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Engagement and Enlargement: Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy and
its Influence on U.S. Interventions in Haiti and Rwanda

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Table of Contents

1	Acknowledgement	3
2	Abstract English.....	4
3	Abstract Deutsch	6
4	Introduction.....	7
5	Historical Background: U.S. position on foreign interventions from 1918 until 1992 ..	12
5.1	Wilsonianism and liberal internationalism 1918	12
5.2	Containment politics since 1947.....	13
5.3	Fall of the Soviet Union in 1991: George H. W. Bush and his foreign policy	14
6	Bill Clinton and his administration's position on foreign interventions	17
6.1	Presidential campaign in 1992.....	17
6.2	University of Georgetown Address in 1991	18
6.3	Bill Clinton's first years in office	25
6.4	National Security Strategy Report 1994.....	27
7	Case Studies	36
7.1	Haiti.....	36
7.1.1	President Bill Clinton - Address to the Nation on Haiti. September 15th, 1994.	42
7.2	Rwanda	49
7.2.1	The United States and Rwanda Relations.....	52
7.2.2	The White House Statement by the President on Rwanda, July 29, 1994.....	57
8	Reception of the Clinton Administration's Foreign Policy.....	62
9	Conclusion.....	66
10	Bibliography	68

1 Acknowledgement

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2 Abstract English

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged as the leading global superpower. Now the United States and the newly elected President Bill Clinton no longer had to focus on containment policies but were able to shift focus towards establishing the country's new role in international relations. Positioning themselves as advocates for democratic ideals and values, the United States had to ask itself if it was their moral responsibility to protect the rights of other states and their citizens and if so, when to intervene and to what extent. The 1990s witnessed a number of crises unfolding around the world, including the coup d'état in Haiti in 1991 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. These events presented the United States with significant foreign policy challenges, deciding whether interventions were justified and, if deemed necessary, to what degree involvement should occur.

The aim of this master's thesis is to investigate the foreign policy strategy of Bill Clinton during his first term of presidency and to analyze his administration's position towards international interventions. The thesis will delve into the evolution of the Clinton administration foreign policy both before and after the presidential election, providing a comprehensive overview of how Clinton's campaign promises translated into actual governmental policies.

To achieve this, the thesis will examine Bill Clinton's speech at the Georgetown University during his presidential campaign in 1991 and The National Security Strategy Report from 1994. Both these sources feature the central themes of the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Furthermore, the thesis will investigate the administration's response to the coup d'état in Haiti in 1991 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. These case studies were selected due to their distinct challenges they posed to the U.S foreign policy. By utilizing these case studies, the thesis aims to provide an insightful analysis of the context of each crisis, the decisions made by the administration, and the outcomes of those decisions. Through this analysis, an understanding of the Clinton administration's foreign policy strategy towards interventions during the 1990's will be presented.

3 Abstract Deutsch

Nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion im Jahr 1991 wurden die Vereinigten Staaten zur führenden globalen Supermacht. Nun mussten sich die USA und der neu gewählte Präsident Bill Clinton nicht mehr auf die Eindämmungspolitik konzentrieren, sondern konnten den Schwerpunkt auf die Festlegung der neuen Rolle des Landes in den internationalen Beziehungen verlagern. Die Vereinigten Staaten, die sich als Verfechter demokratischer Ideale und Werte positionierten, mussten sich fragen, ob es ihre moralische Verantwortung war, die Rechte anderer Staaten und ihrer Bürger zu schützen, und wenn ja, wann und in welchem Umfang sie eingreifen sollten. In den 1990er Jahren kam es in der ganzen Welt zu einer Reihe von Krisen, darunter der Staatsstreich in Haiti 1991 und der Völkermord in Ruanda 1994. Diese Ereignisse stellten die Vereinigten Staaten vor große außenpolitische Herausforderungen, denn es galt zu entscheiden, ob Interventionen gerechtfertigt waren und, falls sie für notwendig erachtet wurden, in welchem Umfang sie erfolgen sollten.

Ziel dieser Masterarbeit ist es, die außenpolitische Strategie von Bill Clinton während seiner ersten Amtszeit zu untersuchen und die Haltung seiner Regierung gegenüber internationalen Interventionen zu analysieren. Die Arbeit wird sich mit der Entwicklung der Außenpolitik der Clinton-Administration vor und nach der Präsidentschaftswahl befassen und einen umfassenden Überblick darüber geben, wie Clintons Wahlversprechen in die tatsächliche Regierungspolitik umgesetzt wurden.

Zu diesem Zweck werden in dieser Arbeit Bill Clintons Rede an der Georgetown University während seiner Präsidentschaftskampagne 1991 und der National Security Strategy Report von 1994 untersucht. In diesen beiden Quellen werden die zentralen Themen der Außenpolitik der Clinton-Regierung behandelt. Darüber hinaus wird die Reaktion der Regierung auf den Staatsstreich in Haiti im Jahr 1991 und den Völkermord in Ruanda im Jahr 1994 untersucht. Diese Fallstudien wurden ausgewählt, weil sie die Außenpolitik der USA vor besondere Herausforderungen stellten. Anhand dieser Fallstudien soll eine aufschlussreiche Analyse der außenpolitischen Strategie der Clinton-Administration in Bezug auf Interventionen in den 1990er Jahren verständlich gemacht werden.

4 Introduction

“We’ve entered a new era, and we need a new vision and the strength to meet a new set of opportunities and threats. We face the same challenge today that we faced in 1946 -to build a world of security, freedom, democracy, free markets, and growth at a time of great change.”¹

- William J. Clinton, Georgetown University, December 12, 1991.

When the Democratic presidential candidate William J. Clinton delivered a speech at his alma mater, Georgetown University, on December 12, 1991, he emphasized the distinctive nature of the 1990s in U.S. foreign politics. He highlighted the need for a renewed vision and the strength to navigate new opportunities and threats in the post-Cold War era. The United States have always played a prominent role in global affairs. Throughout the 20th century, American liberal internationalism, often associated with Wilsonianism, shaped the nation’s approach to foreign policy. The ideology established by President Woodrow Wilson provided a framework for U.S. diplomatic relations and continues to influence American politics until today.² Central to this ideology is the belief that the United States hold a distinct responsibility to engage in global affairs, reflecting a core aspect of the American identity.³

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States found itself no longer focusing on its containment policy, which sought to prevent the spread of communism around the world since the end of World War II. As the last decade of the 20th century began, and the United States was now the leading global superpower, the nation was eager to start a new chapter and to define its role globally. The issue of a new foreign policy strategy became an essential part of the 1992 U.S. presidential elections. During his presidential campaign and once elected to office, Bill Clinton focused on the linkage between foreign and domestic policy and insisted that even though the Cold War was over, the United States’ global leadership remained imperative. According to Clinton, it was the responsibility of the United States to make a difference through its engagement around the world. Nevertheless, he argued that international involvement must be

¹ William J. Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security. Remarks to Students at Georgetown University. Georgetown University, December 12, 1999.

² Tony Smith, Why Wilson Matters. The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today. Princeton: University Press, 2017. 8–9.

³ Smith, Why Wilson Matters. 8–9.

carefully considered in order to serve the interest and priorities of the United States itself.⁴ Thus, in 1994 the Clinton administration released *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, a report that was the administration's first broad approach to their foreign policy. In this report the three central pillars of Clinton's foreign policy were specified: national security, economic prosperity, and democracy promotion.⁵ The terms *engagement* and *enlargement*, coined by Anthony Lake and Warren Christopher, two of Clinton's political advisors, became almost synonymous with the president's foreign policy. The administration was dedicated to advance democracies globally, with the belief that expanding free markets and democracies worldwide would bring about peace, as democratic nations are less likely to engage in warfare against one another.

Since the 1990s witnessed a number of global crises, the Clinton administration was forced to put their foreign strategy into actions immediately. The coup d'état in Haiti in 1991 as well as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 were crucial events that presented the United States with significant foreign policy challenges. President Bill Clinton and his administration had to decide when foreign interventions were warranted and, if deemed necessary, to what degree involvement should occur.

Various scholars have published books on President Bill Clinton and his foreign policy. The main sources for this thesis was the research of James D. Boys, John Dumbrell and Hal Brands.

James D. Boys wrote "*Clinton's Grand Strategy – U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World*". In this book, Boys gives a comprehensive overview of Bill Clinton's foreign policies and the administration's development of a *Grand Strategy* between 1993 and 2001. He explains that the Clinton administration entered office after "the foreign policy president" George H.W. Bush, and even though Clinton was naturally inclined towards domestic politics, he was eager to address the new geopolitical environment that his administration found itself in. Boys argues that even though many scholars have criticized Bill Clinton's disengagement in foreign politics and his lack of a coherent

⁴ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994. Washington D.C., July 1994. In: National Security Strategy Archive, 1994. i.

⁵ James D. Boys. *Clinton's Grand Strategy. US Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World*. London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, 103.

doctrine, he believes that despite these difficulties, they produced a series of documents which all revealed a continuing intent behind a grand strategy.⁶

The author John Dumbrell, who wrote “*Clinton’s Foreign Policy, Between the Bushes, 1992-2000*” gives a detailed insight into Clinton’s foreign policy from 1992 until 2000, covering the main foreign policy issues of the administration. Dumbrell agrees with Boys on many accounts. He states that the presidency of Bill Clinton marks a special period in history, since it was the era after the end of the Cold War and before the 9/11 terror attacks. The book examines Clinton’s adaptation of his foreign policy and discusses in detail key policies like foreign economic policy, humanitarian interventions and peace-making.⁷

Hal Brands, the author of “*From Berlin to Baghdad, American’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World*” and other articles on the United States search for a grand strategy also aims to offer a comprehensive look at U.S. foreign policy from 1989 until 2006 and the United States’ search for purpose in the aftermaths of the Cold War world. Brands examines how certain (foreign) policy decisions relate to larger ideas about security strategy and he looks at how these big-picture strategies shaped specific foreign policy decisions and vice versa. However, in contrast to Boys and Dumbrell, Brands concludes that there was no coherent and sustainable foreign strategy during the years of the Clinton administration.⁸

⁶ Boys, Clinton’s Grand Strategy, 1-5 and 134.

See also:

James D. Boys, A Lost Opportunity: The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (1991-1993). In: European Journal of American Studies, 7 (1), 2012.

⁷ John J. Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy. Between the Bushes 1992-2000. London: Routledge, 2009. 1–2.

See also:

John J. Dumbrell, Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Reconsidered. In: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13 (2), 2002.

John J. Dumbrell, President Bill Clinton and US transatlantic foreign policy. In: Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 8 (3), 2010.

John J. Dumbrell, America in the 1990s: Searching for Purpose. In: Cox, M. and Stokes, D. (Eds.) U.S. foreign policy. Oxford University Press, 2008.

⁸ Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad. America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015. 1–7.

See also:

Hal Brands, The Promise and Pitfalls of Grand Strategy. U.S. Army War College, 2012.

Hal Brands, Presidential Doctrines: An Introduction. In: Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36 (1), 2006.

Hal Brands, Choosing Primacy: U.S Strategy and Global Order at the Dawn of the Post-Cold War Era. In: Texas National Security Review, 1 (2), March 2018.

Hal Brands, Grand Strategy for a New Twilight Struggle. In: Emma Ashford et al. (Eds.) New Voices in Grand Strategy. Center for a New American Security, 2019.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate Bill Clinton's position on foreign interventions and his foreign policy strategy from 1991 until 1995. In the first part of the thesis, the history of U.S. positions on foreign intervention is explored. The first chapter analyzes Wilsonianism and liberal internationalism in the aftermath of World War I. The next chapter takes a closer look at the emergence of containment politics as the primary goal in U.S foreign policies following World War II. Next, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 under the presidency of George H. W Bush and its influence in U.S. foreign policy perspectives are also being examined. This provides a comprehensive understanding of the core principles and the strategic shifts that defined U.S. foreign interventions in the 20th century. Then, the thesis continues by exploring the insights of Bill Clinton and his administration's position on foreign interventions during his presidential campaign and the first years of his presidency from 1993 until 1995. To do this, the thesis analyzes Bill Clinton's presidential campaign speech at Georgetown University in 1991 and The National Security Strategy Report from 1994. These sources are significant since they both feature the central themes of Clintons foreign policy. Having addressed the focus of the Clintons foreign policy strategy, the thesis will look at the execution of Clinton's foreign policy with regard to the coup d'état in Haiti in 1991 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. By utilizing two primary sources, Bill Clinton's Address to the Nation on Haiti and his public statement in regard to Rwanda, the thesis provides an insightful display on the administration's actual foreign policy. Through this analysis, a comprehensive understanding of the Clinton administration's foreign policy strategy towards interventions during the 1990s will be presented.

In regard to this, these are the research questions this master thesis investigates:

1. How did Bill Clinton and his administration position themselves in regard to U.S. interventions in foreign countries?
 - What was Bill Clinton's position towards U.S interventions in foreign countries before his election in 1992 and how after his election?
 - How did Bill Clinton justify (non)-interventions in foreign countries before and after his election?
 - What factors influenced the extent to which the Clinton administration intervened in foreign countries?

2. How did Bill Clinton and his administration position themselves in the conflicts of Haiti in 1991-1994 and Rwanda in 1994 and how did they justify (non)-intervention?
- What were the reasons given by Clinton and his administration for (non)-interventions in the conflicts of Rwanda and Haiti?
 - How did Clinton's speeches and statements regarding Rwanda and Haiti reflect his administration's foreign policy strategy towards interventions?

5 Historical Background: U.S. position on foreign interventions from 1918 until 1992

5.1 Wilsonianism and liberal internationalism 1918

When examining the history of the United States' foreign interventions throughout the 20th century, several key concepts emerge for consideration. Even though the U.S. has demonstrated a longstanding tradition of foreign interventions, this approach has not always been the prevailing policy. Dating back to 1776, the general consensus in U.S. politics wanted the United States to distance themselves from European politics, a view that was also underscored by George Washington, the first president of the U.S.⁹ When Thomas Jefferson, the third president of the United States, assumed office in 1801, he warned his nation about “*entangling alliances*” and promised “*peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliance with none*”.¹⁰ Similarly, in 1823 James Monroe, the fifth president, mentioned in his State of the Union Address the now-famous Monroe Doctrine, advocating for non-interference in European affairs and promoting multilateralism and non-interventions as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.¹¹ Another prominent figure in regard to U.S. interventions in foreign countries is President Woodrow Wilson. In office from 1913 to 1921, he is considered to be the father of American liberal internationalism and his policies have been identified as “Wilsonian” or “Wilsonianism”.¹² Wilsonianism, a form of liberal internationalism, advocates for the spread of democracy and emphasizes the importance of self-determination for all people. The underlying assumption is that ensuring global peace would benefit the international community, a goal which is achievable through American leadership. Wilsonianism's notion that democratic nations do not engage in wars against each other and differences are resolved peacefully finds its roots in Immanuel Kant's *perpetual peace* theory. Kant argued that democracies are more disposed to coexist peacefully with one another compared to other forms of government.¹³ President Woodrow Wilson, in turn, perceived the U.S. as a moral global authority, viewing its leadership role deeply tied to its democratic

⁹ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 10–11.

¹⁰ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 10.

¹¹ Smith, Why Wilson Matters, 8-9.

¹² Smith, Why Wilson Matters, 8-9.

¹³ Smith, Why Wilson Matters, 10-13.

nature. Its moral authority extended beyond national interest, including the common interest of global peace, a concept acknowledged not only by the U.S. itself but also by a large part of the international community.¹⁴ Recognizing its prominence in world affairs, the United States envisioned itself as a peacekeeper, championing not only its own interest but also the collective interests of the global world.¹⁵ Apart from the emphasis on promoting democracies abroad, the Wilsonian agenda included other aspects, such as advocating for the opening of world economic markets to foster commercial integration as well as fostering the growth of multilateral institutions.¹⁶ However, while economic openness and multilateralism were critical components, the primary focus of Wilsonianism remained democracy promotion.¹⁷ To further its mission of endorsing democracy, the U.S. pursued both direct and indirect persuasion by supporting open economies and multilateral institutions.¹⁸ Wilson believed that democratic governments were the highest form of state organization and he envisioned that, as time progressed, other nations would emulate the American example, leading to multiple democratically led nations across the globe.¹⁹

With the start of the Second World War and the United States' involvement after the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the United States elevated to the status of a true global power. America's position in the world and its grand foreign strategy became linked to its response to the Soviet threat, which also dominated the later part of the 20th century immensely.²⁰

5.2 Containment politics since 1947

Following World War II, the United States established the containment policy, also known as the Truman doctrine, as its primary foreign political strategy. Enacted in 1947 by then-president Harry S. Truman, the Truman Doctrine aimed to contain the spread of communism around the world in the interest of preserving global peace. In order to achieve this goal, the U.S. provided political, military and economic assistance to nations facing the threat of communist influence.²¹ Furthermore, the Marshall Plan, a

¹⁴ *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 21-22.

¹⁵ *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 15-16.

¹⁶ *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 16.

¹⁷ *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 16.

¹⁸ *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 22.

¹⁹ *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 133.

²⁰ *Boys*, *Clinton's Grand Strategy*, 10-11.

²¹ *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 173.

crucial part of Truman's foreign policy, was implemented in order to provide economic aid to democratic countries in Western Europe. The idea was to strengthen the economies of these nations, securing democracy in Europe and therefore preventing the possible shift towards communism in the aftermath of World War II. Together, the containment policy and the Marshall Plan embodied crucial elements of Truman's foreign policy approach, intending to safeguard democratic values, and promoting global stability.²² By adopting the containment policy, U.S. foreign policy departed from its previous isolationist tendencies, which had often discouraged involvement in global affairs. The containment policy represented a willingness to engage with foreign leaders, even if it meant cooperating with authoritarian regimes to stop the spread of communism. Consequently, containment policy took over liberal ideals in the pursuit of national security.²³ Throughout the next decades, containment of Soviet power remained the central agenda of U.S. foreign policy until the late 1980s.²⁴

5.3 Fall of the Soviet Union in 1991: George H. W. Bush and his foreign policy

The Cold War and the United States' grand strategy of containment provided a coherent foreign policy. For decades, the United States knew exactly who its enemy was.²⁵ Thus, when George H.W Bush came into office in 1989, his administration encountered a unique situation, since the possibility of the Cold War being over soon seemed close. However, with the loss of their main adversary, the Soviet Union, the U.S. had to provide a new and clear foreign policy objective. Anti-communism had shaped the nation's identity for decades, and therefore, the United States was suddenly confronted with an uncertain future.²⁶ Furthermore, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989, Bush Sr. was cautious not to jeopardize the ongoing efforts of fostering international stability and promoting diplomatic relations in the post-Cold War era. Even though the administration was optimistic about prospects for peace, they were still nervous about the rise of new threats.²⁷ The U.S. had to search for a new foreign strategy that would guide it through the post-Cold War era. Some advocated for the revival of the virtues of the containment policy with a new

²² *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 173.

²³ *Smith*, *Why Wilson Matters*, 162-168.

²⁴ John. *Dumbrell*, *American Foreign Policy. Carter to Clinton*. London: MacMillan Press, 1997. 2.

²⁵ *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 8–9.

²⁶ *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 12–13.

²⁷ *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 40.

diplomatic stance. Since anti-communism had been an easily understandable strategy, many believed that a similar concept should follow in order to define U.S. foreign policy in the coming decades.²⁸ In 1991, House Foreign Affairs Committee chairmen Lee Hamilton foresaw a tumultuous future for the world:

*“The world is going to be messy in the decades ahead. We’ve got to begin to lay an intellectual base for U.S. involvement in the world, a rationale that people understand and support and around which you can build a consensus, as was done with containment.”*²⁹

Nonetheless, a critical difference from the Cold War era was evident: the United States was no longer dealing with a singular dominant threat but was now confronted with a multitude of perils. This presented the fundamental challenge on foreign policy in the early 1990s. While there was a general agreement that U.S. diplomacy should be clear and consistent, the challenge was the absence of a single main threat that could make it an overarching strategy.³⁰ In 1992, George H.W. Bush used his re-election campaign for presenting himself as a president capable of guiding the United States into the next chapter. However, his foundational principles, anti-communism, American exceptionalism, and economic liberalism, had started to lose prominence. Furthermore, foreign policy events that encountered obstacles like the negotiations regarding NAFTA and the civil war in Yugoslavia as well as the protests in Tiananmen Square cast shadows over his presidency. Finally, his political slogan, “New World Order” which described the nature of the new post-Cold War era, did not resonate with the American public. With the end of the Cold War, the United States was eager for a shift in political focus, especially redirecting their resources to address domestic social challenges.³¹ Although Bush was not able to provide a clear and coherent foreign policy strategy, it was obvious that there was a need to produce one for the next administration.³²

²⁸ Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 71.

²⁹ Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 71.

³⁰ Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 74-75.

³¹ Boys, Clinton’s Grand Strategy, 13-14.

³² Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 100.

6 Bill Clinton and his administration's position on foreign interventions

6.1 Presidential campaign in 1992

The end of the Cold War offered the United States the possibility to reevaluate its foreign policy strategy. The issue of a new foreign policy strategy became a crucial part during the 1992 U.S. presidential elections.³³ On October 3rd, 1991, Arkansas' Governor and Democrat Bill Clinton announced his candidacy for presidency for the United States. In the beginning, it seemed improbable that Clinton, a 46-year-old governor from one of the poorest states in the U.S., could defeat a president with the highest approval ratings ever recorded. Furthermore, his political background was primarily focused on domestic matters and his exposure to foreign politics was largely academic, having attended the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Despite this, Clinton recognized the emerging concept of globalization, and he was willing to seek solutions from the international community, which became pivotal to his presidential campaign. In the beginning of his presidential campaign, Clinton's opponents focused on domestic issues, believing international affairs were unpopular with the public. This left Governor Clinton as the lone candidate addressing foreign issues already early in his campaign.³⁴ Clinton's goal was to address global issues during a domestically focused campaign. The linkage of foreign and domestic policy, arguing that the United States could not "*build a safe and secure world unless we can first make America strong at home*"³⁵ became the signature concept of the Clinton campaign.³⁶ Additionally, Clinton argued that the U.S. needed to replace the outdated foreign policy strategy of containment with something new for the end of the 20th century.³⁷

Clinton's foreign policy advisors, namely Anthony Lake, Samuel Berger, and Nancy Soderberg, formed a team which allowed them autonomy in shaping foreign policy decisions. Anthony Lake assumed the role of preparing Clinton's first foreign policy speech, scheduled to be delivered at Georgetown University in December 1991. With

³³ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 11.

³⁴ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 15.

³⁵ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 18.

³⁶ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 7.

³⁷ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 11.

the collapse of the Soviet Union, containment policy as the primary justification of the United States' global presence became obsolete. The pressing question for the Clinton team was how a superpower like the U.S. should navigate in a world that was no longer dominated by a superpower conflict.³⁸ Anthony Lake strongly advocated for the United States to use its moral, military, economic, and political power to actively engage in promoting a fairer and more stable global environment. His perspective was deeply rooted in moral ideas, aligning him with the principles of Wilsonian foreign policy.³⁹ In the end, Clinton's team came up with a foreign policy approach that was built on three key principles: ensuring a strong national defense, advancing the American economy, and promoting the spread of democracy. The argument was that the world had evolved, and the Bush administration had missed the opportunity to effectively address the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Clinton's core concept was the linkage between foreign and domestic policy, underscoring the belief that the U.S. could no longer build a safe and secure world without first strengthening America at home. This interconnection between domestic and foreign policy served as a guiding principle for Clinton's campaign. Clinton and his team believed that the combination of these core principles would guarantee the nation's role as the leading force for peace, freedom, and prosperity globally.⁴⁰

6.2 University of Georgetown Address in 1991

This chapter examines Bill Clinton's Address at Georgetown University, aiming to illustrate his foreign policy approach during his presidential campaign. The speech will be analyzed in order to understand how Clinton and his foreign policy advisors positioned themselves in regard to U.S. interventions in foreign countries before the election.

On December 12th, 1991, Bill Clinton delivered his first foreign policy speech at Georgetown University, titled "*A New Covenant for American Security*". This speech was one of three speeches which Clinton delivered at his alma mater. The speech aimed to address Clinton's political stance at the beginning of his presidential

³⁸ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 17-18.

³⁹ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 16.

⁴⁰ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 17-18.

campaign, specifically focusing on his foreign policy positions. The speech was written by his foreign policy advisors Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger.⁴¹

At the beginning of his address, Bill Clinton starts by explaining the significance of the post-Cold War era and how *“anyone running for president right now Republican or Democrat is going to have to provide a vision for security in this new era.”*⁴² From the start, Clinton itemizes the three objectives of his future foreign policy strategy: restructuring the U.S. military, reestablishing Americas economic leadership at home and abroad, and encouraging the spread of democracies globally.⁴³

In regard to restructuring the military, Clinton states that the U.S. has to replace their Cold War military structure with a smaller, more flexible mix of capabilities. Furthermore, he insists that the U.S. has to

*“reach a new agreement with our allies for sharing the costs and risks of maintaining peace. [...] We need to shift that burden to a wider coalition of nations of which America will be a part.”*⁴⁴

Here, Clinton positions himself as a supporter of multilateral policies, an approach he strongly believes is necessary in a post-Cold War globalized world. He continues by arguing that the focus of U.S. military and foreign interventions should be first on stopping disorder in the former Soviet Union, second on preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, third, stopping tensions in various regions in order to stop the risks of terrorist attacks on Americans and lastly, dealing with ethnic rivalries and separatist violences within national borders around the world. He continues his speech by acknowledging another focus of his presidential campaign, which are domestic matters in the United States, especially the economic leadership of the U.S. This part of the speech will not be analyzed extensively. However, the significant correlation between Clinton’s domestic and foreign policies needs to be mentioned. In his speech, he asserts:

⁴¹ Boys, Clinton’s Grand Strategy, 11.

⁴² Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁴³ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁴⁴ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

*"If we're not strong at home, we can't lead the world we've done so much to make. And if we withdraw from the world, it will hurt us economically at home."*⁴⁵

This statement underscores Bill Clinton's position on foreign policy, favoring globalized policies and highlighting global issues within a domestic context. Bill Clinton continues his speech by stating the importance of promoting democracies around the world. He emphasizes that the United States must use its power to reinforce global movement towards democracy. Clinton makes the point that Americans share moral principles, and that the U.S. cannot ignore how other governments treat their citizens. However, according to Clinton

*"[...] this does not mean we should deal only with democracies or that we should try to remake the world in our image. But recent experiences from Panama to Iran to Iraq shows the danger of forging relationships with despotic regimes [...]"*⁴⁶

Clinton suggests that while the U.S. should not limit its engagements strictly to democratic nations, there are significant risks associated with supporting despotic governments. The reference to Panama, Iran, and Iraq highlights historical instances where the U.S. had interactions with authoritarian regimes that ultimately proved problematic. Clinton intends to learn from the United States past experiences and wants to adopt a more cautious approach.

Clinton continues by noting that the promotion of democracies around the world serves various U.S. interests as he states that

"Democracies don't go to war with each other. The French and British have nuclear weapons, but we don't fear annihilation at their hands. Democracies don't sponsor terrorist acts against each other. They are more likely to be reliable trading partners, protect the global environment, and abide by international law. Over time, democracy is a stabilizing force. It provides nonviolent means for resolving disputes. Democracies do a better job of

⁴⁵ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁴⁶ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

protecting ethnic, religious, and other minorities. And elections can help resolve fratricidal civil wars”⁴⁷

Here, he articulates the core principles behind his foreign policy. In this statement, he suggests that democracies inherently possess characteristics that make them more peaceful and reliable to global stability compared to other forms of government. The assertion that "Democracies don't go to war with each other" is a reference to the democratic peace theory, arguing that democratic nations are less likely to engage in armed conflict with each other. The mention of France and Britain, both nuclear-armed democracies, illustrates the lack of fear between democratic nations. Furthermore, the quote highlights several benefits of democratic governance: the prevention of state-sponsored terrorism, reliable trade partnerships, environmental protection, adherence to international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. By asserting that democracies are more likely to protect minorities and resolve internal conflicts through elections, the statement emphasizes democracy's role in fostering domestic stability and human rights.

Clinton further elaborates on his central foreign policy concept of democracy promotion by asserting that

"The defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world aren't merely a reflection of our deepest values; they are vital to our national interest. Global democracy means nations at peace with one another, open to one another's ideas and one another's commerce."⁴⁸

Here, Clinton believes that promoting democracy globally not only aligns with America's core principles but also serves its national interest by fostering international peace and economic cooperation. Again, Clinton does not only point out the moral values of the U.S., but he also draws the connection between domestic and foreign policies, illustrating the important link between them. He continues his speech by addressing the need for

⁴⁷ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁴⁸ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

“a coherent strategy that enables us to lead the world we have done so much to make”⁴⁹ “[...] American foreign policy of engagement for democracy that will serve the interests and values of the United States.”⁵⁰

Here, it should be noted that Clinton is using the word *engagement* for the first time in a public context in regard to his foreign policy strategy. This term will emerge in his future foreign policy strategy once elected president and will be examined in more detail subsequently in this thesis in a later chapter. Clinton proceeds by arguing that the spread of democracy is crucial in keeping the United States safe. He claims that President Bush has rushed *“to resume cordial relations with China barely a month after the massacre in Tiananmen Square”*, therefore criticizing the president’s relationship with China. He states that this might have made sense during the Cold War,

“when China was a counterweight to Soviet power. But it makes no sense to play the China card now, when our opponents have thrown in their hand.”⁵¹

In his Georgetown Address, Clinton additionally illustrates how the United States should position itself in regard to foreign interventions. He suggests that the U.S. should utilize its diplomatic and economic leverage to enhance material incentives for democratization and to raise the costs for those who are unwilling to do so. Furthermore, he insists that the United States should condition its foreign aid and debt relief policies on evident improvement towards democracy and market reforms and that it should increase funding democratic initiatives as a component of the U.S. national security budget. Additionally, the U.S. should establish a Democracy Corps, similar to the Peace Corps that was launched 30 years prior by President Kennedy, which will send numerous American volunteers to nations that require legal, financial, and political expertise. Clinton further emphasizes to encourage countries to adopt democracy by offering incentives while increasing the costs for those resisting this transition.⁵²

⁴⁹ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁵⁰ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁵¹ Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁵² Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security.

At the end of the speech, Bill Clinton declares that the United States needs to elect a president who is not caught up in the past, but someone who is “[...] *the first President of the 21st century*.”⁵³ He finishes his address with a quote from President Abraham Lincoln, which he delivered before Congress in 1862:

*"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country. Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history."*⁵⁴

Bill Clinton concludes his Georgetown Address by acknowledging that navigating the post-Cold War Era will be challenging. However, he urges that the United States must rise to the occasion, think and act innovatively, as history and changing times are inescapable.

With this Georgetown University Address, Bill Clinton had the opportunity to address international policy for the first time. He offered a significant perspective on his campaign's foreign policy, explicitly articulating the linkage between democracy promotion and U.S. foreign interventions. Moreover, in the speech he emphasized the importance of promoting democracy as a fundamental element of American foreign policy, arguing that the U.S. should use various tools to encourage democratization globally. Furthermore, the Georgetown speech already included Bill Clinton's future key foreign policy elements: the restructuring of the U.S. military, the expansion of the U.S. economy, and the promotion of democracy around the world.⁵⁵

The Georgetown University Address marked the beginning of several speeches in which Clinton outlined his main foreign policy principles. This series included the New York Primary Address on April 1, 1992, his Acceptance Speech at the Democratic National Convention in July 1992, his address to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on August 13, 1992, and a speech at the University of Wisconsin on October

⁵³ *Clinton*, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁵⁴ *Clinton*, A New Covenant for American Security.

⁵⁵ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 20.

1, 1992. Throughout his campaign, Clinton aimed to bridge the foreign policy credibility gap both as an individual and as a member of the Democratic Party.

The success of the speech resulted in Anthony Lake being invited to continue coordinating foreign policy for the rest of the campaign. The Georgetown Address was significant since it was delivered just two months before the first primary. At this time, other candidates were focusing on domestic issues, therefore, Clinton positioned himself a candidate adept at addressing international policy. It earned him the backing of the Democratic Party's foreign policy elite before shifting his focus back to domestic issues in later speeches in New Hampshire and Iowa.⁵⁶

In an opinion piece in *The New York Times* on December 11, 1991, Leslie H. Gelb analyzed Bill Clinton's approach to foreign policy ahead of his Georgetown speech. She characterizes Clinton as a "man of liberal ends" tempered by "conservative means", appreciating the contributions of the Bush era to winning the Cold War. She further notes that Clinton is the only Democratic candidate to have fully the use of force in the Persian Gulf War, indicating his recognition of military power's importance. Based on a draft of his speech Gelb obtained and discussed with him days before, she reveals that the candidate plans to embrace much of Bush national security policy, though modifying and questioning its sincerity before integrating it into his own strategy. She mentions his plan to reduce Pentagon's spending over the next five years, which she calls a "bold move" that aims to attract liberal voters who dominate the Democratic primaries and are already skeptical of Clinton's affiliation with the center-right Democratic Leadership Council. She also writes about his understanding of interconnectedness of foreign and domestic policies in a globally interdependent era. However, Gelb criticizes Clinton's response to specific foreign policy questions, which in her opinion lack of depth and clarity. In the end, Gelb concludes that while Clinton is not yet a foreign policy expert, he is learning quickly and attempting to foster serious dialog between the press and the public and he is hoping that people are paying attention to his effort.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 16.

⁵⁷ Leslie H. Gelb. "Foreign Affairs; Mr. Clinton Tries on....". *The New York Times*, December 11, 1991. <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/11/opinion/foreign-affairs-mr-clinton-tries-on.html> . Accessed May 27, 2004.

William J. Clinton secured the Democratic Party's nomination in the spring of 1992, and he defeated Republican President George H. W. Bush on the evening of November 3rd, 1992, making him the 42nd president of the United States of America.

6.3 Bill Clinton's first years in office

The new administration had to assemble a foreign policy team to implement his post-Cold War grand strategy.⁵⁸ As already mentioned, throughout Bill Clinton's presidential campaign, his foreign policy approach predominantly centered around three pivotal principles: the restructuring of military forces, integrating economics in foreign affairs, and promoting democracy globally.⁵⁹ Guided by these distinct principles, Clinton was eager to overcome his foreign policy credibility deficit and address the criticism from his opponents regarding his perceived lack of international experience.⁶⁰ Therefore, he faced the task of assembling a foreign policy team which would be capable of executing his foreign policy vision and also compensating his limited international experience. He chose Warren Christopher, who had previously served as Deputy Secretary of State under President Jimmy Carter.⁶¹ Additionally, Samuel Berger and Anthony Lake assumed crucial roles within Clinton's foreign policy team, with Lake taking the top position at the National Security Council (NSC). Furthermore, Nancy Soderberg joined them as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Madeleine Albright assumed the role of U.N. Ambassador.⁶² Introducing his newly selected foreign policy team, Clinton stated that, *"in a time of great change and challenges, the world is no longer a simple place with clear choices."* He added that in a post-Cold War world, *"we need bold thinking to advance our American values."*⁶³ However, following the announcement of his foreign policy team, numerous critics voiced their opinions, arguing that the team was not suited to formulate U.S. policies during a period of unpredictable changes. Many viewed the appointees as a group of individuals linked to the previous Carter administration, which further fueled doubt and skepticism.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 42-44.

⁵⁹ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 25.

⁶⁰ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 32.

⁶¹ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 45-46.

⁶² Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 45-46.

⁶³ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 42-44.

⁶⁴ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 48.

It is crucial to note that Bill Clinton took office during an ongoing foreign intervention in Somalia. Back in August of 1992, President George H.W. Bush supported a U.N.-sponsored humanitarian relief operation. Somalia was in the midst of a humanitarian crisis due to domestic policy issues. The goal was to airlift food to starving people in a country that was on the verge of collapse.⁶⁵ So, in December 1992, the U.S. military landed in Somalia, as United Task Force called Operation Restore Hope. When Bill Clinton took office in 1993, the new administration supported and expanded the U.S. mission in Somalia. However, it soon became evident that the military mission in Somalia was more complicated than initially perceived. The lack of detailed planning further intensified criticism of Bill Clinton's foreign policy strategy. As a result, the Clinton administration found itself under even more pressure to quickly produce an official Grand Strategy. From the start, the National Security Council had been drafting ideas for an official document. The task was to produce a doctrine that embodied the administration's primary foreign policy concepts, including rebuilding U.S. military and security capabilities, emphasizing the role of economics in global affairs, and advocating for democracy promotion.⁶⁶ Additionally, the significance of a *Grand Strategy* was to provide the public with a policy that would explain the complexity of the post-Cold War Era in a coherent and simple way. However, as one senior administration official stated, "*with no Cold War, the threats are more amorphous. The rallying ground is more difficult to find. It's tough to put U.S. policy goals on a bumper sticker*".⁶⁷ Furthermore, Clinton criticized the validity of previous strategies. He argued that grand strategies from prior presidents often lacked an adequate explanation. Typically, overarching policies had been applied retrospectively and administrations always relied on improvised decisions. However, in the end, Clinton knew that the public needed a policy that would crystallize the complexity of the administration's policies.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, Warren Christopher emphasized that the challenges the administration faced in a post-Cold War era were too multifaceted to be summarized in a defined doctrine.⁶⁹ The biggest challenge of the administration was to define

⁶⁵ Loch K. *Johnson*. *The Threat on the Horizon. An Inside Account of America's Search for Security after the Cold War*. Oxford University Press, 2011. 3–5.

⁶⁶ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 84.

⁶⁷ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 83–84.

⁶⁸ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 82.

⁶⁹ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 45–46.

exactly where U.S. interests lay in the absence of a single, formidable foe.⁷⁰ Anthony Lake came up with the description of *Democratic Enlargement* for policies that were needed in the post-Cold War world. Clinton stressed that this description represented the notion that as free states grew, the international order became more secure and prosperous. He compared this idea to the Cold-War *Domino Theory*, a theory that claims that if one country falls to communism, neighboring countries will also succumb in a domino effect, however now in reverse. Clinton particularly appreciated how Lake's *enlargement policy* was closely connected to economic renewal, emphasizing the United States' position as the leading exporter. *Democratic Enlargement* suggested that where command economies failed, free markets could emerge and thrive. Secretary of State Warren Christopher additionally coined the term *Engagement*, emphasizing again a clear stance against isolation politics for the late 20th century. In September 1993, the new *Grand Strategy* was presented to the rest of the world in a week of high-profile speeches.⁷¹ The foreign policy concept of *Democratic Enlargement* replaced the policy of containment after 45 years. The United States would remain engaged in world affairs, but only selectively. That meant that the Clinton administration was committed to maintain an international perspective, preferring multilateralism, nevertheless being willing to act unilaterally when it was required. The administration wanted to make clear that the United States would be selective when and where it would intervene.⁷² Anthony Lake described the administration's foreign policy concept as "*together when we can, alone when we must*".⁷³ After introducing Clinton's *Grand Strategy* in a number of speeches, the administration had to provide a coherent overall policy for the public.

6.4 National Security Strategy Report 1994

This chapter examines the National Security Strategy Report of 1994, aiming to illustrate President Clinton's foreign policy approach during his first years in office. The report will be analyzed in order to understand how Clinton and his foreign policy advisors justified interventions in foreign countries and what factors influenced these interventions.

⁷⁰ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 54.

⁷¹ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 85-86.

⁷² Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 98.

⁷³ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 98.

Back in 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was introduced, which demanded from each administration to produce an annual National Security Strategy Report, short NSSR. The report has served as a comprehensive statement outlining the United States' worldwide interest, objectives, and goals until today. In 1994, the NSSR offered the Clinton administration the opportunity to demonstrate its official *Grand Strategy* for addressing global issues.⁷⁴ The report was primarily written by Morton H. Halperin, a member of the Clinton National Security Council, and had the subtitle *Enlargement and Engagement*. After undergoing 21 revisions, the NSSR was released in July 1994. It drew from various sources, including the 1991 Georgetown University Address, Clinton's 1993 Inaugural Address and his 1993 and 1994 State of the Union.⁷⁵ The report is 29 pages long and includes a preface by President Clinton. It is further divided into four chapters; *Introduction, Advancing our Interests through Engagement and Enlargement, Integrated Regional Approaches and Conclusion*. The report states the key objectives of the administration's national security strategies and the tools and approaches the administration aims to use in order to achieve these objectives. Furthermore, it states the legal and moral justification that the administration has to consider when it comes to implementing security strategies.

In the preface, Bill Clinton starts by emphasizing the fact that despite the end of the Cold War, American leadership remains crucial. He continues by pointing out the three central goals of his administration, which are national security, American's economic strength and democracy promotion abroad. He continues by elaborating on how these factors are linked, arguing that by maintaining a credible defense capability, strengthening American economic power at home and abroad, and expanding the community of democracies and free markets worldwide, the United States would further prosper.⁷⁶

"Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work towards freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interest and more likely to

⁷⁴ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 101–102.

⁷⁵ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 102–103.

⁷⁶ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 104.

*cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote sustainable development”.*⁷⁷

Bill Clinton uses the preface of the NSSR to repeatedly highlight the central goals of his presidency, which are national security, America’s economic strength and democracy promotion abroad. Since the 1991 Georgetown University Address was used as a source, a direct congruency can be observed.

In the following paragraph, the NSSR describes the administration’s different approaches towards foreign interventions. It states numerous times that American global leadership is necessary and that the U.S. must make a difference through its engagement. The report explains that by establishing stable political relations around the world and fostering open trade, the U.S. would keep its active role in global affairs.⁷⁸ Moreover, the report provides a list of key dangers to which the U.S. is obligated to respond, such as weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression, and threats to the stability of the United States themselves.⁷⁹ However, the United States must carefully select its means of participation when it comes to foreign interventions. First, preventive diplomacy must take place

*“through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, military-to-military contacts and involvement in multilateral negotiations”.*⁸⁰

In regard to overseas military presence, the report states that the United States has to *“carefully select the means and level of our participation in particular military operations”*⁸¹. It continues by pointing out that it is

*“unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force, but it is appropriate to identify several basic principles that will guide our decision on when to use force.”*⁸²

⁷⁷ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, i-ii.

⁷⁸ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 5.

⁷⁹ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 10.

⁸⁰ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 5.

⁸¹ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 10.

⁸² *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 10.

Also, the costs and risks of any U.S. military involvement have to be assessed. The report claims that if the security of the United States is at risk, the use of military force will be unilateral. However, in other situations that pose less of a threat to the country itself, military engagement will be selective, depending on “[...] *our national interests, economic stake, commitments to allies or potential refugee flow to our nation or our allies.*”⁸³ Additionally, the report offers several questions that the United States needs to consider when committing military force in foreign interventions:

*“Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success? What types of U.S. military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objective? Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?”*⁸⁴

Here, the report highlights the administration's emphasis on exhausting nonmilitary options first, ensuring that any military action is aligned with clear political objectives, and securing domestic support. The administration also stresses the importance of setting timelines and milestones to evaluate progress and having a well-defined exit strategy. This pragmatic framework aims to demonstrate a nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in foreign interventions. Additionally, the report claims that the United States will be more inclined to act in foreign conflicts when there is reason to believe that these interventions will provide a lasting improvement of the situation.⁸⁵

The NSSR continues by underlining the importance of multilateral peace operations as a component of U.S. foreign interventions. What the U.S. should do is strengthen sanctions imposed by the United Nations and contain localized conflicts before they require military response from the United States.⁸⁶ Furthermore, it states that

⁸³ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 10.

⁸⁴ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 10.

⁸⁵ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 10.

⁸⁶ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 13.

“traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multilateral peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.”⁸⁷

Moreover, the report states that the United States has to work closely with the United Nations in order to help them ensure that their peace operations succeed politically and militarily. However, the report also clearly says that the U.S. will carefully evaluate U.N. peace operations before deciding to support them. This includes the assessment of the threat to international peace, consideration of U.S. and international community interests, the identification of clear objectives, availability of necessary resources and again, the identification of an operation’s end goal.⁸⁸ It is crucial to note that the paragraph on peace operations ends with the statement that the mission of the U.S. military is not peace operations but to avert and, if necessary, fight in conflicts that are threatening U.S. interest: *“[...] while the international community can create conditions for peace, the responsibility for peace ultimately rests with the people of the country in question.”⁸⁹*

A recurring theme in the document is the continuous emphasis on the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights and human dignity abroad as a crucial factor in U.S. foreign interventions.⁹⁰ The report states that even though the United States should not police the world, democracy and human rights are universal ambitions and norms that should be established globally.⁹¹ However, the report claims that efforts by the U.S. and the international community to promote or restore democracy *“must be limited in duration and designed to give the peoples of a nation the means and opportunity to put their own house in order.”⁹²*

Since part of the thesis focuses on the foreign policy of the United States in regard to Haiti, it is important to note that the NSSR is mentioning the Clinton administration’s foreign policy strategy towards Haiti. Some crucial insights into the foreign strategy in

⁸⁷ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 13.

⁸⁸ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 13.

⁸⁹ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 13.

⁹⁰ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 26.

⁹¹ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 24.

⁹² *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 26.

regard to Haiti will be addressed in this chapter. In a later chapter, the foreign relations between the United States and Haiti will be analyzed in more detail.

In the beginning of the National Security Strategy Report, Haiti is already specifically mentioned as the report offers examples as to what the Clinton administration has already done in regard to interventions in Haiti:

*“The administration led efforts to strengthen U.N. sanctions on the military rules of Haiti towards the end of restoring democracy and Haiti’s democratically elected president”*⁹³

Furthermore, Haiti is addressed again later on in the report, particularly, in regard to the concept of democracy promotion. The report states that the United States *“must be willing to take immediate public positions to help staunch democratic reversals, as we have in Haiti [...]”*⁹⁴. Here the administration wants to emphasize on their continuous effort to support democratic movements around the world. The report continues by asserting that the U.S. has to increase the respect for human rights and engage in the evolution of democracy wherever this is possible.⁹⁵ Later on, Haiti is referred to again, stating that, next to Cuba, it is the last nondemocratic state in the Western Hemisphere.⁹⁶ Concerning how the United States will engage in those democratic efforts of Haiti, the report claims that the U.S.

*“[...] will continue to induce the military forces in Haiti to accept the installation of its democratically elected government, in part to help stem the flow of Haitians attempting entry into the United States.”*⁹⁷.

The arrival of refugees in the United States is mentioned here specifically as a domestic concern for the U.S. At the end of the report, Haiti is mentioned once more, again stating how the U.S. is already helping restore democracy: *“In Haiti we are working with the international community to reverse the military coup and restore democracy.”*⁹⁸

⁹³ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 3.

⁹⁴ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 18.

⁹⁵ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 19.

⁹⁶ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 19.

⁹⁷ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 20.

⁹⁸ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 25.

The report on U.S. foreign intervention in Haiti aligns closely with the actual events that unfolded during the coup d'état. The report acknowledges the ongoing diplomatic efforts, such as sanctions, which correspond to the real actions taken by the U.S. government. Additionally, the report outlines the intention to utilize military forces to halt the conflict, which mirrors the subsequent actions implemented. Moreover, it addresses the refugee crisis as a domestic concern, a stance consistent with the Clinton administration's repeated emphasis on this issue during the Haiti intervention. This perspective is further displayed later on in the thesis, where Clinton's address to the nation in September 1994 regarding Haiti will be discussed.

As the foreign relations between the United States and Rwanda will be analyzed in detail in this thesis, it is crucial to note that the NSSR provides essential insights into the foreign strategy concerning Rwanda. However, as with the case study on Haiti, a more in-depth analysis of the diplomatic relations between the United States and Rwanda will be conducted in a subsequent chapter.

In the NSSR, Rwanda is specifically addressed as an example of “a *resurgence of militant nationalism as well as ethnic and religious conflict*”. The report continues by arguing that in this conflict, “*the United States has participated in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.*”⁹⁹ Later on, the report mentions how the United States will use foreign interventions in Africa in order to “*support [...] resolution of conflicts through negotiation, diplomacy and peacekeeping.*” It continues by stating that

*“New policies will focus on efforts to strengthen civil societies and mechanisms for conflict resolutions, particularly where ethnic, religious, and political tensions are acute.”*¹⁰⁰

Later on, Rwanda is explicitly mentioned, pointing out that the United States encourages a peaceful resolution in order to promote long lasting stability and development in the region.¹⁰¹ The report continues by claiming that the United States has to protect human rights and human dignity.¹⁰² As to the strategies on how the United States will do that, the report states that

⁹⁹ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 1.

¹⁰⁰ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 26.

¹⁰¹ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 26.

¹⁰² *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 26.

*“humanitarian interventions, along with the international community, will require continued active participation to address the grave circumstances on the continent.”*¹⁰³

However, the report continues the issue of interventions in Africa by stating that

*“in the end, however, such efforts by the U.S. and the international community must be limited in duration and designed to give the peoples of a nation the means and the opportunity to put their own house in order”.*¹⁰⁴

Here, the report addresses the limitations and objectives of U.S. interventions, underscoring the belief that while external assistance is crucial, such interventions must be temporary and focused on empowering the local population to achieve self-sufficiency and stability.

The report concludes its mentioning of Rwanda by stating that *“[...] the United States has also taken an active role in providing relief to those displaced by ethnic violence.*

This concludes the mention of Rwanda in the National Security Strategy Report. The release of the NSSR in July 1994, following the Rwandan genocide, is significant as it provides a contextual backdrop. It presents an overview of the actions taken by the U.S. in response to the Rwandan crisis. The report acknowledges the U.S.'s involvement in humanitarian missions in Rwanda, underscoring the importance of protecting human rights and dignity. However, this aspect is particularly relevant given the criticism against the U.S. for its perceived inaction and failure to address the magnitude of the Rwandan genocide. Moreover, the report acknowledges the collaborative efforts of the international community in addressing interventions in Africa, reflecting the cooperative approach adopted by the U.S. during the genocide a few months prior.

¹⁰³ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 26.

¹⁰⁴ *The White House*, National Security Strategy Report 1994, 26.

To sum up, in June 1994, the Clinton administration released their first National Security Strategy Report (NSSR) which served as a blueprint for the Clinton administration's foreign policy, reflected on the changing dynamics of the post-Cold War era and outlined its core principles: national security, economic prosperity, and democracy promotion. In light of the absence of overt military threats to the nation's physical security, the administration redefined security in broader terms, emphasizing the importance of "safeguarding our citizens, our land, and our values."¹⁰⁵ The NSSR underscored the interconnectedness of national security and economic strength and the administration's commitment to promoting democracy worldwide. This commitment was not only a reflection of American values but also a strategic imperative, since the spread of democracy was seen as a means to create a more secure international environment. However, the report also acknowledges the complexities of global politics, recognizing that the United States could not act unilaterally in addressing international challenges and therefore stressing the importance of fostering multilateral cooperation.

President Clinton was searching for a pragmatic foreign policy strategy, and the report revealed a broad approach to foreign affairs that was notably more restrained than Clinton had initially envisioned. The National Security Strategy Report was perceived by some critics as a "watered-down version" of previous White House statements, lacking boldness and specificity.¹⁰⁶ The document's unceremonious unveiling led some observers to conclude that it was intended to be missed and did not aim to capture significant public attention.¹⁰⁷ However, despite the criticism, the NSSR was a critical document and the foundation of President Bill Clinton's grand foreign strategy, which remained largely consistent throughout his presidency.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Don M, *Snider*. The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision. US Army War College Press, 1995.

¹⁰⁶ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 103.

¹⁰⁷ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 102.

¹⁰⁸ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 103.

7 Case Studies

7.1 Haiti

Haiti has had a tumultuous history marked by a series of challenging phases. Initially colonized by the French in the 17th century, it became a key player in the transatlantic slave trade. In 1804, Haiti revolted against their French oppressors and achieved independence. This made Haiti, after the United States, the second independent country in the Western Hemisphere and the world's first black independent nation, marking a historic success for a slave revolt. Despite its history of slavery and subsequent periods of turmoil, including multiple coups, foreign occupations, and militarization, Haiti represented a symbol of resilience and self-determination.¹⁰⁹

In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a leftist and Roman Catholic priest, became the first democratically elected president in Haiti. Aristide had already been a controversial candidate of his party, the *National Front for Change and Democracy* (FCND). However, his strong positions on economic reforms and his stance on fighting corruption brought him a victory in the elections. Soon after his election, he implemented social reforms and changed economic policies. His policies did face strong oppositions from Haiti's upper class. Also, Aristide's attempt to remove loyalists of the old regime from the military cost him his support within the military ranks. Consequently, on September 29th, 1991, only 9 months after his initial election, Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras and other military officials successfully staged a coup and sent Aristide into exile.¹¹⁰

President Bush initially praised Jean-Bertrand Aristide's democratic election as a symbol of a growing shift towards democracy and the removal of tyrannic regimes. Now, the subsequent coup presented a significant political and diplomatic challenge for the Bush administration. Initially, the president took a strong stance against the coup and reaffirmed support for Aristide. His administration worked with the Organization of American States (OAS) to impose a trade embargo on Haiti. Nevertheless, the Bush administration found itself in a difficult situation. On the one

¹⁰⁹ *Haiti: A Brief History of a Complex Nation*. <https://haitianstudies.ku.edu/haiti-brief-history-complex-nation>. Accessed September 25, 2023 and *Haiti's Turbulent Political History – a Timeline*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/7/haitis-turbulent-political-history-a-timeline>. Accessed September 25, 2023.

¹¹⁰ *Haiti: A Brief History* and *Haiti's Turbulent Political History* and *Brands*, From Berlin to Baghdad, 91.

hand, it publicly denounced the new regime under General Raoul Cédras, severing diplomatic ties and suspending economic aid to Haiti. On the other hand, it did not take any more assertive measures. President Bush was firmly against military interventions, as there was minimal U.S. economic interest in Haiti and therefore, he saw no reason to deploy U.S. troops into a conflict where no vital national interest was at stake. For Bush, the reversal of democracy in Haiti did not justify military intervention.¹¹¹ In a White House news conference, President Bush said:

*"We're committed to the restoration of democracy [...]. We feel very strongly about it. I am reluctant to use U.S. forces to try to accomplish it except if American citizens' lives are in any way threatened. [...] there's a lesson out there for all Presidents, and the lesson I've learned is that you've got to be very, very careful of using United States forces in this hemisphere."*¹¹²

Bush continued to work with the OAS and imposed economic sanctions such as a trade embargo on all goods except food and medicine and urged for the restoration of democracy.¹¹³ However, these sanctions proved to be rather a demonstration of U.S. involvement in Haiti than an effective solution to the problem. They were largely ineffective, leading to criticism regarding the administration's response to the putsch. Additionally, President Bush suffered another blow to his credibility when Haitian refugees seeking shelter in the United States were denied asylum by the Coast Guard. The White House justified this by stating that federal law mandated this response due to the Haitian refugees not facing political persecution. However, this justification appeared problematic especially after seventy-three refugees were immediately arrested once they returned to Haiti in December 1991. Despite growing pressure, Bush and his administration continued to oppose military interventions in Haiti. The Cédras regime remained in power throughout the remainder of President Bush's presidency.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 91–92.

¹¹² Norman Kempster. Bush Against Sending GIs to Haiti. *Los Angeles Times*, October 5, 1991. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-10-05-mn-3153-story.html>. Accessed September 25, 2023.

¹¹³ *Office of the Historian*. Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995, Milestones: 1993–2000. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>. Accessed September 25, 2023.

¹¹⁴ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 93.

Following the coup in 1991, Haiti's situation deteriorated significantly. Under Cédras' regime, civil associations got banned, dissent was brutally suppressed, and gangs aligned with the regime carried out violent campaigns against Aristide loyalists. Incidents of beating and killings became a common threat, and the nation became even more impoverished. Between the years 1992 and 1993, Haiti was considered a diplomatic embarrassment for Washington, evolving into a humanitarian crisis. Cédras' rule was responsible for the death of approximately 4,000 Haitians, with 60,000 attempting to flee to the U.S. and an additional 300,000 forced into becoming internal refugees.¹¹⁵ For presidential candidate Bill Clinton, Haiti served as a key point for his campaign critique of the Bush administration. In his 1992 presidential candidacy, Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration for its policy on refugee return and promised to increase pressure on the military junta by tightening the economic sanctions.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, when Bill Clinton got into office, he and his administration displayed hesitancy in addressing the ongoing crisis in Haiti. They decided to maintain the refugee policy established during Bush's tenure, a decision that ran counter to the commitments made by Clinton during his election campaign.¹¹⁷

In July 1993, the United Nations and the OAS facilitated negotiations in order to bring peace to Haiti and for a while there seemed to be hope for a peaceful resolution. During these talks, an agreement known as the *Governor's Island Accord* was reached, which outlined a blueprint for the return of civilian rule in Haiti. The agreement was signed both by Aristide and Cédras and stated that Aristide would return to Haiti by October 30th while it also allowed amnesty for the coup leaders. The deal supported the creation of a new Haiti police force as well as the modernization of the Haitian army. It also mentions that the U.N. sanctions would be lifted once Aristide returned to power.¹¹⁸ However, Cédras violated the agreement quickly and orchestrated the assassination of former members of Aristide's government. The situation in Haiti was coming to a head in October 1993, when the United States dispatched the U.S.S. Harlan County, with 200 U.S. and Canadian engineers and military police on board, in order to prepare for the return of Aristide. On October 11, the operation under the U.N.

¹¹⁵ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 139.

¹¹⁶ *Office of the Historian*, *Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995*.

¹¹⁷ *Office of the Historian*, *Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995*.

¹¹⁸ *Office of the Historian*, *Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995*.

banner was met at the pier in Port-au-Prince by a mob of Haitians, preventing them from landing in Haiti with the threat of violence. Remembering the street battle in Mogadishu a week before, the Clinton administration did not want to risk any casualties. The ship returned to the United States the next day.¹¹⁹ Four days later, the United Nations Security Council imposed a naval blockade on Haiti. Through the following months the administration pursued a dual strategy, planning for military intervention while hoping that the threat of a U.S. invasion would coerce the Haitian leaders to surrender power. Pressure towards action continued to build, with Congressional Black Caucus members especially vocal in demanding an end to military rule in Haiti.¹²⁰

Due to Cédras' refusal to accept the *Governor's Island Accords* and his defiance of the United States, some of Clinton's advisors advocated for U.S. intervention to restore Aristide to power. A possible intervention in Haiti seemed far less complex compared to previous interventions in Somalia or Rwanda, since the situation in Haiti lacked the ethnic complexities that previous foreign interventions involved. Also, Cédras' unpopularity and the absence of civilian support for his regime made the proposition of an intervention appealing. Despite these assumptions, Clinton displayed little inclination to employ U.S. forces in 1993.¹²¹ Clinton and his administration made it clear that they did not want to start a new military conflict. Additionally, they doubted whether Congress would approve another foreign military intervention. Representatives of the U.S. State Department claimed that the United States maintained its dedication to achieving a "*peaceful, negotiated settlement*" for Haiti.¹²² Madeleine Albright exercised caution, emphasizing that President Clinton would not initiate a military intervention that did not have broad political support. Therefore, the administration tightened the pre-existing sanctions against Haiti, hoping to prevent a military confrontation.¹²³ However, the situation in Haiti persisted and the sanctions imposed by the U.S. proved to be ineffective. Not only did the sanctions weaken the Haitian economy, but they did so without diminishing Cédras and his regime. Consequently, there was doubt that additional restrictions would yield different results. Moreover, people of the United

¹¹⁹ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 139. and *Office of the Historian*, *Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995*.

¹²⁰ *Office of the Historian*, *Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995*.

¹²¹ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 139.

¹²² Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 140–41.

¹²³ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 140.

States were confronted with extensive media coverage of Haitian refugees trying to get to the U.S. and harrowing stories of the Haitian regime's atrocities. Therefore, the public shifted towards supporting an intervention, which then further reinforced the administration's stance on an intervention in Haiti.¹²⁴ Additionally, President Clinton's approval ratings had been declining and the situation in Haiti and his administration's inaction contributed to the low public perception on his presidency.¹²⁵ With the congressional mid-term elections in sight, the White House was confronted to reassess the U.S. foreign strategy regarding Haiti.¹²⁶

Since Cédras displayed no inclination to step down as president, the Clinton administration prepared for a multilateral military intervention in the summer of 1994. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright outlined a U.S. policy of *assertive multilateralism* with an increased role for the United Nations. They worked to secure a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 940), allowing the use of force to remove the Haitian military regime.¹²⁷ On July 31st, the Security Council approved the resolution, which stated that a U.S. military intervention would involve the removal of Cédras and the restoration of the Aristide government. Furthermore, it established a six-month duration for the *United Nations' Mission in Haiti* (UNMIH), responsible for upholding order following the intervention. UNMIH would help restore basic order in Haiti, assist in the return of Aristide, and support the presidential election and subsequently a peaceful transfer of power. The United Nation's mandate that authorized this intervention allowed the administration to assemble troops from Caribbean nations to participate in the security force after the invasion.¹²⁸ It is crucial to note that the UNSCR 940 was the first resolution permitting the use of military force to reinstate democracy within a member state.¹²⁹

Nevertheless, many U.S. politicians strongly opposed the possibility of a U.S. military intervention. The Senate passed a nonbinding resolution urging the administration to seek congressional authorization before deploying any troops to Haiti.¹³⁰ Even inside

¹²⁴ Henry F. Carey, U.S. Domestic Politics and the Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy: Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In: *World Affairs*, 164 (2), 2001. 74.

¹²⁵ Carey, U.S. Domestic Politics and the Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy, 75.

¹²⁶ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 140.

¹²⁷ *Office of the Historian*, *Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995*.

¹²⁸ *Office of the Historian*, *Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995*.

¹²⁹ *Office of the Historian*, *Intervention in Haiti 1994–1995*.

¹³⁰ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 140–41.

the Clinton administration, the consensus was not clear as to how to deal with the situation in Haiti. In August of 1994, Strobe Talbott, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, advocated for military action. He wanted to remind the people of the administration's former *enlargement and engagement* concept and claimed it would be ethically immoral to let Haiti endure further suffering under Cédras' regime. However, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense William Perry strongly criticized Talbott, arguing that it would be immoral for the United States not to do everything possible to prevent the loss of American soldiers' lives. Even Clinton himself aligned with Perry concluding that an invasion would be premature. The president still wanted to explore alternative methods of resolving this crisis, including dispatching a U.N. delegate for negotiations, offering assurances of non-punishment to Cédras, or even providing incentives for the regime to depart Haiti. The president remained committed to finding a way to avert military conflict.¹³¹ However, it became clear that Cédras and his regime had no intention on accepting the demands of the U.S. and U.N. Additionally, this crisis was happening so close to the United States that Clinton had to take actions in order to remain credible in regard to his foreign policies. In September, Clinton declared on national television that the United States would invade Haiti if Cédras did not surrender.¹³² Still, Bill Clinton refrained from imposing a specific deadline for Cédras' departure, therefore leaving the timing for any potential invasion uncertain.¹³³

The planning and preparation for the invasion was completed under the code name *Operation Uphold Democracy*, which consisted of U.S. troops and the U.N.'s Multinational Force (MNF). The invasion force numbered nearly 25,000 military personnel from all services, backed by two aircraft carriers and extensive air support. Although the United States provided the vast majority of the forces, a multinational contingent from Caribbean nations agreed to serve in an operation conducted under U.N. mandate. The addition of these multinational forces shifted the operation from a U.S. military intervention to an U.N. sanctioned multinational action. The operation was scheduled for September 19th. Nevertheless, with military action clearly imminent, Bill Clinton dispatched a diplomatic team consisting of former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General

¹³¹ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 140–41.

¹³² Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 141.

¹³³ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 142.

Colin Powell as a delegation to Haiti in search of a last-minute negotiated settlement. The delegation flew to Haiti on September 17th, well aware that they had little time to reach an agreement. In the meantime, the military intervention launched with the negotiations in progress. In the end, the negotiations were successful and Cédras capitulated after receiving the delegation's message that the U.S. was prepared to send U.S. forces imminently. General Hugh Shelton, the commander of the invasion force, was charged with working out a peaceful transition of power and met Cédras on September 20th. Amnesty for General Cédras and other leaders was granted, and the police and military forces cooperated with the U.S. army and U.N. forces. One month later, Cédras left for exile in Panama and Aristide returned to Haiti, reclaimed his presidency while he let U.S. troops oversee the transition of power. The operation ended with the transfer to UNMIH command in March 1995, and a year later, peaceful elections and the transfer of power occurred. The intervention in Haiti in 1994 was a crucial moment regarding the post-Cold War foreign policies of the United States and showcased the balance between diplomatic efforts and military action. Ultimately, Clinton and his administration were able to achieve a successful intervention without the costs of a military intervention.¹³⁴

7.1.1 President Bill Clinton - Address to the Nation on Haiti. September 15th, 1994.

On September 15th, 1994, President Clinton addressed the United States in a televised speech at 9 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House on the government's position on Haiti, explaining to the nation why the U.S. was leading the international effort to restore the democratic government in Haiti. In this speech, one can observe the Clinton administration's key objectives on foreign interventions. Throughout the address, he emphasizes the preference for peaceful solutions through international collaboration, he highlights the principles of multilateralism and diplomacy as prerequisites before resorting to military action. He argues that efforts to stop human rights violations have to be made and how the United States will even deploy military force in order to restore democracy.

In the beginning of the address, Clinton mentions how Cédras had not only rejected every peaceful solution that the international community had proposed but had also

¹³⁴ Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 142.

broken agreements they had made to give up his power. Right from the start, Clinton explains how the U.S. and the international community have not sought any confrontation in the last three years and always tried to find diplomatic solutions first. He lists different actions that were taken by the U.S. and the international community in order to stop the conflict in Haiti, such as strengthening embargos and sending humanitarian aid to the Haitian people:

*“The United Nations, The Organization of American States, the Caribbean community, the six Central American Presidents all have sought a peaceful end to this crisis. We have tried everything: persuasion and negotiation, mediation, and condemnation.”*¹³⁵

*“Let me say again, the nations of the world have tried every possible way to restore Haiti's democratic government peacefully. The dictators have rejected every possible solution. The terror, the desperation, and the instability will not end until they leave.”*¹³⁶

In this part of the speech, the president assures the American people that his administration and the international community have taken multiple, non-violent steps, which were not sufficient enough. He continues by saying that even though the U.S. would still prefer to seek a peaceful solution, they have now decided to lead a multinational force to carry out the will of the United Nations:

*“[...] in July the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means, including force, to remove the Haitian dictators from power and restore democratic government”*¹³⁷

Here, the president underlines the fact that the United States is acting in accordance with the United Nation's effort and not solemnly on their own. He further mentions that over twenty countries have also joined in the effort to restore democracy in Haiti, emphasizing the multinational effort concerning Haiti.

¹³⁵ William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti. Oval Office, White House, September 15, 1994. In: John Wooley and Gerhard Peters. The American Presidency Project. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-haiti>. Accessed December 11, 2023.

¹³⁶ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹³⁷ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

The speech continues with one of the administration's key arguments concerning foreign interventions: to stop human rights violations. In the address, Clinton enumerates the multiple atrocities that the dictators have committed since, mentioning beatings, rape, torture, and mutilation. Clinton also adds personal stories from Haitian citizens. Due to the crimes that the Cédras regime has committed towards the Haitian population, Clinton believes that the United States must do everything in its power to

"[...] stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians".

138

*"[...] the United States cannot, indeed we should not, be the world's policemen". [...] But when brutality occurs close to our shores, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act.*¹³⁹

As shown above, Clinton frequently mentions the United States' own national interest. The president points out the geographical proximity of Haiti and the effects of Haitian politics so close to the shores of the U.S. Specifically the concerns regarding refugees coming into the U.S. are mentioned multiple times during the address. Clinton explains how thousands of Haitians have already fled towards the U.S. and how this possible refugee crisis could affect U.S. politics directly in the future:

*"Three hundred thousand more Haitians, five percent of their entire population, are in hiding in their own country. If we don't act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will continue to face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its constant threat to stability in our region and control of our borders".*¹⁴⁰

He continues by stating the exact numbers of refugees that have already been rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy and concludes that *"As long as Cédras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our Nation."*¹⁴¹

The address given by President Clinton directly correlates the issues of refugees in the U.S. with the existence of non-democratic countries. He notes that the Haitian refugees

¹³⁸ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹³⁹ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹⁴⁰ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹⁴¹ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

originate from one of the few remaining nations in the Western hemisphere that lacks democracy. Additionally, he underscores that the Haitian population had chosen democracy, yet their elected president was forcibly ousted by the Cédras regime. He describes how Haiti has tried to free itself from repression for almost 200 years, failing again and again. However, four years ago, after Haiti finally had their first free and fair election, a military coup overthrew the newly elected president. In this part of the speech, Clinton not only emphasizes Haiti's will for independence but also its wish for a democratic government:

*"Today, 33 of the 35 countries in the Americas have democratically elected leaders. And Haiti is the only nation in our hemisphere where the people actually elected their own government and chose democracy, only to have tyrants steal it away."*¹⁴²

Clinton illustrates how the restoration of democracy in Haiti directly correlates with the refugee flow to the United States and, therefore, a foreign intervention would avert destabilization in the U.S.:

*"History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America's security and prosperity. Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and to stabilize our region. They're more likely to create free markets and economic opportunity, and to become strong, reliable trading partners. And they're more likely to provide their own people with the opportunities that will encourage them to stay in their nation and to build their own futures. Restoring Haiti's democratic government will help lead to more stability and prosperity in our region, just as our actions in Panama and Grenada did."*¹⁴³

Again, Clinton uses the address to provide the American public with his main arguments concerning democracy promotion: democracy equals peace, free markets, and economic opportunities and therefore guarantees more stability in the region and fewer refugees. He draws parallels to Panama and Grenada, two countries where the U.S. has taken action in the past in order to stabilize the nation.

¹⁴² Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹⁴³ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

Clinton continues by asserting that the U.S. has to take a strong stance against dictators who do not cooperate with the U.S. and the U.N. He justifies military intervention in other countries by stating “[...] *when our national security interests are threatened, we will use diplomacy when possible and force when necessary.*”¹⁴⁴

In his address to the nation, Clinton further argues that there would be economic costs for the U.S. if they did not intervene in the Haitian conflict. He explains that the expanses concerning the conflict in Haiti are already high and would only increase if the United States decided not to interfere any further:

*“The American people have already expended almost \$200 million to support them, to maintain the economic embargo. And the prospect of millions and millions more being spent every month for an indefinite period of time loom ahead unless we act.”*¹⁴⁵

It is interesting to note that during his speech, Clinton mentions former President Bush and how he once declared the situation in Haiti as “*an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.*”¹⁴⁶ Here, Clinton not only further highlights how the situation in Haiti is a concern for U.S. national interest, but by mentioning the former Republican President Bush and his view on the crisis, Clinton wants to emphasize how the situation in Haiti has always been a bipartisan issue.

Concerning the deployment of U.S. military forces in Haiti, Clinton states that the American people might be reluctant when it comes to committing military resources and personnel beyond their own border. Yet, Clinton argues:

*“the country in question is nearby, in which our own interests are plain, in which the mission is achievable and limited, and in which the nations of the world stand with us.”*¹⁴⁷

This statement highlights the United States’ concern about the coup in Haiti, primarily due to its close geographical proximity and the direct impact on U.S. national interest.

¹⁴⁴ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹⁴⁵ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹⁴⁶ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹⁴⁷ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

Nonetheless, it also suggests that the mission will be successful, considering its clear objectives and the support of other nations. The limitation of the military mission is mentioned multiple times throughout the speech. Regarding the military operation, Clinton explains that the United States will

*"[...] call up the military reserve personnel necessary to support United States troops in any action we might undertake in Haiti. I have also ordered two aircraft carriers, the U.S.S. Eisenhower, and the U.S.S. America into the region."*¹⁴⁸

He continues by explaining the process of this military operation in more detail. The first objective is to remove Cédras and his regime and reinstate the democratically elected government. Then, the U.S. military will train civilian-controlled Haitian security forces to protect the Haitian people. In the meantime, police monitors from around the world will help the Haitian authorities to maximize security, restore civil order and minimize retribution. He continues by emphasizing that the Haitian people should know that the Americans come in peace. Moreover, the American people should be certain that U.S. soldiers will not rebuild Haiti but with the help of the international community will *provide "economic, humanitarian, and technical assistance necessary to help the Haitians rebuild."*¹⁴⁹ Once more, Clinton emphasizes that the U.S. will solely aid in the reconstruction of Haiti and not participate in Haiti's politics any further. According to Clinton, once Cédras' authoritarian regime is removed from power,

*"[...] the vast majority of our troops will come home, in months, not years. I want our troops and their families to know that we'll bring them home just as soon as we possibly can. Then, in the second phase, a much smaller U.S. force will join forces from other members of the United Nations. And their mission will leave Haiti after elections are held next year and a new Haitian government takes office in early 1996."*¹⁵⁰

Finally, Clinton reassures the American public by stating that the elected President Aristide has told him personally that he will leave office once his presidential term has ended, therefore respecting the peaceful transfer of power. Through this, Clinton aims

¹⁴⁸ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹⁴⁹ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

¹⁵⁰ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

to convey to the public that the future trajectory of Haiti has already been mapped out and that the U.S. will withdraw its involvement as swiftly as possible.

In the end of the speech, Clinton directly addresses the Cédraes regime, offering the Haitian government one final opportunity to halt the intervention:

“Once again, I urge them to do so. They can still move now and reduce the chaos and disorder, increase the security, the stability, and the safety in which this transfer back to democracy can occur. But if they do not leave now, the international community will act to honor our commitments; to give democracy a chance, not to guarantee it; to remove stubborn and cruel dictators, not to impose a future.”¹⁵¹

The address ends with an analogy on the history of the United States itself. Clinton argues that while some may contend that the Haitian people should simply accept their fate, he has to remind the American people that 200 years ago they themselves took up arms against tyrants, fought for their freedom and for democracy. This allowed a new nation to be born, a nation *“[...] that ever since has believed that the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness should be denied to none.”*

The purpose of the speech given by Bill Clinton on September 15th, 1994, to the nation was to clarify the decision to take the lead in the U.N.’s military intention in Haiti. From the start, Clinton insists that this foreign intervention is necessary to stop the violence imposed by the authoritarian regime, safeguard U.S. borders, preserve stability and uphold democracy.

The speech resonates with his administration key aspects on foreign interventions. As well as the National Security Strategy Report, the speech recognizes the diplomatic initiatives that have to be regarded before further interventions take place. Furthermore, the potential for military interventions to address conflict and promote democracy was mentioned in the NSSR. The concern over a refugee crisis is agreed upon both in the NSSR and in Clinton’s address to the nation. These similarities indicate that the administration’s intervention in Haiti aligned with their official position on foreign interventions as outlined in the NSSR.

¹⁵¹ Clinton, Address to the Nation on Haiti.

7.2 Rwanda

To understand Rwanda and the genocide in 1994, it is essential to grasp its origins, which can be traced back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. Rwanda is located in east-central Africa and by 1994, had a population of approximately seven million people, consisting of three main ethnic groups; The Hutu made up 85 % of the population, the Tutsi 14%, and the Twa around 1%.¹⁵² Rwanda was one of the poorest nations worldwide, its economic situation worsening. The country suffered from limited farmable land and its rapidly growing population. Due to draughts food production had declined, global market prices for Rwanda's export had dropped and it was estimated that in the year 1994, around 800 000 people needed food assistance.¹⁵³

In the Rwandan revolution, which took place between 1959 and 1963, the Tutsi monarchy had been replaced by a Hutu led republic, forcing more than 336,000 Tutsi to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Some of these refugees founded the Rwandan Patriotic Front, also known as RPF, in Uganda. The remaining Hutu population in Rwanda resented and feared the remaining Tutsi minority. Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, had been president of Rwanda since 1973.¹⁵⁴ In the 1980s, the RPF had become significantly more powerful and on October 1st, 1990, the RPF invaded north-eastern Rwanda. Consequently, the Rwandan Civil War erupted between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the RPF. This conflict further enhanced the long-running dispute between the Hutu and Tutsi groups within the Rwandan population. The RPF rebels had the clear objective to remove president Habyarimana from power and facilitate the return of the thousands of Rwandan refugees living in exile. In the beginning, Habyarimana did not consider the RPF a significant threat. However, when the RPF achieved further military success, many Hutu leaders, including Habyarimana, exploited Rwanda's ethnic divisions to further polarize the population.¹⁵⁵ The president decided to exaggerate the RPF's threat, and many civilians were wrongly depicted as RPF supporters. Habyarimana categorized the Rwandan population into two separate groups: the *Rwandans*, the supporters of the regime, and the *ibytso* or "accomplices

¹⁵² *United Nations*, Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml>. Accessed October 23, 2023.

¹⁵³ Alison *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*. Genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 6.

¹⁵⁴ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 6.

¹⁵⁵ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 6–8.

of the enemy”, representing the Tutsi minority and the Hutu’s who opposed his rule.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, the Habyarimana government strategically evoked anger and fear against the Tutsi community who had once enjoyed a favored status during the Belgian colonial rule. By using historical memories of the Tutsis' past rule and referencing the revolution that removed them from power in 1959, the government exploited Hutus grievances against the Tutsi.¹⁵⁷

Additionally, the regime employed physical and verbal violence to suppress the Tutsi population and any opposition. Between 1990 and 1993, multiple anti-Tutsi attacks were carried out by Habyarimana's backers, where Tutsi individuals and Hutu political adversaries were murdered.¹⁵⁸ During this time, the Hutu leaders formed the civilian *Interahamwe* militia, a paramilitary organization, to consolidate their own power. Throughout 1993, Habyarimana’s party recruited and trained the militia. There were some who criticized the militia’s partisan affiliation, therefore forming the *civilian self-defense force*, which enlisted young men not through party connections but through administrative channels. Those young men would get training from former soldiers in carrying out attacks against the perceived “enemy” within their own communities.¹⁵⁹ Simultaneously the RPF made significant military advances and a peace settlement favorable to them threatened Habyarimana. Even Hutu who had not sympathized with Habyarimana until then became increasingly threatened by the RPF’s wins. Furthermore, a new radio station called *Radio Télévision Libre des mille Collines* (RTLM) attracted many Hutu and build support for Hutu Power, an ideology that insisted on the superiority of Hutu and the domination, and if necessary, annihilation of Tutsi. This ideology embodied the ethnic unity Habyarimana had promoted for years.¹⁶⁰

In October 1993 Tutsi extremists killed the Hutu president of Burundi. This assassination resulted in a killing spree in which thousands of Burundians, Hutu, and Tutsi, were killed. Back in Ruanda, the fear that the RPF would not agree to a power-sharing arrangement spread and the RTLM deepened the concerns of many Rwandan Hutu. By March 1994, the Hutu Power leaders were getting ready for large scale

¹⁵⁶ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 6-8.

¹⁵⁷ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 8. and *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 136.

¹⁵⁸ *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 136.

¹⁵⁹ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 9.

¹⁶⁰ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 9.

assaults against the Tutsi minority.¹⁶¹ The Hutu factions began importing weapons and started distributing them to the militia and other supporters of Habyarimana.¹⁶² They provided firearms to the *civilian self-defense force*, later also arming them with machetes. Consequently, roughly every third adult Hutu male had been equipped to fight. These preparations did not go unnoticed by the RPF. They increased their recruitment of supporters and troops and violated their peace agreement by stocking up their firearms as well. Moreover, the RPF knew that those who had publicly expressed support for the RPF in the previous months were now at a higher risk of being attacked. So they alerted foreign observers to this concern.¹⁶³ However, governments around the world had overlooked the systematic discrimination against the Tutsi in the previous years, which further made Rwandan extremists believe they could commit large-scale slaughter without facing any consequences.¹⁶⁴ The United Nations had already stationed peacekeeping troops in Rwanda in order to monitor the situation. In the beginning, Rwanda appeared to be an opportunity for a successful peacekeeping mission since both conflict parties had requested U.N. intervention. However, the U.N. and member states were seeking success at minimal costs which led them to reduce spending. The creation of a human rights division was proposed, one that could have potentially monitored the hostility against Tutsi. Yet, the budget constraints made this idea unfeasible.¹⁶⁵

On April 6th, 1994, a plane carrying president Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down by missiles, killing all passengers inside. The individuals responsible for the assassination were never identified, but the death of the presidents was the incentive for Hutu radicals. Colonel Bagosora, the Presidential Guard, and other military forces and allies were able to seize control of the government. They implemented their agenda by eliminating moderate Hutu officials and opposition leaders, in order to ensure that the government was dominated by Hutu Power supporters. In the meantime, soldiers and militia groups began to slaughter all Tutsi systematically.¹⁶⁶ Thereafter, the government replaced their military chief of staff who

¹⁶¹ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 9.

¹⁶² *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 136.

¹⁶³ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 9.

¹⁶⁴ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 19.

¹⁶⁵ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 19-21.

¹⁶⁶ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 10.

was known for resisting the massacres. By April 20th, the organizers of the killings had gained almost absolute control over the state apparatus.¹⁶⁷ From the start, the genocide was intertwined with the Rwandan civil war, which complicated efforts to stop the massacres. The Rwandan government used the slaughter of Tutsi to draw the RPF into new combat. When the RPF made advances, they demanded a cease-fire as a prerequisite for ending the genocide. However, the RPF resumed the war in order to stop the killings and instead insisted on an end to the genocide as a condition for a cease-fire. The RPF also proposed a joint operation against the killers with the help of Rwandan army troops that were not involved in the slaughter as well as with U.N. peacekeeper. However, soldiers previously opposed to Habyarimana would not switch sides during the war.¹⁶⁸

On July 4th, 1994, the RPF took control of the Rwandan military and ended the genocide. They exiled the military, militia, and other attackers from the area, allowing Tutsi individuals to come out of hiding and return.¹⁶⁹ In the thirteen weeks that followed April 6th, the army and civilian leadership had been able to mobilize the Hutu majority in order to kill all Tutsi. The exact number of Tutsi killed in Rwanda in 1994 remains uncertain to this day, however it is estimated that approximately half a million Tutsi lost their lives in the Rwandan genocide.¹⁷⁰

7.2.1 The United States and Rwanda Relations

The United States had established diplomatic relations with Rwanda back in 1962, coinciding with its independence from Belgium.¹⁷¹ At the beginning of the conflict in 1994, the White House's primary goal was to focus on the peace process between the Hutu and Tutsi following the assassination of Habyarimana.¹⁷² By mid-April, the Clinton administration knew that Rwanda was descending into a deadly catastrophe. The CIA warned about a potential resumption of the civil war and the U.S. embassy in Kigali reported that the Rwandan army was part of killing Rwandan officials and Tutsi. Furthermore, it was evident that the U.N. was unable to control the situation. The

¹⁶⁷ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 6.

¹⁶⁸ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 22.

¹⁶⁹ *United Nations*, Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations.

¹⁷⁰ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 6.

¹⁷¹ *U.S. Embassy in Rwanda*. Policy & History. <https://rw.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/>. Accessed February 8, 2024.

¹⁷² *Dumbrell*, *Clinton's Foreign Policy*, 79.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, short, UNAMIR, was originally established back in 1993 in connection with a peace agreement between the Rwandan government and the RPF to end the civil war. Nonetheless, UNAMIR faced limited resources and its efforts to install a transitional government were hindered by President Habyarimana throughout the early months of 1994.¹⁷³ When the genocide started, UNAMIR tried to mediate a cease-fire but was not successful. Thus, by April 15th, it became evident that the U.N. Security Council was unlikely to issue any peacekeeping missions or to intervene in order to stop the massacre.¹⁷⁴ On April 21st, the U.N., with the support of the U.S., voted to reduce the UNAMIR force in the country significantly from 2,500 to 270, a request made by the Belgian government in order to prevent more casualties among its troops.¹⁷⁵ The U.S. also refused all measures that would increase the costs of the UNAMIR.¹⁷⁶

In regard to further U.S. involvement in the conflict, the Clinton administration remained on the sidelines for the time being. The U.S. had already deployed troops to Rwanda, but only for observation. The administration decided that they would not deploy additional troops since they argued that if reinforcements were dispatched, it would still be inadequate to halt the escalating conflict. As Nancy Soderberg recalled, no one proposed to send U.S. or other troops in the middle of a genocide.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the United States was willing to apply diplomatic pressure to improve the situation in Rwanda, sending the Associate Secretary of State for African Affairs to Rwanda.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, the administration generated ideas for “soft intervention”, such as jamming the RTLM radio station and imposing an arms embargo. However, the Pentagon dismissed these actions as ineffective and viewed them as a step towards troop deployment, thus disregarding them again.¹⁷⁹ After successfully evacuating U.S. citizens in April, the only direct action President Clinton approved was the imposition of a U.N. arms embargo on Rwanda.¹⁸⁰ Anthony Lake issued a singular appeal to the

¹⁷³ Gérard *Prunier*. *The Rwanda Crisis. History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 205.

¹⁷⁴ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 11.

¹⁷⁵ *United Nations*, Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, and *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 137.

¹⁷⁶ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 132–133.

¹⁷⁷ *Dumbrell*, *Clinton's Foreign Policy*, 79.

¹⁷⁸ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 132–133.

¹⁷⁹ *Dumbrell*, *Clinton's Foreign Policy*, 79.

¹⁸⁰ *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 137.

Rwandans who were orchestrating the genocide. In this appeal, he addressed them by name and urged them to cease the killings. However, there were no subsequent actions taken after. Furthermore, President Clinton never really entertained the idea of a military intervention or strong diplomatic actions.¹⁸¹

Furthermore, the State Department instructed its officials not to use the term *genocide* in relations to Rwanda, since they were worried that international observers would then call for stronger actions.¹⁸² Legal advisor of the National Security Council Alan J. Kreczko argued that while acknowledging that the events were a genocide would not impose a legal obligation to act on the administration, it would intensify the political pressure for some form of action.¹⁸³

The reluctance to send U.S. armed forces into Rwanda was influenced by the 1992-1993 Somali humanitarian mission. President George H.W. Bush had sent American troops to Somalia to support a U.N.-sponsored humanitarian relief operation. The country was in the midst of a humanitarian crisis due to domestic policy issues. Thus, when Bill Clinton took office, the new administration expanded the U.S. mission in Somalia and included the disarming of the warring clans and the capture of the warlords who were responsible for stealing food supplies from the U.S. and other foreign donors. However, on October 3rd, 1993, Somali fighters shot down three U.S. helicopters and engaged in a combat with U.S. soldiers. This resulted in the deaths of eighteen American soldiers and many more wounded. When Somalis dragged the naked body of a murdered U.S. soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, TV stations around the world displayed those violent scenes.¹⁸⁴ For that reason, the Clinton administration did not consider the possibility of venturing into another conflict in Central Africa. As Nancy Soderberg later pointed out:

*“After Somalia, there was simply no eagerness to deploy troops on the ground anywhere. I believe it [...] certainly delayed any response in Rwanda [...].”*¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 24.

¹⁸² *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 137.

¹⁸³ *Boys*, *Clinton's Grand Strategy*, 225.

¹⁸⁴ *Johnson*, *The Threat on the Horizon*, 3–5.

¹⁸⁵ *Boys*, *Clinton's Grand Strategy*, 59.

Another reason for non-intervention was that for some people within the Clinton administration, Rwanda was just another “failed state” and adding to the series of political disasters in Africa. One member of the U.S. National Security Council characterized the genocide as “tribal killings”. Others viewed the genocide as a tragic outcome of the ongoing civil war rather than something that required direct intervention.¹⁸⁶ In addition, interventions in that area were believed to be extensive, costly, and likely producing little real improvement. Furthermore, Rwanda was considered a small and distant nation that did not concern the national interests of the United States.¹⁸⁷

Moreover, there was a notable lack of public support for an intervention in Rwanda. In general, Americans had become more and more disinterested in humanitarian efforts. A poll conducted in 1994 showed that only 26% of the public believed that protecting human rights is “very important”, a significant drop of over 30% from 1990.¹⁸⁸ Once they had witnessed the challenges and costs associated with interventions, Americans had changed their view about the feasibility of such endeavors.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, the American public still remembered the images of U.S. soldiers being killed in Somalia which made them envision a similar scenario in Rwanda.¹⁹⁰ This absence of an outcry also influenced the U.S. government in their decision making process.¹⁹¹

Another important factor in the U.S. reluctance about foreign interventions in Rwanda was that in the spring of 1994 the Clinton administration released a new policy known as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which aimed to reduce the number and costs of peacekeeping operations. Under this new policy peacekeeping missions had to align with the interest of the United States, possess secure sources of funding and troops and have well-defined objectives and a fixed end date.¹⁹² Anthony Lake now emphasized that peacekeeping was not the focal point of American national security policy. When it came to humanitarian intervention, the most important thing was to make careful distinctions and to ask when and where interventions would be

¹⁸⁶ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 21–22.

¹⁸⁷ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 476–478.

¹⁸⁸ *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 138.

¹⁸⁹ *Brands*, *From Berlin to Baghdad*, 137–38.

¹⁹⁰ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 476–478.

¹⁹¹ *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 476–478.

¹⁹² *Des Forges*, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 477–478.

viable.¹⁹³ Moreover, the PDD 25 expressed doubts about the effectiveness of peacekeeping in civil conflicts, highlighting the complexity of those conflicts.¹⁹⁴ It is important to note that this new policy differed from Clinton's original campaign promises, where he had advocated for protecting civilians in civil conflicts and providing humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, PDD 25 was finalized and influenced the decision-making process in the Rwanda conflict.¹⁹⁵ Rwanda marked the first crisis to be assessed in the context of PDD 25, offering a way to avoid commitments and involvement without a clear end in sight.¹⁹⁶

In the aftermath of the Rwandan civil war and genocide, some U.S. forces were deployed to Kigali to assist survivors.¹⁹⁷ Later on, the U.S. sought to leverage credibility by highlighting the American lead in assisting the U.N. to set up international tribunals to enforce accountability for the war years after the genocide.¹⁹⁸ In 1998, Clinton visited Rwanda and, in a speech delivered in Kigali, he issued an apology to the people of Rwanda. He stated that his administration had not acted quickly enough after the killings began and that they had not fully understood the depth and speed with which the atrocities took place.¹⁹⁹ However, these claims were met with skepticism years later. In 2004, the National Security Archive declassified and released documents that revealed that the CIA's daily intelligent reports to which Clinton had access were already using the term genocide as early as April 23. Furthermore, warnings from a U.N. force commander in Rwanda went unheard, not just by the U.S. but by the entire international community. The Rwandan genocide later served as ammunition for Clinton's critics.²⁰⁰ Even Anthony Lake later declared that: "*In Somalia we tried to do too much. In Rwanda we did too little.*"²⁰¹

In the Rwandan genocide, between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsi lost their lives. From the beginning, President Clinton was reluctant to intervene and commit troops to Rwanda. The shadow of the failed mission in Somalia loomed largely above the Clinton

¹⁹³ *Dumbrell*, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 78.

¹⁹⁴ *Brands*, From Berlin to Baghdad, 137.

¹⁹⁵ *Des Forges*, Leave None to Tell the Story, 477–478.

¹⁹⁶ *Dumbrell*, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 78.

¹⁹⁷ *United Nations*, Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations.

¹⁹⁸ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 225.

¹⁹⁹ *Dumbrell*, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 78.

²⁰⁰ *Dumbrell*, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 79.

²⁰¹ *Boys*, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 288.

administration. This and the lack of public support resulted in a shift away from international involvement and multilateral operations.²⁰² The administration's unwillingness to intervene shows a clear break in Bill Clinton's engagement strategy. The Rwandan genocide displayed a new philosophy of humanitarian interventions. It ruled out U.S. forces participating in peace missions in countries during internal conflicts. Humanitarian missions were viewed as too complex and always entangled in the country's political dynamics. An intervention in Rwanda was not an option due to its political and military dimension. With the new PDD 25 policy at place, foreign interventions became more restrictive.²⁰³ The Rwandan genocide marks a change in the Clinton administration's foreign policy.

7.2.2 The White House Statement by the President on Rwanda, July 29, 1994

On July 29th, 1994, President Clinton issued a statement on the situation in Rwanda at 11.15 a.m. from the Briefing Room of the White House. In this statement, the president mentions the different steps the United States has already taken in order to aid the Rwandan people and he further provides information on their forthcoming plans. In this statement to the U.S. public, President Bill Clinton addresses the tragedy of the conflict in Rwanda, highlights the humanitarian relief that the United States has already contributed to the Rwandan people and praises the international community and NGOs for their continued effort to help in this conflict. Furthermore, he argues that there are additional tasks that must be addressed, yet he explicitly emphasizes that any intervention should be strictly limited to peacekeeping objectives.

First, the president elaborates on the humanitarian aid the United States has already provided for Rwanda and gives examples as to what the Armed Forces of the U.S. have done to help in this conflict:

"[...] In the past week the United States has taken significant steps to alleviate the problems in Rwanda and the suffering - the terrible suffering - of the refugees. We have delivered more than 1,300 tons of equipment, food, water and medicine. We have increased safe water production and

²⁰² Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 252.

²⁰³ Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 138–39.

*distribution from nothing to 100,000 gallons a day. This relief effort is the most difficult and complex the world has faced in decades.”*²⁰⁴

Clinton continues by stating that the United States Armed Forces have responded to this tragedy with urgency, as they have managed to make sure that the Goma Airport is now operational 24 hours a day. Transportation between the airfields and the refugee camps has also significantly improved, and the United States are rapidly expanding water supplies in Rwanda. Additionally, the U.S is actively collaborating with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to establish conditions necessary for the refugees to return back home to Rwanda.²⁰⁵

However, Clinton continues by saying that the U.S. must do more and illustrates the next steps the United States will take in order to assist the people in Rwanda. He states that he has requested that Congress immediately provide 320 million dollars in emergency relief assistance. He states that *“If Congress approves the balance of our request this would bring total United States assistance since April to almost half a billion dollars.”* Furthermore, to monitor United States on-the-ground activities in the refugee camps, Clinton states that he has sent Secretary Perry to visit Rwanda and to make an immediate report upon his findings. The administration is urgently reviewing whether to open the new airfield in Kigali in Rwanda to help deliver supplies that are being held up because of the limited airport capacity in Zaire.²⁰⁶

Additionally, the president says that:

“Assistant Secretary of State George Moose will be traveling again to Kigali this weekend to continue his talks with the new leadership, and we are hopeful that more refugees will be returning soon. That is the only solution ultimately to this humanitarian tragedy.”

Here, the president highlights the ongoing diplomatic efforts to address the crisis. George Moose’s travels to Kigali reflects the administration’s commitment to engage directly with the new leadership in Rwanda in order to facilitate the return

²⁰⁴ *The White House*, The Rwanda Press Releases. Washington D.C., July 29, 1994.

²⁰⁵ *The White House*, The Rwanda Press Releases.

²⁰⁶ *The White House*, The Rwanda Press Releases.

of refugees. By stabilizing Rwanda internally, therefore addressing the root causes of the refugee crisis, the Clinton administration wants to support a post-conflict reconstruction through diplomatic efforts.

During the speech, Bill Clinton clarifies U.S. intentions regarding the foreign intervention in Rwanda. The president states that the sole purpose of deploying United States' troops inside Rwanda is humanitarian relief, rather than for peacekeeping or any other purpose.²⁰⁷ This distinction helps to define the scope of the intended intervention, since humanitarian relief focuses on immediate assistance in emergency situations and is intended to be temporary until the situation stabilizes, whereas peacekeeping missions involve the deployment of military personnel in order to maintain peace in conflicts and are often long-term efforts aimed to foster stability.

In his speech to the nation, Clinton focuses on international collaboration for humanitarian assistance in Rwanda. A point about multilateralism is made to signal to the American public that the administration is not deviating from one of its key policies:

*"Working together with the international community, both public and private, I believe we are making progress in the battle against suffering and death on the borders of Rwanda."*²⁰⁸

Additionally, Clinton praises the world's private relief organizations, whose employees and volunteers have worked in the refugee camps:

*"The American people should know about the remarkable skill and compassion they bring to their work. But they, too, need more assistance to continue."*²⁰⁹

He then reaches out directly to the American people, asking them for continued support: *"[...] I appeal to all Americans to reach out in the form of private contributions to these relief efforts so that more people can be kept alive."*²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ *The White House*, The Rwanda Press Releases.

²⁰⁸ *The White House*, The Rwanda Press Releases.

²⁰⁹ *The White House*, The Rwanda Press Releases.

²¹⁰ *The White House*, The Rwanda Press Releases.

In the excerpt above, Clinton specifically mentions individual donations in regard to helping resolve the conflict in Rwanda. By appealing directly to the American people for private contributions, he is highlighting the role of the citizens. Additionally, by mentioning individual donations, Clinton may be signaling a need for additional resources beyond government aid to meet the scale of the humanitarian needs in Rwanda. However, it should be noted that Clinton had not done this in his address on Haiti nor had the factor of private contribution been mentioned in his previous (administration's) foreign policy strategies like the NSSR.

In the end, President Clinton sums up the purpose of the U.S. intervention in Rwanda: *"The United States will not cease its efforts until the dying stops and the refugees have returned. This is our mission; we must continue it until it's accomplished."*²¹¹

Clinton assures the public that the main goal of this humanitarian mission is to stop the violence and help the displaced people of Rwanda to return home. Clinton positions human rights and human dignity as the crucial factor in the foreign intervention in Rwanda.

The White House statement made by President Bill Clinton on July 29th was issued in order to explain to the American public the ongoing foreign intervention in Rwanda. When analyzing the statement in comparison to Clinton's Georgetown Address in 1991 and especially the National Security Strategy Report, there are a few things that need to be considered.

First, it can be observed that back in 1991, Clinton stated in his Georgetown University Address that his future foreign policy would consider ethnic rivalries and separatists violences within national borders around the world, now exemplified by the genocide in Rwanda. Then, there are consistencies regarding the White House statement and the National Security Strategy Report. In the report, it is stated that the United States would use foreign interventions in Africa in order to support peacekeeping missions in case of conflicts, a strategy being implemented in the Rwandan conflict. Furthermore, President Clinton mentions in the statement, how the help of the international community is a crucial aspect in regard to foreign interventions in Africa. This argument can also be found in the NSSR. However, it

²¹¹ *The White House*, The Rwanda Press Releases.

specifically states that the United States' and the international communities' help must be limited, since the ultimate responsibility rests with the people of the country in question. Moreover, it is noteworthy that even though the NSSR identifies regional aggressions as grounds for foreign intervention, it also specifies that threats to the stability of the United States itself must also be present. Regarding U.S military missions, those will only be applied if the U.S. interests are threatened. In the context of the Rwandan genocide, such a direct threat to U.S. stability was absent, therefore foreign intervention improbable. Finally, Clinton emphasizes the limited duration of the intervention in Rwanda, again coinciding with the NSSR, where it is mentioned multiple times that efforts of the U.S. concerning foreign interventions must be limited in duration. Overall, the statement by the President on Rwanda on July 29 clearly coincides with the NSSR since both were issued around the same time. Therefore, those two sources do not significantly differ or contradict each other.

In conclusion, on July 28th, 1994, President Bill Clinton addressed the United States regarding the situation on Rwanda. Notably, this address came after the genocide had already taken place. In his address, the president outlined the various steps the United States had already taken to aid the Rwandan people and provided information on forthcoming plans. Addressing the U.S public, Clinton highlighted the humanitarian relief efforts that the United States had already contributed and also praised the international community and NGOs for their continued efforts to help in the conflict. Even though he addressed the additional tasks that must be done, he explicitly emphasized that any intervention should be limited to peacekeeping objectives. Again, the policy shift in the Clinton administration's approach to foreign policy can be observed in this statement, as the United States are steering towards humanitarian aid post-conflict, when it could be effectively implemented, rather than attempting to intervene during the ongoing violence.

8 Reception of the Clinton Administration's Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of the Clinton administration has been a subject of extensive debate and analysis. While some contend that the administration's approach lacked coherence at times, others argue that President Clinton and his team remained loyal to their core principles. This chapter examines the different perspectives on the Clinton foreign policy, exploring criticism and praise voiced by different people.

After Clinton's presidency, the public standing on the administration's foreign affairs was high since the president was seen as having achieved a good balance between the foreign and the domestic policy arenas. A series of newspaper articles published in 2000 by *The New York Times* reported that Clinton crafted a unique form of restrained executive action, ensuring that the presidency remained actively involved in both minor domestic endeavors and in efforts to foster peace and trade globally. Moreover, the articles argued that Clinton's success was due to his focus on the interconnectedness of global free trade, American internationalism, and the pursuit of global democracy.²¹² Clinton's message was always clear: *"prosperity would create choices, choices would lead to a demand for information, and that information, [...] would bring political change."*²¹³ Furthermore, Clinton's international reputation, particularly in Europe, improved after George Bush's handling of the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent criticisms.²¹⁴

Nevertheless, criticism also surfaced. The perceived lack of coherence and the reactive nature of Bill Clinton's policies were frequently at the forefront of these critiques. Richard Nixon's former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, described Clinton's foreign policy in an article in 2000 by *The Economist* as *"a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to specific crises"*²¹⁵ Christopher Hitchens, an English-born American journalist and author insisted that the Clinton administration had *"no big plans or grand thoughts, an absence of an overall perspective."*²¹⁶

²¹² Dumbrell, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 3.

²¹³ Dumbrell, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 3.

²¹⁴ Dumbrell, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 3.

²¹⁵ *The Economist*. It's the world, stupid! Washington D.C, February 17, 2000.

<https://www.economist.com/united-states/2000/02/17/its-the-world-stupid>

²¹⁶ Christopher Hitchens, No One Left To Lie To. The Triangulation of William Jefferson Clinton. London: Verso, 1999. 80

Former Clinton employees had a more positive judgment after Clinton's term ended. Some emphasized on the struggles of the post-Cold War uncertainties and how Clinton maintained America's internationalist credibility.²¹⁷

Boys describes Bill Clinton's foreign policy as a work in progress that had to adapt quickly to different situations in the post-Cold War time. He claims that

*"[...] while Engagement and Enlargement was an imperfect policy, in an age when the old rules did not apply and no New World Order had emerged, Clinton's Grand Strategy provided a flexible and pragmatic response to an evolving world order."*²¹⁸

Hal Brands' resumé of Clinton's foreign policy is more critical. He argues that there was a lack of strategy to incorporate the administration's aims and ideas into a sustainable policy. There was an absence of an overall strategy that made the post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy often chaotic.²¹⁹

Dumbrell states that the common criticism the Clinton administration faces in terms of their foreign policy is accurate. Clinton's inherent approach to decision-making often showed a flexibility that verged on indecisiveness. Clinton was compared to former president Lyndon Johnson and how both of these presidents often did not fully reveal their positions until the last possible moment once conditions were fully known to them.²²⁰ As Clinton's Security of State Warren Christopher pointed out *"When it comes down to the wire, Clinton likes to keep several names or options in play until the decision absolutely must be made."*²²¹

Dumbrell adds that another common criticism of Clinton was his early personal neglect of foreign policy. From the beginning, he positioned himself primarily as a domestic rather than a foreign policy president. According to Dumbrell, this reluctance was damaging and had negative implications for the rest of his presidency. In relation to the genocide in Rwanda, Clinton's foreign policy did not consider serious interventions due to their struggle in Somalia. Dumbrell adds that the *"The quasi-invasion of Haiti in 1994*

²¹⁷ Dumbrell, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 4.

²¹⁸ Boys, Clinton's Grand Strategy, 288.

²¹⁹ Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 2.

²²⁰ Dumbrell, Clinton's Foreign Policy, 1–9.

²²¹ Christopher Warren, Chances of a Lifetime. New York: Scribner's, 2001. 154

was a sloppy success.”²²² However, Dumbrell points out that Bill Clinton had a great capacity for hard work, acute intelligence, and a willingness to learn and adapt.²²³ He continues by saying that Bill Clinton was a president of contradictions yet embracing them. A pro-business, pro-global free trade president who is remembered as a leader who surrendered to the market. A president who believed in the connection between free trade and political democracy which was often seen as naïve and self-serving.²²⁴ Furthermore, Clinton did not miss to integrate foreign policy purposes in his presidency. Clinton’s foreign policy developed in a coherent way, responding to the post-Cold War dynamics.²²⁵ Another point Dumbrell makes is that Clinton was the first American president since the 1920s to be in office while the U.S. was not in a severe economic depression or part of a global war. The foreign policy issues were “to some extent manipulated to maximize presidential control over them. But they were less than existential.”²²⁶ As a result, he gradually built up a reserve of public approval.²²⁷

Dumbrell concludes that the erratic nature of Clinton’s foreign policy decisions has been highly exaggerated and adds this analysis:

“Clinton was able to use his personal qualities of forcefulness and flattery to keep his foreign policy afloat in times of strategic uncertainty and domestic political challenge. His own political self-image was ‘an exemplary blend of idealist and political roughneck’.”²²⁸

In the end, Dumbrell argues that the post-Cold War period demanded not the capacity to command troops and confront enemies, but the ability to negotiate across various issues, establishing coalitions, and seizing opportunities for reaching agreements, and President Bill Clinton provided exactly that kind of leadership.²²⁹

²²² Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 166-167.

²²³ Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 166-167.

²²⁴ Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 166-167.

²²⁵ Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 166-167.

²²⁶ Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 8.

²²⁷ Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 8.

²²⁸ Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 170–171.

²²⁹ Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, 170-171.

9 Conclusion

The 1990's marked a significant change in U.S. politics, as the collapse of their primary adversary and the election of a domestically focused president called for a reevaluation of American's role in global politics. Despite this shift, the fundamental belief that the United States had a responsibility to participate in global affairs remained central to President Bill Clinton's ideology. However, he argued that foreign interventions must be carefully considered. The terms *engagement* and *enlargement* became synonymous with Clinton's foreign policy which aimed to promote democracy and human rights, while also balancing the United States' own national interests.

During Bill Clinton's presidential campaign, this strategy was articulated in multiple speeches, such as the one given at Georgetown University in 1991. Once he was elected president, he implemented his foreign policy strategy into the National Security Strategy Report in 1994. The implementation of this strategy is evident in the administration's handling of the coup d'état in Haiti. The United States firmly supported democracy and sought to stabilize the region to stop human rights violations and to prevent refugees coming into the U.S. The response to the genocide in Rwanda was considerably less decisive, largely due to the United States' earlier failed military intervention in Somalia. Additionally, Rwanda was perceived as lacking strategic importance and thus remained outside the U.S. interest. Nevertheless, the documents and speeches examined in this thesis reveal a consistent approach to the implementation of foreign interventions throughout Bill Clinton's first years of presidency.

It is important to note that this thesis focuses solely on the initial years of Bill Clinton's presidency. There is potential for further research to explore the later years of his presidency, particularly his second term, and how his foreign policy decisions evolved during this period. It would be interesting to examine how the concepts of *enlargement* and *engagement* shifted over the course of his presidency. Additionally, analyzing the subsequent National Security Strategy Reports released during Clinton's tenure could provide insights into any changes in priorities or approaches. It is possible that there was a shift towards less emphasis on humanitarianism, democracy promotion, and multilateralism in later years, influenced by setbacks, domestic issues, and his impeachment trial.

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