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„Gender Effects in Salary Negotiation – The Moderating
Role of Gender Role Orientation“

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Abstract

Research suggests that gender-related differences in negotiation contribute to the existence of the gender wage gap. This is because women who violate gender role expectations by negotiating assertively risk incurring backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals. With the intention to disentangle economic and social consequences for negotiators acting counter stereotypically, this thesis tested differences in financial outcomes, the negotiation partner's concession making behavior and perceptions of likability. Additionally, intending to identify a new person-based moderator that reduces backlash, the influence of the negotiation partner's gender role orientation was tested. Therefore, an experimental online simulation of a salary negotiation was conducted with 180 undergraduate students. Results showed that, while female negotiators outperformed male negotiators financially, they were socially penalized for violating the female gender role prescription. This was not the case for atypical male negotiators. It was further found that the negotiation partner's gender role orientation moderated the relationship between atypical behavior and economic outcome. Participants endorsing a more egalitarian gender role orientation financially differentiated more between atypical and typical candidates and between men and women. Finally, the differentiation between implicit and explicit prejudice and the influence of prejudice control mechanisms on backlash were proposed as new theoretical explanations for gender differences in negotiation.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Topic Introduction

With an increasing number of women entering the labor market, gender differences in economic outcomes have received broad attention in business and economics research over the past decades. A large body of research focusing on salary differences between female and male employees found that, even under the exclusion of different demographic factors, women continue to earn less than their male colleagues (Bayard et al., 2003; Blau & Kahn, 2017; Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebmer, 2005). As today most entry-salaries, as well as future pay-raises, are the result of bilateral negotiation between the employee and the employer (Brenzel et al., 2014), one possible explanation for the persistence of the gender wage gap are gender-related differences in negotiation behaviors, treatments and outcomes.

Previous research in this area found that, under certain conditions, women do in fact achieve lower negotiated outcomes than their male counterparts (Kray & Thompson, 2004). For example, it has been shown that gender-related differences in the first salary negotiation can result in a substantial gap between the cumulated economic outcomes of female and male employees over the course of a career (Säve-Söderbergh, 2019). But there exist different explanations for the observed gap, depending on whether the theoretical perspective focuses on the focal negotiator or the negotiation partner (Dannals et al., 2021). While the focal negotiator-based narrative assumes that the gap in negotiation outcomes results from *behavioral* differences between male and female negotiators, the negotiation partner centered approach suggests that the gap stems from different *treatments* of men and women at the negotiation table (Kray & Thompson, 2004). Which of these theoretical approaches is assumed, has important implications for possible strategies and measures to overcome the gender gap in negotiation. Because the focal negotiator-based approach assumes that differences in negotiation outcomes stem from women insufficiently using assertive (masculine) behaviors, the gender gap could be closed by making women negotiate more assertively. In contrary, from the perspective of the negotiation partner-based approach, the main cause for the gender gap is the way they are treated by their negotiation partners. Following this logic, the gender gap would be likely to remain, even if women adopted a more assertive negotiation style, because their negotiation partners react differently to assertive females than to assertive males (Dannals et al., 2021). In the context of negotiation partner-based effects, one of the most important constructs in research is *backlash* (Eagly & Karau, 2002). *Backlash* refers to negative reactions, in the form of social or

economic penalties, brought towards individuals, and particularly women, who violate gender stereotypes (Keck & Babcock, 2018; Phelan et al., 2008). For example, it has been shown that women who exhibit assertive (masculine) behaviors in a negotiation, were judged more negatively than men acting the same way (Bowles et al., 2007; Bowles & Babcock, 2013). But there also appear to be contextual factors that can attenuate backlash. For example, in a more recent meta-analysis examining gender differences in economic negotiation outcomes and potential interaction effects, Mazei et al. (2015) observed that, although on average men did outperform women with regard to their economic negotiation outcomes, these differences varied according to different contextual conditions. In fact, some situational, personal and task-based moderators have been shown to reduce gender effects in bilateral negotiation substantially (Bowles & McGinn, 2008; Mazei et al., 2015). Variables that were shown to reduce gender effects in (salary) negotiation are, for example, the structural ambiguity of a negotiation (Bowles et al., 2005), negotiating on behalf of others (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) or experience in negotiation (Mazei et al., 2015). Nevertheless, this list of moderators is not conclusive. Especially through the lens of the negotiation partner-centered approach, other moderators related to the person of the negotiation partner are likely to influence the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash.

1.2. Research Objective

This thesis contributes to existing research on gender differences in negotiation in multiple ways. First, while backlash effects in professional contexts have been widely studied for atypical women, only a few studies were focused on backlash against atypical men. The present study aims at closing this gap, by also capturing reactions towards atypical male negotiators. Thus, in contrast to previous studies, the present study focuses primarily on the relationship between *atypical behavior* and backlash. Second, notwithstanding the growing body of research focusing on potential moderators that attenuate backlash effects in negotiation, there is not much research on negotiation partner-based moderators yet. To deliver new insights into negotiation partner-based factors that influence gender differences in negotiation, this study further investigates the moderating role of the gender role orientation of the negotiation partner, which, to the best of knowledge, has not been subject of prior research.

Based on a thorough literature review, the present study is built on two basic assumptions. First, it was assumed that atypically behaving negotiators (assertive women and modest men) would incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals in a salary negotiation. Second, it was hypothesized that the gender role orientation (GRO) of the negotiation partner

would attenuate the negative effect of atypical behavior on backlash. It was expected that a more egalitarian GRO of the negotiation partner, as opposed to a more traditional GRO, would weaken the negative effect of atypical behavior on the economic and social outcome of the negotiation. These propositions were tested by analyzing data collected through an online experiment with a student sample from the University of Vienna.

In the following, an overview of the relevant theories and literature in the context of gender effects in negotiation and the impact of gender role orientation will be provided. Furthermore, the data collection for the present study will be outlined and the methodological approach explained. Subsequently, the statistical data analysis will be presented, followed by a thorough discussion of the results. Ultimately, the limitations of the present study and the implications for future research will be explained.

2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review

Negotiation is a social endeavor in which individuals with diverging interests resolve conflict through discussion and affects multiple areas of peoples' daily and future lives (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Walters et al., 1998). Especially in organizational contexts, negotiation plays an important role when it comes to the distribution of resources and privileges (Mazei et al., 2015). For example, salaries and other benefits are resources, which need to be allocated among the employees of an organization and, therefore, are common issues of negotiation. In a salary negotiation, there are at least two parties with different interests involved, the employer and the employee. Each party has their own reservation and aspirations prices. While the reservation price represents the very minimum (from the employee-perspective) or maximum (from the employer-perspective) one is willing to accept as a negotiation outcome, the aspiration price represents the negotiators' most desired negotiation outcome, or in other words, the best possible outcome they can reasonably expect (Blount et al., 1996; Buelens & van Poucke, 2004). When negotiating a distributive issue, these points typically lie at the opposite extremes and the interests of both parties are negatively correlated (Kristensen & Gärling, 1997). In a salary negotiation, for example, employers typically want to negotiate the lowest possible salary to maximize their profit, while employees want to negotiate the highest possible salary. In such a scenario, each gain on one side implies a loss on the other side. Therefore, effective negotiation is an important tool, when it comes to gaining access to organizational resources. Given the power of negotiation to shape professional advancements, factors that potentially influence negotiation success, have been of great interest in past research. In particular, the question of whether and how gender affects negotiation outcomes and processes has been

present in research for decades (Kray & Thompson, 2004). Thus, in the following chapters, relevant findings from previous research on the existence of a gender gap in negotiation outcomes, as well as important theoretical frameworks that explain gender-based differences will be reviewed.

2.1. Evidence of Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcomes

One of the most widely asked question in negotiation research was, and still continues to be, the question of whether men and women differ systematically in their negotiation performance (Mazei et al., 2015; Walters et al., 1998). And this is for good reason. Even though, results are not unanimous, there is a considerable number of studies indicating that men and women differ significantly in terms of their negotiation outcomes (ibid). Because negotiation performance can be measured in tangible (economic) or intangible (social) outcomes (Thompson, 1990), in the following, relevant findings on both, gender differences in economic and social negotiation outcomes are being reviewed.

2.1.1. Economic Outcomes

In negotiation research, performance is typically understood as the value, a negotiator is able to extract from a negotiated agreement (Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). This implies that the measure of individual negotiation performance consists of two parts. First, in a situation where the zone of possible agreement is positive, an agreement is the economically advantageous outcome, whereas ending the negotiation with an impasse is regarded suboptimal (Tuncel et al., 2016). Second, in a situation where an agreement was reached, negotiator-performance depends on how much value they were able to claim (Dannals et al., 2021). Thus, gender differences in negotiation performance can emerge from two sources. Firstly, women and men could differ in the propensity to end a negotiation with an agreement or an impasse. Secondly, the agreement values negotiated by women and men could differ.

In literature there is evidence for both, gender differences in impasse-rates and agreement value. For example, in a recent study examining the gender gap in negotiation performance, Dannals et al. (2021) found that, in a situation where negotiators have strong alternatives to the negotiated agreement and at least one of the parties is female, negotiations disproportionately end in impasse. These results indicate that, compared to male negotiators, female negotiators do not benefit as much from the generally proposed enhancing effect of strong alternatives (Kim & Fragale, 2005). In fact, women were shown to underperform as compared to men with equally strong alternatives, because they more often failed to reach agreements (Dannals et al., 2021).

Other studies found that, regardless of the impasse rates of men and women, male negotiators tend to extract more value from a negotiation than do female negotiators (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998). For example, in a recent meta-analysis investigating gender-based differences in the economic results of negotiations, Mazei et al. (2015), confirmed that men tend to achieve better negotiation outcomes than do women. Similar results were found in a preceding meta-analysis by Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999). Even though, in the latter study, the effect size was quite small ($d = .09$, which according to Cohen, (2013), is a rather small-sized effect), it is suggested that even small disadvantages women face in situations of negotiation might have a substantial impact on their future career and compensation advancements (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Because salary increases are often based on percentage of pay, even small differences in entry salaries can perpetuate, or even increase over time (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Using the example of an entry-salary negotiation to demonstrate the impact of a small asking-advantages on an individual's lifelong earnings, Save-Söderbergh (2019) predicted losses of up to \$30.645 over the course of a 38-year career. More evidence for a gender gap in negotiation outcomes, is provided in field studies (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Säve-Söderbergh, 2019). For example, when comparing the negotiated salary outcomes of 205 MBA students, Gerhart and Rynes (1991) found that in comparison to male applicants, female applicants obtained a 1.6% lower increase in monetary returns from negotiating their entry-salaries (4.3% entry-salary increment for men and 2.7% for women) (Dittrich et al., 2014). Similarly, Säve-Söderbergh (2019) demonstrated in her field study comparing the entry-salary negotiations of recent college graduates that women received lower starting salaries and their requested salaries were accepted less often than those of similar male graduates. These observations are further supported by experimental studies, particularly focusing on wage negotiation. For example, Schwierien (2012) documents lower negotiated salary-offers for women in experimental labor markets. Altogether, these findings suggest that women, indeed, may be placed at a systematic disadvantage in distributive negotiation, leading to observable outcome differences such as the gender pay gap or glass ceiling phenomena (Mazei et al., 2015).

2.1.2. Social Outcomes

Because negotiation is a social endeavor that usually includes conflict, it would be short-sighted to only consider economic or monetary outcomes when evaluating negotiation success. Thus, to analyze negotiation performance, social-psychological measures also need to be taken into consideration. According to Thompson (1990), social measures in negotiation are rooted in concepts of social perception and include various elements. Important elements are for example,

the negotiators' perceptions of the bargaining situation, their negotiation partner and their perception of themselves (Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).

In the context of gender differences in negotiation outcomes, especially the way negotiators are perceived by their opponents plays an important role. Negotiator perception is mainly determined by how likable, trustworthy and fair negotiators are rated by their counterparts (Thompson, 1990). The question of whether ratings of likability, trustworthiness and fairness vary according to the negotiator's gender, has been subject to multiple studies in past research (Bowles et al., 2007; Bowles & Babcock, 2013). Typically, such studies compare social outcomes for female and male negotiators engaging in certain behaviors that are generally regarded as beneficial in (distributive) negotiation settings, such as being assertive or demanding (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). The reasoning of these studies is obtained from research focusing on the social cost of female agency in professional contexts (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). The basic assumption is that many business-related tasks require the more agentic behaviors to succeed. But because such behaviors are more closely related to male gender stereotypes, women who act agentic pay are socially sanctioned for disconfirming to the female gender stereotype (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). This has been tested in multiple studies focusing on sex bias in the workplace (Heilman et al., 2004; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Parks-Stamm et al., 2008; Rudman, 1998).

For example, in an experimental study testing reactions to women who were successful in a male gender-typed task, Heilman et al. (2004) found that women were liked less and more personally derogated for succeeding than men. An experimental study by Heilman and Okimoto (2007) confirmed these results. They found that women described as successful at male gender-typed jobs were "not liked, were viewed as having very undesirable interpersonal attributes, and were seen as less desirable as bosses relative to similarly described male managers" (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007, p. 85). A study by Parks-Stamm et al. (2008), indicated that especially female evaluators tend to penalize successful women in male gender-typed tasks. More evidence for different social treatment of men and women was obtained by Rudman and Glick (2001). In their experimental study examining hiring discrimination against agentic female applicants, results indicated that agentic female applicants were rated as significantly less likable and ascribed with lower social competency as compared to agentic male applicants (Rudman & Glick, 2001).

In the context of negotiation specifically, similar results were obtained. For example, Bowles et al. (2007) demonstrated in three experiments, that female negotiators are treated differently from their male counterparts when attempting to negotiate for higher compensation.

In particular, their results proved that evaluators were less inclined to work with women, who asked for higher compensation, because they were perceived as demanding and unlikable, while for men asking for higher compensation had no such negative effects (Bowles et al., 2007). Similar results were reported by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a). They found that assertive women incurred social sanctions in form of lower likability ratings, when negotiating for themselves, as compared to negotiating on behalf of a third party, while this was not the case for assertive men (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a).

2.2. Evidence of Gender Differences in Negotiation Behavior

Apart from evidence for systematic differences in the negotiation outcomes of men and women, there is also a substantial number of (experimental) studies, that have examined differences in the way men and women behave in bargaining situations. By definition, a negotiation does not only involve the actual bargaining process, but also the initiation of the negotiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014). Thus, whether men and women differ in the way they approach negotiation has been examined analyzing both, differences in the process of initiating a negotiation (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Barron, 2003; Kray et al., 2001) and in the process of value extraction (Dannals et al., 2021).

2.2.1. Differences in Initiating Negotiations

In real-life scenarios, it is often unclear whether a situation calls for negotiation or not. For example, in an entry-salary negotiation it is common practice that job candidates receive an offer from their employer. In that situation, it is the candidate's decision to either accept the offer or attempt to negotiate for a better outcome. If confronted with such a situation, it has been shown that people generally profit from taking advantage of the opportunity to negotiate, especially in professional contexts (Kugler et al., 2018; Thompson et al., 2010). Thus, if women were more reluctant to initiate a negotiation than men, this could explain some of the variance observed in the economic outcomes of female and male negotiators. The question of whether men and women differ in the likelihood of engaging in negotiation has already been studied in previous research (Barron, 2003; Bowles & McGinn, 2008; Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012; Greig, 2008; Kugler et al., 2018; Small et al., 2007). But results are not unanimous. While some studies report significant differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations between men and women (Bowles et al., 2007; Greig, 2008), others come to different conclusions (O'Shea & Bush, 2002; S  ve-S  derbergh, 2019).

The evidence for women being more reluctant to negotiate includes both, studies in the field and in laboratory settings. For example, when analyzing salary negotiations among recent

university graduates, Babcock and Laschever (2003), found that only 7% of the female graduates tried to negotiate their entry-salaries, as opposed to 57% of their male counterparts. Similarly, when Hall and Krueger (2012) analyzed the bargaining behavior of a representative sample of US workers, they found that women were less likely to have negotiated their salaries when entering their current or most recent job. Experimental studies came to similar results. For example, Small et al. (2007) conducted an experiment where participants were offered a cash payment for participating in a word game task, not knowing that they could increase their payout by negotiating. Results proved that men were more likely to ask for more money than women, when the possibility to negotiate was not made explicit. While 23% of the male participants requested more payment, only 3% of the female participants did (Small et al., 2007). Another study made participants assume the role of a candidate in a job interview to assess whether they would ask for higher pay (Bowles et al., 2007). Results showed that, while overall men and women were equally disinclined to ask for higher pay, this changed with the dyad composition. Female participants were significantly less inclined to ask for higher compensation when their negotiation partner was male, while this was not the case for male participants (Bowles et al., 2007).

On side of the studies not reporting gender based differences in the propensity to start negotiations, O'Shea and Bush (2002), reported that women were no less likely to engage in negotiation than men. When they asked recent college graduates to indicate whether they had negotiated their salary, female graduates were shown to negotiate at comparable rates as did male graduates (O'Shea & Bush, 2002). Furthermore, in a more recent field-study analyzing the data of salary negotiations between recent college students and their future employers, Säve-Söderbergh (2019), found that there was only a small gap in the propensity female and male applicants stated a salary request, but this gap was even reversed. In fact, her data indicated that women were slightly more inclined to state salary requests than their male counterparts – 46% of all female respondents indicated that they have stated a salary request as compared to 44% of all male respondents (Säve-Söderbergh, 2019).

Given these contradictory findings, Kugler et al. (2018), conducted a meta-analysis to explore whether women and men systematically differ in their likelihood of entering a negotiation. They found that, even though the effect was small ($g = 0.20$), women were less likely to initiate negotiations than men. And considering that missing even one opportunity to negotiate for better access to organizational resources can have severe consequences on future career advancements, even a small effect can lead to serious disadvantages for women in the workplace (Kugler et al., 2018).

2.2.2. Behavioral Differences during a Negotiation

Apart from the observed differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations (Bowles et al., 2007), it is suggested that women and men also differ in their negotiation styles and behaviors. Based on traditional sex-role stereotypes, men are expected to be tougher and more competitive in a negotiation, while women are expected to be more cooperative and accommodating (Walters et al., 1998). Whether and how men and women differ with regard to their behavior during a negotiation has been examined in multiple studies.

Important theoretical implications for the analysis of gender differences in negotiation behavior were made by Walters et al.'s (1998). In their meta-analysis, Walters et al. (1998), investigated whether women and men behave differently in a negotiation setting, based on their conflict management styles. Because negotiation can be perceived as the process of resolving conflict through discussion (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), it is likely that differences in how men and women manage conflict influences their negotiation behavior. Walters et al. (1998) argue that a person's conflict management style is best described by their orientation on the dimensions assertiveness and cooperativeness. Based on theoretical implications from the "dual concerns model" (Pruitt, 1983), they define assertiveness and cooperativeness as follows: "Assertiveness is defined as the degree of concern that one has about one's own outcomes in a conflict, while cooperativeness represents the degree of concern that one has about the other's outcomes" (Walters et al., 1998, p. 2). From these orientations, four styles of conflict management were derived: competing, accommodating, collaborating and avoiding. A competitive person typically scores high on assertiveness and low on cooperativeness, while an accommodating person scores low on assertiveness but high on cooperativeness. Avoiding individuals score low on both, assertiveness and cooperativeness, while their collaborative counterparts score high on both, assertiveness and cooperativeness (Walters et al., 1998). For an overview of all four conflict management styles, see Figure 1.




Figure 1: Cooperativeness - Assertiveness Matrix, based on Walters et al. (1998)

Of course, it needs to be noted that how these orientations translate into concrete negotiation behaviors is highly contextual. Nevertheless, Walters et al. (1998) argue that from an individual's conflict management style, inferences can be made about their likelihood to employ certain negotiation behaviors. For example, in a bargaining situation, a competitive person is likely to make high demands and use distributive tactics, such as making threats. A cooperative person on the other side is more likely to state lower demands and is more inclined toward making concessions (Walters et al., 1998).

These theoretical implications have been tested in a number of studies. Typical methods to test behavioral differences in bargaining situations between men and women are matrix-based economic games, such as the dictator game or ultimatum game (Dittrich et al., 2014). Dictator and ultimatum games typically include tasks where a fixed amount of money needs to be allocated between a proposer and one or more responders. In both games, the proposer must make a suggestion on how to split the money between the parties involved. The difference between the two games is that in an ultimatum game, responders are allowed to choose whether to accept or decline the offer made by the proposer, while in a dictator game, they are not (Kahneman et al., 1986; K. Zhao et al., 2018). Utilizing the dictator game to examine prosocial preferences of men and women, a number of studies demonstrated that, indeed, women tend to be more inequality averse and less individually-orientated (or selfish) than men in the role of the proposer (Eckel & Grossman, 1996, 1998; Selten & Ockenfels, 1998). Experiments utilizing ultimatum games produce similar results. For example, in a large-scale three-person bargaining experiment, measuring participants' bargaining behavior, Güth et al. (2007), find that women care more about equal distributions than men. Furthermore, results obtained by Eckel and

Grossman (2001) show that, in the role of the responder, women are significantly more inclined to accept an offer than men.

Other studies focusing on gender differences in negotiation settings found that, in a negotiation, women tend to speak less and doubt themselves more than men (Kimmel et al., 1980). Female negotiators were also shown to be more emotionally involved than male negotiators (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) and perceive negotiation as a more relationship-centered endeavor (Kray & Gelfand, 2009). Gender differences were also detected in ethical considerations (Manea et al., 2020). In this sense, female negotiators were shown to use unethical behaviors, such as “positional commitments, threats and derogatory put-downs” (Manea et al., 2020, p. 237), less often than their male counterparts (Kimmel et al., 1980; Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Manea et al., 2020; Robinson et al., 2000). Together, these findings support the proposed dichotomy of women acting more cooperative and men more competitive in a bargaining situation.

However, results from research are not consistent. For example, when testing for gender-based differences in an ultimatum game, Solnick (2001), did not support the assumption that women are content with less than men. Their results rather implied the contrary, that women in the role of the responder had higher acceptable minimums than men assuming the same role (Solnick, 2001). This supports the above-mentioned findings indicating that women act more equity-oriented than men do in the role of the proposer.

2.3. Moderating Factors of Gender Differences in Negotiation

As previously discussed, research on gender differences in negotiation outcomes and behaviors has produced mixed results (see chapters 2.1 and 2.2; and Kray & Thompson, 2004, for an overview). While some research indicate that men negotiate more effectively than women, there is a range of recent studies implying that gender differences putting women at a disadvantage can be attenuated or even reversed under certain conditions (Bowles et al., 2005; Kray et al., 2001; Kugler et al., 2018; Mazei et al., 2015). In the following, relevant findings on moderation effects in both areas, negotiation outcomes and behaviors will be discussed.

There is a broad range of experimental primary research focusing on the identification of potential moderating factors influencing the relationship between gender and negotiation outcomes. Typically, these studies are built on the assumption that female negotiators underperform relative to their male counterparts (Mazei et al., 2015). Such moderating effects have been tested for variables like advocacy (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a; Bowles et al., 2005), self-initiation of a negotiation (Bowles et al., 2007), the integrative potential of a negotiation (Miles & LaSalle, 2009) and negotiator status (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013b).

And indeed, some studies report significant moderation effects. For example, in two experimental studies, Bowles et al. (2005) examined advocacy as a gender trigger in negotiation. Their results demonstrated that female negotiators performed significantly better, when it was made prevalent that they negotiated for someone else instead of negotiating on their own advances (Bowles et al., 2005). In a similar manner, Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a) found that self-advocating female negotiators faced social reprisals in form of poor likability evaluations, while this was not the case for women negotiating for someone else. This is also supported by findings from Bowles et al. (2007). In an experiment where participants had to evaluate accounts for higher compensation written by job candidates, they found that female candidates were socially penalized more for initiating the negotiation than male candidates (Bowles et al., 2007). Furthermore, Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013b), found that externally conferred status mitigated the likelihood for women to incur financial backlash when making a resource request in a business to business setting. While in the not externally conferred status condition, participants were less likely to accept financial requests made by women, as compared to men, the differential treatments of men and women vanished in the high-status condition (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013b).

Other primary research aimed at identifying moderating factors that influence the relationship between gender and negotiation behavior. Based on the assumption that women act less assertively than men when negotiating, studies in this vein of research typically ask whether there are contextual conditions that enforce or attenuate behavioral differences between men and women. An important variable identified as moderators in this regard is advocacy (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). A noteworthy study by Amanatullah and Morris (2010) demonstrated that advocacy does not only moderate differences in negotiation outcomes but also in the way women and men behave during a negotiation. In a computerized negotiation exercise, they observed participants' negotiation behavior in form of the concessions they made. Results showed that concessions made by self-advocating female negotiators were significantly larger than those of male and other-advocating female negotiators (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). The structural ambiguity of a situation was found to be another moderating factor (Bowles et al., 2005). In an experiment including a single-issue price negotiation, Bowles et al. (2005) tested whether structural ambiguity moderates gender differences in negotiation performance by observing differences in participants entry offers. Manipulating structural ambiguity by altering the information participants received about external price standards, they found that gender differences favoring male negotiators were significantly greater in the high structural ambiguity condition but diminished in the low structural ambiguity condition. The

moderating role of structural ambiguity, or “the degree to which a situation explicitly prompts a negotiation or is ambiguous about whether negotiating is expected and accepted” (Kugler et al., 2018, p. 206), has been confirmed by the results of a recent meta-analysis by Kugler et al. (2018) examining gender-based differences in the likelihood to initiate negotiations. They found that the gender difference in the propensity to negotiate was smaller in situations that were clearly identifiable as negotiable (Kugler et al., 2018).

The above-mentioned primary results were also confirmed in a recent meta-analysis examining gender differences in negotiation outcomes conducted by Mazei et al. (2015). Mazei et al. (2015) tested a variety of different moderating variables that potentially influence the relationship between gender and economic negotiation outcomes. Using a multilevel modeling approach, they retrieved data from a large sample of studies (123 effect sizes), accounting for a total of 10,888 participants (Mazei et al., 2015). Results revealed that, indeed, gender differences favoring men could be reduced or even reversed by certain person-based (i.e. negotiation experience and self-initiation), situation-based (i.e. advocacy and structural ambiguity) and task-based (i.e. integrative negotiation potential) moderators (Mazei et al., 2015). Similar to the above-mentioned results from primary studies, Mazei et al. (2015) found advocacy ($p = .003$), structural ambiguity ($p = .021$) and negotiation experience ($p = .017$) to be statistically significant moderators of economic backlash.

2.4. Theoretical Explanations for Gender Differences in Negotiation

In the previous chapter, empirical evidence for the existence of gender-based differences in negotiation outcomes and behavior was presented. Even though, not all studies reported significant differences between the economic and social outcomes of men and women, there was a large body of research confirming the existence of a gender gap in negotiation outcomes (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998). Similarly, even though results were not unanimous, a considerable amount of studies reported significant differences in the way men and women approach negotiation (Kugler et al., 2018; Walters et al., 1998). Overall, women were shown to underperform men regarding their negotiation outcomes and to negotiate less assertively, both, in the process of initiating negotiations and the process of value extraction. And yet, research also proved that there are certain situational and person-based moderators that attenuated such effects (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998). In light of these findings, the question arises, what are the causal forces that give rise to the observed differences and how they could have been attenuated under certain conditions. To answer this question, literature delivers distinct explanations and theoretical

frameworks. In particular, two different narratives explaining the roots and conditions of gender effects in negotiation have emerged in research (Dannals et al., 2021; Kray & Thompson, 2004).

The first narrative suggests that women underperform men in negotiation because they *are* insufficiently assertive (Dannals et al., 2021). On this notion, behavioral and performance related differences between female and male negotiators are typically explained by the internal traits women and men possess (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Kray & Thompson, 2004). In other words, men and women are seen as inherently different and because women are generally less agentic, they face disadvantages in a situation of negotiation. Thus, this perspective stipulates that variations in negotiation behaviors and outcomes are a consequence of the traits innately to men and women (Kray & Thompson, 2004).

An alternative narrative suggests that gender-based differences in negotiation behaviors and outcomes emerge because men and women are *perceived and treated* differently when negotiating (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Kray & Thompson, 2004). In contrast to the previously mentioned narrative, this perspective proposes that the critical factor in the relationship between gender and negotiation outcome is that negotiation partners react differently to certain behaviors depending on the gender of the counter negotiator. Thus, when examining the roots of gender-based differences in negotiation, this vein of research focuses on the social construction of gender in negotiation (Kray & Thompson, 2004).

As a consequence of the two opposing narratives, distinct explanations for gender variations in negotiation behaviors and outcomes have emerged. In the following, these are being explained in more detail.

2.4.1. Trait Models

Based on the condition that there are differences in the way women and men approach negotiations, early gender research traced these back to inherent personality differences between men and women (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). Researchers proposed that differences in negotiation outcomes between the sexes can be explained by psychological and biological conditions, holding constant other influential situational factors (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Kray & Thompson, 2004). For example, Maccoby and Jacklin (1975) found that in comparison to women, men are more socially aggressive. Similarly, more recent research based on trait models indicates that women and men differ regarding their personality traits. For example, in a replication study on global sex differences in personality, based on the 16PF personality test, Kaiser et al. (2020), report that women score higher in sensitivity, anxiety, warmth and complexity, while men are higher in dutifulness, emotional stability and assertiveness.

Regarding the origin of the behavioral differences between men and women, different explanations exist. Among the most common explanations for gender-stereotypical personality traits provided by research, are gender differences in socialization, self-construal and moral values (Kray & Thompson, 2004).

According to the *socialization framework*, differences in behavior among sexes, e.g. that men are more aggressive than women and women are more verbal than men, can be traced back to the different experiences men and women make throughout their lives (Kray & Thompson, 2004). For example, Maccoby (1988) demonstrated that gender segregation among children is related to socialization pressures in their social environment. Thus, the socialization account assumes that women and men behave differently in a given situation because of their socialization (Kray & Thompson, 2004). In a negotiation context, this means that, for example, male negotiators are better at claiming value because they were socialized to behave more aggressively than women. On the other hand, female negotiators are expected to be better at creating value because through their socialization they learned to better verbally express themselves as compared to men (Kray & Thompson, 2004).

Another explanation for sex differences in negotiation behavior is that women and men differ in the way they construe themselves. In contrast to socialization theory, the *self-construal account* refers to self-concepts that individuals hold up about themselves and their environment (Kray & Thompson, 2004). Thus, instead of focusing on sex differences in abilities and behaviors, the self-construal perspective focuses on how women and men see themselves and what their understanding of adequate behavior is in a given situation. The basic assumption of this view is that women tend to see themselves as interrelated with others, while men tend to understand themselves as independent from others (Cross et al., 2011; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In a negotiation context, this can be translated into women acting more relationship-oriented, trying to find common interests and thus being more effective integrative negotiators. Men on the other side rather focus on their own interests, what is advantageous when it comes to claiming value in a distributive negotiation situation (Gelfand et al., 2006; Kray & Thompson, 2004).

The existence of gender-related differences in *moral reasoning* is another explanation of the gender gap in negotiation. It is assumed that men and women differ in the values they place on certain personal attributes. For example, in a situation of moral conflict, men and women are hypothesized to differ in the mechanisms they employ to dissolve conflict. In this sense, two moral orientations are distinguished in literature, the justice- and the care-based (Gilligan, 1982). According to Gilligan (1982), an individual with a justice-based moral orientation, uses

the principles of fairness and equity to manage moral conflict, while an individual with a care-based moral orientation prioritizes the maintenance of relationships and integrity to navigate through moral disputes (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Applied to the value men and women put on certain personal attributes, this means that men put more value on logic, while women place a premium on relationship-oriented values such as honesty and respect (Kray & Thompson, 2004). In a context of negotiation, this is likely to influence how negotiators approach conflict resolution but also their judgements of fairness. If men value logic over relationship-maintenance, they might prefer to resolve conflicts through “a discussion of right versus wrong with a clear winner and a loser” (Kray & Thompson, 2004, p. 140). Women on the contrary, might focus more on finding common interests in a dispute because they value relationship-maintenance over logic (Kray & Thompson, 2004).

Critique on Gender Trait Models

Together, these findings and theoretical considerations offer valid explanations of gender differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes. And yet, there is some considerable critique on the account offered by gender trait models. First, there is empirical evidence contesting the existence of biological conditions producing disadvantages for women in negotiation. For example, in their meta-analysis analyzing a broad range of studies on gender differences in moral orientation, Jaffee and Hyde (2000), did not find strong support for the claim that women predominantly use care-based morality while men predominantly use justice-based morality. Second, as previously mentioned, there is an array of primary experimental research demonstrating that gender-based differences in negotiation outcomes and behaviors are highly contextual (cf. Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013b; Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a; Bowles et al., 2005). These findings find support in results from recent meta-analyses (Kugler et al., 2018; Mazei et al., 2015).

Together these findings indicate that gender differences in negotiation outcomes and behaviors are not only produced by internal differences but rather depend on external, situational conditions. By assuming that differences in negotiation performance between the sexes can be explained by psychological and biological conditions, trait models thus seem not to tell the entire story. This becomes even more prevalent when considering empirical findings indicating that women incur social and economic reprisals even if they acted more assertively (or men-like). Based on this, another, more comprehensive, theoretical approach toward gender differences in negotiation has emerged in literature, the so-called social role theories (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly & Wood, 2012).

2.4.2. Social Role Theory

Accounting for the critique on trait models, *social role theory* (Eagly & Wood, 2012) and in particular *role congruity theory* (Eagly & Karau, 2002) have been proposed as a more comprehensive and unifying theoretical framework for the analysis of gender differences in negotiation outcomes and behaviors (Kugler et al., 2018; Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). In brief, social role theory suggests that people hold shared expectations and beliefs about individuals based on the social roles they assume (e.g. man, woman, negotiator, job candidate etc.) (Eagly & Wood, 2012; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Because people can assume multiple social roles with distinct role expectations, incongruences between the expected characteristics of members belonging to one social group and the attributes that are thought to be required to succeed in a certain social role can emerge (Eagly & Karau, 2002). According to Eagly and Karau's (2002) role congruity theory of prejudice against women in leadership roles, the incongruence of role expectations is particularly detrimental to female leaders. Based on this, in the context of negotiation outcomes and behaviors, it is argued that gender differences emerge from a perceived incongruence between the female gender role and the agentic behaviors that are considered necessary for effective negotiation (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). The construction of gender and negotiation roles and the theoretical considerations behind role congruity theory in the context of negotiation will be explained in more detail in the following chapters.

2.4.2.1. Gender Roles and Negotiation Roles

In the context of gender roles, social role theory (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013) basically assumes that behavioral differences between men and women reflect so called *gender role beliefs*. These beliefs are formed by people's perceptions of the *social roles* typically assumed by men and women (e.g. that men are more likely to be employed and women are more likely to be involved in caretaking) (Eagly & Wood, 2012). Generally, roles can be described as "behavioral expectations individuals hold for themselves and others based on one's social positions" (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013, p. 222). Similarly, gender roles carry expectations about characteristics and appropriate behaviors of men and women (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). According to Eagly and Wood (2012), role beliefs emerge based on the observations people make in their surroundings. Because of physical conditions and the evolutionary division of labor between women and men in postindustrial societies, such observations will typically include men and women occupying differential social roles. While traditionally women tend to occupy the role of the caretaker more frequently, men are more likely to assume the role of the breadwinner (Eagly & Wood, 2012).

Now, gender role beliefs emerge because, based on the observed sex differences, people infer that men and women possess differential dispositions depending on their sex-stereotypical roles. In this sense people, for example, attribute women as more caring or communal and men as more agentic. These inferences become visible in consensually-shared beliefs about typically female and male attributes, or in other words *gender stereotypes* (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly & Wood, 2012). It is important to note that gender roles do not only entail descriptive norms, which are beliefs about what people in certain roles do, or not do, but also injunctive, or prescriptive norms, which are expectations about what people in certain roles ought to do or ideally would do (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Summed up, the term gender role refers to a communally shared collection of descriptive and prescriptive expectations associated with the sex of a person (Eagly & Karau, 2002).

This marks an important differentiation to the previously discussed trait models. While the latter regarded behavioral differences between men and women as inherent to their personality traits, social role theory assumes that stereotypical gender characteristics are also socially constructed and emerge as a response to cultural and environmental conditions. As demonstrated in Eagly and Wood's (2012) *biosocial model*, causes for sex differences are multifold (a brief overview of the model is provided in Figure 2).




Figure 2: Biosocial Model of Sex Differences, by Eagly and Wood, 2012, p. 465

A key proposition of social role theory, with regard to gender stereotypic behavior, is the differentiation between agency and communion. Drawing on empirical evidence on descriptive gender expectations (Diekmann & Eagly, 2000), the male gender role is commonly associated with agentic characteristics, such as assertiveness, competitiveness, confidence and dominance (Eagly & Karau, 2002). In contrast, characteristics linked to the female gender role are communal, like for example, concern for others, friendliness, warmth, kindness, sensitivity and helpfulness (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013).

This differentiation has also been approved for prescriptive properties of gender roles. For example, research has shown that people characterize the ideal woman with more communal traits and the ideal man with more agentic traits. Similar results were obtained when letting women and men characterize their ideal selves or directly asking people about their beliefs about the roles of women and men (Eagly & Karau, 2002, p. 574). But such investigations have not only confirmed positive prescriptive properties of gender stereotypic roles. Studies dedicated at identifying traits that are regarded as undesirable for the female and male gender role respectively, reported that typically feminine, communal qualities are regarded as undesirable for men, while typically male, agentic qualities are regarded as undesirable for women (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Based on an experimental investigation, Prentice and Carranza (2002) suggest to divide traits differing in their desirability for women and men into four categories. While the term *gender intensified prescriptions*, includes traits that are “high in general social desirability and even higher for the target gender” (Prentice & Carranza, 2002, p. 271), *gender relaxed prescriptions* mark traits that are “high in general social desirability but significantly lower in desirability for the target gender” (Prentice & Carranza, 2002, p. 271). Similarly, *gender relaxed proscriptions* are low in general desirability but significantly more desirable for the target gender, while *gender intensified proscriptions* score low in general desirability but even lower for the target gender (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Based on this categorization Prentice and Carranza’s (2002) results confirmed the aforementioned traditional prescriptive gender stereotypes (i.e. intensified prescriptions were “interpersonal sensitivity, niceness, modesty, and sociability” (Prentice & Carranza, 2002, p. 275) for women; and “strength, drive, assertiveness, and self-reliance” (Prentice & Carranza, 2002, p. 275) for men and vice versa for intensified proscriptions).

Such gender-based “shoulds” and “should nots” have important implications for social interactions. Since gender role prescriptions have normative character (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013), violating them by asserting counter stereotypical behaviors produces social disapproval or negativity, also known under the term “backlash” (Heilman,

2012). Backlash can take on many forms, such as dislike (Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007), unfavorable social evaluations (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a; Bowles & Babcock, 2013) and personal derogations (Heilman, 2001). Particularly in the workplace, other, more tangible forms of backlash can be lower pay (Bowles & Babcock, 2013), hiring discrimination (Bowles et al., 2007; Rudman, 1998) or slower career advancements (Greig, 2008).

Despite the power of gender roles - being evoked by visible, biological characteristics - in a negotiation context, negotiator role descriptions and prescriptions are equally important. Because people can occupy multiple social roles at once, when negotiating, individuals act at least in two roles, their gender role and the role of a negotiator (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Although prescriptions for the role of a negotiator have not been studied as extensively as the propositions of gender roles, there are some relevant findings. For example, Raiffa (1998) identified traits like assertiveness, rationality, decisiveness, constructivism and intelligence as characteristics linked to good negotiators. These traits largely overlap with traits associated with agency. And indeed, there is research indicating that the role of an effective negotiator is commonly associated with more agentic characteristics (Kray et al., 2001; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Because agentic traits also overlap with stereotypically masculine traits (e.g., “strong, dominant, assertive, rational” (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013, p. 223)) and communal traits overlap with stereotypically female traits (e.g. “weak, submissive, intuitive, emotional” (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013, p. 223)), it seems that men have a “natural” advantage over women in negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). To demonstrate the linkage between gender stereotypic attributions and attributions associated with successful negotiators, Kray et al. (2002), let participants rate how well the attributes identified as critical for good negotiators by Raiffa (1998), fit male and female gender stereotypes. Their results showed that assertiveness, problem-solving competency, self-interest and knowledge were associated more with men, while emotionality, insightfulness, listening skills and verbal expressiveness were rather linked to women (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). An overview of the presumed linkage between gender stereotypes and negotiator attributes is provided in Figure 3.




Figure 3: The gender stereotype-negotiation link, by Kray & Thompson, 2004, p. 104

Thus, there is a perceived incongruence between the agentic behaviors that are commonly considered critical for negotiation and the female gender role. This incongruence might affect how individuals, and particularly women, approach negotiations and how they are perceived by their negotiation partners when negotiating. A central theoretical framework explaining the effects of gender role incongruent behavior in professional settings, is so called *role congruity theory* developed by Eagly and Karau (2002). Thus, in the following chapter, role congruity theory of prejudice against female leaders will be explained in more detail and applied to the situation of women in negotiation.

2.4.2.2. Role Congruity Theory

Based on the propositions about the content of gender differences made in social role theory, Eagly and Karau (2002) introduced so-called *role congruity theory*. Role congruity theory was originally developed as an explanation of prejudice against women in leadership roles (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). The basic assumption of role congruity theory is that, in a situation where there is a mismatch, or incongruence, between a person's inferred (stereotypic) characteristics and the expectations linked to a given social role, prejudice emerges as a negative reaction (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Applied to the case of female leaders, Eagly and Karau explain the emergence of prejudice as follows:

“Prejudice can arise when perceivers judge women as actual or potential occupants of leader roles because of inconsistency between the predominantly communal qualities that perceivers associate with women and the predominantly agentic qualities they believe are required to succeed as a leader. People thus tend to have dissimilar beliefs about leaders and women and similar beliefs about leaders and men” (Eagly & Karau, 2002, p. 575).

In other words, because the stereotypical female gender role is commonly associated with communality, while the role of a leader is associated with agency, women are expected to be less successful in leadership positions. Male leaders, on the other hand, do not face unfavorable prejudice because the stereotypic male gender role overlaps with the role of a successful leader (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). But there is more to the disadvantageous situation of women in leadership roles. Despite being perceived as less suitable for leadership roles than men, women are evaluated less favorably in the role of a leader, even if they conform to the stereotypic leadership role. This is because, by asserting more agentic behaviors, women violate the stereotypic feminine gender role of communality. As a consequence, female leaders who comply with the agentic leadership role risk unfavorable social evaluations. Eagly and Karau describe this dynamic as follows:

“Paradoxically, perceiving a female manager or leader as very similar to her male counterpart may produce disadvantage. This disadvantage can arise from the injunctive norms associated with the female gender role. Because women who are effective leaders tend to violate standards for their gender when they manifest male-stereotypical, agentic attributes and fail to manifest female stereotypical, communal attributes, they may be unfavorably evaluated for their gender role violation, at least by those who endorse traditional gender roles.” (Eagly & Karau, 2002, p. 575).

Thus, according to role congruity theory, women in leadership roles face two types of prejudice. On the one hand, women are perceived to have less leadership potential than men because there is a lack of fit between the female gender role and the role of a successful leader. On the other hand, when enacting agency to comply with the role of a leader, women are evaluated less favorably than men because they disconfirm the female gender role stereotype.

This theoretical consideration has been confirmed by multiple other studies. Commonly described as women’s “impression-management dilemma”, evidence abounds that in professional settings, women face a catch-22 when it comes to assuming leadership roles (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). On the one hand, women confirming their communal gender stereotype are rated as less competent as leaders than men and agentic women. On the other hand, women disconfirming feminine gender stereotypes to fit into the stereotypic role of a leader are rated as highly competent but risk backlash in form of social and economic penalties (Phelan et al., 2008; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Or in Rudman and Phelan’s words, women “may be damned if they disconfirm feminine stereotypes and damned if they do not” (Rudman & Phelan, 2008, p. 62). In particular, it has been shown that women’s *social* evaluations tend

to decrease when they present themselves as agentic, or in other words, when they violate the feminine gender stereotype of communality (Heilman et al., 2004; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Phelan et al., 2008; Rudman & Glick, 2001). For example, when measuring reactions to women's success in male gender-typed jobs, Heilman et al. (2004) found that successful women, as compared to men, were rated as "less likable and more interpersonally hostile" (Heilman et al., 2004, p. 420). Heilman and Okimoto (2007) provide further support for the notion that backlash against successful women in male domains results from an inferred communality deficit. They found that, while successful female managers were rated as significantly less likable and more interpersonally hostile than successful male managers, these effects were mitigated in presence of an indication that the female manager was communal (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007). Consistent with these results, Phelan et al. (2008) report that, when letting participants rate managerial applicants on the dimensions of competence, social skills and hirability, agentic females, as opposed to agentic males, were rated as very competent but low in social skills. Extending previous findings on the mere social devaluation of agentic women, Phelan et al. also demonstrate that such social devaluation results in hiring discrimination. Precisely, they found that participants shifted their hiring criteria. While for "masterful" female applicants, hiring decisions were influenced more by ratings on social skills than ratings on competence, the opposite was found to be true for all other applicant groups (Phelan et al., 2008). Together, these results provide strong arguments in favor of Eagly and Karau's (2002) theoretical model predicting that female leaders suffer from prejudice and ultimately face backlash.

Even though, originally developed to explain women's disadvantageous situation when it comes to leadership roles, these theoretical and empirical findings can also be applied to a context of negotiation. As previously explained, the role of a successful negotiator, like the role of a successful leader, is commonly characterized with agentic rather than communal traits (Kray & Thompson, 2004; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012). Thus, because negotiation, like leadership, is generally perceived as a male gender-typed task, a similar pattern of prejudice and backlash can be expected against women in negotiation (Heilman, 2012; Rudman & Phelan, 2008; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Thus, role congruity theory has been proposed as a unifying theoretical framework to explain gender differences in negotiation outcomes on a social and economic dimension (see chapter 2.1 for the respective empirical findings). The power of role congruity theory to explain backlash against female negotiators is further supported by Mazei et al.'s (2015) recent meta-analysis. Specifically, they tested whether role incongruity moderators gender differences in economic negotiation outcomes. Mazei et al.'s (2015) results

confirmed the presumption that men would have a bargaining advantage over women in the context of highest predicted role incongruity for women, while the opposite was true in the context of lowest predicted role incongruity. The degree to which the negotiation context was high or low in role incongruity was measured based on factors such as negotiation experience of the negotiators, advocacy or self-initiation. In this sense, male negotiators outperformed female negotiators under conditions of low negotiation experience, when women negotiated for themselves as compared to others or initiated the negotiation (Mazei et al., 2015). But role congruity theory does not only offer explanations for gender differences in negotiation outcomes (or personal evaluations). It has also been shown to account for gender differences in negotiation behavior (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). This is because women have been shown to both, anticipate the negative reactions of others for violating gender injunctions, and to adjust their behavior accordingly to avoid backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2007; Mazei et al., 2015).

Overall, the above-mentioned considerations demonstrate that Eagly and Karau's (2002) theory delivers a reliable unifying framework for the analysis of gender differences in social and economic negotiation outcomes. Nevertheless, it merely focuses on the situation of counter stereotypical women. This is because most professional roles, like the one of a negotiator, are congruent with male gender stereotypes but incongruent with female ones. Thus, generally men do simply not need to violate gender stereotypes in workplace settings to be successful. Nevertheless, there are situations in which non-conforming men, i.e. communal men, might suffer backlash as well. This is why, the following chapter provides a brief discussion of the constraints and triggers of backlash against atypical men.

2.4.3. Men and Gender Roles in Negotiation

As mentioned before, the question of whether men who disconfirm the masculine gender stereotype by asserting more communal behaviors risk backlash in form of social and economic reprisals has not received a lot of attention in research (Heilman, 2012; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). One reason for this is that in most professional contexts, men are not as likely to be discriminated against as women are. Because the masculine gender stereotype largely overlaps with the characteristics commonly deemed beneficiary for career advancement, men do not usually have to choose between being perceived as either competent or socially skilled (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Another reason is that leadership roles are predominantly occupied by men, so that even if counter stereotypical men were subject to backlash, the consequences for gender parity would not be as severe (Rudman & Phelan, 2008).

However, there is good reason to also consider how men are affected by gender stereotypes and norms. From a practical perspective, this becomes clear when considering that, similar to gender disparities in male-dominated domains, there also exist gender disparities in communally oriented roles, such as care work (Croft et al., 2015). Thus, in female-dominated occupations, men might face an impression management dilemma similar to the one, women face in male gender-typed positions. In this sense, due to the incongruity between the agentic masculine gender role and the requirement of communality to succeed in a female gender-typed task, atypical men might be evaluated less favorably than women (Croft et al., 2015). But disadvantages for atypical men might not only arise in female domains. Because the adherence to the masculine gender role requires the demonstration of agentic qualities, such as assertiveness, competitiveness and dominance, men's social outcomes might be compromised.

2.4.3.1. Evidence of Backlash against Atypical Men

The dilemma men face in becomes clear when considering empirical evidence. For example, on the one hand, it has been shown that men's conformity to masculine norms is harmful to their relationships (Burn & Ward, 2005). On the other hand, men who do not confirm masculine gender role prescriptions by acting modest were also shown to suffer from prejudice (Heilman & Wallen, 2010). Thus, even in traditionally male-dominated areas, men might suffer from backlash in form of social and economic reprisals (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). From a theoretical perspective, this would deliver further support for the assumption that backlash against atypical individuals emerges as a consequence of gender role-deviant behavior (Heilman, 2012).

And indeed, there are several studies demonstrating that, even in masculine domains, men are not immune to negative consequences for violating gender prescriptions (Bosak et al., 2018; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). For example, when investigating backlash in form of prejudice (i.e. dislike) against atypical (modest) men, Moss-Racusin et al. (2010) confirm the emergence of prejudice against modest men. When examining prejudice, in the form of liking, and hireability of managerial applicants, they find that modest men, as compared to modest women, were disliked. This supports the hypothesis, that men are not only expected to display agency, but also required to do so in professional settings (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). Yet, Moss-Racusin et al. (2010) also note that, despite a general positive relationship between liking and hireability, hiring recommendations were no different between modest male and female managerial applicants. Similarly, in a study focusing on social evaluations of successful typical and atypical employees, Heilman and Wallen (2010) found that women and men were penalized for their success in areas that imply gender norm

violations (i.e. men who are successful in female gender-typed jobs and women who are successful in male gender-typed jobs). Moreover, in a more recent study investigating femininity stigma of male employees who request family leave, Rudman and Mescher (2013), reported that perceptions of weakness were reliable predictors of a greater risk for social penalties. More evidence indicating that individuals who deviate from gender-prescribed behavior suffer backlash is provided by Bosak et al. (2018). In their study, they let professionals evaluate managerial applicants for internal promotion, manipulating the respective performance reviews by either mimicking self- or other-advocacy. Results showed that atypical, or other-advocating, men were ascribed a lack of agency and competence, leading to job dismissal. In contrast, this was not the case for other-advocating female applicants (Bosak et al., 2018).

Together, these findings provide general support for social role theory's prediction that prejudice and backlash emerge as a consequence of gender stereotype violations of women *and* men. And yet, the dynamics of backlash against atypical men, as compared to atypical women, might differ from each other. This is mostly because in male gender-typed domains, men, as opposed to women, do not face the problem of an incongruity between their gender role and the role of a leader or negotiator. Thus, role congruity theory can explain backlash against atypical men in female gender-typed tasks, but not if the context is male gender-typed. As a consequence, researchers propose the application of so-called status incongruity hypothesis (SIH) (Rudman et al., 2012) to explain the specific dynamics of backlash against atypical men (Mazei et al., 2021; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010).

2.4.3.2. Status Incongruity Hypothesis

The basic assumption underlying SIH is that gender, as well as behaviors (e.g. agency or modesty) are ascribed a certain status. For example, past research indicates that agency is linked to high status to a higher degree than is communality (Conway et al., 1996). Moreover, the ascribed power based on gender is commonly low for women but high for men (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Now, SIH proposes that when there is an incongruence between individuals' ascribed power based on their gender and the power expectations linked to certain behaviors, observers exhibit backlash to protect the gender's social status hierarchy (Rudman et al., 2012).

For example, men are typically expected to be agentic. Because agency is ascribed with high power, as is the male gender role, enacting agency helps men to achieve high status (Mazei et al., 2021; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). In the case of atypical men, i.e. men who enact communality, there is an incongruence between the high status ascribed to the male gender role and the neutral status of communality (Mazei et al., 2021). This is especially true for male gender role proscriptions (do not's), like naiveté or weakness, which are explicitly linked to

low status (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). In research it has already been established that atypical women are socially sanctioned (disliked) because they are perceived as too powerful, in contrast to the low power ascribed to their gender role (Rudman et al., 2012). For the case of atypical men, Moss-Racusin et al. (2010) report similar results. When examining reactions to modest men, they found that modest men, indeed, were perceived low status proscriptions as well as high status prescriptions and therefore suffered backlash in form of prejudice (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). Thus, SIH offers intriguing explanations for the emergence of backlash against atypical men in male gender-typed domains, as well as the emergence of backlash against atypical women in female gender-typed domains. Therefore, it can be regarded as complementing role congruity theory, which presumes an incongruity between the gender role and other social roles.

2.5. The Role of Gender Role Orientation in Negotiation

As mentioned before, research has demonstrated that there is a large number of moderators, attenuating backlash effects against non-conforming individuals (see chapter 2.3 for an overview). This is also supported by the theoretical considerations of role theories. Following the reasoning of role congruity theory, it can be presumed that situational factors that make the female gender role and the role of a negotiator more congruent, reduce the observed gender differences and backlash in negotiation (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Mazei et al., 2015). Such situational factors can be the characteristics of the negotiation situation itself (e.g. advocacy), properties of the negotiation task (e.g. structural ambiguity) or personal characteristics of the negotiators (e.g. negotiation experience) (Mazei et al., 2015).

One personal negotiator characteristic potentially moderating gender differences in negotiation outcomes, which has not been studied empirically yet, is the gender role orientation of the negotiation partner. Gender role orientation (GRO) is defined as “the beliefs that individuals hold about the proper roles for men and women at work and at home” (Judge & Livingstone, 2008, p. 995). Based on social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012), as well as role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), suggest that traditionally, women are identified more with private or family roles that are associated with communality, while men are identified more with public or professional roles that are associated with agency. A person’s gender role orientation now, expresses the degree to which individuals subscribe to this perspective (Judge & Livingstone, 2008).

Generally, it is distinguished between two extremes of gender role orientation. Individuals who strongly adhere to the view that women are expected to assume more private roles and specialize in communal behaviors while men are expected to occupy more public roles and

specialize in agentic behaviors, hold a traditional GRO. In contrast, individuals who have a more relaxed view on the separation of private and public roles, allowing either women or men to be involved in each role, hold an egalitarian GRO (Judge & Livingstone, 2008). In other words, the less people endorse traditional gender roles, or the more egalitarian their GRO is, the more latitude towards gender role deviant behavior they might grant to their counterparts (Mazei et al., 2015). As a consequence, atypical women and men might negotiate more effectively when negotiating with a negotiation partner holding a more egalitarian GRO, as compared to one holding a more traditional GRO. Thus, the GRO of the negotiation partner is considered a potential moderator attenuating backlash effects and gender differences in negotiation outcomes.

2.6. Research Gap and Research Questions

The literature review has examined a large body of relevant empirical and theoretical findings on the emergence of gender differences in workplace settings and negotiation. Results lead to important implications for the present study. First, the literature was reviewed for empirical evidence for the existence of gender differences in economic and social negotiation outcomes. Although results were not unanimous, most studies found that women achieved lower economic negotiation outcomes than their male counterparts. Similar results were obtained regarding the social negotiation outcomes. In addition to the review of empirical evidence for the existence of gender differences in negotiation outcomes, empirical findings on gender differences in negotiation behavior were reviewed. Important findings were that in comparison to men, women tend to initiate negotiations less often and that they generally negotiate less assertively. Furthermore, evidence on contextual variables, attenuating gender differences in negotiation was reviewed. It was found that there exist multiple individual-based, situation-based and task-related moderators that significantly reduce or even circumvent gender differences. To explain the above-mentioned empirical findings, the theoretical constructs of social role theories, and in particular, role congruity theory, were outlined. Lastly, literature on gender role orientation as a potential moderator attenuating gender differences in negotiation outcomes was discussed. It was proposed that a more egalitarian gender role orientation reduces gender differences, while the opposite is true for a more traditional gender role orientation.

Overall, this shows that there already is a large body of research analyzing gender dynamics and differences in negotiation. Nevertheless, most empirical and theoretical findings focused on the situation of female negotiators, while only a few studies explicitly examined potential disadvantages male negotiators, especially when asserting atypical

behaviors, might face. Thus, in the present study, atypical men were also included in the research design. In addition to that, not many studies have included both, social and economic negotiation outcomes as dependent variables when measuring backlash. With the inclusion of social and economic reprisals and participants' negotiation behavior as dependent variables, this study is intended to get an even deeper understanding of backlash effects and how they are interconnected. Furthermore, it has not yet been empirically confirmed whether GRO moderates gender differences in negotiation. This is why this study is intended to answer the questions in how far the GRO of the negotiation partner attenuates gender differences in negotiation outcomes.

3. Empirical Study

3.1. Research Model and Hypotheses

Based on the findings from the literature review, in the following, the developed research model and hypotheses will be presented.

3.1.1. Research Model

The research model (see Figure 4) of the present study is mainly based on findings related to Eagly and Karau's *Role Congruity Theory* (2002) about prejudice towards female leaders and Rudman's *Status Incongruity Hypothesis* (2012) about backlash against individuals challenging the status quo of gender hierarchy.




Figure 4: Graphical research model

The basic relationships between the independent variables “focal negotiator gender”, “negotiation behavior” (and their interaction term “atypical behavior”) and the dependent

variables “social and economic outcome” have already been established in previous research (Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman et al., 2012). It is suggested that assertive behavior will negatively affect the social and economic outcomes of female focal negotiators, while modest behavior will negatively affect the social and economic outcomes of male focal negotiators. The new variable integrated into the model, the “gender role orientation” (GRO) of the negotiation partner, is an individual-based contextual variable. It is expected to moderate the relationship between the independent variables (focal negotiator gender and negotiation behavior) and the dependent variables (social and economic outcome) in such a way, that a more egalitarian view on gender roles of the negotiation partner will weaken the negative effect between atypical behavior and backlash.

3.1.2. Hypotheses Deduction

Based on the research model and the findings from the literature review, the following hypotheses have been developed (for an overview of the hypotheses, see Table 1).

3.1.2.1. Hypotheses 1 and 1a to 1d –Backlash Effects

Previous research has demonstrated that women and men are expected to display different kinds of behaviors in a bilateral negotiation (Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Tinsley et al., 2009). While men are expected to employ more agentic behaviors, such as assertiveness, competitiveness, and ambition, women are expected to act more communal, for example socially sensitive, warm, and friendly (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). But apart from expectations about how women and men *should* behave (gender stereotype prescriptions), there also exist expectations about how men and women *should not* behave (gender stereotype proscriptions) (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman et al., 2012). Such proscriptions are characteristics that generally score low in social desirability, but are strictly prohibited for one gender while being tolerated for the other (Rudman et al., 2012). For example, negative masculine characteristics, such as arrogance and insensibility are low in general desirability but are even less desirable for women. Likewise, weak feminine traits, such as naiveté and gullibility, are generally undesirable, but even more undesirable for men as compared to women (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Because expectations about gendered behavior are normative (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) and have been shown to be activated automatically (Banaji & Hardin, 1996), a perceived discrepancy between the expected and observed behavior (i.e., a woman acting assertive or a man acting modest) is likely to evoke negative external reactions, so called *backlash* (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). One theoretical framework, predominantly used to explain backlash against women in leadership roles, is Eagly and Karau’s (2002) role

congruity theory. The basic assumption of role congruity theory is that, in a situation where there is a mismatch, or incongruence, between a person's inferred (stereotypic) characteristics and the expectations linked to a given social role, prejudice emerges as a negative reaction (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Because, like the role of a leader, the role of a negotiator is generally perceived a male gender-typed task, similar patterns of prejudice and backlash against atypical female negotiators are expected. But there is more, especially when focusing on backlash against atypical male negotiators, who do not face the same incongruence between the role of a successful negotiator and their gender role, another important theoretical construct is Status Incongruity Hypothesis (SIH) (Rudman et al., 2012). According to the SIH, violations of gender pre- and proscriptions represent a threat to the status-quo in gender hierarchy, where communal, feminine attributes are more on the low status side, while agentic, masculine traits are rather high in status (Ridgeway, 2001; Rudman et al., 2012). Thus, when low status individuals (women) display high status traits (assertiveness) or when high status individuals (men) display low status traits (modesty) respectively, counterparts are likely to react with backlash to defend the existing gender hierarchy (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Rudman et al., 2012). This is supported by further research. For example, it has been shown that individuals who defy "gender-intensified proscriptions" (Prentice & Carranza, 2002, p. 271) by failing to demonstrate desirable, prescribed gender traits, while manifesting undesirable, proscribed traits, face the highest risk of experiencing backlash (Rudman et al., 2012). Previous research also indicates that this is even more prevalent in situations where individuals are openly negotiating for their own advancement, like in salary negotiations (Bowles & Babcock, 2012).

Therefore, when negotiators violate female or male gender role stereotypes in a salary negotiation by employing atypical, proscribed behaviors, they are likely to evoke negative reactions in their negotiation partner, which manifest in the form of social and economic reprisals. Because social backlash stems from the incongruence between expected and observed behavior – the *violation* of gender stereotypes and the status-quo of the gender hierarchy – individuals who act in congruence with gender stereotypes, i.e. avoid proscribed and fulfill prescribed behaviors, are unlikely to incur backlash in the same way (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a). This leads to the following basic prediction regarding backlash against atypical focal negotiators:

Hypothesis 1: In a bilateral negotiation, atypically behaving focal negotiators (assertive women and modest men) will incur backlash in the form of social and economic reprisals by their negotiation partners.

Built upon this basic assumption, the following four sub-hypotheses have been developed to specify the predictions made for atypical men and women:

Hypothesis 1a: Women, who act assertive in a salary negotiation will incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals to a higher degree than women who act modest. Specifically, the negotiation partner will grant lower salary requests (economic reprisals) to assertive women, than to modest women, and will be less willing to work with assertive women in the future (social reprisals).

Hypothesis 1b: Women, who act assertive in a salary negotiation, will incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals to a higher degree than men who act the same way. Specifically, the negotiation partner will grant lower salary requests (economic reprisals) to assertive women, than to assertive men, and will be less willing to work with assertive women in the future (social reprisals).

Hypothesis 1c: Men, who act modest in a salary negotiation will incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals, to a higher degree than men who act assertive. Specifically, the negotiation partner will grant lower salary requests (economic reprisals) to modest men than to assertive men and will be less willing to work with modest men in the future (social reprisals).

Hypothesis 1d: Men, who act modest in a salary negotiation will incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals to a higher degree than women who act the same way. Specifically, the negotiation partner will grant lower salary requests (economic reprisals) to modest men, than to modest women, and will be less willing to work with modest men in the future (social reprisals).

3.1.2.2. Hypothesis 2 – Backlash Effects Ordering

Because the present study shall also deliver insights about the relative strength of the backlash effect for atypical male and female negotiators across all four comparisons (agentic women vs. agentic men; agentic women vs. modest women; modest men vs. modest women; and modest men vs. agentic men), the following hypothesis (H2) focuses on the ordering of the predictions about backlash made in H1 a-d.

First, because it has been shown that women are generally ascribed lower status than men (Ridgeway, 2001; Rudman et al., 2012) and negotiation is considered a rather male-dominated (i.e. high status) task, it is expected that atypical women will encounter backlash to a higher degree than atypical men, when negotiating for compensation. This is in line with previous

findings, indicating that there exists a difference in backlash against atypical men and atypical women (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). In a study investigating gender prejudice in hiring decisions, Moss-Racusin et al. (2010) found, that despite the fact that modest (atypical) men did encounter backlash in the form of dislike, they did not suffer hiring discrimination. This indicates that, even though atypical men may incur backlash in the form of social reprisals, they are spared from the economic losses resulting from not being hired. This differs from findings on backlash against assertive (atypical) women. As previous research on the evaluation of female applicants in hiring decisions demonstrates, atypical women tend to encounter both, backlash in the form of dislike *and* hiring discrimination (Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Similar results can be found in research focusing on backlash in salary negotiation (Mazei et al., 2015). Bowles et al. (2007) for example, found that negotiation partners were significantly less willing to continue to work with female candidates who negotiated for higher compensation instead of accepting the initially proposed salary. Furthermore, Bowles and Babcock (2013) found that, when negotiating for higher compensation, women do not only pay social costs (reduced willingness to work with agentic women in the future) but also economic costs (lower salaries) for acting assertively.

One potential explanation for atypical men not being subject of economic penalties, is that the male gender role, in contrast to the female gender role, is generally higher in social status. Thus, men might be granted a “benefit of the doubt” when engaging in atypical behavior, which prevents them from experiencing hiring discrimination, even though they are perceived as less likable (Croft et al., 2015; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). Based on these findings, it is predicted that atypical women will encounter backlash to a higher degree than atypical men.

Hypothesis 2: When comparing the within-sexes-comparisons, the backlash effect is expected to be stronger for atypical women (women acting assertive) than atypical men (men acting modest).

3.1.2.3. Hypothesis 3 – GRO of the Negotiation Partner as Moderator

Because it is assumed that social backlash stems from the perceived incongruity between expected and observed behavior, it is likely to be influenced by the negotiation partner’s GRO (Mazei, et al., 2015). The term “gender role orientation” refers to the beliefs, individuals hold about the characteristics of female and male gender roles (Judge & Livingstone, 2008). It is assumed that the less individuals endorse egalitarian gender roles, the less latitude towards gender role deviations they grant (Mazei et al., 2015), and the less threatened they feel by gender stereotype violations. One of the main findings in the literature review is that backlash against

atypical individuals stems from a perceived discrepancy between the expected and observed behavior. It has been shown that the violation of gender stereotypes, where individuals act in contradiction to their gender role prescriptions, can evoke negative reactions in the negotiation partner, so-called backlash (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a). Thus, a greater latitude towards gender role deviations might influence the negative relationship between atypical behavior and backlash. Consequentially, if a negotiation partner has a more egalitarian GRO and thus is more inclined to tolerate counter stereotypical behavior, the negative impact of atypical behavior on backlash might be attenuated. Thus, in the present study, it is predicted that the GRO of the negotiation partner moderates the effect between the atypical behavior and the social and economic outcome of the negotiation. In other words, it is expected that participants with a more egalitarian GRO will penalize atypical candidates (assertive females and modest males) less, than participants with a more traditional GRO. This is summarized in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: The effect of atypical behavior on backlash will be moderated by the gender role orientation of the negotiation partner. Specifically, a more egalitarian GRO of the negotiation partner will reduce the negative impact of atypical behavior on the social and economic outcome of the negotiation.

3.1.2.4. Hypothesis 4 – Social Outcome as Mediator

As stated earlier, gender stereotypes entail prescriptive elements, or expectations about appropriate behavior for men and women (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman et al., 2012). While for women, modesty is one of these prescribed characteristics, assertiveness is prescribed for men (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Since gender role prescriptions have normative character (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013), violating them by asserting counter stereotypical behaviors produces social disapproval or negativity, also known under the term “backlash” (Heilman, 2012). This is supported by findings demonstrating that agentic women evoke negative emotional and implicit reactions in their counterpart (Butler & Geis, 1990; Koch, 2005; Rudman et al., 2012). In research, backlash has been shown to take on many forms, such as dislike (Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007), unfavorable social evaluations (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a; Bowles & Babcock, 2013) and personal derogations (Heilman, 2001). For example, Heilman et al. (2004) found that when their work success was made explicit, female employees were rated far less likable than their male counterparts. Similarly, it has been shown that men who violate gender stereotypes by acting modest in a negotiation score lower in likability ratings because they are perceived as weak

(Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). This is in line with H1, which predicted that atypical behavior negatively affects the social outcome of the negotiation.

Nevertheless, there might also be a relationship between the dependent variables, social and economic outcome of the negotiation. For example, research focusing on the relationship between likability (here social outcome) and the negotiation partner's behavior demonstrated that likability positively affects compliance in a negotiation (Goei et al., 2003; Pulles & Hartman, 2017). This is because people tend to comply more with requests made by someone they like in order to create or maintain a positive relationship (Goei et al., 2003). Thus, to get a deeper understanding of the relationship between the dependent variables, social and economic outcome, it is predicted that the degree, to which the focal negotiator is perceived as likable, mediates (explains) the effect between atypical behavior and backlash in form of economic reprisals. This is summarized in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: The degree to which the focal negotiator is perceived as likable by the negotiation partner (social outcome) mediates the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash in form of economic reprisals.

Overview Hypotheses

Backlash Effects

- H1 In a bilateral negotiation, atypically behaving focal negotiators (assertive women and modest men) will incur backlash in the form of social and economic reprisals by their negotiation partners.
- H1a Women, who act assertive in a salary negotiation will incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals to a higher degree than women who act modest. Specifically, the negotiation partner will grant lower salary requests (economic reprisals) to assertive women, than to modest women, and will be less willing to work with assertive women in the future (social reprisals).
- H1b Women, who act assertive in a salary negotiation, will incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals to a higher degree than men who act the same way. Specifically, the negotiation partner will grant lower salary requests (economic reprisals) to assertive women, than to assertive men, and will be less willing to work with assertive women in the future (social reprisals).
- H1c Men, who act modest in a salary negotiation will incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals to a higher degree than men who act assertive. Specifically, the negotiation partner will grant lower salary requests (economic

reprisals) to modest men than to assertive men and will be less willing to work with modest men in the future (social reprisals).

- H1d Men, who act modest in a salary negotiation will incur backlash in the form of economic and social reprisals to a higher degree than women who act the same way. Specifically, the negotiation partner will grant lower salary requests (economic reprisals) to modest men, than to modest women, and will be less willing to work with modest men in the future (social reprisals).

Backlash Effects Ordering

- H2 When comparing the within-sexes-comparisons, the backlash effect is expected to be stronger for atypical women (women acting assertive) than atypical men (men acting modest).

GRO of the Negotiation Partner as Moderator

- H3 The effect of atypical behavior on backlash will be moderated by the GRO of the negotiation partner. Specifically, a more egalitarian GRO of the negotiation partner will reduce the negative impact of atypical behavior on the social and economic outcome of the negotiation

Social Outcome as Mediator

- H4 The degree to which the focal negotiator is perceived as likable by the negotiation partner (social outcome) mediates the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash in form of economic reprisals
-

Table 1: Overview hypotheses 1 to 4

3.2. Method

To examine whether atypically behaving negotiators incur backlash in the form of social and economic reprisals, when negotiating their salary and whether the gender role orientation of the negotiation partner attenuates such effects, an experimental study was conducted among undergraduate students at the University of Vienna. The experiment took place in form of a self-administered online questionnaire within a three-week time frame from June 14th, 2021, to July 4th, 2021. The questionnaire has been designed and pretested with SoSciSurvey (www.sosicisurvey.de), an online data collection tool for social studies, and has been administered via email.

3.2.1. Participants and Study Design

The link to the questionnaire was sent out to students inscribed in the class “ABWL Unternehmensführung 1”, which is part of the bachelor program of Business Administration at

the University of Vienna. Participation was incentivized with the accreditation of one bonus point that was to be added to the participants' overall score in the above-mentioned class. In total, 275 questionnaires have been started within the data collection period. However, 74 of those questionnaires were exited early and therefore had to be excluded from further analysis. Furthermore, 21 questionnaires had to be excluded from the dataset due to inappropriate answers in the gender manipulation control (comprehension test). The remaining 180 completed questionnaires formed the sample of the present study.

Of the sample of 180 participants, 127 (70.6%) were female and 53 (29.4%) were male. The average age of the participants was 22.61 years, with the youngest participants being 18 years old, and the oldest being 46 years old. In terms of professional experience, 63 participants (35%) indicated that they had no professional experience, while 73 participants (40.6%) indicated to have little professional experience, 28 participants (15.6%) indicated they had some professional experience and only 6 participants (3.3%) indicated they had a lot of professional experience (see Figure 5). When asked about their negotiation experience, 96 participants (53.3%) stated to have no negotiation experience, 53 participants (29.4%) stated to have little negotiation experience, 26 (14.4%) stated to have some negotiation experience and only five (2.8%) stated to have a lot of negotiation experience (see Figure 6).




Figure 5: Overview professional experience




Figure 6: Overview negotiation experience

Regarding the study design, a 2 x 2 between subjects factorial design was employed, with gender of the negotiation partner (female vs. male) and negotiation behavior (assertive vs. modest) as the manipulated independent factors. This yields a total of four experimental conditions (“female x assertive”, “female x modest”, “male x assertive” and “male x modest”). At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. This yielded the following distribution of participants (excluding the invalid cases): 44 participants were assigned to the “female x assertive” condition, 44 participants were assigned to the “female x modest” condition, 46 participants were assigned to the “male x assertive” condition, and the remaining 46 participants were assigned to the “male x modest” condition. An overview of the distribution of participants across all four experimental conditions is provide in Table 2.

*Candidate Gender * Behavior Cross Tabulation*

Count		Behavior Grouped		Total
		Assertive Condition	Modest Condition	
Gender	Female	44	44	88
	Male	46	46	92
Total		90	90	180

Table 2: Distribution of participants across experimental conditions

3.2.2. Procedure

To access the online questionnaire, participants had to click on the invitation link provided to them via email by a course administrator of the class “ABWL Unternehmensführung 1” of the University of Vienna. The study consisted of three overall parts. A pre-experimental survey, the experimental task, and a post-experimental survey. Upon confirming their consent to participate in the study, participants were directed to the pre-experimental survey. In this section, focus was put on the participants’ demographic data. After this, to collect data on how negotiators react to atypically behaving individuals in a salary negotiation, participants had to take part in a simulated negotiation exercise including five rounds of negotiation. Participants were informed that they had to assume the role of a hiring manager at a consulting firm, which they had to represent in a salary negotiation with a new to be hired job candidate. In the scenario, the gender of the job candidate (female vs. male) as well as the negotiation behavior (assertive vs. modest) was manipulated by the experimenter. Thus, depending on the experimental condition, participants had to complete a simulated negotiation task with either a female or male job candidate. The candidates were fictive personas (named Mary [Mark]) that were designed to interact with participants through automated, written messages. The behavior of the candidates was manipulated by the experimenter by using either assertive or modest language in the scripted answers. The allocation of the participants to one of the four treatment groups took place through a randomized assignment process. After having completed the negotiation task, participants were directed to the post-experimental survey. In the post-experimental survey, participants were asked to rate their willingness to interact with the candidate in future social and work- related contexts. This was to examine the effect between atypical behavior and the social outcome of the salary negotiation. To investigate whether the gender role orientation of the negotiation partner attenuates the relationship between atypical behavior and economic and social outcome of the negotiation, additional data on the participants’ gender role orientation was collected in the post-negotiation survey with a newly designed gender role orientation scale (see chapter 3.2.3.4. for a detailed description of the GRO measure).

The expected completion time for all three parts of the experiment was 12 to 15 minutes, depending on participant’s reading speed, language proficiency and negotiation experience. The estimation of the completion time was derived from a pre-test conducted with five test-participants prior to the actual data collection. The average completion time of all 180 participants who were included in the sample, was 12.69 minutes (761.11 sec) and thus, was within the expected range. In the following, all three parts of the experiment are explained in more detail.

3.2.2.1. Pre-Experimental Survey

Upon clicking on the link to the experiment, participants were directed to the starting page of the online questionnaire. They were informed that the experiment was part of the research for a master's thesis and that they could earn one bonus point that was to be accredited to their overall score in the class "ABWL Unternehmensführung 1" for completing all experimental parts. Participants were also informed about the confidentiality and the academic purpose of the data collection and had to fill out a consent form to state their voluntary participation.

The second page contained questions about the participants' demographic data (gender, age, nationality), as well as their current university degree and their professional and negotiation experience. The questions asked and their order remained the same for all participants.

3.2.2.2. Experimental Task

Upon completing the pre-experimental survey, participants were introduced to the experimental task. They were briefly informed about their role as a hiring manager at a Viennese consulting firm and their task of negotiating the entry-salary with a pre-selected job candidate.

Upon the introduction, participants were provided some additional role information and a short briefing on their negotiation aspirations. In the role information, participants were introduced to the candidate who would become their negotiation partner. The candidates' gender was manipulated by the experimenter by introducing the candidate either with a female (Mary) or male (Mark) first name and by using the respective pronouns (she or he). This gender manipulation procedure was imported from an experimental study conducted by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a). As previously mentioned, the gender of the candidate depended on the treatment group the participants had been allocated to with help of a PHP Code-based random generator. To account for an equal distribution across all treatment groups, the randomization process resembled a random draw without discarding. Apart from the information on their negotiation partner, participants were also provided information about their own negotiation aspirations. The information included that it would be desirable for the consulting firm to reach an agreement with the candidate (Mary or Mark), that the participant's reservation point is 30,000€ and that comparable salaries lie between 25,000€ and 30,000€. This information was identical across conditions.

After confirming that the role information has been read carefully, participants were asked to state their first offer to the candidate (Mary [Mark]). Upon entering their offer, participants received an automated written answer from the candidate including a counteroffer. This continued for a total of five consecutive rounds. Each round was started with an offer made by the participant and was concluded with an automated answer from the candidate. The total

number of negotiation rounds remained unknown to the participants throughout the experiment. This was to ensure that participants stayed focused and concentrated during the experiment. Only after finishing negotiation round five, participants were informed that they have reached the end of the negotiation and were given the chance to make a final offer to the candidate. They were also asked to indicate what their highest offer to the candidate would have been as well as the lowest counteroffer they would have accepted from the candidate. It was not possible for the participants to drop out of the negotiation at an earlier point of time.

The automated answers from the candidates were structured in such a way, that each message contained a numerical value (counteroffer) and two written components (response and justification). While the values in the counteroffers made by the candidates were the same across all experimental conditions [Round 1 and 2: 35,000€; Round 3 and 4: 33,000€; Round 5: 30,000€], the wording of the candidates' responses and justifications was manipulated to either represent assertive or modest negotiation behavior. This procedure was adopted from a study conducted by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a), with the difference that in the original study, offers were not staggered throughout the experiment.

The values of the counteroffers were chosen according to an average entry-salary for a position as a junior consultant at a Viennese consulting firm. They were staggered from 35,000€ to 33,000€ to 30,000€ to mimic a real, dynamic negotiation. To make sure an agreement could only be reached in the final negotiation round, all counteroffers made by the candidates before the fifth round of negotiation were designed to lie above the participants' reservation point of 30,000€, as indicated in the role information. To withhold from participants that they were receiving automated answers, value entries exceeding 30,000€ were automatically disabled for participants in this section.

The scripts used for the assertive and modest negotiation behavior manipulation have been adopted from previous studies conducted by Amanatullah and Morris (2010) and Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a). The original script has been developed and pre-tested by Amanatullah and Morris (2010), in a study investigating impression management strategies used by women in bargaining situations and the effect of gender role expectations on the latter (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a). The experimental design included the exchange of pre-scripted messages between the participants in the role of a recruit or agent and a computerized hiring manager as their negotiation partner. To develop authentic scripts, a pilot test had been conducted prior to the experiment. In the pilot test, participants had to indicate their willingness to engage in a series of behaviors in a salary negotiation and state how they would categorize the respective behaviors. Based on this, Amanatullah and Morris (2010) identified five categories of common

responses to offers made in a salary negotiation. The identified categories were “assertive, entitled, qualification-based, cooperative and dejected/hopeful” (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010, p. 260), and included a written response and a corresponding justification. In an up-following study investigating the relationship between self-advocating behavior and backlash in salary negotiation, Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a) utilized the original scripts of the “assertive” and “dejected/hopeful” category to represent an assertive and non-assertive negotiation style of a self- or other-advocating negotiator in a salary negotiation. While in the original study conducted by Amanatullah and Morris (2010), the scripts were used as answering options for the participants in the role of the job candidate, in Amanatullah and Tinsley’s study (2013a), the scripts were presented as automated responses of a job candidate to the participants’ offers in the role of a hiring manager. In this scenario, participants were presented messages in the form of direct quotations from a job candidate in each round of negotiation. The messages consisted of two components, a response to the offer previously made by the participant in the role of a hiring manager and a justification of the candidate’s counteroffer. In total, each participant received five messages from the candidate, either being assertive or modest throughout all five rounds of negotiation (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a).

In the present study, the scripts for the assertive and non-assertive condition were used in a similar way to Amanatullah and Tinsley’s study (2013a). The difference was that, instead of manipulating advocacy, the gender of the candidate was manipulated in the scripts and the non-assertive condition has been transformed into a modest condition. Because assertive behavior is defined as the display of harsh, competitive, and ambitious behaviors (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a), in the assertive condition, wording was chosen to make the candidate appear demanding, competitive, and arrogant. Offers made by the participants were described as “insulting” or “unreasonable”, and justifications for counteroffers included threats such as “I may be forced to accept a position at another company” or dead-end statements such as “I refuse to work for less” or “This is my last word in this negotiation”. In contrast, modest behavior is related to the employment of more weak, insecure and uncertain behaviors (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). Therefore, the wording in the modest condition was designed to make the candidate appear even more soft, and submissive than in the original study by Amanatullah and Morris (2010). In the modest script, offers made by the participants were first appreciated and then turned down in a very polite way, using expressions such as “I appreciate your offer but unfortunately I do not think I can accept” or “Thank you for that offer but I was hoping to earn a bit more”. Furthermore, the justifications for the candidate’s counteroffers in the modest condition highlighted relationship aspects, as well as joint gains, and appealed to fairness. For

example, counteroffers were introduced with phrases such as “I think both, you and I would be happy with (...)” and described as “fair salaries” or “reasonable compromise” (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a). A detailed overview of all ten scripts for the messages (five for the assertive and five for the modest condition), as well as the alterations made to the modest script in comparison to the original scripts, is provided in the Appendices 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.

As indicated earlier, whether participants received assertive or modest messages depended on the treatment group they had previously been assigned to in a randomized drawing process. Upon receiving the last message from the candidate in the fifth round of negotiation, participants were informed that this was their last negotiation round and had to answer three further questions about the economic results of the negotiation. After this, participants were informed that they have finished the experimental task and were directed to the last part of the study, the post-experimental survey.

3.2.2.3. Post-Experimental Survey

The post-experimental survey consisted of four overall blocks of questions. The first block was designed to measure the social outcome of the negotiation. It included six questions about the willingness of the participants to interact with the candidate in future social and professional contexts. The second block of questions was designed to check whether the behavior manipulation in the experimental task was successful. To monitor how the candidates were perceived, participants were asked to rate how well different positive and negative masculine and feminine traits (17 in total) described the candidate they negotiated with. The third block of questions in the post-experimental survey included measures to assess the participants’ gender role orientation. Items were selected from three existing scales (namely the Social Roles Questionnaire by Baber and Tucker (2006), the Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role scale by Larsen and Long (1988) and the Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role scale by Judge and Livingstone (2008)), that had been used to measure GRO before and had been validated in previous studies. The decision to include a mix of items from different scales, instead of adopting a complete scale, was made to measure GRO with a more professional focus (for a more detailed description of the selection process, refer to chapter 3.2.3.4). The final part of the post-experimental survey included two additional control questions. First, participants were asked to indicate which gender the candidate they negotiated with had. This measure was implemented to control for the success of the gender manipulation installed in the negotiation task and how carefully participants read the role information and instructions. Lastly, participants were asked to indicate what they believed had been the purpose of the study. This

was to control for potential interferences with biased answering behavior of the participants (e.g. social desirability).

3.2.3. Measures

Based on the data received from the online questionnaires, different measures were developed to operationalize the independent and dependent variables for statistical analysis. The following part describes the measures for backlash (in the form of economic and social outcome), perceived likability, atypicality and GRO, as well as the operationalization of the behavior manipulation control.

3.2.3.1. Backlash

Findings from previous studies suggest, that backlash towards atypically behaving individuals, and especially atypically behaving women, can be experienced not only in the form of economic penalties, but also in the form of social sanctions (Bowles et al., 2007; Keck & Babcock, 2018). Thus, to capture the multiple facets of backlash towards atypically behaving negotiators, in the present study, the dependent variable “backlash” was measured using the economic outcome, concession behavior and the social outcome of the negotiation, as well as the interaction term between the two.

Economic Outcome

To assess the economic outcome of the negotiation, the final offer made by the participants to the candidates was used. This was after having completed all five rounds of negotiation. Responses could take on any score below 30,000€ (participants’ reservation point). In terms of interpretation, a high score represented a good outcome for the candidate and a lower tendency for backlash of the participant and vice versa.

Participants’ Concession Behavior

In addition to the economic outcome, the concession behavior of the participant was used as a dependent variable to investigate backlash effects. “Concession behavior” was defined as the difference between the first and the final offer made by participants. The reason for including participants’ concession behavior as a dependent variable was to get a deeper understanding of potential economic penalties representing backlash. As indicated above, the concession behavior of the participants was calculated by subtracting the first offers made in the negotiation from the final offer. This was implemented to capture how willing participants were to make concessions in favor of the candidate they negotiated with. Conversely, this can be interpreted as the performance of the candidates in terms of the total value they were able to claim throughout the negotiation. In terms of interpretation, again, a high score on the concession

behavior scale represented high concessions of the participant and good performance of the candidate and thus, a lower tendency to backlash and vice versa.

Even though, the study design would have allowed for comparing all six offers made throughout the negotiation individually, the measure was limited to the above-mentioned sub-measures for two reasons. First, the negotiation rounds one to five were implemented in the experiment for the purpose of manipulating the way participants perceived the candidate they negotiated with. With each round of negotiation, participants either received a statement by the candidate that was representing assertive or modest negotiation behavior. Thus, with an increasing number of negotiation rounds, participants receive increasing information about the negotiation behavior of the candidate and thus, the strength of the behavior manipulation should increase accordingly. In this sense, comparisons among offers made in an early stage of the negotiation were not regarded to be as fruitful as comparisons between the final offers, because the behavior manipulation was not expected to be strong enough at the early stage of the negotiation. And second, comparing all rounds of negotiation among each other would bear the risk of violating the assumptions of independence.

Social Outcome

For the social outcome of the negotiation, a scale originally developed by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a) to measure backlash in the form of work-based and social-based sanctions against atypically behaving women was employed in the present study. Participants had to rate six items about their willingness to socially interact with the candidate in the future on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Of the six items, three items referred to future interactions in a private context, while the other three items referred to future interactions in a professional context. The following items by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a, p. 120) were included in the present study:

1. “How interested would you be in working in a team with Mary [Mark] as a coworker?”
2. “If you were the project manager on a work assignment, how likely would you be to ask Mary [Mark] to be part of the project team?”
3. “Is Mary [Mark] the type of person you like to work with?”
4. “How interested would you be in interacting socially with Mary [Mark]?”
5. “If Mary [Mark] invited you out for drinks after work, how likely would you be to go with her [him]?”
6. “Is Mary [Mark] the type of person you like to socialize with?”

The way the items were worded, a lower score on the social outcome scale represented a lower degree of likability of the candidate. In terms of backlash this translates into a lower score on

the social outcome scale, representing a greater tendency towards backlash of the participants and vice versa.

3.2.3.2. Perceived Likability

Because literature also hints towards likability being a potential mediator between the relationship of atypical behavior and backlash, the social outcome scale from the backlash measure was also used to assess how likable candidates were perceived by the participants. As such, a high score on the social outcome scale represented a high degree of perceived likability of the candidate.

3.2.3.3. Atypical Negotiation Behavior

For analysis, the independent variable “atypical negotiation behavior” was measured in two different ways. First, for the ANOVAs, atypical behavior was operationalized as a binary variable (0=“typical behavior”, and 1=“atypical behavior”) with “typical behavior” representing modest women and assertive men, and “atypical behavior” including assertive women and modest men. This variable will further be called “actual negotiation behavior” because it refers to the manipulated behavior condition. For the linear regressions on the other side, a new, metric variable was created. This new variable was designed to measure the degree to which candidates were *perceived* as atypical by the participants.

Atypicality was assumed, if a candidate was attributed traits that typically belong to the gender roles of the opposite sex. In other words, female candidates were assumed to be atypical when participants characterized them with masculine attributes and male candidates, when participants characterized them with feminine attributes. Therefore, participants’ ratings on how well different attributes described the candidates (for a detailed description of all items refer to chapter 3.2.3.5, *Behavior Control Scale*) were utilized to determine the degree to which participants perceived the candidates as either assertive (high on masculine attributions and low on feminine attributions), or modest (low on masculine attributions and high on feminine attributions). Because masculine behavior was treated as the opposite of feminine behavior and vice versa, a universal scale to measure negotiation behavior was created in an intermediate step. The reference of this scale was masculinity, so that a high score on the scale represented high masculinity and a low rating represented low masculinity. Therefore, all items with feminine attributions were reverse coded before being included in the scale. Based on their ratings on the negotiation behavior scale, female candidates were perceived as highly atypical, if they were rated high on masculine attributions and male candidates, if they were rated low on masculine attributions. Conversely, it was assumed, that female participants were perceived

as highly typical, if they were low on masculine attributions, and male candidates, if they were rated high on masculine attributions. Thus, perceived atypical behavior was calculated by measuring the *difference* between participants' scores on the negotiation behavior scale (high = assertive, low = modest), and the expected typical behavior scores, which marked the endpoints of the negotiation behavior scale (male = highest possible rating on masculine negotiation behavior, female = lowest possible rating on masculine negotiation behavior). This process yielded a unified six-point scale for atypical behavior, ranging from 0 (extremely typical) to 6 (extremely atypical). This scale will further be referred to as "*perceived negotiation behavior scale*".

3.2.3.4. GRO of the Negotiation Partner

To measure participants' gender role orientation, or in other words, the degree to which the negotiation partner endorses an egalitarian or traditional view about gender roles (Mazei et al., 2015), a scale consisting of 17 items was employed in the present study. The items were adopted from three existing scales that have been used and validated in previous research in the field of gender roles. The employed scales were the Social Roles Questionnaire (SRQ) by Baber and Tucker (2006), the Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role scale by Larsen and Long (1988) and an adapted version of the Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role scale developed by Judge and Livingstone (2008). For the purpose of brevity and to avoid the risk of taxing participants, only certain items of each scale were included in the questionnaire. The item selection process followed three basic principles. First, as the present study focuses on effects in salary negotiation, all items with a direct professional reference were included. Second, all items that were indirectly linked to a professional context (i.e. items referring to tasks around the house and family life) were included. And third, items measuring social roles in general but with a more transcendent approach were included. This process yielded a final list of 17 items. An overview of the selected items per source and category, is provided in Table 3. For a validation of the new GRO Scale, see Chapter 3.3.1.2.

To assess whether participants rather endorse traditional or egalitarian gender roles, they were asked to rate the extent to which they agree or disagree to each item on a four-point Likert Scale from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 4 ("strongly agree"). The decision to limit the Likert Scale to only four answering options was made to force participants to position themselves to one or the other side in terms of their attitudes toward gender roles. Utilizing forced-choice scales can be valuable to facilitate data processing and to increase the informative value of the collected data (Hughes, 1969). Nevertheless, forced choice should only be employed in cases where participants are expected to hold the necessary knowledge about the attitude object and where

a neutral option would bear the risk of participants selecting it for reasons of convenience. As the scale measuring participants' GRO refers to their personal feelings and attitudes toward the social roles of women and men, it is presumed that participants hold the knowledge required to provide an adequate answer. Thus, the employment of a forced-choice (four point) Likert Scale was deemed appropriate for the purpose of the present study. Generally, items were designed in such a way, that a higher score represented a more traditional GRO and a lower score a more egalitarian GRO. Because the questionnaire included several inverted items (where a high score represented a more egalitarian GRO) to increase concentration among participants, some items had to be reverse coded prior to analysis. Items that were reverse coded for further analysis are marked with a * in the overview provided in Table 3. To avoid any ordering effects, the order in which the items were displayed to the participants was randomized.

List of items included in GRO scale per source and category

	Social Roles Questionnaire by Baber and Tucker (2006, p. 465)	Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role scale by Larsen and Long (1988, p. 5)	Scale by Judge and Livingstone (2008, p. 1000)
Direct professional context:	“For many important jobs, it is better to choose men instead of women.” “Only some types of work are appropriate for both men and women.” “Some types of work are just not appropriate for women.”	“The belief that women cannot make as good supervisors or executives as men is a myth.” (R) “In groups that have both male and female members, it is more appropriate that leadership positions be held by males.” “Men make better leaders.”	“A wife with a family has no time for outside employment.”
Indirect professional context:	“A father’s major responsibility is to provide financially for his children.” “Tasks around the house should not be assigned by sex.” (R)	“A man who has chosen to stay at home and be a househusband is not less masculine.” (R)	

	“Mothers should work only if necessary.”	
Transcendent approach:	“People should be treated the same regardless of their sex.” (R) “We should stop thinking about whether people are male or female and focus on other characteristics.” (R) “People can be both aggressive and nurturing regardless of sex.” (R)	“Women should be more concerned with clothing and appearance than men.” “Men who cry have weak character.”

Note. Items marked with (R) were reverse-coded.

Table 3: Overview items included in GRO scale per source and category

In the following, all three original scales and the respective items selected for the present study, are explained in more detail.

Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role Scale

The Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role Scale by Larsen and Long (1988) was developed to measure, whether individuals rather hold traditional or egalitarian beliefs about the social roles of women and men. The Likert-type scale has originally been created based on a variety of different sources including feminist speeches, books, articles and experimental studies and after controlling for reliability and validity yielded a final list of 20 items (Larsen & Long, 1988). Although, Larsen and Long (1988) recommend using the entire list of items to achieve high levels of variance, for the purpose of this study, only certain items have been adopted. This was because some of the items of the Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role Scale appeared very old-fashioned and thus were considered inappropriate for measuring GRO among a sample of undergraduate students. Thus, only those items, that appeared contemporary and not offensive, were included.

Social Roles Questionnaire

To complement the items selected from the Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role Scale with a more recent measure of GRO, several items from the Social Roles Questionnaire (SRQ) by Baber and Tucker (2006) were included in the questionnaire. The SRQ has been developed as an

alternative measure for the assessment of gender role attitudes. It does not only capture the way individuals think about social roles of *men* and *women*, but also examines attitudes that transcend dichotomous categories. Apart from the advantage of following a more contemporary approach toward gender roles, the SRQ was chosen as a basis for the present study due to its good face validity, psychometric properties and applicability.

Adapted Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role Scale

Another more recent scale to measure GRO, that has been employed for the present study, is a scale developed by Judge and Livingstone (2008). The scale Judge and Livingstone (2008) developed in their study consisted of only five items, which were developed to measure the degree to which individuals endorse traditional versus egalitarian views about women's roles at work and at home. Because some of these items were overlapping with items already included from the Traditional-Egalitarian Sex Role Scale (Larsen & Long, 1988) and the SRQ (Baber & Tucker, 2006), but the overall scale still has been proved to have high reliability and good concurrent validity with other measures of GRO, only one single item from Judge and Livingstone's scale was included in the present study.

3.2.3.5. Manipulation Checks

To determine the effectiveness of the manipulations implemented in the experimental design, two manipulation checks have been included in the present study. The first manipulation check was implemented to test the success of the gender manipulation, while the second manipulation check was included to test the success of the negotiation behavior manipulation.

Check for Gender Manipulation

To test whether manipulating the gender of the candidate by altering the candidate's name (Mary [Mark]) as well as the pronouns used to refer to the candidate (she [he]) was successful, the following single item question has been implemented at the end of the questionnaire:

1. What was the gender of your negotiation partner in the experiment?

Participants were asked to select one of three options, a) male, b) female or c) don't remember. The manipulation was considered successful, in case participants identified the correct gender of their negotiation partner. For the case that participants selected the opposite gender or the "don't remember" option, data entries were considered inappropriate and had to be excluded from further analysis.

Check for Negotiation Behavior Manipulation

To determine the effectiveness of the assertive and modest negotiation behavior manipulation, a scale developed by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a), to operationalize positive and negative attributions of masculinity and femininity, was adopted in the present study. Participants were asked to provide ratings on how well different positive and negative masculine and feminine traits (17 in total) described the candidate they had negotiated with, on a scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“extremely”). 15 of the 17 attributions selected for the manipulation check were derived from previous research conducted by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a) and Rudman et al. (2012) and two items were added by the researcher as direct manipulation checks.

The original scale developed by Rudman et al. (2012), to measure gender prescriptions and proscriptions, included a total of 50 attributions which were split into four sub-scales: positive male, negative male, positive female and negative female traits. To increase the operationality of the original scale, for their research, Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013), condensed the scale of 50 items into 11 items. This shortened list consisted of the two to three attributions that have been found to have the highest factor loadings and internal validity for each of the four subscales (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a). The selected items were: “dominating”, “arrogant”, “angry” (negative masculine attributions), “independent”, “good business sense” (positive masculine attributions), “insecure”, “naïve”, “gullible” (negative feminine attributions), and “sensitive to others”, “warm”, and “friendly” (positive feminine attributions) (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a; Rudman et al., 2012). In addition to that, Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013) also included four more items into their scale. The additional items were “entitled” (negative masculine attribution), “ambitious” (positive masculine attribution), “conciliatory” (negative feminine attribution) and “reasonable” (positive feminine attribution) (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a). All of the above-mentioned attributions were included in the behavior control scale for the present study. Additionally, the characterizations, “assertive” and “modest” were added by the researcher as a direct manipulation check. For a detailed overview of the subscales used in the present study, the respective items and their sources, refer to Table 4. To control for potential order effects, the order, in which the items appeared to the participants, was randomized.

List of items included in negotiation behavior scale per source and category

	Original items by Rudman et al. (2012)	Items by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013)	Additional items
Negative masculine attributions	Dominating, arrogant, angry	Entitled	Assertive
Positive masculine attributions	Independent, good business sense	Ambitious	
Negative feminine attributions	Insecure, naïve, gullible	Conciliatory	Modest
Positive feminine attributions	Sensitive to others, warm, friendly	Reasonable	

Table 4: Overview of negotiation behavior items per source and category

3.3. Results from Statistical Data Analysis

The following chapters outline the procedure and results of the statistical analysis, including the preliminary analysis of the dataset, hypothesis testing and the testing of alternative explanatory variables.

3.3.1. Preliminary Analysis

3.3.1.1. Outlier Identification

In a first step, the dataset was reviewed for extreme values, or so-called *outliers*, among the entries for the dependent variables, economic outcome, relative economic outcome, and social outcome of the negotiation. This was to reduce statistical noise and enable accurate data analysis. To detect such extreme values, the data was examined according to the rule of interquartile ranges. Using the lower and upper fourths, the rule of interquartile ranges labels as outliers any observation that lies more than three interquartile ranges below the 25th percentile or above the 75th percentile (Hoaglin et al., 1986; Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987). In the present study, such outside observations were identified by hand, utilizing graphic demonstrations in the form of box plots.

Outliers Economic Outcome

By reviewing entries made for the economic outcome of the negotiation according to the rule of interquartile ranges, three cases were found to lie three interquartile ranges below the 25th percentile (case 42 = 18,000€, case 49 = 25,000€ and case 166 = 2,900€) and were thus

classified as outliers. For a visual demonstration, refer to the boxplot provided in Figure 7 (outliers marked with *).




Figure 7: Outliers among the entries for economic outcome

Whether or not identified outliers need to be excluded from further analysis primarily depends on the nature of the outlier, or in other words, whether the extreme value is seen as an error of measurement or a natural deviation in the dataset. Given that in the present study, participants were asked to state an offer for an annual salary for a junior consultant, the offer of 2,900€ (case 166), as well as the 18,000€ (case 42), were unrealistically low and thus seemed to be the result of a measurement error. The offer of 25,000€ (case 49) on the other hand, could still be interpreted as part of a tough negotiation strategy, as 25,000€ was plotted as the lower bound of comparable salaries in the industry in the negotiation brief. Therefore, only the cases 166 and 42 were excluded from further analysis of the economic outcome of the negotiation.

Outliers Participants' Concession Behavior

Reviewing the entries made for the dependent variable “relative economic outcome” of the negotiation according to the rule of interquartile ranges, four cases were found to lie three interquartile ranges away from the 25th or the 75th percentile (case 59 = 29,000€, case 98 = 29,000€, case 166 = -22,780€ and case 189 = 24,800€) and were thus classified as outliers. A visualization is provided in Figure 8 (outliers marked with *).




Figure 8: Outliers among the entries for participants' concession behavior

Whether these extreme values rather resemble an error of measurement, or a natural deviation in the dataset, depends on the context of the experimental task. The relative economic outcome of the negotiation was calculated based on the difference between the first and the final offer made by the participants in a five-round negotiation task. In light of this, the negative value of case 166 appears to be unrealistic and can therefore be interpreted as an error of measurement. In contrast, the other relative economic outcomes (case 59, 98 and 189) can still be interpreted as part of a tough negotiation strategy. Therefore, it was decided to only exclude case 166 from further analysis of the relative economic outcome.

Outliers Social Outcome

The review for outliers among the entries for the social outcome of the negotiation, no outliers were identified (see boxplot). Thus, all cases were considered in further analysis. A visualization is provided in Figure 9.




Figure 9: Outliers among the entries for social outcome

3.3.1.2. Internal Consistency of Scales

In the present experiment, several measures were included to test the constructs of the social outcome of the negotiation, the characteristics attributed to the candidate, and the GRO of the participant. Each measure consisted of a combination of different pre-established items, which participants were asked to provide ratings for. In consequence, instead of directly asking participants how much they liked the candidate, what characteristics they would attribute to the candidate or what their GRO was, the constructs were assessed based on participants' ratings on multiple single items belonging to the respective scale. For example, to measure GRO, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed or disagreed to several statements like "For many important jobs, it is better to choose men instead of women", or "Only some types of work are appropriate for both men and women" (Baber & Tucker, 2006, p. 465) (for a list of all items, see chapter 3.2.3.4). To obtain the assessment for the underlying construct, the single ratings provided by the participants then were summed and averaged into scores. This method of measuring constructs is called summated rating scales and is commonly used in scientific research (Miller, 1995; Streiner, 2003).

Nevertheless, to avoid averaging ratings for items that do not measure the same construct, it is important to verify, that the items belonging to the same scale, actually measure the same target construct - and only that construct (Clark & Watson, 2019). In other words, the internal consistency of each scale needs to be ensured. One common measure to assess the internal consistency of a scale is the coefficient alpha, or Cronbach's Alpha (Cronbach, 1951). The Cronbach's Alpha basically indicates, how well a group of variables (items) measures a unidimensional latent construct, by assessing the degree to which the single items within the

group correlate with each other (Clark & Watson, 2019). Generally, Cronbach's Alpha can take on values up to 1. In terms of interpretation, a Cronbach's Alpha above 0.7 is commonly regarded as an acceptable reliability coefficient (Cortina, 1993). Nevertheless, this does not implement, that a higher Cronbach's Alpha necessarily indicates stronger internal consistency. In contrary, a Cronbach's Alpha above 0.9 indicates, that there are items included in the scale, that are redundant with one another and the scale might be overly narrow (Clark & Watson, 2019). In research it is generally suggested that a Cronbach's Alpha between 0.8 and 0.9 signals optimal internal consistency of a scale. For cases where Cronbach's Alpha takes on values between 0.6 and 0.7, it is questionable whether items included in the respective scale are intercorrelated. In the case of a Cronbach's Alpha below 0.6 a scale is commonly not being considered internally consistent anymore (Clark & Watson, 2019; Cortina, 1993).

In the present study, Cronbach's Alpha was used to determine the internal consistency of the scales measuring "social outcome", "negotiation behavior", and "GRO".

Social Outcome Scale

Cronbach's Alpha for the social outcome scale was 0.894 (see Table 7), which is considered optimal, following the above-mentioned criteria. This indicates that the items chosen to measure the likability of the candidate, measure the same construct and thus can be averaged to an overall score for the social outcome scale.

Negotiation Behavior Scale

For the negotiation behavior scale (including positive and negative masculine attributions and the reverse-coded positive and negative feminine attributions for the assertive behavior scale and positive and negative feminine attributions and reverse-coded positive and negative masculine attributions for the modest behavior scale), a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.663 (see Table 7) was obtained. According to the above criteria, this is considered a low, but still acceptable coefficient alpha. Thus, internal consistency can still be assumed for the negotiation behavior scale in the present study.

Because the Negotiation Behavior Scale consisted of multiple dimensions (positive masculine, negative masculine, positive feminine and negative feminine attributions) (compare, Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a), an exploratory (maximum likelihood) factor analysis with Varimax-Rotation was conducted in addition to the internal consistency evaluation based on Cronbach's Alpha. In a first step, a four-factor solution was tested, followed by a two-factor solution.

Four-Factor Solution

Generally, items are considered suitable for factor analysis if the partial correlations between items are small but items still correlate. To test this, two measures were considered. First, to assess whether partial item correlations are sufficiently small, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) was used (H. F. Kaiser, 1960). The KMO can take on values between 0 and 1, but according to Kaiser (1960) a value above .80 is considered optimal. In the present analysis, the KMO was .791, implying that the items were suitable to perform a factor analysis. Furthermore, to ensure that the items correlate, the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was used. The Bartlett-Test was found to be significant ($\chi^2(136) = 1083.63$, $p < .001$), indicating that the included items were also sufficiently correlated with each other. Additionally, to ensure that all single items were sufficiently inter-correlated, the measure of sampling adequacy value (MSA) was reviewed for each item individually. In the anti-image correlation matrix, all items had an MSA above 0.5 implying sufficient inter-correlation. Based on the scree-plot, which rules out factors with an eigenvalue below 1, items were loaded on four factors (see Appendix 7.3.1.1.). Together, these four factors explained 48.3% of the variance. The factors included in the four-factor solution were, "positive masculine attributions", "negative masculine attributions", "positive feminine attributions" and "negative feminine attributions". Nevertheless, the cross-loadings obtained from the rotated factor matrix indicated that not all four factors were clearly separable from each other (see Table 5).

Rotated Factor Matrix

Negotiation Behavior Scale item	Factor loading			
	1	2	3	4
Factor 1: Positive masculine attributions				
Independent	,539	,457		
Ambitious	,471	,328		
Equipped with a good business sense	,611		-,354	
Factor 2: Negative masculine attributions				
Dominating		,534		
Arrogant	-,324	,605		,332
Assertive	,425			
Entitled		,412		
Angry		,423		,539
Factor 3: Positive feminine attributions				
Warm (R)			,483	,551
Reasonable (R)	-,506		,553	
Sensitive to others (R)			,442	
Friendly (R)			,394	,905
Factor 4: Negative feminine attributions				
Modest (R)			,799	
Gullible (R)	,573		,361	
Naive (R)	,737			
Conciliatory (R)			,569	
Insecure (R)	,574			

Note. N = 180. The extraction method was maximum likelihood with a Varimax with Kaiser Normalization rotation. Factor loadings below .30 are excluded from table. Highest factor loadings per item are in bold. Reverse-scored items are denoted with an (R).

Table 5: Results from Factor Analysis: Negotiation Behavior Scale – Four-Factor Solution

Especially items that were loaded on factor four, “negative feminine attributions” rather resembled a dimension that could be interpreted as generally impolite behavior instead of specifically negative feminine attributions. A reason for this could be that whether certain

attributes are perceived as “positive” or “negative” is contextual and depends on personal preferences. For example, assertiveness can be perceived as positive in a business context or if the observer is more task-oriented, but as negative in a personal context, or if the observer is more relationship-oriented. Conversely, modesty might be appreciated in a personal context or by an observer, who is more relationship-oriented, but not in a business context or by a more task-oriented observer. Thus, in addition to performing factor analysis with four factors, a two-factor solution was considered, where one dimension represented an individual’s “concern for substance” and the other one an individual’s “concern for people”.

Two-Factor Solution

Similar to the factor analysis with four factors, Bartlett's test ($\chi^2(120) = 1040.39, p < .001$) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy ($KMO = .800$) indicate that the variables are suitable for factor analysis in the two factor-solution. Again, a factor analysis (maximum likelihood) with Varimax-Rotation was performed. Although the initial factor analysis indicated the presence of four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, based on theoretical considerations, a two-factor solution was chosen, explaining 37.9% of the variance. The two-factor solution was derived from the so-called *dual concern model* (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). The dual concern model has been widely used in negotiation research to explain negotiator’s strategic choices based on different motives (Sorenson et al., 1999). It is based on Blake and Mouton’s (1964) *Managerial Grid* and stipulates that a negotiator’s motivational orientation is influenced by two main factors, “concern about own outcomes” and “concern about other’s outcomes”, leading to different strategic choices (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). These factors can also be described as an individual’s orientation on two dimensions: assertiveness (“concern about own outcomes”) and cooperativeness (“concern about other’s outcome”) (Ruble & Thomas, 1976; Thomas, 1992). When looking at the items of the negotiation behavior scale that load on factor one and factor two, a similar pattern can be detected. Items assigned to factor one are rather on the assertive side and can be interpreted as an individual’s “concern for substance”. Items assigned to factor two, on the other side, are rather cooperative and can be interpreted as an individual’s “concern for people”. Thus, the two factors in the analysis were interpreted as "concern for substance" and "concern for people". The cross-loadings retrieved from the rotated factor matrix indicate that both factors are clearly separable from each other (Table 6: Results from Factor Analysis: Negotiation Behavior Scale – Two-Factor Solution).

Rotated Factor Matrix

Negotiation Behavior Scale items	Factor	
	1	2
Factor 1: Concern for substance		
Independent	,620	
Ambitious	,537	
Equipped with a good business sense	,590	-,433
Dominating	,347	,327
Arrogant		,589
Assertive	,416	
Angry		,509
Factor 2: Concern for people		
Warm (R)		,767
Reasonable (R)	-,442	,620
Sensitive to others (R)		,437
Friendly (R)		,819
Gullible (R)	,499	
Naive (R)	,695	
Conciliatory (R)		,490
Modest (R)		,573
Insecure (R)	,604	

Note. N = 180. The extraction method was maximum likelihood with a Varimax with Kaiser Normalization rotation. Factor loadings below .30 are excluded from table. Highest factor loadings per item are in bold. Reverse-scored items are denoted with an (R).

Table 6: Results from Factor Analysis: Negotiation Behavior Scale – Two-Factor Solution

GRO Scale

The scale measuring participants' GRO, has a Cronbach's Alpha of .893 (see Table 7), which is considered to represent optimal internal consistency. Thus, all items included in the scale appear to measure the same construct and can be averaged into an overall score to measure the participants' GRO.

Reliability Statistics

Scale	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
Social Outcome Scale	.894	.894	6
Negotiation Behavior Scale	.663	.663	18
Gender Role Orientation Scale	.893	.893	16

Table 7: Overview reliability statistics

3.3.1.3. Manipulation Success

Because a comparison of the four treatment groups (female x assertive, female x modest, male x assertive and male x modest) can only deliver valuable results in case of successful manipulation, prior to hypothesis-testing, it had to be assessed whether participants in different treatment groups also perceived their negotiation partner differently. Thus, two assumptions had to be verified prior to data analysis. First, it had to be verified that participants were able to correctly identify the gender (male or female) of the candidate they negotiated with. And second, it had to be verified that participants assigned to the assertive condition, also perceived the candidate as more assertive while participants assigned to the modest condition, perceived the candidate as more modest.

Success of Gender Manipulation

To ensure the success of the gender manipulation, participants were asked a control question about the gender of the candidate they negotiated with, at the end of the questionnaire. Manipulation was considered successful if participants correctly identified the gender of the candidate. In case participants failed to correctly identify the gender of the candidate had to be regarded as inappropriate and were excluded from further analysis. This was the case for 21 participants, of which eleven did not recall the gender of the candidate at all and ten did not identify the correct gender of the candidate (seven participants indicated that the candidate was male while she was female, and three indicated that the candidate was female while he was male). Thus, the gender manipulation was not considered successful in 11.67% of all cases.

Nevertheless, the gender role manipulation could be regarded as successful in the remaining cases (88.33% of all cases) for two reasons. First, the results from further analysis of the excluded cases revealed that participants who failed to identify the gender of the candidate correctly, also took on average 2.29 minutes (137.4 seconds) less time to complete the questionnaire (average of 623.71 seconds) as compared to participants who correctly identified

the gender of the candidate (average of 761.11 seconds). Second, the gender manipulation in form of the candidate's name has repeatedly been displayed to the participants in the questionnaire (in the negotiation task, the role information, and all five rounds of negotiation, as well as in the questions that formed part of the post experimental survey), so that participants would not easily overlook it. Together with the time spent to finish the questionnaire, this hints towards the problem involved in participants not passing the gender manipulation control, rather resulted from a lack of attention paid when reading the instructions, than the general explicitness of the gender manipulation. Thus, it was presumed that the gender manipulation was successful for those participants, who correctly identified the gender of the candidate and only the 21 failed cases were excluded from further analysis.

Success of Behavior Manipulation

To control whether the behavior manipulation was successful, it had to be assessed whether participants assigned to either the assertive (female and male) or modest (female and male) condition also perceived the candidate as more *assertive* or more *modest* respectively. To compare the respective experimental groups, an independent samples t-test was conducted, with behavior (assertive vs. modest) as the independent and the participants' ratings on the assertive behavior scale as the dependent variable. This method was chosen because the samples were independent in the sense that each participant could only be assigned to either the assertive or modest group and there were only those two groups to be compared.

Assertive vs. Modest Behavior

In the independent samples t-test, the ratings on how well different positive and negative masculine and feminine traits describe the candidate, were used as a basis for the dependent variable "assertive behavior". Because it has been established that typically masculine (positive and negative) traits are closely related to assertiveness, while typically feminine (positive and negative) traits are more related to modesty, ratings provided in the behavior control were used to create an assertiveness scale. On that scale, high ratings on masculine traits and low ratings on feminine traits indicated that the candidate is perceived as more assertive, while low ratings on masculine traits and high ratings on feminine traits indicated that the candidate is perceived as more modest. Ratings of the participants were then averaged into assertive behavior scores, whereby ratings on feminine traits were reverse coded so that a high score on the assertive behavior scale always represented high perceived assertiveness. The independent variable was obtained by grouping participants according to the treatment they received in the experiment into an *assertive* and *modest* group. Thus, participants belonging to the "male x assertive", as

well as the “female x assertive” condition formed one group, and those that were allocated to the “male x modest” as well as the “female x modest” condition formed the other group. This yielded a group size of 90 participants per group ($n = 180$). The behavior manipulation was to be considered successful, if participants in the “assertive” condition rated the candidate as significantly more assertive on the assertive behavior scale, than participants in the “modest” condition at a .05 significance level. Results from the independent samples t-test revealed, that the degree of assertiveness was significantly higher for participants in the “assertive” condition, than for participants in the “modest” condition (*assertive condition: Mean = 4.80, SD = .54*, vs. *modest condition: Mean = 4.51, SD = .49; $t(178) = 3.70, p < .001$*). For a visualization of the results of the independent samples t-test, see Figure 10.




Figure 10: Means –Perceived negotiation behavior per behavior condition

In addition, it was assessed whether these differences were also significant when comparing perceived assertiveness between the assertive and modest female condition and the assertive and modest male condition respectively. For that purpose, two t-tests with behavior as the independent and the participants’ ratings on the assertive behavior scale as the dependent variables were conducted among the female and male experimental group separately. Results from the independent samples t-tests revealed, that the degree of assertiveness was significantly higher only when comparing assertive and modest behavior in the female condition (*assertive female condition: Mean = 4.93, SD = .52*, vs. *modest female condition: Mean = 4.51, SD = .47; $t(86) = 3.98, p < .001$*). When comparing assertive and modest behavior among the male condition, no significant difference between the groups was obtained (*assertive male condition:*

Mean = 4.68, *SD* = .54), vs. *modest male condition*: *Mean* = 4.53, *SD* = .50; $t(90) = 1.33$, $p = .169$). A visualization is provided in Figure 11.




Figure 11: Means – Perceived negotiation behavior per behavior condition and gender

Based on these findings, the behavior manipulation was considered successful in the sense, that participants negotiating with an assertive candidate also perceived that candidate as more assertive, than people negotiating with a modest candidate and vice versa. Nevertheless, this difference proved to be statistically significant only when comparing assertiveness ratings between modest and assertive female candidates, but not when comparing modest and assertive male candidates. For an overview of the results of the independent samples t-test, see Table 8.

Group Comparison Assertive and Modest Condition: Perceived Assertiveness

Variable	Assertive Condition (n=90)		Modest Condition (n=90)		t
	M	SD	M	SD	
Perceived Assertiveness All	4.80	.54	4.51	.49	3.70***
Perceived Assertiveness Female	4.93	.52	4.51	.47	3.98***
Perceived Assertiveness Male	4.68	.54	4.53	.50	1.39

*** $p < .001$

Note. Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all assertive to 7 = extremely assertive.

Table 8: Results from independent samples t-test – Perceived negotiation behavior per behavior condition

3.3.2. Hypotheses Testing

Having ensured that the dataset of the present study meets the basic requirements for statistical analysis and that manipulation was successful, the following chapters outline the analyses involved in hypotheses testing as well as the respective statistical results.

3.3.2.1. Influence of Atypical Behavior on Backlash

One of the central findings from the literature review was that negotiators, especially women, who violate gender stereotypes by displaying atypical behaviors in a negotiation, incur backlash in the form of social and economic reprisals from their negotiation partners (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a). This assumption was captured in hypothesis one, which predicted that atypically behaving focal negotiators (agentic women and modest men) would incur backlash in the form of social and economic reprisals by their negotiation partners. Notably, the term atypical behavior can be interpreted from two points of view. On the one hand, it can express the degree to which an individual *actually behaves* atypical. On the other hand, it can relate to the degree to which *others perceive* an individual's behavior as atypical. To account for this difference, in the present study, two separate analytical methods were employed to test the basic assumption. First, the influence of *actual* negotiation behavior on backlash was measured using ANOVA and independent samples t-tests. Second, the influence of *perceived* negotiation behavior was analyzed using multiple linear regression.

Testing of H1 and H1 a-d – Influence of Actual Negotiation Behavior

The basic prediction made in H1 was that atypically behaving focal negotiators (agentic women and modest men) would incur backlash in the form of social and economic reprisals. To test this assumption, the measures of economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome were subjected to three ANOVAs with negotiation behavior (atypical vs. typical) as the independent factor, and gender (male vs. female) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) as control factors.

In the hypotheses 1a to 1d, predictions were being made about how backlash effects compare between different treatment groups (H1a compared agentic women with modest women; H1b compared agentic women with agentic men; H1c compared modest men with agentic men; and H1d compared modest men with modest women). To test these assumptions, multiple independent sample t-tests among the male and female and typical and atypical treatment groups were conducted with actual negotiation behavior (atypical vs. typical) as the independent variable and economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome as the dependent variables. In the following, both, the results obtained from the

ANOVAs and the independent samples t-tests are presented for each dependent variable separately.

Economic Outcome

H1 - ANOVA

To test the influence of the candidates' atypicality on economic outcome, an ANOVA with the independent factor "actual negotiation behavior" (typical vs. atypical) and the dependent variable "economic outcome" was conducted. Additionally, to control for their influence, the independent factors "gender" (male vs. female) and "behavior" (assertive vs. modest) were included as control factors. Results revealed a significant main effect between "gender" and "economic outcome". Female candidates were found to be granted significantly higher economic negotiation outcomes than male candidates (*female candidates: Mean = 29124.70, SD = 1216.05 vs. male candidates: Mean = 28614.41, SD = 1849.95; $F(1,174) = 4.768, p = .030$*). This effect was shown to explain 2.7% of the variance ($\eta_p^2 = .027$) in the model. For a visualization, see Figure 12: Means – Economic outcome per candidate gender.

Apart from this, there were no further significant main effects between actual negotiation behavior or gender and economic outcome. Typical negotiators were granted slightly higher salaries than atypical candidates (*typical candidates: Mean = 28886.10, SD = 1348.16 vs. atypical candidates: Mean = 28841.03, SD = 1809.66*), but the difference was not statistically significant at a .05 significance level ($F(1,174) = .024, p = .876$). Similarly, assertive candidates were found to achieve better economic outcomes than modest candidates, but the difference was not statistically significant (*assertive candidates: Mean = 29041.57, SD = 1283.09 vs. modest candidates: Mean = 28686.07, SD = 1834.84; $F(1,174) = 2.342, p = .128$*).




Figure 12: Means – Economic outcome per candidate gender

H1 a-d - Independent Samples T-Tests

H1a and H1c predicted that when comparing atypical and typical individuals of the same gender (H1a: assertive women with modest women; H1c: modest men vs. assertive men), atypical individuals would reach lower economic outcomes than typical individuals would. H1b and H1d, on the other side, predicted that in a comparison between atypical individuals of one gender and typical individuals of the other gender (H1b: assertive women vs. assertive men; and H1d: modest men vs. modest women), the atypical individual would reach significantly lower economic outcomes than the typical individual of the other gender would.

To test the assumptions made in H1a and H1c, the sample was split into a female and male sub-sample. In each sub-sample, an independent samples t-test was conducted with negotiation behavior (assertive vs. modest) as the independent factor and economic outcome as the dependent variable. The independent samples t-test did not reveal any significant results. When comparing the economic outcomes of assertive female candidates with those of modest female candidates, the former achieved higher economic outcomes than the latter, but the difference was not statistically significant (*assertive female: Mean = 29288.37, SD = 1109.90, modest female: Mean = 28964.75, SD = 1304.36; $t(85) = -1.245, p = .217$*). In contrary, when comparing the economic outcomes of modest and assertive male candidates, modest candidates achieved lower economic outcomes than assertive candidates did (*modest male: Mean = 28413.58, SD = 2217.43, assertive male: Mean = 28810.87, SD = 1398.96*). But again, the difference was not statistically significant ($t(74) = 1.020, p = .311$).

To test the assumptions made in H1b and H1d, the sample was split into an assertive and a modest sub-sample. In each sub-sample, an independent samples t-test was conducted with gender (female vs. male) as the independent factor and economic outcome as the dependent variable. Results showed a marginally significant difference between assertive female and assertive male candidates. Assertive female candidates achieved higher economic outcomes than assertive male candidates (*assertive female: Mean = 29288.37, SD = 1109.90, assertive male: Mean = 28810.87, SD = 1398.96; $t(87) = 1.776, p = .079$*). When comparing the economic outcomes of female and male candidates in the modest group, there was no statistically significant difference. Even though, modest female candidates reached higher economic outcomes than modest male candidates, the difference was not statistically significant at the .05 significance level (*modest female: Mean = 28964.75, SD = 1304.36, modest male: Mean = 28413.58, SD = 2217.43; $t(71) = 1.433, p = .156$*).

Participants' Concession Behavior

H1 - ANOVA

When analyzing backlash effects in bilateral negotiation, the economic outcome in form of the final offer is not the only factor that can be compromised through atypical behavior. Because negotiation is a dynamic process where parties make offers and react to counteroffers, the concession making behavior of the negotiation partner is another important factor to consider. Thus, in addition to testing the influence of atypical behavior on the economic outcome of the negotiation, in the present study, the influence of the former on participants' concession making behavior was included into the analysis. Participants' concession behavior was measured as the absolute difference between the first and the final (sixth) offer participants made to the candidates. Thus, it was calculated by subtracting the first offers made by the participants from their final offers.

To test the influence of atypical behavior on participants' concession behavior, an ANOVA was conducted with candidates' actual negotiation behavior (typical vs. atypical) as the independent and participants' concession making behavior as the dependent variable. Additionally, the participants' gender (female vs. male) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) were included as control factors. The one-way ANOVA did not yield any significant main effects between either of the independent factors and participants' concession behavior at a .05 significance level. Even though, participants made higher concessions to typically behaving candidates than to atypically behaving candidates (*typical candidates: Mean* = 6356.11, *SD* = 4749.30 vs. *atypical candidates: Mean* = 5572.03, *SD* = 4182.14), the difference was not statistically significant ($F(1,177) = 1.373, p = .240$). Similarly, participants made larger concessions to female candidates than to male candidates, but again, the difference was not statistically significant (*female candidates: Mean* = 6489.07, *SD* = 5066.31 vs. *male candidates: Mean* = 5499.03, *SD* = 3821.40; $F(1,177) = 2.035, p = .155$). Lastly, regarding the behavior control, participants made marginally larger concessions to modest candidates than to assertive candidates, but the difference was really small and not statistically significant (*assertive candidates: Mean* = 5972.23, *SD* = 4034.97 vs. *modest candidates: Mean* = 5960.22, *SD* = 4914.25; $F(1,177) = .000, p = .995$). For a visualization, see Figure 13.




Figure 13: Means – Participants' concession behavior per actual negotiation behavior

H1 a-d - Independent Samples T-Tests

To test the assumptions made in H1a and H1c for participants' concession behavior, an independent samples t-test was conducted among the female and male sub-group, with negotiation behavior (assertive vs. modest) as the independent factor and participants' concession behavior as the dependent variable. Results showed that participants made higher concessions to modest female candidates than to assertive female candidates, but the difference was not statistically significant at a .05 significance level (*assertive female*: Mean = 6056.82, SD = 4402.76, *modest female*: Mean = 6842.02, SD = 5649.36; $t(86) = -.727$, $p = 0.469$). In contrary, when comparing participants' concession behavior toward assertive and modest male candidates, participants tended to make higher concessions to assertive males than modest males (*assertive male*: Mean = 5891.33, SD = 3696.23, *modest male*: Mean = 5098.02, SD = 3946.14; $t(89) = .990$, $p = .325$).

To test the assumptions made in H1b and H1d, two independent samples t-tests were conducted with gender (female vs. male) as the independent factor and participants' concession behavior as the dependent variable, for the assertive and modest sub-group separately. Results demonstrated a marginally significant difference when comparing the concessions participants made to female and male modest candidates. Participants made higher concessions to modest female candidates than to modest male candidates (*modest female*: Mean = 6842.02, SD = 5649.36, *modest male*: Mean = 5098.02, SD = 3946.14; $t(87) = 1.691$, $p = .094$). In the assertive group, there was no significant difference between the concessions participants made to female or male candidates, even though, assertive female candidates achieved higher concessions than

assertive male candidates (*assertive female*: $Mean = 6056.82$, $SD = 4402.76$, *assertive male*: $Mean = 5891.33$, $SD = 3696.23$; $t(88) = .193$, $p = .847$).

Social Outcome

H1 - ANOVA

Apart from backlash in the form of reprisals in economic outcome and concession making, this study also aimed at testing the influence of atypical behavior on backlash in form of social reprisals. It was assumed that negotiators violating gender stereotypes would be perceived as less likable than negotiators behaving according to the respective gender stereotypes.

To test this assumption, an ANOVA was conducted with actual negotiation behavior (typical vs. atypical) as the independent factor and social outcome of the negotiation as the dependent variable. Additionally, gender (female vs. male) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) were included as control factors. The results from the ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect for candidate behavior at the .05 significance. Modest negotiators were found to be perceived as significantly more likable than assertive negotiators (*modest condition*: $Mean = 4.53$, $SD = 1.06$ vs. *assertive condition*: $Mean = 4.10$, $SD = 1.29$; $F(1,176) = 5.939$, $p = .016$). For a visualization, see Figure 14.




Figure 14: Means – Social outcome per actual negotiation behavior

Apart from this, there were no further main effects. Even though, typical candidates were generally perceived as more likable than atypical candidates (*typical candidate*: $Mean = 4.37$, $SD = 1.23$ vs. *atypical candidate*: $Mean = 4.26$, $SD = 1.16$), the difference was not statistically significant ($F(1,176) = .442$, $p = .507$). Neither did the candidate's gender significantly

influence the social outcome of the negotiation. Female candidates were perceived as marginally more likable than male candidates, but the difference was not significant (*female candidate: Mean = 4.40, SD = 1.26 vs. male candidate: Mean = 4.23, SD = 1.13; F(1,176) = .931, p = .336*). This indicates that the degree to which participants perceived the candidates as likable mainly depended on whether they acted assertive or modest, regardless of whether this behavior was typical or atypical for the candidates' gender.

Furthermore, because the dependent variable "social outcome" included two subscales, the "social likability scale" and the "work-related likability scale", two two-way ANOVAs have been conducted for each scale separately. This was to test for potential differences in backlash depending on whether a more private or professional context was applied. Results from these analyses were similar to those of the original social outcome measure. There was a significant main effect at the .05 significance level between work-related likability and behavior (*modest condition: Mean = 4.77, SD = 1.13 vs. assertive condition: Mean = 4.28, SD = 1.39; F(1,176) = 6.79, p = .010*). There also was a marginally significant main effect between social likability and behavior (*modest condition: Mean = 4.28, SD = 1.27 vs. assertive condition: Mean = 3.92, SD = 1.43; F(1,176) = 3.24, p = .074*), but there were no other significant effects. Because the main effects for work-related and social likability were similar to those for the combined measure of social outcome and moved in the same direction, it was decided to continue analysis with the original measure of social outcome as the dependent variable in the following chapters.

H1 a-d - Independent Samples T-Tests

To test the assumptions made in H1a and H1c for the social outcome of the negotiation, the sample was split into a female and male sub-sample. For each group, an independent samples t-test was conducted with negotiation behavior (assertive vs. modest) as the independent factor and social outcome as the dependent variable. The independent samples t-test comparing the social outcome scores of assertive and modest female candidates revealed that assertive female candidates were perceived as significantly less likable, when compared to modest female candidates (*assertive female: Mean = 4.13, SD = 1.33, modest female: Mean = 4.67, SD = 1.14; t(86) = -2.067, p = .042*). On contrary, when comparing the social outcome scores of assertive and modest male candidates, the difference between the groups was not statistically significant (*assertive male: Mean = 4.08, SD = 1.26, modest male: Mean = 4.39, SD = 0.96; t(84) = -1.334, p = .186*). For a visualization, see Figure 15).




Figure 15: Means – Social outcome candidate gender per behavior condition

To test the assumptions made in H1b and H1d, the sample was split into an assertive and a modest group. In each group, an independent samples t-test was conducted with gender (female vs. male) as the independent factor and social outcome of the negotiation as the dependent variable. Results did not reveal any significant differences between assertive female and male candidates and modest female and male candidates. In the assertive group, females were rated as marginally more likable than males, but the difference was not significant at the .05 significance level (*assertive female: Mean = 4.13, SD = 1.33, assertive male: Mean = 4.08, SD = 1.26; $t(88) = .193, p = .847$*). Similarly, in the modest group, female candidates were rated as more likable than male candidates, but again, the difference was not statistically significant (*modest female: Mean = 4.67, SD = 1.14, modest male: Mean = 4.39, SD = 0.96; $t(88) = 1.291, p = .200$*).

Testing of H1 and H1 a-d – Influence of Perceived Negotiation Behavior

Because in the above-mentioned analyses, the binary variable “actual negotiation behavior” (that resulted from the experimental manipulation) was used, results can only give insights about how the candidates’ *actual* negotiation behavior affects backlash. Nevertheless, this does not answer the question in how far the degree to which participants *perceived* the candidates’ as atypical influences backlash. Thus, to test whether the *perceived* negotiation behavior significantly predicts the economic outcome, participants’ concession behavior and the social outcome of the negotiation, multiple linear regression was used to complement previous analyses. For the multiple linear regressions, a metric variable measuring the degree to which

participants perceived the candidate's negotiation behavior as atypical was included as a predictor (instead of the binary variable measuring actual negotiation behavior). Because the results from previous analyses indicated that the factors "gender" and "behavior" also influence the negotiation outcomes, these variables, as well as their interaction terms with "perceived atypicality", were included into the regression analyses as additional predictors to control for their influence.

To ensure that there was no violation of the assumptions necessary for multiple linear regression, preliminary analyses were performed. Results showed that, overall, the data met all required standards to perform multiple linear regression (see Appendix 7.3.2.1 for the respective test results). Complications emerged only with regard to the assumption of collinearity. Preliminary tests of collinearity revealed that there was a negative correlation between X_1 and X_2 ($r = -.780$), as well as a positive correlation between X_1 and X_4 ($r = .844$). Pearson correlation coefficients above .7 are generally considered critical in regression, as they are indicative of multicollinearity. Nevertheless, when testing for multicollinearity, in addition to Pearson's correlations, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) as well as the Tolerance need to be considered. Tolerance values should generally not fall below .1. Regarding critical VIF values, there is mixed opinions in research. While some authors argue that VIF values above five or even lower indicate multicollinearity (Johnston et al., 2018), others see VIF values as critical only when they exceed the value of ten (Allison, 2004). Based on the latter opinion, the Tolerance and VIF values of X_1 , X_2 and X_4 still meet the assumption of collinearity (*Economic outcome*: X_1 : Tolerance = .18, $VIF = 5.72$; X_2 : Tolerance = .38, $VIF = 2.65$; X_4 : Tolerance = .26, $VIF = 3.80$; *Participants' concession behavior*: X_1 : Tolerance = .18, $VIF = 5.56$; X_2 : Tolerance = .38, $VIF = 2.61$; X_4 : Tolerance = .27, $VIF = 3.74$; *Social outcome*: X_1 : Tolerance = .18, $VIF = 5.66$; X_2 : Tolerance = .38, $VIF = 2.61$; X_4 : Tolerance = .26, $VIF = 3.81$). Furthermore, to facilitate interpretation, the continuous predictor "perceived atypicality" was mean-centered for the analyses.

Multiple Linear Regression – Economic Outcome

First, a multiple linear regression analysis was carried out to evaluate whether the degree to which participants perceived the candidate's negotiation behavior as atypical significantly predicts the economic outcome of the negotiation. The results of the regression analysis indicated that the model explained 1.7% of the variance ($R^2 = .044$; adjusted $R^2 = .017$), which is indicative for a low goodness-of-fit according to Cohen (2013).

The final predictive model was:

$$\text{Economic Outcome} = 29318.306 - 101.328X_1 - 657.051X_2 - 345.894X_3 - 185.578X_4 + 216.034X_5 + \varepsilon_i$$

$X_1 = \text{PNB_mc}$ (perceived negotiation behavior)

$X_2 = \text{GG}$ (gender grouped)

$X_3 = \text{BG}$ (behavior grouped)

$X_4 = \text{PNB_GG}$ (interaction term)

$X_5 = \text{PNB_BG}$ (interaction term)

Overall, the model was not tested to be significant, $F(5, 172) = 1.60$, $p = .163$. Of the five predicting variables, only X_2 was found to predict the economic outcome with marginal significance ($B = -657.05$, $p = .089$). None of the other predictors significantly predicted economic outcome ($X_1: B = -101.328$, $p = .763$; $X_3: B = -345.894$, $p = .167$; and $X_4: B = -185.578$, $p = .695$; $X_5: B = 216.034$, $p = .472$). For an overview, see Table 9.

Coefficients^a

	Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients		Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t		Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	29318,306	336,174		87,212	,000	28654,749	29981,863
	X ₁	-101,328	334,962	-,054	-,303	,763	-762,493	559,837
	X ₂	-657,051	384,542	-,207	-1,709	,089	-1416,079	101,978
	X ₃	-345,894	249,214	-,109	-1,388	,167	-837,805	146,018
	X ₄	-185,578	472,577	-,057	-,393	,695	-1118,375	747,218
	X ₅	216,034	299,891	,067	,720	,472	-375,905	807,974

a. Dependent variable: Economic outcome

Table 9: Coefficients and significance values for economic outcome – H1

The marginally significant predictor X_2 is the gender of the participants. Because the female condition was dummy coded as 0, the coefficient of -657.05 refers to the economic outcome in the male condition. In more detail, this means that, holding all other factors constant, male candidates achieved 657.05€ lower economic negotiation outcomes than female candidates. As none of the other predictors significantly predicted economic outcome, they will not further be discussed.

Multiple Linear Regression – Participants' Concession Behavior

A second multiple linear regression analysis was carried out to evaluate whether the degree to which participants perceived the candidate's negotiation behavior as atypical significantly

predicts the participants' concession behavior. Again, the results of the regression analysis indicated that the model had a low goodness-of-fit according to Cohen (2013), explaining only 1.0% of the variance ($R^2 = .037$; adjusted $R^2 = .010$).

The final predictive model was:

$$\text{Participants' Concession Behavior} = 7544.988 - 1631.839X_1 - 2609.287X_2 - 219.998X_3 + 367.516X_4 + 492.848X_5 + \varepsilon_i$$

$X_1 = \text{PNB_mc}$ (perceived negotiation behavior)

$X_2 = \text{GG}$ (gender grouped)

$X_3 = \text{BG}$ (behavior grouped)

$X_4 = \text{PNB_GG}$ (interaction term)

$X_5 = \text{PNB_BG}$ (interaction term)

Overall, the model was not tested to be significant, $F(5, 173) = 1.346$, $p = .247$. When considering the influence of the predictors individually, only X_2 significantly predicted participants' concession behavior ($B = -2609.287$, $p = .016$) at a .05 significance level. While X_1 was found to be a marginally significant predictor of participants' concession behavior ($B = -1631.839$, $p = .083$), X_3 to X_5 were not (X_3 : $B = -219.998$, $p = .754$; X_4 : $B = 367.516$, $p = .782$; and X_5 : $B = 492.848$, $p = .562$). For an overview of the coefficient and significance results, refer to Table 10.

Coefficients^a

		Unstandardized		Stand.		95,0% Confidence		
		Coefficients		Coefficients		Interval for B		
						Lower	Upper	
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.	Bound	Bound
1	(Constant)	7544,988	929,235		8,120	,000	5710,891	9379,084
	X ₁	-1631,839	935,093	-,307	-1,745	,083	-3477,499	213,821
	X ₂	-2609,287	1077,494	-,292	-2,422	,016	-4736,013	-482,561
	X ₃	-219,998	700,094	-,025	-,314	,754	-1601,824	1161,827
	X ₄	367,516	1325,889	,040	,277	,782	-2249,486	2984,518
	X ₅	492,848	848,658	,054	,581	,562	-1182,209	2167,904

a. Dependent variable: Participants' concession behavior

Table 10: Coefficients and significance values for participants' concession behavior – H1

When interpreting the coefficient of the significant predictor X_2 , participant gender, results indicate that, participants made 2609.29€ smaller concessions to male candidates than to female candidates. Thus, the male gender condition negatively correlates with participants' concession

behavior, while the opposite is true for the female gender condition. Regarding the marginally significant continuous predictor X_1 , perceived negotiation behavior, the coefficient of -1631.84 indicates that the degree to which a candidate is perceived as atypical negatively correlates with participants' concession behavior. In particular, if the degree to which a candidate is perceived as atypical increases by one unit, the concessions made to them are expected to decrease by 1631.84€, holding all other factors constant. As none of the other predictors significantly predicted economic outcome, they will not further be discussed.

Multiple Linear Regression – Social Outcome

A third multiple linear regression analysis was carried out to evaluate whether the degree to which participants perceived the candidate's negotiation behavior as atypical significantly predicts the social outcome of the negotiation. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 10.5% of the variance ($R^2 = .130$; adjusted $R^2 = .105$), which is indicative for a medium goodness-of-fit according to Cohen (2013).

The final predictive model was:

$$\text{Social Outcome} = 4.931 - 0.813X_1 - 0.618X_2 + 0.200X_3 + 1.250X_4 - 0.355X_5 + \varepsilon_i$$

$$X_1 = \text{PNB_mc (perceived negotiation behavior)}$$

$$X_2 = \text{GG (gender grouped)}$$

$$X_3 = \text{BG (behavior grouped)}$$

$$X_4 = \text{PNB_GG (interaction term)}$$

$$X_5 = \text{PNB_BG (interaction term)}$$

Overall, the model was tested to be a significant predictor of social outcome, $F(5, 174) = 5.205$, $p < .001$. Regarding the individual influence of the predicting variables, X_1 , X_2 , and X_4 were found to significantly predict social outcome at a significance level of .05 (X_1 : $B = -0.813$, $p = .001$; X_2 : $B = -.618$, $p = .024$; and X_4 : $B = 1.250$, $p = .000$). X_5 predicted social outcome only marginally significantly ($B = -.355$, $p = .095$) and X_3 was not found to be a significant predictor in the model ($B = .200$, $p = .259$). See Table 11 for the coefficient and significance results.

Coefficients^a

		Unstandardized		Stand.		95,0% Confidence		
		Coefficients		Coefficients		Interval for B		
						Lower	Upper	
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.	Bound	Bound
1	(Constant)	4,931	,235		20,981	,000	4,468	5,395
	X ₁	-,813	,236	-,579	-3,443	,001	-1,280	-,347
	X ₂	-,618	,272	-,260	-2,273	,024	-1,155	-,081
	X ₃	,200	,176	,084	1,132	,259	-,149	,548
	X ₄	1,250	,332	,519	3,760	,000	,594	1,905
	X ₅	-,355	,211	-,150	-1,677	,095	-,772	,063

a. Dependent variable: Social outcome

Table 11: Coefficients and significance values for social outcome – H1

The predictors that significantly predicted the social outcome of the negotiation were, perceived negotiation behavior, gender and the interaction term of the two. For perceived negotiation behavior, the coefficient of -0.813 indicates that if the degree to which participants perceive the candidate as atypical increases by one unit, the social outcome of the negotiation decreases by .813 units. The significant predictor “gender” (female vs. male) was a dichotomous variable with the female condition as reference category (dummy coded as zero). Thus, the coefficient of -0.618 indicates that male candidates are liked .618 units less than female candidates, holding all other factors constant. Nevertheless, because the interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and gender also was found to be significant, the interdependence of the two variables needs to be considered when interpreting their influence. This is because the significant interaction term indicates that the influence of the degree to which a candidate is perceived as atypical on social outcome depends on the candidate’s gender and vice versa. In particular, for male candidates the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on social outcome is expected to change by 1.078 units, in reference to the social outcome of female candidates. Because the regression coefficient of the interaction term is positive, in the male condition, the negative influence of being perceived as atypical on social outcome should decrease, or in other words, be attenuated. For female candidates on the other hand, the coefficient would be -1.078. Thus, for female candidates, being perceived as atypical to a higher degree negatively affects social outcome. As visible in Figure 16, for male candidates, perceived negotiation behavior positively correlates with social outcome, while for female

candidates there is a negative correlation. In short, this indicates that male candidates are liked more, the more they are perceived as atypical, while female candidates are liked less, the more they are perceived as atypical. Again, this also indicates that the social outcome depends on the degree to which a candidate is perceived as assertive or modest in such a way, that assertive negotiation behavior negatively affects social outcome.




Figure 16: Interaction perceived negotiation behavior * gender - MLR social outcome

Regarding the dichotomous predictor behavior, results indicate that modest behavior positively influences social outcome. However, the influence of behavior was only small and not statistically significant. Similarly, for the interaction term of behavior and perceived negotiation behavior, results indicate that the influence of the degree to which participants perceived the candidates as atypical on social outcome did not significantly depend on whether the candidates were assertive or modest.

Summary Influence of Atypical Behavior on Backlash

Regarding the independent variable, atypical behavior, the present study distinguished between actual and perceived negotiation behavior. While the former referred to the experimentally manipulated atypical behavior of the candidates, the latter referred to the degree to which participants perceived the candidate as atypical. Because actual negotiation behavior was defined as a categorical variable (atypical vs. typical), while perceived negotiation behavior was defined as a continuous variable, different statistical methods were employed to measure

their influence. Thus, results for both, the influence of actual and perceived negotiation behavior, will be summarized for each of the dependent variables.

Actual Negotiation Behavior

According to H1 it was hypothesized that atypical candidates would achieve lower economic outcomes, concessions and social outcomes than typical candidates. To test this assumption, the measures of economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome were subjected to three one-way ANOVAs with negotiation behavior (atypical vs. typical) as the independent factor, and gender (male vs. female) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) as control factors. Results generally did not provide support for H1. Economic outcome was only significantly influenced by gender, in that female candidates were found achieve better economic negotiation outcomes than male candidates (female candidates: Mean = 29124.70, SD = 1216.05 vs. male candidates: Mean = 28614.41, SD = 1849.95; $F(1,174) = 4.768$, $p = .030$), but did not differ depending on whether candidates were atypical or typical. Similarly, there was a significant main effect between behavior (assertive vs. modest) and social outcome, but not between atypical behavior and social outcome. Modest negotiators were found to be perceived as significantly more likable than assertive negotiators (modest condition: Mean = 4.53, SD = 1.06 vs. assertive condition: Mean = 4.10, SD = 1.29; $F(1,176) = 5.939$, $p = .016$). For participants' concession behavior, there were no significant main effects. Overviews of the results from the ANOVAs, are provided in Table 12 to Table 15.

Influence of Actual Negotiation Behavior (typical vs. atypical) on DVs

Measure	Typical (n = 90)		Atypical (n = 88-90)		ANB
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	F
EO	28886.10	1348.16	28841.03	1809.66	.024
PCB	6356.11	4749.30	5572.03	4182.14	1.391
SO	4.37	1.23	4.26	1.16	.442

Base. N = 178-180, ANOVAs, *p<0.1, ** p < 0.05.

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 12: Results from ANOVA - Actual negotiation behavior

Influence of Candidate Gender (female vs. male) on DVs

Measure	Female (n = 90)		Male (n = 88-90)		Gender
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	F
EO	29124.70	1216.05	28614.41	1849.95	4.768**
PCB	6489.07	5066.31	5499.03	3821.40	2.035
SO	4.40	1.26	4.23	1.13	.931

Base. N = 178-180, ANOVAs, *p<0.1, ** p < 0.05.

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 13: Results from ANOVA - Candidate gender

Influence of Negotiation Behavior (assertive vs. modest) on DVs

Measure	Assertive (n = 90)		Modest (n = 88-90)		Behavior
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	F
EO	29041.57	1283.09	28686.07	1834.84	.128
PCB	5972.23	4034.87	5960.22	4914.25	.000
SO	4.10	1.29	4.53	1.06	5.939**

Base: N = 178-180, ANOVAs, *p<0.1, ** p < 0.05.

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 14: Results from ANOVA - Negotiation behavior

Interactions between Actual Negotiation Behavior and Candidate Gender

Measure	Female		Male		G*ANB	B*ANB
	Atypical	Typical	Atypical	Typical	F	F
	(n=43-44)	(n=44)	(n=46)	(n=45)		
EO	29288.37	28964.75	28810.87	28413.58	-	4.768**
PCB	6056.82	6842.02	5891.33	5098.02	-	-
SO	4.13	4.67	4.08	4.39	5.94**	-

Base: N = 178-180, ANOVAs, *p<0.1, ** p < 0.05.

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 15: Results from two-way ANOVA - Candidate gender per actual negotiation behavior

In the hypotheses 1a to 1d, predictions were being made about how backlash effects compare between different treatment groups (H1a compared agentic women with modest women; H1b compared agentic women with agentic men; H1c compared modest men with agentic men; and H1d compared modest men with modest women). To test these assumptions, multiple independent sample t-tests among the male and female and typical and atypical treatment groups were conducted with actual negotiation behavior (atypical vs. typical) as the independent variable and economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome as the dependent variables. Regarding the economic negotiation outcome, there only was a marginally significant difference between the economic outcome of assertive female and assertive male candidates. Assertive female candidates were found to achieve better economic outcomes than assertive male candidates (assertive female: Mean = 29288.37, SD = 1109.90, assertive male: Mean = 28810.87, SD = 1398.96; $t(87) = 1.776$, $p = .079$). Nevertheless, in H1b, the opposite effect – that assertive women would achieve lower economic outcomes than assertive men – was predicted. Because no further significant differences between assertive or modest candidates of the same gender (H1a and H1c) or atypical and typical candidates of the opposite gender (H1b and H1d) were detected, the data does not provide support for either of the predictions made in H1a to H1d with respect to the economic negotiation outcome. When comparing participants' concession behavior, there only was a marginally significant difference between the concessions made to modest female and male negotiators. Participants were found to make higher concessions to modest female candidates than to modest male candidates (modest female: Mean = 6842.02, SD = 5649.36, modest male: Mean = 5098.02, SD = 3946.14; $t(87) = 1.691$, $p = .094$). This supports the assumption made in H1d. Nevertheless, because there were no further significant differences in participants' concession behavior H1a, H1b and H1c were not supported by the results. Regarding the social outcome of the negotiation, analysis revealed that assertive female candidates were perceived as significantly less likable than modest female candidates (assertive female: Mean = 4.13, SD = 1.33, modest female: Mean = 4.67, SD = 1.14; $t(86) = -2.067$, $p = .042$), providing support for H1a. On the contrary, when comparing the social outcome scores of assertive and modest male candidates, the difference between the groups was not statistically significant, so that H1c was not confirmed. When testing for differences between atypical candidates of one gender with typical candidates of the opposite gender, no significant results were obtained. Thus, results do not provide any evidence for H1b and H1d. For an overview of all results from the independent samples t-tests testing H1a and H1c, as well as H1b and H1d, see Table 16 and Table 17.

Group comparisons same gender, different behavior (H1a and H1c)

Variable	Assertive Condition		Modest Condition		t
	(n=90)		(n=90)		
	M	SD	M	SD	
EO Female	29288.37	1109.90	28964.75	1304.36	-1.25
EO Male	28810.87	1398.96	28413.58	2217.43	1.02
PCB Female	6056.82	4402.76	6842.02	5649.36	-0.73
PCB Male	5891.33	3696.23	5098.02	3946.14	.99
SO Female	4.13	1.33	4.67	1.14	-2.07**
SO Male	4.08	1.26	4.39	.96	-1.33

*p < .1; ** p < .05

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 16: Results from independent samples t-tests H1a and H1c

Group comparisons same behavior, different gender (H1b and H1d)

Variable	Female Condition		Male Condition		t
	(n=90)		(n=90)		
	M	SD	M	SD	
EO Assertive	29288.37	1109.90	28810.87	1398.96	1.79*
EO Modest	28964.75	1304.36	28413.58	2217.43	1.43
PCB Assertive	6056.82	4402.76	5891.33	3696.23	.19
PCB Modest	6842.02	5649.36	5098.02	3946.14	1.69*
SO Assertive	4.13	1.33	4.08	1.26	.19
SO Modest	4.67	1.14	4.39	.96	1.29

*p < .1; ** p < .05

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 17: Results from independent samples t-tests H1b and H1d

Perceived Negotiation Behavior

To test whether perceived negotiation behavior, or in other words, the degree to which candidates were perceived as atypical, predicts the economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome, three multiple linear regression analyses were performed. For

economic outcome, results showed that gender was the only marginally significant predicting variable in the model ($B = -657.05$, $p = .089$). Interpreting the coefficient indicates that economic outcome negatively correlates with the male gender condition, while the opposite is true for the female condition. Overall, these findings are in line with the findings from the above-mentioned one-way ANOVA, not supporting H1, which predicted that atypical negotiators would incur backlash in form of economic reprisals. When analyzing in how far the degree to which candidates are perceived as atypical influences participants' concession behavior, again, only gender was tested to be a significant predictor ($B = -2609.287$, $p = .016$). Participants made smaller concessions to male than to female candidates. Furthermore, perceived negotiation behavior predicted participants' concession behavior with marginal significance ($B = -1631.839$, $p = .083$). The negative coefficient indicates that participants made smaller concession to atypical than to typical candidates, providing (at least marginal) support for H1. Notably, these findings differ from the results obtained from the ANOVA, where no significant differences between either male and female, or atypical and typical candidates were found.

The only model that was tested to be significant was the one predicting the social outcome of the negotiation, explaining 10.5% of the variance ($F(5, 174) = 5.205$, $p < .001$). The predictors "perceived negotiation behavior", "gender" and their interaction term were found to significantly predict social outcome at the .05 significance level. As predicted in H1, the degree to which the candidates were perceived as atypical negatively correlates with their social outcome ($B = -0.813$, $p = .001$). Furthermore, there was a negative correlation between the male gender condition and social outcome, while the opposite was true for the female condition ($B = -.618$, $p = .024$). Additionally, the interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and gender was tested to significantly predict social outcome ($B = 1.250$, $p = .000$). In the male condition, the negative influence of perceived atypical behavior was attenuated, while it was intensified in the female condition. For an overview of the correlations between the dependent variables and perceived negotiation behavior, candidate gender and negotiation behavior, see Table 18.

Correlations between DVs and Perceived Negotiation Behavior, Candidate Gender and Negotiation Behavior

DV	Perc. Neg. Beh.	Gender	Behavior	PNB*G	PNB*B
	B	B	B	B	B
EO	-101.33	-657.05*	-345.90	-185.58	216.03
PCB	-1631.84*	-2609.29**	-220.00	367.52	492.85
SO	-0.81**	-0.62**	.20	1.25***	-0.36*

Base. N = 178 – 180, *p < .01, **p < .05, ***p < .001.

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 18: Overview of results from multiple linear regression - Perceived negotiation behavior

3.3.2.2. H2 - Comparison of Backlash Effects

The basic prediction made in H2 was that when comparing the negotiation outcomes of typical and atypical negotiators of the same gender, backlash is expected to be stronger for atypical women (women acting assertive) than atypical men (men acting modest).

To test this assumption, the results obtained from the analyses presented in chapter 3.3.2.1 were used. Again, it was differentiated between actual negotiation behavior and perceived negotiation behavior.

Testing of H2 – Actual Negotiation Behavior

As shown in the independent samples t-tests conducted in chapter 3.3.2.1, when testing actual negotiation behavior, assertive female candidates were perceived as significantly less likable than modest female candidates (assertive female: Mean = 4.13, SD = 1.33, modest female: Mean = 4.67, SD = 1.14; $t(86) = -2.067$, $p = .042$). On the contrary, the social outcomes of assertive and modest male candidates, were not found to significantly differ. These findings indicate that actual negotiation behavior might interact with gender in such a way, that the influence of atypical behavior depends on the candidate's gender. To test this, an additional two-way ANOVA with “actual negotiation behavior” (typical vs. atypical) and “gender” (male vs. female) as the independent factors and social outcome as the dependent variable was conducted.

Results revealed a significant interaction between “perceived negotiation behavior” and “gender” ($F(1,176) = 5.939$, $p = .016$). While atypical female candidates were rated as less likable than typical female candidates were, the opposite was true for atypical male candidates (*typical female: Mean = 4.67, SD = 1.14 vs. atypical female: Mean = 4.13, SD = 1.33; typical*

male: $Mean = 4.08$, $SD = 1.26$ vs. *atypical male*: $Mean = 4.39$, $SD = .96$; for a visualization see Figure 17 and Figure 18: Means – Social outcome per actual negotiation behavior and gender). Thus, the negative effect atypical behavior on social outcome depends on the gender of the candidate. In other words, this indicates that the social outcome depends on whether the candidate acted assertively or modestly.




Figure 17: Means – Social outcome per actual negotiation behavior and gender 1




Figure 18: Means – Social outcome per actual negotiation behavior and gender 2

This provides support for H2, at least for social outcome. When comparing economic outcomes or participants' concession behavior, no similar significant interactions were detected.

Testing of H2 - Perceived Negotiation Behavior

When testing the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on social outcome, multiple linear regression (see chapter 3.3.2.1) was used. Results show that the interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and gender significantly predicted the social outcome of the negotiation ($B = 1.250$, $p = .000$). When interpreting the respective coefficients, it appears that in the male condition, the negative influence of perceived atypical behavior was attenuated, while it was intensified in the female condition. Neither economic outcome, nor participants' concession behavior were found to be significantly predicted by the interaction between perceived negotiation behavior and gender. Thus, the results from multiple linear regression testing the influence of perceived negotiation behavior confirm the findings from the independent samples t-tests and the two-way ANOVA conducted when testing actual negotiation behavior. These findings provide further support for H2, at least with regard to backlash in form of social reprisals.

3.3.2.3. Moderating Role of Participants' GRO

One of the main insights from the literature review was that backlash against female negotiators can be reduced under certain conditions. For example, when investigating the moderating role of advocacy, it was found that assertive women were penalized less, when negotiating for others, as compared to when they negotiate on their own advances (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a). One of the main purposes of this thesis was to further explore the moderating role of personal characteristics of the negotiation partner in salary negotiation. In particular, the present study aimed at exploring, in how far the negotiation partner's GRO influences the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash. As stated in H3, it was assumed that a more egalitarian GRO of the negotiation partner would reduce the negative impact of atypical behavior on the economic and social outcome of the negotiation. Thus, it was expected that participants with a more egalitarian GRO would penalize atypical candidates (assertive females and modest males) less, than participants with a more traditional GRO. Because, again, there might be a difference between the actual and the perceived negotiation behavior, to test the above presumption, two analytical approaches were employed. First, to test whether participants' relative GRO moderates the relationship between *actual* negotiation behavior and backlash, ANOVA was selected as statistical analysis method. Second, to test whether the participants' GRO moderates

the relationship between *perceived* negotiation behavior and backlash, multiple linear regression was used.

Testing of H3 – Moderating Role of GRO – Actual Negotiation Behavior

To test the moderating role of participants' GRO based on the candidates' actual negotiation behavior, three 2 x 2 (two-way) ANOVAs were conducted. Thereby, actual negotiation behavior (atypical vs. typical), GRO (traditional vs. egalitarian) and the interaction between the two were the independent factors. Additionally, to control for their influence, gender (female vs. male) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) were included as independent (control) factors. Economic outcome, participants' concession behavior, and social outcome were the respective dependent variables.

In a first step, the metric measure for the GRO of the negotiation partner (participant) was transformed into a categorical variable for the ANOVAs. For that purpose, participants were categorized as either "traditional" or "egalitarian" based on their *relative* GRO scores. Because the GRO of the negotiation partner was originally measured based on four-point Likert ratings on 16 items, the median level of the GRO of all participants served as the reference point to determine the *relative* GRO. The basic principle was that participants who scored below the median GRO were categorized as relatively "egalitarian", while participants who scored above the median GRO were categorized as relatively "traditional". The identified median score of the participants' GRO was 1.5625. Thus, participants with a GRO score of 1.5625 or above were categorized as "traditional" (relatively traditional), while participants with a GRO score below 1.5625 were categorized as "egalitarian" (relatively egalitarian). Following this principle of categorization for the economic outcome, of the 178 participants, 92 were categorized as "relatively egalitarian" and 86 participants were categorized as "relatively traditional". For participants' concession behavior, out of 179 participants, 93 were "relatively egalitarian" and 87 "relatively traditional". For social outcome, of the 180 participants, 93 were "relatively egalitarian", and 87 "relatively traditional". Overviews of the allocation of cases per experimental condition and relative GRO are provided in Table 19.

*Relative GRO of Participants * Dependent Variables Cross-tabulation*

Dependent Variable	Relative GRO	Actual Negotiation Behavior		
		Typical	Atypical	Total
EO	Relatively egalitarian	53	39	92
	Relatively traditional	37	49	86
	Total	90	88	178
PCB	Relatively egalitarian	53	39	92
	Relatively traditional	37	50	87
	Total	90	89	179
SO	Relatively egalitarian	53	40	93
	Relatively traditional	37	50	87
	Total	90	90	180

Table 19: Distribution of cases per actual negotiation behavior and relative GRO

Two-Way ANOVA - Economic Outcome

To test whether participants' relative GRO moderates the relationship between actual negotiation behavior and economic outcome, a two-way ANOVA was conducted with actual negotiation behavior (typical vs. atypical) and relative GRO (relatively egalitarian vs. relatively traditional) as the independent factors, and economic outcome as the dependent variable. To control for their influence, the factors gender (female vs. male) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) were included as control factors.

Results confirmed the significant main effect between gender and economic outcome of the previously conducted one-way ANOVA (compare chapter **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**). Again, female candidates were found to be granted significantly higher salaries than male candidates (*female candidates: Mean = 29124.70, SD = 1216.05 vs. male candidates: Mean = 28614.41, SD = 1849.95; $F(1,172) = 4.116, p = 0.044$*). There were no further significant main or interaction effects. Even though, assertive candidates were granted higher salaries than modest candidates, this difference was not statistically significant (*assertive candidates: Mean = 29041.57, SD = 1283.09 vs. modest candidates: Mean = 28686.07, SD = 1834.84; $F(1,172) = 2.708, p = .102$*). The analysis of the two-way interaction between actual negotiation behavior and relative GRO yielded similar results. While participants with a relatively egalitarian GRO granted lower salary requests to atypical candidates than to typical candidates, the opposite was true for participants with a relatively traditional GRO. Nevertheless, the differences between the groups were only small and the interaction was not

statistically significant (*relatively traditional x atypical*: $Mean = 28951.24$, $SD = 1903.73$, vs. *relatively traditional x typical*: $Mean = 28672.95$, $SD = 1577.20$, vs. *relatively egalitarian x atypical*: $Mean = 28702.56$, $SD = 1698.37$, vs. *relatively egalitarian x typical*: $Mean = 29034.91$, $SD = 1154.86$; $F(1,172) = 1.510$, $p = .221$). For a visualization, see Figure 19 and Figure 20. Consequently, according to the results from the two-way ANOVA, participants' relative GRO does not moderate the relationship between actual negotiation behavior and economic outcome.




Figure 19: Interaction relative GRO * Actual negotiation behavior - Economic outcome 1



Figure 20: Interaction relative GRO * Actual negotiation behavior - Economic outcome 2

Because it there was a significant main effect between *gender* and economic outcome it would also be interesting to test in how far participants' relative GRO moderates this relationship. Notably, this exceeds the scope of H3, which specifically predicted the moderation between *atypical behavior* and economic outcome, and can thus only be presented as a side result. To test whether relative GRO moderates the relationship between gender and economic outcome, an additional three-way ANOVA was carried out with actual negotiation behavior (atypical vs. typical), gender (female vs. male) and relative GRO (traditional vs. egalitarian) as the independent factors. This side analysis revealed that there is a marginally significant interaction between relative GRO and gender (*relatively traditional x female*: $Mean = 28892.08$, $SD = 1409.45$, vs. *relatively traditional x male*: $Mean = 28783.56$, $SD = 2017.97$, vs. *relatively egalitarian x female*: $Mean = 29305.10$, $SD = 1020.84$, vs. *relatively egalitarian x male*: $Mean = 28425.58$, $SD = 1645.39$; $F(1,170) = 3.655$, $p = .058$). Although both, participants with a relatively egalitarian and traditional GRO, granted lower salaries to men than to women, the difference between economic outcomes for men and women was larger among participants with a relatively egalitarian GRO (see Figure 21 and Figure 22 for a visualization).




Figure 21: Interaction relative GRO * Gender - Economic outcome 1




Figure 22: Interaction relative GRO * Gender - Economic outcome 2

Two-Way ANOVA – Participants’ Concession Behavior

To test whether participants’ relative GRO moderates the relationship between actual negotiation behavior and participants’ concession behavior, a two-way ANOVA was conducted with the actual negotiation behavior (typical vs. atypical) and relative GRO (relatively egalitarian vs. relatively traditional) as the independent factors. Furthermore, the factors gender (female vs. male) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) were included as control variables.

Similar to the results from previous analyses, the two-way ANOVA did not reveal any significant main or interaction effects at the .05 significance level. While participants made smaller concessions to male than to female candidates, the difference was not statistically significant (*male candidates: Mean = 5499.03, SD = 3821.40 vs. female candidates: Mean = 6489.07, SD = 5066.31; $F(1,173) = 1.858, p = .175$*). Neither was the difference between concessions made to assertive and modest candidates significant (*assertive candidates: Mean = 5972.23, SD = 4034.87 vs. modest candidates: Mean = 5960.22, SD = 4914.25; $F(1,173) = .002, p = .962$*), or to atypical and typical candidates (*atypical candidates: Mean = 5601.26, SD = 4196.95 vs. typical candidates: Mean = 6356.11, SD = 4749.30; $F(1,173) = 1.271, p = .261$*). Most importantly, results showed that there was no significant two-way interaction between actual negotiation behavior and relative GRO. While both, participants with a relatively egalitarian and traditional GRO made smaller concessions to atypical candidates than to typical candidates, the difference between concessions made to atypical and typical candidates was

larger among participants with a relatively egalitarian GRO. Still, the differences between the groups were only small and the interaction was not statistically significant (*relatively traditional x atypical*: $Mean = 5632.22$, $SD = 3941.59$, vs. *relatively traditional x typical*: $Mean = 6070.27$, $SD = 5023.52$, vs. *relatively egalitarian x atypical*: $Mean = 5494.87$, $SD = 4523.21$, vs. *relatively egalitarian x typical*: $Mean = 6555.66$, $SD = 4586.46$; $F(1,173) = .104$, $p = .748$). For a visualization, see Figure 23 and Figure 24.




Figure 23: Interaction relative GRO * Actual negotiation behavior - Participants' concession behavior 1




Figure 24: Interaction relative GRO * Actual negotiation behavior - Participants' concession behavior 2

Two-Way ANOVA - Social Outcome

To test whether participants' relative GRO moderates the relationship between actual negotiation behavior and the social outcome of the negotiation, a two-way ANOVA was conducted with the actual negotiation behavior (typical vs. atypical) and relative GRO (relatively egalitarian vs. relatively traditional) as the independent factors and social outcome as the dependent variable. Additionally, to account for their influence, the factors gender (female vs. male) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) were included as control factors.

Similar to the results from previous analyses, the two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect between behavior and social outcome at the .05 significance level. Assertive candidates were perceived as significantly less likable than modest candidates (*assertive candidates: Mean = 4.102, SD = 1.286 vs. modest candidates: Mean = 4.528, SD = 1.057; $F(1,174) = 6.887, p = .009$*). Apart from that, there were no further significant main or interaction effects. Gender did not significantly influence the social outcome of the negotiation ($F(1,174) = 1.34, p = .249$), neither did actual negotiation behavior ($F(1,174) = .77, p = .383$). Neither was there a significant two-way interaction between actual negotiation behavior and relative GRO ($F(1,174) = .93, p = .336$). Even though, participants with a relatively traditional GRO disliked atypical candidates more than participants with a relatively traditional GRO, the difference was not statistically significant (*relatively traditional x atypical: Mean = 4.28, SD = 1.12, vs. relatively traditional x typical: Mean = 4.53, SD = 1.15, vs. relatively egalitarian x atypical: Mean = 4.24, SD = 1.21, vs. relatively egalitarian x typical: Mean = 4.26, SD = 1.29.*). For a visualization, see Figure 25 and Figure 26.




Figure 25: Interaction relative GRO * Actual negotiation behavior – Social outcome 1




Figure 26: Interaction relative GRO * Actual negotiation behavior – Social outcome 2

Because there was a significant main effect between *behavior* and social outcome it would also be interesting to test in how far participants' relative GRO moderates this relationship. Because this exceeds the scope of H3, which specifically predicted the moderation between *atypical behavior* and social outcome, the following results should be considered additional. To test whether relative GRO moderates the relationship between behavior and social outcome, a three-way ANOVA was conducted with actual negotiation behavior (atypical vs. typical), behavior (assertive vs. modest) and relative GRO (traditional vs. egalitarian) as the independent factors. However, this side analysis did not reveal any further significant interactions. Both, participants with a relatively egalitarian and traditional GRO liked assertive candidates less than modest candidates. Although, the difference between social outcomes for assertive and modest candidates was larger among participants with a relatively egalitarian GRO (see Figure 27 for a visualization), this difference was not statistically significant. (*Relatively traditional x assertive*: Mean = 4.32, SD = 1.16, vs. *relatively traditional x modest*: Mean = 4.46, SD = 1.11, vs. *relatively egalitarian x assertive*: Mean = 3.85, SD = 1.39, vs. *relatively egalitarian x modest*: Mean = 4.58, SD = 1.02; $F(1,172) = 2.055, p = .154$).




Figure 27: Interaction relative GRO * Behavior - Social outcome

Problems Involved in ANOVAs

When interpreting the results obtained from the analyses testing the moderating role of participants' relative GRO in the relationship between atypical behavior and economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome, it needs to be noted that the reliability of these results might be compromised. The main problem involved in both, the two- and the additional three-way ANOVAs was that, due to the grouping of participants according to their relative GRO, group sizes across treatments were very unequal. For example, there were considerably more egalitarian participants in the “female x assertive x traditional” condition ($n=26$), than in the “female x assertive x egalitarian” condition ($n=17$) (for the complete allocation of cases for each dependent variable, see Table 19). This led to two problems. First, for group comparisons with group sizes smaller than 30 cases per group, normality of the data cannot naturally be assumed. Second, the statistical power of the ANOVA decreases when the assumption of equal variances is violated *and* there are unequal group sizes. While group sizes were unequal in all ANOVAs, for the ANOVA with participants' concession behavior as the dependent variable, at least the assumption of equal variances was met (for the results of the Levene's Test, see 7.3.2.2), so that the ANOVA should be fairly robust against the violation of the assumption of equal group sizes. Nevertheless, for the ANOVAs with economic outcome and social outcome as the dependent variables, group sizes were unequal *and* the condition of equal variances was violated. Thus, at least for the ANOVAs with economic and social outcome as the dependent variable, it is likely that statistical power was reduced. Unequal group sizes

across experimental conditions are a common problem related to natural grouping mechanisms. Therefore, grouping participants according to their relative GRO scores, and employing a factorial design might not lead to the most accurate results regarding the moderating role of participants' GRO. In the present study, the underlying prediction of the moderation effect was that participants would penalize atypical negotiators less, the more egalitarian their GRO is (= the lower they score on the GRO scale). Thus, using participants' original GRO score in multiple linear regression is an alternative to the factorial solution. Ultimately, operationalizing participants' GRO as a metric variable in multiple linear regression should lead to results that are even more accurate and circumvents the problem of unequal group sizes across conditions.

Testing H3 – Moderating Role of GRO – Perceived Negotiation Behavior

As mentioned previously, regarding the operationalization of atypical behavior, a differentiation was made between *actual* negotiation behavior (a binary variable with the levels atypical vs. typical) and *perceived* negotiation behavior (a metric variable expressing the degree to which participants perceive the candidate's behavior as atypical). Thus, in addition to the ANOVAs measuring whether participants' *relative* GRO moderates the relationship between *actual* negotiation behavior and backlash, multiple linear regression analyses were performed to explore whether participants' GRO moderates the relationship between *perceived* negotiation behavior and economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome, as predicted in H3. The underlying assumption was that with a more egalitarian GRO of the participants, backlash in form of economic and social reprisals would decrease. Thus, the negative effect of atypical behavior on the dependent variables, economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome, was expected to be weakened the more egalitarian participants are.

Because the regression analysis shall yield insights about the influence of the degree to which participants perceived the candidates as atypical, the metric variable "perceived negotiation behavior" was used to predict backlash. This variable was based on the degree to which participants perceived candidates as atypical (for a detailed description of the actual negotiation behavior scale, refer to chapter 3.2.3.3). To measure GRO, participants' average scores on the GRO scale were employed. Because the results from previous analyses indicated that the factors "gender" and "behavior" also influence the negotiation outcomes, these variables were included into the regression analyses as additional predictors to control for their influence.

Multiple Linear Regression – Economic Outcome

A multiple linear regression analysis was run, to test whether the interaction between atypical behavior and the GRO of the negotiation partner, predicts the economic outcome of the negotiation. The predictors included in the regression analysis were “perceived negotiation behavior” (X_1), “gender” (X_2), “behavior” (X_3), “participant GRO” (X_4) and “perceived negotiation behavior * GRO” (X_5). To ensure that there was no violation of the assumptions necessary for multiple linear regression, preliminary analyses were performed. Results showed that overall the data met all required standards to perform multiple linear regression (see Appendix 7.3.2.1 for the respective test results). As in the preliminary analyses of the previous multiple linear regressions (compare chapter 3.3.2.1), complications emerged only with regard to the assumption of collinearity. There was a correlation of $-.782$ between X_1 and X_2 . Nevertheless, when considering the respective Tolerance and VIF values for the respective variables, collinearity can still be assumed (X_1 : Tolerance = $.356$, $VIF = 2.810$; X_2 : Tolerance = $.371$, $VIF = 2.698$). Furthermore, to facilitate interpretation, the continuous predictors “perceived negotiation behavior” and “participant GRO” were mean-centered. Results showed that the model explained 3.5% of the variance ($R^2 = .063$; adjusted $R^2 = .035$), which is indicative for a low goodness-of-fit according to Cohen (2013).

The final predictive model was:

$$\text{Economic Outcome} = 29459.942 - 203.761X_1 - 726.051X_2 - 429.762X_3 - 203.805X_4 - 557.372X_5 + \varepsilon_i$$

$$X_1 = PNB_mc \text{ (perceived negotiation behavior)}$$

$$X_2 = GG \text{ (gender grouped)}$$

$$X_3 = BG \text{ (behavior grouped)}$$

$$X_4 = GRO_mc \text{ (gender role orientation)}$$

$$X_5 = PNB_GRO \text{ (interaction term perceived negotiation behavior * GRO)}$$

Overall, the model was tested to be a significant predictor of economic outcome, $F(4, 172) = 2.300$, $p = .047$. Regarding the individual influence of the predicting variables, X_2 , X_3 and X_5 predicted economic outcome only marginally significantly (X_2 : $B = -726.051$, $p = .061$; X_3 : $B = -429.762$, $p = .072$; X_5 : $B = -557.372$, $p = .076$), while X_1 and X_4 were not found to be significant predictors in the model (X_1 : $B = -203.761$, $p = .382$; X_4 : $B = -203.805$, $p = .403$). See Table 20 for the coefficient and significance results.

Coefficients^a

		Unstandardized		Stand.		95,0% Confidence		
		Coefficients		Coefficients		Interval for B		
						Lower	Upper	
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Bound	Bound
1	(Constant)	29459,942	269,328		109,383	,000	28928,328	29991,555
	X ₁	-203,761	232,531	-,108	-,876	,382	-662,742	255,221
	X ₂	-726,051	384,315	-,229	-1,889	,061	-1484,633	32,531
	X ₃	-429,762	237,248	-,136	-1,811	,072	-898,053	38,530
	X ₄	-203,805	242,990	-,063	-,839	,403	-683,432	275,823
	X ₅	-557,372	312,205	-,137	-1,785	,076	-1173,619	58,875

a. Dependent variable: Economic outcome

Table 20: Coefficients and significance values for economic outcome - H3

The marginally significant predictors in the model were gender (male vs. female), behavior (assertive vs. modest) and the interaction of perceived negotiation behavior and participants' GRO. The interpretation of their coefficients leads to the following observations. Because the reference category of the dichotomous variable gender was the female condition, the regression coefficient of -726.051 indicates that male candidates' negotiation outcome was 726.05€ lower than the one of female candidates, holding all other factors constant. Similarly, for behavior the coefficient of -429.762 indicates that the economic outcome for modest candidates was 429.76€ lower than the economic outcome of assertive candidates, holding all other factors constant. The marginally significant interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and participant GRO indicates that the influence of the degree to which participants perceive a candidate as atypical on economic outcome depends on the GRO of the participant. Thus, when interpreting the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on economic outcome, the dependency (interaction) between perceived negotiation behavior and GRO needs to be considered. In particular, results indicate that, when GRO increases by one unit, the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on economic outcome changes by -557.37€ per level of GRO. Because the regression coefficient of the interaction term is negative, the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on economic outcome should decrease, the lower (ergo the more traditional) participants' GRO is. Conversely, it should increase, the more egalitarian participants are. For a graphical illustration of the interaction effect, see Figure 28.




Figure 28: Interaction perceived negotiation behavior * GRO - MLR economic outcome

By themselves, the continuous predictors “perceived negotiation behavior” and “participant GRO” do not significantly predict economic outcome.

Multiple Linear Regression – Participants’ Concession Behavior

A second multiple linear regression analysis was run, to test whether the interaction between atypical behavior and the GRO of the negotiation partner, predicts the participants’ concession behavior. Again, the predictors included were “perceived negotiation behavior” (X_1), “gender” (X_2), “behavior” (X_3), “participant GRO” (X_4) and “perceived negotiation behavior * GRO” (X_5). Results of preliminary analysis showed that overall the data met all required standards to perform multiple linear regression (see Appendix 7.3.2.2 for the respective test results). As before, complications emerged only with regard to the assumption of collinearity. There was a correlation of $-.782$ between X_1 and X_2 . Nevertheless, when considering the respective Tolerance and VIF values for the respective variables, collinearity can still be assumed (X_1 : Tolerance = $.362$, $VIF = 2.766$; X_2 : Tolerance = $.378$, $VIF = 2.645$). Furthermore, to facilitate interpretation, the continuous predictors “perceived negotiation behavior” and “participant GRO” were mean-centered.

The final predictive model was:

$$\text{Participants' Concession Behavior} = 7517.770 - 1442.012X_1 - 2783.023X_2 - 232.878X_3 \\ + 78.101X_4 - 714.338X_5 + \varepsilon_i$$

$X_1 = \text{PNB_mc}$ (perceived negotiation behavior)

$X_2 = \text{GG}$ (gender grouped)

$X_3 = \text{BG}$ (behavior grouped)

$X_4 = \text{GRO_mc}$ (gender role orientation)

$X_5 = \text{PNB_GRO}$ (interaction term perceived negotiation behavior * GRO)

The model explained 1.1% of the variance ($R^2 = .039$; adjusted $R^2 = .011$), which is indicative for a low goodness-of-fit according to Cohen (2013). Overall, the model was not tested to be a significant predictor of participants' concession behavior, $F(4, 173) = 1.388$, $p = .231$. Regarding the individual influence of the predicting variables, only X_1 and X_2 were tested to be significant predictors of participants' concession behavior (X_1 : $B = -1442.012$, $p = .030$; X_2 : $B = -278.023$, $p = .011$). None of the other predictors was found to significantly predict participants' concession behavior (X_3 : $B = -232.878$, $p = .731$; X_4 : $B = 78.101$, $p = .909$; X_5 : $B = -714.338$, $p = .424$). See Table 21 for an overview of the coefficient and significance results.

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized		Stand.		95,0% Confidence		
	Coefficients		Coefficients		Interval for B		
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	7517,770	755,808		9,947	,000	6025,978	9009,563
X ₁	-1442,012	658,957	-,271	-2,188	,030	-2742,642	-141,382
X ₂	-2783,023	1083,719	-,311	-2,568	,011	-4922,037	-644,009
X ₃	-232,878	674,987	-,026	-,345	,731	-1565,148	1099,393
X ₄	78,101	684,840	,009	,114	,909	-1273,616	1429,819
X ₅	-714,338	891,041	-,062	-,802	,424	-2473,050	1044,373

a. Dependent variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

Table 21: Coefficients and significance values for participants' concession behavior - H3

Even though, the overall model was not significant, significant predictors can be interpreted individually. The significant predictors in the above model were the continuous variable “perceived negotiation behavior” and the dichotomous variable “gender” (male vs. female). The negative coefficient of X_1 indicates that participants' concession behavior negatively correlates with perceived negotiation behavior. In more detail, if the degree to which candidates

are perceived as atypical increases by one unit, participants concessions decrease by 1442.01€, holding all other factors constant. For the dichotomous variable gender, interpretation differs slightly. Because the reference category of gender was the female condition, the regression coefficient of -2783.023 indicates that, holding all other factors constant, participants make 2783.02€ lower concessions to male candidates than they make to female candidates.

As the predictors behavior (assertive vs. modest), participant GRO and the interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and participant GRO were not found to significantly predict participants' concession behavior, they are not further interpreted.

Multiple Linear Regression – Social Outcome

A third multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to test whether the interaction between atypical behavior and the GRO of the negotiation partner predicts the social outcome of the negotiation. The predictors included in the predictive model were “perceived negotiation behavior” (X_1), “gender” (X_2), “behavior” (X_3), and “participant GRO” (X_4), as well as the interaction terms “perceived negotiation behavior * gender” (X_5) and “perceived negotiation behavior * GRO” (X_6). Results of preliminary analysis showed that overall, the data met all required standards to perform multiple linear regression (see Appendix 7.3.2.2 for the respective test results). As before, complications emerged only with regard to the assumption of collinearity. There was a negative correlation between X_1 and X_2 ($r = -.780$), and a positive correlation of between X_1 and X_5 ($r = .844$). Nevertheless, when considering the Tolerance and VIF values for the respective variables, collinearity can still be assumed (X_1 : Tolerance = .181, $VIF = 5.518$; X_2 : Tolerance = .375, $VIF = 2.668$; X_5 : Tolerance = .248, $VIF = 4.030$). Furthermore, the continuous predictors “perceived negotiation behavior” and “participant GRO” were mean-centered to facilitate interpretation.

Results of the multiple linear regression for social outcome indicated that the model explains 9.2% of the variance ($R^2 = .123$; adjusted $R^2 = .092$), which represents still a low goodness-of-fit according to Cohen (2013) (medium goodness of fit is assumed for $|R^2|$ between .13 and .26). Overall, the model was tested to be a significant predictor of economic outcome, $F(4, 173) = 4.034$, $p = .001$. Regarding the individual influence of the predicting variables, X_1 , X_2 and X_5 significantly predicted social outcome at the significance level of .05 (X_1 : $B = -.882$, $p = .000$; X_2 : $B = -0.625$, $p = .025$; X_5 : $B = 1.078$, $p = .002$). In contrast, X_3 , X_4 and X_6 were not found to be significant predictors in the model (X_3 : $B = .223$, $p = .211$; X_4 : $B = .140$, $p = .428$; X_6 : $B = -.199$, $p = .384$). See Table 22 for the coefficient and significance results.

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	4,882	,235		20,742	,000	4,418	5,347
X ₁	-,882	,235	-,628	-3,753	,000	-1,346	-,418
X ₂	-,625	,277	-,263	-2,257	,025	-1,171	-,079
X ₃	,223	,178	,094	1,255	,211	-,128	,575
X ₄	,140	,176	,058	,794	,428	-,208	,488
X ₅	1,078	,344	,448	3,133	,002	,399	1,758
X ₆	-,199	,228	-,066	-,872	,384	-,648	,251

a. Dependent variable: Social outcome

Table 22: Coefficients and significance values for social outcome - H3

The final predictive model was:

$$\text{Social Outcome} = 4.882 - 0.882X_1 - 0.625X_2 + 0.223X_3 + 0.140X_4 + 1.078X_5 - 0.199X_6 + \varepsilon_i$$

$$X_1 = \text{PNB_mc (perceived negotiation behavior)}$$

$$X_2 = \text{GG (gender grouped)}$$

$$X_3 = \text{BG (behavior grouped)}$$

$$X_4 = \text{GRO (gender role orientation)}$$

$$X_5 = \text{PNB_GG (interaction term)}$$

$$X_6 = \text{PNB_GRO (interaction term)}$$

The significant predictors in the model are perceived negotiation behavior, gender (male vs. female), and the interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and gender. The interpretation of their coefficients leads to the following observations. For the continuous predicting variable perceived negotiation behavior, the negative coefficient indicates that social outcome negatively correlates with the degree to which participants perceive the candidates as atypical. Particularly, if the degree to which candidates are perceived as atypical increases by one unit, participants' social outcomes decrease by .882 units, holding all other factors constant. For the dichotomous predictor gender, the regression coefficient of -.625 indicates that, generally, male candidates' social outcomes decrease by .625 units, while for female candidates, social outcomes should increase by .625 units, holding all other factors constant. Nevertheless, because the interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and gender also was significant, the dependency (interaction) between perceived negotiation behavior and

gender needs to be considered when interpreting their influence. This is because the significant interaction term indicates that the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on social outcome depends on the gender of the candidate and vice versa. In particular, for male candidates the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on social outcome is expected to change by 1.078 units. Because the regression coefficient of the interaction term is positive, in the male condition, the negative influence of being perceived as atypical on social outcome should decrease, or be attenuated. For female candidates on the other hand, the coefficient would be -1.078. Thus, for female candidates, the negative influence of being perceived as atypical on social outcome should increase, or be intensified. For a graphical illustration of the interaction effect, see Figure 29.




Figure 29: Interaction perceived negotiation behavior * gender - MLR social outcome

As the predictors behavior (assertive vs. modest), participant GRO and the interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and participant GRO were not found to significantly predict participants' concession behavior, they are not further interpreted.

Summary Moderating Role of GRO

H3 predicted that the participants' GRO would moderate the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash in form of economic and social reprisals. In particular, it was expected that participants with a more egalitarian GRO would penalize atypical candidates (assertive females and modest males) less than participants with a more traditional GRO. Because, again, a difference was being made between the actual and perceived negotiation behavior, moderation analysis followed two different analytical approaches. First, to test whether participants'

relative GRO moderates the relationship between *actual* negotiation behavior and backlash, ANOVA was selected as statistical analysis method. Second, to test whether the participants' GRO moderates the relationship between *perceived* negotiation behavior and backlash, multiple linear regression was used.

Actual Negotiation Behavior

To test the moderating role of participants' GRO based on the candidates' *actual* negotiation behavior, three 2 x 2 (two-way) ANOVAs were conducted, with actual negotiation behavior (atypical vs. typical) and GRO (traditional vs. egalitarian) as the independent factors and economic outcome, participants' concession behavior, and social outcome were the dependent variables. Additionally, to control for their influence, gender (female vs. male) and behavior (assertive vs. modest) were included as independent (control) factors.

For economic outcome, results did confirm the significant main effect between gender and economic outcome that had already been found in the one-way ANOVA. The interaction between actual negotiation behavior and participants' GRO was not tested to be significant, so the present data does not support the assumption made in H3. Additional analysis of a potential two-way interaction between gender and participants' GRO revealed a marginally significant effect ($F(1,170) = 3.655, p = .058$). This indicates that, although both, participants with a relatively egalitarian and traditional GRO, granted lower salaries to men than to women, the difference between economic outcomes for men and women was larger among participants with a relatively egalitarian GRO.

The two-way ANOVA with participants' concession behavior as the dependent variable did not reveal any significant main or interaction effects. Regarding the concessions participants made to the candidates, no significant interaction between actual negotiation behavior and participants' GRO was detected ($F(1,173) = .104, p = .748$). Thus, the present results do not confirm the predictions made in H3. Regarding the moderating role of participants' GRO between actual negotiation behavior and social outcome, again, the previously established main effect between behavior and social outcome was confirmed. The predicted two-way interaction between actual negotiation behavior and participants' GRO was not found to be significant ($F(1,174) = .93, p = .336$). For an overview of the results of the moderation analyses, see Table 23.

Two-way Interactions between relative GRO and Actual Negotiation Behavior, Candidate Gender and Behavior Condition

DV	Atypical				Typical				ANB*	G*	B*
									RGRO	RGRO	RGRO
	Egalitarian		Traditional		Egalitarian		Traditional				
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	F	F	F
EO	28702.56	1698.37	28951.24	1903.73	29034.91	1154.86	28672.95	1577.20	1.51	3.66*	-
PCB	5494.87	4523.21	5632.22	3941.59	6555.66	4586.46	6070.27	5023.52	.10*	-	-
SO	4.24	1.21	4.28	1.12	4.26	1.29	4.53	1.15	.93	-	2.06

Base. N = 178-180, ANOVAs, *p < 0.1.

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 23: Overview of Results from Moderation Analysis - ANOVA

Perceived Negotiation Behavior

When analyzing the moderating role of participants' GRO in the relationship between perceived negotiation behavior and backlash with help of multiple linear regression, participants' GRO, as well as, atypical behavior were included as continuous variables, avoiding the problem of unequal group sizes. As predicted in H3, it was expected that the negative influence of perceived atypical behavior on the dependent variables, economic outcome, participants' concession behavior and social outcome, would be weakened the more egalitarian participants are. Regarding the economic outcome, the interaction term between perceived negotiation behavior and participants' GRO was tested to be marginally significant ($B = -557.372$, $p = .076$). Interpretation of the respective regression coefficients revealed that the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on economic outcome tends to decrease, the lower (ergo the more traditional) participants' GRO is. For an overview of the regression coefficients see Table 24.

Thus, in contrast to the results from the two-way ANOVA, these results generally provide support for the assumption that participants' GRO moderates the relationship between perceived atypical behavior and economic outcome. Nevertheless, when interpreting the regression coefficients, results indicate that the negative influence of perceived atypical behavior is attenuated when participants' endorse a traditional GRO, while it should be intensified when they endorse an egalitarian GRO. This is the opposite of what was expected according to H3. Regarding the moderating role of participants' GRO in the relationship between perceived negotiation behavior and participants' concession behavior, no significant interaction was found ($B = -714.338$, $p = .424$). Thus, H3 is not supported when analyzing the concessions participants made to atypical or typical candidates. Similarly, GRO was not found to moderate the relationship between the degree to which candidates are perceived as atypical and the social outcome of the negotiation ($B = -.199$, $p = .384$).

Regression Coefficients

DV	Perceived Neg. Beh.	Gender	Behavior	GRO	PNB*GRO	PNB*GG
	B	B	B	B	B	B
EO	-203.76	-726.05*	-429.76*	-203.81	-557.37*	-
PCB	-1442.01**	-2783.02**	-232.88	78.10	-714.34	-
SO	-.88***	-.63**	.22	.14	.38	1.08**

Base. N = 178 – 180, *p < .01, **p < .05, ***p < .001.

Note. Economic outcome: Means based on participants' final offers. Participants' concession behavior: Means based on difference between participants' initial and final offer. Social outcome: Means based on 7-point Likert Scale from 1 = not at all likable to 7 = extremely likable.

Table 24: Overview Results Multiple Linear Regression - Moderating Role of GRO

3.3.2.4. Mediator Effect of Social Outcome

This study also aimed at exploring the mechanisms behind backlash against atypical individuals to get a deeper understanding of factors that drive such negative reactions. Thus, in addition to exploring the direct relationship between atypical behavior and backlash in form of social and economic reprisals, the relationship between the dependent variables, social and economic outcome, was analyzed. In other words, it was tested whether the degree to which a candidate was perceived as likable (social outcome) explains, or mediates, the relationship between atypical behavior and economic outcome. The assumption was that there is a relationship between the degree to which candidates were perceived as atypical and their social outcomes, as well as between the candidates' social and economic outcomes (H4). Specifically, it was predicted that the degree to which candidates were perceived as atypical negatively affects the degree to which they were perceived as likable (social outcome). The degree to which candidates were perceived as likable (social outcome), in turn, was expected to positively affect the size of the offer made to the candidates (economic outcome) and the size of the concessions made to them (participants' concession behavior).

To test whether atypical negotiation behavior predicts the economic outcome and participants' concession behavior and whether these relationships are mediated by the degree to which candidates were perceived as likable, the data was subjected to two simple mediation analyses based on linear regression. For both analyses, the PROCESS macro by Hayes (2017) was used. PROCESS uses ordinary least squares regression. Furthermore, bootstrapping with 5000 samples and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors were used (Davidson &

MacKinnon, 1993). Statistical significance of the effects was assumed when confidence intervals did not include zero. The influence of the independent variable “perceived negotiation behavior” was measured based on the degree to which participants perceived the candidates as atypical (metric variable of negotiation behavior). Similarly, the mediating variable “social outcome” was integrated into the model as the degree to which participants perceived the candidates as likable. The dependent variables, “economic outcome” and “participants’ concession behavior” were measured based on the negotiation outcomes in Euro. For a detailed description of the respective measures, refer to chapter 3.2.3.

Testing H4 – Economic Outcome

Results for the direct relationship between the degree to which candidates were perceived as atypical and the economic outcome of the negotiation showed that there was no significant effect between the two variables, $B = -137.70$, $p = .469$. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a significant direct effect is a necessary condition to statistically prove mediation effects. Nevertheless, this is contested by other researchers, who suggest that even with a non-significant direct effect, the analysis of mediation effects can be continued (Rucker et al., 2011; X. Zhao et al., 2010).

Thus, after including the mediator “Social outcome” into the model, the model was tested for indirect effects. Results show that the degree to which candidates were perceived as atypical did predict social outcome with marginal significance, $B = -.32$, $p = .079$. Nevertheless, the degree to which candidates were perceived as likable significantly was not found to predict economic outcome, $B = 50.57$, $p = .597$. Thus, the relationship between perceived atypical behavior and economic outcome was not found to be mediated by the degree to which candidates were perceived as likable, indirect effect $ab = -16.01$, 95%-CI $[-103.87, 46.83]$ (also see Figure 30).




Figure 30: Graphical illustration of mediation effect - Economic outcome

Testing H4 – Participants’ Concession Behavior

Regarding the influence of perceived negotiation behavior on participants’ concession behavior, results indicate that there is a significant direct effect between the degree to which candidates were perceived as atypical and the size of the concessions made to them, $B = -1212.72$, $p = .045$. Further analysis of the indirect effects revealed that, after including the mediator “perceived likability” into the model, perceived negotiation behavior did only marginally significantly predict perceived social outcome, $B = -.31$, $p = .083$. However, social outcome did not significantly predict participants’ concession behavior, $B = -278.18$, $p = .280$. Thus, the relationship between the degree to which candidates were perceived as atypical and relative economic outcome was not found to be mediated by the degree to which they were perceived as likable, indirect effect $ab = 86.13$, 95%-CI $[-74.86, 314.53]$ (also see Figure 31).




Figure 31: Graphical illustration of mediation effect – Participants’ concession behavior

3.3.2.5. Summary of Results from Statistical Data Analysis

To facilitate the subsequent discussion of the statistical results, the following section summarizes and highlights the most important results from preliminary analyses and hypotheses-testing.

First, preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that the measures included in the present study were accurate and that participants were successfully primed according to the experimental manipulation. Analysis of internal consistency revealed that for the negotiation behavior scale the Cronbach’s Alpha of .663 was not optimal. Because the scale included multiple dimensions, an additional explorative factor analysis was conducted and ultimately yielded a scale with two dimensions that were interpreted as “task oriented” and “relationship oriented”. Furthermore, the present study included two important experimental manipulations, one relating to the gender and one to the negotiation behavior of the candidate. For the gender

manipulation to be successful, participants needed to correctly identify the candidate's gender (female or male). Participants who failed at this task, were excluded from data analysis. Regarding the negotiation behavior, successful manipulation was assumed if participants perceived candidates in the assertive condition as more assertive than in the modest condition and vice versa. Therefore, it was tested whether participants assigned to the assertive condition attributed the candidate as significantly more assertive, than participants assigned to the modest condition. While results generally supported this assumption when comparing the assertive and modest condition, this was not the case when groups were further separated according to the candidates' gender. While analyses comparing attributions between the assertive and modest behavior condition in the female treatment group revealed a significant difference in perceptions of assertiveness, this was not the case when comparing the assertive and modest behavior condition in the male treatment group. The same pattern emerged when testing perceptions of atypical behavior.

After testing for the success of the experimental manipulation, it was tested in multiple analyses whether participants economically or socially penalized atypical candidates. It was expected that participants would make lower offers and smaller concessions to atypical than to typical candidates and that they would perceive them as less likable. Thereby, it was distinguished between *actual* atypical behavior and *perceived* atypical behavior.

When testing for the influence of actual negotiation behavior, results revealed that typical candidates achieved better economic and social outcomes and were granted higher concessions than atypical candidates, but none of these differences were statistically significant. Instead, economic outcome was mainly influenced by the candidates' gender, as in female candidates received significantly higher final offers than male candidates, irrespective of their behavior. Similarly, social outcome was primarily influenced by the candidates' behavior, meaning that assertive candidates were liked significantly less than modest candidates.

Regarding the influence of perceived negotiation behavior, similar results were obtained for economic outcome. Nevertheless, results differed when testing for differences in participants' concession behavior and candidates' social outcome. Perceptions of atypical behavior were shown to negatively correlate with participants' concession behavior and candidates' social outcomes. The more participants perceived the candidates as atypical, the smaller the concessions made to them and the less they were liked. Regarding the social outcome, there also was a significant interaction between gender and perceived negotiation behavior. While being female intensified the negative influence of being perceived as atypical on likability, being male attenuated the negative influence.

When further testing how economic and social outcomes compared among the different treatment groups, support was found for the assumption that assertive female candidates were liked significantly less than modest female candidates. Notably, this was not the case when comparing assertive and modest male candidates. This supports the aforementioned observation that gender moderates the relationship between atypical/assertive negotiation behavior and social outcome. An additional moderation analysis confirmed the moderation for both, actual and perceived negotiation behavior. Apart from this, support was found for the assumption that modest female candidates are granted higher concessions than modest male candidates. Nevertheless, the difference was only marginally significant. Furthermore, when comparing the economic outcomes of assertive female and modest male candidates, a marginally significant difference was detected. Nevertheless, the observed effect went into the opposite direction as predicted, indicating that assertive females achieved better final offers than modest males.

Another important part of the analysis was to test the moderating role of participants' GRO in the relationship between actual, as well as perceived negotiation behavior, and economic and social negotiation outcomes. It was assumed that participants with a more egalitarian GRO would economically and socially penalize atypical candidates less, than participants with a more traditional GRO. Results did not confirm this prediction when analyzing the moderating role of GRO between *actual* negotiation behavior and economic and social outcome. However, using a different statistical approach, participant GRO was shown to marginally significantly moderate the relationship between *perceived* negotiation behavior and economic outcome. Nevertheless, the direction of the moderation effect deviated from the prediction made in H3. While a more traditional GRO was found to attenuate the negative influence of perceived atypical behavior on economic outcome, a more egalitarian GRO was found to intensify it.

Lastly, to gain more insights about the interconnectedness of the independent and dependent variables, it was tested whether the social negotiation outcome (likability) explains, or mediates, the relationships between perceived negotiation behavior and economic outcome and participants' concession behavior respectively. However, results did not provide support for the mediating role of social outcome in neither of the relationships.

4. Discussion

The present study examined the influence of atypical behavior on different outcome variables using the example of an experimental entry-salary negotiation. Apart from that, the moderating role of "gender role orientation" in the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash was tested empirically. In the following chapter, results will be interpreted and explained in more

detail and compared to other relevant findings. In particular, implications for the research questions, the research model and the hypotheses will be discussed.

Preliminary Analyses

Regarding the validation of the negotiation behavior scale, results from factor analysis in the present study differed from previous findings in literature. While the present results generally supported the existence of four dimensions, the interpretation of cross-loadings revealed that not all four factors were clearly separable. In particular, the dimension that was supposed to represent negative feminine attributions was not clearly separable from the dimension of positive feminine attributions. This differs from the initial findings by Rudman et al. (2012), as well as Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013a), both suggesting a four-dimensional measure of gender characterizations (pre- and proscribed, masculine and feminine). Based on the present data, and taking into account other theoretical considerations, a two-dimensional solution was tested alternatively. Even though, in comparison to the four factors, the two factors explained 10.4% less of the variance (four factors 48.2% vs two factors 37.9%), in the two-dimensional solution, factors were separable more clearly. Thus, in the present study, the negotiation behavior scale is assumed to have two dimensions, one representing “concern for substance” and the other one “concern for people”. This might be noteworthy for future research intending to measure perceptions of atypical behavior.

When testing for the success of the behavior manipulation, results from group comparisons revealed that, overall, participants in the assertive condition also perceived candidates as significantly more assertive than those in the modest condition. The same held true for perceptions of atypical behavior. However, when splitting the sample into a male and a female group and repeating the comparison of perceptions of assertiveness and atypicality, mixed results were obtained. In particular, results implied that a significant difference between perceptions of assertiveness and modesty, as well as perceptions of atypical and typical behavior, was only made in the female condition but not in the male condition. This might have several reasons. First, it is likely that the assertive script was generally stronger than the modest script and that atypical behavior generally is more noticeable than typical behavior, because it represents a violation of the observer’s expectation. In consequence, in the case of atypical female candidates, the presence of the two stronger conditions (assertive script and atypical behavior) might increase the prevalence of the role violation. In the case of atypical male candidates, on the contrary, the presence of one strong but also one weak condition (atypical behavior but modest script), might reduce the prevalence of the role violation. Thus, the one-sided success of the behavior condition could be a natural consequence of the study design,

where female atypicality would generally be more noticeable to participants than male atypicality. But there might be more to this. Another factor that might influence participants' perceptions of atypical behavior, is status. In line with status incongruity theory (Rudman et al., 2012), it can be assumed that both, gender roles and certain behaviors are ascribed different levels of status. Following the assumption that the male gender role is ascribed higher status than the female gender role (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000), and that assertive behaviors are rather linked to high status while modest behaviors to low status (Conway et al., 1996; Rudman et al., 2012), status violations can have different directions. In this sense, female assertiveness represents an upward status violation (low status individual enacting high status behavior), while male modesty represents a downward violation (high status individual enacting low status behavior). Considering this, it is likely that upward status violations are more noticeable to observers than downward status violations. Especially as they are more likely to be perceived as a threat to the existing status hierarchy, the protection of which is, according to Rudman et al. (2012), one of the main motivators for backlash. Thus, the reason why the atypical behavior manipulation was successful in the female condition but not in the male condition, might be indicative for the different perceptions of atypical male and female individuals. This is an important observation for future research, which will be explained in more detail later. For the interpretation of the present data, this implies that statistical results related to the influence of atypical behavior in the male condition need to be treated with caution.

Backlash against Atypical Negotiators

At the heart of the present study was the examination of the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash in form of economic and social reprisals. This reasoning was based on theoretical and empirical findings related to role theories (Eagly & Wood, 2012), and particularly role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), suggesting that individuals (predominantly women) who violate gender roles by enacting counter stereotypical behaviors, would incur economic and social reprisals. It was the aim of the present study, to explore in how far the mere atypicality of the observed behavior triggers backlash and whether that backlash was of social or economic nature, using the example of an entry-salary negotiation. Furthermore, the present study was intended to deliver insights into how backlash compares between women and men.

According to H1 it was hypothesized that atypical candidates would incur backlash in form of lower economic outcomes, smaller concessions and worse social outcomes, as compared to typical candidates. However, results did not provide unanimous support for this assumption.

Considering both, actual and perceived negotiation behavior, economic outcome was predominantly influenced by gender, implying that female negotiators generally achieved better economic outcomes than male negotiators. Thus, the present research does not confirm the assumption that atypical negotiators would be penalized economically in form of lower salary offers. The finding that female negotiators achieved even better final offers than did male negotiators, also came at surprise. In past research, including experimental studies (Dittrich et al., 2014; Schwierén, 2012), field studies (Bayard et al., 2003; S  ve-S  derbergh, 2019) and meta-analyses (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), women have continuously been shown to underperform relative to men, when comparing financial results from salary negotiations. One potential reason for the present findings is that the experiment was conducted online. In e-negotiations, gender effects in negotiation might be reduced because power cues and relationship expectations are less prevalent than face-to-face. This has been confirmed, for example, in an empirical study by Stuhlmacher et al. (2007), suggesting that negotiating virtually, as compared to face-to-face, enhances negotiation outcomes for women. Additionally, it needs to be noted, that in the present study, participants were instructed not to make final offers exceeding 30,000   and they were also provided a range of comparable salaries in the industry ranging from 25,000   to 30,000  . It is possible that these numbers have anchored participants to a certain value, so that the variance in the final offers participants made might have been reduced as a consequence of the way the experimental task was composed.

Regarding participants' concession behavior and social outcome, on the other side, results provided support for H1 only when examining *perceived* negotiation behavior, or in other words, the degree to which participants perceived the candidate as atypical. It was shown that perceptions of atypicality were negatively correlated with the size of participants' concession behavior. However, the negative correlation was only marginally significant. Still, this is an interesting finding, considering that no significant difference was obtained when comparing the *final offers* made to typical and atypical candidates. A potential reason for this is that in contrast to the concessions made throughout the negotiation, the final offers were capped at a maximum of 30,000  . Although speculative, it is possible that, if final offers would not have been capped, the difference between the final offers made to atypical and typical candidates might have been larger (results already indicate better economic outcomes for typical than for atypical candidates, but the difference was only very small and not significant). Thus, the negative correlation between participants' concession behavior and perceived negotiation behavior is still a relevant finding when discussing economic reprisals for atypical negotiators.

Even more importantly, perceived negotiation behavior was found to negatively correlate with social outcome, holding all other factors constant. Notably, the model predicting social outcome was the only model that was found to be significant and that had the best goodness-of-fit, explaining 10.5% of the variance. In contrast, the model predicting economic outcome only explained 1.7% of the variance and the model predicting participants' concession behavior 1%, both indicative for a very low goodness-of-fit. In addition to the negative direct relationship between perceived atypical behavior and social outcome, there also was a significant interaction between perceived negotiation behavior and gender. This implies that the relationship between perceived negotiation behavior and social outcome varied depending on whether the candidate was female or male. In particular, interpretation of the regression coefficients revealed that, for male candidates, the negative influence of perceived atypical behavior was weakened, while it was intensified for female candidates. Although, this was not predicted in H1, the interaction should be considered when interpreting the direct effect between the degree to which candidates are perceived as atypical and their likability and when discussing H2.

That results differed, depending on whether the influence of actual or perceived negotiation behavior was tested, does not come at surprise. Considering that the variable "perceived negotiation behavior" represented the difference between participants' ratings on how well different attributes described the candidate and what would be stereotypically expected, this measure actually captured how participants actually experienced their counterpart. Actual negotiation behavior, in contrast, was purely based on the treatment participants received, irrespective of their perceptions. As it has been shown that, at least in the male treatment groups, the behavior manipulation was not successful, statistical results from tests measuring differences between groups (like ANOVA or t-tests) were likely to be compromised. Thus, it was expectable that the observed effects would be stronger when analyzing the influence of perceived as compared to actual negotiation behavior.

Specifying the basic assumption made in H1, four more specific predictions about backlash against atypical negotiators were tested in the present study. These predictions were formulated in the four sub-hypotheses H1a to H1d. While H1a and H1c compared backlash towards typical and atypical candidates of the same gender, H1b and H1d compared backlash towards typical candidates of one gender and atypical candidates of the opposite gender.

Results from group comparisons, only provided support for the sub-hypotheses H1d regarding participants concession behavior and H1a regarding social outcome. It was found that participants made higher concessions to modest female candidates than to modest male candidates and that assertive female candidates were perceived as significantly less likable than

modest female candidates. For the social outcome of the negotiation, the assumptions made in H1a were further supported by the previously mentioned significant interaction between atypical negotiation behavior (both, actual and perceived behavior) and social outcome. For participants' concession behavior, there was no significant interaction between gender and atypical behavior. Thus, the observed difference in participants' concession behavior is more likely to be explained by participants generally making larger concessions to female negotiators than to male negotiators, as indicated by the results testing the influence of perceived negotiation behavior. Regarding the economic outcome, the data did not provide support for neither of the predictions made in H1a to H1d.

This also has implications for the assumption made in H2, predicting that backlash effects would be stronger for female negotiators than for male negotiators. At least for the social outcome of the negotiation, atypical female candidates were, indeed, shown to suffer social backlash to a higher degree than atypical male candidates.

Moderating Role of Participant GRO

Another important part of the analysis was the investigation of participants' GRO as a person-based moderator in the relationship between actual, as well as perceived negotiation behavior, and economic outcome, concession behavior and social outcome. Based on theoretical findings from previous research, in H3, it was predicted that participants with a more egalitarian GRO would economically and socially penalize atypical candidates less, than participants with a more traditional GRO. In the present study, no support for this assumption was found. Although, participants' GRO was shown to marginally significantly moderate the relationship between perceived negotiation behavior and economic outcome, H3 still cannot be supported. This is because the direction of the moderation effect deviated from the one predicted in H3. While H3 predicted that more egalitarian GRO of the negotiation partner would reduce the negative impact of atypical behavior on the dependent variables, the present results implied the opposite effect. When analyzing the present data, a more traditional GRO was found to attenuate the negative influence of perceived atypical behavior on economic outcome, while a more egalitarian GRO was found to intensify it. A potential reason for this might be that individuals who endorse a more egalitarian GRO generally dislike assertiveness more than do individuals who endorse a more traditional GRO. Thus, although speculative, the interaction between perceived negotiation behavior and GRO might result from typical male behavior (ergo high assertiveness) more than it does from typical female behavior (ergo low assertiveness). Further investigations on the influence of GRO on backlash might thus be a worthwhile endeavor for future research.

When investigating the moderating role of GRO for economic outcome, there also was an interesting explorative finding. Because there was a significant main effect between gender and economic outcome, an additional three-way interaction between *actual* negotiation behavior, gender and relative GRO has been conducted. Results from the ANOVA showed that there was a marginally significant interaction between relative GRO and gender. This implies that, although both, participants with a relatively egalitarian and traditional GRO, granted lower salaries to men than to women, the difference between economic outcomes for men and women was larger among participants with a relatively egalitarian GRO. More specifically, participants with a more egalitarian GRO made higher final offers to women, than did participants with a more traditional GRO and lower final offers to men, than did participants with a more traditional GRO. A similar, but non-significant, pattern was detected when analyzing the two-way interaction between behavior and relative GRO for social outcome. Again, participants with a more egalitarian GRO disliked assertive candidates as compared to modest candidates to a higher degree than participants with a more traditional GRO. Thus, it rather seems that participants with a relatively egalitarian GRO generally value modesty and femininity more than participants with a relatively traditional GRO, but this only is a speculation and should be further researched.

Overall, the present results did not support the presumption that traditional individuals would socially and economically penalize atypical negotiators more than egalitarian individuals would do. This might be because the sample of the present study, which was an undergraduate university class, was not very heterogeneous regarding their gender role orientation. Generally, there were only a few traditional participants while the most part was rather on the egalitarian side. If repeated with a more heterogeneous sample, results might vary more across groups.

Mediating Role of Social Outcome

Lastly, to gain more insights about the interconnectedness of the independent and dependent variables, it was tested whether the social negotiation outcome (likability) explains, or mediates, the relationships between perceived negotiation behavior and economic outcome and participants' concession behavior respectively. However, results did not provide support for the mediating role of social outcome in neither of the relationships. Because in previous analyses, perceived negotiation behavior was shown to negatively correlate with social outcome, it is interesting so see that participants socially penalizing atypical female negotiators, did not automatically result in economic reprisals. Quite the contrary, it was found that female candidates economically outperformed male candidates. As previously mentioned, it is possible that this finding is a consequence of the study design where the negotiated outcomes were

capped at a maximum. Nevertheless, the observation of female candidates economically outperforming male candidates, albeit paying a social cost for acting atypical, could also be indicative for participants cognitively correcting their negative social reaction against atypical women, when deciding on their final offers. Processes of cognitive prejudice control have, for example, been observed when it comes to racial discrimination (e.g. aversive racism) (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). The basic distinction made in literature on prejudice control, is the one of implicit and explicit attitudes (Sritharan & Gawronski, 2010). While the former are commonly described as more automatic and direct, the latter are typically equated with more controlled, deliberative responses (Gawronski et al., 2006). In particular, individuals holding an egalitarian belief system, are hypothesized to feel the pressure to counteract potential negative implicit attitudes towards a group of people in order to live up to their egalitarian standards (Sritharan & Gawronski, 2010).

Although, likability ratings in the present study were self-reported, which are measures commonly used to for explicit responses, they might be more on the implicit side when considering the overall design of the study. When comparing the nature of the measures of social and economic backlash, it might well be that social reactions, such as dislike, are more implicit. This is because in the context of a negotiation, they are the more indirect and thus less controlled outcomes. Economic negotiation outcomes, on the other side, might be the result of a more explicit decision making process, directly affecting the focal negotiator and the negotiation partner. In consequence, participants' final offers were likely to be more cognitively controlled than their likability ratings, leaving room for (particularly egalitarian) participants to correct the negative implicit reaction of dislike against assertive women by granting them higher salaries.

5. Conclusion

The aim of the present study was to further explore backlash effects in negotiation. Based on theoretical and empirical findings evolving around role congruity theory, it was hypothesized that negotiation partners would economically and socially penalize negotiators who violate gender role prescriptions by enacting atypical behaviors. In other words, it was assumed that female negotiators who acted assertively and male negotiators who acted modestly would incur backlash in the form of social and economic reprisals. In contrast to role congruity theory, which assumes that gender role violations primarily hurt women in male-dominated fields, the present study rather focused on the atypicality of the negotiator's behavior, regardless of their gender. This was to also gain new insights into how backlash affects atypical men. Another new aspect added to the present study was the operationalization of atypical behavior. In contrast to previous studies, a distinction was made between actual and perceived negotiation behavior,

adding more depth into the analysis of backlash effects. While actual negotiation behavior referred to the behavior manipulation that either represented assertive or modest behavior (typical vs. atypical), perceived negotiation behavior expressed the degree to which a negotiator was perceived as atypical. Apart from that, the present thesis aimed at providing new empirical evidence for the moderating role of “gender role orientation” in the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash. In line with role congruity theory, it was assumed that a more egalitarian gender role orientation would attenuate backlash against atypical negotiators.

To test these presumptions, the influence of atypical behavior, and the negotiation partner’s gender role orientation, on different outcome variables was tested using the example of an experimental entry-salary negotiation. The online experiment was conducted among a sample of 180 undergraduate students at the University of Vienna. Participants assumed the role of a hiring manager with the task to negotiate an entry-salary with a new hired job candidate within six rounds of negotiation. Additionally, participants were asked to provide ratings on how likable they perceived the candidate and in how far they agreed to several statements that were selected to measure participants’ gender role orientation. The outcome variables economic and social outcome were then measured based on participants final offers and their likability ratings. A third outcome variable included in the study was participants’ concession behavior. Concession behavior expressed the difference between the first and the final offer participants made to the candidates. To explore in how far these outcome variables differed for atypical and typical candidates, the study included two experimental manipulations. First, gender was manipulated by referring to the candidates either with a male or female first name (Mary or Mark) and second, behavior was manipulated using either assertive or modest scripts in the candidates’ automated written responses.

Results from statistical analysis provided several interesting findings. Regarding the influence of atypical behavior, analysis revealed that, although no significant differences were observed among economic outcomes of typical and atypical negotiators, social outcomes differed significantly. Atypical negotiators were liked significantly less than typical negotiators. However, it was also found that gender moderates the relationship between atypical behavior and social outcome. While atypical female candidates were found to be perceived as significantly less likable than typical female candidates, there was no significant difference in social outcomes when comparing the atypical and typical male condition. This provides general support for role congruity theory, predicting social penalties in professional contexts only for women, because of the incongruence of role prescriptions of the female gender role and the role of a leader, or in the present case, a negotiator. However, when analyzing economic negotiation

outcomes, it was shown that, in contrast to previous research finding that men financially outperformed women in salary negotiations (Mazei et al., 2015), the present findings indicate the opposite effect. Together, these findings revealed an interesting new pattern regarding backlash against atypical women. While it seems that individuals, indeed, penalize assertive female negotiators socially, this does not result in economic penalties, or quite the opposite, it results in female negotiators economically outperforming male negotiators.

Regarding the moderating role of the negotiation partner's gender role orientation, mixed results were obtained. While results provide marginal support for GRO moderating the relationship between atypical behavior and economic outcome, this was not the case when testing social outcome or participants' concession behavior. Also, the direction of the moderation was the opposite of the expected. Participants endorsing a more egalitarian gender role orientation were found to financially differentiate more between atypical and typical candidates, than participants endorsing a more traditional gender role orientation. An interesting explorative finding in this regard was that relative GRO and gender also interacted marginally significantly when comparing economic outcomes. This implies that, although both, individuals with a relatively egalitarian and traditional GRO, tend to grant lower salaries to men than to women, the difference between economic outcomes for men and women is larger among individuals endorsing a more egalitarian GRO. A similar, yet non-significant, interaction was detected between GRO and gender when comparing social outcomes.

5.1. Theoretical Contributions

This Thesis is a valuable addition to existing research in several ways. First, this study provides new primary evidence on the existence of backlash women violating gender stereotypes in salary negotiation. While findings generally support the existence of social backlash against atypical female negotiators in form of dislike, no evidence was found for the existence of backlash in form of economic reprisals. This has important implications for theoretical considerations in the field of negotiation.

A common theoretical framework used to explain gender differences in negotiation is social roles theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012). The basic assumption is that, when confronted with a male gender-typed task, women are often required to violate their gender role prescription of communality and act more according to the male gender prescription of agency. This violation then results in social and economic reprisals, also called backlash. While the present findings confirmed that atypical women faced social reprisals in form of dislike, it did not support the occurrence of economic reprisals when comparing the final offers made to female and male

negotiators. In contrast, female negotiators were found to outperform male negotiators financially. Thus, ultimately, social backlash was not found to result in economic backlash.

A potential explanation for this observation is grounded in the distinction between implicit and explicit prejudice and prejudice control mechanisms. When comparing the nature of social and economic backlash, it appears that social reactions, such as dislike, are the more indirect and implicit negotiation outcomes. Economic outcomes, on the other side, are likely to be the result of a more explicit decision making process, more directly affecting the counter negotiator. When negotiating with an assertive woman, dislike might thus emerge as an implicit reaction to the gender role violation. However, particularly individuals with a more egalitarian belief system might cognitively correct this form of implicit prejudice in their explicit reaction (their final offers), to live up to their egalitarian standards. Based on this reasoning, it might be fruitful to include the distinction between implicit and explicit prejudice into the theoretical framework of gender role theories explaining backlash against atypical women.

In addition to providing further evidence for the relationship between atypical behavior and backlash, the present study contributed to existing research by empirically testing the role of the negotiation partner's gender role orientation (GRO) as a new person-based moderator. Particularly the finding that negotiation partners endorsing a more egalitarian GRO appeared to financially differentiate more between atypical and typical candidates and that the difference between economic outcomes for men and women was larger among individuals endorsing a more egalitarian GRO, provides interesting theoretical implications. This, again, relates to the suggested differentiation between implicit and explicit prejudice and the consideration of prejudice control mechanisms. In particular, participants with a more egalitarian GRO might be more inclined to correct their implicit negative social reaction towards atypical individuals with financial benefits. For example, individuals who endorse an egalitarian GRO might try to counteract their implicit dislike of assertive women by offering them better salaries to a higher degree, than do individuals with a traditional GRO. This might explain why negotiation partners with a more egalitarian GRO differentiated to a larger degree between economic outcomes of female and male negotiators than those with a more traditional GRO. From a more general perspective, it is also possible that individuals holding a more egalitarian GRO tend to financially differentiate more between men and women to compensate for the gender wage gap on a societal level.

Overall, from a theoretical perspective, the proposed compensation-mechanisms related to backlash and the negotiation partners' GRO might thus be an interesting field for future studies investigating gender differences in negotiation. It might further be worth considering to include

the distinction between implicit and explicit prejudice into the theoretical model of Eagly and Karau's (2002) role congruity theory.

Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that even if, in a negotiation context, social outcomes appear as the more indirect outcome variables, it is important to study both, social and economic outcomes in negotiation (Curhan et al., 2006). The present results reinforce the notion that the mere focus on only one of the two outcome variables does not capture all disadvantages women might face at the negotiation table (Bowles & Babcock, 2013). If, for example, the present study would have focused on financial negotiation results exclusively, the social disadvantages women face when acting counter stereotypical would have been overlooked. The present study went even further and additionally included participants' concession behavior as a third outcome-related variable. For further exploration of this variable, for example by inducing strategic behavior (distributive vs. cooperative behavior), more research is needed.

5.2. Limitations and Future Research

Although designed with caution and developed based on a broad literature review, the present study exhibits several limitations. These limitations, however, offer potential for improvement for future research in the area of gender effects in negotiation and business contexts.

First of all, as mentioned previously, the behavior manipulation, intended to make the candidates appear typical or atypical, was only successful in the female but not the male candidate condition. Because it was the goal of the present study, to examine potential differences between negotiation outcomes of typical and atypical negotiators, it was central to the present study that participants also perceived the candidates as atypical. In other words, male candidates in the atypical behavior condition needed to be perceived as modest and male candidates in the typical condition as assertive. The failure of the experimental manipulation thus made it difficult to adequately assess how atypical men are affected by backlash, which was one of the intentions of the present research. It is thus recommended to future research on backlash against men who violate gender stereotypes, to adapt the study design in such a way, that male atypical behavior becomes more prevalent to participants. This could for example be achieved by embedding the experimental task in the context of a female gender-typed job or environment (such as care-related work).

Another problem related to the study design was the risk of anchoring participants to certain cutoffs that were mentioned in the description of the negotiation task. The indicated cutoff of 30,000€, as well as the information about industry benchmark lying between 25,000 and 30,000€, might have influenced participants' decision-making process when deciding on

their offers. In consequence, the data may lack some variability leading to non-significant results in the analyses of economic outcome and participants' concession behavior. Future research might consider increasing the zone of possible agreements or providing participants with less industry information. Another aspect worth mentioning is that none of the financial decisions participants made throughout the negotiation task was self-relevant for participants. Although participation was incentivized with extra credits for a university class, incentivization only depended on whether participants completed the questionnaire or not. Incentivizing the negotiation task itself through performance dependent monetarization might have made the negotiation more self-relevant for participants and thus might have made their decisions more realistic. Thus, future research should consider including performance dependent monetary incentives in the negotiation task.

Furthermore, it needs to be noted that the experiment was conducted online through a self-administered questionnaire. Therefore, it was not possible to observe participants while they conducted the experiment and potential disruptions influencing the success of the experimental manipulations could not be detected. It is thus possible that the gender, as well as the behavior manipulation would be more successful when data is collected in a laboratory. On top of that, it is important to acknowledge that the study was conducted among a sample of undergraduate students. With an average age of 22.6 years, participants were relatively young and inexperienced when it comes to salary negotiations, either representing a firm or negotiating for themselves. Particularly with regard to the influence of gender role orientation, the homogeneity of the sample might have reduced the significance of the results. Thus, although providing important indications, results might not be generalizable to other societal groups. For future research investigating the role of gender role orientation, it might be interesting to increase sample heterogeneity by including different age groups, study backgrounds or political orientations.

As explained earlier, the results of this study indicated that while gender role non-conforming female negotiators paid a social cost for their behavior but this did not result in economic reprisals. Based on this, it was hypothesized that the nature of social and economic outcomes might differ. While social outcomes be more indirect and implicit, economic outcomes appear to be more direct and explicit. Thus, one potential explanation for the observed gap between social and economic reprisals was participants' motivation to financially correct their perceptions of dislike by making higher final offers to women than to men. Because this reasoning is purely hypothetical, it might be a worthwhile endeavor for future research to investigate the interconnectedness of implicit and explicit prejudice and economic backlash

against female leaders. For theoretical approaches, it could be interesting to test in how far the distinction between implicit and explicit prejudice should be included in models of social role theories. This could even be expanded to the role of the negotiation partner's gender role orientation, where it would be interesting to see whether negotiators' motivation to correct negative implicit reactions is influenced by whether they endorse a more egalitarian or traditional gender role orientation. Regarding the social outcome, future research could consider in how far it changes according to whether it is presented as a more direct or indirect negotiation outcome (e.g. by highlighting its importance for future career advancements).

6. References

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7. Appendices

7.1. Zusammenfassung (deutsch)

Geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede in der Verhandlungsführung spielen eine entscheidende Rolle in der Entstehung der Lohnlücke zwischen Männern und Frauen. Dies liegt daran, dass Frauen, die gegen geschlechtsspezifische Rollenerwartungen verstoßen, finanzielle und soziale Einbußen riskieren. Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit den wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Konsequenzen für atypische Verhandlungsführer*innen. Mithilfe einer experimentellen Studie in Form einer simulierten Gehaltsverhandlung mit 180 Studierenden, wurden finanzielle Unterschiede, sowie Unterschiede im Verhalten und Sympathieempfinden der Teilnehmenden gemessen. Zusätzlich wurde der Einfluss der Geschlechterrollenorientierung der Teilnehmenden als neuer personenbasierter Moderator getestet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass weibliche Verhandlungsführerinnen zwar finanziell besser abschneiden als männliche Verhandlungsführer, sie aber gleichzeitig als weniger sympathisch wahrgenommen werden, wenn sie gegen weibliche Geschlechterstereotypen verstoßen. Dies war bei atypischen männlichen Verhandlungsführern nicht der Fall. Ferner wurde festgestellt, dass die Geschlechterrollenorientierung der Teilnehmenden die Beziehung zwischen atypischem Verhalten (und Geschlecht) und dem finanziellen Verhandlungsergebnis moderiert. Teilnehmende mit einer egalitären Geschlechterrollenorientierung, differenzierten finanziell stärker zwischen atypischen und typischen, sowie zwischen männlichen und weiblichen Verhandlungspartner*innen. Schließlich wurde die Unterscheidung zwischen impliziten und expliziten Vorurteilen und der Einfluss von Vorurteilskontrollmechanismen als neue

theoretische Erklärungen für geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede bei Verhandlungen vorgeschlagen.

7.2. Manipulation of Assertive/Modest Behavior

7.2.1. Overview of Scripts used in Present Study

Neg. Round	Behavior Condition	Candidate's Response Script
1	Assertive	"Your offer is insulting; it is way too low. I request 35,000€ . You would be foolish not to seriously consider this counteroffer. I am highly qualified to succeed in this job and should be rewarded accordingly."
	Modest	"Thank you for that offer, but I was hoping to earn a bit more than that. I believe 35,000€ would be a fair salary to both you and me."
2	Assertive	"I have other offers that are looking much more desirable right now. If you do not consider at least 35,000€ , I may be forced to accept a position at another company."
	Modest	"I appreciate your offer but unfortunately, I do not think I can accept. I believe 35,000€ would serve as a reasonable compromise."
3	Assertive	"Your offer is unreasonable; I refuse to work for so little. There is no way you can possibly expect me to work for less than 33,000€ ."
	Modest	"I feel we are making some progress, but unfortunately, I still cannot fully accept. I was hoping you might find 33,000€ a reasonable compromise."
4	Assertive	"I am shocked that you would offer me so little. I need to be paid more. I strongly suggest you accept the 33,000€ because I refuse to work for less."
	Modest	"While I cannot accept that offer, I feel we are nearing a satisfactory middle ground. I think both you and I will be happy with 33,000€ ."
5	Assertive	"You need to be more flexible. There is no way I can work for a salary that low. 30,000€ is my last offer, I simply will not work for less than this. This is my last word in this negotiation."
	Modest	"That salary is less than I had originally hoped for. If you were willing to agree on 30,000€ , I would be happy to accept. What do you say?"

7.2.2. Overview Alterations made to Modest Condition

Script original studies	Script present study
"Thank you for that offer, but I was hoping to earn more. I believe this salary is fair to	"Thank you for that offer, but I was hoping to earn a bit more than that . I believe

both you and me. " (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a, p. 120)	35,000€ would be a fair salary to both you and me."
"I appreciate your offer but unfortunately I just cannot accept. I believe this number serves as a reasonable compromise. " (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a, p. 120)	"I appreciate your offer but unfortunately, I do not think I can accept. I believe 35,000€ would serve as a reasonable compromise."
"I feel we are making some progress, but unfortunately still cannot accept. I was hoping you might find this salary reasonable." (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a, p. 120)	"I feel we are making some progress, but unfortunately, I still cannot fully accept. I was hoping you might find 33,000€ a reasonable compromise. "
"While cannot accept that offer, I feel we are nearing a satisfactory middle ground. I think both you and I will be happy with this salary." (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a, p. 120)	"While I cannot accept that offer, I feel we are nearing a satisfactory middle ground. I think both you and I will be happy with 33,000€. "
"That salary is less than had originally hoped for. My worth exceeds the amount of your current offer" (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010, p. 267)	"That salary is less than I had originally hoped for. If you were willing to agree on 30,000€, I would be happy to accept. What do you say?"

Note: Alterations made in the script of the present study in comparison to the original studies are marked in bold.

7.3. SPSS Output from Statistical Analysis

7.3.1. Preliminary Analysis

7.3.1.1. Internal Consistency of Scales

Social Outcome Scale

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,894	,895	6

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
1. How interested would you be in working in a team with Mary/Mark as a coworker?	4,58	1,426	180
2. If you were the project manager on a work assignment, how likely would you be to ask Mary/Mark ...	4,80	1,279	180
3. Is Mary/Mark the type of person you like to work with?	4,21	1,516	180
4. How interested would you be in interacting socially with Mary/Mark?	4,17	1,541	180
5. If Mary/Mark invited you out for drinks after work, how likely would you be to go with her/him?	4,26	1,590	180
6. Is Mary/Mark the type of person you like to socialize with?	3,88	1,486	180

Negotiation Behavior Scale*Coefficient Alpha:**Reliability Statistics*

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,663	,655	18

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Deleted	Scale Variance if Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Independent	78,66	82,583	,370	,414	,638
Dominating	78,79	80,019	,467	,340	,626
Ambitious	78,02	87,195	,244	,384	,653
Agentic	79,47	93,848	-,119	,160	,683
Arrogant	79,62	79,612	,334	,523	,639
Equipped with a good business sense	78,76	92,272	-,059	,496	,685
Assertive	78,97	87,362	,129	,297	,665
Entitled	79,30	87,139	,173	,239	,659
Angry	80,41	81,271	,264	,511	,650
Warm (R)	79,33	80,279	,418	,558	,630
Gullible (R)	79,04	82,384	,310	,414	,643

Reasonable (R)	80,36	87,997	,101	,594	,668
Naive (R)	78,78	86,543	,131	,498	,666
Sensitive to others (R)	79,31	82,350	,329	,301	,641
Conciliatory (R)	79,72	82,861	,350	,377	,640
Modest (R)	79,04	80,680	,392	,500	,633
Friendly (R)	79,81	79,864	,389	,691	,633
Insecure (R)	78,42	80,715	,329	,369	,640

Note. $N = 180$. Reverse-scored items are denoted with (R).


Factor Analysis – Four-Factor Solution:

Assumptions for factor analysis:

- A first factor analysis with all 18 items revealed that the item “agentic” did not load above 0.3 on any factor and that there were four factors in total. The item “agentic” was thus excluded from the second factor analysis (see below) and four factors were pre-defined.
- The **KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy** was .791 and the **Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity** was significant as well ($p < .001$), so items were sufficiently correlated to perform factor analysis.
- **Anti-image correlation matrix** revealed that all items had a measure of sampling adequacy value (MSA) above 0.5, indicating that each single item was suitable for a factor analysis.

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy		,791
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	1083,625
	df	136
	Sig.	,000



Anti-image Correlation Matrix

	PM1	PM2	PM3	NM1	NM2	NM3	NM4	NM5	PF1	PF2	PF3	PF4	NF1	NF2	NF3	NF4	NF5
PM1	,843 ^a	-,200	-,189	-,148	-,131	-,102	-,158	,010	,018	,005	-,090	,002	,051	-,005	-,129	-,014	-,127
PM2	-,200	,747 ^a	-,064	,072	-,106	-,211	,044	-,146	-,087	,269	-,057	,047	-,057	,033	,023	,101	-,257
PM3	-,189	-,064	,886 ^a	-,124	,141	-,052	-,014	-,064	,009	,106	-,001	,166	,204	-,155	-,162	-,005	-,025
NM1	-,148	,072	-,124	,741 ^a	-,324	-,129	-,009	-,124	-,068	,023	-,176	,048	,056	-,033	-,068	-,059	-,060
NM2	-,131	-,106	,141	-,324	,820 ^a	,143	-,142	-,239	-,098	-,214	-,011	-,026	-,002	,081	,038	-,023	,082
NM3	-,102	-,211	-,052	-,129	,143	,784 ^a	-,145	,064	,023	,002	,162	,028	-,070	-,101	-,014	-,137	,079
NM4	-,158	,044	-,014	-,009	-,142	-,145	,577 ^a	-,203	,036	,055	,051	,086	-,112	-,081	,126	,210	-,137
NM5	,010	-,146	-,064	-,124	-,239	,064	-,203	,716 ^a	,119	,090	,083	-,471	-,042	,152	,068	-,029	,136
PF1 (R)	,018	-,087	,009	-,068	-,098	,023	,036	,119	,823 ^a	-,112	,038	-,510	-,130	,055	-,070	-,076	-,038
PF2 (R)	,005	,269	,106	,023	-,214	,002	,055	,090	-,112	,855 ^a	-,099	-,174	-,242	-,029	,274	,049	-,022
PF3 (R)	-,090	-,057	-,001	-,176	-,011	,162	,051	,083	,038	-,099	,772 ^a	-,119	-,278	,055	-,046	,049	-,106
PF4 (R)	,002	,047	,166	,048	-,026	,028	,086	-,471	-,510	-,174	-,119	,764 ^a	,106	-,163	-,037	-,118	-,026
NF1 (R)	,051	-,057	,204	,056	-,002	-,070	-,112	-,042	-,130	-,242	-,278	,106	,765 ^a	-,225	-,004	-,310	-,055
NF2 (R)	-,005	,033	-,155	-,033	,081	-,101	-,081	,152	,055	-,029	,055	-,163	-,225	,714 ^a	-,316	-,198	-,064
NF3 (R)	-,129	,023	-,162	-,068	,038	-,014	,126	,068	-,070	,274	-,046	-,037	-,004	-,316	,810 ^a	,105	-,221
NF4 (R)	-,014	,101	-,005	-,059	-,023	-,137	,210	-,029	-,076	,049	,049	-,118	-,310	-,198	,105	,772 ^a	-,090
NF5 (R)	-,127	-,257	-,025	-,060	,082	,079	-,137	,136	-,038	-,022	-,106	-,026	-,055	-,064	-,221	-,090	,803 ^a

a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA)

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4,328	25,457	25,457	3,027	17,806	17,806	2,782	16,366	16,366
2	2,983	17,547	43,005	2,595	15,266	33,072	2,271	13,358	29,724
3	1,794	10,554	53,558	1,317	7,747	40,819	1,742	10,247	39,971
4	1,060	6,237	59,795	1,264	7,437	48,256	1,409	8,285	48,256
5	,960	5,650	65,445						
6	,839	4,938	70,383						
7	,766	4,505	74,888						
8	,593	3,490	78,379						
9	,587	3,454	81,833						
10	,526	3,092	84,924						
11	,495	2,913	87,838						
12	,434	2,551	90,389						
13	,421	2,475	92,864						
14	,381	2,242	95,105						
15	,359	2,113	97,218						
16	,275	1,617	98,835						
17	,198	1,165	100,000						

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Factor Analysis – Two-Factor Solution

Assumptions for factor analysis:

- Conducting the factor analysis with all 18 items revealed that the items “agentic” and “entitled” did not load above 0.3 on any of the two factors. Both items were thus excluded from the factor analysis.
- The **KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy** was .800 and the **Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity** was significant ($p < .001$), so items were sufficiently correlated to perform factor analysis.
- **Anti-image correlation matrix** revealed that all items had a measure of sampling adequacy value (MSA) above 0.5, indicating that each single item was suitable for a factor analysis as well.

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy		.800
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	1040,388
	df	120
	Sig.	.000

Anti-image Correlation Matrix

	TO1	TO2	TO3	TO4	TO5	TO6	TO7	RO1	RO2	RO3	RO4	RO5	RO6	RO7	RO8	RO9
								(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)	(R)
TO1	,840 ^a	-,196	-,194	-,151	-,157	-,128	-,023	,024	,014	-,083	,016	-,018	-,112	,020	,034	-,152
TO2	-,196	,748 ^a	-,064	,072	-,101	-,207	-,140	-,088	,268	-,059	,043	,037	,018	,094	-,052	-,253
TO3	-,194	-,064	,884 ^a	-,124	,141	-,054	-,069	,010	,107	,000	,168	-,157	-,162	-,002	,204	-,028
TO4	-,151	,072	-,124	,728 ^a	-,329	-,132	-,128	-,067	,023	-,176	,049	-,034	-,067	-,058	,055	-,062
TO5	-,157	-,101	,141	-,329	,818 ^a	,125	-,277	-,094	-,208	-,004	-,014	,070	,057	,007	-,018	,063
TO6	-,128	-,207	-,054	-,132	,125	,798 ^a	,035	,028	,011	,171	,042	-,114	,004	-,110	-,088	,060
TO7	-,023	-,140	-,069	-,128	-,277	,035	,721 ^a	,130	,104	,096	-,465	,139	,096	,014	-,067	,112
RO1 (R)	,024	-,088	,010	-,067	-,094	,028	,130	,819 ^a	-,114	,036	-,516	,058	-,075	-,085	-,127	-,033
RO2 (R)	,014	,268	,107	,023	-,208	,011	,104	-,114	,857 ^a	-,103	-,179	-,025	,270	,039	-,237	-,015
RO3 (R)	-,083	-,059	,000	-,176	-,004	,171	,096	,036	-,103	,772 ^a	-,124	,059	-,053	,039	-,274	-,100
RO4 (R)	,016	,043	,168	,049	-,014	,042	-,465	-,516	-,179	-,124	,763 ^a	-,157	-,048	-,140	,116	-,014
RO5 (R)	-,018	,037	-,157	-,034	,070	-,114	,139	,058	-,025	,059	-,157	,721 ^a	-,309	-,185	-,237	-,076
RO6 (R)	-,112	,018	-,162	-,067	,057	,004	,096	-,075	,270	-,053	-,048	-,309	,824 ^a	,081	,010	-,208
RO7 (R)	,020	,094	-,002	-,058	,007	-,110	,014	-,085	,039	,039	-,140	-,185	,081	,820 ^a	-,295	-,063
RO8 (R)	,034	-,052	,204	,055	-,018	-,088	-,067	-,127	-,237	-,274	,116	-,237	,010	-,295	,771 ^a	-,071
RO9 (R)	-,152	-,253	-,028	-,062	,063	,060	,112	-,033	-,015	-,100	-,014	-,076	-,208	-,063	-,071	,824 ^a

a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA)

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4,322	27,011	27,011	3,786	23,665	23,665	3,381	21,132	21,132
2	2,929	18,305	45,317	2,276	14,225	37,890	2,681	16,758	37,890
3	1,653	10,330	55,647						
4	1,034	6,464	62,111						
5	,853	5,329	67,440						
6	,838	5,241	72,681						
7	,594	3,713	76,394						
8	,587	3,670	80,064						
9	,539	3,371	83,435						
10	,522	3,259	86,694						
11	,460	2,872	89,567						
12	,434	2,711	92,277						
13	,386	2,410	94,687						
14	,361	2,256	96,943						
15	,290	1,814	98,757						
16	,199	1,243	100,000						

Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Gender Role Orientation Scale

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
,893	,895	16

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Deleted	Scale Variance if Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
1. A wife with a family has no time for outside employment.	24,82	58,061	,526	,440	,888
2. Some types of work are just not appropriate for women.	24,23	53,182	,696	,570	,881
3. Mothers should work only if necessary.	24,63	56,157	,573	,445	,886
4. Only some types of work are appropriate for both men and women.	24,46	53,769	,671	,548	,882
5. For many important jobs, it is better to choose men instead of women.	24,84	54,717	,701	,586	,881
6. People can be both aggressive and nurturing regardless of sex. (R)	24,75	59,205	,371	,214	,893
7. We should stop thinking about whether people are male or female and focus on other...	25,00	58,101	,490	,357	,889
8. Women should be more concerned with clothing and appearance than men.	24,82	57,063	,558	,379	,887
9. The belief that women cannot make as good supervisors or executives as men is a myth.	24,81	56,426	,509	,344	,889
10. Men make better leaders.	24,71	54,419	,719	,594	,881
11. Men who cry have weak character.	25,01	58,290	,540	,382	,888
12. A man who has chosen to stay at home and be a househusband is not less masculine. (R)	24,52	55,044	,467	,287	,892
13. Tasks around the house should not be assigned by sex. (R)	24,79	58,100	,356	,243	,895

14. A father's major responsibility is to provide financially for his children.	24,16	54,724	,577	,456	,886
15. People should be treated the same regardless of their sex. (R)	24,94	57,472	,473	,328	,890
16. In groups that have both male and female members, it is more appropriate that lead...	24,78	54,632	,698	,610	,881


Note. Reverse-scored items are denoted with an (R).

7.3.1.2. Output from Tests of Behavior Manipulation Success

Perceived Assertiveness Scale: All

Assumptions for independent samples t-test:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to the assertive or modest group.
- No outliers: Given, see boxplot.
- Normality: Normal distribution is assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given, as Levene's test not significant (.190)



Tests of Normality

	Behavior Grouped	Kolmogorov-Smirnov ^a			Shapiro-Wilk		
		Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Perceived Assertiveness	Assertive Condition	,058	90	,200*	,991	90	,827
	Modest Condition	,080	90	,200*	,988	90	,550

*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Group Statistics

	Behavior Grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Perceived Assertiveness	Assertive Condition	90	4,8019	,54440	,05738
	Modest Condition	90	4,5173	,48687	,05132


Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means					
						Sig. (2-tailed)		95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Perceived Assertiveness	Equal variances assumed	1,730	,190	3,696	178	,000	,28457	,13265	,43649

Perceived Assertiveness Scale: **Per gender (female vs. male)**

Female:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to the assertive x female or modest x female group.
- No outliers: Given, see boxplot.
- Normality: Normal distribution is assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given, as Levene's test not significant (.728).



Group Statistics^a

	Behavior Grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
PA	Assertive Condition	44	4,9306	,52406	,07900
	Modest Condition	44	4,5063	,47478	,07158

a. Gender grouped = Female


Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means					
								95% Confidence Interval of the	
								Diff.	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	Lower Upper
PA	Equal variances assumed	,121	,728	3,980	86	,000	,42424	,10661	,21232 ,63617

a. Gender grouped = Female

Male:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to the assertive x male or modest x male group.
- No outliers: Given, see boxplot.
- Normality: Normal distribution is assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given, as Levene's test not significant (.252).



Group Statistics^a

	Behavior Grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
PA	Assertive Condition	46	4,6787	,54040	,07968
	Modest Condition	46	4,5278	,50318	,07419

a. Gender grouped = Male

Independent Samples Test^a

Levene's Test				t-test for Equality of Means					
						Std. Error		95% Confidence Interval of the	
				Sig. (2-tailed)		Mean Diff.		Diff.	
				F	Sig.	t	df	Lower	Upper
PA	Equal variances assumed	1,328	,252	1,387	90	,169	,15097	,10887	-,06532 ,36726

a. Gender grouped = Male

7.3.2. Output from Hypotheses Testing

7.3.2.1. Influence of Atypical Behavior on Backlash

Testing of H1 and H1 a-d – Influence of Actual Negotiation Behavior

Economic Outcome

H1 - ANOVA

Assumptions for one-way ANOVA:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to one of the two treatment groups, “atypical” or “typical” actual negotiation behavior.
- Normality: Normal distribution can be assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given, as Levene’s test (.257) is not significant.

Between-Subjects Factors

	Value	Label	N
Actual Negotiation	0	Typical	90
Behavior	1	Atypical	88

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

Actual Negotiation	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Typical	28886,10	1348,158	90

Atypical	28841,03	1809,661	88
Total	28863,82	1588,739	178

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

F	df1	df2	Sig.
1,295	1	176	,257

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + BG + GG + IV_ANB

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	17450019,756 ^a	3	5816673,252	2,357	,073	,039
Intercept	49792236086,971	1	49792236086,971	20180,662	,000	,991
BG	5778198,484	1	5778198,484	2,342	,128	,013
GG	11764726,637	1	11764726,637	4,768	,030	,027
IV_ANB	60339,738	1	60339,738	,024	,876	,000
Error	429314404,492	174	2467324,164			
Total	148742145422,000	178				
Corrected Total	446764424,247	177				

a. R Squared = ,039 (Adjusted R Squared = ,022)

H1 a-d - Independent Samples T-Tests

Assumptions for independent samples t-test:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to the assertive female, assertive male, modest female or modest male group.
- Normality: Normal distribution is assumed for sample sizes >30.

H1 a + c:

Gender grouped: Female

Group Statistics^a

	Actual Negotiation Behavior	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Economic Outcome	Typical	44	28964,75	1304,358	196,639
	Atypical	43	29288,37	1109,903	169,259

a. Gender grouped = Female

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means						
						Sig.	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	(2-tailed)	Diff.	Diff.	Lower	Upper
EO	Equal variances assumed	1,277	,262	-1,245	85	,217	-323,622	259,936	-840,444	193,200

a. Gender grouped = Female

Gender grouped: Male

Group Statistics^a

		Actual Negotiation Behavior		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Economic	Typical			46	28810,87	1398,964	206,266
Outcome	Atypical			45	28413,58	2217,429	330,555

a. Gender grouped = Male

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means						
						Sig. (2- tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df				Lower	Upper
EO	Equal variances assumed	4,363	,040	1,025	89	,308	397,292	387,771	-373,201	1167,784
	Equal variances not assumed			1,020	73,970	,311	397,292	389,631	-379,070	1173,653

a. Gender grouped = Male

H1 b + d:

Behavior Grouped: Assertive Condition

Group Statistics^a

Gender grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
----------------	---	------	-------------------	--------------------

Economic Outcome	Female	43	29288,37	1109,903	169,259
	Male	46	28810,87	1398,964	206,266

a. Behavior Grouped = Assertive Condition

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means					
								95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	Lower Upper
EO	Equal variances assumed	2,866	,094	1,776	87	,079	477,503	268,899	-56,964 1011,969

a. Behavior grouped = Assertive Condition

Behavior Grouped: Modest Condition

Group Statistics^a

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
EO	Female	44	28964,75	1304,358	196,639
	Male	45	28413,58	2217,429	330,555

a. Behavior Grouped = Modest Condition

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means					
								95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	Lower Upper
EO	Equal variances assumed	5,993	,016	1,425	87	,158	551,172	386,751	-217,537 1319,881
	Equal variances not assumed			1,433	71,490	,156	551,172	384,621	-215,650 1317,994

a. Behavior Grouped = Modest Condition

Participants' Concession Behavior

H1 - ANOVA

Assumptions for one-way ANOVA:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to one of the two treatments groups “typical actual negotiation behavior” and “atypical actual negotiation behavior”.
- Normality: Normal distribution can be assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given, as Levene’s test (0.659) is not significant.

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Actual Negotiation Behavior	0	Typical	90
	1	Atypical	89

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Relative Economic Outcome

Actual Negotiation Behavior	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Typical	6356,11	4749,304	90
Atypical	5572,03	4182,136	89
Total	5966,26	4481,001	179

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

F	df1	df2	Sig.
,195	1	177	,659

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + GG + BG + IV_ANB

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	68288042,050 ^a	3	22762680,683	1,136	,336	,019
Intercept	2455216321,957	1	2455216321,957	122,556	,000	,412
GG	40777558,199	1	40777558,199	2,035	,155	,011
BG	733,639	1	733,639	,000	,995	,000
IV_ANB	27866283,890	1	27866283,890	1,391	,240	,008
Error	3505839640,609	175	20033369,375			
Total	9945863423,000	179				
Corrected Total	3574127682,659	178				

a. R Squared = ,019 (Adjusted R Squared = ,002)

H1 a-d - Independent Samples T-Tests

Assumptions for independent samples t-test:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to the assertive female, assertive male, modest female or modest male group.
- Normality: Normal distribution is assumed for sample sizes >30.

H1 a + c:

Gender grouped: Female

Group Statistics^a

	Behavior Grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Participants'	Assertive Condition	44	6056,82	4402,755	663,740
Concession Behavior	Modest Condition	44	6842,02	5649,356	851,672

a. Gender grouped = Female

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means					
								95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	Lower Upper
PCB	Equal variances assumed	,030	,864	-,727	86	,469	-785,205	1079,767	-2931,711 1361,302

a. Gender grouped = Female

Gender grouped: Male

Group Statistics^a

	Behavior Grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Participants'	Assertive Condition	46	5891,33	3696,226	544,979
Concession Behavior	Modest Condition	45	5098,02	3946,138	588,256

a. Gender grouped = Male

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means						
						Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df				Lower	Upper
PCB	Equal variances assumed	,270	,605	,990	89	,325	793,304	801,320	-798,901	2385,509

a. Gender grouped = Male

H1 b + d:**Behavior grouped: Assertive Condition***Group Statistics^a*

	Gender grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Participants'	Female	44	6056,82	4402,755	663,740
Concession Behavior	Male	46	5891,33	3696,226	544,979

a. Behavior Grouped = Assertive Condition

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means						
						Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df				Lower	Upper
PCB	Equal variances assumed	1,049	,308	,193	88	,847	165,492	855,473	-1534,581	1865,565

a. Behavior grouped = Assertive Condition

Behavior grouped: Modest Condition*Group Statistics^a*

	Gender grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Participants'	Female	44	6842,02	5649,356	851,672
Concession Behavior	Male	45	5098,02	3946,138	588,256

a. Behavior Grouped = Modest Condition

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means						
								95% Confidence Interval of the Difference		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	Lower	Upper
PCB	Equal variances assumed	1,588	,211	1,691	87	,094	1744,001	1031,039	-305,301	3793,302

a. Behavior grouped = Modest Condition

Social Outcome

H1 - ANOVA

Assumptions for ANOVA:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to one of the two treatments groups “typical actual negotiation behavior” and “atypical actual negotiation behavior”.
- Normality: Normal distribution can be assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given, as Levene’s test (.579) is not significant.

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Actual Negotiation Behavior (typical / atypical)	0	Typical	90
	1	Atypical	90

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

Actual Negotiation Behavior (typical / atypical)	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Typical	4,3685	1,23325	90
Atypical	4,2611	1,15606	90
Total	4,3148	1,19315	180

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

F	df1	df2	Sig.
,309	1	178	,579

a. Design: Intercept + GG + BG + IV_ANB

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	10,073 ^a	3	3,358	2,414	,068	,040
Intercept	1036,116	1	1036,116	745,059	,000	,809
GG	1,294	1	1,294	,931	,336	,005
BG	8,259	1	8,259	5,939	,016	,033
IV_ANB	,615	1	,615	,442	,507	,003
Error	244,754	176	1,391			
Total	3606,000	180				
Corrected Total	254,827	179				

a. R Squared = ,040 (Adjusted R Squared = ,023)

Two-Way ANOVA (ANB * GG)

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Actual Negotiation Behavior (typical / atypical)	0	Typical	90
	1	Atypical	90
Gender grouped	0	Female	88
	1	Male	92

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

Actual Negotiation Behavior (typical / atypical)		Gender grouped	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Typical		Female	4,6742	1,14060	44
		Male	4,0761	1,25939	46
		Total	4,3685	1,23325	90
Atypical		Female	4,1288	1,32793	44
		Male	4,3877	,96164	46
		Total	4,2611	1,15606	90
Total		Female	4,4015	1,26088	88
		Male	4,2319	1,12523	92
		Total	4,3148	1,19315	180

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^{a,b}

		Levene			
		Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Social Outcome	Based on Mean	3,106	3	176	,028
	Based on Median	3,058	3	176	,030
	Based on Median and with adjusted df	3,058	3	174,702	,030
	Based on trimmed mean	3,132	3	176	,027

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Dependent variable: Social Outcome

b. Design: Intercept + IV_ANB + GG + IV_ANB * GG

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	10,073 ^a	3	3,358	2,414	,068	,040
Intercept	3352,445	1	3352,445	2410,704	,000	,932
IV_ANB	,615	1	,615	,442	,507	,003
GG	1,294	1	1,294	,931	,336	,005
IV_ANB * GG	8,259	1	8,259	5,939	,016	,033
Error	244,754	176	1,391			
Total	3606,000	180				
Corrected Total	254,827	179				

a. R Squared = ,040 (Adjusted R Squared = ,023)

H1 a-d - Independent Samples T-Tests

Assumptions for independent samples t-test:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to the assertive female, assertive male, modest female or modest male group.
- Normality: Normal distribution is assumed for sample sizes >30.

H1 a + c:

Gender grouped: Female

Group Statistics^a

	Behavior Grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
SO	Assertive Condition	44	4,1288	1,32793	,20019
	Modest Condition	44	4,6742	1,14060	,17195

a. Gender grouped = Female

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means						
						Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df				Lower	Upper
SO	Equal variances assumed	2,083	,153	-2,067	86	,042	-,54545	,26390	-1,07008	-,02083

a. Gender grouped = Female

Gender grouped: Male

Group Statistics^a

	Behavior Grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
SO	Assertive Condition	46	4,0761	1,25939	,18569
	Modest Condition	46	4,3877	,96164	,14179

a. Gender grouped = Male

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means						
						Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df				Lower	Upper
SO	Equal variances assumed	4,763	,032	-1,334	90	,186	-,31159	,23363	-,77574	,15255
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,334	84,162	,186	-,31159	,23363	-,77618	,15299

a. Gender grouped = Male

H1 b + d:

Behavior grouped: Assertive

Group Statistics^a

		Gender grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
SO		Female	44	4,1288	1,32793	,20019
		Male	46	4,0761	1,25939	,18569

a. Behavior Grouped = Assertive Condition

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means					
								95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	Lower Upper
SO	Equal variances assumed	,506	,479	,193	88	,847	,05270	,27273	-,48928 ,59469

a. Behavior Grouped = Assertive Condition

Behavior grouped: Modest

Group Statistics^a

		Gender grouped	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
SO		Female	44	4,6742	1,14060	,17195
		Male	46	4,3877	,96164	,14179

a. Behavior Grouped = Modest Condition

Independent Samples Test^a

		Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means					
								95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Diff.	Std. Error Diff.	Lower Upper
SO	Equal variances assumed	2,373	,127	1,291	88	,200	,28656	,22202	-,15467 ,72779

a. Behavior Grouped = Modest Condition

Testing of H1 – Influence of Perceived Negotiation Behavior


Predictor variables definition:

PNB_mc (perceived negotiation behavior)	X ₁
GG (gender grouped)	X ₂
BG (behavior grouped)	X ₃
PNB_GG (interaction term)	X ₄
PNB_BG (interaction term)	X ₅

Multiple Linear Regression – Economic Outcome

Assumptions for multiple linear regression

- Continuous outcome variable and continuous or dichotomous (coded as 0/1) predictors: the outcome variable “economic outcome” is continuous; the predictors X₁, X₄, and X₅ are metric and the predictors X₂ and X₃ are dichotomous and can only take on the values [0; 1].
- Linearity: the partial regression plots demonstrate that the predictor X₁ and the interaction terms X₄ and X₅ have a linear relationship with social outcome.



- Independence of residuals: Given, as Durbin-Watson-Statistic 2.086, which is close enough to the critical value of 2.

- No multicollinearity: Given as no Tolerance value below 0.1 or VIF above 10.0.


Correlations

		EO	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅
Pearson Correlation	EO	1,000	,107	-,161	-,112	,058	,118
	X ₁	,107	1,000	-,782	-,068	,842	,584
	X ₂	-,161	-,782	1,000	-,011	-,654	-,515
	X ₃	-,112	-,068	-,011	1,000	,099	-,051
	X ₄	,058	,842	-,654	,099	1,000	,528
	X ₅	,118	,584	-,515	-,051	,528	1,000
Sig. (1- tailed)	EO	.	,078	,016	,068	,222	,059
	X ₁	,078	.	,000	,184	,000	,000
	X ₂	,016	,000	.	,441	,000	,000
	X ₃	,068	,184	,441	.	,095	,251
	X ₄	,222	,000	,000	,095	.	,000
	X ₅	,059	,000	,000	,251	,000	.
N	EO	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₁	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₂	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₃	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₄	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₅	178	178	178	178	178	178



Collinearity Statistics

Model	Tolerance	VIF
X ₁	,175	5,719
X ₂	,377	2,650
X ₃	,898	1,114
X ₄	,263	3,799
X ₅	,644	1,553

- Homoscedasticity: Can be assumed, as the scatterplot indicates that the variances of the residual terms are spread relatively equal across the levels of the predictor variables.



- **Normality of residuals:** Given according to the Histogram and the P Plot



Tests of Normality

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov ^a			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Studentized Residual	,156	178	,000	,873	178	,000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Results from multiple linear regression:

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,211 ^a	,044	,017	1575,445	2,086

a. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_BG, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, mod_PNB_GG, PNB_mc

b. Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	19855691,367	5	3971138,273	1,600	,163 ^b
	Residual	426908732,880	172	2482027,517		
	Total	446764424,247	177			

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

b. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_BG, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, mod_PNB_GG, PNB_mc

Coefficients^a



Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	29318,306	336,174		87,212	,000	28654,749	29981,863
X ₁	-101,328	334,962	-,054	-,303	,763	-762,493	559,837
X ₂	-657,051	384,542	-,207	-1,709	,089	-1416,079	101,978
X ₃	-345,894	249,214	-,109	-1,388	,167	-837,805	146,018
X ₄	-185,578	472,577	-,057	-,393	,695	-1118,375	747,218
X ₅	216,034	299,891	,067	,720	,472	-375,905	807,974


a. Dependent variable: Economic outcome

Multiple Linear Regression – Participants' Concession Behavior

Assumptions for multiple linear regression

- Continuous outcome variable and continuous or dichotomous (coded as 0/1) predictors: the outcome variable “participants’ concession behavior” is continuous; the predictors X₁, X₄, and X₅ are metric and the predictors X₂ and X₃ are dichotomous and can only take on the values [0; 1].
- Linearity: the partial regression plots demonstrate that the predictor X₁ has a slightly positive linear relationship with social outcome, while interaction term X₄ and X₅ have a slightly positive linear relationship with social outcome.





- Independence of residuals: Given, as Durbin-Watson-Statistic 1.873 (which can be considered close enough to the critical value of two)
- No multicollinearity: Given as no Tolerance values below 0.1 or VIF above 10.0.


Correlations

		PCB	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅
Pearson Correlation	PCB	1,000	-,013	-,106	-,001	-,001	,047
	X ₁	-,013	1,000	-,780	-,067	,841	,584
	X ₂	-,106	-,780	1,000	-,005	-,655	-,513
	X ₃	-,001	-,067	-,005	1,000	,094	-,051
	X ₄	-,001	,841	-,655	,094	1,000	,528
	X ₅	,047	,584	-,513	-,051	,528	1,000
Sig. (1-tailed)	PCB	.	,434	,078	,493	,496	,266
	X ₁	,434	.	,000	,186	,000	,000
	X ₂	,078	,000	.	,471	,000	,000
	X ₃	,493	,186	,471	.	,104	,250
	X ₄	,496	,000	,000	,104	.	,000
	X ₅	,266	,000	,000	,250	,000	.
N	PCB	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X ₁	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X ₂	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X ₃	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X ₄	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X ₅	179	179	179	179	179	179



Collinearity Statistics

Model	Tolerance	VIF
X ₁	.180	5.563
X ₂	.383	2.612
X ₃	.907	1.103
X ₄	.267	3.742
X ₅	.644	1.553

- Homoscedasticity: Can be assumed, as the scatterplot indicates that the variances of the residual terms are spread relatively equal across the levels of the predictor variables.



- Normality of residuals: Given according to the Histogram and P Plot, as well as significant Shapiro-Wilk Test.



Tests of Normality

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov ^a			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Studentized Residual	,153	179	,000	,817	179	,000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Results from multiple linear regression:

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,194 ^a	,037	,010	4459,381	1,873

a. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_BG, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, mod_PNB_GG, PNB_mc

b. Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	133836558,371	5	26767311,674	1,346	,247 ^b
	Residual	3440291124,288	173	19886075,863		
	Total	3574127682,659	178			

a. Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

b. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_BG, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, mod_PNB_GG, PNB_mc

Coefficients^a



Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	7544,988	929,235		8,120	,000	5710,891	9379,084
X ₁	-1631,839	935,093	-,307	-1,745	,083	-3477,499	213,821
X ₂	-2609,287	1077,494	-,292	-2,422	,016	-4736,013	-482,561
X ₃	-219,998	700,094	-,025	-,314	,754	-1601,824	1161,827
X ₄	367,516	1325,889	,040	,277	,782	-2249,486	2984,518
X ₅	492,848	848,658	,054	,581	,562	-1182,209	2167,904


a. Dependent variable: Participants' concession behavior

Multiple Linear Regression – Social Outcome

Assumptions for multiple linear regression

- Continuous outcome variable and continuous or dichotomous (coded as 0/1) predictors: the outcome variable “social outcome” is continuous; the predictors X₁, X₄, and X₅ are metric and the predictors X₂ and X₃ are dichotomous and can only take on the values [0; 1].
- Linearity: the partial regression plots demonstrate that the predictor X₁ and the interaction term X₅ have a negative linear relationship with social outcome, while the interaction term X₄ has a positive linear relationship.





- Independence of residuals: Given, as Durbin-Watson-Statistic 2.094
- No multicollinearity: Given as no Tolerance value below 0.1 or VIF above 10.0.


Correlations

		SO	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅
Pearson Correlation	SO	1,000	-,034	-,071	,179	,125	-,081
	X ₁	-,034	1,000	-,780	-,077	,844	,595
	X ₂	-,071	-,780	1,000	,000	-,656	-,515
	X ₃	,179	-,077	,000	1,000	,078	-,067
	X ₄	,125	,844	-,656	,078	1,000	,548
	X ₅	-,081	,595	-,515	-,067	,548	1,000
Sig. (1- tailed)	SO	.	,327	,171	,008	,047	,139
	X ₁	,327	.	,000	,152	,000	,000
	X ₂	,171	,000	.	,500	,000	,000
	X ₃	,008	,152	,500	.	,149	,187
	X ₄	,047	,000	,000	,149	.	,000
	X ₅	,139	,000	,000	,187	,000	.
N	SO	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₁	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₂	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₃	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₄	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₅	180	180	180	180	180	180



Collinearity Statistics

Model	Tolerance	VIF
X ₁	.177	5.657
X ₂	.383	2.613
X ₃	.909	1.100
X ₄	.262	3.810
X ₅	.629	1.590

- Homoscedasticity: Can be assumed, as the scatterplot indicates that the variances of the residual terms are spread relatively equal across the levels of the predictor variables.



- Normality of residuals: Given according to the Histogram and the P Plot



Multiple linear regression results:

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,361 ^a	,130	,105	1,12870	2,094

a. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_BG, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, mod_PNB_GG, PNB_mc

b. Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	33,156	5	6,631	5,205	,000 ^b
	Residual	221,671	174	1,274		
	Total	254,827	179			

a. Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

b. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_BG, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, mod_PNB_GG, PNB_mc

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	4,931	,235		20,981	,000	4,468	5,395
X ₁	-,813	,236	-,579	-3,443	,001	-1,280	-,347
X ₂	-,618	,272	-,260	-2,273	,024	-1,155	-,081
X ₃	,200	,176	,084	1,132	,259	-,149	,548
X ₄	1,250	,332	,519	3,760	,000	,594	1,905
X ₅	-,355	,211	-,150	-1,677	,095	-,772	,063

a. Dependent variable: Social outcome

7.3.2.2. Testing H3 - Moderating Role of GRO

Grouping Participants according to GRO

Statistics

GRO_mean

N	Valid	180
	Missing	0
Mean		1,6469
Median		1,5625
Std. Deviation		,49805
Range		2,63
Minimum		1,00
Maximum		3,63

- Based on this, participants with a GRO score above the median of 1.5625 were categorized as traditional = 2, and participants with a GRO score below the median of 1.5625 were categorized as egalitarian = 1. This lead to the following distribution of cases across experimental conditions:

GRO_mean (Klassiert)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	relatively egalitarian	93	51,7	51,7	51,7
	relatively traditional	87	48,3	48,3	100,0
	Total	180	100,0	100,0	

GRO_mean

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1,00	13	7,2	7,2	7,2
	1,06	8	4,4	4,4	11,7
	1,13	8	4,4	4,4	16,1
	1,19	11	6,1	6,1	22,2
	1,25	15	8,3	8,3	30,6
	1,31	11	6,1	6,1	36,7
	1,38	7	3,9	3,9	40,6
	1,44	3	1,7	1,7	42,2
	1,50	9	5,0	5,0	47,2
	1,56	8	4,4	4,4	51,7
	1,63	11	6,1	6,1	57,8
	1,69	6	3,3	3,3	61,1
	1,75	6	3,3	3,3	64,4
	1,81	7	3,9	3,9	68,3
	1,88	2	1,1	1,1	69,4
	1,94	4	2,2	2,2	71,7
	2,00	8	4,4	4,4	76,1
	2,06	6	3,3	3,3	79,4
	2,13	6	3,3	3,3	82,8
	2,19	7	3,9	3,9	86,7
	2,25	6	3,3	3,3	90,0
	2,31	2	1,1	1,1	91,1
	2,38	3	1,7	1,7	92,8
	2,44	3	1,7	1,7	94,4
	2,50	1	,6	,6	95,0
	2,56	2	1,1	1,1	96,1
	2,63	1	,6	,6	96,7
	2,69	2	1,1	1,1	97,8
	2,75	1	,6	,6	98,3
	2,88	1	,6	,6	98,9
	3,19	1	,6	,6	99,4
	3,63	1	,6	,6	100,0
	Total	180	100,0	100,0	

Moderating Role of GRO – Actual Negotiation Behavior*Two-Way ANOVA Economic Outcome*

Assumptions for Two-Way ANOVA:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to one treatment group.
- Normality: Normal distribution can be assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given as Levene's test (.152) is not significant.

ANB * GRO Two-Way Solution

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Actual Negotiation Behavior	0	Typical	90
	1	Atypical	88
Relative GRO	0	Relatively egalitarian	92
	1	Relatively traditional	86

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

Actual Negotiation Behavior		Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Relative GRO				
Typical	Relatively egalitarian	29034,91	1154,864	53
	Relatively traditional	28672,95	1577,203	37
	Total	28886,10	1348,158	90
Atypical	Relatively egalitarian	28702,56	1698,372	39
	Relatively traditional	28951,24	1903,731	49
	Total	28841,03	1809,661	88
Total	Relatively egalitarian	28894,02	1412,053	92
	Relatively traditional	28831,51	1766,174	86
	Total	28863,82	1588,739	178

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

F	df1	df2	Sig.
1,786	3	174	,152

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + BG + GG + ANB + GRO + ANB * GRO

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	21271119,963 ^a	5	4254223,993	1,720	,132	,048
Intercept	49317180774,779	1	49317180774,779	19935,813	,000	,991
BG	6698895,399	1	6698895,399	2,708	,102	,015
GG	10182730,862	1	10182730,862	4,116	,044	,023
ANB	16498,940	1	16498,940	,007	,935	,000
GRO	103600,193	1	103600,193	,042	,838	,000
ANB * GRO	3736065,887	1	3736065,887	1,510	,221	,009
Error	425493304,284	172	2473798,281			
Total	148742145422,000	178				
Corrected Total	446764424,247	177				

a. R Squared = ,048 (Adjusted R Squared = ,020)

ANB * GRO * Gender Three-Way Solution

Assumptions for Three-Way ANOVA:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to one treatment group.
- Homogeneity of variances: Not given as Levene's test (.006) is significant. Also, group sizes vary, so the violation of the assumption of homogeneity compromises results from three-way ANOVA.

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Actual Negotiation Behavior	0	Typical	90
	1	Atypical	88
Relative GRO	0	Relatively egalitarian	92
	1	Relatively traditional	86
Gender grouped	0	Female	87
	1	Male	91

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

Actual Negotiation Behavior		Gender grouped	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Typical	Relatively egalitarian	Female	29101,67	1198,309	30
		Male	28947,83	1116,048	23
		Total	29034,91	1154,864	53
	Relatively traditional	Female	28671,36	1512,718	14
		Male	28673,91	1648,751	23
		Total	28672,95	1577,203	37
	Total	Female	28964,75	1304,358	44
		Male	28810,87	1398,964	46
		Total	28886,10	1348,158	90
Atypical	Relatively egalitarian	Female	29626,32	536,286	19
		Male	27825,00	1957,677	20
		Total	28702,56	1698,372	39
	Relatively traditional	Female	29020,83	1362,137	24
		Male	28884,44	2336,833	25
		Total	28951,24	1903,731	49
	Total	Female	29288,37	1109,903	43
		Male	28413,58	2217,429	45
		Total	28841,03	1809,661	88
Total	Relatively egalitarian	Female	29305,10	1020,837	49
		Male	28425,58	1645,389	43
		Total	28894,02	1412,053	92
	Relatively traditional	Female	28892,08	1409,453	38
		Male	28783,56	2017,973	48
		Total	28831,51	1766,174	86
	Total	Female	29124,70	1216,050	87
		Male	28614,41	1849,948	91
		Total	28863,82	1588,739	178

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^{a,b}

		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Economic Outcome	Based on Mean	2,944	7	170	,006
	Based on Median	1,983	7	170	,060
	Based on Median and with adjusted df	1,983	7	114,567	,063
	Based on trimmed mean	2,729	7	170	,010

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Dependent variable: Economic Outcome

b. Design: Intercept + ANB + GRO + GG + ANB * GRO + ANB * GG + GRO * GG + ANB * GRO * GG

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	36439359,637 ^a	7	5205622,805	2,157	,040	,082
Intercept	141605919171,850	1	141605919171,85	58668,135	,000	,997
ANB	3875,467	1	3875,467	,002	,968	,000
GRO	166568,630	1	166568,630	,069	,793	,000
GG	11605589,401	1	11605589,401	4,808	,030	,028
ANB * GRO	3567344,933	1	3567344,933	1,478	,226	,009
ANB * GG	8487156,368	1	8487156,368	3,516	,062	,020
GRO * GG	8821956,350	1	8821956,350	3,655	,058	,021
ANB * GRO * GG	6051993,937	1	6051993,937	2,507	,115	,015
Error	410325064,610	170	2413676,851			
Total	148742145422,0	178				
Corrected Total	446764424,247	177				

a. R Squared = ,082 (Adjusted R Squared = ,044)

Two-Way ANOVA Participants' Concession Behavior

Assumptions for Two-Way ANOVA:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to one treatment group.
- Normality: Normal distribution can be assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given, as Levene's test (0.970) is not significant.

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Actual Negotiation Behavior	0	Typical	90
	1	Atypical	89
Relative GRO	0	Relatively egalitarian	92
	1	Relatively traditional	87

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

Actual Negotiation		Std.		
Behavior	Relative GRO	Mean	Deviation	N
Typical	Relatively egalitarian	6555,66	4586,463	53
	Relatively traditional	6070,27	5023,521	37
	Total	6356,11	4749,304	90
Atypical	Relatively egalitarian	5494,87	4523,212	39
	Relatively traditional	5632,22	3941,590	50
	Total	5572,03	4182,136	89
Total	Relatively egalitarian	6105,98	4565,270	92
	Relatively traditional	5818,52	4411,716	87
	Total	5966,26	4481,001	179

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

F	df1	df2	Sig.
,081	3	175	,970

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + BG + GG + ANB + GRO + ANB * GRO

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	70756638,010 ^a	5	14151327,602	,699	,625	,020
Intercept	2417662559,422	1	2417662559,422	119,387	,000	,408
BG	45446,641	1	45446,641	,002	,962	,000
GG	37617534,562	1	37617534,562	1,858	,175	,011
ANB	25739101,936	1	25739101,936	1,271	,261	,007
GRO	398788,267	1	398788,267	,020	,889	,000
ANB * GRO	2105557,278	1	2105557,278	,104	,748	,001
Error	3503371044,649	173	20250699,680			
Total	9945863423,000	179				
Corrected Total	3574127682,659	178				

a. R Squared = ,020 (Adjusted R Squared = -,009)

Two-Way ANOVA Social Outcome

Assumptions for Two-Way ANOVA:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to one treatment group.
- Normality: Normal distribution can be assumed for sample sizes >30.
- Homogeneity of variances: Given as Levene's test (0.840) is not significant.

ANB * GRO Two-Way Solution

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Actual Negotiation Behavior	0	Typical	90
	1	Atypical	90
Relative GRO	0	Relatively egalitarian	93
	1	Relatively traditional	87

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

Actual Negotiation Behavior		Std.		N
	Relative GRO	Mean	Deviation	
Typical	Relatively egalitarian	4,2579	1,28874	53
	Relatively traditional	4,5270	1,14767	37
	Total	4,3685	1,23325	90
Atypical	Relatively egalitarian	4,2375	1,20946	40
	Relatively traditional	4,2800	1,12357	50
	Total	4,2611	1,15606	90
Total	Relatively egalitarian	4,2491	1,24858	93
	Relatively traditional	4,3851	1,13390	87
	Total	4,3148	1,19315	180

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^a

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

F	df1	df2	Sig.
,280	3	176	,840

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + GG + BG + ANB + GRO + ANB * GRO

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	13,408 ^a	5	2,682	1,933	,091	,053
Intercept	1033,582	1	1033,582	744,941	,000	,811
GG	1,855	1	1,855	1,337	,249	,008
BG	9,555	1	9,555	6,887	,009	,038
ANB	1,063	1	1,063	,766	,383	,004
GRO	2,129	1	2,129	1,535	,217	,009
ANB * GRO	1,293	1	1,293	,932	,336	,005
Error	241,419	174	1,387			
Total	3606,000	180				
Corrected Total	254,827	179				

a. R Squared = ,053 (Adjusted R Squared = ,025)

ANB * GRO * BG Three-Way Solution

Assumptions for Three-Way ANOVA:

- Independence of observations: Given, as each participant can only be assigned to one treatment group.
- Homogeneity of variances: Not given as Levene's test (.039) is significant. Also, group sizes vary, so the violation of the assumption of homogeneity compromises results from three-way ANOVA.

Between-Subjects Factors

		Value Label	N
Actual Negotiation Behavior	0	Typical	90
	1	Atypical	90
Behavior Grouped	0	Assertive Condition	90
	1	Modest Condition	90
Relative GRO	0	Relatively egalitarian	93
	1	Relatively traditional	87

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

Actual Negotiation Behavior	Behavior Grouped	Relative GRO	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Typical	Assertive Condition	Relatively egalitarian	3,7101	1,30095	23
		Relatively traditional	4,4420	1,12771	23
		Total	4,0761	1,25939	46
	Modest Condition	Relatively egalitarian	4,6778	1,12864	30
		Relatively traditional	4,6667	1,20894	14
		Total	4,6742	1,14060	44
	Total	Relatively egalitarian	4,2579	1,28874	53
		Relatively traditional	4,5270	1,14767	37
		Total	4,3685	1,23325	90
Atypical	Assertive Condition	Relatively egalitarian	4,0175	1,50400	19
		Relatively traditional	4,2133	1,20235	25
		Total	4,1288	1,32793	44
	Modest Condition	Relatively egalitarian	4,4365	,85387	21
		Relatively traditional	4,3467	1,05948	25
		Total	4,3877	,96164	46
	Total	Relatively egalitarian	4,2375	1,20946	40
		Relatively traditional	4,2800	1,12357	50
		Total	4,2611	1,15606	90
Total	Assertive Condition	Relatively egalitarian	3,8492	1,38752	42
		Relatively traditional	4,3229	1,16052	48
		Total	4,1019	1,28632	90
	Modest Condition	Relatively egalitarian	4,5784	1,02217	51
		Relatively traditional	4,4615	1,11046	39
		Total	4,5278	1,05683	90
	Total	Relatively egalitarian	4,2491	1,24858	93
		Relatively traditional	4,3851	1,13390	87
		Total	4,3148	1,19315	180

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances^{a,b}

		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Social Outcome	Based on Mean	2,174	7	172	,039
	Based on Median	1,815	7	172	,087
	Based on Median and with adjusted df	1,815	7	165,569	,087
	Based on trimmed mean	2,166	7	172	,040

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Dependent variable: Social Outcome

b. Design: Intercept + ANB + BG + GRO + ANB * BG + ANB * GRO + BG * GRO + ANB * BG * GRO

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	16,740 ^a	7	2,391	1,728	,105	,066
Intercept	3201,843	1	3201,843	2313,089	,000	,931
ANB	,626	1	,626	,452	,502	,003
BG	8,182	1	8,182	5,911	,016	,033
GRO	1,837	1	1,837	1,327	,251	,008
ANB * BG	1,101	1	1,101	,795	,374	,005
ANB * GRO	1,016	1	1,016	,734	,393	,004
BG * GRO	2,845	1	2,845	2,055	,154	,012
ANB * BG * GRO	,562	1	,562	,406	,525	,002
Error	238,087	172	1,384			
Total	3606,000	180				
Corrected Total	254,827	179				

a. R Squared = ,066 (Adjusted R Squared = ,028)

Moderating Role of GRO – Perceived Negotiation Behavior


Multiple Linear Regression – Economic Outcome

Predictor variables definition:

PNB_mc (perceived negotiation behavior)	X ₁
GG (gender grouped)	X ₂
BG (behavior grouped)	X ₃
GRO_mc (gender role orientation)	X ₄
PNB_GRO (interaction term)	X ₅

Assumptions for multiple linear regression

- Continuous outcome variable and continuous or dichotomous (coded as 0/1) predictors: the outcome variable “economic outcome” is continuous; the predictors X₁ and X₄, as well as the interaction term X₅ are metric and the predictors X₂ and X₃ are dichotomous and can only take on the values [0; 1].
- Linearity: the partial regression plots demonstrate that the continuous predictors X₁ and X₄, as well as the interaction term X₅ have a linear relationship with economic outcome.



- Independence of residuals: Given, as Durbin-Watson-Statistic 2.119, which is close enough to the critical value of 2.
- No multicollinearity: Given as no Tolerance value below 0.1 or VIF above 10.0.


Correlations

		EO	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅
Pearson Correlation	EO	1,000	,107	-,161	-,112	-,078	-,126
	X ₁	,107	1,000	-,782	-,068	,037	-,213
	X ₂	-,161	-,782	1,000	-,011	,063	,105
	X ₃	-,112	-,068	-,011	1,000	-,031	-,085
	X ₄	-,078	,037	,063	-,031	1,000	,006
	X ₅	-,126	-,213	,105	-,085	,006	1,000
Sig. (1-tailed)	EO	.	,078	,016	,068	,151	,046
	X ₁	,078	.	,000	,184	,310	,002
	X ₂	,016	,000	.	,441	,203	,081
	X ₃	,068	,184	,441	.	,340	,131
	X ₄	,151	,310	,203	,340	.	,466
	X ₅	,046	,002	,081	,131	,466	.
N	EO	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₁	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₂	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₃	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₄	178	178	178	178	178	178
	X ₅	178	178	178	178	178	178



Collinearity Statistics

Model	Tolerance	VIF
X ₁	,356	2,810
X ₂	,371	2,698
X ₃	,972	1,029
X ₄	,976	1,025
X ₅	,932	1,073

- Homoscedasticity: Can be assumed, as the scatterplot indicates that the variances of the residual terms are spread relatively equal across the levels of the predictor variables.



- Normality of residuals: Given according to the Histogram and the P Plot



Results from multiple linear regression:

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,250 ^a	,063	,035	1560,350	2,119

a. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_GRO, GRO_mc, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, PNB_mc

b. Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	27997135,103	5	5599427,021	2,300	,047 ^b
	Residual	418767289,144	172	2434693,542		
	Total	446764424,247	177			

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Outcome

b. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_GRO, GRO_mc, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, PNB_mc

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	29459,942	269,328		109,383	,000	28928,328	29991,555
X ₁	-203,761	232,531	-,108	-,876	,382	-662,742	255,221
X ₂	-726,051	384,315	-,229	-1,889	,061	-1484,633	32,531
X ₃	-429,762	237,248	-,136	-1,811	,072	-898,053	38,530
X ₄	-203,805	242,990	-,063	-,839	,403	-683,432	275,823
X ₅	-557,372	312,205	-,137	-1,785	,076	-1173,619	58,875

a. Dependent variable: Economic outcome

Multiple Linear Regression – Participants' Concession Behavior


Predictor variables definition:

PNB_mc (perceived negotiation behavior)	X ₁
GG (gender grouped)	X ₂
BG (behavior grouped)	X ₃
GRO_mc (gender role orientation)	X ₄
PNB_GRO (interaction term)	X ₅

Assumptions for multiple linear regression

- Continuous outcome variable and continuous or dichotomous (coded as 0/1) predictors: the outcome variable “economic outcome” is continuous; the predictors X₁ and X₄, as well as the interaction term X₅ are metric and the predictors X₂ and X₃ are dichotomous and can only take on the values [0; 1].

- Linearity: the partial regression plots demonstrate that the continuous predictors X_1 and X_4 , as well as the interaction term X_5 have a linear relationship with participants' concession behavior.



- Independence of residuals: Given, as Durbin-Watson-Statistic 1.863, which is close enough to the critical value of 2.
- No multicollinearity: Given as no Tolerance value below 0.1 or VIF above 10.0.


Correlations

		PCB	X_1	X_2	X_3	X_4	X_5
Pearson Correlation	PCB	1,000	-,013	-,106	-,001	-,016	-,035
	X_1	-,013	1,000	-,780	-,067	,036	-,224
	X_2	-,106	-,780	1,000	-,005	,051	,114
	X_3	-,001	-,067	-,005	1,000	-,042	-,083
	X_4	-,016	,036	,051	-,042	1,000	,004
	X_5	-,035	-,224	,114	-,083	,004	1,000
Sig. (1-tailed)	PCB	.	,434	,078	,493	,414	,322
	X_1	,434	.	,000	,186	,315	,001
	X_2	,078	,000	.	,471	,249	,064
	X_3	,493	,186	,471	.	,290	,136
	X_4	,414	,315	,249	,290	.	,477
	X_5	,322	,001	,064	,136	,477	.
N	PCB	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X_1	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X_2	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X_3	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X_4	179	179	179	179	179	179
	X_5	179	179	179	179	179	179



Collinearity Statistics

Model	Tolerance	VIF
X ₁	,362	2,766
X ₂	,378	2,645
X ₃	,974	1,026
X ₄	,981	1,019
X ₅	,929	1,077

- Homoscedasticity: Can be assumed, as the scatterplot indicates that the variances of the residual terms are spread relatively equal across the levels of the predictor variables.



- Normality of residuals: Given according to the Histogram and the P Plot



Results from multiple linear regression:

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,196 ^a	,039	,011	4456,770	1,863

a. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_GRO, GRO_mc, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, PNB_mc

b. Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	137863962,729	5	27572792,546	1,388	,231 ^b
	Residual	3436263719,931	173	19862796,069		
	Total	3574127682,659	178			

a. Dependent Variable: Participants' Concession Behavior

b. Predictors: (Constant), mod_PNB_GRO, GRO_mc, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, PNB_mc

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	7517,770	755,808		9,947	,000	6025,978	9009,563
X ₁	-1442,012	658,957	-,271	-2,188	,030	-2742,642	-141,382
X ₂	-2783,023	1083,719	-,311	-2,568	,011	-4922,037	-644,009
X ₃	-232,878	674,987	-,026	-,345	,731	-1565,148	1099,393
X ₄	78,101	684,840	,009	,114	,909	-1273,616	1429,819
X ₅	-714,338	891,041	-,062	-,802	,424	-2473,050	1044,373

a. Dependent variable: Participants' Concession Behavior


Multiple Linear Regression – Social Outcome

Predictor variables definition:

PNB_mc (perceived negotiation behavior)	X ₁
GG (gender grouped)	X ₂
BG (behavior grouped)	X ₃
GRO (gender role orientation)	X ₄
PNB_GG (interaction term)	X ₅
PNB_GRO (interaction term)	X ₆

Assumptions for multiple linear regression

- Continuous outcome variable and continuous or dichotomous (coded as 0/1) predictors: the outcome variable “social outcome” is continuous; the predictors X₁, X₄, X₅, and X₆ are metric and the predictors X₂ and X₃ are dichotomous and can only take on the values [0; 1].
- Linearity: the partial regression plots demonstrate that the predictors X₁ and X₄, as well as the interaction terms X₅ and X₆ have a linear relationship with social outcome.



- Independence of residuals: Given, as Durbin-Watson-Statistic 2.125, which is close enough to the critical value of 2.
- No multicollinearity: Given as no Tolerance value below 0.1 or VIF above 10.0.


Correlations

		SO	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X ₄	X ₅	X ₆
Pearson Correlation	SO	1,000	-,034	-,071	,179	,073	,125	-,088
	X ₁	-,034	1,000	-,780	-,077	,048	,844	-,237
	X ₂	-,071	-,780	1,000	,000	,051	-,656	,120
	X ₃	,179	-,077	,000	1,000	-,044	,078	-,067
	X ₄	,073	,048	,051	-,044	1,000	,139	-,006
	X ₅	,125	,844	-,656	,078	,139	1,000	-,298
	X ₆	-,088	-,237	,120	-,067	-,006	-,298	1,000
Sig. (1-tailed)	SO	.	,327	,171	,008	,165	,047	,119
	X ₁	,327	.	,000	,152	,260	,000	,001
	X ₂	,171	,000	.	,500	,246	,000	,054
	X ₃	,008	,152	,500	.	,279	,149	,185
	X ₄	,165	,260	,246	,279	.	,031	,470
	X ₅	,047	,000	,000	,149	,031	.	,000
	X ₆	,119	,001	,054	,185	,470	,000	.
N	SO	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₁	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₂	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₃	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₄	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₅	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
	X ₆	180	180	180	180	180	180	180

Collinearity Statistics

Model	Tolerance	VIF
X ₁	,181	5,518
X ₂	,375	2,668
X ₃	,905	1,105
X ₄	,935	1,069
X ₅	,248	4,030
X ₆	,895	1,117

- Homoscedasticity: Can be assumed, as the scatterplot indicates that the variances of the residual terms are spread relatively equal across the levels of the predictor variables.
- Normality of residuals: Given according to the Histogram and the P Plot



Results from multiple linear regression:

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,350 ^a	,123	,092	1,13675	2,125

a. Predictors: (Constant), mod_GRO_PNB, GRO mean centered, Behavior Grouped, Gender grouped, mod_PNB_GG, PNB_mc

b. Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	31,278	6	5,213	4,034	,001 ^b
	Residual	223,549	173	1,292		
	Total	254,827	179			

a. Dependent Variable: Social Outcome

b. Predictors: (Constant), mod_GRO_PNB, GRO_mc, Behavior grouped, Gender grouped, mod_PNB_GG, PNB_mc

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stand. Coefficients	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	4,882	,235		20,742	,000	4,418	5,347
X ₁	-,882	,235	-,628	-3,753	,000	-1,346	-,418
X ₂	-,625	,277	-,263	-2,257	,025	-1,171	-,079
X ₃	,223	,178	,094	1,255	,211	-,128	,575
X ₄	,140	,176	,058	,794	,428	-,208	,488
X ₅	1,078	,344	,448	3,133	,002	,399	1,758
X ₆	-,199	,228	-,066	-,872	,384	-,648	,251


a. Dependent variable: Social outcome

7.3.2.3. Mediator Effect of Likability

Economic Outcome

Assumptions for mediation analysis

- Linearity: The relationship of the variables perceived negotiation behavior, social outcome and economic outcome was approximately linear, as visible in the scatterplots after LOESS smoothing.



Total Effect Perceived Negotiation Behavior on Economic Outcome

Effect	Se(HC3)	t	p	LLCI	ULCI	c_ps
-137,6965	189,9023	-,7251	,4694	512,5053	237,1123	-,0733

Path Dependencies

Model	coeff	Se(HC3)	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
PNB	-,317	,179	-1,767	,079	-,670	,037
SO	50,5705	95,4697	,5297	,5970	-137,8650	239,0059

Direct Effect Perceived Negotiation Behavior on Economic Outcome


Model	coeff	Se(HC3)	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
PNB	-121,6912	187,0114	-,6507	,5161	490,8092	247,4268

Indirect Effects of Perceived Negotiation Behavior on Economic Outcome

Mediator	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
SO	-16,0053	35,7410	-103,8658	46,8259

Participants' Concession Behavior

- Linearity: The relationship of the variables perceived negotiation behavior, social outcome and participants' concession behavior was approximately linear, as visible in the scatterplots after LOESS smoothing.



Total Effect Perceived Negotiation Behavior on Participants' Concession Behavior

Effect	Se(HC3)	t	p	LLCI	ULCI	c_ps
-1313,724	649,5031	-2,023	,045	-2595,592	-31,855	-,247

Path Dependencies

Model	coeff	Se(HC3)	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
PNB	-,3096	,1773	-1,7466	,0825	-,6595	,0402
SO	-278,1779	256,3747	-1,0850	,2794	-784,1827	227,8270

Direct Effect Perceived Negotiation Behavior on Participants' Concession Behavior

Model	coeff	Se(HC3)	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
PNB	-1399,8491	658,8921	-2,1245	,0350	-2700,2996	-99,3986

Indirect Effects of Perceived Negotiation Behavior on Participants' Concession Behavior

Mediator	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
SO	86,1256	98,7433	-74,8620	314,5272