MASTER THESIS

Titel der Master Thesis / Title of the Master's Thesis

"Good practices towards effective development partnership in Africa"

verfasst von / submitted by

Chelsea Maree Daniels

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S.)

Wien 2022 / Vienna 2022

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt Postgraduate programme code as it appears on the student record sheet:	A 992 940
Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt Postgraduate programme as it appears on the student record sheet:	Internationale Studien / International Studies
Betreut von / Supervisor:	Professor Werner Neudeck

diplomatische akademie wien
Vienna School of International Studies
École des Hautes Études Internationales de Vienne

DECLARATION OF HONESTY

"On my honour as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it."

NAME: CHELSEA MAREE DANIELS DATE: 02.08.202 PLACE: VIENNA, AUSTRIA

ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)

This paper fundamentally looks at how development funding can effectively be used in African countries. Narrowing in through the lens of development economics, an analysis of two African countries, namely Kenya and Uganda are presented: showcasing their colonial histories, thereby their original institutions and foundations left behind by colonial times; followed by their post-colonial national development plans until today; and further identifying how development partnerships and aid are presented and incorporated into each country's strategic growth plan. After which good practices from each country allow for insights into the role of development partners, how governments manage partnerships and aid, and how the outcomes created or affected different actors.

ABSTRACT (DEUTSCH)

In diesem Beitrag geht es um die Frage, wie Entwicklungsgelder in afrikanischen Ländern wirksam eingesetzt werden können. Durch die Linse der Entwicklungsökonomie betrachtet, werden zwei afrikanische Länder, nämlich Kenia und Uganda, analysiert: ihre koloniale Geschichte, d.h. ihre ursprünglichen Institutionen und Fundamente, die die Kolonialzeit hinterlassen hat, gefolgt von ihren postkolonialen nationalen Entwicklungsplänen bis heute, und wie Entwicklungspartnerschaften und -hilfe in den strategischen Wachstumsplan jedes Landes integriert sind. Danach geben bewährte Praktiken aus jedem Land Aufschluss über die Rolle der Entwicklungspartner, die Art und Weise, wie die Regierungen Partnerschaften und Hilfe verwalten, und wie die Ergebnisse verschiedene Akteure hervorgebracht oder beeinflusst haben.

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION

Development has become the ultimate buzzword over the last decades in the international sphere. Now we have the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, culminating in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which were adopted in 2015 by all United Nations (UN) Member States.[1] Before they arrived on the scene, in September 2000, UN Member States adopted the Millennium Declaration at the Millennium Summit, creating the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aimed at ultimately reducing extreme poverty in just five years – by 2015.[2] These goals were not the first attempt by the UN in setting an international development agenda.

The year 1960 saw the admittance of 17 countries to the UN as member states including: "Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta".[3] With the wave of independence over the African continent, the UN as an institution saw a massive shift in not only its membership but its obligation towards said members, especially regarding the development trend of the 1960s aimed at reducing world hunger – focusing on the newer members from the African, Asian, Pacific and Caribbean regions of the world.[4] This lead for instance to the establishment of the World Food Programme (WFP) in 1961. Simultaneously, it was recognised that the people from many developing countries suffered from more than just hunger, which led to the 1960s being proclaimed as the "United Nations Development Decade", where developing countries created their own targets of economic development as "a minimum annual growth rate of 5 per cent of aggregate national income".[5]

[1] "THE 17 GOALS | Sustainable Development", www.*sdgs.un.org*, 2022, https://sdgs.un.org/goals.

[2] Peter Jackson, "A Prehistory of The Millennium Development Goals: Four Decades of Struggle for Development in The United Nations | United Nations", *United Nations*, accessed 7 June 2022, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/prehistory-millennium-development-goals-four-decades-struggle-development-united-nations.

[3] "Growth In United Nations Membership | United Nations", *United Nations*, 2022, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership#1960s.

[4] Peter Jackson, "A Prehistory of The Millennium Development Goals: Four Decades of Struggle for Development in The United Nations | United Nations", *United Nations*, accessed 7 June 2022, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/prehistory-millennium-development-goals-four-decades-struggle-development-united-nations.

[5] Peter Jackson, "A Prehistory of The Millennium Development Goals: Four Decades of Struggle for Development in The United Nations | United Nations", *United Nations*, accessed 7 June 2022, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/prehistory-millennium-development-goals-four-decades-struggle-development-united-nations.

Developing countries established the Conference on the Problems of Economic Development (9-18 July 1962, in Cairo, Egypt) where they collected and discussed recommendations pertaining to the objective of the international development campaign in order for their development concerns to be accurately addressed and included in the principles that would form the foundation of the Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries, which the Assembly and wider UN system would consider when addressing any economic and social development of developing countries.[6]

There are numerous attempts to establish and support an international agenda on development, not just by the UN, but by most international organisations in one manner or another. The development seen in Africa since most country's independence in the 1960s is impressive, but majority of the continent is still suffering from the consequences of underdevelopment. These factors being worsened on an extreme basis of late by climate change and subsequent security and basic needs crises including mass migration, loss of natural water sources, desertification of previously arable land, and now even pandemics.

Development aid to Africa has always been deemed what will solve the above-mentioned crises. During the 1960s, "the assumption during this period was that the old colonial powers would gradually phase out their direct financial aid as colonies became independent and multilateral organisations like the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund took over development work.".[7] The 1960s saw the real start to aid commitments for development as countries who had no colonial ties to poorer, underdeveloped countries, began to understand and flag the need for humanitarian aid and development aid for specific struggling countries. In 1968, head of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, came up with the idea to change concept of development aid and rather focus donor-funded programs on what he identified as basic needs within the sectors of water, sanitation, health and education.[8]

[6] Karl P. Sauvant, "The Early Days of The Group Of 77 | United Nations", *United Nations*, accessed 7 June 2022, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/early-days-group-77.
[7] Keri Phillips, "The History of Foreign Aid", *www.reliefweb.int*, 2013, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/history-foreign-aid.
[8] Keri Phillips, "The History of Foreign Aid", *www.reliefweb.int*, 2013, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/history-foreign-aid.

The newer "development cooperation on the basis of mutual self-interest", here the prime example showing the new donor-recipient relationship is visible when looking at the Chine-Africa development aid relationship.[9] To be understood by this 'new' relationship, is that China is afforded the privileged position of being the buyer of raw materials coming out of Africa in exchange for helping with the development of the respective African countries' economic and social development. This new type of 'cooperation' is endorsed by most current leading world powers. What is consistently reiterated, mainly by the leading powers, are that this relationship is not in any shape or form that of the previous colonial powers, but rather one of horizontal cooperation. However, ideological dissonance amongst aid-related agencies between the objective of development being economic growth or being "greater human wellbeing" has left development strategies often inconsistent.[10]

Aid effectiveness, assessing the degree of failure or success of development has become an increasingly important aspect of the donor-recipient aid relationship and the evolution of the concept of development aid. The main motivation behind this paper bringing in the aspect of aid effectiveness as a main factor in analysis is that whilst aid programmes have been around for decades, in many forms and for many reasons with the initial aid donor-recipient relationship between government supplied aid to stable low-income governments, this relationship has changed drastically and finds itself in a new era, however the "rules of the game" have stayed rather unchanged. Aid effectiveness aims to identify what is working best, and where not, but moreover how to improve the donor-recipient relationship.

On the international level, aid effectiveness has sparked multilateral initiatives to ensure it's factored into the overall development roadmap and aid programmes. Such initiatives include: the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, and the 2011 Busan Partnership Agreement. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was a roadmap that set principles and practical actionable objectives improving the impact and quality of aid by 2010.[11] The idea behind this Declaration was

[9] Keri Phillips, "The History of Foreign Aid", *www.reliefweb.int*, 2013, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/history-foreign-aid.
[10] Keri Phillips, "The History of Foreign Aid", *www.reliefweb.int*, 2013, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/history-foreign-aid.
[11] https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/paris-declaration-on-aid-effectiveness_9789264098084-en

founded in the fact that aid should be producing more impact than we are seeing, and that development initiatives need to base off of first-hand experiences of those on the ground that know what is working but also what is not.[12] The pillars formulated out of this dialogue and Declaration are, namely: "Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results, and Mutual Accountability".[13]

The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) brought together over 3000 civil society organisations, 80 developing countries, and all OECD donors.[14] The main areas of improvement identified by the AAA as needing improvement and strengthening were namely: "ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivery results, capacity development".[15]

The Busan Partnership Agreement contains a set of principles to make development co-operation more effective, namely: "ownership of development priorities by developing countries; a focus on results; partnerships for development; and shared transparency and shared responsibility".[16] Noteworthy here is that the Agreement was formed on the base of consensus between various organisations and governments. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) was established as a direct consequence of the Busan Partnership Agreement.

There exist only tools to help international organisations, regional bodies and country-level officials to plan on what to prioritise and how to implement development activities, including monitoring and evaluation reporting. For example, the 17 SDGs, including their 169 targets, create such a framework. Moreover, the United Nations published in 2019 the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, previously known as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which equally facilitated what development should look like and the targets necessary to see success. There exists no current general (and sustainable) framework for African countries of good practices of them using development aid.

[12] https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827300.pdf
[13] https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm
[14] https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827311.pdf
[15] https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm
[16] https://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm

QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The hypothesis this paper employs the following argument:

Should Country X be given development aid, it is assumed that, should the development aid be used in a certain manner, Country X will develop. It is then assumed that should Country X continuously develop over time, that there should be something they are repeating over time that culminates in one or many good practices in using development aid for development. Should there be any good practices, across the various countries researched, it is hypothesised these good practices could be synergised creating a general framework of (sustainable) good practices that could then be applied or employed by any/all African countries that receive development aid to maximise development growth.

RELEVANCE OF TOPIC

This paper aims to make a general contribution to scholarship on how to effectively use development funding in African countries. There is vast literature as to how it ought to be done and little on what is actually working on the ground. As a practical person myself, who aims to build a hands-on career within the field of development in Africa, finding out the practices currently working for African countries is key in my personal academic knowledge and skill development. Moreover, should it be possible to find enough practices in so far as to create a framework, this would be most advantageous in guiding future engagements with development funding, regardless of whether it be of the side of a multilateral institutional like the UN, or from the national side, for my home country South Africa, negotiating terms of cooperation with development partners.

STRUCTURE

After this introductory chapter, the thesis is structured to next provide an overview of existing and relevant literature to this study, specifically focusing on development economics and effective development. Then the methodological framework used to conduct the thesis will be presented. Moving on to the analytical section of the thesis, the chapters are arranged individually per country providing a brief introduction to the colonial history of each country, giving a sense of the institutions and foundations of the country left behind by colonial times. This is followed by an analysis of each country's development plan and how development partnerships and aid are presented and incorporated into each country's strategic growth plan. After which a few examples of good practices from each country are presented, indicating how development partners are involved, how governments manage partnerships and aid and how the outcomes are created or affected by the different actors. To conclude, the data found and analysed from each country will be presented together indicating the similar and/or duplicable good practices of government and development partner engagement toward effective development.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The overview of relevant literature aims to cover vast ground over two disciplines, namely political economy of development and development economics. Referring back to the hypothesis, the review starts with a foundation in: What is development? How to measure development? How other countries developed?

In their book on the Economics of Development published in 2006, authors Perkins, Radelet, Lindauer dive into the issue of how to measure economic growth and development. The first measurement proposed is Gross National Product (GNP), which is defined as the "the sum of the value of finished goods and services produced by a society during a given year".[17] GNP is the same concept as what many multilateral institutions refer to as the Gross National Income (GNI) of countries.[18] However, what is heard more commonly when speaking about economic growth is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of countries. The GDP differs only in one aspect from the GNP in that it includes all output produced within the borders of a country, including that of foreign residents and excluding the value of production from its citizens living outside of the borders.[19] When the GDP is divided by the country's entire population, it produces the measurement, per capita income.[20] The weakness within merely using GDP as a measure of economic growth, is that it fails to include unpaid labour in the forms of household members performing services that are paid for in higher-income or more developed countries.[21] Unpaid labour distorts the GDP not just in the services sector of day-care or cleaning, but also in agriculture where unpaid household members produce food and other goods and services communally on their family farm for their own consumption.[22] A further weakness of the GDP lies in the dilemma of accounting for the bad products of a society

---

[17] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 32.
[18] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 32.
[19] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): pp. 32-33.
[20] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 33.
[21] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 34.
[22] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 34.

such as the cost of pollution, congestion and even crime.[23] This study will be comparing several countries therefore, according to Perkins et al., the per capital incomes must be measured and compared in a common currency.[24] Here, attention must be paid to exchange rates of developing countries as they can be distorted due to direct government intervention and/or trade restrictions that set exchange rates.[25] A measurement proposed by Perkins et al. to counter this issue is to use a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate.[26]

Another measurement of development is provided for by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), through their annual Human Development Report, starting in the 1990s, that aimed to situate citizens back at the middle of the development process.[27] To quantify this goal, the Human Development Index (HDI) was created, combining tools of measurement such as "years for life expectancy, school enrolment rates and percent of literate adults for education, and dollars of income for access to resources".[28] Since the 90s, weaknesses to this index were identified, resulting in the addition of further measurement indicators such as gender-related development and human poverty.[29]

Reassessment of development and its measurements resulted in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), setting 8 specific goals aimed at a universal fight against poverty towards development for all.[30] Interesting to this study, is the 13th target, although non-binding, that focused on "the special needs of the least developed countries" including recommendations on relief of debt and providing an increased amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) by wealthier nations.[31] The MDGs

---

[23] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 34.
[24] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 35.
[25] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 35.
[26] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 36.
[27] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 45.
[28] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 46.
[29] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 47.
[30] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 50.
[31] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 52.

cemented an international precedent that "recognized the positive correlation between economic growth and human development.".[32]

Building on this understanding, Perkins et al. agrees with Amartya Sen, as states in her book, *Development as Freedom*, that the definition of development must venture beyond that of merely income and Gross National Product.[33] Sen identifies political and civil freedoms, specifically democratic rights and liberties, as fundamental parts of human freedom which he states become the building blocks of development.[34] This freedom-centred approach is based on the concept of 'quality of life' as a measurement for development, a concept traced back Adam Smith's own examination of "necessities and the conditions of living".[35]

It is theorised that there are five main characteristics that are attributed to developing countries that grow rapidly, namely: macroeconomic and political stability; favourable environment for private enterprise; investment in health and education; effective governance and institutions; favourable geography.[36]

Macroeconomic stability is determined as: continuous low budget deficits in conjunction with high levels of government savings; cautious monetary policy holding inflation in check; suitable exchange rates; financial markets and sustainable borrowing practices in accordance with their stage in development.[37] Indicators such as high rates of inflation and volatile short-term capital flows, are known to undermine growth through making profits and prices less predictable.[38] Sen argues that democratic governments are incentivised to implement institutions that provide economic security, a dimension of economic development, by needing to win elections and having to face public criticism.[39] Further argued by Sen is the relationship between the market mechanism and freedom, freedom of exchange and freedom of transaction, freedoms vital to economic

[32] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 54.
[33] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): p. 14.
[34] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): pp. 16-17.
[35] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): p. 24.
[36] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): pp. 76-89.
[37] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 76.
[38] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 77.
[39] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): p. 16.

development.[40] A country's openness to foreign trade highly influences growth as businesses can specialize, become more efficient, access global leading technologies, and reduce their costs by accessing global less expensive suppliers.[41] Increase in openness to foreign trade does however allow for an increase in the country's vulnerability to world market shocks.[42]

Political instability is tolerated by the economy when it is mostly short-lived, but issues like Paul Collier's "insidious negative cycle of civil war in low-income countries" shows that not only is there a direct correlation between poverty and the risk of conflict, but conflict naturally deters any forms of economic growth and increases the levels of inequality and poverty in developing countries.[43]

Many studies show the positive results from investing in the health and education aiming to improve the life expectancy of citizens of developing countries. A longer life expectancy influences growth through creating a more productive and healthier labour force, naturally increasing productivity, which might increase savings and capital accumulation.[44] There is a direct and positive correlation between growth and life expectancy as the better the health, the faster the growth of a population, and faster growth tends to improve life expectancy.[45] This income and mortality relation is entirely dependent on upon the community relations and social arrangements within the country, namely: "medical coverage, public health care, school education, law and order prevalence of violence".[46]

Economic growth needs the environment to take seed and prosper. These are argued to be effective governance and institutions, a concept dating back to the beginning of the 1990s.[47] Douglass North, found a positive relationship between "economic growth and the

---

[40] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): pp. 25-26.
[41] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 86.
[42] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 86.
[43] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 78.
[44] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 79.
[45] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p 80.
[46] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): pp. 22-23.
[47] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 81.

strength of the rule of law, the extent of corruption, property rights, the quality of government bureaucracies, and other measures of governance and institutional quality".[48] Sen argues additionally for media and communication institutions as intrinsic to the development process.[49] Moreover, strong government economic institutions, for instance the Central Bank or government ministries of finance or trade, are key in creating policies that will centre on both productivity and factor accumulation for economic growth.[50] To have economic growth that sustains itself in the long-run, policy makers are advised to strengthen their market by creating space and opportunities for small businesses, by having some regulation, by investing in infrastructure – the example given that no matter the policy climate, no one can start a business when the electricity is shutting down every other day.[51]

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue the 'reversal of fortunes' theory of development, more intelligently known as "the reversal in relative incomes among the former European colonies".[52] They argue, the different trends that have emerged on economic growth are best explained by the "institutions hypothesis", which states that governments that give incentives and provide opportunities for investment tend to be richer than those who do not, on the basis that if a society is given a set of institutions that enable them to secure property rights, there is a direct correlation to economic growth as investment requires strong institutions of private property.[53] What would be unwanted for sustained economic growth would be what Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson call extractive institutions where a small political elite hold the concentration of the power producing high risks of expropriation of the rest of society resulting in investment being discouraged and an

[48] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 81.
[49] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): p. 53.
[50] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 81.
[51] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 85.
[52] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (November 2002): p. 1231.
[53] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (November 2002): p. 1234.

overall lack of economic development.[54] Taking the institutions hypothesis, they looked at countries previously under European colonisation in the past 500 years. What they found was that in "prosperous and densely settled areas, Europeans introduced or maintained already-existing extractive institutions to force the local population to work in mines and plantations, and took over existing tax and tribute systems", but contrastingly, in "previously sparsely settled areas, Europeans settled in large numbers and created institutions of private property, providing secure property rights to a broad cross section of the society and encouraging commerce and industry". [55] When industrialization came in the nineteenth century, those in countries with institutions of private property were advantaged the most and also took the opportunity more than others, to industrialize.[56] The reversal of incomes is shown as a reflection of the effects of the reversal of institutions these countries underwent upon European colonisation.[57]

Extractive institutions have been inherited by African countries from European colonialists. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue these extractive institutions can be easily identified as being in areas where Europeans could not settle in large amounts due to the high mortality rate they experienced there.[58] Such areas are identified as the Congo and the Gold Coast, where a purely extractive system to export the abundance of resources was implemented.[59] They argue these institutions are still in place and present today, that they still are detrimental to investment and economic development, and that

---

[54] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (November 2002): p. 1235.

[55] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (November 2002): p. 1279.

[56] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (November 2002): p. 1279.

[57] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (November 2002): p. 1279.

[58] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation", *The American Economic Review* 91, no.5 (December 2001): p. 1369.

[59] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation", *The American Economic Review* 91, no.5 (December 2001): p. 1395.

fundamentally the colonial experience in its entirety, but not solely accounts for current institutional failure and low income per capita.[60]

Yoo and Steckel build on Acemoglu et al. showing in a study on Japanese colonies in Asia that there is a direct correlation between property rights and economic development. They argue people are less willing to invest in a prospect in a country where there is a possibility of others being able to "seize the returns of their investment".[61] Accessing an abundance of reliable data from the early 20th century, Yoo and Steckel discovered that secure property rights did in fact stimulate economic growth.[62] Secure property rights were explored as being: a thorough land tenure system; and a properly surveyed land, characterised as having clearly defined boundaries and title registrations.[63] Furthermore, they identified especially in agricultural economies, that land could then be used as collateral through property right ownership which in turn boosted the financial markets.[64] This in combination with the legitimate land tenure system, brought in not only investment, but technological innovation and an overall increase in productivity, especially within agriculture.[65] In turn, all leading to a clear and sustainable economic development.

Where Sen argues for democratic institutions and civil freedoms, Acemoglu highlights the natural Korean experiment. Korea was split into two independent states that have chosen to organise themselves in contrastingly different manners, the North choosing communism, removing private property rights for land or capital, with the state dictating all economic decisions, whereas the South kept a capitalist economic system and maintained private property rights.[66] This natural experiment is one of a kind as before their split, Korea held the same culture, language, ethnic homogeneity, geography and

[60] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation", *The American Economic Review* 91, no.5 (December 2001): p. 1295.
[61] Dongwoo Yoo and Richard H. Steckel, "Property rights and economic development: the legacy of Japanese colonial institutions", *Journal of Institutional Economics*, (2016): p. 1.
[62] Dongwoo Yoo and Richard H. Steckel, "Property rights and economic development: the legacy of Japanese colonial institutions", *Journal of Institutional Economics*, (2016): p. 24.
[63] Dongwoo Yoo and Richard H. Steckel, "Property rights and economic development: the legacy of Japanese colonial institutions", *Journal of Institutional Economics*, (2016): p. 24.
[64] Dongwoo Yoo and Richard H. Steckel, "Property rights and economic development: the legacy of Japanese colonial institutions", *Journal of Institutional Economics*, (2016): p. 24.
[65] Dongwoo Yoo and Richard H. Steckel, "Property rights and economic development: the legacy of Japanese colonial institutions", *Journal of Institutional Economics*, (2016): p. 24.
[66] Daron Acemoglu, *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*, 2009. Chapter 4: pp. 125-126.

even income per capita, in the North and South.[67] The only difference they essentially maintain is their difference in institutions, which has led to divergent economic results.[68]

Mukand and Rodrik question "what constitutes policies to promote economic growth", in their 2005 study *In Search of the Holy Grail*.[69] Their research concludes that policy makers that allow for the creation of a "country-specificity of policies", in combination with the opportunity to learn from successful leaders, creates policies stimulating economic development.[70] They researched the difference between policy makers experimenting with policy or imitating policy from other countries. Their findings indicate that whilst experimentation brings a higher level of risk, the result ends up being a policy solution closer to the ideals of said country whilst imitation allows for an overall avoidance of risk, it results in policies suboptimal policy solutions pertaining to that country.[71] In their experimentation of learning from successful leaders, only countries that had a "very close degree of similarity to the leader" benefited whilst it negatively impacted countries that held a level of similarity indicated as "intermediate" and worse, further creating suboptimal policies.[72]

A country's location, especially if located between the Topic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn, can have a huge impact on economic growth based on factors such as: contagious diseases, unpredictable climate, poor-quality soil.[73] Being a landlocked country or island also play a determining factor as it increases transport costs in the aims of reaching major markets or coastal economies.[74] Perkins et al. indicates that countries most affected by the favourable geography theory, are those landlocked countries found in the Sahara Desert, namely: Ethiopia, Mali, Chad, Niger, Sudan, Burkina Faso.[75] Mellinger

[67] Daron Acemoglu, *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*, 2009. Chapter 4: p. 126.
[68] Daron Acemoglu, *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*, 2009. Chapter 4: p. 126.
[69] Sharun W. Mukand and Dani Rodrik, "In search of the holy grail: policy convergence, experimentation, and economic performance.", *The American Economic Review* 95, no. 1(March 2005): p. 374.
[70] Sharun W. Mukand and Dani Rodrik, "In search of the holy grail: policy convergence, experimentation, and economic performance.", *The American Economic Review* 95, no. 1(March 2005): p. 382.
[71] Sharun W. Mukand and Dani Rodrik, "In search of the holy grail: policy convergence, experimentation, and economic performance.", *The American Economic Review* 95, no. 1(March 2005): p. 382.
[72] Sharun W. Mukand and Dani Rodrik, "In search of the holy grail: policy convergence, experimentation, and economic performance.", *The American Economic Review* 95, no. 1(March 2005): p. 382.
[73] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 88.
[74] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 89.
[75] Dwight Perkins, Steven Radelet and David Lindauer, *The Economics of Development*, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006): p. 90.

et al. validate this statement in that they argue climate and coastal proximity are the two key geographical elements for economic growth.[76] Their findings showed more than half of global economic output can be attributed to countries within 100km of sea-navigable waterways.[77] Ecozones closer to the water can average 10 times the GDP compared to those more inland.[78] Mellinger et al. concluded countries in the tropics and the interior regions do not see sustained long-term economic development as they are overcome with disease or temperate climates, naturally leading to a lower level of productivity especially in the agricultural area which is key in sustaining economic development.[79] Mellinger et al. address past theories such as of how temperate zones would develop in terms of technological barriers and what role climate would play for technological development – mainly concluding that owing to globalization spreading telecommunication and data transmission technology rather easily in these regions and due to the cost reduction seen in land and air travel during the 20th century, these temperate climates have seen more development than expected.[80]

An infamous theory of economic development for developing countries that explains their growth rate is that of the natural resource curse. The curse, "an observation that countries rich in natural resources tend to perform badly", is empirically proven and been studied since 1990 by various researchers in the field.[81] Sachs and Warner state the curse originally entered the international academic field of study during the inter-war period in Latin America.[82] The resource-abundant countries tend to be mineral-intensive and have seen a stagnation in their growth dating back to the beginning of the 1970s.[83] More importantly, the findings of Sachs and Warner show these cursed countries have a

[76] Andrew D. Mellinger, Jeffrey D. Sachs and John L. Gallup, *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2000): p. 191.
[77] Andrew D. Mellinger, Jeffrey D. Sachs and John L. Gallup, *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2000): p. 191.
[78] Andrew D. Mellinger, Jeffrey D. Sachs and John L. Gallup, *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2000): p. 191.
[79] Andrew D. Mellinger, Jeffrey D. Sachs and John L. Gallup, *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2000): p. 191.
[80] Andrew D. Mellinger, Jeffrey D. Sachs and John L. Gallup, *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2000): p. 192.
[81] Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, "The curse of natural resources in Natural Resources and Economic Development", *European Economic Review Journal* 45, (2001): p. 827.
[82] Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, "The curse of natural resources in Natural Resources and Economic Development", *European Economic Review Journal* 45, (2001): p. 828.
[83] Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, "The curse of natural resources in Natural Resources and Economic Development", *European Economic Review Journal* 45, (2001): p. 837.

tendency to also be high-price economies and subsequently fail to foster export-led growth – whilst their abundant resource sector allows for a rather rapid growth as seen with the likes of Botswana, there is a failure to create growth and export growth in other sectors.[84]

The relation between unemployment, income and poverty is intrinsic to understanding development and fostering development. Sen argues poverty is to be evaluated as not just having no or low income, but as a "deprivation of basic capabilities", which directly creates inequality.[85] There is a psychological side to poverty that is proven to have a direct influence upon the development process. Sen argues unemployment specifically leads to citizens being socially excluded from certain groups within society, to having a loss of self-reliance, and self-confidence, which in combination leads to bigger issues of not just psychological but physical health.[86]

Thus far, the literature review provides an understanding as to the theories and research done on the topic of development economics in respect to political science and economics. This study aims to contribute to this rich body of literature by researching the role of development aid in the process of development. How is development aid best used to spur development? How can countries use development aid more efficiently? What needs to be factored in to make aid effective? These questions lead us to discuss the factors and institutions that are crucial for successful development aid. Additionally, what hinders this – learning what not to do, is equally as insightful and advantageous for countries as learning about what has worked for others.

The Brookings Institute, in a 2009 published paper on aid effectiveness in Kenya, highlighted three main areas through which aid effectiveness is being influenced, namely: the volatility of foreign aid; the fragmentation of foreign aid; and the coordination of foreign aid.[87]

---

[84] Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, "The curse of natural resources in Natural Resources and Economic Development", *European Economic Review Journal* 45, (2001): p. 837.
[85] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): p. 20.
[86] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): p. 21.
[87] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 35.

It is volatile and even unpredictable regarding the volume and timing and/or arrival of foreign aid.[88] Aid donors are driven by political agendas and their advancement of political hold over states.[89]According to *The 2010 Brookings Blum Roundtable Policy Briefs*, in 2007 foreign aid recipient countries on average each received 263 donors missions – resulting in some countries like Ghana and Kenya creating "mission-free periods" giving officials back time to fulfil their domestic obligations. [90] Aid donors have complicated disbursement procedures leaving countries waiting unprecedented periods of time before they see the pay out of funds that have been committed long before.[91] This results in recipient countries of foreign aid having no way in which to plan the funds into their government expenditures, let alone in the long term for sustainable growth of development projects and a stable flow of the necessary resources.[92] Governments will lean towards "quick-yielding projects" to facilitate the sporadic nature that foreign aid rolls in, making long term development uncertain and frankly, impossible.[93] Governments need multi-year commitments from aid donors, along with predictable and reliable fund pay outs in exchange for sustainable development programs focused on macro level results.[94]

According to the Brookings Institute 2009 study, there are three ways in which fragmented foreign aid starts negatively effecting countries, namely: increased transaction costs incurred by recipients when donors apply strenuous rules and procedures to developments projects/programmes; large fixed costs and high returns to

---

[88] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 12.

[89] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 12.

[90] *Making Development Aid More Effective*, The 2010 Brookings Blum Roundtable Policy Briefs (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2010): p. 4.

[91] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 12.

[92] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 12.

[93] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 14.

[94] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 15.

scale; and undermining of recipient's financial and administrative abilities through demanding specific projects, instead of providing programme aid.[95] These costs generate recurring cost issues and take away the legitimacy of local bureaucrats by forcing a focus on donor-driven projects instead of letting local agencies decide and coordinate what is best to strengthen the local communities and governance.[96] Governments start being more accountable to their aid donors than to their own citizenry.[97] Bräutigam and Knack found in Sub-Saharan Africa, that high transaction costs associated with foreign aid programs were negatively effecting governments, and weakening local and national institutions.[98] In a joint UN and OECD report (2008) on why aid effectiveness matters, donor-driven aid projects were deemed as hindering sustainable development as they do not run parallel to the aid recipients institutions or governance, stating once implementation is complete, donors leave a gap in local capabilities and incentives to continue the project.[99]

An enhancement of country's capacity for ownership of their own aid coordination and a harmonization and alignment between donors and recipients of foreign aid procedures are the biggest reforms needed to allow for successful coordination of foreign aid.[100] Aid needs to be coordinated in that it is interlined with other development policies including those covering investment and trade - emphasizing here that the private sector is the main way through which to foster development.[101] This is reiterated by the Africa Union in their report on *Africa's Integration into the Global Economy* (2018), where they state ODA would be better used towards "encouraging investment in Africa's productive assets", elaborating that donors have focused on social sectors for aid funds to mainly fight

[95] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 20.
[96] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 20.
[97] Eveline Herfkens and Mandeep Bains, *Reaching Our Development Goals: Why Does Aid Effectiveness Matter?* (UN/OECD Publishing, 2008): p. 7.
[98] Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, "Foreign Aid, Institutions, And Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52, no. 2 (2004): p. 277.
[99] Eveline Herfkens and Mandeep Bains, *Reaching Our Development Goals: Why Does Aid Effectiveness Matter?* (UN/OECD Publishing, 2008): p. 5.
[100] Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers, *A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health*, The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009): p. 27.
[101] *Making Development Aid More Effective*, The 2010 Brookings Blum Roundtable Policy Briefs (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2010): p. 4.

extreme poverty but that a re-organising of aid allocations towards financial sectors to drive growth through the economy would be more beneficial to all those suffering the effects of poverty.[102]

[102] AUC/OECD, *Africa's Development Dynamics 2018: Growth, Jobs and Inequalities* (Addis Ababa/Paris: AUC/OECD Publishing, 2018): p. 59.

3. METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This research study is designed as a casual empirical study. Conclusions of this study will therefore be concretely drawn from empirical evidence.

Disciplines

This study will analyse the effective use of development aid by African countries from the point of view of two core disciplines of the MAIS programme, namely, economics and political history.

Research Methods

This study uses a mixture of research methods. On the one hand, it uses the longitudinal study method by which good practices, here seen as behaviour and decisions, can best be observed and determined over a period of time. On the other hand, a case study method is employed as various African country results will be compared to comparatively determine a framework of good practices. A mixture of quantitative and qualitative data is used. Quantitative data in the main form of statistics are used. It is a secondary data research collection from a readily available variety of sources, based primarily on external secondary data. This existing data ranges from government national statistics to statistics generated by international organisations and agencies, to independent think tanks. Qualitative data in the form of official government and institutional reports and national policies are analysed.

Sampling

The sampling process started with two data bases found on the OECD Statistics online data base, filtered by the theme of Development, and then by the theme of Flows by Provider and Recipient. Under this theme, the first data set analysed was 'Total official development flows by country and region (ODF)' and the second, 'AID (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions'. Each data set provided the amount of aid received in Millions of US Dollar (2019 currency value) received. Table 1.1 shows the top twelve highest aid recipients of ODF. Table 1.2 shows the top twelve highest aid recipients of ODA. Table 1.3 cross-references tables 1.1. and 1.2, to find out which countries in the overall top twelve recipients of ODF and ODA aid, most frequently receive aid. It is hypothesised that the countries who receive the highest amount of funds for development [inset text]

Table 1.3 shows the first six countries, namely: Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, received aid consistently every year and placed in the top twelve highest receiving countries consecutively for the years 2016 to 2020, in both tables.

Table 1.1:

OECD.Stat: Development: Flows by Provider and Recipient: Total official development flows by country and region (ODF)
Ranked according to highest amount received in US Dollar, Millions, 2019

	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016
1.	Kenya	Ethiopia	Egypt	Nigeria	Egypt
2.	Ethiopia	Egypt	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Ethiopia
3.	Egypt	Nigeria	Nigeria	Morocco	Morocco
4.	Morocco	Kenya	Mozambique	Tanzania	Nigeria
5.	Uganda	DRC	Kenya	Kenya	Kenya
6.	DRC	Morocco	Tanzania	Egypt	Tanzania
7.	Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	South Sudan	DRC
8.	Nigeria	Uganda	DRC	DRC	Uganda
9.	Mozambique	Mozambique	Cameroon	Uganda	South Sudan
10.	Ghana	Senegal	Malawi	Mozambique	Mozambique
11.	Cote d'Ivoire	Mali	South Sudan	Ghana	Sudan
12.	Niger	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Ghana

Link to data collection site: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?ThemeTreeID=3&lang=en

Table 1.2:

OECD.Stat: Development: Flows by Provider and Recipient: AID (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions
Ranked according to highest amount received in US Dollar, Millions, 2019

	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016
1.	/	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Ethiopia
2.	/	DRC	Nigeria	Nigeria	Tanzania
3.	/	Kenya	Kenya	South Sudan	Kenya
4.	/	Nigeria	Tanzania	Kenya	South Sudan
5.	/	South Sudan	South Sudan	Tanzania	Nigeria
6.	/	Somalia	DRC	Uganda	Uganda
7.	/	Uganda	Mozambique	Somalia	Mozambique
8.	/	Tanzania	Uganda	Mozambique	South Africa
9.	/	Mozambique	Somalia	DRC	DRC
10.	/	Mali	Mali	Morocco	Morocco
11.	/	Cameroon	South Africa	Malawi	Somalia
12.	/	Senegal	Malawi	South Africa	Malawi

Link to data collection site: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?ThemeTreeID=3&lang=en

Tables 1.3:

Results based on a cross-reference of Tables 1.1 and 1.2, ranking countries according to the number of times appeared

	Country	Number
1.	Kenya	9
2.	Ethiopia	9
3.	Uganda	9
4.	Nigeria	9
5.	Mozambique	9
6.	DRC	9
7.	Tanzania	7
8.	South Sudan	7
9.	Somalia	7
10.	Morocco	6
11.	Egypt	5
12.	Malawi	4
13.	Ghana	3
14.	Mali	3
15.	South Africa	3
16.	Sudan	2
17.	Cameroon	2
18.	Niger	1
19.	Cote d'Ivoire	1

These top six countries are the highest development aid recipients for ODA by DAC countries in the years 2016-2020. ODA is the biggest source and channeler of development funding and is viewed as a reliable and trustworthy source. It is assumed that the countries receiving the highest amounts of development aid must on the one hand show great potential for development as development partners are willing to give so much money but on the other hand desperately need the funds for development and are therefore incentivised to create an environment for effective development to maintain that level of donor support.

Initially this thesis set out to analyse all six countries highlighted above, however data, time and word limitations culminated in only two countries being chosen for review, namely, Kenya and Uganda. These two were chosen out of the six after extensive research into government databases and project reporting databases in aid of finding reliable and accurate, and also recent data on this topic.

4 COUNTRY CASE: KENYA

4.1 COLONIAL HISTORY

In 1750 the nomadic cattle herders, the Masai, entered into present-day Kenya from the north, and by the 1850s they spread along the coast near Mombasa.[103] In 1498, Vasco Da Gama and his fleet arrived in East African on their initial voyages to the East Indies.[104] Meaning the Portuguese were the initial European settlers along the coast of nowadays Kenya.[105] The Masai violently fought and resisted the presence of the Portuguese, which eventually in the Portuguese being forced out of the coastal towns they had tried to settle in and colonise along the Kenyan coastline.[106] In the 1880s and 1890s major outbreaks of cattle-disease and smallpox broke out and infighting saw the Masai weakened by the 1890s.[107]

Before the 19th century, before the arrival of the British, settlers in Kenya did not venture further than the coast, leading to the British discovering the entire Kenyan hinterland.[108] The Kikuyu people, the indigenous community that lived in Kenya before any European settlers arrived, lived around Mount Kenya which they called Kerenyaga or Kirinyaga ("mountain of whiteness"). When the British arrived, the mountain was their main landmark and became the symbol of the colony once claimed, but they could not pronounce the indigenous name of the mountain and instead called it Mount Kenya, giving Kenya its present-day name.[109]

By 1884, history sees European countries desperately scrambling for African colonies, resulting in the Berlin Conference being convened to distribute the colonies amongst the

103 "The Colonization of Kenya", Black History Month 2022, 2020, https://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/article/section/african-history/the-colonisation-of-kenya/.
104 "About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.
105 "General Information About Kenya | Kenya", www.un.int, accessed 30 July 2022, https://www.un.int/kenya/kenya/general-information-about-kenya.
106 "About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.
107 "The Colonization of Kenya", Black History Month 2022, 2020, https://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/article/section/african-history/the-colonisation-of-kenya/.
108 "General Information About Kenya | Kenya", www.un.int, accessed 30 July 2022, https://www.un.int/kenya/kenya/general-information-about-kenya.
109"About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.

European rivals, where present day Kenya was given to the British.[110] The Berlin Conference, the 1886 Anglo-German Agreement, along with inter-European territorial agreements, culminated in erecting the artificial territorial boundaries setup to create present-day Kenya, forcefully bringing together more than 40 priorly independent and indigenous communities.[111] The Imperial British East Africa Company was established by the British government as a trading company to go, setup and administer the land.[112] The trading company was unable to contain and control the hostility of the local communities upon their arrival, and the British East African Company went bankrupt because Kenya had minimal minerals to exploit compared to other colonies like Uganda, which led the British government to take over the land from the Company and establish Kenda as their colony on July 1st, 1895 and installed sir Arthur Hardinge as the first formal British Governor.[113] Despite the British colonial trend of indirect rule, many indigenous leaders lost their and their community's sovereignty to colonial rulers who were sent to replace them.[114] Enforcing colonial rule was originally difficult in Kenya because of the population demographics which saw Indians outnumbering white persons with a ration of two to one, and the currency used at the time was the Indian Rupee.[115]

Colonial rule in Kenya was characterised by harsh and racial discriminatory economic, political and social policies as it was the only way the British could establish and consolidate their power.[116] The most significant colonial economic policy that was enforced in Kenya was the so-called 'Land alienation for European settlers', the taxation on Africans, and the forced and migrant African labour specifically geared towards building the settlements and subsequent production needs like agriculture and commodity production, for colonialists.[117] One specific tax was called the hut tax implemented in 1902 which decreed for every hut owned by a family, the government was

110 "About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.
111 Peter O Ndege, Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya, e-book, 2009: p. 2-3.
112 "About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.
113 "About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.
114 Peter O Ndege, Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya, e-book, 2009: p. 3.
115 "The Colonization of Kenya", Black History Month 2022, 2020, https://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/article/section/african-history/the-colonisation-of-kenya/.
116 "About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.
117 Peter O Ndege, Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya, e-book, 2009: p. 5.

to be paid a tax. This created the need for a monetary income, meaning indigenous Kenyans who had never before needed to, now had to source a job where they would be paid a monetary wage – ironically, if one did not pay the tax, a monetary fine was issued, and if left unpaid, led to legal forced labour.[118] Another tax implemented was a poll tax collected per citizen, additionally if you did not work directly for the British settlers, one had to work an additional 60 days for the government per year.[119] Vast fertile land was removed from local possession, especially arable land, and was given to white settlers, and labour laws forcefully made locals work on such white settler farms for extremely low wages and no benefits. [120] Environmental degradation becomes widespread in Kenya under colonial rule and its commodity production which because of malpractice and concessions culminate in massive deforestation. [121] Officially in 1913, the British government passed a land bill that stated any white British settler was allowed a 999-year lease on any land thereby monopolising land use in their favour.[122]

Indirect rule by colonialists left the local people extremely excluded and distant from politics and governance.[123] Legislative and executive councils who formulated budgets and policies were run by colonialists from Nairobi after broad scale plan development and approval from London.[124] Participation by local Kenyans in politics was confined to local municipal government participation.[125] The allowed low level of political engagement came in the forms of native tribunals, local native councils, and chief's councils, which was arguably a "mockery of democracy" as all forms were chaired by colonial district officers which kept locals subordinate and served as an burden of administrative costs and political expedience.[126]

118 "The Colonization of Kenya", Black History Month 2022, 2020, https://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/article/section/african-history/the-colonisation-of-kenya/.
119 "The Colonization of Kenya", Black History Month 2022, 2020, https://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/article/section/african-history/the-colonisation-of-kenya/.
120 "About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.
121 Peter O Ndege, Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya, e-book, 2009: p. 5.
122 "The Colonization of Kenya", Black History Month 2022, 2020, https://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/article/section/african-history/the-colonisation-of-kenya/.
123 Peter O Ndege, Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya, e-book, 2009: p. 4.
124 Peter O Ndege, Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya, e-book, 2009: p. 4.
125 "About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington D.C.", www.kenyaembassydc.org, accessed 30 July 2022, https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.
126 Peter O Ndege, *Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya*, e-book, 2009: p. 4.

Important characterisations of colonial times that create disarticulation for post-colonial, independent Kenya, are mainly the structural and geographical. Geographical in terms of how urban areas were built and development concentrated only in those areas, mainly with the intention of being for white settlers, such as Naivasha, Eldoret, Kisumu, Nakuru, Mombasa, and Nairobi. Outside of these main developed areas, there are limited activities and services available. Structural disarticulation in the form of the economy being extremely narrow and lacking enough diversity, only being able to adequately do few activities such as agriculture and a small range of secondar industries, relying quite significantly on primary commodities such as flowers, pyrethrum, tea and coffee used for international trade. Moreover, the external link of Kenya's currency, makes it vulnerable to world price volatility. [127] For commercial trade partners and later after independence, also for development aid partners, Kenya relies heavily on Britain, and other European states[128]

In 1944, the Kenyan political party, the Kenyan African Union (KAU) is established to fight for African independence.[129] Three years later, Jomo Kenyatta becomes the new leader of the KAU.[130] In 1952 and 1953, the Mau Mau, a secret guerrilla group from the Kikyuyu start becoming violent against the white settlers.[131] The Mau Mau rebellion ends in 1956.[132] In March 1957, elections are held and subsequently the racial barriers to the Kenyan government are slowly lifted.[133] In 1960 the state of emergency ends in Kenya as Britain announces the intention of transforming Kenya into an African majority rule state.[134] This sees the establishment of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) by founders Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya.[135] In 1961 Jomo Kenyatta is released from his two years of house arrest and becomes president of Kanu.[136] Two years later, in 1963, as Kenya becomes independent, Kenyatta becomes the country's new prime minister.[137] Then, in 1964 Kenya

[127] Peter O Ndege, *Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya*, e-book, 2009: p. 6.
[128] Peter O Ndege, *Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya*, e-book, 2009: p. 7.
[129] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.
[130] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.
[131] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.
[132] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.
[133] "General Information About Kenya | Kenya", *www.un.int*, accessed 30 July 2022, https://www.un.int/kenya/kenya/general-information-about-kenya.
[134] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.
[135] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.
[136] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.
[137] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.

becomes the Republic of Kenya and Jomo Kenyatta officially becomes the new president.[138]

[138] "Kenya Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.

4.2 THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND PARTNERS

The Kenya Vision 2030, launched in 2008 by President Mwai Kibaki, is the current national development strategy for the country made up of three medium term development plans and one agenda called the Big Four.

First Medium Term Plan, for the period of 2008 to 2012.

> A Public Financial Management (PFM) Reform Program will be implemented by government and development partners, providing "a positive shift in investor and creditor confidence as well as boost growth by providing the fiscal resources to raise public development spending from 4.6 per cent of GDP in 2006?07 to 9.5 per cent of GDP by 2012.".[139]
>
> Section 2.4 provides an overview of the strategy toward external financing and explains Kenya is expecting total donor support to increase from 3.9 per cent to 4.6 percent during the period of 2007/08 to 2012/13, on the premise that the increase will be met as development funding absorption capacities will improve.[140] Overall donor support to Kenya's development plan is expected to increase and provide donor's with confidence under the new Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS), but also after MTPI has implemented certain reforms and has improve governance.[141]
>
> In a section on Resource Mobilisation, the MTPI highlights a "significant (financial) gap" remaining to fully implement the develop plan.[142] The development budget for MTPI is sources from government funding, the Kenyan National STI Fund, venture capital, tax concessions and STI levy, and development partners. Development partners are said to be supporting the plan through specific initiatives and their engagement is used "to full in the resource gap", emphasising the relationship to the partner will be "based on the needs and policy direction of the Vision 2030" but

[139] Office of The Prime Minister, Ministry of State for Planning, *First Medium Term Plan, 2008-2021* (Nairobi, Kenya: Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2008): p. 11.
[140] Office of The Prime Minister, Ministry of State for Planning, *First Medium Term Plan, 2008-2021* (Nairobi, Kenya: Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2008): p. 13.
[141] Office of The Prime Minister, Ministry of State for Planning, *First Medium Term Plan, 2008-2021* (Nairobi, Kenya: Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2008): p. 13.
[142] Office of The Prime Minister, Ministry of State for Planning, *First Medium Term Plan, 2008-2021* (Nairobi, Kenya: Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2008): p. 32.

that all development partners will need to form and join a Joint Financing framework through that will handle the funds needed for the project implementation.[143]

Second Medium Term Plan, for the period of 2013 to 2017.

Under the Economic Pillar of the MTPII, the Kenya Climate Fund (KCF) is named the main way through which financial resources are to be mobilised from development partners toward the any climate change activities and projects.[144]

Under the Social Pillar of the MTPII, Education and Training Financing envisions the development of a financing model that will allow for but mainly be in place to guide the participation of stakeholders such as development partners[145]

Under the Implementation Framework section of the MTPII, a key requirement mentioned is the "Adherence by the government and development partners to Aid Effectiveness and General Principles of Partnership that will ensure faster and full absorption of donor funded programmes and projects to achieve development results". [146]

Section 7.6. on Aid Effectiveness and General Principles of Partnership outlines the role of government and development partners for the period of the MTPII. On average 57 per cent of the Kenyan development budget is described as being sources externally, however the low absorption ratio of ODA leaves only around 44 per cent per annum of this funding utilized. Kenya foresees under the MTPII increasing this rate to more than 80 per cent.[147] How this will change is accredited to "a more vigorous implementation of Aid Effectiveness and Partnership Principles", naming five Aid Effectiveness principles as: "Country Ownership and Leadership; Alignment and Use of Country systems; Harmonisation; Managing for

---

[143] Office of The Prime Minister, Ministry of State for Planning, *First Medium Term Plan, 2008-2021* (Nairobi, Kenya: Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2008): p. 33.

[144] The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, *Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013): p. 67.

[145] The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, *Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013): p. 77.

[146] The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, *Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013): p. 112.

[147] The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, *Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013): p. 114.

Development Results; and Mutual Accountability."[148] Furthermore, stating that the cooperation is guided by requirements of not only the Constitution, but the Public Finance Management Act (2012), and the Kenya External Resources Policy (2013).[149]

The Aid Effectiveness and Partnership principles are presented as two separate action-based lists, one for Government and one for Development Partners.

"The Government will:

- Set the country's development objectives and policies through a broad based and inclusive stakeholder dialogue and consultations.
- Translate Vision 2030 into prioritized results oriented operational programmes as expressed in Medium Term Plans (MTP), Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF), and annual budgets.
- Take the lead in coordinating ODA assistance among development partners, civil society and private sector.
- Coordinate and maintain a harmonized and rationalized timetable for all development partners' joint missions.
- Adopt a participatory approach in formulating a Mutual Accountability Framework and joint assessment of progress to achieve aid and development effectiveness.
- Ensure a smooth transition in development partners' engagement at the county level.
- Harmonize the definition of sectors for MTP and MTEF to improve consistency and transparency on the annual budgetary allocations compared to development priorities defined in the MTP. This will also enable development partners to align their support to MTP and the budget process
- Develop harmonized MTP and MTEF indicators that will be used to track annual progress of set targets

[148] The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, *Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013): p. 114.
[149] The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, *Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013): p. 114.

- Coordinate the Development Partnership Forum (DPF), which is the principal forum for follow up, review and dialogue between Government and Development partners."[150]

Development Partners will:

- Align their various country strategic policies and assistance programmes to Vision 2030, Second MTP, the revised Public Procurement and Disposal Act and other relevant Acts of Parliament.
- Align their support to the country through use of GoK's country systems in budgeting, procurement, reporting, accounting, auditing and monitoring and evaluation. Annual assessments will be done to monitor progress of development partners use of country systems.
- Ensure that their support is integrated within the MTP framework and use the sector wide approaches and Sector Working Groups (SWGs) in planning, budgeting and implementation of programmes
- Undertake division of labour process as agreed on in the Mutual Accountability Framework led by the Government.
- Work closely with the National Treasury to ensure that development partner support is integrated into the MTEF to provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi -year period (3 years). This information will be provided at least three months before commencement of the finalisation of the preparation of the annual budget. In addition, development partners will submit expenditure returns to the National Treasury on resources channelled to nonstate actors on a quarterly basis.
- Development partners will seek to improve the predictability of aid flows and absorption of aid funding.
- Commit to update information on Appropriation in Aid in NIMES including e-ProMIS to ensure timely information and transparency in implementation of programmes/projects

[150] The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, *Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013): p. 114.

- Hold Development Partners Group (DPG) meetings for review and follow up on the effectiveness of their support to government"[151]

Third Medium Term Plan (MTPIII) and the Big Four Agenda, for the period of 2018 to 2030. The Big Four Agenda focuses on food security, affordable housing, manufacturing, and affordable healthcare for all. In reference to development partners and development assistance, the MTPIII emphasises the following points:

> Learnt since that "Effective collaboration, networking and linkages between the Government, the private sector and development partners is critical for successful implementation of key programmes".[152]
>
> In aid of strengthening the public sector and its institutions, MTPII aims to build up "Collaboration with Development Partners to support technical and capacity building programmes through: Kenya Country Support Programme; Kenya Devolution Support Programme; Governance for Enabling Service Delivery and Public Investments Programme; and Agence Francaise de Development (AFD)".[153]
>
> MTPII thematic on Early Childhood Development and Education (ECDE) achieved target only due to investment by development partners and county governments specifically focusing on this level of education.[154]
>
> MTPIII implementation reforms include an "Adherence by the Government and Development Partners to Aid Effectiveness and General Principles of Partnership to ensure faster and higher absorption of donor funds to achieve development results".[155] Diving into further detail, an entire section on "Aid Effectiveness and General Principles of Partnership" is provided for.[156] As a member of the Global Partnership for Effective Development cooperation (GPEDC), the four principles of

[151] The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, *Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013): p. 115.
[152] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 56.
[153] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 30.
[154] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 80.
[155] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 113.
[156] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 114.

Effective Development Cooperation are used as a guiding tool to ensure effective implementation of all development programmes. The four principles are outlined in the MTPIII as: "Country Ownership of Development priorities by recipients of development assistance; Focus on Results; Inclusive Development Partnerships; and Transparency and Accountability". [157] The MTPIII further elaborates that effective development cooperation specifically in Kenya is implemented at technical and policy levels and through various multi-stakeholder partnerships, not just government and development partners. Kenya acknowledges that for full implementation of the GPEDC principles, strong leadership by Kenyan Government is required, along with Government ownership which should be guided by "the Constitution, Public Finance Management Act, Kenya External Resources Policy and the Devolution Policy" and emphasise the accountability principle of the framework, in so far that the progress made by government should be measured and made open.[158] Implementation progress reporting under MTPIII is on a quarterly and annual basis by MCDAs and consolidated by the National Treasury and Planning and are shared with development partners.[159]

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is briefly mentioned in the role is plays in supporting the development budget. In the previous MTPII, ODA provided on average 53.6 per cent of the budget for development, the example of 2016/17 given where it provided 50.4 per cent of the development budget which was calculated at 16.4 per cent of the Kenyan total national budget.[160] A critical challenge arising in the MTPII was "low absorption of development partner funds in the development budget slowing down project implementation".[161] An emerging issue arose during MTPII, seeing "reduced financing due to change in policies of major development partners.". [162] MTPIII sets out to "ensure higher absorption of ODA" ensuring

[157] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 114.
[158] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 114.
[159] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 115.
[160] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 114-115
[161] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 2.
[162] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 107.

effective implementation and achievement of desired targets, specifying that on the national and county level the GPEDC principles and the 2016 Nairobi Outcome Document on GPEDC will be used.[163]

The MTPIII provides a list of actions that the Kenyan Government and development partners commit to and commit to implement when working together to ensure the GPEDC principles are met. Actions of importance are:

- "Ensure that Development Partners' Country Assistance Strategies and Programmes are aligned to Kenya Vision 2030 and the MTP III;
- Sensitization and implementation of the Kenya External Resources Policy;
- Adhere to laws, regulations, and policies relevant to development finance;
- Implement the operational guidelines for development partners' engagement at the counties;
- Champion the use of country systems in budgeting, procurement, reporting, accounting, auditing, and monitoring of government programmes and projects;
- Regular joint assessments will be done to monitor progress of development partners' use of country systems;
- Finalize the integration of the electronic Project Monitoring Information System (e-ProMIS) with other governmental financial systems and ensure full implementation of all modules in e-ProMIS by all actors;
- Promote broader engagement of the public in the budgeting process;
- Improve the engagement modalities with non-traditional development partners and other non-state actors;
- Improve the predictability of development finance by ensuring that development partners provide reliable indicative commitments over a multi-year period (3 years) within the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF);
- Ensure that expenditure returns are submitted to the National Treasury on resources channelled directly to implementing agencies by development partners;

[163] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 115.

- Coordinate and maintain a harmonized and rationalized timetable for all development partners' joint missions;
- Operationalize and strengthen inclusive joint sector working groups between Government, development partners and non-state actors;
- Strengthen the capacities of existing projects' monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure timely availability of information and transparency in implementation of programmes and projects;
- Support reduction in data gaps by capacity building through appropriate financial and technical support to improve the national statistical capacity;
- Develop networks for knowledge exchange, peer learning and coordination among South-South and Triangular cooperation and establish a South-South Centre;
- Hold regular technical and policy level meetings for review and follow-up on implementation of effective development cooperation principles and commitments;
- Establish a National Coordinating Mechanism to facilitate Monitoring and Evaluation of implementation of various bilateral, regional and international cooperation frameworks as well as international obligations between the Government of Kenya and foreign governments, regional and international organizations; and
- Promote Nairobi City as an economic and diplomatic hub."[164]

To summarize, MTP I, II and III have spanned over the years 2008 until present. MTPI emphasised the need for a Public Financial Management (PFM) Reform Program, better absorption of development funds and that development partners should only "fill in the gap" of what the development budget is missing, on the basis of a joint financing framework. MTPII emphasised an Education and Training Financing model for development partner participation, a Kenya Climate Fund (KCF) to channel and organise all climate change related development funding, and the Aid Effectiveness and General Principles of Partnership, specifying the five Aid Effectiveness principles that should

[164] The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building, *Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022* (Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018): p. 115.

guide development partnerships going forward. Moreover, the Constitution, the Public Finance Management Act (2012), and the Kenya External Resources Policy (2013) were named as crucial instruments in guiding the development plan and partnerships with foreigners. Interesting to note is that government and development partner actions and commitments were explicitly listed separately in the development plan, while harmonization and ownership of the national development plan seemed most important. MTPIII emphasised collaboration with development partners and other stakeholders as key to effective development and assertation of goals. Yet again, the Aid Effectiveness and General Principles of Partnership principles were mentioned as the foundation of partnership engagement, however this type "adherence by the Government and Development Partners" to said principles was highlighted. New to the plan was the introduction of the Global Partnership for Effective Development cooperation (GPEDC), and their four principles, which took the forefront, indicating the older Aid Effectiveness Principles are now to the GPEDC the equivalent of what the MDGs are to the SDGs. Low absorption rates of development funds were critically named as a hinderance to project implementation and continuation. A key change is the new mutual list of actions and commitments based on GPEDC principles for government and development partners to adhere to, indicating a move towards actual cooperation and mutual accountability.

4.3 GOOD PRACTICES OF GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNER ENGAGEMENT

4.3.1 e-ProMIS – Electronic Project Monitoring Information System for the Government of Kenya

In a move to facilitate the creation open data in the area of development aid and development projects through the Open Aid Partnership of the World Bank, the Kenyan government developed an automated information management system that is fundamentally a data repository of development project information. Government and development partners input information into the data repository, and various stakeholders, including policy makers, the media, even civil society, have open access to the platform and its information.[165]

Launched in 2010, the project aims to improve the transparency and efficiency of the Kenyan national development plan and to increase the availability and accessibility of information on government spending. Disclosing information on use and allocation of domestic resources creates a critical tether between civil society and government.

Some qualitative and quantitative issues relating to data supply and accuracy have been identified, specifically the updating process of projects. This challenge limits the platform from reaching its intended and full potential, however the demand for what the platform is providing in terms of being a tool for tracking and analysing the inherent flows of development aid by project and provider into Kenya, is expected to be incentive enough for the technological and operational side of the project to install better mechanisms for creating a more accurate data supply. The manager of e-ProMIS, Christopher Oisebe, identified that whilst public officials have been instructed through a circular from the Treasury to use the system, there is "a lack of greater buy-in from middle management within government".[166] A response to this project challenge was implement regular trainings for public officials on how to use the system.

[165] Daniel Nogueira-Budny, "Boosting Demand for Open Aid Data: Lessons from Kenya's E-Promis", *World Bank Blogs*, 2016, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/boosting-demand-open-aid-data-lessons-kenya-s-e-promis.

[166] Daniel Nogueira-Budny, "Boosting Demand for Open Aid Data: Lessons from Kenya's E-Promis", *World Bank Blogs*, 2016, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/boosting-demand-open-aid-data-lessons-kenya-s-e-promis.

This good practice was partially funded by development aid, but also fills a gap felt by most donor-recipient-citizen dynamics, namely: integration of development project information linking the budget, plan and policy of each project; efficiency of monitoring and evaluation processes aligning with national development strategy and policy; and transparency and accountability in the source, amount, and allocation of development aid for all to see, including civil society.[167]

4.3.2 M-Pesa – Mobile money service

The M-Pesa, mobile money service project is allowed as evidence of a good practice in Kenya given that it is still ongoing and has required over the years constant engagement by government and other stakeholders.[168] Often development aid is used for a once-off project, and either the donor funding ends or is pulled after a certain time period, or the project reaches its initial objectives and has no project plan beyond this, and no one plans for the sustainable longevity of the project. The M-Pesa project, however, is still 15 years later succeeding in Kenya.

M-Pesa is a mobile money service that taps into the market of microfinances. It allows you to with your mobile cell phone, via a SMS-based system, transfer money be it depositing money, sending someone money, or even withdrawing money yourself.[169]

The mobile money service was and still is the solution to many developing country challenges including: the difficulty of attaining a bank account, the fees and minimum amounts attached to commercial banks, physical access to banking institutions, and non-cash methods of payment that is not subject to being easily stolen. The service also allows for those Kenyans working outside of the country, or perhaps in the capital, to send remittances back to their families.

The project was created and run by Safaricom and Vodafone. Safaricom is the largest operator in Kenya of mobile services, is 40 per cent owned and part of the UK Vodafone

---

[167] "Kenya Electronic Project Monitoring Information System (Epromis) | Synergy International Systems", *Synergy International Systems*, accessed 11 June 2022, https://www.synisys.com/featured-projects/kenya-electronic-project-monitoring-information-system-epromis/.

[168] "Leveraging Mobile Phones to Enable Basic Banking, Payments, And Economic Growth", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2017, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2021-06/Delivery%20Note%20Kenya%20M-Pesa.pdf.

[169] "Mobile Currency in Kenya: The M-Pesa", *Centre for Public Impact (CPI)*, 2016, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/m-currency-in-kenya/.

Group, and is 35 per cent owned by the Government of Kenya.[170] The initial idea of creating this mobile currency service for the Kenyan market was derived from research of the UK Department for International Development (DFID).[171] The research showed a practice where individuals would as a proxy for money, transfer mobile phone airtime to other individuals.[172] There was a clear development need identified for Kenyans. A finding that spurred this project on, was that in 2007, around 83 per cent of Kenya's population that was 15 years of age and older, had possessed a mobile cell phone that had embedded SIM cards which are known to enable payment transactions.[173] The DFID provided extra development aid than originally intended for this project which was aimed at improving access to financial services through its Financial Deepening Challenge Fund.[174] In under just two years, M-Pesa claimed the spot of the country's leading money transfer method and by 2015, had 19.9 million active users, with 43 per cent of the Kenyan GDP flowing through the mobile currency service.[175]

The government played a critical role in reforming financial regulations to allow for the M-Pesa service as it was technically not a banking service tied to a commercial bank in the country. Only with the partnership between the UK DFID, the Government of Kenya and the private sector could this project be actualised. Since its inception, M-Pesa now boasts partnerships with all major Kenyan banks, and even secured international money transfers for their clients through a partnership with the Western Union Bank.[176]

4.3.3 Menengai Geothermal Field Development

The project, and subsequent Geothermal Development Company (GDC), was established by the Government of Kenya in 2011 in response to the national energy supply, consisting

[170] "Mobile Currency in Kenya: The M-Pesa", *Centre for Public Impact (CPI)*, 2016, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/m-currency-in-kenya/.
[171] "Mobile Currency in Kenya: The M-Pesa", *Centre for Public Impact (CPI)*, 2016, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/m-currency-in-kenya/.
[172] "Mobile Currency in Kenya: The M-Pesa", *Centre for Public Impact (CPI)*, 2016, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/m-currency-in-kenya/.
[173] "Leveraging Mobile Phones to Enable Basic Banking, Payments, And Economic Growth", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2017, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2021-06/Delivery%20Note%20Kenya%20M-Pesa.pdf.
[174] "Mobile Currency in Kenya: The M-Pesa", *Centre for Public Impact (CPI)*, 2016, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/m-currency-in-kenya/.
[175] "Mobile Currency in Kenya: The M-Pesa", *Centre for Public Impact (CPI)*, 2016, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/m-currency-in-kenya/.
[176] "Mobile Currency in Kenya: The M-Pesa", *Centre for Public Impact (CPI)*, 2016, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/m-currency-in-kenya/.

almost 50 per cent on hydropower, being increasingly disturbed and made unreliable from the impacts of the change in climate and population's rapid demand for electricity. The Company was tasked with making use of the vast geothermal resources home to Kenyan territory that is estimated "7,000 to 10,000 megawatts (MW)". The country's development plan aims to tap into at least 5,000 MW of this energy source by 2030. Research showed interest from the private sector in developing such a power supply downstream as capital investment and high resource risks hindered them from undertaking the upstream development including that of explorations and the field development. To fill the gap between private sector interest and challenges, the Company was created to "carry out surface exploration, exploratory and production drilling, and sales of stream to third parties, including independent power producers".[177] The Menengai field is the first to be developed through the Company and project. The Menengai field of the project is funded by the African Development Bank, AfDB and the Climate Investment Funds.[178]

By overtaking the risk from the private sector through the Company and development funding, the Menengai Model shows how Government can facilitate public-private partnerships to bridge a gap in development that would otherwise not allow for the renewable energy source to be explored and established as an alternative to the "short-term, high-cost, fossil-fuelled thermal generation". [179] The mixture of stakeholders mitigated risks and provided a wealth of knowledge and finance, one company alone could never have accomplished. Moreover, "DFI-supported investments by the public sector in the stream development phase underpinned an effective package of financial incentives and risk assurance that attracted private sector investors. The perceived risk profile of future projects is expected to improve over time based on positive GDC and KPLC track records, making it possible to eventually phase out the use of such financial

[177] Jans van den Akker, "Geothermal Energy Powering Kenya's Future: Menengai Geothermal Field Development Facilitated by Public-Private Partnerships | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2018, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/geothermal-energy-powering-kenyas-future-menengai-geothermal-field-development-facilitated.

[178] Jans van den Akker, "Geothermal Energy Powering Kenya's Future: Menengai Geothermal Field Development Facilitated by Public-Private Partnerships | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2018, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/geothermal-energy-powering-kenyas-future-menengai-geothermal-field-development-facilitated.

[179] Jans van den Akker, "Geothermal Energy Powering Kenya's Future: Menengai Geothermal Field Development Facilitated by Public-Private Partnerships | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2018, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/geothermal-energy-powering-kenyas-future-menengai-geothermal-field-development-facilitated.

instruments".[180] Additionally, "the desired commercial rate of return was ultimately achieved by means of concessional loans. It took several years to reach this set of agreements and financing solutions. Learning from this experience can help future public-private partnerships in geothermal energy move more quickly".[181]

4.3.4 Strengthening Management for Health in Nyaza Province

Launched originally in 2009, the project ran until 2013 and is therefore, with a majority of its duration taking place within the examined time period of 2010-2020, included in this study. The project was originally put forward by JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) to improve the quality of life and health services for Kenyans through creating a stronger health care system by building up the capacity of the relevant health care sector's management teams. The project faced major challenges as up until 2010, Kenya operated as a centralized state through which development partners easily set their own agenda as to what they wished Kenya to focus on with their funds for development. The health care sector was deeply affected by this infringement by foreign agendas. The project was furthermore challenged by various other development partners that were involved in similar trainings for the health care sector, these included: the World Health Organization, the U.K. Department for International Development, and the Danish International Development Agency – all holding official approval from the Kenyan Ministry of Health to undertake these projects. The level of confusion on behalf of the targeted management teams of this sector, not forgetting the inconsistency across the board between these trainings, showed the fragmentation within Government itself and a lack of ownership within the country towards its development plan and development funding. When the regime changed in 2010, so with it came a breath of fresh air into the project around 2012: a strategic partnership with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and the U.S. Agency for International Development allowed for the facilitation of information sharing between development partners, including

[180] Jans van den Akker, "Geothermal Energy Powering Kenya's Future: Menengai Geothermal Field Development Facilitated by Public-Private Partnerships | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2018, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/geothermal-energy-powering-kenyas-future-menengai-geothermal-field-development-facilitated.

[181] Jans van den Akker, "Geothermal Energy Powering Kenya's Future: Menengai Geothermal Field Development Facilitated by Public-Private Partnerships | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2018, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/geothermal-energy-powering-kenyas-future-menengai-geothermal-field-development-facilitated.

observations made in the trainings and a sharing of technical support; the 'new' Ministry of Health harmonized the existing programs by standardizing the Kenyan national training program for the health care sector. The project was invited by the Ministry of Health to participate in revising the national training programme and give insights based on the project's experiences, allowing for a development partner inclusive and an all-round more contemporary evidence-based approach across the nation.[182]

4.3.5 The Lamu Port and South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor [183]

Kenya, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan partnered up together in a multi-stakeholder project to create an infrastructure corridor in East Africa joining all three countries including highways, crude oil pipelines, railway lines, airports, resort cities and a dam on the Tana River.[184] The project reaches rural parts of the country bringing, integrating Kenyans into the national development economy. The project predicted bringing in a three per cent increase to the GDP by 2020.[185] Despite being a multi-country project, LAPSSET was originally designed by the Government of Kenya and public private partnerships have become essential in terms of funding and implementation of the project. The Public Private Partnerships Unit estimated about USD 24.5 billion necessary to fully implement the project, averaging per year at USD 2-3 billion.[186]

In 2014, the China Communication Construction Company (CCC) was awarded the bid to construct part of the project (three berths) at the Lamu Port for USD 484 million. The European Union, the African Development Bank and the Kenya Government are jointly funding and constructing a 505 kilometre Isiolo-Moyale A2 highway to allow for cross-border and regional trade between Nairobi, Lamu and Addis Ababa.[187] Kenya is using

---

[182] Keiko Kita and Kana Takio, "Global Delivery Initiative: Strengthening Health Systems Management Under Decentralization in Kenya", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2019, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2021-06/strengthening_health_systems_management_under_decentralization.pdf.

[183] "Partnering To Make In-Roads for Kenya's Development | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2020, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/partnering-make-roads-kenyas-development.

[184] "LAPSSET Corridor Program", 2022, https://www.lapsset.go.ke/.

[185] "LAPSSET Corridor Program", 2022, https://www.lapsset.go.ke/.

[186] "Partnering To Make In-Roads for Kenya's Development | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2020, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/partnering-make-roads-kenyas-development.

[187] "Partnering To Make In-Roads for Kenya's Development | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation", *Effectivecooperation.Org*, 2020, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/partnering-make-roads-kenyas-development.

LAPSSET to simultaneously address infrastructure issues and gaps whilst growing the national economy and creating economic opportunity in remote areas of the country. The project is seeing many challenges arise out of what can only be called poor planning as many local communities, environmentalists and private sector actors have expressed concern with the ambitious project. Local communities felt an intrusion from government but through civil society dialogues led together by local leaders and municipal government officials, locals were sensitized on the idea and now understand but have also provided input as to how they foresee the economy in their areas bring built up. New infrastructure brings vast opportunity for development, job creation but also allows for basic services to be provided on a consistent and more easily accessible basis for citizens such as water and electricity.

5 COUNTRY CASE: UGANDA

5.1 COLONIAL HISTORY

Around 1500, the Bito dynasties of Ankole, Bunyoro and Buganda were founded by immigrants in the South of present-day Uganda.[188] Uganda was not invaded, but gradually over time more and more travellers settled on the land.[189] By 1700 and 1800, the Buganda had expanded negatively impacting the Bunyoro and gaining control of the land bordering on Lake Victoria.[190] The first European coloniser to visit Uganda and British explorer, John Hanning Speke, arrived in 1862.[191]

Compared to historical colonial development of other states, British colonisation did not create racial and cultural divisions in the country, these already existed, specifically showing development distinctions between the North and South of Uganda.[192] The North was seen as more rural and simpler whereas the South was quite organised and centralised, split into various kingdoms, a famous one being the Kingdom of Buganda – also where the country's name originates from.[193]

The King of Buganda, Mutesa I, gave Christian missionaries permission to enter his kingdom.[194] More white settlers that arrived came in the form of Christian religious missionaries from the British Missionary Society in 1877.[195] The colonialists provided cash to kingdoms for invading and conquering new land.[196] The British colonialists viewed

---

188 "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.
189 Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.Uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.
190 "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.
191 "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.
192 Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.
193 Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.
194 "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.
195 Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.
196 Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-

South Uganda as "sophisticated" due to their political structures in place and began inserting themselves purposefully in this area.[197] Colonialists increased the political, educational and economic advancement of the South over the North, which benefited the colonialists most as the Bugandans became "agents of their imperialism" as the British quite easily deployed the Bugandans to go and conquer surrounding kingdoms.[198]

In 1890, Germany signed a treaty allowing Britain the rights to the land of present-day Uganda.[199] The trading company, the Imperial British East Africa company in 1892 extends their control overtaking southern parts of Uganda.[200] The period spanning from the 1890s to the 1930s was a health wise a tough period in African history which the British perceived as a direct crisis to their development plans for the land as population size was in decline in the main centralized kingdoms, which could leave the newly acquired land in jeopardy economically and socially.[201]

In 1894, Uganda officially becomes a British protectorate.[202] The success of the Baganda kingdom left the rest of the country feeling divided, especially as the British policies provided advantages and royalties as payment for their loyalty.[203] The Baganda army was disbanded by the British once they had served their purpose and the British had consolidated their rule.[204] Buganda gains autonomy in 1900 after signing an agreement with the British, establishing Buganda as a constitutional monarchy to be controlled by

---

content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.

[197] Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.

[198] Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.

[199] "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.

[200] "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.

[201] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 788.

[202] "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.

[203] Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.

[204] Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.

the Protestant chiefs who had settled there.[205] The British used Northerners mainly for unskilled labour such a working on plantations, whilst using Southerners in educational and civil service purposes.[206] The southern land of Uganda was very fertile and was exploited by the colonialists for mass production of cash crops, mostly coffee and cotton – with the cotton commercial cultivation starting in 1904.[207] But many epidemics had made it difficult to live in Uganda, from the bubonic plague, to cholera, smallpox, and even a sleeping sickness called trypanosomiasis.[208]

The Ugandan Agreement of 1900 was negotiated between the British and the Kingdom of Buganda and cemented the authority of the British enforcing new hierarchies of indirect rule between chiefs and bakopi (peasants), enforcing land distribution, taxation, and new chiefs. The tax was to be collected in a "traditional manner" through the chiefs but this actually created "a set of salaried administrators who were beholden to the colonial administration (and tax collection) for their livelihood".[209] Taxation was introduced by the British into Ugandan society in 1901 after it became a Protectorate as British social and administrative change and rule was brought in, which initiated major changes to society.[210] Taxation introduced monetary payments and currencies into Ugandan life, which spilled over into traditional life as well such as changing social relations like bridal dowries into cash instead of gifts.[211] Other taxes included a hut tax and a gun tax, where tax could be paid in labour, but equally labour obligations to the state existed, especially for the bakopi who had no rights under the Uganda Agreement.[212]

The population decline was blamed on sexually transmitted diseases, specifically syphilis, which was at the time confused with gonorrhoea and endemic yaws due to the similarity

---

[205] "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.
[206] Colette Armitage, "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda", *www.cers.leeds.ac.uk*, 2015, https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.
[207] "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.
[208] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 787.
[209] Michael Tuck, "Poverty, Health and Reproduction in Early Colonial Uganda", *Social History of Medicine* 19, no. 1 (2006): 168-170, doi:10.1093/shm/hkj022: p. 226.
[210210] Michael Tuck, "Poverty, Health and Reproduction in Early Colonial Uganda", *Social History of Medicine* 19, no. 1 (2006): 168-170, doi:10.1093/shm/hkj022: p. 221.
[211] Michael Tuck, "Poverty, Health and Reproduction in Early Colonial Uganda", *Social History of Medicine* 19, no. 1 (2006): 168-170, doi:10.1093/shm/hkj022: p. 222.
[212] Michael Tuck, "Poverty, Health and Reproduction in Early Colonial Uganda", *Social History of Medicine* 19, no. 1 (2006): 168-170, doi:10.1093/shm/hkj022: p. 240.

of the symptoms.[213] And so with the population decline, women suddenly become important to the white settlers for repopulation of land and thereby the workforce, but first to counter the "sexual deviance" proven with the syphilis outbreak, they had to essentially "re-educate" and "re-brand" Ugandan women through the different interventions.[214] Following the World War, the British installed "social hygiene" strategy into the Ugandan society to counter the population crisis. The strategy was taken up in three manners, through a medical intervention, a moral intervention, and an institutional intervention.[215]

The medical intervention brought commissions from London to expect and evaluate the crisis, which meant after the intervention was over, many scientists and doctors stayed behind in Uganda. An administrative health intervention into the lives of those living in the Protectorate also left behind a type of public health system and initiated a pattern of medical commission visits that brought with and advocated for population management and certain coercive therapies. Once the health crisis mainly pertaining to the sleeping sickness was in check, the population size had gravely decreased and the administration turned to assess the low birth rates, especially since the lowest birth rates were found in Buganda, which was supposed to be the economic centre and politically stable sphere of the Protectorate.[216] Buganda had become quite significant gem to British colonial rule, which showed when Buganda received around 2000 pounds sterling per year as a means to fight disease and was viewed as "one of the blessings of European Civilization".[217] The institutional intervention implemented motherhood programs and education focusing on girls in an aim to reshape African families and counter the 'future' sexual deviance in them that would accelerate the syphilis crisis.[218] The moral intervention came as the health crisis was originally founded on the basis of a syphilis outbreak which left the Christian missionaries identifying anyone ill as equally being immoral as they were assumed to be

---

[213] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 787.
[214] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 806.
[215] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 788.
[216] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 789.
[217] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 792.
[218] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 799.

having nonmonogamous sex, seeing the administration request funding from London to build isolation hospitals specifically for syphilis treatment.[219] In 1918, a Maternity Training School was founded and run by the Church Missionary Society which trained teenage girls from Uganda as midwives and sent them to care for mothers and their children. A shocking turn of events occurred in 1924, when it was recorded that for the first time in Uganda since becoming a protectorate, there were more births recorded than deaths.[220]

By 1958, the British hand over internal control to Uganda, allowing them self-governance.[221] Uganda gained independence October 9th, 1962, and elects Dr. Milton Apollo Obote as prime minister, and a year later becomes a republic with the King of Buganda, Mutesa II as the new president.[222]

---

[219] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 793-4.
[220] Carol Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807, doi:10.1086/494703: p. 787.
[221] "Uganda Profile - Timeline", *www.bbc.com*, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.
[222] "Brief Political History of Uganda", *www.ottawa.mofa.go.ug*, accessed 30 July 2022, https://ottawa.mofa.go.ug/data-smenu-11-Political-History-of-Uganda.html.

5.2 THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND PARTNERS

Uganda Vision 2040 was officially launched April 18th, 2013; however, the National Vision Framework consists of six five-year National Development Plans, of which three have been published and implemented.

National Development Plan I, for the period of 2010/11-2014/15.

> NDPI outlines a Partnership Policy and Memorandum of Understanding that the government and all development partners will need to sign, clearly addressing and bringing all parties involved to agreement on: "alignment of aid with country priorities and systems, transaction costs/burden of inefficiency, coordination with development partners and other stakeholders, predictability of and information on aid flows, mutual accountability for development results, partnerships beyond aid".[223]
>
> In the section that follows the Partnership Policy, NDPI lays out the "strategies to improve the Effectiveness of Partnerships and Assistance", highlighting major issues such as off-plan and off-budget development assistance, meaning not linked or reflecting the government's priorities or disbursement procedure.[224] Technical assistance is identified as often undermining the local capacity instead of enhancing it.[225] Misalignment in many sectors are reflecting weak strategies or perhaps even non-existent ones and while the government is fixing this, development aid needs to be funnelled through the government so that the government can disburse the necessary amounts where needed in sectors that have some type of plan in place ensuring funds are not 'misplaced' and misused.[226]
>
> Development partners are provided guidelines from the government on how they can reduce the transaction costs involved in development aid donation and receipt, including: an aid modality of general budget support to easily align funds with the development plan and priorities, encouraging here the Joint Budget Support Framework as a solution for mutual accountability and transparency; only

[223] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010): p. 68.
[224] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010), p. 68.
[225] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010), p. 68.
[226] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010), p. 68.

on an exceptional basis should parallel implementation structures occur for projects, and normally the Public Financial Management (PFM) and procurement structures should be used; with more than 40 development partners, aid fragmentation is detrimental to Uganda, therefore to effectively use aid Uganda encourages co-financing and division of labour across partners; and finally an aid mission free closed season will take place so that Government has time to accurately formulate the budget without engagement (also stated in the Partnership Policy).[227]

The Local Development Partners' Group (LDPG) is established for a singular channel through with official communication for the purposes of development assistance between the Ugandan government and development partners will take place.[228]

NDPI recognises predicting development aid disbursements in regard to timing and volume is critical in setting up an accurate development budget and critical for effective management of public resources, and therefore commits to the creation and implementation of a platform for data reporting between government and development partners on disbursement of aid, both off- and on-budget.[229]

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is acknowledged by the Ugandan government as a "contractual relationship in which the flow of funds is subject to the achievement of development results" and therefore wants to include the Accra Agenda for Action which specifies a moving toward country ownership of development aid whilst supporting a results-based reporting system that is equally available to civil society ensuring transparency and accountability.[230]

NDPI identifies and highlights that sometimes development assistance needs to go beyond the simple act of giving financial aid and often advances the development plan in ways money cannot, such as: "measures on improving access to markets through reducing tariff barriers, tackling debt sustainability, improving

[227] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010), p. 69.
[228] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010), p. 69-70.
[229] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010), p. 70.
[230] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010), p. 70.

access to affordable essential drugs, and improving access to new technologies.”.[231]

National Development Plan II, for the period of 2015/16-2019/20.

NDPII specifically outlines that non-state actors had limited involvement during project implementation of the first NDP and felt this was insufficient for effective development at both the local and national government levels, accruing it to a lacking platform for engagement as there was no partnership policy in place defining the specific terms of engagement.[232] A key takeaway from NDPI was that the budget and planning instruments of government were not well aligned for effective implementation losing focus of national goals, and therefore the NDPII looks to create a mechanism to facilitate overall alignment.[233]

Throughout the NDPII, where development partners are mentioned in accordance with specific sectors or projects, they are only mentioned as providing a complementary role to government by giving technical and/or financial support.[234] Moreover, development partners of Uganda provide capacity training to the other sub-sector actors as the sub-sector is expected to increase the industry contribution of the GDP by 3.9 per cent between 2012/13 and 2019/20.[235]

NDPII names the international institutions as the biggest infrastructure development providers of technical and financial support, these include “the World Bank, European Union, African Development Bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency and Trade Mark East Africa”.[236]

NDPII states that key players supporting the government plans for the healthcare system in terms of provisions and financial assistance are multilateral and bilateral development partners, specifying that a “strong inter-sectoral collaboration to enhance disease prevention and health promotion will need to be enhanced”.[237]

---

[231] *National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15)* (The Republic of Uganda, 2010), p. 71.
[232] *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20* (The Republic of Uganda, 2015): p. 9.
[233] *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20* (The Republic of Uganda, 2015): p. 10.
[234] *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20* (The Republic of Uganda, 2015): p. 168.
[235] *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20* (The Republic of Uganda, 2015): p. 175.
[236] *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20* (The Republic of Uganda, 2015): p. 179.
[237] *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20* (The Republic of Uganda, 2015): p. 188.

NDPII identifies that development partners go beyond finance and technical support in the Science, Technology, Engineering and Innovation (STEI) sector, additionally providing a sharing and transfer of technological support.[238]

NDPII provides development partners with an annual NDP Review Forum, a Private Sector and CSO NDP Review Forum, Project Mid-Term Reviews, Project ex-post evaluations, and impact evaluations.[239]

National Development Plan III, for the period of 2020/21-2024/25. E

NDPIII seeks to have development partners that "will align their frameworks to meet the aspirations of the Plan".[240] The previous two NDPs showcased a weak and underperforming national budget and ministerial work-plans, and therefore under NDPIII the government aims to align the "planning, budgeting and budget implementation processes" to ensure proper coordination which will be appealing to development partners, brining in the funds needed.[241]

External financing is identified as the main source of funds for the duration of the NDPIII, and Uganda predicts that domestic and external funds should decline over the course of the development plan because various large infrastructure projects will soon be reaching completion.[242] The average amount of external funding averages at 4.1 per cent of the Ugandan GDP.[243] Furthermore indicating that "concessional loans from multilateral creditors will continue to be an important source of financing for NDPIII, averaging at 1.7% of GDP over the period".[244] Non-concessional external loans are highlighted as being a requirement under the

[238] *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20* (The Republic of Uganda, 2015): p. 198.
[239] *Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20* (The Republic of Uganda, 2015): p. 252-254.
[240] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. xxii.
[241] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 9.
[242] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 29.
[243] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 29.
[244] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 30.

ambitious development plan, and is expected to average out at 3 per cent of the GDP.[245]

Enhancement of partnerships with non-state actors is briefly mentioned in connection with development partners in so far that currently development partners can directly fund and implement programs creating off-budget streams of finance into the country's development.[246] The government envisions a strategy to mainstream resources into the national plan by increasing coordination of development partners, the government and NGO/CSOs.[247]

One of the objectives under interventions of the NDPIII is to "initiate and establish funding linkages for STI with multi-national development partners".[248]

Within a section on other public financing strategies, development assistance grants provided by development partners are identified as one of the ways through which the NDPIII will be financed, specifying that Uganda received all together grants worth UGX 4.5 trillion for the period of 2012/13 – 2017/18.[249] The Plan emphasises mutual respect between government and partners of not only global but national and regional interest when it comes to financing development, siting further that opportunities exist to find cross cutting strategies and thereby financial resources with those implementing the African Agenda 2063, the SDGs, and many other thematises.[250] The government envisions the establishment of a Joint Development Assistance Committee that will organise local development partner groups creating optimal flows of development assistance into the direct implementation on the ground.[251]

---

[245] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 30.
[246] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 46.
[247] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 46.
[248] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 167.
[249] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 203.
[250] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 203.
[251] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 203.

> Development partners are provided "Project Mid-Term Reviews" that report on the implementation progress of projects focusing on the consistency, focus and objectives of the project and partners are provided "Projects ex-post evaluations, to determine effectiveness, relevance, sustainability and intermediate and final outcomes of the NDPIII projects and programmes" and impact evaluations every two years after the closing of the project.[252]

To summarize, NDPI, II, and III have spanned over the years 2010 until present. NDPI emphasised the Partnership Policy and Memorandum of Understanding signed between government and development partners at the beginning of their initiatives. An Effectiveness of Partnerships and Assistance strategy is introduced to guide what partnerships should look like. Many development funding and partner issues are mentioned including off-budget assistance, disbursement procedure issues, technical assistance undermining capacity, and misalignment between development plans. A Public Financial Management (PFM) and procurement structures are named as what should be the primary manner through which development aid is captured and channelled. Development partners are encouraged to not just provide financial aid, but support in other ways too. NDPII emphasised budget and planning instruments not being aligned in NDPI. Calls for development partners to be complimentary support via technical or financial means only. However, assistance in building capacity through training of sub-sector is welcomed. Mostly healthcare is a top priority for development partners, meaning there lacks diversity within where development funds are going if they are off-budget. NDPIII emphasised that partners must align to national development frameworks and that external financing remains the majority source for the development budget. Therefore, partnerships with non-state actors are encouraged to be built and strengthened, and to encourage on-budget development funding. A Joint Development Assistance Committee should be put in place for coordination and accountability purposes.

[252252] National Planning Authority, *Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25* (The Republic of Uganda, 2020): p. 218.

5.3 GOOD PRACTICES OF GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNER ENGAGEMENT

5.3.1 Program Based Budgeting (PBB)

In 2013, Uganda made a transition to program-based budgeting, moving away from the older system of output-based budgeting which had caused many challenges to the development of Uganda as there was severe misalignment between development partners, development plans, data, security and insecurities about the manual process behind it.[253] The new system now accessible not only online but also remotely, brings security controls, interface capabilities with other financial systems, and creates a history of collected data for reporting. The 2016 initiative is a joint operation between Uganda, Germany and the European Commission aimed at country ownership development and enhancing the alignment of development projects with national priorities according to the national development plan. By creating joint programming processes for development partners and the Government of Uganda, the project looks to reduce the level of development fragmentation and rather facilitate the possibility for complementary donor-recipient initiatives and enhanced development co-operation.[254] The Ministry of Finance spearheaded the shift wanting to change the focus from "outputs to outcomes in terms of services delivered". They gave the example of health care saying that "new budgets, for example, focused on the quality of health services provided rather than the number of hospitals constructed, and this outcome would have a number of other contributing outputs such as the number of physicians employed and the availability of medical equipment".[255] This new approach aligned budget allocation to be accurate and specific, aligning with local and central government agency indicators of development and aligning with the goals and objectives of the national development plan. Knowing the shift would be a process, not only in changing reporting styles to government but in training staff on how to re-think impact on the ground, development partner's expertise was enlisted as their signoff was critical in maintaining the development assistance. The U.S. Treasury together with the International Monetary Fund provided technical support

[253] Joseph Ssekitoleko, *Strengthening Budgeting for Sustainable Development: Uganda's Transition from Output-Based Budgeting to Program-Based Budgeting*, e-book (Global Delivery Initiative, 2020): p. 1.
[254] Joseph Ssekitoleko, *Strengthening Budgeting for Sustainable Development: Uganda's Transition from Output-Based Budgeting to Program-Based Budgeting*, e-book (Global Delivery Initiative, 2020): p. 1.
[255] Joseph Ssekitoleko, *Strengthening Budgeting for Sustainable Development: Uganda's Transition from Output-Based Budgeting to Program-Based Budgeting*, e-book (Global Delivery Initiative, 2020): p. 5.

and was gravely instrumental in developing the new system with the Ugandan government over a three year process which produced the present-day National Standard Indicators in the Ugandan development strategy.[256]

This good practice can be improved by providing adequate technical training for users on either end, more stable internet connections and power connections. This good practice can be duplicated in other African countries as it assists in alignment of budgeting and the national development plans whilst creating online history and thereby accountability of the development budgeting process.

5.3.2 Annual Growth Conference

Various multi-stakeholders are brought together by the Ugandan government to discuss key strategic issues facing development at a multi-day conference that focuses purely on "national and cross-cutting" priorities.[257] Presented and discussed from an evidence and policy perspective, technical sessions allow for generation of actionable points and enough time is allowed for agreement on next steps. Input from stakeholders range from the government itself, to DAC donors, to the private sector, international researchers and experts, and even Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Discussing pressing development issues in a common space with all stakeholders affected present creates a strategic and effective type of development cooperation not seen elsewhere.

This good practice can be improved by having a narrow focus for each individual conference, adequate preparation of stakeholders before the conference, make negotiated action points binding for stakeholders, and implement a follow-up mechanism to the conference action points.[258] Improvements can allow for this good practice to be duplicated across other African countries when facing development issues.

5.3.3 Economic Management Group (EMG)

The EMG is a meeting that was set up initially by the Donor Economists Group to create new linkages between the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development

[256] Joseph Ssekitoleko, *Strengthening Budgeting for Sustainable Development: Uganda's Transition from Output-Based Budgeting to Program-Based Budgeting*, e-book (Global Delivery Initiative, 2020): p. 5.
[257] *Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020): 30.
[258] *Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020): p. 30.

(MoFPED) and development partners as relations previously failed during the Budget Support period when partners were allowed to engage with the government process including key reforms and the budget. The EMG meeting used to restart dialogue was strategically set up first as a technical meeting with a small group of country expert economists to bring specific focus to prioritising evidence-based decision-making between government and development partners.[259]

This good practise can be improved by: more regular meetings, including a wider grouping of multi-stakeholders, using the type of tool for wider dialogues with governments (i.e. using expert based interactions to build decision-making capacity for members (government and development partners)), ensure co-ownership of the meeting agenda (between government and development partners) to maintain incentive for active and renewed participation.[260] Improvements can allow for this good practice to be duplicated across other African countries.

5.3.4 Joint Action Plans

A Joint Action Plan, known as joint programming between governments and development partners ensures that in a crisis, government can be swift in their actions, not being held down by bureaucracy and lack of access to funds. Pre-approval clauses in the Plan ensure that development partners sign off on what, when, and how they will support the national government in a specific crisis, including the setup of a budget line.[261] By streamlining the process beforehand, each sector is left with a singular strategy involving all stakeholders, identifying their needs, roles, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to be used and implemented.[262] Joint programming is specifically used by Uganda in HIV/AIDS healthcare support and response. Development partners such as Ireland and the United Kingdom have joined together with the Government of Uganda to support and compliment the national response to the health crisis.[263] One of the objectives of the plan is to facilitate quicker responses by government when pandemics hit creating a flow of

[259] *Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020): p. 30.
[260] *Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020): p. 30.
[261] *Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020): p. 41.
[262] *Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020): p. 41.
[263] "JP For AIDS Support in Uganda | MPTF Office", *Mptf.Undp.Org*, 2022, https://mptf.undp.org/fund/jug00.

information through platforms, and already having results-based comprehensive monitoring and measurement tools in place to effectively manage a crisis.[264] Legislation, planning, government responses, policy and budget are all discussed and agreed upon as much as possible prior to any specific time constraining crisis. This good practice allows a harmonization of procedures in a crisis and allows the government to maintain control and oversight during a crisis, however still having support from development partners.

5.3.5 USAID Government to Government assessment to Aid Management Platform (AMP)

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is one of the few development partners of Uganda that still works actively with its country systems since the major withdrawal from most DAC donors after the country's corruption crises in around 2007 -2008. USAID however has installed monitoring and review mechanisms to counter having to pull its funding to the country. They require from the Ugandan country offices to make regular evaluation reviews of the projects in the country and show how the Ugandan country systems are most effectively implementing the funding provided. This instils a relationship of mutual accountability and dialogue between development partner and national counterparts, helping navigate difficult political tensions when otherwise aid would be immediately withdrawn from the country, leaving development programmes, jobs and partners at a standstill.[265] While a few development partners stayed, the Ugandan government acknowledged the need to create a new funding mechanism that would be likely to foster corruption.

The Aid Management Platform (AMP) is the next step for Uganda in channelling and sharing information on development assistance received and how it will be/is used. The aid-database platform will increase transparency and mutual accountability between the government of Uganda and development partners but will also allow for better monitoring and evaluations as a track record and collection of data is created online. This good practice can be improved by regular data collection mechanisms, increasing technical capabilities of staff through trainings, providing a similar space for data on off-budget

[264] "JP For AIDS Support in Uganda | MPTF Office", *Mptf.Undp.Org*, 2022, https://mptf.undp.org/fund/jug00.
[265] *Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020): p. 51.

development assistance to be catalogued, incentivise development partners but also stakeholders to move to the AMP.[266]

5.3.6 Educate! Experience – secondary education and workforce entry/job creation

The Educate! Experience is a secondary education program in Uganda that addresses the issue of low unemployment rates and the transition for youth from schooling to the labour market. Partnering with a United States based non-profit called Educate!, the educational program focuses on three thematises which are "student skills development, teacher training, and advising on national policy". [267] Over 100 000 students in 380 secondary schools per year in Uganda are a part of the program.[268] Students receive leadership, entrepreneurship trainings with mentorship supervision and support each other in Student Business Clubs. Ten per cent of the development budget for this project was set aside for monitoring and evaluation including baseline assessments, student surveys, and randomized controlled trials to accurately assess the impact of the project on students.[269] By using mobile data technology for tracking, the project saved money and time when collecting and assessing data, seeing as the project is implemented all over the country. Educate! is an open source allowing the curricular resources created and implemented to be copied anywhere else in the world. While directly implementing the project and developing students into entrepreneurs from a young age and building up their capacity to entire the labour market, but on a larger scale there is systemic change to the education system in Uganda by creating a skill-based curriculum for the national educational system.[270] International non-profits and development partners have a direct role besides funding, to follow up with schools that are unable to pay the annual Educate!

---

[266] *Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020): p. 52.
[267] Christina Kwauk and Jenny Perlman Robinson, *EDUCATE! RIDING THE REFORM WAVE TO SCALE UP YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN UGANDA*, e-book (Washington: Center for Universal Education at BROOKINGS, 2016): p. 3.
[268] Christina Kwauk and Jenny Perlman Robinson, *EDUCATE! RIDING THE REFORM WAVE TO SCALE UP YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN UGANDA*, e-book (Washington: Center for Universal Education at BROOKINGS, 2016): p. 3.
[269] Christina Kwauk and Jenny Perlman Robinson, *EDUCATE! RIDING THE REFORM WAVE TO SCALE UP YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN UGANDA*, e-book (Washington: Center for Universal Education at BROOKINGS, 2016): p. 8.
[270] Christina Kwauk and Jenny Perlman Robinson, *EDUCATE! RIDING THE REFORM WAVE TO SCALE UP YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN UGANDA*, e-book (Washington: Center for Universal Education at BROOKINGS, 2016): p. 10.

fee and have ensured a "Secured cost recovery" program for support these school's programs.

5.3.7 Smallholder Oil Palm Farmers – private sector growth and digital growth

In Uganda's Kalangala District, oil palm farmers were met with a proposal from government to form a "public-private producer partnership" in order to facilitate private sector-led growth, diversify the local economy, create reliable incomes for farmers, and competitively gain access to the regional and global markets.[271] Partnering together with SAP, the software company, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the project has been able to provide farmers with an easy transformation into digital farming, gaining features like traceability along the value chain.[272] The Ugandan government installed the "Kampala Principles" into the project plan and objectives which include factors like "inclusive country ownership", "inclusive partnerships", "results and targeted impact", "transparency and accountability", and "leave no-one behind".[273]

A tripartite agreement was made between the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust (KOPGT), the Oil Palm Uganda Limited (OPUL), and the Ugandan Government, which formed the foundations of the project. The government agreed to source land for the project, enhance infrastructure and run the organisation of the project. OPUL agreed to "begin commercially cultivating oil palm on Bugala Island, Lake Victoria, in Kalangala District".[274] KOPGT organised smallholder farmers into a collective and provided them with services for the project including administrative and financial assistance. KOPGT together with IFAD assisted farmers in receiving the government loans that allowed to develop their farms. The loans were an easy investment by government and development partners as the market and demand for the product was guaranteed through the OPUL purchases. IFAD also ensured all stakeholders involved or affected by the project were included in

[271] Teodora Mihaylova and Kim Eric Bettcher, *Enabling the Digital Inclusion of Smallholder Farmers in Uganda: A Kampala Principles Case Study*, e-book (Center for International Private Enterprise, on behalf of the GPEDC Business Leaders Caucus, 2021): p. 1.
[272] Teodora Mihaylova and Kim Eric Bettcher, *Enabling the Digital Inclusion of Smallholder Farmers in Uganda: A Kampala Principles Case Study*, e-book (Center for International Private Enterprise, on behalf of the GPEDC Business Leaders Caucus, 2021): p. 2.
[273] Teodora Mihaylova and Kim Eric Bettcher, *Enabling the Digital Inclusion of Smallholder Farmers in Uganda: A Kampala Principles Case Study*, e-book (Center for International Private Enterprise, on behalf of the GPEDC Business Leaders Caucus, 2021): pp. 1-6.
[274] Teodora Mihaylova and Kim Eric Bettcher, *Enabling the Digital Inclusion of Smallholder Farmers in Uganda: A Kampala Principles Case Study*, e-book (Center for International Private Enterprise, on behalf of the GPEDC Business Leaders Caucus, 2021): p. 2.

dialogues and ensured that locals, especially lower-income households, were built into the project from the start.[275] SAP provided a Rural Sourcing Management mobile app for the project in 2017 that has allowed more than 2000 farmers to effectively add to and view the agricultural value chain of oil palm production in Uganda.[276] SAP also provided technical support in the form of staff it flew down from Germany to train the farmers on how to use the mobile apps and to see where the app could improve to work better for the farmer's needs.

Clear outlines of ownership and mutual benefit, active dialogue between partners, targeted investment and technological innovation created a partnership in one region that is now being duplicated in three other regions of the country, perhaps in the future becoming a national project.

[275] Teodora Mihaylova and Kim Eric Bettcher, *Enabling the Digital Inclusion of Smallholder Farmers in Uganda: A Kampala Principles Case Study*, e-book (Center for International Private Enterprise, on behalf of the GPEDC Business Leaders Caucus, 2021): p. 3.

[276] Teodora Mihaylova and Kim Eric Bettcher, *Enabling the Digital Inclusion of Smallholder Farmers in Uganda: A Kampala Principles Case Study*, e-book (Center for International Private Enterprise, on behalf of the GPEDC Business Leaders Caucus, 2021): pp. 7-8.

6 REMARKS

When comparing the two country case studies, it is evident that Kenya more elaborately outlines the role of development partners in their national development strategy compared to Uganda. This may be attributed to the fact that Uganda started off with strong ambitions towards development partnerships but was then hit by a corruption crisis destroying all advancement made. Kenya shows in the national development plan consistent increase in detailing out the role of the development partner but over time creates a more mutual and cooperative attitude toward the partnership by creating common actions and commitments both parties need to adhere to. The global standard on effective development and effective development cooperation through the GPEDC is used as an instrumental guide in Kenya.

Both countries have made strides towards effective development together with development partners, especially when looking at how the government has started to facilitate public-private partnerships and itself filling the gap, be it making policy or legislation, providing access to funding, or access to land. The takeaway from all practices is that none were possible by singular stakeholders, all were in some way or another multi-stakeholder projects, and their success was dependent on all stakeholders having a voice in the project at some stage. It is also evident that to be a development partner to an African country does not necessarily imply having to give monetary support. Many development partners are beginning to support directly with technical assistance on the ground, trainings, access technology, access to development partner's country expertise, and so much more. While Aid Management Platforms are being implemented and slowly being used, it seems there is a lack of motivation in moving over to the new system. This problem could lie in the levels of corruption present, and that AMPs would essentially shine a light on a lot of that corruption. Technology and innovation are key in education and healthcare sectors but also in agriculture and is the only way Africa will be able to sustainably develop in time for it to make a difference. Examples like the oil palm production system could easily be implemented in various African countries and with different crops as well, solving many regional food sourcing issues, while keeping the price low. Examples like the m-pesa show just how easily a mobile phone and access to the internet can make a difference to someone's life when living in a developing country.

These are all factors of development readily available in many African countries, but resources and talent go untapped for self-development.

The colonial histories of Kenya and Uganda hold similarities and equally differences. Both were only colonised by the British however in different ways. Kenya was colonised by British white settlers that overpowered them after they were originally able to organise and fight off the Portuguese. Uganda was colonised essentially by its own people, the Bugandans, who were manipulated by the British to take up their colonial rule, so much so that Ugandans fought each other over land and title, meanwhile the British were paying cash for any land triumphs. The North vs. South divide in Uganda was uniquely already in existence before occupation by the British, whereas in Kenya, it was only later on through legislation that a racial and cultural divide was instilled. Though both suffered from racially violent institutions, heavy taxation, the introduction of monetary systems and currency, slavery, and deprived of various human rights, one distinct aspect that stood out was the health crisis in Uganda. Especially the purification of women by missionaries, the introduction of midwives, and the beginnings of disease control. A unique aspect to Kenya is the fake participation in politics at the lower level that was coordinated by the British, whereas in Uganda there was no 'political participation' per say but chiefs existed in the hierarchy, but only so far as to collect tax easily compared to the British themselves.

These paths of development through colonial history play a part in today's national development in both countries. For instance, the high level of development partner engagement not only in number but in funding volume and direct participation in the healthcare systems of both countries. Both countries still engage with the United Kingdom as a development partner but Kenya for instance leans more towards assistance from the European Union as a whole, or Japan or China, when not engaging with International Organisations. African countries seem very concerned with having development partners that align themselves to the recipients needs and not the other way round which is very easily labelled as "neo-colonialism" in news headlines nowadays. So, ownership of development in all aspects, be it allocating the funding provided to specific projects, or be it setting the rules of engagement, countries are very cautious about the power balance. This is most visible in the terminology change from development donor and recipient to partners and partnerships in all the literature.

7 BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Africa's Development Dynamics - Statistical Annex". *stats.oecd.org*, 2022. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AFDDANN.

"Aid Effectiveness | Data". data.worldbank.org, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/topic/aid-effectiveness.

"Brief Political History of Uganda". www.ottawa.mofa.go.ug. Accessed 30 July 2022. https://ottawa.mofa.go.ug/data-smenu-11-Political-History-of-Uganda.html.

"Country-Level Impact and Progress". Effectivecooperation.Org. Accessed 11 June 2022. https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2019-05/GlobalPartnership_CountryCompendium.pdf.

"General Information About Kenya | Kenya". www.un.int. Accessed 30 July 2022. https://www.un.int/kenya/kenya/general-information-about-kenya.

"Growth In United Nations Membership | United Nations". United Nations, 2022. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership#1960s.

"Human Development Reports: Specific Country Data: Kenya". hdr.undp.org, 2020. https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/specific-country-data#/countries/KEN.

"Human Development Reports: Specific Country Data: Uganda". hdr.undp.org, 2020. https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/specific-country-data#/countries/UGA.

"JP For AIDS Support in Uganda | MPTF Office". Mptf.Undp.Org, 2022. https://mptf.undp.org/fund/jug00.

"Kenya Electronic Project Monitoring Information System (Epromis) | Synergy International Systems". Synergy International Systems. Accessed 11 June 2022. https://www.synisys.com/featured-projects/kenya-electronic-project-monitoring-information-system-epromis/.

"Kenya Launches External Resources Policy to Manage Overseas Aid | News Ghana". News Ghana, 2016. https://newsghana.com.gh/kenya-launches-external-resources-policy-to-manage-overseas-aid/#:~:text=Kenya%20launches%20external%20resources%20policy%20to%20mana ge%20overseas,and%20management%20of%20overseas%20aid%20into%20the%20country.

"Kenya Profile - Timeline". www.bbc.com, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176.

"LAPSSET Corridor Program", 2022. https://www.lapsset.go.ke/.

"Leveraging Mobile Phones to Enable Basic Banking, Payments, And Economic Growth". Effectivecooperation.Org, 2017. https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2021-06/Delivery%20Note%20Kenya%20M-Pesa.pdf.

"Mobile Currency in Kenya: The M-Pesa". Centre For Public Impact (CPI), 2016. https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/m-currency-in-kenya/.

"OECD International Development Statistics". oecd-Ilibrary.org, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/data/oecd-international-development-statistics_dev-data-en.

"Partnering To Make In-Roads for Kenya's Development | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation". Effectivecooperation.Org, 2020. https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/partnering-make-roads-kenyas-development.

"THE 17 GOALS | Sustainable Development". sdgs.un.org, 2022. https://sdgs.un.org/goals.

"The Colonization of Kenya". Black History Month 2022, 2020. https://www.blackhistorymonth.org.uk/article/section/african-history/the-colonisation-of-kenya/.

"The Effectiveness Principles | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation". Effectivecooperation.Org, 2022. https://www.effectivecooperation.org/landing-page/effectiveness-principles.

"The Effectiveness Principles | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation". effectivecooperation.org, 2022. https://www.effectivecooperation.org/landing-page/effectiveness-principles.

"Uganda Profile - Timeline". www.bbc.com, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112446.

About Kenya – History – Kenya Embassy Washington .C.". Www.Kenyaembassydc.Org. Accessed 30 July 2022. https://kenyaembassydc.org/aboutkenyahistory/.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. "Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution". The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (November 2002): 1231 – 1294.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation". The American Economic Review 91, no.5 (December 2001): 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation". The American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, Daron. Introduction to Modern Economic Growth, 2009. Chapter 4: 123-43.

Armitage, Colette. "The Residuals of Colonial Rule and Its Impact on The Process of Racialisation in Uganda". www.cers.leeds.ac.uk, 2015. https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/97/2016/04/The-residuals-of-colonial-rule-and-its-impact-on-the-process-of-racialisation-in-Uganda-Colette-Armitage.pdf.

AUC/OECD. Africa's Development Dynamics 2018: Growth, Jobs and Inequalities. Addis Ababa/Paris: AUC/OECD Publishing, 2018.

Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett. "Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in An Increasingly Connected World". International Organization 71, no. 4 (2017): 735-766.

Bräutigam, Deborah A., and Stephen Knack. "Foreign Aid, Institutions, And Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa". Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 2 (2004): 255-285.

Country-Level Impact and Progress. The Global Partnership for effective Development Co-operation. Accessed 1 August 2022.

de Anquin, Julian Eduardo. "Towards Full System Ownership: The Government of Ethiopia's Journey to AMP Self-Reliance – Development Gateway: An IREX Venture – Data and Digital Solutions for International Development.". Development Gateway: An IREX Venture, 2019. https://developmentgateway.org/blog/towards-full-system-ownership-government-ethiopias-journey-amp-self-reliance/.

Development Partnerships Thematic Report: Mid-Term Review of The Uganda National Development Plan. Delta Partnership in Association with REEV Consult for the National Planning Authority, 2013.

Fee, Derek. How To Manage an Aid Exit Strategy: The Future of Development Aid. London: Zed Books Ltd, 2012.

Groves, Leslie, and Rachel Hinton. Inclusive Aid: Changing Power and Relationships in International Development. Earthscan, Routledge, 2004.

Herfkens, Eveline, and Mandeep Bains. Reaching Our Development Goals: Why Does Aid Effectiveness Matter?. UN/OECD Publishing, 2022.

Irish, John. "France, African Leaders Push to Redirect $100 Bln in IMF SDR Reserves by October". Reuters.Com, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/macron-hosts-summit-financing-africas-post-pandemic-recovery-2021-05-18/.

Jackson, Peter. "A Prehistory of The Millennium Development Goals: Four Decades of Struggle for Development in The United Nations | United Nations". United Nations. Accessed 7 June 2022. https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/prehistory-millennium-development-goals-four-decades-struggle-development-united-nations.

Kita, Keiko, and Kana Takio. "Global Delivery Initiative: Strengthening Health Systems Management Under Decentralization in Kenya". Effectivecooperation.Org, 2019. https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2021-06/strengthening_health_systems_management_under_decentralization.pdf.

Kwauk, Christina, and Jenny Perlman Robinson. EDUCATE! RIDING THE REFORM WAVE TO SCALE UP YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN UGANDA. E-book. Washington: Center for Universal Education at BROOKINGS, 2016.

Macroeconomics, Robert J. Rossana, 2011, Taylor & Francis group

Making Development Aid More Effective. The 2010 Brookings Blum Roundtable Policy Briefs. Washington: Brookings Institution, 2010.

Mellinger, Andrew D., Jeffrey D. Sachs, and John L. Gallup. The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Mid-Term Review of The Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16-2019/20: Development Partnerships Thematic Report. National Planning Authority, 2019.

Mihaylova, Teodora, and Kim Eric Bettcher. Enabling The Digital Inclusion of Smallholder Farmers in Uganda: A Kampala Principles Case Study. E-book. Center for International Private Enterprise, on behalf of the GPEDC Business Leaders Caucus, 2021.

Mitchell, Ian, and Andrew Rogerson. "A New Framework to Measure Aid Effectiveness". Center For Global Development | Ideas to Action, 2020. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-framework-measure-aid-effectiveness.

Mukand, Sharun W. and Dani Rodrik. "In search of the holy grail: policy convergence, experimentation, and economic performance.". The American Economic Review 95, no. 1 (March 2005): 374-383.

National Development Plan (2010/11 - 2014/15). The Republic of Uganda, 2010.

National Planning Authority. Third National Development Plan (NDPIII) 2020/21 - 2024/25. The Republic of Uganda, 2020.

Neumayer, Eric. The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

Nogueira-Budny, Daniel. "Boosting Demand for Open Aid Data: Lessons from Kenya's E-Promis". World Bank Blogs, 2016. https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/boosting-demand-open-aid-data-lessons-kenya-s-e-promis.

O Ndege, Peter. Colonialism And Its Legacies in Kenya. E-book, 2009.

Office of The Prime Minister, Ministry of State for Planning. First Medium Term Plan, 2008-2021. Nairobi, Kenya: Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2008.

Perkins, Dwight, Steven Radelet, and David Lindauer. The Economics of Development. 7th ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006. Chapters 2-4: 31-147.

Peterson, Derek R. "The Politics of Transcendence in Colonial Uganda". Past &Amp; Present 230, no. 1 (2016): 197-225. doi:10.1093/pastj/gtv059.

Phillips, Keri. "The History of Foreign Aid". www.reliefweb.int, 2013. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/history-foreign-aid.

Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. "The curse of natural resources in Natural Resources and Economic Development". European Economic Review Journal 45, (2001): 827-838.

Sauvant, Karl P. "The Early Days of The Group Of 77 | United Nations". United Nations. Accessed 7 June 2022. https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/early-days-group-77.

Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 - 2019/20. The Republic of Uganda, 2015.

Sen, Amartya. Development As Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Ssekitoleko, Joseph. Strengthening Budgeting for Sustainable Development: Uganda's Transition from Output-Based Budgeting to Program-Based Budgeting. eBook. Global Delivery Initiative, 2020.

Summers, Carol. "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925". Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 16, no. 4 (1991): 787-807. doi:10.1086/494703.

The National Treasury and Planning, Treasury Building. Third Medium Term Plan, 2018-2022. Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018.

The Presidency, Ministry of Devolution and Planning. Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017. Nairobi, Kenya: The Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013.

Tuck, Michael. "Poverty, Health and Reproduction in Early Colonial Uganda". Social History of Medicine 19, no. 1 (2006): 168-170. doi:10.1093/shm/hkj022.

Uganda's Development Partnership Review: A Country Pilot of The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Kampala: Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, 2020.

Van den Akker, Jans. "Geothermal Energy Powering Kenya's Future: Menengai Geothermal Field Development Facilitated by Public-Private Partnerships | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation". Effectivecooperation.Org, 2018. https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/geothermal-energy-powering-kenyas-future-menengai-geothermal-field-development-facilitated.

Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Papers. A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya: Volatility and Aid Fragmentation of Foreign Aid, With A Focus on Health. The Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper Series. Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009.

Yoo, Dongwoo and Steckel, Richard H. "Property rights and economic development: the legacy of Japanese colonial institutions". Journal of Institutional Economics, (2016): 1 -28.