agreeing that this reliance is likely to persist. The lack of strong disagreement and the small number of unsure responses reinforce the view that oil dependency is seen as a persistent feature of Nigeria's economic landscape.



Diagram 15: Nigeria's position on the terms of oil exploration in the world

The responses to Nigeria's position on the terms of oil exploration in the world reveal a consensus that Nigeria is perceived as having a relatively weak stance. 39.2 per cent view Nigeria **in a weak position** and 47.1 per cent view Nigeria **in a somewhat weak position.** A total of 44 respondents categorizes Nigeria's **position as weak or somewhat weak**. This suggests a broad consensus that Nigeria is not in a strong negotiating position globally regarding oil exploration terms. The majority perceive Nigeria as struggling to leverage its oil resources effectively in international negotiations. 9.8 per cent of the survey taker see Nigeria in a **somewhat strong position,** indicating a minority view that Nigeria does have some negotiating power or advantages in the global oil market. One respondent believes Nigeria is in a very strong position. One respondent is unsure about Nigeria's position, indicating some uncertainty or lack of information on the topic. Overall, the responses suggest that Nigeria is largely viewed as having a **relatively weak or somewhat weak position** regarding global terms of oil exploration, with the majority seeing it as struggling to assert itself effectively on the world stage.

Q16 Additional questions: (Multiple answers are possible) Which one of the following countries/Institutions helps Nigeria’s national interest the most in your opinion?

Multiple Choice



Choice	Total
European Union (EU)	4
OPEC	18
The World Bank / IMF	15
Germany	1
China	13
Great Britain	8
Russia	1
USA	5
None of the above	10
Other	1

Diagram 16: Countries / Institutions coming to Nigeria’s aid

The responses to the final survey question on which country or institution helps Nigeria’s national interest the most reveal varied opinions, with OPEC being the most frequently mentioned. The highest number of respondents (23.7 per cent) believe that OPEC helps Nigeria's national interest the most. This suggests that many view Nigeria's membership in OPEC as significantly beneficial for its national interests, likely due to the influence on oil production and pricing. A substantial number of respondents (19.7 per cent) think that the World Bank / IMF plays a crucial role in supporting Nigeria's national interests. This indicates that these financial institutions are seen as important for economic development and financial stability. 17.1 per cent of the respondents believe that China helps Nigeria’s national interest the most. This could reflect China's involvement in trade, investment, and infrastructure development in Nigeria. 10.5 per cent of the respondents see Great Britain as having a significant positive impact on Nigeria's national interests, which may relate to historical ties, trade relations, or diplomatic support. The EU (5.3 per cent) and the USA (6.6 per cent) are mentioned by nine respondents. This suggests that their support is seen as somewhat beneficial, but not as prominently as other entities. Germany (1.3 per cent) and Russia (6.6 per cent)[46] of the respondent believe that Germany or Russia is the most helpful to Nigeria's national interests, indicating these countries are seen as less influential in this context. 13.2 per cent of the respondents opined that none of the listed options significantly helps Nigeria's national interest, suggesting skepticism about the effectiveness or relevance of the mentioned countries and institutions. One respondent selected "Other," indicating that other countries and institutions not listed are helpful to Nigeria's national interest. For the most part the responses highlight that OPEC is viewed as the most influential in supporting Nigeria's national interests, with notable support also attributed to the World Bank / IMF and China. The responses reflect a range of opinions about the roles and impacts of various international actors on Nigeria's interests.

7. Discussion: The reasons for dependency based on endogenous factors

7.1 The evolution of the Niger Delta oil production



[46] Russia's influence has been rising in the Sahel region and has been gaining momentum in Nigeria. Vide: https://theconversation.com/russian-flags-waved-during-nigeria-protests-why-its-a-cause-for-concern-236611.

Figure 3: Areas of the oil exploration in the Niger Delta region (Kabari 2017).

Focusing solely on economic transformation while ignoring cultural history and conflicts is inadequate. The disparities among ethnic groups in terms of education, moral beliefs, and especially access to power arise from the country's diverse makeup (cf. Olayiwola 1987: 61). Like many African states, Nigeria is still heavily influenced by its heterogeneity and colonial past. This history can be partitioned into four distinct periods: the pre-colonial era, the colonial period marked by the drive for independence between 1860 and 1960, the post-colonial transition from 1960 to 1970, and the period of the oil boom and crisis from 1971 to 1985 (cf. Olayiwola 1987: xii). In the pre-colonial period, Northern Nigeria thrived through trade with the Arabs. After the Portuguese discovered the region in the 15th Century, there was significant exchange between the Nigerians and the Portuguese. Eventually, the British took control, establishing Nigeria as a British protectorate. This colonial rule, which divided the population based on ethnic lines, brought both opportunities and challenges, particularly for the three major ethnic groups that emerged as the nation's elites. Initially, like the Portuguese, the British were primarily interested in Nigeria's resources, especially palm oil from the Niger Delta. However, with the advent of New World slavery, Nigerians became valuable as a labor source for the British.

The post-colonial era began with the British abolition of slavery in the mid-1880s and Nigeria's push for independence, culminating in the nation's desire to control its own affairs. After the abolition of slavery, palm oil became Nigeria's primary export, accounting for approximately 82 per cent of the country's exports (cf. Olayiwola 1987: 70). While the politics and treatment of people during colonialism may appear exploitative, a shift in perspective is necessary. According to Olayiwola, colonialism also brought infrastructural progress, such as the building of ports and deepwater berths. Furthermore, roads that did not exist in pre-colonial Nigeria were constructed. By 1926, there were about 6,000 miles of roads, and by 1950, this number had increased to 28,000 miles (cf. Ibid). Additionally, railway lines were established to transport tin, peanuts, cotton, and primarily cocoa. Moreover, the new railway lines facilitated transportation into the interior, to which educational and social institutions were established. These developments indeed brought some progress to the country (cf. Olayiwola 1987: 71f.).

Before the British began drilling operations in the Niger Delta, the German Nigerian Bitumen Corporation had started drilling there. However, these efforts were halted due to the advent of World War I. (cf. Zündorf 2008: 155). Regarding the oil, the British were determined to ship the country's resources to Great Britain. According to Cyril Obi, the search for oil by the British needs to be categorized in three phases, beginning with the concession of the oil, the participation by the government and lastly the deregulation period (cf. Obi 2010: 446). The concession phase granted the British a monopoly on the oil, while the Nigerian Bitumen Company received exploration rights (cf. Ibid.). By 1951, documents from the NAE[47] indicate that Shell D'Arcy's large-scale and speedily increasing oil expedition operations employed approximately 1000 people, consisting of both foreign workers and hundreds of permanent and casual Nigerian staff (cf. Iwilade 2016: 34). And with the successful struck of oil in 1956 external capital held most of the financial power in the Nigerian oil industry. By this scenario the Nigerian governments participation was demoted in handing out concessions (cf. Ibid.). However, these agreements often involved forceful acquisition of land from indigenous people, a practice that continues to resonate in today's Niger Delta region. This history laid a foundation of resentment towards both the multinational oil companies and the Nigerian state. It is crucial to undergird that even in its inception of oil exploration in the Niger Delta, local communities were acutely aware of the interlinked association between the state and the oil companies (cf. Iwilade 2016: 35).

1963	1965	1970	1975	1981	1991	2000	2006
11%	26%	58%	93%	97%	97%	99%	98%

Table 2: Petroleum Exports percentage of the Total National Exports (1963 – 2006) (Mähler 2010: 14 as cited in UN Comtrade Database).

With the 1960s coming to an end, the Nigerian state now in power over the oil revenues foresaw that oil would become pivotal and therefore issued the Decree No. 51 of 1969, which gave the state unrestricted access over the oil (cf. Onoh 1983). The order was issued during the intense Biafran civil war in Nigeria, which deepened the military's consolidation of power within the state administration. The 1970s oil crisis and the OPEC[48] revolution highlighted the critical role of oil and heightened the state's involvement in the oil production. Furthermore, in order to further expand its reach, the state unified the Ministry of Petroleum Resources with the Nigerian National Oil Company to form the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. This unification gave the state the chance to function as a multinational enterprise beyond the borders of Nigeria (cf. Iwilade 2016: 35). Additionally, the government took up ownership in the multinational

[47] National Archives Enugu.
[48] Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

corporations presiding over explorations in Nigeria, established refineries, and implemented national and indigenous policies aimed at boosting regional involvement acquainted with the petroleum sector (cf. Hoogvelt 1979; Ovadia 2013; Ikpe 2014).

With the oil crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, Nigeria was inadequately equipped to handle the strain on the country's fiscal health and the resulting tension in the political arena. The contentious elections of 1983, marked by increasing repression and widespread corruption, eventually led to the return of military rule. General Buhari's military regime took power but was shortly ousted by General Babangida (cf. Ergas 1983; Forrest 1986). In response to financial and public tension, those in charge aligned with international trends of economic adaptation and federal reduction. In the year of 1986 the third stage of Nigeria's petroleum industry was initiated, under the guise of implementing a domestic SAP[49], the Babangida regime introduced deregulation and policies to scale back state involvement, clearly influenced by the Bretton-Woods system, which was evident throughout the Nigerian economy (cf. Mustapaha 1991; Ihonvbere 1993; Olukoshi 1998). The third stage intent was on deregulating the extraction and distribution of oil, this meant privatizing state assets and adopting international pricing regimes, regardless of local economic conditions. These meant the shortening of social investments, which as result led the country into financial hardships and rising (political) tensions (cf. Olukoshi 1998). These state-led modifications only further intensified the already pre-existing discrepancies between the rich and the poor and with the state abandoning certain areas (In the Niger Delta), elites seized the opportunity to install their own form of government (cf. Iwilade 2016: 37). In conclusion these factors underscore the unfortunate legacy of the oil industry's evolution in the Niger Delta region, raising recurring questions about participation, democracy, and the dynamics between local and federal politics in Nigeria.

7.2 Collaboration with Nigeria's petroleum industry

Nigeria exported around $52.1 billion valuation of oil, which accounted for 3.59 per cent of the global trade in oil in the year 2022, hoisting it to the 9th largest exporter of oil in the world in the year 2024. With the most sizeable, confirmed oil reserves in Africa, Nigeria holds 37.1 billion barrels primarily situated along the Delta of the Niger River (cf. OEC 2022; U.S. Energy

[49] Structural Adjustment Programme.

Information Administration 2024). Judging by this metric, Nigeria couldn't have achieved this enormous trade of oil solely on its own, it required collaborations with foreign companies and investors.

The oil sector in Nigeria is controlled by the NNPC[50], which collaborates in joint ventures with major oil explorers. These companies, which are also the largest and oldest in Nigeria, include Shell, Mobil (now ExxonMobil), Chevron Nigeria, Elf, Agip Oil Company (now Eni), and Partners. NNPC owns 57 per cent of these joint ventures, and profits are distributed accordingly (cf. Ngomba-Roth 2007: 133).

In the NNPC/Shell joint venture, NNPC accounts for 55 per cent, while Royal Dutch/Shell accounts for 30 per cent, Elf accounts for 10 per cent, and Eni accounts for 5 per cent. Until the early 1990s, NNPC held over 75 per cent of the joint ventures but sold 20 per cent of its equity to fellow oil companies, 10 per cent to Shell, 10 per cent to Elf, and 5 per cent to Eni. It is worth noting that while 20 per cent were sold, 25 per cent of the shares actually went to oil firms. In the Elf Joint Venture, NNPC holds 60 per cent, and Elf holds 40 per cent. Similarly, in the Eni Joint Venture, NNPC holds 60 per cent, with Eni holding the remaining 40 per cent (cf. Ibid.). By the aforementioned equation of the shares the multinational oil companies are capable of manufacturing and producing crude oil in Nigeria and these productions are as follows:



Figure 4: Nigerian oil production by operator in comparison 2007 and 2014 (Stratfor 2015).

[50] Nigerian National Petroleum Company.

- With Shell being the largest and longest-operating oil producer in Nigeria is responsible for nearly half of the country's production (approximately 9,000,000 barrels per day) and reserves. The company operates two main units, located in Port Harcourt to the east and Warri to the west. Shell manages over 100 active oil fields and maintains a network of more than 6,000 kilometers of pipelines, servicing 87 flow stations. Operating under the name SPDC[51], Shell oversees two additional oil export terminals at Forcados and Benny on the coast. It has also established two subsidiaries, SNEPCO and Nigeria Gas Limited, to operate deep-water blocks ranging from 400 to 1400 meters below sea level. Additionally, SNEPCO[52] operates onshore blocks in northern Nigeria (cf. Ngomba-Roth 2007: 132f.).

- ExxonMobil primarily focuses its oil production in offshore shallow water fields. The operational hub is situated southeast of Eket, where the company manages a terminal known as Q.I.T.[53] As of 2003, ExxonMobil's total daily production reached approximately 520,000 barrels per day. The company's production capabilities are further enhanced by the development of the Oso condensate field, anticipated to achieve a production rate of around 900,000 barrels per day by 2030. Due to its offshore production infrastructure, ExxonMobil has not encountered the community-related challenges experienced by Shell and Eni (cf. Ngomba-Roth 2007: 133).

- Chevron's joint venture operations are based in Escravos. They oversee operations across more than 25 fields, spanning "5,180 square kilometers offshore and 2,590 square kilometers onshore" (Ngomba-Roth 2007: 134). Complementary to their on and off-shore operations Chevron has heavily invested in gas utilization, notably through projects like the Escravos Gas Gathering Project, which commenced in 1997 and processes about 185 million cubic feet of associated gas. Currently, the project is advancing into its third phase of development (as of 2003) (cf. Ngomba-Roth 2007: 134).

[51] The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria.
[52] Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Limited.
[53] Qua Iboe Terminal.

- NAOC[54], a subsidiary of Eni, ranks as the fourth-largest oil producer in Nigeria, currently yielding about 145,000 barrels per day from 146 active wells. The company manages an export terminal located in Brass and maintains its operational base in Port Harcourt. NAOC has faced production disruptions in recent years due to attacks from local communities. Additionally, NAOC is involved as a partner in the Liquefied Natural Gas Project and is progressing with an independent power project in Rivers State (cf. Ngomba-Roth 2007: 134).

- Elf Nigeria Limited produces around 125,000 barrels per day from its onshore and offshore operations. The company's operational hub is located in Port Harcourt and utilizes a floating production unit. As of 2024, Elf does not own export terminals. Presently, production is distributed between onshore and offshore fields, with Elf intending to increase offshore production primarily to reduce costs and mitigate community unrest in oil drilling areas (cf. Ngomba-Roth 2007: 134f.).

In summary, the partnerships within the Nigerian oil sector illustrate an interdependent relationship and a power imbalance that favors the oil companies, which they themselves perpetuate. Consequently, transnational oil corporations wield significant influence and dominance within the power structure of the Nigerian state.

7.3 The ramifications of political and economic factors

It is merely surprise that the exploration and production of such an important resource like oil brings political and economic challenges with it. By this impression the conflicts and subsequent violence that have been continuously plaguing Nigeria can be traced back to the control over oil in the Niger Delta region (Johnson & Lafenwa 2023: 1). This battle for control over resources has shaped the nature and intensity of both conflicts and politics within Nigeria. Consequently, some scholars argue that where resources are present, politics inevitably follows, and with politics comes conflict, as the distribution of resources inevitably leads to clashes of

[54] Nigerian Agip Oil Company.

interest (cf. Ibid.). Research conducted by the GSDMSM[55], RMDC[56], NMC[57], and NSC[58] indicates that Nigeria possesses multiple mineral resources in commercial quantities that could be exported to diversify the economy away from oil. Historically, political and economic attention has been on crude oil. However, due to financial constraints, the ministry has made little progress in exploiting the significant bitumen deposits in four states where production was previously concentrated (cf. Okeke & Anichie 2013). Instead of fostering socio-economic development and security for the residents of oil-producing communities, oil production has led to prolonged instability, severe environmental pollution, and the degradation of regional ecosystems and livelihoods. The ecological damage originating from the oil and gas extraction in the Niger Delta is largely responsible for the region's declining productivity, which is primarily based on fisheries and other agricultural activities (cf. Ibid.).

In this context, oil production, which is heavily subsidized and aggressively promoted by the Nigerian government due to its substantial revenue generation can (now) be viewed as a curse to which the indigenous population of the Niger Delta hold a rate of unemployment (in the year 2013) at circa 40 percent and their answers to this predicament consisted of nonviolent movements in order to lament the overexploitation of their surroundings by the multinational oil companies (cf. Udoh 2013: 64). These strategies included organizing marches and sending delegations to represent them before the Nigerian government and MNOCs[59]. These efforts often resulted in patronizing and defensive responses from the authorities and companies (cf. Udoh 2013: 64). This has led the government to adopt a three-pronged response approach, consisting of policies, legislation, and punitive measures. “Policy responses often involve redistribution or reallocation of resources such as oil fields, wells, or other rewards to one community at the expense of other claimants” (Ibid.). The policy approach was met by reallocating and redistributing resources and the execution of programmes, e.g. OMPADEC[60] and NDDC[61] under the aegis of the Babaginda government and the NDM[62] under the Yar’Adua government (cf. Ibid.).

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[55] Geological Survey Department of Ministry of Solid Materials.
[56] Raw Materials and Development Council.
[57] Nigerian Mining Council.
[58] National Steel Council.
[59] Multinational oil companies.
[60] Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission.
[61] Niger Delta Development Commission.
[62] Niger Delta Ministry

The oil companies also invested resources in the region's development, working both independently and in partnerships to implement various programmes. However, like government initiatives, the efforts by multinational oil companies did not live up to the expectations of the local communities, mostly due to the reputation of the oil companies that precedes them, but also to a myriad of other factors that were a.) political and b.) the lack of responsibility by the oil companies (cf. Udoh 2013: 65). In this context the Nigerian government in cooperation with the oil companies created the following approaches when their former policies weren't meeting their expected targets. The government therefore created new states in the Niger Delta region in the 1990s and picked Goodluck Jonathan[63] in the year 2007 as the vice-presidential candidate in order to appease the natives in the Niger Delta region. In contrast the state did not hesitate to also take a rather harsh approach, which led to the targeting of MOSOP[64] and the assassination of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others (cf. Udoh 2013. 65). The prior mentioned approach made the government and multinational oil companies grow increasingly apprehensive of coordinated and assertive grassroots protests in the 1990s, they further deployed troops known as the JTF[65] (cf. Udoh 2013: 65). The communities counter approached the state measures by forming a movement which was readily on a par with the governmental measures. The local communities formed militias and armed themselves heavily with weapons and did not shy away from murder, if it gave them a sense of retribution against the state (cf. Ibid: 65-66). According to Duru and Ogbonnaya it can therefore be claimed that: "the restiveness which started on a mild not [sic] as pockets of peaceful demonstrations to the offices of multinational oil companies by community development committees of various host communities, soon degenerated into lock-ins and seizures of oil installations" (Duru & Ogbonnaya 20212: 164). By the year 1998, the Niger Delta region had devolved into an ungoverned zone where youth disruptions of oil manufacturing were common, and the population frequently, with cause, engaged in fatal conflicts (cf. Ibid.). Because of the youths' illegal activities, which result in an annual cost of approximately 3.5 billion US dollars to the state, an alliance has formed between the government and oil companies.

Despite the conflicts between the workforce, the oil companies, and the state, opportunities have emerged. The Nigerian government compels investors and oil companies to undertake development projects in oil communities, aiming to offer residents new perspectives in life (cf.

[63] A native of the Ijaw tribe in the Niger Delta.
[64] Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
[65] Joint Task Force.

Ngomba-Roth 2007: 221). These projects receive support from DFID[66], GTZ[67], USAID[68], the EU[69], and the World Bank, aimed at providing residents with expertise, skills, and resources. Critics contend that these aids fail to truly benefit the residents and their needs, instead primarily serving to enhance the image of the oil companies (cf. Ngomba-Roth 2007, 222). Given these factors, it is plausible to argue that the situation in the Niger Delta has not improved and may deteriorate further in the near future, due to political and economic decisions by the Nigerian government that prioritize self-interest over national collective interests.

7.4 The impact of oil spills

The widespread oil contamination in the Niger Delta has devastated traditional livelihoods, inciting conflicts and disputes within communities (cf. Imobighe 2004). The contamination, coupled with factors like insufficient compensation for environmental damage, poverty, poor governance, and the hostile actions of law enforcement and combative groups, has heightened tensions (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 74). These disputes not only threaten human lives but also hinder efforts to address oil spills and their impacts (cf. Ibid.). Journalists have extensively reported on the violence resulting from oil spills in the Niger Delta. One significant incident involved youth protester from the Illaje Local Government Area in Ondo State accusing Chevron Nigeria Limited of violating the GMOU[70] terms (cf. Ibid.). Hundreds of frustrated youths demonstrated in Akure, the state capital, marching towards the Governor's office on Alagbaka Road. The protest featured passionate displays, with angry youths carrying placards, chanting solidarity songs, and vehemently criticizing the oil company (cf. Sahara Reporters 2014). Despite the GMOU agreement, Chevron allegedly failed to meet its obligations, sparking a large-scale protest. The march organizers accused Chevron Nigeria Limited of infringing on their rights, particularly by exploiting the unresolved opposition to a proposed merger for the oil-producing communities in the region (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 74).

These challenges have sparked extensive debates at local, national, regional, and international levels, focusing on the complex issues surrounding oil in Nigeria. These discussions highlight

[66] Department for International Development.
[67] Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (engl. German Society for Technical Co-operation).
[68] United States Agency for International Development.
[69] European Union.
[70] Global Memorandum of Understanding.

entrenched feelings of exclusion and power imbalances across multitude lines (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 73). These elements have come to affect not only the present-day but are also likely going to affect the generations to come (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 74). In the Bayelsa region, for example, oil companies have installed pipelines, established facilities both onshore and offshore, and constructed canals. However, these operations have adversely affected neighboring communities due to oil spills (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 76). Despite these repercussions, the oil companies have refused to conduct any kind of evaluation to determine the extent of the damage. Instead, they proceed with cleaning up the affected regions and offering reimbursement to the residents (cf. Ibid.).

According to the Bayelsa State Oil and Environmental Commission's report: "oil companies have spilled at least 110,000 barrels of oil in Bayelsa over the past 50 years. Ninety percent of this toxic pollution came from facilities operated by just five international oil majors: Shell, Eni, Chevron, Total and ExxonMobil, the report says" (Ekott 2023). Although major spills haven't occurred recently in Nigeria, "an average of 240,000 barrels of crude oil are spilled in the Niger delta every year, in large part due to unknown causes (31.85%), third party activity (20.74%), and mechanical failure (17.04%)" (Isumonah, 2013).



Figure 5: Oil disruptions in the Niger Delta region in the year 2006 (Bergen Risks 2007).

This leads us to the culprits behind oil spillage in the Niger Delta area. An analysis on the literature pertaining to oil spills reveals that oil theft, pipeline degradation, sabotage, and, to a lesser degree, the actions of oil companies are the primary factors behind oil spills (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 77). Moreover, deliberate illegal bunkering of oil and sabotage also played a huge part on spillage of oil. Several factors further contributed to oil spillage in the Niger Delta region, like natural causes, while the human causes encompassed acts of vandalism on oil pipelines, oil theft etc. (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 77-78).

As highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, oil spillage has significant consequences, including financial losses and community disputes. Fishing gear like nets and traps set in the river are destroyed, resulting in substantial financial losses in the thousands of Nigerian naira[71] (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 78). Furthermore, fish in rivers and streams are exposed to lethal amounts of spilled oil, leading to a decline or eradication of the fish population. This scenario imposes considerable hardship on the local populace, many of whom depend heavily on the fishing sector for their livelihoods (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 78). With such consequences to the environment, scholars have extensively documented the effects of oil spills on the ecosystem. Oil spills affect these ecosystems differently due to the complex interactions among various species. Key factors include the chemical composition and quantity of spilled oil, which determine the reactions of populations within these ecosystems (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 79). In conclusion, oil-related activities have sparked environmental degradation, leading to a downturn in traditional economic practices in oil-rich regions. This has also incited violent communal conflicts, youth militancy, and the harsh suppression of protests and demonstrations by multinational oil companies with the help of the Nigerian state. The base of these disputes lies in the degradation of vital land and water resources crucial for sustaining local livelihoods. In addition, "communities discontent with the consequences of oil operations on their economy are expressed in various form ranging from peaceful protest and dialogue to violent demonstration against oil companies, blockages of their operation, sabotage of pipelines or other oil installation and hostage taking" (HRW 1999; Ukeje et al. 2002; Imobighe et al. 2002; Imobighe 2004).

7.5 Socio-political oil conflicts

The adverse economic impacts of oil exploration have provoked not only political but also social matters that have been lying underneath the surface (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2020: 79).

[71] The currency (₦) in Nigeria.

Interviews with locals reveal that these oil-producing areas suffer from severe underdevelopment. Moreover, environmental degradation poses a significant threat to human health and well-being. These environmental and economic challenges have intensified conflicts between local communities (cf. Ibid.). These conflicts often stem from land ownership disputes where oil wells are located and demands for compensation and contracts from oil companies. The ongoing neglect of these communities has frequently driven militant youths to target oil company personnel in protest (cf. Ibid: 79-80). According to Babatunde: “oil-related activities have led to environmental degradation that has not only engendered the decline of traditional economic activities in oil-bearing areas, but also led to a violent communal crisis, youth militancy, and the government and oil companies' brutal repression of protests and violent demonstration by the people of the Niger Delta” (Babatunde 2017: 36). This was not always the case, when highlighting protests and conflicts between the 1970s to the early 1990s.



Figure 6: The cycle of dispute in the Niger Delta region (Johnson; Lafenwa 2023).

Unlike the current and ongoing situations, these uprisings were mostly nonviolent and notably less intense. The protests gained more traction and publicity with the establishment of MOSOP in 1990 in which MOSOP demanded a fair share of the oil profits for the local communities, to which the government answered with reprisals (cf. Ibeanu & Mohammed 2005: 44). Furthermore, several significant themes have emerged regarding the societal impacts of oil-related disputes. These include disruptions to economic activities, reduced income, loss of life, displacement, and the depletion of farmlands. Other themes encompass family separations, damage to shops and goods, and setbacks in development projects. These findings indicate that the profound repercussions of conflicts on communities could present a significant obstacle to economic prosperity and sustainable development (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2016: 81). Ofuoku and Isife in their investigation of the "Causes, Effects, and Resolution of Farmers-Nomadic Cattle Herders Conflict in Delta State, Nigeria," stressed a number of factors that were responsible for conflicts between local communities, all of which contributed to the impact of communal livelihoods (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2016: 82 as cited in Ofuoku & Isife 2009). Similarly, Wanyande in his paper on "State-Driven Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa," argued that conflicts often hinder societal development. This condition can also be observed in regions of the Niger Delta, where oil-related conflicts have been the primary drivers of social, political, and ecological stagnation and regression (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2016: 82 as cited in Wanyande 1997). In closing the interrelation between oil companies and local communities is frequently branded by violence, hostility, and suspicion, which is exacerbated by underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region and the actions of oil companies sowing division and discord within communities by manipulating local interest groups through divisive tactics. Additionally, locals argue that oil companies consistently neglect to address community demands for compensation related to oil spillages and other environmental degradation caused by oil operations, or to provide employment opportunities for community members as contractors or laborers (cf. Etta & Aigbe 2016: 81).

7.6 The Dutch disease syndrome – prima facie

Countries with surplus resources, such as Nigeria, often overvalue their currency. When an economy experiences a resource boom, the value of its currency typically increases. This results in a higher real exchange rate, which in turn hampers the export of other goods (cf. Glyfason 2001: 850). These symptoms are known as the Dutch disease, an expression that stemmed in the 1950s and early 1960s when the Dutch discovered large quantities of gas and subsequently experienced a decline in exports of industrial and service goods (cf. Bardt 2005: 5). How does the Dutch Disease manifest in Nigeria? Nigeria was a prime exporter of agricultural products with a thriving economy in the 1960s, seen as a beacon of hope for African developing countries, as noted by Axel Harneit-Sievers (cf. Harneit-Sievers 2004: 2). However, due to a significant shift towards the oil sector, agriculture and its associated subsidies were neglected. Particularly between 1992 and 2002, the Dutch Disease became evident in Nigeria, with oil export revenues comprising no less than 95.5 per cent of government income (cf. Olusi & Olagunju 2005: 159).

Years	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Cocoa	189.2	193.9	178.8	219.6	298.3	184.6	267.2	238	191.8	220.8
Coffee	--	--	--	--	--	--	2.0	3.1	3.2	3.0
Cotton	30	52	29	49	44	44	52	27	56	92
Groundnuts (in shells)	1150	1245	1515	1393	1251	1687	1693	1558	1813	1846
Cattle	--	--	--	7445	7470	7515	--	--	--	--
Maize	1143	900	1118	1105	1130	914	707	688	816	910
Palm-Kernel	430	437.l	368	420.3	407.9	456.4	421	241	214	255
Palm-Oil	552	541	509	510	515	530	551	320	336	418
Rice	360	340	350	330	400	350	200	301	275	282
Wheat	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Table 3: Major agricultural production from 1960 to 1969, ('000 metric tons and '000 heads) (1979/80 Statistics yearbook: 724).

The 1970s marked a golden era in Nigerian history when the country had the potential to become an economic superpower. With this golden era came with it initial high hopes and simultaneously the decline of the hopeful future. This was based on the following premise: a.) The resource sector went through an expansion due to the commercialization of crude oil, b.) With it came fundamental changes of the Nigerian economy[72] and c.) an immense wealth was created, but the wealth was not concentrated sustainably in the country but was rather invested in goods from abroad (cf. Yusuf 2021: 54). According to Yusuf the indicators of Nigeria's new oil prosperity: "include the phenomenal rise of GDP from N9.4 billion in 1970-71 to N14.4 billion in 1974-75, and of gross international reserves from barely US$222 million in 1970, to US $5203 million in 1976; oil and total non-oil export of N7969.2 million and N704.3 million, respectively, in 1977," (Yusuf 2021: 58). The terms of trade drastically increased and so did the GDP of the country (cf. Yusuf 2021: 58 as cited in Onimode 1982). "Ironically over the period of 1970 – 78, real food output per capita declined by 5.1% per annum; total food imports stood at ₦ 790 million (almost 11% of total import), while in 1965 the bill was ₦46.4 million (8.8% of all imported commodities)" (Yusuf 2021: 58). Furthermore, staple imports were affected by the rampant inflation of the 1970s, which reached 16 per cent per annum in 1978 (cf. Yusuf 2021: 58).

Moreover, Nigeria based its external loan on its oil reserves in order to further import foreign products. This affected the services and good economic sector negatively, due to the crowding-out effect of the imported products (cf. Ibid.). In an attempt to control oil export earnings, the Nigerian federal government passed a law in 1970 that effectively transferred all mineral rights

[72] From a subsistence economy to a semi-industrialized country.

to the federal government (cf. Yusuf 2021: 59). On paper the oil profits were being distributed fairly across the nation, while in actuality the profits went to government officials, while the states were dependent on alms from the federal government (cf. Ayittey 2005: 34).

In this context, the Dutch disease syndrome offers a plausible explanation. However, its utility lies in understanding it within the political-economic realities specific to Nigeria (cf. Ifediora 2012: 2). Edo suggests that while some central hypotheses explain formational transition, the Nigerian case seems to align more closely with the Dutch disease model of formational transition (cf. Edo 2013: 106). The symptom of the Dutch disease mirrors that of the Nigerian condition. Unlike the Netherlands, which swiftly recovered and resumed its path to economic growth and development through diversification, Nigeria has yet to recover. The hindrance to Nigeria's recovery lies in the lack of diversification across different sections of the financial system. Rather than diversifying, the Nigerian state has been drawn into bribery and extravagant spending. They have shown weak investment efforts and a lackadaisical approach to reinvesting excess income from oil exploration. Consequently, this has led to the demise or complete fall down of financial action in other parts of their economies (cf. Mustapaha & Masih 2016: 1).

Since the discovery of crude oil, Nigeria has experienced numerous economic crises. Therefore, it is crucial to delve into this subject historically and subject the Nigerian issue to rigorous academic scrutiny. Pre the 1970s, Nigeria's financial system relied heavily on the agrarian section, which served as the motor driving financial increase and advancement all over the country (Yusuf 2021: 55). Many farmers capitalized on these natural advantages by engaging in cash crop farming (cf. Ibid.). Based on the above, around 80 per cent of Nigerians were employed in the agrarian section of the economy. Agriculture supplied 95 per cent of Nigeria’s food needs and employed over 70 per cent of its population. For instance, in the 1960s, agriculture contributed approximately 80 per cent of total export earnings. In 1962, it represented about ₦229.9 million or 82 per cent of the nation’s grand total in export, and by the year 1964, it yielded ₦356.4 million, accounting for 85 per cent of the country’s sum total for that period (cf. Yusuf 2021: 55). In this context Ekundare opines as follows:

> “in 1962/63 fiscal year, agriculture accounted for approximately 65% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 63% in 1966/67 fiscal year. These agricultural products included forestry and fishing.” (Ekundare 1971)

Agriculture was historically the predominant activity in Nigeria's economy until the commercialization of crude oil. As stressed earlier in this chapter, Nigeria emerged as a vital net oil exporter in 1970. The first oil boom shocks occurred in 1973 following the "Arab-Israeli war, crude oil prices skyrocketed from about $3 a barrel at the beginning of 1973 to more than $12 a barrel globally in 1974" (Meredith 2006: 276). The rise in oil prices was tied to the consequences of the 1973 Yom Kippur war (cf. Yusuf 2021: 56). In response to the support for Israel by the US and some European countries, Arab states imposed an oil embargo. Within months, the price of oil became four times higher, plunging the international financial system into chaos (cf. Muhamad 2011: 94). Another shock occurred in 1979 due to events in Iraq and Iran[73], causing the global rate of oil to increase "from $19 a barrel in April 1979 to $38 in early 1981, globally" (Yusuf 2021: 56).

It was under the premise above, that as a member of OPEC, Nigeria began exporting sought-after high and "medium-grade crude oil. The oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979 resulted in a large transfer of wealth to Nigeria. Public expenditure" surged, along with the country gaining increased access to international capital markets (Pinto 1987: 419). Despite Nigeria earning millions of dollars on a daily basis from exporting crude oil, the income per head declined. As crude oil production increased, agricultural production declined. Concurrently, OPEC oil price hikes resulted in billions of so-called petrodollars flooding in from petroleum trade, causing agricultural export earnings to systematically diminish in significance (cf. Yusuf 2021: 56). Collier also analyzed the paradoxical situation in Nigeria's economy during the 1970s. As oil revenues grew, Nigeria's other exports like cocoa and peanuts became unprofitable, leading to rapid production collapses (cf. Collier 2007). Ultimately, the impact of the oil boom and subsequent Dutch disease syndrome on the Nigerian financial system and public life must be understood in terms of capital management. It can be argued that the oil boom arrived too swiftly and prematurely. Various governments, whether military or civilian, have proven ineffective in managing the assets generated by oil wealth and have struggled to use this wealth to improve the living standards of Nigerians. Diversifying the Nigerian economy, integrating all sectors, utilizing human and technological resources, and attracting capital from both Western and Eastern sources, presents a potential solution to the Nigerian-Dutch disease. This diversification could reduce Nigeria's reliance on oil.

[73] Vide the Iranian Revolution: https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution.

7.7 Rent-seeking behaviour

"The concept of the rentier state goes back to Hossein Mahdavy's study of pre-revolutionary Iran (1971). It was particularly expanded upon by Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (1987), who classified a rentier state as a state in which at least 40 percent of the total government revenue consists of economic rents" (Mähler 20210: 7). As claimed by the rentier state theory, reliance on economic rents leads to two primary outcomes: economic inefficiency and, consequently, the hindrance of socioeconomic development (cf. Beck 2007: 46). The theory further expands on the political effects as follows:

> "It attributes the linkage between oil rents and authoritarianism to the following causal mechanisms: Firstly, it is presumed that oil rents foster the formation of stabilizing patronage networks, widespread clientelism, and assistentialistic distribution policies, all of which lessen the pressure from the population to democratize and may additionally result in the depoliticization of the society. Secondly, the abundance of revenues generated by the oil sector means that national rulers do note [sic] need to tax the population." (Mähler 2010: 7)

This lack of taxation in a way relieves the political elite from the populace's clarion call for political participation and accountability, which has been the case in the Nigerian condition (cf. Mähler 2010: 7).

With this introduction an attempt is made to exert Beblawi und Giacomo's theory on the Nigerian rent-seeking behaviour case.

> "The need (for some citizens) to change the rent-seeking[74] mindset and become more productive to the economy is a challenge. We must embrace the campaign to change our value system. We must tell our people that the challenge we face is for all of us to change our mindset about our country." (Peoples gazette Nigeria 2024)

These were the words of the current Nigerian president[75] Bola Tinibu while felicitating Eid-el-kabir[76] with a delegation from the National assembly. Tinibu's words were carefully chosen, because rent-seeking in Nigeria in the context of oil exploration whether in the past or the present had been and remains a liability.

In discussions of social development and political economy, rent-seeking behavior generally refers to the tendency of those in charge to accumulate the country's riches from raw materials,

[74] Emphasized.
[75] As of September 2024.
[76] Festival of sacrifice.

often to the loss of their inhabitants (cf. Ibid.). Rentier behavior, therefore, describes the attitudes focused on achieving, maintaining, and expanding this practice (cf. Anugwom 2011: 208). Thus, the concept of a rentier based financial system is particularly apt for Nigeria. With over 80 per cent of its wealth or earnings derived from oil, Nigeria's leadership has shown a notable tendency to appropriate or misappropriate this oil wealth. This has resulted in a deplorable level of development in the country, despite the substantial revenues from oil. (cf. Achebe 1983; Anugwom 2003). The state in this regard naturally produces rentier elites, who are the primary beneficiaries of these rents and therefore have a vested interest in maintaining and perpetuating the rentier system (cf. Anugwom 2011: 208). By this standard rent-seeking can be categorized as a form of DUP[77], which primarily involves seeking profit opportunities without contributing to the producing foundation of the financial system (cf. Ibid.). In the Nigerian case, rent seeking is the misuse of democratic state implemented instruments for personal enrichment, while siphoning the oil industry (cf. Ibid.).

The 1970s saw the rise of an oil-centered rentier state in Nigeria, driven by a hegemonic oriented nationals amongst the elites, who were keen on implementing policies. Firstly, it was paramount of the state to have a major stake and hold of power over the oil enterprise, previously dominated by the TNOCs[78]. Secondly, it aimed to centralize power and resources within the federal state by systematically disempowering the sub-national regions. This strategic approach has stayed a defining factor of rentierism in Nigeria since the 1970s (cf. Omeje 2006: 216-217).

Thus, the financial make-up pursued an altered rentier method, characterized by a productive and diversified agricultural economy inherited from the colonial era (cf. Omeje 2006: 217). Notably, a sturdy system of financial opposition existed among the three ethnic elites and their respective regions. However, in the early 1960s, the NPC[79], began to take a disproportionate share of federal revenue to address the shortcomings of the Northern areas of the country, even though most revenues were being generated in the Western and Eastern parts of Nigeria (cf. Ibid.). This controversial revenue allocation strategy disrupted the initial agreement, which allocated profits obtained from export in an even split between the state and the manufacturing region, dating back to colonial times. This disruption not only added to the plight of the First Republic's government in a coalition, but also fed into the circumstances that led to the first

[77] Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking.
[78] Transnational Oil Companies.
[79] Northern People's Congress.

military coup in the year of 1966 and the following civil war in the year of 1967 (cf. Okonta; Douglas 2003). Notably, the surfacing of an oil (rent) system and their new (rentier) elites in the advent of the 1970s facilitated a significant departure from the colonial regionalist revenue distribution formula (cf. Omeje 2006: 217).

In retrospect, the above illustration can be distilled into three key factors for the political drift that manifested itself in the early 1970s in Nigeria. Firstly, the Biafran War and the Eastern region of the country trying to secede from Nigeria. Secondly, Nigeria's membership in OPEC and the thirdly, the drastic boost in the global oil trade and with Resolution NO.XVI.90, OPEC advised its member states to obtain a 51 percentage of external shares and to diligently operate in all facets of oil exploration (cf. Omeje 2016: 218 as cited in Khan 1994).

Furthermore, following the Biafran War, the federal government dissolved the largely autonomous regional governments and replaced them with a 12-state structure. Since then, it has systematically reduced the powers of sub-national entities. Nigeria, originally divided into three regions after independence, now comprises 36[80] autonomous states plus the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja[81], which functions as a quasi-subnational entity (cf. Omeje 2016: 217-218). Consequently, the subnational states share of national revenue declined from the 50:50 derivation formula of the colonial era to a mere 3 per cent in the 1990s, before being increased to 13 per cent in the 2000s to appease the oil-manufacturing states. These federal states have been in a violent resistance campaign against the Nigerian federal government and transnational oil companies since the beginning of the 1990s (cf. Omeje 2006: 218).

Nevertheless, Omeje concludes that, the control exerted by the major ethnic groups over Nigeria's oil enterprise continues to be a contentious matter. Experts dispute that the dominance is rather perceived than actual, due to the tactical judgement and high-level elements of the oil commercial enterprise still being made at the headquarters of the multinational oil companies in the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. This often leads to the sidelining of the important issues of both the ethnic minority and ethnic majority simultaneously. Indigenous delegates of the multinational oil companies and the Nigerian state have no interest in counterbalancing this presumed trend, likely influenced by power dynamics between the Global South and North (cf. Ibid.)

[80] As of 2024.
[81] The capital of Nigeria since 1991.

In summary in the Nigerian context, under conditions of rent-seeking, different groups vie for control of the state, driven by incentives to access its resources (cf. Bardt 2005: 5). In Nigeria's case, rent seeking has resulted in substantial profits from natural resources, yet it has also fueled heightened corruption among the country's leaders and elites, who have perpetuated the existing system for decades. Bardt contends that rent-seeking thrives under conditions of weak governance, ambiguous property rights, market deficiencies, and an unreliable legal system, which collectively facilitate the capture of state resources by vested interests. Politically influential groups thus have motivations to obstruct the establishment of efficient, democratic, and rule-of-law mechanisms. This would entail shifting power from specific groups to the entire population and providing equitable access to oil resources (cf. Ibid.). In the Nigerian context, one can argue that rent-seeking benefits oil companies, but from a collective and macroeconomic standpoint, it harms the long-term efficiency of the Nigerian economy.

7.8 The challenges of good governance

Good governance arose contextually in the 1980s due to weak governments in Africa. In order for the World Bank / IMF to grant loans to certain countries, these countries had to meet specific requirements that were of good governance (cf. Muhammad & Rizwan 2021).

Contributing to the governance debate, George-Genyi states that:

> "Governance encompasses the state's institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making processes, and policy formation and implementation capacity. Other indices include development of personnel, information flows and the nature and style of leadership within the political system." (George-Genyi 2013: 56)

How can poor/good governance therefore in Nigeria be categorized? Between 1999 and 2004, Nigeria consistently ranked either last or next to last in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. During this period, 82 percent of Nigerians regarded corruption as a deeply significant and pervasive issue (cf. Tull 2007: 108; Transparency International 2004: 7). Governance in Nigeria has its roots in the pre-independence period when colonial rulers were in control. After gaining independence in 1960, governance shifted from British colonial masters to Nigerians, and the country adopted a parliamentary system oriented towards Britain. However, the First Republic, led by Sir Tafawa Balewa, collapsed on January 15, 1966, due to a coup d'état led by Major Patrick Chukwuka Kaduna Nzeogwu, which resulted in the suspension of the Nigerian Constitution (cf. Makinde 2013: 108).

On this background the issues obstructing good governance had to be tackled by governments and institutions globally, due to countries (Nigeria included) accumulating more debts and further sliding into abject poverty (cf. Bolarinwa 2013: 5.). In practice financial institutions in the likes of the IMF[82] started emphasizing governance issues such as: "military spending, democracy, human rights, corruption, and crony-capitalism because it believed that addressing them would provide markets with better information, ensure greater transparency, and limit the irrational destructiveness of financial crises" (Muo 2007: 420).

Along with other issues hindering good governance in Nigeria, the biggest danger to legitimizing the government has historically been the military in Nigeria, which has repeatedly intervened in politics and government, acting as a political renegade in their quest for power, which has resulted in circa eleven military coups since independence (cf. Azeez 2002: 343). Moreover, the military government is often seen as a source of instability because, unlike a poor civilian administration that can be elected out of office, the removal of a military regime is mostly by another (military) regime (cf. Ibid.).

In terms of leadership, it has been observed that (good) governance can be very complex, where even a good leader with good intentions might come to struggle with it. Nigeria's political history is in this regard filled with unsuccessful tries, primarily characterized by the leaderships' incompetence to build an alliance amongst ethnic lines, that make up the republic (cf. Bolarinwa 2013: 12f.). Bolarinwa bases his hypothesis primarily on the following premise:

> "Nigeria's segmented character is unique, with well over 250 ethnic-linguistic groups, some of which are bigger than many independent states of Africa. For instance, at the beginning of the 60s, there were 3000 tribes or ethnic groups in the world. About 1000 were represented in the continent of Africa and over 30 of those are found in Nigeria today." (Bolarinwa 2013: 13)

This has presented itself as a unique obstacle not encountered by other societies. Neither has an Eastern nor a Western society developed a form of government capable of addressing the immense challenge of 'hyper-ethnic instability syndrome'. This is problematic because pluralistic and divided societies perceive "themselves as biologically, culturally, linguistically, and socially distinct from" one another, often viewing their interactions as inherently or potentially antagonistic (Azeez 2002: 344). Furthermore, due to a combination of suspicion and toxic competitiveness amongst the ethnicities and their fight for control, the disputes have too often taken a violent turn. Access to power, including the distribution of administrative offices,

[82] International Monetary Fund.

the earmarking of resources and the allocation of revenues, is often seen as a means to favour the ethnic group(s) over other ethnic groups, which at times (might) leads to ethnic conflicts (cf. Bolarinwa 2013: 13).



Figure 7: Leadership and institutional structure in Africa and Nigeria (Owoye & Bissessar 2009).

This often occurs to the detriment of those excluded, with every region claiming marginalization (cf. Bolarinwa 2013: 13). As a result, ethnic, cultural, and religious divisions were exacerbated rather than reconciled through fair and impartial consideration of interests. This led to a lack of dedication to achieving good governance, widespread human rights abuses, and the stifling of potential energies that would have been better invested in developing the country (cf. Ibid.). One more critical issue is the pervasive corruption in terms of leadership across all levels of governance. Corruption has consistently hindered the establishment of sustainable democracy, effective governance, and the protection of human rights (cf. Bolarinwa 2013: 13).

The pervasiveness of corruption and the lack of morals within the country's leaders and its institutions pose a significant threat to sustainable democracy and must be addressed urgently (cf. Bolarinwa 2013: 13). It is crucial to highlight the challenges in achieving good governance also stems from the insufficient participation of citizens in government affairs on a daily basis[83] (cf. Ibid.). Beyond the widespread poverty that hampers Nigeria's government from achieving greater efficiency due to limited resources, the scarce available resources are often misused (cf. Ibid.). Corruption consumes a significant portion of these resources, while inefficiencies and wastages further disconnect the government from its citizens (cf. Ibid.). According to Makinde, a major obstacle to Nigeria's progress is the tendency to solely blame leadership while overlooking the influential nature of the followership (cf. Coker & George-Genyi 2014: 1125 as cited in Makinde 2012).

It is undeniable that both the followership and their leaders both play an integral part in shaping the government they experience, even when the followership primarily acts as spectators. Followers are positioned to influence the political behavior of leadership, whether through explicit or tacit approval or disapproval (cf. Coker & George-Genyi 2014: 1125). Furthermore, civil society in Nigeria is often fragmented and exclusionary, as it grapples with local and spiritual sectarianism, often subjected to a specific native group. This division typically weakens nationwide unity on shared issues, allowing the ruling elite to manipulate matters for their own benefit, thereby jeopardizing the emerging democratic culture and its longevity. Such actions can intensify divisions within civil society (cf. Ibid.).

Looking back, it is evident that Nigeria's challenges amongst other things stems from poor governance and in this respect promoting good governance across all aspects of political and public life continues to be the most efficient solution to ensuring democratic effectiveness in the country. In conclusion, inadequate governance in the nation has resulted in currency instability, balance of payment deficits, foreign indebtedness, increasing crime rates, and neglect of education and healthcare. Moreover, armed militias in the Niger Delta, viewing themselves as ethnonationalist protectors of the region, are actively resisting the capitalization of their lands by multinational oil companies and the Nigerian state, thereby posing a growing challenge to the state's control over oil resources (cf. Tull 2007: 109). Furthermore, widespread ignorance has often led to military interventions, which have proven to be disastrous for attempts at establishing good governance that ensures a sustainable democratic society. Once a robust system of good governance is firmly established, the task on concentrating on the

[83] This is indeed a significant matter plaguing the Nigerian populace, where the majority bases the political participation lethargy on the absence of political institutions operating outside of the government.

challenges of economic advancement and expansion might presume itself much easier (cf. Bolarinwa 2013: 16).

9.9 Corruption as an entrenched malaise

Corruption has been plaguing Nigeria since independence till the present day and has persisted in both the public and private sector of the country (cf. Nzeribe 2017: 1; Hope 2017: 126). According to Michael Ogbeidi and Chinelo Okekeocha, corruption in Nigeria dates back to the British rule in Nigeria, when they appointed local delegates to oversee the recently settled regions. These delegates, however exploited their authority for their individual gain (cf. Àkànle & Nkpe 2022: 13 as cited in Ogbeidi 2012; Okekeocha 2013). Furthermore, with the establishment of public management, there has been an abundance of officials allocating resources for their personal gain (cf. Ibid.).

Under this template a survey conducted on Nigerians regarding their perception of corruption tried to shed light on the severity of corruption across the board in the nation. Although empirical data on corrupt individuals in Nigeria does not exist, the installed system makes it easy for corruption to thrive (cf. Àkànle & Nkpe 2022: 13 as cited in Adedokun 2020b). Some experts stress the fact, that with the commercialization of crude oil, corruption became rampant and further fed into bad governance (cf. Hope 2017: 126). Corruption has thus become Nigeria's greatest obstacle on a national and international stage (cf. Ibid.).

The pressing question now is, how has corruption permeated the oil industry? According to Alexandra Gillies, in the 1970s, Nigeria's economy became heavily reliant on oil after the discovery of crude reserves. Despite generating over US$ 400 billion in oil revenues from exports, the standard of living continues to decline, and Nigeria's government is labelled as unstable, corrupt, and driven by patronage (cf. Gillies 2009: 1). During the military rule under General Yakubu Gowon between 1966 to 1975[84], the government was overwhelmed with the surge of oil drilling which led to mismanagement of oil wealth and grappled with the rapid expansion of oil drilling, resulting in mismanagement of oil wealth. In an effort to combat corruption, General Murtala Mohammed mandated delegates to state their assets and created a commission to investigate corruption-related matters during this period. During the Second Republic, led by Shehu Shagari from 1979 to 1983, corruption was rampant and ultimately

[84] Contemporary witnesses coined this period as the good years of Nigeria.

ended with a military coup in 1983. The administration of Buhari / Idiagbom from 1983 to 1985 then emerged and introduced the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) campaign to confront corruption and societal disorder amidst Nigeria's near bankruptcy, environmental degradation, and lawlessness, as noted by Nmah and Nzeribe. (cf. Nmah 2017: 120; Nzeribe 2017: 5). The Buhari / Idiagbom government was considered too practical due to human rights issues and was usurped by Ibrahim Babaginda in 1985 (cf. Ibid.). During the Third Republic, spanning from 1985 to 1993, corruption was not a priority; instead, individuals convicted of corruption during the Murtala and Buhari administrations were granted pardons (cf. Nzeribe 2017: 5).

In 1993, Ibrahim Babangida reluctantly stepped down amid widespread public opposition to his prolonged tenure. Following a short period in power, the ING[85], established by Babangida, was ousted by Sani Abacha (cf. Nzeribe 2017: 5f.). During Abacha's regime from 1993 to 1998, corruption persisted unabated. He carried on the practices of his predecessor, engaging in widespread theft, looting, and embezzlement without remorse (cf. Ocheje 2017: 370; Nzeribe 2017: 6). According to the International Centre for Asset Recovery, of the approximately US$ 3 billion Nigeria yearly grosses from its oil exploration, Abacha allegedly siphoned between US$ 0.5 billion and US$ 1 billion per year during his regime. Additionally, a sum of US$ 600 million was reportedly found in an account in Switzerland (cf. Daniel 2009: 173; Adetola et al. 2022: 27).

Year	*Ranking of countries (Nigeria)*	*Scores (scale 10/100)*
1996	54 of 54	0.69/10
1997	52 of 52	1.7/10
1998	81 of 85	1.9/10
1999	98 of 99	1.6/10
2000	90 of 90	1.2/10
2001	90 of 91	1.0/10
2002	101 of 102	1.6/10
2003	132 of 133	1.4/10
2004	144 of 146	1.6/10
2005	152 of 158	1.9/10
2006	150 of 163	2.2/10
2007	147 of 179	2.2/10
2008	141 of 180	2.7/10
2009	134 of 178	2.5/10
2010	143 of 183	2.4/10
2011	139 of 176	2.4/10
2012	144 of 177	27/100
2013	136 of 175	25/100
2014	136 of 168	27/100
2015	136 of 168	26/100
2016	136 of 176	28/100
2017	148 of 180	28/100
2018	144 of 180	27/100
2019	146 of 180	26/100

[85] Interim National Government.

Table 4: Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria (1996-2019) (Transparency International 2020).

Can the pervasive corruption in the Nigerian government be cured? This question is frequently posed domestically in Nigeria and overseas. Under the Obasanjo administration from 1999 to 2007, which saw the country transition from a military rule to a democratic elected government, bureaus (ICPC and EFCC) were established to fight the endemic corrupt practices of its citizens (cf. Àkànle & Nkpe 2022: 15).

These agencies and many more acts haven’t brought the overall success that they initially promised. Under the administration of Goodluck Jonathan between 2011 and 2015 corruption seemed to have reached its peak (cf. Ocheje 2017: 367). Cases of corruption were rampant across all government sectors. Typical cases of these comprised of the presence of so-called ‘ghost workers’ in the civil service, where individuals not actually employed were on the payroll. Additionally, funds allocated for contracts were often reallocated to individuals or left unused (cf. Ibid.). Furthermore, capital designated for safety reasons were embezzled by military personnel, contributing to the fear exacerbated by Boko Haram (cf. Àkànle & Nkpe 2022: 15).

It was under this circumstances Muhammadu Buhari assumed office as president in 2015, succeeding Goodluck Jonathan, with efforts to curb corruption through the implementation of technological separation of power in the administration (cf. Ocheje 2017: 367). Despite numerous arrests compared to former administrations, Nigeria's development in its anti-corruption fight has shown no improvement (cf. Ibid.). Furthermore, both the state-owned sector and the private enterprise sector are countering responsibility on their part (cf. Igiebor 2019: 498f.). Those formerly founded anti-corruption agencies are now viewed as retribution devices against supposed foes (cf. Nmah 2017: 121).

Hence it can be asserted, that Nigeria grapples with systemic and endemic corruption, evidenced by the decay of social structures and the proliferation of corruption across all spheres of human activity, exacerbating crises in socio-economic and political development. However, the prevalence of the corrupt system is not due to non-existing laws in convicting the culprits, rather the obstacle lies in the implementation of these legislations (cf. Nzeribe 2017: 1). Despite its enormous revenues attributed to oil, Nigeria’s financial development has stagnated for decades. Corrupt elites' misappropriation of public funds and assets contributes to Nigeria's underdevelopment (cf. Martini & Transparency International 2014: 2; Ogbeidi 2012: 19). Nigeria continues to face issues such as national insecurity[86], unemployment, economic instability, and more. Furthermore, the volatility in oil prices from 2000 to 2014, coupled with their subsequent collapse and mismanagement by those in charge across the board has stagnated the country's (possible) economic development (cf. World Bank 2019). In closing, although Nigeria's (political) power stems from its abundant occurrence of oil, the pervasive corruption in the country and the refusal to diversify its economy can lead to the country's future collapse. If not attended to, corruption in its highest form could act as Nigeria's Achilles heel and therefore lead the country on a path of a failed nation (cf. Kinnan et al. 2011).

7.10 Politization of ethnical identity

Martin Doornbos, asserts, that ethnicity by itself says less, it has to be interpreted in order for it to be understood (cf. Doornbos 1991: 56). In the Nigerian context, Doornboos's statement is highly applicable. As Ukiwo poignantly claims, ethnicity has fallen victim to all things wrong with Nigeria (cf. Ukiwo 2005: 7). It is therefore indispensable to explore the broader concept of ethnicity beyond the Nigerian context before highlighting the ethnic framework of ethnicity in Nigeria. Ethnicity can be defined as benefitting explicitly from it in situations in which it is not actually required (Osaghae 1995: 11). This description highlights two main factors essential to the discussion: Firstly, "ethnicity is neither natural nor accidental" but rather a result of deliberate actions "by social actors". Secondly, it demonstrates "that ethnicity is not only evident in the conflicting relationships or competition, but also in the context of cooperation" (Ukiwo 2005: 8).

Most experts generally concur on the fundamental elements that encompasses native groups but differ on the origins and reasons for their formation, the causes of ethnicity, the factors that sometimes lead to violent conflicts, and the measures needed to prevent negative outcomes. Primordialism and constructivism serve as the primary explanatory frameworks for understanding ethnicity (cf. Ukiwo 2005: 8). In the opinion of Ukiwo primodrialists for example draw a line between never changing attributes that make up ethnicities, while constructivists rather view ethnicity from the barriers ethnicity itself creates (cf. Ibid.).

[86] Vide Boko Haram and kidnappings in the Niger Delta region.

According to Hale, the debate has produced more confusion than clarity. He notes that most primordialists seldom claim that ethnic groups are immutable (cf. Ibid.). Edward Shills and Clifford Geertz describe primordialism as the perception among ethnic group members that their group identity is ancient and enduring (cf. Ukiwo 2005: 8 as cited in Hale 2004).

In the Nigerian context, the key question is: How does ethnicity influence politics? To understand the interplay of ethnicity and politics, it is essential to examine the historical trajectory from the colonial era to Nigeria's independence. Colonial powers appointed makeshift chiefs and local leaders from a community lacking such historical roles, utilizing these new elites as tools of colonial authority, often pitting them against their own people (cf. Anugwom 2018: 61). To assert their authority and increase their influence, these newly appointed chiefs not only reinterpreted oral traditions but also adopted the British tribal discourse for their own legitimacy (cf. Anugwom 2018: 61) Yet, this colonial legacy, often regarded as the root of ethnic divisions and regional disparities, is exemplified in Nigeria's administrative practices during colonial rule.

The divide-and-rule strategy, involving the incorporation of local populations into the colonial agenda and effectively implemented by colonial administrators, bears significant responsibility for today's ethnic tensions, alongside other factors. This dynamic was particularly pronounced in Nigeria, where emerging local politicians swiftly adopted the colonial model. Thus, just as colonial powers exploited ethnic divisions to consolidate power and extract economic benefits, emerging political elites saw this strategy as instrumental in their quest to gain and retain power (cf. Anugwom 2018: 62).

Moreover, the Richards Constitution[87] of 1946 formally used regionalism as a governing system in Nigeria, thereby solidifying and legitimizing a longstanding challenge that originated from the divided Lord Lugard amalgamation[88] of 1914 (cf. Anugwom 2018: 63). "The constitution, which set the regions as administrative and political structure, was also consistent with ethnic divisions and the relegation of the minorities to the apron strings of the three major ethnic

[87] Introduced by Arthur Richards, 1st Baron Milverton, to foster unity in Nigeria and to enhance Nigerian participation in discussions about their own affairs.

[88] "Before 1914, Nigeria consisted of diverse ethnic groups, languages, and cultures, and it was governed as two distinct entities: the Northern Protectorate and the Southern Protectorate. The British colonial government amalgamated these regions into a unified entity primarily for administrative and economic purposes" (Legit 2023).

groups. Thus, the Northern region became the domain of the Hausa-Fulani; the Western region, the home of the Yoruba; and the Eastern region, the bastion of the Igbo" (Ibid.).

Interestingly, among these major ethnic groups, the Igbo have the smallest numerical advantage over ethnic minorities in their region. This situation has been particularly evident since the end of the 1970 war, during which millions of Igbo perished due to both military action and starvation caused by the economic blockade preceding the conflict (cf. Ibid). The subsequent increase in influence and population of ethnic minority groups such as the Ijaw in the former Eastern region has further diminished the relative prominence of the Igbo. Despite the aforementioned points, the colonial imposition of territorial structures, as significant as it may seem, does not appear to be the sole cause of the ongoing social conflicts in Nigeria, even after six decades of independence (cf. Ibid.). Moreover, current discussions focusing excessively on colonial legacies can sometimes resemble futile lamentations rather than productive efforts to address or improve the situation. Consequently, this emphasis on solely blaming the colonial past often obscures the critical examination of the role played by the modern Nigerian state and its political and social elites in perpetuating ethnicity-driven politics (cf. Ibid.).

The following assessment underscores the prevalence of ethnicity-driven politics in Nigeria. Ethnicity remains a significant challenge in Nigeria, exacerbated by the undue influence of ethnoreligious factors on politics and governance. This influence extends to federal development strategies, particularly in resource allocation, development projects, and handling of certain utilities. The consciousness of social groups regarding ethnicity and its perceived advantages plays a crucial role in shaping this dynamic (cf. Ibid: 65).

In this context some argue that ethnic tensions in Nigeria are exacerbated by the political dominance of the influential Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, who benefit from entrenched power structures and advocate for maintaining the status quo as essential for national unity (cf. Illorah 2009: 699). By the year 1999 with the election of Obasanjo to the presidential seat, the dominance of the Hausa-Fulani in central Nigerian politics has been tempered. This shift highlights that ethnicity does not contribute to the unity necessary for economic growth, alternatively, it often diverts attention to competing for and distributing the benefits of oil wealth. (cf. Anugwom 2018: 65). Furthermore, while the notion that efforts to maintain political dominance by specific ethnic groups contribute to ethnic tensions and conflicts in Nigeria has value indeed, the unexpected presidency of Goodluck Jonathan from the Ijaw ethnic group between 2010 and 2015 challenges this ethnic power paradigm. This occurrence cannot be dismissed as an isolated exception (cf. Anugwom 2018: 65f.). As believed by Anugwom (political) nationalism amidst the major tribes played a significant role.

It can undoubtedly be claimed that the politicization of ethnic identity has been a persistent feature of Nigeria's political landscape since independence. This politicization has sparked conflicts primarily driven by competition for mostly oil resources. As a result, it has contributed significantly to Nigeria's enduring development challenges, despite its abundant occurrence of natural resources. Moreover, these ethnic conflicts have been exacerbated by the state's failure to establish effective frameworks on operating and managing the nation's oil resource.

8. Conclusion

8.1 Summary

The evaluated factors of the dependency theory as an overall umbrella for Nigeria's dependency on oil do hold true to a certain degree. The history and the theoretical origin of the dependency theory highlights not only the theoretical but also the practical economic, cultural etc. mismatch between the core countries and the peripheries, which seamlessly flows into a capitalist world system in which underdevelopment has been pervasive in Nigeria for over a century now, starting from the industrialist age in the core and being upheld in the modern era by multinational companies and their thirst for new capital(istic) terrain.

In chapter 4, the focus was on why external factors play a significant part in the perpetuation of dependency in Nigeria, through a Latin American theory perspective, firstly by Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, secondly by Andre Gunder Frank and lastly by Samir Amin, who viewed dependency interwoven between the Latin American and African perspective, in which he concludes that, in order for Africa (Nigeria) to economically grow, it has to unglue itself from global capitalism, driven by Europe. Accordingly highlighted were the roles in which transnational companies and institutions keep on taking when it comes to the (inter)dependency of Nigeria.

The survey results in chapter 6 undergirds most of the hypothesis, to what extent external and internal factors were and are the culprits of Nigeria's dependency on oil. The overall majority viewed the political landscape due to its oil exploration as promising and the overall majority categorized the dependency applicability onto Nigeria has justified, which is congruent to the perspectives of the dependency theorists, mostly to Frank and Amin in their assessment of peripheral dependency from the core. Furthermore, did the survey disclose internal factors that were in accordance with the theorists, such as the domestic elites, who upheld the periphery in dependence due to personal gain, regional political dynamics consisting of bad governance, corruption and the politization of the ethnical identity etc. Lastly did the survey display the overall assumption that Nigeria in this case is symptomatic for the periphery with its abundant oil occurrence and other riches has not been able to gain economic independence, while it has gained (domestic) political independence.

8.2 Critical reflection

Addressing such a complex subject, which has persisted even before the commercialization of oil in Nigeria in the 1950s, is no small-scale task. What was once a blessing in the form of oil exploration has transformed into a behemoth. It's crucial to critically examine this behemoth both internally and externally. Internally, widespread corruption and poor governance continue to drive Nigeria's degenerative underdevelopment. The country has become the personal estate of those whose primary goal is not national development but rather the siphoning of resources into foreign bank accounts. A significant portion of the nation's wealth is stolen through inflated contracts, fraud, and other corrupt practices. Beyond the direct theft of public funds, there is also the adoption of a corrupted approach to development, where government projects and programmes are often driven by private interests rather than the public good. As a result, investments are funneled into white elephant projects that fail to yield returns or create jobs, depriving sectors like education, health, energy, and infrastructure of much-needed funding. It is imperative for Nigerians and their political leaders to reflect on what history has taught them and consider whether they can abandon the practices that keeps the country trapped in a cycle of dependency.

The external view is that of the factors plaguing Nigeria till today. These are mostly of geopolitical nature, starting from the Berlin Conference of 1884 – 1885 in which African and Nigerian territories without extensive expertise on culture, language, traditions etc. were divided and therefore intensifying local quarrels between ethnicities. Furthermore, the age of colonialism did its part on halting the (Self)-development[89] of Nigeria, which brought with itself byproducts in the likes of the slave trade, imperialism and capitalism. With the division of power between the core countries and the periphery, Nigeria is mostly impacted by political and economic events in the centre, while political and economic events in Nigeria have little to no effect in the core countries[90]. The political and economic discourse therefore has to change from a capitalistic view in which money and greed is the impetus for oil exploration to a discourse of sustainability in which the collective interests of the people and the development of Nigeria is put at the forefront. This is indeed not an easy task and could be categorized as wishful thinking, but with the combined strength by the core countries and the peripheries it is on achievable grounds.

8.3 Outlook

It takes a different approach to such a complex topic and the following is an outlook mostly based on the responsibilities of the multinational oil companies and the Nigerian state on the grounds that the dependency of Nigeria is maintained by these two parties:

- Oil corporations should prioritize Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives that improve the local environment and address critical development needs. Building positive relationships with host communities is crucial, fostering mutual coexistence and good neighborliness.

- As the world transitions to renewable energy and reduces dependence on fossil fuels, demand for oil may decline. This shift could force Nigeria to diversify its economy more quickly. Preparing for this global trend by investing in non-oil sectors and renewable energy can help Nigeria mitigate the risks of being left behind in the global energy transition.

- Unethical business practices and environmental exploitation must be actively avoided.

[89] "Historically, a lot of facts were gathered and supported by scholars that African societies, before the coming of the whites were not underdeveloped because they were able to develop within their capacity based on their agricultural economy" (Alaye 2019: 9).
[90] As of 2024 some are of the opinion that with migration this might have changed.

- Companies should adopt consultative approaches that encourage community involvement, which is essential for advancing local development. Additionally, supporting the creation of institutions that promote human development in oil-producing regions, providing mentorship for skill acquisition, and offering scholarships to enhance industrial expertise are vital.

- Nigeria can capitalize on its position as a major economy in Africa by expanding trade within the continent and beyond. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers opportunities for Nigeria to become a hub for manufacturing, services, and digital innovation, thus reducing its reliance on oil exports.

- Efforts should also focus on generating employment opportunities for the youth. Moreover, oil companies must stop aggravating conflicts within oil-producing communities through divisive tactics. Instead, they should adopt a more empathetic approach to the challenges faced by these communities. A constructive path forward involves positioning themselves as genuine partners in the development of oil-producing areas. This can be achieved by engaging in ongoing dialogue with credible representative organizations within each community to identify effective and practical solutions to their concerns. In cases of conflict between companies and their host communities, exploring peaceful conflict resolution and management strategies is essential.

- Investing in education, skill development, and health is crucial for diversifying the economy. A more skilled and educated workforce can drive growth in knowledge-based industries, services, and technology. Improving human capital will help Nigeria reduce its dependency on oil by enabling innovation and the development of new sectors.

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