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„ Understanding The Roots of Conflict: The Role of
Ideology, Territory, and Ethnicity in the Ogaden
Crisis 1977-78 “

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Abstract

This thesis examines international relations theoretical approaches to the sources of conflict. It focuses on three particular aspects: ideology, territory, and ethnicity. These theoretical frameworks are applied to analyze the events of the Ogaden Crisis of 1977-1978.

For ideology this thesis underscores Althusser's ideological state apparatus as a framework of how elites maintain state power. For territory, Godder's indivisible territory theory explains how elites and state actors can portray territory as a non-negotiable and integral part of the state. And, for ethnicity the psychology of threat, and Kaufman's symbolic politics theory is discussed to demonstrate how elites justify ethnic conflicts. The research also addresses the gaps in the study of the Ogaden in the Horn of Africa, where the instrumentalism of territorial, ideological, and ethnic components is often overlooked.

The sources of conflict in the Ogaden are due to the political elite who seek to assume power by manipulating a combination of ideological hegemonies, indivisible territory theory, and instrumentalizing ethnonationalism. The events that occurred during the Ogaden Crisis were a culmination of various political forces from both the Horn of Africa region and abroad who pursued safeguarding their interests at the cost of several conflicts. The colonial treaties that arbitrarily demarcated the borders between Ethiopia and Somalia have been a focal point of territorial and ethnic conflicts as well as a source of contrary ideological hegemonies such as Ethiopian imperialism and Somali nationalism. Therefore, this thesis unravels the interplay of political elites protecting their interests and ideology, territory, and ethnicity in their role in the constant conflicts in the Ogaden region.

Abstrakt

In dieser Arbeit werden theoretische Ansätze der internationalen Beziehungen zu den Ursachen von Konflikten untersucht. Sie konzentriert sich auf drei besondere Aspekte: Ideologie, Territorium und Ethnizität. Diese theoretischen Rahmen werden zur Analyse der Ereignisse der Ogaden-Krise von 1977-1978 herangezogen.

In Bezug auf die Ideologie wird in dieser Arbeit Althussers ideologischer Staatsapparat als Rahmen für die Aufrechterhaltung der staatlichen Macht durch die Eliten hervorgehoben. Was das Territorium betrifft, so erklärt Godders Theorie des unteilbaren Territoriums, wie Eliten und staatliche Akteure das Territorium als unverhandelbaren und integralen Bestandteil des Staates darstellen können. Im Hinblick auf die ethnische Zugehörigkeit werden die Psychologie der Bedrohung und die Theorie der symbolischen Politik von Kaufman erörtert, um zu zeigen, wie Eliten ethnische Konflikte rechtfertigen. Die Forschungsarbeit befasst sich auch mit den Lücken in der Untersuchung des Ogaden am Horn von Afrika, wo der Instrumentalismus territorialer, ideologischer und ethnischer Komponenten oft übersehen wird.

Die Konfliktursachen im Ogaden sind auf die politische Elite zurückzuführen, die durch eine Kombination aus ideologischen Hegemonien, der Theorie des unteilbaren Territoriums und der Instrumentalisierung des Ethnonationalismus versucht, die Macht zu übernehmen. Die Ereignisse während der Ogaden-Krise waren ein Höhepunkt verschiedener politischer Kräfte aus der Region am Horn von Afrika und aus dem Ausland, die ihre Interessen um den Preis mehrerer Konflikte durchsetzen wollten. Die Kolonialverträge, mit denen die Grenzen zwischen Äthiopien und Somalia willkürlich festgelegt wurden, waren ein Brennpunkt territorialer und ethnischer Konflikte sowie eine Quelle gegensätzlicher ideologischer Hegemonien wie des äthiopischen Imperialismus und des somalischen Nationalismus. Daher wird in dieser Arbeit das Zusammenspiel von politischen Eliten, die ihre Interessen schützen, und Ideologie, Territorium und ethnischer Zugehörigkeit in ihrer Rolle bei den ständigen Konflikten in der Ogaden-Region entschlüsselt.

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Introduction

The Horn of Africa, a region home to nearly 140 million, has been a theatre for enduring conflict rooted in ideological, territorial, and ethnic disputes. The legacies of colonialism, alongside constant climate changes, have led the leaders of the various political regimes to expand the extent in the name of safeguarding their peoples and nations. The Horn of Africa, comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, has a complex history, a tapestry of conflict in an immensely ethnically diverse region. Despite their diversity and various geographical conditions, the countries in the Horn of Africa are linguistically, religiously, and ethnically linked together because of their long history. The region's history of conflict can be traced as far as the Middle Ages, and the peoples have also created a history of intertwining through marriages, adopting each other's religions, and cooperating against foreign invaders. But, the history of cooperation is overshadowed by the history of conflict, as there are far more instances of conflict and hate towards the 'other'. The geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa can be understood by its vital maritime routes: the Red Sea, which flows through the Bab-Al-Mandab, then into the Indian Ocean. The small area of water flows is a key connection between Africa, Europe and Asia, which is still a popular trade route for commercial entities.

The long ancient histories of the Orthodox Christian Ethiopian Empire and various Muslim Somali and Afar Sultanates have been a history of conflict for the hegemony of power and influence for the Red Sea area and other vital ports. The British, French, and Italian colonial powers also understood the significance of this region, which is why they partitioned the coastline of the Horn of Africa throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Although the coastline's geopolitical significance is high, the roots of conflict in the region cannot simply be explained as an issue of resources and port claims. For instance, local people are expected to engage with different communities for trade in weekly open-air markets throughout the Horn of Africa. There have been numerous peace and trust-building initiatives by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental throughout the post-colonial era. Nevertheless, the Horn of Africa remains plagued by persistent conflicts and weak

governance. Thus, understanding the multifaceted roots of conflict in the Horn of Africa is crucial for the prosperity of its people and for developing sustainable solutions for the region's growth.

To improve the conflict-ridden geopolitical environment solutions in the Horn of Africa, it would be necessary to examine the longest-lasting conflictual actors: Ethiopia and Somalia. The relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia, the region's largest states, is characterized by their land border marked by centuries of conflict, displaced peoples, and severe poverty. The typology of the conflicts that often occur between them is noted as territorial disputes and ethnic rivalries. However, their conflicting ideologies of self-identity have been a hurdle for ever-lasting peace.

This concept can be best understood by the Ogaden War 1977-78, initiated by President Siad Barre, a Pan-Somali nationalist, as he attempted to annex the Ogaden region, ethnic-Somali clans in Ethiopia. The brief but costly Ogaden conflict underscored the intricated interplay of ideology, territory, and ethnicity, used as political mobilization and conflict instruments. Somalia used immense resources to annex the region but was forced to withdraw from the war after Ethiopia received support from the Communist bloc. The long-term outcomes of this war would then cause a state collapse in Somalia, as Siad Barre's government was toppled due to his security apparatus losing confidence in his regime and internal ethnic turmoil in Ethiopia, as many ethno-nationalists emerged against 'centrist' Ethiopian hegemony.

There have been significant ideological transformations in Ethiopian national identity, from imperialism to socialism and ethnic federalism. Different generations of Ethiopians have contrasting ideas and perceptions of "Ethiopianism". Differing perspectives on collective history in Ethiopia have caused several ideological fragmentations based on religion, social identity, and social hegemonies. Ethiopia is understood as a multi-ethnic homeland with religious diversity, which was ruled under Christian Emperors for most of its existence. On the other hand, Pan-Somali Nationalism is a prominent ideology initiated by early anti-colonial Somali leaders who formed Somalia's first political party, the Somali Youth League. And then post-colonial leaders such as Aden Adde and Siad Barre, who waged war against Ethiopia

throughout their political careers as a means of developing the Somali nation. The Pan-Somali ideology is understood as a rationale that all Somali clans should be governed under a single flag, without any external influences on their nation-building process.

On two occasions, the Pan-Somali ideology would directly clash with Ethiopian centrist hegemonic ideologies in the vast Ogaden region. Since the perennial conflictual issue is yet to be politically settled among them, this thesis seeks to answer the following questions: What are the primary roots of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia? How do ideological, territorial, and ethnic factors interplay into their conflict? Moreover, how do their political elites utilize these factors to justify their actions in conflict? This thesis aims to identify and analyze the roots of conflict by evaluating them through international relations theories of conflict to propose strategies for conflict resolution. By shedding light on the keyhole of the Ogaden conflict, this research thesis aims to contribute to the academic discourse on conflict resolution and provide security policymakers with insight to create more effective strategies for peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa.

This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1) introduces ideological explanations of conflict, such as Gramsci's Ideological Hegemony theory and Social Identity theories, to understand how conflict can arise due to ideological differences and oppressions. Chapter 2) explains two common approaches to understanding territorial disputes, such as the indivisible territory and irredentism theory, which entail aspects of disputes of territory where actors believe that they cannot share nor accept that territory with akin ethnicity is out of their control. Chapter 3) explains the socio-psychological explanations of ethnic conflict to broaden the understanding of how, when, and why ethnicity matters to a group of people and their respective leaders. Lastly, Chapter 4) will provide a case study on the conflicts in the Ogaden region and provide explanations based on the theories discussed in the earlier chapters. In all the comprehensive examination of the sources of conflict in the Ogaden, aims to contribute to a deeper understanding and nuanced approach to conflict and peace studies in one of the world's most strategic yet conflict riddled regions.

Chapter I

1. Ideology

This chapter investigates ideological conflicts, aiming to understand their intricacies and reveal their fundamental workings. At the core of this chapter are three major theoretical frameworks that provide valuable insights into the characteristics and progression of ideological disagreements: the theories of Civilizations, Ideological Hegemony, and Social Identity. These frameworks are the guiding principles which navigate the complexities of ideological strife.

I aim to analyze the complex interactions of concepts, beliefs, and power dynamics that drive ideological conflicts utilising this trio of theoretical perspectives. I will analyze the situation by providing illustrations of actual conflicts that fall into these theories, such as the South Africa's anti-apartheid conflict. This chapter aims to enhance our knowledge of how ideologies influence human actions, societal frameworks, and historical events.

1.1 Civilizations Theory

Huntington's Clash of Civilization theory is a crucial tool to interpret conflict in the post-Cold War world. Huntington believes that global conflicts will be further determined by cultural and religious differences between civilizations rather than geo-political boundaries¹. By examining real-life illustrations of conflict and several academic criticisms, I aim to emphasize the complexities of the Clash of Civilizations. The purpose is to clarify how relevant this theory is for describing the complexities of modern conflicts. So, what are civilizations, and why could they considered to be the highest form of an ideological community?

Civilizations are defined as a cultural entity, a combination of villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, and religious groups. In other words, there may be differences between a Northern French village and a Southern French village, but they still have more in common than a Spanish village that shares a border with France. Thus, Arabs, Chinese, and European communities are not merely cultural

¹ Henderson, Errol A., and Richard Tucker. “*Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict*”, 319

entities; rather, their differences constitute a civilization. This is how a civilization can be regarded as the highest form of human grouping. Huntington argues that because of rigid differences, countries should be grouped along civilizational lines and that the essential basis of grouping should be religion.²

The Cold War is a clear example of ideological conflict of ideological as Capitalist and Communist ideologies spewed several proxy wars across the globe. For instance, the Vietnam and Korean wars were indeed fought to 'unify' the territories of common people under the same structure of governance. However, conflicting ideological frameworks from the global powers were sufficient to divide their civilizations. Consequently, this created a new ideological civilization that did not encompass ethnic and territorial identities.

The explicit argument in Huntington's proposition is that the source of conflict will not primarily be economic, but rather driven by ideological differences which primarily stem from religion. He claims that countries should be grouped according to their civilizations because the most important grouping of people is based on their ideological civilization.³ Thus, the grouping of civilizations can allow for cooperation based on reconciliation and dialogue. Furthermore, the Clash of Civilizations can occur because of 1) increasing interaction among peoples of different civilizations, 2) the de-westernization and indigenization of elites in non-Western states, 3) increased economic regionalization, which increases civilization consciousness, and 4) global resurgence of religious identity diminishing local and state-behind.⁴ The idea that belief systems greatly enhance warfare between states of different civilizations illustrates how people begin to conflict and differentiate themselves from the 'other.'

There are numerous critiques of Huntington's theory of civilizational conflict, often centring on his definitions of civilization and culture. Huntington asserts that there are broad agreements on central propositions regarding the nature, identity, and

² Henderson, Errol A., "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict, 319

³ Ibid., 320-321

⁴ Ibid., 323

dynamics of civilizations.⁵ Many scholars agree that a ‘civilization’ is a cultural entity, though they differ on what constitutes a cultural entity.⁶ The scholarly disagreements on which components are necessary for a group to be categorized as a civilization result in dissimilarities in the explanations of conflict. Jack Matlock challenges Huntington’s theory by inquiring whether a civilization encompasses the material side of life, or if it is exclusively a matter of how people think.⁷

Theoretical debates on what creates and constitutes a civilization can refute the argument that conflicts can arise solely due to civilizational differences. However, reviewing both historical and contemporary explanations of civilization theory may be beneficial for understanding the sources of conflicts. For example, Jacob Burckhardt's methodology of analyzing modern civilizations sets him apart from other social theorists, such as Comte and Weber. Comte's analysis, in turn, provides an abstract schema of successive periods of time to better understand civilizations.⁸ Whereas Max Weber's analysis varies between nomothetic generalizations and ideographic understanding of history.⁹

Notwithstanding the different explanations of civilization building, there are key similarities and differences between Burckhardt's theory and Huntington's analysis of civilization, especially regarding civilization categorization. Their similarities are that they both contend that state, religion, and culture are prime components of a civilization.¹⁰ Burckhardt's significant theoretical difference is his categorization of how a society can become a civilization. He explains that there can be greatness in civilization, such as during the Renaissance period, as society discovers its 'individuality.'¹¹ This contribution differs from Huntington’s explanations of civilization theory because religion is his focal point for civilization building. Burckhardt makes it clear that the recognition of the individual from

⁵ Matlock, Jack F. “*Can Civilizations Clash?*” .,429

⁶ Ibid., 430

⁷ Ibid., 430

⁸ Garner, R. “*Jacob Burckhardt as a Theorist of Modernity: Reading The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, 49

⁹ Ibid., 49

¹⁰ Matlock., 430

¹¹ Garner, R. “*Jacob Burckhardt as a Theorist of Modernity*, 49

collective primordial and hierarchical structures are key distinctions of the civilization an individual may belong to.¹²

Further theoretical debates from Kroeber, and Braudel standpoint that culture and civilizations encompass all categories of ‘societal life’. They assert that civilizations also include materialistic aspects of life alongside mentality and spirituality.¹³ When it comes to civilizational building, this perspective suggests that successful civilizations are not solely defined by their material achievements or technological advancements. Instead, they are shaped by a rich tapestry of cultural expressions, beliefs, customs, and artistic creations. Braudel's analysis entails that a civilization's space, land, and natural resources are relevant to a civilization's sustainability.¹⁴ A civilization’s ability to manage its resources, adapt to geographical challenges, and sustain itself over time contributes to its development.

As mentioned above, Huntington’s theory of civilization explains that conflicts will occur due to irreconcilable differences between various civilizations. However, there are several conflicting academic definitions of civilizations and Huntington’s theory. Kroeber and Braudel stress the intricate and interrelated nature of civilizations. They see culture and civilization as complex, ever-changing entities. On the other hand, Huntington's theory oversimplifies civilizations as uniform groups, neglecting internal variations and common pasts. Moreover, Braudel's consideration of material conditions such as resources and geography as a measurement of success contravenes Huntington's theory because of his focus on ideological differences. Some scholars may contend that Huntington oversimplified his perspective of civilizations as his explanations fail to consider the complex relationship between material and cultural aspects.

1.2 Ideological Hegemony Theory

Ideological hegemonies are yet another theoretical approach to understanding how a society can distinguish itself from another. The issues of social order are of constant interest to political theorists as the issue of societal identity is ever-

¹² Ibid., 50

¹³ Matlock, Jack F. “Can Civilizations Clash?” .,429

¹⁴ Ibid., 429

changing. How do people distinguish themselves based on class, religion, and political ideologies? And how can these societal components be utilized to cause conflicts? This section will briefly describe concepts of ideological hegemony and how it is intricate for initiating conflict.

Antonio Gramsci explains that concepts of hegemony are the “certain way of life and thought is dominant” and this conceptual reality is diffused throughout society via a vis institutional manifestation.¹⁵

Gramsci's analysis entails that a dominant class uses its privileged access to ideological institutions to propagate values and beliefs and to reinforce its structural positions in the future.¹⁶ One of the crucial aspects of ideological hegemonies is its ability to delineate the dimensions of discussion of alternative beliefs, values, and perspectives. For instance, a dominant class can propagate its ideology while also punishing or 'ex-communicating' those who do not heed the principles of their ideology.

The primary source of social control lies through processes of ideological hegemony. As Gramsci explains, there are two aspects of the ideological hegemonic process: 1) the influence of the wealthy and the corporate elite within ideological sectors of society, and 2) the tendency for belief systems to be increasingly fragmented and inconsistent as one descends the class structure.¹⁷ His formulation opens a debate on several areas of this thesis because it provides alternatives on whether conflict is intrinsic to society or if it is a by-product of sociocultural structures. If people are suppressed by an ideology, it certainly can cause revolt. Moreover, if a state or an entity has a belief that its ideology is superior to others, then it may even expand its interests coercively by subjecting other territories to adhere to said ideology. The communist versus capitalist ideological war is one example of ideological hegemony expansions. And, as of recently, radical Islamic entities such as ISIS and Al-Shabaab, in their attempts to create an Islamic Caliphate, have been sources of conflict in Africa and the Middle East. The focal point of these

¹⁵ Egan, Daniel. *The Dialectic of Position and Maneuver: Understanding Gramsci's Military Metaphor*, 41

¹⁶ Ibid., 41

¹⁷ ¹⁷ Egan, Daniel. *The Dialectic of Position and Maneuver: Understanding Gramsci's Military Metaphor*, 42

conflicts is the process by which they re-enforce their ideologies over others, under the belief that it is superior to others, and give little room for alternative beliefs or values.

Although, Gramsci theory on ideological hegemony is a fundamental concept in Marxist school of thought, there are several scholarly critiques on its relevance of class domination vis a vis ideology as a potential source of conflict. Louis Althusser provides an argument with clear divergences from Gramsci's approach, by highlighting a further deterministic and structured approach to better understanding ideology and state power.

Althusser argues that there are not only repressive state powers and state apparatus but also ideological state apparatus.¹⁸ He distinguishes the '*Ideological State Apparatus*' from the '*Repressive State Apparatus*' by these basic differences: the *Repressive State Apparatus* functions 'by violence,' whereas the *Ideological State Apparatus* functions 'by ideology.'¹⁹

It is key to note that there are several overlaps between state violence and ideology, they are not mutually exclusive. *Repressive State Apparatus* function predominantly by physical violence, while operating secondarily under its ideology. For instance, the army and the police function by ideology to ensure institutional cohesion and reproduction, as well as the '*values*' they set forth externally.²⁰ On the other hand, *Ideological State Apparatus*' operate predominately by ideology, and they function secondarily by repression, especially if one goes against the belief or commits an act against the values of that ideology.²¹ As mentioned above, a dominant ideology hegemony may use punitive measures such as ex-communication against those who do not adhere to the principles of their ideology. For instance, there are variations of the levels of punishments, schools, and churches, which Althusser considers to be key ideological institutions, and suitable methods of

¹⁸ Althusser, Louis., *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*., 79

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 80

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 81

²¹ Althusser, Louis. "*Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*", 79

punishing and expulsions are used to discipline both the individual and the larger groups of subjects of that ideology.

Clear examples of *Ideological State apparatuses* that use coercive measures to enforce Sharia ideology are 1) Guidance Patrol (Iran) and 2) the Committees for Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Gaza Strip and Saudi Arabia).²² These are legitimate bodies of the State and have a monopoly of violence, as they are tasked to enforce Sharia-Islamic law, respectively according to the state's interpretation, by enforcing 1) the preservation of Islamic dress codes, 2) not engaging in Western traditions such as Valentines Day, 3) Not consuming alcohol or any form of illicit drugs.²³

So, Althusser argument contrasts with Gramsci's as the latter sums up ideology as a humanistic by-product (the dominant class) propagating ideology on others. Althusser emphasizes the structural and systemic aspects of ideology by contending that ideology operates primarily through 'state apparatuses' and, to a greater extent, is rooted in social, ideological structures rather than by being developed and propagated by a dominant ideological and cultural class.

In sum, Althusser sought to refine Gramsci's arguments as he claims that Gramsci did not sufficiently consider the importance of '*Repressive State Apparatus*', i.e. (Army and Police), alongside '*Ideological State Apparatus*', i.e. (Schools and Religious Institutions).

Even though Gramsci and Althusser often distinct yet complementary perspectives of conflict within societies due to ideological hegemonies, their theories underscore the interplay between ideological, structural, and institutional factors. But what are the methods of conflict used against ideological hegemonies, and who are the actors who drive it? As Gramsci discusses, his concepts of the "war of position" and the "war of maneuver" are relevant strategies for social change, especially regarding dismantling an ideological hegemony. His focus is on how ideological

²² Ghaedi, Monir. "Why Is Iran Bringing Back Its 'Morality Police'?" Deutsche Welle, July 17, 2023. *Note: Committees bear the same name but are different entities.*

²³ Ibid

struggles may lead to societal conflict, ultimately for the objective of revolutionary change.

The “war of manoeuvre” and “war of position” are his metaphors that entail a complex series of actions that revolutionary forces should pursue in specific situations.²⁴ He explains that a state with an underdeveloped civil society revolutionary strategy requires a direct frontal assault against the principal form of bourgeois political power: the state.²⁵ In contrast, a state with developed civil society, a direct frontal assault against the dominant power, would likely fail.²⁶ Thus, the strategy against states with developed societies requires 'revolutionary' forces to consider the significance of hegemony.²⁷

Whether revolutionary forces conduct a "war of maneuver" or "war of position" depends on the hegemonic status of civil society. So, Gramsci's belief is that “war of manoeuvre” fits in the context of crisis within the ideological authority, hence why it would be feasible for revolutionary forces can directly assault the existing ideological order. He underscores that the Bolshevik Revolution was an important milestone of a successful "war of maneuver," as it marked an "decisive shift in the art and science of politics."²⁸ The lasting ideological impact of the Bolshevik's success was seen throughout the 20th century in Ethiopia, China, Vietnam, and Nepal. All of them had communist revolutions against their state power due to ideological disputes, and when the crisis of authority was prevalent, it allowed ideological revolutionaries to seize the opportunity to dismantle the contrary ideological hegemony. (ADD explanation of War of Position, relates to Anc struggle)

However, dismantling hegemonic ideology is not solely confined to capitalist and communist rivalries; it can also be a result of conflicting belief systems or racial

²⁴ Egan, Daniel. *The Dialectic of Position and Maneuver: Understanding Gramsci's Military Metaphor*, 30

²⁵ Ibid., 30

²⁶ Ibid., 33

²⁷ Ibid., 33

²⁸ Ibid., 35

systems. As previously mentioned, Althusser expands Gramsci's approaches to ideological hegemonies by expanding that ideological state apparatus function through ideology vis a vis state institution such as educational, media, and belief systems.²⁹ The state institutions distribute and reiterate the prevailing ideology to ensure the reproduction of the existing social order. A perfect example of this form of ideological hegemony was during South Africa's apartheid era (1948-1994). During the apartheid era, South Africa's various state apparatuses played a crucial role in maintaining and legitimizing the racially segregated system. As a result, the state required every person in South Africa to be registered as belonging to a racial group under the Population Registration Act of 1950.³⁰

It is key to note that it was not the population registration act that caused people to be created differently, but rather the construct of educational, media, and religious rationalization of apartheid. In fact, apartheid was a developed form of racism which entailed an ideology for allegiance or rejection.³¹ In other words, an individual can only be a part of one group and may not associate and assimilate itself with another, not ideologically, socially, and institutionally. To effectively dismantle the hegemonic ideology that underpinned Apartheid, a multifaceted approach was required, or as Gramsci would advise, a "war of position". The internal resistance to apartheid entailed not only tackling the institutional components but also the social and cultural elements that supported the apartheid ideology. Indeed, Black South Africans had a subpar education in the school system because of the Bantu Education Act.

Penny Eslin examined the variations between the Christian National Education Policy (*White Policy*) and the Bantu Education Policy (*Black Policy*) to illustrate the role of fundamental pedagogies of educational policies in Apartheid South Africa.³² She explains that according to CNE policy, education for blacks consisted of legal features such as 1) being taught in their mother tongue, 2) funding should be independent of white educational expenses, 3) it should preserve the cultural identity of the black community, whilst promoting the 'colonial' Christian

³⁰ Roberts, M. "*The Ending of Apartheid: Shifting Inequalities in South Africa*", 54

³¹ Richardson. "*Apartheid, Heresy and the Church in South Africa*", 3

³² Kallaway, Peter. *Apartheid and education: The Education of Black South Africans*, 139

National principles, and 4) it should be administered by whites.³³ On the other hand, some of the key principles that fundamentally privileged white students were that European children's education should reflect their parents' worldview and adult education, particularly for European and Afrikaans speakers, should prioritize cultural apartheid and a Christian nationalist mindset.³⁴ Hence, the *CNE* policy was a clear key institution and fundamental institution for abetting racial segregation across South Africa. However, there are key ideological takeaways one must revise, such as the intersectionality between religion and education promoted by the institutions to formally rationalize the discriminatory policy. In essence, it was not merely the policy that upheld apartheid but rather the ideology it was founded on. In agreement with Althusser's explanation of *Ideological State Apparatuses*, the *CNE* policy influenced educational institutions to operate predominately by ideology and function secondly by repression.³⁵

So, what was the Christian ideological rationale of apartheid, but rather the ideology of was founded on, and where did it stem from? Religious institutions were at the forefront of both legitimizing and denouncing state actors during the apartheid era. For example, the Dutch Reformed Church reinforced the state and the ruling party's racial discrimination laws, garnering its nickname of “National Party at Prayer”.³⁶ However, other religious actors, such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference, were critical of the apartheid system.³⁷ The Dutch Reformed Church's religious leaders offered a moral and ethical framework that made Apartheid ideology more appealing to the white majority. The portrayal of racial hierarchy and segregation as part of a divine design, and religious organizations contributed to conformity and reduced resistance among believers who considered these practices as consistent with their spiritual convictions.

³³ Ibid., 140

³⁴ ES van Eeden & LM Vermeulen, *Christian National Education (CNE) and People's Education (PE): Historical perspectives and some broad common grounds* 179-180

³⁵ Althusser, Louis. “*Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*,” 81

³⁶ Richardson, Neville. “*Apartheid, Heresy and the Church in South Africa.*” 4

³⁷ Ibid., 4

The legality of apartheid on a macro level derived from a 1935 document which argued that no one should be deprived of a “social status as honourable as he could reach”, but each nation should have the right to be by itself.³⁸ In addition in 1948, another statement affirmed the divinity of apartheid by noting that God’s intervention of Babel – the creation of separate languages and nations – was God’s normative pursuit to delineate humanity “into nations and races”.³⁹ Hence, the core divine belief was able to transcend into almost all aspects of civil society because the apartheid’s Christian ideology entailed that the segregated structures were natural and essential to humanity.

Lastly, the media was another key *Ideological State apparatus* that propagated racist stereotypes and censored anti-apartheid voices, reinforcing segregation. State-controlled media outlets produced propaganda presenting black South Africans as inferior and an imminent threat to national stability, arguing why it was necessary for Apartheid laws. Strict censorship rules suppressed anti-apartheid voices and restricted the spread of information that may provoke opposition to the institutional framework. In 1969, the apartheid regime appointed the 'Meyer Commission' to investigate the debacle of television and whether it was necessary for it to be whether it should be available to the public.⁴⁰ There were contending arguments within the commission on how television could affect the ideology and ethnic relations within the state. The ruling National Party often used ideology as an excuse for restricting television because they assumed the medium would undermine Christian values, ethnic identities, and the ‘South African way of life’; racial segregation.⁴¹

However, the National Party had a shift in their position after it understood the value of television. The National Party recognized that television could virtually work in their favour, by upholding their ideology by portraying issues and events in

³⁸ Ibid., 7

³⁹ Ibid., 7

⁴⁰ Bevan, C. “*Putting up Screens: A History of Television in South Africa*”, 22

⁴¹ Ibid., 29

order to maintain the status quo.⁴² Similar to press media and art, television can tell a story and depict a picture.

In conclusion, Gramsci's notions of classist ideological hegemonies and the methods of 'war of position' and 'war of maneuver' provide crucial frameworks for understanding how a dominant ideology is upheld and can become a source of conflict. The ideological hegemony theory, further upheld by Althusser's distinctions *between repressive and ideological state apparatuses*, clarified how state institutions maintain ideologies through coercive and ideological persuasion. Althusser's propositions based upon Antonio's earlier explanations of ideological hegemonies both emphasize the socio-cultural and institutional propagation of hegemonic ideologies, underscore how a dominant class, whether it is based on religion, race or ideology, can be legitimized and rationalize its influence on social norms and values. The illustrative example of apartheid in South Africa exhibited how educational, religious, and media institutions reinforced the prevailing ideology to preserve a racial system, which was the main source of conflict in South Africa until 1994.

1.3 Social Identity Theory

As discussed thus far, conflict stems from a combination of reasons, contrary perspectives of historical narrative, and social, political, and cultural dynamics. To better understand the variation of conflict sources, it is essential to provide a distinction between immediate or proximal and the underlying causes of conflict. A proximate cause can be understood as a specific event that leads to direct military action, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which later invoked the war on 'terror', causing societal and ideological strife. Whereas underlying causes are fundamental and ongoing reasons that generate situations conducive to conflict. To achieve conflict resolution or even management among people who have constant strife, there should be a focus on the socio-psychological reasons for their conflict, as they intertwine with the immediate causes of conflict.

Henri Tajfel and John Turner's Social Identity Theory is a social psychological theory that delves into how individuals form a sense of identity and

⁴² Ibid., 24

assert themselves into a larger group. However, social identity theory is not inherently ideological because it is not specifically tied to a set political or ideological doctrine. The theory does have significant implications for clarifying and analyzing individual ideological behaviors in group formations and interactions. The theoretical framework of Social Identity is that the basis of identity is categories or groups. If it follows that the 'self' is reflexive, it means that the 'self' can change in various ways by relating to other social categories and classifications.⁴³

This section will briefly discuss the key elements of the Social Identity Theory (SIT), such as how individuals categorize themselves and identify themselves. And, then it will compare, the Identity theory and SIT to underscore how individuals are drawn to certain ideological movements. According to the SIT, individuals can derive a sense of belonging and self-esteem by joining nationalist, religious fundamentalist, and political extremist groups. The purpose of this section is to provide a better understanding of the psychological mechanisms behind these sources of conflict.

The scholarly work on the social psychological variable of intergroup relations has focused on various patterns of individual prejudice, which then leads to consequential actions of interpersonal interaction. The two important processes within social identity formation are self-categorization and social comparison; both produce societal consequences.⁴⁴ So, it would be essential to clarify the distinctions between these processes to have a fuller understanding of psychological influences on identity formations. In the post-Cold War era, where an individual is from is inherently more important than the political ideology, they believe in. People are inherently more concerned with what they belong to by aligning themselves with others based on commonalities. This may be because identities pertain to individuals' fundamental demands and values. Social labels can be both inclusive and exclusive, spanning generations or shifting in response to actual or imagined threats or even using group identity markers like race and religion for personal gain.

⁴³ Stets, and Burke., *Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory*, 224

⁴⁴ Stets, and Burke., *Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory*, 225

It can be a fair assumption that social identity comparison may result in in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. Individuals pursue to enhance their self-esteem because their perceptions enhance their perception of their group as superior. The main cognitive processes in social identity theory are self-categorization and the frequently associated depersonalization (seeing oneself as a member of the group rather than as a distinct individual), whereas the main cognitive process in identity theory is self-verification (affirming one's own meanings in the context).⁴⁵ The core concept within social identity theory and the processes it describes is that it creates the psychology of 'us' vs. 'them.' This is a very critical aspect in conflict; whether it is ideological, territorial, or ethnic, there often is a differentiator between 'us' and 'them.' The process in which these distinctions are formed primarily falls within the social identity formation process. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, many people felt pride in resisting Soviet dominance in 1948 and creating a unique political and economic system.⁴⁶ However, as the domestic political situation deteriorated in the late 1980s – early 1990s, the former 'Yugoslavs' felt more attached to their regional ethnicities and religions as they began to consider it more important for their individual security. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was due to a combination of socio-political and economic reasons, though the changes in social identification consciousness were a fundamental fault line for the conflicts.

Indeed, the social identity theory underscores the importance of collectivist frameworks in understanding the psychology of the 'individual' and its belonging to a group. But what are the psychological drivers of self-identification that can lead to conflict? For instance, differing religious identities and institutions, integrations, and actions based upon the traditions of their faith have been considered the cause of conflict in North Ireland.⁴⁷ Through this framework of 'us' vs. 'them,' the conflict in Northern Ireland has been described as a persistent conflict of politics of memory by remembering certain myths and traditions of the 1690 Battle of the Boyne victory by

⁴⁵ Eagly., and Gary., *Bridging Social Psychologies: An Introduction.*, 316

⁴⁶ Maisano, Chris. "When Tito Turned to the West." <https://jacobin.com/2023/03/socialist-yugoslavia-tito-soviet-union-nato-imperialism-non-alignment-independence>.

⁴⁷ SZCZECIŃSKA-MUSIELAK, E., *Social Conflict Theory in Studying the Conflict in Northern Ireland*. 122

the Protestants to which they recount the myths of oppression and victimhood by the Catholics.⁴⁸

Alice Eagly and Gary Alan Fine explain the process of bridging and dividing social psychologies:

Unlike ingroup favoritism, however, status beliefs involve consensual evaluations of worth shared by both the advantaged and disadvantaged. This distinction involves a basic tension between status characteristic theories and social categorization theories; for ingroup/outgroup distinctions to occur and prejudice to develop, members of different social categories—different statuses—must develop divergent, rather than consensual, conceptions of worth.⁴⁹

What this infers to the understanding of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ psychology formation is that the basis of social categorization begins with self-worth. Thus, it follows that once individuals prioritize their self-worth, they associate ‘worthiness’ with values, especially as a distinction marker. Values can thus play a significant role in such confrontations when nations, groups, and individuals claim that their way of life and political-economic system is just and superior to that of other states, groups, and individuals. Since values are frequently viewed as an integral component of an individual's identity, their challenges are frequently interpreted as a danger to identity. Therefore, values shifting causes people and groups to respond defensively because they believe changing their values will be necessary to resolve the issue. As previously mentioned, in-group and out-group psychology often leads to discrimination and prejudice.⁵⁰ These variables can lead to societal strife and, eventually, conflict.

⁴⁸ Ibid.,122

⁴⁹ Eagly., and Gary., *Bridging Social Psychologies: An Introduction.*, 345

⁵⁰ Stets, and Burke., *Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory.*, 225

CHAPTER II

2. Territory

Territorial ideas have long played a crucial role in the conduct of war. Throughout history, the concept of territory has been intrinsically linked to war and conflict. From ancient civilizations to modern nation-states, the desire to control and expand territory has served as a driving force behind military campaigns. The origins of territorial ideas in the context of warfare can be traced back to the earliest human civilizations. These early societies relied on territorial control for survival and resources. Territorial disputes and conquests were often the catalysts for conflicts, as tribes and civilizations fought to secure their land and resources. With the establishment of nation-states, territorial ideas became even more pronounced. Nations began to view territorial expansion as a symbol of power and prestige.

Territory could be understood as an object in the sense of its physical geographical coordinates or geographical markers such as rivers and mountains.⁵¹ However, for territories to have meaning, societies must think of them in value and then act upon these thoughts.⁵² Hence, territory is what states and societies make of them. For the study of conflict, *territorial ideas* have historically been argued as the focal point of war.

The acquisition of new territories through colonization and conquest became a common practice as empires sought to extend their influence and control over larger areas. The implications of *territorial ideas* for war are far-reaching. Territorial claims have the potential to ignite conflicts and escalate tensions between nations. They can serve as a rallying point for mobilizing support and generating violence in pursuit of political objectives. Territorial disputes have been one of the main causes of conflicts throughout history, leading to devastating wars with widespread destruction. This section will briefly discuss the Indivisible Territory Theory and Irredentism theory, to underscore how and when state actors engage in conflict over disputed territory.

⁵¹ Kadercan, B., *Shifting grounds: The social origins of territorial conflict.*,15

⁵² *Ibid.*, 15

2.1 Indivisible Territory Theory:

Territorial control has been a central issue in explaining the escalation and onset of wars. Many conflicts throughout history have revolved around combatants vying for control over specific territories.

Territorial characteristics influence the development and resolution of conflicts. Whether a region is incapable of being divided or can be divided impacts the type of peace that ensues after a conflict. Armed conflicts related to land are a major factor in worldwide violence and devastation, and this pattern seems to be on the rise. The idea of the territory being indivisible pertains to a specific geographic area or land that cannot be easily split or divided without leading to major issues or conflicts. Territories that cannot be divided are frequently linked to areas with great symbolic, cultural, or strategic importance.

Stacie Goddard is a scholar who specifically addresses the concept of indivisibility of territory by focusing on the social constructs of conflict, as well as the rhetoric used by states to frame territorial disputes. To begin, she explains that indivisibility is not rigid because, throughout time, different political actors have chosen whether a certain territory is divisible or not.⁵³ For instance, contemporary Israeli politicians vow to claim Jerusalem as its eternal and undivided capital, even though earlier leaders were able to divide the Holy City among religious lines.

So, Goddard's claims are that indivisibility is ascribed to factors that are not directly connected to the issue, such as commitment or prestige over the 'other.'⁵⁴ The principle of theory is that claims over a territory are a constructed idea, that is used to influence various forms of conflict due to its social construct nature.⁵⁵

Goddard defines the issue of indivisibility of actors who represent an issue, in this case territory, who eliminate any possibility of division which reduces opportunities of bargaining and cooperation to 0.⁵⁶ Bargaining failures inevitably

⁵³ Goddard, S., *Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy.*, 36

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 36

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 36

⁵⁶ Goddard, S., *Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy.*, 36

cause irreconcilable differences between actors who assert claims of territory. However, the bargaining failures are upheld by both contenders because of the symbolic value they arguably create. One may ask, why a territory cannot be divided? Logically speaking, territory can absolutely be divided in infinite ways as there are no physical barriers to doing so. In fact, territories are what states and their societies make of them.⁵⁷ Burak Kadercan discusses that ‘Germany-as-territory’ has gone through extreme transformations due to significant changes of ideational and political constructs.⁵⁸ Essentially, throughout history, there are wide variations of ideas about what constitutes a territory; these ideas are not limited to Germany as almost all states have gained or lost territories for a variety of reasons such as state dissolutions, losing a war, secessionist movements, etc..... But the focus of *territorial ideas* is not the consequences of what objectively occurs to the territory, but rather how state elites and society perceive space, history, and politics. Their collective ideology and actions thereafter are what can lead to a territory being their primary concern of identity. In many cases, it should not even be a primary concern; for instance, a state with dire living conditions, a poor economy, and a lack of infrastructure should be focused on improving these conditions, but *territorial ideas* can surpass those concerns and lead to primacy in their political movements of acquiring or defending the symbolism of territory.

Therefore, the questions are who exacerbates *territorial ideas* and what are its implications for the study of conflict. Goddard answers the mentioned questions by asserting that indivisibility is constructed through the legitimization theory. Her examinations provide a framework for how territories can be framed as non-negotiable due to social constructs, legal frameworks, and identity politics. Her theoretical explanation of *indivisibility* revolves around the legitimization of relativity because it is shaped by prevailing social and cultural institutions. Firstly, she explains the use of legitimization strategies to accept rational and rhetoric, such as historical inhabitation; who was there first? ⁵⁹ Secondly, she asserts that actors may even signify the cultural achievements of their predominant group in that given

⁵⁷ Kadercan, B., *Shifting grounds: The social origins of territorial conflict.*, 2

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-3

⁵⁹ Goddard, S., *Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy.*, 40

territory to assert legitimacy.⁶⁰ For example, Benjamin Netanyahu had often denied the existence of the Palestinian people by asserting that before the creation of modern Israel, the historic land was a "barren mess."⁶¹ In addition to his historical narrative, he continues to add that since the inception of modern Israel, the Jewish state has been able to revitalize the land and allow for democracy to prosper.⁶² In other words, he attributes the historical claim of Jews inhabiting the territory alongside the socio-cultural developments of Israel's Jewish society as a legitimate claim to the land contested by Palestinians.

Furthermore, historically, religious institutions have been able to legitimize territorial claims. This is an intertwinement of ideology and territory as the interplay of both their symbols may be used by actors to legitimize conflict. Although most modern states do not use religious claims to take over land, there have been cases where territory was fought over under historical claims of its religious value. A clear example of this is the Battle of Kosovo Polje, where Ottomans violently expanded their territory against Christian Orthodox Serbians.⁶³ The Serbian Struggle against the Ottomans underscored the Serbian determination for independence and the preservation of cultural Orthodox Christian heritage.⁶⁴ Thus, the Kosovo territory remains a contemporary area of conflict, as 'legitimate' claims of Serbians who regard it as an integral religious historical part of their historical nations, which is contested by ethnic Albanians, who are also indigenous to the land.⁶⁵ The conflictual territorial struggle between the two actors not only stems from ideological beliefs but moreover because they perceive that territory as indivisible. Both actors symbolize the territory of Kosovo as a crucial matter of their national integrity.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 40

⁶¹ Staff, The New Arab. "Netanyahu Denies Palestinians Exist in Jordan Peterson Talk." <https://www.newarab.com/news/netanyahu-denies-palestinians-exist-jordan-peterson-talk>.

⁶² Alterman, O., *Analysis: Netanyahu's Argument That Could Boomerang in Int'l Courts*. <https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/1670528159-analysis-netanyahu-s-argument-that-could-boomerang-in-int-l-courts>.

⁶³ Khong, A., *The Field of Blackbirds: Balkan History*. <https://www.youngpioneertours.com/the-field-of-blackbirds/>.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Khong, A., *The Field of Blackbirds: Balkan History*. <https://www.youngpioneertours.com/the-field-of-blackbirds/>.

In contrast to Goddard's analysis of indivisibility as a construct of political and cultural narrative, Ron Hassner brings attention to the intrinsic indivisibility of territories due to their sacred significance. He asserts that despite the prevalence of conflict over sacred space, and their destructive consequences, the causes and characteristics over sacred space remain understudied.⁶⁶ Additionally, he claims that sacred sites provide resources for political mobilization, which raises the question of how and why sacred places have a high probability for mobilization.⁶⁷ Therefore, Goddard's framework is beneficial for a broader and more fluid explanation of territorial disputes, whereas Hassner's claims are particularly valuable for understanding the ideological significance of sacred space and the opportunity it provides for actors to manipulate mobilization. Despite having varying approaches to the significance of the ideology of territory, they both question why disputes over spaces cannot be resolved by dividing or sharing the space.

Why is dividing or sharing a territory, whether it is over ideology or ethnicity, so difficult to achieve? Hassner argues that 'a good' or 'issue' is perceived as indivisible under three conditions: i) unambiguous boundaries, ii) perfectly cohesive, and iii) cannot be substituted or exchanged.⁶⁸ A fitting illustration of the sacred indivisible territory is the 464-year-old Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India, because it highlights *indivisibility* caused by religious, territorial significance.

The focal point of the territorial dispute between Muslim and Hindu organizations was the latter contended that a Hindu temple once existed in Ayodha until it was torn down by Mughal King Barbar in 1528 A.D, who built the Babri Mosque in its place.⁶⁹ The significance of the Babri Mosque and the narratives constructed around it has caused tremendous impediments to secularism in India. In contrast to the West, where the phrase 'secularism' refers to the division of church (*religion*) and state, in India, it denotes the equality of all religions under the law.⁷⁰ Thus, the Babri Mosque (*territory*) became the focal point in broader struggle

⁶⁶ Hassner, R., *To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility.*, 3

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 3

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 8

⁶⁹ Ramachandran, S., *Hindutva Violence in India: Trends and Implications.*, 16

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 19

between secularism and religion (*ideology*) in India. But is it the history of the location that creates this dispute, or are there actors who can further exacerbate the issue?

James Fearon explains that rational leaders may be unable to achieve a mutually preferred negotiation settlement because of *private information* of actual capabilities and *incentives to misrepresent* such information.⁷¹ The tragic events of December 6, 1992, when a 300,000-strong Hindu nationalist mob destroyed the Babri mosque, caused widespread intercommunal violence in India and left 1,700 people dead and 5,500 wounded.⁷² The mosque's demolition highlights the determination and commitment of Hindu nationalists, even though it worsened communal relations and undermined Indian secularism. Both Hindu nationalist and Muslim parties may have over-symbolized the significance of the Babri site to mobilize their respective supporters and bolster their negotiation positions.

This begs the question of how the sacred dispute was deemed 'unnegotiable' and why were there actions pursued of demolition. Logically, actors could have called for the rebuilding of a Hindu temple in the area. However, the symbolic action of demolishing the mosque and rationalizing violence underscored the attitude of revenge against the narrative of King Babri's actions centuries before. The common denominator of the Babri dilemma and indivisibility are the social constructs actors believe and pursue, which over time leads to conflict over the objective territory. It is not solely the territory but rather a combination of rationalities because negotiations and legal rulings of the symbolic territory fail to satisfy both parties since the underlying issue is seen as non-negotiable by each side.

Moreover, to think of indivisibility as an issue of substance that cannot be divided rather than an issue that can lead to non-negotiable terms is a shortcoming mentioned by theorists because it impedes conflict resolution.⁷³ In spite of many

⁷¹ Fearon, J., *Rationalist Explanations for War.*, 381

⁷² Thakur, R., *Ayodhya and the Politics of India's Secularism: A Double-Standards Discourse.*, 645

⁷³ Hassner, R., *To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility.*, 10

authors arguing that indivisibility is a creation of actors involved in disputes, Hassner highlights that this may be a shortcoming, as all ideas are not always 'top-down'.⁷⁴

For instance, when Hindu Nationalist mobs destroyed the Babri mosque⁷⁵, it would be short-sighted to claim that it was Hindu elite actors that sanctioned its demolition. Ideas of indivisibility were also prevalent among the civil society, and it is known that during the partition of India, Hindu and Muslim communities had stringent relations, not because of the Babri mosque, but for a multitude of reasons such as post-colonial power-sharing, and state building. Furthermore, the assumption that only state actors create constant indivisible issues does not allow for us to identify indivisible territorial issues because they would not have existed prior to the intervention of state actors.⁷⁶ In other words, civil societies can also be an actors in creating indivisibility; even though it may they may not have the same power of legitimizing indivisibility, they can construct the narratives which can then be instrumentalized by state actors.

2.2 Irredentism Theory

Objectively, territory means nothing until people value it and act on it.⁷⁷ A territory might be of no interest until scientist reveals that it has minerals of economic value, to which nearby populations may begin to assert their claim over it. Or, until archaeologist reveal that there are some ancient artifacts that could be of value or prestige, which can lead the nearby population to suddenly be more inclined to assert their claims of said territory. But what happens when a territory is of historiographical value? In other words, what happens when there is oral or written history of territory to which the subjects of that history are no longer the legal owners of the territory? For instance, if an individual were to lose or to be robbed of a sentimental valuable item, such as a family heirloom, they would most likely use significant effort and resources to regain what they lost. The individual would use such effort simply not because of the economic value of the said item but rather the

⁷⁴ Ibid., 10

⁷⁵ Thakur, R., *Ayodhya and the Politics of India's Secularism: A Double-Standards Discourse.*, 645

⁷⁶ Hassner, R., *To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility.*, 10

⁷⁷ Kadercan, B., *Shifting grounds: The social origins of territorial conflict.*, 15

sentimental history the item has in the individual's memory. The same logic can be applied to claims of 'lost' or 'stolen' territory. Many authors have discussed sources of territorial conflict through the lens of '*Irrendta*' or the Irredentism theory.

To begin with, 'Irredentism' derives from the Italian word *irredenta*, which translates as unredeemed.⁷⁸ Following Italy's unification in 1870 and the acquisition of the Papal states, the Austrian Empire still controlled small pockets of ethnically Italian territory, to be specific: Trieste, Istria, Trentino, and South Tirol, to which the 'irredentist' laid claims.⁷⁹ The term was coined to explain other phenomena of political mobilization and ambitions of restoring land due to ethnic and cultural notions. Thus, this section will analyze the idea of history, culture, and land being of significant value for nation-building.

There are two commonly agreed motivations for a state to pursue irredentism: history and ethnicity. Although, scholars disagree on whether both variables are necessary for true irredentism or if one is sufficient. As there are varying opinions on what is classified as necessary for irredentism, this chapter will briefly discuss both historical and ethno-demographic variables to later underscore the case of the study.

Christopher Hale and David Siroky proposed three hypotheses on which variation of ethno-demographics and ethnic discrimination can increase the likelihood of irredentist claims.

H1a. Ethnically homogeneous states are more likely to pursue irredentism than ethnically heterogeneous states.

H1b: Ethnically homogeneous enclaves are more likely targets of irredentism than ethnically heterogeneous enclaves.

H1c. Irredentist states are more likely to pursue enclaves where co-ethnics experience more ethnic discrimination.⁸⁰

Another dimension of irredentism that has been discussed is whether material gain can play a factor in pursuing land claims. Scholars who pursue economic motivations of irredentism often tie their analysis within a *realpolitik* framework. The notion follows that some state actors can pursue land claims to expand their

⁷⁸ Reference, Oxford., *Irredentism*

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰Siroky, D., and C, Hale., *Inside Irredentism: A Global Empirical Analysis.*, 119, 119

population to expand their economy. For example, the Leviathan equilibrium model highlights that rulers can behave like monopolies by maximizing their revenue by attaining more nations to subjugate them to taxes.⁸¹ But, this proposition may not sufficiently explain why many states have pursued ‘unredeemed’ territories. Alberto Alesina rebuts this notion by illustrating that even though dictators and emperors prefer larger empires because they can extract larger sums of rent or taxes from larger populations, they often face a trade-off between size and heterogeneity.⁸²

As a result, when territorial size increases and the populations also become further heterogenized, the likelihood of discontent from the population can further rise, leading to a potential insurrection. Hence, the claim that irredentist actions are more influenced by economic factors would not be a viable explanation, as world history shows empires that expand their means often sabotage themselves.

Moreover, some studies have suggested that examining regime types could also be beneficial in explaining why a state would uphold irredentism. One may assume that a democracy would want to annex a territory to expand democratic ideology. However, this would be an unconvincing argument as democracies are more responsive to diverse preferences since rulers have an electorate and must provide citizens with more public goods and services to retain power.⁸³ As mentioned above, expanding territory does not equate to expanding ideology or power, matter of fact, it could lead to the opposite of that.

The concept of Irredentism is highly intertwined with ethnicity, as the host state asserts claims over territory because of its akin inhabitants. And, discussed above the minority group in the neighbouring country would have to be in a situation where they are being discriminated. The emotions of a minority ethnic group can be influenced by various factors, such as the historical relations and their political representation with the host state.

However, beyond any grievances and demands for political and social justice, the likelihood of conflict is influence by the power balance of the ethnic kin group in

⁸¹ Alesina, 306

⁸² Alesina, 306

⁸³ Siroky, D., and C. Hale., *Inside Irredentism: A Global Empirical Analysis.*, 119

the host state.⁸⁴ The relations between size and available resource are critical for the prosperity of irredentist movements. Most scholars agree as to what can initiate irredentist movement to escalate violence; increase of ethnic kin strength. In sum, their studies highlight two key aspects of irredentist functionalities: 1) as the ethnic-kin group's relative power increases in the host state, the risk for internal conflict rises, but could face limitations, such as continuity of resources, and 2) as the ethnic-kin group's demographic weight increases there will be a weakening effect on the conflict's prosperity.⁸⁵ Interestingly, as the ethnic-group population increases mobilization efforts become hindered because the larger amount of people, the more diverse opinions there are. For instance, the larger ethnic kin might have internal debates on whether it is worth engaging in conflict.

2.3 Illustration of Sentimental Irredentism

Kyriacos Tsolainos, Former Premier of Greece Secretary, published a short academic article on the rationale of Greek irredentism in the Asia minor. His arguments were mixture of sentimental political memory and claims 'lost' territories:

Now, that was our position in Turkey, especially in connection with Asia Minor. That country was the cradle of Greek civilization, namely, of our Western civilization. Ages, hundreds of years before civilization reached its apogee in Athens, it had flourished in Asia Minor. There, in that country, the Greeks lived happily and progressed. It was their own home. Then the Turks came and subjugated us. We lost our churches, our schools, our homes and lived as slaves. But we never lost our national consciousness, our religion, and the desire to liberate ourselves was supreme in our hearts.⁸⁶

In short, the concept of Irredentism is highly intertwined with ethnicity, as the host state asserts claims over territory because of its akin inhabitants. And, as discussed above the minority group in the neighbouring country would have to be in a situation where they are being discriminated. The emotions of a minority ethnic group can be influenced by various factors, such as the historical relations and their political representation with the host state.

⁸⁴ Goemans, H., and K., Schultz. *The Politics of Territorial Claims: A Geospatial Approach Applied to Africa*, 35

⁸⁵ Ibid., 47

⁸⁶ Tsolainos, Kyriakos P. "Greek Irredentism." 160

CHAPTER III

3. Ethnicity

Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group, historical, or ideological differences. The exacerbating factors for ethnic conflict are multifaceted and have been re-occurring throughout human history. Factors such as immigration, mobility, identity displacement, and the maintenance of cultural differences also play a significant role in exacerbating ethnic conflicts. The annexation of culturally or linguistically diverse people into bigger colonial nations has caused many countries to have a turbulent state-building process because of the conflictual relations amongst different nations. Furthermore, the psychology of violence during and after ethnic conflict makes it self-reinforcing because physical threat and trauma increase hostility and prejudice.

High-intensity conflict or violence can be understood as decision makers of at least one party perceiving an actual attack or a serious threat, including the use of armed force, to a value defined by them as essential, and deciding to resist using all their means at their disposal. The psychology inflicted by violence makes conflict self-reinforcing. According to the terror management theory, physical threat increases hostility and prejudice, violence further increases threat perception, generates desires for revenge, and discredits moderation. But why do people act on the psychology of violence? And what are the ethnic implications on the psychology of violence? Firstly, it is necessary to understand how 'ethnicities' are framed and defined. Secondly, it is essential to how they are constructed to become politically valuable. There are many explanations for the role of ethnic political behavior, which either understates or overstates its value.⁸⁷ There are variants of theories that explain why individuals organize themselves according to ethnicity, such as instrumentalist and constructivist approaches. Regardless of the differences between their theoretical approaches, which will be discussed throughout this chapter, they both share one common psychological element: ethnicity provides individuals with a sense of belonging.

⁸⁷ Kafsir, N., *Explaining Ethnic Political Participation*, 365

The psychology of the group is the primary focus of the study of ethnic conflict because it is groups of people who are often mobilized and susceptible to the rationalization of ethnic conflict. The key element is that the social status and history of the group play into the creation of inferiority and superiority complexes. How social statuses are created has long been argued between Marxist and Liberal Modernization theories. Despite their fundamental differences, their concepts of ethnicity are not thoroughly defined. Nelson Kafsir asserts that it is essential that ethnic identity be understood as fluid and intermittent, which is why it is one of many political identities that could motivate political action.⁸⁸

Constructivism emphasizes ethnicity as a social construct, emphasizing the role of social interactions, cultural practices, and past occurrences in producing ethnic identities. It accepts primordial ties but argues that they are understood within particular social circumstances rather than being predetermined. Instrumentalism, on the other hand, views ethnic identities as strategic instruments used by people or organizations to achieve certain objectives, such as political mobilization or resource distribution. It emphasizes the instrumental reasoning that drives ethnic identity adoption, implying that people or elites use ethnicity for their own benefit. Both theories provide useful insights into the fluidity and strategic character of ethnicity in societies, providing nuanced reflections on the processes of ethnic identity construction and mobilization.

This chapter will analyse how ethnicities are constructed while providing an illustration of how ethnic conflicts were based on historical symbolic narratives. Then, it will provide instrumentalist explanations of ethnicity and how ethnic conflicts have been fought due to economic or resource interests. In sum, this chapter will analyze the role of political elites and state policies in shaping ethnic identities and conflicts. By integrating these perspectives, a comprehensive insight into the multifaceted nature of ethnic conflict will be achieved.

⁸⁸ Kafsir, N., *Explaining Ethnic Political Participation*, 365

3.1 Symbolic Politics

To begin with, constructivism is a social science that postulates social phenomena such as identities and relationships, which are 'constructed' through a historical process through cultural norms and social interactions. A key element of constructivist theoretical frameworks is that they argue that ethnicity is not innate, unlike the largely disproven primordial theory. The scholarly interest in ethnicity is that it increasingly became the source of many conflicts in the post-Cold War. Especially in authoritarian post-colonial states, to note a few of the afflicted states: Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Rwanda. Ethnic differences co-relating with animosity between groups appear to be a plausible argument, particularly in newly democratized nations, where authoritarian regimes effectively suppress political dissidence, invoking collective dissatisfaction.

This allows us to ask what the co-relations there are between political dissatisfaction (historical or ongoing) and ethnicity. In a constructivist framework, ethnicity is, to a certain extent, fluid, although the set possibilities for an actor are finite.⁸⁹ There have been several attempts to put forward an integrated theory of ethnic conflict. Donald Horowitz argues that ethnicity is socially constructed that is based on communities of individual, historical, cultural, and ancestral roots, though he expands his argument by highlighting that ethnicity is continually reshaped by social, political, and economic factors.⁹⁰ The shifts of ethnic groups and their social status can potentially explain the roots of ethnic conflict. For instance, ethnic conflict does not inherently have to be directly caused by inter-group differences or historical feuds but rather by a collective fear of the future.

The idea of ethnicity can revolve around rigid psychological aspects, and members of a given ethnic group feel a deep-seated sense of belonging and solidarity. Even if an ethnic group shares a similar genealogy to another ethnic group, perhaps even a common history, and akin cultures, the psychological aspect of the ethnicity leads members to have an in-and-out group mentality. The key aspect of ethnic

⁸⁹ Thomson, C. *Instrumental and Constructivist Conceptualizations of Ethnicity*, 68

⁹⁰ Horowitz, D. *Ethnic groups in conflict*." 52-3

grouping is its essential psychological bond, and the minimal probing members do of where the psychological bond even derives from.

Symbolic politics has been argued by various scholars as a profound influence on the psychological bond of ethnicity because it utilizes cultural symbols, historical narratives, and performative politics as a way of appealing to stimulate an intrinsic deep sense of group identity and solidarity. Stuart Kaufman's symbolic politics theory is one of the main contenders of rational choice theories, for explaining the root causes of ethnic conflict. According to his model, critical sources of extremist ethnic violence are group myths, which legitimize hostility, fear of group extinction, and prejudiced political mobilization.⁹¹ The co-relation between the drive for ethnic violence and political symbols are irrational determinants and emotions invoked upon the group. Furthermore, symbolic politics arguments assert their individual choices emotionally between competing values and leaders by corresponding their choices to the most expressive symbol presented to them.⁹² So, the development of collective emotions can be one of the bases of an ethnic identity because symbolic politics expresses a common history, common fear, and common indignation, forging a strong identity amongst those who share those common points.

But how does the development of symbolic politics lead to violence? Symbolic politics are a part of our daily lives, from party symbols to political rallies, media, and even civic studies in secondary schools. The literature on ethno-politics and ethnic conflict suggests that there are four master drivers of ethnic violence, especially regarding different variations in social status and ethnic groups. The four widely accepted master drivers of ethnic violence are 1) emotions (fear, hatred), 2) tangible interest/greed, 3) opportunity/feasibility (attaining state power), and 4) capability.⁹³ The listed 'master' drivers of ethnic conflict are not exclusive and can mutually influence one another. For instance, historical grievances can intensify an ethnic group's perception of injustice and 'eternal' drive for retribution, while tangible interest can lead to economic competition amongst ethnic groups, which can also fuel resentment and tensions due to perceptions of economic injustices.

⁹¹ Kaufman, *Symbolic Politics*, 47

⁹² *Ibid.*, 52

⁹³ Tang, *The Onset of Ethnic War: A General Theory*, 266

Shiping Tang explains that ethnic conflicts are predominately associated with the territory (secessionist movements, autonomy politics), domination or total 'annihilation' of another group, competition for access to business, and control over natural resources.⁹⁴ Thus, tangible interests and the fear of the 'other' can inherently cause one ethnic group to begin preparing for an offense or even to mobilize defense measures because of a perceived threat from the 'other.' The key element here is that emotions play a critical role in influencing the decision-making of ethnic groups, such as fear, anger, and resentment.

So, why are emotions, myths, and symbols more successful in explaining ethnic conflicts? According to Kaufman's findings, rationalist models, which explain ethnic conflict models because of information failures and commitment problems, are irrelevant and insufficient in explaining ethnic conflict.⁹⁵ He tested the case of Rwanda's genocide and Sudan's civil war to examine which model would better explain the initiation of the conflict sufficiently. To be concise, I will solely focus on the Rwandan illustration, as there were several ethnic conflicts that occurred prior to the widely known genocide.

Rwanda's case is peculiar as two conflicting ethnic groups, the Hutus and Tutsis, have a long history of co-existence as both societies had integrated on profound levels and share common faith, cultures, and language. Thus, unlike many ethnic conflicts, the distinction of 'us vs them' was embedded in socio-psychological foundations rather than distinct differences such as different religions or languages. In fact, there is minimal scholarly agreement on the pre-colonial nature between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa groupings found in Rwanda.

Peter Uvin questions whether these groups are indeed ethnic groups, or if they are socio-economic divisions, or even social castes.⁹⁶

Some authors suggest that by the 19th century hundreds of years of cohabitation and intermarriage had produced an "integrated" social system wherein the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were largely occupationally defined:

⁹⁴ Tang, *The Onset of Ethnic War: A General Theory*, 267

⁹⁵ Kaufman, *Symbolic Politics*, 47-48

⁹⁶ Uvin, Peter. "Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda", 92

whoever acquired a sizable herd of cattle was called Tutsi and was highly considered.⁹⁷

The historical context is important to model where socio-psychological strife could stem from. As previously mentioned, symbols and myths of ethnicity could legitimize hostility and fear, although, with the lack of Hutu and Tutsi's clear distinction of differences and history of strife, it becomes difficult to comprehend how co-existing groups acted violently on prejudices. In the post-World War II period, as many African nations gained their independence, their political elites faced several challenges of state-building, especially due to arbitrary colonial state boundaries. As Horowitz notes, during the colonial period in Asia and Africa, territorial boundaries became larger. Simultaneously, many sub-group amalgamations took place, often with groups who were unfamiliar with each other.⁹⁸ The shifts from colonial rule and the question of which grouping of political elites would rule surely exacerbated civil conflicts across the continent, such as the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), the Congo Crisis (1960-1965), and the Cameroonian Civil War (1955-1964). These conflicts were a combination of ethnic and territorial disputes embedded in a struggle for political power in newly formed states.

Rwanda's revolution against Belgian colonial powers culminated in its independence in 1962, and like other newly independent African nations, they also faced the who should rule question as well. In Rwanda's case, there was a shift in power from a Tutsi king and elite, who cooperated with colonial powers, to an independent government led by the Hutu majority.⁹⁹

Following Rwanda's independence and its transition from Tutsi indirect control towards Hutu elite dominance, prejudices about the Tutsi minority community grew stronger. The 'twin' strategies for state-building of the use of force and the quest for legitimization were implemented negatively against the Tutsis by both post-independence regimes: the first Republic (1962-1973) under Kayibanda and the sec-

⁹⁷ Ibid., 92

⁹⁸ Horowitz, Donald L. "*Ethnic groups in conflict*." 66

⁹⁹ Kaufman, *Symbolic Politics*, 69

ond Republic (1973-1994) under General Habyarimana.¹⁰⁰ Firstly, the Kayibanda regime imprisoned, exiled, or killed previous Tutsi powerholders regime, Tutsi politicians, and even opposition Hutu politicians.¹⁰¹ Secondly, the subsequent Republic was equally authoritarian as it killed many previous power holders of the first republic and repressed any dissent.¹⁰²

It is reasonable to speculate that the Hutu elite disseminated anti-Tutsi rhetoric and policies with the goal of capitalizing on collective fears about the Hutu's future, thus extending their own control. Both regimes implemented discourses of repressive legitimization, the 'social revolution' and the 'development' argument. The former was an ideology that propagated that Rwanda belonged to the Hutu, who were subjugated by Tutsi elites and colonial rule, to which the Hutu had to mobilize a popular revolution against minority rule.¹⁰³ Whereas the latter argument presented the idea that the Hutu majority government's primary objective was to pursue economic development for the underdeveloped masses (Hutus).¹⁰⁴

Thus, the state's perspective was that economic engagement should fit within the state's framework to achieve its objectives. In other words, the state's intrusive mechanisms were legitimized since both ideologies held that building Rwanda was a collective effort for the masses.

According to Kaufman's symbolic theory, there are three preconditions for ethnic wars are necessary:

1. Widespread group myths exist on both sides that explicitly justify hostility towards, or the need to dominate, the ethnic adversary.
2. Fear of group extinction is strong on both sides at the time violence breaks out.
3. Both sides have a territorial base and the opportunity to mobilize.¹⁰⁵

The Hutus had been psychologically conditioned to consider Tutsis as 'traitors'. These legitimized concepts led to a consensus among young Hutus that Tutsis were

¹⁰⁰ Uvin, Peter. *"Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda"*, 97-98

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 98

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 98

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 98

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 99

¹⁰⁵ Kaufman, *Symbolic Politics*, 58

an alien population that may threaten Hutu prosperity. Nevertheless, the legitimized theories were able to influence the emotions of the Hutus, both with fear and anger, as their underdevelopment and colonial trauma were deflected on the Tutsis.

In short, the symbolic theory which falls into constructivist framework provides a refined understanding of ethnic identity and conflict, especially regarding how political entrepreneurs or elites can manipulate ethnic identities to retain power. For example, the Rwanda illustration highlighted that creating fearful and emotional narratives on social and historical process of an ethnic group can legitimize ethnic strife. Additionally, the significance of emotions, myths, and symbolic politics reiterated as the key mechanisms to uphold psychological rationale which inherently could lead extreme in-group and out-group hostility. Hence, this brief analysis underscored the limitations of rationalist IR theories by highlighting that socio-psychological factors are embedded in ethnic conflict, indicating that it is not merely driven by political elites. Essentially, both the people and political elites need to be in agreeance with the in-group narratives to pursue conflict.

Chapter 4. Ogaden Case Study

4. Introduction

Ethiopia and Somalia have a long historical bond, which can be traced back to the relationship between the Abyssinian Christian Orthodox Empire and the various Somali Sultanates, such as the Adal and Ajuran medieval Sultanates. Throughout time, people from both nations have engaged in trade, inter-marriage, and sharing customs because of important historical regional trade routes. The Abyssinian (Ethiopian Highlands) Empire and Somali Sultanes have had instances of cooperation, but just like any neighbouring empires in history, they have also engaged in conflict. The strides for regional dominance, by warlords, tribal chiefs, emperors, and emirs are ingrained in both the nation's history. The Horn of Africa is often noted with conflict, famines, and religious extremism because for almost 80 years the region has suffered from one or more of those crises. The research done on the Horn of Africa, and its extensive list of conflict often highlights the weaknesses of governance and post-colonial influences on the region. Although, further and deeper research should be done on pinpointing and measuring the sources of conflict, that causes continual strife which seems to have no viable end.

Thus, this case study of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, which is inhabited by predominately by ethnic-Somalis, can provide an historical and international relations theoretical explanations, as to where this conflict began and what led for the continual confrontations between historical archenemies. As discussed, throughout this thesis, this case study will provide first a detailed historical background of the Ogaden region and the impact of British and Italian colonial legacies. Secondly, it will examine the ideological divide between Ethiopian centralism and Somali aspirations. Thirdly, a detailed analysis of the territorial invasion of the Ogaden led by Siad Barre's regime because of the 'Greater Somali Republic' vision will be discussed in relation to ideology and ethnicity. Fourthly, it will explore the ethnic dynamics in Ogaden, including the role of Somali clan dynamics between ethnic Somalis on both sides of the border and the impact of Ethiopian Christian Orthodox superiority. This case study will explain the impact of natural resources discoveries and examine whether this has any influence of the mentioned sources of conflict. Lastly, it will

provide an overview of the current state of conflict in the Ogaden and provide prospects for conflict resolution and sustainable peace. This case study seeks to uncover the complexities behind the Ogaden conflict by examining its ideological, territorial, and ethnic aspects, providing valuable insights for addressing and resolving similar conflicts on a global scale.

4.1 Historical Background

The historical background of the Ogaden region is critical for constructing the analysis of the several conflicts driven by ideological, territorial, and ethnic factors. To begin, the Ogaden region located in the eastern part of what-is-now Ethiopia, has a rich history of clan-based communities such as the Issaq, and the Ogadenis dating back centuries. During the pre-colonial era, the Somali clans maintained a socio-political structure based on kinship, and clan alliances leading their traditional pastoralist lifestyle.

Clan alliances were a fundamental, arguably still are, form of governance in Somali civil society. As the average clan contained about 100,000 people, all bonded through paternity, the clans were responsible for the widowed, sick, and orphaned in their group.¹⁰⁶ Land was also divided according to clans, for instance, for settled farmers the field only belonged to members of that clan, whereas, for the nomads it meant that they could only wander to a certain route.¹⁰⁷ Then, clanship was the centralized system of community-building, to which members adhered to their clan leaders guidance, and allegiance. There is little written history as to what the people's developments were in the region, although it is known that they accepted Islam earlier on.

On the other hand, there has been a lot of historical texts preserved from Ethiopian rulers from the highlands, who as early in the Axumite empire made vague inscriptional references on attempts of reaching the area.¹⁰⁸ The medieval rulers of Ethiopia made several attempts to extend their sphere of control in the Ogaden re-

¹⁰⁶ Woods, H., and G, Woods., *The horn of Africa: Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti*. 44

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 44-45

¹⁰⁸ Eshete, T., *TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE INCORPORATION OF THE OGADEN: 1887-1935*, 70

gion, though their success was limited. Several factors such as the establishment of a new capital (*Gonder*) further north in the highlands, the medieval events of intra-feudal wars (*Zemene Mesafint*), and invasion of Ahmed Gragne, (Imam of the Adal Sultanate), all played a role to their failures of attaining the Ogaden region earlier on.

In the 1800s, the Ogaden region was neither *terra nullis*, nor was it under Ethiopian territory. But, by the late 1880s, as European colonial powers scrambled for Africa mission was expanding, the modernist Emperor Menelik II, sought to also his land claims to further protect his growing empire. The historiography of Emperor Menelik II's territorial expansion campaign, by annexing adjacent kingdoms, is key to understanding the formation of Ethiopia's modern state. Menelik's territorial expansions from the 1880s to the early 1900s were legitimized under the notion of 're-unifying' lost territories from the Orthodox Christian empire in the aftermath of Oromo expansions during the 16th-17th century.¹⁰⁹ The strategies and outcomes of Menelik of his conquests developed Ethiopia's contemporary ethnic relations and political hierarchy.

The *Agar Maqnat* from 1887-1897 (Cultivation Campaigns) took two distinct forms, indirect colonization and forced colonization.¹¹⁰ In areas such as Wollega and Jimma, where there was minimal local resistance, the socio-political arrangements were kept, and a Ras (duke) would be appointed as a vessel to oversee the newly conquered territory.¹¹¹ In *the Arsi, Wolaita, Kaffa, and Harrar* kingdoms, where there were resilient populations, Menelik outmanoeuvred them and imposed the *naftgnya* system. The word *naftgnya* means 'bearer of the gun', in Amharic and signifies the dominance of the imperial Amhara and Tigray culture. The system Menelik imposed was to send armed imperial settlers to annexed territories and provide them with large swaths of land, which made them relatively wealthy compared to the local population. Northern highland societies where the old Ethiopian core was built incorporated citizens as peasants from tiny and non-representative groups.¹¹² The relocation of imperial settlers formed a new dual society: the conqueror and the con-

¹⁰⁹ Bereketab, R., *Historical Sociology of State Formation in the Horn of Africa: Genesis, Trajectories, Processes, Routes, & Consequences.*, 41

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 41

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 41-42

¹¹² Clapham, C., *The Structure of Regional Conflict in Northern Ethiopia.* 245

quered. Northern highland societies where the old Ethiopian core was built incorporated citizens as peasants from tiny and non-representative groups.¹¹³

The source of attraction for the Ogaden region for Menelik primarily for three reasons:

1. The trade routes passing through it connected Harar coastal ports of Zeila and Berbera.
2. The livestock potential.
3. the political point of view, controlling the Ogaden would enhance Menelik's position in his dealings with neighbouring powers.¹¹⁴

Hence, annexing the Ogaden provided the Ethiopian empire with a hegemony of control in the region, while also providing a territorial shield from potential invaders.

After Italy's defeat at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, the Ethiopian Empire was given legitimate control over the territories it had controlled prior to the colonial invasion. Therefore, all the territories Menelik had acquired during the *Agar Maqnat* was official recognized by international power. Although, this inherently meant that the Somali populations that had inhabited the area were now subjugated by the Ethiopian empire. In short, the final expansions of Ethiopian Empire's territory in the Ogaden at the end of 19th century would later be the disputed focal point of subsequent regimes throughout the 20th century.

The events that occurred between 1903-1933 in the Ogaden entailed serious implication for Ethiopian Empire. As the empire solidified its imperial control by taxation and establishing Christian settlements, neighbouring colonial powers perceived its actions as threat. The interwar period between was characterized by financial difficulties, shifts in government, and changes in society. Facism was on the rise in Italy, Germany, and Japan as they pursued aggressive foreign policies. Italy, in contrast to other major nations, did not possess a vast colonial empire and its new fascist ruler, Benito Mussolini, sought to conquer the only independent Empire in Africa, Ethiopia. The Italian fascists sought revenge for their defeat in 1896, and who

¹¹³ Ibid., 245

¹¹⁴ Eshete, T., *TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE INCORPORATION OF THE OGADEN: 1887-1935*, 71

had effectively colonized most of the Somali coastline territories perceived the Ethiopian annexation of the Ogaden as a threat.¹¹⁵

The mixture of Italy's revengeful and colonial aspiration culminated in the *Walwal* incident on December 5th, 1934, where Ethiopian and Italian colonial troops engaged in military confrontation. *Walwal* is a small town located in Ogaden where Italian colonial troops demarcated their colonial border with Ethiopian settlers. Prior to the incident both Ethiopian and Italian powers were amassing troops on the loosely demarcated border between Italian Somalia and Ethiopia. In fact, the sporadic clashes between Italian colonial troops and Ethiopian settlers preceding the *Walwal* incident were of graver nature, in terms of the intensity of fighting, though the *Walwal* incident received international recognition because it was Benito Mussolini's rationale for invading Ethiopia, causing the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.¹¹⁶

The end of World War II marked a new era of global governance and economic institutions. The shift in global politics caused several implications on territorial annexation. Thus, throughout 1950s was the beginning of political and economic change for Africa, as many colonies were able to secure their independence. Ethiopia having been liberated in 1941 by a coalition of indigenous guerrilla fighters and allied forces was able to begin their reconstruction phase earlier than Somalia which secured its independence in 1960.

4.2 Origins and development of Somali nationalism in the 20th century

Somali nationalism, like most forms of nationalism, calls for the unification of all Somali clans because they share a common ethnicity, language, culture, and history. After the end of World War II, Italian Somali territories were united with British Somali territories in the north since Italian fascist were ultimately defeated. But the Somali peoples did not gain immediate independence like their Ethiopian counterparts, instead they were put under British military administration. The origin of Somali nationalism has its roots in various sultanates that ruled prior to European colonization, although contemporary Somali nationalism was initiated by the Somali

¹¹⁵ Eshete, T., *TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE INCORPORATION OF THE OGADEN: 1887-1935.*, 83

¹¹⁶ Henze, P. *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*, 215

Youth League which was founded in 1947.¹¹⁷ The Somali Youth League the first prominent formal political organisation in Somalia initially had a four-point programme.

- 1) To unite all Somalis all permanently and the Youth especially with the consequent repudiation of all harmful prejudices including tribal/clan distinctions.
- 2) To educate the youth in the ways of modern civilisation by means of schools, cultural, activities and propaganda.
- 3) To assist in eliminating by constitutional and legal means, any existing or future solution which might be prejudicial to the interest of the Somalis.
- 4) To develop a Somali language and to help use the writing known Ismaniya.¹¹⁸

This well formulated political agenda can be understood as the first modern legitimization of the Somali identity. The basis of their manifestation was multifaceted, as it created a social identity based on the ideology that there was indeed a pan-Somali identity regardless of pre-colonial clan identities.

Additionally, the Somali Youth League political movement highlighted that the pan-Somali identity should be developed to create an independent Somali nation-state. Since, there was never a Somali state prior to colonization, their political manifestation was rather revolutionary both the Somali people and to the region. Hence, the ideology of Somali Nationalism illustrates the concept of civilizations which many scholars agree often has religious and linguistic cohesiveness.¹¹⁹

Despite the stereotypical notions of Somalis and their homogeneity many early scholars often ignored key differences among their clans and variant local customs. Between 1946-1948, the British Military Administration (BMA) supported the Somali Youth League as it sought to establish a stronger native administration. For example, the BMA supported the Somali Youth League by providing their members

¹¹⁷ Sheik-Abdi, A., *Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future.*, 660-661

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 660-661

¹¹⁹ Henderson, E., *Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict*, 319

jobs, so they can attain administrative experience.¹²⁰ Furthermore, there were several contestations on the statehood of Somali peoples, as there was never an official state that governed the people, a decision from the newly formed United Nations was awaited until a decision could be made regarding the issue of state formation.

The aspiration of Somali statehood was almost solidified in 1948, when the allied victors namely Britain, France, the U.S.A and the Soviet Union, commissioned a fact-finding mission to examine the plausibility of creating a sovereign Somali state.¹²¹ To the Somali Youth Leagues' dismay the commission deemed that Somali people were not yet well equipped nor organized adequately, thus the BMA surrendered the Southern territorial ethnic-homelands of Somalis, ironically, to Italy under a U.N Trusteeship Administration, and the Ogaden to Ethiopia.¹²² Despite, the early prospects of Somali sovereignty after the end of WWII, the Somali peoples were still under foreign administration. Although, the key difference was that the Somali political elite were more enlightened than the days of direct colonialism, as the BMA had provided them education. Throughout, the 1950s as many African nations strived for independence, the SYL continued assert their political manifestations for full independence under their ideological framework of pan-Somali nationalism.

4.3 Independence and Concept of Greater Somalia

The developments which lead to the 're-unification' of the British Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Trusteeship Somalia, was through popular negotiations and municipal elections. In 1956, as part of the 'Somalisation' of the civil service, the first legislative assembly was introduced forming a Somali-led government headed by Abdullahi Issa Mohamud.¹²³ And, by 1960, the British Protectorate and Italian Trusteeship with negotiations with Somali civil services leader both in the North and the South, the Republic of Somalia was established. Thus, marking the first time in history the establishment of pan-Somali modern state.

¹²⁰ Woodward, P., and M, Forsyth., *Conflict and peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and its alternatives*. 115

¹²¹ Sheik-Abdi, A., *Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future*., 660-661

¹²² *Ibid.*, 661

¹²³ Lewis, I. M. "Problems in the Development of Modern Leadership and Loyalties in the British Somaliland Protectorate and U.N. Trusteeship Territory of Somalia." 50

The union of the two territories was advantageous for Somali nationalists, as it expanded their territorial authority, control of resources and legitimate recognition by international actors. As mentioned earlier, the most educated and experienced Somalis, were members of the SYL. Since, one of their cores political manifestations was to re-unite all Somali peoples. So, the newly formed state continued to advocate the attain the remaining ‘lost’ Somalis to effectively achieve their earlier stated manifestation.

Furthermore, the notions of extending the Somali State to include French Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Kenya is also seen as consistent with Pan-Africanism, as Pan-Somalism was centred on the idea of self-determination.¹²⁴ The stance of Somalia was supported by a resolution at the African Peoples' Conference in Tunis in 1960 but faced challenges at Pan-African gatherings despite some backing from Ghana and Egypt.¹²⁵ The issues against Pan-Somalism could stem from the reasons that Somali was an inward ideology holding that political manifestation should focus on guarding and developing the Somali identity rather than a progressive Pan-African integration approach. However, the dawn of African independence movements was prioritized on the actual formation of independent African states from colonial powers. So, inherently Somali leaders were able to promote their nationalist ideologies with minimal interference from other emerging African states. Furthermore, the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 provided a charter for the legitimization of African sovereign borders; Art. III. (3) entails the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.¹²⁶ But, the organisation was a novel inception and did not have the economic nor political efficacy to intervene if an African state were to go against the principle of African Unity.

The biggest challenge to the Pan-Somali ideology was the regional hegemonic power, Ethiopia. While Somali elites were negotiating for independence and forming their state, Ethiopia had already undergone various economic and political transformations from its liberation from Italian fascist occupiers in 1941. Ethiopia imple-

¹²⁴ Lewis, I. M. *“The Somali Republic since Independence, 171*

¹²⁵ Lewis, I. M. *“The Somali Republic since Independence, 171*

¹²⁶ OAU Charter Art. III

mented a 5-year plan focused on infrastructure development in 1956, which would become a permanent feature of the imperial development efforts.¹²⁷ For example, the foreign aid per capita, despite its large population, was relatively low compared to other African countries, for the entire decade of the 1960s, Ethiopia had an average per capita aid of 13.80\$, whereas Kenya had an average per capita aid of 56.90\$, and Somalia had a significant per capita aid of 90\$.¹²⁸ Therefore, it was clear that politically and economically, Ethiopia was by far the strongest regional power in the Horn of Africa, and amongst the highest in Africa at the time. The factors of retaining independence during the colonial era, as well as positive international diplomacy with strong actors contributed for Ethiopia's relative success.

Ethiopia's hegemonic status might have infuriated Somali elites, as they still had long road for developing Somalia as a whole. Another aggravating factor was the fact that that the vast territory of Ogaden was still under Ethiopian rule, and was recognized by the UN, offering little room for officially bargaining the territorial acquisition through the UN. Since, the goal of creating a Somali state was complete, the government was in the position of moving forward with their ideological manifestations of governing the remaining 'lost' Somalis under one state. The Republic of Somalia's ambitions were not only ideological in nature, but there were also security and economic implications. The political and economic disparities between Somalia and Ethiopia could also be discerned as one of the fundamental bases of their emphasis on Ogaden.

4.4 Ethiopian Imperial Ideology and Centralist policies.

It is noteworthy, that even though Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, consisting of over 80 ethnicities and large population of Christians and Muslims, throughout the Imperial-era, the state and the church were intertwined. In 1964 Muktal Dahir, one of the leaders of the Ogaden Somalis, who boasted of amassing 12,000 guerrillas stated:

¹²⁷ Henze, P. *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia.*, 270

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 273

My people are under no one 's jurisdiction and take orders from no one but me. We have no intention of observing any cease-fire. Our fight with Ethiopia has nothing to do with Somalia.¹²⁹

Dahir's statement underscored a larger issue of the ideological hegemonies of Imperial Ethiopia. The Northern highland societies (Amhara and Tigrayans), where the Empire core was established, often settled in newly conquered lands such as the Ogaden and would assert their dominance by establishing *Ideological State Apparatuses* (Orthodox Churches).

Some may argue that Shoa Amharas ethnic presence which was the rather dominant ethnicity within the Imperial structure is what could have triggered rebellions in the Europeans periphery. In fact, the issues of the Ogaden were not solely based on ethnicity as some may suggest. According to histories voiced by current political elites in the Ogaden region, the early clan leaders of Ogaden submitted to Ethiopian authorities on their own transactional terms as long as the centre of the Ethiopian Empire did not interfere with local authorities the question of sovereignty would not be an issue.¹³⁰

The common phrase: *Ushada nin aad ka qaadan karta loo dhiibtaa* ("The staff of authority is given to a man from whom you can take it away").¹³¹ This local saying is a key indicator of the larger ideology of the Ogadenis; it was better to retain some autonomy from the Ethiopian, whom they could put up a fair fight against, rather than a European colonial power who would further subjugating the population and disturb the local customs. To the Ogadenis dismay their 'transactional' based allegiance was destroyed in 1963 as the Imperial core pursued to rigorous taxation campaign to support its industrial development programs.

Ethiopia's imperial territorial expansion thought the 20th Century was primarily driven by a centralist ideology deeply rooted in Ethiopian Orthodox Christian-

¹²⁹ Times, NewYork. "*Somali Guerrilla Chief Says He'll Ignore a Truce; Ogaden Rebel Says Warriors Obey His Orders Only; Emperor Pardoned Him Once after Sentence to Death.*" <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/28/archives/somali-guerrilla-chief-says-hell-ignore-a-truce-ogaden-rebel-says.html>.

¹³⁰ Thompson, D., *Capital of the Imperial Borderlands: Urbanism, Markets, and Power on the Ethiopia-British Somaliland Boundary*, 545

¹³¹ Ibid.

ity, a religion heavily practiced by Amharas and Tigrean in the Center and North. As Emperor Haile Selassie consolidated his regime in the centre by diminishing regional governor's powers, promoted cultural assimilation, as many of the Orthodox religious holidays were celebrated on a national level, while other Muslim and traditional faiths did not receive any State recognition.

Walelign Mekonnen, a student activist throughout the 1960s wrote a prominent article named '*On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia*', which would later influence several separatist and ethno-nationalist rebel groups to emerge. What stood out most from his short article was his claim that Ethiopia was not a nation but rather a collection of nations. This was explained in his text:

To be a "genuine Ethiopian" one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity and to wear the Amhara-Tigre *Shamma* (Tradional Clothing) in international conferences. In some cases, to be an "Ethiopian", you will even have to change your name. In short to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an Amhara mask. Start asserting your national identity and you are automatically a tribalist, that is if you are not blessed to be born an Amhara. According to the constitution you will need Amharic to go to school, to get a job, to read books and even to listen to the news on Radio "Ethiopia".¹³²

Hence through 1960s, the Ethiopian Empire would suffer from rebellions in the periphery due to an increasing ideological as well as centralized tax campaigns. The prominent inhabitants of the periphery such as Ogaden, felt that it was unfair not only to have their identity represented within the state's framework but also to be taxed by the centre.

The enlargement of the Imperial centre, both ideologically and ethnically, caused for the first significant rebellion in the Ogaden territory, in 1963. The rebellious movement ties back into the earlier stated quote from Muktal Dahir, where he boasted "Our fight has nothing to with Somalia".¹³³ Therefore, the Rebellious Og-

¹³² Mekonnen, Walelign. 'On the Questions of Nationalities in Ethiopia'

¹³³ Times, NewYork. "Somali Guerrilla Chief Says He'll Ignore a Truce; Ogaden Rebel Says Warriors Obey His Orders Only; Emperor Pardoned Him Once after Sentence to Death." <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/28/archives/somali-guerrilla-chief-says-hell-ignore-a-truce-ogaden-rebel-says.html>.

adeni Movement was set to dismantle Ethiopian Imperial hegemony within its territory and not necessarily to 're-unite' with Somalia.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the symbolic politics theory, ethnic wars can emerge if there are historical myths, fear of group extinction, and if opposing sides have territorial base to mobilize.¹³⁴ The Ogaden rebellion of 1963, had several elements of ethnic and ideological warfare, since the Orthodox Amhara in the centre had little in common with the Muslim Somali periphery. In contrast to the minority Orthodox settlers, the indigenous population was almost entirely Muslim. Additionally, despite local tensions and historical grievances historians assert that the serious insurgency of 1963 would have been unlikely if Somalia had not become independent in 1960.¹³⁵

Somalia as a state, provided more than material support to the rebellious movements in Ogaden, it also indirectly spread ideological aspirations of the two akin ethnicities, living in harmony, and prospering together. Indeed, the material and ideological support would be sufficient for the Ogadeni rebels to mobilize and establish an ethnic based organization called the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF).¹³⁶ This organisation posed a serious threat for the Ethiopian Empire, since the conception of OLF entailed land claims (territory), Somali nationalism (ideology), and showcased preferences of being close with the Republic of Somalia (ethnicity).

As the WSLF rebellious movement continued to sporadically attack Ethiopian posts and local municipal offices, the Empire mobilized provincial police to subdue the insurgency. And, as the sporadic fighting gradually intensified, and it became clear that the provincial police and militias could not contain the revolt, the imperial government declared a state of emergency and called in the National Army.¹³⁷ The Ethiopian Imperial offensive was rather aggressive because the army had far better military equipment than the Ogadeni guerrillas.

¹³⁴ Kaufman, *Symbolic Politics*, 47

¹³⁵ Henze, P. *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia.*, 262

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 262

¹³⁷ De Waal, A., *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia.*, 67

Ethiopian Military tactics subsequently shifted to a pacification strategy, which avoided direct military engagement on the ground. Roads were built across the rebel stronghold with the help of British military engineers.¹³⁸ This, along with mobility restrictions and military monitoring of the lowlands, helped to cut off aid from Somalia.¹³⁹ Air attacks continued, with US technical aid, to intimidate the rebels and destroy their food supply.¹⁴⁰ The last demise WSLF arrived in March 1970, after the Somali government cut off military aid. The tightening circle of government troops assured that they ran out of food supplies.¹⁴¹

In short, the first instance of conflict between Ogaden rebels backed by Somalia and Ethiopia central authorities would be a hallmark event for subsequent territorial conflicts. As, Imperial Ethiopia took severe measures against Ogaden rebels, the central authorities measures demonstrated its severe willingness to escalate hostilities rather than negotiate new terms of alliance. The dynamics of the Imperial aggressive taxation, and ideological hegemony, heavily rooted in Orthodox Christianity, separated the predominately Muslim Ogaden region, from the core of the nation. Muktal Dahir's earlier statements regarding Ogaden autonomy underscored the rebels desire to dismantle Ethiopian Hegemony within its territory. Furthermore, the Imperial aggressive approach, might have been a success at subduing the immediate rebel threat, although its actions gave further pretext for Somali Irredentism.

¹³⁸De Waal, Alexander., *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia*,. 68

¹³⁹ Ibid., 68

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 68

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 68

5.1 Conclusion

The fall of the Imperial centre in 1974, marked significant shifts across Ethiopia, as there previously repressed opposition groups and rebel groups saw an opportunity to pursue their goals. The 3000-year-old Ethiopian Empire was very conservative in its ideological hegemony, apart from the 20th century economic transformations and increasing international diplomacy, the Empire had barely changed the socio-psychological understanding of state formation and opted to keep a feudalistic structure.

Somali President Siad Barre, inspired by the goal of Greater Somalia, launched a full-scale invasion of the Ogaden area on July 23, 1977. This invasion was a deliberate act, taking advantage of Ethiopia's internal instability to retake land and proclaim Somali nationality, driving up what were long-simmering frustrations and ambitions for irredentism. The initial attack was launched in central-southern Ogaden, and the invaders captured Gode and Gabridaharey (key border posts) in less than a week.¹⁴² Half of Ethiopia's Third Division was rendered ineffective, and the Somali army advanced quickly north.¹⁴³ Siad Barre's invasion of the Ogaden was fundamentally different than the previous border skirmishes and meagre support of rebellions within the Ogaden in Ethiopia; he ultimately wanted to annex the region into 'Greater Somalia'.

Since, Ethiopia's centre was in a volatile political situation it follows that its ideological state apparatuses were weakened, especially in the periphery of the nation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, ideological state apparatuses primarily function on ideology, then on repression to enhance its ideology.¹⁴⁴ Ethiopia's centre was going through a turbulent communist revolution supported by the Soviet, and for a centuries old-feudal Christian Empire, the acceptance, and comprehension of the foreign Communist concept was not easily implemented. For the Somali regime, which was a socialist republic perceived the opportunity of a weakening Ethiopia to assert its claim on the Ogaden.

¹⁴² De Waal, Alexander., *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia*,. 75

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 75

¹⁴⁴ Althusser, Louis., *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, 81

The complex invasion of Ogaden, was difficult to understand for many international actors as both states were under the guise of communism. It was to infer that since there were minimal political ideological between the two states, then it should be more flexibility for the two states to make amends for their shared peoples and territories. After all, Ethiopia was changing its ideology towards communism and Somalia's regime was already adhering to socialism, it follows that the two should be able to comprise and cooperate on the disputed territories. But this is not how the two nation's history narratives describe their relationship. The myths behind their nationhood, is entrenched in successive phases of Somali resistance to their Christian highland invaders.¹⁴⁵ In other words, each side waits for the other to weaken to assert its hegemony in the region.

Hence, the Ogaden War (1977-78), became one of the largest interstate interstate wars in modern African history. Both nations rationalized that the war was essential for ideological, territorial, and ethnic integrity. A loss of any of these factors could have potentially led for state collapse or regime change, which neither actor would have accepted. In fact, Somalia's initial victory in the Ogaden was the greatest threat to Ethiopian sovereignty and territorial integrity since Mussolini's invasion in 1935-36.¹⁴⁶ The conflict was immensely significant even for the Cold War superpowers as it caused "seismic" shifts of alliances in the Horn of Africa, with the Soviets turning to support Ethiopian and enabling them to regain control of the Ogaden.¹⁴⁷

By the spring of 1978, the Ethiopian National Army was able to ward of Somali invaders, mostly due to the strategic support from the Soviet military advisors and Cuban militias. Following the defeat, the Ogaden region suffered a massive refugee crisis as nearly a million Ogadenis fled into Somali throughout 1978 and 1979.¹⁴⁸ These outcomes of the intra-state war shaped both Somalia's and Ethiopia's future for the remainder of the 20th century.

¹⁴⁵Hagmann, T. *Beyond Clannishness and Colonialism: Understanding Political Disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991-2004.*, 512

¹⁴⁶ Mekonnen, T. *The Nile Issue and the Somali-Ethiopian Wars (1960s-78)*, 279

¹⁴⁷Lewis, I. M. *The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism.*, 575

¹⁴⁸ Lewis, I.M, *The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism* , 575

Immediately after the war, Ethiopia communist government began to support the Somali National Movement (SNM) an opposition movement against Siad Barre's regime. In result, the SNM waged war against the WSLF, and disrupted Siad Barre's regime within Somali territory.¹⁴⁹ After a final round of fighting between the Ethiopian-backed SNM and regime-backed WSLF, in December 1984, the latter was officially disbanded.¹⁵⁰

Ethiopia's victory in the Ogaden followed by the rebel counter-insurgency caused several implications for Somalia's prosperity. Since, the Ogaden War was immensely popular in Somalia, due to the Pan-Somali nationalism ideology, and because President Barre's public standing was at its peak the unexpected defeat, and subsequent refugee crisis, the nation swiftly fell into widespread national demoralization.¹⁵¹ Additionally, throughout the 1980s, Somalia seen an upsurge of 'clannism' or 'tribalism' as different groups within the nation sought scape goats to explain the 'humiliating' loss.¹⁵² Ironically, what had started off as an irredentist 're-unification', in fact, caused Somalia to be more divided than its history throughout the colonial-era.

The final defeat in the Ogaden essentially meant that 'Pan-Somalism' was a politically unsustainable ideology, which could be noted as the primary source for the downfall of the Somali state. The overall outcome would be that: Somalis were divided by ideology (nationalism vs regionalism), territory (the emergence of Somaliland), and ethnically (further assertions of clan rule rather than central rule)

The Ogaden War ended in a devastating loss for the invading Somali army. The two liberation fronts were also pushed out of the nation. This setback altered the path of Somalia's domestic politics, prompting Siyad Barre to pursue a different strategy to interaction with Ethiopia. As a result, the two sides signed a treaty that, among other things, influenced the former's assistance for the two liberation fronts while also imposing a reciprocal responsibility on Ethiopia. The post-war internal political changes in Somalia, particularly the civil war that ended in the demise of the

¹⁴⁹ De Waal, Alexander., *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* 96

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 96

¹⁵¹ Lewis, I.M, *The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism*, 575

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 575

Siyad Barre dictatorship and the subsequent dissolution of the nation, undermined the irredentist claims and liberation movements.

The role of ideology was Ethiopia's ideological hegemony of Orthodox Christianity which was intertwined with the imperial state. Throughout, most of Ethiopia's history the emperors would wage war on the 'periphery' under the guise of spreading faith. The most notable campaign was during Emperor Menelik II's, cultivation campaign 1887-1897 expanding the Abyssinian border into hinterlands of the Horn of the Africa. As, Abyssinian settlers began dominated the Ogaden region throughout the 20th century, the region would see a rise in Pan-Somali nationalism set to dismantle the Ethiopian centrist hegemony. This would be one of the focal points of the Ethiopian and Ogaden conflict.

The role of territory can be understood two-fold issue; Ethiopia views the Ogaden regions as indivisible while Somalia had believed it was lost territory. As explained throughout Chapter 2, when actors perceive a territory as indivisible then the bargaining is lowed to effectively 0. They believe that the territory is integral to the state, and the loss of territory can inevitably to other integral concessions. On the other hand, Somali nationalism also entailed irredentism, a belief that a territory hosting an akin ethnicity must be redeemed by the larger state. The contrary beliefs on the land lead for two deadly conflicts in the Ogaden which killed over 30,000 people and displaced nearly million. The ideology of the territorial ownership is still unresolved between Ethiopia and Somalia, indicating that further disputes can arise.

The role of ethnicity was one of the most instrumentalized factors in several wars in the Ogaden war, due to the fear of the other and historical myths. These ideas of ethnicity are categorized in symbolic politics, where actors can use the myths, and prejudices, to invoke the emotions of their ethnicity to stride against the other. Ethiopia and Somalia have had centuries long disputes, and surely their modern leaders are aware of these histories. Regardless, if medieval age disputes matter to the peoples living standards or welfare, both sides have shown that instrumentalizing the history of ethnic war has proven as an effective way of political mobilization.

In all, the intricate interplay of ideology, territory, and ethnicity has played a tremendous role most of the Horn of Africa's conflicts. Although, many of the implications of these factors can be bargained to strive for peacebuilding and intra-state cooperation. The future leaders in the region must accept the past faults of history and should begin to develop intra-state integration on the borderlines, to overcome ideological and ethnic hegemonies.

Pledge Of Honesty

“On my honour as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.”

VITA

Kaleb Zewdineh was born in Toronto, Canada on September 11, 1998. Throughout, his childhood he would travel between his ethnic homeland, Ethiopia, and Canada. The stark differences of living conditions between his two ‘homes’ would later inspire him to study politics and governance at Toronto Metropolitan University. Throughout his undergraduate studies, he would receive an opportunity to complete his first internship at the African Union HQ in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The marvels of the African Union would then inspire him to pursue his degree in International Studies. Upon completion of his undergraduate studies, he would go back to Ethiopia in 2021 to better understand the political realities of his nations, so he could best serve his peoples throughout his career. And, by the following year he was admitted to the Diplomatic Academy.

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Chronol-
ogy

- ❖ **1889:** Emperor Menelik II establishes Addis Ababa as his capital and signs the Treaty of Wuchale with Italy, sparking the First Italo-Ethiopian War in 1895-1896
- ❖ **1896** – Ethiopia wins the Battle of Adwa, bringing the First Italo-Ethiopian War to an end.
- ❖ **1923-** Ethiopia became the sole African member of the League of Nations.
- ❖ **1935-1936:** During the Second Italo- Ethiopian War, Italy invaded and occupied the country.
- ❖ **1941:** Allied soldiers, including Ethiopian nationalists, free Ethiopia from Italian domination.
- ❖ **1952:** Ethiopia becomes a member of the UN.
- ❖ **1955:** Emperor Haile Selassie established the Ethiopian and Eritrean Federation
- ❖ **1960:** Somalia gains independence as British Somaliland and Italian Trusteeship form the first Somali Republic
- ❖ **1961:** Eritrea's armed war for independence against Ethiopia begins
- ❖ **1969:** Coup d'état led by General Siad Barre effectively topples the first regime, and he subsequently declares Somalia's Socialist Republic
- ❖ **1974:** Emperor Haile Selassie is deposed in a coup orchestrated by the Derg, a Marxist Leninist military junta.
- ❖ **1977-1978:** Ogaden War with Somalia. Ethiopia wins with support from the Soviet Union and Cuba,
- ❖ **1984-5:** Ethiopia faces a catastrophic famine because of many armed conflicts.

- ❖ **1987:** Civil conflict rages between the Derg administration and several rebel factions, notably the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).


- ❖ **1991:** The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seizes Addis Ababa, and the Derg dictatorship crumbles. Eritrea gains independence.
- ❖ **1991-** Siad Barre flees Somalia after many General wage war against him throughout the nation, causing the long-lasting Somali Civil War.
- ❖ **1994:** A new constitution is enacted, making Ethiopia a federal state.
- ❖ **1998-2000:** Border dispute with Eritrea leads to an armed conflict.

Maps



AGAR MAQNAT (Cultivation Campaigns) 1882-1907

Menelik's first phase of territorial expansions.

Keynote: Shoa was the centre of the Ethiopian Empire during his reign



Menelik's second phase of territorial expansion




Menelik's Final Phase

Africana Italiana Orientale (1936-1941)

Keynotes: The gouvernantes of were based on ethno-religious lines. Central colonial authority based in Scioa. Ethnic groups were divided with disregard to former kingdom alliances. The contemporary territorial contestation of the Ogaden region located in Somalia originates during this period.

The Amara and Scioa gouvernantes become a breeding ground for anti-fascist guerrilla fighters, and their victory gives them impetus to claim themselves as guardians of the Ethiopian empire.



Imperial Ethiopian provinces (1951-1991)

Keynotes: Provinces were governed by the central authority in Shewa; limited autonomy for regional rulers. Provinces were not based on ethnicity, as most provinces were multicultural. Eritrean war of independence commences in 1961, as they were officially annexed by Haile Selassie.

Failed invasion of Siad Barre's socialist Somalia in Ogaden (Hararghe province), in 1977. Ethiopian communist military junta is victorious due to the military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Emergence of ethno-nationalist liberation fronts (see TPLF; OLF) towards the end of the communist regime.



Current Ethiopian Federal Map


Keynote: Eritrea is granted independence after 30-years of warring against central authorities from 1961-1991.

Sidama and *Southwest* are the most recent successful regional referendums. They were formerly a part of the SNNPR



All regions are based on ethnic homelands, despite each region hosting significant populations of minority groups. Ethnic conflicts on the borders of regions, and between minority groups and their rulers of the ethnic homeland.

Former/Current Rebel Group Map



***From the 1960's onward several ethnic/nationalist liberation fronts emerged and contested central authority claim of legitimacy. (SEE. Glossary)**

Dramatis Personae

Menelik II – Emperor of Ethiopia from 1889-1913. Transformed the Ethiopian Empire by

expanding its borders, incorporating a colonial settler system, and maintaining positive external relations with European powers after the Battle of Adwa (1896).

Haile Selassie I – Emperor of Ethiopia from 1930-1974. He was the last emperor, and his

removal from power marked the end of the 3000-year-old Solomonic Dynasty. He furthered the modernization of Ethiopia after the de-occupation from Italian fascist forces. Modernized the educational, economical and infrastructure sectors of the state. But his failure / negligence to

reform land policies would be the catalyst of his downfall.

Mengistu and Geremame Neway: Ethiopian politicians also a part of the aristocracy during Haile Selassie's rule. They are known for the 1960 coup d'état with the goal of removing the emperor from power and enacting land reforms. This was pivotal point for the regime, as previous attempts to de-throne an emperor was for the sake of taking over the empire. But, in the case of 1960 coup d'état, their ambitions were to change land power structures, under the notion of

'Land to the Tiller'.

Walegn Mekonen - Marxist student activist and militant active in the Ethiopian Student

Movement from the mid-1960s until his assassination in 1972. He was the author of the highly influential but contentious article "On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia" published in 1969. Ethnic liberation fronts would cite his article and use it as a guiding policy to form a new

‘equal’ Ethiopia.

Haile Fida – Ethiopian politician who drafted the Program of National Democratic Revolution, a document which emphasized the patriotic motto *Itiopiya Tikdem* ("Ethiopia first"). The military

junta (Derg) used as their guiding ideological principles vision for ‘Revolutionary’ Ethiopia.

Mengistu Hailemariam – A lieutenant Colonel who became leader of communist Ethiopia from 1977-1991. His reign is attributed to the end of feudal rule, widespread political violence, crimes against humanity as well as the famine of 1984

Meles Zewawi – Ethiopian rebel soldier and politician for the TPLF, who led the country from 1991-2012. He was a Marxist-Leninist who firmly believed Ethiopia should be organized under an ethnic-federalist structure. He drew many inspirations from *Walelign Makonnen* earlier works on Nationality and Ethiopia. His rule was marked with economic growth, development of democracy as well as ethnic domination from his ruling party.

Jawar Mohammed – Popular human rights activist, contributed immensely for the Oromo national question. Lead the Oromo protests via a group called Qerro, who blocked government access and services to the largest region in Ethiopia.