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“PLO Leader Addresses Palestine Conference”

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ABSTRACT

Die internationale Bühne ist von einer Vielzahl von Konflikten geprägt, die die Grundsätze von Frieden und Sicherheit in Frage stellen. Unter ihnen ist die israelisch-palästinensische Krise ein komplexer und dauerhafter Konflikt, der seit Jahrzehnten die Aufmerksamkeit der Weltöffentlichkeit auf sich gezogen hat.

Im Streben nach Frieden hat sich die Bewegung der Blockfreien Staaten (NAM) als eine besondere Kraft erwiesen, die sich durch die Feinheiten der Weltpolitik bewegt und dabei die Prinzipien der Unabhängigkeit, der Blockfreiheit und der friedlichen Koexistenz hochhält. Diese umfassende Studie befasst sich mit der vielschichtigen Rolle der NAM bei der Aufrechterhaltung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf ihrem Engagement in der israelisch-palästinensischen Krise zwischen 1955 und 1983 liegt. Die Untersuchung verfolgte drei Ziele: die Identifizierung der Akteure, die die Diskussionen über den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt dominierten; die Aufdeckung der Politiken und Resolutionen, die die NAM im Zuge des Konflikts verabschiedete oder zu ihrer Verabschiedung beitrug; und die Frage, wie sich die politische Landschaft der Entkolonialisierung auf die Wirksamkeit der Bewegung bei der Bewältigung der israelisch-palästinensischen Krise auswirkte. Durch eine gründliche Untersuchung der diplomatischen Initiativen, der Einhaltung des Völkerrechts, der Vermittlungsbemühungen und der humanitären Beiträge sollten die Auswirkungen und die Wirksamkeit der NAM bei der Bewältigung eines der langwierigsten Konflikte der Welt erhellt werden.

Das Forschungsdesign für die Studie war eine explorative Forschung unter Verwendung der Fallstudienmethode. Zur Auswahl der relevanten Daten für die Studie wurde eine gezielte Stichprobenauswahl getroffen. Die Primärdatenerhebung war durch den Einsatz von Archivierungsmethoden möglich. Die Primärdatenerhebung erfolgte in zwei Formen. Erstens wurden die Daten durch die Nutzung der digitalen Archive der Vereinten Nationen gesammelt. Zweitens waren die von Medunarodna Politika, Institut Za Medunarodnu Politiku I Privredu, Jugoslovenska stvarnost und Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies veröffentlichten Dokumente von großem Wert für den Zugang zu den NAM-Tagungsunterlagen. Die Daten wurden mit Hilfe von qualitativen und quantitativen Methoden analysiert. Bei der Literaturrecherche

wurde auch die Technik des Schneeballverfahrens eingesetzt, um weitere Sekundärdaten zu ermitteln.

ABSTRACT

The international stage is marked by a myriad of conflicts that challenge the principles of peace and security. Among these, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis stands as a complex and enduring conflict that has garnered global attention for decades.

In the pursuit of peace, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emerged as a distinctive force, navigating the intricacies of global politics while upholding principles of independence, non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. This comprehensive study delved into the multifaceted role of the NAM in the maintenance of international peace and security, with a particular focus on its engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis between 1955 and 1983. The research had three objectives: to identify actors dominating discussions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; to uncover policies and resolutions that NAM adopted or contributed to its adoption at the wake of the conflict; and how the political landscape of decolonisation impacted the movement's effectiveness in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Through a rigorous examination of diplomatic initiatives, adherence to international law, mediation efforts, and humanitarian contributions, this research aimed to elucidate the impact and effectiveness of the NAM in addressing one of the world's most protracted conflicts.

The research design for the study was exploratory research by use of case study method. Purposive sampling was used to select relevant data for the study. Primary data collection was possible by the use of archival research methodology. Primary data collection took two forms. Firstly, data was gathered by the use of UN digital archives. Secondly, of great value to accessing NAM meeting document was those published by *Medunarodna Politika*, *Institut Za Medunarodnu Politiku I Privredu*, *Jugoslovenska stvarnost*, and *Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies*. Data was analyzed by use of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Snowballing technique was also used to identify other secondary data during the literature review process.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

During the 20th century, the international stage was marked by a myriad of conflicts that challenged the principles of peace and security. Among these, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis stood as a complex and enduring conflict that garnered global attention. The damage caused by the two world wars ushered actors into a phase where the search for peace became a primary concern. Consequently, the United Nations (UN) was established to lead the world into a more stable and sustainable peace. Among the many issues that the UN was confronted with, the immediate was the Israeli and Palestinian Statehood. Tensions within Palestine and the question “What does the world propose to do with the Jews for whom exile is enforced,”¹ the United Nations was more determined to address Louis D. Brandeis’s concern that “Unless civilization has so reverted to primitivism as to wish the destruction of homeless Jews, it must encourage the proved medium to solve in great measure the problem of Jewish homelessness”² and create peace within Palestine. Adopting Resolution 181, United Nation’s General Assembly Partitioned Palestine into “independent Arab and the Jewish State.”³ Hoping that the Partition would provide a home to “exiled Jews,” and a relief to Palestinians, however tensions continued to rise between both the Jews and the Arabs, with the former claiming its presence on the land as “biblical Promised Land” whilst the later claimed ownership of the territory as “a Holy Place.”⁴

The continuous unattended call on United Nations about Palestinian Arabs’ “full rights to independence and liberty”⁵ continued to rise tensions among the Jews and Arabs culminating in a new force to ensure the maintenance of peace and security that required attention and cooperative efforts to resolve. Drawing on tensions between the two major world powers during the Cold War- the United States and the Soviet Union, in addressing Palestinian Question of statehood, the later

¹ Penkower, 2014

² ibid

³ United Nation Security Council Resolution 242

⁴ Penkover, 2014

⁵ ibid

“endorsed the Palestinian movement as an anti-imperial "just war" of national liberation”⁶ whilst the former saw Palestinian land as a “Greater Land of Israel” thus “denying real Palestinian self-determination and expanding Jewish settlement of Palestinian land without limit.”⁷ Amidst tensions, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emerged as a prominent force, representing a shared dedication to autonomy, self-governance, and avoiding alignment with major power blocs.

NAM represented a shared belief in aiding colonized countries to finding a path to freedom from their oppressor. With an interest to throw its weight to international peace and security, the movement viewed colonization, racial discrimination, and Zionism as threat to global peace. According to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru the goal of the movement was to keep away from the “military alliances” and “throw our weight in favour of peace.”⁸ Emphasising the goal of the movement, Fidel Castro stressed “Peace is one of the most sacred duties of our Movement. Nobody is exempt from this obligation.”⁹ Thus, Non-Aligned Movement emerged as a voice advocating for peaceful coexistence and the resolution of conflicts through while distancing itself from the aggressive posturing and militarization that characterized the cold-war period.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rooted in historical claims to territory and issues of identity, has persisted for decades, leaving a trail of human suffering and geopolitical challenges. In the mid-20th century, the Non-Aligned Movement, comprising a diverse array of states from four different geographical spheres (Latin America, Africa, Europe, and Asia) evolved as a “new bloc” seeking to navigate the complexities of global politics without aligning with major power alliances. Mostly comprised of decolonized states with a role to play in the creation of a world based on the recognition of equality of all peoples to freedom from oppression and on the universal application of the principles of peaceful coexistence, NAM’s aims and motivations towards Palestinian sovereignty and independence should be studied.

As the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is “becoming one of the hot topics of international scholarship,”¹⁰ understanding the role, of the movement in addressing the conflict becomes crucial. Thus, this

⁶ Forsythe, 1971

⁷ Khalid, 2013

⁸ Cavoski, 2022

⁹ Castro, 1987

¹⁰ Cavoski, 2022

study delves into the multifaceted role of the NAM in the maintenance of international peace and security, with a specific focus on its engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

1.2 Relevance of study

The research is motivated by the need to explore the effectiveness of the NAM in contributing to conflict resolution, especially in a region marked by historical grievances and geopolitical intricacies. NAM's foundational principles of sovereignty, de-colonization, anti-imperialism, non-racism, and non-interference offer a unique perspective on conflict resolution. By focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, the research seeks to unravel the mechanisms and initiatives undertaken by the movement to promote peace and security in a region where conflict surrounded national sovereignty. The study explores the movement's varied role in preserving global peace and security between 1955 and 1983.

The period was chosen based on Jovan Cavoski's scholarship, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits: A History*, where he described 1955 to 1983 as a period where all Non-Aligned Movement's "major decisions were taken" and when "the global influence of the group or the movement was at the apex."¹¹ Researching on the movement within this period, will help both the researcher and readers to gain an in-depth understanding on the NAM's approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The primary object of the research is to identify the actors who dominated in the discussions of finding solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Secondly, the research aims to explore the policies and resolutions that NAM adopted or contributed to its adoption in the wake of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thirdly, it also analyzes how the geopolitical landscape during the Cold War impacted the Non-Aligned Movement's effectiveness in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

With the founding principle of helping countries to develop economically and survive politically in an atmosphere of international peace and mutual cooperation, a look into NAM's relationship

¹¹ Cavoski, 2022, p.3

with the Palestinian Question from historical perspective is be a worthy cause. By focusing on NAM's involvement in this specific conflict from 1955 to 1983, this study aimed to contribute to a more nuanced comprehension of the movement's historical significance in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.

1.4 Research questions

The research intended to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent did the Non-Aligned Movement contribute to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
2. How did the policy of neutrality of the movement influence its ability to mediate and facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
3. How did NAM perceive and prioritize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within its foreign policy agendas?

1.5 Delimitation of Thesis

The scope of the investigation covered an in-depth examination of the Non-Aligned Movement's peace efforts in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis between 1955 and 1983. The research paid particular attention to NAM's position on the Palestinian Question of self-determination. The study also gathered NAM's declaration and resolutions adopted at its meetings, and its communiques submitted to United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (UNSC).

Researching on NAM's political activism to Israeli occupation, I hoped to find new insights about the many dimensions of the conflict and to contribute to the academic discourse over conflict resolution.

1.6 Limitation of existing Literature

Although literatures have been produced on Non-Aligned Movement, existing scholarships tackle the movement's approach to Middle-East Crisis, thence giving readers a limited understanding about the movement's contribution in finding a solution to the world's most protracted conflict despite NAM's argument in that the Palestinian cause of self-liberation is the core of the Middle East crisis. Thence, an understanding of Middle East conflict requires an in-depth understanding of the Palestinian conflict. Additionally, this gap has led to a lack of comprehensive understanding and critical analysis of the NAM's contributions, limitations, and overall effectiveness in influencing the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, by extension, its impact on international peace and security.

Even scholarships that partially tackle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict highlights the African Union's approach to addressing the Palestinian Question of self-determination. Despite NAM's stated principles of non-alignment, peaceful coexistence, and support for national liberation movements, its influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains highly understudied and unclear.

Scholarly productions fail to view the Non-Alignment Movement as an episodic and polycentric process that occurred in different spaces around the world which involved many actors, therefore an in-depth understanding of the complex relationships between nations, people, and events regarding the turbulent interconnected past can be gained by closely examining the movements at these various spaces.

Although the movement defined the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as the bedrock of the Middle East Crisis and that a solution to the Middle East cannot be achieved without addressing Israel-Palestinian crisis, the study will contribute to closing existing gaps, and also be of significance to other researchers who shall learn lessons, utilize the recommendations and the gaps created to further on this research.

1.7 Limitation of the Thesis

Due to an absence of a digital archive that holds all NAM documents coupled by a financial constraint from the researcher to travel to five NAM member countries-India, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Myanmar and Indonesia, where some documents of the movement have been declassified, the researcher could not access NAM's original documents. However, NAM meeting documents compiled and published by *Medunarodna Politika*, *Institut Za Medunarodnu Politiku I Privredu*, *Jugoslovenska stvarnost*, and *Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies* were of great value to the study.

1.8 Organization of study

This masters thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter One highlights the background of the study, relevance of study, purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research questions, significant of the study, delimitations of thesis, limitations of thesis, Chapter Two comprises of the literature review and is divided into the following parts: introduction, origin of NAM, Principles, Israel and Palestine, an Interlocking relationship, NAM and the State of Israel before 1960, NAM and Israel in post 1960. It also consists of both theoretical frameworks. Chapter Three describes the research methodology and includes the following parts: introduction, research design, sampling procedures, methods of data collection, and methods of data analysis. Chapter four, presents data, analysis and make interpretation. Chapter 5 is divided into four parts. These parts are Summary of the findings which was tested based on my hypothesis; contribution to knowledge, recommendation for future researchers.

Chapter Two

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher threw highlights on what has been done by other researchers. It encompasses the various steps taken by the Non-Aligned Movement towards achieving peace drawing a particular focus on the Israeli Palestinian Crisis. The review is categorised into seven parts: The Birth of NAM; Principles of NAM; Palestinian Struggle for Self-Determination; Arab League and NAM; NAM and Israel in Pre-1960; NAM and Israel in post 1960; and Theoretical foundation. Thus, this chapter primarily focuses on the history of Non-alignment Movement and the approach taken to address the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

2.1. The birth

The specific period for the formation of the NAM is far more complex. Whilst historian Jürgen Dinkel situate its formation during the first congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in Brussels in 1927, other scholars such as Zivojin Jezic', Jovan Cavoški, Duško Dimitrijević and George McTurnan Kahin see it from the lens of the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955 or the conference of non-aligned states in Belgrade in 1961. Amidst all these dissensions, three things stand peculiar.¹² Firstly, NAM was formed to respond to the exigencies of the international arena, that is, it was established as an independent actor within international cooperation and became recognizable in the 1970s. Secondly, the movement started as a product of the confrontation between the East and the West in early 1950s.

¹² Dinkel, 2019

Non-alignment was primarily a grouping of developing and anticolonial countries.¹³ During the height of the Cold War, the majority of the developing nations were caught up in intense confrontation from the two superpowers to draw them in their ranks¹⁴. Nonetheless, the desire to keep away from superpower confrontation and the decision to preserve their independence in world affairs while affirming national individuality, became the interest of the developing countries' search for ways that would allow them to achieve this goal.¹⁵ Amidst confrontations, the movement tried to negotiate for peace and stability, between the 50s and the early 80s. The central theme of the movement was to prevent the division of the world into “antagonistic bloc,” led by the Soviet Union and the United States.¹⁶ Claimed by Cavoški

“Non-alignment did not emerge as part of some initial deliberations among different newly liberated or non-bloc nations or through implementation of some preconceived theories or ideas, but rather as an expression of different struggles for political or economic independence and as a distinct response to the emergence of two antagonistic blocs in world affairs.”¹⁷

In the words of Ahmed Sukarno, the Indonesian President, *“There was no prior consultation and agreement between us before we adopted our respective policies of non-alignment . . . We arrived at this policy inspired by common ideals, prompted by similar circumstances, spurred on by like experiences.”¹⁸*

These similar conditions were based on the common history of all members having suffered from a degree of great “power domination or subjugation,” as a result a formal alignment to either the west or the East which was perceived to be harmful for achieving the primary objective of the movement-peace.

The non-alignment insured political freedom and independence and contributes to national self-respect and moral integrity; in contrast to alliance membership, nonalignment permits freedom of expression and action; non-alignment keeps a small nation from getting involved in larger conflicts

¹³ Jezic, 2005

¹⁴ (De Prat Gay, 1980)

¹⁵ ibid

¹⁶ ibid

¹⁷ ibid

¹⁸ The president’s speech during the Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade September 1-6, 1961

*of no concern to it; alignment would make local problems more difficult to solve; alliances involve military obligations that divert scarce resources from the urgent necessities of economic development; non-aligned nations are in a position to accept and to bid for economic aid from both sides in the Cold War.*¹⁹

Expressly proclaimed by the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to be aligned to a bloc meant to “give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party’s view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour. It means that and nothing else as far as I can see, because if our view is the view of that party, then there is no giving up and we do go with that bloc or country.”²⁰ Hence, the movement evolved “to inject new political quality.”²¹

In fact, it was the rivalry between the two powers that had increased the amount of influence of non-aligned states. Four general historical preconditions can be identified that ultimately contributed to the emergence and development of global non-alignment: economic underdevelopment due to over exploitation of states resources, which eventually garnered a lot of developing states to connect the freedom of “their international action with the overriding priorities of economic modernization;” anti-colonial revolutions that birth a political liberation and independence to a significant number of Asian, African, and Latin American countries; the bipolar Cold War system which served as the general framework for the global stage, where non-alignment could function and engage freely, while also promoting the easing of international tensions and minimizing interferences from major powers; and the formation of the United Nations, with its inclusive and democratic nature, had provided non-aligned countries with equal opportunities to engage in dialogue with great powers, present their perspectives, and advocate for their ideas through both individual and collective actions.²² Thus, the non-alignment was a policy largely driven by nationalist sentiments and a strong sense of self-preservation, to survive politically under the tense international peace aimed at achieving a new international equilibrium. With anti-colonial and anti-imperialist origins, It adapted to the circumstances and requirements of the post-liberation while simultaneously acknowledging the preceding atrocities of colonialism.²³ Being non-aligned

¹⁹ Cavoški, 2022

²⁰ *ibid*, p.14

²¹ Cavoški, 2022

²² *ibid*

²³ *ibid*

meant being “impartial to judge actions and policies objectively, as we see them either contributing to or detracting from the resolution of the world’s problems” thus requiring the cooperating to either the two blocs. Thus, any of the non-aligned member who denounces “one side on every major problem or issue, while reserving nothing but praise for the other cannot claim to be non-aligned’ especially those countries ‘whose policies are shaped for them elsewhere’ and who ‘wait patiently to be instructed.’²⁴

Non-alignment meant an establishment of a new global order, a fight against any form of bloc division; promotion of equal standing among all countries in international relations; advancing fostering peace, disarmament, and engaging in cooperative efforts among nations, regardless of size or strength which required the development of new rules and regulations that all both small and big states need to act upon. In other words, “non-alignment is not merely a synonym for independence nor is it an ephemeral disassociation from blocs, it is a complete doctrine striving to effect essential changes in international relations,” where peace served as the prevailing characteristic of state interactions, while the wealthy and powerful would not be the sole arbiters of global destiny.²⁵

The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement can be traced back to the first Asian-African Conference where the driving force of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism led to the “collectivist impulse” of establishing a body resembling a permanent regional organisation aimed at promoting solidarity among the colonised.²⁶ The idea of solidary was birth by Nehru following the end of World War II; when India’s significance in the Asian region and the United Nations had grown since a lot of Asian nations were still colonies.²⁷ It was the force of taking a regional role that propelled Nehru in advancing the course of establishing a neutral bloc of Asian nations which was out of great power blocs which “stood in the way of materializing aspirations of Asian nations.”²⁸ At the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, where twelve Asian countries, two African countries (Egypt and Ethiopia) and Australia had participated, Nehru had stressed the importance of Asian nations not to allow themselves to be a mere peon of the great power politics “although cooperation

²⁴ Cavoški, 2022

²⁵ *ibid*, p.17

²⁶ *ibid*

²⁷ *ibid*, p. 40

²⁸ *ibid*

with all international factors on an equal and independent basis should be actively pursued.”²⁹ Despite the dream of forming an Asian group was left responded, a new framework for non-bloc cooperation was being gradually developed.

In spite of the urge for the formation of non-bloc, motivation was still low. It was the Korean War of the 50s, the formation of Central Treat Organisation (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) which significantly contributed to the resuscitation of international awareness and national solidarity among newly independent Asian and African nations. During the war, Yugoslavia, India and Egypt maintained a non-permanent position in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) thus allowing them to establish a mechanism for exchanges and the coordination of their actions towards the spirit of promoting “the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security.” Although each had its specific interest, yet the differences in opinion largely contributed to the promotion of “mutual understanding.”³⁰ On April 28, 1954, India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Burma, otherwise known as the “Colombo Five,” decided to convene a regional conference in Colombo³¹ to speak in one voice concerning regional and international issues, thus integrating Asian political discourse into a wider Afro-Asian politics.

Compelled to keep Asia out of West-East conflict, a second “Colombo Five” meeting was held from December 28 to 30, 1954 in Bogor-Indonesia, to further expand the “zone of peace” (all countries that opposes war, speak against bloc divisions, and strive to end all conflicts). Eventually, twenty-five countries were invited to an African-Asian conference scheduled to take place on April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss political and economic issues such as colonialism, world peace, economic, cultural and social cooperation and racism.³²

Yugoslavia’s interest to “launch wide, constructive actions, not only in Asia, but also in the world in general” and the dangers of having a regionally closed blocked became a recipe to insert Belgrade’s foreign policy or independence and sovereignty.³³ Consequently, in July 1956, a tripartite meeting between leaders of India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, was held at Brioni Isles to the expand peace and cooperation to colonized states. The concept was later endorsed by President

²⁹ Cavoški, 2022, p. 40

³⁰ Cavoški, 2022

³¹ Jezic, 2005

³² Cavoški, 2022, p.43

³³ De Prat Gay, 1980, p.30

Sukarno and the Prince of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk, following their visit to Yugoslavia. Therefore the “Brioni spirit” was spread throughout the Third world creating a proactive core of a non-aligned group.³⁴

Participation in the conference was based primarily on geopolitical considerations. For example, South Africa and Israel were excluded from joining the Bandung conference. The former due to the policy of apartheid and the latter on account of the Arab delegates’ likely opposition since the Arab-Israeli conflict was ongoing.³⁵ The latter despised Israel and considered it as “exploiters.”³⁶ Thus, the conference aimed to foster a sense of postcolonial solidarity that would be grounded in shared historical memories and common future aspirations, ultimately leading to a new era where the global centre of civilization would shift from the West to regions such as Asia and Africa.³⁷ Symbolic of its readiness in engaging more actively in global peace and the despise of colonialism and imperialism, President Sukarno renamed the conference, initially built by the Dutch, “*Gedung Merdeka*” which meant both “house of peace” or “house of freedom.”³⁸

At the conference, participants did not abandon their nation’s policy. The primary aim was to convey to the international community that negotiations and agreements between nations with fundamentally different ideologies could still be achieved, while the role of Afro-Asia was to serve as a moral and practical model for reaching equitable settlements. Nehru and U Nu were particularly proactive in this regard, attempting to facilitate dialogue between factions aligning with either of the two blocs.³⁹ At Bandung, President Sukarno speech- “Let a New Asia and a New Africa be Born!”, reiterated that the emerging states in both Africa and Asia were asserting their right to influence international politics. To the non-aligned states, in order to fully achieve its internal and external objectives, global peace must be maintained.⁴⁰ Other speakers also stressed that the Bandung conference raises the “awakening” of “states call for international law to honour the right to national self-determination”⁴¹ and the need for Western states to adhere to them. Other speakers also invoked the United Nation’s Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights to

³⁴ Cavoški, 2022, p.45

³⁵ Dinkel, 2019, p.46

³⁶ Laqueur, 1959

³⁷ Cavoški, 2022, p.43

³⁸ Dinkel, 2019, p.51

³⁹ Cavoški, 2022, p.43

⁴⁰ *ibid*, p.22

⁴¹ Dinkel, 2019, p.56

delegitimise colonial policies and “the exclusion of the new nations from debates on international issues” (Dinkel, p.56).

After the conference, Yugoslavia commenced to hold meetings with other African and Asian countries looking for common grounds that would permit an expansion of the Bandung umbrella. Thence, from 1955 to 1961, President Tito’s active engagement with other world leaders- mainly Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah and Sukarno— birth the first Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade in 1961.⁴² Since then, the four leaders closely coordinated their activities to “launch constructive proposals for the resolution of pressing world issues” within the United Nation. This initiative was widely regarded by the press as the emergence of a "neutralist or third bloc" within the United Nations.⁴³

2.2 Principles

With the increasing insecurities of the bi-polar international system coupled by the search of peace and stability by the leaders of the non-alignment, NAM developed principles that would guide the conduct of its relations with global powers.

Before proceeding with its principles, it is important to define the concept “principle.” For the purpose of the thesis, definition provided by Professor Lerche and Siad (1979) is considered. Principle is “*the values that give rise to political action.*” Thus, members of the movement were provided with “*useful cohesive elements*” which promises to promote a “*common action as a protective cover for their independence and sovereignty.*”⁴⁴

Guided by the principles and goals outlined in the UN Charter, the Non-Aligned Movement established its own doctrinal and organizational foundation, which it utilized to achieve its objectives and principles.⁴⁵ Through its participation in the United Nations system, the Non-Aligned Movement was able to realize its unique objectives of preserving world peace and security and fostering friendly relations and international cooperation, particularly during the Cold War era

⁴² De Prat Gay, 1980

⁴³ Cavoški, 2022, p.47

⁴⁴ De Prat Gay, 1980

⁴⁵ Dimitrijević, 2021

and in the post-Cold War period.⁴⁶ However, United States' policy of "pactomania,"⁴⁷ sought to prevent the expansion of communism from reaching many part of the world, whilst their opponents, the Soviet, "was intensively trying to influence the developing world with an aim to prevent it from concluding tight linkages with Washington,"⁴⁸ thus, "Pactomania" was faced with "peaceful coexistence," a subtle way to diffuse the conflict and drive away the proclaimed dangers of coming military confrontations.⁴⁹

The Indian-Chinese summit held in New Delhi in 1954 resulted in the formulation of the Five Principles known as the "*Panscheal*" principles which later served as the foundation of the non-aligned movement:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. 3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful co-existence

These principles represented

*"...the governance of international relations and for peaceful coexistence of nations, without interference with each other; so that each nation and people might grow according to their own genius and in cooperation with others..."*⁵⁰

However, at Bandung, the five principles were expanded into the "Ten Principles of Bandung." These principles also served as the primary criteria for admission into the movement⁵¹:

1. *Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;*

⁴⁶ Dimitrijević, 2021

⁴⁷ Otherwise known as the policy of containment

⁴⁸ De Prat Gay, 1980

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Mišković et.al, 2014, p.125

⁵¹ Dimitrijević, 2021, p.431

2. *Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;*
3. *Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small;*
4. *Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country;*
5. *Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the U.N;*
6. (a) *Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve particular interests or any of the big power;*
- (b) *Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries;*
7. *Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;*
8. *Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the U.N;*
9. *Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation;*
10. *Respect for justice and international obligations.*

Adopting these principles, the movement showcased that it was not ready to continue to remain passive in international politics. At a “tripartite meeting in Brioni Isles in mid-July 1956, involving President Tito, President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, it was agreed:

*“peace cannot be achieved through division, but by working for collective security on the world scale and by expanding the region of freedom, as well as by terminating the domination of one country over another.”*⁵²

NAM’s division into two major groupings: the radical and anti-western Casablanca Group and the moderate and pro-western Monrovia group fuelled the Yugoslavia leader to find an antidote for a stronger movement. However, what would be described as the main force for the voyage was the

⁵² De Prat Gay, 1980, p.20

quest to set-up a non-aligned summit prior to the 16th United Nations General Assembly meeting where leaders could discuss issues around preservation of peace, disarmament, ending colonialism, its new role in the United Nations, and form a united but clear voice which could be tabled before the superpowers as a unified stand of “third bloc” and not just five-aligned countries.⁵³ Therefore, a preparatory (19 members) NAM meeting, convened at the level of foreign ministers or their deputies, was scheduled to take place in Cairo from 5 to 12 June 1961, with a defining agenda to discuss central issues such as non-interference, peaceful cooperation, anti-colonialism, economic development, racial equality, role in the UN, and disarmament, and economic development.

Due to India’s demand on a strict participation, a critical issue that arose was determining the appropriate attendees for the conference.⁵⁴ A consensus was drawn on five criteria for participation:

"1. A country should follow an independent policy based on peaceful co-existence and non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favor of such a policy;

"2. It should consistently have supported movements for national independence;

"3. It should not be a member of multilateral military alliances concluded in the context of great power conflict. If it had conceded military bases these concessions should not have been made in the context of great power conflicts.”⁵⁵

For the consolidation of international peace and security, at the Cairo meeting, participants approved a recommended agenda for its main conference:

1. Respect of the right of peoples and nations to, self-determination; the struggle against imperialism; liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism;
2. Respect of the territorial sovereignty and integrity of states; non-interference-and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states;
3. Racial discrimination and apartheid;

⁵³ Cavoški, 2022, p.49

⁵⁴ De Prat Gay, 1980, p.20

⁵⁵ H. Jansen, 1966

4. General and complete disarmament; prohibition of nuclear experiments; problem of foreign military bases;
5. Peaceful coexistence between states with different political and social systems;
6. Role and composition of the United Nations and the implementation of its resolutions.⁵⁶

Under these guidelines, the first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was scheduled to take place in September the same year at Belgrade. Although, Nehru was pessimistic about the greater influence of the conference on achieving international peace and security, thus, resolving “international problems,” he concluded that it “could still stimulate the lessening of tensions around the world.”⁵⁷ In De Prat Gay’s analysis, it marked the first time that non-alignment was somehow defined.

Expanding the “Ten Principles,” the declaration contained twenty-seven points with a new wording “. . .to accept and practice a policy of peaceful coexistence in the world....” Elaborating on it, the declaration later stated

*“All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities. Furthermore, any attempt at imposing upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from outside is a direct threat to world peace. The participating countries consider that under such conditions the principles of peaceful coexistence are the only alternative to the "cold war" and to a possible general nuclear catastrophe.”*⁵⁸

Thus, they wished to pursue a policy independent of East and West where they would be making their own decisions on international issues. By branding every form of colonial rule racist, and any link to the West as imperialism,⁵⁹ Vital to abolish these practices, NAM was ready to collaborate with any government that aimed to bolster international peace and security.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Non-Aligned Conferences Basic Documents 1961-1975, Compiled and Published by Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies B. M. I. C. H., Colombo 7, Sri Lanka.

⁵⁷ Cavoški, 2022, p.54

⁵⁸ ibid

⁵⁹ Mišković et.al, 2014

⁶⁰ Dinkel, 2019, p.56

At Bandung, delegates expressed that colonial rule was the greatest danger to the sovereignty of states. For example, speakers highlighted the ongoing Israeli “imperialist” policy towards the Palestinians, and the oppression of the Palestinians as imperialist policies.

To ensure the stability of world peace through the recognition of rights of all nations, achievable through anti-colonial struggle, disarmament and economic advancement, at the preparatory meeting in Colombo (March 23-28, 1964), a second non-aligned conference was scheduled on 1-4 October 1964 in Cairo under the theme “Conference for Promotion of International Cooperation” or “Conference for Progress and Peace.”⁶¹ However, the conference couldn’t have been possible without the support of Algeria since there were tension between two groups, those that favoured “Second Belgrade or Second Bandung.” During the conference, a declaration was accepted based on ideas expressed in the September 1961 Belgrade declaration. The 47 participants widely expressed:

*“The principles of non-alignment, thanks to the confidence they inspire, are becoming an increasing dynamic and powerful force for the promotion of peace and the welfare of mankind.”*⁶²

To NAM members, peace was an essential precondition to resolving outstanding issues, since nothing could be accomplished during wartime. Knowing that colonialism is multifaceted, not only through military or political alliances, but also economic, NAM built interest in economic development of underdeveloped countries. It viewed it as a necessary as a countermeasure against the rise of neo-colonialism.⁶³

In open condemnation of racial discrimination and every policy of apartheid as well as the use of force⁶⁴, as against human rights and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations⁶⁵, participants endorsed Tito’s initiative and extended a formal recommendation to the UNGA to adopt the “Declaration on the Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence,” which suggested that the future of humanity should not be determined by a few great powers, rather it should be a shared responsibility among all nations, thus, making contribution to the process of codification of these

⁶¹ Cavoški, 2022, p.79

⁶² De Prat Gay, 1980, p.23

⁶³ Cavoški, 2022, p. 87

⁶⁴ Jezic, 2005

⁶⁵ Duško 2021, p.431

principles as part of international law.⁶⁶ The adoption of these principles further led to the adoption of United Nations General Assembly's resolution 1514 (XV) "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."⁶⁷

With the growing interest of building confidence on the international stage, its new recognition as the “central spokesperson” for oppressed world, the rising demands for liberation from Israel and other colonial powers in Africa, and the drive to fight the “last remnants of colonialism,” the next Conference of Heads of States or Governments of the non-aligned states was organized in September 8 -10, 1970 at Lusaka after a consultative meeting in Belgrade (8-12 July, 1969).⁶⁸ Attended by 51, customarily, a declaration, “Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Cooperation on Democratization of International Relations,” was adopted where the principles of the movements were enlarged (De Prat Gay, 1980). Cavoški described the document as

*“where for the very first time the basic political principles and goals of non-alignment were clearly and scrupulously defined and elaborated, while non-alignment was emphasized as a factor decisively standing up to all encroachments pursued by great powers.”*⁶⁹

The participants at the conference emphasized the importance of seven core principles, later increased to eight objectives of non-alignment. The new additions were primarily focused on the arms race, opposition to great power military alliances and pacts, and the strengthening of their position in favour of United Nations efficacy and the pursuit of independence.⁷⁰ To keep the movement afloat as “permanent factor in world politics” but not “just a passing phenomenon,” that could achieve its anti-imperialist motives only through the firmness of its principles, clarity of its vision and continuity of its actions, participants adopted “Resolution on the Strengthening of the Role of Non-Aligned Countries” to ensure continuity and increasing efficacy with regards to implementing decisions made at the summit. Thus, NAM emerged as a significant agency, envisioning itself as extending beyond the initial East-West divide of the global landscape.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Cavoški, 2022, p. 88

⁶⁷ *ibid*, p. 49

⁶⁸ *ibid*, p. 102

⁶⁹ *Ibid*

⁷⁰ De Prat Gay, 1980

⁷¹ Cavoški, 2022, p. 121

Having been transformed as movement that is fully consolidated in the collective struggle of the underdeveloped nations, and the Middle East also remaining as a hotspot of inter-bloc interest, thus serving as a test to NAM's coherence, at its fourth summit in Algiers on 5 to 9 September 1973, a political declaration of twenty-seven pages was adopted signalling a clear warning to both super-powers that international peace and security "rested on more than two legs."⁷² NAM threatened to take up a direct control over key global issues, thus boosting the movement's active component in both economic and political spheres. More specifically, in its "Political Declaration" and "Declaration on National Liberation," NAM expressed its strong condemnation of different colonial or racist and apartheid regimes promoted by Israel and South Africa and declared its support for national liberation movements against colonialism.⁷³ Its support on based on the recognition of the occupation of territories as a threat to international peace and security during its "Consultative Meeting" organised on July 8 to 12, 1969 at Belgrade, where participants from Arab countries demanded the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories as well as a Palestinian Independence.⁷⁴

The summit was characterized by a heightened sense of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial spirit, leading to a more critical stance towards the United States without aligning to with Moscow either. In the words of Algerian Prime Minister, NAM

*"...developed a new mood" and "it no longer feels that it is a petitioner," "it has the right to make its voice heard, and the right to demand the correction of historical inequalities," since so far "all the important decisions are made by the rich, though the consequences are often borne by the poor."*⁷⁵

In 1970s, the fifth conference of NAM, was organised in August 1976 at Colombo based on decisions made at the ministerial conference in Lima. The conference was catalysed by the two major global events, the Oil Embargo of mid-October 1973 and January 1974, and the Middle East conflict/Yom Kippur War. The Non-Aligned Movement considered the former as a weapon to try to extract Western concessions related to the latter.⁷⁶ At its V summit, the principles and objectives

⁷² Cavoški, 2022, p. 146

⁷³ *ibid*, p. 147

⁷⁴ *ibid*, p. 118

⁷⁵ *ibid*, p. 150

⁷⁶ *ibid*

of were captured in its political and economic declaration, “Action Program for Economic Cooperation” and 32 political and economic resolutions. In its Political Declaration, participants praised the consistent struggle for decolonization, and upholding the paramount principles of independence and equality.⁷⁷ It was concluded that the movement had emerged as an indispensable element in global affairs, advocating for an enhanced democratization and ending any form of domination.⁷⁸ Thus, reflecting Lenin’s prediction that “all peoples of the East” will “take part in settling questions of the whole world” and become active partakers on shaping world affairs.⁷⁹ However, due to the increasing growth in membership of the movement, it became vulnerable limiting its strengths on achieving a unified position.⁸⁰

In the early 1970s, the hopes of a “radical stabilization” of the global affairs, and the expansion of freedom into other parts of the world was rapidly fading away despite the super powers' seemingly commitment to global détente. Coupled with the increasing rise to conflicts between non-aligned members, these trends, ushered the movement into a “precarious phase,” giving rise to a new generation of radical Third World countries embracing bloc ideologies. For example, the PLO had become a Soviet political and military stronghold in the Middle East.⁸¹ After Tito’s meeting with India’s Foreign Minister, Minister Mishra, the duo decided to work together to save the basic principles of the movement without fracturing its unity. Consequently, the VI Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Havana. In a heated tension among Non-aligned States following Castro’s open attack on Anwar Sadat relating to the signing of the Camp David Accord which he regarded as a betrayal of “Palestinian rights,” for freedom and self-determination, and a move against NAM’s policies of anti-racism and decolonization, he backed Egypt’s suspension from the movement⁸² thus, presenting Cuba as “a selfless anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-racist fighter.”⁸³ However, Tito emphasized the values of unity:

“Our movement is facing key problems of the world today – issues of peace, security, development, and general progress. It expresses fundamental interests of the entire humanity, not just one part

⁷⁷ De Prat Gay, 1980, p.24

⁷⁸ Cavoški, 2022, p. 180

⁷⁹ Wünsche et.al, 1985, p. 5

⁸⁰ Cavoški, 2022, p. 185

⁸¹ *ibid*, p. 194

⁸² *ibid*, p.219

⁸³ *ibid* p.216

*of it . . . We should never lose from sight what is common to all of us and what unites us. We should oppose everything that separates us and what facilitates penetration of foreign interests into our ranks. Our permanent interest and our strategic goal in this moment is further affirmation of the basic principles of the policy of non-alignment and based on that we should strengthen solidarity, unity, and action capability of the NAM . . . Only in this way we can successfully contribute to the construction of the world we strive for”*⁸⁴

In Havana, issues relating to the “opposition to imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, Zionism, apartheid, exploitation, foreign occupation, interference, intervention, domination and hegemony”⁸⁵ were embroiled in a political and economic declaration.⁸⁶ Nonetheless, in Havana and in the years to come, each non-aligned government had to consider which shared interests and objectives still united the movement, despite the various disputes, and what additional collective actions within the movement they hoped to accomplish.⁸⁷

According to De Prat Gay (1980), quoting from Morton Kaplan's "*eight essential rules for the maintenance and the stability of the loose bipolar system*," Non-aligned nation-states ought to

1. "support the United Nations and seek to employ it to check the power of the two blocs
2. "reduce the danger of war between the two blocs
3. "adopt a neutral stance between the two blocs except when important objectives of the United Nations are at issue"

Providing summary of the principles of non-alignment, De Prat Gay (1980) also quoting from Nazli Moustafa Choucri's dissertation, *The Perceptual Base of Nonalignment*, concludes the following as the rationale of non-alignment:

- a. it enhances freedom of action in world politics.
- b. it serves to regulate interaction with the major powers.

⁸⁴ Cavoški, 2022, p.217

⁸⁵ Jezic, 2005, p. 60

⁸⁶ De Prat Gay, 1980, p.25

⁸⁷ Dinkel, 2019, p.229

- c. it satisfies the requirements of domestic politics within the context of nation-building and development;
- d. it copes with perceived threats emanating from the external environment;
- e. it is conducive to systemic stability,
- f. it accords status to its holder.

2.3 Israel and Palestine

The Struggle for Independence

With the expulsion of Jews from Palestine by Emperor Hadrian in the Second Century, the Jews settled long the shore of the Mediterranean of North Africa. However, the 12th century saw the spread the Jews to Europe leading to Europe's population explosion. For example, population increased from 3 million in 1800 to 5 million in 1850, and 12 million by 1914.⁸⁸

The appointment of the 43-year-old leader of the Nationalist Socialist German Workers Party (NAZI), Adolf Hitler, as the Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933, created unsafe haven for those without a "German blood."⁸⁹ Park posters with writings "Jews and dogs are not allowed," expanding from the themes of Hitler's "Mein Kamp" connecting world Jewry—"the personification of the devil"—to "any form of filth or profligacy." Hitler asserting that "by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord," intensified further fears among German Jews. Pornographic caricatures in "Der Stürmer" also propagated hate crimes by depicting the Jewish population as the origin of all evil. The 1931 Boxheim Documents which had already published the hidden intentions of the Nazi that "Jews would be forced to emigrate or to starve to death on the spot," street chant- "Lied der Sturmsoldaten," and the "When Jewish blood spurts from the knife, then things go even better" continued to exacerbate fears.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Jansen, 1971

⁸⁹ Penkower, 2014

⁹⁰ *ibid*, p.14

Pamphlets and posters warning the “Citizens of the State,” or Aryans (those of German blood) that the “Passover festival of the Jews is approaching,” necessitated a reaction from the Jewish Agency Executive in London to seek to obtain “Immigration Certificate” from the mandatory government to enable “some thousands of Jewish men and women from Germany, in addition to the steady stream of immigration from Eastern Europe, to enter Palestine”⁹¹ then under the administration of His Majesty’s Government (HMG). In fact, the HMG had given recognition to “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine” and to “the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.” Its origins lay in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 when Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour in a letter to Baron Walter Rothschild, gave HMG’s pledge to “use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement” of establishing in Palestine “a national home for the Jewish people.” With growing attack on the Jews, the Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann called for an annual immigration that would bring the Yishuv (Jewish Community in Palestine) up to a half million in four to five years.⁹² However, it was Ben-Gurion’s plea that the Jewish people would have “no choice but suicide” if Palestine also had no room for Jews⁹³ resulted in British authorities further facilitating immigration of Jews to Palestine⁹⁴ despite the recommendation in the Passfield’s White Paper (October 1930), which had called for a reduction in the number of immigration certificates awarded to the Jews to Palestine due to the Zionist labour policies to the “detriment of the Arab Population.” Amidst the growth of the Jews in Palestine, Arabs harbored fears that Zionists intend to take over their lands (*dunams*) either through immigration or land purchase (between 1930-1933 118,000 *dunams* of Arab were in Jewish possession), thence they must “resist this danger with all possible means in order to safeguard their existence, their religion and their religious places in the “Holy Land” with assistance from every “Muslim of the world.”⁹⁵ From May 1936, the Zionist confronted “a serious political struggle” with Arab states to “defend themselves and their national existence.”⁹⁶

⁹¹ Penkower, 2014, p.28

⁹² *ibid*

⁹³ Penkower, 2014

⁹⁴ Jansen, 1971

⁹⁵ Penkower, 2014, p.157

⁹⁶ Penkower, 2014, p.8

2.4 *The Six-Day War and Its Aftermath*

The Six-Day War of June 1967 was a watershed moment in the Palestinian struggle for independence. Israel's swift and decisive victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria resulted in the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. For Palestinians, the war was a devastating blow, leading to further displacement and the loss of the remaining Palestinian territories.⁹⁷ The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip brought nearly one million Palestinians under direct Israeli military control. The occupation also intensified the Palestinian sense of urgency and desperation, as it became clear that the Arab states were unable to defeat Israel militarily or secure Palestinian rights. The war led to a reevaluation of the Palestinian strategy, with increasing calls for an independent Palestinian leadership and a shift towards guerrilla warfare.⁹⁸

In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) underwent significant changes. The organization came under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Fatah movement, which had been carrying out guerrilla operations against Israel since the early 1960s. Arafat's rise to power marked the beginning of a new phase in the Palestinian struggle, characterized by greater assistance from the Arab states and a focus on armed struggle as the primary means of achieving liberation.⁹⁹ Under its new leader, the PLO adopted a more aggressive and confrontational approach launching cross-border attacks and hijackings, aiming to bring international attention to the Palestinian cause for independence. The PLO also sought to establish a base of operations in Jordan and Lebanon, where a large Palestinian population resided, and from which they could launch attacks into Israel.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Morris, 2004

⁹⁸ Smith, 2010

⁹⁹ Rubin, 1994

¹⁰⁰ Cobban, 1984

2.5 An Interlocking Relationship-LAS and NAM

To understand NAM and its discussions on Palestinian requires taking into consideration the Arab League.¹⁰¹ Formed on 1945 by seven Arab nations (later members of the NAM), Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen following the London Conference of 1939 organized by Britain, between Arab and Jewish Delegation to investigate alternatives to the partition of Palestine,” the birth of League of Arab States (LAS) was to reflect the objective of pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamic solidarity.

Although, the league had focused on other international issues, yet its main concern was Arab affairs.¹⁰² Following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 through the adoption of United Nations General Assembly (GA) Resolution 181, Israel began to face attacks from Arab nations. The resentment of Arab nations owed to the LAS founding principles of treating every aggression towards any Arab nation as an aggression against all.¹⁰³ At the conference, LAS had attributed Israel as a seedbed of imperialism.

Since the NAM was driven by desire to eliminate all relics of colonialism, and considered colonialism and racism as basic evils of mankind, the League perceived NAM conferences as an arena of discussion about Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism.¹⁰⁴ The late birth of the league does not presuppose these Arab nations only became entangled with the Palestinian struggle for independence only after 1945. Prior to the formation of the League, Arab nations had remained committed to the Palestinian fight for self-determination in the 1920s.¹⁰⁵ However, it was from 1944 and 1947 that Arab delegates focused mainly on Palestinian self-determination in order to claim Palestine as an Arab territory; It was the plight of Palestinians for national freedom that brought Arab nations together.¹⁰⁶ Nonetheless, the leagues’ commitment to the struggle became stronger after the signing of 1950 Arab Defense pact which instructed members to treat acts of aggression against any member state as an act against all. With the goal “to promote equality

¹⁰¹ Mišković et.al, 2014

¹⁰² Mišković et.al, 2014

¹⁰³ Ojo, 1981

¹⁰⁴ Mišković et.al, 2014

¹⁰⁵ Mayer, 1986

¹⁰⁶ Mišković et.al, 2014, p.167

between nations and fight any kind of foreign domination,”¹⁰⁷ LAS connected its fight against Zionism with NAM’s valuation of national liberation movements as an element of the common endeavor of people for freedom, peace, and justice. At its delegates meetings held in Cairo on October 1948, discussions surrounded around the consequences of the creation of Israel, wherein two questions had to be answered: Could the League welcome a Palestinian nation? And could a Palestinian State be recognized? And how could Arab countries defend themselves against Israeli attack?¹⁰⁸

With the rise in Zionist colonialism in late 1950s, LAS became heavily occupied by the goal of delegitimizing the expansionist ideology of a Jewish state-Israel. It was in this moment that the league began to pursue a special interest in the movement. To the League, the fight against colonialism required joining other Asian and African countries on the fight against decolonization and discrimination as threat to global peace. In the opening speech of Iraqi’s prime minister at the Bandung Conference, Fâdil al-Jamâlî stated

*“There are three international forces in the world today that disturb peace and harmony, and that need to be handled with realism and determination, the first is what we call old time colonialism... and the second disturbing force in the world is that of Zionism.... It is one of the blackest and darkest chapters in human history. It is the worst offspring of imperialism, for imperialism includes occupation, partition, subjugation and moral disintegration of lands and people’s which are ruled by it.”*¹⁰⁹

Additionally, addressing participants at Bandung, the Syrian delegation led by Khâhlid al-Âzm, the minister of foreign affairs:

*“There can be no peace with imperialism, aggression, and lack of freedom.... [Israel is] a pocket left behind the line of imperialism in its desperate retreat”*¹¹⁰

At the conference, they entreated Afro-Asian countries to fight colonialism and imperialism, through solidarity. Nasser advocated:

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p.167

¹⁰⁸ Mišković et.al, 2014, p.169

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p.172

¹¹⁰ Ibid

*“the condemnation of imperialism by twenty states in Africa and Asia which represent half of the population of the globe ... will have a significant impact on the liberation movements of Arabs.”*¹¹¹

Although, Nehru, did not reject the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, he warned the Arab delegation that the danger to them came not from Israel but from the larger, more powerful forces behind the state.¹¹² According to Jamâlî, the Bandung Conference was the first time that Zionism was declared as a colonial ideology. Speaking after the conference in May 1955, Khâhlid al-Âzm concluded that there was a progressive fight for liberation of Palestine.¹¹³

As Members of OPEC, Arab states held a considerable degree of economic and political authority within the NAM. Through the provision of substantial bilateral aid, particularly to sub-Saharan countries, it took advantage of its power to gain support for their struggle against Israel. Consequently, their political unity with other non-aligned states and their newly acquired economic might, an increasing number of non-aligned states endorsed their political demands during the 1970s.¹¹⁴

2.6 The Relationship between Non-Aligned Movement And the State of Israel in pre-1960

As most NAM members were still grappling with colonialism, Nasser’s support for the liberation movement of African and Asian countries were “based on the United Arab Republic's anti-imperialist policy and [the belief] that it was the responsibility and the duty of those nations which had achieved freedom to aid the new comers.”¹¹⁵ Egypt, in the early years of anti-imperialism had granted many African states such as Nigeria, Uganda, Somalia, Kenya, Guinea, and Senegal to use the Cairo-based "Voice of Free Africa" to spread anti-imperialist propaganda throughout the African continent.¹¹⁶ Additionally, at UN, Arab states continued its support for Africa’s liberation. For example, it contributed to the solidarity fund which was to be used to fight against apartheid in South Africa and built generous bilateral aid to sub-Saharan countries.¹¹⁷ It is under this

¹¹¹ El-Khawas, 1975

¹¹² Jansen, 1971, p.xiv

¹¹³ Mišković et.al, 2014, p.176

¹¹⁴ Cavoški, 2022

¹¹⁵ El-Khawas, 1975, p.33

¹¹⁶ ibid, p.34

¹¹⁷ Dinkel, 2019

impression of “indebtedness,” which would cause most NAM members to stay loyal to Egypt’s advocacy for solidarity towards the Palestinians especially in the 1970s despite the demise of the Egyptian leader.

At the Bandung conference, Nasser equated Palestine question to the Third World struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism. This would lead to the adoption of a resolution by the twenty-nine members present at the conference to declare their support for the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.¹¹⁸

For NAM, Israel was a new form of colonialist which perpetuated the subjugation of Palestinian people and the denial of their right to self-determination. Against this background, Israel begun to compete with other Arab nations for African and Asian friendship. Its aim was to counteract Arabs influence on the continent.¹¹⁹ Amongst its most strategic and essential partner in the movement were African states. Israeli leaders feared that without an action, emerging African states would cooperate with Arabs in supporting the Palestine cause for self-determination at the international front, specifically the United Nations.

To demonstrate to other Non-Aligned African member states what Israel could do for newly independent African states, in 1957, Israel signed its first a treaty of friendship on African soil with Ghana by providing economic and technical assistance.¹²⁰ As Zach notes, “these projects made a great impression upon other African leaders.”¹²¹ Between the late fifties and early sixties, Israel had expanded its foreign policy to other non-aligned member states, however it stayed away from Muslim-dominated nations-states such as Mauritania, Algeria, and Somalia. Oded asserts that between this period Israel built friendly relationships with thirty-three Africa States; Israeli embassies in Africa was about half of its embassies in the world. Nonetheless, in late June 1958 in Cairo, Nkrumah issued a joint communique with Nasser urging a 'Just solution to the Palestine.’¹²²

However, relationship between Israel and African countries survived only for three years after the Casablanca and Belgrade Conference of 1961. Although Arab Nations continued to solicit for

¹¹⁸ Kahin, 1955

¹¹⁹ Levey, 2003

¹²⁰ Botchway, 2021

¹²¹ Zach, 2004

¹²² Oded, 2010

support for the Palestinian cause, in the 1950s, its call for solidarity did not receive much attention by NAM members until 1970s.¹²³ For example, in Accra on April 1958, at the Conference of Independent States (CIAS), “African Bandung,” Ghanaian officials such as Kojo Botsio and the likes, rejected Arab demands for a debate on Palestine.¹²⁴

El-Khawas (1975) even points further that African nations were suddenly thrown into a cross-current between Israel and the Arab nations by the end of the 1950s. This is owned to the fact that most had gained support from Arab states during the decolonization struggle whilst it continued to receive military, economic and developmental assistance from Israel. This would make most African States stay non-aligned to the long-standing conflict between Palestine and Israel and try to keep it out of the African politics. African non-aligned members aimed to keep friendly ties with both Israel and the Arab states. With other non-African member states of the movement, such as Yugoslavia, Tito continued to build a friendly relationship with Israel vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. However, in the mid-1950s, its relationship with Israel began to severe. Tito also wished to be regarded as a neutral leader, pursuing the positive neutrality policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As Abadi later points out, Tito aimed to maintain an image of an impartial observer whose aim was to help achieve a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹²⁵ In contrast, Nehru’s India continued to maintain its pro-Arab policy towards Israel from 1940s up until the late 1980s. As seen in 1947, India voted against Resolution 181. Additionally, when Israel was formed in 1948, India had opposed its formation.¹²⁶ In fact, out of the 11 members of UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), formed on May 15, 1947, only three members, Iran, India and Yugoslavia, who were later to be pillars of the NAM movement voted against the majority proposal which sought to partition Palestine. The three countries had made minority proposal calling “for the establishment of a federal Palestine with internal autonomy for the Jews.”¹²⁷

¹²³ Dinkel, 2019

¹²⁴ Botchway, 2021

¹²⁵ Cavoški, 2022

¹²⁶ Hafeez, 2009

¹²⁷ *ibid*

2.7 A betrayal of friendship (Non-Aligned Movement's commitment with the Palestinian Cause) in post 1960

The year 1960 can be characterized as a watershed in the relationship between Israel and the NAM members. Israel began to feel betrayed by its friend countries. Even those NAM members who continued to maintain a diplomatic relationship with Israel did so clandestinely but their abhorrence for Israel's treatment of Palestine became fully fledged in the early 1970s.

The determination of newly independent non-aligned states to put an end to all colonial rule led 25 countries to a six-day conference, September 1-6, 1961, at Belgrade-Yugoslavia. Amongst the many topics which were on the agenda was Israel's imperialist policy towards the Arab state-Palestine.¹²⁸ Although the topic remained on the agenda, Arab states failed to garner enough support for a resolution calling for sanctions against Israel for its operation in Palestine. In fact, as newly independent states and new members to UN who had ratified the UN Charter, NAM saw the resolution to Palestinian crisis which threatened international peace and security more as a UN role. However, following the African States meeting in Casablanca-Morocco on January 6, three African states, Ghana, Mali, and Guinea, joined Morocco and Egypt in connecting Palestinians fight for self-determination with the theme of African state's efforts to defend its independence and security. These states, here in called "allied group" equated Israel's aggression against the Palestinians with neo-colonialism. To further express their disgust, they considered Israel as an instrument of imperialism and neo-colonialism not only on Middle East but also in Asia and Africa.¹²⁹ In 1961, these nations had recognized Palestinian violence towards Israel, as was the case in the 1956 war, as an important quality and ingredient in every struggle for liberation.

The many meetings that Nasser had had with non-aligned members between 1962 and 1964 rendered the Cairo conference of October 1964 as not necessary to most non-aligned countries. El-Khawas argues that NAM members distaste for the meeting was due to two reasons. Firstly, the tensions between Egypt and the pro-Western Saudi-Arabia over who was to lead the Arab world.¹³⁰ Secondly, as conflicts with Israel grew more frequent, the Egyptian government's options became more limited, leading to the establishment of close ties with the Soviet Union. With Egypt's new

¹²⁸ Dinkel, 2019, p.100

¹²⁹ El-Khawas, 1975, p.35

¹³⁰ El-Khawas, 1975

close relationship with Moscow contrasting non-aligned movement's interest of neither being pro-western nor pro-soviet, NAM members saw Egypt as a threat to the principles or values of the movement as captured in the Bandung's five principles.

Although, both Arab nations and the allied group had openly registered their resentment against David Ben-Gurion's treatment of Palestinians, Israel continued to maintain a friendly relation with the NAM's African members. However, some NAM members still saw the importance of remaining neither pro-western (Israel was seen as western ally) nor pro-soviet. Nonetheless, during NAM's conference in Cairo in 1964, NAM members endorsed two proposals relating to Palestine:

1. "The full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland, end their inalienable right to self-determination
2. The "full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism."¹³¹

To the movement, Israel was the symbol of imperialism. The mass support of NAM members towards Palestinian cause could also be attributed to the League of Nation's step-up game to support the liberation of South African from apartheid.

The year between 1967 and 1973 can be marked as a major caesura in the movement's pursuit of Palestinians' self-liberation struggle. Amidst the Six-Day War (June 5 and June 10, 1967), NAM members such as Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon and Mauritania, who later became part of the "Ten African Sages," continued to call for a cease fire between the Arab nations and Israel. The resentment of NAM toward Israel's actions towards Palestine led the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)¹³² to be recognized by NAM as the legitimate government of the Palestinian People in 1964.

NAM's relevance on the Palestinian Question was also seen in the 5th UNGA Emergency meeting where 14 of a total of 32 Non-Aligned African States members joined Egypt and Yugoslavia's

¹³¹ El-Khawas, 1975

¹³² In 1964, the Arab League established the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a means of coordinating the Palestinian struggle and giving it a unified political and military leadership. The PLO was initially dominated by the Arab states, particularly Egypt, and its first leader, Ahmed Shukeiri, was appointed by Nasser. The organization's creation was part of a broader effort by the Arab states to assert control over the Palestinian issue and prevent it from becoming an independent force that could challenge their own regimes.

resolution which called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in Palestine. These countries were Burundi, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo- Kinshasa, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Eight states (Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi and Togo) joined Israel in voting against the resolution. Ten nations abstained from voting in an attempt to avoid any entanglement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Conversely, a better united front was seen amongst NAM members after the passage of UNSC Resolution 242 in November 1967.¹³³ In December 1971, with a majority of NAM members voting affirmatively, an anti-Israeli draft resolution was sent to the UNGA, as an Afro-Asian resolution to support UNSC Resolution 242.¹³⁴

Due to NAM's new commitment to Egypt's long-standing call for a more coherent political solidarity towards Palestinians, the "Rabat Resolution" was adopted in 1972 demanding that Israel withdraw from every Arab and African territory which it captured in 1967. At the Lusaka conference in 1970, the announcement of Sri Lanka's Sirimavo Bandaranaike about his intentions to stop its diplomatic relationship with Israel led to the sharp decline of friendly foreign policy between Israel and many NAM members. Cuba, Sri Lanka, India and 28 of the 32 African states broke their diplomatic relations with Israel between 1971 and 1973. Additionally, Non-aligned states pledged material and financial support for PLO. It allowed PLO to participate in their conferences as observers, but later granted PLO a full membership to NAM in 1975 thus giving it an international platform to let their political demand to be heard by a broader public.¹³⁵

During NAM's Algeria conference in 1973, members equated Palestinians' fights to anti-imperialist struggle. At the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in early October 1973, NAM continued to support the PLO's use of force which is evident in NAM pushing for the adoption of resolution 3070 On November 30, 1973, justifying that the usage of armed struggle is a legitimate means of pursuing self-determination. I must point here that, the increase in support for the Palestinian question can also be attributed to the oil crisis of 1973 where most NAM member needed oil from Arab nations to meet the national demand. In 1974, the movement also pushed for the adoption of UNGA Resolution 3237 which granted the PLO Permanent Observer status.¹³⁶ Through the hard efforts

¹³³ Obed, 2010, p.13

¹³⁴ Obed, 2010, p.13

¹³⁵ Ojo, 1981

¹³⁶ *ibid*

of NAM countries, a further UN resolution, resolution 3236, helped in recognizing Palestine's demand for self-determination. Thus, Resolution 3236 contributed to majority of the GA recognizing the legitimacy of PLO's demand. Worthy to bring to notice is that prior to the Colombo (Sri Lanka) conference in 1976, NAM members had met in Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975 where they condemned Zionism as a threat to global peace and called on every country to boycott Israel and any disgust any ideology embedded with racism and imperialism.

To push further on its demands in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, during the 30th UNGA, NAM states although faced huge backlash from Western government succeeded in calling for the passage of Resolution 3379 in November 1975 entitled "Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination" which generated enough attention around the world although was later to be revoked in 1991. To make worse, ahead of the NAM's meeting in Havana (Cuba) in 1979, the president of Uganda, Idi Amin, called for Israel's expulsion from the United Nations at the GA because it viewed Israeli policy towards the Palestinians as colonial rule and a form of apartheid.¹³⁷

2.8 Normative Power Theory

Normative Power Theory (NPT) offers a compelling lens to the influence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) towards global peace and security particularly in conflict scenarios like the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

Debates surrounding normative power have predominantly remained within the academic realm, originating from the concept of 'normative power Europe' which suggests that only the European Union (EU) possesses normative power.¹³⁸ However, Janusch contends that once redefined through relationalism and the inclusion of shared practices, this concept can be applied to actors beyond the EU.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Ojo, 1981

¹³⁸ Garlick & Qin, 2023

¹³⁹ Janusch, 2016

The notion of normative power implies that a regional organization is not only built on a normative foundation but also predisposed to act normatively in global politics.¹⁴⁰ Normativity is defined as what is considered ‘normal’ in international relations,¹⁴¹ reflecting a sense of standardization.¹⁴² Central to normative goals is the promotion of peace, human rights, international law, and the rule of law. This necessitates the normalization of rules and values in global affairs through noncoercive means.¹⁴³

It posits that an actor's power in international relations stems from its ability to shape norms and values, allowing actors to influence the norms, values, and standards governing international behavior.¹⁴⁴ and coordinates interactions around concepts like justice.¹⁴⁵

Unlike Manners, who argued that creating international standards is possible only through promoting universal norms, Sjursen identified three criteria for identifying normative power.¹⁴⁶ First, it promotes universal norms—those accepted by participants. Norms are formed through ideas that “shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations.”¹⁴⁷ Norm creation through regional cooperation aims to establish a “community of practice,” involving normative justification rather than material incentives or force.¹⁴⁸

In contrast to traditional conceptions of power, which emphasize military and economic capabilities, Normative Power Theory (NPT) centers on the diffusion of norms. Unlike military power, which relies on material means to enforce rules or standards, normative power utilizes ideational means, such as emulation, to propagate norms. Contrary to Lenz's criteria, Manners delineates three mechanisms by which normative power is promoted: contagion, informational diffusion, and procedural diffusion. Contagion refers to the unintentional spread of norms as a consequence of a normative power's mere presence or actions. Informational diffusion involves the deliberate dissemination of norms through communication and advocacy, including public statements, diplomatic efforts, and strategic media usage. Procedural diffusion occurs when norms

¹⁴⁰ Janusch, 2016

¹⁴¹ Manners, 2002, p. 32

¹⁴² Kumar, 2008

¹⁴³ *ibid*

¹⁴⁴ Manners, 2009

¹⁴⁵ Popitz, 2020

¹⁴⁶ Sjursen, 2006a and 2006b

¹⁴⁷ Manners, 2002, p. 239

¹⁴⁸ Garlick & Qin, 2023

are institutionalized through formal processes, such as international treaties, the creation of new institutions, or the embedding of norms within organizational practices.¹⁴⁹ Persuasion, in the context of promoting shared practices, necessitates constructive engagement, multilateral and plurilateral dialogue, and the institutionalization of relations.¹⁵⁰ This engagement can manifest in two ways: the conferral of prestige or the attribution of shame by other participants. Prestige may be granted through public declarations of support and inclusion within the international community, whereas shame might involve public condemnation or symbolic penalties.¹⁵¹

A second criterion for normative power is adherence to law, positing that the pursuit of norms is legitimate when it aligns with established legal principles. A normative foreign policy is defined by both normative goals and means. Thus, a normative power adheres to and promotes international law, thereby binding itself to these legal frameworks. In contrast, actors devoid of normative goals or means may pursue imperialist or realist foreign policies.¹⁵² For normative justification to be compelling, the principles being advanced must be perceived as legitimate, coherent, and consistently applied. The legitimacy of principles in international relations derives from established conventions, treaties, or agreements, especially those central to the UN system. Coherence refers to the degree to which differing principles and practices are logically consistent and non-contradictory, while consistency pertains to the uniform application of these principles both within the promoting entity and in its external actions.¹⁵³

The initial phase of earning recognition involves the normative power issuing a discursive signal to targeted actors in an effort to shape specific practices. Should these actors broadly agree, they engage in the shared practice, adapting the initiative to align with their beliefs, rules, and interests. This process allows them to participate while negotiating adaptations to meet their expectations and demands, with the normative power viewing itself as a 'force for good.'¹⁵⁴ A normative power is acknowledged when it refrains from employing material force in its discourse and creates a credible environment where weaker actors perceive an absence of coercion and feel they are on

¹⁴⁹ Manners, 2002

¹⁵⁰ Janusch, 2016

¹⁵¹ Manners, 2009

¹⁵² Tocci, 2008

¹⁵³ Manners, 2009

¹⁵⁴ Janusch, 2016

equal footing.¹⁵⁵ A normative power is recognized by others as one that abstains from the use of material force in the discourse itself, and is able to create a credible situation in which weaker actors sense no coercion and feel themselves on an equal footing.¹⁵⁶

Finally, the results of the shared practice may then reshape the initiative, leading to the final stage. Negative or unmet outcomes can undermine the recognition of a normative power. In the dynamic and complex international environment, normative powers exhibit 'constructive vulnerability,' wherein recognition is "tentative and revocable." Targeted actors may emphasize localized claims, introduce new demands, or provide feedback on the shared practice, prompting the norm-diffuser to negotiate and modify the initiative to regain recognition. This iterative process, wherein the definition of what is 'normal' is co-produced through shared practice, involves the norm-diffuser continually negotiating recognition through co-constitution, renegotiation, and localization.¹⁵⁷

2.8.1 Key components of NPT

1. **Persuasion:** The ability to convince other actors to adopt certain norms through dialogue and argumentation.
2. **Example-setting:** Leading by example in adherence to norms, thereby encouraging others to follow suit.
3. **Advocacy:** Actively promoting specific norms and values in international forums and diplomatic interactions.
4. **Diffusion:** Spreading norms through institutional mechanisms, education, and policy frameworks.

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*

¹⁵⁶ Janusch, 2016

¹⁵⁷ Garlick & Qin, 2023

2.7.2 The intersection of Non-Alignment and Normative Power Theory

Normative Power Theory (NPT) provides a unique perspective in the way that non-aligned states used their stance to promote certain norms and values amidst the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. While non-alignment originally focused on avoiding superpower influence, it also involved the active promotion of principles such as sovereignty, peace, independence/freedom, and equitable development.

This integration sheds light on how non-aligned members applied non-alignment not only as a strategic stance or policy but also as a normative practice to influence global norms and values.

Non-aligned members often engaged in normative power by advocating for a multipolar world order. The movement's efforts in international forums, such as the United Nations, aimed to establish norms that counterbalance the dominance of major powers and promote a more just and balanced international system. The NAM emphasized principles such as peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs—norms that stood in contrast to the prevailing realpolitik of the era.

2.8.3 Normative Principles of the NAM

The NAM's normative framework is grounded in several key principles:

1. **Anti-Colonialism:** Advocacy for the rights of peoples under colonial rule to self-determination and independence.

In the 20th century, anti-colonialism emerged as a significant political and ideological force advocating for the rights of peoples under colonial rule to self-determination and independence. Emerging in an era marked by the decolonization of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, anti-colonialism was both a reaction to the oppressive structures of colonialism and an assertion of the inherent right of all peoples to determine their own political, economic, and social destinies.

At its core, NAM challenged the legitimacy of colonial rule, which it justified through ideologies of racial superiority, economic exploitation, and cultural domination. NAM

believed that colonialism violated fundamental human rights, particularly the right to self-determination—a principle enshrined in international law and articulated in the United Nations Charter.

Anti-colonialism within the NAM was not just a political stance but also a moral imperative. It underscored the belief that true independence and sovereignty could only be achieved through the dismantling of colonial structures and the establishment of governance systems that reflected the will of the people. This advocacy extended to the Palestinian cause, where the NAM framed the struggle against Israeli occupation as a continuation of the broader fight against colonialism, emphasizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and statehood.

In conclusion, anti-colonialism within the framework of the NAM was a driving force for global decolonization, advocating for the rights of oppressed peoples to determine their futures free from external domination. This principle not only shaped the NAM's policies but also left an indelible mark on the post-colonial world order, contributing to the reconfiguration of international relations based on equality, justice, and respect for sovereignty.

2. **Sovereignty and Non-Interference:** Respect for the sovereignty of all states and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Rooted in the belief that all states have the right to govern themselves without external interference, these principles guided NAM's approach to global diplomacy and conflict resolution since its inception.

Sovereignty refers to the full right and power of a state to govern itself without outside influence. This includes making laws, conducting foreign policy, and managing internal affairs (Jackson, 1990). To the movement sovereignty was not just a legal concept but a hard-won right. It symbolized autonomy and the end of external control, marking their entry as equal members into the international community.

Non-interference asserts that no state should interfere in the internal affairs of another. It includes avoiding actions that might undermine a nation's political independence, economic systems, or cultural identity. For NAM members, non-interference was a critical

safeguard against the resurgence of neocolonial practices, where powerful nations sought to exert control through economic, political, or military means (Singh, 1980). NAM argued that interventions violated the sovereign rights of states and often exacerbated conflicts rather than resolving them. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the NAM opposed foreign interference that undermined the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

By championing sovereignty and non-interference, the NAM sought to promote a more equitable international system where states, regardless of size or power, could pursue their own paths to development and peace. These principles remained central to the NAM's policy, advocating for a world where respect for national sovereignty is paramount and international relations are governed by mutual respect and cooperation.

3. **Peaceful Coexistence:** Promotion of peaceful coexistence among states with different political and social systems.

The principle of peaceful coexistence was a foundational within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). NAM advocated for the harmonious existence of states with diverse political, economic, and social systems, underscoring the importance of respecting sovereignty while avoiding conflict. For the movement, peaceful coexistence provided a pragmatic approach to navigating global tensions while promoting stability.

At its core, peaceful coexistence is predicated on the belief that despite profound ideological differences, states can engage in constructive dialogue and diplomacy to resolve disputes and foster mutual respect. The principle emphasizes the primacy of negotiation, compromise, and non-aggression in international relations (Wright, 1955). NAM's peaceful coexistence was both a diplomatic strategy and a safeguard for their sovereignty. It was aware of the risks posed by external interventions and was committed to preserving their autonomy while pursuing development and maintaining regional and global peace.

The NAM's commitment to peaceful coexistence reflected in its consistent support for policies that promoted non-aggression, respect for territorial integrity, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This principle was deeply intertwined with the movement's broader

objectives of decolonization and the establishment of a more just and equitable international order. By advocating for peaceful coexistence, the NAM sought to mitigate global tensions, particularly those exacerbated by superpower rivalry, and to prevent smaller nations from being drawn into larger geopolitical conflicts. NAM's advocacy for the respect of international law of friendly relations between Israel and Palestine underscored its commitment to fostering a peaceful resolution that respected the rights to self-determination and security for both Israelis and Palestinians.

4. **Disarmament:** Advocacy for disarmament and the reduction of military expenditures.

Disarmament refers to the reduction or elimination of a country's military forces and weaponry, with a focus on preventing armed conflicts and promoting global peace (Mohammed, 1999).

Its disarmament advocacy was also influenced by the Cold War context, during which the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union posed a significant threat to global peace. The movement called for comprehensive disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, to reduce the risks associated with superpower rivalry and to prevent smaller states from being drawn into these conflicts. NAM's leaders frequently emphasized that true security could not be achieved through the accumulation of weapons but rather through mutual trust, dialogue, and the equitable distribution of resources. Within, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, NAM highlighted the dangers of militarization and the arms trade, advocating for a reduction in arms supplies to Israel as a means to de-escalate tensions and pave the way for a peaceful resolution. Disarmament, as promoted by the NAM, thus reflected a broader vision of international security, where peace and development take precedence over military might.

5. **Equitable International Order:** Striving for a more equitable international economic and political order.

Hettne, (2007) postulates that equitable international order is rooted in the belief that global peace and stability can only be achieved through the establishment of a fair and just international system, where all nations, regardless of their economic or military power,

have equal opportunities to participate in global governance and share in the benefits of economic development

NAM pushed for a more democratic and inclusive international system. The movement emphasized the importance of multilateralism and the need for greater representation of developing countries in international decision-making bodies. NAM's commitment to non-alignment reflected a desire to create a global order where smaller and weaker states were not forced to align with powerful blocs but could pursue independent paths that reflected their own interests. NAM's call for an equitable international order has translated into strong support for Palestinian self-determination and opposition to what the movement viewed as the unjust and disproportionate power dynamics in the region. NAM's stance underscored its broader commitment to justice, fairness, and the equitable treatment of all nations and peoples within the international system. By advocating for a more equitable international economic and political order, NAM sought to address the structural inequalities that perpetuate conflict and underdevelopment, striving to create a world where peace, justice, and prosperity are accessible to all.

These principles not only guided NAM's internal cohesion but also its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. NAM's normative power can be characterized to be based on its commitment to act in accordance with “world values” as established through United Nations resolutions and the movement's established standards achieved through shared practices and principles through constant “localization process in interactions.” NAM's normative norms can be grouped under two main categories:

(a) Advocacy for Palestinian Self-Determination

One of the core aspects of the NAM's normative power in the Israeli-Palestinian context was its unwavering support for Palestinian self-determination. The movement consistently advocated for the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-governance and statehood. This stance was rooted in NAM's broader anti-colonial and anti-imperialist ethos.

1. **Support in International Forums:** NAM used platforms such as the United Nations to advocate for Palestinian rights. Notably, NAM member states played a significant role in

the UN General Assembly's adoption of resolutions supporting Palestinian self-determination and condemning Israeli occupation.

2. **Recognition of the PLO:** In 1974, the NAM recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, bolstering the PLO's international standing and its ability to engage diplomatically.

(b) Promotion of International Law and UN Resolutions

The NAM's engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was characterized by a strong emphasis on international law and adherence to UN resolutions. This normative stance was evident in several key areas:

1. **Condemnation of Occupation:** The NAM consistently condemned Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories following the 1967 Six-Day War, citing international law principles, including the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war.
2. **Support for UN Resolutions:** NAM member states advocated for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 242 (1967), which called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and the recognition of every state's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
3. **Human Rights Advocacy:** The NAM highlighted human rights violations in occupied territories, calling for international accountability and the protection of civilian populations.

Chapter three

RESEARCH METHOD

3.0 Introduction

This chapter captures the research methodology that was used to collect data. It also explains how the data collected was analyzed. The chapter contains a number of sections namely, research design, sampling procedures, sample size, methods of data collection, validity, reliability, methods of data analysis, operational definition of variables and the summary.

3.1 Research Design

The research used a mixed method adopting both qualitative and quantitative methods. This study was exploratory research by use of a case study methodology. The choice of methodology was inspired by the desire to collect an in-depth knowledge about the NAM's role in addressing the protracted and complex conflict, a crisis which has received little attention from scholars in the field of Global Studies. The methodology offered the researcher insight into NAM's strategies, actions, and their outcomes, thereby offering an understanding of its impact on the conflict. By scrutinizing these dimensions, this research presented a comprehensive and nuanced evaluation of the Non-Aligned Movement's part in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis from 1955 to 1983, thereby contributing to a deeper comprehension of its effort to buffer world peace and security.

This methodology was also economical due to limited resources available to do a large-scale search. The method was efficient in collecting information on unexplored topic and gaining an in-depth knowledge on a specific real-world subject. This method is also economical due to the limited period for the submission of this thesis and the limited resources available to do a large-scale search.

Historical Analysis was employed to examine NAM's evolution and principles which guided its policy actions. Data was gathered through a review of primary sources: NAM declarations,

resolutions, and official communications, as well as existing academic literatures. Data collection also involved archival research from UN archives, and national archives of five key NAM member states. Online databases and digital archives were also utilized to access relevant historical documents. Zald argues that archival work provides a basis for defining key questions, and establishes a base of evidence.¹⁵⁸ Quantitative techniques were utilized to understand the voting pattern of the Head of States and Government during United Nations General Assembly meetings in regard to significant resolutions. Secondary sources, such as academic literatures were utilized to provide additional context and perspective.

3.2 Sampling procedure

Purposive sampling was used to select record from NAM meetings and United Nations Archives for this research. Three criteria were considered for sampling of the relevant documents:

1. On specific time periods: The researcher identified three key historic moments relevant to this study: the 1967 (Six-Day War) which was an attempt “to abort the Jewish national revival” (Karsh, 2017) and 1973 (Yom Kippur War). Here a total of 16 documents were identified ranging from declaration to resolution. Under this criterion, the researcher also evaluated the Brioni document of 1956 and 1961 Political Declaration for better conceptual analysis of NAM-Israeli-Palestinian crisis nexus.
2. Particular document types: The researcher visited UN digital archives to gather all letters that were submitted by the moment to United Nations. This helped the researcher in analysing the statements by NAM on the conflict. More particularly, it was helpful in drawing a link between decisions made at its meetings and those that it made at United Nations.

Through UN digital archives, data was gathered by using phrases and words. The “Advanced Search” tool was utilized where keywords were entered in its search engine to filter documents:

¹⁵⁸ Zald, 1993

Palestine. Palestinian Question, NAM, and Non-aligned Movement. Available documents were further filtered by keying in the relevant case period.

In order to answer my research questions, I further collated UN resolutions to understand the voting pattern of the movement. Gathering of the resolutions was limited to those that were captured in NAM documents. A total of 12 resolutions were identified. Reference was also paid to reports of UN special Investigation Committee captured in NAM document.

3. A focus on thematic areas. This criterion was also introduced to identity relevant documents that captured NAM's stance on Palestinian fight for self-determination. Additionally, attention was paid to materials related to NAM's efforts to influence UN resolutions. The latter was possible through sampling of all resolutions captured under NAM's categories, "Question on Palestine" and "Middle East." A total of 35 resources were identified.

Snowballing sampling was utilized to identify and gather literature. This technique helped in gathering enough data useful for the study. This technique was also useful in identifying other resolutions within United Nations digital archives that the Non-Aligned Movement had contributed to its adoption. It was useful in understanding

Although sampling was based on the researchers' judgment, the technique was employed to helped in selecting information rich in the case for an in-depth study.

3.3 Overview of *Sampled documents*

Criteria	Date (MM.YYYY)	Meeting Location	NAM Archives
CRITERION 1 <i>On specific time periods</i>			
1967 (Six-Day War)	09.1961	Belgrade, Yugoslavia	Declaration of The Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries

	10.1964	Cairo, Egypt	Programme for Peace and International Cooperation
	07.1969	Belgrade, Yugoslavia	Consultative Meeting of Special Government Representatives
	04.1970	Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania	Preparatory Meeting of for Third Conference
	09.1970	Lusaka	Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Cooperation and Democratization of International Relations
	09.1970	Lusaka, Zambia	Resolution on Middle East.
	09.1970	Lusaka, Zambia	Resolution on Disarmament
1973 (Yom Kippur War)	03.1974	Algiers, Algeria	Final Document Coordinating Bureau of NAM
	03.1974	Algiers, Algeria	Declaration on the Middle East and The Question of Palestine
	03.1975	Havana, Cuba	Final Declaration
	03.1975	Havana, Cuba	Resolution on Palestine
	08.1975	Lima, Peru	Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensity Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among NAM countries

	08.1975	Lima, Peru	Resolution on the Question of Palestine
	08.1975	Lima, Peru	Resolution on Middle East and the Occupied Arab Territories.
	05 – 06.1976	Algeria	Final Communique
	8.1976	Colombo, Sri Lanka	Political Declaration

CRITERION 2 <i>Particular document types</i>				
Resolution No	Plenary/ Cttee/UN body	Meeting	Meeting Record/ Date/ Press Release/ Vote	Topic
A/RES/3236(XXIX)	Plenary	29 th session	A/PV.2296 22 Nov. 1974 89-8-37	Question of Palestine
A/RES/3379(XXX)	C.3	General Assembly at its 30th session	A/PV.2296 22 Nov. 1974 95-17-19	Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination
A/RES/3375(XXX)	Plenary	General Assembly at its 30th session	A/PV.2399 10 Nov. 1975 101-8-25	Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East
A/RES/3376(XXX)	Plenary	30 th	A/PV.2399 10 Nov. 1975 93-18-27	Question of Palestine

A/RES/194(III)	C.1	3 rd session	A/PV.186 11 Dec. 1948 35-15-8	Palestine - progress report of the United Nations Mediator
A/RES/32/91	SPC	32 nd	A/32/PV.101 13 Dec. 1977	Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories
A/RES/33/28 A-C	Plenary	33 rd Session	A/33/PV.73 7 Dec. 1978	Question of Palestine
A/RES/ES-7/2	N/A	GA 8 TH Emergency Special Session	A/ES-7/PV.11 29 July 1980 112-7-24	Question of Palestine
A/RES/36/120A-F	Plenary	36 th GA Meeting	A/36/PV.93 10 Dec. 1981	Question of Palestine
A/RES/31/20	Plenary	31 st GA Meeting	A/31/PV.77 24 Nov. 1976 90-16-30	Question of Palestine
A/RES/ES-9/1	Plenary GA 9 TH Emergency Special Session		A/ES-9/PV.12 5 Feb. 1982 86-21-34	The situation in the occupied Arab territories
A/RES/ES-9/2	Plenary	GA 9 TH Emergency Special Session	A/ES-9/PV.12 5 Feb. 1982 without vote	Credentials of representatives to the 9th emergency special session of the General Assembly
A/RES/ES-7/4	Plenary	NA	A/ES-7/PV.20 28 Apr. 1982 86-20-36	Question of Palestine

A/RES/ES-7/5	Plenary		A/ES-7/PV.24 26 June 1982 127-2-0	Question of Palestine
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CRITERION 3		
A focus on thematic areas		
Year	Location	Document
9.1970	Lusaka, Sri Lanka	Resolution on Middle East
9.1970	Lusaka, Algeria	Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Cooperation and Democratization of International Relations
08.1972	Guyana, George Town	George Town Declaration
08.1973	Guyana, George Town	Resolution on the Middle East
09.1973	Algiers, Algeria	Political Declaration
9.1973	Algiers, Algeria	Resolution on Middle East Situation and Palestinian Problem
9.1973	Algiers, Algeria	Resolution Number 6 on Economic Effects of the Israeli Aggression Against Arab States
09.1973	Algiers, Algeria	The Struggle for National Liberation
03.1974	Algiers, Algeria	Final Document
03.1974	Algiers, Algeria	Declaration on the Middle East and The Question of Palestine
03.1975	Havana	Final Declaration
03.1975	Havana	Resolution on Palestine

08.1975	Lima, Peru	Resolution on the Question of Palestine
08.1975	Lima, Peru	Resolution on Middle East and the Occupied Arab Territories.
03.1975	Lima	Political Declaration
05 – 06.1976	Algeria	Final Communiqué
8.1976	Colombo, Sri Lanka	Political Declaration (I, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX,
8.1976	Colombo, Sri Lanka	Resolution of Middle East
8.1976	Colombo, Sri Lanka	Resolution on the Question of Palestine
8.1976	Colombo, Sri Lanka	Resolution on the Report of the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of Palestine People
4.1977	New Delhi	Final Communiqué
9.1977	New York	Declaration on the Situation of in Middle East and the Question of Palestine
5.1978	Havana	Final Communiqué
7.1978	Belgrade	Declaration of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of NA Countries
7.1978	Belgrade	Resolution on the Middle East
7.1978	Belgrade	Resolution on the Question of Palestine
7.1978	Belgrade	Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over National Resources in the Occupied Arab Territories
6.1979	Colombo	Final Communiqué (H, I, T)
9.1979	Havana	Political Declaration
9.1979	Havana	Resolution No 2 on The Question of Palestine
2.1981	New Delhi	Political Declaration
9.1981	New Yorke	Final Communiqué (IV)
4.1982	Kuwait	Final Communiqué
6.1982	Havana	Final Communiqué

7.1982	Nicosia, Cyprus	Final Communiqué
3.1983	New Delhi	Political Declaration (X, XII)
10.1983	New Yorke	Final Communiqué

3.4 Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

Null Hypothesis (H_0): The Non-Aligned Movement's efforts had no significant impact on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Alternative Hypothesis (H_1): The Non-Aligned Movement's efforts contributed significantly to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Hypothesis 2

Null Hypothesis (H_0): NAM's advocacy for adherence to international law had little impact on the behaviour of the parties involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Alternative Hypothesis (H_1): NAM's advocacy for adherence to international law significantly influenced the behaviour of parties involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Hypothesis 3

Null Hypothesis (H_0): The diversity of national interests among Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) member states did not significantly hinder their collective action in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

Alternative Hypothesis (H_1): The diversity of national interests among NAM member states significantly hindered their collective action in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

3.5 Methods of data analysis

After collection of data, content analysis was employed to scrutinize documents. Codes were developed paying attention to study's objectives. A total of 6 categories were developed to enable analysis. Coding categories included: Call on international intervention; diplomatic initiatives; criticism of Israeli actions; Palestinian rights and statehood; Reference to international law and UN resolutions; and humanitarian support proposals.

Chapter Four

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the data gathered, its analysis and interpretation. The first section is dedicated specifically for the movement's reaction to Palestinian's fight for self-determination the. The second session analyzed the voting behavior of NAM member states on several UNGA resolutions concerning Palestinian self-determination. The last section covers the data as collected and analyzed in relation to the research objectives.

4.2 The Non-aligned Movement and Palestinian Cause for Independence

The Non-aligned movement has been active in building a stronger relationship with the Palestinian National Liberation following its establishment. However, not until the 1970s. In the aftermath of the Six-Day war, for the first time, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation was invited to NAM's Consultative Meeting of Special Representatives held at Belgrade from July 8 to 12, 1969. The extension of this invitation was made more specifically to its first agenda, "The role of the policy of non-alignment in the present-day world, with special reference to the problem of peace, independence and development." Arguing that the occupation of territories of Israel violates the principles of United Nations, thus poses a threat to peace, invitation of PLO remained symbolic to the movement's support for PLO during its fourth conference in Algiers. Although at the conference, accusation of Israel's violation of occupation was made more specifically to three members of the group,¹⁵⁹ the movement made reference to Security Council resolution 242, thus, calling for withdrawal of Israeli's armed troops from "all the Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967."¹⁶⁰ Even, the paragraph arrangement shows how the last part of the 13th paragraph is connected with Palestine. In the preceding paragraph, NAM expressively endorsed a full

¹⁵⁹ These members were Syria, Jordan and United Arab Republic.

¹⁶⁰ Read paragraph 13 of the document

restoration of the rights of Palestinians to their homeland and restoration of their inalienable right from colonialism. In fact, NAM's support for Palestine was influenced by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting¹⁶¹ held prior to the its meeting, where the only four non-aligned member states and an observer¹⁶² had all voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 242. Mr. Gopalaswami Parthasarathi¹⁶³ made specific reference to NAM's support for Palestine during UNSC session:

“Members of the Council will recall that during the fifth emergency special session an overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, whether they voted for the Latin American draft resolution or the non-aligned, Afro-Asian draft resolution,³ had reaffirmed the principle of non-acquisition of territory by military conquest and had supported the call for the withdrawal of Israel armed forces to the positions they held prior to the outbreak of the recent conflict on 5 June 1967.”

From the data in this Table 1.1, it is noticeable that at NAM meeting in Dar Es Salaam¹⁶⁴ unlike the previous NAM meeting in Belgrade where PLO was invited without any special status, in Dar Es Salaam, the organisation was invited under a special status. Its invitation was the special recognition as a Liberation Movement. This contributed to the PLO's new status not merely as a liberation movement, but as an observer in NAM 's third conference head of state meeting. PLO having already spoken at two of the previous NAM meeting without a special status, thus limiting its frequency to contribute to deliberation during meetings, as an observer at the third meeting in Lusaka¹⁶⁵ this meant that PLO although could not vote on resolutions, yet, it could contribute enormously to deliberation of topics.

It is noticed from Table 1.1 that following PLO's appearance at its main organ's meeting, for the first time, a resolution dedicated specifically dedicated to Middle East was adopted. In this

¹⁶¹ Security Council official records, 22nd year, 1382nd meeting, 22 November 1967, New York, document S/PV.1382.

¹⁶² Five non-permanent members of UNSC> Member states of NAM Nigeria, India, Mali and Ethiopia; Brazil was an observer

¹⁶³ Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations (Aug 1965-Dec 1968)

¹⁶⁴ Preparatory meeting of NAM countries was held from April 13 to 17, 1970.

¹⁶⁵ This conference was held at the level of Head of State and Government. The Conference of Heads of State or Government is the main organ of the movement. At the Lusaka meeting of 1970, a consensus was that it should convene at a three-year interval.

The first appearance of PLO in NAM summit

resolution unlike previous documents of the movement, new wordings were added. For the first time, non-aligned movement accused Israel for pursuing a policy of “flagrant use of force and to use the occupation of these territories for imposing solutions” and recommended “to the UN to take adequate measures against Israel if it continues to disregard UN efforts to the establishment of peace.” It is analyzed that, at Lusaka, Heads of State and Government were evoking special reference to Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter which sets a general and universal principle of threatening to use force which is binding on all states. Thus, for Israel been a subject of international law and being member of United Nations, it has a customary responsibility to restrain itself from using force. As a principle considered as *ius cogens*, participants at the conference were indirectly calling for sanctions to the state of Israel for violating the peremptory norm of general international law. It is therefore not surprising that last paragraph of the resolutions called on the United Nations to take action if Israel continues to violate this binding principle. Additionally, adopting other resolutions, the position of this resolution¹⁶⁶ indicates how important the topic of finding a solution to the Palestinian statehood and right to be free from colonialism was to the movement.

At the Georgetown-Guyana conference¹⁶⁷ PLO had its first participation in the organ as observer. This meant that PLO could engage in deliberations leading to an adoption of which issues must be put on the agenda for discussion at the movement’s main summit. The wording of the Georgetown declaration was different from any of the movement’s previous meetings. Unlike previous document which made reference directly to Israel occupation, this declaration made no mention of Israel rather participant’s attention was drawn more to the PLO.¹⁶⁸

But as it is known, the previous two meeting has expressly showed its position on Israel operation in Palestine attributing it to breach of Article 2 (4) of the UN chapter. Its call on the United Nation to take “adequate action” against Israel meant that NAM it has seen UN to be the most viable force to ensure a restoration of alienable right of Palestinians which has since been under threat. A new channel for seeking the restoration of the inalienable right of Palestinians, thus, was required.

¹⁶⁶ Resolution of The Middle East was the first resolution to be adopted by the Movement

¹⁶⁷ The Georgetown conference was held from August 8 to 12, 1973 at the level of foreign ministers. This organ convened a year before the summit of head of state and government in order to prepare the documents to be considered by the top leaders of the movement.

¹⁶⁸ Read paragraph 7 and 8 of the declaration.

NAM participating members also reflected upon repression against national liberation movement by proxies. Without making reference to any specific entity, the language of the document was more subtle into opening accusations on states for collaborating with other state to repress liberation movement¹⁶⁹ NAM reasoned that linking liberation movements to the principles of the movement was another way to call for a broader support for people's struggle for independence.

*"... It noted the growing solidarity, cooperation and collaboration linking these movements to the non-aligned, peace-loving nations which, taken as a whole, represent a powerful combination of forces struggling to liberate subjugated peoples and to consolidate national independence, safeguard world peace and security and promote social progress. The Non-Aligned Countries expressed their intention to continue to work with a view to strengthening and broadening the existing solidarity and cooperation among all antiimperialist and anti-colonialist forces."*¹⁷⁰

*"progressive nations to strengthen their solidarity, and mutual assistance, to intensify their political, moral and material support, in every field, for the national liberation movements to go on fighting unceasingly until colonialism and racism are completely wiped out."*¹⁷¹

The single most striking observation to emerge from the data comparison was the resolution adopted on Middle East unlike the previous resolutions also had new wordings which indicated the movement incorporating the Palestinian case into broader Middle East conflict.¹⁷² Arguing that peace in Middle East cannot be achieved without achieving peace in Palestine, the results emphasize the validity of the movement as progressively establishing a deeper connection for decolonization within the Asian region.

There was a significant correlation between PLO's presence at the Georgetown and the Political Declaration of Algiers. For the first time, "Measures to assist peoples and countries which are victims of aggression, colonialism and foreign occupation" was put on the agenda for discussion at NAM fourth conference resulting from the participation of PLO at Georgetown. As already stated above, their participation had allowed PLO to contribute to the discussion and adoption of issues that needed to be discussed at the moment's main conference. Unlike previous document

¹⁶⁹ Read paragraph 20 of the declaration.

¹⁷⁰ Paragraph 7

¹⁷¹ Paragraph 21 of the declaration.

¹⁷² *Reiterating further that the full respect for the inalienably rights of the Arab people of Palestine is a pre-requisite to peace in the Middle East" Look at third paragraph.*

which was quite on proxies that were supporting Israel's fight against Palestinians, the Political Declaration adopted by Head of States and Government had made a direct attack on the United States as aiding Israel, thus protracting the conflict.

“Member countries of the Conference call upon all States, and in particular the United States of America, to abstain from providing Israel with arms or any political, economic or financial support which may enable it to continue its aggressive and expansionist policy”¹⁷³

To further express its despise for Israel's actions against Palestine, its declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation had specifically made reference to Zionism¹⁷⁴ as major issue of the third world. It would argued that, the movement had specifically captured the word Zionism in its document to illuminate the problems of Palestinians thus supporting its call in previous meeting for states to provide support and solidarity to liberation movement, more specifically to "the Palestinian people in their difficult trials and great sacrifices they are suffering in order to regain their dignity and national identity."¹⁷⁵

The research found that it was in Algiers that the movement began to gather a more formidable approach towards supporting Palestinians fight for liberation from Israel. For the first, the movement had made specific reference to a chapter within the UN charter that Israeli's actions was violating.

“Israel's persistence in its defiant attitude towards the international community and the United Nations will lead non-aligned countries, on, their own and within the framework of the United Nations in conjunction with the States Members for that Organization, to take individual or collective measures against it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter”

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had strategically invoked Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to emphasize its dedication to addressing global peace and security within the established framework of international law. Chapter VII which grants the UN Security Council the authority to undertake collective measures, including the use of force, in response to threats to peace,

¹⁷³ Paragraph 30 of the declaration.

¹⁷⁴ This is was the time that the word Zionism had appeared in the movement's document

¹⁷⁵ Paragraph 32 of Political declaration

breaches of peace, or acts of aggression. NAM's reference to this chapter, particularly concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reflected its conviction that the international community has a fundamental responsibility to protect the rights of oppressed peoples and to hold states accountable for acts of aggression.

This principle was notably pertinent in the context of the Six-Day War leading to the subsequent adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 242 which had called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied.¹⁷⁶ By categorizing Israel's policies as aggressive, NAM underscored the imperative for collective action, insisting that the enforcement of Security Council decisions must be a shared responsibility of the international community, rather than just a task relegated to individual member states.

Thus, NAM's position constituted a call to action for the international community to fulfill its collective security obligations, ensuring that peace in the Palestine is rooted in the principles of justice, accountability, and the rule of law as envisioned by the UN Charter.

Worthy of mentioning is the study noting that, for the first time at a NAM conference that a resolution was adopted linking strongly the Palestinian fight for liberation as central to Middle East conflict was at Algiers¹⁷⁷. In this resolution, Resolution on Middle East and Palestine, the movement recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in its just struggle, hence given a more credence to member states' support to PLO in its struggle against colonialism and Zionist racism. Participants further endorsed that

- 1) "Israeli forces withdraw unconditionally from all the Arab territories which they occupied after June 1967."¹⁷⁸
- 2) "all states withhold Israeli emigration to the occupied territories"¹⁷⁹
- 3) United states immediately its military, economic and political and moral aid to Israel

¹⁷⁶ All resolutions or decisions made by UNSC is binding all member states.

¹⁷⁷ Fourth summit of NAM

¹⁷⁸ Refer to Resolution on The Middle East Situation and Palestine at the Algiers summit.

¹⁷⁹ *ibid*

- 4) “Member states to work for a boycott of Israel in the diplomatic, economic, maritime and air traffic in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.”¹⁸⁰

In fact, the call for a boycott of Israel was an expression of its solidarity with Arab countries which continued to suffer from Israel's aggressive policy. Meeting in Algiers, the Coordination Bureau of NAM, re-emphasized its strong support for the fight against Zionism arguing further that Israel's action continued to “create new threat to world peace.” NAM's argument that Israel's action poses new threat could be attributed to the outbreak of Yom Kippur, which it viewed as a yet another breach of international law by Israel. Its adoption of a special declaration on the Question of Palestine further suggests its determination to work with members and non-members.¹⁸¹ to expose Zionism as racist and expansionist ideology which must be curtailed in order to establish a just and durable peace in Palestine. To compel Israel to adhere to international laws which it had in its previous meetings made several claims to, the organ called on other members to explore ways to deprive Israel of its membership in the United Nations.¹⁸² and further appealed to non-aligned countries “which have not as yet severed their diplomatic relations with Israel should do so immediately in implementation of the Resolution adopted by the Fourth Summit Conference.”¹⁸³ Consequent of NAM's continues call that peace in Middle East depends on the withdrawal of Israel and the restoration of the nation rights of Palestinians, prior to CB meeting in Havana¹⁸⁴, out of the total 138 participating countries participating 29th session of UN General Assembly meeting, presided over Algerian President, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who also doubled as the chairman of Non-aligned Movement, 62 NAM members voted in favor of resolution 3236 (XXIX) with four members, Laos, Nepal, Singapore and Swaziland abstaining whilst Chile casted voted against.

Thus, the movement reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinians as fundamental to

- (a) “the right to self-determination without external interference”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ *ibid*

¹⁸¹ NAM defined non-members as any country which was a “lover of peace,” hence was ready to cooperate with the movement to create a peaceful world.

¹⁸² paragraph 9 (c)

¹⁸³ Paragraph 9 (a)

¹⁸⁴ Meeting was held by the Coordinating Bureau

¹⁸⁵ Official record of the General Assembly, 29th session, Plenary meeting, A/L.741, Question of Palestine

(b) “the right to national independence and sovereignty”¹⁸⁶

Additionally, drawing from its recognition of PLO as the legitimate representative of PLO, NAM voted massively for resolution 3210(XXIX) which recognized PLO as the “representative of Palestinian people”. The most striking result to emerge from the data is the distinction between the language used in the 1973 Algiers Summit resolution of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the subsequent United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3210(XXIX) of 1974, regarding the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), is significant and reflects the nuances of international diplomacy. The Algiers Summit which explicitly recognized the PLO as the "legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,"¹⁸⁷ a phrase which conveys a full endorsement of the PLO's authority and its role in the Palestinian cause.

Interestingly, this correlation thence was pivotal within NAM, which sought to assert a unified stance on decolonization and national liberation movements.

In contrast, UNGA Resolution 3210(XXIX) omitted the term "legitimate," thence opting for a more cautious language. Although the resolution invited the PLO to participate in UN discussions on the Palestine question, but it stopped short of explicitly affirming PLO's legitimacy. This omission reflects the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests within the UN membership, where some states were unwilling to fully endorse the PLO due to diplomatic ties with Israel or concerns over the implications of such recognition. The more neutral language used by the UNGA illustrates the organization's attempt to balance divergent international perspectives while still acknowledging the PLO's role in representing Palestinian interests on the global stage. From Table 1.3.1, the results of this study indicates that out of the 73 NAM members present, 68 voted in favor, Loas and Burma abstained and 3 members (Chile, Swaziland, and Lesotho) did not vote. A comparison of the two results reveals that Loas maintained a uniform vote.

On the issue of

“Exploration of the prospect of depriving Israel of membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies and barring it from participation in international conferences if it does not

¹⁸⁶ ibid

¹⁸⁷ Resolution of the Middle East and Palestine Question, item number 3

*withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories in a short period of time and recognize the Palestine people's rights.”*¹⁸⁸

this study found that in its Havana meeting, NAM deemed it right to take severe measures against Israel such as suspension or expulsion from United Nations. What is surprising is that the movement did not sponsor any resolution which called for Israel's suspension. This finding was unexpected and suggests that the moment decision of not sponsoring a resolution could be attributed to Mr. Akè¹⁸⁹ argument:

“any reference to certain relevant provisions of the Charter, and particularly to the prerogatives of the Security Council. that might imply a return to measures with the unavowed intention of suspending or expelling one of the parties that is already a Member of the United Nations, or that might imply the application of Chapter VII of the Charter” is difficult to accept¹⁹⁰

Drawing on the ambassadors, its decision of not sponsoring a resolution against Israel on the ground of suspension suggest the extend of which the movement was still hoping for a political dialogue aiming at all peaceful solution to the conflict.

Nonetheless, NAM members voted in favor of General Assembly Resolution 3376(XXX)¹⁹¹, which established a Committee on the Exercise of Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to recommend to the General Assembly a program which will enable the Palestinian People to exercise their rights to self-determination without external interference. It can be noticed from Table 1.3.2 that out of 80 members, 76 voted in favor, 4 (Ivory Coast, Chile, Ecuador, and Liberia) voted “Abstained;” 1 (Swaziland) voted against; whilst Central African Republic did not note. Another important finding was that, other resolutions adopted at the 30th GA meeting all received a huge endorsement from NAM members states. The results, as shown in Table 1.3.3, indicate that

¹⁸⁸ Refer to the Declaration adopted during the CB meeting in Algiers.

¹⁸⁹ Ivory coast ambassador to the UN

¹⁹⁰ Official records of the General Assembly, 30th session, plenary meetings, vol. 2 (of 3 volumes) : verbatim records of the 2383rd to 2413th meetings, 10 October - 20 November 1975 - UNA(01)/R3 - p. 755-768. A/PV.2399

1) ¹⁹¹ Membership of the Committee included: Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela.

2) This data shows that the committee comprised of 16 NAM members

Resolution 3375(XXX)¹⁹² received 76 "Yes", 1 abstained and 3 did not votes. These countries that did not cast a vote were Libyan Arab Republic, Central Africa Republic and Iraq. It is interesting to note that in this study, there is a correlation between the movement's meeting in Havana and the GA meeting. The correlation between the two is interesting because

- 1) it was at Havana that for the first time a complete resolution was adopted on Palestine
- 2) It was at the 33rd GA meeting that most Resolutions on Palestine were adopted.

Furthermore, there is a significant positive correlation between the movement's meeting which it held in Lima, three months before the GA meeting, At Lima¹⁹³, participants likened Israel's occupation of Palestine to South Africa and Zimbabwe to be of imperialist origin, thus describing Israel as operating as an Apartheid system. Additionally, a resolution was adopted exclusively on Palestine. The finding of this study is also consistent with that of (El-Khawas, (1975) and Obed (2010) who argued that Zionism was recognised by the movement as an ideology embedded with racism and imperialism. This result could explain

1. Why no member voted against the resolution 3378 (XXX)-79 voted Yes and one Abstained (Central African Republic)¹⁹⁴, and
2. The movement succeeded in promoting the adoption Resolution 3379 (XXX) despite major setback from Israeli allies (France, United States and United Kingdom). The results, as highlighted in Table 1.3.5, indicate that 54 members voted in favor, 21 abstained, and 5 voted against.

This table is quite revealing in several ways. unlike the other tables Nam most recorded abstinence on a resolution was Resolution 3379 (XXX). Thence, NAM actively working towards the adoption

¹⁹² The resolution

1. Requested the Security Council to take steps to ensure and safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people in consistent with Resolution 3236 (XXIX),

2. The right of PLO to participate in all conferences on Middle East.

The resolution allowed PLO to present Palestinian People at the World conference to combat racism and racial discrimination.

¹⁹³ Meeting was organized at the Ministerial level of foreign ministers

¹⁹⁴ A/RES/3378(XXX, World conference to combat racism and racial discrimination: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly

The World Conference Against Racism and Racial Discrimination affirmed that Zionism was one of the manifestation of Racism and Racial Discrimination.

and implementation of all relevant resolutions, further demonstrates its unwavering dedication to the ongoing struggle of the Palestinian people for the liberation of their homeland and the full restoration of their national rights. A struggle that is closely linked to the broader fight against colonialism, racism, and imperialist domination, as an essential component of the global liberation movement.¹⁹⁵

Further analysis shows that the Fifth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held in Colombo in 1976, represents a critical juncture in the internationalization of the Palestinian issue, reflecting the increasing diplomatic prominence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Following the Fourth summit, where NAM had attributed Israeli's operation in the occupied territory as convening Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Hague Rules and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949 Hague Convention, the Colombo summit further intensified the Movement's focus on the Palestinian rights to independence. Four pivotal developments at this summit underscore this shift.

Firstly, for the first time in NAM's history, the agenda of the summit prominently featured the "Question of Palestine" as a distinct and central issue. This decision to prioritize Palestine on the summit's agenda signified a deepened commitment within NAM to address the Palestinian struggle as a key issue of decolonization and human rights, aligning with the Movement's broader objectives of anti-imperialism and support for national liberation movements. The exclusive focus on Palestine highlighted NAM's view of the Palestinian struggle not merely as a regional conflict but as a global issue of justice and self-determination and inactivity on this global concern jeopardizes NAM's struggle for against colonialism, racism, occupation and Zionism.

Secondly, the PLO's transition from observer status to full membership within NAM at the Colombo summit marked a significant diplomatic advancement for the organization. This elevation in status was not merely symbolic; it represented a collective endorsement by NAM members of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. By granting the PLO full membership, NAM reinforced its support for Palestinian self-determination and further

¹⁹⁵ Refer to Resolution on Palestine adopted at the Havana Conference on March 1975.

legitimized the PLO's role in international forums. These developments at the Colombo summit thus reflect NAM's growing influence in shaping a discourse on the Palestinian issue.

Thirdly, the election of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the Non-Aligned Movement's (NAM) Coordination Bureau marked a significant milestone in the PLO's evolving role within the movement. As a key body within NAM responsible for steering the Movement's initiatives, coordinating member states' positions, and ensuring the implementation of NAM's principles and resolutions, the inclusion of the PLO in this influential body is indicative of the widespread recognition and legitimacy that the organization had garnered among NAM members by this period. From this study, we can observe that a total of 11 communiques from the Coordinating Bureau were sent to United Nations expressing the movement's stand on the inalienable rights of self-determination of the people of Palestine. Since no prior communique of NAM had been submitted to UN, this new culture of NAM depicts the effect of the PLO participation had on the movement's to lobby for a discussion of Palestinian's national right.¹⁹⁶

An investigation of PLO's role within the movement reveals that by electing the PLO to the Coordination Bureau, NAM not only reaffirmed its support for the Palestinian cause but also positioned the PLO as a central actor within the Movement's decision-making processes. The election is seen as a strategic endorsement, reflecting NAM's commitment to advancing the cause of Palestinian self-determination on the global stage. Furthermore, this move underscores NAM's role in amplifying the voices of national liberation movements, solidifying its position as a key advocate for the rights of oppressed peoples in the post-colonial world. The PLO's election to the Bureau thus symbolizes its growing stature and the increasing centrality of the Palestinian issue within NAM's agenda.

Fourthly, the establishment of a special committee tasked with identifying practical means to assist Arab countries¹⁹⁷, in their struggle against Israeli occupation. This initiative reflects NAM's strategic commitment to not only endorsing resolutions at UNGA but also translating its political support into tangible actions.

¹⁹⁶ See Table 1.4 for which documents were submitted to the UN.

¹⁹⁷ Refer to Paragraph 9, item 2 of the Resolution on the Middle East.

This development followed NAM's active participation in the 30th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), where the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People was established. The creation of this UN committee highlights the Movement's influential role in shaping international policy regarding Palestine. The Colombo Summit's special committee, therefore, is an extension of NAM's efforts within the UN, reflecting a coordinated strategy to provide concrete support to Arab countries and advance the Palestinian cause within international frameworks. This initiative underscored NAM's evolving role from a platform of political solidarity to an active agent of international diplomacy and advocacy for Palestinian and Arab rights.

There is evidence that Resolution 3376(XXX) influenced the Resolution of Middle East because the relationship between the two committees lies in their complementary roles: the NAM Special Committee focused on practical, actionable support for Arab countries, while the UN Committee sought to solidify and advance the legal and diplomatic foundations of Palestinian rights at the international level. Both committees exemplify NAM's dual strategy of direct support and diplomatic advocacy in advancing the Palestinian cause and opposing Israeli occupation.¹⁹⁸

The movement's participation at the International Seminar Against Apartheid¹⁹⁹ which denounced the collaboration between South Africa and Israel, and the adoption of a Resolution on the use of Veto in Colombo which condemned the United States for using its veto powers to block the adoption of resolutions that sought to find a solution and establish peace in Palestine, together these findings of the study provide important insights into NAM's willing power to work against any obstacle that impedes the achievement of peace in Palestine. The finding further suggests the movement's role in advocating for the rights of oppressed people of Palestine.

As a result of the adoption of Resolution 3236(XXIX), 3375(XXX), Resolution 3379 (XXX) participants at the Colombo Summit declared their satisfaction for "the growing international recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as well as the alienable national rights of the

¹⁹⁸ Table 1.3.2 shows the vote distribution.

¹⁹⁹ The International Conference Against Apartheid was held in Havana in May 1976. "The Seminar condemns the increasing military, political and economic collaboration between the South African racist regime and Israel, which was further developed during the recent official visit of B. J. Vorster, Prime Minister of the Pretoria regime, to Israel, 'The Seminar warns... that any alliance with apartheid will provoke forthright condemnation and hostility of all freedom-loving Governments and peoples.'"

Palestine People”²⁰⁰ and further declared its continues support for national liberation movement in their struggle for independence from colonial rule²⁰¹ The empirical findings in this study provide a new understanding of the movement as symbolic for peace and security among nations and the determination to establish a new and equitable international social and political order.²⁰²

With NAM's desire to translate its political rhetoric into concrete actions that could materially support the Arab nations involved in the conflict, at the 31st Session of the UNGA meeting, majority of NAM countries voted in favor of A/RES/31/106. It can be seen from the data in Table 1.3.6 that out of the 147 UNGA members, comprising of 86 NAM members present, 78 voted in favor, 6 abstained, and 4 did not vote. This vote data can be seen as part of NAM’s broader strategy to influence international diplomacy and mobilize resources to support the Palestinian and Arab struggle which is “...an unavoidable option for the...establishment of a new political relations in the word.”²⁰³

Voting in favor for the adoption of General Assembly resolution 31/20 which called upon the Security Council to revisit and consider the recommendations made by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and urging the Council to take the necessary actions to implement these recommendations, this resolution sought to advance the resolution of the Palestinian conflict and contribute to establishing a just and enduring peace in the Middle East. NAM’s support for this resolution underscored its commitment to advancing the Palestinian cause through effective international mechanisms. By advocating for the Security Council's involvement, NAM sought to ensure that the committee's recommendations were not only acknowledged but actively pursued. Additionally, NAM's vote in favor was not merely symbolic; it reflected the collective stance of developing nations against imperialism and occupation. This vote also demonstrated NAM's influence in shaping global discourse on decolonization and its role as a key advocate for Palestinian aspirations.²⁰⁴ The resolution also authorized the committee to intensify its efforts in promoting the implementation of its

²⁰⁰ Refer to paragraph 4 of the Political Declaration

²⁰¹ Paragraph 34, Political Declaration adopted at Colombo

²⁰² Paragraph 7

²⁰³ Refer to paragraph 6 of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Solidarity to Intensity Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-aligned Countries.

²⁰⁴ Table 1.3.7 shows vote distribution for Resolution 31/20

recommendations, thus further aligning NAM's objectives with the broader goal of achieving peace and justice in the region.

The current study found that in the aftermath of the 31st Session of the UNGA meeting, at New Delhi, the movement called on Security Council to meet to adopt effective measures for the implementation of Resolution 31/106 to enable Palestinians in exercise their right to liberation and self-determination which a prerequisite to the attainment of a just and lasting peace in Middle. There are three possible explanations for this result.

1. NAM's appeal to the UNSC highlights the movement's recognition of the limitations of General Assembly resolutions, which, while symbolically powerful, often lacked the enforcement mechanisms necessary to effect real change.
2. NAM's insistence on the Security Council's involvement reflected a strategic shift towards seeking binding international action. The movement acknowledged that without Security Council measures, the aspirations articulated in Resolution 31/106 would remain unfulfilled.
3. This move also underscored NAM's role as a key actor in global diplomacy, striving to translate its collective political will into concrete actions that could alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East in favor of Palestinian self-determination and regional stability.

One unanticipated finding is the movement's extraordinary meeting held in New Yorke to discuss the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine following the extension of Israeli settlement in the West Bank and Gaza strip. Ministers of the movement argued that that

*"illegal occupation does not authorize the occupying Power to carry out any changes which would affect authorize the occupying Power to carry out any changes which would affect sovereign and other established rights"*²⁰⁵ of the occupied.

There are three explanations for this result:

²⁰⁵ Paragraph 3 of the Declaration on the Situation in the Middle East and the Question of Palestine, adopted at New York, Ministers of Foreign affairs of Non-aligned Countries, September 30, 1977.

1. By this argument, ministers sought to invoke common article 3 of the Geneva Convention. This perspective aligns with the humanitarian principles embedded in Common Article 3²⁰⁶ of the Geneva Conventions, which seeks to protect the dignity and rights of individuals in conflict zones. Although Common Article 3 primarily addresses internal conflicts, its spirit resonates here: the illegal occupation should not legitimize actions that degrade the rights or alter the status of the occupied people. The prohibition against inhumane treatment, forced displacement, or changes to the legal status of territories reflects a broader commitment to of NAM principle of upholding human dignity and international law.
2. The Non-Aligned Movement's (NAM) decision to hold an extraordinary meeting on the question of Palestine in New York holds considerable significance. By convening in New York, the epicenter of global diplomatic activity and the home of the United Nations, NAM strategically positioned the Palestinian issue at the forefront. This approach underscores NAM's intent to elevate the urgency of the Palestinian cause directly within the corridors of power where key decisions are made.
3. The extraordinary nature of the meeting signals NAM's recognition of the critical juncture in the Palestinian struggle, necessitating immediate and focused attention. It highlights the Movement's commitment to mobilizing its collective influence to advocate for Palestinian rights on a global stage which is inseparable from the broader Middle East conflict.

Its emergency meeting explains the relatively good correlation between United Nations and NAM. Prior to its meeting in ministerial meeting in Havana, members met at the 32nd General Assembly meeting voting for the adoption of resolution 32/91. As captured in Table 1.3.8, out of total of 90 present, 79 voted in favor, 4 (Liberia, Malawi, Panama, and Swaziland) abstained, whilst 7 (Angola, Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and United Republic of Tanzania) did not vote.

²⁰⁶ Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is a cornerstone of international humanitarian law, setting forth fundamental principles for the humane treatment of individuals in non-international armed conflicts. It ensures protections for those not actively participating in hostilities, including civilians and incapacitated combatants. The article prohibits murder, torture, degrading treatment, hostage-taking, and extrajudicial executions, underscoring the need for judicial guarantees.

Its universal applicability establishes a baseline of human dignity, irrespective of the conflict's nature. Common Article 3 is crucial for maintaining a semblance of humanity during conflicts, serving as both a legal standard and a moral imperative, and has been instrumental in prosecuting war crimes, reinforcing the global commitment to human rights even in the most dire circumstances.

At Havana, the movement call on members to observe the International Day of Solidarity with Palestinians also suggest how the movement was ready to work constantly and perseveringly to achieve a uniform voice on the Palestinian cause which is prerequisite for the maintenance of peace and just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Fearing that the growth in assistance of weapons for Israel would lead to an escalation of the conflict, at the Belgrade conference ministers made four endorsements:

1. *“Call on countries, and in particular the United States of America, to cooperate completely in undertaking effective measures in accordance with the VIIth Chapter of the United Nations Charter, to avoid thus perilous threat to international peace and security*
2. *Appeal to the Security Council in particular, to call upon all countries to undertake the following, in keeping with the VIIth Chapter of the United Nations Charter, regardless of any prevailing contracts.*
 - (a) *To refrain from supplying Israel with any kind of weapons, ammunition, equipment, military vehicles and necessary spare parts, without exception.*
 - (b) *To guarantee that such supplies do not reach Israel through other parties*
 - (c) *To terminate all transfer of nuclear equipment and fissionable material of its technologies to Israel.*
3. *Appeal to the Security Council to establish an organ to supervise the implementation of the preceding measures of paragraph 2.*
4. *“Call upon all governments and organizations to undertake all suitable measures to reinforce support of the Palestine cause.”*

Additionally, considering that the principles of the movement is sufficient to render its support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, before its sixth summit in Havana, the movement met at the 33rd session of the UNGA session where again it massively endorsed resolution 33/28.²⁰⁷ Vote

²⁰⁷ Resolution 33/28>“urged the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problems and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations.”

distribution is seen in Table 1.3.9 which shows that out of 89 members, 76 voted in favor, 8 abstained, and 5 did not vote. The movement's endorsement of UNGA Resolution 33/28 reflects its commitment to a comprehensive and inclusive peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The resolution's emphasis on involving all parties within the United Nations framework underscores the need for a negotiated settlement that addresses the conflict's complex issues. By urging a comprehensive approach, NAM highlights its belief in multilateralism and the importance of international legitimacy in resolving conflicts. This endorsement aligns with NAM's core principles of promoting peace, justice, and self-determination, demonstrating its continued solidarity with the Palestinian cause and its commitment to achieving a fair and lasting resolution through collective international efforts.

At its sixth Summit, three most important relevant finding was firstly, its rebuke of the Camp David Accords. Participants argued that the signing of this accord has resulted in the continued aggression and exploitation of Israel towards Palestinians. Members therefore condemned

(a) Israel for devising new methods to continue its policy of force and aggression.²⁰⁸

(b) The Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel since it meant a total abandonment of the Arab cause of achieving statehood for Palestine.²⁰⁹

This finding observed in this study mirrors that of the previous studies by Cavoški (2022) which showed that relating to Anwar Sadat's agreement to sign the agreement, members had regarded it as a betrayal of the NAM's policy on Palestine and violate the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, therefore called for the suspension of Egypt. Nonetheless, the study noticed that despite the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to examine the damage caused to Palestine consequent of the conduct of Mr. Sadat, no significant progress was made to suspend Egypt.

Secondly, due to the continual use of veto by United States to annul Security Council decision, thus making it difficult to make progress on finding a solution to the conflict, members called for

²⁰⁸ Refer to the Resolution No.2 on The Question of Palestine.

1) ²⁰⁹ Paragraph 7 of the No2

2) Paragraph 65 and Paragraph 3 of Agenda IV, of the Political Declaration, Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries New Delhi, February 1981 NAM meeting in New Yorke, September 1981 respectively, also highlights its abhorrence of the Accord.

recompositing the Security Council, thus increasing its “ability to act.”²¹⁰ A possible explanation for this might be that the push for "recompositing" the Security Council is not merely about increasing the number of seats but about ensuring a more equitable and democratic decision-making process. By advocating for a more representative and balanced Security Council, NAM aims to enhance the Council's legitimacy and its ability to address global challenges more impartially and effectively. This includes making the Council more reflective of the current global political landscape, where the voices of developing and non-aligned countries are better represented. Ultimately, its call for reform was a demand for a Security Council that can act decisively in upholding international law and fostering peace without being stymied by the geopolitical interests of a few.

Thirdly, as a result of its call for convening a United Nations General Emergency Special Session exclusively dedicated to discussion on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People²¹¹ in July 1980 and April 1982, Emergency Sessions were organized where Resolution ES-7/2 and ES-7/4 were respectively adopted. These sessions demonstrated NAM's ability to mobilize international attention and action despite obstacles in the Security Council. NAM's efforts ensured that the Palestinian struggle remained a priority and emphasized the need for sustained global engagement.

In the study, interestingly, NAM's modus operandi for the fight against Israeli's occupation and expansion policy is reflected in its New Delhi. At the conference, NAM endorsed three broad approaches for its work. To work to

- 1) “Weaken Israeli economic capacity”
- 2) “Put an end to the political, economic and financial support
- 3) Change the political attitude of states and organizations so that they favor the Palestinian cause and the liberation of the occupied Palestinian”

A further interesting discovery was the movement's call for support from the European Economic Community (ECC) to render its support for the Palestine. Although it is difficult to explain this

²¹⁰ Paragraph 239 of Political Declaration.

²¹¹ Although NAM document had called for an Emergency Session, this session would not have been possible without the initiative of Senegal Mr. Falilou Kaice of Senegal.

In a letter dated dated 1 July 1980, the NAM member country requested an emergency special session of the General Assembly be held pursuant to resolution 377 A (v).

result, however NAM's appeal to the European Community at that moment might be related to the Greece's new membership into the community. Table 1.5 shows that out of the total members of European Committee as at 1981, it was only Greece that had voted mostly in line with NAM in the United Nations. Thus, NAM wanted Greece to use its new membership to change EU's foreign policy towards Israel. NAM recognized gaining ECC support would contribute to a significant shift towards Israel's policy on Palestine and Palestinian decolonization. Despite its call, no significant progress could be achieved between EU and NAM policy towards Palestine. For examples, ECC did not change its voting on Resolution 36/226.²¹²

Although, Palestinian people still strive to achieve a sovereign state despite NAM's efforts, yet with the organization of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine²¹³, the movement made a major achievement towards its support for the PLO's strive to achieve sovereign state for Palestine

4.3 Dominant Actors in discussions of Israeli-Palestinian conflict

By comparing voting behaviors from Table 1.2 to 1.3.9, the study identifies the following:

Leading Supporters of the Palestinian Cause: A consistent pattern of strong support for the Palestinian cause is evident among several NAM member states. Countries such as Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Mali, Libya and Yugoslavia emerged as key supporters, consistently voting "Yes" on resolutions related to Palestinian national rights to self-determination. These countries' voting records reflect their strong commitment to NAM's principles of anti-colonialism and their broader geopolitical interests in supporting the Palestinian cause.

For instance, in the resolution A/RES/3236(XXIX), which is central to recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people, a significant number of NAM countries, including Algeria, Egypt, and

²¹² All members of the committee voted against resolution A/RES/36/226A and Abstained from A/RES/36/226B.

²¹³ ES 7/7 called for an International Conference on the Question of Palestine. The conference was held 5 months after its Seventh Summit in on September 07, 1983.

India, voted in favor. The overwhelming "Yes" votes across these resolutions highlight the central role these countries played in advocating for the Palestinian cause within NAM.²¹⁴

Abstentions and Non-Participation: While many NAM member states supported the Palestinian cause, a noticeable number of countries either abstained or chose not to vote on several resolutions. Notable examples include Chile, Swaziland, Singapore, Argentina, and Ivory Coast, which frequently abstained or did not vote (ND). The abstentions and ND votes suggest a more cautious approach or possible external pressures influencing these countries' decisions. For example, Chile behavior could be attributed to its assistance to Israel.

For example, in the case of A/RES/3376(XXX), Singapore and Ivory Coast abstained, while Chile opted not to vote. These patterns indicate a degree of ambivalence or diplomatic balancing, possibly influenced by economic ties or political relations with Western powers or Israel. Despite this, the overall support for Palestinian self-determination remained robust within NAM.

Strategic Abstainers: Countries like Singapore and Argentina consistently displayed a pattern of abstaining from votes, indicating a nuanced position within NAM. These abstentions could reflect a desire to maintain neutrality or avoid alienating key international partners. However, their consistent presence in the abstention column suggests that while they did not oppose the Palestinian cause outright, they were not leading voices within NAM's advocacy for Palestinian self-determination.

The Role of Influential Leaders: Egypt and India stand out as particularly influential within NAM, not only due to their consistent support for pro-Palestinian resolutions but also due to their broader leadership roles within the movement. Egypt, given its proximity to the Palestinian territories and its historical leadership in the Arab world, played a crucial role in mobilizing support for Palestinian self-determination. India's long-standing commitment to anti-colonial struggles further reinforced its leadership in advocating for the Palestinian cause within NAM.

Opposition and Divergence: Opposition to the resolutions within NAM was rare, indicating a strong consensus on the Palestinian issue. However, there were instances of divergence, such as

²¹⁴ Y (Yes): Support for the resolution ; N (No): Opposition to the resolution; A (Abstained): A decision not to take a definitive stance; ND (Not Voting): Absence from the voting process.

Chile's opposition to A/RES/3236(XXIX), which stood in contrast to the broader NAM consensus. This opposition likely reflects specific national interests or diplomatic relations that influenced Chile's voting behavior, marking it as an outlier within the movement.

4.3 Data Distribution Table

Table 1.1 Participation of PLO and Israel at NAM meetings

Non-aligned meeting	Date (MM.YYYY)	PLO's Appearance	Israel's Appearance	Status	Organ/Type of conference
Bandung	04.1955	✓	✗	N/A	Summit of Afro-Asian Countries
Belgrade	09.1961	✓	✗	N/A	Summit of Head of State and Government
Cairo	10.1964	✓	✗	N/A	Summit of Head of State and Government
Belgrade	07.1969	✓	✗	No Special recognition	Consultative Meeting of Special Government
Dar Es Salam	04.1970	✓	✗	Observer	Preparatory Committee
New Yorke	09.1970	✗	✗	N/A	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Lusaka	09.1970	✓	✗	Observer	Summit of Head of States and Government
New Yorke	09.1971	✗	✗	N/A	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Georgetown	08.1972	✓	✗	Observer	Conference of Ministers of

					Foreign Affairs
Kabul	05.1973	×	×	N/A	Preparatory Committee
Algiers	09.1973	✓	×	Observer	Summit of Head of States and Government
Algiers	03.1974	✓	×	Observer	Foreign Minister of Coordinating Bureau
Havana	03.1975	✓	×	Observer	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
Lima	08.1975	×	×	N/A	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Colombo	08.1976	✓	×	Member	Summit of Head of State and Government
New Delhi	04.1977	✓	×	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
New Yorke	09.1977	×	×	N.AV	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Havana	05.1978	✓	×	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
Belgrade	07.1978	✓	×	Member	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Maputo	01.1979	✓	×	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
Colombo	06.1979	✓	×	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the

					Ministerial Level
Havana	09.1979	✓	✖	Member	Summit of Head of State and Government
New Yorke	10.1979	✖	✖	N.AV	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
New Yorke	10.1980	✖	✖	N.AV	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
New Delhi	02.1981	✓	✖	Member	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Algiers	04.1981	✓	✖	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
New York	09.1981	✖	✖	N.AV	Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Kuwait	04.1982	✓	✖	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
Havana	05.1981	✓	✖	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
Nicosia	07.1982	✓	✖	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
Managua	01.1982	✓	✖	Member	Coordinating Bureau at the Ministerial Level
New Delhi	03.1982	✓	✖	Member	Sumit of Head of State and Government

New Yorke	10.1983	✕	✕	N.AV	Coordinating Bureau at the Level of Permanent Representativ e to the UN
Total appearance		24	0		33

✕ not present

N/A Not Applicable

✓ Present

N.AV not available

Table 1.2 Vote distribution on S/RES/242

NAM member countries	Vote
ETHIOPIA	Y
INDIA	Y
MALI	Y
NIGERIA	Y

Y vote in favor

Table 1.3 Vote distribution on A/RES/3236(XXIX)

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANIST AN	Y	INDIA	Y	PERU	Y
ALGERIA	Y	INDONESIA	Y	QATAR	Y
ARGENTINA	Y	IRAQ	Y	RWANDA	Y
BAHRAIN	Y	IVORY COAST	Y	SAUDI ARABIA	Y
BANGLADES H	Y	JAMAICA	Y	SENEGAL	Y
BHUTAN	Y	JORDAN	Y	SIERRA LEONE	Y
BOTSWANA	Y	KENYA	Y	SINGAPORE	A

BURMA	Y	KUWAIT	Y	SOMALIA	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LAOS	A	SRI LANKA	Y
UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y	LEBANON	Y	SUDAN	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Y	LESOTHO	Y	SWAZILAND	A
CHAD	Y	LIBERIA	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
CHILE	N	LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y	TOGO	Y
CONGO	Y	MADAGASCAR	Y	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CUBA	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MALI	Y	TUNISIA	Y
DAHOMY	Y	MALTA	Y	UGANDA	Y
EGYPT	Y	MAURITANIA	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Y	MAURITIUS	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
ETHIOPIA	Y	MOROCCO	Y	YEMEN	Y
GABON	Y	NEPAL	A	YUGOSLAVIA	Y
GAMBIA	Y	NIGER	Y	ZAIRE	Y
GHANA	Y	NIGERIA	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
GUINEA	Y	OMAN	Y		
GUYANA	Y				
Total	Total Y = 62	Total N = 1	Total ND = 0	Total A = 4	Total members 73

Y vote in favour

N vote against

A abstained from vote

Table 1.3.1 Vote distribution on A/RES/3210(XXIX)

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANISTAN	Y	INDIA	Y	PERU	Y
ALGERIA	Y	INDONESIA	Y	QATAR	Y
ARGENTINA	Y	IRAQ	Y	RWANDA	Y
Y BAHRAIN	Y	IVORY COAST	Y	SAUDI ARABIA	Y
BANGLADESH	Y	JAMAICA	Y	SENEGAL	Y
BHUTAN	Y	JORDAN	Y	SIERRA LEONE	Y
BOTSWANA	Y	KENYA	Y	SINGAPORE	Y
BURMA	A	KUWAIT	Y	SOMALIA	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LAOS	A	SRI LANKA	Y
UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y	LEBANON	Y	SUDAN	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Y	LESOTHO	ND	SWAZILAND	ND
CHAD	Y	LIBERIA	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
CHILE	ND	LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y	TOGO	Y
CONGO	Y	MADAGASCAR	Y	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CUBA	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MALI	Y	TUNISIA	Y
DAHOMAY	Y	MALTA	Y	UGANDA	Y
Y EGYPT	Y	MAURITANIA	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y
Y EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Y	MAURITIUS	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
Y ETHIOPIA	Y	MOROCCO	Y	YEMEN	Y

Y GABON	Y	NEPAL	Y	YUGOSLAVIA	Y
Y GAMBIA	Y	NIGER	Y	ZAIRE	Y
Y GHANA	Y	NIGERIA	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
Y GUINEA	Y	OMAN	Y		
Y GUYANA	Y				
Total	Total Y = 68	Total N = 0	Total ND = 3	Total A = 2	Total members 73

Y vote in favor N vote against A abstained from note ND did not vote

Table 1.3.2 Vote distribution on A/RES/3376(XXX)

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANISTAN	Y	INDONESIA	Y	SIERRA LEONE	A
ALGERIA	Y	IRAQ	Y	SINGAPORE	Y
ARGENTINA	Y	IVORY COAST	A	SOMALIA	Y
BAHRAIN	Y	JAMAICA	Y	SRI LANKA	Y
BANGLADESH	Y	JORDAN	Y	SUDAN	Y
BHUTAN	Y	KENYA	Y	SWAZILAND	N
BOTSWANA	Y	KUWAIT	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
BURMA	Y	LAOS	Y	TOGO	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LEBANON	Y	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CAMBODIA	Y	LESOTHO	A	TUNISIA	Y
CAPE VERDE	Y	LIBERIA	A	UGANDA	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	ND	LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
CHAD	Y	MADAGASCAR	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y
CHILE	A	MALAYSIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC	Y

				OF TANZANIA	
CONGO	Y	MALI	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y
CUBA	Y	MALTA	Y	YEMEN	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MAURITANI A	Y	YUGOSLAVI A	Y
DAHOMEY	Y	MAURITIUS	Y	ZAIRE	Y
DEMOCRATI C YEMEN	Y	MOROCCO	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
ECUADOR	A	MOZAMBIQ UE	Y		
EGYPT	Y	NEPAL	Y		
EQUATORIA L GUINEA	Y	NIGER	Y		
ETHIOPIA	A	NIGERIA	Y		
GABON	A	OMAN	Y		
GAMBIA	Y	PANAMA	Y		
GHANA	Y	PERU	Y		
GUINEA	Y	QATAR	Y		
GUINEA- BISSAU	Y	RWANDA	Y		
GUYANA	Y	SAUDI ARABIA	Y		
INDIA	Y	SENEGAL	Y		
Total	Total Y = 73	Total N = 1	Total ND = 1	Total A = 5	Total members 80

Y vote in favor N vote against A abstained from note ND did not vote

Table 1.3.3 Vote distribution on A/RES/3375(XXX)

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANIST AN	Y	INDONESIA	Y	SIERRA LEONE	Y
ALGERIA	Y	IRAQ	ND	SINGAPORE	Y
ARGENTINA	Y	IVORY COAST	Y	SOMALIA	Y
BAHRAIN	Y	Y JAMAICA	Y	SRI LANKA	Y
BANGLADES H	Y	JORDAN	Y	SUDAN	Y
BHUTAN	Y	KENYA	Y	SWAZILAND	A

BOTSWANA	Y	KUWAIT	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
BURMA	Y	LAOS	Y	TOGO	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LEBANON	Y	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CAMBODIA	Y	LESOTHO	Y	TUNISIA	Y
CAPE VERDE	Y	LIBERIA	Y	UGANDA	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	ND	LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC	ND	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
CHAD	Y	MADAGASCAR	Y	Y UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y
CHILE	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	Y
CONGO	Y	MALI	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y
CUBA	Y	MALTA	Y	YEMEN	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MAURITANIA	Y	YUGOSLAVIA	Y
DAHOMEY	Y	MAURITIUS	Y	ZAIRE	Y
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	Y	MOROCCO	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
ECUADOR	Y	MOZAMBIQUE	Y		
EGYPT	Y	NEPAL	Y		
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Y	NIGER	Y		
ETHIOPIA	Y	NIGERIA	Y		
GABON	Y	OMAN	Y		
GAMBIA	Y	PANAMA	Y		
GHANA	Y	PERU	Y		
GUINEA	Y	QATAR	Y		
GUINEA- BISSAU	Y	RWANDA	Y		
GUYANA	Y	SAUDI ARABIA	Y		
INDIA	Y	SENEGAL	Y		
Total	Total Y = 76	Total N = 0	Total ND = 3	Total A = 1	Total members 80

Y vote in favour

N vote against

A abstained from note

ND did not vote

Table 1.3.4 *Vote distribution on A/RES/3378(XXX)*

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANISTAN	Y	INDONESIA	Y	SIERRA LEONE	Y
ALGERIA	Y	IRAQ	Y	SINGAPORE	Y
ARGENTINA	Y	IVORY COAST	Y	SOMALIA	Y
BAHRAIN	Y	JAMAICA	Y	SRI LANKA	Y
BANGLADESH	Y	JORDAN	Y	SUDAN	Y
BHUTAN	Y	KENYA	Y	SWAZILAND	Y
BOTSWANA	Y	KUWAIT	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
BURMA	Y	LAOS	Y	TOGO	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LEBANON	Y	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CAMBODIA	Y	LESOTHO	Y	TUNISIA	Y
CAPE VERDE	Y	LIBERIA	Y	UGANDA	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	A	LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
CHAD	Y	MADAGASCAR	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y
CHILE	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	Y
CONGO	Y	MALI	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y

CUBA	Y	MALTA	Y	Y YEMEN	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MAURITANI A	Y	YUGOSLAVI A	Y
DAHOMAY	Y	MAURITIUS	Y	ZAIRE	Y
DEMOCRATI C YEMEN	Y	MOROCCO	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
ECUADOR	Y	MOZAMBIQ UE	Y		
EGYPT	Y	NEPAL	Y		
EQUATORIA L GUINEA	Y	NIGER	Y		
ETHIOPIA	Y	NIGERIA	Y		
GABON	Y	OMAN	Y		
GAMBIA	Y	PANAMA	Y		
GHANA	Y	PERU	Y		
GUINEA	Y	QATAR	Y		
GUINEA- BISSAU	Y	RWANDA	Y		
GUYANA	Y	SAUDI ARABIA	Y		
INDIA	Y	SENEGAL	Y		
Total	Total Y = 79	Total N = 0	Total ND = 0	Total A = 1	Total members 80

Y vote in favor

N vote against

A abstained from note

ND did not vote

Table 1.3.5 Vote distribution on A/RES/3379(XXX)

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANIST AN	Y	INDONESIA	Y	SIERRA LEONE	A
Y ALGERIA	Y	IRAQ	Y	SINGAPORE	A
ARGENTINA	A	IVORY COAST	N	SOMALIA	Y
Y BAHRAIN	Y	JAMAICA	A	SRI LANKA	Y
BANGLADES H	Y	JORDAN	Y	SUDAN	Y
BHUTAN	A	KENYA	A	SWAZILAND	N
BOTSWANA	A	KUWAIT	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
BURMA	A	LAOS	Y	TOGO	A

BURUNDI	Y	LEBANON	Y	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	A
CAMBODIA	Y	LESOTHO	A	TUNISIA	Y
CAPE VERDE	Y	LIBERIA	N	UGANDA	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	N	LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
CHAD	Y	MADAGASCAR	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y
CHILE	A	MALAYSIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	Y
CONGO	Y	MALI	Y	UPPER VOLTA	A
CUBA	Y	MALTA	Y	YEMEN	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MAURITANIA	Y	YUGOSLAVIA	Y
DAHOMEY	Y	MAURITIUS	A	ZAIRE	A
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	Y	MOROCCO	Y	ZAMBIA	A
ECUADOR	A	MOZAMBIQUE	Y		
EGYPT	Y	NEPAL	A		
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Y	NIGER	Y		
ETHIOPIA	A	NIGERIA	Y		
GABON	A	OMAN	Y		
GAMBIA	Y	PANAMA	N		
GHANA	A	PERU	A		
GUINEA	Y	QATAR	Y		
GUINEA-BISSAU	Y	RWANDA	Y		
GUYANA	Y	SAUDI ARABIA	Y		
INDIA	Y	SENEGAL	Y		
Total	Total Y = 54	Total N = 5	Total ND = 0	Total A = 21	Total members 80

Y vote in favour

N vote against

A abstained from vote

ND did not vote

Table 1.3.6 Vote distribution on A/RES/31/106[D]

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANISTAN	Y	GUINEA	Y	OMAN	Y
ALGERIA	Y	GUINEA-BISSAU	Y	PANAMA	Y
ANGOLA	ND	GUYANA	Y	PERU	Y
ARGENTINA	Y	INDIA	Y	QATAR	Y
BAHRAIN	Y	INDONESIA	Y	RWANDA	Y
BANGLADESH	Y	IRAQ	Y	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Y
BENIN	Y	IVORY COAST	A	SAUDI ARABIA	Y
BHUTAN	Y	JAMAICA	Y	SENEGAL	Y
BOLIVIA	A	JORDAN	Y	SEYCHELLES	ND
BOTSWANA	Y	KENYA	Y	Y SIERRA LEONE	Y
BURMA	Y	KUWAIT	Y	SINGAPORE	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LAO PEOPLE's DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	Y	SOMALIA	Y
CAPE VERDE	ND	LEBANON	Y	SRI LANKA	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Y	LESOTHO	Y	SUDAN	Y
CHAD	Y	LIBERIA	A	SWAZILAND	A
CHILE	ND	LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
COMOROS	Y	MADAGASCAR/ MALAGASY	Y	TOGO	Y
CONGO	Y	MALAWI	A	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CUBA	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	TUNISIA	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MALDIVES	Y	UGANDA	Y
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	Y	MALI	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
ECUADOR	A	MALTA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y
EGYPT	Y	MAURITANIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	Y

EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Y	MAURITIUS	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y
ETHIOPIA	Y	MOROCCO	Y	YEMEN	Y
GABON	Y	MOZAMBIQUE	Y	YUGOSLAVIA	Y
GAMBIA	Y	NEPAL	Y	ZAIRE	Y
GHANA	Y	NIGER	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
GRENADA	Y	NIGERIA	Y		
Total	Total Y = 78	Total N = 0	Total ND = 4	Total A = 6	Total members 88

Y vote in favor

N vote against

A abstained from vote

ND did not vote

Table 1.3.7 Vote distribution on A/RES/31/20

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANISTAN	Y	GUINEA	Y	OMAN	Y
ALGERIA	Y	GUINEA-BISSAU	Y	PANAMA	Y
ARGENTINA	ND	GUYANA	Y	PERU	Y
BAHRAIN	Y	INDIA	Y	QATAR	Y
BANGLADESH	Y	INDONESIA	Y	RWANDA	Y
BARBADOS	A	IRAQ	Y	SAO TOME AND PRINCE	Y
BENIN	Y	IVORY COAST	A	SAUDI ARABIA	Y
BHUTAN	Y	JAMAICA	A	SENEGAL	Y
BOLIVIA	A	JORDAN	Y	SEYCHELLES	ND
BOTSWANA	A	KENYA	Y	SIERRA LEONE	Y
BURMA	Y	KUWAIT	Y	SINGAPORE	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	Y	SOMALIA	Y
CAPE VERDE	Y	LEBANON	Y	SRI LANKA	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	ND	LESOTHO	A	SUDAN	Y

CHAD	Y	LIBERIA	Y	SWAZILAND	ND
CHILE	A	LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIY A	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
COMOROS	Y	MADAGASC AR	Y	TOGO	Y
CONGO	Y	MALAWI	A	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CUBA	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	TUNISIA	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MALDIVES	Y	UGANDA	Y
DEMOCRAT IC YEMEN	Y	MALI	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
ECUADOR	A	MALTA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y
EGYPT	Y	MAURITANI A	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	Y
EQUATORIA L GUINEA	Y	MAURITIUS	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y
ETHIOPIA	Y	MOROCCO	Y	YEMEN	Y
GABON	Y	MOZAMBIQ UE	Y	YUGOSLAVI A	Y
GAMBIA	A	NEPAL	A	ZAIRE	ND
GHANA	Y	NIGER	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
GRENADA	A	NIGERIA	Y		
Total	Total Y = 71	Total N = 0	Total ND = 5	Total A = 12	Total members 88

Y vote in favor N vote against A abstained from note ND did not vote

Table 1.3.8 Vote distribution on A/RES/32/91[C]

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANIST AN	Y	GUINEA	Y	OMAN	Y
ALGERIA	Y	GUINEA- BISSAU	Y	PANAMA	A

ANGOLA	ND	GUYANA	Y	PERU	Y
ARGENTINA	ND	INDIA	Y	QATAR	Y
BAHRAIN	Y	INDONESIA	Y	RWANDA	Y
BANGLADESH	Y	IRAQ	Y	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Y
BARBADOS	ND	IVORY COAST	Y	SAUDI ARABIA	Y
BENIN	Y	JAMAICA	Y	SENEGAL	Y
BHUTAN	Y	JORDAN	Y	SEYCHELLES	ND
BOLIVIA	Y	KENYA	Y	SIERRA LEONE	Y
BOTSWANA	Y	KUWAIT	Y	SINGAPORE	Y
BURMA	Y	LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	Y	SOMALIA	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LEBANON	Y	SRI LANKA	ND
CAPE VERDE	Y	LESOTHO	Y	SUDAN	Y
CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE	Y	LIBERIA	A	SWAZILAND	A
CHAD	Y	LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
CHILE	ND	MADAGASCAR	Y	TOGO	Y
COMOROS	Y	MALAWI	A	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CONGO	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	TUNISIA	Y
CUBA	Y	MALDIVES	Y	UGANDA	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MALI	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	Y	MALTA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y
ECUADOR	Y	MAURITANIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	ND
EGYPT	Y	MAURITIUS	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y

EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Y	MOROCCO	Y	VIETNAM	Y
ETHIOPIA	Y	MOZAMBIQUE	Y	YEMEN	Y
GABON	Y	NEPAL	Y	YUGOSLAVIA	
GAMBIA	Y	NIGER	Y	ZAIRE	Y
GHANA	Y	NIGERIA	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
GRENADA	Y				
Total	Total Y = 79	Total N = 0	Total ND = 7	Total A = 4	Total members 90

Y vote in favor N vote against A abstained from vote ND did not vote

Table 1.3.9 Vote distribution on A/RES/33/28[C]

NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote	NAM member Countries	Vote
AFGHANISTAN	Y	GUINEA	Y	OMAN	Y
ALGERIA	Y	GUINEA-BISSAU	Y	PERU	A
ANGOLA	Y	GUYANA	Y	PANAMA	A
ARGENTINA	A	INDIA	Y	QATAR	Y
BAHRAIN	Y	INDONESIA	Y	RWANDA	Y
BANGLADESH	Y	IRAQ	Y	SAO TOME AND PRINCE	Y
BARBADOS	Y	IVORY COAST	A	SAUDI ARABIA	Y
BENIN	Y	JAMAICA	Y	SENEGAL	Y
BHUTAN	Y	JORDAN	Y	SEYCHELLES	ND
BOLIVIA	Y	KENYA	Y	SIERRA LEONE	Y
BOTSWANA	Y	KUWAIT	Y	SINGAPORE	Y
BURMA	Y	LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	Y	SOMALIA	Y
BURUNDI	Y	LEBANON	Y	SRI LANKA	Y
CAPE VERDE	Y	LESOTHO	A	SUDAN	Y

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE	Y	LIBERIA	Y	SWAZILAND	A
CHAD	Y	LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIY A	Y	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Y
CHILE	A	MADAGASC AR	Y	TOGO	Y
COMOROS	Y	MALAWI	A	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Y
CONGO	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	TUNISIA	Y
CUBA	Y	MALDIVES	Y	UGANDA	Y
CYPRUS	Y	MALI	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Y
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	Y	MALTA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	Y
EGYPT	Y	MAURITANIA	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	Y
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	ND	MAURITIUS	Y	UPPER VOLTA	Y
ETHIOPIA	Y	MOROCCO	Y	VIETNAM	Y
GABON	Y	MOZAMBIQUE	Y	YEMEN	Y
GAMBIA	Y	NEPAL	Y	YUGOSLAVIA	Y
GHANA	ND	NIGER	ND	ZAIRE	Y
GRENADA	ND	NIGERIA	Y	ZAMBIA	Y
Total	Total Y = 76	Total N = 0	Total ND = 5	Total A = 8	Total members 89

Y vote in favor

N vote against

A abstained from vote

ND did not vote

Table 1.4 Documents of NAM to UN

Document Symbol	Document Type
S/12410	Declaration on the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine in the light of recent developments, adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of non-aligned countries at their

	extraordinary meeting in New York on 30 September 1977
N.AV	Communique Issued on 17 August by Group of Non-aligned Countries-Sri Lanka
S/15454	Communiqué Issued on April 3, 1979 by Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries/Question of Palestine – Letter from Cuba, NAM communiqué
S/13217	Communiqué issued on 3 April 1979 by the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries
S/13307	Communiqué issued on 9 May 1979 on behalf of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries
S/14990	Final Communiqué of the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries on the Question of Palestine, Kuwait, 5 to 8 April 1982
S/15165	Communication dated 5 June 1982 from the Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/15327	Final Communiqué of the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries on the question of Palestine, held at Nicosia, Cyprus, from 15 to 17 July 1982.
S/15675	Final document of the twelfth Conference of Heads of state or Government of Non-Aligned countries, held at Durban, south Africa, from 7 to 12 march 1983
S/15675	The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi, India from 7 to 12 March 1983, considers the Question of Palestine, the Question of Lebanon and the Situation in the Middle East
S.16035	Final Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries
Total	11

Table 1.5 European Economic Voting Distribution on UNGA Resolutions

A/RES/3236(XXIX)	Vote	A/RES/3210(XXIX)	Vote	A/RES/3376(XXX)	Vote	A/RES/3375(XXX)	Vote	A/RES/3378(XXX)	Vote
Germany, Federal Republic	A	Germany, Federal Republic	A	Germany, Federal Republic	N	Germany, Federal Republic	N	Germany, Federal Republic	N
France	A	France	Y	France	A	France	A	France	Y
Italy	A	Italy	Y	Italy	A	Italy	A	Italy	N
Netherlands	A	Netherlands	A	Netherlands	N	Netherlands	N	Netherlands	N
Belgium	A	Belgium	A	Belgium	N	Belgium	A	Belgium	N
Luxembourg	A	Luxembourg	A	Luxembourg	N	Luxembourg	A	Luxembourg	N
Denmark	A	Denmark	A	Denmark	N	Denmark	A	Denmark	N
Ireland	A	Ireland	Y	Ireland	A	Ireland	A	Ireland	N
United Kingdom	A	United Kingdom	A	United Kingdom	N	United Kingdom	N	United Kingdom	N
Greece	A	Greece	Y	Greece	Y	Greece	Y	Greece	Y

Y vote in favor

N vote against

A abstained from vote

ND did not vote

Table 1.5.1 European Economic Voting Distribution

3379(XXX)	Vote	A/RES/31/106[D]	Vote	A/RES/31/20	Vote	A/RES/32/91[C]	Vote	A/RES/33/28[C]	Vote
Germany, Federal Republic	N	Germany, Federal Republic	A	Germany, Federal Republic	N	Germany, Federal Republic	A	Germany, Federal Republic	N
France	N	France	A	France	A	France	A	France	A
Italy	N	Italy	A	Italy	A	Italy	A	Italy	N
Netherlands	N	Netherlands	A	Netherlands	N	Netherlands	A	Netherlands	N
Belgium	N	Belgium	A	Belgium	N	Belgium	A	Belgium	N
Luxembourg	N	Luxembourg	A	Luxembourg	N	Luxembourg	A	Luxembourg	N
Denmark	N	Denmark	A	Denmark	N	Denmark	A	Denmark	N
Ireland	N	Ireland	A	Ireland	A	Ireland	A	Ireland	N
United Kingdom	N	United Kingdom	A	United Kingdom	N	United Kingdom	A	United Kingdom	N
Greece	A	Greece	Y	Greece	Y	Greece	Y	Greece	Y

Y vote in favor

N vote against

A abstained from vote

ND did not vote

Chapter five

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

5.0 Summary of Findings Relative to Hypothesis

5.1 NAM's Contribution to the Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Hypothesis 1)

The Non-Aligned Movement's efforts contributed significantly to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The thesis details the consistent and strategic support provided by NAM to the Palestinian cause, especially through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This support was not only rhetorical but also manifested in concrete actions within international forums, such as the United Nations (UN), where NAM member states collectively advocated for resolutions that condemned Israeli actions and supported Palestinian self-determination. For instance, NAM's influence was pivotal in the passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 3236, which reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination. The study indicates that such actions by NAM members were instrumental in keeping the Palestinian issue on the international agenda, thus contributing significantly to the global discourse on the conflict.

Additionally, the research outlines how NAM's efforts provided the Palestinian cause with legitimacy and international recognition, factors crucial for any movement seeking resolution through international diplomacy. By consistently aligning with the PLO and framing the Israeli occupation as a violation of international norms, NAM helped to build international pressure on Israel, which in turn facilitated various peace initiatives, albeit with varying degrees of success. The chapter's findings, therefore, confirm that NAM's contributions were not peripheral but central to the ongoing international efforts to address and resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

5.2 NAM's Advocacy for International Law and Its Impact on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Hypothesis 2)

NAM's advocacy for adherence to international law significantly influenced the behavior of parties involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This research provides substantial evidence that NAM's consistent call for compliance with international law had a impact on how the conflict was framed and addressed by the international community. NAM's members, many of whom had experienced colonialism and were newly independent states, were particularly sensitive to issues of sovereignty and self-determination. This collective historical experience informed NAM's strong stance against Israeli occupation, which was consistently portrayed as a breach of international law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The study also shows that NAM's legalistic approach to the conflict had a dual impact. On one hand, it reinforced the international community's understanding of the conflict as one that required both legal and diplomatic resolutions, rather than purely military or political solutions. This is evidenced by the numerous resolutions and declarations championed by NAM at the UN, which emphasized the illegality of Israel's occupation and settlement activities in the occupied territories. On the other hand, NAM's advocacy also influenced the behavior the PLO, which increasingly framed its demands within the context of international law. By leveraging NAM's support, the PLO was able to gain greater international legitimacy and build a legal case against Israeli actions in international forums, further solidifying the influence of NAM's advocacy.

5.3 Impact of Diversity of National Interests within NAM on Collective Action (Hypothesis 3)

The diversity of national interests among NAM member states significantly hindered their collective action in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. The findings in this study reveal that while NAM maintained a unified rhetorical stance in support of Palestinian self-determination, the diversity of political, economic, and strategic interests among its member states often led to inconsistencies in collective action. The thesis highlights several instances where these internal divergences affected NAM's ability to implement its resolutions or take decisive actions. For example, the chapter notes how certain member states with closer ties to Western powers or with

economic interests in maintaining relations with Israel were often reluctant to fully support punitive measures against Israel, such as economic sanctions or diplomatic isolation.

The thesis further elucidates how the Cold War dynamics exacerbated these divisions. NAM, despite its non-aligned stance, was not immune to the influences of the bipolar world order. Some member states leaned towards the Soviet bloc, while others had closer ties to the United States, leading to differing priorities within the movement. This lack of cohesion is evidenced in the varying degrees of support for Palestinian's struggle expressed in the voting pattern on UN resolutions. While some NAM members strongly supported the PLO's resistance as a legitimate means of liberation, others were more inclined to vote against.

The study concludes that these internal divisions did indeed hinder NAM's effectiveness as a unified body, limiting its ability to exert maximum pressure on Israel and other involved parties. However, it also recognizes that despite these challenges, NAM's collective efforts were still significant in maintaining international attention on the Palestinian issue, even if the implementation of its resolutions was sometimes inconsistent.

5.4 Broader Implications of NAM's Role

The findings of this thesis have broader implications for understanding the role of international movements in conflict resolution and global governance. NAM's experience with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict underscores the potential and limitations of such movements in shaping international norms and influencing global politics.

On the one hand, NAM's success in championing the Palestinian cause illustrates the power of collective action and advocacy in advancing the rights of marginalized and oppressed peoples. The movement's ability to mobilize international support for the Palestinians and to frame the conflict within the broader context of decolonization and anti-imperialism was a testament to its influence and effectiveness. NAM's efforts contributed to a shift in global perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from a regional dispute to a matter of international concern that required collective action and intervention.

On the other hand, the challenges faced by NAM in maintaining unity and coherence within its ranks highlight the difficulties of sustaining effective collective action in a diverse and complex international environment. The movement's internal divisions, driven by the differing national interests and strategic priorities of its member states, often undermined its ability to act decisively and consistently. This underscores the importance of managing internal diversity and building consensus within international movements to ensure their effectiveness in addressing global challenges.

6.0 Contribution to knowledge

In conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that the Non-Aligned Movement played a significant and multifaceted role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between 1955 and 1983. NAM's contributions were crucial in advancing the Palestinian cause on the international stage, shaping global perceptions of the conflict, and influencing the strategies of both the Palestinians and the broader international community. However, the movement's effectiveness was often limited by its internal diversity and the complex geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War era.

The findings of this study contribute to a deeper understanding of NAM's historical significance and its impact on one of the most protracted conflicts in modern history. They also offer valuable insights into the broader dynamics of international diplomacy and the role of collective action in global governance. As the world continues to grapple with new and enduring conflicts, the lessons learned from NAM's experience with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain relevant, highlighting the potential and challenges of international movements in shaping a more just and equitable world order.

7.0 Recommendations for future research

The evolving role of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents a rich area for further research. This research has given positive insights into the movement's role in advocating for Palestinian rights. Future research exploring NAM's influence on international legal norms, multilateral diplomacy, and the impact of member states' diverse interests can provide deeper insights into its contemporary relevance and challenges. These

proposed topics aim to offer future researchers to contribute to knowledge in this highly under-researched relationship, thus helping to advance understanding of NAM's evolving role in global conflict resolution.

1. Research Topic: The Role of Emerging Powers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
2. Research Topic: NAM's Influence on International Legal Frameworks Regarding Occupation.

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