

MASTER THESIS | MASTER'S THESIS

Titel | Title

The Development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik
(Host State Policy) in the Second Republic

verfasst von | submitted by

Rafael Konstantin Klausnitzer, LL.M.

angestrebter akademischer Grad | in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S.)

Wien | Vienna, 2024

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt |
Degree programme code as it appears
on the student record sheet:

A 992 940

Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt |
Degree programme as it appears on the
student record sheet:

Internationale Studien / International Studies

Betreut von | Supervisor:

Prof. Markus Kornprobst, M.A., Ph.D.



PLEDGE OF HONESTY

On my honor as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I, Rafael Klausnitzer, do hereby affirm, that I submit this thesis in good faith, having neither received nor given unauthorized assistance on it.

Rafael Konstantin Klausnitzer, LL.M.

June 7, 2024

Abstract

This thesis presents the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik (Host State Policy) in the Second Republic and addresses the question of why it developed the way it did. The research uses a mixed method approach, a descriptive as well as an empirical one. Based on the descriptive part, a conceptual framework of nine key parameters, that shaped the development of Austria's host state policy, is proposed. These parameters are derived from an integrative literature review and then empirically tested by interviewing a panel of experts, evaluated via online questionnaires. The focus of the research is on the overall impact and the change of impact of these parameters over time and how this change influenced the way AASP developed. The thesis divides the development of AASP into four periods to provide a better overview on the development. Two hypotheses are tested: That the changing impact of parameters influences the development of AASP and that the impact of functional parameters increased over time, whereas the impact of normative parameters decreased. Based on the findings the thesis argues that all nine identified parameters had an impact, but that it was the changing impact of certain parameters that had a significant influence on the course of the development of AASP. The results confirm that parameters with a normative character had a stronger influence in the first periods of the development of AASP, while the impact of more functional parameters has increased during the last two periods. The most significant increase in impact could be identified for the parameters 'International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Location' and 'Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria'. Based on its findings the thesis also gives a short outlook on the current and future challenges of AASP.

Abstrakt

Diese Arbeit präsentiert die Entwicklung der österreichischen Amtssitzpolitik in der Zweiten Republik und untersucht ihre Entwicklung und die Faktoren, die diese Entwicklung beeinflusst haben. Die Recherche umfasst sowohl einen deskriptiven als auch einen empirischen Teil. Auf Basis des deskriptiven Teils wird ein Framework bestehend aus neun bedeutenden Parametern präsentiert, die die Entwicklung der Amtssitzpolitik in Österreich geprägt haben. Diese Parameter ergeben sich aus einer Literaturrecherche und werden anschließend durch Interviews mit Expertinnen und Experten in Form von Online-Fragebögen empirisch getestet. Der Fokus dieser Arbeit liegt auf dem generellen Einfluss und der Veränderung des Einflusses dieser Parameter im Laufe der Zeit und wie diese Veränderung die Entwicklung der österreichischen Amtssitzpolitik (AASP) beeinflusst hat. Um einen besseren Überblick zu ermöglichen, wird die Entwicklung der AASP in vier Perioden unterteilt.

Zwei Hypothesen werden getestet: Zum einen, dass der sich verändernde Einfluss der einzelnen Parameter Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklung der AASP hat und zum anderen, dass sich der Einfluss von funktionalen Parametern über die Zeit verstärkte, während jener von normativen Parametern zurückging. Auf Basis der Ergebnisse hält diese Thesen fest, dass alle neun identifizierten Parameter Einfluss hatten, die Entwicklung aber vor allem durch den sich verändernden Einfluss bestimmter Parameter geprägt war. Die Resultate bestätigen, dass Parameter normativen Charakters einen stärkeren Einfluss, während der ersten beiden Perioden der Entwicklung der AASP hatten, während sich die Auswirkung von funktionalen Parametern, während der letzten zwei Perioden verstärkte. Die signifikanteste Zunahme an Einfluss konnten die Parameter „Internationaler Wettbewerb, Public Diplomacy und Attraktivität des Standorts“ und „Wirtschaftliche Vorteile und Mehrwert für Österreich“ verzeichnen. Die Arbeit gibt abschließend auch einen Ausblick auf die aktuellen und künftigen Herausforderungen der AASP.

Contents

List of Tables	VI
List of Abbreviations	VII
 Introduction	 1
 Chapter 1 Theory	 5
1.1. Literature Review	5
1.2. A Conceptual Framework of Parameters of Impact	19
1.2.1. The ‘Security Rationale’	19
1.2.2. International Reputation	21
1.2.3. The Status of Neutrality	24
1.2.4. The Geopolitical Systemic Changes	26
1.2.5. Rule of Law - The Legal Framework	28
1.2.6. Economic Effects and Added Value	29
1.2.7. The Role of Membership in the EU	30
1.2.8. The Role of NGOs and QIOs	32
1.2.9. International Competition	33
1.3. Methodology	35
 Chapter 2 The Four Periods of Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik (Host State Policy)	 41
2.1. Period I (1945 - 1965)	41
2.2. Period II (1965 - 1983)	52
2.2. Period III (1983 - 1995)	58
2.3. Period IV (1995 - Today)	65
 Chapter 3 Empirical Results	 79
3.1. Results of the Expert Interviews	79
3.2. Additional Results	87
 Chapter 4 Analysis, Hypotheses and Research Question	 92
 Conclusion	 98
 Bibliography	 102
 Appendix	 113

List of Tables

1. Expert Responses: Impact of Parameters	80
2. Expert Responses: Change of Impact of Parameters	81
3. The Composite Score of Impact and Change of Impact of Parameters	82
4. Overview: Impact Score, Change Score and Composite Score	88
5. Danger of an Exodus of IOs and QIOs from Vienna	91
6. Responses on the Case of the King Abdullah Center (KAICCID)	92
7. Change Score of Normative Parameters vs. Functional Parameters	97

ABBREVIATIONS

AASP	Austria's Amtssitzpolitik
ASG	Amtssitzgesetz/Host State Law
BMEIA	Bundesministerium für Europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Austria)
BKA	Bundeskanzleramt/ Austrian Federal Chancellery
BKMC	Ban-Ki-Moon Center
CERN	European Organization for Nuclear Research
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COCOM	Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
CS	Composite Score
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EEC	European Economic Community
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/Freedom Party of Austria
FRA	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSP	Host State Policy
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IHS	Institut für Höhere Studien/Institute for Advanced Studies)
IO/s	International Organization/s
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
KAICIID	King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue)
KPÖ	Kommunistische Partei Österreichs
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
N+N	Neutral and Non-aligned
ODIHR	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei/Austrian People's Party
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
QIOs	Quasi-International Organizations
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs/Social Democratic Party of Austria)
TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization)
UN/O	United Nations Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOV	United Nations Office in Vienna
US/A	United States /of America

VCDNP	Vienna Center for Disarmament and non-Proliferation
VIC	Vienna International Center
WACS	Weighted Average Change Score
WAIS	Weighted Average Impact Score
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WWII	Second World War

Introduction

Vienna was the center of European political activity at the time of the Vienna Congress in 1815. After 1945 Austria, now much smaller and politically insignificant, started to position itself again as a bridge builder and hub for international dialogue and a location for international organizations. According to the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this is still one of the key objectives of Austria's foreign policy.¹ Austria and particularly Vienna have become an important center of international organizations and conferences over time. Fifty-two international organizations and institutions have established their headquarters in and around of Vienna including one of the four UN headquarters of the world.² The geopolitical landscape is constantly changing and the competition among states and cities for hosting large international organizations has intensified, presenting a challenge to Austria's position, and requiring a constant evaluation of the strategies and initiatives of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik. Besides its impact on the reputation of a country, hosting international organizations has become an important economic factor, creating added value for the host country.

This thesis presents the development of AASP in the Second Republic, focusing on international organizations (IOs) and quasi-international organizations (QIOs) in Vienna. Based on the research question "Why did Austria's 'Amtssitzpolitik' (Host State Policy) develop the way it did?" the thesis has three main objectives: First, to present the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik (AASP) in the Second Republic. Second, to identify and analyze the key parameters that impacted this development and if and how this impact changed over time. Third, to combine the findings in the literature and reviewed documents with the perspectives of experts and external stakeholders to answer the research question.

To answer the question of why AASP developed the way it did, the thesis focuses, as in a cross-bearing, on three reference points. The first is an integrative review of literature to present a general overview of host state policies of different comparable countries and cities as well as evaluating general parameters that impact the

¹ BMEIA, "We Position Ourselves as International Bridge Builder and as Place for Dialogue," Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs - European & Foreign Policy, accessed April 26, 2024, <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy>.

² BMEIA, International Organisations and Institutions Based in Vienna, March 15, 2023, https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Plakat_Amtssitz_Wien_EN_Web.pdf.

development of AASP. The second reference point is a framework of parameters synthesized from the review of literature. A third important reference point is the opinion of a panel of experts to empirically test and enhance the proposed framework of parameters. The research question as stated, requires both a principled strategic policy approach as well as a practical perspective. With its empirical research of the perspectives of experts, this thesis aims to offer a practical perspective as well.

The theory chapter opens with a review of literature on host state policy in general and of government documents from different countries on their approach to host state policy. This way, Austria's host state policy and its development over time can be put into a broader context to understand the similarities but also the differences and specialties of AASP in the Second Republic. For this general view, the cases of Geneva, The Hague, Brussels as well as Vienna were selected, comparable in size and political systems. Nairobi, as a 'special' case of UN host city will be addressed too.

The second part of the theory chapter makes use of the findings of the literature review on host state policy in general and on the four periods of AASP in particular, to deconstruct the history and elements like turning points and milestones of AASP to achieve a synthesis in the form of a conceptual framework of parameters that influenced the development of AASP. The research applies, as laid out in the third part of the theory chapter, a mixed method approach to propose a conceptual framework of parameters that have an impact on the development of AASP.

Based on this conceptual framework, the thesis empirically tests the impact of these parameters based on the opinions of experts and how this impact changed over time. The panel of 14 experts resembles a mix of academics that contributed literature about the topic, practitioners from Austria's Foreign Service and experts from the City of Vienna. The third part of the theory chapter explains the mixed method approach of the research and the two hypotheses: (H1) The change of impact of the parameters presented in the framework influences the development of AASP. (H2) The impact of functional parameters on AASP increases over time, whereas the impact of normative parameters decreases.

The theory chapter is followed by an in-depth presentation of Austria's historical and current role in being a host state for international organizations (IOs) and quasi-international organizations (QIOs), based on the scholarly debate about its development over time and how this relates to the proposed framework of parameters. To structure the course of developments regarding AASP and connect it with the impact of the

framework of parameters, the thesis divides the development of Austria as a host state for IOs and QIOs and international conferences into four periods:

The First Period (1945-1965), with Austria's efforts to gain international visibility and reintegration into the international community, Austria's State Treaty 1955, and its UN-membership as well as the establishment of the IAEA headquarters in 1957, the first success in attracting an IO headquarter to Vienna. The impact of the Vienna Summit (Kennedy-Khrushchev) in 1961, and the 'coup' to lure the OPEC Headquarters from Geneva to Vienna in 1965 are additional milestones of this first period.

The Second Period (1965-1983), which can be termed the 'Kreisky-Era', presents Austria as a bridge builder during the Cold War, expanding its role by applying an 'active neutrality policy' and attracting more international organizations to Vienna, with the inauguration of the Vienna International Centre (VIC) and the UN headquarters ('UNO-City') in 1979 as a highlight of AASP.

The Third Period (1983-1995) addresses the domestic political debate about Austria's investments in its role as a host state, that led to a referendum against the construction of the Vienna Conference Center. A turning point in this period are the big changes that occurred in the geopolitical landscape: The end of Cold War and the turn from a bilateral to a multilateral perspective leading to a recalibration of the neutrality status. The change in the focus of the international dialogue on critical issues, such as human rights, environment, and security, resulting in the establishment of the OSCE headquarters in Vienna, represents a further milestone in the development of AASP into the next period.

The Fourth Period (1995-Today) is dominated by Austria's membership in the European Union which changed Austria's international position and its foreign policy orientation from a United Nations focus to a more European one, triggering the debate if Austria can still be considered a neutral host or intermediary in global conflicts. Austria's focus on QIOs and international NGOs to further extend the scope of Austria-based headquarters is an issue in this period as well as the debate about the problems with the King Abdullah Center (KAICIID). This fourth period shows a still growing number of headquarters and international offices but also a growing competition from other host states. Consequently, it will be discussed how Austria adapts and extends its legal framework for the hosting of IOs, QIOs and international conferences with a new 'Amtssitzgesetz' (Host State Law). The presentation of the development of AASP over

time follows the timeline of milestones and turning points of AASP in these four periods but also summarizes and integrates themes and concepts across periods and assigns them to the periods in which they either emerged or accumulated to make their influence across periods clear and to support the identification of parameters of impact on AASP and how this impact changed over time.

The results of the expert interviews that were done by online questionnaires are evaluated in chapter 3.1., showing the interrelation of the parameters, their perceived impact as well as the change of impact of each parameter that occurred over time, including the comments of experts on these impacts on AASP.

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the results derived from the evaluation of the parameters of the conceptual framework based on the empirical results and comments of the expert interviews. The data of the empirical findings from the perspectives of experts are presented in detail and possible implications and recommendations on the further development of AASP are discussed. The concluding chapter addresses the motivation and the significance of the research and summarizes the results of the research and the answer to the research question. Finally, it addresses the limitations of the research and delivers an outlook on the future of Austria's role as a location for IOs and QIOs.

Chapter 1

Theory

1.1. Literature Review

In this section literature is reviewed that presents and debates different approaches to host state policy: Firstly, the studies and government documents that focus on the development of host state policy (HSP) in countries and cities comparable to Austria and Vienna. Secondly, literature that presents general aspects of HSP and discusses the important parameters that impact HSP in all host states. By doing so, AASP and its development over time can be put in a broader, global context that helps to understand the similarities, but also the differences and uniqueness of AASP in the Second Republic. From the vast number of different competing host cities, from Nairobi to Bonn and from Budapest to Montreal the focus of this first part will be on Geneva, The Hague, Brussels, and Vienna as these cities and countries are comparable in size and political systems, but the ‘special’ case of Nairobi will be addressed too. As Groen (2016) points out, these, except for Nairobi, are (West)European cities with a proven track record of attracting important IOs and QIOs.³ Looking at the policies of those comparable states and cities, the paper will evaluate how AASP aligns with general standards or practices regarding host state practices or how it differs and for what reason.

1.1.1. The Cases of Geneva, The Hague, Brussels, and Vienna

The Case of Geneva

Even if Vienna set a milestone with the Vienna Congress of 1815 as a place of international negotiation with global significance, it is Switzerland that can refer to the

³ Rosa S. Groen, “The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna,” *Urban Research & Practice* 9, no. 3 (April 27, 2016): 250–74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2016.1174291>, 5.

greatest tradition as a host of international organizations. In 1863 the International Committee of the Red Cross was established and in 1884 the first Geneva Convention was concluded. A few years later, the headquarters of the International Telegraphic Union, now the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) were opened, followed by numerous further organizations.⁴ After the foundation of the United Nations with its headquarters in New York, Geneva became its second headquarters leading to the settlement of UN agencies and other IOs in Switzerland. The Swiss Government mentions

the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1951, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1970 and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 1993.⁵

The Swiss HSP is guided by the perception of the traditional role of the country as a “good power” and having a “good reputation and enhanced visibility on the international stage.”⁶ The aspect, that Switzerland, through its role as host state for IOs, QIOs and NGOs, contributed to “frictionless international relations and the resolution of the greatest challenges of our times” is frequently addressed.⁷ Simultaneously it becomes clear that, besides the enormous relevance for foreign policy, the “considerable economic added value for the region and the entire country” plays an important role too.⁸

In the political debate about Switzerland’s HSP and especially the role of Geneva, the fact of increasing competition is addressed. An argument used in favor of Geneva is the ‘Cluster Effect’ and its synergies. The advantage of already hosting a greater number of IOs at the host location can be a decisive factor⁹ and should be further strengthened. Switzerland considers the role of non-governmental-organizations as important and aims to further support it. Hosting headquarters of international NGOs is considered an incentive for already settled IOs but also for the attraction of additional IOs and QIOs.¹⁰ Neutrality was a significant factor at the beginning of Switzerland’s role as a host state.

⁴ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), “A Host by Tradition,” Host State Switzerland, accessed May 10, 2024, https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/InternationaleOrganisationen/GaststaatSchweiz/Switzerland-Host-State_en.pdf, 6.

⁵ Ibid., 7.

⁶ Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, “Botschaft zu den Massnahmen zur Stärkung der Rolle der Schweiz als Gaststaat 2020–2023,” 2314.

⁷ Ibid., 2319.

⁸ Ibid., 2314.

⁹ Ibid., 2315.

¹⁰ Ibid.

As Schindler (1998) points out “Swiss neutrality enjoyed its highest esteem in the second half of the nineteenth century...permanently neutral states were considered to be islands of peace, entrusted with special functions by the international community.”¹¹ Switzerland very early started to hold conferences and encouraged the establishment of IOs with headquarters in Geneva. Humanitarian issues became more important and in 1863 the Red Cross was founded and one year later the first Geneva Convention was adopted.¹² Schmidl (2001) argues that small and neutral states in general find it „easier to act as ‘honest brokers’ and therefore can play a positive or even crucial role in negotiations.”¹³ Over time, Swiss neutrality has been considered as a stable, self-evident, and unquestioned principle. In the position paper of the Swiss Government the parameter “neutrality” can be found only once, commenting that Switzerland “can offer its position as a neutral space, that promotes discussion beyond political polarization.”¹⁴

Regarding the development of Switzerland’s host state policy and its competitive situation, Groen (2016) states that Switzerland has a complex governance structure involving the Confederation, the Canton, and the City of Geneva. The leading entity in maintaining and enhancing the relationships with IOs and QIOs is the MFA of Switzerland. After the WTO considered to relocate to Bonn, several initiatives have been implemented to deliver assistance and help through supportive agencies and foundations.¹⁵ With the Host State Act of 2008 the support and privileges for IOs and QIOs were extended, but the Swiss Government decided to focus more on providing optimal conditions for existing IOs and QIOs than on trying to attract new ones. “We do not want to attract everything. We want Geneva to be strong and efficient. We don’t want Geneva to be big.”¹⁶ Despite these efforts and initiatives Geneva lost some departments of IOs to other cities and therefore is aware of the growing competition and the resources and policy enhancements needed in this ongoing challenge.

¹¹ Dietrich Schindler, “Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and in the International Community,” *American University International Law Review* 14, no. 1 (1998): 155–70, 156.

¹² Dietrich Schindler, “Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and in the International Community,” 156.

¹³ Erwin A. Schmidl, “Small States and International Operations,” *Small States and Alliances*, 2001, 85–88, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-13000-1_8, 73.

¹⁴ Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, “Botschaft zu den Massnahmen zur Stärkung der Rolle der Schweiz als Gaststaat 2020–2023,” 2346.

¹⁵ Rosa S. Groen, “The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna,” 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

The Case of The Hague

Another European competitor for IOs and QIOs are the Netherlands, namely The Hague. This city is hosting almost 40 intergovernmental organizations and numerous institutions that provide “good service” to the international community by working for “a more just, secure and peaceful” world.¹⁷ Among the most important organizations hosted are the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Court (ICC), Europol as well as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and many others such as the European Medicine Agency (EMA) and the European Space Agency.¹⁸ The Dutch HSP aims to provide “good service” and present itself as a “good power” in accordance with Article 90 of the Dutch constitution which postulates that “the Government shall promote the development of the international legal order.” Being a good host for IOs is one way to comply with this constitutional objective.¹⁹

In her research of the development of Dutch HSP Groen (2016) states, that the economic benefits and the added value for The Hague and the Netherlands is recognized, but as there was critique about the support provided to IOs in the late 1990s, reforms were introduced in 2005 and efforts were made by enhancing the service, branding campaigns and direct support for IOs and QIOs, involving different layers of governmental and external stakeholder networks.²⁰ In 2012 the number of hosted organizations significantly increased, delivering substantial economic benefits for the region. But, quoting officials of the Dutch MFA, Groen concludes that compared to places like Geneva, the effectiveness of The Hague’s policy network as well as its funding options are not at par with places like Geneva, which have more resources to support IOs and QIOs.²¹

The Case of Brussels

When the European Economic Community was established in the late 1950s, Brussels was among several candidates to host the new institution, but no initial consensus could be reached. Due to the principle of rotating presidency and the alphabetical order, it was

¹⁷ Government of the Netherlands, “The Netherlands as Host Country for International Organisations,” Government.nl, October 17, 2019, <https://www.government.nl/topics/international-organisations/netherlands-as-host-country>.

¹⁸ Government of the Netherlands, “The Netherlands as Host Country for International Organisations.”

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Rosa S. Groen, “The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna,” 6-7.

²¹ Ibid., 8-9.

Belgium that had to organize the first months and the staff was already waiting to know where they will be located. Victor Laroc, the Belgian Foreign Minister acted proactively and secured the necessary office space for a temporary solution.²² As a next step the Berlaymont building, an impressive infrastructure for the EEC, was provided and a temporary solution became permanent, turning into a snowballing effect, that attracted more and more EU institutions. Another early milestone for Belgium's HSP was the move of the NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels in June 1966.²³ At that time an Interministerial Committee for Host Nation Policy (CIPS) was established to ensure liaison with NATO, later its mission was extended to all IOs hosted in Belgium, including the European Union. Today, more than 60 international organizations with 40.000 employees and their families are hosted in Belgium, mainly in Brussels. The Belgian Host Nation Policy (HNP), defined as "the policy and procedures applying to IO's having HQ's or a representation... in Belgium," is explained in detail on the website of the Interministerial Committee for Host Nation Policy. The positive development is attributed to its "proactive and strategic policy that aims at strengthening the attractive position of Belgium as host country for IOs," and its adherence to the rule of law by providing "proper implementation of privileges and immunities" through seat agreements and treaties.²⁴ The Belgian Government also addresses the factor of international reputation and 'good power' by mentioning that "a major factor in establishing this reputation is the successful implementation of a comprehensive host nation policy."²⁵ There is a clear dedication to accept the challenge of global competition among host states by stating the high interest in acquiring new IOs that want to set up headquarters in Belgium and that interest also includes "other actors such as multinational companies, lobby groups, NGOs and the international press."²⁶ The Dutch HSP signals flexibility in the amount of support by indicating the willingness to "grant additional facilities in the framework of the hosting policy... to be 'tailor-made' to each individual case."²⁷ Among the competing host cities in Europe,

²² Phillipe Van Parijs, "Why Did Brussels Become the Capital of Europe? Because Belgium Starts with Letter b!" The Brussels Times, September 7, 2014, <https://www.brusselstimes.com/29273/why-did-brussels-become-the-capital-of-europe-because-belgium-starts-with-letter-b>.

²³ Interministerial Committee for Host Nation Policy, "The History," Kingdom of Belgium - Federal Public Service, January 13, 2022, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/interministerial-committee-host-nation-policy/short-history>.

²⁴ Interministerial Committee for Host Nation Policy, "General Information Note," Kingdom of Belgium - Federal Public Service, January 13, 2022, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/interministerial-committee-host-nation-policy/general-information-note>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Interministerial Committee for Host Nation Policy, "General Information Note."

²⁷ Ibid.

Brussels is the one that benefited most from the geopolitical systemic changes brought by the European Union and its extensions since the times of the EEC.

The Case of Vienna

There is not a great deal of literature that directly deals with the development of AASP since 1945, but there are valuable contributions to the special aspects of its development in numerous academic papers and sources that deal with the history of Austria's foreign policy in the Second Republic in general and with Vienna's development as an international host city in particular. In his paper about Austria's Amtssitzpolitik, Troy (2023) defines AASP as "the strategic effort of a state to attract international governmental and nongovernmental organizations to establish headquarters in its territory and to serve as a location for international conferences."²⁸ This strategic effort has become part of Austria's foreign policy in the Second Republic. It contains, as he notes, normative aspects, but there is also a functional necessity to obtain international visibility and standing. From a normative point of view, it supports peaceful coexistence and the solution of conflicts, providing what is termed "good services". At the same time AASP is driven by functional objectives such as securing Austria's sovereignty and generating economic benefits and added value for the host country.²⁹ Troy (2023) points to the fact that Austria strengthens its attractiveness as a host state through diplomatic efforts but also through a legal framework that provides benefits and privileges to IOs and QIOs. The recent legislation has reinforced Austria's commitment to meet the growing competition among host states to maintain and attract IOs and QIOs.³⁰ He argues that AASP initially aimed at providing security, sovereignty, and international reputation, but the focus has changed to parameters such as the economic benefits and added value for Austria and the contribution to multilateralism and dialogue.³¹

Comparing the competition between Geneva, The Hague and Vienna, Groen (2016) mentions the early start and growth of Austria as a host state and bridge builder emphasizing the milestones of the establishment of the IAEA headquarters as well as that of OPEC and UNIDO in the 1960s. The construction of the VIC is seen as the significant step in the development as an international hub. She adds that AASP is

²⁸ Jodok Troy, "Amtssitzpolitik," 241.

²⁹ Ibid., 242.

³⁰ Ibid., 245.

³¹ Ibid., 250.

supported by favorable conditions such as charging only one Austrian Schilling (0.07 €) per year for a 99-year lease for the VIC to attract more IOs.³² This policy significantly contributed to the relocation of agencies and offices from New York and Geneva to Vienna. From the late 1990s into the 2000s, a lack of interest of the Austrian Government in foreign policy is noted. Frey (2011) describes this phase by mentioning the complaints of the US embassy in Vienna through confidential channels, about the disinterest in foreign policy by the Austrian Government.³³

After an Ernst & Young research paper was published in 2008, according to Groen (2016), discussions about the legal framework for IOs and QIOs concerning the privileges and conditions started that finally culminated in a new host state law improving the conditions for IOs and QIOs in Austria.³⁴ Despite some ongoing challenges, Austria is enhancing its role as host for IOs and QIOs through improving infrastructure, favorable leasing terms, and a competitive legal framework. The substantial changes in Austria's legal framework regarding IOs and QIOs are an important parameter of influence on the development of AASP as the example of SE4All shows. The combination of certain tax exemptions, the improvement of the legal statuses including exemption from work permits for NGO employees, and direct funding were decisive for having the SE4All headquarters in Vienna.³⁵ Troy (2023) agrees that the Amtssitzgesetz of 2021 supports AASP and strengthens Vienna's role as international hub but he points to the challenges such as the growing international competition for seats, public disinterest and budget limitations, and argues that the current state of AASP, although still proclaimed as a central aim of Austria's foreign policy may be seen as "a pale reflection of its peak" as it changed from a pure necessity to be considered "a tradition" of Austria's foreign policy, thus potentially requiring a further evaluation of its strategic approach.³⁶ In its latest foreign policy report (Außen- und Europapolitischer Bericht 2022), the Austrian Government states that, for Austria, a modern and future-oriented host state policy is a key aspect of its foreign policy and Vienna therefore actively promoted as a host city for international organizations and

³² Rosa S. Groen, "The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna," 11.

³³ Eric Frey, "Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site," 158.

³⁴ Rosa S. Groen, "The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva, and Vienna," 16.

³⁵ Rosa S. Groen, *"Walking the Extra Mile": How Governance Networks Attract International Organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)* (The Hague, the Netherlands: Eleven, 2022), 126-130.

³⁶ Jodok Troy, "Amtssitzpolitik," 252.

conferences. The focus is on transforming Vienna into a hub for security and sustainability with special focus on energy, sustainable development, and climate diplomacy. The impact of the economic benefits and added value for Austria is explicitly mentioned as well as the important role of the legal framework to enhance Austria's attractiveness. The role of NGOs and civil society is emphasized by stating that the presence of numerous NGOs, some with the status of a QIO, are an important contribution to Vienna's international community.³⁷

1.1.2. The Special Case of Nairobi and the Global South

Although not belonging to the traditional host cities for IOs the case of Nairobi becoming the fourth global UN headquarters should nevertheless be addressed. It illustrates the influence of the change in geopolitical systems as the decision to headquarter 'The United Nations Environment Programme' (UNEP) in Nairobi, done in 1972 and realized in 1996, can be regarded as a strategic push to increase the influence and representation of developing states within the UN, with the aim to correct the imbalance that UN headquarters were only located in Western countries. Kenya had launched a campaign that was well-prepared and built on the experiences of previous, unsuccessful bids. Having lost UNIDO to Vienna in 1966, Kenyan diplomats had learned their lesson.³⁸ As Ivanova (2021) writes, "it was the result of a political calculus that sought to affirm developing countries' stature in global governance."³⁹ At that time developing countries represented the majority of UN member nations providing an advantage in the number of votes. Logistical and operational advantages of other locations like Geneva or New York were put aside as the decision was seen affirming developing countries as equal partners, overturning the established routine to place UN headquarters in the Western hemisphere.⁴⁰ The case of Nairobi as so many others can be taken as a vivid example of how the shift from a bilateral to a multilateral geopolitical system influences the decisions of IOs and in turn impacts the policy of host nations.

³⁷ BMEIA, "Außen- und Europapolitischer Bericht 2022," Parlament Österreich, May 7, 2024, <https://www.parlament.gv.at/gegenstand/XXVII/III/1151>.

³⁸ UNEP, "How Nairobi Came to Host UNEP's Headquarters," News, Stories & Speeches, accessed May 9, 2024, <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/how-nairobi-came-host-uneps-headquarters>.

³⁹ Maria Ivanova, *The Untold Story of the World's Leading Environmental Institution* (The MIT Press, 2021), 54.

⁴⁰ Maria Ivanova, "UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, Location," *Global Environmental Politics* 10, no. 1 (February 2010): 30–59, <https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2010.10.1.30>, 34–36.

1.1.3. Parameters of Influence on Global Host State Policies

The literature that is dealing with the special aspects of HSP in different states and cities as well as the literature that addresses general aspects of HSP provide insights into what parameters can be identified that have an impact on HSP. The hunches on these parameters are presented in the following part of this literature review.

International Competition, Public Diplomacy, and the Attractiveness of Location

Looking at the similarities and differences in the approach of states to HSP, literature hints to the central role of host state competition. With the end of the Cold War and the geopolitical changes that followed, competition among states and cities as a host for international organizations grew year by year. Singapore, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, and Seoul entered the game to challenge established host cities such as Vienna, Bonn, The Hague, and Copenhagen. “The newcomers try to attract international organizations with privileges and financial incentives.”⁴¹ Switzerland implemented a new law (*Gaststaatgesetz*) to prepare Switzerland for this new competition that started to grow in the early 1990s. In its statement about the motives for this legislation, Switzerland underlines the historical importance of hosting international organizations and addresses the change caused by the end of the East-West rivalry and the deregulating effect of globalization that brought an increase in competition by cities like “Bonn, The Hague, and Montreal.”⁴² Interestingly, Vienna was not mentioned, although it had already - together with Geneva - become one of the traditional international meeting places. In the statement explaining the motives of their host state law, the Swiss Government argues that initially multilateral relationships had been dominated by states and intergovernmental organizations, but that the scene now includes non-governmental actors and private sector partnerships. It is also stated that this competition, besides adequate immunities, and privileges secured by headquarters agreements, needs financial contributions, including real estate benefits.⁴³ As Groen (2016) points out, cities that host IOs and QIOs are challenged by a growing number of competing cities. Hosting IOs and QIOs “offers varied opportunities for cities, including significant

⁴¹ Patrick Dümmler and Pascal Lago, “A Magnet for International Organizations,” *Avenir Suisse*, June 28, 2019, <https://www.avenir-suisse.ch/en/a-magnet-for-international-organizations/>.

⁴² EDA, “Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die von der Schweiz als Gaststaat gewährten Vorrechte, Immunitäten und Erleichterungen sowie finanziellen Beiträge.”

⁴³ *Ibid.*

economic advantages and the potential improvement of a city's reputation and public life."⁴⁴ Groen (2016) who has done significant research on successful city diplomacy, argues that "many fundamental changes", including the "changing power relations" create a situation of increasing competition, and host states and cities do not "have a clear picture of the factors that play an important role in the creation of an ideal international and institutional climate."⁴⁵ Based on her research on the role of city diplomacy in attracting IOs, she sees three stages of competition. One is the "relational scope: a city's culture, values, beliefs and identity," the second is the "instrumental scope: A city's political system and policies", and the third is the "discursive scope: access to information, networks, allies."⁴⁶ She points out, that the governmental levels in the policy networks involved in promoting and negotiating the hosting deals are different. In Geneva, the Canton level is in the lead, in The Hague it is the city level whereas in Vienna and Copenhagen both the federal and regional governments cooperate to attract international organizations.⁴⁷ She also looks at the scope of networks and alliances used in the bidding process and concludes that the relational and discursive sets of categories are better equipped to explain the success of city diplomacy through a city's network than the instrumental scope.⁴⁸ Although the research did not show a clear correlation between the composition of the policy networks and the success or failure of bids, she believes that the diversity of the network and the inclusion of IOs and NGOs representatives can be a decisive factor as well as reaching out to the international community and other governmental and non-governmental partners.⁴⁹ External non-governmental actors in these networks, identified in this research, were NGOs, public-private partnerships, private funds, external experts and lobbyists.⁵⁰ An important factor for the attractiveness of a location is the 'Cluster Effect', which works like a magnet for international organizations.⁵¹ A city needs important international organizations to be attractive to other IOs and QIOs. International organizations are working together quite closely. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

⁴⁴ Rosa S. Groen, "The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna," 1.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Rosa S. Groen, "Understanding the Context for Successful City Diplomacy: Attracting International Organisations," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 17, no. 1 (February 24, 2022): 123–37, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-bja10095>, 126-129.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 127.

⁴⁸ Rosa S. Groen, "Understanding the Context for Successful City Diplomacy: Attracting International Organisations," 130.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 129.

⁵¹ Patrick Dümmler and Pascal Lago, "A Magnet for International Organizations."

(FRA) regularly meets with UN agencies such as the UNODC or with different offices of the OSCE like the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) or NGOs.⁵² If there are several IOs and QIOs present in a city, this helps and offers synergies. Dairon and Badache (2021) extend this term of ‘Cluster Effect’ by suggesting the metaphor of an IO-ecosystem that can be seen as the outcome

of an original configuration between actors, issues, and solutions...IOs necessarily share a temporal and spatial proximity with other global governance institutions such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), platforms and diplomatic representations...In a nutshell, an ecosystem constitutes a shared place and tempo for various actors; a unit of time and a unit of space.⁵³

This describes very well how this ‘Cluster Effect’ is generated, which takes time and a special dedication of a city as a whole. In the case of Geneva, Dairon and Badache (2021) speak of “a vocation” of the city to be a host of international organizations.⁵⁴ In the case of Vienna, Troy (2023), as already mentioned, calls it “a tradition.”⁵⁵

Public diplomacy and nation or city branding are considered new tools in the competition between host states and host cities, although there is not enough research available about the correlation of alignment of nation or city branding policies with the respective bid-books and its impact on the success of bids.⁵⁶ IOs influence QIOs, NGOs and other institutions and they, in turn, are influenced by those vice-versa. The discussions and decisions about choosing a headquarters location do not merely remain in the private diplomacy domain; they are also more and more influenced by public diplomacy. Therefore, what Groen (2016) referred to as policy networks⁵⁷ and Zaharna (2011) termed “policy formation network”⁵⁸ might be an interesting aspect that can have an impact on host state competition. He mentions Brian Hocking who called the interdependence of state and non-state actions “catalytic diplomacy” and Shaun Riordan, who named it “dialogue-based public diplomacy”, both describing a

⁵² FRA, “UN, OSCE and Other International Organisations,” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, August 2, 2022, <https://fra.europa.eu/en/cooperation/osce-un-international-organisations>.

⁵³ Emilie Dairon and Fanny Badache, “Understanding International Organizations’ Headquarters as Ecosystems: The Case of Geneva,” *Global Policy* 12, no. S7 (December 2021): 24–33, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12956>, 27.

⁵⁴ Emilie Dairon and Fanny Badache, “Understanding International Organizations’ Headquarters as Ecosystems: The Case of Geneva,” *Global Policy* 12, no. S7 (December 2021): 24–33, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12956>, 30.

⁵⁵ Jodok Troy, “Amtssitzpolitik,” 252.

⁵⁶ Rosa S. Groen, “Understanding the Context for Successful City Diplomacy: Attracting International Organisations,” 128.

⁵⁷ Rosa S. Groen, “The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna,” 3-4.

⁵⁸ R.S. Zaharna, “The Public Diplomacy Challenges of Strategic Stakeholder Engagement,” *Trials of Engagement*, January 1, 2011, 201–29, <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004179400.i-309.52>, 223.

collaborative foreign policy strategy, where the diplomat actor is the “manager, coordinator and integrator.”⁵⁹

The Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarter Agreements

Host states try to convince international organizations to establish their headquarters in the country. States can grant each other privileges and immunities for their diplomats on a quid pro quo basis. But international organizations are not considered the same as states, they cannot grant or withdraw immunity. Still, IOs and their staff enjoy privileges and immunities. Article 105 of the UN Charter formulates:

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.⁶⁰

The UN, a role model for other big IOs, considers these provisions as a ‘conditio sine qua non’ for the fulfillment of its functions and to be able “to operate free from unilateral control by host states.”⁶¹ Article 105 defines the basis for the recognition of the privileges and immunities of international organizations. Thus, enabling IOs to fulfill their functions and not being unilaterally controlled by host countries. The constituent instruments of international organizations like Article 105 of the UN Charter or Article 40 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, express the scope of the immunities and privileges expected. The details of such provisions are laid down in multilateral agreements. One example is the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.⁶²

An important legal instrument on a bilateral basis are headquarters agreements (host agreements) that specify the immunities and privileges granted by the host state. In addition to these headquarters’ agreements, additional agreements may regulate specific situations like those of peacekeepers or conference events.⁶³ The domestic law creates the legal basis for the implementation and the possible scope of headquarters agreements. Examples are the “Bundesgesetz über die von der Schweiz als Gaststaat gewährten Vorrechte, Immunitäten und Erleichterungen sowie finanziellen Beiträge”

⁵⁹ R.S. Zaharna, “The Public Diplomacy Challenges of Strategic Stakeholder Engagement,” 223.

⁶⁰ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, accessed April 24, 2024, https://legal.un.org/repertory/art104_105.shtml.

⁶¹ Martin Faix, “The Law of International Organizations,” Centre for International Humanitarian and Operational Law (CIHOL), accessed April 10, 2024, <https://www.pf.upol.cz/cihol/people/martin-faix/>, 94.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

(Gaststaatgesetz 2006)⁶⁴, the “Gaststaatgesetz für internationale Einrichtungen” in Germany (2019)⁶⁵ and Austria’s “Bundesgesetz zur Stärkung Österreichs als internationaler Amtssitz- und Konferenzstandort” (ASG 2020).⁶⁶

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

Already during the 1960s, the public sphere experienced “new forms of self-organization.”⁶⁷ Amnesty International was established in 1961, and the Austrian chapter in 1970. In Vancouver, Greenpeace was founded in 1971 and Transparency International started in Berlin in 1993. As Plassnik (2013) notes, NGOs in the United States had already positioned themselves through the US Congress, “They drew attention to specific issues and problems and became partners of governments and diplomatic services.”⁶⁸ Throughout the 1970s, large IOs such as the United Nations reacted to this development. In 1979 a “NGO liaison function” at the United Nations Office in Vienna was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In a statement, the UN remarked that they initially only dealt with governments, but they have realized that for maintaining peace and prosperity partnerships with nongovernmental partners are necessary. “In recognition of the important work performed by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the United Nations enshrined in its Charter provisions for consultations and the development of relations with NGOs”.⁶⁹

The Council of Europe adopted in 1986 the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations, which came into force in 1991. In this convention, the Council of Europe and its members acknowledge that NGOs contribute value to the international community, “particularly in the scientific, cultural, charitable, philanthropic, health and

⁶⁴ EDA, “Gaststaatgesetz,” Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA, accessed April 12, 2024, <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/de/home/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/privelegien-und-immunitaeten/gaststaatgesetz.html>.

⁶⁵ Bundesamt für Justiz, “Gaststaatgesetz,” Bundesministerium der Justiz, November 30, 2019, <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gaststg/BJNR192910019.html>.

⁶⁶ BKA, “Bundesgesetz Zur Stärkung Österreichs als Internationaler Amtssitz- und Konferenzstandort (Amtssitzgesetz – ASG),” RIS, accessed April 12, 2024, <https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20011502>.

⁶⁷ Ursula Plassnik, “On the Road to a Modern Identity: Austria’s Foreign Policy Agenda from the Cold War to the European Union,” Essay, in *Austria’s International Position after the End of the Cold War* (New Orleans, USA: UNI Press, 2013), 55–94, 89.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ UNOV, “NGO Liaison Service,” United Nations Office at Vienna, accessed April 26, 2024, https://www.unov.org/unov/en/ngo_liaison_service.html.

education fields.” and therefore contribute to the goals and principles laid down in the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the Council of Europe.⁷⁰

For Borge Brende (2023), President of the World Economic Forum and Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2013 to 2017, this development marked the change from a bilateral geopolitical situation to a multilateral geopolitical world, challenged by economic fragmentation, heightened nuclear risk and climate change. As traditional intergovernmental cooperation declines, the private sector increasingly addresses global challenges. These purpose-driven partnerships within and across borders should be supported. He calls for a focus on “stakeholder geopolitics”, which can transform “competitors for power to collaborators for global stability.”⁷¹

Host states like Switzerland or Austria and others have responded to this increasing importance of cooperation between IOs and NGOs. In the introduction to the Swiss Host State Law, the Swiss Government argues that the structure of multilateral relations has changed from sole states and intergovernmental organizations to new forms of partnerships and that over time, states started to be consulted or even accompanied by representatives of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at international conferences.⁷² Taking this into account, the host state law provides the framework for the Swiss authorities to consider NGOs under certain conditions as “Quasi-International Organizations” and to be able to offer competitive headquarters agreements (see 1.2.9.). The Swiss host state law defines “International Organizations”, “International Institutions” and “Quasi-governmental International Organizations” as categories entitled to privileges and immunity under specific circumstances, the Austrian Host State Law names “International Organizations”, “Other International Institutions”, “International non-governmental organizations” and “Quasi-International Organizations” as categories.⁷³ Austria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has communicated a clear position on QIOs and international NGOs by

⁷⁰ Council of Europe, “The European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non- Governmental Organisations,” Explanatory Report European Treaty Series - No. 124, April 24, 1986, <https://rm.coe.int/16800ca439>.

⁷¹ Børge Brende, “The Dawn of Stakeholder Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/dawn-stakeholder-geopolitics>.

⁷² EDA, “Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die von der Schweiz als Gaststaat gewährten Vorrechte, Immunitäten und Erleichterungen sowie finanziellen Beiträge,” 10.

⁷³ BKA, “Bundesgesetz, mit dem ein Bundesgesetz zur Stärkung Österreichs als Internationaler Amtssitz- und Konferenzstandort (Amtssitzgesetz – ASG).”

declaring that they are “an expression of the efforts of civil society and, enrich the thematic work of International Organizations.”⁷⁴

1.2. A Conceptual Framework of Parameters That Impact Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik (AASP)

In this theory part a conceptual framework of parameters of impact on the development of AASP in the Second Republic is presented, derived from the literature review regarding the development of host state policy in general and the development of AASP in particular. Different influence factors could be identified as either directly or indirectly influencing the development of AASP or at least having an influence on the frame of action connected with this development. These, as far as they seemed relevant, were subsumed into nine key parameters to create a framework that can serve as a basis for the evaluation by the experts. To cover the broad range of identified influence factors, a quite extensive number of parameters as independent variables had to be accepted. The opinion of the experts on the impact of these parameters and their transformation over time will be addressed in 3.1. and the analysis of the results of this research in chapter 4. A summary for each of the parameters is provided in a box at the end of each section.

1.2.1. The ‘Security Rationale’ (Security, Sovereignty, and Independence)

The parameter of the ‘Security Rationale’ could be identified as the one that had the greatest impact on how Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik developed in the early years after WWII. Rathkolb (2018) points out, that the focus on hosting international organizations and conferences as well as being considered as a bridge builder and intermediary represents the key element of Austria’s security-policy strategy in the 1960s and 1970s.⁷⁵ Frey (2011) notes “that there was already early on a broad consensus among both diplomats and political leaders that Austria needed to attract an international

⁷⁴ BMEIA. “NGOs and Quasi-International Organizations.” Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. Accessed April 26, 2024. <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/international-organisations-in-austria/ngos-and-quasi-international-organizations>.

⁷⁵ Oliver Rathkolb, “International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality,” *Neutrality in Austria - Contemporary Austria Studies* 9 (April 17, 2018): 69–91, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351308847-4>, 15.

presence to secure its survival as a neutral state between the two Cold War blocs.”⁷⁶ Bischof (2021) points to the fact, that the ‘Security Rationale’ to promote the role as a bridge builder and host for international organizations, was based on the geopolitical situation “as Austria could not take part in the European integration (like EEC and NATO) at that time.”⁷⁷ Bruno Kreisky never left any doubt that he considered Austria's role as a host for international organizations and conferences to be the best safeguard for Austria's sovereignty and peace and therefore the investment in headquarters and conference centers is important. This strategy was an essential part of his active neutrality policy. Until the end of the Cold War, the focus on this active neutrality policy and Austria's intensive engagement in the UN contributed to the development of the AASP. After the end of the Cold War, the bilateral geopolitical background changed. The question of sovereignty was not relevant anymore and the EU became the important ‘framework for action’ for Austria's security. The impact of security rationales changed but kept its influence on the development of AASP in a new way.⁷⁸ The development of the Conference for Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE), which later turned into the OSCE is a vivid example. Rooted in the times of the Cold War, when Austria was on the borderline between two global powers, it offered Austria, after a long and intensive period of engagement, the opportunity to host an international organization that contributed to a more multilateral view on how the new issues of peace and security could be addressed.⁷⁹

From the literature reviewed it can be concluded that the parameter of achieving security and sovereignty changed after the first two periods of AASP into a broader understanding of security, considering the way security threats had evolved beyond military threats to transnational challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, environmental issues and, as the COVID pandemic has shown, global health threats.⁸⁰ Austria's Security Strategy 2013 underlines that Austria will stay committed “to actively offer its good offices, by pointing out its comparative advantages and by seizing the relevant opportunities for mediation,” it will also continue to “support the work of

⁷⁶ Eric Frey, “Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site,” 149.

⁷⁷ Günter Bischof, “Zweite Republik,” *Österreichische Zeitgeschichte - Zeitgeschichte in Österreich*, August 8, 2021, 160–77, <https://doi.org/10.7767/9783205209980.160>, 172.

⁷⁸ Franz Eder, “Sicherheitspolitik,” Essay, in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreichs*, ed. Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, 2023), 285–306, 292.

⁷⁹ Wolfgang Zellner, “Österreich in Der OSZE,” Essay, in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, ed. Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023), 729–44, 731-732.

⁸⁰ BKA, “Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie,” Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, July 2013, <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/themen/sicherheitspolitik/sicherheitsstrategie.html>.

the Vienna-based organizations and arms control instruments”⁸¹ and even more “will make efforts to provide headquarters for additional organizations...Vienna’s role in housing international organizations and as a hub of international security policy is to be further expanded.”⁸² Troy (2022) presents a table of IOs in Austria in terms of their focus on issues, showing that the number of organizations with a primary focus on security ranks third behind the ones on economics and environment.⁸³

The parameter of the ‘Security Rationale’ in a nutshell:

The ‘Security Rationale’ is considered as the most important driver in the first two periods of AASP. Its relevance continued but the focus shifted with the end of the Cold War from military threats to more transnational challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, or environmental issues. The second shift was created by Austria’s membership in the EU. As Austria became integrated into the EU security framework, its engagement concentrated on the commitment to promote multilateralism and address transnational threats through diplomacy and dialogue.

1.2.2. International Reputation (‘Good Power’ and ‘Good Services’)

To achieve independence and full sovereignty, the most important objective of Austria’s foreign policy in the years after WWII was to restore its international reputation and acceptance in the international community of states. This strategy of “realpolitischer Außenpolitik”⁸⁴ resulted in a foreign policy focus on not only becoming a member of important international organizations but also becoming host state for the headquarters of such organizations as well as the active participation in peace-keeping missions of the United Nations. Presenting Austria as a “good power” also contributed to ‘nation-building’ and the unique identity of the young state.⁸⁵ Acting as a “good power” or a “good citizen” is considered in the academic debate as one of the main pillars of Austrian Foreign Policy, supporting the ‘Rule of Law’ and multilateralism in international relations. Senn et al.(2023) name three dimensions of acting as a “good

⁸¹ BKA, “Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie,” Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, July 2013, lists the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation (IAEO), Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Sekretariat des Hague Code of Conduct, Sekretariat des Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) sowie die mit Fragen der Wechselwirkung von Entwicklung und Sicherheit befasste Organisation für industrielle Entwicklung (UNIDO).

⁸² BKA, “Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie,” 12 para 3.2.5.

⁸³ Jodok Troy, “Amtssitzpolitik,” 251.

⁸⁴ Emil Brix, “Außenpolitik,” 690.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 691.

power”: First, the focus on multilateralism and the rule of law with human rights and the focus on children, women and minorities as well as arms controls.⁸⁶ Second, being an active member of the Security Council, the Human Rights Council, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and, as the third dimension, the fact that Austria hosts more than 60 international organizations, providing space for international conferences and negotiations and supports international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.⁸⁷ Looking at the different periods of AASP, many examples of Austria acting as a “good power” can be found. The “good services” of Austria led to success in hosting international organizations or at least enhanced its international reputation. Austria, for instance, provided “good services” for the Helsinki Process. It was the first neutral country to proclaim interest in Finland’s memorandum of 1969, which set out the path for a conference on security and cooperation in Europe and subsequently, Vienna was chosen as the host for the Secretariat of the OSCE. Another example is Austria’s and in particular Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch’s role in addressing the Balkan Crisis in the 1990s, as Bischof (2013) points out. Petritsch contributed to securing the Dayton agreements and the resolution of the Kosovo conflict. Austria’s engagement was beyond the role as an intermediary. It included substantial humanitarian aid as well as sending peacekeepers to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as part of EU and UN missions.⁸⁸

Senn et al. (2023) point to the fact, that this acting as a “good power” can be regarded as a normative motive, but on the other hand as a functional one as well. Austria’s engagement and the resulting “good reputation” should not only correct the image of Austria after two lost wars and the atrocities of the Nazi regime, but it should primarily secure peace and Austria’s sovereignty.⁸⁹ Roithner (2023) also underlines that Austria’s Foreign Policy was driven by its ambition to present Austria as a “good power” and that this can be connected to its success as a host state and bridge builder. He thinks that providing the location for peace and disarmament talks and negotiations should be understood as a “continuum”. Non-governmental organizations have welcomed and supported these “good services” and have demanded an increase of

⁸⁶ Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, “Die Außenpolitik Österreichs in der Zweiten Republik: Befunde und Empfehlungen,” Essay, in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreichs*, ed. Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023), 777–93, 781.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Günter Bischof, “Of Dwarfs and Giants: From Cold War Mediator to Bad Boy of Europe Austria and the U.S. in the Transatlantic Arena (1990-2013),” essay, in *Austria’s International Position after the End of the Cold War* (New Orleans, US: UNO Press, 2013), 13–55, 25.

⁸⁹ Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, “Die Außenpolitik Österreichs in der Zweiten Republik: Befunde und Empfehlungen,” 782.

Austria's role as an intermediary in terms of content.⁹⁰ But Roithner also mentions critical voices, which argue that AASP is lacking a vision about Austria's contribution of 'good services' concerning the global power play in terms of content. Instead, the critique argues that it sees the image as host and bridge builder just as an instrument for city marketing.⁹¹ The other problem mentioned is that the role as a host state and bridge builder demands resources in the Foreign Service. In an interview with the Austrian daily newspaper 'Kurier', Kramer (2017) complains that the press departments are growing, but in the most important departments, the staff resources are scarce.⁹²

A recent example of providing "good service" is Austria's and especially Ambassador Alexander Kmentt's active role in humanitarian arms control and the regulation of autonomous weapon systems. These weapons represent a legal, ethical and security challenge and Austria advocates for the prohibition of systems that cannot be controlled by humans in a meaningful way. End of April 2024, the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International hosted an international conference "Humanity at the Crossroads: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Challenge of Regulation" at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna.⁹³

The parameter of 'International Reputation and Good Service' in a nutshell:

To be regarded as a 'good power' and be accepted in the international community of states, is a main goal of Austria. Early on it focused on becoming a member of relevant international organizations and a host for the headquarters of international organizations. The main contributions of Austria are to support the 'Rule of Law' and multilateralism as well as engage in human rights issues, humanitarian arms control, and the active participation in international organizations such as the UN Security Council, Human Rights Council, and OSCE. As the impact of Austria's neutrality on being a host state fades, the provision of providing 'good service' might become more important in supporting AASP. International reputation and delivering 'good services' are an important parameter for all other reviewed host states as well.

⁹⁰ Thomas Roithner and Markus Kornprobst, "Friedenspolitik," Essay, in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreichs*, ed. Martin Senn and Franz Eder (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023), 307–22, 312.

⁹¹ Ibid., 313.

⁹² Tom Schaffer, "Politologe: Der Spitzenpolitik fehlen Außenpolitiker," Interview Helmut Kramer March 3, 2017, <https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/politologe-helmut-kramer-der-spitzenpolitik-fehlen-aussenpolitiker/248.156.044>.

⁹³ BMEIA, "Humanity at the Crossroads: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Challenge of Regulation - Vienna Conference on Autonomous Weapons Systems," Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, accessed April 26, 2024, <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/conventional-arms/autonomous-weapons-systems/2024-vienna-conference-on-autonomous-weapons-systems>.

1.2.3. The Status of Neutrality

Austria's neutrality "which had since 1955 constituted the conceptual and principled fundament of its active foreign policy"⁹⁴ is one of the most important but also most ambivalent parameters that influenced the development of Austria's *Amtssitzpolitik* since 1955. There seems to be consensus in the academic debate: "The historical significance of neutrality for Austria cannot be overstated" and "it is unlikely that Vienna would have been chosen as the location for organizations like the UN and the OSCE, or for meetings such as the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit, had it not been neutral."⁹⁵ Brix (2013) confirms the positive impact of Austria's neutrality for its role as a place for dialogue⁹⁶ and Rathkolb (2015) argues that in order to contain existing "großdeutsche Tendenzen" (trends toward a 'Greater Germany'), neutrality became the national code for internationalization. This is a necessity if a state wishes to become a bridge builder and a host for international organizations and conferences.⁹⁷ Frey (2011) points out, that for the decision of the IAEA to establish its headquarters in Vienna (despite being a compromise between the US and the Soviets), Austria's neutral status was decisive. "Vienna was picked over Geneva, Copenhagen, and Rio de Janeiro, mostly because its neutral site so close to the Iron Curtain."⁹⁸

The status of Austria's neutrality remained an important factor for Austria's *Amtssitzpolitik* even after the 1980s, when a recalibration of Austria's understanding of its neutrality was necessary due to the change in the geopolitical situation. Together with the 'Security Rationale' and the 'good power' reputation it belongs to the troika of parameters that impacted especially the first two periods of AASP. But over time meaning and the impact of this parameter changed significantly. After the 'wind of change' years, recalibration, with the most important adaptations of Austria's neutrality happening in connection with its accession to the EU to be able to participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, took place in that period. Despite some criticism, Austria tried to adapt its neutrality to the changing geopolitical landscape to maintain its role as an attractive host of international organizations and conferences.

⁹⁴ Helmut Kramer, "Austrian Foreign Policy 1995-2015," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 45, no. 2 (September 12, 2016): 49–57, <https://doi.org/10.15203/ozp.1372.vol45iss2>, 51.

⁹⁵ Sophia Stöckl, *Austria in the International Community Exploring the Role of Neutrality*, November 2021, https://www.marshallplan.at/images/All-Papers/SAIS/Final_Research_Paper_by_Sophia_Stoeckl.pdf, 21.

⁹⁶ Emil Brix, "Außenpolitik," 692.

⁹⁷ Oliver Rathkolb, *Die Paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 Bis 2005* (Wien, Austria: Paul Zsolny Verlag, 2015), 31.

⁹⁸ Eric Frey, "Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site," 149.

In 1992 Chancellor Vranitzky commented on the necessity of a flexible interpretation by saying “neutrality and neutral policy are parts of a dynamic and fluid process that has to be adapted and developed in and according to a changing international environment” and he added that neutral states have to adapt neutrality to “these changing circumstances...as long as neutrality has not become wholly obsolete by a total transformation of the international order.”⁹⁹ This illustrates the ambivalent picture of Austria’s neutrality quite well in both the academic debate and the public opinion.¹⁰⁰ Schmidl (2016) believes that Austria’s ‘neutrality’ transformed from “a legal to a mythical concept.” But it is “deeply entrenched in Austria’s national identity” and consequently can be placed into the same category as “snowy mountains, Mozart’s music, Lipizzaner horses, and sweet Viennese desserts.”¹⁰¹ A recent survey done by the Foreign Policy Lab at the Department of Political Science of the University of Innsbruck illustrates this. It shows that 72,28% of Austrians think that in case of a military conflict the other EU members should help Austria, but only 13,58% think that Austria should help other EU states by providing armed troops if those are attacked.¹⁰²

The parameter of ‘The Status of Neutrality’ in a nutshell:

Austria’s neutrality is an integral part of its self-confidence and identity, a kind of ‘holy cow’. It was important for the development of AASP in the first two periods. The policy of ‘active neutrality’ helped to build the position as a host state for IOs and bridge builder and mediator in conflicts and peace talks. The practical consequence of Austria’s permanent neutrality prohibits Austria from concluding military alliances or permitting foreign military bases on its territory.¹⁰³ The debate about the role of neutrality continues but ending it could further harm Austria’s reputation as an independent mediator.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Michael Koran, “Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making or Moral Good Rediscovered?” *Perspectives* 26 (2006): 23–45, <https://doi.org/http://www.jstor.org/stable/23616157>, 30.

¹⁰⁰ See also 1.2.3.

¹⁰¹ Erwin A. Schmidl, “Lukewarm Neutrality in a Cold War? The Case of Austria,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (October 2016): 36–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00679, 50.

¹⁰² Franz Eder, “Wehrbereitschaft ist kaum vorhanden,” Foreign Policy Lab, April 22, 2024, <https://foreignpolicylab.at/news/outreach/2024-04-22-VN-wehrbereitschaft/>.

¹⁰³ Helmut Tichy, “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality,” New Austrian-Austrian Press & Information Service in the United States Embassy of Austria, August 18, 2016, <https://www.austrianinformation.org/winter-2015-16/wc55d7qi5qrmyzmxh1qkofcmluxvj?rq=Austria%27s+Permanent+Neutrality>.

¹⁰⁴ Sophia Stöckl, *Austria in the International Community Exploring the Role of Neutrality*, 22.

1.2.4. The Geopolitical Systemic Changes in the International System

The global as well as the regional geopolitical situation and the systemic changes in the international system influenced AASP. The main impacts on Austria's host state policy, according to literature, generated by the changing geopolitical situations, were the post-war situation of the Cold War, the end of the Cold War, the European Integration and 'Europeanization' and, impacted by these influences, the recalibration of Austria's neutrality. The post-war situation of the Cold War generated a window of opportunity for Austria's State Treaty and its neutrality as the US did not consider their geopolitical position as the world leader challenged.¹⁰⁵ As the American-Russian relations got worse and worse, Western Allies such as the British suggested that Austria might act as a bridge builder between East and West and that Vienna might be the "most interesting point on the continent" in helping to overcome the tensions between the superpowers.¹⁰⁶ On the heights of the Cold War "neutrality was a credible solution for smaller states in specific geopolitical positions."¹⁰⁷

The end of the Cold War was the other main milestone that can be identified as an example where a systemic change in international relations disrupted the geopolitical situation that in turn influenced Austria's foreign policy and the development of AASP. The reviewed literature shows that Austria has been forced to recalibrate its foreign policy, building stronger ties with East Central Europe and the Western Balkans as well as continuing and completing its integration into the EEC.¹⁰⁸ This geopolitical situation "marked the end of its beloved self-definition as a builder of bridges ... Without East and West, no more demand for go-betweens."¹⁰⁹ Brix (2013) specifies the influence of this parameter by stating that Austria, which had maintained a neutral and very special status with a focus on good relations with the signatory states of the Austrian State Treaty, had turned into a normal European country.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Günter Bischof, *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55: Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 152.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁰⁷ Anton Pelinka and Ruth Wodak, "Austrian Neutrality," essay, in *Neutrality in Austria*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak (New York, USA: Routledge, 2017), 1–7, 3.

¹⁰⁸ Günter Bischof, "Austrian-American from Cold War to Post-Cold War," Austrian Embassy Washington, accessed April 20, 2024, <https://www.archive.austria.org/new-page-2>.

¹⁰⁹ Urslua Plassnik, "On the Road to a Modern Identity: Austria's Foreign Policy Agenda from the Cold War to the European Union," 55.

¹¹⁰ Emil Brix, "Austrian Cultural and Public Diplomacy after the Cold War," Essay, in *Austria's International Position after the End of the Cold War*, ed. Günter Bischof and Ferdinand Karlhofer (New Orleans, USA: UNO Press, 2013), 95–107, 95.

European Integration and ‘Europeanization’ represent the third example of the influence of the parameter of the geopolitical situation and systemic changes. This systemic change, a fundamentally new order for Europe (“fundamentale Neuordnung Europas”) began after the end of the Cold War and created a “new Europe” with Austria moving from a position on the border of a free Europe to a position in the middle of an “emerging united continent.”¹¹¹

The fourth example of the impact of this parameter as discussed both in the academic and in the public debate is the constant recalibration of Austria’s neutrality. It was triggered by the systemic changes in the geopolitical landscape. The geopolitical situation determined the international perception of Austria’s neutrality which in turn influenced Austria’s interpretation of its neutrality, impacting its foreign policy in general and its host state policy in particular. The establishment of the IAEA was not a first sign of the internationalization of Austria nor was it just owed to Austria’s neutral position. It was the result of a compromise between the US and the Soviets as well as Austria’s willingness to support this decision financially. But in turn, it helped to establish Austria’s active neutrality policy. The same can be said for the establishment of OPEC in Vienna, which was not primarily caused by its neutrality. But it further strengthened the perception of Austria as a neutral state and a host for international organizations and conferences. Rathkolb (2018) states that the international perception of Austria’s neutrality is now accepting that the country is economically, politically and culturally integrated into the “West,” including the active cooperation in security and military matters of the EU.¹¹² But pointing to the interdependence between the understanding of neutrality and the geopolitical situation, he argues that “in real politics, neutrality policy always is influenced by the neighboring and great power framework which decides the options and the decision-making capabilities.”¹¹³

The parameter of ‘Geopolitical Changes’ in a nutshell:

Literature shows that the geopolitical background and the systemic changes had a decisive impact on AASP. Main events: The post-war situation of the Cold War, the end of the Cold War, the European integration and ‘Europeanization’ and the flexible recalibration of Austria’s neutrality, triggered by systemic changes in the international system. “Real politics” defined the options and resulting decisions and those decisions influenced Austria’s position as a host state. This parameter is a decisive factor for all host states.

¹¹¹ Emil Brix, “Außenpolitik,” 701.

¹¹² Oliver Rathkolb, “International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality,” *Neutrality in Austria - Contemporary Austria Studies* 9 (April 17, 2018): 69–91, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351308847-4>, 84.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 69.

1.2.5. Rule of Law - The Legal Framework

The ‘Rule of Law’ is a condition for stability and predictability in international relations and a fundament on which diplomatic relations are conducted. It establishes the norms and procedures for states in their interaction with each other and provides the framework for solving disputes and the enforcement of agreements. For host states it is important to adhere to these legal principles to make sure that they are willing to comply with international law and treaties. Another important objective is the protection of individual rights and liberties within a state, meaning that host state policy must respect these rights internationally as well as domestically. This legal framework is an important factor with impact on host state policies. It is regarded as the foundation that enables international organizations to pursue their functions. The two legal instruments that specifically regulate the relationship between guest organization and the host state, are host state laws and headquarters or seat agreements. Both are important to define the “legal status, immunities, and privileges of the organization in the territory of the host state” and also those of its representatives and employees and – usually their spouses.¹¹⁴ Literature hints to the “do ut des” (give to receive) mechanism that often underlies the negotiations between a guest organization and the host state.¹¹⁵ The state trades parts of its sovereignty, by granting immunities and privileges to the international organization against the economic value created by the organization for the host country and the international reputation gained by the host state. The ‘Rule of Law’ parameter is considered a normative one and as Merrill (2022) says, “it describes a political ideal in which the executive arm of the state exercises coercive power against individuals only when this is authorized by settled principles of law.”¹¹⁶ In the case of host state policy, the ‘Rule of Law’ parameter is normative, but it also has a functional dimension. One important goal in crafting and applying the legal framework is to stay competitive compared to other host states. OPEC insisted on a headquarters agreement when first

¹¹⁴ I. P. Enemo and C. M. Ogwezy, “The Necessity of Headquarters Agreement under the Law of International Organisations,” *International Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance* 5, no. 1 (April 2015): 15–38, 38.

¹¹⁵ Ludovica Moro, “The (Dis)Advantageous Relationship between International Organisations and Their Host Countries: The Austrian Experience,” *BrettonWoodsLaw*, June 2017, <https://brettonwoodslaw.com/disadvantageous-relationship-international-organisations-host-countries-austrian-experience/>.

¹¹⁶ Thomas W Merrill, “The Essential Meaning of the Rule of Law,” *Columbia Law School-Faculty Publications*, 2022, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4915&context=faculty_scholarship, 675.

going to Geneva. The Swiss did not want to grant it, but Austria did and thus won the competition.

Both Switzerland and Austria amended their legal framework by introducing new host state laws that reflect the growing competition and the importance of including QIOs and international NGOs as eligible (under certain conditions) to receive immunities and privileges. For Austria, the possibility of granting immunities, privileges and financial support based on an existing legal framework is not only an important parameter but a ‘*conditio sine qua non*’ in staying ahead in the growing competition. There is a clear message by the Austrian Government about the objectives of the new Amtssitzgesetz (Host State Law) in 2020. It stated that Austria competes with other countries that have comprehensive legal regulations to promote the settlement and activity of international organizations and institutions. Therefore, Austria needs a modern and comprehensive host state law in Austria, to “increase the attractiveness of Austria as an international official headquarters and conference location.”¹¹⁷

The parameter of ‘The Rule of Law’ in a nutshell:

The ‘Rule of Law’ governs the necessary framework for the operation of international organizations in their host states, but host states must protect individual rights both domestically and internationally. The most important parts of this legal framework are the host state laws and headquarters agreements. Austria, as well as other competing states, is updating its legal frameworks to meet the challenges of global competition and enhance its status as an international hub that can attract IOs and QIOs.

1.2.6. Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria

Large public projects like the investments connected with an ambitious host state policy are always at the center of domestic political debate. Sometimes this public debate prohibits the completion of projects or leads to their downsizing, sometimes to the loss of elections, as seen in the case of Bruno Kreisky. The literature about the events accompanying the planning and construction period of the VIC and the Vienna Conference Center provides a vivid picture of these domestic political debates. The

¹¹⁷ Parlament Österreich, Ministerialentwurf betreffend Bundesgesetz zur Stärkung Österreichs als internationaler Amtssitz- und Konferenzstandort (Amtssitzgesetz – ASG), November 13, 2020, <https://www.parlament.gv.at/gegenstand/XXVII/ME/76?selectedStage=100Motivenbericht>.

economic effects and the added value of such projects as well as the effect of the whole economic mechanism behind host state policy in general impacts AASP.

The VIC and the Vienna Conference Center would probably not have been completed without Bruno Kreisky's determination. He was convinced that the investment would be worthwhile and that the benefits would be lasting. His successor Sinowatz, as already mentioned, downsized the vision of the Kreisky Government regarding the conference center to the “necessary extent of completion.” As the reports from the Kreisky Era have shown, the aspect of long-term economic effects was not really in focus at that time. It mainly was the focus on the costs that fueled the domestic political debate at that time, but not the possible benefits, although Vice Chancellor Hannes Androsch tried to focus the attention on these benefits at the opening ceremony of the VIC.¹¹⁸

Comments in the literature and the media emphasize the usefulness and meaningfulness of hosting international organizations (e.g. Frey 2011, Schmidl 2013, Moro 2017, Groen 2022, Troy 2023). The recent reports on the economic benefits and the added value of AASP for Austria are addressed in more detail in section 2.4.3. Today, the aspect of long-term economic effects has become an important factor for states and cities to obtain the necessary approval from domestic stakeholders and the public for investments to maintain an ambitious host state policy.

The parameter of the ‘Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria’ in a nutshell:
The investments necessary for an ambitious AASP have been the focus of the political debate in the early decades but the economic effects and the added value that come with a successful host state policy are getting now more and more attention. The willingness of Austria to significantly invest in attractive facilities for IOs and QIOs was a decisive factor for the success of AASP. Relevant studies that demonstrate the benefits of these investments are an important tool to gain and maintain the necessary public and domestic political support for maintaining and extending Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik. The review of other host states shows that the economic benefits are a central topic for all host states.

1.2.7. The Role of Membership in the EU

Austria's accession to the European Union could be viewed as a systemic geopolitical change and therefore be classified under this parameter. But it was a unique,

¹¹⁸ See also 2.4.3.

disruptive geopolitical event and therefore is included here as an individual parameter in its influence on the development of AASP. As Rathkolb (2015) explains, the accession ended Austria's special role as a small, neutral state between the two large superpowers. It brought new, unfamiliar situations.¹¹⁹ Discussing the question if Austria's EU membership had positive effects on AASP in the light of Austria's relationship with the UN being Austria's most important partner in its HSP, Plassnik (2013) points out that "we had to unlearn thinking in terms of "UN + bilateral world" and learn thinking in terms of "EU + UN + bilateral world."¹²⁰ Kramer (2016) sees the impact of the accession to the EU on the relationship between Austria and the United Nations, being the most important partner of AASP, as positive. It enhanced "Austria's traditionally active role in the UN" and he points to the "distinct advantages to participation in UN affairs as a member of a political bloc which represented the most loyal partner of the UN in matters of UN-funding as well as in the international initiatives of the UN in the field of worldwide peacemaking."¹²¹

The 'Austrian Security Strategy 2013' calls on the government to use the EU membership to take advantage of opportunities that arise from its position as being simultaneously a member-state of the European Union and a neutral state. The new foreign policy focus on issues like the "protection of civil society, rule of law, environmental protection, women, dialogue between religions, and the stabilization of fragile states" should benefit Austria's traditional role as intermediary and bridge builder, supporting its position as the host location for international as well as EU organizations and institutions.¹²²

The parameter of 'The Role of Membership in the EU' in a nutshell:

Austria joining the EU led to a change in its foreign and security policies, trying to strike a balance between the integration into the EU frameworks and maintaining aspects of its neutrality. In the academic debate it is argued that the EU membership strengthens Austria's ability to have a voice in international politics to promote international law, human rights, and humanitarian initiatives. Concentrating on these issues can help to further extend its position as a successful host state for international as well as EU organizations. But there are also critical voices arguing that Austria lost its position as a neutral intermediary.¹²³

¹¹⁹ Oliver Rathkolb, *Die Paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005*, 18.

¹²⁰ Ursula Plassnik, "On the Road to a Modern Identity: Austria's Foreign Policy Agenda from the Cold War to the European Union," 57.

¹²¹ Helmut Kramer, "Austrian Foreign Policy 1995-2015," 50.

¹²² BKA, "Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie," 20.

¹²³ See also 2.3.3.

1.2.8. The Role of NGOs and QIOs

Over the years, the role of QIOs and International NGOs has evolved as an impact factor on host state policies. After the end of the Cold War, the issues that international organizations had to deal with became more global and diverse. In addition to the balance of power, security and economy issues, the issues of human rights, sustainability, the environment, women's, and children's rights and many more emerged. At the same time, civil organizations became increasingly global in their orientation. Amnesty International, Greenpeace and others became global players, often, in terms of knowledge and experience of issues, at the same level as international organizations and above. In the first two periods, international organizations like the UN largely stayed to themselves, initially dealing only with governments. Then, in 1979 there was the establishment of a "NGO liaison function" at the United Nations Office in Vienna.¹²⁴ The United Nations had realized that maintaining peace and prosperity needs a partnership with nongovernmental partners. The Council of Europe in 1991 adopted a convention that acknowledged the contribution of value by NGOs to the international community, "particularly in the scientific, cultural, charitable, philanthropic, health and education fields."¹²⁵

For Brende (2023), as already mentioned, this development marks the change from a bilateral to a multilateral world. He argues for more focus on "stakeholder geopolitics". This can transform "competitors for power to collaborators for global stability."¹²⁶

The importance of this focus and the increase of impact of this parameter is demonstrated by the fact that competing states like Switzerland, The Netherlands or Austria have already adapted their host state policies to attract more QIOs and international NGOs. As the Swiss Government stated, the structure of multilateral relations has changed from only states and intergovernmental organizations to new forms of partnerships where states are consulted or even accompanied by representatives of civil society and non-governmental organizations.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ See also 2.4.4.

¹²⁵ Council of Europe, "The European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non- Governmental Organisations," Explanatory Report European Treaty Series - No. 124, April 24, 1986, <https://rm.coe.int/16800ca439>.

¹²⁶ Børge Brende, "The Dawn of Stakeholder Geopolitics," Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/dawn-stakeholder-geopolitics>.

¹²⁷ EDA, "Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die von der Schweiz als Gaststaat gewährten Vorrechte, Immunitäten und Erleichterungen sowie finanziellen Beiträge," Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige

The parameter of ‘The Role of NGOs and QIOs’ in a nutshell:

A significant evolution of the role of QIOs and international NGOs is noted in the literature. There is a transformation from a strictly state and intergovernmental-based model of HSP to a more inclusive one, that involves nongovernmental actors. QIOs and international NGOs contribute significant knowledge and expertise in fields like science, human rights, environmental issues, and sustainable development. Austria and other countries such as Switzerland adopted their legal frameworks to recognize and support the work of QIOs and international NGOs as well as provide a collaborative environment to address global challenges.

1.2.9. International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Locations

This parameter encompasses several sub-categories that are either directly or indirectly connected to the issue of competition between host states and cities. Addressed in the literature are the competition between host states on a governmental level, the role of nongovernmental institutions and external stakeholders, the attractiveness of the host city in general and in terms of the special needs of IOs and QIOs and the role of public diplomacy and location branding on a professional basis. International competition and its increase over time is considered as an important challenge by all reviewed states and cities. This, as Groen (2016) points out, led to “changing power relations” and the formation of “policy networks” to attract IOs and QIOs. These policy networks were extended in many cases beyond the governmental level.¹²⁸ An important tool for governments in the competition for IOs is the legal framework of host state law and headquarters agreements to allow competitiveness in terms of immunities, privileges and support offered. The policies of international organizations such as the UN and others confirm that the role of QIOs and international NGOs in the competition for hosting international organizations is further increasing as they have become both subject and object of the development of HSP.

Another factor becoming more and more important for the attractiveness of a location, is the ‘Cluster Effect’.¹²⁹ A city needs a significant amount of IOs to be attractive to other IOs and QIOs as the level of cooperation between them increases

Angelegenheiten EDA, June 2007,
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/de/home/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/privelegien_und_immunitaeten/gaststaatgesetz.html.

¹²⁸ Rosa S. Groen, “The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna,” 1-2.

¹²⁹ Patrick Dümmler and Pascal Lago, “A Magnet for International Organizations.”

constantly. As an example, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), headquartered in Vienna states that “cooperation creates synergies and optimizes resources, so duplication of work is avoided” and it adds that the work done by the different organizations located in one host city “complements each other, so that recommendations and advice are more aligned.”¹³⁰

The role of the attractiveness of the host state and especially the host city in terms of ‘livability’ and ‘workability’ is another sub-category of this parameter. Literature shows that this subcategory has always been regarded as an important influence factor of headquarters decisions by IOs, although the scope of what resembles “attractiveness” has changed over time from the ‘spirit’ of a city, like the ‘Spirit of Vienna,’¹³¹ which was created by the special atmosphere of the historic center of Vienna and the charm of restored ‘Grand Hotels’ as headquarters (Hall 1987, Fischer 1997) to more operational features addressed in bid-books of today like housing, education, cultural life, travel connections, domestic workforce and the ‘Cluster Effect’ of working relations among guest organizations as well as on the livelihood of the international community in town.

Finally, the role of public diplomacy and location branding as a professional challenge is addressed in the literature as part of this parameter. In the 1960s, the term public diplomacy gained a new meaning, as a description of “the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies... going beyond traditional diplomacy.”¹³² Szondi (2008) argues that public diplomacy is, step by step, turning ‘private’ with external consultants delivering services for governments. He speculates that “it may not be too long until a ‘brand attaché’ will be a vital member of embassies abroad or a ‘brand department’ a crucial part in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”¹³³ The reviewed literature documents very well that more and more states and cities, as competitors in the race for IOs, QIOs and international NGOs, are employing mechanisms of public and private diplomacy and location branding in the form of nation and city branding. (Szondi 2008, Groen 2016).

¹³⁰ FRA, “UN, OSCE and Other International Organisations,” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, August 2, 2022, <https://fra.europa.eu/en/cooperation/osce-un-international-organisations>.

¹³¹ See also 3.1.3.

¹³² Gyorgy Szondi, *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences* (Den Haag, NL: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2008), 2.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 37.

The parameter of ‘International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractiveness of Location’ in a nutshell:

The literature on the parameter of host state competition confirms a competitive landscape where Austria’s vision and willingness to apply a supportive and flexible approach created a competitive advantage in the years after WWII up to the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War and the effects of globalization, the competition between states and cities increased. New players entered the competition by offering attractive privileges and financial support. Working conditions and the “Cluster Effect” have become as important as the ‘livability’ of a host city. Dimensions like public diplomacy and location branding are becoming professional challenges, as well as the role of policy networks involved in the bidding process for hosting IOs and QIOs. Competition is now a relevant factor for every host state.

1.3. Methodology

1.3.1. Background and Objectives

Since the end of WWII, AASP could achieve notable successes. Over time, the competition of other states and cities to host large international organizations has grown, presenting a challenge to Austria’s position. The fact that Austria benefits from this position as a host state, both economically and in terms of its international reputation, is evident. Therefore, an active AASP has been a priority of Austria’s foreign policy up to date and will be a priority in the future. Defending Austria’s position as a leading host state for IOs and QIOs and even further extending this position in the future, requires the combination of a clear understanding of the past, why Austria’s host state policy developed the way it did. But it is also necessary to realize the transformation of the parameters that influenced this development as well as the policy actions taken by other host states. These insights can help to evaluate Austria’s position in this host state competition and to decide, how future challenges in this competition could be met.

Based on these premises the thesis has three main objectives: First, to present Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik in the Second Republic and to evaluate why it developed the way it did. Second, to identify and analyze the key parameters that impacted this development and how their impact changed over time and third, to deliver conclusions that are not only based on the historical accounts in the literature but also include the perspectives of experts and external stakeholders.

1.3.2. Research Question and Hypotheses

Based on the objectives, laid out in the foregoing, the research question of this thesis is: “Why did Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik (Host State Policy) develop the way it did?” I expect that the way AASP has developed is not determined by one single variable but by a set of key parameters. The individual parameters cannot be completely separated as they are partly interrelated. Therefore, a quite extensive set of parameters as the independent variables and its changing impact must be evaluated. The hypotheses of this paper are:

(H1) The change of impact of the parameters presented in the framework influences the development of AASP.

It suggests that the policy development of AASP is driven by the changes of influential factors of the framework. These dynamics shape the development as they enable a reaction to changing environments and are important for keeping the AASP competitive. The indicators to evaluate H1 will be the Weighted Average Change Score (WACS) and the Weighted Average Impact Score (WAIS).

(H2) The impact of functional parameters on AASP increases over time, whereas the impact of normative parameters decreases.

This hypothesis suggests that there is a shift in influence on AASP from value-driven normative parameters to more operational, functional parameters due to the competition of host states, increasing the focus on functionality and efficiency at the expense of the focus on traditional norms and values. For this research, functional parameters are defined as those that relate to the practical, operational and efficiency-related aspects of AASP, whereas the normative parameters of the framework are those, even if they might have functional motives too, that relate to values, norms and principles in foreign relations and the interaction of states and IOs as displayed in Table 6. Verifying or nullifying the hypotheses is an important prerequisite for answering the research question as the change of impact of the different parameters is an important indicator to explain why AASP developed the way it did.

1.3.3. Methodology and Design of Research

The thesis approaches the research question like a cross bearing. One reference point taken are the results of the literature review on host state policies in general and on the development of AASP in particular. The second is the framework of parameters synthesized from these results and a third important reference point is the empirically collected opinion from experts. In combining the analysis of the parameters of impact on AASP with the insights from the empirical research on the perspectives of experts, the study can not only provide a framework for a better understanding of the key parameters that influence AASP, but also deliver conclusions and recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders, to protect and enhance Austria's position as a host for IOs and QIOs.

To meet the objectives and to answer the research question, this thesis therefore applies a mixed methods approach including an integrative literature review of the development of AASP and the creation of a conceptual framework of parameters that have a potential impact on its development. This set of parameters is empirically tested by doing expert interviews, asking the experts to give their opinion on the degree of impact of each of these parameters on the development of AASP and about the change of impact over time and comment on it.

1.3.3.1. Integrative Literature Review

The first step consists of an integrative literature review, which as Torraco (2005) points out, reviews and synthesizes relevant literature regarding the topic “in an integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated.”¹³⁴ As there is not much literature available on the subject itself, especially not on the perspective of the parameters that influenced AASP, the first step will be to draw from the extensive literature available about Austria's foreign policy since WWII and on the limited literature available on the subject itself and on the role of Vienna as a host location for international organizations. In this respect, the ‘Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich’ by Senn, Eder and Kornprobst and the works of Bischof, Brix, Frey, Kramer, Rathkolb, Schmidl and Troy were especially helpful and provided a lot of hints to additional literature and documents that could be used for this research.

¹³⁴ Richard J. Torraco, “Writing Integrative Literature Reviews: Guidelines and Examples,” *Human Resource Development Review* 4, no. 3 (September 2005): 356–67, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1534484305278283>, 356.

An important part of an integrative literature review is “deconstructing the topic into its basic elements” such as “its history, main concepts and key relationships.”¹³⁵ In the case of this research, it is done by building on Troy’s (2023) concept of dividing the key events of AASP after 1945 into different phases, but instead of dividing it into three periods, the analysis of the timeline indicated that the division of the development of AASP into four periods might be better suited to present the timeline of the development of AASP and the synthesis required for generating the next step. Torraco (2005) presents different forms of synthesis that can be derived from an integrative review. One of those are “conceptual frameworks” which can “generate new ideas and directions for the field,”¹³⁶ used to derive a framework of parameters.

1.3.3.2. Conceptual Framework of Parameters that Impacts AASP

As mentioned, the ‘conceptual framework’ of parameters that have an impact on the development of AASP is derived from the reviewed literature. Miles and Huberman (1994) state that a conceptual framework “lays out the key factors, constructs, or variables, and presumes relationships among them.”¹³⁷ Although such a framework does not present “a causal-analytical setting but, rather, an interpretative approach to social reality” it helps the research as the basis for the empirical input of expert opinions.¹³⁸ This methodological approach is justified for the objectives of this research, as according to Jabareen (2009), “rather than offering a theoretical explanation, as do quantitative models, conceptual frameworks provide understanding.”¹³⁹

1.3.3.3. Empirical Research: Expert Interviews

The empirical dimension of this research is the input of expert opinions to evaluate which of the independent variables (parameters of impact) had what impact on the dependent variable (AASP) and to what degree this impact changed over time.

¹³⁵ Richard J. Torraco, “Writing Integrative Literature Reviews: Guidelines and Examples,” 361.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 364.

¹³⁷ Matthew B. Miles and Michael A. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook* (Thousand Oaks, USA: SAGE Publications, 1994), 440.

¹³⁸ Yosef Jabareen, “Building a Conceptual Framework: Philosophy, Definitions, and Procedure,” *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 8, no. 4 (December 2009): 49–62, <https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690900800406>, 51.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

The conceptual framework of parameters, representing the independent variables is used as the basis for structuring and evaluating the input of the experts, as well as testing the impact of those parameters. The input will be gathered through an online questionnaire consisting of two parts, described in more detail in the following. The first set of questions is aimed at the opinions of experts regarding the impact of the parameters in the framework of parameters derived from the literature review. These questions ask about the overall impact each parameter has on the development of AASP, and about the perceived change of impact over time. In addition, a ‘snowballing function’ was included that made it possible to add additional parameters if the recipient thought that important parameters that impacted AASP had not been included in the framework. The design of the second part of the questionnaire is done in an iterative process where the results of the input for the first part can be used to generate the questions for the second part. In a third step, additional questions are sent individually to experts for further details or explanations, especially on the perspectives for the future.

To conduct the expert interviews, a semi-structured question approach is chosen. Some of the questions are structured (matrix type or multiple choice) to be able to compare and summarize the answers regarding the perceived strength of impact or the degree of change of impact. The second set of questions is ‘open-ended’, but in any case, there is the opportunity to add comments, explicitly addressed and appreciated in the questionnaire. Given the fact that the experts are dispersed over different geographical areas and have limited time resources, a self-completion online-questionnaire is used. The use of a self-completion questionnaire can reduce bias errors that can occur in personal interviews, and it also offers a degree of anonymity for the participants, which helps the completion rate, but questions must be put in a short and rather simple form.¹⁴⁰ In this survey, this is compensated for by the possibility of adding comments even to structured questions. The software used for sending and conducting the interviews as well as collecting the data is a globally available platform for academic and business surveys¹⁴¹, used by the author before, as it has been proven to be reliable and easy to use in self-administered online questionnaires with a limited number of participants.

¹⁴⁰ Constantinos Phellas, Alice Bloch, and Clive Seale, “Structured Methods: Interviews, Questionnaires and Observation,” (Manchester eScholar - The University of Manchester), January 1, 1970, <https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/uk-ac-man-scw:196608>, 184.

¹⁴¹ <https://uk.surveymonkey.com/roles/research/>

A combination of a quantitative and qualitative approach is used in analyzing the results. The quantitative approach provides the scores of impacts and their perceived change, while a qualitative approach is needed to interpret these numbers and put them in context with the comments given by the experts and the findings of the literature review. The quantitative data can deliver the trends and patterns of the impact and changes, but as these data represent the subjective opinions of experts, qualitative data can help to interpret the causal mechanisms behind the quantitative trends. Thus, the mixed approach is not only appropriate but necessary for the analysis and the answer to the research question.

Three scores are calculated from the data to present the results of the input by the experts: A 'Weighted Average Impact Score', a 'Weighted Average Change Score' and a 'Composite Score'. As a first step, the Weighted Average Impact Score is aggregated for each parameter. It is generated by assigning the value of 0 for 'no impact', 3 for 'impact' and 5 for 'strong impact'. The second step is the calculation of a score for the change of impact of each parameter by assigning -1 for 'decrease of impact', 0 for 'unchanged impact' and +1 for 'increase of impact' for each answer. As a third step the Composite Score is calculated by multiplying the Weighted Average Impact Score with the Weighted Average Change Score for each parameter. This will enable the research to identify the dynamic change of impact of parameters and their influence on AASP, and those with a negative composite score, indicating a declining influence. In combination with the comments of the experts and the findings of the literature review this will build the basis for answering the research question.

The Selection of Experts

The sample of participants taking part in the interviews consists of current and former members of Austria's Foreign Service and officials of the MFA, renowned scholars in international relations and history and representatives of relevant departments and agencies of the City of Vienna. Concerning the positions of the participants and making it possible to use their additional comments to illustrate their answers, anonymity and protection of their data were guaranteed. 16 experts were asked to participate of which 14 agreed to do so. Of this group that got the questionnaires, 100% (14) returned the first part and 93% (13) returned the second part of the questionnaire.

Chapter 2

The Four Periods of Development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik (Host State Policy)

This chapter presents the timeline of the development of AASP in the Second Republic, divided into four periods. It connects the milestones and turning points of AASP with the parameters of influence, presented in the conceptual framework. The nine parameters are addressed again, but this time from the perspective of Austria's foreign and domestic policy in these four periods in general and AASP in particular.

2.1. Period I (1945 – 1965) The Bilateral World of the Cold War: A Small and Neutral State Looking for Reputation and Security

2.1.1. The Shadows of the Past

In 1945 Austria was 'freed' but not free. A country, divided into four occupation zones, searching for its identity. The 'self-focus' as a permanent constant of Austria's state of mind, was no help in this search. This 'navel-gazing' evolved in the last phase of the monarchy, as Austria and Vienna have been represented and celebrated as being the center of all important elements of this monarchy, and the outside world was largely suppressed.¹⁴² Also suppressed was the role of Austria during the annexation by Hitler-Germany and the reprocessing of the past was replaced by the picture of "Hitler's first victim". Until the late 1980s, Austrians resorted to this doctrine as an excuse, supported by the 1943 declaration of Moscow.¹⁴³

The omens for a new start weren't favorable for Austria. The provisional government under Federal Chancellor Renner, a coalition between the ÖVP, SPÖ and the KPÖ, being installed by the Soviets, lacked acceptance by the other allies. Another shadow from the past was the fact that in 1938, Austria disappeared from the map as an independent, sovereign state, invaded and annexed by Germany. Only one single state of the whole international community of states, Mexico, refused to accept this 'Anschluss'. This trauma, being forgotten by the international community of states,

¹⁴² Oliver Rathkolb, *Die Paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 Bis 2005*, 20.

¹⁴³ Günter Bischof, "Zweite Republik," *Österreichische Zeitgeschichte - Zeitgeschichte in Österreich*, 169.

vanishing from the global landscape of sovereign states and the strong desire of international standing, independence, security and peace are rooted in these shadows of the past and addressed in the academic discussion about Austria's foreign policy after 1945.¹⁴⁴ The Viennese diplomat Dr. Heinz Haymerle later addressed this fact termed "Mexico Syndrome" as a "larger, security-based rationale" for the objective of positioning Austria as a host state for IOs and international conferences.¹⁴⁵ The focus on Austria's international standing has over time remained one of the decisive factors in finding and forming Austria's identity.¹⁴⁶

Early on, Austrian diplomats not only tried to prepare the return of Austria into the international community of states and its membership in international organizations but also the vision of being a host state for these international organizations. According to Rudofsky (1982), quoted by Troy (2013), first initiatives already evolved in 1945 when it became clear, that Austria would not merely seek membership within the United Nations, but also anticipate the installation of the UN headquarters on its territory.¹⁴⁷

2.1.2. "Austria is Free"- Small and Neutral

After the end of WWII, it took 10 years until Austria became a "free" and sovereign state again, a process which involved the question if and how the new Austrian state's neutrality would be defined. Already in 1943, the 'Moscow Declaration' acknowledged that Austria was 'Hitler's first victim' and that Austria should be a free and independent state again. In 1947 the preparations for a treaty with Austria started in London, where Austrian delegates initially had no active role, but just the right to observe and be heard.¹⁴⁸ In 1951 President Theodor Körner indicated that Switzerland could be a role model for a sovereign state, "having good friends everywhere while not binding oneself unilaterally to any side,"¹⁴⁹ and in 1952 Foreign

¹⁴⁴ Eric Frey, "Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site," 149.

¹⁴⁵ David Fischer, *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years* (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997), 56.

¹⁴⁶ Oliver Rathkolb, *Die Paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005*, 458.

¹⁴⁷ Jodok Troy, "Amtssitzpolitik," in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich Hrsg. von Martin Senn, Franz Eder, und Markus Kornprobst* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, 2023), 241–67, 246, fn 11.

¹⁴⁸ Gerald Stourz, "Österreichs Weg zum Staatsvertrag und zur Neutralität," Essay, in *Frei - Souverän - Neutral - Europäisch. 1945 - 1955 - 1995 - 2005 Hrsg. Forum Politische Bildung*, vol. 22 (Innsbruck/Wien, Austria: Studien Verlag, 2004), 4–20, 14.

¹⁴⁹ Matthias Daum and Florian Gasser, "Schweiz im UN-Sicherheitsrat: Neutral, aber nicht tatenlos," ZEIT ONLINE, March 7, 2022, <https://www.zeit.de/2022/10/schweiz-un-sicherheitsrat-neutralitaet-peter-jankowitsch>.

Minister Karl Gruber argued in the Austrian Parliament in favor of “Austria’s fundamental legal neutrality”, based on the Swiss model. Later that year, after the death of Stalin, there were signs from Moscow that it might be willing to withdraw from Austria if neutrality like Switzerland would be declared. There was a back-and-forth of diplomatic negotiations and political contacts but in the end, Austria got the State Treaty (Staatsvertrag) and declared its permanent neutrality.¹⁵⁰ Bischof (2021) believes that the decisive factor for the success was that the final negotiations were done directly and bilaterally with Moscow and the ‘Staatsvertrag’ could be signed on May 15th, 1955.¹⁵¹

According to Rathkolb (2015), the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, initially opposed the plan of a neutral Austria, he was afraid of creating an example for other European states, especially Germany¹⁵², but at a Foreign Ministers’ conference in Berlin, Dulles privately told his Russian counterpart that America would have no objections if Austria chose to become “a Switzerland.” He also stated publicly at this Foreign Ministers' Conference that the USA would recognize Austria's free decision if it voluntarily declared its neutrality, similar to Switzerland.¹⁵³

The West considered Austria’s 1955 declaration of neutrality and its accession to the United Nations as correlated. As Bruckmüller (2005) puts it, the UN “was still an organization dominated by the West, or more precisely by the Americans. Austria's membership could therefore also be seen as a kind of antidote to the potentially dangerous consequences of neutrality.”¹⁵⁴ This is confirmed by Stourzh (2004), who writes, that during the key negotiations in Moscow between April 12th and 15th 1955, the Soviets revealed their primary concern on how to address the risk of Austria’s reunification with Germany (“Anschlussgefahr”) and its integration into NATO and their solution was: Austria’s neutrality.¹⁵⁵ The reference to the “Swiss model” in the Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955 was a consensus formula to secure the international agreement on the status of Austria from Moscow to Washington.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁰ Gerald Stourz, “Österreichs Weg Zum Staatsvertrag und Zur Neutralität,” 14.

¹⁵¹ Günter Bischof, “Zweite Republik,” 172.

¹⁵² Oliver Rathkolb, *Die Paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005*, 296.

¹⁵³ Gerald Stourz, “Österreichs Weg zum Staatsvertrag und zur Neutralität,” in *Frei - Souverän - Neutral - Europäisch. 1945 - 1955 - 1995 - 2005 Hrsg. Forum Politische Bildung*, vol. 22 (Innsbruck/Wien, Austria: Studien Verlag, 2004), 4–20, 17.

¹⁵⁴ Ernst Bruckmüller, “Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen,” *Das Neue Österreich - Ausstellung zum Staatsvertragsjubiläum*, May 2005, https://androsch.com/media/buecher/noe/192-217_Neutralitaet_und_Vereinte_Nationen.pdf, 194.

¹⁵⁵ Gerald Stourz, “Österreichs Weg zum Staatsvertrag und zur Neutralität,” 18.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

The ‘tit for tat’ of this compromise: Austria’s neutrality for Austria’s UN accession. It looked like a ‘win-win’ situation for the country that aimed to become a meeting place for global politics. In the ‘Regierungserklärung’ (Government Declaration) of the Second Raab Government in June 1956¹⁵⁷, Julius Raab quoted the author Friedrich Hebbel, who said:

Dies Österreich ist eine kleine Welt,
In der die große ihre Probe hält,
Und waltet erst bei uns das Gleichgewicht,
So wird's auch in der andern wieder licht.¹⁵⁸

What he described in this rather poetic picture was Austria’s developing self-confidence as a place that provides a kind of “rehearsal stage” and a negotiation stage for the world to solve its problems. The preconditions to realize Austria’s vision of being a bridge builder and host for international organizations were set, Austria was independent, small, and neutral.

In these early years, Austria positioned itself between the East and the West, but it did not abandon its cultural and ideological ‘West’ orientation. “Numerous young Austrians have been increasingly ‘Americanized’ since the occupation,” as Bischof (2021) observes, “the American lifestyle and popular culture attracted the young people, also as a form of protest against the generation of their ‘Nazi parents’.”¹⁵⁹

2.1.3. The First Step: IAEA and the ‘Spirit of Vienna’

After the State Treaty was signed in 1955, Austria was small, neutral, and eager to be noticed and to play a role on the stage of international politics. Being neutral was not a given advantage in the first place to become host state for an international organization in times of the Cold War. When US President Eisenhower first introduced the idea of an International Atomic Energy Agency, he made it clear that he expected that this organization “would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations,” many in the Eisenhower Administration wanted the IAEA to be headquartered in the USA.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Parlament Österreich, “Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich VIII. Gesetzgebungsperiode Tagesordnung I. Erklärung der Bundesregierung,” Stenographisches Protokoll, July 4, 1956, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/VIII/NRSITZ/2/imfname_157106.pdf, 25.

¹⁵⁸ This Austria is a small world, in which the great one holds her rehearsal and once we have found the balance here, there will be light again in the other one too.

¹⁵⁹ Günter Bischof, “Zweite Republik,” 172.

¹⁶⁰ Dwight D Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace Speech, December 1953,” IAEA, July 16, 2014, <https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech>.

Austria's diplomacy immediately saw the chance. Dr. Haymerle, who attended the General Assembly as Austria's observer to the UN when President Eisenhower presented his 'Atoms for Peace' initiative, immediately recommended that Austria should offer Vienna as the location for the headquarters of the new international organization, which received the strong support of Karl Gruber, at that time ambassador of the Republic of Austria to the United States.¹⁶¹

The Secretary of State John Foster Dulles finally agreed to the Soviets' proposal to choose a location in a neutral state, with Geneva, Stockholm, and Vienna as candidates.¹⁶² Geneva had an advantage as Europe's CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, was already there. For Austria, it was clear that hosting the IAEA in Vienna would be an important contribution to establishing Austria internationally. As Röhrlich (2022) states, Austria's diplomats worked hard to bring the IAEA to Vienna, "the Austrian ambassador to the United States, Karl Gruber, took every possible chance to praise the advantages of an Austrian location," arguing that this decision would help to restore Vienna as "a center of world affairs"¹⁶³.

Despite the huge efforts of Austrian diplomacy, Rathkolb (2018) sees the main reason for the decision to base the IAEA in Vienna not in Austria's neutrality but more as the result of a compromise between the two superpowers. He notes that the US Government, namely John Foster Dulles, was not keen on Austria playing a role in East-West détente and disarmament negotiations. Austria's neutrality should not become a role model for Europe and an "internationalization" of Austria was not intended by the US Foreign Minister. The decision to headquarter the IAEA in Vienna was not regarded as a first step to make Austria the bridge builder and host of international organizations but was based on a compromise between the US and the Soviets. The US claimed the top position in the new organization and therefore had to agree to the Soviet proposal to choose Vienna as the headquarters location. This and the acceptance of the US leadership in the IAEA administration by Austria, as well as the financial support offered, influenced the decision to bring the first international organization to Vienna.¹⁶⁴ Additional arguments for the State Department to agree to the decision for Vienna were

¹⁶¹ John A Hall, "Origins and Early Years," IAEA -Bulletin 2/1987, accessed April 24, 2024, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull29-2/29201284754.pdf>, 51.

¹⁶² Elisabeth Röhrlich, *Inspectors for Peace a History of the International Atomic Energy Agency* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022), 63.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 64.

¹⁶⁴ Oliver Rathkolb, "International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality," *Neutrality in Austria - Contemporary Austria Studies* 9 (April 17, 2018): 69–91, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351308847-4>, 1-3.

the fact that it considered Austria “strongly anti-Communist, and...even though military neutral...part of the Western World.”¹⁶⁵ After several months of preparations, the Conference on the Statute confirmed the decision for Vienna in October 1957. The head of Austria’s delegation, as Röhrlich (2022) critically notes, avoided a reference to Austria’s role during the Nazi regime, only praising Vienna’s “tradition of scientific research and progress” and its “atmosphere of tolerance and respect for other people’s points of view.”¹⁶⁶ The Austrian Government offered several locations to the IAEA as a temporary solution until a permanent headquarters could be built. Finally, the IAEA decided on the Grand Hotel on the Ringstrasse, as it was centrally located and provided both accommodation and meeting facilities. As Fischer (1997) mentions, Dr. Karl Gruber was presiding over the first meeting of the General Conference, supporting “the IAEA to fit into Austria, or, as the wits had it, helping Austria to fit into the IAEA.”¹⁶⁷

Austria’s ‘active foreign policy’ and neutral status could celebrate its first big victory in establishing Austria as a bridge builder and host for international organizations and conferences. John A. Hall (1987), Deputy Director General of the IAEA from 1961-64 and from 1967-80, recalls: “Thanks to a small group of postwar Austrian statesmen, within a period of two years the goals of independence, permanent neutrality, membership in the United Nations, and host to an important and politically sensitive international organization had been attained.”¹⁶⁸

The Spirit of Vienna

The first period of the development of Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik represents a very special mixture, as authors such as Hall (1987) or Fischer (1997) describe. This mixture consisted of proactive support and cooperation of Austria’s Government and diplomacy as well as the support and special flair of the City of Vienna providing the use of historic buildings like the Musikakademie, the Konzerthaus and later the Grand Hotel. The Austrian authorities ensured smooth operations and the necessary legal arrangements such as the headquarters agreement in 1957. It showed that Austria and

¹⁶⁵ Elisabeth Röhrlich, *Inspectors for Peace a History of the International Atomic Energy Agency*, 65.

¹⁶⁶ Elisabeth Röhrlich, *Inspectors for Peace a History of the International Atomic Energy Agency*, 65-66.

¹⁶⁷ David Fischer, *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years* (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997), 72.

¹⁶⁸ John A. Hall, “Origins and Early Years,” IAEA -Bulletin 2/1987, accessed April 24, 2024, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull29-2/29201284754.pdf>, 51.

Vienna could handle complex international legal and logistic requirements. As Hall (1987) notes, it was this special Viennese mixture of hospitality, historical charm, and efficiency that made the city an ideal host for international organizations and conferences. This spirit is characterized by a collaborative environment, support for international communities, and a strong sense of identity and pride in hosting global entities and he recalls the charm of the adapted Grand Hotel: “The Agency was new, its important purposes presented a unique challenge and the environment of the Grand Hotel seemed to foster a pride in the organization.”¹⁶⁹ Fischer (1997) confirms the existence of this “Spirit of Vienna”:

In those years personal relations between delegations and the Secretariat were as a rule very warm and informal. Russians and Americans, Arabs and Israelis, Indians and South Africans built up friendships that were hard to find in New York, Geneva or other cities that were home to UN agencies.¹⁷⁰

When Kennedy met Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961, he addressed this “Spirit of Vienna” in a lunch toast by calling “Vienna, a city that is symbolic of the possibility of finding equitable solutions.”¹⁷¹ According to Fischer (1997), this “Spirit of Vienna” regarding the ‘flavor’ of Vienna as a special host state location experienced a gradual decline from the late 1970s onwards. He attributes this decline to the geopolitical shifts, especially the divide between the developing countries and industrialized nations but also to the relocation of entities from the city center to the Vienna International Center, which changed the setting from a historically rich and centered location to a more modern, but also more impersonal location.¹⁷² But although this “Spirit of Vienna” might have diminished in its original form, he concedes that aspects of its essence like its commitment to international collaboration and its cultural vibrancy still influence the city’s international role as a host of international organizations and conferences. Being a place for dialogue and a location for headquarters of IOs, QIOs and NGOs became a tradition over time.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ John A. Hall, “Origins and Early Years,” 51.

¹⁷⁰ David Fischer, *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years* (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997), 89.

¹⁷¹ Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *The Vienna Summit and its Importance in International History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 20.

¹⁷² David Fischer, *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years*, 89.

¹⁷³ Jodok Troy, “Amtssitzpolitik,” 252.

2.1.4. The Vienna Summit

In 1958, Vienna started to renovate the Hofburg, the imperial palace where in 1814, the Vienna Congress brought together the superpowers of Europe and the city showed its talent in hosting an international conference. Almost 150 years later, in early June 1961, the Vienna Summit between US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev became one of the important milestones in positioning Austria as a bridge builder in international relations and a location for international conferences. Already years before this meeting, Austria's diplomacy has tried to bring a summit of the superpowers to Vienna. Bischof, Karner, and Stelzl-Marx (2014) note that in May 1953, when Churchill called for a summit, Karl Gruber proposed Vienna but Eisenhower declined to meet with the Soviets.¹⁷⁴ Eight years later reportedly Stockholm, Oslo, Helsinki, and Geneva were in discussion as host cities for a summit between the two world leaders.¹⁷⁵ But Kreisky suggested Vienna as the location for this top level meeting to Kennedy, which the US President preferred.¹⁷⁶ On May 16th, 1961, Khrushchev accepted in a letter to Kennedy:

Your initiative concerning a meeting has found a favorable response among us and we agree with you concerning the usefulness of such an exchange of views. I confirm by this letter that I accept your proposal for a meeting. The time and place of the meeting which you have proposed, namely June 3-4 in Vienna, are acceptable to me.¹⁷⁷

Politically, the Vienna Summit did not deliver the results the US and its allies had hoped for. "Worst thing of my life, he savaged me", Kennedy later admitted to a journalist.¹⁷⁸ In this article, Richard Reeves who wrote 'President Kennedy: Profile of Power', said that Kennedy was not properly prepared for that crucial meeting in Vienna. Kennedy had been in office for only some months, "he went in there unprepared and Khrushchev walked all over him." Kennedy was surprised about Khrushchev's aggressive approach, who threatened at one point to cut off the access for the US and its allies to Berlin.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *The Vienna Summit and its Importance in International History*, 7.

¹⁷⁵ Eric Frey, "Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site," 150.

¹⁷⁶ Austria Forum, "Bruno Kreisky," AustriaWiki, April 2022, https://austriaforum.org/af/AustriaWiki/Bruno_Kreisky.

¹⁷⁷ Office of the Historian, "15. Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Geneva," U.S. Department of State, May 16, 1961, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d15>.

¹⁷⁸ Becky Little, "JFK Was Completely Unprepared for His Summit with Khrushchev," History.com, July 13, 2018, <https://www.history.com/news/kennedy-krushchev-vienna-summit-meeting-1961>.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

During their final conversation at that Vienna Summit, Khrushchev told Kennedy that “it is up to the U.S. to decide whether there will be war or peace,” which led to the often-quoted response of the US President “then, Mr. Chairman, there will be war. It will be a cold winter.”¹⁸⁰ As a result of the failed meeting of the two leaders, Kennedy was given the green light from Congress for an additional \$3.25 billion for the US defense budget. Two months later Khrushchev ordered to build the Berlin Wall.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, the Vienna Summit of 1961 can be considered a success for Austria and Vienna. Approximately 1.500 journalists were present in Vienna and the Viennese people lined the streets and watched the event on television.¹⁸² It put Austria on the international political stage as a neutral power and as Bischof, Karner and Stelzl-Marx (2014) argue, it was the prerequisite for Vienna to become the third headquarters for important UN agencies and an “international conference metropolis” and “Austria’s neutrality, practiced in the skill of maintaining equidistance between the power blocks, made the Austrian capital a favorite Cold War meeting place. Building on the old tradition of Austrian diplomacy as a premier role in the European concert of power.”¹⁸³ For the global audience watching the television reports of this meeting, the festivities around this event- including the appearances of the two first ladies Jacqueline Kennedy and Nina Khrushcheva- presented Vienna as a peaceful, attractive and open-minded city, for the Austrian audience, it created a feeling of “national solidarity” and “the belief that the policy of neutrality, and the international respect for this policy choice, could form the basis of a new national identity.”¹⁸⁴

2.1.5. The Case of OPEC

The increasing international orientation of Austria’s foreign policy, which extended beyond the East-West Conflict, symbolizes the transition from the first to the second period. In contrast to the first period, shaped by the East-West Conflict and based

¹⁸⁰ Andrew Glass, “JFK and Khrushchev Meet in Vienna, June 3, 1961 - Politico,” POLITICO, February 6, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/02/jfk-and-khrushchev-meet-in-vienna-june-3-1961-238979>.

¹⁸¹ JFK Library, “The Arms Race,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed April 24, 2024, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war>.

¹⁸² Andrew Glass, “JFK and Khrushchev Meet in Vienna, June 3, 1961 - Politico,” POLITICO, February 6, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/02/jfk-and-khrushchev-meet-in-vienna-june-3-1961-238979>.

¹⁸³ Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *The Vienna Summit and its Importance in International History*, 6.

¹⁸⁴ Eric Frey, “Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site,” 150.

on the known and accepted geopolitical situation of the Cold War, a new and increasingly more global orientation influenced Austria's Amtssitzpolitik. The first significant example of this change and a further milestone in the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik is the establishment of the OPEC headquarters in Vienna in 1965, which redirected the focus to the problems and interests of a wider world.¹⁸⁵

The story of OPEC and how and why it was finally headquartered in Vienna is a vivid example of the mixture of circumstances due to the geopolitical situation and diplomatic efforts of Austrian diplomats, flexible enough to benefit from the situation. To understand what was going on at that time behind the scenes, one must look at the role of the so-called 'Seven Sisters', the largest oil enterprises of the world (Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, Gulf, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and Chevron). They held the exclusive rights to the production and distribution of petroleum in almost all relevant oil-producing nations. In exchange, the states got a share of the profits. In 1951, they owned almost 100% of the world's oil production.¹⁸⁶ These deals were beneficial for either side, as the states got revenues from their resources at a time when they had no expertise to handle production and distribution on their own.¹⁸⁷ But in the late 50s, the producing states became dissatisfied with this kind of deal. They considered their share of profit to be too low and they also thought not to have enough control over their resources. This situation led to the formation of an organization, founded by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Venezuela, aimed to control the global oil price to represent the interests of the member states. As Gavarini (2019) notes, "the founding of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 sent a clear signal to the majors."¹⁸⁸ In the eyes of the OPEC at that time, Geneva seemed to be the ideal host for its headquarters. This city in Switzerland, a neutral state, had already hosted the League of Nations and was now hosting one of the United Nations headquarters as well as major international conferences and "its large community of diplomats and government representatives promised significant network and lobby opportunities."¹⁸⁹ To be able to participate and benefit from this already existing

¹⁸⁵ Jodok Troy, "Amtssitzpolitik," 248.

¹⁸⁶ Aaron D. Wood, Charles F. Mason, and David Finnoff, "OPEC, the Seven Sisters, and Oil Market Dominance: An Evolutionary Game Theory and Agent-Based Modeling Approach," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 132 (December 2016): 66–78, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.011>, 2.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Giuliano Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 89.

¹⁸⁹ OPEC Bulletin, Location matters: the story of OPEC's buildings, accessed April 24, 2024, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/flipbook/OPEC_Bulletin_Apr-May_2020/66/, 64.

multilateral system the newly established intergovernmental organization needed a headquarters agreement with its host state to gain immunities and diplomatic privileges and equally important the legitimacy and status among the other international organizations.¹⁹⁰ One major goal, “was the ability to gain observatory status in multilateral bodies, preferably influential ones within the UN system or the oil committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.”¹⁹¹ Some of the host states of the ‘Seven Sisters’, such as the US, Great Britain and the Netherlands, but also the private oil companies themselves pursued a strategy of “neutral non-recognition” towards OPEC. The goal was “to minimize the influence of OPEC by negating its official existence without expressing open hostility,” and Switzerland depended on the reliable supply by the network of the Seven Sisters.¹⁹² As a result, in early 1960, the Swiss Government tried to discourage OPEC from choosing Geneva as the OPEC’s headquarters. Although the Canton of Geneva had permitted OPEC Secretary General Dr. Rouhani to open an office, the Swiss Government, supported by the Seven Sisters, insisted that OPEC had to keep its informal status and would not be granted a headquarters agreement. OPEC insisted on full immunity and privileges and as Dr. Rouhani remembers “it was because of that, that the year I left, discussions began with the Austrian Government over the host agreement from Austria.”¹⁹³ It was not only the circumstances of the geo-political and even more the geo-economic situation preventing the Swiss from granting the desired headquarters agreement for OPEC, but also other things played into the cards of Austria. Kreisky’s strategy as a foreign minister was focused on extending Austria’s position as a host state for IOs and international conferences. It was a perfect match, OPEC needed a headquarters agreement, and Austria could showcase its active neutrality policy and further strengthen its *Amtssitzpolitik*. As Djemal Berrouka, a former Head of Protocol of OPEC remembers: “They were a neutral state like Switzerland and Sweden. It was the cleverness of the foreign ministry to turn this into a positive thing.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ OPEC Bulletin, Location matters: the story of OPEC’s buildings, 64.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid., 65.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Maureen MacNeill, “50 Years of Sharing,” OPEC Bulletin 50 years in Vienna, September 2015, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/1666.htm, 11.

2.2. Period II (1965-1983) From a Bilateral World to Multilateralism: Kreisky's 'Security Rational' and the Commitment to an Active Neutrality Policy

2.2.1. The Early Years of the Second Period of AASP

The early years of the second phase of AASP were dominated by a reorientation of Austria's foreign policy. The focus on the bilateral system of the Cold War changed to a more global view.¹⁹⁵ This started, as already mentioned, during the last years of the first period. Offering OPEC a headquarters agreement and to clear the way to host this organization in Vienna instead of Geneva as well as the Vienna Summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1961, can be regarded as the first milestones for the development of Austria as an internationally accepted host state for international organizations and of important international conferences. The next important milestone in the early years of the second phase of AASP was the decision to base UNIDO in Vienna when it was established in 1966 as an autonomous agency.¹⁹⁶ In 1975, the General Assembly endorsed a recommendation to turn the UNIDO into a specialized agency of the UN with its headquarters based in Vienna.¹⁹⁷

The most important step for Austria in its ambitious host state policy was the decision of the Austrian Government under Josef Klaus in 1967 to offer the United Nations Vienna a headquarters building on the bank of the River Danube free of charge for their agencies.¹⁹⁸ In August 1979, the Vienna International Center was opened and UNIDO moved its offices from its city location to this new complex, referred to as the UNO City. In those early years of the second period, the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik was shaped by Austria's 'active neutrality policy and the growing influence of Bruno Kreisky's foreign policy both on an international and on a domestic level. Austria's Foreign Policy considered its Amtssitzpolitik in these days as the most important strategy to support Austria's neutrality and security. The goal to achieve and protect security, sovereignty and independence of the young nation seemed to have the

¹⁹⁵ Jodok Troy, "Amtssitzpolitik," 248.

¹⁹⁶ UNIDO, "A Brief History," UNIDO-Who we are, accessed April 24, 2024, <https://www.unido.org/who-we-are/brief-history>.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Eric Frey, "Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site," 151.

greatest impact on the development of AASP in this period and has been called “the main pillar for Austrian defense.”¹⁹⁹

2.2.2. The Rule of Law - Host State Law and Headquarter Agreements

The first two periods of Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik already shed light on the importance of the ‘Rule of Law’ for a successful host state policy throughout all periods of AASP. The first headquarters agreement with an international organization, after Austria became an independent and free nation, was signed on December 11th, 1957, by W. Sterling Cole, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Leopold Figl, Austria’s Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs.²⁰⁰

The decision by OPEC to choose Austria as the host state for their headquarters can be regarded as an impressive example of the fact that, despite all the attractive features of a potential host location, the question of the legal framework is crucial. As discussed in the case of OPEC,²⁰¹ headquarters agreements are the “operational basis or livewire” of IOs, as they determine the “legal status, immunities, and privileges of the Organization in the territory of the host state.”²⁰²

Austria and Vienna as hosts for international organizations and conferences have a historic relationship with the ‘Rule of Law’ regarding international relations. The first initiatives to codify diplomatic law were presented at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Almost 150 years later, Vienna hosted the first Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. But it was not only the historical context but also the available conference space and Austria’s neutrality that made it acceptable for all partners.²⁰³ As Bruns (2014) recalls, Austria saw it as a chance for the young and independent state and was “lobbying for the right to host from 1958 on when a codification conference first became a possibility.”²⁰⁴ In late 1959, the invitation was put forward again, combined with the offer that Austria would cover all additional costs that would arise compared to the costs

¹⁹⁹ *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 28 Oct. 1976, quoted in Frey, “Konferenzplatz Wien,” 152.

²⁰⁰ IAEA, “Text of the Agency’s Agreement with the Republic of Austria,” International Atomic Energy Agency, December 10, 1959, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1959/infcirc15.pdf>.

²⁰¹ See also 2.1.5.

²⁰² I. P. Enemo and C. M. Ogwezzzy, “The Necessity of Headquarters Agreement under the Law of International Organisations,” 38.

²⁰³ Kai Bruns, *A Cornerstone of Modern Diplomacy: Britain and the Negotiation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 81.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

of holding the meeting in New York²⁰⁵ and Vienna became the host of the UN Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities. This first Vienna Convention was followed by two others in the 1960s. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 1963, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969, and then, seven years later, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations.²⁰⁶

Using Austria as an example, Moro (2017) examines the legal and political challenges between IOs and their host states. Normally, a degree of privileges and immunities is granted to IOs, which can impact the sovereignty of the host state. In this relationship very often the principle of “do ut des” (give to receive principle) is applied, where parts of the sovereignty are traded against the economic benefits and the international visibility of the host state.²⁰⁷ Another issue is the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations, meaning they are exempt from legal suits. The established principle is that IOs should not have absolute immunity unless they provide sufficient internal justice mechanisms. Courts usually do consider if there are alternative dispute resolution mechanisms before they grant immunity. If they conflict with fundamental rights, immunities can be challenged. Most host states try to avoid conflicts over the privileges and immunities of IOs, therefore a transparent and regulated cooperative approach is necessary to ensure the rights of IO employees or third parties. For Tichy (2019), such cases and previous rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) “have a major impact on Austria’s practice as host state of international organizations...(as) Austria is one of the few states that have granted constitutional status to the European Convention and its Protocols.”²⁰⁸

The constitutional compliance of Austria’s headquarters agreements can pose a constant challenge to the host state as well as to the international organization. It demands pragmatic solutions as Tichy (2020) already argued before the Constitutional

²⁰⁵ Kai Bruns, *A Cornerstone of Modern Diplomacy: Britain and the Negotiation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, 81.

²⁰⁶ United Nations, “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations,” United Nations Treaty Collection, accessed April 12, 2024, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-3&chapter=23&clang=_en.

²⁰⁷ Ludovica Moro, “The (Dis)Advantageous Relationship between International Organisations and Their Host Countries: The Austrian Experience,” *BrettonWoodsLaw*, June 2017, <https://brettonwoodslaw.com/disadvantageous-relationship-international-organisations-host-countries-austrian-experience/>.

²⁰⁸ Helmut Tichy, “The Impact of the ECHR on Austria’s Practice as Host State of International Organisations,” Seminar: The Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights to the Development of Public International Law, Prag, September 23, 2020, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/cahdi/the-contribution-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-to-the-development-of-public-international-law,1>.

Court made its ruling. He mentioned the solution negotiated with the OPEC Fund (OFID) as a role model in the case of other IOs. This solution “would oblige international organizations to revise their internal regulations accordingly, to offer ‘reasonable alternative means’.”²⁰⁹ The legal framework on which the hosting of IOs, QIOs and international conferences is based, is not only challenged by legal constitutional requirements but also by the competition among competing host states. To be attractive for IOs, Austria had to adapt and extend the benefits granted in its headquarters agreements over time. In 1995 the Government of Austria and the United Nations Office (UNOV) signed a new headquarters agreement considering the changes since the headquarters agreement with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) was signed in 1967. It brought some additional benefits like the exemption from immigration restrictions for retired UN staff as well as the permission for spouses and dependent relatives of UN staff to seek work in Austria. They would also be granted access to education (universities, and educational institutions) under the same conditions as Austrians. UNOV Director-General Giorgio Giacomelli saw this as “an extraordinary confirmation of what has been an excellent relationship with the host country” and said that UNOV finds itself in “an oasis of understanding” in Austria. He added that the new headquarters agreement makes Vienna an “even more attractive place” as a host for IOs.²¹⁰

2.2.3. Kreisky and Austria’s ‘Active Neutrality Policy’

There is a broad consensus among scholars that, under the influence of Bruno Kreisky both as minister of foreign affairs and then as federal chancellor, Austria defined its neutrality in “an extensive and comprehensive manner.”²¹¹ Höll (2014) notes that Austria, based on its understanding of an ‘active neutrality policy’ that offers ‘good service’ in cases of conflicts and presenting itself as a place for international relevant

²⁰⁹ Helmut Tichy, “The Impact of the ECHR on Austria’s Practice as Host State of International Organisations,” 3.

²¹⁰ United Nations, “United Nations Signs New ‘seat Agreement’ with Austria Consolidating Number of Legal Agreements between Government and Vienna-Based UN Offices,” United Nations Press Release, December 1, 1995, <https://press.un.org/en/1995/19951201.l2747.html>.

²¹¹ Carmen Gebhard, “Is Small Still Beautiful? The Case of Austria,” *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 279–97, <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12042>, 286.

meetings, delivered an important contribution to the European peace order.²¹² As a small state, Austria provided its ‘good service’ and understood very well how it could present itself as a ‘mediator’ between the military blocks of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as being a host state for international organizations and conferences.²¹³ Rathkolb (2018), who considers Austria’s foreign policy in the 1960s as a way to define Austria’s identity, admits that “despite his very unconventional and personal style of acting in the international arena, Kreisky worked on the permanent international recognition and acceptance of Austria as a neutral country,”²¹⁴ and he points out that Kreisky realized early on that Austria would not be able to follow the Swiss model of strengthening its military power. Instead, Kreisky was convinced that Austria’s position as a sovereign nation could only be safeguarded by an active foreign policy that established the country as an intermediary in international conflict and a host for international organizations.²¹⁵ He considered the project of establishing Vienna as the third UN Headquarters as an investment to secure Austria’s sovereignty. In 1979, Kreisky told the Financial Times in August that he was convinced that hosting IOs is crucial for Austria, both from a political and a security standpoint, “they are as valuable as big stores of arms which might never be used.”²¹⁶

During that time, Austria developed and supported significant peace initiatives and hosted important conferences such as the Strategic Arms Talks (SALT) 1969-1972, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 1973 as well as the deployment of peacekeeping troops as early as 1961 in the Congo and then in the UN peacekeeping operations in Cyprus (1972) and on the Golan Heights from 1974 to 2013. The aim of Kreisky’s strategy, as Rathkolb (2018) notes, was to enhance Austria’s reputation through personal involvement in crisis regions. And it was no coincidence that Kreisky’s commitment coincided with the term of office of Kurt Waldheim as UN Secretary-General, who owed his mandate in part to the efforts of the Austrian Chancellor and also third-world countries.²¹⁷ Brix (2019) argues that small states like Austria are focused on securing the sovereignty and international standing of the state, but not so much on being involved in shaping global politics. The main objective of

²¹² Othmar Höll, “Die Österreichische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der 2. Republik,” Essay, in *Österreich in der Zweiten Republik*, ed. Phillip Strobl (Hamburg, Germany: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2014), 71–88, 75.

²¹³ Othmar Höll, “Die Österreichische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der 2. Republik,” 75.

²¹⁴ Oliver Rathkolb, “International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality,” 11.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 80.

Austria's foreign policy was to define the Austrian "Selbstverständnis" (self-perception) and secure Austria's role in the European and global theater.²¹⁸ For Brix, 'idealistic approaches' like Kreisky's special interpretation of neutrality as an order to act as a global intermediary were exemptions of Austria's 'Realpolitikansatz' (Realpolitik approach) in its foreign policy. It was a reaction to the changes in the geopolitical landscape to increase the scope for action.²¹⁹

2.2.4. Austria and the United Nations

To understand the development of AASP, it is important to understand its relationship with the United Nations over time. The accounts in the relevant literature show the crucial role of this relationship in the development of Austria as a host state for international organizations and conferences. In their article about Austria in the United Nations, Gintsberger et al. (2023) point out that the geopolitical situation had always been a factor that defined the possibilities of Austria's UN policy. In his speech in December 1955 at the General Assembly of the United Nations, Foreign Minister Leopold Figl addressed the Austrian strategy of an active foreign policy, which Figl at that time defined as "co-operating actively in discussing and solving the manifold and frequently complex problems of our age."²²⁰ Austria wanted to play an active role in the theater of the Cold War and at the same time it not only wanted to find itself on this stage but also to provide the stage for it.²²¹ That was the reason why Austria, especially under Kreisky, despite a lot of domestic political discussion, consistently worked on the construction of such a stage by hosting the headquarters of the United Nations in Vienna.²²² The question of how this active role in foreign policy, as envisioned by Austria's diplomacy, and its status of permanent neutrality can go together, is a constant topic of political and scholarly discussion. When Austria applied for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, the neutrality issue was resolved by the so-called 'Verdross Doctrine', stating that the UN does not expect Austria to participate in any actions not

²¹⁸ Emil Brix, "Außenpolitik," 690.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Sandra Gintsberger et al., "Österreich in Den Vereinten Nationen," Essay, in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, ed. Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, 2022), 679–98, 680.

²²¹ Ibid., 683.

²²² Ibid., 681.

compatible with Austria's neutrality. As Koran (2006) puts it, "Verdross' aim was, indeed, to protect an active foreign policy from neutrality."²²³

As already mentioned in the foregoing chapter, the 1970s under Kreisky can be regarded as the most important period for the development of AASP. Gintsberger et al. (2022) argue that, on a domestic basis, foreign policy was challenged by a lack of interest but internationally it was highly regarded, especially during the 1970s. Austria was elected to the UN Security Council in 1972 with 115 out of 118 votes and Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch's interpretation of active neutrality supported Austria's international reputation by mediating between not only the superpowers but also between the Global North and South. At that time, Kurt Waldheim's election as the UN's Secretary-General was also seen as a sign of Austria's high reputation. The 1970s can therefore be considered a peak in Austria's political standing within the United Nations.²²⁴

2.3. Period III (1983-1995) Wind of Change: The End of the Cold War and Austria's Shift of Focus from the United Nations to Europe

2.3.1. Wind of Change: The Cold War is Over

End of the 1980s, the German rock-band Scorpions released the rock ballade 'Wind of Change'. It should become what the media at that time called 'Hymne der Wende', one of the most successful German rock songs. But this 'Wende' already started for Austria and its domestic and foreign policy in the early 1980s. Kreisky, who was always convinced that Austria could be better protected by an active foreign policy and an active interpretation of its neutrality had just lost the 'Konferenzzentrum-Volksbegehren' (public referendum regarding the Conference Center) and subsequently the majority in the election in 1983. Fred Sinowatz, the new chancellor after Bruno Kreisky had resigned, acknowledged the achievements of the past regarding Austria's international status in some short sentences but put the focus completely on the global and domestic economic situation. The International Conference Center, initiated by the Austrian Government in 1967, was only mentioned in a short remark, stating that it

²²³ Michael Koran, "Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making or Moral Good Rediscovered," 26.

²²⁴ Sandra Gintsberger et al., "Österreich in Den Vereinten Nationen," 684.

should be finished in “the most cost-effective way”.²²⁵ Bruckmüller (2005) argues, that the era of Austria’s active foreign policy ended with the resignation of Bruno Kreisky. For a certain period, this strategy gave Austria the illusion of a strong international position.²²⁶ Brix (2019) asks, if this type of foreign policy had been in the national interest of Austria and he argues that after the end of Kreisky’s political career, a change in the priority list of Austria’s foreign policy issues could be noted quite quickly.

The focus on the identity and the position of Austria concerning Europe increased. Even before 1989, the year of the change, it became more important to evaluate which leeway the neutral Austria would be able to achieve in the political and economic integration in Western Europe.²²⁷ During the Cold War, as Bischof (2013) puts it, Austria “was the superpowers’ ‘darling’ of sorts and saw itself playing a ‘special role’ between East and West”. The achievements as a ‘neutral’ intermediary, bridge builder and host of international organizations had made it “an important player among the Neutral & Non Aligned states.”²²⁸ With the end of the Kreisky Era and a SPÖ-FPÖ government taking over, Austria’s foreign policy and international orientation turned back to the focus it had before Kreisky’s chancellorship.²²⁹ Kicker (2002) notes that a new emphasis on the military aspects of Austria’s neutrality and a “back to Europe” characterized Austria’s foreign policy from 1983 onward. This led to a much more bipartisan consensus. She adds, that the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition government under Vranitzky and Mock did not bring new aspects but followed the foreign policy line of the ÖVP governments and that of the great coalition governments of the past. Priorities mentioned in the ‘Regierungserklärung’ (Government Declaration) were neighborhood policy and European integration, namely the relationship to the European Union (EU).²³⁰ While four years earlier, Sinowatz had barely mentioned Austria’s role as a bridge builder and host of international organizations, Vranitzky declared that the previous activities of Austria’s foreign policy to further strengthen Vienna as a UN

²²⁵ Parlament Österreich, “Erklärung der Bundesregierung,” Stenographisches Protokoll 2. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich XVI. Gesetzgebungsperiode, May 31, 1983, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XVI/NRSITZ/2/imfname_144027.pdf.

²²⁶ Ernst Bruckmüller, “Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen,” Das Neue Österreich - Ausstellung zum Staatsvertragsjubiläum, May 2005, https://androsch.com/media/buecher/noe/192-217_Neutralitaet_und_Vereinte_Nationen.pdf, 193.

²²⁷ Emil Brix, “Außenpolitik,” 691.

²²⁸ Günter Bischof, “Of Dwarfs and Giants: From Cold War Mediator to Bad Boy of Europe Austria and the U.S. in the Transatlantic Arena (1990-2013),” Essay, in *Austria’s International Position after the End of the Cold War* (New Orleans, US: UNO Press, 2013), 1–13, 13.

²²⁹ Renate Kicker, “Die Außenpolitik in Der Zweiten Republik,” Demokratiezentrum Wien, November 2002, https://www.demokratiezentrum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/kicker_aussenpolitik.pdf, 8.

²³⁰ Ibid.

headquarters and international conference location will be continued, as well as the participation in peacekeeping operations, advocacy for human rights protection, the continuation of the refugee and asylum policy. The relations with developing countries and the focus on foreign cultural policy and minority policy will be intensified.²³¹

One year after the new Austrian Government, the Vranitzky-Mock coalition, was inaugurated, the year 1989 turned out to become what Ursula Plassnik (2013) calls “the biggest game-changing year in the recent history of Austria.”²³² She remembers that “Austria had to enter a process of continental self-assertion. Even those actively involved in the sea changes of 1989 were slow to understand their full significance.”²³³ In the summer of this year, Austria officially applied to become a member of the European Union, transforming “large parts of domestic and foreign policy into European policy.” On November 9th, the Berlin Wall came down and “pushed Austria from the edge of the “Free World” into the heart of a continent in full re-calibration.”²³⁴ For Austria, the seismic shift of the geopolitical landscape starting in that year of 1989, “marked the end of its beloved self-definition as a builder of bridges and a mediator between East and West. Without East and West, no more demand for go-betweens. We had been deprived of our well-established foreign policy identity.”²³⁵ Bischof (2013) argues that Austria’s answer to this shift in the geopolitical situation was a recalibration of its foreign policy, “it rebuilt traditional ties with its East-Central European and Western Balkans neighbors... and investing enormously in the new markets of formerly communist Eastern Europe while completing its economic integration into the European Economic Community.”²³⁶

In a very symbolic ceremony, the foreign ministers of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia cut through the ‘Iron Curtain’ celebrating the end of the division of Europe. As Brix (2019) puts it, Austria, which had maintained a neutral and very special status with a focus on good relations with the signatory states of the Austrian State Treaty, turned into a normal European country. Finally, Austria joined the EU in 1995 enhancing its relations with Central and Southeast Europe. The bilateral conflict with

²³¹ Renate Kicker, “Die Außenpolitik in Der Zweiten Republik,” Demokratiezentrum Wien, November 2002, https://www.demokratiezentrum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/kicker_aussenpolitik.pdf, 8.

²³² Ursula Plassnik, “On the Road to a Modern Identity: Austria’s Foreign Policy Agenda from the Cold War to the European Union,” 55.

²³³ Ursula Plassnik, “On the Road to a Modern Identity: Austria’s Foreign Policy Agenda from the Cold War to the European Union,” 56.

²³⁴ Ibid., 55.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Günter Bischof, “Of Dwarfs and Giants: From Cold War Mediator to Bad Boy of Europe Austria and the U.S. in the Transatlantic Arena (1990-2013),” 15.

Italy over South Tyrol could be solved, the economic dependence on Germany decreased and -important to note- Austria's foreign cultural diplomacy increased.²³⁷

2.3.2. The Issue of Neutrality

A famous proverb from the times of the Habsburgs says “Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube.”²³⁸ For Austria after 1945, the best protection of its new sovereignty was its marriage with ‘neutrality’.²³⁹ Over time this marriage of convenience seemed to have turned into a love marriage or, more precisely into an ‘ambivalent’ affair. The status of Austria's neutrality or better the interpretation of its status is regarded as a key parameter of impact that accompanies the story of the development of AASP over all four periods. Austria's neutrality was the result of Austria's occupation after 1945 and the precondition for achieving the State Treaty of 1955. An Austrian delegation, led by Chancellor Raab, declared in April 1955 in Moscow, that Austria would oblige itself to permanent neutrality. The Austrian State Treaty was signed one month later, not containing a neutrality clause. But on October 26th the Austrian Parliament passed the Constitutional Law on the neutrality of Austria, stating:

1. For the purpose of the lasting maintenance of her independence, Austria declares of her own free will her perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend this with all means at her disposal.
2. For the securing of this purpose in all future times Austria will not join any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on her territory.²⁴⁰

There is an extensive debate among scholars about the nature and the development of Austria's ‘permanent neutrality’ and how it impacted Austria's foreign policy and in turn Austria's host state policy. Rathkolb (2018) notes that during the government of Julius Raab, it was used for its ‘Ostpolitik’ to manage the frictions of the Cold War and to improve the relations with the Soviet Union and Austria's neighbor states in the east.²⁴¹

²³⁷ Emil Brix, “Außenpolitik,” 692.

²³⁸ “Tu Felix Austria Nube,” Die Welt der Habsburger, accessed April 25, 2024, <https://www.habsburger.net/de/themen/tu-felix-austria-nube>.

²³⁹ Sophia Stöckl, *Austria in the International Community Exploring the Role of Neutrality*, 3.

²⁴⁰ Federal Constitutional Law of October 26, 1955 on the neutrality of Austria, official translation by Gerald Stourzh, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945-1955. Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität*. Studienausgabe, 3rd edition (Graz-Vienna-Cologne: Styria, 1985), 239.

²⁴¹ Oliver Rathkolb, “International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality,” 76.

During the ‘Kreisky Era’, as already mentioned, Austria’s foreign policy was dominated by an ‘active neutrality policy’, focused on security as the top priority. Kreisky was convinced that a strong political standing, the membership in international organizations and the presence of headquarters of international organizations in Austria are better guarantees than to build up military power.²⁴²

Austria’s status as being permanently neutral helped Austria’s diplomacy by providing legitimacy to acting as a bridge builder and intermediary and to achieve its goal of establishing Vienna as a preferred location for the headquarters of international organizations. The decisions to host both the IAEA and OPEC, the early milestones of Austria’s host state policy, were an example of neutrality being a pre-condition for the headquarters decision, and at the same time in return, the decisions strengthened Austria’s neutral status.^{243 244} Over time Austria’s perception of its neutrality changed due to the changing geopolitical background. Koran (2006) notes that due to the radical change, “from then on it was not a priori limited to the wartime circumstances.”²⁴⁵ A re-interpretation had to “actively seek policies” that help “the abolishment of wars as such.”²⁴⁶ From the end of the 1950s until the 1990s, neutrality was foremost an instrument to construct a new national identity of Austria and the narrative for being a bridge builder and host for international organizations, although, as he argues “there was nothing natural or determinate in neutrality for it to become one of Austria’s defining features.”²⁴⁷ Tichy (2016) finds that two major events after the end of the Cold War “led to a fundamental reassessment and to the reduction of the scope of Austria’s permanent neutrality.”²⁴⁸ One was the Iraq/Kuwait conflict. Initially, Austria did not consider itself bound by decisions of the UN Security Council due to its permanent neutrality. This was not put to test during the Cold War. But in 1990 Austria “reconsidered its position” and decided that “use of force authorized by the Security Council did not activate its permanent neutrality, thereby adapting its position to the new international environment after the end of the Cold War.”²⁴⁹ The other event that led to a recalibration of the scope of Austria’s neutrality was its accession to the EU in 1995, including its participation in the CFSP. For this case, Austria added Article 23j to its

²⁴² See also 3.2.3.

²⁴³ Eric Frey, “Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site,” 55.

²⁴⁴ Sophia Stöckl, *Austria in the International Community Exploring the Role of Neutrality*, 11.

²⁴⁵ Michael Koran, “Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making or Moral Good Rediscovered,” 28.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Helmut Tichy, “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality,” New Austrian-Austrian Press & Information Service in the United States Embassy of Austria, August 18, 2016, <https://www.austrianinformation.org/winter-2015-16/wc55d7qi5qrmyzmxh1qkofcmluxvj?rq=Austria%27s+Permanent+Neutrality>.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

constitution, to enable Austria's participation in the CFSP. Tichy (2016) concludes that thereby Austria's neutrality was recalibrated to just the basic elements as laid out in the Constitutional Law of 1955 "non-participation in wars, defense of neutrality with all means, no accession to military alliances, and no foreign military bases in Austria."²⁵⁰

Despite the general lack of interest of Austria's media and public discourse in foreign policy, Austria's neutrality, and its membership in the EU as well as the interdependence of these two issues constantly fueled the domestic political battlefield and consequently the attention of the media. The literature about Austria's domestic political discussion on its neutrality delivers a mixed picture, from significant support to harsh criticism. According to Schmidl (2016), Austrian neutrality has been used to gain domestic public favor and not so much as a political position. Neutrality has been "sold" as a successful security policy.²⁵¹ Luif (2001) describes Austria's neutrality as an "instrument of domestic power politics", indicating its role in influencing the outcome of elections. Over the years political opinions and positions have changed.²⁵² The discussion intensified after the end of the Cold War and at the turn of the millennium even abandoning neutrality was discussed. ÖVP, FPÖ and the Green Party favored abandoning neutrality, while the SPÖ remained an outspoken supporter,²⁵³ Kirk (2004) reports: "Austrian Greens in heated discussion over neutrality."²⁵⁴ The neutrality debate was also driven by issues like an EU army and a possible NATO membership. Austrian leaders like President Thomas Klestil suggested rethinking neutrality in the context of a European future. Austria was not alone with these domestic debates on ending neutrality, also Sweden discussed its neutrality and considered a change on its position.^{255 256}

²⁵⁰ Helmut Tichy, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality."

²⁵¹ Erwin A. Schmidl, "Lukewarm Neutrality in a Cold War? The Case of Austria," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (October 2016): 36–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00679, 50.

²⁵² Paul Luif, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality—Its Origins, Development, and Demise," essay, in *Neutrality in Austria*, ed. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), 129–59, 91.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 92.

²⁵⁴ Lisbeth Kirk, "Austrian Greens in Heated Discussion over Neutrality," EUobserver, November 9, 2004, <https://euobserver.com/news/17718>.

²⁵⁵ "Austrians Begin to Question Neutrality," POLITICO, July 24, 1996, <http://www.politico.eu/article/austrians-begin-to-question-neutrality>.

²⁵⁶ Lisbeth Kirk, "Solana: Neutrality Is a Concept of the Past," EUobserver, January 17, 2001, <https://euobserver.com/>.

2.3.3. From UN to EU

A key aspect of this third period from 1979 to 1995 is the redirection of focus from the global view of politics as represented by the United Nations, to the European view of politics as represented by the European Union. Plassnik (2013) notes, that Austria had “to unlearn thinking in terms of “UN + bilateral world” and learn thinking in terms of “EU + UN + bilateral world,”²⁵⁷ and she adds, that Austria had to realize that it has to act like a “shareholder in a large enterprise. We had to internalize the dimension of Europe as part of our new mental framework.”²⁵⁸ This is a shift from the earlier view on Austria’s position in the world, caused by geopolitical systemic changes. Since 1986 the Austrian Government under Vranitzky (SPÖ) and Foreign Minister Alois Mock recalibrated its European policy and in 1989, despite resistance within the SPÖ and by social-democratic unions, agreed on the application for accession as a full member to the European Union. In 1991, the EU Commission permitted the accession. In his opening speech to the official accession negotiations, Alois Mock praised not only Austria’s economic performance but also that “its historical relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would be a major asset to the Community.”²⁵⁹

As Austria had not been able to take part in the European integration (EEC and NATO) it had positioned itself as a bridge builder, a meeting place for the superpowers and as the third center of UN headquarters.²⁶⁰ But now the geopolitical background had changed. According to Kramer (2017) the key features of this geopolitical background are: (1) The end of the ‘North-South’ dialogue, a proactive Third World policy, prominently promoted by Chancellor Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s. (2) The shift of focus towards Europe, starting under Kreisky’s successor Fred Sinowatz and intensified under the leadership of Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, with Alois Mock as Foreign Minister. Internal political pressure from the ÖVP, advocating for a stronger focus on European matters. (3) European integration as a priority with the result of a reduced role in global and UN engagement. The focus on further integration with the European Community and the aim of full membership

²⁵⁷ Ursula Plassnik, “On the Road to a Modern Identity: Austria’s Foreign Policy Agenda from the Cold War to the European Union,” 57.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 69-70.

²⁵⁹ Lisa Lechner and Melanie Martinz, “Außenwirtschaftspolitik,” Essay, in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, ed. Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, 2022), 227–40, 230.

²⁶⁰ Günter Bischof, “Zweite Republik,” 172.

resulted in a decreased involvement in UN activities and reduced the role of Austria as a hub for diplomatic activities, in particular with Arab nations.²⁶¹

There are also different conclusions on the effect of this refocusing on European integration in the final part of this period, namely towards the end of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Plassnik (2013) is convinced, that despite the great efforts of Austria's diplomacy to achieve the integration into the European Union and prepare Austria for its accession, Austria's commitment to the United Nations was never questioned and did not weaken: "Our membership in the UN Security Council, the 1993 Vienna World Conference for Human Rights, our active engagement in Geneva, New York, and Vienna, as well as our constant efforts to expand the UN headquarters in Vienna are illustrations of this profound and undiminished engagement."²⁶²

Despite Austria's continued efforts towards the United Nations, the perception of the "West" and particularly the US, of Austria's role showed a different picture. According to Bischof, Austria "figured less significantly in US geopolitics" since George H.W. Bush's presidency. On the "mental map of American policy makers," Austria has changed from being perceived as a Central European state to being a part of Western Europe on its way to becoming a full member and therefore part of the European Union (without becoming a member of NATO), while formerly communist states of the former 'Eastern Europe' "were rushing towards NATO and the EU."²⁶³

2.4. Period IV (1995 - Today) A New Balance in the Light of Growing Host State Competition: Austria Being a 'Neutral' EU Member State Recalibrating its Neutrality and its Focus as a Host State

2.4.1. Austria's Arrival in the European Union

The year 1995 marked Austria's accession to the European Union, with its Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Austria became more and more integrated into European policies regarding

²⁶¹ Helmut Kramer, "Zur Bilanz Der Österreichischen Entwicklungspolitik (1945-2017)," Universität Wien, November 2017, https://archeza.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_archeza/Eigene_Texte/Kramer_2017.pdf, 4-5.

²⁶² Ursula Plassnik, "On the Road to a Modern Identity: Austria's Foreign Policy Agenda from the Cold War to the European Union," 87.

²⁶³ Günter Bischof, "Austrian-American from Cold War to Post-Cold War," Austrian Embassy Washington, accessed April 20, 2024, <https://www.archive.austria.org/new-page-2>.

politics, defense and economics, and redirected and aligned its foreign policy with Brussels, losing its tight connections with Washington that existed before but already crumbled under the Reagan Administration.²⁶⁴ Puntischer-Riekmann (2011) notes that Austria adapted its constitutional law to “regulate European decision-making of national actors in a much more extensive way than any other national constitution in Europe,”²⁶⁵ and Bischof (2013) concludes that Austria was on its way to fully integrate with Western Europe in terms of politics and economics, “but never fully aligned its security policy with the Atlantic community—thusly it never fully arrived in the West.”²⁶⁶ Brix (2019) laconically sums up the essence of the situation: The “neutrale Sonderfall” (neutral special case) of Austria, which had to focus on good relations with the signatory states of the Austrian State Treaty since 1955, became a “normaler europäischer Staat” (normal European state) that joined the European Union in 1995 and had the chance to expand its relations with “the new old neighbors” in Central and Southeastern Europe.²⁶⁷

After the initial enthusiasm about Austria's accession, the public perception and domestic political discussion of Austria's situation in the EU developed in a way quite like that of Austria's neutrality. Plasser and Seeber (2011) notice that a majority of Austria's population sees themselves “as ‘ambivalent’ Europeans.”²⁶⁸ Puntischer-Riekmann (2011) calls her contribution to the topic “Austria's Dismal EU Membership: From Enthusiasm to Ambivalence” and discusses the fluctuations in public perception by looking at the results of Eurobarometer polls. Approval of membership was consistently low, about 15% below the EU average. A significant dip down to 30% was noticed in 1997 which continued and might have been influenced in 2000, “when the installment of the conservative radical right coalition provoked “diplomatic measures” of the other fourteen member states against the Austrian government.”²⁶⁹ Regarding the impact of Austria's membership in the EU on Austria's position as a host state and bridge builder, Kramer (2015) sees some advantages that Austria gained by its accession to the EU. He argues that it boosted the traditional active role of Austria within the UN and

²⁶⁴ Günter Bischof, “Austrian-American from Cold War to Post Cold War.”

²⁶⁵ Sonja Puntischer-Riekmann, “Austria's Dismal EU Membership,” essay, in *Global Austria Austria's Place in Europe and the World*, ed. Günter Bischof and Fritz Plasser (New Orleans, USA: UNO Press, 2011), 238–56, 243.

²⁶⁶ Günter Bischof, “Of Dwarfs and Giants: From Cold War Mediator to Bad Boy of Europe Austria and the U.S. in the Transatlantic Arena (1990–2013),” essay, in *Austria's International Position after the End of the Cold War* (New Orleans, US: UNO Press, 2013), 1–13, 15.

²⁶⁷ Emil Brix, “Außenpolitik,” 692.

²⁶⁸ Fritz Plasser and Gilg Seeber, “The Europeanization of Austrian Political Culture,” essay, in *Global Austria Austria's Place in Europe and the World*, ed. Günter Bischof and Fritz Plasser (New Orleans, USA: UNO Press, 2011), 212–37, 216.

²⁶⁹ Sonja Puntischer-Riekmann, “Austria's Dismal EU Membership,” 239.

supported Austria in securing influential positions such as a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2009 and 2010, where it initiated resolutions on human rights and the protection of civilians in conflicts.²⁷⁰ But he also addresses negative impacts such as the fact that Austria had to change its view on foreign policy and security issues from an independent position to a view through the lens of European internal policies, aligning with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which went hand in hand with "the weakening of the political relevance and the narrowing of the scope of application of its neutrality."²⁷¹ Senn et al. (2023) come to the conclusion that in those years Austria has parted ways with an active and global orientated foreign policy and reduced itself into the role of a "pragmatic" observer.²⁷²

The "Austrian Security Strategy 2013" sees an advantage of the EU membership as it formulates that Austria should actively use the opportunities as a bridge builder and intermediary in international conflicts that arise from its position being a member of the EU and at the same time a neutral state.²⁷³ It points to the importance of Austria's host state policy by underlining Austria's success as a host for international organizations and conferences and suggests that Austria should not only support the work of the international organizations and 'arms control instruments' headquartered in Vienna but also further extend its role as "internationaler Amtssitz." (International Headquarters)²⁷⁴ Ten years later in a study by the Austria Institute for European and Security Policy (2023) one hundred experts from science, diplomacy and military were asked about Austria's status as a bridge builder and intermediary and its role as a trusted 'neutral actor'. A total of 64,17% of respondents said that this status of Austria as a bridge builder and intermediary 'does not' or 'does not really' apply. Regarding the status as a 'neutral actor' towards non-EU states, 31,43% of respondents said that Austria's position within the EU has strongly influenced Austria's credibility as a 'neutral actor' and 33,33% said that the credibility has been lost totally.²⁷⁵

The domestic discussion and ambivalence about Austria's international position as a member of the European Union continued as well as the related debate about the

²⁷⁰ Helmut Kramer, "Austrian Foreign Policy 1995-2015," *Österreichische Zeitschrift Für Politikwissenschaft* 45, no. 2 (September 12, 2016): 49–57, <https://doi.org/10.15203/ozp.1372.vol45iss2>, 50.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, "Die Außenpolitik Österreichs in Der Zweiten Republik: Befunde und Empfehlungen," 5.

²⁷³ BKA, "Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie," 20.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 12.

²⁷⁵ Christoph Schwarz and Adam Urosevic, "Österreichs Neutralität - Rolle und Optionen in Einer Sich Verändernden Weltordnung," Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, September 2023, <https://www.aies.at/publikationen/>, 1.

importance of its neutrality. A survey in 2019 shows that a vast majority consider Austrian neutrality important, and there is a strong preference for maintaining neutrality over joining military defense unions like NATO.²⁷⁶ This has not changed in the recent years. A survey done in April 2024 by the Foreign Policy Lab at the Department of Political Science of the University of Innsbruck, shows that 72,28% of Austrians think that in case of a military conflict the other EU members should help Austria, but only 13,58% think that Austria should help other EU states by providing armed troops if those are attacked.²⁷⁷

2.4.2. The Case of OSCE

The start of the fourth period of Austria's *Amtssitzpolitik* marks another example of how persistent, longtime diplomatic engagement and the willingness to be an 'issue leader' can lead to hosting an international organization. The establishment of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) is the result of a process that culminated in the conclusion of the Helsinki Act of 1975 (Helsinki Accords) and led to the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as it was known until 1994.²⁷⁸ It was Austria, as the first neutral country, who proclaimed interest in Finland's memorandum of 1969 which would set out the path for a conference on security and cooperation in Europe.²⁷⁹ In 1994, at the Budapest Summit, it was decided to transform the CSCE into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and to move the secretariat to Vienna, Austria. Thus, in the following year, Vienna became home to the newly formed OSCE having already hosted the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation.²⁸⁰ In the first years, the OSCE had offices in the Kärntnerringhof while the main bodies such as the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation were based at the Hofburg Congress Center. Following a 2002 decision at the Porto Ministerial Council, Austria and the City of

²⁷⁶ "OGFE-Umfrage: EU-Armee für Österreicherinnen derzeit kein Thema," Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, October 5, 2020, https://www.oegfe.at/umfragen/eu_armee_umfrage.

²⁷⁷ Franz Eder, "Wehrbereitschaft ist kaum vorhanden," Foreign Policy Lab, April 22, 2024, <https://foreignpolicylab.at/news/outreach/2024-04-22-VN-wehrbereitschaft/>.

²⁷⁸ Wolfgang Zellner, "Österreich in der OSZE," Essay, in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, ed. Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023), 729–44, 729.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ OSCE, "OSCE Secretariat Wallnerstrasse Vienna 2017," <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/b/28969.pdf>.

Vienna offered the Palais Palffy at Wallnerstrasse 6 near the Hofburg for the Secretariat of the OSCE described as giving the OSCE “a face.”²⁸¹ The € 26.1 million renovation, overseen by the Federal Office of Historical Monuments, was jointly covered by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor, the city of Vienna and OSCE. This relocation meant more formal and suitable headquarters to symbolize its statute and role in international affairs.²⁸²

Stabilizing the relation of nation-states is an important goal in maintaining peace and security internationally, nationally, and regionally, which is related to both the parameter of the ‘Security Rationale’ and of the ‘International Reputation and Good Service’. During the Cold War with its ‘neo-realist’ thinking, as Borchert and Zellner (2003) argue, stabilization meant to extend the influence on both sides of this bilateral system of East-West, “as long as these goals could be achieved, the quality of the political systems of the states involved was secondary”²⁸³ This changed with the end of the cold war and the focus “shifted from the interstate to the intrastate source of conflict.”²⁸⁴ To address these challenges, the OSCE has established key special institutions like the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Representative on Freedom of the Media as well as numerous field missions contributing to the efforts of the organization. Borchert and Zellner (2003) conclude that the OSCE, “with its comprehensive security agenda, a primarily civilian focus, and a light institutional structure, is one of the most cost-effective (though easily sidelined) international organizations in the area of providing stability in zones of turmoil.”²⁸⁵ Another institution, not part of OSCE but related to this new view on security issues and the efforts in arms control and headquartered in Vienna is the ‘Wassenaar Arrangement’, focusing on the export controls of conventional weapons and ‘dual use’ goods. It is the successor to the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which originated in the Cold War and ceased in 1994. Its founding assembly with 33 participating states took place in 1996 in Vienna, where the organization's secretariat is located. Now, 41 states are members of

²⁸¹ OSCE, “OSCE Secretariat Wallnerstrasse Vienna 2017.”

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Heiko Borchert and Wolfgang Zellner, “The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and its Contribution to the Stabilization of Central and Eastern European Countries,” Researchgate.net, January 2003, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228366170_The_Organization_for_Security_and_Co-operation_in_Europe_OSCE_and_its_Contribution_to_the_Stabilization_of_Central_and_Eastern_European_Countries, 3.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 2.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

this institution which acts in the same consensus modus as the OSCE.²⁸⁶ Austria's "Security Strategy 2013" stresses that the OSCE traditionally stands for a "comprehensive security concept" and that Austria, as the host state, would actively promote the further development of OSCE as a multi-dimensional security organization and contribute to all negotiations and field missions of it.²⁸⁷ The question about the future of this international organization has been raised several times over the decades. On January 25, 2023, OSCE Secretary General Helga Schmid met with Austria's Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg. They discussed Austria's ongoing support for OSCE and its important role as a platform for dialogue in the time of Russia's war against Ukraine. In this meeting and then again in a special meeting of the OSCE in February 2024, he underscored the importance of the OSCE as a vital forum for European security and reaffirmed Austria's commitment. "With Vienna as the headquarters of the OSCE, Austria has a special responsibility to protect the organization as a dialogue forum for European security. Especially given the war of aggression and the numerous current crises, we need a strong, functional OSCE."²⁸⁸

2.4.3. Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria

After the early days of AASP with its focus on security aspects and Austria's international standing, the domestic political discussion started in the 1970s to focus on the question of the costs for the Austrian state and its taxpayers connected with hosting international organizations and conferences. In the mid 1970s after a bipartisan vote in 1972 supporting the construction of a conference center for the VIC, the Peoples Party started to campaign against the project. As Frey (2011) notes, "it is fair to say that the campaign by the People's Party against the conference center was driven by short-term political calculations and an appeal to populism rather than a long-term vision."²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ "The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies," The Wassenaar Arrangement, June 22, 2021, <https://www.wassenaar.org/>.

²⁸⁷ BKA, "Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie," Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, July 2013, <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/themen/sicherheitspolitik/sicherheitsstrategie.html>, 15.

²⁸⁸ BMEIA, "Important Dialogue Forum: Foreign Minister Schallenberg at the Special Meeting of the OSCE," Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs Press Department, February 23, 2024, <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/ministerium/presse/aktuelles/2024/02/important-dialogue-forum-foreign-minister-schallenberg-at-the-special-meeting-of-the-osce>.

²⁸⁹ Eric Frey, "Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site, 154.

In his speech at the opening ceremony of the VIC (UNO-City) in August 1979, Austria's Vice-Chancellor Hannes Androsch addressed the economic dimensions and the added value of this project. He argued that this largest construction project in the country was completed in just 6 years, almost 9 billion Schilling (654 Mio €) were invested, 4 billion (291 Mio €) below the estimate. He underlined, that the decisions on this were made by various Austrian governments. The construction helped the economic development of Vienna and Austria in the 1970s and provided around 3,000 jobs, especially in economically difficult times. The awarding of 500 contracts worth 5.7 billion Schilling (414 Mio €) benefited many medium and small businesses. About 90% of the construction contracts were awarded domestically, underlining the strength and competitiveness of the Austrian economy as well as the competence of its engineers and workers.²⁹⁰ In the same year, the yearly report of the Foreign Ministry extensively presented the activities connected with the VIC and the conference, arguing that, while in the year 1956 Vienna had a total of 42 international congresses, there were already 380 in 1979.²⁹¹

Nevertheless, in late 1981 the Peoples Party initiated a "Volksbefragung" (public consultation) with the aim that the conference project should be canceled, and the cheaper 'Hofburg'-extension should be realized instead. As the Socialist Party (SPÖ) in Vienna called for a boycott of this referendum, only 16% of the electorate participated.²⁹² A national 'Volksbegehren' (public referendum) against the project was initiated soon after by the Peoples Party (ÖVP). The claim of this initiative was "for 12,000 apartments, secure jobs in all of Austria, and against the unnecessary conference site" which turned out to be a greater success. 1.36 million voters signed this "Volksbegehren."²⁹³ The Austrian Government under Kreisky stuck to its plans and continued with the completion of the conference center. The costs were estimated at around 4.5 billion Schilling (327 Mio €), whereas the Peoples Party calculated an amount of 7.5 billion (545 Mio €) for the construction. Finally, the project came in with total costs of 3.5 billion, roughly one billion under budget.²⁹⁴ Despite the fight of the domestic political players about the costs of all these 'host state projects', the further development of Vienna as a host city and

²⁹⁰ Hannes Androsch, "Rede Zur Eröffnung des Internationalen Konferenzzentrums (UNO-City) in Wien 23. August 1979," androsch.com, August 23, 1979, <https://androsch.com/media/vortraege/79.08.23.Red.HA.Konferenzzentrums.pdf>.

²⁹¹ BMEIA, "Außenpolitischer Bericht 1979," Parlament Österreich, 1979, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XV/III/43/imfname_555903.pdf, 180.

²⁹² Eric Frey, "Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site," 154.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 155.

location for international conferences was successful. The track record of the conference center, despite its operating profit problems over time is impressive and the number of headquarters and international offices of international organizations as well as of NGOs and QIOs grew significantly and delivered an enormous economic effect.²⁹⁵ One of the largest meetings was the Conference on Human Rights which attracted over 5000 attendees from all over the world and medical conferences are even attracting up to 10.000 visitors.²⁹⁶ Frey (2011) notes that “given the enormous indirect benefits for business in Vienna, the conference center is no longer subject to any significant controversy,”²⁹⁷ and he adds that the effect of “making the city more cosmopolitan” should also be considered as an added value, “both the presence of international organizations and the brisk conference business contributed to that fortunate development.”²⁹⁸ This effect alone can be regarded as added value as it contributes to the overall attractiveness of the City of Vienna and Austria in general. To prove that the economic effects and the added value from hosting international organizations are worth the efforts and costs for Austria and the regional host locations, particularly the City of Vienna, several studies, commissioned by the BMEIA have tried to calculate the economic and added value effect of Austria’s Amtssitzpolitik. Based on a study from 2009 which had been updated in 2014 and in 2016, Ernest and Young researched the economic effect of being a host state. The results show that, in 2014, multilateral organizations based in Austria employed 6,044 individuals whose expenditures and income used within Austria, increased from €557.6 million in 2012 to €562.9 million in 2014.²⁹⁹ The increase in net expenditures indicated an economic contribution that exceeded the growth of the country’s GDP during the analysis period. The study further notes the growth in conference tourism (the number of conference days increased 34% from 2010-2014, largely driven by the IAEA and the economic impact of conference tourism of this growth, increasing GDP contribution of 16% (2010-2016). The numbers presented underline the growing economic significance of multilateral and bilateral institutions in Austria, especially in terms of employment and expenditure as well as the impact of conference tourism on the national economy.³⁰⁰ In 2020 (as an update of a

²⁹⁵ Ludovica Moro, “The (Dis)Advantageous Relationship between International Organisations and Their Host Countries: The Austrian Experience.”

²⁹⁶ Eric Frey, “Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site,” 156.

²⁹⁷ Eric Frey, “Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site,” 156.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 158.

²⁹⁹ Ernst & Young, “Die Umwegrentabilität internationaler Organisationen in Österreich,” BMEIA, April 2016, https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Publikationen/BMEIA_Studie_2016.pdf, 2.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

report from 2018) the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) presented the economic effects of international organizations in Austria. According to this study, the main parameters that indicate the impact on Austria's economy show constant growth. Compared to the preceding study in 2018, the annual gross value added (€ 1.35 billions) showed an increase of 3%. 18.940 jobs in Austria annually are supported by international institutions in Austria, an increase of 5% compared to the 2018 study.³⁰¹ The study also shows that these effects are not only benefitting Vienna but have a 'spillover effect' on other federal states. Even though these organizations and their staff are exempted from Austrian tax, the Austrian authorities annually collect about € 527 million in tax revenues that are related to the activities of international organizations and associated entities.³⁰² In connection with the publication of these figures in 2020, the Foreign Minister announced that Austria will introduce a new host state law very soon as it is important for Austria to be competitive as a host state and that the "Amtssitz Vienna" (host-city Vienna) should be further developed into a hub for safety and sustainability with a focus on energy, development and climate diplomacy.³⁰³

2.4.4. The Role of NGOs and QIOs

As already addressed in the literature review, in 1979 a "NGO liaison function" at the United Nations Office in Vienna was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Austria, like other host states has reacted to the increasing cooperation between IOs and NGOs. It has become an important issue in the fourth period of AASP and Austria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has communicated a clear position on QIOs and international NGOs by declaring that they are "an expression of the efforts of civil society and, enrich the thematic work of International

³⁰¹ Jan Kluge and Alexander Schnabel, "Die Ökonomischen Effekte internationaler Organisationen in Österreich - Update 2020," BMEIA, December 21, 2020, https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Europa/Die_oekonomischen_Effekte_internationaler_Organisationen_in_OEsterreich_-_Update_2020.pdf, 5.

³⁰² Jan Kluge and Alexander Schnabel, "Die Ökonomischen Effekte internationaler Organisationen in Österreich - Update 2020," 5.

³⁰³ Ulrike Botzenhart, "1,35 Mrd. Euro Wertschöpfung durch Diplomatie in Österreich," Kurier Online, December 29, 2020, <https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/135-mrd-euro-wertschoepfung-durch-diplomatie-in-oesterreich/401141652#:~:text=Den%20jährlichen%20Bruttowertschoepfungseffekt%20bezeichnen%20die,Zuwachs%20von%20rund%20drei%20Prozent>.

Organizations.”³⁰⁴ With the new Host State Law (Amtssitzgesetz), Austria provides a structured legal framework to strengthen Austria’s position as a host state for this type of organizations. Under this law, NGOs can apply to be recognized as an international NGO or a Quasi-International Organization. If the organization meets the criteria, the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs can grant the legal status of an international NGO or a Quasi- International Organization by decree, providing significant benefits comparable to those of international organizations.³⁰⁵ Austria has successfully attracted numerous QIOs to establish headquarters in Vienna. Notable examples are Sustainable Energy for All, the Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), and the Ban Ki-Moon Centre for Global Citizens. Currently, nine international NGOs have been granted this special status. Appendix A presents a list of all IOs and QIOs that have their headquarters in Austria.

2.4.5. The Special Case of the King Abdullah Center (KAICCID)

In 2012, the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID) was established in Vienna, aimed to promote dialogue and understanding among different religions and cultures. The initial partner states were Saudi Arabia, Austria, Spain, and the Vatican as an observer. The mission statement stipulates that the center is a unique intergovernmental organization with “a dual governance structure, a Council of Parties made up of states, and a Board of Directors made up of religious leaders” uniting “followers of different religious traditions, religious leaders and policymakers”.³⁰⁶ Soon after the establishment of this new international organization it became the target of criticism and calls for disengagement.³⁰⁷ One point of criticism was the contradiction between the values promoted and the human rights violations of its main promoter and financier, the Saudi state, questioning the integrity and effectiveness of the dialogue center. Public protests against the center were triggered by the case of Raif Badawi, a Saudi blogger and by the

³⁰⁴ BMEIA, “Non-Governmental Organizations and Quasi-International Organizations,” Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, accessed April 26, 2024, <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/international-organisations-in-austria/ngos-and-quasi-international-organizations>.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ KAICIID, “Who We Are,” KAICIID Dialogue Center, accessed April 26, 2024, <https://www.kaiciid.org/who-we-are>.

³⁰⁷ APA, “Abdullah-Zentrum: Anzeige Und Proteste Zur Eröffnung,” *diepresse.com*, November 26, 2012, https://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/1316929/AbdullahZentrum_Anzeige-und-Proteste-zur-Eroeffnung.

case of 18-year-old Murtaja Qureiris, addressed in the public protests.³⁰⁸ In June 2019, the Austrian Parliament backed a motion that asked the Foreign Ministry to terminate the headquarters agreement with the King Abdullah Centre.

Soon after, the Foreign Ministry reacted with the message that it will act accordingly as “there is a clear decision of parliament which must be implemented,” and “all legally necessary steps” will be considered.³⁰⁹ Nevertheless, Austria’s former President Heinz Fischer said in newspaper interviews that all arguments should be reconsidered, as well as “the impact of such a decision on Vienna and Austria as an established seat of International Organizations.”³¹⁰ Critical comments in the press referred to possible damage to Austria’s position as a host state of international organizations. The daily newspaper ‘Die Presse’ argued, that “diplomatically, there is fear that the excellent reputation of Austria as host state of international organizations would take damage,”³¹¹ and ‘Der Standard’ wrote in a comment that “any criticism of Saudi Arabia is legitimate, any rejection of the Abdullah Center is understandable” but the question in the first place is a policy that brought it here and now does not want it any longer.³¹² The reason for this change of mind is not to be found in Saudi Arabia, as its position and practice on human rights were well known, but rather in Austria itself. “Any international organization that is thinking of setting up in Vienna should be warned.”³¹³ In 2021, the member states (Saudi Arabia, Austria, and Spain) mutually decided that KAICIID would leave Austria. The statutes state that with the organization's departure, the headquarters agreement and other relevant contracts will automatically expire, therefore Austria does not have to terminate it. A face-saving solution for all sides and Austria remains a member of the KAICIID. New to the group is the state that now hosts the center, Portugal.³¹⁴ In a meeting with his counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud

³⁰⁸ Ulrike Lunacek and Hannes Tretter, “Abdullah-Zentrum in Wien: Ein frommer Wunsch,” Die Presse, March 15, 2021, <https://www.diepresse.com/5951720/abdullah-zentrum-in-wien-ein-frommer-wunsch?two-term-flow=true>.

³⁰⁹ Reuters, “Austria to Shut Saudi-Backed Religious Dialogue Center in Rights Protest,” reuters.com, June 12, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-saudi-idUSKCN1TD2DR>.

³¹⁰ APA, “Alt-Bundespräsident Fischer gegen Ausstieg aus Abdullah-Zentrum,” DER STANDARD, July 6, 2019, <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000105995035/alt-bundespraesident-fischer-gegen-ausstieg-aus-abdullah-zentrum>.

³¹¹ Matthias Edtmayer, “Schließung des Abdullah-Zentrums rechtlich möglich,” Die Presse, October 30, 2019, <https://www.diepresse.com/5714543/schliessung-des-abdullah-zentrums-rechtlich-moeglich>.

³¹² Gudrun Harrer, “Abdullah-Zentrum zieht ab: Wiens Geschenk an Genf,” DER STANDARD, June 19, 2020, <https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000118199985/abdullah-zentrum-zieht-ab-wiens-geschenk-an-genf>.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Gudrun Harrer, “Abdullah-Zentrum schließt in Wien endgültig seine Pforten,” DER STANDARD, May 14, 2022, <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000135724269/abdullah-zentrum-schliesst-in-wien-endgueltig-seine-pforten>.

from Saudi Arabia in June 2021, Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg did not mention any reasons for the closing of the center, he just noted that the “intercultural and interreligious dialogue is to be continued even after the relocation of the King Abdullah Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID)” and that “a professional solution was found in this matter, which was supported by all sides.”³¹⁵

2.4.6. Host State Competition, Public Diplomacy, and the Attractivity of Locations

There has always been competition between states to attract international organizations. In 1965, OPEC chose Vienna as the seat of its headquarters because Switzerland did not want to grant the new international organization a headquarters agreement, in contrast, Austria was willing to meet the request for a headquarters agreement. Whenever an international organization was looking for a headquarters seat in a city, there was a certain degree of competition between cities and between states. But in the early years after 1945, the number of available competitors was small. The dominating international organization was the UN and only two cities were hosting it, New York, and Geneva. Still, when the UN decided to establish its third headquarters in Vienna, competition was limited. Then in 1972, not very long after the decision for Vienna, the United Nations chose Nairobi to host its headquarters for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It was the first time that a UN headquarters was based in the Global South. But it was not a decision ‘out of the box’. The genesis of the selection of Nairobi dates to the mid-1960s when Kenya tried to attract the United Nations Industrial Development Organization but failed. This time, their approach rallied key states of the Global South behind them and in December 1972, their bid was supported by 128 states with no single vote against it.³¹⁶

Höll (2023) reports that in the early 1970s, Austria's efforts to locate international organizations in Vienna started a competition conflict between Geneva and Vienna. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the Organization of the

³¹⁵ BMEIA, “Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg Welcomes Saudi Arabian Counterpart Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al Saud,” Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs Press Department, June 22, 2021, <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-ministry/press/news/2021/06/foreign-minister-alexander-schallenberg-welcomes-saudi-arabian-counterpart-prince-faisal-bin-farhan-al-saud>.

³¹⁶ UNEP, “How Nairobi Came to Host UNEP’s Headquarters,” United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), May 3, 2022, <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/how-nairobi-came-host-uneps-headquarters#:~:text=With%20this%20united%20front%2C%20Nairobi's,institution%20in%20Nairobi%2C%20Kenya.>”.

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) had moved their headquarters to Austria. Not only did Austria expand its activities in the United Nations, but it had also contributed “blue helmets”-troops to the UN peacekeeping missions and Kurt Waldheim had been at the head of the UN since 1971 as Secretary General in New York. These developments and the fear that with the construction of the VIC other institutions might be interested in moving to Vienna led to tensions between Vienna and Geneva for some time but these could be resolved after a few years.³¹⁷ Nevertheless, until the 1990s, Switzerland considered itself, particularly the City of Geneva, as the unchallenged center of multilateral diplomacy.³¹⁸ As already pointed out in 2.1.4 Austria has developed a favorable position in the global competition of host states, but discovered in the fourth period that AASP “as a tradition”³¹⁹ is not enough. Over the course of this fourth period of AASP, substantial changes of Austria’s legal framework can be observed, culminating in a new host state law in 2021 that further improved the situation of IOs and QIOs in Austria.

2.4.7. Austria’s New Host State Law, the ‘Amtssitzgesetz’ (Headquarters Law)

Department I.4 in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, led by Ambassador Klaus Famira, which is specifically responsible for Austria’s host state policy (Amtssitzpolitik), organizes international conferences of states and other meetings and takes care of the settlement of international organizations and other international institutions in Austria, providing organizational support for the Vienna International Center(VIC) as well as the International Office and Conference Center Vienna AG and the Austrian Conference Center Vienna AG. The department is also responsible for looking after international schools.³²⁰ In 2021, existing legal regulations on privileges and exemptions of international and quasi-international organizations as well as other international non-governmental organizations in Austria were revised and merged into the “Amtssitzgesetz” (ASG), which regulates not only classical international

³¹⁷ Othmar Höll, “Die Außenpolitik gegenüber Deutschland, der Schweiz und Liechtenstein,” Essay, in *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, ed. Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst (Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023), 447–80, 464.

³¹⁸ EDA, “Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die von der Schweiz als Gaststaat gewährten Vorrechte, Immunitäten und Erleichterungen sowie finanziellen Beiträge.”

³¹⁹ Jodok Troy, “Amtssitzpolitik,” 252.

³²⁰ Ibid., 251.

organizations but also quasi-international organizations such as the Ban Ki-Moon Center for Global Citizens (BKMC). There are also regulations for international conferences, as they are equally important for Austria's role as a host country.³²¹ The objectives of this new host state law are to further develop Vienna into a hub for security and sustainability with a focus on energy, sustainable development, and climate diplomacy. This contemporary and comprehensive host state law should further increase the attractiveness of Austria as a location.³²² It should support the Federal Government in proactively promoting the establishment of international organizations, institutions, and non-governmental organizations as well as the holding of international conferences. The new law replaces the legal regulations on the privileges and exemptions as laid down in the Federal Law of December 14, 1977, on the granting of privileges and immunities to international organizations (BGBl. Nr. 677/1977) and the Federal Law of 1992 on the granting of privileges to non-governmental international organizations (BGBl. Nr. 174/1992).³²³

³²¹ Jodok Troy, "Amtssitzpolitik," 252.

³²² Parlament Österreich, Ministerialentwurf betreffend Bundesgesetz zur Stärkung Österreichs als internationaler Amtssitz- und Konferenzstandort (Amtssitzgesetz – ASG), November 13, 2020, <https://www.parlament.gv.at/gegenstand/XXVII/ME/76?selectedStage=100Motivenbericht>.

³²³ Parlament Österreich, "Allgemeiner Teil zu Artikel 1 (Amtssitzgesetz - ASG)," Parlamentsdirektion, December 17, 2020, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVII/I/609/fname_856568.pdf.

Chapter 3

Empirical Results (Expert Interviews)

3.1. Results of the Expert Interviews Regarding Impact and Change of Impact of the Parameters of the Conceptual Framework

As laid out in the methodology chapter, the evaluation of the results of the empirical research on the impact and the change of impact of the identified key parameters will be based on three scores: A ‘Weighted Average Impact Score’(WAIS), a ‘Weighted Average Change Score’ (WACS) and a ‘Composite Score’(CS). As a first step, the WAIS is aggregated for each parameter. The second step is the calculation of a score for the change of impact of each parameter (WACS) and in the third step the CS is calculated, that combines the data on the overall impact with the change of impact of the parameters over time. The data on the impact of parameters is exhibited in Table 1 and the data on the change of impact in Table 2.

Table 1. Response of Experts on the Impact of the Parameters

Parameter of Impact on AASP	Weighted Average Impact Score (out of 5)	No Impact	Impact	Strong Impact	No Answer
International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Location	4.38	0.00%	30.77%	69.23%	0.00%
The ‘Security Rationale’ (Security, Sovereignty, and Independence)	4.31	7.69%	15.38%	76.92%	0.00%
The Geopolitical Systemic Changes in the International System	4.23	0.00%	38.46%	61.54%	0.00%
The Status of Neutrality	4.17	0.00%	38.46%	53.85%	7.69%
International Reputation and “Good Service”	4.08	0.00%	46.15%	53.85%	0.00%
Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria	3.54	7.69%	53.85%	38.46%	0.00%
The Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations	2.31	38.46%	38.46%	23.08%	0.00%
Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements	2.15	38.46%	46.15%	15.38%	0.00%
The Role of Membership European Union	2.08	46.15%	30.77%	23.08%	0.00%

Source: Results based on the completed questionnaires (see appendix B)

Table 2. Response of Experts on the Change of Impact of Parameters Over Time

Change of Impact of Parameters on AASP	Impact decreased over time	Impact stayed the same	Impact increased over time	No Answer
International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Location	15.38%	23.08%	61.54%	0.00%
The 'Security Rationale' (Security, Sovereignty, and Independence)	53.85%	30.77%	15.38%	0.00%
The Geopolitical Systemic Changes in the International System	53.85%	30.77%	15.38%	0.00%
The Status of Neutrality	61.54%	38.46%	0.00%	0.00%
International Reputation and "Good Service"	15.38%	61.54%	23.08%	0.00%
Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria	7.69%	7.69%	76.92%	7.69%
The Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations	7.69%	61.54%	23.08%	7.69%
Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements	15.38%	69.23%	7.69%	7.69%
The Role of Membership European Union	23.08%	38.46%	38.46%	0.00%

Source: Results based on the completed questionnaires (see appendix B)

Table 3 presents the Composite Score (CS) of impact, that combines the data on the perceived impact of parameters on AASP with the perceived change on this impact over time, indicating if it was a positive change (increase) of the parameter or a negative (decrease) one. This additional score is added as it helps to evaluate the overall influence of each parameter on AASP by considering both its significance and its trend over time.

The results show that all parameters have changed to a certain degree. The parameters with the highest Composite Score (CS) are 'Economic Effects and Added Value' parameter with the highest positive score of 2,66 and 'International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Locations' parameter with a positive score of 2,02. The group of parameters with a significant decrease of impact on AASP over time are 'Geopolitical Systemic Changes' with a CS of -1,61, the 'Security Rationale' (achieving security, sovereignty, and independence) with a CS of -1,64 and the Status of Austria's Neutrality with the highest negative CS of -2,59. In the following the results are addressed in detail for each parameter.

Table 3. The Composite Score of Impact and Change of Impact of Parameters

Parameters	Composite Score
Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria	+2.66
International Competition, Public Diplomacy, Attractivity of Location	+2.02
Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations	+0.39
International Reputation and 'Good Service'	+0.33
Relationship/Membership European Union	+0.31
Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements	-0.17
The Geopolitical Systemic Changes in the International System	-1.61
Achieving Security, Sovereignty, and Independence	-1.64
Status of Austria's Neutrality	-2.59

Source: Results based on the completed questionnaires (see appendix B)

3.1.1. International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Locations

The interviewed experts regard the parameter of 'International Competition' as the one with the strongest impact on AASP. With a WAIS of 4.38 out of 5 it is ranked higher as the parameter of 'Security Rational'. Regarding 'International Competition' the experts note that "we are observing an increasing international competition to host UN-IOs to boost the standing of the host countries."³²⁴ Another expert comments that the increase in international competition might be important for (future) employees of international organizations, "but not for the political decision-makers who decide on the location of an IO" and one added that "considerations such as in the international labor market and accessibility are more important than reputation and branding." Another expert reminds that "Kreisky, in particular was convinced that Vienna is an excellent location for this international competition to host IOs."

Regarding the change of impact of this parameter, 61.54% of the experts think that it increased over time, 23.08% that it stayed the same and only 15.38% say that the impact decreased.³²⁵ The comments state that "competition has become fierce" and that the character of "attractiveness changed over years". While "stability and neutrality in

³²⁴ This and all following comments with quotation marks, are from the panel of experts, but anonymized.

³²⁵ See Table 2.

the 1960s” were important arguments in the competition to host IOs, “international workforce and cosmopolitan lifestyle (are) more important nowadays.”

One expert comments on the ‘Cluster Effect’, that is mentioned in the literature as being an important aspect of the competition parameter that “the IOs based in Vienna primarily focus on two topics: security and sustainability. To further increase synergies in this regard, the Austrian strategy for attracting new IOs, QIOs and NGOs focuses on organizations with these areas of focus.”

3.1.2. The Security Rationale

The parameter ‘Security Rationale’ is ranked second in impact on AASP with a score of 4.31 out of 5. The experts underline the fact that the impact initially was high, “relevant in the beginning” and that “the presence of international organizations in Austria has provided a strong message to the international community that Austria intends to be an active member-state in the IOs.” But some experts think that it had a “rather limited impact. Sovereignty and independence were already achieved when ‘Amtssitz’- policy started” and that “Austria would not become an important meeting place before it was sovereign and master of its own house.”

A majority of 53.85% of the interviewed experts think that the impact of this parameter decreased and 30.77% that it stayed the same. Only 15.38% of the experts think that the impact of this parameter increased.³²⁶ The experts note on the change of impact of the ‘Security Rationale’ that it was “relevant in the 50ies and 60ies” and that it was “strong during (the) first years” but it is “overestimated in recent years.”

3.1.3. Geopolitical Systemic Changes

Ranked third in impact on AASP is the parameter of “Geopolitical Systemic Changes” with an impact score of 4.23 out of 5. Experts see this parameter “connected to neutrality” and one argues that “The thaw in global relations has had an significant impact on Austria regaining her independence and another adds that “the agreement between superpowers was easier to find for Vienna than other seat states, in particular during Cold

³²⁶ See Table 2.

War and it is also commented that “Austria's geopolitical location in the Cold War was crucial; having suffered a ten-year Soviet occupation, made neutral Austria an important meeting place and attractive to the Soviets (they knew Vienna from the occupation).”

The impact of geopolitical systemic changes is, according to the opinion of the expert panel decreasing. 53.85% of the interviewed experts think that the impact decreased over time, commenting that it was “stronger during Cold War. Decreased since 1990s.” 30.77% think that it stayed the same, only one expert thinks that the impact of the geopolitical systemic changes increased over time.

3.1.4. The Status of Neutrality

Despite Austria's neutrality being one of the most often debated parameters in the academic literature, the experts rank the impact of this parameter only in the middle field of the nine parameters regarding its impact on AASP. Comments reach from “Some influence during Cold War and after its end (for some member states, e.g. Russia in OSCE,” and “used as argument during the Cold War” to “continuously high, with a temporary drop in early 2000s.” It is noted that “the Austrian parliament decided in favor of an armed neutrality, only once the occupying nations had left its territory,” and that “Austrian neutrality was important to the Soviet side as they saw themselves the "godfathers" of Austrian neutrality,” but as another expert notes, it has “limited influence most recently.” There is a clear answer given on the question about the role of Austria's neutrality and its impact on AASP: None of the interviewed experts think that its impact increased. 61.54 % think that the impact of the status of Austria's neutrality decreased, while 38.46% say it stayed the same.³²⁷ The decrease over time is commented as “stronger during Cold War and during the establishment of OSCE. Weak from 1990s till 2023. Might increase most recently.”

³²⁷ See Table 4.

3.1.5. International Reputation and 'Good Service'

The parameter of 'International Reputation and Good Service' is ranked in the middle field too with a weighted average impact score of 4.08 out of 5. It is mentioned that the impact is "decreasing over time" but that "Austria's role as a place of international dialogue has earned significant reputation" and that "the 1961 and 1979 summits added to Austria's reputation as a 'bridge builder' between East and West as neutral Austria was becoming an important meeting place in the Cold War." One expert added that this parameter still can be considered as a "strong motivation in recent years. Sometimes Austrians oscillate between over- and underestimating their own reputation."

Most experts (61.54%) think that the impact of this parameter stayed the same over time and 23.08% that its impact increased. Two of the experts stated that in their opinion the impact decreased. One comment for the steadiness of the impact of this parameter said that the international reputation had been a "strong motivation for Austria during all periods. Motivation and area of service changed over years (disarmament 1970's, international conventions 1960's, service for democratization movements of Eastern Europe in 1990s...)." Another expert notes that this parameter is "increasingly used as argument for international candidacies (e.g. SC)."

3.1.6. Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria

The third parameter in the middle range of impact is 'Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria' with a weighted average of 3.54 out of 5. The experts comment that this is an "underestimated effect in general public and among decision makers. Value added is often taken for granted," and that "the economic impact of international organizations is not to be underestimated and whenever Vienna gets highly ranked internationally these international organizations come in handy in the assessments." The comments also acknowledge that "the presence of a significant number of international civil servants contributes both to the goodwill as well as to the local economy." Despite its average overall WAIS, the expert panel considers this parameter to be the one that has the most increase of impact among all parameters. Nearly 77% (76.92%) say that the impact increased, commenting that "most recently this is one of the main motivations

(how much does a new organization in Vienna bring to the Republic?).” Thus giving this parameter the highest CS.³²⁸

3.1.7. The Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations

The role of non-governmental and quasi-international organizations has an impact score of 2.31 out of 5 and experts comment that “the presence of NGOs and quasi-IOs is rather a consequence of the presence of international organizations than an effect of it.” It is noted that “the UN Human Rights Conference, 1993, in Vienna was among the first international conferences with an important participation of NGOs.” Regarding the change of the impact of this parameter, 61.54% of the experts consider the impact as remaining the same over time, whereas 23.08% think it increased, stating that “the role of these organizations has increased tremendously. Some of them are more flourishing than international organizations.” Only one expert out of thirteen who voted on this parameter, thinks that the influence decreased.

3.1.8. The Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements

The ‘Rule of Law’ parameter, concerning host state laws and headquarters agreements received an impact score of 2.15 out of 5 with only one comment, noting that this parameter has only “limited impact on the most recent relocations /newly established international organizations” being “too recent (2021) to have real impact.” A majority of 69.23% of the experts thinks that the impact of this parameter stayed the same over time, as “headquarter agreements (privileges and immunities) were important throughout,” but the “Host State Law 2021 is too recent to assess.” 15.38% think that the impact on AASP decreased and only one expert thinks that it increased.

³²⁸ See Table 4.

3.1.9. The Role of Membership in the EU

The role of membership in the European Union is considered by the experts to have the least impact of all nine parameters. It got an impact score of only 2.08 out of 5. It is argued that “as a member of the EU, Austria has resumed the role of a country in the heart of Europe” and that “in particular CFSP made it harder for a middle-sized EU-member state to actively pursue mediation efforts.” A “lack of interest and low effort in hosting rotating EU council in 2018” is noted by the experts as well as that “Austria was bound to get EU-organizations once it was a member.” Although the general impact score of this parameter is the lowest of all, still 53.85% of the interviewed experts think that Austria’s EU membership has an impact or strong impact on AASP. The experts’ opinions are split if this impact changed. The same number of experts (38.46%) think it stayed the same or increased, with one comment stating that “EU-membership changed Austrian position in N+N movement and CFSP limited scope for individual mediation efforts by Austria.” Only 23.08% think that it decreased. To get a clearer view on the impact of this parameter on the development of AASP, an additional open-ended question was asked in the second part of the questionnaire if Austria gained an advantage or disadvantage in terms of attractiveness as host state by joining the EU. Of the 13 experts that returned the second part of the questionnaire, 12 answered and commented on this specific question. 25% think that it has no impact on AASP (“EU membership is neither an advantage nor a disadvantage in the headquarters context.”) 8.3% consider it is a disadvantage (“Due to Austria's neutral status, I think Vienna was more attractive during the Cold War than when it joined the EU. EU membership eroded neutrality and made Austria less attractive as an Amtssitz”), while 50 % regard Austria’s membership in the EU as an advantage. The comments range from “Austria has undoubtedly gained since Vienna represents the only UN headquarters in the EU” to

“Given that the EU is largest trading partner, investor, and development cooperation partner of most countries in the Global South, EU membership has increased the weight of Austria as an international player. With regard to AT as host country for IO's, Vienna is the only UN-HQ in an EU-MS and therefore of particular significance to the European Union when it comes to identify internationally relevant issues related to security and sustainability matters.”³²⁹

³²⁹ All comments in this chapter with quotation marks are from the panel of experts, but anonymized.

16.7% of the experts are undecided and see it both as an advantage and a disadvantage:

“For EU-member states Austria has become a closer partner, more predictable and more aligned to the EU-mainstream through CFSP. For other countries, in particular the Global South and G77, increasingly also for Russia and Belarus, Austria's anchoring in the EU has probably diminished its standing as a neutral and honest broker.”

The disadvantage due to the recalibration of Austria's neutrality is also addressed in another comment stating that “on the one hand, Austria might have become more attractive because civil servants working for the IO have free movement within the EU. On the other hand, Austria is less seen as a neutral state and as such as an honest broker.”

Table 4. Overview: Impact Score, Change Score and Composite Score

Parameters of Impact on AASP	Weighted Average Impact Score	No Impact	Impact	Strong Impact	No Answer	Impact decreased over time	Impact stayed the same	Impact increased over time	No Answer	Weighted Average Change Score	Composite Score
International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Location	4.38	0.00%	30.77%	69.23%	0.00%	15.38%	23.08%	61.54%	0.00%	+0.46	+2.02
The 'Security Rationale' (Security, Sovereignty, and Independence)	4.31	7.69%	15.38%	76.92%	0.00%	53.85%	30.77%	15.38%	0.00%	-0.38	-1.64
The Geopolitical Systemic Changes in the International System	4.23	0.00%	38.46%	61.54%	0.00%	53.85%	30.77%	15.38%	0.00%	-0.38	-1.61
The Status of Neutrality	4.17	0.00%	38.46%	53.85%	7.69%	61.54%	38.46%	0.00%	0.00%	-0.62	-2.59
International Reputation and "Good Service"	4.08	0.00%	46.15%	53.85%	0.00%	15.38%	61.54%	23.08%	0.00%	+0.08	+0.33
Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria	3.54	7.69%	53.85%	38.46%	0.00%	7.69%	7.69%	76.92%	7.69%	+0.75	+2.66
The Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations	2.31	38.46%	38.46%	23.08%	0.00%	7.69%	61.54%	23.08%	7.69%	+0.17	+0.39
Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements	2.15	38.46%	46.15%	15.38%	0.00%	15.38%	69.23%	7.69%	7.69%	-0.08	-0.17
The Role of Membership European Union	2.08	46.15%	30.77%	23.08%	0.00%	23.08%	38.46%	38.46%	0.00%	+0.15	+0.31

Source: Results based on the completed questionnaires (see appendix B)

3.2. Additional Results

3.2.1. The View from the City

The location for IOs and QIOs, in most cases the capital of the country, is a key factor in the competitiveness of a host state policy. The attractiveness and the cooperation between the city and the federal policy network are crucial for the success of AASP. Therefore, city officials in the panel were asked separately to provide additional input on the issue of the current situation and challenges for the City of Vienna as a host for IOs

and QIOs. The results are not surprising and quite in line with that of the other experts. City officials stress the good cooperation with the BMEIA and mention the work in the “Amtssitz-Koordinationsgremium nach § 3 Amtssitzgesetz,” adding that they consider the coordination and cooperation with both the federal policy actors and external stakeholders for crucial. They consider “the increasing expectations regarding financial support”³³⁰ from the host city and state as one of the big challenges. Another issue raised is the danger of geopolitical changes that could move Vienna from its central European location back to a peripheral location, “now representing a very real threat again, and not just for Vienna.” Besides the usual factors of attractiveness of the city from travel connections to quality of life in the city, Vienna’s officials stress that “the political framework must be right, both domestically and internationally, and especially at the European level.” For Vienna, the parameter of ‘Economic Benefit and Added Value for Austria’ is extremely important as already mentioned, but “without international connections, physically in the sense of accessibility, but also on a political, intellectual and social-cultural level, we cannot be an attractive location for international organizations.” In a question to the panel of experts about future challenges, not included in this research as it focuses on the development of AASP so far, similar concerns were expressed. The financial problems of IOs that lead to increasing expectations of the financial support given by the host state and city as well as the international mindset and openness of Austria and the City of Vienna were among the most mentioned threats to a successful AASP in the future, in line with the opinion of the city officials.

3.2.2. The Danger of Exodus of IOs

In addition to the questions referring directly to the framework of parameters that impacted the development on AASP, some related issues were addressed that might help to draw some additional conclusions in terms of the parameters presented and the connected challenges that the experts think that AASP should consider and prepare for. It was asked if the experts expect a danger of an exodus of important IOs that can endanger Austria’s successful host state policy.

Of the 10 experts that answered this question, 60% (6) responded with yes, there is a danger, although two of them stressed that it would be hard for IOs to leave. The

³³⁰ Texts in quotation marks in 4.2.2. are quotes from City of Vienna officials.

problems of the UN both politically and financially are seen as a possible cause. Some of the expert answers on this question are quoted in full length as they provide interesting insights on the perception of the experts.

“Because of Russia's full-fledged aggression against its Slavic neighbor Ukraine and the war between Israel and Hamas, the UN system has suffered enormously. Russia as one of the P5 in the UNSC has effectively brought the SC to a screeching halt. On the other hand, the US position on the war in the Middle East has made it difficult to fully activate the most important political body of the UN - the Security Council. Despite the recent US abstention in the SC on the Gaza conflict, there is a growing concern in the Global South that the UN system is too easily giving in to Big Power Politics. Since the Vienna UN Center has important special organizations dealing with the Global South - UNIDO - there is a danger that such organizations could be under pressure to move southward (remember, Kenya, Addis Ababa are two important UN-centers as well).”

Another expert confirms the danger in principle but argues:

“There is no immediate risk, since any relocation of an international organization is associated with high costs and the staff is usually very content with life in Vienna (low rental costs, international city, safe, ‘most livable city in the world’ according to the Economist. Having said that, the risk of relocation is there, especially if other countries make attractive offers (new premises etc.). Those offers might come more from other European cities (Copenhagen, The Hague, Bonn) and from the Gulf rather than from developing countries.”

Most of those experts that think that there might be a challenge that IOs relocate to other host cities, point to the fact that Vienna has the advantage of the ‘Cluster Effect’, but if Vienna is challenged it could most likely be from the Gulf region.

“The synergies between IOs, QIOs and NGOs, in Vienna focusing on the very same issues has created a conducive environment for all of them, making it much harder for them to leave Austria. Major competitors of the existing UN-HQs are for example countries in the Gulf region who are willing and able to spend a lot of resources and would consider an UN-presence in their country as an international recognition for their role in the world.”

Those experts who don’t see a risk that Vienna might lose headquarters of IOs or QIOs to other host cities argue that the Global South is no challenge regarding an exodus, “not to the Global South. Vienna is a very attractive and suitable location, not many places in the Global South can compete with its attractiveness.” Another expert adds that Austria constantly strives to bring IOs to Vienna that are thematically appropriate, “the fact that the Gulf states in particular are prepared to offer almost limitless financial resources for a settlement has often not been enough to actually get an IO into the Gulf region.”

Table 5. Danger of an Exodus of IOs and QIOs from Vienna

Expert	Yes/No/n.a.	Danger of Exodus of IOs and QIOs?
1	Y	Yes
2	N	No risk
3	Y	Danger because Vienna has important IOs dealing with Global South (UNIDO). Possible pressure to move southwards (Kenya/Addis Abbeba)
4	Y	Risk if others make attractive offers (premises...), but such offers might rather come from European cities like Copenhagen, The Hague or Bonn) and from Gulf rather than developing countries.
5	Y	Risk concerning Global South, but also from European cities like Cologne or Copenhagen.
6	N	Vienna is a very attractive and suitable location, not many places in the Global South can compete with this attractiveness.
7	Y	Synergies between IOs, QIOs and NGOs in Vienna make it hard to leave, but countries in the Gulf region are willing to spend a lot of resources and would consider a UN presence as an international recognition of their role. In the world.
8	n.a.	-
9	N	I don't really think so.
10	n.a.	Don't know.
11	Y	Yes, UN related institutions.
12	N	No, in the end the living conditions in the Global South are not really attractive.

Source: Results based on the completed questionnaires (see appendix B)

3.2.3. The Case of the King Abdullah Center

The relocation of the King Abdulla Center (KAICCID) was the first and only case where an IO hosted in Vienna was relocated to another country due to domestic political protests that led to a motion of the Austrian Parliament. This event, which ended in a face-saving but intensively debated solution relates to several of the parameters that have an impact on AASP. The expert panel was asked: “In 2021 the King Abdullah Center (KAICCID) relocated from Vienna, Austria to Lisbon, Portugal. Do you consider this as a decision based on the principles of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik or a forced reaction to the domestic political debate? Did it hurt or help Austria's reputation as a host state?” The answers show that the majority of the 12 experts who answered this question think that this case hurts Austria's image as a host state, with one comment saying that it was “one of the worst political decisions taken in many years of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik.” 25%

think that it was a decision based on the principles of AASP, 33% that it was a forced reaction to the political debate.

Table 6. Responses on the Case of the King Abdullah Center (KAICCID)

Answer-Options	% of all responses (12)
the closure damaged Austria's reputation as a host state	58,33%
the closure helped Austria's reputation as a host state	8,33 %
it was a decision based on the principles of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik	25,00 %
it was a forced reaction to the domestic political debate	33,33%

Source: Results based on the completed questionnaires (see appendix B)

Chapter 4

Analysis, Hypotheses and Research Question

4.1. Analysis of the Results

The quantitative results of the experts' interviews provide a good basis to analyze the development of AASP. But to be able to present the full picture and identify the causes that impact the way of this development it is necessary to combine it with a qualitative approach by using the comments added and the findings of the literature review. As it can be seen in the results of the impact scores, all parameters of the proposed framework have an impact on the development of AASP. None of the parameters is considered as to have no impact and no additional parameters were mentioned that could not be subsumed in one of the nine parameters of the framework. The degree of impact in general, as perceived by the experts, is quite different and reaches from the lowest WAIS of 2.08 (out of 5) for 'The Role of Membership in the European Union' to the highest WAIS of 4.38 (out of 5) for the parameter 'International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attraction of Location'.³³¹ Troy (2023) argues that AASP is shaped by both normative and functional motives, but stresses that these two different explanations for AASP "cannot be clearly separated from each other."³³² Taking this into account, this research nevertheless separates the parameters into two groups. One dominated by normative perspectives, the second dominated by more functional perspectives, as displayed in Table 7.

The results show that parameters that can be associated with normative aspects, according to both the literature and the opinion of the expert panel, had the highest impact in the first period from 1945 to 1965 but decreased in impact over time. On the other hand, a growth of influence of functional parameters, such as the 'Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria' or 'International Competition' can be noticed; 61.5% of the experts notice an increase of impact. The high CS for both parameters support this conclusion. The parameter regarding international competition is interrelated with other parameters such as the economic benefits on the one hand and the rule of law on the other, as

³³¹ See Table 4.

³³² Jodok Troy, "Amtssitzpolitik," 244.

favorable host state laws and headquarters agreements are used as arguments in the competition between host states. In the case of the competition- parameter it must be noted that the comments of experts and the literature hint to different aspects of this international competition. One of these sub-issues of this parameter, beside the attractiveness of the location and the role of public diplomacy, is the so called ‘Cluster Effect’. This effect makes locations more attractive, that can offer synergies between established headquarters of IOs and QIOs or NGOs in the host city. This might become an even more important argument in the future competition.

The analysis of the quantitative as well as qualitative results show that the way AASP developed over time was influenced and shaped by the framework of parameters presented in this research: In the first period (1945-1965) by the parameters of the ‘Security Rationale’ with the focus on security, sovereignty, and independence for Austria, by the bilateral geopolitical system, the focus on ‘International Reputation’, ‘The Status of Neutrality’ and as the example of OPEC shows, it was already shaped by issues related to the rule of law, in the form of headquarters agreements. Authors such as Frey (2011), Rathkolb (2018), or Bischof (2021) underline the importance of the ‘Security Rationale’ in this first period and the experts assign this parameter a high, though over time decreasing impact score, manifested in the relatively low CS. In the second period (1965-1983) the impact of the ‘Security Rationale’ was still strong as it was the main argument of the Austrian Government, namely of Bruno Kreisky that Austria’s role as host of international organizations and conferences is not only contributing to Austria’s international reputation but that it is above all the best insurance to protect Austria’s sovereignty. In this period Austria’s policy of ‘active neutrality’ played an important role in adapting to the change of the geopolitical situation from a bilateral to a multilateral system. The ‘Security Rationale’, the ‘Status of Neutrality’ in the form of Austria’s ‘active neutrality’, ‘International Reputation’, and being recognized as a ‘good power’ were the decisive parameters for this period. For the first time the aspect of economic effects and added values were addressed in the domestic political discussion about the costs of the VIC. In the third period (1983-1995), geopolitical change was a decisive factor for the development of AASP. The impact of this parameter influenced the way Austria’s foreign policy and AASP developed in this ‘wind of change’ period. With the end of the Cold War, the importance of the ‘Security Rationale’ and the ‘Status of Neutrality’ decreased. Maintaining Austria’s ‘International Reputation’ and image as a ‘good power’ required a balancing act between multilateral requirements as member of the UN and the increasing

focus on becoming a member of the EU. In this period AASP was shaped by the impact of the geopolitical changes and already by the impact of its future position in the new Europe, interrelated with the parameter of its neutrality status. In the fourth period (1995 - Today) a significant change in the impact of the parameters that influenced the way of the development of AASP occurred. The accession of Austria to the European Union replaced Austria's position on the geopolitical map. This is the third turning point as result of a geopolitical systemic change. The Cold War and the end of the Cold war were the other two. The multilateral geopolitical system, already emerged in the second period, has become one of the main influence factors in this fourth period. The establishment of the OSCE headquarters in Vienna reflects the new interpretation of security and global issues. The fourth period of AASP is shaped by growing international competition and the new definition of attractivity of locations. NGOs and QIOs become more and more important as they are increasingly involved in agenda setting of global issues and operationally connected to IOs. Therefore, host states try to give these organizations a similar status of benefits and privileges as to IOs. The recent Austrian Amtssitzgesetz (ASG) can be taken as an example of how AASP tries to stay competitive in the global competition and of how the different parameters are interrelated, both on a normative and a functional level.

There are divergences in the perspectives of the expert panel and the findings in the literature, which must be noted in this analysis. The role of NGOs is mentioned in the reviewed literature and in numerous host state documents as being increasingly important for host state policy whereas the experts only ranked it seventh out of nine in impact on AASP and a majority of 61.5% thinks that the impact did not increase. The initiatives of AASP in the fourth period to extend privileges to non-governmental organizations to attract them can be taken as an indication of the increasing importance of QIOs. QIOs are becoming part of the 'IO-ecosystems' of host cities, contributing to the 'Cluster-Effect' mentioned, that is important to be competitive. The other parameter that shows differences between the findings in the literature and the opinion of the expert panel is the parameter of 'the rule of law'. Host state laws and the resulting headquarters agreements have been a decisive parameter in the development of host state policies and in the competition between host states but rated only second last in impact on AASP in the opinion of the expert panel. The case of OPEC is an early example of the impact of headquarters agreements on AASP.

4.2. Hypotheses and Research Question

The research shows that both hypotheses can be verified by the empirical results regarding the proposed framework of parameters:

(H1) The change of impact of the parameters presented in the framework influences the development of AASP.

A majority of experts (from 54% for the ‘Role of Membership EU’ to 100% for ‘International Competition’, ‘Geopolitical Systemic Changes’, ‘Status of Neutrality’ and ‘International Reputation’) considers all parameters as “having an impact” or “having a strong impact.” As the results presented in Table 4 show, all parameters (except for one outlier ‘International Reputation and Good Service’), with a high change score (WACS) have a high impact (WAIS) on AASP, thus verifying H1 and confirming the conclusion that the dynamics of the parameters of the framework influenced the development of AASP.

(H2) The impact of functional parameters on AASP has increased over time, whereas the impact of normative parameters decreased.

Table 7 shows, which of the parameters of the proposed framework can be considered as having a normative character and which as having a functional character. A positive WACS indicates that a parameter increased in impact, whereas for a parameter with a negative WACS, the impact has decreased over time. All parameters with a functional character have been assigned a positive WACS by the experts panel, whereas all normative parameters, except for ‘International Reputation and Good Service’ (+0.08), show a negative score. This confirms H2 that the impact of functional parameters on AASP has increased over time, whereas the impact of normative parameters decreased.

Table 7. The Weighted Average Change Score of Normative Parameters vs. Functional Parameters

Parameter	Classification	Weighted Average Change Score (WACS)
The Security Rationale (Security, Sovereignty, and Independence)	Normative	- 0.38
Status of Austria's Neutrality	Normative	- 0.62
The Geopolitical Situation	Functional	+ 0.38
International Reputation and 'Good Service'	Normative	+ 0.08
Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements	Normative	- 0.08
Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria	Functional	+ 0.75
Relationship/Membership European Union	Functional	+ 0.15
Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations	Functional	+ 0.17
International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractiveness of Location	Functional	+ 0.46

Source: Results based on the completed questionnaires (see appendix B)

Answering the research question of why AASP developed the way it did, this thesis argues, based on the findings of the literature and the results of the empirical research, that a framework of nine key parameters shaped the development of AASP in the Second Republic. The impact of these parameters changed over time, indicating that in the early periods of the Second Republic the development of AASP was mainly driven by a high impact of normative parameters, as it was necessary after WWII to establish Austria as a sovereign and independent state and enhance its international reputation. Over time, the impact of functional parameters increased. AASP was shaped by the change of the geopolitical systems, an increasing international competition, and the necessity to argue the economic benefit for the host country to justify the necessary investments and the privileges granted. The fact that almost all parameters increased or decreased over time regarding their impact on AASP can be interpreted as the reaction of AASP on the changing geopolitical situation, a flexibility necessary to be successful as a bridge builder and host state for IOs and QIOs.

AASP developed as it did, because in the early years of AASP, Austria was focused on the normative parameters that enhanced the reputation, providing 'good services' to the international community of states and it stayed flexible in its 'active neutrality' in the later years. It facilitated a new interpretation of security, when sovereignty and independence were not anymore real issues and it provided room to

address global issues of a multilateral, globalized world. The parameters of international competition and economic benefits especially influenced AASP in the last period, as the adaption of a new host state law and the inclusion of QIOs show.

Analyzing the development of AASP in the Second Republic and realizing the big changes of some of the parameters of influence demands, although not the objective of the research question, the view on what will be the challenges ahead. A nuanced view on the changing dynamics of parameters can deliver insights for policy decisions and future strategies regarding AASP, challenged by the growing global competition in hosting IOs. That is why this research added the hypothetical question about the danger of an exodus of IOs from Vienna. The answers show that if there is a danger it is less expected from the Global South than from the Gulf States and other European Cities. They also point to an interesting fact: IOs and QIOs are challenged by financial problems that lead to increasing expectations of the financial support given by the host state and city, changing the balance between costs and benefits for AASP.

Finally, the analysis of the case of the King Abdullah Center shows that both the results from the experts as well as the findings in the literature point in the same direction: The decision, forced by the domestic political debate damaged the image of Austria as a host state. The question arising out of this event is if the Geneva approach of “We do not want to attract everything,”³³³ would have been the better one in this case.

³³³ See also 1.1.1.

Conclusion and Outlook

This thesis researched the development of AASP in the Second Republic and presents a framework of key parameters of influence that shaped the way it developed. It combines the findings of an integrative literature review with the empirical research on the opinion of a panel of experts to evaluate the impact and the change of impact of parameters in this framework. The review of the literature presented the similarities and differences of the influence on the development of HSP in different host states and host cities, with a special focus on AASP.

For Austria, a successful host state policy (Amtsitzpolitik) was important to regain reputation and good standing in the international community of nations after WWII. This dedication to act as a bridge builder and location for headquarters of international organizations and host for international conferences has not changed and still is a key objective of Austria's foreign policy, which makes this research relevant for understanding the past and current development of AASP.

The main objectives of this thesis were to present the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik (AASP) after WWII, to identify and analyze the key parameters that impacted this development and to present an answer to the research question. To achieve this, a mixed-method approach was chosen. An integrative literature review 'deconstructed' the findings based on the literature about the milestones and turning points of AASP as well as that on host state policy in general. The cases of Geneva, Brussels, The Hague, and Vienna in particular, and -as a special case- Nairobi, provided the perspective of the international status of HSP. Based on these findings the thesis proposed a framework of nine key parameters that had an impact and shaped the course of the development of AASP. To connect these parameters to the milestones and turning points of AASP in the Second Republic and to answer the research question, of why the AASP developed as it did, the thesis divided the development of AASP into four periods:

The First Period (1945-1965), was marked by Austria's efforts to gain international visibility and reintegration into the international community, with Austria's State Treaty 1955 as a precondition and its UN-membership as well as the establishment of the IAEA headquarters in 1957, the Vienna Summit in 1961, followed by the establishment of the OPEC headquarters in Vienna, as the first milestones of AASP.

The Second Period (1965-1983), which can be termed the ‘Kreisky-Era’, presented Austria as a bridge builder during the Cold War, applying an ‘active neutrality policy’ and attracting more international organizations to Vienna. In this period a second Vienna Summit Meeting between Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev, signing the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ³³⁴, took place in 1979 as well as the inauguration of the Vienna International Centre (VIC) and the opening of the UN Headquarters (‘UNO-City’) in 1979 as the highlight of AASP. These first two periods of AASP were dominated by the parameters of the ‘Security Rationale’, ‘The Status of Neutrality’, and ‘International Reputation and Good Service’. Parameters that - according to the results of this research- have decreased in impact in the following periods.

The Third Period (1983-1995), after Kreisky had resigned, brought a domestic political debate about Austria’s investments in its host state policy, leading to a referendum against the construction of the Vienna Conference Center. The big turning point for Austria’s foreign policy and AASP was a systemic change in the geopolitical landscape: The end of the Cold War, leading to a recalibration of the neutrality status, and a change in the focus of the international dialogue on critical issues, such as human rights, environment, and security. The parameter of ‘Changes in the Geopolitical Systems’ was a main factor of influence on the development of AASP in this period, the establishment of the OSCE a consequence of the change of impact of the traditional ‘Security Rationale’ and for the first time the parameter of ‘Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria’ was addressed, discussing the costs and benefits of the investment in the Vienna Conference Center.

The Fourth Period (1995-Today) is dominated by Austria’s membership in the European Union which changed Austria’s international position and its foreign policy orientation from a United Nations focus to a more European one. This raised the question if Austria is still considered a neutral host or intermediary in global conflicts. The growing importance of QIOs and international NGOs offered the opportunity to further extend the scope of Austria-based headquarters. Consequently, Austria adapted the legal framework for hosting IOs, QIOs and international conferences with a new ‘Amtssitzgesetz’ (Host State Law). Key parameters that increased in impact over time and became especially relevant in this period are the parameters of “International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Location” as well as that of

³³⁴ “Vienna Summit Meeting Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Communiqué,” The American Presidency Project, June 18, 1979, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/vienna-summit-meeting-joint-us-ussr-communicue>.

‘Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria’, supported by several studies on the economic benefits of AASP.

To evaluate the impact and the change of impact of the nine key parameters of the framework that shaped AASP, three scores were used for the empirical part of the research, a ‘Weighted Average Impact Score’(WAIS), a ‘Weighted Average Change Score’ (WACS) and a ‘Composite Score’(CS). The evaluation of these scores, as argued in detail in the analysis section, shows that all identified parameters had an impact on the development of AASP and the results support the first hypothesis that the change of impact of parameters shaped the development of AASP. It can be concluded that the dynamics of the impact of parameters enabled a flexible approach to the changing geopolitical landscape and contributed to the success of AASP. The second hypothesis, that the impact of functional parameters on AASP has increased over time, whereas the impact of normative parameters decreased, could be verified too. This supports the conclusion that AASP as well as the host state policies of other states are increasingly shaped by functional aspects like economic benefits and aspects of the increasing international competition, with new competitors and new challenges coming up.

In concluding, the answer to the research question can be summarized as follows: The devolvment of AASP is shaped by an interplay of the impact of different key parameters with either normative motivations or functional ones. The research shows that all identified parameters are considered to have an impact on AASP, thus influencing the way AASP developed. The research reveals that the impact of the parameters dynamically changed over time, indicating a trend that functional parameters increased in impact while normative parameters decreased in impact over time. In the first two periods of AASP normative parameters such as the ‘Security Rational’, ‘The Status of Neutrality’ or ‘International Reputation’ had the highest impact on the development of AASP, but its impact decreased. In the second two periods, especially in the last one, the functional parameters such as ‘Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria’ or ‘International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Location’ significantly increased their impact on AASP.

Furthermore, based on both the findings in the literature and the comments of experts it can be concluded that certain aspects of parameters will play a decisive role for the future development of AASP. One of these aspects is the ‘Cluster Effect’, providing synergies for IOs and QIOs, which can be an advantage for established host cities, which is not researched sufficiently so far. To sustain this ‘Cluster Effect’ it is crucial to prevent

already hosted organizations from relocating. Retention of hosted IOs and QIOs might become more important than new acquisitions.

Another challenge, addressed by the experts, might evolve out of the difficult economic situation of IOs and QIOs that can result in increased expectations of financial support by host states and host cities. According to the experts, future competition can be expected from established international host cities as well as from Gulf states, as they might be most willing to accept the expectations of IOs regarding the financial contributions of host states, while the Global South may find it difficult to provide this financial support and competitive working and living conditions. Finally: Examples of other host states and host cities suggest that the composition of the policy networks and the inclusion of external stakeholders involved in the acquisition and bidding processes might need additional attention when drafting strategies for AASP.

The limitations of this research are the broad range of influence factors that shape the development of policies over such a long timeframe. Therefore, the set of parameters of influence on AASP has become quite extensive, while still containing sub-parameters that could have been observed separately. But this would have extended the scope of parameters even further. The research provides a basis for a better understanding of why AASP developed as it did, but it can also serve as a basis for further research. This could be research with a focus on the role of specific parameters within a strategy for HSP, especially for AASP, but also research on how the ‘Cluster Effect’ of established host cities like Vienna can provide synergies and economic benefits for IOs and QIOs, that could help to address the financial challenges of these organizations. An active ‘Cluster’ management might become an important issue for AASP in the future.

Bibliography

- Androsch, Hannes. “Rede zur Eröffnung des Internationalen Konferenzzentrums (UNO-City) in Wien 23. August 1979.” androsch.com, August 23, 1979.
<https://androsch.com/media/vortraege/79.08.23.Red.HA.Konferenzzentrums.pdf>.
- APA. “Abdullah-Zentrum: Anzeige und Proteste zur Eröffnung.” diepresse.com, November 26, 2012.
https://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/1316929/AbdullahZentrum_Anzeige-und-Proteste-zur-Eroeffnung.
- APA. “Alt-Bundespräsident Fischer gegen Ausstieg aus Abdullah-Zentrum.” DER STANDARD, July 6, 2019. <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000105995035/alt-bundespraesident-fischer-gegen-ausstieg-aus-abdullah-zentrum>.
- Austria Forum. “Bruno Kreisky.” AustriaWiki, April 2022. https://austria-forum.org/af/AustriaWiki/Bruno_Kreisky.
- “Austrians Begin to Question Neutrality.” POLITICO, July 24, 1996.
<http://www.politico.eu/article/austrians-begin-to-question-neutrality>.
- Bischof, Günter, Stefan Karner, and Barbara Stelzl-Marx. *The Vienna Summit and its Importance in International History*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014.
- Bischof, Günter. *Austria in the first Cold War, 1945-55: Austria in the first Cold War, 1945-55*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999.
- Bischof, Günter. “Austrian-American from Cold War to Post-Cold War.” Austrian Embassy Washington. Accessed April 20, 2024. <https://www.archive.austria.org/new-page-2>.
- Bischof, Günter. “Of Dwarfs and Giants: From Cold War Mediator to Bad Boy of Europe Austria and the U.S. in the Transatlantic Arena (1990-2013).” Essay. In *Austria’s International Position After the End of the Cold War*, 13–55. New Orleans, US: UNO Press, 2013.
- Bischof, Günter. “Zweite Republik.” *Österreichische Zeitgeschichte - Zeitgeschichte in Österreich*, August 8, 2021, 160–77. <https://doi.org/10.7767/9783205209980.160>.
- BKA. “Bundesgesetz zur Stärkung Österreichs als Internationaler Amtssitz- und Konferenzstandort (Amtssitzgesetz – ASG).” RIS Dokument Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich, Februar 22, 2021
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2021_I_54/BGBLA_2021_I_54.html.
- BKA. “Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie.” Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, Juli 2013.
<https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/themen/sicherheitspolitik/sicherheitsstrategie.html>.

- BMEIA. “An Important Dialogue Forum for European Security: Foreign Minister Schallenberg Meets with OSCE Secretary General Schmid.” Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs Press Department, January 25, 2023. <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/ministerium/presse/aktuelles/alle/2023/01/ein-wichtiges-dialogforum-fuer-europas-sicherheit-aussenminister-schallenberg-trifft-osze-generalsekretaerin-schmid>.
- BMEIA. “Außenpolitischer Bericht 1979.” Parlament Österreich, 1979. https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XV/III/43/imfname_555903.pdf.
- BMEIA. “Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg Welcomes Saudi Arabian Counterpart Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al Saud.” Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs Press Department, June 22, 2021. <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-ministry/press/news/2021/06/foreign-minister-alexander-schallenberg-welcomes-saudi-arabian-counterpart-prince-faisal-bin-farhan-al-saud>.
- BMEIA. “Humanity at the Crossroads: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Challenge of Regulation - Vienna Conference on Autonomous Weapons Systems.” Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. Accessed April 26, 2024. <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/conventional-arms/autonomous-weapons-systems/2024-vienna-conference-on-autonomous-weapons-systems>.
- BMEIA. “Important Dialogue Forum: Foreign Minister Schallenberg at the Special Meeting of the OSCE.” Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs Press Department, February 23, 2024. <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/ministerium/presse/aktuelles/2024/02/important-dialogue-forum-foreign-minister-schallenberg-at-the-special-meeting-of-the-osce>.
- BMEIA. International Organisations and Institutions Based in Vienna, March 15, 2023. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Plakat_Amtssitz_Wien_EN_Web.pdf.
- BMEIA. “NGOs and Quasi-International Organizations.” Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. Accessed April 26, 2024. <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/international-organisations-in-austria/ngos-and-quasi-international-organizations>.
- BMEIA. “Non-Governmental Organizations and Quasi-International Organizations.” Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. Accessed April 26, 2024. <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/international-organisations-in-austria/ngos-and-quasi-international-organizations>.
- BMEIA. “We Position Ourselves as International Bridge Builder and as Place for Dialogue.” Austria’s European and Foreign Policy. Accessed April 20, 2024. <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy>.

- Borchert, Heiko, and Wolfgang Zellner. "The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and Its Contribution to the Stabilization of Central and Eastern European Countries." Researchgate.net, January 2003.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228366170_The_Organization_for_Security_and_Cooperation_in_Europe_OSCE_and_its_Contribution_to_the_Stabilization_of_Central_and_Eastern_European_Countries.
- Botzenhart, Ulrike. "1,35 Mrd. Euro Wertschöpfung durch Diplomatie in Österreich." Kurier Online, December 29, 2020. <https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/135-mrd-euro-wertschoepfung-durch-diplomatie-in-oesterreich/401141652#:~:text=Den%20jährlichen%20Bruttowertschöpfungseffekt%20bezeichnen%20die,Zuwachs%20von%20rund%20drei%20Prozent>.
- Brende, Børge. "The Dawn of Stakeholder Geopolitics." Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2023.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/dawn-stakeholder-geopolitics>.
- Brix, Emil. "Außenpolitik." Essay. In *Lebenszeugnisse österreichischer Vizekanzler im soziopolitischen Kontext*, Hrsg. Wolfgang Mantl, 690–703. Wien, Austria: Böhlau, 2019.
- Brix, Emil. "Austrian Cultural and Public Diplomacy after the Cold War." Essay. In *Austria's International Position after the End of the Cold War*, edited by Günter Bischof and Ferdinand Karlhofer, 95–107. New Orleans, USA: UNO Press, 2013.
- Bruckmüller, Ernst. "Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen." Das Neue Österreich - Ausstellung zum Staatsvertragsjubiläum, May 2005. https://androsch.com/media/buecher/noe/192-217_Neutralitaet_und_Vereinte_Nationen.pdf.
- Bruns, Kai. *A cornerstone of modern diplomacy: Britain and the negotiation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.
- Bundesamt für Justiz. "Gaststaatgesetz." Bundesministerium der Justiz, November 30, 2019.
<https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gaststg/BJNR192910019.html>.
- Council of Europe. "The European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non- Governmental Organisations." Explanatory Report European Treaty Series - No. 124, April 24, 1986. <https://rm.coe.int/16800ca439>.
- Dairon, Emilie, and Fanny Badache. "Understanding International Organizations' Headquarters as Ecosystems: The Case of Geneva." *Global Policy* 12, no. S7 (December 2021): 24–33. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12956>.
- Daum, Matthias, and Florian Gasser. "Schweiz im UN-Sicherheitsrat: Neutral, aber nicht tatenlos." ZEIT ONLINE, March 7, 2022. <https://www.zeit.de/2022/10/schweiz-unsicherheitsrat-neutralitaet-peter-jankowitsch>.
- Dümmeler, Patrick, and Pascal Lago. "A Magnet for International Organizations." Avenir Suisse, June 28, 2019. <https://www.avenir-suisse.ch/en/a-magnet-for-international-organizations/>.

- EDA. “Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die von der Schweiz als Gaststaat gewährten Vorrechte, Immunitäten und Erleichterungen sowie finanziellen Beiträge.” Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA, June 2007. https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/de/home/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/privelegien_und_immunitaeten/gaststaatgesetz.html.
- Eder, Franz. “Sicherheitspolitik.” Essay. In *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreichs*, edited by Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, 285–306. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, 2023.
- Eder, Franz. “Wehrbereitschaft ist kaum vorhanden.” Foreign Policy Lab, April 22, 2024. <https://foreignpolicylab.at/news/outreach/2024-04-22-VN-wehrbereitschaft/>.
- Edtmayer, Matthias. “Schließung des Abdullah-Zentrums rechtlich möglich.” *Die Presse*, October 30, 2019. <https://www.diepresse.com/5714543/schliessung-des-abdullah-zentrums-rechtlich-moeglich>.
- Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA. “Gaststaatgesetz.” Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA. Accessed April 12, 2024. <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/de/home/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/privelegien-und-immunitaeten/gaststaatgesetz.html>.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Atoms for Peace Speech, December 1953.” IAEA, July 16, 2014. <https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech>.
- Enemo, I. P., and C. M. Ogwezzy. “The Necessity of Headquarters Agreement under the Law of International Organisations.” *International Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance* 5, no. 1 (April 2015): 15–38.
- Ernst & Young. “Die Umwegrentabilität internationaler Organisationen in Österreich.” BMEIA, April 2016. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Publikationen/BMEIA_Studie_2016.pdf.
- Faix, Martin. “The Law of International Organizations.” Centre for International Humanitarian and Operational Law (CIHOL). Accessed April 10, 2024. <https://www.pf.upol.cz/cihol/people/martin-faix/>.
- Fischer, David. *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The first forty years*. Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997.
- FRA. “UN, OSCE and Other International Organisations.” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, August 2, 2022. <https://fra.europa.eu/en/cooperation/osce-un-international-organisations>.
- Frey, Eric. “Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site.” Essay. In *Global Austria - Austria's Place in Europe and the World*, edited by Günter Bischof and Fritz Plasser, 147–60. Innsbruck, Austria: Innsbruck University Press, 2011.

- Garavini, Giuliano. *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
- Gebhard, Carmen. "Is Small Still Beautiful? The Case of Austria." *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 279–97. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12042>.
- Gintsberger, Sandra, Karina Karik, Melanie Petrov, and Markus Kornprobst. "Österreich in den Vereinten Nationen." Essay. In *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, edited by Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, 679–98. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, 2022.
- Glass, Andrew. "JFK and Khrushchev Meet in Vienna, June 3, 1961." *POLITICO*, February 6, 2017. <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/02/jfk-and-khrushchev-meet-in-vienna-june-3-1961-238979>.
- Government of the Netherlands. "The Netherlands as Host Country for International Organisations." *Government.nl*, October 17, 2019. <https://www.government.nl/topics/international-organisations/netherlands-as-host-country>.
- Groen, Rosa S. "The Policy of Attraction. Comparing Three Cities on Their Policy toward International and Nongovernmental Organizations: The Hague, Geneva and Vienna." *Urban Research & Practice* 9, no. 3 (April 27, 2016): 250–74. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2016.1174291>.
- Groen, Rosa S. "Understanding the Context for Successful City Diplomacy: Attracting International Organisations." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 17, no. 1 (February 24, 2022): 123–37. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-bja10095>.
- Groen, Rosa S. *"Walking the Extra Mile": How governance networks attract international organizations to Geneva, The Hague, Vienna, and Copenhagen (1995-2015)*. The Hague, the Netherlands: Eleven, 2022.
- Hall, John A. "Origins and Early Years." IAEA -Bulletin 2/1987. Accessed April 24, 2024. <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull29-2/29201284754.pdf>.
- Harrer, Gudrun. "Abdullah-Zentrum schließt in Wien endgültig seine Pforten." *DER STANDARD*, May 14, 2022. <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000135724269/abdullah-zentrum-schliesst-in-wien-endgueltig-seine-pforten>.
- Harrer, Gudrun. "Abdullah-Zentrum zieht ab: Wiens Geschenk an Genf." *DER STANDARD*, June 19, 2020. <https://apps.derstandard.at/privacywall/story/2000118199985/abdullah-zentrum-zieht-ab-wiens-geschenk-an-genf>.
- Hauser, Gunther. "ESDP and Austria: Security Policy between Engagement and Neutrality." Essay. In *Austrian Foreign Policy in Context*, edited by Anton Pelinka, Günter Bischof, and Michael Gehler, 207–45. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006.

- Höll, Othmar. "Die Außenpolitik gegenüber Deutschland, der Schweiz und Liechtenstein." Essay. In *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, edited by Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, 447–80. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023.
- Höll, Othmar. "Die Österreichische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der 2. Republik." Essay. In *Österreich in Der Zweiten Republik*, edited by Phillip Strobl, 71–88. Hamburg, Germany: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2014.
- IAEA. "Text of the Agency's Agreement with the Republic of Austria." International Atomic Energy Agency, December 10, 1959.
<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1959/infcirc15.pdf>.
- Interministerial Committee for Host Nation Policy. "General Information Note." Kingdom of Belgium- Federal Public Service, January 13, 2022.
<https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/interministerial-committee-host-nation-policy/general-information-note>.
- Interministerial Committee for Host Nation Policy. "The History." Kingdom of Belgium - Federal Public Service, January 13, 2022.
<https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/interministerial-committee-host-nation-policy/short-history>.
- Ivanova, Maria. *The untold story of the world's leading environmental institution*. The MIT Press, 2021.
- Jabareen, Yosef. "Building a Conceptual Framework: Philosophy, Definitions, and Procedure." *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 8, no. 4 (December 2009): 49–62. <https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690900800406>.
- JFK Library. "The Arms Race." John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Accessed April 24, 2024. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war>.
- KAICIID. "Who We Are." KAICIID Dialogue Center. Accessed April 26, 2024.
<https://www.kaiciid.org/who-we-are>.
- Kicker, Renate. "Die Außenpolitik in der Zweiten Republik." Demokratiezentrum Wien, November 2002. https://www.demokratiezentrum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/kicker_aussenpolitik.pdf.
- Kirk, Lisbeth. "Austrian Greens in Heated Discussion over Neutrality." EUobserver, November 9, 2004. <https://euobserver.com/news/17718>.
- Kirk, Lisbeth. "Solana: Neutrality Is a Concept of the Past." EUobserver, January 17, 2001.
<https://euobserver.com/>.
- Kluge, Jan, and Alexander Schnabel. "Die Ökonomischen Effekte Internationaler Organisationen in Österreich - Update 2020." BMEIA, December 21, 2020.
https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Europa/Die_oekonomischen_Effekte_internationaler_Organisationen_in_Oesterreich_-_Update_2020.pdf.

- Koran, Michael. "Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making or Moral Good Rediscovered?" *Perspectives* 26 (2006): 23–45.
<https://doi.org/http://www.jstor.org/stable/23616157>.
- Kramer, Helmut. "Austrian Foreign Policy 1995-2015." *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 45, no. 2 (September 12, 2016): 49–57.
<https://doi.org/10.15203/ozp.1372.vol45iss2>.
- Kramer, Helmut. "Zur Bilanz der österreichischen Entwicklungspolitik (1945-2017)." Universität Wien, November 2017.
https://archeza.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_archeza/Eigene_Texte/Kramer_2017.pdf.
- Lechner, Lisa, and Melanie Martinz. "Außenwirtschaftspolitik." Essay. In *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, edited by Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, 227–40. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, 2022.
- Little, Becky. "JFK Was Completely Unprepared for his Summit with Khrushchev." History.com, July 13, 2018. <https://www.history.com/news/kennedy-krushchev-vienna-summit-meeting-1961>.
- Luif, Paul. "Austria's Permanent Neutrality - Its Origins, Development, and Demise." Essay. In *Neutrality in Austria*, edited by Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak, 129–59. New York, NY: Routledge, 2001.
- Lunacek, Ulrike, and Hannes Tretter. "Abdullah-Zentrum in Wien: Ein frommer Wunsch." Die Presse, March 15, 2021. <https://www.diepresse.com/5951720/abdullah-zentrum-in-wien-ein-frommer-wunsch?two-term-flow=true>.
- MacNeill, Maureen. "50 Years of Sharing." OPEC-Bulletin 50 Years in Vienna, September 2015. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/1666.htm.
- Merrill, Thomas W. "The Essential Meaning of the Rule of Law." Columbia Law School-Faculty Publications, 2022.
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4915&context=faculty_scholarship.
- Miles, Matthew B., and Michael A. Huberman. *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. Thousand Oaks, USA: SAGE Publications, 1994.
- Moro, Ludovica. "The (Dis)Advantageous Relationship between International Organisations and Their Host Countries: The Austrian Experience." *BrettonWoodsLaw*, June 2017.
<https://brettonwoodslaw.com/disadvantageous-relationship-international-organisations-host-countries-austrian-experience/>.
- Office of the Historian. "15. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Geneva." U.S. Department of State, May 16, 1961.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d15>.

- “OGFE-Umfrage: EU-Armee für Österreicherinnen derzeit kein Thema – EU soll global auf Diplomatie und humanitäre Hilfe setzen.” Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, October 5, 2020. https://www.oegfe.at/umfragen/eu_armee_umfrage.
- OPEC-Bulletin. Location matters: the story of OPEC’s buildings. Accessed April 24, 2024. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/flipbook/OPEC_Bulletin_Apr-May_2020/66/.
- OSCE. OSCE Secretariat Wallnerstrasse Vienna, 2017. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/b/28969.pdf>.
- Parijs, Phillipe Van. “Why Did Brussels Become the Capital of Europe? Because Belgium Starts with Letter b!” The Brussels Times, September 7, 2014. <https://www.brusselstimes.com/29273/why-did-brussels-become-the-capital-of-europe-because-belgium-starts-with-letter-b>.
- Parlament Österreich. “Erklärung der Bundesregierung.” Stenographisches Protokoll 2. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich XVI. Gesetzgebungsperiode, May 31, 1983. https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XVI/NRSITZ/2/imfname_144027.pdf.
- Parlament Österreich, “Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich VIII. Gesetzgebungsperiode Tagesordnung I. Erklärung der Bundesregierung,” Stenographisches Protokoll, July 4, 1956, https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/VIII/NRSITZ/2/imfname_157106.pdf.
- Parlament Österreich. “Allgemeiner Teil zu Artikel 1 (Amtssitzgesetz - ASG).” Parlamentsdirektion, December 17, 2020. https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVII/I/609/fname_856568.pdf.
- Parlament Österreich. Ministerialentwurf betreffend Bundesgesetz zur Stärkung Österreichs als internationaler Amtssitz- und Konferenzstandort (Amtssitzgesetz-ASG), November 13, 2020. <https://www.parlament.gv.at/gegenstand/XXVII/ME/76?selectedStage=100Motivenbericht>.
- Pelinka, Anton, and Ruth Wodak. “Austrian Neutrality.” Essay. In *Neutrality in Austria*, edited by Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak, 1–7. New York, USA: Routledge, 2017.
- Phellas, Constantinos, Alice Bloch, and Clive Seale. “Structured Methods: Interviews, Questionnaires and Observation.” (Manchester eScholar - The University of Manchester), January 1, 1970. <https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/uk-ac-man-scw:196608>.
- Plasser, Fritz, and Gilg Seeber. “The Europeanization of Austrian Political Culture.” Essay. In *Global Austria Austria’s Place in Europe and the World*, edited by Günter Bischof and Fritz Plasser, 212–37. New Orleans, USA: UNO Press, 2011.
- Plassnik, Urslua. “On the Road to a Modern Identity: Austria’s Foreign Policy Agenda from the Cold War to the European Union.” Essay. In *Austria’s International Position after the End of the Cold War*, 55–94. New Orleans, USA: UNO Press, 2013.

- Puntscher-Riekmann, Sonja. "Austria's Dismal EU Membership." Essay. In *Global Austria Austria's Place in Europe and the World*, edited by Günter Bischof and Fritz Plasser, 238–56. New Orleans, USA: UNO Press, 2011.
- Rathkolb, Oliver. *Internationalisierung Österreichs seit 1945*. Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006.
- Rathkolb, Oliver. *Die Paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005*. Wien, Austria: Paul Zsolny Verlag, 2015.
- Rathkolb, Oliver. "International Perceptions of Austrian Neutrality." *Neutrality in Austria - Contemporary Austria Studies* 9 (April 17, 2018): 69–91.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351308847-4>.
- Reuters. "Austria to Shut Saudi-Backed Religious Dialogue Center in Rights Protest." [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-saudi-idUSKCN1TD2DR), June 12, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-saudi-idUSKCN1TD2DR>.
- Roithner, Thomas, and Markus Kornprobst. "Friedenspolitik." Essay. In *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreichs*, edited by Martin Senn, Franz Eder and Markus Kornprobst, 307–22. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023.
- Röhrlich, Elisabeth. *Inspectors for peace a history of the International Atomic Energy Agency*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022.
- Schaffer, Tom. "Politologe: 'Der Spitzenpolitik fehlen Außenpolitiker.'" Interview Helmut Kramer im Kurier, March 3, 2017. <https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/politologe-helmut-kramer-der-spitzenpolitik-fehlen-aussenpolitiker/248.156.044>.
- Schindler, Dietrich. "Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and in the International Community." *American University International Law Review* 14, no. 1 (1998): 155–70.
- Schmidl, Erwin A. "Lukewarm Neutrality in a Cold War? The Case of Austria." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (October 2016): 36–50.
https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00679.
- Schmidl, Erwin A. "Wien als Internationales Zentrum." Essay. In *Wien seit 1945 - Die Metamorphose Einer Stadt*, edited by Michael Dippelreiter, 703–30. Wien, Austria: Böhlau, 2013.
- Schwarz, Christoph, and Adam Urosevic. "Österreichs Neutralität - Rolle Und Optionen in Einer Sich Verändernden Weltordnung." Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, September 2023. <https://www.aies.at/publikationen/>.
- Senn, Martin, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst. "Die Außenpolitik Österreichs in der Zweiten Republik: Befunde und Empfehlungen." Essay. In *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreichs*, edited by Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, 777–93. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023.

- Stourz, Gerald. "Österreichs Weg zum Staatsvertrag und zur Neutralität." Essay. In *Frei - Souverän - Neutral - Europäisch. 1945 - 1955 - 1995 - 2005 Hrsg. Forum Politische Bildung* 22, 22:4–20. Innsbruck/Wien, Austria: Studien Verlag, 2004.
- Stöckl, Sophia. Rep. *Austria in the International Community Exploring the Role of Neutrality*, November 2021. https://www.marshallplan.at/images/All-Papers/SAIS/Final_Research_Paper_by_Sophia_Stoeckl.pdf.
- Szondi, Gyorgy. *Public diplomacy and nation branding: Conceptual similarities and differences*. Den Haag, NL: Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael," 2008.
- "The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies." The Wassenaar Arrangement, June 22, 2021. <https://www.wassenaar.org/>.
- Tichy, Helmut. "Austria's Permanent Neutrality." New Austrian-Austrian Press & Information Service in the United States Embassy of Austria, August 18, 2016. <https://www.austrianinformation.org/winter-2015-16/wc55d7qi5qrmyzmxh1qkofcmluxvj?rq=Austria%27s+Permanent+Neutrality>.
- Tichy, Helmut. "The Impact of the ECHR on Austria's Practice as Host State of International Organisations." Seminar: The Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights to the Development of Public International Law, Prag, September 23, 2020. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/cahdi/the-contribution-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-to-the-development-of-public-international-law>.
- Torraco, Richard J. "Writing Integrative Literature Reviews: Guidelines and Examples." *Human Resource Development Review* 4, no. 3 (September 2005): 356–67. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1534484305278283>.
- Troy, Jodok. "Amtssitzpolitik." Essay. In *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, edited by Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, 241–67. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS, 2023.
- "Tu Felix Austria Nube." Die Welt der Habsburger. Accessed April 25, 2024. <https://www.habsburger.net/de/themen/tu-felix-austria-nube>.
- UNEP. "How Nairobi Came to Host UNEP's Headquarters." United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), May 3, 2022. <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/how-nairobi-came-host-uneps-headquarters#:~:text=With%20this%20united%20front%2C%20Nairobi's,institution%20in%20Nairobi%2C%20Kenya.>
- UNIDO. "A Brief History." UNIDO-Who we are. Accessed April 24, 2024. <https://www.unido.org/who-we-are/brief-history>.
- United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations." REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS. Accessed April 24, 2024. https://legal.un.org/repertory/art104_105.shtml.

United Nations. “United Nations Signs New ‘Seat Agreement’ with Austria Consolidating Number of Legal Agreements between Government and Vienna-Based UN Offices.” United Nations Press Release, December 1, 1995. <https://press.un.org/en/1995/19951201.12747.html>.

United Nations. “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations.” United Nations Treaty Collection. Accessed April 12, 2024. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-3&chapter=23&clang=_en.

UNOV. “NGO Liaison Service.” United Nations Office at Vienna. Accessed April 26, 2024. https://www.unov.org/unov/en/ngo_liaison_service.html.

“Vienna Summit Meeting Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Communiqué.” The American Presidency Project, June 18, 1979. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/vienna-summit-meeting-joint-us-ussr-communicue>.

Wood, Aaron D., Charles F. Mason, and David Finnoff. “OPEC, the Seven Sisters, and Oil Market Dominance: An Evolutionary Game Theory and Agent-Based Modeling Approach.” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 132 (December 2016): 66–78. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.011>.

Zaharna, R.S. “The Public Diplomacy Challenges of Strategic Stakeholder Engagement.” *Trials of Engagement*, January 1, 2011, 201–29. <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004179400.i-309.52>.

Zellner, Wolfgang. “Österreich in der OSZE.” Essay. In *Handbuch Außenpolitik Österreich*, edited by Martin Senn, Franz Eder, and Markus Kornprobst, 729–44. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer SV, 2023.

Appendix A

International Organizations and Institutions in Austria (as of 15.03.23)

Organizations and entities of the United Nations in Vienna	Other International Organizations and Institutions	International Organizations outside Vienna	Quasi-International Organizations
• UNOV (UN Office in Vienna) • UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime) • UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organization) • IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) • CTBTO (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization) • UNOOSA (UN Office for Outer Space Affairs) • UNRoD (UN Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian territory) • UNSCEAR (UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) • UNCITRAL (UN Commission on International Trade Law) • UNODA (UN Office for Disarmament Affairs) • UNEP Vienna- ISCC (UN Environment Program- Interim Secretariat of the Carpathian Convention) • UNOIOS (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, Vienna) • UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency, Vienna Office) • UNIS (UN Information Service Vienna) • UNOPS (UN Office for Project Services, Vienna Office) • UNLOPS (UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security) • UNPA (UN Postal Administration, Vienna Office) • IOM (International Organization for Migration, Vienna Office) • INCB (International Narcotics Control Board)	• CoE (Council of Europe, Vienna Office) • ECS (Energy Community Secretariat in Vienna) • EIB (European Investment Bank, Liaison Office in Vienna) • EPO (European Patent Office, Vienna Office) • FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) • WORLD BANK GROUP (Vienna Office) • ICMPD (International Center for Migration Policy Development) • ICPDR (International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River) • JVI (Joint Vienna Institute) • PCA (Permanent Court of Arbitration) • OFID (OPEC Fund for International Development) • OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) • WA (Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) • OSCC (Open Skies Consultative Commission of the OSCE) • JCG (Joint Consultative Group of the OSCE) • OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) • HCOC-ICC (Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation) • IMF (International Monetary Fund- Office for the Western Balkans) • IVI (International Vaccine Institute)	• PSAC (Permanent Secretariat of the Alpine Convention, Innsbruck) • ECML (European Center for Modern Languages of the Council of Europe, Graz) • eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale-IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, St. Johann/ Pongau Office) • IACA (International Anti-Corruption Academy, Laxenburg) • IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg)	• Ban-ki-Moon Centre in Vienna • FES Vienna (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Vienna Office) • Women-without-Borders in Vienna • IUFRO (International Union of Forest Research Organizations) • KAS- Multilateral Dialogue (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Vienna Office) • REEEP (Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership) • SEforAll (Sustainable Energy for All) • The Global Initiative - against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna Office • VCDNP (Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation)

Source: www.bmeia.gv.at/filedmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Plakat_Amtssitz_Wien_DE_Web.pdf

Appendix B

Online-Questionnaire for the Expert Panel

I. Questions on the overall influence of parameters

Based on the review of relevant literature, 9 main parameters were identified that seem to have an important -albeit changing- causal impact on the development of Austria's *Amtsitzpolitik*. Please indicate your opinion on the general impact of each of these parameters over time. Another question will ask if this impact decreased, increased or stayed the same over time.

1. Which impact, in your opinion, did the following parameters have on the development of Austria's 'Amtsitzpolitik' (host state policy) since 1945? (you can comment on your opinion, which is highly appreciated).

	no impact	impact	strong impact	no answer
Achieving Security, Sovereignty and Independence	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish: 				
Status of Austria's Neutrality	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish: 				
The Geopolitical Situation	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish: 				
Gaining Reputation and Providing 'Service' to the International Community of States	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish: 				
Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish: 				
Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish: 				
Relationship/Membership European Union	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish: 				

Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish:				
International Competition (Attractiveness of Location/Nation- and City Branding)	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish:				

2. Are there any other important parameters that had a causal impact on the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik since 1945 that are not mentioned? Please add them here and rate them (no impact=0/impact=3/strong impact=5)

1.	
2.	
3.	
If you wish to comment:	

II. Questions on the change of impact of parameters

The causal impact of these parameters may have changed over time. This question aims to evaluate which of these parameters had an increasing or decreasing influence on Austria's Amtssitzpolitik. So if -for example- you think the impact of a parameter changed over time, please mark it here. You can also comment on this change, if you wish.

3. Please indicate your opinion if the causal impact of the following parameters on Austria's Amtssitzpolitik over time stayed the same/increased/decreased. The impact of ...

	decreased	stayed the same	increased	k. A.
Achieving Security, Sovereignty and Independence	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish:				
Status of Austria's Neutrality	☐	☐	☐	☐
please comment if you wish:				

The Geopolitical Situation
☐
☐
☐
☐

please comment if you wish:

Gaining Reputation and Providing 'Service' to the International Community of States
☐
☐
☐
☐

please comment if you wish:

Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements
☐
☐
☐
☐

please comment if you wish:

Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria
☐
☐
☐
☐

please comment if you wish:

Relationship/Membership EU
☐
☐
☐
☐

please comment if you wish:

Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations
☐
☐
☐
☐

please comment if you wish:

International Competition (Attractiveness of Location/Nation- and City Branding)
☐
☐
☐
☐

please comment if you wish:

4. If you have named any other important parameters that had a causal impact on the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik, please add them here and rate them (decreased=0/stayed the same=3/increased = 5)

1.
2.
3.

Additional Questions

These additional questions should help to augment the overall rating of the impact of the parameters on the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik and support the analysis and the conclusions on the implications of these parameters. Thank you for your time and patience.

1. There are different opinions on the influence of Austria's accession to the European Union on the development of Austria's Amtssitzpolitik. Has Austria gained an advantage or disadvantage in terms of attractiveness as host state by joining the EU - why? (Open-ended question, you can use as much space as you like)

2. IOs and QIOs increasingly focus on the Global South, is there a risk of an exodus of international organizations? Which ones are most at risk? (Open-ended question, you can use as much space as you like)

3. What - in your opinion- are the biggest current or future challenges for Austria as a host state (you can name 1-3)

1.

2.

3.

please comment:

Appendix C

Results of the Expert Interviews on WAIS, WACS and CS.

Parameters of Impact on AASP	Weighted Average Impact Score	No Impact	Impact	Strong Impact	No Answer	Impact decreased over time	Impact stayed the same	Impact increased over time	No Answer	Weighted Average Change Score	Composite Score
International Competition, Public Diplomacy and Attractivity of Location	4.38	0.00%	30.77%	69.23%	0.00%	15.38%	23.08%	61.54%	0.00%	+0.46	+2.02
The 'Security Rationale' (Security, Sovereignty, and Independence)	4.31	7.69%	15.38%	76.92%	0.00%	53.85%	30.77%	15.38%	0.00%	-0.38	-1.64
The Geopolitical Systemic Changes in the International System	4.23	0.00%	38.46%	61.54%	0.00%	53.85%	30.77%	15.38%	0.00%	-0.38	-1.61
The Status of Neutrality	4.17	0.00%	38.46%	53.85%	7.69%	61.54%	38.46%	0.00%	0.00%	-0.62	-2.59
International Reputation and "Good Service"	4.08	0.00%	46.15%	53.85%	0.00%	15.38%	61.54%	23.08%	0.00%	+0.08	+0.33
Economic Effects and Added Value for Austria	3.54	7.69%	53.85%	38.46%	0.00%	7.69%	7.69%	76.92%	7.69%	+0.75	+2.66
The Role of Non-Governmental and Quasi-International Organizations	2.31	38.46%	38.46%	23.08%	0.00%	7.69%	61.54%	23.08%	7.69%	+0.17	+0.39
Rule of Law: Host State Law and Headquarters Agreements	2.15	38.46%	46.15%	15.38%	0.00%	15.38%	69.23%	7.69%	7.69%	-0.08	-0.17
The Role of Membership European Union	2.08	46.15%	30.77%	23.08%	0.00%	23.08%	38.46%	38.46%	0.00%	+0.15	+0.31

Source: Own Research - Results of Interviews Expert Panel