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„Corrupted Governance:
Impacts of the 2017-2021 Governance by Andrej Babiš
upon Democracy and Society in the Czech Republic“

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GENDER-INCLUSIVE LANGUAGE DISCLAIMER

Throughout the thesis, gender-specific terms may be used in order to ease the text flow. Whenever a gender-specific term is used, it should be understood as referring to both genders, unless explicitly stated.

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1. Introduction

The brutal intervention by government forces of a student gathering to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 1939 murder of medical student Jan Opletal by a Nazi paramilitary group along with protests against the ruling Communist regime, at the same time, ignited a spark for democracy and freedom within Czechoslovakia and throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe. After nearly a month of strikes and protests, communist leader President Gustáv Husák resigned and Czechoslovakia took its first steps toward establishing a new government by holding free elections in 1990.

Consequently, a wave of optimism washed over Czechoslovakia nurturing hopes for freedom and humanity, as well as hopes for the transformation of the general political, societal, and economic landscape. And while political society was busy drafting and executing these transformations, civil society dreamed of a life free from state persecution. This persecution was often based on intelligence delivered by informers to the states' secret services or even by neighbors – the Committee for State Security was known under its acronym “KGB” in the Soviet Union and the equally pernicious Czechoslovakian State Security was ‘StB’. Political opponents or alleged opponents of the regime were, for example, constantly surveilled and interrogated (often brutally, especially when the state's secret services were involved). Other “suspects” could lose their jobs and/or see their possibilities for a better education themselves or for their children suddenly disappear. And, of course, there were also dangers of being publicly humiliated, or subjected to fabricated court proceedings, and being sent to labor camps or the uranium mines. After the ‘Velvet Revolution’, citizens dreamed of a state full of possibilities – be it travelling, a better supply of goods, the free practice of religion, or free and voluntary elections – and a state free of propaganda penetrating the everyday lives of the citizenry through work, education, the media, or culture.

Those dreams, however, did not last long. Soon afterwards, the citizens were confronted with their reality. Liberalization certainly brought them the desired freedoms. However, it also implicated several unwelcome phenomena. On one hand, social and other state securities were reduced massively: the welfare state was reduced to its minimum while provisions for welfare services in the rural areas were

abandoned completely. At the same time, economic difficulties induced by the transformation, for example, the transition to new currency, high inflation, or the collapse in production, had a major impact on the economic situation and, thus, on society. These undesirable developments contributed to the general disillusion about the previously welcomed capitalist way of living.

However, part of the population was quite satisfied about the environment of confusion and the merely established institutions that emerged from the transformation. One group of that section of the population was, first of all, those who belonged to the 'old structures' of the communist establishment. Since there was no dealing with the past (as it was, for example, after the victory over the Nazi regime in 1945), members of the old regime remained embedded in the highest societal, economic, and political spheres. And, since new institutions were being established, there were plenty of opportunities for them to take part in the process and retain their former powers. These actors were following the political and/or societal opportunities.

The other group that welcomed the buzz around the state's transformation included those who recognized the economic benefit that can be gained from the 'fog of transformation'. The economic profit opportunists, again, either came from the old communist days when goods were smuggled behind the Iron Curtain from the West or there were the new players to the game who quickly learned and exploited the rules of the game before most anybody else.

Eventually, the two groups learned how to cooperate in their new environment so there could be profits for both – although not in every case. Consequently, these developments resulted in the part of society which had become even more dissatisfied with the once promised land – the capitalist world.

The dissatisfaction or frustration over the course of the transformation grew among some of the citizens of Czechoslovakia as well as among those in the Czech Republic (established in 1993) so much so that it resonates to these very days. Moreover, dissatisfaction over the transformation might very well have been the reason for much of the skepticism toward yet another transformation in 2004 – the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union. It is both that keeps some of the Czech citizens rather wary in the sui-generis establishment: (1) the fear to repeat the past in the form of a dictate from abroad; and (2) the suspicion of another fog of transformation being exploited while the cost is borne by ordinary citizens.

And while the first narrative has been picked up by traditional national and/or extremist movements/parties, the new populist movements/parties have built their narrative by utilizing the latter. This new type of populism has also become of great interest for scholars and observers of populism in central European countries and beyond. In the Czech Republic, one movement of this kind was founded in 2012 by the entrepreneur Andrej Babiš – ANO 2011. And dissatisfaction remains not only the leading narrative but also part of the movement's name as it does not only stand for the Czech word 'yes' but it is also an acronym for the Czech translation of „Action of Dissatisfied Citizens”. In the course of Babiš' involvement as a political actor, the Czech Republic witnessed many – often unprecedented – instances of how this type of political movement is utilized to penetrate the state's structures and processes at their highest levels.

However, Andrej Babiš himself was not completely unfamiliar with this utilization of state structures and processes prior to his direct involvement in Czech politics. In the pre-revolutionary era, when travelling and education abroad were a privilege for those 'loyal' to the Communist Party, Babiš was able (thanks to the high-profile career of his father) to gain an education outside the Soviet bloc and, later, becoming involved in state's exports. Eventually, Babiš' membership in the Communist Party as well as his activity as an agent of Czechoslovak State Security enabled him not only to benefit from the loyalty perks but also establish strategic relationships with the state's actors. Several decades later, after a continuous expansion of strategic connections which led to the expansion of his business activities from Slovakia to the Czech Republic – and, eventually, to his resettlement in the Czech Republic – challenges in the political environment brought Babiš to the decision to found ANO 2011.

Appealing to the post-revolutionary sentiment of the dissatisfied citizens, Babiš was able to gain enough support to participate in the 2013-2017 government as a coalition partner. Finally, after the Czech national election in 2017, a further increase in the support of the voters enabled Babiš to establish himself and his movement as the most powerful political power in the country, leading the 2017-2021 government as Prime Minister. Governance during this period, eventually, led society to gather once again and speak out against the governance in the largest demonstration since the Velvet Revolution of November 1989.

1.1. Aim and Structure of the Thesis

In this thesis, we will analyze the governance of Andrej Babiš and the movement ANO 2011 in the modern procedural and institutional setup arising from relations after 1989 in Czechoslovakia and, later, in the independent Czech Republic from 1993.

There are three interesting sociological aspects motivating this research. First, the movement ANO 2011 and Andrej Babiš enjoy relatively stable voter support in spite of the negative developments brought to public attention which are/were, in modern Czech history, unprecedented. Second, the public engagement that arose from the 2017-2021 governmental period was, in the Czech Republic, unprecedented as well – especially as many observers pointed out that the civil engagement in Central and Eastern European countries was low. Third, many journalists and commentators stressed the worsening political, economic, and societal situation as a result of Andrej Babiš' governance and his involvement as political actor. Andrej Babiš, on the other hand, claimed that this was only a counter-campaign against his person led by the establishment. Therefore, the third motivation is to conduct scientific research on sociological indices in order to shed light on this dispute.

As described, the governmental period under scrutiny is 2017-2021 when Andrej Babiš was the Prime Minister of the elected government of ANO 2011 and the Czech Social Democratic Party. The limitation of the focus to the governmental period 2017-2021 is necessary, especially, since Babiš and the movement ANO 2011 continue to remain active political actors and further related developments have emerged or continue to emerge.

For this thesis, it is important to analyze the effects of state capture and entrepreneurial populism on democracy and the well-being of the citizens. Only then can we determine exactly if and how this type of governance is harmful or beneficial for both variables and what kind of governance is induced by these phenomena in the first place. This, in turn, helps us understand how the current approach of governance analysis can or should be adapted. Especially in the environment of a transformed or transforming country. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to analyze

the 2017-2021 governance of Andrej Babiš and point out its specifics as well as the impacts on democracy and society's well-being and, consequently, contribute to the theoretical debate in this field.

Before we start with further elaboration, we will briefly address the structure of the thesis. The thesis starts with a brief overview of the current research (Chapter Two). This helps us to establish a general understanding of all the phenomena related to ANO 2011 and Andrej Babiš which, in turn, enables us to set our research questions and hypotheses in the correct context. The research questions and hypotheses are explored in the next chapter (Chapter Three), with research questions reflecting the aims of the thesis as well as presenting the main and secondary interest of this research. The related hypotheses provide then a red thread for interpretation and evaluation of the results which will, in the end, lead to verification or falsification of those hypotheses. In Chapter Four, methodology, context, and the setting of the study will be described. First, we will describe the theoretical context of the selected method with its main assumptions and difficulties. Then, we turn to defining the methodology and research design, and from there, we will be able to articulate by which methods we are going to answer our research questions.

Subsequently, in Chapter Five, the theoretical framework for defining the relation between 'state' and 'society' will be discussed. We will explore the main aspects of this relationship by elaborating on different inputs to the theoretical approach. Furthermore, the main theoretical assumptions regarding the phenomena related to the research questions will be described.

Chapter Six is concerned with the historical context and the development of governance in the Czech Republic since 1989. We will explore the different transformations the country has experienced starting with the transformation after the fall of socialism in 1989, continuing with the transformation in the course of the breakup of the Czechoslovak Federation in 1993, and, finally, reflecting upon the transformation after accession to European Union in 2004. Following the methodology, we will, in Chapter Seven, explore the structures of the political framework in the Czech Republic. We will analyze the general relations between

legislative, executive, and judicial powers as well as the Czech national elections. Furthermore, we will analyze the empirical data from national elections held in 2017 and in 2021 as well as from the interim electoral period. In Chapter Eight, we will focus on the actors and processes related to ANO 2011 and Andrej Babiš. In this chapter, the most relevant developments will be elaborated upon with respect to the background of the movement as well as Babiš himself and interactions among the relevant actors. Furthermore, in Chapter Nine, the public policies made by the government will be analyzed. The chapter starts with a brief elaboration on the role of the prime minister and the government in the process of making public policies and continues with analyzing the most relevant public policies carried out during the 2017-2021 government with Andrej Babiš as Prime Minister. In their turn, the public policies will be evaluated. In the following chapter (Chapter Ten), we will inspect selected sociological variables and indices in order to answer our research questions.

Finally, in Chapter Eleven, we will summarize the findings, and, in the final chapter (Chapter Twelve), we will discuss the results and conclusions further.

2. Current research

There are several scholarly articles that shed light on the situation in the Czech Republic during the governmental period of Andrej Babiš and the ANO 2011 movement. Some authors focus on the *modus operandi* of the movement and its connection to Andrej Babiš – as for example Hloušek and Kopeček (2019). Other scholars such as Buštíková and Baboš (2020), Snegovaya (2020), or Havlík and Voda (2018) – are concerned with the character of the movement and its voter demographics. Finally, a third group of scholars analyzes the functional perspective of the movement's program as well as its consequences for Czech society and Czech democracy (Guasti 2020; Hanley and Vachudova 2018; etc.). We shall now explore all three perspectives in more detail.

In their article “How to run an efficient political machine: the billionaire Andrej Babiš and his political-business project,” Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček (Hloušek & Kopeček, 2019) examine how the ANO 2011 movement has been designed. The authors describe the movement as an entrepreneurial party and suggest that these types of parties are becoming a new organizational form that is more successful than the traditional parties in gaining political capital. Based on the observations of the movement's institutionalization, public image, and several interviews with political and marketing actors, they describe ANO 2011 as being „[...] born as a political project based on Andrej Babiš' objection to the corruption and incompetence of politicians and his offer of a technocratic solution [...]” (Hloušek & Kopeček, 2019:49) that, in turn, is being characterized as business-like, professional, efficient, and inter-party loyal. All in all, the authors observe a process of “[...] translation of business firm practices into internal organization and internal life of the party.” (Hloušek & Kopeček, 2019: 50) Furthermore, the authors suggest that this type of party organization – the entrepreneurial party – is “[...] centralizing internal decision-making and candidate selecting processes” (ibid.). The conclusion here is that the analysis of the movement's institutionalization has revealed the use of a new organizational form merging business practices with traditional political structures and procedures manifesting itself in the application of corporate management practices to a field that, traditionally, has been subject to political party practices such as, for example,

development of party factions or wings. In fact, before ANO 2011 only one major political party, 'Věci veřejné' [Public Affairs], has been created as a completely new party to the political system. The party, however, was rather short-lived due to bribery accusations leading to the resignation of its leader Vít Bárta. Until then, the major political parties had been born from other big parties through fractioning such as, for example, the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) parting from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in 1990 or, more recently, the split of the Green Party into the Green Liberals and its more radical wing during the governmental period 2006-2009. Thus, the creation of a political party or movement without any previous connections embedded in Czech political culture is quite rare.

Apart from describing the ANO 2011 movement as entrepreneurial or a technocratic party, there are scholars who describe it as a populist or even technocratic populist party. Lenka Bušíková and Pavol Baboš conclude in their article „Best in Covid: Populists in the Time of Pandemic“ (Bušíková & Baboš, 2020) that Andrej Babiš gained legitimacy from the “politicization of expertise” (Bušíková & Baboš, 2020: 496) thus qualifying not only as a populist but a technocratic populist. Similarly, Maria Snegovaya in her article “Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties?” (Snegovaya, 2020) identifies Andrej Babiš as a technocratic leader and examines characteristics of his political presence. The author differentiates between rightwing populists and technocratic leaders as the latter “[...] lack a distinctive ideological profile and offer a broader, more inclusive vision of the community of people whose interests they claim to represent [...]” (Snegovaya, 2020: 557) which very much corresponds to the claim of Babiš who sees ANO 2011 as a catch-all party as he stated in his speech during the movement’s assembly in 2019 (cf. Novinky.cz, 2019: 00:02:32). The approach of attracting voters across different socio-demographic categories is supported by the findings of Vlastimil Havlík and Petr Voda (Havlík & Voda, 2018) who find that the supporters of ANO 2011 are to be found rather in the center of the political landscape and the movement presents itself with non-ideological appeals based solely on the dissatisfaction with the establishment. Its supporters hail from the entire spectrum regarding globalization and other socio-demographic categories (such as political values, issues and valence, or proximity to parties) (cf. Havlík & Voda, 2018). Snegovaya examines the characteristics of the voters of technocratic parties and for ANO 2011 and identifies

that, in this sense, the voters of the technocratic parties differ from the voters of rightwing populist parties: “Overall [...] voters of parties led by technocratic leaders represent quite different social groups, especially in relation to their socioeconomic status and attitudinal characteristics.” (Snegovaya, 2020: 562) Another article connecting ANO 2011 to the term ‘technocratic populism’ is the study by Petra Guasti “Populism in Power and Democracy: Democratic Decay and Resilience in the Czech Republic (2013-2020)” (Guasti, 2020). The author comes to the conclusion that “[...] Andrej Babiš used his political power to weaken his business opponents and exploited his media power [...]” (Guasti, 2020: 481) and, based on the V-Dem data, that there has been an erosion of diagonal accountability (civic participation and media freedom) as a result of technocratic populism in the Czech Republic. This, in turn, has resulted in contributions to democratic backsliding. The article “Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic” by Seán Hanley and Milada Vachudova (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018) identifies Andrej Babiš and the movement ANO 2011 as a populist one as well and stresses that the movement brands itself as “defending ordinary people from ‘traditional parties’,” the official statements are to be characterized as “pronouncements of key individuals, usually of Babiš himself,” and Andrej Babiš, while “[...] complaining bitterly that he was being unfairly persecuted and silenced by the establishment [...],” continues concentrating political power on top of his already existent economic and public media powers (cf. Hanley & Vachudova, 2018: 281ff.).

Apart from authors seeing populism as a part of democratic backsliding (Cf. Bútorá, 2007; Krastev, 2007) Licia Cianetti et al. observe in their article “Rethinking ‘democratic-backsliding’ in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland” that in the case of the Czech Republic democratic backsliding is, furthermore, connected to the phenomenon of state capture (Cianetti, Dawson & Hanley, 2018: 246). State capture has been observed in the Czech Republic since the 1990s (cf. Innes, 2014, 2016) and with Andrej Babiš and the movement ANO 2011 being the product of these developments – as Babiš stated himself: “You forgot that you have made me. *You*, the corrupted right wing” (čt24, 2015: 00:00:38) – the state capture phenomenon is, in that sense, still present as a part of democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic.

3. Research Questions and Hypotheses

In this thesis, we shall explore the developments with respect to democracy and the well-being of society in the Czech Republic during the government of Andrej Babiš and ANO 2011 between 2017 and 2021. As described in the previous chapter, there are studies analyzing some of the particular aspects of the operations of the movement, its characteristics, and related negative phenomena. However, a more complex and coherent case study is still pending, so it is the aim of this thesis to shed some light on how state capture, governance, and democratic backsliding are related. This shall be examined against the background of what might be, for many reasons, described as an unprecedented example of governance in history of the modern Czech state.

3.1. Main Interest of the Research

The thesis should explore relations within the state and the effects of a particular setting which can be described with the main research question as follows:

What type of governance arises from state capture and how is it related to democratic backsliding?

For the thesis, the question translates to the following empirical question:

How did the governance of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš during the governmental period 2017-2021 – as a product of state capture – affect society and democracy in the Czech Republic?

In this respect, we shall analyze the effects of his governance as the leader of the ministers, first, on society and then, the quality of democracy in the Czech Republic. The answer should help us understand how the actions at the highest executive level, motivated by private interest, have affected major sociological indices and, thus, the well-being of the constituency as well as the state of democracy in the Czech Republic.

3.2. Secondary Research Questions

The following secondary research questions should add to an understanding of and establish both a short-term and a long-term comparison of the concerned governance. That means a comparison throughout the period in question, on one hand, and the framework set by previous government(s) on the other:

How can we characterize the governance by Andrej Babiš as the prime minister during the period 2017-2021 in the Czech Republic?

What are the specifics of that governance within the political context of the Czech modern state?

Finally, one more secondary research question should be answered in order to contribute to the theoretical debate of Governance Analysis – especially with respect to the Four Governance Model approach brought by Peters and Pierre (2016):

What are the implications of the findings for the theoretical debate in the field?

3.3. Research Hypotheses

For these research questions, we can assume some hypotheses based on the current research made by scholars.

First, the evidence – based on the assumptions of governance analysis theory – is expected to show that the implications of the governance of Andrej Babiš during the governmental period 2017-2021 will, in different areas, turn out differently (cf. Peters & Pierre, 2016: 117f). This means that some aspects of the governance are going to be considered as beneficial to society and/or democracy while others are not.

Second, as the current research suggests, the overall score on society's well-being and democracy-related sociological indices is expected to decline. Additionally, since the evidence for democratic backsliding and state-capture in relation to Andrej Babiš is increasingly being pointed out by scholars and other social actors, this

decline is expected to occur not only comparatively to previous government(s) (long-term indication) but also during the governmental period 2017-2021 (short-term indication) itself.

Third, should the evidence confirm the findings of the cited scholars, Andrej Babiš might be one of the entrepreneurs who became a politician much like Donald Trump or Silvio Berlusconi. However, the case might be unprecedented even internationally and – if not, it can still be considered a rare case – governance analysis might fall short of assessing the cases when the state is perfectly captured or rather “privatized” by actors in order to pursue their private interests. For this reason, the thesis should provide valuable arguments for the debate.

Finally, for the main research interest, we can expect that state capture leads to a particular type of governance accompanied by populism where the overall well-being of society as well as the levels of democracy are dropping. This, in turn, leads to democratic backsliding or democratic deconsolidation as identified by the scholars.

It is important to stress here how the scope of the research questions is confined. First, the concerned governance level is limited to the governmental level. Furthermore, as during the period of analysis, ANO 2011 was the most powerful actor on the governmental level, the focus is pointed to the developments of this movement. The scope has been limited even further – mostly with the actions and developments of Andrej Babiš himself. That is for two reasons: (1) based on the current research, ANO 2011 is considered the strongly hierarchical one-man project of Andrej Babiš; (2) the responsibility for any actions or consequences of the government in the Czech Republic lie with the Prime Minister. Second, a governmental period can be understood as a limited political unit. As such, it allows for comparisons and provides data on voters' satisfaction with elected governments. Third, the effects under scrutiny concern society and democracy as a part of the democratic backsliding phenomenon which has been brought to discussion, especially in connection with Central and East European (CEE) countries.

4. Methodology, Context and Setting of the Study

In the following, the methodology, its theoretical context, and the particular setting in relation to the research questions and hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter will be explained. In order to answer the research questions, we need to assess the governance during the period in question. This will be achieved by the methods of governance analysis.

4.1. Governance Analysis

As stated, this thesis analyzes the notion of governance in a particular governmental setup throughout a defined period. At this point, it is essential to distinguish between the terms 'governance' and 'government'. 'Government' can be characterized as a 'polity' of a particular political unit. Even though Müller (2011) points out that government can be understood in several ways – (1) as a general hierarchical structure, (2) as a public institution concerned with policy implementation, (3) as a general executive, legislative, and judicial power, or, more narrowly, (4) as a central political executive (cf. Müller, 2011: 142) – the term stands for a political structure or its institutional setting.

On the other hand, 'governance' can be defined as a collective term for 'polity', 'policy', and 'politics' (e.g. Lange, Driessen & Sauer, 2013: 412). The theory of Governance Analysis, as part of comparative politics and one of its main approaches, is focused mainly, but not exclusively, on politics. In his text, Peters (2020) identifies several major approaches to comparative politics (Peters, 2020: 38f.) with governance being a variation of structural functional analysis which is concerned with the functioning of political systems. Governance broadens the structural functional analysis by the analysis of "[...] the variety of roles that social actors may play in the process of making and implementing decisions" (ibid.). In other words, governance analysis focuses not only on government itself but mainly on the motives and roles of the those who govern and those who are governed in the legislation and execution of policies.

In order to make governance analysis comparable, Peters and Pierre (2016) have designed a model with four ideal types of governance. The authors suggest that there are four types of governance: (1) *Étatiste Governance* where only the state in

its narrowest sense shapes public life; (2) Liberal-Democratic Governance where social actors enjoy more autonomy than in *Étatiste* Governance; (3) State-Centrist Governance where the state in its narrowest sense is the central unit but has corporate relations with social actors; and (4) Interactive Governance where social actors self-organize themselves (cf. Peters & Pierre, 2016).

The problem with this approach, however, is that – as the authors have identified – it sees the relationship between the state in its narrowest sense and society as a dichotomy which, outside of the theoretical world of functional governance analysis, is more complex. Furthermore, the identified governance models are ideals, while in the real world, one is expected to find mixed forms of these models depending on the varieties in governance (“multiple patterns of governance”) on the one hand and in their respective policies, on the other. Moreover, the variation changes over time, even though, according to the authors, this might occur gradually and in increments. (Cf. *ibid.* 115 ff.)

With this in mind, we can compare the findings with the model and attempt to identify which type of governance -- and to what extent – fits the governance of Andrej Babiš most accurately and then point out any specifics that the case study might hold. Finally, the results of this comparison could also lead to further suggestions in adapting the Governance Model Approach and Governance Analysis.

4.2. Methodology and Setting of the Study

The reason for applying comparative research methods is that a comparison enables an evaluation of the changes in the well-being of society as well as in the state of democracy. As Rothstein points out, comparative politics helps to determine the quality of government based on selected variables – such as the levels of democracy and/or corruption in a state, or the state’s capacity or the effectiveness of a government in cases of human well-being (cf. Rothstein, 2020). Based upon comparative research, we are able to determine how governance during the years 2017-2021 contributed to the development of democracy and societal well-being in the Czech Republic.

For this thesis, comparative research following the research design of Daniele Caramani is being applied (Caramani, 2020: 10f.). The study is a case study with extensive analysis of the defined governance segment (research unit): governance by the government of Andrej Babiš during the governmental period 2017-2021. The research design is a cross-temporal comparison – comparing the governance in question with previous government(s) in the Czech Republic in the sense of most similar systems design (method of difference) for a long-term comparison on the one hand (a comparison of different governments in the Czech Republic) and short-term comparison (a comparison of 2017 and 2021 values) on the other.

Overall, the governance in question will be examined in its historical and societal context. Furthermore, it will be analyzed with respect to its (1) polity, (2) politics, and (3) policies. Finally, the governance in question will be set in context to previous government(s) for a long-term comparison. The thesis is designed according to the methods of comparative research so we will analyze, *first*, the history and context of the case, *second*, the structures and institutions as they came into being, *third*, the actor(s) and his/her/their motives, *fourth*, their actions and, *finally*, the impact of those actions. This means that the chosen design requires a multidisciplinary approach to be applied.

The methods used will be, first, a qualitative analysis of secondary sources, in particular texts, journals, articles, etc. by scholars and public actors. This applies especially to the theoretical inputs concerning state, society, and governance on the one hand, and an analysis of the historical context, structures, and actions, on the other. For the historical, institutional, actors, and policy segments, qualitative analysis of the primary data, such as legal texts, documents, and reports, will be used.

Second, quantitative data (statistics and sociological indices) will be used when analyzing elections and the policies in question. For elections, it will be of profound interest to examine the data on voter turnout, total votes, valid votes, voter volatility, and party fragmentation. For public policies, data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Eurostat, etc. as well as data from public opinion surveys will be analyzed.

5. Theoretical Framework: State and Society

We turn now to theoretical context and examine how governance can be understood in terms of relations between the governing ones and the governed ones. Since we are concerned with the question how governance affects society, we need to understand, first, how we define society, the state, and the state in its narrowest sense.

5.1. The Integral State: Defining Society and Political Society

The general discussion on the ontology of the state can be traced far back into human history. A broad spectrum of thought on what the state is and what the state should be has developed over the centuries and it has been further enriched by the development of the 'modern' state after Europe's revolutionary years, most prominently since the 18th century. In the book "Staatsdenken: Zum Stand der Staatstheorie heute" published by Rüdiger Voigt, a categorization of thoughts on the state can be found without being limited to modern history alone (Voigt et al., 2016).

In more general terms, we can classify state theories, more or less, according to the level of independence held by those who are ruled by those who rule. A much more comprehensive analysis would be needed in order to examine the particular theories with respect to the specific relations between rulers and the ruled. However, in this master's thesis, a simplified differentiation can be used between modern, liberal, state law-centered, or conservative theories on one side and the revolutionary on the other. Whereas the former group considers a state being a far more autonomous ruler understood in structural terms, the latter sees a state as something far less isolated from society. At this point, the revolutionary or materialistic state theory and the theory of Antonio Gramsci, in particular, will be discussed. As this thesis touches, inter alia, upon the relations between what the theory describes as a political society and what can be further understood as state core on one side and the society in general on the other, it is essential to examine these theoretical assumptions.

As already stated, a significant characteristic of revolutionary or materialistic state theories is that the ruling entity is not considered to be a neutral actor enjoying a fair amount of independence from its ruled entity. In a very simplified sense, what these theories suggest is that what we call a 'state' is something stemming from society's power struggles.

In Marxist theories, the state is a structure tailored by the bourgeoisie class in order to keep their desired capitalist order intact as it is imposed upon the working class. The compliance of the working class is secured through the provisions of what has become to be known as the 'welfare state'.

Gramsci modernizes the assumptions of the materialistic theories and develops them further. He understands the state as an integral unit. In his understanding, the state is integrated into society itself. It does not stand isolated from the practices and struggles of the society. Rather, the state is an area of society where a part of this society becomes political society. What this means is that the state core (political society) operates in the same sense as the rest of the society. And, it is not limited to only structures or institutions. It includes processes, practices, interests, and ideas. (Cf. Demirovic, 2007). Simplified, we can visualize it as follows:




Fig. 1: Integral state by Gramsci; own depiction according to Demirović (2007: 24)

The question arises as to how political society rules over the rest of society if it is its integrated part. Gramsci suggests it is by establishing hegemonies that represent the actual manifestations of the political society. These hegemonies are, however, not only imposed on the rest of the society. Following the logic of the theory, such an act would be impossible. Rather, these hegemonies are being built

within the society and thus enjoy certain amounts of legitimacy. Furthermore, these hegemonies are constantly being challenged since they are still bound to the society's power struggles. What this means is that the integral state is a lively compilation of political society's programs that are, on one hand, actively gaining support or compliance within society. In the end, this creates, in Gramsci's terms, 'the state's armor'. On the other hand, at the same time, the state's armor is contested by the non-compliant parts of the society. These parts of society are being kept in check by, again in Gramsci's terms, 'the state's force'. (Cf. *ibid.*)

For Gramsci, the root of this struggle lies in the economy – even though Gramsci himself was critical of such conceptions that focused only on the economic aspect (cf. Jessop, 2007: 45). Another solution to this problem has been raised by Louis Althusser, who further developed some of Gramsci's concepts. Althusser argued the underlying economic conflict between classes transposes itself into societal relations (*ibid.*). Once transposed to the overlays, conflicts can be grasped and settled by problem-solving principles and, in the end, a consensus is achieved (cf. Demirovic, 2007: 27).

It is the struggle of those being kept in check by the state's force over political society to put through their hegemonies. One way of achieving that is, as described, to transpose the conflict into societal relations and resolve it there. However, in the case where the conflict has not yet been resolved or has been resolved in such a manner that her or his interest has not become a hegemony, the social actor may try to become a part of the state's force by herself or himself by pretending a certain hegemony that enjoys enough legitimacy but, in fact, pursuing another one according to her/his interest. In such a case, state capture occurs.

5.2. State Capture

Abby Innes considers state capture being "the 'highest point of corruption'" (Innes, 2016: 595). She draws her conclusions from the text of Joel S. Hellmann et al. (2003) in which the authors discuss the phenomena of state capture and develop a categorization measuring state capture from the corporate perspective (cf. Hellmann, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003). But how can we define state capture and what are its main characteristics?

Especially in transformed countries (such as the Czech Republic after the fall of communism) where the main efforts of the economic, societal, and political transitions were made to reduce the economic powers of the state, one particular side effect has occurred – i.e., the overpowering of the liberalization and privatization aspects of the transition, so that some market actors were able to influence political actors and institutions in order to pursue their economic advantage. These individuals or businesses are what Hellmann et al. describe as ‘captor firms’ or ‘individual captor’ (cf. Hellmann, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003: 753). The authors define captor firms as “[...] firms that make private payments to public officials to affect the rules of the game [...]” (ibid.). Another variety of this manipulation of the political environment in order to create better or even the best conditions for an economic actor would be what Hellmann et al. describe as ‘influential firms’: “[...] firms that have influence on those rules without recourse to private payments to public officials [...]” (ibid.). In short, we can, according to Hellmann et al., – in general – differentiate between individual captors or influencers and captor firms or influential firms. Their characteristics differ mainly in their original status in the system. Influential firms have mostly established ties with the regime and are more or less ‘operating’ in firm-state relations. On the other hand, captor firms whose ties with the state need to be established are penetrating the given environment. (Cf. ibid)

Hellmann et al. describe the relation of firms and state in a case of state capture as follows: “In the bargain between politicians and firms the politician uses political power to provide rents to firms in return for private economic gains, which further his political or economic objectives” (Hellmann, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003: 756). According to the authors, different actors act differently while making their state capture. Where an oligopoly with rather weaker actors results in a less dangerous situation of state capture, in the case of a single power player state capture is very significant. (Hellmann, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003: 762f, 757)

At this point, it should be discussed why state capture is problematic for the economy and the state – apart from the moral aspect – and how is it different from ‘regular’ corruption. In general, influential and captor firms or individuals aim at gathering more improvements for their businesses at the cost of others. These can be, for example, economic rights, benefits, investments, or turnovers. And while what we consider ‘regular’ corruption does not create a systemic discrimination to other

actors, state capture creates exactly the type of systemic discrimination which, according to Hellmann et al., leads to “[...] large social costs for the rest of the economy in deteriorating sales and investment growth at the same time it generates individualized gains to captor firms” (Hellmann, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003: 769f.). And, the authors go even further in stating that the phenomena can expand, thus leading to a situation in which a “capture economy” emerges (ibid.).

It would be logical to say that this expansion can be moderated by the political actors in the sense that when the situation ‘gets out of hand,’ it would be the political actors who will gain control over the economic actors. However, it is possible that the economic actors do not have to rely on political actors. In this situation, a direct state capture occurs when economic actors become political actors. This is what Abby Innes describes as a situation where “[...] entrepreneurial political elites established ‘brokerage’ party systems, in which public policy remains a side-product of an essentially economic competition” (Innes, 2014: 88). In other words, the economic actors ‘disguise’ themselves as politicians with a public policy program in order to pursue their economic interests with a high level of state capture.

Such a situation is not easy to accomplish for economic actors in an environment that is more resistant to state capture and where state and non-state institutions are strong and public engagement is high. However, the developments of some CEE countries have led to an environment of weak institutions. In sum, state capture was made possible by the political society trying to gain some advantage from the weakening position of the state. From the perspective of civil society, there were actors who tried to use the weakened state to gain more profits (‘captor firms’ or ‘individual captors’) and actors who opposed it. However, because of the non-simultaneity of information (Demirović, 2004), the latter came too late in order to prevent the state-capture by captors and failed to build up their position in the power struggle.

What Hellmann et al. suggest is a quantitative approach. In their conclusion “[...] the capture economy should be measured by the extent of its impact on the economy rather than the extent of efforts by firms to engage in state capture” (Hellmann, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003: 757). Therefore, in 2003, the Czech Republic

was classified as a country with a low capture classification together with Latvia and Estonia based on the aggregate capture economic index as opposed to the high capture classifications of Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, or Slovak Republic (ibid.: 758). However, not only with respect to developments in the Czech Republic, a more qualitative approach might be needed in order to fully determine the risks of state capture for a society. Not only are the economics negatively affected – there are severe consequences for democracy as well. Through state capture, democratic backsliding develops.

5.3. Democratic Backsliding

Democratic backsliding has been defined as a situation “[w]hen executives systematically devise and implement measures [...] that enable them to dominate the institutions and organizational structures of the state, erode the balance of powers and increase their control of the state and judiciary, this results in democratic backsliding” (Dimitrova, 2018: 257f.). This means that the continuing efforts to hold and empower the position of a social actor in a state capture situation lead to democratic backsliding. Even though the society may show active opposition against state capture, it might not be enough to change the structures and processes imposed by the actors involved in state capture for two reasons: (1) state capture has become strongly institutionalized and/or (2) the discourse is controlled by the state capture actor(s) (cf. ibid.: 267f.). The conclusion of Dimitrova (2018) is that there are certain characteristics of the process where state capture leads to democratic backsliding. These are: (1) the weakening of democratic institutions; (2) control of emerging interests; (3) active society as opposition to democratic backsliding; (4) securing voter loyalty; (5) undermining social trust (cf. ibid.: 268f.).

Another perspective on this concept has been described by Robert Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk (cf. Foa & Mounk, 2016, 2017). In 2016, the authors conducted a comparative study of data from the United States and Europe and came to the conclusion that once consolidated democracies can be reverted back to their deconsolidated state – which, in turn, may even result in a “democratic breakdown” – if (1) authoritarian tendencies increase among the population, (2) parties with anti-systemic rhetoric and programs grow stronger; and/or (3) traditional parties or

political authorities are weakened (Foa & Mounk, 2016: 15). One year later, in their article “The Signs of Deconsolidation” (Foa & Mounk, 2017), they include the role of social actors as possible defendants of the consolidated democracy and once again stress the dangers of populism as a means of democracy deconsolidation (ibid. 13f.).

Useful insights on populism are presented by Pippa Norris in her 2020 study on “Measuring populism worldwide” (Norris, 2020b). She suggests that populist discourse cannot be linked to a particular political ideology but, rather, “[t]he rhetoric may be consistent with subsequent actions, for example, genuine commitments to radical procedural reforms, getting rid of corrupt graft, fixing laws [...], and restoring electoral accountability to ordinary citizens” (ibid.: 699). This is much in accordance with what scholars have observed in the Czech Republic with ANO 2011 being classified as “technocratic” or “entrepreneurial” populism. However, in Norris’ understanding, it would rather be characterized as populism in a technocratic or entrepreneurial environment than a technocratic/entrepreneurial way of populism.

With this in mind, we shall now analyze the governance of Andrej Babiš during the governmental period 2017-2021 and examine how the environment of a governance being a result of state capture affected the well-being of Czech society and democracy.

6. Historical Context: State and Governance since 1989

The transformation of the relations between state in its narrow sense and society after '89' was supposed to be shaped by three major situations – the transformation in course of the fall of the communist regime, the splitting of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, and the EU accession. These situations have led to major institutional changes and have been expected to have a particular influence on the (national) state and society. However, it seems that there is a cleavage between these formal changes or 'changes on paper' and the behavioral changes in society which might not have followed the path of institutional changes.

There have been three major transformations in the Czechoslovak and Czech State since 1989 based on changes in constitutional law. One transformation after 1989 was less important since a more significant constitutional transformation had been postponed until 12th December 1990. Until that time, the reformed constitution from 1968 had been in force. With the Constitutional Law 556/1990 Sb. of the Czechoslovak Federation (Zákony.cz, 1990), the preceding Constitutional Law 143/1968 Sb. of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Sbírka zákonů, 1968) was modified. The new law included the change in the formation of the state; a new definition of the national economy; relations of the two federative states on both the national and international levels; as well as the national budget and relations in finances; monetary matters; among others.

However, it was not until 16th December 1992 with the split of the Czech and Slovak Republic that a completely new constitution, the Constitutional Law 1/1993 Sb.(PSP, 1992) came into being. The new Constitution is separated into nine sections: The Preamble including a declaration of the citizens' values; (1) Fundamental Provisions including rights, freedoms, and obligations of the citizens; division of government into legislative, executive, and judiciary branches; as well as relations to national polity, democratic, and international provisions; further chapters are focused on (2) legislative, (3) executive, and (4) judicial powers; followed by more specific chapters defining (5) The Supreme Audit Office – a body

responsible for “the management of state property and the implementation of state budget”; (6) The Czech National Bank with defined primary responsibilities; and the principle of (7) Territorial Self-Government – defining the government structures beneath the national level; the last chapter includes (8) Transitional and Final Provisions focused notably on the provisional upkeep of the two parliamentary chambers until the elections in 1996. (Cf. PSP, 1992) Another Constitutional Law was issued in 1997 when the lower governmental structures were amended by Constitutional Law 347/1997 Sb. (Zákony.cz, 1997). With the accession of the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Constitutional Law 300/2000 Sb. (Zákony.cz, 2000) came into force amending the military provisions with respect to the Treaty.

Finally, three Constitutional Laws were issued regarding the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union (EU): first, 448/2001 Sb. (Zákony.cz, 2001b) amending the provisions regarding the Czech National Bank; second, 395/2001 Sb. (Zákony.cz, 2001a) defining the relations to obligations stemming from international law; and, finally, 515/2002 Sb. (Zákony.cz, 2002) introducing a one-time referendum concerning the ratification of the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. These latest three Constitutional Laws came into force between 2009 and 2013 and aimed at the following: first, the 319/2009 Sb. (Zákony.cz, 2009) introduced the ‘self’-dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies (meaning that the Chamber of Deputies can – by a 3/5 majority – propose a dissolution of itself to the President of the Czech Republic). Second, with 71/2012 Sb. (Zákony.cz, 2012) the direct election of the President of the Czech Republic was introduced. Finally, Constitutional Law 98/2013 Sb. (Zákony.cz, 2013) has changed the current provisions regarding the legal immunity of deputies, senators, and of judges of the Constitutional Court.

With all of these constitutional and institutional arrangements, we will now explore the conditions that are typical for the Eastern Europe area and how they stem from the transformation after 1989/91.

6.1. After the Fall of Socialism (1989-1992)

If we follow the argumentation of Jan Drahekoupil (2008) the transformational process started with provisions of what Drahekoupil describes as the “Klausian Welfare National State” (Drahekoupil, 2008: 73). The principles of this part of the transformation consisted of ideas of monetarism, minimized regulations and social policies as well as economic nationalism and compensating state (ibid.: 76). The most important goal of this phase was to ‘stay low’ on most of the major economic and monetary factors: low inflation, low spending, low regulations and subventions, as well as low (downgraded) currency (cf. Süß, 2001: 156).

One of the most prominent policies of this period was the process of privatization. According to Dirck Süß (cf. Süß, 2001: 154ff.), privatization in the Czechoslovak Republic was kicked off under relatively favorable conditions. The beginning of the process, however, was disrupted by the lack of constraints from both the financial and legitimacy perspectives. He differentiates four different aspects of the legal regulation at that time: (1) large privatization regulated by the privatization act of February 1991 with a voucher method modality launched in February 1992; (2) small privatization regulated by the legislation of October 1990; (3) small restitution of October 1990; and (4) large restitution of February 1991 (cf. Süß, 2001: 165f.; Drahekoupil, 2008: 77).

Privatization was based on a simple principle in which state-owned companies should be placed on the market for purchase by private actors. This was accomplished by transferring the companies to a fund and thus the companies were operating completely free of state involvement and financing. Because of the missing capital for these funds, a plan was designed in which coupon books were sold to Czechoslovak citizens. Each coupon book contained 10 coupons with 100 points which citizens could use to acquire stocks in a company of their choice, directly or indirectly, in the investment funds which yielded the investors certain gains depending on the fund.

However, because of the limited knowledge of the free market among would-be investors and a lack of financial intelligence among the citizens, the process was easily corrupted by criminal actors. In the most notorious case, Viktor Kožený lured

several hundreds of thousands of citizens into investing in his fund, promising payouts of up to 10 times their investment. However, instead of paying out any yields, he fled with the trusted money to the Bahamas where he remains to this day. Other actors also corrupting the process were those with background information on companies as well as those with connections to politicians. For example, the state mining company OKD (Ostravsko-karvinské doly [Ostrava-Karviná Mines]) was sold well over the listed market price (along with several other major companies, including oil processing company Unipetrol).

Finally, the process was also corrupted by those who bought companies with previous distribution in the Soviet Union market. Because this market crashed, companies such as agricultural machinery producer Zetor or the vehicle manufacturer Tatra fell deeply into debt. For these companies, generous bank funding was granted. In some cases, the lack of transparency resulted in increased bank funding without control over the funds which were, in fact, being used to finance the companies' operations. And, in other cases, the companies were simply being defrauded. More recently, however, bankruptcy has been declared by some companies and these companies have been transferred back to a *state-owned* consolidation agency or have reverted back to being a *state-owned* company.

These practices were mostly the case during the days of large privatization while the companies falling under the process of small privatization have been auctioned and were left with situations in which debt and ownership questions had to be settled (cf. Süß, 2001: 166). This meant that these small businesses – retail stores or services – were left to be bought and sold at an auction and bought by a specific person who paid cash on spot.

For restitutions, the intended goal has been two-fold. Through small restitution, the seizure of the expropriated property being solely politically motivated and lacking any legal foundation or being conducted between 1955-1959 should have been transferred back to the owners. During the large restitution, three months later, all legislation regarding ownership transfers during the period 25.02.1948-01.01.1990 have been revoked. (Cf. Süß, 2001: 166f.)

As with privatization, similarly with the question of restitution, there are several cases where social actors have tried – and continue to try -- to undermine the state's efforts in order to gain economic advantage. In that sense, there have been and continue to be high value properties claimed by social actors who wish to be included in the restitution process based on documents of questionable authenticity as in the case of the properties around Slapy reservoir. Other cases include situations property registry officers have been bribed in order to include illegitimate restitution claims (e.g. Blažek, 2022).

All in all, the 1990s are being called 'The Wild 90s'. The winners have been those with political connections and thus a better position on the market. The lack of control mechanisms and transparency have led to a situation where social actors have corrupted the state – both the politicians and the processes – in order to achieve economic gains. In this sense, state capture, the systemic political corruption where private interests influence a state's decision-making process, has boomed in the Czechoslovak state.

6.2. Breakup of the Czechoslovak Federation and Thereafter (1993-2003)

After the economic paradigm had been established, a new discourse occurred – with the debate over the nation-state. The discussion over the breakup of the Czechoslovak Federation and the creation of independent republics was initiated in 1990 and climaxed in late 1992 after Constitutions for both countries had been drafted and adopted (the Slovak Constitution in September 1992 and the Czech Constitution in December 1992) (cf. Stein, 2000: 271ff.). Generally, the differences between the the two countries arose mostly in two areas: *First*, from the differences in the economic development with Czech industry being considered much stronger and more developed than Slovakian industry. *Second*, from the differences in social and historical context. From these perspectives, both countries developed independently during the days of the Austro-Hungarian empire, during the Second World War, and then during the communist era. Furthermore, both countries speak distinct languages although neither society has a problem understanding the other's language. (Cf. Stein, 2000: 23ff.) Despite these differences, the process for the independence of both republics was peacefully completed on 1st January 1993.

With their newly established independence intact, the focus of both countries turned once again to economics. Following the argumentation of Jan Drahekoupil (2008), the welfare part of the earlier Czechoslovak transformation was minimized and this led to an economic boom that was very short-lived. The positive economic trend began to sag in 1996 since economic growth had been induced at the expense of a minimized involvement in social matters. Furthermore, the financial and banking sector started to decline in its performance and, in some cases, in its legitimacy. All these developments in 1996, seeping into 1997, led to a change in government as the 1998 election ushered the Social Democrats in as the new party in power. (Cf. Drahekoupil, 2008)

According to Drahekoupil, the change in this part of the transformation was marked by a re-orientation of the economy from nationalism to internationalism. This led to an incentive to satisfy and optimize the factors on the national 'supply side' with respect to international demands. Consequently, privatization was influenced by the decisions of international actors. While the focus had shifted to securing a pool of high quality workers, some social provisions were also introduced, even though these remained determined by economic factors. Finally, the guardian of the market was no longer the compensating state but the governing state. Drahekoupil describes this as the Proletarian Workfare Postnational Regime. (Cf. Drahekoupil, 2008) Furthermore, prior to EU accession in 2003, a new cooperation project between the state's core and society was inaugurated: the Public-Private-Partnership (cf. *ibid.*: 84).

Consequently, we can say that direct governance of the Czech Republic was established after 1996 and through a number of initiatives -- such as the Public-Private-Partnership -- attempts were made to improve the functionality of the state. With the governance era, the previous withdrawal of the state led to a rethinking of the state as a welfare provider, i.e., the state in its narrowest sense readily cooperating with social actors. This has given social actors a new incentive to create or preserve established connections with political actors and thus obtain new opportunities for pursuing their interest.

6.3. After the EU accession (2004-present)

Since the creation of the Public-Private-Partnership in 2003, the government entity has continued to grow and develop, while creating more connections between the state's core and society in an effort to improve its supply side (cf. Drahokoupil, 2008: 84). Any social actor seeking EU funding can make an application to the Ministry of Regional Development, further deepening the connection between the government entity and interested parties.

Close connections between political and social actors, already well-established in the past, has once again been revived – simply in another institutional setup. As Soulsby and Clark have noted, there is a behavioral heritage from the communist era present in the society characterized by ideas, such as the idea of necessary alliances with state actors in business management in order to gain advantages for their enterprises. There are also times when a compulsion for agreements is needed to overcome institutional structures. (Cf. Soulsby & Clark, 1996: 480 ff.)

We observe a persistent dissonance between institutional changes on the one hand and the behavioral reluctance to changes on the other. The result of many major transformations in the Czech Republic is that institutionalization has not yet been completed. Consequently, the state in its narrowest sense is vulnerable and the conditions for state capture to occur are favorable.

It is a natural consequence that has been identified by Jan Drahokoupil as a situation where “[...] the basic social forms are only in the process of institutionalization and are thus contested by different social actors and path-dependencies” (Drahokoupil, 2008: 71). It is the imperfect or non-existent completion of the institutionalization process that serves as an incentive for ‘captors’ to establish such structures and frameworks that would benefit them at the cost of others.

As we have seen the Czech state has been transforming almost continuously since 1989. In such a case, I would argue, state capture is not only undesirable because it distorts market competition (cf. Hellmann, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003: 753f.) but also because a conflict or dissonance between institutional setup and

society's behavioral setting can even lead to an undermining of these institutions. In other words, it creates a situation where "[t]he withdrawal of social legitimacy increases the vulnerability of economic institutions and structures [...]" (Soulsby & Clark, 1996: 476). How these structures and institutions have been designed in the modern Czech state will be discussed in the upcoming chapter.

7. Structures, Institutions, and Elections

7.1. Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in the Czech Republic

The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy with (1) *judiciary powers* resting with the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Administrative Court; (2) *legislative powers* being assigned to the bicameral Parliament; and (3) *executive powers* being divided between the Government consisting of Ministers and ministries under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the President who is the formal head of state appointing the prime minister as well as his or her cabinet. Czech citizens elect both chambers of the Parliament as well as the President in a direct election. The lower chamber of Parliament (Chamber of Deputies) votes of confidence for the Government that is thereafter nominated by the President. The upper chamber of Parliament (Senate) votes of confidence for the Constitutional Court which is also nominated by the President. (Cf. PSP, 1992)

7.2. Legislative elections in the Czech Republic

The regular electoral term is four years, however, if the Chamber of Deputies declares a vote of no confidence in the Government (the vote can be carried out at any time) and/or if there is a self-dissolving motion by the Chamber of Deputies, snap legislative elections are to be held. The dates for regular or snap legislative elections are set by the President. After the election, the chairman of the winning party or movement is designated by the President to compile the new Government. Once the proposal for a new Government is completed, the President nominates the candidates. Consequently, the Government-To-Be has to call for a motion of confidence by the Chamber of Deputies within a 30-day period. If the vote is successful (meaning that the Government gains more than half of the votes) the Government is elected. If the Government-To-Be does not have enough support, the process can be repeated. However, the President must again nominate the candidates based on the new, mostly adapted, proposal for Government. If the vote of confidence fails a second time, the Prime Minister proposed by the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies is nominated by the President. (Cf. PSP, 1992)

In the history of the Czech Republic, there has only been one snap legislative election. Since the legislative elections were re-regulated in 1998 with the

Constitutional Law No. 69/1998 (PSP, 1998), the only snap legislative election took place in 2013 after the self-dissolving motion by the Chamber of Deputies in the course of a crisis over the Government of Petr Nečas of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in June 2013 following a scandal involving corruption and later an abuse of the state's powers by the Prime Minister's wife, Jana Nagyová.

7.3. Czech National Election 2017

The election for the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Republic was to be held the 20th and 21st October 2017 by the decision of the Czech President Miloš Zeman (cf. Volby.cz, 2017). The first elections date back to 1920 when the first election for the two chambers (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) of the Czechoslovak Republic was held (cf. PSP, n.d.). After the election, executive power in the country was re-considered by the Czech citizens and the political scene on the executive level was re-arranged according to the outcomes of the elections.

After the 2017 election, the composition of the Czech Parliament led to a government headed by ANO 2011 together with the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) with tolerance of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). ANO 2011 came out of the election as the strongest member of the coalition (ANO 2011 achieved totally 1.500.113 votes or 29,64% of the valid votes; cf. Volby.cz, 2017) leading the coalition in the Chamber of Deputies with 78 out of 200 seats. This was more than three times the number of seats won by the second winning party – the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) (with 572.948 or 11,32% of the valid votes and 25 seats). However, this was not the first time ANO 2011 had become a relevant player in the Chamber of Deputies and in the government. In the 2013 election, ANO 2011 placed second (behind the Czech Social Democratic Party) with 18,65% of the valid votes (cf. Volby.cz, 2013) and 47 seats. Even though the coalition of the Czech Social Democratic Party, ANO 2011, and the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL) was led by the social democrats, ANO 2011 gained seven ministries (including the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, or Ministry of Transport, among others) and a position of deputy Prime Minister. This was interpreted as a great success since the political movement had only been established in 2012. For the 2017 election, the following statistical values can be observed:

7.3.1. Voter Turnout and Valid Votes

Slightly more than two-thirds of the population participated in the 2017 election (60,84%) and 99,40% of the votes were valid (cf. Volby.cz, 2017).

7.3.2. Total Votes and Seats

Party/Movement	Total Votes	Percentage	Seats
<i>ANO 2011</i>	1.500.113	29,64	78
<i>ODS</i>	572.948	11,32	25
<i>Czech Pirate Party</i>	546.393	10,79	22
<i>SPD</i>	538.574	10,64	22
<i>ČSSD</i>	368.347	7,27	15
<i>KSČM</i>	393.100	7,76	15
<i>KDU-ČSL</i>	293.643	5,80	10
<i>TOP 09</i>	268.811	5,31	7
<i>STAN</i>	262.157	5,18	6
Total	3.243.973	93,71	200

Table 1: Chamber of Deputies Election 2017 - Total Votes and Seats
(cf. Volby.cz, 2017)

7.3.3. Voter Volatility (values 2017 compared to 2013)

Winners	Gained in total	Most votes gained from
<i>ANO 2011</i>	570.000,00	ČSSD (360.000,00)
<i>Czech Pirate Party</i>	430.000,00	TOP 09 (140.000,00)
<i>SPD</i>	240.000,00	Non-Voters/KSČM (à 120.000,00)
<i>STAN</i>	180.000,00	Non-Voters (100.000,00)
<i>ODS</i>	160.000,00	TOP 09 (180.000,00)
<i>KDU-ČSL</i>	20.000,00	Non-Voters (50.000,00)

Table 2: Chamber of Deputies Election 2017 – Voter Volatility Winners
(cf. Škop, 2017)

Losers	Lost in total	Most votes lost to
<i>ČSSD</i>	640.000,00	ANO 2011 (360.000,00)
<i>KSČM</i>	370.000,00	ANO 2011 (200.000,00)
<i>TOP 09</i>	320.000,00	ODS (180.000,00)

Table 3: Chamber of Deputies Election 2017 – Voter Volatility Losers
(Škop, 2017)

7.3.4. Party Fragmentation

Overall, nine parties garnered enough votes to overcome the 5%-threshold for entering the Chamber of Deputies leaving 22 parties outside the lower chamber of the Parliament (cf. Volby.cz, 2017).

7.4. Between the Elections: Party Preferences

The interim between elections brought about some interesting developments for the Czech political scene. Many parties formed coalitions in an effort to gain enough voter support to challenge ANO 2011. Predictions for the 2021 election assigned the top position to ANO 2011 as a single party or movement with a number coalitions challenging for a prominent position in the post-election hierarchy.

Polls favored ANO 2011 as the strongest movement or party with more than 25% of the expected total vote (26,6% in week 39). According to the forecast model released by the journalist group of Czech media company Seznam.cz, ANO 2011 was expected to remain the single strongest player in the political arena of the Czech Chamber of Deputies since the winner of the election was forecast to be a coalition of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Popular Party (KDU-ČSL) and TOP 09 with 21,6% of the total vote. Similarly, third place was expected to be claimed by a coalition of the Czech Pirate Party, the Party of Mayors and Independents (STAN) with 19,8% of the vote. The model calculated the weighted average based on the time of the survey of all polls conducted during week 44 in 2017. (Cf. Škop & Mahdalová, 2021)

From the data Škop and Mahdalová drew the following chart (week 27/2021):




Figure 1: Weekly development of polls by all agencies in the Czech Republic week 44/2017-39/2021 (Škop & Mahdalová, 2021)

Before we elaborate on the results for ANO 2011, it is important to note that the apparent missing data for some parties at the end of 2020 are a result of the official announcement of a merger of the Civic Democratic Party, the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Popular Party, and TOP 09 into the coalition ‘Together’ (SPOLU) on one hand, while the merger of the Czech Pirate Party and the Mayors and Independents formed the coalition ‘Pirstan’ (in the chart indicated as Piráti+STAN) on the other.

Regarding ANO 2011, the chart shows a steady development in the voters' support (staying above 30% in total votes) until week 23 of 2020 when the arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic and its ramifications. We can observe a rise in political support again starting from week 22 in 2021 not only for ANO 2011 but also for the other parties as well as the parties were, once again, able to address their voters directly.

The focus of this thesis does not primarily aim at explaining these changes in the voters' support, however, we will discuss the development of the voters' support in the following chapter as we will analyze in more detail ANO 2011 and the path of Andrej Babiš. The steadiness of preferences throughout the years prior to the Covid-19 pandemic as well as the pre-election success later in 2021 have been observed despite some major developments around ANO 2011. Starting from 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic clearly had a negative effect on the popularity of the government. Finally, during the pre-election campaign in 2021, its voters' support began to rise once again.

7.5. Czech National Election 2021

The parliamentary election 2021 was held on the 8th and 9th October (cf. Kenety, 2020). As stated, after the previous election in 2017, the Chamber of Deputies had been run by ANO 2011 together with the Social Democrats. The 2021 election was framed by some commentators and even the political actors themselves as a clash of 'democratic opposition' to Andrej Babiš and his movement, ANO 2011 (e.g. Bruner, 2021).

With a total voter turnout reaching slightly over 65% (65,43%, cf. Volby.cz, 2021), ANO 2011 was the winning single party for the election to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament with 72 seats and 27,12% of the total vote. The ANO 2011 movement was second overall to the SPOLU coalition comprised of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Popular Party (KDU-ČSL) and TOP 09, which garnered 27,79% of the total vote – but for one less seat in the Chamber of Deputies. Third place was occupied by the coalition of the Czech Pirate Party and the Party of Mayors and Independents (STAN) with 15,62% of the votes. One more party also reached the 5% threshold for parties or movements entering the Chamber of Deputies – the Freedom and Direct

Democracy (SPD) with 9,56% of the total valid votes. Parties usually present in the Chamber of Deputies, The Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), did not gain enough support to reach the parties' and movements' threshold and therefore did not receive any seats in the Chamber. Similarly, the newly created movement 'Oath' (Přísaha – Robert Šlachta's Civic Movement) did not collect enough votes in order to join the Chamber. (Ibid.)

7.5.1. Voter Turnout and Valid Votes

More than 65% of population participated in the election 2021 (65,43%) and 99,32% of the votes were valid (cf. Volby.cz, 2021b).

7.5.2. Total Votes and Seats

Party/Movement	Total Votes	Percentage	Seats
<i>ANO 2011</i>	1.458.140	27,12	72
<i>SPOLU (ODS+TOP 09+KDU-ČSL)</i>	1.493.905	27,79	71
<i>Czech Pirate Party+STAN</i>	839.776	15,62	37
<i>SPD</i>	513.910	9,56	20
Total	4.305.731	80,09	200

Table 4: Chamber of Deputies Election 2021 - Total Votes and Seats
(cf. Volby.cz, 2021b)

7.5.3. Voter Volatility (comparison April 2021-October 2021)

Winners	Gained in total	Most votes gained from
<i>SPOLU</i>	160.000,00	Czech Pirate Party+STAN (370.000,00)
<i>ANO 2011</i>	60.000,00	Non-Voters (340.000,00)

Table 5: Chamber of Deputies Election 2021 – Voter Volatility Winners
(cf. Prokop, 2021)

Losers	Lost in total	Most votes lost to
<i>Czech Pirate Party+STAN</i>	620.000,00	SPOLU (370.000,00)
<i>SPD</i>	210.000,00	Non-Voters (260.000,00)

Table 6: Chamber of Deputies Election 2021 – Voter Volatility Losers
(cf. Prokop, 2021)

7.5.4. *Party Fragmentation*

Of the 22 parties vying in the election, only two parties (ANO 2011 and SPD) and two coalitions (SPOLU and Czech Pirate Party + STAN) gained enough support to reach the 5%-threshold for parties, the 8%-threshold for two-unit coalitions, and 11%-threshold for more-units coalitions entering the Chamber of Deputies (cf. Volby.cz, 2021b). The threshold was re-regulated in May 2021 by the law No. 189/2021 Sb. §49 (epravo.cz, 2021).

7.6. The Elections in Comparison

The comparison of both elections to the Czech Chamber of Deputies shows both quantitative and qualitative differences. When we analyze the quantitative data, we see that the voter turnout increased by 7,54% from 60,84% in 2017 to 65,43% in 2021. This points to an increased public engagement in the election. With respect to the percentage of valid votes we see no significant change – the percentage dropped from 99,40% in 2017 to 99,32% in 2021 which accounts for a 0,08% change. We can conclude, then, that there is no significant evidence for protest votes.

It is important to note that the data for 2017 are from the period 2013-2017 (both post-election results) and the data for 2021 are a comparison of voters' intended voting preferences in April 2021 and the post-election results in October 2021. The data are not comparable and thus we cannot make any conclusions on the overall volatility dropping in average from approximately 325.500 voters changing their voting decisions in 2017 to 262.500 voters in 2021. However, we can observe significant changes in the opinion of the 2021 voters over a short period of time.

The process of the election in 2021, from the qualitative perspective, changed significantly from the election of 2017. Whereas only single parties or movements participated in the 2017 election and won seats in the Chamber of the Deputies, in 2021, coalitions had been forged and the national law was adapted accordingly. The fragmentation of nine parties in 2017 was replaced by the polarization to three main political factions: (1) the movement ANO 2011; (2) the far-right movement SPD; and (3) the so-called 'demo-block' represented by the coalition SPOLU on the one hand and the Czech Pirate Party + STAN coalition on the other.

8. Actors and Processes: ANO 2011 & Andrej Babiš

8.1. The Up and Downs in ANO 2011 Preferences

If we take a more detailed look at the preferences of ANO 2011, we observe several significant up and downs. *First*, there was a down late in 2017/early in 2018. In this period, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) identified the 'Stork's Nest' case as subsidy fraud. *Second*, the up, almost back to the preferences before the down, late in 2018 can be connected to the Government withstanding the motion of no confidence by the Chamber of Deputies issued in week 47 in 2018. *Third*, there has been a short down to the preferences after the municipal office found Andrej Babiš guilty of violating the Conflict of Interest Act followed, *fourth*, by an up back to 32% voter support after framing discourse on the issue, as well as on anti-government demonstrations held after changes in the Ministry of Justice, the proposed replacement of the supreme prosecutor in favor of Andrej Babiš' case, as well as the proposed amendment to the Act on the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office increasing the influence of politicians on selection of the Supreme Public Prosecutor. *Finally*, the Covid-19 pandemics has had a significant negative effect on the ANO 2011 preferences since week 18 in 2020 from which the movement recovered only to 26.6% of total voters' preferences. (Cf.

Valášek, 2021a)




Figure 2: Weekly development of polls for ANO 2011 by all agencies in Czech Republic week 44/2017-39/2021 (Škop & Mahdalová, 2021)

If we extract the preferences for ANO 2011 from the preference chart (as we did in Figure 2) we can connect events brought to attention by the media to the respective changes. In the annex, there is a brief overview of these events including the week of publishing.

In general, we can identify some major areas that had a negative impact on the voters' preferences and on the general public opinion during the Babiš' government 2017-2021. We will now examine Andrej Babiš' conflict of interest, his personal history, and the political culture surrounding ANO 2011.

8.2. Andrej Babiš' Conflict of Interest and Personal History

Starting with an elaboration on the conflicts of interest of Andrej Babiš, we should be able to better understand the essence of the other identified areas. Furthermore, 'connecting the dots' in these particular cases will be much easier if we begin by taking a look at the bigger picture.

The beginning of Agrofert holding dates back to the early 1990's, however, Babiš did not gain full control over Agrofert until 1996. The connections with the 'old' structures from the pre-revolutionary era occupying the Ministry of Interior Affairs led to a rapid rise in the value of Agrofert holding (cf. Kmenta, 2017) and were the foundation for building an imperium with several hundreds of subjects being active in a number of areas of business from forestry, media, and marketing, to the chemical industry, food industry, transportation and agriculture as well as many more (a simplified visualization of the company connections to Agrofert holding from 2019 can be found in the appendix; Hradílková Bártová, 2019).

In 2017, shortly before the Conflict of Interest Act came to force, Babiš established two trust funds for all the subjects with him being the only beneficiary. One of the trusts (AB Private Trust II) owns a 10% share in Agrofert holding and the other (AB Private Trust I) owns a 90% share in Agrofert holding and 100% in another company „SynBiol a.s.“ which, in turn, connects with a 100% share to the IMOBA group (among other the owner and operator of the Stork's Nest), with a 100% share to SYNVAK a.s., and with a 87,75% share to Hartenberg Holding s.r.o. (Cf. European Commission, 2021: 18; Hradílková Bártová, 2019)




Figure 3: AB trusts visualization (own depiction according to European Commission, 2021 and Hradílková Bártová, 2019)

Even though the trusts have, on paper, appointed members, the members are appointed and/or dismissed by Andrej Babiš himself and, therefore, the Audit of the European Commission has determined that Babiš “[...] has a direct, as well as an indirect decisive influence over the Trust Funds [...]” leading to the conclusion that “[...] Mr Babiš indirectly controls the parent company of the AGROFERT group [...]” (European Commission, 2021: 19). For this reason, the European Commission concludes the following: “a) Mr Babiš was actively involved in the implementation of the EU budget in the Czech Republic; b) Mr Babiš is the beneficial owner of the AGROFERT group companies and since February 2017, of the two Trust Funds, which he fully controls and therefore has a direct economic interest in the success of the AGROFERT group; and c) the impartial and objective exercise of Mr Babiš functions (as Prime Minister, the Chairman of the ESIF Council, Minister for Finance and Deputy Prime Minister for Economy) was compromised, due to the fact that he was involved in decisions which also affected the AGROFERT group.” (Ibid.: 22)

But how did Andrej Babiš get involved in such a conflict of interest in the first place? In order to answer the question of how this state capture came into being, we need to re-trace his path from approximately 1998. As already stated, in the late '90s Babiš used his connections with former state security agents who had successfully been integrated into the new state's structures to gain information, for example, on privatization processes. That Andrej Babiš had been registered in the database of high-ranked state security agents and that he joined the forces voluntarily has been confirmed by the Regional Court in Bratislava.

As we have mentioned in the chapter on privatization in the Czech Republic, the company Unipetrol has been one of the businesses privatized in the course of the large privatization. As an oil processing holding company with several companies producing and distributing petrochemical products, it was in Babiš' best interest to gain influence in Unipetrol since Agrofert started in the 1990s as primarily a petrochemical and agricultural company. It was in 1998 that Andrej Babiš started to build tight connections with political actors in the Czech Social Democratic Party and, finally, in 2002 his holding Agrofert won privatization for Unipetrol. However, later that year, Babiš withdrew from the contract and Unipetrol was privatized for a second time. This time by Polish company 'PKN Orlen'. However, the process again involved Babiš since PKN Orlen agreed to pay him for his help in the privatization process. The connecting partner between Babiš and PKN Orlen was Stanislav Gross, the Interior Minister from the Social Democrats (ČSSD) at that time and then later, in 2004, Prime Minister of the Czech Republic from the same party. (Cf. Kmenta, 2017; Babiš, 2011)

With the change in government in 2006, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), previously an opposition party, came into power. Consequently, the connection with political actors deteriorated for Babiš since the new government had tighter connections with other social actors than the Social Democrats. In the course of this development, in 2011, Babiš started the project ANO which later that year became the political movement ANO 2011. (Cf. Kmenta, 2017) This founding process was confirmed by the movement itself, for example, through the founding statement (Babiš, 2011) spelling out the reasons why Babiš got politically involved directly. In the statement, Babiš frames himself as a force against the traditional parties, even though as we have just discussed he himself has several connections to these

traditional politicians which he did not deny. The statement further follows a rhetorical style described by scholars as one of an entrepreneurial or technocratic party.

Another major aspect of the beginnings of ANO 2011 was the acquisition of the largest media group in the Czech Republic, the Mafra media group, by Babiš' Agrofert holding in June 2013 – four months before the next legislative election in October 2013. Mafra's reach at that time via television, radio, digital and print media was approximately 6 Mil. users (about 57% of the Czech population). (Cf. Kmenta, 2017)

Having close connections to state actors, to political actors, being in charge of a corporate 'empire' including up to several hundreds of subjects, acquiring the largest media group in the Czech Republic, and, at the same time, being directly involved in politics has embroiled Babiš – apart from the conclusions made by the European Commission and apart from a controversial membership in the communist secret police force – in several negative events.

One of the most prominent cases has been the 'Stork's Nest' case investigated by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The case starts in 2006 when the company IMOBA – part of Andrej Babiš' holding – acquires property close to the Czech Republic's capital, Prague. Two years after, in 2008, ownership of the property was transferred to an anonymous company. As such, the company obtained funding for small and medium enterprises which would have been impossible if the company had been part of a large holding. In 2013, ownership was returned back to IMOBA. A multifunctional resort for entertainment, relaxation, with event venues and a congress center mainly, but not exclusively, meant for the uses of Agrofert holding becomes in 2016 a target of an investigation conducted by OLAF for alleged fraudulent funding. Babiš himself explained the case in several different ways from not knowing to which company the resort belonged to, to not knowing who the owner was, before finally admitting his daughter and his son were the owners of the resort. Babiš' son, Andrej Babiš Jr., made several statements during the investigation including that he had been a straw man in the case. He later alleged that his father ordered his abduction to Crimea in order to prevent him from influencing the prosecution of his father. The prosecution itself has been initiated and halted several times. (Cf. Mortkowitz, 2019) To this day, (as of 17.07.2022, GH) the case remains open [status: 17.07.2022, GH].

In 2019, the case provides even more public dissatisfaction when the ANO 2011 Minister of Justice resigns and is succeeded by Marie Benešová (ANO 2011). Shortly after, a proposal for an amendment to the Act on Public Prosecutor's Office by Benešová was presented including, according to the information by the Ministry of Justice, a limitation of terms for public prosecutors, as well as some other changes, such as qualification requirements or seniority (cf. Ministerstvo spravedlnosti, 2019). This became a cause for demonstrations organized by the grassroots movement 'Milion Chvilek pro Demokracii' [A Million Moments for Democracy]. The demonstrations, depending upon their setup, numbered from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of people.

Even though the final report in the 'Stork's Nest' case has not yet been released (cf. European Ombudsman, 2020), the European Commission found Andrej Babiš being in conflict of interest in several other cases of involving EU funding. On 23rd April 2021 the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion of the European Commission published Audit No REGC414CZ0133 (An audit of the functioning of management and control systems set up to avoid any conflicts of interest [...]). The following objectives were set up for the audit: (1) the audit should examine if effective control and management mechanisms are in place to guarantee that the allocation of EU funds to the companies of the Agrofert holding comply with the regulations set for this purpose; (2) the audit should review a sample of such operations in regard to "adequate selection of operations" and (3) in regard to "adequate management verifications"; (4) the audit should, furthermore, evaluate the possible conflict of interest for the allocation of EU funds to the Agrofert holding companies; and (5) propose corrective measures if necessary (cf. European Commission, 2021: 7).

Finally, the leaked Pandora Papers revealed that Babiš had secretly acquired a luxurious property by using offshore companies while publicly advocating for fair and comprehensive tax collection in order to prevent companies from diverting their obligations to tax havens (cf. Alecci, 2021).

8.3. Andrej Babiš, ANO 2011, and the Czech political culture

8.3.1. *Pre-Election situation 2017*

The pre-election government in 2017 consisted of a coalition of the Socialist Democratic Party (ČSSD) which was the winning party in 2013 with 20.45% of the total votes, with ANO 2011 garnering 18.65% of the total votes, and of the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Popular Party (KDU-ČSL) receiving 6.78% of the votes (Volby.cz, 2013). This meant that the Social Democrats together with ANO 2011 shared similar powers in the governing coalition when complemented by the comparably minor coalition partner represented by the Popular Party. The election period was rather turbulent and, in the end, resulted in the severe weakening of the Social Democratic Party. The Social Democrats exhibited internal weaknesses from the beginning of the term with conflicts running through the party between Bohuslav Sobotka, later the Prime Minister, and the first vice-chairman of the party delaying the compilation of the coalition for several weeks. The dispute also included a request for Sobotka to resign his chairman position. (Cf. Nachtmann & Pálková, 2013)

After the coalition agreement was reached (with Sobotka maintaining his position and being nominated by President Miloš Zeman), the government managed to remain stable until May 2017. The election was a major breakthrough for ANO 2011 with the movement claiming six ministries and Andrej Babiš being nominated as Minister of Finance. The Social Democrats, for their part, secured eight ministries while the Popular Party had control over three ministries).

However, in May 2017, the ‘one-crown-bond’ case of Babiš – together with his non-transparent financial situation – resulted in a major destabilization and his dismissal as Minister of Finance. The problem with the ‘one-crown-bonds’ consisted of a loophole in the law. By legislation of the previous government, it became possible to reinvest bond interest in the form of one-crown-bonds meaning that if the bonds, for example, yielded an interest of 641 Czech crowns, one could exchange it for 641 single bonds denominated for one Czech crown. Because the tax rate was set to 15% and rounded down, the tax for the one-crown-bonds would be zero. Even though Babiš did not break the law, the case has been considered grey-zone behavior and strongly amoral since he had promoted the idea of fair tax collection. In

connection to this case and the situation around the bonds of Agrofert, the media became increasingly interested in Babiš' income. State broadcaster, Česká televize [Czech Television], asked Babiš on the program 168 hodin [168 hours] about his income statements that had been amended once discrepancies had been found by an investigative journalist. Babiš' reaction to questions as to why he did not state his correct income immediately has become notoriously famous. "Proč bych vám měl sdělovat všechny svoje příjmy? Sorry jako. Vy sdělujete někomu příjmy? Nebo kdo tady sděluje příjmy posledních 22 let? Co vám je vůbec do toho jako?" [Why should I tell you all my income? Like sorry. Do you disclose your income to anyone? Or who here has reported their income from the last 22 years? How is it your business at all?] (Česká televize, 2017: 00:04:40-00:04:50; Kmenta, 2017: 283) The quote "sorry jako" [like sorry] became very popular and, after reframing the discourse around it, it was used by ANO 2011 for marketing purposes.

After Babiš being dismissed afterwards, the coalition continued its government until the establishment of a new government in December 2017 resulting from the regular election in October 2017.

8.3.2. After Election 2017

The outcome of the 2017 legislative election considerably shifted the power among political parties and movements. The Social Democrats suffered a major defeat receiving only 7,27% of the votes. After the defeat, former Prime Minister Sobotka left the party and even withdrew from political life in general. ANO 2011 formed a coalition with the Social Democrats. However, this was not the first choice of Andrej Babiš. Since other political parties had seen how ANO 2011 collected political capital at the expense of its coalition partner in the previous government, most of the parties declared immediately after the election that they would not enter the coalition. The only potential partners, at that time, were the Communist Party (KSČM) and the Freedom and Direct Democracy Movement (SPD). Partners that, in turn, were not seen as fit coalition partners by Andrej Babiš for their extremist positions – the KSČM being extreme left and SPD extreme right. Consequently, the government did reach an adequate level of support to form a government and Andrej Babiš was nominated for the second try to form a government.

The second, and successful, proposal to form a coalition government was achieved together with the Social Democrats and the silent support of the Communist Party. ANO 2011 accounted for ten and the Social Democrats for five ministries. Even though the Communist Party remained a silent partner (meaning that the party would express a vote of confidence and would not vote for non-confidence to the government), there was public dissatisfaction about the involvement of the Communist Party in the Czech government.

8.3.3. Regional Governments

In spite of the major success on the national level, regional politics, according to Babiš, was something he did not particularly favor. In reaction to the results of the Senate election in 2016, in which one third of the upper chamber of the Parliament had been newly elected, Babiš stated for the media his negative view of regional governments:

“Jinak kraje jsou jen průtokáč peněz. Kdyby nebyly, tak by se nic nestalo. Jsou i brzdou - například plán územního rozvoje Jihomoravského kraje Hašek [governor of the district in that period, note GH] nebyl za osm let schopen udělat, proto ministr Ťok nemůže řešit vůbec dálnici Brno - Vídeň. A jsou historicky i semeništěm korupce a netransparentního hospodaření. [...] role krajů pro život obyčejného občana není de facto žádná.” [Otherwise, the regions are just a money sink. If they didn't exist, nothing would have happened. They are also an obstacle - for example, Hašek [governor of the district at that time, note GH] was unable to complete the territorial development plan of the South Moravian Region in eight years, which is why Minister Ťok [Minister of Transport at that time, note GH] could not solve the Brno-Vienna highway at all. And they are also historically a hotbed of corruption and non-transparent management. [...] the role of regions for the life of an ordinary citizen is de facto non-existent.] (Neprašová, 2016)

Similarly, Babiš expressed a similarly low opinion of the Senate: *“Senát je de facto zbytečný, zpomaluje legislativní proces, stojí 600 miliónů korun ročně [...]” [The Senate is de facto useless, it slows down the legislative process, it costs 600 million crowns a year [...]] (Rovenský, 2016).* The Senate election traditionally takes place in

connection with the election of regional governments so both statements originated in 2016. In the 2016 Senate election, ANO 2011 did not achieve any great success. It gained three out of 27 senators (Volby.cz, 2016b). For the 2016 regional elections, the results were significantly better: ANO 2011 gained 21,05% of the total votes and won the election (Volby.cz, 2016a).

Any of the subsequent more successful elections did not change Babiš' opinion on non-governmental levels of governance. Until today, he still favors the removal of the Senate from the political system of the Czech Republic. For regional politics, ANO 2011 achieved even greater success in the 2020 regional elections – winning in 10 out of 14 regions, with 21,82% of the total vote (Volby.cz, 2020). However, as on the national level, other parties have rejected coalitions with the ANO 2011 movement and Babiš, in this regard, has never publicly contradicted or rejected his opinions of 2016.

8.3.4. Fragmentations, Political Culture of ANO 2011, and Interest Groups

ANO 2011, based on the scholars' findings described in Chapter Two (see: Current research), is defined by three main characteristics: (1) a centralized and hierarchical decision-making structure; (2) entrepreneurial processes; and (3) a focus on public image. We will now examine all three factors in more detail.

First, regarding its structure and possible fragmentations, we can observe that the movement remains strongly hierarchic without any internal division or division of its supporters. Compared to traditional parties, as for example the Social Democrats, no platform for young people (or any other sub-organization in the movement) can be identified. Moreover, Babiš himself is known for 'stealing the spotlight' from his ministers. In one example, the Minister of Health, Adam Vojtěch, publicly and falsely accused a doctor in one press conference of being infected with the Coronavirus because she had incorrectly taken a sample from a patient who had tested positive and was subsequently isolated. After being questioned by a journalist about the accusation and taking political responsibility, Vojtěch replied that he had received incorrect information and based on that incorrect information he made such a statement. The minister added that he had apologized to the doctor and he, again,

apologized for the mistake he had made. After being questioned further as to whether he was not spreading a hoax given the general situation and the fact that the doctor had been in contact with several patients, Vojtěch replied that „they“ corrected the information as soon as it became known that the information was incorrect the next day. After being asked where the information had come from, Andrej Babiš stepped in and the following exchange with the Health Minister ensued:

Babiš: „Nebud'te slušný, řekněte pravdu. Kdo vám to řekl? Který úředník? Jste moc hodný,“ [*Don't be polite, tell the truth. Who told you that? Which official? You are too kind,*"]

Vojtěch: „Dostal jsem tu informaci,“ [*I've been given the information,*"]

Babiš: „Od koho?“ [*From whom?*"]

Vojtěch: „Ze Státního zdravotního ústavu.“ [*From the State's Health Institute*"]

Babiš: „Jméno?“ [*Name?*"]

Vojtěch: „Od paní doktorky Mackové“ [*From Dr. Macková*"]

Babiš: „No tak, tak to řekněte. Paní redaktorka vás tady trénuje...politická odpovědnost. Dostal tu informaci od státního úředníka,“ [*Say it, then. Madam journalist is pressuring you here...political responsibility. He got the information from a civil servant,*"]

(Novinky.cz, 2020; *ibid.*: 00:01:55-00:02:19)

Second, the entrepreneurial processes were often made public by Andrej Babiš himself. For example, on the official website of the movement, Babiš published an article in 2017 about how his intention is to run the state as a business since, in both cases, the processes are alike (Babiš, 2017). Furthermore, in 2017, after winning the election, Babiš stated in an interview that the government should, above all, consist of experts (Rovenský, 2017). Despite these statements, the government struggled with stability and credibility throughout the government's mandate. For example, the Minister of Finance, Alena Schillerová, was called incompetent by the governor of the Czech National Bank. Schillerová criticized the National Bank in September 2021 for increasing the leading interest rate as a measure to counter rising inflation which she described as being an economic policy a developing country would make (Schillerová, 2021).

However, Andrej Babiš continued to repeat his opinions on government several times afterwards and kept insisting on them despite a number of ministers being dismissed from or leaving the government. One of many examples is the resignation of Vladimír Kremlík, who as Minister of Transport assigned a contract worth more than 400 Mil. Czech crowns without tender, which the government, according to Babiš, was unaware of (Jac, 2020). After Kremlík's dismissal, the position was taken over by Karel Havlíček, who became a double minister as the Minister of Industry and Trade and the new Minister of Transport. However, Havlíček also made some negative news for the government himself even though he never resigned nor was he dismissed. He was alleged to have intentionally influenced the tender for a new unit at the Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany so that the Russian company "Rosatom" remained competitive in the tender based on selected conditions. Rosatom had been excluded from the tender after revealing that GRU (the foreign military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) agents had been operating in the Czech Republic and caused the explosion at the ammunition depot Vrbětice. However, Rosatom was still present at the event sponsored by Karel Havlíček at the Pilsen University. (Cf. Klézl & Valášek, 2021; Tomeš, 2021)

Moreover, the government was confronted with two no-confidence votes – in both instances, the vote was related to Babiš' involvement in the Stork's Nest case and, in both instances, the government gained confidence to continue governing. But the movement ANO 2011 itself has been confronted with more cases of clientelism or client politics, -- generally seen as a quid pro quo arrangement involving the exchange of goods or services for political support. In April 2021, news was made by then vice-chairman of ANO 2011, Jaroslav Faltýnek, whose diary contained notes from a series of business negotiations and meetings concerning the distribution of public contracts, the allocation of subsidies and the political key to the division of positions in municipal companies in Prague and Moravia had been found (cf. Kroupa & Koutník, 2021). The Chairman of Deputies for ANO 2011, Radek Vondráček, was, in turn, confronted with the fact that he was still active as a lawyer for companies loaning quick money (Blažek, 2021). Even regional politicians connected with ANO 2011 were not scandal-free. The most prominent case was "Stoka" [„Sewer“] in Brno - the region's capital and second largest city in the Czech Republic. Several regional politicians were indicted for the alleged manipulation of processes for public contracts

(ČTK, 2020). Back on the national level, several examples of clientelism could be found, where state contracts had been assigned without tenders like contracts between the state company Czech Railways and Mafru, a.s. – part of the Agrofert holding – (Chaloupská, 2021) or between the state company ČEPRO and Agrofert Holding (Valášek, 2021b).

It is not the aim of this thesis to evaluate these cases – which even for the Czech judiciary requires an extensive amount of resources – however, comparative work is very well its aim. The cases listed – whether ultimately proven or not – would have been more than enough for traditional politicians, even prime ministers, to resign. If we review for which reasons Czech prime ministers have resigned, we arrive at the following:

<i>Year of resignation</i>	Name	Function, Party	Cause(s) to resign
2004	Vladimír Špidla	Prime Minister, ČSSD	Party's electoral result in European Parliament election in 2004
2005	Stanislav Gross	Prime Minister, ČSSD	Irregularities with the financing of his private apartment
2010	Mirek Topolánek	Chairman, ODS	Antisemitic and homophobic comments made by himself
2012	David Rath	Former Minister of Health, regional governor at that moment, ČSSD	Corruption in personal affairs, damaging financial interests of the European Union
2013	Petr Nečas	Prime Minister, ODS	Allegations of corruption against high-ranking politicians including himself
2018	Bohuslav Sobotka	Chairman, ČSSD	Party's subpar electoral results in Chamber of Deputies election 2017

Table 7: Causes for resignation of high-ranked politicians in Czech Republic

We can further observe other differences between traditional parties and ANO 2011. Where high-ranked politicians of traditional parties (whether the left-wing Czech Socialist Democratic Party, ČSSD, or the right-wing Civic Democratic Party, ODS) have taken responsibility either for the subpar election results of their party or for allegations of corruption whether eventually proven or not. Only Andrej Babiš, when asked if he would consider resignation after being confronted with the case of the Stork's Nest and after Babiš' son alleged that his father had ordered his abduction to Crimea in order to prevent him from influencing the investigative process. When challenged by journalists, Babiš reacted with these words: „Já vám jenom chci říct, že nikdy neodstoupím. Nikdy. Nech si to všichni zapamatují. Nikdy,“ [“I just want to tell you that I will never resign. Never. Let everyone remember it. Never,”] (Novinky.cz, 2018: 00:01:28-00:01:35)

Third, there is the movement's public image. Again, a complex analysis of marketing methods is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, we can at least compare the movement's spending on campaigns in 2017 and 2021, respectively. According to Czech Transparency International, for the Chamber of Deputies election 2017 following spendings were made:

<i>Parliamentary Party (post-election perspective)</i>	Total Amount in CZK	Average per Vote
ČSSD	84.730.478,00	230,03
ANO 2011	83.386.368,00	55,59
TOP 09	74.033.408,00	275,41
ODS	71.042.443,00	123,99
STAN	54.913.058,00	209,47
KDU-ČSL	52.199.976,00	177,77
KSČM	35.307.929,00	89,82
SPD	29.682.127,00	55,11
Czech Pirate Party	11.767.754,00	21,54

Table 8: Spending on Election Campaign: Chamber of Deputies 2017

Sources: Amount in CZK (Transparency International – Česká republika, 2018); Average per Vote (own calculation)

For the next election in 2021, following figures has been observed:

Parliamentary		
Party/Coalition	Total Amount in CZK	Average per Vote
(post-election perspective)		
<i>Czech Pirate Party + STAN</i>	75.571.000,00	88,80
<i>SPOLU</i>	74.093.000,00	49,60
<i>ANO 2011</i>	62.370.463,00	42,77
<i>SPD</i>	58.182.000,00	113,21

Table 9: Spending on Election Campaign: Chamber of Deputies 2021

Sources: Amount in CZK (Transparency International – Česká republika, 2021); Average per Vote (own calculation)

Comparing the effectiveness of the spending of the parties', coalitions', and movements', we can conclude that ANO 2011 had the third-most effective electoral campaign in 2017 and the most effective electoral campaign in 2021 based on the average cost per vote. According to the official statements of ANO 2011, the means raised by the public and used for the campaigns for election 2017 (these represent the monetary donations to the running subject) amounted to 17.216.055,00 CZK (cf. anobudelip.cz, 2018). In 2021, the monetary donations made by the public amounted to 1.065.000,00 CZK (cf. anobudelip.cz, 2022b). These numbers, however, do not include the regular social media presence of the movement as, for example, the Sunday program "Čau lidi" ["Hi people"] by Andrej Babiš himself where the most important updates -- not limited exclusively on political happenings -- are brought to YouTube watchers. The channel made its debut on 11th September 2013 and nowadays, while featuring other content as well, has 30.900 subscribers [state: 24.07.2022, GHA] (cf. anobudelip, 2022a).

Another fact that has not been included in the figures are campaigns run through the state's structures – for example, the case in which a photo of Babiš and Health Minister Adam Vojtěch was published in an article about cancer prevention as a part of a brochure for the state's health insurance company, VZP (Všeobecná Zdravotní Pojišťovna [General Health Insurance Company]) just three weeks prior to the election. The opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies, however, criticized

the leaflet, arguing that the article was no more than prop in the election campaign. Due to the overall negative feedback, Babiš postponed distribution until after the election was held (cf. Němcová, 2021). However, the brochures worth 7 Mil. CZK, in the end, were never distributed (Tiscali.cz, 2021).

Last, but not least, we shall examine the movement's interest groups. As we have already seen, there were several examples of clientelism throughout the period being discussed. However, one final element to this section is still missing – the EU and national subsidies for the Agrofert and SynBiol holding companies. In the Appendix, a detailed table of subsidies claimed by Agrofert and agriculture subsidies claimed by Agrofert and IMOBA companies has been compiled based on data from The State Agricultural Intervention Fund (SZIF, Státní Zemědělský Intervenční Fond) and on data from Ministry of Justice.

It can be seen that, overall, the subsidies claimed by the Agrofert holding have grown by 1,57% in the 2017-2021 period and the total amount of subsidies received between 2017 and 2021, according to the official reports the holding, amounts to 9,540 billion CZK (Ministerstvo spravedlnosti, 2022). Furthermore, in terms of agriculture subsidies, the companies belonging to Agrofert and IMOBA show, on average, a lower share on national funding and higher share on EU funding than the rest of the companies. The average share of Agrofert companies has amounted to an average of 2,44% on the total subsidies issued by the SZIF being highest in 2020 (2,73%) when the funding program period (2014-2020) ended (cf. SZIF, 2022).

9. Public Policies

9.1. The role of Government and Prime Minister in making public policies in the Czech Republic

As authors Bénassy-Quéré et al. have summarized, the tasks of politicians in the area of economic policy are: (1) set and enforce the rules of the economic game (economic legislation); (2) tax and spend (government spending); (3) issue and manage the currency (monetary policy); (4) produce goods and services (provide for public sector); (5) fix problems or pretend to (responsibility); and (6) negotiate with other countries (global trade rules) (cf. Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2010: 11f.).

In the Czech Republic, most of these tasks lie with the government and the Prime Minister being responsible for its actions. One area where the tasks are clearly assigned to another institution is monetary policy. Monetary policy in the Czech Republic is being executed by the Czech National Bank (ČNB) as an independent actor. Politicians are free to comment on decisions and information disclosed by the Bank. However, the Bank's independence remains procedurally guaranteed. The primary task of ČNB is to maintain price stability through managing interest rates and inflation in the Czech economy and, secondarily, to maintain financial stability. (cf. ČNB, 2022) The Bank's board members are nominated by the President and are, in general, divided into two groups: the doves and the hawks. Dove members tend to keep interest rates low and let inflation grow. Hawks, on the other hand, apply such interest rates in order to keep inflation low and thus maintain a rather modest level of economic growth. Since the board of members during the Andrej Babiš government consisted mostly of hawks, there were some tensions between the government issuing pro-inflation policies, on the one hand, and the Bank aiming to maintain low inflation by raising interest rates, on the other. Rising interest rates, in turn, were not favored by the government since it strived for investment goals as well. In other words, the government issued policies that led to flooding the economy with money (resulting in increased inflation) in order to, first, maintain or grow voter support and/or, second, increase the state's income through inflation on one hand while striving for (1) low-cost state investments and/or (2) maintaining or improving credit ratings on the other.

The second area, which is not completely under the authority of the government, is negotiating with other countries and other activities in international relations. Here, the competencies are divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President. Where the President is the formal head of state – in accordance with the government, he or she represents the state negotiates internationally as well as ratifies international agreements – the Ministry is tasked mainly with administrative, managerial, and organizational matters (PSP, 1992).

Any government, once nominated by the President, solely or after building a coalition, publishes its policy statement with key areas of political activity. We will now discuss the policy statement of the 2017-2021 government.

9.2. Policy Making: Policy Statement of the Government (2018)

The policy statement of the Government of Andrej Babiš starts with a preamble listing the key priorities of his government. These are: (1) pension reform; (2) digitalization of state's services; (3) active participation in international politics (especially mentioning relations within the European Union); (4) preparation of an investment program (especially for infrastructure); (5) tax reform, price controls, and resource management as well as welfare state provisions; and finally (6) domestic and military security (cf. *Vláda.cz*, 2018). These goals should be reached by involving actors from political and societal fields: „The Government stands ready to involve the opposition's experts, social partners' representatives, professional associations, interest groupings, other similar organizations, and local government in the implementation of government priorities and the Policy Statement in a bid to find the maximum possible consensus“ (ibid.).

For better orientation, sub-titles of policy sections listed in the policy statement are summarized in more general categories. The order in which these categories are listed is based on the statement itself so that the first named policy area defines the particular category (sub-section). All the corresponding policies are added to that policy group (sub-section/category). We will, first, explore the contents of the statement issued on 27th June 2018 by presenting the document in its summarized form.

9.2.1. Finance and Economy: State Financing, Finance Management, and Economic Policy

In the field of economy and finance, the policies are mostly pro-employee (abolition of the “super-gross wage”, reducing the employees’ tax by one percentage point) and not favorable to the corporate sector (solidarity-based tax, regulation of tax from gambling and online betting, Sales Registration Act, incentives against evasion of corporate income tax and VAT as well as corporations’ duty on notification on income (especially of dividends transferred from the Czech Republic abroad). On the macro-economic level the government states that it will simplify taxes and eliminate tax distortions, it will create a stable and predictable fiscal landscape, maintain a low-level state debt (relative to Gross Domestic Product, GDP), target at keeping the state’s deficit under the amount of nationally-sourced investments, and continue to decline the euro as a common currency. (Cf. [Vláda.cz](http://vlada.cz), 2018)

9.2.2. Welfare State: Social Policy, Health, Employment, Housing Policy, and Sport

In terms of the Welfare State, the government has set many goals. For seniors, an expert working team should be established to draw on pension reform and the Pension Insurance Act should be amended so that the basic pension assessment rate should be set to 10% of average wage. Furthermore, for selected professions, there should be an extra rise in pensions, and discounts on train and bus fees should be introduced for seniors over the age of 65 (as well as for school pupils and students up to the age of 26). For families, the government plans tax concessions for working families with children as well as a set of family support benefits for these families (or family members who are trying to get a job) and public services should be developed. Further support should be provided to families with a child or children in need of assistance and the parental allowance should be increased. (Cf. *ibid.*)

In the health sector, transparency, digitalization, and interconnectivity throughout the system should be reinforced. Transparency on data by hospitals directly run by the Ministry of Health as well as their methodology and management improvements are stated to be introduced. In terms of health insurance, a new concept for their operations should be devised. Furthermore, overall working conditions should be improved, the evaluation of training institutions and definition of

young doctors' skills and competences should be introduced, and salaries should be gradually increased. The government also aims at introducing a system to control the quality of care and informing the public on a healthy lifestyle, damage and risks associated with substance and gambling addiction, and disease prevention (including a reward system for citizens taking care of their health) and at making a high-level social-service network available and affordable (including support for palliative care). (Cf. *ibid.*)

The statement, furthermore, includes maintaining a low poverty rate, an intention for preparing a regulation for a rise in minimum wages, a restoration of the wage compensation policy for the first three days of incapacity at 60% of the daily basis of assessment, and simplifying the process for granting work permits to foreign workers. Employment policy is to be the center of Labor Office activity and the employment of disabled persons should be improved. In terms of housing policy, the government advocates for an increase in funding for housing construction, affordable rental housing for all citizens and especially for the vulnerable (seniors, young people, the disabled, single parents, and low-income citizens), and social housing for citizens on the verge of homelessness. Legislation on this issue should be modernized (to guarantee ownership rights to members of homeowner associations and housing cooperatives) and new law on real estate brokering should be prepared (with a goal of consumer protection). (Cf. *ibid.*)

Finally, for sports, sufficient, more transparent, and efficient funding should be introduced and, additionally, a new law on the support of sport should be issued under a newly established central authority ("The National Sports Agency"). Furthermore, experts should be increasingly involved in educating the young citizens and appropriate conditions and rules for the organization of significant international sports events should be created. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.3. Digitalization and Public Administration

Digitalization should be pursued in several policy areas including taxes (simplification and computerization of the tax system, online tax gateway, etc.), cooperation between central and local governments or a general digital transformation including a digitalization strategy ("Society 4.0") which should be run by a central institution under the authority of the Prime Minister. The aim is to create a single digital identity for each citizen and to set up a modern central state portal.

This should be reached by involving experts from across the political spectrum and tendering procedures for all parties and platforms. A pre-requisite, and simultaneously another commitment by the government, is the completion of the country's high-speed internet network. Citizens with low or no digital skills should be enabled to process the agenda via their local post office run by the state company Česká pošta [Czech Post] – an institution that also should be enhanced. Regarding the administration, it should be centralized, and its effectiveness should be improved. Civil servants' positions should be de-bureaucratized meaning to be open to external experts, educated, and motivated workers. The contracts should be evaluated and published by a central administrative authority and self-government should be promoted. In the end, a high-quality, modern, and financially stable public service with non-corrupt state administration should be established. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.4. Education, Science, and Research

For education, the government proclaimed to raise salaries of teachers and non-teaching staff to at least 150% of the 2017 levels. Furthermore, it advocates for open, accessible, and professional education without superfluous bureaucratization of the regional education system. The role of teachers should be reinforced, as managers and experts should be increasingly involved in the teaching processes. Sufficient capacity of nurseries should be provided. Internationally, education, science, and research should be advocated. For science and research, transparent evaluations should be set up. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.5. Transport, Industry, and Trade

Another area of concern for the government is transport. Major motorway connections, preparations for high-speed railway tracks as well as an upgrade of the existing ones, and projects for waterways are listed in the policy statement. In order to put 210 km of motorways into service by 2021, to schedule another 180 km for construction, and to build 130 km of bypasses on class I roads, an amendment to the construction law for priority infrastructure projects will be prepared and PPPs should be used for engaging private investors. Another priority of the government is to replace the existing system for motorway vignettes with an electronic coupon for traffic and tackling the problematic electronic toll system for freight vehicles (over 3,5 tons). Freight transport should be shifted to railways and the railway market should

be opened for market competition with Czech Railways remaining the main actor. A reconstruction of more than 60 station buildings should be arranged. For passengers, Park & Ride system should be promoted and an integrated transport system with a single ticket for public transport should be created. (Cf. *ibid.*)

For industry and trade, the government stresses the need to adapt to new developments in industry ("Industry 4.0"). It should work closely with businesses, scientists, and researchers to implement new technologies and work on smart projects in the energy sector. "Technology 4.0" should be reviewed and pushed for implementation in the construction sector. Exports should be promoted internationally and the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises for the Czech economy and for its growth should be emphasized. As well as in other areas, industry has to be modernized, its administration has to be minimized and projects should be reviewed (as, for example, investment programs, innovation projects, etc.). (Cf. *ibid.*)

Greater consumer protection should be achieved by an increased involvement of the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, the Assay Office, and the State Energy Inspectorate. Furthermore, the government sets for itself the following items on the agenda: "energy, security, self-sufficiency, environmental friendliness, competitive and socially tolerable prices for electricity and heat, and their unrestricted and safe supply to all customers" (*ibid.*). A mix of nuclear power, renewable sources, and enhancing the measures for improving energy efficiency together with smart energy projects should be promoted. The final issue mentioned in the section is the regulation of mining mineral deposits in the Czech Republic with special focus on strategic resources including reviewing legislation (especially the Mining Act and the Geology Act) with respect to the possibility of mining and processing lithium. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.6. Security and Defense: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Internal Security, and Public Administration

The budget for defense should gradually be increased so that by 2021 it reaches 1,4% of GDP and the budget of the Armed Forces should be increased further depending on the developments of the security situation. Special value is assigned to hybrid threats (as, for example, cyber-attacks) for which a mitigation system should be created. For the military, professional as well as active reserves should be increased in numbers (by 2025, at least 30,000 professional soldiers

should be recruited). At the civilian level, education at primary and secondary schools should be introduced and legal possession of legal weapons as the right to self-defense should be preserved.

Similarly, to other policy areas, the system should be restructured and modernized. International cooperation should be further fostered – within NATO, the EU, the V4 (Visegrad Four format: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic), and the V4+ formats involving Slovenia, Croatia, and Austria in matters of tackling migration on the Balkan route, bilateral relations with the United Kingdom -- regardless of Brexit, as well as cooperation with foreign intelligence service partners. The government states that it is one of its primary commitments to remain the sixth safest country in the world which should be achieved by striving to reduce the risks of terrorism, extremism, and uncontrolled migration. Another priority, in this sense, is to oppose the distribution quota system since the government holds the quota system inefficient and divisive for Europe. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.7. Law and Justice

For law and justice, lawmaking skills and methods as well as the quality of judicial administration, and the activities of judges and public prosecutors should be improved. There should be more transparency in decision-making on subsidies and public procurement, and the judiciary should be computerized. The government acknowledges the “Rechtsstaat” as the core value of society and declares its respect to the constitution and its principles, rights, and freedoms. Corruption in all areas should be confronted with whistleblowers being protected by effective legal instruments. Additionally, lobbying should be regulated according to international recommendations. (Cf. *ibid.*)

In the area of voting, the process should be simplified and made more accessible (through the introduction of postal voting, dropping the requirement for local residence in the election district, and advocating for the reduction of senate elections to a single-round system). (Cf. *ibid.*)

Another priority for the government is the change in enforcement where for one debtor there is only one enforcement officer. Furthermore, any practices that impose debts on children or lead to the impoverishment of the poor should be rooted out, and the Insolvency Act should be amended so debt relief can be permitted independently of the creditor satisfaction rate. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.8. Culture and Tourism

The government considers culture a reflection of the values of society with its European Christian spiritual tradition being of a great importance for the development of society domestically and for the representation of the Czech Republic internationally. The budget of the Ministry of Culture, payment assessment, and the support of art and creative education should be increased. Several historical buildings are listed to be renovated (including the National Museum and the State Opera). Directors of cultural institutions should be selected with respect to their expertise and reputation. Additionally, a law for public cultural institutions should be drafted and investment as well as plans for financing cultural infrastructure projects should be prepared. The most valuable national cultural monuments should be digitally mapped, and the existing Copyright Act should be prepared for the implementation of the EU directive on copyright on the digital single market. Internationally, cooperation on cultural projects should be fostered, both bilaterally and multilaterally. The government should guarantee the non-transferability of Budějovický Budvar n.p. (Czech national beer producer), the Povodí companies [River basin companies] (the national administration for major river basins and their facilities), and Lesy České Republiky [Czech Republic's forests] (the national administration of forests owned by the Czech state). (Cf. *ibid.*)

For tourism, domestic products should be promoted by a newly created section at the Ministry for Regional Development including a subsidy scheme for marketing and infrastructure building. A new system for local tax collection should be introduced in order to create an incentive for municipalities to invest in tourism and a tax on accommodations is planned to be merged with the tax on recreation and spas. Tourists should be protected by rules on safe movement in the mountains and the Mountain Rescue Service should become a part of the integrated rescue system. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.9. Public Investments, Regional and Local Development, European Funds

The aim for public investments is to centralize responsibility in one institution so that national subsidies can be coordinated better. The redistribution of local tax revenues should be re-designed to motivate municipalities to improve services for seniors who are permanent residents in those municipalities. The State Housing

Development Fund should be transformed to the State Investment Fund so it can also provide regional and rural support (for example, through the regeneration of brownfield sites, local roads, and tourism). Overall, construction should be accelerated, mainly through a re-assessment of public construction law, a simplification of the construction project preparation process, and a simplifying of small-scale public procurement(s). A coherent Rural Development Concept should be created; while cooperation among municipalities is enhanced and countryside businesses are supported. On the national level, strategic investment plans and a review of upcoming investments will be conducted. (Cf. *ibid.*)

EU funds (2014-2020 period) should be allocated judiciously, according to national and local priorities and in cooperation with municipalities and regions. After 2020 and the start of a new EU funding period, the process for receiving EU funds should be simplified. Additionally, on the EU level, partnerships among municipalities should be actively promoted. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.10. *International Relations: Foreign Policy and European Union*

At the international level, the government assigns the Czech Republic with an active role. As a Member State of the European Union, it should advocate for principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, for the use of the EU's instruments to standardize wages, as well as living and social conditions across the Member States, and for more effective work of/by the EU. The government states that "Europe must remain cooperative, integrating on a voluntary basis without discriminating (against?) the countries that are not members of the euro area" (*ibid.*) and that "European funds must not be leveraged as a means of bribing Member States who entertain different views on certain Union policies" (*ibid.*).

Furthermore, Member States should remain independent of the EU in the decision-making on the resettlement of refugees. The government advocates for a greater involvement of Czech nationals in EU institutions and bodies. Outside the EU institution, the Czech Republic should cultivate "pragmatic alliances and groupings" to carry out its national interests and priorities. On a bilateral level, relations with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (despite Brexit) are seen as essential by the government. The aim is also to maintain and promote relations with Slovakia both bilaterally and within the V4 format which is seen by the government as "an important platform for cooperation and for the formulation of common positions". Another

important partner should be Austria, both bilaterally and in concert with Slovakia (“Austerlitz format”). The government will advocate for the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU as well as maintaining cooperation with Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership countries. Outside of Europe, cooperation with the US should be developed (for defense, security, trade, investment, and science and research area) and active contributions to NATO should be made as the “backbone” of the security policy. The “traditional friendship and strategic partnership” with Israel, with respect to the Palestinian issue, should be maintained and strengthened. Apart from NATO, the Czech Republic should actively participate in the UN, WTO, World Bank, IMF, and OECD. (Cf. *ibid.*)

In general, the foreign policy of the government should aim at a respect for human rights, global security issues (particularly, with emphasis on migration and nuclear matters), development, the environment, humanitarian assistance, and promoting the national and economic interests of the Czech Republic. Domestically, matters of security and foreign policy should be discussed on a regular basis within the “highest constitutional bodies”. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.11. *Agriculture and Environment*

On the EU level, the interests of Czech farmers and food producers in terms of legislation and subsidies should be encouraged. It should be pledged for a fair competition and equal food quality within the EU. Domestically, the government should strive to protect agricultural land, advocate for self-sufficiency, simplify administration, and promote livestock farming. For subsidies, a “balanced structure of subsidization measures under agricultural policy for all types and sizes of farming entities” (*ibid.*) should be endorsed while medium-sized and large businesses should not be discriminated against and small farmers should receive higher subsidies. Increased payments should be administrated for livestock production and sensitive plant commodities. Another means of supporting farmers should be the Fund for Hard-to-insure Risks helping to mitigate the negative effects of uninsurable events (for example, droughts or floods) or “subsidies for innovation and improvements in the efficiency and safety of food production” (*ibid.*). Furthermore, water management, development, and innovation (Agriculture 4.0) will be encouraged. (Cf. *ibid.*)

Regarding the environment, land-grabs of agriculture properties should be prevented, forests and woodlands should be protected, afforestation [*expansion of*

woodlands, note GHA], and the efficient use of timber in general should be encouraged. Circular economic principles should be promoted including the implementation of a new Waste Act with the aims of waste reduction and recycling improvement. Greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced, air quality improvements should be supported, and objectives introduced by the Paris Agreement should be implemented. Biodiversity and landscape should be protected and preserved for the future. (Cf. *ibid.*)

9.2.12. *Formal and Interpretative Analysis of the Policy Statement*

The Policy Statement is 45 pages which is markedly fewer than the policy statement of the former government at 65 pages. The reason for the shorter policy statement by Babiš is that there was no coalition agreement or principles of coalition cooperation or party members included. Quite differently from the previous statement, the contents are categorized by policy areas, where the previous policy statement consisted of one general section written by the Prime Minister with the remaining sections left to members of the respective Ministry. The Preamble was signed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Government. The articulation of the policy statement was kept fairly vague using phrases such as “we will prepare,” “we will strive,” “we will draw up” – which hardly made the aims of the statement specific or measurable. However, this is not unusual. The policy statement does not deviate in this respect from the other policy statements of prior or subsequent governments. (Cf. *Vláda.cz*, 2014)

We have observed that the content includes a couple of underlying ideas. First, the existing legislation and institutions are framed as inefficient, poorly managed, underdeveloped, lacking expertise, and over-bureaucratized. Secondly, modernization, centralization, digitalization, reviewing, expertise, and managing all play a central role in nearly every policy area – and even for teachers, there is a management system to be strived for. Third, Welfare State categories play a central role in the statement. Employees, seniors, and the most vulnerable population (children, the poor, working families, etc.) are being addressed as target groups for the policies. Fourth, the underlying discourse is shaped by the migrant and refugee crisis (especially noticeable in the security and culture sections). Fifth, the statement is formulated without any reference to the involvement of ANO 2011 in the former government.

9.3. Evaluation of policy making by the 2017-2021 government

9.3.1. *'Facts' of the Policy Making*

We will now evaluate the success of the particular policy areas with respect to achievement or the lack thereof in achieving the articulated policies. The first part of this evaluation is based on the information published by the fact-checking platform "demagog.cz". According to the official information of the platform itself, demagog.cz is based on organizations as, for example, PolitiFact or The Washington Post Fact Checker. Its methodology is to objectively check relevant non-predicational official statements and categorize the results as: (1) untruth (not in accordance to official data); (2) truth (in accordance to official data); (3) misleading (in accordance to official data, however, deliberately or unintentionally presented without context); and (4) unverifiable. (Cf. demagog.cz, 2022)

A slightly different categorization has been applied for evaluating the Policy Statement of the 2017-2021 Government. The policies have subsequently been categorized as (1) accomplished; (2) failed; and (3) declarations that were partially accomplished. Overall, out of the 50 policy declarations that had been fact-checked by demagog.cz [state 17.09.2021, note GH], 44% (or 22 policies declared) have been accomplished, 30% (15 declarations) failed, and 26% (13 declarations) have been partially accomplished. Out of hundreds of statements, 50 of them were selected, monitored, and continuously updated for four years. (Cf. demagog.cz, 2021)

After categorizing the statements according to their respective policy area, we can determine the number of statements for each area and, more importantly, we can calculate the score based on its status. For each policy area, we can have a positive score for what was accomplished as well as for partially accomplished policies. For every failed policy, there would be a negative score. Added together we can ascertain an overall score considering not only the successes but also the failures. If we divide this score with the number of statements made for each policy area, we can estimate its success rate. As we can see in Table 10, the government achieved the most success in the areas of security and defense by accomplishing every fact-checked statement followed by success in digitalization (with two accomplished and two partially accomplished statements). None of the failed statements that had been

fact-checked were to be found in infrastructure, agriculture, public administration, and in international relations. On the other side of the spectrum, we can see that the government failed to accomplish its one fact-checked policy in tourism. Out of the 10 policy statements in the area of law and justice, the score was 0 (with three accomplished, two partially accomplished, and five failed fact-checked policies) And, finally, for the 13 fact-checked policies regarding the Welfare State, only a 23% success rate was achieved. Altogether, the government was 40% successful in, or at least partially, accomplishing the selected policies.

<i>policy area</i>	<i>accomplished</i>	<i>partially accomplished</i>	<i>failed</i>	<i>statements</i>	<i>score</i>	<i>score/area</i>
<i>Security and Defense</i>	4	0	0	4	4	100%
<i>Digitalization</i>	2	2	0	4	4	100%
<i>Infrastructure</i>	1	1	0	2	2	100%
<i>Agriculture</i>	0	2	0	2	2	100%
<i>Public Administration</i>	0	1	0	1	1	100%
<i>International Relations</i>	0	1	0	1	1	100%
<i>Environment</i>	3	1	2	6	2	33%
<i>Finance and Economy</i>	2	2	2	6	2	33%
<i>Welfare State</i>	7	1	5	13	3	23%
<i>Law and Justice</i>	3	2	5	10	0	0%
<i>Tourism</i>	0	0	1	1	-1	-100%
Sum	22	13	15	50	20	40%

Table 10: Fact-checking selected policy statements for 2017-2021 government (cf. Demagog.cz, 2021); own categorization; own calculations; own depiction

It is important to point out that only selected statements were fact-checked and, thus, we cannot generalize about these results in evaluating the government's overall success (especially in those areas with a low number of fact-checked policies). However, many public commentators and journalists have based their articles on the data that shaped public opinion at the time.

If we take a look at the data collected on the previous government of Bohuslav Sobotka (2013-2017) we can make the following observations: out of 156 fact-checked promises, 79 were accomplished (51%), 14 were partially accomplished (9%), and 63 were not realized (40%). That accounts for an overall score of 30 (93 at least partially successful policies minus 63 failed policies) and thus, a success rate of 19%. (Cf. demagog.cz, 2017)

Both data compared show us that there is a higher success rate for the government of Andrej Babiš. This might be the result of several factors. First, the data under scrutiny is not identical. While 156 policies were checked for the Sobotka government, only 50 were evaluated for Babiš. Second, the composition of the governments was different. Where Sobotka's government was a coalition of three partners (the Social Democrats and ANO 2011 sharing similar powers with eight and six ministers respectively with the KDU-ČSL participating with three ministers) with some turbulent developments – as we have discussed before – the Babiš government was a coalition of two partners with ANO 2011 having ten ministers and the Social Democrats having five. Third, the composition of the Chamber of Deputies was also different. During Sobotka's period as prime minister, the Social Democrats achieved 50 mandates, ANO 2011 achieved 47 mandates, and KDU-ČSL achieved 14 mandates. Under the Babiš' government, ANO 2011 achieved 78 mandates and Social Democrats achieved 15 mandates in the Chamber of Deputies.

This suggests that the government of Andrej Babiš was twice as powerful on the ministerial level. If we look at the comparison from the perspective of mandates from Chamber of Deputies, we can see that it was more difficult for the Social Democrats with 50 mandates to push through legislation against the will of ANO 2011 than it was for ANO 2011 with 78 mandates to do the same leading the government. Combined, we can come to the conclusion that both governments had similar success and/or interest at accomplishing their policy initiatives and pushing through their planned legislation.

9.3.2. *Figures of the Policy Making*

From the perspective of quantitative data, we can draw further conclusions on the evaluation of the 2017-2021 governance. We will now inspect the data collected, mostly, by the OECD but also from other institutions categorized by the policy areas established in previous chapters (complete data including sources can be found in the Annex). It is important to note that there was a distortion in 2020 because of the Covid-19 crisis. The data has also been influenced by the 2015 migration and refugee crisis as well as by the 2008/2009 financial crisis. The data was also divided into the particular governmental periods which are, in some years, overlapping. These years have been split up between the particular governments. In those cases where the government changed one month before or after the new year, the year has been assigned to one government only. Furthermore, since more complex indices on the levels of democracy and the well-being of the citizenry will be introduced, not all available variables are analyzed. The focus has been put on selected variables with respect to the policy statement and on establishing a general overview of the respective policy area.

Economy and Finance

In the field of the government's economics and finances, we can identify that the government did not follow its own statement regarding taxes. In fact, taxes on corporate profits have been cut every year of the governmental period. On the other hand, taxes on personal income have risen every year. Furthermore, the growth of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has declined from the first governmental year on. That appears to contradict what has been published in the policy statement(s). On the other hand, the government has been able to push through the abolition of the super-gross wage which we can observe if we look at the tax wedge as a percentage of labor costs dropping in 2020 by 9,35%.

On the macroeconomic level, statements have been made for the level of the government deficit and government debt. By observing the data available, we can see that the government has been able to maintain a slight surplus in the first two and a half governmental years until the arrival of the Covid-19 crisis in 2020. Similarly, the government debt was reduced in 2017-2019. These developments have been accompanied by GDP growth until 2020. Inflation has increased as well

during the governmental period since 2018. On the microeconomic level, the household income growth rate slowed throughout the governmental period until 2020. Afterwards, however, it climbed sharply due to the Covid-19 measures taken by the government. Furthermore, household savings were increasing while household debt was decreasing until 2020. We can see that the government favored companies slightly more than individuals, which contradicted the government's policy statement. However, the government held true with its promises to address government spending as well as with helping households manage their debts despite the decreases in household income. The government was also able to keep the Czech crown as national currency.

From a long-term perspective, we can make the following comparisons to previous governments: (1) the Babiš government recorded a high tax revenue share of GDP – comparable to that of Václav Klaus in 1993-1995. However, this came about mostly from the highest level of taxation on private income in modern Czech history in 2020 -- and the fourth highest in 2019. The corporate income tax, on the other hand, was kept low, making it comparable to the right-wing governments of Petr Nečas or Václav Klaus. (2) Inflation levels continued to increase steadily during the Babiš administration, which historically, was rather an exception. There have been sharp changes in the inflation growth rate during previous governments with the exception of the Klaus' government during 1995-1998. This points to a stable and controlled increase in the amount of money in the economy (based on national and/or international factors). (3) the Babiš government showed promising results in addressing the government deficit in the early years. Moreover, the government designated such a portion of GDP growth to deficit reduction that the deficit was cut by more than any of the other administrations in modern Czech history. For example, the highest GDP growth in Czech history was achieved in 2007 (reaching 9,90%), however, the government of Mirek Topolánek still recorded a deficit -- even though only 0,65%. Similarly, the Babiš government cut into the state's debt more than any other administration. (4) Even though we identified a decrease in household debt in 2017, it reached its highest point in modern Czech history in 2020, as a consequence of Covid-19 pandemic, despite comparatively high levels of household savings. Higher levels of household savings were recorded during the government of Mirek Topolánek, 2006-2009, and household income levels were also comparatively high (within the data since 2008).

Welfare State

In terms of social benefits, social spending, as a percentage of GDP, has increased from 2017 on. Pensions, as a percentage of average wages, increased as well after a slight drop in 2018 brought about by an increase of average wages. And, even though, discounts on train and bus fares for seniors were introduced, this part of the policy statement remained rather unfulfilled since no amendment nor reform of the Pension Insurance Act were made. Since data from 2017 are missing for family benefits, we cannot draw any conclusions. However, in 2017, the spending on family benefits as a percentage of GDP dropped.

Average wages continued to grow throughout the governmental period 2017-2021 except for 2020, when wages dropped by 1,04% which, in turn, increased any variables based on average wages. This includes the poverty rate which increased in 2018 but dropped the following year to its previous level. The employment rate continued to increase until 2020. This is in accordance with the policy statement addressing employment, growth in minimum wages, and maintaining a low poverty rate.

Finally, for the health sector, government spending increased, most notably in 2020 in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis. Accordingly, the number of doctors and nurses per 1.000 inhabitants increased. On the other hand, the number of hospital beds continued decreasing throughout the governmental period. Overall life expectancy increased until 2020, reaching a high of 79,3 years in 2019. Both the volume of alcohol consumption and number of daily smokers decreased in 2020, however, until then, alcohol consumption had been increasing and the number of daily smokers peaked in 2018. For obesity, no data are available. The proclaimed rise in the awareness of the population regarding addiction and substance abuse did not yield any noticeable results – at least, not until 2020 when the effects of the Covid-19 crisis started to unfold. In the area of sport, spending on recreational and sporting activities remained at 1,1% of GDP on average (with 1,2% in 2018 and 1,0% in 2020).

In comparison to other governments in the Czech Republic, social spending has continued at a high level since 2009 with the Babiš government being no exception (even though the percentage of GDP remained relatively low). On the other hand, the average pension as a percentage of the average wage was the lowest among the data available. This is particularly noteworthy if we take into account that the growth of average wages during the Babiš government, which were among the highest in modern Czech history. Higher growth, however, was reached by the left-wing governments of Zeman (1999-2002) and Špidla (2003-2004). Despite this, the poverty rate was kept at a comparatively low level – in contrast to the values of the right-wing governments of Topolánek, Nečas, or to the first two years of the left-wing government of Sobotka. During the Babiš administration, the highest employment rates were achieved. Similarly, there was continuity in the growth of the percentage of GDP dedicated to health spending.

Apart from the 2020 data, the Babiš government maintained some of the highest levels and in 2019 recorded the highest numbers with regard to health spending as a percentage of GDP and the number of doctors as well as nurses per 1.000 inhabitants. The Babiš government also continued to cut the number of hospital beds per 1.000 inhabitants reaching its minimum level in 2020. The 2019 peak in life expectancy was also the peak of life expectancy in the Czech Republic overall. The use of substances reveals a different development with respect to the particular substance. While the number of daily smokers were among the lowest during Babiš' government, the volume of alcohol consumed remained constant or slightly below the average values. Finally, even though the Babiš government continued to spend 1,0-1,2 percent of GDP on recreational and sporting activities throughout his administration, it is not entirely unprecedented – the right-wing government of Topolánek spent 1,0-1,1 percent of GDP throughout its governmental period as well. However, both governments were exceptions in this respect, since other administrations stayed below the one-percent-level except for a one-time exception in 1996 during the Klaus' government.

Digitalization and Public Administration

In the field of digitalization and public administration, not much data has been collected. Government spending on general public services increased during the Babiš administration, but, in general, remained mostly below the average. The

second variable that provides a comparison is the percentage of households with internet access. This percentage has increased in recent years and the Babiš government continued this trend, albeit – out of saturation reasons – with a much slower growth rate than the governments between 2006 and 2012.

Education, Science, Research

The stated commitment to raise teacher salaries to at least 150% of 2017 levels has not been realized since the average salary as a percentage of average wages grew slower than expected, reaching 0,96% in 2017 and 1,08% in 2021. Nevertheless, this growth rate was the highest posted for the data available. We have also observed that the number of students per teacher has been dropping steadily to 12,3 students/teacher in 2020. This was the lowest level yet marked for the data available. Similarly, the highest percentage of GDP was dedicated to research by the Babiš government in 2020, continuing the growth started in 2017. Overall, only the previous government of Sobotka and the government of Nečas accounted for similarly high levels of spending. The number of researchers per 1.000 employees also continued to grow with its maximum in 2020 of 8,3 researchers per 1.000 employees.

Transport, Industry, and Trade

The investment in infrastructure increased steadily during the period of the Babiš' government. However, its share of GDP remained among the lowest values compared to other governments, especially the government of Topolánek 2006-2009. That contradicts the policy statement of the Babiš' government presenting transport as one of the government's priorities. On the other hand, the government was able to shift freight transport to rail while cutting freight transport over the roads – at least until 2020 when freight transport over the road reached its second highest mark in the history of the Czech Republic due to the increased volume of freight transport in total. Passenger transport, as well, increased during the 2017-2021 governmental period to its maximum values until fell to lower levels in 2020 due to the Covid-19 crisis. For trade, the highest value in net trade was met in 2017, at the beginning of the Babiš government. Until then, trade continued to decrease meaning that, increasingly, more goods were being imported than exported. This was contradictory to what the government had stated regarding the promotion of exports from domestic

companies. In 2021, net trade dropped to its lowest levels (albeit while still remaining positive) making it comparable to the governmental periods prior to 2009. It is important to note that trade was negatively impacted by the Covid-19 crisis. Meanwhile, renewable energy as a percentage of the primary energy supply continued to increase in the Czech Republic.

Defense and Security

Spending on defense increased as a percentage of GDP from the beginning of the governmental period 2017-2021. In 2020, defense spending reached 1,02% of GDP, but still below its target for 2021 --1,4% of GDP, according to the policy statement. These values, albeit increasing within the Babiš' government period, still remained at its lower levels. A trend started by the government of Nečas in 2010 was continued by the government of Sobotka afterwards. On the other hand, the Babiš' government was successful at reaching its goal of 30.000 professional soldiers being in service. Similarly, spending on defense and the number of professional soldiers enlisted have been increasing but, in general, remain below average. As for the police force, the total number of police officers have also remained, on average, unchanged with the Babiš government and have followed the same development as the number of professional soldiers – increasing from their lowest levels in 2012, but still remaining below average.

The policy statement of the Babiš' government describing the Czech Republic as the 6th safest country in the world could not be traced to any source. Consequently, however, the Global Peace Index has been chosen for its broad selection of variables and has listed the Czech Republic, in 2011, as the 6th safest country in the world. The index takes into account 23 quantitative and qualitative indicators scaled from one to five points, resulting in a score where the lowest values would indicate a safer environment (cf. Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022). The index remained stable during the Babiš government with the exception of the years 2018-2020 when the rank slipped by one position to a total score of nine. This score, in general, was at its low levels compared to years prior to 2016 making the Czech Republic one of the safest countries globally.

Law and Justice

For the quantitative evaluation of law and justice policy area, the Rule of Law Index by the World Justice Project is used with nine factors and 47 sub-factors

evaluated in the form of questionnaires by experts and the general public (cf. World Justice Project, 2022). Data collection shows the best (highest) score for the Czech Republic was achieved in 2016 during the government of Sobotka, but has slipped since then. During the Babiš government, the index dropped in its first year and then again in its third year. The score, however, was at its lowest the very first year of data collection in 2015.

Culture and Tourism

The percentage of GDP dedicated to recreation, culture, and religious spending increased from the first year of the Babiš government to higher levels comparable to values reached by the right-wing governments of Topolánek and Nečas. However, in terms of the average salaries as a percentage of average wages, it was the Babiš government that reached maximum levels in 2019 and throughout its governmental period kept the average salaries in this area at the highest levels.

The policy statement of the Babiš government declared a plan to renovate several historical buildings. If we take a look at the number of cultural hotspots operating, we can observe different developments depending on the type of institution. For example, libraries have been declining throughout the 2017-2021 governmental period being no exception to the long-term trend. For museums and galleries, the data shows that the number peaked in 2013 and has been declining since then, so the decreasing number of these institutions during Babiš' government was no exception. A slight increase in the numbers was achieved in 2019 but this was still below the numbers of Sobotka's government. A steady increase, however, can be observed in the numbers of monuments open to public as well as in the number of operating theaters. The Babiš' government achieved in this respect the highest values.

In the area of tourism, the number of arrivals in total for the Czech Republic has increased during both Babiš' tenure as Prime Minister as well as in general. A different development was observed in the number of short-stay accommodations which peaked in 2012 with a significant increase over to the previous year and then a decline afterwards. During the second year of Babiš' government, there was a slight increase the number of short-stay accommodations, but this declined again soon after.

Public Investments, Regional and Local Development, and European Funds

Investments made by the government as a percentage of net additions to fixed capital (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) increased during the Babiš' government, even if a slight decrease was recorded in 2020. Even though the values were above average during the last two years of the governmental period, they did not reach the levels of governments in years 2003-2010 (except 2007) or the value recorded in 2015 by the Sobotka government despite the favorable long-term interest rates. Interest rates increased significantly from 2017 to 2018 but decreased again from the middle of 2021. With the exception of the Sobotka government 2014-2017, long-term interest rates were at their lowest among the data collected.

Regarding the declared support for rural areas, the data shows that the urbanization rate increased continuously during the Babiš government. In fact, the growth rate was the most rapid in the history of the modern Czech state. The urbanization rate began to increase from 2012 after a continuous decline from its peak in the early '90s.

In the area of EU funding, the Babiš government continued to increase its share of the total state income. After a decrease in 2017, the percentage of EU funding on state income kept increasing. For the second and third year of the government, the values were at the lower levels. However, for 2020 and 2021, higher levels, comparable to those of the Nečas government, were reached – mainly due to the Covid-19 situation. Since the cohesion policy period does not meet with the governmental periods, it is not possible to draw any conclusions on the particular use of the funds by a particular government. The planned EU financing for 2014-2020 was channeled through four funds: (1) the European Regional Development Fund, mostly used multi-thematically for infrastructure, education, and culture, but also used for research and innovation as well as to enhance the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises; (2) the Cohesion Fund mostly used for network infrastructure in transport and energy for railways, and other infrastructure concerns; (3) the European Social Fund mainly used for sustainable and quality employment; and (4) the Youth Employment Initiative. (Cf. European Commission, 2022)




Figure 4: Planned EU financing by detailed themes (European Commission, 2022)

International Relations

In the field of international relations, values for the net official development aid continued to increase during the Babiš' government until 2020. In 2019, the maximum value overall was reached. However, if we take a look at the data regarding the programmable aid, we can observe that the programmed aid decreased not only during the Babiš' government but also, in general, from the time of its maximum values during the Topolánek government.

Agriculture and Environment

The area designated as an agricultural land continued to decrease constantly – with minor exceptions – from the early '90s. Beginning in 2017, during the Babiš' government, there was a steady increase, even though the values still remained below average. In forestry, the area of wooded land continued to increase at a steady pace during the 2017-2021 governmental period. Roundwood removals, on the other hand, grew rapidly from 2016 – nearly doubling volume by 2019. This was a result mainly of the bark beetle crisis starting in 2016. For water management, water withdrawals as well as wastewater treatment values continued to improve throughout both the governmental period, 2017-2021, and in general. Similarly, CO₂ as well as

greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution mortality continued to decrease steadily. As mentioned earlier, the percentage of renewable energy on primary energy supply increased. There was a slight drop in the first two years of the Babiš' government.. However, the percentage began to increase again from 2019.

Overall evaluation

The complete data set, including sources, can be found in the appendix. From a quantitative perspective, the priorities of the Babiš' government were aimed at lowering corporate profit taxes, spending on the health and sport sector, as well as on education and research, while maintaining a high global ranking in the areas of security, and protection of the environment while expanding agricultural lands.

This is, in many areas, different to what the original policy statement(s) proclaimed. For example, enterprises were favored; the average pensions were kept at low levels; spending on general public services was at higher levels; teacher salaries remained below the set target; investments in infrastructure as well as spending on defense, in many cases, remained mostly below average; and efforts for regionalization did not yield any decline in urbanization, in fact, quite the opposite occurred as the rate of urbanization grew more rapidly.

9.3.3. *Populist or Real Policy?*

According to the 2019 Global Party Survey (Norris, 2020a), the ANO 2011 movement has been qualified by more than 1.861 party and election experts as follows: *First*, ANO 2011 is a left-conservative and strongly populist movement reaching the maximum value on the populist scale (together with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia as well as with the Freedom and Direct Democracy). *Second* (V2), the movement has been qualified as very united in its policy positions (scoring 9,0 out of 10 points). *Third* (V3), ANO 2011 has been said to campaign on very general slogans and vague promises (7,7/10). *Fourth* (V8_Scale), according to experts, the movement strongly favors populist rhetoric meaning „POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions, and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail“ scoring 8,4 out of 10 points. Furthermore and *fifth* (V9), populist rhetoric is of great utility and importance for the movement (8,8/10). *Sixth* (V17), regarding clientelism, ANO 2011 scored 7,5 out of

10 points meaning the experts regard the movement as favoring distribution mainly to their own supporters as opposed to universal distribution to all citizens. *Seventh* (V18), for the type of rhetoric commonly used by ANO 2011, experts have qualified it to strongly emphasize that politicians should follow the will of the people (2,77/10) and, *eighth* (V20), the rhetoric itself strongly emphasizes that most politicians are dishonest and corrupt (8.0/10). *Finally* (V21), there is strong opposition to the checks and balances on executive power by the movement (8,25/10). (Cf. Norris, 2020)

Further, we can observe that ANO 2011 scores the highest ranking in maintaining a unified party position as well as in its opposition to the check and balances on executive power. In other variables, the movement scores the second highest rank after the right-populist movement Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). In regard to the rhetoric emphasizing the dishonesty and corruption of most politicians, ANO 2011 scores third behind the SPD movement and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). The scores in selected variables related to populism and clientelism can be depicted as follows:




Figure 5: Global Party Survey Scores of major political parties in Czech Republic 2019 in selected variables; own depiction (Norris, 2020)

Moreover, if we turn to the empirical evidence, we find several instances of presenting the public with results that were misleading, at best. For example, the official opening of the allegedly reconstructed parts of Czech highway D1, which is the major highway connection in the country, was held before its certification as compliant with applicable building codes and before the construction work had even been completed. Similarly, a pool at the prominent Hotel Thermal in the spa city of Karlovy Vary had officially been opened before work had been finished. Commentators have described these as the Potemkin highway or the Potemkin pool. (Cf. bam, 2021; Hejdová, 2021)

10. Impacts of the 2017-2021 Governance

We will now turn to answering our main research question – what type of governance arises from state capture and how is it related to democratic backsliding? For that, we will start by elaborating on how did the governance of the Prime Minister Andrej Babiš during the governmental period 2017-2021 affected democracy levels and the well-being of the citizenry in the Czech Republic.

10.1. Impact of 2017-2021 Governance on Democracy

10.1.1. *V-Dem Indices*

The ‘Varieties of Democracy’ (V-Dem) study draws on a complex set of variables, such as for example, free and fair elections, freedom of expression, equality, etc., and estimates of indices for several forms of democracy. (Cf. Coppedge, Gerring & Knutsen, 2022b) The first high-level democracy index is the electoral index and it is defined as follows: „The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.“ (Coppedge, Gerring & Knutsen, 2022b: 43) For the second index, the liberal democracy index, measures as civil liberties, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a limitation of the exercise of executive power are relevant. The participatory democracy index is constituted by the degree of suffrage, engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. The fourth index, the deliberative democracy index is based on the level of a presence of a dialogue among informed and competent participants and the level of electoral democracy. Finally, the egalitarian democracy index depends on the degree to which

„[...] rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; [...] resources are distributed equally across all social groups; [...] groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power.“ (Cf. Coppedge, Gerring & Knutsen, 2022b: 44f.)

The data of V-Dem indices show that there has been a decline in all democracy indices both – short-term during the 2017-2021 governmental period of Andrej Babiš and long-term since 1992. We can summarize the findings in the following table:

<i>Democracy Index</i>	Short-Term Change in % (2017-2021)	Long-Term Change in % (1992-2021)
<i>Electoral Democracy</i>	-5,41%	-9,65%
<i>Liberal Democracy</i>	-4,96%	-12,90%
<i>Participatory Democracy</i>	-8,06%	-7,90%
<i>Deliberative Democracy</i>	-12,87%	-19,61%
<i>Egalitarian Democracy</i>	-5,94%	-11,55%

Table 11: V-Dem short-term and long-term comparison of democracy indices
(own calculation based on Coppedge, Gerring & Knutsen, 2022a)

Furthermore, the data can be depicted as follows:




Figure 6: V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices; own depiction
(Coppedge, Gerring & Knutsen, 2022a)

10.1.2. Revised Combined Polity Score – Polity5

The Revised Combined Polity Score or Polity5 is based on the Polity IV Project inspecting the democratic and autocratic regime changes. The index has been developed to enable a time-series analyses reviewing and updating the data available. (Cf. Marshall & Gurr, 2020: 8ff.)

The data shows a drop in several indicators in 2006: (1) Institutionalized Democracy; (2) The Competitiveness of Participation; (3) Regulation of Participation; (4) Political Competition Concept; (5) Regime Transition; and consequently, (6) leading to a decrease in the overall Polity score (cf. Worldbank.org, 2022). For the revised combines polity score, there is a scale of 0-10 points with 10 being the best possible result. We can depict the values as follows:

Indicator	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<i>Institutionalized Democracy</i>	8	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
<i>Executive Constraints Concept</i>	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
<i>Executive Recruitment Concept</i>	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
<i>The Competitiveness of Participation</i>	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
<i>Regulation of Participation</i>	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
<i>Political Competition Concept</i>	7	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
<i>Regime Transitions</i>	8	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
<i>Executive Constraints Decision Rules</i>	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
<i>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment</i>	3		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
<i>Openness of Executive Recruitment</i>	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
<i>Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment</i>	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
<i>Revised Combined Polity Score</i>	8	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

Table 12: Revised Combined Polity Score – Polity5 own depiction
(Worldbank.org, 2022)

The Institutionalized Democracy indicator includes “[...] the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders”; “[...] the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive”; and “[...] the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (Marshall & Gurr, 2020: 14). The Competitiveness of Participation, Regulation of Participation, and Political Competition Concept all represent the level of institutionalization of autocracy (ibid.: 15ff.). Regime Transition refers to “[...] the collapse, or failure, of central state authority [...]” (ibid.: 19).

10.1.3. *Freedom in the World – Freedom House*

Freedom in the World by Freedom House represents the state of political rights and civil liberties and is based on a series of questions each scoring for 0-4 points with four points being the best possible result. There are 10 questions in the area of political rights and 15 questions in the area of civil liberties meaning that the best overall score would be 100 points (Cf. freedomhouse.org, 2022)

Scores for the Czech Republic show the following values:

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
<i>Political Rights</i>	38/40	37/40	36/40	36/40	36/40
<i>Civil Liberties</i>	56/60	56/60	55/60	55/60	55/60
<i>Freedom House Index</i>	94	93	91	91	91
Source:	Freedom House (2017)	Freedom House (2018)	Freedom House (2019)	Freedom House (2020)	Freedom House (2021)

Table 13: Freedom in the World by Freedom House; own depiction

Since 2017, the score declined by one point in 2018, by a further two points in 2019, and has remained stable/steady over the next three years. The problematic areas involved following questions: (1) “Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?”; (2) “Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?”; (3) “Does the government operate with openness and transparency?”; (4) “Are there free and independent media?”; (5) “Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?”; (6) “Is there an independent judiciary?”; (7) “Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?”; (8) “Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?” (cf. Freedom House 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021).

While the freedom and independence of the media was not a concern in 2018 with a score of 4/4, the score slipped to 3/4 points in 2019 and has remained there the next two years. Furthermore, while the measure of safeguards against corruption was scored 3/4 in 2018, it subsequently slipped to 2/4 in 2019 where it has remained the last three years (cf. *ibid.*). Unfortunately, only a short-term comparison is possible due to the lack of data prior to 2017.

10.1.4. *Evaluation of Results on Democracy*

In general, all the democracy indices declined – two out of three during the Babiš government. The Freedom House Index allows only a short-term comparison. However, based on the decline in media independence, equality, and corruption safeguards, the rating dropped throughout his governmental period. The Polity5 index shows that the decreasing scores can be dated back to 2006. A year in which the right-wing government of Topolánek came to power and political participation and as well as the institutionalization variables dropped. Later, during Babiš' government, the values remained stable.

The most complex of the indices, V-Dem, shows that there was a decline in scores in every measure of democracy both short-term and long-term. However, the most abrupt changes have occurred since 2017. The biggest shift in the values by far can be observed in the deliberative democracy index. V-Dem defines this type of democracy as one “[...] in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions [...]” (Coppedge, Gerring & Knutsen, 2022b: 44). The liberal democracy index, as the second highest democracy index, shows a drop in how well political power is limited by the judiciary (cf. *ibid.*). A similar decline can be observed in the electoral democracy index showing how well equality is embedded within the distribution of rights and freedoms, resources, and power (cf. *ibid.*: 45). The highest levels were, overall, achieved on electoral democracy representing “[...] the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country.” (*ibid.*: 43). Finally, the participatory democracy index, the lowest democracy index in the Czech Republic, in general, points to the “[...] active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral” (*ibid.*: 44).

Based on the V-Dem indices, we can see that the values worsened extensively during (1) the years of the Babiš' government itself as well as during (2) the preceding governmental period with the involvement of Babiš as deputy prime minister as well as minister of finance and with the movement ANO 2011 sharing executive and legislative powers.

10.2. Impact of 2017-2021 Governance on Citizenry

To analyze the impact on the citizenry, we will, first, inspect another relevant index – the Happiness Index. The index is based on the evaluations of three indicators: (1) life evaluations (as an indicator for the quality of life in general), (2) positive emotions (indicator for reflecting positive emotions during recent experiences); and (3) negative emotions (indicator for reflecting negative emotions during recent experiences). The results are presented within a range of zero to 10 points with 10 being the best possible result. (Cf. Helliwell, Layard & Sachs, 2021: 16)

10.2.1. *Happiness Index*

Values for the Czech Republic's Happiness Index continued to increase from 2013 to 2020 with a slight drop in 2021. The evaluations, however, are themed differently every year so we cannot take the values as a general indicator for all public areas. Nevertheless, the following results show us how happy the population was during the years within the selected area:

Year	Value	Topic
2013	6,29	happiness: measurement, explanation, and policy
2015	6,51	happiness in general
2016	6,60	happiness distribution, secular ethics, and sustainable development
2017	6,61	social foundations of happiness
2018	6,71	migration within and between countries
2019	6,85	communities: IT, governance, and social norms
2020	6,97	social, urban, and natural environment
2021	6,92	life under COVID-19

Table 14: Happiness Index

(values: The Global Economy, 2022; topics: cf. World Happiness Report, 2022)

For a general comparison, we will turn now to public opinion surveys conducted annually by the Czech Public Opinion Research Centre's and compare the satisfaction values, 2017-2021, in the selected areas of public life.

10.2.2. Public Opinion on the State of Selected Areas of Public Life

Based on the comparison of data from 2017 and 2021, the public has become almost twice as satisfied in some areas of public life, on one hand, while, at the same time, almost three times more dissatisfied with other aspects of public life. Overall, if we compare the satisfaction and dissatisfaction in the 4-year government period of Andrej Babiš, the public has become one time less satisfied with public life. Furthermore, the category of “halfway satisfied” public has been reduced by almost 60 % and the category ‘undecided’ has grown more than six times since 2017.




Figure 7: Change in opinion on the state of selected areas of public life 2017-2021 in %; own calculation; own depiction; (cf. Tuček, 2017, 2021)

These results point to several conclusions: First, there is a polarization in public opinion. A similar trend to the 2021 election (as we have seen in Chapter 7). Second, we can observe that positive change occurred in areas of security, agriculture, health, and the judiciary. These are areas that were, according to the facts and figures (as presented in Chapter 9), actually targeted by the government and, are in line with the interested parties (the SynBiol and Agrofert companies – as discussed in Chapter 8). Third, the public was most dissatisfied with areas that were proclaimed to be a priority by the government. Despite the proclamations, the government did not, in reality, address these areas – such as, for example, education, culture, and the economy, among others.

10.2.3. *Public Participation - Million Chvilek pro Demokracii*

Finally, the last perspective on public opinion can be determined by analyzing public participation. During 2018 and 2019, several demonstrations were held in the name of democracy, democratic institutions, and an independent judiciary in the Czech Republic. These demonstrations were organized by the grassroots civic organization “Million Chvilek pro Demokracii” [Million Moments for Democracy] with the aim of enhancing the political participation of the public. The organization was founded in 2018 as part of a public movement that unfolded during the Babiš’ government. (Cf. milionchvilek.cz, 2022)

The mobilization was, at that time, concerned mostly with the negative events surrounding ANO 2011 and Andrej Babiš. The focus of the demonstrations followed the developments as listed in the appendix including, for example, the Stork’s Nest case, developments in the judiciary and political culture. However, the demonstrations also focused on developments surrounding President Miloš Zeman and the Office of the President’s staff. The organization proclaimed that it was not party but *value* oriented. The two most prominent demonstrations took place in Prague in 2019 with 250.000 participants at each, making them the largest demonstrations since 1989. Furthermore, several decentralized demonstrations took place as well, which was an unprecedented setup for larger-scale demonstrations.

10.3. Babiš' Government, Democracy, and Citizenry

Putting together all the above information, we are able to answer our research question about the effects the Babiš' governance 2017-2021 had on democracy and the citizenry of the Czech Republic. First, the democracy indices in the Czech Republic dropped significantly. The reason being that the democracy variables, such as participation, institutionalization, political competition, rights, freedoms, and equality all worsened remarkably during the 2017-2021 period. Second, even though the situation-related happiness index improved until the arrival of the Covid-19 crisis, the public overall became more dissatisfied with certain areas of public life. Moreover, public opinion had become polarized and significantly more confused about those areas of public life. Third, the worsening situation regarding democracy, led to public mobilization which, in turn, had a slightly positive effect on the indices of democracy as observed by V-Dem. Thus, we can see that, in general, the governance of Andrej Babiš during the governmental period 2017-2021 had a negative effect on society and democracy in the Czech Republic.

However, we can also observe, as the theory suggested, that the effects in some areas were negative and in other areas positive. One example of a positive effect is the increased voter turnout as well as the mobilization of public engagement. Once the state of democracy in the Czech Republic began to worsen, the public took action and actively worked to promote democratic values and a better political culture. This points to the fact that a portion of the public was keen to maintain a particular standard of democracy. Another positive effect can be observed in relation to the situational happiness of the citizenry. The Babiš' government was able to execute reactive politics so the happiness of the citizens increased over time (with the exception of the Covid-19 crisis in the 2021 World Happiness Report). Furthermore, the government achieved better levels of satisfaction in certain areas of public life as, for example, in security, agriculture, health, and the judiciary.

On the other hand, all of these positive effects resulted from the particular type of governance that the Babiš' government pursued. How we can characterize this type of governance and what are its specifics is described in the following chapter.

10.4. Characteristics and Specifics of the Babiš' Governance

Based on the Governance Analysis, we have seen that the governance of the Babiš' government had its own specifics. First, polarization of both political and general society had increased. Second, the political culture, as known from the traditional parties, diminished. Instead, a new political culture of conflict of private and public interest, relativism, deflection, grey-zone behavior, and a denial of political responsibility was introduced. Third, public policies differed both – qualitatively as well as quantitatively – from the government's policy statements. These were, fourth, made mostly in a populist and clientelist manner. Finally, fifth, the effects on democratic values were insignificant for the government.

The populist mode of policy making explains why the government did well in reactive politics. The united position with vague promises and populist rhetoric enabled the government to wait out and execute outcomes that would be most desired by the public. Furthermore, areas of public life that were coherent with the interests of particular interest groups were those that were actually targeted. Thus, the public became more satisfied with them. For example, a more controlled approach to political participation and competition resulted in better values in the area of corruption, economic crime, and security. A higher satisfaction with agriculture and health concerns can be, based on Babiš' conflict of interests, associated with the fact that the government was interested in improving these areas since companies of the Babiš' trust funds were operating in these sectors rather than in others as proclaimed by the policy statement.

Finally, as already mentioned, increased public participation stemmed from the state of democracy which was, according to the V-Dem data, the worst in modern Czech history.

With this in mind, how can we characterize the governance by Andrej Babiš as prime minister of the Czech Republic during the period 2017-2021 in terms of the governance model? If we turn back to the model of Peters and Pierre (2016) and consider the historical development of relations between the state, in its narrow sense, and society, we can confirm that there was a shift from liberal-democratic governance with more autonomy for social actors during the period before EU-accession to state-centrist governance with the state having corporate relations with

social actors. However, due to the problematic stages of the transformation in the Czech Republic, relations between political and general society in the integral state became corrupted. As we have seen in the example of Andrej Babiš, the autonomy granted to social actors after 1989, subsequently, led to the rise of conditions favorable for state capture developed during the '90s. After that, in the course of the further transformation towards PPPs and EU-accession, relations between social actors and political society became corporate. As long as these relations remained stable, there was no further incentive for social actors to become political actors. It was at the point when the political actors were no longer 'obedient' that the social actors became the political society.

Here, a question arises – would it be possible for *any* of these state-capture social actors to become a part of political society? Or, what was the precondition necessary for Andrej Babiš to complete this process? Based on the results, I would argue that it was finding the perfect narrative. To appeal to that part of the population disappointed by the developments after 1989 when the Welfare State was minimized, liberalization took place and major social changes occurred. Finding the 'correct' populist approach, that is blaming the establishment of incompetence, corruption, and indifference to public needs, on the one hand, and promising the opposite, on the other, resulted in a relatively stable portion of the population (approximately 30%) becoming indifferent to democratic backsliding and/or any other negative conditions relating to Andrej Babiš or ANO 2011.

And even though the findings of Peters and Pierre (2016) apply to the incremental changes from liberal-democratic governance to state-centrist governance, they do not explain external disruptions or corruptions of the governance induced by extreme cases of state capture. At this point, I would suggest introducing a fifth type of governance – Corrupted Governance.

10.5. Corrupted Governance

As we have seen in the case of Andrej Babiš, a state, in its narrow sense, may get captured by a social actor which, under certain circumstances, can result in a situation that exceeds 'regular' instances of lobbying or venality. In cases where the distinction between social actor and political actor is substantially violated, corrupted governance occurs. A substantial violation would include abrupt changes in democratic variables, high levels of populism, negative changes to political culture, and the use or misuse of the state's institutions as a resource in the pursuit of private interests. Furthermore, corrupted governance does not develop incrementally from some other form of governance, as a standard governance would. Rather, it rapidly replaces any form of governance that had been developing beforehand. In order to be embedded into political society, corrupted governance uses populist narratives which, with a declining political culture, results in the deterioration of democracy. Its final outcome is democratic backsliding.

Translating this to our primary research question, what type of governance arises from state capture and how is it related to democratic backsliding, leads to the conclusion that state capture alone does not lead to any specific type of governance. The answer depends on how we define state capture in the first place and what circumstances accompany the phenomenon. In cases where social actors bribe political actors in order to pursue their private interests (influencer or influential firms), the model of four ideal types of governance by Peters and Pierre (2016) can be applied. However, in cases where the social actor *becomes* a political actor and the distinction between social and political diminishes, then the model does not suffice. Within a certain framework (as described above), a corruption in governance unfolds leading to Corrupted Governance. In the former cases, state capture in the sense of lobbying or bribery does not necessarily lead to democratic backsliding. If the institutions are strong, the judiciary independent, and freedoms and rights are fair and equal, democratic backsliding does not occur. In the latter case, however, democracy indices decline as we have observed in the case of Babiš' government.

Therefore, it is essential to apply a multidisciplinary approach in order to determine which type of state capture within which framework unfolds. In any case,

state capture represents a vital variable in governance analysis. As such, comparative methods should be developed to include the aspect of state capture in governance analysis not only as an economic but also as a sociological variable.

10.6. Corrupted Governance: The Fallout

In the case of Andrej Babiš we can see that corrupted governance does affect its actors as well. After the change resulting from the national election in 2021, the case of Stork's Nest was re-opened again and is, at present [as per 03.11.2022, note GH], being processed by the Municipal Court in Prague. Several witnesses have testified in the case, including Andrej Babiš jr./Jr.?? However, even though ANO 2011 became an opposition party with Andrej Babiš no longer being Prime Minister, he still uses all political powers in an effort to influence the ongoing process. Since the beginning of the case, the number of defendants has dwindled to only two – Andrej Babiš and Jana Mayerová. Jana Mayerová, an ANO 2011 politician who ran a campaign for election to the Senate in 2022 and received the full support of the movement's leaders -- most notably Andrej Babiš, Alena Schillerová, Karel Havlíček, and Klára Dostálová -- which was considered exceptional in comparison to candidates in other districts. The reason being that if Mayerová were to be elected [hypothetical case, note GH], she would enjoy the political immunity the office guarantees. This, in turn, would complicate Babiš' case again and stall the process even further. Moreover, Andrej Babiš has announced his intention to run for the Czech presidency with the election scheduled for January 2023. Again, if Babiš were [hypothetical case, note GH] to win, he would obtain political immunity and his case would be postponed or dismissed.

As we can see, in this case, the notion of a corrupted government has not gone unaddressed. The legislative, executive, and judicial framework has withstood the period of state capture and, after the change in government, has been able to resume its mandated tasks. Naturally, the processes are not being carried out without a struggle as we are witnessing now. However, they are existent and have been re-activated anew which, in turn, should improve the democratic indices in the Czech Republic.

11. Summary & Conclusion

As we have seen, Andrej Babiš and the movement ANO 2011 have been discussed by many scholars in connection with state capture, populism, and democratic backsliding. The movement is described as entrepreneurial or technocratic, Babiš' political performance as populist, and his act(s) of state capture as leading to deepen democratic backsliding or democratic deconsolidation in the Czech Republic. Based on the theory of Gramsci, further developed by Althusser, and revised by Demirovic, we observe that Babiš – in an environment of weakly embedded hegemonies – was able to penetrate the state's armor.

First, he tried to do so by capturing parts of political society. However, since political society had changed, he was no longer able to establish a suitable hegemony. Therefore, secondly, Babiš has become part of political society himself by utilizing the sentiment of the dissatisfied portion of society (while pretending to represent one hegemony), in order to push through societal relations that would benefit his own best interests (executing a different hegemony). In the historical context of frequently changing political, social, and economic relations, a fog of transformation has emerged which has helped many state captors to establish an environment that would enable them to benefit at the cost of others. This has been identified as undesirable for the economy since state capture distorts market competition. It is also undesirable for society since state capture leads to a decrease in the legitimacy of affected institutions and structures. The effects of this phenomena on democracy and the well-being of the citizenry as well as its specifics and characteristics have been analyzed in this master's thesis.

In order to conduct the research, a comparative research method for governance analysis has been applied so the governance in question has been assessed by methods of governance analysis. The case study consisted of an extensive analysis of the defined governance segment (research unit): governance by the government of Andrej Babiš in the governmental period 2017-2021. The research was designed as a cross-temporal comparison – comparing the governance in question with previous government(s) in the Czech Republic in the sense of the

most similar systems design (method of difference), on one hand, (long-term comparison) and its starting and closing values on the other (short-term comparison).

The government analysis in the area of polity revealed that the Czech national election process to the Chamber of Deputies had to be adapted in the course of the qualitative changes in the 2021 election where major political parties formed coalitions and entered, as such, the election. The formation of these coalitions to a 'democratic block' against Babiš and ANO 2011 represents the qualitative change in the election of 2021. Quantitative changes were observed in increased voter turnout and rapid voter volatility prior to the election.

From the political perspective, we have seen some unprecedented changes to the political culture in the modern Czech Republic. First, personal history and a conflict of interest did not prevent Babiš from entering and remaining at the highest executive level of Czech politics. Counter to the behavior of what politicians of traditional political parties do in response to subpar electoral results, affairs, or allegations, Babiš never took the political responsibility as a representative, chairman of the movement, or as Prime Minister of the country. Second, a government coalition of Social Democrats with ANO 2011 – under the leadership of Babiš – led, eventually, to the coalition's weakening in the Chamber of Deputies.

This, in turn, led many major parliamentary parties to officially declare that they would not enter into a coalition with ANO 2011 after the election of 2021, which was also unprecedented. Third, Babiš' behavior in public stressed the strongly hierarchical, even autocratic, style of his leadership as Prime Minister. Fourth, hierarchical and entrepreneurial processes were the modus operandi of the movement ANO 2011 and were often declared publicly as the best way of policy making. Power fragmentations inside or outside the movement were presented as inefficient and even as an obstacle to policy making – as we have seen with Babiš' opinion on regional governments or the Senate. Fifth, the state's resources were utilized to strengthen Babiš position – both in politics and in business – by using, for instance, the institution of the state to manage election campaigns or to advocate for various interest groups.

Finally, the evaluation of policy making showed that Andrej Babiš and the movement ANO 2011 were neither particularly better nor particularly worse than

other governments at policy making. However, it showed that the actually targeted policy areas were different from those proclaimed by the policy statement. The reason being, again, that Babiš' policy making was carried out by the populist way – not only in the sense that he framed the previous establishment as being corrupt, establishing inefficient, poorly managed, underdeveloped, and over-bureaucratized institutions and processes that lack expertise. But, also in the sense that, promises were vague and their execution were, in some instances, only a staged illusion.

So, what kind of governance resulted from these specifics? The government of Andrej Babiš during the period 2017-2021 can be characterized as one qualitatively very distinct from other governments in modern Czech history. However, before we make conclusions on this finding, we will first summarize the effects this particular government had on democracy and the well-being of Czech society.

We have identified that democracy indices declined sharply during Babiš' involvement in politics. In terms of V-Dem methodology, (1) political decisions were less based on the common good; (2) political powers became less limited by the judiciary; (3) equality within distribution of rights and freedoms, resources, and power declined; (4) electoral competition was constricted, political as well as civil society organizations operated less freely, and the election environment worsened in terms of systematic irregularities or fraud; and (5) the active participation of citizens declined.

In terms of the society's well-being, we observed that situational happiness (i.e., happiness related to the current discourse) based on the Happiness Index improved during the governmental period 2017-2021 – with the exception of 2021 during which life under Covid-19 was evaluated and the score was still the second highest.

On the other hand, public opinion on selected areas of public life showed that the general satisfaction with policy making during Babiš' governance dropped. Moreover, the data shows that a significantly greater part of society were undecided in their opinions of the state in many areas of public life. The results reflect, in general, the finding that the 2017-2021 government effectively executed different policies (mostly those which were in line with specific interest groups) other than those that had been proclaimed. Unsatisfied with the political culture of ANO 2011

and Andrej Babiš as well as a concern with developments in the judiciary, the engagement of citizens grew. This, eventually, resulted in the establishment of a grassroots organization to enhance further political participation among the public while leading to society's mobilization, the promotion of democratic values, and demands for a better political culture.

Now we can turn back to our question how this type of governance can be characterized. As we have identified, none of the types of governance suggested by Peters and Pierre (2016) does not apply to the type of Babiš' governance. We can see those as 'regular governance types' opposed to the governance conducted by Babiš. In his case, a regular type of governance was violated by populism, utilization of state's resources for private interests, and decline in quality of democracy as well as political culture. Consequently, democratic backsliding deepened in the Czech Republic.

In this sense, the final research question has been answered. Governance analysis needs to apply a multidisciplinary approach when analyzing particular governances and, furthermore, it should include state capture variable to the analysis – not only in its economical but also in its sociological terms. State capture phenomenon occurs in various forms, for example as lobbying, corruption, or bribery, and does not always result in such extreme cases as the one of Andrej Babiš. State capture *does* have an influence not only on economics but also on democracy and society or, at least, on the part of society that is concerned with democracy, its rights and freedoms, equality, and justice (especially, if they are not tackled). Because, as we have seen in the instance of the Czech Republic, there is a part of population that is indifferent to these values or chooses to exchange them for state's securities and/or enhanced social welfare system. Even if these come in pair with illiberal governance, even if these might be only empty promises, and even if these create polarized environment in the society – or in short, if these come in pair with corrupted governance.

12. Discussion

The case study – a governance analysis in a transformed CEE country – of the 2017-2021 governmental period in the Czech Republic revealed that it is important for democracy and the well-being of the citizenry to address the demands as well as feelings of dissatisfaction related to the changing political, economic, and societal transformations in society. It does not necessarily mean that governance needs to execute policies that would satisfy these demands. However, they need to be addressed, discussed, and reasoned transparently for the public. As we have seen, in instances where the public is not well informed, some social actors utilize the state's structures and processes so they can benefit at the cost of others. This leads to the further frustration of an already dissatisfied portion of the population which then exchanges the values intended to be established by the transformation for promises of the 'old' values in the way that passes by the regular hegemony competition.

There are several areas that require further research. First, we need to design a method for analyzing state capture from a sociological perspective as a variable that, eventually, would be comparable. We need a way to be able to differentiate between state capture as 'merely' a case of bribery or corruption as opposed to extreme cases in which state structures and/or resources are completely privatized.

Second, we need to analyze the relation to the state's transformation process and, by comparison, determine under which conditions extreme cases of state capture occur. Furthermore, we need to examine how entrepreneurial populism, in particular, utilizes these conditions while further research should determine which factors within corrupted governance can be limited or counterbalanced. Since the state's structures and resources are corrupted or lack legitimacy, other channels – non-governmental or international, for example, as well as international institutions, international law, public control mechanisms, civil engagement, among others, need to be evaluated.

Third, further research should determine by which factors corrupted governance can be limited or counterbalanced. Since the state's structures and resources are corrupted or lack legitimacy, other channels – non-governmental or international, for

example, international institutions and international law, public control mechanism, civil engagement, etc. – need to be evaluated.

Fourth, and finally, we need to analyze what the long-term consequences of corrupted governance in politics and economics, as well as society will be/might be. Further, we need to explore whether or not and, if possible, how democratic backsliding induced by corrupted governance can be reversed.

As this case study has identified, the governance of Andrej Babiš has had several impacts on politics, the economy and society in the short-term. How the Babiš-led governance of 2017-2021 will affect further developments in the Czech Republic will continue to unfold over the coming years and decades. We should keep in mind that it is possible that the new populist rhetoric will continue to be utilized, and corrupted governance may well persist. Populist movements/parties may well gain the upper hand, uncertainty and discontent could deepen, and once-desired freedoms could be traded away, especially, if public concerns are not satisfactorily addressed. However, since the Czech Republic is, at the moment, embedded in several international organizations, civil society remains wary. We can expect that the newly elected government and future governments will continue to improve upon some of the variables that have recently fallen into decline. However, the legitimacy of the state's institutions and processes, given the needs and demands arising from public discussion, will need to be properly addressed. How long this will take and how exactly it will (re-)shape Czech governance and society remains, for now, an open question.

APPENDIX

Abstract

Three major transformations shaped the political, economic, and societal landscape of today's Czech Republic – the 1989 post-revolutionary transformation, the 1993 independency transformation, and the 2004 European Union accession transformation. In course of these transformations, state became vulnerable to social actors who sought political and/or economic gains. Eventually, state capture occurred in various forms. The most significant instance of state capture in history of the Czech Republic is the case of Andrej Babiš – a Slovak entrepreneur who utilized public dissatisfaction in order to penetrate the Czech state at its highest levels.

Babiš applied new populist rhetoric through the by him founded movement ANO 2011. The entrepreneurial or technocratic populism gained him enough support to participate in the 2013-2017 government and to lead, as Prime Minister, the government 2017-2021. As the study shows, the governance 2017-2021 led to increased public participation and improved situational happiness. However, it also led to a significant decrease in quality of democracy in the Czech Republic, it affected negatively Czech political culture and general satisfaction with public life. Furthermore, private interests were prioritized over real policy and state's structures and processes were utilized for private gains. All these factors resulted in a new type of governance – the 'corrupted governance'.

Abstrakt

Drei signifikanten Transformationen haben die politische, wirtschaftliche, und gesellschaftliche Landschaft der heutigen Tschechischen Republik gestaltet – die 1989 post-revolutionäre Transformation, die 1993 Unabhängigkeitstransformation und die 2004 Beitrittstransformation zur Europäischen Union. Im Zuge dieser Transformationen ist der Staat gegenüber sozialen Akteuren, die nach politischen und/oder wirtschaftlichen Vorteilen gestrebt haben, vulnerable geworden. Dies hat, letztendlich zu unterschiedlichen Arten von ‚State Capture‘ geführt. Das prominenteste Beispiel vom State Capture in der Geschichte der Tschechischen Republik ist der Fall von Andrej Babiš – eines slowakischen Unternehmers, der die öffentliche Unzufriedenheit genutzt hat, um in die höchsten Stufen des tschechischen Staates einzudringen.

Babiš hat mittels der von ihm selbst gegründeten Bewegung ANO 2011 die neue populistische Rhetorik angewendet. Der unternehmerische oder technokratischer Populismus hat ihm ausreichend Unterstützung gebracht, um an der Regierung 2013-2017 teilzunehmen und die 2017-2021 Regierung als Premierminister zu leiten. Wie diese Studie zeigt, die Regierung 2017-2021 hat zu einer verstärkten öffentlichen Partizipation sowie zu einer Verbesserung der situativen Zufriedenheit geführt. Allerdings diese hat auch zu einem signifikanten Rückgang der Demokratiequalität in der Tschechischen Republik geführt sowie negativ die tschechische politische Kultur und die allgemeine Zufriedenheit mit öffentlichem Leben beeinflusst. Darüber hinaus wurde das Privatinteresse statt realer Politik priorisiert und staatliche Strukturen und Prozesse wurden privat ausgenutzt. All diese Faktoren haben einen neuen Typ der Governance entstehen lassen – die ‚corrupted Governance‘.

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Abbreviations

ANO (2011)	Akce Nespokojených Občanů [Action of Dissatisfied Citizens]
CEE	Central and East Europe
ČEPRO	České Produktovody a ROpovody [Czech Product and Oil Pipes]
ČNB	Česká Národní Banka [Czech National Bank]
ČSSD	Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická [Czech Social Democratic Party]
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRU	Glavnoje Razvedyvatel'noje Upravlenije [The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation]
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KGB	Committee for State Security
KDU-ČSL	Křesťanská a Demokratická Unie – Československá Strana Lidová [Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Popular Party]
KSČM	Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy [Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia]
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOZ	Národní Centrála proti Organizovanému Zločinu [National Center against Organized Crime]
ODA	Občanská Demokratická Aliance [Civic Democratic Alliance]
ODS	Občanská Demokratická Strana [Civic Democratic Party]
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OKD	Ostravsko-karvinské doly [Ostrava-Karviná Mines]
OLAF	European Anti-Fraud Office
SPD	Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie [Freedom and Direct Democracy]
STAN	Starostové a Nezávislí [Mayors and Independents]
StB	Státní bezpečnost [State Security]
SZIF	Státní Zemědělský Intervenční Fond [The State Agricultural Intervention Fund]
TOP 09	Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita [Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity]
VAT	Value Added Tax
VZP	Všeobecná Zdravotní Pojišťovna [General Health Insurance Company]
V4	Visegrad Four [or Visegrad Group of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic]
WTO	World Trade Organization

Major developments around ANO 2011 and Andrej Babiš

<i>Week/Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
<i>Week 03/2018</i>	European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigates Stork's Nest as a possible subsidy fraud. The advertisement deal between Agrofert and Stork's Nest is being inspected.
<i>Week 07/2018</i>	The regional Court in Bratislava decides that Andrej Babiš might be registered in the evidence of agents of "Státní bezpečnost" (StB) [communist secret police force; note GH].
<i>Week 26/2018</i>	Tolerance agreement for the government of ANO 2011 and ČSSD is signed between ANO 2011 and KSČM.
<i>Week 26/2018</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Justice-to-be and a supporter of Andrej Babiš in the Stork's Nest case, Taťána Malá, is alleged to have been involved in two cases of diploma fraud.
<i>Week 46/2018</i>	Andrej Babiš Jr. accuses his father, Andrej Babiš, of ordering his son's abduction to Crimea in order to prevent him from influencing the prosecution in the Stork's Nest case.
<i>Week 47/2018</i>	No-confidence vote on the government is held.
<i>Week 06/2019</i>	A municipal office finds Andrej Babiš guilty of violating the Conflict of Interest Act. The decision was annulled by higher instance (regional office) controlled by ANO 2011.
<i>Week 10/2019</i>	An anti-corruption action "Stoka" was launched by the NCOZ (National Center against Organized Crime). Several high-ranking politicians from ANO 2011 have been investigated for their possible involvement.


Week/Year	Event
<i>Week 15/2019</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Industry and Trade, Marta Nováková, was dismissed after controversial behavior.
<i>Week 16/2019</i>	Czech police propose to indict Andrej Babiš in the Stork's Nest case.
<i>Week 16/2019</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Justice, Jan Kněžínek, resigns. Marie Benešová (ANO 2011) becomes his successor. Several demonstrations by grassroots organisation "Milion Chvílek pro Demokracii" [A Million Moments for Democracy] are held in response.
<i>Week 26/2019</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Health, Adam Vojtěch, is found to be in contact with lobbyist Tomáš Horáček who was prosecuted for manipulating contracts in medical fields.
<i>Week 26/ 2019</i>	(A) no-confidence vote on the government is held.
<i>Week 41/2019</i>	Prosecution of Andrej Babiš in the case of Stork's Nest is halted.
<i>Week 49/2019</i>	Prosecution of Andrej Babiš in the case of Stork's Nest is resumed.
<i>Week 04/2020</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Transport, Vladimír Kremlík, is dismissed by Andrej Babiš after assigning a state's contract without tender. ANO 2011 Minister of Industry and Trade, Karel Havlíček, is assigned to the Ministry of Transport.
<i>Week 18/2020</i>	In the/a state of emergency,(comma) billions of Czech crowns are spent on contracts for Covid-19 protective equipment without tender.
<i>Week 21/2020</i>	Information about a lucrative state contract without tender between state carrier České Dráhy [Czech Railways] and the Mafra media group (a part of Agrofert Holding) is published.


Week/Year	Event
<i>Week 38/2020</i>	Irregularities in the investigation of a leakage of toxic substances into the Bečva River raised suspicions about the possible involvement of the Ministry of the Environment in ruling out the Deza company (part of the Agrofert holding) as a possible inflictor of the/an environmental catastrophe.
<i>Week 39/2020</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Health, Adam Vojtěch, resigns and Roman Prymula (ANO 2011) becomes his successor.
<i>Week 43/2020</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Health, Roman Prymula, resigns on call of Andrej Babiš based on evidence of violations of Covid-19 measures prescribed by the Ministry of Health. Jan Blatný (ANO 2011) becomes Prymula's successor.
<i>Week 03/2021</i>	Information about a contract without tender between the company ČEPRO [Czech Product and Oil Pipes], owned completely by the Ministry of Finance, and Agrofert holding is published.
<i>Week 12/2021</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Industry and Trade and the Minister of Transport, Karel Havlíček, is alleged to have intentionally influenced the tender for a new unit at the Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany in favor of the Russian company "Rosatom".
<i>Week 14/2021</i>	Notes about meetings and lobbying activities by the head of the ANO 2011 Parliamentary Club, Jarsolav Faltýnek, are published.
<i>Week 14/2021</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Health, Jan Blatný, is dismissed by Andrej Babiš at the demand of Czech President Miloš Zeman who alleged Blatný had blocked the use of the Sputnik vaccine in the Czech Republic. Petr Arenberger (ANO 2011) becomes Blatný's successor .

Week/Year	Event
<i>Week 16/2021</i>	European Commission's audit finds Andrej Babiš in conflict of interest based upon his control of Agrofert holding via trust funds. This is denied by Andrej Babiš himself and ANO 2011 Minister of Regional Development, Klára Dostálová.
<i>Week 21/2021</i>	ANO 2011 Minister of Health, Petr Arenberger, resigns. Adam Vojtěch (ANO 2011) becomes Arenberger's successor and the Minister of Health for the second time.
<i>Week 22/2021</i>	Czech police propose again to charge Andrej Babiš in the case of Stork's Nest.
<i>Week 27/2021</i>	Andrej Babiš is registered as the final beneficiary of the Agrofert holding. The information became public after Law on Registration of Beneficial Owners came into force.
<i>Week 23/2021</i>	The European Parliament condemned Andrej Babiš' conflict of interest.
<i>Week 24/2021</i>	The chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, Radek Vondráček (ANO 2011), was connected to providing legal services to loan fraudsters as well as supporting creditors in voting on execution amendments and the insolvency law.
<i>Week 35/2021</i>	Andrej Babiš Jr. disrupts the pre-election campaign of Andrej Babiš.
<i>Week 37/2021</i>	VZP (General Health Insurance Company), the biggest Czech health insurance organization, planned to distribute a brochure to its clients with Andrej Babiš appearing in a campaign against cancer during the pre-election campaign.

Week/Year	Event
<i>Week 39/2021</i>	A municipal office imposes a penalty on Andrej Babiš for his violation of the Conflict of Interest Act. The process is halted by a higher instance (regional office) controlled by ANO 2011 again.
<i>Week 39/2021</i>	The governor of the Czech National Bank (ČNB) calls the ANO 2011 Minister of Finance, Alena Schillerová, incompetent.
<i>Week 39/2021</i>	The Pandora Papers are published. It became public that Andrej Babiš bought real estate on the French Riviera through his offshore companies after campaigning against offshore companies and tax havens. It was further revealed that Andrej Babiš did not declare the properties in the property declarations.

Major developments around ANO 2011 and Andrej Babiš (Cf. Valášek, 2021a)





Visualization of Agrofert holding structure (ibid.)

Subsidies Claimed by AGROFERT, a.s. and IMOBA, a.s.

Subsidies Adopted			Subsidies Claimed by AGROFERT, a.s.			
	Operations	Investment	Operations	Investment	Sum	Change prev. Year
2017	1.347.444.000,00	607.045.000,00	1.337.201.000,00	712.910.000,00	2.050.111.000,00	
2018	1.517.256.000,00	276.987.000,00	1.606.091.000,00	310.834.000,00	1.916.925.000,00	-6,50%
2019	1.619.756.000,00	354.382.000,00	1.546.625.000,00	272.451.000,00	1.819.076.000,00	-5,10%
2020	1.243.975.000,00	291.733.000,00	1.452.156.000,00	220.399.000,00	1.672.555.000,00	-8,05%
2021	1.870.984.000,00	382.196.000,00	1.741.453.000,00	340.788.000,00	2.082.241.000,00	24,49%
Change 2017-2021						1,57%

Subsidies in CZK claimed between 2017 and 2021 by companies in the AGROFERT, a.s. holding according to the respective consolidated annual reports (Ministerstvo spravedlnosti, 2022).

AGROFERT, a.s. & IMOBA, a.s.					
	Sum national	Sum EU	Sum total	Percentage national	Percentage EU
2017	116.253.858,79	812.491.316,96	928.745.175,75	12,52%	87,48%
2018	107.010.896,46	771.271.420,92	878.282.317,38	12,18%	87,82%
2019	68.849.927,41	737.095.587,79	805.945.515,20	8,54%	91,46%
2020	183.059.217,24	909.458.383,46	1.092.517.600,70	16,76%	83,24%
2021	88.055.505,25	843.524.954,40	931.580.459,65	9,45%	90,55%
Average				11,89%	88,11%

OTHER COMPANIES & HOLDINGS					
	Sum national	Sum EU	Sum total	Percentage national	Percentage EU
2017	3.936.522.812,24	30.329.380.976,06	34.265.903.788,30	11,49%	88,51%
2018	5.139.366.352,10	30.332.758.965,53	35.472.125.317,63	14,49%	85,51%
2019	6.105.117.690,79	32.524.164.135,43	38.629.281.826,22	15,80%	84,20%
2020	6.073.400.471,18	32.911.093.625,12	38.984.494.096,30	15,58%	84,42%
2021	5.126.909.079,93	32.883.479.560,30	38.010.388.640,23	13,49%	86,51%
Average				14,17%	85,83%

OVERALL					
	Sum national	Sum EU	Sum total	Diff. Share national	Percentage AGROFERT & IMOBA
2017	4.052.776.671,03	31.141.872.293,02	35.194.648.964,05	-1,03%	2,64%
2018	5.246.377.248,56	31.104.030.386,45	36.350.407.635,01	2,30%	2,42%
2019	6.173.967.618,20	33.261.259.723,22	39.435.227.341,42	7,26%	2,04%
2020	6.256.459.688,42	33.820.552.008,58	40.077.011.697,00	-1,18%	2,73%
2021	5.214.964.585,18	33.727.004.514,70	38.941.969.099,88	4,04%	2,39%
Average				2,28%	2,44%

Comparison of agriculture subsidies in CZK claimed nationally and from EU funds between 2017 and 2021; Companies of AGROFERT, a.s. and IMOBA, a.s. compared to other companies and holdings including overall comparison (own calculations based on SZIF, 2022).

Figures of Policy Making: Finance & Economy I

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	MACROECONOMY							
		GDP	Change	GGDEF ¹	Change	GGDEBT ²	Change	Inflation (CPI ³)	Change
		USD/capita	in %	% of GDP	in %	% of GDP	in %	growth rate in %	in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992	11.843,37	1,67%					11,09	
Klaus	1993	12.116,57	2,31%					20,81	87,73%
	1994	12.728,50	5,05%					10,04	-51,76%
	1995	13.847,45	8,79%	-1,24		18,05		8,99	-10,45%
	1996	14.685,53	6,05%	-3,00	142,89%	16,65	-7,75%	8,76	-2,58%
	1997	14.825,36	0,95%	-3,17	5,66%	17,02	2,22%	8,60	-1,86%
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	14.976,89	1,02%	-4,17	31,44%	17,90	5,15%	10,70	24,46%
Zeman	1999	15.397,92	2,81%	-3,13	-25,04%	23,71	32,47%	2,14	-80,04%
	2000	16.207,92	5,26%	-3,58	14,30%	24,32	2,55%	3,78	76,80%
	2001	17.607,98	8,64%	-5,76	61,08%	28,28	16,29%	4,66	23,50%
Zeman/Špidla	2002	18.245,67	3,62%	-0,64	-88,97%	30,58	8,16%	1,90	-59,19%
Špidla	2003	19.523,41	7,00%	-6,86	979,77%	33,32	8,93%	0,12	-93,76%
Špidla/Gross	2004	20.911,94	7,11%	-2,37	-65,45%	32,90	-1,25%	2,76	2224,52%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	22.046,00	5,42%	-3,03	27,73%	32,40	-1,52%	1,86	-32,72%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	23.859,06	8,22%	-2,15	-28,96%	31,97	-1,32%	2,53	36,45%
Topolánek	2007	26.221,62	9,90%	-0,65	-70,00%	30,56	-4,41%	2,85	12,59%
	2008	27.853,55	6,22%	-1,96	204,53%	32,97	7,87%	6,36	122,87%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	27.635,67	-0,78%	-5,41	175,50%	39,66		1,02	-83,97%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	27.768,40	0,48%	-4,15	-23,27%	44,06	11,09%	1,47	44,47%
Nečas	2011	28.999,75	4,43%	-2,70	-34,96%	46,98	6,64%	1,92	30,18%
	2012	29.258,90	0,89%	-0,39	-85,57%	56,23	19,68%	3,29	71,48%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	30.828,53	5,36%	-1,28	229,45%	55,97	-0,46%	1,44	-56,25%
Sobotka	2014	32.504,22	5,44%	-2,08	61,66%	54,84	-2,01%	0,34	-76,08%
	2015	33.909,31	4,32%	-0,64	-68,98%	51,71	-5,72%	0,31	-10,07%
	2016	36.101,29	6,46%	0,71	-210,56%	47,43	-8,27%	0,68	120,94%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	38.842,90	7,59%	1,50	-110,94%	43,33	-8,65%	2,45	258,53%
Babiš	2018	41.157,37	5,96%	0,89	40,55%	39,73	-8,30%	2,15	-12,28%
	2019	42.865,74	4,15%	0,29	67,67%	37,45	-5,73%	2,85	32,49%
	2020	41.706,80	-2,70%	-5,77	2098,72%	46,42	23,94%	3,16	11,01%
	2021	44.197,93	5,97%	-5,88	2,03%			3,84	21,46%
Source		OECD (2022a)		OECD (2022b)		OECD (2022c)		OECD (2022d)	

1 – General Government Deficit; 2 – General Government Debt; 3 – Consumer Price Index

Figures of Policy Making: Finance & Economy II

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	TAXES							
		Tax revenue	Change	Tax on PI ⁴	Change	Tax on CP ⁵	Change	Tax wedge	Change
		% of GDP	in %	% of GDP	in %	% of GDP	in %	% of labor costs	in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992								
Klaus	1993	36,73		3,28		6,06			
	1994	35,48	-3,41%	3,98	21,40%	4,82	-20,47%		
	1995	34,50	-2,77%	4,41	10,67%	4,21	-12,61%		
	1996	33,11	-4,03%	4,39	-0,52%	3,09	-26,68%		
	1997	33,40	0,87%	4,43	1,07%	3,52	13,92%		
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	32,30	-3,29%	4,34	-2,03%	3,13	-11,11%		
Zeman	1999	33,12	2,55%	4,13	-4,97%	3,53	12,76%		
	2000	32,34	-2,38%	4,18	1,24%	3,19	-9,50%	42,59	
	2001	32,41	0,22%	4,09	-2,15%	3,66	14,66%	42,59	0,01%
Zeman/Špidla	2002	33,28	2,68%	4,27	4,53%	3,97	8,36%	42,98	0,91%
Špidla	2003	34,10	2,48%	4,44	3,96%	4,23	6,58%	43,21	0,55%
Špidla/Gross	2004	34,50	1,16%	4,43	-0,32%	4,20	-0,73%	43,52	0,71%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	34,23	-0,76%	4,20	-5,17%	4,13	-1,64%	43,73	0,48%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	33,84	-1,15%	3,95	-5,98%	4,37	5,96%	42,53	-2,75%
Topolánek	2007	34,10	0,77%	4,04	2,28%	4,46	1,88%	42,88	0,84%
	2008	33,30	-2,36%	3,52	-12,83%	4,03	-9,61%	43,44	1,29%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	32,09	-3,63%	3,44	-2,24%	3,37	-16,29%	42,01	-3,29%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	32,23	0,44%	3,30	-4,10%	3,21	-4,75%	42,13	0,30%
Nečas	2011	33,03	2,47%	3,51	6,52%	3,19	-0,56%	42,61	1,13%
	2012	33,44	1,25%	3,54	0,80%	3,31	3,57%	42,45	-0,36%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	33,71	0,81%	3,62	2,12%	3,39	2,51%	42,44	-0,03%
Sobotka	2014	32,85	-2,55%	3,54	-2,18%	3,50	3,16%	42,61	0,41%
	2015	33,13	0,86%	3,56	0,62%	3,57	2,06%	42,80	0,44%
	2016	34,03	2,71%	3,82	7,22%	3,73	4,40%	43,04	0,57%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	34,44	1,20%	3,96	3,67%	3,69	-1,10%	43,40	0,82%
Babiš	2018	34,98	1,58%	4,27	7,91%	3,62	-1,68%	43,74	0,80%
	2019	34,78	-0,57%	4,41	3,30%	3,51	-3,17%	43,96	0,50%
	2020	34,38	-1,15%	4,65	5,37%	2,87	-18,07%	44,03	0,16%
	2021							39,91	-9,35%
Source		OECD (2022e)		OECD (2022f)		OECD (2022g)		OECD (2022h)	

4 – Personal Income; 5 – Corporate Profits

Figures of Policy Making: Finance & Economy III

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	MICROECONOMY				
		HH ⁶ Income change in %	HH Savings % of HH Income	Change in %	HH Debt % of HH Income	Change in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992					
Klaus	1993					
	1994					
	1995		6,35		28,89	
	1996		7,05	11,02%	21,57	-25,35%
	1997		7,31	3,69%	20,59	-4,54%
Tošovský/Zeman	1998		6,03	-17,51%	19,29	-6,31%
Zeman	1999		5,50	-8,79%	20,44	5,97%
	2000		6,48	17,82%	21,66	5,98%
	2001		6,93	6,94%	22,12	2,11%
Zeman/Špidla	2002		6,96	0,43%	26,90	21,59%
Špidla	2003		6,31	-9,34%	29,10	8,18%
Špidla/Gross	2004		5,66	-10,30%	33,93	16,62%
Gross/Paroubek	2005		6,98	23,32%	39,09	15,20%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006		8,43	20,77%	43,46	11,18%
Topolánek	2007		7,62	-9,61%	53,19	22,40%
	2008	1,38	6,85	-10,10%	59,54	11,93%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	1,25	8,73	27,45%	61,84	3,86%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	0,40	7,98	-8,59%	63,59	2,84%
Nečas	2011	-0,75	6,59	-17,42%	66,52	4,61%
	2012	-0,84	6,89	4,55%	67,46	1,41%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	-0,48	6,36	-7,69%	70,85	5,02%
Sobotka	2014	2,46	7,40	16,35%	69,60	-1,76%
	2015	3,47	7,04	-4,86%	70,64	1,48%
	2016	2,84	6,28	-10,80%	72,70	2,93%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	4,38	7,00	11,46%	76,58	5,33%
Babiš	2018	3,68	7,54	7,71%	75,71	-1,13%
	2019	3,27	8,54	13,26%	74,79	-1,22%
	2020	2,10	1,47	-82,79%	79,03	5,68%
	2021	3,35	1,50	2,04%		

Source		OECD (2022i)	OECD (2022j)		OECD (2022k)	
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Figures of Policy Making: Welfare State I

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	SOCIAL BENEFITS							
		Social Spending	Change	Pension spending	Change	Av. pension	Change	Family benefits ¹	Change
		% of GDP	in %	% of GDP	in %	% of av. wage	in %	% of GDP	in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992	15,35	1,80%	6,13	1,74%			2,40	-2,99%
Klaus	1993	15,62	1,74%	5,69	-7,24%			2,00	-16,60%
	1994	15,70	0,53%	5,51	-3,20%			1,97	-1,90%
	1995	15,97	1,69%	5,82	5,79%			1,84	-6,26%
	1996	15,98	0,11%	6,00	3,00%			1,72	-6,84%
	1997	16,72	4,64%	6,69	11,47%			1,65	-3,79%
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	17,06	1,98%	6,73	0,57%			1,82	9,87%
Zeman	1999	17,70	3,77%	6,87	2,20%			1,82	0,17%
	2000	17,86	0,91%	6,84	-0,42%			1,77	-2,75%
	2001	17,81	-0,29%	6,78	-0,92%			1,70	-3,90%
Zeman/Špidla	2002	18,55	4,14%	6,99	3,01%			1,75	2,88%
Špidla	2003	18,68	0,72%	6,82	-2,42%			1,67	-4,63%
Špidla/Gross	2004	17,84	-4,48%	6,52	-4,39%			1,73	3,90%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	17,96	0,66%	6,65	2,01%	39,83		2,04	17,61%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	17,65	-1,75%	6,58	-1,04%	39,68	-0,39%	2,00	-1,77%
Topolánek	2007	17,43	-1,21%	6,78	3,02%	39,45	-0,56%	2,24	11,74%
	2008	17,72	1,65%	7,08	4,41%	40,21	1,92%	2,29	2,19%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	20,00	12,85%	7,87	11,23%	40,42	0,51%	2,40	5,16%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	19,57	-2,12%	8,03	2,02%	39,84	-1,44%	2,36	-1,91%
Nečas	2011	19,62	0,24%	8,35	3,93%	40,58	1,86%	2,18	-7,55%
	2012	19,83	1,06%	8,56	2,58%	40,33	-0,60%	2,16	-1,01%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	20,68	4,29%	8,60	0,48%	41,08	1,85%	2,20	1,99%
Sobotka	2014	20,07	-2,94%	8,33	-3,14%	40,29	-1,93%	2,08	-5,27%
	2015	19,27	-3,97%	8,03	-3,61%	39,85	-1,08%	2,03	-2,64%
	2016	18,89	-2,00%	7,90	-1,69%	38,45	-3,52%	2,01	-1,18%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	18,55	-1,81%	7,70	-2,48%	37,21	-3,22%	1,98	-1,20%
Babiš	2018	18,76	1,14%			35,90	-3,51%		
	2019	19,16	2,13%			36,26	1,00%		
	2020					37,30	2,85%		
	2021					37,78	1,28%		
Source		OECD (2022l)		OECD (2022m)		CSU (2022a, b)		OECD (2022n)	

1 – Public spending

Figures of Policy Making: Welfare State II

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, POVERTY					
		Average wages total, USD	Change in %	Employment rate % of working POP ²	Change in %	Poverty rate % of POP	Change in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992						
Klaus	1993						
	1994						
	1995	14.329,43					
	1996	15.803,46	10,29%				
	1997	16.050,34	1,56%				
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	16.047,43	-0,02%	67,33			
Zeman	1999	16.685,49	3,98%	65,63	-2,53%		
	2000	17.312,52	3,76%	64,98	-0,99%		
	2001	18.205,37	5,16%	65,03	0,08%		
Zeman/Špidla	2002	19.306,37	6,05%	65,43	0,62%		
Špidla	2003	20.778,46	7,62%	64,73	-1,07%		
Špidla/Gross	2004	21.713,95	4,50%	64,18	-0,85%	0,058	
Gross/Paroubek	2005	22.352,25	2,94%	64,80	0,97%	0,055	-5,17%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	23.248,16	4,01%	65,28	0,73%	0,056	1,82%
Topolánek	2007	23.941,98	2,98%	66,08	1,23%	0,055	-1,79%
	2008	24.070,05	0,53%	66,55	0,72%	0,059	7,27%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	23.973,67	-0,40%	65,38	-1,77%	0,060	1,69%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	24.710,49	3,07%	64,98	-0,61%	0,065	8,33%
Nečas	2011	24.911,84	0,81%	65,73	1,15%	0,059	-9,23%
	2012	24.957,45	0,18%	66,55	1,26%	0,052	-11,86%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	24.801,86	-0,62%	67,73	1,77%	0,059	13,46%
Sobotka	2014	25.324,91	2,11%	68,98	1,85%	0,059	0,00%
	2015	26.069,65	2,94%	70,23	1,81%	0,064	8,47%
	2016	26.990,31	3,53%	71,95	2,46%	0,056	-12,50%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	28.369,81	5,11%	73,63	2,33%	0,056	0,00%
Babiš	2018	29.872,44	5,30%	74,83	1,63%	0,061	8,93%
	2019	31.113,27	4,15%	75,13	0,40%	0,056	-8,20%
	2020	30.790,26	-1,04%	74,40	-0,97%		
	2021	31.722,52	3,03%				
Source		OECD (2022o)		OECD (2022p)		OECD (2022q)	

Figures of Policy Making: Welfare State III

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	HEALTH										SPORT						
		Health spending % of GDP	Change in %	Hospital beds per 1.000 inh. ³	Change in %	Doctors per 1.000 inh.	Change in %	Nurses per 1.000 inh.	Change in %	life expectancy at birth, years	Change in %	Alcohol consumption l/capita, age 15+	Change in %	Daily smokers % of POP, age 15+	Change in %	RSS ⁴ Spending % of GDP	Change in %	
Pithart/Klaus	1992	3.97	3.20%			2.68	0.37%	7.29	0.69%	72.4	0.56%	11.8	2.61%					
	1993	5.32	33.92%			2.86	6.72%	7.26	-0.41%	72.9	0.69%	11.5	-2.54%	26.1				
	1994	5.48	3.03%			2.93	2.45%	7.25	-0.14%	73.2	0.41%	11.6	0.87%					
	1995	5.70	4.05%	8.50		3.00	2.39%	7.41	2.21%	73.3	0.14%	11.5	-0.86%			0.8		
	1996	5.59	-2.02%	8.26	-2.82%	2.98	-0.67%	7.38	-0.40%	74.0	0.95%	11.6	0.87%	26.2		1.1	37.50%	
Tošovský/Zeman	1997	5.60	0.18%	8.04	-2.66%	3.11	4.36%	7.35	-0.41%	74.1	0.14%	11.9	2.59%			0.8	-27.27%	
	1998	5.59	-0.05%	7.93	-1.37%	3.03	-2.57%	7.35	0.00%	74.7	0.81%	11.8	-0.84%			0.9	12.50%	
	1999	5.77	3.15%	7.74	-2.40%	3.08	1.65%	7.38	0.41%	74.9	0.27%	11.9	0.85%	23.5		0.7	-22.22%	
	2000	5.70	-1.18%	7.80	0.78%	3.37	9.42%	7.61	3.12%	75.1	0.27%	11.8	-0.84%			0.7	0.00%	
	2001	5.86	2.84%	7.77	-0.38%	3.45	2.37%	7.85	3.15%	75.3	0.27%	11.8	0.00%			0.8	14.29%	
Zeman/Špidla	2002	6.18	5.36%	7.76	-0.13%	3.51	1.74%	7.99	1.78%	75.4	0.13%	11.9	0.85%	24.1		0.8	0.00%	
	2003	6.52	5.62%	7.73	-0.39%	3.53	0.57%	7.98	-0.13%	75.3	-0.13%	12.1	1.68%	27.2	12.86%	0.7	-12.50%	
	2004	6.35	-2.65%	7.65	-1.03%	3.52	-0.28%	8.11	1.63%	75.9	0.80%	11.5	-4.96%	25.4	-6.62%	0.9	28.57%	
	Gross/Paroubek	2005	6.34	-0.16%	7.57	-1.05%	3.56	1.14%	7.57	1.00%	76.1	0.26%	12.0	4.33%	24.3	-4.33%	0.9	0.00%
	Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	6.16	-2.79%	7.45	-1.59%	3.58	0.56%	8.07	-0.49%	76.7	0.79%	11.9	-0.83%	23.4	-3.70%	1.1	22.22%
Topolánek	2007	5.99	-2.89%	7.33	-1.61%	3.60	0.56%	8.03	-0.50%	77.0	0.39%	12.1	1.68%	24.0	2.56%	1.1	0.00%	
	2008	6.33	5.75%	7.21	-1.64%	3.64	1.11%	7.97	-0.75%	77.3	0.39%	12.1	0.00%	21.8	-9.17%	1.0	-9.09%	
	2009	7.25	14.52%	7.14	-0.97%	3.67	0.82%	8.09	1.51%	77.4	0.13%	12.1	0.00%	23.8	9.17%	1.1	10.00%	
	Topolánek/Fischer	2010	6.88	-5.16%	7.30	2.24%	3.69	0.54%	8.10	0.12%	77.7	0.39%	11.4	-5.79%	22.8	-4.20%	1.0	-9.09%
	Fischer/Nečas	2011	6.93	0.77%	7.06	-3.29%			8.03	-0.86%	78.0	0.39%	11.5	0.88%	21.7	-4.82%	0.9	-10.00%
Nečas	2012	6.98	0.74%	6.93	-1.84%			8.06	0.37%	78.1	0.13%	11.6	0.87%	22.9	5.53%	0.8	-11.11%	
	2013	7.72	10.65%	6.70	-3.32%			7.99	-0.87%	78.3	0.26%	11.5	-0.86%	22.2	-3.06%	0.9	12.50%	
	2014	7.60	-1.62%	6.68	-0.30%			7.93	-0.75%	78.9	0.77%	11.9	3.48%	22.3	0.45%	0.9	0.00%	
	2015	7.20	-5.28%	6.67	-0.15%			8.01	1.01%	78.7	-0.25%	11.5	-3.36%	18.2	-18.39%	0.9	0.00%	
	Sobotka	2016	7.11	-1.24%	6.66	-0.15%			7.93	-1.00%	79.1	0.51%	11.7	1.74%	19.6	7.69%	0.9	0.00%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	7.38	3.86%	6.63	-0.45%			8.50	7.19%	79.1	0.00%	11.6	-0.85%	18.4	-6.12%	1.1	22.22%	
	2018	7.47	1.23%	6.62	-0.15%	4.04		8.52	0.24%	79.1	0.00%	11.8	1.72%	21.1	14.67%	1.2	9.09%	
	2019	7.61	1.78%	6.58	-0.60%	4.07	0.74%	8.56	0.47%	79.3	0.25%	11.9	0.85%	18.1	-14.22%	1.1	-8.33%	
	2020	9.24	21.50%	6.50	-1.22%			8.66	1.17%	78.3	-1.26%	11.6	-2.52%	16.6	-8.29%	1.0	-9.09%	
	2021																	
Source		OECD (2022a)		OECD (2022a)		OECD (2022a)		OECD (2022a)		OECD (2022a)		OECD (2022a)		OECD (2022a)		Eurostat (2022a)		

3 – Inhabitants; 4 – Recreational and Sporting Services

Figures of Policy Making: Public Administration & Digitalization

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DIGITALIZATION					
		General public services	Change	Internet access	Change	Access to computers from home	Change
		% of GDP	in %	% of HH	in %	% of HH	in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992						
Klaus	1993						
	1994						
	1995	3,77					
	1996	3,61	-4,28%				
	1997	3,71	2,60%				
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	3,43	-7,38%				
Zeman	1999	3,57	4,07%				
	2000	3,54	-0,95%				
	2001	3,57	0,97%				
Zeman/Špidla	2002	4,21	17,71%				
Špidla	2003	4,55	8,30%				
Špidla/Gross	2004	4,59	0,84%				
Gross/Paroubek	2005	5,22	13,72%	19,05			
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	4,34	-16,90%	29,25	53,53%	39,04	
Topolánek	2007	4,59	5,66%	35,12	20,07%	43,40	11,16%
	2008	4,59	0,05%	45,86	30,58%	52,41	20,78%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	4,96	8,19%	54,18	18,14%	59,59	13,68%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	4,78	-3,77%	60,52	11,69%	64,06	7,50%
Nečas	2011	4,77	-0,15%	66,63	10,11%	69,90	9,12%
	2012	6,70	40,44%	72,55	8,88%	74,56	6,67%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	5,15	-23,05%	72,62	0,09%	73,87	-0,93%
Sobotka	2014	5,16	0,09%	77,99	7,40%		
	2015	4,68	-9,21%	78,98	1,26%	78,94	
	2016	4,56	-2,72%	81,65	3,39%		
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	4,20	-7,91%	83,24	1,94%	82,18	
Babiš	2018	4,43	5,54%	86,36	3,75%		
	2019	4,36	-1,61%	87,00	0,74%		
	2020	5,16	18,47%	88,02	1,17%		
	2021			89,31	1,47%		
Source		OECD (2022y)		OECD (2022z)		OECD (2022za)	

Figures of Policy Making: Education & Research

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	EDUCATION						RESEARCH			
		Education spending ¹ % of GDP	Change in %	Av. salary % of av. wage	Change in %	Teachers students/teacher	Change in %	R&D ² spending % of GDP	Change in %	Researchers per 1.000 employed	Change in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992										
Klaus	1993										
	1994										
	1995	3,20						0,88		2,3	
	1996							0,89	1,51%	2,5	8,04%
	1997							0,99	11,14%	2,5	-2,27%
Tošovský/Zeman	1998							1,06	7,29%	2,5	1,65%
Zeman	1999							1,05	-1,00%	2,8	10,08%
	2000	2,56						1,11	5,75%	2,9	3,19%
	2001							1,10	-1,02%	3,1	8,48%
Zeman/Špidla	2002							1,10	-0,05%	3,1	-0,71%
Špidla	2003							1,14	4,00%	3,3	6,42%
Špidla/Gross	2004							1,14	-0,24%	3,4	3,30%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	2,75		1,03				1,16	1,90%	4,9	45,46%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006			1,03	0,26%			1,23	5,55%	5,3	7,24%
Topolánek	2007			1,01	-1,42%			1,30	5,74%	5,5	3,96%
	2008	2,51		0,98	-3,23%			1,23	-4,80%	5,7	4,56%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	2,74	9,10%	1,00	2,25%			1,29	4,29%	5,6	-1,67%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	2,68	-2,26%	0,98	-2,66%			1,33	3,12%	5,8	2,69%
Nečas	2011	2,70	0,80%	0,96	-1,65%			1,54	16,44%	6,1	5,26%
	2012	2,73	1,30%	0,98	1,93%			1,77	14,56%	6,6	7,81%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	2,66	-2,57%	0,99	0,65%	13,9		1,88	6,19%	6,7	2,84%
Sobotka	2014	2,63	-1,38%	0,97	-1,26%	13,7	-1,44%	1,96	4,21%	7,1	4,58%
	2015	2,63	0,12%	0,96	-1,07%	13,5	-1,46%	1,92	-2,12%	7,3	4,18%
	2016	2,50	-5,05%	0,96	-0,23%	13,4	-0,74%	1,67	-12,88%	7,1	-3,49%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	2,65	6,19%	0,96	0,24%	13,2	-1,49%	1,77	5,90%	7,3	3,33%
Babiš	2018	2,91	9,61%	0,99	2,87%	13,1	-0,76%	1,90	7,40%	7,6	3,75%
	2019			1,04	4,58%	13,0	-0,76%	1,93	1,49%	7,8	2,91%
	2020			1,07	2,96%	12,3	-5,38%	1,99	3,29%	8,3	5,77%
	2021			1,08	0,79%						
Source		OECD (2022zb)		CSU (2022b)		Eurostat (2022b)		OECD (2022zc)		OECD (2022zd)	

1 – Primary to Post-Secondary Level; 2 – Research and Development

Figures of Policy Making: Transport & Trade I

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	TRANSPORT												
		Infrastructure investment % of GDP	Change in %	Infrastructure maintenance road, Euro	Change in %	Passenger transport mio. passenger km	Change in %	Freight transport mio. tonne km	Change in %	Freight transport road, mio. tonne km	Change in %	Freight transport rail, mio. tonne km	Change in %	
Pithart/Klaus	1992													
	1993					73.845		40.627		13.014		25.574		
	1994					71.714	-2.89%	49.285	21.31%	22.662	74.14%	24.400	-4.59%	
	1995	Klaus	0.86		133.302.205.47		73.496	2.48%	59.091	19.90%	31.267	37.97%	25.459	4.34%
1996		0.88	1.95%	188.357.307.22	41.30%	73.986	0.67%	56.864	-3.77%	30.052	-3.89%	24.286	-4.61%	
1997		1.21	37.91%	178.179.114.70	-5.40%	73.255	-0.99%	63.849	12.28%	40.640	35.23%	21.010	-13.49%	
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	1.14	-5.68%	173.417.935.56	-2.67%	75.479	3.04%	54.847	-14.10%	33.912	-16.56%	18.757	-10.72%	
	1999		0.97	-14.84%	185.871.589.98	7.18%	78.006	3.35%	55.558	1.30%	36.964	9.00%	16.713	-10.90%
	2000	Zeman	1.03	5.96%	202.478.387.14	8.93%	80.591	3.31%	58.230	4.81%	39.036	5.61%	17.496	4.68%
	2001		0.93	-9.66%	271.629.660.51	34.15%	81.377	0.98%	55.884	-4.03%	37.260	-4.55%	16.882	-3.51%
2002	Zeman/Špidla	1.16	24.08%	280.122.407.52	3.13%	81.555	0.22%	62.663	12.13%	45.059	20.93%	15.810	-6.35%	
2003	Špidla	1.19	2.81%	264.236.386.99	-5.67%	83.327	2.17%	64.301	2.61%	46.564	3.34%	15.862	0.33%	
2004	Špidla/Gross	1.51	26.90%	296.530.087.10	12.22%	82.676	-0.78%	63.051	-1.94%	46.010	-1.19%	15.092	-4.85%	
2005	Gross/Paroubek	1.73	14.85%	350.374.177.87	18.16%	83.915	1.50%	60.634	-3.83%	43.447	-5.57%	14.866	-1.50%	
2006	Paroubek/Topolánek	1.59	-8.41%	544.247.693.93	55.33%	86.053	2.55%	68.482	12.94%	50.369	15.93%	15.779	6.14%	
2007	Topolánek	1.52	-3.81%	589.735.645.68	8.36%	87.959	2.21%	66.560	-2.81%	48.141	-4.42%	16.304	3.33%	
2008		2.03	32.81%	611.282.503.31	3.65%	88.552	0.67%	68.658	3.15%	50.877	5.68%	15.437	-5.32%	
2009	Topolánek/Fischer	1.86	-8.01%	578.344.950.63	-5.39%	88.287	-0.30%	59.936	-12.70%	44.954	-11.64%	12.791	-17.14%	
2010	Fischer/Nečas	1.48	-20.42%	669.805.763.44	15.81%	80.977	-8.28%	67.837	13.18%	51.833	15.30%	13.770	7.65%	
2011		1.07	-28.05%	569.721.666.42	-14.94%	81.471	0.61%	71.142	4.87%	54.830	5.78%	14.316	3.97%	
2012	Nečas	0.78	-26.49%	570.711.609.89	0.17%	80.540	-1.14%	67.439	-5.20%	51.228	-6.57%	14.266	-0.35%	
2013	Nečas/Rusnok	0.62	-20.86%	513.098.756.31	-10.09%	81.277	0.92%	70.816	5.01%	54.893	7.15%	13.965	-2.11%	
2014		0.68	9.02%	587.126.577.04	14.43%	84.067	3.43%	70.756	-0.09%	54.092	-1.46%	14.574	4.36%	
2015		1.22	80.08%	684.442.001.10	16.57%	87.999	4.68%	76.031	7.46%	58.713	8.54%	15.261	4.71%	
2016	Sobotka	0.87	-28.74%	767.272.565.86	12.10%	91.355	3.81%	67.557	-11.14%	50.314	-14.31%	15.618	2.34%	
2017		0.80	-7.62%	721.269.257.65	-6.00%	95.002	3.99%	62.307	-7.77%	44.273	-12.01%	15.842	1.43%	
2018	Sobotka/Babiš	0.85	5.71%	871.462.498.68	20.82%	99.207	4.43%	59.766	-4.08%	41.072	-7.23%	16.564	4.56%	
2019		0.97	14.88%	982.477.463.79	12.74%	102.656	3.48%	57.321	-4.09%	39.059	-4.90%	16.179	-2.32%	
2020	Babiš	1.31	34.50%	883.823.779.55	-10.04%	81.045	-21.05%	73.032	27.41%	56.089	43.60%	15.250	-5.74%	
2021														
Source		OECD (2022ze)		OECD (2022zf)		OECD (2022zg)		OECD (2022zh)		OECD (2022zi)		OECD (2022zj)		

Figures of Policy Making: Transport & Trade II

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	TRADE	
		Trade in goods and services net, mio. USD	Change in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992	3.884,53	-35,10%
Klaus	1993	3.134,37	-19,31%
	1994	874,55	-72,10%
	1995	1.067,82	22,10%
	1996	1.711,06	-260,24%
	1997	1.252,95	-26,77%
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	86,67	-106,92%
Zeman	1999	94,44	8,96%
	2000	276,44	192,72%
	2001	569,62	-306,06%
Zeman/Špidla	2002	2.630,22	361,75%
Špidla	2003	3.204,55	21,84%
Špidla/Gross	2004	1.774,64	-44,62%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	2.051,08	-215,58%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	4.650,77	126,75%
Topolánek	2007	3.471,88	-25,35%
	2008	4.689,34	35,07%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	5.560,81	18,58%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	6.233,08	12,09%
Nečas	2011	9.468,45	51,91%
	2012	11.785,07	24,47%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	12.051,91	2,26%
Sobotka	2014	11.547,05	-4,19%
	2015	11.172,72	-3,24%
	2016	13.780,29	23,34%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	16.139,44	17,12%
Babiš	2018	13.554,39	-16,02%
	2019	13.647,69	0,69%
	2020	12.823,25	-6,04%
	2021	3.990,57	-68,88%
Source		OECD (2022zk)	

Figures of Policy Making: Security & Defense I

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	DEFENSE & MILITARY					
		Defense spending % of GDP	Change in %	Professional soldiers total	Change in %	Basic Service/Active Backup total	Change in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992			63.335		68.630	
Klaus	1993			56.916	-10,13%	54.326	-20,84%
	1994			58.139	2,15%	43.178	-20,52%
	1995	1,68		54.110	-6,93%	36.797	-14,78%
	1996	1,66	-1,19%	53.400	-1,31%	32.174	-12,56%
	1997	1,74	5,08%	45.556	-14,69%	32.942	2,39%
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	1,51	-13,21%	44.447	-2,43%	33.281	1,03%
Zeman	1999	1,74	15,04%	45.022	1,29%	31.185	-6,30%
	2000	1,71	-1,91%	44.341	-1,51%	24.955	-19,98%
	2001	1,71	-0,13%	41.515	-6,37%	21.235	-14,91%
Zeman/Špidla	2002	1,76	3,45%	43.924	5,80%	19.783	-6,84%
Špidla	2003	1,93	9,48%	41.863	-4,69%	6.359	-67,86%
Špidla/Gross	2004	1,26	-34,82%	39.433	-5,80%		
Gross/Paroubek	2005	1,50	18,81%	38.081	-3,43%	1.312	
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	1,14	-23,78%	37.587	-1,30%	1.112	-15,24%
Topolánek	2007	1,09	-3,98%	36.280	-3,48%	1.101	-0,99%
	2008	1,02	-6,55%	34.678	-4,42%	1.087	-1,27%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	1,01	-1,44%	32.153	-7,28%	1.041	-4,23%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	0,97	-3,40%	30.564	-4,94%	1.098	5,48%
Nečas	2011	0,88	-9,48%	29.999	-1,85%	1.093	-0,46%
	2012	0,80	-9,15%	30.021	0,07%	1.128	3,20%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	0,76	-5,40%	28.541	-4,93%	1.214	7,62%
Sobotka	2014	0,69	-8,54%	28.351	-0,67%	1.237	1,89%
	2015	0,91	31,73%	29.512	4,10%	1.259	1,78%
	2016	0,72	-21,18%	30.847	4,52%	1.488	18,19%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	0,80	11,28%	32.120	4,13%	2.270	52,55%
Babiš	2018	0,86	7,85%	33.084	3,00%	2.853	25,68%
	2019	0,88	1,48%	33.958	2,64%	3.236	13,42%
	2020	1,02	16,19%	34.771	2,39%	3.440	6,30%
	2021			35.127	1,02%	3.615	5,09%
Source		OECD (2022zl)		MO (2021)		MO (2021)	

Figures of Policy Making: Security & Defense II

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	POLICE		SECURITY	
		Policemen total	Change in %	Global Peace Index global ranking	Change total
Pithart/Klaus	1992				
Klaus	1993				
	1994				
	1995				
	1996				
	1997				
Tošovský/Zeman	1998				
Zeman	1999				
	2000	44.828			
	2001	44.680	-0,33%		
Zeman/Špidla	2002	45.538	1,92%		
Špidla	2003	46.616	2,37%		
Špidla/Gross	2004	46.486	-0,28%		
Gross/Paroubek	2005	47.129	1,38%		
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	45.207	-4,08%		
Topolánek	2007	45.429	0,49%		
	2008	42.364	-6,75%	16	16
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	42.441	0,18%	14	-2
Fischer/Nečas	2010	43.272	1,96%	10	-4
Nečas	2011	41.224	-4,73%	6	-4
	2012	39.037	-5,31%	11	5
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	38.363	-1,73%	12	1
Sobotka	2014	38.754	1,02%	11	-1
	2015	39.497	1,92%	15	4
	2016	40.055	1,41%	8	-7
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	40.389	0,83%	8	0
Babiš	2018	40.152	-0,59%	9	1
	2019	40.401	0,62%	9	0
	2020	40.228	-0,43%	9	0
	2021			8	-1
Source		PCR (2019,2020)		Institute for Economics & Peace (2022)	

[illegible]

Figures of Policy Making: Culture & Tourism I

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	Recreation, culture, religion spending % of GDP	CULTURE																	
			Change in %	Av. salary % of av. wage	Change in %	Monuments open to public		Change in %	Museums & Galleries		Change in %	Theaters		Change in %	Libraries		Change in %	Cultural Facilities		Change in %
						total	in %		total	in %		total	in %		total	in %		total	in %	
Pithart/Klaus	1992																			
	1993																			
Klaus	1994																			
	1995	1.36																		
	1996	1.49	8.97%																	
	1997	1.31	-11.60%																	
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	1.33	1.53%																	
	1999	1.24	-6.86%				185									6141				
Zeman	2000	1.29	4.12%				197	6.49%		440			118			6019				
	2001	1.30	0.58%				222	12.69%		447	1.59%		127	7.63%		6091	1.20%			
	2002	1.37	5.61%				233	4.95%		442	-1.12%		110	-13.39%		6057	-0.56%			
Zeman/Špidla	2003	1.41	2.71%				245	5.15%		445	0.68%		101	-8.18%		6046	-0.18%			
Špidla/Gross	2004	1.38	-2.26%				257	4.90%		461	3.60%		119	17.82%		5885	-2.66%			
	2005	1.34	-2.90%		0.88		269	4.67%		457	-0.87%		121	1.68%		5920	0.59%			
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	1.48	10.33%		0.87	-1.19%	271	0.74%		478	4.60%		125	3.31%		5662	-4.36%			
	2007	1.41	-4.87%		0.86	-1.48%	272	0.37%		487	1.88%		130	4.00%		5333	-5.81%			
Topolánek	2008	1.42	1.23%		0.83	-3.37%	277	1.84%		491	0.82%		133	2.31%		5438	1.97%			
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	1.62	13.77%		0.84	1.99%	287	3.61%		479			137	3.01%		5432	-0.11%			
Fischer/Nečas	2010	1.52	-5.86%		0.83	-1.28%	284	-1.05%		477	-0.42%		151	10.22%		5415	-0.31%			
	2011	1.41	-7.19%		0.81	-2.94%	295	3.87%		490	2.73%		153	1.32%		5408	-0.13%			
Nečas	2012	1.35	-4.19%		0.82	1.26%	295	0.00%		502	2.45%		153	0.00%		5401	-0.13%			
	2013	1.35	-0.65%		0.83	0.89%	297	0.68%		512	1.99%		152	-0.65%		5381	-0.37%			
Nečas/Rusnok	2014	1.36	0.80%		0.82	-0.35%	308	3.70%		509	-0.59%		152	0.00%		5360	-0.39%			
	2015	1.32	-2.39%		0.83	0.89%	315	2.27%		484	-4.91%		155	1.97%		5325	-0.65%		555	
Sobotka	2016	1.29	-2.78%		0.85	1.74%	316	0.32%		485	0.21%		175	12.90%		5353	0.53%		615	10.81%
	2017	1.31	1.54%		0.86	2.08%	318	0.63%		477	-1.65%		175	0.00%		5339	-0.26%		596	-3.09%
Sobotka/Babiš	2018	1.47	12.73%		0.88	1.77%	327	2.83%		477	0.00%		182	4.00%		5317	-0.41%		601	0.84%
	2019	1.43	-3.27%		0.91	3.09%	326	-0.31%		481	0.84%		205	12.64%		5307	-0.19%		613	2.00%
Babiš	2020	1.44	0.99%		0.89	-1.44%														
	2021				0.86	-3.93%														
Source		OECD (2022zm)	CSU (2022b)		NIPOS (2019a)		NIPOS (2019b)		NIPOS (2019c)		NIPOS (2019d)		NIPOS (2019e)							

Figures of Policy Making: Culture & Tourism II

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	TOURISM			
		Number of arrivals	Change	Short-stay accommodation	Change
		total	in %	total	in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992			1.132	-30,68%
Klaus	1993			1.476	30,39%
	1994			1.939	31,37%
	1995			2.623	35,28%
	1996			5.719	118,03%
	1997			7.342	28,38%
Tošovský/Zeman	1998			7.685	4,67%
Zeman	1999			7.487	-2,58%
	2000			7.469	-0,24%
	2001			7.703	3,13%
Zeman/Špidla	2002			7.869	2,16%
Špidla	2003	20.108.000		7.926	0,72%
Špidla/Gross	2004	23.808.000	18,40%	7.640	-3,61%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	24.747.000	3,94%	7.605	-0,46%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	25.102.000	1,43%	7.616	0,14%
Topolánek	2007	22.625.000	-9,87%	7.845	3,01%
	2008	21.850.000	-3,43%	7.705	-1,78%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	23.285.000	6,57%	7.557	-1,92%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	21.941.000	-5,77%	7.235	-4,26%
Nečas	2011	22.810.000	3,96%	7.657	5,83%
	2012	25.750.000	12,89%	10.057	31,34%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	26.332.000	2,26%	9.970	-0,87%
Sobotka	2014	27.166.000	3,17%	9.013	-9,60%
	2015	29.604.000	8,97%	9.163	1,66%
	2016	32.519.000	9,85%	9.168	0,05%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	34.701.000	6,71%	9.007	-1,76%
Babiš	2018	36.268.000	4,52%	9.426	4,65%
	2019	37.202.000	2,58%	9.383	-0,46%
	2020				
	2021				
Source		Our World in Data (2022)		Eurostat (2022c)	

Figures of Policy Making: Investment, Development, EU Funding

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	INVESTMENT				REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT		EU FUNDING	
		General Government Investment	Change	Long-term interest rates	Change	Urbanization	Change	EU funding	Change
		% of GFCF ¹	in %	% p.a.	in %	% of POP	in %	% of state income	in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992					75,03	-0,17%	-	-
Klaus	1993					74,90	-0,17%	-	-
	1994					74,77	-0,17%	-	-
	1995	16,55				74,64	-0,17%	-	-
	1996	13,60	-17,86%			74,51	-0,17%	-	-
	1997	13,54	-0,41%			74,38	-0,18%	-	-
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	14,14	4,45%			74,25	-0,18%	-	-
Zeman	1999	12,46	-11,94%			74,12	-0,18%	-	-
	2000	14,82	18,99%			73,99	-0,18%	-	-
	2001	13,42	-9,42%	6,31		73,88	-0,15%	-	-
Zeman/Špidla	2002	13,87	3,32%	4,88	-22,77%	73,81	-0,09%	-	-
Špidla	2003	26,17	88,69%	4,12	-15,60%	73,74	-0,09%	-	-
Špidla/Gross	2004	17,45	-33,33%	4,82	17,13%	73,67	-0,09%	1,32	
Gross/Paroubek	2005	18,05	3,42%	3,54	-26,52%	73,60	-0,09%	3,57	170,45%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	18,17	0,70%	3,80	7,27%	73,53	-0,09%	6,01	68,35%
Topolánek	2007	15,80	-13,08%	4,30	13,22%	73,46	-0,10%	6,09	1,33%
	2008	17,95	13,63%	4,63	7,69%	73,39	-0,09%	6,84	12,32%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	21,71	20,98%	4,84	4,41%	73,32	-0,10%	7,96	16,37%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	18,68	-13,98%	3,88	-19,71%	73,26	-0,09%	8,51	6,91%
Nečas	2011	16,67	-10,75%	3,71	-4,55%	73,19	-0,10%	9,99	17,39%
	2012	15,84	-5,00%	2,78	-24,97%	73,20	0,02%	8,51	-14,81%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	14,50	-8,43%	2,11	-24,09%	73,29	0,13%	8,43	-0,94%
Sobotka	2014	16,12	11,18%	1,58	-25,37%	73,38	0,13%	8,19	-2,85%
	2015	19,25	19,40%	0,58	-63,51%	73,48	0,13%	7,20	-12,09%
	2016	12,97	-32,62%	0,43	-25,65%	73,57	0,13%	7,87	9,31%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	13,43	3,50%	0,98	129,43%	73,68	0,14%	7,75	-1,52%
Babiš	2018	15,77	17,46%	1,98	102,04%	73,79	0,16%	5,33	-31,23%
	2019	16,13	2,25%	1,55	-21,87%	73,92	0,17%	6,29	18,01%
	2020	18,27	13,28%	1,13	-27,13%	74,06	0,19%	8,03	27,66%
	2021	17,99	-1,53%	1,90	68,76%	74,21	0,21%	9,51	18,43%
Source		OECD (2022zn)		OECD (2022zo)		World Bank (2022a)		own calculations ²	

1 – Gross Fixed Capital Formation;

2 – own calculation based on European Commission (2022a, b)

Figures of Policy Making: International Relations

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS			
		Net ODA ¹ provided total, USD	Change in %	CPA ² total, USD	Change in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992				
Klaus	1993	20.000.000,00			
	1994	25.250.000,00	26,25%		
	1995				
	1996				
	1997				
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	16.160.000,00			
Zeman	1999	14.800.000,00	-8,42%		
	2000	16.160.000,00	9,19%	9.433.892.835,62	
	2001	26.490.000,00	63,92%	29.263.023.609,44	210,19%
Zeman/Špidla	2002	45.430.000,00	71,50%	21.204.710.684,73	-27,54%
Špidla	2003	90.550.000,00	99,32%	13.238.507.444,28	-37,57%
Špidla/Gross	2004	108.280.000,00	19,58%	63.376.140.430,65	378,73%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	135.150.000,00	24,82%	43.264.531.413,88	-31,73%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	160.870.000,00	19,03%	61.485.265.219,59	42,11%
Topolánek	2007	178.880.000,00	11,20%	60.943.850.450,21	-0,88%
	2008	249.210.000,00	39,32%	91.212.700.374,93	49,67%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	214.700.000,00	-13,85%	90.271.967.381,25	-1,03%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	227.560.000,00	5,99%	64.938.202.888,32	-28,06%
Nečas	2011	250.460.000,00	10,06%	40.879.541.765,37	-37,05%
	2012	219.635.000,00	-12,31%	44.661.391.386,20	9,25%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	210.882.000,00	-3,99%	35.185.566.886,76	-21,22%
Sobotka	2014	212.150.000,00	0,60%	37.704.669.815,82	7,16%
	2015	199.000.000,00	-6,20%	49.747.332.689,21	31,94%
	2016	260.240.000,00	30,77%	40.682.477.325,83	-18,22%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	304.120.000,00	16,86%	47.340.361.252,97	16,37%
Babiš	2018	305.360.000,00	0,41%	40.004.119.667,10	-15,50%
	2019	309.200.000,00	1,26%	43.474.505.371,90	8,68%
	2020	299.140.000,00	-3,25%	40.491.352.030,16	-6,86%
	2021				
Source		World Bank (2022b)		OECD (2022zp)	

1 – Official Development Assistance; 2 – Country Programmable Aid;

Figures of Policy Making: Agriculture & Environment I

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	AGRICULTURE		FORESTRY				WATER MANAGEMENT			
		Agricultural land	Change	Area of wooded land	Change	Roundwood removals	Change	Water withdrawals	Change	Wastewater treatment	Change
		1.000 ha	in %	1.000 ha	in %	1.000 m3	in %	m3/capita	in %	%	in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992	4.283	-0,05%			9.800					
Klaus	1993	4.282	-0,02%			10.406	6,18%				
	1994	4.281	-0,02%			11.950	14,84%				
	1995	4.280	-0,02%			12.365	3,47%	265,54			
	1996	4.279	-0,02%			12.600	1,90%	249,11	-6,18%		
	1997	4.280	0,02%			13.491	7,07%	241,91	-2,89%		
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	4.272	-0,19%			13.991	3,71%	221,16	-8,58%		
Zeman	1999	4.282	0,23%			14.203	1,52%	192,15	-13,12%		
	2000	4.282	0,00%	2.637		14.441	1,68%	186,71	-2,83%	64,0	
	2001	4.280	-0,05%			14.374	-0,46%	179,84	-3,68%	65,1	1,72%
Zeman/Špidla	2002	3.652	-14,67%			14.541	1,16%	187,06	4,02%	69,8	7,22%
Špidla	2003	3.668	0,44%			15.140	4,12%	207,43	10,89%	70,7	1,29%
Špidla/Gross	2004	3.631	-1,01%			15.601	3,04%	198,69	-4,21%	71,1	0,57%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	3.605	-0,72%			15.510	-0,58%	190,42	-4,16%	73,0	2,67%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	3.566	-1,08%			17.678	13,98%	188,59	-0,96%	72,0	-1,37%
Topolánek	2007	3.597	0,87%			18.508	4,70%	190,77	1,16%	73,1	1,53%
	2008	3.572	-0,70%			16.187	-12,54%	190,64	-0,07%	75,6	3,42%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	3.546	-0,73%			15.502	-4,23%	185,60	-2,64%	75,9	0,40%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	3.524	-0,62%	2.657		16.736	7,96%	185,48	-0,07%	77,0	1,45%
Nečas	2011	3.504	-0,57%			15.381	-8,10%	179,73	-3,10%	78,2	1,56%
	2012	3.526	0,63%			15.061	-2,08%	175,16	-2,54%	78,1	-0,13%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	3.521	-0,14%			15.331	1,79%	157,02	-10,36%	80,0	2,43%
Sobotka	2014	3.516	-0,14%			15.476	0,95%	156,74	-0,18%	79,9	-0,12%
	2015	3.494	-0,63%	2.668		16.163	4,44%	152,05	-2,99%	80,8	1,13%
	2016	3.489	-0,14%	2.670	0,05%	17.617	9,00%	154,81	1,81%	81,3	0,62%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	3.521	0,92%	2.672	0,07%	19.387	10,05%	153,96	-0,55%	82,4	1,35%
Babiš	2018	3.523	0,06%	2.673	0,07%	25.689	32,51%	149,73	-2,75%	82,4	0,00%
	2019	3.524	0,03%	2.675	0,07%	32.586	26,85%	141,18	-5,71%	82,7	0,36%
	2020	3.524	0,00%	2.677	0,07%			127,65	-9,58%	83,5	0,97%
	2021										
Source		OECD (2022zq)		Eurostat (2022d)		Eurostat (2022e)		OECD (2022zr)		OECD (2022zs)	

Figures of Policy Making: Agriculture & Environment II

GOVERNMENT	YEAR	ENVIRONMENT							
		Air and GHG emissions	Change	Air and GHG emissions	Change	Air pollution mortality	Change	Renewable energy	Change
		CO2 tonnes/capita	in %	GHG tonnes/capita	in %	per 1 Mio. inhabitants	in %	% of primary energy supply	in %
Pithart/Klaus	1992	12,76	-3,92%	16,80	-3,11%	1.149,07	-3,50%	3,80	50,18%
Klaus	1993	12,47	-2,27%	16,08	-4,28%	1.092,32	-4,94%	3,85	1,42%
	1994	11,85	-4,97%	15,23	-5,29%	1.064,55	-2,54%	3,85	-0,12%
	1995	11,92	0,59%	15,13	-0,63%	1.057,06	-0,70%	3,43	-10,90%
	1996	12,08	1,34%	15,46	2,14%	993,49	-6,01%	3,32	-3,22%
	1997	11,91	-1,41%	15,04	-2,68%	961,61	-3,21%	3,60	8,51%
Tošovský/Zeman	1998	11,35	-4,70%	14,46	-3,84%	891,15	-7,33%	3,79	5,26%
Zeman	1999	10,70	-5,73%	13,54	-6,40%	854,93	-4,06%	4,29	13,12%
	2000	11,80	10,28%	14,56	7,57%	838,54	-1,92%	3,92	-8,70%
	2001	11,84	0,34%	14,64	0,54%	825,98	-1,50%	4,11	5,10%
Zeman/Špidla	2002	11,48	-3,04%	14,32	-2,19%	805,08	-2,53%	4,56	10,92%
Špidla	2003	11,89	3,57%	14,63	2,14%	814,13	1,12%	4,10	-10,23%
Špidla/Gross	2004	11,93	0,34%	14,73	0,66%	776,94	-4,57%	4,40	7,44%
Gross/Paroubek	2005	11,57	-3,02%	14,47	-1,73%	767,12	-1,26%	4,61	4,79%
Paroubek/Topolánek	2006	11,58	0,09%	14,55	0,54%	731,76	-4,61%	4,78	3,68%
Topolánek	2007	11,78	1,73%	14,64	0,63%	720,98	-1,47%	5,02	5,01%
	2008	11,15	-5,35%	14,01	-4,31%	717,85	-0,43%	5,56	10,76%
Topolánek/Fischer	2009	10,45	-6,28%	13,03	-6,96%	709,22	-1,20%	6,67	20,00%
Fischer/Nečas	2010	10,53	0,77%	13,27	1,80%	700,72	-1,20%	6,93	3,89%
Nečas	2011	10,24	-2,75%	13,16	-0,84%	693,08	-1,09%	7,91	14,03%
	2012	9,95	-2,83%	12,77	-2,97%	673,09	-2,88%	8,54	7,94%
Nečas/Rusnok	2013	9,50	-4,52%	12,27	-3,93%	649,41	-3,52%	9,37	9,73%
Sobotka	2014	9,12	-4,00%	12,04	-1,83%	612,98	-5,61%	9,95	6,28%
	2015	9,26	1,54%	12,16	0,96%	603,46	-1,55%	10,18	2,31%
	2016	9,47	2,27%	12,26	0,83%	581,06	-3,71%	10,38	1,93%
Sobotka/Babiš	2017	9,45	-0,21%	12,33	0,59%	573,42	-1,32%	10,14	-2,32%
Babiš	2018	9,32	-1,38%	12,11	-1,74%	585,81	2,16%	10,13	-0,11%
	2019	8,84	-5,15%	11,52	-4,91%	585,26	-0,10%	11,02	8,76%
	2020	7,88	-10,86%	10,54	-8,49%			12,12	10,01%
	2021								
Source		OECD (2022zt)		OECD (2022zu)		OECD (2022zv)		OECD (2022zw)	

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