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„Evoking Interest through Storytelling:
A Cognitive Narratological Investigation of
Suspense, Curiosity, and Surprise“

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Abstract

Novels and movies have the remarkable capacity to capture our attention and even keep us on the edge of our seats - but how do narratives evoke such powerful responses? This work attempts to answer this by exploring what Meir Sternberg calls the *Universals of Narrative: suspense, curiosity, and surprise*.

Although emotions are widely recognized as an important aspect of storytelling, the question of how stories should be crafted and told to evoke emotions has received limited scholarly attention. Traditional writing advice typically cites *conflict* as a key element of an interesting narrative, yet there is no clearly defined concept of *narrative conflict* that distinguishes it from conflict in real life (e.g., a dispute between people). This work outlines a systematic model of narrative conflict inspired by Hegel's *Kollision* and introduces a complementary model of suspense. This novel approach avoids shortcomings of the predominant probabilistic suspense theories by drawing on cybernetic concepts (*goals, anti-goals, and the proximity* towards them).

A central finding of this work is that the narrative techniques of *gapping* and *gap-filling* can generate *insights* in the reader, such as those experienced during problem-solving (Eureka!). Compared to the basic idea of surprise, which Hitchcock regarded as a cheap trick, this is a more complex, longer-lasting form of surprise.

This work also suggests that individual factors, such as novelty or information gaps, are not sufficient to generate curiosity. Therefore, this research introduces an alternative in the form of the Learn/Effect Model of Interest, a model that combines several theories including Loewenstein's *information gap theory* and Berlyne's *collative variables*, and organizes them into two factors necessary to generate interest.

At its core, this research takes an interdisciplinary approach to investigate how authors ignite reader interest and the fundamental cognitive and emotional mechanisms in play. These insights are valuable not only for narrative theory but also for the practice of storytelling.

Kurzfassung

Romane und Filme haben die bemerkenswerte Fähigkeit, unsere Aufmerksamkeit zu fesseln und uns in Atem zu halten - aber wie schaffen es Erzählungen, solch starke Reaktionen in uns hervorzurufen? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, untersucht diese Arbeit die von Meir Sternberg identifizierten *Universals of Narrative: Spannung, Neugierde und Überraschung*.

Obwohl Emotionen weithin als wichtiger Aspekt des Geschichtenerzählens anerkannt sind, hat die Frage, wie Geschichten gestaltet und erzählt werden müssen, um Emotionen hervorzurufen, bisher nur begrenzte akademische Aufmerksamkeit erhalten. In Schreibratgebern gilt *Konflikt* als Schlüsselement einer interessanten Erzählung, jedoch fehlt uns ein klar definiertes Konzept, das den narrativen Konflikt von Konflikten im wirklichen Leben (z.B. einem Streit zwischen Menschen) unterscheidet. In dieser Arbeit wird ein Modell des narrativen Konflikts erarbeitet, das sich auf Hegels *Kollision* stützt. Darüber hinaus wird ein komplementäres Spannungsmodell eingeführt, welches Schwächen der vorherrschenden probabilistischen Spannungstheorien vermeidet, indem es auf kybernetische Konzepte zurückgreift (*Ziele*, *Anti-Ziele* und die *Nähe* zu ihnen).

Eine zentrale Erkenntnis dieser Arbeit ist, dass die Erzähltechniken *Gapping* und *Gap-filling* beim Leser *Insights* erwecken können, wie sie beim Problemlösen erlebt werden (Heureka!). Verglichen mit der gängigen Vorstellung der Überraschung, die Hitchcock als billigen Trick ansah, handelt es sich hierbei um eine komplexere, länger anhaltende Form der Überraschung.

Diese Arbeit geht davon aus, dass Faktoren wie Neuartigkeit oder Information Gaps alleine nicht ausreichen, um Neugierde zu erwecken. Daher führt diese Arbeit eine Alternative in Form des Lern-/Effektmodells von Interesse ein, das mehrere Theorien, darunter Loewensteins *information gap theory* und Berlynes *collative variables*, kombiniert und sie in zwei Faktoren ordnet, die für das Erwecken von Interesse erforderlich sind.

Im Kern verfolgt diese Forschung einen interdisziplinären Ansatz, um zu untersuchen, wie Autoren das Interesse der Leser wecken und welche grundlegenden kognitiven und emotionalen Mechanismen dabei im Spiel sind. Diese Erkenntnisse sind nicht nur für die Erzähltheorie, sondern auch für die Praxis des Geschichtenerzählens von Bedeutung.

Foreword

I entered the world of poetics when I read Robert McKee's *Story* (1997), a book on the principles of screenwriting, over a decade ago. After I internalized his theory, which was inspired by Aristotle's Poetics, I read fiction and watched films differently. I disapproved of the use of voice-over narration for some time (avoiding voice-overs in film was one of McKee's most controversial suggestions) but revised my opinion a few years later. McKee's book changed my aesthetic judgment, and its application reinforced its validity. This made me aware that I evaluated narratives according to my expectations and theories, and I wondered to which degree narrative aesthetics is determined by social, cultural, and historical context and to which by (cognitive-)psychological phenomena.

In this thesis, I investigate storytelling in the Western world, in particular in the narrative film. The position taken here is that this domain relies strongly on the writer's ability to evoke suspense, curiosity, and surprise, and this against the backdrop of the audience's expectations. Alfred Hitchcock's *The Birds* was extremely suspenseful when it came out in 1963, but when we watch the film with today's expectations, we cannot help but laugh over some of the special effects. The twist in Hitchcock's *Psycho* (1960) was surprising back then, but it is quite predictable for today's moviegoers. To understand what made Billy Wilder's film *The Lost Weekend* (1945) so special, one must understand the expectations the audience had about alcoholism. Until *The Lost Weekend*, which portrays a chronic alcoholic on a four-day drinking bout, a drunken man was pure comedic gold. The audience expected to laugh at the man who tottered from one misadventure into another. Billy Wilder's film, on the contrary, was fresh and interesting because it was the first film that portrayed alcoholism seriously (Lemmon and Wilder 1995). Unfortunately, we cannot watch *The Lost Weekend* in the same way as people watched it back then because what was novel and interesting 70 years ago is old, or even a cliché, nowadays. These examples showcase how interest depends on culture and knowledge.

In *Art as Experience*, John Dewey ([1934] 2005) argued that "poet and novelist have an immense advantage over even an expert psychologist in dealing with an emotion. For the former build up a concrete situation and permit *it* to evoke emotional response. Instead of a description of an emotion in intellectual and symbolic terms, the artist 'does the deed

that breeds' the emotion" (p. 70, [original emphasis](#)). The question of how well novelists understand the human psyche is quite intriguing and so is the question of whether the novelist's writing process can be facilitated by knowledge of cognitive narratological models.

[Bruner \(1986\)](#) argued that "[i]n contrast to our vast knowledge of how science and logical reasoning proceeds, we know precious little in any formal sense about how to make good stories" (p. 14) and in [Ryan's \(2009\)](#) view, this has not changed since. My fascination with this question motivated me throughout my investigation. Whenever I gained new insights, I asked myself, could this be applied by a writer? This is a different perspective than that of most literary analysts.

Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

Interest & Cognitive Narratology

Gestalt psychologists argue that humans have an innate need for sense-making that is manifested in the desire to organize information into coherent ‘wholes’ (see [Loewenstein 1994](#)). From this, narrative provides us with material that we try to make sense of, which appeals to our *need for cognition*, our “need to structure relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways [...] to understand and make reasonable the experiential world” ([Cohen et al. 1955](#), p. 291; as cited in [Loewenstein 1994](#), p. 83). Most scientific treatises dealing with curiosity, suspense, or surprise only look at one of these phenomena in isolation, but this thesis investigates all three at once because they are taken to one family of emotions that stimulates our desire to learn and to understand (see [Tan 1996](#)). As such, they are then also the main motivators that storytelling tries to elicit (see [Sternberg 1978](#)). Sometimes they are mild, sometimes they are intense, sometimes the narrative favors only one of them, and sometimes they seamlessly blend into each other. Suspense evokes expectations, whose violations evoke surprise, and eventually, we are left behind, wondering what happened. In this introductory chapter, I establish the thesis’ theoretical position, as well as fundamental concepts required for later chapters, which further the discussions drawing on narratological, drama theoretic, and cognitive psychological theories and concepts.

1.1 Affect & Narratology

In 2003, when Greg Smith told non-academics that he was going to write a book on *Film structure and the emotion system*, they usually responded with “Isn’t that an enormous subject? There must be so much written about film and emotion” ([Smith 2003](#), p. 3).

However, few cinema theorists had written about emotions and affect before him. Although most people associate narration with an emotional experience, affect played a minor role in the whole narratological domain after Wimsatt and Beardsley argued in the 1950s that the objective literary critic cannot judge a poem based on the emotional effects on a reader (Keen 2011; Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949; Wimsatt and Beardsley 1954). Proponents of *New Criticism* postulated that an objective form of literary criticism could not rely on emotional impressions because these are subjective and, thus, unrepeatable and unreliable. A critic who judges a piece of art according to the elicited emotional response commits *The Affective Fallacy* and confuses the poem and its *results* (what it *is* and what it *does*) because this would lead to an “emotional relativism” that could not be the foundation of any scientific view on literature.

For a long time, the exchange between narratology and psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science has been sparse, and affect only re-entered narratology through cognitively oriented theorists such as David Bordwell (1985), Noël Carroll (1990), Murray Smith (1995), Ed Tan (1996) and Torben Grodal (1997). The branch of narratology¹ in which scholars study the mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices is called *cognitive narratology*.²

1.1.1 Affect, Emotion & Mood

Given that layperson notions of *emotion* and *affect* are fuzzy, and given the broad range of the affective sciences (Davidson et al. 2003), it should not be too surprising that there is no uniform use of the terms affect and emotion (Scherer 2005). Sometimes, they are used as synonymous, sometimes, emotions are seen as a type of affect, and sometimes, the term affect only refers to the experienced feelings of pleasure and pain (e.g., Frijda 2010). It is, therefore, necessary to define a common ground for the following discussion.

The presented taxonomy is one out of many and is introduced for reasons of systematization. It is representative of the *Cognitive Appraisal Theory* of emotion (Scherer, Schorr, et al. 2001), a family that has obvious and strong ties to cognitive science and narratological developments, reflecting the cognitive and affective turns in psychology and the language sciences.

Emotions are complex responses that comprise various components (Scherer 2005), including

¹Todorov 1969 proposed *Narratology* as the science of narrative with the mission to investigate its logic and structure. Like most other *structuralists*, Todorov largely ignored the effect of affect in narration. However, models like Meir Sternberg’s *Universals of Narrative* (Sternberg 1978; also Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982) indicate that there is interdependence between affect and narrative structure (e.g. if we want to surprise the audience, we must structure it in a way so that surprise occurs).

²Cognitive narratology comprises print narratives (fictional and nonfictional), computer-mediated virtual environments, comics, graphic novels, cinema, and other storytelling media (Herman 2013).

“core affect [...] overt behavior of the right sort (flight with fear, fight with anger, etc.) in relation to the object; attention toward, appraisal of, and attributions to that object; the experience of oneself as having a specific emotion; and, of course, all the neural, chemical, and other bodily events underlying these psychological happenings” (Russell and Barrett 1999, p. 806).

Affect, by contrast, is often seen as a more elementary concept that involves neurophysiological states (i.e., states of the central nervous system), which are consciously experienced through *feelings* along dimensions such as *pleasure/displeasure* (also pleasure–pain, appetitive–aversive, and the like) and *activation/deactivating* (also arousal–calmness, tension–relaxation, and the like) (Russell 2003). Affect is frequently considered to be a core component of emotion, but it can also occur alone. Cognitive appraisal theory, in particular, posits emotions to have an object (e.g., we enjoy or fear *something*), whereas *moods* are taken to be undirected and free-floating, e.g., we can be depressed or anxious without an apparent cause.

When it comes to emotions, we often think of anger, sadness, or happiness, and arguably, little about emotions related to knowledge. The term knowledge emotions—or *epistemic emotions*—refers to psychological states, such as curiosity, confusion, surprise, shock, awe, and worry (Keltner and Shiota 2003; Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987; Silvia 2006), and the suspense construct (Carroll 1996a; de Wied et al. 1992). Whether these epistemic effects are emotions, is controversial (e.g., Silvia 2006). However, they fulfill many of the characteristics attributed to ‘typical’ emotions. For example, like these other emotions, interest involves *action tendencies* (Frijda 1987), which “lie in the realm of approach and exploration, however bounded it is by the role of spectator or witness imposed by the diegetic effect. As a witness, one cannot take any part in the action. But the witness is able to follow intently the action of the film, speculating about coming developments by forming expectations and searching for confirmation of those expectations” (Tan 1996, p. 86).

1.1.2 Epistemic Emotions

The term *interest* is often used synonymously with the term *curiosity*, but we take it to designate a broader family of emotions consisting of suspense, curiosity, and surprise. These phenomena form a family because they are all related to knowledge and overlapping principles (see Section 5.2). Although uncertainty is a component of suspense (Carroll 1996b), it can also arouse curiosity, and while novelty can incite curiosity (Berlyne 1971), it often co-occurs with surprise (Barto et al. 2013). Sternberg (1978) calls suspense, curiosity and surprise the *master effects* or the *Universals of Narrative*. It must be noted that Sternberg developed a literary model of the master effects and deliberately avoided framing them as emotions, yet he emphasized their affective and cognitive impacts. From a cognitive narratological point of view, it is interesting to compare literary constructs with psychological

conceptualizations of these phenomena. The psychological research on curiosity reached a peak during the 1960s and 1970s (Gottlieb, Oudeyer, et al. 2013; Loewenstein 1994), and attracted renewed attention from psychology (Silvia 2008) and neuroscience (Jepma et al. 2012; Kang et al. 2009) in recent years.

1.1.3 Epistemic Emotions in Storytelling

Compared to other emotions, the epistemic family stands out in the storytelling cosmos. Emotions like sadness are typical for specific genres, require extensive preparation (e.g., the buildup of sympathy), and are only sparsely distributed over narrative discourse while epistemic emotions are found in all genres, can be maintained over a long time frame (“who-dunit?”), can occur with very little preparation (e.g., surprise) and can also co-occur with other emotions. Part of storytelling is to provide information in a way so that epistemic emotions are evoked. Simply put, suspense and curiosity involve the lack of desired information, and surprise involves the disclosure of unexpected information. Writers play with information to direct us through their discourses and incite epistemic motivations. Therefore, stories are rarely told chronologically, but in a way so that these emotions can be experienced (see Sternberg 1978). The ability to arouse curiosity, suspense, and surprise may, thus, be one of the most fundamental skills an author must master. This is reflected by the story development process of writers, who put a major effort into keeping us interested:

“You know, at a certain point, especially in a movie like *The Big Lebowski*, you’ve got to think ahead. At a certain point, we had to sit down and say, ‘All right. It’s gotta be somebody’s fucking toe.’ And that was before we actually got to the scene that discloses it, but well after the toe itself showed up.” [...]

“I mean, that’s just an example, but that’s the rule. We get the idea first—‘Oh, it would be good if a severed toe shows up here’” [...]

“You just come up with a bizarre image.”

“Right. We want to goose it with a toe. And then you’re left with the problem of whose toe it is.” (interview with Joel and Ethan Coen in Robertson and Cooke 1998, p. 49)

The severed toe in *The Big Lebowski* (1998) is an interesting image, and also serves another “affective function”. It surprises us because, until its revelation, we are led to think that the situation was staged and that Lebowski’s wife faked her kidnapping to extort money from her husband. We now become curious: Whose toe is it really? In addition, it also propels the story in a new direction. Without a doubt, not every author’s process has such a strong focus on keeping their reader’s interest, but if a narrator is unable to keep us interested, why should we *care* at all? The most valuable message is missed if the reader resigns chapters before it is disclosed.

Our view is grounded in a cognitive interpretation of Daniel E. Berlyne’s theory of curiosity, which proposes that arousal depends on the *collative variables*: novelty, complexity, uncertainty, and conflict (Berlyne 1971). As a behaviorist, Berlyne strongly focused on low-level research with simple and abstract stimuli, such as randomly generated polygons, to investigate their impact on curiosity. Within this behaviorist framing, curiosity may be attributed to the properties of a stimulus. However, curiosity, suspense, and surprise are highly knowledge-dependent phenomena, and hence, interest depends not only on the stimulus (e.g. the novel or film) but also on a person’s knowledge and previous experiences.

1.2 Cognitive Narratology

Narratives do not affect readers in arbitrary ways. Effective storytellers are able to continuously affect their readership, and masters of the craft are proficient in predicting and guiding its (emotional) response. Cognitive narratologists assume that this ability partly depends on the regularities of human cognition. Hence, it is interested in not only meanings, such as other narratological domains, but also how the cognitive apparatus enables us to understand and construct narratives. Whereas “traditional” narratology finds that “sympathizing with a corrupt character may lead us to a certain thematic statement,” cognitive narratology also asks “what processes enable the film to mobilize our sympathy in the first place?” (Bordwell 2010, p. 6).

1.2.1 Cognitive Science & Cognitivism

During the 1980s, David Bordwell and Noël Carroll proposed a *cognitivist* approach to film theory as a counter-movement to the predominant psychoanalytic, Marxist, and semiotic research. The notion of ‘cognitivism’³ proves problematic in narratological discussions because it implies “that the mind can be reduced to disembodied mental representations that are disattached from particular environments for acting and interacting” (Herman 2013, p. 48). However, even self-proclaimed cognitivists like Bordwell and Carroll do not claim that this is the case. Bordwell even argues that our ability to understand film piggybacks on our regular capacities of *interacting* with the world physically, emotionally, and socially, and many of these capacities are acquired through ordinary experience (Bordwell 2010; Messaris 1994). Within narratology, cognitivism has often a different meaning, referring to a psycho-

³*Cognitivism*, a branch in cognitive science, assumes that cognition largely depends on discrete mental representations in the form of symbolic structures and mental processes, which depend on some form of computation. However, such a computationalist view does not imply that the mind works like a digital computer, but rather that both, the mind and the computer, use computational mechanisms (Pinker 2003; Pylyshyn 1984).

logical approach isolated from other narratological domains (see Sternberg 2003a; Sternberg 2003b).

Cognitive science developed between 1940 and 1970 as a response to radical behaviorism, which involves dismissing inner mental states and processes. The *cognitive turn* led scientists to focus on mental processes such as recognition, comprehension, emotional responses, inference-making, interpretation, judgment, memory, and imagination (Bordwell 1989). Such emphasis on (mental) activities was passed on to cognitive narratology, which studies the cognitive processes that allow us to experience and comprehend narratives (Bordwell 2010, p. 6).

1.2.2 Mental Representations

Having its roots in artificial intelligence, cognitive science focuses on knowledge and its representation. It is assumed that information needs to be encoded in memory (Pitt 2013). There must be a mental entity or state that encodes semantic information about other people, stereotypes, social roles, the world, or how we act in it (e.g., to order at a restaurant). The predominant representationalist view in cognitive science is compatible with the core idea of narratology, *the science of narrative*, which was founded by the structuralist Tzvetan Todorov, who argued that the analysis of narrative must not stop at the levels of letters, words, or sentences, but must focus on the logical and structural properties of narrative as an *univers de représentations* (Meister 2014; Todorov 1969). While structuralist narratologists locate these structures in narrative discourse, cognitive narratologists investigate their mental counterparts and how they affect how stories are told.

Knowledge is taken to be stored in the form of information-bearing structures, whereas mental representations are an orchestration of their activations. It is known in neurosurgery that dreams, hallucinations, smells, the sound of music, and long-lost memories can be evoked through electrical stimulation of cortical neurons (Bartolomei et al. 2004; Penfield and Jasper 1954; Penfield and Rasmussen 1950; Vignal et al. 2007). This evidence comes from epilepsy surgeries where patients remain fully conscious while their skull is opened. Using electrodes, neurosurgeons stimulate small areas of the brain and ask their patients questions to identify and map the concerned brain areas. The famous neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield found that during this procedure around 8% of his patients reported memory recalls such as images of a circus traveling at night (Perot 1963). In these cases, the artificially-induced activation appears to have spread to other brain areas, activating brain patterns that represent memories that were then consciously experienced (Jacobs et al. 2012). There is strong evidence from neuroimaging studies that activities of the brain are closely linked to the activities of the mind (Haynes and Rees 2006). Several studies, for instance, have shown that semantic categories of pictures and words (e.g. tools, animals, buildings) can be predicted from spatial patterns of neural activation (Mitchell et al. 2008). Nishimoto et al.

(2011) could even roughly reconstruct film trailers from the brain activity of people who watched them. The reconstructed film shows blurry shapes that move in accordance with the people and objects in the presented clips.

In another study with epileptic patients, scientists measured the activity of single neurons in the medial temporal lobe and found neurons that fired selectively when the person saw pictures of the famous actress Halle Berry, but not when the person saw pictures of other famous and non-famous faces, landmarks, animals, or objects (Quiroga et al. 2005). The neurons responded to different pictures of Halle Berry dressed as Catwoman, but not to pictures of Catwoman which were impersonated by other actresses. However, these neurons fired not only when the person saw pencil drawings, caricatures, and colored photographs showing different perspectives of Halle Berry but also when they read the letter string “Halle Berry”. Considering such selective behavior of neurons, the scientists assume there is a sparse set of cells in the medial temporal lobe that explicitly represent specific percepts such as Halle Berry (i.e., “grandmother cells”) (Gross 2002).

These findings support a mental representationalist approach as advocated by cognitive narratologists. However, while neuroscientists can activate mental representations with the tip of an electrode, novelists do it with the tip of their pen: Philip Johnson-Laird argued that we develop mental models of a text’s meaning by using known mental representations (Johnson-Laird 1983; Johnson-Laird 2006; Van Dijk and Kintsch 1983), and when these representations are recombined, we can imagine characters we have never met, constructs fictional worlds we have never seen, and understand texts we have never read.

There are varying approaches to mental representations, each of which is suited to model specific aspects of cognition. However, there is no consensus of whether mental representations are *symbolic structures* (Fodor 1975; Fodor 2001; Fodor 2008; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Marr 1982; Newell and Simon 1976), *patterns of activation* over the units in a network (McCulloch and Pitts 1943; Rumelhart et al. 1986; Smolensky 1988), parameters in a *dynamic system* (Clark 1997a; Clark 1997b; Clark 2008; Van Gelder 1995) or whether the mind combines them.

Besides these paradigms, cognitive psychologists have used the notions of *schemata* (Bartlett 1933), *associative networks*, *exemplars*, *distributed representations* (Smith and Queller 2001), and *simulators* (Barsalou 1999; Barsalou 2003a) to refer to different types of encoded information. Among these, schemata are frequently used by narratologists. A *schema*—or *frame* (Minsky 1975)—is an organized cluster of knowledge that holds generic information about objects, concepts, or action sequences (Bartlett 1933; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Markus and Zajonc 1985; Smith and Queller 2001). Whether we visit a doctor or order a dish at a restaurant, our schemata are taken to provide us with information about how we have to behave and what we can expect in these situations. “A schema contains the network of associations that is believed to hold among the attributes of the stimulus and thereby provides rules for thinking about the stimulus” (Tesser 1978, p. 290). Thus, schemata help

us to “compensate for any gaps in the text. As schemata represent the knowledge base of individuals, they are often culturally and temporally specific, and are ordinarily discussed as collective stores of knowledge shared by prototypical members of a given or assumed community” (Alexander and Emmott 2014, para. 2).

This *constructivist* perspective suggests that narrative comprehension strongly depends on the schemata we carry with us from prior experiences. On their basis, we make assumptions, erect expectations, and confirm or disconfirm hypotheses (Bordwell 1985). In *Good Will Hunting* (1997), a short scene with cues such as a dust mop, a uniform, and a cleaning activity is sufficient for the audience to instantly apply the janitor *prototype schema*. In a fraction of a second, we infer much about Will Hunting, without really knowing him at all. However, it is not a single schema, but the combination of various schemata that allows us to *understand* events, actions, locales, and characters. Our understanding of *Bonny and Clyde* is made up of several prototype schemata, including “lovers,” “bank robbery,” “small Southern town,” and “Depression-era” (Bordwell 1985). Consider how the TV series *House of Cards* (2013) plays with the “lovers” schema: Francis Underwood cheats on his wife Claire with a young journalist. The Western “default” assumption is that if Claire found out, she would be emotionally devastated (suspense), but we are then surprised to see that she supports his actions (surprise & curiosity) because the young journalist gives them access to something which is seen to be more important than fidelity—access to the media and thus to power.

1.2.3 (Spatio-)Temporal Coherence

During narrative comprehension, narrative elements are linked using spatio-temporal information to facilitate a coherent understanding of the story (Zwaan et al. 1995). The sequential, chronological, and causal connections between events are of special interest because in contrast to every other form of communication, narrative “uniquely entails the concurrence of two temporal sequences: that in which events happened [*fabula*] and that in which they unfold [*sujet*]” (Sternberg 2003a, p. 326).

Fabula and sujet can be understood as two different ways how events are mentally linked, whereby fabula, the chronological order of events, must be inferred from the sujet, the sequence in which the story is told, e.g., flashed-back, *in medias res* or non-linear^{4,5}(see table. 1.1).

⁴More precisely, fabula can be understood as “the totality of motifs in their logical causal-temporal chain” and sujet as “the totality of the same motifs in that sequence and connectivity in which they are presented in the work”(Tomashevsky 1925; in Černov 1977, p. 40).

⁵This ability seems to be impaired in patients with frontal lobe lesions: Patients with this condition have difficulties to “reconstruct the sequential links among events and to extract inferential knowledge from the text during encoding” (Zalla et al. 2002, p. 215).

Table 1.1: An example comparison of the strict chronological event order of the fabula and a possible presentation order in the sujet.

Sujet	2	4	1	5	3
Fabula	1	2	3	4	5

1.2.4 Story as Mental Construction

The Russian formalist concepts of fabula and sujet were extended by the French structuralist concepts of *story* and *discourse* (Barthes 1977; Todorov [1966] 1980). According to Chatman (1980), “each narrative has two parts: a story (*histoire*), the content or chain of events (actions, happenings), plus what may be called the existents (characters, items of setting); and a discourse (*discours*), that is, the expression, the means by which the content is communicated. In simple terms, the story is the *what* in a narrative that is depicted, discourse the *how*” (p. 19, original emphasis).

Thus, discourse goes beyond sujet and refers to how the story is presented (e.g., the order of events, voice, perspective, style). Unlike fabula and sujet, story and discourse can be understood in *semiotic* terms (Scheffel 2013): Discourse is the *signifier*, which can be mediated materially (e.g., by text or film), and the story is the *signified*, the mental (re-)construction of the happenings including the characters and the story world.

1.2.5 Affect & Mental Representations

Miall (1989) argued that “a schema-based approach [and pure representationalist approaches in general] to complex literary narratives cannot succeed, as the comprehension of such texts goes beyond the schemata activated during comprehension. [...] Because literary texts are indeterminate, the reading process is directed towards the creation of schemata” (para. 3). Although ‘expository prose’ can be modeled with rather ‘stable’ meanings, literary narratives involve unstable mental representations. Miall illustrates the problem with the help of the beginning section of Virginia Woolf’s *Together and Apart*:

“[1] Mrs Dalloway introduced them, [2] saying you will like him. [3] The conversation began some minutes before anything was said, [4] for both Mr Serle and Miss Anning looked at the sky [5] and in both of their minds the sky went on pouring its meaning [6] though very differently...” (as quoted in Miall 1989, para. 10).

Phrase #3 is harder to comprehend than the other phrases. Here, Virginia Woolf cultivates an information game through a statement that seems to be contradictory at first, resulting in an unstable mental representation of the text's meaning. However, if the term 'conversation' is not interpreted by its prototypical meaning that first comes to mind (a chit-chat or discussion), but as non-verbal communication, the representation of the text's meaning becomes stable and allows further inferences⁶.

Miall concludes that "no network of relationships and inferences will capture the indeterminacy of a literary text, its complex of shifting and continually developing meanings" (Miall 1989, para. 4). If mental representations are unstable in literary narratives, such as the meaning of the sky metaphor that changes in the course of the narrative, then how should they guide the comprehension process? Miall suggests that reading is guided by not only schemata but also affect. Our challenge is to understand, to construct a story (or stories) that accounts for the discourse. We can only understand the text when we find mental representations that yield stable meanings. Virginia Woolf's text constitutes a puzzle, and solving it is emotionally rewarding. It is the uncertainty about which schemata represent the meaning of the text that catches our attention (Klinger 1978). In Woolf's example, we experience curiosity in the face of the contradiction and a surprising insight when we succeed in solving it.

1.3 Narrative Functionalism

Aristotle's *Poetics*, one of the precursors of modern narratology (Meister 2014), already comprised a cognitive view (Heath 2009) that coupled structure with affect. Also, adopting a functionalist way of thinking, he argued that events must serve a *purpose* within the plot.

"The events which are the parts of the plot must be so organized that if any of them is displaced or taken away, the whole will be shaken and put out of joint; for if the presence or absence of a thing makes no discernible difference, that thing is not part of the whole" (Aristotle 1902, part XIII, para. 1).

Aristotle described a convention that applies to a wide range of genres and that leads us to expect that discourse elements—including characters, salient objects, descriptions, or analogies—serve a purpose. It makes a *difference* whether a stimulus is categorized as an object of everyday life or as a work of art because we assume that authors, and artists in general, *intentionally* arrange elements so that we can *discover* their meanings (Belke et al. 2015; Danto 1974). Exceptions prove the rule: Seemingly unrelated and random

⁶For example, "the phrase 'the conversation began some minutes before anything was said' is important as it shows an affinity 'the together bit' between two people" (Miall 1989, Reader's Comments section, para. 2).

elements are puzzling, just precisely because we are unable to make sense of them. In a scene in the film *The Room* (2003), several characters play football in their tuxedos, and we, as the audience, want to know the purpose of this unusual scene. However, moviegoers were puzzled by this mysterious event, and even the actors speculated about its purpose, especially because it was given priority over seemingly more relevant scenes (Sestero and Bissell 2013).

Narrative events and elements can have two primary functions: *Propulsion* and *Direction*.

1.3.1 Propulsion & Direction

Propulsion refers to the function of an element or event to affect the *story-universe* (intradiegetic level), whereas *direction* refers to the function of affecting the *audience's* mind (extradiegetic level). Meir Sternberg (1987) referred to these functions as *plot function* (affecting the world) and *rhetorical function* (affecting the reader).

Intradiegetic elements and events can be analyzed by their propulsive function—their role in taking part in the causal sequence of events in the enacted/simulated story world. The elements and events in the *discourse* can be analyzed by their directive function: their role in directing the audience's mind (e.g., guiding attention, emotions, expectations, comprehension, associations, and beliefs) which includes logical and associative connections (e.g., thematic) between the elements and events within the discourse. Misleading clues ('red herrings') are an example of (mis)direction.

Propulsion is related to Propp's ([1928] 1968) generic notion of *function*, which "is understood as an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action" (p. 21). However, the notion of direction highlights that narrative elements not only have a function in the progression of the plot, but they are also designed to produce certain effects on the audience (Ryan 2009): Narrative discourse goes beyond a mere simulation of reality consisting of agents, objects, and state changes. It also contains extradiegetic elements (e.g., parallelism, metaphor, thematic statement, and evoking particular emotions within the audience), and directive elements that the characters are typically unaware of. Events are presented for a purpose (e.g., to shock, persuade, and inform), and information is conveyed in a sequence that evokes curiosity, suspense, surprise, and other forms of affect to motivate the reading process and to sustain the motivation over time.

While propulsion is related to *mimesis* (imitation, representation, or enactment), direction is related to *diegesis* (narrative or narration), which in turn is derived from the Greek verb *diegeisthai* (which means to lead or to guide through) (Halliwell 2013). An artificial intelligence approach to storytelling that only takes agents with their plans, goals, and actions into account, is just a model of propulsion: more of a *social simulation* than

a narrative. Virginia Woolf's *Together and Apart*, on the contrary, is not very propulsive: Many elements in the discourse, such as the sky metaphor, do not play a causal role in the plot, yet they have a purpose.

Chekhov's gun principle says,

“Remove everything that has no relevance to the story. If you say in the first chapter that there is a rifle hanging on the wall, in the second or third chapter it absolutely must go off. If it's not going to be fired, it shouldn't be hanging there” (Anton Chekhov quoted by Shchukin 2011, p. 44).

In other words, why introduce an element that does not propel the story? In popular narratives, elements, and events tend to be propulsive (e.g., *because* his bride was executed by Englishmen, William Wallace started a revolt (*Braveheart* (1995))). Chekhov's principle demands that an element like a gun must have a propulsive function because, otherwise, it does not add anything to the story. However, what if an author uses the gun intentionally as a red herring to mislead the audience's expectations, to create uncertainty about the outcome of a conflict? In this case, the rifle would not need to be fired at all because its mere presence would have a purpose, albeit not a propulsive one. Whereas the red herring can be exclusively directive, a *MacGuffin* is primarily propulsive: The spy is after the papers, and the crook is after the necklace. In the case of a *MacGuffin*, the exact nature of these artifacts is unimportant, as long as they propel the story.

Propulsion and direction tend to go hand in hand, as in the case of the killing of William Wallace's bride, which causes a revolt in the story world and also directs our sympathies for Wallace. We are shown the unfair behavior against him, his spouse, and his people for a reason because if the author had omitted the beginning, Wallace would not appear as a freedom fighter, but as a brutal terrorist.

1.3.2 Advances

In F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Last Tycoon* (1941), the novelist George Boxley is brought to Hollywood to work as a screenwriter. In a talk with Monroe Stahr, the studio chief, Boxley expresses his frustration with the medium's cheap way of telling stories and the weak vocabulary of his two colleagues. Stahr responds that everything he got from Boxley was nothing more than interesting talk, and proceeds with a tutorial on how to tell a story through film.

This shortened version of F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Last Tycoon* (1941) was taken from David Bordwell's article “How to tell a movie story: Mr. Stahr will see you now” which contains a more detailed analysis (Bordwell 2014).

[Imagine, Stahr tells Boxley, you're sitting in your office, tired out.]

A pretty stenographer that you've seen before comes into the room and you watch her—idly. She doesn't see you though you're very close to her. She takes off her gloves, opens her purse, and dumps it out on the table.

[Stahr continues. From her change, the young woman picks out a nickel and puts it on the desk. She picks up a matchbox and then takes her black gloves to the stove. She puts them inside the stove and starts to light it, when the phone suddenly rings.]

The girl picks it up, says hello—listens—and says deliberately into the phone, 'I've never owned a pair of black gloves in my life.'

[The stenographer hangs up and kneels by the stove again.]

Just as she lights the match, you glance around very suddenly and see that there's another man in the office, watching every move the girl makes.

[Stahr pauses.]

"Go on," said Boxley smiling. "What happens?"

"I don't know," said Stahr. "I was just making pictures."

[Boxley feels he's been wrong-footed.]

"It's just melodrama," he said.

"Not necessarily," said Stahr. "In any case, nobody has moved violently or talked cheap dialogue or had any facial expression at all. There was only one bad line, and a writer like you could improve it. But you were interested."

"What was the nickel for?" asked Boxley evasively.

"I don't know," said Stahr. Suddenly he laughed, "Oh yes—the nickel was for the movies." (p. 32–33; shortened version by Bordwell 2014, [Just Making Pictures](#))

Chekhov suggested that we should remove elements that are irrelevant or replaceable, and the same applies to this nickel, but why? Chekhov's advice implies a very simple poetic norm that is referred to as *narrative functionalism*. Here, narrative functionalism does not designate an analytic method or paradigm (e.g., Propp [1928] 1968; Sternberg 2010), but the *functionalist reader* (i.e., our tendency to think functionally, "What was the nickel for?").

Whatever element we put in the foreground, whether it is a gun, a metaphor, a gap, a man sitting in the corner, or a whole scene, we try to infer its purpose within the given context because we assume that the element is relevant to understanding the discourse. In the psychology of *discourse comprehension*, it is commonly assumed that understanding requires a coherent mental representation of the discourse (Thagard and Verbeurgt 1998). This conversely implies that

“[t]he text as a whole must hang together and make sense to the reader, so that he is able to construct a coherent macro-structure in which each text unit has its place and is meaningfully related to the other sections of the text” (Kintsch 1980, p. 89).

Assuming that narrative discourse complies with this demand, we give the nickel, or better, its role in the overarching whole, an *advance*. Advances are motivational incentives that are provided by our motivation system when it predicts (learning) rewards (see Chapter 8: Interest & the Seeking System).

1.4 Conclusion

In this introductory chapter, I covered several narratological and cognitive psychological concepts alongside the idea of narrative functionalism, which is derived from Aristotle’s demand that the portrayed events must form a coherent whole, but why must this be so?

It is my theory that stories satisfy predispositions of the mind. They appeal to our need to make sense and to organize information into a coherent mental representation (i.e., a Gestalt) (Loewenstein 1994). Some Gestalt psychologists assumed that Gestalt creation involves an inherent motivation to strive for coherence (Heider 1960; Suchman 1971). This desire is here seen as one manifestation of interest. In Piaget’s view, curiosity “plays a part in the search for coherence and organization. It is a motive force in the need to order reality” (Kakar 1976, p. 192). Assuming that narratives satisfy this affinity, we try to make sense of the discourse elements, infer their internal connections and their order (e.g., fabula), and search for their purpose and meaning to construct and understand the overarching whole. In this regard, I pointed out two categories of functions—propulsion and direction—that serve as a basis for the next two chapters about narratological (Chapter 2) and drama theoretic concepts (Chapter 3) associated with interest.

The reader implicitly assumes that a coherent understanding of a story is in principle possible, although sometimes, as in the case of ambiguous endings, achieving coherence is left to the audience. Discovering such a structure often goes hand in hand with the experience of having a surprising insight. However, as much as storytelling deals with coherence, it also

deals with the contrary: we are given incoherent or incomplete information ([Silvia 2006](#)), which produces knowledge gaps that arouse epistemic curiosity ([Loewenstein 1994](#)). Next to curiosity (Chapter 5) and surprise (Chapter 7), suspense is investigated from a cognitive psychological perspective in Chapter 6. The role of interest in aesthetics and its relation to other emotions such as joy and happiness is discussed in Chapter 4.

Part II

Narratological Correlates of Interest

Chapter 2

Directive Concepts of Interest

This part covers narrative theories and concepts, split into directive and propulsive conceptualizations associated with interest. From a directive view, the narrator deliberately chooses elements, events, and their order to achieve specific effects in their readership (e.g., to guide their attention, to arouse curiosity, etc.). Noël Carroll’s *Erotetic Narration*, a simple model of curiosity for popular narratives, lays down the groundwork for the subsequent sections of this chapter (Carroll 1990).

2.1 Erotetic Narration (Carroll)

Erotetic narration is based on the assumption that in a popular narrative, “scenes, situations, and events that appear earlier in the order of exposition in a story are related to later scenes, situations, and events in the story, as questions are related to answers. [...] Such narration, which is at the core of popular narration, proceeds by generating a series of questions that the plot then goes on to answer” (Carroll 1990, p. 130).

In mystery stories, for example, the detective solves the crime by generating a series of questions that guide the reader through the plot. Questions on the macro-level determine the whole plot (*whodunnit?*) and questions on the microlevel guide us from scene to scene (e.g. “How was the man shot with a toy gun?”) or through the dialogue (“Can we trust the witness?”). In a monster movie, “the onset of the monster raises the question of whether it will be discovered. Its discovery leads either directly to the question of whether it can be destroyed, or, if the discoverers need outside support, it leads to the question of whether they will be able to convince the authorities of the existence of the monster and of the danger it poses” (Carroll 1990, p. 130). According to the erotetic narration model, narratives covertly state questions in one scene and answer them in another. Next to such scenes, some scenes

sustain questions (e.g. a serial killer commits another murder) and scenes that establish the characters, the settings, or the problem. Scenes that do not fall in these categories are called *digression*.

In Steven Spielberg’s *Saving Private Ryan* (1998), a team of nine GIs has the task of bringing James Ryan back from the front, because he is the only out of the four Ryan brothers who has survived the war so far. The macro-question can be formulated easily: Will they be able to bring him back? During the story, several small questions and answers lead the viewer through the plot. When the squad arrives in the French town of Neuville, Caparzo, one of the group, is shot by a German sniper. Will they be able to take down the enemy sniper to rescue Caparzo? The answer: they eventually neutralize the sniper, but Caparzo dies. After storming a German machine gun position, one of the German soldiers capitulates, but some of the American GIs want to kill him to take revenge for their fallen medic. Will they kill him? When they finally find Private Ryan, another question arises: is he even coming with them?

When a question is answered, we speak of *closure* or resolution, but some questions never get answered, leaving the story open-ended. Although we might not be consciously aware of our constant questioning, erotetic structures keep us engaged and lead us to turn one page after another. Carroll concludes that the basis of “coherence is not causal; rather it is erotetic. That is, the later scene fits as a coherent and connected expansion of the story because it delivers an answer to a question that earlier scenes and events had already posed saliently in the text for the reader” (Carroll 1990, p. 130).

2.2 Universals of Narrative (Sternberg)

Meir Sternberg’s *Universals of Narrative* (Sternberg 1978) describe how narrative plays with information by revealing it in a particular sequential order. This form of communication is not only unique to narrative, but it should even *define* it. At its core stand the *master effects*: suspense, curiosity, and surprise, with their mental dynamics: prospection, retrospection, and recognition.

2.2.1 Gaps in Time

All master effects are triggered by a felt *gap*, which lies either in the future (“will she escape?”) or in the past (“who committed the crime?”), distinguishing curiosity (retrospection) and suspense (prospection) through “the *chronological direction* of the missing and desired information” (Sternberg 1978, p. 244, *emphasis added*).

Gaps correspond to questions in the erotetic narration model, but Sternberg is more specific and locates gaps in discontinuities in the event sequence presented so far, which, once recognized, invite us to form hypotheses to fill them. “Although different in thrust, all [master effects] involve the construction of rival hypotheses with which to fill in the gaps opened up by the sequence about the world’s affairs and whatever attaches to them by nature or art” (Sternberg 1992, p. 531–532). Sternberg predominantly uses the terms suspense, curiosity, and surprise instead of the lesser known mental dynamics terms, prospection, retrospection, and recognition, because he regards the former to be handy abbreviations that help readers to understand his model (Sternberg 2003a). However, Sternberg’s terminology led to many misconceptions, as it differs from the established cognitive psychological concepts (see Sternberg 2003a; Sternberg 2003b).

2.2.2 Prospection (Narrative Suspense)

According to Sternberg, suspense “arises from rival scenarios about the future: from the discrepancy between what the telling lets us readers know about the happening (e.g., a conflict) at any moment and what still lies ahead, ambiguous because yet unresolved in the world” (Sternberg 2003a, p. 117); “The criterial driving force remains the *uncertain* prospection, born of a gapped future, an ambiguous contingency, a multiple scenario, with or without normative polarization.” (Sternberg 2003b, p. 614, *emphasis added*).

When prospection incorporates normative polarization, we usually anticipate two possible outcomes, which correspond to *hope* and *fear*. Prototypical examples can be found in thrillers or horror stories, e.g., Will they win or will they lose? Will they marry or not? In Alfred Hitchcock’s *Psycho* (1960), Vera Miles, the female protagonist, dies unexpectedly in the middle of the film. With our expectations rooted in popular fiction, we wonder how the story will proceed, deprived of its protagonist. This is an example of prospection without normative polarization because there is nothing at stake, there is nothing to hope for, nor is there something to fear, yet we are left clueless as if there was a gap in the future.

2.2.3 Retrospection (Narrative Curiosity)

In contrast to *narrative suspense*, *narrative curiosity* and *narrative surprise* require a dechronologization of the event order: This demands either a twist or a gap in the sequence (Sternberg 1992). In narrative curiosity, we know that we do not know something about the past, and we try to restore coherence by building hypotheses about the gapped antecedent events.

“Who killed old Karamazov? Why does Iago victimize Othello? How has Odysseus fared since leaving Troy? Are the ghosts real or hallucinatory? What are we to make of the conflicting Rashomon versions? On our part, knowing that

we do not know and may never be told for sure, we must take immediate steps to repair the breach in order and understanding as best we can at the moment—through provisional reconstructions of antecedents from their consequences, of the world from the discourse” (Sternberg 1992, p. 524).

The prototypical example is the detective story, in which the event of the murder is gapped and then, in hindsight, bit by bit reconstructed by the detective.

2.2.4 Recognition (Narrative Surprise)

“Our distinction between [...] curiosity and surprise relates to the perceptibility of the process of gapping and gap-filling. With ‘curiosity gaps,’ the reader is at once alerted to the *deformation of antecedents*; with ‘surprise gaps,’ in contrast, his awareness of the gap’s very existence and/or relevance and/or true significance is retrospective, being delayed to the point of closure rather than heightened at the point of opening” (Sternberg 1978, p. 244, *emphasis added*).

The films *The Sixth Sense* (1999), *Fight Club* (1999), and *The Unusual Suspects* (1995) are famous examples involving recognition and narrative surprise. At the end of each of these films, we receive a piece of information that (dis)closes an unknown gap in the past and enforces a reinterpretation (“re-cognition”) of what happened before this event. Narrative surprise can be “mild or sharp, local or plot-length [as in the given examples], actional or cross-level [and it is] an index of false understanding and a belated call for realignment” (Sternberg 1992, p. 531).

Mission: Impossible (1996), a spy film by Brian De Palma, provides an example of local narrative surprise right in the introduction: We see a screen, fed by a surveillance camera, in an East European apartment, and a person with a headset monitoring it. The television set shows a dead woman lying on a bed and a disoriented man in an undershirt. A bearded Russian enters the room and forces the confused man to sit. An interrogation ensues. The man in front of the monitor gets nervous: “Give us the name!” The desperate interrogatee reveals his contact in Minsk: Miediev. Then, he is quickly put to sleep, and the walls of the room roll to the side to expose a large storehouse. The Russian man tears away a mask to reveal his true identity: Ethan Hunt (Tom Cruise), our protagonist. In this example, we are not aware of what happened earlier (i.e., the preparation of the staged interrogation in the storehouse). Then, we unexpectedly are served a piece of information that leads to recognition and a reinterpretation of the scene.

2.3 The Universals vs. Cognitive Psychology

Sternberg's theory was a narratological milestone, yet, as already mentioned, we must carefully distinguish his notions of suspense, curiosity, and surprise from the equally called psychological concepts. Even though overlapping, Sternberg's concepts are partially incompatible with those of psychological theories of emotion. A closer look at the differences shall not only help mediate between narratologists and psychologists, but it shall further elucidate the specifics of Sternberg's theory.

2.3.1 Suspense vs. Prospection

By counting every type of uncertain anticipation as suspense, Sternberg's notion is broader than psychological definitions of suspense, which are usually confined to the case of normative polarization where something desirable is at stake. However, most cognitive psychologists would not account for prospection without hope and fear as suspense. Sternberg resists such a narrow definition because "suspense would thus depend on mutual incompatibility — of characters, objectives, prospects, norms, attitudes — hence on maximum chargedness. This entails flatness, invariance, computability, in minimizing the network and play of relations at work. [...] Why persist in limiting the repertoire of suspense, hence the extent and workings of narrativity, to an all too charged option?" (Sternberg 2003b, p. 615). However, psychologists and cognitive narratologists do not deny the importance of these "milder" forms, but rather conceptualize them as cases of curiosity (e.g., Brewer and Ohtsuka 1988b). Carroll (1990) argues that in discussing artworks,

"critics seem prone to regard any structure that involves anticipation as suspense. But [...] [o]utside art, anticipation and suspense are discriminable. As Husserl points out, every experience involves anticipation to some degree. But experiences of suspense are much less frequent. Likewise, when it comes to narrative art, it is advisable to keep the concept of suspense more narrowly defined than that of anticipation simpliciter" (p. 129). "Suspense in life, as opposed to fiction, is not just anticipation, but anticipation where something desired is at stake — a job, admission to a school, securing of a loan, passing an exam, escaping a nasty situation. Moreover, whatever is at stake has some psychological urgency partly because the outcome is somehow uncertain" (p. 137).

The death of Vera Miles in *Psycho* feels as if the story comes to a halt. Time does not press on, the movie reduces its pace, and because there is no concrete anticipated event, bodily reactions such as excitement, anxiety, or nervousness, which are associated with suspense, eventually relax. In this case, psychologists would rather use the term curiosity than suspense, because the emotional and physiological experience is far off the prototypical

concept of suspense, which is associated with bodily tension, a tendency to warn the hero, “*There is somebody behind you!*”, or a tendency to reach for the golden snitch, as if we were Harry Potter playing Quidditch (Vorderer, Wulff, et al. 1996).

2.3.2 Curiosity vs. Retrospection

Cognitive narratologists and psychologists have often misunderstood Sternberg, because the psychological concept of curiosity does not locate the gap in a temporal sequence but in one’s knowledge (Sternberg 2003a; Sternberg 2003b). To understand Sternberg’s retrospection, one must understand it in the context of *sujet*, the “order of the appearance (of the events) in the work” (Chatman 1980, p. 20), and *fabula*, the “mental (re)construction of the event order implicit and freely twistable along the discourse” (Sternberg 2003a, p. 325) — cf. Section 1.2.3, p. 9.

“Narrative curiosity involves “manipulations of the past, which the tale communicates in a *sequence discontinuous with the happening* [sujet]. [...] knowing that we do not know, we go forward with our mind on the gapped antecedents, trying to infer (bridge, compose) them in retrospect [to construct the chronological fabula]” (Sternberg 2003a, p. 117, *emphasis added*).

Hence, Sternberg’s curiosity is quite different from the concept used in everyday life. The homicide detective Columbo, for instance, is portrayed as an Italian, and from his look, we would judge Columbo’s actor Peter Falk to be Italian, but the name Peter Falk does not sound Italian at all. Some of our readers might now start wondering whether Peter Falk has an Italian background...? Although this is a *knowledge* gap (see Chapter 5.1: Information Gaps), it is not a *sequential* gap in Sternberg’s sense. The distinction between *fabula* and *sujet*, which is almost axiomatic in narratology, is fundamental to understanding Sternberg’s Universals of Narrative: If the discourse does not lead to a construction of a chronological *fabula*, then the question about Peter Falk’s past cannot be regarded as narrative curiosity. However, by paying attention to Falk’s controversial background (“Is he Italian?”), a narrative, such as a documentary about his life, could motivate the audience to perform retrospection on Peter Falk’s background. Here, the discourse is not telling the events chronologically, but rather in an order that makes the story interesting. A biographical documentation about Peter Falk’s life likely would not begin with his birth. Rather, it would begin with him playing Columbo, the role he became famous for, and it would only later address and reveal Peter Falk’s ancestry.

In contrast to Sternberg’s narrative universals, psychological models do not assume that the eliciting conditions of curiosity depend on the chronological direction of desired information. Sternberg’s model can thus lead to “anomalies” in the form of leaps between *prospction* and *retrospection*. The issue becomes apparent in extremely dechronologized

narratives, such as Iñárritu’s films, *21 Grams* (2003) and *Babel* (2006). Figure A.1 in Appendix A demonstrates this problem with the film *Memento* (2000), which starts with the chronologically last event. Concerning the Universals of Narrative, we speak of narrative curiosity (retrospection) at this point, because the gap lies in the past. This scene is followed by the chronologically first event, and because now the gap lies in the future, we speak of narrative suspense (prospection). This alternation between curiosity and suspense continues until the end of the film. In contrast to Sternberg’s universals, such jumps are not possible in psychological models of curiosity and suspense. To maintain compatibility with psychological models, Brewer and Ohtsuka (1988a; 1988b) went as far as to use the terms “Curiosity about the Future” and “Curiosity about the Past”. However, their model sacrificed the power of Sternberg’s narrative universals, which deliberately defined curiosity as “the process of retrospective gap-filling” (Sternberg 2003b, p. 619).

2.3.3 Surprise vs. Recognition

Sternberg’s definition of surprise is particularly far off psychological mainstream models, which typically include an expectancy violation (Barto et al. 2013; Meyer, Reisenzein, et al. 1997; Teigen and Keren 2003). McDaniel (2013) argued that Sternberg “is not interested so much in the emotion as he is building a specific literary definition distinct from the recognition of surprise” (p. 23). Like narrative curiosity, narrative surprise transcends the psychological notion, and hence, many surprising events fall out of this category.

Consider the following example: Since *Goldfinger* (1964), James Bond ordered his Martini “Shaken, not stirred” in almost every film of the franchise, but when Bond was portrayed by the actor Daniel Craig in for the first time *Casino Royale* (2006), Bond answers “Do I look like I give a damn?” — a surprising answer, given the expected line. This type of surprise does not qualify as narrative surprise, because “[a]ll the effects concerned both arise from and subdivide by the handling (or, experientially, working) of gaps *between the narrative and the narrated sequence*: hidden discontinuities for surprise, anticipatory for suspense, backward-looking for curiosity” (Sternberg 2003b, p. 521, *emphasis added*). In the given example, surprise only arises from a violation of an expectation that stems from our previous experiences, not from a sequential gap in the event order presented in the particular movie. Sternberg says that “surprise itself [...] outreaches narrative, because it coextends with our experience of belated recognition, hence re-cognition, which any sequence (e.g., prosodic) may trigger by abrupt disclosure” (Sternberg 2003b, p. 603).

The reasoning behind Sternberg’s narrow definition of surprise can again be found in the *sujet-fabula* duality. If surprise were defined by a violation of expectations, as in Bond’s case, then this would not be an exclusive and thus defining characteristic for narratives. Sternberg, therefore, characterizes surprise in the inter-sequencing of *sujet* and *fabula*. We can only speak of narrative surprise when we receive information within a discourse that

reveals a gap and leads to belief revision or a repatterning of the events. Inversely, communication counts as narrative if it contains narrative surprise and/or other universals.

2.3.4 Universals as Definition of Narrative

From a cognitive perspective, one could assume that Sternberg defines narrative based on suspense, curiosity, and surprise, but it is the other way around; it is his notions of suspense, curiosity, and surprise that are defined according to his model of narrative.

“The three [master effects] accordingly cover among them the workings that distinguish narrative from everything else, because they exhaust the possibilities of communicating action: of aligning its natural early-to-late development with its openness to untimely, crooked disclosure” (Sternberg 2003a, p. 117).

Sternberg (1992) defines “*narrativity* as the play of suspense/curiosity/surprise between represented and communicative time [and] *narrative* as a discourse where such play dominates” (p. 529, original emphasis). To the critics arguing that there are narratives such as folk tales, anecdotes, or historiography, which are strictly chronological (see Fludernik 2002), Sternberg answers that the “question is never whether narrative interest arises, but which one(s), how, to what extent, as well as where focused or diversified, raised or lowered, satisfied or frustrated, and why. Thus the historian or Trollope or Lawrence, or Aristotle’s simple plot or Propp’s folktale or Labov’s Harlem anecdote or the western, favors suspense; Fielding or Jane Austen, surprise; the detective story, curiosity; Dostoevsky or Henry James, the richest possible interrelation of the three dynamics” (Sternberg 1992, pp. 534–535).

However, Sternberg’s definition of narrative does not come without caveats, because every chronological sequence can eventually be dechronologized. For example, a discourse about the assembly of a product would show high narrativity, if the assembly process is not told in chronological order. It would thus show potentially more narrativity than most fairy tales (and it would be potentially more interesting depending on the audience and the subject). In fact, Sternberg’s notion of narrative is not very restrictive. According to Sternberg, a narrative could be a discourse about the digestion process in the gastrointestinal tract, the transformation of data in a CPU, the steps of a surgical procedure, a series of chemical reactions leading to a particular outcome, or the stages of human growth.

2.4 Knowledge Disparities

According to [Branigan \(1992\)](#),

“narration comes into being when knowledge is unevenly distributed when there is a disturbance or disruption in the field of knowledge. Informally, one can grasp the importance of disparity by imagining a universe in which all observers are perfect and all-knowing. In such a universe, there can be no possibility of narration since all information is equally available and already possessed in the same ways” (p. 66).

This is in line with the widely acknowledged assumption that a “reader’s cognitive interest is closely related to maintaining a disparity of knowledge between the reader and the characters in the story” ([Bae and Young 2009](#), p. 305). [Branigan \(1992, p. 75\)](#) argued that, as a rule of thumb, spectators experience:

suspense when they know **more** than a character
mystery when they know **as much as** a character
surprise when they know **less** than a character

If we map this framework onto Sternberg’s narrative universals, then readers usually know less than characters about events in the past, and they are either aware (narrative curiosity) or unaware (narrative surprise) of this shortcoming, whereas, in narrative suspense, the reader often knows more than the characters (see mind incongruence p. 78). [Bae and Young \(2009\)](#) developed a story generator that takes knowledge disparities in relation to the knowledge about events into account. Their model is based on Brewer’s *Structural Affect Theory* ([Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982](#)), which is an adapted version of Sternberg’s narrative universals. The disparity is created through two different story plans, one which holds the events which are generated by the story generator and one which is presented to the reader. To create surprise, the reader is only presented with a subset of events, and the omitted events are included (e.g., as flashbacks) later in the discourse.

Genres have characteristic forms of knowledge disparity, for instance, in “conventional melodrama, the narration creates a ‘disparity of knowledge’ structured to situate the spectator on the top tier of the epistemic hierarchy. Consequently, the melodrama’s narrative is presented with maximum transparency, mobilizing mainstays of the genre such as legibility of action and dramatic irony. By contrast, the detective film contrives a mode of narration governed by opacity, repressiveness, and retardation” ([Bettinson 2014](#), p. 67).

2.5 Conclusion

Carroll's (1990) erotetic narration model, which suggests that popular narratives evoke a series of questions and answers, can be complemented by Sternberg's (1978) Universals of Narrative, which relate such questions to gaps in the sequence of events. These models emphasize the importance of epistemic emotions in storytelling, and Sternberg even goes as far as to say that they define what is a narrative and what is not. Branigan (1992) proposed that we are highly sensitive to the distribution of knowledge and that knowledge disparities arouse our interest. According to this model, suspense is the result of *dramatic irony*, and its mental counterpart, which is here called *mind incongruence* (we return to it in Chapter 6.3.2).

In this chapter, I have explicated how Sternberg's notions of curiosity, suspense, and surprise differ from psychological definitions. They nevertheless involve epistemic emotions, supporting the thesis that story comprehension is predominantly driven by the motivating components of interest.

Chapter 3

Propulsive Concepts of Interest

Whereas Carroll and Sternberg take up a diegetic stance that favors the perspective of the narrator, Aristotle’s mimetic approach portrays narration as an imitation and, thus, looks at the narrative from within the story world (i.e., from the perspectives of characters partaking in a spectacle that is observed by the audience). This chapter discusses the concepts *peripeteia* (reversal of fortune), *anagnorisis* (discovery), *conflict*, and *collision* (also Kollision), which are central notions used in theories of drama and tragedy. These concepts can be traced back to Aristotle’s Poetics and describe intradiegetic effects that are not only propulsive but are also associated with interest. This chapter concludes by introducing a new theory of narrative conflict.

3.1 Peripeteia & Anagnorisis

Aristotle’s *peripeteia* describes a turning point in a plot, a type of change that entails the reversal of a character’s fortune from good to bad or vice versa (MacFarlane 2000). Reversals not only affect a character’s goals and actions (propulsion), but they also correlate with the spectator’s curiosity, suspense, and surprise because such changes can give rise to novel and unexpected situations, as well as valenced world states (e.g., when a character is sentenced to death, we may hope for another, positive reversal). Reversals are a key source of emotions. According to Frijda’s (1988) *law of change*, “[e]motions are elicited not so much by the presence of favorable or unfavorable conditions, but by the actual or expected changes in favorable or unfavorable conditions. It is change that does it—change with respect to current adaptation level” (p. 277).

According to [Durnat \(1967\)](#),

“Many a film is built on the crescendo of an original surprise, on a series of patterns like the inversion of a musical phrase in a symphony. The bitter bit, sudden reversals of fortune, sins coming home to rest, getting more than you bargained for, being beaten at your own game, losing what you love too much—all these and many other dramatic ironies or ‘reversals of expectation’ form the substructures of most tales” (pp. 182–183).

Anagnorisis, a further concept of Aristotle, denotes ‘discovery’ or ‘recognition’, and refers to a character’s discovery of the “true state of affairs, having previously been in error or ignorance” ([Baldick 2008](#), p. 12). *Anagnorisis* is correlated with surprise and insight because in many cases we undergo the same sudden acquisition of knowledge as the character, but given that we often know more than a character, we often feel suspense up until the character makes the discovery (see Chapter 6.3.2: Mind Incongruence (Dramatic Irony)).

3.2 Conflict & Kollision

Conflict is a central element of theories of drama and tragedy. It is sometimes even regarded as the essence of drama ([Pfister 1977](#); [Tan 1996](#); [Van den Berg 1979](#)). The term *conflict* is often traced back to the ideas of Aristotle, even though he never explicitly mentioned the term. It regained popularity after Hegel reintroduced it in the form of *Kollision* ([Gellrich and Zerba 2014](#)). Today, the pattern of conflict and resolution is widely taught by writing instructors (e.g. [Egri 2004](#); [Field 2005](#); [McKee 1997](#)) as a means to arouse interest and propel storylines. [Tan \(1996\)](#) suggested that to be interesting, a story requires at least a minimal amount of complications and a real possibility that these can be resolved.

3.2.1 Conflict as Agon

One conception of *narrative conflict* is *Agon*. It is a concept from Ancient Greek literature that means ‘struggle’ or ‘contest’ and involves power that is at stake ([Abbott 2008](#)). It often comes in the form of a protagonist who opposes an antagonist with competing values, goals, and ways of seeing the world. For example, in Sidney Lumet’s *12 Angry Men* (1957), an 18-year-old boy is accused of killing his father. The entire film plays in a single room, where a jury has to decide whether the boy is guilty. The two competing outcomes of the situation—one portraying him as guilty, one as innocent—form the *Agon* of the film. Eventually, the jury has to decide the boy’s fate, and the initial odds clearly stand against him because Juror #8, played by Henry Fonda, is not convinced of his guilt. Will Juror #8 manage to convince the others? And if so, how?

3.2.2 Conflict from Obstacles

When Indiana Jones triggers a trap, we can hardly speak of a ‘contest’: yet we still identify a kind of conflict. An obstacle “corresponds to a practical situation within the world of the story which hinders some tasks to succeed” (Szilas 2007, p. 770). Putting obstacles in the way of the protagonists is common advice from screenwriting theorists such as Vale (1973) and Field (2005). Barthes (1966) suggested that obstacles are a key component of narratives.

In the case of obstacles, conflict results from a party’s inability to easily achieve an objective. As a rule of thumb, we can say that the higher the stakes and the ‘bigger’ the obstacles are, the more suspenseful the narrative. In *12 Angry Men*, the obstacle is large because juror #8 must convince all 11 other jurors to rescue the boy from the death sentence. If Frodo Baggins could simply stroll to Mount Doom to destroy the ring, then *The Lord of The Rings* would quickly be over, but Gollum, Orcs, and the Nazgul stand in the way, so Frodo is forced to take heroic actions. In addition to these *external* obstacles, Frodo also faces an *internal* obstacle, as the seductive powers of the ring grow stronger. To overcome internal obstacles, a character must grow or change and must move from ignorance to knowledge or from passivity to action.

Resistance prolongs and intensifies hope, fear, and related emotions (see chapter 6.2.7: Related Emotions). For example, quick and easy revenge is less intense “than revenge that is achieved only after countless difficulties and complications have been overcome. The same may be said of a romance that proceeds without any noteworthy problems, a treasure that is found within minutes, or an immediately successful adjustment to stereotypical norms of civilization or of physical or mental health” (Tan 1996, Chapter 5, Themes and the Paradoxical Complication section, para. 1).

3.2.3 Internal and External Conflict

In *It’s a Wonderful Life* (1946), George Bailey wants to leave Bedford Falls to accomplish great things, but before he can pursue his goal of traveling around the country, his father dies unexpectedly. In *Writing Drama* (2005), Yves Lavandier calls the father’s death George’s first obstacle that poses an *inner conflict*, whereupon George decides to stay at home to take over his father’s company.

Following the mantra that “story is character, and character is story” (McKee 1997; also see Egri 2004), which emphasizes that it is the character that drives the plot, many drama theorists hold a character-centric view. However, this view does not seem to make a writer’s life easier, as developing a story through the perspective of the character implies that there was an actual inner conflict enacted by the writer. However, was George Bailey’s decision the product of some complicated mental simulation leading to a real inner conflict

or, rather, a mere dramatic necessity to further propel actions and events? [Ryan \(2009\)](#) argued that “most narratives are created not prospectively, but retrospectively. Rather than charting the evolution of an initial situation, the storyteller imagines a climactic scene, a situation of high tellability, and constructs a causal chain of events that leads to the target situation” (p. 67). Aristotle similarly argued that “character comes in as subsidiary to the actions” ([Aristotle 1902, part VI, para. 5](#)). The death of George’s father—an external event—has the dramatic purpose of propelling George’s actions, which are also external events. In Hollywood, it is common for actions to not arise out of ‘nowhere,’ and be caused by external events.

This is not to say, writers never try to get into their character’s mind. Indeed, they must do the reasoning for them because otherwise, their actions would only be reactive and predictable ([Ryan 2009](#)). However, if demanded by the plot, a writer can let characters do almost anything, as long as they provide the necessary preparation that make the actions appear congruent with the character’s history. Both a robber and a priest can become murderers, but their motivations may be quite different.

3.2.4 Conflict as Disequilibrium (Todorov)

In *Jaws* (1975), an idyllic seaside town gets haunted by a white shark, and as the mayor of the town refuses to impose a bathing ban, further victims fall prey to the predator. At the end of the film, the conflict is resolved and stability is restored when police chief Martin Brody, played by Roy Scheider, finally manages to kill the shark. [Todorov \(1977\)](#) argued that the ‘ideal’ narrative starts with a harmonious equilibrium state that is disrupted through an event (the appearance of a shark), which leads to an unacceptable disequilibrium state (killing of people), and the story ends when the old equilibrium or a new equilibrium are reached (the shark is killed or chased away). Whenever a protagonist survives the zombies, a detective solves a crime, or when a hero defeats the enemy, a (new) equilibrium has been obtained. Todorov illustrates his *Grammar of Narrative* with the help of *Decameron*:

“Peronella receives her lover when her husband, a poor mason, is away from home. But one day the husband returns early. Peronella hides her lover in a cask and tells her husband that someone is in fact examining the cask right now. The husband believes her and is delighted by the prospect of the sale. He climbs inside the cask to scrape it out, and while he does so the lover makes love to Peronella, who has thrust her head and arms into the opening of the cask to keep her husband from seeing what is going on. [...] The words lover and husband [...] describe the initial equilibrium state. Peronella is the mason’s wife, hence she is not entitled to make love with other men. Then comes the transgression of the law: Peronella receives her lover. [...] It produces a state of disequilibrium, for the family law is no longer respected. From this moment on, two possibilities

exist by which equilibrium can be reestablished. The first would be to punish the unfaithful wife [...] the second possibility consists in finding a means of avoiding punishment; this is what Peronella will do” (Todorov 1977 in Hale 2006, p. 214).

Again, we can identify a conflict with the element of uncertainty: will Peronella be punished, or will she be able to avoid punishment? Todorov’s bird’s eye view appears to be neat at first sight, but upon a closer look, his formal approach gives way to a more metaphoric theory. Using a rule-based approach, Todorov ignores the empathetic reader with their expectations, hopes, and fears. The disequilibrium is explained via a violation of the ‘family law,’ but we detect a disequilibrium not only because there is a violation of a rule, but because we fear that Peronella’s husband may find out, and this fear is intensified as the infidelity occurs right next to her husband. Todorov acknowledges that avoiding punishment is a valid equilibrium, but this dilutes his model because it leaves things as they are (i.e., the family law is still violated).

The disequilibrium metaphor is simple and efficient in the analysis of the prototypical narrative. It describes a coherent story arc, starting with a state change within the world that calls for actions that lead to a restoration of the equilibrium. Disequilibria not only tend to evoke interest in the audience, but they also depict reasonable causes that propel the actions of characters. It is quite implausible that a chemistry teacher like Walther White in the TV series *Breaking Bad* (2008–2013) should start to cook the drug crystal meth, but once reasons for this transformation are provided—Walter White discovers that he has cancer and thus fears that his son will not be able to afford college (disequilibrium)—his radical change is not questioned.

3.2.5 Conflict as Collision (Hegel)

In Hegel’s view, tragedy is not constituted by the suffering of characters alone. More importantly, it is also constituted by the actions and collisions that cause it. The obstacle metaphor implies that a character is obstructed in their pursuit of a goal, but this metaphor can also be interpreted differently: it is the obstacle that is the *cause* for action. An elegant metaphor that contains a specific form of propulsion is Hegel’s *Kollision*⁷ (Hegel [1843] 1975). Hegel’s equivalent to Todorov’s equilibrium is the *ideal world situation*, which

“does not yet display the active movement of individuals *in* their living agency [...] Therefore we have to regard that world situation primarily as something still unmoved in itself, as a harmony of the powers ruling it, and thus far as a substantial uniformly valid existence which yet cannot be understood at all as

⁷The term *Kollision* is sometimes translated as “collision” or “conflict,” and sometimes, it is left in its German form.

a so-called state of innocence. [...] collision has its basis in a transgression; [...] it is an alteration of the state of affairs which was otherwise harmonious and is itself to be altered. Nevertheless the collision is still not an *action*; on the contrary, it contains only the beginnings of an action and its presuppositions, and therefore, by being merely a stimulus to action, it retains the character of situation. Nevertheless, the opposition, in which the collision is disclosed, may be the result of an earlier action. For example, the trilogies of Greek tragedy are continuations, in the sense that out of the end of the first drama a collision arises for the second, which demands its resolution in the third. [...] The beauty of the Ideal lies precisely in the Ideal's undisturbed unity, tranquility, and perfection in itself. Collision disturbs this harmony, and sets the Ideal, inherently a unity, in dissonance and opposition" (Hegel [1843] 1975, pp. 204–205).

Although the terms conflict, Agon, obstacle, and disequilibrium embody static metaphors, Hegel's Kollision elegantly makes use of a dynamic physical analogy. In the same way as a billiard ball colliding with another causes movement or a change in its trajectory, the appearance of the shark causes Brody to act, the imprisonment of Princess Leia instigates Luke Skywalker to rescue her, and Jason Bourne's amnesia sends him on a quest to regain his identity.

Todorov's Grammar of Narrative demands an *equilibrium* $\rightarrow$ *disequilibrium* $\rightarrow$ *equilibrium* progression, but, as Hegel argued based on the Greek trilogies, one collision can lead to another, evoking several disequilibria in succession without any equilibria in-between. According to Hegel ([1843] 1975), "collision is still not an *action* [and] retains the character of situation" (p. 204). Thus, Hegel distinguishes between states and events, and a collision is a state that causes and is caused by events. This distinction is germane to our discussion of suspense in Chapter 6, which is fundamentally based on Hegel's notion of Kollision.

3.2.6 Conflict–Interest Mapping

The covered propulsive concepts are relevant in this thesis because they can be mapped onto curiosity, suspense, and surprise. In *Game of Thrones*, Stannis Baratheon's army stands at the gates of Winterfell, but, afflicted by a loss of men and by the coming winter, chances to win the war against the Boltons are small. He can either fight and risk losing everything or give up his plan to become the King of Westeros. Will he fight, and if so, would he stand any chance to win (*inner conflict/curiosity*)? The plot takes an unexpected turn: Stannis can win the war, but only if he sacrifices his beloved daughter to the Lord of Light (*reversal/surprise*). How will he decide (*inner conflict/suspense*)? He eventually sacrifices his daughter to the deity (*surprise* because scenes earlier we learned that he traveled through the whole world to find a cure for her disease), and leads his soldiers into battle (*exter-*

nal conflict/suspense), but, against our expectations, he loses the war despite the sacrifice (*reversal/surprise*)—but why? (*curiosity*)

3.3 A Model of Narrative Conflict

Although conflict is recognized as a key element of drama and narrative in general, we still lack a clear understanding of how *narrative conflict* differs from the everyday concept of conflict. To go beyond a mere metaphorical understanding, the following model of narrative conflict (also: *Narrative Kollision*) seeks to explain what constitutes narrative conflict and what functions it serves.

3.3.1 Functions of Narrative Conflict

Narrative conflict has such a broad dramatic potential because it serves the following important functions:

- 1.) the *propulsive*: it propels the story forward through *causation*
- 2.) the *affective*: it arouses our *concern*
- 3.) the *erotetic*: it arouses curiosity through *uncertainty*

Narrative conflict motivates characters to take action and makes us wonder whether those actions lead to failure or success.

3.3.2 Elements of Narrative Conflict

Narrative conflict is an undesirable world state, which is caused by events (the prince is kidnapped) and which itself motivates further actions (rescuing the prince). Narrative conflict signals that the situation has two possible outcomes:

- the *goal* (the prince is rescued)
- the *anti-goal* (the prince is killed)

Through the reader's concern and uncertainty over the two possible outcomes, narrative conflict evokes suspense. This model of suspense is further elaborated in Chapter 6.

The elements of narrative conflict are depicted in figure 3.1. The Y-axis represents the desirability of a world state (e.g., the heroine marries the prince, the prince is kidnapped, and the prince is killed), and the X-axis shows the change over time. Several conflicts can




Figure 3.1: A conflict/collision building block. The horizontal bars represent the past (solid) and possible future (dashed) world states, placed vertically according to their associated valence (desirability). The arrows represent the past (solid) and possible future (dotted) events causing state changes.

be strung together, leading to ever more negative states, moving the current state further and further away from the initial ideal state. Note that inverting the Y-axis of a series of linked collisions yields Freytag's (1863) Pyramid/Triangle.

3.4 Conclusion

The conflict metaphor can take on various meanings (e.g., clash, crisis, contradiction, ambivalence, value conflict, information conflict, disorder, dispute, opposition, strife, tension, or moral dilemma). However, in this chapter, we elaborated a very specific notion of conflict based on Hegel's Kollision, which connects to the model of suspense outlined in chapter 6.

Narrative conflict is important for two key reasons. First, it correlates with (epistemic) emotions and thus provides the necessary motivational incentive for the audience. In this regard, conflict and suspense correspond to two different analytical perspectives: We speak of conflict when we analyze the narrative from within the story world, and of suspense when we take the psychological reaction of the reader into account. Second, it advances the plot through causation. Merely portraying two people insulting each other is not sufficient

to create narrative conflict. Conflict must comprise three qualities: causality, prolonged concern, and uncertainty about its resolution.

Part III

Psychological Theories of Interest

Chapter 4

Interest & Aesthetics

In line with [Tan \(1996\)](#), interest is defined here as an umbrella term that subsumes curiosity, suspense, and surprise—three closely related phenomena that correspond to one family of emotions. They often occur together because one can result from the other. A surprising twist can make us curious, and the resolution of a suspenseful scene can be surprising. This chapter discusses the dramatic functions of interest, its role in aesthetics, and its relation to other phenomena, such as pleasure, liking, joy, aesthetic appreciation, and preference.

4.1 Functions of Interest

Shakespeare killed our beloved Romeo and Juliet, Irvine Welsh disgusts us in *Trainspotting*, and Stephen King makes us fear clowns. To common sense, the attraction to seemingly aversive events seems counterintuitive. Why do we expose ourselves to aversive affective states such as sadness, anxiety, or disgust? Part of the answer may lie in our desire to seek novel, complex, and surprising impressions that activate the reward system ([Berlyne 1971](#); [Schultz 2015](#); [Silvia 2009](#)). Because we can only know in hindsight whether a new social contact or a novel piece of information proved useful, a mechanism that motivates us to engage in unfamiliar experiences may be warranted. Curiosity might, thus, act as a counterweight to feelings of uncertainty and anxiety, without which we would not try out new things and or engage in unfamiliar activities ([Kashdan and Roberts 2004](#)). Knowledge emotions might therefore explain our paradoxical desire for horror stories. In *The Philosophy of Horror*, [Carroll \(1990\)](#) argued that “even after the existence of the monster is disclosed, the audience continues to crave further information about its nature, identity, origin, purposes, and astounding powers and properties, including, ultimately, those of its weaknesses that may enable humanity to do it in. Thus, to a large extent, the horror story is driven explicitly

by curiosity. It engages its audience by being involved in processes of disclosure, discovery, proof, explanation, hypothesis, and confirmation” (p. 182).

Driven by curiosity, we ask questions, read deeply, examine interesting images, and persist in challenging tasks: “[i]n short, all theories agree that curiosity’s immediate function is to learn, explore, and immerse oneself in the interesting event. [...] Curiosity can be defined as the recognition, pursuit, and intense desire to explore novel, challenging, and uncertain events” (Kashdan and Silvia 2009, p. 368). The pleasures of learning, understanding, and exploring eventually motivate us to engage in the unpleasant and the unfamiliar (Turner and Silvia 2006).

4.2 An Appraisal Theory of Interest (Silvia)

A prominent family of current psychological theories of emotion assumes that emotions involve *cognitive appraisals*, which are primarily non-conscious and automatic processes that evaluate stimuli and events. According to cognitive appraisal theories, particular emotions are elicited by particular evaluation patterns (Lazarus 1991; Roseman and Evdokas 2004; Scherer, Schorr, et al. 2001; Smith and Ellsworth 1985).

“It is meanings and the subject’s appraisal that count – that is, the relationship between events and the subject’s concerns, and not events as such. Thus, in goes a personal loss that is felt as irremediable, and out comes grief, with a high degree of probability. In goes a frustration or an offense for which someone else is to blame and could have avoided, and out comes anger – almost certainly. The outputs are highly probable, but are not absolutely certain because the inputs can still be perceived in different fashions. [...] Frustration or offense can be seen as caused by someone powerful who may have further offenses in store, and fear then is likely to supplant anger as the emotional response. [...] Emotions change when meanings change. Emotions are changed when events are viewed differently” (Frijda 1988, pp. 272–273).

Silvia (2005) suggested that interest requires two primary appraisals: One is a *novelty check*, which is based on Berlyne’s collative variables: Is an event new, sudden, unfamiliar, ambiguous, complex, obscure, uncertain, mysterious, contradictory, unexpected, surprising, vivid and suspenseful (Scherer 1999; Scherer 2001; Silvia 2006)? The second is an appraisal of the subjective *coping potential*: Can I deal with the ambiguous stimulus or event? Will I be able to understand it clearly and coherently? Does it appear to be comprehensible/meaningful or incomprehensible/meaningless? This is supported by empirical studies showing that text-based interest correlates with perceived coherence, ease of comprehen-

sion, prior knowledge, readers' connection, simple vocabulary, character identification, and concreteness (Schraw and Lehman 2001; Wade et al. 1999).

In Chapter 8, I suggest an alternative model that consists of a *learning potential*, which includes knowledge gaps, and an *effect appraisal*, which determines whether a piece of information will affect an agent (e.g., through anticipated pleasure or aversion).

4.3 Interest versus Liking

Even though interest is typically regarded as a pleasant emotion, it differs from the cluster of positive emotions consisting of happiness, enjoyment, or liking, because we often find ourselves interested in unpleasant, unfamiliar, and possibly unrewarding activities (Kashdan and Silvia 2009, pp. 368–369).

4.3.1 Valence of Interest

The term *valence* refers to the positive or negative character of an emotion and its aspects (e.g., eliciting events, objects, behaviors such as facial expressions, and corresponding feelings) (Colombetti 2005). *Emotional valence* is the positive or negative character of a whole emotion (Charland 2005) while the *hedonic tone* (or affect valence) indicates whether a single feeling (or 'affect') is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant (Beebe-Center 1932; Frijda 2010). Anger, for instance, is typically considered a negatively valenced emotion but can be accompanied by positive feelings when actions motivated by anger help us to get past obstructions to our goal. Affect valence is typically attributed to sensations (e.g., "this smell is unpleasant"), objects (e.g., "this perfume is pleasant"), people, events, or actions (Arnold 1960; Frijda 2010; Ruckmick 1936; Wundt 1896).

Empirical evidence suggests "positivity" and "negativity" are two separate dimensions instead of one bipolar dimension because "the neurobiological substrates coding for positive (e.g., approach, rewarding) and negative (e.g., avoidance, aversive) affect are at least partially independent allowing for coactivation of both positive and negative evaluations (as in ambivalence) (Norman et al. 2011, p. 350).

4.3.2 Pleasure versus Desire

A conative core element of interest is the *desire* to know. Associated with approach behavior and experiences of reward (Berlyne 1960; Litman 2005; Loewenstein 1994), curiosity thrives on an urge to assimilate novel information to our existing knowledge and to accommodate our existing knowledge to the incoming information (Frijda 2010; Piaget 1936). This desire

can lead to pleasure if we progress toward goal achievement (understanding) and to displeasure if we do not make progress (confusion) or, specifically, if we appraise our progress rate as insufficient (Carver and Scheier 1990). Although pleasantness is marked by goal congruence, unpleasant feelings are caused by obstruction of opportunity and hindrance of progress and completion (Frijda 2010). Cognitive appraisal theories extend this principle to emotions: positive emotions are elicited when we encounter events and situations congruent with our goals and negative emotions when they are incongruent (Lazarus 1991). This is in line with Loewenstein’s (1994) *information gap theory*, which conceives of curiosity as a *reference point phenomenon* (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979). It suggests that epistemic curiosity involves a “discrepancy between one’s actual level of attainment [current knowledge] and a goal or aspiration level [a subjective informational goal]” (Loewenstein 1994, p. 87). Loewenstein furthermore draws an analogy between curiosity and other goal-approach behaviors. “[M]otivation increases as an organism physically approaches a goal. Applied to information, such an accelerating function would imply that the marginal value of information should increase as the individual accumulates information toward the goal of completing the reference set” (p. 157).

According to Frijda (2010), “pleasure, in contrast to pain, is best described as a stable state. It is the state that brings the individual to accept the state, situation or action he or she is in, and to persist in that state, to prolong it or to return to it” (p. 29). Warming up in the sun or warm water can be highly pleasurable, which motivates us to prolong that state. Curiosity, by contrast, is driven by a different motivation. It is a *desire* to explore, which sometimes even means engaging in unpleasant activities. Among others, Loewenstein (1994) suggested that curiosity is a desire but not necessarily a pleasurable one: “[i]f people like positive levels of curiosity, why do they attempt to resolve the curiosity? Why do they not put mystery novels down before the last chapter or turn off the television before the final inning of a close ball game?” (Loewenstein 1994, p. 85). Panksepp (1998), in contrast, argued that the system responsible for curiosity and interest (the Seeking System) performs a “do-loop” which motivates exploratory behavior. In other words, we do not put the mystery novel down because seeking and exploration is in the nature of curiosity. Although this state of “anticipatory eagerness” is taken to have incentive properties, it is not itself rewarding. Rather, it is taken to be reinvigorated through repeated stimulation to seek rewards.

According to Schultz (2015),

“Desire requires a prediction [...] of reward and constitutes an active process that is intentional [in being about something]. Desire makes behavior purposeful and directs it towards identifiable goals. Thus desire is the emotion that helps to actively direct behavior towards known rewards, whereas pleasure is the passive experience that derives from a received or anticipated reward. Desire has multiple relations to pleasure; it may be pleasant in itself (I feel a pleasant desire),

and it may lead to pleasure (I desire to obtain a pleasant object). Thus pleasure and desire have distinctive characteristics but are closely intertwined” (Schultz 2015, p. 855, *emphasis added*).

The terms pleasure and desire correspond to the notions of liking and wanting, as commonly used in affective neuroscience (Schultz 2015).

4.3.3 Liking versus Wanting

Neuroscience suggests that there are two distinct reward processes, which correspond to two independent, but interacting, neurobiological systems: *liking*, the hedonic impact of a reward, and *wanting*, the desire to pursue the reward (Berridge 1999). *Reward signals* promote approach and consummatory behavior, next to feelings of pleasure. *Rewards*, on the contrary, are the stimuli, objects, events, activities, or situations that *arouse* these processes (Schultz 2015). Seen cybernetically, a reward is primarily a beneficial goal state that we want to attain and secondarily a cue that indicates progress toward the attainment of a goal (DeYoung 2013).

“The link between goal achievement and pleasure can be generalized over everything that can be considered a ‘goal’: optimal body temperature in temperature regulation, gaining or regaining self-esteem and social esteem; achieving one’s standards or expectations of performance in work, or maintaining social harmony” (Frijda 2010, p. 106).

Several models of emotion view goal achievement as the main cause of pleasure (Arnold 1960; Frijda 1986; Scherer 2005; Stein and Trabasso 1992), but we also experience pleasure through cues that reinforce the pursuit of goals (e.g., food and sexual cues), through experienced progress toward goal achievement (Frijda 2010), and according to Carver and Scheier (1998) also through distancing from anti-goals (negative world states). We conversely experience negative affect through negatively conditioned cues (Mowrer 1960) and progress toward anti-goals or away from goals (Carver and Scheier 1998).

4.3.4 Desire of Curiosity & Pleasure of Learning

Curiosity is associated with pleasure because surprising insights and discoveries during exploration (Day 1971; Kashdan, Rose, et al. 2004) as well as relief from negative states of ignorance and uncertainty are associated with a rewarding experience (Berlyne 1950; Berlyne 1955; Litman 2005; Litman and Jimerson 2004; Loewenstein 1994). However, as Frijda (2010) pointed out, anticipated pleasure must be distinguished from joy and enjoyment because the anticipation of pleasure need not feel pleasant. Next to pleasurable feelings

of learning and relief, curiosity is also associated with the negative feelings ascribed to negative states of uncertainty and ignorance (Berlyne 1950; Berlyne 1955; Loewenstein 1994), and stimuli that are too novel, challenging, complex, or incomprehensible lead to negative feelings and confusion (Silvia 2010). Litman and Jimerson (2004), therefore, suggested that curiosity involves two different forms of affect: *feelings-of-interest*, which come along with the pleasures of learning, and *feelings-of-deprivation*, which involve some degree of unpleasantness in the form of tension, dissatisfaction, and frustration. In this regard, interest is similar to love, which “usually is not a pleasant emotion. One is filled with anxiety, shot through with moments of delight. In other words, pleasure itself serves as an attractor, as befits it being a stable state” (Frijda 2010, p. 110).

Feelings of curiosity, interest, and urge are associated with dopaminergic activity in the nucleus accumbens (Ikemoto and Panksepp 1999; Panksepp 1998), which is also correlated with wanting, while subsequent consummatory liking is associated with opioid activity (Berridge, Robinson, and Aldridge 2009). However, dopaminergic activity can also occur without liking. It has been shown that although “[o]ne population [of dopamine neurons] is excited by rewarding events and inhibited by aversive events, [...] A second population is excited by both rewarding and aversive events in similar manners” (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, et al. 2010, p. 820). These findings suggest that dopamine has a *motivating* role, which aligns with the fact that aversive events also increase motivation and promote changes in attention and cognitive processing. Hebb (1955) already argued that it “appears that, up to a certain point, threat and puzzle have positive motivating value, beyond that point negative value” (p. 250).

4.4 Interest & Aesthetic Preference

According to Boselie (1991), “aesthetic preference refers to see, hear, read something for its own sake, not because it would be a means to another end” (p. 66). It is, thus, different from preferences in everyday life, where we choose objects not just because of their aesthetic appeal. This section discusses three clusters of aesthetic motivations, which are explained by fluency effects, novelty effects, and ecological effects.

4.4.1 Fluency Theory

Fluency theory states that the “more fluently the perceiver can process an object, the more positive is his or her aesthetic response” (Reber, Schwarz, et al. 2004, p. 365). Qualities commonly associated with beauty—including order, symmetry, goodness of form, redundancy in patterns, and figure-ground contrast—reduce mental effort and make objects easier to process, which enhances their aesthetic appeal. Empirical findings also suggest that perceptual

and conceptual priming effects have a positive impact on the aesthetic response (Reber, Winkielman, et al. 2003; Winkielman and Berridge 2004) and that fluency itself comes along with a pleasurable experience (Winkielman, Schwarz, et al. 2003).

Mere-Exposure Effect (Zajonc)

Some authors have suggested that the increase in fluency explains other important hedonic phenomena like the *mere-exposure effect* (Bornstein and D'Agostino 1994; Seamon et al. 1983; Whittlesea 1993). Zajonc (1968) found that initially neutral stimuli are liked more with repeated exposures (see Bornstein 1989; Leder 2001). This is consistent with the findings that our attitude toward political messages and consumer products is enhanced through repetition (Fang et al. 2007; Winkielman and Berridge 2003).

Preference for Prototype Theory (Martindale)

Also, *prototypical* stimuli may be more attractive because “they are easy on the mind” (Winkielman, Halberstadt, et al. 2006). Martindale and Moore (1988) found that preference for stimuli correlated with typicality, which suggests that central members of a category are preferred over peripheral members, possibly because they yield the greatest neuronal activation. Empirical evidence suggests that we show preferences for not only average faces (Langlois and Roggman 1990; Rhodes and Tremewan 1996) but also for prototypical dogs, birds, fish, cars, or watches (Halberstadt and Rhodes 2000; Halberstadt and Rhodes 2003). This preference for prototypical stimuli is also called the *beauty-in-averageness effect*.

The prototype model has been criticized (e.g., Konečni 1996) because “it seems obvious at first sight that there will be exceptions to Martindale’s claim that very typical exemplars of a category will be preferred over less typical ones [...] iron and steel are more prototypical metals than gold and silver. Nevertheless, it seems very unlikely that people would have ‘a’ preference for iron and steel over silver and gold” (Boselie 1991, p. 68). Hekkert and Snelders (1995) replied that Boselie’s examples are not aesthetic judgments, a “metal will be preferred because of its value (gold over steel), and sometimes because of its usefulness in applications [...] Preferences for fruit or vegetables will be based on how they taste, and so on. Instances of such natural categories will only become objects of an aesthetic experience if they are embedded in an *aesthetic context*, fruits on a painting, metals in ornaments, emotions in the movies or the theater” (p. 151).

4.4.2 Novelty Effects

A challenge for fluency theory is that “its basic premise—that the most easily processed image will be the most aesthetically pleasing one—seems to contradict a central tenet of art




Figure 4.1: The Wundt Curve (Berlyne 1970, p. 284). Reproduced with permission.

theory: namely, that the aesthetic (or perhaps the artistic) impact of an image is increased by intentionally violating the viewer's expectations. Indeed, the most fluent image of an object would seem to be the most boring" (Palmer, Schloss, and Sammartino 2013, p. 23). The prototype model was a response to Berlyne's *optimal level theory* (North and Hargreaves 2000), but whereas Martindale and Moore (1988) investigated aesthetic preference, Berlyne was primarily interested in curiosity and exploration.

Optimal Level Theory: The Wundt Curve

Optimal level theories assume that the attractiveness (hedonic value) of a stimulus increases with its degree of novelty and complexity but only up to an optimal level. From there, additional novelty and complexity lead to a decline. Berlyne (1970) proposed that novelty is directly related to the level of arousal, the optimal level of which is located at the top of an inverted-U shape—the *Wundt curve* (figure 4.1). This model suggests that we are interested in moderately novel stimuli and that too little or too much novelty and complexity may result in a negative hedonic tone.

Sluckin, Colman, et al. (1980) proposed an altered version of the inverted-U curve, with the abscissa flipped and the ordinate labeled as favorability instead of pleasantness




Figure 4.2: Inverted U-curve, from [Sluckin, Colman, et al. \(1980, p. 164\)](#). Reproduced with permission.

(see figure 4.2). They argue that complete familiarity can never be achieved and thus there can also be no zero novelty as in Berlyne's curve. Total novelty, in contrast, occurs when a stimulus has never been seen before. High novelty (low familiarity) is therefore on the left and high familiarity (low novelty) is on the right end of the axis. This model should not only explain Zajonc's findings that liking of a stimulus increases with repeated exposures, but that it sometimes also declines (e.g., [Cantor 1968](#); [Cantor and Kubose 1969](#)).

[Martindale et al. \(1990\)](#) challenged the Wundt curve, as they could only replicate the inverted-U pattern in a small portion of their studies and instead discovered a *monotonic* relationship between complexity and preference. Recent research shows promising advances in the attempt to decompose the inverted-U curve. [Güçlütürk et al. \(2016\)](#), for example, investigated the relationship between image complexity and liking and found support for the inverted-U curve. However, they identified two groups among the participants using a clustering algorithm: participants in the first group liked stimuli more as their complexity decreased while participants in the second group liked the stimuli more as their complexity increased. These two crossing regression lines result in an inverted-U curve when the liking ratings of all participants are averaged. The researchers also found that the group that preferred simple images was faster in their liking evaluations than the group that preferred more complex images. [Liao et al. \(2011\)](#) suggested that we form preferences for familiarity or novelty depending on the *processing depth* ([Schneider and Shiffrin 1977a](#); [Schneider and Shiffrin 1977b](#)): *passive exposure* (automatic processing) promotes *familiarity preference* while *active judgment* during exposure (controlled cognitive processing) results in *novelty*

preference. Graf and Landwehr (2015) proposed a similar dual-process perspective and argued that “aesthetic liking related to fluent stimuli can be ascribed to aesthetic pleasure, whereas aesthetic liking associated with disfluent stimuli can be attributed to aesthetic interest (because of disfluency reduction)” (p. 405).

Empirical evidence suggests that novelty can induce both, fear and curiosity, in animals (Russell 1973). Highly novel stimuli may not be *liked*, but they can arouse our curiosity. Through repeated exposures to a stimulus, fear wanes, and preferences for and attachments to the stimulus object can develop (Sluckin, Hargreaves, et al. 1983). Such a development can be seen in the perception of art when we eventually start to like an artwork that was merely interesting at first.

Narrativity (Herman)

Herman’s (2002) *narrativity* is a narratological concept that combines prototype and optimal level theory. Narrativity is based on *scripts*, a specific form of schema that encodes prototypical knowledge about action sequences (i.e., encoded information about what we expect to happen in a particular situation). Because we make use of this generic knowledge, narratives need not tell us everything in detail. If we hear a shot followed by the dropping of a body, then generic information fills the gap and tells us that a person was killed.

“By contrast, where a gap cannot be filled by stereotypical information, it ‘focus[es] attention on the unusual and the remarkable’ (Herman 2002, p. 90) and requires a narrative explanation. [...] If the majority of events in a story are too stereotypical, they will be untellable and/or uninteresting, but if events are too unusual, the text may not readily be interpreted as a story” (Alexander and Emmott 2014, para. 7).

Herman’s narrativity, which is inspired by Bruner’s (1991) notion of ‘canonicity and breach,’ thus incorporates both prototypicality and the inverted-U shape.

Familiarity-to-Novelty Shift

Optimal level theories are consistent with results from developmental psychology, which demonstrate a preference shift from the familiar to the novel over time (Mather 2013). Hunter, Ames, and Koopman (1983) presented 8 to 12-month-olds with a set of toys and a second set after some familiarization time. The study demonstrated that infants prefer toys of the familiar array after a shorter familiarization period (i.e., moderate novelty) and novel toys after longer familiarization. This preference for familiar stimuli before the preference for novel stimuli was also found by others (Roder et al. 2000; Rose et al. 1982; Wagner




Figure 4.3: Effect of familiarization time on infants' preference for novel and familiar stimuli (Hunter and Ames 1988, Figure 2; as cited in Houston-Price and Nakai 2004, p. 343).

and Sakovits 1986) and was formulated with a descriptive model by Hunter, Ames, and Koopman (1983) (Figure 4.3).

Infants also tend to prefer novel stimuli from known categories over novel stimuli from novel categories (Mather 2013). It is assumed that attention shifts to novel stimuli once the familiar stimulus is sufficiently encoded by mental representations and free of discrepancies (Houston-Price and Nakai 2004; Sokolov 1963). Neuroscientific evidence suggests that novel stimuli lead to a high neuronal activation, which declines with the formation of novel representations (Ranganath and Rainer 2003). The time until the shift occurs depends on their processing speed and the complexity of the stimuli, which suggests that more complex stimuli require longer encoding time and that preferences for familiar stimuli are more likely for young infants and complex stimuli (Mather 2013).

Cognitive Mastering (Leder)

Belke et al. (2015) suggest that preference involves at least two motivational processes because fluency theory alone, while well suited to explain concepts such as beauty, cannot explain why highly challenging art (e.g., modern art) can be highly rewarding. According to Leder, Belke, et al. (2004), aesthetic appreciation involves the *cognitive mastering* of styles and content of artworks using background knowledge.

“Exposure to art provides the perceiver with a challenging situation to classify, understand and cognitively master the artwork successfully. It is this entire process that we call an aesthetic experience. [...] Successful mastery of an artwork is the source of intrinsic motivation to search future exposure (and the challenge) of art in the future. In the long run, this kind of motivation increases interest in art” (Leder, Belke, et al. 2004, p. 493).

Mastering artworks is assumed to activate rewards centers in the brain (Maffei and Fiorentini 1995; Zeki 1999), which is in line with evidence suggesting that understanding a piece of art leads to gains in liking (Muth and Carbon 2013). Cognitive mastering is also an important component of narrative appreciation. It is highly rewarding to find interpretations for ambiguous narratives or theories that explain open questions. The aesthetic experience of a narrative depends not only on what it tells but also on what it leaves open.

4.4.3 Ecological Effects

Berlyne (1971) never claimed that optimal level theory is a full-fledged model of preference because if novelty and complexity were the only factors involved, then we would constantly modify our favorite dish. Well aware of this shortcoming, Berlyne suggested that the hedonic value also depends on *ecological variables*.

Ecological Variables (Berlyne)

Fechner (1876) argued that when it comes to ‘liking’ and ‘preference,’ “half of aesthetics depends on association” (p. 89). For example, people show diverging preferences for stimuli that only differ in color (e.g., when someone prefers a red car over a green car of the same type). Berlyne suggested that stimulus features can be associated with an *ecological significance* (*ecological stimulus properties*), such as potential harm or potential benefit (Berlyne 1971, p. 69). On the most fundamental level, the sight of food, potential threats to health and survival, and any other biologically relevant situation would lead to arousal that directs the organism’s behavior. More recently, Palmer and Schloss (2010) proposed the *Ecological Valence Theory*, which was tested for single colors. Their empirical findings suggest that we like or dislike colors to the extent that we like or dislike all things we associate with them. We like the color of our favorite sports team, for instance, and tend to dislike the colors of our team’s main rival (Palmer and Schloss 2011).

Experiments with children have shown that it is possible to alter preferences for simple visual stimuli, such as geometrical shapes or printed nonsense syllables, through extrinsic rewards, such as money (Nunally, Duchnowski, et al. 1965; Nunally, Stevens, et al. 1965). In these experiments, children received a one-cent piece whenever a spinning pointer stopped

at a particular visual stimulus. Over time, the stimuli associated with the reward received increasing attention and were described with more favorable adjectives than patterns that were not associated with rewards. In the same way, rewarding narrative experiences may bring us to like particular types of narratives and to come back for more.

Novelty, suspense, and surprise act as nonphysical rewards (Schultz 2015), or at least as motivational incentives, which have a similar effect to monetary reward. The sight of a horror film poster may be sufficient for horror fans to appraise it as interesting because they have learned from their previous experience that horror films are rewarding and exciting. Common things, like panoramic views, the smell of freshly mown grass, or the sound of chirping crickets can also be ecologically significant. Thus, the ecological variables “form the principal recourses of the literary arts for manipulation of arousal, and their exploitation in painting or music, especially through reference to a connected scene or story, is frequently called ‘literary association’ and almost as frequently decried. As Dryden puts it, ‘The trumpet’s loud clangor invites us to war,’ and drum beats create a funeral mood” (Berlyne 1971, pp. 138–139). Related to this view is Greg Smith’s *Mood-Cue Approach* (see chap. 6.3.5).

4.5 Interest versus Aesthetic Appreciation

Leder, Belke, et al. (2004) suggest that “the challenge of art is mainly driven by a need for understanding” (p. 489). They assume that some forms of art, such as much of modern art, require a larger interpretational effort compared to others, and that understanding a piece of art increases the probability that one will experience aesthetic pleasure.

4.5.1 Aesthetics and the Role of Meaning

If aesthetic appreciation is mainly driven by understanding, then many art forms evoke pleasure through the rewarding effects of learning. This involves conceptual ideas, stylistic reflections, and abstract concepts provided by the art expert (Leder, Belke, et al. 2004). Fechner (1876) already distinguished between *aesthetics from below*, corresponding to bottom-up processes (e.g., perceived beauty), and *aesthetics from above*, highlighting the importance of top-down processes and the role of knowledge.

“People [...] differ in what they focus on regarding art. Some appreciate craftsmanship, some want to learn about life based on the consumption of art, and others appreciate the amusing and arousing nature of contemporary art” (Leder, Gerger, et al. 2012, p. 1).

A narrative’s aesthetic appeal is influenced by fashion, individual and cultural differences, as well as genre-dependent expectations. We may like a comedy for its unrealism

and dislike a thriller for the same reason. Do we watch horror alone or together with our dearest? Was the screenplay written for film or is it a stage-to-film adaption? Because taste and knowledge influence our aesthetic judgment, we may even need knowledge of analytical approaches or a book's zeitgeist to appreciate its *aesthetic value* (see Goldman 2005). Once we experience the rewarding effects of learning, we may want to understand further works of art. However, we do not find an artwork aesthetically appealing just because it arouses our curiosity.

“When a perceiver comes to the conclusion that artwork is not well done, not meaningful, or not producing clear associations, then the judgment is negative and the artwork is not preferred. [...] For example, when it is not possible to understand the artwork, or when adequate top-down information about the concept and possible meaning are not available, displeasure results and the aesthetic judgment might also be negative” (Leder, Belke, et al. 2004, p. 503).

A work of art can be an impetus for learning and knowledge construction, which suggests that the aesthetic experience is determined by not only the artwork but also the knowledge brought by the perceiver. The importance of cognitive interpretation and meaning leads to interesting implications. We may, for instance, appreciate a book's aesthetic value only years after we read it and that of a film only after we discuss it with others.

Our tendency to infer the purpose of elements presented during narrative discourse (see chap. 1.3: Narrative Functionalism) reflects the importance of meaning in narratives, but what if there is no apparent purpose?

4.5.2 ‘Bad’ and ‘Good’ Bad Films

A narrative's aesthetic appeal arguably depends on its ability to arouse curiosity, yet curiosity does not guarantee that we also find it ‘good’. Many people, for example, find soap operas “stupid but nevertheless addictive,” and even though Joel Schumacher's *Batman & Robin* (1997) or Tommy Wiseau's *The Room* (2003) are said to be ‘bad’ films, many people find them highly enjoyable⁸. According to Kant, aesthetic judgments (or ‘judgments of taste’) have “subjective universal” validity. Although subjective, we nevertheless act as if an aesthetic value is a property of a thing (“the film is ‘bad’”) and as if there is an aesthetic judgment “capable of making a rightful claim upon the assent of all men” (Kant [1790] 1987, p. 52). This finds support from Waters ([1981] 2005), for whom “bad taste is what entertainment is all about. If someone vomits while watching one of my films, then it is like getting a standing ovation, but one must remember that *there is such a thing as good*

⁸On imdb.com, critics describe *The Room* as “Worse than Mission to Mars... And yet, 1000x more enjoyable”, “an incompetent masterpiece”, or “My favorite ‘so bad it’s good’ movie”.

bad taste and bad bad taste” (p. 2, [emphasis added](#)). Indeed, the ‘bad’ may be its own aesthetic category with its own characteristics ([Steven 2009](#)). Therefore, B-movie fans do not enjoy all ‘bad’ films, but those that are ‘good’ according to the aesthetic characteristics of B-movies. But what are the candidates for those characteristics?

One aesthetic component of ‘trash’ films is their appeal to visceral qualities. They evoke arousal through sexual stimuli, taboos and other norm violations, brutality, perversions, and humor focused on obscenities, feces, and other bodily waste ([Gross 2009](#)). However, some B-movies like *The Room* fall short of such vulgarities. The merit of the ‘good bad’ may lie in its ability to exploit the motivating effects of novelty and unexpectedness (see [Schultz 2015](#)).

“In these films, which utilize techniques that could be considered ‘bad form’ in direct relation to the ‘good form’ of Classic Hollywood cinema, the standard recuperative devices of continuity editing, sound and image relations, shot motivation and narrative resolution (among other techniques) could not be relied upon to work in the ways audiences, through consistent exposure to these stable forms, might otherwise have expected” ([Joyce and Wilson 2009](#), p. 133).

Indeed, a tornado consisting of sharks is an unusual and novel visual stimulus but B-movies may also please higher cognitive faculties. If cognitive mastery of the ‘good’ is pleasurable, the same must apply to the ‘bad’. Even though *The Room* appears to be a gathering of arbitrarily pieced-together events, some people may want to understand the creator and his intentions in the same way as art fans want to understand a painting and horror fans a monster (see p. 12: “why do they play football in tuxedos?”). Other B-movies may be deliberately made not ‘masterful’ to provide clues as to which kind of aesthetic judgment we must apply. If “a classification of an artwork as ‘abstract’ might prevent further search for meaning” ([Leder, Belke, et al. 2004](#), p. 501), then the same can apply to B-movies of a particular kind.

4.6 Conclusion

While happiness is characterized by the belief that one has got what one wants ([Smith, Haynes, et al. 1993](#)), interest is characterized by deprivation ([Loewenstein 1994](#)). It is not defined by liking or disliking but by a desire to close a knowledge gap. Like love, interest involves positive and negative affect resulting from the pleasures of learning and the aversive nature of uncertainty and ignorance ([Litman and Jimerson 2004](#)). [Leder, Belke, et al. \(2004\)](#) suggested that

“Successful mastery of an artwork is the source of intrinsic motivation to search future exposure (and the challenge) of art in the future. In the long run, this kind of motivation increases interest in art” (p. 493).

Once interest is aroused, we engage in challenging, and even aversive activities, which suggests that one of the functions of interest is to act as a counterweight to feelings of uncertainty and anxiety (Kashdan and Roberts 2004). Extremely novel stimuli are known to evoke both curiosity and fear in animals (Russell 1973) while liking and preference are associated with familiarity, prototypicality, and fluency (Sluckin, Hargreaves, et al. 1983; Winkielman, Schwarz, et al. 2003; Zajonc 1980), as well as ecological factors (Berlyne 1971).

It has been argued that interest is an integral part of aesthetic appreciation because an artwork’s aesthetic impact is related to the violation of a viewer’s expectations (Palmer, Schloss, and Sammartino 2013). Although such artworks may nevertheless be ascribed with a low aesthetic appeal, there does seem to be a difference between the ‘bad bad’ and the ‘good bad’. The latter differs from the former in that it incorporates novelty and unpredictability. As with the reception of other works of art, these epistemic incentive effects can further motivate cognitive mastery, leading to further rewarding learning experiences.

Chapter 5

Curiosity

According to Sternberg, “a temporary gap concerns relevant information about the narrated world (states, existents, doings) that we encounter out of order” (Sternberg 2003b, p. 521). However, temporary gaps are only one way how a narrative can arouse curiosity. In *Good Will Hunting* (1997), Will Hunting is a young janitor at MIT who can solve the trickiest mathematical problems, and we wonder how this is possible. But was this curiosity caused by a gap in time?

5.1 Information Gaps

Whereas Sternberg’s narrative curiosity refers to a felt gap in the order of events, Loewenstein’s (1994) psychological model of curiosity refers more generally to a gap in one’s knowledge. Temporary gaps, therefore, only constitute a subcategory of *information gaps* (also knowledge gaps). William James similarly suggested that our “philosophic brain responds to an inconsistency or a gap in its knowledge” (James [1890] 2013, p. 430). In Hunting’s case, we cannot detect a temporal gap but a discrepancy between our janitor prototype schema and the observed stimulus that creates a knowledge gap.

Silvia (2006) argued that “the information gap theory may be too narrow. [...] When one of four fictional characters must be the murderer or one of the 50 states must be the easternmost state, it is easy to represent curiosity in terms of information gaps. But can all inducers of curiosity be reduced to uncertainty and information gaps? Internally inconsistent objects, such as airplanes with feathered wings (Nunnally 1971), are interesting” (p. 51). However, Loewenstein confined knowledge gaps to *epistemic curiosity*. According to Berlyne’s (1954) taxonomy, *perceptual curiosity* is aroused by novel stimuli and reduced

through repeated exposure, while epistemic curiosity is the desire for knowledge and thus mainly applies to humans.

Berlyne's theory is of special interest in this thesis because it is one of the few accounts of the *situational determinants* of curiosity (Loewenstein 1994). Given that the collative variables refer to features of a stimulus, they are here investigated under the label of perceptual curiosity. However, all variables can be interpreted as forms of incongruities and are thus in line with a range of more cognitively oriented incongruity theories (e.g., Hebb 1955; Hunt 1963; Hunt 1965; Piaget 1969). Kagan (1972) suggested that epistemic curiosity is about resolving uncertainty and striving for cognitive harmony and equilibrium as suggested by Festinger's (1957) *cognitive dissonance theory*. Festinger proposed that we seek consonance between our beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. For example, when a prophecy of a cult fails, the members experience a state of dissonance that they must resolve (e.g., by assuming that the prophecy was only a hoax or that God gave them a second chance) (Festinger et al. 1956). The theories of Hebb, Piaget, and Hunt assumed that there is an optimal level of incongruity (see Chapter 4.4.2: Optimal Level Theory: The Wundt Curve) and that curiosity results from the violation of expectations (see Chapter 7: Surprise), which, however, is only one type of incongruity (Loewenstein 1994).

5.2 Perceptual Curiosity (Collative Variables)

The *collative variables* (or *collative stimulus properties*) *novelty, uncertainty, complexity, conflict, surprisingness, ambiguity, puzzlingness, or diversity* involve a comparison because “to decide how novel, surprising, complex, and so on a pattern is, one must compare or collate information from two or more sources” (Berlyne 1971, p. 69). As an alternative, Berlyne suggested the term ‘structural property’ because he assumed they are responsible for ‘form,’ ‘structure’ and ‘composition’ in artworks. Berlyne's extensive groundwork had a strong impact on modern psychological theories of curiosity and interest (e.g., Silvia 2006). However, even his admirers (e.g., Martindale, Moore, and Borkum 1990) criticized his behavioristic stance, which depicts curiosity as being quantifiable by measuring the qualities of a stimulus. This does not hold because semantic content and meaning cannot be entirely derived from a percept. The sensory qualities of stimuli are processed superficially and they evoke deep (semantic) representations (Fraik and Lockhart 1972). When we process sentences deeply, we tend to forget sensory features such as the exact wording, but we remember its semantic content (Johnston and Thomas 1993). Berlyne's variables are therefore interpreted from a cognitive perspective in this thesis.

5.2.1 Novelty

We speak of *historical novelty* when something has never occurred in history and *psychological novelty* when something is novel to a person, regardless of whether it is known to someone else (Boden 2009). In this thesis, the term novelty always refers to psychological novelty. It is commonly understood as “the discrepancy between what is known and what is discovered” (Mather 2013) or “the quality of not being previously experienced or encountered” (Barto et al. 2013). However, Berlyne (1960) argued that this does not explain how novelty is detected and suggested that a stimulus is novel when it falls between equally responding mental categories. Carroll (1990) similarly argued in his Philosophy of Horror that monsters “are repelling because they violate standing categories. [...] They are attractive, in the sense that they elicit interest, and they are the cause of, for many, irresistible attention, again, just because they violate standing categories” (p. 188).

It is commonly assumed that there is an optimal level of novelty (see Chapter 4.4.2: Optimal Level Theory: The Wundt Curve). However, stimuli can “contain both familiar and unfamiliar elements; a well-known melody may be heard with new rhythms or harmonies. It has been traditionally said that such variation, or unity-in variety, is at the root of aesthetic appreciation” (Sluckin, Hargreaves, et al. 1983, p. 246).

Stimulus Novelty

Neuroscientists have studied three forms of novelty so far. *Stimulus novelty*, the most studied case, can be found in any narrative where we experience stimuli directly (e.g., film or theater). *Associative novelty* results when we arrange familiar stimuli in a new way such as when we combine familiar things in new spatial locations, in a new temporal sequence (e.g., an uncommon word combination in a poem), or when we pair items in novel ways (e.g., when we combine words in odd ways) (Kumaran and Maguire 2007). *Contextual novelty*, which is closely related to associative novelty, refers to a combination of familiar objects with an unusual context (e.g., the T-Rex in Stephen Spielberg’s *The Lost World: Jurassic Park* (1997) which is brought to San Diego). Neuroscientists try to attribute these different “types” of novelty to different brain areas. However, outside the laboratory, they may not be clear-cut. One stimulus may trigger different types of novelty at the same time, and according to simulation theories (Barsalou 1999; Barsalou 2003b; Oatley 1999), we should even be able to experience stimulus novelty via reading because we can imagine novel visual and auditory stimuli based on linguistic descriptions (see p. 8).

Novelty Through Change

The problem of neuroscientific experiments is that they only study static stimuli although our environment changes continuously. In narratology, a change from one state to another is called an *event* (Hühn 2015), but when we ask for news, we are not interested in any generic event (*type I event*), but in non-prototypical, unexpected, and relevant events (*type II event*). Thus, change represents a major source of novelty in storytelling. Characters grow or fall, become friends or antagonize, get together or break up, and give birth or die. Some emotion theorists like Frijda (1988) assume that every emotion is caused by some novel or unexpected event. These emotions are positive when the event is congruent with our goals and negative emotions when it harms or threatens our concerns.

Constructive Novelty

Piaget assumed that novelty stimulates adaption processes (assimilation and accommodation), leading to an increasing equilibrium between organism and environment through the development of new mental structures. However, what bothered him was that humans, as creative individuals, create novelty themselves. After all, a work of fiction originates within the mind of a writer, which of course, cannot be interpreted as an adaption to the external world. Piaget (1977) thus located novelty in the epistemic process which suggests that “progress in cognition both generates and is generated by novelty” (Vonèche 1999, p. 648). In many forms of art, the novelty of a stimulus (e.g., Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’) can be comparatively small compared to the knowledge resulting from reflection and interpretation (see cognitive mastery in Leder, Belke, et al. 2004). It is, thus, assumed in this thesis that novelty and its anticipation drive curiosity through its rewarding effects (e.g., Schultz 2015) and that these reinforcing effects apply to not only perceived but also *constructive novelty* (see Piaget 1977).

Producing Novelty

In fiction, we often find novelty in the strange and the unusual. In Joanne K. Rowling’s *Harry Potter* (1997), a weather forecast reports about a swarm of owls, which is quite unusual given that owls are solitary animals. In this case, novelty results from a simple combination of two hitherto unrelated concepts: owls and swarm behavior. This novel stimulus catches our attention, and based on the principle of narrative functionalism, we follow the erotetic information game: What is the purpose of the owl swarm?

From associative novelty, we can derive a simple method of creating novel stimuli—a technique known as *conceptual combination* (Kaufman and Sternberg 2010). Whereas the basilisk is a mix of a rooster and a serpent, the monster in *Alien* is a mix of eusociality,

parasitism, and acid (its blood). We can find novelty on all levels from concrete forms and learned patterns to abstract concepts⁹. Creativity research assumes that conceptual combination is one of the most fundamental principles underlying creativity and problem solving (Kaufman and Sternberg 2010; Mobley et al. 1992; Mumford et al. 1997; Sternberg and Davidson 1995; Ward et al. 1999). If we combine two ideas, especially when they are dissimilar, opposing, or contradicting (i.e., *Janusian Thinking*), then we infer *emergent features* that neither of the base concepts possess (Estes and Ward 2002). We judge a Harvard-educated carpenter to be non-materialistic, for instance, although neither Harvard-educated people nor carpenters are generally appraised to be non-materialistic (Kunda, Miller, et al. 1990). Stephen Donaldson, the writer of the fantasy series *The Chronicles of Thomas Covenant* (1977–2013), reported that he used conceptual combination in the form of *metaphoric thinking* as an idea generator (afterword in Donaldson 1992). He tried to write a book about *unbelief* but was unable to start writing until he combined it with *leprosy* (Hansen’s disease) (for a detailed discussion see Ward 2001).

5.2.2 Complexity

In experiments with randomly generated polygons, people tend to watch complex polygons with more elements longer and give higher ratings of interest (Aitken 1974; Eisenman 1966) and experiments with music and paintings support the inverted-U relation with complexity (Hekkert and Wieringen 1990; North and Hargreaves 1995). Berlyne hypothesized that we are interested in complex stimuli because their diverse elements invite us to make conflicting categorizations and make the stimulus unpredictable because the whole cannot be predicted by its parts (Berlyne 1960; Silvia 2006). It has also been suggested that complex stimuli attract our attention because they require longer encoding times (Mather 2013). Although complexity can be objectively quantified in randomly generated polygons, it can only be subjectively appraised in semantic content. We do not have to go through all possible states a Mexican Standoff can end in, yet we appraise the situation as more complex and less predictable than a situation with only two parties. The number of characters, storylines, interdependencies of incongruent character goals, and the number of erotetic questions influence the complexity of a whole narrative, which makes it unpredictable and difficult to comprehend.

⁹Asked about his writing process, Quentin Tarantino talked about the inspirations that led to *Pulp Fiction*(1994): “[T]he idea [...] was to take three separate stories, and make them the oldest stories in the book, whether it be, Vincent’s character, the hoodlum, has to go out with the boss’s lady, ‘but don’t touch her!’ And there’s the whole history of people who have touched her, and what happens. Well, we’ve seen that before, a zillion times... and the case of the Bruce Willis story, that the boxer’s supposed to throw the fight, and he doesn’t, and now the mob’s after him... we’ve seen that story a million times as well. And [...] the third story was basically kind of the beginning of, at that time, almost every Joel Silver movie, which would start off with like a couple of hitmen showing up, boom boom, alright, ‘you wanna witness something? witness this!’” (Tarantino 2009, 0:15).

5.2.3 Uncertainty

A TV show in which the butler turns out to be the murderer in every episode is dull and uninteresting, and the same can be said about all other clichés that make stories, paintings, or musical compositions predictable. A tennis match is similarly uninteresting when one player completely outperforms the other because we assume the better player will win anyway. On intuitive grounds, our sense of probabilities and *uncertainty* seems to be related to interest. Berlyne incorporates uncertainty into his theory. However, his notion of uncertainty does not refer to subjective feeling (although it may co-occur) but to the information-theoretic concept developed by [Shannon and Weaver \(1948\)](#). Berlyne’s explanation goes beyond *predictive uncertainty* and encompasses ‘variety’ ([Berlyne 1971](#)), which can be understood in the context of *patterns* (see [Schmidhuber 2009](#)) (i.e., regularities within artworks, genres, and styles).

Information Theory

Information theory defines uncertainty as a quantitative measure that depends on the *probabilities or relative frequencies of classes of events*. The alternative classes (e.g., the number of candidates of an election) and their given probability of occurrence (e.g., the candidates’ probabilities of winning the election) are contained within a *sample space*.¹⁰

According to information theory, the average uncertainty rises with the number of possible alternatives (e.g., the number of candidates in an election) and when their occurrence becomes equally probable (each candidate has the same chance to win). Therefore, the average uncertainty is reduced if one candidate is most likely to win the election. When the best football team in the world plays against a mediocre team, the average uncertainty level is quite low but increases with the strength of the opposing team, making the outcome unpredictable and interesting. By contrast, the uncertainty of a single alternative is low when its probability of occurrence is high, and vice versa. In information-theoretic terms, the *surprisal* of an outcome of a random variable is high when its probability of occurrence is low ([Barto et al. 2013](#); [Tribus 1961](#)). This matches the intuition that improbable events with a higher uncertainty value are more interesting because they are *unexpected*. We would certainly be surprised if the best football team in the world lost against a team of nobodies.

Berlyne saw art as a signal involving uncertainty (variety) and redundancy. According to this view, variety and redundancy evoke patterns we try to explore, such as in rhymes and musical compositions that carry redundant compressible information. However, such a behaviorist view brittles when higher-order cognition is involved. The term ‘dog’ can be

¹⁰The average uncertainty (or *Shannon Entropy*), measured in *bits*, is calculated with the formula $H = -\sum_i^N p_i \log_2 p_i$. N is the number of event classes in the sample space, and p is the probability that the event i will occur.

transmitted with very little information, but our mind can provide an appearance, barking sounds, and even a psyche.

5.2.4 Information Conflict

Information conflict (Nunnally and Lemond 1973) or just *conflict* (Berlyne 1960) is a result of “competing information relative to identifying, labeling, remembering, categorizing, and otherwise encoding the stimulus” (Nunnally and Lemond 1973). It is associated with *doubt* (e.g., the conflict between tendencies to believe a statement or not), *perplexity* (when an individual holds mutually incompatible beliefs), *contradiction*, *incongruity*, or *irrelevance* (Berlyne 1974).

Incongruity

Incongruity, or *incompatibility* in William James’ terms, is brought forth by properties of objects and events that are considered to be incompatible or unlikely to be found together. Whenever we want to understand situations or texts, we draw on a wealth of information stored in the form of schemata and stereotypes (Thagard and Verbeurgt 1998). Kunda and Thagard (1996) suggest that sense-making requires *conceptual coherence* resulting from constraints in the form of excitatory and inhibitory links between evoked concepts: “positive constraints come from correlations among the characteristics; and the negative constraints come from negative correlations. For example, if you are told that someone is a Mafia nun, you have to reconcile the incompatible expectations that she is moral (nun) and immoral (Mafia)” (Thagard and Verbeurgt 1998, p. 6). In the same way, Will Hunting evokes conceptual incoherence through his conflicting traits (see Figure 5.1).

An example of incongruous action can be found in *Pulp Fiction* (1994), where Jules Winnfield, a hitman played by Samuel L. Jackson, cites the bible to justify his contract killing. Such incongruities are quite common in Tarantino’s films. After Christopher Waltz played Hans Landa, a Jew hunting Nazi, in *Inglourious Basterds* (2009), he plays a German in *Django Unchained* (2012), but incongruent with the German racist stereotype, he lacks prejudices and even tries to help the Afro-American protagonist Django (Jamie Foxx). Samuel L. Jackson, on the contrary, plays the Afro-American house slave Stephen, who is racist against other Afro-Americans: “Can’t believe you [slave owner] brought a nigger to stay in the Big House. Yo daddy’s rollin’ over in his goddamn grave, right now. Brought a nigger to stay with us. What kinda shit is that?” Virtually the same paradox can be found in Polanski’s film *The Pianist* (2002), which is based on Władysław Szpilman’s memoirs, *The Death of a City* (1946). The film portrays how some Jews served the Jewish Ghetto Police which was as cruel as Hitler’s Waffen-SS. “Off they go to the melting pot,” says a Jewish policeman while he watches the deportation of his Jewish fellows. We perceive




Figure 5.1: *Conceptual incoherence* resulting from concepts associated with Will Hunting. Excitatory links are shown in red and inhibitory links in blue; inspired by Kunda and Thagard (1996) and Thagard (1997).

stimuli as incongruent when they carry contradicting features or when they evoke different, incompatible categorizations. Roberto Benigni’s *La vita è bella* (1997), for instance, is a holocaust comedy that combines the seriousness of the holocaust with the playfulness of the comedy.

Contradiction

In mystery stories, it is the indebted student with one million dollars in his bank account, the woman who confesses to the crime but was imprisoned during the murder, and the killer who was caught in the act but only carried a toy gun. The mystery writer’s bag of tricks is full of incompatible evidence, contradicting testimonies, and seemingly paradoxical motifs. If we cannot resolve these contradictions with generic knowledge (schemata), then information gaps are opened and questions are raised (see Herman 2002). We can create such gaps almost mechanistically because we can easily find information that contradicts common sense or the evidence presented in the narrative. A bigger challenge is to fill these gaps in unexpected yet plausible ways.

Contrast

Contrast, the fundament of *antithesis* and *binary opposition*, was not explicitly mentioned as a unique variable by Berlyne. However, he noted the following:

“When we speak of an organism’s response to a stimulus, we usually mean a response to something that *contrasts* with its background or with what has just

preceded it [...] The presence of two discriminably different qualities side by side or the placing of one next to the other seems to be the simplest way of inducing arousal increment. [...] Graves (1951) speaks of the ‘aesthetic conflict or visual tension between opposing or contrasting lines, directions, shapes, space intervals, textures, values, hues.’ [...] The simple juxtaposition of two distinct colors, or forms, or sounds generally keeps arousal increment within the pleasant range” (Berlyne 1960, p. 141, *emphasis added*).

This definition raises contrast to one of the fundamental principles of interest. In literature, music, and other arts, antithesis and contrast are known to be aesthetically appealing. In *Epic Laws of Folk Narrative*, Olrik ([1909] 1965) proposed *Das Gesetz des Gegensatzes* (The Law of Contrast): “This very basic opposition is a major rule of epic composition: young and old, large and small, man and monster, good and evil” (p. 135). Binary opposition was later used by the folklorist Vladimir Propp and the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss to analyze folk tales. Structuralism’s strong emphasis on binary opposition was criticized by the post-structuralist movement, which argued that contrasting oppositions may appeal to the mind, but ignore the shades between categories and thus do not reflect reality. Derrida ([1967] 2001) even argued that binary oppositions are a defining feature of ideologies because they construct a reality where one category is privileged over the other.

5.3 Epistemic Curiosity

As a behaviorist, Berlyne mainly studied perceptual stimuli that are rather simple compared to narrative stimuli that unfold over time and are, therefore, mentally represented by complex situation models (see Zwaan et al. (1995) and Chapter 1.2.3: (Spatio-)Temporal Coherence). Loewenstein’s (1994) information gap theory, by contrast, was inspired by Gestalt psychological ideas such as those from Malone (1981) who suggested that cognitive curiosity “is evoked by the prospect of modifying higher level cognitive structures [...] and] can be thought of as a desire to bring better ‘form’ to one’s knowledge structures” (p. 363). This view lends itself to the analysis of narrative discourse with its various interlinked elements because we recognize gaps in the attempt to organize information into coherent ‘wholes’.

5.3.1 Incoherence & Incompleteness

To fully account for epistemic curiosity, Berlyne’s variables must be extended by *incoherence* (see Silvia 2006), which suggests that there is a macrostructure that is *inconsistent* or *incomplete*. The concept of incongruity, as employed in this thesis, aligns with Van Dijk and Kintsch’s (1983) notion of *local incoherence*, which occurs within short-term memory.

Conversely, coherence pertains to *global coherence*, which requires sequential access to the long-term memory to represent complex stimuli such as narratives. Physical and rhetorical causality was found to be particularly important to narrative discourse (e.g., Schank and Abelson 1977; Trabasso et al. 1984). This is consistent with Sternberg’s (1978) master effects, which depend on gaps resulting when the reader cannot resolve the incoherence (e.g., through schemata) (see Herman 2002).

5.3.2 Anticipated Novelty

Films, novels, and scientific papers can evoke curiosity before we even have the chance to inspect them. The mere “awareness that novel stimuli are available for inspection [...] can induce curiosity, just as the sight of food or the awareness that it is available can stimulate hunger” (Loewenstein 1994, p. 82). Such stimuli are appraised as rewarding and are thus provided with a motivational *advance*. In Chapter 1.3.2, I suggested that even elements as mundane as the nickel in *The Last Tycoon* can be given an advance if we assume that it plays an important role in understanding the discourse. This hypothesis is further outlined in Chapter 8 (Interest & the Seeking System).

5.4 Evoking Curiosity

Loewenstein (1994) suggested that epistemic curiosity is evoked when a gap or its associated information set becomes salient and proposed several *situational factors* that direct our attention in the presence of information gaps:

- “1. The posing of a question or presentation of a riddle or puzzle confronts the individual directly with missing information and is therefore perhaps the most straightforward curiosity inducer. [...]
2. Exposure to a sequence of events with an anticipated but unknown resolution will almost inevitably create curiosity to know the outcome [see Chapter 6: Suspense][...]
3. The violation of expectations often triggers a search for an explanation [see Chapter 7: Surprise][...]
4. Possession of information by someone else also causes curiosity. [see Chapter 2.4: Knowledge Disparities][...]
5. Past attainments can serve as a reference point against which current attainments are compared [...] Consider the enormous curiosity that is evoked by the recognition that one knew a piece of information but has forgotten it.” (p. 91).

5.5 Conclusion

Loewenstein (1994) suggested that epistemic curiosity is caused by knowledge gaps, and, inspired by Gestalt psychology, he assumed that we try to close them to arrange information into coherent wholes. This links the psychological with the narratological gap concept and could explain why coherence is a desirable quality of discourse (e.g., Kintsch 1980; Toolan 2013).

The discussed situational determinants of curiosity serve as a tool for the writer and the critic, but they may not be sufficient as a comprehensive psychological model of curiosity. Chapter 8 discusses Silvia's (2006) model of interest that consists of a novelty and a coping appraisal. This chapter also presents the Learn/Effect model of interest, which attempts to reconcile Berlyne's collative variables with Loewenstein's information gap theory.

Chapter 6

Suspense

Most models of suspense are conceptualized around two factors: *uncertainty* and *emotional valence*. Both are present in Meir Sternberg’s model (see 2.2.2), according to which

“suspense derives from a lack of desired information concerning the outcome of a conflict [uncertainty] that is to take place in the narrative future, a lack that involves a clash of hope and fear [valence]” (Sternberg 1978, p. 65).

We can also find these factors in the popular model of Ortony, Clore, et al. (1988), which involves the emotions of *hope and fear* coupled with a *cognitive state of uncertainty*.

This chapter delineates a cognitive psychological approach that explains suspense based on five primary factors:

1. **Goals & Anti-Goals** (two possible outcome states)
2. **Proximity & progress** toward these outcome states
3. **Uncertainty** about the outcome (knowledge gap)
4. **Moods** (e.g., anxiety or enthusiasm)
5. **Mind Incongruence** (dramatic irony)

The first three factors correspond to the (*Anti-*) *Goal Model* of suspense, outlined in the following sections.

6.1 Hope & Fear

Hume was one of the first who considered hope and fear as opposite sides of the same coin:

“When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to fear or hope, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other” (Hume [1739] 2003, p. 439).

Hope and fear also intertwine in our language. When we say “I hope we have enough gas to reach the next gas station,” we usually express our worries rather than our hopes. According to Zillmann (1980), “hopes and fears are inseparably intertwined in the apprehensions that produce suspense. In fact, the conceptual separation of hopes and fears may appear to be pointless because the two concepts seem to constitute two alternative ways of describing the same phenomenon of apprehension about an outcome” (p. 136). Nevertheless, if we look at how different narratives elicit suspense, we can see that hope and fear are two different emotions. Fear-dominant genres involve monsters, murderers, natural disasters, and other dangers, whereas genres rooted in hope focus on achievement-related goals (e.g., career-related, artistic, or athletic success), interpersonal relationships (e.g., the hope that two characters get together), or altruistic hopes for the wellbeing of characters (see Averill et al. 1990; Ben-Zeev 2001). *Rocky* (1976), *The Karate Kid* (1984), *Forrest Gump* (1994), *Good Will Hunting* (1997), *The Pursuit of Happiness* (2006) and *Slumdog Millionaire* (2008) are representatives of the latter category.

Theories of hope and fear share considerable similarities. Both are experienced in relation to an individual’s well-being (Ortony, Clore, et al. 1988; Roseman 1996) and both are typically modeled along the same appraisal dimensions: uncertainty, importance, valence, and goal congruence (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Underhill 2012). We experience hope in the face of an event outcome that is pleasant and goal congruent, and fear when it is unpleasant and goal incongruent.

6.1.1 Uncertainty & Probabilities

Although most theories of suspense incorporate uncertainty and probability appraisals, these concepts have limited predictive power. For instance, viewers can experience suspense even upon repeated viewings (see Smuts 2009), suggesting that they can feel hope and fear despite having complete certainty and that uncertainty only plays a role in modulating the experience of suspense.

Explaining the intensity of suspense based on a rise in information-theoretic uncertainty is counter-intuitive because the highest uncertainty is experienced when both possible outcomes—the positive and the negative—are equally probable (i.e., a 50/50 chance). This

implies that suspense decreases as the probability of a negative outcome decreases (until it is as probable as the positive outcome).

Uncertainty is incorporated in most theories of suspense (Carroll 1990; Gerrig 1997; Sternberg 1978) as well as of hope and fear (Roseman 1984; Scherer and Ekman 1984; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Tiedens and Linton 2001). But although uncertainty is considered to be an important element of suspense, many theorists support the view that a rather *low uncertainty* and a *high probability* of the harmful outcome maximize suspense (Brewer 1996; Carroll 1996a; Comisky and Bryant 1982; de Wied 1995; Hoffner and Cantor 1991; Vorderer 1994; Zillmann 1996).

Because sports events with equally strong opponents are considered to be suspenseful, suspense occurs in contexts with a high level of information-theoretic uncertainty (50/50 chance). Evidence from Gan et al. (1997) suggests that suspense in sports is associated with a lower score difference. However, average probabilities do not guarantee that a match is suspenseful because suspense also depends on single situations in which our team is close to scoring or getting a goal (Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2009).

The position taken here is that a game is exciting if our team has both a high probability of losing and a high probability of winning. In the following sections, we will resolve this paradox by replacing probabilities with the alternative factors *proximity* & *progress*. This solves another problem with probabilities, namely that they cannot express the urgency required to explain the suspense experience.

6.1.2 Interdependence of Hope and Fear

There is one fundamental question: are hope and fear opposite sides of the same coin, or do they work independently? Consider the following example: A meteor is quickly approaching Vienna and our fears grow as it comes closer. A flying superhero trying to catch it should reduce the likelihood of the city being destroyed, but does it also reduce our fears? Or will it additionally ignite our hopes?

Based on what we know about superheroes, their presence alone should reduce the chance that a meteor will destroy a city, but although their presence decreases the probability of a negative outcome, the intensity of suspense does not seem to decline. It seems like the opposite happens: suspense increases because the scene raises both our hopes and our fears. Considering that the approach and avoidance processes occupy different brain areas, hope and fear possibly grow independently as the hero comes closer to our *goal* and the meteor comes closer to our *anti-goal* (see Carver 2004; Carver and Scheier 1998).

6.2 The (Anti-) Goal Model of Suspense

The (Anti-) Goal Model explains suspense based on two possible outcome states resulting from one or several events. These two states—the goal and the anti-goal—correspond to hope and fear. This model is outlined in the following sections.

6.2.1 States & Events

A world state is a snapshot of a state of affairs that can be changed to a new state through an event.¹¹ Events typically get more attention than states because

“states are much easier to infer from the report of events than the other way around. From the episode ‘John gambled and lost one hundred dollars’ we can infer that at t_{i-1} John had at least one hundred dollars, and that he was one hundred dollars poorer at t_i , but we cannot retrieve the proposition ‘John gambled between t_{i-1} , and t_i ’ from the description of these two states. By necessity, then, events get more attention on the level of discourse” (Ryan 1985, p. 719).

Not only do we infer states from the sequence of events, but we also anticipate potential states, some of which will never be realized. We can often imagine these implied states quite vividly (e.g., the Death Star destroys the planet) and sometimes only abstractly (e.g., an aversive or painful state). We typically infer two possible outcome states resulting from a suspenseful event (e.g., shark attack): one state is goal congruent and desirable (getting on the boat) and one is goal incongruent and undesirable (being injured or killed) (see Carroll 1990).

Modeling suspense based on states has advantages. Whereas events are dynamic, states are stable and discrete (dead/alive, lost/won, together/apart), and while one event can evoke both hope and fear, each emotion can be attributed to either the positive or the negative outcome. Ambivalent outcomes can be explained by dividing the world-state into positively and negatively valenced sub-states.

Defining suspense based on states furthermore allows us to model cases where suspense not only results from one single event but from several interdependent events.

Example E1: Tony, a talented amateur boxer, takes a loan to start a professional boxing career, but, injured after a serious accident, he cannot recover without the

¹¹Herman argues that “events, conceived as time- and place-specific transitions from some source state S [...] to some target state S’ [..., are...] a prerequisite for narrative.” (Herman 2008, p. 151). We can distinguish between *happenings*, which are accidental changes of the world state (e.g., a character gets sick, an earthquake destroys a city, etc.), and *actions*, which require agents to perform goal-directed activities that result in a transition from the current state to a new state (Ryan 1991).

necessary medical treatment. Unable to pay his rent, his enormous debts, and his medical expenses, he accepts the offer to fight against the world champion, hoping that an unlikely victory will resolve his problems and make him famous. He finds a doctor who is willing to attest to his physical fitness, but the doctor advises him not to fight because his life is at risk.

We can identify two possible outcomes: either Tony turns out as a winner, becomes a star, and will be able to pay the rent, as well as the necessary medical treatment, or he loses and ends up in bankruptcy, living on the streets with even more injuries. We can hardly explain this example solely based on the box event because we do not fear the fight as much as the negative outcome state that could follow it, a state that depends on several previous events: taking the loan, an accident, the offer, and the decision to fight. All these events have an impact on how we appraise the two potential outcome states and all affect the experienced intensity of suspense.

One limitation of modeling emotions based on states is that we experience feelings of fear even in the absence of any specific future state. For instance, we may be afraid of objects and events such as spiders, clowns, or public speaking. These cases may be explained by learned or genetically influenced responses to stimuli that are regarded as predictive of aversive future states. [Scherer \(2005\)](#) calls such preferences, which are independent of the current needs and goals of the appraiser, *intrinsic appraisals*. In contrast, *transactional appraisals* evaluate events and their outcomes based on the appraiser's needs, desires, or goals (see [Lazarus 1991](#)), which is consistent with the (Anti-) Goal model.

6.2.2 Goals & Anti-Goals

According to [Carver and Scheier \(2002\)](#),

“A goal is a reference point (a target) toward which a person wishes or intends to move. In the cybernetic view, moving toward a goal requires identifying one's location on the relevant variable [...], determining where that location is with respect to the goal [...], and making changes to diminish the gap between present location and goal [...] These processes together form a discrepancy reducing feedback loop” (p. 305).

However, [Carver and Scheier \(2002\)](#) propose that there are not only discrepancy reducing feedback loops but also loops that enlarge discrepancies.

“To avoid confusion, we will label the reference values of such loops anti-goals [...] Self-regulation regarding an anti-goal entails escaping, withdrawing from,

or avoiding it. The actions of discrepancy enlarging loops are often constrained by discrepancy reducing loops. Thus, a person can often avoid an anti-goal by approaching a goal that is at some remove from the anti-goal (Carver, Lawrence, et al. 1999; Elliot 1999; Higgins 1996)” (p. 305).

In the same way, the (Anti-) Goal Model of Suspense assumes that we predict two future states that are treated independently: the goal and the anti-goal. In the case of horror stories, writers give their characters goals to counteract their anti-goals (e.g., breaking a door open, finding secure places and weapons, and capturing a monster with a trap).

6.2.3 Valence Magnitude & Significance

A suspenseful situation typically involves two anticipated states—one with a positive and one with a negative valence. The term valence corresponds to Sternberg’s *normative judgment* and Carroll’s *desirability* and it is often conceptualized as a bipolar positive-negative dimension ranging from the desirable, attractive, or pleasant to the undesirable, aversive, or unpleasant (Russell and Carroll 1999). However, the neurophysiological underpinnings of positive and negative affect are at least partially independent, suggesting that the positive and negative dimensions are uncoupled (Norman et al. 2011).

Different world states differ in desirability. Losing one’s wedding ring is undesirable but not nearly as unpleasant as losing one’s child. As demonstrated in example *E1*, writers modulate an (anti-)goals *valence magnitude* to increase the felt suspense – a technique often referred to as ‘raising the stakes’ (e.g., when the doctor tells Tony that another fight puts his life at risk). The valence magnitude is seen here as a convenient compound of the valence and the significance of an outcome (see Smith and Lazarus 1993; Smuts 2009; Witte 1992). Hope and fear are terminated when their importance is reduced and intensified when their importance is increased (Ben-Zeev 2001).

6.2.4 Proximity Appraisal

Carroll (1990) suggested in his *Philosophy of Horror* that suspense only occurs when the negative outcome is likely, whereas Ortony, Clore, et al. (1988) proposed that we also experience suspense when we confront a likely positive outcome. Thus, according to the latter view, hope and fear are most intense toward the ends of the probabilistic scale (see Figure 6.1).

Fear grows as the skidding car approaches the cliff, and hope grows as the protagonist is about to grab the key to his prison cell. In the first case, the probability of a negative outcome is high, while in the second case, the probability of a positive outcome is high.



Figure 6.1: Probabilistic model of suspense.

This logic may seem plausible, but it has its weaknesses. For example, in the horror genre, it is counter-intuitive that a high probability of survival creates suspense. This logic also fails in *last-minute rescues*, arguably the most intense form of suspense. Situations in which a bomb is about to explode and the hero is close to defusing it are better described with a 50/50% probability. But if probabilities cannot model suspense, what is the alternative?

I suggest that hope and fear do not depend on the appraised probability but on the appraised *proximity* to potential future states which is determined through heuristics, (i.e., spatially, e.g., an approaching shark), temporally (e.g., a ticking bomb), acoustically (steps of a monster), through higher-order thinking (a series of decreasing sales figures), and so on. I argue that football fans can hardly appraise the probability that a ball lands in the goal, but they can visually determine the proximity of the ball to the goal. The closer we come to a valenced outcome state, the higher the level of arousal and the greater the urgency to act. This is empirically supported by the *goal gradient effect* which suggests that the motivation of an organism tends to increase as it approaches a goal (Hull 1932; Hull 1938; Lewin 1931; Miller 1944). Instead of one probability appraisal, the (Anti-) Goal Model assumes that there are two independent proximity appraisals for the goal and the anti-goal. This is illustrated in figure 6.2.

But proximity alone is insufficient to explain hope and fear. We know, for instance, that we can experience hope even in the face of improbable positive outcomes (e.g., patients with cancer) (Ben-Zeev 2001). We need to look at not only the proximity but also at the dynamics—the progressing toward the positive and the negative outcomes.

6.2.5 Progress Appraisal

We experience hope when we move closer to the goal and fear when we move closer to the anti-goal. This *progression appraisal*, which hitherto has been modeled with *probability shifts* (e.g., Ben-Zeev 2001; Moulard et al. 2012; Sternberg 1978), can induce, sustain, and intensify hope and fear. Once one of the implied states is reached, suspense wanes and other emotions can occur (e.g., satisfaction and relief).




Figure 6.2: The (Anti-) Goal Model of Suspense is complementary to the presented model of narrative conflict in figure 3.1. The horizontal bars represent the past (solid) and possible future (dashed) world states, placed vertically according to their associated valence (desirability).

Given that hope and fear are products of a long evolutionary process and were tested and tried by situated and embodied agents, simple heuristics such as the changing size of a predator on an agent's retina or the rising or falling volume of its roaring may suffice as a simple threat evaluation. Proximity and progress are therefore plausible and efficient heuristics in the face of immediate threats.

Progress is here seen as a necessary component of hope and fear because proximity/probability is insufficient to explain whether we experience hope or fear.

Example E2: A doctor must explain to two of his patients that they suffer from cancer. He tells Tony that he has an 80% chance and Tim that he has a 20% chance to survive. In the following month, the doctor corrects his estimations and tells both that they have a 50% chance of surviving.

We may find it difficult to understand what it means to have a 50% chance to survive,¹² yet we can detect whether a threat is approaching or retreating. I argue that although both patients have the same probability of surviving, they experience a different mix of emotions. Tony is ‘moving’ toward the positive state and feels more hope than Tim, whose progress toward the negative state intensifies his fear.

Ben-Zeev (2001) argues that

“changes in the probability of the emotional object often generate hope. Hope is mostly initiated when we confront events that cause a decrease in the probability of a previously certain [negative] event, or an increase in the probability of a previously unlikely [positive] event” (p. 476).

When 120 people apply for an interesting job, we may not be very hopeful in the beginning, but our hopes rise as we pass one knockout phase after the other. In such cases, a probability appraisal would be possible, but how should we estimate probabilities in suspense novels? In this case, it is impossible to estimate probabilities in the information-theoretical sense. However, we can rely on *proximity cues* and *progress cues* provided by the author.

Because higher-order cognition enables us to anticipate valenced outcomes well in advance or worry about the unknown outcome of a past event, some cases are better modeled with probabilities and probability shifts based on *outcome indicators* rather than proximity and progress based on progress cues. However, evaluations based on higher-order thinking may still map onto the ancient proximity/progress appraisal structures. Given that we all die at some point, a 50% chance can mean that we are either far away or close to the actualization of an event outcome. Therefore, probabilistic models cannot represent the involved urgency of a situation and are, thus, less suitable for narratological models.

6.2.6 Uncertainty Appraisal

Although Sternberg (1978) argues that suspense is primarily based on uncertain prospection that is optionally linked to hope and fear, others argue that it is the other way around (Smuts 2008). Some film scenes are even said to be more suspenseful on repeated viewings, although this eliminates all uncertainty. Many cineastes, for instance, find *Psycho* (1960) more suspenseful on a second viewing when they know that the protagonist Marion Crane is going to be murdered (Smuts 2009). This leaves a discrepancy between the claim that

¹²Experiments by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that we have difficulties dealing with probabilities. The scientists told their participants that they had to decide on a treatment against a deadly disease and found that the same option varies in attractiveness depending on how the issue is framed. Treatment A (“saves 200 of 600 people”) was preferred over treatment B (“400 of 600 people will die”), even though both options are identical.

suspense involves uncertainty and the anecdotes indicating that it is also felt under complete certainty. This discrepancy is called the *paradox of suspense*.

Because it is widely assumed that suspense involves high certainty, [Zillmann \(1980\)](#) argued that uncertainty, “at least high levels of uncertainty, may not be as essential to suspense as has been commonly thought” (p. 134). It is tempting to define suspense by the peak of highest arousal as found in thrillers and horror stories, but whereas these genres contain many moments of immediate threat, other genres primarily play with more distal and uncertain outcomes. Let us expand example *E1* from p. 68:

Example E3: Tony, our injured boxer, is in bad shape and has limited time to prepare for the fight. The training is painful and he cannot progress fast enough. But then he gets a tempting offer: a new doping agent unknown to the World Boxing Association which boosts strength, endurance, and inhibits pain receptors. Tony is torn. How will he respond to the offer?

The example is driven by high uncertainty piggybacking on a gentle form of hope and fear, whereas the undesirable state (taking the drug/getting caught) lies in the distant future. Will Tony buy the drug? The answer, of course, is postponed to keep the audience in a state of uncertainty. First, Tony gets the offer. Will he meet the dealer? Then the meeting. Will he buy it? Then the decision: take it or throw it away? How much risk is he willing to take?

This example contains hope, fear, and a high level of uncertainty. Acting as a knowledge gap, uncertainty may constitute a separate, epistemic component of suspense which, in contrast to hope and fear, may only arouse us when we read a novel for the first time.

The effect of uncertainty on motivation was demonstrated in a study by [Daddaoua et al. \(2016\)](#). Monkeys were provided with cues that indicated whether they would get a reward or not. The monkeys could freely choose whether to view these reward predictive cues. In three different conditions, the monkeys were given rewards with different probabilities (0%, 50%, and 100% likelihood). The monkeys barely searched for the predictive cues when they did not expect to get any rewards (0% likelihood) and vigorously searched for the cues when they were certain to get a reward (100% likelihood). However, the most intense information-seeking behavior was observed when the monkeys were uncertain about the reward (50% likelihood). This suggests that there is a drive that motivates us to reduce uncertainty and close information gaps. The fact that this motivation persists even when the monkeys are completely certain about the reward is consistent with the thesis that suspense is even experienced under complete certainty (see p. 83). We can say that the monkey is in a state of suspense, hoping that the positive outcome is going to be actualized.

Both suspense and curiosity involve uncertainty, and both motivate us to form questions and hypotheses. However, suspense makes us wonder which of the two states is going

to be actualized (Sternberg 1978) and incites action tendencies that are typically sensed as bodily tensions that “keep us on the edge of our seat” (see Chen and Bargh 1999). Once an outcome state is considered to be actualized, suspense and its associated action tendencies decline, and other emotions can occur.

6.2.7 Related Emotions

Next to the two future-oriented emotions of hope and fear, suspense is accompanied by a variety of other affective states. Hope shifts to *frustration* when goal attainment is blocked (Anderson and Bushman 2002; Scherer 2001) and to *anger* when we hold someone accountable for it (Ellsworth and Smith 1988a; Frijda 1986; Ortony, Clore, et al. 1988), to *disappointment* upon nonattainment (van Dijk and Zeelenberg 2002), and to *satisfaction*, *joy* or *pride* when the goal is achieved (Ortony, Clore, et al. 1988; Roseman 1996). Fear shifts to *relaxation* when the progress is reduced or suspended and to *relief* and *contentment* when the anti-goal is abolished (Carver 2001; Deutsch et al. 2015; Pekrun et al. 2002), to *pain* and *anguish* upon its actualization (Ortony, Clore, et al. 1988), and to *sadness* when this entailed a personal loss (Frijda 1988).

	progress	stagnation	(non-)actualization
goal	hope	frustration	disappointment–satisfaction
anti-goal	fear	relaxation	relief–anguish

Table 6.1: Emotions related to the suspense experience.

6.3 Evoking Suspense

Given that we are not directly threatened nor directly benefited by fictional events, we are only *witnesses* of dramatic events involving *others* (Zillmann 1980). Why, then, do we hope and fear for particular outcomes and characters?

6.3.1 Modulation of Goals

Morality

According to Carroll (1990), we must appraise one outcome as desirable and one as undesirable to experience suspense, and the positive outcome is morally correct and the negative is evil. We do not have to sympathize with the protagonist of a spy thriller to know that saving the world is morally correct and desirable. In narratives with bad or ambiguous protagonists, suspense typically originates in their anti-goals rather than their morally questionable

goals. In *Lord of War* (2005), we do not hope that the gunrunner Yuri Orlov (Nicolas Cage) sells millions of weapons to dictators, drug lords, and warlords who arm child soldiers, but we hope that he does not get caught by the police, killed by his clients, or abandoned by his family. Although the morality principle holds in many situations, there are exceptions to the rule. In heist movies like *Ocean's Eleven* (2001), we hope that the protagonists will be able to steal money.

Affective Disposition

The *Affective Disposition Theory* by Zillman and Cantor (1977) takes a different approach and attaches morality to people. As we watch characters, we judge their actions as appropriate and good or inappropriate and bad. Based on this moral judgment, we form affective dispositions toward the characters and their goals (Zillmann 1995). The disposition theory thus predicts that:

- “1. the respondent will hope for outcomes that are (a) favorable to liked and deserving protagonists and (b) deplorable for disliked and undeserving ones; and that:
2. the respondent will fear outcomes which are (a) deplorable for liked and deserving protagonists and (b) favorable to disliked and undeserving ones” (Zillmann 1980, p. 135).

According to this theory, we side with the ‘bad guy,’ if he is more likable than the ‘good guy.’ “[A]n unfavorable disposition toward enemylike characters is thought to instigate hopes for aversive, punitive outcomes and fears of benefaction. Disliked characters, then, are deemed deserving of bad fortunes and undeserving of good ones” (Zillmann 1998, p. 201). The Affective Disposition Theory is intuitive, can be used to explain the scheme of most Hollywood films, and has empirical support (Hoffner and Cantor 1991; Oliver 1993; Oliver 1996; Raney and Bryant 2002; Zillman and Cantor 1977). Zillmann (1980) assumes that “suspense in drama is characteristically created by the projection of negative and feared outcomes for liked protagonists—and not in such projections for just any member of the cast” (p. 138), but is it necessary that characters are likable? Some suspenseful scenes work even without a setup of the characters.

Empathy

An interesting example is the short film *Unmut* (2006) by Rafael Haider, which is set in the wardrobe of a theater.

Behind the counter, a young man, played by Alexander Meile, is sobbing quietly while he makes rhythmic movements. He is having sex with a young woman lying on the floor. Then the camera reveals a shocking detail: the girl is dead. Suddenly, the theater manager enters the room, but neither can the manager see the corpse behind the counter, nor his naked lower body. In the following minutes, the young man has to deal with the manager's attempts to call his murdered female co-worker and to get behind the counter to get the books, and we ask, will the manager find out the naked truth?

In *Unmut*, we fear that the protagonist's evil secret could be discovered, but should it not be the other way around? Should we not wish him many years in prison? He is neither a liked nor a deserving protagonist. One possible explanation for this dilemma might be that we not only *feel for* but also *feel with* characters (e.g., Smith 2003).

Hoffman (2001) argued that "humans are built in such a way that they can involuntarily and forcefully experience another's emotion" (p. 5) and suggested that there are three modes of automatic and involuntary empathy: "*monitor mimicry and afferent feedback*," "*classical conditioning*," and the "*direct association of cues* from a victim or his situation with one's own painful past experience". If we observe facial expressions, such as the signaling disgust or pain, "internal representations of the state associated with these actions or emotions are evoked in the observer, 'as if' they were [...] experiencing a similar emotion" (Gallese et al. 2004, p. 400). The mirror neuron system has therefore been suggested as an explanation for why watching someone squirming in pain elicits a similarly negative experience in the observer. Also, the sniveling of *Unmut*'s protagonist could elicit such a reaction.

Hoffman further suggests two higher modes of empathy that allow us to empathize with others who are not present. *Role- or perspective-taking* involves imagining how someone feels or how one would feel in the person's situation. In the case of *Unmut*, for instance, the fear of being seen naked by one's boss is comprehensible. *Mediated association*, on the contrary, involves expressive cues where the association is mediated by semantic processing of information from or about a person. Although the latter two modes are "subject to voluntary control, [...] if one is paying attention to the victim they can be involuntary and triggered immediately on witnessing the victim's distress" (Hoffman 2001, p. 5).

Alternatives

An alternative theory comes from Vorderer (1996), who argues that it is sufficient for readers to take on the perspective of characters to feel suspense. In contrast to empathy, which involves *feeling* the same feelings as someone else, perspective-taking only requires *understanding* a character's emotions.

In line with the (Anti-) Goal Model, I suggest a simplified view according to which narratives lure us into attaching our interests to particular anticipated outcome states and we do this for different reasons. We hope that a terrorist gets caught for moral reasons, but fear that she could get tortured purely for egoistic reasons (to avoid emphatic distress). Authors thus manipulate our (anti-)goals through different devices, e.g., morality, sympathy, empathy, perspective-taking, or mind incongruence.

6.3.2 Mind Incongruence (Dramatic Irony)

Dramatic irony occurs when characters have false beliefs and would act differently if they had the information available to us, the audience. In Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet*, we know Juliet faked her death with a sleeping draught. Romeo, however, does not know and commits suicide out of grief. The conflict can be found in the incongruence between our knowledge (we know that Juliet is not dead), and that of a character (Romeo believes that she is dead). Here, we refer to the cognitive counterpart to dramatic irony as *mind incongruence*.

Mind incongruence can occur in every genre and is often induced through lies, secrets, and misapprehensions. As a device, it is straightforward to apply: It is the man who purchases an expensive car, unaware of his imminent job loss; the wife who remains oblivious to her husband’s terminal cancer; and the devoted husband, who is unaware of his partner’s infidelity. To intensify mind incongruence, authors portray clueless characters engaging in actions they wouldn’t undertake if they had the necessary information. In some narratives, mind incongruence pervades the whole plot from the beginning to the end, whereas others contain only short-lived episodes. It is assumed here that mind incongruence is an unconscious automatic process that is a separate factor in the experience of suspense. The existence of the concept of dramatic irony suggests that this phenomenon is so different from other experiences that it deserves its own term¹³.

Mind incongruence may have proven to be evolutionarily beneficial because it fulfills socially useful functions, i.e., it elicits an action tendency to warn or inform others, prevent harm, and discourage lying. Among the anecdotes of people wanting to warn fictional characters is Hitchcock’s famous “bomb under the table” example: “The audience is longing to warn the characters on the screen: ‘You shouldn’t be talking about such trivial matters. There’s a bomb beneath you and it’s about to explode!’” (Truffaut and Scott [1967] 1983, p. 52).

While this master thesis does not provide a thorough examination of mind incongruence, I will present various hypotheses about its cognitive foundations in the following

¹³When I started my research, I was unaware of the concept of dramatic irony. However, I noticed that situations with characters lacking important knowledge were more stressful for me, sometimes even unbearable, compared to situations with higher stakes.

paragraphs. Despite the association between mind incongruence and ignorance, the *ignorance hypothesis* is inadequate, as not all forms of ignorance lead to mind incongruence. If this were the case, we would have a constant urge to teach others.

In contrast, the *empathic incongruence* hypothesis questions the importance of ignorance. Instead, it assumes that mind incongruence is enabled by *self-other overlap* and relies on cognitive systems such as *mirror neurons*. We align ourselves empathically with other people, but their behavior is incongruent with how we would behave if we were in their shoes. This self-other mapping leads to situations where we feel as if we are approaching a cliff but are unable to stop the movement because it is not our own body but that of someone else. Just as we can control a character in an interactive computer game, empathic processes could make us want to take control of a character in a non-interactive narrative. The empathic incongruence hypothesis is plausible and could explain the anecdotes in which people feel compelled to warn people on a screen.

A narrower form of empathic incongruence is *action* or *goal incongruence*. In this case, the person we empathize with does not necessarily lack knowledge but acts contrary to what we consider appropriate. Indeed, mind incongruence seems to intensify when authors have characters do exactly what they shouldn't do. For example, Susan Mayer, played by Teri Hatcher, can trigger feelings of stress in the viewer when she breaks into her neighbors' houses in *Desperate Housewives* (2004-2012). We worry about the consequences and wish that she would not take such actions.

Phenomenologically, these scenarios resemble situations in which the characters lack essential knowledge. Mind incongruence may therefore be fully explained by characters progressing towards anti-goals—be it due to ignorance or because the character's goals are different from those of the audience. However, ignorance and misconceptions *do* seem to play a role in this phenomenon. Pranks, for instance, require ignorance on the part of the pranked person. It makes a difference whether the observed individuals know that they are about to get a cold shower or whether they are unaware of it. Only in the latter case is it a prank, and intuitively, we associate this case with more excitement and a greater sense of anticipation.

The *mentalizing hypothesis* suggests that mind incongruence involves the ability to infer goals, beliefs, intentions, and desires of others—functions that are attributed to mentalizing processes (also: *theory of mind*)—that do not develop before the age of four¹⁴. Current neuroscientific evidence indicates that the mentalizing system is widely independent of the mirror neuron system (Van Overwalle and Baetens 2009), which enables us to recognize the

¹⁴In false-belief experiments (Wimmer and Perner 1983), children are asked about the content of a box, and based on its appearance, the children typically think that it holds crayons. Then, the experimenter reveals that the box contains candles. When the three-year-old children are then asked what another person thinks is in the box, they typically answer candles, although shortly before that, they were convinced that it contained crayons. This experiment demonstrates that young children find it difficult to distinguish between their beliefs and the beliefs of others; in their worldview, everyone sees the world the same way.

goal of a perceived action through mapping it on our own behavioral repertoire and its associated goals (Gallese et al. 2004). While the mirror neuron system helps us to understand low-level goals and specific actions, the mentalizing system works on high-level goals and intentions.

In *Forrest Gump* (1994), the young Forrest believes that Jenny’s father “was a very loving man. He was always kissin’ and touchin’ her and her sisters,” when, in fact, the narrative suggests that Jenny’s father was abusing her. In this case, mind incongruence involves ignorance and it is phenomenologically different from mind incongruence involved in suspense. Phenomenologically, this form of mind incongruence is much more similar to conceptual incongruence (see Chapter 5.2.4: Incongruity). The film *Everybody’s Fine* (2009) is another interesting case study that is primarily driven by the ignorance of a character. After the death of his wife, Frank Goode (Robert De Niro) visits his four grown children who live scattered around the country. The film tells a simple story about a man and his relationship with his children, and it keeps us engaged by giving us the information that something happened to his son, David, but the three remaining siblings do not want to tell their father until they have additional information. Without this situation, the movie would just be about a man visiting his busy children. *Everybody’s Fine* evokes a very subtle form of suspense. We don’t know Frank’s son David, and yet Frank’s ignorance affects us.

Finally, the *multifactor hypothesis* suggests mind incongruence may involve two or more independent, but typically co-occurring cognitive processes. Empathic incongruence may exist without ignorance, while mind incongruence based on mentalizing requires ignorance and misconceptions.

6.3.3 Modulation of Progress & Direction

Sternberg (1978) argued that hope and fear involve a “seesaw shift of probabilities,” and refers to the shifting progressing toward the positive and negative outcome state. This principle works on a macroscopic level ranging over whole acts, as well as on the microscopic level (e.g., the protagonist is going to fall from the cliff–negative progress–but can latch onto a rock–positive progress–which suddenly breaks away–negative progress–and so forth). These ups and downs are an integral part of drama (Vorderer and Knobloch 2000), as they induce, sustain, and intensify suspense. This is supported by empirical evidence from sports entertainment, which suggests that shifts in positive and negative affect increase suspense (Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2009).

Generally, micro-structures appear to be more arousing than macro-structures (Zillmann 1996). This may be explained through proximity by frequent progress shifts and, thus, also by the larger emotional variety (see Chapter 6.2.7: Related Emotions). The intensity of single emotions furthermore depends on the framing of the situation. This is supported by empirical evidence showing that the prospect of losing \$1 of \$6 in a performance task

leads to more agitation and quiescence-related emotions whereas the prospect of gaining \$1 in addition to the \$5 leads to more cheerfulness and dejection related emotions (Higgins et al. 1997). Showing how a character escapes a dangerous anti-goal should thus lead to more calmness and relief, whereas framing the same situation as a form of goal achievement may elicit more hope and elation.

6.3.4 Modulation of the Valence Magnitude

Zillmann (1996) suggested that sympathy for characters and the magnitude of harm intensify suspense. In both cases, the valence magnitude of anticipated states is altered. As demonstrated with the help of Tony (p. 68), writers can modulate the valence magnitude of an outcome. Losing the boxing fight may cost Tony a lot of money, his marriage, or maybe even his life. No matter whether communicated explicitly or implicitly, the stakes and the gains associated with the outcomes can change and intensify suspense as the narrative progresses.

6.3.5 The Mood-Cue Approach

Arousing emotions in other people is not an easy task—how, then, can professional writers trigger our emotions so continuously? According to Greg Smith’s *Mood-Cue* Approach, we are most likely to experience particular emotions when we are in a related *mood* (Smith 2003). Current cognitive approaches functionally conceptualize emotions as having action tendencies (which motivate us to run or hide from threats), facial patterns (fearful expression), vocalizations, goals (eliminating the threat), and objects (we hate or love *something*).

Smith argues that goal and object-oriented action tendency is too narrow to account for the emotive variety in narration and suggests that there is an interaction between intense emotions, which are quite short-lived affective states, and less intense moods that can last for hours or even days (see Ekman 1994). A mood is a preparatory affective state that facilitates the expression of particular emotions – if we are irritated, we will quickly become angry at something and if we are anxious, we will easily fear something. Like emotions, moods direct our attention toward particular stimuli in our environment that are congruent with the mood (i.e., anxiety focuses our attention on potentially dangerous objects).

Smith depicts the emotion system as a highly interconnected associative network consisting of nodes that fire when we encounter connected experiences. The core of this system is the limbic system, which gets its input from several subsystems as well as from the autonomic and central nervous systems. Perception, thoughts, memories, physiological reactions, and facial patterns are all connected to the limbic system and contribute to activating its nodes and, thus, our emotions and moods.

“For example, a node in the network labeled ‘fear’ might be associated with a childhood memory of falling from a height, a trembling voice, running, increased heart rate, increased right frontal hemispheric activity in the brain, and widened eyes. If only one of these six systems is activated, the chances of the fear node being activated in an associative network is small. If two are activated, the chances of having the emotion increase [...]. As more nodes are activated (i.e., as more channels of input provide emotion cues), the emotion is more likely to be experienced and expressed. Whether or not an emotion occurs in a situation depends on how many channels of emotion provide emotion cues and how intense those signals are (Smith 2003, p. 29).

Narrative utilizes these structures and induces mood through redundant *associative cues*. Smith uses Steven Spielberg’s *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (1981) to demonstrate his theory:

“The initial sequences of the film follow Indiana Jones (Harrison Ford) through the jungle and into a booby-trapped cave in search of a golden statue. These sequences are packed with redundant cues that signal an appropriate emotional orientation toward the film, as the mood-cue approach would predict. The mood is suspenseful, apprehensive of the imminent attacks of jungle savages or the swift triggering of hidden death traps. The musical score is an unsettling mix of unusual melodic intervals and percussion; the environment is full of deep shadows, and the camera tracks behind Jones. One of Jones’ trail guides tries to shoot him from behind, and Jones saves himself with a quick lash of his whip [...] obstacles use multiple emotion cues (musical stingers, facial closeups) to signal emotional expression of fear, both serving important narrative functions [...] and providing emotional payoffs. [...] One of the guides traveling through the thick jungle uncovers a grotesque stone idol and screams, accompanied by the loud flapping of a flock of flushed birds and a musical stinger. Clearly this is a concentrated organization of emotion cues [...] What this moment does do is provide a reliable burst of congruent emotion which helps maintain the sequence’s suspenseful mood. This is the primary purpose of the stone idol scare” (Smith 2003, pp. 118–119).

The example leaves us in suspense, without any clear indication of what we should fear or hope for. This is the power of associations. A dark alley can make us anxious, even in the absence of any specific threat. In contrast to fear, which requires a specific referent, anxiety is a diffuse mood state (Barlow 2000) that can be evoked through learned associative cues (i.e., musical stingers, wind chimes, stuffed animals, deer antlers, or low-key lighting). With anxiety comes a state of heightened vigilance which directs our attention toward harmful stimuli and thus facilitates the evocation of fear (Hefner et al. 2013; Shackman et al. 2011).

By contrast, watching Rocky in a training montage accompanied by trumpets evokes a euphoric mood that facilitates hope. Smith regards mood as the primary emotive effect of film because moods facilitate the arousal of other intense emotions and they also last longer. We feel the comedy's cheerfulness and the action film's vibrancy even hours after leaving the cinema.

6.4 The Paradox of Suspense

As the source of the paradox of suspense (see Chapter 6.2.6), the role of uncertainty is hotly debated (Smuts 2009). As pointed out by Berlyne (Chapter 5.2.3), we must distinguish between two related but not identical concepts: the subjective feeling of uncertainty and information-theoretic uncertainty based on probabilities (Berlyne 1971). A “cognitive state of uncertainty,” as suggested by Ortony, Clore, et al. (1988), refers to the former, which raises the question of whether a state of uncertainty can occur without actual uncertainty.

If suspense is, in fact, a construct of hope and fear, then looking into these two primary emotions could help us answer the question of whether uncertainty is a necessary condition. There is a theoretical discordance about whether hope requires uncertainty (Roseman 1996) because several studies failed to replicate this relationship (Ellsworth and Smith 1988b; Fridja 1987; Mauro et al. 1992; Smith and Ellsworth 1987). However, we know that terminally ill patients experience an increasing fear as they approach death (Tsai et al. 2005). It could be argued that this situation still involves some uncertainty (e.g., temporal uncertainty, afterlife), but empirical studies indicate that even completely predictable events evoke fear (Davis et al. 2010; Grillon et al. 2004; Schmitz and Grillon 2012; Schmitz, Merikangas, et al. 2011). In a laboratory setting, uncertainty can be eliminated by giving participants cues signaling that they will get a shock. These studies suggest that certainty diminishes anxiety but not fear. These two phenomena are commonly distinguished by their duration and threat predictability: anxiety is a prolonged state that is felt in the presence of distant, diffuse, and unpredictable aversive events, whereas fear is a relatively short-lived state experienced in the presence of imminent, unambiguous, and highly probable threats (Davis 2006).

The reason why we experience fear in certain situations is that the fear module is encapsulated and impenetrable to conscious cognitive control (Öhman and Mineka 2001). The human brain “is shaped by an economic trade-off between minimizing [material and metabolic] costs and allowing the emergence of adaptively valuable topological patterns of [...] connectivity between multiple neuronal populations” (Bullmore and Sporns 2012, p. 336). As a result of this compromise, there is restricted communication among different brain regions. The brainstem has limited access to knowledge that is available to cortical systems, which conversely have limited control over the brainstem and our emotions. Next

to fear, suspense also often involves anxiety, which is associated with uncertain and more distal threats (see p. 82 for an example). Smith’s Mood-Cue Approach suggests that mood is evoked in our brainstem, which involves highly automatic processes that are only partially under voluntary control (Baas et al. 2006; Frijda 1988). Because we cannot consciously control our mood, we feel anxious, even in situations where the outcome is known. A dark alley can evoke anxiety because associative cues incite a *feeling of uncertainty*, but we experience this feeling regardless of the presence of a threat and, thus, without any uncertainty.

Yanal (1999) argued that suspense must involve uncertainty, and thus genuine suspense cannot be experienced through repeated viewings. The issue with this argument is that the paradox doesn’t only apply to repeated viewings. We know that Indiana Jones will not die in the first film of a series with his name in the title and we know that the laser will not cut James Bond into halves, but we feel suspense nevertheless. The position taken here is that hope and fear are involuntary emotional reactions determined by the appraised proximity to the goal and the anti-goal. Because the approach and avoidance centers of our brain create conflicting neural activations and action tendencies, we may experience a state that we attribute to uncertainty.

6.5 Conflict & Suspense

Conflict and suspense are closely related because suspense can be “viewed as the experience of apprehensions about the resolution of conflicts and crises” (Zillmann 1980, p. 135). The canonical narrative involves an equilibrium state (“ideal world state”) which is disturbed through collisions. The resulting valenced states represent a link between suspense, propulsion, conflict/collision, and erotetic narration because they propel the actions of characters and arouse our concerns. According to the psychologist Nico Frijda (1988),

“Emotions arise in response to events that are important to the individual’s goals, motives, or concerns. Every emotion hides a concern, that is, a more or less enduring disposition to prefer particular *states of the world*” (p. 275, *emphasis added*).

Frijda’s *law of concern* is reflected in the (anti-)goal model of suspense and illustrates how valenced states provide reasonable motivations for characters. Hollywood films in particular tend to begin with an event that turns a neutral world state into disequilibrium (see Chapter 3.2.4), and the disposition toward this undesirable state motivates characters to take action. If we can relate to these states, regardless of whether these states are actualized (the princess was kidnapped) or just anticipated (a Death Star could destroy a planet), then we are drawn into aligning our goals and anti-goals with those of the affected characters.

When the coast in *Jaws* is haunted by a shark, Martin Brody faces an undesirable state that needs to be changed to a desirable state. If the audience can relate to this aversive state, then the collision gives rise to not only actions (propulsion) but also suspense (direction). As a result, we follow the erotetic game: Will Brody defeat the shark? Using relatable motivating states, writers can change our perspective almost arbitrarily. We may hope that the king's assassin gets imprisoned, but when we are told that the assassin was coerced an organization that kidnapped his child, we will hope that he can escape because, through the revelation of his comprehensible motivations, we are lured into *goal alignment*.

6.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, suspense is portrayed as a multi-component process evoked by uncertainty, mind incongruence, mood, and proximity/progress toward a goal and an anti-goal. Although uncertainty is commonly involved in models of hope and fear, evidence suggests that uncertainty is a distinct component of suspense that acts as a knowledge gap and that hope and fear resulting from proximity and progress can even occur under complete certainty (e.g., Ellsworth and Smith 1988a; Grillon et al. 2004). If uncertainty is, in fact, a separate source of arousal, then this would explain why we experience suspense even upon repeated viewings (i.e., the paradox of suspense). Since we only have limited cognitive control over our feelings, we feel with James Bond, even though reason tells us that we have nothing to fear. Furthermore, associative cues can evoke moods that facilitate intense emotions (e.g., anxious moods favor fear while euphoric moods favor hope) (Smith 2003).

According to Frijda's (1988) law of concern, we have dispositions to prefer particular states of the world. These valenced states link the psychological notion of suspense with the poetic notion of conflict (see Chapter 3.2.6: Conflict–Interest Mapping) because events leading to valenced world states not only motivate actions within the story world through collisions, but they also lure us into aligning our (anti-)goals with those of the affected characters.

Suspense typically involves two valenced future reference states: one that is approached (i.e., goal) and one that is avoided (i.e., anti-goal). This is in line with Carver and Scheier's (1998) cybernetic view and suggests that suspense must be modeled along two dimensions. Probabilistic models are limited because one probability can lead to a different mix of emotions and a varying sense of urgency. Appraisals of proximity and progress represent an alternative that is evolutionarily plausible and better suited to model the involved urgency as well as the emotional impact of progress toward goals (relief vs. hope and fear vs. frustration).

For the sake of simplicity, the model left out other affective states relevant for suspense: altruistic feelings and attitudes related to *emphatic concern*, such as pity, compassion, sym-

pathy, care, liking, tenderness, and feelings of connectedness (e.g., Batson 2011), as well as object-oriented emotions, such as love, disgust, and hate.

Given that the experienced intensity of suspense differs between people, it is plausible that some scenes require more voluntary engagement than others (see Hoffman 2001) and that people deviate in their ‘vulnerability’ to particular components of suspense, such as mind incongruence. However, studying suspense phenomenologically may be difficult because conscious thought interferes with *immersion*. According to Frijda’s (1988) *law of apparent reality*, emotions “are elicited by events appraised as real, and their intensity corresponds to the degree to which this is the case” (p. 276).

Chapter 7

Surprise

Alfred Hitchcock regarded suspense as a much more potent emotion than surprise and underlined his position with an example:

“Four people are sitting around a table talking about baseball or whatever you like. Five minutes of it. Very dull. Suddenly, a bomb goes off. Blows the people to smithereens. What does the audience have? Ten seconds of shock. Now take the same scene and tell the audience there is a bomb under that table and will go off in five minutes. The whole emotion of the audience is totally different because you’ve given them that information. [...] Now the conversation about baseball becomes very vital. Because they’re saying to you, ‘Don’t be ridiculous. Stop talking about baseball. There’s a bomb under there.’ You’ve got the audience working” ([Hitchcock 1972, 0:03](#)).

In the presented form, the example is not much different from a sudden light flash which evokes a *startle reaction*. Although we consider abrupt sensory inputs as surprising in our everyday language, experiments have shown that this reflex, which appears 40ms after the onset of a startle stimulus, is distinct from surprise, which takes about 200-300ms ([Reisenzein et al. 2012](#)). Given that it is not sufficient for a stimulus to be salient, it is not surprising that this example just evokes 10 seconds of shock, whereas more elaborate forms of surprise—such as demonstrated in Hitchcock’s own film *Psycho* (1960)—linger around for much longer. Twists like those in the TV series *Game of Thrones* (2011–2019) can have such a strong impact that we are still talking about them days later. Hitchcock’s bomb example does not contain a buildup of expectations that are then violated, any recognition or repatterning as suggested by [Sternberg \(2003b\)](#), nor is the event emotionally charged or improbable in the given context. The following example is a more accurate depiction of surprise in storytelling:

“Four high-ranking officers are sitting around a table in the command center of a military base. Corporal Lopez enters the room with coffee. We know that she is actually a spy with a very delicate mission. She must cancel a planned assassination. The problem: the bomb is already in the room. After a suspenseful five minutes, Lopez can eventually remove the bomb unnoticed. She leaves the command center and defuses the bomb at the last second. But then: BOOM! A blast wave, bursting windows, buzzing ears. Lopez spins around and sees a huge hole in the command center right where the target was located”.

With the expectations established, the example is much more representative than Hitchcock’s example. Furthermore, it shows how suspense, surprise, and curiosity go hand in hand. First, a suspenseful scene directs our attention to two possible outcome states: can she defuse the bomb? Then convinced that she completed her mission, we are surprised when another bomb goes off, which opens up a curiosity gap: where did the second bomb come from?

The combination of suspense, surprise, and curiosity yields a pattern that is frequently exploited in storytelling. [Gendolla \(1997\)](#), for instance, found that valence and importance had an interaction effect on surprise which suggests that the intensity of surprise is also influenced by the preceding suspense. This is in line with the *emotion-amplification effect*.

7.1 The Surprise Complex

To account for the cognitive processes which accompany surprise, this chapter discusses the *Expectancy Disconfirmation Theory* ([Meyer, Reisenzein, et al. 1997](#); [Teigen and Keren 2003](#)), the *Representation Fit Theory* ([Maguire and Keane 2006](#)), *Norm Theory* ([Kahneman and Miller 1986](#)) and *Insight Learning* ([Köhler 1925](#)). The depicted model distinguishes between surprise and curiosity, yet it acknowledges that both occur in the *surprise complex*. In this thesis, surprise is seen as a quick emotional reaction followed by a *post-surprise phase* involving curiosity and other emotions (e.g., fear or joy) that can further increase or sustain the level of arousal.

Although surprise is often studied as part of curiosity, it is a distinct affective phenomenon with characteristic physiological reactions such as eye-widening, eyebrow-raising, mouth-opening, or jaw-dropping ([Barto et al. 2013](#); [Berlyne 1971](#); [Reisenzein et al. 2012](#)). Most scientists suggest that surprise is hedonically neutral and that it is only positively or negatively valenced through subsequent emotions ([Ekman and Friesen 2003](#); [Meyer, Reisenzein, et al. 1997](#)). More recently, [Noordewier and Breugelmans \(2013\)](#) provided evidence that surprise is a slightly negative emotion, however, this does not mean that surprising events are only negative.

“Once the surprising event is understood people can feel good about it. [...] surprise may contribute to more intense positive experiences through what has been called an emotion-amplification effect. Given that surprise induces arousal (e.g., Fontaine et al. 2007; Russell 1980), residual arousal may still be present when the surprising event is understood and the emotion surprise has dissipated. Any subsequent emotion, such as joy, may thus arise in a situation where people are already in a state of heightened arousal, which may lead to intense experiences of this emotion (see Schachter and Singer 1962; see also Valenzuela et al. 2010). In other words, the residual arousal can become ‘attached’ to the subsequent emotional state” (p. 1332–1333).

The function of surprise is to interrupt ongoing cognitive processes, to focus our attention on unexpected stimuli or events, and to motivate their exploration and the reconsideration of beliefs (Meyer, Niepel, et al. 1994). The accompanied epistemic search typically involves causal thinking (attributional search), e.g., “*why* did a second bomb explode in the command center?” (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987; Weiner 1985; Wong and Weiner 1981).

7.2 Surprise, Novelty, and Incongruity

Most theorists assume that surprise, in contrast to curiosity, requires a mentally active expectation, that is, a conscious or subconscious belief. Barto et al. (2013) suggest that in “the most abstract setting [...], detecting novelty requires examining (by one means or another) the contents of memory to determine if the stimulus has or has not previously been experienced and attended to. Surprise, on the other hand, is the result of a discrepancy between an expectation [an active mental model] and an observed actuality” (Introduction, para. 2; Barto 2014, personal communication, August 18, 2014).

Incongruous stimuli are typically novel, but they also tend to be surprising because “the distinction between surprise and incongruity is not a sharp one. Elements that are present at the same time are likely to be examined in turn, so that when we are, for example, looking at a large complex painting, what we see in one are arouses expectations that cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed until our eyes move to focus on another area” (Berlyne 1971, p. 145). Therefore, we often experience surprise even in the face of non-temporal stimuli through incongruity.

7.3 Types of Surprise

The literature suggests that there are various sources of surprise which are sometimes seen as ontologically different types (e.g., [Lorini and Castelfranchi 2007](#); [Ortony and Partridge 1987](#)). It is assumed here that there are at least three causes/types of surprise: mismatch-based surprise, astonishment, and insight.

7.3.1 Mismatch-Based Surprise

[Lorini and Castelfranchi \(2007\)](#) suggested that *mismatch-based surprise* is “a (felt) reaction/response of alert and arousal due to an inconsistency (discrepancy, mismatch, non-assimilation, lack of integration) between an incoming input and our previous knowledge, in particular an actual or potential prediction” (p. 133). Although surprise and novelty often go hand in hand, they are not the same thing ([Berlyne 1971](#)). If we expect Liz to enter the room but encounter Tony, then our expectation is not met and we experience surprise. The intensity of this form of surprise depends on the appraised probability of the expected event, or in other words on our confidence in particular beliefs. If we are highly certain that Liz will enter the room, then we will be strongly surprised when this is not the case.

7.3.2 Astonishment

In the taxonomy of [Lorini and Castelfranchi \(2007\)](#), mismatch-based surprise is distinguished from *astonishment*. The two often go hand in hand but are independent. Astonishment depends on an appraisal of the *implausibility* of events. We would certainly be surprised if an Oscar-winning actor came to our house to meet us even though there was no previously held expectation violated. It is generally assumed that we experience surprise in the face of events that are unlikely to occur in a given context ([Barto et al. 2013](#)). “Unexpectedness is intuitively associated with an impression of low probability. Rare events, remarkable happenings, oddities, exceptions, deviations from norms are all extra-ordinary. They contrast with ordinary situation which, almost by definition, conform to expectations and are regarded as probable” ([Saillenfest and Dessalles 2013](#), p. 219). The intensity of astonishment does not depend on the expected event but the probability that the actually-observed event ‘should not’ occur according to our beliefs. When highly astonished, we conclude that the event was unpredictable on the basis of our current beliefs.

The probabilistic view has been challenged by [Teigen and Keren \(2003\)](#), who suggest that surprise is triggered by the high *contrast* between the expected and the actual outcomes. They argue that surprise is essentially based on similarity, a measure related to subjective

probability ratings.¹⁵ They asked students in an experiment whether Karin, who weekly gets a bottle of red wine from Johan, is more surprised when Johan brings (a) a bottle of white wine or (b) a bunch of flowers. 29 out of 31 participants found that flowers would surprise her more than a bottle of white wine. In the control condition with estimated probabilities, they found that 62% judged the more surprising gift to be more probable, which contradicts the low probability hypothesis and supports the view that surprise rather depends on the similarity to a reference which is often the prototype of the parent category. For instance, if a friend tells us, that she recently bought a bird, we will think of something like a canary bird and we would be surprised upon discovering that she actually bought a pelican, which is quite dissimilar to the prototypical pet bird.

The *Contrast Hypothesis* is in principle an element of [Kahneman and Miller's \(1986\) Norm Theory](#), which suggests that surprise involves not only expectations but also backward processing and depends on the contrast between an observation and a normal alternative. The alternative (i.e., the norm) is evoked by the stimulus itself and compiled ad hoc after an event takes place rather than in advance. A “stimulus selectively recruits its own alternatives ([Garner 1962; Garner 1970](#)) and is interpreted in a rich context of remembered and constructed representations of what it could have been, might have been, or should have been. Thus, each event brings its own frame of reference into being” ([Kahneman and Miller 1986, p. 136](#)). Seeing the pelican in our friend's garden would therefore be sufficient to experience surprise because it evokes prototypical alternatives (e.g., pets) which stand in high contrast. “An abnormal event is one that has highly available alternatives, whether retrieved or constructed; a normal event mainly evokes representations that resemble it” ([Kahneman and Miller 1986, p. 137](#)).

Norm Theory suggests that surprise involves retrospective judgments, but this does not imply that astonishment is independent of expectations. In the model of [Lorini and Castelfranchi \(2007\)](#), backward processing involved in astonishment always operates based on current expectations. Seeing our friend's garden, for instance, evokes context-dependent background beliefs that are then checked against the incoming facts. This operation reveals that finding a pelican in our friend's garden is abnormal (according to similarity) or implausible (according to probability) in the given context.

¹⁵In their famous experiments, [Kahneman and Tversky \(1972\)](#) found that we estimate the subjective probabilities of events based on their representativeness, which is a measure of how similar something is to the most typical instance of its parent category. In a series of coin tosses, for instance, a sequence of two heads following two tails is judged as more likely to occur than four tails in a row, although both sequences are equally likely. Presumably, the latter is judged as less likely, because it appears to be less representative (less random).

7.3.3 Insight

The third cause of surprise is insight. It is a common phenomenon for insights to unexpectedly pop into our awareness during problem-solving breaks (‘incubation’). Our subconscious mind signals that a solution has been found and triggers surprise to interrupt ongoing processes to turn our attention to the novel discovery. I argue in this thesis that this form of surprise is more common in storytelling than it ostensibly appears to be and that it corresponds to what [Sternberg \(1978\)](#) calls *recognition*.

7.4 Expectancy-Disconfirmation Hypothesis

Although some theorists regard mismatch-based surprise and astonishment as two different forms of surprise, other authors like [Stiensmeier-Pelster et al. \(1995\)](#) argue that also cases of astonishment can “be conceptualized as instances of expectancy disconfirmation: They disconfirm the *implicit*, schema-based belief that the unexpected event was unlikely to occur in the given situation” (p. 6, footnote). Thus, according to the Expectancy Disconfirmation Hypothesis, an *expectancy disconfirmation* is necessary and sufficient to account for a surprise ([Stiensmeier-Pelster et al. 1995](#)).

7.4.1 Expectation

In the psychology of surprise, the term expectation is understood as a synonym for *belief* because expectations need not be bound to time—“e.g., one is surprised that a particular theorem follows from the axioms of a theory” ([Reisenzein et al. 2012](#), p. 566). Based on beliefs about temporal, spatial, causal, motivational, person, and object-related information, we construct a coherent representation of the discourse (i.e., a *situation model*) necessary for narrative comprehension ([Johnson-Laird 1983](#)). Once corporal Lopez removes the bomb, we assume that there is no bomb in the command center anymore (spatial) and once the bomb is defused, we expect that it will not explode (causal). Such beliefs can be modeled with propositions ([Reisenzein et al. 2012](#)) (e.g., “the bomb was removed” or “the bomb is defused”), and we are surprised when we discover that these propositions are disconfirmed.

But our expectations depend on not only the current model of the situation but also knowledge about “what is likely to follow what and what is likely to accompany what” [Berlyne \(1971, pp. 143–44\)](#). We know that a police car on the roadside indicates a radar control and that after a lottery drawing follows a payout. We draw on a comprehensive collection of causal and structural knowledge acquired by direct or narratively mediated experience (see [Grimes-Maguire and Keane 2005](#)) which allows us to anticipate what is

likely to come next, e.g., when a vase is thrown at the wall, we predict that it will break or when hero and villain face each other after a long action scene, we expect a climaxing fight.

In Shirley Jackson’s short story *The Lottery* (1948), a small village acts out an old ritual. Like every year, the inhabitants assemble to attend a lottery drawing, and when the winners are finally determined, we expect that the lottery win gets paid out, but this expectation is put to test when the winners start to protest and do not want to accept their prize. When the ‘losers’ grab stones to stone the ‘winners,’ we eventually realize that this was not a lottery in the conventional sense.

7.4.2 Un- & Misexpectedness

The terms surprisingness and unexpectedness are typically used synonymously (Silvia 2006) and the literature widely agrees that we are surprised when an observed experience does not match our expectations (Barto et al. 2013; Ekman and Davidson 1994), yet it is not clear whether this means that ”(1) [an unexpected target outcome] T is surprising because it was not expected, or (2) [an unexpected target outcome] T is surprising because *something else* was expected more strongly” (Teigen and Keren 2003, 58, original emphasis).

Reisenzein et al. (2012) call case (a) *unexpected* in the strict sense and case (b) *misexpected*. Something is misexpected if a relatively specific and explicit belief is disconfirmed and something is unexpected when one of our subconscious background beliefs is disconfirmed. This distinction is related to the distinction between mismatch-based surprise and astonishment as well as to Kahneman and Tversky’s 1982 *active expectations* (misexpectedness) and *passive expectations* (unexpectedness). “[A]n active expectation occupies consciousness and draws on the limited capacity of attention; in contrast, a passive expectation is automatic and effortless, and is better described as a disposition than as an activity” (p. 4).

Different authors use different words for these two types of expectations. Huron (2004) studied how the composer Peter Schickele (“P.D.Q. Bach”) evoked surprise through music. To determine the triggers of surprise, he examined the laughter of the audience included in Schickele’s live recordings. In one recording, the audience bursts into laughter when Schickele misquotes Beethoven’s *Fifth Symphony* through an altered melodic movement. This is an example of *misexpectedness* (mismatch-based) surprise rooted in *veridical expectations* (“That’s not how the music goes”). In other recordings, classical orchestral elements were mixed with bizarre instruments producing *unexpectedness* (astonishment) through a transgression of *schematic expectations* (“That’s not what happens in music”).

7.5 Evoking Expectations

We can form expectations by either the conveyed or implied information in the discourse or by the background knowledge that we bring with us. *Discursive expectations* assemble as we read and constitute the consciously accessible part of our situation model. These expectations are typically verbalizable and end in misexpectedness, whereas personal expectations are subconscious, difficult to verbalize, and typically lead to unexpectedness. The border between the two is not clear-cut because our situation model draws on schemata that we bring to the narrative.

7.5.1 Discourse Expectations

We are surprised by the chapter’s introductory example because our situation model (the bomb was removed and defused) contradicted the actual outcome (yet a bomb explodes). In this case, the information required for surprise was conveyed by the discourse and not by our previous knowledge. Likewise, Gandalf’s apparent death in *The Fellowship of the Ring* (1954) and his surprising return in *The Two Towers* (1954) is communicated through narration is thus widely independent of the viewer’s cultural background and his knowledge base. This class of expectations correlates with misexpectedness and can, thus, be consciously accessed and verbalized with clear and unambiguous propositions, e.g., “Gandalf is dead” or “Barney and Robin are married” (see Schacter 1987). In Franklin J. Schaffner’s *Planet of the Apes* (1968), astronauts land on a strange foreign planet, but at the end of the film, this assumption is disconfirmed. When the protagonist George Taylor (Charlton Heston) discovers the partly buried Statue of Liberty, we recognize that he never landed on a strange planet but future earth.

In detective stories, our situation model is shaped by *clues*, factual evidence that suggests a particular interpretation of the situation, and surprise results when a further clue contradicts our current situation model. Large footprints in the snow imply that the murderer was a man with large feet, but our expectation is violated when the detective finds a contradicting piece of evidence (e.g., a pair of small socks in big shoes).

7.5.2 Personal Expectations

Although discourse expectations are explicitly communicated through storytelling or result from evident inferences, personal expectations consist of schemata that we bring with us and which largely lie outside of our conscious awareness. We hold schematic knowledge about event sequences (e.g., ordering in a restaurant or visiting the doctor) that leads to surprises when it is violated by atypical behaviors. We would be surprised if a patient left a medical facility during a medical examination to take a cake out of the oven. Such behavior

is surprising because it is considered ‘abnormal,’ compared to what we have experienced in previous doctor visits.

Consider the following example taken from the action film *The Avengers* (2012). One of the most memorable events in the film is the fight between the god Loki and the Incredible Hulk. We are amidst the final battle between good and evil when an explosion hurls Loki down from a flight vehicle onto a platform on a skyscraper. The Hulk jumps next to Loki and punches him against the wall. As Loki stands up, we come to realize that now that the possibly two strongest forces on this planet are clashing, the time for the ultimate showdown has come.

Loki: “Enough! You are, all of you are beneath me! I am a god, you dull creature! And I will not be bullied by...”

WOOSH! The Hulk grabs Loki BAM! BAM! BAM!

...and smashes him repeatedly into the floor, as if the heavyweight boxing world champion picked his opponent from a retirement home.

The Hulk (leaving an entirely crushed Loki behind): “Puny god.”

To understand this scene, we need to apply our climax script, which predicts that fight scenes in Hollywood movies are usually preceded by a series of fights, which are followed by a moment of rest in which hero and antagonist face each other to say their line. Then the fight begins, and the hero almost loses the fight just to win by a whisker. Within seconds, the movie provides enough *cues* (i.e., through spatial positioning, pace, music, sound effects, dialog) so that we can anticipate the climactic fight, but in this case, our expectation is disconfirmed.

The same schema was exploited in *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (1981) when Indiana Jones fights against a horde of swordsmen. After a spectacular street fight scene, Indy ends up amid a crowd that splits to reveal the lead swordsmen. The movie reduces the pace. We see an exhausted Indy holding his whip in his right hand opposing the grinning swordsman who is swinging his huge saber to communicate his superiority. Again, we expect the climactic battle, however, Indy simply grabs his gun and shoots him.¹⁶ When we observe the audience in *Avengers* and *Raiders*, we can find the same effect that Schickele found in music. Through the comedic framing, the audience bursts into laughter over the transgression of the schematic expectation.

Most people are consciously unaware of the climax script, yet they can detect its violation. One large source of expectations are social norms, as demonstrated in the following example:

¹⁶In the case of Indiana Jones, even the scriptwriter expected a fight scene. There was a 3 1/2-page long script written by Lawrence Kasdan, but after suffering from dysentery for five weeks, the actor Harrison Ford proposed the gun variant to reduce the shooting time in Tunisia.

In *At First Sight* (1999), Virgil, a blind character played by Val Kilmer, gets into a relationship with Amy, who convinces Virgil to get an operation to restore his ability to see. At the birthday party of Amy's ex-husband, Virgil observes how Amy kisses her ex. He is confused because he has never seen Amy kissing someone else like this before. Amy explains to Virgil that this is what a birthday kiss looks like. However, we are as surprised as Virgil, because Amy's intimacy was more similar to a romantic rather than a friendly kiss.

This scene would not be surprising if Amy were single or if she greeted her ex-husband with a cheek-to-cheek air kiss, just like any other party guest, because these behaviors would not violate our (western) relationship schema. In this case, the necessary expectations are not conveyed through discourse but are brought by us viewers. Thus, personal expectations may vary over time and between cultures whereas discursive expectations are more invariant.

7.6 Appraisal Process of Surprise

According to Meyer, Reisenzein, et al. (1997), surprise follows a particular appraisal sequence (see Figure 7.1). At first, the activated schemata and beliefs concerning an event are compared to a perception/cognition of an event. What follows is an appraisal of unexpectedness (schema discrepancy check). If the unexpectedness rises above a certain threshold, then the feeling of surprise is elicited, current processing is interrupted, and processing resources are reallocated. It follows an analysis of the event (discrepancy verification, causal analysis, well-being check, action relevance check, and so on). At last, schemata are updated or revised when necessary. The last two stages—analysis and revision—are here called the *post-surprise phase* because, in contrast to the first stages, which are short, they can extend over a long period of time.




Figure 7.1: The *surprise complex* based on the cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise from Meyer, Reisenzein, et al. (1997, p. 254) and Reisenzein et al. (2012, p. 566) with the added distinction between the surprise and post surprise phase.

7.6.1 The Representation Fit Theory

Maguire, Maguire, et al. (2011) found that the intensity of surprise depends on not only an event that disconfirms an expectation but also how well we can integrate this event in our situation model.

“Consider a scenario, for instance, where you leave your house to discover that your car is no longer in the driveway. This is obviously an unexpected, or schema-discrepant, event. However, if you remember that you left the car in to be serviced yesterday morning, you will be not be so surprised, since a satisfactory explanation for this unexpected event has been identified” (Maguire and Keane 2006, p. 1766).

In our attempt to form a coherent discourse representation, we try to integrate novel events into the coherent whole but whereas some events can be incorporated easily, others do not *fit* in our representation. Thus, Maguire and Keane (2006) suggest that “the more difficult it is for an individual to coherently integrate a new event into their discourse representation, the more surprising that event will appear” (p. 1766).

7.6.2 Gapping & Gap-Filling

Here, it is suggested that the Representation Fit Theory essentially describes the concept of a knowledge gap (see 5.1) following an unexpected event and thus corresponds to curiosity

rather than to surprise. Because both phenomena yield synergistic effects, the surprise-curiosity pattern is quite common in narration. If the bomb was removed and defused, then why did a bomb go off? If Gandalf is alive, then how did he survive the fall into the deep? This pattern reflects the ‘paradox’ of erotetic narration. We are provided with new information but have the impression that we know less than before. This model highlights an interesting dilemma between narratological and psychological models of surprise because if surprise involves gapping, it contradicts Sternberg’s notion of surprise which involves retrospective gap-filling. I thus suggest that surprise can involve both gapping and gap-filling.

7.7 Discovery

According to the Representation Fit Theory, surprise is most intense when an event cannot be coherently integrated into our discourse representation. This theory applies to surprising twists at the beginning of narrative discourses, which tend to open gaps (raise questions), whereas twists at the end tend to fill them (à la Sternberg’s recognition), unless they act as cliffhangers or open endings.

In Roman Polanski’s *Chinatown* (1974), Hollis Mulwray (Darrell Zwerling), the chief engineer of LA’s Water and Power Department, was found murdered in a freshwater reservoir. Hired by Noah Cross (John Huston), Hollis Mulwray’s business partner and father of his wife Evelyn Cross Mulwray (Faye Dunaway), the private investigator J.J. “Jake” Gittes (Jack Nicholson) has to find Mulwray’s missing mistress. On his quest, Gittes starts an affair with Evelyn, the wife of the murder victim, and discovers that she is keeping the mistress in a house. Because Gittes assumes that the mistress is being held against her will, he takes her to task. Evelyn says that she is her sister, but, knowing that she has no sister, Gittes confronts her again two scenes later.

Evelyn Mulwray: “She’s my daughter.”
 Gittes slaps Evelyn
 Jake Gittes: “I said I want the truth!”
 Evelyn Mulwray: “She’s my sister...”
 Gittes slaps her again
 Evelyn Mulwray: “She’s my daughter...”
 Gittes slaps her again
 Evelyn Mulwray: “My sister, my daughter.”
 He hits her again
 Jake Gittes: “I said I want the truth!”
 Evelyn Mulwray: “She’s my sister and my daughter!”

In contrast to the prediction of the Representation Fit Theory, this twist evokes intense surprise. The contradiction at the beginning (“she is my sister/daughter”) evokes curiosity, whereas the unexpected twist fills the gap and allows us to form a coherent representation of the discourse. The disclosed information explains Evelyn Mulwray’s suspicious secretiveness. She hid her daughter from her father Noah Cross with whom she had an incestuous affair when she was 15 and Noah Cross did not want to find Hollis Mulwray’s mistress but his incestually-fathered daughter.

This is an example of what Sternberg (1978) calls recognition (see 2.2.4), the mental dynamic of narrative surprise. A gap in the past— a “surprise gap”— is filled at the moment of its exposure. Although Maguire and Keane (2006) suggests that surprise is intensified when we have difficulties forming a coherent understanding of the circumstances, Sternberg suggests quite the contrary and conceives surprise as the act of retrospective gap-filling. I argue that Sternberg’s notion of recognition which is presumably derived from Aristotle’s notion of recognition (see Chapter 3.1: Anagnorisis) and means *discovery* or *insight* is better described by the notion of insight than by surprise.

7.7.1 Insight

Köhler (1925) demonstrated that apes solve problems through not only trial and error but also thinking or *insight*. Thus, he coined the term *insight learning*, which is typically used in the context of problem-solving. Insight is defined as a “sudden comprehension that solves a problem, reinterprets a situation, explains a joke, or resolves an ambiguous percept” (Kounios and Beeman 2009, p. 210). Grasping a narrative’s metaphoric statement, for instance, can reward us with an “Aha!” experience. Originating within our mind, insights can even occur when we suspend any conscious effort to solve a problem (i.e., during an incubation period) (Pretz et al. 2003) Piaget (1969) noted that once a problem is solved, “there follows, sometimes abruptly, a feeling of coherence and of necessity, the satisfaction of arriving at a system which is both complete in itself and indefinitely extensible” (p. 139). Although insight comes abruptly and unexpectedly, it is typically conceptualized as a phenomenon distinct from surprise because although insights “pop into your awareness, seemingly out of nowhere” (Kounios and Beeman 2015, p. 7). Surprise is typically attributed to external stimuli and events.

In contrast to surprise, insight is associated with a mental impasse that occurs during problem-solving, mental effort spent to overcome the impasse, and a sudden discovery of a solution. We often describe insight by metaphors such as “a sudden flash,” “a moment of illumination,” “seeing the light,” or “approaching the problem from a different angle” (Sternberg and Davidson 1995). This change in perspective is often “the result of the reorganization or restructuring of the elements of a situation or problem, though an insight may occur in the absence of any preexisting interpretation” (Kounios and Beeman 2009,

p. 210). Here, insight is conceptualized more broadly as a rewarding form of learning that is accompanied by a deep understanding. It involves a sudden restructuring or reorganization of mental representations which is triggered by internal processes. However, in contrast to the prevalent scientific notion, I argue that there is a continuum ranging from unexpected out-of-nowhere experiences to quite immediate forms that are nudged by external events and require little cognitive effort.

In this case, insight is evoked through a guided and thoughtfully developed discourse that gives rise to a coherent understanding. When we read an interesting scientific paper, for instance, we may experience several insights in succession without solving any problem. These aha! moments can be compared to the spatial exploration of a foreign city. Whenever we discover that two seemingly unrelated regions hang together, we experience an aha! moment that is accompanied by a reorganization of previously unrelated mental maps to one coherent representation of the city.

7.7.2 Coherence

In the same way, as we try to maintain coherent spatial representations, we also seek a coherent understanding of narrative discourse. However, narrative links are not only spatial but also causal, sequential, metaphorical, conceptual, and so on.

In the climax scene of Robert Zemeckis *Back to the Future Part III* (1990), Marty McFly (Michael J. Fox) and Dr. Emmett Brown (Christopher Lloyd) are stuck in the Wild West. To travel back to the future, they must accelerate the damaged DeLorean, their time-traveling car, to 88 mph by pushing it with a steam engine. After fueling the engine, Doc Brown climbs toward the DeLorean but recognizes that Clara Clayton (Mary Steenburgen), his love interest, has boarded the locomotive unnoticed. Clara tries to join them, but both fall after an explosion. Clara keeps hanging by her dress while the Doc hangs by his hands. We wonder: how will they be rescued? The solution: Marty, who is sitting in the DeLorean, passes his hoverboard back to the Doc, who steps onto it and is thus able to save Clara and himself.

As with many insightful solutions, the solution to the problem in *Back to the Future* is unexpected yet obvious in hindsight. The hoverboard was shown very briefly earlier in the film, but its placement in the DeLorean was strategically concealed between dialogue, making it difficult for us to recognize its connection until the solution is disclosed. Suddenly, the elements fit together as if the hoverboard was only put into Part II of the series to serve this function.

The following experiential account from insight problem solving is also applicable to Back to the Future:

“[W]hen the solution is found, distinct coherence in the relationships between the problem elements is perceived [hoverboard, DeLorean, train, etc.]. [...] when the solution is seen, all the parts suddenly seem to fit together. This analysis suggests that suddenness of both insight and visual recognition may be associated with situations for which there exists a potential source of coherence that can unite a seemingly disparate set of elements” (Schooler et al. 1995, p. 579).

Similar to insight problem solving, which is done using already-present elements, narratives prepare twists through elements that were already carefully placed earlier. Phelan argued that

“the author includes material in the progression that can retrospectively be understood as preparing the audience for the surprise; or to put this point another way, the audience can *recognize* that the necessary *reconfiguration* caused by the surprise actually *fits* well with the beginning and the middle of the progression; and [...] the audience’s emotional and other investments in the characters are rewarded–deepened, used in the service of meaningful instruction, or otherwise enhanced–rather than undermined by the surprise” (Phelan 2007, p. 95, *emphasis added*).

As in spatial exploration, we try to “connect the dots” and identify a mental construct that coherently represents the discourse. Elaborate forms of discovery require an extensive representational reorganization and a reinterpretation of the events that occurred earlier in the discourse.

“[B]y the general rule of conclusive endings, readers are invited to revise their understanding of the beginning of the text so that the ending, which at first seems a surprise, turns out to in fact be prefigured” (Rabinowitz 2002, p. 305; quoted in McDaniel 2013, p. 22).

7.7.3 Surprise, Insight & Recognition

Sternberg’s notion of recognition may be closer related to insight than to mismatch-based surprise or astonishment. This is reflected by the (visual) recognition metaphor which is one of the main metaphors describing the “Aha!” experience and the fact that unexpectedness is central to surprise, but only optional for Sternberg’s recognition, which lives from a repatterning and reordering—a form of reorganization or restructuring as found in insight.

The reason why narratologists generally speak of surprise may lie in the fact that the two tend to co-occur in fiction.

“[I]t is an important formal feature of any good plot to move us to anticipate certain things, to mislead us into expecting the wrong things [surprise], but to induce us to believe, upon looking back, that the way things actually turned out, however surprising, was nevertheless adequately prepared for and is the only truly appropriate outcome [insight]” (Friedman 1975, p. 69; quoted in McDaniel 2013, p. 22).

Furthermore, the similarity between the two phenomena complicates their discrimination. Like surprise, insight interrupts ongoing cognitive processes, shifts attention, motivates exploration (Kounios and Beeman 2015), and is associated with a phenomenologically similar surprise experience (see Cosmelli and Preiss 2014). Despite these similarities and although we speak of “surprising insights,” we lack a model which connects the two. Mismatch-based surprise and insight have different causes but they may share the same surprise mechanism. While the former is based on an expectancy disconfirmation, the latter is caused by nonconscious reasoning processes that bring newly recognized coherent constructs into our consciousness. Alternatively, surprise could be interpreted as the measure of the difference between prior and posterior beliefs as in Bayesian models of surprise (Barto et al. 2013; Itti and Baldi 2009).

While mismatch-based surprise tends to open gaps (see Maguire and Keane 2006), insight is associated with gap-filling (see Cosmelli and Preiss 2014). In Chinatown, we ask “who is the mistress,” and once we are answered, things suddenly “come together,” “make sense,” and somehow “fall into place” (see Schooler et al. 1995).

7.8 Evoking Surprise

The aesthetic appeal of a plot twist is not only determined by its unexpectedness. As the master of surprise George R.R. Martin said, “It’s easy to do things that are shocking or unexpected, but they have to grow out of characters. They have to grow out of situations. Otherwise, it’s just being shocking for being shocking” (interviewed by Hibberd 2015, para. 4). Twists that appear to be forced, formulaic, unrealistic, irrational, based on coincidence, or are merely easy and convenient solutions (e.g., magic spells, and *deus ex machina*) are generally regarded as *cheap plot tricks* (for a discussion see Ryan 2009). An elaborate plot design nevertheless hinges on the nature of surprise. As an element of erotetic narration, surprise tends to either open curiosity gaps (leading to retrospection) or fill surprise gaps (recognition).

7.8.1 Disconfirmation of Schemata and Scripts

Schemata and scripts hold information about the default knowledge required to have a coherent understanding of discourse. We have acquired these schemata from other narratives and experiences of everyday life. According to Bruner (1991), “[n]arratives require such scripts as necessary background, but they do not constitute narrativity itself. For to be worth telling, a tale must be about how an implicit canonical script has been breached, violated, or deviated from” (p. 11). A breach of the canonical is, thus, a potential source of surprise (see p. 94), but not every breach needs to be surprising because they are, as Bruner argues, “often highly conventional and are strongly influenced by narrative traditions. Such breaches are readily recognizable as familiar human plights—the betrayed wife, the cuckolded husband, the fleeced innocent, and so on” (p. 12). Infidelity per se is common in narrative contexts and may thus not be surprising, at least not due to schema disconfirmation. However, we might be surprised if beliefs about particular characters are disconfirmed or if fidelity-related schemata are violated (e.g. when the betrayed partner shows complete understanding).

7.8.2 Change

Change is a major source of surprise (Barto et al. 2013; Feldman 1934) and is characterized by a transition from a source state to a target state (Herman 2008). We continually adapt to gradual changes in our environment, but when small adaptations are gapped or change is significant, surprise is evoked if the new state (e.g., Hanna and Dan are divorced) disconfirms our lapsed situation model (e.g., Hanna and Dan are married). This is followed by curiosity if the change creates a gap that cannot be filled through inferences or stereotypical information, leaving incongruent beliefs. If we thought that Hanna and Dan had a harmonic marriage, then we might ask why they split up. The answer could be that Hanna and Dan are homosexual. We might then ask why they married in the first place, and so forth. One specific form of change is Aristotle’s *peripeteia* (i.e., a reversal of fortune). It is “a change by which the action veers round to its opposite, subject always to our rule of probability or necessity” (Aristotle 1902, part XI, para. 1).

7.8.3 Setup & Payoff

A setup prepares the audience unobtrusively for a plot twist in advance. Elements included earlier in the discourse retrospectively confirm the new interpretation resulting from recognition (Friedman 1975; Phelan 2007; Rabinowitz 2002), leading to insight and a sense of coherence once the surprise gap is filled. Without finesse, however, this pattern ends up in a cheap plot trick (see Ryan 2009). In *Jurassic World* (2015), for instance, we are shown the Mosasaurus, a giant sea reptile, right in the beginning, which leaves no doubt that it will play a role in the climax of the film.

7.8.4 Dechronologization

An expectancy disconfirmation can stem from a defective situation model, which can be produced through the withholding of information. As suggested by [Sternberg \(1978\)](#), narratives typically create such surprise gaps through a dechronologization of the event order (i.e., flashbacks, foreshadowing, beginning in medias res, or non-linear storytelling). Information is held back so that once it is presented (e.g., motivations, causing events), the audience is invited to reinterpret earlier scenes which may now have a different meaning or suddenly make sense in the overarching whole (e.g., [Rabinowitz 2002](#)). For example, disclosing hitherto unknown character motivations can reveal the actions of characters in a different light.

7.8.5 Misinformation & Misdirection

Misinformation and misdirection are two methods of evoking wrong situation models. The former is achieved through unreliable narration (see [Shen 2011](#)). Film examples are *The Usual Suspects* (1995) and *Fight Club* (1999). By contrast, misdirection is achieved through *Red Herrings*, misleading clues that suggest misinterpretations (e.g., through flashbacks or flash-forwards). This results in a flawed situation model which is later corrected through recognition. Sometimes red herrings only inconspicuously deceive us to raise expectations that are disproved upon recognition (e.g., the title “Planet of the Apes”), while others also play more salient roles in the erotetic game (e.g., clues in a whodunnit).

7.8.6 Suspense

Hope and fear are a potential source for unexpectedness, whose intensity depends on our confidence in single beliefs ([Barto et al. 2013](#); [Itti and Baldi 2009](#); [Lorini and Castelfranchi 2007](#)). In the TV series *Dexter* (2006–2013), Dexter Morgan (Michael C. Hall) kills the Trinity-Killer (John Lithgow) in the climax of the fourth season which brings us to believe that the situation is terminated. In this case, we are susceptible to unexpectedness because the show gives us every reason to believe that the danger is averted. We are shocked, however, when Dexter discovers that the Trinity-Killer outpaced him and killed his wife.

Progress cues and outcome indicators (see p. 73) can furthermore influence our confidence in one of the possible outcomes. If we are led to believe that the anti-goal will eventuate with a high probability, then we will be surprised when the opposite happens. Sometimes, biases like wishful thinking (i.e., overconfidence in the success prediction) provide the foundation for surprises. The causes of the *desirability bias* are not yet fully understood, but empirical evidence suggests that the effect is pronounced under high uncertainty (‘arbitrary guessing’) ([Windschitl et al. 2009](#)). [Krizan and Windschitl \(2007\)](#) propose that

preferences can lead to increased *focalism*, which in the case of hopes leads to a tendency to evaluate only evidence for the preferred outcome. This can either lead to “enhanced optimism or enhanced pessimism, depending on the nature of the evidence” (p. 109). In *District 9* (2009), for instance, we hope that our anti-hero Wikus van de Merwe (Sharlto Copley) will help Christopher Johnson (Jason Cope), a refugee alien stranded in Johannesburg. However, Wikus surprises us several times as he repeatedly refuses to help.

7.9 Conclusion

The function of surprise is to interrupt ongoing processes, reallocate mental resources, shift our attention, motivate the exploration of the unexpected stimulus or event, and induce belief revision (Meyer, Niepel, et al. 1994). In this thesis, surprise is understood as a quick emotional reaction that is followed by a post-surprise phase involving curiosity and an array of checks (e.g., relevance check and wellbeing check). While surprise may be brief, its impact can be long-lasting. Authors such as George R. R. Martin prove that a surprising twist can continue to generate discussions for weeks afterwards.

There are at least three different causes or forms of surprise: mismatch-based surprise, astonishment (Lorini and Castelfranchi 2007), and insight (see Köhler 1925). Mismatch-based surprised results from a discrepancy between an expectation and an incoming input (Meyer, Reisenzein, et al. 1997), astonishment is the result of unlikely or abnormal events (see Teigen and Keren 2003), and insight is evoked through a sudden understanding which is typically accompanied by a sense of coherence (Pretz et al. 2003). These forms often go hand in hand because abnormal events can disconfirm expectations and expectancy disconfirmations can go hand in hand with insights. Other phenomena involving surprise are *shock*, which is accompanied by an emotional disturbance, and *awe*, which is experienced in the face of the sublime.

Expectations depend on our situation model, other beliefs, and the background knowledge provided by schemata and scripts. They are thus either formed by the discourse (e.g., Gandalf was killed in the fight with the Balrog) or by our existing knowledge base (e.g. after a lottery drawing follows a payout). It has been furthermore suggested that surprise can go along with gapping as well as gap-filling. The former case disproves our situation model and implies incoherence, whereas the latter case leads to a discovery and, thus, establishes coherence.

Chapter 8

Interest & the Seeking System

Based on [Berlyne's \(1971\)](#) ideas, several situational determinants of interest were addressed in this thesis: uncertainty, novelty, incongruity, ambiguity, information conflict, unexpectedness, and knowledge gaps. However, if uncertainty is sufficient to evoke curiosity, then why do we not throw coins all day long? In isolation, the knowledge gap metaphor can be similarly troublesome. Being aware that one does not know the highest mountains in the world is not sufficient to make a student want to know them even though this represents an information gap. Why do some gaps make us curious whereas others leave us cold? To address this issue, a cognitive theory of interest is proposed which, in the narrowest sense, models *curiosity* as the prediction of an epistemic reward through novelty, unexpectedness, and insight, and in a broader sense, *interest* as the anticipation that a piece of information is going to affect us because it is rewarding, harmful or significant in any other way (signaled by pleasure and aversion).

8.1 Silvia's Appraisal Model of Interest

[Silvia \(2005\)](#) collected a list of qualities that are intuitively associated with text-based interest: coherence, ease of comprehension, prior knowledge, themes of death, simple vocabulary, suspense, sexual themes, vividness, author voice, concreteness, meaningfulness, imagery, readers' connections, surprisingness, importance, character identification, power themes, familiarity, unexpectedness, emotiveness, and engagement.

He further states that “[i]nteresting ideas, interesting films, and interesting texts are presumably interesting because they share the same appraisal structure. Stated differently, text-based interest has the same causes as interest based in anything else” ([p. 81](#)). Based on this assumption and on the list of associated variables that align with by empirical evidence,

Silvia suggests an appraisal model with the two appraisal dimensions *Novelty-Complexity* and *Ability to Understand* (see table B.1 in Appendix B).

The upcoming sections will present an alternative approach that draws inspiration from Silva’s model of interest and emphasizes its practical applicability.

8.2 The Learn/Effect Model of Interest

Here, I propose an alternative to Silva’s model with two components based on [Loewenstein’s \(1994\)](#) information gap theory and [Panksepp’s \(1998\)](#) Seeking System:

1. *Learning potential*: Is there something to learn?
2. *Effect appraisal*: Does it affect me?

The learning potential involves the monitoring of knowledge gaps, inadequacies in our mental representations, and the appraisal of learning progress, while the effect appraisal pertains to whether the information is significant to the agent.

The effect appraisal is related to [Nico Frijda’s \(1988\)](#) *law of concern*. Upon discovering our grandmother’s Alzheimer’s diagnosis, our concern acts as a driving force, compelling us to seek information about the disease, provided we perceive it as beneficial for ourselves or our grandmother. In many cases, interest is intensified by the motivational component of other emotions. However, we can be curious without any apparent concern, or, as Nico Frijda put it, it is questionable whether “a concern can be found behind every single instance of emotion. It would not be meaningful to posit a ‘concern for the unexpected’” (p. 275). Epistemic emotions can be widely free of concerns because we need incentives that motivate exploration. The effect condition is therefore not just fulfilled by a concern, but also by the incentive effects of novelty, unexpectedness, and other rewarding epistemic phenomena, such as insights and learn progress.

8.2.1 Learning Potential

This appraisal monitors whether there is something to be learned or understood. Its function is to detect gaps and to determine learning progress. The learning potential is related to [Loewenstein’s \(1994\)](#) concept of specific epistemic curiosity (see below) which is a goal-directed process centered on a reference point. This appraisal is not concerned about immediate novelty such as of a directly experienced stimulus but about the anticipation of further novelty and learning.

A painting may depict a novel stimulus, but the evoked interest will only be short-lived if we appraise it as meaningless or cannot identify aspects that require further exploration (e.g., the painter's technique). Experience shows that it makes a difference whether an artifact is classified as an artwork or not, and thus empirical studies on aesthetic experience must explicitly inform the participants that the study is about aesthetics and art reception (Leder, Belke, et al. 2004). Danto (1974) suggested that the essence of art is 'aboutness,' which implies that a work of art is the result of an intentional act and that its elements are organized in a way that is meaningful for the viewer. We must be convinced that there is something to learn and to understand. *Context cues* (e.g., art exhibition, museum, or art gallery), for example, help us classify an object as a work of art that was furnished with purpose and meaning. If we are convinced that a painting tells a story that must be understood in the history of the artist's paintings, then chances are that (if the effect condition is fulfilled) we want to know more about that story. Art can thus thrive on self-fulfilling prophecies because as we spend time to find answers, we may eventually come up with interpretations on our own, and the incentive qualities of insights (see Chapter 5.2.1) will in turn motivate us to seek further novelty, meaning, and insights in that domain. Leder, Belke, et al. (2004) calls the understanding process the *cognitive mastering* of an artwork, which eventually leads to the development of a general interest in similar artworks over time.

Loewenstein (1994) suggested that curiosity is positively related to one's knowledge because

“an individual is likely to focus on the information that is present when most of the information from a set is missing. At this point, the informational reference set is effectively zero. As information is acquired, however, at some point a qualitative shift of attention is likely to occur from a focus on what is known to one on what is not known. This shift is the genesis of curiosity because, at that moment, the individual suddenly becomes focused on the gap in his or her knowledge” (p. 90).

The position taken here is that such a shift is not sufficient to cause curiosity and that motivational processes must be considered.

Specific Versus Diverse Curiosity

Berlyne (1954) distinguished between *specific* curiosity, which refers to the desire for a particular piece of information, and *diverse* curiosity, which is related to boredom reduction and novelty seeking (also see Loewenstein 1994). From the two, only specific curiosity involves an appraisal of the learning potential because diverse curiosity refers to seeking “stimulation regardless of source or content” (Berlyne 1960, p. 26). There is no gap that

needs to be filled but, rather, a desire for stimulus variations and other sensations (see Chapter 8.4.3: Novelty and Sensation Seeking). Specific curiosity is longer-lasting and involves goal-oriented learning.

Learn Indicators

Gaps, incoherence, uncertainty, incongruence, ambiguity, unexpectedness, and contradictions can be interpreted as learning indicators that imply that there is something to learn.¹⁷ Authors play with incompatibilities to indicate shortcomings in our knowledge, deficiencies that we eventually try to resolve (also see p.97, Representation Fit Theory). Abstract forms can be found in Virginia Woolf's *Together and Apart* (see p. 10) and mundane forms in gossip and melodrama (e.g., "How could she cheat on him? They always seemed so happy together!"). Learn indicators can also be very explicit. In oral storytelling, for instance, we often explicitly promise novel and unexpected information to evoke the curiosity of our audience (e.g., "You'll never guess what happened today!").

Learn Progress

Loewenstein (1994) proposed that specific curiosity is goal-directed and involves a reference point, and as discussed in Chapter 4.3.2 (Pleasure versus Desire), he also assumes that motivation increases as an organism approaches a learning goal. This is in line with Carver and Scheier's (1998) self-regulation model which is the basis for the discussed model of suspense (see Chapter 6). It is assumed here that low slow learning progress or stagnation results in disinterest or frustration, whereas high learning progress intensifies positive affect and motivation.

By identifying a reference point and the progress toward it, the learning potential implicitly incorporates Silvia's coping appraisal because our curiosity ceases if we have difficulties identifying a reference point (what is it that we have to learn?) or if we lack motivational incentives due to insufficient learning progress.

The appraisal of the learning potential allows us to explore situations that involve high uncertainty. Computational simulations have shown that agents who merely minimize uncertainty, exclusively focus on predictable tasks, whereas agents who use heuristics that explore states of high uncertainty become trapped in random unlearnable tasks (Gottlieb, Lopes, et al. 2016). This problem can be resolved by endowing agents with meta-cognitive

¹⁷In the 19th century, for instance, Young and Helmholtz developed a trichromatic theory of color vision that states that we have three color receptors for red, green, and blue that enable us to see the full color spectrum. Hering, on the contrary, defended the opponent-process theory based on the discovery that there is no such thing as reddish-green or yellowish-blue. The seeming *contradiction* indicated that there was still something to be understood and thus spurred scientific discussions until a novel theory was eventually found.

processes that only continue exploring initially uncertain situations when learning progress is detected (e.g., Lopes et al. 2012).

Motivational Advances

A theory of curiosity must focus not only on what triggers information-seeking behavior but also on what sustains it. I argue that next to learning progress, this process is supported by *motivational advances*—motivation that is provided upfront by the Seeking system (see below) to follow a learning path. In the simplest case, cues can acquire motivational properties if they are associated with rewards (Robinson, Yager, et al. 2014). Cues associated with drugs, for instance, can induce drug-seeking behavior in drug addicts. Similarly, a psychology book in a bookstore can act as an incentive stimulus for information-seeking when a person associates psychology with a rewarding experience. Panksepp (1998) assumes that this search mode often works “without much forethought, but there are now many reasons to believe that forethoughts (e.g., positive expectancies/anticipatory states) do in fact emerge from the interactions of the SEEKING system with higher brain mechanisms” (p. 151).

In the given examples, the cues are learned predictors of rewards. However, the Seeking System may also be nudged by meta-cognitive processes so that we explore learning paths that are not directly related to the stimulus, event, or knowledge gap that triggered the information-seeking behavior.

Example: Linda has difficulties with paying attention and wonders how she could improve her condition. She ends up showing interest in psychology, even though she did not have any experience with psychology before.

In this case, the psychology book was not associated with a reward. Linda did not have any experience with psychology before and, therefore, higher-order cognition was necessary. Psychology only became interesting because (1) there was a condition that affected and thus motivated her and because (2) psychology was appraised as a possible answer to her question. The effect appraisal (1) provided the initial motivation, and the learning potential guided and sustained it (2).

Also, the nickel in The Last Tycoon is not associated with a reward (see p. 13), but we may assume that understanding its role is required to gain a coherent understanding of the whole narrative. As a result, the processes assessing the learning potential nudge the Seeking system to provide motivation and this investment finally pays off when we are rewarded with insight (see Chapter 7.7: Discovery).

8.2.2 Effect Appraisal

Loewenstein (1994) wrote that

“people are not always curious, even though they are surrounded by vast regions of ignorance. Dissatisfaction with one’s state of knowledge, like dissatisfaction with one’s material condition, depends on a contrast between one’s objective situation and a subjective reference point” (p. 87).

But what causes this dissatisfaction and is dissatisfaction always a necessary precondition for curiosity?

The uncertainty of a coin toss creates an information gap, but we are not very interested in the outcome of a throw unless the outcome is significant to us. If the two outcomes are affectively valenced because we can either win or lose money, then emotions are elicited (hope and fear) which incite interest through their motivational component. We would neither show interest if the outcome states were not valenced (no motivation) nor speak of interest if we knew the outcome of the throw already (no knowledge gap). Watching somebody reading a newspaper is not sufficient to make us curious, but if we see the person chuckling out loud, we may want to know what information affected her because it may also affect us.

The Seeking/Desire System

The human brain is equipped with a general-purpose Seeking system that is responsible for all kinds of desires.

“This harmoniously operating neuroemotional system *drives* and *energizes* many mental complexities that humans experience as persistent feelings of interest, curiosity, sensation seeking, and, in the presence of a sufficiently complex cortex, the search for higher meaning. Although this brain state, like all other basic emotional states, is initially without intrinsic cognitive content, it gradually helps cement the perception of causal connections in the world and thereby creates ideas. [... and] it appears to translate correlations in environmental events into perceptions of causality” (Panksepp 1998, p. 145).

The system described by Panksepp may not only be vital for day-to-day pursuits (seeking food, water, and sex), but it might also mediate the appetitive qualities of narratives and art in general. It motivates the search for meaning, which was suggested to lie at the heart of aesthetic appreciation (Leder, Belke, et al. 2004), and it is also responsible for the more fundamental ability to understand causal relationships. Panksepp (2010) suggests that

this system houses the ‘reality-creating’ mechanism of the brain because it seems to produce causal beliefs based on the perception of correlated events. He, furthermore, assumes that the arousal of this system is accompanied by feelings of ‘intense interest,’ ‘engaged curiosity,’ and ‘eager anticipation’ (Panksepp 1998). The Seeking System “corresponds to the extensive medial forebrain bundle and major dopamine-driven, self-stimulation ‘reward’ circuitry coursing from ventral midbrain to nucleus accumbens and medial frontal cortex, where it can promote frontal cortical functions related to planning and foresight. [...] It promotes learning by mediating anticipatory eagerness, partly by coding predictive relationships between events” (Panksepp 2010, *The Seeking/desire system*, para. 2).

Taken together, this system is in charge of various cognitive functions essential for narrative comprehension. It operates the necessary incentive processes, evokes exploratory behavior and anticipatory states, and is involved in understanding causal relationships between events.

Types of Interest

Depending on which affective motivator is at play, we can distinguish between *epistemic curiosity* and *generic interest*. Epistemic curiosity is the result of current and previous encounters with immediate novelty, unexpectedness, and insight, which have appetitive qualities and motivate us to seek further novelty. This is in line with the fact that novel and salient stimuli are known to attract attention, evoke behavioral orientation reactions, and are be motivating and rewarding (Fujita 1987; Gottlieb, Oudeyer, et al. 2013; Kakade and Dayan 2002; Schultz 1998). On the contrary, generic interest involves a concern and is amplified by other forms of affect (e.g., hope and fear).

In real life, the distinction between these two categories is not clear cut because we may show epistemic curiosity based on a history of generic interest. For example, a family member’s serious illness may motivate a person to study medicine. However, once an interest has been developed through a series of rewarding learning experiences, the person may continue to show curiosity about the subject even after the family member has been cured.

8.3 Epistemic Curiosity

In a narrower sense, interest refers to epistemic curiosity, which is the “desire for knowledge that motivates individuals to learn new ideas, eliminate information-gaps, and solve intellectual problems” (Litman 2008, p. 1586). This type of interest is purely driven by epistemic factors and not by any other incentives as in the case of general interest. According to Berridge, Robinson, and Aldridge (2009), reward processes consist of several dissociable psychological components: ‘liking’ (hedonic impact), ‘wanting’ (incentive salience), and

learning (predictive associations and cognitions). The wanting component, which corresponds to the Seeking System, is of special interest in this thesis. Although the Seeking System cannot be reduced to the dopaminergic system, it does seem to be its central component (Panksepp 1998). Initially, the dopaminergic system was assumed to mediate reward and pleasure, but empirical evidence revealed that this system is rather responsible for the *anticipation* of reward and that its arousal is accompanied by incentive processes promoting exploration and goal-directed behaviors.

Most dopaminergic neurons—i.e., neurons that use dopamine as a neurotransmitter to communicate information—encode the expected value and the probability of rewards whereas another population reacts to punishment and aversive stimuli (Schultz 2010). Another subset of dopamine neurons is sensitive to novel, unexpected, and physically salient stimuli (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, et al. 2010; Di Chiara 2002; Dommett et al. 2005; Horvitz 2000; Lisman and Grace 2005; Ljungberg et al. 1992; Redgrave and Gurney 2006; Redgrave, Prescott, et al. 1999). Dopamine was also found to modulate novelty-seeking behavior (Costa et al. 2014) and is suggested to signal the expectation of information in information-seeking (Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka 2009).

8.3.1 The Incentive Salience Hypothesis

According to Berridge and Robinson’s (1993) *incentive salience hypothesis*, the role of dopamine is to assign

“ ‘incentive value’ to objects or behavioral acts. Incentive salience is a motivational, ‘magnet-like’ property, which makes external stimuli or internal representations more salient, and more likely to be wanted, approached or consumed. Attribution of incentive salience to a stimulus that predicts some reward makes both the stimulus and the reward ‘wanted’ ” (Colombo 2014, p. 59; also Berridge 2007; Berridge and Robinson 1998).

It is assumed here that epistemic curiosity is motivated through the incentive effects of immediate novelty, surprise, and insight or from their anticipation based on previous encounters of similar stimuli. If we have not learned that a particular domain can be rewarding, then knowledge gaps or the anticipation of novelty and learning will not suffice to make us curious.

Most people would not appraise a lecture on the Tibetan culture as interesting, for instance, unless it is associated with a hedonic impact or an incentive value. Do we like it, is it related to existing interests? Can we expect further affective incentives, or does the information affect us in any other way? Most of us wouldn’t pay too much attention to this very specific niche topic, but if we are told a series of novel and unexpected facts about

Tibetans, such as that in certain Tibetan communities, several brothers are married to the same wife, the resulting surprise may provide an initial incentive that can arouse epistemic curiosity when mixed with knowledge gaps. A series of rewarding learning experiences eventually leads to the development of interests in particular domains.

8.3.2 Advances & Anticipated Novelty

Given that dopamine neurons are suggested to act as reward predictors, they may facilitate motivational incentives in the face of unexpectedness and novelty, as well as when they predict further novelty. The advance concept is in line with a set of reinforcement theories that suggest that “novelty acts like a surrogate reward (i.e., something that is itself sought out). This surrogate reward distorts the landscape of predictions and actions, as *states predictive of future novelty come to be treated as if they are rewarding*” (Kakade and Dayan 2002, p. 554, *emphasis added*).

Here, anticipated novelty is understood as a form of information gap. When we like reading a specific scientific journal, we associate it with a rewarding experience, but there is a distinction between issues we’ve already read and those that are new. The novelty of the journals appears to affect us even though we do not experience the effects of novelty right away (such as in the case of a novel painting). The novel issues are, thus, given an advance (i.e., a motivational investment that pays off if the volume contains new or unexpected information).

8.3.3 Learning Potential as Motivation Switch

Reward-predicting dopamine neurons display a continuous baseline activity that is shortly increased when an unexpected reward is received or at the moment a reward is predicted (see *reward-prediction error hypothesis* in Colombo 2014; Schultz et al. 1997). The anticipatory nature of this system becomes clear when an expected reward is received or omitted. If an expected reward is received, then the dopaminergic activity remains at baseline. If an expected reward is omitted, then the activity of these neurons is interrupted and falls below the baseline. Also, novelty-induced increases in dopaminergic activity are frequently followed by a dip below their baseline activity (Schultz 1998), but why is this the case?

Experiments show that the activation of dopamine neurons persists as long as behavioral-orienting responses (i.e., gaze shifting) occur (Schultz 1998). It is assumed that phasic bursts of dopamine neurons result in high levels of dopamine and the activation of D1 receptors, which causes the direct pathway to promote actions. Firing pauses, by contrast, lead to low dopamine and the inhibition of D2 receptors, which suppresses actions (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, et al. 2010; Frank 2005; Hikosaka 2007).

Kakade and Dayan (2000) suggest that the dip after the novelty response is required so that there is no distortion of the reward function which would have an impact on action choice. The initial activation of dopamine neurons may serve as a motivational catalyst for the orienting response. However, this motivation wanes swiftly when the assessment of learning potential indicates there is nothing to learn, as the stimulus aligns with existing mental representations. This pattern may be so commonly observed because neuroscientific experiments often use simple stimuli that do not require further exploration (e.g., physically salient stimuli like flashing lights). Kakade and Dayan (2002) assume that novelty-induced increases in dopaminergic activity can occur without being followed by dopaminergic activity dips. Such ‘*novelty bonuses*’ do distort the reward function and thus impact action choices.

8.3.4 Simultaneous Appraisal Triggers

The appraisals of effect and learning are often triggered simultaneously, such as through novel philosophic questions, hitherto unknown scientific problems, or novel stimuli with incongruous features. Also, surprise tends to fulfill both conditions at once: it can create knowledge gaps resulting from an incoherent representation (Maguire and Keane 2006) and it can provide the necessary motivational incentive resulting from expectancy disconfirmations (see Meyer, Reisenzein, et al. 1997). This motivation is either used to facilitate curiosity and search behaviors or it is ‘switched off’ again if the expectation disconfirmation was a false alert (e.g., you are surprised because your car is not in the driveway, but then you remember that you left the car in to be serviced) (see Maguire and Keane 2006).

8.4 Generic Interest

We often use the term interest to refer to a much broader construct that also includes other forms of affect which provide motivational incentives. The hypothesis that dopamine mediates positive motivational incentives has been criticized (e.g., Gray et al. 1997) because some dopamine neurons respond to not only rewarding but also to aversive stimuli (Berridge and Robinson 1998).

“DA [dopamine] neurons may not encode motivational events along our intuitive axis of ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ and may instead be specialized to support specific forms of adaptive behavior” (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, et al. 2010, *Directions for Future Research*, para. 4).

The seemingly paradoxical theory that dopamine also provides ‘positive’ incentive salience for the exploration of aversive events and stimuli might explain our ostensibly

counterintuitive desire for suspense. We can, thus, speak of generic interest when the effect appraisal involves other motivational sources next to novelty, insight, and unexpectedness.

8.4.1 Interest and Suspense

In contrast to epistemic curiosity, which is purely driven by the appetitive qualities of knowledge acquisition, generic interest is amplified by other affects as abundantly elicited through narration. Thriving on the motivating properties of hope, fear, and mind incongruence, suspense is seen here as a case of general interest. According to [Frijda \(1988\)](#), emotions arise because we prefer particular world states over others. An unemployed person who wants to change his situation will show interest in the information that will help him or her get a job (e.g., how to write a CV), and a person with health issues will show interest in the information that can improve his or her situation (e.g., healthy cooking recipes). In these cases, the initial motivation is not evoked by epistemic factors such as novelty and unexpectedness, but rather by needs and concerns.

8.4.2 Violence, Taboos & Norm Violations

There are several theories of why violence, destruction, taboos, and norm violations have such a strong appeal (see [Goldstein 1998](#); [Zillmann and Vorderer 2008](#)). These phenomena are typically embodied through salient stimuli and correlate with moral emotions such as contempt, anger, disgust, shame, embarrassment, and guilt (see [Haidt 2003](#)). [McCauley \(1998\)](#) noted that the violation of norms “holds a fascination for people to the extent that they rarely see these violations in everyday experience” (p. 149). This fascination may thus be explained by basic functions of our affect system (e.g., surprise due to an unexpected norm violation mixed with pity for the cheated and contempt for the cheater). The aesthetic theory of destruction, for example, assumes that destruction involves physical salience, complexity, novelty, and unexpectedness. People, thus, “seek stimulation in the destruction of an object just as they seek stimulation in more socially acceptable aesthetic experiences [Berlyne \(1971\)](#) [...] Demolition derbies, disaster movies, and burning buildings are just a few examples of mundane situations in which persons intentionally choose to observe acts of destruction” ([Allen and Greenberger 1979](#), p. 94).

8.4.3 Novelty and Sensation Seeking

People show interest in failed stunts, disgusting dishes, and even more aversive stimuli, such as morbid curiosities and disturbing illustrations. There is a correlation between *novelty seeking* and *sensation seeking* ([McCourt et al. 1993](#)), “a trait defined by the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take physical,

social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experience” (Zuckerman 1994, p. 27). Aversive and appetitive systems are likely to contribute to sensation seeking and because both systems show mutually inhibitory effects, the aversion may be dampened by positive states in high sensation seekers (Lissek et al. 2005). Aversive stimuli and events might thus be particularly interesting when they are novel and unexpected. The incentive properties of novelty and surprise are possibly amplified by that of other affective states because “[b]oth rewarding and aversive events trigger orienting of attention, cognitive processing, and *increases in general motivation*” (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, et al. 2010, *Diverse Dopamine Responses to Aversive Events*, para. 1, emphasis added).

8.5 Conclusion

Silvia’s (2006) appraisal model consists of a novelty and a coping appraisal: Is it novel, complex, surprising, and so on, and can I understand it?

By contrast, I suggested an alternative model based on two components: an appraisal of the learning potential indicated by a knowledge gap (Loewenstein 1994) and an effect appraisal indicated by an arousal of the Seeking System (Panksepp 1998). Is there something to learn? And does it affect me?

The types of interest are here understood as (epistemic) curiosity, which is purely driven by the appetitive qualities of knowledge acquisition, and (generic) interest, which also involves other forms of affect such as hope and fear. In the case of epistemic curiosity, the effect appraisal is fulfilled when we encounter immediate novelty, which was suggested to act as a surrogate reward (see Kakade and Dayan 2002), or if we predict future novelty rewards based on previous experiences. Thus, stimuli like the nickel in *The Last Tycoon* may get a motivational advance although the stimulus is not per se novel. A series of rewarding experiences eventually leads to the development of interests that increase the probability that the effect appraisal will be satisfied in future encounters with similar stimuli or events. In the case of generic interest, the effect condition is fulfilled when affective states unrelated to knowledge acquisition provide the motivational incentive.

The appraisal of the learning potential, by contrast, is satisfied when a gap or an informational reference point is detected. I argued that Silvia’s (2006) coping appraisal is implicitly incorporated into the proposed model because if we lack necessary prior knowledge, then we fail to detect the learning potential, and if we only have few learning successes, then we will only experience few intrinsic rewards and, therefore, lack the necessary motivation to proceed.

The proposed model is not yet fully refined and requires further empirical evidence and theoretical work on the search system. In addition, the theoretical framework does not yet sufficiently take into account factors such as boredom and defamiliarization.

Chapter 9

Summary of Findings

[Bruner \(1986\)](#) argued that “[i]n contrast to our vast knowledge of how science and logical reasoning proceeds, we know precious little in any formal sense about how to make good stories” (p. 14) and in [Ryan’s \(2009\)](#) view, this has not changed since.

In this thesis, I argued that the ability to evoke interest is one of the most fundamental aspects of the narrative design process (e.g., [Black and Bower 1980](#); [Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982](#); [Herman 2002](#)). [Sternberg \(2003a\)](#) harshly criticizes this weak formulation and asks:

“[W]hat does ‘interest’ mean? How to spot, anchor, trace, verify, measure, explain its occurrence? Where does it come into our understanding and overall experience, specifically into the ‘story’ process? And what if it doesn’t (e.g., a goal-driven event chain leaving us cold)? How, in a word, to advance beyond subjective registration, the mere gesture toward a teleology of pleasure?” ([Sternberg 2003a, p. 341](#)).

This work aimed to use a cognitive-scientific approach to investigate what constitutes interest and how interest is evoked through the intentional design of narratives.

9.1 A Cognitive Approach to Narrative Design

According to [Kristin Thompson \(1988\)](#), an approach is not an analytical method (“a set of procedures employed in the actual analytical process”), but “a set of assumptions about traits shared by different artworks, about procedures spectators go through in understanding all artworks, and about ways in which artworks relate to society” (p. 3). [Thompson \(1988\)](#)

and [Smith \(2003\)](#) intentionally leave out methodological suggestions in their approaches because they fear that preconceived analytical methods could lead to predetermined outcomes.

However, a narrative design approach that focuses on the author instead of the academic analyst should seek to create methods for the narrative design process and understand why they work. One such method can be found in Smith's Mood-Cue Approach in the form of *redundant emotive cueing*, which provides a plausible explanation of how to put the audience in a particular mood through associative cues (see Chapter 6.3.5: The Mood-Cue Approach).

9.1.1 An Epistemo-Affective Approach

The findings of this thesis can be consolidated into an *Epistemo-Affective Approach*. The main assumption states that narrative is erotetic (see [Carroll 1990](#)), especially in its canonical form, and that the reader is primarily motivated by epistemic emotions. The works of [Carroll \(1990\)](#) and [Sternberg \(1978\)](#) constitute the narratological foundation of this thesis while the psychological part is grounded in theories of [Berlyne \(1971\)](#), [Loewenstein \(1994\)](#), and [Silvia \(2005\)](#).

9.1.2 Functionalism resulting from Sense-Making

In Aristotle's view, the parts of the plot must be organized in an overarching whole (see Chapter 1.3: Narrative Functionalism) to the extent that elements are not an organic part of the whole if we can displace or remove them without making a discernible difference. Homer only showed very specific events in the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad* and omitted others because they were not relevant to the plot. On the other hand, readers view what is shown as relevant and assume that it serves a purpose in the narrative. Based on this expectation, they try to understand how the narrative elements and events make sense in the overarching whole.

[Loewenstein's \(1994\)](#) account provides a psychological answer by suggesting that "there is a human need for sense making. Indeed, the very notion of a gestalt reflects the fundamental human tendency to make sense of information by organizing it into coherent 'wholes'" (p. 83). This basic need explains not only the role of narrative coherence but also, even more so, the relevance of incoherence. When a sequence of events is incomplete, incoherent, or ambiguous, our curiosity is aroused because we tend to maintain coherent mental representations.

Instead of locating the coherent whole in the discourse, a cognitive approach locates it in the reader's mental representations. Although a narrative's ambiguous ending may leave the plot incomplete or even incoherent, the reader will still try to form a coherent under-

standing (e.g., through symbolism). Overdetermined and unambiguous prose, by contrast, provides a poorer playground for literary interpretations.

The Epistemo-Affective Approach, therefore, assumes that art reception is inherently driven by a need to understand (see Leder, Belke, et al. 2004). We tend to ascribe purpose, meaning, and ‘aboutness’ (Danto 1974) to narrative constituents and narratives as a whole.

9.2 Three Primary Aspects of Narrative Design

The Epistemo-Affective Approach assumes that the design of a narrative involves three primary considerations:

- How to motivate actions in the story world (propulsive aspect)?
- How to motivate the reader (the affective aspect)?
- And how to direct the readers’ minds and make them form questions to prolong their interest (the erotetic aspect)?

How these aspects fit into the larger framework of this work is outlined in Appendix C.1.

9.3 Interest Emotions

9.3.1 Epistemic curiosity and generic interest

This thesis distinguishes between two categories of interest: *Epistemic curiosity* more narrowly describes a form of interest that is purely motivated by epistemic rewards (novelty, surprise, insight, and learning progress), whereas *generic interest* is a broader category of interest. This broader class also includes suspense, morbid curiosities, or sensation seeking and involves co-occurring feelings and emotions.

9.3.2 Curiosity: Reconciling Berlyne & Loewenstein

According to Loewenstein (1994),

“people are not always curious, even though they are surrounded by vast regions of ignorance. Dissatisfaction with one’s state of knowledge, like dissatisfaction

with one's material condition, depends on a contrast between one's objective situation and a subjective reference point" (p. 87).

But where does this dissatisfaction come from, or in other words, what influences the subjective reference point?

9.3.3 The Learn/Effect Model of Interest

In Chapter 8 (Interest & the Seeking System), I suggested an appraisal model of interest that reconciles Loewenstein's information gap theory with Berlyne's collative variables through two cognitive appraisals: the *learning potential* corresponds to Loewenstein's information gap theory whereas the *effect appraisal* comprises collative variables. These two appraisals correspond to the erotetic and affective aspects of narrative design.

The learning potential deals with knowledge gaps and monitors learning progress. It is as such related to Loewenstein's (1994) information gap theory. The Learn/Effect model suggests that knowledge gaps only arouse curiosity if the effect condition is fulfilled.

Others have mentioned these two factors but did not explicitly address their psychological functions. We can find them in Herman's (2002) narrativity concept (see p. 47), which suggests that narrative events must be moderately novel and unusual (effect appraisal) and that questions emerge if we cannot utilize stereotypical information to fill gaps (learning potential). The effect and learning appraisals are also implicitly included in Carroll's (1990) Erotetic Narration model, which points out that narratives generate a series of questions (learning potential) and contain stimuli and events that violate standing categories (effect appraisal).

9.3.4 Epistemic curiosity

In the case of epistemic curiosity, the effect condition is fulfilled by the incentive effects of novelty and unexpectedness, which are known to go hand in hand with an orienting response and the activation of the Seeking System (see Panksepp 2010; Schultz 2015). The effect condition is also fulfilled through the intrinsically rewarding effects of insights, uncertainty reduction, learning progress, or the achievement of learning goals (e.g., Litman 2005). Eventually, we develop personal interests in topics that are associated with learning rewards. This ensures that the effect condition is fulfilled on subsequent encounters with related stimuli.

At the core of the Seeking System lies the dopaminergic system. Not only is it associated with the anticipation of rewards, but it is also known that a subset of dopaminergic neurons is activated by novel and unexpected stimuli. A range of reinforcement theories

involve the assumption that “novelty acts like a surrogate reward (i.e., something that is itself sought out). This surrogate reward distorts the landscape of predictions and actions, as *states predictive of future novelty come to be treated as if they are rewarding*” (Kakade and Dayan 2002, p. 554, *emphasis added*).

Effect appraisal	Learning potential
Novelty, incongruity, diversity, stimulus variation, unusualness, expectancy disconfirmation, surprising insights, or experienced learn rewards.	Knowledge gaps, information conflict, contradiction, uncertainty, ambiguity, learning progress, or uncertainty reduction.

Table 9.1: Concepts associated with appraisals of epistemic curiosity

9.3.5 Generic interest

Generic interest exceeds epistemic curiosity and is induced by not only novelty, unexpectedness, and insight but also other affective states. For example, if a friend started a narrative by saying, “Oh my god! Today I went to work but forgot that I still had my pajama pants on,” then we would be empathically embarrassed. With the effect condition fulfilled, we would ask: “What happened next?”

Effect appraisal	Learning potential
Personal relevance, anticipation of positively or negatively valenced states (hope & fear), violation of moral standards and norms (disgust, shame or guilt), empathy, mind incongruence, or engaging stimuli (e.g., sexual or disgusting stimuli).	Knowledge gaps, information conflict, contradiction, uncertainty, uncertainty reduction, gaining information, monitoring proximity and progress towards valenced states, puzzlingness, or ambiguity.

Table 9.2: Concepts associated with appraisals of generic interest

9.3.6 Suspense: A Five-Factor Model

The common assumption that suspense involves hope and fear (Ortony, Clore, et al. 1988; Sternberg 1978; Zillmann 1980) suggests that suspense is a broad psychological construct

rather than a simple phenomenon. In Chapter 6.2.7 (Related Emotions), I suggested a list of further affective states that take part in the suspense experience. To account for this complexity and the fact that we can experience suspense even upon repeated viewings (i.e., the paradox of suspense), I suggested a model with five components:

1. Goals & Anti-Goals

Suspense involves at least two valenced states: a desirable reference point toward which we wish to move and an undesirable reference point from which we want to withdraw or which we want to avoid (see Carver and Scheier 2002). Cybernetically seen, hope is experienced when we want to diminish the gap between the current state and a desirable goal (discrepancy reducing loops) and fear when we want to remove from an anti-goal (discrepancy enlarging loops). However, in many situations, avoiding an anti-goal means approaching a goal (Carver, Lawrence, et al. 1999; Elliot 1999; Higgins 1996). The *valence magnitude* describes how desirable or undesirable an outcome state is and depends on its appraised valence and significance (i.e., the impact on an agent) (see Smith and Lazarus 1993; Smuts 2009; Witte 1992). Authors can modulate the valence magnitude of outcome states. A common dramatization technique to elevate tension is to raise the stakes, i.e., making the anti-goal state more punishing.

There are competing theories about why fictional events arouse our hopes and fears: morality, affective dispositions, empathy, and so on. By contrast, I proposed an alternative based on *valenced outcome states*. This view suggests that we attach our concerns to particular outcome states for various reasons: because we hope that the terrorists are imprisoned for moral reasons, because we are presented the perspective of their persecutors, because we sympathize with their victims, or for several reasons combined.

2. Proximity & Progress

Many theories make use of a probability measure to explain suspense (Carroll 1990; Ortony, Clore, et al. 1988; Sternberg 1978; Zillmann 1980). This leads to a view according to which the “conceptual separation of hopes and fears may appear to be pointless because the two concepts seem to constitute two alternative ways of describing the same phenomenon of apprehension about an outcome” (Zillmann 1980, p. 136).

By contrast, the valenced states view suggests that hope and fear are two distinct emotions evoked by two different anticipated states (goals and anti-goals). I argue that when a superhero is about to catch a meteor that is approaching the surface of the earth, suspense does not decline even though the probability of the negative outcome is reduced. Instead of a single probability value, the model of Carver and Scheier (2002) makes use of two independent dimensions: progress rates concerning the two goal states. Our fears grow

as the meteor approaches the earth and our hopes grow as the hero comes closer to catch it. The advantage of this view is that it is much more intuitive for the writer and that it can account for the involved urgency of a situation (a 50% chance does not tell us anything about when the outcome is actualized).

3. Uncertainty/Knowledge gap

Many suspense theories are based on the assumption that uncertainty only plays a subordinated role in suspense because they associate suspense with a high probability of the negative outcome and a low probability of the positive outcome (e.g., Carroll 1990) and because we experience suspense even on repeated viewings (Smuts 2009). By contrast, Sternberg (1978) suggested that suspense is primarily based on uncertain prospecting while hope and fear are optional.

Here, uncertainty is seen as a separate, epistemic component of suspense that acts as a knowledge gap and, in contrast to hope and fear, only affects us when we read a novel for the first time.

4. Mood

In contrast to emotions, moods can last for a long time, do not induce action tendencies, and do not have any goals or objects attached to them. Smith (2003) proposes that moods are elicited through *redundant emotive cues* (e.g., music and sound effects) and that they can facilitate the expression of related emotions. An anxious mood, for instance, will bring forth fear if our heroine is in danger.

5. Mind Incongruence

Mind incongruence is the cognitive correlate of dramatic irony. Dramatic irony occurs when readers are aware that a character holds false beliefs and that knowing the true state of affairs would affect the character and his decisions. In addition, mind incongruence may also occur in cases where characters have full knowledge, especially when characters we empathize with act in ways we find counterproductive (e.g. breaking into places, behaving embarrassingly, etc.). Mind incongruence is associated with a tendency to warn characters ('You shouldn't be talking about such trivial matters. There's a bomb beneath you and it's about to explode!' (Truffaut and Scott [1967] 1983, p. 52)).

9.3.7 Surprise: Unexpectedness, Misexpectedness & Insight

Types of Expectations

According to the Expectancy Disconfirmation Hypothesis, an *expectancy disconfirmation* is necessary and sufficient to account for the experience of surprise (Stiensmeier-Pelster et al. 1995). In this context, the term expectation is usually understood as a synonym for belief (Reisenzein et al. 2012). From a narratological view, I distinguish between two types of expectations:

1. **Personal Expectations** are beliefs brought by the reader.
2. **Discourse Expectations** are conveyed or implied by the discourse.

While personal expectations vary over time and between cultures, discursive expectations are more invariant and more in the control of the writer.

Types of Surprise

Compared to the Expectancy Disconfirmation Hypothesis, a more granular view is taken here, which identifies at least three types of surprise:

1. **Unexpectedness (astonishment)** is the result of unlikely (Lorini and Castelfranchi 2007) or abnormal events (see Teigen and Keren 2003).
2. **Misexpectedness (mismatch-based surprise)** results from a discrepancy between a relatively specific expectation and incoming information (Meyer, Reisenzein, et al. 1997).
3. **Insight** is the feeling of sudden understanding (“Eureka!”) based on improved coherence of knowledge, often experienced when solving problems (Pretz et al. 2003).

All these types of surprise have something in common; they interrupt ongoing processes, redirect our attention, and motivate exploration (Meyer, Niepel, et al. 1994). Here, surprise is seen as a quick emotional reaction that is often followed by a post-surprise phase. In this phase, we may experience curiosity, for example, when knowledge gaps emerge (Representation Fit). Together, the surprise and post-surprise phases are here referred to as the surprise complex.

The distinction between unexpectedness, misexpectedness, and insight is especially helpful in the narratological domain and from the perspective of an author. However, alternative models may be able to explain all three phenomena at once. For instance,

surprise may be caused by the detection of a difference between prior and posterior beliefs (see Barto et al. 2013; Itti and Baldi 2009).

Gapping & Gap-filling

The Representation Fit Theory posits that “the more difficult it is for an individual to coherently integrate a new event into their discourse representation, the more surprising that event will appear” (Maguire, Maguire, et al. 2011, p. 1766). This suggests that events are more surprising if they leave a gap. In contrast, Sternberg’s (1978) concept of surprise (i.e., recognition) entails retrospective filling of gaps. I argued that this divergence results from the different types of surprise. Whereas astonishment and mismatch-based surprise tend to open gaps (see Maguire and Keane 2006), insight is associated with gap-filling (see Cosmelli and Preiss 2014).

9.4 Sternberg’s Universals: Caveats

Sternberg’s concepts of suspense, curiosity, and surprise are not consistent with the tenet of mainstream psychology and led to many misunderstandings (Sternberg 2003a; Sternberg 2003b). I showed, for instance, that Sternberg’s model can lead to anomalies in the form of leaps between suspense and curiosity. Because of this incompatibility with psychological models, Brewer and Ohtsuka (1988b) used the terms “Curiosity about the Future” and “Curiosity about the Past”.

Especially Sternberg’s concept of surprise can be confusing because many situations in which the reader is surprised do not count as recognition. McDaniel (2013) argued that Sternberg “is not interested so much in the emotion as he is building a very specific literary definition distinct from the recognition of surprise”(p. 23). I argue that from a psychological point of view, Sternberg’s concept of surprise is best described by the term insight (see Chapter 7.3.3).

9.5 Topics for Further Investigation

9.5.1 Applicability

This thesis outlines a cognitive-narratological approach that aims to facilitate the narrative design process. But to what extent are the concepts applicable to the writer? The effectiveness of this approach could be tested by comparing the artistic output of students who follow this approach to that of students who make use of other approaches in writing courses. In

addition, expert interviews and observing experts during the writing process could reveal the extent to which their methodology is compatible with the epistemo-affective approach, and whether the concepts could help them to improve their writing process.

9.5.2 Empirical Evidence for the (Anti-) Goal Model

The (Anti-) Goal Model suggests that we consider two possible outcome states of a situation during the suspense experience: one positive and one negative. There is no agreement on whether we favor certain outcomes due to moral judgments (Carroll 1990), affiliations toward characters (Zillmann 1995), empathy (e.g., Smith 2003), or perspective-taking Vorderer (1996). By contrast, I suggested that the desirability of outcome states can essentially be appraised based on any of these principles (p. 77). Further data could elucidate whether this is indeed the case, whether combining these principles intensifies suspense, and whether it is even sufficient for authors to give readers subtle cues that indicate which outcomes they want them to desire.

9.5.3 Mind Incongruence without Ignorance

Dramatic irony arises when the audience or readers have information that the characters do not have. The cognitive correlate of dramatic irony is here referred to as mind incongruence. In this thesis, several hypotheses about the processes underlying dramatic irony have been put forward and it has been suggested that dramatic irony may even occur in cases where the characters have complete knowledge (through action or goal incongruence). These hypotheses have yet to be empirically tested.

9.5.4 The Role of Boredom

The main question of this thesis is how a narrative, and any stimulus in general, evokes interest. This stimulus-centric perspective involves ignoring a very important phenomenon related to interest: boredom. We have to ask, what the role of boredom relates to the proposed model. From a narratological point of view, we might also want to know whether boredom may be deliberately utilized by authors to achieve specific effects.

9.5.5 Defamiliarization

To shorten this thesis, I omitted the section discussing *defamiliarization*. Defamiliarization, or estrangement, is an art technique that goes back to Victor Shklovsky's term *ostranenie*, that is, *to make strange* (Shklovsky [1917] 1965). In his work *Art as Technique*, Shklovsky

described how novelty can be found not only in the unfamiliar but also in the common things we think we know. Further investigation is needed to uncover how making strange relates to the concept interest, what methods are used to evoke it, and what cognitive processes and effects are involved.

Appendix A

Memento (2000): An Example of Extreme Dechronologization




Figure A.1: The film [Memento \(2000\)](#) is an example with strong dechronologization. Starting with the last scene, the movie shows the events in reverse chronological order (in color). Between these events we see past events in chronological order (in black and white). At the end of the film, these two event sequences meet in the middle. The abscissa shows the sujet and the ordinate shows the reconstructed fabula (visualization by [Aprahamian \(2009\)](#)).

Appendix B

The Learn/Effect Model of Interest

The two tables below compare [Silvia's \(2005\)](#) model of interest (fig. B.1) to the Learn/Effect Model (fig. B.2) proposed in Chapter 8.2.

Novelty-Complexity	Ability to Understand
Vividness	Coherence
Surprisingness	Ease of comprehension
Unexpectedness	Prior knowledge
Suspense	Concreteness
Engaging themes (death, power, sex)	Readers' connection
Emotiveness	Meaningfulness
Imagery	Simple vocabulary
Author voice	Character identification

Table B.1: Silvia's appraisal model of interest ([Silvia 2005, p. 82](#)).

Learning Potential	Effect Appraisal
Meaningfulness	Emotiveness
Anticipated Novelty/Learning	Immediate Novelty
Mis- & Unexpectedness (Gap)	Surprisingness (Reward)
Concreteness	Vividness/Imagery
Author Voice (e.g., Expert)	Readers' Connection
Simple Vocabulary	Interests
Foresight	Suspense (Hope/Fear)
Ease of Comprehension	Character Identification
Incoherence (Gap)	Coherence (Insight)
Puzzle	Engaging themes
Prior Knowledge	Familiarity
Slow Reveal	Discovery
Problem/Question	Promising Benefit

Table B.2: The Learn/Effect Model as an alternative to Silvia's appraisal model of interest.

Appendix C

Primary Aspects of Narrative Design

C.1 The Propulsive Aspect

Narratives house a range of events leading to changes in the states of the story world. However, not every cause-effect relationship is propulsive. Propulsion refers to causal effects in an event sequence. If an event can be removed from a story without influencing the whole, then, it is not propulsive because it does not serve a function in the plot.

Propulsion	Trey Parker and Matt Stone (2011) , the creators of South Park, have a very simple writing rule to ensure propulsion. The words “ <i>and therefore</i> ” and “ <i>but</i> ” must always fit as a link between the beats of their story.
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Valenced states	Generally, the actions of characters are motivated by not only negative states but also the outlook of potentially better states. To create conflict and the necessity for further actions, the current state is made incompatible with the desired state.
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Collisions Collisions are a form of propulsion that involves conflict (Hegel [1843] 1975). The author creates a negatively valenced world state that motivates characters to take action. This action has typically two possible outcomes – one positive and one negative – resulting in uncertainty and suspense. The initial collision that defines the major conflict of a narrative is sometimes referred to as inciting incident.

C.2 The Erotetic Aspect

Gapping	By withholding information about relevant events, causes, goals, and outcomes, narratives produce information gaps that arouse our curiosity and motivate us to follow the discourse (Miall 1989).
Dechronologization	Gapping by dechronologizing the event sequence (Chapter 2.2: Universals of Narrative (Sternberg)).
Functionalism	What is the purpose of X? We try to infer the purpose of salient elements and events because we assume they were intentionally placed in the discourse (Chapter 1.3: Narrative Functionalism).
Uncertain outcomes	Typically, in the form of the goal–anti-goal duality, which evokes uncertainty and acts as gaps in the future (Chapter 6: Suspense)
Information conflicts	Incongruities, incoherence, unexpectedness, ambiguity, contradictions, and paradoxes evoke questions because they demand a resolution (Chapter 5.2.4: Information Conflict).
Knowledge disparities	See Chapter 2.4: Knowledge Disparities
Mood cues	Redundant associative cues can evoke mysterious moods and anticipatory states.

Challenges	Games, riddles, and mysteries invite us to solve them.
Explication	Explicitly pointing at missing information (e.g., by stating questions verbally) or by presenting the prospect of novelty or unexpectedness (e.g., “You will not believe what happened today”).

C.3 The Affective Aspect

Novelty	Created through conceptual combination, Janusian thinking, metaphoric thinking, analogical reasoning, and other transformational processes (Chapter 5.2.1 and Kaufman and Sternberg (2010)). The goal is to produce unusual, remarkable, bizarre, or strange stimuli and events.
Un- & misexpectedness	Red Herrings, withholding important information, implying incorrect situation models, improbable events, reversals of fortune, disconfirmation of knowledge and expectations.
Insight	Recognition (Chapter 2.2.4) and Discovery (Chapter 7.7)
Change	Provides novelty and surprise.
Valenced states	Desirable and undesirable world states combined with proximity and progress cues (Chapter 6: Suspense).

Mood cues	Musical stingers, heroic trumpets, wind chimes, or weather conditions evoke moods and facilitate the expression of related emotions (Chapter 6.3.5: The Mood-Cue Approach).
Engaging themes	Humor, eroticism, romanticism, violence, norm violations, destruction, and so on.
Emotional attachment	We tend to care for sympathetic, altruistic, and point-of-view characters, as well as characters who evoke empathy.
Interests	Designing narratives based on interests of the target group.
Significance	Personally or socially relevant themes.
Defamiliarization	Creating novel experiences through <i>making strange</i> .

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